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HOPPENS v. NEBRASKA DEPT. OF MOTOR VEHICLES 857

Cite as 288 Neb. 857

§ 3-508.4(b). Respondent has waived all additional proceedings against him in connection herewith. Upon due consideration, the court approves the conditional admission and enters 

the orders as indicated below.

CONCLUSION

Respondent is ordered suspended for a period of 18 months 

retroactive to the date of his temporary suspension, September 

13, 2012, and respondent is ordered automatically reinstated 

without further application to the court. Respondent is also 

directed to pay costs and expenses in accordance with Neb. 

Rev. Stat. §§ 7-114 and 7-115 (Reissue 2012) and Neb. Ct. R. 

§§ 3-310(P) (rev. 2014) and 3-323(B) of the disciplinary rules 

within 60 days after the order imposing costs and expenses, if 

any, is entered by the court.

Judgment of suspension.

 Order of reinstatement.

Daniel Hoppens, appellant, v. Nebraska Department

of Motor Vehicles, appellee.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed August 22, 2014. No. S-13-755.

1. Administrative Law: Judgments: Appeal and Error. A judgment or final order 

rendered by a district court in a judicial review pursuant to the Administrative 

Procedure Act may be reversed, vacated, or modified by an appellate court for 

errors appearing on the record.

2. ____: ____: ____. When reviewing an order of a district court under the 

Administrative Procedure Act for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is 

whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, 

and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.

3. Judgments. Whether a decision conforms to law is by definition a question 

of law.

4. Judgments: Appeal and Error. An appellate court determines questions of law 

independently of the lower court.

5. Administrative Law: Motor Vehicles: Licenses and Permits: Revocation: 

Police Officers and Sheriffs: Jurisdiction. An arresting officer’s sworn report 

under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-498.01(2) (Cum. Supp. 2012) serves two functions 

essential to the administrative license revocation process: (1) It establishes a 

prima facie basis for revocation, and (2) it confers jurisdiction on the Department 

of Motor Vehicles.
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6. Drunk Driving: Arrests: Proof. There are two components to the reasons for 

arrest which must be included in a sworn report: (1) driving or actual physical 

control of a motor vehicle and (2) doing so while under the influence of alcohol 

or drugs.

7. Administrative Law: Jurisdiction: Drunk Driving: Proof. Sworn reports 

which do not include factual reasons supporting the officer’s suspicion that a person is driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle and doing so while 

under the influence are not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Department of 

Motor Vehicles.

8. Drunk Driving: Statutes. Nebraska’s driving under the influence statutes do not 

apply to the operation or control of a motor vehicle on private property not open 

to public access.

9. Statutes: Appeal and Error. The rules of statutory interpretation require an 

appellate court to give effect to the entire language of a statute, and to reconcile different provisions of the statutes so they are consistent, harmonious, 

and sensible.

10. ____: ____. An appellate court gives statutory language its plain and ordinary 

meaning, and the court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning 

of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.

11. ____: ____. An appellate court gives effect to all parts of a statute and avoids 

rejecting as superfluous or meaningless any word, clause, or sentence.

12. Statutes. A court will not read a meaning into a statute that is not warranted by 

the legislative language.

13. Drunk Driving. A sworn report under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-498.01(2) (Cum. 

Supp. 2012) does not need to state or support an inference that the individual 

arrested drove or controlled a motor vehicle on property open to public access.

Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Gregory

M. Schatz, Judge. Affirmed.

Thomas Petersen, of Petersen Law Office, for appellant.

Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and Milissa Johnson-Wiles 

for appellee.

Wright, Connolly, Stephan, McCormack, Miller-Lerman, 

and Cassel, JJ.

Connolly, J.

SUMMARY

A police officer arrested Daniel Hoppens after he was found 

in a motor vehicle parked in an Omaha Police Department 

parking lot. The arresting officer observed signs of intoxication and asked Hoppens to perform a chemical test. Hoppens 

refused, and following an administrative license revocation 
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Cite as 288 Neb. 857

(ALR) hearing, the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles 

(DMV) revoked his driving privileges for 1 year and the district court for Douglas County affirmed the revocation. On 

appeal, Hoppens argues that the DMV did not have jurisdiction to revoke his license because the sworn report submitted 

by the arresting officer did not state that the motor vehicle 

was on property open to public access. Finding no error, 

we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Omaha police officer Scott Shymkewicz was “working 

a DUI mini grant” on March 10, 2013. As he was fueling his cruiser at an Omaha Police Department parking lot 

in downtown Omaha, he noticed a vehicle without police 

markings in the lot. Shymkewicz approached the vehicle and 

found Hoppens in the driver’s seat. Shymkewicz observed that 

Hoppens had bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and a strong odor 

of alcohol on his breath. Hoppens told Shymkewicz that “he 

had just driven into the lot” and was waiting for a friend to 

exit a nearby bar. Shymkewicz testified that the parking lot is 

private property and that signs posted on the lot warned it was 

for police use only. Although Shymkewicz did not observe the 

vehicle in motion, he concluded that Hoppens had driven the 

vehicle, because the engine was running and Hoppens said that 

he drove to the lot.

After Hoppens failed several field sobriety tests and an 

“aqua breath sensor test,” Shymkewicz placed him under arrest 

and took him inside police headquarters. Shymkewicz testified that he then read the postarrest chemical test advisement form to Hoppens. In addition to a signature field for the 

“Advising Officer,” the form contains a space for the signature 

of a “Witnessing Officer.” Hoppens told Shymkewicz that there 

needed to be a witnessing officer and refused to sign the form 

without one. Shymkewicz told Hoppens that it was not necessary for a witnessing officer, or even Hoppens himself, to sign 

the form, but Hoppens nevertheless declined to take a chemical test.

Shymkewicz drafted a “Sworn Report,” which stated that 

Hoppens had been directed to take a chemical test and refused. 
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860 288 NEBRASKA REPORTS

The report further stated that Shymkewicz arrested Hoppens as 

described in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197 (Cum. Supp. 2012) and 

provided the following reasons for the arrest:

HOPPENS was sitting in the driver’s seat of his car with 

the keys in the ignition, engine running, and headlights on 

in the Omaha Police Dept. headquarters parking lot where 

a sign is posted prohibiting it. He admitted drinking a few 

sips of beer and showed signs of intoxication: bloodshot 

eyes, slurred speech, strong odor of alcoholic beverage on 

his breath. He showed impairment on field tests and failed 

an alco test.

On March 19, 2013, Hoppens filed a petition for an ALR 

hearing.

On April 5, 2013, an ALR hearing was held before the DMV. 

The hearing officer acknowledged that Hoppens, Shymkewicz, 

and the attorney representing the DMV all agreed that the 

parking lot was private property. However, the hearing officer 

found that she did not need to address the issue, “because the 

totality of the circumstances leading to [Hoppens’] arrest convinces her that [Hoppens] had to have been intoxicated and 

operating a motor vehicle prior to and at the time he drove into 

the lot.” Because there was no evidence that anyone other than 

Hoppens operated the vehicle and he had to have traveled on 

public streets to reach the parking lot, the hearing officer found 

that “it must be assumed that [Hoppens] operated his vehicle 

on a public roadway while intoxicated prior to entering the 

lot.” The hearing officer recommended that the director of the 

DMV revoke Hoppens’ driver’s license. The director adopted 

the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer and revoked 

Hoppens’ driver’s license for 1 year.

Hoppens filed a petition for review in the district court, 

arguing that he was on private property not open to public 

access and therefore not required to submit to a chemical test. 

The district court dismissed Hoppens’ petition. The court found 

that “[w]hether the parking lot is private property not open to 

public access is a question of fact to be determined at trial” 

and that Shymkewicz’ sworn report was “clearly sufficient” 

to confer jurisdiction on the DMV. The court also rejected 
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HOPPENS v. NEBRASKA DEPT. OF MOTOR VEHICLES 861

Cite as 288 Neb. 857

Hoppens’ argument that, because the vehicle was on property 

not open to public access, the arresting officer lacked probable 

cause to arrest.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Hoppens assigns, restated, that the DMV erred in concluding it had jurisdiction to revoke his driving privileges, because 

the sworn report did not state or support an inference that 

he had operated a motor vehicle on property open to public access.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1-4] A judgment or final order rendered by a district court 

in a judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure 

Act may be reversed, vacated, or modified by an appellate 

court for errors appearing on the record.1 When reviewing 

an order of a district court under the act for errors appearing 

on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision conforms to 

the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither 

arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.2 Whether a decision 

conforms to law is by definition a question of law.3 An appellate court determines questions of law independently of the 

lower court.4

ANALYSIS

Hoppens argues that the sworn report was insufficient to 

confer jurisdiction on the DMV. Specifically, Hoppens contends that a sworn report must at least support an inference that 

he was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 

on property open to public access. The DMV argues that its 

jurisdiction is not dependent on a statement of the vehicle’s 

location in the sworn report. The following statutes guide 

our analysis.

1 Underwood v. Nebraska State Patrol, 287 Neb. 204, 842 N.W.2d 57 

(2014).

2 Id.

3 See id.

4 See State v. Patton, 287 Neb. 899, 845 N.W.2d 572 (2014).
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862 288 NEBRASKA REPORTS

Any person who operates a motor vehicle in Nebraska is 

deemed to have consented to submit to chemical tests to determine the concentration of alcohol in the blood, breath, or urine. 

Peace officers may direct any person arrested for suspicion of 

driving under the influence of alcohol to submit to a chemical test.5

 A driver who refuses to submit is subject to the ALR 

procedures found in Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 60-498.01 to 60-498.04 

(Cum. Supp. 2012).

The ALR process begins with a sworn report authored by the 

arresting officer. If the driver refuses to submit to a chemical 

test, § 60-498.01(2) provides:

The arresting peace officer shall within ten days forward 

to the director a sworn report stating (a) that the person 

was arrested as described in subsection (2) of section 

60-6,197 and the reasons for such arrest, (b) that the person was requested to submit to the required test, and (c) 

that the person refused to submit to the required test.

Section 60-6,197(2) applies to “any person arrested for any 

offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed 

while the person was driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic 

liquor or drugs.” Unless the driver submits a petition to 

the director, revocation is automatic 15 days after the date 

of arrest.6

[5] An arresting officer’s sworn report serves two functions 

essential to the ALR process. First, it establishes a prima facie 

basis for revocation.7 Second, given the substantial role which 

the sworn report plays, it must, at a minimum, contain the 

information specified in the applicable statute to confer jurisdiction on the DMV.8

 Here, our focus is on the “reasons for 

such arrest” that must be included in the sworn report under 

§ 60-498.01(2).

5 Snyder v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 274 Neb. 168, 736 N.W.2d 731 

(2007).

6 § 60-498.01(4).

7 Snyder, supra note 5.

8 Murray v. Neth, 279 Neb. 947, 783 N.W.2d 424 (2010); Hahn v. Neth, 270 

Neb. 164, 699 N.W.2d 32 (2005).
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Cite as 288 Neb. 857

We addressed the sufficiency of the reasons for arrest in a 

sworn report in Betterman v. Department of Motor Vehicles.

9

The sworn report in Betterman stated the following reasons for 

the driver’s arrest: “‘[R]eckless driving. Driver displayed signs 

of alcohol intoxication. Refused SFST and later breath test.’”10

We explained that “[a]n arrest described in § 60-6,197(2) is 

an arrest ‘for any offense arising out of acts alleged to have 

been committed while the person was driving or was in actual 

physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence 

of alcoholic liquor or drugs.’”11 Examining the information 

conveyed in the report, we held that “‘reckless driving’” and 

“‘“displayed signs of alcohol intoxication”’” were sufficient 

reasons for an arrest under § 60-6,197(2).12

[6,7] Under Betterman, there are two components to the 

reasons for arrest which must be included in a sworn report: 

(1) driving or actual physical control of a motor vehicle and 

(2) doing so while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 

Both components are derived from the language on the face 

of § 60-6,197(2). The statutory requirements are not onerous,13

and sworn reports which do not include factual reasons supporting the officer’s suspicion that a person is both driving 

or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle and doing 

so while under the influence are not sufficient to confer 

jurisdiction on the DMV. For example, we held in Snyder v. 

Department of Motor Vehicles14 that “‘[s]peeding (20 OVER)/

D.U.I.’” was insufficient because it failed to state the officer’s 

factual reasons for believing that the driver was intoxicated. 

The Nebraska Court of Appeals has held that sworn reports 

failed to include the factual reasons for suspecting that the 

individual arrested was driving or in actual physical control of 

9 Betterman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 273 Neb. 178, 728 N.W.2d 

570 (2007).

10 Id. at 182, 728 N.W.2d at 578.

11 Id. at 186, 728 N.W.2d at 581, quoting § 60-6,197(2).

12 Id.

13 See Johnson v. Neth, 276 Neb. 886, 758 N.W.2d 395 (2008).

14 Snyder, supra note 5, 274 Neb. at 168, 736 N.W.2d at 732.
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a motor vehicle where the reasons for arrest were as follows: 

“‘[P]assed out in front of [the gas] Station, near front doors. 

Signs of alcohol intoxication,’”15 and “‘1 vehicle accident, 

odor of Alcoholic beverage Bloodshot watery eyes, Slurred 

Speech, Refused Field Sobriety. Refused PBT Refused Legal 

Blood, Refused Urine sample test.’”16

[8] Hoppens does not dispute that Shymkewicz’ sworn report 

includes sufficient factual reasons for suspecting that he was 

in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the 

influence of alcohol. Instead, Hoppens argues that the “reasons 

for such arrest” in § 60-498.01(2) must also include a statement of the arresting officer’s factual reasons for believing that 

the vehicle was driven or controlled while on property open 

to public access. Hoppens relies on the Nebraska Rules of 

the Road,17 in which § 60-6,197 is codified. Section 60-6,108 

provides that § 60-6,197 “appl[ies] upon highways and anywhere throughout the state except private property which is not 

open to public access.” We have recognized that our driving 

under the influence statutes, including criminal liability for the 

refusal of a chemical test, do not apply to the operation or control of a motor vehicle on private property not open to public 

access.18 Hoppens argues, in essence, that the phrase “arrested 

as described in subsection (2) of section 60-6,197 and the reasons for such arrest” found in § 60-498.01(2) incorporates a 

requirement that the sworn report include the facts necessary 

to sustain a criminal conviction.

[9-12] Hoppens’ assignment of error calls upon us to interpret § 60-498.01. The rules of statutory interpretation require 

an appellate court to give effect to the entire language of a 

statute, and to reconcile different provisions of the statutes so 

15 Yenney v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 15 Neb. App. 446, 451, 729 

N.W.2d 95, 99 (2007).

16 Barnett v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 17 Neb. App. 795, 797, 770 

N.W.2d 672, 674 (2009).

17 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 60-601 to 60-6,382 (Reissue 2010, Cum. Supp. 

2012 & Supp. 2013).

18 State v. McCave, 282 Neb. 500, 805 N.W.2d 290 (2011).
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Cite as 288 Neb. 857

they are consistent, harmonious, and sensible.19 We give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, and we will not 

resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory 

words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.20 We will give 

effect to all parts of a statute and avoid rejecting as superfluous 

or meaningless any word, clause, or sentence.21 And we will 

not read a meaning into a statute that is not warranted by the 

legislative language.22

[13] We conclude that the reasons for an arrest as described 

in § 60-6,197(2) include those reasons described in the text of 

that section. Namely, the sworn report must state the arresting 

officer’s reasons for believing that the individual arrested was 

driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while 

under the influence of alcohol or drugs. We do not read the 

disputed clause of § 60-498.01(2) to incorporate the Nebraska 

Rules of the Road and any other factual predicates for a 

criminal conviction under our driving under the influence laws. 

Furthermore, there is no requirement in § 60-498.01(2) that the 

sworn report describe the requisites of a valid arrest. In fact, 

the Legislature amended the predecessor to § 60-498.01(2) in 

2003 to remove the requirement that the arresting officer aver 

that the driver was “validly” arrested under § 60-6,197(2).23 We 

hold that the sworn report under § 60-498.01(2) does not need 

to state or support an inference that the individual arrested 

drove or controlled a motor vehicle on property open to public access.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the arresting officer’s sworn report under 

§ 60-498.01(2) does not need to state or support an inference 

that the motor vehicle was driven or operated on property 

open to public access to confer jurisdiction on the DMV. The 

19 ML Manager v. Jensen, 287 Neb. 171, 842 N.W.2d 566 (2014).

20 Id.

21 See id.

22 See id.

23 2003 Neb. Laws, L.B. 209, § 4.
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reasons for arrest that must be included in a sworn report are 

those facts supporting the officer’s suspicion that the individual arrested drove or physically controlled a motor vehicle 

while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Hoppens does 

not dispute that Shymkewicz’ sworn report included these 

factual reasons or argue that the sworn report was otherwise 

deficient. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

We note that in Sherman v. Neth,

24 the Court of Appeals 

held that a sworn report must contain sufficient assertions to 

allow an inference that the motorist was on a public road or 

private property open to public access. Although we reversed 

the Court of Appeals’ decision on other grounds in Sherman 

v. Neth25 and remanded the cause to the Court of Appeals 

with orders to vacate its decision, we take this opportunity to disapprove the above-stated holding in the Court of 

Appeals’ decision.

Affirmed.

Heavican, C.J., participating on briefs.

24 Sherman v. Neth, 19 Neb. App. 435, 808 N.W.2d 365 (2011).

25 Sherman v. Neth, 283 Neb. 895, 813 N.W.2d 501 (2012).

Telrite Corporation, doing business as Life

Wireless, appellant, v. Nebraska Public

Service Commission, appellee.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed August 22, 2014. No. S-13-870.

1. Public Service Commission: Appeal and Error. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 75-136(2) (Supp. 2013), an appellate court reviews an order of the Nebraska 

Public Service Commission de novo on the record.

2. Appeal and Error. In a review de novo on the record, an appellate court reappraises the evidence as presented by the record and reaches its own independent 

conclusions concerning the matters at issue.

3. Public Service Commission: Appeal and Error. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 75-136 

(Supp. 2013), an appellate court must reappraise the evidence on the record as