UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-4038

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOHNATHAN OLANDUS HALL, a/k/a Jonathan Olandis Hall,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, 

at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, Chief District Judge. (3:15-cr-00303-FDW-DCK-1)

Submitted: July 27, 2017 Decided: August 3, 2017

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ross Hall Richardson, Interim Defender, Ann L. Hester, FEDERAL DEFENDER FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, Charlotte, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Jill Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, Anthony J. Enright, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Johnathan Olandus Hall pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). On appeal, Hall challenges the 

procedural reasonableness of his sentence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

In the presentence report (“PSR”), the probation officer incorporated the written 

Factual Basis prepared by the Government. Among other information, the Factual Basis 

summarized the arresting officer’s observations at the time of the incident, including that 

he saw the muzzle flash to a black handgun in Hall’s hand and that a victim suffered a 

serious gunshot wound. With the exception of facts not relevant to his appeal, Hall did 

not dispute the Factual Basis. 

The PSR applied the assault with intent to murder cross reference based on the 

shooting. Initially, Hall objected to the application of the cross reference, but he 

subsequently withdrew the objection and accepted the Sentencing Guidelines calculations 

in the PSR, which were ultimately adopted by the district court. He argued for a below 

Guidelines sentence on several grounds, including his mental health, the purported 

overstatement of his criminal history, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing 

disparities, and his claim, raised for the first time at the initial sentencing hearing, that 

someone else shot the victim. The district court ultimately sentenced Hall to 110 months’ 

imprisonment, the bottom of his 110- to 120-month Guidelines range.

Hall argues that the district court procedurally erred by failing to address his 

argument that he was not the shooter. In evaluating the adequacy of a district court’s 

explanation of a selected sentence, we have consistently held that the sentencing court 
3

“need not robotically tick through the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors.” United 

States v. Helton, 782 F.3d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

However, the court must conduct an “individualized assessment justifying the sentence 

imposed and rejection of arguments for a higher or lower sentence based on 

§ 3553.” United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 584 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

“Where the defendant or prosecutor presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a 

different sentence than that set forth in the advisory Guidelines, a district judge should 

address the party’s arguments and explain why he has rejected those arguments.” United 

States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The district court must provide sufficient explanation to “demonstrate that it ‘considered 

the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal 

decisionmaking authority.’” Lynn, 592 F.3d at 576 (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 

U.S. 338, 356 (2007) (alterations in original)). Such explanation is necessary to 

“promote the perception of fair sentencing” and to permit “meaningful appellate review.” 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).

Supreme Court precedent “plainly precludes any presumption that, when imposing 

a sentence, the district court has silently adopted arguments presented by a party. Rather, 

‘the district judge,’ not an appellate court, ‘must make an individualized assessment 

based on the facts presented’ to him.” Carter, 564 F.3d at 329 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 

49-50). However, “[t]he context surrounding a district court’s explanation may imbue it 

with enough content for us to evaluate both whether the court considered the § 3553(a) 
4

factors and whether it did so properly.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 

381 (4th Cir. 2006). Where the record clearly reveals that the court considered the 

parties’ arguments and relevant evidence and that the case is “conceptually simple[,] . . . 

the law does not require a judge to write more extensively.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 359. 

In this case, sentencing took place over the course of three hearings. The district 

court continued the initial sentencing hearing when Hall asserted, for the first time—and 

in the context of challenging the assault with intent to commit murder cross reference—

that he was not the shooter and alluded to evidence in support of his claim. At the second 

sentencing hearing, Hall withdrew his objections to the cross reference, but he sought a 

below-Guidelines sentence on several grounds, including that he claimed that he was not 

the shooter. Sentencing was continued to allow for discovery because the Government 

requested access to a recorded statement of the purported shooter incriminating himself, a 

recording that was in defense counsel’s possession. 

When the third hearing commenced, Hall still had not provided the recording to 

the Government. The court gave Hall the option whether to introduce it but reminded 

Hall that evidence that someone else was the shooter would potentially be very favorable 

to Hall in fashioning his sentence. Hall did not introduce the recording.

In imposing a within-Guidelines sentence, the district court expressly rejected 

Hall’s arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence based on overstatement of criminal 

history, his mental health issues, and unwarranted sentencing disparities. However, the 

court did not, at this point, explicitly address Hall’s argument that he was not the shooter. 
5

Nevertheless, we can discern from the context of the sentencing hearings that the court 

considered and rejected Hall’s argument. Cf. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d at 381. 

In the third and final sentencing hearing, the court stated that it had considered all 

of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. At the second sentencing hearing, the court 

acknowledged that Hall’s claim that he was not the shooter was an important issue to 

resolve in order to determine Hall’s sentence. The court opined that such information 

was relevant to the nature and circumstances of the offense and could weigh heavily in 

Hall’s favor. The court observed that the Factual Basis contained no mention of another 

shooter or a second gun. The arresting officer, the only eyewitness to testify, stated that 

he saw Hall fire his weapon and the victim double over and fall and that he heard no 

other gun. The court continued the hearing to give the Government an opportunity to 

hear the recording and further investigate Hall’s claim that he was not the shooter, 

describing this as “a huge, huge factor in sentencing.” (J.A. 83).*

 When Hall sought 

reconsideration of the court’s order directing discovery of the recording, the court 

advised Hall’s counsel that it was up to the defense whether to introduce the recording

but repeated that “it really does impact my – some of my thought processes about the 

culpability of the defendant.” (J.A. 105).

Aware of the court’s position, Hall nevertheless chose to not introduce the tape. 

Viewed in the context of the court’s statement that it had considered the § 3553(a) 

factors, its earlier statements that whether Hall was the shooter was relevant to the nature 

 * “J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed by the parties.
6

and circumstances of the offense, its remarks that the victim’s description of the shooter 

in the police report matched Hall’s appearance and that no second shooter or second gun 

was mentioned in the Factual Basis to which defense counsel agreed, and the court’s 

reminder to defense counsel at the third hearing that it could choose whether to introduce 

the recording but that it affected the court’s thoughts regarding Hall’s culpability, it is 

clear that the district court considered and rejected Hall’s claim that he was entitled to a 

downward variance because he was not the shooter.

We therefore discern no procedural error. Accordingly, we affirm Hall’s sentence. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED