alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-2292

EILEEN CHU HING, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. GLENN F. HING, Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:08-cv-00210-BO)

Submitted: January 15, 2009 Decided: January 21, 2009

Before MOTZ and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Eileen Chu Hing, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.PER CURIAM: Plaintiff-appellant Eileen Chu Hing filed a complaint for divorce in Pennsylvania state court. Hing subsequently

removed the case to the Eastern District of North Carolina. Concluding that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking, the

district court dismissed and remanded the action back to the state court. Hing moved for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and the district court denied the motion. Hing filed a timely appeal. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (d) (2006), “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443 . . . shall be reviewable . . . .” The Supreme Court has limited § 1447(d) to insulate from appellate review those remand orders based on the grounds specified in § 1447(c): a defect in the removal procedure and a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 517 U.S. 706, 711-12 (1996). Because the district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under § 1441, its remand order is not subject to appellate review.

See Severonickel v. Gaston Reymenants , 115 F.3d 265, 266-69 (4th Cir. 1997); Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc. , 77 F.3d 1442, 1450

23 (4th Cir. 1996); Noel v. McCain , 538 F.2d 633, 635 (4th Cir. 1976). Moreover, having determined that subject matter jurisdiction over Hing’s case was lacking, the district court was without jurisdiction to consider Hing’s motion to

reconsider. See In re Lowe , 102 F.3d 731, 734-35 (4th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. We also deny Hing’s motion for a transcript at government expense. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
No. 379, Misc.

#### Jefferson *v.*Maryland.

Court of Appeals of Maryland. Certiorari denied.
From: djmenke@q.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 12:05:36 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

John Menke

Saint Paul, MN 55112
**EXHIBIT 31(a)**

I, Eric Montandon, chief executive officer of WWA Group, Inc. (“Registrant”) certify that: 

1.     I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB (“Report”) of Registrant; 

2.     Based on my knowledge, this Report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this Report; 

3.     Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this Report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as of, and for, the period presented in this Report; 

4.     I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and have: 

a)     Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under my supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this Report is being prepared; 

b)     Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this Report my conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this Report based on such evaluation; and 

c)     Disclosed in this Report any change in the Registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the Registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

5.     I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation, to the Registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of Registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

a)     All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

b)     Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the Registrant’s internal controls over financial reporting. 

Date: August 15, 2006 

/s/ Eric Montandon

Eric Montandon

Chief Executive Officer 

----
EXHIBIT 11

STATEMENT RE: COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS

Earnings per share ("EPS") is calculated on a Basic EPS and Diluted EPS basis.
Basic EPS is calculated by dividing income available to common shareholders
(the numerator) by the weighted-average number of common shares outstanding
(the denominator) during the period.  Income available to common shareholders
is Net Income in the table below and as reported in Bancorp's income statement
on page 27 of its Annual Report to Shareholders for 1997.  No adjustments were
required to net income for any EPS calculations.

Diluted EPS is calculated by adjusting the denominator for all dilutive
potential common shares that were outstanding during the period.  Bancorp had
stock options outstanding during the periods presented below which had a
dilutive effect on EPS. Therefore, the number of additional common shares that
would have been outstanding if the options had been exercised is added to the
denominator to arrive at the dilutive number of shares.

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

(Dollars in thousands)         For the Years Ended December 31,
                         -------------------------------------------

                            1997             1996           1995
                         ----------       ----------     ----------
<S>                         <C>           <C>            <C>

Net income                  $ 12,159      $   8,611      $  10,727
                            --------      ---------      ---------
                            --------      ---------      ---------
Basic EPS
  Shares                   5,982,934      5,954,684      5,939,690
  EPS                       $   2.03       $   1.45       $   1.81

Dilutive shares
  Stock options               51,349         44,806         49,007
  EPS                       $   0.02       $   0.01       $   0.02

Diluted EPS
  Shares including
  Options                  6,034,283      5,999,490      5,988,697
	EPS                    $   2.01       $   1.44       $   1.79
</TABLE>
50

55

60

65

70

75

1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000



 	




	
	

	



	

	

	




	
	

	




 		
 
	 	

		 	

	 	


 	 	  

	

	

			


	
 
	 	 

	


	 	
	!
	

	
	  	 			 	

	!
"
#	



!
	

				
	

!


	

 
  




 $ 
 
	 

 %

& 
	

 
 	 

 ' 
 $ #
	 	



	
		
 %'

	 $()	



	

	



			
)


*	

 		 




			


 	 
  	+



	
,-	
	.






				







	




		

	

)				

#
 	
 %	 $/ 

'
$

0.
1)


	



				2
	



					

	
)
		





	


		

			)


				#

	
		




   	 
 
 

 

 


	  	
  


 
 

 


 


 

 	


 
  





   

 
 

 





 	  !
 "

# !"$   
 	  

  
 %

 	 &&' 




 
   

 ( 



	 &&) 
 
 
 
 	

 	 

 * 	 !"

+
 
  *  


 &&' (* 	 +

   
 (
 
*

,+(

* 	
*(


 (  ( 
* 

  ( ( 

, 
* 

  
 
 



 	   	 

   	 &&'

	(
 "  


 #  
 	 -

$ ( .
 

  	 	
 .*

 (  
*  	

( #/(



 
    



( 
 
  (


      
 

 
 	(*
 $  

&&) )&  	 01 &1
1

 !" (     


 ( &2   &&' 
	

 + 
  ( 3

	 &&' 
 ( 
 +

(
 
 
(
 



  	  
 

 	&2
4,

(   
 *

  &&'*  


  

 

	 !" 




		

	
	#

'$	

"
			




		

	
		

 
 	 		

	
 
	 	 



	3 ' 
 $ #


		

	
			

				
' 	'%/2

				

	 



			
 $	 4'

)#			





		

	

	
 

	  	 /
	

3 ' 
 $ 


			#




	 	 

	 
  





	
%/	%$)

	4	
				

#
	

		





		

	
	





0.
1

)	 

 



		

			



Labor force participation rate for 16- to 19-year-olds, not seasonally

adjusted, July 1948-2000

Percent

NOTE: Data from 1994 forward are not strictly comparable with earlier data because of the redesign of

the Current Population Survey introduced in January 1994.

SOURCE: Current Population Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
	
	







 !"

	



	



 ! 	" #$%&

#'(!

)' ! * #&#+#,&&&+


 

	



 
 


	
 # 	

5	 

	   




*		

			

)5	
	 	 

	 


	  	  	



	
 	 	 '$

		



#
			


		
	

	 

 			 	


	
				)
		



	 
 
 	
 '$

5	'	(/4

$6	


		


				

	



!	
/4	/%!


 0
	   
	


 
1 
 
	 	

*	

 			

)  	

 	 


	


		




	



	


	

	

	

 		
	




	

			

	
	  	
 



	
	

"7 .899&:;
 			

				




 
 	  < 
	 	



	
			


   

 
	 	



	
	+



	5		




		



	

			
	

	  		 
 
	

	  
  	




		)	


 
 

	 







			

	




		


) 


 
 
  =


=
 
 		
 	 

3
 	 >
	 .
 6	 
	


Percent of 16- to 19-year-olds enrolled in school and labor force participation rate

by age, not seasonally adjusted, July 1994 to 2000

(Percent)

Percent enrolled in school Labor force participation rate1

Year 16 to 19 16 to 17 18 to 19 16 to 19 16 to 17 18 to 19

years years years years years years

1994 ................ 19.5 21.4 17.5 65.4 57.0 74.0

1995 ................ 21.9 24.4 19.4 66.6 57.3 76.3

1996 ................ 22.0 24.8 19.0 64.8 55.9 74.3

1997 ................ 23.9 25.7 22.1 63.6 53.3 74.3

1998 ................ 24.8 27.8 21.8 63.9 53.3 74.8

1999 ................ 26.8 31.3 22.3 62.9 53.4 72.4

2000 ................ 27.0 31.3 22.7 62.3 51.2 73.3

1Percent of the population that is in the labor force.

SOURCE: Current Population Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

	
	 	
	 	 



	 	
 5 	 ?
	



 8
	
 .
3
 	

>
	 .
@
	 +, $$$

)	A0$$1  (/4?


A

	

"	
		

 




	 	




	BC		A0$$1

 %$26
:
.A44//

4(()
#### LAMB *v.*CALIFORNIA.

No. 578.

Decided January 7, 1963.

*David Daar*for appellant.

Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.
United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-3007

___________ Marquez A. Miller, for all others * similarly situated, * * Plaintiff - Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Arkansas. Larry G. Dunklin, Attorney at Law; * Carolyn Staley, Circuit County Clerk; * Sue Newbery, Criminal Justice * Coordinator; Morris W. Thompson, * [UNPUBLISHED] Circuit Judge, * * Defendants - Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: January 6, 1998 Filed: January 27, 1998

___________ Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.The Honorable William R. Wilson, Jr., United States District Judge for th e 1 East ernDistrict of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of th e Honorable Jerry W. Cavaneau, United State s Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. -2- Marquez A. Miller appeals the district court & s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 1 action and the denial of his motion for relief from judgment. After a careful review of the record and the parties & submissions on appeal, we conclude the judgment of th e district court was correct. We deny Larry G. Dunklin & s motion to dismiss the appeal. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. See8th Cir. R. 47B. A true copy. Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### In re BLUM.

(District Court, E. D. New York.

January 19, 1912.)

Bankruptcy (§ 482*) — Attorneys—Fees—Lien.

Attorneys for the bankrupt, having recovered two judgments for Mm, scheduled the same, but did not schedule any debt paid themselves for services, nor did they file any claim for allowance or to prove a debt during the year after adjudication. A discharge having been granted and the estate closed, the attorneys collected $194.75 from the judgment debtor, and, after deducting their bill for legal services prior to bankruptcy from the amount collected, they notified the trustee, who opened the estate and then employed the same attorneys to complete the collection, for which they charged 25 per cent. *Hold,*that the attorneys had preserved no legal or equitable lien on the judgments for their services before bankruptcy, and, such debt having been discharged, they were only entitled to fees for making the collection.

[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 874r-876; Dec. Dig. § 4S2.*]

In the matter of bankruptcy proceedings of Nathan B. Blum. Proceedings to determine the amount of attorney’s fees allowable for the collection of certain judgments in favor of the bankrupt.

Whitmel H. Smith, for trustee.

Blandy, Mooney & Shipman, pro se.

*

For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. *’&*Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Bep'r Indexes

CHATFIEDD, District Judge.

This bankrupt filed a voluntary petition on December 1, 1906. Blandy, Mooney & Shipman were his attorneys and prepared the schedules in which are set forth two judgments recovered by the bankrupt through the services of these attorneys. The schedules show no debt whatever to the attorneys, and they prosecuted no claim for allowance or to prove debt during the year after adjudication. On May 17, 1907, a discharge was granted, and on January 3, 1908, the estate was closed.

Thereafter Blandy, Mooney & Shipman, as attorneys, began garnishee proceedings in the name of the bankrupt against his judgment debtor, and have collected $194.75 therefrom. After deducting their bill for legal services prior to bankruptcy from the amount collected, they notified the trustee, who reopened the estate. The trustee then apparently ón his own authority employed Blandy, Mooney & Ship-man to complete the collection. For this collection they have charged 25 per cent, (a proper compensation). But during bankruptcy they had no security or property in their possession and nothing on which even a legal or an equitable lien had been preserved. The bankrupt has obtained a discharge from all his debts including theirs, and, if property be afterward recovered, then the creditors whose claims had been proved could alone profit therefrom, and the attorneys collecting or securing the property are entitled to their fees for the collection, and no more.

Motion granted.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                            4864
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                       5551
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                             197
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                               196
<LOANS>                                          62926
<ALLOWANCE>                                        680
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   76889
<DEPOSITS>                                       63461
<SHORT-TERM>                                      2000
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                                605
<LONG-TERM>                                       3000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             4
<OTHER-SE>                                        7819
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                   76889
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                   2681
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                  184
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                    43
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                  2908
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                                1305
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                1461
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                             1447
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                       90
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                   1254
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    643
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                         643
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       393
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.98
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.98
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    8.74
<LOANS-NON>                                         81
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                   649
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                       69
<RECOVERIES>                                        10
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                  680
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                                 0
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                            680


</TABLE>
INCEPTION
MINING INC.


5320
South 900 East, Suite 260


Murray,
Utah 84117


 


January
1, 2016


 


David
A. Wavrek


Petroleum
Systems International., Inc.


461
E. 200 So STE 103


Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111


 


Attention:
Dave Wavrek


 


	 	Re:
    	Promissory
    Note (the “Note”) dated June 7, 2014 in the amount of $100,000 (the “Principal”) by Inception Mining,
    Inc. (“Maker”) in favor of Petroleum Systems International, Inc. (“Holder”) 


 


Dear
Mr. Wavrek:


 


Reference
is hereby made to the Note as executed by Inception. The Note is hereby amended (the “Amendment”) as follows:


 


It
is hereby acknowledged by Inception and Holder that as of June 7, 2014, the remaining Principal is $100,000 (the “Remaining
Amount”). It is also hereby acknowledged by Inception and Holder that at any time prior to or at the time of repayment of
the Note, the Holder may elect to convert some or all of the Remaining Amount into shares of common stock of Inception at a price
of $0.45 per share by completion of a conversion notice and delivery of such notice to Inception.


 


As
set forth in the Note, the maturity date is December 31, 2014 (the “Maturity Date”) The maturity date was extended
(‘Extension #1”) 12 months with a new maturity date of December 31, 2015. By executing this letter, (“Extension
# 2”) the undersigned parties agree to extend the note an additional 12 months with a new maturity date of December 31,
2016 at which time any principal and accrued interest owing on the Note shall be due and payable. 


 


All
other provisions in the original Note remain unchanged. We kindly request that you execute this letter below indicating that you
agree with the above Amendment.


 


	 	Sincerely,
	 	 
	 	Inception
    Mining Inc.
	 	 
	 	By:
    	/s/
    Michael Ahlin
	 	Name:	Michael
    Ahlin
	 	Title:	CEO
    


 


AGREED
AND ACKNOWLEDGED:


 


David
A. Wavrek


 


	By:	/s/
    David A. Wavrek	 
	Name:	David
    A. Wavrek	 
	Title:	Holder
EXHIBIT 32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE


SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Annual Report of AE Biofuels, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form
10-K for the year ending December 31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “ Report “), I, Todd Waltz, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





By: /s/ Todd
Waltz


Todd
Waltz


Chief
Financial Officer





Date:
March 15, 2010
No. 182.

#### Kerr's Catering Service *v.*Department of Industrial Relations of California et al.

*Robert E. Hannon*for

petitioner. *Stanley Mosk,*Attorney General of California, and *B. Franklin Walker,*Deputy Attorney General, for respondents.

Supreme Court of California. Certiorari denied.
Order filed, November 14, 2013.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-13-00922-CR

____________

KAREN WOODING BRYANT, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Co Crim Ct at Law No 8

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1872448

ORDER

The reporter’s record in this case was due November 11, 2013. See Tex. R. 

App. P. 35.1. The court has not received a request to extend time for filing the 

record. The record has not been filed with the court. Because the reporter’s record 

has not been filed timely, we issue the following order.

We order Sondra Humphrey, the substitute court reporter, to file the record 

in this appeal within 30 days of the date of this order. 

PER CURIAM