IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mirsada Begovic, :

Petitioner :

: No. 682 C.D. 2019

v. :

: Submitted: December 20, 2019

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION BY

JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: June 23, 2020

Mirsada Begovic (Claimant), representing herself, petitions for review of 

an adjudication of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board),

reversing the referee’s determination of Claimant’s financial eligibility for 

unemployment compensation (UC) benefits under section 404 of the Unemployment 

Compensation Law (Law).1 The Board concluded that wages Claimant earned as a 

canvasser for OpenPittsburgh.org (Open Pittsburgh), and as an interpreter for Steel City 

Interpreters, Ltd. (Steel City Interpreters), did not count towards her financial eligibility

 

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §804. 

Section 404 of the Law provides that in order to financially qualify for UC benefits, an employee 

must have sufficient high quarter and total qualifying base year wages in covered employment, as set 

forth in a table titled “Rate and Amount of Benefits.” 
2

under section 404 of the Law, 43 P.S. §804, because they were not earned in 

employment.2 After review, we reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

Claimant filed an application for UC benefits with an effective date of 

February 25, 2018, which established a base year consisting of the 4th Quarter of 2016 

and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Quarters of 2017.3 (Certified Record (C.R.) at Item No. 1.) 

Claimant reported earnings from multiple establishments during the base year,

including Conservation Consultants, Inc. (CCI); Optimal Phone Interpreters/Stratus 

Audio, Inc. (Optimal); Your Own Home d/b/a Comfort Keepers (Comfort Keepers); 

Steel City Interpreters; and Open Pittsburgh. The local service center found Claimant 

ineligible for benefits pursuant to section 404 of the Law, 43 P.S. §804, because she 

did not meet the minimum amount of wages in a base-year period necessary to qualify 

for benefits. In determining her financial eligibility, the local service center excluded 

wages she earned from CCI, Optimal, Comfort Keepers, Open Pittsburgh and Steel 

City Interpreters on the ground that Claimant’s services did not constitute covered 

employment. The local service center concluded that Claimant’s highest quarter was 

the 4th Quarter of 2016, when she was paid wages in the amount of $3,307, and her 

total qualifying base-year wages were $5,232. Id. According to the table set forth in 

 

2 Section 4(x) of the Law defines “wages” to generally mean all remuneration “paid by an 

employer” to an individual with respect to her employment. 43 P.S. §753(x).

3 The local service center made no determination as to the circumstances surrounding 

Claimant’s separation from employment, and this was not an issue developed before the referee. 

Rather, the only issue before the referee and the Board was Claimant’s financial eligibility for UC 

benefits. This analysis was limited to determining whether the services that Claimant provided for 

various putative employers constituted “employment” pursuant to section 4(l)(2)(B) of the Law, 43 

P.S. §753(l)(2)(B).
3

section 404(e)(1) of the Law, 43 P.S. §804(e)(1), a claimant with “high quarterly 

wages” of $3,307 is financially eligible for benefits at a rate of $131 per week provided 

she had base-year wages of at least $5,258. Claimant’s total base-year earnings, after 

the earnings from CCI, Optimal, Comfort Keepers, Open Pittsburgh and Steel City 

Interpreters were deducted, were only $5,232. Therefore, Claimant did not meet the 

test of financial eligibility under section 404 of the Law, 43 P.S. §804.

Claimant appealed to the referee. (C.R. at Item No. 11.) At issue was

whether Claimant’s wages earned while performing services for Steel City Interpreters 

and Open Pittsburgh and the three other putative employers4should be included in 

calculating her base-year wages and determining her financial eligibility. Id.

The referee held an evidentiary hearing on August 1, 2018, at which 

Claimant, her counsel, and a witness from Open Pittsburgh appeared. David Tessitor, 

the Chairman of Open Pittsburgh testified that the organization is a political action 

committee. (Notes of Testimony (N.T.) 8/1/18 at 69, C.R. at Item No. 15.) He denied 

that Claimant was an employee. He explained that the arrangement in the industry has 

always been on the basis of “subcontracting.” (N.T. at 66-67.) He explained that the 

canvassers can work whenever they desire. (N.T. at 66.) He testified that in 2016, 

Claimant was hired for three days to collect signatures for an Open Government 

amendment to the Pittsburgh City Charter and for which she was paid $2 per signature. 

Id. Mr. Tessitor testified that he brought in several dozen professional canvassers from 

out of state to help the local canvassers, including Claimant, to collect 8,000 signatures 

in three days. (N.T. at 67.) Mr. Tessitor testified that Open Pittsburgh terminated the 

project early when it found out that it was not going to be able to acquire the necessary 

signatures that were needed. (N.T. at 68.) Mr. Tessitor testified that in 2017, Claimant 

 

4 The Board ultimately concluded that Claimant’s wages from these employers were covered 

wages for purposes of calculating Claimant’s financial eligibility. 
4

was hired again as a canvasser to obtain signatures on two petitions for which she was 

paid $3 per signature. Id. He testified that Claimant was permitted to hire

subcontractors, such as children or friends, to help her collect signatures, and pay them 

from the wages she received from Open Pittsburgh. (N.T. at 69.) 

Claimant testified that when she was first hired by Open Pittsburgh, she 

had no experience as a canvasser or collector of signatures. (N.T. at 40.) She testified 

that she “started with Open Pittsburgh” and before Open Pittsburgh, she “did not have 

experience as either canvasser or petitioner, collector of signatures” and that she “was 

not trained in anything professionally.” Id. She testified that she was hired by Open 

Pittsburgh after she called Mr. Tessitor and told him that she could canvass for Open 

Pittsburgh because she “politically [] agree[d] with the agenda and would like to help.” 

(N.T. at 38.) She agreed that she was able to determine when and where in the City of 

Pittsburgh she would canvass. (N.T. at 47-48.) Claimant testified that she was able 

to work with other canvassers or on her own and did not have any particular territory 

in which to canvass or other restrictions concerning where she could canvass for 

signatures. (N.T. at 47, 71.) When asked what training she received, Claimant 

testified:

It was like basically going through the agenda and how to 

approach the people, what is the best energy, or how you said 

hi, introduce myself, this is for open government and so, and 

very quickly introduce what is the topic and then ask for 

signature. And then I tested the (inaudible) and then let’s go 

and try to find somebody. So listening [a] couple [of] times 

and you are not new, you can go on your own. So that was 

basically training.

(N.T. at 51.)
5

Claimant was given documentation with canvassing tips and talking

points, flyers with information on the ballot initiative to hand out to people, and an 

electronic tablet in order to verify signatures. (N.T. at 40, 70.) Claimant was issued 

an IRS Tax Form 1099 for the work she performed for Open Pittsburgh and Open 

Pittsburgh did not withhold taxes from Claimant’s pay check. (N.T. at 39, 52.) 

No witness appeared on behalf of Steel City Interpreters. Claimant 

testified thatshe is fluent in Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian. (N.T. at 52.) She explained 

that Steel City Interpreters provides in-person interpreter services for healthcare 

organizations such as the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, and Allegheny 

Health Network. Id. She explained whenever Steel City Interpreters had an assignment 

that required her particular language expertise, a scheduler would call her and ask her 

if she was available. Id. She admitted that she was free to refuse an assignment and 

was not required to answer Steel City Interpreters’ call. Id. However, she testified that 

she never turned one down because the assignments were “so rare.” Id. She only 

received three assignments from Steel City Interpreters during the relevant time period. 

Id. at 53. She was paid $40 an hour, with a minimum of two hours of pay guaranteed; 

that was not negotiable. Id. at 52. She received no training with respect to the language 

aspect, but did receive training on how to introduce herself and close the call. Id. 

Claimant testified that she did not advertise her services on the internet or elsewhere 

and she did not have any business cards or a business in interpretation. Id. at 63. She 

explained that she found this job and applied because the company was in the business 

of providing interpreters. Id.

Following the hearing, the referee determined that “[w]hile [Claimant]

frequently obtained work as an independent contractor for various entities, there is no 

evidence of record to demonstrate intent on the part of [Claimant] to be a self-employed 
6

business person.” (Referee decision at 5.) The referee concluded that 

Open Pittsburgh and Steel City Interpreters failed to demonstrate that Claimant was 

“customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or 

business.” Id. The referee concluded that, therefore, the remuneration Claimant 

received from these entities was performed in covered employment and should count 

towards her financial eligibility. Id. Pursuant to Section 404(e) of the Law, 43 P.S. 

§804(e), the referee found Claimant eligible for a weekly benefit rate of $292. Open 

Pittsburgh and Steel City Interpreters appealed to the Board. On April 2, 2019, the 

Board issued its decision and order. 

Steel City Interpreters

With respect to Steel City Interpreters, the Board made the following 

findings of fact:

14. During the 1st and 2nd Quarters of 2017, [Claimant]

provided face-to-face interpretation services for [Steel City

Interpreters] and was paid $40.00 per hour with a minimum 

of two hours per assignment and could potentially obtain 

some travel reimbursement for assignments requiring a one 

hour commute from the zip code 15233.

15. [Claimant] provided interpretation services to healthcare 

organizations when performing services through Steel City

[Interpreters].

16. [Claimant] could accept or reject interpretation 

assignments offered through Steel City [Interpreters].

17. [Claimant] was issued a Form 1099 for her work for Steel 

City [Interpreters] and Steel City [Interpreters] did not 

withhold taxes from [Claimant’s] pay.

(Board decision at 2; Findings of Fact (F.F.) Nos. 14-17.)
7

Based on these findings, the Board determined that:

[Claimant] was paid $40.00 an hour, with a minimum of two 

hours of pay guaranteed. This weighs towards [Claimant]

being an employee. However, other than that factor, the rest 

of the factors weigh in favor of [Claimant] being free from 

direction and control. [Claimant] had the right to refuse 

assignments, was issued a Form 1099 for her services and no 

taxes were withheld from her paychecks, was not provided 

on-the-job training, was not given tools or equipment to 

perform her services, was not subject to monitoring by Steel 

City [Interpreters], and Steel City [Interpreters] did not 

review [Claimant’s] performance. Thus, the Board concludes 

that [Claimant] was free from direction and control and the 

first prong is met.

[Claimant] was hired on a job-to-job basis and could refuse 

any assignment. This weighs toward her being an 

independent contractor. She was able to work for more than 

one entity, which weighs toward independent contractor 

status. Because she could work for more than one entity for 

work, she did not depend on the existence of Steel City 

[Interpreters] for ongoing work. These factors all weigh 

towards [Claimant] being customarily engaged in an 

independently established trade, occupation, profession, or 

business. Therefore, the Board concludes that both prongs 

have been met and the services [Claimant] performed 

through Steel City [Interpreters] were done as selfemployment. 

(Board decision at 6.)

The Board concluded that “both prongs [were] met and the services 

[Claimant] performed through Steel City [Interpreters] were done as self-employment. 

Thus, the earnings she received from her work with Steel City [Interpreters] will not 

be counted towards her financial eligibility.” Id.
8

Open Pittsburgh

With respect to Open Pittsburgh, the Board made the following findings 

of fact: 

18. During her base year, [Claimant] also provided services 

to Open Pittsburgh as a canvasser collecting signatures for 

ballot initiatives and was paid $3.00 per verified signature.

19. [Claimant] was able to work with other canvassers or on 

her own and did not have a set territory to canvass or other 

restrictions on where she could canvass for signatures.

20. [Claimant] was given a document with canvassing tips 

and talking points on it, flyers with information on the ballot 

initiative to hand out to people, and was also given an 

electronic tablet by Open Pittsburgh in order to verify 

signatures.

21. [Claimant] was issued a Form 1099 for the work she 

performed with Open Pittsburgh and Open Pittsburgh did not 

withhold taxes from [Claimant’s] pay.

(Board decision at 2-3; F.F. Nos. 18-21.)

Based on these findings, the Board determined that: 

Claimant was free to canvass for signatures anywhere she 

chose, either by herself or with others, and Open Pittsburgh 

only cared about the end result, i.e., [Claimant] getting as 

many signatures as possible. If [Claimant] did not feel like 

working on a particular day, she did not have to and the only 

repercussion was not getting paid for the signatures she could 

have collected that day. Thus, the Board concludes that 

[Claimant] was free from the direction and control of Open 

Pittsburgh.

. . . [Claimant] could work for others while providing 

services for Open Pittsburgh, therefore, she was not 

dependent on the existence of Open Pittsburgh for ongoing 
9

work. This factor weighs in favor of [Claimant] being an 

independent contractor. [Claimant] was hired each time for 

one project with one goal – collect as many signatures as she 

could before the ballot initiative. She had the right to not 

work on any particular day with the only repercussion being 

she would not get as much money as she would have had she 

canvasses (sic) for signatures. This too weighs in favor of 

her being an independent contractor. As to her right to refuse 

assignments, again, [Claimant] was hired for one project so 

this factor is neutral. Therefore, the Board concludes that 

[Claimant] was customarily engaged in an independently 

established trade, occupation, profession or business. 

(Board decision at 5.)

The Board concluded that: “[b]ecause both prongs [were] met[, Claimant]

was an independent contractor when working through Open Pittsburgh and her 

earnings from Open Pittsburgh will not count towards her financial eligibility.” Id. 

The Board vacated the referee’s determination and directed the local service center to 

disqualify wages earned from Steel City Interpreters and Open Pittsburgh for purposes 

of calculating Claimant’s financial eligibility.5 

 

5 On June 12, 2019, this Court ordered the parties to address the appealability of the Board’s 

order under the Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 311(f) which provides: “[a]n appeal may 

be taken as of right from (1) an order of a . . . government unit remanding a matter to an administrative 

agency or hearing officer for execution of the adjudication of the reviewing tribunal in a manner that 

does not require the exercise of administrative discretion. . . .” Pa.R.A.P. 311(f). “[I]f a local agency 

must engage in fact-finding to determine an award calculation, administrative discretion is involved, 

the order is not final and, thus, the appellate court must quash the appeal. P.R. Hoffman Materials v. 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Zeigler), 694 A.2d 358 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). However, an 

order is appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 311(f) if it merely calls for a calculation based upon record 

evidence. Williams v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Center City Construction Co.), 781 

A.2d 251, 252 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). 

 Claimant’s appeal from the Board’s order is appealable pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(f). The 

Board concluded that Claimant’s earnings from CCI and Optimal should be included in calculating 

Claimant’s financial eligibility and that wages earned from Open Pittsburgh and Steel City 

Interpreters should not be included. The Board remanded the matter to the local service center to 

issue a new financial decision consistent with the Board’s decision. Such action on the part of the 
10

Claimant petitions this Court for review of the Board’s order.6

Discussion

Under section 401(a) of the Law, 43 P.S. §801(a), a claimant is financially 

eligible for UC benefits if she has been paid wages for employment as required by 

Section 404(c) of the Law, 43 P.S. §804(c), and has earned at least 37% of her baseyear wages in one or more quarters other than the highest quarter in her base year.7 43

 

local service center does not require the exercise of discretion. The record already contains wage 

information for these entities. The local service center merely needs to recalculate Claimant’s 

financial eligibility and issue a new notice of financial determination. Because the local service center 

will merely be performing a calculation, and exercising no discretion, the Board’s order is appealable 

under Pa.R.A.P. 311(f).

6 Our review of the Board’s order “is limited to determining whether the necessary findings 

of fact were supported by substantial evidence, whether errors of law were committed, or whether 

constitutional rights were violated.” Johns v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 87 

A.3d 1006, 1009 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). In unemployment compensation proceedings, the Board’s 

findings of fact are conclusive on appeal as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Grieb 

v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 827 A.2d 422 (Pa. 2003). In making a substantial 

evidence determination, this Court must view the record in a light most favorable to the party that 

prevailed before the Board by allowing that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be 

drawn from the evidence. Tapco, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 650 A.2d 

1106 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).

7 To be financially eligible for benefits during a benefit year, a claimant must have sufficient 

wages in covered employment during the “base year” (the first four of the last five completed calendar 

quarters immediately preceding the first day of an individual’s benefit year). See section 4(a), (b) of 

the Law, 43 P.S. §753(a), (b). Financial eligibility is determined pursuant to a table set forth in section 

404(e)(1) of the Law, 43 P.S. §804(e)(1). Department of Labor & Industry, Office of Employment 

Security v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 530 A.2d 129 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). Using 

the table set forth in section 404(e)(1), a claimant must first determine her highest quarterly wage 

earned during her base year. The highest quarterly wage determines the corresponding weekly benefit 

rate and total amount of compensation. Id. To be eligible for benefits, however, a claimant must 

have earned base-year wages equal to or in excess of the amount of qualifying wages that corresponds 

to the weekly benefit rate set forth in the table. See Dorn v. Unemployment Compensation Board of 

Review, 866 A.2d 497, 501 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). The table is designed to require that a claimant earn 

a certain percentage of wages outside the highest quarter, therefore, indicating a “genuine attachment 

to the labor force.” Department of Labor & Industry, Office of Employment Security, 530 A.2d at 130.
11

P.S. §801(a) (emphasis added). “Wages” are “all remuneration . . . paid by an employer

to an individual with respect to [her] employment.” 43 P.S. §753(x) (emphasis added).

“Employment” is “all personal service performed for remuneration by an individual 

under any contract of hire.” 43 P.S. §753(l)(1). 

There are various exceptions to “employment.” Income generated from 

self-employment as an independent contractor is not “wages” for purposes of 

determining an individual’s eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits. See

Bruno v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 523 A.2d 843 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1987). The independent contractor/self-employment exemption is set forth in section 

4(l)(2)(B) of the Law, and provides, in pertinent part:

Services performed by an individual for wages shall be 

deemed to be employment subject to this act, unless and until 

it is shown to the satisfaction of the [local service center] 

that—(a) such individual has been and will continue to be 

free from control or direction over the performance of such 

services both under his contract of service and in fact; and 

(b) as to such services such individual is customarily engaged 

in an independently established trade, occupation, profession 

or business.

43 P.S. §753(l)(2)(B).

This provision presumes that an individual is an employee, as opposed to 

an independent contractor, but this presumption may be overcome if the putative 

employer sustains its burden of showing that the claimant was free from control and 

direction in the performance of her service and that, as to such service, was customarily 

engaged in an independent trade or business. Beacon Flag Car Co. (Doris Weyant) v. 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 910 A.2d 103, 107 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2006). Unless both of these showings are made, the presumption stands that one who 

performs services for wages is an employee. York Newspaper Company v. 
12

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 635 A.2d 251 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993),

appeal denied, 647 A.2d 906 (Pa. 1994); Electrolux Corporation v. Department of 

Labor & Industry, Bureau of Employment Tax Operations, 705 A.2d 1357, 1360 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1998).

A. Open Pittsburgh: First Prong of the Independent Contractor/SelfEmployment Test

The first prong—the issue of control—is based upon a showing of control, 

not only with regard to the work to be done, but also with regard to the manner of 

performing it. Villager Realty of Bloomsburg v. Unemployment Compensation Board 

of Review, 211 A.3d 900, 908 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (citing Osborne Associates, Inc. v. 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 3 A.3d 722, 728 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010))

(internal quotation marks omitted). Factors typically considered by reviewing courts 

with respect to the first prong of the analysis, i.e., whether the claimant was free from 

direction and control, include:

whether there was a fixed rate of remuneration; whether 

taxes were deducted from the claimant’s pay; whether the 

presumed employer supplied equipment and/or training; 

whether the presumed employer set the time and location for 

the work; whether the presumed employer had the right to 

monitor the claimant’s work and review his performance; 

and the requirements and demands of the presumed 

employer.

Resource Staffing, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 961 A.2d 

261, 264 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). Additionally, the level of direct, day-to-day supervision 

may also be considered in determining whether a claimant is an independent contractor

or self-employed. See, e.g., Venango Newspapers v. Unemployment Compensation 

Board of Review, 631 A.2d 1384, 1388 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (considering direct daily 
13

supervision as a factor in whether the claimant was an independent contractor). “No 

one factor will control the outcome, but the courts will look to the entire relationship 

to determine whether the requisite control exists to establish an employer-employee 

relationship.” Tracy v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 23 A.3d 612, 

616 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).

Here, the record and findings clearly support the Board’s conclusion that 

Open Pittsburgh does not control Claimant’s day-to-day actions in the performance of 

her work collecting signatures. For example, Claimant was not required to work 

specific hours or days and was free to determine her own schedule, what days she 

would work, and where she would canvass within the City. Open Pittsburgh paid

Claimant on a per-signature basis, rather than an hourly wage. Claimant was free to 

hire others, including her friends and children, to assist her in collecting signatures. 

Viewing all the factors as a whole, we conclude that these factors weigh in favor of 

finding an absence of control.

B. Open Pittsburgh: Second Prong of the Independent Contractor/SelfEmployment Test

Claimant contends that the Board erred in finding that she was customarily 

engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business of 

canvassing. We must agree. 

Our Supreme Court recognized that “a worker can be considered an 

independent contractor only if he or she is in business for himself or herself.” 

Danielle Viktor, Ltd. v. Department of Labor & Industry, Bureau of Employer Tax 

Operations, 892 A.2d 781, 798 (Pa. 2006) (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court in 

Danielle Viktor, Ltd. established a three-part test for determining whether a putative 

employee is engaged in “an independently established trade, occupation, profession or 
14

business” under this second prong. Specifically, under Danielle Viktor, Ltd., we look 

at the following factors: (1) whether the individuals are able to work for more than one 

entity; (2) whether the individuals depended on the existence of the presumed employer 

for ongoing work; and (3) whether the individuals were hired on a job-to-job basis and 

could refuse any assignment. 892 A.2d at 801-02. Moreover, as part of the second 

prong, we must analyze whether “the claimant [was] customarily engaged in such 

trade or business in order to be considered self-employed.” Minelli v. Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review, 39 A.3d 593, 598 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (en banc) 

(emphasis in original).

Recently, in A Special Touch v. Department of Labor and Industry, __

A.3d __ (Pa., No. 30 MAP 2019, filed April 22, 2020, slip op. at *22-23), 2020 WL 

1932622 at *10, our Supreme Court clarified that the meaning of the phrase 

“customarily engaged” requires an individual to be “usually,” “habitually,” or 

“regularly” “employed” or “involved” in activity; or “employed” or “involved” in 

activity “according to the customs,” “general practice,” or “usual order of things.” The 

Supreme Court has instructed a putative employer must show that an individual is 

actually involved in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business in order 

to establish that the individual is self-employed under the second prong of subsection 

(4)(l)(2)(B). Id. The Supreme Court further explained that: “circumstances 

demonstrating that an individual is actively holding himself out to perform services for 

another, such as through the use of business cards or other forms of advertising, even 

if not actually performing those services during a particular time period at issue” are 

relevant to the analysis. Id.

Here, the evidence establishes only that Claimant’s work for Open 

Pittsburgh was on the side to make extra money and not that of an individual 
15

customarily engaged in a trade, occupation, profession or business. There is no 

evidence that Claimant had established a private enterprise or independent business 

through which she provided services to Open Pittsburgh. The record lacks any 

evidence that Claimant advertised a canvassing “business” to Open Pittsburgh or to the 

public, or that she “solicited” business for herself. She did not offer her “canvassing 

services” to anyone but Open Pittsburgh. She worked on two projects for a very limited 

time. Significantly, the undisputed evidence demonstrated that prior to working for 

Open Pittsburgh, Claimant did not know how to canvass. She testified that she “started 

with Open Pittsburgh” and before Open Pittsburgh, she “did not have experience” as 

either canvasser or collector of signatures and that she “was not trained in anything 

professionally.” (N.T. at 40.) 

In Minelli, the claimant performed consulting services for DK Harris on 

an “as needed” basis but contended that her activities were insufficient to demonstrate 

that she was customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation or 

business. This Court agreed, concluding that the occasional offer of a limited amount 

of work over such a short period of time was simply not enough to demonstrate that 

the claimant was customarily engaged in an independently established trade, 

occupation, profession or business. Minelli, 39 A.3d at 598.

Similar to Minelli, Claimant’s brief stint as a canvasser for Open 

Pittsburgh is not sufficient to establish that Claimant was customarily engaged in an 

independently established trade or business. Thus, we must reverse the Board’s 

holding that the wages Claimant earned from Open Pittsburgh should not be included 

in calculating Claimant’s financial eligibility for UC benefits.
16

C. Steel City Interpreters: First Prong of the Independent Contractor/SelfEmployment Test

Next, Claimant contends that the Board erred in concluding that she was 

not an employee of Steel City Interpreters. The Board found that Claimant was paid 

$40 per hour with a minimum of two hours of pay guaranteed, and that this factor 

weighed in favor of Claimant being an employee. The Board found, however, that the 

rest of the factors weigh in favor of Claimant being free from the direction and control 

of Steel City Interpreters. Specifically, the Board considered that Claimant had the 

right to refuse assignments, was issued a Form 1099 for her services and no taxes were 

withheld from her paychecks, was not provided on-the-job training, was not given tools 

or equipment to perform her services, and was not subject to monitoring by Steel City 

Interpreters. 

Claimant contends that Steel City Interpreters exercised control over its 

interpreters because she was instructed to follow strictly Steel City Interpreters’

guidelines regarding the manner of performing a job. Specifically, she asserts that she 

agreed that she “will represent Steel City Interpreters and conduct herself[] in a 

professional manner including appropriate dress and behavior.” (Claimant’s Br. at 

18.) She further contends that she was instructed to use Steel City Interpreters’ script 

for introduction. Id.

We have held that there is a “difference between control of a work product 

and control over the time, place and manner of performance.” J. Miller Co. v. Mixter, 

277 A.2d 867, 869 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1971). As this Court explained in J. Miller Co., 

“control of the result only and not of the means of accomplishment” does not transform 

an independent contractor relationship into an employer-employee relationship. Id. 

“Every job, whether performed by an employee or by an independent contractor, has 

parameters and expectations.” Language Line Services, Inc. v. Department of General 
17

Services, 991 A.2d 383, 388 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). “Control . . . is not a matter of 

approving or directing the final work product so much as it is a matter of controlling 

the means of its accomplishment.” Id.

In this case, Steel City Interpreters provided Claimant with a standard 

script to use when introducing herself. She was evaluated by Steel City Interpreters’

clients and she was required to “conduct herself in a professional manner.” While Steel 

City Interpreters exercised the minimum control necessary to ensure the quality of 

services provided to its clients, there is nothing in the record from which we can 

conclude that Steel City Interpreters controlled the work to be done or the means of 

Claimant’s performance of her translation services. Steel City Interpreters merely 

offered assignments to Claimant, which Claimant was free to accept or reject. Based 

on these facts, we conclude, as the Board did, that Claimant was free from direction 

and control in the performance of her services for Steel City Interpreters. 

D. Steel City Interpreters: Second Prong of the Independent Contractor/SelfEmployment Test

As to the second prong, whether Claimant was customarily engaged in an 

independent trade of providing interpretation services, we conclude that Claimant was 

not a self-employed interpreter. 

We are obligated by the Law to examine “such individual[’s]” unique set 

of circumstances. 43 P.S. § 753(l)(2)(B). The proper approach is to focus the inquiry 

on the conduct of the individual claimant. Thus, the appropriate inquiry is whether the 

claimant, was, in fact, customarily engaged in a trade, occupation, profession or 

business that was independently established. See A Special Touch. See also Glatfelter 

Barber Shop v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 957 A.2d 786 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2008).
18

Here, Claimant performed three interpretation assignments for Steel City 

Interpreters. There is no evidence indicating that Claimant intended to establish her

own interpreters business or held herself out to the public as an interpreter for hire. 

Thus, we reverse the Board’s holding that the wages Claimant earned from 

Steel City Interpreters should not be included in calculating Claimant’s financial 

eligibility for UC benefits. 

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing discussion, we conclude that both prongs required 

to demonstrate an independent contractor status of Claimant under section 4(l)(2)(B) 

of the Law were not met for either Open Pittsburgh or Steel City Interpreters. 

Accordingly, we reverse the Board’s order.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mirsada Begovic, :

Petitioner :

: No. 682 C.D. 2019

v. :

:

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 23rd day of June, 2020, the order of the 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review is hereby reversed.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge