IV 

110TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. RES. 1345 

Impeaching George W. Bush, President of the United States, of high crimes 

and misdemeanors. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 15, 2008 

Mr. KUCINICH submitted the following resolution 

JULY 15, 2008 

By motion of the House, referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

RESOLUTION 

Impeaching George W. Bush, President of the United States, 

of high crimes and misdemeanors. 

1 Resolved, That President George W. Bush be im2 peached for high crimes and misdemeanors, and that the 

3 following Article of Impeachment be exhibited to the 

4 United States Senate: 

5 An Article of Impeachment exhibited by the House 

6 of Representatives of the United States of America in the 

7 name of itself and the people of the United States of 

8 America, in maintenance and support of its impeachment 


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1 against President George W. Bush for high crimes and 

2 misdemeanors. 

3 ARTICLE ONE—DECEIVING CONGRESS WITH FAB4 RICATED THREATS OF IRAQ WMDS TO FRAUDU5 LENTLY OBTAIN SUPPORT FOR AN AUTHORIZATION

6 OF THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ

7 In his conduct while President of the United States, 

8 George W. Bush, in violation of his constitutional oath to 

9 faithfully execute the Office of President of the United 

10 States, and to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, 

11 and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in 

12 violation of his constitutional duty under article II, section 

13 3 of the Constitution ‘‘to take care that the laws be faith14 fully executed,’’ deceived Congress with fabricated threats 

15 of Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction to fraudulently ob16 tain support for an authorization for the use of force 

17 against Iraq and used that fraudulently obtained author18 ization, then acting in his capacity under article II, section 

19 2 of the Constitution as Commander in Chief, to commit 

20 U.S. troops to combat in Iraq. 

21 To gain congressional support for the passage of the 

22 Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States 

23 Armed Forces Against Iraq, the President made the fol24 lowing material representations to the Congress in S.J. 

25 Res. 45: 


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1 1. That Iraq was ‘‘continuing to possess and 

2 develop a significant chemical and biological weapons 

3 capability. . . .’’ 

4 2. That Iraq was ‘‘actively seeking a nuclear 

5 weapons capability. . . .’’ 

6 3. That Iraq was ‘‘continuing to threaten the 

7 national security interests of the United States and 

8 international peace and security.’’ 

9 4. That Iraq has demonstrated a ‘‘willingness 

10 to attack, the United States. . . .’’ 

11 5. That ‘‘members of al Qaeda, an organization 

12 bearing responsibility for attacks on the United 

13 States, its citizens and interests, including the at14 tacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are 

15 known to be in Iraq. . . .’’ 

16 6. The ‘‘attacks on the United States of Sep17 tember 11, 2001, underscored the gravity of the 

18 threat that Iraq will transfer weapons of mass de19 struction to international terrorist organiza20 tions. . . .’’ 

21 7. That Iraq ‘‘will either employ those weapons 

22 to launch a surprise attack against the United 

23 States or its Armed Forces or provide them to inter24 national terrorists who would do so. . . .’’ 


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1 8. That an ‘‘extreme magnitude of harm that 

2 would result to the United States and its citizens 

3 from such an attack. . . .’’ 

4 9. That the aforementioned threats ‘‘justify ac5 tion by the United States to defend itself. . . .’’ 

6 10. The enactment clause of section 2 of S.J. 

7 Res. 45, the Authorization of the Use of the United 

8 States Armed Forces authorizes the President to 

9 ‘‘defend the national security interests of the United 

10 States against the threat posed by Iraq. . . .’’ 

11 Each consequential representation made by the Presi12 dent to the Congress in S.J. Res. 45 in subsequent 

13 iterations and the final version was unsupported by evi14 dence which was in the control of the White House. 

15 To wit: 

16 1. Iraq was not ‘‘continuing to possess and de17 velop a significant chemical and biological weapons 

18 capability. . . .’’ 

19 ‘‘A substantial amount of Iraq’s chemical 

20 warfare agents, precursors, munitions and pro21 duction equipment were destroyed between 

22 1991 and 1998 as a result of Operation Desert 

23 Storm and United Nations Special Commission 

24 (UNSCOM) actions. There is no reliable infor25 mation on whether Iraq is producing and stockVerDate Aug 31 2005 01:53 Jul 25, 2008 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\HR1345.RTH HR1345

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1 piling chemical weapons or whether Iraq has or 

2 will establish its chemical warfare agent produc3 tion facilities.’’ 

4 The source of this information is the De5 fense Intelligence Agency, a report called, 

6 ‘‘Iraq—Key WMD Facilities—An Operational 

7 Support Study,’’ September 2002. 

8 ‘‘Statements by the President and Vice 

9 President prior to the October 2002 National 

10 Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq’s chemical 

11 weapons production capability and activities did 

12 not reflect the intelligence community’s uncer13 tainties as to whether such production was on14 going.’’ 

15 The source of this information is the Sen16 ate Select Committee on Intelligence, a report 

17 entitled ‘‘Report on Whether Public Statements 

18 Regarding Iraq By U.S. Government Officials 

19 Were Substantiated By Intelligence Informa20 tion.’’ June 5, 2008. 

21 ‘‘In April and early May 2003, military 

22 forces found mobile trailers in Iraq. Although 

23 intelligence experts disputed the purpose of the 

24 trailers, administration officials repeatedly as25 serted that they were mobile biological weapons 


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1 laboratories. In total, President Bush, Vice 

2 President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Sec3 retary Powell, and National Security Advisor 

4 Rice made 34 misleading statements about the 

5 trailers in 27 separate public appearances. 

6 Shortly after the mobile trailers were found, the 

7 Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense In8 telligence Agency issued an unclassified white 

9 paper evaluating the trailers. The white paper 

10 was released without coordination with other 

11 members of the intelligence community, how12 ever. It was later disclosed that engineers from 

13 the Defense Intelligence Agency who examined 

14 the trailers concluded that they were most likely 

15 used to produce hydrogen for artillery weather 

16 balloons. A former senior intelligence official re17 ported that ‘only one of 15 intelligence analysts 

18 assembled from three agencies to discuss the 

19 issue in June endorsed the white paper conclu20 sion.’ ’’ 

21 The source of this information is the 

22 House Committee on Government Reform, mi23 nority staff, ‘‘Iraq on the Record: Bush Admin24 istration’s Public Statements about Chemical 

25 and Biological Weapons.’’ March 16, 2004. 


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1 Former chief of CIA covert operations in 

2 Europe, Tyler Drumheller, has said that the 

3 CIA had credible sources discounting weapons 

4 of mass destruction claims, including the pri5 mary source of biological weapons claims, an in6 formant who the Germans code-named 

7 ‘‘Curveball’’ whom the Germans had informed 

8 the Bush administration was a likely fabricator 

9 of information including that concerning the 

10 Niger yellowcake forgery. Two other former 

11 CIA officers confirmed Drumheller’s account to 

12 Sidney Blumenthal who reported the story at 

13 Salon.com on September 6, 2007, which in fact 

14 is the media source of this information. 

15 ‘‘In practical terms, with the destruction of 

16 the al Hakam facility, Iraq abandoned its ambi17 tion to obtain advanced biological weapons 

18 quickly. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) found no 

19 direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans 

20 for a new biological weapons program or was 

21 conducting biological weapons-specific work for 

22 military purposes. Indeed, from the mid-1990s, 

23 despite evidence of continuing interest in nu24 clear and chemical weapons, there appears to be 

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1 est in biological weapons at the Presidential 

2 level. In spite of exhaustive investigation, the 

3 Iraq Survey Group found no evidence that Iraq 

4 possessed, or was developing, biological weapon 

5 agent production systems mounted on road ve6 hicles or railway wagons. The Iraq Survey 

7 Group harbors severe doubts about the source’s 

8 credibility in regards to the breakout program.’’ 

9 That’s a direct quote from the ‘‘Comprehensive 

10 Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of 

11 Central Intelligence on Iraq’s WMD,’’ com12 monly known as the Duelfer report by Charles 

13 Duelfer. 

14 ‘‘While a small number of old, abandoned 

15 chemical munitions have been discovered, the 

16 Iraq Survey Group judges that Iraq unilaterally 

17 destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons 

18 stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indica19 tions that Baghdad resumed production of 

20 chemical munitions thereafter, a policy the Iraq 

21 Survey Group attributes to Baghdad’s desire to 

22 see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or 

23 its fear of force against it should WMD be dis24 covered.’’ 


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1 The source of this information, the ‘‘Com2 prehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the 

3 Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq’s 

4 WMD,’’ Charles Duelfer. 

5 2. Iraq was not ‘‘actively seeking a nuclear 

6 weapons capability.’’ 

7 The key finding of the Iraq Survey 

8 Group’s report to the Director of Central Intel9 ligence found that ‘‘Iraq’s ability to reconstitute 

10 a nuclear weapons program progressively de11 cayed after that date. Saddam Husayn (sic) 

12 ended the nuclear program in 1991 following 

13 the Gulf War. Iraq Survey Group found no evi14 dence to suggest concerted efforts to restart the 

15 program.’’ 

16 The source of this information, the ‘‘Com17 prehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the 

18 Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq’s 

19 WMD,’’ Charles Duelfer. 

20 Claims that Iraq was purchasing uranium 

21 from Niger were not supported by the State 

22 Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Re23 search in the National Intelligence Estimate of 

24 October 2002. 


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1 The CIA had warned the British Govern2 ment not to claim Iraq was purchasing uranium 

3 from Niger prior to the British statement that 

4 was later cited by President Bush, this accord5 ing to George Tenet of the Central Intelligence 

6 Agency on July 11, 2003. 

7 Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General 

8 of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in 

9 a ‘‘Statement to the United Nations Security 

10 Council on The Status of Nuclear Inspections 

11 in Iraq: An Update’’ on March 7, 2003, said as 

12 follows: 

13 ‘‘One, there is no indication of resumed 

14 nuclear activities in those buildings that were 

15 identified through the use of satellite imagery 

16 as being reconstructed or newly erected since 

17 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related pro18 hibited activities at any inspected sites. Second, 

19 there is no indication that Iraq has attempted 

20 to import uranium since 1990. Three, there is 

21 no indication that Iraq has attempted to import 

22 aluminum tubes for use in centrifuge enrich23 ment. Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a 

24 plan, it would have been—it would have en25 countered practical difficulties in manufacturing 


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1 centrifuges out of the aluminum tubes in ques2 tion. Fourthly, although we are still reviewing 

3 issues related to magnets and magnet produc4 tion, there is no indication to date that Iraq im5 ported magnets for use in a centrifuge enrich6 ment program. As I stated above, the IAEA 

7 (International Atomic Energy Agency) will nat8 urally continue to further scrutinize and inves9 tigate all of the above issues.’’ 

10 3. Iraq was not ‘‘continuing to threaten the na11 tional security interests of the United States.’’ 

12 ‘‘Let me be clear: analysts differed on sev13 eral important aspects of [Iraq’s biological, 

14 chemical, and nuclear] programs and those de15 bates were spelled out in the Estimate. They 

16 never said there was an ‘imminent’ threat.’’ 

17 George Tenet, who was Director of the 

18 CIA, said this in Prepared Remarks for Deliv19 ery at Georgetown University on February 5, 

20 2004. 

21 ‘‘We have been able to keep weapons from 

22 going into Iraq. We have been able to keep the 

23 sanctions in place to the extent that items that 

24 might support weapons of mass destruction 

25 have had some controls on them. It’s been quite 


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1 a success for 10 years.’’ The source of this 

2 statement, Colin Powell, Secretary of State, in 

3 an interview with Face the Nation, February 

4 11, 2001. 

5 On July 23, 2002, a communication from 

6 the Private Secretary to Prime Minister Tony 

7 Blair, ‘‘Memo to British Ambassador David 

8 Manning’’ reads as follows: ‘‘British Secret In9 telligence Service Chief Sir Richard Billing 

10 Dearlove reported on his recent talks in Wash11 ington. There was a perceptible shift in atti12 tude. Military action was now seen as inevi13 table. Bush wanted to remove Saddam through 

14 military action, justified by the conjunction of 

15 terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and 

16 facts were being fixed around the policy. The 

17 NSC had no patience with the U.N. route and 

18 no enthusiasm for publishing material on the 

19 Iraqi regime’s record. There was little discus20 sion in Washington of the aftermath after mili21 tary action. The Foreign Secretary said he 

22 would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. 

23 It seemed clear that Bush had made up his 

24 mind to take military action, even if the timing 

25 was not yet decided. But the case was thin. 


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1 Saddam Hussein was not threatening his neigh2 bors, and his WMD capability was less than 

3 that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should 

4 work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to 

5 allow back in the U.N. weapons inspectors. This 

6 would also help with the legal justification for 

7 the use of force.’’ 

8 4. Iraq did not have the ‘‘willingness to attack, 

9 the United States.’’ 

10 ‘‘The fact of the matter is that both bas11 kets, the U.N. basket and what we and other 

12 allies have been doing in the region, have suc13 ceeded in containing Saddam Hussein and his 

14 ambitions. His forces are about one-third their 

15 original size. They really don’t possess the ca16 pability to attack their neighbors the way they 

17 did 10 years ago.’’ The source of this quote, 

18 Colin Powell, Secretary of State, in a transcript 

19 of remarks made to German Foreign Minister 

20 Joschka Fischer in February 2001. 

21 The October 2002 National Intelligence 

22 Estimate concluded that ‘‘Baghdad for now ap23 pears to be drawing a line short of conducting 

24 terrorist attacks with conventional or chemical 

25 or biological weapons against the United States, 


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1 fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement 

2 would provide Washington a stronger case for 

3 making war.’’ 

4 5. Iraq had no connection with the attacks of 

5 9/11 or with al Qaeda’s role in 9/11. 

6 ‘‘The report of the Senate Select Com7 mittee on Intelligence documents significant in8 stances in which the administration went be9 yond what the intelligence community knew or 

10 believed in making public claims, most notably 

11 on the false assertion that Iraq and al Qaeda 

12 had an operational partnership and joint in13 volvement in carrying out the attacks of Sep14 tember 11.’’ This is a quote from Senator John 

15 D. Rockefeller, IV, the chairman of the Senate 

16 Select Committee on Intelligence entitled ‘‘Ad17 ditional Views of Chairman John D. Rocke18 feller, IV’’ on page 90. 

19 Continuing from Senator Rockefeller: 

20 ‘‘The President and his advisors undertook 

21 a relentless public campaign in the aftermath of 

22 the attacks to use the war against al Qaeda as 

23 a justification for overthrowing Saddam Hus24 sein. Representing to the American people that 

25 the two had an operational partnership and 


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1 posed a single, indistinguishable threat was fun2 damentally misleading and led the Nation to 

3 war on false premises.’’ Senator Rockefeller. 

4 Richard Clarke, a National Security Advi5 sor, in a memo of September 18, 2001, titled 

6 ‘‘Survey of Intelligence Information on Any 

7 Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks’’ 

8 found no ‘‘compelling case’’ that Iraq had either 

9 planned or perpetrated the attacks, and that 

10 there was no confirmed reporting on Saddam 

11 cooperating with bin Laden on unconventional 

12 weapons. 

13 On September 17, 2003, President Bush 

14 said: ‘‘No, we’ve got no evidence that Saddam 

15 Hussein was involved with September 11. What 

16 the Vice President said was is that he (Sad17 dam) has been involved with al Qaeda.’’ 

18 On June 16, 2004, a staff report from the 

19 9/11 Commission stated: ‘‘There have been re20 ports that contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda 

21 also occurred after bin Laden had returned to 

22 Afghanistan in 1996, but they do not appear to 

23 have resulted in a collaborative relationship. 

24 Two senior bin Laden associates have ada25 mantly denied that any ties existed between al 


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1 Qaeda and Iraq. We have no credible evidence 

2 that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks 

3 against the United States.’’ 

4 ‘‘Intelligence provided by former Undersec5 retary of Defense Douglas J. Feith to buttress 

6 the White House case for invading Iraq in7 cluded ‘reporting of dubious quality or reli8 ability’ that supported the political views of sen9 ior administration officials rather than the con10 clusions of the intelligence community, this ac11 cording to a report by the Pentagon Inspector 

12 General. 

13 ‘‘Feith’s office ‘was predisposed to finding 

14 a significant relationship between Iraq and al 

15 Qaeda,’ according to portions of the report re16 leased by Senator Carl Levin. The Inspector 

17 General described Feith’s activities as ‘an alter18 native intelligence assessment process.’ ’’ The 

19 source of this information is a report in the 

20 Washington Post dated February 9, 2007, page 

21 A–1, an article by Walter Pincus and Jeffrey 

22 Smith entitled ‘‘Official’s Key Report on Iraq is 

23 Faulted, ‘Dubious’ Intelligence Fueled Push for 

24 War.’’ 


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1 6. Iraq possessed no weapons of mass destruc2 tion to transfer to anyone. 

3 Iraq possessed no weapons of mass de4 struction to transfer. Furthermore, available in5 telligence information found that the Iraq re6 gime would probably only transfer weapons of 

7 mass destruction to terrorist organizations if 

8 under threat of attack by the United States. 

9 According to information in the October 

10 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on 

11 Iraq that was available to the administration at 

12 the time that they were seeking congressional 

13 support for the authorization of use of force 

14 against Iraq, the Iraq regime would probably 

15 only transfer weapons to a terrorist organiza16 tion if ‘‘sufficiently desperate’’ because it feared 

17 that ‘‘an attack that threatened the survival of 

18 the regime were imminent or unavoidable.’’ 

19 ‘‘The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) prob20 ably has been directed to conduct clandestine 

21 attacks against the United States and Allied in22 terests in the Middle East in the event the 

23 United States takes action against Iraq. The 

24 IIS probably would be the primary means by 

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1 ical and biological weapon attacks on the U.S. 

2 homeland, although we have no specific intel3 ligence information that Saddam’s regime has 

4 directed attacks against U.S. territory.’’ 

5 7. Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction and 

6 therefore had no capability of launching a surprise 

7 attack against the United States or its Armed 

8 Forces and no capability to provide them to inter9 national terrorists who would do so. 

10 Iraq possessed no weapons of mass de11 struction to transfer. Furthermore, available in12 telligence information found that the Iraq re13 gime would probably only transfer weapons of 

14 mass destruction to terrorist organizations if 

15 under severe threat of attack by the United 

16 States. 

17 According to information in the October 

18 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq 

19 that was available to the administration at the 

20 time they were seeking congressional support 

21 for the authorization of the use of force against 

22 Iraq, the Iraqi regime would probably only 

23 transfer weapons to a terrorist organization if 

24 ‘‘sufficiently desperate’’ because it feared that 

25 ‘‘an attack that threatened the survival of the 


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1 regime were imminent or unavoidable.’’ That, 

2 again, from the October 2002 National Intel3 ligence Estimate on Iraq. 

4 ‘‘The Iraqi Intelligence Service probably 

5 has been directed to conduct clandestine attacks 

6 against U.S. and Allied interests in the Middle 

7 East in the event the United States takes ac8 tion against Iraq. The Iraq Intelligence Service 

9 probably would be the primary means by which 

10 Iraq would attempt to conduct any chemical or 

11 biological weapons attacks on the U.S. home12 land, although we have no specific intelligence 

13 information that Saddam’s regime has directed 

14 attacks against U.S. territory.’’ 

15 As reported in the Washington Post on 

16 March 1, 2003, in 1995, Saddam Hussein’s 

17 son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, had informed U.S. 

18 and British intelligence officers that ‘‘all weap19 ons—biological, chemical, missile, nuclear— 

20 were destroyed.’’ That from the Washington 

21 Post, March 1, 2003, page A15, an article enti22 tled ‘‘Iraqi Defector Claimed Arms Were De23 stroyed By 1995,’’ by Colum Lynch. 

24 The Defense Intelligence Agency, in a re25 port called ‘‘Iraq—Key WMD Facilities—An 


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1 Operational Report Study’’ in September 2002, 

2 said this: 

3 ‘‘A substantial amount of Iraq’s chemical 

4 warfare agents, precursors, munitions and pro5 duction equipment were destroyed between 

6 1991 and 1998 as a result of Operation Desert 

7 Storm and United Nations Special Commission 

8 (UNSCOM) actions. There is no reliable infor9 mation on whether Iraq is producing and stock10 piling chemical weapons or whether Iraq has or 

11 will establish its chemical warfare agent produc12 tion facilities.’’ 

13 8. There was not a real risk of an ‘‘extreme 

14 magnitude of harm that would result to the United 

15 States and its citizens from such an attack’’ because 

16 Iraq had no capability of attacking the United 

17 States. 

18 Here’s what Colin Powell said at the time: 

19 ‘‘Containment has been a successful policy, and 

20 I think we should make sure that we continue 

21 it until such time as Saddam Hussein comes 

22 into compliance with the agreements he made 

23 at the end of the Gulf War.’’ Speaking of Iraq, 

24 Secretary of State Powell said, ‘‘Iraq is not 

25 threatening America.’’ 


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1 9. The aforementioned evidence did not ‘‘justify 

2 the use of force by the United States to defend 

3 itself’’ because Iraq did not have weapons of mass 

4 destruction, or have the intention or capability of 

5 using nonexistent WMDs against the United States. 

6 10. Since there was no threat posed by Iraq to 

7 the United States, the enactment clause of the Sen8 ate Joint Resolution 45 was predicated on 

9 misstatements to Congress. 

10 Congress relied on the information provided to it by 

11 the President of the United States. Congress provided the 

12 President with the authorization to use military force that 

13 he requested. As a consequence of the fraudulent represen14 tations made to Congress, the United States Armed 

15 Forces, under the direction of George Bush as Com16 mander in Chief, pursuant to section 3 of the Authoriza17 tion for the Use of Force which President Bush requested, 

18 invaded Iraq and occupies it to this day, at the cost of 

19 4,116 lives of servicemen and -women, injuries to over 

20 30,000 of our troops, the deaths of over 1 million innocent 

21 Iraqi civilians, the destruction of Iraq, and a long-term 

22 cost of over $3 trillion. 

23 President Bush’s misrepresentations to Congress to 

24 induce passage of a use of force resolution is subversive 

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1 structive of Congress’s sole prerogative to declare war 

2 under article I, section 8 of the Constitution, and is there3 fore a High Crime. An even greater offense by the Presi4 dent of the United States occurs in his capacity as Com5 mander in Chief, because he knowingly placed the men 

6 and women of the United States Armed Forces in harm’s 

7 way, jeopardizing their lives and their families’ future, for 

8 reasons that to this date have not been established in fact. 

9 In all of these actions and decisions, President 

10 George W. Bush has acted in a manner contrary to his 

11 trust as President and Commander in Chief, and subver12 sive of constitutional government, to the prejudice of the 

13 cause of law and justice and to the manifest injury of the 

14 people of the United States and of those members of the 

15 Armed Forces who put their lives on the line pursuant 

16 to the falsehoods of the President. 

17 Wherefore, President George W. Bush, by such con18 duct, is guilty of an impeachable offense warranting re19 moval from office. 

Æ 


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