UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-4881

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER TERRELL SHORT,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen,

Senior District Judge. (1:07-cr-00084-WLO)

Submitted: April 12, 2010 Decided: June 29, 2010

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and GREGORY and AGEE, Circuit 

Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Richard L. Cannon, III, CANNON LAW OFFICES, PLLC, Greenville, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra Jane Hairston, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Christopher Terrell 

Short pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 1000.2 

grams of cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1) (2006). The district court sentenced him as a 

career offender to a 190-month term of imprisonment. On appeal, 

Short’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no 

meritorious issues for appeal but questioning the procedural 

reasonableness of Short’s sentence. Short has filed a pro se 

supplemental brief. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Although neither Short nor his counsel challenges the 

adequacy of plea hearing on appeal, we have reviewed the 

transcript of the plea hearing for plain error. See United 

States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002) (providing 

standard). Our careful review of the record convinces us that 

the district court substantially complied with the mandates of 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Short’s guilty plea and that 

any omission on the court’s part did not affect Short’s 

substantial rights. Moreover, the district court ensured that 

Short’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and supported by a 

sufficient factual basis. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 

F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991). 
3

Short and his counsel question the procedural 

reasonableness of Short’s sentence. We review a sentence for 

reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This review requires 

appellate consideration of both the procedural and substantive 

reasonableness of a sentence. Id. This court must assess 

whether the district court properly calculated the advisory 

guidelines range, considered the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

(2006), analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and 

sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49-50; see

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010); United 

States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009). Finally, 

this court reviews the substantive reasonableness of the 

sentence, “examining the totality of the circumstances to see 

whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding 

that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in 

§ 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 

(4th Cir. 2010).

Counsel first asserts that Short’s prior North 

Carolina convictions should not count separately for purposes of 

designating Short as a career offender under U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (2006 & Supp. 2007). Because an

intervening arrest separated Short’s two state court convictions 

for felony possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine, 
4

the district court properly counted the convictions as separate 

offenses. See USSG § 4A1.2(a)(2). To the extent counsel also 

attempts to challenge the validity of Short’s January 31, 2001 

predicate offense, he may not do so in this appeal. See

Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 493-97 (1994).

Next, Short asserts in his pro se brief that the 

predicate offenses on which the district court relied to 

classify him as a career offender did not constitute felonies 

because he was sentenced to less than twelve months. Short’s 

claim is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Harp, 

406 F.3d 242, 246 (4th Cir. 2005).1

Counsel also suggests that the district court did not 

adequately state its reasons for imposing a 190-month sentence.

 Thus, Short is not entitled 

to relief on this claim.

2

 1 Short relies on an unpublished decision in United 

States v. Lemons, 280 F. App’x 258, 258-59 (4th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 129 S. Ct. 238 (2008), as support for his claim of 

procedural error. However, Short mischaracterizes the holding

in Lemons.

 

Because Short argued in the district court for a sentence below 

the career offender guidelines range, we conclude that he has 

preserved this claim for appellate review. See Lynn, 592 F.3d 

2 Based on the case cited in the issue statement in the 

formal brief, we liberally construe the claim as challenging the 

adequacy of the district court’s reasons for the selected 

sentence.
5

at 578, 581. We have reviewed the sentencing transcript and 

find no abuse of discretion. See id. at 576 (stating standard 

of review). Although the district court’s explanation was 

brief, the court specifically considered the facts of Short’s 

case in imposing a within-guidelines sentence. See Gall, 552 

U.S. at 51 (stating that district court “must make an 

individualized assessment based on the facts presented”); Lynn, 

592 F.3d at 576 (“[I]n explaining a sentencing decision, a court 

need not robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection, 

particularly when imposing a within-Guidelines sentence.”) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, the 

district court committed no procedural error in sentencing Short 

as a career offender.3

Finally, turning to counsel’s claim that the career 

offender guidelines range overstated Short’s criminal history, 

we lack the authority to review a sentencing court’s decision 

not to depart downward “unless the court failed to understand 

its authority to do so.” United States v. Brewer, 520 F.3d 367, 

371 (4th Cir. 2008). Based on our review of the sentencing 

hearing, we are convinced that the district court clearly 

recognized its authority to depart but determined that a 

 3 In light of our conclusion, we need not address counsel’s 

argument that, in the event Short was not a career offender, he 

should be placed in criminal history category II.
6

downward departure was not warranted on the facts of Short’s 

case. Thus, this claim is not reviewable on appeal. Id.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record for any meritorious issues and have found none. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This 

court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of 

the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If the client requests that a petition be 

filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be 

frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED