COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Senior Judge Baker 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

PAULUS THENDOLL OWENS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1060-98-2 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 MAY 4, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 

George F. Tidey, Judge 

William T. Linka (Boatwright & Linka, on 

brief), for appellant. 

H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 

 Paulus Thendoll Owens (defendant) was convicted by the trial 

court for operating a motor vehicle after being adjudged an 

habitual offender, a violation of Code § 46.2-357(B). On appeal, 

defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove 

actual notice of the adjudication. We disagree and affirm his 

conviction. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of the appeal. 
 “On appeal, ‘we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Archer v. Commonwealth, 

26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (citation omitted). 

The credibility of the witnesses, the weight accorded testimony, 

and the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are matters to be 

determined by the fact finder. See Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. 

App. 194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). The judgment of the 

trial court will not be set aside unless plainly wrong or without 

support in the evidence. See Code § 8.01-680. 

 On October 1, 1997, State Trooper J.L. Bradford observed 

defendant speeding and “pulled [him] over.” When Bradford 

inquired “about his license,” defendant initially acknowledged 

“that he doesn’t [sic] have his license,” but denied that his 

privileges were “suspended.” Defendant then “changed his mind” 

and confessed that he “was suspended,” adding that he “didn’t know 

he was a habitual offender.” Following further investigation by 

Bradford, defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated and 

after having been declared an habitual offender, the instant 

offense. 

 At trial, the Commonwealth introduced a certified DMV 

“Transcript of [defendant’s] Driver History,” which reflected an 

habitual offender adjudication by the Richmond General District 

Court on September 3, 1996, together with the attendant show cause 

and final orders. The adjudication order recited that defendant 

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had failed to appear at the hearing, despite personal service of 

the show cause order on May 2, 1996. The documentary evidence 

further established that an “appeal [was] noted” of the order, but 

“not perfected,” and a “copy [of the order had been] mailed to 

[defendant]” on October 3, 1996. Nevertheless, relying upon Reed 

v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 467, 424 S.E.2d 718 (1992), defendant 

contends that such evidence failed to establish actual notice of 

the adjudication, a proof indispensable to the instant conviction. 

 Code § 46.2-357(B) punishes “any person found to be an 

habitual offender . . ., who is thereafter convicted of driving a 

motor vehicle . . . while the revocation determination is in 

effect.” However, “Code § 46.2-355 . . . requires that the person 

receive actual notice of having been declared an habitual offender 

and directed not to drive before he can be convicted and 

imprisoned for driving after having been declared an habitual 

offender.” Reed, 15 Va. App. at 471, 424 S.E.2d at 720-21. Thus, 

the Commonwealth must prove actual notice of an habitual offender 

adjudication to support a conviction for violation of Code 

§ 46.2-357. See id. at 471-72, 424 S.E.2d at 720-21. 

 Here, the record clearly reflects that an appeal was noted 

from the adjudication order. “An appeal [from a general district 

court judgment] may be noted by a party or by the attorney for 

such party.” Rule 7A:13; see also Code § 16.1-106. “In the 

absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts may presume that 

public officers have properly discharged their official duties.” 

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Robertson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 854, 856-57, 406 S.E.2d 

417, 418 (1991) (citations omitted). “The attorney-client 

relationship presumes that attorney and client, as servant and 

master, will communicate about all the important stages of the 

client’s . . . trial.” Hunter v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 717, 

722, 427 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1993); see also Code § 8.01-314. Guided 

by these principles, the record establishes that an appeal of the 

order was properly noted by defendant or his attorney in 

compliance with the Rules of Court, a circumstance sufficient to 

prove that defendant was actually cognizant of its import, 

directly or through counsel. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed. 

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