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81–606 PDF ★(Star Print) 2002

S. HRG. 107–485

PROTECTING THE INNOCENT: ENSURING

COMPETENT COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 27, 2001

Serial No. J–107–29

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

JON KYL, Arizona 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Majority Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

SHARON PROST, Minority Chief Counsel 

MAKAN DELRAHIM, Minority Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Durbin, Hon. Richard J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Illinois .................... 123

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., a U.S. Senator from the State of Wisconsin ............. 69

Hatch, Hon. Orrin G., a U.S. Senator from the State of Utah ............................ 14

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont .................... 8

Thurmond, Hon. Strom, a U.S. Senator from the State of South Carolina ........ 148

WITNESSES 

Brackett, Kevin S., Deputy Solicitor, 16th Judicial District, York, South Carolina ........................................................................................................................ 56

Bright, Stephen B., Director, Southern Center for Human Rights, Atlanta, 

Georgia .................................................................................................................. 33

Collins, Hon. Susan, a U.S. Senator from the State of Maine ............................. 6

Delahunt, Hon. William D., a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Massachusetts .................................................................................................. 3

Eisenberg, Ronald, Deputy District Attorney, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania ....... 45

Ellis, Hon. Rodney, Texas State Senator, Austin, Texas ..................................... 29

Graham, Michael R., Roanoke, Virginia ................................................................ 42

LaHood, Hon. Ray, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois ..... 1

Pryor, Hon. William H., Jr., Attorney General, State of Alabama, Montgomery, Alabama .................................................................................................. 20

Wilkinson, Beth, Co-Chair, Constitution Project’s Death Penalty Initiative, 

Washington, D.C. ................................................................................................. 52

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Kevin S. Bracket to questions submitted by Senator Leahy ......... 78

Responses of Steven B. Bright to questions submitted by Senator Durbin ........ 80

Responses of Steven B. Bright to questions submitted by Senator Leahy ......... 81

Response of Rodney Ellis to a question submitted by Senator Leahy ................ 84

Responses of William H. Pryor, Jr. to questions submitted by Senator Durbin 85

Responses of William H. Pryor, Jr. to questions submitted by Senator Leahy .. 87

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Washington, DC: 

Executive Summary ......................................................................................... 93

Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Director, July 5, 2001, letter ................................ 103

Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Director, July 16, 2001, letter .............................. 105

American Bar Association, Governmental Affairs Office, Norman Lefstein, 

Washington, DC, statement ................................................................................ 105

Benjamin, Steven D., Benjamin & DesPortes, P.C., Richmond, VA, statement . 110

Brackett, Kevin S., Deputy Solicitor, State of South Carolina, York, SC, 

July 2, 2001, letter ............................................................................................... 112

Bruck, David I., Attorney, Columbia, SC: 

statement .......................................................................................................... 113

letter, July 2, 2001 ........................................................................................... 117

Constitution Project’s Death Penalty Initiative, Washington, DC, summary 

of recommendations and attachment ................................................................. 118

Equal Justice Initiative, Bryan A. Stevenson, Executive Director, Montgomery, AL, statement ........................................................................................ 124

Firestone, David, New York Times, June 16, 2001, article .................................. 128

Former prosecutors, law enforcement officers, and Justice Department officials, statement .................................................................................................... 130

Page

IV

Liebman, James S., Simon H. Rifkind Professor of Law, Columbia Law 

School, New York, NY, July 2, 2001, letter ....................................................... 131

Lloyd, Charles J., Lindquist & Vennum, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN, June 

26, 2001, letter ..................................................................................................... 134

Louisiana Crisis Assistance Center, Clive Stafford Smith, Director, New Orleans, LA, statement ............................................................................................... 135

Mississippi Post-Conviction Counsel Project, Charles J. Press, Director, Jackson, MS, statement .............................................................................................. 139

Pescetta, Michael, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal 

Public Defender for the District of Nevada, Las Vegas, NV, statement ......... 141

Rowley, Maureen Kearney, Chief Federal Defender, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, July 5, 2001, letter ................................................ 143

Smith, Hon. Gordon H., a U.S. Senator from the State of Oregon, statement ... 145

Texas Defender Service, Maurie Levin, Managing Attorney, Austin, TX, statement ...................................................................................................................... 145

Young, Denise, Attorney, Tempe, AZ, statement .................................................. 149

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PROTECTING THE INNOCENT: ENSURING 

COMPETENT COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY 

CASES 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 27, 2001

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Leahy, Feinstein, Feingold, Hatch, Specter, 

and Sessions. 

Chairman. LEAHY. Good morning. I am going to withhold my 

opening statement for a few minutes to accommodate two of the 

most distinguished members of the House who have a vote in a 

short while. 

I would just note that the Members are Congressman Ray 

LaHood, of Illinois, and Congressman William Delahunt, of Massachusetts. Both Mr. LaHood and Mr. Delahunt are close personal 

friends, one a Republican, one a Democrat. They are the main 

sponsors of this legislation in the other body, and with the permission of Senator Collins, I thought we would go first with their 

statements. I appreciate very much their taking the time to be 

here. I also applaud the enormous amount of work done in a totally 

bipartisan fashion in the other body. 

Congressman LaHood? 

STATEMENT OF HON. RAY LAHOOD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

Representative LAHOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

very much for accommodating our schedule and the fact that we 

have a vote. I am going to be very brief. I assume our statements 

will be made a part of the record. 

Chairman LEAHY. They will. 

Representative LAHOOD. Let me just say, as a Republican, as 

much as I dislike the idea of all of you folks taking over the Senate, 

I think this really enhances our opportunity to pass this bill, your 

bill, and thank you for your leadership in this and getting us all 

involved in the House. You really have shown extraordinary leadership on this issue. 

Just very briefly, Mr. Chairman, I have been a proponent of the 

death penalty and still am a proponent of the death penalty, but 

I do believe that when the death penalty is meted out and adminisVerDate Feb 1 2002 10:08 Sep 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\HEARINGS\81606.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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tered, we have to have 100-percent certainty that it is done correctly. 

I think the Innocence Protection Act, which Mr. Delahunt and I 

and others—now we have 203 cosponsors in the House, which is far 

in excess of what we had a year ago, and I think it shows, again, 

leadership on the part of many organizations. 

I have sort of taken the lead from my own Governor, Governor 

George Ryan, whom you know and is a good friend of yours. I know 

you have had many discussions with him and he has been to Washington and testified before the House Judiciary Committee subcommittee a year ago. I have taken my lead from him because he 

did place a moratorium on the death penalty because he wanted to 

be sure there was certainty when the death penalty is administered. 

So I think our bill is a good bill. It requires and calls for DNA 

testing, it requires competent counsel. I think it is a well-worded 

bill. I have talked to Chairman Sensenbrenner, the chairman of the 

House Judiciary Committee, about this issue, and I believe he has 

a great deal of interest in it. 

So again, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to speak here ahead of everyone else, and thank you again 

for your leadership. We look forward to working with you and 

hopefully passing this bill and having it signed into law. 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, after all the enormous amount of work 

you and Congressman Delahunt have done over there in obtaining 

over 200 co-sponsors, we should move along with it. I hope to sit 

down with Chairman Sensenbrenner after the 4th of July break 

and, among other things, talk about that with him. I also want to 

see how our committees can work well together. 

So thank you very much. Give my best to the Governor. He has 

not wavered on this issue at all, and I appreciate that. 

Representative LAHOOD. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Representative LaHood follows.]

STATEMENT OF HON. RAY LAHOOD, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE

STATE OF ILLINOIS

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee for holding this hearing and allowing me the opportunity to testify 

today on a very important subject. Additionally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to 

thank you for the strong lead you have taken on this issue in the Senate. Your efforts are greatly appreciated as we try to ensure the fairness in our justice system 

with the reintroduction of the Innocence Protection Act. 

Illinois Governor George Ryan showed great leadership and tremendous courage 

by imposing a moratorium on the Illinois death penalty earlier last year. One of the 

many things that led him to this decision was the case of Anthony Porter. Porter 

was two days from being executed for allegedly killing two people in 1982. Due to 

a temporary stay of execution with questions over his mental competence and his 

low IQ, journalism students from Northwestern University obtained a videotaped 

confession from the true killer and an affidavit from a witness who admitted he 

gave false statements about the case. Without those students, Anthony Porter could 

have been executed. 

Due to cases such as that, there is no better time than now to take appropriate 

measures to correct the wrongs that have occurred in our capitol punishment system across this country. 

Mr. Chairman, I support the death penalty. However, I believe there must be 

100% certainty when the death penalty is administered. A just society cannot engage in the taking of an innocent life. Our nation’s system is fatally flawed, and 

we must ensure that every possible legal and technological method is provided to 

determine guilt in capital cases. Since the reinstatement of the death penalty in 

3

1976, 96 people have been exonerated after spending years on death row for crimes 

they did not commit. In my home state of Illinois, 12 death row inmates have been 

executed, while 13 have been exonerated. 

As a supporter of the death penalty, I have, again, introduced the House version 

of the Innocence Protection Act, H.R. 912, with Congressman Bill Delahunt. I introduced this bill because I believe that those of us who support the death penalty 

have a special responsibility to ensure it is applied fairly. I am pleased to report 

that we have 203 cosponsors, 38 Republicans and 165 Democrats, which is well over 

twice the number we had in the 106‘’’ Congress. To me, this means people are beginning to recognize the importance of this bipartisan legislation. 

As long as innocent Americans are on death row, guilty predators are on our 

streets. Many defendants lack competent counsel and are unable to obtain and 

present evidence that will establish their innocence. The Innocence Protection Act 

seeks to address both of these concerns by giving those accused of murder access 

to new DNA technology that may not have been available at the time of their trial 

and by ensuring that the attorneys, in whose hands these lives are placed, are 

qualified. In Illinois alone, 22 defendants have been sentenced to death while being 

represented by attorneys who have either been disbarred or suspended at some time 

during their legal careers. In some cases, attorneys have even been found sleeping 

or under the influence of alcohol during the trial. I believe ensuring competent counsel is a vitally important step in the right direction toward fixing our capitol punishment system. 

This legislation would increase public confidence in our nation’s judicial system 

specifically as it relates to the death penalty. People have spent years on death row 

for crimes they did not commit. Some have come within hours of execution. A death 

sentence is the ultimate punishment. Its absolute finality demands that we be 100% 

certain that we’ve got the right person. For in protecting the innocent, we also ensure that the guilty do not go free. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you and the Committee for the opportunity to testify 

today.

Chairman LEAHY. Congressman Delahunt. I should note for the 

record that the Congressman and I helped keep New England safe 

for years in our roles as prosecutors, he in Massachusetts, I in 

Vermont. 

Go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS 

Representative DELAHUNT. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 

I would just associate myself with the kudos that were put forth 

about you from my friend and colleague, Ray LaHood. I would also 

add that it warms the cockles of my heart to address you as ‘‘Mr. 

Chairman.’’ In any event, thank you for inviting us to come here and to testify on behalf of 200 of our House colleagues who have cosponsored 

the Innocence Protection Act. We introduced this Act because the 

reality is our Nation’s system for trying capital cases is failing, and 

this has been demonstrated by a series of studies such as the one 

conducted last year by researchers at Columbia University. 

I want to acknowledge the Ranking Member. 

Senator HATCH. Good to see you. 

Representative DELAHUNT. Senator, good to see you. 

The study at Columbia examined over 4,000 capital cases in 28 

States over a 23-year period, and the study concluded that 7 out 

of every 10 death penalty cases contained serious reversible error—

7 out of 10. A failure of that magnitude calls into question the fairness and integrity of the American justice system itself. 

Some suggest that the high rate of reversals showed that the system is working. Let me suggest that is absurd. We cannot know 

whether the appeals process is catching all the errors or not, but 

4

what we do know definitively is that errors are not being caught 

at trial. We do know that innocent people are serving lengthy sentences for crimes that they did not commit. 

What is heartening and encouraging is that the public understands this. Polls reveal growing misgivings about the administration of the death penalty and overwhelming support for reforms 

that would provide some degree of reassurance that it is being 

properly and fairly implemented. 

Now, the catalyst for this sea change can be summed up in one 

word, or actually three words—DNA. Science has given us a new 

forensic tool which can conclusively establish guilt or innocence, 

and this tool has been used to exonerate nearly 100 people who 

spent years on death row for crimes they did not commit, some of 

whom came within days of being put to death. Fortunately, their 

lives were spared, but the system failed them, and it failed society 

as well by leaving the real perpetrators out walking the streets. 

DNA is the spotlight that has enabled us to focus on this problem with our criminal justice system, and our bill would help ensure that defendants have access to testing in every appropriate 

case. But we should be under no illusion that by granting access 

to DNA testing we are solving the problem. DNA is not a panacea 

for the frailties of the justice system. To suggest otherwise would 

be tantamount to fraud, particularly when, in the vast majority of 

cases, biological evidence that can be tested does not even exist. 

What DNA has revealed is that the lack of adequate legal services is the crux of the problem. The adversary process is the heart 

and soul of our system of justice, a chance to put evidence on trial 

and confront the witnesses in open court. 

As you indicated, I was a prosecutor for over 20 years, and I 

know that the process, the system can work only when lawyers on 

both sides are up to the job. Those kinds of lawyers aren’t as easy 

to find as some may think. We have a lot of lawyers in this country, but very few of them are engaged in trial practice, and fewer 

still have ever tried a criminal case from beginning to end. And it 

is a tiny percentage of that percentage who are equipped to shoulder the immense responsibility of trying a case in which a human 

being is on trial for his or her life. 

These are complex matters which cannot be handled by lawyers 

who lack the training, experience and resources to prepare a proper 

defense, let alone by lawyers who are incompetent, unprepared, or 

impaired by substance abuse. We cannot tolerate a system that relies on reporters and journalism students to develop new evidence 

that was never presented at trial, a system in which luck or chance 

plays such a profound role in determining whether a defendant 

lives or dies. 

The Innocence Protection Act encourages States to develop minimum standards for capital representation, as some States have already done, and it would provide the States with resources to ensure that indigent defendants have access to a lawyer who can 

meet those standards. 

If we are successful, the impact of these measures will be felt far 

beyond simply death penalty cases. By raising standards, we can 

help restore public confidence not just in the fairness and reliVerDate Feb 1 2002 10:08 Sep 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\HEARINGS\81606.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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ability of capital trials, but in the integrity of the American justice 

system itself. 

The American people have a right to expect that the truth will 

be relentlessly pursued, that every needed resource and every possible safeguard will be brought to bear. Yet, if that does not happen 

in death penalty cases, how can they have confidence that the justice system is any less fraught with error in non-capital cases? 

Without that confidence and respect, our system of justice, so essential in a democracy, is at grave risk. 

I thank the Chair. 

[The prepared statement of Representative Delahunt follows.]

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE

STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for inviting me to testify today on behalf of the more than 200 members of the House of Representatives who have cosponsored the Innocence Protection 

Act. 

—We introduced the Innocence Protection Act because our nation’s system for trying capital cases is failing. This has been demonstrated by a series of studies, such 

as the one conducted last year by researchers at Columbia University. They looked 

at over 4,000 capital cases in 28 states over a 23-year period. And they concluded 

that seven out of every 10 death penalty cases contained serious reversible error. 

Seven out of 10. A failure of that magnitude calls into question the fairness and 

integrity of the American justice system itself. 

Some suggest that the high rate of reversals shows that the system is working. 

But that is nonsense. We cannot know whether the appeals process is catching all 

the errors or not. But we do know—definitively—that the errors are not being 

caught at trial. We do know that innocent people are serving lengthy sentences for 

crimes they did not commit. 

What is heartening is that the public understands this. Polls reveal growing misgivings about the administration of the death penalty, and overwhelming support 

for reforms that would provide some degree of reassurance. 

The catalyst for this sea-change can be summed up in one word: DNA. Science 

has given us new forensic tools which can conclusively establish guilt or innocence. 

And these tools have been used to exonerate nearly 100 people who spent years on 

death row for crimes they did not commit. Some of whom came within days of being 

put to death. 

Fortunately, their lives were spared. But the system failed them. And it failed society as well, by leaving the real perpetrators out walking the streets. 

DNA is the spotlight that has enabled us to focus on this problem, and our bill 

would help ensure that defendants have access to testing in every appropriate case. 

But we should be under no illusion that by granting access to DNA testing we are 

solving that problem. DNA is not a panacea for the frailties of the justice system. 

To suggest otherwise would be tantamount to fraud-particularly when, in the vast 

majority of cases, biological evidence that can be tested does not even exist. 

What DNA has revealed is that the lack of adequate legal services is the crux of 

the problem. The adversary process is the heart and soul of our system of laws. The 

chance to put the evidence on trial, and confront the witnesses in open court. I was 

a prosecutor for over 20 years. And I know that the process can work only when 

the lawyers on both sides are up to the job. 

Those kinds of lawyers aren’t as easy to find as some may think. We have a lot 

of lawyers in this country. But very few of them are engaged in trial practice, and 

fewer still have ever tried a criminal case from beginning to end. 

It is a tiny percentage of that percentage who are equipped to shoulder the immense responsibility of trying a case in which a human being is on trial for his life. 

These are complex matters which cannot be handled by lawyers who lack the training, experience and resources to prepare a proper defense. Let alone by lawyers who 

are incompetent, unprepared, or impaired by substance abuse. 

We cannot tolerate a system that relies on reporters and journalism students to 

develop new evidence that was never presented at trial. A system in which chance 

plays such a profound role in determining whether a defendant lives or dies. 

The Innocence Protection Act would encourage states to develop minimum standards for capital representation, as some states have already done. And it would proVerDate Feb 1 2002 10:08 Sep 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\81606.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
6

vide the states with resources to help ensure that indigent defendants have access 

to a lawyer who can meet those standards. 

If we are successful, the impact of these measures will be felt far beyond the confines of death penalty cases. By raising standards we can help restore public confidence, not just in the fairness and reliability of capital trials, but in the integrity 

of the American justice system as a whole. 

The American people have a right to expect that the truth will be relentlessly pursued. That every needed resource-and every possible safeguard-will be brought to 

bear. Yet if this does not happen in death penalty cases how can they have confidence that the justice system is any less fraught with error in non-capital cases? 

Some have suggested that our society cannot afford to pay for qualified counsel 

in every capital case. The truth, Mr. Chairman, is that we cannot afford to do otherwise, if that cherished system of justice is to survive.

Chairman LEAHY. Well, I thank both you and Congressman 

LaHood. 

I would note for the record that the good-looking group of people 

who have joined us here are all relatives of Senator Hatch. You 

might not have known that if I hadn’t pointed it out, because they 

are all better looking than he is. 

Senator HATCH. That is not saying much. 

Chairman LEAHY. We are delighted to have them here. 

I don’t know if you wanted to make a comment. 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you. I am very happy to have them 

here to listen to the three of you. I am also very interested in what 

you have to say. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Congressman Delahunt and Congressman LaHood, I understand 

you do have a vote. If you wanted to leave at any point, just feel 

free to do so. 

Representative LAHOOD. Thank you. 

Representative DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Collins, I appreciate your courtesy in 

letting our two colleagues from the other body go forward at this 

point. 

I thank you both. We obviously will be talking about this a lot 

more during the summer. Thank you both. 

Senator Collins, we appreciate you being here. As I have noted 

before, we have withheld the opening statements myself and by 

Senator Hatch to allow the witnesses to testify. Senator Collins, as 

will the rest of us, will also have a vote very shortly. 

Go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN COLLINS, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF MAINE 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Senator Hatch, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me 

to testify before you this morning. 

I feel compelled to say a few words to Senator Hatch’s relatives 

to tell you what an outstanding Senator he is. He has been such 

a help to me as a first-term Senator, and I take great pleasure in 

working very closely with him. 

Senator HATCH. You can see why I love this woman, that’s all I 

can say. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I also want to commend the efforts of our two House leaders on this important issue. It is exVerDate Feb 1 2002 10:08 Sep 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\HEARINGS\81606.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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traordinary that they have been able to sign up more than 200 cosponsors, and I believe that bodes well for enactment of this important legislation. 

To appreciate the importance of the issue of procedural safeguards in death penalty cases, consider what price our society 

would be willing to pay to prevent the execution of just one innocent individual. The price, of course, cannot be measured, and yet 

the threat of such a wrongful execution is all too real. 

Since the reinstatement of capital punishment in 1976, 720 people have been executed nationwide, including 37 this year alone. In 

this same time period, nearly 100 individuals who were sentenced 

to die had their convictions overturned and were released from 

death row. Each of these individuals has lived the Kafkaesque 

nightmare of condemnation and imprisonment for crimes that they 

did not commit. Thirty-seven hundred prisoners now sit on death 

row. It is impossible to know for certain how many of them are innocent of the crimes for which they have been sentenced to die. But 

if history is any guide, some of them undoubtedly are innocent. 

My home State of Maine ushered in the first era of death penalty 

reform in 1835 with what came to be known as the Maine Law. 

The Maine Law held that all felons sentenced to death had to remain in prison at hard labor and could not be executed until 1 year 

had elapsed, and then only on the Governor’s order. No Governor 

ordered an execution under Maine law for 27 years, and Maine finally abolished the death penalty in 1887 after a botched hanging. 

But Maine is one of only 12 States to abolish the death penalty, 

and so under the great majority of State court systems and under 

the Federal system, executions can and do occur. It is our responsibility to make sure that this frightening power to take another’s 

life is wielded judiciously, with the greatest care. 

I am proud to join many in this room in cosponsoring the Innocence Protection Act, and I commend the chairman, Senator Gordon Smith and Senator Feingold for their tireless efforts to see this 

bill through to passage. I believe that over time, as more and more 

capital convictions are overturned, more and more Americans will 

come to embrace the principles of this important bill. 

Take Title II of the bill, for example, which is designed to ensure 

competent legal counsel in death penalty cases. Instead of attempting to impose Federal requirements created out of whole cloth, the 

bill establishes a commission of prosecutors, defense attorneys and 

judges tasked with developing standards for providing adequate 

legal representation for those facing the death sentence. It then 

provides grants to help States implement the commission’s standards, as well as disincentives for States that choose to ignore them. 

I also strongly support the DNA testing provisions of this bill. 

Convicted offenders ought to have access to DNA testing in cases 

where it has the potential to help prove an inmate’s innocence. The 

Innocence Protection Act sets procedures governing DNA testing in 

the Federal courts and encourages States to adopt their own procedures to ensure that testing is available and that biological material is preserved. In recognition that the States are higher in death 

penalty cases, our bill would prohibit States from denying applications for DNA testing by death row inmates if the testing could 

produce new exculpatory evidence. 

8

Mr. Chairman and Senator Hatch, thank you again for inviting 

me to testify today on an issue of such profound significance. I am 

hopeful that this Congress we will reach across the aisle to enact 

meaningful safeguards to protect the innocent from paying the ultimate price and society from making the ultimate mistake. This is 

an issue that should unite all of us, whether we are opponents or 

proponents of the death penalty. Surely, we can come together to 

ensure that important procedural safeguards and protections are 

provided in these cases. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Hatch, members of the committee. 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, thank you, Senator Collins. I appreciate 

your support of this. 

I will also place in the record a statement by Senator Gordon 

Smith, who is a proponent of the death penalty but a cosponsor of 

this legislation. That will be part of the record. 

I appreciate you being here. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Senator HATCH. Thank you. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT 

Chairman LEAHY. I know that we will having a vote soon. I am 

going to give my opening statement and then yield to the distinguished senior Senator from Utah for his. 

Obviously, we are pleased to have all of you who have taken the 

time to come here. Certainly Senator Collins’ testimony and Senator Smith’s testimony is very welcome, as were the statements of 

the lead House cosponsors, Congressmen Bill Delahunt and Ray 

LaHood. We have already heard their testimony, one a proponent 

of the death penalty, one an opponent of the death penalty, and one 

a former prosecutor. They make it very clear that they are united 

on the question of competent counsel in capital cases and, of 

course, on the availability of whatever evidence may be there. 

We now have 200-or-so cosponsors in the House and 19 in the 

Senate, including three members of this committee—Senators Feingold, Kennedy and Cantwell. I am grateful to each of them for their 

help, and also for the interest that Senator Hatch and Senator 

Feinstein have shown on this issue. 

I am really very pleased because we have had liberals, conservatives, supporters of the death penalty, opponents of the death penalty, Republicans and Democrats, on this. That is the way it should 

be. This should not be a partisan issue. It is an issue of conscience, 

but also an issue of confidence in our criminal justice system. A 

criminal justice system only works if people have confidence in it, 

and it totally falls apart—especially in a democracy—if people lose 

confidence in it. 

I may disagree with some of my friends on this committee on 

some issues, but none of us disagrees with the principle that somebody who is on trial for his life deserves a fair trial and deserves 

a competent defense attorney. We are talking about the ultimate 

penalty that can be imposed. I appreciated Senator Specter’s comment on Sunday that competent counsel is fundamental. 

9

Let’s look at what has happened while the Innocence Protection 

Act has been pending in the Congress. In the last 6 months, more 

than a dozen people have been cleared of the crimes that sent them 

to prison. In 6 cases they were convicted and sent to death row, 

and then we find we made a mistake. 

Let’s go with this: Jerry Frank Townsend was sentenced to seven 

concurrent life sentences in Florida, in 1980—seven concurrent 

death sentences. And then we found, ‘‘Sorry, we made a mistake.’’

You are free to go. 

Joaquin Martinez, sentenced to death in Florida, in 1997—sentenced to death. Fortunately, they found out they had the wrong 

person before he was actually executed. 

Gary Wayne Drinkard was sentenced to death in Alabama, in 

1995. I understand Mr. Drinkard is here today with his attorney. 

The headline in the Associated Press says it all: ‘‘He Fought Fear 

of Death Everyday.’’ He was on death row, knowing he was innocent, wondering what it would be like to be executed as an innocent man. 

Of course, in every one of these cases, while they had the wrong 

person on death row, that meant whoever committed the crime was 

out free and able to commit the same crime again. 

Jeff Pierce was sentenced to 65 years in Oklahoma, in 1986. I 

would ask anybody at this hearing, what would you think if you 

heard the cell door close and knew you had been sentenced for 65 

years for something you didn’t do. Then they find out, well, a chemist made a mistake and they had the wrong person. 

Danny Brown was sentenced to life in Ohio, in 1982. Nineteen 

years you can never give back to somebody in their life; 19 years 

behind bars, and they had the wrong person. 

Richard Danziger was sentenced to 99 years in Texas, in 1990. 

Now, he was finally cleared, but he has an uncertain future, as it 

says here. Why does he have an uncertain future? He was beaten 

so badly while in prison that he now has brain damage. He was 

in prison for a crime he did not commit. 

Kenneth Waters was sentenced to life in Massachusetts. I think 

the headline says it all from the Boston Globe: ‘‘’After 18 years in 

prison, it is great to be free,’ ex-inmate says.’’ I can well imagine. 

In 1984, Earl Washington was sentenced to death in Virginia. He 

came within days of execution, and then they did a DNA test and 

they found they had the wrong person. Mr. Washington is here 

with us today and I appreciate him coming here to join us. 

David Pope was sentenced to 45 years Texas, in 1986. He served 

15 years and then they did a DNA test, and again, sorry, wrong 

person. Again, I would point out not only the injustice of serving 

that time behind bars, but it also means that the guilty person is 

free to commit more crimes. 

Peter Limone was sentenced to death in Massachusetts, in 1968. 

He spent 33 years in prison after his conviction, and they say 

again, wrong person, we will let you go. His wife had eked out a 

living by sewing so the family could visit him every week in prison, 

convinced of his innocence. 

Christopher Ochoa was sentenced to life in Texas. It turns out 

he was falsely accused and he was freed from a life term. 

10

Michael Graham and Albert Burrell were sentenced to death in 

Louisiana, in 1987. Mr. Graham is here as a witness today; death 

row inmates exonerated, having served time facing death, expecting to be executed. Wrong person, and they were finally let out. 

Gerald Harris was sentenced to 9 to 18 years in New York, in 

1992. Guess what? The headline says it all in Newsday: ‘‘He Was 

the Wrong Man.’’ He served the time, but the wrong man; the right 

man was out free. 

Frank Lee Smith was sentenced to death in Florida, in 1986. It 

turns out the DNA tests cleared him. 

Now, we didn’t go back through a long, long history to get these. 

These people were all released in the last 6 months. What should 

we learn from these cases? Well, some have argued these cases in 

which innocent people were cleared after years and sometimes decades in prison show that the system is working. Working? Something is tragically flawed with the system if they can serve all that 

time. 

I have only one thing to say. Listen to Michael Graham testify 

today about 14 years on death row, knowing that they had the 

wrong person. Listen to what he has to say. Put yourself in the 

place of sitting there, waiting to be executed for a crime that you 

didn’t commit. Then ask yourself whether finally being released is 

a triumph of the judicial system or whether there was a failure 

that put you there in the first place. 

The Innocence Protection Act proposed some basic, commonsense reforms to our criminal justice system to reduce the risk of 

mistaken execution. We have listened to a lot of good advice. We 

have made refinements to the bill since the last Congress. Again 

and again, experts in the field have told us that ensuring competent counsel is the single most important thing we can do to get 

to the truth and protect innocent people. I will tell you what we 

have done. 

The bill would establish a national commission which would consist of distinguished American legal experts who have experienced 

the criminal justice system firsthand—prosecutors, defense lawyers 

and judges. They would formulate reasonable minimum standards 

for ensuring competent counsel at each stage of a capital case, 

something that the Conference of Chief Justices has been calling 

for for years. 

The IPA uses a ‘‘carrot and stick’’ approach to ensure that counsel standards are met. The carrot is more than $50 million in 

grants to help put the new standards in effect. The stick is that 

States that fail to meet the standards would have their death sentences given less deference and subjected to more rigorous Federal 

court review. This is because we would not have the confidence 

that comes from knowing that competent counsel represented the 

defendant. These states would forfeit some of their prison grant 

funding over time. 

Now, I want to stress the importance of these enforcement mechanisms. Without them, standards developed under the IPA would 

merely gather dust on a shelf, like a lot of the other voluntary 

counsel standards that we have seen over the years. 

11

Critics of the bill raise two arguments against its mandate for 

competent counsel in death penalty cases. Let me briefly discuss 

them. 

The first argument I have heard is that there is no real problem 

because the States are already providing decent defense counsel in 

capital cases. The facts show otherwise. The problem is real, it is 

urgent and it is well-documented. It has been more than a decade 

since the U.S. Judicial Conference and the ABA issued reports on 

the widespread problem of incompetent and underfunded capital 

defense counsel. It has been 8 years since this committee held a 

hearing on innocence and the death penalty, in which witness after 

witness spoke to the same issue. 

In March of 2000, the Justice Department released a report on 

indigent defense services across the country and concluded that 

‘‘Indigent defense in the United States today is in a chronic state 

of crisis, resulting in legal representation of such low quality to 

amount to no representation at all, delays, overturned convictions, 

and convictions of the innocent.’’ In June of 2000, Professor Jim Liebman and his colleagues at the 

Columbia Law School released the most comprehensive statistical 

study ever undertaken of modern American capital appeals. They 

found that serious errors were made in two-thirds of all capital 

cases. The most common problem was grossly incompetent defense 

lawyers. 

Today, in Alabama, there are 42 prisoners on death row who 

have no lawyer to pursue appeals. Today, in Texas, one out of 

every four death row inmates was defended by a lawyer who has 

been disciplined, suspended or disbarred. This is not competent 

counsel, and it is certainly not the counsel that any Senator on this 

panel would expect to have if they were accused of a capital crime. 

Today in America, there are people awaiting execution whose lawyers slept through part of their trials. That is unjust, it is shocking, 

and it ought to be unacceptable in this country. 

The other argument I have heard against our bill goes something 

like this: maybe some States could do a better job providing counsel 

for indigent defendants. Maybe some States do skimp on funding. 

Maybe this has resulted in a few innocent people being sentenced 

to death here and there. But that is no reason for Congress to get 

involved. 

In fact, it is a reason for Congress to get involved. There should 

be zero tolerance for mistakes in death penalty cases. We have a 

duty to get involved to try to contain the crisis before innocent people are put to death. Congress has the duty to get involved because 

the crisis is national scope. 

Since 1973, 96 people who were sentenced to death and were 

heading to death row have been exonerated—one for every seven 

or eight who have been executed. These 96 exonerations span 22 

different States, which is a substantial majority of the States that 

have a death penalty. 

In Illinois, the Governor, a conservative Republican, imposed a 

moratorium on executions because of the State’s dismal record of 

sending innocent people to death row. But this isn’t an Illinois 

problem or a Texas problem; it is a national problem. It calls into 

question the legitimacy of criminal convictions, but it also underVerDate Feb 1 2002 10:08 Sep 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\HEARINGS\81606.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
12

mines public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system as a whole. 

If mistakes occur when a life is at stake, what happens when the 

crimes and penalties are less severe? Witnesses and juries and 

judges become more skeptical about how well the police and prosecutors are doing their jobs. If they do not trust the jobs that are 

being done, what does that mean for our prosecutors and police? It 

means that it is going to be far more difficult to get convictions 

when they have the right person if they show sloppiness when they 

have the wrong person. 

And let us not forget that when an innocent person is put in prison, that doesn’t protect us. The person who committed the crime 

is out there, free to do the same thing. If you convict the wrong 

person, leaving the actual murderer free, what does that do? 

In 1985, Rolando Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez were wrongly 

convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a 10-year-old 

girl. DNA tests ultimately linked another man to the little girl’s 

death, clearing them. In the meantime, because the wrong men 

were convicted and the right person was still out there, the actual 

criminal committed another murder. This is a national problem. It 

is not a question whether Congress should act, but when. 

Last year, we passed the Paul Coverdell National Forensic 

Sciences Improvement Act. I was proud to cosponsor this bipartisan 

legislation which will improve the quality and credibility of our Nation’s crime labs. We are still working to fund it. When the Senate 

took up the Paul Coverdell bill, I proposed a sense of the Congress 

amendment which the Senate adopted. In it, we resolved to work 

with the States to improve the quality of legal representation in 

capital cases through the establishment of counsel standards. Congress has already gone on record in recognizing what has to be 

done; now is the time to do it. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Leahy follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF

VERMONT

I want to welcome all of the witnesses and thank you for coming today. I am particularly pleased to welcome Senator Smith and Senator Collins, as well as our lead 

House cosponsors, Congressman Bill Delahunt and Congressman Ray LaHood. I 

thank them for their commitment to our legislation, the Innocence Protection Act 

of 2001. 

We now have 19 cosponsors in the Senate. That includes three members of this 

committee: Senator Feingold, Senator Kennedy, and Senator Cantwell. I am grateful 

to each of them for their support. I also want to thank Senator Feinstein and Senator Hatch for the interest that they have shown in this issue. 

I could not be more delighted with the progress that the IPA has been making 

in the House. There are now more than 200 House cosponsors, including Republicans and Democrats from all parts of the country, conservatives and liberals, supporters and opponents of the death penalty. 

That is how it should be, because this is not a partisan issue; it is an issue of 

conscience and confidence in our criminal justice system. I may disagree with some 

of my friends on this committee on some issues, but none of us disagrees with the 

principle that someone on trial for his life deserves a fair trial and a competent defense lawyer. I appreciated Senator Specter’s comment on Sunday that competent 

counsel is ‘‘fundamental.’’

Let’s look at what has happened while the Innocence Protection Act has been 

pending in the Congress. In the last six months, more than a dozen people have 

been cleared of the crimes that sent them to prison or, in six cases, to death row.

13

• Jerry Frank Townsend, sentenced to 7 concurrent life sentences in Florida in 1980

• Joaquin Martinez, sentenced to death in Florida in 1997; 

• Gary Drinkard, sentenced to death in Alabama in 1995; 

• Jeff Pierce, sentenced to 65 years in Oklahoma in 1986; 

• Danny Brown, sentenced to life in Ohio in 1982; 

• Richard Danziger, sentenced to 99 years in Texas in 1990; 

• Kenneth Waters, sentenced to life in Massachusetts in 1983; 

• Earl Washington, sentenced to death in Virginia in 1984; 

• David Pope, sentenced to 45 years in Texas in 1986; 

• Peter Limone, sentenced to death in Massachusetts in 1968; 

• Christopher Ochoa, sentenced to life in Texas in 1988; 

• Michael Graham and Albert Burrell, sentenced to death in Louisiana in 

1987; 

• Gerald Harris, sentenced to 9–18 years in New York in 1992; 

• Frank Lee Smith, sentenced to death in Florida in 1986.

What should we learn from these cases:’ Some have argued that these cases, in 

which innocent people were cleared after years and sometimes decades in prison, 

show that the system is ‘‘working.’’ To them, I have only one thing to say: Listen 

to :Michael Graham testify today about his 14 years on death row. Then ask yourself whether his case represents a triumph of our judicial system. We must do better. 

The Innocence Protection Act proposes some basic, common-sense reforms to our 

criminal justice system. The goal of our bill is simple, but profoundly important: To 

reduce the risk of mistaken executions. 

We have listened to a lot of good advice and made refinements to the bill since 

the last Congress. Again and again, the experts in the field have told us that ensuring competent counsel is the single most important thing we can do to get at the 

truth and protect innocent lives. So let me briefly describe our proposals regarding 

counsel. 

The bill would establish a national commission, which would consist of distinguished American legal experts who have experienced the criminal justice system 

first hand-prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges. The commission would formulate reasonable minimum standards for ensuring competent counsel at each stage 

of a capital case—something that the Conference of Chief.Justices has been calling 

for many years. 

The IPA uses a ‘‘carrot and stick’’ approach to ensure that counsel standards are 

met. The ‘‘carrot’’ is more than S50 million in grants to help put the new standards 

into effect. 

As for the ‘‘stick’’: States that fail to meet the standards would have their death 

sentences given less deference and subjected to more rigorous federal court review, 

because we will not have the confidence that comes from knowing that competent 

counsel represented the defendant. These States would also forfeit some federal 

prison grant funding over time. 

I want to stress the importance of these enforcement mechanisms. Without them, 

standards developed under the IPA would merely gather dust on a shelf like the 

many other voluntary counsel standards developed over the last decade. 

Critics of the bill have raised two arguments against its mandate for competent 

counsel in death penalty cases. I will address these arguments briefly. 

The first argument I have heard is that there is no real problem because the 

states are already providing decent defense counsel in capital cases. The facts show 

otherwise. The problem is real, it is urgent, and it is well-documented. 

It has been more than a decade since the U.S. Judicial Conference and the ABA 

issued reports on the widespread problem of incompetent and underfunded capital 

defense counsel. 

It has been eight years since this committee held a hearing on ‘‘Innocence and 

the Death Penalty,’’ where witness alter witness described the same problem. 

In March 2000, the Justice Department released a report on indigent defense 

services across the country. The report concludes that ‘‘indigent defense in the 

United States today is in a chronic state of crisis,’’ resulting in ‘‘legal representation 

of such low quality to amount to no representation at all, delays, overturned convictions, and convictions of the innocent.’’

In June 2000, Professor Jim Liebman and his colleagues at the Columbia Law 

School released the most comprehensive statistical study ever undertaken of modern 

American capital appeals. They found that serious errors were made in two-thirds 

of all capital cases. The most common problem: Grossly incompetent defense 

lawyering. 

14

Today in Alabama, there are 42 prisoners on death row who have no lawyer to 

pursue appeals. Today in Texas, one out of every four death row inmates was defended by a lawyer who has been disciplined, suspended, or disbarred. Today in 

America, there are people awaiting execution whose lawyers slept through parts of 

their trials. This is unjust, shocking and unacceptable. 

The other argument I have heard against our bill goes something like this. 

‘‘Maybe some states could do a better job providing counsel for indigent defendants. 

Maybe some states do skimp on funding. Maybe this has resulted in a few innocent 

people being sentenced to death here and there. But that is no reason for the Congress to get involved.’’

In fact, it is a reason for Congress to get involved. I would go farther than that. 

I think that we have a duty to get involved—to try to contain the crisis—before an 

innocent person is put to death. 

Congress has a duty to get involved because the crisis is national in scope. Since 

1973, 96 people who were sentenced to death have been exonerated—one for every 

seven or eight who have been executed. These 96 exonerations span 22 different 

states, which is a substantial majority of the states that have the death penalty. 

In Illinois, the Republican governor imposed a moratorium on executions because 

of the state’s dismal record of sending innocent people to death row. But this is not 

just an ‘‘Illinois problem’’ or a ‘‘Texas problem.’’ This is a national problem. 

It is a problem that calls into question the legitimacy of criminal convictions and 

undermines public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system as a 

whole. If mistakes occur when a life is at stake, what happens when the crimes and 

penalties are less severe? Witnesses, juries and judges become more skeptical about 

how well the police and prosecutors are doing their jobs. That skepticism makes 

their jobs harder. 

We must also remember that when all innocent person is put in prison, then the 

person who committed the crime stays free. In 1955. Rolando Cruz and Alejandro 

Hernandez were wrongly convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a 10-

year-old girl. DNA tests ultimately linked another man to the little girl’s death, but 

only after he had committed another murder. 

This is a national problem, and as a nation, we need to step up to the plate and 

deal with it. 

The question is not whether Congress should act, but when. Last year, we passed 

the Paul Coverdell National Forensic Sciences Improvement Act. I was proud to cosponsor this bipartisan legislation, which aims to improve the quality and credibility 

of our nation’s crime labs. Many of us are still working to fully fund this new law. 

When the Senate took up the Paul Coverdell bill, I proposed a Sense of Congress 

amendment, which the Senate adopted. In it, we resolved to work with the states 

to improve the quality of legal representation in capital cases through the establishment of counsel standards. 

Congress has already gone on record in recognizing what has to be done. Now it 

is time to do it.

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Hatch, would you like to speak now 

or break for the vote? It is your call. 

Senator HATCH. Why don’t I see if I can get through what I 

would like to get through and then we will go vote? 

Chairman LEAHY. Fine. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ORRIN G. HATCH, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF UTAH 

Senator HATCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning to everybody who is here. Before I begin, I would just like to say how 

much I appreciate the chairman’s leadership on this important 

issue. He has worked tirelessly both in the Senate and in the 

media to raise public awareness on this important topic and I want 

to commend him for his hard work. 

The death penalty is an issue that engenders great passion both 

among its supporters and among its opponents. There are those 

among us who sincerely believe that the power of the state simply 

should never, under any circumstances, be used to put someone to 

death. There are others who believe that some crimes are simply 

15

so heinous, so evil, that there is no punishment short of death that 

will adequately express the outrage of society at the perpetrator of 

such a crime. 

Each of us must make our own decision on this issue. It is a matter of personal conscience. There can be no question, however, that 

the imposition of the death penalty is an awesome power. And with 

that awesome power comes a solemn responsibility, a responsibility 

to ensure that the death penalty is imposed only on those criminals 

who are truly guilty of these horrible crimes, and only on those 

criminals who have the benefit of all the procedural protections 

provided by our centuries-old system of justice. 

In this vein, I believe it is important to acknowledge the study 

that was recently completed by the United States Department of 

Justice, which revealed no racial bias in the administration of the 

death penalty by the Federal Government. 

That important study, which found that a minority defendant 

was actually slightly less likely to be subject to the death penalty 

when facing a capital charge, has helped to alleviate the concern 

that the death penalty is being implemented in a racially biased 

fashion. The study reaffirmed the preliminary conclusion reached 

late last year by Janet Reno’s Justice Department. 

The concern that is the subject of today’s hearing is equally important: whether capital defendants are being systematically deprived of their right to competent counsel. Obviously, we can only 

have confidence in our criminal justice system if every defendant, 

whether they are charged with a capital crime or even a simple 

misdemeanor, has the benefit of representation by an able attorney. 

Today’s hearing is not about whether defendants charged with 

capital crimes are entitled to competent counsel. The right to a 

competent attorney is already guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution and by innumerable decisions of 

our own U.S. Supreme Court. 

A defendant who does not feel that he has received adequate 

legal representation has numerous avenues of relief. The defendant 

may raise his concern to the trial judge prior to or after the trial. 

If convicted, the defendant may raise on appeal a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. If his appeal is denied, the defendant 

may challenge his conviction in Federal court on a writ of habeas 

corpus. If the writ is denied, the defendant may appeal that decision, and if that appeal is denied, the defendant may bring his case 

all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. 

Thus, at an absolute minimum, a defendant has an opportunity 

to persuade five different courts that he has received ineffective assistance of counsel. Five different courts have an obligation of ensuring that the defendant’s attorney has provided competent representation. 

Is the system working? Some would say that it is not. Such people point to several highly publicized instances in which a capital 

defendant has not received the effective assistance of counsel. We 

have all heard the horror stories of the attorney who fell asleep 

during his client’s trial and the attorney who showed up for trial 

intoxicated. 

16

Some opponents of the death penalty seek to portray these stories as par for the course. This view ignores the hundreds, if not 

thousands, of capital cases in which no flaw was found in the quality of the legal representation. It also ignores the hundreds of capital cases in which defendants were either acquitted or sentenced 

to a penalty less than death due at least in part to the vigorous 

efforts of their able attorneys. 

Far more often than not, a capital defendant is represented by 

multiple outstanding attorneys. Some of this Nation’s finest legal 

talent is attracted to the challenging, high-stakes arena of capital 

case defense. As several of today’s witnesses will testify, the prosecution team in a capital case often finds itself overwhelmed by defense teams funded by a combination of public and private sources. 

More importantly, what opponents of the death penalty would 

have us ignore is that those defendants represented by sleeping or 

intoxicated attorneys, or attorneys who fall below the level of acceptable lawyering for whatever reason, routinely have their convictions overturned either on appeal or on habeas corpus review. 

Make no mistake, it is completely unacceptable for any criminal 

defendant to be represented by a sleeping or intoxicated or incompetent attorney. But as unfortunate as these rare cases are, they 

do demonstrate unequivocally that the appellate system and our 

system for habeas review remain robust and entirely capable of 

identifying and rectifying instances of deficient legal representation. The examples that the distinguished Senator from Vermont 

has shown are all examples of horrible situations. There is no question about that, and they should not have occurred. 

Currently, each of the States that chooses to implement the 

death penalty has different qualifications for attorneys assigned to 

represent defendants in capital cases. This makes sense, given the 

different number of criminal lawyers in various jurisdictions, the 

different frequency that the death penalty is sought from State to 

State, and the differing systems that the States have established 

for assigning lawyers to indigent defendants. 

Obviously, a rural jurisdiction with few lawyers in a State that 

requests the death penalty relatively infrequently will have different requirements for capital case attorneys than those of an 

urban jurisdiction with many criminal lawyers in a State that 

seeks the death penalty more often. 

The legislation that is the subject of this hearing would seek to 

paper over the differences between the States and create a onesize-fits-all national standard for capital case attorneys. If I believed this was a good idea, and I do not, I cannot see how it would 

address the supposed problems in capital case representation that 

are trumpeted by the opponents of the death penalty. 

No legislative scheme we enact will be able to predict prior to 

trial whether a particular lawyer will asleep during trial or whether he or she will develop a problem with alcoholism. That is why 

our current system is designed the way it is, to evaluate after the 

trial whether a lawyer has provided competent representation to 

his or her client. 

Capital representation standards already exist in nearly every 

State that has implemented the death penalty. There has been a 

recent movement in many States to make such standards more exVerDate Feb 1 2002 10:08 Sep 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\HEARINGS\81606.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
17

acting, and I agree with that. Yet, incompetent attorneys still slip 

through the cracks, and regardless of their good intentions, capital 

representation standards simply cannot ensure that every defendant will receive competent representation. That assurance will continue to be provided, as it is now, by the appellate process and by 

the system for habeas corpus review. 

My concern is that the only group likely to benefit from the legislation we are discussing today are those individuals intent on 

eliminating the death penalty altogether. Capital representation 

standards could easily be written so that many isolated jurisdictions would have no attorneys judged capable of handling death 

penalty cases. A system already renowned for its glacial pace would 

experience further massive delays as the few death-penalty-eligible 

attorneys are rationed out among competing jurisdictions. 

Mr. Chairman, I share your concern that the innocent must be 

protected. It is intolerable for even one innocent person to reside 

on death row, much less that we ever allow an innocent person to 

be actually executed. 

We have reached substantial agreement on some important reforms that would go a long way toward protecting the innocent. We 

agree that potentially exculpatory DNA testing must be provided to 

inmates on death row who did not have access to such testing at 

the time of their trial. We agree that the Nation’s forensic laboratories must receive increased funding to enable them to process evidence more expeditiously, leading to exoneration for some defendants and in some cases to the arrest of the actual perpetrator. 

We agree that increased funds must be provided for the treatment and prevention of drug abuse to break the cycle of addiction 

which underlies many of these violent crimes. And with respect to 

capital representation standards, I have no problem with the Federal Government providing the States with financial assistance 

available on a voluntary basis to ensure competent counsel at trial. 

With all due respect, Mr. Chairman, I basically cannot support 

the provisions that are the subject of today’s hearing, but I want 

to work with you and I want to acknowledge your outstanding leadership on this issue. We are in complete agreement as to the goal 

for which we must be striving that our criminal justice system operate fairly and efficiently and that no innocent person be wrongfully convicted. 

While I disagree with the approach that is being debated today, 

I hope that we will be able to continue to work together on this important issue. So I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I ask unanimous consent to submit my full written statement for 

the record. I want to thank you for your efforts in this regard. I 

fully respect them. I respect your experience in these types of cases 

and in prosecutions in general, and I intend to work with you to 

make sure that we resolve these problems in ways that bring 

American together and not keep us apart, and hopefully in ways 

that will prevent any innocent person from ever being convicted, let 

alone being sentenced to death going to death under our current 

laws or laws in the future. 

So I will work with you and will see what we can do to resolve 

these problems. I just think we can do better a job and I am going 

to do everything in my power to see that we do. 

18

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Hatch follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ORRIN G. HATCH, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE

OF UTAH

Before I begin, I would just like to say how much I appreciate the Chairman’s 

leadership on this important issue. He has worked tirelessly, both in the Senate and 

in the media, to raise public awareness on this important topic, and I want to commend him for his hard work. 

The death penalty is an issue that engenders great passion, both among its supporters and among in its opponents. There are those among us who sincerely believe 

that the power of the state simply should never, under any circumstances, be used 

to put someone to death. There are others who believe that some crimes are simply 

so heinous, so evil, that there is no punishment, short of death, that will adequately 

express the outrage of our society at the perpetrator of such a crime. 

Each of us must make our own decision on this issue as a matter of personal conscience. 

There can be no question, however, that the imposition of the death penalty is 

an awesome power. And with that awesome power comes a solemn responsibility—

a responsibility to ensure that the death penalty is imposed only on those criminals 

who are truly guilty of these horrible crimes, and only on those criminals who have 

had the benefit of all the procedural protections provided by our centuries-old system of justice. 

It is incumbent on us in the federal government, as well as in the states themselves, to remain eternally vigilant to ensure that our system of administering the 

death penalty is completely fair and respectful of the rights of the accused. 

In this vein, I believe it is important to acknowledge the study that was recently 

completed by the United States Department of Justice, which revealed no racial bias 

in the administration of the death penalty by the federal government. That important study, which found that a minority defendant was actually slightly less likely 

to be subject to the death penalty when facing a capital charge, has helped to alleviate the concern that death penalty is being implemented in a racially biased fashion. The study reaffirmed the preliminary conclusion reached late last year by Janet 

Reno’s Justice Department. 

The concern that is the subject of today’s hearing is equally important—whether 

capital defendants are being systematically deprived of their right to competent 

counsel. 

Obviously, we can only have confidence in our criminal justice system if every defendant, whether they are charged with a capital crime, or even a simple misdemeanor, has the benefit of representation by an able attorney. 

Today’s hearing is not about whether defendants charged with capital crimes are 

entitled to competent counsel. The right to a competent attorney is already guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and by innumerable decisions of the United States Supreme Court. 

A defendant who does not feel that he has received adequate legal representation 

has numerous avenues of relief. The defendant may raise his concern to the trial 

judge prior to, or after, the trial. If convicted, the defendant may raise on appeal 

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. If his appeal is denied, the defendant 

may challenge his conviction in federal court on a writ of habeas corpus. If the writ 

is denied, the defendant may appeal that decision, and if that appeal is denied, the 

defendant may bring his case all the way to the United States Supreme Court. 

Thus, at an absolute minimum, a defendant has an opportunity to persuade five 

different courts that he has received ineffective assistance of counsel. Five different 

courts have an obligation of ensuring that the defendant’s attorney has provided 

competent representation. 

Is the system working? Some would say that it is not. Such people point to several 

highly publicized instances in which a capital defendant has not received the effective assistance of counsel. We have all heard the horror stories of the attorney who 

fell asleep during his client’s trial, and the attorney who showed up for trial intoxicated. 

Some opponents of the death penalty seek to portray these stories as ‘‘par for the 

course.’’ This view ignores the hundreds of capital cases in which no flaw was found 

in the quality of the legal representation. It also ignores the hundreds of capital 

cases in which defendants were either acquitted, or sentenced to a penalty less than 

death, due, at least in part, to the vigorous efforts of their able attorneys. 

19

Far more often than not, a capital defendant is represented by multiple outstanding lawyers. Some of this nation’s finest legal talent is attracted to the challenging, high stakes arena of capital case defense. As several of today’s witnesses 

will testify, the prosecution team in a capital case often finds itself overwhelmed by 

defense teams funded by a combination of public and private sources. 

More importantly, what opponents of the death penalty would have us ignore is 

that those defendants represented by sleeping or intoxicated attorneys—or attorneys 

who fall below the level of acceptable lawyering for whatever reason—routinely have 

their convictions overturned, either on appeal, or on habeas corpus review. Make no 

mistake—it is completely unacceptable for any criminal defendant to be represented 

by a sleeping or intoxicated attorney. But as unfortunate as these rare cases are, 

they do demonstrate unequivocally that the appellate system, and our system for 

habeas review, remain robust and entirely capable of identifying and rectifying instances of deficient legal representation. 

Currently, each of the states that chooses to implement the death penalty has different qualifications for attorneys assigned to represent defendants in capital cases. 

This makes sense, given the differing number of criminal lawyers in various jurisdictions, the differing frequency that the death penalty is sought from state to state, 

and the differing systems that the states have established for assigning lawyers to 

indigent defendants. 

Obviously, a rural jurisdiction, with few lawyers, in a state that requests the 

death penalty relatively infrequently, will have different requirements for capital 

case attorneys than those of an urban jurisdiction, with many criminal lawyers, in 

a state that seeks the death penalty more often. 

Whatever method a state uses to appoint capital case attorneys, the standard for 

their performance is exactly the same from state to state. An attorney must provide 

effective assistance of counsel as defined by the United States Supreme Court. 

The legislation that is the subject of this hearing would seek to paper over the 

differences between the states and to create a one-size-fits-all national standard for 

capital case attorneys. Even if I believed this was a good idea, and I do not, I cannot 

see how it would address the supposed problems in capital case representation that 

are trumpeted by the opponents of the death penalty. 

No legislative scheme we enact will be able to predict, prior to trial, whether a 

particular lawyer will fall asleep during trial, or whether he will develop a problem 

with alcoholism. That is why our current system is designed the way that it is—

to evaluate after the trial whether a lawyer has provided competent representation 

to his or her client. 

Capital representation standards already exist in nearly every state that has implemented the death penalty. There has been a recent movement in many states to 

make such standards more exacting. Yet incompetent attorneys still slip through 

the cracks. Regardless of their good intentions, capital representation standards 

simply cannot ensure that every defendant will receive competent representation. 

That assurance will continue to be provided, as it is now, by the appellate process, 

and by the system for habeas corpus review. 

My concern is that the only group likely to benefit from the legislation we are discussing today are those individuals intent on eliminating the death penalty altogether. Capital representation standards could easily be written so that many isolated jurisdictions would have no attorneys judged capable of handling death penalty cases. 

A system already renowned for its glacial pace would experience further massive 

delays as the few death-penalty-eligible attorneys are rationed out among competing 

jurisdictions. 

As I said at the beginning of this statement, the death penalty is a subject that 

engenders great passion. Although a substantial majority of the American public remains solidly in favor of the death penalty, there is a vocal minority that is passionately opposed to the imposition of the death penalty under any circumstances. 

I fear that the adoption of national capital representation standards, although undoubtedly well-intentioned, would provide a mechanism for those who would thwart 

the will of the majority of American citizens, and achieve what the minority failed 

to achieve at the ballot box—the complete evisceration of the death penalty. 

While it is true that a small proportion of capital defendants do not currently receive effective assistance of counsel, it is also true that in these rare cases, the convictions do not withstand appellate and collateral review. If national capital representation standards are established, the situation will not be changed—there will 

still be a small proportion of capital defendants who do not receive effective assistance of counsel. What will be changed, is that opponents of the death penalty will 

be handed yet another procedural tool with which to manufacture delay. 

20

Mr. Chairman, I share your concern that the innocent must be protected. It is intolerable for even one innocent person to reside on death row, much less, God forbid, 

that an innocent person ever be executed. 

We have reached substantial agreement on some important reforms that would 

go a long way towards protecting the innocent. We agree that potentially exculpatory DNA testing must be provided to inmates on death row who did not have 

access to such testing at the time of their trial. We agree that the nation’s forensic 

laboratories must receive increased funding to enable them to process evidence more 

expeditiously, leading to exoneration for some defendants and, in some cases, to the 

arrest of the actual perpetrator. We agree that increased funds must be provided 

for the treatment and prevention of drug abuse, to break the cycle of addiction 

which underlies many of these violent crimes. And with respect to capital representation standards, I have no problem with the federal government providing the 

states with financial assistance, available on a voluntary basis, to ensure competent 

counsel at trial. 

With all due respect, Mr. Chairman, I cannot support the provisions that are the 

subject of today’s hearing. The provisions are harmful to the efficient administration 

of justice; they are harmful to the rights of the states to order their own affairs; 

and above all, they are harmful to the victims, and their families, who are entitled 

to a fair and speedy justice being meted out to the perpetrators of these heinous 

crimes. 

Mr. Chairman, I want again to acknowledge your outstanding leadership on this 

issue. We are in complete agreement as to the goal for which we must be striving: 

that our criminal justice system operate fairly and efficiently, and that no innocent 

person be wrongfully convicted. I hope that we will be able to continue to work together on this important issue.

Chairman LEAHY. Well, I thank the Senator from Utah. He and 

I have worked closely together for over 20 years on many different 

issues and I am sure we will continue to work together on this one. 

I also thank him for bringing members of his family here today. 

We are going to recess for about 10 minutes while Senator Hatch 

and I go to vote, and then we will be back and resume the hearing. 

[The committee stood in recess from 10:49 a.m. to 11:15 a.m.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Hatch is on his way back. I just 

checked, and we will start. I see Senator Sessions, of Alabama, is 

here, and we will begin with the Attorney General of Alabama, 

William Pryor. 

We will give 5 minutes to each of the witnesses. They will be 

able to put their full statements in the record. When Senators get 

the record back, they understand that you will be able to expand 

it. You will all have a chance to see your transcript. If you find that 

there is something you want to add or detract from your statement, 

feel free. 

Attorney General Pryor? 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM H. PRYOR, JR., ATTORNEY 

GENERAL, STATE OF ALABAMA, MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA 

Mr. PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, Senator Sessions. Thank you for inviting me to comment on 

the problems posed by S. 486, which has been referred to as the 

Innocence Protection Act of 2001. 

As the Attorney General of Alabama, my office defends the death 

sentences in capital murder cases and all direct appeals, State 

post-conviction proceedings, and Federal habeas corpus proceedings. My office also occasionally prosecutes capital murder 

charges at the trial level. 

In my 4 1/2 years as Attorney General, 10 capital murders have 

been executed, after pursuing an average of 16 years and 5 months 

of appeals and other post-conviction proceedings. Our process is 

21

much longer and involves more levels of review than the relatively 

speedy execution of Timothy McVeigh. 

My concerns about the legislation before you are that it would 

lengthen and complicate an already byzantine system, create perverse incentives for the criminal justice systems of each State, and 

harm the real innocents in this process. The real innocents, of 

course, are the families of victims of capital murderers and the future victims of those murderers who either escape justice or are not 

deterred by a system that fails to punish swiftly and adequately 

the most heinous crimes in our society. 

If your concern is to protect the innocent from being executed, 

then you need not worry. It is not occurring and it is highly unlikely to occur. As Professor Paul Cassell of the University of Utah 

School of Law has stated, ‘‘The death penalty system in America 

is the most accurate criminal sanction in the world.’’

Consider first how this legislation would cause unreasonable 

delays and complications. Section 201 would shift the appointment 

of defense lawyers in capital cases from the independent judges of 

the State to a so-called independent appointing authority. The evaluation of fitness to practice as defense counsel in capital cases 

would shift from the State bar and courts to the independent appointing authority. 

I am concerned that this authority might be captured and staffed 

by attorneys who favor the abolition of capital punishment and 

therefore are not independent. It is unreasonable and contrary to 

basic constitutional principles of federalism to expect that an independent authority would be more objective, balanced and diligent 

than the judges of the State courts who now appoint counsel in 

capital cases. Judges are independent. For that matter, so are prosecutors whose ethical duty, in contrast with the defense attorneys, 

is to pursue truth and justice. 

A group of anti-death penalty lawyers would have many incentives to set the performance standards and qualifications of attorneys on their roster unreasonably high so that few lawyers would 

be placed on the roster. This perverse incentive would then mean 

that indigents who face capital murder charges would not have 

competent counsel for trial. The system created by this legislation 

could become a self-fulfilling prophecy where capital murder trials 

come to an abrupt end because of an alleged lack of competent 

counsel. 

Moreover, this legislation could empower attorneys who favor the 

abolition of capital punishment to inflict real harm on the corrections system of each State. Under the guise of serving as the independent appointing authority, these attorneys could ensure that 

each State that administers capital punishment fails to meet the 

standards set by the attorneys, and as a result the State loses Federal funds for prisons. 

States that desire to forgo the burdens of this legislation would 

also have to forgo the benefits of Federal funds for the prisons of 

that State, which many States would do, to the detriment of inmates, the vast majority of whom are not on death row, and victims of criminals who could be released from prison. In my State, 

the amount of Federal funds at stake this year is over $1.3 million. 

22

Finally, this legislation would create incentives for States to 

abolish post-conviction proceedings for capital murderers. Currently, under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996, States with post-conviction proceedings receive deference 

for the determinations made by their courts in respect of fundamental principles of federalism. 

By removing the benefits of AEDPA, this legislation would offer 

the States no incentive to maintain post-conviction proceedings, 

which are not required by the U.S. Constitution. With the elimination of these proceedings after a trial and direct appeal, an inmate on death row would have access only to Federal courts and 

habeas corpus proceedings as a process for review of his death sentence. This disincentive for access to State post-conviction proceedings runs directly contrary to the entire purpose and rationale 

for AEDPA. 

In 1996, Congress wisely concluded that the Federal process for 

review of death sentences should accord deference to State courts 

and be streamlined to make capital punishment a more effective 

deterrent of heinous crimes and a better system of justice for the 

innocent families of victims of capital murder. 

I have also made available to you today for filing with my statement my written remarks that I gave last year to the Board of Bar 

Commissioners of the Alabama State Bar to defend our system of 

capital punishment against charges of unfairness and the alleged 

risk of executing an innocent person. 

I want to thank you again for this opportunity on this most important issue. I look forward to answering any questions you have 

about the matter. 

[The prepared statement and an attachment of Mr. Pryor follow:]

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL PRYOR, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for inviting me to comment on the problems posed by S. 486, which 

has been referred to as the Innocence Protection Act of 2001. As the Attorney General of Alabama, my office defends the death sentences in capital murder cases in 

all direct appeals, state post-conviction proceedings, and federal habeas corpus proceedings. My office also occasionally prosecutes capital murder charges at the trial 

level. In my four and a half years as attorney general, ten capital murderers have 

been executed after pursuing an average of 16 years and 5 months of appeals and 

other post-conviction proceedings. Our process is much longer and involves more levels of review than the relatively speedy execution of Timothy McVeigh. 

My concerns about the legislation before you are that it would lengthen and complicate an already Byzantine system, create perverse incentives for the criminal justice systems of each state, and harm the real innocents in this process. The real 

innocents, of course, are the families of victims of capital murderers and the future 

victims of those murderers who either escape justice or are not deterred by a system 

that fails to punish swiftly and adequately the most heinous crimes in our society. 

If your concern is to protect the innocent from being executed, then you need not 

worry; it is not occurring and is highly unlikely to occur. As Professor Paul Cassell 

of the University of Utah School of Law has stated, ‘‘The death penalty system in 

America is the most accurate criminal sanction in the world.’’ Marcia Coyle, 66% 

Error Rate Found In Death Case Study: Author Calls Serious Problems ‘‘Epidemic,’’

Nat’ L.J., June 19, 2000, at A1 (col.2). 

Consider first how this legislation would cause unreasonable delays and complications. Section 201 would shift the appointment of defense lawyers in capital cases 

from the independent judges of the state to a so-called independent appointing authority. The evaluation of fitness to practice as defense counsel in capital cases 

would shift from the State Bar and courts to the independent appointing authority. 

23

I am concerned that this authority might be captured and staffed by attorneys who 

favor the abolition of capital punishment and, therefore, are not independent. 

It is unreasonable and contrary to basic constitutional principles of federalism to 

expect that an independent authority would be more objective, balanced, and diligent than the judges of the state courts who now appoint counsel in capital cases. 

Judges are independent. For that matter, so are prosecutors whose ethical duty, in 

contrast with defense attorneys, is to pursue the truth and justice. A group of antideath penalty lawyers would have many incentives to set the performance standards and qualifications of attorneys on their roster unreasonably high so that few 

lawyers would be placed on their roster. This perverse incentive would then mean 

that indigents who face capital murder charges would not have competent counsel 

for trial. The system created by this legislation could become a self-fulfilling prophecy where capital murder trials come to an abrupt end because of an alleged lack 

of competent counsel. 

Moreover, this legislation could empower attorneys who favor the abolition of capital punishment to inflict real harm on the corrections system of each state. Under 

the guise of serving as the independent appointing authority, these attorneys could 

ensure that each state that administers capital punishment fails to meet the standards set by the attorneys and, as a result, the state loses federal funds for its prisons. States that desire to forego the burdens of this legislation would also have to 

forego the benefits of federal funds for the prisons of that state, which many states 

would do to the detriment of inmates, the vast majority of whom are not on death 

row, and victims of criminals who could be released from prison. In my state, the 

amount of federal funds at stake this year is $1,389,635. 

Finally, this legislation would create incentives for states to abolish post-conviction proceedings for capital murderers. Currently, under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, states with post-conviction proceedings receive 

deference for the determinations made by their courts in respect of fundamental 

principles of federalism. By removing the benefits of AEDPA, this legislation would 

offer the states no incentive to maintain post-conviction proceedings, which are not 

required by the U.S. Constitution. With the elimination of these proceedings, after 

a trial and direct appeal, an inmate on death row would have access only to federal 

courts in habeas corpus proceedings as a process for review of his death sentence. 

This disincentive for access to state post-conviction proceedings runs directly contrary to the entire purpose and rationale for AEDPA. In 1996, Congress wisely concluded that the federal process for review of death sentences should accord deference to state courts and be streamlined to make capital punishment a more effective deterrent of heinous crimes and a better system of justice for the innocent families of victims of capital murder. 

The entire rationale for the competency requirements in this legislation is flawed. 

After many years of review, capital murderers are executed because they are guilty, 

not because their counsel is incompetent. Take, for example, in my state, the case 

of Phillip Wayne Tomlin, who last year was tried by prosecutors in my office, convicted, and sentenced to death for the fourth time for the murders of 19 year old 

Ricky Brune and 15 year old Cheryl Moore on January 1, 1977. None of the reversals of his first three convictions was related to competency of defense counsel. He 

received a death sentence for the fourth time even though he was represented by 

Stephen Bright, who is testifying today because of his expertise as a defense lawyer 

and opponent of capital punishment. 

I will also make available to you written remarks that I gave last year to the 

Board of Bar Commissioners of the Alabama State Bar to defend our system of capital punishment against charges of unfairness and the alleged risk of executing an 

innocent person. 

Thank you again for this opportunity and I look forward to answering any questions you may have about this matter.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF HON. B

fILL PRYOR, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF

ALABAMA

President Rumore, members of the Executive Committee, and Commissioners, I 

appreciate this opportunity to speak to you today regarding a proposed death penalty moratorium in this State. The death penalty has the support of a majority of 

Americans and a large majority of Alabamians. Depending on which poll you view, 

the death penalty in this state is supported by anywhere from 65% to 80% of our 

State’s citizens. 

24

The public support for the death penalty is for good reason. The statistics kept 

by the FBI show that there is a strong correlation between murder rates and capital 

punishment. When these statistics are graphed, a trend is reflected showing that 

when executions go up, murder rates go down and vice versa. A graph reflecting 

this trend is included in a handout my office has prepared for you which will be 

available after my remarks. Even if you don’t believe statistics, because—as the saying goes—figures lie and liars figure, it is still clear that the death penalty has overwhelming public support for good reason. As Professor McAdams of Marquette University put it: 

‘‘If we execute murderers and there is in fact no deterrent effect, we have killed 

a bunch of murderers. If we fail to execute murderers, and doing so would, in fact, 

have deterred other murders, we have allowed the killing of a bunch of innocent 

victims. I would much rather risk the former. This, to me, is not a tough call.’’

The truth of this statement is irrefutable and opponents of the death penalty 

know it. That is why the attack on the death penalty no longer focuses on its deterrent effect, but instead focuses on the alleged risk that we will execute an innocent 

person or that we have executed an innocent person. Make no mistake about it, the 

death penalty moratorium movement is headed by an activist minority with little 

concern for what is really going on in our criminal justice system. You need look 

no further than the origin of this moratorium movement to see that. This movement 

started in the American Bar Association, from which I resigned eleven years ago. 

The moratorium issue was placed before the ABA’s House of Delegates not by the 

Criminal Justice Section, but by the ABA’s Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities. 

The Criminal Justice Section of the ABA is defense-oriented. A study on the 

ABA’s Criminal Justice views, written by a board composed of former U.S. Attorney 

General Edwin Meese, former U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, and the 

Attorneys General of Idaho, California, and Colorado examined how defense-oriented the ABA’ Criminal Justice Section is. They found that between 1994 and 

1996, 11 of the 15 positions taken before Congress through the CJS’s lobbying were 

defense-oriented. The remaining 4 issues were neutral, such as gun control where 

prosecutors and defense attorneys can agree without regard to their positions in our 

legal system. The defense-oriented positions included favoring the de novo review 

of state court decisions in habeas corpus, and abolishing, through legislation, exceptions to the exclusionary rule established by U.S. Supreme Court precedent. The 

study also found that of 20 articles between the spring to 1995 and winter of 1997 

in the CJS’s publication, 11 articles took defense-oriented positions, 3 too a prosecutor’s side, and the remaining articles were neutral. The various amicus curiae briefs 

filed by the CJS with the U.S. Supreme Court on the behalf of the ABA also Section 

of the ABA. 

The revealing factor, however, is that despite its defense-orientation, the Criminal 

Justice Section did not report the moratorium issue to the House of Delegates. Instead, the even more liberal Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities did. 

One need only look at the ABA’s proposal to see how liberal its moratorium proposal 

is. 

The proposal is to adopt a moratorium until certain standards can be imposed to 

ensure fairness in the system. Insuring fairness in the system would involve the following:

1) the ABA would not allow experienced capital appellate attorneys to represent capital defendants at trial, even as second chair. Attorneys experienced in trying capital cases at the federal habeas corpus level would also 

be excluded from representing defendants in state trials, even as second 

chair. 

2) Even more revealing is that, under the ABA’s plan, former prosecutors 

who have tried capital cases for years would be barred from representing 

capital de3fendants in state trials, even as second chair, because the lack 

the necessary ‘‘defense’’ experience. Again, this is one of the many areas 

where the ABA is consistently anti-prosecution in its views. 

3) Under the ABA moratorium proposal, the procedural bars enacted by 

Congress and our legislature would not be recognized in habeas proceedings. Never mind the will of the people as expressed through their 

elected representatives. The public supported these actions, such as the 

Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which made federal habeas 

corpus proceedings more efficient and reflected the constitutional principles 

that our State courts are able to address constitutional claims as well as, 

if not better than, federal courts, something the Section on Individual 

Rights and Responsibilities deliberately ignores. 

25

4) the ABA moratorium proposal rejects the presumption of correctness of 

state court findings of fact under the AEDPA.

Before I return to why the proposed moratorium is not needed in Alabama, allow 

me to offer you one lesson the ABA is learning the hard way. The ABA has always 

billed itself as the representative of the nation’s lawyers. In the past 20 years, however, the ABA has started taking more and more politicized views, and as I mentioned earlier, has started supporting more and more criminal defense-oriented and 

liberal positions. Today, there are an estimated 900,000 to 1,000,000 lawyers in the 

United States. Of that number, the ABA says it represents approximately 400,000, 

or less than 50%. Of that number, many are first-year lawyers taking advantage 

of the ABA’s free year of membership. 

In 1991–1992 the ABA;s retention rate was 92%. By 1995–1996, the retention rate 

had fallen to 83.9%. The ABA’s decision to take on political issues that have nothing 

to do with advancing the legal profession has resulted in its decline. This year, there 

are reports that the ABA lost money on its annual conference. The ABA is losing 

members because it is turning into a political action committee. Although you might 

think to yourself that membership in this organization is mandatory, so the Alabama State Bar cannot suffer the same fate, that is not true. The decision that this 

body makes COULD deprive this organization of its status as an integrated bar, but 

I will explain that later. 

Recently, a report from Columbia University written by a liberal professor named 

James Liebman has been touted as proof that our system is broken and that we 

run the great risk of an innocent person being executed. Overlooking, for the moment, that the study’s conclusion is a non sequitur, there are several problems with 

this study. First this study is skewed because it covers the time period in which 

Beck v. Alabama was decided by the United States Supreme Court, resulting in 48 

reversals in Alabama, without covering the past five, practically flawless, years. The 

Beck decision, for those of you unfamiliar with Alabama’s capital system, invalidated Alabama’s entire capital statute in 1980. The study covers the Beck period 

yet it stops in 1995, although Alabama’s error rate in the past 5 years is less than 

5%. These are concerns about the validity and motivation of the study, but they are 

not even the most glaring irregularities. 

I am sure all of you are familiar with the United States Supreme Court’s Daubert

analysis, used for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence at a trial. One 

of the Daubert factors is whether the expert’s methodology has been subjected to 

peer-review. If you apply that test to the Liebman study, you will find that the 

study does not define ‘‘error rate.’’ If you call Liebman, he cannot tell you what he 

used as the basis for qualifying something as ‘‘error.’’ He cannot supply you with 

a list of the names of all of the cases he considered. He cannot prove to you that 

he examined every case in Alabama where the death penalty was imposed. Liebman 

cannot give you a baseline of non-capital cases with which to compare his error rate. 

Finally, Liebman cannot defend his conclusion that the high error rate he found— even if he could prove it was accurate—means that there is a risk of an innocent 

person being executed, as opposed to being evidence that the Alabama judiciary is 

doing a fine job of giving these cases serious review. 

The Liebman study is more evidence of the ideological nature of this issue. if 

there is a high error rate—presumably meaning a high number of reversals or other 

corrective actions by appellate courts at the State and federal level—the anti-death 

penalty movement argues that there is a high level of risk that an innocent person 

will be executed. If there is a low error rate, the argument then becomes that the 

reviewing courts are simply ‘‘rubber stamping’’ these cases and they are not receiving meaningful review. You cannot have it both ways, however. 

In the spirit of ‘‘put up or shut up,’’ I am going to put up. I have brought with 

me today handouts for each of you. In these handouts you will find the procedural 

histories of the 281 cases in which the death penalty has been imposed since 1975. 

To the best of my office’s knowledge, this represents all of the cases. You can review 

these cases for yourself and decide if the 80% error rate cited by Liebman is illustrative of the fact that his study is propaganda or if you think he was right. In any 

case, the State of Alabama is doing what the author of this study cannot or will 

not do; we are giving you the information from which our opinion has been reached. 

Our list reveals 281 individuals sentenced to death since 1975. Our first important statistic is that our error rate, the number of innocent people executed by the 

State of Alabama is 0%. Because there are no cases of actual innocence, we must 

turn to the more practical outcome-based analysis. Of the 281cases, 23 people have 

been executed. Another 180 of those cases represent active cases that my office is 

currently involved in. Because they are active, meaning still moving towards an execution date, it cannot be said that there is error in those cases. Of those 180 cases, 

we are awaiting execution dates from the Alabama Supreme Court on 2 of the cases. 

26

Another 10 individuals have died while on death row. One person’s sentence was 

commuted by the Governor FOB James. Four people settled their cases for sentences less than death. 

Of all of these cases, no court found error resulting in the reversal of the conviction or sentence. Thus, there can be no legal error cited as to these cases. That 

leaves, of the original 281 cases, 63 cases. Even if the remaining 63 cases were legally flawed, the resulting error rate would still only be 22.4%. 

But of the remaining 63 cases, we know that 47 of them received a sentence of 

less than death. Most of these sentences were life without parole or life, or in the 

case of Dudley Wayne Kyzer, a 10,000-year sentence. Thus, the error was not with 

the guilt or innocence of the individual, but involved sentencing. Defining these 

cases as error would be understandable. The risk of executing an innocent person, 

however, is not increased by having a death sentence later decreased to 10,000 

years, or life without parole, if the inmate is guilty. Thus, these cases should be subtracted from the remaining 63 cases to which I referred earlier. This leaves 16 

cases. Our ‘‘error rate’’ when we are left with 16 problematic cases after we started 

with 281 cases is 6%, if you round the number up. Of those 16 cases, 8 are awaiting 

new trails. If any of these 8 cases are retired and a new death sentence is imposed, 

there is arguable no error. If history is any guide, and I will get to this in a moment, 

at least 4 of these cases will result in a new death sentence. Using history as a 

guide, at least 7 of these 8 cases will be retried and will result in death or life in 

prison without parole. 

Thus, the number of cases where it can be said there is error can probably be 

decreased to about 10 of the original 281 cases. That results in an error rate of 4%, 

if you round the numbers up. 

There are eight cases that are unaccounted for. We do not know what happened 

after they were reversed. Of these 8 cases, 5 were Beck reversals from the 1980– 1981 time period, which is why they are difficult to track. Another case is twentyone years old and involved a fatal variance between the indictment and the jury’s verdict, which is why is was difficult to find any records documenting the ultimate 

disposition of this case. 

Even if you do not look at individual cases and outcomes, and instead rely on reversals by higher courts, the Liebman study is inaccurate. First, it would not be 

wise to base a study on the number of times an appellate court reverses a particular 

defendant’s case. There are several persons who have been executed whose cases 

had been reversed and then were re-sentenced to death. The reversal had nothing 

to do with the person’s guilt or innocence. The risk of executing an innocent person, 

if you recall, is the reason the Liebman study’s error rate was considered so important. Phillip Wayne Tomlin, for example, has been tried and convicted of capital 

murder and sentenced to death 4 times. The total number or reversals, then, is not 

persuasive evidence of a problem in our system. If we executed Phillip Wayne 

Tomlin tomorrow after 4 trials, four guilty verdicts, and four death sentences, the 

risk of executing an innocent person would be minimal, though Liebman’s study 

asks you to assume otherwise. To be fair, I will also discuss what my office has discovered in regard to the overall number of reversals. 

Our findings are that there have been 136 reversals of cases since 1975. Of that 

number, 24 of those sentences were later reinstated by a higher appellate court, reducing the total number of actual reversals to 112. Of the 112 reversals, 46 of the 

cases were re-sentenced to death. Another 47 were sentenced to a punishment less 

severe than death, ordinarily life without parole. Another 8 cases are awaiting new 

trials, so they cannot be included in determining the percentage of cases that are 

later re-sentenced to death. Another 47 were sentenced to a punishment less severe 

than death, ordinarily life without parole. Another 8 cases are awaiting new trials, 

so they cannot be included in determining the percentage of cases that are later resentenced to death or less than death. That leaves a total of 104 reversals. Of 104 

reversals, 89% of the reversals later resulted in the new death sentences or sentences of less than death. 

Interestingly, of the 136 overall reversals, 48 were the result of the United States 

Supreme Court’s Beck decision. That is 35.3%.That is why the starting date of 1975 

and cut-off date of 1995 skewed Liebman’s study and reflects the bias behind the 

study. Another 9 of those reversals were due to Batson violations, which have absolutely nothing to do with the defendant’s guilt or innocence. An additional 36 reversals were as to the defendant’s sentence only. Again, this shows that the reversals 

had noting to do with the defendant’s guilt or innocence. These 45 reversals make 

up 33% of the total number of reversals. 

If anyone still believes that the overall number of reversals is relevant, then there 

is a final statistic to consider. Of the 281 cases mentioned, we have compiled record 

of 1145 instances of review by courts. This compilation does not include ordered reVerDate Feb 1 2002 10:08 Sep 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\81606.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
27

mands where the court does not undertake a review of the case. This compilation 

also does not count the pending reviews in courts at both the federal and state levels. This compilation includes only reviews where the courts were presented with 

an opportunity to reverse the sentence of conviction of an inmate. Finding error in 

136 of these 1145 reviews would mean out error rate is approximately 11.9% If you 

discount the reversals that were later reversed by a higher court, using the 112 actual reversals, our error rate in those 1145 instances of judicial review falls to 9.8%. 

The bottom line is this: If you look at the persons who have been sentenced to 

death and what has happened in each of their cases, you will see that the system 

in Alabama is not flawed but is working. In fact, it is getting better. 

1. Attorneys at the trial level are paid $60/hour in court and $40/hour out-of-court 

on these cases, plus overhead. With overhead, the hourly rate easily exceeds $100 

per hour. There is not cap on these fees. 

2. The law in Alabama guarantees you an attorney with five years criminal trial 

experience if you are appointed an attorney. 

3. Death row inmates are routinely represented in post-conviction proceedings by 

the top law firms in the nation, including Wall Street law firms. 

Jimmy Davis, for example, is represented by the law of Chadbourne and Parke, 

LLP. This is a law firm with offices in New York, Los Angeles, Washington, DC., 

Hong Kong, Moscow, and London. This law firm has over 2000 attorneys. In addition to Chadbourne and Parke, Davis is also represented by Foley and Lardner, a 

Law firm with offices in Brussels, Chicago, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., San 

Francisco, San Diego, Sacramento, Tampa, and West Palm Beach. Foloey and larder 

employs over 750 attorneys. Another inmate, Joseph Hooks is represented by Palmer & Dodge. This law firm in Chicago employs more then 190 lawyers. Another inmate, Christopher Less Price, is represented by Ropes & Gray. This law firm over 

325 attorneys has offices in Boston, Providence and Washington, D.C. 

These are not isolated cases. Huge corporate, high-powered law firms get involved 

in a majority of these cases. You, the State Bar, review and retain the pro hac vice 

requests on these case. Look them up and see what is happening in these cases. 

You can easily see that these inmates are well represented at all levels of review. 

Most of us in this room could not afford to pay these to do work for use, yet our 

death row inmates get representation from them. The system is working. 

4. One Large, out-of-state law firm recently spent $100,000 solely to investigate 

an inmate’s claims for a Rule 32 proceeding. 

5. A majority of the death row inmates in Alabama are represented by Bryan 

Stevenson’s organization, the Equal Justice Initiative. Stevenson was recently 

named one of the top 100 lawyers in the Nation by the National Law Journal. Additionally Stevenson has been named the public interest Lawyer of the Year, has been 

awarder the ABA Wisdom Award for Public Service, the Thurgood Marshall Medal 

of Justice, and the ACLU Medal of Liberty.Those who are not represented by Stevenson or his organization are represented by lawyers, found by Mr. Stevenson, who 

rely heavily on his expertise. I understand that you have heard already a presentation by Mr. Stevenson, Who is an able and articulate supporter of abolishing capital punishment. 

6. Many Alabama death row inmates are also represented, at some point, by Stephen Bright and his organization, the Southern Center for Human Rights. In Williams v. Head, 185 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 1999), the Eleventh Circuit had this to say 

about Stephen Bright, singling him out in the opinion of the court:

Mr. Bright is a nationally known expert who has been litigating against the 

death penalty for twenty years. He has taught on that and related subjects 

at Harvard, Yale, Georgetown, Emory and other universities, has written 

numerous law review articles on the subject, and has testified extensively 

about it before committees of Congress and many state legislatures. For his 

efforts and dedication, Mr. Bright was awarded the Roger Baldwin Medal 

of Liberty by the American Civil Liberties Union in 1991, the Kutak-Dodds 

Prize by the National Legal Aid & Defenders Association in 1992, and last 

year he received both the American Bar Association’s Thurgood Marshall 

award and the Louis Brandeis Medal given by the Brandeis Scholars at 

Brandeis School of Law at the University of Louisville.

7. Death row inmates are given at least 10 opportunities to present their claims 

to Alabama and federal courts after a death sentence is imposed. 

8. Governor Siegelman has offered to grant DNA testing for any inmate for whom 

the test could be determinative of guilt or innocence. May office will not deny DNA 

test to any inmate who presents a valid claim of innocence, if they present the claim 

in a timely manner, not on the eve of execution. 

28

9. In case reviewed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the Alabama 

Supreme Court, oral argument is granted usually as a matter of right. I have an 

attorney in my division who has been in practice for 1 year who has argued in the 

Alabama Supreme Court 3 times and the Court of Criminal Appeals 11 times. How 

many of you know lawyers who have had oral arguments granted in non-capital 

cases that many times in their careers, let alone in one year of practice? 

10. Although the trend in Alabama is for Rule 32 petitions in non-capital cases 

to be dismissed or denied without an evidentiary hearing, capital cases often involve 

evidentiary hearings that last from 2 days up to a week in length. That is longer 

than many non-capital trials in this State. 

11. Although non-capital cases are bound by the ‘‘contemporaneous objection’’ rule 

requiring lawyers to preserve error for appellate review, in Alabama we allow courts 

to notice any plain error at any stage of the direct appeal proceedings. BY law, we 

require the Court of Criminal Appeals to search the record for error, even if the 

error was not preserved by the defendant. 

12. Earlier this year, the Supreme Court of Alabama unanimously adopted a 

change in Rule 39 of the Rules and Appellate Procedure that I and Governor 

Siegelman proposed to streamline appeals of death sentences, which have received 

more scrutiny in Alabama than in any other state. The Supreme Court obviously 

believe the system is working. 

There is no crisis or problem in our capital system. We do not need a moratorium 

to fix the system, because the system is not broken. This brings me to my final 

point. 

Keeping in the tradition of saving the best for last, here is the best reason why 

you should not get involved with the moratorium issue: Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990). 

Should you choose to move this organization away from its purpose of regulating 

the legal profession and into the realm of taking political and ideological positions 

on issues, you invite a legal challenge to the status of our Alabama State Bar as 

an integrated bar. The decision to take an ideological position will invite a federal 

lawsuit challenging the use of compelled dues to finance this organization, which 

would be departing from its purpose. 

Even to invite an unsuccessful Keller challenge would cause hardship to this 

group. According to Keller, a challenge would require placing the challenging members’ dues into an escrow account while an accounting is given. If successful, the 

challenge would result in the loss of those dues. 

Consider the question left unresolved by Keller: Can an integrated bar be totally 

disbanded based on freedom of association grounds? In my office there are 10 attorneys who prosecute the 180 cases currently moving towards execution of their sentences. In addition, there are dozens of district attorneys and their hundreds of assistants who regularly integrated bar be totally disbanded based on freedom of association grounds? In my office there are 10 attorneys who persecute the 180 cases 

currently moving towards execution of their sentences. In addition, there are dozens 

of district attorneys and their hundreds of assistants who regularly try these capital 

murder cases. If the Bar adopts the proposed resultion in favor of a moratorium, 

you will declare that you believe the system is flawed and that we run a grave risk 

of executing an innocent person. That declaration would imply that you believe that 

the district attorneys, their assistants, my assistant attorneys general and I would 

violate our duty to see justice done if we sought to allowed an execution to proceed. 

You cannot expect the prosecutors of Alabama to be forced to join an organization 

that impugns our integrity. You will invite a challenge by those who wish not longer 

to be forced to associate and contribute financially to a group that insults our professional work. Such a challenge might very well succeed. 

For several reasons, this body should drop this moratorium proposal. First, This 

body cannot and should not go against the will of a majority of the citizens of this 

state on this political issue. I again mention public support for capital punishment 

for this reason: the public holds capital punishment in higher esteem than the members of our profession. I believe the low regard of the public of our profession is too 

often deserved. If you want death row inmates to obtain better representation, then 

encourage more members of the Bar to perform that public service. If you desire 

to enhance the image of our profession, then you should reject the proposed resolution before you. 

Second, regardless of what ideologies say in their studies while hiding their underlying data, there is no problem in Alabama’s capital system as the handout my 

office has prepared evidences. Our defense attorneys are paid reasonable fees and 

two of the top lawyers in the national are continuing to represent these death row 

inmates, along with some of the top law firms in the United States. The appellate 

courts scrutinize these cases with a fine-toothed comb under the plain error standVerDate Feb 1 2002 10:08 Sep 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\81606.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
29

ard. Finally, because we are an integrated the Alabama State Bar has absolutely 

no business taking a position on this political and ideological issue. 

Thank you for your time.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. I should also note for the record 

that General Pryor follows in distinguished footsteps. He was appointed to fill the vacancy as attorney general when his predecessor left the power and glory of that office for the anonymity of 

the U.S. Senate. But you did follow in distinguished footsteps, Mr. 

Pryor, following Senator Sessions. 

I would also note that Kurt Bloodworth, one of the exonerees 

mentioned earlier, is now here with his wife, Brenda. I appreciate 

them joining us today. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add——

Chairman LEAHY. Sure. Do you want to contradict my statement 

about distinguished footsteps? 

Senator SESSIONS. No. He has carried the office to greater 

heights. Bill Pryor was appointed when I was elected to the Senate. 

He has been reelected by the people of Alabama. He has a wonderful family. He is committed to the rule of law as deeply as any person I know. He is a great constitutional scholar, a man who is running his office in an extraordinarily fine way, and such things as 

editor of the Tulane Law Review when he was in college and just 

the kind of person that we are proud to have in law enforcement. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator Rodney Ellis is a State senator from Texas representing 

Houston in his fifth term in office, I believe. He had served as chief 

of staff to the late U.S. Congressman Mickey Leland. One of his 

colleagues in that office, Leah Gluskoter, then also of Harris County, is now a key staff member in my office. 

Senator Ellis has fought to improve the indigent criminal justice 

system and to ban the execution of the mentally retarded. His most 

recent effort in the Texas Legislature to ban the execution of mentally retarded inmates passed the Texas Legislature, but was vetoed 10 days ago by the Governor of Texas. 

Senator Ellis, go ahead, sir. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RODNEY ELLIS, TEXAS STATE SENATOR, 

AUSTIN, TEXAS 

Mr. ELLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members. I appreciate 

being invited here and I applaud your efforts. 

I make my living as an investment banker, and I am also a corporate lawyer, not a criminal lawyer. From the State legislative 

standpoint, I know how difficult it is to take these issues on. They 

are not issues where there is generally an organized constituency. 

I chair the Senate Finance Committee in the State of Texas. We 

have a very bipartisan body. In fact, I was named as Chair by a 

Republican lieutenant Governor. It is a body that has 16 Republicans and 15 Democrats, so anything we pass out of the senate has 

to have bipartisan support. 

During the legislative interim, I served as president pro tem of 

the Senate, not because I am so bright; we do it by rotation. It was 

my term. Under the Texas Constitution, the president pro tem is 

the person who serves as Governor of the State of Texas when the 

Governor and the lieutenant Governor are out of the State. ObviVerDate Feb 1 2002 10:08 Sep 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\HEARINGS\81606.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
30

ously, our Governor was busy during the interim, and the lieutenant Governor was out of the State a bit as well, so I served as Governor of Texas for a total of 50 days. During that period, I had the 

awesome responsibility of presiding over three executions and 

granting one reprieve. 

I support the death penalty. Some of my critics, because of the 

legislation I carry, have wondered if I support the death penalty. 

I am one of a handful of people who work in the Texas State capital who has both filed death penalty legislation—I did it in my 

freshman term as a senator—and who has had the dubious distinction of presiding over an execution. It changes one’s life and I think 

gives one greater commitment to a number of these issues. 

While I remain a supporter of the death penalty, as I stated, that 

experience has changed me and has made me to fight to ensure 

greater fairness in our death penalty system in Texas, particularly 

Texas because we are the global leader on executions in the world. 

We need to ensure that only competent counsel and adequate 

funding handle these life-and-death cases. We need to make sure 

that cases receive full and fair judicial review. In addition, we must 

ensure that execute only the most culpable. I applaud the Innocence Protection Act of 2001 for its embodiment of these ideals. 

In Texas, I have been working to see similar reform enacted. In 

each of the last two legislative sessions and, in fact, over the last 

decade, I have authored numerous bills to promote increased fairness in our criminal defense system in Texas, particularly in capital punishment cases. 

I proposed and cosponsored the post-conviction DNA testing bill 

that has been signed into law by our Governor. I passed a bill to 

increase compensation for people who have been wrongfully convicted. This will be one area where Texas, I guess, will be on the 

cutting edge and ahead of many other States. As you mentioned, 

I passed a bill to ban executing persons with mental retardation 

that was unfortunately vetoed. 

But perhaps the most significant and far-reaching reform that I 

have championed in Texas is the Texas Fair Defense Act. It is the 

culmination of nearly a decade of work to reform our tattered indigent defense system in Texas. We have 254 counties in Texas. The 

counties have the primary responsibility for our indigent defense 

system, so that means that in the second largest State in the country we have 254 different ways of administering the indigent defense system in our State. We have over 500-some-odd trial court 

judges, and under the current system, prior to enactment of the 

bill, each judge essentially determines the indigent defense system 

in his or her courtroom. 

The effects of the bill that we passed will be felt for years to 

come and, in my judgment, should lay the foundation for a criminal 

defense system in Texas that is both tough and fair. For some time 

now, the Texas criminal justice system has been under the glare 

of the national spotlight. I guess some of my colleagues would say 

I have done a little bit to fan that flame occasionally. 

This attention provided us with many examples of how the poorest among us are treated in Texas. From sleeping lawyers to allowing a person’s race to be used as a reason for execution, we saw 

that poor Texans were being sentenced to a poor defense as well. 

31

I, like many of my colleagues, both Democrats and Republicans, 

was outraged by the problems that we were alerted to by that 

media spotlight; for example, a recent report on how in the Ricardo 

Aldape Guerra case defense lawyers fought to get authorization for 

the court to pay $700 for an investigation matter and were denied 

it. Meanwhile, the prosecution spent $7,000 alone on a pair of mannequins depicting the suspects. Seventeen years later, after $2 million of work by a large law firm in the State on a pro bono basis, 

Guerra was freed from death row based on a finding of police and 

prosecutorial misconduct. The Harris County district attorney’s office declined to re-prosecute the individual. 

Since that case, some changes have been made in the Texas 

criminal justice system, but recent reports reveal that funding for 

investigations remains minimal in our State. I think we have a 

long way to go. The Texas Fair Defense Act addresses several critical concerns—timeliness of appointment, method of appointment, 

reporting of data regarding indigent defense services, experience 

requirements for defense attorneys in capital cases, and development of statewide standards for provision of indigent defense services through an appointed task force. 

I worked for 2 years with everyone involved in the system because the previous bill that I passed was vetoed. I worked with 

judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, legislators, the State bar and 

a number of advocacy groups to craft a strong, effective and bipartisan reform bill. 

But I must emphasize that the bill is a compromise, something 

that I am sure you are accustomed to doing even in this great body. 

As a result, Texas has launched a series of reforms that will eliminate the worst abuses and provide some State oversight of our tattered system, without bankrupting our counties or mandating a 

one-size-fits-all approach. 

That means, members of the committee, that in Texas we made 

a good start. What it does not mean is that we have finished the 

job. Still more must be done to ensure a completely fair system of 

indigent defense in our State. The Innocence Protection Act provides safety measures that will fill many of those gaps that are left 

in State law. 

I know my time is ending, so I appreciate being invited and I will 

obviously submit the rest of my testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ellis follows:]

STATEMENT OF RODNEY ELLIS, TEXAS STATE SENATOR, AUSTIN, TEXAS

Good morning, Chairman Leahy and members of the committee. Thank you for 

conducting this hearing, and for inviting me to lend my support to the need for minimum standards for attorneys in capital cases. I sincerely appreciate your efforts. 

I am especially pleased to appear today because of the enormous respect I have 

for the U.S. Congress. As you may know, prior to my becoming an elected official, 

I had the honor of serving as Chief of Staff for the late Congressman Mickey Leland. 

It was an eye-opening experience and it gave me the opportunity to witness, firsthand, the many responsibilities and challenges each of you faces every day. 

Today, I am serving my fifth term as a member of the Texas Senate, where I am 

Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee as well as a member of the Jurisprudence and Redistricting Committees. During the last interim, I served as President 

Pro Tempore of the Texas Senate. Under the Texas Constitution, the President Pro 

Tempore becomes the Acting Governor when the Governor and Lieutenant Governor 

are out of state. During the 50 days that I served as Acting Governor, I had the 

unenviable task of presiding over three executions and granting one 30-day reprieve. 

32

Like many who must take the grim responsibility for overseeing executions, the experience made me reflect deeply on the entire practice of executing our citizens. 

While I remain a supporter of the death penalty, that experience made me even 

more committed to ensuring fairness in our death penalty system. We need to ensure that only competent counsel with adequate funding handle these life and death 

cases. We need to make sure that cases receive a full and fair judicial review. In 

addition, we must ensure that we execute only the most culpable. I applaud the Innocence Protection Act of 2001 for its embodiment of these ideals. 

In Texas, I have been working to see similar reform enacted. In each of the last 

two legislative sessions, I authored numerous bills to promote increased fairness in 

the criminal defense system, particularly the capital punishment system. I proposed 

and co-authored the post-conviction DNA testing bill that has been signed into law 

in Texas. I passed a bill to increase compensation for people who have been wrongfully convicted in Texas. I passed a bill to ban executions of persons with mental 

retardation in Texas, which unfortunately was vetoed by Governor Rick Perry. 

But perhaps the most significant and far-reaching reform I championed was Senate Bill 7, the Texas Fair Defense Act. It was the culmination of nearly a decade 

of work to reform Texas’s tattered indigent defense system. The effects of this bill 

will be felt for years to come and should lay the foundation for a criminal defense 

system that is both tough and fair. 

For some time now, Texas’s criminal justice system has been under the glare of 

the national spotlight. This attention provided us with many examples of how the 

poorest among us are treated. From sleeping lawyers to allowing a person’s race to 

be used as a reason for execution, we saw that poor Texans were being sentenced 

to a poor defense. I, like many of my colleagues, was outraged by the problems we 

were alerted to by that spotlight. 

For example, a recent report related how in the Ricardo Aldape Guerra case, defense lawyers fought to get authorization from the court for payment of $700 for investigation. Meanwhile, the prosecution spent $7,000 alone on a pair of mannequins 

depicting the suspects. Seventeen years later, after $2 million of work by a large 

private law firm, Guerra was freed from death row based on a finding of police and 

prosecutorial misconduct. The Harris County District Attorney’s Office declined to 

re-prosecute him. (Source: A State of Denial: Texas Justice and the Death Penalty, 

published by Texas Defender Service in 2000.) Since that case, some changes have 

been made to the Texas criminal justice system. But recent reports reveal that funding for investigations remains minimal. We still have a long way to go. 

The Texas Fair Defense Act addresses several critical concerns:

1) timeliness of appointment of attorneys for indigent persons accused of 

crimes; 

2) method of the appointment; 

3) reporting of data regarding indigent defense services; 

4) experience requirements for defense attorneys in capital cases; and 

5) development of statewide standards for provision of indigent defense 

services through an appointed task force.

I worked for two years with everyone involved in the system—judges, prosecutors, 

defense attorneys, legislators, the State Bar and advocacy groups—to craft a strong, 

effective, and bipartisan reform plan. 

But I must emphasize that the plan is a compromise. It goes too far for some and 

not far enough for others. As a result, Texas has launched a series of reforms that 

will eliminate the worst abuses and provide some state oversight of the system, 

without bankrupting our counties or mandating a one-size-fits-all approach. What 

that means, members of the Committee, is that we have a good start in Texas. What 

that does not mean is that we have finished the job. Still more must be done to 

ensure a completely fair system of indigent defense in Texas. 

I have said that I had to make a lot of compromises in Senate Bill 7, and I have 

said that some of those compromises kept me up at night. Stronger enforcement 

mechanisms could be in place to require adherence to the task force standards. We 

could have gone farther on the capital standards. And more needs to be done on 

fees. In one large urban county, compensation for out-of-court time is limited to 60 

hours, a tiny fraction of the average time needed to defend a capital case. (Sources: 

Texas Appleseed Fair Defense Project, The Fair Defense Report: Analysis of Indigent 

Defense Practices in Texas (2000); Subcommittee on Federal Death Penalty Cases of 

the Committee on Defender Services, Federal Death Penalty Cases: Recommendations Concerning the Cost and Quality of Defense Representation (1998).) 

The Innocence Protection Act includes provisions that will ensure gaps in state 

law get addressed. For example, the Texas Fair Defense Act, by design, focuses on 

trial-level representation and does not address adequate counsel for appeals and on 

33

habeas corpus writs. But we know the stage at which most innocent people get freed 

on the basis of new evidence is the habeas stage. When it comes to these areas of 

critical national concern, it is useful for Congress to make sure all states are on an 

equal footing. I welcome the federal government’s standard-setting in the area of 

capital qualifications and pay. 

When the state or federal government takes the life of a person using the immense power of the government, we must be ever-vigilant in protecting the rights 

of those individuals and check that the criminal justice system operates correctly 

throughout the process. Having carried out three executions and been engaged on 

this issue in Texas, I must say that I have serious concerns with how the death 

penalty is applied and believe we can and should do much more to ensure fairness 

in the system. I think we have seen that states can achieve positive improvements 

on some issues. For example, each state can determine appropriate local rates for 

attorneys. On the other hand, we ought to have a national statement of the national 

consensus that the death penalty is not appropriately applied to the mentally retarded. And we should have a national panel that ensures that no state fails to provide adequate and well-funded counsel to a citizen facing the ultimate penalty. 

Title II of the Innocence Protection Act establishes the National Commission on 

Capital Representation to give us that assurance we need as a nation. As a supporter of the death penalty, I want to sleep at night, even nights when an execution 

is taking place. I need to be satisfied that we are doing everything we can to keep 

the system honest and fair. I believe that the Commission established by the Innocence Protection Act is a good first step to achieve this with respect to capital counsel standards. I believe that low standards and pay for capital defense counsel has 

been a problem in all states with the death penalty, and the problem needs to be 

solved across the board. I urge the members of the Committee to support the establishment of the Commission, and the entire Innocence Protection Act. 

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to share the experiences of Texas with 

you today. I will gladly answer any questions you might have.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much, Senator Ellis. With you 

and General Pryor traveling this far, it must seem awfully arbitrary to have a 5-minute limit. But I can’t emphasize enough how 

important it is that you are here. Your experience with your legislation in Texas, the fact that you were acting Governor during executions, and everything else is extremely important to us. 

Stephen Bright is the H. Lee Sarokin Director for the Southern 

Center for Human Rights and, in fact, has directed that organization since 1982. The Center provides legal representation to defendants facing the death penalty and works to ensure that they have 

qualified attorneys. 

He has written widely on this subject. He teaches courses on the 

death penalty and criminal law at both Yale and Emory Law 

Schools. I wanted to mention Emory because my oldest son graduated from law school at Emory. 

Mr. Bright? 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN B. BRIGHT, DIRECTOR, SOUTHERN 

CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 

Mr. BRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you for having 

me, Senator Hatch, Senator Feingold, Senator Sessions. It is an 

honor to be here to testify about this Act because it is urgently 

needed. 

Mr. Chairman, you said earlier that the need was urgent, real 

and well-documented. I just want to say Powell v. Alabama was decided in 1932. That case said, in capital cases, that people had a 

right to a lawyer. That was 70 years ago. Gideon v. Wainwright

was decided in 1963. It said people had a right to a lawyer. 

Senator Hatch, in your opening statement you said there is not 

a systematic denial of counsel. What there is in many States is a 

34

systematic failure to provide counsel. That is the problem we have. 

I think what a lot of people don’t realize is how many States there 

are that still don’t have public defender offices. 

We have offices that specialize in the prosecution of these cases. 

They have lawyers there who are trained, who are veterans, who 

know what they are doing, who bring an expertise to the table 

when they try these cases. Then on the other side, often we have 

a general practitioner or somebody like that representing people. 

I will give you just one recent example, which is Gary Drinkard, 

one of our clients, Mr. Chairman, just 3 weeks ago acquitted at a 

capital trial. Mr. Drinkard is sitting right here directly behind me. 

What happened to him is typical, I am afraid, of too many cases 

in our system. 

Gary Drinkard was at home with his family the night the crime 

took place. He had been to the doctor that day because he had had 

a disk problem and was in such pain he couldn’t have committed 

this crime, physically couldn’t have committed this crime. But he 

was appointed lawyers, one who was a collections and commercial 

lawyer with virtually no criminal experience, another lawyer who 

represents creditors in foreclosures and bankruptcies. That is the 

kind of representation people often get. A foreclosure lawyer should 

not be representing somebody in a death penalty case. 

What happened was they never called the doctor to testify about 

his medical condition. They just dumped the medical records into 

the evidence. The jury didn’t know what to do with that. There was 

nobody to explain, nobody to talk about the pain, nobody to talk 

about how disabling it was. So the jury didn’t have that critical information. 

There was a man about 70 years old who was just by the home 

that evening, didn’t even know Mr. Drinkard, was there with somebody else who was there with him during the crime went down, the 

most objective person never called as a witness. 

Now, fortunately, Mr. Drinkard was represented at his retrial by 

Richard Jaffe, a very distinguished and good lawyer from Birmingham, Alabama; John Mays, a lawyer from Decatur; and Chris 

Adams from our office. The two people who investigated that case 

are also here today, Kate Weisberg and Jason Marks. But that is 

the exception, Mr. Chairman. 

Most people in Alabama, and I notice the attorney general—I 

will mention that I tried a case there, the Tomlin case. I tried the 

Tomlin case because I went to Mr. Tomlin’s earlier trial and I 

watched the two court-appointed lawyers trying that case and I 

said after the case was over, if this case gets reversed, I am going 

to come back here and try this case, because the lawyering was just 

dreadful. 

By the way, it said that Tomlin four times got the death sentence. Actually, in Mr. Tomlin’s case the jury unanimously give 

him a life sentence. Judges in Alabama are allowed to override the 

jury, and they have. About a fourth of the death row, as I am sure 

Senator Sessions and Mr. Pryor know, are cases where juries in 

Alabama gave life, but the judges overrode and gave the death penalty. 

That judge, Farrell McRae, was a judge who ran for office showing on his TV commercials all the people he had sentenced to death 

35

on the TV commercials. Now, that is the same judge who appoints 

the lawyers in these cases, which is why we need an independent 

appointing authority. Judges who run for election and who unfortunately can’t resist sometimes the temptation to demagogue on some 

of these issues should not be appointing either the prosecutor or 

the defense. The judge ought to be fair and impartial. 

There are other cases: Anthony Porter, who came within 2 days 

of execution in Illinois. His execution was stayed 2 days before it 

was to take place only because there was a question of whether he 

was mentally competent to be executed, only because it wasn’t 

clear he could understand why he was being executed. 

It was only after that that the journalism class at Northwestern 

became involved. And as I have often said, thank goodness those 

students decided to take journalism that semester instead of chemistry, because if they had taken chemistry, Anthony Porter would 

have been executed and we would never know. We would be saying 

no innocent people have been executed. 

Look at Earl Washington, who is sitting right here beside me. 

Mr. Washington is a man who confessed to a crime he didn’t do. 

It is a classic example of the vulnerability of some of the mentally 

retarded people who come into our criminal justice system. But for 

so many people, there is no journalism class, there are no lawyers 

like the ones that Senator Ellis described, the Guerra lawyers who 

come in and take the case. 

I want to mention one other thing. It was said earlier that the 

sleeping lawyer cases are routinely thrown out. There have been 

three cases where the lawyers slept during the trial out of one jurisdiction alone, and that is Houston. And in all three of those 

cases, Senator Hatch, they have been upheld by the courts. 

I was at the Fifth Circuit in January and saw 14 life-tenured 

United States judges agonizing over the question of whether the 

lawyer who slept during Calvin Burdine’s trial denied him a fair 

trial. The panel held two to one that he was not denied, that in an 

18-hour trial—that is all it took—that the fact that his lawyer slept 

through the trial didn’t deny him a fair trial. Now, that is what it 

means to get the dream team if you are poor in this country. And 

that lawyer, Joe Cannon, put 14 people on death row. 

I will say this: the judges in Houston are not appointing Mr. 

Cannon anymore, but I think it is only because he is no longer in 

life. I am not sure that that would be the case otherwise. 

We need programs to provide competent legal representation, 

lawyers who are trained, who know what they are doing. They 

need to be independent. It has been suggested with this parade of 

horribles here, well, what if we get people who zealously want to 

defend these people? Well, the cases are zealously prosecuted. Why 

shouldn’t they be zealously defended? My understanding is that is 

what the Constitution and what the Canons of Ethics require, is 

that the case be zealously defended. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. You would agree with Senator Ellis, if I might 

paraphrase him, that poor defendants should not be sentenced to 

a poor defense? 

Mr. BRIGHT. Well, I wrote an article one time that said the death 

sentence for the worst lawyer, not for the worst crime. That is the 

36

1 ‘‘Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer,’’ volume 103 of the Yale Law Journal, page 1835 (1994) and ‘‘Neither Equal nor Just: The 

Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake,’’ Volume 197 of the New York University Annual Survey of American Law, page 783 (1997) Both 

available at http://www.schr.org. 

system we have in Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Texas. In a number of the States that are sentencing the vast majority of people to 

death row, Mr. Chairman, in this country people are getting the 

death penalty not because they committed the worst crime, but because they often have lawyers who have no more business trying 

a death penalty case than I would have trying an antitrust case. 

That is just not right. 

And somebody said we shouldn’t have one-size-fits-all. The Constitution doesn’t come in different sizes. Everybody, no matter 

where they are charged—whether it is Tupelo, Mississippi, or Mobile, Alabama, or Atlanta, Georgia, everybody is entitled to competent legal representation, with the resources necessary to investigate the case and present it. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bright follows:]

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN B. BRIGHT, DIRECTOR, SOUTHERN CENTER FOR HUMAN

RIGHTS, LECTURER, YALE, HARVARD AND EMORY LAW SCHOOLS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for this opportunity to address the committee regarding Title II of the 

Innocence Protection Act of 2001, which is absolutely essential to minimizing the 

risk of executing innocent people. 

I have been interested in the quality of legal representation for the poor for over 

25 years, as a public defender, as the director of a law school clinical program here 

in the District of Columbia, for the last 19 years as director of the Southern Center 

for Human Rights, and, since 1993, as a teacher of criminal law, including the right 

to counsel, at Yale, Harvard and Emory Law Schools. I have testified as an expert 

witness on the subject in the courts and have written a couple of law review articles 

on the subject.1

People are wrongfully convicted because of poor legal representation, mistaken 

identifications, the unreliable testimony of informants who swap their testimony for 

lenient treatment, police and prosecutorial misconduct and other reasons. Unfortunately, DNA testing reveals only a few wrongful convictions. In most cases, there 

is no biological evidence that can be tested. In those cases, we must rely on a properly working adversary system—in which the defense lawyer scrutinizes the prosecution’s case, consults with the client, conducts a thorough and independent investigation, consults with experts, and subjects the prosecution case to adversarial testing—to bring out all the facts and help the courts find the truth. But even with a 

properly working adversary system, there will still be convictions of the innocent. 

The best we can do is minimize the risk of wrongful convictions. And the most critical way to do that is to provide the accused with competent counsel and the resources needed to mount a defense. 

I. 

We have been very fortunate that the innocence of some of those condemned to 

die in our courts has been discovered by sheer happenstance and good luck. A few 

of many examples illustrates the point. 

Anthony Porter came within hours of execution before his innocence was established by the journalism class at Northwestern. Porter had been convicted by a jury. 

He had been sentenced to death. His case had been reviewed and affirmed on appeal 

by the Illinois Supreme Court. He had gone through the state and federal post-conviction processes and every court had upheld his conviction and sentence. He was 

scheduled to be executed. 

However, a question arose as to whether Porter was mentally competent to be executed; that is, whether he understood that he was being put to death as punishment for the crime of which he had been convicted. A person who lacks the mental 

ability to understand this relationship cannot be executed, but is instead treated 

until he is ‘‘restored to competency.’’ When he has improved to the point that he 

37

2Pam Belluck, ‘‘Class of Sleuths to Rescue on Death Row,’’ New York Times, Feb. 5, 1999, 

at A14. 3 Jon Jeter, ‘‘A New Ending to an Old Story,’’ Washington Post, Feb. 17, 1999, at C1. 4Don Terry, ‘‘DNA Tests and a Confession Set Three on a Path to Freedom in 1978 Murders’’, 

New York Times, June 15, 1996, at A6. 5Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, ‘‘Ryan Suspends Death Penalty: Illinois First State to Impose 

Moratorium on Executions,’’ Chi. Trib., Jan. 31, 2000, at 1. 6 Brooke A. Masters, ‘‘Missteps On Road To Injustice: In Va., Innocent Man Was Nearly Executed,’’ Washington Post, Dec. 1, 2000, at A1. 7Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1992). 

can understand why he is being executed, he is put to death. Anthony Porter was 

a person of limited intellectual functioning and mental impairments. Because there 

was a question about whether he could understand why he was being executed, a 

court stayed his execution in order to determine his competency to be executed.2

After the stay was granted, the journalism class at Northwestern University and 

a private investigator examined the case and proved that Anthony Porter was innocent. They obtained a confession from the person who committed the crime. Anthony 

Porter was released from death row.3 He was the third person released from Illinois’s death row after being proven innocent by the journalism class at Northwestern.4 Since Illinois adopted its present death penalty statute in 1977, thirteen 

people sentenced to death have been exonerated and twelve have been executed.5

In 1994, the governor of Virginia, Douglas Wilder, commuted the sentence of a 

mentally retarded man, Earl Washington, to life imprisonment without parole because of questions regarding his guilt.6 Six years later, DNA evidence—not available 

at the time of Washington’s trial or the commutation—established that Earl Washington was innocent. 

Frederico Martinez-Macias was represented at his capital trial in Texas, by a 

court-appointed attorney paid only $11.84 per hour.7 Counsel failed to present an 

available alibi witness, relied upon an incorrect assumption about a key evidentiary 

point without doing the research that would have corrected his erroneous view of 

the law, and failed to interview and present witnesses who could have testified in 

rebuttal of the prosecutor’s case. Martinez-Macias was sentenced to death. Martinez-Macias received competent representation for the first time when the Washington, D.C., firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom volunteered to take his 

case and represented him without charge. After a full investigation and development of facts regarding his innocence, Martinez-Macias won federal habeas corpus 

relief. A grand jury refused to re-indict him and he was released after nine years 

on death row. 

Similarly, volunteer lawyers from the Houston firm of Vincent & Elkins established in federal habeas corpus proceedings that Ricardo Aldape Guerra had been 

convicted in violation of the Constitution and was innocent. He was released and 

he returned to Mexico. 

Gary Nelson was represented at his capital trial in Georgia by a solo practitioner 

who had never tried a capital case. This court-appointed lawyer, who was struggling 

with financial problems and a divorce, was paid at a rate of only $15 to $20 per 

hour. His request for co-counsel was denied. The case against Nelson was entirely 

circumstantial, based on questionable scientific evidence, including the opinion of a 

prosecution expert that a hair found on the victim’s body could have come from Nelson. Nevertheless, the appointed lawyer was not provided funds for an investigator 

and, knowing a request would be denied, did not seek funds for an expert. Counsel’s 

closing argument was only 255 words long. The lawyer was later disbarred for other 

reasons. 

Nelson had the good fortune to have some outstanding lawyers volunteer to represent him in post-conviction proceedings, who devoted far more time to the case 

than had the court-appointed lawyer and spent their own money to investigate Nelson’s case. They discovered that the hair found on the victim’s body, which the prosecution expert had linked to Nelson, lacked sufficient characteristics for microscopic 

comparison. Indeed, they found that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had previously examined the hair and found that it could not validly be compared. As a 

result of such inquiry, Gary Nelson was released after eleven years on death row. 

But for the vast majority of those sentenced to death, there are no journalism students or volunteer lawyers who come forward and examine their cases. 

For example, Exzavious Gibson, a man whose IQ has been tested between 76 and 

82, was forced to represent himself at his state post-conviction hearing in Georgia 

because he could not afford a lawyer. There are dozens of people on death row in 

Alabama who do not have lawyers to represent them in post-conviction proceedings. 

And the statute of limitations is running on them. 

38

8See Jeffrey L. Kirshmeier, Drink, Drugs and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 Nebraska Law Review 

425, 455-60 (1996) (citing cases in which convictions were upheld even though defense lawyers 

were intoxicated, abusing drugs, or mentally ill). 9 Numerous examples are collected in Stephen B. Bright, ‘‘Counsel for the Poor: The Death 

Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer,’’ volume 103 of the Yale Law Journal, page 1835 (1994) (also available at http://www.schr.org.) 10 Burdine v. Johnson, 234 F.3d 1339 (5th Cir. 2000), reversing Burdine v. Johnson, 66 F. 

Supp. 2d 854, 866 (S.D. Tex. 1999). 

Some of the lawyers provided in post-conviction proceedings are worse than no 

lawyer at all. Ricky Kerr was assigned a lawyer by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals who had been in practice only four years, had no capital experience and suffered serious health problems. Federal Judge Orlando Garcia said the appointment 

of the lawyer ‘‘constituted a cynical and reprehensible attempt to expedite [the] execution at the expense of all semblance of fairness and integrity.’’

If the journalism class had not become involved in Anthony Porter’s case, he 

would have been executed and we would never know to this day of his innocence. 

Those who naively proclaim that no innocent person has ever been executed would 

continue to do so, secure in their ignorance. If Martinez-Macias, Guerra, Nelson and 

others had been left without any post-conviction representation, as was Exzavious 

Gibson in Georgia, or had been provided a lawyer like the one assigned by the Texas 

Court of Criminal Appeals to represent Ricky Kerr, they would be dead and their 

innocence would have gone to the grave with them. 

We should not count on luck to discover the innocent. We do not know how many 

Anthony Porters have been put to death and we never will. We can be confident 

that innocent people will be convicted and sentenced to death so long as those accused receive inadequate representation at trial and equally inadequate representation—or no representation at all—during post-conviction review. 

Some have said that the fact that Anthony Porter and others have been released 

shows that the system works. However, someone spending sixteen years on death 

row for a crime he did not commit is not an example of the system working. When 

journalism students prove that police, prosecutors, judges, defense lawyers and the 

entire legal system did not discover a man’s innocence and instead condemned him 

to die, the system is not working. And it is not a system of justice. It is a cruel 

lottery. 

II. 

The major reason that innocent people are being sentenced to death is because 

the representation provided to the poor in capital cases is often a scandal. The state 

legislatures have been unwilling to provide the resources and structure necessary 

to provide competent legal representation. And the courts have been willing to tolerate representation that is an embarrassment to our legal system and the legal 

profession. 

In at least four cases in Georgia, counsel referred to their clients before the jury 

with a racial slur. A woman in Alabama was represented by a lawyer so drunk that 

her trial had to be suspended for a day and the lawyer sent to jail to sober up. The 

next day, both lawyer and client were produced from jail and trial resumed. Defense 

lawyers in Alabama and Missouri cases had sexual relations with clients facing the 

death penalty. There have been far too many cases in which defense lawyers defending capital cases were impaired by alcohol, drugs or infirmity.8 In case after case, 

defense lawyers for people facing the death penalty are denied investigators and 

funds for expert assistance.9

Last January, 14 judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit earnestly considered the issue of whether a death sentence can be carried out 

in a case in which the one lawyer appointed to defend the accused slept through 

much of a trial that lasted only 18 hours. The Texas Solicitor General’s office argued 

that Calvin Burdine’s conviction and death sentence should be upheld because a 

sleeping lawyer is no different from a lawyer who is intoxicated, under the influence 

of drugs, suffering from Alzheimer’s disease or having a psychotic break. The judges 

engaged the assistant solicitor general on this argument, asking whether there was 

not some difference between a lawyer who was merely impaired by alcohol and a 

lawyer who was completely unconscious. A panel of three members of that court had 

previously concluded in a 2-1 opinion that sleeping did not violate the right to counsel. The two judges in the majority held that the record did not show that the lawyer slept through an important part of the trial.10 Of course, the person responsible 

39

11 Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concurring). 12 John Makeig, ‘‘Asleep on the Job; Slay Trial Boring, Lawyer Said,’’ Houston Chronicle., Aug. 

14, 1992, page A35. 13 Burdine v. Johnson, 66 F. Supp. 2d 845 (S.D. Tex. 1999). 14 A full description of the case is provided by David R. Dow in his article, ‘‘The State, the 

Death Penalty, and Carl Johnson,’’ published in volume 37 of the Boston College Law Review 

page 691 (1996). 15Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, ‘‘Inept defense cloud verdicts,’’ Chicago Tribune, November 

15, 1999 (reporting that in 33 of the 285 cases in which death was imposed in Illinois the defense lawyers were later disbarred or suspended); Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, ‘‘Flawed trials 

lead to death chamber,’’ Chicago Tribune, June 11, 2000 (reporting that in 43 of the 131 most 

recent executions in Texas prior to publication of the story the defendants were represented by 

an attorney who was later disbarred, suspended or otherwise sanctioned). 

for making the record was the lawyer. And he was asleep. The entire Court is now 

reconsidering the case. 

The standard for counsel is so low that Judge Alvin Rubin of the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, once observed that, ‘‘The Constitution, as interpreted 

by the courts, does not require that the accused, even in a capital case, be represented by able or effective counsel.’’ 11 A trial judge in Houston put it even more 

bluntly, saying that while the Constitution guarantees a lawyer, ‘‘[t]he Constitution 

doesn’t say the lawyer has to be awake.’’ That judge presided over the case of 

George McFarland, another of the three capital cases tried in a single city, Houston, 

in which the defense lawyers slept through trial. The Houston Chronicle described 

McFarland’s trial as follows: 

Seated beside his client—a convicted capital murderer—defense attorney 

John Benn spent much of Thursday afternoon’s trial in apparent deep 

sleep. 

His mouth kept falling open and his head lolled back on his shoulders, and 

then he awakened just long enough to catch himself and sit upright. Then 

it happened again. And again. And again. 

Every time he opened his eyes, a different prosecution witness was on the 

stand describing another aspect of the Nov. 19, 1991, arrest of George 

McFarland in the robbery-killing of grocer Kenneth Kwan. 

When state District Judge Doug Shaver finally called a recess, Benn was 

asked if he truly had fallen asleep during a capital murder trial. 

‘‘It’s boring,’’ the 72-year old longtime Houston lawyer explained. 

Court observers said Benn seems to have slept his way through virtually 

the entire trial.12

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed McFarland’s conviction and death 

sentence, as it did in the cases of Calvin Burdine and Carl Johnson.13 Johnson was 

executed by Texas in 1995.14

For poor people facing the death penalty, this is what is means to be represented 

by the ‘‘dream team.’’

The old adage ‘‘you get what you pay for’’ applies with particular force in the legal 

system, and many states pay very little to lawyers appointed to defend capital cases. 

Studies of capital cases in Illinois, Kentucky and Texas have found that about onethird of those sentenced to death in those states were represented by lawyers who 

were later been disbarred, suspended or convicted of crimes.15

States also fail to provide a structure, such as there is on the prosecution side, 

so that lawyers defending the poor are trained and supervised and develop an expertise in criminal law and the sub-speciality of capital punishment law. The lawyer 

who defended Wallace Fugate at his capital trial in Georgia had never heard of 

Furman v. Georgia, the case which declared Georgia’s death penalty law unconstitutional in 1972, or Gregg v. Georgia, the case which upheld Georgia’s current death 

penalty law in 1976. He could not recall ever having had an investigator in over 

40 years of defending people in court-appointed cases and thought he may have had 

an expert on one occasion. He failed to find out that the gun, which his client said 

had fired accidentally, had a design defect that made it susceptible to accidental discharge. 

Another lawyer who handled the cases of a several people sentenced to death in 

Georgia, when asked to name all the criminal cases with which he was familiar, answered, ‘‘the Miranda and Dred Scott.’’ (Dred Scott was not a criminal case.) 

These are only a few of the most egregious examples of the poor quality of legal 

representation that one sees every day in states that lack a structure for providing 

indigent defense, that fail to provide the resources to defend a case properly and 

that fail to provide for the independence of defense counsel from the judiciary. But 

they tell you how urgently this legislation is needed. 

40

16 American Bar Association, Canons of Ethics, Canon 5. 17See Allan K. Butcher & Michael K. Moore, Committee on Legal Services to the Poor in 

Criminal Matters, Muting Gideon’s Trumpet: The Crisis in Indigent Criminal Defense in Texas 

(Sept. 22, 2000), available at http://www.edu/pols/moore/indigent/whitepaper.htm. Judges in the 

survey were specifically asked to discount their experiences in capital cases, but there is no reason to believe that their motivations for appointment decisions would vary depending on the 

type of case. 

Unfortunately, many jurisdictions—including many which are sending large numbers of people to their death rows—still do not have a working adversary system, 

even in cases in which a person’s life is at stake. In those states, it is better to be 

rich and guilty than poor and innocent because the poor are represented by courtappointed lawyers who often lack the skill, resources, and, on occasion, even the inclination to defend a case properly. 

There are exceptions. Some states, like Colorado and New York, not only have 

public defender offices, but capital defender offices that specialize in the defense of 

capital cases. But other states, such as Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Texas and 

Virginia have no state-wide public defender system. There are some outstanding 

lawyers who will occasionally take a capital case, but they find those cases drain 

them emotionally and financially. In states where at any one time there are hundreds of people facing capital trials and hundreds more on death row whose cases 

are under review in the courts, there are not nearly enough good lawyers willing 

to take the cases for the small amount of money paid to defend them. There are 

also lawyers who, although lacking in experience, training and resources, make conscientious efforts to do the best they can in defending people in capital cases, but 

many find it simply impossible to overcome these disadvantages in these complex 

and difficult cases. And, unfortunately, there are too many lawyers who are taking 

court-appointed cases because they can get no other work and do not even make 

conscientious efforts. 

III. 

One of the very important provisions of Title II is the requirement of an independent authority for appointing attorneys in capital cases. Lawyers are ethically, 

professionally and constitutionally required to exercise independent professional 

judgment on behalf of a client.16 The appointment of counsel by judges creates— at the least—the appearance that lawyers are being assigned cases to move dockets 

and that lawyers may be more loyal to the judge than to the client. A lawyer’s con- duct in a case should not be influenced in any way by considerations of administrative convenience or by the desire to remain in the good graces of the judge who assigned the case. However, because some lawyers are dependent upon judges for continued appointments—which, in some cases, are the only business the lawyer receives—a lawyer may be reluctant to provide zealous advocacy for fear of alienating 

the judge. Some lawyers have remarked that one way to avoid being assigned indigent cases is to provide a vigorous defense in one. 

Almost half of the judges in Texas, responding to a survey, said that an attorney’s reputation for moving cases quickly, regardless of the quality of the defense, was a 

factor that entered into their appointment decisions.17 One-forth of the judges said 

an attorney’s contribution to the judge’s campaigns was a factor in appointing counsel. When the judges were asked whether contributions influenced appointments by 

other judges they knew, over half said that judges they knew based their appointments in criminal cases in part on whether the attorneys were political supporters 

or had contributed to the judge’s political campaign. The perception of lawyers and 

court personnel is that the influence of campaign contributions on elected judges decisions is even more significant, with 79 percent of the lawyers and 69 percent of 

the court personnel saying they believe campaign contributions effect judges’ decisions. 

The same factors influence some judges in other states. But even if a judge appoints laywers based their reputation for providing competent representation, there 

is the danger that some lawyers may not always provide the zealous representation 

that the Constitution requires because of the fear—whether justified or not—that 

the lawyer risks losing future appointments from the judge. For lawyers whose entire practice is made up of appointments from the court, such fears may considerably chill their performance. 

This is a system riddled with conflicts. A judge’s desire for efficiency conflicts with 

the duty to appoint indigent defense counsel who can provide adequate representation; a lawyer’s need for business taints the constitutional and ethical requirement 

of zealous advocacy. And later, if there is a claim of ineffective assistance, the judge 

who appointed the lawyer is the one to decide the claim. This is not a good way 

41

to run a system of justice. Judges do not appoint prosecutors to cases. Judges should 

be fair and impartial. They should not be managing the defense. 

Accordingly, Standard 5-1.3 of the American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice 

Standards, provides:

(a) The legal representation plan for a jurisdiction should be designed to 

guarantee the integrity of the relationship between lawyer and client. The 

plan and the lawyers serving under it should be free from political influence 

and should be subject to judicial supervision only in the same manner and 

to the same extent as are lawyers in private practice. The selection of lawyers for specific cases should not be made by the judiciary or elected officials, but should be arranged for by the administrators of the defender, assigned-counsel and contract-for-service programs. 

(b) An effective means of securing professional independence for defender 

organizations is to place responsibility for governance in a board of trustees. 

Assigned-counsel and contract-for-service components of defender systems 

should be governed by such a board. Provisions for size and manner of selection of boards of trustees should assure their independence. Boards of 

trustees should not include prosecutors or judges. The primary function of 

boards of trustees is to support and protect the independence of the defense 

services program. Boards of trustees should have the power to establish 

general policy for the operation of defender, assigned-counsel and contractfor-service programs consistent with these standards and in keeping with 

the standards of professional conduct. Boards of trustees should be precluded from interfering in the conduct of particular cases. A majority of the 

trustees on boards should be members of the bar admitted to practice in 

the jurisdiction.

The Innocence Protection Act will bring jurisdictions to where they should have 

been long ago in having independent defender programs whose primary concern is 

providing zealous and effective representation to those facing the death penalty so 

that the adversary system can work properly. 

CONCLUSION 

The states have received enormous amounts of federal funds to improve their law 

enforcement and prosecution functions. But they have failed to develop and maintain a properly working adversary system in criminal cases involving poor defendants. Many states—those I have mentioned and many others—lack the key elements 

of an effective indigent defense system: a structure, independence from the judiciary 

and the prosecution, and adequate resources. 

It is much easier to convict a person and obtain the death penalty when the defendant is represented by a lawyer who lacks the skill and resources to mount a 

defense. And it is much easier to execute people who are not adequately represented 

in post-conviction proceedings. But there is a larger question than whether adequate 

indigent defense systems make it harder for prosecutors to obtain convictions and 

for attorneys general to carry out executions swiftly. There is the question of fairness. It is not supposed to be easy to convict someone. Under our system required 

by our Constitution, the prosecution’s case is supposed to undergo a vigorous adversarial testing process. 

The American people are realizing that we have sacrificed fairness for finality and 

reliability for results. They want protection from crime, but they want fairness. The 

system is woefully out of balance. The many exonerations from DNA evidence as 

well as the release of over 95 people those sentenced to death shows that the system 

is broken. A major component, the defense function, lacks the structure, independence and resources to contribute to a fair, reliable and just result. It is not unreasonable for Congress to require the states as a condition of receiving millions of federal dollars to implement an adequate indigent defense system to protect the innocent at least in capital cases.

Chairman LEAHY. I want to make sure that General Pryor gets 

a chance to give us his views on that, too. 

To give you an example of what happens, Michael Graham was 

wrongly convicted of murder. He spent 14 years on death row in 

Louisiana. The majority of U.S. Senators have not served here in 

the Senate for 14 years. Last December, after a 9-month investigation, the Louisiana Attorney General dismissed the charges against 

Mr. Graham and his co-defendant, who had also been sentenced to 

42

death, citing the total lack of credible evidence linking either of 

them to the crime. 

Mr. Graham? 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL R. GRAHAM, ROANOKE, VIRGINIA 

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be 

here. 

My name is Michael Graham. In 1986, I was 22 years old, working as a roofer and living with my mom and my two little brothers 

in Virginia Beach. That summer, I met a family from Louisiana 

and became friends with their son, Kenneth. They suggested that 

I return with them to Louisiana for a vacation and I took up their 

offer. 

While down in Louisiana, Kenneth and I got arrested for writing 

some bad checks. I wasn’t an angel back then, but I never physically hurt anyone and was never accused of hurting anyone, that 

is until a couple of months later. While in jail for the bad checks, 

I was arrested for the brutal murders of an elderly couple. I 

couldn’t believe it and I told the police that I didn’t know anything 

about the murders and I had never met the couple. All the time, 

I was sure that the truth would come out and I would be found innocent. It seems funny now, but I even asked one of my public defenders if he would represent me in a false arrest lawsuit. 

My trial was in early 1987. One of my two lawyers had some 

criminal law experience, but had never tried a death penalty case. 

My other lawyer just graduated from law school. The State didn’t 

have any physical evidence against me. Basically, all it had was 

three witnesses, including a jailhouse snitch with a history of serious mental illness. 

The lawyers had a tough time at the trial. They didn’t investigate the snitch’s deal with the prosecution. They didn’t know the 

rules of evidence. They didn’t object to a jury instruction that I 

later learned was totally illegal under Louisiana law. They did 

nothing to prepare for my sentencing phase. They didn’t ask my 

mother to come down and testify on my behalf. 

My trial only lasted a few days. When the jury convicted me of 

capital murder, I was stunned. So was my experienced lawyer, who 

disappeared. That left with my inexperienced lawyer, just 1 year 

out of law school, to handle the sentencing hearing by himself. 

When the jury sentenced me to death, I could hardly talk and I 

was in a state of shock. A few months later, my co-defendant, Albert Burrell, was also convicted and given the death sentence. I understand that his lawyers were even worse than mine. 

I will never forget my first night on death row. The night before, 

the State had executed another inmate and I was given his cell. 

During the night, I looked down on the floor and completely 

freaked out. I thought I saw a pool of blood and it turned out to 

be rusty water. That pretty much set the tone for the next 14 

years. 

I spent 23 hours a day in my 5-by–10-foot cell alone. I was allowed out 1 hour a day to shower and walk up and down the tier. 

Three times a week, I could go outside and spend an hour by myself in an exercise yard. Whenever I left my tier, my hands and 

43

legs were shackled. Everyone in my world was either a prison 

guard who considered me an animal or a condemned man. 

The guards told me when to wake up and when to go to sleep, 

and just gave me a few minutes to eat. I tried not to go crazy by 

reading and praying to the Lord. I also passed the time by trying 

to keep up on my case and what was happening in the outside 

world. I studied for the GED, but the prison ended the program 

right before I was going to take the test. 

Each day, I would beg the Lord to make sure nothing happened 

to my family. My family was poor, and my mother was only able 

to visit me twice. My brothers never made it. The Lord answered 

my prayers, but my co-defendant wasn’t so fortunate. My co-defendant’s mother died while we were on death row. One of the 

guards told me that it was the hardest thing he has ever had to 

do. 

As in many cases, there was no DNA evidence to exonerate me 

and Albert, but we were two of the lucky ones. We both had pro 

bono lawyers who worked diligently for us and stuck with our cases 

for many years. If we had depended on State lawyers, we probably 

would still be on death row, or worse. 

After years of hard work, my attorneys got me a new trial on 

March 3, 2000. It was the second greatest day of my life. My lawyers proved that the prosecution had withheld evidence showing I 

was innocent. They also proved that the jailhouse snitch was a 

pathological liar. They got sworn statements from the two other 

witnesses recanting their testimony. They even got a statement 

from the prosecutor saying that the case should never have been 

brought to trial to begin with because the evidence was too weak. 

Ten long months later, in December, the State dismissed the case 

against me and Albert. The attorney general said that there was 

a total lack of credible evidence linking us to the crime. On December 28, 2000, the best day of my life, I was released from Louisiana’s death row, where I had spent close to 14 years for two murders I did not commit. I was the 92nd innocent person released 

from death row since 1973. My co-defendant was released a few 

days later and became the 93rd innocent person released. 

Half of my adult life had been taken from me. I had been falsely 

branded as a murderer in connection with horrible crimes. Meanwhile, the suffering family of the victims was misled into believing 

that the crime was solve when, in fact, the real murderer or murderers had not been brought to justice. 

In compensation, the State gave me a $10 check and a coat that 

was five sizes too big, not even the price of a bus ticket back to 

Virginia. My lawyers had to buy that for me. 

At first when I got back to my family in Virginia, I was afraid 

to go out. I thought people would guess from my complexion that 

I had just come out of prison. I couldn’t stop guzzling down my food 

and pacing the floor. Men in uniform freaked me out. Nowadays, 

I am just trying to put my life back together. I am getting to know 

my family again, including my brothers, who are now young men. 

I have a job as a roofer and I am getting married in October. 

During my 14 wasted years on death row, I always hoped that 

my nightmare would count for something. That is why I am here 

today. Mistakes like my nightmare are real. I never figured that 

44

this could happen to an innocent person before it happened to me, 

and I am sure that many people listening today feel the same way. 

I ask you to listen to my story and to the many others like mine 

and do what you can to fix the process. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Graham follows:]

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL GRAHAM, ROOFER, VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA

My name is Michael Graham. In 1986, I was 22 years old, working as a roofer, 

and living with my mom and my two little brothers in Virginia Beach. That summer, I met a family from Louisiana and got friendly with their son, Kenneth. They 

suggested that I return with them to Louisiana for a vacation. I took up their offer. 

While down in Louisiana, Kenneth and I got arrested for writing some bad checks. 

I was no angel back then, but I never physically hurt anyone, and was never accused of hurting anyone. 

That is, until a couple of months later. While in jail for the bad checks, I was 

arrested for the brutal murders of an elderly couple. I couldn’t believe it. I told the 

police that I didn’t know anything about the murders and had never met the couple. 

All the time, I was sure that the truth would come out and I would be found innocent. It seems funny now, but I even asked one of my public defenders if he would 

represent me in my false arrest lawsuit. 

My trial was in early 1987. One of my two lawyers had some criminal law experience, but had never tried a death penalty case. My other lawyer had just graduated 

from law school. The state didn’t have any physical evidence against me. Basically, 

all it had was three witnesses, including a jailhouse snitch with a history of serious 

mental illness. 

My lawyers had a tough time at the trial. They didn’t investigate the snitch’s deal 

with the prosecution. They didn’t know the rules of evidence. They didn’t object to 

a jury instruction that I later learned was totally illegal under Louisiana law. And 

they did nothing to prepare for my sentencing phase. They 

didn’t even ask my mother to come down and testify on my behalf. 

My trial only lasted a few days. When the jury convicted me of capital 

murder, I was stunned. So was my experienced lawyer, who disappeared. That left 

my inexperienced lawyer, just out of law school, to handle the sentencing hearing 

by himself. When the jury sentenced me to death, I could hardly talk - I was in 

such a state of shock. 

A few months later, my co-defendant, Albert Burrell, was also convicted and given 

a death sentence. I understand that his lawyers were even worse than mine. 

I’ll never forget my first night on death row. The night before the state had executed another inmate, and I was given his cell. During the night, I looked down at 

the floor and completely freaked out. I thought I saw a pool of blood. It turned out 

to be rusty water. 

That pretty much set the tone for the next fourteen years. I spent 23 hours a day 

in my 5 by 10 foot cell, alone. I was allowed out one hour a day to shower and walk 

up and down my tier. Three times a week I could go outside and spend an hour 

by myself in an exercise yard. Whenever I left my tier, my hands and legs were 

shackled. Everyone in my world was either a prison guard who considered me an 

animal or a condemned man. The guards told me when to wake up and when to 

go to sleep, and just gave me a few minutes to eat. 

I tried not to go crazy by reading and praying to the Lord. I also passed the time 

by trying to keep up on my case and what was happening in the outside world. I 

studied for a GED, but the prison ended the program right before I was going to 

take the test. 

Each day I would beg the Lord to make sure nothing happened to my family. My 

family is poor and my mother was only able to visit me twice. My brothers never 

made it down. The Lord answered my prayers. But my co-defendant wasn’t so fortunate. Albert’s mother died while we were on death row. One of the guards told me 

that telling Albert his mother was dead was one of the hardest things he ever did. 

As in many cases, there was no DNA evidence to exonerate me and Albert. But 

we were two of the lucky ones. We both had pro bono lawyers who worked their 

tails off for us and stuck with our cases for many years. If we had depended on state 

lawyers, we probably would still be on death row, or worse. 

After years of hard work, my attorneys got me a new trial on March 3, 2000. It 

was the second greatest day in my life. My lawyers proved that the prosecution had 

withheld evidence showing I was innocent. They also proved that the jailhouse 

45

snitch was a pathological liar, and got sworn statements from the other two witnesses recanting their testimony. They even got a statement from the prosecutor 

saying that the case should never have been brought in the first place because the 

evidence was too weak. 

Ten long months later, in December, the state dismissed the case against me and 

Albert. The Attorney General said that there was ‘‘a total lack of credible evidence’’

linking us to the crime. 

On December 28, 2000 - the best day in my life - I was released from Louisiana’s 

death row, where I had spent close to 14 years for two murders I did not commit. 

I was the 92nd innocent person released from death row since 1973. Albert was released a few days later, and became the 93rd innocent person released from death 

row. 

Half of my adult life had been taken from me. I had been falsely branded as a 

murderer in connection with horrible crimes. Meanwhile, the suffering family of the 

victims was misled into believing that the crime was solved, when in fact the real 

murderer or murderers had not been brought to justice. 

In compensation, the state gave me a $10 check and a coat that was five sizes 

too big. Not even the price of a bus ticket back to Virginia. My lawyers had to buy 

that for me. 

At first, when I got back to my family in Virginia, I was afraid to go out. I 

thought people would guess from my complexion that I had just come out of prison. 

I couldn’t stop guzzling down my food and pacing the floor. Men in uniforms freaked 

me out. 

Nowadays, I am just trying to put my life back together. I am getting to know 

my family again, including my brothers who are now young men. I have a job as 

a roofer, and I am getting married in October. 

During my 14 wasted years on death row, I always hoped that my nightmare 

would count for something. That’s why I’m here today. Mistakes like my nightmare 

are real. I never figured that this could happen to an innocent person before it happened to me, and I am sure that many people listening today feel the same way. 

I ask you to listen to my story and to the many others like mine, and do what you 

can to fix the process.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Graham, and I 

wish you and your fiancee well. I met her earlier this morning. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. I will submit for the record a letter I received 

from Mr. Charles Lloyd, who represented your co-defendant, Albert 

Burrell. Mr. Lloyd took the case pro bono after Burrell was convicted and sentenced to death. The letter describes the shocking incompetence of Burrell’s trial lawyers, who were just a few years out 

of law school, apparently did little investigation before the trial, 

were ineffective during the trial, and did nothing to prepare for the 

penalty phase. Mr. Burrell was sentenced to death, both of his lawyers were indicted and convicted, one on a drug charge, the other 

for stealing client money. Both were later disbarred. 

Ronald Eisenberg is the Deputy District Attorney in Philadelphia. He previously served as chief of the Appeals Unit in Philadelphia, an office where he began work as a prosecutor in 1981. Mr. 

Eisenberg served on the Task Force on Death Penalty Litigation of 

the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. He is a member of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Criminal Rules Committee. 

Mr. Eisenberg, thank you for taking the time to come down and 

join us today. 

STATEMENT OF RONALD EISENBERG, DEPUTY DISTRICT 

ATTORNEY, PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 

Mr. EISENBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the 

committee. I would like to touch briefly on two points from my 

written testimony that I have submitted to the committee. 

46

First, one of the arguments that has been made in favor of Federal intervention into the State appointment process in capital 

cases is that there is a chronic lack of funding for lawyers in State 

capital cases, and that, in fact, previous Federal funding for those 

cases, for assistance in State capital cases, was cutoff by Congress 

in 1996. 

In fact, however, while that money was cutoff in the form of one 

program, it was then paid out again ever since in the form of another program administered by the United States courts. And in 

fiscal year 2001, over $20 million was paid by the Federal Government to lawyers for assistance and training in State capital cases, 

not Federal cases like the McVeigh case, but State capital cases. 

Now, I know that the argument will be made that, well, if they 

were paying out that money and we still have a bad system, it 

must not be enough money. The point is that for opponents of capital punishment, and I understand their position, there is no 

amount of money or Federal intervention that is ever going to be 

enough to solve the problem as long as juries in State capital cases, 

on review of all the evidence, keep returning death penalties in 

some cases. 

Chairman LEAHY. So your position is totally the opposite of what 

the three Members of Congress testified earlier, that it is not a 

question of whether you are for or against the death penalty, and 

it is totally different from that of the position of the pro-death penalty Members of Congress who have supported this legislation? 

Mr. EISENBERG. Senator, my point was that I understand that 

for people who are opponents of the death penalty—and as we have 

acknowledged, there are many who are and I can understand their 

position—the amount of money or the nature of the standards will 

not be enough, whatever they are, and that leads me to my next 

point about standards. 

Chairman LEAHY. So you do not accept the testimony of Congressman LaHood, for example? 

Mr. EISENBERG. I don’t think it is a contradiction, Senator. 

Chairman LEAHY. OK. 

Senator SESSIONS. He is simply saying if you oppose the death 

penalty, Senator Leahy, deeply and personally and so greatly, nothing is going to make you satisfied with the system. 

Chairman LEAHY. I just wanted to make sure I understood him. 

Mr. EISENBERG. Thank you, Senator. 

On the issue of standards, there has been a lot of talk about the 

absence of standards in State courts. The reality is that most death 

penalties arise in States that do have standards for the appointment of counsel. In fact, those standards are in most cases much 

stricter, much higher, than the standards that the Federal Government itself imposes for appointment of counsel in Federal capital 

cases such as the McVeigh case. 

The Justice Department, not the current Justice Department but 

the previous Justice Department, did a study reviewing standards 

for appointment of counsel in capital cases and collected all of this 

information. Those States have been doing that, have been promulgating these standards on their own, without Federal compulsion, 

for many years. 

47

Now, there has been talk about State courts today and about the 

claim that we can’t trust the State courts, that there are a lot of 

errors found in death penalties, reference to the study by Professor 

Liebman. While I certainly believe that the numbers in his study 

are greatly exaggerated, there is no question that death penalty 

cases are reversed at a significantly higher rate than other cases, 

even cases that were tried under identical circumstances but simply resulted in the end in a non-capital verdict rather than a death 

penalty verdict, and that significant numbers of those reversals 

occur in the State courts. 

Now, the question arises, I believe, that if the State legislatures 

and courts are already out in front in many areas in the standards 

that they have promulgated, and if the State courts are already out 

in front in the number of death penalty cases that they are reversing, that they are reviewing and reversing, I think it is quite questionable whether it is necessary for the Federal Government then 

to come in and mandate different standards for those States and 

different procedures than they have already been following. 

I understand the argument—and I believe that this is Professor 

Liebman’s argument—that if lots of cases are being reversed in the 

State courts, then there must be lots more that should have been 

reversed. In other words, in effect, what we are saying is we can 

trust the State courts completely to the extent they reverse death 

penalty cases, but they must be wrong as to the cases they are not 

reversing. 

I think really that the argument goes the other way that if we 

are going to trust the State courts are properly reversing in the 

cases where they are, then we should trust the results in the cases 

where, after years of review, they do not reverse those cases. 

The argument has been made that because of the alleged politically biased nature of those same State courts that are reversing 

so many death penalty cases, we can’t let those courts appoint 

counsel; we have to have an independent appointing authority that 

will be run by zealous advocates against the death penalty. After 

all, it is argued, prosecutors can be zealous advocates for the death 

penalty. 

Well, an independent counsel-appointing authority is not performing a function of an advocate; it is a performing a function of 

the court, of a neutral arbitrator and it controls access to the system. That access can have a great effect on the ability of the capital litigation system to proceed or not. 

In California, for example, death penalty cases are routinely delayed for 3 and 4 years at the appellate stage after the conviction 

merely to wait for the court to try to find lawyers to take the cases. 

So if the access of available lawyers is restricted, these cases can’t 

proceed and delay results. 

We already have, on average, 10 and 20 years of delay in these 

cases. If we put the access to the system in the hands of lawyers 

whose job it is to be against the death penalty, we cannot assume 

a proper result. The appointment process is a function that we put 

in the hands of a neutral body, the court system. People can make 

complaints about the court system, but certainly it is far more neutral, we can assume, than either adversary on either side. And if 

48

we want the system to be able to function at all, we have to make 

sure that that neutrality remains. 

The current proposal, as I understand it, would penalize the 

States or not adopting such a proposal. It would penalize the States 

for not paying defense lawyers, for example, at local markets rates, 

which in my jurisdiction for lawyers for complex litigation may be 

$200, $300, $400 an hour. 

One of the penalties that the States will suffer is the elimination 

of various provisions for Federal habeas corpus review of State 

courts. Right now, the Federal courts that have these cases, after 

three and sometimes four appeals in State courts, are required to 

abide by the factfinding and give deference to the legal rulings of 

the State courts. 

The argument is made that if the State courts aren’t following 

mandated Federal standards, we can’t trust their results, and the 

Federal courts therefore should ignore them. As I have said, however, we trust the State courts to reverse death penalty cases that 

we know they are doing in large numbers. We trust the State 

courts to appoint counsel on standards which are higher than the 

current Federal standards. 

I think that if we want to encourage a system, as Attorney General Pryor said, where the States provide this process, we must 

continue current law that gives effect to the process that occurs in 

the State courts. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement and an attachment of Mr. Eisenberg follow:]

STATEMENT OF RONALD EISENBERG, DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, PHILADELPHIA, 

PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to address the Committee on the important issue 

of competency of counsel in state capital proceedings. I believe there is no real disagreement on this goal; I know of no prosecutor who does not desire an active, ethical capital defense bar pursuing clients’ interests. Such quality representation is 

necessary to achieve justice, public confidence, and efficiency. 

The real question here is whether it is appropriate and productive for the federal 

government to intervene in the states’ processes for appointing counsel in state 

criminal proceedings. I would like to address two points that may bear on that question: the existence of federal funding for state capital litigation, and the existence 

of standards for appointment of counsel. 

Existing federal funding. Capital punishment opponents charge that defense lawyers in state capital cases are chronically underfunded. Much of the impetus for the 

complaint stems from the so-called defunding of the capital resource centers, set up 

by Congress in 1994 to provide legal advice, training and assistance in state death 

penalty cases. While it was largely unreported, however, federal assistance for state 

capital defense was not actually cut off. Instead, the funding was picked up by the 

Administrative Office of United States Courts. This reallocation process began at 

the end of 1995, before the resource center cutoff date, so that new funding would 

be immediately in place. There was never any gap, and many of the new federal 

court-funded attorneys were the very same lawyers who had worked for the resource 

centers. 

Each year, the funding level has risen. In FY 2001, the total amount was over 

$20,000,000. The money went to many of the most active capital litigation jurisdictions: California, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Oklahoma, Arizona, Nevada, and Tennessee. The federal office administering the program reports that no defender organizations in other states have been refused funding. (The list does not include states 

such as Florida and New York that have independently established highly-funded 

statewide capital defense organizations.) 

49

Ostensibly, this money is to be used for representation of state capital defendants 

in federal habeas proceedings, after the case has already moved through the state 

courts. In my jurisdiction, however, capital defense lawyers paid by the federal government have spent at least as much of their time in state court as in federal court. 

At the very minimum, the federal millions free up considerable resources for direct use in state court, at the trial, appeal, and post-conviction level. Undoubtedly, 

capital defense lawyers will still claim it is not enough. (I am not personally aware 

of any government-funded lawyers, at least at the state and local levels, who believe 

they have enough resources to perform their jobs optimally.) But the existence of 

this funding stream surely impacts on the question of whether Congress need impose new federal mandates on the states, with significant financial and legal penalties for those jurisdictions that devise their own different solutions to the problem. 

Existing counsel standards. Opponents of the death penalty claim that the system 

is unfair because lawyers are not sufficiently qualified. The deficit can be redressed, 

it is argued, only if the federal government steps in to force states to adopt federal 

standards for appointment of counsel in capital cases. 

Under the previous administration, however, the Department of Justice performed 

a study finding that most state death penalty cases arise in jurisdictions that have 

already adopted standards for appointment of capital counsel. And in most cases, 

those standards exceed the qualifications that Congress chose to require for appointment of counsel in federal capital cases. 

The Clinton Justice Department study can be found on the internet at http://

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/indigentdefense/compendium/pdftxt/vol3.pdf. It concluded that at 

least 17 states have by statute or court rule promulgated standards for appointment 

of counsel at various stages of a capital case. These states include California, Florida, Georgia, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and Utah. (The list does 

not include Pennsylvania, which does not have statewide standards, but does have 

detailed standards for Philadelphia, which represents the majority of capital cases 

in the state.) 

At least 14 other states, according to the study, have public defender systems for 

capital representation. These states include Colorado, Delaware, Maryland, New 

Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Oregon. (The study predates the recent establishment of a statewide indigent defense system in Texas.) 

Standards for appointment of counsel in federal cases carrying a potential death 

sentence are set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(A) and (5)–(7). They provide only that 

the court appoint one (and for good cause shown, a second) attorney, who has been 

a member of the bar for five years and has three years of felony trial or appellate 

experience. Unlike many of the state appointment standards, the federal standards 

do not require experience in any prior capital cases, or any training in capital litigation. 

This discussion of counsel appointment standards is not to suggest, however, that 

particular standards necessarily result in reduced claims of attorney error. Experience is actually to the contrary. In Philadelphia, for example, where capital appointment standards were adopted a decade ago, I am unaware of any capital case that 

does not involve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Frequently, counsel 

whose ineffectiveness is raised will testify that they did indeed err in some fashion. 

Of course, a lawyer who avoids a death sentence for his client by confessing his own 

ineffectiveness is, paradoxically, supremely ‘‘effective.’’

But if the goal is to achieve effective counsel in the constitutional sense, rather 

than simply to reduce the number of successful capital prosecutions, then it is unclear that any particular appointment methods are optimal whether or not Congress 

chooses to punish states that diverge from federally mandated provisions.

fDISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19102

July 5, 2001

Hon. Patrick Leahy 

Chairman 

Committee on the Judiciary 

United States Senate 

Washington, D.C. 20510–6275

Dear Chairman Leahy, 

I was a witness at the June 27, 2001, Judiciary Committee hearing exploring 

issues related to competency of counsel in state capital proceedings. During the 

50

hearing, you read from the posed questions to me concerning an April 2001 report 

by Janice L. Bergmann entitled ‘‘The Crisis in Post-Conviction Representation in 

Capital Cases Since the Elimination by Congress of Funding for the Post-Conviction 

Defender Organizations.’’ Because I was previously unaware of the report, I would like to add to my responses to your questions, which focused on the report’s discussion of post-conviction 

capital litigation in the Commonwealth Pennsylvania. 

At page 75, the report alleges that Pennsylvania fails ‘‘to provide trained legal 

counsel for indigent death row prisoners.’’ The report attempts to justify this charge 

with several assertions. 

First, the report states that the post-conviction capital defender organization 

originally funded by the federal government in 1994 was downsized and eventually 

forced to close entirely in 1999. In reality, as I mentioned at the hearing, federal 

funding for post-conviction capital defense in Pennsylvania never ended; on the contrary, it has increased ten-fold since 1994. 

It is true that the organization originally called the Pennsylvania Capital Case 

Resource Center has changed its name several times—but not its function. The resource center changed its title to the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Defender Organization, and then, after the so-called ‘‘defunding,’’ to the Center for Legal Education, Advocacy, and Defense Assistance. 

At the same time that the CLEADA title emerged, however, so did another; the 

Capital Habeas Unit of the Federal Defenders Office for the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania. This was the entity that officially received the continuing federal 

funding for post-conviction capital defense in Pennsylvania. The report acknowledges that this organization was created ‘‘not long after’’ the ostensible defunding 

of the resource center. In reality, there was no gap at all; the Administrative Office 

of United States Courts Defender Services Division officially acted, months before 

the ‘‘defunding,’’ to appropriate money to the new Capital Habeas Unit. 

The overlap between the resource center and the Capital Habeas Unit was more 

than temporal. The staff of the habeas unit largely consisted of attorneys who had, 

until the moment of the unit’s creation, been resource center lawyers. Indeed, while 

two of the resource center’s lawyers worked under the separate letterhead of 

CLEADA, the remainder officially became employees of the capital habeas unit. 

But these lawyers did not have to go far to communicate. CLEADA and the capital habeas unit shared offices on the same floor of the same building. While they 

had different suite and telephone numbers, lawyers from these offices answered the 

phones and used the face machines interchangeably, regardless of their official title. 

(The rest of the Federal Defenders Office, of which the Capital Habeas Unit was 

officially a part, was housed in a different location.) 

Most importantly, however, all of these lawyers continued to work together on 

state capital cases. The Bergmann report implies that lawyers of the Capital Habeas 

Unit represent capital defendants only in federal court, after state post-conviction 

proceedings have been completed. That is flatly false. Lawyers employed by the Capital Habeas Unit represent capital defendants in the majority of—indeed, in almost 

all—post-conviction proceedings in state court. My colleagues deal with these lawyers, in writing and in person and in state court, every day. 

So when in 1999 CLEADA chose to end its independent existence, there was no 

question what would happen to its lawyers and state court caseload. All were immediately assumed by the Capital Habeas Unit staff. The report carefully asserts that, 

when CLEADA dissolved, ‘‘no state entity in Pennsylvania’’ was available for capital 

defense. The author seemingly was aware that an entity did indeed exist, although 

it had been created and funded by the federal government though the AOUSC. 

And that entity has flourished. In 1995, the Defender Services Division allocated 

$1,590,744 to the Capital Habeas Unit for the portion of FY96 following the upcoming resource center ‘‘cut-off’’ date of March 31—apparently far more federal funding 

than the resource center ever received as such. For FY97, the Division allocated 

$2,327,600. In FY98, the allocation was $2,485,100. In FY99, the unit received 

$2,904,800. And for FY2000, Capital Habeas Unit funding jumped to $5,565,000. 

When the Pennsylvania resource center was supposedly cut off, there were four federally funded lawyers providing assistance, training, and most of all, direct representation of state capital defendants. Today, there are at least fifteen. The report 

says none of this. 

The report misrepresents Pennsylvania conditions in other respects as well. The 

report implies that capital defendants go unrepresented, stating that the Commonwealth adopted a one-year filing deadline for state post-conviction petitions (as Congress did for federal post-conviction petitions), yet has no state standards for appointment or funding of post-conviction counsel. In reality, Pennsylvania has a guaranteed right to appointment of counsel for one full round of post-conviction counsel, 

51

but to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, to be judged on Strickland 

standards. No court can dispose of the first post-conviction petition without appointing counsel, even if the one-year filing deadline has passe. I am aware of no case 

in which an unrepresented capital defendant was time-barred from an initial State 

post-conviction petition. The report says none of this. 

As to appointment standards and funding, the report makes no effort to gauge 

conditions. Instead it simply takes the position that, since these functions are not 

mandated at the state level in identical, centralized terms for all of Pennsylvania’s 

67 counties, they must be performed inadequately. Astonishingly, the report fails to 

discuss practices in Philadelphia, which accounts for roughly three fourths of all 

homicides in Pennsylvania, and two-thirds of the capital cases. 

As I mentioned at the hearing, Philadelphia has for more than a decade had in 

place appointment standards that far exceed federal standards. The standards apply 

not just for appointment of trial and direct appeal counsel, but for appointment of 

post-conviction counsel as well. They require that the court appoint at least one attorney (and two attorneys if the case presents numerous or complex issues). The attorney must have at least five years of litigation experience, must have handled at 

least ten trials or hearings to final factual resolution, must have taken training 

within the previous two years focusing on capital post-conviction litigation, and 

must submit an adversary writing sample and questionnaire to a screening committee of defense lawyers. The report says none of this. 

All these commissions are not surprising. The report states that it was prepared 

‘‘with the assistance of local practitioners.’ I know of no Pennsylvania prosecutors, 

however, who were consulted under the auspices of the report, or who were even 

informed of its existence after completion. 

The report’s author is identified as ‘‘a federal defender staff attorney.’’ It is unclear to me from this description whether the author is a direct employee of the Defender Services Division of AOUSC, or whether she is in fact a practicing capital 

defense attorney; at the least, as a Westlaw search shows, her training and experience are as a capital defense attorney. What is clear, then, it that this report is 

hardly an objective analysis by a neutral government agency. It is an advocacy document, written by an advocate. 

Still, the existence of the report underscores two points made at the hearing: that 

many state and local governments are now taking great efforts to provide competent 

capital defense counsel, and that, in many areas, their primary opponent in defending capital convictions is an agency of the federal government. I hope that this more 

complete discussion of the Pennsylvania experience in capital litigation will aid the 

Committee in the consideration of the issues before it. 

Thank you for this opportunity to supplement the record of the hearing. 

Sincerely,

RONALD EISENBERG

Deputy District Attorney

Chairman LEAHY. Unfortunately, in Illinois, we had to trust 

some teenage or just-out-of-their-teens journalism students to do 

what the courts and the whole criminal justice system had not 

done—to find innocent people. 

Beth Wilkinson, our next witness, was the lead prosecutor in the 

Oklahoma City bombing case. She delivered the closing arguments 

in the sentencing phase of the McVeigh case—in which he received 

the death penalty—and delivered also the arguments in the Nichols trial. 

She began her legal career as a captain in the U.S. Army, where 

she served as an assistant to the general counsel for the Office of 

the Army General Counsel. She has also served as an Assistant 

U.S. Attorney in New York and as the principal deputy chief of the 

Terrorism and Violent Crime Section at the Department of Justice. 

She is now a partner with Latham and Watkins here in Washington, and serves as co-chair of the Constitution Project’s Death 

Penalty Initiative. 

52

Ms. Wilkinson, I thank you very much for taking time in what 

I know has already been a very busy day to be here with us. Go 

ahead. 

STATEMENT OF BETH WILKINSON, CO-CHAIR, CONSTITUTION 

PROJECT’S DEATH PENALTY INITIATIVE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Ms. WILKINSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a 

privilege to be here with you; Senator Hatch, to see you again; Senator Sessions and Senator Feingold to speak about something that 

is so important to, I believe, everyone on this panel. 

I come to you today not just in my personal capacity as a former 

Federal prosecutor, but also as the co-chairman of the Death Penalty Initiative that made its recommendations public this morning. 

We are a bipartisan group of people who are in favor and oppose 

the death penalty, and have worked in a similar way that I think 

you, Senator Leahy, and you, Senator Hatch, are trying to do on 

these very important issues. 

We have brought together people as diverse as Paula Kurland, 

who is here today, who is a mother of a victim of a murder who 

actually witnessed the execution of her daughter’s murderer. Her 

daughter, Mitzi, was murdered at age 21. 

We are also joined on our committee by Judge William Sessions, 

the former Director of the FBI, a proponent of the death penalty 

and a strong supporter of DNA evidence and analysis. 

On the other side of the aisle is David Bruck, a prominent capital 

defense lawyer who has chosen in his career to defend many people 

who have faced capital punishment. We even are joined by Reverend James Andrews, who represents a variety of the clergy, including the Presbyterian Church, who oppose the death penalty. 

We took the time to come together with our divergent views and 

make 18 recommendations for what we saw as the minimum standards that States and jurisdictions across the country needed to employ to ensure that capital litigation was improved in our country. 

Today, we have announced those recommendations, and three 

are directly related to the topic of your hearing today and that is 

the competency of counsel. I personally believe there is nothing 

more important in any type of litigation, but especially in capital 

litigation, that defendants receive good and zealous representation. 

It is important for obvious reasons, to protect the system, to protect the victims who want to know that the right person was convicted fairly, to streamline the appellate process so we don’t have 

the long delays that some of the other panelists have alluded to 

this morning, and so that we know our system is working properly 

and is tested at every level. 

As a former prosecutor, I found great comfort in participating in 

the McVeigh case knowing that Mr. McVeigh and Mr. Nichols were 

represented by very fine, experienced advocates. In the end, when 

Mr. McVeigh challenged most recently his death penalty conviction 

and sentence, I think Judge Matsch and the rest of us found great 

comfort in knowing that there had been a thorough investigation, 

a thorough pre-trial process, extraordinary resources expended by 

the defense that left no doubt that Mr. McVeigh was the perpetrator of the crime. 

53

I believe that most people who participate in the system want to 

know on both sides that the defendant is being represented zealously. Unfortunately, that doesn’t happen in our system in very 

many instances. While States across the country do have standard, 

as Mr. Eisenberg noted, few or any of them are enforced on a regular basis. It does us no good to have those standards if those counsel that represent indigent defendants are not actually accomplished, experienced criminal lawyers. As Mr. Bright was saying, 

many of these lawyers have no experience in criminal law. 

What the Constitution Project’s Death Penalty Initiative recommends to you, and is consistent with the legislation that we support, the Innocence Protection Act, is that three main fixes be made 

in the system. 

First, there is an independent authority that appoints counsel, 

sets the standards, and ensures that each individual defendant has 

adequate and well-trained counsel. Now, Mr. Eisenberg noted that 

if such an independent authority were established, it might be 

taken over by people who are zealous anti-death penalty advocates. 

Well, first of all, I think most people who defend death penalty 

defendants are opposed to the system. Few other people would ever 

take on that type of representation. It is emotionally exhausting, 

it is intellectually challenging, and it is not well-paying. So I don’t 

think that it should surprise anyone that if there is an independent 

authority that the people who actually take on the representation 

would oppose the death penalty. That should make no difference in 

how they zealously represent the defendants. In fact, if it improves 

their skills—that is, if they receive more training and they have 

more experience—that is only to all of our benefit. 

Second, we want to ensure that all of the counsel who represent 

individuals in this system are paid properly. Everyone knows and 

has heard of the stories of people who receive $20 to $40 an hour 

in Alabama, Tennessee where there is a $20 to $30 limit, and in 

Mississippi a $1,000 cap. No attorney, no matter how zealous, who 

has to pay their bills, pay back their law school loans, can afford 

to take on those types of representations. 

It is essential that attorneys are well compensated, and that not 

only are they compensated but that their investigators and experts 

can be paid so that they can pursue all of their rights under the 

system. 

Finally, the third recommendation we make is that the current 

standard under the Supreme Court precedent of Strickland v. 

Washington for competency of counsel be changed for capital litigation. The idea that you can have effective assistance but fatal assistance, as we have heard described here so dynamically by Mr. 

Graham, is shocking. We should hold defense counsel who represent capital defendants to a higher standard. 

I come here today to thank all of you for all the hard work that 

you have been doing, and I know you will continue to do on this 

bipartisan issue, and to provide the support of our committee and 

me personally for the Innocence Protection Act. I look forward to 

answering any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Wilkinson follows:]

54

STATEMENT OF BETH WILKINSON, CO-CHAIR, CONSTITUTION PROJECT’S DEATH

PENALTY INITIATIVE

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. My name is Beth 

Wilkinson. I presently serve as co-chair of the Constitution Project’s Death Penalty 

Initiative. I am here today to speak on behalf of the Committee and personally, as 

a former federal prosecutor, about the importance of competent counsel for defendants facing capital punishment. 

The members of the Committee are supporters and opponents of the death penalty, Democrats and Republicans, conservatives and liberals. We are former judges, 

prosecutors, and other public officials, as well as victim advocates, defense lawyers, 

journalists, scholars, and other concerned Americans. We disagree on much, including whether abolition of the death penalty is warranted. But we agree that insufficient safeguards are in place to assure fairness in the administration of capital punishment. We have come together not to abolish the death penalty, but to improve 

the administration of capital litigation. 

We have conducted extensive research and have deliberated long and hard about 

the issues presented today, seeking consensus because we recognized the need to 

overcome past divisions. For too long, society has cast the death penalty debate as 

one between ‘‘liberals’’ and ‘‘conservatives,’’ those who are ‘‘soft on crime’’ and those 

who ‘‘care about victims of crime.’’

This morning our Committee announced to the public some of the minimum reforms essential to a fair and just death penalty system. One of our paramount concerns is competent counsel for indigent defendants facing the death penalty. All of 

our citizens, regardless of ability to pay, and especially those facing capital punishment, should be well represented. 

As a prosecutor in the federal system and specifically, as a prosecutor in the Oklahoma City bombing case, this is especially important to me. Timothy McVeigh and 

Terry Nichols were defended by highly skilled teams of lawyers, experienced in capital cases. All of the participants in the process wanted a fair trial, and with talented and zealous counsel, McVeigh and Nichols indeed received fair trials. 

Far too few capital defendants have quality defense attorneys at trial, and while 

not every defendant may be entitled to a dream team of defense lawyers, every defendant facing the death penalty is entitled to qualified counsel who meet minimum 

qualifications. 

As a prosecutor, I wanted both Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols to be represented by a good defense lawyer for many reasons. First and foremost, a competent defense lawyer is essential in getting at the truth. I wanted the defense to 

do a thorough investigation to make it easy for the appellate court to decide there 

had been a fair trial. Substandard counsel is likely to result in an inadequate trial 

record, through failure to investigate and failure to preserve objections. I also wanted the families of the victims to rest knowing the perpetrators were punished. When 

a defendant has ineffective counsel the state, the families of victims, and society all 

suffer. Litigation becomes protracted, complicated and costly, putting legitimate convictions at risk. This subjects the victims’ families to continuing uncertainty, and 

deprives society of the knowledge that the real perpetrator is behind bars. This 

means that ensuring competent counsel to defendants facing the death penalty benefits not only the defendant, but also victims and society at large. 

We have all heard the stories of wrongful convictions involving defense lawyers 

who lacked the appropriate experience and resources. We hear that sometimes, capital defense lawyers were under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or slept through 

parts of a trial; and that there have been a number of capital defense lawyers who 

were subsequently disbarred or otherwise cited for serious ethical violations. 

For example, in 1986 in Georgia, defendant Aden Harrison, Jr. was all but abandoned by his court-appointed attorney James Venable. Not surprising since Harrison 

was a black man and his attorney was a former imperial wizard of the Ku Klux 

Klan who was later disbarred. 

In 1992 in Texas, defendant George McFarland’s attorney admitted to sleeping 

through parts of the trial. The judge permitted the trial to continue saying ‘‘the Constitution guarantees the right to an attorney. It doesn’t say the lawyer has to be 

awake.’’ McFarland is currently on death row. 

The state of Oklahoma paid approximately three thousand dollars for Ronald 

Keith Williamson’s defense. His lawyer conducted no investigation and failed to 

mention to the jury that another man had confessed to the killing. 

These cases highlight the need for death penalty reform on a National level. 

Today we announced to the public a number of recommendations for reform, including three provisions dealing specifically with representation of capital defendants. 

55

First, we recommend every jurisdiction create an independent authority to screen, 

appoint, train, and supervise capital defense attorneys, and to set minimum standards for capital representation. 

Without such a process, as numerous studies have shown, competent representation becomes more a matter of luck than of constitutional guarantee. The independence of the authority and its freedom from judicial or prosecutorial conflicts is crucial to ensure that its members can act without partisanship and in a manner consistent with the highest professional standards. 

Instead, many states award capital cases by contract or appointment, employing 

explicit or implicit incentives to these attorneys to keep their costs low and their 

hours on the case few. The attorneys may be chosen based on friendship with the 

judge, a desire not to ‘‘rock the boat,’’ their willingness to work for low wages, their 

presence in the halls of the courthouse, or other factors poorly correlated with competent representation. Many of them have little knowledge of capital litigation or 

even criminal law in general. Many have little experience or skill in the courtroom. 

A disproportionate number have records of disciplinary action, even disbarment. Establishing independent appointing authorities to alleviate many of these problems 

is a crucial and central recommendation of this committee. 

All jurisdictions should adopt minimum standards for the provision of an adequate capital defense at every level of litigation. The standards for qualified counsel 

will vary according to the requisites of the particular stage of proceedings. There 

is some flexibility as to which minimum standards a jurisdiction ought to adopt. 

However, we suggest that minimum standards should, at the least, require two attorneys on each capital case, and at the trial level that: (1) the lead attorney have 

at least five years of criminal litigation experience as well as experience as lead or 

co-counsel in at least one capital case; (2) co-counsel have at least three years of 

criminal litigation experience; (3) each counsel have significant experience in jury 

trials of serious felony cases; (4) each attorney have had recent training in death 

penalty litigation and (5) demonstrated commitment and proficiency. Similar standards should be met at the appellate and post-conviction stages, although at these 

stages the type of relevant prior experience will vary. The important thing is that 

a set of stringent and uniform minimum standards should be adopted, implemented 

and enforced. 

Second, we recommend that each jurisdiction adopt standards ensuring adequate 

compensation of counsel appointed in capital cases, as well as adequate funding for 

expert and investigative services. Many jurisdictions impose shockingly low maximum hourly rates or arbitrary fee caps for capital defense (Alabama $20–40 an 

hour, up to $2000 cap, meaning that an attorney devoting 600 hours to pretrial 

preparation in Alabama would earn $3.33 an hour; Tennessee, $20–30 an hour; Mis- sissippi, a $1000 cap). Courts often will not make funds available for reasonable expert, investigative, support or other expenses that are crucial to the adequate preparation for both trial and sentencing in capital cases. Attorneys should not be forced 

to choose whether to spend a severely limited pool of funds on their own fees or on 

experts and investigators. Failure to provide adequate funding and resources is a 

failure of the system which forces even the most committed attorneys to provide inadequate assistance. 

Third, we recommend that the current standard of review for ineffective assistance in capital sentencing be replaced with a more stringent standard better keyed 

to the particulars of capital representation. 

The current Supreme Court (Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984)) 

standard for effective assistance of counsel permits ‘‘effective but fatal counsel.’’

Every state that permits the death penalty should adopt a more demanding standard to replace the current test for effective assistance of counsel in the capital sentencing context. 

In support of the Death Penalty Initiative, my law firm, Latham & Watkins, took 

on a research project of death penalty laws in 6 states. All of the states, Texas, Virginia, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, California, have laws governing standards 

for counsel in capital cases. Yet, stories like Aden Harrison, Jr., George McFarland, 

and Ronald Keith Williamson are rampant. This is why it is so important to address 

this issue on a National level with an enforcement mechanism to ensure counsel 

standards are actually met. 

There are very few ways to ensure from a federal perspective that indigents facing 

the death penalty have effective counsel. We all can agree that there is a problem. 

The question becomes how can the federal government help enforce and resolve the 

problem. The reforms proposed today, coupled with the Innocence Protection Act of 

2001, will ensure that minimum standards for competent counsel will be met in all 

States. This is why the Committee and I, personally, am such a strong supporter 

of this legislation. 

56

The Act rightly enforces standards for qualified counsel through monetary incentives, both through award and withholding of grants; and through the invocation of 

certain procedural advantages in federal habeas corpus review for those states that 

provide competent counsel to capital defendants. Unless these standards are enforced in ways that assure compliance, the mere adoption of standards is meaningless. 

The lack of adequate counsel to represent capital defendants is likely the gravest 

of all problems, which makes the death penalty arbitrary, unfair, and rife with 

error. I urge the Congress to support the reforms establishing a National standard 

for competent counsel in death penalty cases. These reforms will benefit not only 

defendants, but also victims and society at large. 

In closing, I urge the Congress to pass the Innocence Protection Act of 2001 in 

order to fulfill the Constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel to all 

defendants. 

I look forward to answering any questions that you might have. 

Thank you.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Ms. Wilkinson. You never taught 

me how to hold on to some of these props, Senator Hatch. You were 

supposed to teach me some of these things before I took over the 

chairmanship. 

Senator HATCH. I would just like you to share them with the Minority, because we asked for it yesterday and still don’t have a 

copy. 

Chairman LEAHY. I got this about a half hour ago and I will be 

glad to give you my copy, if you would like. 

Senator HATCH. If you would, we would be glad to have it. 

Ms. WILKINSON. I would be happy to provide one. 

Chairman LEAHY. Why don’t you bring it up right now? 

Senator HATCH. We will send somebody down. 

Chairman LEAHY. I just want to make sure you get it. I have not 

read it. 

Kevin Brackett is the Deputy Solicitor of the 16th Judicial Circuit in South Carolina. You have been there for 10 years. You have 

prosecuted capital cases, you have trained colleagues in handling 

such cases. You were named the Ernest F. Hollings Prosecutor of 

the Year in 1998. 

Mr. Brackett, I appreciate you taking the time to come here, and 

I hope while you are here you have a chance to stop by and say 

hello to both of your Senators. For one you have an award named 

after him; the other, Senator Strom Thurmond, is a member of this 

committee. 

STATEMENT OF KEVIN S. BRACKETT, DEPUTY SOLICITOR, 

16TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, YORK, SOUTH CAROLINA 

Mr. BRACKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Hatch, members of the committee. As Chairman Leahy has said, my name is 

Kevin Brackett, and I am honored and pleased to be here to participate in this discussion on this very important topic. 

I have been a prosecutor for nearly 10 years and I have been 

serving the citizens of York and Union Counties in South Carolina. 

I have prosecuted the last five capital murder cases that have occurred in our jurisdiction. Prior to my employment with the solicitor, I worked as a law clerk with the Richland County Public Defender’s Office, which is down in Columbia, the capital city of 

South Carolina. And while employed there, I was privileged to participate in the defense of a capital murder case in which the defendant was sentenced to life in prison. I feel that my experience 

57

on these issues on both sides gives me a good perspective on some 

of the issues that we are discussing here today. 

My written statement which I have submitted for the consideration of the committee details my thoughts on the necessity of this 

legislation in the State of South Carolina. In sum, I believe that 

South Carolina already complies with any reasonable standards 

which the proposed commission may choose to suggest. Minimum 

standards of competence for counsel in capital cases are already in 

place. 

This year’s budget provides $2.75 million to compensate counsel 

and for the purpose of retaining experts and investigative services 

in capital cases. In addition, that $2.75 million is augmented by a 

special levy that is attached to every fine imposed in any court in 

the State of South Carolina. If a fine is given of $50, there is an 

additional $50 levy that is placed on that. Eleven percent of that 

levy goes into the fund for the defense of indigents. So the $2.75 

million is just the baseline funded by the legislature. Additional 

funds are available throughout the year as these fines and fees are 

paid. 

I believe if the committee’s proposals are reasonable, I don’t 

think that Title II of the Innocence Protection Act is really going 

to have any kind of noticeable impact on capital case processing in 

South Carolina. 

I would point out that we just finished a capital case about 3 

months ago, State v. Bobby Lee Holmes. It was a retrial. It was a 

10-year-old murder case and Mr. Holmes was represented by two 

very capable counsel, one of whom is basically a specialist in defending capital cases, defends them all across the State, and the 

other of whom has approximately 15 years’ experience on both defense and prosecution. 

In addition to these two lawyers, they were supported by a phalanx of attorneys. I think there were four or five other attorneys 

who were volunteering pro bono to assist in this case. There were 

investigators in the courtroom at all times. They had numerous experts. Six, eight, ten experts testified, and there were other experts 

who were retained to assist who never testified. 

There is no shortage of assistance to indigent capital defendants 

in South Carolina, and the system there I believe works to give 

them every opportunity. In fact, were I charged with a capital murder in South Carolina, I would divest myself of every asset I have 

and ask to be given indigent representation so that I could access 

this quality of representation because I could not afford to mount 

the defense that Mr. Holmes mounted 3 months ago. 

Nobody can quibble with the contention that capital defendants 

are entitled to competent representation and adequate resources to 

help assist in their defense, hiring experts and investigators. That 

notwithstanding, I cannot support or endorse Title II of the Innocence Protection Act as it is proposed. 

First, while there may be isolated incidents of incompetence and 

insufficient funding for capital defendants, there is already a mechanism in place to remedy the problem. It is called the Sixth 

Amendment and the Due Process Clause. 

The courts do a fine job. They are in the best position to evaluate 

these situations on a case-by-case basis and determine whether 

58

there is any merit to these claims. I submit that the courts do an 

excellent job of this, and this legislation only tends to indicate a 

lack of faith in their ability. 

Second, Title II appears to put the cart before the horse by accepting that there is a need for change prior to undertaking an objective assessment of the situation and the system. The Act is premised on the supposition that incompetence and underfunding are 

rampant through the system. I know that this is the position taken 

by those who are opposed to capital punishment under any circumstances. 

I do not believe that an objective study of capital punishment in 

this country would support this premise, however. It would be 

much more practical to undertake a thorough, objective assessment 

of the system first and then proceed to recommend positive 

changes. 

Finally, if the Congress feels it is necessary to mandate 

changes—in other words, if we must do this, if we are going to 

make these changes, it should resolve to correct as many of the 

flaws in the system as it can. Perhaps it would be prudent to rename the bill the Truth Protection Act. 

As our Supreme Court noted in Oregon v. Haas, we are, after all, 

engaged in a search for the truth. Mandating safeguards for the 

truth-seeking function of the courts of this country achieves the 

goal of protecting the innocent. The truth will also set the innocent 

man free. It also has the added benefit of ensuring that the guilty 

are held accountable. 

A Truth Protection Act could embrace all the concerns addressed 

in the Innocence Protection Act. It could mandate minimum standards of competence and experience for all capital counsel, but this 

should also include, however, a requirement that any defense attorney found to be ineffective in more than a set number of habeas 

proceedings, or grossly ineffective in just one, should be barred 

from ever representing capital defendants again. Currently, there 

are no ramifications for such a finding, and thus no deterrent to 

prevent an over-zealous defense attorney from falsely confessing to 

incompetence to secure a new trial for his client. 

It could also set reasonable standards for the appropriation of expert and investigative funding for indigent defendants. This should 

include a requirement that any experts retained be required to generate reports, to be turned over to the State, to preclude expert witness-shopping and frivolous expenditures of public money. This 

should be mandated for non-indigent defendants as well. 

These are not the only areas of the system that need attention. 

Most Americans would be appalled to learn that a criminal defendant is required to be given the entire State’s file and access to all 

the evidence prior to deciding what his defense will be. Originally 

intended to prevent trial by ambush, the criminal discovery laws 

now serve only to frustrate the search for the truth by allowing the 

defendant to conform his defense to the State’s evidence. This is an 

example of another problem that a Truth Protection Act could address. There are problems on both sides and they both need to be 

addressed. 

In conclusion, I submit that the issues this bill addresses are 

more complex than they may first appear. I urge the committee to 

59

study the matter more carefully before acting, and if action is 

taken, the committee should resolve to take a more comprehensive 

approach to the system’s problems. 

I would ask that my statement be made part of the record. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to be here 

today and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brackett follows:] 

[Additional material is being retained in the Committee files.]

STATEMENT OF KEVIN S. BRACKETT, DEPUTY SOLICITOR, 16TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, 

YORK, SOUTH CAROLINA

I am honored to be here today to participate in this important debate on the quality of our criminal justice system as it relates to capital murder trials. I have been 

a prosecutor for ten years now and have participated in the prosecution of six capital murder trials in South Carolina. While in law school I also enjoyed the experience of participating in the defense of an individual on trial for capital murder. Additionally, I was witness to the first execution in South Carolina by lethal injection. 

More than this though, I think a lot about what I do. The prosecution of capital 

cases demands a great deal of sober reflection: This is a business with no room for 

regrets. 

I take no exception to the goals of Title II of the Innocence Protection Act. Who, 

after all, could be opposed to protecting the innocent? In fact, I believe that I come 

from a jurisdiction that will, in all likelihood, probably be found to already meet any 

standards set by the proposed commission: 

I am not aware of any sleepy or drunken capital defense attorneys in South Carolina. No judge I know would tolerate it. 

Nor have I seen any incompetent attorneys take up the cause of a man on trial 

for their life. South Carolina already imposes minimum standards for capital defense counsel and the judges are required to find affirmatively that any prospective 

capital defense attorney is qualified. Five years of recent felony trial experience is 

the minimum requirement for the lead attorney. In most cases the actual level of 

experience far surpasses this. South Carolina law requires indigent defendants be 

appointed at least two attorneys. 

I have also had the pleasure of meeting many fine defense experts over the last 

10 years. South Carolina provides ample funding for retaining expert witnesses and 

private investigators. This year’s budget provides $2.75 million for use in paying appointed counsel and hiring experts and investigators. In addition, state law allows 

for part of every dollar paid in criminal fines to be deposited into the same account. 

When you consider that South Carolina tries approximately 15 capital cases per 

year you realize that our legislature is not stingy in this regard. 

In short, I believe that Title II of the Innocence Protection Act won’t really have 

much of an impact on my state. South Carolina should have an impact on the Innocence Protection Act though. Consider this case study: 

Three months ago our office concluded the retrial of Bobby Lee Holmes. Mr. 

Holmes was being retried for the rape and murder of 86-year-old Mary Stewart. He 

was granted a new trial after a post-conviction relief hearing in which he asserted 

that he was denied a fair trial because the judge led him to believe that he OR his 

attorney could make a closing argument instead of he AND his attorney. Had he 

realized that both he and his attorney could have addressed the jury he asserted 

that he would have spoken in his own defense. Both of his experienced attorneys 

from the first trial conceded at the hearing that they had failed to properly advise 

Mr. Holmes of his rights. The court granted his request. 

The evidence against the defendant was straightforward: Blood from the victim 

(who was sodomized) was found on the defendant’s underwear, the defendants bodily fluids were found on a paper towel in the victims apartment. Fibers consistent 

with the defendant’s clothes were found in the apartment and fibers consistent with 

the victims bedding were found on the defendant’s clothes. Finally, the defendants 

palm print was found in the victim’s apartment. The defendant told the police he 

had never been in the apartment. 

Mr. Holmes was represented by at least five attorneys. I say at least because I 

am still not sure who at the defense table was an attorney and who was not. The 

‘‘lead’’ attorney specialized in capital murder litigation in South Carolina and his cocounsel has approximately 15 years felony trial experience. I don’t know who paid 

for the other attorneys. 

60

During jury selection there appeared to be a jury consultant working with the defense. Throughout the trial there was a social worker/therapist by the defendants 

side at almost all times. There was at least one investigator in the courtroom at 

all times. Possibly two. 

During the defendants case in chief numerous experts from various parts of the 

country were called on his behalf. An expert on DNA, an expert from New Mexico 

on laboratory standards, one hair and fiber expert from Alabama, a fingerprint expert from South Carolina, an expert on criminal investigation from North Carolina, 

a professor of neuro-psychology from the University of South Carolina, a psychiatrist from the Medical University of South Carolina, the former Director of the Indiana State Department of Corrections and a social worker all were paid to give testimony on the defendants behalf. There were at least four other experts who were 

retained yet never used. 

The first point to be made concerns the attorneys who represented Mr. Holmes 

in his first trial. There are no apparent consequences in South Carolina for being 

found to be an ineffective attorney in a post conviction relief hearing. It is close to 

impossible to prove but it is the opinion of many prosecutors who spend any time 

in capital litigation that some defense attorneys will deliberately infect a record 

with error or, confess to error at a later habeas hearing in order to secure a new 

trial for their client. A competent prosecutor worries not only about their own case 

but also must be vigilant to protect the record to ensure that the conviction can 

withstand appellate and habeas scrutiny. 

If Congress intends to compel the states to maintain rosters of qualified capital 

defense attorneys they should establish as a criteria for determining competence the 

number of times the attorney has been adjudicated ineffective. This should then be 

tracked to guarantee continued competence. 

The second point concerns effective allocation of resources. Everyone agrees that 

an indigent defendant should be entitled to the reasonable resources needed to 

present his defense. But consider the defense in Mr. Holmes’ case. How many Americans could afford to mount such an extravagant defense? 

Unfortunately this sword has two edges. If we spend the money then the cost of 

the death penalty is cited as a reason for it’s abolishment, if we don’t then the battle 

cry becomes ‘‘No justice for the poor’’. The solution to the problem has to lay in stricter accountability. The law allows 

for ex parte applications for funding. These must be explicitly detailed by defense 

counsel and then more carefully scrutinized by the judiciary. In addition, no funds 

should be disbursed until a detailed report from the expert or investigator is tendered to the court. The report should include the results of any testing done along 

with a strict accounting of the time spent. Lastly, judges should not hesitate to limit 

the amount that any expert can charge. The former director of the Indiana Department of Corrections was paid five hundred ($500.00) dollars per hour to testify in 

the Holmes case. Would he have refused to participate if the court had told him that 

he could only charge $150.00 per hour? How about if they had capped his total payment at $2000.00? 

A balance must be struck between the need to provide adequate resources to indigent defendants and the need to prevent frivolous expenditures of public funds. The 

Constitution guarantees every criminal defendant to equal access to justice. This 

does not absolve the legislatures or the courts of their responsibility to regulate the 

spending of these monies. 

In conclusion it is my opinion that while the goals of the Innocence Protection Act 

are laudable I am concerned about the methods that will be employed to achieve 

these goals. We don’t know what conclusions or recommendations the proposed commission will make. Perhaps it would be a more intelligent use of our time and resources to commission the study first and then draft the legislation needed to address the problems the commission identifies. The scope of the study could be widened to include an investigation into the issue of incompetent counsel and inadequate resources. Our course could then be charted based on reliable information 

rather than anecdotal evidence and reports issued by individuals and organizations 

with a known bias towards the death penalty.

Chairman LEAHY. I thank you for making the trip to Washington 

to do this. I appreciate it very much. 

Senator Hatch has a scheduling conflict. Normally, I would begin 

questioning, but to accommodate him, of course, I will yield to him 

first. 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I only intend to 

take a minute or so. 

61

I apologize for not being here for your testimony, General Pryor, 

and yours, Senator Ellis. I apologize for that, but I have really appreciated this whole panel. Each of you has, I think, presented 

your case very persuasively and well. 

Let me also say I want to make a point about the cases Chairman Leahy mentioned in his opening statement. Many, if not all, 

of these individuals were released because of DNA testing, not all, 

but many of them. Senator Leahy’s bill contains two major parts, 

one dealing with DNA testing, and the other addressing competency of counsel. As you can tell, the competency of counsel provisions are controversial. 

The DNA provisions, however, are similar to a bill I introduced 

last year and a bill Senator Feinstein recently introduced. Indeed, 

DNA legislation enjoys nearly universal support in this committee. 

I notice Mr. Scheck here, for whom I have a great deal of respect, 

who has been a great advocate on this and has been persuasive to 

me. 

Now, I am confident that we could reach an agreement on DNA 

immediately. We very quickly could get it through both Houses of 

Congress. I think we could have done this 2 years ago, to be honest 

with you, or at least a year ago, on the DNA provisions. I am 

equally confident the House would move quickly on such a bill. 

This would ensure that innocent individuals in prison have the opportunity to prove their innocence, and immediately, not while we 

argue this other part. 

I am also concerned about this other aspect. I think all of you 

have made good cases, but I am concerned about competency of 

counsel. Let me just say that I will commit to continue to work 

with the chairman of this committee on the issues related to competency of counsel, but let us at least accomplish what we can to 

help remedy some of the injustices that the distinguished chairman 

has described, and let’s do that right away. 

I think we should have done this a couple of years ago and we 

were just unable to, but I would like to offer that to the chairman 

and get that done, and then make a good-faith effort to try and 

solve the competency of counsel difficulties that all of you have spoken eloquently about on both sides. 

In particular, I am very happy to have your report, Ms. 

Wilkinson. I appreciate the work that you have done and I appreciate the bipartisan nature of your testimony, and we will read that 

very carefully and see what we can do to help here. 

So, I would like to have that done. It is something that can be 

done now, and the other we may be able to do also, but I don’t 

think that it can happen as quickly as we can solve the DNA problem. So I just want to make that good-faith offer here so that we 

don’t waste another day not providing this type of resource, help 

from the Federal Government, in both State and Federal cases in 

ways that will help to alleviate and remedy some of these problems. And then I commit to work on the competency of counsel aspect in good faith and try and see what we can do, taking into consideration all of the testimony and the evidence to see what can be 

done in that particular area. 

But thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will get out of your hair. 

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Chairman LEAHY. It is very easy to get out of my hair with my 

hair line. But if you could hold just for a moment, do we agree that 

DNA evidence should be available? Of course, we all do on this 

panel. That is not an issue. 

Senator HATCH. But every day we delay——

Chairman LEAHY. That is not an issue. But let’s not fool ourselves. You have got to have competent counsel to know when and 

how to ask for DNA evidence and determine whether it is available. It is not so that the person charged can prove their innocence. 

That is not their burden. The burden is on the state to prove their 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden is on the state in this 

case. 

I would remind everybody—every prosecutor and former prosecutor knows this—a lot of the cases aren’t going to have DNA evidence of any sort anyway, just like a lot of cases don’t have fingerprints. I recall once when I was prosecuting cases, I had to put an 

investigator on the stand to testify that, one, he or she didn’t find 

any fingerprints at the scene; second, they had investigated several 

hundred cases; and, third, it is not unusual that there are no fingerprints. In the large majority of the cases they investigated, 

there were no fingerprints. Well, in the large majority of cases that 

are going to be raised here, there is not going to be any DNA evidence. 

An easy example is somebody goes into a bank to rob the bank. 

On the way out, they shoot the guard and the guard dies. We have 

got a Federal case against this bank robber. In most States, it 

would be a felony murder; if the State had the death penalty, it 

would carry the death penalty. But it would be awfully hard to 

think where there was going to be DNA there. Now, there may 

have been three people who identify somebody as being the perpetrator. Then you go in to question everything from alibi to eyewitnesses, and so on. 

In Mr. Graham’s case, a man who served years upon years upon 

years on death row, who was finally released with a check for $10 

and a suit that was too big, there was no DNA. So we want access 

to DNA, of course; to fingerprints, of course; to blood samples, of 

course. But you are not going to get any of these things unless you 

have competent counsel. 

Senator HATCH. If the Senator would yield, I am, of course, talking about post-conviction DNA for people who already may be unjustly convicted. I think we could start that tomorrow and I think 

we could get it through both Houses even before we leave this 

week, if we really wanted to do it. 

Why not do that, and at the same time accept by good-faith offer 

to try and resolve the competency of counsel issue, taking into consideration all these respective points of view that are sincere and 

educated and well thought through? 

That is my point. There is no reason to continue to hold post-conviction DNA from being enacted when we can do that right off the 

bat. And hopefully we can solve this other problem, too, because I 

am concerned about it; anybody with brains would be concerned 

about it. But there are two sides to that issue. That is my point, 

and both sides have good arguments. I think we have got the abilVerDate Feb 1 2002 10:08 Sep 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\HEARINGS\81606.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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ity on this committee to resolve these conflicts and to try and do 

what is in the best interests of people. 

I don’t think you need to hold up the passage of post-conviction 

DNA solutions in order to solve trial competency problems, but I 

do think it is going to take more effort to solve the competency of 

counsel problems. We can do the post-conviction DNA stuff, like I 

say, right now. 

Well, I need to leave, but I want to thank you for letting me 

make that statement. 

Chairman LEAHY. I appreciate it, and I will continue to work 

with you on that. Obviously, post-conviction DNA is a small part 

of this problem. We can work on achieving that. We should also 

make sure that if we are going to have post-conviction DNA, we 

also have counsel competent enough to know when to ask for it. 

We will start questions on 5-minute rounds. 

Ms. Wilkinson, you described your committee’s recommendations 

regarding competence counsel, and I am going to submit for the 

record the executive summary of your committee’s report. 

What are some of the other recommended reforms, if you could 

just briefly mention them? 

Ms. WILKINSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Some of them are so basic, 

I think they are recommendations that many people would hope 

are already in place across the jurisdictions, but they are not. 

For example, we recommend that no one who is mentally retarded or a juvenile who commits the crime under 18 be subject to 

the death penalty. We did that because, as we saw most recently 

in Texas, jurisdictions have refused to set that standard, and so we 

think that is a minimal standard that should be set in all jurisdictions. 

We have also asked for things like the felony murder rule to be 

limited in capital cases so that a felony defendant who had no intent to commit the murder or did not commit the murder would not 

be subject to the death penalty, even though they would under the 

precedent of the felony murder rule in many jurisdictions. 

We made recommendations about the roles of prosecutors and 

judges. We asked that judges ensure that every capital defendant 

be provided with a jury instruction to jurors to choose between 

death and life without parole, meaning truly life with no reduced 

sentence, and that juries understand what those sentencing options 

are, just like a judge would if he or she were to make that determination. 

We talked about open-file discovery, which I know Mr. Brackett 

was saying has been used by some defense counsel in nefarious 

ways. I found just the opposite. I found that as a prosecutor in the 

McVeigh and Nichols cases what really saved our conviction at the 

very end was that we did have open-file discovery, and that the defense has access to all the information that honestly we couldn’t 

have known at some points whether it was Brady or not. And only 

by sharing all of it with the other side were we able to know that 

they could pursue whatever they thought was appropriate during 

the pre-trial phase. 

So those are some of the recommendations that we made as a 

committee. There are 18 recommendations that we are going to 

send obviously not just to you, but to State legislatures and policy 

64

advocates around the country, hoping that other jurisdictions will 

pursue these recommendations. 

Chairman LEAHY. I appreciate that. When I looked at the list of 

people who were there, you went about as far across the spectrum 

on this issue as possible, people with a lot of experience, and I commend you in reaching the agreement that you did. 

Mr. Bright, I was taking some notes here. I was wondering if you 

could respond to Mr. Eisenberg’s statements about what he calls 

the de-funding of the Federal resource centers. 

Mr. BRIGHT. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I must say both from my own 

practical observations and also from reading some of the reports 

that have been done, I don’t understand those comments. 

It is true that some Federal defender offices have provided some 

representation in Federal post-conviction. In Georgia, for example, 

there is only one defender, obviously, and that is in the Northern 

District of Georgia. So for a small number of cases that are in the 

Northern District of Georgia, the Federal defender may be involved 

in the Federal post-conviction. 

In the Middle and Southern Districts, which is where most of the 

death cases come from, there is no Federal defender office. It is a 

court-appointed system. There is no provision at all. Those lawyers 

are not providing any assistance in State court. The result of that 

is a man named Exzavious Gibson, with an I.Q. measured on various tests at 76 to 82, represented himself in his first State postconviction case. The result of that in Alabama is that there have 

been a number of people for whom the statute of limitations ran 

who were not represented at all just simply because the time ran 

out. 

There is a report here, Mr. Chairman, ‘‘The Crisis in Post-Conviction Representation Since Elimination of Funding.’’ I would ask, 

Mr. Chairman, to make this a part of the record, if you would like. 

It was issued in April of 2001 and describes this in much greater 

detail than I can here. 

Basically, there is a real crisis particularly in those States that 

have not been willing to provide lawyers at the post-conviction 

stage. I mean, Alabama theoretically does; it will pay $1,000, but 

you don’t get much of a lawyer for $1,000. Georgia doesn’t pay anything at all. Some of the lawyers appointed in Texas have missed 

the deadlines. 

Federal Judge Orlando Garcia, in San Antonio, said in one case 

that the lawyer who was appointed, who was a kid right out of law 

school with no experience and was very, very ill—that the appointment of this lawyer to handle post-conviction was a cynical and 

reprehensible attempt to expedite his execution without even the 

pretense of fairness. Now, that is a Federal judge getting this case 

when it comes into the Federal court. 

There is a tremendous crisis in this area, and I don’t quite understand how someone objectively could claim to the contrary. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Mr. Graham, could I ask you a question? You spent 14 years on 

death row waiting to be executed for a crime you did not commit. 

When it was finally admitted that you shouldn’t have been on 

death row, you said that the State of Louisiana gave you $10 and 

a coat that was a few sizes too big. 

65

Did the State of Louisiana do anything else? Did they apologize 

to you or to your family, or compensate you or your family for locking you up for 14 years? 

Mr. GRAHAM. A couple of delegates from the legislature apologized, but as far as compensation, nothing. 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Ellis, one of the criticisms of the 

Texas system of appointed counsel includes allegations that some 

judges appoint specific counsel who, for example, will move cases 

quickly and cheaply through the system, or who contribute to the 

judge’s reelection campaign coffers. 

You acknowledge that the Texas Fair Defense Act does not go as 

far as you would like in establishing a neutral system of appointment for indigent counsel. Does it address the conflict of interest 

problem? 

Mr. ELLIS. No, it does not, Mr. Chairman, directly, and that 

would have been very difficult to do. Obviously, judges jealously 

guard that prerogative of appointing lawyers. The judges are elected in our State; a good number are appointed and then run for 

election. But nobody in their right mind would run a campaign for 

a judge, not even me, on the notion of fairness. You run on the notion of efficiency. For whatever reason, the word ‘‘fairness’’ denotes 

coddling to criminals. 

You run on efficiency, and efficiency generally means that you 

want people who work the docket. I mean, I don’t think it is really 

fair to criticize the judges directly. I criticize the system because 

the system just breeds that kind of cynicism, but the bill does not 

directly address it. 

I think the spotlight on the issue nationally and the spotlight 

that will remain in the local press make it more difficult for judges 

to appoint people just because people gave them contributions. But 

obviously, you wouldn’t necessarily, even if you or I were a judge, 

appoint someone that you thought would be financing your opponent’s campaign. That is just not how the system works. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Senator Ellis. 

Senator Sessions, you have been waiting patiently and I appreciate your time. You are also a former prosecutor, and that has 

been very valuable to all of us here on this committee. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Graham, your story is something that touches all of us. Anybody in the criminal justice system who is involved in a circumstance where an innocent person has been charged has got to 

be affected, also, and all of us who believe in law, who believe in 

the justice system, the jury system and the criminal justice system 

have got to be extremely troubled to hear your story. I think truly 

it is an unusual event, but that it happens at all is something that 

should give us all cause for pause. 

I know I used to tell my prosecutors on my staff if they believed 

a defendant was innocent or the did not believe they had sufficient 

evidence to proceed with the case, they should never proceed with 

it; come tell me about it, but never prosecute a case you don’t believe in. That would be a horrible thing to do, and to convict someone who is innocent is a great and tragic event. 

These cases are for the most part, in my background, pretty aggressively defended—Mr. Brackett, you have testified about that—

66

and pretty intense sometimes. I have a quote here from one defense lawyer: ‘‘Sometimes, counsel should file motions just to make 

trouble. It is part of a capital defense attorney’s job to do that. If 

the prosecution wants to kill the client, they have to go through the 

defense attorney. File motions for money for special investigations, 

for opinion polls of the community; file all kinds of motions, support them as much as possible with affidavits or proffers that can 

be introduced in evidentiary form. Constantly make a record and 

constantly make trouble.’’ That is a quotation from an article by 

the head of the Illinois Capital Resource Center, a defense attorney. 

Was that what you were referring to? Is that the kind of aggressiveness that you see? 

Mr. BRACKETT. Well, sir, I have certainly experienced what that 

article describes, and I have had capital murder cases where the 

motions come piling in and a lot of them have very little merit. We 

have had cases where 20 or 30 motions were filed, and on the day 

of trial when these motions were to be heard a great number of 

them were abandoned. 

It seems to be part of the strategy, and whether it is legitimate 

or not I am not going to debate. But it seems to be part of the 

strategy to make capital litigation as expensive as possible because 

that is one of the things that you can then argue. Is it worth the 

cost? I think that the courts need to step in and take a more active 

role in monitoring the expense of capital cases to ensure that the 

moneys that are being expended are being expended wisely. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I think there is something there. It does 

appear to me that there are groups—I know Mr. Bright is very talented, and certainly not timid about expressing his views and defending people in criminal cases. That is healthy. 

It does not bother me that attorneys who are absolutely opposed 

to the death penalty are hired to defend the cases. It doesn’t bother 

me at all. I am troubled, Mr. Chairman, by funding organizations 

who are advocacy organizations in many ways against the death 

penalty. That troubles me. 

I will ask Mr. Eisenberg and General Pryor, are you aware of 

any other criminal legal system in which a lawyer, an office of the 

court, is appointed by some advocacy or independent, non-legal organization to represent somebody at the taxpayers’ expense? Are 

you aware of anything like that? 

Mr. EISENBERG. Senator, I am not aware of anything like that, 

but I will say, to echo these comments, that in death penalty cases 

specifically we are essentially fighting against the Federal Government, in the sense that our opponents in virtually every case, from 

the point of the death penalty verdict onward for years, are funded 

by the Federal Government. 

It has been commented that those lawyers don’t come into State 

court. I can tell you they do. I see them everyday in State court, 

in court itself and in legal filings. It has been commented that a 

lot of jurisdictions don’t have those kinds of federally funded lawyers. Well, the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts says that they 

have given funding to every defender organization under this program that has asked for it. 

67

Senator SESSIONS. So they are getting money now? Mr. Bright’s 

group is—— Mr. BRIGHT. Senator, my group has never, ever gotten a penny 

of State or Federal money, ever. 

Mr. EISENBERG. I am not talking about Mr. Bright’s group. In addition to all those privately funded organizations and in addition 

to all those non-profit corporations, et cetera, there are lawyers 

that are hired in the same manner as Federal public defenders are 

in Federal criminal cases, but whose job is to litigate State capital 

cases. That is the $20 million-plus that I referred to in my testimony earlier. 

I agree with you, there is nothing wrong with zealous attorneys 

representing the defendants in capital cases. They should be zealous. The question is whether we should hand them administrative 

control over the appointment process. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Pryor, do you want to comment on 

that? 

Mr. PRYOR. I do. 

Senator SESSIONS. First, the historic uniqueness of a plan to 

allow that to happen. 

Mr. PRYOR. Well, that is exactly what I wanted to refer to, Senator. I am not aware of anything like this, and I think that the 

most troubling aspect of this legislation as it pertains to the competency of counsel is the notion that we are totally rejecting the 

perspective that judges are independent, that they do not perform 

their sworn duty. 

They take oaths of office to uphold the Constitution and the rule 

of law. The overwhelming majority of judges in our system do that 

work diligently and honestly and with integrity, and the entire 

premise of this legislation is that they do not. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Pryor, can you see this chart from 

where you are? 

Mr. PRYOR. Yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. You have good eyes. This is a chart I put together to deal with the appellate process. I do think that we could 

do a better job with trial attorneys. I think every State needs to 

look at that. That is the most critical phase of it. I know Ms. 

Wilkinson would agree that is the most critical phase, but these 

cases receive extraordinary review. 

This is a typical appeal of a criminal case in Alabama. Would you 

run through real briefly—my time is expired—how that appellate 

process would work? 

Mr. PRYOR. Yes, it is typical capital case, which is quite different 

from a typical criminal case. After a trial where you have two attorneys—the lead attorney would have to have at least 5 years’

criminal trial experience. The payment for the attorneys, in contrast to what was said earlier, is there are two kinds of payments, 

$60 for in-court work, $40 for out-of-court work, plus overhead, 

which really works out to be an effective rate of about $100 an 

hour. There is no cap. We have been doing more work to make that 

a better system. 

Senator SESSIONS. You are working on improving it? 

Mr. PRYOR. Yes, we have done that in recent years and I have 

been supportive of it. 

68

Then there is an appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, a direct appeal. At that level, two lawyers each receive 

$2,000, plus the overhead. Then there is an appeal to the Supreme 

Court of Alabama. By the way, I favored raising that to $15,000 

per lawyer; again, the same method of payment. 

Then there is an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United 

States. Then there are State post-conviction proceedings under 

Rule 32 which go to the circuit court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, the Alabama Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court. 

Now, in many of those instances which Mr. Bright referred to the $1,000 cap, there are international law firms, Wall Street law firms 

representing inmates on death row in Alabama. Then there is the 

Federal habeas process in the Federal district court, the Federal 

court of appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court. Of course, there is 

taxpayer-financed representation throughout that system. So there 

are ten levels of appellate review and post-conviction review of 

death penalties. 

Senator SESSIONS. Are you aware of any of the cases, unless the 

defendant just insisted it be short-cut, that those ten steps at least 

did not occur? 

Mr. PRYOR. Yes, there have been a couple of recent instances, 

and this Congress passed a law that was meant to streamline the 

death penalty appeals process and provide a statute of limitations. 

Despite that statute of limitations, two executions in Alabama have 

been stayed without real regard to what the statute of limitations 

is. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, at any rate, it is a remarkable appellate 

process. When I was attorney general, I think there were two executions. One had been to the U.S. Supreme Court three times and 

had a long history of appellate review. They are given a great deal 

of scrutiny, but perhaps if we did a better job at the trial, we 

wouldn’t have as much fussing on appeal. 

Chairman LEAHY. Am I correct, General Pryor, that the two people whose executions were stayed obtained those stays because 

they didn’t have any lawyers at all? 

Mr. PRYOR. No, that is not the reason for the stays, Senator. 

Chairman LEAHY. Did they have lawyers? 

Mr. PRYOR. Well, they certainly did when they obtained the 

stays. 

Chairman LEAHY. But had they not had lawyers before? 

Mr. PRYOR. There were some periods in which—let me take the 

two cases. One is Thomas Arthur. Mr. Arthur has been tried three 

times and convicted. At his last trial, he testified that he wanted 

the death penalty; he asked the jury to give him the death penalty 

because he wanted the heightened scrutiny and additional counsel 

that the system provides. He was represented, of course, until the 

Rule 32 stage. He did not file a Rule 32 petition, despite his great 

experience with the death penalty system. He has been tried three 

times. 

Chairman LEAHY. So that qualified him as a good lawyer. Is that 

what you are saying? 

Mr. PRYOR. No, I didn’t say it qualified him as a lawyer. 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, anyway, we are going into Senator 

Feingold’s time. I will come back. 

69

Senator Feingold? 

STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, in his opening statement Senator Hatch spoke briefly 

about the Federal system and he said that the Department of Justice has confirmed that there is no evidence of bias in the Federal 

death penalty system. But he didn’t mention that the Department 

of Justice has a renewed commitment to studying racial and geographic disparities. 

So I would like to correct the record at this point and note that 

at the subcommittee hearing that I held on this issue following the 

release of the June report, the Justice Department announced that 

it would proceed with a thorough examination of these disparity 

issues. Deputy Attorney General Thompson acknowledged that the 

June report was not the Department’s final word on this matter. 

So I simply want to clear the record on that. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for this hearing. It has been 

extremely good. I want to commend you for your efforts on this 

issue overall. I think it is one of the finest legislative efforts I have 

witnessed since I have been in the U.S. Senate and I am grateful 

to you for it. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I wish every American could hear Mr. Graham’s words and the words of other people in the room that I have 

met and the stories that they have to tell. 

Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my full statement be placed in 

the record. 

Chairman LEAHY. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF

WISCONSIN

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for holding this hearing. I am proud to be an original cosponsor of your bill, the Innocence Protection Act. I am very pleased that this 

Committee—and, more importantly, our nation—is beginning to re-examine the administration of the ultimate punishment a society can impose, the death penalty. 

Mr. Chairman, the American people are becoming increasingly uncomfortable 

with the fact that our criminal justice system runs the very real risk of executing 

innocent people. Many believe that we have already executed innocent people. Since 

1973, close to 100 people who were sentenced to death were later found innocent 

and released from death row. And the number of innocent people walking free keeps 

growing. 

We know that one of the primary factors resulting in wrongful convictions across 

the country is the fact that all too often, incompetent counsel defend those needing 

the best legal representation, and at a very minimum, competent representation. It 

is clear, to even the most cursory observer of our nation’s death penalty system, that 

the standards for competent counsel and the process for assigning counsel to capital 

cases is in dire need of repair. I hope the national attention brought to this issue 

by this hearing will do much to begin to repair that breach. 

Mr. Chairman, I think Congress should pass your bill. But Congress should do 

even more, and I think the American people expect more. A key part of the Innocence Protection Act focuses on the need for a national commission to develop standards for competent counsel in death penalty cases. I think this is such a good idea 

that I propose Congress go a step further. A national, blue ribbon commission can 

not only provide excellent guidance for counsel standards but can provide Congress 

and the American people with a thorough, top-to-bottom review of all the flaws in 

the administration of the death penalty at the state and federal levels. There are 

70

a number of additional issues that can be addressed by a commission—issues like 

racial disparities, geographic disparities and other questions of arbitrariness in the 

application of the death penalty, police or prosecutorial misconduct, and the fallibility of eyewitness testimony. 

I hope my colleagues would agree that a matter as grave as the risk of executing 

innocent people should be reviewed at the highest levels of our government, with 

input from experts. An independent, blue ribbon commission could do just that. 

Furthermore, if we are prepared to acknowledge that our death penalty system 

is broken, we should not go forward with executions. As most Americans have come 

to realize, a suspension of executions while a thorough study is undertaken is the 

fair and just approach. It is time we had a time-out on executions and review of 

why basic fairness and due process are sometimes ignored. Yes, we should consider 

legislation like the Innocence Protection Act but as part of a broader program that 

includes a thorough review of the death penalty system at the state and federal levels and a suspension of executions while it takes place. That is why I encourage my 

colleagues to join me on the National Death Penalty Moratorium Act. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for holding this hearing, and I look forward to 

hearing from the witnesses.

Senator FEINGOLD. I would also like to commend Ms. Wilkinson. 

I am very impressed with the report of your group, the Death Penalty Initiative group. It is a thoughtful set of recommendations to 

improve our criminal justice system and, very importantly, reduce 

the risk that innocent people are executed. 

The recommendations touch on a number of areas that are in 

dire need of reform and some of the issues that are addressed in 

the Innocence Protection Act, like competent counsel, access to 

DNA testing, and the right to an informed jury. I, of course, am 

a proud cosponsor of the Innocence Protection Act. The Death Penalty Initiative’s report clearly and unequivocally makes the case for 

why this has to become law, and I hope the Congress takes up this 

legislation soon and passes it. 

I also believe that the Innocence Protection Act is part of a 

broader program to ensure fairness and restore public confidence in 

our criminal justice system. In fact, I believe that, given the grave 

issues we are confronting—obviously, the risk of executing innocent 

people—that the work of the Initiative should be elevated to the 

national level. I have a bill that would do that. 

The National Death Penalty Moratorium Act would create a national blue-ribbon commission to review the fairness of the administration of the death penalty, and I believe it is time for Congress 

to create a commission to thoroughly review the State and Federal 

death penalty systems. 

Mr. Chairman, in the couple of minutes I have, I would like to 

ask a couple of questions, first, of Mr. Brackett. 

You mentioned that you witnessed, I believe, a lethal injection. 

Was that the execution of Sylvester Adams on August 18, 1995? 

Mr. BRACKETT. Yes, it was. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Now, the Adams case, I am told, arose from 

your home county of York. Is that right? 

Mr. BRACKETT. That is correct. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Isn’t it true that no mitigation evidence was 

presented to the jury by Adams’ court-appointed attorneys, even 

though his I.Q. scores were in the mentally retarded range? 

Mr. BRACKETT. Well, I didn’t come prepared to discuss that in 

any detail, but I did review the file before I went down to see the 

execution. I wanted to know exactly what it is that I was going to 

witness, so I took the time to go to the police department and reVerDate Feb 1 2002 10:08 Sep 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\HEARINGS\81606.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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view the file. I did not have a copy of the transcript, so I couldn’t 

read the transcript of the trial so I don’t know exactly what took 

place there. 

However, I also went and reviewed the physical evidence in that 

case. It involved the kidnapping of a 12-year-old boy from his 

home. He was taken out back into the woods and a piece of cloth 

tied around his neck. A stick was stuck inside the piece of cloth 

and twisted like a tourniquet until he was choked to death. He was 

then buried under a pile of leaves and sticks. Mr. Adams then went 

to a telephone and attempted to ransom the boy to his mother. Apparently, they believed that the family had money, and they did 

not. The police—— Senator FEINGOLD. Is that your way of suggesting that his I.Q. 

was not in the mentally retarded range? 

Mr. BRACKETT. Well, no, sir. In the course of investigating the 

case and making these determinations, I wanted to give you some 

background on the crime. But I did review some of the files and 

it appeared from the files that the individual who tested his I.Q. 

at the Department of Disabilities and Special Needs found him to 

be malingering when they were attempting to determine what his 

I.Q. was. 

The expert that was appointed by the court to evaluate his I.Q. 

said that basically I can’t tell you what is I.Q. is because he appears to be attempting to fake the results to this test to possibly 

get an advantage. I think that is indicative that perhaps he was 

not mentally retarded. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Chairman, I would ask if we could supplement the record subsequently with information regarding this 

individual. 

Chairman LEAHY. Yes. In fact, the record will remain open for 

a week and further questions from Senators can be submitted until 

Thursday, July 5. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me ask you one other question, sir, about 

this case. Isn’t it true that on the day you watched Mr. Adams die, 

his lead defense attorney at his trial was sitting in Federal prison? 

Mr. BRACKETT. I have no knowledge of that. I know Mr. Bruck, 

who is seated in the room here, was standing behind me. And I 

suppose that Mr. Bruck was involved in his defense, but I have no 

knowledge of who his defense counsel were at the various stages 

of the proceedings or where they might have been. I know that he 

was allowed to have one attorney in the chamber with him, and 

then ultimately Mr. Bruck stepped out of the chamber and was 

standing behind me. I assumed that he was the counsel for Mr. 

Adams. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Now, I would like to ask Beth Wilkinson and 

Stephen Bright, how do you respond to the argument that the fact 

that innocent people have been freed from death row is a sign that 

the system is working and that there is no need for the Innocence 

Protection Act and other legislation to ensure fairness? 

We will start with Ms. Wilkinson. 

Ms. WILKINSON. Well, just simply I think it is a red herring and 

really doesn’t get to the point that we are trying to get to today. 

The fact that the system somehow, through efforts of individuals 

like college journalism students or pro bono lawyers who come in 

72

at the last minute and find that there are facts, obvious facts in 

some cases, that would free individuals like Mr. Graham, only tells 

me that with more diligence and better representation, we will find 

that there are more of these problems, not less. 

So I don’t understand the argument that somehow, because the 

system has thankfully freed people like Mr. Graham, it is working 

properly. I don’t think anyone sitting here today believes that these 

stories of sleeping counsel, drunk counsel, or lack of investigation, 

lack of mitigating evidence is something any of us should be proud 

of. We shouldn’t here one of those stories in capital litigation. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Bright? 

Mr. BRIGHT. Well, I would just echo that. I think somebody 

spending 16 years on death row for a crime they didn’t commit is 

not an example of the system working. I think when undergraduate 

journalism students—and I should have pointed out when I talked 

about Anthony Porter that he was the third person freed from Illinois’ death row by the journalism students, not by the police, not 

by the prosecution, not by defense lawyers, not by judges, but by 

journalism students who took this on as a class project. I would 

also point out that Illinois is a State that provides a much better 

quality of representation than a lot of the States in the Death Belt 

where so many people are sentenced to death. 

It has been suggested that the notion of an independent appointing authority would somehow be unusual. Florida, Tennessee, Kentucky—there are a number of States where the defense function is 

independent of the courts. In fact, we recently had hearings in 

Georgia where the public defenders in both Florida and Tennessee 

came and said the judges were relieved not to have that responsibility anymore. And the system was working a lot better; it was a 

real adversary system. So it is not true. 

The ABA standards say that the appointment function should be 

independent. In Illinois, for example, the Cook County public defender’s office has an excellent capital defender unit where people 

are represented by lawyers who really specialize and who know 

what they are doing, investigate the cases, and you don’t have 

these sorts of things happening. 

Not a single one of the 13 innocent people freed from death row 

in Illinois was represented by that public defender’s office. It shows 

what a difference and how fundamental counsel is. Counsel is the 

most fundamental because DNA doesn’t apply in the vast majority 

of cases. So what Senator Hatch was saying about DNA—in the 

small number of cases where there is biological evidence that is 

very helpful, but really what is fundamental is that people be adequately represented by real lawyers who know what they are 

doing. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank you for that. 

Mr. Chairman, I just have one more question, if I could. 

Chairman LEAHY. Go ahead. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Ms. Wilkinson, the Justice Department, as I 

pointed out, recently renewed its commitment to continue a study 

by the NIJ on racial and geographic disparities in the Federal 

death penalty system. 

As a former Federal prosecutor, were you troubled by the Justice 

Department’s September 2000 report on the Federal death penalty 

73

system that related to these issues of racial and geographic disparities, and do you support a thorough examination of these disparities to be conducted by the National Institute of Justice? 

Ms. WILKINSON. I do, and I am glad that finally this Justice Department has supported that, although belatedly, this new and 

more thorough investigation. I believe last year when the initial report came out, Ms. Reno and the rest of the Justice Department 

recognized that we needed a more thorough, extensive study. 

One of the recommendations that we put forward as the bipartisan Committee for the Death Penalty Initiative was to look at racial bias. People who are much more experienced than I am who 

have lived through the system in the 1950’s, 1960’s, 1970’s, former 

prosecutors and defense attorneys, all say they are very troubled 

by the history of racial bias in capital litigation. So I think it is 

something we should pursue vigorously and I am happy, although 

it is belated, that the Justice Department has authorized the study. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator Sessions? 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, Ms. Wilkinson, a study had already been 

done in great depth by Attorney General Reno, who opposes the 

death penalty herself, and this was just an additional study that 

focused, I think, on one additional aspect. Isn’t that correct? 

Ms. WILKINSON. That is part of it, but I don’t believe that the 

study was exhaustive. As you know, there are very few Federal defendants on death row, and so it makes a statistical study very difficult to pursue. And I think Ms. Reno and others determined that 

there was additional research that needed to be done, and I am 

sure most people—— Senator SESSIONS. And that is being done by General Ashcroft. 

But let me ask you, just basically on the death row and death penalty charges in Federal court, you have to do, as a prosecutor, a 

prosecutorial memorandum to the Department of Justice, and a 

committee reviews that for objectivity and fairness and legal soundness. Isn’t that correct? 

Ms. WILKINSON. Yes, that is right. 

Senator SESSIONS. The individual prosecutors don’t have that authority. 

Ms. WILKINSON. No, they don’t have the authority to make the 

ultimate decision, but obviously they are, with the Federal agents 

that are normally involved in the State, law enforcement agents, 

conducting the investigation, developing the facts that they would 

put forward in the memorandum. As we all know, prosecutors have 

extraordinary discretion, and that includes how they develop the 

case and present it to the Justice Department. 

Senator SESSIONS. One more thing, General Pryor and Mr. 

Eisenberg. You work on appeals, do you not, Mr. Eisenberg? 

Mr. EISENBERG. Yes, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. My question is simply this: do you have an 

opinion, Mr. Eisenberg, on generally what percentage of the appeals actually focus on guilt or innocence as a primary part of the 

appeal, and what percentage of the appeals focus on issues such as 

ineffective counsel or other issues of that kind? 

74

Mr. EISENBERG. In our capital cases, Senator, I would be surprised if it is even more than 1 or 2 percent. In fact, the Department of Corrections in Pennsylvania—— Senator SESSIONS. Only 1 or 2 percent focus on guilt or innocence? 

Mr. EISENBERG. On issues related to guilt or innocence. 

In Pennsylvania, the Department of Corrections wanted to take 

DNA samples from every death row inmate in the State. There are 

over 200. The lawyers for those defendants opposed that effort to 

have DNA samples taken from those death row inmates. We have 

only had one case in my experience, death penalty case, where the 

defense lawyers asked for DNA testing. We agreed to that testing. 

The testing was done by the defense and they then refused to turn 

over the results to us, as they had previously promised to do. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Pryor, is that somewhat consistent 

with your experience? 

Mr. PRYOR. Yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. You handle all the appeals in Alabama? 

Mr. PRYOR. We do, and some trials as well. I don’t know if I 

would characterize it as less than 1 percent, but it is a very small 

percentage. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I think in many of these cases 

lawyers defend them aggressively and it is a question of whether 

death should be the jury verdict or other questions. But for the 

most part, most cases that come to a trial of this kind, the guilt 

or the innocence of the defendant is pretty plain, almost undisputed. 

Chairman LEAHY. All those ‘‘guilty accused,’’ is that it, as a 

former Attorney General once said? 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, the evidence is overwhelming many 

times. I mean, sometimes the murders are committed, filmed by 

the cameras in the 7-Eleven store and things of that kind. 

Chairman LEAHY. I understand. Like you, I prosecuted my share 

of murder cases, and I think most prosecutors do want to make 

sure they are convinced in their own mind of the guilt of the accused, before they go pursue a charge. But we also know of a number of people on death row who were about to be executed. Suddenly somebody says, ‘‘Wait. We made a mistake’’. But it is usually 

not the prosecutor who says, ‘‘wait.’’ It is usually not the judge. 

Typically, it is somebody on the outside that makes that statement. 

This is a cause for worry. 

I will let his Mr. Eisenberg’s testimony speak for itself. But I 

would like to point out that it gives the impression that there are 

no problems. I read a very recent report by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts about Pennsylvania. Allow me to read this. 

In that report it says, ‘‘The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has 

long been widely regarded as having one of the worst systems in 

the country for providing indigent defense services. Indeed, Pennsylvania’s death penalty representation crisis has been recognized 

for years. As early as 1990, the Joint Task Force on Death Penalty 

Litigation in Pennsylvania warned of a problem of major proportions in the provision of legal representation to indigent death row 

inmates, and noted several series problems including the shortage 

of qualified counsel to assist inmates in State and Federal post-conVerDate Feb 1 2002 10:08 Sep 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\HEARINGS\81606.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
75

viction proceedings, the lack of standards governing the qualifications for capital counsel or the appointment of counsel at any stage 

of State capital proceedings, the lack of standards for the compensation of counsel, the lack of State funding for investigation of 

capital cases, and the lack of any mechanism for the identification 

and recruitment of qualified counsel. In the decade since the Task 

Force report, little in Pennsylvania has changed.’’ Mr. EISENBERG. Senator, I would like to comment on those points 

briefly. 

Chairman LEAHY. Of course. Please go ahead. 

Mr. EISENBERG. Well, thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. I would not present this material without giving you a chance to respond. 

Mr. EISENBERG. Thank you, Senator. Pennsylvania is a State 

where appointment of counsel standards funding is done at the 

county level rather than on a uniform statewide basis. So that report, when it referred to, for example, an absence of State standards, what it meant was not that there were no appointment standards; it meant that the standards are implemented at the county 

level rather than the State level. 

Let me tell you briefly about the standards for appointment of 

counsel in Philadelphia, which represents over two-thirds of the 

death penalty cases in the State. They were promulgated in 1991. 

To get appointed to a murder trial, any murder trial, since it could 

be capital, you have to have 5 years of trial or appellate criminal 

law experience. You have to have previously been the sole or lead 

counsel in 10 serious criminal jury trials. 

You have to have previously been the sole or lead counsel in at 

least one homicide case that went to verdict, or assisted in two 

homicide cases that went to verdict. And you have to have taken 

continuing legal education classes within the previous 2 years focusing on capital cases. You are then screened by a committee of 

defense lawyers in order to get on to the roster for appointment by 

the court. Those standards are well in excess of the standards that 

the Federal Government implemented for appointment of counsel 

in Federal death penalty cases. 

Chairman LEAHY. It is interesting, with those standards, that 

they still say the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has long been 

widely regarded as having one of the worst systems in the country 

for providing indigent defense services. Pennsylvania’s death penalty representation crisis has been recognized for years. 

Mr. EISENBERG. Based, Senator, on the technicality that those 

standards are implemented at the county level, and the Commonwealth is the Commonwealth, the State. The report that you mention makes no reference to the kind of protections that I have just 

outlined. It doesn’t dismiss them. It doesn’t say that they weren’t 

good enough. It just doesn’t talk about them. 

Chairman LEAHY. The executive summary of that report will be 

part of the record. 

General Pryor, is your office seeking execution of any people who 

have never had State or Federal post-conviction review of their 

cases? 

Mr. PRYOR. Well, in our earlier colloquy that we were not able 

to finish that Senator Feingold began——

76

Chairman LEAHY. That is why I wanted to give you a chance to 

respond. 

Mr. PRYOR. There are two cases where we have moved to set execution dates where, at least after the last conviction, there had not 

been—there had been, of course, the direct appeal process with an 

appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals. 

Chairman LEAHY. Was there any State or Federal post-conviction 

review? 

Mr. PRYOR. There had not been a Rule 32 proceeding in the State 

courts as to Mr. Arthur. There had been an evidentiary hearing 

and a Rule 32 as to Mr. Barber. There was no appeal taken from 

that, and neither filed a petition for a Federal writ of habeas corpus within the statute of limitations. They did so outside of the 

statute of limitations and Federal courts have stayed both of those 

executions. 

Chairman LEAHY. Let me ask you this, and then I will go back 

to that other question. Do you have any death row inmates in Alabama who are currently not represented by lawyers? 

Mr. PRYOR. That is a difficult thing for us and the prosecution 

to know. 

Chairman LEAHY. Are you aware of any death row inmates in 

Alabama who are currently not represented? 

Mr. PRYOR. I am aware that Brian Stevenson, who heads the 

Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama, sometimes claims that there 

are not attorneys for some inmates. 

Chairman LEAHY. Are you aware of any inmates on death row 

in Alabama who do not have lawyers? Are you aware of any? 

Mr. PRYOR. No, I am not, because I don’t represent inmates. 

Chairman LEAHY. Is it your understanding that all death row inmates in Alabama are represented? 

Mr. PRYOR. It is my understanding that all inmates on death row 

in Alabama can obtain counsel and have counsel appointed by the 

courts at all stages, including Rule 32 stages. 

Chairman LEAHY. Notwithstanding your earlier comment to me 

suggesting that if one went through a death penalty case as a defendant, one would have a pretty good understanding of the system—would it be fair to say that if you really wanted to file for 

post-conviction relief in State or Federal court, with the standards 

required in State and Federal court, you had better have a lawyer 

to do it for you, a lawyer who is competent in such post-conviction 

relief acts? 

Mr. PRYOR. I think the obsessions with Federal and State postconviction proceedings is a bad one. I think that we need to spend 

much more of our resources at the trial and direct appeals stage. 

Chairman LEAHY. I must be having a difficult time conveying my 

question to you, and it is probably my Vermont accent. I apologize 

for that. I don’t think you understand my question, so I will ask 

it again. 

Is it your understanding that if somebody wants to take a postconviction relief act remedy in State or Federal court that they are 

hampered at the very least in that effort unless they are represented by counsel who has some experience in that type of postconviction relief act? 

Mr. PRYOR. They are certainly assisted by counsel, Senator. 

77

Chairman LEAHY. Mr. Bright, what do you think? 

Mr. BRIGHT. I think having just any lawyer in town represent 

somebody in a death penalty case is sort of like if someone in town 

brain surgery and you say, well, we don’t have any brain surgeons 

in this town, but there is a chiropractor down the street, so we will 

just take this person down to the chiropractor and have him do the 

brain surgery. 

The Barber case is a good example of that, Mr. Chairman. Barber was given a local lawyer who had no idea what he was doing. 

The lawyer showed up for a little evidentiary hearing. He didn’t 

even file the notice of appeal. 

A few years ago, Mr. Chairman, the idea of a person not having 

a lawyer during the post-conviction process and being executed because they were too poor to afford a lawyer would have been unthinkable, absolutely unthinkable. Now, we have got two people, 

and there are more in the pipeline in Alabama, who have missed 

the statute of limitations. Or in Barber’s case, the lawyer shows up 

for this hearing, doesn’t file a notice of appeal, and then misses the 

Federal statute. So this fellow has no post-conviction review at all. 

That is unthinkable in any system that says we are going to have 

equal justice. If he had been a person of means, he would have had 

State post-conviction review and he would have had Federal postconviction review. 

I agree there is a need to provide lawyers at trial for people, and 

the quality of representation at trial is a scandal and something 

has to be done about it and this bill is a small first step toward 

that. But people have to be represented all the way through this 

process if this system is going to be fair. 

I will give you another example, Walter McMillan, the innocent 

man who was freed in Alabama by Brian Stevenson, first with our 

office and then with the Equal Justice Institute. Walter McMillan 

would have never been freed if he had not had post-conviction review. Brian Stevenson got his case. He proved that Walter was in 

another community at the time the crime took place, and he was 

ultimately exonerated and released from death row after a number 

of years. 

Mr. Chairman, one other thing that I just think is important to 

point out here. Brian Stevenson’s office, the Equal Justice Institute, and our office, the Southern Center for Human Rights, receive 

no State or Federal money. We simply are there providing representation to people because there are people that desperately 

need legal assistance that don’t have any other source of it. 

The lawyers from law firms that provide pro bono assistance are 

recruited by the American Bar Association or by our office to provide that representation, but none of these people are paid anything. The State of Alabama has no system for providing people, 

and some people that we represent or the firms represent do get 

good representation. Many other people don’t get any representation at all, and that is just a cruel lottery that says that one person, because their number comes up, gets competent legal representation, and the next person the statue of limitations expires 

on because they are not represented at all. 

Chairman LEAHY. Mr. Pryor, I don’t want you to feel that you 

were treated unfairly. Did you want to respond to that? 

78

Mr. PRYOR. Whenever Stephen speaks, there are so many things 

I would like to respond to, but the notion that Walter McMillan 

would have been executed had he not had post-conviction proceedings is not true. His conviction was overturned in the direct 

appeal stage, in the first level of review, where we ought to spend 

most of our considerable resources in this system, and do. 

Chairman LEAHY. Do you disagree with the article in the New 

York Times which said the lack of appeals lawyers in Alabama is 

one reason the State has the fastest growing death row in the 

country and the second largest number of condemned prisoners per 

capita? 

Mr. PRYOR. Yes, I disagree, and I was, I think, quoted in that 

article. 

Chairman LEAHY. I would note in the article that you were 

quoted as saying the State should increase the money paid to trial 

lawyers for indigent defendants, which is consistent with what you 

have said here. 

Mr. PRYOR. Right, trial and direct appeals. 

Chairman LEAHY. I understand, and I will put that article in the 

record. 

Well, General Pryor and Senator Ellis and Mr. Bright and Mr. 

Graham and Mr. Eisenberg and Ms. Wilkinson and Mr. Brackett, 

we have kept you here a long time. I appreciate you being here. 

I realize we have gone back and forth with some of you, and I am 

sure each of you can think of other things you would like to say. 

I will keep the record open for a week. I will keep it open to Senators for additional questions until Thursday, July 5. 

I think everybody agrees that there is a need to have evidence 

of all kinds available to both the prosecution and the defense. I 

think there is a need to have standards for competent counsel 

throughout the country. 

When I prosecuted cases I wanted the best counsel possible on 

the other side because I didn’t want the case to be remanded 5 or 

6 years later for lack of competent counsel. Every prosecutor knows 

it is extraordinarily difficult to retry a case 5 or 6 years later. You 

want to get it right the first time. 

I hope that if any of you have further material you want to add, 

you will do so. If you feel that you were not given adequate time 

to answer any of the questions and want to add to your answers, 

feel free to do that. 

We have several statements that have been submitted for the 

record and we will include them in the record at this point. 

With that, we stand in recess. 

[Whereupon, at 1:06 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.] 

[Additional material is being retained in the Committee files.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Responses of Kevin S. Brackett to questions submitted by Senator Leahy 

Question 1: South Carolina law provides that ‘‘only attorneys who are licensed to 

practice in [South Carolina] and residents of [South Carolina] may be appointed by 

the court and compensated with funds appropriated to the Death Penalty Trial 

Fund in the Office of Indigent Defense.’’ S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16–3–26(1) and 17–3–

330(C). (A) Did you or anyone in your office support passage of this law? (B) Isn’t 

79

the effect of this law to prevent poor defendants who are on trial for their lives from 

getting the best lawyer available? 

Answer 1:

(A) Neither I nor anyone in my office lobbied for passage of this law. I do not 

recall being aware of the law until some time after its’ enactment. 

(B) I believe that for a South Carolina defendant on trial for a capital offense 

in South Carolina the ‘‘best lawyer available’’ would be a South Carolina lawyer. A 

South Carolina lawyer would be most familiar with the South Carolina rules of 

court and legal precedent, more in tune with the cultural background and temperament of the jurors, and more familiar with the judiciary of the state. 

The question is troubling because it has two false premises:

First, the questioner seems to assume that indigent capital defendants are 

entitled to have the modern equivalent of Clarence Darrow represent them. 

The Constitution does not require this and the public purse cannot afford 

it. An indigent capital defendant is not entitled to more than a non-indigent, middle-class capital defendant. 

My second problem with this question is the implication that the ‘‘best lawyer available’’ couldn’t possibly come from the South Carolina bar. On behalf of my many very talented friends in the South Carolina criminal defense bar I take exception to this assumption.

Question 2: Does South Carolina’s ‘‘5-year/3-year’’ standard for counsel in capital 

cases prevent the appointment of attorneys with no experience, training, or background in capital defense litigation? 

Answer 2:

The standard makes no comment on the need for experience in capital litigation. 

It only requires a certain amount of experience in the trial of felony cases and a 

minimum length of time as a lawyer. 

I do not believe that mandating prior experience in capital cases is necessarily 

going to insure that a capital defendant will always get quality representation. Even 

the most brilliant attorney can have an off day. One of the finest and mast talented 

criminal defense lawyers I know has never tried a capital case yet I would prefer 

his service over two or three others I know that have tried several. 

One of the major problems I perceive as affecting indigent representation in South 

Carolina (capital and noncapital) is our Inability to attract and retain attorneys to 

serve in this area. Congress would strike a more effective blow by passing legislation that allows for student loan forgiveness for public defender’s and public prosecutors. Too many offices lose experienced and talented attomeys to the private sector because the attorney’s cannot afford to pay their student loans on the meager 

salaries offered. I have had many alumni of my office tell me that they would have 

stayed forever if they could only have afforded to. I suspect the public defenders experience the same problem.

Question 3: The South Carolina Bar has proposed standards for appointed counsel 

in capital cases, which the South Carolina Supreme Court has refused to adopt. The 

proposed standards would ensure that at least one of the lawyers have (a) experience as lead counsel in at least one capital case that was tried to verdict and sentence, or (b) experience as lead counsel in at least three non-capital murder cases 

which were tried to verdict, or (c) experience as lead counsel in at least nine felony 

cases that were tried to verdict. The proposed standards would also require both 

lawyers to have completed, within two years prior to appointment or to trial, specialized training in the defense of persons accused of—capital offenses, and ‘‘have 

demonstrated that level of knowledge, skill and commitment to the defense of indigent persons expected of defense counsel in capital cases.’’ Do you support or oppose 

these proposed standards? 

Answer 3:

I have no problem with that portion of the standard that delineates the trial experience necessary to defend a capital case. I do have a problem with the portion that 

requires specialized training and a ‘‘demonstrated. . .level of knowledge, skill and 

commitment. . .’’. I generally favor—standards in matters such as these but I think 

it is appropriate to require more specificity than vague assertions of minimum levels 

of competence that can later be interpreted to exclude all but a small handful of 

people. Or worse, later be interpreted to justify habeas relief because the hazy notion propounded hasn’t been satisfied. I would like to know what kind of training 

would be required and what criteria are used to determine whether someone satisfies the standard. Also, who decides when the standard has been met? 

As regards the requirement for specialized training, how can we require attorney’s 

to attend that class instead of another one? If only a small number of lawyers go 

to the class then the pool of qualified lawyers might be too small to draw from to 

80

1Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355 (1963). 2Michael K. Moore, The Status of Indigent Criminal Defense in Texas: A Survey of Texas 

judges (1999) (prepared for the State Bar of Texas Committee on Services to the Poor in Criminal Matters). 

allow for representation In all the capital cases that occur. This would result in 

backlogs and delayed justice for victims.

Responses of Stephen B. Bright to questions submitted by Senator Durbin 

f Question: Do you agree that there are disparities in resources available to prosecutors verses defenders? How would you recommend we address these disparities? 

Answer: I agree. There are vast disparities between the resources available to 

prosecutors and defenders. Legislatures tend to be very generous in appropriating 

money for prosecutors, law enforcement, crime laboratories, specialized units (such 

as prosecutors for domestic violence or drug courts), and loan forgiveness for law 

enforcement officers and prosecutors, but many state legislatures have been reluctant or even unwilling to provide funding for the defense of poor people accused of 

crimes. Congress contributes to this problem by providing for grants to the states 

for law enforcement without requiring that some of those funds be used to insure 

an adequate defense for the increasing number of people being prosecuted. For example, in many states not a single penny of Byrne Grants goes to the defense function. As a result, the disparities between the prosecution and defenders continue to 

grow. 

As Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy once pointed out, the poor person accused 

of a crime has no lobby. There is still great resistance by many states to the Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,1 guaranteeing a lawyer to poor 

people accused of crimes. Not only has there been insufficient funding for indigent 

defense, many states have yet to set up even a structure for providing indigent defense and to make the defense function independent of the judiciary. 

For example, Texas leaves indigent defense up to each of its 254 counties. Georgia 

leaves indigent defense up to each of its 159 counties. Funding for indigent defense 

comes primarily from the counties in those states and some others. The counties employ a hodgepodge of methods, ranging from contracting with individual lawyers 

who submit the lowest bid to represent indigents, to having judges appoint individual lawyers to cases and paying them modest—if not token—amounts, to setting 

up public defender offices. Thus, even the limited resources that are available are 

not efficiently utilized in many places because of the absence of any organization. 

In a survey of Texas judges, over half said that other judges they knew based their 

appointments to defend indigent defendants in part on whether the attorneys were 

political supporters or had contributed to the judge’s political campaign. Almost half 

of the judges with criminal jurisdiction admitted that an attorney’s reputation for 

moving cases quickly, regardless of the quality of the defense, was a factor that entered into their appointment decisions.2

The result is that in many states, prosecutors’ offices are staffed by full-time, 

trained and supervised lawyers who specialize in criminal law, and are supported 

by several law enforcement agencies. On the other hand, the poor may be defended 

by lawyers who may have had no training, may not even specialize in criminal law, 

may not know the law and may lack investigative and expert assistance. Many of 

these lawyers are forced to handle so many cases at one time that they can give 

only a few minutes to each client. This is not legal representation; this is a processing of people through the system. And it means that there is no system in place 

to provide an adequate defense to a capital case when one is brought. The same lawyers who are handling the cases of indigent defendants on a part time basis may 

be appointed to defend someone facing the death penalty. 

To address these disparities, elected officials and other leaders must recognize 

that indigent defense is essential to a fair and reliable determination of guilt and 

punishment. They must recognize the urgency of the situation: the courts are convicting innocent people and giving harsher punishments to people who are not adequately represented. Gideon v. Wainwright was not a ‘‘dream’’ or a ‘‘promise’’; it is 

a constitutional mandate. The routine violate of this mandate by the very institutions which are responsible for upholding the law undermines public confidence in 

the courts and the rule of law. Elected officials must provide leadership by standing 

up for fairness and the constitutional right to counsel without being afraid of being 

labeled ‘‘soft on crime.’’

81

Senator Durbin’s bill providing loan forgiveness is critical to reducing this disparity. I teach at three law schools—Yale, Harvard and Emory. Two—Harvard and 

Yale—have very large endowments and provide full loan forgiveness for students 

who take public interest jobs. We have graduates from Yale and Harvard law 

schools working at the Southern Center for Human Rights for $30,000 per year. But 

many other law schools have no loan forgiveness program and their graduates leave 

with huge debts than cannot be paid on a public interest salary. If we want to involve these graduates in achieving the goal of equal justice by being public defenders, they must be provided with loan forgiveness. 

In addition, any grants made by Congress to the states for law enforcement or 

prosecution purposes should include requirements that some of those funds be used 

to ensure an adequate defense and fair trial for those accused. 

Congress must recognize the failure of many states to provide structure for providing legal representation to the poor and the need for that structure to be independent of the executive and judicial branches. Grants, such as those provided for 

in the Innocence Protection Act, are needed to encourage states to establish the 

structure and provide for the independence of the lawyers appointed to defend the 

poor.

Responses of Stephen B. Bright to questions submitted by Senator Leahy 

f Question 1: During the hearing, Senator Sessions and Attorney General Pryor expressed—confidence in the ‘‘extraordinary review’’ given to Alabama’s capital convictions, and Senator Hatch stated that ‘‘the appellate system and our system for habeas review remain robust and entirely capable of identifying and rectifying instances of deficient legal representation.’’ Do you share these views of the review 

process? Please explain. 

Answer: The review provided on appeal and in post-conviction is neither ‘‘extraordinary’’ in any positive sense nor ‘‘robust and entirely capable of identifying and rectifying instances of deficient legal representation.’’ There are several reasons this is 

the case. 

First, the worse the legal representation at trial, the less review a case receives 

on appeal and in post-conviction proceedings. The failure of the trial lawyer to put 

on evidence or to protect the legal rights of the client will be deemed ‘‘waiver’’ of 

the right to present that evidence or assert that right in the review process. For 

example, Wallace Fugate was sentenced to death after a two-day trial in Georgia, 

in which he was represented by a lawyer who had never heard of Gregg v. Georgia, 

the case that upheld the current death penalty law in Georgia, Furman v. Georgia, 

the decision that declared the death penalty unconstitutional in 1972, or any other 

case. Not surprisingly, given this complete ignorance of the law, there was not a single objection during the entire two-day capital trial. There was no motions practice 

and no requests for jury instructions. Thus, no issues were preserved for review on 

appeal or in post-conviction proceedings. 

Second, the lawyer’s failure to present evidence at trial will not be corrected on 

appeal or in post-conviction review. For example, the jurors who condemned Horace 

Dunkins to die were never presented evidence that he was mentally retarded. Before Dunkins was executed by Alabama in 1989, a juror, upon learning that 

Dunkins was mentally retarded, said she would not have voted for the death sentence if she had known of his condition. She and other members of the jury had 

not been informed of this compelling mitigating circumstance because the lawyer assigned to defend Dunkins did not present school records or other evidence of his retardation. Dunkins was executed. 

Third, the representation provided on appeal is often provided by the same court 

appointed lawyer who defended the accused at trial. His lack of knowledge will be 

as fatal to the client on direct appeal as at trial. For example, the brief on direct 

appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court in the case of Larry Eugene Heath consisted 

of only one page of argument and cited only one case. It would not have received 

a passing grade in a first year legal writing class, or even a college (and perhaps 

high school) English class. The lawyer did not show up for oral argument. Nevertheless, the Alabama Supreme Court accepted this nonperformance as good enough; it 

did not appoint a new lawyer to brief the issues or to appear before the Court and 

argue a case involving whether a man would live or die. It simply affirmed. In postconviction proceedings, the courts held that all of the issues raised were precluded 

from review because they had not been raised at trial or on direct appeal. Larry 

Heath was executed by Alabama. 

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3Gibson v. Turpin, 513 S.E.2d 186 (Ga.1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 363 (1999). 4See Ex parte Skinner, No. 20,203–03 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 2,1998) (dismissed because petition filed one day late); Ex parte Smith, 977 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (petition dismissed because filed nine days late); Ex parte Colella, 977 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) 

(petition filed because 37 days late). 5 Ex parte Smith, 977 S.W.2d at 611. 

Fourth, a convicted person, even one condemned to death, has no right to a lawyer 

for state post-conviction proceedings. In Alabama, there are around 30 people condemned to death who have been unable to obtain post-conviction review because 

they have no lawyers. For some of them, the deadline for filing in both state and 

federal courts has expired, so they will get no post-conviction review at all, ‘‘robust’’ or otherwise. The State of Alabama has tried to execute two people in this situation. 

Although the courts granted stays in both cases, it is unclear whether either will 

receive any review. In Georgia, Exzavious Gibson, a man with an I.Q. in the 80s, 

was forced to represent himself in state post conviction proceedings because Georgia 

does not provide counsel at this stage of the process. Gibson’s evidentiary hearing 

started as follows:

The Court: Okay. Mr. Gibson, do you want to proceed? 

Gibson: I don’t have an attorney. 

The Court: I understand that. 

Gibson: I am not waiving my rights. 

The Court: I understand that. Do you have any evidence you want to put 

up? 

Gibson: I don’t know what to plead. 

The Court: Huh? 

Gibson: I don’t know what to plead. 

The Court: I am not asking you to plead anything. I am just asking you 

if you have anything you want to put up, anything you want to introduce 

to this Court. 

Gibson: But I don’t have an attorney.

Nevertheless, the court went ahead with the hearing. The state was represented 

by an Assistant Attorney General who specialized in capital habeas corpus cases. 

After his former attorney had been called as a witness against him, Gibson was 

asked if he wanted to conduct the cross-examination:

The Court: Mr. Gibson, would you like to ask Mr. Mullis any questions? 

Gibson: I don’t have any counsel. 

The Court: I understand that, but I am asking, can you tell me yes or no 

whether you want to ask him any questions or not? 

Gibson: I’m not my own counsel. 

The Court: I’m sorry, sir, I didn’t understand you. 

Gibson: I’m not my own counsel. 

The Court: I understand, but do you want, do you, individually, want to ask 

him anything? 

Gibson: I don’t know. 

The Court: Okay, sir. Okay, thank you, Mr. Mullis, you can go down.

Gibson tendered no evidence, examined no witnesses and made no objections. The 

judge denied Gibson relief by signing an order prepared by the Attorney General’s 

office without making a single change. The Georgia Supreme Court held that Gibson 

had no right to counsel and affirmed the denial of relief.3

Fifth, because Congress eliminated funding for the capital resource centers and 

post conviction defender organizations, even those who do have lawyers may not be 

represented by lawyers knowledgeable in the areas of criminal, capital and post-conviction law. For example, some of those condemned to die in Texas could not have 

done any worse had they represented themselves than they did with the lawyers 

assigned to them by the Texas courts after the Texas Resource Center, which had 

employed lawyers specializing in capital post-conviction litigation, was closed due to 

the elimination of federal funding. 

Many of the lawyers assigned by the courts have lacked experience and expertise 

in post-conviction litigation. Several have missed deadlines for filing their applications, thereby forfeiting any post-conviction review.4 In refusing to consider one untimely application, the court noted that the ‘‘screamingly obvious’’ intent of the 

Texas legislature in setting a time limit has been ‘‘to speed up the habeas corpus 

process.’’ 5 Judge Charles Baird took issue with the majority’s conclusion that ‘‘speed 

should be [the court’s] only concern when interpreting the statute,’’ and argued in 

dissent that the court had failed ‘‘to accept [its] statutory responsibility for appointing competent counsel.’’ Judge Morris Overstreet, also dissenting, said the court’s 

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6See Ex parte Kerr, 977 S.W.2d 585, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 7 Kerr v. Johnson, Order of Feb. 24,1999 at 20 (W. D. Tex. No. SA–98–CA–151–OG (Feb. 24, 

1999). Further discussion of this and other similar examples is contained in Elected Judges and 

the Death Penalty in Texas: Why Full Habeas Corpus Review by Independent Federal Judges 

IsIndispensable to Protecting Constitutional Rights, 78 Texas Law Review 1805 (2000), (also 

available at www.schr.org under ‘‘Articles and Reports ’’). 8For numerous examples, please see Bright & Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 Boston University 

Law Review 759, 803–811 (1995) (also available at www.schr.org under ‘‘Articles and Reports 

’’). 

9 I have elaborated on these points in a lecture, Is Fairness Irrelevant? The Evisceration of 

Federal Habeas Corpus Review and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to Protect Fundamental 

Rights, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1997) (also available at www.schr.org under ‘‘Articles and 

Reports’’). 10 Burdine v. Johnson, 231 F.3d 950, 965 (5th Cir. 2000), vacated and rehearing en banc ordered, 234 F.3d 1339 (5th Cir. 2000). 

action ‘‘borders on barbarism because such action punishes the applicant for his lawyer’s tardiness.’’

Ricky Eugene Kerr was assigned an attorney who had been in practice for only 

two years, had never tried or appealed a capital case even as assistant counsel, and 

had suffered severe health problems that kept him out of his office in the months 

before he was to file a habeas corpus application on behalf of Kerr. The lawyer so 

misunderstood habeas corpus law that, as he later admitted, he thought he was precluded from challenging Kerr’s conviction and sentence—the very purpose of a postconviction petition. As a result, the lawyer filed a perfunctory application that failed 

to raise any issue attacking the conviction. Even though prosecutors did not object 

to a stay, the Court of Criminal Appeals denied Kerr’s motions for a stay of execution and for the appointment of competent counsel.6 Judge Overstreet, warning that 

the court would have ‘‘blood on its hands,’’ dissented in order to ‘‘wash [his] hands 

of such repugnance,’’ saying: 

For this Court to approve of such and refuse to stay this scheduled execution is a farce and travesty of applicant’s legal right to apply for habeas relief. It appears that the Court, in approving such a charade, is punishing 

he applicant, rewarding the State, and perhaps even encouraging other attorneys to file perfunctory ‘‘non-applications.’’ Such a ‘‘non-application’’ certainly makes it easier on everyone—no need for the attorney, the State, or 

this Court to consider any potential challenges to anything that happened 

at trial.

United States District Judge Orlando L. Garcia found that the appointment of the 

inexperienced lawyer with serious health problems to represent Kerr ‘‘constituted a 

cynical and reprehensible attempt to expedite [Kerr’s] execution at the expense of 

all semblance of fairness and integrity.’’ 7

Sixth, state court judges are elected and, in many cases, will be signing their own 

political death warrants if they grant relief in a capital case. In Alabama, state 

court judges typically allow the Attorney General’s office to write the order denying 

relief. The judges sign these orders no matter how one-sided they may be.8

Seventh, as the members of this Committee know, not long after eliminating funding for the resource centers, Congress passed the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996, which placed new, unprecedented restrictions on habeas corpus 

review, including a one-year statute of limitations, and limits the power of federal 

courts to conduct evidentiary hearings and to grant the writ even when constitutional violations are shown.9

What is ‘‘extraordinary’’ about the review is that constitutional error—no matter 

how egregious—is often not corrected because of procedural barriers, impossible burdens and other impediments to the review. The starkest example are the three cases 

out of one city, Houston, in which defense lawyers slept during capital trials. All 

three have been upheld, although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 

is reconsidering one of those cases en banc. In that case, a panel of the court held 

that Calvin Budine was not denied his right to counsel even though his lawyer slept 

through various parts of a trial that lasted only 18 hours.10 But even if the full 

court reverses the panel, the fact that 14 federal judges are agonizing over whether 

this violates the Constitution speaks volumes about what passes for sufficient 

lawyering in capital cases. The same lawyer who represented Burdine, also represented Carl Johnson and slept during Johnson s trial. There will be no relief for 

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11See David R. Dow, The State, the Death Penalty, and Carl Johnson, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 691, 

694–95 (1996), for a full description of the case. Neither the state nor federal courts published 

an opinion in the case.

Carl Johnson. After appellate and post-conviction review, he was executed on September 19, 1995.11

Question 2: The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 created 

incentives for states to set up procedures for the appointment, compensation and 

payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel in state post-conviction proceedings brought by indigent death row inmates. In your experience, has the 

AEDPA done anything to improve the quality of representation in these proceedings? 

Answer: No. For the most part, states have not adopted the incentives, such as 

providing counsel in state-postconviction proceedings, because the other provisions 

of the AEDPA are so favorable to the states and so limit review, that they can take 

advantage of the limits of the Act without doings things like providing or compensating counsel and litigation expenses.

Question 3: Attorney General Pryor suggested in his testimony that it would be 

unprecedented for the capital defense function to be independent of the state courts, 

as is proposed by the Innocence Protection Act. Please provide some examples of jurisdictions that use independent appointing authorities to select lawyers for death 

penalty cases. Are you aware of any jurisdiction in which an independent appointing 

authority impeded the prosecution of capital murder cases by setting performance 

standards and attorney qualifications unreasonably high? 

Answer: In New York, the capital defender is appointed by a board made up of 

three people, one appointed by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, one by the 

Temporary President of the Senate and one by the Assembly Speaker. The person 

selected as capital defender operates art office that specializes in the defense of capital cases at trial, funded at about $4.5 million. The lawyers in that office usually 

represent those facing death. However, it also selects and trains private lawyers 

who defend capital cases when there are multiple defendants or the capital defender 

office is unable to represent the accused for some other reason. The person designated as capital defender decides which lawyer is to represent a person facing the 

death penalty and it has been very effective in promptly getting counsel for those 

facing the death penalty. 

There are similar models in other states, although it may be that the public defender, who is appointed by a board or other authority, designates a person to direct 

the capital trial unit and assign lawyers within that unit to defend people facing 

the death penalty. For example, Colorado has an excellent capital trial unit that operates within its state-wide public defender system. The Cook County Public Defender in Chicago has an excellent homicide unit that defends capital cases, as does 

a similar unit in the office of the Philadelphia Public Defender. North Carolina recently passed legislation providing for a state-wide public defender system, governed 

by a board of directors. The public defender assigns lawyers to defend capital cases. 

In Florida and Tennessee, public defenders are elected within the judicial circuits. 

The elected public defender decides who within the office will represent a person 

facing the death penalty. (Judge may still appoint lawyers to cases which are not 

handled by the public defender.) 

This list is certainly not exhaustive, but it shows that representation provided by 

an independent defender program is not at all uncommon. 

I am not aware of any jurisdiction in which an independent authority impeded 

the prosecution of capital cases by setting performance standards and attorney 

qualifications unreasonably high. Quite to the contrary, the offices with which I am 

familiar have done an outstanding job in recruiting qualified lawyer to defend capital cases, in training other lawyers, and in serving as a resource to lawyers defending capital cases. 

One witness at the hearing mentioned the delay in providing lawyers for capital 

appeals in California, but appointments are handled by the California Supreme 

Court, not an independent appointing authority. 

If there are any additional questions, I will be glad to answer them.

Response of Rodney Ellis to a question submitted by Senator Leahy 

f Question: In Texas and many other states, the level of funding available to counsel for indigent defendants is woefully inadequate. There may be caps on the total 

85

amount available per case, resulting in minimum-wage levels of compensation. 

There are often limits to the amount that can be spent on expert witnesses. You 

struggled with this issue in negotiations over the Texas Fair Defense Act. How do 

you recommend that we address this issue, which is critical to ensuring that real 

criminals are convicted, but is always a politically unpopular expenditure of state 

funds? 

Answer: It is critical that compensation of appointed defense attorneys is increased, as well as compensation for expert fees and investigations. But it is also 

true that it is a politically unpopular expenditure. Some states have done much better than others at striking a balance between defense and prosecution costs. I think 

it is important to view defense costs as part of the entire criminal justice system 

that the states are sustaining. And part of that system, as the question points out, 

aims to convict the right persons and acquit the wrong ones. There must be a reasonable fee structure if we wish to minimize unfairness in the system and prevent 

innocent people from being convicted. While we do not necessarily expect to achieve 

parity between the prosecution and the defense, Texas has taken a big step in recognizing that funds are needed to shore up a sagging system. 

Before the passage of the Fair Defense Act, Texas was one of only four states that 

put no state money into its indigent criminal defense system. Because Texas does 

not have a unified court system or a statewide prosecution unit, the counties are 

seen as the focal points of the criminal justice system in the state. As a result, there 

was no state mandate or set of requirements for how counties or local judges could 

adequately compensate attorneys that represented indigent clients. 

The Texas Fair Defense Act maintains the local control aspect of the indigent 

criminal defense systems in Texas, but requires the judges of each county to come 

together to devise a fee schedule that takes into account ‘‘reasonable rates.’’ Each 

fee schedule is to take into consideration ‘‘reasonable and necessary overhead costs 

and the availability of qualified attorney willing to accept the stated rates.’’ In essence, the law will allow each county to come up with a reasonable fee schedule that 

takes into account local conditions. A judge has the ability to disapprove an attorney’s fee request, but the judge must make written findings stating the amount approved and the reason for disapproving the requested amount. 

The modest amount of money (about $20 million) that the state put into the Fair 

Defense Act will be used to supplement county expenditures for indigent defense 

services. If counties can demonstrate that the services that they are providing (i.e. 

more timely appointment of counsel, fairer system of appointment, more investigative services) actually make their system of indigent criminal defense better, then 

those counties will be eligible to receive the supplemental state money. 

I believe that any federal legislation that addresses the issue of indigent defense 

must recognize the diverse systems throughout the country. I think that any legislation should provide as much local control and flexibility as possible. We must, however, attempt to ensure that attorneys are adequately compensated so that we can 

expect and maintain quality services. 

To ensure that the real criminals are convicted, it is important that attorneys who 

agree to take on indigent clients have the training and experience necessary to properly defend their clients. In Texas we were able to put some state money into the 

Court of Criminal Appeals to strengthen the training programs that are provided 

by the criminal defense bar. More importantly, though, the Task Force on Indigent 

Defense will be responsible for bringing consistency, quality control, and accountability to all aspects of indigent defense practices in Texas. 

I would hope that any federal legislation would contain an oversight committee 

or board that would be responsible for making sure that the provisions of the bill 

are adhered to. Oversight of indigent defense practices will help ensure that individuals are not wrongfully convicted.

Responses of William H. Pryor, Jr. to questions submitted by Senator 

fDurbin 

Question: In Illinois, Governor Ryan declared a moratorium on the death penalty 

after 13 death row accused were found to be innocent during the same time that 

12 people were executed by the state. How can you be so certain of a system which 

fails so often when the most severe punishment is involved? 

Answer: Senator, I do not purport to be an expert regarding the Illinois system 

of capital punishment and the problems that led Governor Ryan to declare a moratorium. I do not know the details of each of the cases upon which your question is 

86

based and you have provided none. If recent articles regarding the subject in the 

Chicago Tribune are accurate, I would not dispute the existence of problems within 

that system. I disagree, however, that the existence of corruption, incompetence, and 

malfeasance in your state—and, in fact, primarily within a single county of your 

state—constitutes a legitimate basis upon which to enact comprehensive national 

legislation. Governor Ryan has, as you note in your question, suspended executions 

in Illinois and steps are being taken, within the state government, to remedy the 

problems. 

This committee should additionally consider the underlying basis of your question 

in the context of the proposed legislation. Leaving aside the DNA aspect of the proposed act—indeed, the release of death row inmates due to DNA technology refutes 

the need for federal legislation mandating such testing—the rationale for the competency requirements, as I stated in my prior testimony, is flawed. Senator Durbin, 

as you are no doubt aware, many of the problems in your state are not a result of 

the quality of representation received by death row inmates. Rather, they are a result of corruption and malfeasance of some law enforcement officers of Chicago. 

‘‘Charges of police misconduct—from manufacturing evidence to concealing information that could help clear suspects—are central to at least half of the 12 Illinois 

cases where a man sentenced to death was exonerated.’’ (Steve Mills and Ken Armstrong, ‘‘A tortured path to Death Row,’’ The Chicago Tribune, November 17, 1999); 

see also Maxwell v. Gilmore, 37 F.Supp.2d 1078, 1094 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (‘‘It is now 

common knowledge that in the early to mid-1980s Chicago Police Commander Jon 

Burge and many officers working under him regularly engaged in the physical 

abuse and torture of prisoners to extract confessions. ’’) It simply does not make 

sense to base national legislation mandating competency of counsel requirements on 

wrongful convictions that did not result from inadequate representation. 

Any problems of competency that do exist in Illinois, may be attributable to the 

fact that your state has had no requirements regarding the appointment of counsel 

in a capital case. Again, to rely upon competency problems in Illinois as a basis 

upon which to enact national legislation is dubious, especially considering the fact 

that your state is taking steps to improve this aspect of its capital litigation process. 

According to the Chicago Tribune ‘‘a study committee created by the Illinois Supreme Court submitted a report recommending establishment of a capital litigation 

trial bar that would mandate minimum standards for both prosecutors and defense 

attorneys.’’ (Ken Armstrong and Steve Mills, ‘‘Inept defenses cloud verdict,’’ Chicago 

Tribune, November 15, 1999) Unlike Illinois, however, Alabama has no need for 

such mandatory minimum requirements as they already exist. Specifically, pursuant 

to Ala. Code section 13A–5–54 (1975), appointed counsel in a capital case must have ‘‘no less than five years’ prior experience in the active practice of criminal law.’’ Moreover, in almost every instance, two attorneys are appointed to represent an individual charged with capital murder—at least one having met the statutory requirement quoted above. 

Legislation aimed at setting national standards for defense counsel in capital 

cases, therefore, seeks to remedy a problem that, at least in my State, does not 

exist. Since 1990, only two Alabama capital cases have been reversed due to a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel, despite the fact that such claims are raised 

in essentially every death penalty case without any apparent regard for the existence of merit. Additionally, in most instances, such claims are directed at all conceivable aspects of the representation received. The quality of the attorneys, including their level of experience, appears to be irrelevant to those asserting such claims 

on behalf of death row inmates. For example, my office has routinely had to defend 

the representation provided by the Equal Justice Initiative—an organization that is 

opposed to the death penalty in all circumstances and almost exclusively represents 

death row inmates on appeal—during post-conviction proceedings against claims of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The lawyers for the Equal Justice Initiative have even made claims of ineffective assistance of appellant counsel and attacked the quality of a brief actually ghost written for another attorney by members 

of their own office. 

Moreover, the extremely low percentage of cases being overturned during postconviction review in Alabama is not due to incompetent representation at that stage 

of the process. Indeed, many of the individuals on Alabama’s death row are represented by some of the most prestigious law firms in the country. These firms allot 

enormous resources and monies to the case. Rather, the low percentage of cases reversed on post-conviction in Alabama is due to fact that—despite the existence of 

a fair trial, quality representation, and significant resources—the defendants are 

guilty of heinous crimes. The legal representation received by those charged with 

capital murder is not, as a general matter, inadequate. I am well aware that many 

on the other side of this issue strongly disagree with this statement. I would ask 

87

the Committee to keep in mind, however, that, for the most part, these are the same 

individuals who contend that every resident of Alabama’s death row is a victim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, and their contentions are routinely rejected by 

state and federal courts. As Attorney General, I acknowledge that incompetent representation on some rare occasions infects the capital litigation process. The extensive review process applied to death penalty cases is, however, more than adequate 

to identify those few and far between cases where such has occurred. 

Finally, the release of 13 men from death row in Illinois does not change the fact 

that no credible evidence exists that an innocent individual has been executed since 

the reinstatement of the death penalty. Rather, it demonstrates that, when credible 

evidence of innocence does exist, an inmate is given a forum to present that evidence and it is taken seriously by the courts. Although I certainly acknowledge the 

tragedy that occurs when any innocent individual is convicted of a crime, it appears 

that the State of Illinois is attempting to remedy the problems that resulted in the 

wrongful convictions referenced within your question. 

It is my hope that the Innocence Protection Act of 2001 is well intentioned and 

not driven by death penalty abolitionists as a means of achieving what they candidly admit is their ultimate goal. As stated during my previous testimony I am, 

however, concerned that the independent appointing authority created by this legislation will be staffed by attorneys who oppose capital punishment in all circumstances. For example, Stephen Bright, who testified before this Committee, is 

one such attorney who might be considered for placement on the appointing authority due to his perceived expertise in the area of capital defense. I again ask that 

the Committee not lose sight of the truly innocent, the families of victims of capital 

murderers and the future victims of those murders who either escape justice or are 

not deterred by a system that fails to punish swiftly and adequately the most heinous crimes in our society.

Responses of William H. Pryor, Jr. to questions submitted by Senator 

fLeahy 

Question 1: In your testimony, you stated that after a direct appeal in state court, 

an appeal to the United States Supreme Court is part of the process in death penalty cases. In Alabama, who is responsible for making sure that certiorari petitions 

for death row prisoners are properly prepared and timely filed at the United States 

Supreme Court on direct appeal? What state resources are allocated to fund this responsibility? 

Answer: Although filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Court 

after a direct appeal in state court is part of the process in death penalty cases, it 

is not considered a state court appeal. No state resources, therefore, are allocated 

to pay an attorney to file such a petition. As this Committee knows, the United 

States Supreme Court receives many thousands of such petitions in a given year 

and grants certiorari in less than one hundred cases. This proceeding is, however, 

before a federal court and no state resources are allocated by the state legislature 

to represent a death row inmate in a federal court. A conviction is considered to be 

final in state court upon the certificate of judgment being issued pursuant to Rule 

41 of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure. The filing of a petition for writ of 

certiorari in the United States Supreme Court is a discretionary review that takes 

place after the state courts have entered the certificate of judgment. No state resources are available to pay lawyers to file a discretionary appeal in a federal court.

Question 2: Under Alabama law, it appears that considerable time and resources 

must be spent before filing a state postconviction petition. To satisfy Alabama’s 

pleading requirements, new facts must be investigated, legal research must be conducted, and witnesses must be interviewed. Who is responsible for providing death 

row prisoners with lawyers to do the work necessary before a petition is filed? What 

state resources are allocated to this function? 

Answer 2: In Alabama, a death row inmate can file a post-conviction petition 

under Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. The issues typically litigated in a Rule 32 petition are allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and 

allegations that the prosecutor suppressed evidence. Your question assumes that it 

takes considerable time and resources to prepare a post-conviction petition. I do not 

necessarily agree with that assumption. 

As I stated in my testimony before this Committee, the trial of the defendant is 

the main event, and state post-conviction proceedings are collateral to the trial. 

State post-conviction proceedings, among other things, determine whether the inVerDate Feb 1 2002 10:08 Sep 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\81606.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
88

mate failed to receive the effective assistance of counsel. It does not necessarily take 

‘‘considerable time and resources’’ to formulate a Rule 32 petition as your question 

suggests. A lawyer who represents a death row inmate in state collateral proceedings should read the transcript of the trial so that a determination can be made 

whether any issues regarding trial counsel’s performance should be raised. In preparing a petition, the postconviction lawyer should also consult with the inmate and 

ask what the inmate told trial counsel regarding any possible guilt-phase defense. 

Hypothetically speaking, if the inmate told his trial counsel about an alibi defense 

that turned out not to have been properly investigated, then post-conviction counsel 

should certainly raise that issue in a postconviction petition. The same is true for 

any matters relating to the penalty phase of a capital proceeding. This type of investigation should not take a considerable amount of time. 

Your question also assumes that Alabama’s pleading requirements require that 

‘‘new facts must be investigated, legal research must be conducted, and witnesses 

must be interviewed.’’ Alabama’s pleading requirements for state post-conviction petitions only require that each claim be pleaded with full disclosure of the facts underlying that claim. It is, therefore, incorrect to assume that Alabama’s pleading requirements require what your question suggests. That is not to say that new evidence (if there is any) should not be investigated or that legal research should not 

be done. This can be done, however, by the postconviction lawyer reading the transcript of the trial and talking to the inmate and also to the trial counsel to determine what claims can be raised in a state post-conviction petition. 

Even though little compensation ($1000 per case) is paid for representing a death 

row inmate during Rule 32 proceedings in the trial court, the reality is that death 

row inmates are typically represented by large out-of-state law firms and death penalty resource centers. (In addition to the legal compensation, $5000 per case is available for expert witnesses per case in the Rule 32 trial court.) These law firms and 

resource centers typically present evidence during Rule 32 proceedings in an effort 

to show that trial and appellate counsel were constitutionally ineffective. Despite 

having more financial resources than my office has, they have had little success in 

proving ineffective assistance of counsel. Since 1990, two death row inmates have 

received a new trial or penalty phase based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. 

My office still has an appeal pending in one of these two cases. It is remarkable 

that, in all of the cases litigated during the state and federal post-conviction stages 

by these large out-of-state law firms and death penalty resource centers, they have 

established, in only two instances, that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective.

Question 3: If a death row prisoner files a state postconviction petition (Rule 32) 

which fails to allege new claims (claims that could not have been raised at trial or 

on appeal), or fails to allege facts with adequate specificity, does your office take 

the position that such petitions should be dismissed? 

Answer 3: The first part of the question asks whether my office seeks to dismiss 

a petition that fails to allege new claims which the question defines as ‘‘claims that 

could not have been raised at trial or on appeal.’’ I understand this part of the question asking whether my office seeks to dismiss a claim that alleges newly discovered 

evidence. Rule 32.1(e)(1)–(5) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure lists five 

requirements that a Rule 32 petitioner must establish before evidence is considered 

to be newly discovered. The fifth element is that the newly discovered evidence establish innocence or that he should not have received a death sentence. As long as 

a Rule 32 petitioner pleads a claim alleging newly discovered evidence with the factual specificity required by the Rules of Criminal Procedure my office does not seek 

dismissal of that claim due to deficient pleading. 

The second part of this question asks whether my office seeks dismissal of a claim 

that ‘‘fails to allege facts with adequate specificity.’’ The answer to that question is 

an emphatic yes. The Rules of Criminal Procedure require that each claim state the 

full factual basis. If a claim does not comply with these rules that were promulgated 

by the Alabama Supreme Court, then my office seeks a dismissal. Because amendments to Rule 32 petitions are freely allowed, even until the time of the final order, 

a Rule 32 petitioner can amend his petition to comply with the Rules by disclosing 

the factual basis for the claim. My office does not generally oppose such amendments as long as they are made in a timely fashion. It might interest this Committee to know that even petitions drafted by lawyers employed by death penalty 

resource centers, the socalled ‘‘experts’’ in capital case litigation, are routinely dismissed because of deficient pleading.

Question 4: If Alabama death row prisoners do not know how or where or when 

to file a state postconviction petition, who is responsible for making sure that such 

death row prisoners do not forfeit their rights by failing to properly or timely file 

a petition? What state resources are allocated to this function? 

89

Answer 4: The division of my office that handles capital appeals tells me that they 

have not received a truly pro se Rule 32 petition from a death row inmate. Therefore, even if it were true that a death row inmate may not know where or when 

to file a Rule 32 petition (I do not believe that statement), that fact is irrelevant 

because only lawyers representing death row inmates are filing the Rule 32 petitions. It has been my experience as Alabama’s Attorney General that prisoners, 

whether under a death sentence or under a sentence for a term of years, do not 

seem to have trouble finding a way to file pro se post-conviction petitions in state 

and federal courts. I reject any suggestion, however, that a Rule 32 petition should 

be filed in every capital case. This petition is often abused but is supposed to be 

reserved for extraordinary circumstances. Most Rule 32 petitions in capital cases are 

frivolous. 

Your question asks who is responsible for making sure that death row prisoners 

‘‘do not forfeit their rights’’ by failing to file a petition. First and foremost, the death 

row inmate is responsible for failing to file properly or timely a petition. The Equal 

Justice Initiative, a group of lawyers who represent death row inmates and are located in Montgomery, claim that they track every death penalty case. Presumably, 

they can counsel a death row inmate who may be facing a deadline to file either 

a state or federal post-conviction petition.

Question 5: (A) If death row prisoners file pro se state postconviction petitions and 

request counsel, does your office seek adverse rulings against the unrepresented 

death row prisoners before counsel is appointed? (B) Has your office ever filed a 

pleading which requested rulings adverse to a death row prisoner who was seeking 

counsel and who, at the time you filed the pleading against him, was proceeding 

pro se? 

Answer 5: As stated in my answer to question four, my office has not received a 

pro se petition from an Alabama death row inmate. My capital litigation division 

has received Rule 32 petitions that are signed only by the inmate which might lead 

one to believe they are pro se petitions. These petitions, however, are typewritten 

and number over 100 pages. I think we can all agree that such petitions were ghost 

written for the death row inmate by a lawyer, most likely one from an anti-death 

penalty activist group. The answer to the first part of your question, therefore, is 

that my office has not sought an ‘‘adverse ruling’’ against a pro se petitioner since 

there have been no true pro se petitioners. 

This fact is also true for the second part of the question since my staff is not 

aware of a death row inmate proceeding in a pro se fashion. In addition, the second 

part of your question asks whether my office will seek an ‘‘adverse ruling’’ against 

a pro se petitioner seeking counsel. Under Rule 32.7(c) of the Alabama Rules of 

Criminal Procedure, a death row inmate can request that counsel be appointed for 

the purpose of filing a Rule 32 petition. As long as this request is made within the 

two year statute of limitation period for filing such a petition, my office will not seek 

an ‘‘adverse ruling.’’

Question 6: Under Alabama law, attorneys representing inmates in state 

postconviction proceedings at the trial level are paid $40 an hour. The statutory cap 

on such compensation is $1,000. Do you think 25 hours is a reasonable amount of 

time for an attorney to spend working on a state postconviction case? 

Answer 6: As stated in previous responses, a lawyer representing a death row inmate should read the trial transcript and interview the death row inmate and the 

trial counsel to prepare a Rule 32 petition. In most cases, those tasks cannot be 

completed in 25 hours. In Alabama, however, death row inmates are represented by 

large out-of-state law firms and death penalty resource centers that have more resources than my office can provide. In a recent case, a Portland, Oregon law firm 

paid an investigator approximately $100,000 to investigate a case. It is fair to say 

that this investigator billed that law firm for more than 25 hours. Most of the Rule 

32 petitions received by my office very likely required more than 25 hours to prepare. One must keep in mind, however, that lawyers—who apparently feel the need 

to raise every conceivable issue without regard for merit—prepare the majority of 

these petitions. 

I recently attended a capital case symposium that was attended by both prosecutors and anti-death penalty activist lawyers and also judges from the state and federal bench. One of the speakers was a lawyer from Florida that represents death 

row inmates. In Florida, the taxpayers fund a state-wide office that provides representation to death row inmates at the state post-conviction level. This lawyer stated that on average it takes 2000 hours to prepare a post-conviction petition. In other 

words, this lawyer stated that it takes approximately one year to prepare a state 

post-conviction petition. From listening to the reaction of the audience in the room, 

it was apparent that everyone, with the exception of the anti-death penalty activist 

90

lawyers, was shocked by the statement that it takes a year to prepare a state postconviction petition. 

The main purpose of the state post-conviction proceeding is to determine whether 

trial and appellate counsel were constitutionally ineffective. This is the stage when 

anti-death penalty activist lawyers such as Stephen Bright, who testified before this 

Committee, become involved. The type of evidence that lawyers like Stephen Bright 

present do not support the argument that a considerable amount of time is necessary to litigate a post-conviction petition. In the typical Rule 32 case, lawyers such 

as Stephen Bright generally present evidence in an effort to show that trial counsel 

was ineffective at the penalty phase of the trial. This is the phase of the trial when 

the jury and the trial judge determine whether the defendant should be sentenced 

to life without parole or death. The evidence that is typically presented is testimony 

from family members who did not testify at the death row inmate’s trial. 

Additional evidence is also presented by a social worker who testifies about the 

family dynamics of the death row inmate. Additional evidence is usually presented 

by a psychologist who testifies about the mental health of the death row inmate. 

Lawyers such as Stephen Bright are usually unsuccessful in proving ineffective assistance of counsel. Since 1990, only two cases, one of which is still on appeal, have 

been reversed due to ineffective assistance of counsel. In any event, the reason for 

the detail in this answer is to show that a considerable amount of time is not ordinarily necessary to litigate a case on behalf of a death row inmate in the Rule 32 

trial court.

Question 7: In your testimony, you stated that you were not aware of any inmates 

on death row in Alabama who do not have lawyers. Can you confirm that every inmate on Alabama’s death row does have a lawyer? 

Answer 7: Generally speaking, when the direct appeal stage of review ends, there 

is some amount of time before a death row inmate is able to locate counsel. It is 

my understanding that the Equal Justice Initiative attempts to link the death row 

inmate with a death penalty resource center or an out-of-state law firm. As I stated 

in my testimony before this Committee, I am not aware of any death row inmate 

that does not have a lawyer. If a death row inmate does not have lawyer, however, 

they can request that one be appointed for them pursuant to Rule 32.7(c) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Again, I reject the notion that every capital murderer should file a Rule 32 petition. For those inmates who do not have a reasonable 

ground to seek collateral review of their sentence, they do not need a lawyer.

Question 8: The New York Times recently reported that dozens of prisoners on 

Alabama’s death row have no lawyers to pursue appeals. (See David Firestone, ‘‘Inmates on Alabama’s Death Row Lack Lawyers,’’ The New York Times, June 16, 

2001.) You indicated during the hearing that you were familiar with this article. Did 

it concern you? Has your office taken any steps to verify the information in the article or to remedy the situation? 

Answer 8: The New York Times article makes reference to 30 death row inmates 

not having lawyers to represent them in their collateral appeals. As stated previously, I do not have personal knowledge whether that is true or not. My staff, 

however, tells me that they are unaware of a death row inmate who is not presently 

represented by counsel. It is possible that a death row inmate who has completed 

the direct appeals process does not have a lawyer for a period of time before a Rule 

32 petition is filed. I was accurately quoted in this article regarding my opinion of 

post-conviction appeals: ‘‘These appeals are crucial only for Mondaymorning quarterbacks who try to second-guess things and create issues that were probably not real 

in the first place. It’s an abuse of the habeas corpus process to retry the case after 

it’s already been tried and appealed.’’

As an additional matter, the New York Times article erroneously implies that 

Christopher Barbour and Thomas Arthur, two inmates who were recently scheduled 

for execution, made a showing of factual innocence to the federal district judges who 

granted stays only hours before the scheduled execution. In the Barbour case, his 

lawyers requested DNA testing to show Barbour did not rape the victim, even 

though neither the State’s argument nor Barbour’s own confessions state that he 

raped the victim. I certainly disagree with any journalist who suggests that this 

claim raises reliable evidence of factual innocence. In the Arthur case, the federal 

district judge granted the stay only because Arthur’s counsel filed a habeas petition 

six days before the scheduled execution, which did not give the judge enough time 

to review the petition. The federal district judge in the Arthur case noted that he 

was skeptical of Arthur’s ability to meet the high burden imposed on a habeas petitioner who claims he is actually innocent. The federal district judge dryly noted that 

Arthur was making a claim of factual innocence despite the fact that he had been 

convicted three times by three separate juries. 

91

In the order granting a stay of execution, United States District Judge Edwin Nelson responded to the argument that Arthur would be the first person executed without being afforded collateral proceedings in federal court. Although much of Judge 

Nelson’s comments are directed specifically to the Arthur case, his words can also 

be applied to the argument that it is wrong to apply the federal statute of limitation 

to death row inmates seeking relief in federal court:

While this argument [that Arthur may become the first involuntary defendant to be put to death in Alabama without having the opportunity to litigate a federal habeas petition] has some appeal to the human side, in a society such as ours where the rule of law prevails, it is entirely irrelevant. 

The court cannot help but observe that the petitioner’s current predicament 

is largely of his own making. It was he who, having twice achieved reversals of prior convictions and death sentences who prevailed upon the trial 

judge to allow him to engage in some sort of hybrid representation at trial 

and on appeal. It was he who intentionally and affirmatively sought the 

death penalty once he was convicted because he believed as a death row 

inmate his living conditions would be better, he would have greater access 

to the law library, and his conviction would receive more intense scrutiny 

on appellate and, presumably, collateral review. There are far greater and 

more compelling reasons for reviewing the decision of the State of Alabama 

to take the life of one of its citizens than the foolish and seemingly manipulative conduct of that person or appeals to emotion by some acting in his 

behalf. It is exactly because we are a nation of laws with a Constitution 

that protects and defends the rights of even the hardest core, most foolish, 

and decadent criminals among us, that we apply the law evenly and stringently, even if it requires the execution of one who has not received the review that he might, in ordinary circumstances, be entitled to receive. Mr. 

Arthur will get the review from this court that the law entitles him to receive-not one bit less and not one bit more, and if he should eventually be 

executed, never having his conviction and sentence reviewed on federal collateral proceedings, it will be because the law and his failure to comply 

with its requirements disentitle him to such review. 

Arthur v. Haley, Order Granting Stay of Execution, at p.8 n.6, CV-O1-N00983-S. 

The New York Times article inaccurately claims that Congress passed habeas reform in 1996 because prisoners were winning too many lawsuits. In the legislative 

history of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), I 

do not see any reference to passing this legislation because prisoners were winning 

too many habeas cases. In fact, AEDPA does not prohibit a death row inmate from 

filing a habeas petition, but does limit, in most cases, an inmate to only one habeas 

petition and enacts a statute of limitation. The journalist’s statements are also refuted by the low number of cases that are being reversed in Alabama’s federal 

courts. Since 1990, only four inmates have received a new trial/penalty phase by 

federal courts reviewing a habeas petition.

Question 9: To effectively manage death penalty litigation in Alabama, cases must 

be monitored to determine when death row prisoners must file state and federal 

postconviction petitions to comply with applicable statutes of limitations. Should the 

State of Alabama assume responsibility for monitoring death penalty cases and for 

providing counsel to unrepresented death row prisoners so that there is an opportunity to comply with applicable statutes of limitations? 

Answer 9: No, the State of Alabama should not assume responsibility for monitoring death penalty cases. First, I would disagree with an underlying premise of 

this question, which assumes that counsel is necessary to have an opportunity to 

comply with the statute of limitations. The ‘‘pro se’’ petitions filed by death row inmates in Alabama are ghost written by lawyers from anti-death penalty activist organizations. In contrast, an overwhelming majority of the pro se petitions filed by 

non-capital inmates are truly pro se. Thus, it cannot be said that only inmates, 

whether on death row or not, need the assistance of counsel to avoid missing a statute of limitations deadline. 

Second, this question makes the additional assumption that all death row inmates 

should file state and/or federal post-conviction petitions. At least in the case of state 

post-conviction review, this assumption is not true. State post-conviction review is 

available for the purpose of raising the constitutional claim of whether trial counsel 

was effective in the Sixth Amendment sense. These proceedings are also available 

for claims concerning newly discovered evidence or concerning the jurisdiction of the 

trial court to oversee the original proceedings. These post-conviction appeals are not 

opportunities to retry a criminal case. 

92

The assumption that post-conviction petitions should be filed as a routine matter 

overlooks the mandatory legal presumption that trial counsel acted in a reasonable 

manner in defending a capital case. In its leading case on the subject of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that ‘‘a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the 

wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’’ Strickland v.—Washington, 466 

U.S. 688, 689 (1984). The reality is that ‘‘cases in which habeas petitioners can prevail [on ineffective assistance of counsel claims] are few and far between.’’ Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc). Thus, unless someone has 

already determined for themselves that the prevailing legal standards and presumptions governing the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis under the Sixth 

Amendment are erroneous, one cannot claim or maintain that post-conviction litigation is required in every single capital case. 

A further problem with this assumption is that it actually harms the interest of 

death row inmates. If one is to presume that the goal of our legal system is to ensure that qualified and competent attorneys accept appointments to represent indigent defendants (capital or otherwise), then attacking their competence, dedication, 

and decisionmaking as a matter of course after each lost case is a detrimental activity. Not only do attorneys have to devote their energies in an effort to save someone’s life, even in cases where the evidence is overwhelming and the crime is heinous, atrocious, and cruel and where the battle for a life without parole verdict is 

uphill all the way, they are subjected to all sorts of derogatory allegations years 

later during the post-conviction appeal. 

For example, Algert Agricola, a very highly skilled and prominent attorney in Alabama-he represented the former chief justice of the Alabama Supreme Court in a 

successful election contest, worked on a very high profile case involving the posting 

of the ten commandments in a circuit court courtroom, and was involved in litigation surrounding Alabama’s redistricting plan following the 1990 census-represented 

a defendant in a capital murder case where the defendant was ultimately sentenced 

to death for robbing an elderly woman, locking her in the trunk of her car in the 

middle of a parking lot on a 105 degree afternoon, and then leaving her there for 

twenty-four hours until the police found the car and recovered the body. In the subsequent Rule 32 proceedings, Agricola was subpoenaed to appear in court four different times. In several instances, he cleared his schedule to attend court, only to 

have the petitioner seek and gain a continuance at the last minute. He was contacted by lawyers for both the State and defense and had to devote time away from 

his practice to answer questions and prepare for the hearing, at which he had to 

defend himself from allegations of incompetence. Even worse, Agricola was subjected 

to the cursing, shouting, and derogatory fits of the capital inmate’s attorney during 

a six-hour deposition. Although Agricola’s treatment at the deposition was a rare 

occurrence, the remaining inconveniences caused by the Rule 32 proceedings are not 

likely to induce him to seek actively additional appointments to capital cases. 

Thus, anyone who assumes that state post-conviction appeals should be a routine 

aspect of capital litigation probably has never been accused of ineffective assistance 

of counsel or has never been responsible for a law practice where time spent preparing to defend one’s self is at the expense of ‘‘billable hours.’’ Attacking the professionalism, work, and competence of every attorney who happens to lose a capital 

case, without regard for whether a non-frivolous basis exists for such an attack, does 

nothing to promote a fair capital sentencing system. 

Thus, the answer to this question is no. The State of Alabama provides counsel 

for inmates, capital and non-capital, who file postconviction petitions that assert 

claims that are meritorious on their face. I disagree with the entire premise of this 

question. ‘‘To effectively manage death penalty litigation in Alabama’’ presumes that 

death penalty litigation necessarily involves the filing of post-conviction appeals 

without regard to whether they are frivolous. Thus, I must answer that the State 

of Alabama should not have any involvement in assisting all death row inmates, to 

the exclusion of all other inmates in the Alabama Department of Corrections, in the 

filing of petitions that attack the qualifications of their trial counsel as a matter of 

routine policy.

Question 10: Last year, the Alabama Attorney General’s office asked the Alabama 

Supreme Court to execute two inmates (Christopher Barber and Thomas Arthur) 

who, at the time your motions were filed, did not have lawyers and whose cases had 

not been through state or federal postconviction processes. Is it your policy to continue seeking execution dates against unrepresented death row prisoners? 

Answer 10: Your question asks about the cases involving death row inmates 

Christopher Barbour and Thomas Arthur. Since I am sure you do not know about 

the facts of these cases, I’ll inform you why Barbour and Arthur are on death row. 

Christopher Barbour, along with two of his confederates, gained entry into the home 

93

of Thelma Roberts. According to Barbour’s own confession, he and his two friends 

beat Roberts until she fell to the floor. Barbour and one of his friends held Ms. Roberts, while the other friend raped her. Barbour then went into the kitchen, grabbed 

a knife, and returned to the bedroom. He got on his knees and forcibly stabbed the 

victim with such ferocity that several of the knife wounds went all the way through 

the victim’s body and pricked her back. Barbour left the knife in her body, stood 

up, walked to the closet, threw some things from the closet around her body, and 

set them on fire. All of this information is taken from his videotaped confession. 

Thomas Arthur, for hire, killed the husband of a woman that he was having an 

affair with by shooting the victim in the head while the victim was sleeping. When 

Arthur committed this murder, he was on work release for a murder that he had 

committed several years earlier. 

The short answer to your question is that I will use every available resource of 

my office to see that a death sentence that has been upheld as legal and proper is 

carried out promptly. When my office sought execution dates for Arthur and 

Barbour, the relevant state and federal deadlines had run for filing any appeals/petitions. Both the Arthur and Barbour cases had been reviewed on direct appeal by 

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court. Christopher Barbour had litigated a Rule 32 petition to conclusion in the Montgomery 

County Circuit Court but had not filed an appeal from the denial of that petition. 

Both of these cases had no activity for several years and the time had run for 

filing a federal habeas petition. Under federal law, a death row inmate has a statutory entitlement to counsel to file a federal habeas petition. For whatever reason, 

neither Barbour nor Arthur took advantage of this statutory entitlement. They are 

both capital murderers who are guilty of heinous crimes and were appropriately 

sentenced to death. My office is charged with the responsibility of seeing that these 

sentences are carried out. It is my duty to seek an execution date for a death row 

inmate that has completed the appeals process, and to seek an execution date in 

a case where deadlines enacted by the Alabama Supreme Court and this Congress 

have been violated.

Question 11: To get an understanding of how many resources the state allocates 

on the prosecution side of the death penalty appeals process, please provide a budget for the Capital Litigation Division of your office. Please include the number of 

lawyers in the Capital Litigation Division and their salaries. 

Answer 11: As of the filing of these answers, my office has eight lawyers who handle death penalty appeals and three additional attorneys will start in August. My 

office is charged with the responsibility of litigating all death penalty cases, which 

involves three stages of review, each stage involving three to four different courts. 

The experience level of these lawyers ranges from one year to thirteen years of experience. The total amount for salaries to these eleven lawyers is $674,633.80. 

My staff recently requested from the State Comptroller’s Office the total amount 

paid since October 1, 2000 (the beginning of the fiscal year), to attorneys representing defendants who have been charged with capital murder. The Comptroller’s 

Office has stated that it has paid $1,868,047 to lawyers representing capital defendants at the trial level since October 1, 2000. This amount does not include compensation paid to lawyers handling direct appeals or Rule 32 appeals. This amount 

obviously does not include the compensation the federal government pays to lawyers 

who handle habeas corpus litigation. When the salaries of my capital litigation staff 

is balanced against the far greater amount of money that is paid to lawyers who 

represent capital defendants at trial and on appeal and in federal court, it shows 

that many more financial resources are being allocated to the side that represents 

capital murderers.

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

f Statement of Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 1995, during consideration of the federal judiciary’s annual appropriations request, Congress defunded Post-Conviction Defender Organizations (PCDOs), providing a small amount of fiscal year 1996 money for an orderly termination of the 

program. Only seven years earlier, Congress had authorized the federal judiciary to 

support the creation of the PCDOs to address a looming crisis in state and federal 

post-conviction death penalty cases. There were too few competent lawyers willing 

94

1 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 

2On direct appeal, the defendant contends before state appellate courts that the trial judge 

committed an error of law that requires reversal of the conviction or sentence. Direct appeal 

is generally limited to those errors provable on the trial record. If state appellate courts find 

no error and affirm the conviction and sentence, the defendant can petition to the United States 

Supreme Court for certiorari review. 3State post-conviction review allows a defendant to raise claims of error that were not litigated on direct appeal because the constitutional violation did not appear in the trial record. 

Generally, post-conviction review follows the completion of direct appeal, although some states 

combine the two processes. In some states, the post-conviction petition is initially filed in the 

appellate court; in others, it is filed in the trial court and any denial of relief is appealed. At 

times, factual development of claims at an evidentiary hearing occurs. If the state courts ultimately deny post-conviction relief, certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court may 

be sought. 

and able to represent the indigent condemned, and too few resources provided to 

those who stepped forward. In those states with large death-row populations, the 

dearth of qualified counsel willing to provide representation in capital cases had 

brought the process to a standstill. 

To address these problems, PCDOs were established in 20 states where the death 

penalty is authorized. PCDOs were staffed by counsel experienced in the intricacies 

of capital litigation. They provided numerous death-sentenced individuals with competent representation, and offered training and assistance to private counsel, thereby increasing the pool of attorneys willing to accept appointment in capital cases. 

In 1995, the federal judiciary concluded that the PCDOs played a vital role in providing cost-effective, qualified counsel to death-sentenced individuals. 

PCDOs, however, received a harsh reaction from death penalty proponents. 

Prompted by criticism of the program from the National Association of Attorneys 

General and others, Congress eliminated funding for PCDOs. With the termination 

of federal funding, many of the PCDOs had to dramatically scale back operations; 

seven of the 20 offices closed their doors entirely. This left hundreds of people facing 

the death penalty without adequate representation and some with no representation 

at all. The demise of the PCDOs also has made cooperation of private counsel less 

forthcoming. Many have refused to take capital cases without the backup of a 

PCDO. As a result, a growing number of cases have entered federal habeas corpus 

proceedings with no development of claims, no investigation of facts, and no competent counsel to continue on the case. 

Shortly after defunding PCDOs, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which created a statute of limitations that in 

most states allows one year for filing a federal habeas corpus petition, usually from 

the denial of certiorari on direct appeal. AEDPA also established a scheme whereby 

if a state ‘‘opts in’’ by establishing a mechanism for the appointment and compensation of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings, it can obtain certain ‘‘benefits,’’

including the reduction of the statute of limitations for filing a first federal petition 

from one year to 180 days, and an accelerated process of decision in the federal 

courts. Although no state has yet been held to qualify as an ‘‘opt-in’’ state under 

these provisions, in the wake of the enactment of AEDPA, many states created new 

post-conviction processes in an attempt to ‘‘opt in’’ and obtain these ‘‘benefits.’’ Thus, 

while the availability of counsel was diminishing due to the defunding of PCDOs, 

the state and federal jurisprudence became more rigorous and complex. 

When PCDOs were defunded, 3,045 individuals were under a state sentence of 

death; today more than 3,688 reside on death row. The vast majority are in states 

that once had a PCDO. Many of these inmates are in the state post-conviction process and will soon enter federal court. 

Section I of this report traces the history of the PCDOs, from their creation to 

their demise. Section 11 describes the post-PCDO world state-by-state. This review 

leads to the conclusion that most of the problems that precipitated the creation of 

the PCDOs exist once again, but now there are more cases, fewer experienced attorneys, and an increasingly complex and accelerated jurisprudence. 

I. HISTORY OF THE POST-CONVICTION DEFENDER ORGANIZATIONS. 

In 1976, the Supreme Court’s decision in Gregg v. Georgia 1 cleared the way for 

the reimposition of the death penalty in the United States. In the years following 

Gregg, an increasing number of states passed death penalty laws. This led to a 

greater number of criminal trials ending with a defendant sentenced to death and 

a rise in the number of death-row inmates who had completed direct appeal 2 and 

post-conviction proceedings 3 in the state courts. Those inmates denied relief by the 

state courts then moved into the federal courts, seeking federal review of their cases 

95

4 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 5 JAMES LIEBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN & VALERIE WEST, BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR 

RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973–1995, at 4 (2000). 6See generally American Bar Association Task Force on Death Penalty habeas corpus (Ira P. 

Robbins, rep.), Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty 

Cases, 40 AM. U. L. Rev. 1 (1990) (containing materials produced by the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Project to Study habeas corpus Review of State Death Penalty 

Convictions); Report and Proposal of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Federal habeas corpus in Capital Cases at 1, 5 (1989) (also called the ‘‘Powell Committee Report’’ after its 

chair, former Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell, Jr.). 7 Although there is a constitutional right to counsel at trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 

335 (1963), and on direct appeal, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), there is no recognized constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction or federal habeas corpus proceedings. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). 8 U.S.C. § 3006A(g). 9 Indeed, in McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994), the Supreme Court noted that in 

light of the heightened pleading requirements for habeas corpus petitions, requiring an indigent 

capital petitioner to file a petition without the assistance of counsel ‘‘would thus expose him to 

the substantial risk that his habeas claims would never be heard on the merits.’’ 10Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup: Right to Death-Row Lawyer Curbed, N.Y. 

TIMES, June 24, 1989, at 8 (citing amicus curiae brief of the American Bar Association in Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), LEXIs, News Library, NYT File. 

by writ of habeas corpus. The federal habeas corpus statute 4 permits a state inmate 

to obtain federal court review of his conviction and sentence to determine whether 

any violation of the United States Constitution or federal laws occurred. Historically, habeas corpus has acted as a vital systemic check upon the state courts and 

their application of fundamental federal constitutional protections. This is especially 

true in cases where the inmate has been sentenced to death. Of the capital cases 

reviewed in federal habeas corpus proceedings between 1973 and 1995, two out of 

five (40 percent) were found to have constitutional error.5

A. WHY CONGRESS FUNDED PCDOS: TOO FEW LAWYERS FOR THE INDIGENT CONDEMNED, 

STALLED CASES, AND CHAOTIC REVIEW. 

Little more than ten years after the Gregg decision, the review of capital cases 

in federal habeas corpus proceedings had become a quagmire. As more and more 

cases entered the federal courts, a greater number came to the district courts’ attention not through the filing of an ably-written petition, but on a hastily-drafted emergency motion for a stay of execution filed by volunteer counsel recruited 

serendipitously only days before. In some states, emergency motions were filed by 

prisoners acting without counsel. Often, federal judges were forced to put aside 

scheduled work and consider, sometimes through the night, such emergency filings. 

It soon became apparent why a growing number of state capital cases were arriving at the federal courthouse door slapped together at the last minute.6 In many 

states, ill-funded indigent defense systems failed to provide sufficient numbers of 

seasoned defense attorneys for capital trials and subsequent state appeals. As a consequence, important issues were not litigated properly, or were not litigated at all, 

in those proceedings. Moreover, after the direct appeal was completed, indigent 

death-sentenced inmates had to fend for themselves to find pro bono counsel for 

state post-conviction proceedings.7 Few states had in place a mechanism for matching qualified counsel with indigent capital inmates so that claims not resolved adequately on direct review could be promptly and thoroughly reviewed in the state 

post-conviction process. Finally, once they reached federal court, condemned inmates 

had no right to counsel to pursue habeas corpus relief; the appointment of counsel 

was within the discretion of the federal district court judge.8 And even if the district 

court appointed federal habeas counsel, the appointment generally occurred after a 

habeas corpus petition was already filed, thereby precluding counsel’s assistance at 

the most critical stage of any habeas corpus proceeding the preparation of the petition.9

During these years, the difficult and time-consuming task of recruiting and 

matching willing volunteer counsel with indigent capital prisoners in state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus proceedings usually fell to small, non-profit legal 

services organizations, national civil rights groups, the American Bar Association, 

and individual citizens. But by 1988, the demand for counsel greatly exceeded the 

number of volunteers these groups could identify. Indeed, the American Bar Association noted in 1988 that ‘‘there simply are not, and will not be, enough (qualified 

attorney) volunteers’’ to handle the death row cases generated by the states.10 In 

those states with large deathrow populations, the dearth of qualified counsel willing 

to provide representation in death penalty cases brought the process virtually to a 

96

11Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary 

Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 333 (1995). 12The Powell Committee Report reached similar conclusions. 13 21 U.S.C. § 848(q). 14McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849 (1994). 15See Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Defunding of the Post-Conviction Defense Organizations as 

a Denial of the Right to Counsel, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 863, 906–13 (1996). 16FY 1995 was the last year of full funding for PCDOs. 

stand still. And increasingly, state judges or governors, frustrated with the slow 

pace of capital appeals, set execution dates to move the cases through the system. 

By this time, concerns over the large number of death penalty cases in the pipeline, and the limited number of attorneys familiar with the complexities of both 

death penalty and federal habeas corpus jurisprudence, caused the federal judiciary 

and bar to search for some vehicle to ensure that trained and adequately supported 

attorneys could be found. Without such a mechanism, neither the courts nor the bar 

could ensure that the death-penalty review process would continue to function. In 

June 1988, in cooperation with the Administrative Office of the United States 

Courts, the American Bar Association sponsored a national conference to address 

the growing crisis resulting from the unavailability of counsel in capital post-conviction and habeas corpus proceedings.11 Following this conference, a number of states 

formed blue-ribbon panels—comprised of the state and federal judiciary, bar association leaders, state and local prosecutors, civil rights leaders, and the defense bar—

to study the problem further. These committees found that the shortcomings within 

the states’ systems were frustrating both the pace and quality of justice in the federal courts, and that federal habeas corpus review of state capital cases would continue to be chaotic and inefficient unless Congress took action to deal with the crisis 

realistically. In response, the committees recommended the creation of death penalty resource centers. 

Soon thereafter, Congress took two important steps to address the chronic lack 

of seasoned and adequately compensated counsel in the capital process. First, recognizing that early assignment of competent counsel can greatly reduce both the 

length of time and the amount of resources required to litigate a death penalty case 

to conclusion,12 Congress enacted a statutory right to counsel for condemned inmates in federal habeas corpus proceedings in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.13

Under section 848(q) of Title 21, federal courts are obligated by statute to appoint 

experienced attorneys to represent financially eligible federal habeas corpus petitioners under a sentence of death. So that counsel may assist in the preparation of 

the federal petition, section 848(q) also allows the inmate to request appointment 

before the petition is filed.14 And to make such representation more financially feasible for experienced practitioners, it directs that appointed counsel handling capital 

habeas corpus cases be compensated higher than in non-capital cases. 

Second, and importantly, Congress recognized that the complexity and demanding 

nature of capital cases required additional litigation resources. Following the recommendations put forth by the states’ blue-ribbon panels, it approved the federal 

judiciary’s request for federal funding of defender organizations to recruit, assist, 

and support the private bar with these cases. Congress also understood that the 

quality of review afforded in the state system had a direct bearing upon the cost, 

speed, and integrity of subsequent federal review. Thus, these organizations were 

also encouraged to seek state resources so that they could likewise aid counsel in 

state post-conviction proceedings. Such assistance in state proceedings would enhance the quality of representation, and thus simplify later federal proceedings. 

Moreover, such a system would encourage continuity of representation; lawyers recruited in the state system would remain with a case as it entered federal court. 

Thus, in a model of cooperation between the federal judiciary, state governors, 

state judges, state and local prosecutors, private bar associations, and Congress, 

death penalty resource centers were established in a number of jurisdictions.15

These resource centers, later known as Post-Conviction Defender Organizations 

(PCDOs), were structured as community defender organizations pursuant to subsection (h)(2)(B) of the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. PCDOs received 

grants upon approval of the United States Judicial Conference, contingent upon 

each PCDO’s ability to obtain funds to support the state-court-related work that it 

intended to perform. In FY 1995, grants totaling $19,354,400 supported PCDOs in 

20 states.16

PCDOs performed a number of functions. They tracked the status of the appeals 

of those on death row so that counsel could be found and filings could be made in 

a timely, orderly fashion. They recruited volunteer attorneys and provided the assistance required to acquaint attorneys with the complex procedural and substantive 

97

17 Judge Emmett Ripley Cox, of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 

chaired the Subcommittee. Judge Arthur L. Alarcon of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and 

Judge Miriam Goldman Cedarbaum of the Southern District of New York served as Subcommittee members. 18 Cox Committee Report at 7. 19 Id. at 6. 20 Id. 21 Id. at 8. 

aspects of capital habeas corpus representation. This assistance included training 

programs for volunteer and appointed counsel, consultations with counsel, assistance in investigating and litigating cases, and providing manuals, sample pleadings, 

briefs, and other support materials. Although counsel employed by the PCDOs personally represented a limited number of capital habeas corpus petitioners, direct 

representation was not their primary orientation. 

B. THE COX COMMITTEE REPORT: THE JUDICIARY RECOMMENDS CONTINUED PCDO

FUNDING WITH INCREASED DIRECT REPRESENTATION. 

Six years after their creation, the federal judiciary concluded that the PCDOs 

played a vital role in providing cost-effective, qualified counsel in capital cases. In 

1994, Judge Gustave Diamond, Chair of the Committee on Defender Services of the 

United States Judicial Conference, named three members of the Committee to a 

Subcommittee on Death Penalty Representation.17 The Subcommittee’s task was to 

evaluate PCDO performance in assisting the federal judiciary in meeting its goals 

of making qualified counsel available for appointment, and providing quality costeffective representation in capital federal habeas corpus proceedings. 

The Subcommittee’s ‘‘Report on Death Penalty Representation’’ (hereinafter the 

‘‘Cox Committee Report,’’ after its chair, Judge Emmett Ripley Cox), concluded that 

PCDO handing should continue because PCDOs ‘‘play a vital role in providing representation in capital cases.’’ 18 The Subcommittee found that the very presence of 

PCDOs, and their ability to offer training and expert advice regarding each step of 

the habeas corpus process, emboldened private attorneys to accept assignments in 

capital habeas corpus cases. ‘‘Private lawyers who communicated with the Subcommittee almost uniformly expressed the view that they would not willingly represent a deathsentenced inmate without the assistance of a PCDO or similar organization. State and federal judges agreed that PCDO assistance was critical to the recruitment of private attorneys to represent death sentenced inmates.’’ 19 Much more 

importantly, the Subcommittee noted that PCDOs brought for the first time some 

coordination in the delivery of defense services into the state and federal post-conviction process. These offices were crucial in motivating private attorneys to represent condemned inmates in state post-conviction proceedings, where often there 

is little or no compensation.20 Created at a time when the lack of competent and 

knowledgeable counsel in state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus proceedings often resulted in confusion, delay, and increased costs, the PCDOs dramatically expanded the pool of qualified counsel willing to accept these demanding cases. 

However, this reliance on private counsels central tenet of the PCDO concept 

caused the Subcommittee concern. It found that ‘‘the availability of private counsel 

both pro bono and compensated is diminishing across the country, despite PCDO assistance.’’ 21 For example, the Report noted that at the time, 28 condemned inmates 

were without counsel in state post-conviction proceedings in Texas. To address this 

concern, the Subcommittee recommended that PCDO funding be continued, but that 

PCDO counsel represent more death-sentenced inmates directly, rather than simply 

providing consultation and training to appointed counsel. The reason for this recommendation was twofold. First, because PCDOs received both federal and state resources, PCDO counsel could work in both state and federal court, thereby providing 

quality representation in state post-conviction proceedings and continuing that representation into federal court two factors that tend to decrease costs of federal habeas representation. Second, the cost of experienced salaried counsel employed by 

PCDOs was less than private counsel compensated under the CJA. Thus, to the extent PCDO counsel were able to provide representation in lieu of private appointed 

counsel, cost savings in capital cases could be achieved. In September 1995, the 

United States Judicial Conference approved the recommendations in the Cox Committee Report. 

98

22PCDOs never had universal support. The Cox Committee heard complaints that in some 

states, PCDO staff worked to abolish the death penalty rather than recruit attorneys or represent inmates. Cox Committee Report at 6 n.12. 23 In fact, a number of studies on the relative resources available for the prosecution and defense in capital cases have found that there is a disparity of funding in favor of the prosecution 

at all levels of capital cases. For example, in 1991, the American Bar Association study of the 

cost of the death penalty in state jurisdictions, made at the request of Congressman Don Edwards, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, reached this conclusion. 24 Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Defunding of the Post Conviction Defense Organizations as a 

Denial of the Right to Counsel, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 863, 913–14 (1996) (citing Marcia Coyle, 

Republicans Take Aim at Death Row Lawyers, NAT’L L. J., Sept. 18, 1995, at A 1, and Lis 

Wiehl, Program for Death-Row Appeals Facing Its Own Demise, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1995, 

at A13). 25 Act of Jan. 6, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–91, 110 Stat. 7. 

C. CONGRESS DEFUNDS THE PCDOS. 

PCDOs received a harsh reaction from death penalty proponents.22 In the spring 

of 1995, South Carolina Attorney General Charles Condon, testifying for the National Association of Attorneys General, urged Congress not to fund PCDOs unless 

state prosecutors got equal funding.23 Representative Bob Inglis, a Republican from 

South Carolina, and Representative Charles Stenholm, a Republican from Texas, in 

an open letter to their congressional colleagues in June 1995, assailed the PCDOs 

as ‘‘ ‘one of the major reasons that justice is being frustrated in capital cases around 

the country’ and blamed ‘the flow of federal money (to the PCDOs) that goes to finance endless and fruitless appeals.’ ’’ The two congressmen persuaded the Subcommittee of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State of the House Appropriations Committee to eliminate funding for PCDOs.24 On January 5, 1996, Con- gress passed H.R.#1358, which called for a budget of $262,217,000 for the federal 

judiciary’s Defender Services program so long as none of the funds were expended 

on PCDOs after April 1, 1996.25 With the termination of federal funding, many 

PCDOs closed their doors. 

II. POST–PCDO PROBLEMS: ALL OF THE OLD ONES PLUS MORE CASES, FEWER EXPERIENCED ATTORNEYS, AND AN INCREASINGLY COMPLEX AND ACCELERATED JURISPRUDENCE. 

The PCDOs were defunded before they achieved a uniform system of qualified 

representation in state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus cases. Nevertheless, in less than seven years, these offices had dramatically improved the level of 

defense services provided to hundreds of death sentenced inmates. With the withdrawal of PCDO funding, the national picture of post-conviction representation now 

resembles a tattered patchwork quilt. 

After Congress eliminated funding for the PCDOs, those in Arkansas, Florida, 

Mississippi, Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas closed their doors almost immediately. Drastically scaled-back services survived in Arizona, Alabama, California, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia. In a minority of states, the surviving organizations receive limited state funds. In only a very few does the level of funding come 

close to that previously provided the PCDOs. Many no longer provide representation 

or assistance to counsel appointed in capital habeas corpus proceedings before the 

federal courts. Federal defender offices in some states have been called upon to represent death row inmates in federal habeas proceedings. The resulting hodgepodge 

of post-conviction representation since the withdrawal of PCDO funding has caused 

the cases of many indigent condemned inmates to slip through the cracks. 

Other recent actions by the states since the defunding of the PCDOs have also 

affirmatively deepened the crisis in post-conviction representation. Many states, 

frustrated with the slow pace of executions, enacted new statutes imposing time limitations on the filing of capital post-conviction petitions. Counsel representing deathsentenced inmates in Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia must 

now file post-conviction petitions and litigate their claims under accelerated timetables. Many private attorneys are unwilling to accept appointments in light of 

these changes. By speeding up the capital post-conviction process, these states have 

caused cases that would have worked their way through the state system over a period of time to become a tidal wave. The result: too many cases, too few experienced 

attorneys, and too little time. 

But the old problems have hardly gone away. A large number of states still fail 

to provide adequate defense services for capital trial, appellate, and post-conviction 

99

26 Recognizing that it cannot persuade firms to undertake capital post-conviction cases without 

the kind of direction formerly offered by PCDO lawyers, the Project, through grants and other 

fund-raising efforts, now underwrites the salaries of six experienced capital litigators in Alabama, Georgia, Missouri, Texas, and Virginia who are designated as ‘‘resource counsel’’ to the 

pro bono firms the Project recruits. This action is viewed by the Project as a necessary, shortterm response to the current crisis in post-conviction representation. 27Saundra Torry, ABA Endorses Moratorium on Capital Punishment, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 

1997, at A4, available at 1997 WL 2249666. 28See Bill Rankin, Critics Speak Out on Death Penalty: Citing Shift in Attitudes on Capital 

Punishment, Lawyers Continue to Urge Execution Moratorium, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 13, 

2000, at D1, available at 2000 WL 5480954. 29The Spangenberg Group, Time and Expense Analysis in Post-Conviction Death Penalty 

Cases, 11, 20 (Feb. 1987). 30See, e.g., League v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); 

Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993); Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). 31Pub. L. 104–32, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 32The Spangenberg Group, Amended Time and Expense Analysis of Post-Conviction Capital 

Cases in Florida, 16 (April 1998). 33 Id. 34 Id. at 13. 

proceedings, with some furnishing none at all after direct appeal. As before, a substantial and growing number of condemned inmates who have completed direct review have no legal representation, nor any immediate prospects of being matched 

with competent counsel. Once again, in many states the difficult and time-consuming task of recruiting and matching willing volunteer counsel with indigent capital prisoners in state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus proceedings has 

fallen on nonprofit organizations, national civil rights groups, the American Bar Association, and individual citizens, but without the assistance of PCDOs. 

For example, in response to the growing crisis in post-conviction representation 

following the demise of the PCDOs, the American Bar Association Death Penalty 

Representation Project has accelerated its efforts to recruit volunteer lawyers. The 

process of recruitment, however, is a protracted one. Because law firms are aware 

that capital cases demand attorney time and resources at a level few other pro bono

cases demand, approval, on average, takes four to six months. In addition, many of 

the firms recruited have no previous capital experience and require the guidance of 

experienced capital litigators. But without the support of the PCDOs, this guidance 

is difficult to find.26 Since early 1998, the Project has successfully recruited some 

60 major law firms to represent capital inmates in post-conviction proceedings. But 

these efforts cannot come close to meeting the need. Indeed, in 1997 the American 

Bar Association called for a moratorium on executions, noting that the death penalty is administered through ‘‘a haphazard maze of unfair practices,’’ that many defendants facing the death penalty are represented by inadequately paid or incompetent lawyers, and that hundreds of the men and women on death row nationwide 

have no lawyers to represent.them in post-conviction appeals.27 The call for a moratorium was recently reemphasized by the ABA in light of mounting evidence of exonerations of death-row inmates, and the role that inadequate counsel played in 

their wrongful convictions.28

One reason for the devastating shortage of qualified counsel is the failure of most 

states to provide adequate compensation in capital post-conviction cases. Some 

states still provide no compensation for post-conviction counsel at all. A 1987 study 

commissioned by the American Bar Association Death Penalty Representation 

Project found that the average time devoted to a case by post-conviction counsel was 

2,000 hours.29 These figures were gathered before the decade of United States Supreme Court decisions that substantially increased the complexity of habeas corpus

litigation,30 and prior to the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).31 More recently, the Spangenberg Group conducted 

a study of time and expenses required in Florida capital post-conviction cases. It 

concluded that ‘‘the most experienced and qualified lawyers at [one of Florida’s three 

Capital Collateral Regional Offices] have estimated that, on average, over 3,300 lawyer hours are required to take a post-conviction death penalty case from the denial 

of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court following direct appeal to the denial of certiorari’’ through that state’s post-conviction proceedings.32 The study 

found that these estimates were ‘‘consistent with’’ those reported by a number of pro 

bono firms involved in capital post-conviction litigation that were also surveyed.33

In addition, the ancillary costs expended by volunteer firms ranged from approximately $14,000 to in excess of $1.5 million.34 These reported costs far exceed those 

compensated by the vast majority of states. Moreover, the failure of the states to 

provide adequate compensation and reimbursement of costs not only contributes to 

100

35 American Bar Association Task Force on Death Penalty habeas corpus (Ira P. Robbins, 

rep.), Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 

AM. U.L. Rev. 1, 78 (1990). 36Pub. L. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 37 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000). 38See Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 481(2000); 

Bingham v. Anderson, 21 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D. Miss. 1998). 39 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261, 2265 (2000). 40 28 U.S.C. § 2263 (2000). 41 28 U.S.C. § 2266 (2000). 42See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13–4041 (1999); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16–91–204 (2000) (legislative intent of statute is to obtain expedited federal review under AEDPA); S.C. CODE ANN. 

§ 17–27160(B) (1999) (‘‘South Carolina Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ’’). 

the unavailability of lawyers, but also to the poor quality of performance that is actually rendered.35

And all of these problemsboth new and old have only been exacerbated by the accelerated timetables and legal complexities arising from enactment of AEDPA. Several key provisions of AEDPA have heightened the obligations of counsel in state 

post-conviction proceedings. AEDPA has rendered the state post-conviction process 

more fraught with peril to the client who does not have a lawyer, or whose lawyer 

is unable, because of inadequate funding, to fully investigate, prepare, and present 

all claims in the first round of state post-conviction litigation. 

A. AEDPA: A SWIFTER, MORE COMPLICATED HABEAS JURISPRUDENCE. 

The withdrawal of PCDO funding could not have come at a worse time. On April 

24, 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996.36 Although AEDPA has transformed an already painfully complex habeas jurisprudence in many ways, exactly how it has done so is still not entirely clear. Indeed, although five years have passed since its enactment, the interpretation and 

implication of many of AEDPA’s provisions are still being litigated. 

One of the dramatic changes wrought by AEDPA is the creation of a statute of 

limitations which in most states allows one year for filing a federal habeas corpus

petition, usually from the denial of certiorari on direct appeal.37 Although AEDPA 

deals strictly with cases being litigated in federal court, the statute of limitations 

provision creates a de facto statute of limitations for filing a post-conviction petition 

in state court. Some federal courts have held that even if the state post-conviction 

application would be considered timely under state law if filed at a later date, 

AEDPA’s limitations period is not tolled until a state post-conviction application is 

actually filed in state court.38 Thus, for all practical purposes, death-sentenced inmates must file their state post-conviction petitions within one year, or more accurately, early enough to ensure that there will be time to investigate and prepare 

a federal habeas petition should the state challenge fail. 

AEDPA thus creates a dire situation for unrepresented death row inmates. Once 

the United States Supreme Court denies certiorari following affirmance on direct 

appeal, the limitations period begins running. But without counsel, these inmates 

have no ability to investigate the kind of claims that form the basis of most successful post-conviction applications, that is, those that are developed from facts outside 

the record. Moreover, they have no ability to prepare and file for post-conviction relief. In an increasing number of cases, the state courts have appointed post-conviction counsel with only weeks left in the limitations period to file a state post-conviction petition, or the federal courts have appointed counsel with only weeks or days 

within which to file a federal habeas corpuspetition. In a few cases, the limitations 

period has passed without appointment of counsel. 

AEDPA also creates a quid pro quo whereby if a state ‘‘opts in’’ by establishing 

a mechanism for the appointment and compensation of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings,39 it can obtain certain ‘‘benefits,’’ including the shortening of the 

statute of limitations for filing a first federal petition from one year to 180 days,40

and an accelerated process of decision in the federal courts.41 No state has yet been 

held to qualify as an ‘‘opt-in’’ state under these provisions. However, in the wake 

of the enactment of AEDPA, many states created new post-conviction processes in 

an attempt to ‘‘opt in’’ and obtain these ‘‘benefits.’’ 42 Thus, in many states, not only 

have post-conviction capital counsel had to unravel the mysteries of AEDPA, but 

have also had to learn, and litigate, the meaning of totally new state post-conviction 

statutes. 

These and many other AEDPA provisions have significantly complicated and increased the uncertainty inherent in both state and federal post-conviction practice. 

Many part-time capital lawyers appointed in state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus proceedings who came to depend upon the PCDOs to keep them abreast 

101

43See, e.g., Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 F.3d 460 (8th Cir. 2000); Goodman v. Johnson, No. 

9920452 (5th Cir. Sept. 19, 1999) (unpublished), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1131 (2000); Cantu-Tzin v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1091 (1999); Calderon v. United 

States District Court (Kelly), 127 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1063 (1998). 

Spencer Goodman was executed by the State of Texas on January 18, 2000, and Andrew CantuTzin was executed by Texas in January 1999. 44 Rimer, supra, note 46 at Al. 45 Ex parte Cox, 451 So.2d 235 (Ala. 1983). 46See Rimer, supra, note 46, at A1 In 2000, legislation to create a statewide public defender 

office in Alabama failed to pass. 47 In one such case, Henderson v. State, 733 So.2d 484 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), an appointed 

lawyer, who successfully ran for District Attorney a few months later, told the court that the 

trial lawyer was not ineffective as had been alleged in the pro se petition and that the claim 

and the petition should be dismissed, which they were. The client contacted ER on the last day 

for filing a notice of appeal and asked for help. An appeal notice was filed and EJI recruited 

counsel. The client was nonetheless precluded from further post-conviction review because of the 

conduct of appointed counsel. 48 ALA. CODE 15–12–23. 49 EJI provides these services as its budgetary and staffing constraints allow. 50 Elisabeth Semel, Representing Death Row Inmates at the Outskirts of the Southern Front, 

CACJ FORUM, vol. 26, no. 1, at 37, 40. 51 Analysis: Alabama State Officials Continue to Rely on Electric Chair as Alabama’s Primary 

Means of Execution, (All Things Considered, NPR radio broadcast, Feb. 17, 2000), available at 

2000 WL 21469803. 52See Court Comment to Ala. R. App. P. 39. The May 2000 amendment completely revises 

Rule 39 to remove the provision in the former rule that provided that a petition for writ of cerContinued

of significant legal developments are now required to master these comprehensive 

alterations to post-conviction practice in an accelerated environment. Some have 

failed to understand AEDPA’s implications, and unwittingly forfeited their clients’ right to federal habeas corpus review.43 Many others are simply refusing to represent capital clients altogether. 

EJI’s small staff is unflaggingly dedicated in its attempt to fill the huge gap in 

capital representation in Alabama, but it simply cannot do it all. Although EJI represents almost 100 deathrow inmates,44 and the American Bar Association Death 

Penalty Representation Project and other groups have had some very limited success identifying volunteer counsel willing to represent capital prisoners in Alabama 

post-conviction proceedings pro bono, in no way can these resources meet the need. 

Approximately 31 Alabama inmates under sentence of death do not have lawyers 

to represent them in state post-conviction proceedings. 

Other than EJI, there is no one else to provide these services. Alabama law does 

not require appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings.45 Resources for 

capital representation in Alabama are virtually nonexistent. Alabama has no statewide public defender system,46 nor is any other state or local entity including the 

state courts responsible for identifying counsel willing to represent death row inmates in post-conviction proceedings. No court in Alabama routinely appoints counsel for death row inmates who have concluded direct appeal. If a condemned inmate 

files a post-conviction petition pro se, the circuit court may appoint a local lawyers.47

But there are few financial resources to work the case even if counsel is identified. 

On October 1, 2000, following the first rate increase in 18 years, post-conviction 

counsel in a capital case is now paid $60 per hour for in-court work and $40 per 

hour for out-of-court work, but there remains a $1,000 cap.48 There continues to be 

no state statutory right to funds for investigative or expert assistance. Moreover, 

there are no qualifications for capital post-conviction counsel required under state 

law or rule, and no state entity provides training or resource materials to those attorneys who are appointed.49

It is therefore not surprising that even if counsel is appointed by the state court, 

these attorneys usually have no post-conviction experience, and rarely investigate 

claims, gather evidence, or seek evidentiary hearings.50 Even those attorneys recruited by EJI and the ABA Death Penalty Representation Project rarely have any 

experience in capital litigation. Most are pro bono civil attorneys from outside Alabama who need substantial guidance. At present, the ABA Death Penalty Project 

provides limited funding for one EJI attorney to act as resource counsel to assist 

pro bono post-conviction counsel, but one person can only do so much. 

The need to provide guidance to inexperienced capital counsel is made even more 

critical by recent events. At the urging of the Alabama Attorney General and the 

Governor,51 the Alabama Supreme Court enacted a rule change, made retroactive 

to pending cases, that eliminates the Court’s automatic review of capital cases, and 

also imposes strict deadlines.52 In a rather bizarre twist, although the rule change 

102

tiorari in a death penalty case would be granted as of right. Review is now at the discretion 

of the Supreme Court. Rule 39 also requires that a petition for rehearing be filed in the Court 

of Criminal Appeals before a certiorari petition may be filed in the Supreme Court, and that 

a certiorari petition be filed within 14 days of the denial of rehearing by the Court of Criminal 

Appeals, Rule 39(c). If certiorari is granted, the briefing on the merits is to be completed by 

both parties within 28 days of the date the writ issues. Rule 39(h). There is no guarantee that 

the Supreme Court will hear oral argument even if certiorari is granted. Rule 39(1)&(j). 53 As of July 2000, Pennsylvania had a death row population of 235 men and women, the 

fourth largest in the nation. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Death Row USA, July 1, 2000. 54 In 1997, while continuing to deny funding for post-conviction representation for indigent capital inmates, the Pennsylvania Legislature appropriated $500,000 to create a resource center 

for prosecutors in the Attorney General’s office to assist with the opposition of capital post-conviction appeals. 55 Elizabeth Amon, No Stay for Pa. Defense Group: A Lack of Funding Shuts Down Death Row 

Advocate Group, NAT’L L. J., July 5, 1999, at A16. 56 Charles Thompson, Advocate for Death Row Inmates Closes Its Doors: Agency that Represented More than 70 Convicted Killers Loses Battle for Funding, PATRIOT–NEWS (Harrisburg, Pa.), July 4, 1999, at A7, available at 1999 WL 5144962. 57 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. 32 (Spec. Sess. No. 1), § 1, codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9545(b)(I) 

(2000). 58 Amon, supra note 249. 

was made effective in May 2000, the rule was not actually published until August 

2000. 

There is no doubt that capital post-conviction representation is in crisis in Alabama. But perhaps most unsettling is the fact that numerous unrepresented Alabama death row inmates now face the expiration of the federal statute of limitations. Indeed, in an unprecedented move, the State recently asked the Alabama Supreme Court to set execution dates for two unrepresented death row inmates for 

whom the federal statute of limitations has run. 

Pennsylvania. 

At the time of the defunding of the PCDOs, about half of the then nearly 200 

death row inmates in Pennsylvania had no lawyer.53 The Commonwealth has long 

been widely regarded as having one of the worst systems in the country for providing indigent defense services. Indeed, Pennsylvania’s death penalty representation crisis has been recognized for years. As early as 1990, the Joint Task Force on 

Death Penalty Litigation in Pennsylvania warned of a ‘‘problem of major proportions’’ in the provision of legal representation to indigent death-row inmates, and 

noted several ‘‘serious problems’’ including: the shortage of qualified counsel to assist inmates in state and federal post-conviction proceedings; the lack of standards 

governing the qualifications for capital counsel or the appointment of counsel at any 

stage of state capital proceedings; the lack of standards for the compensation of 

counsel; the lack of state funding for investigation of capital cases; and the lack of 

any mechanism for the identification and recruitment of qualified counsel. 

In the decade since the Task Force’s report, little in Pennsylvania has changed. 

The Pennsylvania Capital Case Resource Center (PCCRC) was founded to address 

Pennsylvania’s systemic and endemic failures to provide trained legal counsel for indigent death row prisoners. After more than a three-year delay in the provision of 

matching state funding, the PCCRC opened its doors as a federally-funded PCDO 

in July 1994. In FY 1995, its PCDO grant totaled $621,000. But after Congress 

defunded the PCDOs, state funding was also discontinued. After its defending and 

substantial downsizing, PCCRC became the Center for Legal Education, Advocacy 

and Defense Assistance (LEADA). LEADA received no governmental sustaining 

grants, and in 1996 the Legislature twice defeated measures to fund it.54 Finally, 

because of a shortage of resources, LEADA closed its doors in June 1999.55 At the 

time, it represented more than 70 of Pennsylvania’s 227 death-row inmates.56 When 

LEADA dissolved, no state entity in Pennsylvania was available to systematically 

obtain stays of execution, recruit pro bono counsel for state post-conviction and federal habeas proceedings, or provide consulting, training, and support for appointed 

counsel. 

Other actions by Pennsylvania affirmatively deepened the crisis in post-conviction 

representation. In November 1995, Pennsylvania amended its post-conviction statute so as to limit to one year the time in which condemned inmates may initiate 

collateral review.57 But the Commonwealth still has no standards governing the appointment of post-conviction counsel, and still provides no statewide funding for 

compensation of counsel and reimbursement of expenses in capital post-conviction 

cases. Instead, Pennsylvania leaves the funding for such cases to county governments.58 Indeed, 2000 was the first time Pennsylvania has ever provided any type 

of funding for post-conviction work, when the Legislature appropriated $600,000 for 

103

59 1996 S.C. Acts No. 448, § 1 (eff June 18, 1996), codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 17–27–160 

(1999). 60S.C. CODE ANN. § 17–27–160(C) (1999) (after the state files its return, the statute requires 

the court to hold a status conference within 30 days and to schedule an evidentiary hearing 

within 180 days of the conference, except for good cause shown.). 61 Id., § 17–27–160(B) (1999). 62See Id.; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16–3–26 (1999).

capital post-conviction training. However, this money is for training only. It cannot 

be used to compensate post-conviction counsel nor to reimburse expenses. Moreover, 

although the Governor’s office was placed in charge of distributing these training 

funds, it has yet to do so. 

Not long after the defunding of the resource center, a capital habeas unit was created in the Federal Court Division of the Defender Association of Philadelphia, the 

federal defender organization for Pennsylvania. Since its creation, the unit has attempted to take all new capital habeas corpus cases in the federal courts in Pennsylvania. This has recently become more difficult. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

has begun to dramatically reduce its backlog of capital cases, and headed for federal 

court is a wave of cases35 are now awaiting decision before the state supreme court, 

and another 15 have completed state evidentiary hearings and are awaiting decision 

by the trial court. At present, the unit represents over 50 capital habeas petitioners. 

Unfortunately, because of the lack of competent counsel and resources in state postconviction proceedings in Pennsylvania, when cases come to the unit following completion of the state post-conviction process, usually no discovery has been undertaken and little independent investigation has been done in the case. The unit must 

therefore expend federal resources to uncover all colorable claims to be included in 

the federal petition, and must do so within the time constraints of AEDPA’s statute 

of limitations. 

In June 1996, South Carolina enacted the ‘‘South Carolina Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.’’ 59 The Act imposed for the first time a deadline for filing a postconviction petition in state coup. Now, counsel in capital post-conviction proceedings 

in South Carolina must file an application for post-conviction relief within 60 days 

of appointment. The Act also expedites other aspects of South Carolina capital postconviction proceedings.60 Many South Carolina judges strictly adhere to the statutory time limits. Moreover, due to fears that South Carolina may at some point be 

held to be an ‘‘opt-in’’ state and therefore entitled to the expedited procedures of 

AEDPA, counsel are often required to file a state post-conviction application within 

only days or weeks of appointment. 

The Act also provides for appointment and compensation of post-conviction counsel. Indigent death-sentenced inmates are entitled to the appointment of two attorneys.61 Private counsel is compensated at the statutory rate of $50 per hour for outof-court work and $75 per hour for incourt work. The statutory cap is $25,000.

f 62

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES COURTS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20544

July 5, 2001

Hon. Patrick J. Leahy 

Chairman 

Committee on the Judiciary 

United States Senate 

224 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 20510-6275

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am providing this letter in response to your July 3, 2001 letter asking that the 

judiciary clarify the record with regard to testimony given at the hearing held by 

the Committee on ‘‘Protecting the Innocent: Ensuring Competent Counsel in Death 

Penalty Cases.’’ At that hearing the Committee heard testimony that the federal judiciary is spending more than $20 million in FY 2001 to fund ‘‘assistance and training in state capital cases-not federal cases....’’ I want to assure the members of 

the Committee that this is not the case. The federal judiciary does not fund representation in state proceedings of individuals under a state-imposed death sentence, except in rare and limited circumstances. 

104

Let me provide some background information on this issue. The federal judiciary 

is required to appoint and compensate at least one lawyer for any death-sentenced 

inmate in a federal habeas corpus case. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q). The federal courts 

provide counsel in one of two ways. They may appoint an attorney from the private 

bar (known as a Criminal Justice Act panel attorney) or they may appoint a federal 

defender organization (FDO). 

At its December 1998 meeting, the Defender Services Committee of the Judicial 

Conference resolved that ‘‘Defender Services appropriation funds may not be used 

to represent an individual under a state-imposed death sentence in a state proceeding unless a presiding judicial officer in a federal judicial proceeding involving 

the individual has determined that such use of Defender Services appropriation 

funds is authorized by law.’’ The Administrative Office (AO) monitors such appearances in state court by FDOs. 

The most recent data available to the AO indicate that such appearances in state 

court are rare. For the period from April 1, 2000, through March 31, 2001, seven 

of the 67 FDOs reported a total of 47 state court appearances on behalf of 43 clients. 

The total cost of FDO appearances in state court, including out-of-court and in-court 

activities, was approximately $157,600. The state court activity was for specified 

purposes, including: matters related to exhaustion of remedies in state court; motions related to a stay of execution in state court; pleadings related to successor 

post-conviction litigation; and motions for release of public records. In accordance 

with the Defender Services Committee policy, these activities were pursued at the 

direction of a federal judge and in connection with a federal capital habeas corpus 

proceeding that had been filed in a federal court. 

The $20 million referenced at the hearing as being available for state capital case 

assistance and training is, in fact, limited to use by FDOs to support the direct representation of petitioners in the federal review of state capital habeas cases pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. As noted above, in a limited number of circumstances, these 

FDOs are authorized to use federal funds to represent death-sentenced inmates in 

state court proceedings, but only where a federal judge determines that such use 

of funds is authorized by law. 

We believe that part of the confusion on this point may stem from the fact that 

some attorneys represent indigent defendants in both state and federal capital 

cases, which may lead to an erroneous assumption that they are paid only by federal sources. The federal judiciary only reimburses counsel for representation in a 

federal proceeding (except in the circumstances identified above), and other sources 

of funding must be found to compensate an attorney appearing in a state court action. One defender organization, the FDO serving the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, does receive nonfederal money to support its staff appearing in state court. 

That FDO is a community defender organization receiving grant funds from the judiciary for its federal court work. It has secured non-federal funds through grants 

and private contributions to support state court representations. During the most 

recent reporting period, according to this organization’s documents and the independent audit that was done, it did not use federal resources on state court activity. 

I appreciate this opportunity to clarify any confusion about these issues. I ask 

that a copy of this letter be made a part of the record of the hearing. Please let 

me know if the AO can provide any additional information on this matter to the 

Committee. 

Sincerely,

LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM

Director

f105

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES COURTS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20544

July 16, 2001

Hon. Orrin G. Hatch 

Ranking Member 

Committee on the Judiciary 

United States Senate 

152 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 20510-6275

Dear Senator Hatch: 

Pursuant to a request from a member of your staff, I am writing to clarify the 

record with regard to a document referred to at the hearing held by the Committee 

on ‘‘Protecting the Innocent: Ensuring Competent Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.’’

I want to emphasize that the report, entitled ‘‘The Crisis in Post-conviction Representation in Capital Cases Since the Elimination by Congress of Funding for the 

Post-Conviction Defender Organizations,’’ does not represent the official position or 

policies of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts or the Judicial Conference of the United States. 

This report was drafted by Janice L. Bergmann, an attorney in a federal public 

defender organization, at the request of my staff to assist the judiciary in responding to its ongoing obligation to provide lawyers for death-sentenced inmates in federal capital habeas corpus cases. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q). In that regard, it has been 

provided to Judicial Conference’s Committee on Defender Services, as well as to capital habeas practitioners participating in the judiciary’s strategic planning efforts. 

The report was completed in 1999 and updated in 2001. A disclaimer was incorporated into the report in the hope that it would avoid any confusion. I regret that 

it was not more clear. 

The opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed in the report are those of the 

author. As part of the updating process, portions of the report were sent to various 

capital habeas practitioners for fact-checking purposes in anticipation of having a 

revised report available to the Committee on Defender Services at its May 2001 

meeting. In order to meet this deadline, Administrative Office staff incorporated a 

number of the suggestions made by these practitioners into the report when the report’s author became unavailable for an extended period this Spring. This activity, 

however, did not cause the Administrative Office to adopt or endorse the report, and 

I want to reiterate that the report does not reflect the official position or policies 

of the Administrative Office or the Judicial Conference of the United States. Indeed, 

the judiciary’s policy making process frequently is informed by materials garnered 

from a broad range of sources, and their use to educate judges and others involved 

in that process about particular points of view does not constitute an endorsement 

of either the source material or the opinions expressed therein. 

I appreciate the opportunity to clarify this issue. I ask that a copy of this letter 

be made a part of the record of the hearing. Please let me know if the Administrative Office can provide any additional information on this matter to the Committee. 

Sincerely,

LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM

f Director

Statement of Norman Lefstein, Dean, Indiana University School of Law at 

Indianapolis and Member, Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants on behalf of The American Bar Association 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

My name is Norman Lefstein. I am currently Dean and Professor of Law at the 

Indiana University School of Law at Indianapolis. 

For many years I have dealt extensively with issues concerning the legal representation of indigent defendants in criminal cases in the United States, including 

death penalty cases. I was a reporter for the American Bar Association in preparing 

106

1See ‘‘Providing Defense Services,’’ Chapter Five, American Bar Association Standards for 

Criminal Justice (2d ed., Little Brown & Co., 1980). 2See Federal Death Penalty Cases Recommendations Concerning the Cost and Quality of Defense Representation, Report of the Subcommittee on Federal Death Penalty Cases of the Committee on Defense Services of the Judicial Conference of the United States (1998). 

standards dealing with defense services in criminal cases1 and directed a study on 

the cost and quality of defense representation in federal death penalty cases for a 

committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States.2 I also have been an expert witness in post-conviction death cases in which the quality of representation 

furnished by counsel was attacked. Currently, I am a member of the American Bar 

Association’s Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants. Since 

1989, I have served as Chairman of the Indiana Public Defender Commission, which 

developed death penalty representation standards for the consideration of the Indiana Supreme Court, most of which were later adopted. 

This statement is submitted on behalf of the American Bar Association (hereafter 

ABA or Association). With the exception of its opposition to the use of the death 

penalty for the mentally retarded and for juveniles who committed their crimes 

when they were under the age of 18, the ABA has not adopted a position either for 

or against capital punishment. In 1997, however, because of its concern that the 

death penalty was not being carried out in accordance with due process principles, 

and did not adequately minimize the risk of executing innocent persons, the ABA 

called for a moratorium on the use of capital punishment in the United States. 

Since the death penalty was held constitutional a quarter century ago, the Association has adopted policies concerning the administration of capital punishment. 

Underlying these policies is a concern for protecting the innocent. Thus, the ABA 

has made protection of the right to effective assistance of counsel a top priority and 

has developed standards or guidelines for the effective representation of criminal defendants in capital cases. 

In 1989, the ABA adopted the American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases. These guidelines 

deal with the structure of defense systems for capital representation, the qualifications of counsel to represent defendants in capital cases, and the ways in which 

counsel should perform their various defense functions. As stated in the introduction 

to the guidelines, ‘‘they enumerate the minimal resources and practices necessary 

to provide effective assistance of counsel.’’ Because the guidelines are now more 

than 10 years old and outdated due to numerous changes in the law, the ABA has 

recently undertaken to review the guidelines and to propose necessary changes, 

which will likely be considered for adoption by the Association in 2002. 

This statement addresses three fundamental issues that are bound up in the consideration of the Innocence Protection Act of 2001. First, why are standards for the 

representation of defendants in capital cases necessary? Second, what are the essential elements of a system for capital representation? And, lastly, why is it important 

that standards for representation in death penalty cases be enforceable? 

I. WHY ARE STANDARDS FOR THE REPRESENTATION OF DEFENDANTS IN CAPITAL CASES

NECESSARY?

There is an enormous amount of evidence that the quality of legal representation 

provided to defendants in capital cases in this country is woefully inadequate. If 

proof of this assertion is doubted, one need only recall that nearly 100 persons have 

been released from death rows in this country, with either substantial or incontrovertible evidence of their innocence. Ours is a country that prides itself on the 

quality of its criminal justice system. In the death penalty area, however, it is clear 

that something has gone wrong. Too often our adversary system of criminal justice, 

which requires that the accused be provided a vigorous defense, has not operated 

as intended. It is largely because of this that the ABA has called for a moratorium 

on the use of the death penalty, as noted earlier. 

The problems in death penalty representation have been repeatedly documented 

in law journal articles, studies, newspapers, and in decisions of appellate courts. Too 

often the lawyer who represents the defendant in a capital case is inexperienced and 

lacks the requisite qualifications to defend a person on trial for his life. The lack 

of adequate compensation for counsel, experts and investigators sometimes means 

that the most qualified attorneys refuse to become involved in capital defense representation, thus leaving the defendant to be represented by an inexperienced and 

untrained attorney. Unfortunately, such lawyers all too frequently conduct inadequate factual investigations, fail to keep abreast of the complex and constantly 

changing legal doctrines that apply in capital litigation, and make procedural errors 

that later preclude review of meritorious claims. The deficiencies of lawyers in death 

107

3McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2785, 2786 (1994)(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 4 Ind. R. Crim. P. 24. The rule was originally effective January 1, 1990. Subsequently, it was 

amended on several occasions. The most important provisions related to defense representation 

in capital cases did not take effect until 1993. 5Lefstein, ‘‘Reform of Defense Representation in Capital Cases: The Indiana Experience and 

Its Implications for the Nation,’’ 29 Ind. L. Rev. 495 (1996). 6 ‘‘Capital Litigation from the State Court Perspective or Rushing to Judgment in Fifteen 

Years,’’ Speech by Randall T. Shepard at Judicial Meeting of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Seventh Circuit (May 2, 1996). 7There is one death penalty case in which lawyers appointed pursuant to the Indiana rule 

were found to be ineffective. However, the caseload of one of the lawyers substantially exceeded 

the caseload restrictions specified in the Indiana rule. See State v. Prowell, 741 N.E.2d 704 (Ind. 

2001). 

penalty cases also have included the failure to make appropriate objections, to 

present mitigating evidence, and even to file briefs on appeal. 

In one of his last opinions as a member of the United States Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun identified the lack of standards as one of the primary reasons why 

there are so many problems in the area of defense representation in capital cases. 

‘‘The absence of standards governing courtappointed capital-defense counsel means 

that unqualified lawyers often are appointed, and the absence of funds to compensate lawyers prevents even qualified lawyers from being able to present an adequate defense. Many states that regularly impose the death penalty have few, if 

any, standards governing the qualifications required of court-appointed capital-defense counsel....’’ 3

Justice Blackmun offered this analysis in 1994, but his assessment of the situation is still accurate in 2001. Although standards for the appointment of counsel 

have been adopted by rule or statute in some states, most are not comprehensive 

and thus fail to deal with all facets of capital representation. In about half of the 

death penalty states, moreover, there are no court rules or statutes of any kind governing capital defense representation, and this includes a number of jurisdictions 

that have large death row populations. 

The importance of standards for capital representation can perhaps best be understood by recalling what has happened in Illinois. Governor Ryan, a proponent of the 

death penalty, imposed a moratorium on the use of the death penalty in that state 

because of the release from death row of numerous defendants determined to be innocent. In these cases, there was abundant evidence that the lawyers who represented the defendants were not qualified by either experience or training to do 

so. Significantly, until March of this year, Illinois did not have any standards governing the appointment of counsel in death penalty cases or any of the other facets 

of capital representation. 

In contrast, Indiana has had since 1994, by virtue of a Supreme Court rule, one 

of the more comprehensive provisions governing capital defense representation in 

the country.4 As a result of this rule, there is considerable evidence that the quality 

of defense representation in capital cases has improved, as documented in a study 

that I published in 1996.5 The Honorable Randall T. Shepard, Chief Justice of Indiana, seemingly agrees with this conclusion. As he stated in a speech, ‘‘[t]he net result of our rule and [state] appropriations is some very thorough, high quality, and 

effective representation.’’ 6 Since the adoption of Indiana’s rules, no person has been 

released from the state’s death row because of innocence. Nor has there been a case 

in which lawyers were appointed pursuant to the Supreme Court’s rule, complied 

with its requirements, and were held to be ineffective.7

In short, whether contained in court rules or statutes, standards for capital defense representation can and do make a difference, just as in other criminal cases 

requiring counsel for the indigent. Standards can assure that only attorneys with 

appropriate experience and training are appointed to represent defendants. Thus, 

standards can be instrumental in assuring that defendants’ constitutional rights are 

protected, reduce the likelihood of error in proceedings, diminish the number of appeals and ultimately enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice 

process. 

The Innocence Protection Act of 2001 contemplates the creation of a National 

Commission on Capital Representation to develop standards for providing adequate 

legal representation for indigents in death penalty cases. Although the ABA has 

never taken a position on the establishment of such a commission, clearly the approach of the proposed legislation is fully consistent with the ABA’s guidelines on 

defense representation in death penalty cases and with other policies of the Association. 

108

8 National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Courts 13.8 (1973). 

9See supra note 1, Standard 5–1.3. 10 ‘‘Providing Defense Services,’’ Standard 5–1.3, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (3d ed. 

1992). 

II. WHAT SHOULD BE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A SYSTEM FOR CAPITAL

REPRESENTATION?

The ABA guidelines on capital defense representation call for an independent appointing authority to develop qualification and compensation standards, to recruit 

and train lawyers to handle capital cases, to certify them as competent in this specialty area, and to make the actual appointments of counsel in all cases. The guidelines also provide that this independent authority should establish standards of performance for counsel and monitor their conduct to assure that clients are receiving 

quality legal representation. In addition, this independent body should have the authority to remove unqualified lawyers from the roster of attorneys eligible to receive 

appointments in capital cases. 

As long as state court judges continue to make capital case assignments without 

adequate regard for the qualifications and training of counsel, the problems of incompetent counsel will surely continue. Unskilled attorneys will continue to make 

serious errors during trial; subsequently, post-conviction counsel will seek to discover those errors and seek reversals of death sentences imposed; and state appellate courts and federal courts will bear the brunt of correcting those errors. The only 

longterm answer is to conduct trials correctly in the first place. In the Association’s 

view, this requires independently appointed, competent counsel. 

The recommendation in the ABA’s guidelines that the program for furnishing 

counsel in capital cases be vested in an independent appointing authority had its 

genesis in earlier reports and standards of the Association. In 1973, for example, 

the National Advisory Commission, organized during the Nixon administration and 

comprised of criminal justice experts from across the country, expressed the following viewpoint: ‘‘The method employed to select public defenders should insure 

that the public defender is as independent as any private counsel who undertakes 

the defense of a fee-paying criminally accused.’’ 8 This approach for providing defense counsel to the indigent was spelled out in further detail in the ABA’s second 

edition of Providing Defense Services, adopted by the Association in 1979.9 The current version of these standards, approved by the Association in 1990, reads as follows: ‘‘The plan and the lawyers serving under it should be free from judicial supervision only in the same manner and to the same extent as are lawyers in private 

practice. The selection of lawyers for specific cases should not be made by the judiciary or elected officials....’’ 10

There are a variety of reasons why judges should not appoint lawyers in indigent 

cases, or otherwise be involved in the overall supervision of indigent defense, and 

these arguments are even more compelling when capital cases are involved because 

the stakes are so much greater. The paramount reason for not having judges appoint defense lawyers is to assure that counsel always feels completely free to act 

in the client’s best interest. While there are obviously many fine judges who preside 

over criminal cases, there are occasions when judges are angered by motions filed 

by defense attorneys, resent arguments advanced by counsel, and rule against lawyers insistent upon continuances. Judges, for example, are understandably concerned with moving their dockets, but this is not defense counsel’s concern and 

should never be the reason that a lawyer fails to make arguments or take actions 

on the client’s behalf. 

A lawyer should not have to fear reprisals of any kind from either the judge before whom he or she is appearing or some other judge before whom the lawyer 

might later appear. The power of judges to appoint lawyers and approve claims for 

compensation necessarily includes the power to withhold appointments and to reduce payments for the time lawyers devote to indigent cases. 

A lawyer’s advocacy on behalf of an indigent defendant in an appointed criminal 

case, especially a capital case, should be no more inhibited than the lawyer’s advocacy in representing a client in a retained private case. Judges do not select privately retained lawyers or prosecutors. Judges should not be involved in the selection and operation of indigent defense programs either. The appointment of counsel 

and the oversight of indigent defense by an independent authority should also alleviate the fear of defendants that the judge or some other court official in charge 

of assignments controls the defense lawyer. 

While it was noted earlier that some changes in the Association’s guidelines are 

likely to be recommended next year, clearly the call for an independent appointing 

authority, which is quite central to the guidelines, will not be one of them. As the 

109

foregoing discussion demonstrates, the call for independence in the operation of indigent defense predates the development of the ABA’s guidelines for capital representation. 

But, in addition to an independent appointing authority, there are a number of 

other components deemed essential to a system of capital defense representation 

specified in the guidelines. Included among these are the following:

• The appointment of two qualified attorneys at trial, on appeal, and in 

post-conviction proceedings, due to the complexity of capital defense litigation; 

• Specific, detailed qualification standards to assure that attorneys appointed to capital cases are capable of rendering competent representation 

by virtue of their prior experience and training; 

• Adequate support assistance in the form of investigative, expert, and 

other services necessary to prepare and present an adequate defense; 

• Mandatory training in capital defense representation as a precondition 

for continuing to be eligible to receive appointments in death penalty cases; 

and 

• Reasonable compensation paid to defense counsel for actual time and 

service performed, based upon a rate of hourly compensation that is commensurate with the provision of effective representation and taking into account the extraordinary responsibilities inherent in death penalty litigation. 

Obviously, there is a good deal of similarity between the ABA’s guidelines for 

death penalty representation and the provisions of the Innocence Protection Act of 

2001. In the view of the Association, the proposed statute is absolutely right in declaring that a ‘‘centralized and independent appointing authority,’’ as specified in 

paragraph (c) of Title II, should be an element of an effective system for capital defense. The statute is also correct in granting to the independent authority broad responsibilities for administering the system of capital defense representation. The appointment of a National Commission on Capital Representation to develop national 

standards would be a monumental advance in addressing the many problems that 

exist in this country in capital defense representation. 

III. WHY IS IT IMPORTANT THAT STANDARDS FOR DEATH PENALTY REPRESENTATION BE

ENFORCEABLE?

The Innocence Protection Act of 2001 proposes that sanctions be imposed on 

states if they fail to maintain a system of capital defense representation consistent 

with the National Commission’s standards. The sanctions would take the form of 

withholding from non-compliant states a portion of funds under prison grant programs and making habeas corpus relief more available to petitioners in capital cases 

from such states. 

Although the Association has never addressed withholding funds from states failing to comply with national standards, in 1990 the ABA adopted a resolution urging 

that certain procedural barriers to habeas corpus review not apply if a state ‘‘failed 

to appoint competent and adequately compensated counsel to represent the defendant. . . .’’ As the resolution explained, this would help ‘‘[t]o assure that the state 

provides competent representation and to avoid procedural delays as well as multiple reviews of the same issues....’’

In addition, the Association adopted a resolution in 1998 calling upon state and 

local jurisdictions ‘‘to adopt minimum standards for the creation and operation of 

its indigent defense delivery systems’’ based upon previously approved standards, 

including the ABA’s guidelines for capital defense representation. The resolution 

also calls upon government bodies, which fund indigent defense services, to insist 

that minimum standards for representation are being met ‘‘as a condition for receiving funds.’’ As the commentary to the resolution explained, ‘‘standards have the 

greatest impact when the state or other funding entity reimburses a jurisdiction’s 

indigent defense program for some or all of the cost of delivering services, but reimbursement is made only if the jurisdictions adopt and enforce standards for the delivery of indigent defense services.’’

In the commentary to this ABA resolution, Indiana is the state that is most 

prominently cited for linking compliance with standards to the funding of indigent 

defense. Pursuant to statute in Indiana, the Indiana Public Defender Commission 

is authorized in capital cases to reimburse counties for SO% of their defense service 

expenditures if county officials and the trial court certify compliance with the Supreme Court’s requirements governing death penalty representation. The standards 

in Indiana are contained in a rule of the Indiana Supreme Court, which requires 

the appointment of two attorneys on trial and appeal; establishes experiential requirements for lawyers willing to serve as lead and co-counsel in capital cases at 

110

trial and on appeal; sets caseload limitations for lawyers handling capital cases, as 

well as their rates of compensation; and requires that adequate investigative, expert 

and other services be provided to the defense. 

Because counties do not want to forego 50% reimbursement of their defense expenditures in capital cases, which are often quite substantial, there has been almost 

complete compliance with the rule of the Indiana Supreme Court on capital defense 

representation. As noted earlier, there is also evidence that the system of indigent 

defense in Indiana has improved. However, the compliance of counties has not been 

100%. Recently, as Chairman of the Indiana Public Defender Commission, I wrote 

to the Chief Justice of Indiana to advise him that the Commission has learned of 

instances where two attorneys were not appointed to a death penalty case and of 

capital cases where caseload restrictions of lawyers were violated. This leads, therefore, to this question: if you cannot achieve 100% compliance with a rule of the 

state’s highest court on capital representation when a county has much to lose from 

non-compliance, are there not apt to be far more violations of requirements for 

death penalty representation if the officials have absolutely nothing to lose? 

The incentives for a state to comply with requirements aimed at assuring that 

every capital defendant is vigorously represented must be strong. The history of the 

past 25 years in providing counsel in death penalty cases shows that many states 

are quite reluctant to spend the funds necessary to assure that every capital defendant is effectively represented. Although many legislators undoubtedly understand 

what is needed to improve the system, there is not a strong constituency advocating 

for reform of indigent defense in most states. If national standards are developed 

as envisioned in the Innocence Protection Act, the reality is that many state and/

or local jurisdictions are going to ignore them unless they decide it is simply too 

costly to do so. 

The opposite of enforceable standards for capital defense representation is voluntary standards. Essentially, this is what we have had in the United States for 

many years. Ever since 1989 when the ABA adopted its guidelines for the appointment and performance of counsel in capital cases, a detailed blueprint has been 

available to every state and local jurisdiction to adopt. But this has not happened 

in any systematic or organized way, and in many jurisdictions nothing at all has 

been done. Meanwhile, enormous problems in the defense of capital cases have been 

experienced in virtually all 38 of the nation

f’s death penalty states.

Statement of Steven D. Benjamin, Benjamin & DesPortes, P.C., Richmond, 

Virginia 

INTRODUCTION

I am a member of the Virginia State Bar, and have practiced in the Commonwealth of Virginia since 1979. I am admitted to practice in the United States District Court, Eastern and Western Districts of Virginia, the Fourth Circuit Court of 

Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court. I am a partner in the Richmond, 

Virginia, firm of Benjamin & DesPortes, P.C. My partner, Betty Layne DesPortes, 

and I limit our practice to the defense and appeal of criminal cases. I am a director 

of the Virginia College of Criminal Defense Attorneys and an active member of the 

National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. I am an adjunct professor of law 

at the University of Richmond School of Law. I present continuing legal education 

in all phases of criminal defense. 

During my career, I have tried dozens of murder cases. I have represented as lead 

counsel approximately 15 to 20 defendants who were charged with capital murder 

in the Eastern District of Virginia, the City of Richmond, Henrico County, Chesterfield County, Fairfax County, Brunswick County, Henry County, and Ameba County. No defendant represented by me or Ms. DesPortes at the trial court level has 

ever received a death sentence. 

In view of my experience and background, I have been asked to describe and comment generally on Virginia’s provision of indigent defense in capital cases. 

MECHANISM AND CRITERIA FOR APPOINTMENT

In Virginia, a Public Defender Commission is responsible for adopting standards 

for the appointment of counsel in capital cases which take into consideration the following criteria: (i) license or permission to practice law in Virginia; (ii) general background in criminal litigation; (iii) demonstrated experience in felony practice at trial 

and appeal; (iv) experience in death penalty litigation; (v) familiarity with the reqVerDate Feb 1 2002 10:08 Sep 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00114 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\81606.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
111

uisite court system; (vi) current training in death penalty litigation; and (vii) demonstrated proficiency and commitment to quality representation. In addition, the 

Commission is required to maintain a list of counsel qualified to provide capital representation. In establishing this list, the Commission’s mandate is to consider all 

relevant factors, including the Commissions’s assessment of whether the attorney is 

competent to provide quality legal representation. In any case in which an indigent 

defendant is charged with a capital offense, the trial court judge is directed, but not 

required, to appoint one or more attorneys from that list. 

To date, the Commission’s promulgation of standards has been little more than 

a parroting of the statutory criteria. The list of qualified counsel has been compiled 

by the implementation of a questionnaire which requires only that an applicant confirm that he has met the specified criteria. The most egregious deficiency of this 

methodology is that the criteria of demonstrated proficiency and commitment to 

quality representation is satisfied on a purely self-reported basis. No administrative 

mechanism or procedure exists within the Commission or elsewhere to subjectively 

review this requirement or to deny placement on the list of any attorney who 

checks-off each of the specified criteria. Despite the statutory direction, the Commission undertakes no assessment of an attorney’s competence to provide quality legal 

representation, and lacks any means to remove an attorney from the list. 

The criteria in Virginia for capital appointment is meaningless and discretionary. 

As a consequence, attorneys who are only marginally competent in routine criminal 

cases are eligible for appointment even in those cases where a defendant might be 

sentenced to death. Because of a combination of factors in Virginia, the provision 

of indigent defense is characterized by the systematic appointment of attorneys who 

are either unqualified or too busy and conflicted with other cases to adequately represent their clients. 

COMPENSATION

Virginia’s compensation of assigned counsel in non-capital cases is wretchedly inadequate. Unlike any other state in the country, Virginia imposes an absolute, 

unwaivable cap on the compensation which can be paid to attorneys appointed to 

represent the poor in criminal cases. The maximum compensation for the defense 

of a single felony punishable up to twenty years is $318. If a felony carries a possible life term, the maximum compensation is $882. This inflexible disincentive to 

zealous representation is immune from pre-trial or post-conviction systemic review. 

The compensation for the defense of cases punishable by death is not capped. Instead, the amount and rate of pay is left to the discretion of the trial court. This 

allocation is questionable, as the provision of adequate representation can conflict 

with the management of an efficient docket. Trial courts may cut the hours submitted for compensation, leaving attorneys with no opportunity for review. Attorneys who complain are threatened with the loss of appointed work. 

Virginia’s trial courts have generally approved compensation to attorneys in capital cases for all time expended at a rate deemed reasonable for indigent defense. 

This practice will soon change. Trial courts are required by statute to consider any 

guidelines for compensation established by the Supreme Court of Virginia. Effective 

July 1, 2001, the Virginia Supreme Court has suggested that trial courts provide 

compensation at the hourly rates of $75 and $125 for the respective provision of outof-court and in-court representation. These levels represent a substantial reduction 

in the current rate of compensation. The (unintended) effect of this reduction will 

be to further discourage experienced and competent attorneys from undertaking the 

defense of these most serious and unpopular of cases. 

SAME POOL

In any event, the absence of a cap on fees in capital cases accomplishes little towards the goal of ensuring the appointment of truly qualified attorneys. This is because the relatively generous death penalty fees are used to reward or subsidize the 

attorneys who accept the financially devastating non-capital fees. The result is that 

the attorneys who are appointed in capital cases are the same attorneys who depend 

on court-appointed work for their livelihood. Because the ordinary fees are hopelessly inadequate, the attorneys who handle the bulk of court-appointed representation must often carry staggering caseloads in a number of jurisdictions. Attorneys 

who are forced to rely on volume are reluctant to refuse appointment, especially in 

capital cases, and quite simply do not have the time to adequately defend any serious or complex criminal case. Some attorneys are appointed to defend multiple capital cases at the same time. Not surprisingly, these are the attorneys with multiple 

clients on death row. Regardless of an individual’s motive for undertaking such 

crushing responsibilities, it is the client who suffers from the inevitable inattention 

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and neglect. Any system—such as Virginia’s—which permits an attorney to assume 

the simultaneous responsibility for multiple lives asks too much, and sets up the 

innocent for execution. 

EFFICIENCY

Another facet of capital appointment in Virginia is the premium placed on efficiency over zealousness. The attorneys who are appointed are only rarely known for 

innovation or indefatigable efforts on behalf of their clients. Instead, those attorneys 

are valued who can bring a capital case to judgment as smoothly and efficiently as 

possible. Unfortunately, these are often the same attorneys who file boiler-plate motions, raise no challenges, miss obvious objections, conduct ineffective voir dire, seek 

no forensic or investigatory assistance, preserve no record for competent counsel to 

appeal, and make little or no case for innocence or mitigation. Too often in Virginia 

the price of efficiency is the neglect of the client. Attorneys are not encouraged to 

rock the boat. 

EXCEPTIONAL EFFORTS

Some courts diligently seek to provide capital defendants with the best representation available, and have reached out to a responsive private bar. In other instances, the quality of representation has been so manifestly inadequate that courts 

(or prosecutors) have intervened to correct an obvious injustice. That judges have 

done so is a testament to their commitment to the provision of adequate representation, and to an uncommon ability to divine omissions from an otherwise silent 

record. But a criminal justice system is flawed that depends on the judiciary or prosecution to discharge the responsibility of the defense. And a system lacks integrity 

which permits—as does Virginia—the continued appointment of attorneys obviously 

unwilling or incapable of providing zealous and competent representation. It is rarely a secret to the bench or the bar who should not be practicing; it is a shame of 

unparalleled magnitude that the lives of the indigent accused should be held in such 

a precarious balance. 

First rate representation is uncommon, and when it occurs, it is the product of 

personal sacrifice and extraordinary dedication by an individual attorney abiding 

the dictates of his conscience and the ethics of his profession. Virginia boasts an exceptional bar, but neither the standards for capital representation nor the logistics 

of appointment are designed to draw representation from that bar. The reality in 

Virginia is that the provision of appointed counsel is a haphazard event. The quality 

of representation is inconsistent at best, and at times, so abysmally deficient as to 

amount to a complete charade.

fSTATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR

SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

July 2, 2001

The Honorable Patrick Leahy 

U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee 

224 Dirksen Building 

Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Leahy,

During my testimony before the committee on June 27, 2001, Senator Feingold 

asked me about an execution that I witnessed in August of 1995. In order for the 

record to be as complete as possible, I have researched the issues he inquired about 

and submit this letter to supplement my answers to his questions. 

Senator Feingold first desired to know whether it was true that the defendant in 

that case, Sylvester Adams, had an IQ that was below normal. I am enclosing the 

psychiatric and psychological reports from his evaluation by the state Department 

of Mental Health in 1979. This was the agency charged by the court with the responsibility for making these determinations. These reports were made part of the 

court’s record in Mr. Adams’ Post-conviction Relief Hearings. 

As you can see from the reports, the defendant ‘‘answers ‘I don’t know’ to virtually 

every question and then asks why I am asking questions in a rather mocking manner’’. It goes on to say, his ‘‘entire demeanor is that of a coy cat and mouse game 

which he obviously enjoys’’. 

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The psychologist’s scoring of his IQ test did place the defendant in the range of 

mild mental retardation, however ‘‘the psychologist reported) that he was uncooperative and made little effort during testing so that his intelligence is probably 

significantly higher than is reflected by the test data’’. In another section the psychologist puts it thus: ‘‘The lowered score on the performance section (of his IQ test) 

is a direct function of his negativism, belligerence and lack of concerted effort.’’ In addition, I also enclose copies of both sentencing reports that were filed by the 

two trial judges who presided over the two trials of this case. The judges in this 

case had the opportunity to interact with the defendant in court and both listed his 

intelligence level as ‘‘average’’. I realize that the defense may tender evaluations performed by experts they paid 

to assist them however I do not believe that they are as credible as the evaluations 

I am submitting. Their experts have a financial interest in the matter and also can 

be chosen by the defense based on an anti-capital punishment bias. The South Carolina Department of Mental Health is not in any way beholden to our office and has 

often submitted reports and testified that capital defendant’s are mentally ill. 

The second area of inquiry focused on the post-trial status of Mr. Adams’ attorney. 

I did not know who his attorney was at the various stages of litigation but have 

since informed myself on the topic. Sam Fewell represented the defendant at both 

his first trial and his retrial. He was also represented by James Boyd. 

In the early 1990’s, Fewell was convicted in federal court and sentenced to a term 

of imprisonment in a federal correctional facility. I believe this was due to a drug 

related conviction. I do not know whether or not he was incarcerated at the time 

of Adams’ execution. That is irrelevant though as Fewell had no involvement with 

the appeal of the case 

The question of his attorney’s status is calculated to highlight the issue of attorney incompetence in capital cases. Instead, it only serves to highlight the type of 

specious logic employed by the anti-capital punishment groups to make their case. 

The fact that Fewell was convicted in 1991 or 1992 does not lead one to conclude 

that he was incompetent in 1981 or 1982. A former professor of mine has since been 

disbarred and removed from the faculty at the University of South Carolina. Should 

I be required to return my diploma? 

In fact, Fewell’s conviction in the early 90’s was well known for some years before 

Adams was executed and if the defense were able to establish a connection between 

the two events, they surely would have. The issue of Fewell’s competence was fully 

litigated and no basis found to warrant a new trial. 

I hope this helps the committee as you grapple with these weighty and complex 

issues. If I may be of any further service to you at any time please do not hesitate 

to call me. 

Sincerely,

KEVIN S. BRACKETT

f Deputy Solicitor

Statement of David I. Bruck, Federal Death Penalty Resource Counsel, 

Columbia, South Carolina 

Chairman Leahy, Senator Hatch, and members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to submit this statement as the Judiciary Committee 

considers the important question of how indigent capital defendants are represented 

at trial in the courts of this country. I would like to focus on the two jurisdictions 

I know the most about—the state courts of South Carolina, and the federal courts 

throughout the United States. 

I have been a criminal defense attorney in Columbia, South Carolina, for the past 

25 years, and have devoted most of that time to the defense of capital cases. I have 

served as lead counsel in 17 death penalty trials in the South Carolina state courts, 

have argued some sixty death row inmates’ appeals in the South Carolina Supreme 

Court, and six before the United States Supreme Court. I have also been a close 

observer of the federal death penalty since early 1992, when the federal defender 

system contracted with me and a colleague in Frankfort, Kentucky, to provide expert assistance on as ‘‘as-needed’’ basis to federal defenders and court-appointed 

counsel in federal capital cases. In the nine-and-a-half years since then I have 

worked roughly half-time in assisting counsel who have been appointed to defend 

the increasing numbers of federal death penalty prosecutions brought under the 

Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C. 848(e), and later under the Federal Death 

Penalty Act of 1994 (18 U.S.C. § 3591 et seq.). In addition to working with individual 

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1 An additional restriction is that no attorney may be appointed and compensated in a death 

penalty case who is not both a South Carolina resident and a member of the South Carolina 

Bar. S.C. Code § 17–3–330(C) (Supp. 2000). This restriction, which applies only in capital cases, 

was added as a direct legislative response to the appointment of Judy Clarke, a distinguished 

West Coast federal defender and University of South Carolina law graduate, as co-counsel in 

the highly-publicized Susan Smith death penalty case in 1995. Twila Decker, ‘‘Smith Case Spurs 

S.C. House to Rethink Indigent Defense,’’ The State B–5 (Mar. 9, 1995) (quoting sponsor as explaining amendment: ‘‘If people come here and kill our citizens, they ought to have to use our 

attorneys. ’’). 

court-appointed lawyers, our responsibilities as Resource Counsel include identification and recruitment of qualified, experienced defense counsel for possible appointment by the federal courts in death penalty cases, and development of training programs and publications, including a web site, www.caydefnet.org, to assist federal 

defenders and court appointed private counsel in death penalty cases. 

In a few jurisdictions, the counsel standards in Title II of S. 486, the Innocence 

Protection Act of 2001, will effect little change, since these states already furnish 

highly-qualified and adequately-compensated counsel in capital cases. Other jurisdictions, however, have persistently refused to adopt the minimum safeguards that 

Title II would encourage. My own state of South Carolina is one of these. 

SOUTH CAROLINA 

1. THE PRESENT ‘‘SYSTEM′′

South Carolina enacted its current death penalty statute in 1977. S.C. Code § 16–

3–20 (Supp. 2000). Although from the outset the statute required appointment of 

two lawyers for each death penalty defendant, of whom only one could be a public 

defender, state law set counsel fees and litigation expenses at $10 per hour out-ofcourt and $15 per hour in-court, with total allowable counsel fees capped at $1500. 

Expert and investigative expenses were likewise capped at $2000 per case. S.C. 

Code §§ 16–3–26(B), –(C); 17–3–50 (1985). The only qualifications for this essentially 

pro bono service was that one of the two court-appointed lawyers had to have five 

years’ bar membership and three years’ felony trial experience. § 16–3–26(B). 

In 1992, the state supreme court acknowledged the gross inadequacy of South 

Carolina’s statutory counsel fees, and held that the local counties where capital 

prosecutions were brought had to provide minimally adequate counsel fees and expert funding. Bailey v. State, 424 S.E.2d 503 (S.C. 1992). As a result of Bailey, county officials were faced for the first-time with the problem of paying substantial legal 

bills in death penalty cases, and in 1994 the state legislature responded by increasing ten-fold the state funds available for attorney, expert and investigative services. 

S.C. Code § 16–3–26 (Supp. 2000). Accordingly, current law now provides for payment of up to $25,000 per attorney (which can be exceeded upon a showing of necessity) at $50 per hour for out-of-court work and $75 per hour in-court. Expert and 

investigative costs are now capped at $20,000 per case, which limit can also be exceeded for good cause. 

Despite increased funding for capital defense during the 1990s, South Carolina’s 

method of selecting and appointing counsel has remained essentially unchanged. 

Every South Carolina county has some sort of locally-organized public defender system, S.C. Code § 17–3–60 (Supp. 2000), but this extremely decentralized system includes no statewide oversight or training. State judges have unfettered discretion 

to select and appoint counsel, subject only to the ‘‘five year/three year’’ restriction 

and a requirement that one of the two appointed attorneys be a public defender 

whenever possible. S.C. Code § 16–3–26(B)(1) (Supp. 2000).1 A statewide agency created in 1994 to administer state indigent defense funding, the South Carolina Office 

of Indigent Defense, performs no function other than disbursement of funds, and 

has no role in identifying, training or selecting defense counsel in capital cases. S.C. 

Code § 17–3–330 (Supp. 2000). 

2. SOUTH CAROLINA REJECTS REFORM. 

In 1997, the South Carolina Bar approved and submitted to the state supreme 

court a proposal to create modest experience and training qualifications for trial 

counsel in death penalty cases. The Bar proposal would have required only that one 

of the lawyers appointed in a capital case have substantial capital or non-capital 

trial experience, and that both lawyers have received some specialized training in 

capital defense by the time of trial, and have ‘‘demonstrated that level of knowledge, 

skill and commitment to the defense of indigent persons expected of defense counsel 

in capital cases.’’ The South Carolina Supreme Court summarily rejected the Bar’s 

115

proposal. Most recently, as part of a general revision of the court-appointment process in criminal and civil cases, the state court (without notice, hearings or public 

comment) promulgated the following rule: 

CERTIFICATION OF ATTORNEYS IN DEATH PENALTY CASES

(a) Classes of Certified Attorneys. There shall be two classes of attorneys 

certified to handle death penalty cases: lead counsel and second counsel. 

(b) Lead Counsel. Lead counsel shall have at least five years experience as 

a licensed attorney and at least three years experience in the actual trial 

of felony cases. The application for certification to act as lead counsel shall 

be on a form designated by the Supreme Court. 

(c) Second Counsel. Second counsel shall have at least three years experience as a licensed attorney. Second counsel is not required to be further 

certified to be eligible for appointment.

RULE 421, SCACR; SC Order 01–7 (May 29, 2001; effective September 1, 2001). 

Given South Carolina’s persistent refusal, over nearly 25 years, to adopt meaningful standards to govern selection of counsel in capital cases, it should come as no 

surprise that the actual performance of appointed counsel has been, to be charitable, 

uneven. South Carolina has the eighth-highest ratio of executions to population of 

the 38 death penalty states, with 25 post-Furman executions and approximately 70 

prisoners currently on death row. The cases of South Carolina’s executed and condemned prisoners include: 

State v. Mitchell Sims, in which court-appointed counsel began his penalty-phase 

summation as follows: 

What we’ve got here is a very simple question of what do we do with our junk. 

In a few minutes [the defendant] will speak with you . . . I’m just going to ask you 

to listen to the junk that’s been produced and that has done these unspeakable, heinous acts and then consider what to do. We kill our rabid dogs. And perhaps you 

may view him as that . . . . And that’s the question: What do we do with our junk? 

(Trial transcript at 1488–89). 

This lawyer continues to be appointed on capital cases in the Charleston, South 

Carolina area; all but one of his capital clients have been sentenced to death, and 

two have already been executed. 

State v. Joseph Gardner, a highly-publicized and racially-charged rape-murder 

case in which, a year prior to his appointment, lead defense counsel had participated as a prosecutor in a nationwide manhunt for the perpetrators. 

State v. Robert Conyers, in which a 74-year-old parttime public defender, handling 

his first death penalty case along with an annual caseload of 400 other 

courtappointed clients, advised his client to waive a jury sentencing by pleading 

guilty to a murder that he had committed at age 16. A state circuit judge, reviewing 

the case, recently found the attorney’s performance inadequate; the state is appealing. 

State v. Johnny Ray, in which defense counsel began preparing for their client’s 

capital re-sentencing just about a week before it began, and were later forced to acknowledge that their efforts were ‘‘disorganized, rushed . . . seat-of-the-pants.’’ A 

state judge, granting sentencing relief, noted that counsel had 11 months notice of 

the sentencing hearing, but that ‘‘[i]nexplicably, little or nothing was done until 

panic set in about two weeks before . . . .’’ and concluded that if the defense accorded to Mr. Ray were constitutionally adequate, ‘‘then we should dispense with 

the legalese and simply admit that the Sixth Amendment has no meaningful role 

in capital defense litigation.’’ The state is appealing this ruling. 

State v. Edward Lee Elmore is an interracial case involving the rape-murder of 

an elderly white woman and based entirely on circumstantial evidence. The county 

public defender was battling severe alcoholism at the time of the trial; his co-counsel, a private lawyer recruited and paid by other local attorneys hoping to avoid the 

appointment themselves, privately referred to his client as ‘‘a red-headed nigger.’’

Neither lawyer challenged questionable physical evidence, and hair evidence suggesting the defendant’s innocence remained tucked away in a state police locker for 

some 15 years. Raymond Bonner, ‘‘Old Evidence Resurfaces, Unsettling ’82 Murder,’’

New York Times (Dec. 12, 2000). 

State v. Robert Nance. Lead counsel in this capital case, a veteran public defender 

who gave up practicing law not long after this trial, suffered from mental impairment caused by dementia, alcohol abuse, heart disease, blood sugar fluctuations and 

four prescription medications, all of which have psychological side effects including 

sedation, disturbance of sleep, and impaired memory and planning ability. 

State v. Ronnie Howard. In this case, a South Carolina circuit judge solved the 

problem of whom to appoint by selecting the first two names—Acker and AnderVerDate Feb 1 2002 10:08 Sep 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00119 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\81606.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
116

son—from an alphabetical roster of the Greenville county bar. Neither lawyer had 

ever handled a capital case before, and failed to obtain such basic mitigating information as their client’s school military records in time for the trial. However, their 

errors were held insufficiently prejudicial to interfere with Mr. Howard’s execution 

on January 8, 1999. 

This list could go on and on. Of course, not every South Carolina capital case has 

been marred by inadequate defense counsel, and some cases have been very welldefended. My point is simply that in the absence of any sort of system for identifying and training competent counsel, and then matching them with the cases 

where they’re needed, compliance with the Sixth Amendment is hit-or-miss, and will 

remain so. 

There are only between 15 and 20 death penalty cases in South Carolina in any 

given year (and, on average, about 5 new death sentences), so a reliable system for 

assuring adequate an defense in each case would not be difficult to create. A statewide capital defender unit with a staff of five or six lawyers could handle most of 

the work, supplemented by appointments (by the statewide capital defender office) 

from a small, carefully-screened list of private counsel. This is exactly the sort of 

system whose creation would be encouraged by Title II of the Innocence Protection 

Act. South Carolina, like many other states, has given every indication that in the 

absence of such encouragement, nothing will change. 

THE FEDERAL COURTS

The relatively small number of capital cases in the federal courts make it difficult 

to compare the federal system for assigning counsel with those of the states. That 

said, it is notable that the capital-case counsel provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) and 

18 U.S.C. § 3005 have worked to ensure that the federal system provides adequate 

resources for the defense in such cases. While the federal system lacks an independent appointing authority, a 1994 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3005 that mandates 

involvement of the Federal Defender system in the appointment process has provided some of the benefits of such a system. As a result, the federal courts have 

avoided replicating the seemingly chronic problems of under-funded, under-trained 

and under-motivated counsel that have plagued so many of the states’ death penalty 

systems. 

As amended by the 1994 Federal Death penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. 3005 provides, in 

pertinent part:

Whoever is indicted for treason or other capital crime shall be allowed to 

make his full defense by counsel; and the court before which the defendant 

is to be tried, or a judge thereof, shall promptly, upon the defendant’s request, assign two such counsel, of whom at least 1 shall be learned in the 

law applicable to capital cases . . . . In assigning counsel under this section, the court shall consider the recommendation of the Federal Public Defender organization, or, if no such organization exists in the district, of the 

Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

Reflecting and explicating this statutory provision, Judicial Conference policy 

specifies that:

As required by statute, at the outset of every capital case, courts should appoint 

two counsel, at least one of whom is experienced in and knowledgeable about the 

defense of death penalty cases. Ordinarily, ‘‘learned counsel’’ should have distinguished prior experience in the trial . . . of federal death penalty cases, or . . . in 

state death penalty . . . that, in combination with co-counsel, will assure high quality representation.

Judicial Conference of the United States, Subcommittee on Federal Death Penalty 

Cases, Federal Death Penalty Cases: Recommendations Concerning the Cost and 

Ouality of Defense Representation (The ‘‘Spencer Committee Report’’) http://

www.uscourts.gov/dpenalty/2TABLE.htm (May 1998). While the implementation of 

this statute has not been uniform, it has generally meant that in each federal capital case, the Federal Defender’s office undertakes to identify highly-qualified capital 

defense counsel ‘‘with distinguished prior experience’’ for appointment. Most often, 

this effort to identify the best attorneys for appointment involves the assistance of 

contract counsel affiliated with the Federal Death Penalty Resource Counsel Project. 

The defender’s recommendation is usually accepted by the court. Recruitment of topflight capital defense attorneys has been made possible by a fairly uniform practice 

of compensating counsel at the statutory maximum rate of $125 per hour. 21 U.S.C. 

§ 848(q)(10)(A). 

It should be kept in mind that the federal death penalty system is still very small. 

Only a little over 200 capital prosecutions have been authorized by the Attorney 

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1Mr. Brackett erroneously attributes this evaluation to the South Carolina Department of 

Disabilities and Special Needs. In reality, the IQ testing was performed by Mr. T. V. Smith, 

an employee of the Department of Mental Health with an M.A. degree in psychology. 

General since enactment of the first modern federal death penalty statute in 1988, 

and most of those cases ended in a less-than-death sentence without the necessity 

of a jury trial. Given the relatively small scale of the federal death penalty to date, 

and the fact that federal judges can and do select counsel from the capital defense 

bar of the entire nation, it should not be surprising that the over-all quality of representation has been fairly high. Nevertheless, the federal experience does demonstrate that by allocating reasonable funding to the defense as well as the prosecution, and by relying on a recruitment process that emphasizes skill and experience 

instead of expedience or patronage, a court system can ensure that defendants in 

capital cases are adequately defended. This is an experience that the states can and 

should be encouraged to emulate.

FEDERAL

fDEATH PENALTY RESOURCE COUNSEL

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29201

July 2, 2001

Senator Patrick Leahy 

Chairman 

Senator Orrin G. Hatch 

Ranking Minority Member 

Judiciary Committee 

United States Senate 

Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Chairman Leahy and Senator Hatch, 

At last Wednesday’s hearing on Title II of S. 486, the Innocence Protection Act 

of 2001, some factual issues arose involving recent South Carolina capital cases. I 

write to set forth the relevant facts, and ask that this letter be accepted as a supplement to the statement that I previously submitted. 

In his written statement, Deputy Solicitor Kevin Brackett of South Carolina’s Sixteenth Judicial Circuit noted that he had personally attended the first lethal injection in South Carolina. After Mr. Brackett described the defense furnished to a defendant in one recent capital case in his circuit, Senator Feingold asked whether 

the execution Mr. Bracket had attended was that of Sylvester Adams on August 18, 

1995. Mr. Brackett acknowledged that it was, and that Mr. Adams’ case originated 

from Mr. Brackett’s home county of York. However, when Senator Feingold then 

asked whether Mr. Adams had been sentenced to death by a jury that had heard 

no mitigating evidence on his behalf, despite the fact that Mr. Adams’ IQ scores 

were in the mentally retarded range, Mr. Brackett responded as follows:

Well, I didn’t come prepared to discuss that in any detail. But I did review 

the file before I went down to see the execution . . . And it appeared from 

the files that the individual who tested his IQ at the Department of Disabilities and Special Needs found him to be malingering when they were attempting to determine what his IQ was. The expert that was appointed by 

the court to evaluate his IQ said that, basically, ‘‘I can’t tell you what his 

IQ is because he appears to be attempting to fake the results to this test 

to possibly get an advantage.’’ But I think that is indicative that perhaps 

he was not mentally retarded. 

Sen. Feingold then asked whether ‘‘on the day you watched Mr. Adams die, his 

lead defense attorney at his trial was sitting in federal prison?’’ Mr. Brackett responded that he had ‘‘no knowledge of who his defense counsel were at the various 

stages of the proceedings or where they might have been.’’ I represented Sylvester 

Adams in state and federal post-conviction proceedings, and thus am in a position 

to provide the information that Mr. Brackett did not have. 

Mental retardation. Prior to Sylvester Adams’ first trial, a state-employed examiner reported that Mr. Adams had a full-scale IQ score of 65.1 This examiner did 

not, as Mr. Brackett claims, accuse Mr. Adams of ‘‘attempting to fake the results,’’

but he did opine that Mr. Adams’ true IQ level might be between 70 and 80. The 

state’s chief forensic examiner nevertheless determined, and later testified in postconviction proceedings, that Mr. Adams suffered from mild mental retardation. 

Adams v. Aiken, 965 F.2d 1306, Joint Appendix at 1567 (4th Cir. 1992) (testimony 

of Herbert D. Smith, M.D.). After Mr. Adams’ convictions and death sentence were 

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2Mr. Brackett’s account of the Holmes retrial calls for some additional comments. His claim 

that a defense correctional expert received $500 per hour is incorrect. The expert to whom he 

referred was paid $125 an hour, and no other witness received anything like the $500 rate about 

which he complains. His claim that he does not know ‘‘who paid’’ for Mr. Holmes, additional 

attorneys is hard to credit, since the trial record plainly reflects that these attorneys were volunteers from the Washington, D.C. firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld who were not paid 

a penny, by anyone, for their unprecedented contribution to the defense of this indigent South 

Carolina death row inmate. Mr. Brackett also failed to note that Mr. Holmes’ unusual defense 

team was assembled only after the trial judge arbitrarily refused to reappoint the lawyer who 

had successfully represented Mr. Holmes in post-conviction proceedings, former S.C. Death Penalty Resource Center Director John H. Blume. 

Unfortunately, the Holmes case marks the only occasion in at least the past 25 years in which 

an out-of-state firm has volunteered to assist a South Carolina capital defendant at the trial 

level, and the appointment (or compensation) of any out-of-state attorney is expressly prohibited 

by South Carolina law. S.C. Code § 16–3–26(I) (Supp. 2000). 

reversed by the state supreme court, a second trial was held at which the defense 

presented no mitigation evidence whatever on Mr. Adams’ behalf. He was again sentenced to death. In 1984, an experienced forensic psychologist retained by the defense retested Mr. Adams and found him to have a full-scale IQ of 69—still within 

the range of mental retardation. Application for Executive Clemency in the Matter 

of Sylvester Lewis Adams, Aug. 9, 1995, Appendix C ¿ 11 (Affidavit of David R. 

Price, Ph. D). As the Charlotte Observer summarized the facts in an editorial two 

days before Mr. Adams was executed, ‘‘the jurors who imposed the death sentence 

were never told that Sylvester Adams . . . is mentally retarded. Tests show he has 

an IQ of between 65 and 69.’’ ‘‘Mercy Denied,’’ Charlotte Observer at 10–A (Aug. 16, 

1995). 

Defense counsel’s subsequent imprisonment. Senator Feingold also inquired of Mr. 

Brackett about the whereabouts of Mr. Adams’ ‘‘lead defense attorney at . . . trial’’

on the day of his execution. While Mr. Brackett correctly recalled that I was present 

when Mr. Adams was executed, I did not represent him at trial. Mr. Adams’ lead 

defense counsel at both of his trials was Samuel B. Fewell, Jr. Neither Mr. Fewell 

nor the young public defender who served as his co-counsel had ever tried another 

death penalty case. By the time of Mr. Adams’ execution, Fewell had been disbarred, and was serving a federal prison sentence, after pleading guilty in federal 

court to tax fraud and possession of cocaine, and in state court to two counts of 

criminal conspiracy for having a client provide sexual favors to a family court judge 

in exchange for favorable rulings. In the Matter of Samuel B. Fewell, Jr., 450 S.E.2d 

46 (S.C. 1994). Bob McAlister, Mitigating circumstances are there for Sylvester 

Adams, too,’’ The State (Columbia, S.C.) A–7 (Aug. 14, 1995). 

In my statement to the Committee, I described several South Carolina capital 

cases in which the state clearly failed to provide minimally adequate defense representation. The Adams case was another. Mr. Brackett points to yet another York 

County case, State v. Bobby Lee Holmes, in which the quality of the defendant’s 

legal representation was good.2

The conclusion that can and should be drawn from this record is that some capital 

defendants in South Carolina receive an adequate defense, and some don’t. Until 

South Carolina and other states like it adopt some sort of fair and reliable system 

for identifying, training, appointing and monitoring the lawyers who represent the 

poor in death penalty cases—the sort of system that Title II of S. 486 would encourage—capital cases will continue to resemble a lottery, in which the right to counsel 

and to a fair and reliable trial turns on the luck of the draw. 

Yours truly,

f DAVID I. BRUCK

Statement of Constitution Project’s Death Penalty Initiative, Washington, 

DC 

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

I. EFFECTIVE COUNSEL

Every jurisdiction that imposes capital punishment should create an independent 

authority to screen, appoint, train, and supervise lawyers to represent defendants 

charged with a capital crime. It should set minimum standards for these lawyers’

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performance. An existing public defender system may comply if it implements the 

proper standards and procedures. 

Capital defense lawyers should be adequately compensated, and the defense 

should be provided with adequate funding for experts and investigators. 

The current Supreme Court standard for effective assistance of counsel (Strickland v. Washington) is poorly suited to capital cases. It should be replaced in such 

cases by a standard requiring professional competence in death penalty representation. 

II. PROHIBITING EXECUTION IN CASES INVOLVING QUESTIONABLE CATEGORIES OF

DEFENDANTS AND HOMICIDES

Mentally retarded persons should not be eligible for the death penalty. 

Persons under the age of eighteen at the time the crime was committed should 

not be eligible for the death penalty. 

Persons convicted of felony murder, and who did not kill, intend to kill, or intend 

that a killing take place, should not be eligible for the death penalty. 

III. EXPANDING AND EXPLAINING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE (LWOP)

Life without the possibility of parole should be a sentencing option in all death 

penalty cases in every jurisdiction that imposes capital punishment. 

The judge should inform the jury in a capital sentencing proceeding about all 

statutorily authorized sentencing options, including the true length of a sentence of 

life without parole. This is commonly known as ‘‘truth in sentencing.’’

IV. SAFEGUARDING RACIAL FAIRNESS

All jurisdictions that impose the death penalty should create mechanisms to help 

ensure that the death penalty is not imposed in a racially discriminatory manner. 

V. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

Every state should adopt procedures for ensuring that death sentences are meted 

out in a proportionate manner to make sure that the death penalty is being administered in a rational, nonarbitrary, and even-handed fashion, to provide a check on 

broad prosecutorial discretion, and to prevent discrimination from playing a role in 

the capital decision-making process. 

VI. PROTECTION AGAINST WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND SENTENCE

DNA evidence should be preserved and it should be tested and introduced in cases 

where it may help to establish that an execution would be unjust. 

All jurisdictions that impose capital punishment should ensure adequate mechanisms for introducing newly discovered evidence that would more likely than not 

produce a different outcome at trial or that would undermine confidence that the 

sentence is reliable, even though the defense would otherwise be prevented from introducing the evidence because of procedural barriers. 

VII. DUTY OF JUDGE AND ROLE OF JURY

If a jury imposes a life sentence, the judge in the case should not be allowed to 

‘‘override’’ the jury’s recommendation and replace it with a sentence of death. 

The judge in a death penalty trial should instruct the jury at sentencing that if 

any juror has a lingering doubt about the defendant’s guilt, that doubt may be considered as a ‘‘mitigating’’ circumstance that weighs against a death sentence. 

The judge in a death penalty trial must ensure that each juror understands his 

or her individual obligation to consider mitigating factors in deciding whether a 

death sentence is appropriate under the circumstances. 

VIII. ROLE OF PROSECUTORS

Prosecutors should provide ‘‘open-file discovery’’ to the defense in death penalty 

cases. Prosecutors’ offices in jurisdictions with the death penalty must develop effective systems for gathering all relevant information from law enforcement and investigative agencies. Even if a jurisdiction does not adopt open-file discovery, it is especially critical in capital cases that the defense be given all favorable evidence (Brady 

material), and that the jurisdiction create systems to gather and review all potentially favorable information from law enforcement and investigative agencies. 

Prosecutors should establish internal guidelines on seeking the death penalty in 

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tions and statements of informants and co-defendants) particularly subject to 

human error. 

Prosecutors should engage in a period of reflection and consultation before any decision to seek the death penalty is made or announced.

BLACK LETTER RECOMMENDATIONS 

fI. EFFECTIVE COUNSEL

1) Creation of Independent Appointing Authorities 

Each state should create or maintain a central, independent appointing authority 

whose role is to ‘‘recruit, select, train, monitor, support, and assist’’ attorneys who 

represent capital clients (ABA Report). The authority should be composed of attorneys knowledgeable about criminal defense in capital cases, and who will operate 

independent of conflicts of interest with judges, prosecutors, or any other parties. 

This authority should adopt and enforce a set of minimum standards for appointed 

counsel at all stages of capital cases, including state or federal post-conviction and 

certiorari. An existing statewide public defender office or other assigned counsel program should meet the definition of a central appointing authority, providing it implements the proper standards and procedures. 

2) Provision of Competent and Adequately Compensated Counsel at All States of 

Capital Litigation and Provision of Adequate Funding for Expert and Investigative Services 

Every capital defendant should be provided with qualified and adequately compensated attorneys at every stage of the capital proceeding, including state and federal postconviction and certiorari. Each jurisdiction should adopt a stringent and 

uniform set of qualifications for capital defense at each stage of the proceedings. 

Capital attorneys should be guaranteed adequate compensation for their services, at 

a level that reflects the ‘‘extraordinary responsibilities inherent in death penalty litigation’’ (ABA Report). Such compensation should be set according to actual time and 

service performed, and should be sufficient to ensure that an attorney meeting his 

or her professional responsibility to provide competent representation will receive 

compensation adequate for reasonable overhead; reasonable litigation expenses; reasonable expenses for expert, investigative, support, and other services; and a reasonable return. 

3) Replacement of the Strickland v. Wahsington Standard for Effective Assistance 

of Counsel at Capital Sentencing 

Every state that permits the death penalty should adopt a more demanding 

standard to replace the current test for effective assistance of counsel in the capital 

sentencing context. Counsel should be required to perform at the level of an attorney reasonably skilled in the specialized practice of capital representation, be zealously committed to the capital case, and possess adequate time and resources to prepare. (NLADA Standards) Once a defendant has demonstrated that his or her counsel fell below the minimum standard of professional competence in death penalty 

litigation, the burden should shift to the state to demonstrate that the outcome of 

the sentencing hearing was not affected by the attorney’s incompetence. Moreover, 

there should be a strong presumption in favor of the attorney’s obligation to offer 

at least some mitigating evidence. 

II. PROHIBITING EXECUTION IN CASES INVOLVING QUESTIONABLE CATEGORIES OF

DEFENDANTS AND HOMICIDES

To reduce the unacceptably high risk of wrongful execution in certain categories 

of cases, to ensure that the death penalty is reserved for the most culpable offenders, and to effectuate the deterrent and retributive purposes of the death penalty, 

jurisdictions should limit the cases eligible for capital punishment to exclude those 

involving (1) the mentally retarded; (2) persons under the age of eighteen at the 

time of the crimes for which they were convicted; and (3) those convicted of felony 

murder who did not kill, intend to kill, or intend that a killing occur. 

III. EXPANDING AND EXPLAINING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE (LWOP)

1) Availability of Life Sentence without Parole 

In all capital cases, the sentencer should be provided with the option of a life sentence without the possibility of parole. 

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2) Meaning of Life Sentence without Parole (Truth in Sentencing) 

At the sentencing phase of any capital case in which the jury has a role in determining the sentence imposed on the defendant, the court shall inform the jury of 

the minimum length of time those convicted of murder must serve before being eligible for parole. However, the trial court should not make statements or give instructions suggesting that the jury’s verdict will or may be reviewed or reconsidered by 

anyone else, or that any sentence it imposes will or may be overturned or commuted. 

IV. SAFEGUARDING RACIAL FAIRNESS

Each jurisdiction should undertake a comprehensive program to help ensure that 

racial discrimination plays no role in its capital punishment system, and to thereby 

enhance public confidence in the system. Because these issues are so complex and 

difficult, two approaches are appropriate. One very important component—perhaps 

the most important—is the rigorous gathering of data on the operation of the capital 

punishment system and the role of race in it. A second component is to bring members of all races into every level of the decision-making process. 

V. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

In order to (1) ensure that the death penalty is being administered in a rational, 

non-arbitrary, and even-handed manner; (2) provide a check on broad prosecutorial 

discretion; and (3) prevent discrimination from playing a role in the capital decisionmaking process, every state should adopt procedures for ensuring that death sentences are meted out in a proportionate manner. 

VI. PROTECTION AGAINST WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND SENTENCE

1) Preservation and Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence or Avoid Unjust 

Execution 

In cases where the defendant has been sentenced to death, states and the federal 

government should enact legislation that requires the preservation and permits the 

testing of biological materials not previously subjected to effective DNA testing, 

where such preservation or testing may produce evidence favorable to the defendant 

and relevant to the claim that he or she was wrongfully convicted or sentenced. 

These laws should provide that biological materials must be generally preserved and 

that, as to convicted defendants, existing biological materials must be preserved 

until defendants can be notified and provided an opportunity to request testing 

under the jurisdiction’s DNA testing requirements. These laws should provide for 

the use of public fimds to conduct the testing and to appoint counsel where the convicted defendant is indigent. If exculpatory evidence is produced by such testing, 

notwithstanding other procedural bars or time limitations, legislation should provide 

that the evidence may be presented at a hearing to determine whether the conviction or sentence was wrongful. If the conviction or sentence is shown to be erroneous, the legislation should require that the conviction or sentence be vacated. 

2) Lifting Procedural Barriers to Introduction of Exculpatory Evidence 

State and federal courts should ensure that every capital defendant is provided 

an adequate mechanism for introducing newly discovered evidence that would otherwise be procedurally barred, where it would more likely than not produce a different 

outcome at trial, or where it would undermine confidence in the reliability of the 

sentence. 

VII. DUTY OF JUDGE AND ROLE OF JURY

1) Eliminating Authorization for Judicial Override of a Jury’s Recommendation of 

a Life Sentence to Impose a Sentence of Death 

Judicial override of a jury’s recommendation of life imprisonment to impose a sentence of death should be prohibited. Where a court determines that a death sentence 

would be disproportionate, where it believes doubt remains as to the guilt of one 

sentenced to death, or where the interests of justice require it, the trial court should 

be granted authority to impose a life sentence despite the jury’s recommendation of 

death. 

2) Lingering (Residual) Doubt 

The trial judge, in each case in which he or she deems such an instruction appropriate, should instruct the jury, at the conclusion of the sentencing phase of a capital case and before the jury retires to deliberate, as follows: ‘‘If you have any lingering doubt as to the defendant’s guilt of the crime or any element of the crime, 

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even though that doubt did not rise to the level of a reasonable doubt when you 

found the defendant guilty, you may consider that doubt as a mitigating circumstance weighing against a death sentence for the defendant.’’

3) Ensuring That Capital Sentencing Juries Understand Their Obligation to Consider Mitigating Factors 

Every judge presiding at a capital sentencing hearing has an affirmative obligation to ensure that the jury fully and accurately understands the nature of its duty. 

The judge must clearly communicate to the jury that it retains the ultimate moral 

decision-making power over whether the defendant lives or dies, and must also communicate that (1) mitigating factors do not need to be found by all members of the 

jury in order to be considered in the individual juror’s sentencing decision, and (2) 

mitigating circumstances need to be proved only to the satisfaction of the individual 

juror, and not beyond a reasonable doubt, to be considered in the juror’s sentencing 

decision. In light of empirical evidence documenting serious juror confusion on the 

nature of the jury’s obligation, judges must ensure that jurors understand, for example, that this decision rests in the jury’s hands, that it is not a mechanical decision 

to be discharged by a numerical tally of aggravating and mitigating factors, that it 

requires the jury to consider the defendant’s mitigating evidence, and that it permits the jury to decline to sentence the defendant to death even if sufficient aggravating factors exist. 

The judge’s obligation to ensure that jurors understand the scope of their moral 

authority and duty is affirmative in nature. Judges should not consider it discharged simply because they have given standard jury instructions. If judges have 

reason to think such instructions may be misleading, they should instruct the jury 

in more accessible and less ambiguous language. In addition, if the jury asks for 

clarification on these difficult and crucial issues, judges should offer clarification 

and not simply direct the jury to reread the instructions. 

VIII. ROLE OF PROSECUTORS

1) Providing Expanded Discovery in Death Penalty Cases and Ensuring That in 

Death Penalty Prosecutions Exculpatory Information Is Provided to the Defense 

Because of the paramount interest in avoiding the execution of an innocent person, special discovery provisions should be established to govern death penalty 

cases. These provisions should provide for discovery from the prosecution that is as 

full and complete as possible, consistent with the requirements of public safety. 

Full ‘‘open-file’’ discovery should be required in capital cases. However, discovery 

of the prosecutor’s files means nothing if the relevant information is not contained 

in those files. Thus, to make discovery effective in death penalty cases, the prosecution must obtain all relevant information from all agencies involved in investigating 

the case or analyzing evidence. Disclosure should be withheld only when the prosecution clearly demonstrates that restrictions are required to protect witnesses’ safety or shows similarly substantial threats to public safety. 

If a jurisdiction fails to adopt full open-file discovery for its capital cases, it must 

ensure that it provides all exculpatory (Brady) evidence to the defense. In order to 

ensure compliance with this obligation, the prosecution should be required to certify 

that (1) it has requested that all investigative agencies involved in the investigation 

of the case and examination of evidence deliver to it all documents, information, and 

materials relevant to the case and that the agencies have indicated their compliance; (2) a named prosecutor or prosecutors have inspected all these materials to 

determine if they contain any evidence favorable to the defense as to either guilt 

or sentencing; and (3) all arguably favorable information has been either provided 

to the defense or submitted to the trial judge for in camera review to determine 

whether such evidence meets the Brady standards of helpfulness to the defense and 

materiality to outcome. When willful violations of Brady duties are found, meaningful sanctions should be imposed. 

2) Establishing Internal Prosecutorial Guidelines or Protocols on Seeking the Death 

Penalty Where Questionable Evidence Increases the Likelihood That the Innocent 

Will Be Executed 

Because eyewitness identifications by strangers are fallible, co-defendants are 

prone to lie and blame other participants in order to reduce their own guilt or sentence, and jailhouse informants frequently have the opportunity and the clear motivation to fabricate evidence to benefit their status at the expense of justice, prosecutors should establish guidelines limiting reliance on such questionable evidence in 

death penalty cases. The guidelines should put that penalty off limits where the 

guilt of the defendant or the likelihood of receiving a capital sentence depends upon 

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these types of evidence and where independent corroborating evidence is unavailable. 

3) Requiring Mandatory Period of Consultation before Commencing Death Penalty 

Prosecution 

Before the decision to prosecute a case capitally is announced or commenced, a 

specified time period should be set aside during which the prosecution is to examine 

the propriety of seeking the death penalty and to consult with appropriate officials 

and parties.

Statement of Hon. Richard J. Durbin, a U.S. Senator from the State of 

fIllinois 

In the course of the past seventeen months since Governor George Ryan declared 

a moratorium on all executions in my home state of Illinois, a healthy national debate on the topic of death penalty has ensued. I want to thank Chairman Leahy 

for continuing to keep this issue in the forefront of our national agenda by holding 

this hearing today. 

We cannot understate the importance of having competent counsel represent a 

person charged with a crime, especially if that person faces the ultimate penalty of 

death. Like prosecutors, defense attorneys play an integral role in our adversarial 

process. The criminal justice system works best when both sides are adequately represented as this judicial process is the most effective means of getting at truth and 

rendering justice. 

But we cannot forget that for many criminal defendants, it is simply not possible 

to hire the best lawyers in town to represent them. For them, their only hope is 

to pray that the public defender or court-appointed counsel they will end up getting 

is an experienced lawyer with competence and conscience. But we have seen that 

often, this is a luck of the draw. We have all read about attorneys who were appointed to defend capital cases even though they have never handled a criminal case 

before, or attorneys who sleep through trials, or show up in court under influence 

of alcohol. 

It has often been said that ‘‘it is better to be rich and guilty than poor and innocent.’’ I hope this statement does not reflect the real state of affairs in the American 

criminal justice system. The witnesses we will hear from today will hopefully tell 

us that getting assigned an incompetent counsel is the rare exception rather than 

the norm. If not, it is incumbent upon this Senate to act in the best interest of our 

criminal justice system by identifying the causes of these problems, and providing 

innovative and common sense legislative solutions. 

That is why today, I reintroduced a bipartisan legislation with Senator Chafee to 

provide student loan forgiveness for public defenders under the Federal Perkins 

Loan program. The Higher Education Act of 1965 already provides loan forgiveness 

for law enforcement officers, which the Department of Education interprets to include prosecuting attorneys. But the Department’s interpretation excludes public defense attorneys. This policy creates an obvious disparity of resources between public 

defenders and prosecutors by encouraging talented law students and lawyers to pursue public service as prosecutors but not as defenders. 

My bill provides parity to full-time public defenders who play an equally important role in the adversarial process of our judicial system. Like prosecuting attorneys, public defenders are law enforcement officers dedicated to upholding, protecting, and enforcing our laws. Providing loan forgiveness incentive to these attorneys will lead to a larger pool of competent counsel to defend death penalty cases, 

which is consistent with the goals set forth by the Supreme Court to equalize access 

to legal resources.

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1 I am the Executive Director of the Equal Justice Initiative (EJI) in Montgomery, Alabama. 

I have represented capital defendants and death row prisoners for nearly 17 years. I am also 

an Assistant Professor of Law at the New York University School of Law where I teach, among 

other things, Postconviction Remedies, Capital Punishment Law and Litigation, and Race, Poverty and Criminal Justice. I have handled dozens of capital cases, conducted postconviction litigation in the capital and noncapital areas and consulted on these matters for many years. 

Statement of Equal Justice Initiative, Bryan A. Stevenson,

f 1 Executive 

Director, Montgomery, Alabama 

Thank you for the opportunity to address the much needed legislation pending before this Committee. The ‘‘Innocence Protection Act’’ is an enormously important 

step forward in the effort to improve the administration of criminal justice in the 

United States. DNA testing technology has dramatically advanced forensic science 

and criminal case investigations. However, unless addressed, the current crisis surrounding adequate legal assistance to death row prisoners and capital defendants 

will seriously compromise any meaningful, reform which attempts to reduce the incidence of wrongful convictions and executions through DNA testing. 

The Innocence Protection Act will do much to restore confidence in many criminal 

cases where biological. evidence can resolve lingering questions about guilt or innocence. Our nation’s status as the worlds leading democracy and our activism on 

human rights in the international context requires us to take all steps possible to 

protect against wrongful convictions and execution of the innocent. Improved procedures for postconviction DNA testing will tremendously aid the goal of more reliable 

and equitable administration of criminal justice. However, it is worth emphasizing 

that DNA testing will influence a relatively small subset of cases where innocent 

people have been wrongly convicted. Improved, access to DNA testing for. prisoners 

will be useful only in those cases where (1) biological evidence can determinatively 

establish guilt or innocence, most notably rape, rape-murder and sexual assault 

cases, (2) the accused is still in prison or on death row and, most likely, had his 

case tried before 1994, and (3) the biological evidence has been preserved and is still 

available for testing. This is a relatively fixed and finite universe of cases. 

In most instances postconviction DNA testing has required the assistance of counsel to accomplish the exoneration of an innocent person who has been wrongly 

comvicted of a crime. The provisions in the Innocence Protection Acr for improving 

defense services to prisoners who have been wrongly convicted are thus crucial to 

the effectiveness of any effort to protect innocent people from wrongful incarceration 

or execution. 

THE CRISIS SURROUNDING LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF DEATH ROW PRISONERS

In the last 30 years the number of people incarcerated in the United States has 

increased dramatically. In 1972, there were 200,000 people in jails and prisons. 

Today there are over 2,000,000 people incarcerated. The dramatic increase in the 

number of people imprisoned has presented enormous challenges to the fair administration of criminal justice. 

The extraordinary increase in the number of people prosecuted and imprisoned 

has strained the ability of state governments to provide adequate legal representation to the accused or the indigent and to protect against wrongful conviction of the 

innocent. 

In the death penalty arena this problem is especially acute. There are now close 

to 3,900 people on death row in the United States. Hundreds of these condemned 

prisoners have no legal representation. The ability of indigent death row prisoners 

to find competent legal representation throughout the litigation process has created 

tremendous uncertainty and raised serious concerns abouc the fairness and reliability of capital sentencing in many jurisdictions—The problems involved in providing adequate counsel to capital defendants and death row prisoners are the primary reasons why the American Bar Association has recommended that a nationwide moratorium on capital punishment be implemented. 

The Crisis in Alabama 

There are now 185 people under sentence of death in Alabama. The size of Alabama’s death row has doubled in the last ten years. In 1989, there were 90 people 

under sentence of death, in Alabama. Alabama now has the third largest death row 

per capita in the United States and the number of death sentenced prisoners is 

growing at a pace that greatly exceeds other death penalty jurisdictions. In 1998–

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2 In the other states of the Eleventh Circuit there are state funded services to assist death 

row prisoners in the timley filing of state and federal collateral challenges to their convictions 

and sentences. The Georgia Appellate Practice and Educational Resource Center received nearly 

$1 million dollars in its 1999 appropriation from the Georgia legislature. Supreme Court of 

Georgia, 1998 Annual Report on the Work of the Georgia Courts, Judicial Branch in Review, 

Stare Appropriations for the Judicial Branch; Fiscal Years 1997, 1998 and 1999—Florida’s Office 

of the Capital Collateral Representative exclusively represents death-sentenced inmates and received over $8,000,000 in its 1999 legislative appropriation. Mary Smith Judd, ‘‘Changes continue in death sentence appeals arena,’’ The Florida Bar News, June 15, 1998. 3This compensation was increased from $600 to $1,000 by the Alabama legislature, elective 

,June 10, 1999. Ala. Code 415–12–23 (1975), as amended by Act 99–427 (1999). 4 A survey of volunteer lawyers who took on death penalty appeals found the median amount 

of work on each appeal was 665 hours. Howard The Defunding of the Post Conviction Defense 

Organizations as a Denial of the Right to Counsel, 98 W.Va—L.Rev. 863, 893 (Spring 1996). 5Preparation and filing of a Rule 32 petition requires a complete reading of the trial transcript, appellate briefs and pleadings, an investigation into factual based claims such as innocence, jury misconduct, discovery violations, ineffective assistance of counsel anal thorough preparation for a host of complex procedural issues unique to collateral litigation relating to exhaustion, retroactiviry, procedural default, res judicata, the Anti-Terrorism and Effecrive Death Penalty Act (AFDPA) and federal habeas corpus jurisprudence. The Mississippi Supreme Court has 

recently recognized that ‘‘[applications for post-conviction relief often raise issues which require 

investigation, analysis and presentation of facts outside the appellate record. The inmate is confined, unable to investigate, and often without training in the law or the mental ability to comprehend the requirements of the [state law]. The inmate is in effect denied meaningful access 

to the courts by lack of funds for this state-provided remedy.’’ Jackson v. State, 732 So. 2d 187, 

190 (Miss. 1999). 

1999, the last year for which data is currently available, Alabama sentenced more 

people to death per capita than any other state in the country. (See Appendix A) 

EJI’s records indicate that there are currently over 300 people awaiting capital 

murder trials across the state of Alabama. This is an enormously high number of 

pending capital prosecutions for a state with a population of only 4.5 million people. 

While lawyers are appointed to handle trials and direct appeals in Alabama death 

penalty cases, until recently, compensation to appointed lawyers in capital cases 

was capped at $1000 per case for an attorney’s out of couxt time. Most of the people 

currently under sentence of death in Alabama were defended by attorneys whose 

compensation was severely restricted. The result is that many poor people were convicted of capital crimes in trials that lasted less than 2 days. Many death row prisoners were defended by attorneys who have subsequently been disbarred or suspended from the practice of law due to serious failures in adequately protecting the 

legal rights of clients. 

Alabama is one of the few jurisdictions in the country that has no state funded 

mechanism for providing lawyers to death row prisoners once a conviction and death 

sentence is affirmed by state courts on direct appeal.2 If a death row prisoner seeks 

review of his conviction and sentence on direct appeal in the United States Supreme 

Court, a volunteer lawyer must be found. If state collateral appeals are to be filed 

under Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, volunteer counsel must 

also be found. 

The increasing number of death row prisoners needing counsel for postconviction 

appeals has greatly exceeded the supply of volunteer attorneys willing to take on 

these difficult cases. Consequently, there are many death row prisoners who are 

currently without legal representation and who have been unable to file appeals 

under Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure or under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. 

While there is language that permits a trial judge to appoint counsel after a Rule 

32 petition has been filed, Ala. R. Crim. Pro. 32.7(c), state law currently limits compensation to the appointed counsel to $1,000 per case.3 The ridiculously low level 

of compensation makes involvement by counsel in these cases effectively pro bono 

work. Moreover, since hundreds of hours of work are required before a petition is 

filed,4 there must be an assignment of counsel months before a petition is filed and 

much time-consuming and costly work undertaken.5 Death row prisoners can not 

safely initiate litigation pro se with any protection against adverse rulings or summary dismissals. 

In some jurisdictions, the state Supreme Court assumes responsibility for recruiting and assigning counsel to death row prisoners after the direct appeal is complete. 

See e.g., Cal. Gov. Code § 68662 (2000) (‘‘The Supreme Court of shall offer to appoint 

counsel to represent all state prisoners subject to a capital sentence for purposes 

of state postconvietion proceedings. . .’’); Miss. Code Ann. § 99–39–23(9) (2000). 

In many jurisdictions, either a state-wide public defender system ensures that indigent persons receive access to counsel or state-funded agencies have been created 

to provide legal representation to death row prisoners for state and federal, collatVerDate Feb 1 2002 10:08 Sep 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00129 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\81606.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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6The Attorney General’s Office in Alabama will seek summary dismissal of claims even 

though death row prisoners are unrepresented, seeking counsel and filed petitions pro se. For 

example, in Donald Dallas’ case, a pro se petition was filed. The trial judge then granted the 

State’s motion to dismiss most of the claims in the petition eliminating the possibility of relief. 

Only months after most claims had been decided adversely to Mr. Dallas was counsel appointed 

to represent him. Donald Dallas’ case is still pending in the Montgomery County Circuit Court. 

See Dallas v. State, Case No. CC–94–2142. 7See e.g., Exparte Richard Flowers,—So. 2d—, CR–97–1254 (Ala. Crlin. App. Oct. 27, 2000), 

cent. deiced, So. 2d—, No. 1000577 (Ala. Mar. 30, 2001); Ex parte Roy Perkins, —So. 2d—, No. 

(Ala. Mar. 30, 2001); Ex parte Trace Duncan, So. 2d—, No. 1990652 (Ala. Mar. 30, 2001); Ex 

parte Andrew Apicella,—So. 2d—, No. 1992273 (Ala. Mar. 30, 2001); Ex parte Joseph Smith,— So. 2d—, CR–98–0206 (Ala. Crim. App. May 26, 2000), cert. denied,—So. 2d—, No. 1992220 (Ala. 

Mar. 16, 2001); Ex parte Jarrod Taylor,—So. 2d—, No. 1991307 (Ala. Mar. 9, 2001); Ex parte 

LaSarguel Gamble,—So. 2d—, CR–97–0698 (Ala. Crim. App. June 30, 2000), cert. denied,—So. 

2d—, No. 1992229 (Ala. Mar. 2, 2001); Ex parte Geoffrey West,—So. 2d—, CR–98–1956 (Ala. 

Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2000), cert. denied,—So. 2d—, No. 1000231(Al.a. Feb. 23, 2001); Ex parte 

Marcus Williams, So. 2d—, No. 1990902 (Ala. Jan. 12, 2001); F -x parte Eddie Powell,—So. 2d— , No. 1990546 (Ala. Jan, 12, 2001); Ex parte Nicholas Acklin,—So. 2d—¥, CR–98–0330 (Ala. 

Crim. .App. Apr. 28, 2000), cert. denied,—So. 2d—, No. 1991908 (Ala. Jan. 12, 2001); Ex harte 

Joe an les, -So. 2d—, CR–98–2417 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2000), cert, denied,- So. 2d—, No. 

1991959 (Ala. Dec.15, 2000); Ex parte’Ion.yBarhsdale,—So. 2d—, CR–96–07 54 (Ala. Crim. App. 

Mar. 31, 2000), cert. denied,—-—So. 2d—, No- 1992230 (Ala. Dec. 15, 2000); Ex parte Anthony 

Tyson,—So. 2d—, CIZ–98–0267 (Ala. Crim. App. Feb. 4, 2000), cert. denied, ,—So. 2d—, No. 

1991309 (Ala. Nov. 17, 2000); Ex parte John Hardy,—So. 2d—— No. 1981646 (Ala. Nov, 3, 

2000); Ex parte Jeremiah Jackson,—So. 2d—, CR–97–0998 (Ala. Crim. App. Mar. 31, 2000), cert. denied, So. 2d—, No. 1991742 (Ala. Nov. 3, 2000); Ex parte Willie Burgess,—So. 2d—, No. 

1980803 (Ala. Aug. 25, 2000); Ex parte Casey McWhorter,—So. 2d—, No. 1990427 (Ala. Aug. 11, 

2000); Ex parte Robert Melsod, 775 So. 2d—904 (Ala. Aug. 4, 2400); Ex parte Frederick 

WoodT1,—So. 2d—, No. 1990867 (Ala. Jan. 12, 2001); Ex parte Larry Whitehead, 777 So. 2d— 854 (Ala. Jun. 30, 2000); Ex parte Artez Hammonds, , So. 2d—, No. 1.990258 (Ala. juri. 23, 

2000); Ex parte Robert Ingram, So. 2d—, No. 1990282 (Ala. Jun—23, 2000); Ex parte Joseph Wil- son, 777 So. 2d—935 (Ala.—)un. 23, 2000); Ex parte Kenneth Loggins, 771 So. 2d—1093 (Ala. 

Jun. 2, 2000); Ex parte Derrick Mason, 768 So. 2d—1008 (Ma. Apr. 7, 2000); Ex parte Marcus 

Presley, 770 So. 2d—143 (Ala—— Apr. 7, 2000), and Ex parte Marcus Presley, 770 So. 2d 114 

(Ala. Mar. 31, 2000); Ex parte Wayne Travie, 776 So. 2d—874 (Ala. Mar. 31, 2000); Ex parte 

David Freeman, 776 So. 2d—203 (Ala. Mar. 10, 2000); Ex parte Matthew Hyde, 778 So. 2d— 237 (Ala. Mar. 10, 2000); Ex arte Michael Samra, 771 So. 2d—1122 (Ala. Mar. 3, 2000); Ex parte 

Lines Borden, 769 So. 2d—950 (Ala. Feb. 4, 2000); Ex parte Demetrius Frazier, 758 So. 2d— 611(Ala. Dec. 30,1999); Ex parte Ronald Smith, 756 So. 2d—957 (Ala. Jan 21, 2000). 

eral review procedures. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 27.702 (2000); 2000 Miss. Laws Ch. 569 

(H.B. 1228); Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40–30–301–309 (1999); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7A– 486–3 (2000); Cal. Gov. Code § 68661 (2000); Ill. Stat. ch. 725 § 5,122–4 (2000); Okla. 

Stat. tit-22, § 1089 (2000). 

Filing postconviction pecid.ons pro se is not a viable option for death row prisoners who do not have counsel. Alabama courts have interpreted its procedural 

rules to require the dismissal of claims that lack factual specificity. The Alabama 

Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that petitioners ‘‘shall have the burden of 

pleading and proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief.’’ Ala. Crim. R. Pro. 32.3. 

Rule 32.6(b), requires that Rule 32 petitioners plead each claim by fully disclosing 

the factual basis for each claim. Claims not meeting this burden of pleading are due 

to be dismissed. Most claims in petitions filed pro se by indigent death row prisoners necessarily will be dismissed. Without the ability to investigate claims personally or pay for someone else to conduct an investigation, it is impossible for indigent 

prisoners in a maximum security prison to develop any facts to provide the required 

specificity needed to avoid summary dismissal for most constitutional claims.6

The crises surrounding counsel for indigent death row prisoners in Alabama is 

likely to get worse. There are forty-two (42) death row prisoners who currently need 

counsel. Many of these indigent prisoners have had their convictions and death sentences recently affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court and are months away from 

deadlines which could bar their appeals.7 There are dozens of other cases which 

could soon be affirmed where death row prisoners will need counsel. 

There is an immediate need to have a system established for providing adequately 

trained and compensated counsel to death row prisoners for postconviction review. 

Without such a system, unreliability and unfairness will continue to characterize 

the administration of capital punishment and the risk of executing the innocent will 

be unacceptably high. 

Recent Congressional Enactments Have Exacerbated the Problem 

The problem of providing lawyers to death row prisoners for state and federal 

post-conviction appeals has been acute for many years. The problem has been worsened by recent legal developments that have shortened the period of time by which 

127

8 Increases in the total number of people on death row, many of whom rely on pro bono legal 

assistance, has drained the available number of lawyers to assist Alabama prisoners. Less than 

20 percent of the death row prisoners in Alabama, who have counsel, are represented by law 

firms or attorneys who are not members of the state bar. Moreover, there has been a general 

decrease in pro bono assistance among large law firms. In 1992 lawyers at the 100 highestgrossing law firms volunteered an average of 56 hours a year, in 1999 the lawyers at those same 

fines averaged 36 hours a year. Winter, ‘‘Legal Firms Cutting Back on Free Services for Poor,’’

New York Times, Aug—17, 2000 at Al. See also, ‘‘Lack of Lawyers Hinders Appeals in Capital 

Cases,’’ New York Times, July 5, 2001. 

collateral appeals should be filed. Under the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act (‘‘AFDPA ’’), there is a one year statute of limitations for prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief in federal court 28 U.S.C. 2244(d). Under the AEDPA, the 

limitations period begins to run at the conclusion of direct review. 28 U.S.C. 

2244(d)(1)(A). While the time during which a Rule 32 petition is pending does not 

count toward the federal statute of limitation period, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2), a death 

row prisoner must file his Rule 32 petition within one year, to preserve an opportunity to appeal his conviction, and sentence in federal court Thus, although the 

statute of limitations under Rule 32 is two years, Ala. R—Crim. Proc. 32.2(c), 

ALDPA has effectively shortened the statute of limitations period to one year. 

In addition to death row prisoners having one-half of the time previously available 

to file a Rule 32 petition, the number of death row prisoners needing lawyers has 

dramatically increased since the passage of AEDPA.8 Because neither state courts 

nor the state legislature has provided a mechanism for appointing counsel to indigent death row prisoners, condemned inmates must rely on volunteer lawyers to 

come forward to file their appeals. The reduction of time during which lawyers can 

be recruited from two years to one year has made the dependence on volunteer 

counsel inadequate, the dramatic increase in the number of prisoners needing lawyers has made finding sufficient number of volunteer counsel impossible. 

Without greater assurance that indigent death row prisoners will be provided 

legal representation, an unacceptable risk is created that innocent people will be executed. 

CONCLUSION

The Innocence Protection Act is desperately needed. Postconviction DNA testing 

and improving legal representation for death row prisoners is absolutely critical if 

we are to prevent innocent people from being executed and if we are to provide 

equal justice for all. 

I strongly urge this Committee to recommend passage of this important legislation.

BRYAN STEVENSON, Director 

Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama 

APPENDIX A

Death Sentences Imposed in 1998 and 1999 Combined (Ranking: Death Sentences Per Capita 

1998–1999 Combined) 

State Population 

1998 and 

1999 Total 

Sentenced to 

Death 

Sentences to Death Per 

Capita in 1988 and 1999 

Ranking by Death Sentenced Per Capita in 1998 

and 1999 Combined 

Alabama 4,369,862 41 1: 106,582 1

Oklahoma 3,358,044 21 1: 159,907 2

North Carolina 7,650,789 44 1: 173,882 3

Delaware 753,538 4 1: 188,385 4

Louisiana 4,372,035 19 1: 230,107 5

Texas 20,044 141 87 1: 230,392 6

Mississippi 2,768,619 12 1: 230,718 7

Nevada 1, 809,253 7 1: 258,465 8

Arkansas 2,551,373 9 1: 283,486 9

South Carolina 3,885,736 13 1: 298,903 10

Florida 15,111,244 45 1: 335,805 11

Arizona 4, 778,332 12 1: 398,194 12

Georgia 7,788,240 19 1: 409,907 13

Missouri 5,468,338 13 1: 420,641 14

Virginia 6,872,912 16 1: 429,557 15

128

Death Sentences Imposed in 1998 and 1999 Combined (Ranking: Death Sentences Per Capita 

1998–1999 Combined)—Continued

State Population 

1998 and 

1999 Total 

Sentenced to 

Death 

Sentences to Death Per 

Capita in 1988 and 1999 

Ranking by Death Sentenced Per Capita in 1998 

and 1999 Combined 

Ohio 11,256,654 26 1: 432,948 16

Kentucky 3,960,825 9 1: 440,092 17

Pennsylvania 11,994,016 27 1: 444,223 18

California 33,145,121 74 1: 447,907 19

Wyoming 479,602 1 1: 479,602 20

Tennessee 5,483,535 10 1: 548,354 21

Idaho 1,251,700 2 1: 625,850 22

Oregon 3,316,154 5 1: 663,231 23

South Dakota 733,133 1 1: 733,133 24

Ilinois 12,128,370 15 1: 808,558 25

Indiana 5,942,901 5 1: 1,188,580 26

Kansas 2,654,052 2 1: 1,327,026 27

Maryland 5,171,634 3 1: 1,723,878 28

Washington 5,756,361 3 1: 1,918,787 29

Utah 2,129,836 1 1: 2,129,836 30

Connecticut 3,282,031 1 1:3,282,031 31

New York 18,196,601 5 1: 3,639,320 32

Colorado 4,056,133 1 1: 4,056,133 33

New Jersey 8,143,412 2 1: 4,071,706 34

Montana 882,779 0 N/A 35

Nebraska 1,666 028 0 N/A 35

New Hampshire 1,201,134 0 N/A 35

New Mexico 1,739,844 0 N/A 35

Article by David Firestone, New York Times, June 16, 2001

fINMATES ON ALABAMA’S DEATH ROW LACK LAWYERS

Montgomery, Ala.—All but two states with the death penalty guarantee prisoners 

a lawyer for the full range of appeals allowed by the legal system. In Alabama and 

Georgia, however, there is no guarantee of a lawyer after the direct appeal of a conviction, and prisoners have only inconsistent access to a legal process that frequently overturns death sentences. 

Thirty prisoners on Alabama’s death row have no lawyers to pursue appeals, by 

far the largest such group in any state. At a time when some other states are considering suspending executions, debating racial disparities in capital convictions or 

examining the wisdom of executing mentally retarded prisoners, Alabama officials 

remain firmly opposed to changes in the state’s death penalty system. 

The lack of appeals lawyers in Alabama is one reason the state has the fastestgrowing death row in the country and the second-largest number of condemned prisoners per capita, after Nevada. With 199 people sentenced to die, Alabama has twice 

the percentage of condemned inmates per capita as Texas. And in such a system, 

inmates can come close to execution without exercising all their legal options. 

Two of Alabama’s 30 death row prisoners without lawyers recently came within 

hours of execution because they missed deadlines for appeals. They won postponements from federal judges, who ruled that the risk of being wrongly executed without a proper hearing outweighed such deadlines, particularly when the prisoners 

were unaware of the deadlines and could not prepare their own appeals. The prisoners won stays only after volunteer lawyers from out of state filed emergency petitions on their behalf. 

With volunteers in short supply, opponents of the death penalty argue that it is 

only a matter of time before Alabama executes someone who never had access to 

the full protection of the legal system. 

‘‘We don’t provide the resources to give people a full defense,’’ said Bryan Stevenson, executive director of the Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama, a nonprofit group 

here that represents prisoners. ‘‘The system puts prisoners in the position of investigating new facts and presenting claims of legal error, which is a little tough if 

you’re on death row.’’

129

Attorney General Bill Pryor of Alabama said he saw no need for the state to pay 

for death penalty appeals beyond the first when there is no right to them. Mr. Pryor 

said the state should increase the money paid to trial lawyers for indigent defendants. If a defendant gets a fair trial, he said, there should be no need for several 

rounds of appeals. 

Since the Supreme Court’s 1963 decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, every defendant has had the right to a lawyer for a trial and a direct appeal, and Alabama pays 

for such lawyers for poor people, as every other state does. Though they are not required to do so by the United States Constitution, every state with the death penalty, except Georgia and Alabama, guarantees legal representation to condemned 

prisoners who lose their initial appeal. 

In these cases, lawyers for death row inmates can ask a state court judge for a 

review or ask a federal judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus, a legal judgment 

that a defendant is held in custody in violation of the Constitution. Such an order 

typically directs state officials to grant a new trial or sentence hearing. 

Strictly speaking, the habeas process is not a appeal, but rather a new civil case 

brought by a prisoner to test the constitutionality of a sentence. In these cases, prisoners can raise issues like new DNA evidence, and alibi witnesses who were never 

called. Prisoners were filing and winning so many such suits—nearly 40 percent of 

the federal habeas cases overturned death sentences—that Congress is 1966 restricted prisoners to one habeas petition and limited the time in which to file them 

to one year after conviction or the discovery of new evidence. 

Alabama limits such petitions filed in state court to two years. Under these time 

limits, if prisoners cannot find a lawyer to file these civil cases, their habeas rights 

will expire. 

Alabama will pay $1,000 a case for lawyers willing to work on such appeals, but 

the amount does little to cover the cost of mounting complex litigation. A bill to set 

up a state defender office failed in the Legislature, and there is currently no political support for changing the system. 

In Georgia, the Legislature appropriates about $700,000 a year for a nonprofit 

center the employs six lawyers to prepare death penalty appeals. In Alabama, Mr. 

Stevenson’s center receives no state money, relying on private donations. 

Speaking of death penalty case reviews beyond the first appeal, Mr. Pryor, the 

Alabama attorney general, said: ‘‘These appeals are crucial only for Monday-morning quarterbacks who try to second-guess things and create issues that were probably not real in the first place. It’s an abuse of the habeas corpus process to retry 

the case after it’s already been tried and appealed.’’

Gov. Donald Siegelman has also said that the appeals for death row prisoners 

take far too long. 

One Alabama death row inmate on the verge of losing his rights to having his 

case reviewed was Christopher Barbour, convicted in 1993 of stabbing to death a 

40-year-old woman. Mr. Barbour, 31, confessed to the crime but later said his confession was coerced. Three lawyers began work on his appeals but dropped the case 

for various reasons. The case was dormant for more than two years as the time periods for appeals expired, and the state set an execution date of May 25. 

On May 21, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund Inc. in New York 

filed a request for a stay of execution with the United States District Court in Birmingham; less than 48 hours before Mr. Barbour’s scheduled electrocution, Judge 

Myron H. Thompson agreed to the stay. The judge said the even though the deadlines has expired, Mr. Barbour’s new claims of innocence merited a hearing, particularly relating to new DNA evidence. 

A similar stay was issued on April 25, when another federal judge ruled that the 

courts should consider the claims of innocence of Thomas D. Arthur, who was convicted in 1991 of shooting to death the husband of his girlfriend. (At the time, Mr. 

Arthur was on work-release from prison while serving a 1977 life sentence for another murder.) That stay was granted two days before the scheduled execution after 

a lawyer from the Legal Aid Society of New York filed a late petition. 

Both condemned men will now get federal hearings. 

Mr. Pryor said that the stays proved that inmates had access to counsel. ‘‘They 

can get some of the best lawyers in the country to represent them’’ he said, ‘‘much 

better than the people of Alabama could afford if we were paying for it.’’

The Legal Aid Society has set up a project to recruit out-of-state lawyers to represent Alabama prisoners, but legal advocates say they never know from case to 

case whether a lawyer can be found for a prisoner whose execution is near. 

Another reason for the size of Alabama’s death row cited by many lawyers here 

is the ability of state judges to impose death sentences even after juries have recommended life in prison. Alabama is the only state where judges routinely overturn 

130

such recommendations, and nearly a quarter of the prisoners on death row were 

sentenced to death by an elected judge after a jury voted for a verdict of life. 

William Bowen Jr., the former presiding judge of the Alabama Court of Criminal 

Appeals, said most judges would prefer not to have this power, because it heightened the pressure to impose the death penalty. 

‘‘Judicial politics has gotten so dirty in this state that your opponent in an election simply has to say that you’re soft on crime because you haven’t imposed the 

death penalty enough,’’ Mr. Bowen said. ‘‘People run for re-election on that basis, 

because the popular opinion in the state is, Let

f’s hang ’em.’’

Statement of Former Prosecutors, Law Enforcement Officers, and Justice 

Department Officials 

Dear Member of Congress: 

The undersigned individuals are current and former prosecutors, law enforcement 

officers, and Justice Department officials who have served at the state and federal 

levels. Some of us support capital punishment and others of us oppose it. But we 

are united in our support for the federal Innocence Protection Act 2001 (S 486/HR 

912). 

Capital cases present unique challenges to our judicial system. The stakes are 

higher than in other criminal trials and the legal issues are often more complex. 

When the government seeks a death sentence, it must afford the defendant every 

procedural safeguard to assure the reliability of the fact-finding process. As prosecutors, we feel a special obligation to ensure that the capital punishment system is 

fair and accurate. 

The Innocence Protection Act seeks to improve the administration of justice by ensuring the availability of post-conviction DNA testing in appropriate cases, and 

would establish standards for the appointment of capital defense attorneys. The interests of prosecutors are served if defendants have access to evidence that may establish innocence, even after conviction, and if they are represented by competent 

lawyers. 

For these reasons, we are pleased to endorse the Innocence Protection Act. Please 

feel free to contact any of us to discuss this matter.

Mr. William G. Broaddus, Esq. 

Former Attorney General 

Commonwealth of Virginia

Mr. W.J. Michael Cody 

Former Attorney General 

State of Tennessee

Mr. Lee Fisher 

Former Attorney General 

State of Ohio

Mr. Scott Harshbarger 

Former Attorney General 

Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Mr. Charles M. Oberly, III 

Former Attorney General 

State of Delaware

Mr. Tyrone C. Fahner 

Former Attorney General 

State of Illinois

Mr. Charles Hynes 

District Attorney 

Kings County, NY

Mr. Ralph C. Martin, II 

District Attorney 

Suffolk County, MA

Mr. Terence Hallman 

District Attorney 

City & County of San Francisco, CA

Mr. E. Michael McCann 

District Attorney 

131

Milwaukee County, WI

Mr. Robert M. Morganthau 

District Attorney 

New York County, NY

Mr. William J. Kunkle, Jr. 

Former Prosecutor 

DuPage County, IL

Mr. Francis X. Bellotti 

Former United States Attorney 

Commonwealth of Massachusetts

The Honorable Phillip Heymann 

Former United States Deputy 

Attorney General 

Department of Justice

The Honorable Robert S. Litt 

Former Principal Associate Deputy 

Attorney General 

Department of Justice

The Honorable Irvin Nathan 

Former Associate Deputy Attorney 

General 

Department of Justice

Ms. Laurie Robinson 

Former Assistant Attorney General 

Department of Justice

The Honorable Harold R. Tyler, Jr. 

Former Deputy Attorney General 

Department of Justice

The Honorable Gerald Kogan 

Chief Justice 

Florida Supreme Court (ret.)

fCOLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL

July 2, 2001

Senator Patrick Leahy 

Chair 

Senate Judiciary Committee 

United States Senate 

224 Dirksen Building 

Washington, D.C. 20510

Senator Orrin Hatch 

Senate Judiciary Committee 

United States Senate 

152 Dirksen Building 

Washington, D.C. 20510

Re: Hearings on the Innocence Protection Act, June 27, 2001,

Dear Senator Leahy and Senator Hatch: 

I understand that Alabama Attorney General Bill Pryor has inserted into the 

record of your committee’s June 27, 2001 hearing on the Innocence Protection Act 

an October 27, 2000 speech at a bar meeting. General Pryor’s speech refers to a 

study colleagues and I conducted last summer of rates of serious error in capital 

cases in Alabama and elsewhere in the United States. See James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases at 

http://www.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/liebman/liebman final.pdf 

(June 2000) [hereinafter, A Broken System], reprinted in part in James S. Liebman, 

et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 

1839 (2000) [hereinafter Capital Attrition].

General Pryor’s speech contains inaccurate statements about our study and a 

faulty analysis of his own data on Alabama cases. I therefore respectfully request 

that you include this letter in the record of the hearing, immediately following GenVerDate Feb 1 2002 10:08 Sep 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00135 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\81606.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
132

eral Pryor’s speech, to set matters straight. I understand that the hearing record 

remains open for this purpose until July 5, 2001. 

General Pryor’s October 27 speech prompts the following nine responses (among 

others that would require more extended analysis than is appropriate here):

1. In our study, we showed that state and federal courts found serious error in, 

and reversed, 77 percent of the Alabama capital verdicts that were imposed and finally reviewed between 1973 and 1995. A Broken System, supra, at A–9. General 

Pryor implies that most of the errors we identified in Alabama occurred in the early 

part of our 1973–1995 study period, and that Alabama’s rate of serious error in capital cases improved after that. In fact, the number of serious errors in Alabama capital verdicts discovered by state and federal courts during the 23-year study period 

held fairly steady, at about seven per year, throughout the entire study period-the 

beginning as well as the end. Alabama errors were not, as General Pryor suggests, 

front-loaded to the early part of the period. 

2. General Pryor also claims that many of the serious errors found in Alabama 

cases were due to Alabama’s refusal to permit jurors to consider whether the defendant was guilty of an offense less than capital murder, thus giving jurors the 

Hobson’s choice of either convicting the defendant capitally or acquitting him of 

homicide altogether. The United States Supreme Court ruled that practice unconstitutional in Beck v. Alabama in 1980. Why General Pryor believes the frequency of 

Beck error in Alabama cases is a point in Alabama’s favor is unclear. Beck errors 

are serious, because (as the Supreme Court ruled) they call into question the accuracy and integrity of the jury’s decision that the defendant was guilty of a capital 

crime. In any event, for the following reasons, it is inaccurate for General Pryor to 

suggest that Beck error was the main reason that 77 percent of the Alabama capital 

verdicts that were finally reviewed during our study period were overturned by the 

courts: 

(A) Most (87%) of the Alabama reversals occurred at the direct appeal stage, 

where duly elected members of either the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals or 

the Alabama Supreme Court overturned capital verdicts because of errors of state 

or federal law. The single most common basis for reversal at that stage was not 

Beck violations (as serious as they are) but, rather, unlawful practices designed to 

keep African-American citizens from serving as jurors in capital cases. 

(B) Over half of the remaining Alabama reversals occurred at the state post-conviction stage, following rulings by either elected Alabama trial judges or, again, by 

elected members of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court. At that stage, 67% of the errors were of three types: incompetent 

lawyenng, prosecutorial suppression of evidence or other prosecutorial misconduct, 

and jury bias. See A Broken System, supra, at C–6. 

(C) The most common source of error at the third and final (federal habeas corpus) review stage was, again, incompetent lawyering. 

As one would expect of the judges elected by the citizens of Alabama or appointed 

by the President to uphold the law, their reasons for overturning more than threefourths of the state’s fully reviewed death sentences during the 23-year study period 

were serious and a cause for concern-not only about each of the cases in which error 

was found, but also about the reliability of the capital system as a whole. 

3. General Pryor’s speech claims that our study ‘‘does not define ‘error rate’ or ‘‘the basis for qualifying something as ‘error.’ ’’ General Pryor did not read our study. 

(From the moment we issue the report last June, it has been publicly available for 

free to all members of the public on a number of web sites, including: http://

www.law.columbia.edu/instructionalser-vices/liebman/liebman final.pdf). The study 

extensively defines both ‘‘error rate’’ and ‘‘the basis for something qualifying as ‘error.’ ’’ See A Broken System, supra, at 5–6, 25–27 & nn.33, 36, 38, 40, 42; Appendices C and D. As the study explains: 

(A) Our definition of error is the courts’ own definition-we made no subjective 

judgments of our own, and instead relied entirely on the courts’ own judgments. ’ (B) Error defined by the courts as reversible (the only kind we counted) is serious 

error, because it requires a finding by a full set of courts that the defect in the case 

that required the state or federal courts to overturn a capital verdict and order a 

retrial of guilt-innocence, sentence, or both was ‘‘non-harmlesss,’’ ‘‘actually prejudicial,’’ or ‘‘inherently prejudicial’’ as the United States and Alabama Supreme 

Courts have carefully defined those legal standards. 

4. General Pryor suggests that he called us to ask us to define these two phrases. 

We never received a telephone call, e-mail, letter or other inquiry of any sort from 

General Pryor or any member of his staff. Had he called, we would have happily 

supplied him with a copy of the Report and directed him to the definitions of ‘‘serious error’’ and ‘‘error rates’’ that are a prominent part of the text and supporting 

materials and are cited above. 

133

5. General Pryor says we ‘‘cannot supply you with a list of the names of all of 

the cases [w]e considered.’’ This is inaccurate. We have case lists for all 34 states 

in our study. Those lists will be posted on a publicly accessible web site maintained 

by the University of Michigan when we complete our study late this year or early 

next year. In the meantime, we have made the lists available to requesters, including the press, pursuant to a data-sharing agreement drafted by the General Counsel 

of Columbia University. 

6. General Pryor says we ‘‘cannot give you a baseline of non-capital cases with 

which to compare his error rate.’’ General Pryor did not read our report. The baseline to which he refers was published in the Texas Law Review (‘‘Capital

Attrition ’’) at p. 1854, with sources provided in footnote 49. 

7. In his speech, General Pryor says we cannot defend our ‘‘conclusion that the 

high error rate [w]e found . . . means that there is a risk of an innocent person 

being executed ....’’ We would like to directly study the number of innocent individuals executed in the United States in the modern era, but no such study is possible because state attorneys in Virginia and elsewhere have consistently refused to 

disclose the information in their files (including DNA samples) that are indispensable to any such inquiry. See, e.g., Frank Green, DNA Tests Not Likely after an 

Execution: Va. Opposing Third Request of its Kind, Richmond Times-Dispatch, 

March 26, 2001. Like other Americans, therefore, we are forced to rely on evidence 

of risk, because the evidence of what actually happened is not available. The evidence of risk is substantial, in Alabama as elsewhere. When jurors are forbidden 

to convict defendants of the crime they actually committed and instead are required 

either to convict them of a more serious crime, of which they are innocent, or release 

them altogether-this being the Beck error that the Attorney General acknowledges 

occurred with some frequency in Alabama-that creates an obvious risk that people 

who did not commit a capital crime will be executed. The same is true of defendants 

denied a jury of their peers because African-Americans were excluded, defendants 

represented by incompetent lawyers, and defendants prosecuted by officials who 

withheld evidence of innocence. Yet, these are the very kinds of errors that were 

most common in Alabama, as elsewhere, during our study period. Such error puts 

a difficult burden on appellate courts to catch and correct all the problems. When 

there is so much error (e.g., in 77 percent of the fully reviewed cases in Alabama), 

and when the error is so serious, there is a risk-a real risk-that some of it will slip 

through the inspection process and never be caught. If American Airlines or U.S. 

Airlines had a 77 percent rate of equipment failure, we would undoubtedly conclude 

that the risk of innocent death is far too high-no matter how good those airlines’

inspection procedures were for catching problems. The same is true here. 

8. General Pryor reports his own data about all Alabama capital cases from the 

1970s until October of last year. His figures confirm our findings. He reports 281 

death sentences, of which 180 have not reached a final outcome in the courts, and 

10 more were ended prior to a final outcome when the prisoners died in prison while 

the review process was continuing. Of the 91 remaining death verdicts, which were 

finally determined, 63 were reversed by the courts, 4 were abandoned by prosecutors as the result of settlements after errors were challenged in court, and only the 

remaining 124 cases were cleared by the courts. The reversal rate revealed by General Pryor’s own figures thus is 67 (63 + 4) overturned out of 91 fully reviewed, or 

74 percent. We found a 77 percent reversal rate for the period through 1995. General Pryor has carried the study forward through the first half of 2000, and found 

that the reversal rate remains about three-quarters, with only a negligible improvement in the most recent years. 

9. General Pryor reports a smaller figure as the reversal rate. He gets his figure 

by using the 281 death verdicts imposed in Alabama, not the 91 verdicts that were 

actually reviewed by the courts, as his base. That is not an appropriate way to calculate an error rate because it inaccurately assumes that 100 percent of the thus 

far unreviewed cases (A) have been reviewed, and (B) have all been found to be 

without error. When 74 percent of the reviewed cases were found to contain reversible error, it is not appropriate to assume (as General Pryor does) that none of the 

unreviewed cases contain such errors. To use another example, if an automobile 

plant manufactured 281 vehicles, but only subjected 91 of them to inspections, and 

if 67 of the inspected vehicles were found too flawed to go to market and had to 

be sent back for retooling or scrap, we would not permit the plant to report a 124% 

error rate (as bad as that rate would be) by dividing 281 by 67. Instead, we would 

demand to know how many of the inspected cars were found to have serious problems-meaning 91 divided by 67, or 74 percent. The same applies here. 

134

Thank you very much for the opportunity to insert these comments in the record 

of the July 27 hearing. 

Sincerely,

JAMES S. LIEBMAN

Simon H. Rifkind Professor of Law 

f Columbia Law School

LINDQUIST & VENNUM P.L.L.P. 

MINNEAPOLIS MN 55402–2205

June 26, 2001

Hon. Patrick Leahy 

United States Senate 

433 Russell Senate Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Leahy:

I have been asked to share with you and the Judiciary Committee some experience that I have had representing an innocent person who spent thirteen years on 

death row in the State of Louisiana. On January 2, 2001, Albert Burrell walked out 

of the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola a free man. Unfortunately, Mr. 

Burrell is unable to tell you his own story using his own words. He is mentally retarded, schizophrenic and most likely suffered a serious brain injury as a child. He 

is also illiterate. Given his disabilities, he most likely does not know and is probably 

incapable of understanding the various ways in which the system failed to protect 

him. 

In the fall of 1987, Mr. Burrell was convicted for murdering two elderly residents 

of Northern Louisiana over the Labor Day holiday weekend in 1986. The day after 

the jury determined his guilt, they unanimously agreed that he should die for his 

crimes. Mr. Burrell was then sent to death row at Angola. The conviction and death 

sentence was unanimously affirmed by the Louisiana Supreme Court. Similarly, two 

motions for a new trial were presented to the trial court but were rejected. 

My law firm agreed to represent Mr. Burrell on a pro bono basis in early 1992. 

Over the years, as we were slowly granted access to the State’s files on the case, 

our investigation uncovered substantial misconduct by law enforcement officers and 

prosecutors in securing the convictions of Mr. Burrell and his co-defendant, Michael 

Graham. Police investigation reports and witness statements that contradicted both 

trial testimony and the State’s theory of the case had been suppressed. The State 

also withheld information concerning plea agreements with a jailhouse snitch that, 

at least with respect to Mr. Burrell, the State knew was lying. The significant government misconduct involved in Mr. Burrell’s case most likely could fill a separate 

hearing of your committee. Nevertheless, in the summer of 1996, a warrant for Mr. 

Burrell’s execution was issued. When we finally obtained a stay, Mr. Burrell was 

only seventeen days from execution. 

As if misconduct by the State were not enough, a review of the record in Mr. 

Burrell’s case also revealed a shocking incompetence by his counsel. Mr. Burrell was 

represented at trial by two young lawyers. The lead attorney, Keith Mullins, had 

been out of law school less than four years. His associate, Roderick Gibson, had been 

in practice less than two. Neither lawyer had ever tried a capital murder case; in 

fact Mr. Mullins had only handled a relatively few felony cases of any kind in his 

career. 

As an initial matter, the lawyers were woefully unprepared when they began the 

trial. They did not investigate Mr. Burrell’s significant mental health history—Mr. 

Mullins told me many years later when I interviewed him that he did not realize 

that Mr. Burrell had mental health problems. Instead, he simply thought Mr. 

Burrell was ‘‘a little slow.’’ They did not investigate the long standing child custody 

dispute between Mr. Burrell and his ex-wife, a critical prosecution witness who admitted to me that she lied about Mr. Burrell in order to regain custody of her son 

away Mr. Burrell, her ex-husband. They did not investigate a civil settlement that 

Mr. Burrell received from his former in-laws for injuries he received during an assault by his former father-in-law. The source of this money would have fully explained why Mr. Burrell supposedly had more money than his ex-wife had ever 

known him to have at the time of the murders. The State had advanced a theory 

that Mr. Burrell got the money from the victims after he killed them. 

135

The defense team also did absolutely nothing to prepare for the penalty phase of 

the case. When it came time for that part of the trial, the defense called only one 

witness, Mr. Burrell, and then elicited no useful or relevant testimony. No effort 

was made to present any mitigating facts before the jury. Any lawyer who were to 

read the very short transcript of the penalty phase of that trial (it’s less than 20 

pages) would be ashamed for the profession. 

The defense provided by these lawyers was worse than ineffective; in many instances, the defense lawyers blundered so badly that they themselves elicited damaging evidence against their own client, evidence that in at least one instance could 

not have been presented to the jury. For example, during Mr. Mullins’ cross exam- ination of law enforcement officers, he questioned why they had never asked Mr. 

Burrell about his alibi. The response was that Mr. Burrell refused to talk with police without a lawyer being present and that Mr. Mullins later refused to permit 

the police to interview Mr. Burrell. The State could never have even mentioned Mr. 

Burrell’s invocation of his right to remain silent but for Mr. Mullins pitiful examination. In another example, after a critical prosecution witness had admitted that the 

man she had seen on the night of the murders was not Mr. Burrell, Mr. Mullins 

bumbled his way through the remainder of the examinaiton that by the time it was 

completed, the witness was claiming that perhaps it was possible the man she saw 

was his client. The message that Mr. Mullins communicated to the jury during that 

exchange must have been that he thought his own client guilty. 

Mr. Mullins was also unable to demonstrate even basic trial skills, such as impeaching witnesses. Almost every time he made an attempt at the impeachment of 

a witness during the course of the trial (such opportunities were numerous in a case 

that the prosecutor had originally opined should not even be presented to the grand 

jury), the State’s objections were sustained. Mr. Mullins was not able to follow the 

correct procedures. At one point, the trial judge took pity on Mr. Mullins and actually explained the steps he needed to follow in order to lay proper foundation for 

reputation testimony. Even then, Mr. Mullins was unable to lay the foundation and 

failed to get the testimony before the jury. This list of the lawyers’ shortcomings 

is, by no means, exhaustive. These are just some of the examples. 

Incompetence alone, however, does not explain the poor defense that Mr. Burrell 

received from the lawyers. After Mr. Burrell’s conviction and death sentence, Keith 

Mullins was indicted in federal court in Louisiana for cocaine trafficking. He ultimately pled guilty to a marijuana charge and was sentenced to serve a prison term. 

He did, however, receive a downward departure from the federal sentencing guidelines because of his own previously undisclosed mental illness. He was subsequently 

disbarred from the practice of law. 

His associate, Mr. Gibson, was also criminally charged after Mr. Burrell’s conviction. He ultimately pled guility to stealing client money. He too has been disbarred. 

Mr. Burrell never had a chance. Between the unscrupulous prosecution and the 

incompetent defense, Mr. Burrell’s fate was certain. Thankfully, we prevented the 

State of Louisiana from killing him and were able to secure his release after the 

State concluded following its own investigation that there was no credible evidence 

tying him to the murders. Today, Albert Burrell lives on a very small ranch in 

Texas with his sister. 

The Innocence Protection Act is a critical first step to helping ensure that cases 

such as Mr. Burrell’s do not recur. I strongly urge its adoption. 

Respectfully yours,

f CHARLES J. LLOYD

Statement of Clive Stafford Smith, Director, Louisiana Crisis Assistance 

Center 

Chairman, Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for inviting me to address the problems with the defense of those 

charged with capital crimes in the State of Louisiana. As a lawyer, I have been involved in defending capital cases for 17 years. Since 1993, I have been the director 

of the Louisiana Crisis Assistance Center, a not-for-profit legal services organization 

founded to address the crisis in capital defense representation in that state. 

There is an old saying in capital defense circles in the United States that ‘capital 

punishment means them without the capital get the punishment.’ Nowhere was this 

adage more true in 1993 than Louisiana. At that time, people facing the death penalty were represented by lawyers paid next to nothing for their work on these comVerDate Feb 1 2002 10:08 Sep 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00139 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\81606.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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plicated and emotionally difficult cases. The caseload, and lack of resources, of some 

of the public defenders had reached such crisis limits that one lawyer in the western 

part of the state attempted suicide on the morning of a capital trial. 

Plus c ̨a change, plus c ̨a reste meˆme. A decade ago, a study commissioned by the 

state Supreme Court indicated that a minimum of $21 million was needed to provide basic defense services in Louisiana. Ten years on, and the vast majority of the 

funds have not been forthcoming. 

The profile of indigent defense in Louisiana is balkanized chaos. The first major 

problem is the inadequate funding. Most states fund indigent defense through a central government. Not so Louisiana, where the majority of the inadequate funding 

comes from traffic tickets issued by the local police. In one parish, when the public 

defender was too aggressive, the police stopped writing tickets, bringing the office 

close to bankruptcy. The local indigent defender boards are appointed by the judges, 

and must ask the judges for any increase on the ticket assessment. They come 

under heavy pressure not to rock the political boat, and 35 of the 41 districts do 

not even collect the maximum income permitted, $35 per ticket. 

The second problem is the quality of counsel in both capital and non-capital cases. 

In the vast majority of Louisiana’s 41 districts, public defenders are part time. This 

means that they have private practices on the side—or, to be more honest, they 

have public defender jobs ‘‘on the side.’’ In New Orleans, for example, a public defender is permitted to ask a client to retain him (generally, upon the promise that 

he can expect better representation that way). 

The number of lawyers available is wholly inadequate. We are currently conducting a study of three of the largest districts, in New Orleans, Baton Rouge and 

Lake Charles. In Baton Rouge, public defenders average 3 80 open cases at any 

given moment. The numbers that are opened during a year range to a high of over 

700 cases. Given that most of us do not know that many people in the world, it is 

obviously impossible to provide that number of clients with effective representation. 

This is all the more true when one considers that even the director is part time, 

and most of them probably spend less than half their time on their indigent work. 

Since 1994, there has theoretically been a requirement that lawyers be ‘‘certified’’

for trying capital cases. Unfortunately, when the regulation was enacted, opponents 

ensured that a rider was added saying that the provision would create no rights 

that could be raised on appeal. Thus, Dan Bright was sentenced to death for a crime 

he did not commit after being represented by a lawyer who was drunk during the 

trial. The lawyer only called one witness (Mr. Bright’s mother) at the penalty phase, 

and asked her only two questions—her name and whether she knew her own son. 

Shareef Cousin, a sixteen year old, was likewise sentenced to death for a crime he 

did not commit; his lawyer’s first step in preparing for a penalty phase was a phone 

call made to my home after the guilty verdict. 

Overall resources are pitiful. In Lake Charles, the average time the lawyers spend 

visiting their felony clients at the jail (including capital clients) was 69.6 seconds 

per year. With only one investigator, the office generates only one witness interview 

memo per two hundred clients. I have never tried a case, capital or non-capital, 

without consulting an expert on some subject or other; in Lake Charles, they average only one expert per two hundred cases. 

The lack of investigative assistance is a monumental problem in capital and noncapital cases alike. No criminal charge, from a car accident to a capital case, should 

proceed without a complete investigation. ‘‘At the heart of effective representation 

is the independent duty to investigate and prepare.’’ Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 

794, 805 (11th Cir. 1982). Yet Lake Charles has one investigator who is responsible 

for a current office caseload of roughly 9,000 cases, including, at the moment, twelve 

capital cases. The New Orleans public defenders have only six investigators who are 

meant to provide assistance in 16 felony courts, as well as another dozen juvenile, 

magistrate and municipal courts. At a most basic level, the imbalance between prosecution and defense is reflected by the fact that the Office of the District Attorney 

has 24 investigators, in addition to the assistance of the thousands of officers with 

the NOPD. The public defenders receive no federal funds, while grants are made 

readily available to the prosecution. 

Consider the impact of this inequity: In an experiment from January 1999 to June 

2000, my office took over the burden of capital preliminary hearings from the public 

defenders. We were ultimately involved in precisely 100 cases where citizens had 

been arrested for capital murder, and preliminary hearings were held. Where, before, there had been no investigation to determine whether the client was properly 

charged, we put an investigative team on each case. When we exposed the truth, 

the State chose to dismiss the charges against almost half (49) of these citizens. In 

that 18 month period, in not one case where we did the preliminary hearing was 

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the client ultimately found guilty of first degree murder, let alone receive the death 

penalty. 

This might be considered a success story; sadly, it is not. First, we must remember the hundreds of men and women who were arrested before 1999. Angola Penitentiary holds 90 people on Death Row, and over 3,460 serving life without the possibility of parole. The Australian State of Victoria, with a population roughly twice 

as large as Louisiana, does not have that many people in prison for any charge. Yet 

many of those serving life or death in Louisiana stem from New Orleans convictions, 

and were apparently victims of the earlier system. Second, and perhaps even more 

sad, my office’s intervention was so successful that we came under heavy criticism 

from those committed to the status quo ante, who prefer that the PD’s ineffectual 

boat remain afloat. We have recently been forced out of providing this critical service. 

The availability of expert assistance is also critical to fairness. In 1985, the 

United States Supreme Court held that an indigent capital defendant has the right 

to a state-funded expert. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 

53 (1985). In Louisiana, enormous problems are posed by scientific evidence that is 

downright bogus. This is partly due to the inadequate funding and expertise in the 

local crime labs, and partly due to the lack of experts available to the defense. In 

one of the smaller parishes, for example, an experienced public defender admitted 

to using just one independent expert in twenty years. 

The same is true across the state. Ricky Coston spent two years awaiting a trial 

for his life in New Orleans, before being acquitted in December 1998. The only evidence that purportedly linked him to the crime was a single fiber. The NOPD crime 

lab technician simply should not have been acting as an expert in any kind of criminal case. He began doing fiber analysis in criminal cases before he had his first 

training seminar in the speciality, and initially issued a report saying that a fiber 

from Ricky’s jacket matched the victim’s green blanket. He amended the report to 

reflect that it matched a blue sweater. The sweater turned out to be a pair of socks. 

My office secured two independent experts to review the work-apparently, the first 

time the defense had ever challenged his findings—and determined that the picture 

of the ‘‘matching’’ fibers was falsified. I reported this profound misconduct to the 

NOPD, which took no action. I filed a federal civil rights suit on behalf of Mr. 

Coston, which the NOPD felt constrained to settle. Still they took no action against 

the technician, who is still working on capital cases. 

In recent years, the Orleans Parish public defender office has been faced with several thousand clients, and dozens of people charged with capital murder every year. 

The office has a total budget of only $2 million, representing a handful of dollars 

a case. Faced with a choice between paying staff salaries and the experts needed 

for the defense, the office actively opposes lawyers seeking funds for independent 

experts, and the director recently sought to fire a staff attorney for asking for one. 

Across the United States, there is much talk of DNA as a significant forensic tool. 

However, it is not relevant to the vast majority of criminal prosecutions and, even 

where it might prove helpful, it is rarely used in Louisiana. My office has been involved in more than 150 capital cases in the past five years, and DNA has been 

used in only one. While a DNA testing bill was passed by the state legislature this 

year, it is the same old story: No funds were appropriated to pay for it, and the 

legislature refused to include a provision mandating that the state preserve evidence for possible testing. The vast majority of those who could benefit are at the 

Angola State Penitentiary without lawyers or resources, yet they must prove to a 

judge that the evidence can demonstrate innocence before they will even have a 

right to testing. 

Another major factor, that implicates the lack of resources for a defense investigation, is the lack of discovery in criminal cases. To an average citizen, the law must 

seem bizarre: The contents of the police file are not discoverable until after the client is on death row, and has lost his first appeal of right—in other words, until after 

it is most needed. Unfortunately, there has been a pattern of abusing even these 

limited discovery obligations. New Orleans has a particularly shocking reputation 

in this regard. Curtis Kyles was on death row for several years until the United 

States Supreme Court ordered a new trial based on the suppression of evidence. 

Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). And yet his case is by no 

means the most extreme example. John Thompson came within days of execution 

two years ago before it came to light that the prosecutor had destroyed blood evidence that categorically excluded him as the perpetrator of the robbery that enhanced his case to one where the death sentence would be imposed. 

So far, six persons sentenced to death in Louisiana have subsequently been found 

innocent by the state process. Shareef Cousin was, at the age of sixteen, the youngest person sentenced to Death Row in the world. In 1995, Shareef was charged with 

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a politically sensitive crime in New Orleans that ‘‘had to be solved.’’ A white tourist 

in the French Quarter was tragically killed by a group of three black youths. Not 

only did defense lawyers fail to call upwards of twenty witnesses who could have 

demonstrated beyond any doubt that a videotape of Shareef playing basketball in 

a neighborhood gym was being taped at the precise time of the crime; but the prosecution literally kidnaped four alibi witnesses and held them in the D.A.’s office 

until the trial was over. 

Our office took over his case on appeal, and for the retrial. Our investigation uncovered even greater misconduct on the part of the police and prosecutors. The authorities knew the identities of the actual perpetrators just days after the crime, but 

declined to arrest and prosecute them. Along with four hundred pages of information that led directly to the real perpetrators, the prosecution intentionally suppressed the sole eye-witness’s statement in which she said she had not been wearing 

her glasses, and could not identify anyone. Shockingly, one NOPD detective apparently secured the $10,500 Crimestoppers reward by calling in a false tip against 

Shareeλ After we exposed some of this abuse, the district attorney’s office was 

forced to dismiss the case. 

We were so horrified by the misconduct that permeated the local authorities that 

we felt that something had to be done on a systemic level. However, our research 

revealed that no local prosecutor had ever been prosecuted for these kinds of criminal acts-after all, which prosecutor is going to place a brother or sister prosecutor 

in prison? More surprising, no prosecutor from New Orleans has ever been sanctioned by the bar for such actions. Mr. Cousin’s sister reported the prosecutor who 

suppressed evidence in that case to the bar association, and yet no action has been 

taken on her charges in four years. 

Left with only one option, we filed a federal civil rights suit against the prosecutors who were responsible. Recently, United States District Judge Sarah Vance dismissed the suit against them, holding that prosecutors were ‘‘absolutely immune’’

from suit for any actions taken in the course of the prosecution—including kidnaping witnesses, falsifying evidence, and acting out of racial animus. What has the 

world come to, when a prosecutor can rely on the federal courts to grant him immunity for the criminal offenses he committed in placing a child on Death Row for a 

crime he did not commit? This is very much a federal concern—the federal courts 

fashioned this ‘‘immunity’’ out of whole judicial cloth, without any input by Congress, casting a protective blanket over state prosecutors even when they are guilty 

of intentional criminal acts taken in bad faith. It is, with due respect, Congress that 

should take that blanket back. Those charged with defending capital clients in Louisiana, for one, do not have the resources to keep on fighting this hopeless battle 

against such misconduct. 

Indeed, there is a desperate need for federal intervention in the way that federal 

employees contribute to the imbalance in capital cases in Louisiana. Two weeks ago, 

I was conducting a postconviction hearing in the case of Dan Bright, who was originally sentenced to death in 1996. At the time of the trial, the State knew that the 

co-defendant had written statements insisting that Mr. Bright was innocent, but 

they manipulated the case so the co-defendant could not be called as a witness. As 

I previously mentioned, Mr. Bright was represented by a lawyer who was inebriated 

during the capital trial, and an innocent man was sentenced to death. In post-conviction proceedings, we filed a Freedom of Information Act request, and the DOJ 

provided a page of materials that was heavily redacted. It reflected a statement by 

an informant (whose name was likewise redacted) saying: 

that daniel bright, aka ‘‘poonie’’ is in jail for the murder committed by 

———————————

The name of the true perpetrator of this murder was blacked out. Thus, the DOJ 

knew of a witness who could expose the real killer before Mr. Bright’s state court 

trial. The DOJ knew Mr. Bright was on trial for his life, and did not bring this information to the attention of the state or the defense. Even worse, the United States 

Attorney is now actively opposing the defense request for either the name of the informant or the name of the perpetrator now. The U.S. Attorney has filed a motion 

to remove our subpoena to federal court and quash it. He provides no discussion of 

why the federal government should suppress evidence of the real killer, but rather 

seems to be saying that Might makes Right: ‘‘We have the power, so therefore we 

will [ab]use it.’’

Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has judicially fashioned a rule of ‘‘sovereign immunity’’

that allows any federal agency to refuse to honor subpoenas issued in state court. 

State of Louisiana v. Sparks, 978 F. 2d 226, 232-3 (5th Cir. 1992). This is another 

rule fashioned out of judicial whole cloth; it is within the power of the federal govVerDate Feb 1 2002 10:08 Sep 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00142 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\81606.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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ernment to amend it and, with all due respect, this Committee should get on with 

the task. 

Another huge factor in the conviction of the innocent in Louisiana is, sad to say, 

the number of corrupt police officers. Without meaning to denigrate the large numbers of fine officers on the beat, the number of bad apples is frightening. In various 

capital cases, we secured judicial findings that New Orleans police officers had committed perjury. We brought these to the attention of the NOPD hierarchy; they did 

not even bother to ask for the documentary evidence. We notified the NOPD that 

the lead detective in the Cousin case had apparently falsified the evidence in order 

to collect the $10,500 CrimeStoppers award; they showed no interest. In another 

capital case, we were representing a witness who had been told by an NOPD officer 

that they had the ‘‘winning’’ Crimestoppers number, and she could have it if she 

toe’d the right line; we met with representatives of the U.S. Attorney, with a view 

to setting up a sting on the officer, but was told that this, and all our other complaints, were matters for the state authorities. 

The resources in post-conviction are also pitiful. To be sure, this year the State 

of Louisiana established a post-conviction office. However, the legislature refused to 

fund the new mandate. Rather, the state simply did away with the fund for expert 

assistance that had previously existed, and raided some of the other limited funds 

that had been dedicated to capital litigation. Additionally, this came five years after 

the elimination of federal funding for a similar office. Now, then, there are three 

full-time lawyers for the 90 people who expect to be in post-conviction over the next 

couple of years. As a result, my office is trying to help in seven cases, although we 

are told that we will receive not one cent for this work next year. 

It is no fun trying to defend a capital client without resources, and with both 

hands tied behind your back. Yet the problems of the defense lawyer are utterly inconsequential compared to the horrors of facing a capital charge, or sitting on Death 

Row, for a crime that one did not commit. I have had the privilege of being involve 

in the defense of more than 50 men, women and children who faced death for something they patently did not do. Even as I prepare this statement for this Committee, 

I could name at least two people on Death Row who I think are almost definitely 

innocent. I could name half a dozen who are now serving life without parole. How 

can we possibly allow such tragedies to persist?

Statement of Charles J. Press, Director, Mississippi Post-Conviction 

Counsel Project 

f Chairman, Members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to address the Committee on this extremely important issue. As an attorney, I have been representing death row prisoners on direct 

appeal, state post-conviction, and federal habeas corpus proceedings for nearly 9 

years, both in California and Mississippi. Since December of 1998, I have been the 

Director of the Mississippi Post-Conviction Counsel Project, a two-person, non-profit 

office which directly represents death sentenced prisoners in post-conviction and federal habeas corpus proceedings, and assists lawyers handling capital cases in all 

stages of litigation. Having observed how the judicial system treats capital cases in 

both California and Mississippi has given me a unique perspective on how the 

amount of resources available to represent those facing the death penalty is perhaps 

the single most important factor in ensuring that the unfathomable never happens: 

the execution of an innocent person. 

Mississippi is the poorest of the 50 states, and the resources devoted to the defense of those facing the death penalty are a reflection of that. There is no statewide public defender system in Mississippi. Of the 82 counties in Mississippi, only 

3 counties have full-time public defender offices: Hinds County, which includes Jackson, the largest city in Mississippi; Washington County, which includes Greenville, 

the fifth largest city; and Jackson County, which includes Pascagoula, the ninth 

largest city. Not surprisingly, of the 63 persons on Mississippi’s death row, only 4 

of these are from Jackson County, and none are from either Hinds or Washington 

County. This is despite the fact that the homicide rates in Jackson and Greenville 

are among the highest in the state, and Jackson has one of the highest homicide 

rates in the nation. 

The overwhelming majority of people in Mississippi facing the death penalty, 

nearly all of whom are indigent, are represented by court-appointed counsel with 

little, or no experience in handling death penalty cases. Mississippi has no standards for appointment of counsel in capital cases. Recently, a lawyer who had been 

140

admitted to the Mississippi Bar for less than a year was appointed to represent a 

criminal defendant facing the death penalty. In fact, his only criminal experience 

prior to this appointment was defending HIMSELF on a charge of driving while intoxicated. 

Most attorneys who represent criminal defendants facing the death penalty have 

a busy private practice and take criminal appointments in capital cases to supplement their income. Unfortunately, the income these attorneys derive from capital 

cases is scant. In Mississippi, under Miss. Code Ann. Section 15–17, attorneys han- dling capital cases are only entitled to $1,000 as compensation. Furthermore, attorneys are only entitled to be reimbursed for actual expenses or a presumptive rate 

of $25 per hour. See Wilson v. State, 574 So. 2d 1338 (Miss. 1990). 

The result of these meager fees is that lawyers spend very little time preparing 

for capital cases when they know, at the outset, that they will only be receiving a 

flat fee of $1,000. The livelihood of these attorneys is made by the hourly billing 

and fees they generate from paying clients. They simply cannot afford to take time 

away from their paying clients to represent their clients who are facing the death 

penalty. As a result, they ignore their capital clients and prepare little, if at all, for 

their trials. 

Some attorneys handling capital cases have contracts with one or more judicial 

circuits to handle ALL criminal cases from that circuit. These contracts are for a 

fixed fee per year. Many of these contracts are for $30,000 or less. Attorneys operating under these contracts often refer to themselves as ‘‘part-time public defenders’’ because they also represent fee-paying clients to supplement their income. Unfortunately, these attorneys are generally not allowed to refuse appointments in criminal 

cases under these contracts. If they do, the judge can rescind the entire contract. 

Many attorneys who have attempted to refuse appointments in death penalty cases 

because they were unqualified are told by judges that their contact will be terminated unless they accept the appointment. Having never represented a person facing the death penalty is not a valid reason for a refusing a capital case appointment 

under this system. 

Trial judges in Mississippi have sole discretion over appointing and compensating 

lawyers to represent capital defendants. They also have complete discretion regarding appointment and funding for experts, and other assistance. Although there are 

some judges who pay more than the $1,000 fee for capital cases, the overwhelming 

majority do not. Because trial judges are elected by a constituency that overwhelmingly supports capital punishment, there is extreme political pressure to ensure that 

defendants facing the death penalty receive as little money from the county budget 

as possible. The fact that many of these counties are among the poorest in the nation only further ensures that indigent capital defendants will receive the bare minimum towards their legal representation. In Quitman County, the County Supervisors had to raise property taxes on all residents simply to pay for two death penalty trials. Other counties have reported being unable to purchase a much needed 

new fire truck or constructing sewer systems for small towns where residents still 

use outhouses. Judges, therefore, do not want to be put in a position of depleting 

county funds to pay for a person charged with a capital crime. 

The result of having underpaid, unqualified lawyers representing capital defendants is clear: defendants facing the death penalty are not receiving their constitutional right to effective counsel. Capital trials in Mississippi, from the beginning of 

jury selection until sentencing, are usually completed within a week. By contrast, 

jury selection in a capital trial in California can often last several weeks. Per capita, 

Mississippi has the fifth largest death row in the nation. 

In one recent case, a lawyer handling a death penalty had not interviewed a single witness the weekend before the trial was to begin. Neither he, nor co-counsel, 

had ever tried a capital case before. Lead counsel was provided with sample motions 

challenging the DNA evidence, which was riddled with errors, as well as a motion 

for a continuance. Counsel, however, decided not to file any of these motions or ask 

for more time to prepare. Jury selection began on Monday morning. By Wednesday 

afternoon, the client had been convicted and sentenced to death. 

In July of 2000, Mississippi passed legislation to create a state-funded capital trial 

office and authorized the Governor to appoint a Director. However, because the Governor has yet to appoint a Director to this new office, it is unclear when the office 

will open its doors. Even when it does, it will face significant obstacles. The legislation provides for a Director, three attorneys, and two investigators. With dozens of 

capital indictments pending statewide in Mississippi each year, the new office, even 

if it has qualified personnel, will not be able to provide representation to all defendants facing the death penalty. Moreover, the legislation did nothing toward creating 

standards for the appointment of counsel in capital cases, or raising the $1000 flat 

fee also remains. Trial judges retain the authority over appointment of counsel. 

141

Therefore, a trial judge has the power to refuse appointing the new office to a capital case. Although, on the surface, it would seem as if a trial judge would prefer 

to appoint an office with attorneys who would not seek compensation from the 

judge’s county, qualified, experienced capital counsel will likely seek expert assistance, which must still be paid out of county funds. A trial judge can ensure that 

his county will not bear the cost of an expensive capital trial if he appoints a lawyer 

who does not know to ask for expert assistance. 

The situation regarding appeals and post-conviction for death sentenced prisoners 

is hardly better. Under Mississippi law, the SAME lawyer who represents a client 

facing the death penalty at trial MUST represent the defendant on direct appeal. 

If new counsel represents a death sentenced prisoner on direct appeal, counsel must 

raise all issues of ineffective assistance of counsel in the same appeal, without the 

benefit of having the resources provided to post-conviction counsel for discovery, investigative and expert assistance. Therefore, the same, unqualified attorney who 

represented the client at trial is now representing him on his primary challenge to 

his conviction and death sentence. Moreover, counsel is given the same, meager 

$1,000 as compensation. 

Until 1998, death sentenced prisoners in Mississippi were not afforded the right 

to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. However, under pressure from a federal 

law suit challenging the lack of post-conviction counsel, the Mississippi legislature, 

in July of 2000, created the Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel. This new office, consisting of a Director, two staff attorneys, and one investigator, is responsible 

for either directly representing, or finding alternate counsel for all 63 prisoners. For 

those cases where alternate counsel has been appointed, most of the lawyers are 

from states other than Mississippi. While the Mississippi Supreme Court created 

standards that counsel must meet before they can be appointed to represent death 

sentenced prisoners in post-conviction proceedings, only a handful of lawyers in Mississippi meet these qualifications. This, of course, is in large part because the right 

to counsel did not exist prior to 1998, so few Mississippi lawyers have ever handed 

a death penalty case in post-conviction proceedings. 

The Mississippi Supreme Court has also allowed attorneys representing death 

sentenced prisoners in post-conviction proceedings to receive higher compensation 

than the $1,000 rate, and to seek funds for investigative and expert assistance. 

These attorneys, however, must request these fees from the trial courts. Although 

the fees are now being paid from a state fund, many trial judges still continue to 

withhold money for investigative and expert assistance, and some post-conviction 

lawyers are still being compensated only $1,000 for their work. The state post-conviction fund must not only cover the funds to compensate private attorneys, but pay 

for investigative and expert assistance in all of these cases, including those cases 

being handled by the state office. 

There has been much discussion of the many, many prisoners who have been released from death rows across the country after it was later determined that they 

were innocent. One of these prisoners, Sabrina Butler, is from Mississippi. However, 

because so many death sentenced prisoners were represented by lawyers who were 

underpaid, inexperienced, and unqualified, there can be little confidence in the outcome of these trials. A three-day trial is hardly the kind of adversarial proceeding 

that is required for the judicial process to properly function in its truth seeking mission. Whether there are innocent people presently on death row in Mississippi is unclear. However, as innocent people have been freed from death penalty states where 

the quality of legal representation is much higher, it certainly cannot be assumed 

that all 63 prisoners on Mississippi’s death row are guilty of the crimes for which 

they have been convicted.

Statement of Michael Pescetta, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of 

the Federal Public Defender 

f My name is Michael Pescetta. I am an Assistant Federal Public Defender and I 

am chief of the Capital Habeas Unit in the Office of the Federal Public Defender 

for the District of Nevada. Our unit litigates most of the federal habeas corpus proceedings resulting from judgments of death in Nevada state courts, and currently 

we are providing representation in twenty-three such cases. We are therefore familiar with the issues that are routinely presented in these cases and with the problems arising in state court litigation of capital cases. 

I have been litigating capital appeals and habeas corpus cases since 1983, first 

in California (initially as an attorney for the California State Public Defender, and 

142

then as Director of Capital Litigation, overseeing all of the capital cases in that office, from 1988 to 1992) and since 1992 in Nevada. I was the director of the death 

penalty resource center for Nevada from 1992 until 1995, when the resource center 

was de-funded. I currently litigate only capital habeas corpus cases. 

Nevada is in continuing crisis with respect to representation in capital cases. The 

salient factor is that Nevada has the highest death row population per capita of any 

state in the nation and the fewest lawyers per capital case of any state. Currently, 

approximately 30 lawyers are responsible for representing all of the 85 individuals 

who are under capital sentence; and, with the exception of the approximately 10 to 

15 capital trial lawyers in public defender offices, these are the same lawyers who 

provide representation in capital cases at trial. The effect of this situation on the 

quality of representation is severe: there are simply too few lawyers who are willing 

to provide representation in capital cases, particularly in habeas proceedings, and 

many of the lawyers who do provide representation are woefully unskilled. 

The Nevada state system is generally in a position to fund litigation in capital 

cases if it wishes to. The county public defender offices in Clark County (Las Vegas) 

and Washoe County (Reno) pay attorney salaries that are competitive with those 

paid by prosecution offices. While budgets for ancillary services, such as expert witnesses, maybe limited by the county commissions, in general public defender offices 

have been able to secure funds for such services when attorneys request them. 

When private counsel is appointed by the court, Nevada statutes provide for compensation of counsel at a rate of $75 per hour in capital cases. There is a presumptive cap of $12,000 for attorney compensation in capital trial cases, and of $750 in 

capital habeas corpus cases, and a presumptive cap of $300 for reimbursement for 

ancillary services. Nev. Rev. Stats. §§ 7.125, 7.135. These limits are generally recognized as inadequate for competent representation and they are normally exceeded 

when counsel requests additional funds, although the amounts actually authorized 

vary greatly among individual trial judges. 

Unfortunately, the potential availability of resources for litigating capital cases 

does not normally translate into adequate litigation, primarily due to the quality of 

counsel. In public defender offices, the problem is frequently that lawyers fail to recognize the need for adequate investigation or ancillary services—until last year, neither of the two county public defender offices had any organized training programs 

at all—and have often treated the litigation of capital cases as routine. In general, 

the salaries paid in the two largest public defender offices have contributed to a career civil service mentality on the part of lawyers and administrators, and a concomitant unwillingness to antagonize other parts of the criminal justice system, at 

the expense of vigorous advocacy on behalf of clients. Public defender offices also 

have not historically used their budgets to hire adequate numbers of investigators 

to allow them to conduct sufficient investigation in all capital cases, much less in 

all cases. (For instance, until the year 2000, the Clark County Public Defender’s Office had approximately 8 investigators on staff and a yearly caseload of over 31,000 

cases.) It appears that this situation does affect the vigor of defense advocacy: a recent study conducted by the Spangenberg Group for the Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, and the American Bar Association showed that the trial 

rate for the Clark County Public Defender is under 0.6%, while the national urban 

average trial rate is 4–7%. 

While the Nevada Supreme Court has imposed experience standards for counsel, 

Nev. Sup. Ct. Rule 250(2)(b, c), there is no assessment of the quality of representation as a basis for appointment. There is also no formal mechanism for the appointment of counsel other than public defender offices, and individual judges recruit and 

select attorneys for appointment unilaterally. As a result, lawyers who have done 

seriously inadequate work on capital cases continue to be appointed to do more of 

them. In particular, in state habeas corpus proceedings, in which only private counsel are appointed, so few lawyers are willing to accept appointment that courts routinely appoint lawyers whose representation is so inadequate that subsequent federal proceedings require significantly greater expenditure of resources on both procedural and substantive issues. For instance, in over 20% of the capital cases currently pending in state habeas proceedings, representation is being provided by lawyers who have never filed a discovery motion or a motion for funds for ancillary 

services in any habeas proceeding. It is not uncommon for these lawyers to attempt 

to litigate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel without even obtaining the files 

of previous counsel. While these problems have been drawn to the attention of the 

Nevada Supreme Court and the state trial courts, they have been unwilling to intervene or to mandate closer scrutiny of counsel’s actions in state habeas proceedings, 

and the emphasis has remained on simply processing capital cases through that system in any way possible. 

143

Fundamentally, the problem of adequate representation in capital cases reflects 

the legal culture in Nevada. Criminal defense lawyers who provide representation 

in indigent cases, as opposed to representing paying clients, are not held in the 

same respect as other lawyers, and criminal cases involving indigents are treated 

with less concern than others. Some defense lawyers appointed in capital cases often 

treat them as routine and simply do not have the interest in or dedication to this 

type of work that would motivate them to improve their skills. The Nevada Supreme 

Court routinely expresses concern about the quality of representation in capital 

cases, but its actions are often not consistent with its expressed position. For instance, the court has criticized defense counsel, sometimes vehemently, for not raising available issues at the first opportunity, see Beiarano v. Warden, 112 Nev. 1466, 

1470, 929 P.2d 922, 925 (1996), but when thorough counsel attempts to raise all 

available constitutional claims on appeal the court seeks to discourage it. See Hernandez v. State, 2001 WL 668460 (June 14, 2001.) The state trial courts act similarly: they normally do not demand that counsel provide quality representation in 

capital habeas cases, and (along with the state bar) routinely ignore complaints 

from clients about counsel’s actions in failing to communicate with the client, to 

raise issues pointed out by the client, or to conduct adequate investigation. 

The low quality of defense advocacy has a pernicious systemic effect, because the 

corrective function of a vigorous defense on the criminal justice system as a whole 

normally does not occur. For instance, one of the commonest complaints of the defense bar in Clark County is the failure of the district attorney’s office to comply 

with its disclosure obligations under Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), despite 

purportedly maintaining an ‘‘open file’’ discovery policy. In 1998 and 1999 the Federal Public Defender conducted depositions of the records custodians of the district 

attorney’s office and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, in a 17-yearold capital case. These depositions revealed that the district attorney’s office has no 

institutional mechanism for ensuring that disclosable evidence in the possession of 

the police is included in the disclosure to the defense as required by Kyles. This revelation had no effect on the practices of the district attorney, which has been found 

in subsequent cases to have failed to disclose evidence in the possession of the police; and it has not changed the motion practice of the majority of defense counsel, 

who continue to rely upon the ‘‘open file’’ policy. Similarly, in a case involving a 

claim of actual innocence, in which evidence relating to other suspects was concealed by Washoe County authorities for almost 20 years, Mazzan v. Warden, 116 

Nev.—, 993 P.2d 25 (2000), the revelation of the failure to disclose has not had any 

reported effect on the discovery policies currently in force or in most defense counsel’s motion practice with respect to discovery. These are only the most obvious instances in which an absence of vigorous defense advocacy, and appropriate judicial 

response to such advocacy, has left the state system as a whole functioning below 

acceptable constitutional standards. 

Providing thorough and competent representation at all stages of all capital cases 

is currently not a reality in the Nevada state system. That goal will be attained, 

if at all, only with the maturation of the criminal defense bar and with an insistence 

by the state courts on vigorous and thorough defense advocacy in capital cases.

fFEDERAL COURT DIVISION

DEFENDER ASSOCIATION OF PHILADELPHIA

PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106

July 5, 2001

Senator Patrick Leahy 

433 Russell Senate Office Building 

United States Senate 

Washington, D.C. 20510

Senator Orrin G. Hatch 

104 Hart Senate Office Building 

United States Senate 

Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senators Leahy and Hatch:

I am writing in regard to S. 486 (The Innocence Protection Act). I am the Chief 

Federal Defender for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In addition to representing indigent defendants charged with federal crimes, my office also represents 

some prisoners in federal habeas corpus proceedings challenging death sentences 

144

imposed by the state courts of Pennsylvania. As such, I and my staff are familiar 

with standards for quality, and compensation, of counsel in the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania. 

I understand that the Innocence Protection Act seeks to insure minimal standards 

governing the competency of counsel who handle death penalty cases in state court. 

Of Pennsylvania’s 67 counties, only one (Philadelphia) has standards governing appointment of counsel. In this regard, Senator Leahy quoted the 1990 Joint Task 

Force on Death Penalty Litigation in Pennsylvania, that the lack of standards has 

led Pennsylvania to having ‘‘one of the worst systems in the country for providing 

indigent defense services,’’ and has experienced ‘‘problem [s] of major proportions.’’

Indeed, in some cases being handled by my office we have seen stark examples 

of inexperienced and unqualified counsel being appointed to these cases. Scott 

Blystone was represented by a part-time public defender who had one year’s experience as a judicial law clerk and had been practicing law for 31⁄2 months at the time 

of his appointment (Fayette County); Carolyn King was represented by a civil practitioner who specialized in family law who had tried a single criminal case, a oneday trial on drug charges (Lebanon County); Lawrence Christy was represented by 

two lawyers, one who had graduated from law school three years before trial and 

had asked for help from the court because he had never tried a capital case, and 

the other who had graduated from lave school two years earlier and had never tried 

any criminal case; James Carpenter (York County) was represented on direct appeal 

by an attorney who had one year of experience who had never represented a client 

in any appellate proceedings prior to this capital case. 

While Philadelphia County has standards, that jurisdiction is responsible for 55% 

of the Pennsylvania’s capital convictions. According to the Pennsylvania Department 

of Corrections 117 of Pennsylvania’s death row inmates (45% of the Commonwealth’s death row of 241) are from counties that have no published standards governing compensation of counsel, provision of investigators and experts, and qualifications of counsel. 

The capital representation crisis in Pennsylvania is not a semantic question as 

to whether Pennsylvania provides standards at the county, rather than state-wide, 

level. It is that Pennsylvania has no adequate system for capital appointments and 

compensation at any level. As Chief Judge Becker of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found, the issue of whether Pennsylvania provides adequate standards and resources for capital representation is not amenable to ‘‘countyby county or case-by-case determination.’’ The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania itself 

admitted ‘‘that Pennsylvania does not meet the [capital representation] requirements of [the AEDPA] as of January 31, 1997, and that it has not met them previously.’’ Death Row Prisoners of Pennsylvunia v. Ridge, 106 F.3d 35, 36 (3d Cir. 

1997). 

While it is true that the Philadelphia standards would prevent some of the more 

egregious examples of capital non-representation that occur elsewhere in Pennsylvania, the appointment system is neither neutral nor effective. The City courts have 

been sued on numerous occasions by appointed counsel because of non-payment and 

underpayment, and—as was the case at the time of the Task Force report in 1990—

many lawyers have stated that they will not take cases because they cannot afford 

to do so. Even an experienced capital defense lawyer cannot be effective if s/he is 

not paid adequately for the hours required to properly handle a case or does not 

have money for experts or investigators. Counsel qualified for appointment on Philadelphia’s list have been found ineffective in five recent post-conviction cases for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence, and a sixth lawyer who is on 

Philadelphia’s appointment list was found ineffective for failing to investigate and 

present mitigating evidence in a case tried in a neighboring county. 

In short, the observations of the 1990 Task Force report, cited by Senator Leahy 

during the hearing, retain their force today, notwithstanding any isolated suggestions to the contrary made during the hearing. Pennsylvania would greatly benefit 

from the adoption of uniform standards governing these important issues. 

I respectfully request that this letter be made a part of the record. 

Respectfully, 

MAUREEN KEARNEY ROWLEY

Chief Federal Defender

f145

Statement of Hon. Gordon H. Smith, a U.S. Senator from the State of 

Oregon 

I would like to thank you, Chairman Leahy, Senator Hatch, and the rest of my 

colleagues on the committee for allowing me to speak today. I would also like to 

thank you for holding this hearing, which will help focus the Senate’s, and the nation’s, attention on importance of providing competent counsel in death penalty 

cases. 

This subject is important to me because I sit before you today as a proponent of 

the death penalty. I believe that some crimes are so odious, and so heinous that 

the death penalty is the only appropriate punishment. I believe further that the 

death penalty deters crime, and that it ultimately saves lives as a result. But I can 

only support the death penalty in good conscience if I am convinced, and the American people are convinced, that no innocent person is ever executed, and that people 

on trial for their lives have adequate legal representation. Competent counsel is a 

minimum requirement for justice in these cases, and I believe that federal leadership is necessary to ensure that every person on trial for his or her life receives 

qualified legal representation. 

Mr. Chairman, we are very lucky in Oregon to have one of the most progressive 

systems in America for ensuring adequate legal representation in capital cases. Defense attorneys undergo a rigorous state approval process. Prospective capital defense attorneys must have several years of experience, including experience with 

murder cases, must attend regular legal training or education programs on capital 

cases, and must be able to provide at least five letters of recommendation from state 

judges, defense attorneys, or district attorneys attesting to the attorney’s fitness for 

defending death penalty cases. These are all minimum requirements in the state of 

Oregon. 

In addition, Mr. Chairman, Oregon spends far more defending the indigent than 

it does prosecuting them. Next year, Oregon will likely spend in the neighborhood 

of $80 million for indigent defense and approximately $50 million on prosecutions. 

Oregon has also centralized its indigent defense funding at the state level to ensure 

that the quality of defense will not vary with the economic fortunes of individual 

counties. I understand that legal representation cannot always be measured by dollar figures, but I believe that Oregon’s commitment to competent counsel is reflected 

in the resources the state has dedicated to ensure it. 

I believe that the federal government must ensure that we, as a nation, are also 

fully committed to nationwide standards for competent counsel. I have been fortunate to work with the chairman of this committee on legislation that would lead to 

the development of national standards for legal services in capital cases. I believe 

that the federal government should study existing systems for appointing counsel 

in capital cases, determine the minimum standards that states should meet in providing representation, and ensure that states abide by these standards. By establishing these requirements, the federal government’s leadership can help secure the 

nation’s confidence in our application of the death penalty. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m not here because I believe that incompetent defense counsel 

has become the norm in courtrooms across America. But our system of justice simply cannot tolerate severely overworked, underpaid, and even unqualified attorneys 

representing Americans on trial for their lives. I want to urge this committee to do 

all it can to make our excellent system of justice even better. Helping ensure competent counsel nationwide is a good step in that direction. We cannot afford mistakes in death penalty cases, and Americans must be confident that defendants in 

capital cases are receiving adequate representation.

Statement of Maurie Levin, Texas Defender Service 

fBACKGROUND

My name is Maurie Levin. I am the Managing Attorney of the Austin office of 

Texas Defender Service (TDS), a private nonprofit with offices in Austin and Houston, Texas. Since 1995, TDS has provided direct representation to indigent inmates 

on Texas’s death row, consulted with other lawyers litigating capital cases at the 

trial and post-conviction level, and intervened in unusual cases where expert legal 

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1The report is available on our web site at: www.texasdefender.org. 

2 A copy of The Fair Defense Report may be obtained from Texas Appleseed at 

www.appleseeds.net/tx. 3See Allan K. Butcher & Michael K. Moore, Muting Gideon’s Trumpet: The Crisis in Indigent 

Criminal Defense in Texas 12 (Sept. 22, 2000), at http://www.uta.edu/pols/moore/indigent/

whitepaper.htm.

assistance was urgently needed. Senator Leahy’s office asked that I describe for this 

Committee the appointment and compensation process in Texas. 

Texas Defender Service is the only organization in Texas, public or private, that 

concentrates exclusively on tracking capital cases and representing indigent defendants charged with and/or facing a capital sentence. We thus serve as a primary 

source of information about the death penalty in Texas for other organizations, the 

public, and the press. In October 2000, TDS released A State of Denial, the most 

comprehensive report to date on the administration of the death penalty in Texas.1

Local, national, and international media covered its release. The nine chapters of 

the report outlined many of the deficiencies in the Texas system, including official 

misconduct, the use of phony experts, racism and the death penalty, the execution 

of the mentally retarded, and the inadequacies in the representation provided. It 

also underscored the fact that the deficiencies in the system are all exacerbated, 

masked, and allowed to continue when defense counsel fails to fulfill her role as a 

zealous advocate for the defendant and due process. 

THE STATE OF INDIGENT CAPITAL DEFENSE IN TEXAS

Texas is replete with the horror stories that result from the inadequate counsel 

that is provided to inmates facing a sentence of death. Texas, of course, is home to 

the now infamous sleeping lawyer cases—where capital trial counsel actually slept 

through significant portions of trial, and where the Texas appellate court deemed 

that to be nonetheless adequate representation. And lest we dismiss those stories 

as rare aberrations of the past, recent studies from a variety of sources confirm that 

the typical attorney appointed to represent an indigent capital defendant in Texas 

is a solo practitioner who may or may not have any capital experience, is eight 

times more likely than the next lawyer to have suffered some form of disciplinary 

action for ethical lapses, and will get paid an hourly rate that cannot even cover 

her office overhead, and only for a fraction of the hours necessary to do a competent 

job. In addition, she will be fully aware that zealous advocacy may risk future appointments from the Court that hands her the cases that provide her day-to-day 

livelihood. In short, it is a system that makes it a fairly safe bet that counsel cannot 

and will not do a competent job representing their capital clients. 

Despite the increased attention to these problems, and the reforms implemented 

in the last legislative session, they still exist. While the Fair Defense Act, courageously championed and skillfully stewarded through to passage by Senator Rodney 

Ellis, takes crucial first steps to improve indigent defense overall, its effect on capital cases will be extremely limited. Moreover, it does not affect the quality of postconviction representation at all—the crucial stage of the appeals where people are 

discovered to be innocent, and exonerated. In short, we still have a long, long way 

to go. 

To fully understand the nature and extent of the problem, it is necessary to understand how the Texas system works. In explaining the process, and providing examples and statistics, I rely upon TDS’ Report, A State of Denial, the capital chapter 

of The Fair Defense Report, released this past year by Texas Appleseed,2 an earlier 

study by a Subcommittee of the State Bar, reflecting the results of a comprehensive 

survey of attorneys, judges, and courthouse personnel,3 and newspaper studies and 

articles. Each of these reports bears out the anecdotal evidence and describes numerous profoundly disturbing systemic deficiencies. 

The Texas system is marked by the following features: 

• Disparity in the manner in which counsel are appointed, the quality of 

counsel, and the compensation and funding provided. Texas’ appointment 

system is county-based. There are 254 counties, and numerous courts within each county. Some say that there are 800 different appointment and 

compensation systems—a different one for each court. 

• A lack of meaningful statewide standards. Up until 1995, there were no 

standards whatsoever governing the appointment of counsel in capital 

cases. Anyone, even a tax attorney, could be appointed to represent a defendant facing a sentence of death—and were. In 1995, legislative revisions 

required that each of the nine administrative regions establish regional 

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4Defense Called Lacking for Death Row Indigents, But System Supporters Say Most Attorneys Effective, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 10, 2000, at 1A. 5Steve Mills and Ken Armstrong, Flawed Trial Lead to Death Chamber, CHICAGO TUNE, 

June 11, 2000, at Sec. 1, p. 1. 6Dan Malone and Steve McGonigle, Questions of Competence Arise in Death Row Appeal: 

Lawyer with History of Problems Defends Handling of Case, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 

11, 2000, at A1. See also Linda Kane, Death Row Inmate’s Lubbock Attorney Used Drugs, Alcohol, LUBBOCK AVALANCHE-JOURNAL, Sept. 10, 2000, at 12A; A State of Denial, p. 111. 7 BUTCHER & MOORE, MUTING GIDEON’s TRUMPET 12 (Sept. 22, 2000). 

standards, but the results were minimal at best, and the failure to comply 

with the statute bore no consequences—except for the defendant. 

For example, the Dallas Morning News recently found that 24 attorneys who had 

been designated as qualified to represent capital murder defendants had been disciplined for misconduct, one having been suspended from practice twice. As the 

News observed: ‘‘The judge who ordered the most recent suspension [of this attorney] . . . . delayed its activation so the attorney could finish a capital murder case 

he had been appointed to handle. He has since received other death penalty cases— as well as another reprimand from the bar.’’ The same News study confirmed that 

the trial lawyers who had represented Texas death row inmates had been disciplined at approximately eight times the rate of lawyers as a whole.4

In a study conducted by the Chicago Tribune, they found that in one out of three 

of the cases examined, the trial lawyer presented no evidence, or only one witness 

at the sentencing phase of trial—the phase where the jury decides whether their 

client should live or dies.5

One particularly egregious example is that of Joe Lee Guy, whose attorney ingested cocaine on the way to trial, consumed alcohol during court breaks, and had 

been disciplined numerous times both before and after Guy’s capital trial.6 In fact, 

he could not complete the appeal of Guy’s case because of a recent suspension. 

These facts only came to light after TDS intervened on the eve of Mr. Guy’s scheduled execution, and recruited a law firm to represent Mr. Guy on a pro bono basis. 

It is worthwhile noting that Mr. Guy, the lookout, was the only one of the three 

defendants who was sentenced to death—his two co-defendants, the ‘‘shooters,’’ were both sentenced to life after their attorneys presented a compelling case for life on 

their behalf. It is a particularly good example of the title of Stephen Bright’s oftquoted statement: ‘‘the death sentence not for the worst crime, but for the worst 

lawyer.’’ While the Fair Defense Act establishes, for the first time, minimum statewide 

standards for capital trial counsel, the standards that Texas legislators were willing 

to pass are fairly minimal, requiring only that counsel have five years of experience 

in criminal litigation (defense or prosecution), and only ‘‘significant’’ felony experience as defense counsel. Moreover, without the funding necessary to enable qualified 

counsel to litigate these cases, and the concomitant support and independence necessary to make that possible, these standards will affect very little change, and will 

not prevent horror stories such as sleeping or drug-addicted capital counsel. 

Impermissible factors, irrelevant to questions of qualifications, affect the elected judiciary’s appointing decisions and compromise the quality and independence of appointed counsel. According to the State Bar Study, nearly half the judges reported 

that their peers ‘‘sometimes appoint counsel because they have a reputation for 

moving cases, regardless of the quality of defense they provide,’’ and over half indicated that the ‘‘attorney’s need for income’’ influenced the appointment decision. Significant numbers of judges reported that their appointment decisions were affected 

by whether a defense attorney was a personal friend (39.5%), a political supporter 

(35.1%), or a contributor to the judge’s reelection campaign (30.3%).7

While the Fair Defense Act permits and encourages counties to establish a different, more neutral appointment system, it does not require them to do so, and in 

fact permits them to retain their current system. There is nothing to say that judges 

will not continue to appoint attorneys based not on their qualifications, but on the 

basis of how quickly and cheaply they move cases through the courts, or how much 

was donated to the appointing judge’s reelection campaign. 

Trial courts do not provide the resources necessary to defend a person accused of 

a capital crime. Compensation varies drastically between the counties. In many of 

the more rural counties, it is not enough to cover overhead expenses. In others, 

‘‘fixed’’ or ‘‘flat’’ fee structures provide incentives for attorneys to do as little work 

as possible on the case. In one county, compensation for out of court time is limited 

to 60 hours—one twentieth of the amount of time that is spent, on average, preparing for a federal capital trial. Until 1995, Texas law capped the entire amount 

defense counsel could request for investigative and expert expenses at $500, and anecdotal evidence indicates that many judges still apply the old limits. 

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8 Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 61–62 and Exh. 62, Ex parte Colella (CCA No. 

37,418). 9 BUTCHER & MOORE, MUTING GIDEON’s TRUMPET 15 (Sept. 22, 2000) (reporting that 

Texas criminal defense attorneys report overhead costs of $71/hr). 10 Id. 11 ‘‘ See A State of Denial, supra, pp. 104–118. 

For example, the attorney who represented Paul Richard Colella in his 1992 Cameron County capital murder trial was not reimbursed for an investigator and was 

not paid until almost two years after the trial ended.8 When he was paid, he received only $9,000 for handling both the trial and the initial appeal of the case. Dividing this payment by the attorney’s estimates of the number of hours he worked 

yields an average of approximately $20 per houror less than one-third the hourly 

overhead rate in the average Texas criminal defense attorney’s practice.9

There is a lack of any centralized body of expertise upon which attorneys might 

draw for resources and assistance. The State Bar Study found that 66% of the appointed lawyers were solo practitioners and the vast majority of the remainder practiced in small firms, most of which were merely clusters of lawyers sharing office 

expenses. Most of the attorneys reported that only half of their practice involved 

criminal cases, while the remainder involved civil matters.10 Thus, most lawyers 

confronting a capital case, if they are interested in providing an adequate defense, 

must grapple alone with a body of unfamiliar and complex death penalty law, and 

direct an investigation into the client’s background, which can require expertise far 

beyond the typical criminal case. Unlike the cadre of experienced prosecutors trying 

these cases, many attorneys appointed to capital cases must start, each time, learning the law from the ground up. 

The courts do not take responsibility for correcting the egregious problems—such 

as snoozing counsel—that are clearly displayed before them. The judge presiding 

over Calvin Burdine’s trial (whose lawyer slept through significant portions of the 

trial) stated that ‘‘the Constitution doesn’t say the lawyer has to be awake.’’ The 

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals routinely denies any remedy to inmates whose 

court-appointed lawyers perform poorly. Thus, that (elected) Court denied relief to 

two death row inmates whose lawyers slept through trial, and in the past five years 

have achieved one of the lowest reversal rates for capital cases in the entire country: 

three percent. 

Errors are generally not revealed in post-conviction proceedings—the appellate 

proceedings which are supposed to serve as the safeguard to our system—because 

appointed counsel are profoundly inexperienced, inadequate, and underfunded. In 

fact, the post-conviction appointment system simply repeats the errors replete at 

trial, thus making it highly likely that we are not even aware of many of the horror 

stories regarding what occurs at trial. 

In Joe Guy’s case, discussed above, the state post-conviction attorney appointed 

to represent him failed (in her nine page petition) to raise the fact either that trial 

counsel was struggling with drug and alcohol addiction, or that the investigator appointed to assist counsel had become the beneficiary of the surviving victim’s estate. 

It was only by chance that TDS discovered the case, and its horrifying facts, shortly 

before Mr. Guy’s scheduled execution. 

Moreover, the courts appear indifferent to the glaring inadequacies of the work 

produced. For instance, in a study of over half the post-conviction appeals filed in 

Texas since 1995, we found that in 42%, post-conviction counsel appeared to have 

conducted no new investigation, and raised no extra-record claims—even though 

these are the only type of claims that can be considered for review at this stage.11

In many cases, appointed attorneys merely repeated, verbatim, claims which had already been rejected by the courts in a previous appeal. In almost one out of five 

of the cases reviewed, the post-conviction application was less than fifteen pages 

long—barely long enough to contain the minimal procedural formalities. In a number of cases where such patently inadequate applications were filed, subsequent investigation has revealed significant constitutional errors—such as that of Joe Guy, 

as well as a possible claim of innocence—that were not included, and would have 

remained undiscovered if TDS had not become involved. 

CONCLUSION

The lethal consequences of the Texas capital system are concrete. Every year, 

Texas leads the country in number of executions. Last year, Texas set a ‘‘record ‘‘

for the number of executions in one year: 40. We execute disproportionate numbers 

of people of color, persons who are mentally ill, mentally retarded, and juveniles. 

Because of the inadequacies of the system—primarily the inadequacies of trial and 

149

post conviction counsel—it is also highly likely that we are executing people who 

are innocent or not eligible for a sentence of death. Tragically, it is the hallmark 

of the Texas system that its most pervasive feature is its efficiency in burying its 

mistakes. The Innocence Protection Act is an essential step in bringing these problems to light, and in providing the resources and enforcement mechanisms necessary to provide indigent inmates facing a sentence of death the competent counsel 

to which they are constitutionally entitled.

Statement of Hon. Strom Thurmond, a U.S. Senator from the State of South 

fCarolina 

The death penalty is the most serious punishment our criminal justice system can 

seek, and we all agree that defendants who are charged with a capital crime deserve 

the effective assistance of counsel. We all want to make certain that any defendant 

receives a fair trial, and I appreciate the majority’s interest in this issue. 

However, I think what we disagree about is how fair the system is today. The 

states take their responsibility to provide counsel for indigent defendants in capital 

and non-capital cases very seriously. About $1.2 billion dollars was spent by the nation’s 100 largest counties in 1999 to provide lawyers for indigent defendants. The 

fact is that the conviction rate for defendants is approximately the same, regardless 

of whether they are represented by publicly-financed counsel or private counsel, according to a Justice Department study from last year. The criminal justice system 

is not perfect, but it is not fundamentally flawed. 

The system is no worse regarding capital cases in particular. In recent years, the 

media has widely reported allegations of flaws in the death penalty system in the 

states. For example, a widely publicized Columbia University study, which found a 

68% ‘‘error rate’’ regarding capital case reversals on appeal, was very misleading. 

It did not note that most reversals had nothing to do with innocence, and that many 

defendants were again found guilty of their crimes. It also did not cover the period 

since 1995 when all indications are that the law is much more settled than it was 

in the 1970s and 1980s. 

I do not believe that there is a crisis in how criminal defendants who commit capital crimes are treated in the criminal justice system today, and I certainly do not 

believe that the federal government should take control of how the state courts operate in this regard. 

Unfortunately, I am concerned that this is essentially what the Innocence Protection Act would do in its current form. The bill would create a national commission 

that would dictate to the states how all defendants in all capital cases are to be 

represented. If a state did not comply, it would be severely punished through the 

loss of federal funds and even the loss of recent habeas corpus reforms. The Congress enacted these reforms just a few years ago to help limit endless prisoner lawsuits and promote finality and comity between the state and federal systems. 

The federal government should be extremely reluctant to impose federal mandates 

and standards on the states based on a one-size-fits-all mentality, especially in the 

area of criminal justice. It is the responsibility of the states to define crimes and 

the procedures to be followed in their courts. 

I am concerned that many of the proposed changes in this legislation would have 

little to do with actually protecting innocence, but instead could obstruct the appropriate enforcement of capital punishment throughout the country. 

I appreciate the witnesses who have appeared today to discuss this important 

topic. I would especially like to note that one of the witnesses is Kevin Brackett, 

who is a prosecutor from South Carolina. It is a pleasure to have him before the 

Committee. 

Thank you.

Statement of Denise Young, Attorney, Tempe, Arizona 

f I am an attorney licensed to practice law in Arizona since 1982. Since 1989, my 

practice has been devoted entirely to representing defendants under sentence of 

death in appeal and post-conviction proceedings in the state and federal courts, and 

assisting other defense counsel in representing their clients in all stages of capital 

proceedings including pre-trial, trial and post-conviction proceedings. I was also the 

150

former director of the Arizona Capital Representation Project, a capital post-conviction defender organization, from 1989 until July, 1996. 

I have been asked to describe the manner in which the Arizona courts appoint 

and compensate counsel for indigent persons in potential capital trials in Arizona. 

The answer to that question is not an easy one because Arizona has no statewide 

capital defense office, and no unified system of indigent capital defense. As a result, 

the costs of capital trials are largely borne individually by each of Arizona’s fifteen 

counties. Due in no small part to Arizona’s failure to provide a statewide system 

of indigent defense with quality counsel and adequate funding for experts and resources, Arizona’s reversible error rate is shockingly high. A comprehensive study 

conducted by Professor James Liebman recently found that Arizona’s overall reversible error rate for capital cases is 79 per cent. 

State funds account for a very small portion of expenditures on indigent defense 

in Arizona. In 1999, the state allocated $5 million over two years for prosecution, 

indigent defense services, and the court system. A rough estimate suggests that of 

this $5 million, no more than $1 million, approximately one-fifth of total state funding, went to indigent defense. 

Compared with other states that provide funds, Arizona ranks at the very bottom 

in state assistance towards indigent defense representation. Twenty-three states 

fund indigent defense entirely at the state level. In about half of the remaining 

twenty-seven states, state funds account for at least 50% of the money spent on indigent defense. Only two states, Pennsylvania and South Dakota, provide no state 

funding. Assuming that Arizona does indeed spend at least $1 million annually on 

indigent defense, it ranks last among the 48 states which provide some state funding, based on a per capita comparison of state expenditures. 

Because indigent defense services in Arizona are administered at the county level, 

each county has responsibility for establishing and managing its own system to find, 

appoint and compensate counsel to represent the person charged with first degree 

murder where the state is seeking a death sentence. Not surprisingly, the practices 

in this system vary widely from county to county, with no systematic statewide procedure for compensation, defense training or support. Capital representation at trial 

is undertaken primarily by a scattering of public and legal defender offices, sporadically located in some counties. Because these offices are typically grossly underfunded and overworked, contract attorneys represent a substantial number of capital defendants at trial. The majority of attorneys handling first degree murder 

cases at any stage do not practice exclusively in the highly technical and specialized 

area of capital defense. 

Defense procedures vary widely from county to county and there is no systematic 

procedure for ensuring adequate compensation, litigation expenses, training or support. Since 1996, the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure have provided some 

qualifications for appointment of attorneys. The qualifications, however, speak only 

to the number of years in criminal work, not to the quality of work done over those 

years. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 6.8 (b) requires that capital trial counsel 

have ‘‘practiced in the area of state criminal litigation for five years’’ before appointment, and been ‘‘lead’’ counsel in nine felony jury trials and lead or co-counsel in 

one capital murder jury trial. It is left to individual courts and counties to determine whether those minimal qualifications are met. Trial co-counsel, upon whom 

major responsibility is frequently thrust, need have no prior legal experience. Nonmandatory provisions of the rule recommend that appellate and post-conviction 

counsel should have some appellate or post-conviction experience in felony cases, but 

the lawyer need not have any capital experience. Additionally, trial counsel is to 

complete, within one year before the initial appointment, six hours of training in 

‘‘the area of capital defense.’’ After appointment, no further capital training is required, although ‘‘within one year prior to any subsequent appointment’’ in a capital 

case, trial counsel must have completed twelve hours of training ‘‘in the area of 

criminal defense.’’

Trial defense attorneys who are handling these cases in Arizona’s counties do not 

receive adequate resources or assistance, including necessary investigative and expert assistance to competently handle the guilt and penalty phases of the capital 

case. For example, in Pima County (the second most populous county), private contract attorneys represent about 83% of the county’s capital defendants. As is characteristic of defense attorneys statewide, most of these attorneys do not practice exclusively in capital defense. Pursuant to these contracts, an attorney is paid $3000 

for providing representation in a serious felony case, and $800 for other felonies. In 

first-degree murder cases, lead defense counsel is paid $75 per hour up to a maximum of $15,000, compensating about 200 hours of work, and co-counsel receives 

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1The contract does provide that more funds might be available if ‘‘special circumstances’’ are present. What constitutes ‘‘special circumstances,’’ however, is unknown. 2This estimate, too, is excessively low. Competent investigation for the penalty phase of a capital case begins long before the capital trial begins and generally consumes hundreds of hours. 3 Another rural county, Yavapai County, also requires counsel to enter into a contract which 

pays a flat fee for representation in a set number of cases, usually for $70,000. Rural Graham 

County also uses contract attorneys who are paid $80,000 to provide representation in 100 

cases. 

$60 per hour up to a limit of $7,500, compensating about 183 hours of work.1 In 

stark comparison to Arizona’s estimation, the New York State Defender’s Association has estimated an attorney’s time for a death penalty trial at 800 to 900 billable 

hours. Even if one aggregates lead counsel and cocounsel’s time, totaling 383 hours, 

the ceiling on this compensation in Arizona is grossly inadequate to permit competent representation. 

In Maricopa County, Arizona’s most populous county, attorneys are appointed 

from one of four public defender offices, unless a conflict arises. In those cases, attorneys who have contracted with the county to accept court-appointed criminal 

cases are appointed. Contracts are based on a flat fee. For example, under the major 

felony contract, which includes first degree murder cases in which the state is seeking death, attorneys are paid $72,000 over a twelve month period to represent nine 

defendants regardless of the number of hours involved in the case and the number 

of pending criminal cases each defendant may have. If any of those cases end in 

a mistrial, or result in a new trial, the contracting attorney receives no additional 

compensation to retry the case. The contract also obligates the attorney to undertake representation of three more defendants for an additional $8,000 each. If any 

one of these potential twelve cases is a first degree murder case where the state 

is seeking death, the attorney is paid ‘‘an additional $8,000 when the jury is 

empaneled.’’ State v. Rivas, No. CR 1995011272, pp. 6–7 (Mar.Cty.Sup.Ct. Jan, 29, 

2001). 

In a recent capital case, a Maricopa County criminal defense attorney operating 

under this contract in a capital case spent 220 hours preparing for the trial. Although these hours are far below those competent counsel must spend to adequately 

prepare for a capital trial, the county paid the attorney only $16,000.00. Following 

the client’s conviction of first degree murder, the attorney requested additional compensation to prepare for the sentencing phase which he estimated would require an 

additional 100 hours.2 The request was refused by the contracting agency. It was 

also refused by the judge to whom the case had been assigned. Eventually, another 

judge took over the case, and upon counsel’s motion for reconsideration, ordered the 

contracting agency to meet with the attorney to negotiate reasonable additional 

compensation for the completion of the work. Id., p. 13. That matter is still pending.3

In rural Yuma County, capital cases that cannot be handled by the public defender offices are given to the lowest bidder. In one such case, the ‘‘winning’’ bid 

was a contingency fee with an ugly twist: the lawyer was to receive one lump sum 

payment up front and a second lump sum if the case went to trial. The client did 

not want to go to trial and informed his lawyer on numerous occasions that he 

would accept any plea that did not include a death sentence. The lawyer, however, 

stood to make a tidy sum if he spent little time on the case and took it to trial. 

The lawyer did nothing to try to settle the case, and no plea was offered. 

Although this case had been remanded for a new trial following postconviction 

proceedings based on previous trial counsel’s failure to present a viable defense that 

was available to the client, the new trial lawyer failed to even review the 

postconviction file in the case. He failed to consult with an available expert, already 

appointed by the court, regarding this defense and he failed to present this defense 

at trial. 

The lawyer failed to communicate with the client in any form for stretches of six 

months at a time before trial, and again before sentencing. During one of the very 

few visits between the lawyer and client, both the client and second counsel observed evidence that the lawyer had been consuming alcohol before the visit. In an 

unrelated case, a different client listened to this same lawyer describe Yuma as a 

place where the only thing to do at the end of each trial day was get drunk in the 

hotel bar. The lawyer also said, in public, that his Yuma client was ‘‘guilty from 

the beginning’’ and the whole trial was a waste of the lawyer’s time. 

Before trial began, second counsel on this case (who had never tried a capital case 

before) moved to withdraw, informing the court that it would be unethical for her 

to continue when it was clear that the client was not receiving adequate representation. In spite of second counsel’s sworn testimony that she did not believe the cliVerDate Feb 1 2002 10:08 Sep 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00155 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\81606.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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ent’s attorney was performing effectively-because he failed to conduct any investigation, failed to file necessary motions, failed to communicate with the client or second 

counsel, and failed to review the file in the case—the court refused to appoint a new 

lawyer, and instead removed second counsel from the case. 

Also before the trial began, the client was subpoenaed as a witness against the 

lawyer in a criminal case involving another defendant and was asked to testify 

about the incompetent representation he was receiving and the complete breakdown 

of his relationship with the lawyer. In spite of the obvious conflict of interest this 

created, the lawyer failed to withdraw from representation, and the trial court refused to appoint new counsel. 

During a recent hearing, the client again requested, and was denied, new counsel. 

Since his conviction almost one year ago, his attorneys have had almost no communication with him, regularly refusing his collect telephone calls and ignoring his requests for meetings. They have failed to participate in any way in the mitigation 

investigation in the case, or prepare in any way for the upcoming penalty phase 

hearing. Shortly after the recent hearing on the motion for new counsel, the mitigation specialist on the case was replaced by a new mitigation specialist. 

In another case from a rural county, the client was granted a new sentencing 

based on counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to present meaningful evidence in mitigation when there was much available which should have been investigated and 

presented. The lawyer appointed to handle the case at the resentencing failed to 

hire a mitigation specialist, and conducted very little of his own investigation into 

mitigation evidence. The lawyer presented only a few witnesses at the resentencing, 

including a mental health expert who had recently been arrested on domesticrelated 

charges. The lawyer communicated with the client only a few times in the two years 

leading up to the resentencing. The client was recently sentenced to death again. 

The number of death sentences originating from certain counties is extraordinarily high per capita. Two of Arizona’s counties (Maricopa and Pima) are densely 

populated and contain the state’s two largest cities from which the greatest number 

of death sentences originate. However, eight other counties which are sparsely populated and presumably should account for a small portion of first degree murders 

state-wide actually contribute over a quarter of all of the inmates on death row. 

Arizona has no thorough, unified system of review to determine whether counsel 

is conducting work in a professional manner. Thus far, as noted above, the quality 

of representation has been poor. Indigent defendants are frequently appointed counsel who fail to object to constitutional violations, to preserve the objection by properly raising the supporting facts and appropriate provisions of the state and federal 

constitutions, to investigate, or to request funds needed to investigate and hire necessary experts to identify all the constitutional violations in the case. In this last 

year, counsel have allowed their clients to plead guilty to first degree murder with 

no agreement as to sentence, and the defendants were ultimately sentenced to 

death. A vast number of meritorious claims are barred from later consideration by 

rulings of waiver, preclusion, and procedural default due to the attorney’s failure 

to raise issues properly, or at all. In Arizona, courts are routinely procedurally 

barred from hearing the constitutional violations alleged in the cases of numerous 

capital defendants who have been executed such as Don Harding, whose appointed 

public defender advised him to represent himself in the hope that the client might 

create some reversible error, and Luis Mata, whose appointed counsel presented no 

defense, and little mitigation despite overwhelming evidence that Mr. Mata was 

brain-damaged and functionally mentally retarded. Those who are facing execution 

include Ramon MartinezVillareal, a severely mentally ill and mentally retarded 

Mexican national whose attorney failed to present any evidence concerning his multiple disabilities at his capital trial and sentencing. Although his death sentence was 

set aside by the federal district court based on his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, 

that ruling was vacated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals when it concluded 

that the issue was waived because trial counsel, who continued representing Mr. 

MartinezVillareal in state and federal postconviction proceedings, failed to raise his 

own incompetence. 

If counsel does attempt to investigate, testing and expert consultation are exceedingly difficult to obtain, whereas prosecution funding is nearly unlimited. The Arizona Supreme Court recently recognized this pervasive inequality: ‘‘Superior resources for prosecutors and the constant battle for funds faced by indigent defendants and their counsel, especially in our rural counties, will perpetuate or perhaps 

even exacerbate the disparity that already exists between rich and poor.’’ State v. 

Hoskins, 14 P.3d 997 (Ariz. 2000) (Zlaket, C.J., dissenting). In one small county 

where a defendant actually was afforded competent counsel, the trial court refused 

to approve payment for even one mental health expert, appointment of whom was 

crucial in presentation of the client’s mental health defense. Counsel was forced to 

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file a special action to the Arizona Supreme Court two times to gain the bare resources necessary to protect his client’s constitutional right to present a defense. 

Other defendants, without diligent and ethical counsel, have not been so lucky. 

Unlike other states, Arizona’s legislators have done little to fill the funding void. 

Senate Bill 1486 was introduced in the legislature this year to create a capital defense trial office for the rural counties, despite the fact that the vast majority of capital cases are initiated in Maricopa and Pima counties and that nearly 80% of the 

capital cases in which ineffective counsel claims were granted derived from Maricopa and Pima counties. The proposed office was also grossly underfunded, allocating only $981,250.00 for nine full-time employees and expenses ‘‘necessary to 

carry out the duties of the office.’’ It did not allow the office to undertake representation until ‘‘the state has served notice of intent to seek death,’’ although it is wellrecognized that some of the most important work that can be done in a potential 

capital case is early investigation that will convince the prosecutor not to seek a 

death sentence in a particular case. The bill, however, had a short life, and like 

other initiatives to improve indigent defense for capital defenders in Arizona, died 

in a legislative appropriations committee because the appropriations chairperson believed that attempting to provide competent counsel through a statewide office was 

not a state issue. 

In sum, is no reliable system of indigent defense for defendants charged with capital murder exists in Arizona. Quality of counsel is not ensured and investigative 

and expert resources are scarce. Although the magnitude of these problems as they 

impact capital defendants is widely recognized, as recent debate and resulting proposals from the Attorney General’s Capital Case Commission demonstrate, there is 

no mechanism in place capable of addressing these problems, and no funding available to create such a mechanism.

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