1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

________________________________ 

 ) 

DAVID WOOD, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 ) 

v. ) Civil Action No. 14-2066 (EGS) 

 )

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., ) 

 )

Defendants. )

________________________________) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 David Wood brings this action against the District of 

Columbia and Metropolitan Police Department officers Charles 

Kiel, Charandip Sekhon, Andrew Smith, Michael Rodd, Jonathan 

Rosnick, Daniel Chodak, Jason Bagshaw, and Alicia Carter. His 

claims arise from an altercation he had with several of the 

defendant officers that occurred in the front yard of his home 

the evening of October 27, 2013 and from his subsequent 

prosecution on charges of assault on a police officer (“APO”). 

His complaint alleges various common law tort claims, including 

assault, false arrest, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, 

and negligent training and supervision, and that the officers 

violated federal law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when they falsely 

arrested him, used excessive force against him, maliciously 

prosecuted him, and prosecuted him based on false evidence. 

Pending before the Court is defendants’ motion for summary 
2

judgment. Upon review of defendants’ motion, the response and 

reply thereto, the parties’ supplemental filings, the applicable 

law, and the entire record, defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

I. Background 

 A. Factual Background

 Around 8:00 p.m. on the evening of October 27, 2013, 

Officers Charles Kiel, Andrew Smith, Charandip Sekhon, Michael 

Rodd, and Jonathan Rosnick were in a 7-Eleven convenience store 

on South Dakota Avenue in Northeast Washington, D.C. when a 

woman entered the store and alerted them that a taxi cab driver 

was being assaulted and robbed on nearby Jamaica Street. Defs.’ 

Statement of Material Facts (“Defs.’ SMF”), ECF No. 43 ¶ 1; 

Deposition of Charles Kiel (“Kiel Dep.”), ECF No. 43-4 at 8:14-

18; Deposition of Charandip Sekhon (“Sekhon Dep.”), ECF No. 43-7 

at 10:1-8; Deposition of David Wood (“Wood Dep.”), ECF No. 43-9 

at 22:7-9. The officers immediately reported to Jamaica Street, 

saw a taxi cab parked in the road with its door open, and then 

saw a person——whose face was bloodied——on the street calling for 

help. Defs.’ SMF, ECF No. 43 ¶¶ 2, 10. That person was the cab’s 

driver, Minwiylte Gebyehu, who had been attacked and robbed by 

his passenger and a second assailant who entered the cab on 

Jamaica Street after the passenger had instructed Mr. Gebyehu to 
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stop the cab on that street. Id. ¶ 41; Gebyehu Aff., ECF No. 45-

8 at 1-2. 

 Mr. Gebyehu communicated to the officers that two persons 

had attacked him. Kiel Dep., ECF No. 43-4 at 12:6-8. But the 

record is not clear as to what exactly Mr. Gebyehu communicated 

to the officers regarding where the two assailants fled. 

According to the officers, Mr. Gebyehu, when asked where his 

assailants fled, pointed to a specific house located at 1214 

Jamaica Street——the house in which Mr. Wood lived with his 

mother and from which he was soon to emerge. Kiel Dep., ECF No. 

43-4 at 11:1-3, 12:6-8; Deposition of Michael Rodd (“Rodd 

Dep.”), ECF No. 43-5 at 11:2-4; Deposition of Jonathan Rosnick 

(“Rosnick Dep.”), ECF No. 43-6 at 13:1-3, 15:10-12; Sekhon Dep., 

ECF No. 43-7 at 12:11-17; Deposition of Andrew Smith (“Smith 

Dep.”), ECF No. 43-8 at 13:17-22. Additionally, in an affidavit 

provided to the Court by Mr. Wood, Mr. Gebyehu affirmed that he 

showed the officers who arrived on the scene the house that his 

assailant-passenger had indicated was his house on Jamaica 

Street. Gebyehu Aff., ECF No. 45-8 at 3. But Mr. Gebyehu’s 

testimony from Mr. Wood’s criminal trial is in tension with this 

evidence. At one point during his testimony, Mr. Gebyehu said 

that he did not see where his assailants fled and that he told 

the officers as much when they asked him where his assailants 

had gone. Aug. 1, 2014 Criminal Trial Tr., ECF No. 45-3 at 19:2-
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10. However, at another point during his testimony, Mr. Gebyehu 

seems to have said that he did point out a specific house to the 

officers: the house in front of which he had parked his cab. Id.

at 29:1-15. Mr. Wood contends that if Mr. Gebyehu did identify a 

specific house for the officers, the house identified could not 

have been his at 1214 Jamaica Street, as the cab was not parked 

in front of his house. Pl.’s Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 

(“Pl.’s Opp.”), ECF No. 45 at 10 n.2. The officers’ testimony as 

to the location of the cab in relation to 1214 Jamaica Street is 

inconsistent. Compare Kiel Dep., ECF No. 43-4 at 11:12-14 (“Q: 

Where was his cab in relation to the [1214 Jamaica Street] 

house? A: About two to three doors down, closer to Eastern 

Avenue.”), with Rosnick Dep., ECF No. 43-6 at 14:21-15:6 (“Q: So 

how did it come about that you were almost in front of the [1214 

Jamaica Street] home? A: We were, again, we were walking from 

Eastern back towards the scene of the event where the cab was. . 

. . And [Mr. Gebyehu] had indicated that the two men that had 

assaulted him had ran into that home, and pointed towards it.”).

 Whatever directional information Mr. Gebyehu actually 

conveyed to the officers, Officers Kiel, Sekhon, and Smith ended 

up walking towards Mr. Wood’s house at 1214 Jamaica Street, 

while Officers Rodd and Rosnick remained in the street with Mr. 

Gebyehu. Defs.’ SMF, ECF No. 43 ¶ 4; Rosnick Dep., ECF No. 43-6 

at 19:6-8, 22:16-18. Inside the living room of the house, Mr. 
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Wood, who had “had a few drinks,” Wood Dep., ECF No. 43-9 at 

22:2-3, was on the telephone when he saw a red streak reflect on 

his television screen. Defs.’ SMF, ECF No. 43 ¶ 33; Wood Dep., 

ECF No. 43-9 at 13:8-10. Thinking that the flashing red light 

could have been from an emergency vehicle arriving for a beloved 

elderly neighbor, Mr. Wood——after jumping up and unsuccessfully 

attempting to reach his neighbor by telephone——exited the house, 

heading to his neighbor’s house to check on her. Wood Dep., ECF 

No. 43-9 at 17:1-3, 19:8-9, 20:7-22; Pl.’s Answers to Defs.’ 

Interrogs., ECF No. 45-10 at 9.

 When Mr. Wood exited his house he was clad in just his 

underwear and a tee shirt and was “worried” and “panicking.” 

Defs.’ SMF, ECF No. 43 ¶ 15; Wood Dep., ECF No. 43-9 at 13:18-

14:1, 19:4-6; Sekhon Dep, ECF No. 43-7 at 18:5. Officer Rosnick 

observed that Mr. Wood had “an agitated character and 

expression,” Rosnick Dep., ECF No. 43-6 at 25:6-7, and Officer 

Kiel observed that Mr. Wood “had a very confused something-waswrong-with-him look in his eyes” and “appeared to be under the 

influence of some kind of substance.” Defs.’ SMF, ECF No. 43 ¶ 

17; Kiel Dep., ECF No. 43-4 at 15:7-8, 17:18-19. Officer Kiel 

identified himself as a police officer and told Mr. Wood that he 

needed to stop and speak with the officers in view of the 

assault and robbery that had just occurred nearby, Kiel Dep., 

ECF No. 43-4 at 15:16-20, 16:20-17:10; Sekhon Dep., ECF No. 43-7 
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at 18:14-19:8; Smith Dep., ECF No. 43-8 at 19:10-20, but, 

according to the officers, Mr. Wood refused to stop and speak 

with them. Kiel Dep., ECF No. 43-4 at 17:3-4, 18:15; Sekhon 

Dep., ECF No. 43-7 at 25:7-26:18; Smith Dep., ECF No. 43-8 at 

19:16-20:4. Mr. Wood maintains that at this point——prior to 

Officer Kiel grabbing him and handcuffing one of his arms——he 

was unaware of any police presence. Wood Dep., ECF No. 43-9 at 

17:10-17, 21:1-22:1. 

 Officer Kiel told Mr. Wood that he would have to handcuff 

him and proceeded to grab and handcuff one of Mr. Wood’s arms. 

Kiel Dep., ECF No. 43-4 at 18:15-18, 20:7-8; Rosnick Dep., ECF 

No. 43-6 at 26:17-18; Sekhon Dep., ECF No. 43-7 at 27:3-22; 

Smith Dep., ECF No. 43-8 at 20:6-7. Now aware of the officers’ 

presence, Wood Dep., ECF No. 43-9 at 17:10-15, Mr. Wood contends 

that, upon being grabbed, he told Officer Kiel to “stop” and 

raised his hand to Officer Kiel to indicate that he should stop 

grabbing him. Wood Dep., ECF No. 43-9 at 17:1-7, 22:18-24:5. 

According to the officers, Mr. Wood did not merely raise his 

hand to indicate that they should “stop”; rather, he swung at 

Officer Kiel right after Officer Kiel had secured one of his 

arms in handcuffs. Kiel Dep., ECF No. 43-4 at 21:7-10; Rosnick 

Dep., ECF No. 43-6 at 31:2-5; Sekhon Dep., ECF No. 43-7 at 31:7-

22; Smith Dep., ECF No. 43-8 at 24:19-21. 
7

 Whether Mr. Wood merely raised his hand at Officer Kiel or 

swung at him, at about the same time or immediately after 

Officer Sekhon commanded Mr. Wood, “On the ground, 

motherfucker,” to which Mr. Wood responded by telling Officer 

Sekhon, “Don’t try it, Junior.” Wood Dep., ECF No. 43-9 at 

22:21-23:4. Telling Mr. Wood not to call him “Junior,” Officer 

Sekhon then “ram[med] himself into [Mr. Wood],” tackling Mr. 

Wood with the help of Officers Kiel and Smith. Id. at 14:9-13, 

23:5-10. A melee ensued during which the officers punched, 

pulled, stepped on, and kicked Mr. Wood. Id. at 14:14-20, 23:5-

10, 25:8-26:7; Sekhon Dep., ECF No. 43-7 at 42:1-22; Smith Dep., 

ECF No. 43-8 at 28:15-29:21. Soon after the struggle began, 

Officers Rodd and Rosnick ran over to assist the three other 

officers. Rosnick Dep., ECF No. 43-6 at 33:11-14. Officer Rodd 

was able to grab ahold of Mr. Wood’s free arm and pull it behind 

his back so that it could be handcuffed. Defs.’ SMF, ECF No. 43 

¶ 9; Rodd Dep., ECF No. 43-5 at 33:14-34:1. Although Mr. Wood 

insists that he “[c]ouldn’t struggle” because of the handcuffs, 

Wood Dep., ECF No. 43-9 at 27:1-2, he concedes that during the 

melee he was hitting the officers while they were hitting him. 

Wood Dep., ECF No. 43-9 at 26:10-16 (“Q: And while they were 

hitting you, where were your hands? A: Well, I was hitting——they 

were hitting me at one point, my hands were in front of me. They 

put them behind me. They grabbed them, they’re pulling it, they 
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yanked and pulled and then put them in handcuffs.”). After Mr. 

Wood was handcuffed and subdued, he contends that the officers 

continued to punch, kick, and step on him. Id. at 15:4-6 (“I was 

handcuffed and I remember one of the officers just punching me 

and punching me.”), 23:13-15 (“[W]hen I was on the ground they 

had me in handcuffs and still were still stepping on me, 

punching me.”). The officers maintain that any use of force 

ceased once Mr. Wood was fully handcuffed. Kiel Dep., ECF No. 

43-4 at 35:10-15 (“A: At some point we were able to handcuff 

him. Yes. Q: And then what happened? A: We all immediately got 

off of him, assessed what the rest of the situation, and carried 

on with the investigation.”). 

 Officer Daniel Chodak arrived on the scene after the melee 

was in progress but stayed on the street with Mr. Gebyehu 

throughout its duration. Defs.’ SMF, ECF No. 43 ¶¶ 24-26. During 

a subsequent show-up procedure that occurred after Sergeants 

Jason Bagshaw and Alicia Carter arrived on the scene, Mr. 

Gebyehu did not identify Mr. Wood as one of his assailants. Id.

¶¶ 28-31; Deposition of Jason Bagshaw, ECF No. 43-1 at 15:1-3. 

Mr. Wood was then transported from the scene to a police station 

house and eventually taken to a hospital to receive medical 

attention for atrial fibrillation, an accelerated heart rate, 

post-concussive syndrome, and injuries to his head and shoulder. 

Defs.’ SMF, ECF No. 43 ¶ 39; Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 45 at 4. 
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B. Procedural Background 

Mr. Wood was subsequently charged with misdemeanor APO but, 

following a bench trial on July 31 and August 1, 2014 in the 

Superior Court of the District of Columbia, was found not 

guilty. Defs.’ SMF, ECF No. 43 ¶ 40; Criminal Trial Docket 

Sheet, ECF No. 45-9. On October 24, 2014, Mr. Wood commenced 

this lawsuit in the Superior Court alleging: (1) common law 

assault against all defendants (Counts I and II); (2) common law 

false arrest against all defendants (Counts III and IV); (3) 

common law abuse of process against all defendants (Counts V and 

VI); (4) common law malicious prosecution against all defendants 

(Counts VII and VIII); (5) excessive force in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against all 

individual officers (Count IX); (6) false arrest in violation of 

the Fourth Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against all 

individual officers (Count X); (7) prosecution based on false 

evidence in violation of unspecified civil rights, pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, against all individual officers (Count XI); 

(8) malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Fifth 

Amendments, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against all individual 

officers (Count XII); and (9) negligent training and supervision 

against the District of Columbia (Count XIII). See Compl., ECF 

No. 19-1 ¶¶ 39-87. 
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 Defendants removed the case to this Court on December 5, 

2014. See Joint Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. The Court 

partially granted Officer Chodak’s motion to dismiss, dismissing 

Counts I, V, IX, and XI as to him. Order, ECF No. 27. On 

December 23, 2015, defendants filed the motion for summary 

judgment that is presently before the Court. See Defs.’ Mot. for 

Summ. J., ECF No. 43. In his brief in opposition, Mr. Wood 

expressly abandons and requests the Court to dismiss the 

following claims: all Counts as to Officers Bagshaw and Carter, 

and Counts V, VI, XI, and XIII in full. Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 45 

at 1 n.1. The Court thus grants defendants’ motion as to those 

abandoned claims and has considered the parties’ summary 

judgment arguments as they pertain to the remaining claims.

II. Legal Standards

 A. Summary Judgment

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary 

judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 

Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 991 (D.C. Cir. 

2002). The moving party must identify “those portions of the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which 

it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 
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material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 

(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). To defeat summary 

judgment, the nonmoving party must demonstrate that there is a 

genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 324. A material fact is 

one that is capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A 

genuine dispute is one where “the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Id. Further, in the summary judgment analysis “[t]he evidence of 

the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences 

are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. 

B. Qualified Immunity

 Section 1983 provides a private cause of action against 

persons acting under color of District of Columbia law who 

deprive another of his or her federal constitutional or 

statutory rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, the doctrine of 

qualified immunity “exists to protect officers ‘from undue 

interference with their duties and from potentially disabling 

threats of liability.’” Lash v. Lemke, 786 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 

2015) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982)). 

“In resolving questions of qualified immunity at summary 

judgment, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry.” Tolan v. 

Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865 (2014). The first prong asks 

“whether the facts, [t]aken in the light most favorable to the 
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party asserting the injury, . . . show the officer’s conduct 

violated a [federal] right[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The second asks “whether the right in question was 

‘clearly established’ at the time of the violation.” Id. at 1866 

(citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). “To be 

clearly established, the precedent must give officials clear 

warning of unconstitutional conduct.” Doe v. District of 

Columbia, 796 F.3d 96, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “In determining whether officers strayed beyond 

clearly established bounds of lawfulness, [this Court] look[s] 

to cases from the Supreme Court and [the D.C. Circuit], as well 

as to cases from other courts exhibiting a consensus view.” 

Johnson v. District of Columbia, 528 F.3d 969, 976 (D.C. Cir. 

2008). Although courts have discretion to decide the order in 

which to engage the two prongs of the qualified immunity 

analysis, Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 

555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)), under either prong “courts may not 

resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking 

summary judgment.” Id.

III. Analysis

 Mr. Wood’s remaining claims arise under § 1983 and several 

common law torts. Under § 1983, he claims the officers violated 

his constitutional rights by falsely arresting him, maliciously 

prosecuting him, and using excessive force against him. See
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Compl., ECF No. 19-1 ¶¶ 67-76, 80-83. His tort claims are false 

arrest, malicious prosecution, and assault. Id. ¶¶ 39-54, 61-66. 

The Court will address these claims below. 

A. § 1983: False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution 

Mr. Wood contends that there was no reasonable, articulable 

suspicion to permit the officers to initially stop him, Pl.’s 

Opp., ECF No. 45 at 10-11 & n.2, and that the probable cause 

required for an arrest never materialized during his interaction 

with the officers. Id. at 10-13. Accordingly, he argues that the 

officers falsely arrested him in violation of his Fourth 

Amendment rights. Id. at 12-13. Defendants counter that the 

totality of the circumstances gave rise to the reasonable 

suspicion required for an initial investigatory stop, Defs.’ 

Reply, ECF No. 48 at 2-4, and that, based on Mr. Wood’s 

resistant conduct during that lawful stop, they had probable 

cause to arrest him for APO or, in the alternative, they are 

shielded by qualified immunity because it was not unreasonable 

for them to believe that they had probable cause to arrest him 

for APO. Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Mem. 

Supp.”), ECF No. 43 at 26-28; id. at 4.

 As a preliminary matter, the Court concludes that, when 

considering only the facts not in dispute and when drawing all 

reasonable inferences in Mr. Wood’s favor, the officers had the 

reasonable, articulable suspicion required to permissibly 
14 

effectuate an investigatory stop of Mr. Wood.1 Defendants do not 

dispute that Mr. Wood was “seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes 

when Officer Kiel grabbed one of his arms and handcuffed it. See

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (“Only when the 

officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in 

some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude 

that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.”). The inquiry then becomes 

whether that initial stop was constitutionally justified. 

Officers are permitted to conduct a warrantless investigatory——

or “Terry”——stop “so long as they have ‘reasonable, articulable 

suspicion’ of criminal conduct.” United States v. Goddard, 491 

F.3d 457, 460 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 

 

1 Mr. Wood does not assert a stand-alone § 1983 Fourth Amendment 

claim of an unlawful seizure arising from the initial stop, see 

generally Compl., ECF No. 19-1, and instead limits his § 1983 

claims to those of false arrest, malicious prosecution, and 

excessive force. See id. ¶¶ 67-76, 80-83. Even so, “[a] court 

may deny a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on the 

basis of a legal theory never embraced by the plaintiff, as long 

as that theory is supported by the facts alleged and as long as 

the defendant is not prejudiced on the merits.” Hanson v. 

Hoffmann, 628 F.2d 42, 53 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (internal 

citations omitted). Here, denying summary judgment as to an 

unlawful seizure claim based on the initial investigatory stop 

would not prejudice the officers because they have not been 

taken by surprise; in their briefing, they addressed the 

legality of the initial stop, in addition to addressing the 

other claims that Mr. Wood has explicitly articulated. See

Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 48 at 2-4 (arguing that the officers had 

the reasonable, articulable suspicion required for an 

investigatory stop). For this reason, and because analysis of 

the false arrest claim benefits from a preliminary analysis of 

the initial investigatory stop, the Court scrutinizes the 

propriety of the initial stop. 
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U.S. 119, 123 (2000)). This determination depends on an 

assessment of the totality of the circumstances “as viewed 

through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on 

the scene, guided by his experience and training.” United States 

v. Bailey, 622 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In this totality of the circumstances analysis, 

“factors individually susceptible to an innocent explanation may 

suffice[ ] to form a particularized and objective basis when 

taken together.” United States v. Castle, 825 F.3d 625, 634-35 

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, a 

Terry stop only requires that “officers have a ‘minimal level of 

objective justification.’” Goddard, 491 F.3d at 460 (quoting INS 

v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984)). 

 Here, there is a factual dispute as to whether Mr. Gebyehu 

told the officers that his assailants fled to Mr. Wood’s house; 

told them that they fled to a different house on Jamaica Street; 

or told them nothing regarding the whereabouts of his 

assailants. Compare Aug. 1, 2014 Criminal Trial Tr., ECF No. 45-

3 at 19:2-10, with Kiel Dep., ECF No. 43-4 at 11:1-3. Even so, 

there is no dispute that a violent crime had occurred on Jamaica 

Street in the immediate vicinity of the home from which Mr. Wood 

emerged, Defs.’ SMF, ECF No. 43 ¶¶ 1-2; that the crime was 

perpetrated by two persons, Kiel Dep., ECF No. 43-4 at 12:6-8; 

that the altercation between Mr. Wood and the officers occurred 
16 

at night, Wood Dep., ECF No. 43-9 at 22:7-9 (“Q: And about what 

time did this all occur? A: I would say around, say, 8:00.”);

that Mr. Wood was “panicking” and “worried” when he exited his 

house to check on his neighbor after seeing a flashing red light 

from his living room, Wood Dep., ECF No. 43-9 at 13:8-14:2; and 

that Officer Kiel——the officer who initiated the investigatory 

stop——noted that Mr. Wood, clad in only underwear and a tee 

shirt, “appeared to be under the influence of some kind of 

substance” and “had a very confused something-was-wrong-with-him 

look in his eyes.” Kiel Dep., ECF No. 43-4 at 15:7-10, 17:18-19. 

 The Court concludes that the undisputed facts are 

sufficient to sustain a finding of reasonable, articulable 

suspicion here because “[a]lthough an officer does not have 

articulable suspicion a person is committing a crime merely 

because a person is in an area of suspected criminal activity, 

‘officers are not required to ignore the relevant 

characteristics of a location in determining whether the 

circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further 

investigation.’” Bailey, 622 F.3d at 5-6 (quoting Wardlow, 528 

U.S. at 124). Thus “[a]n officer may initiate a Terry stop based 

not on certainty but on the need ‘to ‘check out’ a reasonable 

suspicion.’” Id. at 6 (quoting United States v. Clark, 24 F.3d 

299, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). The scenario that confronted Officer 

Kiel and his fellow officers is a quintessential example of one 
17 

where it was necessary to at least “check out” Mr. Wood to 

dispel their suspicion that he was connected to the crime that 

they were responding to. When Mr. Wood emerged from his house in 

the immediate vicinity of the crime that had been committed, the 

officers were searching for two suspects, and the officers’ 

observation of Mr. Wood’s strange conduct and appearance——

consistent with his own description that he was “worried” and 

was “panicking” when he emerged from his house, Wood Dep., ECF 

No. 43-9 at 13:8-14:2——was enough to permit them to effectuate 

an investigatory stop to dispel their suspicion. See United 

States v. Brown, 334 F.3d 1161, 1165-68 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 

(holding that there was reasonable suspicion for an 

investigatory stop of persons in a car in a high crime area when 

the car was only one of two occupied cars in a parking lot where 

gunshots had recently been fired, a person that exited the car 

engaged in “peculiar” behavior, and the persons remaining in the 

car engaged in “furtive movements”). Although Officer Kiel and 

his fellow officers only barely passed the reasonable suspicion 

threshold, based on Mr. Wood’s panicked demeanor in the

immediate vicinity of a violent crime they had the “‘minimal 

level of objective justification’” needed to effectuate an 

investigatory stop. See Goddard, 491 F.3d at 460 (quoting 

Delgado, 466 U.S. at 217). Certainly Mr. Wood’s conduct was 

“‘ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation,’” but 
18 

“‘Terry recognized that . . . officers could detain [such] [an] 

individual[ ] to resolve the ambiguity.’” Brown, 334 F.3d at 

1168 (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125-26).2

 That the officers had the reasonable suspicion required to 

effectuate an initial investigatory stop of course does not end 

the Court’s inquiry, as at some point the investigatory stop 

morphed into an arrest, and an arrest requires not mere 

reasonable suspicion but rather probable cause. Martin v. 

Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1987). “Probable cause 

 

2 Although the Court concludes that there was reasonable 

suspicion justifying an investigatory stop, to the extent that 

there was not, defendants are still entitled to summary judgment 

on any claim of an unlawful seizure arising from the initial 

stop of Mr. Wood under the second prong of the qualified 

immunity analysis. That prong entitles defendants to immunity so 

long as the violation in question was not “clearly established.” 

Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “In determining whether officers 

strayed beyond clearly established bounds of lawfulness, [this 

Court] look[s] to cases from the Supreme Court and [the D.C. 

Circuit], as well as to cases from other courts exhibiting a 

consensus view.” Johnson, 528 F.3d at 976. Mr. Wood fails to 

cite a single case from the Supreme Court or the D.C. Circuit 

that clearly establishes the absence of reasonable suspicion 

under factual circumstances generally similar to those that are 

undisputed in his case. See generally Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 45. 

And though Mr. Wood does not cite to any out-of-Circuit cases 

relevant to this analysis, the Court’s own research indicates 

the absence of any consensus view. Compare United States v. 

Williams, 11 F. App’x 842, 843-44 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that 

there was no reasonable suspicion when the person stopped was in 

the vicinity of a crime scene and “looked nervously back at the 

crime scene”), with United States v. Broomfield, 417 F.3d 654, 

655 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that there was reasonable 

suspicion when the person stopped matched a highly generalized 

description of the suspect and was less than a mile from the 

scene of a robbery when the streets were nearly deserted). 
19 

exists if a reasonable and prudent police officer would conclude 

from the totality of the circumstances that a crime has been or 

is being committed.” United States v. Holder, 990 F.2d 1327, 

1328 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Like the reasonable suspicion inquiry, 

the probable cause inquiry is an objective one that assesses 

“the facts and circumstances known to the officers at the time 

of the arrest without regard to the ‘actual motivations’ or 

‘[s]ubjective intentions’ of the officers involved.” United 

States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting 

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)). 

 Mr. Wood maintains that the probable cause required for an 

arrest was absent. Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 45 at 12-13. Defendants 

counter, as indicated above, that Mr. Wood’s Fourth Amendment 

false arrest claim must fail because there was probable cause to 

arrest him for APO or, in the alternative, because they had the 

reasonable belief that they had probable cause to arrest him for 

APO. Defs.’ Mem. Supp., ECF No. 43 at 26-28. Defendants’ 

fallback qualified immunity argument thus relies on the wellsettled rule that “law enforcement officials who reasonably but 

mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present are entitled 

to immunity.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

 The D.C. APO statute applicable here directs that anyone 

who, “without justifiable and excusable cause, assaults, 
20 

resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with a law 

enforcement officer on account of, or while that law enforcement 

officer is engaged in the performance of his or her official 

duties shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” D.C. Code § 22-405(b).3

And even when an investigatory stop or arrest is unlawful, a 

person does not have justifiable and excusable cause to use 

force to resist that stop or arrest when he knows it is being 

carried out by a law enforcement officer. See id. § 22-405(d). 

To “constitute an offense under [the APO statute], a person’s 

conduct must go beyond speech and mere passive resistance or 

avoidance, and cross the line into active confrontation, 

obstruction or other action directed against an officer’s 

performance in the line of duty.” Howard v. United States, 966 

A.2d 854, 856 (D.C. 2009) (quoting In re C.L.D., 739 A.2d 353, 

357 (D.C. 1999)). The “key is the active and oppositional nature 

of the conduct for the purpose of thwarting a police officer in 

his or her duties.” Id. (quoting C.L.D., 739 A.2d at 357). 

 Defendants argue that there was probable cause for an APO 

arrest or that it was at least reasonable to conclude that such 

 

3 The current version of D.C.’s APO statute——which became 

effective on June 30, 2016, well after the events in question 

here——reads as follows: “Whoever without justifiable and 

excusable cause assaults a law enforcement officer on account 

of, or while that law enforcement officer is engaged in the 

performance of his or her official duties shall be guilty of a 

misdemeanor . . . .” D.C. Code § 22-405(b). 
21 

probable cause existed because they contend that: Mr. Wood was 

walking away from the officers when they were approaching him on 

his front lawn; when he was grabbed by Officer Kiel he told the 

officers to “stop” and motioned at the officers to stop; he 

said, “Don’t try it, Junior” when Officer Sekhon ordered that he 

fall to the ground; and, in the ensuing melee, he was hitting 

the officers at the same time that they were hitting him. Defs.’ 

Mem. Supp., ECF No. 43 at 27-28; Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 48 at 4. 

Under those circumstances, the defendants contend that they had 

probable cause or a reasonable belief of probable cause for an 

APO arrest. Defs.’ Mem. Supp., ECF No. 43 at 28. For his part, 

Mr. Wood only contends that because there is a dispute of fact 

as to whether Mr. Gebyehu directed the officers on the scene to 

Mr. Wood’s house there was no probable cause for an arrest. 

Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 45 at 12-13. 

 The Court finds that the officers had probable cause for an 

APO arrest, and thus they are entitled to summary judgment as to 

Mr. Wood’s Fourth Amendment false arrest claim. There is no 

dispute that when Officer Kiel initially grabbed Mr. Wood as 

part of his investigatory stop Mr. Wood responded by saying 

“stop” and by raising his hand to the officers in a motion 

intended to emphasize that they should “stop” grabbing and 

handcuffing him. Wood Dep., ECF No. 43-9 at 22:18-22 (“One 

[officer] grabbed my arm, one tried to come at me. I said, stop, 
22 

you know.”), 23:16-24:5 (“Q: So you raised your hand at the 

officer? A: Yeah. ‘Stop.’ You know. I don’t have——as many 

medical injuries as I have, I’m not trying to get hurt 

anymore.”). It is also undisputed that Mr. Wood then refused to 

go to the ground when Officer Sekhon ordered him to do so. Id.

at 22:21-23:6 (“I said, stop, you know. And then the other one . 

. . he came up to me and said, ‘On the ground, motherfucker.’ I 

then said, ‘Don’t try it, Junior.’ And he said, ‘Don’t call me 

Junior.’ And then they all just grabbed me.”). Because probable 

cause for an APO arrest requires an arrestee’s conduct to “go 

beyond speech and mere passive resistance or avoidance, and 

cross the line into active confrontation, obstruction or other 

action directed against an officer’s performance in the line of 

duty,” Howard, 966 A.2d at 856 (quoting C.L.D., 739 A.2d at 

357), the Court is uncertain as to whether Mr. Wood’s refusal to 

go to the ground during the course of the investigatory stop 

when commanded to do so provides probable cause for an APO 

arrest. Compare Howard, 966 A.2d at 856-57 (holding that a 

defendant engaged in only passive resistance when she refused to 

remove her hands from her pockets when an officer ordered her to 

do so), and CLD, 739 A.2d at 357-58 (holding that a defendant 

engaged in only passive resistance when he refused to provide 

his name and walked away when an officer ordered him to state 

his name and not walk away), with Cromartie v. District of 
23 

Columbia, 479 F. App’x 355, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that 

there was probable cause for an APO arrest when a plaintiff “was 

belligerent, refused to obey instructions, and loudly cursed at 

the officers”), and Hargraves v. District of Columbia, 134 F. 

Supp. 3d 68, 84 (D.D.C. 2015) (holding that a plaintiff engaged 

in active confrontation when he “refused to get down on the 

ground as the officer commanded” and “refused to provide his 

loose arm to be handcuffed” during the course of an 

investigatory stop). Even so, when Officer Kiel initially 

grabbed Mr. Wood and began to handcuff him, Mr. Wood’s raised 

hand motion to emphasize that he wanted the officers to “stop” 

was sufficiently “active confrontation” to give rise to probable 

cause for an APO arrest. In In re J.S., 19 A.3d 328 (D.C. 2011), 

the D.C. Court of Appeals held that J.S. “actively resisted” 

officers’ attempts to handcuff him when, while lying on the 

ground, he rolled his body from side to side and broke from an 

officer’s grip by “swinging his arm forward.” 19 A.3d at 332. 

The Court found that although J.S. did not assault the officers 

by swinging at them and his arm movement was motivated by pain 

rather than a specific intent to evade being handcuffed, that 

conduct still crossed the line from passive resistance into 

active confrontation. Id. at 331-33. Relying on its prior 

precedent, the Court said that “resisting handcuffing 

constitutes the type of active resistance directed against 
24 

police that is prohibited by the APO statute.” Id. at 331 

(citing Coghill v. United States, 982 A.2d 802, 805-06, 808 

(D.C. 2009)). Here, there is a dispute as to whether Mr. Wood 

swung at Officer Kiel, but there is no dispute that Mr. Wood at 

least raised his hand to Officer Kiel to emphasize that he 

should “stop” grabbing and handcuffing him. Mr. Wood’s sudden 

hand movement in response to Officer Kiel’s attempt to grab and 

handcuff him might be minimal resistance, but it is resistance 

sufficiently analogous to J.S.’s “swinging his arm forward” to 

sustain the conclusion that “active resistance directed against 

police” had materialized, giving the officers probable cause to 

arrest Mr. Wood for APO. See id. at 331-32.4 Accordingly, because 

the officers had probable cause to arrest Mr. Wood for APO, they 

are entitled to summary judgment as to his Fourth Amendment 

false arrest claim under the first prong of the qualified 

immunity analysis. And because the officers had probable cause 

to arrest Mr. Wood for APO, his § 1983 malicious prosecution 

claim also fails. See Pitt v. District of Columbia, 491 F.3d 

 

4 Because the Court concludes that probable cause for an APO 

arrest materialized when Mr. Wood told Officer Kiel to “stop” 

and raised his hand to Officer Kiel to emphasize his desire that 

he stop grabbing and handcuffing him, the Court has no need to 

assess whether there was independently probable cause for an APO 

arrest when Mr. Wood was exchanging blows with the officers in 

the ensuing melee. See Wood Dep., ECF No. 43-9 at 26:10-13 (“Q: 

And while they were hitting you, where were your hands? A: Well, 

I was hitting——they were hitting me at one point, my hands were 

in front of me.”).
25 

494, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“We join the large majority of 

circuits in holding that malicious prosecution is actionable 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the extent that the defendant’s 

actions cause the plaintiff to be unreasonably ‘seized’ without 

probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”).

B. § 1983: Excessive Force

 Mr. Wood also claims that excessive force was used against 

him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights during his 

altercation with the officers on his front lawn. Pl.’s Opp., ECF 

No. 45 at 6-10. Defendants argue that they did not use excessive 

force or that they were not clearly on notice that the amount of 

force that they used during the altercation was excessive. 

Defs.’ Mem. Supp., ECF No. 43 at 21-25. 

A claim of “excessive force in the course of making an 

arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of [one’s] 

person” is “properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s 

‘objective reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 

386, 388 (1989). That reasonableness standard “requires a 

careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on 

the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the 

countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the 

reasonableness analysis “requires careful attention to the facts 

and circumstances of each particular case, including the 
26 

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an 

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and 

whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 

arrest by flight.” Id. Further, the objective reasonableness of 

a particular use of force “must be judged from the perspective 

of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 

vision of hindsight.” Id. Thus, the “calculus of reasonableness 

must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are 

often forced to make split-second judgments——in circumstances 

that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving——about the 

amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” 

Id. at 396-97. “[A] defendant’s motion for summary judgment is 

to be denied only when, viewing the facts in the record and all 

reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude 

that the excessiveness of the force is so apparent that no 

reasonable officer could have believed in the lawfulness of his 

actions.” Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 

1993). 

 In their altercation with Mr. Wood, the officers used force 

on four different occasions: first, when Officer Kiel initially 

grabbed Mr. Wood and handcuffed one of his arms; second, when 

Officers Sekhon, Kiel, and Smith tackled Mr. Wood to the ground; 

third, when Officers Sekhon, Kiel, Smith, Rodd, and Rosnick 
27 

struggled to subdue Mr. Wood with punches and grabs while he was 

“hitting” them in return; and fourth, when, according to Mr. 

Wood, punches and kicks were leveled against him after he had 

been fully handcuffed and subdued. Although the Court concludes 

that the first three uses of force here did not involve 

excessive force that was so apparent that no reasonable officer 

could have believed in the lawfulness of his actions, the last 

use of force——the alleged gratuitous, post-submission use of 

force——did involve that degree of egregiously excessive force. 

Accordingly, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment as 

to this version of Mr. Wood’s excessive force claim.

 First, it is undisputed that Officer Kiel grabbed and 

handcuffed one of Mr. Wood’s arms as part of his investigatory 

stop. Kiel Dep., ECF No. 43-4 at 20:5-8; Wood Dep., ECF No. 43-9 

at 17:3-5. But the right to make an investigatory stop 

“necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of 

physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Graham, 490 

U.S. at 396. Officer Kiel’s grabbing and handcuffing of Mr. 

Wood’s arm to effectuate the investigatory stop was not 

excessive because the stop was justified based on Mr. Wood 

appearing in the immediate vicinity of the scene of a violent 

crime with a panicked appearance when the officers were 

canvassing for the two perpetrators of the crime. See supra Part 

III.A. Under those circumstances, it was reasonable for Officer 
28 

Kiel to restrain Mr. Wood’s arms by means of handcuffs until his 

suspicions about him could be dispelled. See Cotton v. District 

of Columbia, 541 F. Supp. 2d 195, 203-05 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding 

that an officer did not use excessive force when he pushed the 

plaintiff to the ground and placed her in handcuffs during an 

investigatory stop even though bystanders had already informed 

the officer that the plaintiff’s knife-wielding assailant had 

fled the scene). In any event, even if Officer Kiel’s initial 

use of force was excessive, it was certainly not so excessive 

that no reasonable officer in his position could have believed 

it was lawful. See United States v. Dykes, 406 F.3d 717, 720 

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that officers did not use excessive 

force when, during the course of an investigatory stop, they 

tackled a suspect who was in full flight and then placed him in 

handcuffs once they had brought him to the ground); Kyle v. 

Bedlion, 177 F. Supp. 3d 380, 393-95 (D.D.C. 2016) (holding that 

it was not clearly established that an officer used excessive 

force against a non-arrestee plaintiff when the officer shoved 

the plaintiff into a hot barbeque grill, resulting in burns, 

when the plaintiff had inserted herself between the officer and 

a person that the officer was attempting to arrest). 

 Second, it is undisputed that, after Officer Kiel grabbed 

and attempted to handcuff Mr. Wood, Mr. Wood raised his hand to 

the officers and refused to obey Officer Sekhon’s command to 
29 

fall to the ground, and Officers Sekhon, Kiel, and Smith 

responded by tackling him to the ground. Wood Dep., ECF No. 43-9 

at 22:21-24:5. As explained above, when Mr. Wood raised his hand 

to the officers when Officer Kiel was trying to handcuff him 

pursuant to the investigatory stop, the officers had probable 

cause to arrest Mr. Wood for APO. See supra Part III.A. Just as 

officers are permitted a reasonable amount of force to carry out 

an investigatory stop, they are permitted a reasonable amount of 

force to make an arrest. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. But, in this 

Circuit, the amount of force deemed reasonable in the context of 

an arrest is markedly greater than the amount of force deemed 

reasonable in the investigatory stop context. See, e.g., 

Cromartie, 479 F. App’x at 357 (holding that “the ordinary 

degree of physical coercion used by police officers to 

effectuate an arrest” was used when arrestee was “slammed to the 

ground, handcuffed, and forcibly kept on the ground by one or 

both officers”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); Oberwetter v. Hilliard, 639 F.3d 545, 548, 555 (D.C. 

Cir. 2011) (holding that an officer did not use excessive force 

when he arrested a plaintiff who was dancing at the Jefferson 

Memorial by “ripping apart her earbud, shoving her against a 

pillar, and violently twisting her arm”); Wasserman v. Rodacker, 

557 F.3d 635, 641 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that an officer did 

not use excessive force when she applied force to the arrestee’s 
30 

arm to secure compliance during the arrest because the 

arrestee’s refusal to obey the officer’s order prior to the 

arrest suggested that the arrestee might try to resist or 

escape); Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 759 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996) (holding that the degree of force used to make an 

arrest was not so excessive that no reasonable officer could 

have believed in the lawfulness of his actions when an officer 

struck an arrestee, a second officer joined the first officer in 

slamming the arrestee to the ground, and then five officers 

dragged the arrestee to a police transport vehicle); Martin, 830 

F.2d at 262 (holding that an officer did not use excessive force 

when he grabbed an arrestee about the waist, threw him into the 

driver’s seat of a car, and then slammed the door on his legs). 

In view of the substantial amount of force the Circuit Court has 

said officers can reasonably use to make an arrest, tackling Mr. 

Wood after he raised his hand to the officers and refused to 

obey a command to go to the ground is not excessive, let alone 

so excessive that no reasonable officer could have believed that 

use of force was lawful. 

 Third, it is undisputed that, after Mr. Wood was brought to 

the ground, in an attempt to handcuff Mr. Wood the five officers 

involved in the melee punched, grabbed, and pulled Mr. Wood and 

he, in turn, was “hitting” them. Sekhon Dep., ECF No. 43-7 at 

42:1-22; Smith Dep., ECF No. 43-8 at 28:15-29:21; Rodd Dep., ECF 
31 

No. 43-5 at 33:14-34:1; Wood Dep., ECF No. 43-9 at 26:10-21. 

Drawing all reasonable inferences in Mr. Wood’s favor, the Court 

assumes that Mr. Wood did not start “hitting” until after the 

officers began to hit him. Even so, the Court concludes that the 

officers’ use of force prior to the moment Mr. Wood was secured 

in handcuffs was not so excessive that no reasonable officer 

could have believed that use of force was lawful. As explained 

above, the Circuit Court has repeatedly said that even severe 

force is not clearly excessive in the arrest context, 

particularly when an arrestee has already refused to obey an 

order, as was the case here. See Oberwetter, 639 F.3d at 548, 

555 (explaining that the plaintiff’s refusal to stop dancing and 

leave the Jefferson Memorial when ordered to do so was a primary 

factor permitting the arresting officer “to take decisive action 

to subdue [the plaintiff] quickly and forcefully, thereby 

reducing the risk of interference or escape”); see also 

Cromartie, 479 F. App’x at 357 (holding that it was not 

excessive for officers to slam arrestee to the ground, handcuff 

him, and forcibly keep him on the ground, “especially in light 

of the fact that [the arrestee’s] belligerence and disobedience 

suggested he might try to resist or escape”). 

 Fourth, Mr. Wood alleges that, after he was completely 

handcuffed and had submitted to their authority, the officers 

continued to punch, kick, and step on him. Wood Dep., ECF No. 
32 

43-9 at 15:4-6 (“I was handcuffed and I remember one of the 

officers just punching me and punching me.”), 23:13-15 (“[W]hen 

I was on the ground they had me in handcuffs and still were 

stepping on me, punching me.”). The officers, on the other hand, 

contend that any use of force ceased once Mr. Wood was 

handcuffed. Kiel Dep., ECF No. 43-4 at 35:10-15 (“A: At some 

point we were able to handcuff him. Yes. Q: And then what 

happened? A: We all immediately got off of him, assessed what 

the rest of the situation, and carried on with the 

investigation.”). It is clearly established that punching, 

kicking, and stepping on a handcuffed and submissive arrestee is 

excessive force. See Johnson, 528 F.3d at 975 (holding that an 

officer who kicked a prone and submissive arrestee in the groin 

had used excessive force); Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 

329, 331-33 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding, in a case where a suspect 

was punched, beaten with a baton, pistol-whipped, and attacked 

by a police dog, that such violence “was more force than was 

reasonably necessary” if the suspect had already been disarmed 

and handcuffed). Summary judgment here would be premature 

because there exists a genuine issue of material fact, namely, 

whether any of the five officers involved in the stop, arrest, 

and ensuing melee punched, kicked, or stepped on Mr. Wood after 

he had been completely handcuffed and had fully submitted to 

their authority by ceasing his own “hitting.” Because resolution 
33 

of this dispute must be left to a fact-finder at trial, 

defendants are not entitled to summary judgment as to this 

version of Mr. Wood’s excessive force claim. See Saucier v. 

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 216 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the 

judgment) (“Of course, if an excessive force claim turns on 

which of two conflicting stories best captures what happened on 

the street, Graham will not permit summary judgment in favor of 

the defendant official.”). 

C. Common Law Claims

“The elements of a constitutional claim for false arrest 

are substantially identical to the elements of a common-law 

false arrest claim,” Scott, 101 F.3d at 753-54, and, thus, 

“[c]onstitutional and common law claims of false arrest are 

generally analyzed as though they comprise a single cause of 

action.” Amobi v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 

980, 989 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Accordingly, if the probable cause 

exists that negates a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim, that 

same probable cause negates a common law false arrest claim. See

District of Columbia v. Minor, 740 A.2d 523, 529 (D.C. 1999) 

(explaining that insufficiency of the evidence as to a Fourth 

Amendment false arrest claim “will effectively negate the 

common-laws false arrest claim”); see also Smith v. United 

States, 121 F. Supp. 3d 112, 119 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Under District 

of Columbia law, the existence of probable cause is an 
34 

affirmative defense that can be raised in response to an 

accusation of false arrest.”), aff’d, 843 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 

2016). As explained above, the officers had probable cause to 

arrest Mr. Wood for APO. See supra Part III.A. That probable 

cause that entitles defendants to summary judgment as to Mr. 

Wood’s constitutional false arrest claim likewise entitles 

defendants to summary judgment as to Mr. Wood’s common law false 

arrest claim. And because there was probable cause for the 

arrest, defendants are also entitled to summary judgment as to 

Mr. Wood’s common law malicious prosecution claim. See DeWitt v. 

District of Columbia, 43 A.3d 291, 295-96 (D.C. 2012) (“The 

existence of probable cause will likewise defeat a claim for 

malicious prosecution . . . .”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Amobi, 755 F.3d at 992 (“We think our 

discussion of probable cause for the false arrest is 

sufficiently analogous so as to be dispositive on the malicious 

prosecution claim.”). 

 Mr. Wood also asserts a common law assault claim against 

defendants. In the District of Columbia, an assault is “an 

intentional and unlawful attempt or threat, either by words or 

by acts, to do physical harm to the victim.” Etheredge v. 

District of Columbia, 635 A.2d 908, 916 (D.C. 1993). However, a 

“police officer has a qualified privilege to use reasonable 

force to effect an arrest, provided that the means employed are 
35 

not in excess of those which the actor reasonably believes to be 

necessary.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, 

“unless the threatened use of force is clearly excessive, an 

officer is protected against liability for assault.” Jackson v. 

District of Columbia, 412 A.2d 948, 956 (D.C. 1980). “This 

standard is similar to the excessive force standard applied in 

the Section 1983 context.” Rogala v. District of Columbia, 161 

F.3d 44, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Harris v. Allison, No. 

14-1104, 2016 WL 3166296, at *4 (D.D.C. June 6, 2016) (“[A]n 

assault claim against D.C. law enforcement officials should be 

held to the same standard as its federal counterpart——an 

excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). Accordingly, 

because there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact 

concerning the officers’ use of force after Mr. Wood was 

handcuffed and had fully submitted to their authority, as with 

the § 1983 excessive force claim, defendants are not entitled to 

summary judgment as to the common law assault claim. See Dormu 

v. District of Columbia, 795 F. Supp. 2d 7, 27-28 (D.D.C. 2011) 

(denying a defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to a 

District of Columbia assault and battery claim “for the same 

reasons [relied upon] in analyzing [plaintiff’s] excessive force 

claim under § 1983”).
36 

IV. Conclusion

 For the reasons stated above, the Court will GRANT IN PART

and DENY IN PART defendants’ motion for summary judgment. A 

separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

SO ORDERED. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 

 United States District Judge 

 May 31, 2017