This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8

v. NO. 28,257 9 HAL RAYMOND SNIDER, II, 10 Defendant-Appellant. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF EDDY COUNTY 12 Gary L. Clingman, District Judge 13 Gary K. King, Attorney General 14 Francine A. Chavez, Assistant Attorney General 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 for Appellee 17 Templeman and Crutchfield 18 C. Barry Crutchfield 19 Lovington, NM 20 for Appellant 21 MEMORANDUM OPINION 22 FRY, Chief Judge. 23 Defendant appeals his convictions of two counts of larceny, contrary to 24 NMSA 1978, Section 30-16-1 (1987) (ame nded 2006). Defendant argues that, as 252 to both counts, there was insufficient evid ence to support the value element of the 1 offense, and as to one count, there wa s insufficient evidence to support a jury 2 finding that he stole the property. For the following reasons, we disagree with 3 Defendant’s assertions and affirm his convictions. 4 BACKGROUND 5 Following a jury trial, Defendant was c onvicted of two counts of larceny for 6 the theft of a number of pieces of oil fiel d equipment that had been stolen from two 7 oil fields in southern New Mexico betw een March and July 2005. During this time 8 frame, Defendant and an accomplice had allegedly stolen a large amount of oil 9 field equipment from various wells around the region. Following the thefts, 10 Defendant and his accomplice apparently cleaned the equipment and then 11 Defendant sold the equipment to local businesses. At some point, one of 12 Defendant’s customers discovered that hehad purchased stolen equipment and 13 notified the police. 14 During the ensuing investigation, a number of items that belonged to Basic 15 Energy, Weatherford Services, WRH, Inc ., and ABC Tool Rental, all oil field 16 equipment supply companies, were traced b ack to Defendant. These items had all 17 been stolen sometime between July 1 and 5, 2005. While both Basic Energy and 18 Weatherford identified a large number of tools as their property, each company 193 was only able to positively identify a small number of the stolen items due to the 1 lack of serial numbers or other identifying marks on the remaining items. 2 Weatherford was able to conclusively determine that two pieces of equipment, an 3 accelerator, or a jar, and a bumper sub wereits property due to serial numbers on 4 the devices. Basic Energy was able to conc lusively determine that some recovered 5 BJ tubing elevators were its property due to serial numbers on the equipment. 6 Based on the evidence obtained during the investigation, Defendant was 7 charged with four counts of larceny for th e theft of items valued greater than $2500 8 but less than $20,000. The jury convictedon the counts related to Basic Energy 9 and Weatherford, but the trial court declared a mistrial on the counts related to 10 WRH and ABC Tools. Defendant appeal s, arguing that there was insufficient 11 evidence of the value of the items he was convicted of stealing and that, as to Basic 12 Energy, there was insufficient evid ence that he stole any property. 13 DISCUSSION 14 “In reviewing the sufficiency of the ev idence, we must view the evidence in 15 the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging all reasonable inferences 16 and resolving all conflicts in the ev idence in favor of the verdict.” State v. 17 Cunningham , 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 26, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176. This review 18 “requires analysis of whether direct orcircumstantial substantial evidence exists 194 and supports a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every 1 element essential for conviction. We determine whether a rational [fact finder] 2 could have found that each element of the crime was established beyond a 3 reasonable doubt.” State v. Kent , 2006-NMCA-134, ¶ 10, 140 N.M. 606, 145 P.3d 4 86 (citations omitted). Substantial evid ence is “such relevant evidence as a 5 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. 6 Salgado , 1999-NMSC-008, ¶ 25, 126 N.M. 691, 974 P.2d 661 (internal quotation 7 marks and citation omitted). We do “not weigh the evidence or substitute [our] 8 judgment for that of the fact finder as l ong as there is sufficient evidence to support 9 the verdict.” State v. Mora , 1997-NMSC-060, ¶ 27, 124 N.M. 346, 950 P.2d 789. 10 Basic Energy’s Equipment 11 For the theft from Basic Energy’s oil fi eld, Defendant was charged with and 12 convicted of larceny pursuant to Section 30-16-1 for stealing property valued in 13 excess of $2500. In order for the jury to find Defendant guilty, the jury was 14 required to find that Defendant “took and carried away oil field tools belonging to 15 [Basic Energy], which had a market value over $2500.” Defendant argues that 16 there is a “total lack of any evidence” regarding the market value of the stolen 17 property and thus, that the jury could nothave found that he stole property valued 18 in excess of $2500. In support of this contention, Defendant notes that the only 195 stolen property that was positively identified as belonging to Basic Energy 1 consisted of the BJ tubing elevators, which had identifying serial numbers on them. 2 Defendant contends that while there was testimony that the value of all of the 3 equipment stolen from Basic Energy was approximately $15,000, there was no 4 testimony regarding the actual market value of the BJ tubing elevators that were 5 identified as belonging to Basic Energy. Thus, Defendant argues, there was 6 insufficient evidence for the jury to conc lude that the tools Defendant stole from 7 Basic Energy had a market value over $2500. We disagree. 8 While Defendant focuses on the lack of evidence regarding the specific 9 value of the BJ tubing elevators, Defe ndant fails to acknowledge that he was 10 charged with stealing much more equipment than just the BJ tubing elevators. In 11 fact, Defendant was accused of stealing approximately $9500 worth of equipment 12 from Basic Energy. The jury heard te stimony from Sisk, Defendant’s accomplice, 13 that the pair had stolen oil field equipment sometime around July 2, 2005. The 14 jury then heard testimony from Julian Carillo, a Basic Energy employee, that a 15 number of tools were stolen from an oil field that he was in charge of sometime 16 between July 1 and July 5, 2005. Mr. Carillo testified that a set of rod tongs, four 17 pipe wrenches, a number of hammer wren ches, a PAW valve, a key to the PAW 18 valve, and a set of BJ tubing elevators wereall taken. Carillo further testified that 191 Despite Mr. Carillo’s unequivocal valu ation of the elevators, Defendant 17 curiously argues that “Mr. Carillo did not provide any value of specific equipment and 18 of particular note, provided no value of BJ [t]ubing [e]levators.” 19 6 the value of the stolen items was “[a]round $15,000 for everything back in 2005” 1 and that the value of the “elevato rs like those are somewhere around $1200.” 1 In 2 addition, Mr. Roberts, the owner of a tool service who works with auction 3 companies to ascertain marketvalue of oil field equipment, testified that the value 4 of the rod tongs alone was between $8000 and $10,000 and that because of the 5 rarity of oil field equipment, the value of used equipment parallels that of new 6 equipment. 7 That Basic Energy was only able to positively identify the BJ tubing 8 elevators as its property, after the theft doe s not alter the fact that a number of other 9 items were stolen at the same time. Becau se the theft of the BJ tubing elevators 10 was conclusively linked to Defendant, and because the BJ tubing elevators were 11 stolen at the same time as the rest of Basic Energy’s tools and equipment, the jury 12 could reasonably infer that Defendant was responsible for the theft of all of the 13 equipment stolen over the applicable time frame. Thus, the value of all of the 14 property that was stolen could properly beattributed to Defendant, not just the 15 value of the BJ tubing elevators. 167 Defendant next argues that there was testimony regarding only the 1 replacement value of the property, not the fair market value as required by the jury 2 instructions. Thus, Defendant contends, th e jury was forced to speculate about the 3 fair market value of the stolen property, and speculation is not a permissible basis 4 for a conviction. We are not persuaded. 5
In State v. Hughes , 108 N.M. 143, 145-46, 767 P.2d 382, 384-85 (Ct. App. 6 1988) we noted that “[i]t is clear that an owner of personal property may testify 7 concerning the value of the property and that such testimony is sufficient to 8 support a jury’s determination of value.” We explained that “[t]he reason for this 9 rule is that the owner necessarily know s something about the quality, cost, and 10 condition of his or her property and cons equently knows approximately what it is 11 worth.” Id. at 146, 767 P.2d at 385. Based on this rule, we held that a property 12 owner’s testimony that his property had a value well over $100, based on the 13 owner’s knowledge of the replacement cost of the property, was sufficient to 14 support the valuation element of larceny b ecause “[t]he jury could reasonably infer 15 . . . that the price at which the property could ordinarily have been bought or sold 16 was in excess of $100 at the time it became received stolen property.” Id. In so 17 holding, we also explained that marketvalue “means the price at which the 18 property could ordinarily be bought or sold” and that market value “is the 198 equivalent of ‘retail price.’” Id. Applying this rule in State v. Barr , we concluded 1 that a homeowner’s testimony regarding th e value of property stolen from her was 2 sufficient to support a conviction because “testimony of the purchase price of 3 consumer goods, when coupled with information about the age and condition of 4 the goods, is sufficient by itself to allow a jury to draw reasonable inferences about 5 the present market value of the items.” 1999-NMCA-081, ¶ 30, 127 N.M. 504, 984 6 P.2d 185. 7 Here, the jury heard testimony that it would cost $15,000 to replace all of the 8 equipment that Defendant stole. The juryalso heard testimony that there was not a 9 lot of used equipment available on the market at the time of the theft, that the 10 replacement value paralleled the value of us ed equipment, that the rod tongs stolen 11 from Basic Energy alone had a value of approximately $10,000, and that the value 12 of the BJ tubing elevators was approximately $1200. Based on this evidence, the 13 jury was able to infer that the marketvalue of the equipment stolen from Basic 14 Energy exceeded $2500, as required to convict Defendant. 15 Finally, Defendant argues that “the ev idence presented in this matter defies 16 logic” because while Mr. Carillo testified that the property was stolen sometime 17 between July 1 and July 5, Mr. McInroe, one of the individuals who purchased the 18 stolen equipment from Defendant, testified that he had purchased the BJ tubing 199 elevators prior to July 1. According to Defendant, it was impossible for him to 1 have stolen property from Basic Energy af ter July 1 that had been purchased by 2 McInroe prior to July 1. 3 On review for substantial evidence, we consider only whether substantial 4 evidence supports the verdict, not whether we would reach a different result upon 5 review of the evidence. See Mora , 1997-NMSC-060, ¶ 27. To the extent that there 6 is some conflict between the date that Mr. McInroe testified he purchased the 7 property from Defendant and the date that Defendant stole the property, resolution 8 of this conflict is solely the province of the jury, not of this Court on appellate 9 review. See State v. Sutphin , 107 N.M. 126, 131, 753 P.2d 1314, 1319 (1988) 10 (noting that we “neither reweigh the ev idence nor substitute [our] judgment for that 11 of the jury”). Because there was evidence presented that the property was stolen 12 between July 1 and July 5, the jury was free to reject the testimony regarding the 13 date that the property was purchased and defer to the testimony of Defendant’s 14 accomplice, who testified that they stole equipment sometime around July 2, the 15 testimony of the Basic Energy employee th at the equipment was stolen between 16 July 1 and 5, and the testimony of the deputy who investigated the crime who 17 testified that the equipment was stolen between July 1 and July 5. 1810 Because substantial evidence supports the jury’s determination that 1 Defendant stole property valued over $2500 from Basic Energy, we affirm 2 Defendant’s conviction on this count. 32While counsel contends that only one item could be positively identified as 18 Weatherford’s, Balog unequivocally testifie d that both an accelerator and a bumper 19 sub were positively identified as Weatherford property. 20 11 Weatherford Services’ Equipment 1 Defendant makes the same arguments with respect to his conviction for 2 stealing oil field equipment from Weatherford that he made regarding the Basic 3 Energy theft. Defendant contends th at because only one item was positively 4 identified as Weatherford’s, only that item can be used for purposes of calculating 5 the value of the stolen items, and there was insufficient evidence of the market 6 value of that one item. We disagree. 7 Mr. Balog, an employee of Weatherford, testified that equipment was stolen 8 from a Weatherford worksite sometime between July 2 and July 5, 2005. Balog 9 testified that an accelerator, an overshot, spiders and slips, top bushing, a bumper 10 sub, and some crossover subs were all stolen during this time frame. Because the 11 serial numbers had been ground off of most of the equipment, the only items that 12 Weatherford was positively able to identify when it recovered the property were 13 the accelerator and the bumper sub. 2 14 Balog testified that the replacement cost of all of the equipment that was 15 stolen during this time frame was approximately $27,000, and that due to the 16 damage that had been done to the accelerator when the serial number was removed, 1712 the company paid approximately $6800 to repair the device. Defendant again 1 argues that because the only testimony pres ented was the replacement cost of all 2 the equipment, and because only the accelerator and the bumper sub could be 3 positively identified as Weatherford’s equipment when the property was recovered, 4 there is insufficient eviden ce that the market value of the stolen equipment 5 exceeded $2500. 6 Defendant again assumes that he can only properly be convicted of stealing 7 property that Weatherford was able to positively identify as its own after the 8 property had been recovered. In maki ng this argument, Defendant ignores the 9 permissible inference that if Defendant stole the identifiable property that went 10 missing around July 2, he also stole the unidentifiable equipment that went missing 11 at the same time. Defendant’s argument that a property owner must be able to 12 positively identify a piece of property before the thief can be convicted of stealing 13 it is unsupported by the law and defies logic. Such a rule would preclude the 14 conviction of any individual who steals property that is not marked by a serial 15 number. Similarly, the rule Defendant seeks to apply would preclude conviction 16 for the theft of property that is not rec overed because an owner would be incapable 17 of identifying property that is not recovered. 1813 Thus, for purposes of determining the value of the stolen property, the jury 1 was permitted to consider both the items that were positively identified as 2 belonging to Weatherford as well as the items that were stolen from Weatherford 3 that were either not marked for identif ication or that had the identifying marks 4 removed. The fact that the replacement value of all of this property was $27,000 5 was enough to allow the jury to infer that the market value of the used equipment 6 was greater than $2500. In addition, the f act that Weatherford paid nearly $7000 to 7 repair the accelerator allowed the jury to make the reasonable inference that the 8 value of the accelerator alone exceeded$2500. Thus, substantial evidence 9 supports the jury’s determination that the equipment stolen from Weatherford had 10 a market value greater than $2500. CONCLUSION 11 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant’s convictions. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13

14 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge 15 WE CONCUR: 16

17 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 1814 1 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 2