NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION File Name: 17a0469n.06
No. 16-3368 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM HOWE; BRADLEY CARR; DAVID HULL; DAVID O’NEAL; LESLIE GAISER; MICHAEL HAUSCH; JEFFREY LAYNE; BRUCE CLOUGH; JERRY ELIE; JEFFERY SCHUELLER; PHIL GAUER; GREGORY SNYDER; MICHAEL REED; KERRY BRIGGS; JOHN TRIOLA; BRADLEY ROBSON; JAMES FEEMAN; FRANK POLETTA; WILLIAM R. WILKINSON; JAMES FARINA; BRENDA CHAPMAN; JEFFREY DERRENBERGER; and CYNTHIA CRAWFORD, Executrix of the Estate of Jerome K. Crawford, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. CITY OF AKRON, Defendant-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

BEFORE: MOORE and COOK, Circui t Judges; COHN, District Judge. * PER CURIAM. The “remarkable vigor and venom” of this litigation, Howe v. City of Akron , 801 F.3d 718, 724 (6th Cir. 2015), has not ceased si nce we last visited it nearly two years ago. In its latest iteration, Plai ntiffs, a group of Akron firefighter s who prevailed at trial on the issues of age and race discrimi nation, dispute the district court’ s award of attorney fees. The

* The Honorable Avern Cohn, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.No. 16-3368, Howe, et al. v. City of Akron

2 award of attorney fees is largely at the discretion of district courts, and th e district court in this case did not abuse that discretion. Accordingl y, we AFFIRM the distri ct court’s judgment. I. BACKGROUND In the underlying case, Plainti ffs alleged that the City of Akron discriminated against them on the basis of race or age when it failed to promote them within the fire department. Id. at 726. Plaintiffs also brought a case in the Summ it County Court of Comm on Pleas, which they voluntarily dismissed. After some claims and plaintiffs were di smissed from this case, both voluntarily and through summary j udgment, a jury decided the que stions of “whether Akron’s promotional process had a disparate impact on African-American or over-forty candidates for the rank of Lieutenant and Caucasian ca ndidates for the rank of Captain.” Id. at 727. On these questions, “the jury returned a unanimous verd ict in favor of all of the Plaintiffs.” Id. The jury verdict did not end the case, however . Upon a motion for a ne w trial, the district court determined that a new trial was needed on the issue of damages. Id. at 729. During a renewed period of discovery, Akron deposed each of the 23 plaintiffs using a particular formula to calculate back pay. Id. at 730–31. But shortly after discove ry closed and trial was about to begin, Plaintiffs claimed back pa y using a different formula. Id. at 733. The district court issued an order sanctioning Plaintiffs’ counsel for this switch, expl aining that their “offensive gamesmanship throughout discovery and [] failu re to disclose to Akron the method of computation of damages is indefensible.” R. 530 (1st Sanctions Orde r at 12). Although the district court ultimately vacated this order because “neither party has clean hands with respect to this matter,” it cautioned that it would “take into account Plaintiffs’ counsel ’s conduct as well asNo. 16-3368, Howe, et al. v. City of Akron

3 Defendant’s counsel’s conduct when determining th e proper amount of fees to award.” R. 722 (Reconsidered Sanctions Order at 3–4). We have since instructed the district court to reassign the case. Howe , 801 F.3d at 756– 57. Plaintiffs then filed two motions for attorney fees, to which they attached a substantial bill of

costs. 1 Despite its length, however, the bill is not a model of precision and detail. For instance, a $24,250 invoice for one group of experts stated, in fu ll, “[e]xpert review of City of Akron Fire Lieutenant & Fire Captain selection processes. ” R. 614 (Bill of Costs at 23, 27). Another invoice was for “[d]eposition preparation” a nd “[p]arking,” and yet another was for a “[d]eposition.” Id. at 41, 48. After holding several telepho nic status conferences on the matter, but without the aid of reply br iefing on Plaintiffs’ supplemental motion for attorney fees, the district court issued an order awarding attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Howe v. City of Akron , No. 5:06-cv-2779, 2016 WL 9167 01 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2016). Because the order did not satisfy their en tire request, Plaintiffs have appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion on a variety of grounds.

1 Plaintiffs have filed a motion to supplement the record with copies of the City of Akron’s unredacted attorney fee bills pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e). Since Plaintiffs filed their motion, the district co urt has indicated that “[ t]he un-redacted billing statements of defense counsel were not material to, and did not factor in to, the Court’s award to plaintiffs.” R. 842 (Dec. 15, 2016 Order at 5). Because appella nts may not “add new material that was never considered by the district court,” Inland Bulk Transfer Co. v. Cummins Engine Co. , 332 F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir. 2003), and because th e district court did not consider these bills, we DENY the motion.No. 16-3368, Howe, et al. v. City of Akron

4 II. DISCUSSION In support of its argument that the district court abused its discretion in its award of attorney fees, Plaintiffs raise six “assignments of error.” After setti ng forth the appropriate standard of review, we review each al leged assignment of error in turn. A. Standard of Review We review a district court’s aw ard of attorney fees for abus e of discretion, “defined as a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment.” Paschal v. Flagstar Bank , 297 F.3d 431, 434 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Logan v. Dayton Hudson Corp. , 865 F.2d 789, 790 (6th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation mark omitted). We reverse only if the district court “relies upon clearly erroneous findings of fact, applies the law improperly, or uses an erroneous legal standard.” Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted , 831 F.3d 686, 702 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc. , 515 F.3d 531, 551 (6th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation mark omitted). Such “[s]ubs tantial deference” is owed because of “the district court’s superior understanding of the litigation.” Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)). All the same, and because “that discretion is not unlimited[,] . . . [i]t is essential that the judge provi de a reasonably specific[, concise, and clear] explanation for all aspects of a fee determination.” Id. at 703 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Plaintiffs argue that we do not owe substantia l deference to the district court “[b]ecause the re-assigned Judge did not possess familiarity with the lengthy and complex proceedings in this case.” Appellants’ Br. at 14. It is true that Judge Lioi has less familiarity with this case than she would have if she presided from the beginn ing. Yet, she is not wholly unfamiliar with theNo. 16-3368, Howe, et al. v. City of Akron

5 case, having held five status conferences and is sued numerous orders since her assignment. In addition, district courts’ “superior understanding of the litigation” is not th e sole reason we owe “[s]ubstantial deference” on th e issue of attorney fees. See Husted , 831 F.3d at 702 (citation omitted). We also owe such deference to “avoi d[] frequent appellate review of what are essentially factual matters.” Id. at 703 (quoting Hensley , 461 U.S. at 437) (internal quotation mark omitted). District courts are better positione d to find facts, in no small part because they oversee discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26–37. Relatedly, Plaintiffs argue—for the first time in their re ply brief—that Judge Lioi exhibited similar bias as Judge Adams (the orig inal presiding judge), and that therefore no deference is owed. First off, we bypass as forf eited arguments raised for the first time in an appellate reply brief. See Val-Land Farms, Inc. v. Th ird Nat’l Bank in Knoxville , 937 F.2d 1110, 1114 (6th Cir. 1991). Forfeiture notwithstandi ng, we also note that Judge Lioi’s alleged “unwarranted criticisms” of “the litigation and the parties,” Appe llants’ Reply Br. at 13–15, were nothing of the sort. For instance, the district cour t commented on counsel’s lack of clarity as part of its analysis of “whether the expenditure of counsel’s tim e was reasonably expended on the litigation.” Howe , 2016 WL 916701, at *16 (citing Hensley , 461 U.S. at 433). And the district court commented on Judge Gilman’s concurring opinion, see Howe v. City of Akron , 557 F. App’x 402, 405–07 (6th Cir. 2014) (Gilman, J., concur ring), in determining whether Plaintiffs’ appeal of the district court’s sanc tions order was a “discrete claim[],” see Howe , 2016 WL 916701, at *16 (quoting Hensley , 461 U.S. at 435). Judge Lioi’s attorney fees determination necessitated analysis of these componen ts—it does not reflect improper bias.No. 16-3368, Howe, et al. v. City of Akron

6 B. Plaintiffs’ Allege d Assignments of Error Mindful of the deference we owe to the dist rict court, we now re view each error that Plaintiffs assign. 1. Assignment of Error No. 1: Impermissibly Parsing the Record Plaintiffs first argue that the district court “impermissibly parsed the record to determine which issues and parties ‘succeeded’ or ‘failed’ and thus abused its discretion in excluding time spent on ‘unsuccessful plaintiffs ’ and on procuring a reversal of Judge Adams’[s] sanctions order.” Appellants’ Br. at 16–21. There is no doubt that under §§ 2000e-5 and 1988, “the district court should focus on the significance of the overall reli ef obtained by th e plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonabl y expended on the litigation,” Hensley , 461 U.S. at 435, and not on “the success or failure of the individual claims,” DiLaura v. Twp. of Ann Arbor , 471 F.3d 666, 673 (6th Cir. 2006). The district co urt got it right, here. Rather than parse each claim, it stated in general terms that “[Plaintiffs’ counsel] obt ained a judgment of liability and established [Plaintiffs’] entitlement to damages, and [Plainti ffs] secured previously contested promotions.”
Howe , 2016 WL 916701, at *6. Plaintiffs also contend that the district court “impermissibly parsed the record to determine which . . . parties ‘suc ceeded’ or ‘failed.’” Appellant s’ Br. at 16. This is not impermissible parsing; it is exactly what §§ 2000e-5 and 1988 require. “P revailing party status is a ‘statutory threshold’ which must be cro ssed before there is any consideration of a fee award.” DiLaura , 471 F.3d at 670 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’ n v. Garland Indep. Sch.
Dist. , 489 U.S. 782, 789 (1989)). Thus, the district court was required to determine whether eachNo. 16-3368, Howe, et al. v. City of Akron

7 plaintiff was, in fact , a prevailing party. See King v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections , 410 F.3d 404, 414–15 (7th Cir. 2005) (determining pr evailing-party status party by party). Plaintiffs’ counsel would receive a windfall if they were awarded fees for repres enting those plaintiffs that were dismissed at the summary-judgment stage. Ther efore, the district c ourt did not abuse its discretion in declining to award fees w ith respect to non-prevailing plaintiffs. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the district court impermissibly singled out Plaintiffs’ counsel’s work on the state-court case and the two sanctions imposed by Judge Adams. See Appellants’ Br. at 18–19. Althoug h “the district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the pl aintiff,” it should do so “in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the [civil ri ghts] litigation.” Hensley , 461 U.S. at 435; Webb v. Bd. of Educ. of Dyer Cty. , 471 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). The district cour t did not abuse its discretion in finding that a separate suit brought in state court was not part of the ci vil-rights li tigation. Howe , 2016 WL 916701, at *14. Lawsuits may not be divide d into “a series of di screte claims,” but this principle does not extend to lawsuits that are actually separate actions, such as the case brought in state court. See Hensley , 461 U.S. at 435. Nor did th e district court abuse its discretion in finding that “the fees associated with defending the imposition of sanctions were not ‘useful and of a type ordinarily necessa ry to advance the civil rights litigation.’” Howe , 2016 WL 916701, at *17 (quoting Webb , 471 U.S. at 243). The sanctions issue involved Plaintiffs’ counsel’s conduct durin g discovery, R. 722 (Reconsidered Sanctions Order at 1), an issue involving a different “core of facts” and “legal theo ries” than the age and raceNo. 16-3368, Howe, et al. v. City of Akron

8 discrimination faced by Plaintiffs, see Hensley , 461 U.S. at 435. Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to refrain from awarding attorney fees on this unrelated matter. 2. Assignment of Error Nos. 2, 3, and 4: Across-the-Board Reduction Plaintiffs next contest the district c ourt’s “overly punitive 35% across-the-board reduction.” 2 Appellants’ Br. at 21–50. They offer seve ral reasons why this constitutes an abuse of discretion, none of whic h we find persuasive. First, Plaintiffs contend that the 35-percen t reduction “does not accurately reflect claimed deficiencies in” their counsel’s time entries. Id. at 21–28. “[T]his Court has repeatedly upheld reductions in attorneys’ fees for duplicative or excessive billing,” Ohio Right to Life Soc., Inc. v. Ohio Elections Comm’n , 590 F. App’x 597, 603–04 (6th Cir. 2014), and “[w]here the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly,” Hensley , 461 U.S. at 433. We find the district court’s re view and explanation of the shortcomings in Plaintiffs’ counsel’s bills to be clear a nd concise. Likewise, we dis cern no evidence in the record suggesting the district court “rel ie[d] upon clearly erroneous findings of fact” in concluding that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s excessive efforts and inde terminate entries warranted an across-the-board reduction. Husted , 831 F.3d at 702 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the

2 The City of Akron argues that Plaintiffs waiv ed the argument that “the district court failed to provide a specific explanation for the 35 % reduction.” Appellee’s Br. at 37. Plaintiffs, however, do not dispute th at the district court provided an explanation. See Appellants’ Br. at 22 (identifying the district court’s explanation). Rather, they dis pute whether the district court’s explanation warranted the 35-percent reduction.No. 16-3368, Howe, et al. v. City of Akron

9 district court discussed in suffici ent detail Plaintiffs’ counsel’s excessive and duplicative efforts, overstaffing, and vague billing entries. Howe , 2016 WL 916701, at *10–17. Requiring the district court to parse the bills in even greater detail would be tantamount to requiring a complete audit. “[I]n assessing fees, dist rict courts are not required to act as ‘green-eyesh ade accountants’ and ‘achieve auditing perfec tion’ but instead must simply [] do ‘rough justice.’” Husted , 831 F.3d at 703 (quoting Fox v. Vice , 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011)); see also id. at 713 n.11 (“In essence, Defendants are asking th is court to cull th rough the records and conduct a[ ] line-item review. But as stated throughout this opinion, the Supreme Court does not re quire district courts to conduct such an analysis and preclude s us from micromanag ing fee awards.”); cf. Ohio Right to Life , 590 F. App’x at 604–05 (“This Ci rcuit has not articulated a cl ear requirement that when an across-the-board reduction to attorneys’ fees is based on multiple factors, the court must specify how much of the reduction is attributab le to each factor; nor do we do so today.”). Plaintiffs also claim that the district cour t incorrectly characterized billing entries as block-billed. Appellants’ Br. at 34–42. As the district court not ed, block billing is not per se prohibited. Howe , 2016 WL 916701, at *12. But, if counsel’s block billing relies on inadequate descriptions of the work performed, “the dist rict court may reduce the award accordingly.” Smith v. Serv. Master Corp. , 592 F. App’x 363, 371 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Hensley , 461 U.S. at 433). That is what happened here. The district court gave Plaintiffs’ counsel “the benefit of every doubt” but nonetheless determined that their bi lls “reflect a severe la ck of care,” evidenced by the many entries “list[ing] a st ring of activities using only the mo st general of descriptors . . . leaving the [c]ourt to guess as to the nature of each task.” Howe , 2016 WL 916701, at *13.No. 16-3368, Howe, et al. v. City of Akron

10 Because basing part of the 35-percent reduc tion on Plaintiffs’ counsel’s inadequately documented block billing does not constitute a “clear error of judgment,” it does not amount to an abuse of discretion. Paschal , 297 F.3d at 434. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the district cour t abused its discretion because it “fail[ed] to consider the hypocrisy of Akron’ s objections to the reasonablen ess of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s hours.” Appellants’ Br. at 45–50. This argument is unavailing. Surely a district court can “provide a clear and concise expl anation of its reasons for the f ee award” without criticizing the hours billed by counsel for the party not seeking to recover attorney fees. Adcock-Ladd v. Sec’y of Treasury , 227 F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hadix v. Johnson , 65 F.3d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 1995)) (quotation mark omitted). In sum, the district court perm issibly reduced the fee award by 35 percent. This court has approved the across-the-boa rd approach to fee determinations in the past, a nd we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in employing that approach in this instance. See, e.g. , Sykes v. Anderson , 419 F. App’x 615, 618 (6th Cir. 2011); Auto Alliance Int’l, Inc. v. U.S.
Customs Serv. , 155 F. App’x 226, 228 (6th Cir. 2005); Ky. Rest. Concepts Inc. v. City of Louisville , 117 F. App’x. 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2004). 3. Assignment of Error No. 5: Reduction of Expert Fees Plaintiffs next argue that they presented sufficient evidence to support their requested expert fees for CentrusPS, Dr. Jacobs, and Dr. Jeanneret—which the district court awarded in part or not at all. Appellant s’ Br. at 50–53. Title VII “requi res that the expert fees be reasonable, and if the moving pa rty did not present the court w ith adequate documentation, thereNo. 16-3368, Howe, et al. v. City of Akron

11 would be no basis for the court to deci de whether the fee was reasonable.” See EEOC v. Peoplemark, Inc. , 732 F.3d 584, 595 (6th Cir. 2013); Virostek v. Liberty Twp. Police Dep’t/Trs. , 14 F. App’x 493, 510 (6th Cir. 2001) (observing that “the standard for awarding attorneys’ fees is essentially the same under § 1988 and § 2000e–5( k), as the provision for attorneys’ fees under § 1988 was patterned after that in § 2000e–5(k)” (citing, inter alia, Hensley , 461 U.S. at 433 n.7)). As with attorney fees generally, we review the suffici ency of expert-fee documentation for abuse of discretion. Peoplemark, Inc. , 732 F.3d at 594–95. With respect to CentrusPS, the district c ourt explained that Plai ntiffs did not supply adequate documentation of the services provide d by Dr. Brink—a consultant with CentrusPS.
Howe , 2016 WL 916701, at *23. But through its “own inve stigation,” the court gathered that Dr. Brink “consult[ed] with the court monitor to facilitate the last promotional cycle.” Id. Accordingly, the district court reduced by 50 per cent the requested expert fee for CentrusPS. Given the lack of documentation supporting the costs sought, the di strict court acted within its discretion in reduci ng the fee award. The district court did not award any of the f ees requested for Drs. Jacobs and Jeanneret, finding insufficient documentation to determine the r easonableness of the fees. Plaintiffs simply contend that denying awards for Drs. Jacobs’s and Jeanneret’s fees “amounts to an egregious abuse of discretion, especially given clear reco rd documents showing the services rendered.” Appellants’ Br. at 51. They argue that the dist rict court should have looked at Dr. Jacobs’s actual invoice for his services, instead of relying on a later-in-time billing statement from Plaintiffs’ counsel to Plaintiffs seeki ng reimbursement for an advanced cost. Id. They alsoNo. 16-3368, Howe, et al. v. City of Akron

12 contend that the district court ignored Dr. Jeanneret’s invoice b ecause the opinion did not cite to it. Id. at 50–51. In their briefing before the district court, how ever, Plaintiffs never specifically directed Judge Lioi to either Dr. Jacobs’s or Dr. Jeanneret’s invoices. Instead, they filed a bill of costs supported by roughly 80 pages of invoices and b illing statements, with the relevant invoices stuffed in the middle. Even though the district court did not cite the tw o invoices that, according to Plaintiffs, clearly state the work performe d by Drs. Jacobs and Jeanneret, that does not necessarily imply that it neglec ted to review those documents. Plus, we have reviewed the invoices and find neither particul arly clear or descriptive. Dr. Jacobs’s invoice states only “[d]eposition,” R. 614 (Bill of Costs at 48), and Dr. Jeanneret’s states only “[d]eposition preparation,” id. at 41. At bottom, the district court’ s decision regarding expert fees does not reflect “a clear error of j udgment,” and, therefore, was no t an abuse of discretion. Paschal , 297 F.3d at 434. 4. Assignment of Error No. 6: Current Rates Finally, Plaintiffs argue that th e district court abused its disc retion in setting attorney fees based on historical, rather than current, hourly rates. Appellants ’ Br. at 53–58. This is no doubt the sort of “complex civil rights litigation” where, at least in so me respects, “compensation [was] received several years after services were rendered.” See Barnes v. City of Cincinnati , 401 F.3d 729, 745 (6th Cir. 2005). Thus, it would not have b een an abuse of discretion had the district court awarded current rates, as Plaintiffs requested. See id. But it is not an abuse of discretion for the district court to award fees based on historical rates, either. See Gonter v. Hunt ValveNo. 16-3368, Howe, et al. v. City of Akron

13 Co. , 510 F.3d 610, 617 (6th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs’ citations to an expert who recommended a higher fee be awarded, R. 732 (Oct. 2, 2014 Tr. of Mot. Hr’g at 133–34), and cases where the current rate was applied, see, e.g. , Barnes , 401 F.3d at 745, do not persuade us that the district court abused its discretion here. III. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we AFFIRM the distri ct court’s judgment and DENY the motion to supplement the record on appeal.No. 16-3368, Howe, et al. v. City of Akron

14 KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge, co ncurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur with the majority th at the district court did not im permissibly parse the record or impermissibly apply historical rates in its attorney-f ee award. I also concur that the district court did not abuse its discretion in aw arding expert fees for many of th e expert witnesses. However, because I believe that the district court disregar ded evidence that supported certain expert fees and because I believe that the di strict court inadequately expl ained its 35 percent reduction in attorney fees, I respectfully dissent from section II.B.2 and part of secti on II.B.3 of the majority opinion. First, I believe that the district court’s 35 percent reduction was an abuse of discretion because the district court failed to explain why that particular percentage was chosen. “There is no precise rule or formula for making [fee] determinations,” Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983), but district courts must still “provide a reasonably spec ific explanation for all aspects of a fee determination,” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn , 559 U.S. 542, 558 (2010). Here, the district court came up with 35 percent by citing the percentages used in othe r district courts and stating, without support, that th e reduction “accounts for counsel’s excessive and block billing, overstaffing, and vague entries.” Howe v. City of Akron , No. 5:06-cv-2779, 2016 WL 916701, at *17 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2016). This is insufficient. Turning to “courts in other cases” and punishing counsel for its “‘ indiscriminate approach ’ to the fee pe tition” does “nothing to explain why [35 percent] was the appropriate amount to account for those factors.” See H.D.V. - Greektown, LLC v. City of Detroit , 660 F. App’x 375, 383–85 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). On occasion, we have upheld a percenta ge-based reduction in attorney fees. See, e.g. , Sykes v.No. 16-3368, Howe, et al. v. City of Akron

15 Anderson , 419 F. App’x 615, 618 (6th Ci r. 2011) (allowing a 25 percent reductio n to account for duplicative efforts). But the Supreme Court has ma de clear that if a district court alters the lodestar by a percentage, that pe rcentage cannot be “arbitrary”; th e district court must explain why the particular percentage was chosen. See Perdue , 559 U.S. at 557–58; see also Binta B. ex rel. S.A. v. Gordon , 710 F.3d 608, 639–40 (6th Cir. 2013). Ther efore, and mindful that “[o]ur concern is not whether the requested fee awar d should be reduced but whether the reduction amount was appropriate and adequately explained,” H.D.V. - Greektown, LLC , 660 F. App’x at 384, I believe that the district court abused its discretion by reducing the attorney fees by 35 percent without a su fficient explanation. Second, I believe that the district court abused its discretion in decl ining to award expert fees for Brink, Jacobs, and Jeanneret. With respect to Brink, I beli eve that the district court once again failed to explain why it c hose a particular percen tage reduction. The di strict court reduced Brink’s fees by half, vaguely explaining that his f ee was “properly reduced to reflect the lack of adequate documentation supporting the costs sought.” Howe , 2016 WL 916701, at *23. Without a sense of why the district court chose 50 per cent, and not 40 or 60 percent, “a methodology that permits meaningful appellate review” is not evident. See H.D.V. - Greektown, LLC , 660 F. App’x at 383 (quoting Binta B. , 710 F.3d at 640). In addition, I believe that the invoices for Jacobs and Jeanneret are sufficiently detailed to aw ard expert fees; they refer to depositions that are readily available in the record. R. 614 (Bill of Costs 30–48) (Page ID #16685–703); R. 80-43 (Jacobs Dep.) (Page ID #1716); R. 80-44 (Jeanneret Dep.) (Page ID #1767). Despite this detail, the district court did not men tion the invoices for Jeanneret. And although the district courtNo. 16-3368, Howe, et al. v. City of Akron

16 noted Jacobs’s invoice, it singled out a fee for “Expert Services” without noting more detailed aspects of his invoice. See Howe , 2016 WL 916701, at *23 (quoting R. 614 (Bill of Costs at 45) (Page ID #16700)). Because the di strict court appears to have overlooked evidence that would support an award of fees to Jacobs and Jeanneret, I believe that it abused its disc retion in this respect as well. For the above reasons, I would reverse the dist rict court’s judgment with respect to the 35 percent reduction and with respect to Brink’s, Jacobs’s, and Jeanneret’s expert fees. I would affirm the remainder of the judgment.