United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

September 1995 UNEXPLODED

ORDNANCE

A Coordinated

Approach to Detection

and Clearance Is

Needed

GAO/NSIAD-95-197

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-258886 

September 20, 1995

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

Over the past 2 years, several accounts of the casualties caused by

antipersonnel landmines have brought to light the threat such munitions

pose years after hostilities cease. The deaths and injuries attributed to

these mines each year have been estimated to total about 30,000. Many of

the victims are civilians, including children. While the contamination of

land caused by landmines and other forms of unexploded ordnance (UXO)

may appear to be primarily a Third World issue, closer examination

suggests that the problem is shared by developed nations as well.

As you requested, we assessed the extent to which ongoing or foreseeable

technology efforts offer solutions to worldwide landmine and other UXO

problems. More specifically, we

• reviewed the extent to which the Department of Defense’s (DOD) and other

agencies’ requirements and associated research and development may

have application to clearance problems elsewhere in the world,

• assessed the ability of existing or foreseeable technologies to detect and

clear landmines and other UXO, and

• identified barriers that could impede the progress or output of such

technology.

Background DOD defines “explosive ordnance” as all munitions, weapon delivery

systems, and ordnance items that contain explosives, propellants, nuclear

materials, and chemical agents. Included in this definition are bombs,

missiles, rockets, artillery rounds, ammunition, mines, and any other

similar item that can cause injury to personnel or damage to material. UXO

consists of these same items after they (1) are armed or otherwise

prepared for action; (2) are launched, placed, fired, or released in a way

that they cause hazards; and (3) remain unexploded either through

malfunction or design.

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Antipersonnel mines pose a particularly difficult clearance problem

because they are hard to detect, inexpensive, and prone to proliferation.

The Department of State considers landmines to be a distinct class of

weapon that is subject to specific doctrinal and international legal

controls. Landmines—particularly antipersonnel mines—may pose a

greater hazard to innocent civilians than items such as unexploded bombs

because they are intended to detonate when a person steps on or near

them. Landmines are considered to be a valuable military asset since, by

slowing and possibly demoralizing opponents, they multiply the combat

impact of defending forces. Their attractiveness to smaller military and

paramilitary organizations, such as in the Third World, is further enhanced

because mines do not require complex logistics support and are readily

available and inexpensive—some can be bought for as little as $3 each.

Over 60 countries, developed and undeveloped, report a need to clear

areas from landmine and other UXO contamination. As of December 1994,

the Department of State estimated that 80 million to 110 million landmines

remain uncleared worldwide, the bulk of which are in undeveloped

countries. Most of these countries’ economies depend heavily on

agriculture and thus are particularly vulnerable because the presence of

landmines can deny farmers large sections of land. Within the United

States, DOD estimates that over 900 military sites are contaminated with

UXO. DOD estimates that it has already cost $10.3 billion through fiscal year

1994 to clean up sites contaminated with hazardous materials, including

UXO, and that it will cost an additional $31 billion for future actions. In

European countries, millions of bombs, landmines, and other munitions

from World Wars I and II still remain uncleared.

Results in Brief U.S. research and development requirements for UXO detection and

clearance technology are broader today than they were during the Cold

War years and thus have more in common with the worldwide problem.

Traditionally, DOD’s technical efforts have supported countermine

operations, for which the main priority is rapidly “breaching” or making

paths through minefields during combat. “Clearance” differs from

breaching because it requires that large areas—such as farmland—be

cleared and timeliness is not as critical. With the dissolution of the Soviet

Union, U.S. requirements have evolved that have more in common with

area clearance than breaching. These other requirements include clearing

(1) U.S. military sites of UXO and other hazards and (2) areas and roads

needed for conducting operations other than war, such as peacekeeping.

Such broader requirements make it likely that research and development

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sponsored by DOD will have more direct application to the clearance

problems faced by Third World countries. Other agencies, such as the

Departments of Energy, Transportation, and Justice also sponsor research

and development applicable to the detection and clearance of explosives

and other hazards.

U.S. research and development efforts cover a group of technologies that

can be categorized as (1) near-term, less advanced technologies that can

be put to work immediately and (2) advanced technologies that will take

time to develop but could greatly speed up the detection and clearance

functions. However, the technologies available today to clear wide areas

are inadequate and cannot keep pace with the number of landmines being

emplaced annually. For example, the United Nations estimated that in

1993, 2.5 million mines were emplaced, while only 80,000 were removed.

The most effective techniques, such as hand-held probes and metal

detectors, are time-consuming, expensive, and labor-intensive. While

heavy mine clearing equipment, such as plows, is suited to breaching

paths, it is not practical for clearing large areas. Also, current technologies

do not perform well against newer, more advanced munitions. For

example, metal detectors are ineffective against newer antipersonnel

mines that contain little or no metal. Moreover, recent technology

demonstrations showed the more advanced methods to be much less

reliable than traditional methods.

Several factors limit the potential output from the U.S. investment in

technologies related to the detection and clearance of landmines and other

forms of UXO. Although numerous U.S. organizations within and outside

DOD are sponsoring technologies that could have application to the

problem, no overarching, governmentwide strategy or organization exists

to ensure that the most is gained from these various efforts. Moreover, it is

difficult to develop an accurate estimate of how much funding these

organizations are collectively providing for applicable technologies or

whether that level of investment is sufficient. The House Committee on

National Security recently took a step to address this problem by directing

the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan to improve the management

and cooperation of technology efforts directed at landmine and other UXO

clearance.1 Other barriers to technical solutions include the relative ease

with which inexpensive improvements in mine designs have outstripped

detection and clearance methods, the unique area clearance challenges

Third World countries pose, and the difficulty of controlling the

proliferation of antipersonnel landmines.

1

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, H.R. Rep. 104-131, p. 95.

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Emerging U.S.

Requirements May

Spawn Technology

That Is More

Applicable to

Worldwide Problems

Comparison of Combat

and Noncombat Clearance

Requirements

A primary focus of DOD’s research and development activities in detection

and clearance has been on the countermine mission in support of combat

operations. In combat, mines are seen as an obstacle in the way of an

attack or a maneuver; overcoming these obstacles involves rapidly

detecting, breaching, and marking paths while under assumed enemy fire.

Some casualties are expected and accepted. Most of these countermine

operations are destructive because heavy or destructive equipment such

as plows, rollers, flails,2

 and explosives—are used to breach enemy

minefields. Once breached, the cleared paths are marked so that following

forces can traverse the minefield safely. These operations do not require

the identification of the exact locations of the mines. Also, the operations

do not require that an entire area be cleared unless the area is to be

occupied for future operations.

Detecting and clearing landmines and other UXO in noncombat situations

in some ways is less demanding and in other ways more demanding than

countermine operations. In noncombat situations, neither time nor enemy

fire is a constraining factor, so detection and clearance operations take

place under much less hostile circumstances. On the other hand, because

the noncombat objective is to render an area safe and worthwhile to

repopulate, the corresponding objective is to detect and clear all

landmines and other UXO. Thus, not only must contaminated areas be

positively identified to very high standards of reliability, but efforts must

be made to find all munitions and other hazards. Once found, the

explosives must be removed or neutralized in an environmentally sound

way. In the process, care must be taken not to destroy the land or

infrastructure.

These differing demands produce corresponding differences in research

and development priorities. For example, money spent to develop an

2

Flails generally consist of hardened cylinders with heavy chains that pummel the ground by spinning.

They are mounted on heavy vehicles.

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improved plow for an M-1 tank may be a good investment for the

countermine mission, but it is not necessarily practical for noncombat

operations. Similarly, a detection technology that takes a lot of time may

work well in a noncombat situation, but be too slow for countermine

operations. On the other hand, countermine and noncombat missions do

share some requirements and benefit from the attendant technologies. If a

military force plans to occupy a mined area, it must use detection and

clearance technologies and methods aimed at achieving as near as

possible a 100-percent clearance.3

 Also, it is beneficial to combat forces to

detect the presence of minefields so that they can be avoided, if possible.

Such a detection capability would also benefit noncombat clearance

operations, even if the exact locations of individual munitions could not be

pinpointed, because unsafe areas could be posted or cordoned off and

avoided by civilians.

Broader U.S. Area

Clearance Requirements

Have Emerged

Several factors have converged into a set of emerging U.S. requirements

that go beyond the countermine mission and address the need for

detecting and clearing all hazards, including landmines and other UXO.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States has

become more involved with operations other than war, including special

operations, low-intensity conflicts, and peacekeeping. These operations

require U.S. and other forces to routinely clear operational areas and

infrastructure—such as roads and buildings—of mines and other

explosives. In addition to open area clearance, DOD has developed urban

warfare requirements that include the detection and clearance of mines

and booby traps. It should be noted that while U.S. military personnel will

perform such operations when U.S. interests are at stake, it is against U.S.

policy for them to physically remove landmines from other countries for

humanitarian purposes.

In addition, the closing of numerous bases per the recommendations of

the base realignment and closure process and the environmental cleanup

of other defense sites have generated a sizeable clearance requirement.

Many of these sites, such as test ranges, impact ranges, and training sites,

contain large areas of UXO contamination. Clearing these areas—even

partially—so that they can be used for other purposes requires detection

and clearance methods to meet a 100-percent clearance objective. The

research and development efforts sponsored by DOD to support operations

such as peacekeeping and base cleanup are likely to have more direct

3

DOD’s specific requirement is 99.9-percent clearance at a depth of 18 inches.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-197 Unexploded Ordnance
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application to the clearance problems faced by Third World countries than

those efforts supporting countermine operations.

Other U.S. agencies besides DOD are responsible for detecting and clearing

explosives and other hazards. For example, the Departments of Treasury,

Justice, and Transportation conduct or sponsor research and development

of technologies to help curb terrorism, such as detecting explosives and

weapons in airports, aircraft, and public buildings. The Department of

Transportation is also responsible for detecting subsurface flaws in roads

and bridges. The Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection

Agency are responsible for detecting hazardous materials, such as buried

radioactive and chemical waste. These research and development efforts

have some commonality with those needed to detect and clear landmines

and other UXO. Specifically, they involve (1) detecting the presence and

exact location of explosive and hazardous materials in the open,

underground, or hidden in a building or vehicle; (2) removing or

neutralizing the materials; and (3) using methods that allow maximum

standoff distances.

European countries have had broad clearance requirements for a long

time as they are still clearing areas from World Wars I and II. For example,

in Verdun, France, millions of UXO items from World War I still have not

been found or cleared. Germany has been clearing UXO from Berlin since

World War II ended. The United Kingdom has clearance requirements both

at home following World War II bombardments and abroad. For example,

after the Falkland Islands war, the United Kingdom sponsored efforts to

detect and clear remaining mines there.

An Ideal Solution Is

Not Foreseeable

Based on Known

Technologies

Current Technology Currently, hand-held probes, metal detectors, trained dogs, and

mechanical breaching equipment are considered the most effective tools

to detect and/or clear landmines and other UXO. These methods are slow,

costly, and labor-intensive. They mainly find landmines at or near the

surface, although some metal detectors can find larger, more deeply

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buried UXO items because of their greater metal content. Although current

methods offer the greatest assurance that an area is safe to use, they are

also quite dangerous because they put the operator in close proximity to

the explosive. For example, in the post-Gulf War cleanup of Kuwait, 

84 operators, including at least 2 private U.S. contractors, were killed

using these methods. This number of fatalities is more significant when

one considers that the mines in Kuwait were easier to find than in some

Third World countries because they were in sand and had been placed in

patterns according to known military doctrine.

Metal detectors have been in use since World War II and are still the most

effective sensors for use against landmines and other UXO. There are two

types of metal detectors. One detects anomalies in the earth’s magnetic

field caused by ferrous (iron-based) materials. The other creates an

electromagnetic field that can detect both ferrous and non-ferrous metals.

Improvements made to metal detectors have reportedly been in processing

sensor information, weight reduction, and improved sensitivity to

disturbances in the magnetic field caused by metallic objects. Detection of

trace metal elements and debris—found in most soils—still leads to a high

level of false alarms since operators are often unable to discriminate

between a metal fragment and a mine. False alarms translate into

increased workload because each detection must be treated as if it were

an explosive. Efforts to duplicate the knowledge, skills, and abilities of a

proficient operator through computers and artificial intelligence have not

yet proven successful.

Trained dogs have proven effective at detecting hidden explosives. South

Africa has developed a system that uses blast-hardened vehicles to collect

air samples from geographical sectors in filter canisters. The dogs can then

detect which canister—and thus which sector—contains any evidence of

explosives. These sectors can then be cleared using traditional methods.

Since dogs have been extremely efficient in pinpointing the location of

landmines, research and development efforts have been underway to

duplicate the dogs’ abilities through development of artificial biosensors,

spectrum analysis, and computer intelligence. However, no sensor

technology has been developed that can replicate the dogs’ ability to sense

explosives.

Mechanical equipment used in combat operations to clear mines includes

armored vehicles equipped with devices such as plows, flails, and rollers.

This equipment clears a path by pushing mines aside or detonating them. It

is not effective in rough or rocky terrain and against more advanced,

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off-route or wide-area mines. However, these advanced mines do not yet

make up a large portion of the landmines already emplaced in Third World

countries. For these reasons, and because of the potential environmental

impact, such as pollution and soil erosion, heavy mechanical equipment is

of limited use for wide-area clearance. Another technique used in combat

is the explosive line charge. The line charge is a cord or rope of explosives

that is fired across a suspected minefield. The explosives are set off to

detonate or disable nearby mines and thus clear a path. Line charges have

been used since World War II and are still being improved today.

All of these methods are slow and costly. For example, the Navy estimates

that it would take $2 billion and 20 years to clear the 28,800-acre Hawaiian

island of Kaho’olawe to achieve a 4-foot depth needed for farming. The

services have used the island as a bombing range since 1941. Similarly, we

have previously reported that a study of the Jefferson Proving Ground

found that current cleanup technologies were not practical for removing

the UXO from the installation’s 51,000 heavily forested acres.4

 Army

officials estimated that cleanup estimates for the installation could range

from $5 billion to $8 billion. These estimates underscore the current

challenge the United States faces in cleaning up millions of acres of its

defense sites. The worldwide challenge is even more daunting.

Advanced Technology Generally, more advanced technologies being pursued aim to make the

detection of landmines and other UXO quicker, safer, and more

cost-effective. They employ sensors that can be operated from remote

distances, such as from manned or unmanned ground and air vehicles.

However, no revolutionary area clearance technology with acceptable

reliability has been forthcoming. Most of the advanced technologies have

drawbacks such as weaknesses under certain environmental conditions or

impractical power requirements. At this point, the more promising efforts

involve using a combination of technologies either concurrently or

sequentially. While standoff sensors do not perform as well as current

hand-held methods, they can perform initial searches for landmines and

other UXO to help identify contaminated areas that are ultimately cleared

using traditional methods.

Advanced sensor technologies with application to detection and clearance

can be grouped as follows: infrared sensors, ground-penetrating radars,

microwave, photon backscatter, nuclear or thermal neutron analysis, and

lasers. Their characteristics are summarized in table 1.

4

Military Bases: Environmental Impact at Closing Installations (GAO/NSIAD-95-70, Feb. 23, 1995).

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Table 1: Advanced Detection and Clearance Technologies

Technology Characteristics Comments

Infrared sensor Looks for differences in surface radiation caused by

objects or disturbances in the soil. Affected by

ambient temperatures, high levels of soil moisture,

and vegetation density.

Only effective against UXO at or near the surface

and against UXO that has not been in the ground

too long. 

Ground-penetrating radar Emits short pulses of electromagnetic energy of

various wave lengths (including microwave) into the

ground. Returning signals are collected by arrays of

detectors.

Effectiveness varies with changes in atmospheric

conditions. Ineffective in moist soils without a

high-power system; cost-effective means of meeting

these power requirements in the field is lacking.

Trade-offs exist between radar wave length, depth

of ground penetration, and resolution.

Microwave In addition to its application to ground-penetrating

radar, a high-powered microwave system could be

used to neutralize UXO in situ.

Large power needs. Can affect soil characteristics

and harm life forms and equipment.

Photon backscatter Scans the ground with a pencil-thin beam of X-rays.

X-rays produce scattered returns from objects that

are collected by detectors on either side of the

vehicle and processed.

Early in development. Has large power needs, slow

speed, and a small footprint. Can change soil

characteristics and harm life forms and equipment.

Has a high data processing requirement.

Nuclear or thermal neutron

analysis

One application uses californium (a radioactive

element) to excite explosive material to release

gamma rays that can be detected. Another

application excites hydrogen in an explosive that

releases neutrons that can be detected.

Early in development. Has a small footprint.

Hydrogen sensors are not effective in moist soil.

Laser Irradiates small areas of ground so mines and other

UXO at or near the surface may react to this type of

laser energy by emitting heat and light, unlike the

surrounding soil. Other sensors, such as infrared

and hyperspectral, may be used to detect the

reactions and pinpoint the UXO. Also being

developed to neutralize and to help map locations.

Neutralization and irradiation types have high power

requirements. Can affect soil characteristics and

harm life forms and equipment. Hyperspectral

sensor’s large data processing requirements tax the

capacity of airborne platforms.

Some promising recent research and development efforts involve coupling

sensor technologies. For example, the Army has the Airborne Standoff

Minefield Detection System under development that combines infrared

and laser sensors. The Marine Corps has a project underway that couples

ground-penetrating radar and infrared sensors. The Department of Energy

has initiated a subsurface imaging program utilizing ground-penetrating

radar and seismic measurements. Several projects are also underway that

link sensors with the satellite-based Differential Global Positioning

System. Linkage to this system can help map geographical locations of

landmines and other UXO.

Advances in mine technologies have been made that can reduce the

amount of contamination posed by landmines and other UXO in the future.

Specifically, DOD has developed self-destruct mechanisms that detonate

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munitions a specified time after they have been deployed. According to

DOD officials, such mechanisms have been incorporated into U.S.

landmines since 1979. While not foolproof—self-destruct mechanisms

have demonstrated 90 percent reliability in testing—they do reduce the

risk of injury to innocent civilians. DOD officials noted that not all U.S.

landmines contain self-destruct mechanisms because some minefields are

intended to stay active indefinitely. Self-destruct mechanisms are currently

being developed for submunitions, but are not yet fielded. DOD is also

developing mechanisms that can detonate munitions on demand from

remote locations.

Technology

Demonstrations Have Not

Identified an Ideal Solution

Although numerous efforts to advance technology have been made,

demonstrations have not produced an ideal solution. The Army

Environmental Center, in cooperation with Naval Explosive Ordnance

Disposal Technology Division,5

 has been conducting an Advanced

Technology Demonstration for the detection, identification, and clearance

of UXO, including landmines. The demonstration was mandated by the

Congress in fiscal years 1993 and 1994. The purpose of this effort was to

demonstrate the best available off-the-shelf detection and clearance

technologies. Thirty-three projects were demonstrated, with most coming

from private industry and a few from government laboratories. The

demonstration projects represented airborne, ground vehicle, and

man-portable platforms with metal detectors, ground-penetrating radar,

and infrared sensors. The test areas included a variety of ordnance buried

at realistic depths; however, the terrain was relatively benign—open, clear,

and level. Target processing software and clearance technologies were

also demonstrated. Some used multiple sensors, such as

ground-penetrating radar with infrared or metal detectors.

The goals of the demonstrations were to (1) survey large areas;

(2) determine density of UXO, as well as type, depth, and exact location;

(3) discriminate between UXO and other objects; and (4) demonstrate UXO

detection, identification, and clearance systems as integrated technology.

UXO, scrap metal, and other objects were planted in two courses—one for

ground systems and one for airborne systems.

Demonstration results showed that none of the technologies, either

individually or coupled, came close to approaching 100-percent clearance.

UXO detection ranged from 0 to 59 percent, with the ground-based systems

5

Although this organization originated under the Navy, it is jointly staffed and funded to conduct UXO

research, development, and operations for all three services.

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performing the best, especially when vehicle-mounted and man-portable

systems were used together. However, the ability to separate UXO from

false alarms was dismal for all technologies demonstrated. Again, the

ground-based systems were the most reliable, but the system with the

highest detection rates did not finish the course in the required time. All

but one airborne system completed the course in the required time, but the

airborne systems were the least effective of all systems. The clearance

systems in the demonstration, which relied on robotics excavations, were

considered effective but time-consuming.

Several Factors Could

Impede the Progress

of Future Efforts

Many Organizations Are

Involved With Detection

and Clearance

Technologies, Operations,

and Policies

We identified over 20 U.S. organizations that directly or indirectly conduct

or sponsor research and development with application to detection and

clearance, review related programs and policies, conduct detection and

clearance operations, or provide funds or related training. Some of these

organizations are shown in table 2.

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Table 2: U.S. Organizations Involved in Detection and Clearance Technologies

Organizations

Conducts or sponsors

research and

development

Reviews research and

development policies

or programs

Conducts or sponsors

detection and

clearance operations

and/or training

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Acquisition

and Technology

X X X

Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff X X

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations

and Low-Intensity Conflict

X X X

Advanced Research Projects Agency X X

Army Environmental Center X X X

Program Executive Officer for Armored Systems

Modernization, U.S. Army

X X X

Army Communications Electronics Command, Mine,

Countermine, and Demolitions

X X X

Army National Ground Intelligence Center X

Air Force Materiel Command X X X

Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology

Division

X X X

Office of Naval Research X X

Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare Technology X X X

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity X

Department of Energy, Environmental Restoration and

Waste Management, Technology Development

X X X

Environmental Protection Agency X X X

Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation X X X

Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation

Administration

X X X

Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs X X

U.S. Agency for International Development X

Interagency Working Group on Demining and

Landmine Control

X X

Department of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

and Firearms

X X X

The number of U.S. organizations involved is greater than indicated in the

table because the different offices in the service commands are involved

with one or more forms of UXO, national laboratories conduct research and

development for DOD, and individual contractors work for different

agencies or on commercial applications. Organizations outside the United

States are also involved with detection and clearance technologies. For

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example, the United Nations is actively involved with clearing landmines

from Third World countries and promoting policies to counter

proliferation. Many individual countries have been working on

countermine operations and UXO clearance and are developing clearance

technologies and methods. These countries include the United Kingdom,

France, Sweden, Germany, Russia, and South Africa.

Research and

Development Efforts Are

Not Well-Coordinated

No formal mechanism or strategic plan exists to ensure that a fully

coordinated U.S. research and development effort is leveraged at the

problem. This situation exists because the organizations involved with

technologies related to detection and clearance are seeking solutions to

more narrowly defined problems that fall under their purview. For

example, the combat branches of the military services have traditionally

pursued solutions to the countermine problem. The Department of Energy

and the Environmental Protection Agency sponsor research and

development to detect and clear hazards such as subsurface radioactive,

chemical, and other waste. The Federal Aviation Administration and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation sponsor research and development to see

through concealments to detect explosives, firearms, and contraband.

More recently, DOD has sponsored technology efforts to facilitate cleanup

of defense sites.

Nonetheless, when requirements are more broadly defined as the

detection and clearance of harmful, hidden objects or voids (such as

concrete flaws and underground facilities), the technologies that various

agencies employ or are developing for their own missions can be related.

For example, the Army, the Navy, and the Department of Energy are either

sponsoring research and development in or have experimented with

ground-penetrating radars. This does not necessarily mean that unwanted

duplication is occurring, but it does illustrate the potential for one agency

to be aware of and possibly take advantage of relevant technologies other

agencies are working on.

Some interagency coordination occurs on an ad hoc or narrow basis, such

as through symposia, technology demonstrations, and joint programs, but

this does not necessarily provide a firm basis for technology exchange.

Most of the participants at an interagency UXO forum that we sponsored in

May 1995 cited the lack of a coordination mechanism as a barrier to

making progress in technologies applicable to the detection and clearance

of landmines and other UXO. They also pointed out the need for an

overarching research and development plan for these technologies and for

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an entity to be charged with overseeing and coordinating the relevant

technology efforts.

Even within DOD, full coordination between agencies working on detection

and clearance technologies is not occurring. In particular, agencies that

are responsible for cleaning up military sites and those responsible for

countermine missions are not always working together, even though they

share interests in many of the same technologies. Currently, two

demonstrations of detection technologies for use against landmines and

other forms of UXO are underway. One is being conducted by the Army

Communications Electronics Command, which sponsors countermine

research and development, and the other is being jointly conducted by the

Army Environmental Center and the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Technology Division. Neither organization has participated in the other’s

demonstration. Perhaps illustrative of the need for broader coordination is

the fact that several similar demonstrations have been conducted in the

past 5 years by the Department of Energy, the Army, and the Marine

Corps.

Several cooperative efforts have been undertaken by U.S. organizations. In

September 1993, the National Security Council established what became

known as the Interagency Working Group on Demining and Landmine

Control. The group plans, funds, and organizes operations to remove

landmines from Third World countries. It also established a research and

development subgroup to promote improvements in area clearance

technologies. The group includes representatives from the Departments of

Defense and State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the

Central Intelligence Agency. However, not all U.S. organizations involved

in technology applicable to the detection and clearance of landmines and

other UXO are represented.

Within DOD, several organizations have begun to develop mechanisms for

coordinating, planning, and budgeting countermine research and

development activities. While these efforts may improve coordination,

they involve agencies within the countermine community. The Navy and

the Marine Corps have recently initiated efforts to formally recognize

clearance technology as beneficial to their individual missions. The Marine

Corps and the Navy have established a Mine Warfare Program Executive

Office and a Shallow Water Mine Countermine Steering Committee. The

Army and the Marine Corps have established a joint demonstration effort

that is directed toward identifying advanced concepts for a potentially

integrated countermine capability. The Mine Countermeasures Subpanel

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-197 Unexploded Ordnance
B-258886 

under the Joint Directors of Laboratories, established within the last 

2 years, is a multiservice mechanism that involves all of the services.

The number of different U.S. organizations supporting relevant research

and development also makes it difficult to gauge the level of funding the

United States is devoting to technologies that can detect UXO and other

hazardous materials. For example, based on fiscal year 1996 budget

estimates, the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Transportation could

invest somewhere between $75 million and $150 million in research and

development efforts that may have some application to the detection and

clearance of landmines and other UXO. However, it is unclear how much of

that amount is directly related to detection and clearance technologies

that have application to noncombat situations. Accordingly, it is difficult

to determine whether the United States is getting the most from its level of

investment in these technologies or whether the current level matches

known national requirements.

Other Impediments to

Seeking Technical

Solutions

Even if the maximum output could be gained from the various

organizations sponsoring research and development, several other factors

could blunt the effect of technology gains. One factor is mine technology’s

ability to stay ahead of detection and clearance technologies. For example,

some new mines are made of plastic, composite, and ceramic components,

and have little or no metallic content. Thus, the effectiveness of the metal

detector, which is one of the most widely used detection technologies, is

limited against such mines. Some mines are designed to prevent premature

detonation, such as when they are blasted with explosives or dropped. For

example, some have air bladders that react to blast or overpressure and

inflate to disarm and, then, rearm to await their intended targets. In

addition, scatterable mines have been developed that can be deployed by

air, increasing the number of these mines that can be rapidly deployed

exponentially. Despite these advances, service officials note that even the

traditional research and development efforts devoted to the countermine

mission have historically been accorded relatively low funding priority.

The characteristics of the country to be cleared can also affect the

applicability of a given technology. For example, detection and clearance

equipment to be used by Third World countries must be inexpensive to

buy and maintain as well as easy to understand and use. From a cost and

logistics support perspective, a sophisticated military technology may not

be practical in such circumstances. Landmine and other UXO detection and

clearance equipment must be effective given the geographical and terrain

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-197 Unexploded Ordnance
B-258886 

characteristics at hand. For example, soil with traces of metal elements

can confuse metal detectors, and rocky soil impairs hand-held probes.

High levels of moisture in soil can affect the performance of detection

technologies. Mountainous or forested terrain makes technologies that

depend on large or heavy vehicles impractical.

Finally, despite the efforts of the United Nations, the landmine problem

continues to worsen. Each year, many more mines are emplaced than can

be removed. For example, the United Nations estimated that in 1993,

2.5 million mines were emplaced, while only 80,000 were removed. The

primary mechanism for controlling the use of landmines is contained in

Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons. The

protocol was designed to reduce the harm to innocent civilians. It limits

the use of landmines and booby traps to military objectives, prohibits their

use against civilian populations, requires that parties to a conflict try to

ensure that the location of minefields is recorded, and requires that

scatterable mines contain self-destruct mechanisms or have their location

recorded.

The protocol has been largely ineffective for several reasons. First, it

covers only international conflicts, while most landmine-related injuries

have resulted from civil or internal conflicts. Second, it does not regulate

the production, stockpiling, transfer, or export of landmines. Third, it

contains no provision for monitoring compliance, conducting

enforcement, or penalizing violators.

The Congress and the

Executive Branch

Have Taken Actions to

Help Resolve the

Landmine Problem

The executive branch and the Congress have taken several actions over

the past 3 years to curb the proliferation of landmines and improve

research and technology directed at detecting and clearing landmines and

other UXO. In October 1992, the United States adopted a unilateral export

moratorium on antipersonnel landmines, which has been extended until

1996. According to DOD, the United States was the first country to take

such a step, which has led other countries to follow suit. In his address to

the U. N. General Assembly in 1994, the President called for the eventual

elimination of antipersonnel landmines and for the international control of

production, export, and stockpiling as the first step toward elimination. On

March 24, 1995, the Senate gave its advice and consent and the President

ratified the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons as well as 

Protocol II. In addition, the United States was an active participant in the

July 1995 International Meeting on Mine Clearance in Geneva, Switzerland.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-197 Unexploded Ordnance
B-258886 

Beginning on September 25, 1995, 48 nations will convene as full parties to

reopen the Convention on Conventional Weapons and conduct a

conference to review the Convention, including Protocol II on landmine

use. Other signatories and observers are also expected to participate in the

conference, which will consider several proposals to strengthen Protocol

II. The executive branch strongly supports strengthening the Convention

by (1) extending its scope to include internal conflicts, (2) limiting the use

of non-self-destructing antipersonnel landmines to marked and monitored

areas, (3) making the party that placed the mines responsible for clearing

them, (4) banning nondetectable mines, and (5) creating a system to verify

the restrictions on mine usage.

In the conference report accompanying the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, the Congress directed DOD to

undertake a large-scale detection and clearance technology

demonstration. Although this demonstration did not produce

breakthrough solutions, it did establish a baseline for assessing the state of

the art in UXO detection technologies. In the conference report

accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 1995, the Congress directed the Army to develop technologies for

mine detection and neutralization for use in humanitarian mine removal

operations and operations other than war. Such technologies were to be

capable of being shared in an international environment. In its report on

the fiscal year 1996 DOD authorization bill, the House Committee on

National Security cited the need for a central authority to plan, oversee,

and coordinate the research, development, and acquisition of the

technology applicable to area ordnance clearance. It directed the

Secretary of Defense to submit a plan that defines research and

development priorities, program management, and cooperative activity

with international programs.

Recommendations The numerous research and development efforts funded by the United

States and by other countries could be more productive if they were linked

by a common purpose—the detection and clearance of landmines and

other UXO. Such a common purpose should complement—not

supplant—individual missions, such as countermine, cleanup of hazardous

waste, cleanup of bases, and humanitarian demining, by serving as a

vehicle for sharing technical progress and avoiding duplication.

Accordingly, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense include in the

research and development plan called for by the House Committee on

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-197 Unexploded Ordnance
B-258886 

National Security, a proposal on how a multiagency clearinghouse

function could be performed to

• maintain visibility over all federally funded research and development

projects with application to detection and clearance of landmines, other

UXO, and other hazards;

• develop an overarching strategy that encompasses both near-term and

long-term priorities for detection and clearance technologies; and

• serve as an active link to relevant international and private research and

development efforts.

Such a proposal should be based on consultation with the Secretary of

State, the Secretary of Energy, and the heads of other federal agencies that

sponsor research and development that may have application to detection

and clearance of landmines, other UXO, and other hazards.

We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense designate an

executive agent to serve as a clearinghouse for research and development

efforts within DOD that may have application to detection and clearance of

landmines, other UXO, and other hazards. The role of such an agent would

be to gain visibility over and to leverage these efforts against the broader

problems of detection and clearance rather than to champion an individual

mission.

Agency Comments Both DOD and the Department of State concurred with our

recommendations. In its comments (see app. I), DOD stated that it could

prepare a proposal detailing the functions of a multiagency clearinghouse

and that statutory language could facilitate implementation of the proposal

by specifically identifying the roles and responsibilities of the participating

agencies. DOD also said that it would identify an executive agent to serve as

a clearinghouse within DOD as part of the February 1996 plan required by

the House National Security Committee.

The Department of State commented that it endorsed the need for more

coordinated research and for the identification of a lead institution in U.S.

government research and development (see app. II).

Both agencies provided specific technical clarifications that we

incorporated in the report, as appropriate.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-197 Unexploded Ordnance
B-258886 

Scope and

Methodology

We reviewed pertinent reports, documents, and legislation relevant to

detection and clearance technologies. We also interviewed officials from

the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the military services’ program

offices, laboratories, and intelligence agencies; the Departments of Energy

and State; the Army Environmental Center and the Naval Explosive

Ordnance Disposal Technology Division; the Advanced Research Projects

Agency; the United Nations; and the National Academy of Science. We also

attended related conferences and symposia and spoke with industrial and

technical representatives from other countries, such as England, South

Africa, Austria, Germany, and Sweden.

In May 1995, we hosted a forum to discuss landmine and other UXO

problems, technologies, and solutions. Participants included

representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military

services, the Departments of State and Energy, the Advanced Research

Projects Agency, the United Nations, and CMS, Inc., a firm that conducted

mine clearance operations in Kuwait. The key questions that the forum

attempted to address were (1) whether a legitimate UXO

requirement—different from the countermine requirement—exists that

warrants the pursuit of technological solutions; (2) whether the research

and development efforts currently planned or underway constitute a

sound approach toward such a solution; (3) what factors (technical,

managerial, or otherwise), if any, impede the advancement of detection

and clearance technology for landmines and other UXO; (4) what change in

approach to technology development (technical, managerial, or

otherwise), if any, should be made in the near term and long term; and

(5) who or what organizations should take the lead in instituting change

and ensuring that the efforts in developing landmine and UXO detection

and clearance technology are well orchestrated.

We conducted our review from September 1994 to July 1995 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional

committees; the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, and State; the Secretaries

of the military services; and the Secretary General of the United Nations.

We will also make copies available to others upon request.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-197 Unexploded Ordnance
B-258886 

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were Sharon

Cekala, Paul Francis, MaeWanda Michael-Jackson, and James Dowd.

Mark E. Gebicke, Director

Military Operations and

 Capabilities Issues

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-197 Unexploded Ordnance
Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-95-197 Unexploded Ordnance
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-95-197 Unexploded Ordnance
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-95-197 Unexploded Ordnance
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 17-18.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-95-197 Unexploded Ordnance
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 18.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-95-197 Unexploded Ordnance
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

letter dated August 29, 1995.

GAO Comments 1. A discussion of self-destruct mechanisms has been added to the report.

2. Language has been added to the report to recognize the fact that U.S.

forces do not conduct humanitarian demining missions.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-95-197 Unexploded Ordnance
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-95-197 Unexploded Ordnance
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 5.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-95-197 Unexploded Ordnance
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter

dated August 17, 1995.

GAO Comments 1.We have not concluded that more research and development funds

should be appropriated in the future. As noted in the report, because of the

number of organizations involved and the various projects underway, it is

difficult to estimate the current level of U.S. investment in technologies

related to detection and clearance of landmines and other UXO. We believe

that once a multiagency clearinghouse function and an executive agent for

DOD are established, the data can be assembled to establish the current

U.S. level of investment and determine whether that level is appropriate.

Such analysis, along with an updated assessment of the landmine and

other UXO problem, should be the basis for determining the level of future

funding.

2. Change adopted.

3.We have modified our wording throughout the report in reference to

landmines and other UXO. We have explicitly recognized the distinction the

Department of State makes for the purposes of policymaking. However,

we note that (1) landmines are included in the DOD definition of UXO and

(2) for the thrust of this report—research and development to advance

technology—it is important to stress the similarities between the problems

posed by landmines and by other UXO rather than the distinctions.

4.A summary of all U.S. mine clearance programs currently underway was

beyond the scope of our work. DOD may be able to provide a reasonable

summary at this time, but a better summary would likely be possible

following the establishment of the multiagency clearinghouse function.

5.The U.S. Agency for International Development is included in the report

as a member of the Interagency Working Group on Demining and

Landmine Control. We have also added the agency to our list of U.S.

organizations contained in table 2.

(703066) Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-95-197 Unexploded Ordnance
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