UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1935

HARRIS JASON GOLD, Liquidating Trustee,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

GATEWAY BANK, FSB,

Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony J. Trenga, 

District Judge. (1:12-cv-00264-AJT-IDD; 08-13293-RGM; 10-01510-

RGM)

Argued: May 15, 2013 Decided: June 3, 2013

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Shedd wrote the opinion,

in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Motz joined.

ARGUED: Kenneth Oestreicher, WHITEFORD, TAYLOR & PRESTON, LLP, 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. James Robert Schroll, BEAN, 

KINNEY & KORMAN, PC, Arlington, Virginia, for Appellee. ON 

BRIEF: Kevin G. Hroblak, WHITEFORD, TAYLOR & PRESTON, LLP, 

Baltimore, Maryland; Christopher A. Jones, Bradford F. 

Englander, WHITEFORD, TAYLOR & PRESTON, LLP, Falls Church, 

Virginia, for Appellant. Heidi Meinzer, BEAN, KINNEY & KORMAN, 

P.C., Arlington, Virginia, for Appellee.
2

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

SHEDD, Circuit Judge:

H. Jason Gold is the liquidating trustee of the bankruptcy 

estate of Vijay K. Taneja and Financial Mortgage, Inc. (“FMI”).1 

Gold filed this action in bankruptcy court against Gateway Bank, 

FSB, seeking to avoid monetary transfers FMI made to Gateway, 

claiming they were fraudulent conveyances. Following trial, the 

bankruptcy court dismissed Gold’s action, and the district court 

affirmed that decision. Gold now appeals, arguing that the 

bankruptcy court erred in determining that Gateway met its 

burden to establish the good-faith affirmative defense under 11 

U.S.C. § 548(c) regarding three transfers FMI made to Gateway on 

December 11, 2007 (the “Xu transfers”). Specifically, Gold 

contends that the bankruptcy court erred by finding that Gateway 

did not have actual knowledge or inquiry notice of FMI’s 

fraudulent purpose in making those transfers when Gateway 

received the payments. In light of this asserted error, Gold 

further contends that the district court erred in affirming the 

bankruptcy court’s order. We affirm.

We review the legal conclusions of both the district court 

and the bankruptcy court de novo, and (like the district court) 

 1 Taneja used FMI, a mortgage loan originator, to perpetrate 

a massive Ponzi scheme involving mortgage loans. See In re 

Taneja, 453 B.R. 618, 620 (Bkrtcy., E.D. Va. 2011) (generally 

describing the fraudulent scheme). 
4

we review the factual findings of the bankruptcy court for clear 

error. In re Nieves, 648 F.3d 232, 237 (4th Cir. 2011). Section 

548 of the Bankruptcy Code “sets forth the powers of a trustee 

in bankruptcy . . . to avoid fraudulent transfers,” and it 

permits a trustee to attempt to set aside “not only transfers 

infected by actual fraud but certain other transfers as well —

so-called constructively fraudulent transfers.” BFP v. R.T.C., 

511 U.S. 531, 535 (1994). However, § 548(c) “provides a 

transferee with an affirmative defense where the transferee acts 

in good faith and gives value to the debtor in exchange for such 

transfer.” Perkins v. Haines, 661 F.3d 623, 626 (11th Cir. 2011) 

(internal punctuation altered).2 A finding of good faith under 

§ 548(c) is primarily a factual determination subject to clearerror review. In re Armstrong, 285 F.3d 1092, 1096 (8th Cir. 

2002). Under the clear-error standard, we will not reverse a 

bankruptcy court’s factual finding “that has support in the 

evidence unless that finding is clearly wrong.” In re ESA 

Environmental Specialists, Inc., 709 F.3d 388, 399 (4th Cir. 

2013).

 2 Section 548(c) provides: “[A] transferee or obligee of 

such a transfer or obligation that takes for value and in good 

faith has a lien on or may retain any interest transferred or 

may enforce any obligation incurred, as the case may be, to the 

extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor 

in exchange for such transfer or obligation.” The “for value” 

prong of § 548(c) is not at issue.
5

In reviewing Gold’s challenge to the bankruptcy court’s 

good-faith finding, the district court explained: 

The bankruptcy court determined, based on the 

testimony presented, that Gateway bank had met its 

burden of proving that, with respect to its handling 

of the three Xu transfers, it followed its own routine 

business practices, which were within the industry 

standard. The bankruptcy court indicated that in 

arriving at this determination, [it] gave “more weight 

to the bank’s expert than the Trustee’s expert,” 

finding the bank’s expert [Cisneros] “better 

qualified” and finding “the inferences that [Cisneros] 

drew from the information that he had were more 

plausible.” The bankruptcy court also determined that 

the testimony and evidence before him did not support 

a finding that Gateway Bank had actual notice of fraud 

when it accepted the transfers from FMI.

J.A. 1521-22. Although there is, perhaps, evidence in the record 

to suggest a contrary finding,3 our review of the parties’ 

arguments, the applicable law, and the record before us leads us 

to agree with the district court that the bankruptcy court’s 

finding of good faith is not “clearly wrong.”

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED

 3 Gold attaches much significance to the January 11, 2008, 

email, in which Gateway employee Michael Kenny referred to the 

Xu transfers as being “bogus,” arguing that this statement 

establishes that Gateway knew of FMI’s fraudulent intent on 

December 11, 2007, the date of those transfers. The bankruptcy 

court carefully considered, and ultimately rejected, this 

argument. See J.A. 1456-58. We find that the bankruptcy court’s 

analysis regarding the email is not unreasonable.