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81–064 ★(Star Print) 2002

S. HRG. 107–597

CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY

THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS 

TO THE UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 6, 2002

(

(II)

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

BOB GRAHAM, Florida, Chairman 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama, Vice Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

JON KYL, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

PAT ROBERTS, Kansas 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

THOMAS A. DASCHLE, South Dakota, Ex Officio 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi, Ex Officio 

ALFRED CUMMING, Staff Director 

BILL DUHNKE, Minority Staff Director 

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held in Washington, DC, February 6, 2002 ............................................ 1

Statement of: 

Ford, Hon. Carl W. Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence 

and Research ................................................................................................. 28

Tenet, Hon. George J., Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency ............................................................................................... 5

Watson, Dale L., Executive Assistant Director, Counterterrorism and 

Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation ............................... 88

Wilson, Vice Admiral Thomas R., Director, Defense Intelligence Agency ... 57

Supplemental Materials 

Letter to Hon. George J. Tenet transmitting Questions for the Record ...... 163

Letter to Hon. Carl W. Ford, Jr. transmitting Questions for the Record .... 232

Letter to Hon. Robert Mueller, transmitting Questions for the Record ...... 331

Letter to Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson transmitting Questions for the 

Record ............................................................................................................ 294

Response to QFRs from CIA ............................................................................ 174

Response to QFRs from DIA ............................................................................ 299

Response to QFRs from State .......................................................................... 239

Response to QFRs from FBI ............................................................................ 335

(1)

THE WORLDWIDE THREAT 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2002 

U.S. SENATE, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Bob Graham 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Graham, Rockefeller, 

Wyden, Bayh, Edwards, Shelby, Kyl, Roberts, and DeWine. 

Chairman GRAHAM. I call the meeting to order. 

For several years, this Committee has had a practice of commencing its annual oversight of the United States intelligence community by holding a public hearing to present to the American people and our Committee members the intelligence community’s assessment of the current and projected national security threats to 

the United States. 

There is nothing more important to our national security than 

timely and accurate intelligence. Intelligence forms the foundation 

of our foreign policy and provides the basis of our nation’s defense 

planning, strategy, and supports our warfighters. 

The intelligence community is our nation’s early-warning system 

against threats to the lives and property of United States citizens 

and residents here and around the world. The importance of this 

mission became particularly apparent on September 11 when our 

nation’s greatest strengths—our freedom, our openness—were successfully exploited by an elusive global network of determined zealots. The terrorist threat has been on the intelligence community’s 

radar screen for years. Indeed, it was almost exactly a year ago 

today, on February 7th of 2001, when Director George Tenet testified at this same open session. 

He stated, and I quote, ‘‘Usama bin Ladin and his global network 

of lieutenants and associates remain the most immediate and serious threat. His organization is continuing to place emphasis on developing surrogates to carry out attacks in an effort to avoid detection, blame and retaliation. As a result, it is often difficult to attribute terrorist incidents to his group, the al-Qa’ida.’’

While the intelligence community has been aware of the great 

threat posed by bin Laden and his terrorist organization, it is a priority of this Committee to ascertain what more the intelligence 

community could have done to avert the September 11 tragedy. We 

must identify any systemic shortcomings in our intelligence community and fix those as soon as possible. We owe it to the AmerVerDate 0ct 09 2002 06:36 Oct 17, 2002 Jkt 082338 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\A338.XXX A338
2

ican people to do all that we can to prevent a recurrence of September 11. 

These and other issues will be explored with our witnesses in a 

closed hearing this afternoon and for the remainder of this session 

of Congress. I want to thank our witnesses who are appearing here 

today. We have with us Mr. George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Carl Ford, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research; Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, Director of the 

Defense Intelligence Agency; and Mr. Dale Watson, Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence. 

In order to optimize the time for questions of our witnesses, immediately after Vice Chairman Senator Shelby makes his opening 

statement, we will ask Director Tenet to present his testimony. We 

will ask our other witnesses to submit their full statements for the 

record. For our question-and-answer period, we will observe the 

normal Committee rule of first arrival, first to question. The questions will be limited to five minutes per round. 

Vice Chairman Shelby. 

Vice Chairman SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We held our 

last open hearing on national security threats one year ago tomorrow, as Senator Graham has alluded to. Director Tenet, on that 

day, you testified here that first and foremost among the threats 

to the U.S. was the threat posed by international terrorism, and 

specifically by Usama bin Ladin’s global terrorist network. 

We all agreed with you when you said, and I quote, ‘‘The highest 

priority for our intelligence community must invariably be on those 

things that threaten the lives of Americans or the physical security 

of the United States.’’ To fight this terrorist threat, you assured us then, and I quote 

again, ‘‘The intelligence community has designed a robust 

counterterrorism program that has preempted, disrupted and defeated international terrorists and their activities.’’ In fact, you told 

us then, ‘‘In most instances, we’ve kept terrorists off-balance, forcing them to worry about their own security and degrading their 

ability to plan and to conduct operations.’’

Seven months after your testimony, in an attack that apparently 

had been years in the planning, Usama bin Ladin’s terrorists killed 

nearly 3,000 innocent Americans in less than one hour. As you 

know, the U.S. has an intelligence community today and a Director 

of Central Intelligence in large part because of the Pearl Harbor 

disaster of December 7th, 1941. The fear of another Pearl Harbor 

provided the impetus for our establishment of a national-level intelligence bureaucracy. This system was created so that America 

would never have to face another devastating surprise attack. 

That second devastating surprise attack came on September

11th, and as I said, it killed more Americans than did the Japanese 

assault on Pearl Harbor. All of us, I think, owe the American people an explanation as to why our intelligence community failed to 

provide adequate warning of such a terrorist attack on our soil. 

After all, as Director Tenet has stated, the Director of Central Intelligence is hired not to observe and to comment but to warn and 

to protect. 

In the very near future, this Committee will join with the House 

Intelligence Committee in an effort to provide an explanation to the 

3

American people. Once we determine why we were caught completely by surprise, I believe we must then work together to ensure 

that there is no third Pearl Harbor. 

I’m pleased that the Director of Central Intelligence, George 

Tenet, and his colleagues have joined us today. These threat hearings are important, because understanding what the threats are is 

the first step toward helping our intelligence community meet the 

challenge of defending against them. 

Mr. Chairman, these hearings also give the respective leaders 

within the intelligence community an opportunity to speak directly 

to the American people. While the bulk of the activities of the intelligence community are secret, there is a great deal we can and I 

think we should discuss in a public forum, as you called for today. 

With that in mind, I ask each of our witnesses to address members’ questions to the greatest extent possible in this open setting. 

Not long ago, our intelligence community faced a single clear 

threat—the Soviet Union and its communist allies—against which 

it could devote most of its resources and attention. 

With the end of the Cold War, the world situation facing our intelligence agencies underwent a fundamental change. Until that 

point, murky transnational threats had been only sideshows to the 

main event of the East-versus-West strategic rivalry. Today, however, coping with asymmetric transnational challenges such as terrorism has become the most important duty of our intelligence community. 

To say the least, the post-Cold War period has been one of difficult transition. Even before September 11, we had a rocky history 

of intelligence failures—among them, the bombing of Khobar Towers, the Indian nuclear test, the bombing of our East African embassies, the first attack on the World Trade Center buildings, and 

the attack upon the USS COLE. 

Examined individually, each of these failures, tragic in their own 

way, may not suggest a continuing or systemic problem. But, however, taken as a whole and culminating with the events of September 11, they present a disturbing series of intelligence shortfalls 

that I believe expose some serious problems in the structure of and 

approaches taken by our intelligence community. 

We will have many opportunities in the very near future to discuss the structural and organizational defects inherent in our intelligence community. But for today, we should remember that understanding the threat is the first step along a road that must lead 

to improvements in how our nation confronts these threats. 

It has become apparent that international terrorism now poses 

the most significant threat to our national security and our interests at home and abroad. I will be interested to hear what our intelligence agencies believe such threats will look like in the future. 

Just as militaries can face defeat if they keep trying to fight the 

last war, so can intelligence agencies suffer terrible strategic surprise if they spend their time trying to meet the last threat or if 

they try to meet new threats with the mindset, tactics and obsolete 

mythologies of the past. 

The U.S. clearly faces unprecedented dangers today, and we will 

surely face new ones tomorrow. I look forward to hearing from our 

4

witnesses today as we discuss these threats and how we can work 

together to defeat them in the future. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

As indicated previously, we will now receive the testimony from 

Director Tenet. We’ll ask for the other witnesses to submit their 

statements, and then we will proceed to questions. 

Director Tenet. 

[The prepared statements of Mr. Tenet, Mr. Ford, Admiral Wilson, and Dale Watson follow:]

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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GEORGE J. TENET, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, ACCOMPANIED BY THE 

HONORABLE CARL FORD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 

FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH; VICE ADMIRAL THOMAS R. WILSON, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; AND DALE L. WATSON, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Director TENET. Mr. Chairman, I appear before you this year 

under circumstances that are extraordinary and historic for reasons I need not recount. Never before has the subject of this annual 

threat briefing had more immediate resonance. Never before have 

the dangers been more clear or more present. 

September 11 brought together and brought home literally several vital threats to the United States and its interests that we 

have long been aware of. It is the convergence of these threats that 

I want to emphasize with you today: The connection between terrorists and other enemies of this country; the weapons of mass destruction they seek to use against us; and the social, economic and 

political tensions across the world that they exploit in mobilizing 

their followers. 

September 11 demonstrated the dangers that arise when these 

threats converge and remind us that we overlook, at our own peril, 

the impact of crises in remote parts of the world. This convergence 

of threats has created a world I will present to you today, a world 

in which dangers exist not only in those places we have most often 

focused our attention, but also in other areas that demand it; in 

places like Somalia, where the absence of a national government 

has created an environment in which groups sympathetic to alQa’ida have offered terrorists an operational base and potential 

safe haven; in places like Indonesia, where political instability, separatist and ethnic tensions and protracted violence are hampering 

economic recovery and fueling Islamic extremism; in places like Colombia, where leftist insurgents who make much of their money 

from drug trafficking are escalating their assault on the government, further undermining economic prospects and fueling a cycle 

of violence; and finally, Mr. Chairman, in places like Connecticut, 

where the death of a 94-year-old woman in her own home of anthrax poisoning can arouse our worst fears about what our enemies 

might try to do to us. 

These threats demand our utmost response. The United States 

has clearly demonstrated since September 11 that it is up to the 

challenge. But make no mistake: Despite the battles we have won 

in Afghanistan, we remain a nation at war. Last year I told you 

that Usama bin Ladin and the al-Qa’ida network were the most immediate and serious threat this country faced. This remains true, 

despite the progress we have made in Afghanistan and in disrupting the network elsewhere. 

We assess that al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups will continue 

to plan to attack this country and its interests abroad. Their modus 

operandi is to continue to have multiple attack plans in the works 

simultaneously and to have al-Qa’ida cells in place to conduct 

them. 

127

We know that the terrorists have considered attacks in the U.S. 

against high-profile government or private facilities, famous landmarks and U.S. infrastructure nodes such as airports, bridges, harbors and dams. High-profile events such as the Olympics or last 

weekend’s Super Bowl also fit the terrorists’ interests in striking 

another blow within the United States that would command worldwide media attention. 

Al-Qa’ida also has plans to strike against U.S. and allied interests in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia. American diplomatic and military installations are at high risk, especially in East Africa, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Operations 

against U.S. targets could be launched by al-Qa’ida cells already in 

place in major cities in Europe and the Middle East. Al-Qa’ida can 

also exploit its presence or connections to other groups in such 

countries as Somalia, Yemen, Indonesia and the Philippines. 

Although the September 11 attacks suggest that al-Qa’ida and 

other terrorists will continue to use conventional weapons, one of 

our highest concerns is their stated readiness to attempt unconventional attacks against us. As early as 1998, bin Ladin publicly declared that acquiring unconventional weapons was a religious duty. 

Terrorist groups worldwide have ready access to information on 

chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons via the Internet, and 

we know that al-Qa’ida was working to acquire some of the most 

dangerous chemical agents and toxins. 

Documents recovered from al-Qa’ida facilities in Afghanistan 

show that bin Ladin was pursuing a sophisticated biological weapons research program. We also believe that bin Ladin was seeking 

to acquire or develop a nuclear device. Al-Qa’ida may be pursuing 

a radioactive dispersal device, what some call a dirty bomb. 

Alternatively, al-Qa’ida or other terrorist groups might also try 

to launch conventional attacks against the chemical or nuclear industrial infrastructure of the United States to cause widespread 

toxic or radiological damage. 

We are also alert to the possibility of cyber warfare attack by terrorists. September 11 demonstrated our dependence on critical infrastructure systems that rely on electronic and computer networks. Attacks of this nature will become an increasingly viable option for the terrorists as they and other foreign adversaries become 

more familiar with these targets and the technologies required to 

attack them. 

The terrorist threat goes well beyond al-Qa’ida. The situation in 

the Middle East continues to fuel terrorism and anti-U.S. sentiment worldwide. Groups like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and 

Hamas have escalated their violence against Israel, and the 

Intifada has rejuvenated once-dormant groups like the Popular 

Front for the Liberation of Palestine. If these groups feel that U.S. 

actions are threatening their existence, they may begin targeting 

Americans directly, as Hizbollah’s terrorist wing already does. 

We’re also watching states like Iran and Iraq that continue to 

support terrorist groups. Iran continues to provide support, including arms transfers, to the Palestinian rejection groups and 

Hizbollah. Tehran also has failed to move decisively against alQa’ida members who have relocated to Iran from Afghanistan. Iraq 

128

has a long history of supporting terrorists, including giving sanctuary to Abu Nidal. 

The war on terrorism, Mr. Chairman, has dealt severe blows to 

al-Qa’ida and its leadership. The group has been denied its safe 

haven and strategic command center in Afghanistan. Drawing on 

both our own assets and increased cooperation from allies around 

the world, we are uncovering terrorist plans and breaking up their 

cells. These efforts have yielded the arrest of nearly 1,000 al-Qa’ida 

operatives in over 60 countries and have disrupted terrorist operations and potential terrorist attacks. 

Mr. Chairman, bin Ladin did not believe that we would invade 

his sanctuary. He saw the United States as soft, impatient, unprepared and fearful of a long bloody war of attrition. He did not count 

on the fact that we had lined up allies that could help us overcome 

barriers of terrain and culture. He did not know about the collection and operational initiatives that will allow us to strike with 

great accuracy at the heart of the Taliban and al-Qa’ida. He underestimated our capabilities, our readiness and our resolve. 

That said, I must repeat that al-Qa’ida has not yet been destroyed. It and other like-minded groups remain willing and able 

to strike at us. Al-Qa’ida’s leaders, still at large, are working to reconstitute the organization and resume its terrorist operations. We 

must eradicate these organizations by denying them their sources 

of financing, eliminating their ability to hijack charitable organizations for their terrorist purposes. We must be prepared for a long 

war and we must not falter. 

Mr. Chairman, we must also look beyond the immediate danger 

of terrorist attacks to the conditions that allow terrorism to take 

root around the world. These conditions are no less threatening to 

U.S. national security than terrorism itself. The problems that terrorists exploit—poverty, alienation and ethnic tensions—will grow 

more acute over the next decade. This will especially be the case 

in those parts of the world that have served as the most fertile recruiting grounds for Islamic extremist groups. 

We have already seen in Afghanistan and elsewhere that domestic unrest and conflict in weak states is one of the factors that create an environment conducive to terrorism. More importantly, demographic trends tell us that the world’s poorest and most politically unstable regions, which include parts of the Middle East and 

sub-Saharan Africa, will have the largest youth populations in the 

world over the next two decades and beyond. Most of these countries will lack the economic institutions or the resources to effectively integrate these youth into their societies. 

All of these challenges come together in parts of the Muslim 

world, and let me give you just one example. One of the places 

where they converge that has the greatest long-term impact on any 

society is its educational system. Primary and secondary education 

in parts of the Muslim world is often dominated by an interpretation of Islam that teaches intolerance and hatred. The graduates 

of these schools, madrases, provide the foot soldiers for many of the 

Islamic militant groups that operate throughout the Muslim world. 

Let me underscore what the President has affirmed. Islam itself 

is neither an enemy nor a threat to the United States. But the increasing anger toward the West and toward governments friendly 

129

to us among Islamic extremists and their sympathizers clearly is 

a threat to us. We have seen and continue to see these dynamics 

play out across the Muslim world. Our campaign in Afghanistan 

has made great progress, but the road ahead is fraught with challenges. The Afghan people, with international assistance, are working to overcome a traditionally weak central government, a devastated infrastructure, a grave humanitarian crisis, and ethnic divisions that deepened over the last 20 years of conflict. The next 

few months will be an especially fragile period. 

Let me turn to Pakistan, Mr. Chairman. September 11 and the 

response to it were the most profound external events for Pakistan 

since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the U.S. response to that. The Musharraf government’s alignment with the 

United States and its abandonment of nearly a decade of support 

for the Taliban represent a fundamental political shift with inherent political risks because of the militant Islamic and anti-American sentiments that exist within Pakistan. 

President Musharraf’s intention to establish a moderate, tolerant, Islamic state, as outlined in his 12 January speech, is being 

welcomed by most Pakistanis, but we still have to confront major 

vested interests. The speech is energizing debate across the Muslim 

world about which vision of Islam is the right one for the future 

of the Islamic community. Musharraf established a clear and forceful distinction between a narrow, intolerant, conflict-ridden vision 

of the past and an inclusive, tolerant, and peace-oriented vision of 

the future. The speech also addressed the jihad issue by citing the 

distinction the prophet Mohammad made between the smaller 

jihad involving violence and the greater jihad that focuses on eliminating poverty and helping the needy. 

Although September 11 highlighted the challenges that India 

and Pakistan and their relations pose for U.S. policy, the attack on 

the Indian parliament on December 13th was even more destabilizing, resulting as it did in new calls for military action against 

Pakistan and subsequent mobilization on both sides. The chance of 

war between these two nuclear armed states is higher than at any 

point since 1971. If India were to conduct large-scale offensive operations into Pakistani Kashmir, Pakistan might retaliate with 

strikes of its own, in the belief that its nuclear deterrent would 

limit the scope of an Indian nuclear counter-attack. 

Both India and Pakistan are publicly downplaying the risks of 

nuclear conflict in the current crisis. We are deeply concerned, 

however, that a conventional war, once begun, could escalate into 

a nuclear confrontation, and here is a place where diplomacy and 

American engagement has made an enormous difference. 

Let me turn to Iraq. Saddam has responded to our progress in 

Afghanistan with a political and diplomatic charm offensive to 

make it appear that Baghdad is becoming more flexible on U.N. 

sanctions and inspection issues. Last month, he sent Deputy Prime 

Minister Tariq Aziz to Moscow and Beijing to profess Iraq’s new 

openness to meet its U.N. obligations and to seek their support. 

Baghdad’s international isolation is also decreasing as support for 

the sanctions regime erodes among other states in the region. 

Saddam has carefully cultivated neighboring states, drawing 

them into economically dependent relationships in the hopes of furVerDate 0ct 09 2002 06:36 Oct 17, 2002 Jkt 082338 PO 00000 Frm 00133 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A338.XXX A338
130

ther undermining their support for sanctions. The profits he gains 

from these relationships provide him with the means to reward key 

supporters, and more importantly to fund his pursuit of weapons 

of mass destruction. His calculus is never about bettering or helping the Iraqi people. 

Let me be clear. Saddam remains a threat. He is determined to 

thwart U.N. sanctions, press ahead with weapons of mass destruction, and resurrect the military force he had before the Gulf War. 

Today he maintains his vise grip on the levers of power through 

a pervasive intelligence and security apparatus, and even his reduced military force, which is less than half of its pre-war size, remains capable of defeating more poorly armed internal opposition 

and threatening Iraq’s neighbors. 

As I said earlier, we continue to watch Iraq’s involvement in terrorist activities. Baghdad has a long history of supporting terrorism, altering its targets to reflect changing priorities and goals. 

It has also had contacts with al-Qa’ida. Their ties may be limited 

by diverging ideologies, but the two sides’ mutual antipathy towards the United States and the Saudi royal family suggest that 

tactical cooperation between them is possible, even though Saddam 

is well aware that such activity would carry serious consequences. 

In Iran, we are concerned that the reform movement may be losing its momentum. For almost five years, President Khatami and 

his reformist supporters have been stymied by Supreme Leader 

Khamenei and the hard-liners. The hard-liners have systematically 

used the unelected institutions they control—the security forces, 

the judiciary, and the guardians council—to block reforms that 

challenge their entrenched interests. They have closed newspapers, 

forced members of Khatami’s cabinet from office, and arrested 

those who have dared to speak out against their tactics. 

Discontent with the current domestic situation is widespread, 

and cuts across the social spectrum. Complaints focus on the lack 

of pluralism and government accountability, social restrictions and 

poor economic performance. Frustrations are growing as the populace sees elected institutions such as the Majlis and the presidency 

unable to break the hardliners’ hold on power. 

The hard-line regime appears secure for now because security 

forces have easily contained dissenters and arrested potential opposition leaders. No one has emerged to rally reformers into a forceful 

movement for change, and the Iranian public appears to prefer 

gradual reform to another revolution, but the equilibrium is fragile 

and could be upset by a miscalculation by either the reformers or 

the hard-line clerics. 

For all of this, reform is not dead. We must remember that the 

people of Iran have demonstrated in four national elections since 

1997 that they want change and have grown disillusioned with the 

promises of the revolution. Social, intellectual and political developments are proceeding. Civil institutions are growing, and new 

newspapers open as others are closed. 

The initial signs of Tehran’s cooperation in common cause with 

us in Afghanistan are being eclipsed by Iranian efforts to undermine U.S. influence there. While Iran’s officials express a shared 

interest in a stable government in Afghanistan, its security forces 

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tradiction in behavior reflects a deep-seated suspicion among 

Tehran’s clerics that the United States is committed to encircling 

and overthrowing them, a fear that could quickly erupt in attacks 

against our interests. 

We have seen little sign of a reduction in Iran’s support for terrorism in the past year. Its participation in the attempt to transfer 

arms to the Palestinian Authority via the Karine A probably was 

intended to escalate the violence of the intifada and strengthen the 

position of Palestinian elements that prefer armed conflict with 

Israel. 

The current conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has 

been raging for almost a year and a half, and it continues to deteriorate. The violence has hardened the public’s positions on both 

sides and increased the longstanding animosity between Israeli 

Prime Minister Sharon and Palestinian leader Arafat. Although 

many Israelis and Palestinians say they believe that ultimately the 

conflict can only be resolved through negotiations, the absence of 

any meaningful security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and the escalating and uncontrolled activities of 

the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas make progress extremely 

difficult. 

We’re concerned that this environment creates opportunities for 

any number of players, most notably Iran, to take steps that will 

result in further escalation of violence by radical Palestinian 

groups. At the same time, the continued violence threatens to weak 

the political center in the Arab world and increases the challenge 

for our Arab allies to balance their support for us against the demands of their public. 

Mr. Chairman, let me now turn to the subject of proliferation. I 

would like to start by drawing your attention to several disturbing 

trends. Weapons of mass destruction programs are becoming more 

advanced and effective as they mature and as countries of concern 

become more aggressive in pursuing them. This is exacerbated by 

the diffusion of technology over time, which enables proliferators to 

draw on the experience of others, and develop more advanced 

weapons more quickly than they could otherwise. 

Proliferators are also becoming more self-sufficient, and they are 

taking advantage of the dual-use nature of weapons of mass destruction and missile-related technologies to establish advanced 

production capabilities and to conduct WMD and missile-related research under the guise of legitimate commercial or scientific activity. 

With regard to chemical and biological weapons, the threat continues to grow for a variety of reasons and to present us with monitoring challenges. On the nuclear side, we are concerned about the 

possibility of significant nuclear technology transfers going undetected. This reinforces our need for closely examining emerging nuclear programs for sudden leaps in capability. 

On the missile side, the proliferation of ICBM and cruise missile 

designs and technology has raised the threat to the United States 

from weapons of mass destruction delivery systems to a critical 

threshold. As outlined in our recent national intelligence estimate 

on the subject, most intelligence community agencies project that 

by 2015 the U.S. will most likely face ICBM threats from North 

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Korea and Iran, and possibly Iraq. This is in addition to the longstanding missile forces of Russia and China. Short- and mediumrange ballistic missiles pose a significant threat right now. 

Mr. Chairman, Russian entities continue to provide other countries with technology and expertise applicable to CW, BW, nuclear 

and ballistic missile and cruise missile projects. Russia appears to 

be the first choice of proliferant states seeking the most advanced 

technology and training. These sales are a major source of funds 

for Russian commercial and defense industries and military research and development. Russia continues to supply significant assistance on nearly all aspects of Tehran’s nuclear program. It is 

also providing Iran with assistance on long-range ballistic missile. 

Chinese firms remain key suppliers of missile-related technologies to Pakistan, Iran and several other countries. This in spite 

of Beijing’s November 2000 missile pledge not to assist in any way 

countries seeking to develop nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Most 

of China’s efforts involve solid propellant ballistic missiles, developments for countries that are largely dependent on Chinese expertise and materials. But it has also sold cruise missiles to countries 

of concern, such as Iran. 

North Korea continues to export complete ballistic missiles and 

production capabilities, along with related raw materials, components and expertise. Profits from these sales help Pyongyang to 

support its missile and probably other WMD development programs, and in turn generate new products to offer its customers, 

primarily Egypt, Libya, Syria and Iran. 

North Korea continues to comply with the terms of the agreed 

framework that are directly related to the freeze on its reactor program. But Pyongyang has warned that it is prepared to walk away 

from the agreement if it concluded that the United States was not 

living up to its end of the deal. 

Iraq continues to build and expand an infrastructure capable of 

producing weapons of mass destruction. Baghdad is expanding its 

civilian chemical industries in ways that could be diverted quickly 

into CW production. We believe Baghdad continues to pursue ballistic missile capabilities that exceed the restrictions imposed by 

U.N. resolutions. With substantial foreign assistance, it could 

flight-test a longer-range ballistic missile within the next five 

years. 

We believe that Saddam never abandoned his nuclear weapons 

program. Iraq maintains a significant number of nuclear scientists, 

program documentation, and probably some dual-use manufacturing infrastructure that could support a reinvigorated nuclear 

weapons program. Baghdad’s access to foreign expertise could support a rejuvenated program. But our major near-term concern is 

the possibility that Saddam might gain access to fissile material. 

Iran remains a serious concern because of its across-the-board 

pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missile capabilities. 

Tehran may be able to indigenously produce enough fissile material 

for a nuclear weapon by later this decade. 

Mr. Chairman, both India and Pakistan are working on the doctrine and tactics for more advanced nuclear weapons, producing 

fissile material and increasing their stockpiles. We have continuing 

concerns that both sides may not be done with nuclear testing. Nor 

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can we rule out the possibility that either country could deploy 

their most advanced nuclear weapons without additional testing. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to talk about Russia, China and North 

Korea, and then we will go to questions. And I appreciate the patience, but I think it’s important. 

Mr. Chairman, with regard to Russia, the most striking development, aside from the issues I have just raised, regarding Russia 

over the past year has been Moscow’s greater engagement with the 

United States. Even before September 11, President Putin had 

moved to engage the United States as part of a broader effort to 

integrate Russia more fully into the West, modernize its economy, 

and regain international status and influence. This strategic shift 

away from a zero-sum view of relations is consistent with Putin’s 

stated desire to address many socioeconomic problems that could 

cloud Russia’s future. 

During his second year in office, he moved strongly to advance 

his policy agenda. He pushed the Duma to pass key economic legislation on budget reform, legitimizing urban property sales, flattening and simplifying tax rates, and reducing red tape for small 

businesses. His support for his economic team and its fiscal rigor 

positioned Russia to pay back wages and pensions to state workers, 

and amassed a post-Soviet high of almost $39 billion in reserves. 

He has pursued military reform. And all of this is promising, Mr. 

Chairman. He is trying to build a strong presidency that can ensure these reforms are implemented across Russia, while managing 

a fragmented bureaucracy beset by internal networks that serve 

private interests. 

In his quest to build la strong state, however, we have to be 

mindful of the fact that he is trying to establish parameters within 

which political forces must operate. This managed democracy is illustrated by his continuing moves against independent national television companies. On the economic front, Putin will have to take 

on bank reform, overhaul Russia’s entrenched monopolies and judicial reform to move the country closer to a Western-style market 

economy, and attract much-needed foreign investment. 

Putin has made no headway in Chechnya. Despite his hint in 

September of a possible dialogue with Chechen moderates, the 

fighting has intensified in recent months, and thousands of 

Chechen guerrillas and their fellow Arab mujahidin fighters remain. Moscow seems unwilling to consider the compromises necessary to reach a settlement, while divisions among the Chechens 

make it hard to find a representative interlocutor. The war meanwhile threatens to spill over into neighboring Georgia.

After September 11, Putin emphatically chose to join us in the 

fight against terrorism. The Kremlin blames Islamic radicalism for 

the conflict in Chechnya, and believes it to be a serious threat to 

Russia. Moscow sees the U.S.-led counterterrorism effort, particularly the demise of the Taliban regime, as an important gain in 

countering the radical Islamic threat to Russia and Central Asia. 

So far Putin’s outreach to the United States has incurred little 

political damage, largely because of his strong domestic standing. 

At the same time, Mr. Chairman, Moscow retains fundamental differences with us, and suspicion about U.S. motive persists among 

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rity services. Putin has called the intended U.S. withdrawal from 

the ABM Treaty a mistake, but has downplayed its impact on Russia. At the same time, Russia is likely to pursue a variety of countermeasures and new weapons system to defeat a U.S.-deployed 

missile defense. 

With regard to China, Mr. Chairman, I told you last year that 

China’s drive to become a great power was coming more sharply 

into focus. The challenge, I said, was that Beijing saw the United 

States as the primary obstacle to its realization of that goal. This 

was in spite of the fact that the Chinese leaders at the same time 

judged that they needed to maintain good ties with us. 

A lot has happened in U.S.-China relations over the past year, 

from the tenseness of the EP–3 episode in April, to the positive 

image of President Bush and Jiang Zemin standing together in 

Shanghai last fall, highlighting our shared fight against terrorism. 

September 11 changed the context of China’s approach to us, but 

it did not change the fundamentals. China is developing an increasingly competitive economy and building a modern military force 

with the ultimate objective of asserting itself as a great power in 

East Asia. And although Beijing joined the coalition against terrorism, it remains skeptical of U.S. intentions in Central and South 

Asia. It fears that we are gaining regional influence at China’s expense, and views our encouragement of a Japanese military role in 

counterterrorism as support for Japanese rearmament, something 

that the Chinese firmly oppose. 

On the leadership side, Beijing is likely to be preoccupied this 

year with succession jockeying, as top leaders decide who will get 

what positions, who will retire at the Party Congress, and in the 

changeover in government positions that will follow next spring. 

This preoccupation is likely to translate into a cautious and defensive approach on most policy issues. It probably also translates into 

a persistently nationalist foreign policy, as each of the contenders 

in the succession context will be obliged to avoid any hint of being 

soft on the United States. 

Taiwan also remains the focus of China’s military modernization 

programs. Over the past year, Beijing’s military training exercises 

have taken on an increasingly real-world focus, emphasizing rigorous practice and operational capabilities and improving the military’s actual ability to use force. This is aimed not only at Taiwan 

but at increasing the risk to the United States itself in any future 

Taiwan contingency. China also continues to upgrade and expand 

the conventional short-range ballistic missile force it has arrayed 

against Taiwan. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me say that with regard to North 

Korea the suspension last year of engagement between Pyongyang, 

Seoul and Washington reinforced the concerns I cited last year 

about Kim Jong-II’s intentions towards us and our allies in Northeast Asia. His reluctance to pursue a constructive dialogue with the 

South, or to undertake meaningful reforms suggests that he remains focused on maintaining internal control at the expense of addressing the fundamental economic failures that keep the North 

Koreans mired in poverty, and pose a long-term threat to the country’s stability. 

135

North Korea’s large standing army continues to be a primary 

claimant on scarce resources, and we see no evidence that 

Pyongyang has abandoned its goal of eventual reunification of the 

peninsula under the North’s control. 

Mr. Chairman, I skipped some things, and I’ll end there, because 

I think we want to move to questions as soon as you can. I wonder, 

Mr. Chairman, if I can just respond for a minute to both of your 

opening statements on the whole terrorism issue and how we proceed ahead, because I think it’s important. You get to speak to the 

American people—so do I—and I think it’s important that they 

hear us on this question. 

We welcome the Committee’s review of our record on terrorism. 

It’s important we have a record. It is a record of discipline, strategy, focus and action. We are proud of that record. We have been 

at war with al-Qa’ida for over five years. Our collective success inside Afghanistan bears a reflection of the importance we attach to 

the problem and a reflection of a demonstrated commitment to expanding our human assets, technical operations, fused intelligence, 

seamless cooperation with the military. These are things we have 

been working on very hard over the last five years. 

During the millennium threat, we told the President of the 

United States that there would be between five and 15 attacks 

against American interests both here and overseas. None of these 

attacks occurred—primarily because of the result of heroic effort on 

the part of the FBI and the CIA inside the United States and overseas to ensure that those attacks were not successful. 

A year later the COLE was bombed. We lost a battle there. Part 

of the problem that we need to address as you look at this is not 

only to assess what we can do unilaterally or in conjunction with 

our military and law enforcement colleagues, but the countries out 

there who have often deflected us, or have not recognized there was 

a terrorism problem, who didn’t help us solve problems that we 

could not solve simply on our own. 

In the last spring and summer we saw—in the spring and summer of 2001—again we saw spectacular threat reporting about 

massive casualties against the United States. These threat 

reportings had very little texture with regard to what was occurring inside the United States. We again launched a massive disruption effort. We know that we stopped three or four American facilities from being bombed overseas. We know we saved many American lives. We never had the texture that said the date, time and 

place of the event inside the United States would result in September 11. It was not the result of the failure of attention and discipline and focus and consistent effort, and the American people 

need to understand that. 

What Tom Ridge is doing today in protecting the homeland, in 

thinking about our border control policies, our visa policies, the relationship between all our organizations—airport security—all of 

these things must be in place. Intelligence will never give you 100 

percent predictive capability on terrorist events. 

This community has worked diligently over the last five years, 

and the American people need to understand that with the resources and authorities and priorities the men and women of the 

FBI and the CIA performed heroically. Whatever shortcomings we 

136

may have, we owe it to the country to look at ourselves honestly 

and systematically. But when people use the word ‘‘failure,’’ ‘‘failure’’ means no focus, no attention, no discipline—and those were 

not present in what either we or the FBI did here and around the 

world. 

And we will continue to work at it. But when the information or 

the secret isn’t available, you need to make sure your backside is 

protected. You need to make sure there is a security regime in 

place that gives you the prospect of succeeding—and that’s what 

we all need to work on together. 

The decision of the President to go inside the sanctuary and take 

the war to the Taliban and al-Qa’ida may be the most significant 

thing that happened, because all of this preparation has resulted 

in destroying that sanctuary, even as we chase everybody around 

the world. We have disrupted numerous terrorist acts since September the 11th, and we will continue to do so with the FBI. And 

we welcome the Committee’s review. It is important for the American people. But how we paint it is equally important, because they 

need to know that there are competent men and women who risk 

their lives and undertake heroic risks to protect them. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Chairman GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Director. 

Mr. Director, we are all concerned about the aftermath of September 11 and what we are doing in order to reduce the prospects 

of a similar horrific event in the future. One of the issues that you 

discussed was the fact that Usama bin Ladin did not believe that 

the United States would retaliate in the way it did. 

What was the basis of bin Ladin’s failure to appreciate what the 

consequences of his action should be? And what is your assessment 

of the similar feelings of other terrorist groups or of the leaders of 

the nations that you have described as being the most threatening 

to the United States as to what U.S. response would be to their actions against the interests of the United States here in the homeland or abroad? 

Director TENET. Well, sir, obviously in my statement—well, I 

have never had a chance to talk to bin Ladin—I would love the opportunity some day, and I speculate. But I think that the importance of the sanctuary—I think he always believed it would be denied as a place where we would operate directly. And I think the 

importance of devastating the central command and control node 

can’t be underestimated. The disruption that’s occurred is formidable. And Afghanistan will not be replicated other places in the 

world. 

Other governments with whom we are working with will have to 

step up to the challenge of recognizing that just because it is Americans who are killed, in fact in the World Trade Center many, 

many people from many nations were killed. Their law enforcement 

practices, their visa control systems, their willingness to change 

their laws to allow us to work with them to disrupt these organizations means that what we need to tell these people is that you cannot operate any place safely in the world, and that rather than go 

up and down—rather than a focused—you know, one of the problems is people somehow—my fear is six months from now everybody will say, well, the World Trade Center has receded—so the 

137

leadership that the President has shown and the country has 

shown is going to make a marked difference, because they need to 

understand that there will be consequences that are very real and 

very direct to their ability to try and hurt us. 

Having said that, we know they’ll continue to plan. We know 

that they will hurt us again. We have to minimize their ability to 

do so, because there’s no perfection in this business. 

The importance of Tom Ridge’s effort in unifying homeland security cannot be underestimated as the important back end to what 

we and the FBI do. And as we get better at this, what we hope to 

do is change the security environment that terrorists operate in. 

After all, if you look carefully, in our closed session today, if you 

look at the profile of these 19 or 20 people, most were here legally. 

Most operated almost as sleeper cells. Most gave the FBI no probable cause to believe something was going to happen. 

Compartmentation of the information, all of these are very difficult 

things for us to deal with. And we have to get after it. So that’s 

how I’d answer the question, sir. 

Chairman GRAHAM. Mr. Ford, does the State Department and 

our diplomatic corps feel as if it has sufficient understanding of the 

opinion of our adversaries, whether they be governments such as 

those who were described as the axis of evil governments, or non 

governmental groups such as other terrorist operations—what their 

expectation is of a U.S. response to an act by them that would be 

adverse to our interests? 

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I think we all would agree that we 

never have enough information. We can always use new knowledge 

about all of these threats that we face. I think that the State Department in general—our embassies overseas, the people here in 

Washington—feel as if both the President and the Congress are 

providing us with the resources that we need to be able to not only 

understand the problems, but also, at least from a Department of 

State perspective, express U.S. views overseas through our diplomats. 

I think if I had to point to one area which I think that the State 

Department has as a priority, it is increasing the number of young 

diplomats overseas who are reporting basically on an unclassified 

basis on various groups—students, labor, business, political leaders 

to be. Much of that reporting over the last 20 years has been decimated by budget cuts and reductions in the size of the embassies. 

Secretary Powell is committed to changing that. So I think that we 

in INR are very grateful for the changes that we see occurring, because there is going to be more information, more knowledge for us 

to analyze and provide to the Secretary and to others in the community. 

Chairman GRAHAM. I am going to pursue this line of questioning 

further. The order of questioning will be the Vice Chairman, followed by Senators Roberts, Rockefeller, Bayh, DeWine and Kyl. 

Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Tenet, I think your statement today is—you have laid 

out a lot of the challenges and a lot of the successes, and we all 

know that—only maybe the public doesn’t all know of a lot of the 

successes of the CIA and the FBI and NSA, and other members of 

138

the intelligence community. We all know that we have some of the 

best and dedicated people that you could recruit in America at the 

CIA, at the FBI, at the NSA—and we can go on—and the DIA and 

you name it. 

But some of us are worried about whether the system they are 

in is designed to fail. And this would be part, I think, of our overall 

inquiry which we will be into. But that’s another day, and that’s 

a big thing. Because what we are really interested in here is designing a system, helping the intelligence community with funds 

and with legislative structure to do the job to protect the security 

of the American people. I think we are all in the same book, the 

same page and book. 

But with that in mind—and you went through it some a few minutes ago, Director Tenet—why were we utterly unaware of the 

planning and execution of the September 11 attacks? In other 

words, what went wrong? We know that you are not going, as you 

laid out, you are not going to ever be 100 percent. But these attacks were so well planned, so well executed, I know they caught 

us all by surprise, had to catch you by surprise. You weren’t 

shocked, because you warned us before about these type attacks. 

But the American people ask these questions. We will be asking 

them, and I know you have asked yourselves those questions. 

Director TENET. Well, sir, it’s an important question, but I have 

to tell you that when you do this every day—and we do this every 

day——

Vice Chairman SHELBY. Absolutely. 

Director TENET [continuing]. The shock was not that the attack 

occurred, but where it occurred. So, was there a piece of information that was collected that led us there? No. Did we know in broad 

terms that he intended to strike the United States? There is no 

doubt about that. He started in 1993. They tried to come over the 

border in Canada during the millennium threat. 

The operational difficulties of what you are up against in the 

United States, when you take the profile of these people—and Dale 

Watson should speak to this himself—and what they showed, and 

how little evidence they provided to us in terms of this is something we are now evaluating in terms of what is the profile, how 

do they operate. How do we talk to states and locals about things? 

What other changes need to be made? 

But is there some piece of information out there, sir, that nobody 

saw? That’s not the case. In fact, in July and August, when we saw 

the operational tempo around the world go down overseas, it was 

very clear that what had been planned had been delayed. It was 

very clear in our own minds that this country was a target. There 

was no texture to that feeling. We wrote about it, we talked about 

it, we warned about it. The nature of the warning was almost spectacular. Some people in town thought that this was deception. It 

was never deception, because of how much we understand this target. 

Did we have penetrations of the target? Absolutely. Did we have 

technical operations? Absolutely. Where did the secret for the planning reside? Probably in the heads of three or four people. And at 

the end of the day, all you can do is continue to make the effort 

to steal that secret and break into this leadership structure. And 

139

we have to keep working at it. There will be nothing you do that 

will guarantee 100 percent certainty. It will never happen. 

Vice Chairman SHELBY. What have we learned? What have you 

learned in the intelligence community that you can share in the 

open session with the American people? 

Director TENET. There are some positive things that have been 

learned about what you talk about about future structure, about all 

of the fusion that has occurred—the federation of military intelligence and its analysis; the fusion of how NSA, CIA, and the community operates in terms of bringing all sources together, which we 

have worked on quite hard over the last five years; the notion that 

you have—people have said individual disciplines functioning autonomously where information is not shared is simply untrue. 

The importance of continuing clandestine human operations to 

penetrate these groups, the importance of continued cooperation 

with allied countries around the world who help you do this business is absolutely indispensable. The resources that the President 

has provided us to enhance our flexibility, to maximize our ability 

to operate, is a very important lesson. You can’t operate in 68 countries without a substantial resource base, and he has given us that 

opportunity. 

So there is an extraordinary knowledge of this target. We did not 

start from a standing start. We wouldn’t have succeeded the way 

we did with our military and our Bureau colleagues in Afghanistan 

if we had not known how to act and a lot of the reforms that we 

have been talking about had not been put in place. The relentless 

pursuit of the secret and the human penetration of these organizations is something that we have to continue to attempt to do. And 

that progress over the last five years has been substantial. 

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, could I add a comment? INR, as you 

know, is a very small organization. We are not representative of all 

of the bigger intelligence organizations. But I think that at least 

from our perspective, my perspective, I learned one important 

thing—is that for me getting more money or even more people was 

not what I—since I didn’t get any of that—it wasn’t something that 

I really missed. The fact is that what I couldn’t have gotten by 

without were my people, my experts. People that have been on the 

job 25, 30 years, 15 years, you can’t replace them with 10 rookies. 

You have one old hand that might train 10 rookies, but you are not 

going to be able to have the rookies come in and start producing 

right away. It’s something that you have to build for the future. 

I don’t know about the rest of the community—I think they face 

the same problem we do—but over the next five to seven years we 

are losing a good portion of our expertise. So that while we don’t 

have a problem recruiting new people, we are going to have to 

work on retaining the ones that we have got, and making sure before they leave us that they leave us a legacy of students and apprentices that have learned all the tricks of the trade before they 

leave. And that’s something that I think you can help the DCI and 

all of us with in terms of thinking long term with personnel. I 

know it’s expensive. I know it’s a problem. 

You can’t have good intelligence without good people, period. 

Director TENET. Mr. Chairman, I think it’s true. 

Chairman GRAHAM. Mr. Director. 

140

Director TENET. I think it’s true of all of us. By the year 2005, 

between 30 and 40 percent of the men and women of CIA will have 

been there for five years or less. We’re about to overhaul the entire 

compensation and reward system to reflect on keeping the best and 

the brightest and retaining expertise. But at the end of the day, 

people matter, and expertise, as is embodied in our 

Counterterrorism Center and knowledge of the target, can never be 

replaced. 

Vice Chairman SHELBY. We can help, and we will help. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman GRAHAM. Senator Roberts. 

Senator ROBERTS. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

There has been a nationwide alert, from time to time, to the law 

enforcement agencies and the private sector to prepare for the possibility of attacks against critical infrastructure facilities. I know 

you’ve had some sit-downs with the Department of Agriculture. 

When we asked the so-called experts in Emerging Threats Subcommittee in the Armed Services Committee, what keeps you up 

at night, they would refer to bioterrorism; cyber attacks; chemical 

warfare; a weapon of mass destruction—i.e. the dirty bomb that 

you referred to; their use of explosives. But you can list about 100 

things, and they’ll probably do 101, because that’s the definition of 

a terrorist. 

We’ve had a discussion about the possibility of anybody conducting what I call agriterrorism, or an attack on our food supply, 

food security. I know when we asked the FBI two or three years 

ago about the risk and the chance, the risk was very high in terms 

of chaotic results all throughout the country not only in farm country from an economic standpoint, but the specter of having the National Guard, you know, handing out your food supplies to people 

who are trying to hoard food. 

My question to you is, where is that in your status of worries? 

And what terrorist groups are the likeliest to conduct such operations? 

Director TENET. Well, sir, first, I met with the Secretary of Agriculture last week to discuss this, to discuss a tighter relationship 

between us in working through this. But one of the things that 

we’re learning, and we’ll talk a bit about it more in closed session 

today, is the BW piece of this seems to be more advanced than anything else, and the focus on pathogens and the development of different strains of diseases. 

If you think about what they will try to do to us, this al-Qa’ida/

Sunni network—psychological disruption, eat away at the fabric of 

your people, make it difficult to detect, and when you think about 

agriterrorism, the food process, all those things—this is something 

we have to get ahead of. This is something we need to think 

through a lot harder, because there is vulnerability. 

Now, how you quantify it at this moment, I don’t have an ability 

to quantify it, but you do know that you better get ahead of it now, 

because of the way they exploit vulnerabilities. 

Senator ROBERTS. I’ve said that to Tom Ridge and others. It is 

so easy to do. And I think the results would be absolutely catastrophic. 

141

Let me ask you another question on assessment of the threat to 

the United States in our own hemisphere. If there’s one area that 

really represents problems to the daily life and pocketbooks of 

Americans in regards to drugs, in regards to immigration, in regards to border safety, in regards to energy—because Mexico and 

also Venezuela do supply a great majority of our energy, not to 

mention trade—it is Latin and Central America, or what we refer 

to as the 31 countries of the Southern Command. 

I’m very worried about that, more particularly in regards to Venezuela and a fellow name Hugo Chavez, who I think could be another Castro. 

I would appreciate your assessment. You do that on page 21 of 

your testimony. If you could underscore that a little bit, the threat 

to the U.S. within our own hemisphere, and are there organized 

terrorist cells in Central and South America that could carry out 

attacks against our country, such as 9/11? 

Director TENET. Sir, obviously, Venezuela is important because 

they’re the third-largest supplier of petroleum. I would say that 

Mr. Chavez—and the State Department may say this—probably 

doesn’t have the interests of the United States at heart. But at the 

same time, there is a deterioration in the economic and general 

conditions in that country that he’s responsible for. So I think he’s 

a tough actor for us. 

Maybe you want to say some more about that. 

Mr. FORD. Well, it seems to me—and I’m not an expert on Chavez or South America—but when you can’t solve your basic, fundamental economic problems that Venezuela faces with the natural 

resources that it has available, you’ve got to blame somebody. And 

I think that he’s found that it’s easier and more politically correct 

for him in Venezuela to blame us. 

Senator ROBERTS. Well, that’s what Castro does. 

Mr. FORD. That’s right. And that’s why he joins with Castro in 

several occasions in voicing concerns about the U.S. That doesn’t 

bother me so much as long as it’s just words. But there are also

indications that he is sympathetic and helpful to the FARC in Colombia and various other groups. So that I’m sure that all of us are 

going to be watching very closely to see what goes on in Venezuela 

and with President Chavez in particular. 

Senator ROBERTS. Let me ask you the ‘‘axis of evil’’ question, 

which has started some meaningful dialogue with our allies overseas, more especially our NATO allies. From a counterterrorism 

standpoint, what is more threatening about Iran, Iraq and North 

Korea, in view of the President’s State of the Union message, than 

other countries that are listed as state sponsors of terrorism? 

Director TENET. I’m sorry, sir, what is more——

Senator ROBERTS. What is more threatening about these countries? Obviously, the President has indicated you have to go to the 

source. He has put these countries on notice. There is what I call 

some meaningful dialogue now as to what that really means. And 

what I’m asking you to do is to say from a threat standpoint, from 

a counterterrorism standpoint, what’s more threatening about 

these countries than the others? 

Director TENET. Well, sir, first of all, the Iranians and their support for Hizbollah, I mean Hizbollah is a world-class terrorist orgaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 06:36 Oct 17, 2002 Jkt 082338 PO 00000 Frm 00145 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A338.XXX A338
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nization, and their continued use of Hizbollah and their own surrogates is a very fundamental challenge to American interests. 

Senator ROBERTS. I’m for the speech, by the way. I just would 

like to get your take on it. 

Director TENET. Yes, sir. But from a terrorism perspective, their 

continued use of both terrorist groups and their own IRGC, not 

only to plan terrorist acts, but to support radical Islamic groups, 

radical Palestinian groups, undermine the peace process, when you 

couple that support with a WMD profile, ballistic missiles, nuclear 

capability, I mean, you have—in a regime controlled by hardliners, 

you have a series of twin issues in the convergence I talk about 

that poses substantial risk and challenge to the United States, and 

we have to pay attention to it. 

The North Korean piece, I would say is, look, the ballistic missile 

threat that we talked about in our Estimate in my testimony, you 

know, every—the SCUD/Nodong exports are the basis of which so 

much of this ICBM capability is going to be developed and the ability of countries to mix and match those frames and further threaten us, not just with short-range ballistic missiles, but with longerrange missiles that you have to think about as becoming more 

prominent to you. 

And the Iraqi piece, as I referenced, you know, the WMD profile 

I gave you and my interest in being very careful about was there 

a convergence of interest here between al-Qa’ida and the Iraqis, 

don’t know the answer to the question yet—pursuing it very, very 

carefully. There was a press story today that said CIA dismisses 

these linkages. 

Well, you don’t dismiss linkages when you have a group like alQa’ida who probably buys and sells all kinds of capabilities for people who have converging interests, whether Sunni or Shi’a, and 

how they mixed and matched training capabilities, safe harboring, 

and money is something we’re taking a look at. 

So nobody dismisses anything. Everybody’s on the table, and 

these networks of terrorism should no longer be thought about 

purely in terms of the state’s interests, what they say publicly, 

what their obvious interests are and how they see the benefit in 

hurting the United States. 

Senator ROBERTS. I really appreciate that. Let me ask you one 

more question on what the coffee klatch or the coffee club in Dodge 

City, Kansas, would ask. And that is, there have been a number 

of reports, either right or not, that the CIA had downgraded its 

human intelligence effort in the Afghan region. I know that you 

have stated very clear that it’s not the case, that there were serious 

shortages of officers within the necessary language qualifications. 

That probably is the case. And there was a disinclination to get too 

close to the terrorist networks. Now I’m not trying to put that as 

a fact; I’m just saying that’s background. 

But what the fellows at the Dodge City coffee klatch ask me is, 

if John Walker Lindh could get to talk to Usama bin Ladin, why 

in the heck couldn’t the CIA get an agent closer to him? 

Director TENET. Well, I’m not going to do this in open session, 

but you better tell everybody at the cafe it’s not true. 

Senator ROBERTS. I got you. 

Chairman GRAHAM. Thank you, Senator. 

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Mr. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, may I just quickly comment? 

I know you’re interested in the Department of Agriculture, Senator, and they receive all our threat warnings and the information. 

And additionally, a Department of Agriculture detailee is with us 

since 9–11, and we’re considering that in our Joint Terrorism Task 

Force. 

Senator ROBERTS. I appreciate that. I talked with them yesterday, and they indicate if there was a stovepipe, it doesn’t exist anymore. 

Mr. WATSON. That’s right. 

Chairman GRAHAM. Senator Bayh. 

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for being with us today. I am grateful for your service to our 

country. I’m reminded of I think it was a quote put on the cover 

of the budget submission last year, quoting Napoleon to the effect 

that a well-placed spy is worth two divisions. With the war that 

we’re fighting today, I think that’s probably an underassessment. 

So what you do is vitally, vitally important. 

I’m going to direct my questions to Director Tenet. Any of the 

rest of you who would like to jump in, please feel free to do so. 

Director TENET. They would love to comment, too, Senator. 

Senator BAYH. I’m sure they would. 

I was reminded of something Abraham Lincoln also once said, 

Director, about your being the only one who was given the opportunity to make an oral statement, about being run out of town on 

a rail. He said, ‘‘Except for the honor of the thing, I would just as 

soon have passed it up.’’ So in any event, thank you for your presentation. 

I’m going to ask about Iran. I’d first like to lay the foundation 

here a little bit. You indicated, Director, that you’ve seen little 

change in Iran’s sponsorship of terrorist activities. Based upon 

that, I would assume that you would still consider them to be the 

foremost state sponsor of terrorism in the world. That true? 

Director TENET. Yes, sir. 

Senator BAYH. You also indicated that they were involved in, I 

think the quote was, across-the-board pursuit of weapons of mass 

destruction. Now one of their top officials in the last several days 

has come out and categorically denied that they are involved in 

seeking chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. So I would assume 

that his statements are more proof of their mendacity than their 

innocence, in your opinion. 

Is there any doubt in your mind, any doubt whatsoever, that 

they are vigorously involved in pursuing weapons of mass destruction? 

Director TENET. None whatsoever, Senator. 

Senator BAYH. Russia and China, you indicated, have been involved in assisting, directly or indirectly, their pursuit of weapons 

of mass destruction. What should we think about that? If Iran and 

some of these other regimes are an axis of evil, are Russia and 

China involved with enabling evil? 

Director TENET. Well, sir, I would say that, first of all, they are 

both separate. The reasons may be different. And at times we have 

distinctions between government and entities. And that’s always—

144

and I don’t want to make it a big distinction, but sometimes you’re 

dealing with both those things. 

Senator BAYH. The governments in Beijing and Moscow don’t 

have—— Director TENET. No, sir, I didn’t say that. There are instances 

where you have entities that are doing business. But if you look at 

the Russian relationship with the Iranians, it’s long term, going 

back to the time of the czars, an interest in a strategic relationship 

there for a whole host of reasons—access to water, oil and gas, 

whatever it is. 

What is difficult to understand is why the minimal amount of 

money you would gain from those kinds of activities in generating 

the kind of threat they pose, not just to us, but to the Russians and 

Russian interests around the world, would continue to allow cooperation to occur by entities—with or without the government’s 

knowledge—why the government can’t do more to get on top of this 

and ensure that we don’t create a ballistic missile threat in the region that will only result in other countries in the region acquiring 

that capability, will only result in all that. And quite, frankly, this 

is an issue of dialogue between the President and President Putin. 

Senator BAYH. What’s your answer to that question? It’s so manifestly not in their own long-term self-interest. 

Director TENET. Sir, it must be about their perception about how 

they gain influence. We haven’t talked about conventional weapons 

and the importance of that. But as you’re trying to resurrect a 

modern economy, you don’t have a lot of chips to play with. Weapons are one thing you have to play with, expertise of people and 

other things. And it’s incongruous in terms of, on the one hand, you 

see a Russian behavior and some very positive things President 

Putin has done in terms of reforming their economy and moving in 

the right direction; on the other hand, a record on proliferation that 

I think belies a commitment to the kind of issues and norms that 

we would expect them to pursue. So this is an ongoing discussion. 

But clearly, expertise, foreign assistance, whether it’s Russian or 

Chinese, is the escalator clause in anybody’s ability to quickly mix 

and match capabilities and develop indigenous capabilities. And it 

is a problem. And you have to get after, in the Chinese sense, a 

deeply embedded PLA interest in earning income from these kinds 

of activities. You have to get after strategic influence, particularly 

what it may buy you in places like the Middle East, where your 

country will have an increasing oil dependency in the future, and 

the thought about how you compete against the United States. 

But they pursue these for their own reasons. They are inimical 

to our own interests and relationships that we would like to establish, and they will threaten American forces and interests. So these 

are problem areas that we have to continue to talk about every 

year and put them out in the open because they’re a problem. 

Senator BAYH. It seems to me, in evaluating whether the Russians and the Chinese are truly being cooperative in the war on 

terror, the fight against proliferation needs to be somewhere fairly 

up high on the list. 

Director TENET. And it’s interesting that in the war on terror, 

they have been cooperative. You see, everybody checks different 

boxes. We have had good cooperation with the Russians and ChiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 06:36 Oct 17, 2002 Jkt 082338 PO 00000 Frm 00148 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A338.XXX A338
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nese on the war on terrorism, and it’s an important—you know, 

this has given the President and the Secretary of State an opportunity to try and transform relationships. 

Senator BAYH. Getting back to Iran for a minute, the reason I’m 

focusing on Iran, Director, is I believe that in the long run, this 

may be one of the foremost threats facing our country, from that 

regime. What’s the Agency’s analysis of the domestic situation 

within Iran? You mentioned the fact that the moderates had won 

the last several elections. What’s the assessment in terms of them 

eventually gaining more control over the security and intelligence 

apparatus in that country? 

Director TENET. Well, as I noted in the statement in some detail, 

I think the jury’s out. I think—you know, here’s some interesting 

things to think about. Sixty-three percent of the Iranian population 

was born after 1979. 

They don’t have any context to judge this. There have been elections. There’s a political dialogue in the country. There’s a vibrancy 

to it. 

It’s not Iraq in that sense. There are private relationships where 

these things are discussed. At the same time, you see an immature 

political opposition. And the immaturity of the opposition is, I 

think, something to focus on, dealing with an entrenched, tough security apparatus that uses non-elected vehicles to break back and 

make it more difficult for reform to occur as fast as it might. 

So it’s an interesting and open question that we have to continue 

to follow. So, on the one hand, you have behavior on terrorism and 

weapons of mass destruction that you are deeply troubled about.

On the other hand, there appears to be a very big opportunity with 

people who may want to have nothing to do with all that or something to do with all that. The Iranians may well, in any event, 

want weapons of mass destruction for their own historic sensibilities of who they are in the region. 

But the point is, this is a very conflicted society that is continuing to evolve. And the question is, when does good overcome 

bad, or when do people who want reform, how fast does the opposition mature? Who’s the leader that takes them there? How does it 

really flow? These are very interesting, difficult questions for us. 

Senator BAYH. I assume we’re allocating significant resources to 

that. 

Director TENET. We’re paying a lot of attention to those targets, 

sir. 

Senator BAYH. Mr. Chairman, I have difficulty seeing the lights 

from here. Is my time——

Chairman GRAHAM. I’m afraid you’re on the red. 

Senator BAYH. I’m on the red. Okay, very good. I’d like to thank 

you, gentlemen. Director, I’d like to thank you. You’re doing a very 

good job, and we want to help you any way we can. 

Chairman GRAHAM. The next questioners will be Senators 

DeWine, Kyl and Edwards. Senator DeWine. 

Senator DEWINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Watson, have we had long enough to tell what impact the 

U.S. Patriot Act is having, the anti-terrorism bill? Or is the jury 

still out on that? 

146

Mr. WATSON. The jury is still out on that. But, Senator, it’s been 

a help, particularly the change in the words of the FISA, the use 

of the grand jury material, detaining through the INS process and 

those types of things. But it has been helpful and it will continue 

to be helpful. 

Senator DEWINE. We’re interested, many of us, of course, are in 

seeing what else needs to be done. 

Mr. WATSON. There are some items we have under discussion 

with the department. But as of right now, particularly those areas 

I mentioned, particularly the national security letters we’re able to 

get out much quicker. We appreciate the Patriot Act. 

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Tenet——

Director TENET. Senator, could I comment on that? 

Senator DEWINE. Please. 

Director TENET. I think that——

Senator DEWINE. I’m just trying to help you out here. You don’t 

have to answer all the questions. Go ahead, Mr. Tenet. 

Director TENET. Access to criminal information, grand jury information for threat purposes we’ve now been provided. It’s been a 

very meaningful contribution to our understanding of a lot of 

things that we can now do trend analysis on. It’s been very, very 

helpful. 

Senator DEWINE. And that was one of the things that we hoped. 

Director TENET. Enormously helpful to us. 

Mr. WATSON. That has been a tremendous help, yes, absolutely. 

Senator DEWINE. Good. Mr. Tenet, let me ask you to speculate, 

if you could, if you’re comfortable in talking about it, in regard to 

training camps. Training camps have been destroyed. How long 

does it take to set camps like that back up again? And would you 

want to speculate about that in public, about the ability to do that? 

Director TENET. Well, I guess that’s all going to be a function, ultimately, of the interim government, its evolution, our influence. 

Senator DEWINE. Well, I don’t mean necessarily there. 

Director TENET. Well, other places. As you know, there are other 

places. 

Admiral WILSON. I’d like to comment on it. 

Senator DEWINE. Admiral. 

Admiral WILSON. What was removed in Afghanistan from alQa’ida, in my view, was the elimination of their Fort Bragg or their 

Fort Irwin national training center. And when you arrest terrorists 

around the world, they come from many different nationalities. 

They come from different cells and organizations. But virtually all 

of them have one thing in common. They were all trained in Afghanistan, indoctrinated in the camps. It was truly military-style 

training that was ongoing. And the best and the brightest of them, 

they went on up into other kind of terrorist acts. 

So it is difficult to establish the scale and the complexity of that 

kind of an operation that was unmolested in Afghanistan somewhere else, because we are committed to this global war on terrorism. It’s expensive. You can’t hide it too easily and all those 

sorts of things. But it essentially was as important to them as I 

think some of our national training centers are to our military. 

Senator DEWINE. That puts it in perspective; appreciate it. 

147

Mr. WATSON. And, Senator, the difference, too, is that we knew 

about the camps in Afghanistan for years. The difference now is we 

did something about it. If somebody someplace else tries to build 

a training center, I’m very confident in my colleagues in Defense 

and FBI and CIA that they won’t be there very long. 

Senator DEWINE. I think the President’s made that pretty clear. 

Senator Roberts asked you, Director, about South America. He 

talked a little bit about the importance of that. And I guess one of 

the concerns that we all have is that this is our backyard. It’s not 

an area that has been overrepresented as far as our intelligence 

community. 

And now you have all the other problems that we have and all 

the drains. We have Colombia. We have Venezuela. We have Argentina. We have the tri-border region. All our drugs come out of 

this area of the world, or most of them do. We could go on and on 

and on and on. 

So give me a little perspective about how, as the Director, you 

can deal with that as far as the resources that you have. And also, 

if you could, give me a little insight into what you see going on in 

Colombia. Let’s assume that the peace negotiations don’t turn out. 

We hope they do. What do you see the FARC doing in the future, 

and what kind of threat is that to U.S. citizens in Colombia? For 

example, we see the FARC moving into urban areas more. 

Director TENET. Well, let me get to part two, and then, with regard to the first question, we should talk about this in closed session, because it goes to the heart of priorities and allocation of people and resources. But we are stressed. And the war on terrorism 

alone has resulted in a massive migration of people and resources, 

and we’re trying to balance all these things. Your back door is vitally important. Drugs is very, very important. 

But there is a tension about how we allocate these things, Senator, that we’re trying to work through right now and make the 

best judgments we can about how we allocate people around the 

world. Carl, do you want to say something about that? 

Mr. FORD. On that first part, I would only add that all of us, I 

think, have noticed the coming together of drug traffickers, organized crime, international organized crime, and terrorists, even in 

the sense of just the logistics arrangement—pass money, do favors 

for—so that anywhere you have drug traffickers and organized 

crime and terrorists, you’re going to have a problem. Clearly there 

are a number of places in our own hemisphere that have such problems. Colombia, other parts of South America come to mind. 

This is one that it’s very difficult to try to focus on the immediate 

problem. I think we in the intelligence community have to learn 

flexibility. We have to realize that if you push one button, four buttons someplace else are going to pop out and that we have to design an approach that gives us much greater coverage and depth 

at the same time. And that’s a challenge. 

Senator DEWINE. Director, can you just—I know my time is up—

could you just answer briefly the question on Colombia? 

Director TENET. Well, obviously there’s an election coming up. 

Obviously the peace process is not going forward. We are concerned 

that the FARC is going to up the ante here and threaten—and parVerDate 0ct 09 2002 06:36 Oct 17, 2002 Jkt 082338 PO 00000 Frm 00151 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A338.XXX A338
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ticularly threaten not only Colombians, but us. So this is a situation that we’re all watching very carefully. 

We have to see how these elections come out and how a new 

president decides to engage, and then look at how we want to continue on with Plan Colombia and how we think about this problem. 

But the drug problem is still there. The narcotrafficking, the insurgency, all of these things continue to undermine the fabric of this 

country. And we need to think our way through, particularly after 

the election, where we’re going to be. 

Senator DEWINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman GRAHAM. Thank you, Senator. Senator Kyl. 

Senator KYL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, to Mr. Tenet or other members of the panel, I’m interested 

in the policy concomitant to your concerns expressed about controlling technology transfers, especially, as you said, because of the 

dual-use capabilities of weapons of mass destruction and missilerelated technologies. What would be useful to you to better detect 

and therefore deter such technology transfers? 

Director TENET. On the policy side, sir? 

Senator KYL. Yes. In other words, you’ve testified that this is a 

big problem. And therefore, you must have an idea of what might 

be done to eradicate the problem. 

Director TENET. Sir, one of the challenges we have in designing 

a new regime is that you find there are lines that are drawn, that 

activity falls beyond whether it’s a complete missile system or components of a missile system. And I haven’t looked at the MTCR, 

but it is a mistake to assume that the regimes that are in place 

provide us the kind of security that we’re looking for. And it’s a 

very important question. I haven’t thought through how I’d redesign it. But I know that a lot slips underneath. 

And the problem with this issue is as follows. The indigenous capabilities of the people you care about the most, the component 

that falls outside of the regime, is all they may need to complete 

that work. So we may have design regimes at one point in time 

where there was a have-and-have-not quality to this; in other 

words, the supplier was the dominant actor you wanted to watch. 

Well, that’s not true anymore. And as a consequence, whatever 

we design has to acknowledge the fact that things that come in 

under the transom, that don’t neatly fit into a verification regime 

or a legal framework, are every bit as worrisome to us. But it’s an 

important question. 

Mr. FORD. Well, I think that this also goes back to, I think, Senator Roberts’ question—the issue of both weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. We have this unusual circumstance where the 

non-state terrorists, we know they want them. We know they’re 

trying. But they have not yet succeeded in getting weapons of mass 

destruction. 

On the other hand, we have the states that traditionally supported terrorism that are less involved, to some extent, than they 

were in the past. But they’re going gangbusters with weapons of 

mass destruction. If you look out five, 10 years and you see both 

of these trends continuing and you think about New York City, you 

think about the Pentagon, you think about the horrendous danger 

149

that the world faces, not just America, all of a sudden weapons of 

mass destruction takes on a different context. 

Before 9/11, we could talk about terrorism and say, ‘‘Let’s get 

tough with this and let’s get tough with that.’’ Some of our allies 

didn’t even support us. The difference now is when we talk about 

proliferation, rather than a new scheme, we need ‘‘You’re either 

with us or you’re agin’ us.’’

Senator KYL. Sometimes we’re our own worst enemy. We’ve not 

been as careful about being able to identify the end users, which 

is what both of you are getting to here. We used to pay a lot of 

attention to that, and I think you want us to pay more attention 

to it. And so may I just request—and the reason I point to the light 

is I have two or three other questions here, and we could talk 

about this all day—I really would appreciate and I think the committee would appreciate receiving some kind of memorandum from 

you about ideas of what would be useful to the intelligence community to get a better handle on this problem of technology transfer, 

dual-use issues, end users and the like. That would be very, very 

helpful to us. 

I was at the Wehrkunde in Munich, Germany, the annual security conference, with our NATO allies. And there were some interesting comments at that conference. I just wanted to confirm a couple of points, Director Tenet, that I think you made earlier. 

Minister of Defense Ivanov was a bit indignant about suggestions 

that Russia was proliferating to Iran, for example, and said, ‘‘There 

is absolutely no evidence that Russia is providing any technology 

transfer to Iran,’’ although he did say, ‘‘except for the nuclear program, which is for peaceful purposes.’’ Is he correct in that statement? 

Director TENET. No, sir. And Sergei and I have talked about this 

privately and directly. So, no, we respectfully disagree. 

Senator KYL. Thank you. And let me confirm what I think you 

told Senator Bayh. Is it still correct to call Iran today the world’s 

largest state sponsor of terrorism or proliferation of terrorism? 

Director TENET. Yes, sir, I believe that. Does anybody have a different view? 

Senator KYL. Okay. The reason I mentioned that is that the 

President’s speech raised a lot of consternation among some of our 

allies when he referred to the ‘‘axis of evil.’’

I suggested that he wasn’t talking about a group of three countries that were carefully calibrating their policies together, but 

rather three sides of a triangle, probably identifying the three 

toughest nuts to crack here in terms of states. And in addition, of 

course, he made the point there are many other kinds of organizations. Is that perhaps a more correct way to look at what you think 

he might have intended to say? 

Director TENET. I believe so, sir. 

Senator KYL. And in that regard, all three of these countries deserve the attention not just of the United States, but we can certainly use the help of our allies in crafting policies that may or may 

not involve military means, but in crafting policies that would direct our attention jointly to these three separate and big challenges? 

150

Director TENET. Yes, sir, and that their participation with us is 

absolutely essential if we’re not going to experience the outgrowth 

of their behavior in some catastrophic way as well. 

Senator KYL. Mr. Chairman, I can’t tell from the lights either, 

but am I on red? 

Chairman GRAHAM. You’re in the red zone. 

Senator KYL. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Chairman GRAHAM. Senator Edwards. 

Senator EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, 

gentlemen. 

Director Tenet, I was on the ground in Afghanistan a few weeks 

ago and had the opportunity to meet with some of our intelligence 

operatives there and to see the conditions under which they’re operating. And I have to tell you it was very impressive—the professionalism, the hard work they’re doing, working 24 hours a day 

under very, very difficult conditions, extreme weather. There may 

have been running water where I was, but I didn’t see it. It was 

a very impressive operation, and the information they had was also 

very impressive. So I wanted to tell you that firsthand. 

Director TENET. Thank you, sir. They’re great people. 

Senator EDWARDS. Yeah, very impressive. 

But it’s obvious there’s a lot of work left to be done. Is bin Ladin 

still alive? 

Director TENET. Don’t know, sir. 

Senator EDWARDS. When is the last time we had information indicating he was still alive? 

Director TENET. I’d be happy to talk about all of this in closed 

session this afternoon. 

Senator EDWARDS. I understand that. Is there any information 

you can give us about that publicly? 

Director TENET. No, sir. 

Senator EDWARDS. Same question about Omar. 

Director TENET. Oh, I believe he’s alive, sir. 

Senator EDWARDS. Okay. And can you give us any information 

publicly about the last time we knew his whereabouts? 

Director TENET. No. 

Senator EDWARDS. Let me switch subjects, if I can, here, to the 

United States, and, Mr. Watson, let me direct these questions to 

you. What information can you give us publicly about the presence 

of al-Qa’ida cells here within the United States and the extent to 

which you believe we are able to monitor their activity here, without giving away any information. 

Mr. WATSON. Sure, and I’m sure we’ll talk about this in closed 

a little more. 

Senator EDWARDS. Yes. 

Mr. WATSON. There are hundreds of investigations that we have 

open. I’ll comment on that. An interesting point that Senator Shelby raised, I probably should address is, you know, of the 19, the 

commonalities that we saw in that, a key point to remember is, the 

19 individuals all came in legally in the U.S. Thirteen of the 19 

came in real late in the process—May, June, July of this past year. 

The question I think Senate Shelby was hitting at is, why didn’t 

we detect any of these people? The answer is, there were no contacts with anybody we were looking at inside the United States. 

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If they needed a driver’s license, they paid somebody $50 to $100 

to do it. And there’s a whole set of commonalities, which I’ll be glad 

to talk to you about in the closed session. 

But the answer to your question is, there’s an ongoing, very active program of identifying individuals and where these individuals 

come from. Where we get those leads are from the CIA and from 

the DIA, document exploitation in Afghanistan. There’s a whole 

myriad of things that happen under this program. 

And back to Mr. Tenet’s statement, George’s statement, quite 

honestly, with zero contact in the United States of any of our 

known people with the 19 individuals coming here that we had no 

information about, intelligence-wise, prior to, through no one’s 

fault, that’s how they did it.

Senator EDWARDS. Can you, without disclosing anything that 

would in any way hinder your investigation, can you tell us whether, yes or no, are there al-Qa’ida cells operating within the United 

States today? 

Mr. WATSON. I think I’ll hold that conversation to the closed 

hearing. There are individuals, obviously, that I mentioned. Are 

there core cells like the 19? Have we identified anybody that carries the commonalities of the 19? No, not at this process. But if you 

go back and look at the figures—and I know I’m on your clock, and 

I’ll be real quick about it—if you go back and look the commonalities of the age of the 19, how many of those individuals have come 

in from the countries that the 19 were from—Saudi Arabia, UAE, 

Lebanon and Egypt—you have, since December 31st of 1999, you 

have over 70,000 individuals that have entered the United States 

under that category. So it’s a huge, huge problem, and I look forward to talking to you some more about those numbers. 

Senator EDWARDS. Okay. If I can broaden that question—and 

again, limit this to what you’re able to say publicly, please—

Hizbollah, Islamic Jihad, Hamas cells within the United States? 

Mr. WATSON. Presence in the United States? Absolutely. 

Senator EDWARDS. They all have cells within the United States? 

Mr. WATSON. Yes. 

Senator EDWARDS. Can you tell us anything, without giving us 

any details, of the pervasiveness of their presence? 

Mr. WATSON. No. No, sir, I cannot. No. 

Senator EDWARDS. But that is something you’ll be able to tell us 

later? 

Mr. WATSON. Yes, sir. I’ll be glad to talk to you about that. 

Senator EDWARDS. Okay. Let me switch subjects. I’ve been concerned, and in fact I’ve introduced legislation on this issue, about 

the possibility and the potential threat of cyberterrorism. What I’d 

like, if you would, is to have you address that issue, tell me what 

you’re doing, first starting with how serious is the threat, what is 

the potential damage from cyberterrorism, and third, what are you 

doing, and are you working with private business to address that 

problem? 

Mr. WATSON. Sure. First of all, there is a real threat from the 

cyber arena. We have the National Infrastructure Protection Center set up. It’s not owned by the FBI. It’s a community center 

where we’ve brought down people from DOD and——

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Senator EDWARDS. Okay, I don’t mean to interrupt you, but tell 

us first how serious the threat is and what the potential damage 

is. 

Mr. WATSON. The threat, as we have seen in the al-Qa’ida investigations and in terrorism investigations and across the board in 

criminal investigations, the threat posed by cyber on being able to 

transmit information, communicate with each other is absolute. 

And that’s the wave of the future. If you’re talking specifically, 

Senator, about the infrastructure and can someone attack the infrastructure through the cyber means, they have the capability, 

and that’s why we put so much time and effort as a community on 

this. 

Senator EDWARDS. And what’s the potential for harm if they 

were successful at doing that? 

Mr. WATSON. Sure. A couple of incidents might be if—and these 

are truly made-up stories here, but what if the FARC decided that 

for whatever reason they wanted to change U.S. government policy 

about cocaine spraying or in the drug arena, and they had the capability of saying, if you don’t stop that, then we’re going to turn 

all the lights off down in the state of Florida, or we’re going to disrupt the power to the northeast part of the United States. That’s 

a threat of the cyber. What if—and I know my time’s short here. 

But on the defensive side—and if you think about that for a second—and I know this is an open hearing—that is a tremendous 

threat. We need the capability to be able to understand that and 

be able to counter that threat. Just real quick on the statistics: 

1,200 cases of our National Infrastructure Protection Center last 

year, over 55 percent had ISPs involved outside the United States. 

Senator EDWARDS. Good. 

Very quickly, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Tenet, you’re shaking your head. You obviously agree 

with that, you consider this a serious threat. 

Director TENET. Yes, sir. 

Senator EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman GRAHAM. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First question, I wanted to begin with you, Mr. Tenet, if I could. 

What is your view of the degree to which the Saudis have cooperated in identifying and capturing suspected terrorists? 

Director TENET. Well, sir, I’ll give you a short answer and would 

be pleased to talk about this at length in closed session, but I 

would tell you that since September 11 we have had excellent cooperation in this regard. And I don’t want to go beyond that here. 

Senator WYDEN. Can you tell us—and again, I understand the 

sensitivity in a public session—whether you think that they are 

moving to deal with the font of terror, these various religious 

schools that provide the cadre for terror groups? 

Director TENET. Sir, I’d like to talk about all that in closed session, thank you. 

Senator WYDEN. All right. Cuba is still listed by the administration as a state sponsor of terrorism. Would you give us an example, 

in your view, of how Cuba currently sponsors terrorism? 

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Mr. WATSON. From law enforcement’s perspective, Cuba certainly 

harbors a lot of fugitives and individuals that we still are concerned with, particularly the Puerto Rican issue and some other 

big-time individuals that have been convicted of terrorist crimes. 

Mr. FORD. My staff also suggests in the answer to the question 

in my book that there are 20 ETA members in Cuba, and they provide some degree of safe haven and support to the Colombian 

FARC and ELN groups. Bogota is aware of this arrangement; apparently it does not object.

Cuban spokesmen revealed in August that Sinn Fein’s official 

representative for Cuba and Latin America, who was one of the 

three Provisional IRA members arrested in Colombia on suspicion 

of providing explosives training to the FARC, have been based in 

Cuba for five years. Some U.S. fugitives continue to live on the island. 

Senator WYDEN. What can you tell us, again given the fact that 

this is a public session, about what is being done to address these 

threats that you describe? 

[Pause.] 

Senator WYDEN. Sounds like everybody’s tripping over themselves to answer. 

Director TENET. I don’t have an answer, sir. 

Mr. WATSON. On the law enforcement, on the fugitive side, in 

public I’d rather not say what we’re doing at this point in time. But 

we’re certainly working with the intelligence community. 

Senator WYDEN. Is there anything else to be said with respect to 

how we’re dealing with this in public? 

Director TENET. No, sir, I don’t think so. 

Senator WYDEN. All right. We’ll ask about that in private. 

Senator ROBERTS. Will the senator yield? I’m over here. 

Chairman GRAHAM. Senator Roberts. 

Senator WYDEN. I’d be happy to yield to a Kansan. 

Senator ROBERTS. One of the questions that I had was does the 

intelligence community believe that the resumption of U.S. trade 

with Cuba could hasten the economic and political reform in Cuba, 

given the fact that Castro is 77 years old, and that when he passes 

from the scene—and I was not aware until your commentary that 

in terms of state-sponsored terrorism that they were exporting terrorism, certainly to the degree that they were before when they 

were getting, what, $2 billion from the Soviet Union. But post-Castro with a drug cartel taking over Cuba poses, to me, a greater national security problem. 

And I’m wondering about your assessment in regards to trade 

with Cuba so you can hang your hat on getting some kind of an 

entrepreneurial peg down there so that we can make some 

progress. 

Chairman GRAHAM. Senator, could I ask you to hold that question? I think Senator Wyden had a final question he wanted to ask. 

Senator WYDEN. I did have one last question. With your leave, 

Mr. Chairman, if we could get an answer to Senator Roberts, and 

then I can ask one additional one. 

Chairman GRAHAM. Certainly—— Senator ROBERTS. I’m sorry for taking your time, Ron. 

Senator WYDEN. Not at all. 

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Director TENET. Senator, can I take that for the record? I don’t 

have an answer off the top of my head. 

Senator ROBERTS. Certainly. Thank you. 

Senator WYDEN. The last question I had deals with technology. 

I think this would be appropriate for you, Director Tenet. My sense 

is right now if you look at In-Q-Tel, if you look at the Department 

of Defense, if you look at the various agencies, we’re now having 

the federal government flooded with vendors and products and a 

variety of ideas for how to combat terrorism. It is all very constructive. I think we welcome it. And I’ve read publicly what In-Q-Tel 

has been trying to do, and I think it’s clearly a step in the right 

direction. But there doesn’t seem to be much of a process for evaluating the merits of these various and sundry technologies. 

I’m working on legislation now that would establish a national 

testbed that would allow us, in one place, to look at these various 

products for potential intelligence-gathering and information-sharing technologies. 

We’ve been pleased at the general comments that you all have 

made about this idea. I would just like to get a statement in the 

public domain here whether you think that that is generally a sensible idea to have one place, a national testbed where these products could be examined? 

Director TENET. I haven’t thought about it. It makes sense. I 

think that with In-Q-Tel, though, I mean, it’s a very focused effort. 

And we do identify very specific problems and very specific solutions that we’ve migrated to us, at CIA, when I say ‘‘us,’’ and we’re 

also trying to expand this to other elements of the intelligence community. I mean, unclassified environment, you know, access to people and technologies we would never otherwise see; great ability to 

sort of really get into a world that otherwise would not be open to 

us. And the technology is applicable to all kinds of problems. 

So we feel that it’s been very successful as a model. But certainly, sir, some centralized testbed may be, you know, helpful to 

all. 

Mr. WATSON. Senator, I think that would be very helpful in the 

fact that there are departments and agencies within the federal 

government that cannot communicate electronically, have different 

systems. And certainly in the information-sharing world, which 

we’re moving into, it would certainly be very beneficial. 

Senator WYDEN. We will have draft legislation to show you with 

respect to this process of testing for technology. I do think In-QTel is on to some very important initiatives. One of the things that 

triggered my interest in this is that they’ve said that they have 

really been at a loss as to try to figure out how to evaluate all 

these products. 

We’ll show you the legislation in draft form shortly. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral WILSON. Senator, I do want to mention, in Defense we 

have the C4ISR battle lab in Suffolk, where we try to integrate the 

best ideas in the Joint Task Force commander and, you know, warfighting setting; the Joint Interoperability Test Center, which does 

the same, technically make sure things interoperate. 

155

So certainly it’s been a long-term challenge for us, and we have 

some steps that are important going in the direction you’re talking 

about. It may not be national, but they may be built on. 

Senator WYDEN. Well, you all have worked very closely with us. 

Dr. Wenegar testified yesterday. My concern is you’ve got 20 agencies now that are working in areas, for example, like bioterrorism. 

I’ve been concerned that you if you have a bioterror attack in a 

given community it’s not possible today to get in one place a list 

of experts who can assist with this. And what you have, essentially, 

are all of these agencies proceeding with their own kinds of rules. 

We’d like to bring this together in one place. 

The Administration’s been very cooperative in terms of working 

with us. We’ll show you the draft legislation shortly. 

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman GRAHAM. Thank you, Senator. Senator Rockefeller. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A question for Mr. Watson. You know, when we talk about the 

sort of al-Qa’ida and we talk about the White Aryan Nation, we 

talk about different groups that are terrorists or capable of doing 

terrorism, we tend to divide them into categories. And I’ve never 

heard anybody address whether or not there is any interaction, either within our country or internationally, among those groups. 

Now granted, the White Aryan Nation probably doesn’t have a very 

large role in Saudi Arabia, let’s say. But what about the whole concept of terrorist groups, potential terrorist groups, cooperating.—I 

mean, we have groups in our own country that are organized in 34 

states, and you know the one I’m talking about. My question is, is 

there any interaction among these types of groups on the national 

level and, to whatever extent Director Tenet can tell internationally. 

Mr. WATSON. Specific communications, we do see some interaction and communications between groups. But with the explosion 

of the Internet, we certainly see white supremacist groups in contact with people in Europe, particularly in Germany, et cetera. 

We see on the terrorism, on the international terrorism front, we 

see people here and overseas communicating mainly via the Internet and talking back and forth and communicating that way. 

Again, we get—we the FBI—a lot of people come in and say you’ve 

got an individual down in West Virginia or Houston, Texas, that’s 

complaining against the regime of government. And these are 

friends of ours. And we have to look at that and take a look at it, 

and that’s something that’s protected under the Constitution. 

But there are groups that do communicate. We see more and 

more of that. I don’t think you were here when we were talking 

about the cyber-threat, but that is a real area—a growth area, and 

we’ll see more of that. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. So there’s not direct communication visa-vis higher-ups or middle-level types getting together and talking, 

but they use third-party, i.e. the cyber world, in order to do their 

communicating. But is it communicating of a planning nature, or 

is it just keeping in touch? 

Mr. WATSON. I’m sure we’ll talk about this in the closed sessions. 

There are a lot of indicators and key things we look at as well as 

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the intelligence community about codes, et cetera. I mean, what are 

they talking about, what does this mean. 

And the Agency has done a great job. The CIA has done a great 

job of trying to figure out what they’re talking about, if they’re 

talking about key words. They do communicate electronically. And 

I don’t want to mislead you in any way to say they do not. But they 

do. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Director Tenet, there’s always the talk of 

our coalition. I made a trip recently to the Middle East, and I kept 

bringing up the subject of Iraq. And I did that provocatively in 

order to elicit response. And always the question of the power of 

the coalition or the disintegration of the coalition was brought up 

in stronger or weaker terms. 

But is that not something that we can assume? For me, I’m looking at 20, 25, 30 years of this. And isn’t it probable that as we look 

at coalitions we cannot assume that they’re going to sort of stay 

stable, but that they’re going to ebb and flow, that some countries 

will wander off, that Saudi Arabia may come close to not being particularly friendly to us, maybe perhaps not breaking relations or 

anything of that sort. But then in two or three years, a series of 

events could happen, perhaps within that country or whatever, 

which would bring the coalition back into another form. 

So it’s an ebb and flow type situation, and we shouldn’t try to 

measure the power of our effort always according to the aggregate 

sum of whatever value you attach to a coalition? 

Director TENET. No, I agree with that. I think the other thing, 

particularly in that part of the world, is, as you probably—you got 

a private message and a public message. And you always see two 

forms. But I think in isolation, without knowledge about what 

you’re thinking, I mean, everybody is very careful. 

You’re correct. I mean, when you lead, everybody follows. Nothing ensures coalition success like success. And so the replication 

of—particularly in the war on terrorism. Iraq may be a separable 

issue, but there’s nothing that succeeds in coalescing people when 

they see progress being made and real results and real will to pursue whatever policy objective you set out. It’s when you get into the 

stage of languish and other things start to undermine what the 

original focus was that things start to drift away from you. 

So that focus and leadership brings people to you. And you 

should always start from the perspective of—and this is a policy 

issue; I shouldn’t be talking about it—what my leadership means 

in bringing everybody to me rather than worrying about it from the 

other side. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. So another way of putting that is the 

word unilateralism is used sometimes. And I’m not asking for a 

comment at this point, but the point is that if a country is showing 

absolute resolve, that that has an effect on what it is that countries 

who may be somewhat more on the fence or are somewhat worried 

will, in fact, choose to do with respect to how they coalesce. 

Director TENET. Absolutely. And it also has an impact on others 

whose behavior you’re seeking to modify at any moment in time, 

because that success, they have to be mindful of it. They have to 

look at the power of your operations and your policy. So that kind 

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of success also has an impact on behavior you want to change 

someplace else. So it should not be underestimated. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you.

Vice Chairman SHELBY [presiding]. The U.S., as we all know, has 

accomplished something extraordinary with its military operation 

in Afghanistan, clearly in ways and with capabilities that no other 

country can match, at least today. How will our successes to date 

affect other countries’ assessments of our role in the world and 

their relationship to us? And Director Tenet, especially how will 

such assessments perhaps affect our military intelligence relationship with other nations? 

Director TENET. I think that all of these relationships will be affected very positively and powerfully by what we’ve done. 

Vice Chairman SHELBY. Out of respect? 

Director TENET. Yes, but they also have seen the power of information-sharing, coalition warfighting, intelligence-sharing. They’ve 

seen benefits. And quite frankly—we can talk about this in closed 

session—the Afghan scenario has revolutionized modern warfare 

just in terms of technology and its application and the mating of 

human capabilities on the ground and Special Forces and your air 

war. 

Vice Chairman SHELBY. The ability to project force too. 

Director TENET. There are lots of interesting lessons here that 

we’re all obviously going to study. It never gets applied in the same 

way in the next place or other places, but I think it’s had a powerful impact. 

Vice Chairman SHELBY. But it’s these positive lessons learned, 

isn’t it? 

Director TENET. Oh, absolutely, sir. 

Admiral WILSON. There’s certainly multiple consumers out there 

that watch our military and intelligence community act, and they 

think of ways to fight the next war as well. And so we must not 

rest on the laurels of precision strike and all that stuff, but continue to move through and analyze and understand how our 

strengths can actually be used as weaknesses. 

The other thing is, I think there is some concern expressed by 

even friends about the widening gap between the U.S. military capability and their own, and that we can do the heavy lifting and 

then they’re in the peacekeeping and the mud and slug and all of 

that. 

Vice Chairman SHELBY. Heavy lifting—you mean project force 

and——

Admiral WILSON. We have the ability to do—it’s a widening gap 

in military capabilities, and so, as we continue to build coalitions, 

we need to work hard to capitalize on military, political, intelligence coalitions that can work well together. 

Vice Chairman SHELBY. To go to another area that the Director 

and I have worked together on over the years, that’s leaks. The security of our intelligence activities in the fight that we’re in is 

clearly a great concern to the President, to the Secretary of Defense, and, I know, to you, Director Tenet, and the FBI Director. 

All of you have spoken out against leaks of classified information. 

How damaging have such public revelations been to the intelligence community’s efforts, Director Tenet? 

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Director TENET. Well, sir, I think you know what I’m going to say 

here. 

Vice Chairman SHELBY. Yes. 

Director TENET. But I mean, I think that—— Vice Chairman SHELBY. Well, we’re going into a classified hearing later. 

Director TENET. Yes. I just need to reinforce that when you 

throw this information out, it often appears innocuous to someone 

who’s leaking information. That’s not the prism to look at it in. It’s 

the adversary’s counterintelligence capability—— Vice Chairman SHELBY. That’s right. 

Director TENET [continuing]. And his ability to put together the 

pieces of the puzzle that put at risk your human operations, your 

technical operations, your analytical products, and jeopardizes investment that we’ve made to protect the American people. 

Vice Chairman SHELBY. It’s a problem, isn’t it? 

Director TENET. It continues to be a problem, sir. 

Vice Chairman SHELBY. Mr. Watson. 

Mr. WATSON. I absolutely agree. 

Vice Chairman SHELBY. On behalf of the bureau. Go ahead. 

Mr. WATSON. Yes, absolutely, and it limits our ability to obtain 

additional information, because people are real leery about providing information if they think that’s going to get found out. 

Vice Chairman SHELBY. Compromised, you say. Admiral Wilson. 

Admiral WILSON. I think it could be devastating. 

Vice Chairman SHELBY. And it has at times, hasn’t it? 

Admiral WILSON. To sources and methods. 

Vice Chairman SHELBY. Mr. Ford. 

Mr. FORD. I couldn’t agree more. 

Vice Chairman SHELBY. We have a vote on the floor. Of course, 

Senator Graham, the Chairman, has gone to vote. So I’m going to 

need to vote. I’m not going to adjourn this Committee, because Senator Graham’s coming back. We’ll stand in recess till Senator 

Graham comes back. Is that okay? 

Director TENET. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman SHELBY. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.] 

Chairman GRAHAM [presiding]. The hearing will reconvene. We 

are in the midst of one vote, and there’ll be another vote following 

immediately. So we’ll probably just have a few more minutes of 

questioning and then we’ll adjourn until 3:30 this afternoon, when 

we’ll reconvene in closed session. 

The issue that I’m interested in pursuing is, what are some of 

the lessons that we learned on September 11, and how are we applying actions against those lessons? In my first round, I asked 

about the question of deterrence, based on the information that apparently Usama bin Ladin did not believe that we were committed 

to retaliating, and therefore, that he could take the actions that he 

did with a sense of impunity. And I’m going to be interested in 

closed session in pursuing further what we’re doing to communicate to other terrorist organizations and nations which might 

harbor terrorists or provide them with advanced means of weapons 

of mass destruction, so that they do not make the same mistake 

that bin Ladin did relative to what our intentions would be. 

159

A second area that has been mentioned is the fact that terrorists 

crossed our national borders and gained entry to the United States 

fairly easily. I was surprised to learn that if a U.S. consular office 

with someone standing in front of them requesting a visa wanted 

to know what was the criminal background of that individual or if 

that individual had a criminal background, that, insofar as Interpol 

is concerned—the international police organization—that for about 

half the countries in the world, many of the countries that we 

would be most concerned about, there is no capability of providing 

that information. 

What steps have we taken or would you recommend that we 

should take at every step in the process of a person gaining entry 

to the United States, such as the grant of a visa, screening at the 

point of entry into the United States that would harden our boarders against entry by potential terrorists? 

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, there is, as you know, a number of 

mechanisms already in place through the consular service, through 

the visa process, through an office in my bureau, which we call 

TIPOFF. And it’s a community resource that provides a list of both 

known terrorists and also, in some cases, international organized 

crime figures. This status is supplied by liaison services, by CIA, 

by FBI, DEA—whoever—so that each of our consular posts has an 

electronic hookup with our database, that when someone on our list 

shows up, it doesn’t always tell them what the problem is, but it 

says you don’t give a visa to this person unless you check with 

Washington first. And then we can provide them with the information. 

Chairman GRAHAM. Was that system in effect prior to September 

the 11th? 

Mr. FORD. It was. 

Chairman GRAHAM. All right. 

Mr. FORD. So that, obviously, it’s not foolproof. If you have not 

been picked up as a bad actor by one of our law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies or one of our ally or friend’s agencies, 

you won’t be on the list. You also can have an alias. And you have 

to balance that in terms of, one, both the economic and other interests that people all over the world have in traveling to the United 

States. The sheer numbers of people that go through the process, 

I find staggering. And secondly, there are a lot of countries that we 

do not require visas; they just simply have to have a passport. So 

that those people also are very difficult to track. 

Chairman GRAHAM. But were any of the terrorists involved in 

the September 11 attacks from a country where a visa was not required? 

Mr. FORD. I’ll have to take that question. I don’t think so, but 

I’ll check. 

[Answer supplied for the record: The ‘‘20th hijacker,’’ Zacharias 

Moussaoui, entered without a visa as a French citizen.] 

Admiral WILSON. Senator, I’d like to follow this up in a closed 

session about a cooperative program that we have ongoing with the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service, first for counter intelligence, but it has immense applications in this world that we’re 

pursuing rapidly. 

160

Also I wanted to just comment. You mentioned about lessons 

learned since September 11. And if I had to cite one thing, it would 

be the value of being on the offense—the value of getting prisoners, 

the value of getting documents, the value of operating in their 

lairs, the value of having them move and run and talk and all this. 

It gives us so much more leverage and options than when you’re 

purely on the defense. And so there’s a tremendous value to that. 

I’m not sure if the lesson’s learned, but it’s a lesson reinforced. 

Chairman GRAHAM. Well, I’m going to hold the further discussion 

on the immigration issue for the closed session, but to go to the 

issue of value of being on the offensive, I was interested that in the 

speech that he gave last week, Secretary Rumsfeld used the term 

‘‘preemptive strikes,’’ that we would be prepared not to wait until 

we’ve been attacked, but if we saw developments that were threatening, to move in a peremptory manner. What are the implications 

of that commitment to act peremptorily to our intelligence agencies, starting, Admiral Wilson, to the—— Admiral WILSON. First of all, I would say that, you know, most 

people think of about preemptive strikes in terms of the military, 

and certainly that is one venue for attack, but I suspect that the 

Secretary was talking about preemptive strike with all of our national capability: intelligence cooperation, security forces, financial 

attacks. And it’s also combined with this offense, in terms of not 

just being working on warning and threat levels, but also targeting 

options, targeting packages, the kind of work you have to do in the 

military. We talk about preparing the battle space. So we have certainly increased dramatically our efforts in the areas of preparing 

for future attacks. 

Mr. FORD. It’s very difficult to go on the offensive without having 

good intelligence. It’s always important. But if you’re going after 

specific groups or individuals, whether through law enforcement or 

whether it’s through military action or diplomatic pressure, you 

have to have the evidence, you have to have the information to act 

on. And so that the pressure on all of us has grown considerably 

after 9/11. We’ve got to get better. 

Chairman GRAHAM. For instance, one of the things that we’ve 

talked about that al-Qa’ida used were training grounds. They prepared a whole cadre of people who they then placed around the 

world to be ready to initiate action. And I think were not all of the 

19 hijackers graduates of one of al-Qa’ida’s training programs? 

That would seem to be an example of preemptive strikes. Are we 

gathering intelligence on the training facilities of other terrorist 

groups, and are we preparing ourselves with the kind of military, 

but also other, capabilities to peremptorily take out those training 

capabilities? 

Admiral WILSON. Absolutely. 

Chairman GRAHAM. Maybe that’s something you’d like to discuss 

in more detail in closed session. 

Director TENET. Maybe. [Laughter.] 

Chairman GRAHAM. Are there any other lessons that we have 

learned from the events of September the 11th that have an implication to our intelligence capabilities? 

Mr. WATSON. I think there are some things we probably should 

talk about in the closed session, some other trends that we saw as 

161

a result of the 19, Senator. Be glad to do that this afternoon with 

you. 

Chairman GRAHAM. Okay. 

There are some implications of what happened on September 11 

that I would describe as being the over-the-horizon threats. As an 

example, we know that Afghanistan had been the world’s largest 

producer of heroin. We destroyed a substantial amount of 

warehoused heroin during our attacks, and I would doubt that this 

is going to be a friendly growing season for heroin production in Afghanistan in the year 2002. That raises the question of will the 

world’s supply be thus diminished, or will there be other locations 

that might step forward to take a part of the production that Afghanistan has traditionally provided? 

A major heroin producer, relatively recent heroin producer, is Colombia. What do we know about the possibility of a significant increase in heroin production in Colombia to replace what has previously come from Afghanistan? And if our intelligence indicates 

that is in fact a possibility, what steps can we take to deal with 

it? 

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I’m not ready to write off so quickly 

that Afghanistan will no longer be a problem for our counternarcotics efforts.

Chairman GRAHAM. Even in 2002, with the kind of international 

presence that’s going to be in there? 

Admiral WILSON. I think actually I’ve seen some assessments 

that, because there’s relatively more freedom in Afghanistan than 

there was under the Taliban and people are struggling economically, that there may actually be not a change or even a surge in 

heroin cultivation. 

Mr. FORD. And there is also the storage of crops from before, and 

that——

Chairman GRAHAM. That’s inside or outside of Afghanistan? 

Mr. FORD. Inside Afghanistan. 

So while I think that it will continue to be a problem, my guess 

is that 2002 may be a little bit better than 2003, 2004. But it’s still 

a problem. But there’s always someone somewhere who seems to 

find a way to make up for any shortfalls, unfortunately. There’s so 

much money involved that people are prepared to take almost any 

risk to continue to provide heroin. We’re just going to have to keep 

on top of it. 

Director TENET. Senator, why don’t we provide you an assessment for the record on what the Crimes and Narcotics Center—

take all these facts and put them forward to you in a piece of analysis. I think it might be helpful. 

Chairman GRAHAM. All right. And I’m going to hold the rest of 

my questions until after we reconvene at 3:30. Senator Rockefeller, 

do you have any final questions? 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I can do it later. 

Chairman GRAHAM. We’re going to reconvene at 3:30 in a closed 

session. 

If there are no other questions, first, I would like to say that I 

think one of the lessons that we’ve learned since September 11 is 

just how good our intelligence agencies are. The infrastructure that 

was in place in Central Asia that allowed us to conduct the miliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 06:47 Oct 17, 2002 Jkt 082338 PO 00000 Frm 00165 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A338.XXX A338
162

tary operation didn’t just happen in the afternoon of September 11. 

It represented a vision of where the United States would have the 

need to develop information and the maintenance of an infrastructure that put us in a position to have the information when we 

needed it. 

The fact that the first people on the ground in Afghanistan were 

intelligence officers and that the first casualty in terms of loss of 

life was an intelligence officer are examples of the dedication and 

courage of the men and women who represent us through your 

agencies. And on behalf of the American people, there is a deep recognition and appreciation of what you have done. 

And I recognize that much of the commentary, including some 

today, has been phrased in terms of questioning what happened or 

what didn’t happen. But I hope that the American people understand that those questions are being asked in the sense of how, together, do we take a strong set of agencies and make them even 

stronger in the face of the new threats that have now become so 

apparent. And I want to personally express my appreciation for 

your individual leadership and for the people that you lead so effectively. 

Director TENET. Thank you, Senator. 

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

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