AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

A P u b l i c at i o n o f t h e A f r i c a C e n t e r f o r S t r at e g i c S t u d i e s

n o . 2 9 / No v e m b e r 2 0 1 4

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Lessons from Burundi’s Security Sector 

Reform Process

By Nicole Ball

u Progress made by Burundi’s Security Sector Development (SSD) program in advancing democratic security 

sector governance is noteworthy given that there have been relatively few successful security sector reform cases 

from which to draw.

u Political will for security sector reform was expanded over time by supporting tangible priorities of the Burundian 

security sector that established the trust enabling broader engagement on governance issues.

u The relative success of the SSD program—and particularly its governance pillar—depended heavily on its ability 

to address politically sensitive issues.

u SSD’s 8-year timeframe provided the time to adapt the program to evolving circumstances, facilitate increasing 

Burundian ownership of the reform process, and realize the incremental gains from which substantive change 

was possible. H I G H L I G H T S

Burundi’s 12-year civil war cost approximately 

300,000 lives, devastated the nation’s physical and institutional infrastructure, and tore at the social fabric of 

this ethnically divided population. Efforts to heal these 

wounds thus started from a polarized political environment and high levels of distrust. Compounding these 

challenges, Burundi would have to overcome a long legacy of military domination of politics. The Arusha Peace 

and Reconciliation Agreement, which inaugurated the 

transition process in 2000, called for significant reform 

of the security sector, including the integration of rebel 

factions into the armed forces. A power sharing agreement in 2004 coupled with the decision by the predominantly Hutu rebel group, Front de Libération Nationale, 

to transform itself into a political party in 2008, ushered 

in a period of relative stability and peace in Burundi. The 

armed forces have subsequently made important strides in 

becoming ethnically integrated and professional.

Nonetheless, serious challenges remain. The political rules of the game in Burundi are still not fully agreed 

upon. The political elite remains divided. The ruling 

party has yet to fully embrace democratic norms and 

continues to use the police for political ends.1

 Moreover, for many Burundians, a large rift persists between 

the security sector and society at large. In parts of the 

country, the public harbors a strong resentment of the 

security sector, especially the police, whom many perceive as agents of repression.2

 At times, Burundians’ 

lack of confidence in the security sector has resulted in 

a willingness to resort to vigilantism or “mob justice.” 

Perpetrators of such violence have justified the need to 

take the law into their own hands on the basis of police 

corruption, incompetence, and favoritism.3 In order to 

consolidate peace and security for its citizens, Burundi 

would need to embark on an ambitious security sector 

reform (SSR) program.
Nicole Ball is a Senior Fellow at the Center for 

International Policy. She has worked on issues relating to 

security sector reform for over 30 years and conducted 

assessments and evaluations relating to democratic security 

sector governance in a dozen African countries. 

2

Implementing SSR

While there has been growing appreciation for the 

importance of SSR, there have been few clear successes in 

implementation. There is still a strong preference within 

security assistance programs for a traditional “train and 

equip” approach that is very light on the governance 

aspects of SSR. There are good reasons to provide operational support. However, if not also linked to improving 

governance, operational support alone risks bolstering the 

repressive capability of unaccountable security forces. In 

fact, many SSR programs have lacked either the ambition or the capacity to become transformative initiatives 

aimed at improving the democratic governance of the 

security sector. 

In addition to limited awareness and political will, 

there are several geopolitical reasons why governance has 

taken a backseat to operational support. 

• The “war on terror.” In 2001, the SSR agenda 

was in its infancy. An approach prioritizing governance had not yet taken root among the major 

donors of security and development assistance. It 

was therefore easy to default to a Cold War-era 

approach to security assistance. 

• The financial crisis. Donors are increasingly focusing on “value for money” approaches to programming that require measurable outputs and 

predictable rates of expenditure. This approach 

does not mesh well with lengthy, unpredictable, 

and difficult-to-quantify programs to strengthen 

security sector governance. 

• Failure of important international actors in the security 

arena to buy into the SSR concept. While OECD 

donors may express varying degrees of support 

for security sector governance, nontraditional 

donors—such as China, Russia, Turkey, and the 

Gulf States—are almost uniformly focused on 

building operational capabilities. 

Given SSR’s limited track record of implementation, 

one program stands out for the lessons it holds of how 

SSR can be applied in a fragile, conflict-affected state: 

the Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector Development 

(SSD) program. 

SSD—Promoting the Governance 

Agenda

The SSD program was established in April 2009 with 

the signing of an 8-year Memorandum of Understanding 

The Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector Development (SSD) program aimed for such transformative 

change when it was launched in 2009 with its explicit 

support for the development of more democratic and 

accountable governance of the security sector. The program had little in the way of successful models to draw 

on, however. Most previous SSR efforts had focused on 

training and equipping security forces and given little 

sustained attention to strengthening governance of the 

sector. The SSD program, therefore, had to break new 

ground in integrating democratic governance objectives 

into the existing SSR paradigm. 

What is Security Sector Reform and 

Why is it Important?

The SSR concept was developed in the 1990s to inject a governance component into traditional security assistance. It was based on two closely linked relationships. 

First, it recognized that a safe and secure environment engenders successful economic and political development. 

Second, a safe and secure environment requires sound 

governance of the security and justice sectors. Countries 

where governance of the security and justice sectors has 

been suboptimal have tended to experience higher rates 

of impunity by security and justice sector actors. As a 

result, the state and its citizens are less secure.4

The centrality of governance to the SSR agenda 

has since been reconfirmed by actors as diverse as the 

United Nations, the African Union, the Organization for 

Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and 

the U.S. Department of the Army.5 This has resulted in 

broad agreement conceptually that the objective of SSR 

is to create a nationally owned process to promote the 

effective and efficient provision of security and justice in 

line with citizens’ needs and where security and justice 

providers are accountable to the state and its people, operating within a framework of democratic governance, 

rule of law, and respect for human rights.6 
3

(MoU) between the governments of Burundi and the 

Netherlands. An important impetus on the Burundian 

side was the military’s interest in reconstituting and professionalizing the force and rebuilding its reputation after 

the war. The political leadership may have also viewed 

the SSD program as a means of diversifying their support away from Belgium and France and of enhancing 

the country’s international standing. Thus, the MoU laid 

out a number of strategic objectives for the program, all 

of which would strengthen the governance of Burundi’s 

security sector (Figure 1).

Structure and management. The SSD program has 

been implemented in 2-year phases by a program team 

made up of international advisors and Burundians. Burundians have played an increasingly greater role in the 

management of the program over time. The program 

consists of three pillars: defense, public security, and 

governance. During the first 4 years of the program, the 

governance component was managed by a very small Program Management Unit (consisting of a program director 

and an assistant) and a Governance Advisory Group. In 

late 2014, two project managers were added to the PMU. 

The advisory group consists of representatives of Parliament and other oversight bodies, the executive branch, 

the military, the police, the intelligence service, and civil 

society, thus reflecting the cross-cutting nature of security 

sector governance. 

The program has a three-tiered management structure: 1) the ministerial-level Political Committee to conduct high-level political dialogue between the partners 

(Figure 2); 2) the senior official-level Steering Committee, 

charged with approving work programs, monitoring their 

progress, and discussing program strategies and budgets; 

and 3) the working-level Program Management Units, 

one for each of the program’s three pillars—charged with 

developing and overseeing projects and guiding the future 

direction of the program. Each pillar also has a National 

Coordinator who acts as the link between the program 

and the government on a day-to-day basis. The work of 

the SSD program has been supported by an international 

consulting firm charged with providing financial management and administrative and technical support to the 

execution of the program. 

The Netherlands has been actively engaged at the political level, interfacing with the Burundi government on 

sensitive issues, thereby allowing the SSD program to focus 

on identifying and implementing solutions. (See “Putting 

politics center stage” below.) The program’s unique structure has helped to manage and foster this arrangement. 

It has also changed as needs have evolved. For example, 

the international program managers for the defense and 

public security pillars transformed into coaches for the 

Burundian program managers who replaced them. The 

Steering Committee evolved out of an earlier arrangement 

Source: Ball, 2014.

Source: Mémorandum d’Entente, 2009, Annex B.

 Affirmation of the principles of partnership between the two governments through political 

dialogue

 Accountability of the security services to civil 

authorities

 Adherence of the security services to national 

and international law

 Adherence of the security services to the general 

principles of public expenditure

 Impartiality on the part of the security services

 Professionalism of the security services

In developing and implementing SSR programs, two 

types of political issues routinely arise. The first is the 

normal process of institutions trying to maximize for 

themselves the benefits of a change process. This 

necessitates dialogue, negotiation, tradeoffs, and 

compromise—all inherently political processes. 

The second is the politicization of the change process. This is typically highly nontransparent and is 

generally intended to control the change process 

and often to blunt its impact. It may involve negotiation and tradeoffs but among a small group 

of politically powerful individuals and institutions. 

All change processes are politicized but to differing degrees. Some are more transparent than others. In conflict-affected countries where the rules 

of the game are still being worked out, significant 

politicization of change processes is the norm. It can 

be extremely difficult for those outside the ruling 

elite—both national and international actors—to 

understand how decisions are made and why even 

seemingly small efforts can be blocked.

Fi g u r e 1 . S t rat e g i c o b j e c t i v es

o f t h e Bu r u n d i -Ne t h e r lan ds S SD

pr o g ram

Fi g u r e 2 . Two t ypes o f po l i t i cal 

issu es
4

that was not adequately integrated into the Burundian 

government structure.

Approach. The SSD program is guided by loosely 

defined strategic objectives (Figure 1) and a shared vision 

between the two governments of a transparent, accountable, democratically governed, fiscally sustainable security 

sector delivering security and justice to all Burundian citizens.7

 The program had no logframe, results framework, 

or business case at the outset. Rather, it adopted a highly 

flexible problem-solving approach, taking conditions on 

the ground as its starting point and building on them to 

progressively achieve the shared vision and objectives. 

At the end of each 2-year phase, the program has evaluated its progress and adjusted accordingly. To this end, 

the SSD program began with concrete activities during 

Phase 1 (2009-11) to build the trust and relationships that 

would later be necessary to tackle the thorny governance 

issues involved in security sector reform. For example, 

the program helped refurbish army kitchens and build 

the capacity of the police to maintain their communications equipment. SSD has continued to support activities 

that enhance the operational effectiveness of the military 

and the police. One of the major activities of the defense 

pillar, for example, was a defense review conducted between 2011 and 2014. Program priorities between 2014 

and 2017 include, among other things, an improved 

vehicle maintenance system for the police, building the 

police’s counterterrorism capacity, and enhancements to 

the army’s logistics system.

Having established credibility by generating tangible 

benefits to Burundian security actors, the SSD program 

progressively promoted activities to change the attitudes 

and behaviors of key Burundian actors consistent with 

democratic control of the security sector. A 2013 evaluation of the SSD governance component characterized 

the main features of the SSD program as: 

• an integrated approach to security encompassing 

defense, public security, intelligence, and governance with links to the justice sector

• a demonstrated commitment to enable the defense and security forces to respond to the population’s security needs but also a recognition of the 

value of nonstate security providers and the need 

to better understand their role 

• a focus on strengthening the capacity of key security actors to engage in the process of reform—for 

example, by educating them on governancerelated issues (such as the role of Parliament in 

overseeing the budgeting process or improving 

the quality of the security sector’s legal framework) and by providing critical infrastructure 

(vehicles, computers) and technical assistance 

(expertise in drafting legislation and developing defense policy and strategic documents) to 

enable security sector actors to fulfil their legally 

mandated tasks 

• a focus on strengthening the integrity of key security actors with a view to ending impunity—for 

example, developing a code of ethics and ethics 

courses for the police and the armed forces, promoting dialogue among security personnel about 

the application of the code, and inviting civil 

society actors to take part in evaluating troops’ 

adherence to ethics norms when dealing with 

civilians 

• a dedication to ensuring the sustainability of results generated by the program 

• a mechanism to coordinate all SSR interventions 

in country to maximize the complementarity of 

activities and objectives.8

What the SSD Program Achieved in 

its First 4 Years

While the MoU clearly gave a high priority to effecting change in security sector governance, it was by no 

means assured that this would be the outcome. Skilled and 

dedicated program staff and conducive political dynamics 

within the governments of the Netherlands and Burundi 

enabled the SSD to evolve toward addressing difficult 

political challenges facing the development of the security sector in Burundi. However, despite important gains 

in creating the foundation for democratic governance 

of the security sector, the ultimate outcome in terms of 

greater accountability and transparency is far from certain. 

Nonetheless, the SSD program demonstrates better than 

any other SSR effort to date that an explicit governancefocused approach to SSR is possible.9

The SSD program has not been the only security 

and justice sector program in Burundi. Activities ranging from police and justice reform to training the armed 

forces have been carried out in conjunction with a range 

of partners including Belgium, France, Germany, the 

United Nations, and the United States.10 The SSD 

program has, however, most consistently addressed the 

governance aspects of SSR. As a result, it can be credited with contributing to the changes in the governance 

environment which were evident by late 2013 (Figure 
5

3). These changes have helped increase the potential for 

transparency and accountability in the sector, improved 

the perception of the security bodies (especially the army) 

among the population, and strengthened the quality of 

security provision (for example, by helping to reduce the 

incidence of extrajudicial killings through policy dialogue 

with the Ministry of Public Security and the National 

Police).

While all parts of the SSD program have contributed to these outcomes, the program would have recorded 

considerably less progress in the area of governance without a mechanism for ensuring that governance-related issues could be addressed on an equal footing with capacity 

building for the security bodies. SSD’s governance pillar 

has been able to support capacity building of important 

oversight actors such as Parliament, civil society, the 

media, the Office of the Ombudsman, and the Constitutional Court. It has also been able to play an important 

role in sensitizing the defense and public security actors 

to governance needs.

Key Takeaways of How the SSD

Program Promotes Better Security 

Sector Governance

There are four main reasons why the SSD program 

has improved security and justice governance in Burundi: 

1) the program has put politics center stage; 2) it has established results progressively; 3) it has prioritized the gradual 

development of ownership; and 4) it has matched timeframe with ambition and environment.

Putting politics center stage. The success of SSR 

programs depends heavily on the ability to address politically sensitive issues. This ability is particularly important 

for addressing the governance aspects of SSR. For the most 

part, SSR programs have fared poorly in this regard. The 

SSD program, however, proactively addresses the politics 

of change at both the policy and operational levels on a 

daily basis. 

The MoU placed considerable importance on political dialogue (discussing how best to implement the program and overcome any political constraints). Although 

the MoU envisioned a partnership between the two governments, it took them some time to find the right balance 

in their relationship. Now, political dialogue occurs between the two MoU governments, between the Burundian 

government and other international partners, and among 

Burundian stakeholders. It is clear from the SSD program 

results that there can be no effective SSR unless the political challenges to change processes are squarely addressed. 

The success of this dialogue process has required a 

balancing act on the part of the SSD program, facilitated 

in large part by the political skill of program staff. Because 

the program supports both governments in implementing 

the MoU, the program must make sure the Dutch political agenda does not drive programming decisions (other 

than setting limits on the use of funding). The program 

must also make sure the Burundian government adheres 

to the objectives of the MoU and not simply see the SSD 

program as another source of funding to meet the material needs of the country’s security sector. The program’s 

relationship with both governments has experienced some 

hiccups, but on the whole, the program has succeeded 

in maintaining the necessary balance between pushing 

forward program objectives and maintaining a relationship of trust. 

The engagement of the Dutch government through 

its embassy in Bujumbura has been crucial in addressing 

potential blockages to program activities. The Dutch Embassy has taken responsibility for addressing the political 

Source: Ball and Nsengimana, 2013.

1. Important barriers to transparency in the security sector had eroded, and security issues were 

increasingly acknowledged by many to be the 

legitimate concern of the full range of Burundian 

stakeholders, including civil society. 

2. Dialogue on SSR and specifically governancerelated aspects of SSR was occurring more frequently among key stakeholders in multiple fora 

inside and outside government. 

3. The program provided an increasingly inclusive 

forum for discussion and debate as key oversight 

actors (the Constitutional Court, the Ombudsman’s Office, and the Auditor General) and key 

security actors (the National Intelligence Service and the National Security Council) joined. 

A diverse group of civil society actors also began 

engaging more frequently. 

4. The program made progress in achieving the 

governance objectives of the MoU, particularly 

in terms of strengthening security sector accountability to civil authorities and adherence 

to national and international law, as well as introducing the concept of financial accountability 

to the security services.

Fi g u r e 3 . Fo u r ke y g o v e r nan c e 

r esu lts o f t h e S SD pr o g ram at 

t h e e n d o f P hase 2
6

issues surrounding highly contentious activities aimed at 

implementing the MoU. In doing so it enables the program 

to focus on helping the parties arrive at solutions rather 

than becoming part of the political dispute. 

There has clearly been an evolution in the Burundian 

government’s engagement, one that is linked in no small 

measure to the Burundians’ growing responsibility for managing the program. The National Coordinators of the three 

SSD program pillars, each of whom represents a government ministry, are playing an increasingly important role, 

including in discussions between the partner governments 

on contentious political issues. 

Nonetheless, the commitment of senior Burundian 

political leadership to democratic security sector governance remains uncertain. In order to address this concern, 

the SSD program began to implement a two-pronged strategy in 2014: 1) decentralize SSR by educating local government officials and the population beyond Bujumbura 

on SSR objectives such as the importance of transparency, accountability, and respect for human rights as well 

as the roles of the respective actors in creating a safe and 

secure environment for all Burundians; and 2) develop 

mechanisms to enhance the understanding of these same 

issues among the most senior cadre of Burundian political 

leaders.

Establishing results progressively. The SSD program 

develops work plans on a 2-year basis and within each 

2-year phase it can respond to emerging needs. Accordingly, the program is not tied to objectives that made sense 

in year one but are no longer feasible or salient in year 

five. This is particularly important for governance where 

issues continually surface and the ability of the program to 

address any one of them evolves as trust and relationships 

mature. This flexibility proved helpful when the Burundian government decided that it wanted to conduct a defense review midway through Phase 1 and again when the 

National Intelligence Service and the National Security 

Council expressed interest in participating during Phase 2.

The SSD program has been able to define and 

achieve results progressively because its programming approach is flexible (not tied to a logframe, for example), it 

has a long-term (8-year) time horizon, and relationships 

of trust have been built between the two governments and 

the program. Trust building is facilitated by the program’s 

ability to operate simultaneously on two distinct but interrelated tracks. It provides tangible benefits (training, 

certain types of equipment, infrastructure) prioritized by 

national stakeholders at the same time as it assesses the 

most appropriate way to address the highly political transformational aspects of change (Figure 4). Additionally, the 

program has leveraged delivery of these tangible benefits to 

open windows of opportunity for addressing longer-term 

change issues. For example, the SSD program agreed to 

construct a building for the Constitutional Court, which 

has been housed in a particularly decrepit building, with 

the understanding that the government accord budgetary independence to the Court by 2016 as a first step in 

severing the administrative ties between the Court and 

the Ministry of Justice.

Prioritizing the gradual development of ownership. 

Responsibility and authority for identifying the strategic 

direction, developing activities, and managing the program 

have been progressively transferred to Burundian stakeholders. Burundians are increasingly the public face of the 

program. The ultimate objective is an entirely Burundianmanaged program, which Burundians appreciate and compare very favorably with other internationally supported 

security and justice programs (Figure 5). Ownership is not 

just a matter of the government leading a change process, 

however. If the security and justice needs of all citizens 

are to be addressed, then ways of involving the broadest 

range of actors in the process need to be found. From the 

outset, the intention was to engage civil society in the 

SSD program. However, the inclusion of civil society organizations (CSOs) was particularly contentious, and not 

only, as might have been expected, with the security forces. 

Source: Author interviews, 2009, 2012, 2013,

One Burundian familiar with the SSD program 

suggested that had the program attempted to tackle 

only transformational issues during its first 2 years, 

it would have not gained the degree of acceptance 

it has because “military officers who had spent the 

previous 10 years at war were not ready to think 

strategically in year one.” Also, in the eyes of many 

Burundian counterparts, the fact that the Dutch 

government was willing to begin by addressing the 

concrete needs of the military and police demonstrated its concern for the effective functioning of 

these organizations and gained the confidence of 

key actors in these bodies. Although Dutch interest 

in governance reforms was clear from the MoU, its 

willingness to not prioritize “the European agenda” 

at the outset was critical in gaining the trust of these 

actors.

Fi g u r e 4 . Bu i l d i n g r e lat i o nsh ips

o f t r ust
7

Some parliamentarians in the defense and public security 

committees initially believed that CSOs had no right to 

participate in security discussions with governmental officials. Since CSOs were not elected by the population 

to represent them, it was argued, they had no legitimate 

role to play.

The key to changing attitudes was dialogue. Thus, 

the SSD program (particularly its governance pillar) 

sought opportunities to bring the diverse actors together. 

Skilled facilitators were employed to make the dialogue 

as constructive as possible. The experience of other African countries was examined, often with the support of 

individuals from those countries or by study trips abroad. 

Senegal, a francophone country also undergoing a democratic transition, was particularly relevant in this regard. 

Reflective of an emphasis on South-South engagement, 

Senegal hosted a study visit for Burundian parliamentarians. A Senegalese legal advisor also provided training on 

legal drafting for parliamentarians. When international 

experts were involved, they were often paired with Burundian counterparts, accelerating the sharing of insights 

and lessons learned in both directions. 

Over time, the concept of human security began 

to take hold. Once it became evident that security had 

multiple dimensions beyond a purely military orientation, it became easier to accept the roles that other actors 

could play in creating an environment of security for all 

Burundians. And as the different program stakeholders 

engaged with one another more frequently, they came to 

understand and appreciate the different contributions each 

brought to the table (Figure 6).

Within the SSD program there is now acceptance 

of the importance of discussing security issues outside the 

restricted circle of uniformed service personnel. Security 

has become “everyone’s affair.” 

Matching timeframe with ambition and environment. SSD’s 8-year timeframe has enabled Burundian 

stakeholders to understand what SSR implies and begin 

to adjust attitudes and behaviors so that sustainable change 

can take root. Yet, attitudes and thus behaviors typically 

change gradually. Moreover, because governance raises 

inherently sensitive subjects, it is unrealistic to assume that 

results will be achieved quickly. The SSD program shows 

that what may seem like a very minor change to established democracies can, in fact, be a substantial milestone 

in countries just setting out along the road to democratic 

governance. Numerous stakeholders have noted that had 

the SSD program tried to address the governance-related 

structural issues foreseen in the MoU (e.g., transparent 

budget management, legal framework of the security 

Source: Author interview, 2012.

Source: Author interview, 2013.

“There is no other program like the SSD. There is 

a hierarchy of management: the Steering Committee, the Program Management Units. Others don’t 

have this. With [another donor] you negotiate one 

activity, they develop the budget, the activity is 

executed and that is it. The SSD program has a lot 

of [stakeholder] ownership between the definition 

of a need and its implementation.”

The idea of holding an open day at military and 

police facilities (journée de portes ouvertes) was 

initially raised around 2010 but was too politically 

contentious to implement. During the planning 

for Burundi’s 50th anniversary celebrations, it was 

raised again. Following extensive discussions within 

the military, the Defense Ministry decided to hold 

an open day in 2012, which was highly successful. The police also held an open day, although for 

them the decision was less contentious because they 

had already decided to open nonsensitive units to 

the public. The police were also pleased with the 

outcome. 

For the army, the success of the open day led directly 

to other confidence-building activities between civilians and the military. In 2013, the military decided to hold an ethics competition. Participating 

military units were asked to organize a military operation that protected civilians against a threat, such 

as defending a village from a rebel attack. Evaluators rated each unit against an agreed set of ethical 

norms. The team with the highest rating won a cup. 

The evaluation teams were composed of military officers and civilians from human rights and women’s 

organizations. According to one army officer familiar 

with the event, it would not have been possible for 

civilians to collaborate with military officers to judge 

an event such as the ethics competition before the 

army’s open day in 2012: “It is a miracle that military 

troops were evaluated by civilians.” 

Figure 5. Comparing the SSD

program with other international 

support

Fi g u r e 6 . A r m y ’s “ ope n day ” l eads

to m o r e c o l lab o rat i o n wi t h c i v i l 

so c i e t y
8

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports United States 

foreign and security policies by strengthening the strategic capacity 

of African states to identifiy and resolve security challenges in ways 

that promote civil-military cooperation, respect for democratic 

values, and safeguard human rights. Toward these aims, ACSS is 

committed to building networks of African, American, European, and 

international military and civilian leaders and articulating African 

perspectives to U.S. policymakers.

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of ACSS, 

the U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the U.S. 

Government.

Africa Center for Strategic Studies

http://www.africacenter.org

Africa Center for 

Strategic Studies

Director: 

Kate Almquist Knopf

National Defense University

300 Fifth Avenue, Building 20

Fort McNair

Washington, D.C. 20319-5066

Phone: + 1 202-685-7300

Website: www.africacenter.org

Africa Security Briefs

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Email: SiegleJ@ndu.edu

ISSN 2164-4047 (print)

ISSN 2164-4039 (online)

sector) from day one, it would have failed. Part of the 

problem was the unwillingness of key political actors to 

accept change. But also critical was that key Burundian 

stakeholders simply did not understand what the necessary 

reforms consisted of, why they were important, and how to 

implement a process of change. As one Burundian stakeholder stated, when people do not understand something, 

their default position is “no.” Once they understand why 

change is needed and how they can support the process 

of change, they become more open to it. This process of 

education, however, is a lengthy one, which is why The 

SSD program’s 8-year timeframe is so important.

Notes

1 For a review of the Burundi peace process see Howard Wolpe, 

“Making Peace after Genocide: Anatomy of the Burundi Process,” 

Peaceworks no. 70 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, March 

2011).

2 Willy Nindorera, Security Sector Reform in Burundi: Issues 

and Challenges for Improving Civilian Protection, Centre d’Alerte et 

de Prévention des Conflits (CENAP)/North-South Institute (NSI) 

Working Paper (Ottawa: NSI, July 2007). Willy Nindorera, “La police 

nationale, le renforcement démocratique et la consolidation de la paix 

au Burundi,” Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne 

d’études du développement 32, No. 1 (March 2011), 79-93.

3 Mob Justice in Burundi: Official Complicity and Impunity (New 

York: Human Rights Watch, March 2010).

4 Louis-Alexandre Berg, “Security Governance and the 

Recurrence of Violence after Civil War” (draft paper prepared for presentation at the APSA Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, August 

28, 2014), cited with permission from the author. Berg examines all 

cases of civil war termination since the Cold War and concludes that 

“changes to security sector governance that broaden civilian oversight 

and reduce factional control reduce the chance that civil war recurs....”

5 Report of the Secretary-General on “Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform” 

(UN doc. A/62/659–S/2008/39[)], January 27, 2008). African Union 

Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform, African Union Commission 

(adopted January 2013), 6. Security System Reform and Governance: 

Policy and Good Practice, Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 

Guidelines and Reference Series (Paris: OECD, 2005), 12. U.S. Army, 

Stability Operations, FM 3-07 (Washington, DC: Government Printing 

Office, 2008). 

6 “SSR Glossary,” The Geneva Centre for the Democratic 

Control of Armed Forces’ International Security Sector Advisory 

Team.

7 Mémorandum d’Entente entre le Gouvernement de la 

République du Burundi et les Ministres des Affaires Etrangères, de la 

Coopération au Développement et de la Défense des Pays Bas sur la 

Développement du Secteur de la Sécurité, April 9, 2009.

8 Nicole Ball and Fabien Nsengimana, Evaluation du Volet 

Gouvernance du Programme DSS, October 28, 2013. Nicole Ball, 

Putting Governance at the Heart of Security Sector Reform: Lessons from 

the Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector Development Program, Conflict 

Research Unit (CRU) Report (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of 

International Relations Clingendael, March 2014).

9 Ibid. 

10 Nicole Ball, Jean-Marie Gasana, and Willy Nindorera, From 

Quick Wins to Long-term Profits? Developing better approaches to support 

security and justice engagements in fragile states: Burundi case study (Paris: 

International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), March 

2012).