The Honor able Ge org e C. Steeh, United States Dist ri ct C o u rt for the Eastern D istrict of * Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0867n.06 F iled: Novem ber 29, 2006 No. 05-5789 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,

v. ADRIAN BROOM, Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE WE STE RN DI STR IC T OF TEN NE SSEE

BEFORE: KEITH, COLE, Circuit Jud ges; STEEH , District Judge. * DAMON J. K

EITH , Circuit Judge. Def endant, Adr ian B room, appe als his sentence of 135 months, followi n g h i s p l ea of g uilty for violation of his supervise d rele ase, one count of dis tr ibutio n o f m ari

jua na , a nd on e c ount o f p os se ssi on

wi th i nte nt t o d istri bu te mari jua na . B e c a us e

we fi nd, int e r a lia , that Br oom validly waived his rig ht to this appea l, we G RA NT the Gover nment’s motion to dis miss and AF F IRM the district court’s se ntence

.

I. O nO c t o b e r

3 0 , 1 9 9 8 , B r o o m w a s s e n t e n c e d t o 6 3 m o n t h s o f

i mp r i s o n m e n tf

o l l o w e d b y 3 y e ars of su

pe rv ise d re le a se fo r p os se ssi on wi th i nte nt t o d istri bu te mari jua na . H is s up e rv ise d r e le a seNo. 05-5789

United States v. Broom Pag e 2 beg an on Apr il 30, 2002. Whil e on super vised rele ase, on N ovember 14, 2003, Br oom sold a pound of marijuana

to a conf idential informant. He later ma de an a ttem p t ed sale of an a dditional five pounds of marijuana

to the same confide ntial inf ormant on November

21, 2003, but was deta ined and ar rested b y s t at e l aw enfor ceme nt office rs. Followinghis arre st, Broom not only acc epted respon s i b i l i t y

for his ac tions, but also admitt ed re sponsibili ty for a n additional 210 pounds of marijuana

. On J anuar y 14, 2004, Br oom w as arr ested once mor e whe n law enf orce ment office rs serve d

a sea rch w arr ant at a r esidenc e in M emphis, Tennesse e. Of fice rs found $8,440.00 on B room’s person, the r emains of 10 va cuum pac k wra ppers, a 4-foot hig h marijuana

plant, marijuana

residue, g row lig h t s , an d p lant food, amongother drugpara pherna lia. Br oom admitted that he had the $8,440.00 in order to satisfy a debt he owed f

or pre viously

rec eiving 80 pounds of marijuana

. Ba sed on the for eg oing, the United States Probation Offic e filed a petition to revoke B room’s supervised r elea se on Mar ch 17, 2004. Br oom was a lso indicted on April 6, 2004 on one count of dis tr ibutio n o f mari

jua na fo r his c on du c t on No ve mbe r 14 , 20 03 , a nd on e c ount o f p os se ssi on

wi th intent to dist ribute marijuana for his conduc t on November 21, 2003. On July 7, 20 04 , B ro om e nte re d a ple a a g reem ent, w hic h p ro vid e d, in r e le va nt p a rt , “De fenda nt here by waives his rig ht of appeal as to any and all issues in this case, a nd consents to the final dispositi on of this matter by the United States District Court.” The Gove rnment, in turn, ag ree d to r equest an “ac cepta

nce of responsibility ” reduc tion at B room’s sentenc ing hear i n g o n the cond i t i o n t hat “[his] conduct c ontinues to clear ly demonstrate a cce ptance of his persona l responsibility

for his off

ense up to the date of sente ncing [.] ”No. 05-5789

United States v. Broom Pag e 3

Br oom later pled guilty to state cha

rg es ar ising fr om this i ncident. 1 At his chang e of plea hearing on J uly 8, 2004, Br oom acknowle dg ed that he ha d discussed

an d r e v i e w e d t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f

t h e p l e a a g r e e m e n t , i n c l u d i n g t h e w a i v e r p r o v i s i o n , w i t h h i s a t t o r

n e y. The district cour

t relea sed B room on bond on the condition that h e not commit a fede ral, state, or loc a l crim in al of

fe ns e or tr a ve l outsi de the Wes te rn Di str ic t of

Te nn e sse e wi tho ut a

pp ro va l of

his parole office r. Nonethele ss, on July 29, 2004, befor e re ceivinghis sentence , Br oom was once ag ain caug ht with nine g rams of ma

rijuana w hen state la

w enf orce m ent offic ers se arc hed his truck. On 1 November

17, 2004, the Gover

nment filed a motion to revoke Br oom’s rele ase on the g rounds that his Ju ly 2 9 th p o s s e s s io n o f n in e g r a ms o f ma r ij u an a c o n s ti tute d a v io lati o n o f h is c onditions of rele ase. At sentencing , on May 6, 2005, the Gover

nment further

argued that, since Br oom’s continued mar ijuana dea l i n gs violated the ter ms of his plea ag ree ment, he wa s ineligible f or an “ac cepta nce of responsibility ” re duction as provided unde r the a g ree ment. The district c ourt ag ree d with the Gover nment’s position and sentenc ed Br oom to the statutory maxi mum of five y ear s on the distribution of marijuana c ount, the statutory maxi mum of five y ear s

on the po sse ssi on

wi th i nte nt t o d istri bu te mari jua na c ount, and

15 mon ths on his su

pe rv ise d r e le a se vio la tio ns , to run c on se c uti ve ly . B ro om f ile d a tim e ly no tic e of a pp e a l. On Novembe r 4, 2005, the Go ve rnme nt f

ile d a mot ion to d ism iss B ro om’ s a

pp e a l on the g ro un d th at Br oo m ha d w a ive d h is rig ht to appeal in his plea a g re em en t

. A m otion panel of this Court refe rre d the Gover nment’s motion to t his merits panel on F ebrua ry 6, 2006.No. 05-5789

United States v. Broom Pag e 4 II. On appe al, B room es s e n ti a ll y ar g u e s th a t ( 1 ) th e a p p e ll a te w a iv e r p r o v ision in his plea ag ree ment is invalid and (2) his sentenc e is unconstitutional under United States v. Book er , 5 43 U. S. 220 (2005). We will addre ss eac h in turn. 1. The appe lla te waiv e r pr ov isi on i n Br oo m ’s ple a a gr e e m e nt is v ali d. A. Standard of

Review We “ re vie w[] th e qu e sti on of wh e the r a de fe nd ant wa ive d his rig ht to a pp e a l hi s se nte nc e in

a va lid ple a a g re e me nt de novo .” Un ite d S tat es v . S mi th , 344 F.3d 479, 483 ( 6th Cir. 2003). B. Broom ’s appellate wai ver provision w as m ade “know ingly an d volu ntarily.” “I t is well-established that a ny rig ht, even a

constitutional right, may

be surr ender ed in a plea ag ree ment if that waiver was made knowing ly and voluntarily .” United States v. W ilson , 438 F.3d 672, 673 (6th Cir. 2006). To help e nsure that a n appellate waiver

is made “k n o wing ly

and voluntarily ,” Rule 11(b) (1)(N) of the Fe dera l Rules of Criminal P roce dure instructs that a district “cour t must i nform the de fenda nt of, and de termine that the de fenda nt understands . . . the te rms of any plea- ag ree ment provision waiving the rig ht to appeal . . . .” Fed

. R. Crim. P . 11(b)( 1)(N)

. Br oom asserts that the a

ppellate wa iver provision in his pl ea agr ee m ent is invalid beca use it was “unknowingand unintellige nt” as a result of (1 ) i n ef

fec tive assistance from his counsel, who

a lle g e dly mis c omm

un ic a te d th e natur e of

the wa ive r t o h im, and

(2 ) t he dis tr ic t c ourt’s fa ilure to sp e c if ic a lly “ a sk [him ] wh e the r h e un de rs too d th e te rm s o f t he a pp e a l w a ive r, ” wh ic h, a c c or din g to Br oom, amounted to noncompliance with Rule 11(b)(1) (N).No. 05-5789

United States v. Broom Pag e 5 As an initial matter, it is clear that Br oom’s bare asser tions with respect to his attorney ’s miscommunication are insuff icient to support a claim of i neff ective a ssistance of c ounsel on direc t appea l a nd, acc ording ly , must be rejec ted. See, e .g. , United St ates v. Bradley , 4 00 F .3 d 4 59 , 4 62 (6 th Cir. 2005) (explaining “our prac tice

. . . of consistently declining to a ddress inef fec tive-assistance claims on direc t appea l” wher e the r ecor d contains “sc ant information” to support the c laim). No tw ith sta

nd ing , w e wi ll c on sid e r B ro om’ s c on te nti on that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t c omp ly with Rule 11(b)(1) (N) w hen it neg lected to “ask [ him] whether he understood the terms of the appea l waiver ” provision. Be cause Br oom did not assert this objection before the district court, we revie w his alleg ati o n for “ plain err or.” See U nited States v. Murdoc k , 398 F.3d 491, 496 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (c i t i n g United St ates v. Vonn , 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002)) . Attempting to mee t his burden of proof under the plain er

ror standa rd, B room relies on Murdock, which stands for the proposition that a district court’s “ wholesale omission” of a Rule 11(b)( 1)(N) inquiry constitutes “plain er ror,” and ther eby invalidates a de fenda

nt’s waiver

of appe llate re view. See id. at 499. Murdock, howeve r, i s inapposite to the facts of the instant matter. Her e, t h e d i s t ri ct co urt sp e c if ic a lly inf or me d B ro om t

hat Para g ra ph te n [of the ple a a g re e me nt] s ay s th a t .

. . y ou he re by wa ive y our r ig ht t o appea l as to any

and all issues i n t h i s ca s e and consent to the final disposition of this matter by

the United S tates Dist rict C ourt. I t say s that y ou further waive a ny rig ht that y ou may

have to c ollatera lly

attack a ny sentenc e imposed i n any future proce eding , including but not limit ed to any rig hts y ou may

have unde r 28 U.S.C., Section 2255 and under

Blakely versus Washing ton, a ver y rec ent Supreme Court c a se . . . . I t say s tha t y ou un de rs tand that if y ou purs ue any c oll a te ra l atta c k o f t his conviction, a se ntence of such a n attack w ill constit ute a brea ch o f the plea a g re e me nt, and

y ou un de rs tand

and a g re e that th e Un ite d St a te s d oe s n ot w a ive its r i g h t s t o a p p e a l

. H a v e y o ud i s c u s s e d a l l t h o s e t h i n g s w i t h y o u r c o u n s e l ?No. 05-5789

United States v. Broom Pag e 6 (J.A. at 47). Br oom answe red, “Yes, sir.” Id. Unlike Murdock, the instant rec ord does not show that the district court c ommitt ed a “wholesa le omission” of a Rule 11(b)( 1)(N) inquiry

. Rather, we

c on c lud e tha

t, o n th e ba sis of

its c oll oq

uy wi th B ro om, the dis trict c ourt me t it s d uty un de r R ule 11(b)( 1)(N) in “inform[ing] the defe ndant of, a nd deter min[ ing] that the defe ndant understands

. . . th e te rm s o f a

ny ple a -a g re e me nt p ro vis ion wa ivi ng the ri g ht t o a

pp e a l . .

. .” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)( 1)(N)

. Br o o m’ s ar g u me n t th a t th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s f a il u r e to s p e c if

ic a ll y “ a s k [h im ] w h e th e r he

un de rs too d th e te rm s o f t he a pp e a l w a ive r” c on sti tut e d a n im perm is sible e rr or

un de r R ule 11 (b )( 1) (N ) i s w ith ou t me ri t. Rul e 11 (b )( 1) (N ) do e s no t ne c e ssi ta te a dis tr ic t c ourt

to s pe c if ic a lly

a sk a de fe nd ant w he the r h e or

sh e un de rs tand s th e te rm s o f t he a pp e llate wa ive r pr ov isi on . I t on ly require s a cour

t to “deter mine” that the de fenda

nt understands the te rms of such pr ovision. See Fe d. R. Crim. P . 11(b)( 1)(N)

. Murdock, in fa c t, no te d that “ in the a bs e nc e of an inq

uir y int o th e a

pp e llate

wa ive r [p ro vis ion ] by

the dis tr ic t c ourt a s r e qu ir e d und e r t he ru le , s ome oth e r e ve nt c ou ld s uf fi c e to insure that De fenda

nt’s waiver

was knowingand voluntary . . . . I t might, for e x ample, be suf ficient for a d efendant to assure the district court that he has re viewed the waiver provision (or, at a

bare minimum , the plea a g ree ment) with his attorney and that his attorney has explained it.” Murdock, 398 F.3d at 497–98. This is exactly what transpired here: The dist rict court asked B room, “Ha ve y ou dis c us se d a ll tho se thi ng s [,in c lud ing the a pp e llate wa ive r p ro vis ion ,] w ithy our c ouns e l?” to which he r esponded, “ Yes, sir.” As such, we conclude that – despite not spe cifica lly asking Br oom wh e the r he un de rs too d the te rm s of the a pp e llate wa ive r p ro vis ion – th e dis tr ic t c ourt

me t it s d utyNo. 05-5789

United States v. Broom Pag e 7 under Rule 11( b)(1) (N ). We, theref ore, r ejec t Broom’ s contention that the appe llate waive r provision was made “unknowing ly and unintellige ntly .” C. Br oo m ’s as se r ti on t hatth e G ov e r nm e nt br e ac he d t he ple a a greem en t i s wit hout m erit . B ro om, ne ve rt

he le ss, a rgue s th a t th e a

pp e llate wa ive r p ro vis ion in h is p le a

a g re e me nt i s invalid since the Gove rnment bre ache d the agr eeme nt when it ref used t o ask the district cour t for an “ac cepta nce of responsibility ” re duction in his sente nce. “ I n deter mining whe ther a

plea a g ree ment has bee n broken, c ourts look to ‘what wa s rea sonably understood by

[t he def endant] when he enter ed his plea of guilty .’” Un ite d S tat es v . M an de ll , 905 F.2d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 1990) (c itation omit ted) (alter ation in orig inal). Her e, the a g ree ment plainly prov i d es t h at t h e acceptanc e of r esponsibility reduc tion was conditioned on “[Br oom’s] conduc t c ontinu[ ing] to c lear ly demonstrate a cce ptance of his persona l responsibility

for his off

ense up to the date of sente ncing . . . .” The ag ree ment further provides that “[s] hould it be judge d by the Government that [Broom] has committed . . . any additional crimes or has eng ag ed in any

conduct c onstitut ing obstruct i n g o r i m p eding justice . . . from the date of [Broom’s] signing of this plea ag ree ment to the date of [Broom’s] sentencing . . . the Gover nment wi ll b e re le a se d f

ro m it s o bli g a tio ns and

wo uld be c ome fr e e to a

rgue for any sente nc e wi thi n statutory limit s. Such a bre ach by

[Broom] would not release [Br oom] from this plea of guilty .” On J uly 29, 2004, state l aw enforc ement officer s found ni ne gra ms of m arijuana

in Broom’ s tr uc k, and he la te r p le d guil ty

to s ta te c ha

rg e s st e mmi ngfr om thi s inc ide nt. B ro om a rgue s th a t hi s J uly 29th possession was part of his cooperation as an i nformant to law enforce ment office rs. TheNo. 05-5789

United States v. Broom Pag e 8

I t should also be noted that Br oom contends that, since la w enf orce ment continued to ac cept 2 his cooperation shortly

afte r locat i n g t he nine g rams of ma rijuana, “ the g overnme nt should be estoppe d f r o m a r g u in gth a t [ h e ] w a s n o t c o o p e r a ti n g an d th a t t h e c o o p e r a ti o na g r e e me n t e nded.” Ap p el l an t ’s R ep l y

Br

. at 1 2

. No t ab l y , Br o o m ci t es n o au t h o ri t y fo r t h i s l o ft y p ro p o s i t i o n . T h o u gh law e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs ’ c on tin

ue d e m p l o y m e nt o f B r oo m a s an in fo rm ant a ft e r l oc a tin g nin e g ra ms of mari jua na in h is tru c k ma

y be ill -a dv ise d, we c ann ot f ind that su c h c oo pe ra

tio n p e r s e e xcu se s h is otherwise illeg al conduc t. Go ve rnme nt, ho we ve r, as ser ts that B ro om’ s July 29 th p os se ssi on

we nt b e y on d th e sc op e of his cooper ation and, in any

case , was not authorized by law enf orce ment. We f

ind that Broom’ s e

xpo st fac to a sse rt ion

tha t hi s July

29 th p os se ssi on

wa s p art

of his c oo pe ratio n w itha

uthor iti e s is insufficient to excuse his conduc t. I t is also notable t h at , despite his contention that he wa s

c oo pe ratin g wi th a

uth or iti e s, B ro om la te r ple d g uil ty to state c ha rg e s ste mmi ngfr om t

his inc ide nt. There fore , under h i s agr eeme nt, Broom’ s continuing illeg al conduc t effe ctively rele ased the Gove rn m ent from any

obligation to request an a cce ptance of re sponsibili ty reduc tion under the G u i d e l i n e s , a n d

w e w h o l e h e art e d l y r e

j e c tB r o o m ’ s ar g u m e n tt o t h e c o n t r ar y. 2 D. Br oo m ’s as se r ti on t hatth e appe lla te waiv e r pr ov isi on m ust be inv ali dat e d be c aus e it exc eeds the “stat utory m axim um ” is also w ithout m erit . F ina lly , B ro om a

rgue s th a t th e app ell a te wa ive r p ro vis ion in h is p le a

a g re e me nt i s in va lid beca use the district cour

t’s sentenc e excee ds the “statutory maxi mum” provided by

law. To support his a rg ument, Br oom argues that, under United States v. Calderon , 388 F.3d 197 (6th Cir. 2004), any sentenc e excee ding t h e “st atutory maxi mum” provided by law invalidates a

n appellate waiver provision. Howeve r, Calderon does not stand for this proposition. I n Calderon , we simply found that the par

ticular a ppellate wa iver provision provided in that case was c o n d i tioned on the defe ndants “not re ceiv[ing] a sente nce gr ea ter than the ag ree d-upon maxim um” betwe en theNo. 05-5789

United States v. Broom Pag e 9 Calderon defe ndants and the G overnme nt. Id. at 199. No whe re in Calderon did we eve n mention the ph ra se “ statut or

y ma ximum ” — mu c h le ss h old tha t all wa ive rs are c on dit ion e d o n d e fe nd a nts

re c e ivi ngse nte nc e s w ith in t he statut or

y ma ximum . In f

a c t, “ [i]t is we ll s e ttl e d tha t a def e nd a nt i n

a cr iminal case ma

y waive ‘ any

rig ht, even a constitutional rig ht,’ by means of a plea ag ree ment.” See U nited States v. Fleming , 239 F.3d 761, 763- 64 (6th Cir. 2001) (c itation omit ted). Since Br oom’s appellate waiver is not conditioned upon an “ag ree d-upon maxi mum” betwee n him and the Gover nment, we r ejec t Broom’ s analog y to Calderon

. 2. Because ther e is a clear ly valid appell a te wai ver, we decline to address Broom ’s c ons ti tu ti ona l c lai m s. Since we ha

ve conc luded that Br oom ha s validly waived his r ight to this appea l, we dec line to addre ss the merits of B room’s constitutional claims. See W ilson , 438 F.3d at 673-74. III . For the fore g oing r easons, we GR ANT the Gover

nment’s motion to dis miss and AF F IRM the district court’s se ntence

.