[Cite as Short v. Rhodes , 2021-Ohio-1845.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WOOD COUNTY

Tonya Short Court of Appeals No. WD-20-066 Appellee Trial Court No. 2014-DR-0120

v. Mark J. Rhodes DECISION AND JUDGMENT Appellant Decided: May 28, 2021 * * * * * Stephen M. Szuch and Patricia Hayden Kurt, for appellant.

* * * * * PIETRYKOWSKI, J. {¶ 1} Appellant, Mark Rhodes, appeals the judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, denying his motio ns for a reallocation of parental rights and responsibilities and to modify child suppor t. Appellee, Tonya Short, has not filed a brief in response. For the reasons that follow , we affirm. I. Facts and Procedural Background {¶ 2} On January 22, 2015, the parties entered into a consent judgmen t entry of divorce. In the consent entry, appellee was designated the res idential parent and legal2. custodian of the two minor children, L.R. (born in 2007), and E .R. (born in 2010). Appellant was granted parenting time with the children for thre e evenings each week, as well as Friday overnight, and alternating weekends. Appellant was also ordered to pay $1,600 per month in child support. A. History of Post-Divorce Litigation {¶ 3} On July 18, 2016, appellant reopened the case by filing a motio n to show cause, and for a reallocation of parental rights and responsibi lities. In his motion, appellant alleged that appellee had begun a new job which made the previous parenting schedule impractical. Appellant also alleged that appellee had unilaterally curtailed his parenting time with the children. Appellee responded by also s eeking certain modifications to the parenting schedule. {¶ 4} The hearing on appellant’s motions was vacated and rescheduled several times, and was ultimately held on June 9 and August 17, 2017. During the intervening period, the parties filed additional motions including motions to show cause, to relocate the children, and to prevent the children from being dis-enroll ed from a particular school, among others. {¶ 5} Following the hearing, the magistrate found that appellee unila terally deprived appellant of parenting time on numerous occasions. Ap pellee also unilaterally withdrew the children from the private school they had been att ending, and enrolled them in public school. Records from the private school show that th e children were tardy approximately 25 days, and absent 7 days over the course of the 2015-2016 school year, all of which occurred while appellee was responsible for the ch ildren. Around April3. 2017, the guardian ad litem recommended that the parties try a “week-on/week-off” schedule with a midweek overnight visit. Following the end of the 2016-2017 school year, appellee unilaterally suspended the midweek overnight vis its. At the hearing, appellee stated that she could not remember exercising midweek overnight visits after the parties started the “week-on/week-off” schedule, which the magi strate found not credible since the parties had exercised midweek visits for approximatel y five weeks in April and May 2017. {¶ 6} The magistrate also found that appellee had filed for a domesti c violence civil protection order against appellant, and included the chil dren as desired protected persons. Appellee’s petition listed several dates on which app ellant was at her house, but the magistrate found that appellant had legitimate reasons invo lving his parenting time for being there, noting that appellant could have handled some of the times better to avoid upsetting appellee. In addition, the magistrate found that app ellee had contacted appellant’s pastor to make disparaging remarks about appellant. The magistrate also found that after a referral to children’s services about appell ee’s boyfriend, appellee decided to have a police escort attend all exchanges of the min or children, which she claimed was necessary to protect her safety, and was not a reta liatory action. Finally, the magistrate found that both parties had made inappropriate comme nts to the children about the pending case. {¶ 7} In light of her findings, the magistrate ordered that there was no change of circumstances to cause the court to modify the residential pare nt status. However, the magistrate ordered that the parenting time should be modified s o that the parties alternate4. weeks of parenting time with the children, with exchanges to oc cur on Fridays at 5:15 p.m. The magistrate further ordered that the parties shall enc ourage frequent phone contact with the other parent, and to allow video-call access a t least two times per week. As to child support, the magistrate ordered that appellant shal l be responsible to pay the sum of $600 per month. On January 5, 2018, the trial court den ied the parties’ respective objections, and affirmed and adopted the magistrate’s decision. {¶ 8} On June 15, 2018, appellee reopened the case, seeking to modify the parties’ parenting times surrounding the Wood County Fair and other holi days. Additionally, appellee alleged that appellant was not complying with the requ irement of video-calls two times per week, and that appellant was not allowing the chi ldren to wear and use their phone watches to freely contact appellee. Furthermore, a ppellee alleged that appellant was making “nasty remarks” when the children wanted t o contact appellee, and that appellant yelled at the children, thereby intimidating the children into not wanting to call appellee. Appellee subsequently supplemented her motion f ive times with additional complaints regarding appellant’s availability to be home when t he children return from school, appellant’s inability or unwillingness to hire a babysi tter, and appellant’s move to within a block from appellee’s home and his desire to send the children to appellee’s house after school which would require appellee to expend her o wn funds to hire a babysitter. {¶ 9} Appellant responded to appellee’s motions by filing a motion to reallocate the parental rights and responsibilities, as well as subsequent motions to show cause. In his motions, appellant alleged that appellee’s behavior has bec ome increasingly erratic,5. and that she has attempted to alienate the children from him an d has failed to properly care for the children by not providing adequate meals. Appella nt also alleged that appellee signed the children up for extracurricular activities without first consulting him in violation of the most recent court order, that she denies th e children access to their phones to contact appellant, and that she refuses to allow L.R. to ride the bus from school to appellant’s home and interferes with his parenting time by p icking L.R. up from school. Furthermore, appellant alleged that appellee confiscat ed electronic devices that appellant had purchased for the children and refused to return them to appellant. Finally, appellant alleged that appellee was not paying her share of the medical expenses. {¶ 10} Following a February 6, 2019 hearing on this round of motions, the magistrate found that although there was still tension between the parties, the relationship “seem[ed] to have improved somewhat,” and the children were doi ng relatively well. Based upon the guardian ad litem report and her in-camera discu ssions with the children, the magistrate found that the “week-on/week-off” schedule was t oo long, and since the parties were now living on the same street, it would be easier for the children to travel between the two homes. Additionally, the magistrate found that appellant has undermined appellee’s decisions to the children, has not been r espectful towards appellee’s feelings, and has exhibited a desire to not allow th e children to see appellee during his parenting time. The magistrate also found, on the o ther hand, that appellee has at times evidenced interference and a lack of cooperation. The magistrate exhorted the parties to work together to resolve issues and act in the best interests of the children.6. {¶ 11} In light of her findings, the magistrate ordered that appellee continue as the residential parent, and that the parenting time should be divid ed based on a “2-2-3” schedule. The magistrate further ordered that appellant pay $5 09.66 per month in child support. Both parties objected to the magistrate’s decision, a nd on May 10, 2019, the trial court denied their objections and affirmed and adopted th e magistrate’s decision. B. Current Post-Divorce Litigation {¶ 12} Three weeks later, on May 31, 2019, appellee reopened the case by filing a motion to show cause in which she alleged that appellant has be en withholding the children from her in violation of the terms of the parenting sc hedule. {¶ 13} On June 19, 2019, appellant responded by filing a motion for re allocation of parental rights and responsibilities and other relief. In h is motion, appellant alleged that there has been a change of circumstances in that the child ren have on numerous occasions refused to visit with appellee. Appellant further al leged that while he has encouraged both children to respect and visit with appellee, he is reluctant to force the children to go with appellee given appellee’s history of making domestic violence allegations and her litigious nature. {¶ 14} The matter came to be heard before the magistrate on September 23, and October 23, 2019. {¶ 15} At the hearing, appellee testified regarding the timeline of ev ents. Appellee testified that March 18, 2019, was the last time that she had s een E.R. being herself, i.e., smiling, hugging, interacting, and telling appellee that she lo ves her. Appellee described that since that date, E.R. has had a flat affect, does not show emotion, and does not want7. to look at appellee. Appellee explained that a short time befo re, appellant had moved into the neighborhood, approximately 600 feet from appellee’s h ouse. Appellee testified

that she was concerned that the children would ride their bikes or scooters in front of her house and not even look at her house, and if appellee was outsi de the children would not interact with her. Thinking that this behavior was not healthy for the children, appellee decided to move two miles away. It was during the process of p utting the house up for sale and moving that E.R.’s behavior changed. Appellee did not move until May 2019. {¶ 16} On March 29, 2019, E.R. became upset at appellee and ran away t o appellant’s house. Appellee testified that E.R. was upset that she had to pick up her room and pack, and that they could not have a bonfire that night. A ppellee stated that appellant held E.R. at his house for one and one-half hours. Eventually, with the help of the Bowling Green Police Department, E.R. returned to appellee’s ho use and things settled

down. {¶ 17} The next day, March 30, 2019, appellee took the children to Col umbus, Ohio, where appellee met a friend at the hotel bar/restaurant w hile the children remained in the hotel room. Appellee testified that the friend was know n to the children, and had a child that had gone through some similar issues as E.R. Appell ee stated that the children had a great time in Columbus, and expressed that they did not w ant the weekend to end. {¶ 18} Appellee testified that at the next scheduled exchange, appella nt held the kids from her, so that she did not see them for five days. The n, during the period of April 4 through April 11, 2019, appellant arranged for E.R. to be dri ven in a car to the bus stop in front of appellee’s house, where E.R. remained in the car un til the moment that the bus8. arrived. Appellee testified that she believed this was done so that she could not go out and say hello or good morning to E.R. Several videos of these incidents were recorded by appellee and played at the hearing. {¶ 19} On April 8, 2019, appellee picked up the children for her paren ting time at the baseball field during L.R.’s practice. Appellee recorded t he exchange. Although the audio in the recording is hard to hear, appellee testified that when she asked E.R. to get L.R.’s belongings from appellant’s truck, appellant commented t o E.R. that “your mom just wants [L.R.]’s stuff so he doesn’t have to come back to me and say goodbye.” Further, when appellee told E.R. that it was time to leave, app ellant stated to E.R. that “your mom just wants you to go so that she can take you away fr om me.” Appellee then left with E.R. to find E.R.’s missing smart watch while L.R. wa s still at baseball practice. The watch was at an address near appellant’s house, but appelle e did not realize it was the house immediately next door to appellant’s house. When the y could not find the watch, E.R. stated that maybe it was in appellant’s house, and so she went in to look for

it. But once E.R. went into the house she shut the blinds and closed the door and refused to come out. E.R. then called appellant. After 15 or 20 minut es, appellee messaged appellant that E.R. was in his house, and that she was going to return to the baseball field to pick up L.R. and then come back to get E.R. for her parentin g time. When appellee came back to the house, E.R. came out to the car twice and aske d if they were going to watch a movie that night. When appellee said no, that it was a school night and it was too late, E.R. returned to appellant’s house. The third time t hat E.R. came out, she took9. her belongings from appellee’s vehicle and went back into appel lant’s house and did not come back out. Appellee took L.R. and had her parenting time w ith just him. {¶ 20} On April 12, 2019, a similar scenario occurred where E.R. came to the car but ultimately refused to go with appellee, and so appellee had her parenting time with just L.R. Appellee testified that the next morning, April 13, 2019, the children had an appointment with a counselor, but appellant did not bring E.R. to the appointment. {¶ 21} On April 17, 2019, L.R. notified appellee that they would not b e coming for her parenting time that night. Appellee testified that L.R . told her that appellant was putting pressure on him, and making it difficult for him. {¶ 22} On April 22, 2019, the exchange was to take place at the baseba ll fields. Appellee testified that all of the cars were in a line, and tha t her car was several cars in front of appellant’s truck. Appellee observed E.R. sneak up to her car and put her hand on the door handle, but then back away to appellant’s truck. O n the third time, E.R. opened the door to appellee’s car, and told appellee that she w as not coming. Appellee again had her parenting time with just L.R. {¶ 23} On April 24, 2019, while it was still during appellee’s schedul ed parenting time, the school called appellee and told her that E.R. was sic k with a fever and needed to go home. Appellee went to the school to pick up E.R. When ap pellee arrived, E.R. refused to go with her, despite encouragement to do so from her principal, teacher, and two guidance counselors. Ultimately, the school contacted appe llant and he came to get E.R. While they were waiting, E.R. calmed down and had a good conversation with appellee. At the end of the conversation, they hugged, and exp ressed love for each other.10. {¶ 24} On April 26, 2019, appellee arrived for the exchange. E.R. cam e out to the car, and as she had done previously, asked if they were going t o a movie. When appellee responded that they were not, E.R. said that she was not going to go with appellee, and went back into appellant’s house. {¶ 25} The next morning, April 27, 2019, E.R. went with appellee from the baseball field and had breakfast with appellee and L.R. E.R. t hen went home with appellee. At home, E.R. was looking for something that appelle e had already packed to move, and appellee told her that they would find it once they m oved to the new house. E.R. then wanted to jump on the trampoline, and appellee inform ed her that she would jump with her after she finished mowing the grass. While appel lee was mowing, E.R.

came outside and asked her if she could ride her bike over to a ppellant’s house. Appellee asked E.R. if she was going to go and not come back, to which E .R. replied “No.” Appellee then told E.R. to go over for 15 minutes, and they hug ged and E.R. left. E.R. did not return to appellee’s house. The next day, E.R. returne d to gather her things, but did not stay for the rest of appellee’s parenting time even tho ugh she was being encouraged to do so by appellee and L.R. {¶ 26} On May 1, 2019, appellee did not have any parenting time with E .R., and E.R. did not even come out to speak with her. The same thing h appened on May 6 and May 10, 2019. {¶ 27} On May 13, 2019, appellant picked up L.R. from appellee’s house . Shortly thereafter, L.R. ran back to appellee’s house upset and crying. L.R. told appellee that he had said to appellant that he was excited about picking out a r oom at appellee’s new11. house, to which appellant allegedly responded “if you’re that h appy about moving away from me, go back to your mom’s, I don’t want you here.” Appell ee consoled L.R. over dinner, and after he was calm, returned him to appellant. {¶ 28} Appellee testified that she did not have any parenting time wit h E.R. on May 15, May 24, May 29, June 3, and June 7, 2019. {¶ 29} On June 9, 2019, E.R. text messaged appellee while appellee was at church. E.R. stated that she wanted to go with appellee to go shopping for Father’s Day and to pick out her things for an upcoming 4-H camp. Appellee message d back that she already had plans to visit her parents in Defiance, Ohio, and that she wished that E.R. would join her. Appellee told E.R. that she was unable to take her shoppi ng and drop her back off at appellant’s house. Appellee messaged E.R. to tell her that she loved her and missed her. But the next day, E.R. stated that she never received the messa ge. {¶ 30} On June 12, 2019, appellee again had parenting time with L.R., but not

E.R. {¶ 31} On June 22, 2019, appellee had parenting time with L.R. Two da ys earlier, appellant demanded to have both kids on June 22 so that they co uld attend a cousin’s birthday party. Appellee noted that L.R. had a 4-H obligation earlier in the afternoon, then was playing with the neighborhood kids, and later they wer e going to have a cookout and bonfire. Because of this, appellee told appellant that L.R . would not be able to go to the cousin’s birthday party. Nevertheless, appellant arrived a t appellee’s house and yelled for L.R. to come. Appellant also sent E.R. to persuade L.R. to come, and both of them attempted to make L.R. feel guilty for not going.12. {¶ 32} On June 26, 2019, appellee arrived at 4-H for “rabbit ID day” w ith her boyfriend. Appellee’s parenting time with the children began a t 6:00. The boyfriend videotaped an interaction where appellee was helping E.R. fill out the paperwork for her rabbit, during which appellant approached and told them to hurr y up. Appellee testified that appellant had already approached two or three times before that, despite court orders to not approach each other in public. After the rabbit was che cked in, E.R. informed appellee that she was not going with appellee for appellee’s pa renting time. {¶ 33} Appellee continued to not have parenting time with E.R. through July 12, 2019. Appellee testified that during that time, appellant did not encourage or assist E.R. in completing the tasks necessary to show her rabbit at the cou nty fair. Instead, appellee received notification that E.R. was not going to do her rabbit project. {¶ 34} On July 12, 2019, the counselor had arranged a dinner for E.R., L.R., and appellee during appellee’s parenting time. Appellee initially expressed doubt that she would be available for the dinner given the various 4-H and bas eball commitments, but ultimately decided to leave work early so that she could carve out 45 minutes for dinner. Appellee testified that appellant was 15 minutes late bringing E.R. to the dinner, despite knowing that they were on a tight schedule. As soon as appelle e walked out of the restaurant after dinner, appellant was sitting there on the ben ch and left with E.R. Appellee testified that she was not given time to say goodbye t o E.R., or hug or kiss her. {¶ 35} According to appellee, after the dinner on July 12, 2019, appel lant did not allow appellee to have her next parenting time with the childre n beginning July 15, 2019. Appellee testified that appellant informed her that the childre n did not want to go with13. her. The children did not even come out to appellee’s car to s ay hello. Later, appellee learned that appellant had taken the children with him to his s ister’s house for that week. {¶ 36} Appellee also described difficulties surrounding the county fai r schedule. Appellee testified that appellant did not abide by the court or der regarding the fair and deprived her of two and one-half days of parenting time. In ad dition, appellee testified that appellant was yelling and attempted to engage in a confron tation with her boyfriend during one of the exchanges at the fairgrounds. {¶ 37} On August 7, 2019, the parties went back to court, and at the h earing it was decided that exchanges would take place at the library going fo rward. Appellee’s understanding was that there was to be a 10 minute delay betwee n the person dropping the children off, and the person picking the children up. {¶ 38} The first exchange at the library took place on August 9, 2019. Appellee testified that E.R. was “stand-offish,” and that she did not wa nt to interact with appellee. Appellee tried to encourage her to pick out a book for an upcom ing vacation that E.R. had been excited about only a few days earlier, but E.R. ignore d her. E.R. then told appellee that she was not going with her for appellee’s parenti ng time. In refusing to go,

E.R. stated that she did not have to listen to the counselor or the guardian ad litem. The guardian ad litem, who was present to supervise the exchange, t ried to encourage E.R. to go with appellee, but E.R. ran and locked herself in the bathro om. Eventually, the guardian ad litem contacted appellant to pick up E.R. {¶ 39} Appellee testified that she had a vacation planned for August 1 3 through August 19, 2019. Appellee stated that the court orders allowed for a week of vacation if14. they were going out of town, and that the other parent was to g et an itinerary for the trip. Appellee testified that she told appellant that she was going t o allow the children to decide whether they wanted to go to Toledo or Findlay for ice c ream on the night of August 13, 2019, and when they decided she would let appellant know. Appellant refused to allow the children to go with appellee. {¶ 40} On August 14, 2019, appellee celebrated her birthday. Appellee testified that the court orders provided that appellee would have the chi ldren from 5:00 – 9:00 p.m. on her birthday. Appellee waited at the library for 15 or 30 minutes, messaged appellant, and then went home. After about an hour, appellee c hecked her messages and saw that appellant had replied, “I’m sorry, I forgot it was you r birthday.” Appellee responded and asked if he was not going to give her the kids fo r her parenting time, her vacation, or her birthday, why has he not even allowed the kids to call her. A few minutes later, appellee received a phone call from L.R., who sa id that they were at the library and wanted to know where appellee was. When appellee a rrived at the library, she found out that the children had been waiting for one and on e-half hours. During the time with the children at the library, appellee had a conversat ion with E.R. about going on vacation, and how she wanted E.R. to come with her. L.R. al so tried to convince E.R. to come on vacation. After the 45-minute conversation, appelle e felt like E.R. was just being manipulative, and so she became more direct with E.R. and told her that she could walk politely and respectfully to the car, or appellee could ta ke her by the hand and walk her to the car, and if E.R. threw a temper tantrum and fell to the ground and flailed she would only embarrass herself. Appellee testified that E.R. agr eed to come to the car.15. After they were outside, E.R. returned to the front of the libr ary to get a paper that she had been coloring. Appellee testified that appellant must have honked his horn or flashed his lights to signal to E.R. because she then refused to come, and bolted across the road to appellant’s truck. Appellant refused to return E.R. Ultimatel y, appellee went on vacation

with L.R. {¶ 41} On August 26, 2019, the exchange for appellee’s parenting time was scheduled to occur at the same time as L.R.’s soccer practice. Appellee told appellant that since he did not want to do the exchange before the soccer practice, she would be at the library to pick up the children at 8:00 after practice. Ap pellant refused to bring the children to the library, but instead had L.R. call appellee fro m the soccer field to ask her where she was. L.R. was frustrated that appellee would not pic k him up at the soccer field. Appellee did not have parenting time with the children that night. The next morning, appellee met L.R. at the bus stop, and explained to hi m that she wanted to do the exchange at the library—as had been agreed in court—because at least then she could see E.R. for 10 or 15 minutes, whereas if the exchange was at t he soccer field, she would not have gotten to spend any time with E.R. Appellee then aske d L.R. if he wanted to come for the rest of appellee’s parenting time, and he said no, “dad won’t do it.” Appellee did not have any of her parenting time with the childr en on August 26 and 27,

2019. {¶ 42} On August 30, 2019, appellee met at the library to pick up the children for an extended Labor Day weekend. After 15 minutes of speaking wi th E.R. and L.R.,16. appellee told E.R. that it was time to leave. E.R. responded t hat she was not going and ran out of the library, across the road, and directly to appell ant’s vehicle. {¶ 43} On September 9, 2019, appellant again refused to meet appellee at the library either before or after soccer practice. Appellant info rmed appellee that if she did not show up at the soccer field then she was forfeiting her par enting time with the

children. {¶ 44} On September 13, 2019, appellant was late for the exchange at t he library. When appellant arrived, E.R. left his vehicle, walked into the entrance to the library, and yelled down the hall that she was not coming. E.R. then got ba ck into appellant’s truck and they left. Appellee had her parenting time with L.R. A si milar scenario unfolded on September 18, 2019. {¶ 45} Finally, appellee testified as a general matter that appellant did not consistently bring the children to counseling appointments in t hat they missed four out of six visits, that he did not cooperate with her on getting infor mation from the children’s school, and that he does not work with her to enforce consisten t discipline of the children. {¶ 46} Appellant testified next. Appellant testified that appellee co ntacted the Bowling Green Police Department to oversee the exchanges in Mar ch 2019, and that the police presence upset the children. Regarding the March 29, 20 19 incident where E.R. ran away from appellee’s house, appellant testified that appell ee was yelling and screaming at E.R. and raised her hand with her phone in it as i f she was going to strike E.R., which scared E.R. and caused her to run. Appellant testi fied multiple times that E.R. is afraid of appellee.17. {¶ 47} Appellant also testified generally that he speaks with E.R. all the time trying to convince her to go with appellee, and trying to expla in to her that she is missing out on making memories with her mother. Appellant further desc ribed an incident in April where he messaged appellee and offered a suggestion on a time that appellee could speak with E.R. during one of L.R.’s baseball games. However, appellee did not get the message in time because she does not get phone notifications. Appellant testified that he and L.R. both try to convince E.R. to go with appellee, but tha t their efforts upset E.R. Appellant explained that he does not want to force E.R. to go b ecause appellee has tried to convince the children that he is a monster or an evil-person , and he feels that if he forced E.R. to go he would be playing into appellee’s descripti on of him. In addition, appellant is concerned that if he physically forced E.R. to go with appellee, that he would

be accused of child abuse. {¶ 48} Appellant testified that he believed it was in E.R.’s best inte rest to spend time with appellee, and that he has never disparaged appellee t o the children. Appellant testified that he has never told the children that they cannot interact with appellee at practices or games, and in fact has encouraged E.R. to go over and say hello to appellee. Appellant also encourages the children to call appellee during his parenting time. {¶ 49} Appellant next testified that appellee does not attend all of t he children’s baseball and soccer practices. He stated that the children hav e remarked that appellee “has no interest in what we do.” Appellant, on the other hand, attends all of their practices, even those that occur during appellee’s parenting ti me. Appellant testified that frequently appellee will have a coach or another parent transpo rt L.R. to and from games,18. despite the fact that appellant is present and able to transpor t L.R. Appellant explained that L.R. is embarrassed by this, and to appellant it is an exa mple of appellee not wanting to spend time with her children. Appellant also testified rega rding the times that appellee has left the children alone, highlighting the night in the Colu mbus hotel room and a time when L.R. was left at the fairgrounds. {¶ 50} As to appointments with the counselor, appellant testified that the children have missed three appointments. On two of those occasions, app ellant only found out about the appointment on the day of the appointment. On the th ird occasion, the appointment was the same day as when E.R. was sent home from sc hool for being sick. Other than those, appellant testified that the children have be en seeing the counselor every two weeks for a total of approximately nine appointments. {¶ 51} On the subject of the exchanges at the library, appellant testi fied that on August 14, 2019, he took the kids to the library shortly before 6:00, not remembering that it was appellee’s birthday and that he should have delivered th e children at 5:00. Appellant dropped off the children and then went home. Over an hour later, he received a call from L.R. that appellee was not there to pick them up. Appellant then had L.R. contact appellee. Appellant testified that after that night, h e informed the children that he would not leave until he knew that they were going with appelle e. He denied, however, that he ever told or signaled E.R. to come back to his truck. {¶ 52} Appellant next testified regarding his interaction with the gua rdian ad litem. Appellant stated that although the guardian ad litem ha s been on the case for a long time, he has not spent much time in the last two rounds of litigation. Appellant19. testified that the guardian has only observed him with the chil dren one time, which was at the August 9, 2019 exchange at the library, and that the guardi an has never observed the children at appellant’s house. Appellant also testified that t he guardian did not interview L.R. before filing his report. Appellant noted that the childr en wrote letters to the guardian because they wanted to talk to him but he did not have the time. Appellant explained that the children do not feel like their voices are b eing heard. {¶ 53} Finally, appellant testified that he believes there has been a change in circumstances in that once he moved into his new house, appelle e told the children that it was not healthy or safe to live in that neighborhood and she de cided to move again. Appellant also noted that appellee constantly has boyfriends ar ound. Appellant feels that it is in E.R.’s best interest to stay with him and work on spen ding time with appellee. Appellant testified that E.R. feels safe at his house, but does not feel safe with appellee, and although L.R. is comfortable going back and forth, appellan t testified that he thought it would be best for the children to remain together. Appellan t testified that he is willing to co-parent with appellee, but it is difficult when she is con stantly telling the children that he is abusive and threatening. {¶ 54} The matter was then continued to October 23, 2019, for the rest of the hearing. Appellant testified that during the intervening time, L.R. had a scooter accident on a Saturday during appellant’s parenting time, which resulted in L.R. chipping his front teeth. Appellant took L.R. to an emergency after-hours dentist visit, at which the dentist decided that it would be best to wait until Monday to try to do a permanent repair. On Monday morning, the dentist was unable to repair the teeth beca use L.R. would not let20. the dentist numb his mouth. The dentist recommended a pediatri c dentist that could see L.R. that afternoon. At 10:00 a.m., appellee messaged appellan t that appellant was to remain quiet, not approach her, and was to remain in the waitin g room during the pediatric dentist appointment. If appellant did not agree to t hose conditions by noon, then appellee would cancel the appointment. Appellant testified tha t appellee ultimately cancelled the appointment, and L.R.’s teeth were not fixed unti l Wednesday. {¶ 55} Appellant testified that as a result of the cancellation, L.R. experienced embarrassment at school as a result of his chipped teeth, he co uld not participate in a band performance because playing the trumpet put too much press ure on the front of his teeth and mouth, and he missed a field trip on Wednesday becaus e he had to go to the rescheduled dentist appointment. {¶ 56} Appellant testified that since the dental ordeal on October 5, 2019, L.R. has refused to go with appellee for her parenting time. Appellant explained that L.R. viewed the situation as appellee putting herself before him and his ne eds of getting his teeth

fixed. {¶ 57} Appellant also testified that on October 14, 2019, appellee con tacted him to take the children’s pets because they are taking up space in he r garage, and if he did not, then she would give the pets away. Appellant felt the threat t o give the pets away was

mental abuse and an attack on the children’s emotions. {¶ 58} Appellant next testified that appellee did not show up for the exchange at the library on October 21, 2019.21. {¶ 59} Appellant then described several bills and expenses for the chi ldren that he alleged appellee has not paid. {¶ 60} Finally, appellant testified that the children are not currentl y in counseling, but that he believes that they should be in counseling. Howeve r, appellant stated that he is not allowed to make appointments for them. {¶ 61} The only other witness to testify at the hearing was the guardi an ad litem. The guardian concluded that it was in the children’s best inter ests to maintain the current arrangement with appellee as the residential parent and both pa rents splitting parenting

time on the “2-2-3” schedule. {¶ 62} The guardian spoke about E.R.’s issues with visiting appellee, and commented that based upon his interactions with her, he does no t perceive that E.R. is afraid of appellee or is unsafe with her. The guardian noted t hat during the first library exchange, E.R. was sitting with appellee and talking and intera cting with her in a positive manner. It was only when it came time to leave that E.R.’s moo d changed and she became “stone-faced” and said that she did not want to go with appellee. The guardian believed that the issue with E.R. could have been more easily r esolved at the beginning, but because it has been going on for months, it presented a muc h more difficult challenge. The guardian explained that he believed appellant c ould have been firmer with E.R. in the beginning, and could have worked with appellee and E.R. to restore E.R.’s relationship with appellee. {¶ 63} The guardian also testified that the children hear a lot of neg ative information from appellant and appellee about the other parent, including information22. about the other parent’s compliance or non-compliance with cour t orders. The guardian explained that one of the concerns of the counselor was that th e children felt a need to protect appellant emotionally because they disclosed to the cou nselor that appellant would cry when they leave. The guardian further noted that it was a significant problem when appellee explained to the children that she was moving awa y from appellant

because he made her feel unsafe. {¶ 64} As to the letters sent to him by the children, the guardian exp ressed skepticism that the letters were written free of influence beca use they contained phrasing that he would not normally expect from children, such as “I wan t so and so to have custody so they can sign me up for activities.” {¶ 65} Based upon his interactions with the family, the guardian recom mended that both parents need to engage in individual counseling and f amily counseling. He recommended that each parent should say something positive abou t the other parent to the children at least once a day. Lastly, the guardian recomme nded a parenting coordinator given the parents’ history of being unable to work together to parent the

children. {¶ 66} Following the hearing, the magistrate determined that there had not been a change in circumstances to warrant a change in the residential parent. The magistrate ordered that the children shall resume their counseling and tha t the counselor shall implement a schedule to normalize the mother-child relationship s, with the goal of resuming the full parenting schedule in three months. The magi strate further ordered that each parent shall make a positive statement about the other par ent each day that the23. children are with him or her, and ensure that the children have a picture of the other parent in his or her room. {¶ 67} Appellant objected to the magistrate’s decision. On August 31, 2020, the trial court overruled appellant’s objections and approved and a dopted the magistrate’s

decision. II. Assignments of Error {¶ 68} Appellant has timely appealed the trial court’s August 31, 2020 judgment, and now asserts five assignments of error for our review:

1. The trial court abused its discretion when it neglected to find a change of circumstances to warrant a change in the residential parent from [appellee] to [appellant].

2. The trial court abused its discretion when it neglected to find a change of circumstances before issuing numerous orders that mod ified the then-existing orders relating to the parties’ two minor childre n, to wit: [L.R.] and [E.R.].

3. The trial court abused its discretion when it accepted and reli ed upon a Guardian ad Litem Report and Recommendation although the Guardian failed to carry out numerous responsibilities set fort h in Ohio Sup. R. 48(D).

4. The trial court abused its discretion when it neglected to modi fy the existing child support orders although there had been a cle ar and substantial change of circumstances. At the time of the trial, Appellant was24. acting as the children’s primary caretaker and was paying for a ll of the children’s ongoing expenses in addition to the full child suppo rt order to Appellee.

5. The trial court abused its discretion when it adopted a Magistrate’s Decision that contained numerous Findings of Fact that were unsupported by the evidence on the record. Many of the facts r elied upon by the magistrate were not presented at the trial. III. Analysis {¶ 69} For ease of discussion, we will address appellant’s assignments of error out of order. In his third and fifth assignments of error, appella nt challenges the evidentiary and factual underpinnings supporting the trial court’s conclusi on that there was not a change in circumstances to warrant a change in the residential parent. In his first assignment of error, appellant challenges the trial court’s con clusion itself. In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erre d in modifying the parental rights and responsibilities without finding a change of circums tances. Finally, in his fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial cou rt erred in failing to modify the child support order.

A. Guardian Ad Litem {¶ 70} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the tri al court erred when it considered the guardian ad litem’s report because the g uardian failed to comply25. with his responsibilities under Ohio Sup. R. 48, et seq. 1 Specifically, appellant argues that the guardian failed: to promptly notify the court as requ ired by Sup. R. 48.03(A)(5) that his conclusion was in conflict with the children’s wishes; to maintain independence, objectivity, and fairness as required by Sup. R. 48.03(A)(2); t o meet, interview, and observe the children as required by Sup. R. 48.03(D); and to fi le a report no less than seven days before the hearing as required by Sup. R. 48.06(C)(1 ). {¶ 71} “Appellate courts will not reverse trial court decisions to adm it a guardian ad litem’s testimony and recommendation unless the trial court abused its discretion.” In

re T.C. , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1106, 2015-Ohio-3665, ¶ 20, citing Corey v. Corey , 2d Dist. Greene No. 2013-CA-73, 2014-Ohio-3258, ¶ 9. An abuse of discretion connotes that the trial court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v.

Blakemore , 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). {¶ 72} Sup. R. 48, et seq., provides “good guidelines for the conduct of a guardian ad litem in meeting his or her responsibilities in representing the best interest of a child in order to provide the court with relevant information and an inf ormed recommendation.”

In re M.S. , 2015-Ohio-1847, 34 N.E.3d 420, ¶ 45 (8th Dist.), quoting In re C.O. , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 99334, 99335, 2013-Ohio-5239, ¶ 14. However, the rules of superintendence are only gener al guidelines, and “do not create substantive rights in individuals or procedural law.” Id. , quoting In re C.O. at ¶ 14. “As such, it has generally

1 Appellant references Ohio Sup. R. 48(D), but subsequent to the filing of his brief, Sup. R. 48(D) has been amended and renumbered by the Ohio Supreme Co urt. We will refer to the appropriate sections as renumbered.26. been held that a guardian ad litem’s failure to comply with Sup .R. 48 is not, in and of itself, grounds for reversal of a custody determination.” Id. {¶ 73} In Nolan v. Nolan , 4th Dist. Scioto No. 11CA3444, 2012-Ohio-3736, ¶ 26,

the Fourth District held that the trial court abused its discre tion in considering the guardian ad litem’s report and recommendation where the guardia n ad litem “fell so far below the minimum standards.” In that case, the guardian ad li tem failed to interview the mother’s boyfriend—with whom the child would be living—failed t o investigate the relevant details of the boyfriend’s life, did not interview the child’s half-sister, did not visit the residences of either parent, did not interview the ch ild’s school personnel or medical-health providers despite the child being diagnosed with ADHD and having behavioral issues, and did not meet with the child in a one-on- one setting. Id. at ¶ 25. {¶ 74} Here, in contrast, the guardian ad litem was familiar with the family from his years of service as a guardian, spoke with the children’s c ounselor, spoke with personnel at E.R.’s school, spoke with L.R., observed E.R. with appellant and appellee during an exchange at the library, had a walking interview with E.R. in an attempt to divert her attention so that he would get more organic response s from her, observed her with appellant in the waiting room of his office, and received letters from the children discussing their wishes. Therefore, we find the present case t o be distinguishable from

Nolan , and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the report and recommendation from the guardian ad litem. See In re T.C. at ¶ 23 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering guardian ad litem’s tes timony where the guardian27. testified at length as to the extent of her investigation and w as subject to crossexamination by all parties). {¶ 75} Accordingly, appellant’s third assignment of error is not well- taken. B. Magistrate’s Factual Findings {¶ 76} In his fifth assignment of error, appellant challenges several of the magistrate’s factual conclusions, which were adopted by the tri al court, as not being supported by the evidence. {¶ 77} First, appellant challenges the magistrate’s findings that: 5. Father moved into Mother’s neighborhood sometime in May of

2019. 6. Father is aware that Mother is uncomfortable around him, however he did not take that into consideration prior to moving around the corner from Mother. He refuses to acknowledge that Mother is

uncomfortable around him because he does not feel that he has d one anything to make her fear him. It is not clear if this is a co ntrol issue or a lack of empathy. He testified that he moved because he wanted the children to be able to go back and forth between the houses so that the parents could co-parent. Although that would be an ideal situa tion, and it sounds wonderful, it does not reflect the reality of the curren t situation. {¶ 78} Appellant argues that the magistrate’s findings were factually incorrect as the testimony revealed that he moved into his new home in Febru ary 2019, not May 2019. Further, he argues that the timing of the move is import ant because the close28. proximity of the parties was taken into consideration at a hear ing on March 7, 2019, and because the subsequent events of E.R. running away and the chil dren becoming upset at mother occurred because of appellee’s comments that the neighbo rhood was no longer

safe. {¶ 79} We agree with appellant that the magistrate’s finding that he m oved into the neighborhood in May 2019 was factually incorrect. However, we do not find any prejudicial effect from this error, because although the magist rate may have been confused on the specific dates, the magistrate recognized the e vents and consequences in an appropriate timeline. Rather than ignore appellee’s conduct and its impact on her relationship with the children, the magistrate later found, 23. Mother has done some things that have caused or contributed to

the children’s turmoil: a. She made statements that it was unsafe and unhealthy when Father moved into the neighborhood. The children resented her for these

comments. b. As a result of Father’s move, Mother decided that she had t o move again, so she wasn’t so close to Father. This move upset the children. Therefore, we find the magistrate’s error in the date that appe llant moved into the neighborhood to be of no practical consequence. {¶ 80} Second, appellant challenges the magistrate’s findings that:

7. There is no evidence that the children are unsafe at either parent’s home. On one occasion, [L.R.] left Father’s home and did not w ant to29. return. Mother handled it very well. She made sure that Fathe r was aware of [L.R.]’s location, she talked things through with [L.R.] and then had [L.R.] return to Father’s home. 8. On the other hand, [E.R.] left Mother’s home on April 22, 2 019,

went to Father’s home and never returned. There is no indicati on that Father communicated with Mother or encouraged [E.R.] to return to Mother’s. Father claims he doesn’t want to force [E.R.] to go where she does not feel safe. Knowing that she would be safe at Mother’s , he needs to reassure her that she will be safe, calm her down and send h er back. 9. [E.R.] has left Mother’s home when Mother has corrected her about inappropriate behavior. Instead of trying to learn the c ause of the interrupted parenting time and reinforcing the importance of go od behavior, Father reinforced [E.R.]’s avoidance and poor behavior of runni ng away and this can lead to manipulative behavior. As a parent, there are many occasions when it is necessary to “force” something on a child such as medicine or going to school. It is not a negative. {¶ 81} Appellant disagrees with the magistrate’s finding that appellee ’s home is not unsafe. Appellant points to the fact that E.R. was allowed to run away twice, and the fact that appellee left E.R. unsupervised at appellant’s home o n one occasion as evidence of clear safety risks. Furthermore, appellant argues that forc ing the children to visit with appellee against their will, and when they have stated that the y do not feel safe with appellee, perpetuates the ongoing risk to the children’s health . Appellant notes that E.R.30. stated in her letter to the guardian ad litem that appellee “ge ts very angry and yells too

much.” {¶ 82} In addition, appellant argues that there is no evidence that he reinforced E.R’s behavior in running away, and identifies that he was not home on either occasion that she ran away. Furthermore, appellant testified about his efforts to encourage the children to visit and communicate with appellee. Lastly, appel lant highlights that he does not “force” E.R. to visit with appellee because E.R. does not f eel safe at appellee’s house, and because appellee has previously accused him of domestic vio lence and child abuse and he believes that if he forced E.R. to visit, he would face similar allegations. {¶ 83} Upon review, we find that the magistrate’s findings are support ed by the evidence. Although running away from home obviously is concern ing, there is no evidence that either child has been abused, neglected, or harme d at either home. To that end, the magistrate has implicitly concluded that to the extent that E.R. is afraid of appellee, that fear is irrational. Assuming that E.R. accurate ly reported that appellee raised her hand one time as if to strike E.R., there is no evid ence that E.R. was ever actually struck. Appellant had an opportunity when he discusse d the incident with E.R. to calm her and reassure her that she was safe with appellee, b ut appellant did not do so as evidenced by the fact that E.R. has since consistently refus ed to visit with appellee, claiming that she is afraid of her. Notably, the guardian ad l item testified that he does not believe that E.R. is afraid of appellee or is unsafe with her. Thus, E.R.’s persistent refusal to visit with appellee following a relatively minor inc ident supports the31. magistrate’s conclusion that appellant is reinforcing E.R.’s av oidance of appellee and her poor behavior of running away. {¶ 84} Appellant next challenges the magistrate’s findings that: 12. Since picking up on Father’s cues, [E.R] has now, on her o wn, adopted the attitude of not wanting to see Mother. Following a re some examples:

a. She has gone to Mother’s car on several occasions and told her that she was not going with Mother. At times this was because Mother told her it was too late to watch a movie or do something else.

b. On March 29, 2019, [E.R.] ran away from Mother’s home. She was upset because she wanted to call Father. [E.R] stated Moth er was yelling at her.

c. On April 24, 2019, Mother had planned to pick up [E.R.] at lunchtime to take her to lunch and then pick up [L.R.] from sch ool, as they both had a counseling appointment at 4:30 pm. The school calle d Mother around 9:15 am and stated [E.R.] had a temperature of 101.8 and needed to be picked up from school. Mother went to the school to pick up [E.R.]. When she arrived, [E.R.] said hello and asked why she was there . [E.R.] stated that it was her dad’s time. Mother told [E.R.], “No, it is not your dad’s time,” and asked her to get her things so they could go h ome. [E.R.] stated, “No, dad is to come and get me.” [E.R.] stated that sh e needed to go to her classroom, as there was something she had forgotten. Sh e went to32. the classroom and called her dad. [E.R.] then began crying and hyperventilating, stating that she did not want to go with Moth er. Both [E.R.]’s teacher and principal attempted to intervene and get [ E.R.] to go with her mother. After nearly an hour, [E.R.] calmed down but still would not leave with Mother. Then, Father was called to come to get her. After leaving, Mother sent a message to Father on Our Family Wizard i nforming him of the counseling appointment that day, but [E.R.] was not brought to the counseling appointment.

d. On April 27, 2019, [E.R.] ran away from Mother’s home to Father’s home. Earlier that day, [E.R.] went to breakfast with [L.R.] and Mother. At breakfast [E.R] went under the table and sat on the floor to let [L.R.] out of the booth. Mother talked to [E.R.] about making good choices and reminded her that she is very aware that sitting on the flo or under the table is not a good choice. When [L.R.] returned, [E.R.] stood up at the corner of the table, not allowing [L.R.] enough room to get bac k to his seat. [L.R.] asked [E.R.] two times to move, however, [E.R.] remained obstinate and did not move her foot. [L.R.] tripped over [E.R.]’s foot g etting back into the booth. Mother then stated to [E.R.] if she continues this behavior and continues to not make good choices, she will get a conseque nce. [E.R.]

did not like to hear that and stated she did not know her foot was in the way. When they returned home around 11:00 am, Mother felt she had to mow the lawn before it rained. Mother told [E.R.] she would ju mp on the33. trampoline with her after mowing. [E.R.] then asked where her slime kit was located, however it had been packed and Mother was unsure o f its location. [E.R.] became upset, went upstairs, came down a few minutes later and asked to ride her bike to her dad’s house to say hi. Mother asked [E.R.] if she was going to go to her dad’s to not return and sh e said no she was only going to say hi. Mother had [E.R.] wear a Gizmo watch so that she would be able to call her. Mother asked [E.R.] to come bac k in 15 minutes and [E.R.] told her she would return at 12:05 pm. [E.R .] gave Mother a kiss and told her she loved her. [E.R.] did not retur n to Mother’s

home.

e. On August 9, 2019, the Guardian Ad Litem met the parties at the library. [E.R.] stated she was not going with Mother for her p arenting time. [E.R.] stated that she did not have to listen to the Guardian A d Litem or Ms. Kroniser. The Guardian Ad Litem eventually called Father to co me back and pick up [E.R.] from the library after she locked herself in the bathroom. {¶ 85} In his appellate brief, appellant takes issue with some minor d iscrepancies between the record and the magistrate’s findings. For example, appellant argues that certain direct quotes do not exist in the record, nor does the record reflect that E.R. called appellant while she was sick at school. We find these discrepa ncies to be trivial. Moreover, our review of the record leads us to conclude that th e salient points of the magistrate’s findings are, in fact, supported by the record.34. {¶ 86} More significantly, appellant argues that it is not fair to con clude that E.R. adopted an attitude of not wanting to visit appellee because sh e was “picking up on Father’s clues.” As alluded to above, this is not an unreasona ble conclusion to reach. E.R. initially ran away from appellee’s home on March 29, 2019, because she was upset that appellee was moving, and because she reportedly feared tha t appellee was going to strike her. Despite that, E.R. went with appellee the next day to Columbus, and had a good time. However, the record reflects that at the very next exchange, appellant denied appellee parenting time with the children. This appears to be a consistent pattern with appellant as the record shows that he denies appellee parenting time immediately after she is able to spend time with E.R. For example, in addition t o the exchange following the trip to Columbus, appellant denied appellee her next parent ing time after E.R. spent time with appellee on April 27, 2019, before she ran away, and after appellee’s dinner with E.R. on July 12, 2019. {¶ 87} Relatedly, the record shows that appellant has communicated to the children that he does not want them to leave him to go visit wi th appellee. At the April 8, 2019 exchange, appellant reportedly told E.R., “your mom just w ants you to go so that she can take you away from me.” On April 17, 2019, when L.R. i nformed appellee that they were not coming for her parenting time, L.R. allegedly sta ted that appellant was putting pressure on him and making it difficult on him. The ch ildren have also reported to their counselor that appellant cries when it is time for the m to leave. {¶ 88} Furthermore, appellant testified repeatedly that E.R. is afraid of appellee, but the guardian ad litem does not believe that to be the case. Upon review, the record in35. this case is replete with examples that suggest there may be a different motivation other than fear to explain why E.R. does not want to go with appellee for her parenting time. Early on, after the first running away incident, E.R. refused t o go with appellee after learning that appellee was not going to let her watch movies. The second running away incident came after appellee told E.R. that she was not going t o look for something that had been packed away, and that she would only jump on the tramp oline with E.R. after she finished mowing the grass. Since then, E.R. has had multip le interactions with appellee whether at dinner, 4-H, or the library that have been positive until the moment that it is time to leave to go with appellee. {¶ 89} We recognize that we are not counselors or medical professional s, and we do not attempt to diagnose E.R.’s motivation for not visiting a ppellee. We merely highlight these incidents to demonstrate that there is support for the magistrate’s conclusion that appellant is influencing E.R.—whether intention ally or unintentionally— to maintain in her decision not to visit appellee. Thus, we do not find the magistrate’s conclusion that E.R. is picking up on appellant’s clues to be u nsupported by the record. {¶ 90} Finally, appellant contests the magistrate’s findings that: 16. Father did not explain why Mother was not called after [th e scooter accident where L.R. chipped his teeth] when he was work ing and Mother was at home. Instead, [L.R.] was with the babysitter si nce it was Father’s parenting time. When one parent is available in this type of situation, that parent should be with the child. Instead, Fath er refuses to36. give up his parenting time to Mother, even when he is not avail able and it

would be best for the child. 17. On Monday, October 7, 2019, Father contacted the dentist’s office at approximately 7:45 am. The office said that [L.R.] c ould be seen at 8:30 am, so Father took the children to the dentist’s office to have [L.R.] seen. Father did not notify Mother, he testified that he was r ushed to get to the office. Mother, who had also called the office in the morn ing, learned of the appointment and was also present for [L.R.]’s visit. 18. Because the pediatric dentist was not able to give [L.R.] nitrous oxide, a second appointment to fix [L.R.]’s teeth was scheduled for 3:00 pm later that same day (10/7/19) at another office. 19. Prior to the 3:00 pm dentist appointment on October 7, 201 9, Mother sent Father a message via Our Family Wizard insisting th at he conduct himself a certain way at the 3:00 pm appointment (e.g. “stay in the lobby,” “stay quiet and not approach me,” and stay out of the r oom where [L.R.] will be treated). Mother stated that, if Father did not confirm by noon that he would comply with these rules, she would cancel th e 3:00 pm appointment to fix [L.R.]’s teeth. Father viewed these as dema nds from Mother that he did not have to follow, but Mother testified tha t these were

the doctor’s rules.37. 20. Ultimately Mother did cancel the appointment. 21. [L.R.] was not able to participate in his band concert on Tuesday October 8, 2019 and he had to miss a field trip on Wednesday. Father let [L.R.] know that Mother cancelled the appointment so now the ch ildren and Father are all blaming Mother. 22. Father kept [E.R.] out of school on Monday to take her to the dentist with [L.R.]. He testified that he did that because he did not know how long it would take and whether he would be available to pic k [E.R.] up from school. There was no reason for [E.R.] to miss school; th is is an example of his lack of acknowledgment that the children have tw o parents who can work together to accommodate both children. {¶ 91} Appellant argues that the magistrate’s decision was wrong in tw o respects. First, appellant argues that the magistrate erroneously found t hat he did not explain why he did not contact appellee after the scooter accident. Appell ant stated that L.R. required immediate medical attention, and appellant was able to make tha t appointment. He then notified appellee of the incident later that night. The magist rate’s point, however, was that in that situation it may have made more sense for appellee to respond to the injury because appellant was at work. The fact that appellant did not have appellee contacted was just an example of his unwillingness to truly co-parent the child. {¶ 92} Second, appellant contests the magistrate’s finding that “Mothe r testified that these were the doctor’s rules.” Appellant argues that app ellee’s assertion that the dentist’s office created those rules lacked all credibility. H owever, the magistrate’s38. finding was factually correct. Notably, the magistrate did not make a finding whether or not the rules were created by the dentist’s office, but instead recounted what each party

said. {¶ 93} Appellant further criticized the magistrate for not reprimandin g appellee for cancelling the dentist appointment. The extent to which the ma gistrate specifically considered appellee’s cancellation of the dentist appointment i s unclear, but it suffices to say that the magistrate recognized that “Mother has done some t hings that have caused or contributed to the children’s turmoil,” and “There are numerous examples of both parties contributing to the conflict affecting the children.” Thus, as with the above findings, the trial court’s findings regarding the chipped-teeth incident are supported by the record. {¶ 94} Accordingly, appellant’s fifth assignment of error is not well- taken. C. Change of Circumstances {¶ 95} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the tri al court erred when it found that there was not a change of circumstances to w arrant a change in the residential parent. R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) provides, The court shall not modify a prior decree allocating parental r ights and responsibilities for the care of children unless it finds, based on facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child, the child’s residential parent, or either of the parents subject to a shared parenting decree, and that the modification is necessa ry to serve39. the best interest of the child. In applying these standards, t he court shall retain the residential parent designated by the prior decree or the prior shared parenting decree, unless a modification is in the best i nterest of the child and one of the following applies:

* * * (iii) The harm likely to be caused by a change of environment i s outweighed by the advantages of the change of environment to th e child. {¶ 96} “In determining whether a ‘change’ has occurred, we are mindful that custody issues are some of the most difficult and agonizing dec isions a trial judge must make. Therefore, a trial judge must have wide latitude in cons idering all the evidence

before him or her * * * and such a decision must not be reverse d absent an abuse of

discretion.” Davis v. Flickinger , 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997). “The reason for this standard of review is that the trial judge has the best opportunity to view the demeanor, attitude, and credibility of each witness, someth ing that does not translate well on the written page.” Id. “This is even more crucial in a child custody case, where there may be much evident in the parties’ demeanor and attitude that does not translate to the record well.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 419. {¶ 97} In support of his assignment of error, appellant argues that th ere has been a clear change of circumstances, as evidenced by the fact that E. R. stopped visiting with appellee in April 2019, and L.R. stopped visiting with appellee in October 2019. Appellant claims that the trial court ignored the new reality t hat he is effectively the sole caretaker for the children. In addition, appellant argues that the trial court failed to40. consider that the children no longer wish to visit with appelle e, that E.R. has run away from appellee’s house on multiple occasions, that appellee has left the children unattended, that appellee failed to follow through on dental ca re for L.R., and that appellee told the children that she moved because she was afrai d of appellant and he made their neighborhood unsafe. {¶ 98} Upon our review, it is clear that the circumstances have change d in light of the fact that E.R. has not been visiting appellee since April 2 019, and L.R. has not been visiting since October 2019. However, a change in circumstance s is only a threshold determination, and the trial court should not modify the parent al rights and responsibilities unless such a modification is in the children’ s best interests, and should not change the residential parent unless the harm caused by a c hange of environment is outweighed by the benefits from a change of environment. R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a). Here, although the trial court did not artfully word its decision in finding that there “has not been a change of circumstances to warrant a change in the residential parent ,” (emphasis added), we think it is clear that the trial court’s decision wa s based on the best interests of the children and the potential harm to the children. Indeed, t he trial court emphasized the harm to the children in its comments that “[appellee] and [appe llant] are irresponsibly damaging their children during this war,” that “a Parenting Coo rdinator is necessary to try and curb the sophomoric actions of both [appellee] and [app ellant],” that “the parents don’t even appear to marginally recognize the damage they are d oing by showing the children how not to parent. [Appellant] in particular is letti ng [E.R.] run the show by41. failing to enforce [appellee’s] parenting time,” and that “[app ellant] is undermining counseling. The passive/aggressive actions are more fitting of a teenager, not a parent.” {¶ 99} As to the best interests of the children, appellant argues that the trial court did not conduct an analysis of the relevant factors under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), which provides: In determining the best interest of a child pursuant to this se ction, whether on an original decree allocating parental rights and re sponsibilities

for the care of children or a modification of a decree allocati ng those rights and responsibilities, the court shall consider all relevant fac tors, including,

but not limited to: (a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care; (b) * * * [T]he wishes and concerns of the child, as expressed to t he

court; (c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly a ffect the child’s best interest; (d) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and community; (e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the situation; (f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved parenting time rights or visitation and companionship rights;42. (g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support payments, including all arrearages, that are required of that p arent pursuant to a child support order under which that parent is an obligor;

* * * (i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subje ct to a shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied t he other parent’s right to parenting time in accordance with an order of the court. {¶ 100} Here, while the magistrate’s decision does not expressly list t he R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) factors, the decision itself demonstrates that co nsideration was given to each one. The magistrate’s decision, as adopted by the trial c ourt, contains nearly 12 pages of detailed findings touching on each of the relevant fac tors. Thus, we disagree with appellant’s assertion that the trial court did not conduct a best interest analysis. {¶ 101} In sum, the trial court found that there was not a change in ci rcumstances warranting a change in the residential parent. Giving due defe rence to the trial court, and upon consideration of the evidence, including evidence which su ggests that the children’s desire to stop visiting appellee is at the least partly influen ced by appellant’s own conduct

and that it would not be in the children’s best interests to ch ange the residential parent, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision constitutes an ab use of discretion. {¶ 102} Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is not well- taken.43. D. Change in Terms {¶ 103} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the tr ial court erred by modifying the existing parenting orders without findin g a change of

circumstances. {¶ 104} Appellant does not specify how the previous order was modified, but our comparison of the orders shows that in the August 31, 2020 judg ment the trial court maintained appellee as the residential parent, and continued th e parenting time schedule that had been previously ordered in the May 10, 2019 judgment e ntry. The trial court, however, did modify the May 10, 2019 judgment entry by eliminat ing the requirement that mother’s vacation time does not have to occur out of town, and by requiring the itinerary to be provided no later than 12 hours before the star t of the trip. Additionally, the trial court modified the May 10, 2019 judgment entry by req uiring that exchanges take place at the library as opposed to curbside. {¶ 105} Aside from those modifications, the trial court imposed additio nal requirements upon the parties that were not contained in the Ma y 10, 2019 judgment entry. For example, the trial court ordered that the parties r esume the children’s counseling, and that both parents are to participate in counsel ing as recommended by the

children’s counselor. The court ordered that the counselor sha ll establish a schedule to normalize the mother-child relationship with the goal of resumi ng the court-ordered parenting time as soon as possible and within three months. Th e court appointed a parenting coordinator, and ordered the parties to participate i n communication counseling as recommended by the parenting coordinator. The court ordered that if a parent has the44. children for three straight days, that parent must email the ot her parent describing at least one recent activity or saying something positive about each chi ld. The court ordered the parties to ensure that the children have a picture of the other parent in their rooms. The court ordered that each parent make a positive statement about the other parent each day that the children are with him or her. Finally, the court orde red each parent to acknowledge his or her actions that have contributed to the cur rent situation and work

with the children to overcome the resistance. {¶ 106} The question we are presented with is whether the modifications and additional requirements imposed by the court in its August 31, 2020 judgment entry constitute a modification of “a prior decree allocating parenta l rights and responsibilities for the care of children.” R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a). 2 We hold that they do not. {¶ 107} In Fisher v. Hasenjager , 116 Ohio St.3d 53, 2007-Ohio-5589, 876 N.E.2d 546, ¶ 22, 26, the Ohio Supreme Court noted, “Parental rights and responsibilities” is not defined in the st atute. However, a majority of this court commented that the General As sembly changed the terms “custody and control” to “parental rights and responsibilities” when it amended R.C. 3109.04 in 1991. Braatz v. Braatz (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 40, 43, 706 N.E.2d 1218. “‘“Custody” res ides in the party or parties who have the right to ultimate legal and physi cal control of

a child.’” Id. at 44, 706 N.E.2d 1218, quoting In re Gibson (1991), 61 Ohio

2 There is no shared parenting decree in this case, so modificat ion of the terms of a shared parenting plan under R.C. 3109.04(E)(2) is inapplicable.45. St.3d 168, 171 573 N.E.2d 1074. Therefore, parental rights and responsibilities reside in the party or parties who have the ri ght to the ultimate legal and physical control of a child.

* * * In summary, R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) expressly provides for the modification of parental rights and responsibilities in a decre e. An allocation of parental rights and responsibilities is a designa tion of the residential parent and legal custodian. Therefore, R.C. 3109.0 4(E)(1)(a) controls when a court modifies an order designating the residen tial parent and legal custodian. {¶ 108} From the language in Fisher , we hold that a trial court does not modify an order allocating parental rights and responsibilities when it m akes minor changes to the terms of a parent’s vacation time or imposes additional conditi ons such as counseling or saying nice things about the other parent. Because those minor modifications and conditions do not change the residential parent designation or even alter the parenting time between the parties, we hold that the trial court was not required to first find a change of circumstances under R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a). Truly, if a “party requesting a change in visitation rights need make no showing that there has been a change in circumstances in order for the court to modify those rights,” Kelley v. Kelley , 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-19-073, 2020-Ohio-1535, ¶ 34, quoting Braatz v. Braatz , 85 Ohio St.3d 40, 706 N.E.2d 1218 (1999), paragraph two of the syllabus, it f ollows that a change of circumstances likewise would not be required where the trial co urt imposes minor46. conditions such as counseling. This is particularly so in ligh t of the purpose of R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a), which is to “spare children from a constant t ug of war between their parents who would file a motion for change of custody each time the parent out of custody thought he or she could provide the children a ‘better’ environment. The statute is an attempt to provide some stability to the custodial status of the children, even though the parent out of custody may be able to prove that he or she c an provide a better

environment.” Davis , 77 Ohio St.3d at 418, 674 N.E.2d 1159, quoting Wyss v. Wyss , 3 Ohio App.3d 412, 416, 445 N.E.2d 1153 (10th Dist.1982). {¶ 109} Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error is not well -taken. E. Child Support {¶ 110} In his fourth and final assignment of error, appellant argues t hat the trial court erred when it failed to modify his child support obligati on. {¶ 111} R.C. 3119.79(C) provides, If the court determines that the amount of child support requir ed to be paid under the child support order should be changed due to a substantial change of circumstances that was not contemplated at the time o f the issuance of the original child support order or the last modifi cation of the child support order, the court shall modify the amount of child support required to be paid under the child support order to comply wit h the schedule and the applicable worksheet, unless the court determi nes that those amounts calculated pursuant to the basic child support sc hedule and pursuant to the applicable worksheet would be unjust or inappro priate and47. therefore not in the best interest of the child and enters in t he journal the figure, determination, and findings specified in section 3119.2 2 of the

Revised Code. “It is well established that a trial court’s decision regarding child support obligations falls within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.” Pauly v. Pauly , 80 Ohio St.3d 386, 390, 686 N.E.2d 1108 (1997); Funkhouser v. Funkhouser , 6th Dist. Erie No. E-18- 039, 2019-Ohio-733, ¶ 31 (“We review a trial court’s child supp ort modification order for an abuse of discretion.”). {¶ 112} Appellant argues that the trial court’s decision not to modify the child support orders was unreasonable and arbitrary where there was a change of circumstances resulting in appellant being the primary caregiver for E.R. beg inning in April 2019, and for L.R. beginning in October 2019. As the primary caregiver, appellant states that he has incurred all of the children’s expenses. He concludes that it is unjust and inequitable for him to also be required to pay child support to appellee. {¶ 113} In this instance, we disagree. Although appellant claims a cha nge of circumstances, the trial court did not find the changed circums tances to be desirable. Instead, the trial court entered orders that it hoped would res olve the issues between appellee and the children, and that would restore the original distribution of parenting time. In light of the trial court’s goal of equal parenting ti me, and its efforts toward achieving that goal within three months, we hold that it was no t an abuse of discretion for48. the trial court to maintain the current child support order, pa rticularly where the trial court considered that appellant is at least partially responsib le for the children refusing to visit appellee. {¶ 114} Accordingly, appellant’s fourth assignment of error is not well -taken.

IV. Conclusion {¶ 115} For the foregoing reasons, we find that substantial justice has been done the party complaining, and the judgment of the Wood County Cour t of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pur suant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. ________________________

_______ JUDGE Thomas J. Osowik, J.

_______________________________ Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE CONCUR.

_______________________________ JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Cour t of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing th e final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.