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# United States Court of Appeals Forthe Seventh Cir c uit

No. 17-2307

U NI T E D S TAT E S O F A M E RI C A , Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v.

D E R RI C K D. B E L L, also known as R O C K , Defendant-Appellant.

Appea l fro m the U ni ted S ta tes Di stri ct Co urt fo r the No rthern Di stri ct o f Il l i no i s, Western Di v i si o n
. No . 3 :1 6 -cr-5 0 0 1 1 -1 — Fre de rick J. Ka pa la , Judg e.

A RGU E D M ARC H 29, 2018

— D E C I D E D A P R I L 1 0, 2018

Befor e B AU E R

, F L AUM , and M AN I ON

, Circuit Judges

. B A U E R , Cir cuit Judge. Dur ing the executi on of a sear ch

w ar r ant on Januar y 15, 2016, A TF agents found Der r i ck Bell in possessi on of a .40 cali

ber pi stol. B ell w as char ged wi th being
a felon in p ossessi on of a fi r ear m on Mar ch 1, 2016, in v i olati on2 No. 17-2307
of 18 U.S .C. § 922(g)(1), an d on Febr uar y 6, 2017, he pleaded gui l ty pur suant to a plea agr eement. In the P r esentence Inv esti gati on Repor t ( P S R ) , the Pr obati on Offi cer calculated Bell’s total offense lev el a s 2 3, wi th a cr i min al hi stor y categor y of VI, f or a S entencin g G u id eline
r a n ge of 92 to 1 15 months. The PS R stated that “the [G]ui deline
r a n ge for a ter m of super v i sed r elease i s 1 y ear to 3 y ear s.” See U.S .S .G. § 5D1.2(a)(2). The Pr obati on Offi cer a lso fi led a separ a te sentencing r ecommendati on, whi ch pr ov i d ed a char t br eaki n g down the statutor y and Gui deline r anges f or super v i sed r elease. Fi nally

, the gov er nment fi led a “Noti c e of Agr eement Regar ding S uper v i sed Release,” whi ch s tated that the gov er nment r ecommended a ter m of super v i sed r elease wi thi n the Gui delin es r ange of one to thr ee y ear s. The di str i ct cour t sentenced Bell to 98 months’ im p r i sonment, to be f ollow ed by thr ee y ear s of super v i sed r elease. On appeal, Bell r ai ses thr ee pr ocedur a l challenges to hi s sentence. S ince w e conclude that the di str i ct cour t d i d not c ommi t any er r or s, we affi r m. I. DISCUSSION A. Failure t o Calculate the Guidelines Range for Supervised Release Bell fi r st ar gues that the di str i ct cour t pr ocedur ally er r ed when i t fai led to expli ci tly m ake a Gui delines calculati on for hi s ter m of super v is e d r elease on the r ecor d. W e r ev i ew pr ocedur al er r or s at sentencing de novo
. United States v. Gibbs , 578 F .3d 6 94, 695 (7th Ci r
. 2009). How ev er , we h av e pr ev i ously

r ev i ew ed a d i str i c t cour t’s fai lur e to c alculate the s u per v i sedNo. 17-2307 3

r elease Gui d elines r ange for plain er r or
. United States v
. Oliver , 873 F .3d 601, 610 (7th Ci r
. 2017). Ev en under de novo r ev i ew , w e find no er r or
. The S upr e m e C o ur t has sai d that “a di str i ct cour t should begi n al l s entencing pr oceedi n gs by cor r ectly calculating the appli cable Gui delines r ange.” Gall v
. United States , 552 U.S

. 38, 49 (2007). Fai ling to calculate the Gui delines r a nge i s a “si gni fi

cant p r ocedur al er r or .” Id. a t 51. Whi le the Gu id e l ines hav e s e p a r ate calculati ons for a custodi a l sentence a nd super vi se d

r elease, th e y both for m the ov er all s entence. See United States
v
. Kappes , 782 F .3d 828, 837 (7th Ci r
. 2015) ( “ Any t e r m of super v i sed release i s consi der ed par t of the ov er a ll sentence.”). How ev er

, w e hav e pr ev i ously held t h a t “‘an expli ci t announcement of the [G]ui delines r ecommendati on’ for super v i sed r elease, although helpful for pur poses of a ppellate

r ev i ew , i s not r equi r ed.” Oliver, 873 F .3d at 610 (quoti ng United States v
. Anderson , 604 F .3d 997, 1004 (7th Ci r
. 2010). “Rather , the c r iti cal inqui r y i s whether the di s tr i ct c our t w as aw ar e of and under s t o od the Gui delines r ecommendati on f or super v i sed release.” Id. In exami ning whether the di str i ct cour t under stood the Gui delines c alculati on for super v i sed r elease,

w e exami n e whether the cour t i mposed a w it h in-Gui delin es sentence, and whether the cour t expli ci tly r efer enced the PS R d ur in g the sentencing. See id. at 610–11; Anderson , 604 F

. 3 d a t 1004. In Gibbs , w e r emanded for r esentencing because the di s tr i ct
cour t i mposed a ter m of super v i sed r elease twi ce as long as the G u i delines range, whi l e only acknowledgi ng the statutor y
r a n ge. Gibbs , 5 7 8 F .3d at 695. Thus, w e could not conclude “that4 No. 17-2307
the di str i ct cour t cor r ectly c alculated the adv isor y Gui deline
r a n ge.” Id. at 695–96. How ev er , the d i str i ct c our t her e, li ke in Oliver a nd Ander son , i mposed a ter m of super v i sed r elease wi thi n the Gui delines r ange. See Olive r , 8 7 3 F .3d at 606; And e r s on , 604 F .3d at 1000. Th e cour t also made numer ous
r efer ences to the PS R, t h e Pr obati on Offi cer ’s sentencing
r ecommendati on, and the separ ately fi led “ Noti c e of Agr eement Regar ding S u per v i sed Release,” all of whi ch contai ned the Gui delin e s calculati on for super v i sed release. Mor eov er , w e ar e confi dent the c o u r t w as aw ar e of the contents of these doc u m ents because i t expli ci tly adopted the Gui delin es calculati on contai ned in the PS R for the ter m of i mpr i s onment,
as w ell a s the agr eed modi fi cati ons to the P S R’s r ecommended condi ti ons of super v is e d r elease. Accor dingly , the cour t di d not er r in i mposing a thr ee-y ear ter m of super v i s ed r elease wi thout m a k in g a speci fi c Gui d elines calculati on on the r ecor d. B. Consideration of Depa rtu r e P r o v i s i o n s i n th e S e n t encing Guidelines Next, Bell ar gues that the d i str i ct cour t pr ocedur ally er r ed when i t consi der ed the Gui del in e s ’ depar tur e p r ov i si ons as “contr olli ng author i ty” dur in g i ts 18 U.S .C. § 3553(a) analysi s. Our r ev i ew of the r ecor d does not suppor t thi s conclusi on. When the Gui delines w er e mandator y , a di str i c t cour t could i m pose a s entenc e outsi de the Gui delines r a nge only thr ough the depar tur e pr ov i s i ons. United States v
. B ro wn , 732 F .3d 781, 786 ( 7 t h Ci r
. 2013). After the G ui delines became adv i sor y in Unit ed States v
. Booker , 543 U.S

. 220 ( 2005), the depar tur e pr ov i si ons w er e r end e r e d obsolete. United States v
. Lucas , 670 F .3d 7 8 4 , 7 9 1 (7th Ci r
. 2012). How ev er , w e hav eNo. 17-2307 5

str es s e d t h at “di str i ct cour ts can sti ll take gui dance fr om the depar tur e pr ov i si ons
... and apply th e m b y w ay of analogy when a s s essing the § 3553(a) factor s.” I d. Accor dingly

, w e hav e nev er held that the depar tur e pr ov i si ons “ ar e i r r elev ant to the sentencin g pr ocess.” United States v

. Pankow, 884 F

. 3d 785, 794 (7th Ci r
. 2 018). In fact, § 3 553(a)(5) contemplates that a di s tr i ct
c o u r t w i l l c o n s i d e r “ a ny p e r t in e n t poli cy s tatements” con t a in e d in the Gui d elines. Dur ing t h e di str i ct cour t’s § 3553(a) analysi s of B ell’s
ar guments in f av or of a below-Gui delines sentence, the cour t
c o r r ectly r eli ed on our pr ecedent r egar ding the depar tu r e p r o v i s i ons and p oli cy statement s
. The c o u r t a c kn o w l e d g e d th a t whi le the for mal depar tur e analysi s i s obsolete, the depar tur e pr ov i s i ons could be used as “gui dance” and appli ed “by w ay of analogy

.” As the c o ur t analyzed each of Bell’s mi ti gati on
ar guments in the cour se of i ts § 3553(a) analysi s, i t r efer enced, “by w ay of analogy

,” a par ti cular poli cy statemen t r e gar ding speci fi c offender char acter i sti cs. See, e.g. , U.S .S .G. § 5H1.3 (mental and emoti onal condi ti ons); § 5H1.6 (fami ly ti e s and

r esponsi bi li ti es); § 5H1.12 (lack of gui dance as a y outh and si mi lar ci rcumstances). The cour t di d not tr eat the p o l icy statements as contr olli ng autho r it y; r ather , i t appr opr i ately consi der ed them as par t of the enti r e § 3553(a) an a l y si s in finding that a below-Gui delines sentence was not w a r r anted. C. Consideration of Bell’s History and Characteristics Fi nally , Bell ar gues that t h e d i str i ct cour t di d not consi der hi s hi s tor y and char acter i sti cs in thei r totali ty du r in g t he § 3553(a) analysi s. Once again, our r ev i ew of the r ecor d leads us to conclude other wi se.6 No. 17-2307
The di st ri c t cour t began i ts § 3553(a) analysi s by noti ng Bell’s ar guments in mi ti gati on: hi s di ff ic ult upbr ingi n g; hi s suppor ti v e fami ly and thei r ci r cumstances; hi s hi s tor y of depr essi on, a l ear ning di s abi li ty , and substance abuse; and hi s
r e mo r s e. The cour t also di scussed a rguments in aggr av ati on: Bell’s lengthy cr i min a l hi s t o ry ; hi s f ai lur e to comply w i th cour tor der ed super v i si on; and hi s possessi on of a loaded gun. Each of Bell’s ar guments in m i ti gati on w er e then dealt w it h thor

oughly , in tur n, wi th the cour t noti ng counter v ai ling ar guments in aggr av ati on. The cour t concluded that “in sum,” n one of the ar guments in mi ti gati on w a r r anted a below-Gui delin es sentence, although i t w ould “gi v e d u e m i t i g a t in g c o n s i d er ati on to the poi nts r ai sed by the defense.” Clear l y , the cour t consi der ed Bell’s ar guments in mi ti gati on as a whole—i t si mply w as not per suaded they j usti fi ed a below-Gui delines sentence.

II. CONCLUSION For the for egoi ng r easons, the sentence i s AFFIRMED.