SPEARHEAD 

OF LOGISTICS 

A HISTORY OF THE 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

TRANSPORTATION CORPS 

Benjamin King 

Richard C. Biggs 

Eric R. Criner 

U.S. Army Transportation Center 

Fort Eustis, Virginia 

and 

Center of Military History 

United States Army 

Washington, D.C., 2001 
FOREWORD 

To the 2001 Edition 

War is movement. Success in war requires transportation onto the battlefield 

and within it. Even before the guns sound, organizations of trained specialists 

are working hard to deliver troops and materiel where they are needed at a rapid 

rate. Within the U.S. Army such specialists are the members of the 

Transportation Corps. Their task has grown in magnitude and complexity over 

time, particularly once the nation started to fight its wars overseas. Supply lines 

have lengthened significantly to support expeditions abroad during the last hundred years. Lead time for preparation has not kept pace, chiefly because peacetime constraints kept resources available to a minimum. Thus most overseas 

deployments came injtially as mil itary emergencies, challenging our transporters' skills and ingenuity as they grappled to make effective use of ports, airfields, rail systems, and highways at home and in distant theaters, while at the 

same time keeping track of the great mass of cargo surging forward to the fighting forces. This situation is likely to recur- and has actually been predicted in 

plans and studies designed to assess the Army's contemporary mobility. This further underscores the importance of understanding military transportation and the 

extraordinary importance of the United States Army Transportation Corps. 

We are pleased to reprint Spearhead of Logistics. First published in 1994 as 

a branch history, it will now be available to the broad community of scholars and 

military students and leaders who are interested in transportation and movement 

issues during the course of expeditionary operations. It also records the proud 

heritage and contributions of the men and women of the United States Army 

Transportation Corps. 

Washington, D.C. 

24 April 200 I 

JOHN S. BROWN 

Brigadier General, USA 

Chief of Mi litary History 

First Printed 1994-CMH Pub 69-7-1 
FOREWORD iii 

FOREWORD 

Spearhead of Logistics, A History of the U.S. Army Transportation Corps 

is a unique book. It is not just a chronicle of events, but a story of how Army 

Transporters from the Revolution to Desert Shield/Desert Storm have prevailed 

against equipment and personnel shortages, enemy forces and hostile 

environments to provide the kind of support that ensures victory. Because of the 

way Spearhead of Logistics presents our story, it is useful to Transporters today 

and those in generations to come. 

Lessons learned and lessons relearned abound in its pages. Because war is 

chaos, the same types of problems must be solved regardless of the technology. 

Transporters responding to Desert Shield/Desert Storm faced challenges similar 

to those of their predecessors in previous wars and solved them with the same 

skill and determination. In addition to providing a compact history of problem 

solving, Spearhead of Logistics also addresses the issues facing the 

Transportation community currently and in the future by placing them in their 

historical perspective. 

Spearhead of Logistics will be considered the standard work on the history 

of the Transportation Corps for years to come and should be read by everyone 

who has a stake in military transportation. It is useful for both officers and 

noncommissioned officers who can take examples from the past and apply the 

same successful principles to future operations, thus ensuring a continuing 

legacy of Transportation excellence, an excellence which has proved time and 

time again that the Transpo1tation Corps is truly "The Spearhead of Logistics". 

Fort Eustis, Virginia 

1994 

~~~a.~~ 

DAVID A. WHALEY & 

Major General, United States Army 

Chief of Transportation 
iv Spearhead of Logistics 

PREFACE 

Today's U.S. Army Transportation Corps has proved itself a winner on 

every battlefield and peacekeeping operation since its establishment in 1942. 

However, Army transportation began with the birth of the Quartermaster 

function in the Army in 177 6 and continued in that role until World War I. 

In every war of the 18th and 19th centuries, a corps of transporters was 

created from whole cloth to meet the Army's transportation needs, and after each 

conflict, it was disbanded. Routine transportation matters were assumed by 

contractors supervised by the Quartermaster Department. In the First World War, 

the responsibility for military transportation was combined in the hands of a 

single group of specialists dedicated to the mission of transporting the myriad of 

requirements of a modern army from the manufacturer to the soldier in his 

foxhole. This is a story of dedicated men and women overcoming tremendous 

obstacles to get the job done from Washington's teamsters to Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm. The chronicle that follows was inspired by dozens of 

transporters, many of whom were Chiefs of Transportation, supporting the idea 

of a history of the Corps that would provide a narrative of lessons learned for 

future generations of soldiers. 

The authors are indebted to many for both substantive and moral support. 

We would like to thank Col. John B. Tier (Ret), Lt. Gen. Jack Fuson (Ret), Maj. 

Gen. John Murray (Ret), and Maj. Gen. Thomas Rice (Ret) for taking time to 

share their experiences with us. We thank the Transportation officers at the Army 

War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Naval War 

College for reviewing the initial draft of this book. 

We are grateful to Ms. Marion Knihnicki, head librarian of the 

Transportation School Library and her staff, Ms. Diane Forbes, Ms. Valerie 

Fashion, and Ms. Michelle Masias; and to Ms. Barbara Bower, Director of the 

Transportation Museum and her staff, Mr. Frank McGrane, and Ms. Carolyn 

Wright for their assistance in gathering research for this book. We would like to 

thank Ms. Mary Kazarnowicz, Director of Information Management, who provided 

needed computer equipment and software. Ms. Bonni Benham and Ms. Jan Frank 

for editorial assistance. We are grateful to Mr. Dan Altman, the Deputy Chief, 

Fort Eustis Training and Audiovisual Support Center, who openly provided 

his resources, and skilled staff, Ms. Mary Jane Squires, Mr. Robin Sigler, 
Preface v 

Mr. Robert Beaman, Mr. Troy Smith, Ms. Allison Hillerman, Ms. Ellen Mayo, 

Ms. Elizabeth Lopez, and Ms. Barbara McMichael, and countless other 

behind-the-scenes personnel whose graphics and desktop publishing support had 

an immeasurable impact on the quality of the book. We thank Mr. Mark J. 

O'Konski, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Col. 

Fred Perkins and Col. John Race for the use of their manuscript on the movement 

of XVIII Corps in Desert Storm; Dr. John McLeod, Historian of Military Traffic 

Management Command (MTMC) and Mr. Mason Schaefer for the use of their 

notes; fanner Command Historians of the U.S. Army Transportation Center and 

Fort Eustis, Mr. James Shepard and the late Mr. Carl Cannon; Col. Donald 

Parker and Mr. Zbigniew "Joe" Majchrzak, Joint Strategic Deployment Training 

Center; the officers and soldiers of the 7th Transportation Group and the 8th 

Transportation Brigade; Col. Jonathan House, Cpt. Stewart Wiggins, 2nd Lt. 

John Acuff and Cpt. Scott Douglas of the U.S. Army Transportation School; Col. 

John E. Riley, Chief of Staff, Fort Eustis, and Maj. John Lambusta for providing 

administrative and command assistance; John L. Romjue, Chief, Historical 

Studies and Publications, United States Army Training and Doctrin~ Command, 

for his professional assessment of the final draft; and last but not least, Ms. Judy 

K. Rexrode, our secretary, who had to cope with three types of scribbling and as 

many types of software. 

In the inspirational area we must thank Dr. H. 0. Malone, Chief Historian of 

Headquarters TRADOC, and Dr. Lynn Simms, Historian of Combined Anns 

Support Command for their unwavering support. Lastly, we must thank our 

wives and families for their understanding and support during the entire project. 

If we failed to thank any individual who helped complete this book, we apologize 

for the oversight. The authors take full responsibility for any errors of omission 

or commission within these covers. 

Fort Eustis, Virginia 

1994 

Mr. Benjamin King 

Colonel Richard C. Biggs (Ret) 

Captain Eric R. Criner 
vi Spearhead of Logistics 

Foreword 

Preface 

CONTENTS 

Chapter 1 Beginnings---------------- Overview ______________ _ 

The American Revolution _________ _ 

Colonial Transportation __________ _ 

Post-War Operations __________ _ 

Chapter 2 1815-1848 _ _____________ _ 

Overview ______________ _ 

The Mexican War-----,-----------

Tactical Operations in Mexico ________ _ 

Transportation in the Mexican War ______ _ 

Post-War Transportation _________ _ 

Chapter 3 The Civil War 1861 -1865 __________ _ 

Overview ______________ _ 

TheNa~ ---------------­

Resources ---------------

Transportation Organization ---------

Transportation Operations ----------

Chapter 4 The Years of Expansion to World War I _____ _ 

The Frontier _____________ _ 

The Spanish American War ________ _ 

Chapter 5 World War I _______________ _ 

Overview ______________ _ 

Transportation in the United States ______ _ 

Port Operations ____________ _ 

Logistics in France ___________ _ 

Transportation in the A.E.F. ________ _ 

First Army --------------- Demobilization _____________ _ 

Chapter 6 World War II Operations in the United States ___ _ 

Strategic Overview ___________ _ 

Headquarters Organization ________ _ 

Field Organizations in the United States ____ _ 

Ports of Embarkation -----------

Transportation Zone Offices ---------

Training and Doctrine Organizations _____ _ 

Supply and Procurement Organizations ____ _ 

Transportation Operations in the United States __ _ 

Army Passenger Traffic Management _____ _ 

iii 

iv 

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29 

35 

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127 

129 

136 

138 

142 
Contents 

CONTENTS 

Army Freight Traffic Management ______ _ 

Port Operations--- ----------

Chapter 7 World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments ____ _ 

Introduction ---------------

North Atlantic Bases ------------ Alaska and Western Canada ________ _ 

Greenland ---------------

Iceland ----------------

The Persian Corridor------------

Transportation Operations ---------- The Ports ______________ _ 

Rail Operations-- -----------

Highway Operations ------------

China-Burma-India ------------- North African and Mediterranean Theaters ___ _ 

Strategic Situation ------ ------

North Africa --------------- Transportation Operations _________ _ The Ports ______________ _ 

Highway Operations ------------

Rail Operations--- ----------

Sicily ----------------- The Ports ______________ _ 

Rail Operations - ------------

Highway Operations --- --- ----- -

Animal Transport-------------

Italy ----------------- Tactical Overview ------------- Transportation Operations _________ _ The Ports ______________ _ 

Rail Operations - ------------ Highway Operations ___________ _ 

Animal Transport ____________ _ 

Pipelines - - ---- ---- ---- --

Redeployment-------------- The Invasion of Southern France ______ _ 

Tactical Overview------ -------

Transportation Operations ---------- The Ports ______________ _ 

vii 

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197 

199 
viii Spearhead of Logistics 

CONTENTS 

Highway Operations 200 

Rail Operations 201 

Chapter 8 The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany __ 204 

Strategic and Tactical Overview 204 

Build-up in Britain 211 

Transportation in Great Britain 215 

Outloading for the Invasion 219 

Invasion of the Continent 221 

Logistics Organization 221 

Transportation Operations 223 

The Impact of Shipping 223 

The Beaches 223 

The Ports 226 

Motor Transport Operations 231 

Railroad Operations 244 

Inland Waterway Operations 249 

Air Transport Operations 250 

POL Pipeline Operations 251 

Movement Control 252 

Traffic Regulation 255 

Transportation Corps Supply 256 

Redeployment and the Occupation of Germany 256 

Chapter 9 World War II Pacific Theater 258 

Overview 258 

Command and Logisticai!Transportation 

Organizations 263 

Theater Joint Command Arrangements 263 

Logistics and Transportation Organizations 264 

Control of Shipping in the Pacific 267 

Army Transportation Operations 268 

Support Command Transportation Operations 269 

Pacific Campaigns 271 

Guadalcanal 271 

Army Transportation Operations on Guadalcanal __ 273 

New Guinea 275 

The Gilberts, Marshalls, Marianas and 

Western Carolinas 277 

Philippines 279 

Port Command, BASE K - Tacloban, Leyte 281 

Lingayen Gulf and Base M - Luzon 282 
Contents IX 

CONTENTS 

Rail Operations 284 

Motor Transport Operations 285 

lwo Jima and the Ryukyus 286 

Chapter 10 The Post World War II Era 289 

The Berlin Airlift 289 

Arctic and Antarctic Operations 295 

Cold Weather Research and Development 295 

The Arctic 297 

Antarctic Operations 298 

Explorers of the Transportation Corps 298 

Korea 299 

United States Occupies Korea (1945-1949) 301 

North Korean Invasion (June 1950) 302 

United States Deploys Troops to Korea 303 

Shipping and Terminal Operations 304 

Truck Transport Operations 308 

Rail Transport Operations 311 

Air Transport Operations 314 

Dominican Republic 318 

Chapter 11 Vietnam 323 

Introduction 323 

Establishing the Theater 325 

Logistics Support Concept 326 

Shipping and Terminal Operations 335 

Containerization 341 

Ammunition Operations 344 

RO/RO Vessels 345 

LOTS Operations 347 

Highway Transport Operations 350 

Rail Transport Operations 364 

Helicopters and lntratheater Airlift 367 

lntertheater Airlift: Vietnam and Europe 370 

The Transportation Corps in Europe 372 

Home of the Transportation Corps 374 

Chapter 12 Post-Vietnam Era 376 

Rebuilding the Force 376 

Urgent Fury 378 

Army Aviation Missions Realigned 384 
X Spearhead of Logistics 

CONTENTS 

The Transportation Corps Regiment ______ _ 

A Unified Transportation Command ______ _ 

Modernization of the 

Transportation Corps' Watercraft ______ _ 

Operation Just Cause-----------

Chapter 13 DesertShield ______________ _ 

Origins of the Conflict----------- U.S. Army Involvement in the Gulf ______ _ 

Internal Look 90 - - -----------

The Iraqi Invasion ---------- ---

Desert Shield Begins ------------ The Southwest Asia Theater ________ _ Sealift _______________ _ 

Chapter 14 Supporting the Storm ------------

Schwarzkopfs Plan ------------

Phase I - Reception, Onward Movement, 

and Sustainment ----------- --

Port Operations- Saudi Arabia --------

Air Lines of Communication ---------

The Need for Movement Control--------

Building the Ground Transportation Network ___ _ 

Theater Truck Assets -----------

Centralized Management and the Dry Run ___ _ 

VII Corps Deploys from Germany ______ _ 

Phase II - The Movement of the Two Corps ___ _ 

Final Preparations for the Ground Offensive ___ _ 

Massing Transportation Assets _______ _ 

"A Trailer is a Trailer" -----------

Phase Ill - Ground Offensive ________ _ 

Redeployment Cease-Fire Talks at Safwan ___ _ 

Redeployment--------------

Chapter 15 The Evolution of Movement Control ______ _ 

History of Movement Control Operations 

and Doctrine --------------

The Korean War-------------

Vietnam ----------------

Desert Shield/Desert Storm ---------

384 

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Contents 

CONTENTS 

Chapter 16 Challenges for the Future ----------- Overview ______________ _ 

Personnel ______________ _ 

Equipment ______________ _ 

lntransit Asset Visibility __________ _ 

Movement Control ___________ _ 

Leadership --------------

Appendix A Chiefs of the Transportation Corps _______ _ 

Appendix B Transportation Song ____________ _ 

Appendix C Escort Wagons 1916 ____________ _ 

Appendix D Affiliated Railroad Units World War II _______ _ 

Endnotes ____________________ _ 

Bibliography ___________________ _ 

Glossary of Technical Terms _____________ _ 

Glossary of Code Names--- - -----------

Glossary of Acronyms/Abbreviations __________ _ 

Index _____________________ _ 

About The Authors -----------------

MAPS 

1. Revolutionary War-----------------

2. Indian Campaign of 1794-------------- 3. Seminole War _________________ _ 

4. The Mexican War ----------------- 5. The Civil War _________________ _ 

6. The Red River War 1874-75 ____________ _ 

7. The Services of Supply A. E. F. ____________ _ 

8. Alaska Highway Connecting Routes __________ _ 

9. The Persian Corridor ---------------- 10. Lines of Communication in China-Burma-India Theater ____ _ 

11. Lines of Communication in French North Africa ______ _ 

12. Sicily 1943 -------------------

13. Italy- Salerno to Rome ---------------

14. Northern Italy ------------------ 15. Southern France Beachhead ____________ _ 

16. Southern France Rail Operations ___________ _ 

17. The Final Overlord Plan ---------------

xi 

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xll Spearhead of Logistics 

MAPS 

18. Tactical Progress, U.S. Forces: 1-24 July 1944 208 

19. Tactical Progress: 25 July- 12 September 1944 209 

20. Tactical Developments 212 

21. Transportation Regions in the United Kingdom: October 1943 214 

22. COMZ Boundaries: April 1945 222 

23. Routes of the Red Ball Express 236 

24. Highway Express Routes: September 1944 - February 1946 240 

25. XYZ Motor Transport Hauls: 14 April 1945 242 

26. Phase Operations, 20 MRS: 1 October 1944 246 

27. The POL Pipeline Systems 253 

28. The Pacific Areas: 1 August 1942 260 

29. Philippine Islands 280 

30. Federal Republic of Germany 292 

31. Combat Support in Korea 300 

32. Southeast Asia 324 

33. RO/RO Operations 346 

34. Republic of Vietnam Highway System 352 

35. Republic of Vietnam Railway System 365 

36. Caribbean Islands 379 

37. Grenada 382 

38. Panama 392 

39. Southwest Asia 397 

40. Main Supply Routes 427 

41. Movement of XVIII Airborne and VII Corps 444 

42. Pre G-Day Logistics Network 446 

43. Transportation Consolidation Centers 450 

44. TCC #3 Layout 452 

Maps 6, 7, and 36 were created by the Training and Audiovisual Support Center, Fort Eustis, Virginia. 

Map 38 is courtesy Department of Defense; and Maps 30, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42 are courtesy Department of 

the Anny. Maps 43 and 44 courtesy of the U.S. Anny War College. All other maps, courtesy Center of 

Military History, United States Anny. 

CHARTS 

1 . Organization of the Office of the 

Chief of Transportation: 30 June 1942 122 

2. Organization of the Office of the Chief of 

Transportation: 1 July 1945 125 

3. Typical Organization for Ports of Embarkation, Approved by the 

Chief of Transportation, Army Service Forces: 1 July 1945 128 

4. Typical Organization for Zone Transportation Offices, Approved 

by the Chief of Transportation, Army Service Forces: 

November 1943 130 
Contents xiil 

CHARTS 

5. Transportation Corps Troop Units Activated During World War II __ 134 

6. Quantities of Major Items of Transportation Equipment 

Constructed and Accepted in the Zone of Interior 137 

7. Airlift to China 174 

8. Vehicle and Cargo Deliveries to China and Burma 

by Months (1945) 175 

9. Planned Command Arrangements for Overlord 205 

10. Organization of the Office of the Chief of Transportation, 

COMZONE, ETOUSA: 1 April 1945 224 

11. Supply Build-up Over the Beaches: 6-30 June 1944 226 

12. Organization of Headquarters, Transportation Corps, 

USASOS, SWPA: December 1944 266 

13. Transportation Units Participating in the Ryukyus Assault 287 

14. 1st Log Command Organization February 1968 331 

15. Cam Ranh Bay Transportation Organization 

(Prior to 28 October 1967) 332 

16. Cam Ranh Bay Support Command: 20 February 1968 334 

17. Caribbean Islands 379 

18. 7th Transportation Group's Desert Storm 

Organization (15 April 1991) 420 

Charts 14-17, courtesy Department of the Army; Chart 18 is from the 7th Transportation Group 

Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action Report. All others courtesy Center of Military History, United 

States Army. 

PHOTOGRAPHS 

White House Landing on the Pamunky River, 1862 --------

Railroads during Pope's retreat in 1862 ------------ City Point, Virginia, 1865. ________________ _ 

Stevedores at City Point, Virginia, 1865 -----------

Regular Infantry loading boxcars in 1898 __________ _ 

Infantry waiting for transportation in 1898. __________ _ 

Tampa Bay Pier during Spanish-American War ________ _ 

Wagons supporting the Expedition to Mexico in 1916 _ _____ _ 

The Army's first use of trucks in 1916 ___________ _ U.SS.Huron ____________________ _ 

Getting a convoy moving ----------------

U.S. Troops on their way to the trenches 1918......---------

Loading horses into boxcars ---------------

Wagons moving supplies forward in 1917 -----------

39 

43 

51 

61 

73 

75 

79 

81 

89 

99 

106 

108 

110 

111 
xiv Spearhead of Logistics 

PHOTOGRAPHS 

Men and supplies move forward during the Argonne Offensive 112 

The truck finally comes into its own 114 

Troops embarking on a transport 126 

Troops training at Camp Claiborne on track repair 131 

Troops training on loading and unloading the DUKW 133 

First locomotive purchased by the U.S. Army since WWI 139 

Deck loaded Liberty Ship 140 

Troops in staging area, Camp Patrick Henry 143 

Repair of a hospital kitchen car 149 

Rail yard in Teheran 166 

Ledo Road in Burma 172 

Elephants shunting cars in Assam 176 

First American crew to operate a train in the UK 217 

Offloading ships to rail cars at Cherbourg Port 228 

Discharging ammunition directly from ship to railcar 230 

Convoy assembly area on the Red Ball Express 234 

Refueling dump on Red Ball Express Route 237 

Vehicle recovery operations in France 239 

ABC Truck Route 243 

Bridge near Noumea, World War II 272 

Troop Port Command Operations, Saipan, 1945 278 

A jeep adapted to rail 283 

Berlin motorpool in support of Operation Vittles 291 

Cargo handlers during Operation Vittles 293 

Two LSTs supporting Operation DEW Line 296 

Confusion at the Port of Mukhojin-ni, Korea 306 

1st U.S. Cavalry Division convoys outside Seoul, Korea, 1951 309 

Supply train leaving Pusan, Korea in 1952 312 

Unloading a C-54 aircraft in South Korea 315 

DUKW amphibious landing 317 

World War II vintage ship discharge during the Vietnam War 336 

Port operations in Vietnam 337 

The MV John U.D. Page 339 

1 0-ton forklift 341 

155mm rounds being discharged at a forward supply base in Vietnam _ 343 

LCM-8 in support of Vietnam Intercoastal Operations 347 

Delong Pier 348 

M52 tractor with M127 trailer 351 

Contract trucks providing port clearance 353 

GOER 8-ton cargo truck 354 
Contents 

PHOTOGRAPHS 

Eve of Destruction guntruck - --------------- M54 5-ton truck ___________________ _ 

M35A2C drop side truck ----------------

Helicopter Escort of a truck convoy --------------

Transportation Corps' Regimental Activation _________ _ 

Meeting in the Pentagon Gold Room ------------- Portofad-Dammam __________________ __ 

Staging area in the Port of ad-Dammam ------------

LCM-8 being overhauled in ad-Dammam __________ _ 

7th Transportation Group 1 00-ton crane ------------

Commercial HET --------------------

Rough Terrain Container Handler--------------

37th Transportation Group convoy _______ ______ _ 

Soldiers waiting for equipment to arrive by ship ________ _ 

Tapline Road forward landing strip _____________ _ 

Enemy prisoner of war convoys ______________ _ 

Brigadier General Hines ________________ _ 

Major General Gross _________________ _ 

Major General Leavey ________________ _ 

Major General Heileman ________________ _ 

Major General Yount _________________ _ 

General Besson, Jr.------------------- Major General Lincoln, Jr .. ________________ _ 

Major General Sawyer------------------

Colonel Hutson-------------------- Major General Redling _________________ _ 

Major General Small _________________ _ 

Major General Lilley __________________ _ 

Major General Elam -------------------

Major General Wakefield-----------------

Major General Wykle------------------ Major General Whaley _________________ _ 

Escort Wagon and Team ________________ _ 

Escort Wagon ____________________ __ 

Top View of Escort Wagon Running Gear __________ _ 

Bottom View of Escort Wagon Running Gear _________ _ 

Iron Parts of Escort Wagon _______________ _ 

TooiBoxofEscortWagon ________________ _ 

XV 

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The photographs on pages 414 through 431, 440 and 457 courtesy of Brig. Gen. Daniel Brown; the 

photographs on pages 400 and 447 courtesy of Department of Defense, the photographs on pages 

490 through 495 are from the Quartermaster Manual of 1916 and all others courtesy of the U.S. Army 

Transportation Museum, Fort Eustis, Virginia. 
xvi 

This book is dedicated 

to all transporters 

past, present, and future. 

Spearhead of logistics 
CHAPTER I 

Beginnings 

"Where are the men? Where are the 

provisions? Where are the Cloaths?" 

George Washington to Gouverneur Morris, 

---------- 10 December 1780.----------

OVERVIEW 

The history of military transportation in the modem world is not a long 

one. Until the 17th century most armies lived off the land, taking what they 

wanted and laying waste to the rest, a cruel and wasteful practice that kept an 

army constantly on the move in search of supplies. In the Thirty Years War, 

Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden attempted to regularize supply arrangements to 

eliminate looting and win the "hearts and minds of the people," but was only 

partially effective. His opponent, the Imperial General Wallenstein, successfully 

established magazines and depots that fed and clothed Imperial troops in 

whatever region they happened to be. All his transportation arrangements were 

made through contractors, a practice which continued until the end of the 18th 

century. 

At the end of the 17th century, most armies typically had a wagonmaster in 

their military organization. In 1645, a "Waggon-Master-General" was appointed 

to the New Model Anny in England. In 1690, King William ill had a "waggon 

train" of twelve vehicles regularly paid for from anny funds, 1 though this was, 

no doubt, for his personal baggage rather than for any greater use of the army. 

Throughout the 18th century the British Commissary General was responsible 

for arranging transportation. It was this heritage that the fledgling Continental 

Anny adopted during the War of Independence when the quartennaster general 

became the chief supply officer and transportation officer of the army. The 18th 

century concept of quartermaster was far different from that of today, because he 

was not a supply officer, but the chief of staff responsible for operational 

requirements. In 1794, the British Army established the Royal Corps of 

Waggoners and within the next twenty-five years most European armies 
2 Spearhead of Logistics 

established some sort of military train. It would be more than a century before 

the United States Army would see a similar organization. 

Even by mid 18th-century European standards, the transpor1ation network 

in the North American Colonies was inadequate. Along the Atlantic coast was a 

small strip of settlements unconnected by any appreciable road network. Cities 

and towns were small and the population was relatively stationary, except for 

some adventurous settlers going west. For those trading with other colonies, it 

was faster and cheaper to go by ship. The continent's northern interior consisted 

of wilderness and small farms, and in the south, wilderness, small farms, and 

plantations. Rivers were heavily relied upon for inland traffic, even though boats 

and canoes had to be ported around rapids. The Saint Lawrence, the Ohio, the 

Susquehanna, and the Monongahela were main lines of traffic to the farmlands 

in the west. Traveling overland meant walking, riding, or traveling by wagon.

2 

The warfare carried out on the American continent was very limited 

because the wooded terrain hampered the employment of large numbers of 

troops. Engagements in the colonies were skirmishes or raids involving very 

small forces. The political consequences of a military action might be 

considerable, but they did not involve a great many men or a lot of resources. In 

the open fields of Europe a commander could hope to control 50,000 men with 

some degree of success. In the woods of North America, effective command was 

more difficult. If a European Army wanted to transport thousands of European 

troops to North America, it could not deploy them in a decisive mass. European 

annies needed large supply trains which carried flour and ovens to bake bread. 

Even then, subsistence had to be obtained from the countryside. Horses were 

another matter. A horse of average size consumed from twenty-eight to 

thirty-two pounds of fodder each day it could not graze, and required at least 

eight gallons of water. The tens of thousands of horses needed by a European 

army would have perished quickly in the woods of North America. Artillery 

needed roads or flat open terrain upon which to travel; consequently, only the 

lightest pieces could be employed in the interior. The light raiding party of a few 

hundred men easily moved through the woods carrying what few supplies it 

needed and using nothing but its own feet and perhaps canoes for transpor1. 

Hence, there was less need for a transportation infrastnrcture.3 

Under the best of conditions, the colonjes were a four-week transatlantic 

voyage away from Europe, which meant that troops committed to the American 

continent could not quickly be recalled. Europe was the main theater of war and 

what happened there affected what happened elsewhere. Both Britain and France 

were heavily committed on the continent. The French lost their colonies in the 
Beginnings 3 

New World and I ndia in the Seven Years War ( 1756-1763), not just because 

they lost the war in North America but primarily because they lost in Europe. 

Britain had powerful allies on the continent who helped defeat France and the 

Royal Navy which enabled Britain to project power across the Atlantic and 

prevent France from reinforcing and supplying her colonies. 

Four major wars were fought on the American continent before the War of 

Independence, each an extension of a war fought in Europe. As could be 

expected, the colonists had different names for them. The War of the League of 

Augsburg (1689-97) was called King William's War; the War of the Spanish 

Succession ( 1702- 13), Queen Anne's War; the War of the Austrian Succession 

( 1744-48), King George's War; and the Seven Years War ( 1756-63), the French 

and Indian War. To many colonists the current war was the "French War" and 

the previous war was known as the "Old French War." Battles and sieges were 

few. Most actions were raids in which settlements were burned and the 

inhabitants either killed or taken captive. Both sides made alliances with the 

various nations of Indians, and most operations included a large proportion of 

Indian warriors.4 

The major wars and the dozens of actions with Indians did much to shape 

the English colonists' attitudes toward the French, the mother country, warfare, 

and themselves. In the colonists' view, the French were the enemy and were 

responsible for stirring up the Indians along the frontier. The French were 

considered a great evil that had to be expelled from the continent before the 

colonies could have peace. England was the mother country, but by the middle 

of the 18th century, an American character had already begun to develop, as had 

an American language, and an outlook that differed from European attitudes. 

The colonists perceived the English as "different." It was not yet the America of 

"Manifest Destiny,"5 but the seeds had been sown. Because they were constantly 

involved in conflict with Indian and French raids, Americans believed that the 

colonial militia could handle nearly any emergency in a short time and get back 

to their civilian occupations. Additionally, many high ranking, aristocratic 

British officers of good reputation in Europe did not do well during the colonial 

wars. Examples were Maj. Gen. Edward Braddock, who died in the unsuccessful 

attempt to take Fort Duquesne (later Pittsburgh), and John Campbell, Earl of 

Loudoun, who failed to take Fort Carillon (later Fort Ticonderoga) in New York. 

England often promised to assist the colonies, but the troops and ships 

seldom arrived. The campaign against Quebec was a notable exception, but it 

was an "English" operation that did not rely on the colonists. This lack of 

assistance confirmed the colonists' opinion that they had to rely on their own 
4 Spearhead of Logistics 

resources and led to several attempts at collective security. In the long term, 

none were successful but it was a concept that would eventually lead to the 

Continental Congress. 

It was not until William Pitt became secretary of state that the British 

government pursued a consistent policy in the colonies. Pitt believed that France 

could be defeated by depriving her of her colonies. While this view is 

questionable, it led to the ultimate defeat of the French on the North American 

continent. Had France been victorious in Europe, it is likely that most, if not all, 

of her colonies would have been restored. As it was, France suffered humiliating 

defeats in Europe and through her failure to resupply and reinforce French forces 

in Canada, she lost her settlements in North America. 

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 

The demise of French power in North America took away the mam 

stumbling block to expansion and trade in the colonies, and colonists looked 

forward to an era of peace and prosperity. The king and Parliament shared a far 

different view. The Seven Years War had been an expensive undertaking and 

they did not expect to be left with the entire bill. The colonies would have to pay 

what England considered their fair share. The fact that the colonies had provided 

the lion's share of the manpower for the war in North America was not a 

consideration. There was a new empire to administer, which meant further effort 

and expense. There were also the Indians to consider because many of them had 

been allies in the the long wars against the French. What followed was a series 

of policies that legislated the political and economic life of the colonies without 

asking their advice or consent. Neither the king and his ministers nor Parliament 

saw anything wrong with this. England of the 18th century was hardly a 

representative democracy and since the colonists were English subjects, there 

was no reason why Parliament should ask their consent. The colonists, on the 

other hand, felt they had the rights of Englishmen. The situation was fraught 

with the potential for conflict. 

The first policy to stir the colonists was the Stamp Act of 1765, which put a 

fee on every legal transaction, newspaper, and contract in the colonies, and was 

expected to bring in roughly 60,000 pounds sterling a year. The colonists 

overwhelmingly opposed the Stamp Act, and after demonstrations, boycotts, and 

riots, the act was repealed. The Stamp Act did two things: In England, it created 

an attitude that the colonists were too independent and needed to be brought to 

heel. In the colonies, it led to the organization of the "Committees of 
Beginnings 5 

Correspondence," groups who found common cause in sharing information and 

opposing the oppressive acts. 

Other policies also brought the colonies and mother country closer to 

conflict. The Crown declared everything west of the Alleghenies Indian country 

and colonists were not permitted to settle there. Coin was in short supply and the 

colonies were forbidden to print paper money. Rules and regulations on trade 

and shipping were made for merchants in England, and colonial merchants 

found themselves put out of business at the stroke of a pen. For example, 

colonists had long been trading American barrel staves to the Portuguese for 

Madeira wine. The authorities in London r uled that according to the long 

standing Acts of Trade and Navigation, the colonists could only buy Madeira 

from licensed distributors and could not trade directly with the Portuguese. 

Profitable businesses were threatened and the colonists were forced to pay 

artificially high prices. Custom duties that had been previously ignored were 

now vigorously enforced by the Royal Navy. Citizens in the colonies were 

required to quarter soldiers in their homes and businesses. The Townshend Acts 

attempted to tax paint, lead, paper, and tea. After the colonists protested, the 

taxes were repealed except for that on tea. The main purpose of the tax on tea 

was to bolster the faltering East India Company, but soon the colonists began a 

tea boycott. In Boston, a group of citizens organized a different form of protest. 

On the night of 16 December 1773, several hundred "Sons of Liberty," dressed 

as Mohawk Indians, boarded three tea ships anchored in Boston and dumped 

their cargo into the harbor.6 

After additional "tea parties," the authorities in London determined to put 

an end to the colonists' disobedience. In March 1774, Parliament passed a bill 

closing the Port of Boston on 1 June 1774. This made the colonists even more 

hostile. After more protests and boycotts, militia units began preparing for 

possible conflict. In September 1774, the first Continental Congress convened. 

On 18 April 1775, General Thomas Gage, the British commander at Boston sent 

700 troops under Lt. Col. Francis Smith to seize militia supplies at Concord. 

The following morning the Lexington militia blocked their path. Just who fired 

the first shot no one will ever know, but after the first volley eight Americans lay 

dead and ten wounded. The militia from surroundjng communities marched to 

the area forcing the British to retreat to Boston with heavy casualties. The 

American War for Independence had begun.7 

The war was what few envisioned. To the English it was little more than a 

domestic dispute. They intended to teach a small minority of their disobedient 

subjects a much needed lesson, which wouldn't take much in the way of time or 
6 Spearhead of Logistics 

resources. The colonists were torn between those who demanded absolute 

loyalty to the Crown and those who felt the time for independence had come. 

Even after hostilities commenced, many were undecided. On 5 July 1775, the 

Continental Congress sent an appeal known as "The Olive Branch Petition" to 

the king and Parliament requesting reconciliation. On 23 August 1775, weeks 

before he received the petition, King George III declared the colonies in 

rebellion. From that point what has become known as the American Revolution 

assumed a broader character. First, it was not just a grievance against England 

about taxes and other acts, it was a war for outright independence and it forced 

people to take sides. Although they were not radicals, many Americans opted for 

independence. One aspect of the war that changed very quickly was its local 

nature. The American Revolution started just prior to the outbreak of the War of 

the Bavarian Succession in Europe. It would draw France, Spain, and Holland 

into the war on the side of the emerging nation. These powers had less love for 

li berty than the Americans, but they wanted revenge against their old enemy 

England, and the war in America was a golden opportunity to get it. The war 

became truly international in 1778, when France recognized American 

independence. A month later, a French fleet sailed to New England to support 

the new nation. Throughout the war, the French sea and land force 

augmentations and logistical support were critical to the American war effort. 

Even before French recognition, the European officers who volunteered to serve 

on the American side lent an international flavor to the war. Most of them were 

adventurers with questionable talent, but a few like Marie du Motier, Marquis de 

Lafayette, Tadeusz Kosciuszko, Johann de Kalb, and Baron Friedrich Wilhelm 

von Steuben proved invaluable. Enlisted foreign volunteers were limited by the 

high cost of passage to the colonies. (Map 1 ). 

The colonists' first task was to build an army. The thought of a 

professional army was an anathema to Americans, and it would be 1778 before 

well-trained, long-service, Continental soldiers could stand up in battle to British 

infantry. The Continental Army evolved from the militia organization of the 

colonists and reflected many of its strengths and weaknesses. Most colonists felt 

they could serve for a short term and return horne, and expiring enlistments were 

a major problem when George Washington took over the Continental Army in 

1775. One of the positive aspects of the colonial militia was the fact that a great 

many men could use firearms and had some experience during the numerous 

Indian campaigns. After the actions at Lexington and Concord, the 

Massachusetts Provincial Cong•·ess mised a militia of some 13,000 under 

Artemus Ward, a veteran of the French and Indian War, and laid siege to Boston. 
Beginnings 

Map 1. 

SCALE Of MILES 

-----

0 10 20 30 40 so 100 

7 
8 Spearhead of Logistics 

In June 1775, the Continental Congress took over the New England Army 

besieging Boston and reinforced it with militia from Pennsylvania, Maryland, 

and Virginia, the first soldiers drawn from outside New England. The 

Continental Congress thereby established the Continental Army and asked 

George Washington to become its commander in chief.8 

The Revolutionary War encompassed most of eastern North America, from 

Montreal and Quebec in the north, to the southern colonies of South Carolina 

and Georgia where strong Loyalist sympathies and support of British efforts 

resulted in a civil war. In the west, British Lieutenant Governor of Canada Henry 

Hamilton sent Indian warriors to pillage the frontier settlements in present day 

Kentucky and Illinois, and earned the sobriquet "Hair Buyer" by paying a 

bounty on settlers' scalps. For the first two and a half years of the war, settlers in 

the Ohio Valley suffered terribly from Indian plundering. The frontiersmen 

fought back, but to no avail, until a 25-year-old Virginia militia officer, Col. 

George Rogers Clark, organized them. In a daring series of attacks, Clark and 

his men gained control and pushed the British out of what later became the 

American Northwest Territory. In the south, there was limited activity. In 1776, 

the colonists drove off a British force attempting to seize Charleston and 

defeated the British at Sullivans Island. The Southern Department operated as a 

more or less independent command under Maj. Gen. Charles Lee and later Maj. 

Gen. Robert Howe until1779.9 

During the early years of the war, the main elements of the Continental 

Army and supporting colonial militia under Washington fought mainly in the 

New England and Middle Atlantic department areas. After driving the British 

from Boston, Washington marched to New York to keep that important area 

from British control. Supported by the Royal Navy, Maj. Gen. Sir William 

Howe rapidly defeated the inexperienced Continental Arn1y and drove it from 

New York and New Jersey. Washington showed his understanding of the 

political and military situation by refusing to become decisively engaged unless 

he had a good chance of winning. His surprise attack at Trenton on Christmas 

Day 1776 and his victory at Princeton drove the British from New Jersey and 

provided fresh inspiration for the colonists. Washington also supported two 

abortive invasions of Canada in the last half of 1775 in an attempt to influence 

Canadian support of the Revolution, but the Canadians remained loyal to the 

king. In the spring of 1777, Washington was forced to send some of his best 

leaders and soldiers north to counter a three-pronged British invasion. The main 

thrust consisted of an advance by Maj. Gen. John Burgoyne south along Lake 

Champlain. Lieutenant Colonel Barry St. Leger was to move east along the 
Beginnings 9 

Mohawk, and Howe was to proceed north from New York. The objectives were 

Albany and the Hudson River. British control of the Mohawk and Hudson would 

split New York from New England and the northern colonies from New Jersey 

and points south. Initially, the plan worked well and the British took Fort 

Ticonderoga, but Burgoyne's movement slowed rapidly due to inadequate 

transport, insufficient supplies, and bad weather. Howe, instead of supporting 

Burgoyne, moved south to besiege Philadelphia. After suffering severe losses at 

Freemans Farm and Bemis Heights, Burgoyne withdrew to Saratoga where he 

was forced to surrender. The political consequence of this American victory was 

an alliance with France. From that point on, the north became a theater of 

secondary importance, troubled only by raids made by Tories and lndians. 10 

The British continued to win tactical victories but suffered heavy losses 

and were unable to destroy Washington's army. The continued survival and 

occasional victories of the Continental Army provided an inspiration to the 

colonial population. Even more importantly, the lengthening war was consuming 

British resources that were needed elsewhere. Washington's tactics also 

restricted the British from moving at will through the area and from using the 

countryside as an effective source of supply. In 1779, the stalemate in the north 

and the entry of the French into the war on the colonists' side compelled the 

British to shift the focus of their efforts to the south. 

A southern strategy offered a number of distinct advantages, one of which 

was the large number of Loyalists in the south. In December 1779, the British, 

under Lt. Col. Archibald Campbell, seized Savannah and overran the rest of 

Georgia. After much maneuvering and several battles, Sir Henry Clinton finally 

laid siege to the city of Charleston in April 1780. A spirited defense of the city 

was conducted by Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln, but the city fell in May. Lincoln 

was partly influenced by the city fathers who didn't want to see the city 

destroyed. The fall of Charleston was a severe blow to the colonists and the 

harsh tenns of surrender deprived them of over 5,000 troops and much needed 

war material. It also encouraged those with Loyalist sympathies to actively 

come forward and support the British. Clinton's base in the south was 

established and he tried to exploit the situation by offering a pardon to all who 

actively supported the British. This measure backfired by requiring colonists to 

choose sides rather than being noncommittal, as many were. 

11 

Clinton returned to New York, leaving Maj. Gen. Earl Charles Cornwallis, 

an experienced officer, in charge. The situation looked favorable to the British, 

but shortly after Clinton left, the area erupted into civil war pitting the British 

regulars and Loyalists against the American regulars and the local Patriots. 
10 Spearhead of Logistics 

However, the bulk of the fighting occurred between the Patriots and Loyalists 

rather than between American and British regulars. A strong leader was needed 

to rebuild the southern army and Washington wanted Nathanael Greene for the 

post, but the Continental Congress did not consult Washington and appointed 

Horatio Gates, the " hero" of Saratoga to the position. Gates proved to be a poor 

choice. He fought his first battle in the south against the British at Camden, 

South Carol ina, on 16 August 1780, against the adv ice of his subordinate, 

de Kalb. Gates fled the battlefield after the initial assault, leaving his 

subordinates to their fate. The American loss was 800 men killed (including 

de Kalb) and wounded, and I ,000 captured. The loss at Camden and at Fishing 

Creek two days later ensured British control of South Carolina and paved the 

way for the British invasion of North Carolina. The only bright spot during this 

period was the Battle of King's Mountain in which a colonial force of 1,400 men 

killed, wounded, or captured 1,000 Tories under British Maj. Patrick Ferguson, 

effectively crippling the Tories in the Carolinas. 12 

In December 1780, the Continental Congress appointed Maj. Gen. 

Nathanael Greene to command in the South. Greene, a proven combat 

commander, had been serving as the Army Quartermaster General since early 

1778. He was ihe right man for the job and his appointment proved to be the 

turning point of the colonists' fortunes in the South. In a series of battles at 

Cowpens ( 17 January 178 1 ), Guilford Courthouse ( 15 March 1781 ), and Eutaw 

Springs (8 September 1781 ), as well as many smaller engagements, American 

forces caused the British heavy losses. The British army was so weakened that it 

could not continue the campaign and was forced to retire to Charleston and 

Savannah. By September 178 1, Cornwallis' army was where it had started a year 

and a half before with nothing to show for its efforts but months of hard 

. . d I I 13 campatgmng an 1eavy osses. 

Early in 1779, Cornwallis recognized that Virginia was the key to spl itting 

American forces and made strong recommendations to Clinton, in New York, to 

open a Virginia Peninsula campaign. Clinton was not convinced and did not 

want to leave New York open to attack by General Washington, but he did send 

an 1,800-man force that pillaged the area and occupied Portsmouth. Later a force 

under Benedict Arnold, now a British brigadier general, sai led up the James 

River to Westover and burned much of Richmond. That action was followed by 

a 2,600-man force under Maj. Gen. William Phillips on a raid into Petersburg, 

which Phillips' force sacked. Washington reacted by sending Lafayette, with 

I ,200 men, to prevent Phillips from further burning Ri chmond. Washington later 

sent a force under Anthony Wayne to augment Lafayette. The total force then 
Beginnings 11 

reached about 5,000. In May 1781, Cornwallis arrived with a force of 3,500, 

and after some sharp skirmishing with Lafayette, occupied Yorktown which 

provided a deep water port for the British fleet and troop debarkation area for 

planned reinforcements.

14 

Meanwhile, Washington and the French commander, the Comte 

de Rochambeau, concluded that an attack on Clinton in New York could not be 

successful. The French fleet, in the Battle of the Virginia Capes, defeated the 

British fleet, which returned to New York. This opened the possibility of 

trapping Cornwallis' forces on the Peninsula. Washington, in great secrecy, 

moved his American troops and the French force under Rochambeau from the 

mission of investing New York to the Virginia Peninsula to join Lafayette. The 

combined force, further augmented by 2,500 soldiers landed by the French fleet, 

was more than sufficient to undertake a siege of Cornwallis' force in Yorktown. 

The success of the siege compelled his surrender on 19 October 1781. 

Washington designated General Lincoln, who had been humiliated by the British 

at Charleston, to give the surrender instructions that were made as harsh as those 

imposed on Lincoln. 15 The surrender at Yorktown did not end the war but 

caused the downfall of the Lord North ministry. In the subsequent Peace of 

Paris on 3 September 1783, the British Crown acknowledged the United States 

"to be free, sovereign and independent." 16 

COWNIAL TRANSPORTATION 

With an inadequate transportation system, the colonies developed 

independently, were self-supporting, and were accustomed to solving their own 

problems. Stage lines connected major ports and the largest towns; however, 

trafficable north-south roads were scarce. An exception was the Great 

Philadelphia Wagon Road that followed the Appalachian Warriors' Path which 

extended west from Philade lphia to Hagerstown, Maryland then south through 

the Shenandoah Valley and the Carolinas to Georgia. The road was the main 

artery for thousands of English, Scotch-Irish, and Germanic settlers who 

migrated to America and c laimed lands in the interior. Many key battles of the 

Revolution were fought along its route, which became the western front of the 

war in the South. A portion of Washington's line of communication (LOC) 

followed the road. 17 None of the improvements in roads helped much in terms 

of overland communication. For example, a messenger from the Southern 

Department in Charleston, South Carolina, took over thirty days to reach 

Washington's headquarters, whereas the British, with their control of the seas 

could sail from Boston to Savannah in eight days. 
12 Spearhead of Logistics 

In the western and Canadian areas, human bearers, pack horses and 

sometimes wagons, canoes, and bateaux provided the primary transportation 

modes. Some rivers required frequent portaging of rocky stretches and falls that 

greatly reduced the throughput on those routes. Not only were travelers required 

to man-carry the contents of each craft, but the craft itself. The climate had a 

substantial impact on transportation operations. In winter, snow and ice made 

poor roads worse. Navigable rivers and bays were frozen, and animals were 

prevented from grazing. In summer, the heat lowered productivity, but did not 

stop operations as in winter. 

The need to organize, control, equip, and man transportation resources was 

evident as soon as the war began. Until Congress decided to form an army from 

all of the colonies, no organization had been required. Logistics support of 

militia had been the responsibility of the British Anny when colonists served as 

auxiliaries to British regulars. When the British Army was not involved, the 

colony or the individual militiaman was responsible for support. The militiaman 

habitually carried his own food and water on his back. Sometimes a small supply 

train was provided, but more often support was contracted. Sutlers also followed 

the troops. In some instances, the colonies appointed a temporary commissary 

general or quartern1aster to manage support for a campaign. 

The British model of organizing staffs for administrative and logistical 

support was adopted by the Continental Congress because it was the one used 

during the colonial wars and was described in military texts available at the time. 

On 16 June 1775, the Second Continental Congress authorized a Quartennaster 

General (QMG) for the Army as well as other administrative and technical staff 

officers such as the engineer. 

The largest and best organized civilian managers of transportation were the 

ship owners and merchants in the ports and large towns. The merchant served as 

the shipper, banker, wholesaler, retailer, warehouseman, and insurer. More and 

more as the colonies matured, merchants acted as agents for others and 

employed specialists in key areas. These merchants usually owned or contracted 

for land transportation of their goods and passengers. The Continental Congress 

and the Army drew heavily on the merchant class to provide not only the 

resources but also the teamsters and vessel crews.

18 

No substantial technological improvements in transportation occurred 

during the span of the wars for empire in North America and the Revolution. 

The Continental Army did make improvements in managing transportation by 

centralizing control of some resources, planning requirements in advance, and 

staging assets. European forces had long used those techniques effectively, but 
Beginnings 13 

they had not been well exploited in the dispersed colonies. Throughout the war, 

the soldier, carrying a pack of about sixty pounds, was the main source of 

transportation for his own logistical support. He can-ied rations, cartridges, spare 

clothing (if any), and water. Many of Washington's surprise maneuvers and 

withdrawals to avoid potential disaster depended on foot-soldiers rapidly 

marching 10 to 30 miles, frequently in the dark. "Shanks mare" was a primary 

source of transportation. 

The colonies used water transportation extensively and effectively, 

particularly in coastal and international commerce. Transportation to the interior 

areas served by navigable streams or rivers, and between coastal ports, was 

almost wholly by water. The Continental Congress recognized the advantages of 

water movement by directing the Army to use this method as first choice in 

mode selection. Sloops and schooners were used on large rivers and for coastal 

movement. On less navigable rivers and lakes, canoes, skiffs, bateaux, and 

flatboats carrying forty passengers or cargo provided lift. In rare instances, such 

as operations on Lake Champlain, large vessels for naval warfare and logistics 

were built on site and provided a significant capability. 19 The time and effort 

required to travel along marginally navigable streams made some of the routes 

as costly as road movement for military forces. British control of the oceans 

impeded American movement on the high seas, but the vast distances in 

America provided substantial opportunities to evade British interdiction, 

particularly in intercostal and river movement. Washington's line of 

communication and reserve depots were generally above the head of navigable 

rivers to provide some protection from British water-borne raiding parties, while 

capitalizing on water transportation for the preponderance of the journey inland 

from coastal supply sources. In spite of its advantages, water transportation did 

not play a major part in troop support in most campaigns other than fen-ies 

across water barriers, because of British control of the seas. Tactical movements 

by water were limited to situations where it was the only solution or security was 

ensured. Movement of supplies by water was used whenever possible and 

contributed measurably to the logistical support of Revolutionary forces?0 

Horses were the main source of motive power for cavalry, artillery, and 

logistical support. Ox teams were also used when available, particularly to 

transport large, heavy loads such as siege guns and bateaux. Using animals for 

transport required hay and fodder to maintain them. The challenge to keep 

horses in food took proportionately more effort in colonial times than it would 

today to keep a modern mechanized unit fueled. For example, in 1778 the 

Continental Army's organic horses (artillery, cavalry, officer mounts, and unit 
14 Spearhead of Logistics 

wagons) ate more than 253,000 bushels of grain and 2,500 million tons of hay, a 

consumption rate of over 6,800 tons a day for a small army. In carrying capacity, 

that was the equivalent of more than 1.3 million gallons of liquid fuel, enough to 

keep a modem armored division on the move for a day.21 Since hay was light, it 

would fill the wagon to capacity long before it reached the weight limit, resulting 

in the need for more wagons. 

The massive need for wagons to support army units was not recognized in 

the early years of the Revolution. Most citizens built their own wagons using 

lumber they timbered and dressed into planks. They could barter or pay for the 

services of a wheelwright or blacksmith to shrink on the iron tires, but building a 

wagon was in the same general category of building a house, canoe, or bateaux. 

The skill was an essential requirement for living on the frontier. Small 

manufacturers made carriages, special animal-drawn vehicles and wagons for 

those whose time was too valuable for such chores and who could afford the 

price. The Cadillac of wagons was the Conestoga, which would later contribute 

to the opening of the West. Manufactured in the Conestoga Valley of 

Pennsylvania it was available for general purchase. However, with an empty 

weight of up to 3,500 pounds, and a prewar price of about $250 plus $ 1,200 for a 

six-horse team, it was too bulky and costly for Army needs?2 

Both Washington in the north and Major General Charles Lee, in the south 

repeatedly asked for funding for wagons to move supplies, unit ammunition, and 

impedimenta. In early 1777, Washington authorized the purchase of one wagon 

per eighty men. The authorizations were filled very slowly and haphazardly, but 

as the wagons became available they lessened the soldier's load. Washington 

also authorized wagons to each battalion for baggage, ammunition, and 

entrenching tools, thus greatly improving unit mobility. He also ordered the 

development and purchase of lightweight, strong, two-wheeled wagons to carry 

artillery and regimental ammunition that would not encumber movement as 

heavy and unwieldy wagons did. Brig. Gen. Henry Knox, the Army Chief of 

Artillery, and Quartermaster General Mifflin initiated both procurement and 

in-house production-an early research and development (R& D) initiative. An 

example of the magnitude of animal-power required was the Chief of Artillery's 

estimate of the need for horses for 1778 campaigns: One-thousand and 

forty-nine horses to pull I 06 field pieces, 50 ammunition wagons, and 60 spare 

ammunition wagons, along with necessary harnesses. By any standard, that was 

not a large artillery train, but it illustrated the large number of horses required for 

just a few guns and vehicles. 

23 
Beginnings 15 

A chief of staff was not appointed because in the practice of the 18th 

century, the quartermaster performed that role. The course of the war 

demonstrated that a strong coordinating officer was essential to relieve the 

commander in chief from the massive paperwork; however, the idea of a chief of 

staff as a manager was a concept foreign to the 18th century. The Continental 

Congress departed from the British model by not authorizing an independent 

executive agency similar to the War Office in London. Throughout the war, the 

Continental Congress was unable to get the colonies to agree on the scope of 

authority and support the operations of the centralized Board of War, a 

Congressional agency ftrst established in mid-1776. Due to this lack of 

agreement and the fact that plans and orders for support of the Army depended 

totally on the allocations of funding, the Congress managed support of the war 

"by committee." This was a major frustration that Washington and his 

semi-independent commanders in the South had to face tluoughout the war. 

The Continental Congress generally allowed Washington to appoint his 

own staff officers, although it sometimes reserved that privilege for itself. 

On 9 August 1776, Washington appointed John Goddard of Massachusetts as 

Wagonmaster General and five days later appointed Maj. Thomas Mifflin of 

Pennsylvania as Quartermaster General. Mifflin later appointed Goddard as one 

of the wagonmasters in the three-unit structure he established to provide 

quartermaster support. Mifflin and subsequent Quartermasters General had 

difficulty finding and recruiting effective wagonmasters general. That was one 

of the crucial factors contributing to land transportation problems in the early 

years of the war. A wagonmaster was also authorized as an element of the 

Quartermaster General for the headquarters of each division of the Army. The 

Army followed the Continental policy of hiring wagons for "general" 

transportation use and initially had no organic resources. l11e wagonmasters 

acted as contracting officers, allocators of limited resources, and the agency to 

impress wagons from the populace in emergencies. The system limped along, 

but its weaknesses were recognized by Washington and his commanders. The 

wagon situation became acute following the hasty withdrawal of Washington's 

main army from Long Island in late 1776, when almost all wagons were left 

behind. Only by impressment were enough wagons obtained to support the 

subsequent evacuation of New York City. 

When General Washington authorized organic wagons to improve unit 

mobility, the Quartermaster General and Chief of Artillery procured the 

materials and began in-house fabrication of them. This was a real milestone in 

enhancing Army mobility, but it was not until May 1777 that the Continental 
16 Spearhead of Logistics 

Congress took the frrst step in the direction of a "transportation corps" by 

authorizing a Wagon Department headed by a wagonmaster general and a 

wagonmaster in each military department. However, the officials continued to 

have authority to acquire wagons only after direct approval by the Commander 

in Chief, or the Quartermaster General and his principal assistants. Filling the 

jobs with competent people continued to be a problem. Key positions remained 

vacant for months. The breakdown of wagon transportation at Valley Forge 

resulted in a congressional committee report that almost every species of camp 

transportation was performed by men, who patiently pulled homemade 

carriages, or loaded wood and provisions on their own backs. The Continental 

Congress again attempted to correct the situation, but were thwarted by the 

reluctance of the individual colonies to support measures for the general good of 

the men. Instead they pointed at inefficiencies and corruption in the military. 

The appointments of James Thompson as Wagonmaster General in 

December 1777 and of Nathanael Greene as Quartermaster General in March 

1778 resulted in improvements in organization, reporting, and accounting, 

thereby making requests for support more credible?4 Innovative methods were 

attempted to improve supply and transportation, but most failed because of 

inadequate funding and unreasonable congressional limits on the prices the 

Army could pay for goods and services. Civilian teamsters would not work for 

the pay scale allowed. so soldiers were detailed from line units to drive the 

wagons. Few soldiers had experience in military wagon driving and no attempt 

was made to train them. To make matters worse, the soldiers detailed hated the 

assignment and often abused both the animals and equipment, further reducing 

lift capability. While the abuse stemmed mainly from ignorance, it' was 

sometimes done to get the soldier released from the detail. Pervasive fu nding 

shortfalls drove commanders and staff officers to all manner of expediency. 

Some went into personal debt, while others sold part of the shipments to pay for 

moving the remainder. At a critical time in 178 1, Washington personally 

diverted part of the funds received to pay troops to transport food to troops in the 

field. 

For the remainder of the war, there were never enough wagons to meet 

requirements, and the Army's mobility and resupply efforts suffered despite 

herculean efforts by subordinate commanders and Wagon Department 

personnel. Regardless of the tribulations, organization and development of 

policies and procedures continued in the Wagon Department, and authorizations 

for some organic personnel were fu nded. By 1780, the Wagon Department, the 

genesis of the Transportation Corps of today, had expanded to include offices 
Beginnings 17 

not only with the main army and geographical military departments, but some 

offices with the deputy quartermasters general assigned to districts. There were 

11 deputy wagonmasters general; 108 enlisted wagonmasters, along with three 

from the line and two hired civilians; 256 enlisted wagoners, 104 from the line 

and 272 hired civilians; 45 hired packhorse masters; and 26 hired pack 

horsemen. All were employed on a salary. In 1780, the monthly payroll was 

$72,371 a very respectable showing for the first "Transportation Corps," as the 

bulk of its lift capacity was obtained by contract.25 

The appointment in February 1781 of Robert Morris, a businessman, as 

Superintendent of Finance to head the Treasury Department was a principal 

factor in transportation success in the closing campaigns of the war. Morris' 

exceptional organizational abilities and thorough knowledge of business 

operations made it evident to him that the first order of business to solve the 

country's financial problems was straightening out Army logistics. Morris was 

the catalyst in the successful move of 2,000 American and 4,000 French forces 

to Yorktown. The French Navy and financial support throughout the campaign 

were indispensable to Washington's achievements at Yorktown.26 

No military operation or war in the two centuries since the Revolution 

encountered problems of the magnitude faced by Washington, his limited staff, 

and his commanders. The most significant problem was the instability and 

contjnuing depreciation of the Continental dollar, coupled with the lack of 

funding for necessary staffing. The second most serious problem was the failure 

of colonies to provide support, associated with congressional interference with 

policies and procedures threatening to bring operations to a halt. Those 

challenges were overcome by inspired leadership using every wile and source of 

support for resources. Continuing prioritization of requirements and deferral of 

non-urgent needs involved belt-tightening to the level of semi-starved, ill-fed, 

ill-clothed, poorly shod and badly housed soldiers with limited ammunition. All 

this was mitigated by support from patriots and colonial governments, other than 

that levied by the Continental Congress, but it was never enough. 27 

Campaigns in which transportation played a crucial role generally involved 

small forces, were of limited duration, and covered comparatively short 

distances. Long-range campaigns were almost impossible to support. The 

Canadian campaign involved two different routes and forces of about 1,000 men 

traveling several hundred miles by road and water. Other campaigns followed 

the pattern of most frontier campaigns-small march elements, maximum use of 

navigable water routes, small unit trains transported by boat, and maximum load 

carried by the troops. These campaigns demonstrated the need for planning, 
18 Spearhead of Logistics 

advance preparation, careful route reconnaissance, internal communications, and 

competent leadership. The 450-mile march to the Virginia Peninsula was the 

biggest long-distance move of troops and impedimenta in the war?8 

Fundamental lessons were learned from the study of Revolutionary War 

transportation. The management of military forces had to be handled by an 

executive agency, apart from Congress, and with the authority to allocate funds 

from congressional general appropriations. The use of civilian contractors to 

perform services required legislation by Congress to make civil contracts 

enforceable. The colonial structure, with individual colonies and their delegates 

to the Continental Congress developing operating rules and authorizing funding 

was unworkable. Regardless of how well meaning the participants might be, 

personal and individual colony interests overrode or blocked support of painful 

and expensive courses of action which were best for the nation as a whole. 

The detailing of line troops to perform service functions without proper 

training and motivation demoralized the troops, wasted equipment and supplies, 

and failed to provide the continuity and reinforcement of skills gained by 

sufficient staffing. An executive agency was needed to manage support through 

realistic authorizations and missions. The Army could not be expected to operate 

with the reduced resources and a declining currency depreciating in value. 

Support of the Army by expropriation and impressment of civilian resources 

turned many patriots away. 

POST-WAR OPERATIONS 

The Yorktown Campaign was adequately supported and highly successful 

and should have been the model for logistical support of future operations by the 

Army, but this was not the case. Even though the British still had large forces in 

the country, and the war did not officially end until September 1783, the 

Continental Congress moved quickly to disband the Army. The fear of a 

standing army was still strong, and the desire to curb spending was 

overwhelming. By mid-1784, the Anny was virtually disbanded. The 

Continental Congress authorized a force of 25 privates to guard supplies at Fort 

Pitt and 55 more to guard stores at West Point and "other magazines." No officer 

higher than a captain was to be appointed. The defense of the nation was to be 

provided by the militia of each state, called to federal service. The office of the 

quartermaster general was abolished in 1785 in keeping with the European and 

Colonial concept that a staff was unnecessary in peacetime. The Wagonmaster 

General also disappeared at that time. 
Beginnings 19 

The Articles of Confederation, the first attempt at establishing a 

government, became law in 1781 . The Articles gave the national government the 

power to manage the affairs of the nation, but it could only do so with the 

unanimous approval of the states. This arrangement quickly proved unworkable. 

In 1787, a convention held in Philadelphia resulted in the drafting of the 

Constitution, which was ratified in 1789. The War Department was established 

the same year, initially with limited authority including responsibility for 

military stores. However, with no guidance on the composition of the Army or 

its funding, the Army began to grow and by 1792 reached a strength of 5 ,000. 

Over the next decades, logistics concepts and procedures developed and matured 

gradually with the growth and activity of the Army. Staff positions still were 

considered only a wartime need.Z9 

Congress ignored the fact that the British continued to hold frontier posts 

that were supposed to be given up at the end of the Revolutionary War. Allied 

with the British were the Indians, who continued to raid settlements on the 

frontier. Campaigns against the Indians in late 1790 (Map 2) made it 

increasingly evident that logistics management would have to be bolstered. A 

combined force of 320 regulars and 1,133 militia were badly defeated by the 

Indians at Fort Wayne, primarily because commanders ignored logistics lessons 

learned in the Revolution. A prime mistake was attacking too late in the year and 

not providing fodder for the animals to make up for their inability to graze after 

frost killed the grass. Other errors could have been prevented by elementary 

logistic planning. A second similar expedition in I 791, under Maj. Gen. Arthur 

St. Clair, governor of the Northwest Territory, fared even worse due to the 

negligence of the supply contractor, poor logistics planning, and poor timing of 

the attack in early winter with no forage for the animals. St. Clair's force was 

defeated with a loss of over 600 men. The Indians' victory gave them hope of 

regaining their lands to the east and they formed a new confederation. They were 

also led to believe they would receive support from the British. Settlers began to 

evacuate the frontier. 

The Army, reduced by lack of funds, was in terrible shape. It was lax, 

undisciplined, and riddled by desertion. It was up to Maj. Gen. Anthony "Mad 

Anthony" Wayne to correct the situation. In 1792, on Washington's 

recommendation, Wayne was placed in charge of the Legion of the United 

States. It was not an easy task, but he whipped this new force into shape, 

instilling it with discipline, esprit de corps, and training it for combat. His 

mission was to defeat the Indians and make peace. Supporting Wayne and his 

troops was James O'Hara, a Pittsburgh businessman appointed Quartermaster 
20 Spearhead of Logistics 

INDIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1794 

Ken. 

Map2. 

SCAL£ OF MIL£S 

0 10 20 

--- 30 40 50 

. L----·· 

Penn. 

General who was intimately familiar with the problems in the west. Also, 

Congress authorized Wayne an even more valuable asset-time to make 

preparations and train his troops. O'Hara made exceptionally thorough, timely, 

and complete plans. In late 1792, he added a Wagonmaster General responsible 

for all public teams and drivers. He also added a superintendent of packhorses to 

ens we JYdSt heavy losses of horses were stopped. This wao; done by following specified 

procedures for each march, through inspections and other preventive measures.

30 

Wayne continued his preparations through September 1793. When he was 

notified that efforts to make peace with the Indians had failed and military action 

was the only option, Wayne moved his forces to Fort Jefferson and encamped 
Beginnings 21 

nearby. The Secretary of War ordered him to establish winter quarters, as 

President Washington did not want to risk attacking too late in the campaigning 

season. There was also the problem of support. Despite O'Hara's excellent 

preparations, the contractors either did not fulfill their obligations or fulfilled 

them so slowly that requirements were barely met. Wayne reported the "absolute 

necessity of some effectual and certain mode of supplying the Army than that of . ,31 pnvate contract. 

Training, advance preparation and good leadership finally prevailed. When 

the Indians began their attacks in the summer of 1794, Wayne engaged and 

defeated them at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. Casualties on both sides were 

light, but the Indians lost their sense of invincibility and found the British would 

not support them by openly fighting the United States. Wayne established forts 

to sustain peace, as set forth by the Treaty of Greenville in August 1795. The 

Jay Treaty signed in 1794 had already provided for the British evacuation of all 

their northwestern posts. With these two actions, the settlers in the area enjoyed 

security for the first time. 

From 1798 to 1812, the Secretary of War dominated logistics operations. 

Troops were dispersed in company strength to forts along the frontiers in the 

western and Great Lakes areas. Most troop support was provided by contractors, 

including such services as procurement and delivery of rations and other 

supplies. Contractors also furnished quarters and provided transportation for 

recruits. The Army's organic procurement and storage capabilities were centered 

in Philadelphia, so the transportation function was also located there. 

Transportation management increased dependence on the knowledge of traffic 

management and contracting. Supplies for outlying posts were moved to 

maritime posts by commercial coastal vessels, contracted wagons, or packhorse 

(in winter) to Pittsburgh. They then went by Army flatboats that carried 25 to 30 

men and 3 to 4 tons of cargo to posts on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. For 

posts on the Great Lakes, cargo went to New York and then by water to 

Albany?2 

In 1802, the budget ax again fell on the office of the Quartermaster General 

when Congress eliminated Army staff positions and substituted military agents 

in each of the Revolutionary War geographical departments. The agents directed 

transportation of shipments from origin to storage or the posts. All contracts for 

rations were arranged by the Secretary of War, and for other supplies, only as 

approved by the Secretary of War or the Purveyor of Public Supplies of the 

Treasury Department. The Louisiana Purchase in 1803 greatly expanded U.S. 

territory in the west and required further dispersion of the Army of about 3,000 
22 Spearhead of Logistics 

men. The system of close control by the Secretary of War was workable during 

peace for a small army but would be unable to support wartime requirements, as 

was proven in the War of 1812. 

The War of 1812 found the United States totally unprepared even for the 

limited conflict that was to take place. The Army had been cut back and 

operations were limited to peacetime routine. In May 1812, Congress 

reestablished the Quartermaster Department under a Quartermaster General, 

who had a staff and a corps of officers, but the reorganization took time. Once 

again, the War Department relied on contractors for the majority of its 

transportation and was once more disappointed. The transportation challenges 

and obstacles during the War of 1812 were little different from those of the 

Colonial and Revolutionary Wars, and the war ended without any significant 

change in either transportation doctrine or transportation equipment.33 
CHAPTER II 

1815- 1848 

'With our depots farther from the sources of supply 

than is Algires from Toulon or Marseilles, we have accomplished 

more in the first six months of our operations in Mexico, 

than France, the first military power in Europe, 

had accomplished in Algeria in seventeen years." 

23 

Brigadier General Thomas S. Jesup, 

----------QMGAnnual Report 1847.----------

OVERVIEW 

At the end of the War of 1812, Congress hastily dismantled the Army by 

cutting its strength from 60,000 to 10,000. Three decades after the Revolution, 

Congress and the people were still wary of any large military establishment. 

Furthermore, a large army was seen as an unnecessary expense. An attempt to 

return the Army to its prewar configuration was thwarted by William H. 

Crawford, Secretary of War from 1815-16, and his successor, John C. Calhoun, 

who was Secretary of War from 1817-25. Both were strong and imaginative 

men who recognized the need for a permanent Army staff and kept the issue 

before Congress. In I 818, Calhoun convinced Congress to pass a law that 

provided for the organization of the Quartermaster, Subsistence, and Medical 

Departments. l11is law had a profound effect on Army supply and services for 

decades to come. Calhoun strongly believed in a permanent peacetime staff and 

successfully opposed attempts to return to the contract system, which had proved 

deficient. 1 Even so, 10,000 men were too few for the Army to perform its 

assigned tasks well. No pennanent staff was authorized, but several 

developments were underway that provided the Army with a solid organizational 

foundation to support it in the Second Seminole War (1836-42) and the Mexican 

War (1845-47). 

In May 1818, Calhoun selected a 29-year old Colonel of Infantry, Thomas 

S. Jesup, for the post of Quartermaster General. Jesup, known as the "Father of 

the Quartermaster Corps," served as Quartermaster General for 42 years, 
24 Spearhead of Logistics 

eventually reaching the rank of major general. He was a man of action who 

viewed his position, in an 18th century sense, as that of a commander and chief 

of staff. During the Seminole War, he actually commanded troops in the field. 

A man of great vision, he placed the supply of the Army on solid footing and 

spent extensive periods in the field monitoring Quartermaster General supp01t 

and interfacing with line commanders in both peace and war. 

2 

Trouble in Florida began in the War of 1812 when the Seminole Indians 

and a large number of runaway slaves fought on the side of Great Britain. 

Florida was a Spanish possession, but Spain was an ally of Great Britain in the 

war against Napoleon. At the end of hostilities, the British abandoned their allies 

but left them very well anned. The relationship between the Indians and the 

blacks was complicated. The Seminoles were fragments of tribes who had gone 

to Florida to escape hostile whites and Indians. In Florida, they found a haven 

with fertile land and prospered. They welcomed runaway slaves who brought 

new farming and mercantile techniques and who were willing to fight alongside 

them. In some cases, the runaways were slaves of the Indians, but were treated 

much better than they were by whites. However, a large proportion of them were 

free. After the War of 1812, there was a raid, counter-raid syndrome, typical of 

border areas, but the main objection to the Seminoles came from slave holders 

who were fearful because Florida provided a haven for escaped slaves. As long 

as Florida lay under the political control of Spain, this combined culture 

flourished in relative peace. But once Florida was ceded to the United States in 

1819, those who feared it welcomed the opportunity to destroy it. The military 

significance of the war was its role as a training ground for senior officers who 

successively tried to drive the Seminoles from Florida until it was finally 

decided to leave them in place. 

Two key commanders of the Seminole War (Map 3), Winfield Scott and 

Zachary Taylor, were later to win fame in the Mexican War. Scott went on to 

become General in Chief and Taylor became President. The war also vindicated 

Secretary Calhoun's reorganization of the staff a lmost two decades earlier. The 

planning procedures instituted by Jesup were modified and improved during the 

Seminole War. Steamboats, a key factor in logistical and troop movements for 

the rest of the century, were first used for support in Florida. Supply shipments 

from northern depots were moved by steamship via the Atlantic. In the interior 

of the combat zone steamboats were used for both troop and logistics 

movements.3 
1815 ·1848 25 

SEMINOLE WAR 

Map3 

THE MEXICAN WAR 

The Mexican War was mainly a result of the concept, popular in the United 

States, of "Manifest Destiny," which envisioned a United States stretching from 

the Atlantic to the Pacific and from Canada to the Rio Grande. This vision ran 

headlong into historical Mexican sovereignty over New Mexico and California. 

On both sides, there was opposition to war. There were many diplomatic efforts 

to substitute negotiation and reimbursement for military action, but each attempt 

heightened tension and moved the two nations closer to war.

4 
26 Spearhead of Logistics 

TACTICAL OPERATIONS IN MEXICO 

In July 1845, General Zachary Taylor's army began moving from western 

bases where it had been marshaled, to New Orleans, thence to Corpus Christi. 

As each attempt at negotiation failed, the army moved closer to the planned 

border with Mexico, finally settling in at Fort Texas on the north bank of the Rio 

Grande opposite Matamoros to observe the Mexicans. Military operations 

began on 24 April 1846, when Mexican Maj. Gen. Arista, commanding the 

army across the Rio Grande from Taylor's Army of Observation, notified Taylor 

that hostilities had begun and soon after attacked. In a series of engagements 

between 24 April and 9 May, Taylor's army repelled Arista's assaults and 

successfully counterattacked Mexican forces in the Battles of Palo Alto and 

Resaca de la Palma. The effectiveness of the American artillery was one of the 

main reasons for Taylor's success. Operations ended with both forces in 

essentially the same positions they occupied before the Mexican attack. 

Congress finally declared war in May 1846, which meant that funds for the war 

could be authorized and volunteers called up. It also legalized Taylor's 

subsequent victorious engagement with Arista's forces in the battle of 

Matamoros. This was the first U.S. large-scale war not initially dependent on 

callup of militia because of the prohibition of their deployment outside the 

borders of the U.S. Instead, levies of volunteers made on the states were used to 

supplement the miniscule Regular Army.5 

The Mexican War involved U.S. forces in four principal campaigns (Map 4) 

planned to seize and occupy the lands in the west and southwest, the objective of 

the war. Although some operations penetrated deeply into Mexico, there were 

no designs on Mexico itself. The aim was to bring Mexico to the peace table to 

facilitate negotiations on annexing California, New Mexico, and Oregon. 

During Taylor's operations from the Republic of Texas into Northern 

Mexico, he successfully attacked and occupied Matamoros, Camargo, Monterey, 

and Saltillo through November 1846. He subsequently controlled Northern 

Mexico and subdued Mexican guerrilla operations throughout 1847. The 

operations of the separate Center Division of Taylor's Army, under Brig. Gen. 

John E. Wool, from October to December 1846 had the initial objective of 

Chihuahua. On 17 December, Taylor called off Wool's planned attack against 

Chihuahua while the division was in the town of Parras to dive1t them to join the 

main force to meet an expected Mexican attack on Saltillo, which proved false. 

Wool continued to operate under Taylor's command thereafter and assumed 

command of the Army in late October 1847, upon Taylor's departure to the 

United States. 6 
1815 · 1848 

... 

... 

0 

~ AXIS OF U.S Aov•~tt 

~ HIGH GROUHD ,IQOV( 6000 Hf.T 

0 100 zoo 300 

..,.,lES 

27 

Map4 

The Army of the West under Col. Stephen W. Kearny, commander of the 

1st Dragoons at Fort Leavenworth, was directed by orders personally drafted by 

President Polk to establish a temporary civil government in the conquered areas 

and to retain "all such of the existing officers as are known to be friendly to the 

United States, and will take the oath of allegiance."7 Kearny's force, of less than 

3,000, included volunteers from Missouri, a battalion of Mormons recruited 

from emigrants to Utah, and other units to supplement his regulars. Kearny was 

also authorized by the Army General in Chief Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott to 

recruit as required on the way to his final objective. He established a military 

and civilian government in New Mexico and moved on to California. There his 

orders helped resolve immensely complicated political problems and 

jurisdictional disagreements between U.S. Army and U.S. Navy commanders 

concerning the governing of California. Various appointed and self-styled 

commanders generated political problems that could not be easily resolved 
28 Spearhead of Logistics 

considering the time required to obtain decisions from Washington. Kearny and 

the senior Navy officer on the west coast, Commodore W. Branford Kubrick, 

mutually settled the problems by issuing joint proclamations on 1 March 1847. 

Kearny left for St. Louis on 31 May, arriving on 4 November.8 

A small but important campaign was conducted by the 1st Missouri 

Mounted Volunteers, an element of Kearny's Army of the West. Commanded by 

Col. Alexander Doniphan, it joined Kearny along the route to Santa Fe and was 

subsequently dispatched on an incursion into Navaho territory to put down 

Indian uprisings. By the time Doniphan had quieted the area, signed treaties 

with Navaho and Zuni leaders, and moved his forces to Valverde, New Mexico, 

on the Rio Grande, Kearny was en route to California on the second stage of his 

mission. By then, Donihan had 846 battle-hardened, well-mounted troops, with 

Maj. Meriwether Lewis Clark's six-gun artillery battery of 100 soldiers attached. 

Kearny directed Doniphan to march to join Wool's forces destined to attack 

Chihuahua. Alone, Doniphan's force captured Chihuahua, then moved to 

Saltillo, fought Indian and guerrilla raiders en route, and joined Wool at Buena 

Vista. The Missourians, whose enlistments expired on 1 June, were sent by boat 

to New Orleans and discharged. They had marched about 3,500 miles and 

fought two major battles in what was probably the most difficult trek of the war, 

even though many other units also made long and arduous marches.9 

The campaign that successfully ended the war was led by Maj. Gen. 

Winfield Scott, who developed the strategic and tactical concepts for the 

amphibious operation at Vera Cruz. Scott, General in Chief of the Army, was the 

leading American general of his generation and one of the great military leaders 

in the nation's history. The Vera Cruz landing was the first projection of a 

major force outside the borders of the United States and one of the most 

successful amphibious operations in American annals. On 9 March 1847, 8,600 

men landed between the hours of 1530 and 2300 in specially built amphibious 

craft, with no casualties. Even today this would be an impressive achievement. 

Much of the success of the landing proper was due to close planning with the 

commander of the supporting Navy squadron, Commodore David Conner, who 

was succeeded by Commodore Matthew Galbraith Perry. Scott placed Vera 

Cruz under siege and the garrison surrendered on 27 March 1847.10 

After subduing guerrilla elements around Vera Cruz, Scott's forces seized 

the route to Pueblo on 1 April, winning the Battle of Cerro Gordo. During the 

battle, the army suffered light casualties while inflicting heavy losses on the 

enemy, forcing the Mexicans to withdraw. After taking Pueblo on the 15 April, 

Scott consolidated all available forces, including most of those guarding his lines 
1815-1848 29 

of communication, and temporarily cut loose from his logistical support base. 

With some reinforcements and masterful tactical employment of his army, Scott 

breached the defenses of Mexico City on the 16th and took the city's surrender 

on 17 September 1847. The Duke of Wellington, Europe's most distinguished 

soldier said Scott's "campaign was unsurpassed in military annals. He is the 

greatest living soldier." Only MacArthur's Inchon-Seoul Campaign of 1950 

compares to Scott's Mexico City campaign in concept and audacity. 

11 

Although the war generated considerable political turmoil at home, it was 

decisively won by American arms. Logistics support must be credited with a 

good part of the success. While not perfect, it far surpassed the quality of 

support in prior wars and demonstrated that some commanders were learning the 

necessity of planning logistics as well as strategy and tactics. Like the Seminole 

War, the Mexican War served as a training ground for many of the commanders 

and senior officers of the Civil War. Grant, Lee, Sherman, Jackson, and scores 

of others served as junior officers in Mexico. 

TRANSPORTATION IN THE MEXICAN WAR 

Technologically, the Mexican War marked the emergence of modem 

warfare. Steam-powered vessels, railroads, and the telegraph were 

revolutionizing transportation and long distance communication. Also 

significant was the use of India Rubber cloth to sheath wagon beds and make 

pontoons for bridging rivers. The Mexican War also saw the first widespread use 

of ether for anesthetizing combat casualties for surgery. The Battle of Buena 

Vista was the first time in which both combatants were armed with percussion 

weapons. While the percussion ignition system was far superior to the flintlock it 

replaced, percussion caps had to be manufactured and transported carefully 

because they were sensitive to shock. This development changed the . f . . ~ 12 transportatiOn o ammurutlon torever. 

Steamships were used to some degree in the Seminole War, but in the 

Mexican War they were indispensable. They were used for the projection and 

ongoing support of large forces outside the United States, as well as troop and 

resupply movements on rivers such as the Rio Grande. The steamship, not 

dependent on the vagaries of wind and tide for power, made large amphibious 

operations possible. Scott's Vera Cruz and Mexico City campaigns 

demonstrated the feasibility of amphibious landings and continuing logistical 

support of deep inland objectives. The barges used to land the combat forces 

tactically and then for logistics support were designed by Quartermaster General 

Jesup and procured for the landings. Other special shallow-draft craft for river 
30 Spearhead of Logistics 

operations were also obtained, frequently well in advance of the field 

commanders' identification of the requirement. Steamships also provided rapid 

and reliable retrograde of most of the forces in the theater. During the war, the 

Army acquired and used 38 sailing ships and 35 steamships and chartered a far 

greater number. 13 The ships were not necessarily comfortable for troop 

movements. One Missouri volunteer wrote after his first night aboard "for 

suffering, I have not experienced its equal in all my peregrinations through life."14 

Railroads in the United States were not yet well developed during the 

Mexican War. There were only a few Jines east of the Mississippi and none west 

of it. Railroads were used for mobilization when available and for moving 

supplies and materiel from manufacturers to ports in the northeast, but not for 

moving troops or supplies movements in the theater. Jesup, in the fall of 1845, 

recommended construction of a rail line to connect the Point Isabel/Brazos 

Island area with the Rio Grande for onward movement by river steamboats. The 

railroad was not built since funding was not available. But the recommendation 

demonstrated how innovative Jesup was. Similarly, the telegraph connected 

Washington, Philadelphia, and New York and enhanced contact between those 

centers of support, particularly for procurement. However, it was not yet 

sufficiently advanced to bridge the immense distances between Washington and 

field commanders in Texas and Mexico or within the theater where operating 

forces sometimes were separated by hundreds of miles. 15 

In spite of the addition of mechanical transportation for support, military 

operations still depended on animal-drawn transport and the individual soldier 

for transportation during a campaign. The terrain of Northern Mexico was arid 

and crossed by rivers that were either dry or in flood. To operate in such terrain, 

commanders had to plan well for their logistics support. For example, when 

General Wool joined Taylor, after his recall from the attack on Chihuahua, he 

was carrying in his trains 60-days rations, 400,000 cartridges, and 200 rounds of 

artillery ammunition. 16 Anny transporters in the field continued to be faced with 

the fact that animal transport depended on the terrain and weather. In field 

operations, a two-horse wagon team could haul an average of six barrels of flour 

or I ,332 pounds of supplies, while a four-horse wagon team could can·y ten to 

twelve barrels of flour or 2,100 pounds. In an area like Mexico, where grazing 

was limited, each payload had to be reduced by twelve pounds of forage per 

horse per day and three pounds of food per wagoner per day. On a I 0-day haul, 

the payload of a two-horse wagon team would be displaced by 20 percent if 

forage and food for the return trip were available at destination. If not, the 

payload was reduced by 40 percent to "fuel" the team and driver for the 
1815 ·1848 31 

round-trip. 17 This need complicated planning as well as execution and did not 

take into account events such as flash floods. A small fluctuation in weather or 

season could drastically change the number of wagons and animals required or 

extend the time to go a certain distance by a factor of days. 

Quartermaster General Jesup provided guidance and direction to 

transpot1ation doctrine throughout his long career. He was aware of the needs of 

the soldier in the field and, in many instances, anticipated those needs before the 

commanders had thought of them. Many of his army transportation procedures 

endure today. Unlike most of his predecessors, Jesup considered his office a 

military one. He staffed it with young, active, and intelligent officers. 

Moreover, in a letter to Secretary Calhoun, he said he wished to prepare his 

office to be efficient in time of war and to ensure responsibility in all its 

branches in both peace and war. Within a month after taking office, he drafted 

rules and regulations covering the functions of his office and the duties of its 

officers. The department objectives were established to "insure an ample and 

efficient system of supply, to give the utmost facility and effect to the 

movements and operations of the Anny, and to enforce a strict accountability on 

the part of all officers charged with monies and supplies." 18 Taking complete 

control of the department, he directed all correspondence, set deadlines, 

reviewed invoices personally, and prohibited any quartermaster from 

participating in trade. He established total accountability, personally supervised 

a central disbursing system, and directed assistant quartermasters not to purchase 

items that other bureaus could or should provide. 19 

One of Jesup's major innovations which is still used today is the travel 

allowance. The allowance was for officers travelling without troops and the 

amount was based on the distance travelled, computed fro m Melish's, 

The Travellers Directory, a standard geographical reference that Jesup adopted 

for the department.20 In other transportation functions, Jesup showed foresight 

far beyond the thinking of the time, engaging in what is now known as research 

and development. In the Seminole War, he field tested two-horse wagons pulled 

by four horses to limit the weight and keep the wagons from getting stuck in the 

boggy terrain. Wagons lined with India rubber cloth for flotation and flatboats 

pulled by steamboats were also ideas he tested. Later, these ideas were refined 

and practically applied in the Mexican War and after. Jesup required department 

officers to spend time with the army in the field during both the Seminole and 

Mexican Wars. 

Jesup wisely used the frontier as a model for wartime support. As 

settlements proliferated, the need for security expanded. Transportation 
32 Spearhead of Logistics 

requirements grew and made it increasingly difficult to supply posts. All forms 

of transportation, from steamboats to packhorses, were used to supply posts in 

the west. Railroads were first used in 1833 but would not be the main source of 

transportation in the west until late in the century. The lack of wagon roads made 

it almost impossible to provide security for settlements, resupply the posts, or 

reinforce them promptly. Jesup decided to solve the problem by initiating a 

massive road-building campaign, joining posts between the Indians and frontier 

settlements from the upper Mississippi to the Red River in the south. The 

project, known as the Great Military Road of 1836, was begun in that year and 

completed five years later? 1 Jesup's interests and improvements were not 

limited to quartermaster functions. As early as 1829, he advocated putting a 

portion of the infantry on horseback. This led to the creation of a battalion of 

mounted rangers, then finally to a regiment of dragoons.22 

By the time the United States went to war with Mexico, Jesup had been the 

Quartermaster General for 28 years. He successfully militarized the department, 

organizing it for both peace and war, and instituted positive control procedures 

for supply and transportation. The Quartermaster General trained his staff in 

field operations and prescribed regulations which he made sure were followed. 

By 1846, he achieved the goals he set for his department upon taking office in 

1818. The Army had standard doctrine and an existing staff structure ready to 

provide support in peace or war. 

Although the Quartermaster Department was firmly established, it faced an 

unusual challenge before the war with Mexico. The Army was deployed nearly a 

year before the actual declaration of war, so there were no wartime funds upon 

which to draw. The Quartermaster General had to support from existing funds 

the marshaling of Taylor's army, its move to Texas, and the Army's first major 

engagement. Not only did the situation provide a drain on the quartermaster 

budget, it also precluded advance ordering of wagons, boats, and other 

impedimenta that Jesup and his quartermasters in the field desperately needed. 

Col. Trueman Cross, who was Jesup's quartermaster in the West and initially the 

quartermaster of Taylor's army, clearly recognized the need. He recommended 

Jesup procure a standby train of 300 to 400 wagons, made from a common 

pattern with interchangeable parts to meet emergency movement requirements. 

He aJso recommended strongly that the Army be authorized a corps of enlisted 

drivers, arguing that under the existing system of contracting transportation, 

civilians could quit or strike for higher wages at will, leaving the Army with 

little recourse. The plan was a good one, but Congress never authorized the 

funds to establish the train or the driver corps. 
1815-1848 33 

Jesup and his deputy, Col. Henry Stanton, who acted as Quartennaster 

General while Jesup inspected forts in the West in early 1845, responded to the 

approaching war by prioritizing the use of all available assets, including the staff 

of 37, only 15 of whom were fit for field duty. However, all were thoroughly 

experienced, most having participated in the 1812 and Seminole Wars. The first 

priority was support of Taylor's force en route to Texas. Col. Stanton 

transferred ten of the available officers to New Orleans to serve under Col. 

Trueman Cross. Among them was Lt. Col. Thomas F. Hunt, who had many 

years experience in New Orleans. 

This small staff received, billeted, and staged Taylor's troops in New 

Orleans and arranged their coastal movement to Corpus Christi where they 

established a depot. The staff also received wagons procured by Col. Stanton in 

Philadelphia and augmented them by local purchase. They could not procure the 

necessary mules and substituted 600 oxen. As Col. Cross anticipated, drivers in 

the southwest were in short supply and those that were available were unreliable 

(especially when danger threatened), inept, and frequently unhealthy. A number 

of expedients were tried to make up for the lack of reliable contract drivers. Pack 

mules with Mexican drivers were hired at rates ranging from 50 cents a day to 

$25 a month?3 Soldiers were used as drivers for wagons furnished to units for 

baggage, rations, and ammunition. Jesup even transferred funds appropriated 

for other items to procure the steamboats to move Taylor's troops and supplies 

to Camargo on the Rio Grande, where a general depot was established. 

Shallow draft steamboats and barges were used to carry supplies for 

Taylor's army as far as Camargo. From there, they were transported by wagon 

and pack mules to Monterrey, SaltilJo, and Buena Vista. En route to Monterrey, 

Taylor's force used 180 wagons and I ,900 mules with big wooden pack saddles 

to carry the bulk of the anny's equipment Each mule carried about 300 pounds 

of cargo which had to be unloaded each evening so the mule could graze and 

rest. Support from the Camargo depot was supplemented by local purchase of 

beef, flour, forage, and fresh food to supplement the field ration.24 Support 

throughout the war to northern and western Mexico followed the general pattern 

of the initial support to Taylor with considerable improvement. Once war was 

officially declared and fu nding became available, the advance planning of Jesup 

and his staff paid off. Much of the support to U.S. forces in California and 

Oregon was through local procurement because those expeditions were far 

beyond the capability of the quartennaster to support. For long distance marches 

such as Kearny's and Doniphan's, commissary officers with wagons 

accompanied the expedition, carried food, issued it to the units, and replenished 
34 Spearhead of Logistics 

it from military depots as much as possible. When depots were not within 

supporting distance, the commissary officers used local purchase, barter, or any 

expedient they could to support the troops?5 

Major General Scott was a meticulous planner who paid particular 

attention to logistics, as the logistical support of his campa ign to capture Mexico 

City demonstrates. Scott personally reviewed and revised support plans and 

followed up on progress. Jesup moved to New Orleans in September 1846 to 

assume direction of quartermaster affairs and from there supported Taylor's 

operations and later Scott's expedition. He found much of the criticism of the 

Quartermasters Corps uncalled for and took steps to improve support that was 

inadequate. He instituted an early ancestor of the Direct Support System (DSS) 

by directing water shipments to points closer to the lines of communication in 

Texas and Mexico. He requested waterproof packaging to reduce damage en 

route and in the field. He directed packaging of shipments in sizes that could be 

transferred from steamboats to pack animals without repackaging. Jesup also 

directed bridging installed to replace circuitous routing via fords to shorten the 

lines of communication and established repair and maintenance workshops at 

depots in the field. 

The War with Mexico validated Jesup's organization and system of 

support. Troops and supplies were routinely moved by all available modes of 

transportation. Resources, for the most part, were anticipated by the experienced 

staff of the Quartermaster Department who planned, developed, and delivered 

supplies even before before the war began. Careful planning allowed the Army 

to move and sustain large forces over long distances. Quartermasters in the field 

were not deskbound. They insured routes were reconnoitered, even if they had to 

do it themselves, and they provided transportation where it was needed and used 

every means available. For example, Assistant Quartennaster Capt. S.H. Drum, 

in charge of a drove of 400 horses and 400 mules coming by steamship from the 

North, landed them at Vidalia, Louisiana, and drove them overland 615 miles to 

San Antonio?6 

The war ended with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hildalgo, signed on 

2 February 1848, and ratified on 30 May. About 41 ,000 troops and civilian hires 

had to be brought home and demobilized. Almost all were embarked at Vera 

Cruz and shipped to New Orleans, then to final destinations. Finally, there was 

the task of disposing of quartermaster property. Assistant quartermasters were 

instructed to sell the property that could not conveniently be brought back. 

However, sound, well-broken animals and serviceable wagons were returned, 
1815 ·1848 35 

with the best distributed throughout the southwestern posts and the remainder 

sold. Property from demobilization in the west was handled similarly?7 

l11e period between the War of 1812 and the Civil War was significant for 

the Army and the nation. A small number of dedicated, knowledgeable, and 

imaginative individuals established and systematized logistics and transportation 

support of the Army. This allowed the Army to operate in difficult terrain like 

Florida without suffering lack of support and still operate thousands of miles 

away from its permanent bases and achieve victory in Mexico. Jesup is the 

central figure in this story. For 42 years, he served as quartermaster of the Army. 

During that entire period, he was always looking forward and constantly sought 

newer and more efficient ways of accomplishing his mission in both peace and 

war. Nearly singlehandedly, Jesup created the Quartermaster Department and 

within it the responsibility for transportation. Despite his long tenure, Jesup 

never became deskbound and ensured that he and his staff were in constant 

touch with "the line" as field soldiers were called. Jesup also encouraged line 

officers to take a hand in their own support, and the achievements of Generals 

Taylor and Wool in the arid terrain of Northern Mexico, showed that the line 

officers paid attention. 

POST WAR TRANSPORTATION 

For the decade following the war, the quartermaster was faced with 

lengthening supply lines as the frontier continued westward. Transportation 

costs consumed the greatest part of the budget By 1850, posts ranged from the 

Rio Grande to the Pacific coast as far north as Puget Sound with a series of 

frontier posts in between. To garrison and supply these posts, troops and 

supplies for the west coast were sent by ship on the 5-month voyage around 

Cape Horn. Posts west of the Mississippi in the interior were supplied by 

steamboat and other means much as before the war, pending expansion of the 

rail network west. Fort Leavenworth, on the Missouri River, was the main 

frontier depot, supported by steamboat from St. Louis. From there, wagons had 

to travel 310 miles to Fort Kearny, 63 7 miles to Fort Laramie and 821 miles to 

Santa Fe. A depot was established at Indianola, Texas, about 540 miles across 

the Gulf of Mexico from New Orleans. From there, support went by wagon 420 

miles to Fort Worth or 803 miles to El Paso. The support requirements of U.S. 

forces in the opening of the west were very similar to those required for war. By 

1860, contract carriers, such as the famous western finn of Russell, Majors, and 

Waddell, were carrying the bulk of support forward from the depots. On most 
36 Spearhead of Logistics 

routes, carriers used the huge 5-ton capacity wagons, made by Murphy and 

Espenshield in St. Louis and Studebaker in South Bend?8 

An interesting sidelight shows the great interest taken in transportation by 

Secretary of War Jefferson Davis. He suggested that camels might help solve the 

problems of supplying posts in western deserts since they performed well in the 

deserts of the Middle East. In 1856, thirty camels were purchased and sent to 

posts in the Southwest. In that climate, a camel could carry nearly twice the load 

a horse could pull in a wagon, across terrain that no wagon could negotiate. 

Davis' successor, John B. Floyd, was an enthusiastic supporter of the camel 

experiment and asked Congress to fund the purchase of 1 ,000 more. Congress 

refused the request, and any attempt to further the experiment was interrupted by 

the Civil War. After the war, the completion of the transcontinental railroad 

made the camel unnecessary, and the surviving camels were sold to circuses or 

turned loose. 29 

The decade of the fifties was a time of great expansion and development of 

inland transportation, with much greater use of the western river systems and 

extension of the rail network. By 1860, of the more than 30,000 miles of rail 

trackage, about 21,000 was in the future Union states and 9,000 in the states that 

seceded to form the Confederacy. Northern vessels dominated the inland 

waterways, and Yankee shipping on the high seas nearly equaled that of the 

British Empire.30 
CHAPTER III 

The Civil War 1861-1865 

"That single stem of railroad 

[from Louisville to Atlanta], 473 miles long, 

supplied an army of 100,000 men and 35,000 animals for a period of 

196 days ... That amount of food and forage .. . would have taken 

36,800 wagons of six mules ... each day, a simple impossibility ... in 

that region of the country." 

37 

_______ Major General William T. Sherman, Memoirs. ______ _ 

OVERVIEW 

The roots of the American Civil War lie in the very origins of the United 

States. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, state representatives agreed 

not to discuss slavery in order to establish a workable government. They felt that 

slavery was unprofitable and would soon disappear. Little could they know that 

in a few years the invention of the cotton gin would make slavery very profitable 

and desirable. The framers succeeded in forming a government and were 

confident . that future generations would solve the issue peacefully. Thus the 

seeds of the nation's most terrible conflict were sown at its very birth. 

In the early years of the 19th century, the Industrial Revolution wrought 

enormous changes in the social and economic fabric that would eventually drive 

the North and South apart. The cotton gin meant that unlimited cotton could be 

processed if it could be picked in mass, and slavery provided a means of cheap 

labor. In the South, fortunes were made overnight as plantation owners acquired 

more slaves to till more land to grow more cotton. The South became an 

agricultural semifeudal society with an extremely wealthy class that viewed 

itself as an aristocracy providing much of the political and moral leadership for 

the nation. In the North, the society of small businesses and skilled laborers 

quickly gave way to a system of factories and mills, run by abundant water and 

steam power. Ironically, many of these factories revolutionized textile 

production, creating lower textile prices that greatly expanded markets for 

cotton. A large proportion of the workers in these mills were newly arrived 
.. 

38 Spearhead of Logistics 

immigrants willing to work for much less than native-born Americans. Some 5 

million new citizens arrived in the flfst half of the 19th century, most of them 

from Ireland and Germany. Because a majority were Catholic, ethnic friction 

occurred, but the North was on its way to becoming a capitalist, industrialized, 

and diverse urban society.

1 

After 1815, massive efforts were made by both federal and state 

government<; to improve roads and canals. By 1850, over 3,700 miles of new 

canals were opened. In the same period, the steamboat came into its own for 

both inland and ocean traffic. The rail network breached the Appalachians and 

bridged the Mississippi, and by 1860, the United States had a larger rail network 

than the rest of the world combined. Similar results came from mechanization 

of the whole range of farm production with the transportation network providing 

fast distribution. Farmers increased productivity and specialized in money 

crops, thus reducing prices of farm products. Factories were mechanized and 

interchangeable parts were mass-produced, making many craft skills obsolete 

and manufactured products cheaper. Prices fell as rapid transportation of people 

and goods became commonplace. With increased industrial capacity and rapid 

travel came an improved standard of living. Nevertheless, in areas where the 

transportation revolution had not penetrated, the economy and living standards 

were much the same as they had been before the tum of the century _2 Along 

with the changes in industry and agriculture came political and social changes. 

In the North, the availabi)jty of cheap manufactured goods and farm 

products freed women from making cloth and candles, and mechanization 

reduced the need for them in the fields. They devoted more attention to their 

families and began to work outside the home. Even though they were not 

allowed to vote, they became politically active through church and literary 

groups which strongly influenced the abolition movement. The abolition 

movement worked to outlaw slavery and lobbied aggressively to prevent its 

spread. It also operated the "Underground Railroad" to assist escaped slaves to 

freedom in the North or Canada. On the other side of the slavery issue were the 

Southern politicians and businessmen who rebutted the barrage of criticism from 

the North. They maintained that slavery was a positive good and benefitted the 

slaves and the rest of the country. Southern authors postulated that Northern 

laborers were wage slaves, less well off than Southern Negro slaves. To them 

freedom in the North was a sham "with a servile class of mechanics and 

laborers, unfit for self-government, yet clothed with the attributes and powers of 

citizens."3 As differences between the two sides deepened, a showdown became 

inevitable. 
The Civil War 1861 -1865 39 

White House landing on the Pamunky River, 1862. 

For nearly 75 years, compromises reached by Congress and the president 

kept slavery, with its complex social and political ramifications, from breaking 

up the Union. Expansion into the territories gained by the Louisiana Purchase of 

1803 and the Mexican War of 1846-49 created further discord between the 

North and South. The discord occurred because the Southern pro-slave states 

had to maintain a number of senators equal to those from the Northern states. 

Less than an equal number meant they could not protect their interests because 

the north had a majority in the House. To maintain this balance, states had to be 

admitted to the Union in pairs, one slave, one free. A series of compromises, 

from the ratification of the Constitution to the Compromise of 1850, made sure 

this was precisely what happened, but in 1854 the entire fabric of compromise 

began to unravel. In that year Kansas was supposed to enter the Union as a slave 

state and Nebraska as a free state, but when the territorial legislature of Kansas 

opted for a "free" state, slavery sympathizers poured in to ensure Kansas would 

be pro-slavery. 
40 Spearhead of Logistics 

In I 860, the United States had a population of almost 32 million, about 4 

mjllion of whom were slaves. It surpassed Britain and all European nations, 

except Russia and France, in population. That population was so mobile, 

innovative, and ambitious that American factories and farms were worldwide 

leaders in manufacturing. They exported not only manufactured goods, but 

techniques which the British named "the American system of manufactures."4 It 

had survived crisis after crisis as persons of good will in the North and the South 

tried valiantly to compromise on the slavery question. But the new territories 

became a battleground between pro-slavery men and "freesoilers." "Bleeding 

Kansas" described the situation accurately. Freesoilers eventually prevailed in 

1861 when Kansas was admitted as a free state, joining California, Minnesota, 

and Oregon whose entries since the Mexican War gave the North a four-state 

edge over the South in Congress. 5 

Despite the political compromises, a national fugitive slave law, and the 

Supreme Court's ruling in the Dred Scott Case that slaves were property and had 

no rights, the South had lost its equality in the Senate and began to see itself as a 

unique region with its way of life under attack. The political race of 1860 

confirmed their worst fears as the Democratic Party split into a Southern and 

Northern faction and the Republicans, seen in the South as an abolitionist party, 

won the election. When Southern leaders saw that over 70 percent of the 

country's voters disapproved of slavery, they decided to make other political 

arrangements. Since President Buchanan was a lame duck until Lincoln's 

inauguration on 4 March 1861 and would take no positive action, the Southern 

states decided to act. Led by South Carolina on 18 December 1860, seven states 

seceded from the Union. They met in Montgomery, Alabama, on 4 February 

1861, to establish a confederacy. They paid no attention to compromise efforts 

in Washington.6 By then, the main Union goal was to keep the other Southern 

and border states, many with strong unionist elements and much lower 

percentages of slave owners from going out. In six days, the Montgomery 

Convention drafted a Constitution that turned itself into a provisional Congress. 

They unanimously elected Jefferson Davis of Mississippi as president and 

Alexander Stephens of Georgia as vice president and scheduled elections for 

November 1861. Davis was inaugurated on 18 February 1861 and immediately 

settled down to the heavy responsibilities of organizing a new nation? 

When Lincoln arrived in Washington for his inauguration, the seven 

seceded states were seizing all Federal property within their borders. The only 

Federal property still held in seceding states were three small forts in Florida and 

three in Charleston harbor. Lincoln treated these issues temperately in h.is 
The Civil War 1861·1865 41 

inaugural address, hoping to cool passions and allow the seeds of reconciliation 

to sprout.8 

As soon as he took the oath of office as president of the Confederacy, 

Davis ordered Brig. Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard to assume command of militia 

troops at Charleston, South Carolina. Castle Pinckney, Fort Moultrie, and Fort 

Sumter, the installations the Federal government refused to surrender, were 

under siege by South Carolina milita. On 26 December 1860, Maj. Robert 

Anderson, commanding the small Federal garrison, abandoned the other forts 

and moved hjs troops to Fort Sumter because it was in the middle of the harbor 

and could not be attacked from land. The opposing forces busily improved their 

field works in the ensuing period. A Federal ship sent in January 1861 to 

replenish supplies at Fort Sumter was turned back by cannon fire and an uneasy 

truce prevailed until Lincoln's inauguration. When Lincoln refused to give up 

Sumter, the Confederates fired on the fort on 12 April 1861, forcing it to 

surrender the following day. Lincoln had forced the South to fire the first shot 

and begin what was to be the United States' bloodiest war. Neither side in the 

coming conflict had any idea what war would mean. Each side underestimated 

the will of the other and thought the conflict would be settled by a single bnttle. 

The firsi incidents of the war demonstrated how critical transportation 

would be in the coming conflict. Only a single rail line of the Baltimore and 

Ohio (B&O) Railroad extended to Washington City as the capital was known 

then. Surrounded by Maryland, which was heavily secessionist, and across the 

Potomac from Virginia, which was on the verge of seceding. the capital was 

extremely vulnerable. The defense of Washington was a key objective of Union 

strategy and it was almost lost before the war really began. On 18 April, troops 

from Massachusetts arrived in Baltimore and had to cross the city to take the 

train to Washington. They were attacked by a mob and the result was four 

soldiers and twelve rioters dead. Four days later, the mob tore up the tracks, 

bridges, and telegraph lines to Washington, isolating the capital. Maj. Gen. 

Benjamin F. Butler, commanding the Massachusetts militia, forestalled an attack 

on Washington by cutting the B&O line which Southern forces could use to 

enter Washington and Baltimore. He suppressed anti-Union riots in Baltimore 

and established ferry service by-passing sections of the B&O closed by 

destroyed bridges. Eventually, the rail lines were repaired so troops could travel 

directly to the capital. In doing so, Butler unknowingly laid the groundwork for 

the Union Mi)jtary Railway Service that operated most of the railroads in the 

occupied areas of the Confederacy during the remainder of the war.

9 
42 Spearhead of Logistics 

Only six days after Sumter, the South also demonstrated that its military 

leaders understood the capabilities of the railroads. On 18 April 1861, Capt. John 

D. Imboden, of the Staunton (militia) artillery, with the approval of Virginia 

Governor Letcher and the cooperation of the presidents of the Virginia Central, 

the Orange & Alexandria, and the Manassas Gap railroads, collected a raiding 

force of militia companies in western Virginia and moved them by rail to seize 

the Federal arsenal at Harper's Ferry. When the Union commander learned of 

the force bearing down on him, he set ftre to the arsenal and fled without a 

struggle. 10 The Confederate capture of the arsenal and its intact equipment, 

which was moved to more secure areas, greatly bolstered the South's ability to 

manufacture and repair small arms. 

The Union's first strategic plan was conceived by Winfield Scott, the 

Army's 75 year old General in Chief. He envisioned a major army, created in 

Northern Virginia, to protect the capital and tie down the main Confederate 

Anny. A naval blockade would cut the Confederacy off from European military 

aid and domestic support while combined Army~Navy operations seized the 

Mississippi River and split the Confederacy in two. The objective of the plan 

was to show the Southern states their dependence on the North and demonstrate 

the futility of rebellion. Both Lincoln and Scott also recognized the strategic 

importance of the railroads and planned to exploit the North's large rail network. 

They understood the importance of railroads to the Confederacy and made them 

targets of early Union offensives. 11 Scott's plan did not advocate an early 

ground offensive because the spilling of blood was the surest way to prevent a 

reconciliation. 

The public, convinced a single battle was the solution, labeled Scott's idea 

the "Anaconda Plan" because it was designed to crush the South slowly, rather 

than with a single massive blow. A ground swell of Northern opinion demanded 

that the government move immediately to seize Richmond, before the 

Confederacy could "get organized." The first battle of "Bull Run," on the 

outskirts of Washington, was fought between two ill prepared and amateur 

armies. With casualties of almost 3,000 Union troops and 2,000 Confederates, it 

demonstrated to both sides that the war would be long and costly. Talk on both 

sides of a quick victory abated. 

Jefferson Davis' strategic plan was to hold as much territory as possible to 

maximize the Confederacy's limited resources. The plan appealed to the 

populations of the small towns and villages on the fringes of the Confederacy 

and protected slavery which could not survive incursions by an invading army. 

The plan was well~suited to conditions east of the Appalachians and defined 
The Civil War 1861-1865 

Railroads become a strategic target -destruction of rolling stock 

during Pope's retreat 1862. 

43 

militarily as the "offensive-defensive" strategy. It was likened to an outmatched 

boxer who by superior mobility and strategy avoids serious damage, wears his 

opponent down, and at the opportune moment, counterpunches him with a 

knockout blow. 12 General Robert E. Lee, who initially commanded only the 

forces of Virginia, was in full agreement with Davis' defensive concept and 

held to the basic offensive-defensive strategy when selected to lead the Army of 

Northern Virginia in June 1862. 13 

The incredible scope of the war is shown in Map 5. For most of the war, 

Union campaigns in the Eastern theater consisted of unsuccessful Union thrusts 

at Richmond. Most Confederate operations were defensive. The only exceptions 

to these were Lee's two invasions of the North, the invasion of Kentucky and 

Jackson's Valley campaign. Only the latter was successfu1. 14 The Confederacy 

was weakest in the west, where it consistently lost territory. This theater was 

larger and far more difficult to control with limited resources. The vastly 

superior Union Navy was able to dominate the Mississippi and other rivers in the 
44 

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Spearhead of Logistics 

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The Civil War 1861 ·1865 45 

MapS 
46 Spearhead of Logistics 

west, use them as unbreakable lines of communication, aild conduct joint 

operations, which included the capture of New Orleans in 1862. After the death 

of Albert Sidney Johnston at the battle of Shiloh on 6 April 1862, Jefferson 

Davis was unable to find a leader of similar stature and the Confederate Army in 

the west was plagued by command problems. 15 The two theaters were 

uncoordinated until Grant took command of all Union forces in 1864. At that 

time simultaneous offensives were launched in the east and west with the 

destruction of the Confederate armies as the ultimate objective. Resources and 

leadership eventually decided the issue after a long and costly struggle. 

THE NAVY 

The U.S. Navy contributed substantially to the North's victory by 

providing secure routes for logistical support and carrying out joint amphibious 

operations at will. Flag Officer David Farragut who commanded the West Gulf 

Blockading Squadron was a prime example. His squadron captured New Orleans 

on 25 April 1862 and transported Brig. Gen. Benjamin Butler's army to occupy 

the town, an achievement of enonnous strategic significance. Farragut's 

promotion to be the ftrst admiral of the U.S. Navy was well-deserved. The other 

three Navy squadrons blockading the East Gulf and the North and South Atlantic 

sectors also contributed mightily to limiting imports to and shipments from the 

Confederacy. One of the earliest successful military actions of the war was the 

seizure of Port Royal, midway between Charleston and Savannah in the zone of 

the South Atlantic Squadron. On 7 November 1861, DuPont's squadron reduced 

hastily erected Confederate forts protecting Port Royal Sound and occupied the 

area, while waiting for the arrival of the Union Army 12,000-man occupation 

force that had been delayed because storms drove the ships carrying their 

landing craft ashore. 1l1e Union Navy used the Port Royal Base for four years, 

but Union troops there did not interdict the Charleston and Savannah Railroad 

which crossed the head of the bay. This was a significant strategic error. 

Nonetheless, the ability of the Union Navy to seize any point on the coast at will 

caused General Lee to change his strategy of spreading forces along the 

coastlines. Realizing the Union had the flexibility to select objectives along the 

coasts, he felt the Confederacy's best option would be to consolidate forces 

inland and counterattack rapidly to destroy Union forces ashore. Thus, Navy 

control of the coastal areas gave the Union Anny tactical and transportation 

planners a free rein in planning troop movements and a fully dependable 

supporting line of communication by water. 
The Civil War 1861-1865 47 

With only 36 ships, 13 of. which were laid up when the war began, the 

Navy was unable to effectively blockade the coasts of the Confederacy. Even 

with the 600 ships it had by the end of the war, the Navy could not completely 

seal Southern harbors. Blockade runners and foreign flag vessels could still slip 

through and were a big factor in the South's ability to continue the war on a 

shoestring. Most of the cargoes carried by the blockade runners were luxury 

items which fetched exorbitant prices in the war-torn South, thus sacrificing hold 

space that could have been used for military cargo. The Union did not rely solely 

on the blockade to cut the South's commerce, and by 1864, Union troops 

occupied all of the South's ports on the Atlantic seaboard except Charleston, 

South Carolina, and Wilmington, North Carolina. Nevertheless, the blockade 

was a major contributor to the North's victory. 

Equally important was the Navy's control of the Mississippi and other 

rivers in the west. From the summer of 1861 until the fall of Vicksburg in July 

1863, amphibious warfare in the Mississippi Valley evolved from 

learn-as-you-go to a skillful routine. From the ftrst flimsy wooden boats to the 

later ironclads, the Navy's gunboats were indispensable to Grant's succession of 

victories in the west. The Navy cleared the Mississippi of the Confederate fleet, 

cut the Confederate supply routes up the Red River and the Mississippi, and 

provided ftre support that destroyed or tied down Confederate guns and forces 

that might have been employed against Union ground troops. The commanders 

of the river Navy, Andrew Foote, Charles Davis, and David Porter, cooperated 

fully with the Army. Their support was a timely benefit to the field 

quartermaster officers who contracted for the riverboats to transport troops and 

material support and arranged their movement under Navy escort. As Grant 

wrote in his memoirs of the last Vicksburg campaign, ''The Navy under Porter 

was all it could be, during the entire campaign. Without its assistance the 

campaign could not have been successfully made with twice the numbe~ of men 

engaged. It could not have been made at all, in the way it was, with any number 

of men without such assistance." 16 

RESOURCES 

The disparity in resources was striking.

17 The North had a population of 22 

million, compared to the South's 9 million, of which about 4 million were 

slaves. The North also had a well-developed industrial base with a supporting 

financial system and a strong agricultural sector, while the South had, in cotton, 

a one-crop agricultural economy. The North had a relatively dense rail and canal 

network designed to support the industrial base and distribute its products, while 
48 Spearhead of Logistics 

the South had a limited rail network focused on delivery of agricultural products 

to ports for transshipment. The Northern major waterways, the Ohio, 

Cumberland, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Potomac Rivers, along with the 

Chesapeake Bay, could serve as lines of communication for Union military 

operations aimed at the heart of the South. Many of the rivers in the 

Confederate States flowed west-east, so they could not be used as lines of 

communication. However, these rivers did provide excellent barriers for both 

tactical and strategic defensive operations, particularly in Virginia, and they 

strongly influenced strategic and tactical planning. 18 Some rivers in the west 

could be used as Confederate lines of communication with adequately powered 

steamboats and tactical control of the operational area. 

The transportation requirements of the Union were far greater than those of 

the South. Most of the war was fought on Confederate soil, so the supply 

sources for Confederate forces were relatively close. Union forces had to 

maintain long lines of communication with all that a long supply line entailed, 

such as railroads, railheads, wagon trains, depots, and port fac ilities. The 

proliferation of railroads, and continued improvement of river boats and 

ocean-going ships powered by steam, as well as armored vessels, allowed Union 

forces to carry supplies and troops over longer distances faster than any army in 

western history. The wide use of the telegraph made this transportation more 

effective because assets could be coordinated over great distances. These 

technological advances and the ability to capitalize on them gave the Union an 

important edge over the Confederacy. 19 

While the railroad provided transportation for long hauls, the horse- or 

mule-drawn wagon continued to be the primary vehicle for logistical support for 

troops in the field. Army operations in enemy ten·ain required an average of one 

wagon for forty men and one horse or mule for each two soldiers, including 

those for officers, artillery, and cavalry.20 Mules were used increasingly and by 

the end of the war were used almost exclusively for supply trains throughout the 

Anny. As a planning factor, a campaigning army of 100,000 would require 

2,500 supply wagons and 35,000 animals?' That factor was confirmed by 

Grant's army in 1864, requiring about 4,300 wagons, with a ratio of 33 wagons 

per 1,000 troops. The Quartermaster General required wagons to move supplies 

to forward depots and for the operation of each depot. The quartermaster of a 

field army also required large wagon trains to move supplies forward from 

depots, railheads, or ports to army area distribution points. The size of the trains 

depended on distances, road conditions, forage to be carried, and weather. For 

planning, wagon capacity for a good six-mule team in the best season of the year 
The Civil War 1861·1865 49 

was 3,730 pounds, plus 270 pounds of forage. Operations in the field seldom 

reached that level, and more realistic planning factors, considering poor roads 

and inclement weather, would be 2,000 pounds of baggage, 3,000 pounds of 

forage, or 2,600 pounds of ammunition or hospital supplies. The six-mule wagon 

was considered the most economical and reliable of any used?2 Wagons and 

ambulances were much sturdier and durable than in prior wars and were more 

easily repaired in the field. Each large Union organization carried 

interchangeable spare parts and materials as well as portable forges and tools for 

blacksmiths, wheelwrights, carpenters, and saddlers. Repairs were made 

overnight, and units seldom abandoned a wagon.23 When the Union Eastern and 

Western Armies gathered for a grand review in Washington in the spring of 

1865, both forces drove wagons that had been with them the entire war. 

Acquisition of animals was a major challenge to the Quartermaster General 

because of the many opportunities for trickery and fraud in their procurement. 

Nevertheless, the quartermaster developed effective systems during the war to 

the point that Chief Quartermaster Ingalls of the Army of the Potomac wrote in 

December 1864, "It is proper to state that the artillery and cavalry horses sent to 

the armies in the last three months have been the best received during the war." 

Similar comments were received from other units?4 Forage was a tonnage and 

bulk problem throughout the war, as it had been in all prior wars. The factors in 

pounds per day for horses were fourteen of hay and twelve of grain; for mules, 

fourteen of hay and nine of grain. Human subsistence was three pounds per 

man as in the Mexican War, procured by the Commissary General for 

Subsistence, and transported to the field by the Quartermaster General.25 

Except for changes in steam propulsion technology and metallurgy, water 

transportation changed little from the Mexican War. The experience of 

supporting posts in the west proved valuable. Steamboats and ships provided 

unlimited carrying capacity at lower cost than railroads. The principal river 

systems in the west favored Union operations because they flowed from north to 

south. Steamboats were less vulnerable to the type of guerrilla action that 

frequently put railroads out of action by tearing up tracks and bridges, but on 

rivers like the Mississippi, they needed gunboat escorts to protect them from the 

Confederate Navy. Confederate operations required transportation that enabled 

them to shift resources from east to west and the rivers became barriers rather 

than highways. In the east, rivers like the Potomac, York, and the James also 

favored the North. The disadvantages of river transport included ice in winter 

and seasonal low water that brought operations to a standstill. All this had to be 

considered in logistic planning. The chartering of river craft usually required 
50 Spearhead of logistics 

direct dealings wi.th single owners because there were no large shipping 

companies from which the Army could hire large numbers of craft 

Planning factors for river transportation varied by sea or river conditions 

and the capacity of the craft, but a rule of thumb indicated that an Ohio River 

steamboat of 500 tons carried enough supplies on one trip to subsist an army of 

40,000 for nearly two days. The same cargo carried by rail needed five l 0-car 

trains. The difference in speed was negligible. A steamboat could travel the 702 

river mHes from Cincinnati to St Louis in 70 hours, or roughly 10 miles per 

hour. The miming time for a train along the 339 rail miles between the two 

cities was 30 hours (16 for passenger trains) or roughly 10.4 miles per hour, but 

the steamboat was doing it in a single lift Western steamboats ranged in 

capacity from 250 to I ,700 tons. The total capacity was immense and able to 

meet both military and c ivilian requirements?6 Ocean-going vessels followed 

the same pattern as riverboats and were used extensively by the North to support 

distant bases and amphibious operations. 

The 1850s saw a remarkable expansion of the rail network in the United 

States. Although the expansion in the South was proportionally large, the 

overwhelming quantity of new lines was constructed in the North. This 

constmction was the result of competition between the Erie, New York Central, 

Pennsylvania, and Baltimore and Ohio Railroads to tap the markets of the 

burgeoning states of the former Northwest Territory. Until rail linked them with 

the Atlantic coast, the only practical way for farms and businesses to get their 

products to market was along the major river systems which primaril y flowed 

south. This created a commercia l and social bond between the South and West. 

The railroads changed that relationship by opening the lucrative eastern markets 

of the nation's major population centers to the people of the West. In a short 

time, the West was tied to the Northeast by rail and telegraph. News took a 

matter of hours or days to reach the West instead of weeks and months as it had 

in the early 1850s. Thus, the West felt it had more in common with the North 

when the war began. 

The Northern railroads were large companies interested in developing 

trunk lines to the West. In the South, the focus of the owners was local. Each 

rail line was designed to link agricultural areas with rival port towns and cities. 

They did not constitute parts of a rail system. As they generally were built in the 

interests of rival ports, they carefully avoided connections with other lines. By 

1861, the beginnings of a rail system had been created, but in the Southeast, 

north-south traffic was slowed by the route configuration that required through 

traffic to follow arcs into and out of the main port cities. In the Mississippi 
The Civil War 1861 -1865 51 

.• 

The rail yard at City Point, Virginia, 1865. 

Valley, north-south traffic was more adequately developed; however, the 

dominant lines ran north and south servicing western and southern tier cities 

rather than east and west to permit easy contact with states east of the 

mountains.27 In the South, several connecting lines, sometimes with different 

track gauges, had to be used to travel distances to the West comparable to those 

of the northern trunk lines. 

In both the North and South, rail lines stopped and started in cities or towns 

with no direct connection with the next line. Cargo and passengers were 

unloaded and transferred to the next line by wagon or housed overnight. Local 

business, which profited from connecting transportation, temporary storage, or 

accommodating transient passengers, opposed the continuation of rails through 

towns. Differences in gauge, which varied from the "standard" 4 feet 8 J/2 

inches to 6 feet,28 also prevented throughput of cargo from one rail line to the 
52 Spearhead of Logistics 

other. The situation was more prevalent in the South, but during the war, both 

sides wasted millions of man-hours transferring cargo because of mismatching 

gauges and a lack of connections. Some gauges were realigned during the war, 

and some lines added a third wheel per axle or third rail on their track beds, but 

the problem was not solved until after the war when a standard gauge was 

universally adopted and rail lines were connected throughout the country?9 

Most rail lines were single track, with infrequent sidings. In 1861, rail was 

generally rolled wrought iron ''T" section, weighing from 35 to 68 pounds per 

yard with some 80-pound rail laid in the North during the war. Rail iron was 

poor quality and some Southern lines still had main line tracks and sidings made 

of an iron strap affixed to a wooden "stringer" rather than solid iron rail. These 

wooden rails limited the capacity of the road. Forty-one miles of the Richmond 

and Danville Railroad and thirty-nine of the 151 miles of the Nashville and 

Chattanooga were still on stringers. Most rail was spiked directly to the ties 

without the benefits of tie plates, and the joints were secured using a British 

device called a "chair." This device weighed 12 pounds and was rolled to fit the 

tread of the rail, thus making a smooth joint. Ties were untreated and poorly 

ballasted, so roadbeds deteriorated rapidly, especially where drainage was bad. 

Bridges were frequently hastily constructed. 

The most common locomotive was the "American" 4-4-0 type, with two 

leading wheels and two drivers of 4 to 5 112 feet in diameter on each side. Other 

characteristics were a balloon-type stack, a large cowcatcher, an oversize 

decorative oil headlamp, a square cab, and proportionately small boiler. There 

was no standardization in the size of locomotives or spare parts. A typical engine 

on southern lines weighed from as low as 9 tons to as much as 33 tons and on 

northern lines from 20 to 30 tons, depending on trackage, gradients, and load 

weights. The governing element in the speed of trains was usually the track. 

Southern trains seldom went more than 25 miles per hour. Northern freight 

trains, usually less than 20 cars long, averaged 11 to 20 mph. Passenger trains of 

five to ten cars averaged 33 mph for express and 25 mph for locals.

30 Most 

burned wood, although some Northern lines were experimenting with coal. A 

cord of wood and a ton of coal were generally equivalent in the distance they 

would drive a locomotive. Both fuels produced smoke and soot that descended 

on the passengers. 

Cars were smaller than their modern counterparts but similar in appearance 

and function. They were made of wood with four-wheel trucks, joined with link 

and pin couplers, and depended on the engine for most braking. Hand-operated 

brakes were used for control in yards and sidings. Various uses of iron in car 
The Civil War 1861 ·1865 53 

construction were tested in the North. Passenger cars had open vestibules at 

each end, seated 50 to 60 passengers on straight-backed, wooden, sometimes 

upholstered two-person seats, and had oil lamps and a stove at each end. Dining 

cars were unknown, but some lines had sleeping cars that, according to some 

reports, were neither clean nor luxurious. Various models of freight cars (box, 

gondola, cattle, flat, dump, rack [for logs], and coal) were in use. Both sides 

used boxcars, cattle cars, and in an emergency, any type available for troop 

movements. The U.S. Military Railway Service rated boxcars to carry 10 tons 

or 40 men,

31 antedating the better known European "40 and 8" (men and horses) 

of World War I by 50 years. Light wood construction made rolling stock of 

1861 easy for an enemy to bum or destroy and required frequent maintenance 

and overhaul. One of the most unique uses of railroads during the war was the 

hospital train. Initially, wounded were evacuated in empty supply cars or even 

cattle cars, which led to additional infection. Dr. Elisha Harris of the U.S. 

Sanitary Commission designed a special hospital car and "urged that special 

trains be operated under systemic procedures." 32 Regular hospital train service 

began between Washington and New York in the fall of 1862. 

There were more than a dozen established locomotive and car 

manufacturers in the North, and they held a virtual monopoly on skilled railroad 

mechanics. Inventories of equipment, parts, and supplies were substantial in 

Northern railroads and were replenished with relative ease during the war. 

Northern trackage increased by some 4,000 miles from 1860-1865. This does 

not include rebuilding roads in occupied areas of the Confederacy or improving 

existing facilities. Southern lines imported most of their rolling stock, rail, tools, 

and spare parts from the North or from England. Inventories were marginal and 

heavy wartime use rapidly depleted stocks. The few manufacturers capable of 

building engines, cars, or rails also manufactured weapons and other military 

equipment. Rail, always in short supply, was also used to armor ships which 

increased the difficulty of repairing damaged road beds. Neither Northern or 

Southern lines began the war with adequate terminals, loading facilities, 

interchange yards, machine shops, engine houses, and storage facilities. 

However, the Northern lines were in much better shape than the Southern lines 

and were able to finance and construct some facilities to help meet the immense 

increases in wartime traffic, but the South could not. 33 

The Union's rail system was a key factor in the superior mobility and 

quality of logistics support of its armies. Nevertheless, in spite of its limitations, 

the rail system of the South provided the Confederate States the potential to 
54 Spearhead of logistics 

move troops and logistical support from one battlefront to another, a definite 

advantage for a smaller nation defending itself against a larger adversary?4 

TRANSPORTATION ORGANIZATION 

When Quartermaster General Jesup died on 10 June 1860, his department 

was authorized thirty-seven officers and eight storekeepers. In installations 

across the country, more than fifty regimental ofticers were post quartermasters. 

Most of these positions were filled by younger officers on the frontier who 

became key quartermaster leaders during the war. Inflflnities and deaths of aged 

incumbents, resignations of Confederate sympathizers, appointments to combat 

commands, and long delays in bringing experienced officers in from the West 

left the Washington offices of the quartermaster severely understaffed at the start 

of the war. On 3 August 1861, Congress authorized the department sixty-four 

officers, the only increase during the war. Among those who resigned to join the 

Confederacy was Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, recently appointed to replace 

Jesup. His replacement was Col. Montgomery C. Meigs of the Engineer Corps. 

Meigs was well-known for designing and building the Washington City water 

aqueduct and superintending the construction of the wings and dome of the 

Capitol. At 45, he was promoted from captain to colonel of the II th Infantry 

Regiment for his part in working with President Lincoln on the secret expedition 

to reinforce Fort Pickens in Pensacola Bay at the time Fort Sumter was under 

siege. Despite his desire for a combat command, he was appointed 

Quartermaster General on 12 June. Fortunately for the Union, his selection to the 

second most important position in the Army was equivalent to that of Jesup in 

1818. Meigs, like his predecessor, was a man of impeccable character, a superb 

organizer, aggressive, and imaginative in taking on the massive tasks of wartime 

support of the Army. As General Scott stated, Meigs demonstrated "high genius, 

science, vigor, and administrative capacities." Much of the credit for the 

successful logistical support of the Union Army belongs to Meigs?5 

Simon Cameron was a Pennsylvania politician who became Lincoln's first 

Secretary of War because his delegates supported Lincoln's nomination in the 

Republican Convention. Many of his fellow Republicans felt he was a man 

"destitute of honor and integrity,''

36 but Lincoln honored his obligation and 

appointed him. Cameron, intent on patronage, ignored the established supply and 

transportation functions of the Quartermaster Department and used personal 

appointees to perfonn some of those functions.37 Cameron first reopened 

communications between Washington and the Northeast to bring in troops and 

protect the capital. Thereafter, he reestablished passenger and freight movement 
The Civil War 1861 ·1865 55 

to and from Washington. Cameron appointed Pennsylvania Railroad (PRR) 

president, J. Edgar Thomson; PRR vice president, Thomas A. Scott; and 

Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore president, Samuel M. Felton, to 

coordinate and direct movement of troops and supplies to Washington. They 

were among the ablest railroad men in the country and quickly established 

alternate rail and water routes, aided initially by Butler's efforts. 38 Cameron 

subsequently appointed Scott Assistant Secretary of War in August 1861 and 

appointed John Tucker, a Baltimore businessman and railroad president, as 

general agent of transportation to the War Department, but his duties were later 

restricted, primarily to water transportation. These appointees acquired 

transportation through brokers instead of seeking competitive bids and paid the 

railroads high local rates rather than through rates. These procedures caused 

many problems for General Meigs who was trying to regularize procedures by 

having assistant quartermasters sign contracts for transportation. 

The confusion of the early days of the war gradually gave way to sound 

management. In 1862, the House created a committee to investigate Cameron's 

activities, but Lincoln had sent him to Russia and appointed Edwin M. Stanton 

of Ohio as Secretary of War. Stanton, incorruptible and efficient, swept away 

every vestige of the Cameron regime and stopped the seat-of-the-pants method 

of management prevalent during the early period of mobilization. Under the 

new secretary, Meigs reasserted and tightened the Quartennaster Department's 

control of commercial railroad transportation use and rates. By then, the 

Northern economy was geared for war production, and Stanton and Meigs 

worked successfully to make the Union Army the best fed, most lavishly 

supplied, and best transported anny in the world.39 

The understaffed department managed the responsibilities of the 

Washington office and reviewed the thousands of accounts and reports 

submitted by quartennasters in the field, as required by law. By the time Meigs' 

requests to Congress for more clerks were granted, the responsibilities of the 

department had already outgrown the new authorizations. Meigs was responsible 

for three main areas: clothing and equipage, transportation by land and water, 

and regular and contingent supplies. To effectively control his growing 

responsibilities, he gradually instituted unofficial organizational divisions of 

responsibility within each area. In 1864, he received authorization from 

Congress to organize nine divisions in his office, each headed by a colonel and 

programmed to last the duration of the war plus one year. The 

transportation-related divisions were: first division - horses and mules; third 

division - ocean; fourth division - rail and river; fifth division - forage; and 
56 Spearhead of Logistics 

seventh division - wagons and roads. The quartermaster divisions in 

Washington focused primarily on procurement while the operational 

responsibilities were assigned to the quartermasters in the field.40 

Except for a few engineer, ordnance, and signal corps units, the Army had 

no specialized service troops. Transportation activities in the field were 

operated by quartermaster officers within the structure of the Army's 

geographical departments, which were sometimes grouped together in a 

geographical division. Often they were assisted by civilian employees who were 

contracted or hired directly by the local quartermaster. Mobile forces of a 

department were designated as an "army" or an "army corps," and the 

commander of the · department was also commander of the army. This 

arrangement caused jurisdictional problems when a mobile army moved into an 

adjoining department. There was no general staff corps, but commanders had 

the rudiments of a general staff in the aides they were authorized, as appointed 

by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. They moved with the 

commander when he was transferred. The heads of the War Department Bureaus 

designated their field functional chiefs, such as, chief quartermaster of an army 

corps, who stayed with that corps regardless of the reassignment of 

commanders. Armies, corps, divisions, and brigades all had officers assigned 

from each of the departments to act for the unit in the technical functional area, 

such as quartermaster (supply and transportation) and ordnance. Each regiment 

had a single supply officer (the regimental quartermaster), a lieutenant 

nominated by the regimental commander for appointment by the Secretary of 

War who obtained all supplies (and services) except ordnance. An ordnance 

sergeant was responsible for obtaining arms and ammunition for the regiment 

and keeping them in good repair. General depots were directly under War 

Department bureaus, but army commanders had the authority to establish depots 

in the field as needed. In the field, an army normally established a "grand 

depot" as a base which was accessible to transportation from rear and front, and 

remote enough from planned battle areas to be relatively secure from hostile 

action. During offensive operations, advance depots were established to reduce 

troop unit turnaround time. The grand depots of the armies were supported by 

the major depots of the supply bureaus, usually located in key cities. The huge 

quartermaster depot at Washington had twelve branches including those for 

acquisition of all forms of transportation to move supplies to the armies.41 

President Davis, a former U.S. Secretary of War, created a Confederate 

support structure similar to that of the Union Army, modified to reflect the 

Urnited resources and the scope of operations of the Confederacy. The logistics 
The Civil War 1861·1865 57 

functions were hamstrung from the start There was a significant lack of 

appreciation by the Confederate leadership of the magnitude of the task before 

them and they did little logistical planning. States that had just seceded from the 

Union because of too much Federal control were strongly opposed to the 

centralized control of resources by the Confederate government. Businesses such 

as the railroads also objected to central control. Most importantly, the South had 

insufficient resources and eventually had to rely on increasingly stringent 

measures, such as impressment, to meet troop needs, thereby alienating the 

populace.42 

The Confederacy initially set up depots at Montgomery, San Antonio, 

Charleston, New Orleans, and MobHe. After the second secession, additional 

depots were established at Nashville, Lynchburg, and Richmond, to the 

immediate rear of the armies forming in Tennessee and Virginia.43 They also 

established a forward depot at Manassas. The quartermasters of the field units 

were ostensibly appointed by the Richmond bureau chiefs, but they were 

actually selected by their commanders and felt first loyalty to them.44 The 

effectiveness of support diminished as the distance from Richmond increased. 

Quartermasters in remote areas managed the best they could.45 However, the 

Confederate States, as an adjunct to their strong states' rights position, also felt a 

responsibiUty for the support of their citizen troops. This took some of the 

pressure off the quartermasters and was an important factor in maintaining a 

marginal level of support. The greatest failure in the quartermaster organization 

was its management of field and rail transpottation. Officials worked zealously 

to obtain animals and wagons and to repair worn equipment, but they could not 

keep up with requirements and inadequate field transportation contributed to the 

growing immobility of Confederate forces in the later years of the war. One of 

the most destructive practices in the Confederate Army was the requirement for 

cavalrymen to provide their own mounts. If a trooper lost his horse, he was sent 

home on furlough to procure another horse, or in the slang of the time, he was 

assigned to "Company Q." This meant that as many as 30 percent of a unit might 

be away at any given time. The Union Army avoided this by issuing horses. In 

spite of deficient resources and inadequate supply and transportation 

management and support, the Confederate government produced a workable 

system from scratch and for four years supported its armies in the field. Despite 

legends to the contrary, the Confederate Army was defeated by its inability to 

replace casualties, rather than by lack of support. 

Both Union and Confederate Quartermaster Departments shared Jesup's 

half century of developing regulations, systems of accountability, and testing of 
58 Spearhead of l ogistics 

procedures in war and peace. However, there was no general staff, no strategic 

or mobilization plans, or any body of doctrine on either side. To make matters 

worse, experienced members of the department were spread thinly throughout 

the army. True to American tradition, both the Union and Confederacy began 

preparing for the war after it began. The Civil War was a political war, a war of 

peoples rather than of professional armies. Therefore, political leadership and 

public opinion weighed heavily in the fonnation of strategy and the allocation of 

resources. The experience needed to fight the war had to be gained during the 

war . lf'46 ttse . 

TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS 

Transportation considerations were pervasive in the strategy and tactics of 

the war. There was scarcely a campaign, battle, engagement or raid in which 

transportation was not a major factor in establishing the objective, marshaling 

and maneuvering forces, and/or planning and executing logistical support. 

Objectives frequently were set to control or deny the enemy's use of railroads 

and junctions. Cavalry raids concentrated on the destruction of enemy rail and 

other transportation fac ilities. Imaginative use of transportation resources often 

provided the margin of success in campaigns. Early in the war, Union leaders 

recognized the need for governmental control of the unique new "military" 

transp01tation mode - the railroads. In January 1862, Congress authorized the 

President to seize any or all rail lines and make them a part of the military 

establishment. In May, Lincoln formally took military possession of all 

railroads in the United States and directed them to stand ready to transport troops 

and ammunition, but he wisely left their operation in the hands of their owners. 

Government operation was implemented only rarely, as in running the short 

Jines around Gettysburg for that campaign. The Congressional authorization 

included railroads in the South, and those captured and constructed in the war 

zone were operated by the Mili tary Railway Service. It was largely those 

military railroads, under the leadership of Col. Daniel C. McCallum, a former 

Erie Railroad executive and very efficient administrator, that performed the 

significant portions of large-scale support of the armies in the field. The 

organization reached a total strength of 25,000, including trainmen, dispatchers, 

and superintendents who were civilian employees of the government. The U.S. 

Military Railroad operated over 2,100 miles of railways with 4 19 engines and 

6,330 cars.

47 

The successful operation of the military railroads was mainly due to the 

appointment of Hermann Haupt, colonel and Chief of Construction and 
The Civil War 1861·1865 59 

Transportation of the Department of the Rappahannock in April 1862. Haupt, a 

West Point graduate and former general superintendent of the Pennsylvania 

Railroad was an engineering genius. His reconstruction of the Richmond, 

Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad line from Alexandria to support an 

abortive campaign against Richmond bordered on the miraculous. The feat 

included bridging the 400-foot-wide, 80-foot-deep chasm of Potomac Creek. 

The destroyed bridges had taken a year to build, yet Haupt and his newly 

recruited, unskilled civilian work force built the cribbing, trestles, and track 

rising 80 feet above the water in 12 days. After looking at the bridge, Lincoln 

said " I have seen the most remarkable structure that human eyes ever rested 

upon. That man, Haupt, has built a bridge . .. over which loaded trains are 

running every hour and upon my word, gentlemen, there is nothing in it but 

beanpoles and cornstalks."

48 Haupt supported rail operations in Virginia and the 

Army of the Potomac campaigns at Antietam and Gettysburg until September 

1863, when he was relieved by Secretary Stanton for complex reasons not 

reflecting his outstanding performance in the field. Haupt developed and 

instituted construction innovations and operational policies that markedly 

improved rail support. His influence was felt Armywide through the 

proliferation of his ideas, one of which was emphasis on the overriding necessity 

for prompt unloading of trains. This was periodically reiterated by the Secretary 

of War and by subordinates who moved to positions in the Western theater. 49 

Government supervision of railways in the South never approached that of 

the North. Two reasons for this failure were the emphasis on states' rights and 

the unwillingness of the railroads to come to contractual agreements on the 

exchange of rolling stock. Nearly every road represented a state, county, or 

municipal interest of the most vital sort, and it was difficult to develop united 

solutions to the complex problem of railroading in an intensely competitive 

environment.50 President Davis appointed William S. Ashe, president of the 

Wilmington and Weldon Railroad, to the rank of major as assistant 

quartermaster in charge of rail transportation to Confederate armies in Virginia, 

the ftrst of a series of coordinators who were never able to establish control of 

the Southern railway network. Ashe selected assistants of known ability and 

established regulations, but was unable to stop the use of freight cars, which 

were in short supply, for storage, nor was he able to cope with damage to rail 

lines from wrecks and Union raids. Ashe resigned to take a combat command in 

April 1862.51 William M. Wadley, a self-made man and a recognized railroad 

expert and troubleshooter, followed Ashe in December 1862.52 Wadley 

developed a number of practical proposals for controlling the railroads which 
60 Spearhead of Logistics 

culminated in a strong railroad bill passed by the Confederate Congress in April 

1863. For reasons never fully explained, Congress rejected Wadley as head of 

the Railroad Bureau and appointed his assistant Capt. Frederick W. Sims, to 

head the bureau. Inexplicably, Davis' government failed to implement the new 

law, but Sims was a capable administrator. Faced with a contracting and 

deteriorating rail system, he accomplished a great deal with few resources for the 

remainder of the war. 

The South's limited railroads did not allow it to take full advantage of 

interior lines of communication. There were not enough lines, and those in 

existence were not well located to support operations. The system had gaps in 

design and mismatched gauges prevented continuous travel by rail for critical 

moves. The lack of equipment and the inability to repair damaged track and 

rolling stock were exacerbated by the Union blockade. The effects of those 

weaknesses were intensified by the government's failure to make the most of 

resources available.53 Nevertheless, Confederate railroads performed some 

impressive troop movements. One occurred in June and July of 1862, when 

25,000 troops of Bragg's Anny of Tennessee covered a distance of 776 miles 

from Tupelo, Mississippi, to Mobile, Alabama, and then on to Chattanooga, over 

a total of six railroads, while the horse-drawn elements moved overland. The 

move prevented Union forces from taking Chattanooga which was key to the 

Confederate line of communication from Richmond to the lower Mississippi 

valley.54 The transfer in September 1863 of Longstreet's First Corps from the 

Army of Northern Virginia was the decisive factor in the Confederate victory at 

the Battle of Chickamauga, north of Atlanta. These moves demonstrate the 

South understood the importance of railroads to strategic mobility.55 

The Union and the Confederacy had different attitudes toward railroads in 

the combat area. From the first, Southern strategy was to destroy lines likely to 

be used by the North for invasion of the Confederacy. Bridges and facilities 

were burned, tracks ripped up and rolling stock that could not be evacuated was 

destroyed. Because they were advancing, Union forces attempted to capture 

railroads intact for their own use. Only in rare instances, such as Sherman's 

campaign through the South, when he did not intend to occupy the territory 

traversed, were railroads regularly destroyed. In Northern Virginia, the scene of 

titanic struggles between Lee and several adversaries, armies marched and 

countermarched across the same ground, continuously attacking each other's rail 

lines as well as troops. The more exposed lines and bridges were rebuilt a 

number of times, primarily by the Union Railroad Construction Corps. 5

6 
The Civil War 1861-1865 61 

I 

• / • I 

Stevedores at City Point, Virginia, 1865. 

One of the factors that contributed greatly to the victory of the Union was 

not only its abundant resources, but its ability to coordinate transportation on 

both land and water. Steamboats were as important as the railroads, especially in 

the West. Throughout the war, campaigns were launched to gain control of 

major rivers, and Naval operations to seize coastal operating bases such as New 

Orleans were similar to those used to seize or destroy rail facilities. 5

7 Steamboat 

troop movements were as dramatic as large rail movements. In February 1862, 

Grant moved 15,000 men by boat up the Ohio and Tennessee Rivers to capture 

Fort Henry in northern Tennessee. He then moved part of the force 110 miles by 

river to take Fort Donelson on the Cumberland. The loss of Donelson smashed 

the Confederacy's "long Kentucky line" and eventually resulted in their forces 

falling all the way back to Corinth, Mississippi. In early 1865, the 15,000 men 
62 Spearhead of logistics 

of Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield's Twenty-third Corps were transferred 1,400 

miles from southwest Tennessee via the Tennessee and Ohio Rivers to 

Cincinnati. From Cincinnati, they went by rail to Washington and then by 

coastal vessel to the Cape Fear area of North Carolina on the Atlantic coast to 

attack toward Wilmington. Also in 1865, the Sixteenth Corps with 17,314 men, 

3,400 horses and mules, and 435 wagons and ambulances were moved in forty 

steamboats from Eastport on the Tennessee River, via the Ohio and Mississippi, 

1,330 miles to New Orleans in thirteen days. The extensive use of waterways 

complemented the railroads and ensured they were not overburdened. 58 Several 

campaigns stand out as excellent examples of transportation as it applied to both 

the strategic and operation levels of war. 

Very early, Confederate leaders recognized the ftrst major stand in defense of 

the South would be made in Virginia and assigned all the troops in the state to Lee's 

command. Lee established a force of 12,000 men under General Joseph E. 

Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley and built up the "Manassas Line" consisting 

of 24,000 men. The line was commanded by Maj. Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard and 

supported by a major supply depot in the vicinity of Manassas Junction. The 

Union had Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell's army of about 35,000 men in Fairfax, 

across the Potomac from Washington, and an army of about 18,000 under Maj. 

Gen. Robert Patterson near Harper's Ferry. The objective of McDowell's 

35,000-man Union army was Manassas Junction. Patterson was to keep 

Johnston's forces pinned down and unable to reinforce Beauregard. A successful 

attack by McDowell would deny the Confederacy the use of Northern rail lines 

and terminals; therefore, the capture or retention of a transportation resource was 

the key objective of each side at Bull Run, in the first major battle of the war. 5

9 

Patterson, cautiously advancing toward Winchester on 16 July, was convinced 

that Johnston outnumbered him 2 to 1 and withdrew to Harper's Ferry calling 

for reinforcements. The same day, McDowell's army marched from Fairfax and 

made initial contact with the Confederates along Bull Run Creek two days later 

on the 18th. Probes by both sides to establish the enemy's position went on 

through the 20th. Meanwhile, the Confederates used the Manassas Gap Railroad 

to carry the bulk of Johnston's troops to the battlefield. They arrived just in time 

and turned the tide of battle in the South's favor. The disorganized Federal 

forces fled to Washington, but the equally disorganized Confederates were 

unable to pursue. 

Not all of the Confederate troop movements made by rail were as 

successful as Johnston's. Some did not arrive until after the battle. Lack of 

coordination in rail support proved to be typical of many Southern rail 
The Civil War 1861 -1865 63 

operations.6° First Bull Run forced many to come to grips with the costs and 

casualties of the war and enhanced the appreciation of the role that 

transportation was to play. 

After the defeat of the Union Anny at Bull Run, Maj. Gen. George B. 

McClellan replaced McDowell as commander of the Union army in the east. 

McClellan was a superb organizer and planner but had difficulty with 

commanding the anny in the field. In response to Lincoln's insistence that action 

be taken to destroy the enemy, McClellan devised a plan to outflank Confederate 

forces by capitalizing on the North's control of sea and river routes. The Union 

Anny would be transported to the small port of Urbanna on the Rappahannock 

River, and attack west, cutting Johnston off from Richmond and forcing him to 

fight on ground of the North's choosing. The plan was a bold one, but McClellan 

was convinced that the enemy's strength always exceeded his own, which 

caused him to hesitate and request reinforcements. The delays gave Johnston, 

now the Confederate commander, time to abandon his suppljes in Manassas and 

withdraw south of the Rappahannock to a more defensible position. McClellan 

modified his plan and landed his forces at Fort Monroe, intending to drive the 70 

miles up the peninsula to Richmond, supported by a secure water line of 

communication and crossing only two rivers. The plan had merit compared with 

a 100-mile attack from Washington, crossing several rivers, and supported by a 

rail line of communication subject to constant cavalry raids. Lincoln was 

concerned that the plan laid Washington open to attack by Johnston, but 

approved it contingent on sufficient troops being left in the area to defend 

Washjngton. 

In early March 1862, Secretary Stanton and Quartennaster General Meigs 

assembled about 400 ships and barges and over a three week period transported 

McClellan's army of more than I 00,000 men, 300 cannons, 3,600 wagons, 700 

ambulances, 25,000 military animals, 3,200 cattle for subsistence with 600,000 

rations from Washington and another 2.5 million directly from New York, and 

mountains of equipment to the Peninsula. Paralyzed by his fear that he was 

outnumbered, McClellan with 70,000 men, failed to attack a Confederate force 

of only 13,000 at Yorktown and brought up sappers and heavy guns to begin a 

siege. During this delay, Johnston's whole force was shifted to delay the Union 

advance at Yorktown as long as possible. When Johnston inspected the 

defenses, he stated that "No one but McClellan would have hesitated to attack." 

On 3 May 1862, Johnston withdrew in good order toward Richmond, fighting a 

delaying action at Williamsburg which enabled the rest of the army to get away 

with its artillery and wagons.

62 McClellan followed slowly. 
64 Spearhead of Logistics 

Although the bulk of McClellan's forces were south of the Chickahominy 

River, he set up his headquarters and depot at White House, Lee's plantation 

(where Mrs. Lee was still in residence until escorted to Richmond). The site was 

above the head of navigation of the York River, north of the Chickahominy and 

on the Richmond-York River Railroad, little damaged during Johnston's 

withdrawal. Five locomotives and eighty railcars were shipped from Alexandria 

to establish the railroad as the backbone of the line of communication to 

Richmond. A huge concentration of steamboats and wagons forwarded support 

shipments from Fort Monroe to White House and retrograded casualties from 

there. Support to the field was sent by wagon and rail both north and south of 

the Chickahominy.

61 

From the outskirts of Richmond, Johnston mounted an attack on 31 May 

1862 (the Battle of Fair Oaks) against Union forces north and south of the 

Chickahominy River, hoping to convince McClellan to call off his offensive. 

The battle was plagued by poor Confederate staff work and inept execution and 

Johnston was so seriously wounded that Robert E. Lee was assigned to replace 

him. Lee immediately attacked, convincing McClellan that he was indeed 

outnumbered. The Union commander became more cautious and continued to 

request reinforcements. He found excuses not to attack and on 25 June wired 

Stanton that "the rebel force is stated at 200,000" though it was less than 90,000. 

In the succeeding campaign on the Peninsula, known as The Seven Days' 

battles, Lee sent for Jackson to move secretly from the Shenandoah Valley and 

hit McClellan's exposed right in order to defeat the Union Army in detail. 

Jackson moved on the Virginia Central Railroad from Charlottesville with only a 

single track and 200 cars and over terrain that was marshy unlike the wider dry 

roads of the Shenandoah. Jackson arrived late and in the Battle of 

Mechanicsville on 26 June failed to attack the Union exposed right flank in 

conjunction with other Confederate attacks. This gave the Union much the best 

of it in the battle. Despite the heavy Confederate casualties in this and 

subsequent battles, McClellan was psychologically beaten. Both Fraser's Farm 

and Malvern Hill were actually Union victories, and his logistical arrangements 

were well thought out, but McClellan decided to retreat. On 18 June, McClellan 

began transferring his base of operations and headquarters to Harrison's Landing 

on the more secure line of communication of the James River. McClellan's 

army successfully completed its crab-like movement to the James with herculean 

efforts by field transporters. They did so with the destruction of supplies and 

equipment, by running full train loads into the river, burning rows of tents with 

whisky-soaked hay (from sutler stores), blowing up ammunition dumps, and 
The Civil War 1861 -1865 65 

burning other equipment.63 McClellan was convinced he could not take 

Richmond without reinforcements. Lincoln offered him 50,000, but McClellan 

responded this would not be enough and Lincoln ordered the army recalled. 

Ably executed by quartermaster transporters, the army was returned to 

Washington and Richmond was saved, prolonging the war.64 Despite the dismal 

failure of McClellan as a general, the Union Army had been superbly supported 

logistically. It was only the beginning. 

Vicksburg, overlooking the Mississippi from a 200-foot bluff near a 

hairpin turn on the river, was known as the "Gibraltar of the Confederacy" and it 

was no empty nickname. Earlier attempts to take Vicksburg by attacking from 

the east had been repulsed and assault of the heights north of Vicksburg would 

be too costly. The west bank of the river was flooded bayous and swamps, 

impassable to anything but foot troops. However, after testing a number of 

alternatives, Grant formulated a plan in close coordination with Admiral Porter. 

They decided to cross the Mississippi from their position north of Vicksburg and 

bypass the city on the west bank with foot troops, while Admiral Porter's 

gunboats and troop and supply transports ran past the Vicksburg batteries to 

rendezvous with the foot troops on the west bank. Then the troops, ferried 

across the river, would march east, capture Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, 

and the key node in line of communication support of Vicksburg. After the 

capture of Jackson, the army would reverse direction and attack west to take 

Vicksburg. The plan depended on the Navy bypassing Vicksburg safely, as 

there would be no going back upstream against a five-knot current past the 

batteries. 

Volunteer troops manned the transports after civilian crews refused to risk 

the trips. On the dark night of 16 April, the convoy of eight gunboats escorting 

seven transports moved out and, despite the Confederate's heavy shelling, made 

it through with the loss of only one transport. Grant immediately ordered more 

transports with rations to move by the 22d. Seven transports, towing 12 barges 

with 700,000 rations, ran the batteries, and six got through. Grant planned for 

ammunition and hard bread to be the only items supplied by the base established 

at Grand Gulf to be shipped automatically regardless of requisitions. The army 

struck off toward Jackson and the troops were instructed to live off the land. 

Starting out with no trains and two days' rations in haversacks, the army 

collected wagons as well as food and forage. In twenty days, Grant's army 

marched 200 miles, fought five successful battles, seized Jackson, destroyed 

railroads in the vicinity, marched on Vicksburg, using the Vicksburg and 

Jackson Railroad as a LOC, and, after trying twice to fight its way in, invested 
66 Spearhead of Logistics 

Vicksburg under siege. Grant's quartermaster and transporters quickly 

established a line of communication from the north and a forward depot to keep 

the Union forces well-supplied as well as outfitted with siege guns and 

equipment. Vicksburg, the most important transportation-related target of the 

war, capitulated on 4 July, the same day Lee began his retreat from Gettysburg. 

The fall of Vicksburg led to the early surrender of Port Hudson, the last 

Confederate garrison on the river, which allowed unarmed Union merchantmen 

to sail unmolested from St. Louis to New Orleans. As Lincoln said, "The Father 

of Waters goes unvexed to the sea." The Confederacy was cut in two.65 

Atlanta was the transportation hub of the central south as well as the site of 

factories, depots, and munitions, which supported the armies of the Confederacy. 

It was also a symbol of resistance and nationality, second only to Richmond, and 

its capture became a Union political objective overshadowing the military 

objective to destroy Johnston's western Confederate Army. Johnston's failure to 

take all the defensive measures expected by the Confederate leadership led to his 

dismissal and replacement on 17 July by one of his corps commanders, John B. 

Hood, described by Lee as aggressive, but too reckless. Lee said he was "all 

lion, none of the fox."66 

Sherman's campaign to seize Atlanta was a model of logistics planning, 

with Sherman as the chief logistician, ensuring that everything possible was 

done to keep open the long, precarious rail line of communication that supported 

his three armies. In contrast, the march to the sea was marked by alm9st a total 

lack of support bases and supply lines, as he was marching toward support bases 

on the coast and could live off the land. For the Atlanta campaign, Louisville 

continued to be the primary base (supplied by the major departments), with 

advance depots at Nashville and Chattanooga expanded into secondary bases, 

and new advance depots established at Knoxville and Johnsonville, Tennessee. 

To maintain mobility for the march, Sherman ordered each man to carry food 

and clothing for five days. Each regiment was limited to one wagon and one 

ambulance, and officers of each company were permitted one pack animal for 

baggage. Tents were forbidden. Sherman insisted on moving reserves forward 

and keeping on hand in the wagon trains' twenty days' food supply as a safety 

level to cover interruptions to his fragile line of communication. When the 

rivers were low, supplies from Louisville had to come 185 miles to Nashville, 

then 150 miles to Chattanooga, from there by single track rail another 150 miles 

to Atlanta. He calculated a need for 130 carloads a day to support the campaign, 

but rolling stock limited the throughput to about 90 carloads. He issued an order 

that all cars arriving at Nashville were to be retained for use forward. Soon, cars 
The Civil War 1861 -1865 67 

from all over the north appeared on the military railroad in Georgia. 

Reconstruction of the railroad, south from Chattanooga by the Construction 

Corps, went forward with the armies and at no time were the trains more than 

five days behind General Sherman. Strong detachments were stationed on the 

lines to keep them open, but the secret to maintaining the supply line was rapid 

repair as no defense force could protect the total route against determined enemy 

raiders. A contemporary Confederate soldiers' joke was that Sherman carried 

duplicate tunnels along with trainloads of ties, rails, and bridging timbers. On 

one occasion, a Northern train got through a stretch of repaired area before the 

Confederate cavalry leader could return and report the track damaged.67 

Tactically, Sherman pushed the Confederates back in a series of 

envelopments that threatened their rail communications with Atlanta, and 

eventually threatened encirclement of the city. Hood evacuated Atlanta on I 

September after destroying all the supplies he could not carry. The news of 

Atlanta's fall ensured Lincoln's reelection.68 In Shennan's own appraisal of the 

campaign, he took greatest pride that "for 100 days not a man or horse has been 

without ample food, or a musket or a gun without ammunition." His first and 

last major concern was getting supplies to the troops. The quartennaster supply 

and transportation people throughout the entire chain of support performed 

magnificently, greatly aided by the senior tactical commander's personal 

interest. 69 

Hood's army withdrew to the south, but immediately initiated operations 

against the Union line of communication north of Atlanta in an effort to lure 

Sherman north and out of Atlanta. Sherman followed, but soon realized he was 

being led on a wild goose chase and turned his attention to further offensive 

operations into the heart of the Confederacy .

70 He saw his role in marching from 

Atlanta to Savannah as joining forces with Grant to overwhelm Lee. To 

accomplish this he had to shift his base to the coast and the best way to nullify 

the Confederate threat to his line of communication was to abandon it. Before 

he marched toward the coast with the major part of his command, Sherman left 

sufficient forces under Thomas to watch Hood and defend Tennessee. Breaks in 

the railway line were repaired to collect necessary supplies in Atlanta and return 

excesses to Chattanooga and Nashville. Each soldier received a complete set of 

clothing and shoes. Wagons were repaired and loaded with rations, forage, 

ammunition, and other supplies. Before leaving, Sherman's men tore up the 

tracks of the Atlanta and South Side Railroad to Chattanooga for some 35 miles 

northwest of Atlanta.71 
68 Spearhead of Logistics 

Sherman's force comprised about 62,000 (including civilian attendants), 

35,000 horses and mules, 2,500 six-mule wagons, and 600 two-horse 

ambulances. The wagons carried twenty days of rations, five days of forage, and 

200 rounds of ammunition for each man and artillery piece. In addition, 3,400 

beef cattle accompanied the march. The Army was organized in four corps and 

moved out between November 10 and 15. Each man carried forty rounds of 

ammunition and three days' rations. Baggage was held to a minimum and tents 

were prohibited. Personal support equipment such as cooking pots were 

consolidated by mess groups. For resupply and augmentation of wagons, 

foraging parties of about fifty men per brigade were oriented on the day's march 

and intended stopping place. They fanned out before daylight five or six miles to 

the flanks of the column, collected food for men and animals in light wagons, 

then rejoined the column and turned rations over to the brigade commissaries. 

Captured cattle and sheep were herded along until needed. Enough horses, 

mules, and beef cattle were commandeered so that when they reached Savannah 

they had more than when departing Atlanta. Quartermaster General Meigs had 

convoys off the coast to completely resupply Sherman's army with everything 

he anticipated they would need. Sherman captured Fort McAllister, south of 

Savannah, to reestablish a support base and then turned north to attack. 

Confederate forces retreated north and Savannah fell on December 20.

72 By his 

march, Sherman demonstrated that armies need not be tied down to bases and 

proceeded to march through the Carolinas with a force of similar size and 

composition, covering 425 miles in 50 days. As in Georgia, the Army lived off 

the country and destroyed enemy resources and installations as it went. 

However, Sherman's campaigns were unique and could only succeed in a fertile 

countryside while keeping on the move. Nevertheless, Shennan and his officers 

had to pay strict attention to transportation requirements while oo the march in 

order for these campaigns to succeed.73 

The most outstanding Union logistical feat of the war was the movement 

and support of the 125,000-man Army of the Potomac from positions north of 

the Rapidan River to the south bank of the James River, in six weeks of almost 

steady fighting. Army Quartermaster Rufus Ingalls developed plans, procedures, 

and innovations to eliminate problems that developed during the Peninsula 

campaign. For control purposes, each wagon was marked with the numbers and 

symbols of its corps, division, and brigade, and its cargo (forage, ammunition, 

and bread). When a wagon was emptied, it went back immediately to the depot 

to be reloaded with the same cargo. Support during the battle was so effective 
The Civil War 1861 -1865 69 

that Grant declared there was never a better organized corps than the 

quartermaster corps of the Army of the Potomac in 1864.

74 

For the siege of Petersburg, which turned into the type of trench warfare 

that later characterized World War I, the Union established a supply depot at 

City Point at the confluence of the Appomattox and James Rivers. It grew into 

the greatest advance base of the war and the largest U.S. logistical base prior to 

World War II. Though the accomplishments were astounding, they were, by this 

time, part of a well-managed routine. Commodities such as food, lumber, coal, 

fodder, and ammunition were segregated and handled at separate wharfs. Stored 

at City Point were millions of rations of food and fodder. There was also a 

laundry, a bakery, and a huge hospital. An eleven-mile railroad led directly to 

the trenches at Petersburg delivering up to 1,400 tons of cargo a day when the 

Confederates were unable to get flour and bacon from Richmond, 21 miles 

away. 

The transportation system of the U.S. Army that matured during the Civil 

War was the prototype of that required for a modem war in the Industi·ial 

Revolution. It had taken years of thought, hard work, and, in many cases, trial 

and error, to build a military transportation system that was undoubtedly the 

fmest in the world. Unfortunately, it would be dismantled in fewer years than it 

took to build. 
70 

CHAPTER IV 

The Years of 

Expansion to World War I 

"A well equipped and organized transportation service 

is a necessary adjunct to every army in the field, and its 

absence ... has resulted in more disasters and 

defeats and unsuccessful 

marches and campaigns than perhaps any other cause." 

Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Sawtelle, 

----------in a report to the QMG, 1884.----------

THE FRONTIER 

The Mexican War accomplished a major territorial goal of "Manifest 

Destiny" by extending the United States to the Pacific. Shortly thereafter, the 

discovery of gold in California and the promise of cheap land lured thousands 

west. The journey cross-country to the various territories was arduous and 

fraught with danger. The "roads" described in Captain Marcy's The Prairie 

Traveler, published in 1859, were little more than dusty or muddy tracks, 

depending on the season. The terrain the traveler had to traverse defied 

imagination. The Great Plains, known as the "Great American Desert," was a 

vast tract of featureless land in which the unwary traveler could get disoriented 

and lost. While not a lifeless wasteland like the Sahara, flowing water was not 

plentiful and travelers could easily die of thirst if they carried insufficient water. 

Native grasses supported vast herds of the American bison, called buffalo, and 

Indian ponies, but could not support grain-fed eastern horses, putting the U.S. 

Army at a distinct disadvantage. West of the plains were the Rocky Mountains 

and to the southwest were real deserts. 

By the 1850s, the United States government succeeded in pushing all but a 

few Indian tribes west of the Mississippi River, which would keep the Indians 

away from the "civilized" parts of the United States. Small Army posts scattered 

throughout the Trans-Mississippi area were seldom occupied by more than a few 

companies. The Army garrisons were intended to protect the immigrants, 
The Years of Expansion to World War I 71 

traders, stages, and freight lines that crossed the West with increasing frequency. 

They accomplished this mission by punishing tribes which raided farms and 

settlements. The task was made exceptionally difficult because there was never 

an easily recognizable enemy. The Indian tribes west of the Mississippi were, for 

the most part, nomadic. Government, as the white man knew it, was nonexistent 

and chiefs seldom had more than a tenuous control over their tribes. War and 

raiding were looked upon as manly and profitable, so chiefs who sincerely 

desired peace could not prevent more aggressive members of the tribe from 

going raiding. The contemporary solution to the problem was to keep the tribes 

on reservations and give them annual gifts of food, clothing, and weapons while 

trying to civilize them and tum them into farmers. It was a policy that might 

have worked eventually, but misunderstandings, broken promises on both sides, 

and the inability of the leaders on either side to control their people invariably 

led to conflict. Adding to the trouble were agents of the Bureau of Indian 

Affairs who were placed on the reservations to administer policies of the 

government and provide for the Indians. Many Indian agents were more 

concerned with lining their own pockets than the welfare of the Indians, who 

eventually realized what was happening. Another, and far more serious, 

problem was the large number of white settlers who perceived the Indian as a 

threat and demanded his extermination. Lines of jurisdiction between the Army, 

the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and other agencies were often unclear, making a 

difficult task almost impossible. In the years prior to the Civil War, the Army 

was overextended, but managed to win several important victories against 

Indians in the West. The Army also made an effort to differentiate between 

those members of a tribe who were peaceful and those who were not. This was 

made more difficult by Indians who raided in good weather and returned to the 

reservation during winter months to find comfort and anonymity with the rest of 

the tribe. There were even occasions in which the Army found it necessary to 

protect Indians, especially women and children, from settlers bent on their 

extermination. 

During the Civil War, the Union was hard-pressed to secure the 

Trans-Mississippi area from both Indian and Confederate encroachment. Hopes 

that some of the force used during the war would be sent west when hostilities 

ended were dashed by the loud cry "Reduce!", the I 9th century version of "Cut 

back." In the Anny Act of 1866, the Army was limited to a strength of from six 

to ten cavalry regiments, nineteen to forty-five infantry regiments, five a1tillery 

regiments, and about a thousand Indian scouts. The War Department staff 

consisted of ten bureaus called departments or corps. Unfortunately, this staff 
72 Spearhead of Logistics 

was not the commanding general's staff. Instead, they reported directly to the 

Secretary of War and became almost an anny within an anny, causing friction 

between "line and staff." The departments were looked upon as the way to get 

ahead because of the political patronage they enjoyed, and they were not always 

responsive to needs in the field especially with regard to transportation. Strong 

commanding generals like Shennan and Sheridan could wield considerable 

personal influence but could not directly control the departments. 

In 1866, the strength of the Army was over 57,000 men, which might have 

been enough to effectively handle problems on the frontier. Unfortunately, a 

third of them were stationed in the South for reconstruction duty. From 1867, 

Congress was less and less willing to fund the Army, so that by 1874, it had 

fewer than 27,000 officers and men. By 1868, most of the infrastructure built up 

during the war was already dismantled. Despite the reductions of the Army in 

size, the costs of supporting the individual soldier continued to climb and was 

the subject of much investigation and many inspections by high ranking officers. 

Some believed that the reason for high costs was cornaption, and cases of 

cornaption and fraud were found, but the fundamental reason was the cost of 

transportation. The army was thinly spread in hundreds of small garrisons along 

hundreds of miles of frontier. The most economical way to organize and support 

a distribution system was to hire local freight companies to transport troops and 

supplies. One example of the cost involved is the comparison that 

Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs made between the French and U.S. 

Armies in 1866. In that year it cost $200 per annum to support the average 

French soldier. The annual cost of a U.S. soldier before the Civil War was 

nearly $1000 a year, and in 1866, the cost was rising.

1 Except for small gatTisons 

outside of metropolitan France, most French soldiers were stationed in local 

garrisons which made supply and distribution fairly simple, wllile nothing on the 

Western Frontier was simple. Barley purchased in the East at 1 cent per pound 

cost 10 cents per pound by the time it reached Camp Lyon, Idaho. The most 

extreme example of transportation costs was in the Military Division of the 

Pacific, which had to deal with more than its share of remote posts. Forage and 

other supplies were limited in Arizona, and had to be "shipped by water from 

San Francisco, via the Gulf of California to the Colorado River, and from there 

by steamer to Fort Yuma, a distance of 2,210 miles. Including overland 

transportation of 308 miles from Yuma to Tucson, it cost, by contract, almost 2 1 

cents per pound to send stores from San Francisco to Tucson."2 

The Quartermaster Department continued to use contract hauling as the 

most economical method of transportation during and after the Civil War. In 
The Years of Expansion to World War I 73 

Regular infantry loading boxcars, 1898. 

fiscal year 1866, commercial freight wagons carried over "40,750 tons of 

military stores at a cost of $3,250,000."3 The following year, the railroads began 

to carry a larger and larger share of military cargo. In fiscal year 1868, the Union 

Pacific Railroad carried 18,605 tons of military cargo compared to 22,645 

carried by wagons. 

4 But the freight wagon and the stagecoach remained viable 

means of transportation until nearly the 20th century. In 1898, freight wagons 

still carried 32,647 tons of military cargo and stage coaches 967 passengers. 

Transportation problems existed not only at the national and military 

division level, but also at the local level. Freight was contracted to the lowest 

bidder based on rates "fixed at so much per 100 lbs per 100 miles, the rates 

being adjusted to the season of the year, that is, lower for the summer than for the 
74 Spearhead of Logistics 

winter months."5 The fluidity of the military situation, the diversion of supplies 

by local commanders, and interdiction by hostile Indians all hampered the flow 

of supplies. In many posts of the West, conditions were little different than 

Valley Forge. Everything was affected by the lack of transportation from food 

and clothing, which were always in short supply until the mid-1870s, to timber 

for building adequate housing and for firewood. The lack of building materials 

forced many garrisons to build sod or adobe buildings which were unfavorably 

compared to slave quarters prior to the war. 

The conditions which affected national and theater level transportation, 

also affected tactical transportation. The wagon and the pack mule were the 

only means of carrying supplies once a unit was away from a riverboat landing 

or a railhead. Against a fast-moving, elusive enemy, wagons were a hindrance. 

Mules were nimble and could be used in any terrain, but they had to be 

employed in great numbers since an individual mule only carried around 200 

pounds of cargo. Mules also had to be fed and, like horses, did not fare well on 

plains grasses. The problem was so serious that, in many campaigns, infantry 

was able to outdistance the cavalry after three days of marching. 

In 1868, Maj. Gen. Phillip Sheridan assumed command of the Military 

Division of Missouri which controlled operations from the Dakotas to New 

Mexico. With Sheridan came an overall change in strategy. No longer could 

pursuit be limited to the Indian war party responsible for a raid. Instead, the 

entire village was to be pursued in good weather and bad. Villages were to be 

burned, goods destroyed, and horses captured or killed. As nomads, the plains 

Indians were particularly vulnerable to this strategy. During the winter, they 

moved little. Their teepees were their only shelter, and they Jived on what game 

could be found and what food they had stored. Their horses were their only 

means of transportation both for peaceful pursuits and for war. Destruction of 

any or all of these resources in good or bad weather made it impossible for a 

village to survive in any way other than to settle on a reservation. However, 

pursuit of a mobile enemy by an army supported with horse-drawn wagons was 

never an easy task. The Red River War of 1874 - 1875 provided a typical 

example of the tactical constraints imposed by wagon transportation. 

In 1872, the Kiowas and Comanches in the Red River area of Texas were 

in a state of unrest with many grievances. They were required to live on 

reservations where they received too little food or no·food at all. The food they 

did get was not what they were used to, while white men were slaughtering 

millions of buffalo for hides and leaving the meat to rot. Along with these issues 

were the cultural ones which elevated the successful warrior and demanded 
The Years of Expansion to World War I 75 

Regular infantry waiting for transportation, 1898. 

revenge for those killed in previous raids. All of these factors pointed to a major 

uprising. All that was needed was the right spark. 

In early 1873, the government released the warlike Kiowa chiefs Santana 

and Big Tree from prison as an act of good will. Sherman, who was now 

Commanding General, was outraged because he felt these chiefs would provide 

leadership for the Indians, and his pique proved justified. In early 1874, the 

Kiowas, Comanches, and Cheyenne struck. They raided farms from Texas to 

Kansas and even attacked the Army and Texas Rangers. After the raids, the 

Indians returned to their reservations where the Army was not allowed to follow 

them. In July 1874, new Indian raids occurred and Sherman received permission 

from Secretary of War Belnap for the Army to pursue the Indians responsible for 
76 Spearhead of Logistics 

the raids onto reservations. He ordered Sheridan to find them and punish them. 

The area of operations fell under the jurisdictions of General Christopher C. 

Augur who commanded Texas and part of Indian Territory and General John 

Pope who commanded Kansas and New Mexico as well as parts of Colorado 

and Indian Territory. Augur and Pope developed a plan (Map 6) that would 

relentlessly drive the hostiles into a pocket and force them back onto the 

reservations. 

General Augur's forces consisted of three columns. Colonel Ranald S. 

MacKenzie with eight troops of the 4th Cavalry moved north from the Mexican 

border to operate from a base on the Freshwater Fork of the Brazos River. Lt. 

Col. George P. Buell with the 8th Infantry was assigned to drive from the east in 

the area bordered by the Salt Fork of the Red River on the north and east and the 

Prairie Dog Town Fork of the Red River on the south. The third of Augur's 

columns was to be the lOth Cavalry which was to move directly west from Fort 

Sill, Oklahoma, under the command of Lt. Col. John W. Davidson. General 

Pope's forces consisted of two columns. The 5th Infantry and several troops of 

the 6th Cavalry, commanded by Lt. Col. Nelson A. Miles, commander of the 5th 

Infantry moved southwest from Fort Dodge, Kansas. Four Troops of the 8th 

Cavalry under Maj. William R. Price moved east from New Mexico. The 

campaign began in grueling heat and drought in late August 1874. A few weeks 

later the drought suddenly ended with torrential downpours. 

Although the campaign was a success, transportation, or rather the lack of 

it, proved to be the weak link. Contract transportation was unreliable for 

operations in the field, and Army wagons were too few. Miles defeated a band 

of Indians on 30 August but was unable to pursue them because his sixty wagons 

could only hold enough supplies for twenty-one days.6 The equally aggressive 

Davidson remarked, "Expeditions with our limited transportation find 

themselves with only enough supplies to carry them back when they reach the 

present country of the Indians."7 To emphasize the point, no contract wagons 

were available in January of 1875. In order to maintain his Sweetwater 

Cantonment, Pope had to strip his entire department of wagons as well as obtain 

fifty additional wagons from Sheridan; otherwise he would have had to 

withdraw the garrison. A similar shortage of transportation seventy years later 

would result in a similar solution - The Redball Express. Other operations 

suffered from similar transportation shortcomings. Brig. Gen. George Crook, 

commanding the Department of the Platte, found a partial solution to the 

problem by using mules instead of wagons, but that meant trains of hundreds of 
t 

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78 Spearhead of Logistics 

mules. However, in the rough terrain of the southwest, mules could go where 

wagons could not and mule-supported soldiers eventually defeated the Apache. 

The situation did not go unnoticed. In 1884, Lt. Col. Charles G. Sawtelle, 

who became Quartermaster General in 1896, reported to the Quartermaster 

General, "The history of all wars, modern and ancient, proves that army is the 

weakest whose transportation facilities are the most inefficient. A well equipped 

and organized transportation service to every army in the field, and its absence, 

or even its presence with ignorant and inexperienced officers in charge, has 

resulted in more disasters and defeats and unsuccessful marches and campaigns 

than perhaps any other cause."8 Sawtelle went on to recommend the instruction 

of officers in transportation and railroad operations at the Artillery School at 

Fort Monroe and the School of Application at Fort Leavenworth. While he 

admitted that the small size and decentralized garrisons of the Army precluded 

the formation of a transportation corps, he warned that in case of war the United 

States would be found "sadly deficient in this most important requisite to 

successful military operations."9 The Spanish-American War would prove him 

painfully correct. 

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

1l1e Spanish-American War, declared on 25 April 1898, occurred as a 

result of a genuine belief on the part of the American people that Cuba had to be 

liberated from a tyrannical and oppressive Spanish regime in Cuba and the 

desire of the nation to obtain overseas colonies like other imperialist nations of 

the late 19th century. The direct cause of the war was the destruction of the 

Battleship Maine in Santiago Bay, Cuba, which the media blamed on the 

Spanish. In light of subsequent events, it seems that the Maine was destroyed by 

an internal explosion caused by coal or defective ammunition, but at the time, it 

was all that was necessary to whip the country into a war hysteria. Strategically, 

the war presented the United States with the problem of how to project its 

power across the ocean, initially to Cuba and later the Philippines. Although the 

United States had projected power beyond its borders and conducted amphibious 

operations in the Mexican War and the Civil War, it had shared a common 

border with its enemy in both cases, and coastal operations were much easier to 

support than those conducted across open ocean. In 1898, the nation had to 

assemble the required men and resources and transport both to a port of 

embarkation and thence to a theater of operations. There they had to be 

disembarked with their weapons, supplies, and ammunition to carry out comba't 

operations. While in theater, they had to be supplied with enough food and 
The Years of Expansion to World War I 79 

The pier at Tampa. 

ammunition to ensure victory. At the end of the war or campaign, there was the 

problem of returning the troops and their equipment to the continental United 

States, then to their home stations. 

In 1898, all the expertise gained during the Civil War over thirty-three 

years before was gone. The organizations that carried out effective combined 

operations and transported troops, supplies, and equipment across half a 

continent and along thousands of miles of coastline were no longer in existence. 

The Regular Army consisted of only 28,183 men with a maximum wartime 

ceiling of 65,700. The state militias constituted another 114,000 men, many of 

them of indifferent quality.9 The Army's largest organization was the regiment 

of roughly 1,000 men, which was seldom employed "en masse." The Indian 

enemies the Army faced during the last third of the nineteenth century seldom 

called for more than a few companies at a time. The War Department was 

undoubtedly the weakest part of the Army. It was headed by the Secretary of War, 

Russell A. Alger, whose military sulx>rdinate was Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, 

Commanding General of the Army. The War Department, itself consisted of ten bureaus, 

each of which responded directly to requests from regimental commanders. There 
80 Spearhead of Logistics 

was no general staff and no mechanism for expansion of support or services in 

case of war. To make matters worse, Alger and Miles did not get along. 

When war was declared, the War Department planned for the expansion of 

the Regular Army plus a call for 65,000 volunteers. Instead the President called 

for 125,000 (basically the total militia) in order to get the maximum number of 

soldiers in the shortest amount of time. The bureau system began to break down 

immediately. The War Department could have adequately controlled the 

expansion of the Regular Army, but it was unable to supply enough officers to 

staff the new corps and divisions which were forming. Nor could it provide staff 

supervision for the expansion and deployment of an army the size of which the 

nation had not seen in over thirty years. Neither the nation nor the Army was 

prepared for war. The result was chaos, which was nowhere more evident than 

in the area of transportation. 

To the small army of 1898, organic transportation was a luxury it could not 

afford. While never generously supplied with wagons and pack mules, the 

Army generally had enough of both on hand to support itself in the field even 

though aggressive commanders chasing elusive Indians felt there were never 

enough. In 1895, the War Department decided that the Indian troubles were 

over and the Army would never need wagons again. If it did, the Army could 

hire them from contractors. Expensive Army wagons and harnesses had been 

sold for less than ten percent of their actual value. 11 When war came, Col. 

Crosby P. Miller, the quartermaster officer in charge of procurement, estimated the 

Army needed approximately 5,000 wagons "based on an allowance of 25 wagons to 

a regiment of infantry, 45 to the cavalry and 5 to a light battery making up about 

275 wagons for a division and about 750 to a corps. The manufacturers of wagons 

were completely unable to meet such a demand." 12 During a meeting on wagon 

transportation in his office on 3 April 1898, Secretary of War Alger requested that 

the Studebaker Company furnish 200 six-mule Army wagons and 1,000 escort 

wagons within two months. The company head, Clem Studebaker replied that since 

the Army had sold off all its large wagons and no longer required replacements, the 

Studebaker Company no longer had the machinery or the materials to produce them 

and would be unable to produce 200 six-mule wagons in a year. Information 

supplied by other contractors indicated it would take at least nine months to 

manufacture enough wagons to Army specifications to meet the Army's needs. 13 

Consequently, the Quartermaster Department was required to procure whatever 

it could. The Army eventually procured 4,620 wagons, more than 3,000 of 

which were four-mule wagons. However, not all were delivered before the end 

of the war, and only 114 went overseas, the result of the lack of ocean transport. 
The Years of Expansion to World War I 81 

Wagons supporting the expedition to Mexico, 1916. 

The one bright spot in the war was the efficiency of the railroads in getting 

the troops to their training camps and eventually to the ports. During the war 

months, the railways moved 17,000 officers and 435,000 enlisted men at low 

rates and in reasonable comfort. 14 But the ports were another matter. 

Transportation coordination and planning during the early stages of the 

Spanish-American war were minimal. The Port of Tampa was, no doubt, the 

worst example of a universally bad situation. The port was selected because of 

its proximity to Cuba, not for its facilities. In 1898, Tampa was little more than a 

tourist port built to accommodate smatl steamers bound for the Florida Keys or 

Cuba. It had a narrow channel along a strip of land that served as a pier. Only 

two vessels could load or unload at any one time. 

Although track was laid along the "pier," loading and unloading had to be 

done by barefoot stevedores who carried cargo on their backs across fifty feet of 

soft sand. There was no modern material-handling equipment. Access to the port 

from the land side was equally poor. It consisted of a single nine-mile track 

leading to the port area. Once the decision was made to liberate Cuba, troops, 

equipment, and supplies poured into Tampa. By 18 May, more than 1,000 
82 Spearhead of Logistics 

freight cars jammed the Tampa yards. Trainloads of material were eventually 

backed up as far as Columbia, South Carolina. The War Department continued 

the flow of supplies without regard to the capabilities of port storage. As many 

as fifty cars a day arrived, but only two or three a day could be unloaded. In 

many cases the cargo arrived without invoices and bills of lading. Officers had 

to go from car to car, breaking open crates to fmd out whether they contained 

weapons, clothing, food, or other stores. In one incident, badly needed uniforms 

were found in 15 boxcars sidelined 25 miles from Tampa. 

General Shafter, the Commanding General at Tampa reported to the War 

Department on 31 May, 1898 that he would be able to sail in three days. 

However, when General Miles arrived on 3 June, he could report nothing but the 

existence of a state of confusion to the Secretary of War. Secretary Alger replied 

him that 20,000 men "ought to unload any number of cars and assort them,"15 

hardly a constructive remark. Eventually Shafter moved his headquarters to the 

pier and directed loading operations from the packing case that served as his 

desk. Getting troops to the ships was supposed to be done by schedule, but it 

appears to have been left to the enterprise of the individual regimental 

commanders. Some units commandeered trains; others could not. 

The quality of the transportation differed widely. The celebrated "Rough 

Riders" rode in a coal train. The 6th Infantry traveled in stock cars, ankle deep in 

manure. The famous black 1Oth Cavalry Regiment traveled in passenger coaches 

with ice water in the coolers, but could get nothing to eat because they were 

separated from their mess, and local restaurants refused to serve them. 16 

At first none of the trains moved because of the congestion on the single 

track. The 6th Infantry waited in their stock cars 17 hours before they could 

move. The lOth Cavalry waited almost 24 hours before they got on the transport. 

Soon it was discovered that there was not enough space for all the units assigned 

to transports. Several units were assigned to the same ship. When the Rough 

Riders found out they were assigned the steamer Yucatan, they took a boat to the 

steamer to gain control of it before it docked. Later in the day the 71st New York 

Volunteers (NYV) arrived to find their assigned ship, also the Yucatan, guarded 

by the Rough Riders. The 71st NYV spent another two days in their train before 

they embarked on a ship. 

Eventually, the transports embarked approximately 16,000 men, nearly 

2,300 horses, 38 pieces of artillery. 200 wagons, and 7 ambulancesY The 

deployment was far short of the 25,000 men projected. As the ships were 

leaving, orders came to call them back, due to fear of two nonexistent Spanish 

cruisers. Some ships were reloaded with recently arrived medical supplies. On 
The Years of Expansion to World War I 83 

14 June, the convoy finally steamed out of Tampa Bay. It was twelve days late 

and had only 60 percent of the projected personnel. The troops spent another 

twelve days aboard the ships, living in cramped quarters, and eating tasteless 

food before they landed. 

Since the Army had no transports, ships had to be chartered. Regulations 

required the chartering of only U.S. flag carriers, and the only ones available 

were small coastal freighters unequipped to carry passengers. In many cases, 

ships left Tampa with ships' carpenters still on board building bunks and 

washing facilities. At the landing point, things were no better. On 22 June, 

Shafter's troops had the good fortune to make an unopposed landing at Daiquiri 

on the southern coast of Cuba, 15 miles east of their objective, Santiago. After a 

brief bombardment which failed to hit an unmanned Spanish blockhouse, but 

succeeded in killing and wounding a few Cuban insurgents, a disorganized 

disembarkation began. Some captains, not wishing to risk their ships, refused to 

come close to shore, while one actually pulled farther out to sea, only to be 

turned back by a naval vessel. 

Soldiers boarded long boats and launches and began moving toward shore 

in heavy surf. Steam-launches supplied by the Navy pulled strings of boats 

behind them. On the shore was one iron pier and one small wooden wharf. 

Conditions were so hazardous that two troopers of the lOth Cavalry were 

crushed when they slipped trying to climb from their lighter to the pier. Several 

boats were capsized or smashed and several troops injured. Horses and mules 

were forced to swim ashore, and several horses and 50 mules drowned during 

the operation. By 1800 hours on 22 June, 6,000 soldiers were ashore and an 

equal number were landed the following day. On 24 June, a base was 

established at Siboney, a nearly unsheltered but less treacherous beach closer to 

Santiago, which became the base of operations for the remainder of the 

campaign. Engineers built a wharf, but unloading operations were still difficult 

and not all cargo made it to the shore. The unloading of ships was very slow due 

to a lack of adequate docks and lighters. The result was a lack of support at the 

front. For a few days, the Jack of supplies halted further advance upon Santiago. 

General Shafter did not want to launch his final assault on Santiago until 

sufficient anununition and supplies were ashore at Siboney. His caution was 

necessary in the event a hurricane sent the ships out to sea.

18 Tropical canvas 

uniforms remained in the hold of one of the ships and were not issued until 25 

July when the war was over. 

19 

Land transportation was sadly deficient. The roads in Cuba were poor and 

the weather made them nearly impassable. The road between Santiago and Las 
84 Spearhead of Logistics 

Guasimas was in very poor condition. Wagons were unable to traverse the road 

with its dips, mud holes, and flooded sections with no bridges. The 

Quartermaster Department did a great deal of work repairing the roa<L 

particularly between Siboney and Santiago. They filled depressions, removed 

boulders, cut through woods, and built bridges. However, those improvements 

lasted only a short time. 

The roads were so bad that a mounted man could not pass a wagon and the 

roads needed constant repair. Therefore, planning for one-way traffic was 

crucial. Supplies moving forward and wounded moving rearward had to be 

scheduled to avoid a jam. Shortages of experienced wagoneers resulted in 

wagons overturning and causing even more congestion.2° The bad conditions 

reduced the load a pack mule could carry by half. Mules that could usually carry 

250 pounds could only carry 100 pounds because of the poor state of the roads. 

Packers were in such short supply that pack trains were laid up for lack of 

packers. 21 Only the short duration of the campaign seems to have saved the 

Army from considerable embarrassment. 

After the campaign, Col. Theodore Roosevelt wrote to Secretary of War 

Alger, "The greatest trouble we had was with the lack of transportation". He 

went on to say that while a regiment was normally authorized twenty-five 

wagons his regiment was lucky to have two at any time, and sometimes had 

none. Transportation in Cuba had to be improvised using captured Spanish 

horses in place of mules. Food, tentage, and clothing had to be left behind to 

make room for ammunition and medical supplies. "In my opinion, the 

deficiency in transportation was the worst evil with which we had to contend, 

serious though some of the others were," Roosevelt declared. 22 

An unopposed landing was made on the island of Puerto Rico at Guanica 

on 25 July. The landing was much smoother than had been the landings in 

Cuba. At Guanica, engineers used a pontoon causeway to land more than 1,000 

animals and all heavy equipment without incident.23 Troops under Brig. Gen. 

Guy V. Henry were ordered to occupy the key city of Yauco, six miles from the 

landing site and located on the road and railroad that lead to Ponce. General 

Henry arrived at Yauco on 28 July and marched down the road to Ponce arriving 

the same day. Transports were brought into the port two miles from Ponce, 

and Maj. Gen. James H. Wilson debarked with another 3,500 men. Additional 

troops arrived from Tampa within a week to bring the troop strength in Puerto 

Rico to 15,000. 

The campaign in the Philippines was undertaken in response to 

Commodore George Dewey's call for reinforcements to hold Manila and control 
The Years of Expansion to World War I 85 

the Philippines after the U.S. naval victory in the Battle of Manila Bay. The 

Philippine action went more smoothly than had the campaign in Cuba. The 

Quartermaster Department purchased two transports and chartered eighteen 

more to move troops and supplies to Manila. 25 These ships were generally better 

than those chartered for the Cuban expedition. They were ocean-going vessels 

which were much larger than the coastal steamers, and could easily be adapted 

to carry troops but did not guarantee a pleasant voyage. As one soldier remarked, 

"The troops were not clean in their persons, because no bathing regulations were 

adopted and the regular 'scrub and wash clothes' was unknown. Lice and other 

vermin were rampant. The men spit on the deck, threw waste food on deck, and 

defecated there without regard to the expostulations of the officers of the 

transport. "

26 

On 25 May, an advance party of 2,491 troops left San Francisco aboard 

three transports. Loading at San Francisco took place in an orderly fashion in 

contrast to the fiasco at Tampa. This was mainly due to the advance notice of 

deployment and a clearly defined mission, which allowed the formation of a 

staff to prepare for embarking soldiers and supplies.Z7 The advance party 

arrived at Manila on 30 June after stopping at Honolulu and Guam. They 

disembarked at Cavite the following day,28 sending men and supplies ashore in 

cascos, which were Philippine lighters towed by captured Spanish tugboats. 

Each carried about 200 men. To move supplies from the shore to camps ponies 

and two-wheeled carts drawn by water-buffaloes were used. The Army also 

hired Chinese "coolies" to move ammunition and assigned four of them to each 

company?9 

A second group of 3,586 soldiers departed San Francisco on 15 June and 

arrived in Manila on 17 July.30 A third group of 4,847 troops on seven transports 

under the command of General Arthur MacArthur, father of General Douglas 

MacArthur, left 25-29 June and arrived at Manila on 25 July. A total of 407 

officers and 10,437 men, with 16light field guns and an assortment of rapid-fire guns 

including Gatlings, made up the force at Manila Five additional transports with 4,765 

soldiers left San Francisco in late July but did not arrive until the war was over.

31 

There were no major hostile actions with the Spaniards in the Philippines. 

The Spanish forces preferred to surrender to the Americans rather than face the 

Philippine insurgents. Manila was occupied at the total cost of 18 Americans 

killed and 109 wounded.32 The war ended on 13 August 1898. 

In order to clear overcrowded hospitals in Cuba, General Shafter sent eight 

transports back to the United States with sick and wounded. The transports were 

not equipped to transport sick and wounded men, had little medicine and few 
86 Spearhead of Logistics 

doctors were available. Some returnees died during the voyage, and news of the 

poorly equipped and filthy ships soon caught the public's eye. President 

McKinley ordered an investigation and the attention gained helped General 

Shafter's request for additional medical support. A new hospital ship, the Relief, 

was sent to assist with 20 surgeons and 700 tons of medical supplies on board. 33 

The first troops to redeploy from Cuba left Santiago on 7 August and 

arrived at Camp Wikoff, Montauk Point, Long Island on 14 August Camp 

Wikoff acted as a reception station for the redeployment It was chosen for its 

isolation because the public was afraid soldiers returning from Cuba would 

bring back yellow fever. Despite the fact that only 35,000 of the more than 

200,000 volunteers called to duty actually left the country, Camp Wikoff was 

totally inadequate for its purpose. There was only one railroad line servicing 

Montauk from New York City, and it had no facilities for receiving supplies or 

passengers. Local roads were also unsuitable for the increased traffic?4 

In midsummer of 1899, six transports were purchased for the Army and 

converted to troop ships capable of carrying I ,500 to 2,000 officers and men on 

long voyages. To manage and maintain these ships and any other chartered or 

purchased by the Army, the Secretary of War created the Army Transport 

Service within the Quartermaster Department in November 1898. 

In September 1898, President McKinley had formed a committee in 

response to public criticism of the conduct of the war. It was headed by railroad 

magnate Grenville M. Dodge to investigate allegations of mismanagement of 

operations by the War Department during the war. Mter numerous hearings the 

Dodge Commission reported on 9 February 1899 that, in general, the 

Quartermaster Department was free of fraudulent actions (in marked contrast to 

department practices in the Civil War), but that the transportation system was to 

blame for the poor rate of supply. The Quartermaster Department bad procured 

the proper amount of supplies needed for the war, but was either unable to maintain 

control over the vast amount of materials once in the distribution system or did 

not have the transportation assets available to deliver the cargo from Tampa. 

As a result of these findings the Dodge Commission recommended a 

number of changes to the Army and to the Quartermaster Department. In 

particular, the establishment of the Army Transport Service under the 

Quartermaster Department. The commission also concluded that a lack of 

organization was to blame for the railroads' difficulties during the war. As ·a 

result, new methods of marking railcars were established for wartime. In 

addition, legislation was passed specifying that government loads would have 

priority during war. Provisions were also made for Army Transport Service 
The Years of Expansion to World War I 87 

officers to meet directly with railroad officials at the War Department as determined 

by the Secretary of War. The direct communication between the users and the 

owners would create a better understanding by all, of the complexities and problems 

encountered during mobilization. These changes to the Quartermaster Corps 

organization and increases in its strength, in addition to the improved operation of 

the country's railroad operation, were sorely needed improvements. 

The corrunission's other criticisms of the War Department and Secretary 

Alger were scathing, but rather than just placing blame, the commission 

proposed measures to reduce paperwork and stockpile the necessary supplies for 

war. In addition, it recommended the War Department "develop schools of 

instruction to train personnel for wartime duty and ensure a supply of competent 

officers."35 The findings of the commission helped pave the way for a much 

improved War Department and service schools. On 21 January 1903, Congress 

passed the Militia Act which improved procedures for the training the militias of 

the various states. During this period the Army school system was improved and 

a long overdue staff system responsible to the commanding general was created. 

The chaos of the Spanish-American War thus led to several much needed 

improvements. 

The call for change also came from the newly appointed Secretary of War, 

Elihu Root. Despite, and maybe because of, his lack of familiarity with "the 

army way of doing things," he was able to reorganize the Army into a more 

effective organization.

36 Mr. Root felt that an army could be raised quickly when 

needed, but procuring equipment was a more time-intensive process. Thus he 

sought to increase the readiness of the Army by increasing the equipment on 

hand and in particular, transportation assets. He stated, "With 80 million of our 

people there never will be the slightest difficulty in raising an army of any size 

which it is possible to put into the field. Our trouble will never be in raising 

soldiers; our trouble will always be the limit of possibility in transporting, 

clothing, anning, feeding and caring for our soldiers."37 Two of Root's reforms 

had profound, positive, and far reaching effects on the Army. With the support 

of President Theodore Roosevelt and many younger officers, Root convinced 

Congress to pass a bill abolishing permanent tenure in the bureaus, replacing it 

with four-year detail assignments. This reform insured a constant exchange of 

officers with "line and staff." Root's most impressive reform was the 

establishment of a General Staff Corps by act of Congress in 1903. It was 

"charged with the preparation of defense and mobilization plans, with 

investigation and reporting on all questions affecting the Army's efficiency, and 

with acting as agents of the Secretary of War and respective commanders in 
88 Spearhead of Logistics 

providing information and co-ordinating action." The General Staff would also be 

the major influence behind the creation of an independent transportation corps?8 

In addition to the Dodge Commission Report recommending change, and 

Mr. Root's desire to change the way the Army operated, the Army's mission 

was changing. The annexation of Hawaii and the acquisition of Cuba, Puerto 

Rico, Guam, and the Philippines resulted in a need for a much more extensive 

supply and transport service. Those distant garrisons created a need to move 

both soldiers and their dependents overseas. The British system of troop 

movement was used as a model for the U.S. Army. The Army Transport Service 

established two home ports, one at San Francisco and the other at New York, to 

assist with troop movement. In 1898 the Army Transport Service established a 

regular line of transports that provided weekly service between New York and 

Cuba-Puerto Rico. A service was also established between San Francisco and 

Manila. Prior to World War I the Army Transport Service operated this ocean 

transport service, together with a harbor boat service, and an inter-island service 

in the Philippines. From the start of the Spanish-American War until World War I, 

the Army Transport Service increased its number of transports from 3 to 23, 

other chartered vessels to 125, not counting the 200 small craft used in the 

Philippines?9 After the war, routes and services were discontinued as the 

number of troops overseas declined. At the start of the first World War, the 

Army Transport Service had 16 operational transports. 

In the summer of 1899, there was an uprising in Manila. To put down the 

insurrection, the United States deployed a total of 125,000 soldiers from San 

Francisco and New York. A nonexistent transportation network and extreme 

weather conditions were the major obstacles to providing transportation support 

to the hundreds of garrisons in the archipelago. For example, in the spring of 

1899 it rained 46 inches in one month, making road movement almost 

impossible.40 The Philippine Insurrection was the first "brush flre" war in U.S. 

experience. The second, the Boxer Rebellion in China, occurred shortly 

thereafter. In order to dispatch troops to China, the Army sent transports from 

Manila, San Francisco, and New York to the Gulf of Chihli, China, in the fall of 

1900. By mid-November, in advance of the freezing of the river that emptied 

into the gulf, the Army established an advance base ashore with six months' 

supplies consisting of ammunition, food, winter clothing, lumber, stoves, 

medical supplies, and fuel. Firsthand reports indicated that U.S. Army soldiers 

were landing in better condition, with more complete equipment of every class, 

and larger and better stores of all supplies, than those of any other engaged in 

suppression of the Boxer Rebellion. The 15,500 soldiers redeployed by May of 
The Years of Expansion to World War I 89 

The Army's first use of trucks, Mexico, 1916. 

1901.41 These expeditions were another aspect of the new Army mission, 

projecting power to protect or establish American interests overseas. 

In addition to improvements to the railroads and shipping industries, a new 

invention was making its way into the Army Transport Service. It was the 

automobile in the form of the truck. In 1900, Quartermaster General Marshall I. 

Ludington rejected a proposal for use of automobiles for military operations, 

feeling the roadways in the U.S. were not well-developed enough for the 

widespread use of automobiles. Even had he been an enthusiastic supporter of 

motor transport, the funds were not available for experimental cars or trucks. In 

1906, Quartermaster General Charles F. Humphrey bought six automobiles, but 

the Treasury Department ruled that he exceeded his authority of appropriations, 

and charged them to his personal account - hardly an auspicious beginning. 
90 Spearhead of Logistics 

Humphrey's successor, Major General James B. Alshire, was more successful. 

In I 907, he was able to purchase twelve vehicles for testing. Initial tests 

indicated that they were not cost-effective, but attitudes were changing. 42 In 

1911, on the recommendation of the Inspector General, the Army bought trucks 

for experimental purposes. The use of trucks and motorcycles in various tests 

and maneuvers showed that the motor vehicle had potential, and by 1913, trucks 

were beginning to replace horses at depots. 

In 1913, the United States mobilized in response to unrest in Mexico. 

Although war was avoided, 23,000 soldiers were initially deployed to the 

Mexican border, and 11,000 more followed. In 19 14, the United States sent 

3,200 soldiers to Vera Cruz aboard four transports and one civilian chartered 

vessel. There, U.S. forces went ashore over the beach and maneuvered nine 

miles inland to the c ity's water supply in a show of force. These soldiers were 

deployed and resupplied from Galveston, Texas.43 

In the spring of 1916, General Pershing was preparing for an expedition to 

Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa. On 11 March 19 16 the Southern Department 

led the call for establishment of two motor-truck companies. To he lp support the 

expedition, the companies were formed each consisting of 27, 1- 1/2 ton trucks. 

By July of 1916, the Army had purchased 588 trucks, 57 tank trucks, 10 

machine-shop trucks, 6 wrecking trucks, 75 automobiles, 61 motorcycles, and 8 

tractors for repairing roads. The use of these vehicles on the Mexican border was 

such a success that there were no longer any doubts that the truck would replace 

animal-drawn transportation. The experience gained from the use of motor 

transportation would be of tremendous value just a few months later when the 

United States entered World War I. 

By 1917, when the United States joined the Allies in the war against 

Germany, the desire not to repeat the confusion of Tampa in May and June of 

1898 had already borne fruit. While the responsibility for transportation still 

rested with the Quartermaster General, there was an awareness of the importance 

of transportation unknown in 1898. The Quartermaster General also had the 

responsibility for overseas shipments. The Quartermaster General's Transportation 

Division had two branches. The Land Transportation Branch oversaw shipments by 

inland carriers. However, most of the movements were actually contracted by the 

local quartermasters. The Land Transportation Branch did not get involved 

unless the particular job was too large or too difficult to be handled by local 

offices. The Water Transportation Branch provided general guidance for water 

transportation and had nominal control of the Army Transport Service which 

operated ports of embarkation, transport, and shi pments overseas. Although the 
The Years of Expansion to World War I 91 

organization was far better than the bureaus of the previous era, the efforts were 

still decentralized and oriented to contracting transportation to common carriers 

in a peacetime situation rather than to the pending mission of moving personnel, 

equipment and supplies from military and industrial locations within the 

continental United States through ports of embarkation to fight a major war 

overseas. Control was further fragmented by the fact that the operation and 

repair of railroads in the war zone fell to the Corps of Engineers. The inability of 

existing organizations to meet transportation needs was evident even in the early 

days of World War One, and fear of repeating the mistakes of 1898 led to the 

creation of stronger organizations to handle the wartime requirements. 
92 

CHAPTER V 

World War I 

"It is believed that efficient transportation service for all the 

operations of the Army can not be expected until all matters of 

transportation are centralized into one service." 

Brigadier General Frank T. Hines 

Chief of Transportation, Annual Report, 1919. -------

OVERVIEW 

World War I was precipitated by the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand 

of Austria at the hand of a Serbian nationalist on 28 June 1914. When AustriaHungary decided to use the incident to seize Serbian territory, Russia supported 

Serbia, Germany supported Austria-Hungary, and France supported Russia. 

What began as just another incident in a long history of troubles in the Balkans 

seriously affected the two alliances which dominated European politics. The 

Triple Alliance, composed of Germany, Austria-Hungary. and Italy, opposed the 

Triple Entente of France, Russia, and Great Britain. Saber rattling led to 

mobilization, and before anyone realized it, the entire continent of Europe was at 

war. Great Britain, long fearful of Germany's expanding navy, declared war 

when Germany invaded Belgium. The war, which was supposed to be short and 

glorious, was greeted with enthusiasm in most countries because it was seen as a 

means of settling old scores. Even the most sanguine observers failed to predict 

the course the war would take. Eventually, Italy abandoned the Triple Alliance 

in 1915 and allied herself with Great Britain, France, Russia, and Rumania, a 

coalition that became known as The Allies. Turkey and Bulgaria joined 

Germany and Austria-Hungary to form the Central Powers. 

After only a few months, the war on the western front became a stalemate. 

Trenches ran through Belgium and France from the North Sea to the Swiss 

border and every part of the front was controlled by artillery and machine guns. 

Both sides tried to break the deadlock. Enormous artillery barrages, lasting days, 

followed by huge assaults, resulted in massive casualties. The Germans 

introduced poison gas, but that too failed to break the deadlock. 
World War I 93 

Stymied by the impasse of trench warfare, the Allies and the Central 

Powers tried to break the deadlock by defeating their respective enemies on 

other fronts. In Turkey, an attempt by the Allies to force the Dardenelles and 

open a seaborne route to Russia led to disaster and had to be abandoned. 

Germany achieved spectacular victories against Russia but failed to influence 

events on the Western Front until the Russians, wracked by revolution, left the 

war in 1917. In the Balkans, the Germans knocked Rumania out of the war in a 

mere six weeks but failed to alter the overall situation. In Italy, the Italians 

suffered a number of defeats, causing the British to send in troops, but the 

Western Front remained static. Even the spectacular victories of Gen. Edmund 

H. Allenby and Lawrence of Arabia in the Middle East were merely side shows. 

From the German viewpoint, Britain was the most vulnerable of the Allies. 

As an island nation, she depended on shipping to maintain herself. If that 

shipping could be severely curtailed or stopped, Britain would have to sue for 

peace and the alliance with France would crumble. Having identified the 

problem, the Germans searched for a solution. Neither Germany's partially 

successful commerce raider program nor the questionable success of her navy at 

the Battle of Jutland in 1916 was sufficient to wrest control of the sea from the 

Royal Navy. However, the Germans did have a weapon with the potential of 

winning the war at sea - the U-boat. In 1917, Germany began unrestricted 

U-boat warfare around Great Britain. Twice before, the Germans had tried to use 

the U-boat to destroy British commerce, but curtailed it when the United States 

protested. Americans saw the U-boat as an "unfair" weapon, which struck 

without warnJng, violating their concept of "freedom of the seas." When 

American citizens were killed on torpedoed ships, anti-German sentiment grew 

and relations between the United States and Germany worsened. On 2 April 

1917 Congress, at the President's request, declared war on Germany. 

TRANSPORTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 

In spite of a long history of unpreparedness, it is doubtful whether the 

United States entered any war Jess prepared than in World War I. Before the 

war, President Woodrow Wilson was determined to maintain the appearance of 

strict neutrality and prohibited any sort of military build-up. He even prevented 

the War Department from developing contingency plans for mobilization in case 

of involvement in the war in Europe. This may have been an excellent political 

move, but when war finally came, it meant starting from scratch. 

Land transportation required considerable coordination. In 1917, land 

transportation in the United States meant railroads, since the automobile was in 
94 Spearhead of Logistics 

its infancy. The railroad companies had already been hard at work in 

coordinating movement and cooperating among carriers long before the war. 

Contractual agreements on the exchange of rolling stock, centralized rail depots 

in cities, and the designation of time zones in the continental United States were 

examples of their efforts. However, entry of the United States into the war 

brought difficulties the railroad companies could not have imagined. One was 

the need to coordinate the shipment of men, equipment, and supplies from 

various parts of the country to a port or large army camp without congestion or 

excessive idle time for the roUing stock. 

Immediately after the declaration of war, the American Railway 

Association established the Railway War Board composed of railway executives 

and representatives of the six territorial departments of the Army. It maintained 

agents at all of the territorial department headquarters, each mobilization camp, 

and other important military installations. The board was to coordinate military 

movements, coordinate carriers, and regulate car supply. Unfortunately, the 

board was unable to deal with the increasing production of war materiel by 

industry. The unregulated flow of traffic resulted in port congestion and the 

immobilization of more and more freight cars. Antitrust laws and labor unrest 

compounded the problem as did the severe winter of 1917. 

As a result, the United States government took control of the railroads in 

December of 1917. In his proclamation establishing government control, 

President Woodrow Wilson put his finger directly on the problem: 

This is a war of resources no less than of men, perhaps even 

more than of men, and it is necessary for the complete mobilization of 

our resources that the transportation systems of the country should be 

organized and employed under a single authority and a simplified 

method of coordination which have not proved possible under private 

management and control. 1 

William McAdoo became the Director General of Railroads and the United 

States Railroad Administration (USRA) was established. The USRA used every 

possible means to keep the trains moving and keep rolling stock off sidings. It 

also used its powers of persuasion to induce shippers to load cars more 

efficiently to make better use of space. This resulted in an increase of two tons in 

the average load of a freight car,2 roughly an increase of ten percent in carrying 

capacity. Demurrage charges were increased to the unheard of sum of $10 per 

day for a car detained for 7 days or more.

3 The administration also standardized 

passenger travel and ticketing arrangements. In all, the USRA succeeded in 

coordinating rail efforts and reducing traffic congestion throughout the 

continental United States. 
World War I 95 

The movement of troops within the United States occurred in five phases. 

First was the movement of 25,500 troops of the Regular Army, most from camps 

near the Mexican border to the New York harbor area of Hoboken, New Jersey. 

This phase was completed in early June 1917. The second phase was the 

movement of some 343,000 National Guard troops to their training camps. This 

began in early August and took eleven weeks to complete. Next was the 

movement of selective service men from their homes to the cantonments. Thls 

movement started 4 September 1917 and peaked at 400,000 a month, until a total 

of 2.8 million had been inducted through the Selective Service System. A fourth 

phase was the intercamp travel in whlch half the troop level within the United 

States moved at least once between October 1917 and January 1918. 

The fifth and final phase was the movement of troops to the port of 

embarkation. Approximately 2. 175 million troops were moved between May 

1917 and November 1918. Over 80 percent of these men embarked on their 

transatlantic journey through New York area ports.4 An example of the 

magnitude of the final phase was the movement of 18,000 troops of the 8th 

Division, from Camp Fremont, California, to Camp Mills, Long Island. The 

division required forty-two trains, each covering the distance of 3,444 miles in 

an average time of seven days and three hours. The first train was approaching 

New York as the last was departing California.5 

Changes were occurring that would have profound effects on the future. In 

August 1917, Brig. Gen. Francis J. Kernan became the Chief of the Embarkation 

Service, which was established to control movements of all troops and supplies 

overseas. In January 1918 an Inland Transportation Division (later the Inland 

Transportation Service) was created to coordinate military freight shipments in 

the United States. These agencies were placed under the Purchase, Storage, and 

Traffic Division of the General Staff. With the establishment of the new 

agencies, the Water Transportation Branch and the Inland Transportation 

Branch, both in the Office of the Quartermaster General, were relieved of most 

of their responsibilities. By June 1918, the General Staff absorbed the majority 

of the Army's transportation functions and the Quartermaster General's 

Transportation Division was abolished. In March 1919, the Inland 

Transportation Service and the Embarkation Service were consolidated into the 

Transportation Service, an organization independent of the General Staff. The 

following month the integration of all transportation activities other than motor 

transportation on posts, in camps, and stations, as well as territorial departments 

and procurement zones, was effected. 
96 Spearhead of Logistics 

From the beginning, there were incredible problems to overcome. George 

Washington had advised against the United States becoming involved in 

"entangling alliances" and, as a result, the nation had not dealt with coalition 

warfare since the Revolution. So strong was this tradition that the United States 

entered the war as an "associate" rather than a member of the Allied Powers. 

The United States was already supplying raw materials and equipment to the 

Allies, but arrangements had to be made for supplies to continue to reach the 

Allies already in combat while U.S. troops were being equipped. There were 

considerable difficulties in gearing up to wartime production. Since the United 

States was in the war for just over 20 months, most of the finished materiel 

required to equip the Army was provided by the Allies. In the course of the war 

the Allies furnished 88 percent of the artillery, 81 percent of the aircraft, 65 

percent of the trench mortars and 33 percent of the automatic weapons for the 

American Expeditionary Force (A.E.F.).6 

There were also preconceptions that had to be overcome. By law, the 

militia could not be sent overseas, so it was replaced by the National Army, 

which absorbed many militia units and placed them under Federal control. The 

legend of the robust frontiersman rushing to join the colors in time of war also 

proved to be a myth. There were plenty of volunteers, but over 27 percent of the 

recruits were rejected for reasons of poor health while another 24 percent were 

acceptable for "partial military service" for other health reasons. Many of those 

rejected were from the growing urban population of immigrants who arrived 

undernourished and were susceptible to tuberculosis and simHar diseases. 

Another shocking statistic was that nearly half the recruits given intelligence 

tests showed a low level of intelligence.7 While much of the testing had a 

cultural bias, it nonetheless revealed serious problems in recruiting for modern 

war. To operate modern weapons and equipment, soldiers had to be intelligent 

and have at least a basic education. Since the combat arms had frrst pick of 

qualified soldiers, support units never received a sufficient number of acceptable 

men. There was also a shortage of officers. At the beginning of the war 

approximately 9,000 officers were on active duty, about two thirds of whom 

were regulars. Thousands of graduates of land grant colleges with some military 

training were recruited. Summer training camps for businessmen, established by 

General Leonard Wood in 1915, supplied 1,100 officers, and some 5,000 

noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army were commissioned as company 

grade officers.8 Eventually, over two hundred thousand officers would be 

required, but there was always a shortage. An antidote was to make U.S. 
World War I 97 

divisions twice as large as the Allied divisions.9 Here again, there were never 

enough officers to adequately staff both combat and support units. 

In an era in which animal-drawn wagons were a prime mode of 

transportation, the United States Army did not even have a remount service to 

oversee the procurement of animals, wagons, and harnesses.10 There were three 

pennanent remount depots in Virginia, Oklahoma, and Montana, with two 

auxiliary depots in Texas, but no plan for the purchase of animals, vehicles, or 

harnesses.'' Suddenly, there was a demand for approximately 180,000 horses 

and mules, a problem similar to that which occun·ed in the Spanish-American 

War. Prior to the war, horses were supplied by a contractor who was required to 

deliver so many over a specified period. Quartennaster General Henry G. Sharpe 

did not favor this practice because contracts would require the purchase of 

animals even if the war ended quickly. He recommended the purchase of 

animals on the open market so the government could stop buying horses as soon 

as hostilities were over. This method was adopted on 8 July 1917 and 

purchasing officers were supplied with funds to purchase animals at a given 

price within a given time. 

The shortage of animal-drawn vehicles created an inconceivable demand 

on the wagon industry. In peacetime, wagons were built with air-dried lumber 

which required years to season. When war was declared, that supply was used 

immediately, so that kiln-dried lumber was substituted. Since none of the wagon 

manufacturers had kilns, the government entered into agreements which 

defrayed half the cost of the kilns. To repay the government, the price of each 

wagon was lowered by $10 as was the cost of each $185 of spare parts ordered. 

Between 6 April 1917 and 1 July 1919, the government ordered 190,000 wagons 

of which 117,000 were delivered. All orders ceased on II November 1918, and 

contracts which could be terminated were canceled as soon as possible. 12 

Harnesses posed no problem because the heavy demand for leather meant that 

huge numbers of hides were already stockpiled by the tanning industry. To 

prevent price gouging, prices were fixed in a meeting between the Council of 

National Defense and the tanners. The government also took an option on 

750,000 hides on hand at the various tanners. Despite the immediate need for 

animals, vehicles, and harnesses, it took until September 19 17 before the 

Remount Branch of the Transportation Division was in full operation. The 

supply of animals overseas proved to be the weakest area of U.S. military 

transportation in World War I. Although plenty of animals were available, there 

was insufficient shipping to send them overseas, and the Remount Service 

provided only a fraction of the animals required by the A.E.F. 
98 Spearhead of logistics 

PORT OPERATIONS 

The War Department was determined not to repeat the mistakes of the 

Spanish-American War that had so adversely affected port operations. This 

commitment bore fruit with increased attention paid to water traffic by the 

Quartermaster General. The Army Transport Service formed in 1898 was 

responsible for the Army's ports of embarkation and a fleet of army transports. It 

also had the responsibility for overseas shipments. 

Other organizations designed to control and support transportation 

operations evolved rapidly and became increasingly more powerful. In July 

1917, two primary ports of embarkation were established at New York 

(Hoboken) and Newport News, Virginia. Each was commanded by a general 

officer and the Army Transport Service superintendents at the ports were placed 

under them. In addition, the authority of the Water Transportation Branch in the 

Office of the Quartermaster General regarding ship operations was subordinated 

to that of the commanding generals of the ports. 13 It was a good start, but there 

was still no coordination between shippers and the ports. As a result, troops and 

equipment poured in, causing delays and confusion. There were far more troops 

and equipment than at Tampa in 1898, but total chaos was avoided. The ports 

were modern and well staffed, and there was an existing transportation 

establishment dedicated to getting troops and equipment overseas and ready to 

solve problems as they arose. The first step in coordinating the flow of traffic to 

the ports was for shipping officers in the supply bureaus to obtain transportation 

releases from port commanders before they shipped. The Embarkation Service 

was given the responsibility of re ~lating the Army's ports and providing the 

"releases" for shipment to the ports in November. Unfortunately, this control 

failed because there was no mechanism to hold shipments at points of origin. 

In November 1917, the Secretary of War established the War Board of the 

Port of New York. This board functioned under the guidance of an experienced 

shipping businessman who served as the port's civilian executive officer. He 

was vested with authority to make regulations, establish priorities, and do 

whatever necessary to make the port function smoothly and assure the prompt 

dispatch of War Department cargo. This worked for a short time, but the 

increase in military requirements demanded the use of other ports where 

problems of congestion arose. In February 1918, the Secretary of War, in 

conjunction with the United States Shipping Board, established the Shipping 

Control Committee, which consisted of three civilians, one of them British. It 

was responsible for the allocation of shipping, exchange of ships between allied 

nations, and the utilization of ports. The Shipping Control Committee worked in 
World War I 

U.S.S. Huron, formerly the Friedrich Der Grosse 

a German liner converted to a troopship. 

99 

close cooperation with the Embarkation Service and the Army Transport Service 

superintendents at the ports. 

The initial elements of the Jst Division with 16,000 tons of cargo left New 

York and Hoboken on 14 June 1917. By the end of July, most of the division 

were in training camps in France, but the last elements did not arrive in France 

until December. Soon after the first division left, a second division was ordered 

to prepare for departure. It was at this time that Major General Henry G. Sharpe, 

the Quartermaster General, recommended that a second port of embarkation be 

opened at Newport News, Virginia.

14 The Secretary of War approved his plan. 

Soldiers were to billet in staging areas on the outskirts of the city and embark 

through New York, along with all general supplies being handled by the port. 

All animals, forage, and heavy ordnance would be handled at Newport News. 15 

Secondary ports of embarkation were established at Baltimore, Philadelphia,and 

Boston; and at Montreal, Halifax, and St. Johns in Canada. 16 In the New York 

harbor complex the Embarkation Service operated with 2,500 service men. 

Piers used for the upload included twelve at Hoboken, eight in Brooklyn, and 

thirteen in Manhattan. 17 The record for troop embarkation was set on 31 August 

1918 when over 51 ,000 troops boarded vessels at the New York harbor. This 

was most passengers to sail from any port in a single day up to that time. 18 Of 

all soldiers making the transatlantic journey, 88 percent embarked through New 

York. A total of 1.656 million soldiers had gone through the New York Port by 
100 Spearhead of Logistics 

the end of the war, and another 142,000 through subports attached to the New 

York organization. Over 288,000 troops embarked through Newport News. 19 In 

addition to a record number of soldiers, a record was set for supply shipments of 

809,774 tons in November 1918.20 

The limiting factor on an effective American effort throughout most of the 

war was the availability of ocean shipping. In December 1917, approximately 

1.920 million tons in troop transport and 1.589 million tons in cargo shipping 

were needed. The Army barely had a quarter of what was required and it took 

97,400 gross tons to move a single American division. 

21 In April 19 J 7, the 

Army Transport Service had sixteen vessels; twelve in the Pacific, and four in 

the Panama Canal Zone. The Quartermaster planned to maintain these ships as a 

nucleus of Army shipping and buy and refit civilian ships in a time of crisis. A 

register of suitable civilian ships was kept on record. All that was needed were 

the orders and financial support to expand the fleet of transports from its 

nucleus?3 To assist in transport of troops and equipment, the Army seized 20 

German ships that had been interned in American ports. These vessels had a 

total of 300,000 tons of stowage space for troops and cargo. Altogether, the 

converted German ships carried 500,000 men to fight against their former 

owners.

24 

Each agency competed for space aboard ships, j ust as they competed for 

other modes of transportation. To prevent a crisis, the Shipping Board took 

control over all American flag ships in August 1917.25 During the first seven 

months of the war, 5 million tons of supplies were needed overseas, but less than 

500,000 tons were shipped from the United States due to the shortage of vessels. 

The remainder of the supplies were purchased locally in Europe. Shipments 

were Jess than 16,000 short tons in June, July, and August of 1917. July of 1918 

saw 750,000 short tons shipped, with a record of 829,000 short tons in 

November 1919. A total of 5.13 million short tons were shipped during the war 

with another 2.320 million tons shipped between 11 November 1918 and 30 

April 1919? 6 From the beginning of the war until December 19 18, only 8 of 18 

million tons of needed supplies arrived from the United States.27 

Once war was declared, the first convoy of ships left relatively quickly, 

despite the congestion and lack of coordination. Congestion at the ports and a 

Jack of assets were not the only problems faced by the sealift effort. The German 

submarine offensive inflicted heavy losses on ocean shipping. In April 1917, 

870,000 tons of Allied shipping were lost.28 By the end of the war U-boats had 

sunk 5,234 cargo ships for a total of 12,1 85,832 gross registered tons (GRT)?9 

In response to the U-boat threat, the Allies inaugurated the convoy system in 
World War I 101 

June 1917. It was so effective that losses decreased immediately, eventually 

dropping 90 percent. To replace the losses of ships at sea and to increase the 

number of ships transporting cargo, the United States initiated a huge ship 

construction program. The largest part of the program was carried out at Hog 

Island, near Philadelphia, where 30,000 men worked fifty shipways at a time. 

The steel ships were constructed according to standard design and mass 

production techniques. By November 1918 they were laying six keels a week. 

However, not a single ship was delivered in time to carry cargo to the war zone 

because hostilities ended so quickly. Approximately 650,000 tons, or about lO 

percent of the American operated merchant fleet did get into service by the end 

of the war. Planned ship construction for 1919 would have resulted in the 

construction of 2,249 passenger, cargo, refrigerator, and tanker ships, with an 

aggregate tonnage of 8.50 million tons, equal to one-quarter of the total 

merchant tonnage of all the Allies and the United States in 1914?0 

LOGISTICS IN FRANCE 

The problems encountered by the American Expeditionary Force were 

unlike any of those faced by any army up to that point in history. The strategic, 

tactical, and logistical situation was intimidating and it was fortunate that Gen. 

John J. "Blackjack" Pershing was appointed to command the A.E.F. Pershing's 

mission was to create an American Army out of whole cloth while resisting 

Allied pressure to use American soldiers as piecemeal replacements for their 

own armies. He also rejected the Allies' insistence on training American troops 

only for trench warfare and insisted they be trained for open warfare as well. 

This decision was a good one and the ability to fight in the open contributed 

greatly to the Allied victory. Pershing was acutely aware of the U.S. logistical 

situation and took a personal interest in logistical operations. During an 

inspection of the port of Bordeaux, he discovered that stevedores under Maj. 

John O'Neill had set a record for unloading troops and baggage. Pershing asked 

how it was accomplished and O'Neill explained that he "took off his shirt" 

(removed his rank) and worked like a stevedore himself until he understood the 

job. He then pointed to other officers he was training in the same fashion. 

Pershing was impressed and made O'Neill the stevedore instructor of the 

A.E.F.30 

When Pershing arrived in Europe, the U.S. Anny had, in the United States, 

fewer than 600 artillery pieces (many of them not suited for war) with enough 

ammunition for only nine hours of nonnal combat.32 Logistical and 

transportation doctrine taught at the Army Staff College at Fort Leavenworth 
102 Spearhead of Logistics 

was based on the German experience in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and 

Franco-Prussian War of 1870. During those wars, the Germans developed the 

principle of continuous replenishment in which the "impetus of supply was from 

the rear, .through a system of depots that stretched out behind an advancing army 

like the extensions of a telescope, with continuous shuttling from the rearward 

depot to the next forward." 33 

The 1914 edition of the U.S. Field Service Regulations did not envision a 

major war outside the continental United States. During wartime, the 

regulations divided the country into two areas: the zone of the interior (ZI), and 

the theater of operations. The ZI was the area in which combat operations were 

not being conducted, and it fell under the control of the War Department. The 

theater of operations, under the control of the commander of the Field Forces, 

was the area in whjch combat operations were taking place. The theater of 

operations was further divided into the forward zone (known as the zone of the 

advance) and the rear zone (known as the zone of the lines of communication). 

In the forward zone there might be several armies, each with its own 

commander. In the rear zone, there might be several lines of communication, 

(LOC), each with a base section, an intermediate section, and one or more 

advance sections, but only one commanding general and staff. Each section had 

representatives of the various supply services and an assistant chief of staff who 

acted for the commanding general. Like the German system upon which it was 

based, the base section was to receive all supplies from the zone of the interior. 

The base section shipped the supplies to the intermediate section which would 

transship them to the advanced section for distribution to units at the front. In 

the language of the day, ''The function of the LOC is to relieve the combatant 

field forces from every consideration except that of defeating the enemy."35 The 

German system broke down in the massive offensive of 1914 because a wagon 

based transportation system could not keep up with the rapidly advancing 

armies.

36 Once the war of maneuver stagnated in the trenches, the logistical 

situation for all sides became the proverbial logistician's dream, because it was 

merely a matter of keeping up deliveries to static positions. 

The Western Front, deadlocked for three years, appeared to offer U.S. 

forces the opportunity to take advantage of Allied wartime experience and 

quickly establish a routine. Unfortunately, nothing was further from the truth. 

As late arrivals in the war, U.S. forces had to accommodate themselves to the 

existing system as well as to certain Allied prerogatives. British support came 

through the Channel ports of Le Havre, Cherbourg, and Boulogne, so the United 

States could not use those ports or cross British lines of communication. The 
World War I 103 

French demanded that their army would remain between the enemy and Paris 

and that the Americans were not to be allowed to cross their LOC. The 

Americans were moved south and assigned the port of Sainte-Nazaire on the 

west coast of France. The training base for the lst Division was at Gondrecourt, 

hundreds of miles away. 

When Pershing arrived, he knew the system outlined in the Field Service 

Regulations had to be modified. The A.E.F. in France had to perform many of 

the tasks assigned to the zone of the interior, and one man could not possibly 

command such a large LOC in a foreign country. Only one advance section was 

established with its headquarters at Neufchateau, and each section was to have 

its own commander instead of an assistant chief of staff (see Map 7). Behind the 

advance section was one intermediate section with headquarters at the town of 

Nevers, and behind it were five base sections. The goal for storage of supplies 

was 90 days, but the goal proved to be unrealistic and was subsequently lowered 

to a level of 45 days. 

As the war progressed and more American soldiers arrived in France, 

serious weaknesses appeared in the existing organization. In February 1918, 

General Pershing asked Col. Johnson Hagood to head a board of officers to 

study those deficiencies and make recommendations to correct them. The 

recommendations of the Hagood Board resulted in the establishment of the 

Services of Supply (SOS), which assumed the duties of the zone of LOC. All the 

chiefs of the administrative and technical services were to exercise their 

functions under the direction of the commanding general, SOS. Pershing's 

decision was not universally accepted by the War Department, and efforts were 

made to create an overseas zone of the interior in France by sending War 

Department personnel to run it. After a brief correspondence, Secretary of War 

Newton D. Baker agreed with Pershing and the SOS was allowed to continue 

under Pershing's control. The policy of the theater commander controlling his 

own base section was certainly a positive development, which was to have even 

greater significance in World War II. In addition to the existing branches, the 

SOS also included a Service of Utilities, which contained the Transportation 

Department, the Motor Transportation Service, and a Division of Light Railways 

and Roads. 

The man selected to command the SOS was General James E. Harbord, 

Pershing's former chief of staff and a successful division commander. 

Harbord's chief of staff was CoL Hagood. Harbord, unlike his predecessor, Maj. 

Gen. Francis J. Kernan, was constantly on the move, traveling by rail at night so 

he could keep in touch with his headquarters. Throughout the war Harbord was 
104 

ATLANTIC 

OCEAN 

SPAIN 

BASE 

SECTION 

N-22 

Spearhead of Logistics 

BELGIUM 

Map7 

faced with two problems that would never be solved. One was the lack of 

sufficient support personnel. Although estimates called for approximately 

330,000 service troops for an army of just over 1.3 million men, that strength 

level was never reached. Another problem was the low morale of the troops due 
World War I 105 

to Jack of recognition for accomplishing a difficult mission. General Harbord 

referred to them as "the forgotten men" of the war. 

TRANSPORTATION IN THE A.E.F. 

The first convoy from the United States arrived at Sainte-Nazaire on 26 

June 1917 to begin the build-up of the gigantic supply structure known as the 

LOC. This was the organization that would be responsible for storage and 

distribution of the A.E.F. equipment and supplies. Ships were unloading an 

average of 212,585 cargo tons a month at the port, 63.6 percent of which 

consisted of Quartermaster supplies.l7 Troops were initially debarked at 

Sainte-Nazaire, but later in the war, Brest became the principal port for the 

landing of troops, with Le Havre the secondary port. Many American soldiers 

going to France on British transports landed at Liverpool, Glasgow, or other 

ports in the United Kingdom. After a few days in rest camps, they moved across 

the Channel to Le Havre, Cherbourg, Calais, or another of the other Channel 

ports.l8 There was a shortage of men and equipment to discharge the ships once 

they arrived in France. Early in 1918, the wharfs at Sainte-Nazaire had reached 

a state of confusion similar to that being experienced in U.S. ports. During this 

time, General Pershing spoke to a battalion of stevedores about the importance 

of their work and promised them a chance to go to the front to fight. Their frank 

response was that they would rather go home than any nearer to the fighting?9 

To raise morale, an incentive program was instituted called "The Race to 

Berlin." The stevedore company that had the best improvement on their 

production rate would be the first to go home after the war. The competition 

produced spectacular results and the standings were published in the Stars and 

Stripes. The discharge of cargo increased by 20 percent. The detention time for 

eighty-four vessels in July was fourteen days. In November 1918, it dropped to 

eleven days for 138 vessels. By November 1918, 5.96 million tons of cargo were 

shipped though the ports of embarkation. It grew to 9.577 million tons by the 

end of May 1919.40 Ships were unloaded quickly and supplies were sent to an 

interior depot to be sorted. This change helped decrease the turnaround time of 

the ships, which were in extremely short supply. A shortage of railcars 

prevented equipment from being downloaded from the ships directly to rail 

which contributed to port congestion.41 

Railroads were a particularly thorny command problem in the A.E.F. 

Pershing asked the War Department to send him the best railroad man it could 

find along with several competent assistants. The War Department responded 

by sending Mr. William W. Atterbury, the operating vice president of the 
106 Spearhead of Logistics 

Getting a convoy moving. 

Pennsylvania Railroad. Atterbury's charter was that he was to have a free hand 

in matters dealing with the railroads and be answerable only to Pershing, who 

wired the War Department to say the charter was unacceptable. To make matters 

worse, Atterbury arrived unannounced at Pershing's headquarters in Paris. It 

was to the credit of both men that they resolved their differences and made the 

situation work. Atterbury was appointed the Director General of Transportation 

and was made a brigadier general in 1918. Initially he had considerable 

autonomy, but his authority was adjusted to equate to other chiefs of services as 

the weaknesses of excessive autonomy became evident later in the war. 

Another personality who influenced rail and other modes of transportation 

was Lt. Col. Charles G. Dawes of the 17th Engineers. Dawes, a boyhood friend 

of Pershing, was an influential banker in Chicago and a former comptroller of 

the currency. Using his engineering experience, he obtained a commission in 
World War I 107 

order to fight with the A.E.F. When Pershing found Dawes was in France,_he 

sent for him and made him his purchasing agent. One of Dawes' first coups was 

to obtain 160 locomotives that the Belgians had evacuated to keep them from 

falling into the hands of the advancing Germans. The locomotives, in need of 

minor repairs, were soon in operation with the A.E.F. 

As 1917 passed, it became evident that the supply bottleneck was the 

onward movement from the ports, a problem that had serious long-term 

implications. A contributing factor was the way the French operated their 

railroads, three aspects of which were particularly irritating to American 

transportation personnel. Because the French Railways were run by the 

government, not by the army, there was no attempt to track cargo or consider 

priorities. The second problem was the procedure of using standard trains for the 

movement of units. If the train was not full, it was dispatched with empty cars 

because the French felt it was more economical to send empty cars than to wait 

to fill them. The third matter was that each "Chef de Gare" or station master was 

a law unto himself and had the authority to sidetrack shipments or keep empty 

cars at his station. These irritations would be partially solved when American 

. d be 42 trams an crews gan to operate. 

The A.E.F. determined that it required 4,000 to 5,011 locomotives and 

98,000-127,033 cars.

43 The European cars were smaller than those in the United 

States and it took 2,017 cars with eighty-five locomotives to move an American 

division in France.44 The United States was in the process of manufacturing cars 

and locomotives for the A.E.F., but it would take time before they could be 

delivered. Railroad rolling stock was obtained in Europe whenever possible. To 

alleviate a short-term need, the United States leased six French railway tank cars 

for the movement of petroleum. While 2,950 tank cars were ordered from the 

United States, none arrived by April 1918, and an additional 50 were leased 

from the British. By the end of the war only 549 tank cars had arrived.45 The 

French and British also made up shortages in locomotives.46 

The depot at Nevers was designated Depot #1 for the intermediate section 

on 13 August 1917. Nevers was chosen because it was a division point on the 

French railway system and because it was centrally located in reference to the 

front, affording maximum flexibility to the A.E.F.47 Once the direction of the 

war was certain, the main intermediate depot was established at Gievres early in 

1918. Intermediate depots were also established at Montierchaume and 

Issoudun. The last link was at Neufchateau on 14 December 1917. In July and 

August of 1918, Nevers received more than 6,000 carloads of supplies each 
108 Spearhead of Logistics 

Forty men and eight horses. U.S. troops on their way to the trenches, 1918. 

month and distributed an average of 200 cars daily. Gievres handled as many as 

667 cars in one day, loading 410 and unloading 257.48 

The Remount Service in the A.E.F. was officially established in September 

1917. It numbered 493 officers and 14,596 enlisted men. Its mission was to 

purchase animals, manage remount depots, and care, condition, train, and 

maintain animals.49 Pershing stated: 

"One of the biggest, if not the biggest, problem in the A.E.F. 

was providing horses and mules. Of the 243,360 animals received by 

the Army during the war, only 67,725 were sent from the United 

States. The suppl)' of animals in the United States was ample but 

shipping was not."50 

The shortage of shipping for animals meant the A.E.F. never had a steady 

supply from any single source. At ftrst, animals were shipped from the United 
World War I 109 

States, until the French began supplying them in July 1917. Animals were once 

again shipped from the United States between November 1917 and April 1918 

with animals shipped intermittently across the Atlantic thereafter. 

The A.E.F. was so short of animals that Marshal Ferdinand Foch ordered 

13,000 animals be turned over to the U.S. Army to enable it to immediately 

begin the Argonne offensive in the fall of 1918. Of the 243,360 animals 

received, 135,914 came from French, 21,259 from British, and 18,462 from 

S . h 51 pants sources. 

In World War I the use of motor transportation assumed great significance, 

but it supplemented horses and wagons for local transportation rather than 

substituting for railroads or for long hauls. Truck convoys did carry supplies 

from the ports to forward areas, but usually in connection with the delivery of 

the vehicles themselves to forward units. The A.E.F. never had more than half of 

the vehicles authorized by tables of organization. 52 The motor vehicle shortage 

was evident from the start of the war when the French used busses and 600 taxis 

to take troops to the front lines in the First Battle of the Marne. 

The first four American truck companies to arrive in France in June 1917 

were units used earlier in the Pershing Punitive Expedition in Mexico.53 One of 

the initial problems with motorized vehicles was repairing them. At one time the 

Army was using 294 different types and makes of vehicles, making resupply 

almost impossible.54 In August 1918, there was an effort to standardize military 

vehicles. As production started, more contracts were let until orders called for 

almost 43,000 3-ton cargo standard trucks. About 10,000 were produced before 

the armistice, and 8,000 were shipped overseas. 5

5 With the arrival of the motor 

vehicle, fuel became a necessary item of supply. Over 48.5 million gallons of 

gasoline were delivered between January and December 1918. Deliveries also 

included approximately 5 million gallons of aviation fuel, 1.5 million gallons of 

kerosene, 4 million gallons of lubricating oil, and 2.5 million pounds of grease.56 

In addition to its roads and railways, the French had a 7,000-mile system of 

inland waterways, which was used extensively by the French and British.57 

When the A.E.F. arrived in France, the SOS realized the potential of the 

waterway system, but once again there was no equipment. What the A.E.F. used 

had to be provided by the Allies. By the time of the armistice, the British and 

French furnished the A.E.F., with 13 tugs and 307 barges. Monthly totals of 

supplies and equipment moved peaked at 47,000 tons in October. Most of the 

river traffic was on the Seine from Le Havre and Rouen to below Paris, though 

some barge traffic went to Dijon, Gimouville Saint-Satur, and Montargis. When 

the armistice was signed, the A.E.F. was planning to triple the volume of 
110 Spearhead of Logistics 

Loading horses in boxcars in France, 1918. 

supplies transported on the inland waterways to 150,000 tons a month or 5 

percent of the A.E.F. tonnage.58 

Transportation was the most serious logistical problem on the battlefield as 

well as in the LOC. Horses, mules, and vehicles were always in short supply. 

The roads upon which they traveled were universally bad. Even in good weather 

they were likely to give way under heavy traffic. Most combat operations took 

place in terrain that had been shelled incessantly for years and was impassable to 

wheeled vehicles of any sort. Any tactical movement meant that engineer road 

details had to be ready to repair existing roads or create tracks through a 

moon-like landscape. In November 1918, some 28,000 men were at work on the 

roads in the A.E.F. area, and five engineer battalions were operating quarries to 

provide crushed stone. As in Mexico, trucks were more capable of negotiating 
World War I 111 

Wagons moving supplies forward, 1917. 

difficult terrain than animal-drawn vehicles, which made the shortage of trucks 

even more critical. 

Because animal and motor traffic encountered so many difficulties, a 

narrow gauge railroad was an effective alternative means of transportation. 

Narrow gauge was about two feet (60 em) wide and was invaluable in serving 

the forward areas when offensive operations started. One of the factors that 

made it so effective was the ability to set it up quickly. It took a detail of 60 men 

approximately ten hours to build a quarter mile of plank road, while it took 135 

men only five hours to lay three miles of narrow gauge track. The Germans also 

used this gauge, and during offensives, the A.E.F. hooked up to existing 

German-built lines and used them where possible. Approximately half of the 

I ,400 ki to meters of narrow gauge track in use by the A.E.F. at the time of the 

armistice was German-built. One hundred sixty steam-and gasoline-powered 

locomotives were in use on these lines by the end of the war. 5

9 
112 Spearhead of Logistics 

Men and supplies move forward during the Argonne offensive, in a closing phase 

of World War I, September 28, 1918. 

FIRST ARMY 

On It August 1918, American forces began moving forward by rail, truck, 

and motor busses that earlier had been pressed into service from the streets of 

Paris and London. Three divisions came from the British front, four from the 

Vesle River front (Aisne-Marne sector), two from the Vosges, in the extreme 

east, and three from training areas in the vicinity of Chaumont. Four divisions 

were already in the area of Saint-Mihiel. 

On 12 September 1918, First Army, with nine American and four French 

divisions in line, and three American divisions in reserve, attacked on both sides 

of the point of the Saint-Mihiel salient. Heavy rains made supply by wagons or 

trucks impossible, but the offensive proceeded, thanks to the narrow gauge 

railroads. Thirteen days after the Saint-Mihiel attack, General Pershing 

launched an even bigger attack at Meuse-Argonne. It comprised fifteen 
World War I 113 

divisions which included 600,000 troops, 2,700 guns, and one million tons of 

supplies. To provide secrecy, the movement did not begin until after the 

Saint-Mihiel offensive and was conducted at night in conjunction with regular 

French movements. Once the offensive began, it took twelve to fourteen 

trainloads of artillery ammunition daily to support the operation. Eventually, 

3,500 trucks, 93,000 animals, and over 215 miles of light railways were 

employed to support the operation. It took three to five trainloads of building 

material per day to build roads and six to seven trainloads a day to build 

railroads which carried much more traffic.60 

Just prior to the Armistice, A.E.F . animal assets consisted of 45,000 saddle 

horses, 115,000 draft animals, and 2,500 pack animals. Motor vehicle assets 

were 30,000 trucks, 7,800 motor cars, and 13,700 motorcycles. Railroad assets 

resources included the operation and maintenance of 6,000 miles of standard 

gauge track and I ,400 miles of narrow gauge track. There were 1 ,380 

locomotives and 14,000 cars for the standard gauge track and 450 locomotives 

and 3,300 cars for narrow gauge railroads.61 The day after the Armistice, the 

Transportation Service, which included the Embarkation Service and the Inland 

Traffic Service, became an independent branch, the Transportation Corps, under 

the command of Brig. Gen. Frank T. Hines. The Motor Transportation Corps, 

which was organized to standardize procurement and maintenance of Army 

motor vehicles, was placed under the control of the Quartennaster Corps. 

DEMOBIUZATION 

As in other wars, the transportation mission did not end with hostilities. 

There was still an occupation force of 240,000 men to support in the Rhineland 

as well as a massive demobilization effort to support. The cry to "bring the boys 

home by Christmas" was more than just a slogan. The troopships available had 

a lift capacity of a little over 100,000 men a month. In peacetime conditions, 

without the need for a convoy system, the rate could be increased but it would 

still take over a year to return everyone in the A.E.F. to the United States. The 

obvious solution was to convert cargo ships to troop carriers and charter foreign 

passenger vessels. Averaging forty-four days per ship, fifty-eight cargo vessels 

were converted to troop ships and thirty-three passenger ships were chartered. 

In addition, the Navy installed troop-carrying facilities in fourteen battleships 

and ten cruisers for a carrying capacity of 28,600 men. To round out the effort, 

ten large ships which had lain idle in German ports were taken over and quickly 

repaired. In the end a total of 174 vessels with a single-lift capacity of 419,000 

troops were in service. In June 1919, they achieved a record of 368,000 troops 
114 Spearhead of logistics 

The truck finally comes into its own. 

embarked from France, 60,000 more than ever embarked from the United States 

in a single month.62 

The most significant transportation lesson learned from the war was the 

need for a Transportation Corps. In his 1919 report to the Secretary of War, 

Brig. Gen. Frank T. Hines, who was the Chief of Transportation, emphasized the 

advantages of centralized control of transportation assets and recommended the 

establishment of a transportation corps "with complete jurisdiction over all 

matters of transportation for all branches in the War Department."63 Despite this 

recommendation, the Chief of Staff submitted to the Secretary of War a 

somewhat more limited recommendation for the establishment of a 

Transportation Cqrps to control military transportation and a Motor Transport 

Corps to standardize the procurement of motor vehicles. This was an indication 
World War I 115 

that the Army finally recognized the need for an organization that could 

effectively control its transportation assets and that the motor vehicle was a 

necessary item of equipment in the army of the 20th century. Unfortunately, 

such progress would to have to wait for another war. Bills were submitted to 

Congress regarding the establishment of a Transportation Corps and a Motor 

Transport Corps, but the hearings on these bills revealed no consensus in the 

War Department concerning transportation and none of the bills left committee. 

The National Defense Act of 1920 placed the responsibility for all War 

Department transportation except military railways, under a ''Transportation 

Service ... organized and operated as a separate service of the Quartermaster 

Corps. . . charged with the transportation of the Army by land and water, 

including transportation of troops and supplies by mechanical or animal means, 

and with the furnishing of means of transportation of all classes and kinds 

required by the Army."64 The divisions within the new Transportation Service 

dealt respectively with "animal transport, motor transport, rail transport, water 

transport and war planning" (authors' italics). If this was a defeat for a separate 

transportation corps, it was also an acknowledgment that in order for wartime 

transportation to be effective, there had to be centralized control and advanced 

planning for conflict. 

Another major lesson was that in order to project power beyond the shores 

of the continental United States, sufficient shipping had to be immediately 

available to move troops and heavy equipment. The lesson was ignored. 

Ironically, the U.S. Army had learned to manage the large demand for animals 

during a major war, but it had become an unnecessary skill. Animal power 

would never again be a major consideration for the U.S. Army. 

After 1920, the Army drew rapidly down in size, and war planning became 

less important than routine operations. The Transportation Service ultimately 

became a Transportation Division in the Office of the Quartermaster General. 

As the war receded into the past, the Transportation Division concerned itself 

with routine matters of military transportation more than with war planning until 

the late 1930s when Europe was once again plunged into a world war. 
116 

CHAPTER VI 

World War II 

Operations in the United States 

'There must be great care taken to send us munitions and victuals 

withersoever the enemy goeth". 

-------- - Francis Drake, 29 July 1588. ----- ----

STRATEGIC OVERVIEW 

In the 1930s, the population of the United States was reluctant to face the 

threat of expansionism in Europe and Asia, and military preparedness was not a 

high priority. In mid-1939, the Regular Army numbered 174,000 men, and the 

Congress rejected the expenditure of even modest sums to prepare for war. The 

Japanese invasion of China in 1931 and Hitler's attack on Poland in 1939 

shocked the nation into recognizing the need for preparedness, but 

appropriations were slow in coming. President Franklin Roosevelt fully 

recognized the dangers of the international situation and issued the Proclamation 

of Limited Emergency in September 1939. This proclamation authorized a 

Regular Army of 227,000 and a National Guard of 235,000. The fall of France 

in June 1940 triggered a congressional appropriation of $4 billion and passage of 

the Selective Service Act, which provided for an Army of 1.4 million, but with 

appropriations only to August 1941. The House of Representatives renewed the 

act shortly before Pearl Harbor, by a margin of only one vote. 

In June 1941, the German attack on the Soviet Uruon intensified the crisis. 

The Secretary of War began to compute quantitative requirements for the 

thousands of items to support the massive Army needed to defeat Germany, 

Italy, and Japan. This began the Victory Program, which finally gave realistic 

consideration to the productive resources of the country. It was also the 

requirement base for the war precipitated by Pearl Harbor. 

World War II was the first time U.S. troops were deployed throughout the 

world. The strategy followed by the United States and its Allies was driven by 

their capability to project and support forces worldwide. For most of the war, 
World War II Operations In the United States 117 

support of Allied military forces and civilian populations held a high priority for 

shipping resources, since they were the forces "holding the line" until U.S. 

industrial and military might could be brought to bear. In fact, the prewar 

support of our Allies accelerated U.S. mobilization. The output of factories 

already geared up to support Allied requirements for equipment, and maritime 

control measures were used to mobilize war production and expedite overseas 

deliveries. 

Throughout the war, the availability of shipping directly affected the 

United Nations' capacity to strike decisive strategic blows against the enemy. 

Until the time of the German collapse, ocean transport was the primary factor 

limiting the Allies military effort. The availability of shipping was a key factor 

in the strategy formulated by Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. 

It led to the buildup in the British Isles (code name BOLERO) of the forces to 

invade mainland Europe (code name OVERLORD). There was also an urgent 

need to check the expansion of Japanese aggression in the Pacific and hinder the 

consolidation of Japanese gains. Therefore, the United States, with limited 

resources, assumed the strategic defensive in the Pacific in order to prepare the 

bases from which to launch the Pacific counteroffensive following the defeat of 

Germany. 1 Since Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that forces available in 

1942-1943 were insufficient to mount an invasion of Europe, the strategy was to 

counter the Axis threat to North Africa (code name TORCH) and other areas 

outside the European continent. There was also the need to draw German forces 

away from Russia as quickly as possible. 

HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION 

One of the results of the Army National Defense Act of 1920 was to put 

Army Transportation back to where it was before World War I. The 

Transportation Service was designated as a "separate service" under control of 

the Quartermaster General (QMG) and management of military railroads 

reverted to the Corps of Engineers. The only breakthrough was the assignment 

of motor transportation to the QMG. Quartermaster General transportation 

functions were managed by five staff divisions dealing respectively with animal, 

motor, rail, and water transport, and war plans? The expertise of the World War 

I Transportation Service dissipated as rapidly as Civil War expertise had in the 

1870s. The country was optimistic that peace would prevail. That optimism led 

to such drastic curtailment of Army resources that by 1937, the Transportation 

Service had shrunk to one division. The division had three branches: the 

Commercial Traffic Branch, which controlled and coordinated all War 
118 Spearhead of Logistics 

Department traffic by commercial carriers in the zone of the interior (ZI) and 

overseas; the Water Transportation Branch, which procured, assigned, and 

managed operations of Anny transports and harbor boats, and supervised ports 

of embarkation; and the Motor Transport Branch, which was responsible for 

development, design, procurement, maintenance, storage, and issue of wheeled 

motor vehicles. There were also offices responsible for training, administration, 

and war plans. 

The organization that eventually managed transportation during WWll 

evolved from the expansion of the Transportation Service in the frenetic 

atmosphere of 1939-1941. The Motor Transport Branch became a division in the 

office of the Quartermaster General (OQMG) to cope with the tremendous 

increase in motor vehicles. A Marine Design, Construction, and Procurement 

Branch was separated from the Water Transport Branch to deal with the 

increasing number of Anny transports and harbor craft This was a prophetic 

decision in light of the massive increases in ship, harbor craft, and amphibious 

craft requirements soon to be generated. A Traffic Control Branch, another 

foresighted measure, was established to coordinate and expedite land and water 

movements and plan for future control measures. Other branches were 

established to deal with research and administration, and all branches were 

expanded to meet enlarged responsibilities to support an Anny which had 

increased in size to 1,686,000 by December 1941. In January 1941, the 

Quartermaster General appointed a Transportation Advisory Group. This group 

of leading executives from all transportation modes and the warehousing 

industry advised on potential problems facing the Army and on the organization 

for transportation management? The Quartermaster General's recognition of the 

urgent need to increase transportation management capabilities, and the vigorous 

actions he took to get experienced transportation officials to fill new positions 

contributed immensely to future transportation successes. 

The QMG was not the only Army agency with an interest in transportation. 

The Transportation Section of the War Department Supply Division (G-4) 

exercised General Staff supervision over Army-wide transportation functions 

and war plans. In December 1940, its only members were Maj. FrankS. Ross, a 

civilian highway expert, and a secretary. Ross was an experienced Infantry 

officer, commissioned in World War I, with transportation knowledge gained 

from working summers on railroads while he attended the Texas School of 

Mines. The expansion of the transportation section was similar to that of OQMG 

and reflected a growing desire of the General Staff to increase supervision of all 

logistics functions throughout the Anny. In March 1941, Lt Col. Charles P. 
World War II Operations In the United States 119 

Gross, a decorated Engineer officer, was appointed chief of the section, with 

Ross as his deputy. By October 1941, the section was upgraded to a branch, and 

coordinated lend-lease movements and long-range planning as well as . . 4 transportation operations. 

While the War Department transportation organization was expanding, the 

Federal government increased control over the coordination of transportation 

operations. The government also established controls over resources used to 

manufacture transportation equipment and to expand the government and private 

transportation infrastructure. It was in this confusing and complex period that the 

Transportation Corps was conceived, born, and spent its formative years. There 

were intense jurisdictional battles within the Army and throughout the 

Government as well-meaning, but inexperienced executives attempted to 

accomplish what they perceived as their missions or protected what they 

considered to be their turf Army jurisdictional decisions on the roles of the 

Quartermaster General, and the Transportation Branch of G-4, and other Army 

elements were of prime importance to the future Transportation Corps. The 

chiefs of Engineers, Ordnance, Signal Corps, and the Army Air Forces 

frequently attempted to obtain autonomy in managing traffic and use of 

transportation resources. The QMG and G-4 usually joined forces in combatting 

such aggression, and the logic of centralized control generally brought favorable 

decisions from the Chief of Staff or War Department. Compromises were reached 

through negotiation in many instances. 

The logic of centralized control of transportation did not always prevail. In a 

series of War Department orders prior to and early in the war, authority was 

delegated to the Army Air Forces to administer priorities and space for air 

movement of Army personnel and freight and to operate aerial ports of 

embarkation. The Army Air Forces were also authorized to route freight shipments 

in the zone of the interior, subject to obtaining releases from the Chief of 

Transportation for surface shipments overseas. Even though that delegation caused 

duplication of resources and unnecessary coordination problems, all requests to 

establish centralized control were deferred until "the end of hostilities," when 

they became a moot point with the establishment of an autonomous Air Force.5 

The increase of government agencies with management authority over 

transportation generated the need for an agency to ensure Army requirements 

were recognized in competition with claimants, such as lend-lease, industrial 

expansion, and other military services. The War Department usually designated 

the Transportation Branch, G-4, to represent the Army, but the Quartermaster 

General also maintained liaison because of his responsibilities for field 
120 Spearhead of Logistics 

operations. Close coordination was essential with long-established organizations 

such as the Interstate Commerce Commission and wartime agencies such as the 

Office of Defense Transportation.6 The chief, Transportation Branch, G-4, also 

centralized dealings with the Navy on transportation matters as much as 

possible, focusing initially on controlling Army movements on Navy ships. 

Requirements to coordinate and direct transportation plans and operations 

for the Army cried out for centralized management. Col. Theodore H. Dillon, 

Chief of the Transportation Division, OQMG put it in a nutshell on 4 February 

1942 when he said, ''The real weakness of our transportation setup is that the 

entire job, inland, terminal, and overseas, is not the direct responsibility of one 

operating organization."

7 It was clear the General Staff should be relieved of 

direct supervision of the administration and logistics support functions. 

Under the president's wartime powers, a Services of Supply (SOS), later 

renamed Army Service Forces (ASF), was established on 9 March 1942 to 

relieve the General Staff of direct supervision of the technical and administrative 

services, the nine corps areas in the zone of the interior, and ports and depots. 

The transportation organization absorbed most transportation functions 

previously performed by the G-4, the QMG and those that had been assumed by 

the War Department undersecretary's transportation staff. Placing the 

transportation function at the technical service level rather than the General Staff 

as in 1918 was a bold step that would pay handsome dividends. 

As soon as Lt Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, former War Department G-4, 

was appointed to command the SOS, he created a Transportation Division that 

was quickly redesignated the Transportation Service. Certain air movement 

functions were delegated to the Army Air Forces as described above, but SOS 

was responsible for the reassigned G-4 and OQMG transportation functions, 

which included the nontactical movement of Army personnel and materiel by 

rail, highway, and water. The Services of Supply determined requirements for 

locomotives and rolling stock for utility railways. It operated ocean going 

vessels owned or chartered by the Army and arranged for additional shipping. 

Services of Supply acquired and distributed harbor craft and operated the ports 

of embarkation (POEs) and their staging areas. It established regulating stations 

and holding and reconsignment points to prevent port congestion in both U.S. 

and overseas ports. In all, some 60,000 military and civilian personnel were 

assigned to transportation operations. Military railways remained the 

responsibility of the Corps of Engineers, and motor transport remained the 

responsibility of the QMG. The Transportation Service had no direct 

responsibilities for transportation operations within overseas theaters. The 
World War II Operations in the United States 121 

organization in Chart 1

8 incorporated the personnel who had been operating in 

G-4, OQMG and field activities, so there was little reorganizational delay in the 

continuing expansion of the transportation mission. 

Two aspects of the establishment of the Transportation Service were 

remarkable by any standard. The first was the universal recognition that one 

agency was required to control all the military ground and water transportation. 

Secondly, it was all done so rapidly while the War Department was expanding, 

jurisdictions were changing on a daily basis and resources were constrained . 

. General Gross, in a memo to General Somervell dated II July 1942, reported 

that since Pearl Harbor, 390,000 troops and I ,900,000 short tons of cargo had 

been shipped overseas, compared with 122,400 troops and 287,000 tons in a 

similar six-month period in 1917. Ten ports of embarkation and subparts were 

operational and serving seven overseas theaters, compared with three serving 

one theater in 1917. Furthermore, a complete system of traffic control was being 

operated by the Transportation Service including field agencies that effectively 

forestalled the port congestion which had been such a serious problem in World 

War I. He also pointed out the need for further centralization of movement 

control and the fact that adequate provisions had not been made for procuring 

and training Transportation Corps personnel to meet future needs.

9 The 

requirement for training was demonstrated by the fact that many transportation 

officers appointed by installation commanders instead of the Chief of 

Transportation were not qualified. 

Limitations on Transportation Service authority triggered extensive 

evaluation by the War Department and Services of Supply staffs of the need for 

further changes, many of which were proposed by General Gross' office. 

Recommendations submitted for approval by the Chief of Staff culminated in 

the creation of the Transportation Corps (TC) on 31 July 1942. The Chief of 

Transportation assumed all responsibilities and resources assigned to the 

short-lived Transportation Service. Recommendations to establish a 

Transportation Corps replacement training center and a TC officer candidate 

school were not immediately approved and had to wait until their establishment 

by the Army Service Forces. 1

° Further, the Corps could not be designated as a 

permanent component of the Army without congressional action, which was not 

sought by the War Department. The "temporary" status of the Corps 

complicated personnel and organizational actions in its formation and expansion. 

For example, officers and warrant officers of other Army branches who were not 

transferred when the Transportation Service was redesignated had to be "deL:'liled" 

to duty with the Corps, rather than assigned. General Gross moved quickly to 
..... 

ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION: 30 JUNE 1942 ~ 

J CHIEFOF I I TRANSPORTATION SERVICE j 

I PLANNING DIVISION I I DEPUTY CHIEF OF CONTROLREPORTSI mANSPORTAnON AND INSPEcnONS 

SERVICE DMSION 

STAFF DMS/ONS 

I I OPERAOONS OFFlCER I I EXECUTIVE OFFICER J 

I I OPERATIONS DIVISION I 

I 

l I I I I I I 

REQUIREMENTS TRAININQ 

PORT AND MOVEMENTS DEVELOPMENT LEGAL AND PERSONNEL ADMIN. AND INTEWGENCE, 

FIELD AGENCIES BRANCH AND ASCAL DIVISION DIVISION PROCUREMENT ANDPU8UC 

BAANCH UAJSON DIVISION DIVISION REU.TlONS 

BRANCH DIVISION 

(I) 

OPERATING DIVISIONS 1 

3-

I l I I I I ~ a I WATER DIVISION II RAIL DMSION I TRANSPORTATION HIGHWAY I TRAFFlC CONTROL II TRANSIT STORAGE II AIR OMSION DIVISION DtVISION DMSION 

i 

iii" 

~ Chart 1 
World War II Operations in the United States 123 

solidify assigned responsibilities and ensure the Corps exercised them effectively. 

He initiated actions to integrate all aspects of surface transportation management 

under the TC, particularly military railroad and motor transport operations. 

Army Regulation 100-50, 1 September 1942, and War Department General 

Order 60, 5 November 1942, assigned the Chief of Transportation responsibility 

for all activities (with minor exceptions) connected with military railroads in 

both the zone of interior and in theaters of operation. Responsibility for 

construction remained with the Corps of Engineers. The Chief of Transportation 

. accountability included total "life cycle management" of equipment, 

organizations, and military and civilian personnel. Details of the realignment 

were worked out between the two corps. 11 

In the motor transport decision during the same period, the Chief of 

Transportation was given no responsibilities for vehicle equipment or troop units 

for theaters of operation. The design and procurement of motor vehicles was· 

transferred from the Quartermaster General to the Ordnance Corps on 1 August 

1942, and the organization and training of motor transport troop units was left 

with the QMG. Throughout the war. truck units retained their quartermaster 

designation, although in some theaters a parenthetical (TC) was included. It was 

not until July 1946 that they were officially redesignated ''Transportation."12 

The Chief of Transportation remained deeply interested in motor vehicle 

troops and equipment because the chiefs of transportation in the theaters used 

them in their highway transport services. He exercised considerable influence 

through persuasion and logic rather than authority. In addition, he directed 

studies which led to acquisition and deployment of line-haul carriers with larger 

capacities than tactical vehicles. The studies also validated the feasibility of 

double loading tactical vehicles and hauling trailers for runs on good highways. 

Finally, the Office of the Chief of Transportation provided highway tonnage 

capacity analyses for worldwide logistics plans and vehicle port clearance. In 

June 1942, the Chief of Transportation was ordered to establish and control a 

pool of motor buses to offset shortages of commercial transportation in the 

vicinity of war industries and Army installations. In 1945, the Chief of 

Transportation was made responsible for administrative vehicles used by Army 

Service Forces installations. Also, highway movement of Army-interest 

passengers and cargo continued to be mainly by commercial carrier, managed by 

the Office of the Chief of Transportation. 13 

The organization of transportation headquarters evolved as functions were 

assigned and withdrawn and as senior leaders identified better ways to use assets 

to meet the Army's changing priorities. Comparison of the organization in 
124 Spearhead of Logistics 

mid-June 1945 shown in Chart 2 with the organi7.ation in I 942 shows that the 

structure of the office increased markedly with directorate-level offices and the 

supply function added, but the same fundamental functions remained. In 1945, 

the office was staffed with 407 military and 1 ,573 civilians in the Washington, 

D.C. area and an additional 164 military and 969 civilian spaces outside 

W hi l4 as ngton. 

FIELD ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 

The organization of Transportation Corps field installations reflected the 

Chief of Transportation's policy to decentralize authority, but the essential 

integration of transportation functions remained under his control. Ports of 

embarkation and transportation zone offices were the principal field agencies in 

the ZI to execute operations. Training responsibilities were assigned to ports and 

zone offices and to instaUations devoted only to training. Procurement offices 

and supply depots acquired, stored, and distributed material managed by the 

corps. Many functions in the ZI were largely dependent on performance by 

private industry. Throughout the war, Transportation Corps executives had to 

maintain close coordination with industry and federal oversight agencies. (See 

listing at Endnote 6). The Chief of Transportation was responsible for 

developing plans for operations in the United States and advising on courses of 

action to cope with any wartime impacts on transportation that might adversely 

affect support of the Army. It is to the credit of General Gross, his subordinates, 

the transportation industry, and the labor unions that the voluntary teamwork in 

World War II was so effective. 

PORTS OF EMBARKATION 

Ports of embarkation were established at all major U.S. civilian ports and a 

few specialized subport'>. The commander exercised jurisdiction over assigned 

operating facilities and received, supplied, and provided command and control 

for troops embarking or debarking. Ports of embarkation received, stored, and 

transported supplies, and ensured that ships assigned to the port were properly 

fitted out and maintained. They supervised the operation and maintenance of 

military traffic through and between the port and the supported theater(s). The 

latter responsibility required establishment of two suborganizations in addition 

to the functional transportation elements. An Overseas Supply Division (OSD) 

was established to receive, edit, extract, and forward to supply sources 

requisitions from designated overseas commands, for which the port had 
ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION: 1 JULY 1945 

CHIEF OF 

TRANSPORTATION 

EXECUTlVE I 

1~1 J~~J ~I HSTORlCAI. UNT 

I I 

1~11 OF DrECTOR WATER I I OFMIUTARY DRECTOA 

1~1 I OF DAECTOA IMTal!El. TIWISPORTA~ TfWNNG ANOSUPPLY 

I STAFF I DMS/ONSI I I I I I 

PORT" AND IHTEWGEHC£ MIUTARY MIUTARY IIOJSTRIAL RESEAI'Oi PlANNING FIELD AND LEGAL TfWNING PERSONNEl. PERSONNEl. AND MAINTENANCE DIVISION AGENCIES SECURITY DIVISION DIVISION OMSION DIVISION OEVEl.OPMENT DVISION DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION 

IWE~l](?IW. ADMI~ PROCUREMENT RECU~ PAOPER'TY MOVEMENTS FISCAL DISPOSAL DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION DISTRIBUTION DIVISION DVISIOH 

OPERATING DMSIONS 

I I I 

1~1 OM~ I ~I I= lEI 

F1ELD INSTALLAT70NS 

I I 

PORTS OF TRANSPORTA110N I TRANSPORTAllON I EMBAAI<AllON CORPS BOARD ZO!'ES I ~EHT II SUPPLY DEPOTS I 

Chart2 

~ 

iS: 

~ = 

0 

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en 

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126 Spearhead of Logistics 

Troops embarking on a transport at Seattle Port of Embarkation. 

primary responsibility. This function was assigned after Pearl Harbor. They also 

scheduled the movement of shipments to the port and overseas and kept the 

overseas commanders infonned of supply status. Each theater had a major port 

for supply support. Europe had New York, Pacific had San Francisco, and the 

Caribbean area had New Orleans. A number of studies and recommendations 

were made by Anny Service Forces and other technical services to reassign the 

function, on the grounds that supply was not a transportation responsibility. 

However, an independent study by the ASF chief of staff found the system 

worked well and recommended only minor changes. These changes were 

approved by General Sornervell in April 1943.15 The second supply-oriented 

element was the Initial Troop Equipment Division, which controlled the flow of 

unit related materiel through the port. The division was responsible for both 

equipment accompanying units embarking at the POE and equipment consigned 

to specific units overseas. 
World War II Operations In the United States 127 

As with all wartime organizations, port of embarkation missions changed 

during the course of the war. As the Anny learned more about the transportation 

function, responsibilities were realigned. Each port was organized to fit the 

geographical and operational requirements of its specific mission. The 

"standard" POE organization (Chart 3), approved by the Chief of Transportation, 

ASF, on 1 July 1945, reflects organizations used throughout the war.

16 Each 

War Department technical service with a supply responsibility established 

representatives at the ports to provide immediate technical advice on supply 

matters and to manage other functions of their service supporting port 

operations. The Chief of Transportation valued these contingents highly and 

directed that dealings with service representatives be made directly through port 

commanders rather than through Office of the Chief of Transportation in order 

to simplify coordination and expedite operations. Ports also had extensive 

training functions. In addition to training individuals and units in transportation 

tasks, they were responsible for the continuing training of troops staged for 

embarkation. Further, ports had to train directly commissioned civilians to perfonn 

transportation duties at the port. As of 31 December 1944, ports were staffed with 

62,646 military and 77,986 civilian personnel. New York and San Fnmcisco were 

the largest POEs. The total traffic through all ports by August 1945 was about 

7,300,000 passengers and 127 million measurement tons of cargo.

17 

TRANSPORTATION ZONE OFFICES 

In the United States, the Chief of Transportation directed, supervised, and 

coordinated all transportation by common carrier for the War Department. 

Predecessors of the Transportation Corps established a number of organizations 

to provide necessary control and coordination. These included operating division 

liasion offices at transportation gateways and war production centers. They 

established consolidating stations, regulating stations, and holding and 

reconsignment points, as well as various activities concerned with procurement 

of Transportation Corps equipment and supplies. This abundance of agencies, 

each reporting to different headquarters elements proved almost impossible to 

manage. After several attempts to bring order to the system, General Gross 

established nine transportation zone offices (TZO), each collocated with a 

headquarters of the nine Army Service Forces commands. The Chief of 

Transportation delegated full authority for specified functions previously 

perfonned by his operating divisions. Each zone office supervised and 

coordinated the transportation activities within its zone. The prime 

responsibilities were to provide in-transit visibility, to control traffic according to 
TYPICAL ORGANIZATION FOR PORTS OF EMBARKATION, APPROVED BY THE CHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION, ARMY SERVICE FORCES: 1 JULY 1945 

PORT COMMANDER 

DEPUTY PORT COMMANDER 

CHIEF OF STAFF -----------, 

I r--------l ' ASSlSTANT I 

~~~ DEPIJlY PORT COMMMANDER I NAWPOm' 

' OIA£CTOA I RS.AllONS I -- ~ COtiTROL 01/ERSEAS SUPPlY OMSIOH 

I 

------·---- PORT TRA.'ISPORTATION OMSIOH WATER OMSIOH TROOP r.IIIJV£MEHf OMSIOH INITW. TROOP EOUIPt.IEHT OMSION 

-~~~~~ l 

~~ E: ~~: 

I 

~~ 

B EJ~§J SEPARATE COMMANDS 

~B I I I I ~ I ~-s l I POOTS I I ~ I • The Ovetseas Supply Division exercises supeMsion av« 1he Technical SeMces in connection with ovetSeaS supply matters. 

Chart 3 

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c. 

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World War II Operations In the United States 129 

the Chief of Transportation programs to ensure movements of military traffic did 

not cause congestion or delay operations at ports of embarkation and overseas 

ports and to operate the procurement offices and depots that were responsible for 

transportation supply and industrial relations with manufacturing plants in the 

zone area. While zone offices were organized to meet mission needs, a typical 

organization (Chart 4) was approved by the Chief of Transportation, ASF, in 

November 1943. Control by the transportation zone office was exercised 

through Branch Zone Offices and District Transportation Offices, as well as the 

above operating activities. 18 

Eventually the TZO assumed a dual function. It executed Chief of 

Transportation responsibilities and served as the Transportation Office of the service 

command headquarters in which it was located. Toward the end of the war, the TZO 

also established air freight regulating offices at some aerial ports of embarkation to 

supervise the processing of Army shipments. The zone offices were especially 

valuable in assisting and training post transportation staffs to perform their duties 

according to Chlef of Transportation policies and procedures. The Supply Division 

was deleted from the zone organization in 1945. At the close of hostilities, the nine 

zone offices supervised 67 subordinate organizations with an approximate strength 

of 1,204 military, 8,421 civilians. and about 5,000 contract employees. 19 

TRAINING AND DOCTRINE ORGANIZATIONS 

In addition to the ports and zone offices, the Chief of Transportation 

established other field activities for training and procurement. General Gross 

recognized that well-trained personnel operating with sound doctrine were the 

key to improving and maintaining efficient transportation operations and placed 

strong emphasis on both these objectives. Due to the requirements for immediate 

transportation support in all theaters, training and doctrine evolved slowly. 

Nevertheless, the Transportation Corps demonstrated steady improvement in the 

quality and professionalism of operations throughout the war. 

Although sound doctrine was the foundation of a good training program, 

the Transportation Corps began its existence with neither. Transportation 

responsibilities grew exponentially as the war progressed and the mission could 

not wait for personnel to be trained in schools or training centers. As a result, 

many early transporters were trained on the job. Some training activities were 

assigned to Army Service Forces organizations, but the Chief of Transportation 

continued to be responsible for doctrine, quotas, and inspections for the quality 

of the training and output. 
I 

TYPICAL ORGANIZATION FOR ZONE TRANSPORTATION OFFICES, APPROVED 

BY THE CHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION, ARMY SERVICE FORCES: NOVEMBER 1943 

ZONE 

CHIEF Ou•l TRANSPORTATION --- COORDINATION 

TRANASPORTATION BRANCH C.,uclty OFFICER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, 

SERVICE COMMAND CIVILIAN TRANSPORTATION AGENCIES, INDUSTRIES, 

ALUED NATIONS 

j EXECUTIVE [ 

L OFFICER J I CONTROL INDUSTRIAL I OFFlCER RELATIONS 

I I I ADMINISTRATIVE I I OPERATIONS I SUPPLY DIVISION Ill VISION OMSION 

., 

ERSONNE~ SERVICE STORAGE CONTROLLED BRANCH l OFFICE l BRANCH I TRAFFlC BRANCH I I TRANSIT I BRANCH REQUIREMENTS MATERIALS PRODUCTION PROCUREMENT 

INTEWGENCE 

FISCAL AND 

BRANCH SECURITY 

BRANCH 

I BRANCH RAIL I I HIGHWAY BRANCH 

FIELD INSTALLATIONS 

REGULATING 

STATION'' 

BRANCH PLAN 

BRANCH 

BRANCH BRANCH 

I 

I EXPEDmNG I SECTION I INSPECTION I SECTION 

AND I OR BRANCH OFFICES 

l HOLDING AND I RECONSIGNMENT POINT 

PLANTS 

SURVEY 

ANDWPB 

LIAISON 

BRANCH 

• District office may or may not intervene between agencies shown below and zone headquarters. •• When directly under zone offiCes these installations become branch offices. 

Chart4 

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D.. 

2. 

c8 

!i il. 
World War II Operations in the United States 131 

Troops training at Camp Claiborne on track repair. 

In contrast to today's Army-wide centralized personnel and force structure 

system. General Gross felt it was his responsibility to furnish the Army in 

general, and the theaters in particular, with the required number of competent 

officers and well-trained and equipped units. Army force structure listings and 

tables of organization did not identify all the types of units needed to cope with 

the global and intensive levels of transportation support. Therefore, planners 

identified new functions required to support global operations and conceived, 

developed, organized, trained, equipped, and deployed un its to meet the needs?0 

The first TC unit training center was established in July 1942 at Indian 

Town Gap Military Reservation in Pennsylvania to supplement the training of 

port battalions at the New York Port of Embarkation. The New Orleans 

Transportation Corps unit traini ng center was established in January 1943 and 

had major training responsibilities throughout the war. The center, later designated 
132 Spearhead of Logistics 

as Camp Plauche, eventually included courses originally established at other 

Transportation Corps installations and academic institutions. Eventually the 

center took over officer courses first conducted at San Francisco and New York 

ports and the Transportation Corps Officer Candidate School, which started at 

Mississippi State College in 1942. Marine cadet training was conducted at St. 

Petersburg, Florida. The Chief of Transportation established small boat and 

amphibian truck training at Charleston in the spring of 1943, but it was later 

transferred to Camp Gordon Johnston, Florida, and operated by the Army Service 

Forces. 

In 1939, the Military Railway Service (MRS) was comprised of reserve 

units, each manned by employees of the commercial railroad that sponsored 

them. Because of the long period of inactivity, the units' esprit was low and 

training was limited. Carl R. Gray, executive vice president of the Chicago, St. 

Paul, Minneapolis, and Omaha Railroad, and a reserve colonel was called to 

duty as manager of the Military Railway Service, headquartered at Fort Snelling, 

Minnesota. Colonel (later Maj. Gen.) Gray, together with Col. (later Brig. Gen.) 

Charles D. Young, an executive of an eastern rail line called to duty in the Office 

of the Chief of Engineers, took steps to build up reserve units, rejuvenate 

sponsorship, and prepare for future expansion. In June 1941, the 7 l lth Railway 

Operating Battalion (ROB) was activated at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and moved in 

August to Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, to build and operate a training railroad. 

When the war started, the Military Railroad Service Headquarters (HQ) 

and the 711th Battalion were the only rail troops on active duty. The Military 

Railway Service supervised the activation and training of railway troops, the 

affiliated reserve units, which initially comprised five railway grand divisions, 

twenty railway operating battalions, and three railway shop battalions. Other 

units were activated as requirements dictated. Management of rail training was 

transferred to the New Orleans Port of Embarkation when the Military Railway 

Service headquarters moved to North Africa in the winter of 1943. Basic 

military training was given at Camp Plauche. Most individual, technical, and 

unit training was conducted on the rights of way and shops of commercial 

railroads, which sponsored affiliated rail units in peacetime. Some training was 

conducted on the Claiborne and Polk Military Railway, a 50-mile stretch of track 

built by the 711 th Railway Operating Battalion spec ifically for training and 

known by graduates as "The Worst Railroad on Earth." Rail training was also 

conducted at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and Fort Warren, Wyoming. A list of 

units sponsored by American railroads is at Appendix 0?2 The cooperation of 

American railroads in training individuals and units, as well as furnishing 
World War II Operations in the United States 

Troops training at San Francisco Port of Embarkation 

loading and unloading the DUKW. 

133 

hundreds of experienced employees for direct appointments, was a notable 

success and contribution to the war effort. Some 45,000 officers and men were 

assigned to rail operations by June I 945. 

In early 1944, the Chief of Transportation proposed the establishment of a 

single Transportation Corps unit training center, but the recommendation was 

not approved. A more concrete proposal in May 1945 recommended that Fort 

Eustis, Virginia, be designated as the site for the center. In January 1946, it was 

approved as a Class IV activity under the Chief of Transportation, and the 

Transportation Training Center and Transportation School have functioned at 

Fort Eustis ever since that time. The installation was redesignated as The 

Transportation Center and Fort Eustis in 1950.23 

The number of transportation units activated during the war was a remarkable 

achievement. It is particularly noteworthy since the corps was not established until 

July 1942 and was substantially behind other branches which began organizing and 

equipping units prior to and in the early stages of the war. The broad scope of unit 

functions and the sheer magnitude of the task accomplished is demonstrated by the 

listing in Chart 5 of Transportation Corps troop units activated during the war? 4 
134 World War II Operations in the United States 

TRANSPORTATION CORPS TROOP UNITS 

ACTIVATED DURING WORLD WAR II" 

Activated and/or Trained by Activated overseas or TransChief of Transportation in 

Zone of lnteriofl 

tarred to Transportation Corps 

While Overseas or En Routec 

Warrant Enflsted Warrant Enlisted 

Units Officers Officers Men Units Officers Officers Men 

ALL TYPES 765 7 685 768 170 974 217 2 625 192 39785 

Major and Mobile Port, 

Headquarters and 

HeadQuarters Company 18 1 391 49 7035 6 453 17 2606 

Medium Port, Headquarters 

and HeadQuarters Company 2 152 0 460 5 380 0 1 145 

PortComoanv 420 1 814 0 94 718 70 338 0 15333 

Stevedoring Company 0 1 4 115 

Port Battalion, Headquarters 

and HeadQuarters Detachment 73 237 150 986 19 78 38 322 

Staging Area Comoanv 4 24 0 758 4 24 0 755 

Staoino Area Battalion 1 26 0 457 

Amphibian Truck Company 51 316 0 9028 19 118 0 3,367 

Amohibian Truck Detachment 1 1 0 51 

Amphibian Truck Battalion, 

Headquarters and Headquarters 

Detachment 3 12 0 39 12 66 6 223 

Harbor Craft Comoanv 46 1057 496 11 085 11 125 107 2,707 

Harbor Craft Platoon 1 10 4 85 

Harbor Craft Crew /Class Al 5 25 5 63 1 5 1 13 

Port Marine Maintenance Company 9 54 0 1,836 4 24 0 816 

Anny Marine Ship Repair Company 8 40 0 882 2 10 0 214 

Boat Maintenance Platoon 1 1 0 42 

Traffic Regulation Group 15 851 0 4,558 15 342 0 2,325 

Traffic Reaulalion Battalion 4 212 0 888 

Regulaling Station, Headquarters 

and Headquarters Comoanv 4 168 4 570 1 42 1 141 

Headquarters and Headquarters 

Company, Highway Transport 

Service 1 28 1 101 

Base DeDOt Companv 10 50 0 1550 9 45 0 1246 

FloatingSpara Parts DeDOt 2 10 0 110 

ChartS 
Spearhead of Logistics 135 

TRANSPORTATION CORPS TROOP UNITS 

ACTIVATED DURING WORLD WAR lla 

Activated and/or Trained by Activated overseas or TransChief of Transportation in 

Zone of lnteriof 

ferred to Transportation Corps 

While Overseas or En Routec 

Warrant Enlisted Warrant Enlisted 

Units Oflicers Officers Men Units Officers Officers Men 

ALL TYPES 765 7685 768 170 974 217 2 625 192 39785 

Warehouse Platoon 3 9 0 186 

Transportation Corps Service 

Company 1 7 0 178 

Transportation Corps SeiVice 

(HeadQuarters only) 4 8 0 52 

Transportation Corps SeNice 

Battalion, Headquarters and 

Headquarters Detachment 7 28 0 91 3 12 0 38 

Transportation Corps SeiVice 

Group, Headquarters and 

Headquarters Detachment 7 28 0 119 

Transportation Corps SeiVice 

Group, Headquarlers and 

Headquarters Company 1 16 0 170 

Mllllary Railway Service, 

Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company 2 56 2 361 1 32 6 165 

Railway Grand Division, 

Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company 12 311 0 810 

Railway Operatina Battalion 32 769 41 26,691 6 152 10 4,977 

Railway Ooeratina Detachment 1 13 0 391 

Railway Transoortalion Comoany 1 5 0 325 

Railway Operating Company 2 11 0 325 

Railway Shoo Battafion 11 263 21 7254 1 27 1 406 

Hospital Train 

Maintenance Platoon 5 5 0 135 

Hospital Train 

Maintenance Section 5 0 0 54 

RailwaY Workshop Mobile 8 8 0 204 

Railway Track 

Maintenance Platoon 11 17 0 1199 

• Includes prewar emergency period. 

b Includes some units activated by the Quartermaster General and the Chiel ol Engineers and transferred to the 

Transportation Corps before completion of training. 

< Includes some units activated by the Quartermaster General and the Chief of Engineers in the zone of interior 

and transferred to the Transportation Corps while en route to or alter arrival in oversea commands. 

Chart 5. Continued 
136 Spearhead of logistics 

The columns showing overseas activations and transfers en route reflect the 

Chief of Transportation's late start and War Department troop basis limitations. 

For example, the Chief of Transportation could not activate all units requested 

by the Pacific theater, so the theater adjusted priorities and activated 

transportation units overseas from available personnel to meet mission 

requirements. 

SUPPLY AND PROCUREMENT ORGANIZATIONS 

l n the Office of the Chief of Transportation, the director of materie l and 

supply was responsible for the management of research and development, 

procurement, and supply functions. The Transportation Corps was made 

responsible for procurement after existing technical services had contracted their 

equipment needs with major manufacturers. The Corps was required to contract 

with smaller U.S. firms that had limited facilities and experience. To cope with 

the dispersion of sources, supply and procurement divisions were established in 

each of the the transportation zones to interface with local suppliers and 

administer contracts. 

Depots which stored and issued Transportation Corps supplies and 

equipment were physically located at four holding and reconsignment point 

facilities at Marietta, Pennsylvania; Voorheesville, New York; Montgomery, 

Alabama; and Lathrop, California. A number of subdepots were established and 

operated by the holding and reconsignment point commander under control of 

the zone commander and technical/staff supervision of the zone supply division 

as directed and approved by the Office of the Chief of Transportation. 

Procurement and supply gradually became better organized with standardized 

procedures. Early in 1945, procurement operations were consolidated in field 

offices in New York, Chicago, New Orleans, and San Francisco, which operated 

directly under the director of supply. The scope and success of the major item 

procurement program for Army and lend-lease claimants is demonstrated by the 

quantities listed in Chart 6. 25 

The late start and limited supply experience of the Transportation Corps 

created problems in both the procurement and distribution of spare parts. In 

consultation with Brig. Gen. Frank A. Heilman, Chief of Supply, Army Service 

Forces stock control and maintenance divisions were established in late 1943 

when the problems became evident. This helped control and improve the spare 

parts supply and gradually the situation improved; however, the Chief of 

Transportation was obliged to report in late January 1944, "the present status of 
World War II Operations in the United States 137 

QUANTITIES OF MAJOR ITEMS OF TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 

CONSTRUCTED AND ACCEPTED IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR 

TOTAL 

RAILWAY EQUIPMENT 

ALL TYPES: 1942 -1945 8 

Railway Cars (Passenger and Freight) 

Locomotives 

Locomotive Cranes 

Maintenance-of-Way Cars 

Specialized Industrial Cars 

MARINE EQUIPMENT 

ALL TYPES: JULY 1940- DECEMBER 1945b 

TOTAL 

Total Self-Propelled 

Barges and Lighters 

Freight and Passenger Vessels 

Launches 

Rescue and Salvage Vessels 

Tugs and Towboats 

Miscellaneous Boats 

Marine Tractors and Other Propulsion Units 

Total Nonpropelled 

Barges 

Floating Cranes 

TOTAL 

Gantry Portal Cranes 

Stiff-Leg Derricks 

Miscellaneous 

MATERIALS-HANDLING EQUIPMENT 

ALL TYPES: 1942-1945° 

Number of Units 

106,698 

95,290 

7,570 

260 

3,251 

327 

Number of Units 

13,962 

7,849 

442 

468 

1,358 

813 

2,123 

258 

2,387 

6,1 13 

5,839 

274 

Number of Units 

1,908 

501 

685 

722 

• Data for acceptances of railway equipment not available for 1940 and 1941. Acceptances in 1942 include 

those effected by Chief of Engineers up to 16 November, when railway procurement was transferred to the Chief 

of Transportation. 

b Marine equipment ligures include acceptances by other Army agencies-{;hiefly the Quartermaster Corps, and 

the Transportation Service up to 31 July 1942, when the Transportation Corps was established. 

c Data for acceptances of materials-handling equipment not available for 1940 and 1941. 

ChartS 
138 Spearhead of logistics 

the repair parts problem is acute." Transportation procurement did not fully 

catch up with the need until the production of end items passed its peak.?6 

Until January 1945, transportation research and development was 

conducted in several operating and technical divisions of the Office of the Chief 

of Transportation as well as the ports. In that month, the Transportation Corps 

Board was established at Fort Monroe, Virginia. It was designed to deal with a 

wide range of projects and develop improved designs and specifications for TC 

equipment and supplies. The board also had responsibility to improve training 

programs and devise more effective transportation operating procedures?7 

TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 

The Chief of Transportation operated military transportation facilities and 

arranged for commercial transportation to move Army personnel and material 

within the United States and to overseas destinations, in close coordination with 

Army Service Forces regional service commands. When General Gross became 

the Chief of Transportation, his objectives were to have the Corps control as 

many transportation functions as possible and maintain unbroken control of 

troop and supply movements from the point of origin to their arrival at the 

overseas ports of debarkation. 

The most pervasive consideration in planning and executing transportation 

operations was the shortage of ocean shipping needed to project Army power 

overseas. Constraints on overseas movements directly affected planning, 

scheduling, and control of movements to the ports. Also, they indirectly affected 

routing of traffic, and the allocation, production, and use of resources for all 

modes of transportation within the United States. Shipping limitations stemmed 

from shortfalls brought on by the need to support lend-lease programs and to 

deploy to off-shore bases, by losses to enemy U-boats, and by the inherent 

complexity of shipbuilding industrial mobilization. The demand for ships to 

transport troops and freight overseas began as soon as the war started and 

increased until the end of hostilities. Shortages persisted throughout the war. 

Prior to World War ll, the United States controlled 45 percent of the 

world's oceangoing vessels of 1,000 gross tons or more.

28 The bulk of the 

remainder was owned by nations friendly to the Allies. It was soon evident that 

the resources available were far from sufficient. In September 1941 , the 

Quartermaster General and G-4 took strong actions to increase the Army's 

sealift capacity. The Army Transport Service operated sixteen troop carriers and 

fifteen freighters, with a peacetime lift capacity of 18,000 troops and 177,000 

measurement tons of cargo. The Anny was also using a large amount of 
World War II Operations In the United States 139 

First locomotive purchased by the U.S. Army since WWI 

commercial space obtained from the Maritime Administration. At that time, the 

Naval Transportation Service had a lift capacity of 35,000 troops and 273,000 

tons of cargo. While Army planners were guardedly optimistic about the 

shipping situation at the time, their optimism was ill-founded as more and more 

claimants came forth to swell U.S. support to the potential allies. The attack on 

Pearl Harbor and the invasion of the PhiUppines required revision of all prior 

estimates. The establishment of the War Shipping Administration (WSA) by the 

president and the proliferation of other control measures and agencies generated 

a massive effort in the Office of the Chief of Transportation to ensure future 

support of Army force deployments. As the war intensified, planning was 

frustrated by the extensive losses of shipping from Axis submarine operations, 

estimated at 34,000,000 deadweight tons, from 1939 through August 1945. This 

was about equal to all U.S. and British tonnage existing in 1939. Losses greatly 

exceeded new construction until October 1943 when offensive naval operations 

decreased submarine successes and the massive U.S. shipbuilding program hit 

its stride? 9 Notwithstanding those accomplishments, in February 1945, after the 

United States had accomplished the greatest shipbuilding effort in history, Prime 

Minister Winston Churchill said in a speech in the House of Commons: ''The 

reason why shipping is so tight at present is because the peak period of the war 

in Europe has been prolonged for a good many months beyond what was hoped 

last autumn, and meanwhile the peak period against Japan has been brought 

forward by American victories in the Pacific. "

30 
140 Spearhead of l ogistics 

Deck loaded Liberty ship, Char1eston Port of Embarkation. 

Ocean shipping estimates were further complicated by priority 

requirements for landing craft and equipment needed for the amphibious 

operations needed to retake continental Europe and the islands in the Pacific. 

Amphibious equipment used much the same type of production resources as 

oceangoing shipping, but doctrine and planning data were sparse. The Army and 

Navy conducted exercises and extensive research on equipment to come up with 

credible estimates of oceangoing special lift, small boat, and amphibious 

equipment needs. 

The Directorates of Operations and of Water Transportation were the key 

staff agencies in Office of the Chief of Transportation dealing with federal and 

Allied maritime planners. They negotiated with the controlling agencies, 

presenting strong justification to support Army needs. They developed programs 

in conjunction with the Navy and Army technical services to improve utilization 

of shipping and interfaced actively with agencies that allocated lift resources to 
World War II Operations in the United States 141 

military claimants. As a result of these efforts, by August 1945, the 

Transportation Corps operated 186 oceangoing vessels, which were either 

owned or chartered. They included 51 troop and cargo ships, 26 hospital ships, 

55 inter-island vessels, 17 floating warehouses, 12 repair ships, 7 spare parts 

depots, 2 cable vessels, 1 news transmission ship, and 15 training ships. On 1 

January 1945, at the peak of the war against Germany, those vessels constituted 

only one-seventh of the total of 17,330,000 deadwe ight tons of shipping 

allocated by the War Shipping Administration to the Army to move troops and 

cargo to and from overseas destinations?' This was 48 percent of all tonnage 

available to the War Shipping Administration, greater than the total U.S. 

merchant fleet in September 1939. As the war shifted to the Pacific, Army 

allocations decreased in favor of those to the Navy. 

Army Transport Service vessel operations were managed by the U.S. and 

overseas port commanders to which the ships were assigned. They fu nctioned 

under the Office of the Chief of Transportation policies and procedures 

developed primarily by the Water Division of the Office of the Chief of 

Transportation and were operated by civilian crews. A transport commander, a 

military officer, was responsible for the passengers and a Navy or Army gun 

crew or "armed guard" to man the armament. The transport commander's small 

staff included Navy and/or Army Signal Corps radio operators and Navy radar 

operators for the sets installed late in the war, together with a civilian 

transportation agent, a surgeon, and a chaplain. Troop ship administration was a 

complex and demanding task that tended to generate friction from jurisdictional 

problems, particularly on civilian-operated vessels. Similar problems arose as 

large numbers of Army troops began traveling on Navy transports, 

Navy-operated commercial ships, and British ships such as the ocean liner 

transports Queen M01y and Queen Elizabeth. However, port commanders and 

the Office of the Chief of Transportation worked with their counterparts, 

developed jurisdictional agreements and joint implementing directives, and 

instituted measures such as putting American complements on British transports 

and removing Army transport commanders from Navy vessels. As time went on, 

civilian and military personnel became accustomed to working together and 

teamwork replaced friction. Throughout the war, the Office of the Chief of 

Transportation gave priority effort to improving food service, and broadening 

voyage morale activities and physical training. Those programs improved 

conditions, but troop transport travel was seldom a pleasure cruise.32 

During the war, the Transportation Corps developed small boats and other 

floating equipment which were used for a variety of purposes. The category 
142 Spearhead of Logistics 

"small boats" included all craft, powered or not, under 1,000 gross tons and 200 

feet long. These included coastal freighters, harbor craft and barges, but did not 

include amphibious landing craft, for which responsibility was assigned to the 

Navy in 1943. The development of requirements and tables of organization and 

allowances coupled with actual design, procurement. and distribution of the vessels 

themselves constituted an effort as great as that of supplying oceangoing shipping. 

At the start of the war, the Army had 386 craft By December 1945, the Office of 

the Chief of Transportation had acquired almost 14,000 of the general types shown 

in Chart 6, and additional craft were procured in overseas theaters. 

Crews operating small boats were sometimes provided by the owning 

agency. The Army Air Forces manned its own crash boats, and the Coast 

Artillery manned its mine planters. In overseas commands, boat crews were 

provided by theater commanders who used civilian, military, or Coast Guard 

crews requisitioned from the United States, or hired local civilians in theater. As 

in all prior wars, expedient use was made of indigenous crews to ease the impact 

on U.S. manpower. The Chief of Transportation provided crews for boats 

operated at Transportation Corps facilities in the United States, military crews 

for forward area operations as requested by theater commanders; crews to 

deliver craft to ports of embarkation or to overseas destinations when deployed 

under their own power; and trained personnel to operate boats at ports in the 

theaters. About 13,000 officers and soldiers were trained to man harbor craft 

companies, an additional 3,000 were activated in companies overseas, and about 

20,000 civilians were employed on small boats worldwide by the end of the war. 

The personnel management of civilian small boat employees was a difficult task 

complicated by heavy turnover in personnel, draft deferments, and war bonuses. 

Strong consideration was given to fully militarizing small boat operations, but 

the idea was dropped. Many civilian employees who were experienced crewmen 

could not qualify for military service because of age or physical limitations. 

Like the effort to provide oceangoing shipping, the small boat program was a 

success and contributed markedly to U.S. and theater transportation operations.l3 

ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT 

In the United States, both military and civilian passenger traffic boomed 

during the war. The Army training program was expensive in terms of 

transportation. The newly inducted civilian traveled from home to induction 

station, on to a reception center, and then to the replacement training center. 

After basic training, the soldier might travel to one or more specialist training 

centers before going to his unit or on to a port. Entire units were transported across 
World War II Operations in the United States 143 

Troops in staging area at Camp Patrick Henry before moving to Hampton Roads 

Port of Embarkation. 

the continent to participate in desert training. The average number of moves for a 

draftee, prior to going overseas, was three in World War I and five in World War 

11, although some soldiers made six to seven before leaving the United States. 

Civilian business travel flourished and the improving economy fostered 

personal travel. The rationing of fuel and tires and the elimination of passenger 

car production curtailed the use of private transportation. The withdrawal of 

intercoastal shipping to meet transoceanic requirements and the submarine threat 

shifted travel to land catTiers. Wartime priorities over labor and materials 

precluded public carriers from allocating resources to other than military-related 

missions, so the increase in civilian travel was met by more intensive use of 

existing resources. The public responded well to constraints, and the Office of 

Defense Transportation generally avoided official restrictions on nonessential 

traffic throughout the war. 

Strict controls were established and enforced by the Chief of 

Transportation over movements. His office worked closely with the commercial 

carriers, particularly the Association of American Railroads whose member 

railroads controlled 97.5 percent of the total railroad mileage and carried about 

98 percent of Army group movements (40 or more). The rail portion of intercity 
144 Spearhead of Logistics 

passenger miles grew from less than a tenth of the total in 1 940-1941 to more 

than a third in the 1943-1945 period. Combined private auto and bus passenger 

miles declined from 90 percent in 1940, to about 70 percent in 1945, while bus 

traffic held generally stable at slightly under 10 percent.34 

The Traffic Control Division and Transportation Zone Offices managed the 

routing and approval of group troop movements, while smaller movements were 

routed by origin station transportation officers?5 The working arrangements 

with the railroads were incorporated primarily in the Joint Military Passenger 

Agreement, negotiated annually between rail territorial passenger associations 

and the armed forces. Specific movement and routing arrangements with the rail 

carriers included allocation of cars appropriate for the move, such as day 

coaches, sleepers, commercial dining or converted baggage-kitchen cars, and 

hospital cars. The Army developed and procured special military cars, such as 

troop sleepers and kitchen cars, to supplement commercial equipment in the 

United States, as well as deploying them overseas. Commercial bus carriers 

were not as well-organized as the railroads, and they focused on local 

operations. However, the Traffic Control Division worked with the National 

Association of Bus Operators in Washington, D.C. and the National Bus Traffic 

Association and National Bus Military Bureau in Chicago to negotiate with the bus 

operators. The Transportation Zone Offices negotiated with regional carriers. The 

collaboration of the common carriers and the Army was an outstanding example 

of teamwork between private industry and government in a national emergency. 

The Chief of Transportation and the carriers took a number of measures to 

improve the use of passenger travel resources. For example, the Chief of 

Transportation obtained authority to change departure/arrival times of trains, to 

correlate the use of resources available from nearby troop movements, and to 

restrict the period that equipment could be ordered in advance and staged at 

posts. The Chief of Transportation also obtained relief from state restrictions on 

train length and established a strict inspection program to ensure Army users 

properly cared for equipment and carrier service met equipment and schedule 

specifications. The Chief of Transportation developed and implemented detailed 

troop movement procedures and established Army Reservation Bureaus for 

furlough travel of Army personnel. The bureaus were later used by all services. 

Over four million reservations were obtained for Army personnel in 1945. The 

Office of the Chief of Transportation coordinated closely with the Surgeon 

General and Army Service Forces on the movement of patients in both hospital 

cars and standard equipment and by 1945 received authority to control all 

movements involving fifteen patients and attendants. 
World War II Operations In the United States 145 

The movement of Negro troops in the segregated environment of World 

War II created problems for transporters in those states whose laws required 

segregation. Army policy stated there would be no discrimination in services 

rendered between whites and blacks (even though units were segregated), and 

the Chief of Transportation endeavored to enforce this policy to the extent of his 

ability. On special trains and buses under Army control, the policy was 

implemented; however, on public carriers in segregated states, employee efforts 

to enforce segregation created many unpleasant situations for Negro service 

personnel. Every effort was made to minimize the unpleasantness by working 

with local authorities and carriers to provide equal treatment, use 

Army-controlled equipment to forestall segregation, and correct abuses 

identified through investigations. These measures only partially met the problem 

as the Army had no means to offset segregation laws.36 

Administrative troop movements through ports were based on releases by 

the Office of the Chief of Transportation, which issued them as soon as requests 

were received from the major control headquarters- Army Ground Forces 

(AGF), Army Air Forces (AAF), or Army Service Forces (ASF). The Traffic 

Control Division and Transportation Zone Office controlled all movements by 

issuing routing instructions and allocating rail equipment, including that required 

for concurrent shipment of accompanying supplies and equipment. Much of the 

equipment came from depots or directly from the manufacturers and was 

matched with units by the port of embarkation. The bulk of troops were moved 

to staging areas, such as Camp Stoneman for San Francisco and Camp Kilmer 

for New York, on schedules authorized by the port, which was the only agency 

with complete overview of the myriad factors affecting movements. At the 

staging area, units and individuals were processed to validate physical, medical, 

and equipment status. Deficiencies were corrected and troops trained as needed 

to correct shortages in the skills mandatory for movement overseas. Training 

was also conducted in abandon-ship procedures. Individual replacements were 

organized in casual companies, prepared for movement, then moved to the ship 

embarkation area on precise schedules per detailed procedures. To avoid 

congestion at the ports, processing teams were sent to the locations of units 

moving directly from home station to shipside. Procedures were so effective that 

the loading of huge transports, such as the British Queens, which carried as 

many as 15,000 troops, was accomplished in as little as five hours. From 

December 1941 through December 1945, Army ports embarked over 7.6 million 

passengers.37 
146 Spearhead of Logistics 

ARMY FREIGHT TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT 

Army-sponsored freight traffic in the United States was managed in much 

the same manner as passenger traffic. Controls were imposed on freight single 

carload movements, equivalent to the movement of forty troops. The Traffic 

Control and Rail Divisions of Office of the Chief of Transportation coordinated 

Army interests with the railroads through the Association of American Railroads 

Car Service Division. Member roads delegated authority to the division for such 

matters as transfer of freight equipment from a railroad or territory to another 

and embargoing shipments to critical points. The Army also coordinated freight 

movements and use of resources closely with the Interstate Commerce 

Commission and Office of Defense Transportation. The amount of freight 

moved to overseas destinations during the war was colossal. Shipments on 

government bills of lading by common and contract carriers, which included 

nearly all movements, totaled more than 340 million short tons. During 1944, 

more than 105 million tons were moved, compared to 11.2 million tons in 1919, 

the peak year of World War I. At an average of 30 tons per car, reached in 

1944-1945, about 3.5 million cars were loaded, moved, accounted for, unloaded, 

and in some instances held in reconsignment areas, diverted, or otherwise given 

special handling?8 The nature of Army cargo further complicated movements. 

Engineer, armor, aircraft, and transportation rail and marine equipment included 

bulky, hard to handle, and outsized items requiring special routing to avoid 

bridges and small tunnels. 

About half of Army freight originated at commercial industrial plants, a 

quarter from Army depots, and about a tenth from Army-owned industrial 

plants, with the rest from miscellaneous commercial and military installations. 

For freight originating at commercial activities, control measures such as car 

utilization and documentation were difficult to enforce, further complicating 

management of the program?9 However, the principal Chief of Transportation 

management control, releases and routing orders for carload shipments, applied 

to all shippers of Army cargo. That authority was not only sustained throughout 

the war against general and frequent criticism of the process, but was broadened. 

As the Chief of Transportation strengthened his zones and other field agencies 

with more and better trained officers, it became evident to Army leadership that 

closer control of movements was essential. Additional movement authority was 

delegated to field transportation officers to route selected in-country shipments 

of five carloads or less. Control of the flow of traffic to the ports of embarkation 

and depots and prevention of congestion remained one of the highest priorities of 

transportation managers for the entire war. 
World War II Operations In the United States 147 

Lend-lease shipments did not go through military ports, but their volume 

had a significant impact on U.S. traffic movements. Scheduling their arrival at 

overseas ports also required close control. The War Department and the 

Lend-Lease Administration agreed in July 1941 that the Transportation Corps 

would control movement of lend-lease shipments to all ports using transit 

storage facilities at holding and reconsignment points. 

Numerous innovations were instituted to better manage the transportation 

function and improve productivity. One of the most notable was the consolidated 

car service, initiated in July I 942. Consolidating stations were established at 

selected locations to combine less than carload (LCL) shipments to one 

destination or other transfer point into carload lots. While LCL shipments 

constituted only a small portion of tonnage moved, they amounted to 40 percent 

of the number of shipments. Prior efforts to have post transportation officers 

consolidate shipments produced spotty results. Carrier LCL service and freight 

forwarder rates were high and did not provide the in-transit visibility of 

shipments that was available for carload movements. The consolidation service 

was an unprecedented success and was extended to the Navy in February I 943 

and later to the Marine Corps and Coast Guard. The service worked out 

satisfactorily for the railroads but generated opposition from commercial freight 

forwarders. However, the great savings in railcars and rate savings 

overwhelmingly supported initiation and expansion of the military program. 

Freight forwarders and the Railway Express continued to be used extensively. 

Truck lines also benefited from the service since they provided faster service in 

moving LCL shipments over shorter distances to consolidating stations. They 

also distributed cargo to consignees more quickly, so the Office of the Chief of 

Transportation encouraged their use. The program expedited deliveries, reduced 

misshipments, used car capacities more effectively, and reduced LCL shipment 

damage. Approximately 2.4 million tons of cargo were consolidated from July 

1942 through December 1945.40 

Other major programs were established to mobilize and conserve freight 

cars. Regulations were issued by the Chief of Transportation to reduce Light 

loading of cars and expedite the release and dispatch of loaded cars. The new 

regulations also reduced hoarding of cars and using them for storage. They 

required consignees to unload cars promptly, clean and remove dunnage 

immediately to speed reuse, avoid crosshauling and backhauting, and improve 

loading and unloading techniques. The Army was the nation's largest user of rail 

transportation, and it gave conservation of assets a high priority by preventing 

careless and wasteful practices. The Office of the Chief of Transportation 
148 Spearhead of Logistics 

directed that planning information be distributed in the field to encourage 

conservation at every level. For example, shippers notified consignees by wire of 

large movements such as twenty-five carloads to obtain receiving clearance. Car 

situation reports were required from all installations and analyzed for 

performance. Competition among installations was created by publishing reports 

and encouraging least satisfactory activities to improve performance. Car and 

equipment loading rules were established to promote uniformity and 

conservation of materials, and the Chief of Transportation participated closely 

with the carriers and their 600 "car efficiency committees," which policed local 

civil and military performance throughout the country. 

The Transportation Corps innovation of holding and reconsignment points 

and consolidating stations under Transportation Zone Offices, along with central 

management of carload movements, were major factors in facilitating the flow 

of traffic and preventing congestion at ports and depots. The measures taken to 

train Transportation Corps officers and soldiers and to establish Army 

procedures to supplement and implement those of other agencies enhanced 

productivity. The professionalism of the Army transportation function increased 

as the war continued. 

PORT OPERATIONS 

Numerous management actions were required by U.S. transportation 

officers to move units and cargo overseas through a port of embarkation. Each 

action had to be coordinated with the point of origin and all intermediate points; 

with the Overseas Supply Divisions at the ports if the shipment was requested by 

the theater or had to accompany a deploying unit; and with the Water and Port 

Transportation Divisions of the POE. The Office of the Chief of Transportation 

directors of operations and water tr~nsportation coordinated all operations that 

expedited and maximized POE throughput and utilization. 

The acquisition and retention of Army port facilities in the United States 

was as severe a challenge as obtaining ocean shipping allocations. Ports were 

well-developed and could adequately handle wartime traffic when properly 

managed. However, many alternative nonterminal uses such as storage and 

repair were constantly being proposed, and the Chief of Transportation had to 

guard against them. General Gross personally negotiated with the Navy, the 

WSA, and the Office of Defense Transportation throughout the war to obtain 

and keep the terminal facilities needed to meet Army tactical and strategic plans. 

Much was accomplished to improve port utilization through cooperative efforts 

and realignment of workload among Army ports. In a report to the War 

Department in November 1945, the Chief of Transportation pointed out that 
World War II Operations in the United States 149 

Repair of hospital train kitchen car at Charleston port. 

maintenance of separate establislunents by the Army and Navy at the large ports 

was wasteful and that joint operations would have improved resource utilization 

and eliminated much of the onerous and costly coordination that wartime . d 4l operations generate . 

The majority of troop and cargo movements overseas, through the ports, 

were administrative in the context that ships were to be off-loaded at an 

established port rather than in an assault on a hostile shore. Most amphibious 

assault forces were mounted from the theaters; however, a few were embarked 

in the ZI. The first large one was Maj. Gen. GeorgeS. Patton, Jr.'s Western Task 

Force for the invasion of North Africa, which loaded out of the Hampton Roads 

Virginia port in October 1942. The Army had little experience in combat 

loading for assault landings and other aspects of amphibious warfare. Time for 

planning had been short. Consequently, there was considerable confusion at the 

port, but lessons were learned quickly and applied to subsequent operations. 
150 Spearhead of logistics 

Maj. Gen. Troy Middleton's force for the Sicily landing embarked more 

smoothly from Hampton Roads in June 1943, as did the forces to assault Attu 

and Kiska that were loaded on the west coast in April and July 1943.42 

Stevedoring at the ports of embarkation was performed mainly by Army 

civilians and contractors. lnitially,labor was sufficient to meet the workload, but 

the attraction of other industries with higher wages and better working 

conditions gradually created shortages of longshore labor. In 1943, the office of 

the Chief of Transportation staff and POE commanders foresaw shortages 

developing. The Chief of Transportation included in the 1944 troop basis sixty 

port companies to supplement contract stevedores in U.S. ports in addition to 

those programmed for the theaters. By 30 April 1945, forty-two companies 

were activated and assigned to ports on the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts. 

Also, some 11,000 Italian prisoner of war service units were organized into 

sixty-five units to perform tasks other than shiploading in selected areas ofPOE.43 

By working closely with labor unions and local industry, supplementing 

civilian resources, negotiating more favorable rates, and improving the 

productivity of loading operations, the Transportation Corps was able to meet 

outloading requirements, while reducing operating costs. For example, the 

all-port average cost of handling general cargo dropped from $1.73 per 

measurement ton in November 1943 to $1.42 in June 1945. Explosives handling 

costs dropped from $6.45 per long ton to $4.52 in the same period.

44 

Ammunition movement always received priority attention throughout the 

transportation community. The shipment of ammunition and explosives to the 

theaters was a matter of personal concern to General Gross, not only for the 

period of hostilities, but also for retrograde operations after the war. The size and 

explosive power of shells and bombs exceeded those of World War I and proper 

handling required intense coordination and cooperation among the principal 

interested agencies that included the Chief of Transportation, Chief of Ordnance, 

the Navy, Bureau of Safety of the ICC, Bureau Of Explosives of the Association 

of American Railroads, the Coast Guard, and the WSA. During World War I, 

most explosives were loaded to ships at anchor to minimize the impact of 

explosions and for other safety reasons. In 1940, shipments were loaded both 

from piers at terminals and to ships at anchor. Early in the war, it became 

evident that the volume of ammunition expected would require extensive 

increases in pier facilities away from population centers. Loading directly from 

inland carriers to vessels was the preferred method to avoid double handling. 

Prevailing practice required ports to load small quantities of ammunition on 

several ships to limit the impact of accidents, which required more ports. In 
World War II Operations In the United States 151 

addition, backup facilities for each port would be needed to hold shipments away 

from the ports, since these were most vulnerable to sabotage, fire, and accident. 

The Quartermaster General and Chief of Ordnance jointly developed a 

construction program, which was approved on 19 December 1941 and promptly 

initiated by the Corps of Engineers. The decision was made to keep ammunition 

facilities under the jurisdiction of the approprate port of embarkation, except for 

those directly adjacent to and part of an ordnance installation. Some facilities 

were leased. The outshipment of ammunition was an immensely large and 

complicated program moving more than 11 mjllion tons through Army ports. 

About 9 million short tons were moved through Atlantic and Gulf ports and 2.5 

million through Pacific ports.45 Despite the volume of dangerous cargo handled, 

no major disasters occulTed at any port operated by the Anny. There were fires 

on piers that were quickly extinguished, as well as explosions of ammunition 

moving by rail in the United States. These incidents and the Port Chicago, 

California, Naval Ammunition Depot disaster in July 1944 kept the 

Transportation Corps constantly alert to the hazards of transporting ammunition. 

The role of the port of embarkation in providing continuing support to 

overseas theaters was managed primarily by the Overseas Supply Division. 

After the initial period of automatic resupp.ly and establishment of an organized 

supply system, the Overseas Supply Divisions at each port assumed 

responsibility for the resupply of a designated theater.46 Requisitions were 

"edited" by Army technical service representatives based on data maintained on 

stocks reported on hand and consumption experience. Requests were sent to the 

appropriate supply source or in emergencies filled from stocks on hand in the 

po1t or held in supporting holding and reconsignment points. Many items were 

"controlled" and had to be released by the responsible technical service 

headquarters. Shipments were scheduled for movement if the availability date 

was known; or if not, when availability was detennined, Overseas Supply 

Divisions called them forward in coordination with planned sailings. Shipments 

arriving in the port were received and processed by the Transportation Division 

and loaded by the tenninal operators of the Water Division. The Overseas 

Supply Divisions kept the theater informed of the status of each request, and its 

scheduled arrival in-theater.47 The accomplishments of the Overseas Supply 

Divisions contributed greatly to the quality of logistics support to the theaters 

and were a feather in the cap for the Corps. 

The Transportation Corps was active in programs to improve the protection 

of shipments. At the outset of the war, Anny packaging specifications were 

woefully inadequate to protect supplies from the rigors of wartime transportation 
152 Spearhead of Logistics 

and handling. They also failed to protect items stored in poor quality shelters or 

in the open, a condition which prevailed, particularly following assault landings. 

Strong complaints concerning packaging followed the landing in North Africa in 

1943. Ports of embarkation were excellent laboratories for testing the 

effectiveness of item and shipment packing. In February 1942, the Office of the 

Quartermaster General loaned experts to General Gross to set up a unit that 

eventually became the Packing Section of the Water Division. This organization 

studied and recommended improved specifications and procedures. In June 

1942, on Gross' recommendation, Army Service Forces established similar 

activities, which later became the Army Packaging Board. The various 

packaging activities, coordinating closely with the theaters on their 

requirements, produced major improvements. New packaging regulations 

prescribed the use of sturdier and waterproofed materials, established 

specifications for initial packing by manufacturers and depots, increased 

inspection of palletizing, and repacking/recoopering requirements for holding 

and reconsignment points and ports of embarkation. Feedback programs were 

established so that discrepancies reported by theaters and transportation 

activities, were directed to shipment originators for corrective action.48 

The Chief of Transportation also conducted in-depth studies on special ship 

stowage requirements for bulky cargo, such as tanks, vehicles, and rail 

equipment, that were generally moved in the holds or on the decks of regular 

cargo ships. The overseas movement of aircraft which could not be ferried was a 

special challenge. Even disassembled, they were still bulky and fragile and 

created problems in the theaters that had to set up assembly lines. This delayed 

the availability of aircraft and required more specialists in the theater. 

Successful solutions to shipping assembled aircraft included retrofitting 

thirty-six Liberty ships with larger hatches, shipping aircraft on naval escort 

carriers, and equipping more than 600 U.S. and British tankers with false decks, 

above the main deck, that provided an unbroken area to stow aircraft and other 

light commodities. Even though the Liberty conversions provided for the most 

damage-free movement, over 20,000 aircraft were deployed on tanker decks 

from March 1943 to the end of the war.

49 

The peacetime system for marking shipments was wholly inadequate for 

the volume and scope of destinations for World War II addressees. As with any 

military problem, there were many interests to serve, such as shippers, 

transporters, security experts, and most importantly, the overseas command 

recipients. In late 1942 and early 1943, the European theater complained that the 

existing system was unsatisfactory in North Africa and that a more defmitive 
World War II Operations In the United States 153 

marking system was needed to meet the crowded depot conditions for the 

buildup in the United IGngdom. The Chief of Transportation initially disagreed 

with the theater proposal as burdensome and time-consuming, but eventually 

concurred with a five-part code, published in WD TM 38-414, that provided a 

four-letter POD or area destination; a single letter priority, by the half month, to 

be shipped from the ZI; an abbreviated source (QM, Ord), with Roman numeral 

class of supply; a consignee combination identifying separately packed parts 

of an item to be assembled; letters/numbers identifying origin depot and number 

of shipments from a multiline requisition. The single-line requisition 

was not developed until after the war. An address might read 

BOBO-A-ORDII-GT3-AC02RA3. In addition, each service color coded each 

package with a band or corner triangle for identification in initial sorting. The 

Overseas Supply Divisions included the code markings on extract requisitions 

sent from ports to sources of supply. The Chief of Transportation continued to 

be active in revising marking instructions as a member of the War Department 

Code Marking Policy Committee and had the chief responsibility for policing 

the program.50 

A major improvement associated with shipment identification came with 

the introduction by the Army Service Forces of the standardized War 

Department Shipping Document and Vendor Shipping Document. They were 

tested in the spring of 1943 and quickly made universal. Again, the Chief of 

Transportation was responsible for policing the program. He sent teams of 

officers to Europe to collect opinjons, train people in proper use of the 

documents, and disseminate corrective actions required by the preparers in the 

United States. Shipment documentation and marking were of such importance 

that General Gross established a unit, frequently assisted by ad hoc support, 

devoted entirely to improving the program and monitoring its execution at 

Transportation Corps installations. 

During the latter part of the war, U.S. ports of embarkation repeatedly 

outloaded in a single month more than 400 cargo vessels with over four million 

measurement tons of cargo and 60 to 80 troop transports, with days in port 

declining substantially over the period.51 Operation of ports in the United States 

was a Transportation Corps success story, matching those of traffic 

management, acquisition of shipping, training and doctrine, and Transportation 

Corps supply. 
154 

CHAPTER VII 

World War II 

U.S. Worldwide Commitments 

"In order to make assured conquests it is necessary always to 

proceed within the rules: to advance, to establish yourself solidly, to 

advance and establish yourself again, and always prepare to have 

within reach of your army your resources and your requirements." 

Frederick the Great: Instructions for His Generals, 1747. 

INTRODUCTION 

The decisive land battles of World War II were fought in Europe and on 

the islands of the Pacific. But during and even before direct involvement in the 

war, the United States took important actions in areas distant from the central 

conflict in Europe and the Pacific. Many actions were defensive and designed to 

avert victories by Axis forces from becoming decisive before the Allies could 

mobilize their forces for a counteroffensive. Those that occurred before Pearl 

Harbor were initiated to assist the valiant efforts of Great Britain and the Soviet 

Union, who were already at war with the Axis. All of these actions required 

considerable transportation resources in the way of personnel and equipment. 

While they are less known than the main combat theaters, they too made a 

significant contribution to victory. Principal deployments were in the Western 

Hemisphere, the Persian Corridor (PC), the China, Bum1a, India (CBI) area, and 

the North African/Mediterranean Theaters (NATOUSAIMTOUSA). 

During the rearmament and mobilization of the early 1940s, the President 

deployed military forces to defend American interests in areas of the Western 

Hemisphere that were essential to support future deployment of U.S. forces. 

Plans were drawn to organize, equip, and deploy forces to meet emergencies, 

and as early as 1939, actions were sta1ted to strengthen U.S. bases in the 

Caribbean, Pacific, and Alaska. 

Jn September 1940, the President agreed with Great Britain to exchange 

fifty overage U.S. destroyers for the right to lease Commonwealth naval and air 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 155 

bases in the Atlantic, Caribbean, and Canada. ln early and mid-1941, the United 

States also reached agreements with the governments concerned to establish air, 

sea, and land bases on Greenland and lceland. By the time America entered the 

war, Army transporters were already supporting the 66,000 troops of the 

Caribbean Defense Command (CDC) established in 1941 with the key mission 

to protect the Panama Canal. The CDC also coordinated base operations 

throughout the Caribbean area including Puerto Rico, Trinidad, British Guiana, 

and Cuba. 

Opening new bases and reinforcing established stations caused a major 

increase in the transportation workload. These tasks soon paled in comparison 

with the more formidable challenges of prosecuting the war in the large theaters. 

Solutions to the early transportation problems ensured the security of the 

hemisphere while providing priceless experience for the future. Quartermaster 

General transporters took immediate action with the War Shipping 

Administration to increase the Army Transport Service fleet which was barely 

adequate to support existing off-shore bases. They coordinated extensively with 

the Chief of Engineers and War Department G-4 to arrange delivery of 

construction materials, equipment, and supplies. Concurrently, they initiated 

arrangements for transportation resources to support new bases, troop levels, and . . I 

ffilSSIOnS. 

NORTH ATLANTIC BASES 

The strategic location of Newfoundland dictated the early development of 

U.S. air and naval bases there. In January 1941, the first contingent of 1,000 U.S. 

troops arrived in St. John's, which became the principal Army port. Leased port 

facilities were insufficient for planned discharge. Port clearance was done by the 

government-owned Newfoundland Railway, a narrow gauge road with obsolete 

equipment, and by truck over unimproved local roads. Unionized longshoremen 

restricted work over ten hours a day while heavy snowstorms from January to 

April hampered operations. Negotiations were conducted through government 

channels to improve local labor productivity and develop an extensive base 

construction program for permanent docks, an offshore petroleum, oils, and 

lubricants (POL) discharge facility, and pipeline to Harmon Army Airfield. 

Proposals also included additional railway equipment, the rehabilitation of the 

rail right-of-way, and the improvement of highways. The physical improvements 

and increased productivity reduced port congestion, and shipments of 

construction materials declined as facilities were completed. Newfoundland 
156 Spearhead of Logistics 

remained an important naval activity and air base supported by St. John's Army 

Port for the remainder of the war? 

Army landing fields and weather stations were established in Northeast 

Canada to support aircraft ferry routes to supplement the direct route across the 

Atlantic from Gander, Newfoundland, to Scotland, a 2,100-mile flight, too long 

for most aircraft. In September 1941, the first increment of the program 

emplaced three temporary weather stations in Labrador and on Baffin Island 

(Codename Crystal I, II and Ill) at potential landing fields that could not be 

constructed before onset of winter. The Army Transport Service (ATS) vessel 

Sicilien carried the cargo of arctic housing, communications equipment, 

supplies, food, and fuel to Halifax, Nova Scotia, where it was transferred to 

Army-chartered trawlers and other small vessels that could navigate the narrow 

channels and cope with tides up to 42 feet in the objective area. Eskimos acted 

as pilots and helped as laborers while vessel crews stevedored for extra pay to 

assist the engineers who erected the stations. The mission was completed in late 

November 1941 under extremely hazardous and daunting conditions.3 

The second increment (Codename Crimson) operated at the port of 

Churchill on the Hudson Bay. Originally developed to export wheat during the 

ice-free season from July to mid-October, Churchill was connected to Canadian 

main lines by a 51 0-mile single-track rail line running north through Manitoba. 

The 12th Port, commanded by Lt.Col. (later Col.) Curtis A. Noble, and the 389th 

Port Battalion operated the transfer point and port from mid-July to November 

1942. Their mission was to tranship construction materials from the railhead to 

vessels delivering them to landing fields and weather sites. Off-loading was by 

lighter, and deliveries were hampered by hazardous tides and bad weather. It 

was an expensive and complex operation, superseded the next year by shipments 

direct from the Boston port of embarkation (POE) to construction sites. The 

increasing practice of shipping assembled short-range aircraft as deckloads and 

better weather data eventually eliminated the need for the "stepping-stones" in 

north-east Canada.4 

ALASKA AND WESTERN CANADA 

In the prewar period, Alaska had operational Army and Navy bases with a 

limited transportation infrastructure and minimal staffing at posts and ports. 

Beginning in rnid-1940 there was a gradual Army buildup, and the Alaska 

Defense Command (ADC) was fonned under the command of Col. (later Lt. 

Gen.) Simon B. Buckner, Jr. Strategic planners relied on the strength of the 

Pacific Fleet to defend Alaska. They anticipated that enemy attacks would be 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 157 

limited to the Aleutian Islands, and planning focused on expansion of 

defensively oriented naval bases and a series of air bases in Alaska and across 

Canada to the United States. These bases were nearing completion by the time of 

the Pearl Harbor attack, which changed the strategy to protecting sea lanes. As 

shown in Map 8, this required more and different bases, a substantial force 

buildup, and a land route from the United States for use if sea resupply was 

interrupted.5 As expected, the Japanese attacked Dutch Harbor, but only as a 

diversion for their attack on Midway. United States success at Midway caused 

the Japanese to withdraw to Kiska and Attu in the western Aleutians. Those 

bases lacked strength to seriously threaten Alaska or the sea lanes, but at the 

Casablanca Conference, the decision was to drive them from that lodgement. 

After a period of heavy bombing and the establishment of U.S. forward bases on 

Adak (later to become the most active wartime port in Alaska) and Amchitka 

Islands, Attu and Kiska were invaded and reclaimed during May-July 1943. 

Considering the limitations imposed by the climate and the fact that other 

theaters had a higher priority, the theater in Alaska grew rapidly. By the fall of 

1943, there were twenty-eight ports, forty main posts, and over seventy other 

locations where troops were stationed. Transportation support grew with the 

theater. About a hundred Army and commercial vessels were on the run from the 

zone of interior (Zl) to Alaska. Transportation management was provided by the 

Superintendents, Army Transport Service. Initially, many of the transportation 

units were improvised or provisional and manned by available troops. Extensive 

use was made of combat arms soldiers to discharge cargo from vessels and 

aircraft, particularly in the Aleutian campaigns. As the war progressed, 

organized Quartermaster and Transportation Corps units were deployed to 

Alaska to operate ports and waterways, railroads, and motor vehicles. 

In an area as primitive as Alaska in 1942, water transportation was vitally 

important. Not only did the Transportation Corps expand existing ports and 

develop new ones to handle the oceangoing shipping, it also exploited river 

transportation in revolutionary ways. Bases along the Yukon River in Alaska 

and the Mackenzie River in Canada were only accessible by boat. Tugboats 

were cut into sections and hauled by rail to the navigable head of the Mackenzie. 

There, they were welded together and used on the river until the end of the 

navigable season. At that time, they were once again disassembled and stored 

until next season. 

Two Railway Operating Battalions (ROBs) assisted in running civilianoperated railroads. The 714th Railway Operating Battalion deployed to 

Anchorage to assist in running the Alaska Railroad, and the 770th Railway 
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Operating Battalion deployed to assist in the operation of the White Pass and 

Yukon Railroad. They also opened Whittier to serve a new cutoff on the Alaska 

Railroad. Motor transportation offered its own unique set of challenges and 

transporters tried a number of methods to maximize the use of existing 

resources. One of them was the construction of 5- and lO-ton tote boxes that 

could be hoisted onto a truck or removed from it by crane, an early version of 

today's containers. This effectively reduced turnaround time and made more 

efficient use of the available vehicles. The Transportation Corps also 

experimented with "tractor trains" formed by hauling sleds with Caterpillar 

tractors. These experiments markedly improved the Army's knowledge of 

vehicle transport operations in the Arctic. 

During this hectic period, transporters in Alaska also had to support the 

Aleutian campaign and make contingency plans for supplying Alaska overland 

from the ZI if the sea lanes of transportation were cut. Fortunately, the need 

never arose. 

The accomplishments of the Transportation Corps in Alaska were notable. 

Working in subarctic condi tions with limited visibility during the long winter, 

the Corps found transportation operations in Alaska onerous and challenging, 

but effective management and positive actions to get adequate resources met the 

theater needs. Transportation soldiers made Alaskan operations one of the 

success stories of World War II. The early pressure on Alaskan forces was 

reduced with the successes of Allied operations in other theaters. By Victory in 

Japan (VJ) Day, Alaska was a static area, primarily supported by ocean 

shipping, but with more transportation alternatives and a much greater defensive 

potential due to the Alaska Highway, added air bases, and improved rail 

facilities and p011s.6 

GREENLAND 

Greenland, the largest island in the world, halfway between Labrador and 

Iceland, became an important North Atlantic air route way station. It was a land 

of ice and snow in which aJI supplies and construction materiaJs for U.S. troops 

had to be imported. The only "port" was the village of lvigtut, where 

Greenland's major export, cryolite ore, used as a flux in making aluminum, was 

exported. The U.S. backhauled cryolite from Ivigtut but could not use the port 

for discharge. For much of the year, the seas around Greenland were blocked by 

pack ice or floes. In 1941, the first U.S. convoy with engineers, a small number 

of base operating troops, and an antiaircraft battery landed on the southern end 

of the island at Narsarssuak, near the site of a proposed air base. Even though 
160 Spearhead of Logistics 

this was well before U.S. entry into the war, German propaganda attempted to 

frighten Greenlanders with the consequences of aiding the United States. 

Secrecy and censorship were required, and acquisition of shipping for the 

deployment was a major challenge. The ships were loaded to maximize lift 

rather than facilitate discharge and they were unloaded by inexperienced troops 

in a poor anchorage full of ice. It took two months using all of the personnel and 

resources available to move the cargo ashore in the few available lighters. 

Lessons learned were reported to the War Department and helped appreciably in 

planning for similar projects in the future. 

When the United States entered the war, shipments to the island increased, 

which meant more ships waiting discharge. In order to mitigate transportation 

problems in Greenland, the Boston port of embarkation became solely 

responsible for the allocation of shipping space, and the Corps of Engineers 

project command element moved to the POE to improve coordination. The lack 

of local and military stevedores in Greenland was alleviated by the temporary 

hire of thirty-two experienced U.S. stevedores, who reduced the backlog in 

October-December 1942. Later, the I 94th Port Company, specially trained for 

the task, deployed there. From 1943 to the end of the war support for the 

Greenland air bases was adequate and they accomplished their missions of 

speeding movement of planes and cargo to Europe? 

ICELAND 

When the Nazis invaded Denmark and Norway in April 1940, Iceland's 

ties with Denmark were broken and the country became virtually independent. 

In May 1940, with reluctant Icelandic agreement, Britain sent a 25,000-man 

force under Maj. Gen. H.O. Curtis to forestall a Nazi invasion and protect 

convoy routes. 

The island is subject to strong north winds reaching 130 miles per hour. 

Polar ice is piled ashore in the transition from winter to spring and temperatures 

range from cool to arctic. Iceland had no cross-island roads or railroads and 

highways were generally close to the coastline. Reykjavik, the capital on the 

southwest coast and Akureyri in the north were the largest ports. Both had 

limited docking and port clearance capability. Two ports on the east coast had 

docks for fishing boats and anchorages for large vessels. It was conventional 

wisdom that port operations were only feasible in the summer, but later U.S. 

transporters were able to off-load about the same monthly tonnage throughout 

the year in spite of shutdowns from winter storms.8 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 161 

With agreement of the government, Iceland was placed under the umbrella 

of the Monroe Doctrine in the spring of 1941 because it was essential to the 

defense of the Western Hemisphere. United States Army forces were scheduled 

to relieve British forces stationed there, but in June 1941, when a Nazi invasion 

of England appeared imminent, the first Army echelon was not ready to go. A 

provisional Marine brigade of 4,100 men was substituted and arrived on 7 July 

1941. With British help, the convoy was unloaded and left Iceland on 13 July 

1941. Part of the success of the operation was due to the presence of a special 

representative of the War Department G-4, Maj. Richard S. Whitcomb (later 

Brig. Gen. and Commanding General of the Pusan Base Section in the Korean 

War), who arrived before the convoy and provided sorely needed planning 

information to General Curtis and his key logistics officials. Maj. Whitcomb 

assessed the capabilities of facilities to support the deployed force, identified 

transportation resources needed, and communicated directly to the Chief of 

Transportation his recommendation to assign a port battalion, a truck battalion, 

and watercraft to Iceland. He negotiated with Iceland authorities on allocation 

and use of selected port facilities by the United States and continued as a key 

figure in Iceland transportation operations.9 

On 6 August 1941, the first Army contingent of 4,200 troops arrived. 

Discharge was hampered by lack of facilities and the inexperience of Company 

B, 392d Port Battalion, the deployed port operating element. The company had 

to be supplemented by Marines to expedite convoy turnaround. The second 

Army convoy with about 5,000 troops arrived on 16 September 1941 with the 

commander, Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel, and again the port had discharge 

problems. The Iceland Base Command (IBC) was established and Maj. 

Whitcomb was appointed Assistant Superintendent, ATS, in the Office of the 

Quartermaster where he was responsible for all port activity. Because there were 

not enough Army stevedores, General Bonesteel detailed the lOth Infantry 

Regiment to discharge ships with port company technical assistance, but 

unsatisfactory port operations and ship turnaround times persisted. As a result of 

representations made by Maj. Whitcomb to the Chief of Transportation and a 

report by two experts who inspected in March 1942, additional transportation 

resources were allocated to Iceland. The Marines and British departed. New 

facilities were constructed and three outports were opened and manned with 

elements of newly arrived port companies. Except for growing pains, 

transportation operations were over the hump. By May 1943, the 18th Port was 

activated with in-country resources, commanded by Col. Whitcomb. Ironically, 

as the unit was activated, the IBC was being reduced in strength. On 30 October 
162 Spearhead of Logistics 

1943, Col. Whitcomb and 515 officers and 8,869 men of the Iceland Base 

Command sailed for England. The I 8th Port was inactivated on 29 December 

1943, and the command gradually phased down. The Iceland operation was an 

excellent case in point of the need to include base support troops in overseas 

deployments. Transportation units were particularly necessary in any base 

development situation. The experience indicated that they needed to arrive prior 

to combat elements, or as soon as possible, to provide for adequate support and 

productive use of shipping resources.

10 

THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 

American operations in the Persian Corridor were the most unusual in 

World War II because the command existed for the sole purpose of transporting 

military supplies to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). United 

States transportation operations were closely integrated with those of the British 

and Soviets over the same transportation net on a day-to-day basis. The corridor, 

which is displayed in Map 9, comprised areas that became well known again 

during the Iraq-Iran War of 1980-88 and Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm 

in 1990-91. The area of operations included the towns of Basra and Abadan (the 

largest oilfield in the world during World War II) and the Tigris and Euphrates 

rivers. All these locations were key to operations in the theater. 11 

In the summer of 1941, British and Soviet military activities in Iraq and 

Iran focused on controlling the area because of the rapid advances of the Axis 

forces in the Soviet Union and North Africa. The British, who already occupied 

Iraq, moved into Iran, occupying the area from Teheran to the Persian Gulf, 

while the Soviets occupied Iranian territory north of Teheran. The United States, 

not yet a belligerent, sought to bolster British and Soviet efforts through 

lend-lease. In November 1941, the first elements of a U.S. Military Iranian 

Mission (USMIM) arrived in the area to manage that effort. 

The defensive mission was overtaken in early 1942 by the urgent need to 

increase the use of the long and difficult Persian Corridor to provide military aid 

to the Soviet Union. The quantities of supplies that could be delivered through 

other support routes were insufficient to meet their minimum needs to defend the 

homeland. The difficulties posed by bad weather and the Nazi blockade made 

the prospect of getting convoys to Murmansk difficult at best. The Pacific route 

through Vladivostok could be used only for nonmilitary shipments. Although 

Japan was not at war with the USSR, its neutrality became increasingly 

uncertain. Due to lack of resources, the United States and Britain decided to 

postpone the cross channel invasion, promised the Soviets to take pressure 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 

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164 Spearhead of logistics 

off them by forcing Germany to move troops from the east to fight the invaders. 

Instead, the Western Allies invaded North Africa, an action which was 

calculated to draw troops from the eastern front. They also tried to improve the 

lend-lease program to the Soviets. Both of these measures were designed to aid 

the Soviet Union militarily by tying up Axis troops significantly, by getting 

more supplies to the Soviet Union, and by demonstrating to the Soviets that they 

were not fighting the Nazis alone. 

In 1941 - 1942, the British operated ports, rail facilities, and highway transport 

activities south of Teheran. Basra and its port of Margil served as their principal 

transportation center. They used contractor and military resources to improve and 

operate facilities, but they possessed neither the manpower or equipment to handle 

the increased tonnage projected. By the end of 1942, ship turnaround time averaged 

fifty days, with seventeen ships lying idle because of the low discharge capacity and 

inadequate capability to clear the ports. In 1942, U.S. MjJitary Iranian Mission, also 

using contractors, initiated construction of more docks and roads to enhance port 

clearance. The mission also established truck and aircraft assembly plants, moved 

assembled equipment and supplies on British-operated transport, and arranged 

onward flighLc; to the Soviet Union of U.S. aircraft flown from the United States. The 

USSR operated the Russian Motor Transport activity in the area.

12 

American assumption of operations in the Persian Corridor began with a 

proposal by President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill in July 1942 that 

the United States take over the British share of Iranian State Railroad (ISR) 

operations. After coordinating with Stalin and studying the situation on the 

ground, the prime minister added U.S. operation of Khorramshahr and Bandar 

Shapur ports. United States implementing plans, developed during the 

establishment of the Transportation Corps in Washington, proposed operation of 

even more ports and a motor transport service to augment rail capability and 

meet the throughput goal of 200,000 long tons a month. Those plans became the 

basis for the U.S. force of port, rail, and motor transport units to supplement 

British and Soviet transporters. Troops to staff the force were diverted from 

other operations or activated in the United States on an emergency schedule. The 

plans included extensive use of local labor as evidenced by the fact that U.S. 

forces employed as many as 41 ,000 local nationals at the end of 1943.13 

The U.S. Military Iranian Mission was reconstituted as the command 

element, first as the Persian Gulf Service Command (PGSC) and later as the 

Persian Gulf Command (PGC) with three subordinate districts. Brig. Gen. D.H. 

Connolly (later Maj. Gen.) assumed command on 20 October 1942 at Basra and 

moved in late December 1942 to Teheran. Transition was scheduled for 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 165 

January-March 1943. From the beginning, movement of U.S. forces to Iran was 

beset by delays and difficulties in obtaining shipping, particularly for vital rail, 

port, and motor transport equipment. By the end of May 1943 when 80 percent 

of troops had arrived, only 48 percent of equipment was on hand.

14 

Nevertheless, transfer of operations began in December 1942 when the frrst U.S. 

troop increment arrived. 

TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS 

Many factors affected the transporters' tasks in Iran. In the operating area, 

temperatures ranged from well below freezing in the mountains to 130 degrees F. 

and above in the gulf and desert areas. Railroads and highways were subject to 

frequent landslides and washouts. Attacks by bandits in up-country areas were 

common. Port facilities were poorly designed and improving them was a slow 

process. Local labor was not an adequate substitution for soldiers. Workers were 

hard to train and employ because of language difficulties. Literacy was also a 

problem and strong pro-Nazi sentiment was evident. Pilferage rates were high, 

as could be expected, reflecting the poor local economies. Facilities for U.S. 

troops, both in port areas and up-country, were primitive or nonexistent and had 

to be constructed, causing considerable delay. Almost all planning had to be 

coordinated with the British and frequently required Soviet concurrence.

15 

THE PORTS 

On 13 December 1942, the 9th Port, commanded by Col. D.P. Booth, and 

the 378th Port Battalion began work at Khorramshahr, under British tutelage. 

The Americans took full control on 7 January 1943 and assumed operation of 

Bandar Shahpur a month later, becoming responsible to discharge the 

preponderance of cargo destined for the Soviets. 

U.S. port operations were limited to Korramshahr, Bandar Shapur, 

Cheybassi across the river from Basra, and a lighterage basin near Basra. These 

were the only sites that could be operated with the forces available. The 9th Port 

had four U.S. port battalions and elements of PGC support troops, such as MP, 

medical, signal, and engineer. Local labor for all ports peaked at 7,400 in August 

1944.16 Pilferage was such a major problem that for a while an entire port 

battalion was diverted to guard duty. Through strenuous efforts the port elements 

overcame operational obstacles and discharged 4.4 million long tons of cargo 

from November 1942 through May 1945Y As tonnage to the command 

declined, Cheybassi was returned to British operation on 1 November 1944, 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 167 

was subsequently redesignated the 791st Railway Operating Battalion and 

performed superbly throughout the campaign. 18 

Taking over the operation of the Iranian State Railroad had an even greater 

impact on overall operations than port discharge. Clearance capacity depended 

heavily on the ability to transfer cargo from the port to an adjacent area. At 

Bandar Shapur, the only means of clearance was by rail. More importantly, the 

measure of the command's success was the total tonnage delivered to the USSR, 

and it was considerable. Of some five million long tons delivered through the 

corridor from 1 January 1942 through 31 May I 945, about three million moved 

by rail. The 3d Military Railway Service reached a peak strength of 4,051 in late 

1944.19 The headquarters was reorganized using in-theater assets and 

reconstitution of the 702d Railway Grand Division as the 3d Military Railway 

Service. Under American operation, which included the infusion of U.S. rail 

equipment and construction effort, daily capacity increased to the point that the 

need for the supplementary Motor Transport Service (MTS) operations that had 

been filling the gap between rail capacity and the goal could be curtailed by 

September 1944. While much of the improvement in rail deliveries could be 

credited to added resources, American railroad know-how deserved a substantial 

share of the credit for overcoming exceptional challenges and improving 

operations through sound management. 

HIGHWAY OPERATIONS 

Headquarters, U.S. Motor Transport Service was organized with 

quartermaster personnel at Camp Lee, Virginia in October 1942 and was 

deployed to the Persian Gulf Service Command in late January 1943. It was 

commanded initially by Col. M.V. Brunson and later by Col. D. G. Shingler. 

The command included Quartermaster truck units equipped with 2 l/2-ton 

tractors with 7-ton semitrailers and 10-ton trucks. Ordnance maintenance units 

began arriving a month later. Road construction support was provided by the 

PGSC Construction Service. The requirements of Motor Transport Service 

Headquarters were unique and varied. In Teheran, the headquarters opened a 

school for interpreters, who were used in driver training classes. The 

headquarters deployed maintenance units, and prioritized and coordinated 

construction programs for the main supply route on which motor transport 

operations would be conducted?0 

The Motor Transport Service (MTS) was originally established as a 

supplement to British and Soviet truck operations and the Iranian State Railroad. 

However, until late 1943 and early 1944 when the ISR reached its planned 
166 Spearhead of Logistics 

Rail Yard in Teheran. 

Bandar Shapur ceased operations in January 1945, and Korramshahr operated at 

greatly reduced strength and outloaded U.S. forces until December 1945. The 

Persian Corridor port operations were some of the most unique of the war. 

RAIL OPERATIONS 

The 711 th Railway Operating Battalion took over the Iranian State Railway 

Khorramshahr-Ahwaz line on 1 January 1943 and by 18 January, was operating 

the 363 miles of the Southern Division. By 20 January, Col. Paul F. Yount 

assumed command as the director and general manager of the Military Railway 

Service (MRS) and assigned the 702 Railway Grand Division (RGD) and the 

730th Railway Operating Battalion (ROB) to Teheran to operate the Northern 

Division. By April 1943, it became evident two ROBs could not operate the 

entire line. The lst Provisional ROB was activated to take over the 220 miles 

and many tunnels of a newly formed Central Division. The provisional ROB 
168 Spearhead of Logistics 

capacity, increased American highway operations were essential to pick up the 

slack caused by failure of other carriers to meet deliveries. In early January 

1943, a provisional truck company, organized from theater assets and the 429th 

Engineer Dump Truck Company, formed a special convoy of some 200 vehicles 

to move tires and lumber from the Bushire USMIM-contracted General Motors 

Assembly Plant to Teheran. From this small beginning, truck operations peaked 

in July 1944, operating 3,430 trucks and tractors and 2,779 trailers with an 

overall availability rate of 90 percent The operating units were the 516th and 

51 7th Quartermaster Truck Regiments, with three battalions each, and the 26th 

Regiment with one battalion. There were also supporting ordnance maintenance 

and quartermaster service units. Motor Transport Service schools trained 7,500 

local national drivers, of which a maximum of 3,155 worked for MTS at any one 

time, while the others worked for our Allies or in the civil sector. Local nationals 

were hired as mechanics and for other technical and overhead tasks. By 

November 1943, more than 9,275 local nationals were employed. A highly 

successful antipilferage program was established under which losses from all 

causes were reduced to 0.5 percent of all tonnage moved. This was an 

outstanding accomplishment considering that pilferage rates were as high as 10 

percent at the ports in early operations. During its existence, the MTS hauled a 

total of 619,000 long tons and operated 100 million truck miles in all extremes of 

weather and over rough unsurfaced roads for much of the period. The command 

was disbanded on 1 December 1944, and most of the troops were transferred to 

the European Theater of Operations and China.

21 

After a slow beginning in early 1943 and hampered by delayed receipt of 

troops and equipment, the Persian Gulf Command went on to meet and exceed 

assigned goals for port discharge and rail and highway movements, which 

constituted the theater's main mission. Setting up the Motor Transport Service 

was more time-consuming than planners estimated, but its contributions were 

substantial. By October 1943, Soviet aid through the corridor exceeded the 

monthly goal of 200,000 long tons, and thereafter the command handled all 

receipts. 

The Persian Gulf Command was drawn down and the last 1,000 troops left 

by freighter and Army transport in December 1945. The command was 

inactivated on 31 December 1945. The achievements of the Persian Gulf 

Command were an excellent example of how rail, port, and motor transport 

operations could be successfully conducted in a semideveloped area?2 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 169 

CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 

Before and during World War n, a cornerstone of Japanese strategy in the 

Orient was the isolation of China to deny Chinese armies support from 

Manchurian and Chinese agricultural and industrial areas as well as foreign aid. 

The Japanese seized or destroyed agricultural resources and closed South China 

ports, cutting them off from all sources of supply, except a trickle coming 

through on the Burma Road. These measures effectively limited Chinese armies 

to guerrilla warfare because of lack of supplies. In March 1942, the Japanese 

seized Rangoon and cut the Burma Road. Not only was the Burma Road the last 

source of material which foreign aid had sustained, it was an important 

psychological link to the outside world. Only a modicum of supplies airlifted 

over the Himalayas could reach China after the Burma Road was cut. The area 

of operations is shown in Map 10.23 

Since their commitment to conquering China tied down huge numbers of 

Japanese troops, a primary Allied objective was to keep China actively in the 

war. Implementing that strategy was a matter of logistics, with transportation the 

most essential element. Obvious solutions like reopening the Burma Road, 

liberating Burma and Malaya, or recovering China ports were militarily 

unfeasible in the early stages of the war. Other strategic objectives had much 

higher priorities. 24 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) solution to reestablishing logistic 

support to China was the construction of a road from Ledo in Assam to the old 

Burma Road on the China-Burma border, tlu-ough areas where China's offensive 

capabilities could be expected to maintain contro1.25 Concurrently, augmentation 

of Assam air facilities was needed to increase airlift capability. This decision, in 

turn, required major expansion of the p01t of Calcutta and the lines of 

communication (LOCs) to Assam. The LOCs included the Bengal-Assam 

Railroad and the Brahmaputra Inland Waterway served by British commercial 

barge lines. Pipelines to airfields in upper Assam were necessary for the heavy 

equipment required for construction. All building materials had to be imported. 

There were limited LOC facilities to Ledo which could be expanded or used 

more. intensively. From there, the trace of the Ledo Road was an almost trackless 

waste of rugged mountains, canyons, and broad swampy valleys. Those areas 

were some of the most pestilential in the world. In addition, 150 to 175 inches of 

rain fell in the monsoon season. Many considered the task insuperable because it 

required an immense engineering effort?6 

Not only was the line of communication an engineering and logistic 

challenge, but India's eastern ports were blocked by Japanese naval activity in 
170 Spearhead of Logistics 

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World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 171 

the Bay of Bengal. Until the Allies could regain naval control in that area, 

shipments for China had to be off-loaded at Karachi and moved 2,100 to 3,000 

miles to eastern Assam over railroads already operating at full capacity and 

ill-prepared to accept added traffic. Bombay Port was also operating at full 

capacity and was generally used only for U.S. troop transports with too much 

draft for other ports. 

The first phase of wartime logistics operations began when Brig. Gen. 

(later Lt. Gen.) Raymond A Wheeler and a small staff from the Iranian mission 

arrived in Karachi on 9 March 1942 to command the Services of Supply (SOS) 

of the China, Burma, India theater, commanded by Lt. Gen. (later Gen.) Joseph 

W. "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell. With a limited number of troops and orders from the 

War Department to "live off the land," Wheeler received reverse lend-lease from 

the British and decentralized control of operations to base and advance sections. 

Col. Yount transferred from the Persian Gulf and took command of Base Section 

1 at Karachi where the 393d Quartermaster Port Battalion had just arrived to 

conduct U.S. port operations. In May, Wheeler moved SOS headquarters to New 

Delhi, collocated with British General Headquarters (lndia)?7 

In October 1942, the United States assumed responsibility for building the 

Ledo Road. By the end of the year, construction had begun. Transportation 

support was the responsibility of the regional sections that also controlled the 

assets. In April 1943, a Transportation staff section was formed in HQ SOS. It 

was mainly responsible for planning mode operations, so the sections continued 

to conduct operations. The United States relied as much as possible on the 

British for transport, which was booked through British movements authorities. 

There were limited U.S. transportation activities at Karachi, Bombay, and 

Calcutta ports. In the first phase of the activation of the China, Burma, and India 

theater, U.S. transportation field operations were minimal. 

Decisions at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, the TRIDENT 

Conference at Washington in May 1943, and the QUADRANT Conference in 

Quebec in August 1943 guided the Combined Chiefs of Staff strategic plan for 

Asia. The plans envisioned supplementing Allied forces in order to initiate 

offensive action in upper Burma and establish secure air and land routes to 

China. Maj. Gen. W. E. R. Covell took command of the Services of Supply, 

China, Burma, India in November 1943 and characterized transportation as "our 

most difficult and important problem."

28 

TI1e Services of Supply Transportation Service was established at New 

Delhi on 1 January 1944, commanded by Brig. Gen. Thomas B. Wilson, former 

Chief of Transportation, Southwest Pacific theater. In addition to staff functions, 
172 Spearhead of Logistics 

Ledo Road Burma 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 173 

he commanded the Military Railway Service which, on I March 1944, was 

scheduled to take over the meter-gauge line between Katihar and Ledo, 

American Barge Lines (ABL) and Bombay Port. American Barge Lines had 

been deployed for inland waterway missions, but its equipment was not suitable 

for the Brahmaputra River, and it was reassigned to operations in Calcutta Port. 

After a short time, it was evident that the Assam lines of communication 

were not operating efficiently under civilian control. The allotment of service 

troops to China, Burma, India by the QUADRANT decisions permitted the 

placement of Anglo-American officers in control of the lines of communication 

and the use of U.S. personnel in key positions. As they became available, U.S. 

operating units were incrementally added to the system. This resulted in an 

increase in tonnage just as the Japanese were reopening offensive operations?9 

At the beginning of this period, only the 540th and 54 1st Port Companies 

of the 393d Quartermaster Port Battalion were in the command. Initially 

assigned to Karachi, they were subsequently moved to Calcutta. In mid-1944, 

the 705th Railway Grand Division, affiliated with the Southern Pacific Railroad 

and commanded by Col. Stanley H. Bray, arrived in the theater. The 705th had 

five railway operating battalions and one railway shop battalion to augment 

British and Indian units. The 497th and 408th Port Battalion Headquarters with 

ten port companies and the 326th and 327th Harborcraft Companies were also 

deployed in the theater. Bottlenecks at Calcutta Port and on the Assam line of 

communication ceased and Maj. Gen. Covell reported that Wilson had done "a 

splendid job in building our Transportation Service from practically nothing." 

Nevertheless, Wilson's plans for a centralized control communication zone-type 

organization did not materialize and section commanders continued to control 

transportation operations within their areas.30 

The final phase of transportation operations was marked by the division of 

CBI into the India-Burma and China Theaters on 24 October 1944. At that time, 

Stillwell was recalled and Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Albert C. Wedemeyer 

assumed command of the China theater, while Lt. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan 

commanded the India-Burma theater. Sections were redesignated elements of 

each theater's SOS, or in the case of Advance Section One as the China SOS, 

but without any major initial restructuring?5 Because of the earlier continuing 

extensions of advance section operations, Wilson had assigned Col. Maurice E. 

Sheahan as his deputy and advance section transportation officer in February 

I 944?1 As transportation service operations were extended into China, Sheahan 

established a significant motor transport operation in support of the 14th Air 

Force. 
174 Spearhead of Logistics 

In early operations, cargo airlifted over the "Hump" of the Himalayas to 

Kunming was barely enough to keep Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault's 14th Air 

Force marginally operational and provide some aid to Chinese forces. From 

October 1944, resources of the theater Air Transport Command (ATC) were 

increased, and Hump airlift substantially overshadowed land lines of support to 

China through the end of the war. The completion of a four-inch fuel pipeline to 

Kunming in June 1945 also helped substantially. In October 1944, the ATC had 

an average strength of 298 assigned aircraft By June 1945, the strength of the 

operational fleet was 622. The number of personnel in the Air Transport Command 

increased about 50 percent. The increasing lift is shown in Chart 7.32 

AIRLIFT TO CHINA 

Year and Month To China 

1944 

October---------

November ________ __ 

December----------

1945 

January---------

February _______ _ 

March ________ _ 

April ________ _ 

May ________ __ 

June __________ _ 

• Short tons 

24,715* 

34,914 

31,935 

44,099 

40,677 

46,545 

44,254 

46,394 

55,387 

Chart7 

Intra-India 

12,224* 

15,553 

16,249 

17,112 

17,118 

19,424 

19,569 

15,015 

14,269 

While the bulk of the suppljes delivered to China was airlifted by the Air 

Transport Command, the cargo flown out of Assam was transported to bases 

there by Transportation Corps and Quartennaster troops and civilians of the 

India/Burma surface line of communication. Substantial increases in land 

transportation resources paralleled those for airlift. Chart 8 displays the 

relationship of overland deliveries within Burma and to China in 1945.33 

Prior to the increased air deliveries made by ATC, transportation resources 

in Free China were hopelessly inadequate. Lt. Gen. Wedemeyer requested Lt. 

Gen. Somervell, the Army Service Forces commander in Washington, to 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 175 

VEHICLE AND CARGO DELIVERIES 

TO CHINA AND BURMA BY MONTHS (1945) 

CHINA BURMA 

Vehicle and 

Gross Trailer Cargo Cargo 

MONTH Convoys Vehicles Trailers Weight• Weight• Weight• Weight• 

TOTAL 433 25!783 61539 1461948 1081886 361062 1611986 

FEBRUARY 22 1,333 609 5,231 4,120 1,111 27,087 

MARCH 22 1,152 745 6,788 5,279 1,509 34,579 

APRIL 38 2,342 1,185 15,447 11 ,249 4,198 31,797 

MAY 78 4,682 1,103 28,080 19,645 8.435 28,357 

JUNE 82 4,901 964 27,962 20,977 6,985 14,923 

JULY 75 4,745 828 23,370 17,470 5,900 16,085 

AUGUST 51 2,652 647 15,866 11,582 4,284 5,046 

SEPTEMBER 53 3,060 408 18,599 14,291 4,308 4,112 

OCTOBER 12 916 50 5,605 4,273 1,332 

• Short tons. 

Chart 8 

expedite delivery of 2,000 U.S. Army 2 1/2-ton and 5,000 lend-lease trucks on 

order on an emergency basis. The turning point in the critical transportation 

situation was the opening of the Stilwell Road (combined Ledo and Burma 

Roads) in January 1945, when Chinese forces from India and China routed the 

last Japanese block of the road to China. Additional support, including the sorely 

needed vehicles, flowed in by road. Concurrently, rail facilities in China were 

improved with technical and material assistance.

34 In March and April 1945, the 

Japanese, reacting to the threat of the lwo Jima and Okinawa invasions, began to 

withdraw and the Chinese followed, reoccupying the evacuated territory. For all 

practical purposes, the war in China, Burma, India was over. 

While transportation was the most pressing logistics problem in the CBI, it 

could only be solved by extensive engineer projects for roads, rail 

improvements, pipelines, and airfields. American resources were needed to 

supplement local national labor and commercial management of transportation 

resources. The availability of the infrastructure and resources co.incided with the 

phase-down of the war, and the full capabilities of the final force structure were 

never tested. Transportation management at section level was exercised by a 

variety of branch officers with local national truck units providing the highway 

capability. The effectiveness of Transportation Corps doctrine was not fully 

exploited in the China, Burma, India theater. 
176 Spearhead of logistics 

Elephants shunting cars in Assam. 

NORTH AFRICAN AND MEDITERRANEAN THEATERS 

STRATEGIC SITUATION 

The combined Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) controlled operations 

in the Mediterranean area and was responsible for logistical support of the forces 

that invaded North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and Southern France. Even though the 

Headquarters was combined, U.S. (NATOUSAJMTOUSA) and British logistical 

support elements remained separate. They operated on a cooperative basis, cross 

servicing each other and supporting Allies per political agreements. 35 

On 8 November 1942, a combined U.S. and British force invaded North 

Africa. The operation, codename TORCH, began with combined landings at 

Oran and Algiers in Algeria, and at Casablanca, Morocco. Subsequently, 

operations extended throughout the area shown on Map 11 ?6 Vichy French 

North African forces capitulated in three days. 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 177 

By 1 January 1943, 217,000 Americans of NATOUSA were deployed in 

units of a combined British, U.S., and French force attacking German Africa 

Corps and Italian units from the west. Concurrently, the British forces already in 

Africa attacked from the east. The U.S./British pincer movement compressed 

Axis forces into Tunisia and they surrendered on 9 May 1943.37 

After briefly refitting and regrouping, NATOUSA forces invaded Sicily in 

Operation HUSKY on 10 July 1943. The invading forces were under U.S. 

Seventh Army, part of which deployed directly from the zone of the interior and 

the British Eighth Army. The island was secured by 18 August 1943. 

Less than three weeks later, Operation AVALANCHE, the invasion of 

Italy was begun at Salerno. By I October 1943, Naples was taken. Allied U.S., 

French, and British forces gathered for the long campaign up the peninsula with 

U.S. elements on the west supported by NATOUSA's successor, MTOUSA. 

The campaign was slowed through 1944 because of stubborn resistance from the 

Germans, who were operating in terrain ideal for defense, and by the fact that 

the campaigns in France and Germany received first priority for personnel, 

equipment, and logistics support. After a bitter winter offensive in the northern 

Apennine Mountains, the Allied armies fmally defeated the Germans in the Po 

Valley. Axis forces in Italy capitulated 2 May 1945. 

While heavily engaged in Italy, forces in the Mediterranean Theater also 

supported Operation DRAGOON, the invasion of southern France which took 

place in August 1944. The U.S. Seventh Army and French Army B (later 

redesignated as First French Army) mounted the invasion supplied from bases in 

Italy and North Africa. Mediterranean Theater (MTOUSA) supported both 

major fronts until 20 November 1944 when European Theater of Operation 

(ETOUSA) took over support of operations in southern France. 

North African/Mediterranean Theater of Operation campaigns contributed 

markedly to the overall victory in Europe by holding Axis ground forces in place 

in Italy and threatening those in Yugoslavia. The theaters also provided bases 

for the 12th Tactical and 15th Strategic Air Forces, which operated against 

southern Europe and opened the Mediterranean route to the Middle East and 

India. 

NORTH AFRICA 

Prior to the TORCH landings, British and Axis armies had, since 1941 

fought in the western desert between Tripoli in Libya and Alexandria in Egypt. 

The area was described as a tactician's paradise and a quartennaster's hell because in 

its 1,400 miles, there was only the coastal highway and the ports of Tobruk and 

Benghazi for support operations and few obstacles to mechanized maneuver. 
178 

ATLANTIC 

OCEAN 

s p 

Map11 

Spearhead of Logistics 

A N 

.. ···· 

Opposing forces surged back and forth as each side's line of communication 

became more tenous with each advance?8 In French North Africa, ports were 

more plentiful and lines of communication were more extensive, but they were 

limited in capacity and confined to the coastal plain. Roads became morasses in 

heavy winter rains, and the desert climate in dry seasons put a premium on water 

supply and equipment maintenance. 

Planning for Operation TORCH was conducted by inexperienced staffs in 

only three months because the political decision for the invasion was delayed. 

From planning to execution, the operation was beset by tactical and logistics 

changes. As James A. Huston states in Sinews of War, "The invasion ... was a 

l 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 

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179 

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graduate school in logistics when too many officers had not yet completed even 

elementary school in that subject. ... It was not only the frrst ground offensive 

undertaken by Americans against the European Axis, it was also the greatest 

overseas expeditionary assault ever undertaken up to that time."39 As an 

operation carried out by one nation, it would have been difficult The fact that it 

was a combined operation made coordination doubly complicated. Forces were 

mounted from the United Kingdom (U.K.) and the U.S., separated by thousands 

of miles from each other and the landing sites. Major shortages of equipment 

and supplies were exacerbated by the inability of U.S. depots in the U.K. to 

locate some 260,000 measurement tons needed to meet D plus 5 needs, and the 
180 Spearhead of Logistics 

consequent need to reorder from the United States or procure those supplies in 

the United Kingdom. United States doctrine and procedures on combat loading 

were sorely lacking and potential losses from Axis submarine and air attacks in 

the Atlantic and Mediterranean fostered excessive emphasis on "what if' 

planning. A combined U.S./British transportation organization in Allied Forces 

Headquarters prepared general invasion and operational plans, while task force 

commanders in the U.S. and Britain performed detailed planning. 

As the invasion drew near, uncertainty and confusion bordered on chaos. 

Nevertheless, the convoys were loaded out, landings made with varying degrees 

of success, and initial objectives seized. The U.K./U.S. Eastern Task Force, 

whose landing at Algiers was followed in by the British First Army under 

General Sir Kenneth Anderson, turned toward Tunisia, while a thousand miles to 

the east, the British Eighth Army under Montgomery attacked west. Both were 

attempting to capture Tunis before Axis forces could occupy it The Allies failed 

and Axis forces withdrew into strong defensive positions in Tunisia. These 

moves created a stalemate just before the winter rains and delayed the ultimate 

Allied victory. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who commanded Axis forces 

during campaigns against the British in North Africa since February 1941, was 

absent from the theater during much of this campaign due to illness. General 

Juergen Von Arnim, whose forces had reinforced Tunisia in reaction to the 

British expulsion of Rommel's forces from Egypt in November 1942 and the 

TORCH landings, commanded in Rommel's absence. 

TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS 

In the Tunisian campaign, transportation was the key to victory. The Axis 

had the initial advantage because their Une of communication from Italy was 

very short. Not only was the Allied LOC much longer, but U.S. support elements 

in North Africa were short of units and equipment. Many U.S. units deployed 

with reduced or no organic equipment because of shortages in shipping. 

Vehicles were cut drastically on the premise that U.S. forces would be primarily 

in an occupation role. The thrust to Tunisia suddenly showed how flawed that 

decision was. Fortunately for the Allies, Lt. Gen. Somervell, the Army Service 

Forces Commander, attended the Casablanca Conference .in January 1943. When 

he conferred with Eisenhower and his staff, Somervell recognized that 

equipment and service forces were insufficient to meet even current needs, let 

alone support an offensive. He directed the War Department in the zone of 

interior (ZI) to immediately form and send a special convoy with a huge quantity 

of equipment that included nearly 5,000 trucks, rail engines, and cars, as well as 
·World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 181 

4,000 more service troops. General Eisenhower hailed the arrival of the convoy 

as a godsend, and he later attributed to it the success of the Tunisian campaign.40 

Once the U.S. forces were ashore, Allied Forces Headquarters established 

two U.S. base sections that were responsible for logistical functions in their 

respective areas. The Atlantic Base Section, located at Casablanca, was 

responsible for the Atlantic area. The transportation officer of the Atlantic Base 

Section (ABS) was Col. (later Brig. Gen.) George C. Stewart. The 

Mediterranean Base Section (MBS), headquartered in Oran, assumed 

responsibility for logistical operations in Algeria. Col. Thomas H. Stanley was 

was the section's transportation officer. 

When North African Theater of Operations (NATOUSA) was activated on 

4 February 1943, Colonel Stewart was appointed Staff Transportation Officer 

for the new organization and head of the U.S. transportation element of the 

Allied Forces Headquarters combined staff. This dual appointment centralized 

direction of U.S. transportation operations under Colonel Stewart, but execution 

remained the responsibility of the base section commanders and the 

Commander, Military Railway Service. 

THE PORTS 

Oran, by virtue of its central location, became, with nearby small terminals, 

the principal port for U.S. forces, although Casablanca handled substantial 

tonnages until the end of Axis resistance. As the lines of communication from 

the ports to Tunisia lengthened, it was evident that the highways and railroads 

were unable to support the traffic necessary to meet the armies' tonnage 

requirements, so support was diverted to or transhipped to ports farther east. 

United States port units assisted the British in the operation of Phllippeville, and 

in tum, they authorized the U.S. to use the port of Bone. The U.S. 8th Port 

opened Bizerte on 8 May 1943 and not only supported the close of the Tunisian 

campaign, but also became a port of embarkation for the Sicilian and Italian 

campaigns. 

Problems encountered in port operations were not unique to North Africa, 

but because it was the first large invasion, problems and solutions were 

highlighted and widely disseminated throughout the Transportation Corps to the 

benefit of future operations. The U.S.-operated ports in North Africa rolled up an 

impressive record and went on to provide outstanding service in future 

Mediterranean campaigns. 41 
182 Spearhead of Logistic 

HIGHWAY OPERATIONS 

Preinvasion planners recognized that rail facilities for port clearance could 

be destroyed, leaving trucks as the only means of port clearance. Computations 

of requirements were based on short hauls, but in actual North African 

operations, 50 to 250 mile hauls were required to offset the paucity of rail 

services. The planned force structure was insufficient to provide for the 

additional transportation requirements, but even planned resources were reduced 

because of shortages of shipping. Locally owned vehicles were phased into 

service, but control of civilian drivers was difficult In fact, control of all the 

facets of clearance- vehicles, storage space, and labor-was almost impossible 

to exercise initially because of the lack of adequate communications equipment, 

language problems, failure to bring adequate signage, and slow unloading at 

destinations. Ultimately, a workable control system was established and operated 

effectively, with exceptions for the normal hazards of combat operations such as 

road deterioration in the rainy season and enemy interdiction. 

Highway long hauls were not significant until Rommel's forces broke 

through Allied defenses at Kasserine in February 1943. This battle, which also 

included French and British troops, was notable because of Panzer 

breakthroughs of American forces in one of the more severe U.S. "bloodings" of 

the war. Rommel broke off his thrust through the Kasserine Pass before 

achieving a decisive objective because of personal conflicts in the Axis 

command system. However, this development could not be foreseen by the 

Allies, and because of the loss of the rail net in the area, emergency highway 

movement of rations, POL, ammunition, and other supplies to U.S. II Corps at 

Tebessa was imperative. Several new truck battalions were activated from 

combat units and within a week, loaded convoys moved east toward Tebessa in 

spite of the fact that some drivers had never even driven a car in civilian life. 

The tempo of long haul increased with that of the offensive to take Tunisia, 

and tight movement control in coordination with the British and French was 

established to maximize use of the limited road net. A system of "blocks," such 

as used on railroads, was developed with traffic control stations every thirty 

miles and telephone communications ensured pinpointing the location of each 

convoy at any time. By the fmal phase of the Tunisian campaign in April 1943, 

movement control procedures and experience made possible the successful 

movement of U.S. II Corps' 100,000 troops from the extreme southern flank to 

the coast across the rear of Allied forces and line of communication. Most of the 

move was by organic unit vehicles, supplemented by highway transport provided 

by the 2638th and 2640th Quartermaster Truck Battalions. 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 183 

Highway operations in North Africa accomplished assigned missions in 

spite of enemy air attacks and almost impassable roads, frequently operating 

under blackout conditions. As General Ross wrote, "When you tell a driver to 

get those rations to such and such a place, they only have enough for breakfast, 

you know he'll get them there come hell, high water or Nazis."42 

RAIL OPERATIONS 

North African railways operated in three nets which conformed to the 

boundaries of French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Generally single-tracked, 

the railroads stretched some 1 ,400 miles along the coast and used both electric 

and steam locomotives. Main lines were standard and branches usually meter 

gauge. While the system was generally undamaged, infrastructure and 

equipment were far below U.S. standards and poorly maintained. Operations 

were conducted mainly by the remaining French and Arab civilian organizations 

and directed by Allied military officials. Civilian crews ran the trains except in 

forward combat areas where Allied military engineers were assisted by French 

pilots. 

The initial U.S. supervisory component in the North African Theater of 

Operation Transportation Section was staffed with trained railroad men whose 

affiliations read like a roster of U.S. railroads. In Morocco, military control was 

almost entirely supervisory, and only limited aid was given to increase 

capability. The Algerian roads carried the largest tonnages. They also received 

the most troop and material assistance which eventually constituted about 70 

percent of the Algerian system capacity. The Tunisian system, which was in 

Axis territory most of the campaign, was in the worst condition because of 

combat damage and sabotage, and required the most reconstruction help to 

c th . M d' . 43 support •Or corrung e 1terranean campa1gns. 

By early 1943, it became evident that support of tactical operations 

required a special military railway organization, in addition to Allied Forces 

Headquarters and base section rail staff offices, if it were to function on a 

theaterwide basis. Unfortunately, few qualified military railway people had 

reached the theater at this time. The need was addressed during General 

Somervell's Casablanca visit and he directed Brig. Gen. Carl R. Gray, Jr., 

General Manager of the Military Railway Service in the zone of interior, to deploy 

to North Africa. On 9 February 1943, Gray and an advance party arrived in Algiers, 

where he became Director General of the U.S. and British MRS organizations with 

British Brigadier R. F. O'Dowd Gage as his deputy. Gray reported directly to 

the AFHQ commander and was not under direct supervision of the AFHQ 
184 Spearhead of Logistics 

Chief of Transportation (Coff).44 This potentially awkward arrangement worked 

because everyone concerned handled it professionally with their focus on the 

mission. While Gray continued to look to the French to run the railways because 

of manpower requirements, the Military Railway Service immediately began 

efforts to supplement system resources with personnel and equipment. It aided 

infrastructure improvements, using both Military Railway Service and engineer 

resources. 

Activation of the MRS Headquarters and the crucial stages of the campaign 

coincided, and Gray immediately assigned the bulk of U.S. railway units 

in-theater and those that were arriving to operational roles in the forward areas in 

the vicinity of Philippeville, Constantine, Tebessa, and Gafsa. MRS units 

frequently operated under enemy ground fire and strafing during February 1943, 

and operations were hindered by mines placed along the right-of-way. As the 

Allies advanced deeper into Tunisia, turnaround became increasingly important, 

and the common combat zone problems of cars being unloaded too slowly, fuel 

shortages, and track rehabilitation and replacement were solved by MRS. 

Following the Axis surrender, the Allies focused on rehabilitation of the 

Tunisian system, and the French resumed control of civilian operations as 

rapidly as possible. Some MRS units and resources continued to assist civilian 

operations temporarily to ensure support of the forthcoming campaigns, but the 

bulk of MRS units deployed to other operations in Sicily and Europe.

45 

The North African campaign was a primer for solving fundamental 

transportation problems that would be encountered in future campaigns. The Jist 

of challenges was long and varied. Despite the fact that protective packaging 

was designed and used and guards were posted in ports, pilferage was a 

continuing problem. Units were shipped without their equipment, a serious 

condition that called for immediate corrective action. Insufficient service troops 

to clear ports and gain control of theater stocks was an extremely grave problem 

that led to duplicate shipments and waste of transportation resources. Zealous 

efforts by units to avoid any conceivable shortage strained shipping and 

generated excesses in the theater that in turn overtaxed theater storage capacity 

and denigrated the supply system. The latter problem was acute in estimating 

automatic supply items such as rations. The solution was to stop automatic 

supply and implement requisitioning as soon as possible. 

The North African campaign gave the Transportation Corps it-; first real 

opportunity to manage transportation in combat operations. Allied Forces 

Headquarters and base section transportation staffs closely managed all 

transportation resources, shifting traffic to coastal water movement to 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commttments 185 

supplement highway and rail capacity within port and beach capabilities. 

Existing water, rail, and highway facilities were integrated to form a single 

transportation system within the theater. Brig. Gen. George C Stewart, AFHQ 

Coff, stated in the campaign after-action report, "U.S. troops never lacked 

supplies as a result of the failure of transportation."46 The experience gained in 

the campaign stood the Transportation Corps in good stead throughout the 

remainder of the war. 

SICILY 

Sicily, as shown in Map 12 is about the size of the state of Vermont and 

largely mountainous.47 Movement was difficult except over main roads and 

through the eastern central plain, which is bounded on the north by Mount Etna, 

a peak over 10,000 feet high. The main mountain range runs along the north 

coast. Rivers and streams dry up in July and are not major obstacles to tactical 

operations. The northeast tip is directly across the narrow Straits of Messina, 

which gave the Axis a ready route to reinforce the island using train ferries 

that operated daily across the straits. The port of Messina was a key 

objective, but not for the initial assaults. Only the south coast offered 

practical landing sites that could be protected by Allied aircraft from Malta 

and North Africa. 

Operation HUSKY was a combined U.S. and British operation planned and 

expedited by General Eisenhower's headquarters. General Sir Harold Alexander 

commanded the 15th Army Group (codenamed Force 141), which included 

Patton's Seventh and Montgomery's Eighth Armies as the invasion force. 

D-Day was 10 July 1943, just two months after the surrender of Axis forces in 

Tunisia. 

Planning was conducted during the latter stages of the North African 

campaign by tactical commanders and staffs involved in both operations as well 

as AFHQ and North African Theater of Operation staffs. Logistical support 

elements in North Africa had to make the transition from support of the final 

assault in Tunisia to stage and outload the invasion force. Theater stock control 

procedures were in their infancy, and there was not time to stabilize records, 

align resources, and ensure follow-on support of HUSKY. As a result, the U.S. 

45th Infantry Division was not staged through North Africa, but was combat 

loaded from the United States. Theater units were reequipped through 

emergency requisition to the zone of interior, and resupply was by automatic 

shipment from the zone of interior throughout the operation.48 

At this stage in the development of U.S. amphibious assault doctrine, 

resupply of attacking units over the beach was considered very risky and early 
186 Spearhead of Logistics 

N 

.,... 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 187 

capture of one or more viable ports was considered essential to the sustainment 

of the invasion force. Nevertheless, General Eisenhower decided to concentrate 

attacks in the southeast and capture important airfields early rather than ports in 

the initial stage of the invasion. This proved to be a wise decision, partly because 

of the advantage land-based airpower gave the Allies, but also because the new 

amphibious equipment was a great success. For the first time, U.S. forces used 

the oceangoing landing ship tank (LST) and landing craft tank (LCf), vessels 

that could sail on their own from North Africa, participate in the assault, and 

return for resupply. Sicily also heralded the appearance of the 2 1/2-ton 

amphibian truck (DUKW). Available for ship to shore movement of troops and 

cargo, the DUKW was highly effective, despite the fact that some of them were 

diverted by combat forces to haul cargo inland because of a shortage of trucks.49 

Enemy opposition to the landings and subsequent operations generally did 

not prevent combat forces from attaining objectives on schedule. Allied forces 

were able to seize ports and other transportation facilities rather quickJy. But the 

ports needed considerable repair, so resupply over the beaches and through small 

southern ports continued until Palermo came on line. Taking only thirty-eight 

days, the campaign was very successful. The only drawback was that the Axis 

were able to evacuate about 100,000 combat-hardened troops with their 

equipment before the island fell. The evacuees included three German divisions 

whose presence would be painfully felt in the coming Italian campaign. 5° 

An organizational innovation for the Sicily landings was the designation of 

the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, which conducted amphibious training for all 

units in North Africa, to serve as the SOS for the Seventh Army. By operating 

engineer shore groups for the assault, the brigade quickJy controlled all support 

activities in the objective area. Brigade operations were effective after 

successfully overcoming the chaos of the frrst few days and generated extensive 

lessons learned for the future. 

THE PORTS 

Transportation Corps units were phased in to take over operation of the 

ports as soon as engineer and Navy salvage teams cleared piers and ramps and 

made them safe for operations. On 1 August 1943, the lOth Port took over at 

Palermo, which became the principal port for Sicily even though operations 

were hampered by the extensive damage to facilities and lack of service troops. 

Licata and other small ports on the south coast were closed by the end of 

August, by which time Palermo had reached 60 percent of its peacetime 

capacity. On 1 September 1943, Island Base Section (IDS) took over from the 
188 Spearhead of Logistics 

1st Engineer Special Brigade. All transportation operating units including 

Quartermaster truck and service-type units were assigned or attached to the IBS 

Transportation Division.51 

RAIL OPERATIONS 

Although it was not necessary to use all 759 miles of the Sicilian rail net, 

some sections played a key role in the support of U.S. forces because there were 

not enough vehicles to carry the tonnage the rapid tactical advance required. 

Advance parties of the experienced 727th Railway Operating Battalion anived 

in Licata from North Africa on 12 July and immediately initiated operations 

using U.S. and local rail employees. On the 13th, they shipped 400 tons of 

supplies to the 3rd Infantry Division; on the 14th, the total jumped to 600 and 

gradually rose to a daily total of 2,000 tons. By the end of July, the rest of the 

battalion arrived just as the tracks to clear the port of Palermo were opened by 

the engineers and maintenance of way troops with the 727th ROB advance 

party. Soon rail shipments were exceeding the capability of recipients at 

railheads to unload. Normal combat zone operating problems like sabotaged 

track infrastructure and equipment, lack of water for steam engines, and 

inadequate communications were quickly overcome, and the 727th ROB won 

high praise from General Patton for its operations. 5

2 

HIGHWAY OPERATIONS 

During invasion planning, the Transportation Section recommended and 

received approval to include the 6623d Regulating Co (Provisional), a highway 

traffic regulating unit, in the troop list. The 6623d furnished some of the staff of 

the Transportation Branch, G4, Seventh Army, which ultimately controlled 

highway operations and Quartermaster truck unit activities in Sicily. Key 

highway transport tasks included beach and port clearance which were initially 

controlled by the engineer brigade, line-haul from ports, and line-haul from 

railheads. The Transportation Branch was empowered to exercise close control 

over all highway movements that included routing, siting of supply dumps, and 

centralized dispatch control. The branch was even able to obtain workable 

restrictions on local civilian use of main truck routes. While truck operations did 

not move the quantities shipped by rail, they became increasingly efficient and 

provided a glimpse of what the future had in store for the truck units of the 

Transportation Corps. 5

3 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 189 

ANIMAL TRANSPORT 

Sicily's rough terrain made the use of animal transport essential. Some 

4,000 pack horses, mules, and donkeys were acquired through capture, purchase, 

and hire. Loads were from 250 to 275 pounds and of course had to include 

forage. Some 1,500 animals were lost through enemy action. The experiences 

gained in Sicily using all modes of transportation were soon put to good use on 

the Italian mainland.54 

ITALY 

TACTICAL OVERVIEW 

On 24 July 1943, as Palermo fell to the Allies, the Italian Fascist Grand 

Council deposed Benito Mussolini. His successor, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, 

promised Hitler that Italy would continue the war, but soon began secret 

negotiations with the Allies. The Germans, realizing their ally was no longer 

reliable, began to pull back from Sicily. They realigned their forces to continue 

to control occupied areas and block the Allies from attacking north through Italy 

or across the Adriatic through the Balkans. Meanwhile, the Germans rescued 

Mussolini and established him as the leader of a German puppet regime in 

northern Italy. The Allies modified their strategy to take advantage of the 

changing situation. Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of northern France, 

continued as first priority, but AVALANCHE, the invasion of Italy, was 

scheduled for the Salerno area on 9 September 1943 (Map 13).55 The major 

objectives of AVALANCHE were to force Italy out of the war and tie down as 

many German divisions as possible to keep them away from France and, if 

possible, pull more German divisions from the Eastern Front. Italy also offered 

the Allies control of Rome, a worldwide symbol, and access to airfields within 

striking distance of Axis industrial areas in Germany and Austria. 

Neither the landing site at Salerno nor those further north were ideal for 

amphibious assaults. The beaches were adequate for landings, but the 

surrounding area was mountainous and the narrow coastal plain was dominated 

by steep, high hill masses which favored the defenders. Farther north, from the 

Voltumo River to Rome, were over 100 miles of precipitous mountains divided 

by swift streams usually running east and west, well suited to delaying actions. 

Autumn was the wettest season of the year, bringing with it thick mud that 

hampered vehicle movement. The Germans, under Field Marshal Albert 

Kesselring, defended tenaciously and withdrew skillfully without undue 

casualties or losses of equipment and inflicted maximum delay and casualties on 

the Allies throughout the long campaign. Nevertheless, the Allies persevered and 
190 Spearhead of Logistics 

Anzlo 

0 25 SOMILES 

1~---r--~·--~.----~1 Capri 

0 50 KILOMETl:RS 

Map 13 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 191 

made progress in spite of continued reassignments of their best units to other 

campaigns and their general status as a theater of secondary importance. The 

Germans held successively on strongly developed defensive lines south of 

Rome, fighting the Allies to a standstill by the end of March 1944 in spite of the 

Allied amphibious envelopment and small beachhead at Anzio from late January 

through March 1944. The Allies finally broke through and captured Rome on 

4 June 1944, and continued to press the Germans through 1944 in operations in 

the area shown in Map 14. During that drive, Infantry Private First Class Leo J. 

Powers, later a Sergeant in the Transportation Corps, received the Army Medal of 

Honor for exceptionally heroic actions in the battle for Cassino, Italy.

56 The fmal 

Allied offensive was launched in early April 1945 and resulted in the surrender 

of all German forces and their remaining Italian Fascist allies on 2-4 May 1945. 

TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS 

The duration and slow progress of the campaign had a major bearing on 

transportation support requirements. The Allies literally inched forward. 

Damaged transportation infrastructure was rebuilt and ran very close to the rear 

of combat areas. Transport operations were subject to normal wartime 

interference, but not the long haul emergency challenges of Tunisia or the Third 

Army's attack across France. Transportation managers had to cope with the 

continuing problem of losing trained units to other theater operations and the 

need to replace them with local nationals or minimally trained replacements. 

THE PORTS 

The landing at Salerno was hampered by shortages of units and vehicles 

because of the chronic dearth of shipping that characterized all support in Italy. 

As in Sicily, the new types of landing craft did yeoman service. Salerno port 

could accommodate only coasters, and over-the-beach resupply was used until 

the capture and partial rehabilitation of Naples. 

The 6th Port with the 389th and 480th Port Battalions operated Salerno, 

supplemented by Italian labor. It subsequently moved to Naples after the city 

was occupied on 1 October 1943. Although the Naples Port was thoroughly 

wrecked by Allied bombings and German demolition, American engineers and 

port troops soon had it working at a level exceeding its prewar capacity. A 

number of expedients were used, such as building ramps over the hulks of 

sunken ships to provide pier space. This was much quicker than raising or 

cutting them up. Local labor was used extensively with meals and night 
192 

LIGURIAN 

SEA 

0 

TYRRHENIAN SEA 

0 

0 

I 

0 

26 60 Milea 1 

6b Kilomll ll 

Map14 

Spearhead of Logistics 

GULF 

OF 

VENICE 

ADRIAnCSEA 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 193 

differential pay as incentives. In six months, Naples, with its satellite ports, 

became the busiest port in the theater, a notable achievement In addition to 

German demolition of the port, there was a myriad of other difficulties to 

overcome. At first, the port was a prime target for enemy air raids. There was a 

shortage of lifting equipment and labor at both the port and its supporting 

dumps, which was compounded by damage to the railroads that were the 

primary port clearance facility. The port also had to deal with high winds and 

rough seas. Nevertheless, Naples not only served as the principal port of 

debarkation, but also the port of embarkation for the amphibious assault at 

Anzio. 

The Anzio assault was intended to cut the line of communication of the 

German Tenth Army, in conjunction with attacks by the U.S. Fifth and British 

Eighth Armies, and force the Nazis to withdraw north of Rome. Although the 

Germans were taken by surprise, Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas, commanding the 

operation, failed to exploit the surprise and dug in. Given a chance to react, the 

Germans aggressively counterattacked the expansion of the beachhead, 

threatening to destroy it. Instead of exploitation, survival became the mission. 

The lOth Port and 488th Port Battalion discharged cargo from Liberty ships, 

landing ships tank (LST), and landing craft. Enemy artillery, aircraft, and 

E-boats harassed the operation to the point the 488th Battalion was returned to 

Naples because of casualties, illness, and fatigue. Thereafter, a port crew was 

sent to unload and return with each Liberty ship. Landing Ships Tank were 

loaded with 2 1/2-ton trucks carrying 5 short tons of required items, backed onto 

the LST for rapid discharge at Anzio. Trucks moved rapidly to the appropriate 

dump, were unloaded and reloaded with salvage, and were concealed until the 

next returning LST was ready to load. 

Failure to move out early from the Anzio beachhead meant another 

operation had to be supported from the sea. This caused a further strain on Army 

watercraft resources, which were already in short supply. 

After the fall of Rome, the ports of Civitavecchia, Piombino, and Leghorn 

were opened. Leghorn required extensive rehabilitation, but by the end of the 

war, Naples and Leghorn were the two main ports in operation. Both would 

redeploy thousands of U.S. troops and equipment items in 1945 after doing a 

superb job of supporting the Italian and southern France campaigns.

57 

RAIL OPERATIONS 

Allied bombing and Axis demolition left the railroads m Italy almost 

inoperable. However U.S. engineers quickly initiated temporary repairs so port 
194 Spearhead of Logistics 

clearance rail operations could be conducted at Salerno. Two hundred fifteen 

carloads of ammunition, rations, and POL were moved out of the port by rail the 

last week of September, three weeks after the initial assault. More extensive 

engineer reconstruction was needed, but operations were handicapped by 

insufficient water for the operation of steam locomotives, diversion of a main 

railroad bridge to vehicular traffic, and the transport of refugees. Nevertheless, 

the rail system continued to move cargo to supplement truck clearance of 

Salerno, and the line to Naples was gradually put in operation by U.S. and 

British rail troops and Italian labor. 

On 7 October 1943, General Gray, Allied Forces Headquarters Director 

General, Military Railway Service, took charge of all Allied railroad troops and 

the operation of all state and privately owned railways in Italy. British and U.S. 

rail units were assigned to separate zones, generally behind the Eighth and Fifth 

Armies respectively. They worked together on rehabilitating the entire system, a 

gargantuan task as the Germans had exercised great ingenuity in destruction. 

German engineers had blasted bridges and tunnels and used a device called the 

"big hook," which was towed on a flat car behind a train to rip up the ties and 

drop charges to twist the rails. Coal shortages were a particular problem. Large 

quantities were shipped to the theater, but were insufficient. Diesel fuel could be 

imported more easily, and the Americans brought in diesel locomotives and 

converted many coal-burning locomotives to burn diesel. This dual fuel system 

kept the railroads running. One of the most unusual challenges that faced the 

Military Railway Service was a thick layer of ash and cinders from the eruption 

of Mt. Vesuvius in March 1944, which stopped operations. All efforts were 

diverted for two days to clean up the·ash. 

By January 1944, General Gray's MRS had operational control of about 

2,400 miles of lines. Rehabilitation and operations were pushed forward almost 

within sight of combat operations. Military railway troops assisted the engineers 

in rebuilding a 237-foot bridge over the Garigliano River, the longest span 

replaced in the theater. Military Railway Service operations were based in Rome 

after its liberation and moved to the Leghorn-Pisa-Florence area as operations 

advanced into northern Italy. 

During July and August 1944, Allied forces moved to ports to outload for 

southern France. Included were several rail battalions under General Gray and 

his new Military Railway Service Headquarters. Brigadier R. D. Waghom, the 

British Transportation Service Chief, was made Director of the Allied Military 

Railway Service in Italy. As operations extended to the north, portions of the 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 195 

network were progressively released to the Italian State Railways, with all 

transfers completed by June 1945.58 

HIGHWAY OPERATIONS 

Early in the campaign, highway transport was the only mode available for 

most tasks. Trucks continued to be the workhorse for port clearance, base and 

depot hauling, and deliveries forward from the railheads, which in the early part 

of the campaign were far behind forward supply dumps. Enemy ground and air 

attack, always a threat, was best met by the movement and scheduling flexibility 

provided by truck transport. 

With experiences in North Africa and Sicily, Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Ralph 

H. Tate, the G4, Fifth Army, fully recognized the need for centralized control of 

transportation resources. Despite the unwillingness of the Quartermaster, Tate 

insisted his Transportation Section control all truck unit lift capabilities, rather 

than the Quartermaster who was a user of transportation. The Transportation 

Section was headed by Maj. Franklin M. Kreml, an experienced offi cer, who had 

been on the theater transportation staff since the landing at Oran in November 

1942. The Transportation Section was able to integrate and use the available lift 

of all modes to best perform port clearance and forward movement tasks. The 

section also established controls over traffic behind the combat zone by 

coordinating and prioritizing engineer road and bridge repair, military police 

operations, and convoy operations. Interface with other users of the road net, 

particularly the British and their Q-Movements staff were emphasized. All 

actions were designed to keep traffic fluid behind the armies. To increase 

productivity of vehicles, drivers, and the road net, the section requisitioned 

almost 600 6- and 10-ton tractor trailers by March 1945. The new tractor-trailer 

units were suitable for operations on improved roads, but the standard 2 1/2-ton 

6x6, carrying 4 to 5 tons was the best vehicle for general use on long or short 

hauls in Italy. The Peninsular Base Section (PBS) had about 3,300 in service by 

December 1944. Motor transport remained a major contributor to port and depot 

operations as well as support of combat forces throughout the campaign.59 

ANIMAL TRANSPORT 

As in Sicily, the highly mechanized U.S. Army was forced to fall back on 

animal transport to support advances in the mountainous terrain north of Naples. 

However, few animals could be had and special agencies were set up to procure 

animals, forage, and equipment. By December 1943, the Fifth Army had about 
196 Spearhead of Logistics 

2,300 mules and was highly dependent on them to carry essential supplies to 

forces in contact along the Axis Winter Line. Local animals could subsist on 

home-grown hay and chopped straw that was in short supply but could be 

procured locally. However, when the lOth Mountain Division arrived in late 

1944, they had 7,100 American mules (with 500 replacements a month) that had 

to be fed their customary hay and grain. This markedly increased the importation 

of forage and required the diversion of nine mule ships from the Burma-India 

run for initial deployment and mule replacements. As in previous wars, 

logisticians learned that logistical support of animals had to be given detailed 

attention in planning deployment and support.60 

PIPELINES 

The pipelines operated by engineer and quartermaster troops played a 

major role in keeping the road and rail movement requirements within the 

capabilities of resources. The engineers constructed four- and six-inch pipelines 

to move huge quantities of aviation fuel to support airfields in the Foggia area. 

They also provided motor fuels to support Fifth Army's advance up the west 

side of Italy, easing the transportation task. During January J 944, pipeline 

support of Fifth Army was the equivalent of 50 tank cars or 250 to 300 trucks a 

day. Pipelines were a small target for enemy air and artillery fire, unaffected by 

weather and usable constantly up to capacity, although susceptible to pilferage 

and sabotage. Every effort was made to push pipelines to large consumption 

areas whenever possible.61 

REDEPLOYMENT 

In April 1945, redeployment from Italy began with Naples and Leghorn as 

the primary ports. A number of ships carrying materials no longer needed were 

returned to the United States, while other ships were loaded with ammunWon, 

pierced steel planking, vehicles, and heavy weapons for the Pacific. The loss of 

Transportation Corps units and soldiers was offset by increasing the use of local 

labor and prisoners of war, the latter usually organized into service units. 

Mediterranean Theater transportation management was consolidated under the 

commanding officer, lOth Port and a Military Railway Service supervisory 

element to ensure support of U.S. occupation forces around Trieste and manage 

disposal of U.S. equipment. They remained long after hostilities ceased. 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 

THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE 

TACTICAL OVERVIEW 

197 

The original concept called for the invasion of southern France to be 

executed simultaneously with the Nonnandy landings. Detailed planning was 

initiated in Algiers by a Seventh Army task force working with Services of 

Supply, North African Theater of Operation in Oran under the codename of 

ANVIL. In March 1944, the invasion was temporarily caUed off due to lack of 

shipping, but in June 1944, the decision was made to mount the assault on 15 

August 1944, under the codename DRAGOON. 

As shown in Map 15, the invasion force of Seventh U.S. Anny and French 

Anny B (later First French Army) of some 522,000 troops (of which 72,410 

were in service units) and 110,000 vehicles was to make the initial landing in 

three division task forces on the beaches between Toulon and Nice, capture 

Marseille, and other ports, attack north through the Rhone Valley to join with 

U.S. armies, and provide supplemental combat power and supplies for the 

continuing attacks to the east to defeat Gennany.62 The invasion and follow-on 

operations were to be supported from within the theater and the zone of interior. 

It was considered a secondary operation to provide support for Eisenhower's 

main attack. 63 

The landings were successful and combat forces advanced rapidly. They 

covered about 330 miles by 15 September and joined up with the 6th Anny 

Group of U.S. and French armies. Base and advance sections were established to 

support the combat forces with an advance element of Communication Zone 

(COMZONE), Mediterranean Theater of Operation at Lyon providing overall 

coordination. Communication Zone was eventually replaced by HQ, Southern 

Line of Communications (SOLOC), commanded by Maj. Gen. Thomas B. 

Larkin, under the European Theater of Operations (ETO) Communications Zone 

Commander, Lt. Gen. John C.H. Lee. The Southern Line of Communications 

commander was given wide latitude to direct SOLOC operations. Existing 

arrangements for support from the Mediterranean area and the zone of interior 

remained in effect. 

TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS 

Brig. Gen. George C. Stewart was appointed as Maj. Gen. Larkin's 

Transportation Officer. Stewart had jurisdiction over Transportation Corps 
198 Spearhead of Logistics 

ITALY 

FRANCE ' 

Map 15 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 199 

activities. installations, and troops, and coordinated transportation operations 

between sections. However, the Military Railway Service, under Brig. Gen. Carl 

R. Gray, Jr. remained autonomous under Southern Line of Communication.

64 

Tactical and strategic planners expected stronger German resistance than 

that actually encountered. Consequently, the assault and follow-up convoy was 

weighted heavily in favor of combat units and munitions at the expense of 

petroleum, oil, lubricants (POL), service units, and vehicles. However, 

transportation planning and operational experience gained in North Africa, 

Sicily, and Italy helped offset late arrivals. Transportation operations were well 

planned and executed, and transportation contributed substantially to the success 

of the overall operation. 

THE PORTS 

The initial assaults encountered relatively light resistance on the beach, and 

the division task forces operated independently until the Beach Control Group 

assumed over-all direction for Seventh Army on D plus 2. Amphibian trucks 

and landing craft, tank (LCf) moved cargo from ships in the stream to beaches. 

There were insufficient trucks to move cargo from LCT and other landing craft, 

which had sailed directly from Italy and North Africa, and the rapidity with 

which cargo was put ashore (about 300,000 tons of dry cargo by D plus 30) 

swamped the capabilities of the limited numbers of beach control group troops. 

As the campaign became a pursuit of a fleeing enemy, transportation forward 

movement requirements greatly increased. Emergency measures were taken to 

expedite arrival of troop and cargo-handling equipment, but convoy schedules 

were hard to change, and the priority of forward support missions absorbed 

assets as they arrived. The use of civilians was limited by the dearth of 

able-bodied men, most of whom had either fled to North Africa or been 

conscripted by the Germans for forced labor elsewhere. The early capture of 

Toulon and Marseille, about four weeks ahead of schedule, allowed accelerated 

base development and took pressure off the beaches sooner than anticipated.65 

Toulon was used briefly for invasion support, but subsequently became a 

naval base and the principal discharge point for Civil Affairs cargo. The Coastal 

Base Section (CBS) advance party entered Marseille on 24 August. Destruction 

was enormous and all channels were blocked by seventy-five sunken ships. 

Mines were scattered everywhere in the harbor, and on land all of the buildings 

were demolished or badly damaged and booby-trapped. Railroad tracks were 

ripped up. The Navy and the 36th Engineer Combat Regiment immediately 

started rehabilitation. On I September, the 6th Port and engineer port 
200 Spearhead of Logistics 

construction units came ashore. On 8 September, 6th Port began discharging 

amphibious craft and lighters with cranes brought from Naples. On 15 

September, the first Liberty ship was berthed. At first, most cargo was 

off-loaded to lighters, and troops and vehicles to landing craft, both beached in 

the port area. Rehabilitation progressed rapidly. By the end of September, 

operable pier berthing spaces for fifteen Liberties and five coasters were 

accessible through cleared ship channels. Port-de-Bouc, a satellite port two 

miles west of Marseille, was captured by the French Forces of the Interior (FFI) 

and became a bonus supply base. It initially handled only general cargo, but as 

pipelines and three nearby refineries were rehabilitated, it eventually became the 

principal POL port, handling 70 percent of Allied POL requirements as well as 

substantial general cargo. Port-de-Bouc also became the origin terminal of 

pipelines to the north. 66 In the last two weeks of September 1944, southern ports 

discharged an average of 5,000 tons of general cargo a day, and Marseille and 

Port-de-Bouc quickly became the funnel through which the line of 

communication in southern France was supplied.

67 

On 8 September, Coastal Base Section, which was redesignated 

Continental Base Section two days later, opened at Marseille. The CBS became 

responsible for noncombat activities from the coast to the Seventh Army's 

moving rear boundary, then at Lyon. It sent supply representatives to work with 

the Army G4 staff and coordinated with corps and Army staffs to move supplies, 

dumps, depots, and supply points forward. 

The initial transportation support of combat elements was by necessity 

limited to highway and pipeline modes because of initial delays in getting main 

rail lines operating. A huge shortfall of transportation assets and capabilities was 

evident as early as the initial landings, and it overshadowed all other logistical 

challenges. The situation was the culmination of combat-heavy assault loading, a 

theater-wide shortage of truck and rail assets, and a shortage of POL. The 

rapidity of the Seventh Army's link-up with Third Army exacerbated all other 

obstacles. The linkup occurred on 12 September, eleven days prior to the 

planned capture of Marseille and well before the planned breakout and 

aggressive movement into Northern France. 

HIGHWAY OPERATIONS 

Truck requirements escalated at an alarming rate, and fuel consumption 

rates immediately exceeded estimates. For example, the 3d Infantry Division 

developed shortages on D plus 1 and the VI Corps the following day. By 19 

August, shortages were critical. The crisis was barely solved by focusing 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 201 

DUKW operations on packaged POL and by exploiting captured German stocks 

and those at French refineries at Port-de-Bouc. The construction of military POL 

storage at Port-de-Bouc and the initiation of pipeline construction toward Lyon 

helped. 

The Seventh Army Transportation Officer's centralized control over all 

army truck assets, to include some at division level, was a large factor in 

averting a halt to Seventh Army's advance. The Continental Base Section 

Transportation Section's Highway Division took drastic measures to alleviate 

the crisis. Service units were held in the port areas temporarily for general 

supply operations rather than moving directly to their assignment, and arriving 

units were required to load their trucks with supplies for the forward combat 

units. They were required to make one round trip before deploying to their 

destination. A Movements Control Office was opened at Continental Base 

Section headquarters which established control of U.S. and French military 

convoys and rerouted them over the best routes. 

By the end of September, actions were underway to convert two 

antiaircraft battalions to truck battalions and organize other battalions with 

Italian prisoners of war (POW). By October, truck requirements eased as 

railroad rehabilitation reached the point where the miitary railway system could 

handle the bulk of the line haul. 68 

RAIL OPERATIONS 

The rapidity of the German withdrawal left rail facilities in good condition 

compared with those previously encountered, except in Marseille where the 

majority of rail facilities were destroyed and bridges demolished. Rehabilitation 

was begun as rapidly as possible. The arrival of the 703d Railway Grand 

Division (RGD) and 713th Railway Operating Battalion was accelerated to 29 

August, while the I st Military Railway Service opened an advance element in 

Lyon on 14 September. 

Sections of a narrow gauge railroad in the beachhead area were made 

operational with French crews by D plus 2, and main lines paralleling the coast 

began operations as far west as St. Maxim by 23 August. French train crews 

were recruited, and sections of rail lines were opened as soon as they were 

repaired. Sometimes trucks were used to transfer cargo between breaks in the 

line. By mid-September, the line north was open for 220 miles over temporary 

bridges. By the end of the month, the line was open to Besancon for 1,500 ton5 a 

day, as indicated in Map 16.69 Nevertheless, railroads did not attain the ability 

to carry the bulk of support for some time. For example, during September, 
202 Spearhead of logistics 

SOUTHERN FRANCE RAIL OPERATIONS 

August-November 1944 

0 25 50 Miles 

0 25 50 Kilometers 

Map 16 

......... 

FRANCE~ 

,--/ 

~ALY 

.) 

) 

~ 
World War II U.S. Worldwide Commitments 203 

trucks moved some 220,000 tons forward from coastal areas and rail hauled only 

about 63,000 tons. A major problem was the lack of adequate bridging. High 

priority was given to accelerating the shipment of portable Bailey Bridges and 

heavy bridging construction materials to the theater. 

Part of the solution lay in reducing U.S. air strikes which had caused much 

of the bridge damage already encountered. Seventh Army planners estimated 

that continuation of the bridge destruction program at the current pace would 

slow the Allied advance more than it would impede German withdrawal. Air 

strikes against bridges were limited thereafter. By early October, the railroads 

reached a capacity of over 8,000 tons a day and were ready to take over the 

majority of the support movements. An embargo was placed on use of COMZ 

trucks for line-haul, and the railroads carried steadily increasing traffic 

thereafter. 70 

In early 1945, the direction of transportation activities in the theater was 

consolidated. The European Theater of Operations Communications Zone 

assumed control of Southern Lines of Communications transportation operations 

and jurisdiction over the 1st Military Railway Service. The invasion of southern 

France and the opening of the line of communication from Marseille contributed 

immensely to supporting the drive across France, not only of the U.S. Seventh 

and First French Armies, but the more northern armies as well. 
204 

CHAPTER VIII 

World War II 

The Normandy Invasion and 

Assault on Germany 

"The manner in which you picked up and delivered our two 

divisions into the battle area was about the finest job of its kind 

we have ever seen." 

Major General Matthew B. Ridgeway, 

-----Commander XVIII Airborne Corps, Ardennes Campaign -----

STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL OVERVIEW 

The invasion of France and the drive into the heart of Nazi Germany was 

the decisive campaign on the Western front in World War IT. It began in 

England with Operation BOLERO, the buildup of troops, equipment, and 

supplies for the invasion of France, which was tentatively scheduled for Spring 

1943. As plans grew more detailed, the codename ROUNDUP was used to refer 

to the combat service support portion of BOLERO, while SLEDGEHAMMER 

was used for the combat arms portion. The first combined BOLERO Committee 

met on 29 April 1942, and on 31 May, issued its first Key Plan, which called for 

an eventual U.S. troop level of 1,049,000 troops to be in Great Britain by spring 

1943. 

In August 1943, the QUADRANT Conference in Quebec affirmed both the 

TRIDENT and the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) 

plans for the invasion, codename OVERLORD, for May 1944. Total U.S. 

strength to be available for the invasion was increased to 1,446,000 troops. The 

build up in Britain eventually included 1,340,000 U.S. troops. 

The Teheran and Cairo Conferences confirmed the previous plans and 

added ANVIL, which was the planning phase for the invasion of Southern 

France, and DRAGOON, the execution phase, which had a target date of August 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 205 

1944. A simultaneous landing was ruled out due to the shortage of shipping and 

amphibious resources. 

OVERLORD, the invasion of Normandy, was designed to seize ports and a 

lodgement area in which troops and supplies could be built up and staged for 

offensive operations over a three month period. Allied forces were then to attack 

east across France and into Germany, link up with the Soviets, and force the 

Germans to surrender, ending the war in Europe. 1 Detailed tactical and logistical 

planning was conducted in the United States and England, guided by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Headquarters, AlJjed Expeditionary 

Force (SHAEF), commanded by General Eisenhower (Chart 9)? 

PLANNED COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR OVERLORD 

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The landing and initial beachhead areas for the U.S. First and British 

Second Armies are shown in Map 17, the final OVERLORD plan.3 Additional 

corps, divisions and service troops were to reinforce assault elements as soon as 

they could be landed and deployed. 

On D-Day, 6 June 1944, the amphibious assault succeeded in securing a 

beachhead despite heavy enemy opposition, unfavorable weather, rough seas, 

and inexperienced U.S. forces. 
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World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 207 

Combat forces captured the badly damaged port of Cherbourg on 27 June 

1944 (D plus 21). By 1 July 1944, advances were about sixteen days behind the 

OVERLORD plan schedule, but the Allies were ftrmly established on the 

Continent. Further expanding the beachhead to secure the planned lodgement 

area faced rough going against stubborn enemy resistance, as depicted in Map 

18, which shows the tactical progress of U.S. forces from 1-24 July 1944.4 

Capture of Brittany ports, such as Brest, fell far behind schedule. Logistical 

operations in the lodgement area were so congested that they were only 

permissible with total air superiority. The limited area constrained beach 

clearance and the build-up of reserves, limiting the force that could be 

supported. However, the relatively short lines of communication temporarily 

reduced some transportation needs and the delay gave some time to get the 

severely damaged port of Cherbourg into partial operation. 

Operation COBRA, the breakout from the lodgement area, began on 25 

July 1944. Much of Brittany was occupied, but only minor ports were captured None 

of the main Atlantic coast ports, which figured heavily in OVERLORD port discharge 

estimates, were captured in time to be of any use. The advance to the east was highly 

successful. By D plus 79, the Allies reached the Seine, the original OVERLORD D 

plus 90 objective. That advance covered in 30 days what planners said would 

take 70. During that time, transportation and supply support were to have phased 

forward, but with the rapid breakout, logistical support wa'> provided only with great 

effort, marking the beginning of even more serious support problems. 

At this stage, the armies had used their reserves to reach the Seine. 

Advance depots had not been established because of the delayed breakout and 

rapid exploitation. There was a motor transport deficiency which had been 

predicted well before D-Day, and equipment was badly worn from the relentless 

advance. Nevertheless, General Eisenhower made the tactical decision displayed 

in Map 19 to take advantage of the disorganization of the enemy, cross the 

Seine, encircle Paris, and pursue the retreating Germans without delay. The 

attack continued successfully and Paris was liberated. 

In the south, Third Army reached the line Metz - Nancy by 31 August 

1944. In the north, progress was slow at ftrst against better organized resistance. 

Good progress was made by 12 September 1944 by U.S. First Army, which held 

a line generally along the German border.5 (Map 19) The British Twenty-ftrst 

Army Group was equally successful and, by 4 September 1944, had captured 

Antwerp with most of its facilities intact. The Twenty-First Army Group bypassed 

and invested the port of Le Havre, which surrendered on 12 September 1944. By 

mid-September 1944, British Forces were on the Dutch border. The latter phases 
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210 Spearhead of Logistics 

of the advance were characterized by increasing enemy resistance and 

substantial supply/transportation shortages. 

During the period of the advance across northern France, the U.S. Seventh 

Army invaded southern France and moved rapidly to link up with Third Army. 

United States Seventh and First French Armies came under the Sixth Army 

Group, which held the southern Allied flank adjoining Switzerland. 

DRAGOON's success contributed substantially to the Altied drive. This was due 

in part to the support provided to the northern armies from the second LOC into 

France, through the port of Marseille. 

By mid-September 1944, logistic limitations in northern France clearly 

dominated operations. In October 1944, tonnage discharged was not enough to 

support the existing force, and what was available could not be cleared from 

ports. The LOC capacity from Normandy was insufficient to move resources 

forward to build up advance depots and support combat operations. General 

Eisenhower decided to give priority of support to the British 21st Army Group, 

which was to secure bases that would provide control and speed development of 

the Antwerp-Rotterdam port complexes, essential to the fmal invasion of 

Germany.

6 

Eisenhower also gave priority to secure advance bases in the Metz-Nancy 

area, directing that further attacks on main Brittany ports be reduced to holding 

efforts and let enemy forces there "die on the vine." He authorized continuing 

attacks into the Alsace area by forces supported through the southern LOC to 

maintain a U.S. offensive posture. Three incoming divisions and other traffic 

were diverted through Marseille, while the priority effort to increase the capacity 

of the channel and North Sea ports was continued. The Supreme HQ, Allied 

Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) recognized that large scale offensive operations 

could not be maintained until Antwerp and adequate rail lines of 

communications were made available to support them. Consequently, there was 

a temporary hiatus on operations to penetrate deep into Germany. 

From September 1944 until February 1945, Allied armies either marked 

time or made minor gains. The combination of inhospitable terrain, restricted 

logistic support, and stubborn German resistance prohibited any substantial 

advances, in spite of a U.S. effort to launch a new offensive in November 1944, 

to close on the Rhine. That objective had not been reached when, on 16 

December 1944, the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes area struck a 

lightly held sector and created a large bulge in the American line. Tenacious 

defense by U.S. combat units prevented the attack from attaining its first 

objective, the Meuse River. Prompt U.S. reaction reestablished contact with the 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 211 

beleagured garrison at Bastogne, and after severe fighting in winter weather, 

erased German gains with an overall delay in AUied offensive operations of 

about six weeks. By early February 1945, the Western Front had stabilized on 

the German border-the "West Wall." 

Early in February 1945, the Allies launched the offensive that would not 

end until the German surrender. Allied armies attacked across the front, with the 

main effort in the north, but there were major successes in every sector. The 

Rhine was bridged and Allied forces advanced to the Elbe in the north, as shown 

in Map 20, and linked up with Soviet forces? On 7 May 1945, the German high 

command signed the Act of Surrender which brought an end to hostilities in 

Europe. 

BUILD UP IN BRITAIN 

The strategic position of Great Britain, only 35 miles from the mainland of 

Europe, made it a place of immense strategic importance. To U.S. strategists, it 

was clearly the most obvious place from which to launch an invasion of 

Nazi-occupied Europe. On 19 May 1941 , the War Department created the 

Special Army Observer Group (SPOBS) under Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney and 

sent it to London to coordinate with the British. 

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Allied planners at the Arcadia Conference 

confirmed the general understanding reached before the United States entered 

the war, that Germany would be defeated first. On 8 January 1942, SPOBS was 

enlarged and redesignated U.S. Army Forces, British Isles (USAFBI). In March 

1942, an embryonic quartermaster staff under the direction of Maj. Gen. John C. 

H. Lee was formed. On 24 May 1942, Lee became the head of the Services of 

Supply (SOS) of USAFBI, with Brig. Gen. Robert M. Littlejohn as Chief 

Quartermaster. 

The issue of transportation was addressed even before the SOS was fully 

organized. United States troops began to arrive in Great Britain shortly after 

Pearl Harbor. The first group of 4,058 arrived in Belfast, Northern Ireland, on 

26 January 1942, followed by 8,555 more on 19 February 1942. By the end of 

June 1942, 56,090 U.S. troops were in the British Isles. 

The British, with over two years of wartime experience, realized that U.S. 

troops and equipment would soon become a burden on their already strained and 

damaged transportation network. They requested that USAFBI provide liaison 

personnel to coordinate U.S. forces transportation needs. General Cheney 

concurred, and the War Department assigned Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Frank S. 

Ross as the Chief of Transportation for USAFBI. 
212 Spearhead of Logistics 

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Map20 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 213 

On 8 June 1942, USAFBI became The European Theater of Operations, 

United States Army (ETOUSA), the name it retained for the remainder of the war. 

On 24 June 1942, General Cheney was replaced by Maj. Gen. (later General of the 

Army) Dwight D. Eisenhower. General Lee remained chief of SOS, with Ross as 

his Chief of Transportation, and in the summer of 1942, they organized a series of 

five U.S. base sections in the British Isles, which are shown in the inset of Map 21.8 

Base section commanders were responsible for nearly all SOS operations 

in their sections. In the beginning, many transportation activities were exempt 

from their control, but the commanders argued that they could not adequately 

control their sections unless they were responsible for all activities in those 

sections. General Lee concurred and eventually made base sections responsible 

for all SOS activities, including ports. Ross did not concur with this decision, 

because he felt it inserted an additional headquarters in the transportation chain 

of command and decentralized control of transportation resources, a situation 

that caused difficulties throughout the European theater. 

On 11 June 1942, 135 officers reported for duty at the office of the Chief 

of Transportation (OCoff), ETOUSA, at No. 1 Great Cumberland Place, in 

London. Few realized the magnitude of the task that lay before them. Despite 

the fact that on 20 June 1942, Ross became a special staff officer to the CG, 

ETOUSA, and on 31 July 1942, the Transportation Corps became a separate 

branch, hardly anyone understood the duties and functions of the new branch. In 

the midst of changing headquarters and responsibilities, which were not yet 

defmed, and with constantly shifting priorities, the transporters in London began 

planning the greatest amphibious movement of troops in the world's history. 

In July 1942, Operation TORCH, the invasion of North Africa, brought 

BOLERO to an abrupt halt. This was proof indeed, of Moltke's dictum that "It 

is a delusion to believe that a plan of war may be laid for a long period ... The 

first collision with the enemy changes the situation entirely ... "9 

The North African invasion reduced U.S. influx to Britain considerably. 

Whereas U.S. Army cargo discharged monthly in British ports during the first 

half of 1942 had risen to 279,092 tons per month, by March 1943, discharge fell 

to 65,767 tons. The reduction was accompanied by cuts in the transportation 

staff and loss of units in the United Kingdom like Third Port, and three port 

battalions which were sent to North Africa. Declining shipments also meant the 

remaining staffs and units in the British Isles were not overwhelmed by the 

workload, and augmentation was not necessary. The Transportation Corps 

gained considerable benefit from Operation TORCH. It was the ftrst large scale 
214 

E I R E 

BASE SECTIONS 

Notr: London Rt910n and Centrol 

- Bose Stcl1on ore idtntitol 

Map21 

Spearhead of Logistics 

embarkation and debarkation in the European theater, and both transportation 

units and staff personnel acquired valuable "hands on" experience. 

In early 1943, BOLERO resumed as U.S. troops and equipment once again 

began to arrive in the U.K. in great numbers. British troops were pulled out of 

Southern England, which became the marshalling and training area for U.S. 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 215 

forces. A planning staff was established for a possible invasion of Northwestern 

Europe in April 1943, but commitments in the Mediterranean and heavy 

shipping losses to U-Boats precluded any such possibility. 

TRANSPORTATION IN GREAT BRITAIN 

When Lt. Gen. Brehon Somervell, Chief of SOS, returned from a fact 

fmding tour of Britiain in June of 1942, he reported that the greatest difficulties 

to be overcome in the U.K. were transportation and transportation-related 

issues. 10 Among them were labor for loading and unloading ships and trains, and 

transport of building materials for airfields and facilities. Somervell estimated 

that the Army would require somewhere between 90,000 and 200,000 laborers 

to accomplish the mission. A secondary problem was the reassembly of trucks 

shipped in knocked-down configuration. He also noted a number of other items, 

including landing craft which, while not critical in June 1942, soon would be. 

When the United States entered the war, the transportation system in the 

U.K. was working at its limit. There were personnel shortages, due to the 

allocation of manpower to combat units. Railroads were running efficiently, but 

operating at maximum capacity. Some port facilities had been badly damaged by 

German bombing and not been repaired. To make matters worse, some British 

ports could only handle shallow draft vessels. 

The British had two agencies managing their traffic with which US 

transportation personnel had to deal and from whom they would learn much. The 

first was the primary coordinating agency of the British Government, the British 

Ministry of War Transport (BMWT). Under its leader, Lord Leathers, the 

agency exercised control over shipping, ports, coastal and inland waterways, and 

inland transport, including the rail system. One of its most important elements 

was the Diversion Committee, which assigned the ships at sea to their 

destinations. 

The second agency, the Movements Control Directorate of the 

Quarter-master-General of the British Army, more commonly known as "Q 

Movements," was military. This organization was headed by a director who 

operated through several key subordinates, one of whom controlled the 

movement of "stores" (freight in American parlance), while another controlled 

the movement of personnel. A movement control officer (MCO) was assigned 

to each of the British commands. 

The MCO also operated through his subordinates. In the lowest echelon 

were the railway traffic officers (RTOs), who were stationed at all critical points 

of the railway. At the ports, movement control was in the hands of embarkation 
216 Spearhead of Logistics 

commandants and staff officers. In addition, the Royal Air Force (RAF) had its 

own movement control agency, which coordinated with the Army Movements 

Control directorate. This organization was the model that the U.S. 

Transportation Corps adopted for its own. British transportation personnel, from 

the general officer level down to the noncommissioned officer level, were to be 

the mentors for the Transportation Corps. 

From the beginning, U.S. organization mirrored that of the British and 

followed their procedures as closely as possible. But the objective was not to 

slavishly copy them. In fact, when the British recommended absorbing U.S. 

liaison personnel into their own system, Ross refused. He knew that the U.S. 

Army would require a functional Transportation Corps of its own, with 

procedures adjusted to U.S. needs when it landed in Europe. 

The first U.S. Army Regional Transportation Office was established in 

Belfast on 14 July 1942. By mid-August 1942, an additional five were 

established. The regional offices paralleled the British Military Commands, 

rather than the structure of U.S. Base Sections. This was because the U.S. did 

not follow the British system in which movement control units came directly 

under the control of the Director of Movements in London. Instead, a 

transportation officer was placed on the special staff of each base section 

commander. By 1943, t11ere were eight transportation regions and five base 

sections as shown in Map 21. Ross later recommended that the position of 

Regional Transportation Officer be dropped, since it only applied to the U.K. 

Both the British and the Americans found the system very workable. Ross' only 

complaint was that the British were too polite and did not put his men to work 

qmc "kl y enoug hlJ . 

The first priority for General Ross and the Transportation Corps in the 

U.K. was, of course, the ports. The Army had to cope with both operational and 

labor problems, which included strikes, slow downs, and the habit of working 

only one or two hatches on a four or five hatch ship. Stevedores and crane 

operators took their "tea" breaks at different times, thereby lengthening the time 

it took to work a ship. British dockworkers were loath to use labor-saving 

devices like forklifts because they felt machinery meant a loss of jobs. In 

deference to the labor unions, British authorities were reluctant to allow U.S. 

personnel to unload cargo. While all of this was extremely frustrating to General 

Ross and his staff, it must be remembered that U.S. cargo amounted to less than 

lO percent of total cargo delivered to British ports until the invasion. From the 

dockworkers' point of view, American cargo did not seem as important as the 

import of foodstuffs or other commodities destined for the civilian population. 12 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 217 

First American crew to operate a train in the UK. 
218 Spearhead of Logistics 

Labor problems also included a shortage of port personnel, estimated in 

July 1943 to be approximately 850 men per port. Added to this was an 

equipment shortage, leading to the backlog of ships, which was especially 

noticeable in mid-1943, after the successful campaign in North Africa and the 

revitalization of the BOLERO plan. By August 1943, the British conceded that 

U.S. troops were necessary and General Ross requested an additional nine port 

battalions, bringing the number to fifteen, the quantity allocated by the British 

for U.S. BOLERO port operations. 13 

The movement of U.S. troops and cargo from the ports to their inland 

destinations was the responsibility of British railways, which had been under 

wartime controls since the beginning of the war. When U.S. troops began 

arriving in the U.K., they found the railways operating under severe handicaps. 

There were personnel shortages similar to those in the ports, due to the 

assignment of railway personnel to wartime duties. There was also a lack of 

railway equipment, which was due to combat losses at Dunkirk and overseas 

requirements in North Africa. 

In addition, the existing equipment was suffering excessive wear and tear 

because of extremely heavy wartime traffic. Another problem that was not 

immediately evident was a limited capacity to move tanks, engineer equipment, 

and other bulky cargo, because of the small size of British rolling stock and 

clearance restrictions imposed by tunnels. At the beginning of the war, Britain 

had a total of 19,273 miles of track serviced by 19,463 locomotives, 1,241,711 

freight cars, and 45,838 passenger cars, with a seating capacity of 2,655,000. On 

the basis of ro!Ung stock to mileage, this was a very favorable ratio, but when 

compared to U.S. rolling stock, the picture was not very bright. The average 

British freight car, or "goods wagon," had a capacity of 6 tons, compared to 

40-50 tons for an American box car. 

However, the system was efficiently run and the Army did not try to set up 

the customary staging system for troops debarking in the British Isles. Because 

of the meticulous scheduling of trains, newly arrived troops were able to march 

directly from shipside to railway cars for the journey inland. 14 Despite the 

efficient running of the railways and the excellent coordination between the 

Transportation Corps and its British hosts, the shortage of equipment, especially 

locomotives, began to tell. 

A requisition for 400 U.S. 2-8-0 steam locomotives, which were similar to 

British locomotives, and fifteen 0-6-0 switching locomotives was forwarded in 

mid-August 1942. In November 1942, the first locomotive arrived, but only 26 

had arrived by December 1942, and, by early 1943, the situation was so critical 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 219 

that the British were canceling 1,000 to 1,500 trains per week due to the lack of 

locomotives. General Lee pressured Washington to speed up delivery, and by 

May 1943 a total of 184 had been received. 

These locomotives were U.S. Army property, but they were put in a 

stockpile under joint control. The British operated and maintained the 

locomotives, while the Chief of Transportation kept track of them. In 1944, as 

0 -Day approached, the locomotives were returned to U.S. military control for 

use on the Continent Other equipment lent to the British included 50, 0-6-0 

locomotives for use in coal mines, 700 flat cars for moving large loads, 500 tank 

cars, and 42 refrigerator cars. All of this equipment was due for return on 14 

day's notice. 

The Transportation Corps performed no rail operations in the U.K. except 

at U.S. depots. This gave the Transportation Corps a chance to train some of its 

nonrailroad personnel in an easily controlled environment, and develop plans for 

operations on the Continent. 

In the early stages of BOLERO, U.S. Forces in the U.K. made only limited 

use of motor vehicle transportation to save gasoline, oil, and tires. Safety also 

influenced the decision. British roads were narrow and winding with visibility 

severely limited by the hedges that flanked many of them. Training drivers to 

drive on the left, especially in blackout conditions, also proved difficult. 

However, when the shortage of railway engines compelled British authorities to 

cancel trains, trucks were needed to take up the slack. In mid-1943, operational 

control of motor transport vehicles was assigned to the Transportation Corps, 

and by March 1944, nearly one-third of cargo clearing U.K. ports was carried on 

American and U.S.-contracted civilian trucks. 15 

OUTLOADING FOR THE INVASION 

During preparations for the assault on Europe, troops and equipment were 

concentrated according to a meticulous plan devised by the Build-up Control 

Organization (BUCO), which was formed in spring 1944, under the direction of 

the Allied Army, Navy, and Air Commanders in Chief. The BUCO controlled 

"the build up of personnel and vehicles and set priorities for their movement as 

desired by the tactical comrnands."16 Movements were controlled by formal 

orders. Once Allied forces moved into their assembly areas, the massive task of 

loading the troops and equipment began. 

To control the marshaling and embarking of troops, Embarkation Control 

(EMBARCO) was formed to coordinate the complex undertaking. The validity 

of outloading plans was assessed with a series of preinvasion exercises, the most 
220 Spearhead of Logistics 

significant of which was called Harlequin. That exercise took place on 

3 September 1943, under conditions that closely simulated those expected in the 

D-Day operation. Though primarily a British exercise, it also involved U.S. 

Army Transportation Corps officers and enlisted men, who participated in the 

activities in the assembly areas, transit areas, and embarkation points.

17 

The preloading of the actual invasion fleet began on 4 June 1944, and went 

smoothly with a total of 107,606 tons of cargo loaded by D-Day, 6 June 1944. 

However, once the invasion commenced, confusion in the ports mounted. From 

the outset, the ports suffered from a serious shortage of personnel and there were 

not enough vessels returning from the objective area to lift all the forces moving 

into the ports. Movement planning in the port of Southampton called for the 

planned return of 5 personnel ships, 12 motor transports (MT), and 21 landing 

ships tank (LST), lifting approximately 19,000 troops and 2,700 tons per day, 

but after the initial embarkation on D-Day, these goals were not met. 18 

The ports suffered from severe congestion and confusion, resulting in part 

from constantly changing loading priorities. The EMBARCO was unable to 

regulate this because the tactical commanders in Normandy had the authority to 

change the sequence of unit loads. Moreover, embarking unit commanders 

frequently ignored movement plans which called for support personnel to 

embark later, preferring instead to move their units as one body. 

By 9 June 1944, EMBARCO was unable to furnish accurate information 

regarding the location of units. In an effort to clear the ports and get as many 

troops to Normandy as possible, BUCO directed ships to be loaded regardless of 

priority. If a unit was ready to depart, it was immediately loaded and shipped 

out. By 12 June 1944, as ports began to clear, and vessel turnaround times were 

reduced, EMBARCO and BUCO were able to regain control. Despite the early 

confusion and disorganization, 317,765 soldiers were moved to Normandy in 

June 1944, with another 466,568 in July. By December 1944, a total of 2 million 

had been shipped.19 

In retrospect, embarkation difficulties resulted from a chronic shortage of 

motor transport vessels (MTV) and LSTs, insufficient loading personnel in the 

ports, and the fact that BUCO and EMBARCO lacked sufficient authority to 

take firm control of a situation, which was subject to a barrage of tasklngs from 

frontline commanders. Recommendations of the post-war review included 

attachment of movement control organizations to the highest tactical 

commander's staff to prevent conflicting load requests from disrupting plans. 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 

INVASION OF THE CONTINENT 

LOGISTICS ORGANIZATION 

221 

Logistical support on the Continent was managed by the Communications 

Zone (COMZ) behind field anny rear boundaries, and by the Army G-4, and 

service chiefs in the combat zone. The COMZ managed most operations 

through subordinate sections, which were established as field army rear 

boundaries moved forward and COMZ areas of responsibility expanded. The 

number of sections depended on the volume of work, terrain, priority of 

supported combat effort, and similar factors. Selected intersectional services 

were commanded directly by COMZ. A Forward Echelon of the COMZ 

(FECOMZ) was supposed go to France in the early stages of the invasion, but 

was not sent because of the slow initial expansion of the lodgement area. 

For the Normandy assault, forward elements of an advance section 

(ADSEC) were attached to First Army, some arriving as early as D plus 1. 

These forward elements worked closely with the G-4 staff and Engineer Special 

Brigades, which operated the beaches until the tactical situation permitted 

ADSEC and COMZ to assume control. The slow tactical advances in 

Normandy delayed the decision by First Army to designate an army rear 

boundary and initiate ADSEC operations. However, SHAEF HQ intervened, 

and on 1 August 1944, ADSEC took over what later became the Normandy Base 

Section. By 17 August 1944, COMZ HQ was established in Valognes (between 

Cherbourg and Carentan). Following the breakout, ADSEC moved forward to 

keep up with the swiftly advancing armies, and COMZ HQ moved to Paris. 

Additional sections were opened as the armies crossed France. By April 1945, the 

COMZ organization was deployed as shown in Map 22, COMZ Boundaries·20 

On the Continent, the OCoff was organized substantially as it had been in 

England with Maj. Gen. Frank S. Ross as Chief of Transportation. The main 

operating sections were supply, movements, motor transport service, military 

railway service, and marine operations, which included inland waterways - later 

made a separate section. By this time, Ross had clear staff responsibility for 

motor transport operations in the COMZ, and quartermaster truck units carried 

the suffix "(TC)" in their designation. In addition, Ross had established a 

Motor Transport Brigade (MTB) in ADSEC, which was prepared to assume 

control of motor transport assets. 

Anomalies persisted. The COMZ G-4, rather than the Coff, continued to 

control shipping and exercise important functions of movement control. In 

addition, the sections, particularly ADSEC, maintained operational control of 
222 

-ICICil•X- -ooo- NlMYOHOUI:~o OOUNOAiliES 

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Spearhead of Logistics 

D E L T A 

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Map22 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 223 

many transportation assets, notably truck units. The semiautonomy of 

DRAGOON forces resulted in a transportation section and a military railway 

service supporting 6th Army Group that were not directly responsible to Maj. 

Gen. Ross. These inconsistencies were not finally remedied until February 1945, 

when all Transportation staff activities in the COMZ became the responsibility 

of Maj. Gen. Ross. The final wartime organization is shown in Chart 10: 

Organization of the omce of the Chief of Transportation, COMZ, ETOUSA: 

l April1945? 1 

TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS 

THE IMPACT OF SHIPPING 

In the pre-invasion period, plans and procedures drawn up in the United 

States and England by Transportation Corps personnel and others, helped the TC 

in the theater to react to changes and major challenges which developed during 

and after the assault. These included movement programs, special express 

supply support shipment procedures, and plans for alternative shipping 

programs. However, the problem of the marginal availability of sealift, 

exacerbated by slow discharge and ship turnaround, plagued the landings in 

France, and solutions eluded even the most prescient planners. 

The dearth of landing craft was a particular problem for this assault because 

much of the shipping from England was scheduled for repetitive trips. Excessive 

delays disrupted supply and troop movement plans. Similarly, slow discharge of 

ships from the United States affected worldwide shipping commitments. Delays in 

discharge were due to cargo handling problems, and policy decisions to selectively 

discharge cargo from munitions carriers and other vessels, rather than fully 

discharging and then releasing them. Also, ships that were not designated as floating 

warehouses were used in that capacity, further reducing the number of ships available. 22 

THE BEACHES 

For the Normandy assault, the two special engineer brigades at OMAHA 

Beach supporting V Corps were heavily reinforced by the direct attachment of 

port, truck, and amphibian truck units, totaling 6,300 troops. UTAH Beach was 

a smaller operation with proportionate transportation troops attached to the 1st 

Engineer Special Brigade supporting VII corps, whose mission was to capture 

Cherbourg. In addition, the 11th Port with about 8,600 troops commanded by 

Col. Richard S. Whitcomb, an experienced commander, was attached to the 

Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group, which commanded the three 
224 Spearhead of Logistics 

0 

,... 

~ .c 

0 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 225 

brigades. The 11th provided an advance party for the assault, and the entire unit 

arrived on 0 plus I 0 to operate artificial harbors and breakwaters and small 

nearby ports as they became operational. 

Almost from the beginning, transportation units participated in discharge 

operations. On both beaches, casualties and equipment damage from enemy fire 

and mines, and other obstacles, including debris from the landing, hampered 

initial operations. The experience of the 453d Amphibian Truck Company is 

typical. The company arrived on 0-0ay with its OUKW's, drivers, and 

assistants on an LST. The rest of the troops on a transport were offloaded to an 

LCI that was hit by enemy fire, killing six men during debarkation. The OUKW 

sections, which offloaded 10- 14 miles from shore, lost 17 craft in landing 

through beach obstacles and wrecked landing cmft. Thirty-six surviving 

vehicles delivered preloaded ammunition and began evacuating the wounded. 

From 0 -0ay until 8 September 1944, the company worked 12-hour shifts 

around the clock, clearly demonstrating that OUKWs were invaluable to the 

success of the landing. 

Port companies operated in a similar manner. They unloaded the vessels 

on which they arrived, moved ashore, set up a bivouac, and began working 

assigned vessels with the same shifts as the OUKWs. Quartermaster service 

companies generally performed cargo handling ashore. The challenges were 

vast, ranging from enemy fire to inadequate communications, to requirements 

for selective discharge to dig out priority cargo without proper documentation on 

location, which resulted in a major backlog of ships offshore. This, in turn, 

disrupted the turnaround schedules for reutilization of vessels to such an extent 

that priorities were abandoned on 9 June 1944. This decision resulted in low 

priority cargo usurping beach clearance and storage capability, so priorities had 

to be reinstituted. 

As part of the beach operations plan, artificial harbors (codename 

MULBERRIES) were to be emplaced in the U.S. and British beach areas to 

bridge the gap between beach operations and the capture and rehabilitation of 

ports. From 19-2 1 June 1944, gale winds pounded the invasion coast, wrecking 

scores of craft and smashing the U.S. MULBERRY A off OMAHA Beach 

beyond repair. The British MULBERRY B was not as severely damaged. It 

was repaired and handled 48 percent of all British support tonnage for the next 

three months. The loss to planned U.S. discharge capability was severe, but was 

partially offset by improved beach operations and opening of minor ports. 

In spite of the unimaginable challenges faced by U.S. beach parties 

exacerbated by the loss of MULBERRY A, beach operations were undeniably 
226 Spearhead of Logistics 

successful. They demonstrated beyond a doubt that an invasion force could be 

supported in reasonably favorable weather, without large port facilities. The 

success of initial Normandy operations is evident from the supply buildup data 

in Chart 11.23 Even though planned deliveries were not met, the landing of 

almost 290,000 long tons of supplies, and 71,000 vehicles in 25 days, was an 

unparalleled feat that reflected immense credit on the participants. 

This achievement ensured the success of subsequent combat operations, and 

opened a new chapter in the projection of military power overseas. The invasion 

beaches remained in operation until late November 1944, when bad weather and 

high seas curtailed operations and ports were able to take over the load. During 

beach operations, some 1.265 milUon long tons of cargo were discharged at 

OMAHA and 726,000 at UTAH, plus thousands of personnel and vehicles?4 

SUPPLY BUILD-UP OVER THE BEACHES: 6-30 JUNE 1944 

DATE SUPPLIES (Long Tons) VEHICLES 

Percent of Percent of 

D Days June Planned Actual planned Planned Actual planned 

build-up build-up 

achieved achieved 

D Day 6 4,650 (a) (a) 6,810 2,870 42.1 

D + 10 16 128,750 88,045 68.4 52,606 34,549 65.7 

D + 15 21 207,350 126,961 61.2 74,482 44,567 59.8 

D +20 26 289,950 203,719 70.3 95,170 58,612 61.6 

D +24 30 359,950 b289,827 80.5 109,921 70,910 64.5 

• No record. 

b. Includes 4,558 long tons discharged atlsigny and Grandcamp ports. 

Chart 11 

THE PORTS 

The ports in the theater were opened as quickly as they were captured and 

repaired. Openings fell into three phases. First was the capture of Cherbourg 

and the smaller ports in Normandy and Brittany, of which St. Michelle-en-Greve 

and Morlaix were the most important. The second phase consisted of the 

opening of Le Havre and other channel ports in the north and Marseille, which 

served the southern lines of communication. In the third phase, Antwerp and the 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 227 

Belgian ports were opened. Except for most of the minor ports, all remained 

open throughout the campaign and were returned to national control after V -J 

Day. After the end of hostilities, the workload was transferred to German ports 

whlch served occupation forces. 

Minor Normandy ports in the vicinity of landing beaches were opened and 

operated by the 11th Port. They were suitable mainly for coasters and had 

limited capacity, but were operated to the maximum permitted by the availability 

of shallow draft shipping and the weather. The coal port of Granville, which 

was opened by the 12th Port, provided additional port capacity through 

mid-1945. It was commanded by Col. August H. Schroeder. Minor Brittany 

ports were put into operation by the 16th Port and later replaced by the 5th Port, 

following the breakout when every ton discharged was needed to support the 

advancing armies. Priority for development was given to the major channel 

ports, therefore, the potential of Brittany ports was never realized. The major 

Brittany port of Brest was captured on 17 September I 944, but was so damaged 

it was not worth rehabilitating. The ports of Lorient and St. Nazaire were held 

by the Nazis for the remainder of the war as part of Hitler's plan to keep as 

many ports as possible out of the hands of the allies?5 The minor ports made a 

substantial contr-ibution during the period before major ports could be 

rehabilitated enough to cover the shortfall of support over the beaches. 

Following its capture on June 27 1944, Cherbourg was the first major port 

opened by the 4th Port. It was commanded by Col. Cleland C. Sibley, until 

mid-September and then by Col. James A. Crothers. Damage was severe, but 

U.S. and British naval elements and the U.S. Army Engineers attacked the 

problem vigorously, using imaginative field expedients proven during prior 

campaigns. They employed French locals and German prisoners of war (POW) 

extensively for labor, and used captured supplies of cement and building 

materials to offset shortages caused by the inability to unload supplies from 

ships offshore. After setting up landing ramps made of debris, the port was 

ready on 16 July 1944, to receive four ships for lighterage discharge. 

Initially, only DUKW and barges were available. Later, LCT and rhino 

barges, which were built of ponton units and powered by outboard motors, were 

used. The barges could carry heavy loads and discharge vehicles on almost any 

gradient. Eventually, harborcraft, cranes, and cargo handling equipment were 

brought in from the beaches or offshore. The rebuilding effort focused first on 

lighterage facilities because the construction program was only 75 percent 

completed by mid-September and only five of 28 planned deep water berths 

were operational. Berth reconstruction accelerated and as more alongside 
228 Spearhead of Logistics 

Off-loading ships to railcars at Cherbourg Port 

discharge space became available, port capacity increased markedly from about 

32,000 long tons in July 1944, to a peak of 433,000 in November. 

Thereafter, tonnage received averaged around 270,000 long tons, due to 

diversions to newly opened channel ports with their shorter line of 

communication. Cherbourg did remain an important port, particularly for 

ammunition, which was not moved through Antwerp because of attacks by V- 1 

and V -2 guided missiles. Cherbourg was also the terminal for rail equipment 

ferried on converted LST's and the seatrains Lakehurst and Texas. The port 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 229 

discharged a total of about 2.7 million long tons from its opening until 8 May 

1945, a feat exceeded only by Marseille?6 

The port of Le Havre, which also suffered heavy damage, was operated by 

the 16th Port and initiated over-the-beach discharge on 2 October 1944. 

Rehabilitation progressed rapidly and discharge increased commensurably. Le 

Havre was especially valuable during the German counteroffensive in December 

1944, by rushing ammunition to beleaguered U.S. troops. It also became the 

principal troop debarkation point for the ETO, and as a corollary, a major 

embarkation point following V-E Day for redeploying forces. About 1.2 million 

long tons were discharged and over a million passengers were debarked by 8 

May 1945. 

Up the Seine River from Le Havre, the port of Rouen was operated by the 

11 th Port and was initially restricted to shallow draft vessels. However, as 

rebuilding progressed, deep draft berths were made available and by the end of 

the war, Rouen had discharged about the same tonnage as Le Havre, although it 

was a secondary passenger terminal. At its peak in March 1945, Rouen received 

nearly 9,000 U.S. troops, 5,000 French civilians, and 9,000 POWs?7 

The southern port of Marseille was unique in that it became operational 

ahead of schedule and discharged the most cargo of any of the ETO ports - 4. 1 

million long tons, as well as almost a million passengers during its relatively 

long wartime period of operation. 

In spite of Marseille's quantitative record, Antwerp was the crown jewel of 

ETO military ports. Because of it~ location and immense capacity, Antwerp was 

able to support both U.S. and British requirements. Its capture, in relatively 

undamaged condition, was one of the most fortuitous developments of the war, 

and both U.S. and British forces cooperated in its rehabilitation. The size of the 

installation was indicated by the fact that in negotiating joint use, the United 

States was assured of the availability of 62 working deep-draft berths, as well as 

the joint use of outer harbor berths, inner basins, and other ancillary facilities. 

The British were responsible for local administration, with a British naval officer 

in overall command of the port. It was estimated that the Americans would move 

22,500 tons a day, other than petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL), from the port. 

The 13th Port, which previously operated the port of Plymouth, in England, 

initially commanded U.S. operations and was later supplemented by the 5th Port. 

The first vessel to be unloaded carried the 268th Port Company with its 

equipment, and began discharge on 28 November 1944. By mid-December 

1944, full scale operation of the port was attained and discharge exceeded port 

clearance capacity. Buzz bombs, V-2 rockets, and air attacks interrupted, but 
230 Spearhead of Logistics 

Discharging ammunition directly from ship to railcar. 

did not stop operations. However, these attacks did cause high level concerns 

and pressure on the ETO to develop other continental ports continued. 

Port operations were also interrupted by the German counteroffensive of 

December 1944, which threatened outlying depots, particularly Liege. The 

unwillingness to ship cargo to areas threatened by German forces backed up 

shipments at the port and created congestion of storage areas. United States 

personnel were detailed as guards to provide sentries for the port, and 

anti-sabotage security. Labor was diverted to ship winter supplies and selected 

defensive items to the front. By V-E Day, Antwerp was the principal cargo port 

in the theater and through October of 1946, continued receiving supplies for 

occupation forc.es and outloading materials deploying to the Pacific or 

retrograding to the United States. 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 231 

The Belgian Port of Ghent was also a JOmt U.S./British operation 

established as a standby for Antwerp, with the 17th Port commanding U.S. 

activities. After dredging the harbor and other rehabilitation, Ghent handled 

substantial American tonnage, discharging almost 800,000 long tons by the end 

of May 1945. At that time, the 13th Port at Antwerp assumed responsibility and 

the 17th moved to Bremerhaven, which was developed as the supply port for 

U.S. occupation forces?8 

The operation of most ETO ports was hampered by delays in their capture 

and extensive damage and destruction that took immense effort and time to fix. 

Once operational, the ports had to cope with insufficient troop units and 

equipment in the force structure, poor weather, backlogs of shipping that had to 

be worked off as quickly as possible, and frequent inadequacies in port 

clearance. Notwithstanding these challenges, TC units displayed initiative, 

industry, tenacity, and imagination in meeting goals, eliminating backlogs, and 

forwarding needed resources to the supported troops. In roughly eleven months, 

they discharged 15 million long tons of cargo and debarked 3.7 million 

passengers. Ports were a principal cog in the logistic support gear that helped 

drive the ETO machine to victory ?9 

MOTOR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS 

Transportation planners preparing for OVERLORD understood the truck 

would be the workhorse of the theater land transportation system by carrying a 

higher proportion of the logistical burden than in any other theater. There were 

clear needs for myriad "short haul" requirements in beach, port, and depot 

complexes. There was also an obvious requirement to move supplies from the 

ports all the way to army depots and supply points early in the campaign. As 

soon as the railheads became operational, truck units would move supplies 

forward; however, due to severe damage to the rail infrastructure, trucks would 

have to meet long haul needs until the rail system was repaired. The greatest 

challenge transportation planners faced was convincing the theater staff that the 

theater would need a large number of truck units. With only limited data 

available for planned deployment of combat forces, drastic shortages of sealift. 

competing tactical and other combat support claimants, and War Department 

constraints, the TC faced an uphill battle. The TC estimate of 240 truck 

companies was reduced to 160 on the theater-approved troop list. 

Maj. Gen. Ross continued to lobby vigorously for additional units, but 

without success. In August 1943, he requisitioned heavy trucks, tractors, and 

trailers in lieu of 2 1/2 ton trucks, to increase unit productivity. Ross also 
232 Spearhead of Logistics 

requested two drivers per vehicle, to allow round-the-clock operations. The War 

Department provided substitutes for the heavy trucks requested, but few arrived 

before D-Day. Nevertheless, in the later stages of the war, these trucks proved 

their immense value. 

The War Department also approved authorization for extra drivers at the 

last minute. The requirement for the extra driver was partially filled by a draft on 

other COMZ units, which did not transfer their best soldiers. Fourteen 

quartermaster truck companies were used to provide their personnel and 

equipment resources throughout the COMZ. First, the truck assets from these 

companies were transferred to two Engineer general service regiments 

augmenting their organic truck transport to form truck companies. Then, the 

drivers from the companies were assigned to existing truck companies to 

provide the extra drivers in those units. By D-Day, in spite of these actions, in 

Maj. Gen. Ross' view motor transportation was the least satisfactory mode of the 

transportation function. The Advance Section (ADSEC) hoped to offset the 

shortage of trucks to a degree by forming a Motor Transport Brigade (MTB) 

(Prov), which would reduce the waste of resources by central management of all 

truck assets. The brigade was initially tasked to perform clearance hauls, assist 

the armies in the beachhead and lodgement areas, and then to move forward to 

support the advancing armies. Units performing truck tasks behind ADSEC 

would be assigned to newly established COMZ sections.30 

At the two Normandy invasion beaches, truck companies landed shortly 

after the assault waves. Many trucks were swamped while debarking from LST 

that simply could not beach in shallow water. Other trucks were damaged by 

enemy ground fire and artillery fire, but truck units began operating at once. 

They discharged their prestowed loads, then moved cargo to beach dumps from 

landing craft, DUKW-to-truck transfer points, or from the backpile on the beach 

further inland, sometimes in gaps through minefields. Rain and mud gave a 

foretaste of the "real" Normandy and Brittany mud they would later encounter. 

Units sandbagged truck cab tloors against landmines, but snipers took their toll 

for several days, and air attacks and artillery fire were a continuing hazard. The 

tonnage handled increased until more than 10,000 tons a day was cleared from 

each beach. 

Units operated 24 hours a day through sand, sea, rain, and mud, leaving no 

time for satisfactory maintenance. Constant use, plus a shortage of spare parts, 

created a 40-50 percent deadline rate by Fall. This led to the pernicious practice 

of cannibalization to keep the remaining trucks running and further exacerbated 

the shortage of vehicles. This shortage required drastic measures to support the 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 233 

armies in the breakout and pursuit of the Germans across France. Until then, 

truck assets were adequate for clearing beaches and ports, supporting depot 

hauls to ADSEC, hauling supplies to field anny customers, and relocating stocks 

forward in the limited lodgement area?' 

The ADSEC Motor Transport Brigade, with Col. Clarence B. Richmond 

commanding, landed in increments starting on D plus 3. The MTB assisted the 

Engineer Special Brigades and the II th Port in organizing and managing vehicle 

operations. By 20 June, the MTB joined ADSEC HQ, where several 

Transportation Corps officers of the COMZ forward echelon Motor Transport 

Division (MTD) were temporarily attached to the brigade, with Col. Loren A. 

Ayers, MTD chief, assigned as deputy to Col. Richmond. In August of 1944, 

when the COMZ Chief of Transportation and staff arrived in Valognes, the 

MTD elements rejoined Maj. Gen. Ross and the division was redesignated the 

COMZ Motor Transport Service (MTS), with Col. Ayers as chief. 

The Motor Transport Service was responsible for technical supervision of 

the 90 ADSEC quartermaster truck companies and their parent groups and 

battalions, but the ADSEC Motor Transport Brigade had operational control. 

The bulk of the units were assigned to. the beach or port commands and 

dispatched from pools based on the priorities of the owning command. The 

remaining units were allocated for line-hauls to field army rear areas and 

assigned directly to the MTB. An increasing number were permanently 

committed to the line-haul POL fleet, which reached 14 companies by 

mid-November 1944. These consisted of 750 and 2,000 gallon tankers, and 

2,000 gallon semi-trailers and cargo trucks for packaged POL. Rail bridges and 

other facilities west of the Seine were still under construction or rehabilitation.32 

In August 1944, pursuit of the fleeing enemy and slow rehabilitation of the 

devastated rail net created a demand for large movements to support the First 

and Third Armies. In addition to these requirements, large numbers of trucks 

were needed to haul materials for pipeline construction, and the forward 

displacement of 100,000 tons of depot stocks to supply operations beyond the 

Seine, of which only 18,000 tons could be moved by rail. An express highway 

route was absolutely necessary. Prior to the invasion, TC planners attempted to 

organize and test a truck express system, but equipment and manpower were not 

available, so it had to be activated without a test. 

In seeking a name for the new operation, COMZ turned to the railway 

parlance for fast "through freights," and named it "Red Ball Express." The 

concept for the operation was to give the Red Ball Express exclusive use of a 

one-way loop highway, draft all available motor transport, operate 
234 Spearhead of Logistics 

Convoy assembly area on the Red Ball Express. 

around-the-clock, and establish bivouac and maintenance areas. The concept 

also provided TC and Military Police traffic and vehicle control measures, as 

well as engineer, ordnance, signal, and medical participation. 

The urgency to get tonnage forward left little time for planning. The MTS 

Chief Col. Ayers and Maj. Gordon K. Gravelle, COMZ HQ, developed a plan to 

assign 141 truck companies for the line of communication line hauls, except for 

five to make distribution from recently opened railheads in the Le 

Mans-Chartres area. Truck company allocations were filled from resources in 

the MTS and Normandy base section, and operations began immediately. 

In order to build truck and driver strengths as rapidly as possible, the Motor 

Transport Service took unique courses of action. Two 45-ton tank transporter 

companies were converted to cargo carriers. Ten additional trucks were issued 

to each of 55 companies, and 1 ,400 replacements were assigned on temporary 

duty as drivers. Forty truck units were transferred from base sections to the 

Motor Transport Brigade, and base sections exercised stringent transportation 

economy by using organic vehicles of other service units for local hauls. 

Activity at ports and beaches was reduced and U.K. depots were directed to ship 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 235 

only items for which there was an urgent need. Later, even more stringent 

actions were taken. Two general service engineer regiments were converted to 

seven truck companies each, and a smoke generator battalion was converted to a 

truck battalion. Ten truck companies were made from antiaircraft units. The 

most drastic step of all was the immobilization of three recently arrived infantry 

divisions, so 40 provisional truck companies could be activated from their 

personnel and organic vehicles plus 1,500 vehicles which the COMZ withdrew 

from stocks intended to equip other units. In the field army areas, similar 

measures were taken with engineer, artillery, and antiaircraft units operating as 

provisional truck units. 33 

Major General Ross continued efforts to get more truck units and to equip 

existing units with heavier equipment. Support from the War Department did 

not arrive until November 1944, when 690 tractors and 1,800 semitrailers were 

discharged at Marseille to reduce the workload in northern ports. The vehicles 

were integrated into line-haul operations by sending drivers to Marseille where 

they received an orientation and then drove the vehicles north. While these 

vehicles were valuable in the long term, they arrived too late to help the August 

shortages.34 

The original and successor routes of the Red Ball Express are shown on 

Map 23?5 Throughout its life, the Express faced a number of organizational and 

operational problems. Strict rules were set for operations, but enforcement was 

spotty. There were never enough MP's to police the routes. Convoys of First 

and Third Armies, and Ninth Air Force encroached on reserved roads and 

interfered with operations. Convoy discipline left much to be desired, because 

many drivers had little or no training. Low productivity resulted from slow 

loading and unloading, and underutilization of vehicle capacity. Both organic 

and higher echelon maintenance fell far short of standards. Also, field armies 

regularly diverted convoys to other than designated delivery points, some 

convoys traveling as far as 100 miles further than planned, which increased 

turnaround time up to 30 percent. 

Much of the early confusion was due to the hasty organization of the 

project, inexperience at all operating 1eve1s, and a command structure that 

invited jurisdictional problems. Advance Section (ADSEC) had responsibility 

for the operation itself, but not all the territory the route covered. The route 

originated in Normandy Base Section, and transited other sections that were 

activated as ADSEC moved its rear boundary forward to keep up with the 

armies. Jurisdictional problems were not exclusive to the Red Ball and were not 

solved until ADSEC MTB was inactivated in October 1944 and its personnel 
236 Spearhead of Logistics 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 237 

Refueling dump on the Red Ball Express route. 

integrated with the COMZ MTS. At that time, MTS was given technical 

supervision and operational control of those truck units assigned to the sections 

that were used on intersectional hauling missions.36 

By the time Red Ball was scheduled to end on 5 September 1944, it had 

delivered 89,000 tons of cargo to the Dreux-Chartres delivery area, which 

exceeded it's original tasking. While the Red Ball was a TC operation, other 

services contributed greatly to its success. Military Police provided traffic 

control, the Corps of Engineer troops labeled routes and maintained roadways 
238 Spearhead of Logistics 

and bridges, the Ordnance Corps provided road patrols and maintenance units at 

bivouac areas, and Signal Corps units furnished radio and courier services. 

Medical service units were responsible for ambulance service and set up aid 

stations along the route. 

Tactical requirements dictated the Red Ball would not end on 5 September 

as planned, but instead continued without pause on routes extended to support 

both First and Third Armies. Round trip mileage was 686 miles on the northern 

route, and 590 miles on the southern. Reopening of rail lines east of Paris 

permitted truck to rail transfer in the Paris area and reduced forward hauling on 

the Red Ball by some 4,000 tons a day. Nevertheless, the need for truck 

augmentation continued and Red Ball was extended to operate through 16 

November I 944. Some 412,000 long tons were carried throughout its 81 days of 

operation, an impressive record. However, for comparison, the XYZ operation, 

which operated east of the Rhine, hauled 630,000 tons from 25 March 1945 

through V-E Day on 8 May. 37 

There is no doubt that centralized control of truck resources, epitomized by 

the Red Ball, was essential to support the pursuit across France, and merits the 

praise it received, because of the way transporters overcame obstacles. 

However, the Red Ball Express was also an operation which should never have 

taken place. It occurred because of the failure of planners to provide an 

adequate number of truck units to the invading forces. That failure was 

especially surprising in view of experiences in North Africa and Italy. Even if 

the initial lodgement area was too small for the necessary number of companies, 

units could have been staged in England. ready for deployment when the 

breakout occurred. Neither could Red Ball be cited as a model operation of an 

express route. It was carried out at a considerable cost in terms of operator 

stress and fatigue, fostering malingering and causing accidents, as well as 

immeasurable negative physical effects on personnel. Inadequate management 

and maintenance caused serious deterioration of equipment from wear and tear 

to damage from neglect and abuse. The Red Ball Express also disrupted other 

operations, with the immobilization of three infantry divisions to provide 

provisional truck companies to the project. Lack of command and control also 

fostered black marketing along the route, as civilians were willing to pay high 

prices for goods unavailable in the shattered French economy?8 

The continuing need to support the rapidly moving field armies and cope 

with the German counteroffensive generated requirements for more "color 

routes" to take up the slack. Main routes are shown on Map 24?9 All highway 

express successors benefitted greatly from the Red Ball experience, especially 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 239 

Vehicle recovery operations in France. 

the improved procedures developed and implemented in the second phase. All 

of these had specialized missions, and with the exception of the ABC 

(America/Britain/Canada) route, were of relatively short duration. The ABC 

route was established to clear cargo from Antwerp to depots in the 

Liege-Mons-Charleroi area. It was an excellent example of a well run operation 

in the complex environment of operating jointly with other nations.40 

Meanwhile, the MTS became better organized and more experienced. But 

efforts to establish a routine transportation system were shattered on 16 

December 1944 when Hitler launched a surprise offensive through the Ardennes 
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World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 241 

and began the Battle of the Bulge. The MTS reacted quickly, developing 

contingency operations plans that were executed rapidly and effectively to help 

the annJes cope with the Ardennes Campaign from 17 December 1944 to 16 

January 1945. Motor Transport Service operations started with the marshalling 

of 600 trucks at Rheims. Within 13 hours, these vehicles were moving the 101 st 

Airborne Division to Bastogne. Throughout the campaign, over 90,000 troops 

and one million tons of supplies were moved on TC trucks. Some truck units 

trapped in Bastogne fought alongside the infantry. They helped move troops in 

combat maneuvers, losing 50 trucks in the process. Twenty-eight men were 

killed, wounded, or listed as missing. Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgeway, 

commanding the xvm Airborne Corps in the Ardennes Campaign, wrote to 

Brig. Gen. C. 0. Thrasher, commanding the Oise Section: "I should like you to 

know that all feel that the manner in which you picked up and delivered our two 

divisions into the battle area was just about the finest job of its kind we have 

ever seen. You should all ... take deep satisfaction in a contribution ... which 

time may show was of far greater scope than any of us now realize."41 

By February 1945, transportation operations had become "routine" to the 

extent possible in the active wartime environment, but there were still unique 

challenges. One of these was the movement of landing craft (LCVP, LVT, and 

LCM) from ports to forward areas for crossing the Rhine River, the last water 

barrier to the heart of Germany. The MTS modified tank transporters to carry 

the landing craft and reconnoitered special routes for the moves. In the rush 

period from 11 February through 11 March 1945, MTS hauled tremendous 

tonnages - about 2.8 million tons of cargo and over one million passengers, 

principally to support the Rhine crossing.42 

The last and greatest trucking operation in the theater was the XYZ 

operation. The operation was designed to execute three similarly lettered plans 

to move three levels of tonnage (8, 10 and 12,000 tons a day) forward to support 

four field armies' advances beyond the Rhine. The routes began at railheads near 

the western border of Germany, with the origin points leapfrogging forward as 

rail rehabilitation progressed, thus keeping truck hauls reasonably short as 

shown in Map 25.43 

All truck units used in XYZ were assigned to the 6955th Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company of the MTS. Three provisional Highway Transport 

Division (HTD) headquarters were organized, and one Quartermaster group was 

directed to act as an HTD. Each HTD was designated as the central agency to 

manage transportation operations and be the sole authority for movement 

instructions for a field army. The 6956th supported Ninth Army with 15 truck 
242 

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companies, while the 6958 HTD supported First Army with 31 companies. The 

6957th HID supported Third Army with 62 companies, and the 469th QM 

Group supported Seventh Army with 20 companies.44 

Detailed plans and procedures were developed for each level of operation, 

drawing heavily on the SOP of the successful ABC haul. Organization and 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 243 

ABC Truck Route 

control incorporated the experience gained in all prior express operations. 

Maintenance was heavily emphasized and the necessary resources were 

provided. Quartermaster elements managed supply aspects and operated 

marshalling yards. Other ancillary services were in support of or attached to the 

Motor Transport Service, as in the Red Ball. Truck units were equipped 

primarily with 10-ton trucks or tractor-semitrailers, with substantial numbers of 

tank trucks and semitrailers included. Operations were highly successful and 

thousands of tons of cargo, fuels, and passengers were transported. These 

operations also demonstrated the advantages of using central control 

organizations, such as the MTS and HTD, to exercise overall management. 
244 Spearhead of Logistics 

Highway transportation played a vital role in the success of the campaign 

against Germany in northern Europe, as it did in the Mediterranean campaigns. 

Trucks took up the slack from initial delays in railroad rehabilitation and they 

responded to the crash requirements generated by the pursuit across France and 

Germany which seized objectives well ahead of OVERLORD forecasts. Truck 

units also allowed the U.S. Army to respond rapidly and decisively to Hitler's 

last offensive. The Transportation Corps conducted operations successfully in 

spite of serious cuts in the truck troop list by using provisional units, field 

expedients, and imaginative management. When Maj. Gen. Ross listed 

outstanding TC achievements of the war in Europe, highway operations got 

prominent billing, having overcome his early concerns about truck prospects. 

RAILROAD OPERATIONS 

The French railway system was similar in structure and operating 

procedures to most European systems. It had a closely knit network of some 

26,000 miles of track, a quarter of which was double-tracked. The main lines 

led primarily from the industrial and agricultural areas to Paris, where it was 

operated by the Societe de Chemins de Fer Nationale Francais (SCNF). 

The Germans kept up the lines they used for military support, but most 

equipment was old and not well maintained. The equipment also differed 

markedly from its American counterparts. Chain and hook fasteners were used 

to link cars instead of high pressure air couplers. The standard French freight car 

carried 20 tons rather than 50 tons. On double tracked lines, trains moved on the 

left rather than the right track. 

Planning for rail operations on the Continent began in 1942, when joint 

planners established estimates for equipment required to augment captured 

stocks. Stockpiling in England began shortly thereafter and this laudable 

foresight was to stand the Allies in good stead as the French and German rail 

infrastructure was made operable. Rail operation planning reflected 

OVERLORD scenarios and visualized the following schedule:45 

From D-Day to D plus 41, advance parties from the 2nd Military Railway 

Service (MRS) headquarters would reconnoiter and survey railroads, including 

port clearance lines. They also would provide work trains and crews to assist 

engineer and signal troops working to rehabilitate the lines. In this period, the 

advance party was to prepare operating plans. 

On D plus 25, the ferrying of equipment from the United Kingdom would 

commence and on D plus 41, the 2d MRS HQ would be in France with one 

Railway Grand Division, two Railway Operating Battalions and two Railway 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 245 

Shop Battalions. Rail operations would reach from Cherbourg to the vicinity of 

Carentan and be pushing southward. 

From D plus 90, operations would extend south to Le Mans and through 

the Brittany peninsula. Some 350 locomotives, 7, I 00 freight cars of all types, 

and six hospital trains would be available and in-service. 

By D plus 120, the system would encompass mainly double track lines as 

far east as Dreux and Chartres with some of these lines transitioned to French 

operation under the U.S. military railway Phase I, II and III concept, which is 

shown in Map 26.46 

Planned objectives were not met because of the delay in capturing 

Cherbourg, and fierce German resistance which limited the depth of the 

lodgement until the end of July. Only short rail hauls were possible and they 

were generally uneconomical because of multiple handling by trucks at origin 

and destination. Rehabilitation of rights-of-way and equipment in the lodgement 

area progressed as far as the tactical situation allowed, and by the end of July, 

some 126 miles of track were in operating order. By D plus 90, rail operations 

had expanded rapidly, reaching Rennes, Le Mans, and beyond. Thereafter, 

railroad rehabilitation could not keep pace with the rapid pursuit from the St Lo 

breakout, an event unforeseen in the OVERLORD plan. Neverthless, the plans 

identified the resources that enabled the MRS to reduce the quantities or 

distances of hauls on the highway express routes, and eventually catch up and 

surpass long haul tmck capacities. 

During the breakout, railroad movements were closely integrated with 

express highway hauls. For example, the first heavy rail traffic was over branch 

lines from Cherbourg to Le Mans, where Third Army trucks picked up the 

cargo. The lines east of Paris were not damaged as extensively as those in the 

west, and were put in operation rapidly. They were capable of moving much 

more than the railroads could bring to Paris. Red Ball trucks hauled about 4,000 

tons per day to transfer points in the vicinity of Paris, where cargo was loaded on 

railcars and moved east.47 

During this stage, every effort was made to turn over sections of the system 

to the SCNF. Military railway service troops released by SCNF operations were 

moved east to operate the expanding system. While the turnover of Lines 

released railroad troops, their equipment did not always accompany them and 

SCNF officials did not always deliver locomotives and equipment or supply 

train services as requested by U.S. forces. Some 4,788 miles of track were under 

MRS operation by 1 October 1944.48 
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World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 247 

From October to December 1944, rehabilitation progressed well. Paris 

became an important transfer point from incoming rail lines to outgoing trucks 

and rail, while the railroads as a whole began to live up to their long haul 

promise. In October, 798 Army trainloads reached Paris from western ports, 

while 999 trainloads left for the north and east. By November 1944, a total of 

23,000 tons of supplies per day were being moved by rail east of the Seine. 

Thereafter, more than half of the tonnage from rear areas moved by rail.49 

This progress was achieved by untold blood, sweat, and tears by MRS, 

engineer, signal, other troops, and French railroaders. Intensive efforts were 

launched by Maj. Gen. Ross and his staff, as well as by other SHAEF staffs, to 

deliver to the Continent the troop units, equipment, and construction materials 

needed to do the job. By the end of 1944, 1,500 locomotives had been received 

from stocks in England, with an additional 800 captured engines that were 

repaired by U.S. and French mechanics. About 57,000 of all types of cars were 

put in service. Troops of the 740th Railway Operating Battalion of the 708th 

ROD operating in Belgium supported the U.S. First and Ninth Armies, running 

trains almost within sight of the enemy.50 

In Southern France, the 1st Military Railway Service, which operated as an 

independent command under the MTOUSA commander, vigorously pushed its 

operations north. By mid-October, it was committed to moving 12,000 tons per 

day to forward railheads in the vicinity of Vesoul, supporting the Seventh U.S. 

and First French Annies on a 60/40 basis. By the end of the year, operations 

reached Sarreguemines, with an average of 557 rail cars a day received in army 

areas, while the SCNF was taking over sections of the operations as rapidly as 

possible. By then, the 1st MRS had about 4,000 miles of track under its 

jurisdiction, principally operating under Phase II conditions. 5

1 

Rail operations were highly responsive to requirements of the annies, but 

during the period of the German counteroffensive in December 1944 to January 

1945, they suffered several setbacks. Extreme cold and heavy snows, excessive 

sickness among French employees, and shortages of coal created unacceptable 

backups of loaded cars. Strong controls over movement allocations, the 

initiation of the Green Diamond highway express route shown in Map 24, and 

better weather eventually brought the situation back to nonnal. 

The Gennan counteroffensive drastically slowed rail operations by 

disrupting movements in the forward areas. System tonnages were reduced from 

roughly 50,000 tons per day to 30,000. Approximately 35,000 cars were allowed 

to accumulate in forward areas to support contingencies for large-scale troop and 

supply evacuations. Unloadings were reduced by about 14,000 carloads due to 
248 Spearhead of Logistics 

the German counteroffensive, and the effects on movement control and release 

of rolling stock in forward areas persisted through the end of hostilities. 5

2 

After the Allied repulse of the German counteroffensive, the armies 

prepared to cross the Rhine. In mid-February 1945, COMZ absorbed SOLOC 

(southern lines of communication), and SHAEF established the General 

Headquarters, (GHQ), Military Railway Service to direct the activities of the the 

1st and 2d MRS. The GHQ was activated on 10 February 1945, with Brig. Gen. 

Carl R. Gray, Jr. commanding all MRS units. Gray was also responsible for 

planning, developing, and operating the railway system, as well as for stocking 

and distributing all U.S. rolling stock and other railway equipment. The 

appointment of Gray led to the attainment of the ongoing TC objective of 

making the rail system a true intersectional service. Railroad construction 

remained the responsibility of the Chief Engineer, COMZ. 

The first major challenge facing the GHQ, its subordinate MRS 

organizations, and the engineers of the field army was to support the crossing of 

the Rhine. Then, GHQ had to provide for subsequent rail operations in support 

of the final campaign across Germany. Bridging the Rhine was one of the major 

engineering tasks of the war in Europe, on a par with the major rehabilitation of 

a large port. The task was thoroughly planned, and construction materials were 

carefully marshaled. Among the major engineer units staged for the operation 

was the 1056th Port Construction and Repair Group. On 8 April 1945, the 

1056th completed the frrst rail bridge across the Rhine at Wesel after ten days of 

hard work. During April, other bridges were built at Mainz, Mannheim, and 

Karlsruhe. The 717th, 729th and 720th Railroad Operating Battalions were 

actively committed to assisting in bridge construction by transporting 

construction materials, laying connecting track, preparing adjoining yard 

facilities and turnouts for the bridge approaches, and the laying of rail on the 

bridges. By 18 April 1945, the railroads were hauling about 12,000 tons daily 

over the bridges, a tonnage equivalent to the theater highway hauls. 5

3 

As rail lines were pushed forward and railheads were established behind 

the advancing armies in Germany, serious car shortages developed. Field 

commanders insisted on using rail cars for mobile storage and only accepted 

selected cargo from cars which were unloaded. As railheads moved forward, 

thousands of loaded cars accumulated at railheads, draining France and Belgium 

of rolling stock and adversely affecting the civilian economy. Supreme 

Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force and subordinate headquarters issued 

warnings and directives to little avail. VE-Day solved what had become a severe 

problem for the MRS and COMZ sections, as well as Supreme Headquarters. 5

4 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 249 

From the Rhine crossing to the end of the war in Europe, rail was the 

principal hauler into Germany. Rail units handled 20-25,000 tons per day, 

which was three-quarters of the total forward tonnage. In addition to standard 

cargo hauls and personnel movements, the railroads operated scheduled express 

service runs, the most notable being the "Toot Sweet Express," which carried 

high priority freight and mail from Cherbourg via Paris to the forward areas. 

The Chief of Transportation was also responsible for the operation and 

maintenance of hospital trains, which were built principally from British and 

French rolling stock. The quality of the coaches reflected the general standards 

of French railway equipment in the harsh wartime environment of 1944-1945. 

Lighting and heating were not adequate, and programs to provide more and 

better equipment were overtaken by the end of the war, by which time the 47 

trains in operation were sufficient to meet evacuation requirements. The MRS 

also operated the popular "leave trains" that began in February of 1945 to transport 

soldiers to specified channel ports to be ferried to England for a week of sightseeing. 

Later, the program was expanded to the Riviera, Paris, and Brussels. 5

5 

At the end of the war, the GHQ and the 1st and 2d MRS had assigned or 

attached 7 Railway Grand Divisions; 24 Railway Operating Battalions; and 7 

Railway Shop Battalions. In addition, there were assigned 8 battalions and 2 

independent companies of military police; 2 base depot companies; and various 

small units, such as 10 hospital train maintenance detachments. These units 

made a major contribution to the success of the operations that ensured the 

victory in Europe. 

INLAND WATERWAY OPERATIONS 

In mid-1944, the COMZ Inland Waterways (IWW) Committee 

recommended river and canal barges be used to ease the burden on trucks and 

railroads. The IWW Division was fonned in the Office of the Chief of 

Transportation and immediately coordinated closely with the engineers and 

civili an contractors who had begun reconstructing the waterways system. The 

division provided equipment for local bargemen and set up inland discharge 

points, principally on rivers and canals serving ports. By the end of 1944, most 

waterways in France were in limited use. The Oise and Seine Rivers were used 

the most to move urgently needed coal to Paris. 

In Belgium, extensive barge operations were conducted on the Albert 

Canal from Antwerp to Liege. The canal remained active even when it froze, 

because improvised ice breakers were used to open the channel. From 

December 1944 through July 1945, about 1.2 million tons were moved by barge 
250 Spearhead of Logistics 

in Belgium, and another 580,000 were moved in France. The Rhine River 

Branch of the IWW Division was established in April 1945, and the Danube 

River Branch at the end of May 1945. Both initiated action to recover and 

arrange for the repair of damaged barges, as well as the takeover of enemy river 

fleet equipment. Both branches also established operations that continued 

during the occupation through 1945, at which time the function reverted to 

civilian control.56 

AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS 

The Chief of Transportation had no direct control of air cargo and 

passenger operations which were under the purview of the Army Air Forces. For 

OVERLORD, as well as for subsequent operations on the Continent, SHAEF 

directed in April 1944 that the combined air transport operations room 

(CATOR) at Stanhope, England be designated as a special staff section of the 

AEAF, serving as the "regulating station" controlling aU air-supply missions. 

The supreme commander determined allocations between emergency air supply 

and airborne operations, while SHAEF established procedures to submit bids for 

air movements. 

Transportation planners and operators took advantage of airlift for 

emergency and other high priority requirements and used it as an adjunct to 

express services provided by truck and rail. Special shipping services were set 

up from Britain to move 600 tons of ammunition a day (GREENLIGHT) and 

100 tons of any supplies by daily coaster to the Continent. In the ftrst month 

following the assault, 40 supplemental ammunition shipments were made by air. 

Following the June 1944 storm that temporarily stopped port operations, 6,600 

tons of supplies were flown from England in June and July. Army supply and 

transportation staffs interfaced with air staffs and bases to coordinate receipt and 

delivery of shipments in the COMZ and combat zone. The tonnage moved to 

the Continent clearly demonstrated the value of air shipments to meet 

emergencies and presaged their increased use. 

57 

During the supply crisis that stemmed from the breakout, the extent to 

which airlift would be used for logistic and civilian support became a major 

issue. It escalated to SHAEF, army group, AEAF, and Allied airborne army 

levels. Those agencies made decisions on air support priorities, increased 

volume of airlift tonnage, took actions to refit bombers to be used as supply 

carriers, and provided additional base services to support airlift. United States 

and British air elements transported about 23,000 tons of supplies to Paris and 

the 12th and 21st Army Groups from 20 August to 16 September 1944.58 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 251 

Airlift continued to be used extensively for emergency and priority support 

of operations east of the Rhine as troop carrier aircraft were committed to 

logistic airlift. Those shipments contributed strongly to the success of rapid 

advances such as Patton's push into Austria and Czechoslovakia, which severely 

extended Third Army's supply Jines. Large quantities of POL, rations and 

critical supply classes II and IV items were supplied by air. Quantitatively, 

airlift did not approach the other modes, but the capability to meet emergencies 

was a service highly valued by the supported armies. 

POL PIPELINE OPERATIONS 

Engineer pipeline construction and operation had a major impact on the TC 

responsibility for the transport of POL by all modes and for development of 

movement programs. Combined Chiefs of Staff planners in England and the 

Chief of Engineers in the United States appreciated the immense volume of POL 

needed for operations on the Continent. Extensive plans were made for the 

construction of pipelines and priority was given to to the development of 

improved pipeline equipment to ensure bulk delivery of POL at the earliest 

possible time. 

Other branches also had a direct interest in POL. The quartermaster was 

the responsible supply service for the commodity, while the Ordnance Corps 

was the designer of vehicles. The Army Air Forces consumed unimaginable 

quantities of aviation fuel. However, none of these agencies possessed the 

technical knowledge needed for supply requirements. 

The G-4, ETOUSA established a POL Branch, staffed with officers who 

had served with big oil companies. Estimating requirements, they prepared detailed 

plans for operations through D plus 90, which centered on distributing bulk POL 

through a "minor" pipeline system serving the beaches and lodgement areas, and a 

"major" system, originating at Cherbourg and extending to the vicinity of Paris. 5

9 

After the assault, construction of the minor system went well and pipelines 

were extended to St. Lo and Carentan. By the end of July, the system was 

delivering about 12,000 barrels a day to QM depots, of which 9,500 were 

consumed by First Army. Construction of the major system was delayed by the 

late capture of Cherbourg; however, POL facilities outside the main port area 

were not damaged as badly as expected and rehabilitation and construction went 

well. But the system was not able to receive a product until six weeks behind 

the planned schedule. Reserves remained adequate because consumption was 

well below estimates. Pipelines were laid south within the lodgement area, but at 

the time of the breakout, bulk POL distribution was limited to the minor system. 
252 Spearhead of Logistics 

Development of the major system proceeded apace, following the pursuing U.S. 

Armies. It linked up with the minor system at St. Lo and pushed vigorously 

ahead toward the Seine, with some 7,200 troops and 1,500 POW working on the 

lines and dispensing points. By mid-September, one line reached Dourdan, 

about 20 miles west of the Seine. Construction slowed because using scarce 

transportation resources to move pipeline materials had a much lower priority 

than hauling fuel and other supplies to the armies. When the crisis diminished, 

pipeline construction continued to follow the advancing armies, with the system 

west of the Rhine completed as shown on Map 27.60 

Without the pipelines, lift requirements for trucks and railroads would have 

been astronomical and probably could not have been met. Even with the 

pipelines and special POL express hauls, shortages were endemic in field armies 

for much of the war. 

MOVEMENT CONTROL 

United States movement control organization and procedures for 

operations BOLERO and OVERLORD were modeled on the British system. 

Movement policies and programs for the buildup were coordinated closely with 

British civilian and military officials to prevent disrupting their transportation 

system. The development and execution of movement programs were aided by 

the reliability of the British transportation network and traffic control system. 

Maj. Gen. Ross established in his Movements Division an Operational Branch 

that coordinated directly with British counterpart offices on movement control 

programs. Troop embarkation and planning, and transport of cargo to 

outloading ports in Britain were handled as separate functions. 

The Chief of Transportation coordinated closely with the British to plan the 

combined assault, particularly in Northern France, Belgium, and Germany where 

the British 21st Army Group operated and controlled the areas in which many 

U.S. ports and depots were located. However, overall U.S. movement control on 

the Continent had to adjust to the absence of an American control system and a 

reliable transportation network. War damage to the Continental transportation 

infrastructure and the fluid tactical situation made it almost impossible to 

forecast capabilities accurately. A substitute plan had to be fashioned and 

emplaced for the destroyed or dispersed Continental movement and traffic 

control systems. 

The Operational Branch addressed all aspects of movement control. It 

developed supply movement programs that identified total lift requirements and 

port throughput capabilities in Britain and on the Continent. It allocated the lift 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 

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254 Spearhead of Logistics 

by claimant/requestor for movements to and on the Continent and regulated 

traffic moving over LOC on the Continent. 

The final OVERLORD programs for supply movements from Britain were 

in four phases. The first, from D-Day though D plus 8, involved the pre-stowage 

of balanced/mixed cargo with assault and follow-up units. The cargo was 

tactically loaded onto landing craft and Liberty ships fitted to handle vehicles, 

and onto coasters. In the second phase, from D plus 8 through D plus 21, 

sustaining stocks were moved in returning coasters, commodity loaded Liberties 

and other vessels. The third phase, from D plus 21 through D plus 41, involved 

movement of maintenance stocks in coasters and other craft from England, and 

others loaded in the United States, which were primarily prestowed or 

commodity loaded. Phase four, from D plus 41 through D plus 90, was the 

change over to primary support directly from the U.S. instead of cargo routed 

through or transshipped throug~ the United Kingdom. In addition, the program 

included procedures for emergency shipments by express from Britain. The 

movement program established the baseline and framework on which 

movements from Britain were planned and adjusted. 61 

The Chief of Transportation planned to have his office develop and issue 

programs on the Continent, covering movements from the ports and depots to 

the field armies, and for large interdepot movements in the Communications 

Zone. However, the COMZ G-4 Section intervened by taking direct control of 

priorities, issuing movement orders, and delegating control to section 

commanders of all movements in their areas of responsibility. The Coff had 

"technical supervision" of the program, but in execution, that authority was 

defmed in its narrowest sense. There was no effective coordination of 

movements in 1944 and as a result, many of the depots were swamped by 

shipments exceeding their receiving capabililty. In December of 1944, the G-4 

and Coff agreed on the need for monthly movement programs developed by the 

TC and approved by the G-4. 

The development of these monthly programs was supported by the success 

of the daily allocation programs developed to control use of Red Ball highway 

express lift. Later, the CoiT was also given embargo authority to relieve 

congestion at depots. Unfortunately, the movement programs did not solve all 

the problems, particularly the accumulation of cars in the forward areas and 

other congestion that occurred in the closing days of the war. Nevertheless, the 

TC made great progress toward the objective of gaining complete control over 

military traffic. This experience was put to good use during the occupation and 

in the development of doctrine when the TC became a permanent branch. 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 255 

TRAFFIC REGULATION 

During planning, it was visualized that the Transportation Corps would be 

responsible for traffic regulation of movements in the COMZ after the field 

Army established a rear boundary. Control would first be exercised by the 

ADSEC Transportation Section. Then as elements of COMZ came in, and the 

army rear boundary was moved forward, sections would be added to command 

the additional territory with each transportation section controlling intrasectional 

movements. The COMZ Chief of Transportation would provide overall 

coordination and control intersectional movements. 

Traffic was to be controlled by six traffic regulating groups assigned to 

sections, or the COMZ, depending on the nature of their employment. They 

were to establish control stations at railheads, truckheads, and other critical 

points on the lines of communications, operate classification and dispatch areas 

to ensure orderly movement, and prevent congestion. Another type of regulating 

station, not to be confused with traffic regulating units, also would be set up 

behind each field army area to control movements to and from the army area by 

setting priorities, and handling movement requests from combat units. Although 

doctrinally these stations were controlled by the theater commander, they were 

assigned to ADSEC.62 

The execution of the traffic regulation function did not fully implement the 

above plan because of the extensive delegation of authority to section 

commanders. As an example, the Advance Section was assigned control of the 

entire Red Ball route, but in practice, delegated much of its responsibility to the 

rear section commanders. 

The 24th and 25th regulating stations were assigned to ADSEC and 

operated behind the Third and First Armies respectively, controlling the flow of 

supplies throughout the war. During the long period of insufficient 

transportation, the units served more as expediting agencies to facilitate the 

movement of priority shipments. They also enforced priorities to prevent 

forward movement of unwanted shipments in an effort to reduce congestion. 

The function of regulating highway traffic, which became critical because 

of the enormous numbers of vehicles on the roads, was fully exercised until 

about mid-August 1944 by U.S. First Army and ADSEC. After ADSEC moved 

east, the Coff Movements Division was given the responsibility for traffic 

regulation in areas behind ADSEC, including the issuance of movement 

instructions. This lasted for three months, then the new base sections, as they 

became fully staffed and trained, took over the function and traffic regulation 
256 Spearhead of Logistics 

remained decentralized until VE-Day. Based on overall experience, 

decentralizing the regulation and control of highway traffic, with technical 

control by the Chief of Transportation, was considered the most efficient system 

for the operations on the Continent. 63 

TRANSPORTATION CORPS SUPPLY 

Transportation items stored and issued on the Continent included marine 

and railroad items, with a backup depot in England. Resupply came from both 

the United States and England, which was also a source of local procurement. 

Equipment and stocks captured on the Continent were used to supplement other 

sources. Prior to the breakout, supplies were held in a dump behind Omaha 

Beach. Subsequently, eight depots were located to serve port and railroad 

customers, handling about 30,000 marine and 20,000 rail items. Stock control 

and requisitioning were managed by the COMZ CofT Supply Division. 

Substantial quantities of supplies and miscellaneous items, such as work 

clothing, were issued to Allied units and civilian agencies. 

Transportation Corps Depot companies were plagued by shortages of 

technically experienced personnel, but learned by doing. For example, to 

support Rhine crossings, an emergency trucking service was established to 

support heavy rail and marine requirements. In the closing period of the war, 

depots were able to receive and store some 205,000 tons from April through 

June 1945. Following VE-Day, depots immediately became involved m 

redeploying materiel to the United States and the Pacific, as well as 

repositioning for operations during the occupation. 

Supply operations were affected not only by a lack of trained troops, but 

also by the lack of standardized equipment. A worldwide shortage of repair 

parts, insufficient technical expertise and inadequate supply documentation to 

properly order and identify parts plagued the Transportation Corps throughout 

the war. Most of the problems were caused by the late entry of the TC into the 

supply business. The principal lesson learned was that the supply mission 

required clear definition and the allocation of sufficient resources to provide 

trained personnel and a fully developed supply management system.

64 

REDEPLOYMENT AND THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 

After V -E Day, SHAEF directed the CofT to manage transportation 

activities in the U.S.-occupied areas of Gennany. Part of the staff was shifted to 

Wiesbaden, then later to Frankfurt, while Maj. Gen. Ross divided his time 
World War II The Normandy Invasion and Assault on Germany 257 

between Paris and Frankfurt. In addition to setting up the Army transportation 

system for Germany, General Ross' offices managed the redeployment of forces 

to the Pacific Theater, and coordinated closely with General Gross' staff in the 

Zone of the Interior on the retrograde movement of troops, units, supplies, 

equipment, and ammunition, and the transport of war brides back to the United 

States. Redeployment planning commenced during the last quarter of 1944. 

Following the German surrender on 7 May 1945, Redeployment Day (R-Day) 

was set as 12 May 1945. The most complex moves of unit personnel and 

equipment to the Pacific had priority, and usually required the unit to move on 

organic equipment to staging areas near ports to free rail equipment for the 

moves of troops deploying through or to the United States. The first troop ship 

sent directly from the ETO to the Pacific, the Admiral C. F. Hughes, sailed from 

Marseille on 16 June 1945, via the Panama Canal, with 4,832 service troops 

aboard, and arrived in Manila late in July. Direct redeployment ceased as soon as 

the Japanese surrendered. The redeployment fleet comprised about 400 ships 

ranging in size from converted Liberties to the Queen Mary and U.S. Navy 

combatant vessels, with a one-time lift capacity of about 575,000 troops. From 

R-Day through 27 October 1945, the theater outloaded 1,470,799 troops to the 

United States and about 117,000 to the Pacific. At the same time, almost half a 

million long tons of cargo were loaded for the Pacific, and about 850,000 long 

tons to the United States. General Ross said that his job in the ETO would not be 

fmished until the bulk of the redeployment was accompUshed. He attained that 

goal and on 26 February 1946, sailed for the U.S., closing a successful and 

colorful career as the Chief of Transportation, European Theater of Operations. 

He left capable subordinates to carry on the completion of redeployment, roll-up 

of equipment and supplies, movement of war brides to the United States and 

support of the occupying forces.65 
258 

CHAPTER IX 

World War II 

Pacific Theater 

"Difficulties of landing on beaches are serious, even when the 

invader has reached them; but difficulties of nourishing a lodgment 

when exposed to heavy attack by land, air, and sea are far greater." 

______ Winston Churchill: Note to the Chiefs, 28 June 1940. _____ _ 

OVERVIEW 

In the summer of 1941 , as relations between the United States and Japan 

grew more tense, the War Department took steps to prepare for a possible war. 

In order to provide a single headquarters for the Pacific Area, it established U.S. 

Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) with its headquarters in Manila under 

the command of Lt. Gen. (later General of the Army) Douglas MacArthur. The 

efforts made to give the command real combat power were too little and too late. 

On 7 December 1941, Japanese carrier aircraft crippled the U.S. fleet in a 

surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, followed by landing on 

northern Luzon on lO December. In a series of rapid thrusts, Japanese forces 

captured Malaya, Hong Kong, the Dutch East Indies, and most of New Guinea. 

The Philippines held out until May 1942. The Japanese also penetrated into the 

Indian Ocean and by the spring of 1942, it seemed that nothing could keep them 

from seizing Australia. 

On orders from the War Department, General MacArthur left the 

Philippines on 17 March 1942 and flew to Australia. He set up headquarters in 

Melbourne, as Commander-in-Chief (CINC), Allied Forces in the Southwest 

Pacific Area (SWPA). The command took control of U.S. and Allied forces in 

Australia and New Zealand that were organizing for the defense of those nations, 

as well as U.S. and Allied forces fighting in the Philippines and New Guinea. A 

short time earlier, on 30 March 1942, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was 

designated CINC, Allied Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (POA) which included the 

North, Central, and South Pacific areas. There would be numerous changes in 
World War II Pacific Theater 259 

the internal structure of the two principal headquarters and temporary changes in 

boundaries to adjust to tactical operations, but the original commands remained 

basically unchanged until the theater reorganized for the final attack on the 

Japanese homeland, which was canceled when the Japanese surrendered. Map 

28 shows the command boundaries and approximate limits of Japanese advance 

as of August 1942. 1 

In the Battle of the Coral Sea, south of the Solomon Islands, 4-8 May 1942, 

Japanese aggression in the South Pacific was temporarily checked by Allied 

naval and air forces, but it was not stopped. Japanese land forces captured and 

held bases in northern New Guinea and in adjacent islands suitable for land 

based air attacks on the U.S. supply line to Australia and Allied 

counteroffensives on New Guinea. In the Battle of Midway, 3-6 June 1942, U.S. 

Navy dive bombers sank four Japanese aircraft carriers, crippling the long range 

striking power of the Japanese fleet. The Japanese Navy would never again 

conduct operations away from the protection of land based airpower? 

By August 1942, the Allies were ready to recapture territory from which 

the Japanese could directly threaten Allied territory and the LOC which 

supported that territory. The Allies first defeated the Japanese in a hard fought 

land-naval-air campaign for the island of Guadalcanal in the Solomons. A 

Marine/Army force operating under CINC POA invaded the island by 

amphibious assault on 7 August J 942, finally securing the island on 9 February 

1943. From 28 September 1942 - 22 January 1943, MacArthur's forces took the 

offensive in New Guinea, ejecting the enemy from the area east of Salamaua and 

made amphibious landings on New Britain. Following the victory on 

Guadalcanal, Nimitz' forces captured the rest of the Solomon Islands by the end 

of December 1943.

3 These successes secured the LOC from the United States, 

protected Australia, and provided the bases for future operations in the Pacific. 

Through 1944, both SWPA and POA forces attacked aggressively 

westward, while South Pacific Area (SPA) troops isolated and neutralized 

bypassed Japanese bases. In the SWPA, MacArthur's forces executed a series 

of amphibious landings along the northern coast of New Guinea and the 

Admiralties and by 15 September 1944, captured Morotai, off the eastern tip of 

the main island and on a direct line to Mindanao in the Philippines. In the POA, 

Nimitz' drive across the Pacific began in the Gilberts with costly assaults on 

Tarawa and Makin, seized the Marshalls by attacking Kwajelein and Enwietok 

in January and February 1944, bypassed the Carolines, and attacked the 

Marianas, including Saipan and Guam, and the Palaus from mid-June through 

mid-October 1944. On 19-20 June 1944, Admiral Nimitz' Fifth Fleet, under 
2 

THE PA S: 1 AUGUST 1942 

Map28 

Spear head of Logistics 

•,OH<IA ,I l'j. 

-
World War II Pacific Theater 

THE PACIFIC AREAS: 1 AUGUST 1942 

A If 

v..:.;" ~ .. ... ' , .. , .. 

UNITED 

STATES 

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261 

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Map28 
262 Spearhead of Logistics 

Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, defeated the Japanese fleet off Saipan in 

the battle of the Philipine Sea, eliminating it as a serious threat.4 

By the summer of 1944, both commands were in position to assault 

alternative targets under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support the 

fmal attack of the Japanese mainland. The alternatives were the Philippines and 

Formosa. The JCS chose the Philippines with Leyte as the site of the initial 

amphibious assault. Nimitz' XXIV Corps, enroute to an assault on Yap, was 

loaned to MacArthur, and Nimitz' fleets and China-based bombers provided 

naval surface and air support. At last, the two major commands were jointly 

attacking a common objective and in the process, the largest convoy yet 

assembled in the Pacific landed the Sixth Army on Leyte on 20 October 1944. It 

was during the early days of the campaign that the naval battle for Leyte Gulf 

(23-26 October 1944) destroyed much of the remaining enemy fleet. In 

desperation, the Japanese began using kamikaze tactics, which increased Allied 

ship and personnel losses considerably for the rest of the war.

5 

The successful capture of Leyte was followed by similar success in 

capturing Mindoro and Luzon to establish a base from which Sixth Army could 

be launched for the attack on Japan. Concurrently, offensive operations were 

mounted on Mindanao and other islands to clear them of Japanese. Australian 

elements continued to mop up bypassed pockets of Japanese in the New Guinea 

region and initiated full scale operations to reclaim Borneo. 

From 1 April - 21 June 1945, the last major amphibious campaign in the 

Central Pacific was launched to seize Okinawa in the Ryukyu Islands. Okinawa 

cost U.S. forces about 49,000 casualties and the Japanese over 117,000. The 

United States had 36 ships sunk and 368 damaged as a result of roughly 1,900 

kamikaze attacks. Okinawa provided Allied forces with a base only 350 miles 

from Kyushu, the southernmost Japanese island, an invaluable asset for the 

projected invasion.

6 

The remainder of the war was devoted to bringing the full weight of Allied 

naval and air power against the main Japanese islands. Japan was completely 

cut off from supply by sea. Industry was crippled and starvation was 

widespread. On 6 and 9 August 1945, atomic bombs were dropped on 

Hiroshima and Nagasaki as an alternative to a costly invasion of the Japanese 

home islands, which planners estimated would cos~ a million Allied casualties. 

Recognizing their situation as hopeless, the Japanese unconditionally 

surrendered on 2 September 1945. 
World War II Pacific Theater 

COMMAND AND 

LOGISTICAL/TRANSPORTATION ORGANIZATIONS 

THEATER JOINT COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS 

263 

Of all the theaters in World War II, the Pacific was the one in which US 

forces needed a workable joint logistical organization. Army ground and air 

forces, Marine and Navy forces constantly operated jointly in tactical operations 

where coordination was a prerequisite for mission success. However, 

fundamental differences in Army and Navy approaches precluded effective 

integration of logistical support and adversely affected the support structure of 

both Southwest Pacific Area, which was Army-oriented and the Pacific Ocean 

Areas, which was Navy-oriented. In April 1943, JCS directives required both 

commands to observe the principle of unity of command under which 

responsibilities for the entire command were the same as if the forces were all 

Army or all Navy. The joint force commander assigned missions to service or 

task force commands, and was not to act in the dual capacity as the commander 

of a service component without JCS approval. To guide the development of 

logistical organizations and systems, in March 1943, the Army and Navy jointly 

issued the Basic Logistical Plan for Command Areas Involving Joint Army and 

Navy Operations. Commonly known as the "Basic Logistical Plan," it allowed 

theater commanders to decide the best way to support their own joint forces. 

The plan was probably the best compromise that could be reached without major 

disruption of on-going operations.7 

Admiral Nimitz, with JCS approval was CINC, Pacific Fleet as well as 

POA, which meant he could shift all Pacific fleet resources around (except 

Seventh Fleet) as he wished. There were two Army commanders in POA: Lt 

Gen. Millard F. Harmon, Commanding General (CG), South Pacific 

(COMGENSOPAC); and Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, CG, the Hawaiian 

Department, who was succeeded by Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, CG, U.S. 

Army Forces in the Central Pacific Area (USAFICPA), which absorbed the 

Department. The Army commanders in POA were primarily administrative and 

responsible for training and logistical support. 

In the SWPA, MacArthur had U.S. Marine Corps units and the U.S. 

Seventh Fleet under Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid in his command. He also had 

substantially more Allied units than the POA. Initially, U.S. Army Forces in 

Australia (USAFIA) operated as the theater Army administrative headquarters, 

but in February 1943, U.S. Army Forces Far East (USAFFE) was reactivated. 

General MacArthur assumed command, but he did not have the control of Army 
264 Spearhead of logistics 

units Pacific-wide as Nimitz did for the Pacific Fleet naval units. 

Administratively, U.S. Army units operated under USAFFE, and Navy units 

operated under Seventh Fleet. In combat operations, all forces operated under 

the Allied component or a task force commander. There was little integration of 

logistics operations among the services.

8 

The burgeoning logistics system in the Pacific was forced to cope with a 

number of conditions unknown in other theaters. The command structure was 

complex. Support bases were scattered across a vast ocean which meant extreme 

variations in weather. In addition, there were frequent changes in tactical plans 

and objectives. It was evident to most logisticians that a unjfied supply and 

transportation system was highly desirable, but in practice it was difficult to 

combine two very different systems. The Army system was primarily for 

support of ground forces ashore and the Navy system was organized to support 

the fleet. Early in the war, the Army developed a centralized system to plan and 

control acquisition and distribution of supplies world-wide. They also depended 

on progressive development of land bases close behind the line of advance. The 

Navy system was decentralized with fleet service squadrons that were mobile 

logistical bases with the impetus of supply from the rear. For the Navy, the 

Pacific had first priority and that's where the majority of its units were located. 

The Army focused on Europe and gave lower priority to support of Pacific forces.9 

LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION ORGANIZATIONS 10 

General Headquarters, South West Pacific Area (GHQ, SWPA), an Allied 

geographical and organizational entity, was fonned from units that were en route 

to the Phllippines when the Japanese attacked. They were diverted to Australia, 

where they arrived on 23 December 1941. The embryonic command, which was 

redesignated USAFIA, immediately focused on getting support to troops in the 

Philippines, (in the final analysis a transportation task). 11 

Concurrently, the Allies established Australia as the main base to support 

Allied defensive operations against the expanding invasions of Pacific islands. 

Brig. Gen. Arthur R. Wilson and a small team arrived from the U.S. on I 1 

March 1942 to help the command cope with the formidable supply and 

transportation challenges and was assigned as Quartermaster, (later G-4), 

USAFIA. Irutially, he managed both supply and transportation functions, but in 

April despite local opposition, he followed the precedent established in the office 

of the U.S Army Quartermaster General, and set up the U.S. Army 

Transportation Service (ATS). He also brought in several experienced American 

transportation executives, including Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Thomas B. Wilson, 
World War II Pacific Theater 265 

who had experience in all modes and became the first theater Chief of 

Transportation (Coff) and Colonel Thomas G. Plant, a steamship line executive 

who was put in charge of the Water Branch of the ATS, and later also became 

theater Coff. They quickly instituted more effective procedures. When 

MacArthur established GHQ SWPA in April 1942, USFIA became one of its 

subordinate commands. In July 1942, it became the U.S. Army Services of 

Supply (USASOS) and supported SWPA operations all the way to the 

Philippines. The USASOS relocated several times to Hollandia, Leyte, and 

Manila. Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) James L. Frink took over command of the 

USASOS in September 1943 and remained its commander until 30 May 1945. 12 

While USASOS remained basically the same through the war, MacArthur's 

command organizations were highly complex and underwent numerous 

structural and name changes to reflect his personal role. First, he was the Allied 

commander; then commander of all U.S. Forces in SWPA; commander of 

USAFFE, which was interposed between GHQ, SWPA, and USASOS; and 

eventually in the Spring of 1945, preparatory to the invasion of Japan, 

commander of all U.S. Army Forces, Pacific (AFPAC). The changes in 

MacArthur's command structure complicated the mission of the already 

complex A TS. The A TS was redesignated the Transportation Corps and 

expanded to cope with increasing responsibililties, and in December 1944, was 

organized as shown in Chart J 2. 13 

For the ftrst six months of the war while the Japanese were still on the 

offensive, Army and Navy transportation operations in the Central Paciftc Area 

(CPA) were handled separately. Coordination between the two services was 

informal with only a limited degree of operational cooperation. Army 

operations, within Nimitz' Allied joint command, were under the Hawaiian 

Department. The Army Transport Service (ATS), assigned to the Quartermaster 

at the time of Pearl Harbor, was made a separate division of the Department on 9 

March 1942. 14 As time to assume the offensive grew near, the structure for 

supporting Army forces was reviewed. In August 1943, USAFICPA absorbed 

the functions of the Hawaiian Department. Lt. Gen. Richardson replaced the 

Service Forces element responsible for the movements of troops and supplies by 

establishing the Army Port and Service Command (AP&SC), under the 

command of Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Roy E. Blount, a Cavalry officer, who was 

also the USAFICPA Special Staff Transportation Officer. Port and other water 

transportation activities were assigned to the ATS; motor and rail operations 

were assigned to a Port Transportation Section. The command also had major 

post. camp, and station administrative responsibilities including specifted 
ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS, TRANSPORTATION CORPS, USASOS, SWPA: December 1944 

A.-,.;.ra.t,..c &one:-h 

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World War II Pacific Theater 267 

replacement centers, staging and billeting areas, and recreational facilities, but 

its main effort was the support of Central Pacific task force operations within 

resources available in the command. The Western Pacific Base Command 

(WPBC) took over most functions in the fmal phases of the war. 

15 

Protecting the U.S. lines of communications to Australia was critical, and 

by July 1942, some 50,000 ground and air troops of all services had been 

deployed to South Pacific islands not yet occupied by the Japanese, for that 

purpose. Support was provided from Hawaii and the U.S., distributed under a 

number of makeshift arrangements with much of the ship discharge and local 

distribution accomplished by combat arms units and engineers. In June 1942, 

Vice Adm. Robert L. Ghormley, who was succeeded by Admiral William F. 

Halsey Jr. in October, took command of the South Pacific Area, a sub-command 

of POA, to prepare the counteroffensive in the southern Solomons. The Army 

component was the U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area (USAFISPA), 

first located in Auckland, New Zealand. It was responsible for the 

administration and training of Army ground and air forces, logistical support of 

aU forces at bases commanded by the Army, and supply of all Army units. The 

Navy had similar responsibilities, and also provided POL to all services, and 

controlled all ships and shipping space. The USAFISPA Service Command, 

commanded by Brig. Gen. Robert G. Breene, was activated to support the 

command and moved to Noumea, New Caledonia in November 1942, where it 

was redesignated SOS, South Pacific Area, with widened responsibilities for 

water transport, port operation, and motor transport. The Transportation Section 

was headed by Maj. (later Col.) Jack A. Fraser, who had civilian experience in 

water transportation. For additional control, subordinate Army Service 

Commands (ASC) were established at key points. 16 

With no integration of support for joint operations, it became increasingly 

evident that some action was needed. Both commands increased joint staff 

authority and established coordination committees to solve their problems and 

cope with the control of shipping, the most pervasive transportation problem. 

CONTROL OF SHIPPING IN THE PACIFIC 

In the SWPA, under U.S. Forces in Australia, and later the Services of 

Supply, the Transportation Service was responsible for liaison with Australian 

transport services and Allied committees controlling transportation allocations. 

The G-3 and G-4 established priorities among Army requirements. Even though 

the SOS transportation organization served all U.S. Services and Allies, the 

assignment of priorities for scarce resources eventually required the appointment 
268 Spearhead of Logistics 

of a SWPA theater-wide Chief Regulating Office (CREGO) with Col. Charles P. 

Unger in charge. The CREGO was chartered to use priorities and a booking 

system to control movements of personnel and cargo by water, rail, and air, to, 

within, and from the theater. Their operations expanded from modest 

beginnings into a huge centralized agency directly under the Deputy Chief of 

Staff, GHQ, and included field regulating stations and liaison officers at United 

States and Pacific ports and airfields. Its efforts to control shipping congestion 

and shortages were not fully successful and despite efforts to the contrary, 

created resentment in other transportation management agencies, who took every . b . 17 opportumty to ypass tt. 

In the POA unified command, Nimitz set up a joint staff to facilitate 

integration of logistics support and shipping control operations. He appointed 

Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Edmond H. Leavey as the J-4, Logistics, in 

November 1943. Leavey, who became the second U.S. Army Chief of 

Transportation, took over all the joint logistical and working boards along with 

the usual functions of a theater G-4, including all facets of the supply of existing 

bases and new ones as they were captured. Once operations passed from the 

assault to the garrison phase, the J-4 controlled the employment of all support 

shipping into forward areas regardless of service. A centralized cargo-priority 

and shipping-control system evolved, performing the same functions as 

MacArthur's CREGO. The system was equally distasteful to other 

transportation agencies because it limited their role in managing water 

transportation to support Central Pacific Army operations. However, it was a 

natural concomitant to unity of command, and on the whole was probably the 

best arrangement since it operated within the standard staff structure, manned by 

personnel of all the services and accepted all requests on their merits. 18 

ARMY TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS 

Operating in the broad expanse of the Pacific created significant 

transportation challenges. The distances were vast. It was over 2,000 nautical 

miles from San Francisco to Hawaii and another 4,500 from Hawaii to Australia. 

From Sydney, Australia, it was over 4,000 nautical miles to Manila and from 

Manila, another 1 ,700 to Toyko. The land upon which most of the fighting was 

done consisted of coral atolls or narrow coastal plains, thus the requirement for 

land transportation was minimal. Ocean shipping, port, and over-the-shore 

operations were the main transportation requirements. 

Facilities on most islands were nonexistent and those that did exist were 

usually damaged from U.S. bombing or shore bombardment. In the islands, most 
World War II Pacific Theater 269 

native cultures were unfamiliar with westem style labor and could not be 

counted on for extensive work. Australian labor was highly unionized and not 

cooperative. The climate on most islands was hot and humid, and tropical 

diseases were endemic. In some islands, water was scarce and on top of all the 

other problems, shipping was in short supply. 19 

Procedures for opening new bases developed a general pattern over a 

period of time which was generally followed by all commands in the Pacific. 

The AP&SC, the SOS, USAFISPA, and USASOS performed all the 

transportation functions necessary to train, prepare, and stage Army invasion 

force elements provided by the command. They did not control task force 

elements staged from the United States or other Pacific commands. The Marines 

and Allied units were staged by their own support agencies. Shipping to move 

the assault force and provide initial resupply was controlled by Allied Naval 

Forces until the support agency took over the task by mutual agreement. In the 

objective area, service and supply functions and control of all service forces 

were initially the responsibility of the ground task force commander. As the area 

was secured, the support agency established an advance base command element, 

which assumed control of troop and material resources left by the ground task 

force. The base command then brought in additional service forces to perform its 

mission. The base commander had his own transportation staff, which was not 

subordinate to the support command's staff transportation officer when it came 

to internal base operations. The base requested shipping allocations from the 

command regulating agency such as CREGO in SWPA, or the J-4, POA. This 

pattern was a logical outgrowth of the isolation and wide separation of bases 

established under the leapfrogging concept that bypassed enemy forces and left 

them to "die on the vine" or be mopped up at leisure. In most cases, it markedly 

limited the role of the support command staff transportation officer.20 

SUPPORT COMMAND TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS 

Following Pearl Harbor, transportation agencies in Hawaii and Australia 

were faced with the task of supporting forces in contact with the enemy, 

deploying Army forces to existing bases and other islands to halt the Japanese 

aggression, and securing the LOC while providing bases for future Allied 

offensives. At the same time, they had to establish a viable transportation 

organization, then staff and equip it while nearly everyone else had a higher 

priority for personnel and equipment than they did. 

From Hawaii, port detachments were established on the outer islands. 

Army units were shipped to Fiji, Samoa, New Zealand, New Caledonia and 
270 Spearhead of Logistics 

"nearby" islands such as Palmyra, Christmas, and Canton. Civilians were 

evacuated from Hawaii while large numbers of troops and quantities of supplies 

were received to build up the island's defenses and stock it as a forward base. In 

Australia, the most pressing issues were the support of the Philippines and 

defense of Australia as a base for future operations. Thereafter, U.S. transporters 

coordinated with the Australians to share in-country resources because it was 

U.S. policy to deploy minimal transportation troops to Australia. They surveyed 

the requirements and assembled resources for future operations, particularly for 

the establishment of an Army support base in Port Moresby, New Guinea, to 

prepare for further offensive operations. 

After the first few months of war, U.S. forces in Australia used the ports of 

Cairns, Townsville, and Brisbane in Queensland, and Sydney, primarily because 

of their relative proximity to the U.S. and New Guinea. Australian labor was 

averse to troop involvement in transportation operations, and TC units usually 

staged and trained in Australia then moved to New Guinea as soon as possible. 

Australian ports were well developed and met U.S. requirements, though not 

always as promptly as desired; however, the railroads were militarily inadequate. 

They were generally located on the coasts, with different gauges in different 

states, and many sections had limited capacity. The Australian rail network 

suffered the same shortcomings as those in Britain and Europe in that the size 

and carrying capacity of most rolling stock was considerably smaller than U.S. 

versions. Australian trainloads averaged 300 tons versus nearly 10,000 tons on 

American rail lines. Only by judicious movement control and exploitation of 

water movement were the capacities of the Australian railroads judged able to 

meet U.S. needs without augmentation. 

Truck transportation in Australia was provided by organic unit vehicles and 

the civilian motor transport system. One notable exception was Motor Transport 

Command No. 1, which was established in the spring of 1942 to bridge the gap 

between the terminus of the rail system and Darwin, the principal city on the 

north coast of Australia. Darwin was threatened by the Japanese, was hazardous 

to reach by sea and required reinforcement. The command operated a 687 mile 

stretch of road from Mt. Isa in western Queensland, to Darwin, through some of 

the "grirnr:nest, hardest country in the world."21 The main units were the 48th 

and 29th QM Truck Regiments with associated maintenance, POL, and cargo 

handling units and the 17th Station Hospital. The command comprised about 

5,000 men, of whom 3,500 were Negro drivers in the truck units. Operations 

were under the direct control of the Chief of Transportation Service, USAFIA. 

When the operation began, few facilities were available at the three intermediate 
World War II Pacific Theater 271 

night camps, but were developed as fast as possible. Temperatures reached as 

high as 130 degrees at noon and there were serious ocular and respiratory 

problems from the talc-fine red "bush dust" and bush flies. Equipment 

maintenance costs and efforts mounted steadily. From 28 June-29 October 

1942, trucks logged 9.5 million miles in convoy, with an almost zero AWOL 

rate and low sick rate considering the conditions. As the threat of Japanese 

invasion subsided, the U.S. operation was phased down and the Australians took 

over the reduced requirement.22 

In general, transportation provided through the Australian civilian system 

was sufficient to support U.S. operations and deferred the need to deploy 

thousands of service troops prior to launching the Allied offensive. 

PACIFIC CAMPAIGNS 

GUADALCANAL 

On 2 July 1942, the JCS ordered Operation "Watchtower", a limited 

offensive, the objective of which was to seize and occupy the New Britain - New 

Guinea area. Two days later, an Allied reconnaissance plane discovered the 

Japanese building an airfield on Guadalcanal in the Solomons. Since Japanese 

planes in the Solomons were a direct threat to U.S. lines of communication, the 

initial objective for Watchtower was changed to include Guadalcanal, as well as 

Tulagi, one of the first ''Watchtower" objectives. On 7 August 1942, U.S. Marine Corps 

forces from the South Pacific Area assaulted both islands in the first Allied offensive 

actions in the Pacific. As the campaign progressed, Army elements were also deployed. 

Transportation support was initially provided by the Navy and Marines. 

Army elements were deployed to establish supporting bases in the Fiji 

Islands, New Zealand, the town of Noumea, New Caledonia, and other smaller 

islands. New Zealand was too distant, and bases in the Fijis were committed to 

other missions, so Noumea became the principal SPA administrative and supply 

center for support of the Solomons. Its mission was to receive cargo and 

personnel for local forces, establish reserve stocks, and tranship troops and 

materials for all services. The principal delivery area was Guadalcanal. Support 

came from Hawaii, the United States, Australia, and the Joint Purchasing Board 

in New Zealand, which controlled local procurement in the SPA. Army port 

operations were under the New Caledonia Army Service Command (ASC), 

commanded by Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Raymond B.S. Williamson, who had a 

seven officer Transportation Section, a few harbor craft and barges, three deep 

water berths, a work force of a small provisional port company, some U.S. Navy 
272 Spearhead of Logistics 

Bridge near Noumea, New Caledonia city limits. Railroad was run by the 790th 

Railway Operating Company, 28 December 1943 

Construction Battalions (Seabees), casuals, about 500 local laborers, and details 

of combat troops. The ASC also used three Quartermaster truck companies with 

69 serviceable trucks, even though they were not assigned to it. The scarcity of 

trained port management, labor, and other resources resulted in woefully slow 

ship discharge rates. Shipping backed up at Noumea and other bases to the point 

that the success of the Guadalcanal operation was threatened. At the same time, 

the U.S. 43rd Infantry Division and 3rd New Zealand Division arrived for 

assignment in New Caledonia, and the U.S. America! Division left for 

Gaudalcanal. 
World War II Pacific Theater 273 

In November 1942, Brig. Gen. Breene and the SOS USAFISPA 

Headquarters arrived in Noumea. Major Jack A. Fraser (later Col.), the SOS 

Transportation Officer, focused on improving shipping and port operational 

support actions such as expediting receipt of ship manifests and controlling the 

arrival of vessels. Admiral Halsey, who relieved Admiral Ghormley on 18 

October 1942, asked the Army to take over all port operations in Noumea as of 

20 November 1942, and gave the SOS and Army Service Command (ASC) 

operational control of Navy port assets. The 25th Infantry Division, enroute 

from Hawaii, was diverted directly to Guadalcanal instead of transshipping 

through Noumea. Most of the 1st Port was transferred from Auckland, and 

priority efforts were made to obtain equipment, experienced technicians, and 

labor. A newly assigned Navy construction battalion began improving facilities, 

and corrective actions resulted in a rewarding increase in cargo loaded and 

discharged. The totals rose from 54,000 short tons in November 1942, to 

155,000 in December, and 240,000 in January 1943?3 

The backup in shipping began to decline and the pressure on Noumea 

eased when Guadalcanal was secured in February 1943. The respite was only 

temporary because the supplies stockpiled in New Caldonia had to be shipped 

forward to support SPA operations in the northern Solomons and the Bismarck 

Archipelago, a task requiring all available port capacity. 

In April 1942, Army engineers took over, repaired and operated a 20-mile 

meter-gauge rail line in New Caledonia using French and Javanese employees. This 

unique operation took some of the burden of clearing the port from sparse truck 

resources. The 790th TC Railway Operating Company (ROC) was activated in July 

1943 to take over the line from the engineer detachment On 1 February 1944, the line 

was discontinued, ending Army rail operations on Pacific islands until Luzon. 

24 

ARMY TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS ON GUADALCANAL 

Transportation operations during the entire Guadalcanal Campaign were 

conducted almost entirely by combat troops. There were few service troops on 

the island, and local labor was used wherever possible. The Army XIV Corps, 

along with the America!, 25th Infantry, and 43rd Infantry Divisions, began 

reinforcing and later relieving some Marine units starting in mid-October 1942. 

The campaign officially ended on 21 February 1943. During both Marine and 

Army combat operations all ship discharge was over the beaches. Initially, 

landing craft were unloaded by hand and supplies carried to beach dumps. Units 

were stripped of their vehicles, and were always in short supply. During some 

phases of operations, supply ships unloaded during the day and weighed anchor 
274 Spearhead of Logistics 

at night to maneuver to avoid the nightly Japanese surface and air attacks. While 

this enhanced ship security, it lengthened discharge time. The engineers 

constructed roads, which became mudholes during the frequent rains, but they 

allowed 2 112-ton trucks to move supplies to dispersed dumps at road ends. 

Dumps were kept small to minimize losses from enemy action. Front line troops 

used jeeps and porterage to carry supplies along the narrow jungle roads and 

trails, which were impassable to large trucks. Boats and cableways were used to 

some extent, and the Army 97th Field Artillery Battalion (75-mm Pack 

Howitzer) had mules. The Army again learned the lesson that a mule consumes 

8 pounds of oats and 14 pounds of hay per day, for a daily total of 4,100 pounds 

of forage to support the three four-gun batteries of the 97th. Nor were the mules 

well suited to the jungle trails and boggy ground characteristic of the operating area. 

The experiment was unsuccessful, in contrast to the successful use of animals in Sicily 

and Italy where hiring of civilian handlers and local procurement were feasible. 25 

As soon as Guadalcanal was secured, it became the main base for further 

amphibious operations even though it was not as well equipped to handle the task as 

Noumea. Discharge was restricted to beaches and a few barge piers. Even though 

the ASC employed about 1,000 local laborers, it was seriously short of service 

troops. Combat troops were used in large numbers to work the ships and beaches. 

These were tasks they deplored and Maj. Gen. Alexander M. Patch, Commanding 

General of XIV Corps wrote, they were "apathetic about labor."26 Ship congestion 

increased in the area and backlogs of ships built up in Pacific ports awaiting convoy 

to Guadalcanal. In Noumea, Brig. Gen. Breene made a major effort to embargo 

shipments to Guadalcanal and divert ships with cargo non-essential to forthcoming 

offensive operations, but this did not have a significant impact on the situation. 

Meanwhile, the buildup on Guadalcanal progressed. The 481 st Port 

Battalion arrived and combat units were assigned to beach operations. 

Construction units built large storage areas and a Liberty pier, and both the 

Army and Navy brought in materials handling equipment ranging from pallets to 

floating and mobile cranes. The 451st Amphibian Truck Co with DUKW's 

arrived in May 1943, and immediately earned its keep after a heavy storm 

wrecked quays and floating equipment. In spite of combat successes, the island 

was still vulnerable to attack by Japanese aircraft from Munda airfield in New 

Georgia, and ships worked only in daylight, moving out to sea at night, which 

precluded 24 hour operations. Even though the port could not meet the workload 

needed to support the New Georgia campaign, its capacity increased steadily. 

During a period of a concurrent heavy discharge workload, outloadings increased from 

about 25,500 short tons in July 1943 to 75,000 short tons in October 1943?7 
World War II Pacific Theater 275 

The landings by Army and Marine units on Bougainville in November 

1943 increased the amount of cargo Guadalcanal had to store and transship, so 

the Army assigned two additional port battalions to the island. In March and 

again in May 1944, Guadalcanal discharged and loaded record totals of over 

180,000 short tons. When the enemy was defeated in the Solomons, 

Guadalcanal' s port workload declined, and the focus of tactical operations 

shifted from the South Pacific Area to the Southwest Pacific Area offensive in 

New Guinea. At the same time, operations in the Central Pacific targeted the 

Marshalls, Gilberts, and Marianas. By 1 April 1944, SPA theater and base 

transportation sections were well staffed and experienced, and Army service 

commands conducted port operations in close coordination with Navy and 

Marine authorities. Substantial skilled resources were available in the form of 

six port battalion headquarters, 26 port companies, six DUKW companies, 

numerous harbor craft, and naval port construction resources. Bypassed Japanese 

forces were left cut off from all resources, except their own. 

NEW GUINEA 

The principal transportation task in SWPA was to operate the ports on New 

Guinea and the adjacent islands. With no rail facilities to speak of, motor 

transport was used for port clearance and short onward movements. Vehicle 

operations were routinely supervised by the Transportation Section of the Base 

Section Command. Motor vehicle assets were sparse, and the Army made 

maximum use of every unit's organic vehicles. 

The SWP A established several small ports to support the Papua Campaign 

in eastern New Guinea, and later along the north coast of New Guinea and 

western New Britain and the Admiralties. The latter operations were in 

conjuction with SPA actions in the Solomons to eliminate the Japanese base at 

Rabaul in New Britain. The lack of roads put a premium on the use of shipping 

for coastwise movements and increased the workload and utility of ports all 

along the coast. Existing port facilities were primitive docks totally unsuitable 

for military traffic, so that an extensive engineer effort was required to provide 

pier space to replace the constant use of lighterage. Facilities had to be hewn 

from the jungle with dredges, bulldozers, tractors, and portable sawmills. Even 

with these efforts, the improvements only met immediate needs and conditions 

were primitive. During operations in northeastern New Guinea, ports were 

opened or reopened at Milne Bay, Oro Bay, Lae, and other invasion sites. Milne 

Bay, located at the extreme east end of the island, was the largest port in New 

Guinea, and was jointly operated with the Australians. The 608th Port Company, 
276 Spearhead of logistics 

a Negro unit of the 394th Port Battalion that operated at Port Moresby in 

southeastern New Guinea, operated Milne Bay from July 1942 until April 1943, 

discharging as much as 202,000 tons a month?8 

Hollandia, located on the rugged northern coast of New Guinea, was the 

next objective because Humboldt Bay had protected anchorages. Tanamerah 

Bay, 35 miles west of Humboldt, where the 24th Infantry Division landed, had 

good tanker anchorages to support Sentani Airfield, one of the main objectives 

of the landing. The area was also considered suitable as the main base for the 

invasion of the Philippines. A TC detachment of the 2d Port, headed by Lt. Col. 

Reeford P. Shea, was attached to I Corps and became the first TC element to 

accompany combat troops in a landing in the SWPA.29 The 532d and 542d 

Engineer Boat and Shore Regiments, using Navy craft along with their own, 

conducted the landing alongside Navy units and began to discharge cargo. The 

first TC port troops at Hollandia were from the 244th, 296th, and 609th Port 

Companies. Port clearance was hampered by tortuous roads from the port area 

to the supply dumps, continuous mud, and a shortage of labor. Additional port 

companies were brought in, and Col. Shea became the Base Port Commander. 

By the end of 1944, the port had the 394th Port Battalion, 11 port companies, 

berths for eight deep-draft vessels at one time and numerous jetties, ramps and a 

considerable number of landing/harbor craft. The William F. Fitch and the 

James M. Davis, the first TC marine repair ships in SWPA, arrived in August 

I 944 and were subsequently sent to the Philippines. In the fall of 1944, the 

waters around Hollandia were crowded with ships awaiting a call to go forward 

to the Philippines. A large quantity of accumulated supplies and harbor craft 

were moved to the Philippines in an impressive series of TC towing operations 

under Lt. Col. (later Col.) Leon J. Lancaster, and the 350th Harbor Craft 

Company, which maintained the pool of vessels. Hundreds of harbor craft and 

barges, many loaded with supplies, were towed to Leyte and later directly to 

Luzon. From Luzon, they were moved on to Okinawa and eventually to Japan. 

As supplies were moved out, activity at Hollandia declined and the base was 

inactivated in January 1946. A major landing was made at Biak Island off the 

northwest coast of New Guinea on 27 May 1944. The 296th Port Company was 

attached to the task force and unloaded LSTs while under air attack. Bitter 

fighting on Biak continued through 1944, but by August 1944, sufficient control 

was gained to establish a command designated as SOS Base H. The base was 

developed rapidly. The port included five Liberty docks and other facilities. 

Biak was a subsidiary base of Hollandia and assisted in stockpiling supplies and 

sheltering troops for the invasion of the Philippines?0 
World War II Pacific Theater 

THE GILBERTS MARSHALLS 

MARIANAS AND WESTERN CAROLINES 

The capture of the island chains in the Central Pacific Area provided the 

northern envelopment leading to the Philippines, and established bases for final 

operations against Fonnosa or the Ryukyus, either of which would be the last 

step before the invasion of Japan? 1 The U.S. Marine Corps controlled most of 

the tactical operations in the area, but Marine units were supplemented by Army 

divisions, notably those of the XXIV Corps. Under overall Marine Corps 

control, Army TC units frequently were assigned to assault operations and they 

remained as components of the Army garrison forces that followed up the 

assaults. Those garrisons provided support for Anny units staging through the 

bases as well as those stationed there. This was in keeping with the principle 

that each service supported its own. 

Much of the Army support for these CPA operations came from Hawaii, 

where the Anny Port and Service Command provided embarkation and 

debarkation training, staged units, outloaded follow-up support. and assisted 

Navy and Marine unit outloading from Hawaii. The Anny expedited supply 

support over the beaches for amphibious assaults by palletizing supplies on 

toboggan or sled-like platforms so they could be pulled across beaches by 

vehicles rather than hand carried. The 7th Infantry Division first used pallets in 

the Aleutians. The 27th Infantry Division used them in their assault on Makin in 

the Gilberts, and they were so successful they became standard in the Central 

Pacific. (Map 28) Company D of the 376th Port Battalion accompanied the 

Army garrison force to Makin and took over port and depot activities there. 

In the Marshalls, the 7th Infantry Division captured Kwajalein Island in 

early February 1944, and then captured Eniwetok jointly with the Marines. 

Company B of the 376th Port Battalion was attached to the 4th Army Defense 

Battalion, the garrison force for Kwajelein, where it discharged ships starting on 

D-Day. The first Army DUKW operation in the Central Pacific Area was in the 

Kwajalein assault. Unlike the SWPA, where DUKW's were used principally for 

ship discharge during the post-assault phase, in the CPA they were used in the 

assault to carry field artillery weapons and ammunition. While no Transportation 

Corps DUKW companies were available for the Marshalls Campaign, 7th 

Infantry Division Artillery drivers were hurriedly trained on DUKW operations. 

Subsequently, they landed 105-mm howitzers and their ammunition on an 

adjacent island in time to fire direct preparatory fire on Kwajalein in support of 

the assault and were highly effective in assisting the discharge of LST's and 

movement of cargo to dumps. The joint force commander reported that 
278 Spearhead of Logistics 

Troop Port Command Operations, Saipan, 1945 

DUKW's were invaluable for the rapid transfer of supplies urgently needed.32 

As elsewhere in the world, DUKWs were considered indispensable, and the first 

three TC amphibian truck companies, assigned to AP&SC in February 1944, 

immediately began training for assault operations. 

The Marianas assault forces comprised the Marine III and V Amphibious 

Corps which included the 27th and 77th Infantry Divisions. Those units staged 

through Eniwetok and Kwajalein in May and June 1944 for the assaults on 

Saipan and Guam. The latter assault was a Marine operation in which no TC 

units were involved. The 376th Port Battalion Headquarters, with five port 

companies that had been assigned to garrison port operations in Honolulu, and 

the 477th Amphibian Truck Company were assigned to the provisional Troop 

Port Command (TPC) of the Army Garrison Force for Saipan. In keeping with 

policies in the CPA, some units were attached to Marine and Army assault 
World War II Pacific Theater 279 

forces according to need. The TPC and the 311 th and 53 9th Port Companies 

were attached to the 4th Marine Division for movement to the area, with other 

port elements in subsequent echelons. The port units had only one week of 

training on assault cargo handling techniques. The 477th Amphibian Truck 

Company, also attached to the 4th Marine Division for movement in the assault 

echelon, was activated in Hawaii using selected but inexperienced Negro troops 

from disbanded air base security units. They were given intensive training by 

AP&SC at the CPA amphibious training center and landed with assault forces on 

Saipan on 15 June 1944. During the assault on Saipan, all TC units performed 

with distinction. The performance of the 477th was particularly notable. It 

operated throughout the entire operation under control of the G-4, XXIV Corps 

Artillery, hauling ammunition from ships to the guns while under enemy fire. 

The beaches were turned over to the Army Garrison Force on 29 June 1944, and 

when Saipan was secured on 9 July 1944, the TPC thereafter supervised the 

discharge of all cargo for all the services. Labor was provided from combat units 

and Navy base units to supplement Army port resources. Saipan port was 

developed and improved by dredging and much construction, and the island 

became a primary base for B-29 operations and for staging units. The APC 

worked closely with the Navy and coordinated the use of Navy personnel and 

resources. The result was that by the end of March 1945, the port had 13 berths 

and handled over 387,000 measurement tons per month. 

The last CPA operation prior to the Philippine invasion was in the 

Carolines, where Army and Marine forces secured the islands of Peleliu, 

Angaur, and Ulithi Atoll, in the Palau Islands (see Map 28). The 290th Port 

Company and the 48lst Amphibian Truck Company supported the 81st 

Infantry Division in the capture of Angaur on 17 September 1944, with the 

DUKW unit carrying artillery pieces ashore and then providing ammunition 

resupply. The 454th and 456th DUKW Companies accompanied the 1st 

Marine Division from the SPA, participated in the assault of Peleliu and then 

came under the garrison command and worked cargo discharge. As the war 

went on, it was evident that joint operational techniques were improving, at 

least in the CPA. 33 

THE PHILIPPINES 

The Philippine Archipelago, with over 7,000 islands covering almost 

800,000 square miles, was heavily dependent on ocean transport. Port facilities 

were fairly well developed on the larger islands, of which only eleven had an 
280 Spearhead of Logistics 

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 

50 

so urn 

0 150 

MILES 

CHINA 

SEA 

SULU SEA 

CELEBES SEA 

Map29 
World War II Pacific Theater 281 

area greater than 1,000 square miles. As shown in Map 29, only on Luzon were 

highway and rail operations important.34 

As the invasion progressed, the Americans opened and operated a number 

of ports. The first one was Tacloban on Leyte. On Luzon, there was Manila on 

the west, San Fernando on the Lingayen Gulf, and Batangas on the southern 

coast. Cebu City was opened on the island of Cebu. In addition, the 533d and 543d 

Boat and Shore Regiments at Zamboanga as well as other locations, operated 

temporary ports and beaches to support Eighth Anny combat operations to recover 

Mindanao. Temporary ports and beaches were also used on other islands?5 

PORT COMMAND, BASE K- TACWBAN, LEYTE 

The ports and beaches on San Pedro Bay which opened on the south into 

Leyte Gulf were operated by Base K. They were the landing points for the 

divisions of Sixth Arn1y in the 20 October 1944 assault. The area stretched some 

50 miles from Tacloban in the north to Abuyog beach in the south, with the bay 

paralleled by a narrow coastal road. Behind the sand and coral beaches were 

heavy woods and dense jungles. The bay provided anchorage for about 75 

vessels, but was shallow and not protected from heavy swells. Navigation was 

impeded by shoals, reefs and wrecks. Tacloban, the only existing port on 20 

October, had only 19 feet of water at the four berth concrete wharf that was 

reached through a four mile channel 27-feet deep, so Liberty ships had to be 

lightened to 18 feet to moor at the wharf. Even after February 1945 when the 

area was dredged, maximum draft was 20 feet. Liberty ships with 25-foot drafts 

could approach within half a mile of northern beaches, and only at Dulag could 

LSTs approach as close as 50 feet to the shoreline. Lighterage and intrabeach 

movements were by DUKW, LCT, LCM, and LCVP. These craft also 

performed resupply missions around the island's circumference as combat 

operations progressed, because the coastal waters were too shallow for deeper 

draft vessels. 

36 

Transportation units were particularly active in the assault on Leyte. In the 

southern half of the landing area, XXIV Corps from the Central Pacific made the 

assault. The 291st, 292d, and 293d Port Companies were attached to the assault 

divisions. They served first as ship working parties, and then to augment shore 

parties. The 504th Port Battalion took over operation of the small port of Dulag, 

the only one in the southern sector. Amphibian Truck Companies from Hawaii 

participated in the assault on 20 October 1944 as well. The 828th moved with 

and supported XXIV Corps Troops, the 472d and 480th supported the 7th 

Infantry Division, and the 823d and 827th supported the 96th Infantry Division. 
282 Spearhead of Logistics 

They moved artWery, ammunition, and casualties and were used on land to 

offset the shortage of standard trucks, even though in the rough terrain the 

DUKW'S deteriorated rapidly. Near the end of the campaign, the units were 

relieved from XXIV Corps and worked under Base K. 

When Base K took over the operation of Tacloban and beaches to the south 

from Sixth Army on 22 October 1944, the enemy mounted 56 air raids in four 

days, since naval air cover was withdrawn during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. A 

total of 203 air alerts in the first 42 days significantly hampered operations. The 

weather also failed to cooperate. Three typhoons deposited 33 inches of rain in 

the first three months and interfered not only with ship discharge, but backed up 

port clearance by bogging down land transportation and crowding grounded air 

assets in and around Tacloban Airfield. Despite climatic and natural obstacles 

that required long turnaround times to dumps, the ports and beaches continued to 

operate and improve. At peak operations in December 1944, about 240,000 short 

tons of Army cargo were loaded and discharged. As the only Army discharge 

facility north of Biak, Base K continued operations at capacity until ports in 

Luzon were opened and shipping could go directly to the main thrust of combat . 37 operatiOns. 

LINGAYEN GULF AND BASE M- LUZON 

As in the assault on Leyte, TC units were early ptu'ticipants. Two port 

battalions, lO port companies and six DUKW units were integrated with 

engineer boat and shore regiment shore party operations. They were attached to 

and landed with Sixth Army's I and XIV Corps on beaches at the head of 

Lingayen Gulf on 9 January 1945. The TC units scheduled to arrive during the 

initial phase were assigned to the Sixth Army's Service Command (ASCOM) 

when it took over from assault elements, and later delegated to Base M, a 

subordinate command of ASCOM. At the same time, engineer boat and shore 

regiments were assigned to the 4th Engineer Special Brigade, and LCT's were 

made available by the Navy to assist in lighterage and other port and beach 

tasks, including operation of beaches to support further tactical operations. 

Elements of the Port Command, Base M, arrived ashore on the second day after 

the landing (S+2) and worked with beach units. The transfer of responsibility to 

ASCOM was delayed until S+ I 0, at which time the port command took control 

of TC units and operated Gulf ports and beaches with assistance from boat and 

shore units. During the following weeks, other ports and beaches were opened 

and ASCOM transferred logistics responsibility to USASOS on 13 February 

1945. As other port facilities opened in locations to better support tactical 
World War II Pacific Theater 

A jeep, adapted to rails, hauls a three freight car train, loaded with gasoline, 

carrying a AAA priority, to a combat area on Luzon Island, 1945. 

283 

operations, elements of Lingayen Gulf facilities were relocated to the new 

operations, but the Gulf continued for some time to be a prime source of support 

to Manila. 

The Manila port area was severely damaged by sabotage as well as U.S. 

bombing and shelling during a last ditch stand by the Japanese to defend the city. 

The Japanese sank about 500 ships ranging in size from a coastal freighter to an 

18,000-ton passenger liner in the harbor to block the entrance and access to pier 

space. In the midst of the sunken ships, they planted mines. The buildings 

adjacent to the harbor were totally destroyed and the rubble and craters were 
284 Spearhead of Logistics 

booby trapped. The port machinery was destroyed or dismantled. Rehabilitation 

challenges for Manila were equal to those of Naples, Marseille, or Cherbourg. 

When the port command arrived on 13 February 1945, fighting was still going 

on and the Japanese held much of the city. Navy and Army engineers worked 

valiantly to rehabilitate the port and on 1 and 2 March 1945, thirteen cargo 

vessels entered the harbor to commence discharge by lighterage. Operations 

were controlled by the 4th Engineer Special Brigade, and the bulk of the troops 

and equipment were initially provided by the engineers. At the end of April 

1945, the 54th Transportation Group controlled the port and the nearly 5,000 TC 

port troops and 7,500 local nationals to run it. The group was assisted by about 

5,000 engineer troops. The amount of cargo handled increased daily until it 

reached a total of roughly 275,000 long tons in April 1945. Nevertheless, the 

port of Manila suffered from a situation common to most large Pacific ports. In 

Europe, formally organized port command units were trained to rehabilitate and 

operate under wartime conditions and take control of captured ports with proven 

plans and policies. However, Pacific port commands were frequently 

improvised ad hoc organizations that lacked the stature, organization, and 

experience of their European counterparts. Qualified observers commented 

unfavorably on the port's organization and operations. When Maj. Gen. 

Wilhelm D. Styer, Commanding General, WESTPAC replaced the USASOS, he 

initiated actions that greatly improved operations. He also increased port staffing 

to 13,800 troops and over 28,000 civilians and stepped up the pace of 

rehabilitation of facilities. The sudden capitulation of Japan partially 

immobilized the port, as ship discharge was temporarily halted and shipments of 

cargo, units, and individual personnel were rushed to Japan. Many ships were 

diverted, and both plans and operations required major adjustment During 

winter-spring 1945-46, the largest port in the SWPA gradually reverted to 

peacetime status and the Philippine government began to take over the port. In 

August 1946, the U.S. still retained five piers for Army use, but supported forces 

had dwindled to a fraction of former levels?8 

RAIL OPERATIONS 

Luzon was the only island on which rail had any real importance to 

military operations in the Southwest Pacific Area. While railroads contributed 

substantially to U.S. Army operations in New Zealand and AustraHa, those lines 

were operated by local nationals who made shipments on a commercial basis. 

Transportation Corps railway troops began taking over rail operations in the 

Lingayen Gulf area in early January 1945, when the 790th Railway Operating 
World War II Pacific Theater 285 

Company (ROC) landed and began rehabilitating locally available equipment 

and track which had been severely damaged by the Japanese. The 5202d 

Engineers provided construction and bridge repair. Lacking coal, the rail unit 

used driftwood, green wood, and coconut husks for fue l and made a 30 mile run 

inland on 24 January. Shipments of rail equipment began arriving in 

mid-February, by which time more than 1,300 civilians were being used for rail 

work. Operations were extended southward, and by mid-March the first train 

traveled the 150 miles from the Gulf to Manila. By the end of March, eight 

trains a day were arriving and departing Manila. 

The 790th Railway Operating Company was activated provisionally in 

Noumea and had few if any experienced rail troops. It was augmented in Luzon 

by a levy that produced 65 experienced railroaders from troops on the the island. 

Despite its Jack of experience, the unit perfonned highly valuable services to the 

invasion. On 13 February 1945, major reinforcements from elements of the 

775th Railway Grand Division (RGD) arrived under the command of Lt. Col. 

Henry G. Balch. During March, three service detachment workshops, a depot 

company, and the 737th and 749th Railway Operating Battalions arrived and 

expanded rail service throughout Luzon as area was reclaimed and equipment 

was received from the United States. At the peak of operations in October 45, 

126 officers, 3,074 enlisted personnel, and 6,000 civilians were engaged in 

operating what was known as the Luzon Military Railway. When hostilities 

ended, the system was returned to civilian management as soon as practicable, 

and units were inactivated or prepared for shipment to Japan and Korea? 9 

MOTOR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS 

Luzon was the only island in the Philippines where there was a roadnet 

large enough to set up line haul trucking operations. Fortunately for the 

Americans, the highways survived the Japanese occupation with less damage 

than might have been expected. On 13 February 1945, a Provisional Highway 

Transportation Division was activated under the command of Lt. Col. Ralph H 

Sievers, and assigned to Luzon Base Section, USASOS. Nine Quartermaster 

truck companies were placed under the division's operational control and started 

operations between Base M on the Gulf and Manila. Equipment from the truck 

units was worn out from two prior campaigns, and the provisional division had 

to pool all its truck and maintenance resources and operate them as a single fleet 

so it could function 24 hours a day. On 1 March 1945, the division was 

augmented by four Coast Artillery (CA) battalions, organized as four provisional 

Quartermaster truck battalions, each with four heavy companies. By April, the 
286 Spearhead of Logistics 

division had 454 2 112 ton trucks operating in 5-10 truck convoys on 12-hour 

shifts. Later, additional tmcks, tractors, and trailers augmented the division's 

capability to support Sixth Army's main missions on the narrow mountain roads 

of northern Luzon. Units were transferred between base commands and the 

division to meet mission needs. The provisional division was redesignated the 

tOOth TC Highway Transport Service on 17 July 1945, and the former CA 

battalions became the 505th through 508th Quartermaster Battalions (MED). 

The lOOth, with 23 assigned truck companies, was the first of its type seen in the 

SWPA area, though it was similar to Motor Transport Command No. I that 

operated in Australia in 1942. When the Japanese forces surrendered, highway missions 

changed from sustainment cargo to large personnel moves of POW and redeploying 

American units and individuals. The 1 OOth was inactivated on 31 May 1946.

40 

IWO liMA AND THE RYUKYUS 

Although the assault on lwo Jima was primarily a Marine operation, some 

Army port and DUKW units were attached to the Marines' landing force and 

others arrived with the Army garrison. On D-Day, 19 February 1945, the 471st, 

473d and 476th Amphibious Truck Companies, along with the 4th and 5th 

Marine Divisions, landed artillery pieces and ammunition under heavy enemy 

fire. At the insistence of combat commanders, some DUKWs were overloaded 

and 133 were lost in early operations. The 592d Port Company landed with the 

5th Marine Division in the fourth assault wave and worked with the beach party. 

The 442d Port Company landed on 2 March 1945. On 14 March 1945, the 

Transportation Section of the garrison command organized itself as a port group 

headquarters and took over cargo discharge and beach operations, controlling 

port, DUKW and truck companies and a naval construction battalion. The port 

group operated over the beach because port construction was restricted by the steep 

gradients, heavy surf, and high winds. From mid-March to mid-May the group 

handled about 270,000 measurement tons of cargo and 16,000 passengers. Traffic 

gradually declined until operations were phased out by the end of hostilities.

41 

Between April and July 1945, the seizure of Okinawa and other Ryukyus 

islands by Army and Marine forces of the Tenth Army was the climax of 

operations in the Pacific. In size and complexity, it dwarfed the transportation 

tasks of all prior operations, because it was mounted from all over the Pacific 

and the west coast of the United States. The assault element consisted of 183,000 

troops in 430 assault transports and landing ships, and eventually comprised 

270,000 troops as the garrison force was augmented. A substantial number of 

TC units participated in the assault echelon as shown in Chart 13. For the first 
World War II Pacific Theater 287 

time in the Central Pacific, the 53d Medium Port, HQ & HQ Company, 

organized and trained on Oahu by the AP&SC, was assigned to operate the port 

of Naha when it was secured. The 53d sailed for Okinawa on 27 March 1945, 

while its operating port, truck, and service units sailed with support echelons. 

The TC units attached to combat units performed tasks as they did in other 

Central Pacific operations such as at Iwo Jima and Kwajalein. DUKW 

operations were hampered by the perennial problem of long distances to 

anchorage areas and shortage of trucks at transfer points. The 53d Medium Port 

arrived on 3 May 1945, and worked under the 1st Engineer Special Brigade until 

31 May, when the port, with its assigned TC and Quartermaster units, was 

attached to the Navy Joint Freight Handling Facilities. On 7 June 1945, Naha 

was finally cleared of the enemy and port activities began with lightering 

operations. Organized resistance ceased on 20 June 1945, and base development 

proceeded rapidly with over a million measurement tons discharged in July. 

Responsibility for the Ryukyus passed from Admiral Nimitz to General 

MacArthur on 31 July 1945. The theater devoted all energies to the general 

reorganization of Pacific forces and preparation for the landings in Japan.43 

Preparations for the invasion of Japan were abruptly halted by the end of 

hostilities on 14 August 1945. From a transportation perspective, operations took 

a 180 degree turn with ships diverted to the U.S. or to regulating points, held for 

further orders. Demobilization began almost immediately with all available 

TRANSPORTATION UNITS 

PARTICIPATING IN THE RYUKYUS ASSAULT 

UNIT 

Hq. and Hq. Det., 504th Port Battalion _______ _ 

200th, 291 st Port Companies - - --------

472d, 481st Amphibian Truck Companies -------

204th; 293d Port Companies __________ _ 

474th, 827th Amphibian Truck Companies _____ _ 

292d, 203d, Port Companies -----------

477th, 828th Amphibian Truck Companies ------

456th Amphibian Truck Company ---------

454th Amphibian Truck Company---------

814th Amphibian Truck Company ________ _ 

Chart 13 

ATTACHED TO 

XXIV Corps 

7th Infantry Division 

7th Infantry Division 

96th Infantry Division 

96th Infantry Division 

77th Infantry Division 

77th Infantry Division 

Ill Amphibious Corps 

1st Marine Division 

6th Marine Division 
288 World War II Pacific Theater 

types of vessels used to bring the troops home to the United States. For 

example, Lt. Col. Cecil H. Davidson, Operations Officer of the 2d Port in 

Manila, took the lead in converting Liberty cargo ships to troopships by 

installing bunks, a sickbay, sanitary and messing facilities, and any other 

amenities that could be improvised. By the end of November, 30 Liberty and 

two Victory ships were converted in the Philippines and put into redeployment 

service. Other shipping was diverted to the Pacific theater, and by the end of 

February 1946, almost 700,000 troops had been redeployed by ship, and about 

17,000 by air.44 Demobilization continued well into 1946, but the trend was 

steadily downward. In addition to redeployment, the Corps kept fully 

occupied well into the post-war period with the movement of Australian war 

brides to the U.S. and the roll-up of equipment and supplies at inactive bases, 

as well as the support of occupation forces. 

The success of campaigns in the Pacific was highly dependent on the 

management of scarce transportation resources. Army Transportation staffs and 

units contributed notably to the support of both assault and logistics operations 

in all theater operational areas. 
289 

CHAPTER X 

The Post World War II Era 

"It was a history making maneuver saved Pusan." 

----- General Walker, Commanding General, 8th Army, 1950 -----

THE BERLIN AIRUFT 

The Teheran Conference of 28 November 1943 was the first of four major 

conferences between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. 

While most of the emphasis of the conference focused on military arrangements 

for continuing the war, the participants discussed the fate of postwar Germany. 

President Roosevelt wanted the United States to occupy Northwestern Germany 

and control the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven. His concept included British 

occupation of Southern Gennany and Soviet occupation of a smaller zone in 

Eastern Gennany. 

The Allies met at Yalta in February 1945 and finalized the future zones of 

occupation, which included France as an occupying power. One of the issues left 

unresolved was the occupation of Berlin. At the Potsdam Conference in July 

1945, President Truman found himself in the middle of a dispute between Stalin, 

who wanted to expand the holdings of the USSR, and Churchill, who wanted to 

limit them and halt the westward expansion of Soviet power. Despite the 

disagreements, the division of Berlin was fina lized with the Soviets having 8 

boroughs, the United States 6, the British 4, and the French 2.1 No longer fueled 

by the common danger of Nazism, the Potsdam Conference effectively signaled 

an end to the wartime cooperation between the east and west. The period of 

mutual distrust known as the "Cold War" had begun. 

During the next several months, the four nation government of Berlin ran 

fairly smoothly and, on 30 Nov 1945, the Allied Control Council officially 

approved an "air corridor agreement," which clearly spelled out the rights of the 

Western Allies in the air corridor between Berlin and the western zones. This 

agreement was the only written accord ever concluded with the Soviet Union in 

which the rights of Allied access to Berlin were clearly defined? 
290 Spearhead of l ogistics 

In late 1945, the Transportation Corps established the Berlin Duty Train. 

Commanded by a Transportation Corps lieutenant, the train provided a safe and 

reliable means for transporting soldiers and their family members in and out of 

the Western Sector of Berlin. This 110 mile journey transited the East German 

corridor connecting both Frankfurt and Bremerhaven, West Germany nightly 

with West Berlin. 

In early 1946, after months of communist propaganda, Berlin held its first 

free election since 1933, and the Social Democratic Party (SOP) 

overwhelmingly defeated the Soviet controlled Socialist Unity Party. This 

victory for democracy marked the beginning of the deterioration of East-West 

cooperation in Berlin. 

By late 1946, the Soviets' actions made it evident that they did not intend 

to cooperate in a multinational government of Germany. Poland, Hungary, 

Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania fell under communist control. 

Communist supported civil strife threatened the independence of Greece, while 

the Soviet Union sought to intimidate Turkey. 

Once Soviet intentions were clear, President Truman realized that 

accommodation of the Soviet Union in Europe would surrender the continent to 

Soviet domination.3 In March 1947, President Truman established what became 

known as the "Truman Doctrine," extending military and economic assistance to 

Greece and Turkey. That policy would eventually encompass all of Europe 

under a broader recovery program known as the Marshall Plan, after Secretary 

of State George Marshall. 

The Soviets placed increasingly restrictive controls on transport into and 

out of Berlin. Even U.S. military trains were stopped and passengers checked for 

proper identification. In April 1948, the Soviets closed the civilian freight lines 

into Berlin from Hamburg and Nuremberg. Only one line remained, the route of 

the Berlin Duty Train, which ran from Helmstedt to Berlin and anyone traveling 

the route needed an individual clearance from Soviet military authorities. 

On 24 June 1948, the crisis reached a climax. All traffic to and from the 

western part of Berlin occupied by the Allies was stopped, isolating it from the 

western occupation zone of Germany. The Soviet blockade was a direct 

challenge to the Allies' position in Berlin. The first few days of the blockade 

were uncertain ones for the Berliners, but the constant sound of aircraft flying 

into the city assured them of United States and Allied support. On the first day 

of emergency airlift, "Operation Vittles," sixty four aircraft carried 156 tons of 

supplies into Berlin. This was an impressive statt, especially since the Air 

Force's primary cargo aircraft, the C-47, had a maxi mum lift capability of 2 to 3 
The Post World War II Era 291 

Ber1in motor pool in support of Operation Vittles 

tons. It also demonstrated the Army's quick reaction to the emergency. Prior to 

the airlift, Berlin over a 72 hour time frame had received only 5.8 tons of cargo 

flown in by three aircraft.4 

The newly formed Transportation Corps played a significant role in this 

successful operation. At Rhein-Main Air Base, the Transportation Corps' aerial 

port of embarkation (APOE), was established to support the airlift. The APOE 

controlled the arrival of cargo at the airfield, and ensured the loading operations 

on the field proceeded smoothly. Major Andrew P. Flannigan, a Transportation 

Corps officer from European Command (EUCOM), Chief of Transportation, 

was briefed on the Soviet blockade and his personnel immediately began calling 

cargo forward from the European Quartermaster Supply Depot at Giessen. 

Lieutenant Colonel H. J. Kelleher, Commander, 6th Transportation Truck 

Battalion, mobilized the 67th Heavy Transportation Truck Company and began 

moving supplies. On that first Sunday of the blockade, the 67th Transportation 

Company moved over 200 tons of cargo to the APOE. (see Map 30). 

On 29 June, when the Soviets refused passage to a U.S. train loaded with 

supplies for the civilian population of Berlin, the Allies realized that the airlift 

would have to expand. The Transportation Corps then established a second traffic 

control point (TCP) at Wiesbaden Air Base with the same responsibilities as 
292 

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Spearhead of Logistics 

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DEMOCRATIC 

REPUBLIC 
The Post World War II Era 293 

Cargo handlers moving subsistence in support of Operation Vittles 

those of Rhein-Main. Within three hours of the alert notification, Capt. R. A. 

Brausch had the TCP operational. 

Soon after the two APOEs began operations, the amount of cargo shipped 

to Berlin rose to over 4,000 tons per day. With the increased level of activity, 

vehicle maintenance and driver fatigue became significant problems. Additional 

truck units, including the 122d Transportation Truck Battalion and the 76th 

Heavy Transportation Company were assigned to maintain the constant flow of 

cargo for the airlift.5 

The truck companies were placed under control of the 24th Transportation 

Truck Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. H. Y. Chase. Chase established a 
294 Spearhead of Logistics 

rotation system which allowed truck support to proceed smoothly. The truck 

companies were relieved for I 0 days after 30 continuous days of support 

operations. The relief period allowed for maintenance of the trucks and rest for 

the drivers. 

During the airlift, almost all air cargo was shipped breakbulk, which 

increased the handling requirements, exposure to breakage, and the possibility of 

pilferage. A U.S. Navy study released in 1951 revealed that breakbulk cargo on 

the average was being handled 14 times between supplier and consumer. Though 

the study analyzed ship operations, the handling requirements of breakbulk 

cargo for air transport proved to be basically the same. 

During the Berlin Airlift, a 10 ton trailer would be backed up to the cargo 

door of the aircraft, and the team would manually load the cargo. An 

experienced load team could load nine tons of cargo aboard a C-54 cargo aircraft 

in 25 to 30 minutes. These experiences of handling material accelerated the 

move to palletization of military cargo. Palletizing significantly reduced 

manpower requirements for aircraft loading, eventually revolutionizing the 

capability of military air transport.6 

In Berlin, Col. L. D. Bunting, the Post Transportation Officer, assumed 

responsibility for receiving the supplies and clearing the aerial port of 

debarkation (APOD), Tempelhof Airport. Colonel Bunting used his 

transportation staff to ensure that incoming aircraft were rapidly unloaded so 

incoming cargo did not clog the APOD. 

Additionally, the Transportation Corps managed the assets that delivered 

aviation fuel into Germany for the airlift. Over I ,500 rail tank cars and three 

ocean-going vessels a month were used to ensure that the U.S. Air Force had the 

fuel to continue the massive airlift into Berlin. By the end of April 1949, 15.6 

million gallons of fuel were being consumed monthly to support the operation.7 

Through the winter of 1948, the Transportation Corps supported the 

movement of food, clothing, coal, raw materials and medicines to sustain the 2.5 

million West Berliners. By early 1949, aircraft were flying over 8,000 tons of 

cargo daily to support West Berlin. In total, the Transportation Corps at peak 

operations had at work 55 officers, 295 enlisted men, 3,000 Gennan laborers, 

and several truck companies.

8 On 4 May 1949, the Western Allies arrived at an 

agreement with the Soviets for lifting the blockade; and, on 12 May 1949, all 

transport, trade and communication services between eastern and western 

Germany were restored. After continuing the airlift for three more months to 

build reserve stockage in West Berlin, the historic last flight left Rhein-Main en 

route to Tempelhof on 30 September 1949.9 
The Post World War II Era 295 

From a political standpoint, the airlift proved the Western Allies' resolve to 

stay in Berlin and defend the postwar agreement for the occupation of Germany. 

From a logistical standpoint, the Berlin Airlift validated the ability of the Allies 

to logistically support a massive operation by air. 

Until the Berlin Airlift, air transportation was considered a limited means 

of supporting a ground force for a short period of time. Planning the support of a 

large combat force using only aircraft had been considered to be militarily 

unfeasible. With the unprecedented success of supporting 2.5 million Berliners 

over air lines of communication (ALOC), the age of rapid strategic mobility and 

force projection had begun. 

ARCTIC AND ANTARCTIC OPERATIONS 

In the 1950s and 1960s, the Transportation Corps was actively involved in 

tests and operations both in the Arctic and in Antarctica. At Churchill in 

Manitoba, Canada, Transportation units under the direction of the Transportation 

Corps Board examined equipment under cold weather conditions in testing that 

had begun in World War II. At the same time, other Transportation units 

supported the establishment and operation of the U.S. and Canada Distant Early 

Warning (DEW) Line (code named Project 572). Transportation Corps 

detachments also supported the National Science Foundation in preparing for its 

experiments in the Antarctic during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) 

which began I July 1957. The operation was aptly named Project Deep Freeze. 

COLD WEATHER RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 

During the winters of 1947-1949 the 1st Arctic Test Detachment tested 

transportation equipment in Arctic operations at churchill, where Transportation 

Corps terminal units had supported construction of arctic weather stations and 

emergency landing fields in World War II.

10 The Transportation Arctic Group 

(TRARG) which was established in the early 1950s, continued to test 

transportation equipment as well as observe tests undertaken by other agencies 

in the Arctic. TRARG tested rail equipment and operations, as well as motor 

vehicles for both highway and cross country operations. Many of the tests 

included unique vehicles such as low ground pressure tractor and sled snow 

trains, the commercial bag-wheeled "Rolligon" and rubber rolling fluid 

transporters. TRARG also tested the maintenance of equipment under arctic 

conditions. Cold weather operations were only one of many interests of the 

Transportation Corps Board, first established at Fort Monroe, Virginia in 
296 Spearhead of Logistics 

Two LSTs support Operation DEW Line along the northern coast 

of Alaska and Canada above the Arctic Circle 

December 1944 under the Chief of Transportation (Coff). After a brief 

discontinuance in April 1950, the board was reestablished on 10 August 1950 at Fort 

Eustis as the Transportation Board and served as the senior advisory group to the 

Coff on combat development matters. The Board's operational test agency, the 

Transportation Research and Development Station (TRADS) at Fort Eustis 

developed and tested innovative equipment and concepts such as the aerial 

tramway for ship to shore discharge, the CONEX transporter, overland conveyor 

systems, numerous barge configurations including a collapsible air transportable 

model, the 60 Ton BARC and various prototype barges and lighters. 
The Post World War II Era 297 

In 1952, the board was also experimenting off the coast of France with 

discharging ships while anchored offshore. This was the seed for the current 

logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations. That capability would allow U.S. 

Forces to deploy or be sustained offshore when port facilities were destroyed or 

nonexistent. In August 1962, the board and TRADS were transferred to the 

Army Materiel Command's Test and Evaluation Command when the technical 

services were divested of their operational responsibj}jties. 1 1 

THE ARCTIC 

The largest and longest lasting arctic program was Project 572, which 

supported the U.S. Air Force Northeast Air Command's (NEAC) huge air base 

at Thule, Greenland, and the DEW Line sites across the top of the continent 

Resources for the projects were unprogrammed, so troops had to be drawn from 

the Transportation Corps and sources outside the Corps without depleting 

strategic reserves. At Fort Eustis, engineer, chemical and quartermaster 

organizations supplemented by transportation units were formed into "fixed" or 

"mobile" port units and cross trained in terminal service skills by the 4th 

Transportation Terminal Command. They were then sent to the departure ports 

for deployment. In addition to adverse weather conditions, the program was 

marked by the lack of timely planning information, fluctuations in mission 

requirements, and extremely complex command and control arrangements 

because of the multitude of government and civilian contractor agencies 

involved. Nevertheless, each year the required units were assembled, trained, 

and deployed, executing their assigned missions in an outstanding manner. 12 

Units and cargo shipments were marshaled principally in the New York 

and Seattle POE. During the summer months, Navy convoys shipped units and 

cargo to the ports and beaches supporting NEAC operations and the off-loading 

points accessible to DEW Line sites. There they were off-loaded by 

Transportation Corps units. 

The 373d Transportation Port Command, later redesignated the 7278th 

Transportation Terminal Command, supported operations in the eastern sector, 

which included Greenland, Newfoundland, Labrador, and Baffin Island. The 

first commander of the 373d was Brigadier Genera] Richard Whitcomb, who 

was succeeded by Colonel (later Brigadier General) Charles F. Tank, and 

Colonel Cornelius J. Rinker. Units of the 373d lived aboard their vessels. 

Moving from place to place, they were augmented by land.ing and harbor craft 

and land transportation. At the sites, they rendezvoused with freighters and 

discharged cargo using LCMs and LCUs across partially ice-bound unimproved 
298 Spearhead of Logistics 

beaches. When required, they moved the cargo by truck to dumps or depots. In 

some terrain, transporters fabricated sledges, nicknamed "Stoneboats" which 

were pulled by tractors to move cargo inland. The Transportation Arctic Group 

actively performed some of its tests by hauling cargo 120 miles across the ice 

cap in support of the Corps of Engineers and other Department of Defense 

agencies. In 1951, Operation Blue Jay was the first over-the-beach operation in 

the Arctic. Transportation Corps troops unloaded over a half-million tons of cargo 

in eastern Canada and Greenland prior to the development of port facilities. 

The Seattle POE and the Conunanding General, US Army Alaska 

(USARAL) controlled operations in the western sector. In 1956, there were 

twelve terminal service companies, but no transportation command like the 373d 

was required because the Seattle POE and USARAL provided the command and 

control. The terminal service troops were trained and deployed as they were 

elsewhere. The Transportation Corps continued to provided support through the 

early 1960s, under the acronym SUNEC - Support of Northeast Command, with 

improvements in facilities and equipment each year and a decrease in tonnage as 

construction was completed. Military terminal service support was gradually 

phased out and replaced by contractor operations. 13 

ANTARCTIC OPERATIONS 

The Transportation Corps made small but important contributions to the 

support of National Science Foundation Antarctic operations by Navy Task 

Force 43 before, during and after the 1957 International Geophysical Year. 

Transportation Corps units established "safe" trails across unexplored Antarctic 

territory filled with deadly crevasses, and provided a team with UH-1 B Iroquois 

helicopters to back up the mission of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) 

annually from 1961-1969. Transportation Corps individuals and teams built 

trails and led teams across the ice cap from 1956 through 1961 from Little 

America to inland sites, including the South Pole with great distinction. 14 

EXPWRERS OF THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS 

Lieutenant Colonel Merle R. Dawson, Maj. Palle Mogenson, Maj. Antero 

Havola, and CWO George Fowler each made Antarctic history by leading or 

navigating Army and Navy teams to establish traHs, some of which were used 

for many seasons. They led similar teams across the ice cap on traverses as long 

as 800 miles. Indeed if not fame, their names rank with explorers such as 
The Post World War II Era 299 

Amundsen and Scott. Jointly they contributed to developing techniques for 

navigation, location and filling of crevasses, and trail maintenance. 

In Greenland, CWO Fowler and S.Sgt. B. M. Win developed the 

Fowler-Win Method of High Latitude Navigation, which could fix a position 

within lOO feet. Several had their names given to newly discovered geographical 

features. Fowler Canyon in Greenland was named for CWO Fowler and Mount 

Dawson, a 14,000 foot peak in Antarctica, was named for Lt. Col. Dawson. 

In 1961, a detachment of ten Transportation Corps officers and men led by 

·Lt. John A. Greene was sent to the Antarctic with two Iroquois turbo-driven 

helicopters to support the USGS by gauging the exact altitude of mountains by 

telurometer equipment. At the same time, they tested and reported on operating 

and maintaining helicopters under extreme cold conditions. Similar detachments, 

with three helicopters were sent annually through J 969. Successor models of 

Iroquois, some moctified with extra tanks to increase range, were assigned to 

cold weather operations. Specially developed support equipment was tested to 

improve operations. One such item was a I 0,000 gallon fuel bladder that 

reduced fuel handling and improved fuel cleanliness. 15 

KOREA 

Pre-1945 Korea was a country about the size of Kansas, covering some 

85,246 square miles. When the country was divided after World War II, the 

South Korean portion covered 38, I 75 square miles and the North Korean 

47,701. Bordering China and controlling the entrance to the Sea of Japan, Korea 

had been a strategic prize for China, Russia, and Japan during the last 500 years.

16 

Traditionally isolationist, Korea was dominated by Russian and Japanese military 

politics throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries (see Map 31). 

In the late 19th century, Japan, beginning its period of expansionism, 

launched a military expedition to Korea, "to establish a treaty of friendship and 

commerce". After limited resistance, the Koreans signed an agreement with the 

Japanese to open their ports and provide Japanese citizens extra-territorial rights. 17 

Korea, concerned about Japan's intentions, consulted China, who advised 

them to find an ally in the West and form an alliance. In May 1882, Korea and 

the United States signed a treaty of "amity and commerce". By 1893, the 

Koreans had trade treaties with nearly every European power, but Japan was 

detennined to make Korea part of its empire. 18 Over the next ten years, China, 

Japan, and Russia vied for control of the Korean peninsula. After defeating the 

Russians in the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese established their own military 
300 

MAN~HURIA 

YELLOW 

SEA 

-MA••-o 

- R&ILROAO 

Spearhead of Logistics 

SEA 

0 F 

JAPAN 

Map 31 
The Post World War II Era 301 

government and ruled the Korean people ruthlessly until the fall of the Japanese 

empire at the end of World Warn. 

"To the victors go the spoils of war" was the Soviet attitude toward 

occupied areas during World Warn. The Soviet Union as an ally of the Western 

Powers against Japan and Germany claimed territory it occupied or created 

client states in its "area of influence". Korea was not an issue in any of the major 

conferences and became a Soviet target. 

In April 1945, the Red Army defeated Japanese forces occupying 

Manchuria, and were poised to enter Korea. The possible spread of Russian 

influence into Korea led the United States to consider deploying troops to Korea, 

in order to keep the Soviets from controlling the entire Korean peninsula. 

Late on the night of I 0 August 1945, barely 24 hours after dropping the 

atomic bomb on Nagasaki, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee hastily 

determined that the United States should participate in the occupation of Korea. 

"Two officers from the committee looked over a map of the Far East and 

decided that the 38th Parallel ran across the middle of the country." The ensuing 

proposal for the United States-Soviet division of Korean areas of influence was 

an important test of Soviet intentions in the Far East. Dean Rusk, future 

Secretary of State said, "if the Soviets reject our offer they could overrun Korea 

before the first GI could be landed at Inchon". 19 Much to the relief of 

Washington, the Soviets quickly accepted the proposal and, a month later Soviet 

troops occupied the upper Korean Peninsula. 

UNITED STATES OCCUPIES KOREA (1945-1949) 

The United States involvement in Korea began in early September 1945, 

when U.S. soldiers from the XXIV Corps began arriving in Inchon. In the weeks 

to follow, major units disembarked at Inchon and moved by truck and train to 

take positions between Pusan and the 38th Parallei.20 

Over the next three years the United States was one of nine nations to 

occupy South Korea as part of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea 

(UNCOK), an agency designed to help reunite the country and end the division. 

In May 1948, South Korea held an election under the auspices of the 

United Nations. Syngman Rhee was elected chairman of the Korean National 

Assembly, which adopted the Constitution of the Republic of Korea two years 

later. On 15 August 1948, the government of the Republic of Korea was 

formally inaugurated and the U.S. military government in Korea was terminated. 

Kim II Sung was elected premier of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea 
302 Spearhead of Logistics 

and took office on 10 September 1948, declaring the Democratic People's 

Republic the ruling power of all of Korea. 

With the election of the South Korean government, the U.N. recommended 

the occupying powers withdrawal their forces from Korea. Russia followed with 

an announcement that all her occupation forces had withdrawn from North 

Korea. On 23 March 1949, President Truman approved the withdrawal of the 

remaining U.S. troops from Korea. 

NORTH KOREAN INVASION (JUNE 1950) 

With the withdrawal of U.N. forces, North Korea began its campaign to 

overthrow the South Korean Government. Civil disorder was promoted in the 

south, while incidents increased along the border. Over the next year, border 

incidents and guerrilla attacks in South Korea continued. 

On 8 June 1950, the P'yongyang newspaper published a manifesto adopted 

by the United Democratic Patriotic Front proclaiming its objective to be a 

parliament which could be elected in early August consisting of both North and 

South Koreans. The parliament's first meeting was scheduled in Seoul on 15 

August 1950, the fifth anniversary of the liberation from Japanese rule.21 The 

manifesto clearly indicated that the communist regime in North Korea expected to 

rule a united Korea. During mid-June, the North Korean Anny deployed its regular 

divisions along the 38th Parallel in preparation for an attack on South Korea.22 

On Sunday, 25 June 1950, North Korean tank units began tbe invasion. 

The attack came as a surprise to Washington, which had known for months that 

the North Koreans had the capability to invade the South, although no 

intelligence source indicated it as an imminent possibility. Some observers 

recorded that the shock in Washington resembled that of Pearl Harbor?3 

On the evening of 26 June, General MacArthur informed President Truman 

that Republic of Korea (ROK) forces could not hold Seoul and were in danger of 

total collapse. Subsequently, the United Nations Security Council passed a 

resolution caUing upon member nations to give military aid to South Korea in 

repelling the North Korean attack. This measure was passed only because the Soviet 

delegate abstained to protest the U.N.'s refusal to admit Communist China. 

The invasion rapidly picked up momentum as the South Korean resistance 

collapsed. Seoul fell on 28 June, and the South Korean government fled south to 

Taejon. The U.N.'s resolve to assist South Korea militarily prompted President 

Truman to commit U.S. ground forces. The nearest U.S. combat forces were 

four divisions serving as occupational forces in Japan. Those divisions, the 7th, 

24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions and the I st Cavalry Division, were 
The Post World War II Era 303 

considerably under strength. Due to reductions that had occurred after the end of 

World War II, there were only two battalions in each infantry regiment instead 

of three. Similar shortages were present in the other divisional combat arms 

units, which averaged about 70 percent of full strength. Three of the divisions 

numbered between 12,000 and 13,000, while the remaining had about 15,000 

soldiers. The divisions were also short of heavy weapons, such as recoilless 

rifles and 4.2 inch mortars, and the divisional tank units were equipped only with 

the M24 light tank, and had no main battle tanks. Nearly all divisional 

equipment reflected wear from service in World War n?4 

The United States planners believed that, after limited action, North Korea 

would retreat and the war would end quickly. This early attitude significantly 

affected not only the preparation of combat forces, but also the quantity and 

quality of logistical support to the theater. The view that Korea would be a 

quick operation, coupled with the fact that Western Europe still had the 

highest global military priority, meant the Korean Theater had to compete for 

equipment and personnel. Washington felt a successful full scale war in 

Europe depended on maintaining sufficient troops and equipment 

prepositioned in Western Europe. 

UNITED STATES DEPLOYS TROOPS TO KOREA 

In Japan, General Walton H. Walker, commander of 8th Army, was 

instructed to order the 24th Infantry Division to Korea at once. Because of the 

shortages of personnel and equipment, the 8th Army transferred over 2,100 

soldiers to the 24th Division, bringing its strength to 15,965 men and 4,773 

vehicles.25 

Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith, commanding officer of the 1st 

Battalion, 21st Regiment, was selected to command the first American ground 

troops to meet the enemy in the Korean War. Notified of the battalion's 

deployment on 30 June 1950, Task Force Smith's 440 men arrived in Pusan on I 

July, unaware of what was in store for them. 

Four days later, Task Force Smith engaged the North Koreans at Osan. 

The task force was competently led and, Lieutenant Colonel Smith chose his 

position well. Despite a heroic effort by the task force, there was little it could do 

against a North Korean division equipped with tanks. The result was 150 

American casualties. Task Force Smith became a symbol of imprudent military 

cutbacks and lack of readiness. 
304 Spearhead of Logistics 

SHIPPING AND TERMINAL OPERATIONS 

With U.S. Army ground forces arriving in South Korea, the number of 

supply requisitions to support the Korean Theater rose from 48,000 to over 

98,000 a month, foreshadowing the major support that would be required in the 

future?6 As a normal procedure, requisitions were funneled through the San 

Francisco port of embarkation (SFPOE), Overseas Supply Division (OSD), 

subordinate to the Chief of Transportation. 

In 1950, control of the OSD was assigned to the Department of the Army 

Director of Logistics (G4), while the port of embarkation (POE) remained the 

responsibility of the CofT. With the supply and port operations in two different 

organizations, the need for effective communications was critical. 

Throughout the hostilities in Korea, the SFPOE, commanded by Maj. Gen. 

Graham W. Lester, remained the primary port for equipment and personnel 

deploying to the Korean Theater. The port commander was responsible for the 

troop movement through the port, loading and unloading of ships, inland 

waterway movement of cargo and personnel, maintenance, operations of railway 

equipment and motor vehicles assigned to the port. 

The OSD was staffed with representatives from all the technical services 

(Quartermaster, Ordnance, and Chemical) to oversee the movement and 

requisitions of their respective classes of supply. The OSD received requisitions 

by teletype, radiogram, standard prepared forms, and machine record cards. 

Once verified, requisitions would be forwarded to the respective supply depot to 

ftLL Once the requisitions were filled and delivered to San Francisco or the 

secondary port in Seattle, supply requisitions would arrive in Korea 120 days 

after the date the requisition was submitted. High priority cargo, beyond the 

capacity of airlift, would go by Marine Express (MARINEX) top loaded on fast 

sailing vessels directly to the Korean Theater.

27 

Though air transport was much faster, it was also very expensive, costing 

$5,000 to fly one ton of cargo to Korea, while the cargo rate by sea was only $38 

a ton. Even by the end of the Korean War, the Air Age had not fully arrived. 

Less than 1 percent of all cargo arriving in the theater moved by air?8 

The bulk of the 31 .5 million tons of supplies sent to the Korean theater 

an·ived by Liberty and Victory ships. In 1950, a Liberty ship with a capacity of 

between 6,000 and 7,000 tons could make a one-way trip from San Francisco to 

Korea in 16-20 days. Once a ship arrived, the ability to berth the ship and unload 

its cargo could easily equal transit time. 
The Post World War II Era 305 

Beginning with the deployment phase of the Korean War, the SFPOE saw 

its tonnage jump from 94,000 measurement tons a month to 501 ,823 tons during 

August of 1950. During the same month, the port shipped 10,238 tanks, trucks, 

trailers, and ambulances, almost tripling the peak monthly outload for World 

War II.29 Transporters operating the port of San Francisco saw a 530 percent 

increase in work, with a very little increase in additional manpower. The 

accomplishment was a tribute to the Transportation Corps' capability to respond 

rapidly to support a major military operation. 

With the increased demand for transportation expertise to support the U.S. 

Army's deployment needs, the training operations at Fort Eustis, Virginia were 

increased. To satisfy that requirement , the Army established the Transportation 

Center during August 1950 to serve as the Corps' training base. The 

Transportation Center was organized into three elements: The Transportation 

Corps Board, the Transportation Corps Research and Development Station, and 

the Transportation Corps Training Center. The overall purpose of the Center was 

"To carry out the responsibilities of the Chief of Transportation for training, 

research and development and all other activities located at Fort Eustis, as well 

as to provide for the overall operation of Fort Eustis and the subinstallations"? 0 

With the expansion of the Korean Theater, the Japan Logistical Command 

established the Pusan Base Command, which had the responsibility to receive, 

store, and forward supplies to the 8th Army throughout South Korea. Less than 

two months later, the rapid escalation of forces led to design of a new logistical 

command commanded by a transportation officer, Brig. Gen. Paul F. Yount. The 

2d Logistical Command was the first logistical command organized under an 

approved table of organization during combat operations?' 

The 2d Logistical Command had the immense responsibility for unloading 

and preparing cargo for onward movement into the Korean Theater. The 

primary port used throughout the war was the Port of Pusan, the only one in 

South Korea with adequate deep water dock facilities for handling a substantial 

volume of general cargo. The four piers and intervening quays at Pusan could 

berth 23-29 Liberty or Victory ships, while an additional 12-15 Landing Ships 

Tank (LST) could unload on the beach at one time, for a port discharge potential 

of 45,000 measurement tons per day?2 

The 8057th Provisional Port Company established initial port operations. 

Stepping up unloading to respond to the deployment surge into Korea, the 

8057th supervised the discharge of 309,000 measurement tons of cargo during 

July 1950. Their workload continued to increase to a record 846,000 

measurement tons by December 1950.

33 
306 Spearhead of Logistics 

Confusion rampant at Mukhojin·ni, Korea 

By late 1950, the 7th Transportation Major Port (today the 7th 

Transportation Group, Fort Eustis, Virginia), commanded by Col. Raymund G. 

Stanton, had assumed operational responsibility for the port, discharging over 

28,000 tons of cargo per day. By late 1952, the 7th Port celebrated its ten 

millionth ton of military cargo shipped through the Port of Pusan since the 

outbreak of the Korean War. By the end of 1952, it handled about one million 

measurement tons of cargo a month. All other ports together in South Korea 

were handling a total tonnage about one third as great.34 
The Post World War II Era 307 

Inchon was the second port, with a discharge tonnage of about 4,600 

measurement tons during the month of June 1951; by late 1952, it was handling 

over 55,000 tons a week.35 Some small ports on the south coast were outports of 

Pusan with specialized missions. For example, Ulsan to the east handled 

ammunition and petroleum, oil, lubricants (POL) at two separate terminals. 

Kusan, on the west coast, south of Inchon was directly under the 2d Logistical 

Command and handled primarily civilian relief shipments such as coal, grain 

and fertilizer, and cement for both civilian and military use. The port also 

provided support to the nearby U.S. Air Force K-8 Air ·Base, notably POL 

discharged from coastal tankers at the port and moved by pipeHne to the base. 

The port was inland on the Kum River, subject to 20-30 foot tides, and ships had 

to be lightened in Yokohama or Pusan to clear shoals in the river. 

The port was commanded by Lt. Col. Richard C. Biggs from 1952-53. In 

the Spring of 1953, Lt. Col. Biggs expanded operations across the river to 

establish a temporary ammunition outport served by a branch of the main 

north-south rail line. At that time extraordinary measures were being taken to 

bring theater reserves, particularly ammunition, to authorized levels in 

anticipation of restrictions in armistice terms. Following the truce, the port also 

hosted a United Nations Inspection Team established to monitor compliance 

with armistice restraints on imports of war materials. 

Port operations throughout South Korea were effective in sustaining the 

large combat force in Korea, yet the ability to reach operating capacity was 

hindered by several problems. The first and most significant was the availability 

of a skilled work force. Local stevedores were mainly inexperienced and hard to 

get, and the language barrier caused problems in running the docks in Korea. 

There was also a high pilferage and breakage rate. During a visit to the Port 

of Pusan during February and March 1951, one observer noted that the Korean 

stevedores, with no supervision in the holds, would drop cargo instead of 

lowering it in order to break open the contents. Subsistence and post exchange 

packs were favorite targets. Once broken, the cargo would be searched and 

roughly 10 percent would be stolen?6 

Besides pilferage and breakage, the port at Pusan had a significant shortage 

of harborcraft. With an overwhelming demand for dock space, lighterage was 

used to transfer cargo ashore from ships anchored in the harbor. As use of the 

port increased, the demand for lighterage exceeded available assets. The 

shortage hindered the port commander's ability to reduce vessel turnaround 

time. 
308 Spearhead of Logistics 

Port congestion also hampered throughput in the Port of Pusan. It was the 

product of two factors: establishing supply depots in close proximity to the port 

and the lack of adequate transportation facilities for clearing the port cargo into 

the theater. Rated at a discharge capacity of 45,000 measurement tons a day, 

Pusan had an actual average daily discharge rate of only about 14,000 tons 

during fiscal year 1951. Other South Korean ports had similar limitations, 

resulting in vessels waiting an exorbitant amount of time before discharge. At 

times, ships had to remain at the outer harbors for as long as twenty to 

twenty-five days (The average Victory ship took 18 men 14 days to unload). At 

one time thirty-six vessels were at the Port of Inchon with an average in-port 

time of 22 days?7 

The congested ports, pilferage, and breakage resulted in the Transportation 

Corps developing a reusable steel container somewhat resembling a bank vault. 

The container, initially called the Transporter, was designed to be easily 

transported by all modes of surface transportation. The Transportation Corps 

began the Container Express (CONEX) service during late 1952 with a shipping 

route between the United States and the Far East. Transporters were moved by 

military or civilian truck, a flatbed, or gondola rail car. From the depot to the 

Port of San Francisco, they were shipped by Marine Express (MARINEX) to 

Yokohama, Japan. From there, Transporters were shipped to U.S. ports in 

Korea. 

Military vehicles delivered the Transporters to consignees and returned 

with empty containers. The ability to rapidly handle these containers reduced 

port pilferage and breakage, and significantly reduced transportation time. With 

an average round trip of 55 days, at least 25-30 days of transit was saved.

38 This 

was an important logistical accomplishment for resupply of the Korean War, and 

the beginning of containerization in the Transportation Corps. 

When cargo cleared a Korean port of debarkation, the job of the 

Transportation Corps' had just began. The success of any military operation was 

directly related to the ability to supply it by surface transportation. In Korea, the 

most significant impediment was Korea's poor road network. 

TRUCK TRANSPORT OPERATIONS 

By American standards, the only first-class road in Korea was the 

Inchon-Seoul highway, a paved dual lane thoroughfare, and a few stretches of 

roads branching out from Seoul. Most Korean roads were poorly surfaced with 

crushed stone and barely wide enough for one way traffic. Bridges were 

extremely narrow and had low weight capacities.

39 
The Post World War II Era 

1st U.S. Cavalry Division convoys to new 

positions outside Seoul, Korea 28 April1951 

309 

Weather affected these roads considerably. In the rainy season, they turned 

to mud; in the winter, both roads and bridges were covered with ice. During the 

dry periods, dust clouds revealed the location of even the smallest convoys. 

These conditions were compounded by the mountainous character of Korea. 

Over 70 percent of the country has slopes greater than 30 percent grade, which 

placed severe limitations on military transportation. 

By the end of the war, South Korean and U.S. Engineer units with the help 

of countless Korean citizens, built over 2,700 miles of roads, which were 

maintained for exclusive military usage. Constant repair of the main supply 

route (MSR) meant truck transport was able to take some of the burden off the 

rail network. The Pusan-Seoul highway, like several of the other MSRs, had a 

capacity of 8,000 tons over a 24-hour period. The Inchon-Seoul highway was the 

exception, with a capability of around 20,000 tons a day. By May 1951, the 

highway transport system was moving about 465,000 tons of cargo per month.40 

The tonnages transported on the poor Korean roads placed a heavy 

maintenance burden on already strained truck resources. By World War II 

planning figures, the Korean theater was supposed to have at least 48 
310 Spearhead of Logistics 

transportation companies. However, by mid-1951, only 36 companies were 

available. These 36 truck companies provided the theater with 1,491 two and 

half ton trucks and 181 ten ton trucks, with a readiness rate of 80.5 percent and 

74 percent, respectively.41 The 73d Transportation Company set a maintenance 

standard unheard of in a combat environment by compiling more than one million 

truck miles without having one of its 48 trucks miss a single day of service.42 

Even with the extreme dedication to mission accomplishment portrayed by 

the 73d, the Korean Theater still had a significant shortage of truck transport. 

The line haul support required to sustain the incredible ammunition demands 

during the Communist spring offensive of 1951 taxed the very limits of the 

theater's distribution system. During the Battle of Soyang, expenditures of 

artillery rounds reached unheard-of rates. In seven days, from 17-23 May 1951, 

21 battalions supporting X Corps fired over 309,000 rounds- more than 8,730 

tons of ammunition. This rate of fire placed extreme demands on the corps' truck 

transport system. To offset the demand, X Corps set up and operated a "Truck 

Bank" where corps truck assets were pooled to maximize the corps' lift capacity. 

Trucks from every possible unit were gathered to augment the corps' 

transport assets. On numerous occasions, the 52d Transportation Battalion 

commandeered trucks to haul class V to forward ammunition points. Military 

police (MP) established checkpoints along routes heading north into the X Corps 

sector. At these checkpoints, trucks were inspected. If empty, they were loaded 

with ammunition and the driver instructed where to deliver the load.43 

Commandeering vehicles was not a preferred method of resupply, but these 

unconventional methods allowed the X Corps to successfully launch a 

counteroffensive against the Chinese Communist forces. The "Truck Bank", 

pooling truck assets to support the commander's plan, was also used to support 

other successful X Corps operations during the Korean War. 

The ability of truck companies to support military operations depended a 

great deal on the ability of the rail system to maintain continuous logistical 

support. As long as the railroads carried their current tonnage without 

interruption, the number of truck companies was suffJ.cienL 44 

The problem with rail was twofold. Enemy interdiction and sabotage could 

significantly alter the rail system's ability to support front line soldiers. 

Secondly, although rail transport was and remained the most economical way for 

moving large tonnages on land, rail lines in Korea could only move supplies up 

to a certain point. After railcars reached the furthest railhead, truck transport or 

Korean laborers had to complete the movement to division supply dumps. 
The Post World War II Era 31 1 

Therefore, as the main thrust of the battle advanced, unless rail construction 

could keep up, the dependence on truck transport increased. 

The Transportation Corps had to make every effort to ensure a balanced 

transport system. This need was demonstrated during the I Corps breakout of the 

Pusan perimeter in September 1950, when a demolished bridge cut the rail 

transport to the corps. Trucks were the only means to resupply I Corps, hauling 

supplies from Pusan (Waegwan) to Taejon and then to Osan. The 84-mile round 

trip from Waegwan to Taejon took 24-hours; the second leg from Taejon to 

Osan was another 30-hour round trip. With the poor quality of roads and long 

turnaround time, the strain on truck resources was extensive. 

During the war, 8th Army assigned truck companies on the basis of 

ton/miles required per 24-hour period. One truck company was assigned for each 

15,000 ton/miles required in that period (the equivalent of hauling 100 tons of 

supplies 150 miles per day). Additionally, organic division transportation was 

augmented when the division had to move supplies more than 25 miles from an 

Army supply point to the division area.

45 

Despite the shortage of truck companies and poor road networks, truck 

drivers performed sometimes herculean feats in support of the war operations. In 

the week ending 26 October 1952, 26 truck companies assigned to 8th Army 

transported 57,998 tons of supplies and some 34,337 troops, for an average 

round-trip distance of 52 miles,46 

an amazing performance, using predominantly 

two and half ton trucks. 

The most difficult aspect of transportation in Korea was supplying front 

line soldiers. The cross-country mobility of two and half ton trucks and jeeps 

was insufficient in the mountainous terrain U.N. forces occupied during much of 

the fighting.47 The 8th Army's answer to the problem was the Civil Transport 

Corps, comprised of units staffed with civilian refugees and drafted laborers. 

They had the mission of carrying supplies from a division's rear boundary to 

front line positions that were inaccessible to motor vehicles. A Korean Service 

Corps laborer was expected to transport 50 pounds of supplies over a distance of 

10 miles per day.48 

RAIL TRANSPORT OPERATIONS 

The railroad was the predominant mode of transportation support in Korea. 

The 8059th Transportation Military Railway Service (Provisional), began 

railway operations during the first weeks of the conflict. In August 1950, the 3d 

Transportation Military Railway Service (TMRS) assumed control of all railway 

operation. The 3d TMRS was organized with two railway operating battalions 
312 Spearhead of logistics 

Supply train leaving Pusan, Korea in 1952 

(the 724th and 712th) and one shop battalion. Upon assuming control of the 

railways, the 3d TMRS had responsibility for 270 miles of railroad, 280 locomotives, 

4,300 freight cars and 450 passenger cars, all in varying states of disrepair.49 

By July 1951, after extensive work on both tracks and cars, the rail system 

was moving about 42,000 short tons of freight per day. On an average day in 

1951, over thirty trains were dispatched: 25 carrying supplies to forward 

railheads, three or more carrying troops, and two or more carrying causalities to 

the rear area. 

50 

Repair of the rail network in Korea and an extensive locomotive rebuild 

program in Japan increased the capacity of the rail system dramatically. By the 

end of 1952, the rail system was moving over 153,000 tons and 19,500 

passenger per week. During the last year of the conflict, monthly freight 
The Post World War II Era 313 

movements more than doubled, averaging about 1,250 million short tons and 

300,000 passengers a month.51 

To expand the rail capability, the Transportation Corps relearned many of 

the lessons of World War I and World War II. Movement and control of trains 

significantly Jacked central guidance. Though the 3d TMRS operated the 

railroads, no organization was established to centrally plan or prioritize the use 

of rail cars. Little effort was made to prioritize cargo, coordinate multi-stop rail 

service, or even coordinate the unloading and loading in the forward areas. The 

lack of centralized control of the various modes of transport was a systemic 

problem in an already overburdened transport system. Not until 1957 did the 

Chief of Transportation approve a change in doctrine which would lead to the 

emergence of movement control procedures that the U.S. Army uses today.52 

Despite its imperfections, the rail system in Korea was invaluable for 

providing logistical support to the theater and, more specifically, ensured the 

success of numerous tactical operations. General Walker, Commanding General, 

8th Army, referring to the use of rail for the tactical movement of forces on the 

battlefield, said: "It was a history making maneuver saved Pusan". He referred to 

the movement of the 25th Infantry Division from the Kunchon front into fighting 

positions east of Chinju in only two days during some of the most critical days 

of the war. 5

3 

On 1 August 1950, the enemy threat to Pusan was critical. The 25th 

Infantry Division, engaged with the enemy 150 miles north of Pusan, was 

needed immediately to defend the Pusan perimeter. Before a move of that size 

could be made, the 8th United States Anny Korea (EUSAK) Transportation 

Section had to clear the southern tracks of railcars left by the lst Cavalry 

Division during its redeployment from the combat area. Not only was the U.N. 

forces trying to relocate units to support the fight, but Korean refugees were 

desperately trying to escape the front lines. Besides moving railcars, U.S. MP 

and Republic of Korea National Police were dispatched to clear an estimated 

7,500 refugees from the area in which the railcars were staged. 

Once the rail lines were cleared, EUSAK Transportation personnel quickly 

marshaled the 75 railcars and locomotive power needed to move the 25th 

Division to the Pusan perimeter. In fourteen days, Transportation Corps 

personnel moved three divisions to the threatened perimeter, ensuring the 

successful defense of Pusan by U.N. forces. The accomplishments of the 

personnel involved in the move earned Transportation Corps personnel a Legion 

of Merit and eight Bronze Stars. 5

4 
314 Spearhead of Logistics 

AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS 

Unlike the tonnages moved by rail, air transport accounted for very little -

about one percent - of the tonnage moved from the United States to Korea. Air 

cargo ranged from whole blood to the new 3.5 inch Bazookas, and flights accounted 

for 20-30 percent of the soldiers arriving in the Korean theater each month. 5

5 

Intertheater lift by air was the responsibility of the Air Force, with space 

allocations coordinated through the Joint Military Transportation Committee of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Transportation Corps responsibility began with the 

operation of the aerial ports of debarkation (APOD), which were controlled by 

the Transportation Corps until 1951. In that year, the 315th Air Division took 

control of all the APODs in Korea, and the Transportation Corps picked up 

responsibility for Army cargo at holding areas located in the APOD. Forwarding 

Army cargo was the responsibility of the Transportation Air Forwarding 

Division (later redesignated the Air Movement Control Division) which 

provided liaison teams at 315th Air Division Headquarters. In 1953, an 

Army-Air Force memorandum of understanding resolved the issue of which 

service ran aerial ports, by awarding the responsibility to operate all aerial ports 

to the Air Force. 

Intratheater airlift was equally important. U.N. forces began to outrun their 

supply lines as they pushed retreating Chinese Communist forces northward 

during October and November 1950. Bombing by U.N. aircraft had destroyed 

rail lines and bridges to such an extent that surface transport could not keep up 

with advancing combat units. Truck transport took as long as six to eight days to 

travel the 300 miles of rough road, while air transport made the same trip in two 

hours. With the improvement of several landing st1ips, C-47s moved emergency 

supplies daily to forward areas. These air transport requirements led to the 

design and production of the C-123 cargo aircraft, which had a capacity to lift 

16,000 pounds and take-off or land on landing strips 3,000 feet long. 5

6 

Like rail, this valuable mode of transportation also had its own movement 

control problems. Doctrine outlining the use of intratheater airlift to support 

ground forces did not exist. This led to waste of an already scarce resource, not 

fully corrected until I 957 when the Chief of Transportation approved new 

movements control doctrine. 

In addition to involvement in the use of cargo aircraft to resupply tactical units, 

the Transportation Corps, in August 1952, assumed responsibilities for Army 

aviation that had been prerviously assigned to the Ordnance Corps. In early 1953, 

the movement of Army cargo on the battletield underwent revolutionary changes 

as the first two transportation helicopter companies were deployed to Korea. On 
The Post World War II Era 

Trucks are loaded with ammunition and supplies from a C-54 airplane at a South 

Korean air base 28 June 1950 

315 

15 June 1953, the 1st Transportation Corps Army Aviation Battalion 

(Provisional) was activated. Those actions began a new phase in the Army's 

capability to move supplies and combat troops rapidly on the battlefield. 

The Chief of Transportation, Maj. Gen. Frank Heileman wrote in a 1952 

article in the Army-Navy-Air Force Journal: "The helicopter is going to be used 

to extend our lines of communication and facilitate our movement where its 

unique capabilities will allow it to overcome the difficulties of our other 

resources. We are not going to scrap our trucks, pull up our railroads, or bum 

our bridges; we are going to integrate into a complete transportation system, 

designed to serve the army in the best and most efficient manner possible, this 

newest addition to Army transportation resources and to the Transportation 

Corps."57 
316 Spearhead of Logistics 

The Transportation Corps proved itself on the battlefields of Korea. 

Highlights of those successes included the move of the 25th Infantly Division to 

the Pusan Perimeter, essential to U.S. forces retaining a foothold in Korea; and 

General MacArthur's bold assault on Inchon in September 1950 in which 

transportation units operated almost 500 harbor craft to transport 49,000 

soldiers, 5,356 vehicles and 22,000 tons of cargo ashore in only six days and 

changed the outcome of the war.58 The retrograde of the X Corps from 

Hungnam to Pusan in December 1950 after the Chinese intervention required 

moving over 215,000 people, 18,000 vehicles and 250,000 tons of supplies 

within two weeks on 193 ships. In Operation Changey Changey, some 40,000 

soldiers from front line and reserve units were moved over an 850-mile, 

truck-sea-air route to change places in the battle area.

59 These operations were 

major contributions, but the Corps' day-to-day operation of ports, the rail 

system, highway transport, and helicopter flights constituted the underpinning 

and spearhead of logistics in Korea. 

The Korean War proved the foresight of making the Transportation Corps 

a separate branch of the Army. A corps of highly motivated, well trained 

transportation specialists was not only desirable, but necessary for the Army to 

operate on the modern battlefield. In tl1e three years of the war, the 

Transportation Corps developed doctrine for marine, air, rail, and truck 

transport. Sea transport, still the predominant means for transporting large forces 

between theaters of operation was altered dramatically during the Korean War. 

The Transportation Corps demonstrated that port operations in a theater could be 

rapidly established to deploy and sustain large forces. Developed almost 

overnight, Pusan was handling over a million tons of cargo and 300,000 

personnel per month a year later. Additionally, the development of a rapid sea 

delivery service, Marine Express (MARINEX), allowed the United States to ship 

critical priority cargo to a theater of operations in a fraction of the normal 

shipping time. 

Although only a fraction of the tonnage required in the theater was 

transported by air, transporters in Korea capitalized on this rapid means of 

transportation. Due in part to their efforts, airlift would develop into a significant 

strategic mobility asset. 

Surface transport was fundamental to the success of U.N. ground forces. 

Rail transport rapidly grew more capable and dependable, eventually moving 

1,250 million tons of cargo and 300,000 passengers per month, a significant 

accomplishment. 
The Post World War II Era 317 

DUKW Amphibian landing during the Korean War 

The accomplishments of the Transportation Corps in overcoming the 

extremely poor road network and shortage of trucks, theater wide, testified to the 

Corps flexibility and resourcefulness. On numerous occasion, transportation 

operators overcame shortages of trucks by supporting large operations with 

"Truck Banks" which massed lift capability. As in World War II, the truck 

shortages also prompted extraordinary measures, such as the commandeering of 

empty trucks to haul ammunition to front line units. 

By July 1953, the Transportation Corps moved more than 7.1 miUion tons of 

cargo and 3.2 million passengers over the Korean road network. Developments in 

each mode of transport were extremely important to the future of U.S. military 

transport. The rapid development of transportation infrastructure in Korea 

demonstrated the vital need for a Transportation Corps that could effectively 

support a logistics surge required by tactical operations in a distant theater. The 

signing of the Korean Armistice on 27 July 1953 not only signaled the end of the 

Korean War, it also marked the coming of age of the Transportation Corps. 
318 Spearhead of Logistics 

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 

The mid-1960s saw the beginning of the era of "force projection", the 

requirement of the United States to rapidly project a combat force to points of 

the globe on short notice. This requirement changed the way U.S. military 

commanders looked at deployment. Instead of a gradual buildup, a force 

sometimes had to be projected in a matter of hours or days instead of weeks. 

The beginning of this era was marked by numerous transportation 

innovations. One evolved from the highly successful Transporter, a reusable 

steel box introduced during the Korean War and the forerunner of routine 

container use in the U.S. Army. By 1965, container ships were serving as the 

workhorse of strategic mobility. The container ship could carry large amounts of 

general cargo secured inside the reusable steel containers, not only reducing 

pilferage, but significantly reducing the loading and unloading time compared to 

palletized or breakbulk cargo. 

Containerization had a major impact on the transportation industry, which 

expanded its use by "piggybacking", in which a railcar carries a trailer cross 

country, reducing overall transportation costs. At its destination, the trailer was 

pulled by a tractor to its final destination. 

The early 1960s saw the creation of a new Transportation Corps 

organization. The Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS) 

was established and made responsible for the management of all U.S. Army 

ports worldwide. It served as the transportation manager for all surface moves 

within the continental United States, with profound impact on strategic mobility. 

The first test for these innovations occurred in 1965 when the United States 

intervened in the Dominican Republic. Roughly the size of Vermont and New 

Hampshire combined; the Caribbean nation had a population of about five 

million people. It occupies the eastern half of the island of Hispaniola, lying 

between Cuba to the west and Puerto Rico to the east.60 (see Map 36) 

"Marked by a politically unstable past," a historian of the 1965 intervention 

has noted, "the Dominican Republic has had 123 rulers, mostly military men, 

from its discovery in 1492 until Trujillo. Chaos, political factionalism, 

corruption, and economic instability continuously wrecked the country, 

contributing to the sense of resignation, fatalism, and low self-esteem that 

engulfed large segments of the population."61 

In 1965, a military-civilian coup erupted against the Dominican Republic 

regime. The possibility of the overthrow of the government meant total loss of 

control in the country. That prospect gave Washington two overriding concerns. 

The frrst was the security of American citizens in the Dominican Republic, and 
The Post World War II Era 319 

the second was President Johnson's concern that the Dominican Republic was 

about to become "another Cuba". Previous presidents had been severely 

criticized for losing Cuba; and, along with the humiliation of the Bay of Pigs 

fa ilure, President Johnson was determined not to suffer a similar debacle.

62 

The situation continued to deteriorate and, on 28 April 1965, the U.S. 

ambassador requested the landing of U.S. Marines. That same day, 500 Marines 

came ashore to protect American lives and property. Subsequently, the rapid 

deployment force at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on standby for the previous two 

days, was alerted for deployment to Puerto Rico. Once en route, the 3d Brigade, 

82d Airborne Division (Power Pack) was diverted to arrive at San Isidro 

Airfield, Dominican Republic, and Maj Gen. Robert H. York, 82d Airborne 

Division commander, was designated Land Force Commander.

63 

By 0215, 29 April, U.S. Anny forces landed, marking the beginning of 

another military operation that required Transportation Corps support. Though 

not large in comparison with campaigns such as Korea, transportation support 

was critical to the success of the operation. The Transportation Corps began its 

participation by supporting the rapid deployment of the 82d Airborne Division 

and the XVIII Corps element to the Dominican Republic. Simultaneously, the 

Transportation Corps began assembling the infrastructure required to support the 

new arena of operations. 

Support needs grew on 26 April 1965 when the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 

alerted two battalion combat teams of the 82d Airborne Division for possible 

deployment to the Dominican Republic. Transportation Corps activities at Fort 

Bragg began moving supplies and equipment in preparation. Basic load items 

were moved from contingency warehouses, while equipment was transported to 

the heavy drop rigging facility in preparation for a possible forced insertion. 

As preparations continued, the JCS deployment orders arrived, and 

transportation units at Fort Bragg moved cargo to Pope Air Force Base (Green 

Ramp) in preparation for air movement. Simultaneously, C-130 cargo aircraft 

arrived at Pope to load the 82d for their 1,400 mile trip to the Dominican 

Republic. The 82d's deployment met with numerous delays. Loads arrived out 

of sequence; they were not properly prepared for air movements; and /or they 

arrived too rapidly for the outload facility to handle them. Those problems 

would recur in the years to come.64 

The 82d follow-on forces went out in "packages", designed for combat 

readiness once on the ground. The follow-on packages were not flexibly 

configured, requiring almost all of the division's equipment to be flown to the 

theater, whether it was needed or not. This was a poor use of air transport, 
320 Spearhead of Logistics 

because equipment whether needed or not for the particular contingency was 

shipped. Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr., task force commander, 

summarized the situation by saying; "It appears in some respects that we are still 

fighting World War II ... we must, in conjunction with the Air Force, develop 

procedures permitting greater flexibility, and quicker response to changing 

tactical and support requirements".65 

Once marshaled, operational security prevented first echelon forces of the 

82d from communicating with anyone, including family members. The 

deployment requirements caused numerous problems with soldiers' families not 

having any money, car keys, PX cards, etc. Unaffected families pooled together 

resources and helped the families in need. These uncoordinated effects became 

the forerunner of the Army Community Service.

66 

Even with these delays, the lead aircraft for Power Pack departed Pope Air 

Base at 2052 hours, four hours after the JCS ordered the deployment. The 144 

aircraft (33 carrying 1,800 paratroopers, 11 1 carrying equipment) created a 

virtual air bridge between the United States and the Dominican Republic, 

marking the beginning of a new "Power Projection" capability of the United 

States Armed Forces.67 The Dominican Republic operation was the largest 

sustained United States troop airlift accomplished up to this time. 

The Transportation Corps established the sustainment infrastmcture in the 

Dominican Republic. Deploying from Fort Meade, Maryland, the 502d 

Transportation Company's primary mission was movement control at both the 

Port of Rio Haina and the busy San Isidro Airfield. During the initial days of 

arrival, aircraft were "nose to tail" with C-130 cargo aircraft running while they 

were unloaded so they could take off immediately and allow arriving aircraft to 

land. No ground materials handling equipment (MHE) was available, and the air 

drop platforms had to be manually unloaded from each aircraft.68 Once airfield 

operations were stabilized, the Joint Airfield Central Coordination Center 

assumed control of airfield operations at San Isidro Airfield. 

The 502d Transportation Company personnel played a key role in ensuring 

Army cargo moved smoothly through the aerial port, and matching cargo with 

the right owner and directing it to the correct destination. During the first 

fourteen days of the operation, the U.S. Air Force flew over 1,500 sorties and 

delivered 14,650 personnel and their equipment to the island.69 

Ten days later, sea lines of communication were established to the theater. 

Primary players in the initiation of port operations were the 105th Port 

Company, 491 st Transportation Detachment, and the !59th Transportation 

Battalion (Provisional), all of which deployed from Fort Eustis to operate the 
The Post World War II Era 321 

Port of Rio Haina. During the next year these units operated the only seaport of 

debarkation. They began the arduous task of unloading the large amount of 

cargo, supplies and munitions destined for the 24,000 American troops. Staff 

Sergeant Luis Romero recalled, "seeing cargo specialists under the hot sun of the 

Caribbean, discharging breakbulk supplies of cement and combat rations, diesel 

and gasoline, tentage and bead, vegetable and grocery supplies, barbed wire and 

weapons in sufficient quantities to equip and sustain the forces."70 

Even though the majority of the cargo arriving in country was breakbulk, 

roll on/roll off (RO/RO) ships were used for the first time to support combat 

operations. Using the RO/RO concept, vehicles drove on to a vessel and at its 

destination were driven off, significantly reducing cargo handling and 

minimizing the requirement for ship or port cranes. 

U.S. Army ground transportation was necessary to clear cargo from both 

the sea and air ports of debarkation. Command and control for the bulk of the 

ground transport was the responsibility of the 507th Transportation Group 

headquarters. 

Deployed out of the 1st Logistical Command, Fort Bragg, the 507th 

Transportation Group managed the Corps' truck assets deployed in the theater. 

The 9th Transportation Car Company (Airborne) provided command and control 

vehicles for the Army forces. The 379th Transportation Company (medium 

reefer truck) provided refrigerated transport for classes I and Vill supplies. The 

546th Transportation Car Company provided transport support to the XVlli 

Corps and was collocated at the Port of Rio Haina with the 839th Transportation 

Company, which provided truck assets for support of the theater forces. The 

489th and the 490th Transportation Detachments provided theater level 

transportation support. With the 489th providing truck transport and the 490th 

movement control. 

To support the 82d Airborne Division, the 407th Supply and Transport 

Battalion from the Division's Support Command deployed its organic truck 

company, providing transportation support to the 82d Airborne Division's 

operations. 

As the U.S. military occupation of the Domjnican Republic continued, a 

rapid buildup of combat forces turned into a stability and peacekeeping 

operation. TI1e threat to U.S. forces changed from all-out attack on U.S. 

positions to random rebel sniper fLre, which accounted for the majority of 

American causalities during the intervention.71 

Once the situation stabilized, the mission of the 82d Airborne Division and 

the 4th Marine Expeditionary Force quickly turned to humanitarian aid. By May 
322 Spearhead of Logistics 

1965, the distribution of over 15,000 tons of food and 15,000 pounds of clothes 

had begun, along with community repair projects and the establishment of free 

medical clinics. 

President Johnson's desire for an operative multinational peace force was 

realized with the creation of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), which 

assumed operational control of the peacekeeping forces in the Dominican 

Republic in June 1965. This was a more palatable solution to neighboring states 

than a U.S. occupying force. In all, seven countries contributed forces to the 

IAPF: the United States, Brazil, Honduras, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, 

and El Salvador.72 As the IAPF became operational, Brazilian troops began 

relieving U.S. troops, marking the drawdown of the U.S. occupation of the 

Dominican Republic. By 6 June 1965, U.S. Marines began redeployment back to 

the United States. 

Over the next few months, Transportation Corps units continued to provide 

logistical support to both U.S. forces and other members of the IAPF. As the 

redeployment of U.S. forces continued, the 105th Port Company was 

instrumental in the outload of the massive amounts of equipment and supplies 

returning to the United States. Since rapid redeployment was not essential, the 

majority of equipment went by sea; thus. port operations at Rio Raina served as 

the primary outload operation for redeployment. On 21 September 1966, the last 

of the U.S. forces, under the auspices of the IAPF, left Dominican Republic soil. 
CHAPTER XI 

Vietnam 

''The transportation system moved goods so fast and 

too efficiently for the logistical system to keep up with the 

sophisticated job of translating boxes and measurement tons into 

supply items and balancing item demand in a constantly changing 

combat environment. .. we must have control and positive 

documentation of supply built into the transportation system. 

By the time the box arrives on the ground, 

it is already too late to start finding out what it is." 

Honorable Dr. Robert A. Brooks, Assistant Secretary of the Army, 

Installations and Logistics, Vietnam War 

INTRODUCTION 

323 

The nation of Vietnam is a crescent-shaped land mass bordered by 

Cambodia and Laos to the west, China to the north, and the South China Sea to 

the east. The land area, formerly known as Indo-China, is dominated by the 

Annamite mountain chain, which extends southward from Vietnam's northern 

border to within sixty miles of Saigon (see Map 32). It is a country of jungles, 

deltas, swamps, plains, and mountains in a tropical climate subject to monsoon 

rains, making logistical support of military operations extremely difficult. 

At the end of World War ll, the French attempted to reimpose colonial rule over 

Indo-China which had been occupied by the Japanese during the war. They were 

opposed by the Viet Minh, an indigenous anti French group comprising a coalition of 

various groups all of which wanted independence from the French. The Viet Minh wa<; 

led by Ho Chi Minh, a Soviet trained communist. The United States had no desire to 

help any nation reestablish colonial rule, but France was a wartime ally and prevention 

of the spread of communism had become a matter of national policy. Therefore, the 

United States underwrote up to seventy-five percent of France's expenses in the 

conduct of the war and provided millions of dollars worth of military equipment.1 

By 1954, the French attempt to reestablish colonial rule was failing. That 

same year, the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Union of Soviet 
324 

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Spearhead of Logistics 
VIetnam 325 

Socialist Republics met in Geneva to discuss a political settlement of the Korean 

War and a truce in Indochina. Simultaneously, the Viet Minh, at great cost, dealt 

a devastating psychological blow to the French by defeating their troops at Dien 

Bien Phu. That victory resulted in the withdrawal of French forces from Indochina. 

At Geneva, a series of accords outlined the future of Vietnam. All French 

forces were to withdraw. The area was partitioned near the 17th parallel, and two 

nations were created. Neither North nor South Vietnam was to interfere in the 

internal affairs of the other, and the Geneva Accords included a general ban on 

the introduction of new troops or weapons into the area and a restriction on 

establishing new bases? 

Over the next few years, North Vietnam watched, hoping the South 

Vietnamese government would fail and allow the North to unite Vietnam under 

a "progressive socialist" administration. Free elections called for under the 1954 

Geneva Accords never materialized, and by 1960, the North decided to resort to 

other means to unify Vietnam under their leadership. 

The instrument adopted by North Vietnam to conquer the South was the 

Viet Cong, a guerrilla army of South Vietnamese Communists dedicated to 

undermining the government. In the early I 960s, the Viet Cong conducted a 

campaign of terrorism by killing South Vietnamese government and village 

officials in cold blood and spreading confusion and discontent. These 

depredations severely weakened the Saigon government, and by late 1963, the 

overthrow and assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem demonstrated the 

seriousness of the situation. 3 

Realizing they could not fight the Viet Cong without assistance, the South 

Vietnamese government asked President John F. Kennedy for help in December 

1961. Subsequently, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was 

established to bolster the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) that had 

been put in place by the Eisenhower administration. 

During January and February 1965, the situation in South Vietnam 

worsened as Viet Cong terrorism increased. The South Vietnamese Am1y, the 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), suffered a series of defeats, and its 

military future looked poor. The United States was no longer able to prevent the 

collapse of the South by merely providing aid. 

ESTABLISHING THE THEATER 

General WilUam C. Westmoreland, Commander, MACV, stated as late as 

March 1965 that no decision had been made on U.S. intervention with ground 

forces, other then a Marine detachment to secure the Da Nang Airfield. 
326 Spearhead of Logistics 

Consequently, there was no logistic infrastructure in place, and no development 

of secure logistical bases. The facilities operated by the South Vietnamese forces 

were woefully inadequate, and ports and airfields were insufficient. In addition, 

the South Vietnamese Anny had no logistical organization and no supply, . . 4 

transportation, or mamtenance troops. 

Despite the poor logistical infrastructure, the grave tactical situation led 

President Lyndon B. Johnson to order the deployment of U.S. combat forces. 

Because of force level ceilings and the decision not to mobilize the reserves, the 

logistical buildup lagged behind the combat force buildup.5 

The massive deployment of forces to Southeast Asia into an unimproved 

theater of operations again placed great demands on the Transportation Corps. 

Never before had the Army's logistic system supported large numbers of ground 

combat troops operating in a counterguerrilla role with a supporting pipeline from 

9,000 to 11,000 miles long.6 President Truman's decision to establish the 

Transportation Corps as a permanent branch in 1950 would pay significant dividends. 

LOGISTICS SUPPORT CONCEPT 

The previous U.S. command organization in Vietnam had become overextended and in need of reorganization. In 1960, the Military Assistance 

Advisory Group (MAAG) was the only U.S. military headquarters in Vietnam, 

serving as a joint organization containing Army, Navy, and Air Force sections. 

Those sections were responsible for advising their counterparts in the 

Vietnamese armed forces and assisting the chief of the advisory group in 

administering the Military Assistance Program. Logistical and administrative 

support was provided through each of the different service channels. 

As the theater expanded, several logistical teams were sent from the 9th 

Logistic Command in Okinawa to provide the required logistical support to the 

arriving units. Later, as that logistical infrastructure became overburdened, this 

group of people formed the nucleus of the newly authorized U.S. Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam. Authorized on 8 February 1962, MACV was 

established as a subordinate unified command under Lt. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, 

the Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific. 

The U.S. Army Support Group was the Anny component command within 

MACV with the mission of providing logistical and administrative support to the 

ground forces, providing an overly decentralized logistical support network with 

only limited coordination between services. 

On 15 May 1964, the Military Assistance Advisory Group was formally 

dissolved and the reorganized MACV headquarters commanded by General 
VIetnam 327 

William C. Westmoreland was formed. Even with those changes, the logistical 

system had failed to keep pace with the expanding and complex support 

requirements. By 1964, the decentralized logistical infrastructure worsened. The 

U.S. Army received its support from Okinawa and the continental United States; the 

Marine Corps, from Japan and Okinawa; the Navy, from the Philippines and 

Hawaii; and the Air Force, from the Philippines. There was no single logistic 

agency to oversee and direct the support of U.S. forces in Vietnam. 

Over the following year several different options were discussed at the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) level to help correct the theater's logistical problems. 

Finally, in late April 1965, an Army logistical command was authorized, and in 

July, the 1st Logistical Command was formed. By the end of that year it had 

grown from 5,930 men to more than 22,000.7 

The 1st Logistical Command was given the formidable mission of 

supporting all U.S. and free world forces south of Chu Lai. The area of South 

Vietnam north of Chu Lai remained the responsibility of the U.S. Navy and Air 

Force until 1968 when the Army also assumed that responsibility. The U.S. 

Navy was given responsibility to operate Da Nang port facilities because Army 

transportation elements were fully committed to operating ports in the south. 

The logistical support mission was complicated by the absence of a well--coordinated, 

understandable tactical plan. Unlike both World War II and Korea, Vietnam's 

tactical operations put U.S. soldiers a situation for which they had not been 

trained. Those operations were characterized largely by small, isolated actions 

consisting of ground and air assault operations mounted from numerous base can1ps 

around the countryside to combat counter- insurgency, guerrilla-type attacks. 

With no neat, linear division between enemy and friendly forces, there 

were no front line or rear boundaries. Therefore, the theater did not have a 

recognizable combat and communications zone. In Vietnam they were one and 

the same. Instead, Vietnam was divided into four corps tactical zones, each 

conducting its own tactical operations against the Viet Cong. 

The elusive and rapidly changing battlefield contested by battalion-size 

forces challenged the theater's logistical support infrastructure. Forces spread all 

over the theater required ammunition and rations at a moment's notice. Highway 

lines of communication to support the fight provided the Viet Cong with the 

maximum opportunity to interdict American logistical support. In addition to the 

VietCong ambushes of convoys, logistical bases were harassed by small arms 

fire, mortar bombardments, and sniper attacks. All those factors contributed to 

the complexity of the logistical mission that the 1st Logistical Command 

supported throughout the Vietnam War. 
328 Spearhead of logistics 

The I st Logistical Command, commanded by Col. Robert W. Duke, 

developed in coordination with MACV the concept for logistics support of U.S. 

forces in Vietnam. The plan called for two major base depots and five support 

commands. The seas and rivers would serve as the main supply routes until the 

tactical situation permitted the use of ground transport routes. The plan was to 

establish the depots at Saigon and Cam Rahn Bay. The Saigon Depot would 

support the Vung Tau and Can Tho Support Commands, while the Cam Rahn 

Bay Depot supported the Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, and Da Nang Support 

Commands. This arrangement provided some dispersion in case of enemy attack 

and additional port capacity if the Port of Saigon was destroyed. 

The I st Logistical Command executed the proposal and established support 

depots at Saigon and Cam Rahn Bay. Staffed with only seventeen officers, the 

lst Logistical Command operated the support commands. Prior to the buildup of 

U.S. forces, a U.S. Army major with a briefcase and a jeep was the command 

and control unit for Saigon.8 

With ever increasing demands placed on the theater's transportation 

network and considering recent advances in transportation technology, the 

Commander, I st Logistical Command recommended that an independent 

evaluation be conducted to determine what types of transportation organizations 

and resources were required to support the U.S. Army transportation mission in 

South Vietnam.9 The evaluation was initiated in November 1967, when the 

Director of Transportation, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), 

Brig. Gen. Jack C. Fuson, 10 formerly commander, 4th Terminal Command, 

assembled a team of five officers under the overall guidance of the Commanding 

General, U.S. Army Vietnam, and the Commander, 1st Logistical Command. 

The evaluation included an assessment of the theater's water transport 

capability, including port discharge, lighterage, and SeaLand containerization. 

From a port discharge standpoint, the study concluded that the Vietnam 

theater had the equivalent of forty-one terminal service companies, including six 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) companjes, fifteen U.S. Army 

companies, and twenty civilian (company equivalent) organizations. Trus work 

force was capable of handling the theater's port discharge rate. Only rarely did 

surges at individual locations exceed the local capacity. 

Lighterage according to the DCSLOG study, was in great demand 

throughout South Vietnam. Besides vessel discharge, medium boat companies 

were used for intracoastal transport and security, maintenance centers, aid 

stations, supply carriers, and fire control centers. The study determined that 

lighterage for port support was sufficient to support demand, except for a small 
VIetnam 329 

shortage m Saigon. Lighterage to support the intra-coastal waterways was 

significantly short since the monthly requirement was roughly 311,610 short 

tons, while the capability was 203,026 short tons. This shortfall was due to a 

theater wide shortage of harborcraft personnel and poor contractor maintenance. 

There was also a shortage of tugboats in the theater. Seventy-one were required 

but only sixty-four were on hand. The most significant shortage was in the 

Saigon Pott Complex, which had six. 

Containerization was still a fairly new concept in Southeast Asia, so the 

evaluation team analyzed the impact that containers would have on U.S. forces. 

One of their recommendations was for retrograde cargo to be shipped back to 

the United States in empty containers. 

By far the most significant result of the study was the recommendation to 

establish a centralized transportation command in South Vietnam. Because of 

the geographical dispersion of forces and the lack of secure land lines in the 

theater, the current transportation command had three major support commands 

paralleling the three major port facilities. Transportation operating units were 

assigned to each of these support commands according to respective workloads. 

Each support command had its own transportation staff which coordinated and 

controlled activities with its subcommands. This fragmentation of transportation 

control created a requirement for transportation staff functions at aU levels within 

the U.S. Army in Vietnam. The extreme decentralization and layering of commands 

provided a breeding ground for inefficiency and confusion for numerous functions 

including movement requests or even vehicle tasking. 

The problems caused by the decentralization of transportation led the 

Commander, lst Logistical Command to direct the Cam Rahn Bay Support 

Command to form a Provisional Transportation Command to consolidate 

transportation activities under one commander. This permitted a total system 

approach to the command and control of water terminal operations, local clearance, 

line-haul delivery from depot to consumers, and movement management. 

The improved efficiency of the Provisional Transportation Command was 

the stimulus for the evaluation team to recommend a centralized Transportation 

Command (TRANSCOM) in South Vietnam. The TRANSCOM would consist 

of two transportation brigades controlling all U.S. Army transportation activities. 

Its strength was planned at 17,000 troops and 12,000 contract personnel engaged 

in transportation operations in South Vietnam. The TRANSCOM was to have an 

organic Movements Control Agency (MCA), and the subordinate brigades, 

Movement Control Centers. Those measures would streamline the command and 

control of the theater's transportation support, as well as provide an 
330 Spearhead of Logistics 

understandable and efficient movements management system for common user . 11 transportatiOn assets. 

Even though the analyiis was accurate and the recommendations provided 

efficient solutions to the problems present, the proposal was ahead of its time. 

lnterservice rivalry would not allow one service to control all transportation 

assets in the theater. The lack of command emphasis also played a part in not 

implementing the recommendations of the study, and it became a historical 

footnote instead. However, the concepts were practical and the passage of the 

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 would 

eliminate many of the interservice inefficiencies and force a significant increase 

in joint duty. That 1986 act also increased the authority of both the Secretary of 

Defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over military matters.12 

The Provisional Transportation Command remained at Cam Rahn Bay, but 

its concept was not adopted throughout Vietnam. Transportation commands in 

South Vietnam remained oriented to three major support commands, Saigon, 

Cam Rahn Bay, and Qui Nhon, all geographically located at the theater's 

primary Army ports of debarkation. (see Chart 14). 

At the Saigon Support Command (SSC), the 4th Transportation Command 

provided transportation support to the Port of Saigon, Newport, Cat Lai, and 

Vung Tau. Subordinate to the 4th Transportation Command were the 125th 

Transportation Command and the 48th Transportation Group, which were 

responsible for terminal operations and port clearance. The 125th Transportation 

Command, with its subordinate Terminal Service Company (117th) and a 

Transportation Augmentation Unit, was responsible for commercial operations 

at the Port of Saigon. The 48th Transportation Group provided truck transport for 

port clearance in Long Binh which supported the lli and IV Corps tactical zones. 

The remaining three battalions in the sse served under the 4th 

Transportation Command. The 71st Transportation Battalion operated the newly 

constmcted Newport Terminal outside of Saigon. The 11th Transportation 

Battalion operated the port at Cat Lai, seven miles southeast of Saigon, handling 

over 60 percent of all ammunition entering Vietnam. Jn 1968, the 11th Battalion, 

commanded by Lt. Col Nathaniel R. Thompson, Jr., handled approximately 

42,000 tons of ammunition each month.13• 

14 

The Cam Rahn Bay Support Command, smaller than the Saigon Support 

Command, originally controlled the 500th Transportation Group (Motor 

Transport) and the 124th Terminal Command. (see Chart 15). The 500th 

Transportation Group provided the majority of the truck assets to clear the Cam 

Rahn Bay Port and move the supplies into the theater, while the 124th Terminal 
1ST LOG COMMAND ORGANIZATION FEBRUARY 1968 

11 ST LOG COMO 

I 

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SUPPORT COMMAND 

CAM RANH BAY 

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Vietnam 333 

Command, commanded by Lt. Col. Richard E. Criner, provided the Port at Cam 

Rahn Bay with a majority of its terminal operations capability. 15 

By 1969, the Cam Rahn Bay Support Command was reestablished to form 

the Provisional Transportation Command. Designed to streamline transportation 

management and improve efficiency, the Command was built from assets of the 

SOOth Transportation Group and the !24th Terminal Command. Activated in 

1969, the command was established with three subordinate transportation 

battalions and given the primary mission of discharging and throughputing 

breakbulk and containerized cargos over five piers at the port of Cam Rahn Bay. 

It was instrumental in the discharge of both roll on/roll off (RO/RO) and 

containerships, both new concepts of transportation (see Chart 16). 

The three subordinate units to the Provisional Command were the 1Oth, 

36th, and 39th Transportation Battalions. The lOth Transportation Battalion, 

commanded by Lt. Col. Jimmy D. Ross, operated the port of Cam Rahn Bay 

while the 36th Battalion commanded by Lt. Col. Edward Honor, and 39th 

Transportation Battalion provided trucks for port clearance. 16 

The Qui Nhon Support Command (QNSC), the last of the three support 

commands, was the main source of supply for U.S. installations at An Khe and 

Pleiku and for Republic of Korea (ROK) army units. The support command had 

the 5th Transpo1tation Command, consisting of the 8th Transportation Group 

with six battalions. 

Included in the Qui Nhon mission, the 5th Transportation Terminal 

Command discharged and loaded deep draft and intercoastal vessels, delivered 

cargo to its first destination, and assisted in amphibious operations. The 

command also exercised operational control of the Han Jin Transportation 

Company, a Korean contractor responsible for a portion of the port operations. 

The 5th Transportation Command was originally activated at Fort Story, 

Virginia, in 1966 and arrived in Vietnam in October of the same year. By late 

1968, the 5th Transportation Command began replacing its 500 military 

personnel with 700 local nationals, and by May 1970, the command was 

transferred to Vietnamese control, and the 5th Command redeployed to Da Nang. 

The 8th Transp01tation Group had three subordinate truck battalions; the 

27th, 54th, and !24th Transportation Battalions' primary mission was to provide 

motor transport support to tactical forces in the II Corps Tactical Zone. The 27th 

and 54th Transportation Battalions were collocated at Qui Nhon, while the I 24th 

Transportation Battalion was located in Pleiku. 17 

The remaining two battalions that made up the Qui Nhon Suppott 

Command were the 57th and 159th Transportation Battalions. The 57th 
I 

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CAM RANH BAY SUPPORT COMMAND: 20 FEB 68 

SUPPORT COMMAND 

CAM RANH BAY 

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VIetnam 335 

Transportation Battalion deployed to Vietnam in the fall of 1967, and provided a 

wide range of support to U.S. forces. 

The only subordinate battalion of the 5th Transportation Command was the 

394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal), which proved to be an invaluable 

port discharge asset. In January 1966, the battalion discharged over 59,000 short 

tons of cargo helping alleviate the theater's port discharge backlog. Even with 

terminal service personnel and material-handling equipment shortages, the 

battalion maintained a proud reputation for mission accomplishment throughout 

the Vietnam War. 

In mid-1969, the Presidents of the United States and Vietnam announced 

an agreement to begin replacing United States troops with Vietnamese forces. 

TI1e MACV headquarters issued on 21 July 1969 the Country Logistics 

Improvement Plan to implement the transfer of logistic support operational 

responsibilities, with the goal of a sulf-sufficient Republic of Vietnam Armed 

Forces (RVNAF) logistics system. During the succeeding years, until the 

probability of a cease fire became imminent, U.S. logistics units gradually 

transferred in-country operations to the Vietnamese, and continued to provide 

advisors to RVNAF units. In mid-October 1972, the MACV commander 

directed that plans be developed to withdraw all U.S. forces from South Vietnam 

within 60 days, and to establish the Defense Attache Office (DAO), Saigon. That 

office would continue to administer the United States Security Assistance 

Program, in coordination with the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam. 

The cease fire was signed on January 27, 1973, and the DAO, Saigon was 

activated the following day, assigned to MACV, with a Transportation Corps 

officer, Maj. Gen. John E. Murray as the Defense Attache. At that time, only about 

13,300 U.S. Anny troops remained in South Vietnam. On March 29, 1973, the United 

States closed down its military role in Vietnam, and the DAO, Saigon took over 

administration of the Security Assistance program, contracting for support of the 

activity and as needed for necessary operational tasks such as monitoring use of 

program assets, beyond the limited capability of the DAO staff. DAO continued 

to administer the program until the fall of the South Vietnamese government in 

March 1975. 

SHIPPING AND TERMINAL OPERATIONS 

The success of United States operations in Vietnam depended upon the 

ability to move a large military force to the area and sustain it in combat. The 

depots established "in country" were the first step, but deployment of massive 

amounts of supplies and equipment required an adequate number of ships. 

18 
336 Spearhead of Logistics 

A World War II vintage ship discharges U.S. Army equipment in Vietnam. 

The cargo flow into Vietnam was 140,000 measurement tons per month. 

The last half of 1965 saw that figure climb to 460,000 tons, then to 740,000 by 

the end of 1966. With few exceptions, the ships of the Navy's service force used 

in Vietnam to support this flow of cargo, were of World War IT vintage, and over 

the years, many of them had been scrapped because of budget cuts. There were 

few replacements because the Navy preferred to buy new combat vessels. Not only 

were the ships outdated World War II vintage, but floating dry docks, support 

vessels, and small harbor tugs were all drawn largely from reserve storage. 

Sea lift did achieve great productivity and effectiveness as the constmction 

and buildup program began to produce results. A project called "Sea Express" 

used high speed contract ships to expedite movement of the more critical bulk 

cargo to Vietnam. This method obtained not only priority response to urgent 

needs but also helped to meet the greatest part of the cargo movement for the 
VIetnam 337 

Port operations in Vietnam 

war. Available data indicated that sea lift delivered 95 percent of the 17,200,000 

tons of cargo ultimately put ashore in Vietnam. 19 

Even with massive tonnages that had to be transported by ships, the 

movement of cargo over sea lines of communications got off to a slow start. On 

15 May 1965, the first ship arrived at the newly formed port of Cam Rahn Bay. 

Since Army stevedores had not arrived in theater, South Vietnamese stevedores 

were responsible for offloading the ship. However, the South Vietnam stevedore union 

refused to send civilians to Cam Rahn Bay, and a Transportation Corps lieutenant with 

a small group of enlisted men stepped forward to unload the ship. From this 

inconspicuous beginning, Cam Rahn Bay became an efficiently run major port 20 

Between mid-1965 and late 1966, most cargo was transported by ship, 

while airlift moved the majority of troops and priority cargo. The dependence on 

sea lift placed a considerable strain on the limited port capacity of South 
338 Spearhead of Logistics 

Vietnam. Most of the sea lift cargo was discharged at the Port of Saigon, which 

was the only port with any significant discharge capacity. Designed and built as 

a commercial port, it had a deep water berthing capacity for ten ships and was 

operated by civilian stevedores and managed by the Port Authority. 

The overloaded port facilities meant that vessels were discharged by 

priority of cargo, resulting in numerous ships anchoring with only parts of the 

cargo discharged. This problem significantly increased the ships' turnaround times and 

caused demurrage costs to skyrocket One ship could cost the United States between 

$3,000 and $7,000 a day moored for several weeks waiting complete discharge.21 

The backup of shipping at Saigon was due in large part to slow discharge 

and clearance of cargo imported by the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) for civilian aid and to stimulate the Vietnamese 

economy under the Commercial Import Program (CIP). Cargo included fertilizer 

and food, particularly rice, and items such as refrigerators, bicycles, and 

manufacturing equipment. Relief cargo was processed slowly, and CIP cargo 

was habitually stored in the port areas by importers until sold, since port tariffs 

did not penalize long storage. Not only was the port area congested, but 

commercial port facilities were used jointly, and civilian and military cargo, 

including POL and ammunition was handled at adjacent berths, and stored side 

by side until cleared; a very unsafe situation. 

Prior to his assignment in DCSLOG, Col. Jack C. Fuson assumed 

command of the 4th Terminal Command in July 1966. He immediately charged 

the commander of the llth Transportation Battalion, Lt. Col. Thomas H. Hoy, to 

recommend a location for a new ammunition port. Lt. Col. Hoy recommended 

the Cat Lai area, near the port which had adequate area, isolation and depth of 

water to moor ships for lighter discharge, but the land was swampy. The 1st 

Logistical Command commander approved the site and arranged for engineer 

support to emplace the immense amounts of fill needed and build lighter 

discharge facilities. As soon as partial operations were possible, the 11th 

Battalion built a tent city in the area and commenced discharging all ammunition 

for the U.S. Army, Air Force and RVNAF in the Saigon and Mekong Delta 

areas. Subsequently, when the I st Logistical Command established a general 

depot at Long Binh to receive, store, and distribute cargo cleared from the port, 

the immense port clearance load on the Fish Market general depot near the port 

was relieved to a considerable extent, facilitating overall clearance of cargo. 

Concurrently, construction progressed on a new port facility up river from the 

commercial port. Newport, as it was named, came on line with ramps for LST 

and lighterage in October 1966, and four deep draft piers, one with RO/RO 
Vietnam 339 

The MV John U.D. Page. 

capability in July 1967. Newport was manned entirely with U.S. troops, and its 

opening left the main port area in Saigon free to handle AID and commercial 

cargo. The 4th Terminal Command worked with the Vietnamese port authorities 

to obtain additional equipment, and to modernize port tariffs which helped to 

reduce long term storage and congestion in the port area. The number of U.S. 

transportation advisors to RVNAF port operators was increased and the 

Vietnamese operations also showed major improvements in efficiency during 

1967- 1968. 

Discharge problems were aggravated by the shortage of shallow-draft 

vessels, both military landing craft, mechanized (LCMs) and landing craft, 

utility (LCUs), which were used to discharge vessels when adequate berthing 

capabilities did not exist.22 
340 Spearhead of Logistics 

One solution to the shortage of lighterage was the assignment of the MV 

John U. D. Page to the theater. Equipped with the latest marine terminal 

technology, this shaiJow-draft vessel played a considerable role in the discharge 

of numerous deep draft vessels. The vessel, a one of a kind in the U.S. Army, 

used a vertical axis propulsion system to allow it to maneuver next to a 

deep-draft vessel to take on cargo (either through lift or RO/RO) in support of a 

logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operation. The vessel had the capability to take 

a deck load of seventy 2 1/2-ton trucks or thirty-seven large trailers. Once 

beached and the cargo discharged, the vessel's hydraulic ram would push the 

ship off the beach?3 

In addition to modernizing equipment and expanding port facilities, Army 

transporters realized that command and control had to improve if they were to 

operate an expanding theater port operation effectively. The 4th Transportation 

Command arrived in South Vietnam on 12 August 1965. Initially assigned to 

the I st Logistical Command, the 4th was the first senior terminal command and 

control unit to arrive in the theater, assuming responsibility for all land and water 

transportation units. 

Preceding the 4th Transportation Command's arrival, the 11th 

Transportation Battalion (Terminal) was the ftrst Army transportation unit to 

begin port operations. Arriving in Saigon on 5 August 1965, the 11 th Battalion 

immediately assumed responsibility of the Saigon Port complex from the Navy. 

On 23 September 1965, the I Oth Transportation Battalion arrived in theater, 

augmenting the 4th Transportation Command, assuming operations at the Cam 

Rahn Bay Water Terminal.24 The 6th Transportation Battalion, commanded by 

Lt. Col. Oren E. DeHaven, soon followed and was given responsibility for port 

clearance at Saigon port complex and onward movement of supplies into the 3d 

Military Region, South Vietnam?5

• 26 

The 4th Transportation Command, with a strength of 7,000 personnel, 

initially had the mission of operating the port complex at Saigon and the water 

terminals at Cam Ran Bay, Nha Be, Qui Nhon, Phan Rang, Nha Trang, and 

Vung Tau. It was also required to provide motor transport support of port and 

beach clearance, as well as tactical operations and the establishment of the Army 

Air Cargo Terminal at Tan Son Nhut Air Base?7 

As the theater matured and additional transportation commands arrived, the 

4th Transportation Command's mission was changed to operating the Saigon 

port complex, a subport at Vung Tau, and various ammunition distribution sites. 

With this change of mission, the 4th Transportation Command's truck units were 

reassigned to other transportation groups in the theater. The continual flow of 
Vietnam 

A Rough-terrain 1 0-ton Forklift loads a CONE X 

during a logistics-over- the-shore operation in Vietnam. 

341 

transportation units into the theater, construction of additional ports, and 

establishment of command and control terminal headquarters helped increase the 

theater's terminal throughput capacity. 

By the end of December 1967, the Army had ten ports. Saigon, Qui Nhon, 

Cam Ran Bay, Vung Ro, Vung Tau, Cat Lai, and Nha Trang were deep-draft 

ports. Dong Tam, Pan Rang, and Can Tho were shallow-draft ports. The 

improvements in port capabilities brought about a reduction in the average time 

a deep-draft ship waited for a berth in Vietnam ports. The average time had 

decreased from 20.4 days during the most critical period of 1965 to the 1970 

average of less than two days?8 

CONTAINERIZATION 

As they did in the Korean War, port operators welcomed the use of 

containerization as an efficient means for moving supplies into the theater. The 

Transporter was a reusable steel container with a capacity of about 9,000 

pounds. It played a major role in moving unit cargo and supplies to Vietnam, 

where it became popularly known as CONEX for its use in the Container 

Express System (CONEX). When the lst Cavalry Division deployed to Vietnam 

in 1965, it used about 2,500 CONEXs, each prominently marked with the big 

yellow division patch. Army aviation units also employed CONEXs for the 
342 Spearhead of Logistics 

prebinned stockage of rivets, cotter pins, and the myriad of small items 

necessary for aviation support. 29 

As the conflict escalated, the demand for CONEXs grew exponentially. 

Extremely handy, the CONEX was used for a variety of purposes from 

command posts to dispensaries and even portable stores. While the popularity 

increased the demand for CONEXs, it did not enhance the transportation network. 

Containers sent to forward areas disappeared and were not back hauled. More 

had to be sent to Vietnam until the theater inventory exceeded 150,000. 

Containers played an important part in a special project to make Cam Rahn 

Bay a major U.S. Anny supply base. With the rapid influx of supplies, major 

construction did not keep pace with the demand for storage. During June 1966, 

Cam Rahn Bay was supporting some 95,000 men and their complement of 

equipment. The Army Materiel Command (AMC) prepared a prepacked 

container depot that contained a 60-day stockage level of repair parts for all units 

supported by the depot at Cam Rahn Bay. When completed, the entire package 

of about 53,000 line items, together with a library of manuals, stock records, 

locator cards, and other documents, was contained in 70 military van semitrailers 

and 437 binned containers?0 

Containerization reached a new plateau during the Vietnam War with 

the introduction of containerships from SeaLand Container Services, 

Incorporated. First used to support the theater during 1967, SeaLand 

containers were the next step in the use of intermodal containers (containers 

that could be shipped by rail, truck, air, or ship). The SeaLand ships were 

specifically designed to carry the SeaLand container, which could be easily 

removed from a flatbed trailer or railcar and placed on the ship. This new 

method of containerization required a special type of crane either on the ship 

or at the port to discharge the vessel. 

SeaLand containership service to Cam Rahn Bay began in November 1967, 

delivering containers for Saigon, Qui Nhon, and Cam Rahn Bay. The deliveries 

were made twice a month by nonself-sustaining vessels to Cam Rahn Bay and 

discharged over a Delong pier, upon which two large gantry cranes were 

installed. Containers destined for Saigon and Qui Nhon were transferred to 

smaller C2 self-sustaining vessels owned and operated by SeaLand, and shipped 

to the appropriate destination. By February 1968, six containerships had 

delivered more than 3,683 containers to the theater.31 

Initially, containers were to be pushed to the port complex, unloaded, and 

returned. As idle containers became available, SeaLand allowed the Army to 

transport containers inland by military truck. This reduced the handling of cargo, 
Vietnam 343 

155mm rounds being discharged at a Forward Supply Base in Vietnam. 

but conversely increased the demand for materials handling equipment (MHE) 

in forward locations. 

This widespread use of commercial containers represented a new era in the 

movement of supplies and allowed the Transportation Corps to analyze port 

activities that affected throughput capacity. These activities included identifying 

and sorting cargo, providing adequate MHE, and determining how far forward it 

was feasible to ship containers. 

Achieving total visibility of containerized cargo was not as simple as was 

planned. Throughout the Vietnam War, the problem of identification and control 

of supplies remained a considerable one. The Honorable Dr. Robert A. Brooks, 

serving as the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installations and Logistics, 

during a considerable portion of the Vietnam War, identified intransit visibility 

as a significant problem to the armed forces. Dr. Brooks stated: "The 
344 Spearhead of Logistics 

Transportation system moved goods so fast and too efficiently for the logistical 

system to keep up with the sophisticated job of translating boxes and 

measurement tons into supply items and balancing item supply against item 

demand in a constantly changing combat environment." 

In 1965, during Defense Secretary McNamara's visit to Vietnam, the 

problem of identification was so serious that an Air Red Ball Express was 

established. The express service used a dedicated aircraft each day to transport 

high-priority repair parts to the theater. By using dedicated inventory supply 

points and aircraft, critical repair parts were being transported into the theater 

much more rapidly, increasing equipment readiness rates. 

Even with the Air Red Ball Express, identification and control of supplies 

arriving in theater remained a problem throughout the war. Dr. Brooks' 

summary of the situation was very concise: "we must have control and positive 

documentation of supply built into the transportation system. By the time the 

box arrives on the ground, it is already too late to start finding out what it is ."32 

AMMUNITION OPERATIONS 

The containerization of ammunition was successfully tested during the 

Vietnam War. From December 1969 to January 1970, test shipments of 

containerized ammunition were conducted to determine the feasibility of 

shipping ammunition from the United States to Vietnam by that mode. A 

self-sustaining containership was used to move 226 containers of ammunition 

from the United States to Cam Rahn Bay. Some containers were unloaded at 

Cam Rahn Bay, while others were transshipped on lighterage to Qui Nhon and 

forward supply points.33 Through the container's storage capability was not 

always 100 percent utilized, the use of containers significantly decreased the 

ports' handling requirements. 

Prior to January 1970, the ability to simultaneously build the theater 

stockage level of ammunition while engaged in combat was severely restricted 

by throughput capacities of the ports. Until mid-1966, the discharge of 

ammunition ships was limited because ammunition was removed from pallets at 

U.S. outloading ports and loaded aboard ship by individual box or projectile. When a 

ship arrived in Vietnam, cargo nets and hooks were used to offload the arnmtmition 

piece by piece, after which ammunition was arranged by lot and repalletized. 

At the request of the commanding general, I st Logistical Command, this 

practice ceased and ammunition was shipped on its original pallets. l11is single 

decision increased the discharge rate of ammunition ships nearly 100 percent, allowing 

discharge offloading times to decrease from seven days per ship to four days?4 
VIetnam 345 

Despite the change to palletized shlpments, the sheer volume of 

ammunjtion moving through the ammunition offload facilities still had ships 

spending time offshore waiting for an empty berth. During December 1967, the 

average wait for a berth was 6.5 to 7 days, a considerable amount of time with 

eleven ammunition shlps calling on South Vietnam during that month.35 

To alleviate the discharge delays and improve the management of 

ammunition, a new management technique called "Inventory in Motion" was 

adopted. It allowed an overall reduction in ammunition stockage on the ground 

from 285,000 short tons to roughly 142,500 short tons. Inventory in Motion also 

allowed supply managers to reduce large stockage levels by having total 

visibility of the stockage on the ground and intransit to the theater.36 

ROIRO VESSELS 

Augmenting the container service, and another first in the shipping 

industry, was the use of Roll On/Roll Off vessels. The RO/RO vessels embodied 

a new concept by which cargo is checked at the point of origin and unloaded 

onto a trailer-type conveyance, transported to a vessel at the port of loading, 

rolled into the vessel, stowed, rolled off at the port of discharge, and dispatched 

to forward destinations?7 

General Frank S. Besson, Jr., is credited as father of containerization and 

RO/RO, for his efforts in introducing the RO/RO concept and pressing for the 

constntction of RO/RO vessels to support defense shipping requirements. 

During his tenure as Commander Army Material Command from 1962 to 1969, 

during the buildup in Vietnam, and later in his assignment as the chairman of the 

Joint Logistics Review Board, General Besson had much to do with the 

successful logistics support of the Vietnam Theater.38 

The RO/RO concept, operated by the Military Sea Transportation Service 

(MSTS), was combined with the U.S. Army Trailer Service Agency to facilitate 

the movement of general cargo from Okinawa to support operations in 

Vietnam?9 The service began in March 1966 and operated between Okinawa; 

the three Vietnam ports, Cam Rahn Bay, Saigon, and Qui Nhon; and Bangkok, 

Thailand. 

The MSTS ships Comet, Transglobe, and Taurus were assigned to RO/RO 

operations and were capable of transporting trailers, containers, and large or small 

military vehicles.40 In addition to the ships, 2,400 trailers were assigned to the RO/RO 

operation. These trailers were meticulously tracked to ensure they were returned to the 

system. When the RO/RO vessels arrived in one of three South Vietnam ports, 

tractors from Transportation Corps units attached to local support commands 
346 Spearhead of Logistics 

RO/RO OPERATIONS SITES 

(Ktefl?1 

Us;N$ TNJRUS 

USNS COMET 

SAIGON 

• 

Map33 
Vietnam 347 

LCM-8 in support of the Vietnam intercoastal operations. 

drove aboard to remove the trailers from the vessels. (see Map 33). At Qui 

Nhon, prime movers were furnished by the 8th Transportation Group; at Cam 

Rahn Bay, by the SOOth Transportation Group; and in Saigon, by the 48th 

Transportation Group. Subordinate elements of the U.S. Army Trailer Service 

Agency located in South Vietnam controlled trailer disposition, making it an 

intertheater trailer transfer system. This eventually led to the development of 

trailer transfer points, which broke long main supply routes (MSRs) into 

manageable segments, provide driver rest stops, and provide a location to 

transfer loads when the responsibility for transporting that load changes. 

LOTS OPERATIONS 

In addition to fixed port operations, the Transportation Corps used several 

logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations to move soldiers and supplies into 
348 Spearhead of Logistics 

A Delong Pier in support of offshore discharge operations in Vietnam. 

the theater. Two of these included the LOTS operation at Wunder Beach and 

Operation Highland in support of the 1st Cavalry Division. 

After a brief tour in the Dominican Republic, the 159th Transportation 

Battalion was deployed to Vietnam to provide terminal service support. The 

battalion provided the Qui Nhon Support Command with the unique capability, to 

conduct LOTS operations. With the immense buildup of tactical forces in the I 

Corps Tactical Zone, another line of communication was required to alleviate the 

theater's overburdened fixed port operations. The members of the 159th 

Transportation Battalion set up and operated a LOTS operation on Wunder 

Beach, along the South China Sea just south of the Demilitarized Zone. Using 

lighter, amphibious, resupply, cargo (LARCV) from the 165th Transportation 

Company, and 60 ton LARC LX from the provisional LARC Company as lighterage, 
VIetnam 349 

the LOTS operation was extremely successful. Operating under combat 

conditions with units like the lOlst Airborne Division, the I st Cavalry Division, 

and the 5th Mechanized Division, the men of the l59th proved the necessity for 

a strong LOTS capability. Cargo was discharged from deep draft vessels by the 

soldiers of the 7Ist and 561st Terminal Service Companies, then moved across 

the beachhead into a depot area where the 403d Terminal Transfer Company and 

the 625th Supply and Service Company offloaded, stored, maintained, and issued all 

five classes of supply .

41

' 

42 At the depot area, trucks from the 57th Transportation 

Battalion moved the cargo inland to provisional supply activities and other logistical 

installations in Co Lin, Dong Ha, Quang Tri City, and Hue. 

During the six-month LOTS operation, the 159th Transportation Battalion 

discharged an average of l ,000 short tons of cargo per day over the shore. The 

operation was terminated as a result of the monsoon season. The I 59th 

Transportation Battalion's LOTS operation made possible the major U.S. summer 

offensives in I Corps that relieved Khe Sanh and swept the A Shau Valley. 

Another early mission accomplished by a LOTS operation took place in 

September 1965. Operation Highland was named for the reception and onward 

movement of the 1st Cavalry Division into the Republic of Vietnam. Because of 

its size and complexity, Operation Highland was a difficult assignment. With no 

docks or wharfs available for a more traditional ship offload, the Transportation 

Corps was tasked to support the offshore discharge of an entire division and 

bring it ashore in only two weeks. 

The 394th Battalion Commander, Lt. Col. Thomas D. Emory, and his 

headquarters detachment arrived from Fort Eustis, Virginia just thirty days 

before the start of the operation. The 394th Battalion headquarters was 

augmented with four transportation companies: the 1098th Medium Boat 

Company, the 155th Terminal Service Company, the 344th Light Amphibian 

Company, and the 597th Medium Truck Company. After an appeal to the 4th 

Transportation Command in Saigon, eight additional transportation companies 

and several smaller detachments were sent to Qui Nhon to further support the 

operation. 

The 394th prepared for the mission by training its personnel and preparing 

its equipment. By 12 September 1965, the unjt had a strength of over 3,000 men 

and equipment that included four barge amphibious resupply cargo vessels 

(BARCs); nineteen LCM's; twenty-two LARC's; four LCUs; a floating crane; 

and a landing ship, dock (LSD) provided by the Navy. Operation Highland, also 

a logistical milestone, would begin that same day. 
350 Spearhead of Logistics 

Ships arrived with cargo loaded for multiple ports. Therefore, cargo had to 

be removed and stowed on the crowded beach. Several ships had insufficient 

lifting equipment, and the 60-ton floating crane was needed in several places at 

the same time. The open bay meant that heavy surf continually washed away the 

loading ramps, sand and laterite formed sand bars offshore further hampering 

operations of the landing craft.

43 

Landing Craft Utility loaded with troops plowed ashore at Blue Beach 

making more than 100 landings on the beach and unloading as many as 3,000 

men a day. Once ashore, the men were immediately trucked to the helipad and 

flown to An Khe. Cargo was unloaded at Red Beach: Stevedores from the 7 lst, 

I 17th, !19th, and 155th Terminal Service Companies operated the ships' 

winches and booms, loadedg the landing craft at sea and unloaded them on the 

beach. Once the cargo was delivered to Red Beach, massive convoys were 

formed. One of these convoys, the "Monsoon Express" transported the lst 

Cavalry Division to its area of operations. 

Operation Highland concluded on 28 September 1965, ending the first 

LOTS operation of its size in which troops were not staged in a debarkation area. 

During the operation, 38 million pounds of cargo and 16,000 soldiers were unloaded 

from ships and moved over the beach and into a camp 70 miles away.

44 

HIGHWAY TRANSPORT OPERATIONS 

The requirement for cargo truck assets to clear the ports and move supplies 

to the user or a depot was immense. Trucks played a major role in providing 

combat support to numerous tactical operations. In addition to providing truck 

transport for the theater, the Transportation Corps, until late 1967, was 

responsible for its own second echelon-level maintenance. Transportation unit 

commanders had to manage the equivalent of 1990's organizational level and 

direct support level maintenance operations on a daily basis. 

When U.S. combat troops arrived in Vietnam, there were few roads and 

those were merely gravel or dirt. Consequently, in mid-1965 most highway 

transport units were located at or near the major port areas. Until the arrival of 

additional transportation commands, all truck units in the theater were 

subordinate to the 4th Transportation Command. As the theater matured and 

support commands were established around the major ports of embarkation, 

transportation units were placed under the control of the support command in 

their geographical area. Initial truck transport was provided by three truck 

companies at Saigon and Cam Rahn Bay and a combination of medium truck 

companies (two cargo and one POL) at Qui Nhon. The three truck companies 
Vietnam 351 

M52 tractor with a M127 trailer. 

included the 120th Light Truck Company (arriving on 12 July 1965) at Saigon 

the 163d Light Tntck Company (6 September 1965), at Cam Rahn Bay; and the 

lOth and 62d Medium Truck Companies (2-8 September 1965), which formed a 

composite company to support operations at Qui Nhon. 

As force levels increased, so did requirements for highway transportation 

units. The requirements were met by the arrival of a Transportation Motor 

Transport Group, headquartered in Saigon and its subordinate military truck 

units, the use of commercial trucking contractors, and the arrival of the 1st 

Transportation Company (GOER)45 (see Map 34). 

The 48th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) was the first truck group 

to arrive in South Vietnam. It was assigned to the U.S. Army Support 

Command, Saigon, in May 1966. Subordinate to the 48th Group were the 6th 

and 7th Transportation Battalions. The 6th Battalion had 396 2 1/2-ton trucks 

and 60 5-ton trucks, providing port clearance and support to the ill and IV 

Corps. The 7th Transportation Battalion, with 305 5-ton trucks and 420 12-ton 

trailers, assisted the 6th Transportation Battalion with the 48th Transportation 

Group's port clearance mission.46 

Upon its arrival, 48th Transportation Group's two battalions were 

augmented by a contracting officer representative (COR) for Equipment Inc., of 
352 Spearhead of Logistics 

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HIGHWAY SYSTEM 

Numerals Indicate Route Numbers 

Map34 
Vietnam 

- ------

Contract trucks operated by the 48th Transportation Group 

in support of port clearance Vietnam. 

353 

SeaLand and Philco Ford. It immediately took command of the five companies 

that were operational in the III Corps area. The 48th's original transportation 

battalions included the 6th and 7th Transportation Battalions, arriving in 

Vietnam on 13 August 1966 and 2 August 1966, respectively. Philco Ford was 

contracted and assigned to the 48th Group to provide ground transport support, 

because of a theater shortage of trucks. Becoming operational on 1 March 1967, 

the 48th Group performed the majority of its missions supporting port clearance 

and interdepot hauls, while Philco Ford was instrumental in providing a bulk of 

the theater's line haul capability. 
354 Spearhead of Logistics 

GOER 8 ton cargo truck. 

The reliability of the contractor was superb, but transportation of cargo in a 

hostile environment required military trucks and drivers. Even though the entire 

theater was considered a combat zone, there were routes that were fairly secure 

and others on which Philco Ford would not operate. The contracting of trucks 

served an immediate need for truck assets but reduced the flexibility of 

transportation planners. 

The 7th Transportation Battalion, the "Orient Express," had five medium 

truck companies, (lOth, 62d, 446th, 534th and 572d) and two trailer transfer 

points (506th and 508th). The 7th Battalion's prime mover was the 5-ton tractor 

with Ml27, 12-ton stake and platform trailer. The 6th Transportation Battalion, 

the "Doers", consisted of six light truck companies, (86th, 87th, 120th, 163d, 

26 lst, and 543d). Since the 6th Battalion was composed of light truck 
Vietnam 355 

companies, its primary workhorse was the 2 1/2-ton truck with 1 1/2-ton trailer 

and the 5-ton truck. With 760 trucks, the 48th Group operated over 1.2 million 

miles per month during fiscal year 1967 supporting tactical operations and 

transporting critical combat supplies. 

One operation the 48th supported was Operation Cedar Falls, in which the 

U.S. Army attacked and destroyed a Viet Cong stronghold known as the Iron 

Triangle. A taskforce consisting of twenty-eight U.S. Army battalions reduced 

the supposedly impregnable position to farmland. The objective was achieved by 

a well-managed concentration of men and material and by unstinting 

transportation support. During the battle, the gun tubes of the supporting 

thirty-four artillery batteries rarely cooled. To support this operation, the 5-ton 

tractors of the 7th Transportation Battalion hauled loads day after day from Long 

Binh to Lai Khe and Dau Tieng. Over 7,000 tons of ammunition were delivered 

by the Orient Express, often directly to the firing sites. 

Because it was operating a great distance from its "TC Hill" base in Long 

Binh, Operation Cedar Falls strained the transport resources of the 7th 

Battalions' five medium truck companies. In January of 1967, the unit's vehicles 

cleared 20,500 tons of cargo from the port of Saigon and distributed 45,000 tons 

of supplies throughout the greater Saigon area. The battalion also hauled 26,000 

tons of supplies by military convoys through hostile country in Ill and IV Corps 

areas in support of combat operations of the I st, 4th, and 25th Infantry 

Divisions, the I 96th and 199th Light Infantry Brigades, the 11th Cavalry 

Regiment, and the 173d Airborne Infantry Brigade.47 

The "Orient Express", commanded by Lt. Col. Otto Meerbott, was the 

workhorse of the 1st Logistical command's land transport service in the Saigon 

area. Averaging a half million miles driven per month with only one accident per 

100,000 miles was a monumental achievement for tractors and trailers operating 

over some of the most difficult and dangerous terrain in the world. This feat was a 

tribute to the training and professionalism of the soldiers in the Transportation Corps. 

The professionalism and valor of the 7th Transportation soldiers were 

demonstrated time and time again. One example was the heroism of Sgt. 

William W. Seay on 25 August 1968. Sergeant Seay, while assigned to the 62d 

Transportation Company (Medium Truck), 7th Transportation Battalion, was 

participating in a resupply mission carrying ammun ition and supplies from Long 

Binh to Tay Ninh. 

During this mission, a Viet Cong battalion ambushed the convoy with 

intense rocket, machine gun, and automatic weapons fire. When his convoy was 

forced to stop, Sergeant Seay, took up a defensive position behind his truck, 
356 Spearhead of Logistics 

which was loaded with high explosives, and successfully repelled a frontal 

assault, killing two enemy soldiers. Spotting an enemy sniper 75 meters to his 

front, Sergeant Seay killed him. When an enemy grenade was thrown under an 

ammunition trailer near his position, he left his protected position, picked up the 

grenade and threw it back at the enemy, killing four more and saving the lives of 

fellow soldiers around him. When another grenade was thrown at his position, 

Sergeant Seay again threw the grenade back at the enemy. 

This time Sergeant Seay was wounded in his wrist and began giving 

encouragement and direction to his comrades. After moving to the relative cover 

of a nearby ditch, Sergeant Seay spotted three enemy soldiers preparing to fire on 

his comrades. Weak from the loss of blood, and with his right hand useless, he stood 

up and ftred his rifle with his left hand, killing the three enemy soldiers and saving 

the lives of his comrades. Later, he was mortally wounded by a sniper's bullet. 

Sergeant Seay was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously 9 April 1970.48 

In October 1966, the 8th Transportation Group joined the 48th Group in 

supporting combat operations in Vietnam. Consisting of the 27th, 54th, and the 

!24th Transportation Truck Battalions, the 8th Group began daily operations out 

of the coastal city of Qui Nhon to support tactical units in the northern II Corps. 

Each month, truckers from the 8th Group delivered over 90,000 tons of 

ammunition, building materials, fuel, and other supplies. Convoys of up to 200 

vehicles made line-haul missions 200 miles long in a single day. 

Route 19 was one of the most difficult and dangerous roads traveled by 

the drivers of the 8th Group. The highway began near Qui Nhon, then wound 

its way westward through two treacherous mountain passes. Only partially 

paved, it had little or no shoulder and was pitted with potholes. Sniping and 

mining incidents were frequent. The enemy made a determined effort to 

destroy the route's numerous bridges, of which there was an average of one 

every three miles.49 

Because of frequent attacks along the narrow stretch of graveled road 

between An Khe and the base of the Mang Giang Pass, the truck drivers named 

that section of Route 19, "Ambush Alley". As the frequency and ferocity of the 

enemy's attacks on the convoys increased, the 8th Transportation Group 

commander, Col. Joe 0. Bellino, realized that something had to be done to 

increase convoy security. Military Police were already fully committed in a wide 

range of missions and were unable to provide further assistance. Combat units 

could offer some security while convoys were traveling through their area of 

operations, but not enough. 
Vietnam 357 

8th Transportation Group's Eve of Destruction Guntruck. 

After an extremely vicious attack on a U.S. convoy traveling through 

Ambush Alley, the 8th Group instituted the hardened convoy concept. They 

used trucks that normally hauled cargo and outfitted them with sandbags on 

the floors, beds, and sides for protection. A crew consisting of a driver, two 

M60 machine gunners, and a noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) 

was assigned to each of the hardened security trucks, commonly known as 

guntrucks. 

In addition to providing security vehicles to convoys, the number of trucks 

in individual convoys was reduced. Columns contained fewer than 100 vehicles, 

with march units (the subdivision of a column) of 10 to 20 trucks each. More 

guntrucks were outfitted until there was an average of one security vehicle for 
358 Spearhead of Logistics 

every 1 0 task vehicles. The price for hardened vehicles was not cheap. A 

reduction of I 0 percent in carrying capability was a high price to pay in terms of 

mission accomplishment. Security vehicles required additional personnel, thus 

reducing the number of available drivers, who were already in short supply. 

After weeks of experimentation, guntrucks became more sophisticated. 

The sandbags absorbed water from the frequent rains, thereby increasing the 

weight and overloading the truck. A young warrant officer from the 8th Group 

found sheets of steel plating in a nearby salvage yard and had them welded to the 

sides and bottoms of the security vehicles. The steel plates were a superb 

replacement for the heavy sandbags and gave the 8th Group their first armorplated guntruck.50 

The typical guntruck was armored on the front, rear, and sides, as well as 

the cab floor and bed, for protection against mines. Pedestal mounts for the M60 

guns were installed in the bed, and sections of the side plate directly in front of 

each gun were cut down several inches to provide a field of fire. A grenadier, 

armed with the M79 grenade launcher, was also added to the crew. 

As ambushes continued, so did the evolution of the gun truck. The 2 1/2-ton 

truck was phased out and replaced with the 5-ton cargo truck. Another change 

came with the addition of tools, extra tires, oil, and water, which allowed the 

guntruck to double as a maintenance vehicle for the convoy. In addition, the 

location of the guntruck was altered so frequently it prevented the Viet Cong 

from predicting its location in the convoy. 

Some guntrucks had double plates of armor to protect against rocketpropelled grenades (RPG), while the addition of .50 caliber machine guns 

increased the truck's firepower. The "quad fifty" innovation included four 

electronically synchronized .50 caliber machine guns mounted in the bed of a 2 

1/2-ton truck. At one time, the 8th Group employed eight of these trucks for 

convoy security. A few guntrucks even mounted 7.62 millimeter mini-guns, 

which could fire several thousand rounds per minute. 

The use of guntrucks became common practice among the truck units in 

Vietnam. Never standardized or officially approved, only their names and 

reputations became legend. Among the most famous was the "Eve of 

Destruction". Other guntrucks, such as the "Bounty Hunter'', "Ho Chi's 

Hearse", and the "VC Undertaker", were familiar sights to the drivers of the 

8th Group in Vietnam. 

The personnel who operated these security vehicles maintained an 

extremely high level of morale and exemplified the esprit d'corps of the truck 

drivers of the Transportation Corps. These soldiers were credited with saving 
Vietnam 359 

lives of many truckers who daily traveled the road network of Vietnam. Their personal 

bravery and fighting spirit were a model worthy of emulation by their successors. 

Guntruck crews' luck and courage were exemplified by Specialist Four 

Dallas Mullins of the 444th Transportation Company and Specialist Four Larry 

A. Dahl of the 359th Transportation Company. When the driver of Mullins' 

guntruck was wounded during a highway ambush, the vehicle became stalled in 

the center of the enemy kill zone and was subjected to intense small-arms fire. Even 

though Mullins was wounded twice in the arm and once in the leg, he came to the 

aid of the wounded driver and maneuvered the truck out of the line of ftre. During 

another ambush on Route 19, Specialist Dahl threw himself on an enemy grenade 

that had been tossed into the back of his guntruck. He saved the lives of the rest of 

the crew with the sacrifice of his own. For their unselfish acts, Muliins was awarded 

the Silver Star Medal and Specialist Dahl, posthumously, the Medal of Honor. 5

1 

In addition to the unusually large number of Bronze Star and Purple Heart 

Medals awarded in the transportation companies, the 8th Transportation Group 

was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. It was also the only transportation 

group in Vietnam to receive the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry .

52 

Known affectionately as "Frustrated Tankers" by the combat units they 

supported, the 8th Group maintained an exceptional reputation for the support of 

front line forces. Constantly aware of the dependency of the tactical forces upon 

the cargo moving forward, the officers and men of the 8th Group continually 

risked death and injury to transport the necessary material and equipment over 

insecure and enemy infested roads. 

One such example was the 27th Transportation Battalion's support of 

Operation Highland. The 27th's support mission of Operation Highland was 

formally referred to as the "Monsoon Express", which was a convoy run daily 

between Qui Nhon and An Khe, headquarters of the 1st Cavalry Division. The 

"Monsoon Express" was established by Capt. Robert Luberacki and I st Sgt. I. L. 

Landrum, who formed the nucleus of a provisional transportation battalion to 

coordinate and control assets during the early stages of the Monsoon Express 

Operation. After the operation grew in size and with the assignment of a 

transportation battalion to this mission, the 27th took control of the daily 

operations of the Monsoon Express. 

The teamwork of the 2d, 48th, 61st, 541st, and 597th Transportation 

Companies under the 27th Transportation Battalion helped to make this 

operation a success. The Monsoon Express made its first haul on 3 September 

1965, operating the largest convoys in Vietnam and the ftrst to run from the sea 

to An Khe. During the support of Operation Highland to receive and emplace the 
360 Spearhead of Logistics 

M54 5 ton truck. 

1st Cavalry Division, more than 3,400 vehicles traveled Route 19 with convoys 

as long as 300 vehicles. 

The skill and determination of the truckers from the 27th Transportation 

Battalion, who participated in the Monsoon Express, demonstrated the 

Transportation Corps' ability to expertly support critical operations. The 

Monsoon Express was the last leg of a complete operation in which a division 

was brought ashore by a LOTS operation, offloaded from lighterage, transloaded 

onto either ground or air transport, and then moved into the theater. It was the 

forerunner of what would later become a routine operation.53 

The 500th Transportation Group, which arrived in October 1966, was the 

last truck group sent to Vietnam. It was assigned to the U.S. Army Support 

Command, Cam Rahn Bay, and had the primary responsibility for motor 

transport operations in the southern portion of II Corps. The group consisted of 

two truck battalions, the 57th and the 36th. Unlike the 8th, the 500th Group's 

main concentration was not line-haul operations, though occasionally they were 

tasked to support tactical operations involving line-haul missions. Instead, the 

group concentrated on port and beach clearance, with the major resupply of the 

Phan Rhan Air Base as the principal objective. 
Vietnam 361 

~-

- M35A2C Drop Side Truck. 

In addition to port clearance, the 57th had a wide array of other missions. 

After deploying to Vietnam in late 1967, the 57th conducted operations in 

Quang Tri for eleven months. By November 1968, the 57th relocated to Chu Lai 

and provided transportation, supply and service, and direct support maintenance for 

the Army's largest active duty division, the 23d America! Infantry Division. 

The 57th was ultimately awarded the Meritorious Unit Citation. 

Over the next 26 months, the battalion performed several different 

missions, which included operating a field laundry, bakery, frozen storage facility, 

helicopter refuel point, POL battalion, POL bulk storage yard, and medium boat 

company. In addition to its diverse support missions, the 57th played an integral part 

in the LOTS mission at Wunder Beach. It also supported Operation Pegasus, which 

provided the relief forces for the Khe Sahn outpost, that had been under siege for 

over two months during the Tet Offensive of 1968. The 57th was truly a 

forerunner of today' s multifunctional battalion, which in the 1990s can be found in a 

forward or rear corps support group. Even with such a wide array of missions, the 57th 

managed to perform all of them. The 500th Transportation Group was inactivated in 
362 Spearhead of Logistics 

October of 1969, and its assets were oombined with the 124th Tenninal 

Command to form the Transportation Command (Provisional) at Cam Rahn Bay. 

Even with three transportation truck groups in theater, the truck 

requirements exceeded capabilities. Transportation planners used units' tables of 

organization and equipment (TOE) capabilities to plan the number of truck units 

required in the theater. These capabilities were based on a 20-hour, two-shift 

workday on fairly good roads. With the unsecured ground lines of communications, 

.truck units were forced to operate almost entirely during daylight hours and divert 

cargo trucks to perform security missions. To further complicate the problem, the 

road network was unimproved, further reducing the truck company's productivity 

level. The combination of these factors could reduce a unit's capability to 25 

percent of those stated in its TOE. To combat the problem and increase the 

theater's truck capabilities, new transport equipment was introduced, while 

contractors were hired to offset some of the theater's transport shortfalls. 

In September 1966, the GOER vehicle arrived in Vietnam with the 

one-of-a-kind 1st Transportation Company. There were nineteen vehicles in 

three configurations: the 8-ton vehicle, 8-ton 2,500 gallon tanker, and the 1 0-ton 

wrecker. The GOER vehicle was a large-tire, rough-terrain, cargo-carrying 

vehicle designed and built by the Caterpillar Tractor Company. The vehicles 

were quite versatile, possessing both a cross-country and swim capability. They 

were used extensively and were especially effective in the monsoon period. The 

GOERs were not good road vehicles, and maintaining them was difficult. 

Without the intermediate warehousing of repair parts in theater, all parts had to 

come directly from the continental United States. Despite these maintenance 

obstacles, the service they performed significantly augmented the Transportation 

Corps' off-road capabilities. 5

4 

The amount of cargo moved by motor transport in Vietnam was enormous. 

During the period December 1967 to December 1968, highway tonnage moved 

by a combination of military and commercial motor transport was approximately 

10 million tons. Tonnage moved by the same means during the period January to 

July 1969 was approximately 5 million tons. As the war progressed, it was 

evident that the conventional military truck was not designed to handle 

palletized and containerized loads efficiently. The fixed sides of the cargo bodies 

on the 2 J/2-ton and 5-ton cargo trucks did not pennit forklifts to reach the full 

length of the cargo compartment. Consequently, the push and pull method used 

in loading and unloading operations, was damaging truck bodies. 5

5 

To facilitate operations, U.S. Army Vietnam obtained eighteen dropside 

cargo trucks from the U.S. Marines Corps to serve as test vehicles. The test 
Vietnam 363 

proved that the dropside trucks were highly desirable and effective cargo 

carriers, and through their use, more cargo could be hauled with easier access to 

the entire length of the body, with little or no damage to the tmck. U.S. Anny 

Vietnam requested that the Department of the Army procure these trucks for use 

in Vietnam. After the war in Vietnam, dropside trucks became the standard for 

Transportation Corps light cargo trucks. 56 

By late 1965, transportation planners realized they would have to further 

augment the theater's military truck transport capability to clear the South 

Vietnamese port congestion. During the period March 1966 to June 1967, the 

U.S. Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam, awarded ten major contracts for 

trucking services to augment the military capability. 

One of the major contractors used in Vietnam was the Vinnel Corporation, 

which also provided stevedore support, beach and port clearance, and vessel 

maintenance support. The highway support offered by Vinnel included the 

operation of thirty Army procured Kenworth trucks and trailers. These vehicles 

proved extremely effective on the sand dunes of Cam Rahn Bay. 

Other major trucking contractors used in the Saigon area were Equipment 

Inc., Philco Ford, and Do Thi Nuong. The Han Jin Company of Korea was used 

for trucking and stevedore services in the Qui Nhon area. The Alaskan Barge 

and Transport Company provided stevedores, trucking, and intracoastal barge 

movement. It operated an extensive tug and barge t1eet between Cam Ranh Bay 

and its outports, which included the entire South Vietnamese coast. 

The use of contractor services for trucking, terminal, and marine purposes 

provided the Vietnam Theater with the extra capability necessary to support a 

rapidly expanding logistical base, but it also limited the theater commander's 

f1exibility. The ability to mass logistical capabilities to support a large combat 

operation could be hindered by either contractual agreements or the reluctance of 

contractors to place their employees and equipment in harm's way, a problem 

faced by commanders since the Revolution. 

The contracting of logistical shortfalls was sometimes the best alternative. 

As stated by Maj. Gen. John E. Murray, "Contracting for the Vietnamese to run 

the gauntlet up the Mekong in barges with ammunition to Phnon Penh was the 

best way to go without risk of American life, and with people who knew the river, 

the terrain and the finesse of getting through the VietCong." Yet, a balance had to be 

achieved so that the theater did not overrely on contracting for transportation. 

This mix of transportation support did not go unnoticed by the Department 

of Defense, which decided that in the future, the commitment of Reserve and 

National Guard transportation units was preferable to contractor support 
364 Spearhead of Logistics 

Though the employment of the Reserves and the Army National Guard was 

largely a political decision, transportation planners were determined that the 

commitment of those forces was necessary in any future large-scale conflict. 

RAIL TRANSPORT OPERATIONS 

In addition to truck transport, rail transpott was making its mark on history, 

both in the Southeast Asia and European theaters. In the United States, the 

construction of railcars had tripled in five years. Nearly 105,000 new or rebuilt 

freight cars were put into service by American railroads and private car lines 

during 1966. This represented the best car building year since 1948. In terms of 

overall carrying capacity, new and rebuilt units represented the highest level 

achieved in forty-three years. 

The new cars were equipped with the latest bearing, wheel, and cushioned 

underframe technology. Not only were the cars of 1966 larger (79-ton average 

capability versus 54 tons for cars replaced), but the newer cars were built to last 

longer and provide a more stable ride. The improvements were reflected in the 

doubling of new car cost over the past decade from $7,800 in 1955 to $15,400 in 1966. 

The development of rail lines and cars in Southeast Asia was also 

experiencing a record boom. With the immense force buildup in Vietnam, every 

effort was being made to repair the Vietnam National Railway and bring it up to 

operating standard. The system was government owned and operated under the 

supervision of the Ministry of Communications and Transportation. The Vietnam 

National Railway System originated at Saigon and served the entire coastal area 

from Phan Theit to Dong Ha. (see Map 35) The overall condition of the rail line and 

rolling stock was poor. The long period of intense interdiction and destruction by 

the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regular units had resulted in a system unable to 

carry significant tonnages. The 830 miles of meter gauge railroad wac; 

well-engineered, with 413 bridges, 27 tunnels, controlling grades of less than 

11/2 percent, steel ties, and vertical elevations well above the waterways. 

57 

In 1969, the rolling stock of the railroad consisted of 59 serviceable 

locomotives and over 500 serviceable freight cars. The major repair facility 

located in Saigon was well-equipped to perform major engine and car repair. 

The railway employed approximately 3,500 personnel. Overall planning for 

railway restoration began in June 1966 as a joint effort by the government of 

Vietnam and U.S. agencies. Actual construction was the responsibility of the 

Vietnam Railway System, except for rail spurs to U.S. military installations, 

which were funded and built by U.S. forces. 
Vietnam 365 

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM RAILWAY SYSTEM 

ns Miles Total Rail System Length 

Map35 
366 Spearhead of Logistics 

Helicopter escort of a truck convoy in Vietnam 

The U.S. Army had considerable interest in this railroad because of the 

potential it offered in the bulk movement of cargo at low rates. The system was 

used to support the MACV construction program, transporting hundreds of 

thousands of tons of rock and gravel to air base and highway sites. In 

1967-1968, 200 U.S .-procured freight cars were delivered to Vietnam. These 

cars were maintained and operated by the railroad for the United States, and the 

freight rate for cargo handled on the cars was about 15 percent lower than 

normal rail rates. Vietnamese personnel operated the engines, did their own 

repair work, and restored sections of track destroyed by the VietCong. To help 

the Vietnamese modernize their fleet, the U.S. Army assigned technical advisors 

to the railroad, but for the most part, the Vietnamese ran the entire operation.

58 

From a miltary transportation viewpoint, the railroad system never lived up to its 

potential for moving American military freight because it was so easily 

interdicted. By 1972, the major operational section from Saigon to the Long 

Binh-Bien Hoa area was used only for Vietnamese movements. 
Vietnam 367 

HELICOPTERS AND INTRA THEATER AIRLIFT 

With the rapid buildup of forces in the Republic of Vietnam, the country's 

entire infrastructure had to be expanded. Initially, construction centered on the 

ability to receive massive amounts of supplies at its few major ports. As the 

expansion process continued, the ability of the Transportation Corps was 

hampered by a crude road network. Not only did the network lack the capability 

for continuous truck operations, it also gave the Viet Cong maximum 

opportunity to harass the U.S. logistical buildup. Those disadvantages led 

military planners to increase their dependence on helicopters as a means for 

rapidly moving both supplies and personnel. 

Helicopters were the trademark of the U.S. military operations in the 

Vietnam War. From 1967 through 1969, over 3,228,000 cargo movements were 

made by heHcopter, freeing the Army from sole dependence on surface 

transportation.59 The helicopter became an indispensable link in the forward area 

of operation because of its ability to operate day or night in any weather with 

minimal preparation of landing sites. 

Helicopters used by the United States in Vietnam fell into four general 

categories: utility (UH), cargo (CH), observation (OH), and assault helicopter 

(AH). The UH-19 Chickasaw was used early in the war but was soon replaced 

by the UH-1 or "Huey." The Huey, officially named the Iroquois, was the 

workhorse of the Vietnam War. The Huey was used to transport troops and supplies 

and evacuate the wounded and it was eventually modified to serve as a gunship. 

One of the first helicopters to serve in Vietnam was the CH-23, deployed 

as early as 1962. Although some CH-54 Skycranes were used in Vietnam, the 

standard cargo helicopter was the CH-47 Chinook. The Chinook had a twinengine system with rotor blades fore and aft It was designed to carry equipment, 

supplies, and troops (up to 33 passengers). By use of external slings, it could 

transport light artillery and other loads. Normally its maximum range was 150 to 

200 miles with a speed of about 110 to 120 knots.60 

Commonly referred to as a flying container, the Chinook played a 

significant role in transporting supplies to remote base camps and relocating 

units rapidly on the battlefield. By employing the sling load technique, it was not 

uncommon for the Chinook to airlift 100 tons of supplies a day within a 10-mile 

radius. Artillery units could support a fire mission, then rapidly relocate to 

provide fire support for another mission within hours. Additionally, when 

combat forces were actively engaged, Chinooks had the cargo capacity to 
368 Spearhead of Logistics 

rapidly provide large quantities of ammunition, allowing U.S. forces to continue 

the fight 

Even with the success enjoyed by helicopters during the Korean War and 

the introduction of new and much more versatile helicopters in Vietnam, military 

planners were not positive that a heavy combat force could be completely 

resupplied by air. The notion of a large combat force totally isolated and 

dependent on helicopters for its existence gave most combat commanders pause. 

To test the concept, Operation Remagen was conducted from 16 March 

through 29 April 1969. For forty-seven days, Task Force Remagen, consisting of 

two battalions from the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division, operated at a distance 

of 40 to 60 kilometers from the division base at the Marine Corps Vandergrift 

Combat Base, relying entirely on helicopters for resupply. When the operation was 

completed, over 1 ,000 short tons of supplies had been delivered to the task force. 

Although it would be a routine operation in later years, Remagen laid the 

cornerstone for resupply by air. Months later, the exercise led to the 

reorganization of the 1st Cavalry and lOlst Airborne as airmobile divisions. 

Thereafter, operations would be based on the ability of the helicopter to move 

troops regardless of terrain and resupply them even in enemy-controlled 

territory. For the latter mission, the Transportation Cargo Helicopter Companies 

proved admirably suited. 

In addition to daily combat service support and resupply missions, the 

larger helicopters, the CH-47 and CH-54, were also used to recover downed 

aircraft and evacuate vehicles and equipment to the rear. Through extensive 

experience, procedures were developed whereby aircraft and other equipment 

and material could be rigged for pick-up by helicopter in a matter of minutes, 

even in enemy territory under fire. By 1974, helicopters had accounted for the 

recovery of over 10,000 aircraft, valued in excess of $2.5 billion.61 

Almost ten years before the arrival of U.S. combat troops in Vietnam, the 

Transportation Corps had played a major role in the Army's Aviation program. 

General Order 76, Department of the Army, dated 11 August 1952, transferred a 

major portion of logistical responsibilities of the aviation program to the Transportation 

Corps. The order gave the Transportation Corps the twofold mission of logistical 

support by helicopter and the responsibility of operating helicopter companies. 

The organizational maintenance of aircraft became the responsibility of the 

using unit with technical supervision from the Transportation Corps. The 

Transportation Corps activated theater Army aviation maintenance (TAAM) 

companies specifically to provide helicopter maintenance support. One company 

was normally assigned per corps for a total of three companies per field Army. 
Vietnam 369 

The company also recovered aircraft from the combat zone and provided 

replacement aircraft to using units on a limited basis. 

The next higher unit in the logistical chain was the Transportation Corps' 

new heavy maintenance and supply company. This unit provided backup support 

to three TAAM companies. There was normally one heavy maintenance and 

supply company per field army or one per 1 ,000 aircraft equivalents. The unit 

provided fourth echelon repair for the helicopter battalions as well as for the 

TAAM companies. The Transportation Corps was capable of furnishing the 

logistical support required for a field army and was also responsible for depotlevel maintenance, formerly the responsibility of the U.S. Air Force.62 

The repair and recovery of helicopters during the Vietnam War was a vital 

mission of the Transportation Corps. With the intense flying hours accumulated 

by these aircraft, maintenance at all echelons was immense. On 11 December 

1961, two helicopter companies arrived in Vietnam. The total number of U.S. 

Army aircraft had grown to 510 by I January 1965, then further increased to a 

peak of 4,228 by September 1969. When the buildup commenced in 1965, the 

U.S. Army Support Command Vietnam had one aircraft maintenance and supply 

battalion, the 765th Transportation Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Robert J. 

Dillard. The mission of the 765th was to provide direct, backup, and general 

support for all Army aircraft in country.63 

As additional aircraft arrived in country, the Commanding General, U.S. 

Army Support Command, Vietnam, became concerned about the ability to 

support the large influx of aircraft. He appointed a committee to develop a plan 

to support the increasing numbers. The committee's recommendations included 

the formulation of a separate headquarters commanding all nondivisional aircraft 

supply and maintenance units assigned to the Aviation Brigade, 1st Logistical 

Command, or a separate command under U.S. Army Vietnam. 

On 17 January 1966, the separate headquarters was activated, the 34th 

General Support Group, providing direct and general support to over 

seventy-nine aviation companies in Vietnam. The 34th consisted of two depot 

companies, five general support companies, eleven direct support companies, 

four aviation electronics companies and the Aviation Material Management 

Center. The 34th also included the lst Transportation Battalion, located aboard 

the U.S. Navy ship, Corpus Christi. The Corpus Christi provided a floating 

aircraft maintenance facility, vital to the Army's mission in Vietnam. The ship 

offered excellent mobility by providing a floating support and general support 

facility that could be relocated at any deep water port to provide aircraft support 

based on the tactical mission. 
370 Spearhead of Logistics 

The 34th General Support Group served throughout the remainder of the 

Vietnam War, providing direct and general aviation maintenance support to the 

entire theater, the only such unit in U.S. Army history. The outstanding 

performance by approximately 5,000 military and over 2,000 civilians of the 

34th led to its award of the Meritorious Unit Commendation for three 

consecutive years in Vietnam (1967 -1970).64 

INTERTHEATER AIRLIFT: VIETNAM AND EUROPE 

While Army Aviation was maturing and having a significant impact on 

intratheater lift, the Transportation Corps was also interfacing with the Air Force 

for the air movement of cargo to the Vietnam Theater. One such endeavor was 

based on the 1965 visit by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, who visited 

Vietnam on 1 December 1965, and detected a critical need for a super-fast 

supply pipeline over and above normal supply channels. On 1 December 1965, 

he directed the formulation of a temporary top supply and transportation priority 

program called the Red Ball Express. The first Red Ball Express air shipment 

was made to Saigon on 7 December 1965, the anniversary of Pearl Harbor. The 

project was hailed as one of the most effective cooperative efforts in the history 

of military logistics, but it was merely a reiteration of programs used in World 

War II and Korea and would also be used again twenty-three years later in 

Operations Dese1t Shield/Desert Storm. 

The new system for speeding critical repair parts to Vietnam was 

reminiscent of, and actually named after, the famous supply marathon that kept 

General GeorgeS. Patton, Jr.'s Third Army racing across France during World 

War II. The 1966 version of the Red Ball Express differed from its 1944 

forerunner in one major respect. The 1965 Red Ball moved cargo by air 

transport. In addition, its pace was accelerated in direct proportion to the 

technological advances made since World War II in rapid telecommunications 

and improved administrative techniques. The system was originally designed to 

provide the requester a 168 hour (seven-day) turnaround time from time of 

requisition to time of delivery. The system had originally been planned to handle 

about one ton of supplies per day, but soon after its inception, the Red Ball was 

moving some 75 tons of cargo per day. This volume, however, overloaded the 

system and decreased its effectiveness. 

The Red Ball reports indicated that almost one million requisitions were 

processed during its 1 ifetime. Of this total, 98 percent, representing some 67,000 

tons, were airlifted to Vietnam. The Red Ball concepts were integrated into 
Vietnam 371 

Army procedures in 1969, and U.S. depots gradually replaced the function of the 

Red Ball Express.65 

By the early to mid 1960s, the Department of Defense realized the need to 

rapidly deploy heavy forces almost anywhere in the world, especially to Europe. 

For years, adequate technology in oceangoing vessels had existed to transport a 

heavy force (Army infantry/armor division) aboard several vessels to any point 

in the world that had deep water port capabilities, but delivering troops to a hot 

spot in which there was no port was very difficult. By the Vietnam era, the 

Transportation Corps had developed over-the-shore capabilities to offset 

inadequate port facilities. However, the United States still lacked the capability 

to fly the organic combat equipment of a U.S. Army infantry division to a 

potential combat area. Rapid deployment for heavy or outsized equipment was 

still measured in days, not hours. The trip from a U.S. East Coast port to Saigon 

was fifteen to eighteen days. 

To alleviate the rapid deployment shortfall, Lockheed Corporation, based 

in Marietta, Georgia, was awarded the contract to build the world's largest 

aircraft, the C-5A Galaxy. The C-5A, with a wing span of 223 feet, a length of 

246 feet, and a height of over 65 feet, was powered by four General Electric 

TF-39 turbofan engines, providing a maximum gross payload capacity of 

265,000 pounds. The C-5A was operational by 1968 and continued to be a major 

asset in U.S. ability to rapidly deploy heavy or outsized military equipment. 

The C-5A, like the other Air Force cargo aircraft (C-7, C-123, C-130, 

C-141, etc.), was also capable of transporting the standard Air Force cargo 

pallet. The pallet, designated by the U.S. Air Force as the 463L, is a lightweight 

metal and balsa wood platform that adapts easily to the floor of Air Force cargo 

aircraft. With the increasing dependence on air lines of communications, the 

463L became a common piece of equipment used to transport cargo aboard Air 

Force aircraft. Cargo mounted on the 463L could be moved directly from the 

aircraft to a waiting truck without additional handling. Without the requirement 

to manually transload each piece, the amount of time a truck had to wait to load 

or offload was decreased significantly. This resulted in an overall increase in the 

efficiency of the Transportation Corps' truck fleet. 

The 463L was also used to satisfy a variety of other, unauthorized needs. 

During the Vietnam conflict, it was used for tent floors, bunker ceilings, outdoor 

storage platforms, as well as siding and roofs for houses. The unauthorized use 

of the 463L pallet resulted in a theater wide pallet shortage, and in late 1968, the 

theater initiated a major pallet recovery plan. By August 1969, over 17,900 
372 Spearhead of Logistics 

pallets had been recovered. The experience demonstrated the need for all 

services to share in the responsibility for pallet accounting and recovery.

66 

THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS IN EUROPE 

In addition to an ever-increasing demand for truck transport in the Vietnam 

theater, the Transportation Corps was also developing the backbone of ground 

transport in the European Theater. The establishment of a single headquarters to 

command the surface transportation assets of United States Army Europe 

(USAREUR), was a large step in forming an integrated transportation service in 

Western Europe. With the activation of the United States Army Transportation 

Command, Europe, (TRANSCOM) on 2 December 1968, the major military 

surface transportation assets in Europe were placed under the single manager 

concept. As a major command under the United States Army Europe, the 

TRANSCOM was charged with operating an integrated transportation service 

for Central Europe in support of Army, Navy, Air Force, and other 

governmental agencies in the theater. 

In order for the TRANSCOM to manage a wide variety of logistical 

missions, it was staffed with five subordinate commands and staff sections that 

were almost completely automated. The TRANSCOM maintained a data 

processing unit (DPU) to handle the command's automation needs, such as 

supply and transportation evaluation procedures (EURSTEP) and the retrograde 

passenger movement system. Automation greatly enhanced the TRANSCOM's 

ability to accomplish its myriad of missions. 

The TRANSCOM's five subordinate commands included the Data 

Processing Unit. the Movement Control Agency, the 37th Transportation Group, 

the U.S. Army Reception Group, and the Army Materiel Command, Europe. By 

far the largest of these subordinate commands was the 37th Transportation 

Group (Motor Transport), which at the time was one of the largest trucking 

concerns in the world. The 37th was responsible for the operation of the highway 

line of communications within Western Europe for the support of U.S. forces. 

Organized as a multinational transportation group, the 37th consisted of 

three U.S. Army Transportation battalions with fifteen medium truck companies, 

two heavy-equipment transport companies, one light truck company, and one 

German Labor Service Group with its three organic truck companies. The 37th 

Group was originally assigned the M52 5-ton tractor for transport operations 

along the German autobahns. Recognizing the shortcomings of the M52 tractor 

as a linehaul asset, steps were taken to outfit the 37th with the International 

Harvester 5-ton truck tractor. By 1969, the 37th was equipped with 1,000 of the 
Vietnam 373 

International Harvester diesel tractors. The group also had forty-eight of the 

M911, 55-ton heavy-equipment transporters, and 60 of the M35 series 2 112-ton 

trucks. The M9ll heavy-equipment transporters were the 37th Group's organic 

capability to haul the M60 main battle tank. 

The 37th Group also had a large inventory of trailers ranging from 2,200 of 

the Ml27Al 12-ton stake and platform trailer; 170 M349 7 112-ton capacity 

refrigerated vans; 120 Ml29, 12-ton cargo vans; and 30 Ml72Al 25-ton 

capacity low bed trailers. These assets were controlled throughout the European 

Theater by the use of trailer transfer points (TIPs). These small but vital 

activities expedited the forward movement of loaded trailers, provided trailer 

maintenance and repair services within their limited capabilities, and ensured empty 

trailers were returned in the system using tractors bobtailed to home station.

67 

The majority of the group's cargo entered Europe through the water 

terminal operated by the 11th Transportation Terminal Group, headquartered at 

Bremerhaven. The largest of the five terminals, Bremerhaven also controlled 

shipments processed through the North German ports of Nordenham, Bremen 

and Hamburg. The Benelux terminal at Rotterdam processed shipments through 

Belgium and Dutch ports at Rotterdam, Antwerp and Zeebrugge, and through 

the United Kingdom terminals in London, Liverpool, Southhampton, and 

Felixstowe. The Lisbon terminal processed cargo for U.S. activities in Portugal 

and the Azores, while the Rhine River Terminal at Mannheim handled river 

cargo moved by barge down from the northern ocean ports. 

A million tons of cargo moved through these terminals annually, 

comprising virtually every item of supply and equipment used by U.S. forces in 

Europe. Food, clothing, weapons, ammunition, vehicles. post exchange items, 

mail, and other support material arrived and depatted daily, forwarded to their 

fmal destination on 37th Transportation Group vehicles or by commercial rail, 

barge or highway carriers. 

The TRANSCOM's day-to-day traffic management and movement control 

responsibilities were accomplished by the Movements Control Agency (MCA). 

With its headquarters collocated with TRANSCOM Headquarters at Camp King, 

Oberrusel, Germany, the TRANSOM's MCA operated on an area basis through 

its three movements regions and eight Transportation Movements Offices 

(TMOs), servicing over 300 customers along a supply pipeline 3,000 miles long. 

The MCA provided TRANSCOM with a highly integrated transportation 

management and control capability. Operational elements of the headquarters 

performed three unique functions: container control, passenger port calls, and 

centralized truck commitment. 
374 Spearhead of Logistics 

One of the five subordinate commands of TRANS COM was actually born out 

of the ftrst Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) operation in 1968.68 The 

U.S. Army Reception Group, Europe (USARAGE) was designed to function as a 

reception, processing, and staging element for troop units at arrival and departure 

airfields in the theater. Acting in close coordination with the MCA and the troop 

unit concerned, USARAGE provided the necessary interface between arriving and 

departing Army and Air Force units involved in the movement.69 

With the withdrawal of France from NATO imminent, the 37th was given 

an additional mission in 1966. Under command of Col. John E. Murray, the 37th 

was given the mission to support the project to evacuate all U.S. anned forces 

and installations from French territory .

70 Given the operational name Fast 

Relocation Out of France, code named FRELOC, the bulk of the transportation 

portion of the operation fell to the 37th Group, despite the fact that many of its 

experienced senior noncommissioned officers had been sent to Vietnam. 

Even with the challenge of training fairly inexperienced personnel, the 37th 

Group met the challenge and moved all U.S. cargo out of France on schedule. 

Amassing over 162 million ton miles from January to December 1966, the 37th 

Transportation Group established a new one year record exceeding the famed 

Red Ball Express record by over 40 million miles.71 The 37th Group's 

significant accomplishments allowed Operation FRELOC to be completed on 31 

March 1967 as scheduled. 

The story of the TRANSCOM in Europe and the establishment of a single 

headquarters to command the surface transportation assets of USAREUR was an 

important one for the evolution of the Transportation Corps. The European 

Theater served as a model for future transportation developments. Not only did 

one commander control all surface transportation in the theater, but an integrated 

movement control system was emplaced to expertly manage those assets. While 

the concept of central management and integrated movements worked well in 

Europe, it was, for the most part, ignored in Vietnam. Recommendations to 

improve the situation were never adopted. 

HOME OF THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS 

The Transportation School in Fort Eustis, Virginia, was instrumental in 

providing the quality transportation personnel and leaders necessary to support 

the Vietnam War. From January 1965 through January 1969, the Transportation 

School trained over 64,900 personnel in transportation-related subjects. 

Additionally, it trained 3,645 officers in the Transportation Officer Basic and 

Advanced courses. The installation also provided the Army with over 2,480 
Vietnam 375 

Transportation Officer Candidate School (OCS) graduates. The first of the 

Transportation OCS classes (Class l-67) graduated in December of 1966, 

marking the first officer candidate class at Fort Eustis since 194 7. 72 

With the need to train the massive number of students at the Transportation 

School during the Vietnam era, other changes were occurring at Fort Eustis. By 

1966, the U.S. Army Transportation Engineering Agency at Fort Eustis, under 

the jurisdiction of the commandant of the Transportation School, was transferred 

to the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service.

73 

At the same time, the installation was reorganized as the U.S. Army 

Transportation Center and Fort Eustis, under Headquarters, Second United 

States Army. Later that year the First Army absorbed the Second Army and the 

Transportation Center and Fort Eustis became subordinate to First Army. In July 

1973, after a major Army reorganization, the Transportation Center and Fort 

Eustis was designated a major subordinate command of Headquarters, United 

States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)?4 

As the Transportation Corps expanded and new equipment replaced old, 

the need to preserve the history of the Corps became apparent. In 1959, Lt. Col. 

Kenneth Klinger, then Chief of the Training Aids Division, began a historical 

collection in a warehouse at Fort Eustis. The collection became a museum as a 

provisional activity during the mid-1960s when Brig. Gen. A.W. Lyon was 

Commandant of the School and General Frank S. Besson was Chief of 

Transportation. 

By 1965, the museum became the official Department of the Army 

Transportation Museum. After the formation of the Army Transportation 

Museum Foundation in 1970, funds were raised through individual and unit 

donations to improve the facility. The Army Transportation Museum building 

opened on 9 July 1976 and was still open in 1994 .. 

Although the Transportation Corps had established itself as an important 

branch within the Army, and had its own museum, the Corps still lacked a 

motto. When General William C. Westmoreland visited Fort Eustis in March 

1969, he remarked during a speech to a class of students that the Transportation 

Corps needed a motto that exemplified its "outstanding spirit, accomplishments, 

and objectives." Over the next several months the Transportation Corps held a 

contest to find the best motto. After some 400 prospective entries were 

evaluated, "Spearhead of Logistics," written by Col. Thomas E. Collins, was 

selected and Maj. Gen. Howard F. Schiltz announced the motto during the 

annual Transportation Corps Anniversary Ball held in July 1970.75 
376 

CHAPTER XII 

Post-Vietnam Era 

"Force projection operations 

require comprehensive logistics support from initial planning at the 

strategic level to effective support for the soldier in the foxhole." 

FM 100-5, 1993 -----------

REBUILDING THE FORCE 

After the Vietnam war, the United States Army faced several challenges, 

many of which stemmed from to the nation's reaction to the war. While the 

nation's defense commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Orgaruzation (NATO) 

alliance remained strong, neo-isolationist sentiments were prevalent both in 

Congressional restrictions that effectively precluded American action to counter 

Soviet proxy moves elsewhere, and in defense spending that extended well into 

the mid-1970s. 

1 A majority of the challenges resulted from the Soviet military 

buildup. This buildup occurred when the need to support the Vietnam War 

caused resource shortfalls in other theaters and slowed U.S. weapon 

development for nearly ten years. 

These developments forced Army leadership to reassess the way the Army 

would fight on the battlefield. A significant result was the activation on 1 July 

1973 of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 

commanded by General William E. DePuy.

2 United States Army Training and 

Doctrine Command was charged with the major Anny missions of individual 

training and combat developments.3 After assuming command, DePuy took an 

intense interest in the reform of U.S. tactics and training and sought to bring the 

U.S. military in line with the tactical lessons learned from the Arab-Israeli War 

of October 1973.4 

Over the next few years, TRADOC aligned Army doctrine with conventional 

combined arms warfare in the Western European Theater, a change from almost ten 

years of infantry-ainnobile warfare in Vietnam. With that, TRADOC evaluated possible 

scenarios and rewrote Field Manual 100-5, Operations. The result was the doctrinal 
Post-VIetnam Era 

development of Active Defense, emphasizing the capabilities of weapons in an 

elastic defense. Over the next two years, the Active Defense doctrine received 

considerable criticism. 

The transition from airmobile operations to the Active Defense doctrine 

changed the way the Transportation Corps supported the force. With the 

emphasis on defense and strategies built around weapons systems, the 

Transportation Corps sought ways to more efficiently support a large deploying 

force. Since the bulk of the force would go by sea, the Transportation Corps first 

reviewed its terminal service mission. 

The doctrinal changes coincided with several developments in the 

transportation industry. They included the expanded use of modern commercial 

ocean terminal facilities and the reduction in the volume of Department of 

Defense (DOD) cargo being moved overseas as a result of the end of the 

Vietnam War. Those changes prompted the Military Traffic Management and 

Tenninal Service (MTMTS) to reconsider its name and expanding mission. 

On 31 July 1974, MTMTS was redesignated Military Traffic Management 

Command (MTMC), reflecting the evolution of transportation in the U.S. 

Anny.5 With the decline of military and DOD-owned ocean terminal facilities, 

the new name better described the evolving traffic management function of the 

command. Military Traffic Management Command retained the command's 

traditional responsibility for control and management of DOD cargo through 

commercial ports and expanded its traffic management responsibilities in the 

continental United States (CONUS). 

In 1976, MTMC's responsibility to control and manage DOD cargo 

through commercial ports was expanded. Starting with the ports in Northern and 

Central Europe, ocean tenninal operations in Europe, Okinawa, Panama, and 

Korea were transferred to MTMC. In addition, responsibility for sealift cargo 

and passenger booking was transfen·ed from MTMC to the Military Sealift 

Command (MSC). 

By 1977, further significant changes in doctrine occurred. Probably the 

most influential proponent of these changes was General Donn A. Starry, who 

assumed command of TRADOC on 1 July 1977. General Starry brought to 

TRADOC his experience as a corps commander in Europe as well as the 

command experience of the U.S. Army Annor Center and Fort Knox, Kentucky. 

General Starry's familiarity with TRADOC doctrinal changes gave him 

the background needed to continue development of the Army's war-fighting 

doctrine. The vision of General Starry and his staff he lped prepare 
378 Spearhead of Logistics 

the U.S. Army to move away from Active Defense toward the AirLand Battle 

concept. 

Different "war-fighting" strategies were developed to prepare the U.S. 

Army for the future battlefield. From this development came the concept of an 

"Integrated Battlefield." On 25 March 1981, General Starry formally published 

an operational concept for the Airland Battle and a major revision of FM I 00-5 

followed.6 

A second major change in the U.S. Army during the 1979-1980 time frame 

resulted from an evolution in national policy, requiring the Army to be ready to 

deploy rapidly to any area outside of NATO. While the commitment to NATO 

remained the cornerstone of 1980s foreign policy, General E. C. Meyer7 stressed 

"the most demanding challenge confronting the U.S. Military in the decade of 

the 80s is to develop and demonstrate the capabili ty to successfully meet threats 

to vital U.S. interests outside of Europe, without compromising the decisive 

theater in Central Europe".8 

The Army's role in rapid deployment, marked by advanced weaponry and 

a new war-fighting doctrine, was the impetus for the development of the Army 

of Excellence (AOE). This initiative, together with the preceding Anny 86 

studies, brought about significant revisions in the Army's heavy divisions and 

created the light division and the contingency corps. 

These changes had a far-reaching impact on the equipment and doctrine of 

the Transportation Corps. The concept of the battlefield became more fluid and 

the operational tempo increased significantly. The tenets of Airland Battle -

initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization, - foreshadowed the need for 

transportation units to support the fight day and night, by providing critical 

resupply and mobility to both combat and supporting units. 

With the development of light forces and a strong rapid deployment 

capability, the Transportation Corps took the lead in the development of strategic 

deployment support. Those developments, coupled with the Army's new light 

forces, provided the nation with a formidable strategic mobility capability. 

URGENT FURY 

The new doctrine was tested in October 1983, when the Transportation 

Corps was called on to support the deployment of U.S. forces to the Caribbean 

island nation of Grenada. There they conducted fixed port, logistics-over-theshore operations (LOTS), and terminal transfer operations under the code name 

Urgent Fury. 
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380 Spearhead of Logistics 

Grenada is about twice the size of Washington D.C., and is part of a chain 

of small islands east of Puerto Rico (Map 36). Grenada's geographical location 

was of strategic importance. If its ports were controlled by an enemy force, the 

island could provide a staging point to influence a significant portion of the 

United States imported oil supplies and world shipping, as well as revolutionary 

politics in the region. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Grenada developed 

an economic and military relationship with several Communist countries, 

including the Soviet Union, North Korea, and Cuba. 

After Grenada became an independent nation in 1974, the country 

established a parliament with two major political parties vying for control. In 

March 1979, a bloodless coup, led by Maurice Bishop, seized control of 

Grenada. Bishop became the country's prime minister and established formal 

diplomatic relations with Cuba in April 1979. 

Inunediately, Cuba began providing Grenada with large quantities of 

weapons and ammunition, including 3,400 rifles, 200 machine guns, 1 00 

shoulder-fired rocket launchers, twelve 82-mm. mortars, and twelve 12.7-mm. 

antiaircraft guns.

9 That same year, Cuba provided money and workers to build a 

new international airport, capable of landing large military aircraft 

In 1980, the Soviet Union provided the small nation with arms and 

ammunition. In return, Grenada granted landing rights to Moscow's long-range 

reconnaissance jets and negotiated with the Soviet Union to fund of a new port 

on the east coast, which could be used for recreational calls by Soviet vessels. 

The Soviet Union also secretly provided Grenada ftfty annored personnel 

carriers. 

Over the next two years, Moscow strengthened ties with Grenada by 

opening an embassy and furnishing aid to build a new radio transmitter. In April 

1983, Grenada also began talks with North Korea, which secretly promised over 

$12 million in military aid. North Korea then publicly announced a five year 

development program that included the construction of a new 15,000 seat 

stadium and fruit processing plant. 

By September 1983, however, the ruling party of Grenada was in turmoil 

and the internal power struggles within the Central Committee of the 

Communist- supported New Jewel Movement were reflected by chaos in the 

streets. In October, Prime Minister Bishop was placed under house arrest by a 

sixteen-member military council. Soon, crowds began to demonstrate for his 

release, and on 19 October 1983, the demonstrators forced their way into Mount 

Royal where Bishop was being held and freed him. Later in the day, Bishop was 

rearrested, and he and seven of his most loyal supporters were executed in the 
Post-Vietnam Era 381 

courtyard of Fort Rupert. The country was placed under a 24-hour 

shoot-on-sight curfew. 

Four days later, the United States received a fonnal request from the five 

members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States to assist in the joint 

effort to restore order and democracy on the island. Ironically, as the situation 

deteriorated, President Reagan was notified of the tragic bombing of the U.S. 

Marine compound in Beirut. By the next day, President Reagan was briefed on the 

crisis by Secretary of State George Schultz, Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger, 

'and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John W. Vessey, Jr. 

President Reagan agreed to provide the assistance requested. By the dawn 

of 25 October 1983, the largest U.S. military operation since Vietnam had 

begun. Urgent Fury was conducted primarily to protect the lives of 1,000 U.S. 

citizens on the island, many of them medical school students. Additional 

objectives were to restore democracy and remove the Communist threat 

generated by the New Jewel Movement. 

Urgent Fury commenced with a combined force of U.S. Marines and Army 

Rangers simultaneously assaulting multiple objectives. Four hundred Marines 

conducted a helicopter assault on the Pearls Airport along the northeast coast. 

Thirty minutes later, about 350 Rangers conducted a forced insertion along the 

uncompleted International Airport at Point Salinas. 10 (Map 37) 

The Rangers then pushed toward the capital of St. George's and the True 

Blue medical school campus. By midday, the campus was secure. About 500 

prisoners had been taken. Behind the initial assaults, 750 paratroopers from the 

82d Airborne Division arrived and assisted the Rangers with the evacuation of 

the medical school. As soon as the American Forces achieved their initial goals, 

300 troops from the Eastern Caribbean force were moved in.11 

After the island was secure, the U.S. military began the task of restoring 

order. At the same time they had to secure the mass of Soviet and Cuban arms 

located in caches around the island. Some caches contained enough anns and 

ammunition to outfit two brigades, or about 8,000 men. Most were modern 

combat rifles, stored in boxes labeled "granola" and "rice."12 

The military success of the Grenada operation was achieved by 

synchronization between combat, combat service, and combat service support 

units. The day before the initial assault, Transportation Corps units assigned to 

the XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, were busy moving the entire complement 

of combat supplies from the division ready brigade (ORB) to Green Ramp, Pope 

Air Force Base. 13 In addition, 1st Corps Support Command's (COSCOM) 

transportation units were also moving airdrop platforms from the heavy drop 
382 

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Map37 
Post-Vietnam Era 383 

rigging site and paratroopers from the personnel holding areas to support the 

assault. At Green Ramp, Pope Air Force Base, Transportation Corps personnel 

performed the departure airfield control group (DACG) function to ensure the 

rapid loading of U.S. Army combat personnel and equipment on Air Force 

aircraft. 14 Their attention to detail and expertise ensured the timetable was met. 

Once the airfields in Grenada were secured and cargo planes started 

landing, transportation units managed the influx of personnel and supplies. The 

ftrst transportation units to arrive in Grenada were deployed from Fort Bragg 

and assigned to the XVIII Airborne Corps, 1st COSCOM. They included the 

403d Terminal Transfer Company (Cargo Transfer) to support the reception of 

supplies and soldiers of the 7th Transportation Battalion and the 507th 

Transportation Group. 

Some 193 soldiers of the 7th Transportation Group's 11th and 24th 

Transportation Battalions arrived in theater from Fort Eustis and Fort Story, 

Virginia, setting up port operations at the St. George's Port in Grenada. The 

soldiers participated in LOTS operations and loaded and off-loaded equipment 

and supplies from a fixed terminal operation. The first ship off-loaded was the 

roll on/roll off (RO/RO) vessel, the American Eagle. Over 800 pieces of 

equipment were discharged to support combat operations. As soon as the ship 

was off-loaded, 7th Group soldiers backloaded over 378 short tons of captured 

arms and ammunition. 15 

Transportation Corps units received over 750 flights into the island, 

processing some 18,000 personnel and receiving and transporting 8,800 tons of 

cargo. The Transportation Corps ended the major portion of Urgent Fury by 

loading out the majority of the U.S equipment and the remainder of enemy 

equipment aboard the break-bulk ship Dolly Turman in early November 1983.16 

The U.S. Army had begun the era of rapid deployment with significant 

success. The years of developing new doctrine, improving U.S. weaponry, and 

developing a rapid deployment Army had paid dividends. From a strategic 

standpoint, Grenada was a major success, spelling an end to Soviet-Cuban power 

moves in the Western Hemisphere. However, subsequent analysis showed 

improvements were still needed in joint operations, interservice communications, 

and in the deployment and logistical support of forward deployed forces. 

The remainder of the early 1980s was marked by larger defense budgets 

and more respect for the military on Capitol Hill. Yet the true measure of the 

effectiveness of the past decade's doctrinal work and the defense spending of the 

1980s had not yet been realized. Several more years of combined arms training, 

the further evolution of Airland Battle, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act17 

were 
384 Spearhead of Logistics 

required before the full potential of the 1980's Army would be realized. Its 

capabilities, partially tested in 1989, would later be demonstrated in the deserts 

of Southwest Asia early in the next decade. 

ARMY AVIATION MISSIONS REALIZED 

The decade of the 1980s witnessed changes in the Transportation Corps' 

basic structure. The evolution of Army aviation meant an ever increasing role for 

it in combined arms warfare. For that reason, the Army could no longer afford to 

develop aviation along separate branch lines, and on 12 April 1983, the Aviation 

Branch was activated, officially releasing the Transportation Corps from its 

aviation mission. 

Supervision of the Aviation Logistics School at Fort Eustis was eventually 

transferred, in October 1988, from the Chief of Transportation to the Chief of the 

Army Aviation Branch, Fort Rucker, Alabama. The transfer gave the Aviation 

Branch complete control of aviation maintenance, as well as operation of 

aircraft. 18 

THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS REGIMENT 

On 1 July 1986, the Transportation Corps celebrated its 44th anniversary, 

and 26 July marked the day the Transportation Corps regiment was officially 

activated, integrating it into the Army's Regimental System. The event was 

celebrated at Fort Eustis, Virginia, with an elaborate ceremony. The senior 

active duty Transportation officer, Lt. Gen. John D. Bruen, served as the 

reviewing officer. The ceremony was attended by thousands of distinguished 

transporters. The 7th Transportation Group, 8th Transportation Brigade, 140th 

Transportation Battalion (National Guard), and the United States Continental 

Army Band participated in the ceremony. The day provided an opportunity for 

the Transportation Corps to reflect on its past, but more importantly, the 

activation served as an important step in the continued development of the 

Corps. 19 

The activation of the regiment also marked the redesignation of several 

Transportation Corps training units, in order to provide a definitive link with 

past transportation successes. The Training Brigade was redesignated the 8th 

Transportation Brigade, honoring the 8th Transportation Group in Vietnam. The 

8th Group had enjoyed an outstanding reputation in Vietnam for its support of 

numerous tactical operations as well as the development of the guntruck. The 2d 

Battalion, Training Brigade, was redesignated the 7lst Transportation Battalion, 
Post-Vietnam Era 385 

July 1986 Transportation Corps Regiment activation ceremony. 

another unit that performed superbly during the Vietnam war. The 2d Battalion, 

5th Training Brigade, Fort Dix, New Jersey, was the 36th Transportation 

Battalion, and the 5th Battalion, 4th Training Brigade, Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri, was redesignated the 58th Transportation Battalion?0 

The new regimental crest was inscribed with "Spearhead of Logistics," the 

motto of the Corps, to serve as a symbol of a soldier's aff.tliation with the Corps. 

Officers who successfully completed the Transportation Officer's Basic Course 

were inducted into the regiment. Warrant officers, upon completion of their 
386 Spearhead of Logistics 

Wan·ant Officer Candidate Course, and enlisted soldiers, upon completion of 

Advanced Individual Training, were also inducted. 

The first Regimental Commander, Maj. Gen. Fred E. Elam, named General 

Frank S. Besson, Jr., as the first honorary Colonel of the Regiment, 

posthumously, in honor of his lifelong service to the Transportation Corps. 

Following the Regimental activation, a second ceremony took place at the U.S. 

Army Transportation Museum. A plaque was unveiled naming the museum 

building Besson Hall, in memory of General Besson, who had served as 

commander of the U.S. Army Transportation Center and School and as Chief of 

Transportation. The Regiment was established to foster a spirit of pride, unity, 

camaraderie, cohesion, and cooperation among the Corps' soldiers, as well as to 

provide an organization encouraging professional development and growth. 

A UNIFIED TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

In 1987, Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger, in conjunction with a 

number of military planners, was looking for a means to strengthen the United 

States' ability to project power to reinforce forward deployed elements. The 

concept was to form a unified transportation command to efficiently manage the 

nation's transportation assets. This concept was not a new one. The idea first 

surfaced in 1949 prior to the Korean War, but the Department of Defense did not 

seriously consider the concept until 1978 when it realized the need for a unified 

command. The catalyst for this change of attitude formed because of serious 

problems that arose during a worldwide deployment exercise. The exercise, 

called Nifty Nugget, simulated a f~st-breaking conventional attack in Europe. 

To fix the problems revealed, the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) was 

established in 1979. The JDA coordinated and monitored the development of 

the Joint Deployment System (IDS) a computerized management information 

system designed to plan, execute, and monitor force deployments under 

peacetime or crisis conditions. 

The JDA made significant improvements in the military's force projection 

capability, but it lacked the authority to direct corrective action to the 

unified/specified commands. In order to establish a headquarters that would 

improve efficiency and provide positive control of all U.S. Transportation assets, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) created the United States Transportation 

Command (USTRANSCOM). 

United States Transportation Conunand was given responsibility for air, 

land, and sea transportation for the entire Department of Defense. To perform 

this mission, the USTRANSCOM was functionally rather than geographically 
Post-Vietnam Era 387 

oriented, with three components: Military Airlift Command, Military Sealift 

Command, and the Military Traffic Management Command?1 All of the common 

user strategic transportation forces of these three commands were under the 

operational command of the commander in chief of USTRANSCOM.22 

In the years following the Second World War, the United States developed 

the world's leading transportation system. In the Korean War, the war in 

Southeast Asia, and in several international crises beginning with the Berlin 

Airlift in 1948, the U.S. military moved many tons of supplies and large 

numbers of troops to areas around the world. Those experiences demonstrated 

time and time again the need for a responsive transportation system. The 

USTRANSCOM gave the Department of Defense an effective means of 

balancing the different modes of transportation to ensure long-range 

c01mnitments were met. The USTRANSCOM was capable of effeciently 

tasking, on a global basis, the mobility requirements necessary to support any 

crisis to which it was assigned?3 

MODERNIZATION OF THE 

TRANSPORTATION CORPS' WATERCRAFT 

The 1980s also marked a significant period for the modernization of the 

Army's watercraft capability. Probably the two most significant modernization 

events were the introduction of air-cushioned vehicles in 1985, and the 

commissioning of logistics support vessels (LSYs) in early 1988. 

The lighter, air-cushioned vehicle (LACY) was not new technology. Used 

commercially in Europe for more than a decade to rapidly transport personnel 

and supplies across waterways, the LACY had significant military potential. 

The prospect of unloading cargo from ships anchored offshore, rapidly 

transporting it across water and then to a staging area on the beach, convinced 

military planners that an air cushioned vehicle would be a definite asset in 

logistics-over-the-shore or (LOTS) operations. 

After a long procurement process, the Transportation Corps received its 

first LACYs on 20 August 1982. They were assigned to the 33Ist Transportation 

Company, Fort Story. The 8th Transportation Company was activated in 1984 

to form the second LACY-30 unit, bringing the Army's total of LACY-30s to 

twenty-six. In the years that followed, the LACY -30s participated in numerous 

exercises such as Bold Eagle, Gallant Eagle, JLOTS I, II, and III. The LACY-30 

deployed only one time outside the continental United States, to an annual 

training mission in Honduras. 
388 Spearhead of Logistics 

The most important addition to the Army's watercraft fleet were the LSVs, 

built by the Moss Point Marine Shipyard in early 1987 and launched on 30 June 

of that same year. The LSV was 275 feet long and used a flat-bottom 

technology similar to the commercial container ships. The vessel was designed 

to discharge rolling stock from very shallow waters, working from a fixed 

terminal or from a larger ship anchored offshore. 

On 14 January 1988, the Transportation Corps commissioned the first 

LSV, the General Frank S. Besson (LSV-1), the first time any vessel was 

commissioned at Third Port, Fort Eustis, Virginia?4 The Besson, had an 

assigned crew of twenty-nine soldiers. The $10 million, 4,200-ton ship provided 

the Corps with a capability to carry up to twenty tanks or nearly three infantry . 25 

compames. 

Guest speaker Lt. Gen. Jimmy D. Ross, Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Logistics, stated that the new vessel would have a significant impact on the 

Army "The Besson is the first of four logistics vessels scheduled to join the 

Anny's fleet. .. The logistic vessel allows the Army to be self-sustaining and 

permits the rapid reposition and redeployment of cargo." 

The new LSVs to serve the Army and the Department of Defense, would 

replace the slower less versatile vessels of the past. The LSVs opened a new era 

in Army strategic sealift capability, enabling the Transportation Corps to provide 

a more flexible response to support contingency operations of the future. 

OPERATION JUST CAUSE 

Almost six years after Operation Urgent Fury, President George Bush 

faced a political situation in some respects similar to the one that plagued 

President Reagan in 1983. Not only were relations between the United States 

and Panama declining, but the domestic situation in Panama was deteriorating 

and U.S. citizens were being threatened. 

Panama was historically a sensitive area for U.S. political and military 

interests because of the Panama Canal. Panama, slightly smaller in size than 

South Carolina, had a population of about 2.3 million people in 1987, (see Map 

36). Between 1914, when the canal was completed, and 1925, the United States 

intervened militarily on two occasions to settle election disputes and stabilize the 

country. Over the next forty years, the United States and Panama continued to 

negotiate treaties to govern and operate the strategically important canal. 

Through these sometimes hostile negotiations and anti-U.S. sentiments, the 

United States remained firm on its right to intervene militarily to ensure the 
Post-Vietnam Era 389 

continuous operation of the canal, which was a major asset to military and 

commercial transportation. 

By the mid-1970s, technological change had reduced the importance of the 

canal. Its economic and strategic importance declined because of the 

development of a two-ocean U.S. Navy, nuclear submarines, carriers, long-range 

bombers, and missiles. Further, the increased capability of ground transportation 

within the U.S., and the construction of cargo ships and tankers that were too 

large to transit the canal further reduced its commercial importance?6 In 

September 1977, President Carter and Panama's President General Omar 

Torrijos signed the Panama Canal Treaties in Washington, D.C., and in October 

1979, U.S. control ended.27 

In August 1983, however, conditions in Panama took a new and different 

tum. After General Torrijos was killed in a plane crash, General Manuel 

Noriega assumed command of the Panamanian National Guard and became the 

de facto ruler. Over the next several years, General Noriega was linked to drug 

operations and the laundering of money for drug cartels. 

With continuous drug allegations surfacing against Noriega and the 

pubuc's increasing concern about drugs on American streets, the United States 

cut off all military aid in 1987. The domestic and political situation in Panama 

continued to decay, and in June 1987, the United States called for Noriega and 

his supporters to step down, pending the outcome of several drug and conspiracy 

charges. Noriega responded by ordering his paramilitary force to attack the U.S. 

Embassy and the U.S. Information Service faciUties, with resulted in 

considerable damage to both. 

Over the next two years, the relationship between Noriega and the United 

States became steadily worse. Increasing evidence pointed to Noriega's deep 

involvement in protecting drug shipments, laundering money, and providing a 

safe haven to the Medillien Cartel drug traffickers. Overwhelming evidence Jed 

to two federal indictments and the freezing of all Panamanian assets in the 

United States. Simultaneously, the United States began to increase the number of 

military personnel assigned to Panama. 

Violence and comtption by the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) 

continued to be the law of the land. Results of a democratic election were 

nullified by the Panamanian dictator. At the same time, the United States 

continued to tighten economic sanctions against Panama. By mid-1989, joint 

exercises, rehearsing parts of the later Operation Just Cause, commenced. The 

plan called for the U.S. Contingency Corps and special operations forces to 
390 Spearhead of Logistics 

conduct a night assault on primary objectives, to be closely followed by multiple 

attacks on key Panamanian military facilities. 

On 1 October 1989, General Maxwell R. Thurman took command of the 

United States Southern Command in Panama. His main mission was to update 

the Just Cause plan and prepare Southern Command for a possible U.S. invasion 

of Panama. The crisis escalated when Noriega named himself the "Maximum 

Leader" in December and declared his nation to be "at war" with the United 

States. President Bush then ordered the execution of Operation Just Cause. 

Military commanders immediately made pre-attack notifications and the U.S. 

military prepared for the contingency operation. On H-Hour, 12:45 A.M., 20 

December 1989, Joint Task Force South hit 27 targets simultaneously. 

The assault forces were organized in six task forces, each concentrating on 

its respective targets. Over the next two days, these task forces swept their 

targets and secured their assigned areas. By 24 December 1989, the large-scale 

operational military actions were over. By 3 January 1990, Just Cause had 

fulfilled the president's four national objectives: protect U.S. citizens, support 

the democratic initiatives in Panama, ensure the safe operation of the Panama 

Canal, and apprehend General Noriega and bring him to justice?8 

The ability of the U.S. military to conduct lightning-quick assaults by 

forces stationed in Panama and the rapid deployment of troops from the United 

States could not have been accomplished without the professional support of 

U.S. Southern Command as well as a trained Transportation Corps. Pre-attack 

transportation support of deploying forces was much like that provided during 

Urgent Fury. Transportation Corps units were busy supporting the deployment 

of both the 82d Airborne Division and its follow-on forces from Fort Bragg and 

the 7th Infantry Division (Light) from Fort Ord, California. 

At Fort Bragg, predeployment activity was conducted under the cover of a 

planned emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE). Transportation 

assets on post shuttled equipment from the 82d Division's Ready Brigade (DRB) 

to the heavy drop rigging site for rigging of the brigade's forced insertion 

package. While paratroopers were being shuttled to designated sites to go 

through prejump operations, the 126th Transportation Company, 7th 

Transportation Battalion, was loading and transporting the DRB's ammunition 

from the post's ammunition supply point. 

The departure airfield control group (DACG) operations at Green Ramp, 

Pope Air Force Base, mirrored those of Urgent Fury in 1983.29 Load 

preparations and fmal loading operations moved at an accelerated pace, and the 

only factor affecting the on-time departure of the deploying aircraft was the 
Post-Vietnam Era 391 

weather. Unlike Urgent Fury, Mother Nature put a hold on the 82d's deploying 

aircraft. Temperatures dropped to the point that ice was forming on the wings of 

loaded aircraft waiting for takeoff. Five-minute departure intervals quickly 

exhausted the Air Force's capability to de-ice the planes. Several aircraft were 

delayed on the tarmac until they were adequately de-iced. Despite the weather 

delays, there were only slight interruptions to the overall execution of the plan?0 

Weather, in the form of dense fog, also took its toll on the timely 

deployment of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) from Fort Ord. Since Fort Ord 

had no adjoining air base, the transportation units established convoys to move 

the contingency package to Travis Air Force Base. The fog slowed the 

deployment timetable, but had no significant effect on the overall execution of 

Just Cause. 

In the objective area, Special Forces and U.S. Rangers made parachute 

assaults on several key terrain points, and behind them came reinforcements 

from the 82d Airborne Division's DRB 1. Made up mainly of combat arms 

soldiers, the paratroopers' missions were to reinforce the Rangers at 

Torrijosffocumen Airport, seize control of designated terrain, and engage the 

Panamanian Defense Forces Battalion 2000 at Fort Cimarron. Because of the 

complexity of the mission and the importance the division placed on the arrival 

of follow-on forces, the 82d's commander decided to provide the 403d 

Transportation Company with seats on one of the initial aircraft. 

Several 403d paratroopers made the combat jump and then served as the 

nucleus of the arrival/departure airfield control group (AlDACO) at 

Torrijosffocumen Airport. The decision to have skilled transporters on the 

ground ensured a smoother arrival of follow-on personnel and equipment. It 

was a crowning success for the first combat jump by transporters. 

The heavy fighting was corning to a close by 24 December, but the 

transporters' jobs were just beginning. Follow-on personnel and supplies 

continued to arrive in the theater to assume the expanded logistical missions, 

supporting a theater that had doubled in size and a growing number of 

Panamanians requiring food and shelter.31 

To support the expanded logistical mission, Transportation Corps units 

established a temporary transportation network to ensure that the theater could 

rapidly be resupplied. The first concern was the operation of the Army's primary 

aerial port of debarkation (APOD), at Howard Air Force Base, Panama. (see 

Map 38) 

The airfield was operated jointly by the Air Force and Army. The Air 

Force's major mission was the control and support of flights into and out of the 
392 

Caribbean S8a 

PANAMA 

Pacific Oc6an 

0 10 

=- MILES 

Map38 

Spearhead of Logistics 

airfield. The Army, by doctrine, had responsibility for the Anny cargo only after 

the Military Airlift Command aircraft were unloaded. However, because of the 

large number of flights into the relatively small airfield, Transportation Corps 

personnel unloaded aircraft and directed personnel and equipment to their 

correct destinations. 

32 

Airfield operations were critical to the success of the logistical support 

mission. With one main port of entry, the ability to efficiently process personnel 

and supplies was critical to the entire theater. The bulk of airfield operations 

was conducted by soldiers deployed from the XVTII Corps' Movement Control 

Center (MCC) and 7th Transportation Battalion. In addition, one team of 

soldiers working at the airfield prior to the operation came from the 7th 

Transportation Group, Fort EustisY Fewer than thirty Transportation Corps 

soldiers operated the airfield on a 24-hour basis, an operation normally requiring 

a complete cargo transfer company with three 50-person cargo transfer platoons. 
Post-Vietnam Era 393 

Personnel cleared from the airfield were staged by final destination and 

moved there by commercial buses. While supplies were staged by unit. they 

were shipped by ground or air. Shipments in a 20 to 40 mile radius were 

transported by a composite truck platoon attached to the lst COSCOM.34 

Supplies to remote sites or those that were part of "push packages" were shuttled 

to the sling-load yard where a team of soldiers prepared the load. Helicopters, 

controlled by the XVIll Airborne Corps MCC, then carried the external load to 

final destination. The sling-load facility, next to the airfield on Howard Air 

Force Base, helped alleviate the theater shortage of military trucks. Units also 

relied heavily on commercial buses to transport personnel, even in combat. In 

one instance, an assault force from the 193d Infantry Brigade had to be moved 

by bus for an attack on the Panamanian National Department of Investigations. 

The commercial transportation was actually an advantage because the buses did 

not draw attention to the assault force.35 

Once personnel and supplies were in the theater, the Transportation Corps 

used its capabilities to support the operation. The I 097th Medium Boat 

Company primarily performed combat and combat service support missions on 

the Atlantic side of Panama and in the Canal. By 3 1 December 1989, the 

company had transported 2,442 passengers, 848 prisoners, and 738 short tons of 

cargo. In addition, LCM-8 crews performed combat patrols and furnished 

suppressive fire for landing troops. 

As the theater matured, a shuttle service, using dedicated C-130s, moved 

personnel and supplies from Howard Air Force Base to remote airfields 

throughout the country. The shuttle service was extremely effective in 

responding to resupply needs of remote sites during the final mopping-up phase 

of the operation. 

On 3 January 1990, General Noriega, in full military uniform, walked out 

of the Vatican Embassy and surrendered to U.S. Maj. Gen. Marc Cisneros. He 

was taken to Howard Air Force Base where he was arrested on drug charges and 

subsequently transported by a C-130 back to the United States. 

The 1st COSCOM established a Redeployment Control Center (RCC) to 

expedite the redeployment operations. The RCC centralized the preparation of 

personnel and cargo for redeployment, including U.S. Customs and Department 

of Agriculture inspections, load planning, marking of center of balance and 

vehicle weights, hazardous cargo certification, and vehicle staging and call 

forward? 6 

The RCC was a complete success. The Transportation Corps ensured that all load 

times were met and that the redeployment operations were completed within the 
394 Spearhead of Logistics 

short timeline. By 13 February 1990, only 13,504 personnel remained in 

country, 593 fewer than before the operation. After the departure of the XVID 

Airborne Corps in mid-February 1990, transportation units remaining in country, 

together with Military Traffic Management Command processed military 

equipment and the numerous caches of arms and ammunition through the 

MTMC terminal in Panama. This completed the redeployment of U.S. forces 

and equipment. 

Just Cause was a textbook example of rapid deployment proving the value 

of combined arms doctrine, demonstrating the combined capabilities of airborne, 

light infantry, and special operations forces. The successful operation was the 

culmination of years of force development and training. 
395 

CHAPTER XIII 

Desert Shield 

''Victory is the beautiful, bright colored flower. Transport 

is the stem without which it could never have blossomed." 

---------Sir Winston Spencer Churchill ---------

ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT 

In 1989, the Soviet alliance system that had been established at the outset 

of the Cold War began to unravel. The catalyst for this change was the death of 

communism as a political and social force in the Soviet Union and its Eastern 

European Satellites. Lacking the cohesiveness provided by the Moscow-directed 

bureaucracy, the Soviet Union by 1991, had broken down into independent 

states. Soviet influence in the Middle East was significantly reduced. With the 

end of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in the region, a dangerous power vacuum 

developed. 

With the rising military power of Iraq, the inherent political stability of the 

region was a concern for many Middle Eastern leaders. Fearful of invasion, 

several nations in the Persian Gulf area formed the Gulf Cooperation Council of 

the Arab States (GCC). They included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the 

United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Oman. Formed primarily as a 

defensive pact, the GCC was designed to demonstrate that the Persian Gulf 

states would defend themselves. Their concerns were well-justified. Oil, because 

it is the lifeblood of the modern industrial nations made the world, centrally 

dependent on its Persian Gulf source. 

Iraq's designs on its small, oil-rich neighbor, Kuwait, had roots in past 

border disputes and recent oil disagreements. Borders in the region had been 

arbitrarily imposed by the British during the 1930s. A major point of continual 

conflict was the large Rumaila oil field, which straddled the Iraq-Kuwait 

border. 1 (see Map 39) 

Iraq claimed Kuwait was pumping more oil from the Rumaila field than it 

was entitled to. It also claimed that Kuwait ignored Organization of Petroleum 

Exp01ting Countries (OPEC) production ceilings in the late 1980s by selling 
396 Spearhead of Logistics 

more than its quota on the open market. Iraq claimed millions of dollars in lost 

revenues. Since Iraq and Kuwait were once part of the old Ottoman Province of 

Basra, administered from Baghdad, Iraq argued that Kuwait should rightfully 

have been made part of Iraq in 1932 when it achieved independence. 

Another point of Iraqi contention was the fact that Kuwait administered the 

islands of Bubiyan and Al Warba, which controlled the entrance to the Iraqi port 

of Umm Qasr on the Persian Gulf. Iraqi-bound oil tankers navigate narrow 

waters around those islands. 

In 1990, Iraq told Kuwait to cede its portion of the Rumaila oil field to 

Iraq, demanded $2.5 billion in compensation for the oil removed from it 

"illegally". along with another $14 billion in lost Iraqi revenues due alleged to 

quota violations. Iraq also insisted on cancellation of $12 billion in Iraqi loans 

made to them by Kuwait during the long Iran-Iraq War. When Kuwait refused, 

Iraq began massing troops in July 1990 as a means of forcing Kuwait to the 

negotiation table. 2 

The author of Iraq's intimidation of Kuwait was Saddam Hussein. Born 

into a peasant family in 1937, Saddam Hussein joined the Ba'th political party at 

age 20 and quickly rose to a position of political importance. Remaining active 

in the Ba'th party for almost two decades, Hussein still never filled his lifelong 

desire to don an officer's uniform. Finally in 1976, the number two man in the 

Iraqi leadership, President Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr, bestowed the rank of general 

on him. By July 1979, Hussein had assumed power from President Bakr, 

maintaining his appointed general's rank. With no military training, Hussein led 

the Iraqi invasion against Kuwait which ended in Iraq's expulsion in one of the 

most humiliating mHitary defeats in modern history. 

A major reason for Iraq's behavior was that it was cash-poor as a result of 

the long war with Iran and running up a postwar debt of over $80 billion. So as 

not to cause the Iraqi public discontent from a costly war, most of this money 

had been borrowed from abroad, including Kuwait. Given the unsatisfactory end 

of the Iran-Iraq War and postwar obligations to repay the debts, while 

simultaneously reconstructing Iraq, Saddam faced a considerable monetary 

strain. With the end of the Iran-Iraq War, production of Gulf oil increased, 

driving down the worldwide price. This compounded Iraq's cash-poor position, 

leading to Saddam' s policy of threatening neighboring countries. 3 

Despite its immense debt, Iraq had emerged from the Iran-Iraq War with its 

military power intact. In tactical terms, the Iraq appeared to have a huge edge 

over every regional force except Israel. 
Desert Shield 

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397 

Kuwait appeared to be only the start of a campaign by Saddam Hussein 

that would permit Iraq to control a major portion of the world's oil supply. 

Hussein's control might also extend to Mecca, Islam's holiest place. In addition 

to financial and military power, control of Mecca would also give the Iraqi 

leader an ideological lever over the world's 400 million Muslims. 
398 Spearhead of Logistics 

U.S. ARMY INVOLVEMENT IN THE GULF 

The U.S. Army acquired an active interest in the Persian Gulf in 1979 after 

the Shah of Iran fell and a series of unsettling events threatened the world's oil 

supply. The Ayatollah Khomeini assumed power in Iran and threatened to 

punish the "Great Satan" for its role in supporting the Shah. Since the Soviets 

were seeking access to the Indian Ocean through Iranian warm water ports, 

concerns for the stability of the region increased with the Soviet invasion of 

Afghanistan that very year. 

This series of events led to the establishment of the Carter Doctrine, which 

declared any invasion in the region would be considered a threat to U.S. 

interests. To counter any such threat, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force 

was formed and headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The new 

command had responsibility for the formulation of plans to respond to any 

possible invasion in the Persian Gulf region and if necessary protect the flow of 

the world's oil. By 1983, the joint task force had evolved into one of six United 

States multi-service commands, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).4 

Central Command continued its mission to prepare militarily for any 

possible conflict threatening the Gulf oil supply. In 1980, Saddam Hussein had 

launched a surprise attack against neighboring Iran at the same time the Soviet 

military was preoccupied with the war in Afghanistan. Those protracted 

conflicts created a temporary stalemate in the region, reducing the immediate 

possibility of further expansion by either the Soviets or Iran. 

The Iran-Iraq war eventually led to some U.S. involvement in the Persian 

Gulf to ensure the flow of world oil from that region. Late in the war, Iranian 

attacks against Gulf shipping grew more intense, particularly against Kuwaiti 

tankers in response to the Emirate's support of Baghdad. The United States 

responded with Operation Earnest Will, the retlagging and limited escort of 

Kuwait's tankers in the Persian Gulf, supported by U.S. Army helicopters. Two 

years later, the United States would again come to Kuwait's assistance, only this 

time against Saddam Hussein.5 

INTERNAL LOOK 90 

In November 1988, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf became 

Commander-in-Chief, CENTCOM. With a keen understanding of changing 

world events, General Schwarzkopf directed CENTCOM to take OPLAN 

1002-90, the plan addressing a possible Soviet invasion of Iran and revise it to 
Desert Shield 399 

reflect an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In December, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff granted CENTCOM authorization to shift the geographic focus 

of the biennial Joint Chiefs' war game from Iran to Saudi Arabia. 

Central Command rapidly developed Internal Look 90, an exercise that 

simulated deployment to blunt an Iraqi invasion. The exercise ran concurrently 

from 23-28 July 1990, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Hurlbert Field, 

Florida, and provided a sobering view of that very possible scenario. The most 

important tactical lesson gleaned from the exercise was that, no matter how 

much Air Force and attack helicopter reinforcement the U.S. forces had, they 

would have a tough time confronting Iraqi armor formations. From a logistical 

standpoint, two lessons were reinforced. First, any intervening force in the 

region would depend on host-nation support for survival. Secondly, and one that 

had plagued the United States since World War I, was a serious shortage of 

heavy sealift capability.6 This shortage posed the greatest single element of risk 

to the United States' ability to stop an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. The heavy 

forces, required to destroy the Iraqi armor had to come over a sea line of 

communications from 7,000 to nearly 12,000 miles long.7 

THE IRAQI INVASION 

Ironically, the scenario envisioned by General Schwarzkopf unfolded less 

than a week later in the deserts of Kuwait. At 0200, 2 August 1990, the 

Hammurabi Armored and the Tawakalna Mechanized Divisions raced across the 

Kuwaiti border and quickly overran a Kuwaiti brigade deployed along the 

frontier. Kuwait, equipped only with armored cars, had little hope to check an 

Iraqi invasion of nearly 1 ,000 T -72 tanks. Iraq followed the initial mass assault 

with a rapid ground advance that swept south, capturing most Kuwaiti forces in 

garrison and reaching Kuwait City by 0500 the same morning. 8 

DESERT SHIEW BEGINS 

As soon as the invasion of Kuwait occurred, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff General Colin Powell assembled the team that would lead the U.S. 

intervention to stop Iraq. By 0800 EDT, 2 August 1990, 14 hours after the 

invasion, General Powell and General Schwarzkopf met with the President and 

members of the National Security Council to discuss military options and 

analyze intelligence concerning the Iraqi capabilities.9 

Over the next 48 hours, General Schwarzkopf and Lt. Gen. Thomas W. 

Kelly worked out details to deploy a defensive force to Saudi Arabia to act as a 
400 Spearhead of Logistics 

Meeting in the Pentagon Gold Room - the usual meeting place of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, August 15, 1990, to discuss the U.S. military response to the Iraqi invasion of 

Kuwait, are: left to right: National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft; 

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, U.S. Army, Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central 

Command; Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney; The President of the United States, 

George Bush; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell, and 

Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Dave E. Jeremiah. 

shield to stop an invasion of Saudi Arabia. On 4 August 1990, with a significant 

amount of Iraqi armor staged on his country's border, King Fahd of Saudi 

Arabia asked President Bush for a briefing on the situation from American 

officials. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, along with Secretary of 

Defense Dick Cheney, General Schwarzkopf, and Lt. Gen. John J. Yeosock, 

commander of CENTCOM's Third Army, flew to Saudi Arabia to brief King 

Fahd on the military situation. Their mission was to show the Saudi King the 

seriousness of the situation and offer U.S. assistance. Following the briefing, 

King Fahd issued an invitation for American troops to assist in the defense of 

Saudi Arabia, and on 8 August 1990, the President announced the commitment 

of American forces. 10 

Midmorning the following day, seventy-six soldiers and staff officers of 

the XVTII Airborne Corps assault command post arrived in Saudi Arabia to 

begin laying the framework for the arrival of lead elements of the corps. Led by 
Desert Shield 401 

Brig. Gen. Edison Scholes, XVIII Corps Chief of Staff, the assault command 

post began the dual mission of coordinating host-nation support for follow-on 

corps forces and preparing the corps' defensive plan of Saudi Arabia. 

At Fort Bragg, operations to begin deploying soldiers to the deserts of 

Saudi Arabia had already begun. The pace at Fort Bragg accelerated as it had 

numerous times before for both training exercises and real world conflicts. 

Emergency Operation Centers' (EOCs) telephone lines were busy coordinating 

deployment support of the rapid deployment forces, a routine ingrained at Fort 

Bragg. 

As the alert phone calls went out across post the evening of 6 August 1990, 

the 82d Airborne Division's three ready brigades stood at different levels of 

readiness. The division's 2d Brigade, commanded by Col. Ronald Rokosz, was 

on division ready brigade one (DRB 1) status and stood ready for a no-notice 

deployment in 18 hours. The units of the brigade on DRB2 status were on field 

training exercises, and the brigade on DRB3 status had soldiers on leave and in 

school status. U.S. Forces Command quickly ordered the return of the division to 

Fort Bragg. 

The order to deploy the 82d Airborne Division meant that the 

Transportation Corps was about to face a major challenge. Transportation units 

on post began moving personnel and supplies through their predeployment 

stages. Fort Bragg's air outload facility, Green Ramp, rapidly became the hub of 

activity as the DRB I package arrived. At the first deployment briefing that 

night, no one realized they were about to participate in the largest thirty day 

deployment of forces in U.S. Army history. 11 

With Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard staged on the Saudi border, 

time was critical and the U.S. transportation industry responded. The first surge 

began with the need to put combat power on the ground in Saudi Arabia as 

quickly as possible. The decision to deploy the 82d's DRBl meant that U.S. 

Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) had to provide the 82d with at least 

250 C-141 equivalents, though TRANSCOM could only guarantee 90. 

Within hours, C-141 and C-5 aircraft from U.S. bases all over the world 

were landing at Pope Air Force Base. Because the Air Force was unable to 

predict either the types of aircraft arriving or the times of their arrival, lst Corps 

Support Command (COSCOM) Transportation Corps soldiers were constantly 

reconfiguring loads based on the type of aircraft and needs to fit tactical 

exigencies in Saudi Arabia, making for an extremely demanding mission. As 

aircraft landed, little time was wasted. Aircraft loads were often reconfigured 

and loaded within minutes of the aircraft touching down. 
402 Spearhead of Logistics 

The first paratroopers from the 82d Airborne Division departed at 1000, 

8 August, just 36 hours after the initial alert notice. Despite the overwhelming 

demand for combat troops to defend Saudi Arabia, the initial force also included 

a contingent of Transportation Corps personnel from the 403d Transportation 

Company at Fort Bragg to manage the military operations at the airfield at 

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The move illustrated the importance of deploying 

throughputters prior to the forces they were throughputting. 

As the initial deployment proceeded, the pace quickened. The initial level 

of combat power needed in the theater immediately, required an unprecedented 

surge of aircraft. For the first time in history, Stage One of the Civil Reserve Air 

Fleet (CRAF) Program, was activated, proving, however, to be a double-edged 

sword. 12 

The CRAF program increased air assets at USTRANSCOM's disposal to 

support the deployment, but it also compounded an already confused situation at 

Pope Air Force Base. Not only were military aircraft landing with no notice, but 

civilian cargo and passenger aircraft were arriving unexpectedly. Military loads, 

planned for Air Force aircraft, could not be reconfigured to load aboard CRAF 

aircraft using computer technology, because software was not available. With 

the introduction of the civilian aircraft fleet, important data such as center of 

balance and cargo specifications had to be hand-generated. Changes required 

time delays to ensure cargo was loaded according to civilian aircraft load 

constraints. 

The lack of airflow data was the most significant factor affecting the 

outload of forces from Fort Bragg. 13 Even without significant amounts of data, 

the ground liaison officer, Maj. Drew Young, and Green Ramp transportation 

personnel assigned to the 7th Transportation Battalion, compensated for the 

uncertainty by reallocating aircraft and reconfiguring loads at a moment's notice. 

With the requirement to deploy the 82d, aircraft were arriving from airbases 

around the world. Pope Air Force Base Jacked the modern Global Decision 

Support System (GDSS) that would accommodate that situation. Without that 

technology, real-time aircraft information was not available and aircraft arrival 

information during the initial deployment phase was fragmented. 

From the standpoint of strategic deployment, the most significant airflow 

management problem was a changing Time-Phased Force Deployment Data List 

(TPFDDL), coupled with a data base that could not respond to the changes 

rapidly. The chaos started as soon as Military Airlift Command was tasked to 

begin the deployment of combat forces to the Persian Gulf. With the volatile 

situation on the Saudi border, in which the tactical situation was changing by the 
Desert Shield 403 

moment, the theater commander wanted combat forces on the ground 

immediately. Priorities for airlift changed as many as six times a day, forcing 

aircraft to be diverted, ground crews to be moved, and deploying units left 

partially deployed in theater. 

As the priority of airlift changed, based on the theater commander's 

changes to the TPFDDL, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning and 

Execution System (JOPES) could not cope with the constant adjustments in 

airlift priorities. 14 The JOPES can only work smoothly when the data base is fed 

from the TPFDDL with accurate airlift requirements in terms of who needs to be 

moved, how much needs to be moved, what are the points of origin and 

destination of the airlift, and of course, which unit has first priority. 

The inability of JOPES to support such a rapidly changing scenario 

resulted in a situation where the Military Airlift Command could not tell the 

supported commander the size and composition of the forces that had been 

moved. As priorities stabilized, JOPES began to support the deployment more 

efficiently, but aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) still had difficulty managing 

aircraft allocations to deploying units. 15 The difficulty resulted from the Army's 

inexperience with managing and reporting units by unit line number (ULN). 16 

Neither the deploying units from Fort Bragg and other installations nor their 

immediate headquarters knew their ULN nor were they familiar with the JOPES 

system. 

The inadequate data base had a significant effect on the APOEs as well. 

Without JOPES visibility over the airflow, more aircraft than the system could 

handle were scheduled for loading, and aircraft became backlogged at numerous 

deployment facilities. During one 12-hour period on the third day of the air 

outload, eight C-5s arrived unannounced at Pope Air Force Base, causing the 

entire support staff to scramble for equipment loads and personnel to load onto 

the awaiting aircraft. The XVTII Airborne Corps was under considerable 

pressure to deploy enough combat power to effectively defend Saudi Arabia, and 

the tempo of air deployment soon reached a fevered pitch. The transportation 

community, responsible for the operation of the outload facility, responded. By 

day 17, all three brigades of the 82d Airborne were deployed. In addition, a 

significant XVIII Corps slice of more than 12,000 personnel and 13,000 tons of 

equipment were also deployed to support Operation Desert Shield. Over 650 

C-141 equivalents departed Pope Air Force Base in 31 days. The utilization rate 

exceeded 95 percent, a significant usage rate for cargo aircraft and unheard of in 

. . d 1 17 pnor arr ep oyments. 
404 Spearhead of Logistics 

With unprecedented levels of air activity, the Commander-in-Chief Central 

Command (CINCCENT) and the Commander-in-Chief of USTRANSCOM 

differed significantly over the projected latest arrival dates (LADs) for the 82d 

Airborne Division. 18 At the start of Desert Shield, CINCCENT expected the 

82d to arrive in theater in the following sequence: DRB 1 by day 2, DRB2 by day 

5, and DRB3 by day 15. However, TRANSCOM set the LAD based on 

available aircraft and the physical capability of the departure airfield (Pope 

AFB). Its expectations were the same as the actual force closures with DRB 1 by 

day 6, DRB2 by day 12, and DRB3 by day 17. 

The difference sparked a heated debate between planners at the different 

headquarters, which resulted in FORSCOM directing the key players of the Fort 

Bragg deployment to form a joint committee to study the deployment in detail. 

The results of the study were to be briefed to both the USTRANSCOM and the 

FORSCOM commanders. Undoubtedly the most far-reaching lesson learned 

from the study was that the CINCCENT LAD expectations were physically 

impossible, given the size and capability of the existing deployment facility at 

Fort Bragg and Pope AFB. 19 That revelation sparked a major renovation project 

to expand and improve the physical plant associated with the outload of forces 

from Fort Bragg. 

The study also reinforced a major transportation lesson learned. The real 

capability of an existing transportation network had to be understood and taken 

into consideration when establishing national objectives for a military operation. 

In Desert Shield, the theater commander was staking the success or failure of a 

military operation on latest arrival dates of an airborne division that were 

impossible to achieve. 

Despite overloaded facilities, a mix of military and civilian aircraft and 

faulty LADs, the 82d Airborne Division and its supporting XVIII Corps "slice" 

deployed to Saudi Arabia rapidly enough to deter the Iraqis from invading. 

While the XVIII Corps was deploying its initial combat force, the Southwest 

Asia theater was developing by the hour. 

Simultaneous with the 82d Airborne Division's deployment order, the 24th 

Infantry Division, at Fort Stewart, Georgia, was ordered to move one armored 

brigade to the port of Savannah in 18 hours. Considering the available 

intelligence, that Saddam Hussein's forces were poised on the Iraq-Saudi 

border, General Gary Luck, the XVIII Airborne Corps commander, ordered the 

division to be prepared to fight immediately on arrival in theater. With the 

deployment of an airborne division as a rapid means to bolster Saudi Arabia's 

defense against an Iraqi invasion, the immediate deployment of a heavy force 
Desert Shield 405 

was critical. If Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia with its armored divisions, the 82d 

would need the 24th Infantry Division's armor capability to hold critical 

airheads and ports needed by follow-on forces. 

The challenge was to get the 24th loaded and deployed in theater before 

Saddam Hussein's forces could seize the critical theater aerial and seaports of 

debarkation in Dhahran and the seaport in al-Jubayl. By the time the first aircraft 

left Pope AFB, the vehicles of the 2d Brigade, 24th Infantry Division, were at 

the port, fully stocked with fuel and ammunition and ready to load aboard a 

Navy fast sealift ship?0 

The short notice of the alert and rapid deployment of the 24th Infantry to 

Savannah, its seaport of embarkation, put the Military Traffic Management 

Command (M'IMC) in a dilemma. With a heavy brigade closing on Savannah 

in less than a day, Col. John Riley, Jr., Commander, 1304th Major Port 

Command, had to find a way to support the port operations until MTMC could 

activate a reserve terminal transportation unit. Colonel Riley turned to the 

civilian staff from his own office and enlisted thirty volunteers to begin the 

complex task. Immediately, the volunteers began marshaling the 2d Brigade of 

the 24th Infantry Division and its 7,678 pieces of equipment for deployment to 

the Southwest Asia. The outload of an entire mechanized infantry division had 

not been executed in the recent past, and Col. Riley and his team faced a 

herculean task. 

On 16 August, after seven days of 20-hour work shifts and 

around-the-clock operations, the first of the fast sealift ships departed Savannah 

with the essential elements of the 24th Infantry Division and arrived in Saudi 

Arabia on 27 August. After sixteen days of ship-loading operations, Col. Riley 

and his team watched the last ten ships leave the port of Savannah. In that 

period, they marshaled, marked, and loaded 1,214,897 square feet of military 

cargo. When asked to comment on the final sixteenth day of port operations, 

Col. Riley responded candidly: "Divisions deploy around the world on paper all 

the time, but no one in recent history has actually pulled together and 

combat-loaded all those tanks and wheeled vehicles and all that cargo. Until you 

actually do it, you don't have a real idea of what it takes." 21 

As in every previous war, there was a lack of heavy lift capability. The 

24th Infantry Division had the same difficulty with ships at Savannah that the 

82d Airborne Division had with aircraft. Because of the difficulty of activating 

reserve shipping assets, USTRANSCOM could not predict which vessel would 

be available to transport the 24th Division at a given time. Ready reserve 

vessels were sent to Savannah as they were activated. 
406 Spearhead of Logistics 

Because it was the first time in recent history that a heavy division had to 

be combat-loaded, the Navy was uncomfortable with the idea of loading vehicles 

that were fueled and armed. After some discussion, the Department of Defense 

waived the peacetime prohibition on combat-loading. Recognizing the Navy's 

concerns for ship safety, the 24th assigned IOO additional chemical, medical, fire 

support, and communications specialists aboard each ship. Additionally, the 

24th's air defenders placed Vulcan antiaircraft guns and Stinger missiles on the 

decks of every ship to protect against Iraqi aerial attack during unloading 

operations. 

The shortage of sealift ships forced the Navy to dispatch the fast sealift 

ship Antares to move the 24th Division, even though required maintenance had 

not been completed. The division's aviation brigade and support command were 

nonetheless loaded aboard the Antares. But while transiting the Atlantic, the 

Antares broke down and drifted for two days in the Atlantic before it was towed 

to the Azores Islands and then to Rota, Spain. A team of soldiers deployed from 

Saudi Arabia to Rota and transloaded the cargo from the Antares to the Altair. 

The 24th Infantry Division finally received its logistical support and aviation 

packages on 23 September. Because of the breakdown of the Antares, the 24th 

Division spent nearly three weeks deployed in the deserts of Saudi Arabia 

without the combat power of its aviation assets or the benefits of an organic 

maintenance and supply system. That occurred during a time when an invasion 

of Saudi Arabia by a tank heavy Iraqi force seemed imminent. 

Over the next month, the 24th Division's tail caught up with its teeth. 

Deploying 1,600 armored and 3,500 wheeled vehicles and 90 helicopters on ten 

ships, the 24th Division's soldiers flew on fifty-seven military and chartered 

civilian aircraft. Thirty-one days after the initial deployment, two heavy brigades 

were in field assembly areas en route to their defensive sectors?2 The division's 

third brigade, the I 97th Infantry Brigade (Mech) from Fort Benning, Georgia, 

completed its move on I4 September. 

In early August I 990, the 10 I st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the third 

division of the XVIll Airborne Corps, was alerted to provide the combat power 

necessary to sustain the corps' forces in the ad-Dammam al-Jubayl area. 

Providing the necessary attack helicopters to form a lethal covering force, 

General Luck ordered Maj. Gen. J. H. Binford Peay lll, commander of the 1 Olst, 

to deploy both his aviation brigade and the combat power of the 2d Brigade by 

Air Force aircraft. During the next thirteen days, in one of the largest global 

combat deployments by air, the IOlst filled 56 C-14ls and 49 C-5s to move 117 

helicopters, 487 vehicles, I 23 equipment pallets, and 2,742 troops to the 
Desert Shield 407 

theater?3 Orchestrating the smooth outload operations of this deployment were 

the transporters of the 372d Transportation Company (Cargo Transfer), Fort 

Campbell, Kentucky. Their expertise allowed the IOlst to deploy a combat 

brigade to the Southwest Asia theater in enough time to reinforce the coalition's 

Desert Shield. 

The IOlst Division's other two brigades went by sea from Jacksonville, 

Florida. As in other Desert Shield deployments, the operation was plagued by 

the poor state of repair of vessels from the ready-reserve fleet. The ten ships 

dedicated to the IOlst required an average of twenty-three days to make the 

voyage from Jacksonville to ad-Dammam. Ironically, some of these ships were 

the same ones that had taken the IOlst to Vietnam more than twenty-five years 

before. The poor repair and lack of adequate sealift played a significant factor in 

the speed of the lOlst Division's deployment. Had Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia, 

the absence of the lOlst would have been keenly felt. 

THE SOUTHWEST ASIA THEATER 

Operation Desert Shield forces were predominantly centered in Saudi 

Arabia, a vast, mostly empty country roughly the size of the United States east 

of the Mississippi. Saudi Arabia is approximately 1 ,300 miles north to south and 

1,400 miles east to west. The country is mostly desert except for a thinly 

populated band along the coastal plain. The population lives in small, widely 

separated towns and villages in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf oil fields and at 

sources of water along ancient pilgrimage routes. 

Populated areas were connected by a system of two-lane asphalt roads. 

Secondary roads tied the major cities and towns to minor towns and villages 

with a series of dirt tracks between the smaller villages. Paralleling the 

trans-Arabian pipeline, just south of the Iraqi border, is Tapline Road, a major 

east-west roadway. The major north-south artery is the 500-kilometer-long 

coastal highway that runs from Kuwait, through the length of Saudi Arabia, to 

Qatar. 

Rail facilities were limited, with only one active, standard gauge, single 

track line that ran from the port of ad-Dammam to Riyadh. Seaports were more 

extensive, with a total of seven sizable ports. Two, ad-Dammam and al-Jubayl, 

provided the bulk of the county's 10,000 metric ton capability per day.* 

* One metric ton is equivalent to 1.102 short tons 
408 Spearhead of Logistics 

Saudi Arabia also had five secondary ports and seven others scattered 

along its coasts. The two predominant ports of military significance were the 

port of ad-Dammam and al-Jubayl. These two modern, high-capacity ports, 

when operated by U.S. forces, would provide a reception and transshipment 

capacity equaled only by ports in Europe, Japan, and North America. 

Airfields in Saudi Arabia were modern and well-equipped. Two of the 

largest, Dhahran and Riyadh, were fully capable of accommodating 149 C-141 

cargo aircraft and 3,600 short tons of cargo per day and night in all weather. 

Additional small but well-equipped airfields were scattered throughout the 

country."

24 

In the early stages of the Southwest Asia Theater buildup, transportation 

priority went to getting combat units in theater. Few logistical units arrived 

early, and those that did operated with a small staff organization. Internal Look 

90 results indicated that a mature theater required a logistical overhead structure 

of 120,000 soldiers and that it would take nearly two years to create an 

infrastructure that large. 

Lieutenant General Yeosock, the Third Army commander, could not wait 

to build an infrastructure of that size. He devised an incremental support plan in 

which logistical units were called forward and placed in at precisely the time 

they were needed in country. This action placed a greater burden on the 

logistical community in theater, and it required a significant amount of 

host-nation support to implement. Logistical units that did deploy were 

understaffed and worked 24 hours a day. Almost miraculous accomplishments 

were required from these units to support the expanding theater. The shortage of 

logistical units became so critical that Maj. Gen. William "Gus" Pagonis, later 

commander of the 22d Support Command, contacted the Pentagon to move up 

the logistical units on the TPFDDL. Once that news reached Riyadh, the tactical 

planners responded to Pagonis, that they would decide "when the theater had 

received enough killers, at which point the logisticans would get their seats on 

the airplanes." 25 

With the severe limitations on aircraft, the logisticians had their work cut 

out for them. Pagonis, one of the Army's senior logisticians and a Transportation 

Corps officer, assembled his team in an abandoned movie theater in Dhahran 

and began immediately to support the arrival of U.S. forces into the theater?6 

Hand picked by Pagonis and sent to the theater by the Army chief of staff, the 

early team of logistical experts were called on to work miracles in supporting the 

expanding theater. With the Southwest Asia theater expanding by nearly 4,000 

soldiers per day, the logistical support was no small task?7 
Desert Shield 4n9 

The transportation support to move soldiers and their accompanied 

baggage to staging areas in the theater rapidly exceeded the capabilities of 

Pagonis' team. One of the earliest members of the team, Lt. Col. Mike Velten, 

formed an ad hoc transportation organization to move troops using Saudi 

contract buses. This infant organization, consisting of Cpt. James A. Pabon of 

the 7th Transportation Group and about a dozen soldiers, set up shop in a tent, 

contracted for buses and material handling equipment (MHE), and began 

moving soldiers and their baggage through the airfield at Dhahran. When the 

troop arrival rate suddenly exceeded the available transportation, Velten drove 

the streets of downtown Dhahran contracting every available bus he could find. 

The initiative of soldiers like Lt. Col. Velten during the early stages of Desert 

Shield allowed immature theater capabilities to expand at unprecedented rates. 

As the size of the theater continued to grow, the required logistical support 

increased. Overwhelming the initially deployed logistical infrastructure, a new 

organization was required to manage the logistical support of the ever-increasing 

combat force. Lacking a reserve call-up, CENTCOM planners were concerned 

about where the soldiers would come from to staff a theater army area command 

(TAACOM). On 19 August 1990, Lt. Gen. Yeosock appointed Pagonis 

commander of the Provisional Support Command, later to emerge as the 22d 

Support Command. 

Over the following days, Pagonis and his staff of fifty-eight soldiers began 

to develop the initial support network for the theater, establishing the basic systems 

which would eventually support a two corps force as it prepared for combat. 

SEALIFT 

During the first few weeks of the Desert Shield buildup, the theater's 

reception capability centered on airfields, with the predominant one being 

Dhahran. The short alert notification and the necessity for developing a force 

struct~1re at the end of a 8,000-mile air and 12,000-rnile sea line of 

communication meant that U.S. airlift was the only immediate transport means 

available to rapidly bridge this distance. As the operation continued, the sea lines 

of communication were being established and large oceangoing vessels began to 

arrive at the ports of Saudi Arabia. On 22 August, the Army pre-positioned ship, 

the USS Green Harb01; completed a 2,700-rnile trip from Diego Garcia in the 

Indian Ocean to discharge its cargo at the port of ad-Dammam?8 The USS 

Green Harbor was the first of over 700 ships that would carry supplies to or 

from the Southwest Asia theater. 
410 Spearhead of Logistics 

The massive sealift requirement of putting a two corps army in a theater 

with its logistical support structure would quickly prove to be the weakest link in 

the overall operation. Since World War I, the United States had not had adequate 

sealift to get its combat forces to a theater of operations, and Desert Shield was 

no exception. With the Military Sealift Command (MSC) in possession of only 

eight fast sealift ships and sixteen RO/RO vessels, the required sealift to support 

Desert Shield quickly surpassed the MSC's capabilities. To offset this shortage, 

the Defense Department activated forty-three of the government's fleet of 

ninety-six ready reserve ships. In addition to having to comb the unions and 

retirement records for crews, putting the forty-three ships in service nearly 

exhausted the nation's supply of qualified merchant marine seamen.Z9 

Besides a lack of crews, over 60 percent of the ready reserve fleet could 

not be activated within required timetables, most because of maintenance, but 

some due to the previously discussed crew problems. Those problems led the 

MSC to charter 36 ships from civilian shipping companies. Reliance on the 

private sector highlighted another weakness in U.S. sealift capabilities. 

Twenty-seven of the thirty-six chartered ships flew foreign flags and were 

manned by crews from Panama, Norway, the Bahamas, Japan, Denmark, 

Greece, and elsewhere. There was even discussions about chartering Soviet 

sealift ships to support the operation. 

30 

The shortage of U.S. sealift had been a recurring strategic deployment 

problem for over fifty years and, the beginning of Desert Shield proved no 

different. Fortunately, the United States found itself in the position of being able 

to count on other nations of the world to provide sealift. 

Even with the sealift problem, the arrival of the USS Green Harbor marked 

the beginning of an instrumental segment of the strategic deployment phase of 

Desert Shield sealift. The huge tonnage moved by sealift, no matter what flag it 

was flying, would enable the theater to build at an extraordinary rate. Yet, the 

effectiveness of sealift was dependent on the logistican's ability to receive, 

unload and push supplies into an unimproved theater. 
411 

CHAPTER XIV 

Supporting the Storm 

"Absolutely an extraordinary move, I can't recall anytime in the 

annals of military history when this number of forces have moved 

over this distance to put themselves in a position to attack ... It was 

an absolutely gigantic accomplishment, and I can't give credit enough to 

the logisticians and transporters who were able to pull this off." 

-------- General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, 1991 --------

SCHWARZKOPF'S PIAN 

With Saddam Hussein's message that Iraq was not going to leave occupied 

Kuwait peacefully, the buildup of forces in the theater continued. General 

Schwarzkopf began developing a plan to defeat Iraq and drive Saddam 

Hussein's forces out of occupied Kuwait. The plan became known as the Great 

Wheel because of the pivot movement required of the VII and XVITI Corps. 

The plan required several weeks of continuous bombing by U.S. Allied Air 

Forces, after which coalition forces would begin the ground war by conducting 

two supporting attacks on the flanks of the VII Corps. The Arab forces, in 

conjunction with the U.S. Marines, would begin the assault east of VII Corps 

with artillery and naval gunfire preparations, while the 4th Marine Expeditionary 

Brigade feinted an amphibious landing off the coast of Kuwait. Simultaneously, 

XVIII Airborne Corps west of the VII Corps would conduct coordinated ground 

and air assaults deep into Iraq. Twenty-four hours after the supporting attacks 

began, VII Corps would commence the main assault. 

Supporting attacks were essential to the success of the main VII Corps 

attack for two reasons. First, the Coalition attack into Kuwait and the Marine 

Corps feint along the coast were designed to deceive the enemy into thinking 

they constituted the main attack. Secondly, the XVIII Airborne Corps thrust 

deep into Iraq would prevent the escape of the Iraqi Republican Guard. 

In the description of the Army Chief of Staffs official history: "The main 

attack called for five armored divisions to form a spoke of the Great Wheel. If 

these divisions were to maintain alignment along the spoke, those near the hub 
412 Spearhead of Logistics 

would have to advance relatively slowly while those near the rim would have to 

charge very far, very fast. Alignment was very important to avoid piecemeal 

engagement once contact was made with the Republican Guard. If the rotation 

went according to plan, all five divisions would turn shoulder to shoulder and 

slam into the Guard simultaneously in a collision of unprecedented violence and 

shock effect." 1 

Tactical success was historically related directly to successful logistical 

support, and Desert Storm was no exception. One of the keys to Schwarzkopf's 

plan was his appreciation of that need. Desert Shield was an audacious plan and 

required tremendous amounts of logistical expertise to receive, billet, and sustain 

the thousands of soldiers, vehicles, and items of equipment necessary to execute 

and support the ground assault. 

In addition to other support requirements, the movement of the two corps 

into their attack positions would become the largest battlefield movement ever 

recorded for the time allotted. Once the air campaign commenced, the two corps 

were shifted west almost 300 miles in a move involving over 64,000 wheeled 

and tracked vehicles and 255,000 soldiers in 21 days. (See Map 41) 

Concurrent with the corps' movement, the 22d Support Command had to 

create the enormous logistical infrastructure required to support them. Two 

logistical bases, Charlie and Echo, were constructed, each stocked with a 

sixty-day supply to support each of the corps. From these logistical bases, the 

Corps Support Commands would align their Support Groups to provide direct 

and general support to subordinate divisions. As the war progressed, additional 

logistical bases were planned to provide forward support to the divisions in order 

to maintain their required operational tempo. 

Theater logisticans formulated a three-phase plan to turn Schwarzkopf's 

bold concept into reality. Phase I consisted of the reception, onward movement, 

and sustainment of the combat force. Phase II involved the movement of the two 

corps into their attack positions, and Phase ill was concerned with support of the 

ground offensive. The most significant challenge involved in each of the phases was 

the movement of the force and the thousands of tons of supplies to sustain it. 

To place the sustainment effort in perspective, in little more than a sevenmonth period more than 544,000 tons of supplies were airlifted, more than 3.4 

million tons of dry cargo, and more than 6.1 million barrels of petroleum 

products were moved by sea. By comparison, cargo delivered during the Persian 

Gulf Conflict was greater than the cargo moved across the English Channel to 

Normandy in support of the D-Day invasion during a comparable seven-month 

period, and significantly exceeded the more than 2.3 million tons of coal, food, 
Supporting the Storm 413 

and medical supplies that had been moved to West Berlin during the Berlin 

Airlift, Operation Vittles? 

An undertaking of this magnitude required the extensive team work of a 

wide array of Transportation Corps officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers, 

and civilians, since every mode of transportation would be needed to make the 

operation successful. Operating the theater air and sea ports of debarkation and 

transporting units and sustainment cargo forward, while simultaneously moving 

a two corps combat force into attack positions, was one of the most significant 

achievements in the history of the Transportation Corps. 

PHASE I-RECEPTION, 

ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND SUSTAINMENT 

PORT OPERATIONS- SAUDI ARABIA 

As in many other operations, the Army turned to the Transportation Corps 

to ensure supplies were moved rapidly through the theater's respective ports and 

airfields. The 7th Transportation Group, commanded by Col. David A. Whaley, 

assumed the mission as the only theater-level transportation group performing 

port operations at ad-Dammam and al-Jubayl. With eight fully loaded fast sealift 

ships en route to Saudi Arabia by 22 August, the 7th Group was faced with a 

formidable task. 

An advance party of selected officers, noncommissioned officers and 300 

soldiers from the 6th, 1Oth, and 24th Transportation Battalions was deployed 

from Fort Eustis, Virginia, on 10 August 1990. Personally led by Colonel 

Whaley, the advance party arrived in theater the following day. As soon as 

Whaley arrived, Maj. Gen. Pagonis informed him his advance party was needed 

for a variety of missions. 

The 7th Transportation Group officers and soldiers quickly augmented 

Pagonis' four-man staff, becoming the core of the provisional support command. 

They also provided traffic control at the airfield and main supply routes and 

operated the Port of ad-Dammam. Personnel immediately went to work 

off-loading ships at that port and assisting the 403d Transportation Company in 

operating the arrival/departure airfield control group at Dhahran Air Base. 

Others began working at the airfield coordinating with host nation authorities for 

cargo trucks and buses to move incoming soldiers to their fmal destinations. 

Major General Pagonis later stated: "This was the turning point [7th Group's 

arrival]. I fmally had enough people to start playing logistical catch-up."3 
414 Spearhead of Logistics 

Port of ad-Dammam 

The flfSt port to receive U.S. Army cargo was the King Abdul Aziz port in 

Dammam. The 7th Group moved the 55 1st Cargo Transfer Company to the port 

where personnel immediately began warehousing and shipping the massive 

amounts of food, equipment, and ammunition that was arriving off 

pre-positioned ships from Diego Garcia. 

One of the first ships was the American Connorant loaded with watercraft, 

all of which were immediately put to use and remained in operation for the 

duration of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. By the end of the war, 

most of the tugs had more than 1,000 missions each and had operated 

around-the-clock seven days a week. 

Unloading ammunition ships dominated the early weeks of port operations. 

Three lighter aboard ship (LASH) vessels, each laden with more than eighty 

barges of ammunition, marked the beginning of the theater's massive 

ammunition build up. With too few terminal services soldiers available in 

country to effectively discharge the barges, the 7th Group coordinated with the 

Dammam Port Authority to obtain host nation Jaborers.

4 

A majority of the contract laborers were third world nationals, spoke little 

English, and had never worked with ammunition. This presented the Group's 
Supporting the Storm 415 

24th Battalion with a challenging supervisory task, since the laborers were 

oblivious to the extreme hazards inherent in ammunition handling. Before being 

brought under adequate supervision, they had climbed atop multiple launch 

rocket system (MLRS) pods and smoked in cargo discharge areas. As the pace 

of the deployment increased and terminal service units became available, host 

nation assistance began to evaporate. Many of the contract laborers fled Saudi 

Arabia as the 15 January deadline neared 5 

With the buildup, dependence on sea lines of communication grew, and 

queuing at the Port of ad-Dammam became the primary managerial concern. In 

late September, the first of over 100 Special Middle East Shipping Agreement 

(SMESA) commercial container vessels, carrying cargo of almost every class of 

supply, began to arriving in Dammam. Almost daily, arriving units staged 

hundreds of soldiers in the port to drive the equipment, once off-loaded from the 

ships. As in Korea and Vietnam, the use of ports for break-bulk distribution 

points compounded the problem of queuing for arriving ships, because cargo 

could not be cleared from the ports quickly enough. 

Even with the contents verified, the theater's material managers had a 

difficult time directing the transporters where to ship the cargo. Lacking an 

effective theater distribution plan, cargo required additional storage and 

processing time so that material managers could decipher equipment destinations 

and coordinate with the receiving units' Material Management Center, 

contributing signillcantly to a congested port. 

Break-bulk cargo was not the only problem. The SMESA containers, 

arriving in theater, were routinely delivered unmarked or destined for multiple 

consignees. Questioning the accuracy of the commodity codes on the containers, 

the Theater Material Management Center directed that all containers be 

reopened, and the contents verified. This process was both labor and equipmentintensive, and the inefficiency of the operation contributed to the already 

congested port 6 Even with the container visibility problems and seemingly 

insurmountable supply distribution obstacles, the transporters kept the cargo 

moving to the forward deployed units. 

At the beginning of October, Colonel Whaley relinquished command of the 

7th Transportation Group to Col. Daniel G. Brown. This was the first change of 

command for any unit in Saudi Arabia, and the ceremony established the 

precedent for future changes of command. Colonel Whaley was reassigned to a 

new Theater Support Command where he used his experience to develop the 

theater's transportation infrastructure. 
416 Spearhead of Logistics 

Small portion of staging area at Port of ad-Dammam 

Building a theater in such a short period was an awesome task that required 

a massive influx of sustainment cargo. A continuing challenge was to keep the 

port free of congestion. Consequently, a second port was opened seventy miles 

north of ad-Dammam at the port city of al-Jubayl. It was shared by U.S. 

Marines, U.S. Army, and British forces. Until December 1990, the port was used 

predominantly by the Transportation Corps to move ammunition and the 3d 

Armored Cavalry Regiment ashore. 

On 8 November 1990, President Bush made the decision to deploy VTI Corps 

from Europe to Saudi Arabia. The Support Command and the 7th Transportation 

Group prepared for the receipt and onward movement of the vn Corps supplies 

from the sea ports of debarkation (SPOD) to their tactical assembly areas (TAA). 

After studying the theater's reception capabiUty and Main Supply Routes, 

Colonel Brown recommended that both ports, ad-Darnmam and al-Jubayl, be 

used to receive VII Corps. His argument for a two-port reception operation 

centered on maximizing the throughput of follow-on forces. Multiple aerial ports 
Supporting the Storm 417 

of debarkation (APODs),SPODs, and at least two MSRs were needed to achieve 

the maximum throughput capacity. The key to the plan was allowing units with 

limited road mobility to debark as close to their tactical assembly areas as 

possible. Armored units discharged at al-Jubayl, shortening the distance 7th 

Group's heavy-equipment transporters (HETs) would have to operate. Mobile 

units, such as Military Police and Aviation units, could arrive in ad-Dammam 

and transit the longer distances with their own resources. 

Every effort was made to avoid the backup of ships awaiting discharge that 

had occurred in Vietnam. The 7th Group fiUed the doctrinal role of running a 

Ship Priority and Destination Board (SPDB). Daily, they evaluated ship 

operations and projected berthing capabilities for the next five to ten day period. 

Working closely with the Military Traffic Management Command and the 

Military Sealift Command, the 7th Group could divert incoming ships to 

available berths and begin immediate discharge operations. 

In aU, thirty-five ships were rerouted and no ship ever waited to commence 

discharge during the deployment. The fact that ships were discharged so rapidly 

was a credit to the soldiers of both lOth and 24th Transportation Battalions, 

commanded by Lt. Col. Kinny Black and Lt. Col. Don Parker, respectively, and 

the Port Support Activities they supervised? 

Even with the excellent fixed port facilities at ad-Dammam and al-Jubayl, 

logistics-over-the-shore operations were still necessary.8 One LOTS operation 

was conducted at Ras AI Mishab in support of the U.S. Marine Corps for two 

and one-half months. First, Marine Corps floating causeways were towed to the 

site and installed on the beach by Army tugs. Once established, two Army 

logistic support vessels (LSVs) conducted sixteen missions carrying 16,495 short 

tons of cargo ashore while six Army Landing Craft Utility (LCUs) conducted eighty 

missions transporting over 12,000 short tons of cargo in support of the logistics 

base buildup and subsequent redeployment through Ras Al Mishab. 

Another LOTS operation was established to transport humanitarian support 

ashore through Ash Shaybah, a Kuwaiti port so badly damaged that it was 

inaccessible by other means. From 1 March through 10 April 1991, 13,200 tons 

of cargo were transported through the war-torn port. Both LOTS operations 

demonstrated the potential to support large-scale, long-term combat operations. 

LOTS operations made a significant contribution in supporting the theater's 

overall logistical plan, an essential element of the United States' "force 

projection" Army. 

Transportation Corps watercraft played a significant role in the buildup of 

the theater. Logistic support vessels, developed in the early 1980s, self-deployed 
418 Spearhead of Logistics 

LCM-8 watercraft undergoing overhaul in Dammam. Watercraft were used 

for port security patrols. These watercraft are having protective sheet steel 

added around the gun mounts. 

from Fort Eustis and ran intratheater missions, transporting primarily tanks and 

anununition. Landing craft, mechanized (LCM-8) landing craft served a variety 

of needs, some of which were extraordinary. In one case, they were used as 

gunnery platforms for test firing Bradley fighting vehicles and in another they 

were used for nightly port security. 

Four of the Army's new 2000 class LCUs and two 1646 class LCUs, 

assigned to the 97th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat), shuttled over 300 

missions carrying Marine Corps equipment between sites at Ras AI Mishab and 

the port of al-Jubayl. These missions demonstrated the Army's watercraft 

versatility and played an integral part in positioning the Marine Corps tracked 

vehicles prior to the ground offensive. The 2000 class performed intratheater 

transport by shuttling the 7th Transportation Group's port equipment from 

ad-Dammam to the heavily damaged industrial port at Kuwait City. These 

vessels were the first watercraft to enter the harbor after the ground offensive. 

Upon entering, 7th Group personnel found the blueprints for the minefield in the 
Supporting the Storm 419 

port and, after transporting Navy port opening equipment, helped the Navy clear 

a deep draft channel into the port. 

Through their versatility, Army watercraft demonstrated they were 

necessary for more than LOTS operations. They allowed the Transportation 

Corps to sustain forward forces using intratheater sea lines of communications 

(LOC). Army barge Derrick cranes accomplished over 1,500 lifts during the 

deployment, and tugs moved over 2,500 LASH barges and made eleven offshore 

tows. 

Within a year, 7th Group unloaded and loaded over 700 ships, transporting 

the majority of two corps and their accompanying forces, drove over 31 million 

miles, handled over 36,000 containers, discharged and transported 274,000 tons 

of ammunition, loaded 3,900 railcars, and performed 6,100 intratheater missions 

with Army watercraft.9 

By December 1990, the 7th Transportation Group had grown from two 

battalions to a peak strength of nine, consisting of fifty-two companies with 

9,200 soldiers (see Chart 17). The force structure included two terminal 

battalions, whose four Cargo Transfer Companies and five Terminal Service 

Companies provided the theater's port operations capability. The remainder of 

the group's transportation assets provided theater truck transport, which 

supported the movement of both corps to their attack positions and moved 

sustainment cargo to corps supply points. 

With the arrival of the VII Corps in the theater, 7th Group port operations 

resumed a hectic pace. Discharge of sustainment cargo and critical ammunition 

kept ship discharge operations as the top theater priority throughout the entire 

Desert Shield buildup. At the commencement of combat operations, 

transportation soldiers throughout the theater had successfully accomplished 

their mission. Stockage levels of critical classes of supply had all met or 

exceeded the theater commander's objectives in record time. 

When on 28 February 1991, the ground war ended and Kuwait had been 

liberated, the Transportation Corps' job was not completed. Sustainment 

convoys continued to run and ships continued to be discharged with needed 

spare parts and force modernization equipment. Only seven days after the 

ground war started, the 10th Transportation Battalion, 7th Transportation Group, 

entered Kuwait City. Within two weeks the port was cleared of ordnance, a path 

was made through mine fields, and the Group's dive detachments salvaged Iraqi 

attack boats sunk at pierside. Army watercraft were the first allied vessels to 

enter Kuwait since the Iraqi invasion. During the next two months, 7th Group 

soldiers delivered humanitarian assistance supplies to Kuwait using both trucks 
I :DIT'CGP 1-- -------- ------1 amoc 

MSC ~-- -------

Chart 17 

~AI>AREGT 

~ 

en 

'i 

II> 

:7 

m 

a. 

9.. 

c8 

![ 

~ 
Supporting the Storm 421 

and watercraft. They transported thousands of enemy prisoners of war, ran an 

ArrivaV Departure Airfield Control Group at the Kuwait International Airport, 

and redeployed a large segment of U.S. Marine Corps tanks that were used to 

liberate Kuwait. 10 

AIR UNES OF COMMUNICATION 

As United States strategic deployment capabilities shifted into high gear, 

the colossal task of deploying troops and equipment as far forward as possible in 

the Southwest Asia theater had begun. As many as 5,000 soldiers per day were 

arriving at Dhahran Air Base. As they debarked, they were put in personnel 

holding areas to wait for transportation to their unit staging areas. Sustainment 

cargo arrived through the ports of ad-Dammam and al-Jubayl as well as Dhahran 

Air Base, the theater's primary aerial port of debarkation. 

The bulk of air cargo was palletized on Air Force 463L pallets. Wooden 

and 463L pallets, which were used successful1y in the Vietnam War, served as 

the primary means of moving air cargo during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

Heavy reliance on 463L pallets also meant a significant requirement for forklifts 

and other handling equipment. Air Force or Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft 

arrived at Dhahran Air Base with as many as 500 to 700 pallets of cargo per day. 

Pallets were off-loaded by Air Force K-loaders and shuttled to the theater 

pallet yard, a large area of sand at the end of the Dhahran air strip. The yard, operated by the 403d Transportation Company, had two distinct functions. It segregated 

incoming pallets into either the pallet yard or to the break-bulk yard. Pallets destined 

for a single customer (consignee) were taken and aligned with that consignee's 

servicing supply support activity (SSA). Pallets with multiple consignees 

(multipack), were sent to the break-bulk yard where they were broken down and 

stored break-bulk by SSA until enough cargo existed to build a pallet for that SSA. 

Moving theater sustainment cargo through this process should have been 

fairly simple, but it was complicated by pallet construction and marking in the 

United States, by weather, and by the theater's inability to develop an effective 

supply distribution plan. 

Depots in the United States received tons of sustainment cargo daily from 

multiple sources for dispatch to the forces in Saudi Arabia. Concerned with 

maximizing the use of the airlift resources, depots built pallets to the height 

restrictions of the different aircraft. 1 1 If a depot built a pallet and there was no 

other cargo for the consignee, they simply loaded cargo for other consignees 

onto that pallet. Eventually, the pallet arrived at the Dhahran Air Base pallet 

yard with cargo for different units, some hundreds of miles apart. Since the 403d 
422 Spearhead of Logistics 

7th Transportation Group 100 ton crane raising a 

destroyed Iraqi patrol boat in the Kuwait port of Ash Shaybah 
Supporting the Storm 423 

Transportation Company was the only available Cargo Transfer Company, it 

was required to break down the pallet, sort the cargo, and ship it to each of the 

individual unit's SSAs. 

To further exacerbate the problem, depots and other supply agencies 

routinely identified the ultimate consignee for most pallets as Department of 

Defense Activity Address Code (DODAAC) "W8ILTC", the 403d 

Transportation Company. Simply put, a majority of the sustainment cargo 

arriving by air for the 403d Transportation Company was without any 

·instructions for onward movement. That left the task of identifying the owner of 

each pallet to the few material management personnel at the airfield, a time and 

labor intensive task. 

By building pallets in this fashion, the cargo could be rapidly moved 

through the stateside depots while efficiently using sustainment aircraft. 

However, this procedure placed a significant labor-intensive burden on the Southwest 

Asia Theater's consolidated reception point. As the theater matured and logisticans 

elevated these concerns, the practice of multi packing pallets was minimized. 

The second and probably most significant impact on the ability of the 

Transportation Corps to move sustainment cargo into the theater was the 

inability of the theater to develop an effective supply distribution system. 

Effective supply distribution had been a problem that has plagued the Army 

Logisticians since World War I. Their inability to get supplies from the port of 

debarkation to forward supply points was a reoccurring problem, with 

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm as no exception. 

During the buildup phase, the supply distribution problem was compounded by the fact that the list of units scheduled for deployment to Saudi Arabia 

changed daily. Materiel Management Centers (MMCs) had a considerable task 

in trying to align deployed units with theater supply support activities. New units 

arriving in theater had push packages waiting for them with no SSA to send the cargo 

to. Cargo sat in the 403d' s pallet yard long after units moved to their assembly area~. 

The distribution problem was also compounded by the ever changing 

locations of units in a theater where communication assets were scarce. Units 

would be aligned with one SSA for a short period of time and then realigned to 

another after relocating to a remote forward position, with neither SSA being 

notified. The problem was created because units were frequently task-organized 

at the time of the unit's arrival and then again once the theater matured, each 

time changing its SSA. The task organization problem was compounded by the 

lack of communications between units. Transportation resources were wasted as 

supplies were routinely routed to incorrect SSAs or to old unit locations. 
424 Spearhead of Logistics 

Despite the ineffective theater supply distribution system, hard work and 

attention to detail by countless material managers and Transportation Corps 

soldiers ensured the theater's sustainment cargo kept moving through the 

APOD. It was not uncommon for three to four convoys of fifty trucks each to 

leave the pallet yard en route to several different SSAs daily. Even at that pace, 

the pallet yard routinely ran a backlog of 100 to 200 pallets a day awaiting 

transportation. 

Actually, two factors hampered the ability to push sustainment cargo into 

the theater. One was the lack of an effective supply distribution system, and the 

other was the lack of trucks. Every available truck was tasked to support the 

clearance mission for both the airfields and ports, as well as for the movement of 

units to their forward staging areas. The shortage of trucks resulted from the 

policy of developing the theater by deploying combat units first, and flowing 

logistical units in at the last possible moment. 

As in World War II and Vietnam, problems with transporting critical repair 

parts from the depot to the ultimate customer were solved by circumventing the 

theater distribution system. First used in World War II, a Red Ball Express was 

used to move critical repair parts through France in 1944. During the Vietnam 

War, similar distribution problems resulted in another Red Ball Express to move 

critical repair parts from the United States to Cam Rahn Bay. Once again in the 

deserts of Saudi Arabia, history repeated itself with the "Desert Express." 

With stockpiles of sustainment cargo and mail backlogged at the primary 

APOD, a system had to be devised to push critical repair parts into theater to 

allow combat units to increase their readiness rates. Planners looked to a special 

ALOC that were completely autonomous from established procedures to solve 

the problem. Colonel Steve Koons, 1st Area Support Group Commander, 

Dhahran, was instrumental in using his transportation expertise to devise and 

implement such an operation. 

Working with the Military Airlift Command and various U.S. Anny 

Transportation Corps units, Col. Koons developed a system similar to Federal 

Express services.12 Daily, one C-141 aircraft was designated to transport up to 

thirteen 463L pallets of relatively small, high priority, critical cargo to Operation 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Beginning 30 October 1990, Desert Express 

consisted of one flight daily leaving Charleston Air Force Base destined for 

Dhahran. Each service was allocated a portion of the weight delivered. The 

Army's daily allocation was 15,000 to 18,000 pounds. Upon landing at Dhahran, 

Desert Express aircraft were staged at the parking ramp close to the theater pallet 

yard. Special cargo handlers transloaded the high priority cargo onto waiting 
Supporting the Storm 425 

trucks or helicopters, after which it was delivered directly to the respective units. 

As high priority requisitions increased. a second daily flight was added on 13 

February 1991. With the arrival of the Vll Corps on 8 December 1990, a 

European Desert Express was added to move high priority cargo from 

Rhein-Main Air base, Gennany. Over a six-month period, Desert Express had 

flown over 5.1 million pounds of cargo from the United States and 1.3 million 

pounds from Europe, servicing predon:Unantly Army and Air Force units. 13 The 

Desert Express was a major factor in maintaining the combat readiness of theater 

·units. 

THE NEED FOR MOVEMENT CONTROL 

As the level of force structure and its supporting sustainment cargo grew, 

the need to effectively manage the theater's scarce transportation resources 

became an urgent priority. In the initial stages of deployment, much of the 

transportation management function was accomplished by the respective 

commands. Support Command (SUPCOM) managed its assets using personnel 

borrowed from the 7th Transportation Group, while the XVIII Airborne Corps 

managed its early arriving transportation assets through the few personnel from 

the 330th Movement Control Center (MCC). 

As troops and supplies poured into the theater, it was evident that a 

movement control organization was needed. Since none was available, 

SUPCOM built a provisional movement control battalion out of movement 

teams that had already arrived. Commanded by Lt Col. Bruce Laferrerie, the 

1st Movements Battalion (Provisional) was fonned and assumed the mission as 

the SUPCOM movements control organization responsible for movement 

control until the 3l8th Movement Control Agency (MCA) arrived. 

The 318th MCA, commanded by Col. Peter C. Langenus, was a reserve 

unit based in Jamaica, New York. Organized and staffed to operate the theater's 

entire movement control network, it would by plan have been deployed 

immediately but did not arrive in theater until C+80 because combat units had 

priority during the early phases of Desert Shield. Plagued by a late start and 

insufficient communications assets, the 318th had to struggle to establish an 

effective movements control program. 

The 318th's effectiveness was also hampered by the level to which it was 

assigned in theater. By doctrine, the MCA wa., assigned to the theater army. In 

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the MCA was assigned to the SUPCOM. 

Policies affecting movement control were issued by the SUPCOM commander, not 

the theater commander. The chief of staff of the 318th MCA put it bluntly: ''The 
426 Spearhead of Logistics 

placement of the MCA at the SUPCOM level resulted in a loss of visibility of 

interservice requirements and priorities, a lack of definitive transportation 

priorities based upon accurate current tacticaVlogistical situation, a lack of 

adherence to transportation policies by major commands, and the absence of 

transportation allocation plans." 14 

Despite the numerous obstacles, the 318th MCA, in conjunction with the 

movement control centers of the VII and XVIII Corps, contributed significantly 

to the overall transportation successes achieved during Operation Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm. Its ability to perform, despite shortages in personnel and 

equipment, was a tribute to its sense of mission accomplishment. With the lack 

of communications, movement control personnel were needed at every major 

hub of transportation activity, not only to control movements but also to provide 

effective movements data to the transportation managers at the respective 

movement control organizations. 

BUIWING THE GROUND TRANSPORTATION NETWORK 

Even with the benefits of Desert Express, the theater lacked the resources 

to build an comprehensive transportation system in a short time. Major General 

Pagonis turned to Colonel Whaley, the 7th Transportation Group's outgoing 

commander and Brigadier general selectee, for assistance and appointed him his 

transportation czar with the complex mission of developing an efficient system 

to move material from the ports to forward deployed units. 15 

Colonel Whaley first had to analyze the problems facing him. Although 

Saudi Arabia had some of the world's best ports, its highway network was 

well below the United States standards. The road network, as illustrated in 

Map 40, consisted of two main supply routes that led from the ports of 

ad-Dammam and al-Jubayl to the logistical bases and corps tactical assembly areas. 

The northern route began outside Dhahran, and was named "MSR Audi". It 

was a four-lane highway that stretched the 85 miles from Dhahran to the north of 

al-Jubayl. Outside al-Jubayl, the road, named "MSR Dodge" or Tapline Road 

turned into a narrow two-lane road that ran 250 miles into the interior through 

Hafar al-Batin and then onward through Rafha and across Saudi Arabia. The 

second route ran in a southwesterly direction, from outside Dhahran to Riyadh 

and was dubbed "MSR Toyota." It was an excellent multilane highway, running 

about 225 miles through Riyadh until it narrowed to two lanes. The next stretch, 

MSR Nash, began outside of Riyadh and ran northward approximately 300 miles 

to Hafar al-Batin, where MSR Nash joined MSR Dodge. Although the northern 

and southern routes were different in length (334 miles versus 528 miles), the 
I 

Supporting the Storm 

' ' ' ' ' 

350 miles 

IRAQ 

0 

SAUDI ARABIA 

MAIN SUPPLY ROUTES 

Log Base 

Bastogne 

MSR SULTAN 

(NASH) 

-~ ...... E------- 400 miles ----------i.-~1 

Map40 

427 

difference in travel time was minimal because of the contrasting quality of the 

roads. 

Some of these roads were well-surfaced multilane highways comparable to 

the U.S. interstate network, while others, like MSR Dodge, were two-lane roads 

that were not designed to handle the military traffic necessary to support the 

coalition forces. Main supply route Dodge, known more informally as "Death 

Alley", was considered the most dangerous road in the world. "Winding through 

the desert, MSR Dodge had no lights, dividing lines, or shoulders, and only 

enough width for two HETs to barely pass. Traffic was so intense with military 

vehicles on MSR Dodge that a traffic survey revealed a soldier standing on the 

side of the road would have seen seventeen vehicles pass every 60 seconds." 16 
428 Spearhead of Logistics 

The distances traveled were considerable. The long haul from the port of 

ad-Dammam to the logistical bases at King Khalid Military City (KKMC) was 

over 334 miles along the northern route. With the staggering number of support 

vehicles using the northern MSR, it was not uncommon for multiple convoys to 

jam the two-lane MSRs. Along the northern route, it was a common sight to see 

large trucks breaking off from the two-lane road and carving additional passing 

lanes through the sands of the desert. 

With a long LOC over generally poor roads, Colonel Whaley was faced 

with the task of creating a transportation network capable of supporting Desert 

Shield objectives. As the Deputy Commanding General (DCG), Transportation, 

Support Command, Colonel Whaley began by establishing a series of convoy 

support centers to increase the road network efficiency. According to the Army 

chief of staffs official history, "These centers resembled huge truck stops in the 

desert, and like all truck stops, operated 24-hours a day, providing fuel, latrines, 

food, sleeping tents, and limited vehicle repair facilities. The convoy support 

centers quickly became welcomed oases for overworked and exhausted 

long-haul truck drivers."17 

The support centers actually contributed much to the overall safety and 

success of the logistical support mission. The turnaround time from the theater's 

main ports of embarkation to the logistical bases averaged between three to four 

days. The southeast support centers provided life support for missions of this 

duration. 

Convoy support centers were often confused with trailer transfer points 

(TfP). While both supported the movement of cargo, they had two distinctly 

different missions. The support centers provided technical service and life 

support to sustain all movements conducted on the theater MSRs, while the TIP 

focused specifically on the transfer of trailers between units and provided limited 

maintenance, fuel, and life support to drivers. 

The sheer distance traveled, coupled with demanding road conditions, 

forced transportation planners to increase the required number of truck drivers 

just to support the theater's transportation network. Early on, it was decided to 

assign assistant drivers to all line-haul missions. By doctrine all transportation 

truck companies, except HET companies, were authorized one driver per truck. 

An all out effort had to be initiated to bring as many truck drivers into the theater 

as possible. The theater decided to use available personnel from almost any 

military occupational speciality (MOS) for assistant drivers. The responsibility 

to train those soldiers fell to 7th Transportation Group, which established a 

driver's training program in Dhahran. The program trained over 4,000 drivers 
Supporting the Storm 

Commercial HET assigned to the 702d Transportation Battalion 

moving Bradley Fighting Vehicles to the front. 

429 

and was instrumental in alleviating the driver shortage. With two drivers in 

every cab, truck companies were able to support sustained operations. 

In addition to its driver training program, the 7th Transportation Group 

created a provisional truck battalion to bolster its local and line-haul capabilities. 

Its personnel structure began with a small nucleus of U.S. military and drivers 

from foreign countries. Later, the provisional battalion's foreign-national drivers 

were augmented by 800 soldiers from the Berlin Brigade, bringing the 

battalion's strength to over 1,400 personnel. 

The shortage of HET and lowboy trailers also affected transportation 

capabilities in the theater. 18 Transportation planners conducted an intensive 

effort to get as many heavy lift assets into the theater as quickly as possible. Not 

only was there a significant demand for heavy-lift assets to move unit equipment 

arriving in the sea ports of debarkation, but the anticipated relocation of two 

corps to their attack positions had planners concerned about supporting the move 

with available assets. 
430 Spearhead of Logistics 

The heavy-lift assets in the Army inventory were unable to support both 

the SPOD and the simultaneous unit moves into their attack positions. Every 

effort was made to obtain additional assets from across the world. Other 

countries, including Egypt, Germany, and Italy, were contacted to help out. By 

February 1991, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia 

responded by providing 714 HETs. Added to the 497 HETs belonging to the 

U.S. military and the 99 commercially contracted ones, the borrowed HETs 

brought the theater total to 1,310. 19 Even with this influx, the shortage of HETs 

and lowboys was so significant that both were intensively managed by a general 

officer on a daily basis. 

Heavy-equipment transporters were true combat multipliers relocating Ml 

tanks to forward positions. By saving needless wear and tear on the tanks, HETs 

greatly increased the M1 mission readiness rate and made a direct contribution 

to the tactical victory. The HET was one of the most valuable commodities of 

the war and played a crucial role in the overall plan. Since the Ml tank was the 

primary ground weapon system for the defeat of Iraq's tank-heavy Army, the 

key to success was getting combat-ready Mls to the battlefield. By reducing the 

time tanks had to operate under their own power, the HETs greatly increased the 

Ml s mission readiness rate. 

To cope with the long distances of the road network and maximize the use 

of scarce transportation resources, planners established the trailer transfer point 

system. Modeled on the system used by U.S. forces in Germany, the first TfPs 

were established in the vicinity of ad-Dammam and Riyadh. 

Planners sought to follow doctrine by establishing the points at 90-rnile 

intervals to allow trucks to make two trips between TIPs per 20-hour operating 

day. Unfortunately, the number of TfPs available in theater was limited, and 

two TIPs had to be combined to form one transfer point large enough to 

accommodate the projected traffic flow. Eventually, four TfPs were positioned 

along the 525 mile southern route (ad-Dammam-Riyadh-Hafar al-Batin). A fifth 

was eventually established along the northern route in the vicinity of the corps' 

logistics bases. The system enhanced driver safety and maximized cargo-hauling 

capabilities. 

Though a majority of the sustainment cargo was moved in theater by truck 

assets, rail operations did provide some transport capability. A rail line was used 

between ad-Dammam and Riyadh to move sustainment cargo. Because of the 

expenditure of time and personnel to brace equipment, the decision was made to 

only move containers by rail since they could be easily uploaded and off-loaded 

from the railcars. The rail line gave the theater the capability of moving 150 
Supporting the Storm 431 

Rough-terrain container handler (RTCH) with a 20ft container. 

40-foot containers per day on two trains consisting of seventy-five gondola cars 

each. Once the containers arrived in Riyadh, they were loaded on contracted 

trucks and transported some 300 miles along the southern route to KKMC and 

the newly formed logistical bases? 0 

As the development of the theater's road network began to take shape and 

additional truck assets arrived in theater, attention shifted to the effort to support 

the buildup of supplies in the northern corps logistical bases in support of future 

operations. Priority of movement went to Class I (subsistence), Class m 

(packaged and bulk POL), Class V (ammunition), and water. Once these 

stockage objectives were established, the speed at which the objectives could be 

met was dependent not only on trucks but on the entire cargo distribution 

system. 

Consequently, the limited quantities of materials-handling equipment 

(MHE) available in theater became a major factor in the speed with which the 
432 Spearhead of l ogistics 

transportation network could support the establishment of the new logistical 

bases. Rough-terrain container handlers (RTCHs) were extremely scarce, and 

maintenance problems slowed container upload and download across the theater. 

As an example, the XVIII Corps only had eight RTCHs to service an entire 

corps-size force. With containers being transported down to the subordinate 

divisions, the few RTCHs were quickly overwhelmed. Rough-terrain forklifts of 

4,000 and 10,000-pound capacity were also critical to the logistical base buildup. 

Those assets were assigned to a majority of the same logistical units already 

involved with the reception of supplies at the theater ports of debarkation. 

Though not in short supply in the ports, MHE was a scarce commodity in the 

forward logistical bases. Moving the equipment from the Dhahran or 

ad-Dammam ports to build logistical bases in the north did very little to improve 

the theater's shortage of MHE. 

Innovative systems were used to offset the shortages. One included the 

development of provisional theater MHE companies and positioning forklifts on 

lowboy trailers in the rear of certain convoys. The provisional companies 

provided logistical commanders with the flexibility to direct MHE support to 

possible bottlenecks or priority cargo. While transport of the equipment in 

sustainment cargo convoys was a temporary fix to a larger problem, it 

guaranteed transporters that their cargo would be off-loaded at its destination 

without excessive turnaround time. 

On numerous occasions, truck drivers arrived at remote sites where the 

customer had failed to coordinate for materials handling equipment. With no 

equipment available and the truck needed for another mission, drivers found 

unique ways to unload their cargo. One way was to use a sand dune as a 

temporary ramp. For pallets, drivers connected the pallet to a fixed structure and 

slowly pulled away. Both methods were a little rough on the cargo, but they did 

the job. 

The MHE shortage remained a critical problem throughout Operations 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Temporary fixes were created, but the lack of such 

equipment in corps and theater logistical units remained a significant problem. 

THEATER TRUCK ASSETS 

During most of the reception and buildup phase, 7th Transportation Group 

was the only theater transportation group providing both port and line-haul 

capabilities. To support the theater, 7th Group controlled two terminal service 

battalions and seven truck battalions which operated 1 ,300 military cargo and 

700 commercial trucks. 
Supporting the Storm 433 

Not since World War II had line-haul transportation been so critical to both 

sustainment and tactical operations. Forces were deployed to field locations that 

had little to no life support facilities. Fuel, water, shelter, repair parts, and a 

multitude of other commodities all had to be transported by truck.21 

To support the forward deployed forces over thousands of square miles of 

desert, the 7th Group staged its truck battalions along key portions of the 

theater's transportation network. The 419th Transportation Battalion, 

commanded by Lt. Col. John Gannon, a reserve unit from Illinois, was 

positioned in ad-Dammam and was responsible for transporting unit equipment 

and sustainment cargo from the port. The 68th Transportation Battalion, 

commanded by Lt. Col. Rick Ross, was located on a camel racetrack. As an 

active component unit from Fort Carson, Colorado, the unit was augmented 

with Reserve and National Guard truck companies and assigned the 

mission of ensuring trailers were shuttled between TIPs along the southern 

route (ad-Dammam-Riyadh-Hafer al-Batin). The 68th was also responsible for 

moving trailers north to their final destination. The 180th Transportation 

Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Bill Jones, was an active component unit from 

Fort Hood, Texas, consisting of three medium truck companies, one 

light/medium truck company, and the 406th TTP. The 180th was emplaced at 

the end of the MSR and supported the movement of cargo along the route. 

The 702d Transportation Battalion (Provisional), commanded by Lt. Col. 

Coyd M. "Bud" Vance was organized in October of 1990 and based in 

ad-Dammam. Originally organized with a small cadre of U.S. Army 

transporters and civilian contract drivers, the battalion expanded and served as a 

melting pot for drivers from several nationalities and soldiers from the Berlin 

Brigade. At its peak strength, the 702d consisted of 800 soldiers and 750 civilian 

truck drivers. The 702d could be seen along the MSRs operating trucks from 

numerous countries. 

In January 1991, the 7th Transportation Group's line-haul capability was 

enhanced from an unusual source. When the 3d Battalion, 2d Air Defense 

Artillery (ADA) Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. Pete Deperro, was converted 

to a truck battalion, its soldiers trained as drivers at the 7th Group Drivers 

Training Program. The new drivers were assigned to the Czechoslovakian 

TATRA heavy-equipment transporter, which soon became infamous for its 

obsolete steering and brake systems and poor reliability. By the time the war was 

over, the drivers of Deperro's battalion had developed a keen appreciation for 

U.S. automotive technology. 
434 Spearhead of l ogistics 

As the movement of corps phase neared, the 369th Transportation 

Battalion (HET), commanded by Lt. Col. Francis Kairson, arrived from New 

York City as did the 11 03d Transpottation Battalion (HET) from Alabama, 

commanded by Lt. Col. Ernest McMonagle. Both were assigned to the 7th 

Group. In the beginning of January, both battalions were reassigned to the 32d 

Transportation Group but would be reassigned back to the 7th Group upon 

commencement of retrograde operations. Both units, while assigned to the 7th 

Group, provided much needed heavy truck capability and were instrumental in 

the movement of armored divisions from the seaports to their attack positions. 

With the reliance on truck transport during the reception and buildup 

phase, the lack of adequate communications equipment at every level had a 

significant impact on operations. Transportation unit tables of organization and 

equipment (TOE) did not authorize radios with the capability to communicate 

over long distances. The distances between units and the long miles convoys had 

to travel exceeded the capability of the U.S. Army issued AN NRC 46-series FM 

radios. Even so, radios were installed in very few trucks, but mainly in command 

and control vehicles. 

In response, the transportation community relied on cellular telephones, but 

even these were in short supply and issued only to battalion commanders and 

above. This shortage did nothing for the commanders and soldiers at company 

level who had to execute the missions. They solved the problem by purchasing 

inexpensive citizens band (CB) radios that gave drivers the capability of 

communicating with other trucks in the convoy and, over limited distances, to 

communicate with their base. Still, no real solution evolved to provide dedicated 

communications to the transportation network. 

Cellular phones and CB radios helped, but they were little more than local 

stopgap measures. Even the movement control agency at SUPCOM lacked 

sufficient communications equipment, especially for long distances in a fluid 

situation. That shortage denied the commander effective control over his 

transportation assets and, had the war lasted longer, would have caused severe 

disruption in the flow of supplies forward. Drivers resupplying the forward 

logistical bases at times required a five-day turnaround time to transit the road 

network. On several occasions, mission or priority changes could not be relayed 

to the trucks while they were on the road. Transportation managers had to wait 

until trucks arrived at destination to redirect the assets, usually wasting critical 

blocks of time. 

The lack of communications directly contributed to enemy capture of the 

Transportation Corps' only two prisoners of war (POWs) during Operations 
Supporting the Storm 435 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. As Specialist Melissa A. Rathbun-Nealy and 

Specialist David Lockett of the 233d Transportation Company were driving their 

HET from a mission at Dhahran Air Base, they became disoriented and got off 

the MSR. Proceeding along the coast of Saudi Arabia towards Kuwait, the 

soldiers were unable to reestablish their correct direction. Without any 

communications capability, they were unable to communicate with higher 

headquarters for additional guidance and mistakenly drove into occupied 

Kuwait. 

The fielding of the Global Positioning System (GPS), later nicknamed the 

"Slugger", gave transportation units the much needed capability to know where 

they were in a featureless desert.22 Without the GPS, trying to locate a supply 

point in the desert at night was like searching for the proverbial needle in a 

haystack. Trying to find the owner or consignee of the cargo without adequate 

communications or GPS equipment was a complete waste of scarce 

transportation resources. It was also unsafe on a battlefield of featureless terrain. 

The Global Positioning System helped eliminate these inefficiencies, but very 

few GPS units were issued to each transportation battalion. 

The 32d Transportation Group, commanded by Col. Mike Gaw and aligned 

as the theater's second organic transportation group, arrived in theater towards 

the end of the buildup phase. Its mission was support of the movement of corps 

phase that was ready to commence. The 32d Transportation Group planners 

participated in planning the movement of the XVIII Airborne Corps into its 

attack position. 

As the planning began, the 32d Group planners tried to task organize the 

32d so it could lift an entire division in one move. Constrained by the lack of 

heavy- lift assets, they quickly revised their plans to movement of one entire 

brigade package in one lift. The XVlll Airborne Corps was pleased with the 

concept of placing an entire transportation group with organic command and 

control in support of its relocation and approved the plan. 

The untiring efforts of Transportation Corps units throughout the theater 

ensured that sustainment cargo flowed to logistical bases Alpha, Bravo, Delta, 

and Echo, which were established to support VII and XVIII Corps in their attack 

positions. Over the previous months, truck drivers had moved thousands of tons 

of critical classes of supply to these forward bases almost nonstop. For example, 

Class V (ammunition) alone required hundreds of trucks a day to carry loads to 

forward logistical bases. Fifty truck ammunition convoys from the 7th 

Transportation Group departed the port of ad-Dammam every six hours in 

support of this buildup. 
436 Spearhead of Logistics 

Reserve units, like the 424th Transportation Company (Medium Truck) 

from Galax, Virginia, were instrumental in the success of the logistical buildup 

and subsequent support of the ground offensive. Commanded by Capt. Arthur K. 

Davis, the 424th amassed over 1.1 million accident-free miles transporting 

critical supplies throughout the theater. With the beginning of the ground 

offensive, the 424th found itself hauling sustainment cargo to the advancing 

coalition forces. Specialist Joseph Parks, a truck driver for the 424th, said, 

"When we crossed over the Kuwait border, the craters and debris in the road 

almost always gave us flat tires; as a unit we went through over 500 tires ... also 

the sand storms at times would cut our visibility to almost nothing." Specialist 

Parks' experiences and the 424th's accomplishments were indicative of the 

conditions the Transportation Corps faced in moving cargo to support the 

forward deployed combat units. 

CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT AND THE DRY RUN 

With the fast pace of the buildup's initial stages and the constantly 

changing priorities, transporters were compelled to find innovative ways to 

accomplish their mission. Occasionally, units received vague mission statements 

or conflicting mission priorities. What prevented the confusion from becoming 

chaos was transportation doctrine that provided a framework within 

which to operate. Nonetheless, the senior transportation leadership had 

concerns. Most of them had served in Vietnam and understood the need 

for early centrali zed control to maximize the use of the limited 

transportation assets in the theater. 

Without a movement control agency in theater, Maj. Gen. Gus Pagonis 

created a logistical planning cell that brought logistics planners and subject 

matter experts together to ensure plans were properly supported and to 

troubleshoot the theater's logistical problems. 

The creation of the logistical planning cell in the Support Command took 

transportation planning to a new level. With the second phase of Desert Shield, 

movement of the corps, rapidly approaching, the Provisional Support Command 

set up a two-day logistics exercise (LOGEX) to prepare the SUPCOM staff and 

key leaders for simultaneously supporting the movement of two corps into their 

attack positions. Participants in this LOGEX included SUPCOM commanders 

and their staffs to the battalion level, command sergeants major, key 

commanders and staff officers from the corps, and key officers from the Army 

Central Command staff (Third Army). The LOGEX began with the SUPCOM 

commander's theater overview of the concept for providing theater logistics 
Supporting the Storm 437 

support for the upcoming Desert Storm. Over the next 24 hours, commanders 

and staff officers from every level coordinated and finalized every detail of the 

logistical plan for the future operations.23 

The LOGEX was concluded after every SUPCOM colonel and lieutenant 

colonel had briefed their detailed plans for supporting the operation. Decisions 

and staff coordination were made at the LOGEX, and personnel were not 

released until proper coordination had been completed. By the end of the 

exercise, every key player knew exactly what other players were scheduled to do 

in support of the overall plan. The LOGEX paid big dividends. Effective 

coordination was essential if both corps were to move without clogging the road 

network or allowing one corps to exhaust the available assets. The LOGEX is an 

outstanding example of how an exercise could serve to rehearse a complex 

logistical operation. 

VII CORPS DEPLOYS FROM GERMANY 

As soon as President Bush announced on 8 November 1990 that he was 

doubling the size of the force in the desert, the Transportation Corps prepared to 

help deploy VII Corps from Germany. On 12 November, the 2d Squadron, 2d 

ACR at Bamberg was loaded on railcars and moved to the European ports of 

embarkation. It was only the beginning of the massive deployment of a heavy 

corps, augmented by an infantry division from the United States. The VII Corps 

contingent from United States Army Europe (USAREUR), as reconfigured for 

the Persian Gulf deployment, consisted of 73,369 soldiers from the 1st and 3d 

Armored Divisions, 2d Cavalry Regiment; the VII Corps' combat service and 

combat service support units; and the 2d Corps Support Command with its five 

subordinate support groups. 

Transportation planners from USAREUR arranged 465 trains, 119 truck 

convoys, and 312 barges to move the VII Corps soldiers to their ports of 

embarkation. From the Rhein Main aerial port of embarkation, 435 aircraft 

deployed most of the corps' soldiers to the Saudi Arabian desert. However, additional 

time was required to deploy the 48,600 pieces of corps equipment One hundred nine 

ships transported it in a move plagued by breakdowns and delays. It eventually 

took ninety-seven days to deploy the entire corps.

24 

When it deployed from Germany, the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, 

Kansas was ordered to "round out" the VII Corps. The I st Infantry deployed a 

two-brigade task force from its own resources, along with 166 Reserve and 

National Guard units to furnish the required troops. Transportation planners in 

the United States had to get these assets to their ports of embarkation quicldy?5 
438 Spearhead of Logistics 

37th Transportation Group's convoy operations in the Federal Republic of Gennany. 

Over 49,000 U.S.-based soldiers, which included some 19,900 Reservists and 

National Guard troops, and their equipment, deployed on 143 aircraft and 31 

ships. 26 

As troops and equipment from the United States and Germany closed on 

the theater, the transportation community finalized reception plans to disembark 

VII Corps and move it as quickly as possible to its staging areas. With war 
Supporting the Storm 439 

imminent, time was critical. VII Corps implemented several programs to 

expedite processing personnel and equipment through the ports. The VII Corps 

had an ad hoc port support activity (PSA) headquartered at its "Hotel California" 

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The port support activity was responsible for monitoring 

the arrival of passengers at the King Abdul Aziz Air Base and at King Fahd 

International Airport, the arrival of equipment and supplies at the ports of 

ad-Dammam and al-Jubayl, and coordinating with movement control personnel 

for the forward movement of troops and equipment to their TAAs?7 

VII Corps soldiers could not move into the desert without equipment, so 

the plan was to have them wait in warehouses at the ports for two to three days 

until their equipment arrived. Unfortunately, the plan did not go according to 

schedule. Air transport of the VII Corps into theater worked very efficiently and 

the troops arrived on schedule; however, the lack of sealift, and the numerous 

ship repairs delayed arrival of the equipment. Some units had to wait more than 

two weeks. At times there were more than 30,000 soldiers in a port waiting area 

originally built for a maximum of 17,000?8 

As if the problem of synchronizing the sea and air flow was not enough, 

ship-loading operations at the ports of embarkation emphasized maximizing 

deck space rather than loading to maintain unit integrity. Erom a macro level, it 

made sense to use every bit of a limited sealift capability, but from the combat 

commander's perspective, the lack of unit integrity caused significant 

operational problems. It increased the time a unit needs to close in theater. An 

analysis of nineteen randomly selected combat arms and combat support 

battalions indicated that on average a battalion's equipment arrived on seven 

different vessels over a period of twenty-six days. Further analysis of six 

randomly selected combat service support (CSS) battalions indicated a greater 

dispersion. The average CSS battalion arrived on seventeen different ships over 

a period of thirty-seven days·29 Personnel of the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry 

Regiment, 3d Armor Division, arrived in theater between 28 December and 1 

January 1991 but did not clear the port until 9 February. Its equipment arrived 

on seventeen different ships.30 

The population of the VII Corps reception camps exceeded the planned 

capacity of 17,000 soldiers in two weeks. By 9 January 1991, the camps had a 

population of 35,000 soldiers, raising concerns about sanitation, hygiene, and 

security. 

The VII Corps guidance stated that a battalion could not sustain itself with 

less than 70 percent of its assigned equipment, which meant that units with 90 
440 Spearhead of Logistics 

Intermediate staging base (ISB) housing soldiers waiting for equipment by ship. 

percent of their assigned personnel had to wait as their equipment arrived 

piecemeal on multiple vessels. 

The decision to ship on the basis of effective use of deck space had been 

made after a careful analysis and was chosen as the lesser of two evils. The main 

factor influencing the decision was the critical shortage of sealift assets. With 

adequate sealift available, shipping by unit would have been a viable alternative, 

but with severely limited resources, it was not. Other variables which influenced 

the decision were the marshaling and terminal operations at the sea ports of 

embarkation, the heavy reliance on breakbulk ships, and the lack of complete 

units ready at the ports of embarkation. 

When VII Corps equipment finally began to arrive, transporters were faced 

with two additional problems. First, there were not enough HETs to carry the 

VII Corps armor to the tactical assembly area (TAA) in large unit lifts. The 

second problem was that the theater depended on a single road to transport the 

VII Corps to its jumpoff destination. Thus as the massive amount of VII Corps 

armor arrived and was off-loaded at the ports of debarkation, the capacity of the 

theater's heavy-lift capability was quickly reached. One of the few trucks in 

theater capable oftransporting an Ml tank was the U.S. Army's HET. 
Supporting the Storm 441 

As earlier noted, the United States acquired additional heavy-lift trucks 

from other countries, but most of the contracted trucks were unable to transport 

the Ml A 1 tank. Even the HETs had problems carrying them. During the midday 

heat, HETs had to stop often to keep their tires from exploding in the desert heat. 

The M747 trailer towed by the M911 HET had a rated capacity of 60 tons, while 

the cargo, the MlAl, weighed in excess of 70 tons. Those factors also 

contributed to the backup of VII Corps armor in the ports. The 1st and 3d Armor 

Divisions, under pressure to close on their tactical assembly areas, began road 

marching select units from the port to their T AA. 

Initial plans called for echelon above corps HETs to move brigade-size 

combat units to the attack positions. With the shortage of heavy-lift assets, 

however, transporters quickly realized that moving by brigade or battalion-size 

lifts was impossible. Instead, movement was by company increment, which 

dramatically slowed the projected movement timeline. 

The second problem was that the overwhelming portion of the VII Corps 

movement depended on a single Line of Communications, which was a 

two-lane, hard-surfaced road known as Tapline (Trans-Arabian Pipeline) Road 

or MSR Dodge. The traffic on Tapline Road was nonstop. Deploying units 

moved troops and equipment, while corps transportation units simultaneously 

moved sustainment and unit cargo day and night. The VII Corps deployment to 

its TAA thus competed directly with the other commands using the MSR. Even 

though VII Corps had movement priority on the MSR, sustainment cargo still 

had to go through to the respective logistics bases. General Frederick M. Franks 

Jr., VII Corps commander, best summarized the snags in the deployment process 

by stating that "these problems were certainly not caused by anybody' s lack of 

motivation or unwillingness to do what was required. It was just the 

enormity- the size-of the operation"31 

Throughout the deployment, theater and corps support commands were 

continuously called on to perfonn what sometimes seemed impossible. They 

disembarked the VII Corps through the ports of ad-Dammam and al-Jubayl, while 

simultaneously moving normal theater cargo through the same ports. Over 

110,000 soldiers and the equipment of a heavy corps moved to their assembly 

areas in time to conduct field training in preparation for the ground offensive. 

PHASE II -THE MOVEMENT OF THE TWO CORPS 

Phase II, the movement of XVID Airborne and VII Corps westward from 

the ports and coastal areas of Saudi Arabia was a significant chapter in 

transportation history. No U.S. Army force of its size had been moved in so 

short a time. 
442 Spearhead of Logistics 

The initial guidance called for the two corps to start a simultaneous 

movement to coincide with the start of the air campaign, and the movement must 

have been completed within a 14-day period. The VII Corps would conduct a 

cross-country tactical movement using only its organic heavy-lift assets. The 

much longer XVTII Airborne Corps movement would be conducted over the 

highway and require considerable augmentation from echelons above corps 

(EAC) transportation assets.32 

While the two corps were moving, as noted, sustainment cargo, had to 

continue to flow to the four logistical bases established in the early stages of the 

operation. Planners, however, felt strongly that a fifth logistical base was 

needed, and established Logistical Base Charlie in the extreme northwest portion 

of Saudi Arabia to provide logistical support to the XVIII Airborne Corps. When 

the Army component to Central Command (ARCENT) and 22d SUPCOM 

planners briefed General Schwarzkopf, his opposition to the fifth logistical base 

was clear. In order to mask the movement of the XVIII Corps to its final attack 

positions, no movement of forces in that area could be allowed before initiation 

of the air campaign, in order not to betray the movement of the two corps. 

The transportation planning to support the move was intense. Of special 

concern was the ability of the theater to support the move of the XVlll Corps in 

fourteen day However,. after _much analysis of different aspects of the move, 

transportation planners cr cluded that the entire corps could not be relocated in 

the fourteen-day time frame. 

An alternate plan was devised, to move the XVIII Corps in 21 days and it 

was briefed to the theater commander in chief. Not wishing to see his plan 

delayed too long, General Schwarzkopf wanted to ensure the move would 

indeed be completed in twenty-one days and required the 22d SUPCOM 

commander to sign a document guaranteeing it. Schwarzkopf saw it as 

absolutely essential that the ground forces launch their offensive as soon as the 

air campaign concluded?3 

The XVIII Corps move was massive. With an estimated 28,419 vehicles to 

move, the majority had to move under their own power. But lift requirements 

were still significant with, in all, 535 HET lifts, 1,793 lowboy lifts, and 2,815 

flatbed lifts. These requirements exceeded the organic capability of the corps. 

Concern was expressed that the corps external lift requirements were so great 

because they included more than the doctrinal three days of supplies. The 22d 

SUPCOM plan called for SUPCOM to provide 280 HETs, 280 lowboys, and 

500 flatbeds for a period of twenty-one days against the corps movement . 34 reqmrements. 
Supporting the Storm 443 

The movement plan called for the heavy-lift assets to use the northern 

MSR and for the lighter wheeled vehicles to use the longer southern route. The 

length of the MSRs meant that trucks needed three to four days to make a 

turnaround on the road network. Complicating the movement was the fact that 

both the northern and southern routes intersected at Hafar al-Batin and fed into a 

two-lane MSR for the remainder of the westward movement. 

To ensure the smooth flow of traffic, movement control planners at the 

318th MCA and SUPCOM staff used block times to control movements on the 

different MSRs.35 Block times ensured that the VII Corps had adequate time to 

laterally cross the heavily used MSRs. Block times also allowed sustainment 

cargo to move along the MSRs to support the buildup of Logistics Base Charlie. 

Additionally, block times were essential to allow the engineers to repair the 

roads, especially the northern route. 

The 318th allocated the XVIII Airborne Corps sixteen consecutive hours 

per day on the northern route and two eight-hour blocks on the southern route. 

The corps movement control centers were tasked to ensure that corps movement 

plans supported the theater movement schedule. Transporters at all levels were 

briefed on the plan; then XVIII Airborne Corps conducted a movement exercise 

using a scaled board model and miniature vehicles, walking the different staff 

agencies through the entire movement. The MCC also' did a practice run on 

paper. Like the 22d Support Command LOGEX, the movement exercise 

provided the key to success. 

By 15 January 1991, it was obvious that Iraq intended to ignore United 

Nations Resolution 678, which called for an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from 

Kuwait. After that date, the resolution authorized U.N. members "to use all 

necessary means" to bring about the Iraqi withdrawal. 

At 0050, 17 January 1991, local time, coalition aircraft took off from 

multiple locations to commence the bombing of Iraq. Concurrently, President 

Bush addressed the nation and stated: "The liberation of Kuwait has begun .... We 

will not fail." 

In the early morning hours of 17 January, the two corps movement to 

jump-off position began. With the VII Corps shifting to attack positions and the 

XVIII Airborne beginning their road march up MSR Dodge, the road network 

was packed with moving vehicles. (see Map 41). 

In the lead elements of the XVlli Airborne Corps were Transportation 

Corps soldiers assigned to both corps headquarters and the 1st Corps Support 

Command (COSCOM). A 7th Transportation Battalion advance party, 
444 

Averaged 580 Kllometers 

116,000 Soldiers 

21,000 Wheeled Vehicles 

4,300 Trscked Vehicles 

Averaged 226 Kllometers 

140,000 Soldiers 

32,000 Wheeled Vehicles 

6,600 Tracked Vehicles 

Map41 

Spearhead of Logistics 

commanded by Maj. Victor L. Nelson, was positioned in the lead element of the 

XVIII Corps movement forward. 

Once XVlll Corps was on the Iraqi border, the 7th Transportation 

Battalion transported the corps' ammunition from its stockage area in King 

Khalid Military City (KKMC) to the newly established Logistical Base Charlie. 

As the movement continued, transportation units from throughout 1st COSCOM 

moved critical sustainment cargo to build Logistical Base Charlie into an 

installation capable of sustaining over 100,000 soldiers in combat. 

By 7 February, the movement was complete. The Transportation Corps 

and the units it supported moved over 250,000 soldiers, 53,000 wheeled 

vehicles, and 10,900 tracked vehicles over 400 kilometers?7 The success of this 

movement was due to three factors. First, the air campaign established air 
Supporting the Storm 445 

supremacy and allowed the MSRs to remain free of interdiction, which meant a 

continuous flow of personnel and equipment to their objective sites. Next, the 

establishment of convoy support centers significantly enhanced the ability of the 

Transportation Corps to marshal and support the large convoys moving along the 

MSRs. Last, but not least, the spirit and determination of personnel engaged, 

particularly the truck drivers, provided the key to success. 

FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE GROUND OFFENSIVE 

Arrival at their forward positions did not mean the corps were ready to 

engage the enemy. Critical supplies had to be brought forward to logistics bases 

to build up stockage levels before the initiation of the ground offensive. Theater 

and corps truck units, which moved day and night to transport the two corps into 

their positions, continued the tempo, hauling sustainment cargo to logistical 

bases. (See Map 42). 

At theater level, 7th Transportation Group focused on the continued 

movement of sustainment cargo along the southern route, while the 32d 

Transportation Group hauled cargo along the northern half of the system. XVIll 

Airborne Corps trucks, assigned to the 1st COSCOM, continued to move 

supplies from XVill Corps stockage areas in KKMC to Log Base Charlie'. A 

large portion of this effort was devoted to moving the XVIll Corps' 

forty-five-day supply of ammunition. Around-the-clock transportation units 

from 1st COSCOM moved ammunition undetected up to the Log Base Charlie 

ammunition supply point just inside the Iraqi border. VII Corps trucks 

essentially performed the same mission for the VII Corps, moving critical 

supplies from KKMC to Log Base Echo. 

The development of a forward landing strip (FLS) in the center of Log 

Base Charlie augmented the overburdened road network. Supporting the build 

up of the XVIII Airborne Corps logistics base, a one-mile portion of Tapline 

Road (MSR Dodge) was closed off and converted to a landing strip for C-130 

aircraft. With the assistance of the XVIII Corps engineers, an MSR bypass road 

was cut out of the desert, allowing traffic to continue to flow around the 

flightline operations. The engineers also built an addition to the airstrip on the 

desert sand, which allowed waiting aircraft to park or position themselves for 

uploading or downloading. 

The XVIII Airborne Corps FLS, operated by the 403d Transportation 

Company, had the mission of establishing a critical cargo transfer operation in 

support of a C-130 aircraft shuttle from Dhahran Air Base to the Forward 

Landing Strip during daylight hours. Soldiers from the 403d performed a unique 
SAUDI 

ARABIA 

J 

ASP· AMMUNmON SUPPLY POINT 

CSA ·CORPS STORAGE AREA 

TSA ·THEATER STORAGE AREA 

0 

MAIN SUPPLY 

ROOTE(MSR) 

100 200 

AD-OAMMAM • BASTOGNE 240 KM 

BASTOGNE • KKMC 260 KM 

RIYADH· KKMC 460 KM 

RIYADH· JEOOAH 962 KM 

Map42 

..0 

~+~ 

~ 0~~ 

£ 

en 

"S 

... 

3-

:: 

c. 

g. 

c8 

iii" 

~ 
Supporting the Storm 447 

View of Tapline Road landing strip from a C-130 on final approach. 

mission by actually staging incoming aircraft and downloading them with 

organic 10,000 pound capacity forklifts. Although these were both Air Force 

missions, the shortage of Air Force support personnel compelled the Army 

transporters to pick up the slack and run the flight strip. Once downloaded, cargo 

was staged in either the FLS pallet yard or break-bulk point. Segregated by 

major unit, the cargo spent very little time on the ground. Pallets destined for one 

unit or consignee were either put in the pallet yard or loaded immediately on 

507th Transportation Group trucks. Pallets with multiple consignees were 

broken down at the break-bulk point and shipped either break-bulk or palletized 

to their final destination. 

As the FLS operation continued, the flow of cargo intensified. Daily, more 

than 100 pallets of cargo were shipped from the FLS to final destination. 

Additionally, as the theater began pushing throughput cargo to the XVTII Corps, 

containers for single and multiple consignees began arriving by truck at the FLS. 

At this point, the 403d was operating a container yard in addition to 

downloading a continuous flow of aircraft. 

Containers with a single consignee were then transported to the respective 

division support area (DSA). There, the DSA picked up the responsibility to 

unload the containers and push the cargo into the division. Containers in the 

DSA brought questions concerning how far forward containers should be 

shipped, and if the DSA was the ultimate delivery point, then where were they 
448 Spearhead of Logistics 

going to get their container handling equipment. Neither of those questions were 

answered during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. As of the writing of this book, the 

problem was under analysis by the U.S. Army Transportation Center and School 

and the Combined Arms Support Command. 

The Forward Landing Stri.p also served as a means to push emergency 

resupply of fuel into the area of operations. C-130s, loaded with 250-gallon fuel 

bladders filled with JPl , flew into the FLS. There the fuel was pumped into 

waiting heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMMT) tankers and 

5,000-gallon trailers staged beside the flightline. Fuel handlers coupled hoses 

from the C-130 wings to the waiting fuel trucks. As the trucks departed to carry 

the fuel forward, the aircraft returned for more fuel. Though effective for 

emergencies, this method could not have supported a major resupply to the two 

corps. 

In retrospect, the XVIII Airborne Corps forward landing strip was a 

complete success. During its six weeks of operations, nearly 1,000 sorties were 

flown with an average ground time of twelve minutes. More than 9,000 short 

tons of supplies, 250,000 gallons of fuel, and 900 passengers were off-loaded. 

Additionally, the FLS was expanded to become an air medical evacuation point, 

mortuary affairs site, and a container drop point for host nation drivers.

38 

MASSING TRANSPORTATION ASSETS 

One of the many success stories of Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm was the massing of transportation assets to move large forces and 

significant amounts of supplies. With severe limitations on command and 

control due to the scarcity of communications equipment, transporters looked for 

innovative ways to support the movement of entire divisions into their attack 

positions. The concept was the transportation consolidation center (TCC). 

The TCC concept was built around an ad hoc organization that commanded 

and controlled truck companies from several different commands, and that was 

collocated to facilitate control and centralize the support requirements of a 

Transportation organization of major size. 

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the TCC concept was 

used on three different occasions. (see Map 43). A TCC supported the relocation 

of the 1st Cavalry Division from its location near Pulaski Barracks to its tactical 

assembly area at KKMC. A second TCC was established to support the 

movement of the XVIll Airborne Corps from its Desert Shield locations to its 

TAAs in western Saudi Arabia. The concept was used for the third time to 
Supporting the Storm 449 

support the redeployment of the XV ill Airborne Corps from the T A As to the 

redeployment assembly areas (RAA) after the cessation of hostilities. 

The 330th Movement Control Center, commanded by Lt. Col. John C. 

Race, set up and operated the Transportation Consolidation Center to move the 

1st Cavalry Division, using its own organic personnel assets. Operating on little 

notice, the MCC brought together the leadership and expertise to orchestrate the 

move of over 6,740 vehicles. Included in that number were the 787 HETs and 

1,259 tractor/trailer combinations that had been task organized to form the TCC. 

According to Lieutenant Colonel Race, two significant lessons were 

learned from this operation. First, was the need for a formal command and 

control structure to run a TCC. Task organizing from limited personnel 

resources was taxing on existing organizations. Second, the lack of 

communications significantly impacted on the MCC's capability to control 

movements and pass on critical information. 

Near the conclusion of the 1st Cavalry Division's move to King Khalid 

Military City, the TCC was told to begin the movement of the 3d Armored 

Cavalry Regiment, which was not part of the lst Cavalry Division. Hampered by 

a lack of communications and the need to move two major units at the same 

time, weaknesses in the operation began to show. Trucks initially sent to the 3d 

ACR area never arrived, a circumstance never fully explained. Compounding the 

problem was the increased amount of truck turnaround time caused by the 

additional distance to the 3d ACR. The demand for trucks exceeded the supply, 

and the 29th Transportation Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Joel L. McGrady, 

was called in to provide not only the battalion's vehicles, but also the battalion 

headquarters to run the TCC operations. Upon arrival of the 29th, the 330th 

MCC returned to movement control activities. 

The assignment was a tough task for the 29th. Like the 330th MCC, they 

were simultaneously involved with other operations and lacked the depth of 

personnel to adequately staff the TCC. With the MCC managing movement 

control and the 29th Transportation Battalion Headquarters controlling the TCC, 

the operation began to smooth out, and the 29th was able to get positive control 

of the numerous Saudi and French HETs. Unfortunately, communications still 

was a problem. 

As if inadequate communications were not enough, the XVill Airborne 

Corps priority of movement changed almost by the hour. The situation 

deteriorated to the point that the corps chief of staff had to approve personaJiy 

changes to the movement plan. Unit requests for transport were made to the 

movement control team (MCI') at the transportation consolidation center. A 
D CMA 

Rhafa 0 

KKMC 

IRAQ 

Hafar ai..Satin 

3: 

~ 

~ 

! 

Not to Scale 

Map43 

TCC Phase II 

I 

TCC Phase I 

Oammam I Dhahran 

~ 

(/) 

"i .., 

3-

n> 

.., 

Q. 

a 

c8 

~ 

~-
Supporting the Storm 451 

request was then transmitted to the movement control center and reported to the 

corps headquarters. Based on the impact of the change, the corps chief of staff 

would approve or disapprove the request. Even with these problems, the TCC 

effectively controlled the XVIII Corps move. 

This initial success led transportation planners to use the concept for 

the XVIII Corps' redeployment to its redeployment assembly areas. The 

TCC took the XVIII Corps transportation truck assets and consolidated 

them with the 32d Transportation Group's echelons above corps truck 

assets, as closely as possible to the geographical center of the XVIII 

Corps tactical assembly areas. Run by the 7th Transportation Battalion, 

commanded by Lt. Col. Fredrick C. Perkins, the TCC was staffed by members 

of the 330th MCC, 507th, and 32d Transportation Group, and the 7th Battalion's 

organic staff. 

In the middle of the desert, the TCC operated a self-contained, centralized 

truck motor pool, staffed with over 2,500 soldiers and twenty-two truck 

companies. It also had a Provisional Bus Company, which was established using 

host nation and U.S. soldiers to transport redeploying units to their departure 

airfields. 

Drawing on the lessons of the previous two TCC operations, the 7th 

Transportation Battalion was given satellite, landline, and radio communications 

systems to coordinate with its customers. The 7th Transportation Battalion also 

studied the way it would lay out the TCC. Previous TCCs centralized the 

maintenance capability, but the 7th kept the maintenance capability at the 

company level. Like companies were colocated so the maintenance sections 

could coordinate their efforts. Each company was laid out identically, so visitors 

would know how to find the maintenance or operations center of any company 

assigned to the TCC. (see Map 44). 

Taskings to move XVIII Corps equipment and personnel came from 

forward movement control teams or division transportation officers to the 330th 

MCC cell at the TCC. The corps MCC then prioritized taskings and passed 

them on to the TCC operations center, which had total visibility of truck assets 

and could task the appropriate unit with the mission. As shown in Map 44, fuel, 

repair parts, limited maintenance, recovery support, and life support were aU 

centrally located within the TCC. 

By centrally locating the transportation units and all required support in 

one area, the shortfalls associated with communications were minimized. At 

night, the TCC operations center conducted coordination meetings to ensure 

smooth operation the following day. Division commanders or their 
452 Spearhead of Logistics 

TCC #3 LAYOUT 

BET 

Compallies 

1 =M~Ium Truck 

~· Laundry I 11111 

Compaaiesi 

-

! Stapua: Hospital Ill 

Area 

Helipad 

-

Exit ' -p· 1 Mile 

Map44 

representatives could also stop at one central location for a briefing on the status 

of their move. The TCC concept meant the corps' movement was executed 

smoothly. In a three-week period, the entire XVTII Corps moved 30,000 vehicles 

and 1 ,200 containers over a distance of 350 miles. Transportation units assigned 

to the TCC amassed over 6 million accident-free miles in the relocation process. 

"A TRAILER IS A TRAILER" 

One of the most significant challenges for the theater during the 

preparation for the ground offensive was maintaining an adequate supply of 

M872 trailers at each of the key logistical sites to move sustainment cargo. With 

the sheer magnitude of the sustainment cargo movements, there was a general 

consensus that if enough trailers were available, the system would be selfsustaining. In other words "A trailer is a trailer." No matter who it belonged to, 

any truck driver could use it regardless of unit designation. 
Supporting the Storm 453 

Unfortunately, this theory of loose control failed to consider human nature 

and the shortage of materials handling equipment. As the trailers moved cargo 

forward to the logistics bases, receiving units lacked the capability to unload the 

trailers. Combat units, expecting the movement requirements of the upcoming 

ground war, kept a majority of their supplies on these loaded trailers. Corps units 

stockpiled hundreds of U.S. Army trailers loaded with critical supplies. Two 

weeks before the ground war began, the 7th Transportation Group was missing 

nearly 2,000 trailers that had not been returned to the system. By early February, 

the shortage was about to bring the movement of sustainment cargo to a 

complete stop. 

The theater's trailer problem was compounded by the lack of yard tractors 

assigned to the trailer transfer points. With the magnitude of ammunition 

moving throughout the theater, TIPs were routinely assigned to support a corps 

storage area (CSA) or ammunition supply point (ASP). The yard tractors policed 

empty trailers in the CSA or ASP and returned them to the TIP for maintenance. 

Moving the heavy volume of ammunition with an inadequate number of yard 

tractors meant the TIPs fell behind in trailer maintenance. Often, drivers who 

were told to bring back an empty trailer selected any trailer available, which 

meant that trailers with flat tires, unserviceable brakes, or no landing legs were 

hauled away only to be abandoned later. It was not uncommon to see 

unserviceable trailers scattered along the MSR. Instead of fixing flat tires, 

drivers simply unhooked their trailers and found the next serviceable one. 

There was no way for the truck driver to tell the difference between a 

theater trailer or one that belonged to a corps, unless he or she could identify the 

trailer number and knew where that unit was located. To make matters worse, 

some units acquired trailers by painting over the original bumper numbers and 

adding their own. At the end of the war, supply sergeants and company 

commanders stationed at the theater redeployment reception points checked the 

serial numbers of trailers desperately trying to reestablish property 

accountability prior to redeploying. 

The problem was perplexing, and transportation planners tried several 

different solutions. First, movement control teams were tasked with how to fmd 

out what was moving through the logistics bases. First destination reporting 

points (FDRPs) were set up at the entrance and exits of all logistics bases. 

Staffed by the Theater Materiel Management Center (TMMC) and augmented 

by military police, the FDRPs launched an all-out effort to account for the 

trailers moving in and out. Despite a significant effort, the FDRPs failed to solve 

the trailer problem. Lack of movements personnel, convoy control, multiple 
454 Spearhead of Logistics 

destinations of trucks within convoys, and uneven turnaround times made it 

impossible to keep a detailed account of the trailers. 

The next proposed solution to the trailer shortage problem was a theater 

movement program, which transportation planners called an apportionment 

plan. Essentially the plan identified all EAC transportation assets, the 

requirements those assets were committed against, the percentage of assets 

committed to various requirements, and the objective tonnage by unit to be 

moved. 

The apportionment plan provided complete visibility over what was 

moving throughout the transportation network. Movement control teams tracked 

convoys from their point of origin to their final destination. Upon arrival at final 

destination, the convoy commander was required to report to the Movement 

Control Team/FDRP to find out if priorities or the status for the next mission 

had changed. 

The apportionment plan provided commanders at all levels with the 

increased visibility needed to control the flow of supplies, change priorities and 

mass assets for a priority move. The only problem was that the development and 

implementation of this plan came too late. By the time the plan was 

implemented, the theater had lost control of over 50 percent of its trailers, and 

without them, an effective apportionment plan could not be implemented. The 

trailers had to be located and recovered. Teams of officers and senior 

noncomm.issioned officers were formed to hunt for the trailers. They flew over 

the corps area with video cameras trying to locate them. To no one's surprise, 

hundreds of trailers uploaded with ammunition were found in the corps sectors. 

Although the trailers were found, any large scale recovery was prevented by the 

start of the ground offensive. 

Despite the problems encountered during the buildup of the logistics bases 

and the movement of two corps, over 300,000 tons of supplies were moved 

forward to the logistic bases. The ultimate test of how well the Transportation 

Corps performed its mission was decided by how well the combat soldier was 

supplied when the ground offensive started. 

PHASE Ill - GROUND OFFENSIVE 

By 24 February 1991, the U.S. Air Force had performed the lion's share of 

the single most intensive air campaign in history. Flying over 94,000 sorties, 

Coalition forces prepared the battlefield for what would be a lighting fast ground 

offensive against one of the largest armies in the world. 

As the U.S. Army chief of staff's official history states: "At 0400 local 

time, G-Day, 24 February, two artillerymen hundreds of miles apart pulled the 
Supporting the Storm 455 

lanyards on their howitzers to begin Operation Desert Stonn. Across the 

CENTCOM front, 620,000 soldiers, marines, and ainnen from more than 37 

nations attacked an Iraqi force then estimated at 545,000 men. Offshore in the 

Gulf, Marine amphibious forces threatened a seaborne landing as the Arab joint 

forces command (JFC-East), a Saudi-led combined Arab force, attacked up the 

Khafji-Kuwait City highway. On their western flank, Lt. Gen. Walt Boomer's 

1st and 2d Marine Divisions crossed the border to breach Fortress Kuwait The 

Tiger Brigade, with its newly issued MIAls, provided punch for the more 

"lightly equipped marines. 

Once the Marines cleared a lane through the Iraqi defenses, the Tiger 

Brigade took on the Iraqi armored reserves. Farther west, Arab JFC-North and 

VII Corps' 1st Infantry Division attacked the Iraqi security zone to clear out 

forward reconnaissance elements and artillery observation posts in preparation 

for the next day's attack against the main line of resistance. On the extreme 

western flank almost 400 kilometers from the coast, XVIII Airborne Corps 

attacked northward to seal off the theater."41 

A new method of controlling the forward flow of logistical units was 

developed to ensure the combat success of the xvrn Airborne Corps. The corps 

marshalling area (CMA), offered a centralized facility from which to stage 

convoys, feed and billet drivers, and provide fuel and maintenance support to 

vehicles. The 507th Rear Corps Support Group, subordinate to the 1st 

COSCOM, assigned the CMA mission to the 7th Transportation Battalion. 

Located on MSR Texas, right on the Iraqi border, the CMA was capable of 

staging forty march units of twenty-four vehicles each. With thirty refuel on the 

move sites and numerous contact crews, the CMA released 99.9 percent of the 

staged vehicles into Iraq. 

The CMA also had a significant impact on driver morale. Because of 

delays in clearing MSR Texas, some drivers had to to spend 24 hours in the 

CMA waiting movement clearance. While there, drivers were able to get hot 

meals, latrine facilities, and a place to sleep, so they could rest before their 

d 0 Ir 42 a vance mto aq. 

One factor that contributed greatly to the success of the ground war was the 

abundant stockpile of critical supplies that allowed combat forces to move 

rapidly during the ground offensive. Stocks established at the logistical bases 

before the ground offensive included roughly a 29-day of supply of food and 

water, a 5.2-day supply of fuel, and a 45-day supply of ammunition.43 

The challenge facing the Transportation Corps was how to support the 

advancing combat forces during the ground offensive. The VII Corps needed 
456 Spearhead of Logistics 

9,000 tons of ammunition and 2.4 million gallons of fuel per day. The XVTII 

Airborne Corps planned daily consumption rates that included 5,000 tons of 

ammunition and 2.1 million gallons of fuel. Transportation planners estimated 

that more than I, 700 trucks were needed to provide this level of support on a 

daily basis.44 

The consumption rates, coupled with the long Line of Communications, 

exceeded the U.S. ability to resupply the combat forces. Consequently, planners 

proposed constructing three provisional supply bases (Golf, November, and 

Oscar), which were never needed. Behind the two advancing corps, engineers 

built roads which were essential to the resupply mission because the majority of 

the line-haul trucks were commercial type M915 tractors, which could not 

transport supplies cross-country. To augment ground transportation, the 7th 

Transportation Group developed a plan to operate a logistics-over-the-shore 

operation if a Kuwaiti port could not be taken and used.45 

To support these plans, theater transportation planners assigned echelons 

above corps assets to support the advancing corps. The 766th Transportation 

BattaHon, with its six medium truck companies, was in direct support of the VII 

Corps. The !85th Transportation Battalion, with its five medium truck 

companies, would support the XVIII Corps. In addition, the 369th 

Transportation Battalion with five HET companies and an Egyptian HET 

Battalion with 100 HETs were centrally located to respond to any heavy-lift 

requirements. 

The theater assets, in direct support of the two corps, fell under operational 

control of the 32d Transportation Group. The other theater transportation group, 

the 7th Group, continued to move sustainment cargo along the theater's road 

network to ensure that the logistical bases maintained their critical program level 

of supply. 

In addition to a road network, the XVIII Corps had envisioned the use of 

forward landing strips to fly critical supplies as far forward as possible. 

Transportation soldiers uploaded airfield packages and remained on standby 

throughout the entire ground offensive, should they become necessary. 

When the ground offensive met with unexpectedly rapid success, the 

requirement for a mature transportation network deep in Iraq never materialized. 

But despite the short duration of the ground offensive, it was still necessary to 

keep the ground forces supplied. Trucks carrying critical supplies during the 

ground offensive and thereafter were greeted with heavy rains that quickly 

turned soil into quagmires. Despite the limited cross country capability of the 

M915 tractor, transporters were able to deliver their cargo. Not a single combat 
Supporting the Storm 457 

Convoys returning from Kuwait with enemy prisoners of war. 

operation was hampered for lack of supplies, a tribute to the Transportation 

Corps. 

The overwhelming victory achieved by the coalition brought a new set of 

transportation challenges. Tens of thousands of surrendering enemy prisoners of 

war (EPWs) required transportation to be moved to collection points and 

eventually to EPW camps. Transportation planners had anticipated a rather high 

number of prisoners and had planned to transport them on returning ammunition 

trucks. However, because the ground offensive ended so quickly, most 

ammunition trucks were never downloaded. Transportation planners had to 

marshal all types of vehicles to move EPWs: buses, circus trucks and a variety of 

military trucks. 46 

The concept of providing dedicated echelons above corps transportation 

assets to each corps was extremely effective. The 32d Transportation Group, 

concentrated solely on the dedicated support of the two corps, and the dedicated 

truck battalions were very responsive to the corps movement requests. The 7th 

Group was allowed to focus solely on ensuring theater sustainment cargo moved 

from the theater ports to the forward logistical bases. 

As the ground offensive came to a swift conclusion, the corps were left 

with gigantic stockpiles of unused supplies. Of the 300,000 tons of stockpiled 
458 Spearhead of logistics 

supplies, only a very small portion was ever used. More than 157,000 tons of 

ammunition had to be retrograded.47 

REDEPLOYMENT CEASE-FIRE TALKS AT SAFWAN 

The Central Command also tasked the Transportation Corps to transport 

the resources necessary to establish a facility to conduct the cease-ftre talks, 

once it realized the war would end shortly. The 594th Transportation Company 

was tasked to transport the tents, tables, chairs, and a multitude of other ancillary 

items. With the main battle area littered with destroyed Iraqi equipment and the 

MSRs blocked, the 594th could not complete its mission by road. The 594th 

transported the supplies to the Kuwait International Airport, where Capt. David 

Koleda, operations officer for lst Area Support Group, supervised the transfer of 

necessary items to CH-47 helicopters, which flew them to Safwan. 

On 3 March I 99 J, General Schwarzkopf landed at Safwan airfield to 

conduct the cease-fire talks with Iraq. In addition to Lt. Gen. Fredrick Franks 

and other combat arms leaders, logisticians were also represented. The senior 

logistics commander, Maj. Gen. Pagonis, was present representing the 

importance that logistics played in the swift victory of the coalition forces. After 

negotiations, Schwarzkopf announced that Iraq had accepted all of the ceasefire 

terms and that Coalition prisoners would be repatriated in the next several 

days.48 

With the rapid conclusion of the ground war to liberate Kuwait, the 

Transportation Corps found itself quickly inundated with the tasks both of 

retrograde of surrendering Iraqi soldiers and the support of the forward deployed 

forces in Iraq and Kuwait. 

REDEPLOYMENT 

Prior to the cease-ftre talks, CENTCOM issued ARCENT initial 

redeployment orders. By the redeployment plan, it would take at least ten 

months to get U.S. forces out of Saudi Arabia. According to General 

Schwarzkopfs policy of "first-in, first-out," the XVIII Airborne Corps led the 

redeployment back to the United States, so that it could resume its worldwide 

contingency support mission. VII Corps forces relieved XVIII Corps until the 

final U.N. accords were complete. On 23 March 1991, VII Corps officially 

assumed the occupation mission in Iraq, allowing Lt. Gen. Gary Luck to begin 

redeploying XVIII Airborne Corps forces. 
Supporting the Storm 459 

The ARCENT established five redeployment assembly areas near the 

major ports of embarkation in Saudi Arabia: at IGng Khalid Military City, 

Dhahran, IGng Fahd International Airport, ai-Jubayl, and Doha, Kuwait. The 

assembly areas were used to support units while they prepared their equipment 

for storage or shipment and processed their soldiers for fli.ghts back to the United 

States and Europe. Each area had wash sites and provisional units to assist with 

cleaning and repairing equipment. Once the equipment was ready, U.S. 

Agriculture Department and U.S. Customs inspectors certified that the 

equipment could be processed for redeployment.49 

The Transportation Corps mission was to move U.S. units from their 

tactical assembly areas to the redeployment assembly areas as rapidly as 

possible. Even though the two corps moved in sequence rather than 

simultaneously, the transportation support to line haul the units back to their 

RAAs was as intense as the initial movement to the ground offensive. 

To speed the redeployment, the missions of the theater's two transportation 

groups changed. The 32d Transportation Group assumed the entire line-haul 

mission to provide lift support to the redeploying corps, while simultaneously 

moving the retrograde sustainment cargo back to the ports. It assumed control of 

all EAC truck assets on 1 April 1991, while the 7th Transportation Group 

focused on terminal operations. 

As XVlli Corps redeployed from its T AAs, theater transportation planners 

were busy formulating a plan to move the massive amounts of sustainment cargo 

left in the logistic bases. They assembled representatives from the theater and 

corps MMC, MCC, Theater Army Movement Control Agency (T AMCA), mode 

operators, and various staff sections to identify the movement requirements and 

what EAC assets were available to their movement. They found that the trailer 

problem had actually gotten worse, and that only 20 percent of the EAC trailers 

could be accounted for. Also, not all the material managers were present, so that 

some of the movement requirements could not be identified. 

Instead of creating a movements program, the theater created the Theater 

Distribution Center (TDC). Its purpose was to centralize the material 

management and transportation functions under one roof. The TDC had a 

material management section, a movements control section, and a mode 

operators section. All theater movement requirements were funneled through 

and coordinated by the TDC. Overwhelming trailer problems and the speed in 

which the entire redeployment process occurred, precluded the TDC concept 

from ever being fully implemented. 
460 Spearhead of Logistics 

The theater's trailer situation worsened. The massive number of trailers 

uploaded before the ground war had been subsequently used to support the 

advancing corps. Trailers were hauled either cross country over the rough Iraqi 

terrain or along damaged MSRs in order to keep the two corps sustained. The 

net effect was a trailer fleet that was showing the strains of months of continuous 

operations. Most of the trailers that could be accounted for, were in questionable 

condition. The trailer maintenance program, developed by the theater in the early 

stages of Desert Shield, was never fully implemented or enforced, and the result 

was a trailer system that could not effectively support redeployment operations. 

One reason the trailer maintenance system never worked was there was no 

pride of ownership or accountability. The trailers were not in a centralized trailer 

fleet, but belonged to the corps to which they were assigned. Without the ability 

to rapidly identify trailers, no one was held accountable for maintenance. Several 

units did a superb job maintaining the trailers they managed to control, but few 

units managed to control their own trailers, and they were only maintained by 

the units which owned them. The understaffed and overworked trailer transfer 

points were unable to pick up the slack. 

In the redeployment as in the buildup, poorly maintained trailers littered 

the sides of the MSRs, and no one could really tell whose trailers they were 

without close examination. A color coding system assigned identifying colors to 

each group's trailers was proposed. The color painted along the headboard of 

each trailers would allow them to be identified easily. Unfortunately, this simple 

and, one would think, effective proposal was never implemented on a large 

scale. 

The severity of the trailer problem was exemplified by the numerous mode 

operators who lost confidence in the TIP system. Drivers bypassed the TIPs to 

make deliveries to the fmal destination just to ensure they got their original 

trailer back. In one instance, an EAC convoy was forced to stop on the MSR by 

an officer who ordered the drivers to give him the trailers they were pulling. 

The trailer problem was never resolved and remained a problem for future 

transporters to solve. 50 

As the XVIII Corps redeployed, its organic transportation units deployed 

with it. With the corps redeployment, the EAC transportation units also drew 

down and redeployed. The final objective was to turn over the entire linehaul 

mission to contractors by 1 July 1991 . To provide command and control of the 

contractors, a small cadre of transporters was left to operate the provisional 702d 

Battalion and its four truck companies. Unit equipment and retrograde 

sustainment cargo arrived at ports in Saudi and Kuwait, and the 7th 
Supporting the Storm 461 

Transportation Group shifted into high gear to load it for redeployment to the 

United States. 

When the 82d and JOist Divisions arrived at their assigned redeployment 

assembly areas, problems appeared. Without clear movement plans, units 

arrived at the RAAs as quickly as they could move from their tactical assembly 

areas. The uncontrolled flow of troops and equipment quickly inundated the 

washing and inspection facilities, resulting in additional confusion. Applying 

inconsistent standards, Department of Agriculture inspectors contributed to the 

confusion. When the Department of Agriculture finally did begin certification on 

24 March 1991, two weeks after redeployment began, some inspectors certified 

equipment for shipment one day, only to have different inspectors reject the 

. h d 51 same equ1pment t e next ay: 

Redeployment loading procedures were significantly more stringent than 

those for deployment. During the deployment of equipment to Saudi Arabia, the 

Department of Defense had granted a waiver to combat load the vessels destined 

for the Southwest Asia theater. With the end of hostilities, that waiver was no 

longer in effect. USTRANSCOM reimposed peacetime requirements for loading 

equipment on the ships supporting the redeployment. Military Traffic 

Management Command and terminal service battalions loaded ships in order to 

maximize the use of space, rather than ensure unit integrity. As a result, some 

critical equipment, particularly things packed in shipping containers, did not 

arrive back at home station for months. These factors slowed the return of units 

to full combat readiness.52 

Regardless of the constraints it experienced, the Transportation Corps 

demonstrated its ability to support a massive redeployment operation. 

Transportation planners estimated 400 ships were needed to move the large 

stockpile of equipment and retrograde supplies back to their points of origin in 

the United States and Europe. In total, over 1,386,308 short tons of cargo were 

redeployed including: I 03, 124 wheeled vehicles, I ,224 aircraft, 12,447 tracked 

vehicles and 26,062 containers. By any standard the quantities were staggering. 

With the theater's ship load capability, transportation planners allocated 10 

months to redeploy the theater's supplies.

53 

Simultaneously, transportation units redeployed nearly 5,000 soldiers a 

day from the theater's aerial ports. In total it took 2,126 flights to support such a 

lift. Aircraft eventually moved over 300,000 personnel and 115,466 short tons of 

cargo. The Military Airlift Command provided the bulk of the airlift resources 

with 343 aircraft while the CRAF program accounted for another 117. Foreign 

aircraft accounted for an additional113.54 
462 Spearhead of logistics 

There can be no doubt that transportation was the linch pin for the success 

of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The Transportation Corps drove more than 

50 million miles (over 196,000 per day), participated in the reception and 

discharge of over 8,860 aircraft, and discharged over 500 ships with 5,700,000 

metric tons of cargo. The fact that the Transportation Corps was able to 

accomplish this in the face of equipment shortages, organizational shortfalls, and 

the chaos of a wartime environment in a hostile climate is a tribute to the corps 

well-trained and highly motivated officers, noncommissioned officers, and 

soldiers. 
463 

CHAPTER XV 

The Evolution 

of Movement Control 

Movement control, a wartime command function, is exercised to maximize 

the use of limited transportation capacities to accomplish the assigned mission 

within command priorities. It comprises the policies and procedures to plan, 

schedule, route and control the capacity of transportation resources to move 

people and material over lines of communication. Movement control is exercised 

to balance competing requirements against scarce resources, with cost 

considerations secondary. In peacetime, and in those wartime situations where 

transportation was adequate to meet requirements, the commercial term "traffic 

management" applies because the orientation of the function is on cost.1 

The effectiveness of movement control is highly dependent on the 

capabilities of consignees in the lines of communication to receive and unload 

cargo promptly, a function of their manning, equipment, training, and ability to 

identify the contents of shipments. Therefore, movement control is inextricably 

linked with asset intransit visibility. It helped logistical operators unload cargo 

promptly, release transportation assets for reuse, and reduce duplicate requisitioning 

and shipping of items that were on hand but not identifiable for issue, a situation 

which generated excess cargo and wastes transportation resources. 

HISTORY OF MOVEMENT CONTROL OPERATIONS AND DOCTRINE 

Army movement control doctrine is a product of over sixty years of 

evolution. Begun in 1932, it was refined during World War II and in numerous 

other conflicts. In every one, transportation requirements exceeded capabilities, 

requiring centralized control of available transportation resources. 

In the United States during World War II, the Chief of Transportation 

exercised movement control for the Commander, Army Service Forces, by 

closely controlling passenger and freight movements. All movements of forty or 
464 Spearhead of Logistics 

more passengers (one coach load) or one carload of freight had to be cleared 

with the Traffic Control Division. Oversea movements of troops and equipment 

were cleared with the Movements Division. These divisions provided shipment 

routing and scheduling releases while other controls were exercised over small 

export and express shipments, and oversized loads. As the war progressed, the 

Chief of Transportation delegated release authority for selected movements to 

zone and post transportation officers. He also established holding and 

reconsignment points and personnel staging areas to serve as surge tanks for the 

ports, reinforce releases, and take care of emergency congestion of ports of 

embarkation. Controls were exercised to prevent the congestion of overseas 

ports, based on information from the theaters. Other measures were implemented 

such as consolidating small shipments into carload or truckload lots, and 

programs that increased the average size of a carload from 24 tons in 1941, to 30 

tons in 1945, improving the capacity of available transportation. Movement 

control operations in the zone of interior did not solve all the problems 

engendered by shortages of transportation capacity, but did a remarkable job in 

supporting the theaters and maximizing the use of transportation assets.2 

Because they did not want to conflict with the existing British movement 

system, U.S. Army forces, that were deployed to the United Kingdom in 1942 

modeled their organization on the British system of movement control. It was a 

logical choice. Britain was already at war and its transportation system was 

strained, but the British system worked. Eventually, that system became the 

base line for future U.S. movement control doctrine. 

The British assigned responsibility for military movement control to a 

directorate of the Quartermaster General's office that operated at the same level 

as the general staff sections of operations and logistics with the same authority. 

British doctrine stressed the importance of adhering to a Movements Program, 

published by the theater Army logistical commander. The program allocated 

specific transportation capacity to principal shippers of people and cargo for a 

specified period of an operation, and precluded use of transportation capacity for 

unprogrammed movements. Standardized procedures, augmented by periodic 

directives, gave British movement control officials authority to use all measures 

necessary to implement the movement program. 

The U.S. model for operations on the Continent kept responsibility for 

control of shipping under the Communications Zone G4, and decentralized 

control of most transportation operations to subordinate sections which exercised 

movement control within their assigned areas. The decentralization of movement 

control did not end until 1 January 1945, when the first movement program was 
The Evolution of Movement Control 465 

prepared by the Chief of Transportation and issued by the 04, following the 

success of allocating capacities of the Red Ball Express on a daily basis in 

August 1944. The lack of centralized control of all transportation capacity for 

long hauls was a major weakness of transportation operations on the Continent? 

The adoption of British movements control concepts was not universally 

accepted by U.S. commanders and headquarters. Too many commanders felt it 

was a limitation of their authority to control their own resources. Inevitably, 

these concerns led to friction which undermined the effectiveness of efforts to 

plan, execute, and control movement in the theater. In some cases, there were 

serious repercussions. During the invasion of France, bad weather threatened to 

cancel the entire operation. The situation cleared, but the English Channel 

remained too rough for some of the smaller craft. This eventuality was foreseen 

by the planners who issued an alternate plan reflecting the reduced lift capacity. 

Unfortunately, many commanders afraid of being left behind, adhered to the 

original plan, refusing to consider the revised one. They accepted neither 

directions nor advice from movement control officials, and moved their units 

into the concentration and staging areas without authorization. They inundated 

processing facilities to the point that entire units unable to move were sleeping in 

their vehicles parked along city streets. In a frantic effort to unscramble the 

congestion, hundreds of combat troops and vehicles were embarked for France 

without regard to proper documentation, priority, or beach destination. 

For the first few days of the invasion, the Joint British-American Buildup 

Control Organization attempted to implement the invasion embarkation 

program but was overwhelmed by units ignoring plans, and tactical commanders 

in France changing priorities. Many units on the French shore could not be 

identified, so the commander of the invading forces sent a special team back to 

England to sort out which units had deployed and which had not.4 

The unwillingness of field commanders to support movement control 

stemmed from their lack of understanding of the concept and the fact that the 

Transportation Corps was so new it did not have the prestige to enforce a 

movement plan. The armies on the Continent were provided sufficient 

transportation support by the sheer volume of resources and by the innovations 

and dedication of transportation operators. Transportation support operations 

would have been much more efficient if full authority over all linehaul 

transportation capacity had been established from the outset. 

Organizational changes in the Army following World War II also have had 

a significant effect on movement control. During the war, The Oversea Supply 

Divisions (OSD) and the staging areas of the ports of embarkation were under 
466 Spearhead of logistics 

the operational control of the Chief of Transportation. Additionally, the Army 

controlled a significant portion of military ocean shipping assets. 

After the war, the OSD and the staging areas were transferred from the 

CoiT to the Army G4 and G I, respectively. The Army Air Force, which had 

controlled the aerial ports and airlift resources during the war was, now "de 

facto" a separate service. Additionally, there was a move to inactivate the 

Transportation Corps at the end of the war as had been done after World War I. 

Fortunately, the Transportation Corps was not inactivated, but it was not made a 

permanent branch of the Army until 1950. The Army 04, Movements Branch, 

was dissolved and its fu nctions transferred to the Chief of Transportation in 

May 1950. Other changes within the Army after World War II also affected 

movements management. The Army Transport Service (A TS) was transferred 

to the Navy, where it became the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) and 

the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) became a subordinate command of 

the new U.S. Air Force. Both are forerunners of today's U.S. Transportation 

Command. These changes significantly affected the procedures the Army 

followed to obtain transportation lift. 

THE KOREAN WAR 

With the beginning of the Korean War and the rapidly increasing demand 

for overseas shipping, the loss of the deep water shipping capability to the Navy 

complicated the Department of the Army's movement planning, since it now had 

to coordinate with several agencies to strategically deploy its own forces. This 

shifting of assets and realignment of transportation organizations, previously 

under the Transportation Corps, accentuated the need for effective movement 

control procedures. 

Many of the shortcomings of World War II were also apparent in Korea. 

The Japan Logistical Command (JLC) served as the Korean "communications 

zone" by processing all supply requisitions to the Un ited States and controlling 

movement of shipping to Korea. In Korea, the 2d Logistical Command (also 

known as the Pusan Base Section or Korean Base Section) was the only logistics 

support section with responsibility for movement control behind the 8th Anny 

rear boundary. Eighth Army G4, and assigned logistical units operated as the 

equivalent of an advance section. The Korean Communications Zone (KCOMZ) 

was activated in August 1952 with boundaries contiguous with those of the 2d 

Logistical Command, and administered prisoner of war, civil affairs and Military 

Railway Service (MRS) subordinate commands. The 2d Logistical Command 

continued to process requisitions to JLC through technical service depots; 
The Evolution of Movement Control 467 

however, KCOMZ activated the 425th Transportation Traffic Regulating Group 

with field transportation movement offices to execute the Korean theater 

movement control programs. 

At the port of Pusan, early in the war, ship discharge often exceeded the 

capacity of land transportation, particularly rail, to move people and cargo out of 

the port. The resulting backlog was moved to the appropriate technical service 

depots, established to store theater stocks. The depots were located around 

Pusan Harbor where clearance was by barge, truck, and rail. The depots were 

unable to receive cargo as fast as the ports could clear it because of the lack of 

intransit asset visibility. Simply put, there were not enough people, material 

handling equipment, or storage space to allow the depots to sort, catalog, and 

store the cargo in the time allowed. Congestion quickly resembled that at the 

port. The backlog of ordnance stocks was so overwhelming that the depot 

relocated and started a new operation elsewhere, leaving stocks to be identified 

and sorted later.5 

Combat units stationed "expediters" at the port and depots to ensure 

needed supplies moved forward, a practice also common in World War IT, 

Vietnam, and again in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

Operation of the ports was also hampered by the Jack of control of the 

Military Railway Service resources. Rail was used not only to move supplies 

directly from port areas to combat zone railheads, but also for clearance of cargo 

to main depots in the vicinity of Pusan and Ascom City between Inchon and 

Seoul.6 

Slow unloading of rail cars in the forward areas depleted their availability 

to the point that port clearance and forward movements were severely 

constrained. The 2d Logistical Command put into effect a policy requiring a car 

to be unloaded in the forward areas for each car loaded at the ports or depots. 

That command also developed a new freight movement program which was 

issued in December 1951, improving the efficiency of rail usage.

7 

Nevertheless, periodic shortages of railcars delayed forward movement of 

classes I, ill, and V, which were the most frequent items shipped directly from 

the ports. Once again, port congestion could only be relieved by clearing cargo 

to local depots, already congested from the buildup and storage of theater stocks. 

As combat operations stabilized and requirements became less volatile, rail 

capacities also increased and were generally able to meet movement 

requirements. 8 

Until the establishment of the KCOMZ, no agency in the Korean theater 

was authorized to develop a comprehensive theater movements plan. More 
468 Spearhead of Logistics 

importantly, there was not an agency to support overall theater transportation 

needs or coordinate use of the transportation assets of subordinate commands. 

Instead, each commander was responsible for movement control in his 

respective areas and maintained control over his organic transportation assets. 

Routinely, these commanders prioritized their own transportation needs above 

all others, thus reducing the assets available for theater-wide use. 

The problem of centralized control was not solved during the war. As late 

as 1957, movements doctrine had the Transportation Corps Officer of each 

headquarters under the G4.9 

The Transportation Corps officer was responsible for planning and 

controlling movements performed by any mode of transportation made available 

to that command. The doctrine had movement control commanders responsible 

for the command and administration of their soldiers, while operational control 

fell under field transportation officers. Therefore, movement control personnel 

would answer to two chains of command which might have different priorities. 

These problems, coupled with the lack of centralized control of transportation 

assets, served as the impetus for the Transportation Corps Combat 

Developments Group study titled, "A Study for the Establishment of Doctrine, 

Procedures, and Techniques for Future Operations", conducted during late 1956 

to early 1957. The study highlighted numerous movements control problems and 

provided recommendations that served as a foundation for modern movements 

doctrine. 

It recommended the control of movements be realigned to and centralized 

at the highest level possible within the Field Army, and included a Field Army 

Support Command responsible for the centralized control of transportation 

assets for the theater (Field Army). These changes were eventually incorporated 

into the Army's movement doctrine. By 1965, the Field Army consisted of up to 

three Corps with four divisions each, with the responsibility for movement 

control assigned to the Army headquarters. The Field Army movements control 

assets included a movement control center (MCC) and up to seventeen 

transportation movements offices (TMO). 

The MCC was assigned to the Transportation Brigade in the Field Army 

Support Command (FASCOM) but operated in conjunction with the 

Transportation Branch of the FASCOM Assistant Chief of Services to manage 

the movement of personnel, materiel, and supplies in the Field Army area. 10 

The TMO, a subordinate unit of the MCC, was a small unit staffed in 

accordance with its mission. TMO "A" was the largest of the four types, with 

two officers and seven enlisted men. They were assigned to the Corps Support 
The Evolution of Movement Control 469 

Brigade Headquarters or the Field Atmy rear area. Transportation movement 

offices "B" through "D" were progressively smaller with "D" having only four 

enlisted personnel. The TMOs were strategically located to cover all critical 

transportation points within the Field Army sector. 

VIETNAM 

The 1957 combat developments group study recommendations were 

essentially the doctrine the Army used in South Vietnam once movement 

control was in place. Until September 1965, no coordinated movement control 

agency existed, and air transportation was managed at the local level by 

individual Air Traffic Coordinating Offices, located at various aerial ports. 

Water transport requirements were sent directly to the MSTS Far East, and 

highway transport needs were met by local support elements. Localized and 

decentralized traffic management wasted transportation resources and prevented 

the most efficient use of theater transportation assets. 11 

In September 1965, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam (MACV), established a joint Traffic Management Agency (TMA) 

under the staff supervision of the J-4, which became operational in early 1966. 

By 1968, the TMA had an operational strength of 400 personnel and was 

organized with a directorate staff and five movements regions. The TMA 

communicated directly with numerous agencies to effect the shipment of cargo 

from CONUS to Vietnam. Additionally, they managed common user asset 

capacities in-country to assure optimum use. The TMA received transportation 

requests from units in the theater and compared assets with requirements. If a 

shortfall existed, they worked to solve it. 

The effectiveness of the TMA improved as the theater stabilized, but a 

study by the Department of the Army and U.S. Army Pacific Transportation 

Command in February 1968, revealed that there was limited overall movements 

management of Army owned transportation assets. There was no control at the 

level at which total capability could be matched to priority for movement. In 

practice, the MACV Component Services each managed their own resources. 

The study concluded that a movements control system could be established if the 

theater assigned movement control organizations according to doctrine (e.g., 

Movements Control Agency at the 1st Logistical Command level and 

subordinate movement control centers at the two other major support 

commands, Qui Nhon and Cam Rahn Bay). These recommendations were 

never implemented and the theater continued to lack an effective Movements 

Control System.

12 Nevertheless, the compartmentalization of operational areas 
470 Spearhead of Logistics 

in Vietnam and the general adequacy of transportation lift offset the weakness of 

the movement control system. 

By 1970, many of the lessons of the early period of the war in Vietnam 

were included in Army movements doctrine. 13 The Transportation Movement 

Control Agency (MCA) evolved and was designed to operate the Theater Army 

Support Command (TASCOM) MCA. The MCA was to provide movements 

management within the communications zone (COMMZ) and between the 

COMMZ and the Field Army. After a restructuring of the Army, movement 

control centers were made organic to the Corps Support Brigades. In the late 

1970s, the Army developed the Army 86 designs - to further evolve as the Army 

of Excellence in 1983, and developed its Active Defense doctrine in 1976. In 

1982, a new doctrine known as AirLand Battle, permanently changed the 

perception of the modern battlefield, which became wider, higher, and deeper. 

In the early 1970s, the field army was eliminated, and the corps became 

the Army's largest organizational unit capable of indefinitely sustained tactical 

operations. Changes in the movement control arena reflected evolving theater 

organizational concepts. 

The MCA was assigned directly to the echelons above corps, or theater 

army, commander, and became responsible for all movements in the COMMZ. 

Subordinate Regional Movement Control Teams (RMCT) performed missions 

similar to those of the TMO. No other movement control assets were assigned at 

the theater level. In the combat zone, movement control responsibilities were 

assigned to the corps. All movements within the corps sector were managed by a 

Movement Control Center (MCC) located in the COSCOM. Both heavy and 

light divisions had a movements control officer (MCO) assigned to the division 

transportation office to oversee movements in the division sector and coordinate 

with the MCC for external lift assets when requirements exceeded organic 

transportation capability. The MCC was also assigned movement control teams 

(MCT) to oversee transportation operations at key transportation points and act 

as local points of contact for subordinate units with external lift requirements. 

The teams served as the MCC' s eyes and ears for the transportation network 

throughout the corps area. 

After the early-1980s, operational doctrine evolved rapidly from Active 

Defense to AirLand Battle to force projection, but movement control doctrine 

changed little since it was adequate to meet the needs of the Army, regardless of 

the operational requirements. On the ground, however, there was never enough 

communications equipment or trained personnel for it to be implemented 

adequately. 
The Evolution of Movement Control 471 

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM 

During the Gulf War, movement control units lacked the appropriate type 

of communications equipment to control movements on a widely dispersed 

battlefield. Their few organic FM radios Jacked the range to communicate along 

500 mile main supply routes. The most serious deficiency was the unwillingness 

of theater planners to place the MCA in the theater's highest headquarters 

where it could effectively control transportation theater-wide. In Operations 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the MCA was assigned to the 22d Support 

Command (SUPCOM) instead of theater headquarters. This was similar to the 

organization in Vietnam and had a far reaching negative impact on the 

effectiveness of the theater's transportation network. Movement programs were 

not promulgated at theater level. Transportation policies published by the MCA 

were routinely not followed by corps and major subordinate commands at 

echelon above corps (EAC). Definitive transportation priorities based on current 

tactical and logistical situations were not established. 14 

The experience in Southwest Asia proved that an MCA assigned to a 

support command did not have the authority of one assigned to a theater 

headquarters. Movement directives issued by a commander junior to corps 

commanders, instead of by the theater commander, did not have the same 

authority, and the effectiveness of the movements program suffered. When 

assigned to the support command, the MCA was unable to control all the 

transportation assets in the theater. It lacked "jurisdiction" and became caught 

up in the routine operations of the support command itself. One of the results, 

prevalent in World War II, was the perception of tactical commanders that if 

movement control were inconvenient, it could be ignored. 

The assignment of the theater MCA to the 22d SUPCOM, the lack of 

adherence to movements doctrine, and insufficient communications resulted in 

movements control not being practiced at theater level. In a geographically 

dispersed theater with a significant shortage of transportation assets, an 

effective movements control system was essential for the theater to capitalize on 

its transportation resources. The only reason the theater did not suffer from this 

oversight was the massive quantities of transportation capacity made available, 

the resourcefulness of the transportation community, and the short duration of 

combat operations. 

The need for movement control did not end with hostilities; it continued to 

be necessary. When the Desert Storm ground offensive abruptly ended, no 

theater movements program existed to redeploy combat units from their 
472 Spearhead of Logistics 

northern attack positions. Without clear guidance, units gathered available 

transportation assets and redeployed to their designated redeployment assembly 

areas (RAA), overwhelming both the main supply routes and support 

infrastructure. 15 The situation was not unlike the confusion caused during the 

initial Overlord assault on France in 1944. 

Coinciding with corps movements to their RAA, were theater actions to 

retrograde excess sustainment cargo. The 22d SUPCOM, aware of previous 

movement control shortfalls, held a coordination meeting between the material 

and transportation managers as well as the mode operators to develop an 

apportionment (movement) program. Plagued by poor theater trailer 

accountability, which precluded reasonable estimates of transportation 

capacities, planners could not develop a movement program. 

Instead, planners created a new organization, the Theater Distribution 

Center, to facilitate communications between the material and transportation 

managers. The new organization performed a mission similar to that of already 

existing units, but put material managers, movements personnel, and mode 

operators under one roof, with the intent of fixing an inefficient movement 

control system and ensuring effective communications among all the key 

players. The poor signal equipment available for communications between 

managers and operators in the field, and the material managers' difficulties in 

identifying lift requirements, severely limited the effectiveness of the new 

organization. 16 The Theater Distribution Center was a temporary fix to a 

systemic problem. The need for a strong theater movement control agency, with 

state of the art communications assets was never so obvious. 

In spite of the shortfalls in movement control, the Army conducted 

battlefield movement of major dimensions, just prior to Desert Storm. After the 

war, U.S. forces redeployed to their home bases in record time. These successes 

were a tribute to resourceful transporters who were not afraid to innovate to 

accomplish the mission. 

The movement control function is one of the most important aspects of 

U.S. Army and Department of Defense transportation operations. Despite the 

fact that movement control increases mobility, the essential ingredient to the 

success of any military operation, the concept remains neither well known nor 

understood outside professional transportation circles. The downsizing of the 

Army in the 1990s and the increase of U.S. based strategic deployment forces 

makes the movement control function even more critical because it is the only 

way to maximize U.S. military transportation resources. In the multi-service 

environment in which Army forces would be deployed throughout the world, the 
The Evolution of Movement Control 473 

exercise of movement control became, a joint function, maldng it even more 

crucial than it was in the past. Movement control is managed by the Secretary of 

Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or a joint theater commander, under 

Department of Defense directives and regulations, such as Transportation and 

Traffic Management, and Standard Transportation and Movement procedures. 17 

Movement Control might be exercised by an allied combined command, 

with added coordination complications. Most U.S. transportation assets for force 

deployment were in the 1990s controlled jointly. There is only one 

"transportation system" to support all the services, since no one service has the 

capability to control all the transportation resources needed to execute assigned 

missions. 

18 

Movement control has been a "lesson learned" in every conflict in which 

the U.S. Army has been involved in the since the 1940s and has been quickly 

forgotten as soon as the conflict ended. It is a lesson that needs to be taught to 

every officer and NCO, regardless of branch. Transportation is the single most 

critical combat support asset on the battlefield and there are never enough assets 

to do everything at once. The only way to maxirnize this scarce resource is 

through movement control. In future conflicts, movement control units must be 

adequately staffed and provided with the right equipment to accomplish their 

missions. TI1e movement control agency must be located at a level at which it 

has the authority to program and control theater transportation assets while 

providing the senior commander with up-to-date transportation guidance. 

Without adequate movement control measures, it will be difficult for the Total 

Force to win against a determined adversary. 
474 

CHAPTER XVI 

Challenges for the Future 

OVERVIEW 

After more than 200 years of outstanding service to their country, U.S. 

Army transporters can take justifiable pride in their accomplishments. From the 

Revolution to World War I, the War Department and the Quartermaster 

Department (QMD) were forced to create a transportation corps from whole 

cloth every time the nation went to war. In 1918, the War Department 

established a Transportation Corps because it realized that the nation could 

neither defend itself nor project its power beyond its shores without an existing 

corps of trained transportation specialists who knew how to mobilize troops, 

equipment, and supplies, transport them to the combat arena, and then get them 

home when the war was over. Unfortunately, the Transportation Corps created 

in 1918 lasted only two years and was not resurrected until 1942 when the 

United States found itself involved in the largest, most widespread war in 

history. Despite the Corps' achievements in World War II, some still considered 

it a temporary organization. It is a tribute to Congress and President Truman that 

they realized the value of a permanent Transportation Corps and made it a fact 

in I 950. Thereafter, it exceeded even the considerable accomplishments of its 

predecessors. 

"War is chaos" is a familiar adage and a fact evident to whomever 

participates in war. Although no military element can do more than abate the 

chaos of war, it is the mission of the Transportation Corps to turn that chaos into 

useful order. One only has to look at Tampa Bay in 1898 and Operation Desert 

Shield in 1990 to throw the requirement for a Transportation Corps into sharp 

focus. 

At Tampa in 1898, chaos reigned. The port was selected for its proximity 

to Cuba, not for its capacity to embark troops, equipment, and supplies. Trains 

arrived without bills of lading or manifests, and no one knew which units were 

assigned to which ships. The commanding general had to set up his office on a 

packing crate at the only pier in the port and use combat troops to straighten out 
Challenges for the Future 475 

the mess because no Quartermaster troops were available and a Transportation 

Corps did not exist. The debarkation in Cuba was little better. 

In Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm chaos existed but did not 

reign. Intransit visibility was limited and movement control was only marginally 

effective, but the trained members of the Transportation Corps made the 

difference. They cleared backlogs, expedited shipments, and rapidly forwarded 

critical cargoes. The redeployment phase of The Gulf War occurred with too 

little notice and staff planners were unable to react with alacrity. But trained 

transporters stepped in to facilitate the redeployment of units to U.S. Army 

Europe and to the United States in a way that won them high praise. 

As evidenced by the difference between Tampa and the Arabian Desert, 

training, organization, mission orientation, and the use of new technology have 

made the Transportation Corps a war winner. But, regardless of new technology 

and organizations which have evolved over the years, the Transportation Corps 

faces issues that have been transportation concerns since the War for 

Independence. They exist regardless of technology and are only mitigated by 

the performance of trained transporters. Such issues are personnel, equipment, 

intransit asset visibility, movement control, and leadership. 

PERSONNEL 

There have never been enough trained transporters and transportation 

specialists in wartime. It a simple and telling fact that in every war from the 

Revolution to Desert Stonn, with the exception of Vietnam, combat soldiers had 

to be trained as transporters to make up for the lack of transportation personnel. 

In addition, specialists were drafted from civilian life and contractors hired to 

make up for shortages. The 18th and early 19th century attitude that commercial 

carriers could take care of all the Army's movement needs proved fallacious. 

Even farsighted planners like Quartermaster General James O'Hara, who 

understood the limits of the contracting system of the late 18th Century, found 

himself disappointed by the unnecessarily slow response after the contractors 

were paid. In the end, soldiers had to be used as stevedores, teamsters, and 

clerks to ensure supplies and equipment were transported to the correct 

destination. The advantage of military control of transportation assets was 

admirably demonstrated by Thomas S. Jessup, who was Quartermaster General 

from 1818 to 1860, and his successor, Montgomery Meigs who served from 

I 86 1 to 1882. These two brilliant organizers controlled transportation from 

the Seminole War to the last stages of the Indian Wars, but even they had 

problems with the contracting system. Meigs was able to make the system work 
476 Spearhead of Logistics 

during the Civil War. Military officials were responsible to oversee 

transportation from the national level down to the division. Thousands of troops 

were called upon to perform transportation- related duties, including building, 

repairing, and running railroads in occupied areas. 

After the Civil War, the Quartermaster Department was reduced along with 

the rest of the Army, and transportation responsibility was passed on to 

regimental quartermasters who were regimental officers for whom supply and 

transportation were one detail. The system was workable only in a static 

situation involving small forces. The Spanish-American War demonstrated the 

fallacy of neglecting transportation and reducing its capability. In the debacle of 

the loadout at Tampa Bay, Secretary of War Alger's simplistic view that the 

problem could be solved by using 20,000 men was indicative of that neglect. In 

the campaigns in Cuba and the Philippines, soldiers with mule-skinner and 

teamster experience were taken from combat units for transportation duties. 

Fortunately, the deficiencies of operating without transportation expertise, as 

observed by the Dodge Commission, helped establish a permanent transportation 

infrastructure in the Quartermaster Department. World War I would demonstrate 

beyond any question that transportation expertise and trained transporters were 

necessary in the conduct of war in the 20th century. Throughout that war, there 

was a critical shortage of stevedores, teamsters, railroad men, and later, truck 

drivers. The need for transporters in World War II was even more critical than 

in World War I. Training truck drivers was a major priority throughout the war, 

and drastic conversions of units were necessary to meet the need. Stevedores 

were constantly in short supply, and in many cases port operations would have 

been curtailed had it not been for available civilian labor. Railroad men were 

lacking, though the Railroad Affiliation Program saved the day by providing 

huge numbers of trained railroad men to the Army. But that antidote had its 

price, since both the Army and the railroads had to draw their expertise from the 

same pool of trained men. 

In Korea, the story was a reprise of World War II. There were inadequate 

numbers of truck drivers and rail and terminal service personnel. The price was 

paid in port congestion and late shipments. In Operations Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm, the transportation infrastructure was strained to the limit. An air 

defense battalion and an infantry battalion were converted to truck battalions, 

and civilian drivers were hired worldwide, still with a shortage of drivers. Some 

stevedore units in the Gulf War operated with 50 percent of their authorized 

personnel, and only the extreme dedication of the crews of Army watercraft and 

tugboats allowed them to operate at maximum capacity day in and day out. 
Challenges for the Future 

Coalition sea and air superiority prevented combat losses to these vital units. 

Any loss would have had a severe impact on the theater because there were no 

readily available replacements. 

In nearly a century of projecting power across the oceans of the world, 

United States armed forces have experienced repeated incidents of confusion in 

movement and supply at ports of embarkation, ports of debarkation, and assault 

landing sites because Transportation Corps units were relegated to the second or 

third waves of deployment. At the same time, the number of transportation units 

in the force structure has steadily declined. The impact on deployments is 

predictable. Confusion begets ad hoc units to deal with transportation problems 

in the theater. Trained transportation units arrive to clear backlogs and 

bottlenecks and catch up. Most of these problems could be brought under 

control early in a deployment if sufficient transporters and adequate equipment 

were available early. In an age of long-distance rapid deployment, when days 

and sometimes hours are critical, having the right Transportation units in the 

theater very early will pay handsome dividends. 

EQUIPMENT 

In every war the United States has fought, there have been equipment 

shortages. In the 18th and 19th centuries, equipment shortage was the result of 

the philosophy that contractors could fill the gaps in military support. There 

was seldom an awareness of the critical need for transportation equipment in 

time of peace. Ships, watercraft, railroad rolling stock, trucks, and handling 

equipment are expensive items. In 1990, a rough terrain container handler 

(RTCH) cost approximately $300,000. Today, too, Congress is loath to spend 

money on military hardware. But funding and requirements alone do not explain 

the neglectful attitude toward military transportation evidenced through most of 

the nation's history. In 1895, the War Department sold all of the Army's 

wagons on the premise that the Indian Wars were over and commercial 

transportation could fill the need. Three years later, at the outbreak of the 

Spanish American War, the government paid premium prices for the wagons it 

could get. Even then, a shortage of shipping prevented the wagons from 

reaching the war zones. Fifty-four years later, General Omar Bradley testified 

before Congress that U.S. armed forces no longer needed landing craft because 

there would be no more amphibious assaults. Only nine months after his 

testimony, General MacArthur conducted the landing at Inchon with former 

Navy LSTs leased from the Japanese contractors who had purchased them at 

bargain prices after World War II. 
478 Spearhead of logistics 

Ever since the United States' first requirement to project power across an 

ocean during the Spanish-American War, shipping has been a critical 

component of United States power, and it has always been in short supply. 

There were not enough ships in 1898. In 1917, U.S. soldiers shipped to war in 

confiscated German liners. They redeployed on the same liners, on leased ships, 

and on warships converted to troopships. Vessels carrying U.S. cargo in World 

War I were mostly British. In the early stages of World War li, U.S soldiers 

were transported to Great Britain on the converted liners Queen Elizabeth and 

Queen Mary, and other foreign flag vessels because there was no other way to 

get large numbers of troops to the theater quickly. From the start, the shortage of 

shipping affected every aspect of the war effort and dictated the "Europe first" 

policy of Roosevelt and Churchill. Even at tbe height of U.S. vessel production, 

invasion planners felt compelled to load ships involved in amphibious operations 

by maximizing cargo space rather than loading for rapid off-load. In the Vietnam 

war, there was once again a shortage of both cargo and troopships. The buildup 

in Vietnam was so slow that the shortage of transport was not immediately 

evident. Transportation of replacement personnel to the theater by air also 

obscured the fact of the ship shortage. In Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm, the dearth of ships was again evident Foreign flag vessels were used and 

once again, ships were loaded to maximize cargo space, rather than to facilitate 

combat debarkation. 

In Desert Storm as in Vietnam, Korea, and the later stages of the two 

World Wars, the United States was fortunate to possess control of the sea and 

air. The sea lanes to the combat zones were relatively safe, and it was relatively 

easy to charter commercial shipping. That situation can not be guaranteed in the 

future. In an era when even small nations possess sophisticated and very 

powerful weapons, some interdiction of sea routes can be expected. In addition, 

though the United States possesses a number of reserve ships, their performance 

in the buildup for Desert Shield/Desert Storm had in many cases been 

disappointing. To project its power across the ocean, the United States needs 

ships readily available. Prepositioned ships, Naval assault ships, and the Army's 

LSVs are steps in the right direction, but are not sufficient to move large forces 

and sustain them. In an environment of constrained resources, a balance must be 

struck between naval combat ships and the ships needed to project power across 

oceans. 

In the 20th century, land transportation was never as critically short as 

oceangoing vessels, but the U.S. Army has never had the transport vehicles it 

needed. In the Spanish-American War, wagons ordered at the start of the war 
Challenges for the Future 479 

never reached the front. In World War I, the railroads in the zone of the interior 

performed extremely well, but land transportation in the AEF was a problem. 

There were never enough animals to pull guns or supply wagons. Rolling stock 

was also a problem. Locomotives had to be obtained from the Belgians, and 

necessary cars were never delivered. When trucks became a viable form of 

transportation, the lack of vehicle standardization caused difficulties. 

In World War U, rail was still the most economical form of transportation 

both in the continental United States and overseas. But in the early stages of the 

· war, there were shortages in rolling stock and planners had to decide whether to 

keep locomotives at home or send them to England. Nor could rail be used to its 

full potential in France because of the massive destruction of the European rail 

net by the retreating Nazis and Allied bombing. 

The truck came into it-; own in World War 11 because automotive design 

had reached a high degree of sophistication and rail support was not available in 

many parts of the world. There were not enough vehicles to support the 

breakout from St. Lo and trucks had to be stripped from combat units to form the 

Redball Express. While that expedient became a legend because of the 

determination of the drivers to accomplish the mission, it was the predictable 

result of inadequate transportation assets in the invasion force structure. 

Fortunately, tl1ere was little enemy air activity on Express routes, but massive 

attrition from accidents and poorly maintained equipment was the price paid. 

In the Pacific war, trucks were not needed in large numbers unless the 

area to be invaded was extensive enough to warrant line-haul operations. Even 

so, not enough trucks were available. In the invasion of Saipan, corps 

headquarters stole trucks from 27th Division, the only unit in the invasion astute 

enough to bring part of its transportation company with it. Amphibious craft 

were also a cause of concern. They were in such short supply that General Mark 

Clark became involved personally when over forty DUKWs were damaged 

during a training exercise prior to the Anzio invasion. They could only be 

replaced by stripping DUKWs from divisions not involved in the invasion. 

In Korea, truck pools similar to the Redball Express had to be formed to 

support major corps-level operations. Again, the shortage continued to the end of 

the war. Rail equipment in Korea was not sufficient and was in constant need of 

repair. In Vietnam, land transportation was augmented by cargo helicopter 

companies which performed invaluable service. Rail was not a significant factor 

in Vietnam, and rail transport lost importance in the spectrum of transportation 

planning, a deficiency that continues to this day. 
480 Spearhead of Logistics 

The latest chapter in transportation shortages occurred in Operations 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Initially there was such a shortage of trucks that 

the Army not only had to train over 4,800 drivers to fill the void, but also had to 

strip drivers from combat units, accept foreign vehicles, and rely heavily on 

contract transportation. 

In addition to the obvious shortages of ships, railcars and trucks, the 

Transportation Corps also suffered shortages in watercraft, material handling 

equipment, and communications equipment. The shortages severely affected its 

intermodal capabilities, one of the crucial missions of the Corps. The 

difficulties caused by equipment shortage were often overlooked because of the 

willingness of transporters to make up for them and by the fact that the 

deficiencies in transportation were forgotten in the tide of victory. 

JNTRANSIT ASSET VISIBILITY 

Intransit asset visibility presents perhaps the most difficult transportation 

issue to res<_>lve because it is directly related to the shortages of transportation 

personnel and equipment. Intransit visibility did not become an issue until the 

Spanish-American War. Until then, the Anny moved with all its basic 

equipment. Supplies were shipped break-bulk so they were easily identified at 

the destination. In 1898, the troops at the ports received equipment and supplies 

in mass from places they had never seen. Many supplies were crated and arrived 

without documentation, creating the chaotic situation at Tampa. In World War 

I, the situation was often as bad. Despite all efforts to control shipments by 

creating powerful agencies to oversee both land and ocean traffic, reports of 

units not receiving food or clothing were rife. One unit awaiting clothing 

received a shipment of infants' underwear slated for a department store in 

Boston. Units arriving in theater were sometimes unable to locate equipment for 

months. 

A similar situation existed in World War II. Despite attempts at providing 

advanced manifests by transatlantic cable or by aircraft, vessels still arrived in 

theater without manifests or known destinations for their cargo. In some cases, 

officials did not even know to which ports the ships should be assigned when 

they arrived off the English coast. Once equipment arrived the situation was no 

better. The TORCH invasion was nearly canceled because critical unit 

equipment was lost in the depots in England. The situation in Korea was little 

better. The depots in Pusan Harbor were noted for their lack of organization 

and, in Vietnam, the warehouses at Cam Rahn Bay were combed by expediting 

teams from the various divisions trying to discover what was in them. 
Challenges for the Future 481 

Despite reliance on up-to-date communication equipment and satellite 

hook-ups, the situation in Saudi Arabia 1990-1991 showed little improvement. 

Vessels arrived without manifests or shipping documents, and unknown cargoes 

awaited transshipment. The only difference from other wars was the greater 

amount of cargo that arrived in theater by air. In many cases, the only 

documentation cited was the single transportation company tasked with the 

receipt and forwarding of air shipments in the theater, rather than the ultimate 

consignee. Once received, no one knew where the cargo was supposed to go. 

Intransit visibility is even more critical in a rapid deployment environment. 

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated that rapid deployment 

of forces is necessary in the post-Cold War world. Units cannot delay and 

search for their equipment at terminals or depots or wait for replacement 

equipment to arrive. As General William G.T. Tuttle stated in March 1993, "We 

in the Department of Defense should be ashamed of ourselves for allowing that 

situation to continue in the twenty years between Vietnam and Desert Stonn and 

into Somalia." For such reasons, the Transportation Corps has championed the 

development of electronic methods of tracking cargo from the manufacturer to 

the ultimate consignee. Continuing attention to intransit asset visibility is 

essential, and research must continue for systems that can maintain the visibility 

of cargo to the ultimate consignee and effect routing changes where applicable. 

Once such a system is in place, the need for trained transportation specialist 

operators will be even more vital. 

MOVEMENT CONTROL 

Movement control has been a Transportation issue since the 

Spanish-American War, although it was not recognized as such at the time. The 

serious study of movement control began in 1932 and has evolved through a 

series of refinements ever since. The adoption of British movement control 

doctrine in World War II was not universally accepted at the time and is little 

understood outside the Transportation community. Lack of appreciation of its 

function has led to numerous misunderstandings during combat operations from 

World War II to the present Concern for movement control has been an active 

issue with the Transportation Corps since the mid 1980s when Maj. Gen. Fred 

Elam, then Chief of Transportation, bluntly asked his combat developers: "Is 

movement control broke?" An analysis of movement control showed the 

doctrine was sound, but not always applied the best way. 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm unfortunately proved the analysis correct. 

The 318th Theater Movement Control Agency arrived in country too late to 
482 Spearhead of Logistics 

control operations from the start. The 318th never had enough personnel for its 

Movement Control Teams or enough radios to communicate with transportation 

units across the theater. The results of this combination of shortages were the 

loss of trailer control and distribution management. In future operations, many of 

the movement control problems experienced from World War II to the Gulf 

War could be alleviated if the Movement Control Agency were made a part of 

the initial deployment, given the resources necessary to fulfill its mission. 

LEADERSHIP 

Undoubtedly, one of the most positive resources of the Transportation 

Corps is its leadership. From the time of the first Transportation Corps in 1918, 

the Corps has been fortunate to have as Chiefs of Transportation leaders of 

remarkable vision and talent, beginning with Maj. Gen. Charles P. Gross the first 

Chief of Transportation. 

Transporters who have led transportation commands and units have also 

made significant contributions to the Army and the nation beyond the 

transportation community. Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara selected 

Gen. Frank S. Besson, Jr., the first four-star general in U.S. logistics history, to 

head the newly formed Army Materiel Command (AMC) in 1962. Gen. William 

G. T. Tuttle, another four-star general who, after commanding AMC, became 

president of the Department of Defense, Logistics Management Institute. Lt. 

Gen. Nathaniel R. Thompson, Jr. became the Inspector General of the Army 

after he commanded U.S Army Europe's largest logistical command, the 2 1st 

Support Command. Lieutenant Generals Richard D. Meyer, Oren E. DeHaven, 

and Edward Honor all were assigned as J-4 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Lt. 

Gen. Samuel N. Wakefield commanded the U.S. Army Combined Arms Support 

Command. In Vietnam, Transportation Corps major generals dominated the top 

logistics job in the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) staff- John 

D. Crowley, Raymond C. Conroy, Jack C. Fuson, and John E. Murray. Prior to 

the cease fire in 1973, all four support commands in Vietnam were commanded 

by Transportation Corps generals - Arthur Hurow, Darrie H. Richards, Henry L. 

Del Mar, and James W. Gunn. Following the cease-fire, Maj. Gen. John E. 

Murray assumed responsibilities for military materiel support of Republic of 

Vietnam forces as head of the Defense Attache Office. During the Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm Operations, Transportation Corps generals were in key 

positions throughout the chain of command: Lt. Gen. Jimmy D. Ross was the 

DA DCSLOG (and later was promoted to General and commanded AMC); 

General Tuttle commanded AMC at that time; and Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) 
Challenges for the Future 483 

William P. Pagonis was Deputy Commanding General for Logistics and later 

assumed command of the 22d Support Command, which was responsible for all 

logistics support of the theater. 

The above list demonstrates a prominence in Corps leadership that has seen 

the Transportation Corps through times of great challenge since its birth in 1942. 

Combat arms officers who led major commands fully appreciate the Corps as the 

technical service that overcame obstacles to mobility to move the Army's people 

and goods to accomplish difficult missions. 

The Corps must continue to provide its future leaders with the broad-based 

education, training, and career development programs that have made 

Transportation Corps officers outstanding Transporters and logisticians in the 

past. Only superlative transportation leadership will convincingly articulate the 

justification for the future transportation resources needed by the Army and the 

Department of the Defense. 

While no one can predict future events, it is imperative that the 

Transportation Corps continue the high quality support that has been its hallmark 

in the past It can do that by maintaining its high standards of leadership and 

training, and by using the lessons of past experience to demonstrate the necessity 

of adequate transportation in a viable national defense posture. 

Soldiers of the Transportation Corps faced the challenges of Operations 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm the way their predecessors faced similar 

challenges in previous wars - with determination and commitment to succeed. 

Once again they proved "nothing happens until something moves." 
484 Appendix A 

APPENDIX A 

Chiefs of the Transportation Corps 

Brigadier General Frank T. Hines 

1919- 1922 

Major General Edmond H. Leavey 

December 1945 - June 1948 

Major General Charles P. Gross 

July 1942 - November 1945 

Major General Frank A. Heileman 

June 1948 - March 1953 
Spearhead of Logistics 485 

Chiefs of the Transportation Corps 

Major General Paul F. Yount 

Apri1 1953 - January 1958 

Major General Rush B. Lincoln, Jr. 

March 1962 - June 1963 

General Frank S. Besson, Jr. 

March 1958 - March 1962 

Major General Edward W. Sawyer 

June 1963 - July 1964 
486 Appendix A 

Chiefs of the Transportation Corps 

Colonel Richard K. Hutson 

August 1964 - September 1964 

Major General Harold I. Small 

June 1983- July 1983* 

Major General William H. Red ling 

September 1964 - December 1964 

Major General Aaron L. Lilley 

July 1983 - August 1985 

*In late 1964 the technical service branch chief positions where phased out until 1983, 

when these positions were reestablished. Therefore, for almost 19 years, the 

Transportation Corps did not officially have a Chief of Transportation. 
Spearhead of Logistics 487 

Chiefs of the Transportation Corps 

Major General Fred E. Elam 

August 1985 - April 1988 

Major General Kenneth R. Wykle 

January 1992 - August 1993 

Major General Samuel N. Wakefield 

April 1988 - January 1992 

Major General David A. Whaley 

August 1993 -
488 AppendixB 

APPENDIX B 

The Transportation Song 

The Official Song of The Transportation Corps, Army Service Forces 

Song of The Army Transportation Corps 

Words and Music by HERMAN HUPFELD 

I' • J J> I J J1 J J' I J Jd ) I Jf iJ' id Jl I 

Keep it mov - In: Keep it mov - in; That's a job The stuff has 

1$ • J Jl J J' I r , J J, I r ' r P I l r uJ' I 

got- ta get to 'buclr.s' to the 'boots; that we lr.now Got - to. 

'' • r J) r uJ' I r ) r uJ' I r I r 

feed •em, how we need •em, Bill lLnd Bob. __ _ ' J ) 

Give •em 

I' • J) Ji J> J Ji I r P r ~ I J J1 J li I J 

plen - t y of beef and bul - lets, Th,,y•Jl be AlOp - pin' up the foe. 

Refrain 14 1 II Jl J j) II= ,£ I J ;, J 11 I Jjj 

We load the ships We load the trains ----

I* • J Ji r Jl I Jl Jl 4tJ Jl I J Ji J J! I r. 

So that the oth -er lads- can load thP. guns and planes. __ _ 

14 • 1 ., J ~ 1 r p r p 1 r r 11 1 J 11 u ;, 

When you hear a might - y roar, It's the Trans- por • ta - tion 

I' • r · J. J' J) J1 J) J> Jl I J Js J J' 

Corps _ We've got - ta de - liv - er the goods and not a 

14 1 J oil J j) I J j) J }1 I ,g I J J' J Js I 

sin - gle man com - plains. A· long thE> road A- long the 

track____ The brin • y dt!•·p- We l:ct 't·m there, ·we bring 'em 

'' • r' I r ' J I J l' .I J 

,, . 

baclr. ---- Day and night We're on - du - ty on th" 

]1 J J. ___. sea. and_ 

I J. J Jl I J) Jl J~ J J) I r p J. p I 

shore; At - ways read-y to join the fight to save the I' 1 

p r a " I t J~ r p I rO p I r' J. •na. • tion--- The Ar . my Tra.ns por - ta - tion 

14 • Jt CJ J, J l ~11 J._ EJ i ' ' " II 

Corps!---- We load the Corps!----
Spearhead of Logistics 489 

APPENDIX C 

Escort Wagon 1916 

The horse or mule drawn wagon was a primary mode of land transportation 

for the U.S. Anny from 1776 to the 1920s. Although it appeared to be a simple 

device, the wagon was, in fact, a complex technology that required the skills of 

wheelwrights, farriers, blacksmiths, and harness makers to keep it in working 

order. The photographs in this appendix show some of the components, spares 

and accessories needed to make wagon technology work. 

Escort wagon and team. 
490 AppendixC 

Escort Wagon 1916 

Escort wagon, complete without cover, with spare parts attached, showing front 

and right side. 
491 

Spearhead of Logistics 

Escort Wagon 1916 

Top view of Escort-Wagon running gear. 
492 AppendixC 

Escort Wagon 1916 

Bottom view of Escort-Wagon running gear. 
Spearhead of Logistics 493 

Escort Wagon 1916 

• . ,..~ •r . • . • If; • • 

···-·-~=-- .... _..,.., 

I ., . 

Miscellaneous iron parts of Escort Wagon. 
494 

Escort Wagon 1916 

01 t 

o I 1 

I\ II 

I l 

1 1 . 

Spare parts and accessories carried in tool box of Escort Wagon. 

AppendixC 
Spearhead of Logistics 

APPENDIX D 

Affiliated Railway Units* 

WORLD WAR II 

UNIT 

Headquarters 

Military Railway Service 

701 Railway Grand Division 

702 Railway Grand Division 

703 Railway Grand Division 

704 Railway Grand Division 

705 Railway Grand Division 

706 Railway Grand Division 

707 Railway Grand Division 

708 Railway Grand Division 

709 Railway Grand Division 

71 0 Railway Grand Division 

712 Railway Operating Battalion 

713 Railway Operating Battalion 

714 Railway Operating Battalion 

715 Railway Operating Battalion 

716 Railway Operating Battalion 

717 Railway Operating Battalion 

718 Railway Operating Battalion 

719 Railway Operating Battalion 

SPONSOR 

Association 

of American Railroads 

New York Central Railroad 

Union Pacific Railroad 

Atlantic Coast Line 

Railroad Company 

Great Northern Railway 

Southern Pacific Company 

Pennsylvania Railroad 

Southern Railway Company 

The Baltimore and 

Ohio Railroad Company 

Association of American Railroads 

The Atchison, Topeka and 

Santa Fe Railway Company 

The Central Railroad 

Company of New Jersey 

The Atchison, Topeka and 

Santa Fe Railway Company 

Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis 

and Omaha Railway 

Illinois Central Railroad 

Southern Pacific Company 

Pennsylvania Railroad 

Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and 

St. Louis Railway 

Texas and New Orleans 

Railroad Company 

495 

720 Railway Operating Battalion 

721 Railway Operating Battalion 

Chicago and North Western Railway 

New York Central Railroad 

• Membership as of 7 December 1941. Source: Carl R. Gray, Jr., Railroading in 

Eighteen Countries, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955, p. 24. 
496 Appendix D 

Affiliated Railway Units 

WORLD WAR II 

UNIT 

722 Railway Operating Battalion 

723 Railway Operating Battalion 

724 Railway Operating Battalion 

725 Railway Operating Battalion 

726 Railway Operating Battalion 

727 Railway Operating Battalion 

728 Railway Operating Battalion 

729 Railway Operating Battalion 

730 Railway Operating Battalion 

731 Railway Operating Battalion 

732 Railway Operating Battalion 

733 Railway Operating Battalion 

734 Railway Operating Battalion 

735 Railway Operating Battalion 

736 Railway Operating Battalion 

737 Railway Operating Battalion 

738 Railway Operating Battalion 

739 Railway Operating Battalion 

740 Railway Operating Battalion 

741 Railway Operating Battalion 

742 Railway Operating Battalion 

743 Railway Operating Battalion 

744 Railway Operating Battalion 

745 Railway Operating Battalion 

SPONSOR 

Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company 

Union Pacific Railroad 

Pennsylvania Railroad 

Chicago, Rock Island and 

Pacific Railroad Company 

Washbash Railroad Company 

Southern Railway Company 

Louisville and 

Nashville Railroad Company 

The New York, New Haven and 

Hartford Railroad Company 

Pennsylvania Railroad 

Union Pacific Railroad 

Great Northern Railway 

Central of Georgia Railway Company 

Texas and New Orleans 

Railroad Company 

Association of American Railroads 

New York Central Railroad 

New York Central Railroad 

Chicago Great Western Railway 

Lehigh Valley Railroad Company 

The Chesapeake and 

Ohio Railway Company 

Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad 

Pennsylvania Railroad 

Illinois Central Railroad 

Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul 

and Pacific Railroad 

Chicago, Burlington and 

Quincy Railroad 
Spearhead of Logistics 497 

Affiliated Railway Units 

WORLD WAR II 

UNIT 

746 Railway Operating Battalion 

747 Railway Operating Battalion 

748 Railway Operating Battalion 

749 Railway Operating Battalion 

750 Railway Operating Battalion 

751 Railway Operating Battalion 

752 Railway Operating Battalion 

759 Railway Operating Battalion 

753 Railway Shop Battalion 

754 Railway Shop Battalion 

755 Railway Shop Battalion 

756 Railway Shop Battalion 

757 Railway Shop Battalion 

758 Railway Shop Battalion 

763 Railway Shop Battalion 

764 Railway Shop Battalion 

765 Railway Shop Battalion 

766 Railway Shop Battalion 

SPONSOR 

Missouri-Kansas-Texas 

Railroad Company 

The Atchison, Topeka and 

Santa Fe Railway Company 

The Texas and Pacific 

Railway Company 

The New York, New Haven and 

Hartford Railroad Company 

St. Louis-San Francisco 

Railway Company 

The Denver and Rio Grande 

Western Railroad Company 

Boston and Maine Railroad 

Missouri Pacific Railroad 

Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago 

and St. Louis Railway 

Southern Pacific Company 

Norfolk and Western Railway 

Pennsylvania Railroad 

Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul 

and Pacific Railroad 

The Atchison, Topeka and 

Santa Fe Railway Company 

The Delaware, Lackawanna and 

Western Railroad Company and 

Lehigh Valley Railroad Company 

Boston and Maine Railroad; 

Central Vermont Railway, Inc.; 

Boston and Albany Railroad; 

The Delaware and Hudson Railroad 

Erie Railroad 

Association of American Railroads 
498 Endnotes 

Endnotes 

CHAPTER ONE 

1. Maj. G. H. Edwards, The Royal Corps of Transporl1794- 1965, Somerset, England, 

VVaggonette, 1965,p. 1. 

2. James A. Huston, The Sinews of War, Army Logistics 1775-1953, VVashington, 

D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966, p. 3. 

3. Howard VV. Peckham, The Colonial Wars 1689-1762, Chicago, The University of 

Chicago Press, 1964, p. 4. 

4. Ibid., p. 34. 

5. Manifest Destiny was a political concept which evolved in the 1850s that 

presupposed the expansion of the United States ocean to ocean and beyond was 

historically foreordained. 

6. Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, New York, Alfred Knopf, 1973, p. 276. 

7. R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, An Outline History of the American 

Revolution, New York, Harper and Row, p. 21. 

8. Robert K. VVright, The Continental Anny, VVashington, D.C., Center of Military 

History, 1983, p. 23. 

9. Ibid., p. 28. 

1 0. Henry Lumpkin, From Savannah to Yorktown, The American Revolution in the 

South, Columbia, SC, University of South Carolina Press, 1981 , p. 9. 

11. Christopher Hibbert, Rebels and Redcoats, the American Revolution through 

British Eyes, New York, VV.VV. Norton & Company, 1990, p. 258. 

12. R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Compact History of the American 

Revolution, New York, Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1963, p. 369. 

13. Hibbert, Rebels and Redcoats, p. 307. 

14.1bid., p. 319. 

15. Dupuy and Dupuy, Compact History, p. 450. 

16. Craig L. Symonds, A Battlefield Atlas of the American Revolution, The Nautical 

and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1986, p. 108. 

17. Parke Rouse, Jr., The Great Wagon Road, New York, McGraw, Hill Book, Co., 

1973, p. X. 

18. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 8. 

19. Ema Risch, Supplying Washington's Army, VVashington D.C., Center of Military 

History, United States Army, 1981, p. 129. 

20. Ibid. I p. 128. 

21. VVayne E. Carpe, To Starve the Anny at Pleasure, Chapel Hill, University of North 

Carolina Press, 1984, p. 55. 

22. Rouse, The Great Wagon Road, p. 166. 

23. Risch, Supplying Washington's Anny, p. 70. 

24. Ibid., p. 42. 

25. Ibid., p. 75. 

26. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 85. 

27. Carpe, To Starve the Anny, p. 220. 

28. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 82. 
Spearhead of Logistics 499 

29. Ibid., p. 86. 

30. Ema Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Anny, A History of the Corps 

1775-1939, Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, United States Army, 1989, rep 

1962, p. 102. 

31.lbid., p. 108. 

32. Ibid., p. 128. 

33. Ibid., p. 178. 

CHAPTER TWO 

1. Erna Risch, Quartennaster Support of the Anny, A History of the Corps 1775-1939, 

Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, United States Army, 1989, rep 1962, p. 181. 

2. Ibid., p. 183. 

3. James A. Huston, The Sinews of War, Army Logistics 1775-1953, Washington, 

D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966, p. 120. 

4. Jack K. Bauer, The Mexican War 1846-48, New York, Macmillan, 1975, p. 1. 

5. Ibid., p. 48. 

6. Ibid., p. 145. 

7. Ibid., p. 129. 

8. Robert Selph Henry, The Story of the Mexican War, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 

1950, p. 122. 

9. JohnS. D. Eisenhower, So Far From God: the U.S. War with Mexico 1846-1848, 

New York, Random House, 1989, p. 241. 

10. Ibid., p. 253. 

11. Bauer, The Mexican War, p. 322. 

12. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 129. 

13. Risch, Quartermaster Support, p. 261. 

14. Ibid., p. 263. 

15. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 128. 

16. Risch, Quartermaster Support, p. 277. 

17. Ibid., p. 228. 

18. Ibid., p. 183. 

19. Ibid., p. 182. 

20. Ibid., p. 208. 

21. Ibid., p. 215. 

22. Ibid., p. 216. 

23. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 143. 

24.lbid., p. 143. 

25. Abraham Robinson Johnston, Phillip Gooch Ferguson, and Marcellus Ball 

Edwards, Marching With the Army of the West, 1846- 1848, Ralph Bieber, ed., Glendale 

CA, The Arthur Clark Co., 1936, p. 177. 

26. Risch, Quartermaster Support, p. 275. 

27. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 154. 

28. Ibid., p. 155. 

29. Ibid., p. 157. 

30. Ibid., p. 159. 

CHAPTER THREE 

1. James M. Me Pherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, New York, Oxford University Press, 

1988, p. 9. 
500 Endnotes 

2. Ibid., p. 15. 

3. Ibid., p. 198. 

4. Ibid., p. 15. 

5. Ibid., p. 145. 

6. Ibid., p. 254. 

7. Ibid., p. 259. 

8. Ibid., p. 264. 

9. John W. Barriger, Railroads and the Civil War, Washington, DC, National Railway 

Historical Society, 1966, p. 11. 

10. George EdgarTumer, VictoryRodetheRails, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill,1953, p.15. 

11. Craig L. Symonds, A Battlefield Atlas of the Civil War, Baltimore, MD, Nautical and 

Aviation Publishing Co., of America, 1983, p. 7. 

12. Stephen E. Woodworth, Jefferson Davis and His Generals, Lawrence, KS, 

University of Kansas Press, 1980, p. 19. 

13. Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee, abridgement of the four volume Lee, by Freeman, 

Richard Harwell, ed., New York, Scribners, 1982, p. 185. 

14. Symonds, A Battlefield Atlas, p. 33. 

15. Woodworth, Jefferson Davis, p. 21. 

16. John D. Milligan, Gunboats Down the Mississippi, New York, Amo Press, 1965, p. 177. 

17. Brig. Gen. Vincent J. Esposito, ed., The West Point Atlas of American Wars, 

Volume 11689- 1990, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1959, p. 17. 

18. James A. Huston, The Sinews of War, Anny Logistics 1775-1953, Washington, 

D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966, p. 159. 

19. Me Pherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 325. o62 

20. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 219. 

21. Me Pherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 325. 

22. Ema Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Anny, A History of the Corps 

1775-1939, Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, United States Army, 1989, rep 

1962, p. 420. 

23. Ibid., p. 374. 

24. Ibid., p. 378. 

25. Ibid., p. 379. 

26. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 211. 

27. George Edgar Turner, Victory Rode the Rails, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1953, p. 29. 

28. Thomas Weber, The Northern Railroads in the Civil War, 1861- 1865, New York, 

King's Crown Press, 1952, p. 6. 

29. Turner, Victory Rode the Rails, p. 44. 

30. Weber, The Northern Railroads, p. 1 0. 

31. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 208. 

32. Ibid., p. 245. 

33. Robert C. Black, The Railroads of the Confederacy, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 

University Press, 1952, p. 12. 

34. Barriger, Railroads and the Civil War, p. 7. 

35. Me Pherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 324. 

36. Ibid., p. 260. 

37. Risch, Quartermaster Support, p. 334. 

38. Ibid., p. 362. 

39. Me Pherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 324. 
Spearhead of Logistics 501 

40. Risch, Quartermaster Support, p. 338. 

41. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 172. 

42. Richard D. Goff, Confederate Supply, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1969, 

p. 243. 

43. Ibid., p. 16. 

44. Ibid., p. 21. 

45. Ibid., p. 246. 

46. Me Pherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 312. 

47. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 198. 

48. Me Pherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 527. 

49. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 201. 

50. Black, The Railroads of the Confederacy, p. 64. 

51. Ibid., p. 66. 

52. Ibid., p. 1 08. 

53. Ibid., p. 294. 

54. Ibid., p. 180. 

55. Ibid., p. 184. 

56. Barriger, Railroads and the Civil War, p. 18. 

57. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 211. 

58. Ibid., p. 210. 

59. Symonds, A Battlefield Atlas, p. 9. 

60. Black, The Railroads of the Confederacy, p. 62. 

61. Joseph P. Cullen, The Siege of Petersburg, Harrisburg, PA. Eastern Acorn Press, 

1981, p. 15. 

62. Me Pherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 423. 

63. Wheeler, Sword Over Richmond, p. 123. 

64. Symonds, A Battlefield Atlas, p. 35. 

65. Me Pherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 637. 

66. Ibid., p. 751. 

67. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 234. 

68. Symonds, A Battlefield Atlas, p. 40. 

69. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 236. 

70. Symonds, A Battlefield Atlas, p. 36. 

71. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 236. 

72. Ibid., p. 237. 

73. Ibid., p. 237. 

74. Ibid., p. 224. 

CHAPTER FOUR 

1. Ema Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army, A History of the Corps 1775- 1939, 

Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, United States Army, 1962, rep. 1989, p. 473. 

2. Ibid., p. 474. 

3. Ibid., p. 477. 

4. Ibid., p. 477. 

5. Ibid., p. 476. 

6. Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars, The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-

1891, New Yor1<, NY, Macmillan Publishing Company Co., Inc., 1974, p. 238. 

7. Ibid., p. 238. 
502 Endnotes 

8. Risch, Quartennaster Support, p. 480. 

9. Ibid., p. 480. 

10. David F. Trask, The War With Spain in 1898, New York, NY, Macmillan Publishing 

co., Inc., 1981, p. 155. 

11. Risch, Quartermaster Support, p. 535. 

12.1bid., p. 536. 

13. Utley, Frontier Regulars, p. 536. 

14. Graham A. Cosmas, An Anny for Empire, Columbia, MO, University of Missouri 

Press, 1971 , p. 168. 

15. Frank Friedel, The Splendid Uttle War, Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Company, 

1958, p. 61. 

16.1bid., p. 65. 

17.1bid., p. 68. 

18.1bid., p. 116. 

19. Risch, Quartermaster Support, p. 527. 

20. Friedel, Splendid Little War, p. 116. 

21. Risch, Quartermaster Support, p. 537. 

22. Theodore Roosevelt, The Rough Riders,. New York, NY, De Capo Press, 1990, p. 278. 

23. James A. Huston, The Sinews of War 1775- 1953, Washington, D.C., Office of the 

Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966, p. 284. 

24. Trask, The War with Spain, p. 357. 

25. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 286. 

26. Trask, The War with Spain, p. 387. 

27. Ibid., p. 385. 

28. Friedel, Splendid Little War, p. 283. 

29. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 287. 

30. Trask, The War with Spain, p. 386. 

31. Ibid., p. 386. 

32. Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit, New York, NY, The Literary Guild of America, 

1931' p. 360. 

33. Cosmas, An Army for Empire, p. 254. 

34. Ibid., p. 254. 

35. Trask, The War with Spain, p. 485. 

36. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 294. 

37. Ibid., p. 295. 

38. Ibid., p. 294. 

39. Ibid., p. 302. 

40. Ibid., p. 302. 

41.1bid., p. 302. 

42. Ibid., p. 298. 

43.1bid., p. 305. 

CHAPTER FIVE 

1. James A. Huston, The Sinews of War, Army Logistics 1775- 1953, Washington, 

D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966, p. 284 

2. Demurrage is a charge assessed for detaining a vehicle or a ship beyond the free 

time stipulated for loading or unloading. 

3. John Westwood, Railways at War, San Diego, Howell-North, 1980, p. 182. 
Spearhead of Logistics 503 

4. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 341. 

5. Ibid., p. 342. 

6. Ibid., p. 335. 

7. Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, The American Army in France 1917-1919, Boston, 

Little, Brown, and Company, 1936, p. 27. 

8. Ibid., p. 28. 

9. Ibid., p. 103. 

10. The Remount Service was responsible for procuring animals for cavalry, artillery 

and transportation functions. In the U.S. Army, the Remount Service was also 

responsible for the procurement, replacement and repair of wagons and harnesses. 

11 . Maj. Gen. Henry G. Sharpe, The Quartermaster Corps in the Year 1917 in the 

World War, New York, The Century Co., p. 249. 

12. Ibid., p. 252. 

13. Chester Wardlow, The U.S. Army in World War II, The Technical Services, the 

Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations, Washington, D.C., 

Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1951, p. 29. 

14. Erna Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Anny, A History of the Corps 1775- 1939, 

Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, United States Army, 1962, rep. 1989, p. 612. 

15. 1bid., p. 612. 

16. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 346. 

17. Ibid., p. 346. 

18. Ibid., p. 347. 

19. Ibid., p. 348. 

20. Ibid., p. 345. 

21. Ibid., p. 350. 

22. Col. W.E. Haseltine, Tonnage, Locomotives, and Inland Waterways, Carlisle 

Barracks, U.S. Army War College, p. 4. 

23. Risch, Quartermaster Support, p. 610. 

24. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 350. 

25. Ibid., p. 352. 

26. Ibid., p. 349. 

27. Risch, Quartermaster Support, p. 667. 

28. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 351. 

29. Elmer Belmont Potter, ed., Sea Power, a Naval History, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 

Prentice-Hall, p. 424. 

30. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 351. 

31 . Gen. John J. Pershing, My Experiences fn the World War, Vol I, New York, 

Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1931, p. 200. 

32. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 26. 

33. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 356. 

34. Harbord, American Army in France, p. 44. 

35. Ibid., p. 45. 

36. Martin van Creveld, Supplying War, Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, New 

York, Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 139. 

37. Risch, Quartermaster Support, p. 656. 

38. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 366. 

39. Ibid., p. 367. 

40. Ibid., p. 367. 
504 Endnotes 

41. Risch, Quartermaster Support, p. 657. 

42. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 368. 

43. William J. Wilgus, Transporting the A.E.F. In Western Europe 1917·1919, New 

York, Columbia University Press, 1931, p. 64. 

44. Haseltine, Tonnage, Locomotives, p. 4. 

45. Risch, Quartermaster Support, p. 661. 

46. Pershing, My Experiences, Vol I/, p. 206. 

47. Risch, Quartermaster Support, p. 658. 

48. Ibid., p. 659. 

49. Ibid., p. 661. 

50. Ibid., p. 681. 

51.1bid. 

52. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 369. 

53. Ibid. 

54. Ibid., p. 324. 

55. Ibid., p. 325. 

56. Risch, Quartermaster Support, p. 662. 

57. Haseltine, Tonnage, Locomotives, p. 5. 

58. Huston, Sinews of War, p. 369. 

59. Ibid., p. 378. 

60. Ibid., p. 379. 

61. Ibid., p. 385. 

62. Ibid., p. 392. 

63. Chief of the Transportation Service, Report of the Chief of the Transportation 

Service to the Secretary of War, Fiscal Year 1919, Washington, Government Printing 

Office, 1919, p. 186. In Worfd War I, The term "Transportation Corps" meant the 

personnel who were transporters, primarily in the A.E.F. "Transportation Service" meant 

the organization and the units in the Army as a whole. In 1994, the Transportation Corps 

encompassed both the personnel and the organizations. 

64. Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, p. 35. 

CHAPTER SIX 

1. Lt. Gen. LeA. Lutes, Logistics In World War If, Final Report of the Army Service 

Forces, Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1947, p. 34. 

2. Chester Wardlow, The U.S. Army in World War If, The Technical Services, the 

Transportation Corps; Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations, Washington D.C., 

Office of the Chief of Military History, Uniited States Army, 1951, p. 37. 

3. Ibid., p. 37. 

4. Gross and Ross were highly capable officers without whom the Transportation 

Corps as we know it today might have been less effective. Between WWI and WWII, both 

attended the principal branch and Army Schools, commanded units, taught in service 

schools, and had responsible staff assignments. Ross was commissioned through 

Infantry OCS in 1917, but was sent to France too late to see combat. He was 

permanently commissioned in 1920. From 1935·38, he commanded the Army's only 

medium tank unit at Fort Benning before leaving for an assignment to the General Staff 

G-4. Promoted to Colonel, he was scheduled to command a tank regiment in the 10th 

Armored Division in 1942, but two days before departure, he was reassigned as Chief of 

Transportation of the European Theater (ETO). He served in that capacity throughout the 

war except for a brief interval as Chief of Transportation in North Africa. Irwin Ross, Ross 

of the ETO, Army Transportation Journal, April1945, p. 32. 
Spearhead of l ogistics 505 

Gross not only had combat experience in Wor1d War I, but also several higher levels 

of command and staff since Wor1d War I. One of those assignments was supervisor of 

the Nicaragua Canal Survey for which he received the Presidential Medal of Merit in 

1939. He was the District Engineer at Los Angeles and at Rock Island, IL from which he 

was assigned as General Staff Chief of Transportation. He was promoted to Brigadier 

General in mid-1941 and sent to Russia in September 1941 with Presidential envoy W. 

Averill Harriman's Special War Supply Mission to survey transportation problems of the 

Red Army. In August 1942, he was named Chief of the Transportation Corps as a 

temporary major general and served in this position through the war. He retired on 30 

November 1945, and became Chairman of the NYC Board of Transportation. Later, he 

was recalled to active duty from 1948- 52 as a result of the Ber1in Airlift and served in the 

Office of the High Commissioner for Germany. Current Biography, Who's News and Why 

- 1946, The H.W. Wilson Company, New York, N.Y., 1947, p. 226. 

5. Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, p. 59. 

6. Ibid., pp. 28- 94. The principal agencies with which the Transportation Branch and 

later the Transportation Corps dealt included: Interstate Commerce Commission which 

regulated all carrier rates except air; the Civil Aeronautics Administration which fostered 

development of air commerce and associated facilities; the Maritime Commission and 

later the War Shipping Administration which coordinated with the British Ministry of War 

Transport; the Highway Traffic Advisory Committee and equivalent state committees 

which helped coordinate movements to minimize conflict with civilian highway traffic and 

facilitate mobilization for emergencies; the Army and Navy Munitions Board which had 

major responsibilities for munitions production and distribution and also coordinated and 

cleared use of facilities for transportation operations by the two services; the Lend-Lease 

Administration which managed the acquisition and distribution of foreign aid; the 

Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Office of Production Management concerning 

shipping for strategic imports; and the Office of Defense Transportation (ODT) set up by 

the President in December 1941 with broad powers to coordinate and regulate railway, 

highway and inland waterway carriers. 

7. Ibid., pp. 49, 50. 

8. Ibid., p. 52, Chart 1. 

9. Ibid., p. 53. 

10. Ibid., pp. 54, 55. 

11. Ibid., p. 63. 

12.1bid., p. 66. 

13. Ibid., pp. 91-94,394. 

14. Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, p. 69, Chart, p. 74, Table 1. 

On 11 October 1944, an organizational event important to the future of the Transportation 

Corps occurred with the chartering of the Army Transportation Association (ATA) in 

Washington, D.C. The association was formed to foster transportation preparedness by 

interchanging knowledge and forging relationships among Army and civilian industry and 

with other federal transportation agencies. In July 1949, the ATA was rechartered as the 

National Defense Transportation Association (NOTA). Its scope broadened to encompass 

all segments of civilian transportation and all transportation elements of the nation's 

defense establishment. The organization has continued over the years to foster 

cooperation between the defense and civilian transportation communities. From the Anny 

Transportation Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, February 1945, p. 1 and Vol. V, No.3, May-June 

1949, p.2. 

15. Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, p. 104. 

16. Ibid., pp. 95-103 and 102, Chart 3. 

17. Ibid., pp. 99, 110, Table 2. 
506 Endnotes 

18. Ibid., pp. 111-115, 121, Chart 4. See also Appendices C and D, pp. 424-425 for 

locations of TZO and subordinate installations. 

19.1bid., p. 122, Table 3. 

20. Chester Wardlow, The U.S. Army in World War II, The Technical Services, The 

Transportation Corps: Movements, Training and Supply, Washington D.C., Office of the 

Chief of Military History, 1956, Chapter VI, Military and Technical Training. 

21. Ibid., Chapter VI addresses TC training in depth. 

22. Carl A. Gray, Jr., Railroading in Eighteen Countries, New York, Charles Scribner's 

Sons, 1955. 

23. Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training and Supply, p. 134. 

24. Ibid., p. 437, Table 36. The immense numbers of truck units that operated in most 

theaters under control of transportation staff officers or headquarters such as the Motor 

Transport Brigade in the ETO retained their OM troop basis identity through the war. 

General Gross and the theater chiefs of transportation were closely involved in the 

activation and training in-theater of provisional truck units described in Chapters 8 and 9, 

following. 

25. Ibid., p. 502, Table 40. 

26. Ibid., p. 501. 

27. Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, pp. 125, 126. 

28. Ibid., p. 135. 

29.1bid., pp. 135-151. 

30.1bid., p. 135. 

31. Ibid., p. 175. 

32. Ibid., pp. 228-249. 

33. Ibid., pp. 255-261. 

34. Ibid., pp. 13, 29, 309-311 . 

35. Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training and Supply, pp. 14, 15. 

The division was headed by Col. William J. Williamson, later Brig. Gen., who had been 

general traffic manager of a large mail-order house, one of many experts brought into the 

OM and TC. Colonel Edmund C. A. Lasher was Williamson's deputy and Colonel I. 

Sewell Morris was Chief, Passenger Branch. Both were promoted to Major General in the 

1950's and each later served as Executive Director of the Military Traffic Management 

Agency. 

36. Ibid., p. 33. 

37. Ibid., p. 100. See Chapter II, Troop Movements to the Overseas Commands, for 

details. 

38. Ibid., pp. 241, 295, 303, 305. An average of 30 tons of Army freight was shipped 

on Government Bills of Lading per car by 1945, up from 24 in 1941. Country-wide 

carloadings reached an average of 40 tons by 1945. The difference was due to the nature 

of Army freight, much of it with high cube to weight ratios. 

39. Ibid., p. 243. 

40.1bid., pp. 305-316 and 310, Table 24. 

41. Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, pp. 180, 181. 

42. Ibid., pp. 135-136. 

43. Ibid., p. 264. 

44. Ibid., p. 269, Table. 

45. Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training and Supply, pp. 

376-390, Charts 32 and 33. 

46. See p. 126, above for assignment of theater support responsibilities to Zl POE. 
Spearhead of Logistics 507 

47. Ibid., pp. 341-356. See alsop. 344, Chart 11 which shows theater support by OSD. 

48. Ibid., pp. 392-394. 

49. Ibid., pp. 363-365. 

50. Ibid., pp. 397-399. 

51. Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, p. 280. 

CHAPTER SEVEN 

1. Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, The U.S. Army in World War II, the Technical 

SeNices, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, Washington D.C., Office of 

the Chief Military History, United States Army, 1957, pp. 8-30. 

2. Ibid., pp. 9-11. 

3. Ibid., pp. 11-12. 

4. Ibid., pp. 13. 

5. Ibid., pp. 31 and 58, Map 2, Alaska Highway and Connecting Routes. 

6.1bid. 

7. H.H. Dunham, Monograph 11, Transportation and the Greenland Bases, 

Washington D.C., Office of the Chief of Transportation, 1945, pp. 22-26. See also 

Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 14-16. 

8. H.H. Dunham, Office of the Chief of Transportation, Monograph 14, Transportation 

of US Forces in the Occupation of Greenland, Washington D.C., Office of the Chief of 

Transportation, 1945. 

9. Ibid., p. 28. 

10.1bid., p. 37 

11. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 

387-382. 

12. H.H. Dunham, Monograph 25, The Persian Corridor, Washington, D.C., Office of 

the Chief of Transportation, 1945, pp. 34-42. 

13. Ibid., p. 500. 

14. T.H. Vail Motter, The U.S. Army in World War II, The Middle East Theater, the 

Persian Corridor And Aid To Russia, Washington D.C., Office of the Chief Military History, 

United States Army, 1952, pp. 331-378. 

15. Dunham, Monograph25, pp. 6, 115,187, 

16. Ibid., p. 500. 

17. Ibid., pp. 223-226. 

18. Dunham, Monograph 25, pp. 154, 160, 177. Colonel Yount was an engineer officer 

who became the fourth Chief of Transportation in April 1953. Colonel Frank S. Besson, 

also an engineer officer, succeeded Col. Yount in May 1944 as GM MRS in Iran. He 

followed Yount as fifth C of T in March 1958 and later commanded Army Materiel 

Command with the rank of General. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas W. Rice who 

commanded the 791 st and ?30th ROB during his service in Iran later became president 

of several U.S. railroads, eventually holding the position of Chairman Emeritus of 

Seaboard Coastline Industries, Inc. Rice continued to serve in the Reserves and retired 

at the rank of Maj. Gen. 

19. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 378, 

403-404. 

20.1bid., pp. 192-197. 

21. Ibid., pp. 418-423. 

22. Ibid., pp. 423-424. 
508 Endnotes 

23. James A. Huston, The Sinews of War. Army Logistics 1775-1953, Washington 

D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966, 1966, pp. 545 and 546. 

24. Lt. Gen. LeA. Lutes, Logistics in World War II, Final Report of the Army Service 

Forces, Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1947, pp. 45-47. 

25. Encyclopedia Americana, Danbury, CT, Grolier Inc., 1983, p. 521. Until the 

partition of India into India, East Pakistan and West Pakistan this state covered a large 

part of the Himalayan Assam Chain. 

26. Lutes, Logistics in World War II, p. 46. 

27. Char1es F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, The U.S. Army in World War II, The 

China-Burma-India Theater, Stilwell's Mission to China, Washington D.C., Office of Chief 

Military History, United States Army, 1953, pp. 205-207. 

28. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 553, 

554. At each of the Allied strategic conferences, representatives of the Office of the Chief 

of Transportation were part of the U.S. delegation. Col. Rush B. Uncoln was a member of 

several delegations. He reported that in the final days of each conference, Allied 

transportation experts would work all night analyzing the availability of transportation 

resources to support proposed strategic and tactical decisions. Final decisions were 

made only when estimates deemed transportation resources sufficient. Lincoln was later 

promoted to major general and became the sixth Chief of Transportation. Source: 

Command Historian interview and biographical program files. 

29. Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, The U.S. Army in World War II, The 

China-Burma-India Theater, Stilwell's Command Problems, Washington D.C., Office of 

Chief Military History, United States Army, 1955, p. 293. 

30. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 554, 555. 

31. Chartes F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, The U.S. Army in World War II, The 

China-Burma-India Theater, Time Runs Out in the CBI, Washington D.C., Office of Chief 

Military History, United States Army, 1959, p. 6. 

32. Ibid., p. 40, Chart 1. 

33.1bid., p. 317, Table 4. 

34. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 

596-603. 

35. Creswell G. Blakeney, ed., Logistical History of NATOUSAIMTOUSA, 11 August 

1942 to 30 November 1945, Naples, Italy, Compiled by G-4, NATOUSA, G. Montantino, 

1945, P. 20. 

36. Huston, The Sinews of War; p. 520, Map 18. 

37. Warren Tute, The North African War, London/New York, Sidgwick and JacksonTwo Continents, 1976, pp. 204-215 

38. Brig. Gen. Vincent J. Esposito, ed., The West Point Atlas of American Wars, 

Volume II, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1959, Map 73. 

39. Huston, The Sinews of War, p. 518. 

40. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 

165-166. 

41. Ibid., pp. 152-161. 

42.1bid., pp. 161-168. 

43. Ibid., pp. 168, 176, 177. 

44.1bid., p. 171. 

45.1bid., pp. 171-177. 

46. Ibid., pp. 181-183. 

47. Alfred M. Beck, Abe Bortz, Charles W. Lynch, Lida Mayo, and Ralph F. Weld, The 

U.S. Army In World War II, The Technical Services, The Corps of Engineers: The War 
Spearhead of Logistics 509 

Against Gennany, Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, United States Army, 

1985, pp. 142-143. 

48. Lutes, Logistics in World War II, pp. 38-39. 

49. H.H. Dunham, Monograph 13, Transportation and the Conquest of Sicily, 

Washington D.C., Office of the Chief of Transportation, 1945, pp. 64, 70. 

50. Esposito, ed., The West Point Atlas, Map 93. 

51. Dunham, Monograph 13, Transportation and the Conquest of Sicily, pp. 79-83, 

107, 108. 

52. Ibid., pp. 83-19. 

53. Ibid., pp. 91-98. 

54. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, p. 202. 

55. Beck, et. al., The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Gennany, pp. 142-143. 

56. Esposito, ed., The West Point Atlas, Map 95 and Beck, et. al., The Corps of 

Engineers: The War Against Gennany, p. 210. Sergeant Powers was assigned to the 

Transportation Corps when President Roosevelt awarded him the Medal of Honor. He 

was memorialized by the Transportation Corps when the Fort Eustis welcome center was 

named Powers Hall. Sergeant Powers died in 1967. Source: Transportation Corps 

Professional Bulletin, October 1989, p. 39. 

57. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 

203-214. 

58. Ibid., pp. 214-221, 231 . 

59. Ibid., pp. 221-226. 

60. Ibid., pp. 228-229. 

61 .1bid., p. 227. 

62. Jeffrey C. Clarke and Robert Ross Smith, Riviera to the Rhine, Publication 7-10, 

Washington D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1993, pp. 71, 

107. 

63. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 

290-293. 

64. Ibid., pp. 290, 299. 

65. Clarke and Smith, Riviera to the Rhine, Map 7, pp. 127, 201, 202. 

66.1bid., pp. 203-205. 

67. Beck, et. al., The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Gennany, p. 145. 

68. Ibid., p. 450. 

CHAPTER EIGHT 

1. Alfred M. Beck, Abe Bortz, Charles W. Lynch, Lida Mayo, and Ralph F. Weld, The 

U.S. Anny in World War II, the Technical Services, The Corps of Engineers: The War 

Against Gennany. Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, United States Army, 

1985, passim. 

2. Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I, Washington 

D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1953, p. 225, Chart 6. 

3. Beck, et. al., The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Gennany, p. 301, Map 15. 

4. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Annies, Volume I, p. 428, Map 16. 

5. Ibid., pp. 476-477, Map 15. 

6. Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Annies, Volume II, Washington 

D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1959, pp. 10-17. 

7. Ibid., p. 368, Map 7. 
510 Endnotes 

8. Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, The U.S. Army in World War II, the Technical 

Services, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, Washington D.C., Office of 

the Chief Military History, United States Army, 1957, p. 78, Map 3. 

9. Helmut von Moltke, The Franco-German War. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1892, p. 8. 

10. H. H. Dunham, US Army Transportation in the European Theater of Operations, 

1942-1945. Monograph 29, Washington D.C., OffiCe of the Chief of Transportation, 1946, p. 11. 

11. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, p. 87. 

12. Ibid., p. 109. 

13. Ibid .• pp. 109-122. 

14. Ibid., p. 122. 

15. Ibid., p. 128. 

16. Ibid., p. 249. 

17. M. J. Freschie, Historical Critique of the United Kingdom Overlord Movement. 

HQ, United Kingdom Base Transportation Office, APO 413, US Army, 1 November 1945. 

18.1bid., p. 36. 

19. Ibid., p. 53. 

20. James A. Huston, The Sinews of War, Army Logistics 1775-1953, Washington 

D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966, 

21. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, p. 306. 

22. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II, pp. 124-133. 

23. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I, pp. 416, 419, Tables 7 

and 8. 

24. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 

269-278, 308, 312. 

25. Ibid., pp. 307-308, 315-316. 

26. Ibid., pp. 279-282, 313-315. 

27.1bid., pp. 316-319. 

28. Ibid., pp. 320-324. 

29.1bid., p. 312. 

30. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 

238-242 and Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I, pp. 552-557. 

31. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 

282-285. 

32. Ibid., pp. 284-285, 327-329. 

33. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I, pp. 558, 568-570. 

34. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, p. 328. 

35. Ibid., pp. 332-334, Map 5. 

36. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II, p. 139. 

37. Dunham, Monograph 29, pp. 218-223. 

38. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I, p. 570-571. 

39. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II, p. 136, Map 5. 

40.1bid., p. 142. 

41. Dunham, Monograph29, pp. 341-342. 

42. Ibid., p. 343. 

43. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, p. 338, 

Map6. 

44. Ibid., pp. 337-339. 

45. Ibid., pp. 242-244. 
Spearhead of Logistics 511 

46. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, p. 343, 

Map 7 and Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I, pp. 548-549. 

47. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, p. 334. 

48. Ibid., p. 334. 

49. Ibid., p. 342. 

50. Ibid., pp. 344. 

51. Ibid., p. 345. 

52. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II, p. 155. 

53. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 

346-348, and Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II, pp. 408-415. 

54. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II, p. 413. 

55. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 

348-351. 

56. Ibid., pp. 354-356. 

57. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II, pp. 448-449, 572. 

58. Ibid., pp. 574-581. 

59. Ibid., pp. 319-327. 

60. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II, p. 436, Map 11. 

61. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 

254-255. 

62. Ibid., pp. 244-245. 

63.1bid., pp. 326-327. 

64. Ibid., pp. 357-360. 

65. Ibid., pp. 369-374. 

CHAPTER NINE 

1. John Miller Jr., The U.S. Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Guadalcanal: 

The First Offensive, Washington D.C., Historical Division, DA, Washington, D.C. 1949, 

Map No. I, inside back cover. 

2. Brig. Gen. Vincent J. Esposito, ed., The West Point Atlas of American Wars, 

Volume II, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1959, Maps 129, 130. 

3. Ibid., pp. Maps 132-140. 

4. Ibid., pp. Maps 143, 144. 

5. Ibid., p. Maps 147. 

6. Ibid., pp. Maps 162-165. 

7. Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, The U.S. Army in World War II, The 

War Department, Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-1943, Washington D.C., Office of 

the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1955, pp. 427-424. 

8. James R. Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in the SWPA 1941-1947, TC 

Monograph 31, Office of the Chief of Transportation, Washington D.C., October 1949, pp. 

31-36. 

9. Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-1943, pp. 420-424. 

10. The organizations developed in the principal Pacific commands had a substantial 

bearing on transportation operations in the field and are addressed in some depth to 

describe the structure within which transportation operators had to work. 

11. Extensive efforts were made to supply the Philippines with considerable loss of 

shipping. For example, on 19 February 1942, 70-80 Japanese planes attacked and sank 
512 Endnotes 

all resupply shipping assembled in Darwin. See Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in 

the SWPA, pp. 19-31. 

12. Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, The U.S. Army in World War II, the Technical 

Services, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, Washington D.C., Office of 

the Chief Military History, United States Army, 1957, pp. 425-429 and Masterson, U.S. 

Army Transportation in the SWPA, pp. 31-36. In October 1943, Brig. Gen. Thomas B. 

Wilson was transferred to the China-Burma-India Theater to be the Chief of 

Transportation there. 

13. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 

428-449, 434-436. At that time, Col. (later Brig. Gen.) William W. Wanamaker was C ofT, 

having replaced Col. Plant in April1944. 

14. Ibid., p. 492. The Army Transport Service which focused on operating ports, Army 

transports, and small craft frequently was the nucleus of the command's Army 

Transportation Service that managed other modes as well. Both organizations used the 

acronym ATS. 

15.1bid., pp. 511-516. 

16. Ibid., pp. 491-498, 511-516. 

17. For details on CREGO's operations and its eventual disbandment on 31 Aug 45, 

see Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 437-447. 

18. Ibid., pp. 513-516. 

19. Ibid., p. 429. 

20. Ibid., p. 435. 

21. Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in the SWPA, p. 697. 

22. Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in the SWPA, pp. 694-699 and Bykofsky and 

Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 476-481. 

23. Bykofsky and larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 

497-501. 

24. Ibid., pp. 495, 496. 

25. Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, pp. 123, 142,223-226,313-316,371. 

26. Ibid., p. 225. 

27. Bykofsky and larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 

503-509. 

28. Ibid., p. 461. For operations at Oro Bay, Finschhafen, and other ports, and units 

assigned, see pp. 460-463. 

29. Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in the SWPA, p. 446. 

30. Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in the SWPA, p. 448 and Bykofsky and 

Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, p. 464. 

31. Bykofsky and larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 

516-522, 533-537 provides a summary of these campaigns. See also, Philip A. Crowl and 

Edmund G. Love, The U.S. Army in World War II, The Pacific Theater, Seizure of the 

Gilberts and Marshalls, Washington D.C., Office of the Chief Military History, United 

States Army, 1955, pp. 187-193. 

32. Crowl and Love, The Pacific Theater, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, pp. 

123-131 

33. Ibid., pp. 123-131. 

34. Karl C, Dod, The U.S. Army in World War II, the Technical Services, The Corps of 

Engineers: War Against Japan, Washington D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, 

United States Army, 1966, p. 56. Map 5. 

35. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, p. 465. 

36. Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in the SWPA, pp. 451-454. 
Spearhead of Logistics 513 

37. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 

465-466, 534-535 and Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in the SWPA, p. 454. 

38. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 

466-470, and Masterson, U.S. Anny Transportation in the SWPA, pp. 460-468. 

39. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 

476-480 and Masterson, U.S. Anny Transportation in the SWPA, pp. 670-681. 

40. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 

483-484 and Masterson, U.S. Anny Transportation in the SWPA, pp. 699-715. 

41. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 

535-537. 

42. Ibid., p. 541. 

43. Ibid., pp. 539-545. 

44. Ibid., pp. 487-488. 

CHAPTER TEN 

1. Jean E. Smith, The Defense of Berlin, Baltimore Maryland, John Hopkins Press, 

1963, p. 30. 

2. Ibid., p. 94. 

3. Ibid., p. 99. 

4. James A. Huston, The Sinews of War, Anny Logistics 1775-1953, Washington D.C., 

Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966, p. 595. 

5. The 76th Transportation Company, Medium Truck was assigned to the 53rd 

Transportation Battalion in Kaiserslautem Germany in 1994. 

6. R.H. Knapp, "Save by Palletizing," Military Review, July 1951, p. 42. 

7. Huston, The Sinews of War, p. 596. 

8. William B. Bunker, "The Transportation Corps in the Vittles Operation", Army 

Transportation Journal, November-December 1948, p. 11. 

9. Huston, The Sinews of War, p. 596. 

10. Max Hastings, The Korean War, Simon and Shuster Inc., New York, 1987, p. 24. 

11. Ibid. 

12.1bid. 

13. Ibid., p. 27. 

14. Ibid., p. 28. 

15. Roy E. Appleman, U.S. Army in the Korean War, South to the Naktong, North to 

the Yalu," Washington D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 

1961' p. 19. 

16.1bid. 

17. Ibid., p. 37. 

18. Ibid., p. 39. 

19. Ibid., p. 50. 

20. Ibid., p. 59. 

21. James A. Huston, Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice, Selsingrove, Susquehanna 

University Press, 1989, p. 52. 

22. Ibid., p. 54. 

23. Huston, The Sinews of War, p. 671. 

24. Emma-Jo L. Davis, History of the U.S. Anny Transportation School, 1942-1962, 

Ft. Eustis, VA, U .S.Army Transportation School, 1967, p. 89. 

25.1bid. 
514 Endnotes 

26. Paul F. Yount, was promoted to brigadier general after 14 years of active service. 

He later became the fourth Chief of Transportation serving from 1953-1958. 

27. Huston, Guns and Butter, p. 218. 

28.1bid. 

29. Ibid., p. 219. 

30. Ibid., p. 220. 

31. Ibid., p. 221. 

32. Huston, The Sinews of War, p. 642. 

33. Huston, Guns and Butter, p. 222. 

34.1bid., p. 253. 

35.1bid., p. 256. 

36.1bid. 

37. Ibid., p. 257. 

38. Terrence J. Gough, U.S. Anny Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War, 

Washington D.C., Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987, p. 68. 

39. Huston, Guns and Butter, p. 256. 

40. Ibid., p. 257. 

41.1bid. 

42.1bid. 

43. Ibid., p. 258. 

44. Ibid., p. 246. 

45. Ibid., p. 249. 

46. Ibid., p. 251. 

47. Transportation Corps Movement Doctrine for Support of Future Operations, Ft. 

Eustis, VA, Transportation Corps Combat Development Group, 1957, passim. 

48. Maurice A. Hoard, Jr., "The Vital Role of Movement Control," National Defense 

Transportation Journal, 1950, pp. 7-1 0, 53-54. 

49.1bid. 

50. Huston, Guns and Butter, p. 230. 

51. Ibid., p. 236. 

52. Army, Navy, Air Force Journal, Volume 89, February 2, 1952, pp. 670-677. 

53. Huston, Guns and Butter, p. 227. 

54. Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 519. 

55. Bruce Palmer, Jr., Intervention in the Caribbean, The Dominican Crisis of 1965, 

Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1989, p. 13. 

56. Lawrence A. Yates, Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 

1965-1966, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Fort Leavenworth Papers no. 15, 1988, p. 7. 

57. Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean, p. 19. 

58. Ibid., p. 183. 

59. Yates, Power Pack, p. 202. 

60. Ibid., p. 99. 

61.1bid., p. 198. 

62.1bid., p. 68. 

63. Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean, p. 35. 

64. Lawrence M. Greenberg, United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations 

in the 1965 Dominican Republic Intervention, Washington, D.C., Analysis Branch, Center 

of Military History, United States Army, 1987, p. 4. 
Spearhead of Logistics 515 

65. lnteNiew with Maj. (ret.) Luis Romero, by Capt. Eric R. Criner, September 15, 1993. 

66. Yates, Power Pack, p. 122. 

67. Ibid., p. 147. 

CHAPTER ELEVEN 

1. Adm. U.S.G. Sharp and Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Report on the War in 

Vietnam, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969. 

2. Ibid., p. 2. 

3. Ibid., p. 3. 

4. Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., Vietnam Studies Logistic Support, Washington D.C., 

Department of the Army, 1974, p. 6. 

5.1bid. 

6. Ibid., p. 4. 

7. Ibid., p. 7. 

8. Ibid., p. 15. 

9. Evaluation of U.S. Army Transportation Management in South Vietnam, Joint 

DA-USARPAC Transportation Management Team, 23 February 1968 (hereafter: 

DA-USARPAC Study), p. F-1. 

10. General Fuson's contributions to the Transportation Corps spanned over 35 years 

of distinguished active commissioned seNice. His assignments included Director of 

Logistics, MACV and Commander, U.S. Army Transportation Center and Fort Eustis. 

During the period of 1975- 1977, Lt. Gen. Fuson seNed as the Department of the Army 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. 

11. Ibid., pp.l-13. 

12. Public Law 99-433, 1 OOSTAT.992. 

13. After 35 years of distinguished commissioned seNice, Lieutenant Colonel 

Thompson retired as a lt. gen. Following his tour in Vietnam, he seNed as the Director of 

Logistics, J-4, United States Readiness Command; Commander, 21st Support 

Command; and the Department of the Army Inspector General. In 1994, Lieutenant 

General Thompson (Ret.) was seNing as the honorary Colonel of the Transportation 

Corps Regiment. 

14. "U.S. Army Transportation Corps in the Republic of Vietnam," January 1970, p. 70. 

15. The 124th Terminal Command was inactivated on 1 May 1972. 

16. In his 35 years of outstanding commissioned service, General Ross made 

significant contributions to the Army and the Transportation Corps. He was particular1y 

well known for his role in the development of the Post-Vietnam Transportation Corps. His 

assignments included Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, and 

Commander, Army Materiel Command. General Ross retired from active duty on 31 

March 1994. 

17. The 8th Transportation Group and its three subordinate battalions were inactivated 

in the ear1y 1970s after almost four years of seNice in the Republic of Vietnam. On 11 

June 1986, the 124th Transportation Battalion was reactivated and assigned to the 45th 

Support Group to provide additional combat seNice support to the 25th Infantry Division, 

Hawaii. On 14 July 1986, the 8th Transportation Group was reactivated and redesignated 

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 8th Transportation Brigade. In 1994, the 

8th Brigade was an integral part of the Transportation Corps training base located at Fort 

Eustis, Virginia. 

18. Jerome G. Peppers, History of Military Logistics, Logistics Education Foundation, 

Huntsville, AL, 1988, p. 240. 
516 Endnotes 

19.1bid. 

20. Ibid., p. 15. 

21 . Ibid., p. 24. 

22. Ibid., p. 25. 

23. The Sentinel, Fort Eustis, Virginia, 24 April 1959, p. 29. 

24. Heiser, Vietnam Studies Logistic Support, p. 158. 

25. In 1994, the 6th, 1Oth, and 11th Transportation Battalions were still active duty 

transportation battalions assigned to the 7th Transportation Group, Fort Eustis, Virginia. 

The 10th and 11th Transportation Battalions served as terminal service battalions, while 

the 6th Battalion was a truck battalion. 

26. Lieutenant Colonel DeHaven served as Commandant, U.S. Army Transportation 

School and Commander, U.S. Army Transportation Center Fort Eustis, Virginia after 

promotion to major general, and subsequently as J-4, JCS as a lt. gen., the grade at 

which he retired. 

27. The 4th Transportation Command remained on active duty as a major subordinate 

command in the Federal Republic of Germany until inactivated on 15 November 1991. 

28. Heiser, Vietnam Studies Logistic Support, p. 25. 

29. Ibid., p. 172. 

30.1bid. 

31. DA-USARPAC Study, p. F-1. 

32. Robert A. Brooks, Transportation Proceedings, November 1967, p. 7. 

33. Heiser, Vietnam Studies Logistic Support, p. 172. 

34. Ibid., p. 126. 

35. 1bid. 

36.1bid. 

37. RO/RO vessels were first used during the Civil War. Steamboats were modified 

with rail lines emplaced on their decks so railcars could be rolled aboard and transported 

across water obstacles to new operational areas. 

38. General Frank S. Besson, Commander, Army Material Command was the primary 

force behind the expanding use of containers in Vietnam. After an inspection trip to 

Vietnam in 1966, he recognized that additional containerization was the key to eliminating 

Vietnam's clogged breakbulk pipeline. General Besson has been memorialized twice. 

The U.S. Army Transportation Museum was named in his honor. In 1988, the first vessel 

to enter the Army's inventory in over 30 years, the Logistics Support Vessel, LSV-1 was 

named for General Besson. 

39. Known in 1994 as the Military Sealift Command (MSC). 

40. These ships were designed and built specifically for the Department of the 

Defense to enhance DOD's merchant marine fleet. Designed to operate where no fixed 

ports were available, they were dependent on lighterage to bring their cargo ashore. 

41. The 403d Transportation Company assumed a near1y identical mission during 

Desert Shield/Storm 22 years later with the difference that the supplies it handled arrived by air. 

42. Throughout the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army's supply system had five classes of 

supply: Class I, Subsistence; Class II, Clothing; Class Ill, Petroleum Products; Class IV, 

Barrier Material; and Class V, Ammunition. After the war, the number of classes was 

expanded to ten to make classification easier. 

43. Laterite is a residual product of rock decay that is red in color. 

44. The Wheel, Fort Eustis, Virginia, 3 December 1965, p. 11. 

45. The GOER was introduced to the Transportation Corps to help enhance the Corps' 

off-road capabilities. It was a large-tire, cargo-carrying vehicle designed and built by the 
Spearhead of Logistics 517 

Caterpillar Tractor Company. It was a versatile vehicle with both cross- country and swim 

capabilities. 

46. In 1994, the 7th Transportation Battalion was on active duty with the 507th Corps 

Support Group, 1st Corps Support Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 

47. Letter, General Frank S. Besson, 15 June 1967, Subject: Transportation 

Developments. 

48. The spirit of Sergeant Seay's courage and sacrifice lives on in the Transportation 

Corps. His deeds have been commemorated by Seay Plaza, Fort Eustis and by Seay 

Field, 1st Corps Support Command, Fort Bragg. 

49. Larry K. Ballard, "The Gun Trucks of Ambush Alley," Anny Logistican, July-August 

1986, p.28. 

50. Ibid., p. 30. 

51. Specialist Four Dahl was one of two Transportation Corps soldiers awarded the 

Medal of Honor in the Vietnam War. The other soldier was Sergeant Seay. The 

Transportation Corps had a Medal of Honor winner in World War II and one in the Korean War. 

52. Ballard, p. 32. 

53. A complete throughput of combat forces over the shore using a LOTS operation 

was a new concept. Past operations had soldiers and equipment staged on the beach 

until ground assets could move units/cargo into the theater. This operation throughput 

many of the personnel directly to their tactical assembly areas via helicopter. 

54. Heiser, Vietnam Studies Logistic Support, p. 162. 

55. Ibid., p. 163. 

56. Ibid., p. 165. 

57. Ibid., p. 164. 

58. Ibid., p. 166. 

59. Ibid., p. 154. 

60. Harry S. Summers, Vietnam War Almanac, New York, Facts on File Publications, 

1985, pp. 118, 189. 

61. Heiser, Vietnam Studies Logistic Support, p. 163. 

62. Car1 F. Cannon, History of Aircraft Maintenance in the U.S. Army, 1939 to the 

Present, 1985, Fort Eustis, VA, U.S. Army Transportation School, p. 32. 

63. Heiser, Vietnam Studies Logistic Support, p. 137. 

64. In 1994, the 34th Support Group was on active duty serving in the Republic of 

Korea. 

65. G.W. Collins, ed., "Red Ball Express: 1966," National Defense Transportation 

Journal, July-August 1966, pp. 28-29. 

66. In Vietnam and again during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, U.S. Air Force 463L 

pallets were used for a wide variety of purposes leading to a theater and Department of 

Defense pallet shortage. During both wars a viable pallet recovery program would have 

precluded these shortages. 

67. Robert W. Larson, "The United States Army Transportation Command, Europe," 

Transportation Proceedings, August 1969, p. 18. 

68. REFORGER exercises were initiated in 1968 to demonstrate U.S. commitment to 

the readiness of NATO. The first REFORGER occurred January through February 1969, 

with the Transportation Corps contributing two transportation companies to the overall 

CONUS deployment. Units deploying in support of the first REFORGER included the 

100th Truck Company, Fort Eustis, VA and the 342d Truck Company, Fort McClellan, 

Alabama. 

69. Larson, The United States Army Transportation Command, p. 21. 
518 Endnotes 

70. After relinquishing command of the 37th Group in May 1967, Colonel Murray 

commanded the 4th Transportation Command in Vietnam. Subsequently, he served as 

the Director of Anny Transportation, Department of the Anny Deputy Chief of Logistics. 

Later he was promoted to major general and served as the Director of Logistics, MACV 

and Defense Attache, Saigon following the Vietnam cease fire. 

71. Letter, Maj. Gen. John E. Murray, 28 February 1986, Subject Operation FRELOC, 

72. Maj. Gen. W.N. Redling, "Transportation Developments," 15 June 1967, p. 3. 

73. On 31 July 1974 the command became Military Traffic Management Command 

(MTMC). 

74. Transportation Center, Fort Eustis, Virginia, Regulation 1Q-1, p. ii. 

. 75. The Wheel, Fort Eustis, Virginia, 19 September 1969, p. 1. 

CHAPTER TWELVE 

1. John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to Air/and Battle: The Development of Anny 

Doctrine 1973-1982, Fort Monroe, VA, TRADOC Historical Monograph Series, Office of 

the Command Historian, TRADOC, 1984, p. 2. 

2. TRADOC was established in July 1973 to carry out the Anny missions of individual 

training and combat developments, includ ing the design responsibility for Army forces 

and organizations. 

3. Susan Canedy, Anne W. Chapman, and John L. Romjue, Prepare the Army for 

War, A Historical Overview of the Anny Training and Doctrine Command 1973-1993 

TRADOC Historical Monograph Series, Office of the Command Historians, TRADOC, 

Fort Monroe, VA, 1993. 

4.1bid. 

5. TRANSLOG, August 1974, p. 1, Letter to the editor from Maj. Gen. Del Mar, dated 

21 July 1974, subject: MTMC. 

6. Ibid., p. 4. 

7. General Meyer served as the Army Chief of Staff from 1979-1983. 

8. Gen. E.C. Meyer, CSA White Paper, 1980, Subject: U.S. Army Capabilities. 

9. Peter M. Dunn and Bruce W. Watson, ed., American Intervention in Grenada, the 

Implications of Operation "Urgent Fury," Boulder, CO, Westview Special Studies in 

Military Affairs, 1985. 

10. An airfield forced insertion operation required the assaulting force to seize control 

of the airfield. 

11.1bid., p. 163. 

12. Ibid., p. 175. 

13. Green Ramp served as the primary air outload point for the forces stationed at Fort 

Bragg. The 82d Airborne Division maintained one brigade in ORB 1 status which could 

deploy anywhere in the world from Green Ramp in 18 hours. The ORB was subdivided 

into three Division Ready Forces (DRF) each a battalion equivalent. The 82d deployed 

two OAF's in support of operation Urgent Fury. The logistical slice from the XVIII Airborne 

Corps headquarters and the 1st Corps Support Command accompanied the force. 

14. Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Groups (AIDACG) were assigned to all U.S. Air 

Force Bases or Anny airfields that supported a deployment mission for U.S. Anny forces. 

The NDACG performed numerous outload functions including the staging of deploying 

personnel and equipment, weighing and calculating the center of balance for deploying 

equipment, assisting in hazardous, cargo documentation, and verifying/certifying the 

deploying units load plans. 

15. Vicki Regone and SP4 Michael Smith, "Soldiers From 7th Group Support Grenada 

Mission", The Wheel, 1 Dec 83, p. 14. 

16. Dunn and Watson, American Intervention in Grenada, p. 179. 
Spearhead of Logistics 519 

17. For a brief explanation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, see Chapter Eleven. 

18. In 1952, the Transportation Corps became proponent for aviation logistics support, 

and in 1954, the Department of the Army recommended that all Army aviation 

maintenance instruction be conducted at the Transportation School. This remained the 

case until 1983 when the Aviation Logistics School was established. 

19. The regimental system stemmed from the early days of the Army when regiments 

were formed around an individual of means - the colonel of the regiment. The soldiers 

were paid by the colonel and owed their allegiance to him and to each other. The group 

stayed together, fought together and identified with the regimental flag and 

accouterments. The Wheel, July 1986, p. 6. 

20. Ibid., p. 15. 

21. MAC was redesignated the Airlift Mobility Command on 1 June 1992. MAC was 

disestablished as part of a major Air Force restructuring that recast the Air Force's 

structure from three major subordinate commands (Tactical Air Command, Strategic Air 

Command and Military Airlift Command) to two commands (Air Combat Command and 

Air Mobility Command). 

22. Cassidy, General Duane H., "U.S. Transportation Command: New Command 

Force Projection", TRANSLOG, August 1987, p. 1. 

23. Ibid., p. 2. 

24. In the post-World War II era, Army vessels have been commanded by either 

non-commissioned officers or warrant officers, who unlike the warrants of other armed 

services, were not commissioned when they reached the grade of W-2. By definition, a 

vessel is commissioned when it is placed under the command of a commissioned officer, 

so Army vessels could not be commissioned. In 1987, the law regarding Army warrants 

was changed so they, too, were commissioned upon reaching the grade of W-2. This 

allowed the Army to commission those vessels, like the LSV, which were commanded by 

warrant officers. 

25. Becker, Robert, "Army Commissions 1st Ship", Daily Press, 15 January 1988, pp. 

B1, B4. 

26. Bruce W. Watson and Peter G. Tsouras, Operation Just Cause, The U.S. 

Intervention in Panama, Westview Press, 1991, p. 198. 

27. Ibid., p. 199. 

28. Ibid., p. 201. 

29. Green Ramp, as noted in the text, served as Fort Bragg's primary Aerial Port of 

Embarkation (APOE) and was staffed by the 1st Corps Support Command to support the 

82d's rapid deployment mission. Green Ramp was physically located within Pope Air 

Force Base, but the support structure and its real estate are considered Fort Bragg 

property. Therefore, Green Ramp was often referred to in connection with both Fort 

Bragg and Pope Air Force Base. 

30. Ibid., p. 126. 

31. Before the 20 December 1989 invasion, U.S. forces in Panama numbered 13,597. 

During Just Cause over 19,500 personnel were flown to Panama. Included in this figure 

are the more than 3,000 paratroopers who arrived during the early stages of the 

operation. 

32. Between 20 December 1989 and 1 January 1990, the Military Airlift Command 

flew 408 MAC flights (55 C-130, 254 C-141, and 99 C-5's) supporting Just Cause. A total 

of 19,500 personnel and 11,700 tons of material were delivered. 

33. The 7th Transportation Group, Fort Eustis, Virginia agreed to rotate an 

ArrivaVDeparture Airfield Control Group (A/DACG) every 90 days in support of Army 

cargo transiting Howard Air Force Base. 
520 Endnotes 

34. A composite platoon of 5 ton tractors, 2 1/2 ton trucks and busses, and sedans 

was formed out of in-country assets. Truck drivers from the 126th Transportation 

Company, 7th Transportation Battalion and from the 546th Transportation Company, 

189th Maintenance Battalion were flown in to operate these vehicles. 

35. Ibid., p. 125. 

36. The call forward location on an airfield was the point where the field joint 

inspection was conducted between the Army and the Air Force. Upon completion of the 

inspection, the deploying equipment was controlled by the Air Force. 

37. Ibid., p. 222. 

38. Steele, Dennis, "Operation Just Cause", Army, February 1990, pp. 34-44. 

CHAPTER THIRTEEN 

1. Mark Miller, Desert Shield Fact Book, 1991, Bloomington, IL, GDW Inc., pp. 6·7. 

2.1bid. 

3. Norman Friedman, Desert Victory, The War for Kuwait, 1991, Annapolis, MD, Naval 

Institute Press, p. 27. 

4. Robert H. Scales, Jr., Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War, 1993, 

Washington, D.C., Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, p. 42. 

5. Ibid., p. 43. 

6. A Ready Reserve Fleet Study initiated by Military Sealift Command just prior to 

Desert Shield indicated that the Ready Reserve Fleet was in a high state of readiness 

and could get to the ports of embarkation faster than the deploying units. The draft report 

was canceled one week after deployment began. 

7. Ibid., p. 45. 

8.1bid. 

9. The military time zone for Washington D.C. was Romeo time while Kuwait and 

Saudi Arabia fell in time zone Charlie. The time difference between the zones was 8 

hours. 

10. Ibid., p. 48. 

11. In the first 30 days of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam the following numbers of 

soldiers were deployed: 29,000, 11,900, and 41,000 respectively. 

12. CRAF provided the Department of Defense with additional civilian aircraft in the 

event of a national emergency. CRAF could be called up in stages to augment the Air 

Force's airlift requirements, while minimizing the impact on the civilian airline industry. 

During Desert Shield/Storm 38 CRAF aircraft were activated and flew more than 5,300 

missions. 

13. Eric Criner, Steve Lindahl, Drew Young, Desert Shield, Joint Committee Report, 

Fort Bragg I Pope Air Force Base, NC, XVIII Airborne Corps, December 1990, p. 18. 

14. As described in the 1993 edition of the Joint Staff Officer's Guide, AFSC PUB 1, 

JOPES was the integrated joint conventional command and control system used to 

support military operation monitoring, planning, and execution activities. JOPES 

incorporated policies, procedures, personnel, and facilities by interfacing with automated 

data processing (ADP) systems, reporting systems, and WWMCCS ADP to support 

senior-level decision makers and their staffs at the National Command Authority (NCA) 

level and throughout the Joint Planning and Execution Community. 

15. Bruce Babb, "Desert Shield: Experiences on the MAC Crisis Action Team," Airlift, 

Winter 1990·1991 , pp. 1·3. 

16. Unit Line Numbers (ULN) were alpha-numeric codes used to identify units on a 

TPFDDL and were the primary way to identify units in the JOPES deployment system. 

Aircraft arrived at deployment facilities slotted against a specific ULN from the TPFDDL. 
Spearhead of logistics 521 

17. Transportation Corps load planners maximized the usage of every aircraft in 

coordination with unit movement officers from deploying units. The average utilization 

rate for the C-141 was 96% while the rate of utilization of the C-5 was 97%. In laymen's 

terms the average C-141 departed Pope AFB with all but 4% of its total lift capacity 

(cargo) used. 

18. The Latest Arrival Date (LAD) was a planning tool which forecast the closure of 

units into a theater of operations and was used to allocate transportation resources for 

each specific unit. 

19. The Fort Bragg/Pope Air Base Force Deployment facility encompassed not only 

Green Ramp but the entire physical plant supporting the outload process. Fort Bragg's 

outload capabilities were dependent on facilities such as the Corps Marshaling Area, 

Personnel Holding Area, Call Forward Area and the Heavy Drop Rigging site. At Pope Air 

Force base, deployment outload was primarily supported from Green Ramp but Pope 

AFB also used several other ramps to support aircraft outloading. 

20. Scales, Certain Victory, 1993, p. 87. 

21. "Moving Out," Government Executive, November 1990, p. 232. 

22. Scales, Certain Victory, 1993, p. 89. 

23.1bid. 

24. Ibid., pp. 56-57. 

25. William G. Pagonis and Jeffery L. Cruikshank, Moving Mountains, 1992, Boston, 

Harvard Business School Press, 1992, p. 90. 

26. General Pagonis' military assignments contributed to his impressive logistical 

capabilities. His background included logistical support assignments with the 193d 

Infantry Brigade, Panama; battalion commander of the 10th Transportation Battalion, 7th 

Transportation Group, and Deputy Commander, 21st Support Command, Kaiserslautem 

Germany. At the time of deployment to Saudi, General Pagonis was serving as the 

Director of Logistics, Forces Command. Upon arrival in theater, he assumed the role of 

Deputy Commanding General for Logistics. Later, he was assigned to command of the 

ARGENT Support Command (Provisional) which evolved into the 22d Support 

Command. He retired as a Lt. Gen. in 1993. 

27. Ibid., p. 65. 

28. During the mid-eighties, the Army loaded the Green Harbor and three similar 

vessels with enough tentage, food, ammunition, and water purification and refrigeration 

equipment to provide a logistical jump-start to any Gulf operation until seaborne transport 

arrived from the United States. 

29. William Matthews, "Sealift Feels Strain to Meet Commitment," Navy Times, 24 

September 1990, pp. 6, 30. 

30 Ibid., p. 6. 

CHAPTER FOURTEEN 

1. Robert H. Scales, Terry L. Johnson and Thomas P. Odom, Certain Victory: The 

U.S. Anny in the Gulf War, Washington D.C., Office of the Chief of Staff United States 

Army, 1993, p. 147. 

2. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to 

Congress, Department of Defense, April 1992, p. 411. 

3. William G. Pagonis and Jeffery L. Cruikshank, Moving Mountains, Boston, Harvard 

Business School Press, 1992, p. 91. 

4. LASH technology was developed in 1952. The LASH system provided for the barge 

to be separated from the mother ship using on board cargo handling equipment, which 

reduced the need for fixed port operations. The barges could be lifted onto smaller 
522 Endnotes 

vessels or pushed to a port using available tugs. ACADIA FOREST was the first 

commercial LASH vessel in service in 1962. LASH technology had been tried in the 19th 

century with the Scottish ship CONNECTOR. Utilizing three separate floating 

midsections, the vessel could drop a section at a port for off-loading and retrieve the 

section at a later date. Unfortunately, adequate technology did not exist to keep the 

vessel together in high seas, and during her maiden voyage CONNECTOR was lost at 

sea. World War II provided prototypes and advances in lighterage. The LASH vessels 

launched in the sixties were still in use in 1994. 

5. Jeffery A. Kipers and Donald D. Parker, "The Stonn on the Horizon, The 24th 

Transportation Battalion in Saudi Arabia," Tab A, 7th Transportation Group Operation 

Desert Shield/Storm After Action Review (hereafter known as 7th Group AAR), Ft. Eustis, 

VA, 7th Transportation Group, 1991. 

6. 24th Transportation Battalion After Action Review of Operation Desert Shield/Storm, 

Tab C, 7th Group AAR, 1 January 1991. 

7. 7th Transportation Group, 7th Transportation Group Unit Historical Lessons 

Learned Report, Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Ft. Eustis, VA, 7th Transportation 

Group, 1991, Tab A, p. 4. 

8. Logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations provided for the movement of cargo, 

supplies, or personnel ashore over an improved landing beach or through a fixed port 

facility from off-shore using landing vessels and/or lighterage. 

9.1bid., p.1. 

1 0. Ibid., p.1 0. 

11. Different aircraft had different height restrictions for loading cargo on the aircraft. 

CRAF aircraft nonnally had the most restrictive height limitations because of the loading 

envelope of the aircraft. C130, C141 and C5 had more liberal height limitations 

depending whether the pallet was loaded on the ramp or the floor. 

12. In 1994, the Air Mobility Command (AMC). 

13. P.M. Evans, Headquarters, Department of the Anny, Operation Desert 

Shield/Storm After Action Report, Anny Concept Analysis Agency, Bethesda Maryland, 

AD-C 048960L, JULLS Number 61753- 26130, 27 September 1991. 

14. 22d Support Command After Action Report, Volume IVa, Tab F, 1 April 1991, p. 3. 

15. Scales, et al., Certain Victory, p. 77. 

16. 7th Transportation Group Unit Historical Lessons Learned Report, Tab A. 

17. Scales, et al., Certain Victory, p. 77. 

18. The mission of the Heavy Equipment Transporter was to transport tanks and other 

heavy equipment in the theater of operations. Designed and built by the Oshkosh Truck 

Corporation the tractor-trailer had a payload capacity of 106,000 pounds over a range of 

420 miles. The U.S. 1994 inventory was 750. 

19. DOD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p. 425. 

20. Paul L. Willis, "Theater Linehaul Transportation Operations During Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm," 22d Support Command, April1991, p. 4. 

21. Ibid., p. 5. 

22. The Global Positioning System (GPS) was a satellite based, radio navigation 

system that provided precise, wortd wide, three dimensional position, velocity, and timing 

data. By March 1991, 4,490 commercial and 842 military GPS receivers were deployed in 

for use by Desert Stonn units. 

23. Willis, ''Theater Unehaul Transportation," p. 6. 

24. PeterS. Kindsvatter, "VII Corps in the Gulf War," Military Review, January 1992, p. 3. 

25. The 1st Infantry Division's, 3d brigade had not yet totally upgraded their M113 

personnel carriers to Bradley Fighting vehicles and the decision was made to deploy the 

3d Brigade of the 3d Infantry Division instead. 
Spearhead of logistics 523 

26. Kindsvatter, "VII Corps in the Gulf War," p. 3. 

27. Ibid., p. 9. 

28. Ibid., p. 11. 

29. 22d Support Command After Action Report, Volume IVb, Tab B, 10 May 1991, p. 

15. 

30. Ibid., p. 15. 

31.1bid., p. 11. 

32. Willis, "Theater Linehaul Transportation," p. 7. 

33. Ibid., p. 9. 

34. Ibid., p. 10. 

35. Block times were used to bar the use of a main supply route to all other traffic 

except the unit with priority. Therefore, units were given block times to move along certain 

routes. When their block time expired another unit gained priority over the route and used 

its block time to move. 

36. Col. Stephen F. Rausch, ed., "Tracking the Storm," Miltary Review, September 

1991, p. 72. 

37. Scales, et al., Certain Victory, p. 146. 

38. Col. Frederick C. Perkins and Col. John C. Race, Jr., "Moving the XVIII Airborne 

Corps During Desert Storm, A Personal Experience Monograph," U.S. Army War 

College, 25 May 1994, p. 24. 

39. Ibid., p. 24. 

40. Willis, 'Theater Linehaul Transportation," p. 14. 

41. Scales, etal., Certain Victory, p. 216. 

42. Perkins and Race, Jr., "Moving the XVIII Airborne Corps," p. 19. 

43. Michael D. Krause and William G. Pagonis, "Theater Logistics in the Gulf," Anny 

Logistician, July-August 1992, p. 6. 

44.1bid. 

45.1bid. 

46. Willis, "Theater Linehaul Transportation," p. 15. 

47. Ibid., p. 16. 

48. Scales, et al., Certain Victory, p. 323. 

49.1bid. 

50. Ibid., p. 338. 

51. Willis, 'Theater Linehaul Transportation," p. 19. 

52. Scales, et al., Certain Victory, p. 339. 

53. Ibid. 

54. 22d Support Command After Action Report, Volume IVb, Tab 6. 

55. Wesley V. Manning, "Command Report Desert Storm," 22d Support Command 

After Action Report, Volume Ill, p. 8. 

CHAPTER FIFTEEN 

1. Maurice A. Hoard, "The Vital Role of Movement Control," National Defense 

Transportation Journal, March-April, 1950, p. 7. 

2. Chester Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training and Supply, 

Washington D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1956, pp. 

166,326, 417. 

3. Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, The U.S. Army in World War II, the Technical 

Services, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, Washington D.C., Office of 

the Chief Military History, United States Army, 1957, pp. 324-326. 
524 Endnotes 

4. Hoard, "The Vital Role," p. 7. 

5. Jack Fuson, Transportation and Logistics: One Man's Story, Draft Manuscript, 

Washington D.C., Center of Military History, United States Army, 1994, Chapter 5. 

6. Ascom City was originally the depot for American occupation forces after World War 

II and retained its name during the Korean War. 

7. James A. Huston, Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice, Selsingrove, Susquehanna 

University Press, 1989. Another factor bearing on port problems was that the command 

which controlled the ports did not control either water transport or rail requiring 

coordination across major commands to ensure rail cars arrived during vessel off-load. 

Countless occurrences of ships discharged without rail transport to clear the cargo from 

the port added to the congestion as off-loaded supplies were stored on piers waiting 

onward movement. 

8. Ibid., p. 251 

9. Field Manual 55·10, Army Transportation Movements Management, Headquarters, 

Department of the Army, June 1969, passim. 

10. Transportation Corps Combat Developments Group, A Study for the 

Establishment of Doctrine, Procedures and Techniques for Future Operations, U.S. Army 

Transportation Center, Ft. Eustis, VA, 1957, Annex A and B, passim. 

11. Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., Vietnam Studies Logistic Support, Department of the Army, 

1974, p. 159. 

12. Joint DA-USARPAC Transportation Management Team, "Evaluation of U.S. Army 

Transportation Management in South Vietnam," 23 February 1968, pp. H1-H4. 

13. Field Manual55-10. 

14. 220 Support Command After Action Report, Volume IVa, Tab F. 

15.1bid. 

16. Paul L. Willis, "Theater Linehaul Transportation Operations During Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm," 22d Support Command, Apri/1991, pp. 1-20. 

17. Examples of DOD directives and regulations include: DOD Directive 4500.9, 

Transportation and Traffic Management, dated 1January 1989; DOD Regulation 4500.32, 

Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures, Volume I dated 7 May 1992 and 

Volume II date 1 January 1989; and DOD Directive 4500.37, Management of the DOD 

lntermodal Container System, dated 2 April1987. 

18. Fuson, Transportation and Logistics, Chapter 11, p. 3., and Chapter 15, p. 5. 
Spearhead of Logistics 525 

Bibliography 

In addition to entries in the categories specified, a number of journals, magazines, 

Army professional bulletins, and newspapers were used over the course of research for 

the writing of this book. They include Atmy, Atmy Logistician, Army Navy Air Force 

Journal, Atmy Transportation Journal, Bulletin of the National Railway Historical Society, 

Government Executive Magazine, Military Review, National Defense Transportation 

Journal, Navy Times, The Sentinel, Transportation Proceedings, Translog, Transportation 

Corps Professional Bulletin, and The Wheel, 

MILITARY REPORTS 

Chief of the Transportation Service, Report of the Chief of the Transportation SeNice to 

the Secretary of War, Fiscal Year 1919, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 

1919 

Eric Criner, Steve Lindahl, Drew Young, Desert Shield, Joint Committee Report, Fort 

Bragg I Pope Air Force Base, NC, XVIII Airborne Corps, December 1990 

Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress, 

April1992 

D.M. Evans, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Operation Desert Shield/Storm 

After Action Report, Army Concept Analysis Agency, Bethesda Maryland, AD-C 048960L, 

JULLS Number 61753- 26130, 27 September 1991 

Joint DA-USARPAC Transportation Management Team, Evaluation of U.S. Army 

Transportation Management in South Vietnam, 23 February 1968 

Lt. Gen. LeA. Lutes, Logistics in World War II, Final Report of the Army Service 

Forces, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1947 

Lt. Col. Gerald L. Peterson, Project Officer, Final Report, Vehicle Convoy Operations 

in the Republic of Vietnam, ACTIV Project No. ACG-78F, Army Concept Team in 

Vietnam, APO SF 96384, 30 September 1971 

Adm. U.S.G. Sharp and Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Report on the War in 

Vietnam, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969 

William F. Shonkwiler, Provisioning and Logistics Support of the LARC (Lighter, 

Amphibious Resupply Cargo) Used by the Army in Vietnam, Project Number AMC 58, St. 

Louis, U.S. Army Mobility Command, 1970 

The Transportation Board, Final Report, Project 9-72-01-01 (T- 31), Arctic Test of 

Transportation Corps Equipment, Winter 1947, Fort Eustis, VA, Transportation Board, 1948 

The Transportation Board, Final Report, Project 9-72-01-02 (T- 31), Arctic Test of 

Transportation Corps Equipment, Winter 1948, Fort Eustis, VA, Transportation Board, 1949 

Transportation Corps Combat Developments Group, A Study for the Establishment of 

Doctrine, Procedures and Techniques for Future Operations, U.S. Army Transportation 

Center, Ft. Eustis, VA, 1957 

Transportation Corps Combat Development Group, Transportation Corps Movement 

Doctrine for Support of Futvre Operations, Ft. Eustis, VA, Transportation Corps Combat 

Development Group, 1957 

The Transportation Training Command, Project 572- Final Report, Fort Eustis, VA, 1955 
526 Bibliography 

7th Transportation Group, 7th Transportation Group Operation Desert Shield/Storm 

After Action Review, Ft. Eustis, VA, 7th Transportation Group, 1991 

7th Transportation Group, 7th Transportation Group Unit Historical Lessons Learned 

Report, Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Ft. Eustis, VA, 7th Transportation Group, 1991 

22D Support Command After Action Report, Volume I-XVI, 1 April 1991 

ARMY AND WAR DEPARTMENT MANUALS AND REGULATIONS 

Field Manual 55-1, Army Transportation Services in a Theater of Operation, 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 1971 

Field Manual 55-4, Transportation Movements in the Theater of Operation, 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 1959 

Field Manual 55-4-1 (TEST), Transportation Movements in a Theater of Operation, 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, April 1967 

Field Manual 55-6, Transportation Services in Theaters of Operation, Headquarters, 

Department of the Army, September 1961 

Field Manual 55-7, Transportation Services in the Continental United States, 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1952 

Field Manual 55-10, Transportation Movements Services Field Army, Headquarters, 

Department of the Army, June 1965 

Field Manual 55-10, Army Transportation Movements Management, Headquarters, 

Department of the Army, June 1969 

Field Manual 55-10, Army Transportation Movement Management, Headquarters, 

Department of the Army, March 1973 

Office of the Chief of Transportation, Transportation, The Corps and the Function in the 

U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of 

Transportation, 1957 

Office of the Quartermaster General, Manual for the Quartermaster Corps, 2 Vols, War 

Department Document No. 562, Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1916 

Transportation Center, Fort Eustis, Virginia, U.S. Army Transportation Center and Fort 

Eustis Regulation 10-1, 1 March 1987 

War Department, Regulations, U.S. Army Transport Service, 1900 

MEMOIRS AND AUTOBIOGRAPHIES 

Jack C. Fuson, Transportation and Logistics: One Man's Story, Draft Manuscript, 

Washington D.C., Center of Military History, United States Army, 1994 

Carl R. Gray, Jr., Railroading in Eighteen Countries, New York, Charles Scribner's 

Sons, 1955 

Maj. Gen. Johnson Hagood, The Services of Supply, a Memoir of the Great War, New 

York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1927 

Gen. James G. Harbord, The American Army in France 1917-1919, Boston, Little, 

Brown, and Company, 1936 

Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., Soldiers Supporting Soldiers, Washington D.C., Office of the 

Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1991. 

Abraham Robinson Johnston, Phillip Gooch Ferguson, and Marcellus Ball Edwards, 

Marching With the Army of the West, 1846- 1848 Ralph Bieber, ed. Glendale CA, The 

Arthur Clark Co., 1936 

William G. Pagonis and Jeffery L. Cruikshank, Moving Mountains. 1992, Boston, 

Harvard Business School Press, 1992. 
Spearhead of Logistics 527 

Col. Frederick C. Per1<ins and Col. John C. Race, Jr., Moving the XVIII Airborne Corps 

During Desert Storm, A Personal Experience Monograph, U.S. Army War College, 

25 May 1994 

Gen. John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, 2 Vols, New York, Frederick 

A. Stokes Company, 1931 

Theodore Roosevelt, The Rough Riders, New York, NY, De Capo Press, rep. 1990 

Maj. Gen. Henry G. Sharpe, The Quartermaster Corps in the Year 1917 in the World 

War, New York, The Century Co., 1921 

OFFICIAL HISTORIES 

Roy E. Appleman, U.S. Army in the Korean War, South to the Naktong, North to the 

Yalu, Washington D.C., OHice of the Chief of Military History, USA, 1961. 

Alfred M. Beck, Abe Bortz, Charles W. Lynch, Lida Mayo, and Ralph F. Weld, The U.S. 

Army in World War II, the Technical Services, The Corps of Engineers: The War Against 

Germany, Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, United States Army, 1985 

Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, The U.S. Army in World War II, the Technical 

Services, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, Washington D.C., Office of 

the Chief Military History, 1957 

Jeffrey C. Clar1<e and Robert Ross Smith, Riviera to the Rhine, Publication 7-10, 

Washington D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, 1993 

Robert W. Coakley, The Role of Federal Military Forces on Domestic Disturbances 

1789-1878, Washington D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 

1988 

Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, The U.S. Army in World War II, The War 

Department, Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-1943, Washington D.C., Office of the 

Chief of Military History, 1955 

Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love, The U.S. Army in World War II, The Pacific 

Theater, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, Washington D.C., Office of the Chief 

Military History, 1955 

Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. Army in World War II, The Pacific Theater, The Campaign in 

the Marianas, Washington D.C., Office of the Chief Military History, 1955 

Karl C. Dod, The U.S. Army in World War II, the Technical Services, The Corps of 

Engineers: War Against Japan, Washington D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966 

Terrence J. Gough, U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War, 

Washington D.C., U.S. Army Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987 

Historical Division, Movement Control in Three Wars: World War II, Korea, Vietnam, 

Washington D.C., Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 March 1973 

James A. Huston, The Sinews of War, Army Logistics 1775-1953, Washington D.C., 

Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966 

John Miller Jr., The U.S. Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Guadalcanal: 

The First Offensive, Washington D.C., Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1949 

Walter Millis, ed. The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall, 

General of the Army H.H. Amold and Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Philadelphia, J.P. 

Lippincott Company, 1947 

T.H. Vail Motter, The U.S. Army in World War II, The Middle East Theater, the Persian 

Corridor And Aid To Russia, Washington D.C., Office of the Chief Military History, 1952 

Erna Risch, Supplying Washington's Army, Washington D.C., Center of Military 

History, United States Army, 1981 
528 Bibliography 

Ema Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army, A History of the Corps 1775-1939, 

Washington D.C., Center of Military History, United States Army, 1962, rep. 1989 

Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, The U.S. Army in World War II, The 

China-Burma-India Theater, Stilwell's Command Problems, Washington D.C., Office of 

the Chief of Military History, 1956 

Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, The U.S. Army in World War II, The 

China-Burma-India Theater, Stilwell's Mission to China, Washington D.C., Office of the 

Chief of Military History, 1953 

Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, The U.S. Army in World War II, The 

China-Burma-India Theater, Time Runs Out in CBI, Washington D.C., Office of the Chief 

of Military History, 1959 

William M. Ross and Charles F. Romanus, The U.S. Army in World War II, the 

Technical Services, The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany, 

Washington D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, 1965 

Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I, Washington D.C., 

Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953 

Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II, Washington D.C., 

Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959 

Robert H. Scales, Terry L. Johnson and Thomas P. Odom, Certain Victory: The U.S. 

Army in the Gulf War, Washington D.C., Office of the Chief of Staff United States Army, 

1993 

Chester Wardlow, The U.S. Army in World War II, The Technical Services, the 

Transportation Corps; Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations, Washington D.C., 

Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951 

Chester Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training and Supply, 

Washington D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, 1956 

Robert K. Wright, The Continental Army, Washington D.C., Center of Military History, 

United States Army, 1983 

OTHER HISTORICAL STUDIES 

Loren A. Ayers and William F. Schultz, The General Board, U.S. Forces, European 

Theater of Operations {ETO): Operations, Organization, Supply and Services of the 

Transportation Corps in the ETO, Headquarters, U.S. Forces European Theater of 

Operations, APO 408, New York, undated, circa 1946 

Loren A. Ayers and Horace Lehners, The General Board, U.S. Forces, European 

Theater of Operations (ETO): Motor Transportation Service as a Permanent Part of the 

Transportation Corps, APO New York 408, New York, The General Board, U.S. Forces, 

European Theater of Operations, undated, circa 1946 

Creswell G. Blakeney, ed., Logistical History of NATOUSA/MTOUSA, 11 August 1942 

to 30 November 1945, Naples, Italy, Compiled by G-4, NATOUSA, G. Montantino, 1945 

Susan Canedy, Anne W. Chapman, and John L. Romjue, Prepare the Army for War, A 

Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command 1973-1993, TRADOC 

Historical Monograph Series, Office of the Command Historians, TRADOC, Fort Monroe, 

VA, 1993 

Carl F. Cannon, History of Aircraft Maintenance in the U.S. Army, 1939 to Present, Ft. 

Eustis, VA, U.S. Army Transportation School, 1985 

Emma-Jo L. Davis, History of the U.S. Army Transportation School, 1942-1962, Ft. 

Eustis, VA, U.S. Army Transportation School, 1967 
Spearhead of Logistics 529 

H.H. Dunham, Office of the Chief of Transportation, Monograph 11, Transportation and 

the Greenland Bases, Washington D.C., Office of the Chief of Transportation, 1945 

H.H. Dunham, Office of the Chief of Transportation, Monograph 13, Transportation and 

the Conquest of Sicily, Washington D.C., Office of the Chief of Transportation, 1945 

H.H. Dunham, Office of the Chief of Transportation, Monograph 14, Transportation of 

US Forces in the Occupation of Greenland, 1945 

H.H. Dunham, Office of the Chief of Transportation, Monograph 25, The Persian 

Corridor, Office of the Chief of Transportation, 1945 

H. H. Dunham, U.S. Anny Transportation in the European Theater of Operations, 

1942-1945, Monograph 29, Washington D.C., Office of the Chief of Transportation, 1946 

M. J. Freschie, Historical Critique of the United Kingdom Overlord Movement, 

Headquarters, United Kingdom Base Transportation Office, APO 413, United States 

Army, 1 November, 1945 

Lawrence M. Greenberg, United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations in the 

1965 Dominican Republic lnteNention, Washington, D.C., Analysis Branch, U.S. Army 

Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987 

Henry W. Hall, The Battle of the Aleutians, Western Defense Command, Field Force 

Headquarters, Adak, Alaska, 1943 

W.E Haseltine, Tonnage, Locomotives, and Inland WatefWays, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 

U.S. Army War College, 1943 

Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., Vietnam Studies Logistic Support, Department of the Army, 

1974 

Randolph Leigh, 48 Million Tons to Eisenhower, Washington. D.C., Infantry Journal 

Press, 1945 

Francis A. Lord, Lincoln's Railroad Man, Hennann Haupt, Cranbury NJ, Associated 

University Presses, 1969 

Capt. Duncan K. Major and Capt. Roger S. Fitch, Supply of Sherman's Anny In the 

Atlanta Campaign, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, Army School Services Publishers, 1911 

Henry 0. Malone, Jr., ed., TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm: A Preliminary Study, Fort Monroe, VA, TRADOC Historical Study Series, Office of 

the Command Historian, 1992 

James R. Masterson, Office of the Chief of Transportation, U.S. Anny Transportation in 

the SWPA 1941-1947, Washington D.C., TC Monograph 31, October 1949 

R.F. McMullen and Paul Dolejar, History of the Ordnance Corps in World War II: Motor 

Transport Vehicles, 1 July 1940- 31 August 1945, Washington D.C., Office of the Chief of 

Ordnance, Army Service Forces, 1945 

Military Intelligence Division, American Operations from the Beaches to Voltumo, 

Washington, D.C., The War Department, 1944 

Samuel Elliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, 

Volume V. The Struggle for Guadalcanal August 1942-February 1943, Boston, Little, 

Brown and Company, 1950 

John L. Romjue, The Army of Excellence, Development of the 1980s Army, Fort 

Monroe, VA, TRADOC Historical Monograph Series, Office of the Command Historian, 

TRADOC, 1992 

John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to Alrland Battle: The Development of Anny 

Doctrine 1973-1982, Fort Monroe, VA, TRADOC Historical Monograph Series, Office of 

the Command Historian, TRADOC, 1984. 
530 Bibliography 

U.S. Army Transportation School, U.S. Army Transportation Corps in the Republic of 

Vietnam, U.S. Arrny Transportation School, Ft. Eustis, VA, January 1970 

Lawrence A. Yates, Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 

1965-1966, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Fort Leavenworth Papers no. 15, 1988 

OTHER SECONDARY LITERATURE 

Paul M. Angle, A Pictorial History ofthe Civil War Years, New Vorl<, Doubleday, 1967 

Maj. Chauncey B. Baker, Transportation of Troops and Material, Kansas City, MO, 

Franklin Hudson Publishing, Go., 1905 

John W. Barriger, Railroads and the Civil War, Washington D.C., National Railway 

Historical Society, 1966 

Jack K. Bauer, The Mexican War 1846-48, New Vorl<, Macmillan, 1975 

Robert C. Black, The Railroads of the Confederacy, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 

University Press, 1952 

Arthur K. Bowler, Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America, 1775-1783, 

Princeton NJ, The Princeton University Press, 1975 

Wayne E. Carpe, To Starve the Army at Pleasure, Chapel Hill, University of North 

Carolina Press, 1984 

Henry B. Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution, 1775-1781, New York, 

Promontory Press, 1977 

Graham A. Cosmas, An Army for Empire, Columbia, MO, University of Missouri Press, 

1971 

James P. Cullen, The Peninsula Campaign 1862, New York, Bonanza Books, 1973 

Joseph P. Cullen, The Siege of Petersburg, Harrisburg, PA, Eastern Acom Press, 

1981 

Peter M. Dunn and Bruce W. Watson, ed., American Intervention in Grenada, the 

Implications of Operation "Urgent Fury," Boulder, CO, Westview Special Studies in 

Military Affairs, 1985 

A. Ernest Dupuy, and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Compact History of the American 

Revolution, New York, Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1963 

A. Ernest Dupuy, and Trevor N. Dupuy, An Outline History of the American 

Revolution, New York, Harper and Row, 1975 

Maj. G. H. Edwards, The Royal Corps of Transport 1794- 1965, Somerset, England, 

Waggonette, 1965 

John S.D. Eisenhower, So Far From God: the U.S. War with Mexico, 1846-1848, New 

York, Random House, 1989 

Brig. Gen. Vincent J. Esposito, ed., The West Point Atlas of American Wars, Volumes 

I & II, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1959 

Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee abridgement of the four volume Lee, by Freeman, 

Richard Harwell, ed., New Vorl<, Scribner, 1982 

Frank Friedel, The Splendid Little War, Boston, MA, little, Brown and Company, 1958 

Richard D. Goff, Confederate Supply, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1969 

Max Hastings, The Korean War, Simon and Shuster Inc., New Vorl<, 1987 

Robert Selph Henry, The Story of the Mexican War, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1950 

Christopher Hibbert, Rebels and Redcoats, the American Revolution through British 

Eyes, New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1990 
Spearhead of Logistics 531 

James A. Huston, Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice, Selsingrove, Susquehanna 

University Press, 1989 

Aurora Hunt, The Anny of the Pacific, The Arthur H. Clark Co., Glendale, CA, 1951 

Henry Lumpkin, From Savannah to Yorktown, the American Revolution In the South, 

Columbia, SC, University of South Carolina Press, 1981 

John K. Mahon, History of the Second Seminole War, 1835 • 1842, Rev. ed., 

Gainesville, University Presses of Florida, 1967 

Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, New York, Alfred Knopf, 1973 

Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit, New York, NY, The Literary guild of America, 1931 

James M. Me Pherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, New York, Oxford University Press, 1988 

John D. Milligan, Gunboats Down the Mississippi, New York, Amo Press, 1965 

Helmut von Moltke, The Franco-Gennan War, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1892 

Bruce Palmer, Jr., Intervention in the Caribbean, The Dominican Crisis of 1965, 

Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1989 

Howard W. Peckham, The Colonial Wars 1689-1762, Chicago, The University of 

Chicago Press, 1964 

Jerome G. Peppers, History of Military Logistics. Huntsville, AL, Logistics Education 

Foundation, 1988 

Virginia Bergman.Peters, The Florida Wars. Hamden, CT, Archon Books, 1979 

Elmer Belmont Potter, ed., Sea Power, A Naval History, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 

Prentice-Hall 

Fletcher Pratt, The Civil War on Western Waters, New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1958 

Parke Rouse Jr., The Great Wagon Road, New York, McGraw, Hill Book, Co., 1973 

David Bums Sigler, Vietnam Battle Chronology, U.S. Army and Marine Corps 

Operations, 1965-1973, Jefferson, NC, McFarland & Company, Inc., 1992 

Jean E. Smith, The Defense of Berlin, Baltimore Maryland, John Hopkins Press, 1963 

Laurence Stallings, The Doughboys, The Story of the A.E.F., New York, Harper and 

Row, 1963 

Harry G. Summers, Vietnam War Almanac, New York, Facts on File Publications, 

1985 

Craig L. Symonds, A Battlefield Atlas of the American Revolution, Baltimore, MD, The 

Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1986 

Craig L. Symonds, A Battlefield Atlas of the Civil War, Baltimore, MD, Nautical and 

Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1983 

David F. Trask, The War With Spain in 1898, New York, NY, Macmillan Publishing 

Co., Inc., 1981 

Turner, George Edgar, Victory Rode the Rails, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1953 

Warren Tute, The North African War, London/New York, Sidgwick and Jackson· Two 

Continents, 1976 

Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars, The United States Army and the Indian, 1866 • 

1890, New York, NY, Macmillan Publishing Company Co., Inc., 1973 

Martin van Creveld, Supplying War, Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, New York, 

Cambridge University Press, 1980 

James A. Van Fleet, Rail Transport and the Winning of Wars, Washington D.C., 

Association of American Railroads, 1956 

Weber, Thomas, The Northern Railroads in the Civil War, 1861 • 1865, New York, 

King's Crown Press, 1952 
532 Spearhead of Logistics 

Russell I. Weigley, ed., Images of War- 1861-1865, Volume Six, The Modem Atmy, 

Garden City, NJ, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1988 

John Westwood, Railways at War, San Diego, Howell-North, 1980 

Ronald Wheeler, Sword Over Richmond, New York, Fairfax Press, 1986 

Wilgus, William J., Transporting the A.E.F. in Western Europe 1917-1919, New York, 

Columbia University Press, 1931 

Stephen Wise, Lifeline of the Confederacy, Columbia, SC, University of South 

Carolina Press, 1988 

Stephen E. Woodworth, Jefferson Davis and His Generals, Lawrence, KS, University 

of Kansas Press, 1980 

Ron Zeit, Steel Rails to Victory, New York, Hawthorne Books, 1970 

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS 

Capt. Walworth Jenkins, Q.M.D. or Book of Reference for Quartetmasters, John P. 

Morton & Co., Louisville, KY, 1865 

Letter, General Frank S. Besson, 15 June 1967, Subject: Transportation 

Developments. 

Letter, General John E. Murray, 28 February 1986, Subject: Operation FRELOC. 

Rush B. Lincoln, U.S. Army Transportation Corps, 1942-1962, Birthday Message, 

1962 

W.N. Redling, "Transportation Developments." 15 June 1967 

The Transportation Board, Pamphlet on History and Accomplishments, Fort Eustis, 

VA, Transportation Board, 1962 
Glossary of Technical Terms 533 

Glossary of Technical Terms 

A-frame 

Device used as a field expedient in 

beach operations when cranes were 

not available in sufficient quantity. 

Usually attached to an amphibian 

truck or other vehicle, it could lift 

approximately 4,000 pounds. Also, a 

pack frame used to man-carry loads. 

Amphibian vehicle 

Vehicle capable of operating on both 

land and water. 

Balanced cargo 

a mixture of heavy and light cargo, 

which approximately fills the cargo 

space and weighs the ship down to its 

maximum draft. 

Balanced stocks 

An acumulation of supplies of all 

classes in quantities necessary to 

meet requirements for a fixed period. 

Balloon cargo 

Items, such as assembled trucks, 

which occupy an exceptionally large 

amount of space in relation to their 

weight. 

Bareboat charter 

A form under which the charterer hires 

the vessel only and provides the crew, 

supplies, fuel, and other operating 

requisites. 

Berth 

Place where a ship lies at pier, quay, 

or wharf. 

Block loading 

System, used extensively in the Pacific 

from late 1943 for resupply of invasion 

troops, involving the loading of vessels 

with carefully organized blocks of 

supplies such as trooops were likely to 

require soon after landing. 

Block system (rail) 

System, often used in single-track 

operation, whereby only one train can 

operate over a particular section or 

block at a time. In order to move a 

train from one station to another, the 

operator must clear the intervening 

section with the operator at the end of 

the block. 

Block system (trucking) 

A form of relay operation whereby 

trucks operate continously from origin 

to destination and back with changes 

in drivers at intermediate stations, 

which are usually located one day's 

travel time apart. 

Bunkerage 

Fueling or coaling of ships. 

Cannibalize 

the use of equipment or parts from 

inoperable/damaged materiel to 

maintain other materiel. 

Combat loader 

A vessel especially equipped for 

combat loading. The Navy provided 

two types-APA (transport, attack), and 

AKA (cargo ship, attack). 

Combat loading 

Loading a ship with equipment and 

supplies required by assault forces, 

and stowiing the various items in such 

a manner as to make possible their 

rapid unloading in the order needed. 

Combat zone 

Forward area of a theater of 

operations, where conbat troopos are 

actively engaged. 

Commodity loading 

The loading of vessels with a specific 

type of cargo such as rations, 

vehicles, or ammunition, to fill an 

immediate on-the-spot requirement. 

Communications zone 

The part of a theater of operations 

behind the combat zone, where 

supply, transportation, and other 

facilities are located and services 

performed. 

Deadline 

Remove from action, as for repairs. 
534 

Dead-weight tonnage 

Actual carrying capacity of a vessel, 

including stores, fuel, water, and cargo. 

Double heading 

The use of two locomotives to pull a 

train, usually over rugged country. 

Dry cargo ship 

Any ship, except a tanker ship 

carrying liquids in bulk. As used in 

World War II the term applied to 

passenger ships as well as freighters. 

Dumb barges 

Nonpropelled barges. 

Echelon maintenance 

System of maintenance and repair of 

materiel and equipment in which jobs 

are allocated to organizations in 

accordance with the availability of 

personnel, tools, supplies, and time 

within the organizations. Categories 

range from first echelon, which 

includes simplest forms of upkeep to 

the fifth, which includes heavier 

repairs including overhaul. 

Filler cargo 

Packaged and bagged supplies which 

can be stowed in small and irregularly 

shaped spaces in the hold of a ship. 

Flatting 

bottom stowing and flooring off of 

cargo in a vessel in order to provide 

ballast or an emergency reserve, and 

on which vehicles can be easily 

stowed. 

Full and down 

Term indicating that a vessel has all 

cargo space filled and that the cargo 

is sufficiently heavy to take the ship 

down to the legal maximum draft. 

General cargo 

Broadly used, the term included all 

except bulk cargoes, but in Army 

usage it may include explosives. 

Graving dock 

Dry dock used for ship repair or 

construction. 

Landing craft 

Any vessel used to carry men, 

equipment, and supplies ashore. 

Lighter 

Boat or flat-bottomed barge used for 

loading or unloading ships. 

Spearhead of Logistics 

Line of communications (LOC) hauling 

The transporting of bulk supplies and 

personnel over theater main supply 

roads in accordance with priorities 

and commitments set by the theater 

or a comparable command. This 

hauling was usually intersectional in 

scope, in contrast with local or base 

hauling. 

Longton 

Weight ton of 2,240 pounds. 

Measurement ton 

40 cubic feet; sometimes called ship 

ton, since it was used chiefly in 

connection with ocean transportation. 

Metric ton 

Weight ton of 2,204.6 pounds. 

Packaged gasoline 

Gasoline in cans or drums. 

Palletized or skidloaded cargo 

Cargo fastened to a platform, often 

equipped with bridle and runners for 

towing along the ground. Facility in 

moving pallets on beaches made up 

for some loss in shipping space. 

Pallets facilitate movement of 

breakbulk cargo by mechanical 

means. 

Passing track or siding 

Pier 

A track adjacent to and parallel to the 

main track with a switch at both endds 

connecting it with the main track. 

Used in single-track operation, the 

passing track was used to permit 

trains traveling in opposite directions 

to pass. 

Structure that projects into water 

where vessels berth for loading or 

unloading cargo, usually constructed 

at right angles to the shore line. 

Port capacity 

The tonnage that can be discharged 

daily from ships, based only on 

evaluation of the physical facilities of 

the port. 

Port or beach clearance 

The tonnage that may be transported 

inland daily from a beach or port by 

available means of inland 

communication, including highways, 

railroads, and inland waterways. 
Glossary of Technical Terms 

Prestowing 

A system similar to block loading, 

used in connection with the invasion 

of Normandy. 

Quay 

Wharf parallel with basin or harbor, 

with water on one side. 

Rail wagon 

Railway car. 

Reefer box 

Refrigerated box, used on board ship 

or brought ashore. 

Reefer vessel 

Refrigerated vessel. 

Semitrailer 

Wheeled vehicle without motive 

power, intended primarily for the 

transportation of cargo or equipment 

designed to be towed and attached to 

a truck-tractor by means of a 

fifth-wheel device, a portion of its 

weight being carried by the 

truck-tractor. It is equipped with 

retractable gear to support the front 

end when detached. Containers can 

be loaded on dollies and moved in 

semi-trailer configuration. 

Short ton 

Weight of 2,000 pounds. 

Spotting 

Placing railway car on a track for 

loading or unloading. 

Tanker 

Tank ship for transporting petroleum 

products and other liquids in bulk. 

Theater of operations 

Army command including the area of 

actual fighting (combat zone) and the 

adjacent area utilized for supporting 

administsrative and supply activities 

(communications zone). 

535 

Topping off 

Top stowing of cargo to complete the 

loading of a ship. 

Trailer 

Vehicle designed to be towed, 

provided with a drawbar or tongue for 

attachment to a coupling mounted on 

the towing vehicle. 

Train-order system 

a method of train operation used 

generally in conjunction with a 

timetable, showing where scheduled 

trains will meet. 

Truck-tractor 

Wheeled vehicle propelled by a 

self-contained power unit, designed 

primarily as a truck chassis, but 

provided with a fifth wheel for 

attachment to and for towing 

semitrailers. 

'Tween decks 

Space between the main deck and the 

hold. 

War flats 

Flatcars of 56-ton capacity (WW II), 

manufactured for the War Department. 

Weight ton (British) 

2,240 pounds. 

Weight ton (U.S.) 

2,000 pounds. 

Wharf 

Structure where vessels berth to load 

or unload cargo, usually constructed 

parallel to the shore line. 

Zone of Interior 

The area which furnishes manpower 

and materiel to the forces in theaters 

of operation. During World Wars I 

and II, the zone of interior was the 

United States. 
536 Spearhead of logistics 

Glossary of Code Names 

ANAKIM 

Plan to retake Burma and open the 

line of communications to China 

through the port of Rangoon. 

ANVIL 

The planned 1944 Allied invasion of 

southern France in the 

Toulon-Marseille area. 

ARCADIA 

U.S.-British conference at 

Washington, December 1941-January 

1942. 

AVALANCHE 

Plan to seize Salerno. 

BIG STICK 

Operation plan to destroy the 

Communist suppply complex based 

on Sibyon-ni, to advance Eigth Army 

left flank to the Yesong River, and 

regain Kaesong. 

BIGOT 

Code for correspondence dealing with 

plans for future military operations. 

BLUEHEARTS 

Code name for the original plan for an 

amphibious landing behind enemy 

lines, abandoned by 10 July 1950. 

Succeeded by CHROMITE. 

BOLERO 

Build-up of troops and supplies in the 

United Kingdom in preparation for a 

cross-Channel attack. 

CARGO 

An amphibious exercise in preparation 

for the cross-Channel attack. 

CEDAR FALLS 

AN operation during the Vietnam war 

in which the U.S. Army attacked and 

destroyed a Viet Cong stronghold 

known as the Drew Traingle. 

CENT 

Task force built around the 45th 

Infantry Division for the invasion of 

Sicily. 

CHASTITY 

Plan for the construction of an artificial 

harbor in the Quiberon Bay area, on 

the southern coast of Brittany. 

CHROMITE 

Code name for amphibious operations 

in September 1950, one of which was 

a landing at Inchon. 

CRIMSON 

Project to set up in central and 

northeastern Canada a series of 

airfields situated along alternate 

routes to permit a choice of landing 

fields in the event of bad weather. 

CRYSTAL I 

U.S. weather station and airfield at 

Fort Chimo, labrador. 

CRYSTAL II 

U.S. weather station and airfield on 

Frobisher Bay, Baffin Island. 

CRYSTAL Ill 

U.S. weather station and airfield on 

Padloping Island. 

DESERT SHIELD 

The deployment of U.S. Forces to 

Saudi a Arabia in order to stop Iraq's 

aggression from continuing into 

Saudia Arabia. 

DESERT STORM 

The multinational coalition military 

operation to force Iraq out of Kuwait. 

DESERT EXPRESS 

A rapid, air transport service to 

provide critical supplies {mainly class 

IX) to the Desert Shield/Storm theater. 

DRAGOON 

Allied invasion of southern coast of 

France, 15 August 1944, planned 

under the code name ANVIL. 

FRELOC 

The evacuation in 1967 of all U.S. 

Armed forces and installations from 

French territory. 
Glossary of Code Names 

GOOSEBERRY 

A partial breakwater, formed by 

sinking blockships moored 

bow-to-stem and designed to provide 

a sheltered area for tugs, barges, 

landing craft, and DUKW's. 

GYMNAST 

Early plan for the invasion of North 

Africa. 

HARLEQUIN 

An exercise in preparation for the 

launching of an amphibious force from 

the southern coast of England. 

HIGHLAND 

An operation during the Vietnam War 

by which the 1st Cavalry Division was 

transported over-the-shore and moved 

into theater. 

HUSKY 

Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943. 

JUST CAUSE 

Deployment of U.S. Forces to 

Panama on 20 December 1989. 

LOG EX 

A Desert Shield logistical exercise to 

rehearse the 22d SUPCOM's logistical 

support of the XVII and VII Corps 

movements into their attack positions. 

MAGNET 

Movement of U.S. forces to Northern 

Ireland, 1942. 

MULBERRY A 

Artificial port in American sector at 

OMAHA Beach. 

MULBERRYB 

Artificial port in British sector at 

Arromanches-les-Bains. 

NEPTUNE 

Actual1944 operations within 

OVERLORD. This code name was 

used for security reasons after 

September 1943 on all OVERLORD 

planning papers which referred to the 

target area and date. 

OMAHA 

Invasion beach north of Aure River, 

northern France. 

OVERLORD 

Plan for the invasion of northwest 

Europe, spring 1944. 

537 

PEGASUS 

An operation that provided the relief 

forces to the Khe Sahn outpost during 

the 1968 Tel offensive in Vietnam. 

POWER PACK 

The 82d Airborne deployment to the 

Dominican Republic in April 1965. 

PROJECT DEEP FREEZE 

National Science Foundation 

experiments in the Antarctic in 1957. 

QUADRANT 

First Quebec conference, August 

1943. 

RAINBOW4 

U.S. joint Army-Navy plan for defense 

in the event that both Britain and 

France should be defeated. 

RED BALL EXPRESS 

Code Name for a rapid U.S. truck 

service in France in WW II, and an air 

transport service during the Vietnam 

War. 

REFORGER 

An exercise initiated in 1968 to show 

the world the United States' 

contribution to the increased 

readiness of NATO. 

REMAGEN 

An operation during the Vietnam war 

which was designed to test the 

capabilities of helicopters to support 

combat operations. 

ROUNDUP 

Plan for major U.S.-British attack 

across the Channel in 1943. 

SEXTANT 

Cairo-Tehran Conferences 22 

November·? December 1943. 

SHINGLE 

Plan for landings at Anzio. 

SLEDGEHAMMER 

Plan for a limited-objective attack 

across the Channel in 1942 designed 

either to take advantage of a crack in 

German morale or as a "sacrifice" 

operation to aid the Russians. 

TASK FORCE SMITH 

The first U.S. military operation during 

the Korean War. 
538 

TORCH 

Allied invasion of North and Northwest 

Africa, November 1942. 

TRIDENT 

Washington Conference, May 1943. 

UGLY 

A scheme for numbering requisitions 

so that the oversea command could 

readily identify all items en route in a 

convoy by the receipt of a cargo cable 

listing the identifying numbers and the 

cargo tonnage under each number. 

Spearhead of Logistics 

URGENT FURY 

Deployment of U.S. Forces to the 

island nation of Grenada in October 

1983. 

UTAH 

Invasion beach on the Cotentin 

peninsula, northern France. 

VITTLES 

The name for the massive Berlin Airlift 

during 1948-1949. 

WILDFLOWER 

Great Britain. 
Spearhead of Logistics 539 

Glossary of Acronyms/Abbreviations 

AAA 

Antiaircraft Artillery 

AAE 

Advanced Administrative Echelon 

AAF 

Army Air Forces 

AAR 

Association of American Railroads 

ABC Route 

Antwerp Brussels Charleroi 

Route 

ABCCC 

Airborne Command And Control 

Center 

ABDA 

American British Dutch Australian 

(Command) 

ABL 

Alaska Barge Line 

ABL 

American Barge Lines (in India) 

Abn 

Airborne 

ABS 

Atlantic Base Section 

ACofS 

Assistant Chief of Staff 

ACoff 

Assistant Chief of Transportation 

ACR 

Armored Cavalry Regiment 

ACSI 

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence 

ADA 

Air Defense Artillery 

A/DACG 

Arrival/Departure Airfield Control 

Group 

ADC 

Alaska Defense Command 

A DC OM 

Advance Command and Liaison 

Group in Korea 

ADM 

Admiral 

ADSEC 

Advance Section 

ADVATIS 

Advanced Allied Translator and 

lnterpretor Section 

AEF 

American Expeditionary Force 

AFB 

Air Force Base 

AFF 

Army Field Forces 

AFFE 

Army Forces, Far East 

AFHQ 

Allied Force Headquarters 

AFPAC 

Army Forces, Pacific 

AFWESPAC 

Army Forces, Western Pacific 

AGF 

Army Ground Forces 

AGO 

Adjutant General's Office 

AGWAR 

Adjutant General, War Department 

AH 

Attack Helicopter 

ALOC 

Air Lines of Communication 

AMC 

Army Materiel Command 

AMGOT 

American Military Government 

AMIK 

American Mission in Korea 

AOE 

Army of Excellence 

AP&SC 

Army Port and Service Command 

APOD 

Aerial Port of Debarkation 

APOE 

Aerial Port of Embarkation 

ARCENT 

Army Component to Central Command 
540 

ARVN 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

ASC 

Air Service Command 

ASCOM 

Army Service Command 

ASF 

Army Service Forces 

ASG 

Area Support Group 

ASP 

Ammunition Supply Point 

ASW 

Assistant Secretary of War 

ATA 

American Trucking Association 

ATC 

Air Transport Command 

A TIS 

Allied Translator & Interpreter Section 

ATS 

Army Transport Service 

B&O 

Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 

BARC 

Barge Amphibious Resupply Cargo 

Bde 

Brigade 

BELMOT 

BG 

Belgian Movements Organization for 

Transport 

Brigadier General 

BIL 

Bill of lading 

BMWT 

British Ministry of War Transport 

Bn 

Battalion 

BPE 

Boston Port of Embarkation 

Brig Gen 

Brigadier General 

BS 

Base Section 

BUCO 

Build up Control Organization 

BuDocks 

Bureau of Docks (Navy) 

C/S 

Chief of Staff 

Glossary of Acronyms/Abbreviations 

CB 

Citizens Band 

CBI 

China, Burma, India 

CBS 

Coastal Base Section, Continental 

Base Section 

CCF 

Chinese Communist Forces 

ccs 

Combined Chiefs of Staff 

CDC 

Caribbean Defense Command 

CE 

Corps of Engineers 

CENTCOM 

Central Command 

CG 

Commanding General 

CH 

Cargo Helicopter 

CINC 

Commander-in-Chief 

CINCCENT 

Commander-in-Chief Central 

Command 

CINCFE 

Commander-in-Chief, Far East 

CINCPAC 

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet 

CINCPOA 

Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean 

Areas 

CINCUNC 

Commander-in-Chief, United Nations 

Command 

CMA 

Corps Marshaling Area 

CMTC 

Combined Military Transportation 

Committee 

CNO 

Chief of Naval Operations 

co 

Commanding Officer 

Co 

Company 

CotE 

Chief of Engineers 

CofOrd 

Chief of Ordnance 
Spearhead of Logistics 

CofS 

Chief of Staff 

CofT 

Chief of Transportation 

Col 

Colonel 

COMMZ 

Communications Zone 

COMNAVFE 

Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Far 

East 

COMSERVPAC 

Commander, Service Forces, U.S. 

Pacific Fleet 

COMSOPAC 

Commander, South Pacific Area 

COMZ 

Communications Zone 

COMZONE 

Communications Zone 

CONAD 

Continental Advance Section 

(Southern France) 

CONE X 

Container Express 

CONUS 

Continental United States 

COR 

Contracting Officer Representative 

cosc 

Combined Operational Service 

Command 

COSCOM 

Corps Support Command 

COSSAC 

CP 

Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied 

Commander (Designate) 

Command post 

CPA 

Central Pacific Area 

CPBC 

Central Pacific Base Command 

CPL 

Corporal 

CPT 

Captain 

CRAF 

Civil ~eserve Air Fleet 

CREGO 

Chief Regulating Officer 

CSA 

Corps Storage Area 

CSM 

Command Sergeant Major 

css 

Combat Service Support 

CSUSA 

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army 

CWO 

Chief Warrant Officer 

DA 

Department of the Army 

DACG 

Departure Airfield Control Group 

DAO 

Defense Attache Office 

DCofS 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

DCG 

Deputy Commanding General 

DC ofT 

Deputy Chief of Transportation 

DSS 

Direct Support System 

Det 

Detachment 

Div 

Division 

DOD 

Department of Defense 

DODAAC 

Department of Defense Activity 

Address Code 

ORB 

Division Ready Brigade 

DRF 

Division Ready Force 

DSA 

Division Support Area 

DSSD 

Depot Supplies Shipment Data 

DUKW 

541 

2 1/2 ton, 6 X 6 amphibian truck, used 

for short runs from ship to shore 

E&Dsec 

Embarkation and Debarkation Section 

EAC 

Echelons Above Corps 

EBS 

Eastern Base Section. 
542 

EDRE 

Emergency Deployment Readiness 

Exercise 

EDT 

Eastern Daylight Time 

EMBARCO 

Embarl<ation Control 

EOC 

Emergency Operation Center 

EPW 

Enemy Prisoner of War 

EST 

Eastern Standard Time 

ETF 

Eastern Task Force 

ETO 

European Theater of Operations 

EUSAK 

Eighth U.S. Army in Korea 

FASCOM 

Field Army Support Command 

FDC 

Fire Directon Center 

FDRP 

first destination reporting point. 

FEAF 

Far East Air Forces 

FEC 

Far East Command 

FECZ 

FFI 

Forward Echelon, Communications 

Zone (France) 

French Forces of the Interior 

FLS 

Forward Landing Strip 

FAFPAC 

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 

FO 

Field Order 

FORSCOM 

United States Army Forces Command 

FRELOC 

FY 

G1 

G2 

Free Lines of Communications/Fast 

Relocation 

Fiscal Year 

Personnel section of divisional or 

higher headquarters 

Intelligence section of divisional or 

higher headquarters 

G3 

G5 

Glossary of Acronyms/Abbreviations 

Operations and training section of 

divisional or higher staff 

Civil affairs section of divisional or 

higher staff 

GCC 

Gulf Cooperation Council of the Arab 

States 

GDSS 

Global Decision Support System 

Gen 

General 

GHQ 

General Headquarters 

GHQ,SWPA 

GO 

General Headquarters, Southwest 

Pacific Area 

General Order 

GOER 

GOER Vehicle 

GPS 

Global Positioning System 

GRT 

Gross Registered Ton 

GS 

General Staff 

GSC 

General Staff Corps 

H&R 

Holding and Reconsignment 

HE 

High Explosive 

HEAT 

High Explosive, Antitank 

HEMMT 

Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical 

Truck. 

HET 

Heavy Equipment Transporter 

HRPE 

Hampton Roads Port of Embarl<ation 

HUSAFPOA 

IBC 

IBS 

Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, 

Pacific Ocean Areas 

Iceland Base Command. 

Island Base Section 

ICC 

Interstate Commerce Commission. 
Spearhead of Logistics 

ICRC 

International Committee of the Red 

Cross 

10 

Infantry Division 

JG 

Inspector General 

JGD 

Inspector General's Deparatment 

I&R 

Intelligence & Reconnaissance 

lAO 

International Refugee Organization 

ISA 

Iranian State Railway 

ISS 

Identification of Separate Shipments 

IWD 

Inland Waterways Division 

IWT 

Inland Water Transport 

IWTS 

Inland Water Transport Service 

J1 

Joint Staff Personnel Section 

J2 

Joint Staff intelligence Section 

J3 

Joint Staff Operations Section 

J4 

Joint Staff Logistics Section 

J5 

Joint Staff Civil Affairs Section 

JAG 

Judge Advocate General 

JANIS 

JB 

Joint Army Navy Intelligence 

Service 

Joint Board 

JCS 

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JDA 

Joint Deployment Agency 

JDS 

Joint Deployment System 

JFC 

Joint Forces Command 

JIC 

Joint Intelligence Committee 

JLC 

Japan Logistical Command 

JLOTS 

Joint Logistics Over The Shore 

JMTC 

Joint Military Transportation 

Committee 

JOC 

Joint Operations Center 

JOPES 

Joint Operation Planning and 

Execution System 

JOSCO 

543 

Joint Overseas Shipping Committee 

JPB 

Joint Purchasing Board 

JSPOG 

Joint Strategic Plans and Operations 

Group 

JSSC 

Joint Strategic Survey Committee 

JTF7 

Joint Task Force Seven 

KATUSA 

Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army 

KCOMZ 

Korean Communications Zone 

KCRC 

Kansas City Records Center 

KIA 

Killed in Action 

KKMC 

King Khalid Military City 

KMAG 

United States Military Advisory Group 

to the Republic of Korea 

KMC 

Korean Marine Corps 

KSC 

Korean Service Corps 

LACV 

Lighter, Air Cushioned Vehicle 

LAD 

Latest Arrival Date 

LAPE 

Los Angeles Port of Embarkation 

LARC 

Lighter Amphibious Resupply Cargo 

LASH 

Lighter Aboard Ship 

LBV 

Landing Barge, Vehicle 

LCI 

Landing Craft, Infantry 
544 

LCL 

Less Than Carload 

LCM 

Landing Craft, Mechanized 

LCP 

Landing Craft, Personnel 

LCT 

Landing Craft, Tank 

LCU 

Landing Craft, Utility 

LCV 

Landing Craft, Vehicle 

LCVP 

Landing Craft, Vehicle And Personnel 

LOC 

Lines Of Communication 

LOGE X 

Logistics Exercise 

LOTS 

Logistics-Over-The-Shore 

LSD 

Landing Ship, Dock 

LST 

Landing Ship, Tank 

LSV 

Logistics Support Vessel 

LT 

LongTon 

1LT 

First Lieutenant 

2LT 

Second Lieutenant 

Lt 

Lieutenant 

LtGen 

Lieutenant General 

LTG 

Lieutenant General 

LUBSEC 

Luzon Base Section 

MAAG 

Military Assistance and Advisory 

Group 

MAC 

Military Air1ift Command 

MAC 

Military Armstice Commission 

MACV 

Maj 

Miitary Assistance Command, 

Vietnam 

Major 

Glossary of Acronyms/Abbreviations 

Maj Gen 

Major General 

MATS 

Military Air Transport Service 

MBS 

Mediterranean Base Section 

MC 

Medical Corps 

MCA 

Movement Control Agency 

MCC 

Movement Control Center 

MCO 

Movement Control Officer 

MCT 

Movement Control Team 

MDAP 

Mutual Defense Assistance Program 

MG 

Major General 

MHE 

Materials Handling Equipment 

MLRS 

Miltiple Launch Rocket System 

MMC 

Material Management Center 

MOS 

Military Occuational Speciality 

MOVCO 

Movement Control 

MP 

Military Police 

MPH 

Miles Per Hour 

MRS 

Military Railway Service 

MSC 

Military Sealift Command 

MSG 

Master Sergeant 

MSR 

Main Supply Route 

MSTS 

Military Sea Transportation Service 

MT 

Measurement Ton 

MT 

Motor Transport 

MTB 

Motor Transport Brigade 

MTMC 

Military Traffic Management Command 
Spearhead of Logistics 

MTMTS 

Military Traffic Management and 

Terminal Service 

MTO 

Mediterranean Theater of Operations 

MTOUSA 

Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 

U.S. Army 

MTS 

Motor Transport Service 

MTV 

Motor Transport Vessel 

NAD 

North Atlantic Division 

NASBO 

North African Shipping Board 

NATO 

North African Theater of Operations 

NATO 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NATOUSA 

North African Theater of Operations, 

U.S. Army 

NAVFE 

U.S. Naval Forces, Far East 

NBC 

Newfoundland Base Command 

NCO 

Noncommissioned Officer 

NCOJC 

Noncommissioned Officer In Charge 

NKPA 

North Korean People's Army 

NOIC 

Naval Officer In Charge 

NOPE 

New Orleans Port of Embarkation 

NPRJ 

National Police Reserve Japan 

NTS 

Naval Transportation Service 

NSC 

National Security Council 

NWSC 

Northwest Service Command 

NYPE 

New York Port of Embarkation 

OCAFF 

Office, Chief of Army Field Forces 

OCMH 

Office of the Chief of Military 

History 

OCofE 

Office of the Chief of Engineers 

ocs 

Officer Candidate School 

OCT 

Office of the Chief of Transportation 

(variation of OCofl) 

OCofT 

Office of the Chief of Transportation 

(prior to 1964) 

OCOT 

Office of the Chief of Transportation 

ODT 

Office of Defense Transportation 

OH 

Observation Helicopter 

ONI 

Office of Naval Intelligence 

ONO 

Office of Naval Operations 

OPD 

545 

Operations Division, War Department 

General Staff 

OPEC 

Organization of Petroleum Exporting 

Countries 

OPLAN 

Operation Plan 

OQMG 

Office of The Quartermaster General 

OSA 

Office of the Secretary of the Army 

OSAF 

Office of the Secretary of the Air Force 

oso 

Overseas Supply Division 

PAO 

Public Affairs Office 

PBS 

Peninsular Base Section 

PDF 

Panamanian Defense Forces 

PFC 

Private First Class 

PGC 

Persian Gulf Command 

PGSC 

Persian Gulf Service Command 

POA 

Pacific Ocean Areas 

POE 

Port Of Embarkation 
546 

POL 

Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants 

POM 

Priority of Movement 

POW 

Prisoner Of War 

PAR 

Pennsylvania Railroad 

PVT 

Private 

PX 

Post Exchange 

QM 

Quartermaster 

QMD 

Quartermaster Department 

QMG 

Quartermaster General 

QNSC 

Qui Nhon Support Command 

RDAY 

Redeployment Day 

R&D 

Research and Development 

RAA 

Redeployment Assembly Area 

RCC 

Redeployment Control Center 

ACT 

Regimental Combat Team 

REFORGER 

Return of Forces to Germany 

Regt 

Regiment 

RO/RO 

Roll On/Roll Off 

RGD 

Railway Grand Division 

RMCT 

Regional Movement Control 

Team 

ROB 

Railway Operating Battalion 

ROC 

Railway Operating Company 

ROK 

Republic of Korea 

ROKA 

Republic of Korea Army 

ROM 

Refuel On the Move 

Glossary of Acronyms/Abbreviations 

RR 

Railroad 

RSB 

Railway Shop Battalion 

RTCH 

Rough Terrain Container Handler 

RTO 

Rail or Railway Traffic Officer 

Ry 

Railway 

s 1 

Adjutant 

s 2 

Intelligence Officer 

s 3 

Operations and Training Officer 

s 4 

Supply Officer 

SEAC 

Southeast Asia Command 

SFC 

Sergeant First Class 

SFPE 

San Francisco Port of Embarkation 

1SG 

First Sergeant 

SGM 

Sergeant Major 

SGS 

Secretary of the General Staff 

SGT 

Sergeant 

SHAEF 

Supreme Headquarters, Allied 

Expeditionary Forces 

SMESA 

Special Middle East Shipping 

Agreement 

SOLOC 

Southern Line of Communications 

SOP 

Standing Operating Procedure 

sos 

Services of Supply 

SP4 

Specialist Four 

SPA 

South Pacific Area 

SPBC 

South Pacific Base Command 
Spearhead of Logistics 

SPDB 

Ship Priority and Destination 

Board 

SPE 

Seattle Port of Embarkation 

SPOD 

Sea Ports Of Debarkation 

SSA 

Supply Support Activity 

sse 

Saigon Support Command 

SSG 

Staff Sergeant 

STON 

Short Ton 

SUPCOM 

Support Command 

SWPA 

Southwest Pacific Area 

TAA 

Tactical Assembly Area 

TAACOM 

Theater Army Area Command 

TAAM 

Theater Army Aviation Maintenance 

TAC 

Tactical Air Command 

TAT 

To Accompany Troops 

TC 

Transportation Corps 

TCC 

Transportation Consolidation Center 

TCP 

Traffic Control Post 

TEA 

Transportation Engineering Agency 

TF 

Task Force 

TMA 

Traffic Management Agency 

TMMC 

Theater Materiel Management Center 

TMO 

Transportation Movement Office 

T/0 

Tables of Organization 

TOE 

TPC 

Table(s) of Organization and 

Equipment 

Troop Port Command 

547 

TPFDDL 

Time Phased Force Deployment Data 

List 

TRADOC 

United States Army Training and 

Doctrine Command 

TRANSCOM 

Transportation Command 

TTP 

Trailer Transfer Point 

TZO 

Transportation Zone Office 

U.K. 

United Kingdom 

u.s. 

United States 

UAE 

United Arab Emirates 

UH 

Utility Helicopter 

ULN 

Unit Line Number 

UN 

United Nations 

UNC 

United Nations Command 

UNCOK 

United Nations Commission in Korea 

USAF 

U.S. Air Force 

USAFBI 

U.S. Army Forces, British Isles 

USAFFE 

U.S. Army Forces, Far East 

USAFIA 

U.S. Army Forces in Australia 

USAFICPA 

U.S. Army Forces in the Central 

Pacific Area 

USAFISPA 

U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific 

Area 

USAMGIK 

United States Army Military 

Government in Korea 

USAFPAC 

U.S. Army Forces, Pacific 

USAFPOA 

U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean 

Areas 

USARAL 

U.S. Army in Alaska 
548 

USAREUR 

United States Army, Europe 

USASOS 

U.S. Army Services of Supply 

(Southwest Pacific Area) 

USAT 

United States Army Transport 

USAV 

United States Army Vessel 

USF 

U.S. Forces 

USFET 

U.S. Forces, European Theater 

USMC 

U.S. Marine Corps 

USMIM 

US Military Iranian Mission 

USN 

U.S. Navy 

USRA 

United States Railroad Administration 

USSOCOM 

United States Southern Command 

USSR 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

USTRANSCOM 

United States Transportation Command 

Glossary of Acronyms/Abbreviations 

VADM 

Vice Admiral 

VJ 

Victory in Japan 

WD 

War Department 

woe 

Western Defense Command. 

WP&YROUTE 

White Pass and Yukon Railroad 

WPBC 

Western Pacific Base Command 

WPD 

War Plans Division, War Department 

General Staff 

WSA 

War Shipping Administration 

WTB 

War Transport Board 

WWMCCS 

Zl 

Worldwide Military Command and 

Control System 

Zone of Interior 
Index 549 

Index 

ABC Express Route NW Europe, 239, 

242,243 

Advance Sections (ADSEC) 

See Communications Zone and 

Sevices of Supply 

Affiliated Units (railroads), 132, 

Appendix D, 495 

Air Corps. See Army Air Forces 

Air Operations 

Air Transport Command (CBI), 174 

Airfields (WWII), 155, 156, 157, 159, 

175, 187, 189, 196,268, 271' 274, 

276,282, WW II, 250 

Desert Express. See Saudi Arabia 

dominican Republic, 319,320 

Redball Express, 344 

Alaska, WWII, 154, 156-159 

Ambulance Car. See Railway equipment 

American Barge Lines (CBI), 173 

Amphibious landing craft 

acquisition of, 141 

Amphibious operations. See DUKW, 

Landing Craft, Lighter 

Antartic Operations, 298 

Animal Transport. See Horses and Mules, 

Wagons 

Antwerp, Belgium, 206, 209, 226, 229-231, 

239,249 

ANVIL, 204 

Anzio, Italy, 191,193 

Arcadia Conference, 211 

Artie Operations, 156, 159, 160 

Ardennes Campaign, 241 

Army Air Forces, 119, 145 

Army Aviation, 384 

Army-Navy relations 

Amphibious landing craft, acquisition 

of, 141 

Consolidated car service, 146, 147 

Coordination, 120, 139, 150, 156, 

219,227,229,253-257,263,271, 

273-277,279,282,284 

Manning of vessels, 140, 141 

Use of terminal facilities, 148 

Army Port and Service Command, 265, 

269,277-279, 287 

Army Service Forces, WWII 

Assignment of TC functions, 122-3, 

126, 151 

Common carriers, use of, 128, 129, 

138,144, 145-148 

Documentation, 153, 158 

Interface with Federal agencies, 139, 

151 

Interface with Chiefs of Service, 128, 

151 

Motor bus pools, 124 

Motor vehicles, interest in, 124 

Movement control, 145, 147-149 

Organization, 121,125, 126 

Personnel management, 123, 129, 

142, 143, 159 

Responsibilities, 119, 123-125 

Supply and procurement, 134, 138, 

143, 161 

Training responsibilities, 129, 132-134 

Organization, 120 

Subordinate Commands, 127, 138 

Training responsibilities, 122, 129, 132 

TC functions, 123, 126, 151 

TC supply, 134 

Troop movements, 144, 145 

Army Transport Service (ATS), 138, 141, 

157,161,265,466 

Army Transportation Association, 506 

Artificial Harbors, 143, 145, 150. See 

Mulberry 

Association of American Railroads (AAR), 

143,146,495,496 

Atlantic Base Section, Morocco, 181 

Atterbury, Brig. Gen. William W., 

Director of Transportation, A.E.F., 

105, 106 

Australia 

Line of communications (LOC) to, 

258,259,267 

Motor transport, 270 

Ports,270,274 

Railroads, 270 

AVALANCHE, 177, 189 

Ayres, Col. Loren A., 233, 234 

Balch, Lt. Col. Henry G., 285 
550 

BandarShapur, Iran, 164, 165, 167 

Barge operations, See Inland Water 

Transportation 

Base depot organizations (WWII), 249 

Base Sections, See COMZ, theater or 

place name 

Basic Logistical Plan (JCS, WWII), 263 

Basra, Iraq, 164 

Bastogne, Belgium, 241 

Battle of Bulge, 239 

Batangas, Luzon, PI, 281 

Beach operations, See specific 

campaigns and geographical areas 

Berlin Airlift, 289, 294, 295 

Background, 289 

Operation Vittles, 290, 291, 293 

Palletization, 294 

Rhein Main Air Base, 291, 293 

Truck Transportation, 294 

Workload, 294 

Berlin Duty Train, 290, 291 

Besson, General FrankS. Jr., 167, 344, 374, 

386,485 

Biak Island, 276, 282 

Biggs, Lt. Col. Richard C., 307 

Block system, highway operations, 182 

Blount, Brig. Gen. Roy E., 265 

Boats, small (WWII) 

Acquisition of, 181 

Crews for, 141, 142 

Delivery of, 141 , 142 

Operation and maintenance, 141, 

157, 160 

Training of crews, 132 

Bizerte, Algeria, 181 

BOLERO 

Purpose of, 117,204,213,214,218, 

219,252 

BOLERO Key Plans, 204 

Bombay, India, 171 

Bone, Algeria, 181 

Bonesteel, Maj. Gen. Charles H., 161 

Booth, Col. D.P., 165 

Boston Tea Party, 5 

Boxer Rebellion, 89 

Brahmaputra Inland Waterway, 169 

Bray, Col. Stanley H., 173 

Breen, Brig. Gen. Robert G., 267, 273 

Bremerhaven, Germany, 231 

Brest, France, 205, 227 

Brisbane, Australia, 270 

Spearhead of Logistics 

British Army Units, 161, 162, 171, 176, 

177, 180, 182, 184, 185, 193, 194,205, 

206,209,214,216,229,231,252 

British Transportation 

Airlift, 250 

Highway, 164, 167, 182, 219 

Ministry of War Transport, 215 

Organization, 180, 194,215 

Ports, 161, 162, 164, 165, 181,215, 

216,218,225,227,229,231,252 

Planning, 179, 180, 220 

Q- Movements, 182, 195, 215,216, 

220,252 

Rail, 162, 164, 173, 183, 184, 194, 

218,219,249 

Shipping, 169, 220 

Brittany, 205,209,226,227,232,245 

Brooklyn, NY, See New York POE 

Brunson, Col. M. V., 167 

Buildup Control Organization (BUCO) (UK), 

219,220 

Burma 

Operations, 154, 169, 170, 171, 173, 

174 

LedoRoad, 169,171,175 

Burma Road, 169, 196 

Stilwell Road, 175 

Buses (WWII) 

Army pool of, 123 

Bus Associations and Bureaus, 144 

Commercial use of, 144 

Bushire, Iran, 168 

Cairns, Australia, 270 

CAIRO Conference, 204 

Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, 131, 132 

Camp Gordon Johnson, Florida, 132 

Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, 145 

Camp Plauche, Louisiana, 132, 133 

Camp Polk, Louisiana, 132 

Camp Stoneman, California, 145 

Canada, 155-157 

Canals (WWII), 249 

Canton Island, 269 

Carentan, France, 221, 244, 251 

Cargo, See specific theater of operations 

Carload shipments, 145-148 

Caribbean Bases (WWII), 154, 155 

Caroline Islands, 255,277,279 

Casablanca conference, 157, 171, 176, 

180,181,183 

Casablanca port, 181 
Index 

Casualties, evacuation of, 140, 144, 145, 

193,225,262,282 

Cebu, PI, 281 

Central Base Section (Southern France), 

201 

Central Pacific Area (CPA) 

Command and Organization, 265, 267 

Control of Shipping, 268, 269 

Port and beach operations, 277-279 

Chartres, France, 237 

Cheney, Maj. Gen. James E,. 211 

Chennault, Maj. Gen. Claire L., 174 

Cheybassi, Iraq, 165 

Cherbourg, France, 205, 221, 222, 

226-228,244,245,249,251 

Chief of Transportation (WWII), See also 

unlisted specific theaters of operation 

ETOUSA, 184, 2123,219,222,224, 

233,249,257 

Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), 171, 

265,268,270 

U.S. Army Forces, British Isles 

(USAFBI), 211, 213 

War Department, See Army SeNice 

Forces (ASF) 

China, Burma, India Theater 

Airlift, 174 

Inland waterway operations, 169, 173 

Ledo Road, 169, 172, 175 

Motor transport operations, 173, 174 

Organization, 171, 173, 175 

Port operations, 171, 173 

Rail operations, 173 

Christmas Island, 269 

Churchill, Winston, 117, 139, 164, 395 

Churchill, Manitoba, 156 

Civil War 

Animals required, 63, 68 

Depots, C.S. Army, 57, 62 

Depots, U.S. Army, 48, 56, 64, 66, 

68,69 

Fodder. See forage 

Forage, 48, 49, 55, 65, 67, 68, 69 

Horses, 49, 57, 62 

Mules, 48, 55 

Quartermaster transportation 

divisions, 56, 60 

Rail carloads, 66 

Railroad construction, 59, 67 

Railroads, Confederate, 42, 46, 52, 

53,57,59,60,62,64 

551 

Railroads, government control, 58 

Railroads, Union, 41, 42, 48, 50, 53, 

55 

Riverboats, 47, 50 

Steamboat Capacity, 50 

Steamboat Speed, 50 

Steamboats, 38, 48, 49, 50, 61, 62, 

64 

U.S. Military Railroad, 41,43 

Vessel charter, 49 

Wagon capacity, 68 

Wagon requirements, 48, 62, 63, 68 

Wagons,48,49,57,62,63,64,65,67 

Civitavecchia, Italy, 193 

Coastal Base Section (Southern France), 

199,200 

COBRA,205 

Combat loading, 148 

Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), 205, 221 

Commanding Officers of troops 

(transports), 141 

Communications Zone (COMZ) (WWII) 

See also unlisted specific theaters 

ETOUSA, 221-224,232-234,238, 

248,249,250,254,256,257 

CONEX, 296,308, 341, 342 

Confederate States. See Civil War 

Connolly, Maj. Gen. D. H., 164 

Conroy, Maj. Gen. Raymond C., 482 

Consolidated Car SeNice, 146, 147, 148 

Consolidating station, 127, 146, 147, 148 

Container Express. See CON EX 

Containerization, 308,318,341,342,344 

Continental Base Section (Southern 

France), 200,201 

Control of freight traffic, 145 

Coral Sea, Battle of, 259 

COSSAC, 204 

Covell, Maj. Gen. W. E. R., 171 

CRAF Program. See Saudi Arabia 

CREGO, 268, 269 

Crews for vessels 

See Boats, small 

Crimson project, 156 

Crothers, Col. James A., 227 

Crowley, Maj. Gen. John D., 482 

Crystal Bases, 156 

Cross Channel Operations. See 

BOLERO, OVERLORD 

Dahl, Specialist Four Larry G., 359 

Danube River Fleet, 250 
552 

Darwin, Australia, 270 

Davidson, Lt. Col. Cecil H., 288 

Dawes, Brig. Gen. Charles G., 106 

DeHaven, Lt. Gen. Oren D., 340, 482 

DelMar, Maj. Gen. Henry L., 482 

Delong Pier, 341, 348 

Depots, 467 

Desert Express. See Saudi Arabia 

Desert Shield. See Saudi Arabia 

Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 467, 471, 472 

Desert Storm. See Saudi Arabia 

Design and procurement of TC equipment 

118,123,124,127, 129,134, 138,141 

Diversion of shipments/vessels, 264, 

273,27 4,284,287,288 

Documentation. See Shipment 

documentation 

DRAGOON, 204,209,222 

DUKW Operations, See also Landing 

craft, Lighter, 187, 200, 225, 227, 232, 

274,275,277-279, 281,282,286,287 

Dutch East Indies, 258 

Eisenhower, Gen. of the Army, Dwight D., 

205,206,209,213 

Elam, Maj. Gen. Fred E., 487 

Elbe River, 211 

Embarkation Control, EMBARGO, 219, 

220 

Engineers, Corps of. 

See also Technical Services 

Ammunition port construction (U.S.) 

50 

Boat and Shore Regiments, 276, 

281,282 

Chiefof, 155,156,159,160, 183, 

191,193,194,196,238, 248 

Facility rehabilitation, 227, 244, 

247-249,251,267,273,284,285 

Railroad responsibilites, 117, 120, 

123 

Special Brigades, 187, 188, 221, 223, 

233 

England. See United Kingdom 

European Theater of Operations 

(ETOUSA}. See mode operations in 

France and Germany 

Command and Organization, 213,251 

Transportation Organization, 213, 

221,223,224,232·235,255 

Enewietok Island, 259 

Expediters, 467 

Spearhead of Logistics 

Explosives (WWII}, 150 

FASCOM, 468 

Forage. See Civil War, Indian Wars, 

Mexican War, Revolutionary War, 

Spanish-American War, Wortd War I, 

Wortd War II 

Fort Eustis, Virginia, 133, 295, 296, 297, 

305,320,349,374,375,383,384, 

388,392 

France, Northern operations rtVW II} 

Airlift, 250, 251 

Highway/Motor transport, 231-235, 

239, 241' 243 

Inland waterways, 221, 249 

Movement Control, 252 

Operations, 189 

Pipelines, 251 

Ports, destruction of, 205, 221, 226, 

227,231,244 

Ports, operation of, 225-231 

Ports, rehabilitation of, 227, 231 

Railroads, destruction of, 245, 247 

Railroads, operation of, 221, 222, 

244-249 

Railroads, rehabilitation of, 245 

Shipping, 222, 227,231, 250 

France, Southern operations (WW II) 

Highway/Motor transport, 200, 201 

Operations, 176, 177, 194, 197,200, 

203 

Ports, 197, 199-201 

Railroads, 199, 201, 203 

Fraser, Col. Jack A., 267, 273 

Freight Cars, 312 

Freight consolidating operations. See 

consolidating station. 

Freight forwarders, 147 

Freight traffic management in U.S. rtVW II) 

Army Air Force (AAF) autonomy, 119 

Army operations, 129, 146-148 

Freighters. See Ships/Shipping 

French Army 

First, 177, 197 

"B,", 177, 197 

Frink, Maj. Gen. James L., 265 

Fuel. See Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants 

(POL} 

Fuson, Lt. Gen., Jack C., 328,338,482,516 

G·4, War Department, 118·120, 122, 138, 

464,465,466,468 

History of, 463 
Index 

German Military Operations, WVVII, 160, 

161, 162, 164, 177,183, 187, 189, 191, 

194,197,199,200,201,203 

Germany, WWII 

Air Supply, 251 

Highway, 241, 243 

Inland Waterways, 250 

Lines of Communications, 241 

Occupation, 256, 257 

Ports, 231 

Rail, 248, 249 

Ghent, Belgium, 231 

Gievres, France, 107, 108 

Goldwater-Nichols Act, 330 

Gondrecourt, France, 103 

Gravell, Maj. Gordon K., 234 

Gray, Maj. Gen. Carl R. Jr., 132, 183, 184, 

194, 197, 199, 248, See also Military 

Railway Service 

Great Britain. See UK 

Great Philadelphia Wagon Road 

Great Military Road of 1836, 32 

Great Plains 

Transportation across, 70-77 

Greene, Maj. Gen. Nathaniel 

QMG, 16 

Southern campaign, 1 0 

Greenland, 154, 155, 159, 160 

Greenlight, 250 

Grenada,378,380,381,382,383 

Airfield Operations, 383 

History of, 380 

LOTS,378,383,387 

Port Operations, 383 

History of 

Port Operations 

Airfield Operations 

Gross Maj. Gen. Charles P., 119, 122, 

124,129,131,148,150,151,153,257 

482, 484, See also Chief of 

Transportation 

Guadalcanal, 259, 271, 272, 273, 274, 

275, 

Guam, 259, 278 

Gulf War, See Saudi Arabia 

Gunn, Maj. Gen. James W., 482 

Hagood, Brig. Gen. Johnson, Chief of 

Staff, Services of Supply, A.E.F., 103 

Harborcraft, WVVII, 118, 120,141,142, 

271, 275, 276. See also Boats, small. 

Harbord, Maj. Gen. James G., 

Commanding General, Services of 

Supply, A.E.F, 103, 105 

Harbors, artificial. See Mulberry 

553 

Hawaiian Department, 263,265,267, 

268,269,270,271,273,277,279,281 

Highway Transport operations. See also 

specific theater of operations. 

Highway Transport Service, 1 OOth, 286 

Hines, Brig. Gen. Frank T., Chief of 

Transportation 1919-1922 

Views on control of Transportation 

assets, 114 

Hollandia, New Guinea, 265, 276 

Honor, Lt. Gen. Edward, 333, 482 

Horses and Mules. See Civil War, Indian 

Wars, Mexican War Revolutionary War, 

Spanish-American War, World War I, 

WortdWar II 

Hospital Cars/trains. See railway 

equipment 

Hump, the (India, China), 161, 174 

Hurow, Brig. Gen. Arthur, 482 

HUSKY, Operation, 177, 185 

Hutson, Col. Richard K., 486 

lceland,154,155, 159, 160,161,162 

Iceland Base Command, 161 

lnchon,301,306,307,308,309,316 

India. See China, Burma, Indian Theater 

India-Burma. See China, Burma, India 

Theater 

Indian Wars 

Grass, affect on animals of, 70, 74 

Horses, 70,74 

Mules, 74, 76, 78 

Railroads, 73, 78 

Wagoneers, 84 

Wagons, 73, 74, 76 

Wagons, sale of after Indian Wars, 80 

Wagons, tactical support with, 74, 76 

Inland Water Transportation. See specific 

theater or operation 

In transit Asset Visibility, 467, 480 

Iran, 162, 164, 165, 166, 167 

Iranian State Railway (ISR}, 164, 166, 167 

Iraq, WWII, 162 

Italy (WVV II) 

Animal, 195, 196 

Motor Transport, 195 

Pipeline.s, 196 

Ports,191,192 

Rail, 193, 194 
554 

Redeployment, 196 

lvigtut, Greenland, 159 

lwo Jima, 286, 287 

J-4, Central Pacific Area, 268, 269 

Japan 

Invasion of, 259, 262,265,287 

Occupation of, 288 

Jesup, Maj. Gen. Thomas S., 

Quartermaster General, 23, 24, 29, 30, 

31,32,33,34,35 

Joint Airfield Coordination Center, 320 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 314, 319, 381, 386 

Joint Transportation Operations, 219 

JOPES. See Saudi Arabia 

JUST CAUSE. See Panama 

Karachi, India, 171, 173 

Kasserine Pass, Algeria, 182 

KCOMZ, 466, 467 

Khorramshahr, Iran, 164, 165, 166 

Kitchen Cars. See Railway Equipment 

Korea, Air Transport Operations, 304, 

314,315,316 

Helicopters, 314,315 

History of, 299, 301 

Japan Logistical Command, 305 

Korean Service Corps, 311 

Korean War, 302, 303, 304, 306, 

308,310,316,318 

Movement Control, 313, 314 

Overseas Supply Division, 304 

Pilferage, 294, 307, 308 

Port Congestion, 307 

Port Operations, 304, 307, 308 

Pusan Base Command, 305 

Rail Transport, 310,311,312,313 

San Francisco Port of Embarkation 

304 

Truck Transport, 308, 309, 310, 317 

U.S. Occupation of, 301, 303, 304 

Kreml, Maj. Franklin M., 195 

Kunming, China, 174 

Kwajalein Island, 277,278,287 

Kyushu,Japan,262 

Labrador, 156, 159 

Lae, New Guinea, 275 

Lancaster, Col. Leon J., 276 

Landing Craft, use of, 28, 187, 191, 193, 

199, 273, 275, 281, 282, 284. See also 

DUKW 

Landing Craft, Medium (LCM), 241,281, 

297,338,347,349,393,417,418 

Landing Craft Tank (LCT), 281 

Spearhead of logistics 

Landing Ship, Tank (LST}, 187, 193, 220, 

225,228,232,276,277,281,296,305 

landing Ship Utility, (LSU), 417 

Larkin, Maj. Gen. Thomas B., 197 

Leavey, Maj. Gen. Edmond H., 268, 484 

Ledo Road, See China-Burma-India 

Lee, Lt. Gen. John C. H., 197, 211, 219 

Leghorn, Italy, 193 

Le Havre, France, 206, 229 

Lend Lease, 119, 134, 138, 146 

Liberty Ships, 140, 152,254,281 

Liege, Belgium, 230, 239, 249 

Lighter Air Cushioned Vehicle, 30 ton 

capacity (LACV-30), 387 

Lilley, Maj. Gen. Aaron L., 486 

Lincoln, Maj. Gen. Rush B., 485, 509 

Lines of Communications (LOC). See 

campaigns and geographical areas 

Lingayen Gulf, PI, 281, 282, 283,284 

Littlejohn, Brig. Gen. Robert M., 211 

Locomotives. See Railway equipment 

Logistics Over the Shore Operations, 296, 

340,346,338,347,349,360,417, 

419, 

Logistics Support Vessel (LSV), 387, 388 

London, Base Section, 211, 213 

Lord Leathers, 215 

Lorient, 227 

Luzon, PI, 258, 262, 273, 276, 281, 282, 

283,284,285,286 

Lyon, France, 197,200,201 

MacArthur, Gen. of the Army Douglas, 

258,259,262,263,265,268,287,302, 

316 

Maintenance of TC equipment, WWII, 

118,134,167, 168,178,232,234,235, 

238,243,249,254,270,271,285 

Major Ports. See Ports 

Makin Island, 259,277 

Malaya, 258 

Manifest Destiny, 3, 25, 70 

Margil, Iran, 164 

Marianas Islands, 259,275, 277 

Marine Express (MARINEX), 304, 308, 

316 

Maritime Administration, 120, 139, 

Material Handling, 320 

Marseille, 199,203,209, 229, 235 

McHugh, Mary Lou, 482 

Mediterranean Theater of Operations 

(MTOUSA), 154, 176, 177. See also 

Italy, Sicily, Southern France 
Index 

Medium Ports. See Ports 

Meigs, Maj. Gen. Montgomery C., 

Quartermaster General, 54, 55, 63, 68 

Messina, Sicily, 185 

Mexican-American War, 23, 31, 32, 33, 

34 

Camels, 36 

Contract Transportation, 23, 32, 33, 

34,35 

Forage, 30, 33 

Horses and Mules, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36 

Quartermaster Budget, 32 

Quartermaster Department, 32, 34, 

35 

Railroads, 29, 30, 32,36 

Steamboats, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36 

Wagons,29,30,31,32,33,34,35 

capacity, 30, 31 

number required, 31-35 

Vera Cruz, 28, 29, 34 

Mexico 

Punitive Expedition, need for trucks, 90 

Vera Cruz 1914, 90 

Meyer, Lt. Gen. Richard D., 482 

Midway, Battle of, 259 

Military Air Transport Service, 466 

Military Sea Transport Service, 466 

Military Police, WWJJ, 195, 237, 249 

Military Railway Service. See also specific 

theater or operation. 

China-Burma-India, 173 

Headquarters, 132 

Iran, 166 

Italy, 194 

North Africa, 183, 184 

Northam France, 244, 245, 247, 248, 

249 

Southern France, 204 

Milne Bay, New Guinea, 275, 276 

Mindanao,259,262,281 

Mindoro, 262 

Mor1aix, France, 226 

Morocco, 176, 183 

Motor Transport Command No. 1, 0NW II • 

Australia), 270, 286 

Motor Transport equipment. See also DUKW 

Design and aquisition, 118, 123 

Trucks and tractors, 159, 167, 174, 

182,183,195,201,215,219,231, 

233,234,241,243,270,271,273, 

274, 282,285-287 

555 

Motor Transport Operations. See specific 

theater or operation 

Motor Transport Brigade (MTB) (France), 

232, 233, 234, 235, 

Motor Transport Division (MTD) (France), 

233 

Motor Transport Service Iran, 167, 168 

Motor Vessel John U.D. Page, 338, 339 

Movement Control, 122, 182, 201, 215, 

216,220,221,247,252,270,320,321, 

463-473, See also traffic control. 

Movement Control Agency (MCA}, 470, 471 

Assignment, 471 

Movement Control Center, (MCO), 468, 

470 

Movement Control Officer, (MCO), 215 

MULBERRIES, artificial harbors, 225 

Murray, Maj. Gen. John E., 335, 373, 482 

Naha, Okinawa, 287 

Naples, Italy, 177, 191, 193, 194, 195, 

196,200 

Narsarssuak, Greenland, 159 

National Association of Bus Operators, 144 

National Bus Military Bureau, 144 

National Bus Traffic Association, 144 

National Defense Transportation 

Association, 506 

Navy, U.S. 

Coordination with, see Army-Navy 

relations 

Logistical systems, 236, 234 

Naval construction battalion, 273, 286 

Navalescortsforconvoys,257 

Naval landing Craft, 276, 282 

Naval Transportation Service, 139 

Port rehabilitation, 187, 200, 227, 

273,274,279,284,287 

Nevers, France, Intermediate section, 107 

New Britain Island, 259,271, 275 

New Caledonia Island, 267,269,271, 272 

New Guinea, 258, 259, 262, 270, 271, 

275,276 

New Orleans, Port Of Embarkation, 126, 

131' 132, 134 

New York, Port Of Embarkation 

WW I. See Wor1d War One 

WW II, 126, 127,131,132,134, 145 

New Zealand, 258,267,269, 262,263, 

265,268 

Newfoundland, 155, 156 

Nimitz, Fleet Admiral Chester W., 258, 

259,262,263,265,268,287 
556 

Noble, Col. Curtis A., 156 

Normandy, Invasion of 

Beaches,222,228,232 

Breakout, 205, 206, 221, 227, 233, 

238, 245, 250, 256, 

Invasion, 221, 222, 226 

Planning, 205, 209, 220 

Ports,226,227 

North African theater of operations 

(NATOUSA) 

Assault, 164 

Highway, 182, 183, 195 

Lines of communications, 178, 180, 

184 

Organization and operations, 154, 

176, 177, 181, 184, 185, 187 

Ports, 181,188 

Rail, 183 

Northern Ireland, 211 

Noumea, New Caledonia, 267, 271 , 272, 

273,274,285, 

Office of Defense Transportation, 120 

O'Hara, QMG James, preparations for 

Campaign of 1794, 20 

Oise, France, 241, 249 

Okinawa, 262, 276, 286, 287 

OMAHA Beach, 222,225,226,256 

Operation Earnest Will, 398 

Operation Vittles. See Berlin Airlift 

Oran, Algeria, 176, 181, 197 

Ordnance Department, 119, 123, 150, 

167,168,234,237,251 

OVERLORD, 117, 189, 204, 205, 231, 

244,245,250,252,254 

Overseas supply operations Zl ports, 124, 

148, 151, 153 

Pacific Ocean Area (POA). See Central 

Pacific Area (CPA), and South Pacific 

Area (SPA) 

Packaging, 151 , 152, 184 

Pagonis, Lt. Gen. William P., 408, 409, 

482,522 

Palermo, Sicily, 187, 188, 189 

Pallets and Palletization, 274,277,318,344 

Palmyra Island, 269 

Palau Islands, 259 

Panama, 155,388,389,390 

Airfield operations, 391 

History of, 388, 389 

Lighterage, use of, 393 

Movement Control, 392 

Spearhead of Logistics 

Rapid Deployment in support of, 

390,391 

Redeployment Control Center, 393 

Truck operations, 392, 393 

Panama Canal, WWII, 155 

Passenger Traffic Management in U.S. 

(WW II), 142-145 

Passengers, 312 

Patton, Gen. GeorgeS. Jr., 148, 185, 

188,251 

Pear1 Harbor, 116, 122, 126, 139,258, 

265,269 

Peleliu Island, 279 

Persian Corridor, 154, 162, 163, 164 

Persian Gulf Service Command 

Command and organization, 164 

Motor Transport, 167 

Ports, 165 

Rail, 166 

Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) 

WWI, 107 

WWII, supply of, 155,182,194, 199, 

200,201,229,233,251,252,253, 

267,270 

Philippine Islands, 

Spanish-American War. See 

Spanish-American War 

WWII, 279-288 

Pilferage, 165, 168, 184, 197, 307 

Pipelines, 155, 169, 174, 175, 197,200, 

201,251,252,253 

Plant, Col, Thomas G,. 265, 513 

POL. See Petroleum, oil, and lubricants 

Pontoon Dock and Piers. See artificial 

harbors 

Port Battalions, 131, 156, 161 , 165, 171, 

173,191,213,218,274,275,276,277, 

278,281,282,287 

Port Companies, 150, 160, 173, 225,229, 

271,275,276,279 

Port Moresby, 270, 275 

Ports, Major and Medium, 161, 162, 165, 

181,191,199,213,222,227,229,231, 

232,233 

Ports. (WW II) See also individual ports 

by name 

ammunition (U.S.), 150,151 

clearance, 160, 164, 182, 188, 

194,196,200,226,229,231,232 

congestion, 155, 160, 161,220,230, 

464,467 
Index 

development, 148, 156, 159, 161 , 

191,199,209, 227, 229, 281,282, 

286,287 

facilities, 148, 155, 191, 206, 215, 

227,229,275,276,279,282, 

283,284,287 

manpower problems, 184,216, 218, 

272,276,279,284 

operations, 156, 157, 159, 160, 181, 

193,200,205,225,226,227, 229, 

230,231,267, 269,271,273, 277, 

278, 279,284,286,287 

passengers, 155,161, 165, 168, 171, 

181,200,229,231 

Boston, Massachusetts, 156, 160 

Charleston, SC, 140 

Hampton Roads, Virginia, 143 

New Orleans, Louisiana, 126, 131, 

132, 134 

NewYork, NewYork,126,127,131, 

132, 134, 145 

San Francisco, California, 126, 127, 

132, 133, 134, 145 

Savannah, Georgia, 126 

Powers, Sgt. Leo J., 191 

Power Pack, U.S. intervention in the 

Dominicican Republic, 319, 320 

Prisoners of War (POW) 

Evacuation, 229,286,457 

Use in transportation operations, 201, 

227,252,457 

Punitive Expedition. (Mexico), 90 

Pusan, 161,289,301 , 303, 305,306,307, 

309, 311, 312, 313,316 

Q Movements. See British Transportation 

QUADRANT Conference, 171, 173 

Quartermaster 

Service units, 225,243,251, 

Truck units,167,168, 183,188,221, 

232,233,241,270,271,285,286, 

287 

Quartermaster Corps, 157, 17 4, 196, 211, 

264, 265 

Quartermaster General, 155 

Quarter-Master-General, British. See 

British transportation 

Railway equipment 

Ambulance cars, 249 

Freight cars, 218, 270 

Hospital cars, 144, 245, 249 

Kitchen cars, 144, 149 

Locomotives, 194,218,219,245,247 

Railway Grand Divisions (AGO), 166, 

203,244,247,249,285 

557 

Railway Operating Battalions (ROB), 132, 

157,159,166,167,173,188,201,247, 

248,285 

Railway Shop Battalions (ASB), 173, 244 

Railway Operations. See specific theater 

or operation 

Railway units, activation, 132 

Rebuilding the force, 376, 377, 378 

Rangoon, Burma, 169 

Red Ball Express, WWII, 232-238, 243, 

245,254, 255 

Redeployment, WWII, 197, 256,257,288 

Aedling, Maj. Gen. William H., 486 

Regional Movement Control Team 

(ACMT), 470 

Regulating Group, 255 

Remount Service. See WWI 

Research and Development, 138, 295 

Revolutionary War 

Baggage, 1,14 

Cargo, 5, 13, 21 

Continental Army, 6, 8, 9, 12, 14 

Contractors, 1, 4, 12, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21 

Depots, 1, 13 

Fodder, 2, 13, 20 

Harnesses, 14 

Horses and mules, 2, 12, 13, 14, 17, 

20,21 

Portage,2, 12 

Ports, 5, 11, 12, 13 

Quartermaster, 1, 12, 15, 17, 18 

Shanks Mare, 13 

Teamsters and wagoneers, 12, 16, 17 

Wagon master, 16 17 

Wagon Master Department, 16 

Wagon Master General, 15, 16, 20 

Wagons,2, 12, 14,16,21 

Watercraft 

Bateaux, 12, 13, 14 

Boat, 2, 17 

Canoe,2, 12, 13,14 

Flatboat, 13, 21 

Reykjavik, Iceland, 160 

Rhine River, 209, 211, 238, 241, 248, 

249, 250, 251,252,256 

Rice, Maj. Gen. Thomas W., 508 

Richards, Maj. Gen. Darrie H., 482 

Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C., 263 

Richmond, Col. Clarence B., 233 

Ridgeway, Maj. Gen. Matthew B., 204, 241 

Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 115, 117 
558 

Ross, Gen. Jimmy D .• 333 

Ross. Maj. Gen. Frank S .• 118, 119, 183, 

21 1,213,216,218,221,223,231-233, 

235,244,247,252,256,257,505, See 

also Chief of Transportation 

Russia. See Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics. 

Ryukyu Islands, 287 

Sabotage. 183,188, 186,230,283 

Saigon, 323, 325, 328, 329, 330, 332, 

337,338,339,340,341,344,346 

Saipan, 259, 262, 278, 279 

Salerno, Italy, 191 

San Fernando, Luzon, PI, 281 

San Francisco. See Ports 

Saudi Arabia, 22nd SUPCOM, 442, 443, 

24th Infantry Division Deployment, 

404,405,406 

Ad-Dammam, 413,417,441 

Air Deployment Shortfalls, 404 

Airfield operations, 402, 408, 409 

AI-Jubayl, 413, 417, 418, 426, 441, 

459 

Amphibian Operations, 416, 418, 

419,431,435,444,445,453, 

454,456,457,458 

CENTCOM, 398, 399, 401, 409, 455, 

459 

Commercial Transport, 429, 430, 

433,456 

Communications, 425, 426, 434, 435, 

448,449,451,452 

Containerization, 415, 419, 431, 432, 

447,448,451,452,462 

Convoy Support Centers, 428, 445 

Corps Marshalling Area, 455 

CRAF Program, 402,462 

Desert Express. 424, 425, 426 

Desert Shield, 400,404,407,409, 

410 

Desert Storm, 401 

Dhahran, 413, 421, 435, 447 

Driver, truck shortage of, 428, 429, 433 

Driver Training, 433,434 

Forward landing strip, 445, 447, 448 

Geographical Description of, 407, 408 

Green Ramp Support of, 401 

Gulf Cooperation Council, 395 

Heavy equipment 

Transports,417,427,428,429,430, 

434, 435, 440, 44 442, 443, 449, 451 

History of, 395, 399 

Internal look, 90 

JOPES, 403 

Spearhead of logistics 

Lighterage support of, 417, 418 

LOGEX, 436, 437, 443 

Logistics Base, 441, 442, 443, 445, 

453,454 

LOTS, 417,419 

Main Supply Routes, 416,417,426, 

427,428,433,435,441,443,445, 

453,455,459 

MHE, 432, 453 

Movement Control, 425, 426, 443, 

449,451,454,460 

MTMC,405 

Pagonis, 413, 426, 436, 458 

Pallets/Palletization, 421 ,423, 424, 

425,432,447 

Port Operations, 408, 41 0 

Port Support Activity, 439 

Rail Operations, 408 

Redeployment, 417,449,451,453, 

458,459,460,461,462 

Redeployment Assembly Areas, 449, 

459,461 

Reserve Fleet, 407,410,406 

Savannah Port Operations, 405 

Sea Deployment Shortfalls, 406 

SUPCOM, 425, 426, 434, 436, 437 

TCC, 448,449, 451,452 

TPFDDL Shortfalls, 403, 408 

Trailer Shortage, 429, 433, 453, 454, 

460,461 

Truck Transport, 419, 424, 425, 429, 

430, 431,432,433,434,435,436, 

437,441 

USAREUR, Support of, 425, 430, 

437,438 

USTRANSCOM support of Desert 

Shield/Storm, 402, 404, 406, 462 

U.S. POW, 434, 435 

VII Corps deployment, 416,419, 425, 

437,438,439,440,441 

VII Corps support of Desert 

Shield/Storm, 426, 435, 441, 442, 

443, 455,456 

Whaley, 413,415,426,428,436 

XIII Corps Deployment, 401, 404, 

405,407,412,414,421, 424, 425, 

426,432, 435,437 

XVIII Corps support of Desert 

Shield/Storm, 425, 426, 435, 441, 

442,443,444,445,447,448,449, 

452,455 
Index 

Sawtelle, Maj. Gen. Charles G., 

Quartermaster General, 80 

Sawyer, Maj. Gen. Edward W., 485 

Schroeder, Col. August H., 227 

Schwarzkopf, General, H. Norman, 399, 

400,401,411,442,458,459 

Sealand Transportation Service, 342 

Seatrains, WWII, 228 

Seattle POE. See ports 

Selective discharge, 222, 225 

Seminole Wars, 23, 24, 29, 31 

Services of Supply (SOS). See also 

Communications Zone and Army Port 

and Service Command, CPA 

WWI. SeeWWI 

WW II. See also Army Service 

Forces. 

China, Burma, India, 174, 180 

MTOUSA, 176, 177, 197 

NATOUSA, 154, 176, 177, 181 

South Pacific Area (SPA), 267 

Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), 265 

Shanks Mare, 13 

Sharpe, Henry G., Quartermaster 

General, 97, 99 

Shea, Col. Raeford P., 276 

Sheahan, Col. Maurice E., 173 

Sherman, Maj. Gen. William T., 66-68 

Shingler, Col. D. G., 167 

Shipment documentation, 146, 152, 153 

Ships/Shipping 

Army owned/operated, 138, 140, 

141,142 

Control of, 221, 267 

Losses, 139, 142 

Need for, 117,120,138,152,205, 

215,223,227,269,275,288 

Retention overseas, 231, 272, 273 

Sibley, Col. Cleland C., 227 

Sicily 

Beaches, 187 

Motor Transport, 188 

Planning, 185 

Ports, 187 

Railroads, 188 

Transportation organization, 188 

Sievers, Lt. Col. Ralph H., 285 

Sled Pallets, 277 

Small boats. See Boats, small 

Small, Maj. Gen. Harold 1., 486 

Societe de Chemins de Fer Nationale 

Francais (SCNF), 244, 245, 246 

559 

Solomon Islands, 259, 267,271,273,27-5 

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 120, 122, 

126,174,180,183,215 

Smith, Charles B. See Task Force Smith 

South Pacific Area (SPA) (WW II) 

Command and organization, 267,271 

Joint operations, 275 

Transportation organization, 272, 275 

Port operations, 273 

Southern Line of Communication 

(SOLOC) (WW II), 197,248 

Southwest Asia, See Saudi Arabia 

Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) (WW II) 

Command and organization, 258, 

259,263,264 

GHQ, 265 

Motor transport, 270, 273, 285, See 

also specific campaigns 

Port operations, 275, 276, 284 

Railways, 270, 273, 284, See also 

specific campaigns 

Transportation organization, 264, 

265,267 

Transportation operations, general, 

267,269,275,276,284, 

Spanish American War 

Cuba, debarkation at Siboney, 83 

Cuba, roads, 84 

Horses, 82, 83, 84, 90 

Horses, requirement for, 82 

Manila, Philippine Islands, 85, 88 

Mules, 83, 84 

Mules, capacity of, 84 

Tampa Bay, embarkation at, 79, 81-83 

Wagons, 82, 84 

Stamp Act 1765, 4,5 

Stanley, Col. Thomas H., 181 

Stevedore Units. See Ports 

Stevedore operations (US), 150, 307 

Stewart, Brig. Gen. George C., 181, 185, 

197 

Stilwell, Lt. Gen. Joseph W., 171 

Submarines, 139, 142,215. See also 

U-boats 

Supply 

Automatic, of overseas areas, 151 

TC supply programs, 124, 126, 127, 

129,134,138,148,151,256 

Zl port responsibilities. See Oversea 

supply operations 

Tacloban Bay, PI, 281, 282 

Tampa Bay. See Spanish-American War 
560 

T-anamerah Bay, New Guinea, 276 

Tank Cars. See Railway equipment. 

Tarawa Island, 259 

Tate, Brig. Gen. Ralph H., 195 

Technical Services. See also inidvidual 

services (WW II) 

Chiefs of, 150, 155 

Coordination with, 126, 127, 134, 

139, 156, 159, 160, 165, 169, 175, 

183, 184, 187, 191, 193, 194, 196, 

197, 199 

Representatives at TC installations, 151 

Task Force Smith, 303 

Teheran Conference, 199, 289 

Terminal Operations (WW II) See ports 

(WWII) 

Theater Distribution Center, 47 

Thompson, Lt. Gen. Nathaniel A., 333, 482 

Thrasher, Brig. Gen. C. 0., 421 

TMA, 469 

TMO, 468, 469, 470 

''Toot Sweet Express", 249 

Toulon, France, 197 

Track, railroad, gauges, 155, 173, 183, 

201,273 

Tractors, See Motor transport equipment 

Traffic Control, 182, 237, 252, 255,256 

Traffic Regulation, 255, See also 

movement control 

Training and Doctrine Command, Active 

Defense Doctrine, 376, 377 

Training and Doctrine Command, Airland 

Battle Doctrine, 377, 383 

Training and Doctrine Command, FM 

1 00-5 development, 376, 378 

Training and Doctrine Command, Origin of, 

376, 377 

Trains. See Railway Operations 

Transportation Advisory Group, 118 

Transportation Artie Group, 295, 297 

Transportation Center, 133 

Transportation Corps, 119,122,124,127, 

131, 146,148 

Transportation Corps Board, 295, 305 

Transportation Corps Motto, 375 

Transportation Corps Museum 

Foundation, 375 

Transportation Corps Regiment, 384-386 

Transportation Corps, responsibilities 

(WW II), 124, 129, 134, 138, 141, 142, 

146,148,150,151,153,221 

Spearhead of Logistics 

Transportation Research and 

Development Station, 396 

Transportation Service (WW II), 117, 118, 

120,122,171, 173 

Transports. See Shipping 

TRIDENT Conference, 204 

Trucks. See Motor Transport Equipment 

Truck Units. See Motor Transport 

Operations; QM Truck Units. 

Tunisia, 177, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 

185, 191 

Turnaround times 

cargo ships, 161, 164, 184, 220, 222, 

225 

trucks, 159, 235, 282 

Tuttle, Gen. William G. T., 482 

U-boats 

World War One, ships and tonnage 

sunk, 100 

World War Two, ships and tonnage 

sunk, 138, 139 

Unger, Col. Charles P ., 268 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

(USSR), 162, 164, 167,205 

United Kingdom. See British 

Transportation 

Urgent Fury. See Grenada 

U.S. Army TRANSCOM, Europe, 330, 

371,372 

U.S. Army Services of Supply. See 

Services of Supply 

U.S. Army Transportation Corps. See 

Transportation Corps 

USTRANSCOM, See also Saudi Arabia, 

386,387 

UTAH Beach, 222,226 

Vehicles. See Motor 

T ransportation!Railway Operations 

Victory Program, 116 

Vietnam War 

1st Logistical Command, 327, 

328,329,335,338,343,354,368 

Air Transport, 342, 367, 368 

Ammunition Operations, 327, 332, 

339,342,343,344,345,353,355, 

363,367,372 

Cam Ranh Bay Support Command, 

329-334 

Containerization, 328, 329, 340, 341, 

344 

Contractor, 329, 353-354, 362, 363 
Index 

GOER Truck, 351, 354, 362 

Guntrucks, 356, 357, 358, 399 

Helicopters, 360, 366,366-399 

Highway Transport Operations, 

349-363 

History of, 323, 325 

lntratheater Lift, 367-370 

Ughter, Amphibious Cargo Craft, 

348,349 

Logistic Support Concept, 326-335 

Logistics-Over-the-Shore Operations, 

340, 347-350, 360-361 

Military Assistance Advisory Group, 

325,326 

Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam, 325,326, 327,328,366 

Monsoon Express, 350,359-360 

Movement Control, 329, 372-373 

Newport, 330 

Operation Cedar Falls, 355 

Operation Highland, See Logistics 

over the shore Operations 

Operation Pegasus, 361 

Operation Remagen, 368 

Pallets/Palletization, 343, 344, 345, 

371 

Port congestion, 328-330, 337-340 

Port Operations, 328, 329, 330, 

335-350 

Provisional Transportation 

Command, 329, 330, 331 

Qui Nhon Support Command, 331, 

333, 335-347 

Rail Transport Operations, 364-366 

RO/RO Operations, 333, 338, 

345-347 

Saigon Support Command, 329-331 

Theater Aviation Maintenance 

Companies, 369 

Truck, Dropside, 362, 363 

VietCong,325,327,355,356,363, 

366 

Wagons. See specific war or operations 

Wakefield, Lt. Gen. Samuel N., 482, 487 

War Brides, 257 

War Department, G-4, control of 

transportation, 118, 119, 120 

War Shipping Administration, 139 

Washington, Gen. George, 13, 14, 15, 16, 

17,20,21 

Water Transport Branch, OQMG, 118 

Water Transport Operations. See also 

specific war or theater of operations. 

Coordination with federal agencies, 

WWII, 119,148 

561 

Operations in the Zl, WWII, 139, 141 

Responsibilities, WWII, 120, 122 

Wayne, Maj. Gen. "Mad" Anthony, 10, 20, 

21 

Westmoreland, General William C., 325, 

327,375 

Whaley, Maj. Gen. David A., iii, 413,415, 

426,428,487 

Whitcomb, Brig. Gen. RichardS., 161,223 

Wilson, Brig. Gen. Thomas B., 264 

Wilson, Brig. Gen. Thomas W., 171,264, 

513 

Wilson, President Woodrow, 

nationalization of Railroads WWI, 94 

Wor1d War One 

Advanced Sections, 102, 103 

Army Transport Service, 1 00 

Base, 102, 103 

Cargo, 98, 99,100, 101,105,107 

Cargo, tonnage per month in 

A.E.F., 105 

Chief of Transportation, 114 

Demobilization, 113 

Doctrine, logistical and 

transportation, 1 01 

Gievres, main intermediate depot, 

107, 108 

Gievres, rail deliveries at, 108 

Gondrecourt, training area, 103 

Hagood Board, 103 

Harnesses, 97 

Hoffies,97, 108,109,110,113 

Hoffies, shipped from U.S. to A.E.F., 

109 

Inland Transportation Service, 95 

Inland waterways, France, 109 

Intermediate Sections, 102, 103, 107 

Motor Transport Corps, 114, 115 

Motor Transport Service, 113, 115 

Mules, 97, 108, 110 

Nevers, intermediate section, 1 03, 1 07 

Nevers, rail deliveries at, 107 

New York Port of Embarkation, 98 

Newport News Port of Embarkation, 99 

Port of Bordeaux, France, 101 

Port of Le Havre, France, 105 

Port of Sainte-Nazaire, France, 103, 

105 
562 

Port operations, 98 

Ports, congestion at, 94, 105 

Ports of embarkation, 95 

Rail cars, demurrage cost, 94 

Rail cars, European, 107 

Rail cars, loading time, 94 

Rail cars, shortage at ports, 105 

Rail cars, shortage in A.E.F., 107 

Rail cars, supply of, 94 

Rail cars, tank, 107 

Railroad, French, 107 

Railroads, A.E.F., 105, 106, 107, 

109, 113 

Railroads, zone of the interior, 93, 94 

Redeployment, see demobilization 

Remount Service, A.E.F., 108 

Remount Service, Zone of the 

Interior, 97 

Services of Supply (SOS), 103, 104 

Shipping, 93, 95, 97, 98, 1 00 

Shipping Control Committee, 98 

Ships, 98, 1 oo 

Ships, losses, 100, 101 

Stevedores, 105 

Transportation, zone of the interior, 

93, 110 

Index 

Transportation assets, A.E.F., 113 

Transportation Corps, 113, 114, 115 

Transportation Department. 103 

Transportation Division, General 

Staff, 95 

Transportation Division, OOMG, 95, 108 

Transportation in the A.E.F, 105 

Troopships, 113 

Trucks,109,110,111 , 112,113 

U.S. Shipping Board, 98, 100 

VVagons,97, 109,112 

VVater Transportation Branch, 98 

VVorld VVar II. See theaters of operation 

and transportation mode operations, 

Chapters VI through IX 

VVykle, Lt. Gen. Kenneth R., 487 

Young, Brig. Gen. Charles D., 132 

Yount, Brig. Gen. Paul F., 166, 171, 305, 

485 

Yukon, 157, 159 

Zones, transportation in the Zl, 124, 127, 

129, 130, 134, 143, 144, 145, 146, 148 

Zoning in UK, 214, 216 

Zoning of Interior (ZI) 0NVV II), 116, 117, 

124, 127, 129, 136, 138, 146, 148 
563 

About the Authors 

BENJAMIN KING 

Upon graduation from the University of Connecticut with a 

Bachelor of Arts in history, Benjamin King joined the Army as a 

lieutenant in the Field Artillery. After his release from active duty 

in 1977, Mr. King became an historian at the Casemate Museum 

in Fort Monroe, Virginia, researching Coast Artillery fire control 

procedures. He was appointed Command Historian of the U.S. 

Army Transportation Center and School in July 1992. He has 

written extensively on Transportation issues and history. He 

currently resides in Newport News, Virginia with his wife Loretta. 

COLONEL RICHARD C. BIGGS (Retired) 

Colonel Biggs received an ROTC commission and a Bachelors 

of Arts degree from the University of California, Berkeley. 

Beginning his career as an Infantry officer in combat in the 

Pacific in World War II at Pearl Harbor, and in Australia, New 

Guinea and the Philippines, Col Biggs later became a 

Transportation Corps officer, and commanded a port and a truck 

battalion during the Korean War. After attending the Industrial 

College of the Armed Forces, he commanded Transportation 

Corps units in Germany and at Fort Eustis, Virginia. His staff 

assignments included V Corps Transportation Officer, and supply 

and maintenance management positions as a senior Army civilian 

on the Army General Staff; in Headquarters, United States Army, 

Europe; and in the Defense Attache Office, Saigon. Since 1983, 

he has managed base maintenance contracts in Turkey, 

consulted in that field, and volunteered as a co·author of this 

book. He and his wife Kitty reside in Williamsburg, Virginia. 

CAPTAIN (P) ERIC R. CRINER 

Captain Criner received an ROTC commission from the College 

of William Mary and simultaneously received a Bachelor of Arts 

Degree in Business Administration from Christopher Newport 

University. He received a Master of Science in Logistics 

Management from the Florida Institute of Technology in 1993. 

His assignments include tours with Military Traffic Management 

Command, Rotterdam, Netherlands; 37th Transportation Group, 

Kasierslautern, Germany; 1st Corps Support Command, Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina. Captain Criner participated in Operation 

Just Cause and commanded the 403d Transportation Company 

in Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf War. He is currently 

assigned to Fort Eustis, Virginia where he serves as a special 

assistant to the Chief of Transportation. Captain Criner and his 

wife Sue have one son, Colin.