State of Maryland v. Arnold Davis, No. 1898, September Term 2019, Submitted on Brief: 

September 14, 2020 

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL - VOIR DIRE. 

Whether defense counsel’s failure to object to a compound strong feelings question 

constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel is determined by the state of the law at the time 

the question is posed. 
Circuit Court for Wicomico County 

Case No. 22-K-07-000196 

REPORTED 

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS 

OF MARYLAND 

 

No. 1898 

September Term, 2019 

______________________________________ 

STATE OF MARYLAND 

v. 

ARNOLD DAVIS 

______________________________________ 

 Leahy, 

Gould, 

Moylan, Charles E. 

 (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), 

 

JJ. 

______________________________________ 

Opinion by Gould, J. 

______________________________________ 

 

 Filed: January 28, 2021 
 In 2007, Arnold Davis, appellee, was convicted by a jury sitting in the Circuit Court 

for Wicomico County of several offenses related to an armed home invasion in Salisbury, 

Maryland.1

 In 2019, the circuit court granted Mr. Davis’s motion for post-conviction relief, 

finding his counsel ineffective and awarding him a new trial. The State appeals from that 

decision, asking: “Did the [circuit] court err in finding [Mr. Davis’s] trial counsel 

ineffective for not objecting to a compound voir dire question addressing potential jurors’ 

‘strong emotional feelings’ regarding the crimes of attempted murder and kidnapping?” 

For the reasons below, we agree with the State that the circuit court erred and reverse. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

During voir dire, the circuit court asked the venire panel the following question: 

The charges, as you may have heard, involve an allegation of attempted 

murder. Does the nature – and also kidnapping. Do the nature of the charges 

themselves, just alone, stir up such strong emotional feelings in you that you 

cannot be a fair and impartial juror in this case? 

 

Mr. Davis’s counsel did not object to this question, and no prospective juror responded. 

Mr. Davis also did not challenge the propriety of the voir dire question in his direct appeal. 

Ten years after his conviction and sentencing, Mr. Davis filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial. Citing Dingle v. State, 361 

1

 Specifically, Mr. Davis was convicted of first-degree assault; four counts of 

second-degree assault; five counts of reckless endangerment; and two counts each of use 

of a handgun in the commission of a felony or a crime of violence and wearing, carrying, 

or transporting a handgun. He was sentenced to a total of 75 years and one day of 

incarceration, which was later modified to 62 years and one day. We affirmed his 

convictions on direct appeal. See Davis v. State, No. 2158, Sept. Term, 2007 (filed March 

20, 2009), cert. denied, 409 Md. 414 (2009). 
2 

Md. 1 (2000), he argued that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient because his 

counsel did not object to the compound “feelings” voir dire question recited above. The 

State responded that Mr. Davis’s trial counsel did not perform deficiently because the voir 

dire question was proper when Mr. Davis was tried, and therefore, the circuit court did not 

need to address prejudice. 

A hearing on the motion was held on May 24, 2019. Mr. Davis’s trial counsel was 

the sole witness. He testified that he was aware of the Court of Appeals’ decision in Dingle. 

As to why he did not object to the trial court’s voir dire question, he responded: “[T]here 

are instances where I know a question is a Dingle question and I make an affirmative 

decision not to object. I don’t recall in this case so I would be speculating [as to why I did 

not object].” He explained why he sometimes intentionally did not object, stating: 

“Depends on the jury, it depends on the charge, it depends on sort of how the trial is 

proceeding[,] . . . [whether] I [] believe it is dispositive or significant[, or] I’m more 

interested in other questions.” He testified, “I can’t think of a reason why I wouldn’t object 

to it in this case” and could not recall whether he had a strategy behind not objecting. He 

candidly testified on cross-examination that for him, not objecting to a voir dire question 

is sometimes a trial tactic and sometimes the result of inattention. 

Following the trial attorney’s testimony and the parties’ arguments, the circuit court 

took the matter under advisement. In a subsequent written opinion, the court agreed with 

Mr. Davis’s argument that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. The court 

concluded that (1) the question was improper under Dingle; (2) the trial counsel’s failure 
3 

to object amounted to deficient performance; and (3) prejudice was presumed under Wright 

v. State, 411 Md. 503 (2009). 

DISCUSSION 

The State argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in concluding that Mr. Davis’s 

trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. The State argues that trial counsel’s 

performance was not deficient for not objecting to the voir dire question at issue because, 

at the time of Mr. Davis’s trial, Maryland law allowed compound voir dire questions about 

“the state of mind or attitude” of prospective jurors about the charged crimes. The State 

contends that it was not until the Court of Appeals decided Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350 

(2014), that such questions were deemed improper. The State also argues that the circuit 

court erred in presuming prejudice because Mr. Davis was required to prove actual 

prejudice, which he did not. Mr. Davis responds that the circuit court did not err in finding 

his trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to an improper voir dire question, and the 

court correctly found the error created a presumption of prejudice. 

I. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 “[R]eview of a post[-]conviction court’s findings regarding ineffective assistance of 

counsel is a mixed question of law and fact.” Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 351 (2017), 

cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 665 (2018) (citation omitted). An appellate court 

will not disturb the factual findings of a trial court, unless those findings are clearly 

erroneous. Arrington v. State, 411 Md. 524, 551 (2009). We review a trial court’s 

conclusions of law, including its conclusion as to whether the petitioner’s counsel was 
4 

ineffective, without deference, making an independent determination of the relevant law 

and its application to the facts. Ramirez v. State, 464 Md. 532, 560 (2019) (citation 

omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1134 (2020). 

II. 

ANALYSIS 

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants criminal defendants 

the right to effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

684-85 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court set out a two-prong test for reviewing 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Id. at 687. The first prong is known as “the 

performance prong[,]” and the second prong is known as “the prejudice prong[.]” Newton, 

455 Md. at 356 (citations omitted). 

 As to the first prong, the petitioner must show that trial counsel’s performance was 

so deficient that “counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth 

Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Specifically, the petitioner “must show that 

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under 

prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 688. The Supreme Court explained: 

A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made 

to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct 

from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent 

in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that 

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under 

the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial 

strategy. There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any 

given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a 

particular client in the same way. 
5 

Id. at 689-90 (cleaned up). “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate 

assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 

judgment.” Id. at 690. 

 As to the second prong, the petitioner must also show that counsel’s deficient 

performance prejudiced petitioner’s defense. Id. at 687. This requires a showing of “either 

(1) a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different; or (2) that the result of the proceeding was 

fundamentally unfair or unreliable.” Bailey v. State, 464 Md. 685, 703 (2019) (cleaned 

up). The Court of Appeals has explained: “[w]e have interpreted reasonable probability

to mean there was a substantial or significant possibility that the verdict . . . would have 

been affected.” State v. Syed, 463 Md. 60, 86-87 (cleaned up), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 

140 S. Ct. 562 (2019). In Strickland, the Supreme Court explained how to assess prejudice: 

a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the 

evidence before the judge or jury. Some of the factual findings will have 

been unaffected by the errors, and factual findings that were affected will 

have been affected in different ways. Some errors will have had a pervasive 

effect on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire 

evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect. 

Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is 

more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming 

record support. Taking the unaffected findings as a given, and taking due 

account of the effect of the errors on the remaining findings, a court making 

the prejudice inquiry must ask if the [petitioner] has met the burden of 

showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been 

different absent the errors. 

466 U.S. at 695-96. 

Applying the foregoing principles of law to the facts of this case, we begin with the 

observation that Mr. Davis’s trial occurred seven years after the 2000 decision in Dingle 
6 

and seven years before the 2014 decision in Pearson v. State. The law on compound jury 

selection questions evolved over this 14-year period. Pinpointing Mr. Davis’s trial on this 

continuum is critical to the central issue before us: whether Mr. Davis’s trial counsel’s 

failure to object to the compound strong feelings question deprived Mr. Davis of his Sixth 

Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. 

In Dingle, the Court of Appeals held that a trial court erred when it asked, over 

defense counsel’s objection, several two-part voir dire questions concerning: (1) whether 

prospective jurors had certain “experiences or associations”; and (2) whether those 

experiences or associations would affect their ability to be fair and impartial.2 361 Md. at 

3-4, 21 (footnote omitted). The trial court had instructed the venire that they need not 

respond to the two-part questions unless they answered both parts in the affirmative. Id. at 

4 (footnote omitted). In reversing, the Court of Appeals explained: 

By upholding a voir dire inquiry in which a venire person is required to 

respond only if his or her answer is in the affirmative to both parts of a 

question directed at discovering the venire person[’s] experiences and 

associations and their effect on that venire person’s qualification to serve as 

a juror, and producing information only about those who respond, the holding 

of the Court of Special Appeals endorses a voir dire process that allows, if 

not requires, the individual venire person to decide his or her ability to be fair 

and impartial. Moreover, in those cases where the venire person has had the 

questioned experience or association, but believes he or she can be fair, the 

procedure followed in this case shifts from the trial judge to the venire 

responsibility to decide juror bias. Without information bearing on the 

relevant experiences or associations of the affected individual venire persons 

2

 The voir dire questions at issue in Dingle, asked whether the prospective jurors: 

(1) had been the victim of a crime, (2) had been accused of a crime, (3) had been a witness 

in a criminal case, (4) had served as a juror in criminal case, (5) had belonged to a victim’s 

rights group, (6) had studied the law, or (7) were associated with members of law 

enforcement. 361 Md. at 4 n.4.
7 

who were not required to respond, the court simply does not have the ability, 

and, therefore, is unable to evaluate whether such persons are capable of 

conducting themselves impartially. Moreover, the petitioner is deprived of 

the ability to challenge any of those persons for cause. Rather than advancing 

the purpose of voir dire, the form of the challenged inquiries in this case 

distorts and frustrates it. 

Id. at 21. 

 Less than a year after Dingle was decided, in Thomas v. State, 139 Md. App. 188 

(2001), we were confronted with a slightly different compound question that the trial court, 

over the defendant’s objection, had refused to ask the prospective jurors. The question at 

issue was: “Does any member of the jury panel have such strong feelings regarding 

violations of the narcotics laws that it would be difficult for you to fairly and impartially 

weigh the facts at a trial where narcotics violations have been alleged?” Id. at 195. We 

surveyed the relevant caselaw that included an extensive discussion of the then-recent 

Dingle decision, concluded that the trial court erred in refusing the question, and reversed 

the judgments. See id. at 195-202, 212. We pointed out that although the form of the 

question violated Dingle, we did not “fault” the defendant for proposing the question in 

that manner because the trial had occurred prior to the Dingle decision. Id. at 202. And, 

we instructed the trial court to break up the compound question into two parts, stating: 

The first question should identify any jurors who harbor strong feelings about 

narcotics or the laws governing narcotics. Then, the trial court should 

individually ask those members of the venire who responded affirmatively 

follow-up questions regarding their ability to be fair and impartial despite 

their strong feelings. 
8 

Id. at 202. As of July 2, 2001—the date we issued our decision in Thomas—the state of 

Maryland law appeared to be that Dingle did apply to a “strong feelings” compound 

question. But not for long. 

The Court of Appeals granted the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review 

our decision in Thomas. State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202 (2002). The Court agreed with our 

conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to ask this question. Id. at 

214. The Court also took note of our “guidance” to the trial court that the question should 

be broken into two parts. Id. at 204 n.1. On that issue, the Court disagreed with us, stating: 

We do not share the intermediate appellate court’s interpretation of Dingle

as it relates to this case and, thus, we do not believe the guidance it offers is 

necessary. When the inquiry is into the state of mind or attitude of the venire 

with regard to a particular crime or category of crimes, it is appropriate to 

phrase the question as was done in this case. 

Id. Thus, as of May 10, 2002—the date the Court of Appeals issued its decision in 

Thomas—the state of the law appeared to be that Dingle did not apply to a “strong feelings” 

compound question. 

 The Court of Appeals affirmed its Thomas holding three months later in Sweet v. 

State, 371 Md. 1 (2002). In Sweet, the petitioner had asked the trial court to give the 

following voir dire question: “Do the charges stir up strong emotional feelings in you that 

would affect your ability to be fair and impartial in this case?” 371 Md. at 9 (quotations 

omitted). Although the question had two-parts, the Court held that its decision was 

controlled by Thomas and concluded that “the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 

pose petitioner’s requested voir dire question, and petitioner is entitled to a new trial.” Id.
9 

at 10 (italics omitted). The propriety of the form of the question was not discussed in 

Sweet.

3

We subsequently followed the Thomas holding in Baker v. State, 157 Md. App. 600 

(2004) and Singfield v. State, 172 Md. App. 168 (2006). In Baker, citing Thomas and 

Sweet, we held that the trial court erred in refusing to ask the venire the following question: 

“[D]o you have any bias or prejudice concerning handguns which would prevent you from 

fairly weighing the evidence in this case?” Baker, 147 Md. App. at 612. In Singfield, 

citing Thomas, Sweet, and Baker, we held that the trial court erred in refusing to ask the 

venire the following question: “Does any member of the jury panel feel that the nature of 

this case would make it difficult or impossible for you to render a fair and impartial verdict, 

specifically because this case involves a murder with a handgun?” Singfield, 172 Md. App. 

at 170 n.2, 180-81 (italics omitted). The propriety of the compound form of the question 

was not before us in either case. 

 Mr. Davis was tried in the year following Singfield, on August 27-28, 2007. 

 Four years later, in State v. Shim, 418 Md. 37, 39 (2011), the Court of Appeals 

reasserted its Thomas and Sweet position, holding that the trial court had abused its 

discretion in refusing “to ask whether the venire panel harbored ‘such strong feelings 

concerning the violent death of another human being’ that they would be ‘unable to render 

a fair and impartial verdict based solely on the evidence presented[.]’” The Court stated: 

3

 Perhaps that’s because the trial in Sweet apparently took place before the Court 

decided Dingle. See Maryland Judiciary Case Search, available at 

http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/casesearch/inquiryDetail.jis?caseId=86388C&loc=68

&detailLoc=MCCR (last visited Dec. 6, 2020). 
10 

“When requested by a defendant, and regardless of the crime, the court should ask the 

general question, ‘Does any member of the jury panel have such strong feelings about [the 

charges in this case] that it would be difficult for you to fairly and impartially weigh the 

facts.’” Id. at 54. The compound nature of the question was also not addressed by the 

Court in Shim.

 That same year, in Wimbish v. State, 201 Md. App. 239, 268 (2011), we articulated 

our understanding of the Court of Appeals’ holdings in Dingle, Thomas, Sweet, and Shim. 

There, we held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to ask prospective 

jurors four two-part questions about their “state of mind or attitude” that would prevent 

them from being fair and impartial. We reasoned: 

Unlike the impermissible questions in Dingle, these questions pertained, not 

to the prospective juror’s experiences or associations, but to his “state of 

mind or attitude,” about gangs, race, guns, and appellant, himself. The 

problem inherent in the Dingle questions, as noted, was that those questions 

allowed a prospective juror, who had had a particular experience or 

association that might prejudice his views, to withhold that information from 

the court, thus impermissibly “shift[ing] from the trial judge to the venire 

responsibility to decide juror bias.” Dingle, 361 Md. at 21. 

In contrast, the questions at issue, here, asked prospective jurors specifically 

whether they had any disqualifying biases and highlighted four areas in 

which such a bias might be present: gangs, race, the right to gun ownership, 

and appellant, himself. An affirmative answer to one of the questions meant 

that the prospective juror could not be impartial. Consequently, the 

prospective juror was not, as in Dingle, withholding information that the 

court required to make its own independent determination of the prospective 

juror’s ability to be impartial. Id.

Like the question in Thomas, which addressed the prospective juror’s “state 

of mind or attitude” with respect to a particular crime, these questions did not 

run afoul of Dingle. And, because the questions were permissible, 

appellant’s assertion that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for 

failing to object to them is without merit. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 
11 

U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, the [petitioner] must first show “that counsel made errors so serious 

that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the [petitioner] 

by the Sixth Amendment.”). 

Id. at 267-68. As of September 29, 2011—the date of our decision in Wimbish—it appeared 

that footnote 1 of the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Thomas reflected the state of the law on 

that issue. That is, “[w]hen the inquiry is into the state of mind or attitude of the venire 

with regard to a particular crime or category of crimes, it is appropriate to phrase the 

question” as: “Does any member of the jury panel have such strong feelings regarding 

violations of the narcotics laws that it would be difficult for you to fairly and impartially 

weigh the facts at a trial where narcotics violations have been alleged?” Thomas, 369 Md. 

at 204 n.1. 

 Three years later, in Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350 (2014), the Court of Appeals 

specifically abrogated those portions of Thomas, Sweet, and Shim that permitted two-part 

“strong feelings” voir dire questions. In Pearson, the Court of Appeals held that the trial 

court had acted properly in not asking the venire whether any prospective juror had ever 

been a victim of a crime, in part because the trial court had asked the prospective jurors: 

“Does any member of the panel hold such strong feelings regarding violations of the 

narcotics laws that it would be difficult for you to fairly and impartially weigh the facts of 

this trial where narcotics violations have been alleged?” Id. at 361 (quotation marks 

omitted). In addition, the Court of Appeals determined that the phrasing of the two-part 

“strong feelings” question was improper. Id. at 360-61. 
12 

Before continuing with our discussion of Pearson, we pause to recall that in this 

case, the circuit court found that Mr. Davis received ineffective assistance of counsel by 

concluding that “the precedent that bound Trial Counsel at the time of [Mr. Davis’s] trial 

came from Dingle.” But that was not the state of the law when Mr. Davis’s case went to 

trial in 2007. As noted above, just one year after Dingle, we too believed that its holding 

applied to strong feelings questions, so much so that in Thomas, we sua sponte offered 

guidance to the trial court to break up the compound question into two separate questions. 

Thomas, 139 Md. App. 188. Yet, the Court of Appeals went out of its way to negate our 

guidance by telling the trial court that the original, compound phrasing of the question was 

“appropriate.” Thomas, 369 Md. at 204 n.1. Because our guidance certainly did not 

contravene Dingle, we see no apparent reason for the Court to have done so other than to 

guide courts and trial counsel on the scope and reach of Dingle.

4

 

The Court of Appeals in Pearson recognized that its application of Dingle to the 

strong feelings compound questions marked a change in the law from allowing to 

disallowing compound questions that “shift responsibility to decide a prospective juror’s 

bias from the trial court” to the prospective jurors. Pearson, 437 Md. at 363. Thus, the 

Court of Appeals emphasized that, “[t]o be clear, we amend this Court’s holding in Shim

only in the context of phrasing of the ‘strong feelings’ voir dire question in Shim.” Id. at 

363 (internal citations omitted). Moreover, the Court in Pearson made clear that its 

4

 This likely explains why, in subsequent cases such as Sweet, Baker, Singfield, and 

Shim, the phrasing of the strong feelings questions was not addressed. 
13 

holdings applied “prospectively as of the date on which this opinion [was] filed.” Id. at 

370. 

Here, the circuit court erred in applying the Court’s holding in Pearson retroactively 

to Mr. Davis’s trial counsel in 2007, when the state of the law was quite different. Based 

on the law as it existed at the time of trial, Mr. Davis’s trial counsel’s failure to object to 

the two-part “strong feelings” voir dire question was not a deficiency in counsel’s defense 

of Mr. Davis. See State v. Gross, 134 Md. App. 528, 553 (2000) (“[C]ounsel is under no 

duty to anticipate a change in the case law” because trial counsel’s performance is judged 

“upon the situation as it existed at the time of trial.”) (quoting State v. Calhoun, 306 Md. 

692, 735 (1986), aff’d, 371 Md. 334 (2002) (emphasis added in Gross)). Because Mr. 

Davis failed to satisfy the first Strickland prong of his ineffective assistance claim, we need

not consider the prejudice prong. See Newton, 455 Md. at 356 (“Strickland also instructs 

that courts need not consider the performance prong and the prejudice prong in order, nor 

do they need to address both prongs in every case.”) (citations omitted). 

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 

FOR WICOMICO COUNTY REVERSED. 

COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.