NUMBER 13-22-00351-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

 

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

RIO GRANDE VALLEY, Appellant,

v.

PAUL C. KAVANAUGH, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 138th District Court

of Cameron County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Tijerina, and Peña

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

In this interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction, appellant 

University of Texas Rio Grande Valley (“UTRGV”) contends that appellee Paul 

Kavanaugh failed to present sufficient evidence of pretext to support his claim of age 
2

discrimination. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In March 2019, pursuant to UTRGV’s Reduction in Force (RIF) policy, Kavanaugh 

was laid off from his position as a grant proposal writer in the Vackar College of Business 

and Entrepreneurship. Under the RIF policy, affected employees who apply for a vacancy 

at UTRGV within six months of their termination are given priority consideration over 

equally qualified candidates.

Grant programs are generally divided into two categories: publicly funded 

programs and privately funded programs. UTRGV’s Office for Corporate and Foundation 

Relations (CFR) works with private funders to accomplish the university’s strategic goals. 

In September 2019, CFR posted an opening for a “grant proposal writer.

[1]

” The posting 

described the scope of the position as being “[r]esponsible for the development, writing, 

and editing of assigned proposals and reports.” The posting further stated that the position 

“[p]rovides and coordinates assistance in identifying and developing funding sources to 

support existing and planned program activities.” The posting goes on to describe eleven 

specific duties for the position. The scope and duties described in the posting were 

identical to UTRGV’s description of Kavanaugh’s previous position as a “grant proposal 

writer” for the business school. The only preferred qualification stated in the posting was 

“[e]xperience in [a] higher education setting.”

A search committee was formed consisting of CFR’s three employees at that time: 

Felipe Salinas, Director of Development for Corporate and Foundation Relations, Madahy 

1 The quoted language has been modified from all capital letters.
3

Romero, who also held the title Director of Development for Corporate and Foundation 

Relations, and Alma Rock, Grant Development Manager. The role of the committee was 

to review applications, select candidates to interview, conduct interviews, and then make 

a hiring recommendation to UTRGV administration.

Kavanaugh, sixty-four years old at the time, applied for the position, along with five 

other candidates. As part of the application process, each candidate was required to 

submit samples of their previous grant proposals. According to his application, 

Kavanaugh had a doctoral degree and twelve years of experience as a grant proposal 

writer. In addition to writing grant proposals for publicly funded programs, Kavanaugh also 

had recent experience seeking private funders. Prior to his position with UTRGV’s 

business school, Kavanaugh was a senior associate research strategist at UTRGV from 

September 2015 until October 2017. In this position, he “worked with faculty and staff to 

develop grant applications to private foundations and tax supported entities.” After his 

position at the business school, Kavanaugh took a position with the Catholic Charities of 

the Archdiocese of San Antonio as a “Grants Director.” In this position, Kavanaugh wrote 

grant proposals “to private foundations and tax-supported entities” while supervising two 

other grant writers.

Eslibeth Perez, twenty-six years old at the time, was one of the other applicants. 

According to her application, Perez had a master’s degree and three years of experience 

as a grant proposal writer while working as the “Program Coordinator” for the United Way 

of South Texas’s Volunteer Income Tax Assistance Program. Both candidates were 

selected for interviews.
4

The committee asked each candidate the same set of questions and took notes 

on their responses. Each candidate was asked to discuss their experience as a grant 

writer. The committee noted that Kavanaugh’s experience as a grant writer was primarily 

in higher education, including writing grants “for every college & division” at UTRGV. 

Perez had never worked as a grant writer in higher education. Each candidate was also 

asked about the largest grant they had secured. Perez responded that she had secured 

a grant for $60,000 a year over a two-year period. Kavanaugh responded that he had

secured a Title V grant for $2.5 million and another grant for more than $1 million.

According to his resume, over the course of Kavanaugh’s career, he also collaborated 

with faculty in securing grant awards of $688,000, $500,000, and $299,000. In response 

to a question about their experience drafting budgets for programs or grant proposals, 

Kavanaugh stated that he had developed 200–300 budgets in his twelve years of 

experience. Perez did not specify how many budgets she had developed but discussed 

her process for creating budgets and her familiarity with QuickBooks.

The committee recommended Perez for the position. In an email to the HR 

department, Salinas explained that the committee had recommended Perez over 

Kavanaugh because she “appeared to be a stronger fit for what the office requires.” 

According to Salinas, the position required a “technician” who can manage a program,

and Perez’s experience as a project manager at United Way demonstrated to the 

committee that “she would work well in a fast-paced environment.” UTRGV ultimately 

accepted the committee’s recommendation and hired Perez for the position.
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After receiving his right-to-sue letter from the Texas Workforce Commission, 

Kavanaugh filed suit against UTRGV alleging age discrimination. 2 According to 

Kavanaugh, UTRGV hired the substantially younger and less-experienced Perez to save 

money in salary and benefits, such as medical insurance. The job posting provided for an 

unspecified salary “commensurate with experience,” and up to that point, Kavanaugh was 

commanding an annual salary that doubled Perez’s salary with United Way. Kavanaugh 

also alleged that the decision to hire Perez was part of UTRGV’s pattern and practice of 

forcing older, higher-salaried faculty and staff to retire in favor of hiring younger, lessexperienced faculty and staff with lower salaries and less expensive benefit packages.

After both parties conducted discovery, UTRGV filed a plea to the jurisdiction.

UTRGV acknowledged that Kavanaugh had established a prima facie case of age 

discrimination but argued that the record supported its decision to hire Perez because 

she was the better qualified candidate. Kavanaugh responded that the record supported 

his contrary assertion that he was clearly better qualified for the position than Perez. 

Additionally, he argued that evidence of UTRGV’s pattern and practice of age 

discrimination supported his position that UTRGV’s explanation was pretextual.

After conducting a hearing, the trial court found that a fact issue existed as to 

pretext and denied UTRGV’s plea. This interlocutory appeal ensued. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8).

2 While Kavanaugh was pursuing his discrimination claim with the Texas Workforce Commission,

UTRGV hired him for the position of grant research officer for the UTRGV School of Medicine. Kavanaugh 

voluntarily left this position upon his retirement in December 2021.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW

Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s authority to decide a case. In re 

Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (citing Tex. 

Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993)). Whether a trial 

court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Sampson v. 

Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. 2016).

A common-law doctrine, sovereign immunity protects the State and its agencies 

from lawsuits for money damages and deprives a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction 

over the plaintiff’s claims. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 

655 & n.2 (Tex. 2008) (“Garcia I”). Generally, governmental entities in Texas, such as 

UTRGV, are immune from lawsuits unless the Legislature has expressly waived their 

immunity by statute. Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 

853 (Tex. 2002); see Tex. S. Univ. v. Villarreal, 620 S.W.3d 899, 904 (Tex. 2021) 

(observing that state universities are governmental entities entitled to immunity). 

“A plaintiff has the burden to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction.” 

Town of Shady Shore v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019) (citing Heckman v. 

Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012)). Thus, when a plaintiff sues a 

governmental entity, they must allege facts that fall within a legislative waiver of immunity.

Id. (citing Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999)). A governmental 

defendant may challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction by attacking the plaintiff’s pleadings, 

the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 

S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018).
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When a defendant challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, as UTRGV has 

done here, the analysis “mirrors that of a traditional summary judgment.” Tex. Dep’t of 

Transp. v. Lara, 625 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. 

v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 634 (Tex. 2012) (“Garcia II”)). As such, we take as true all 

evidence favorable to Kavanaugh, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving 

any doubts in his favor. See id. (citing Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 771). Once a 

governmental entity establishes the absence of a jurisdictional fact, the burden shifts to 

the plaintiff to raise a genuine issue of material fact for the jury to resolve; otherwise, the 

trial court should rule on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law. Tex. Dep’t of Parks 

& Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004).

The Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) prohibits employers from 

engaging in discriminatory employment practices against protected classes of people, 

including failure or refusal to hire a person because they are forty years of age or older.

See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.051(1), 21.101. The TCHRA waives a governmental 

employer’s immunity from suit for violations under the act. Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 

770 (citing Garcia II, 372 S.W.3d at 637); see TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.254 (permitting 

an employee to “bring a civil action against” their employer).

Because the TCHRA was modeled after federal statutes, Texas courts are guided 

by federal precedent interpreting those statutes. Lara, 625 S.W.3d at 52 (citing Garcia II, 

372 S.W.3d at 634). Violations of the TCHRA can be established with either direct or 

circumstantial evidence, and for cases based on circumstantial evidence, Texas courts 

employ the three-part McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Alamo Heights, 544 
8

S.W.3d at 781–82 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 

(1973)). First, the employee must establish a prima facie case, which gives rise to a 

rebuttable presumption that a statutory violation occurred. Id. at 782 (citing Tex. Dep’t of 

Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–54 (1981)). The employer may then rebut this 

presumption by offering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the disputed 

employment action. Id. (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254–55). This is a burden of 

production, not persuasion, and involves no credibility assessment. Reeves v. Anderson 

Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 

509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993)). “Once rebutted, the presumption disappears, and an 

employee lacking direct evidence cannot prove a statutory violation without evidence that 

the employer’s stated reason is false and a pretext for discrimination.” Alamo Heights, 

544 S.W.3d at 782 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255–56). Each step of the McDonnell 

Douglas analysis is jurisdictional in nature. Id. at 783.

In the failure to hire context, a plaintiff may raise a genuine issue of material fact 

regarding pretext by presenting evidence that the employer’s proffered reason is 

unworthy of credence or by showing that the plaintiff was clearly better qualified than the 

person selected for the position. Little v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 177 S.W.3d 624, 631–

32 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Evidence of relative qualifications must 

be specific and comparative rather than merely subjective and speculative. Chandler v. 

CSC Applied Techs., LLC, 376 S.W.3d 802, 825 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012,

pet. denied) (citing Russo v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 93 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied)).
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III. ANALYSIS

The parties agree that this is a circumstantial-evidence case that involves step 

three of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework because Kavanaugh 

presented a prima facie case of age discrimination and UTRGV provided evidence of a 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for selecting Perez over Kavanaugh; namely, that 

she was better qualified for the position.3 See Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., 332 F.3d 

874, 881–82 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding employer’s assertion that it promoted the “best 

qualified” two candidates constituted a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for not 

promoting plaintiff).

The primary contention on appeal is whether Kavanaugh rebutted UTRGV’s 

explanation by showing that he was clearly better qualified for the position than Perez. 

The parties also dispute whether Kavanaugh may demonstrate pretext by presenting

3 Generally, stray remarks made by non-decision makers are insufficient to raise an inference of 

discriminatory intent. Anderson v. Hous. Cmty. Coll. Sys., 458 S.W.3d 633, 644 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2015, no pet.). It stands to reason, then, that remarks made by non-decision makers are also 

insufficient to support an employer’s assertion of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for an adverse 

employment decision.

Here, UTRGV relies on statements made by members of the search committee to support its

position that Perez was better qualified. However, UTRGV may be overvaluing the significance of the 

committee’s role in the hiring process. To be sure, the committee had some authority over the process by 

reviewing applications, selecting which candidates to interview, and then conducting those interviews. But 

in the end, the committee only made a recommendation to UTRGV’s administration, and it was the 

administration that made the actual decision to hire Perez. There is nothing in the record to suggest that 

the administration was bound by the selection committee’s recommendation. Moreover, the administration’s 

decision to hire Perez may have aligned with the reasons given by the committee, or it could have been for 

a different reason all together. For example, the administration may have disagreed with the committee’s 

conclusion that Perez was better qualified but instead selected her because of budgetary concerns, as 

Kavanaugh suggests. There is no evidence in the record explaining how the administration arrived at its 

decision.

In any event, Kavanaugh tacitly concedes that UTRGV met its evidentiary burden to present a 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision, so we will assume the same.
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evidence that UTRGV engaged in a pattern and practice of age discrimination. UTRGV 

argues that, under Fifth Circuit precedent, an individual plaintiff may not use the pattern 

and practice method of proof to supplant the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 

framework, and thus, such evidence is not probative of pretext. See Celestine v. Petroleos 

de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 355–56 (5th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by 

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). Kavanaugh responds that 

pattern and practice evidence can be used within the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 

framework because such evidence is probative of whether the employer’s explanation is 

worthy of credence. See Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Cnty. v. Douglas, 651 S.W.3d 122, 

135 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (finding genuine issue of material fact 

regarding whether employer’s proffered reason for not promoting plaintiff was worthy of 

credence based, in part, on evidence of employer’s “history of not promoting women”).

Because Kavanaugh raised a fact issue on whether he was clearly better qualified than 

Perez for the position, we do not reach the pattern and practice question.

We begin by acknowledging that the “clearly better qualified” standard is difficult 

to satisfy. See Deines v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 279 (5th 

Circ. 1999) (“We reemphasize the general rule that differences in qualifications between 

job candidates are generally not probative evidence of discrimination unless those 

differences are so favorable to the plaintiff that there can be no dispute among reasonable 

persons of impartial judgment that the plaintiff was clearly better qualified for the position 

at issue.”); but see Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., 332 F.3d 874, 884–85 (5th Circ. 

2003) (Dennis, J., concurring) (questioning whether Deines remains viable after the 
11

Supreme Court’s decision in Reeves). This case, however, has an unusual wrinkle that 

affects how we view the relative qualifications of Perez and Kavanaugh—the parties 

dispute the very nature of the position.

UTRGV concedes in its brief that Kavanaugh is a talented grant writer, which is 

why the university hired him for grant writing positions both before and after the incident 

in question. UTRGV insists, however, that the position filled by Perez, although certainly 

related to grant writing, was more administrative in nature, and therefore, Perez, who had 

experience as a program manager for United Way, was better qualified than Kavanaugh 

for the position. In support, UTRGV relies on Salinas’s description of the position as 

requiring a “technician” who can manage a program. The university also highlights certain 

job duties in the posting that it describes as administrative.

Kavanaugh disputes the committee’s characterization of the position. According to 

Kavanaugh, after conducting the interviews, the committee reimagined the position to 

justify its preference for the substantially younger Perez. As proof, he points out that 

UTRGV posted the position as a “grant proposal writer,” not as a program manager, which 

was Rock’s position in CFR.4 Beyond the job title, the substantive description of the 

position, both in scope and job duties, was identical to his former position with UTRGV as 

a “grant proposal writer” for the business college. Therefore, first and foremost, the 

4 UTRGV’s Deputy Chief Legal Officer Priscilla Lozano described CFR’s organizational structure 

as follows:

In late summer and fall 2019 the Corporate and Foundations Relations office was 

comprised of four positions—two (2) Director of Development for Corporate and 

Foundation Relations positions; a Grant Development Manager position; and a Grant 

Proposal Writer position. The Grant Proposal Writer position SRGV 4089 was unfilled [and] 

was posted for hiring on August 23, 2019.
12

position required someone who would be “[r]esponsible for the development, writing, and 

editing of assigned grant proposals and reports,” as the job posting stated. This is evident, 

Kavanaugh says, by the fact that candidates were required to submit samples of previous

grant proposals and discuss their experience as grant writers during the interview, 

including the largest grant they had secured. Moreover, Kavanaugh explains that the job 

duties highlighted by UTRGV are part and parcel for any grant writer, which is why those

same duties were also listed in the description of his former position as a grant writer at 

UTRGV. In other words, any experience Perez had in performing those particular job 

duties did not distinguish her in any meaningful way because Kavanaugh had experience

performing those same duties over a much longer period of time.

UTRGV has failed to explain why it posted a position for a “grant proposal writer”

with the same responsibilities normally associated with that position, and yet the 

committee later described the essential duties of the position as being administrative in 

nature. Viewing this disputed evidence in the light most favorable to Kavanaugh, we 

proceed to compare the relative qualifications of Perez and Kavanaugh with an emphasis

on their experience as grant proposal writers, not administrators.

5 See Miranda, 133 

S.W.3d at 228.

5 Regardless, the record does not support the committee’s conclusion that Perez’s role as a 

“project manager” at United Way made her better qualified to handle administrative tasks and “work well in 

a fast-paced environment.” From 2012 to 2015, during his tenure as “manager” of the Department of 

Institutional Grant Writers at the University of Texas Brownsville and Texas Southmost College, Kavanaugh 

oversaw a team of grant writers that secured more than $35 million in awards. More recently, Kavanaugh 

worked as a “Grants Director” supervising two grant writers and writing grant proposals “to support the 40 

human service projects of [the] Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of San Antonio.” At most, Perez was 

equally qualified to handle any administrative tasks that may be associated with the position.
13

While both candidates met the minimum qualification of “[t]hree (3) years of related 

work experience with a proven track record in grant writing and program development,”

Kavanaugh had significantly more experience as a grant writer than Perez. In particular, 

Kavanaugh had twelve years of experience writing grants, while Perez had three years

of experience. As UTRGV correctly points out, this fact alone is insufficient to demonstrate 

that Kavanaugh was clearly better qualified than Perez. See Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., 

Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 959 (5th Cir. 1993).

However, of the two candidates, only Kavanaugh had the preferred qualification of 

working as a grant writer in a “higher education setting.” In fact, Kavanaugh had spent 

nearly his entire career as a grant writer working in higher education for the University of 

Texas System, including writing grants “for every college & division” at UTRGV. Normally, 

the plaintiff’s longer tenure with the employer would not establish that he was clearly 

better qualified than the selected candidate. See Martinez v. Workforce Comm’n-Civil 

Rights Div., 775 F.3d 685, 687 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 283 

F.3d 715, 723 (5th Cir. 2002)). Yet, in this case, based on UTRGV’s stated preference,

Kavanaugh’s extensive experience as a grant writer in the University of Texas System 

set him apart from Perez as the only candidate that exceeded the minimum qualifications.

See Roberson-King v. La. Workforce Comm’n, 904 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Circ. 2018) 

(holding plaintiff failed to meet clearly better qualified standard where both candidates 

“exceeded the minimum qualifications for the district supervision position, and neither 

candidate was clearly better qualified”).
14

Finally, as indicated by the committee’s questions, the performance of any grant 

writer is ultimately judged by the amount of funds they secure. In this regard, Kavanaugh’s 

prior achievements far exceeded Perez’s. The largest grant Perez had previously secured 

totaled $120,000, while Kavanaugh had secured one grant for $2.5 million and another 

for more than $1 million, as well as grants for $688,000, $500,000, and $299,000. This 

evidence is specific and comparative. See Chandler, 376 S.W.3d at 825. And, in the 

parlance of the Fifth Circuit, the disparity between Kavanaugh and Perez “jump[s] off the 

page and slap[s] you in the face.” See Deines, 164 F.3d at 279.

Although any one of the above facts in isolation may be insufficient to raise a fact 

issue, viewing them collectively in the light most favorable to Kavanaugh, we agree with 

the trial court that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Kavanaugh was 

clearly better qualified than Perez for the position.6 See Roberson-King, 904 F.3d at 382 

(holding that, where both candidates exceeded the minimum qualifications for a position, 

“[a]ny difference in qualifications between the two candidates does not create a genuine 

issue of fact that Roberson-King was clearly better qualified for the district supervisor 

position”); Villarreal, 620 S.W.3d at 905 (“If disputed evidence creates a fact question 

regarding a jurisdictional issue that also implicates the merits . . . a jury should resolve 

the issue.” (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28)). Accordingly, the trial court did not err 

in denying the plea, and UTRGV’s issue is overruled.

6 Kavanaugh also argues that because he was clearly better qualified than Perez, UTRGV failed 

to follow its RIF policy, which required UTRGV to give him priority consideration if the candidates were at 

least equally qualified for the position. Although this is an additional fact that may support an inference of 

pretext, the fact itself does not support Kavanaugh’s contention that he was clearly better qualified than 

Perez.
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IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s order.

GINA M. BENAVIDES

Justice

Delivered and filed on the

23rd day of February, 2023.