Filed 11/10/14 Samara v. Estate of Nahigian CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b) . This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

RANA SAMARA,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

ESTATE OF STEPHEN NAHIGIAN

, D.D.S

, Defendant and Respondent. B248553

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. EC056720)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,

William D. Stewart Judge. Affirmed.
Curd, Galindo & Smi th and Alexis Galindo

, for Rana Samara, Plaintiff and Appellant. Taylor Blessey, N. Denise Taylor and Erica A. Levitt

, for Estate of Stephen Nahigian, D.D.S., Defendant and Respondent.

_______________2

Rana Samara appeals from the judgment entered in thi s professional negligence case after the court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Stephen Nahigian on two grounds : T he action was barred by the statute of limitations

, and Samara had failed to

raise a triable issue of material fact as to causation. Because Samara concedes summary judgment was proper on statute of limitations grounds , we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Complaint On September 6, 2011 Samar a filed a lawsuit against Dr. Nahigian and

Dr. Haitham Mat a r for professional negligence/medical malpractice. The first amended complaint alleged that on August 16, 2010 Dr. Nahigian negligently inserted a dental implant while performing oral surgery on Samara

. As a result of Dr. Nahigian’s negligence, Samara suffered permanent n erve damage. Samara alleged Dr. Nahigian was Dr. Matar’s agent/employee when he performed the surgery.

2. Dr. Nahigian’s Motion for Summary Judgment Dr. Nahigian moved for summary judgment on three grounds: (1) Samar a could

not demonstrate his condu ct fell below the applicable standard of care or (2) caused her nerve damage

, and (3) Samar a ’s action against him was time

- barred. Dr. Nahigian submitted the declaration of Dr. Bach Le, an oral surgeon , who opined “ to a reasonable deg ree of medical probab ility

, that no negligent act or omission on the part of

Dr. Nahigian caused or contributed to” Samar a ’s injuries.

Samar a opposed the motion, submitting with her opposition papers the declaration of Dr. Gregory Doumanian, who opined on the issues of negl igence and causation. The trial court granted Dr. Nahigian’s motion for summary judgment

, ruling

Samar a ’s action against Dr. Nahigian needed to be filed no later than August 18, 2011

and was time

- barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5

. Alte rnatively,

Dr. Nahigian had met his burden on summary judgment to show Samara could not3

establish the essential element of causation, and Dr. Doumanian’s declaration failed to

raise a triable issue of material fact on that issue. 1
The court entered judg ment in favor of Dr. Nahigian on February 6, 2013. Samara filed a timely appeal from the judgment

.
DISCUSSION Samara does not challenge the trial court’s ruling her action against Dr. Nahigian

is time

- barred, expressly limiting her appeal to its alterna te ruling on the issue of causation. Her appellate brief argues her expert’s declaration adequately raised a triable issue of material fact on the issue of causation and urges us to reverse the trial court’s decision on that point to preclude any use of i ts finding by Dr. Matar under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Because Samara concedes judgment w as properly entered against
her, we affirm. ( Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 575

- 576 [judgments are presumed to be correct

, and appellant bears bu rden of affirmatively proving prejudicial
error]; Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58 [same] .)

W e need not, and do not, reach the court’s alternative ground for granting summary judgment. (See People ex re l . Gallo v. Acun a (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1119, fn. 4 [appell ate court reviews propriety of trial court’s judgment rather than its stated reasons
for its decision]; Citizens Business Bank v. Gevorgian (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 602, 628 [“[i]n light of our conclusion that AMG was entitled to judgment under the Gluskin theory, we need not and do not [address]

. . . [the] alternative ground for the judgment
discussed by the trial court in its statement of decision”] .) 2

1 Dr. Matar also moved for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, but not on causation. The court denied Dr. Mat ar’s motion, concluding, as to that issue, Samara’s notice to Dr. Matar, unlike her separate notice to Dr. Nahigian, extended the limitations period by 90 days and rendered her lawsuit against Dr. Matar timely. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 364, subd. (d) [auth orizing extension of limitations period in certain circumstances following notice of intent to sue health care provider].)

2 Because the question is not before us, we also do not address whether collateral estoppel may be used with regard to an alternativ e ground for judgment not re viewed by the appellate court. (See generally Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76,4 DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The E state of Stephe n Nahigian , D.D.S., 3 is to recover its costs on appeal.

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

ZELON, J.

SEGAL, J

. *

86

- 88; Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. v. Founding Members of Newport Beach Country Club (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1132.)

3 Dr. Nahigian died while this action was pending. His estate defended the appeal.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.