# FILED

February 2, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL A PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT KNOXVILLE DECEMBER SESSION, 1998

DEXTER JOHNSON, ) ) No. 03C01-9707-CR-00241 Appellant ) ) HAMILTON COUNTY vs. ) ) Hon. Douglas a. Meyer, Judge STATE OF TENN ESSEE, ) ) (Writ of Habeas Corp us) Appellee )

For the Appellant : For the Appellee : Dexter Johnson , Pro Se John Knox Walkup T.H.S.F. Attorney General and Repor ter P.O. Box 1050 Henning, TN 38041 Ellen H. Pollack Assistant Attorney Gener al Criminal Justice Div

ision 425 Fifth Avenue North 2d Floor, Cordell Hul l Building Nashville, TN 37243-0493

OPINION FILED: AFFIRMED

David G. Hay

es Judge1 In Tennessee, a "prisoner" must submit an application, i n the form of a peti tion, for the issuanc e of a writ to th e court m ost con venient in loc ation to the "p risoner." See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-105 (1980).

2 More specifica lly , he contends ( 1) that hi s plea was inv oluntari ly ent

ered because he was on "powerfultranquil izers . . . tha t . . .made him paranoid" when th e offenses were committed and (2) that trial counsel fai led to pr

operly investi gate his char ges. 2 OPINION

The appellant, Dexter Johnson, appeals the Hamilton Cou nty Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his pro se application for a writ

of habeas corpus. On February 11, 1994, the appell ant entered guilty plea s to the offenses of first degree murder for the death of Donald Sirhan; first degree murder for the dea th of Renaldo Crawford; criminal att

empt to commit first degree murder; and criminal attempt to commit aggravated robber y. The appellant receiv ed two life sentences for the murder convictions, twenty-five years for the attempted murder conviction and six years for the attempted aggravated robbery conviction. These sentences were ordered to be served concur rently. The appellant is currently incarcer ated at the West Tenness ee High Sec urity Facil ity in Laud erdale Co unty. 1

On March 5, 1996, the appellant filed an application for wr it of habeas corpus in the Hamilton County C riminal Court allegi ng "ineffective assistance of c ounsel." 2 On March 6, 1996, the trial court found the appellant's clai ms were not appropriate for habeas corpus relief and dismi ssed the appellant's petition . The appellant appeals this decision.

Initially, we note

that, "[t]he mere fact that an appellant designates a pleading as a petition for habeas corpus r elief does not, however, mean that the jurisdiction of the habeas corpus statutes has been properly invoked. If the petition is, in fact, a request for relief that may be granted only pursuant to the post-conviction s tatutes, a court may properly treat that petition as a petition for post-conviction relief and ap ply the appropriate . . . statute of l imitations to its filing ." Archer v. State , 851 S.W.2d3 In the appe llant's first p etition , he a sse rted th at his guilty ple as w ere c ons titution ally deficien t because (1) t hey viol ated Boyk in , ( Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969)) , and (2) b ecaus e he wa s me ntally incom petent. 3 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). The appellant's claim of ineffectiveness is an appropriate ground for post-conviction relief. However, because this petition w as filed after May 10, 1995, it is governed by the Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1995, which permits the filing of only one petition for post-convi ction relief. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(c) (1995). A previous petition for post -conviction relief w

as dismissed upon the merits with the di smissal being affirmed by thi s court on February 6, 1996. See Johnson v. State , No. 03C01-9503-CR-00088 ( Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, Feb. 6, 1996), perm. to appeal dismissed , (Tenn. Nov. 9, 1998). 3 Thus, this is the appellant's second petition for post-conviction reli ef and the trial court was precluded from treating t he appel lant's petitio n as one fo r post- convic tion re lief.

In Tennessee, a state writ of habeas corpus, as oppose d to a federal writ, will issue only

when the conviction is void because the convicting court was without jurisdiction or authori

ty to sentence a defendant or that a defendant's sentence has expired and the petitioner is being illegally rest rained. See Archer , 851 S.W.2d at 164. A void judgment is one which shows "upon the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is r endered" that the convicting court was without j urisdiction. Id. It is undisputed that the Cr iminal Court of Hamilton County had subject matter jurisdiction of the criminal charges refe rred to in the indictments and the authority to enter judgments of convi ction against the appellant for these crimes. See State v. Nixon , 977 S.W.2d 119 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997), perm. to appeal denied , (Tenn. 1998) (lack of jurisdiction refers to subject matter j urisdi ction) . Moreo ver, i t is und isputed

that the appella nt's se ntences

of life imprisonment have not expi red. Accordingly,this issue is without merit.

Based upon the foregoing, the tr ial court's summary di smissal of the4

appellant's petition is affirmed.

____________________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, Jud ge

CONCUR:

___________________________________ JERRY L. SMITH, JUD GE

___________________________________ JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE