alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
From: gaile1963@comcast.net

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 1:13:01 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Gail Engelhardt

Cartersville, GA 30120
No. 414, Misc.

#### Solomon *v.*Illinois.

Supreme Court of Illinois. Certiorari denied.
From: r_e_rutkowski

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: "Religious refusal" exemptions

Date: Wednesday, August 10, 2011 6:46:39 PM

Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services

U.S. Department of Health & Human Services

200 Independence Avenue, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20201

E-mail: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA@dol.gov

Re: “Religious refusal” exemptions

Dear Secretary:

Efforts are underway to expand “religious refusal” exemptions. If

expanded, certain employers would be exempt from having to provide coverage for

contraceptive services to their female employees if the employer is opposed to

contraception.

An expanded exemption would allow an employer to deny their employees access to

care that doctors, medical associations, and the IOM consider necessary. Besides,

with or without an employer exemption, if an employee is opposed to contraception

on religious grounds, she’s unlikely to fill a prescription for birth control. But these

exemptions are also a little sinister.

Religious refusal provisions allow the decision makers at “religious employers” to

determine what sort of contraception, if any, their female employees will have access

to. If the existing religious refusal exemption is expanded, it would create a broad

definition for “religious employers,” and could impact all employees at some schools,

hospitals, charities, and elsewhere – even if the employee does not share the faith of

their employer.

Accept the recommendations of the Institute of Medicine as pertain to coverage

of preventive care under the new health care law, and to reject any exemptions

for “religious employers.” These preventive services are a critical element of the

new law and would provide countless women better access to necessary health

care.

While I believe that “religious refusal” exemptions unjustly deny women access

to contraceptive services, others, driven by an ideological distaste for all

contraceptive services, are pushing the government to make exemptions even

larger. Indeed, some groups are pushing for the exemption to apply to

religiously-run health providers, so hospitals with religious affiliations would be

exempt from the coverage requirement, even though they employ people of all

faiths and ideologies. If granted, this larger exemption would deny access to

thousands of women just because of where they work.

I urge you to ensure women have access to quality preventive care by accepting

IOM’s recommendations and rejecting the proposed religious refusal exemption

provisions.
Thank you for the opportunity to bring these remarks to your attention.

Yours sincerely,

Robert E. Rutkowski

cc: House Minority Leadership

2527 Faxon Court

Topeka, Kansas 66605-2086

P/F: 1 785 379-9671

E-mail: r_e_rutkowski@att.net
From: quixpath@hotmail.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 12:44:15 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Dennis Romary

El Dorado Hills, CA 95762
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Elementary Secondary EducationMathematics EducationRacial FactorsScience EducationTrack System (Education)

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<page>			            EXHIBIT 32.01



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Annual Report of Dean Witter Cornerstone
Fund II (the ?Partnership?) on Form 10-K for the period ended
December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the ?Report?), I, Jeffrey A.
Rothman, President, Demeter Management Corporation, the general
partner of the Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:
(1)	The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
(2)	The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Partnership.







By:    /s/ Jeffrey A. Rothman

Name:      Jeffrey A. Rothman
Title:     President

Date:      March 31, 2006
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**ERIC Number:**

**Record Type:**

**Publication Date:**

**Pages:**

**Abstractor:**

**ISBN:**

**ISSN:**

**EISSN:**

Access to EducationAdmission (School)Educational PolicyElementary Secondary EducationImmigrationMigrant ChildrenPublic EducationSchool PolicyStranger ReactionsStudent RightsStudent School RelationshipUndocumented Immigrants

**Publication Type:**

**Education Level:**

**Audience:**

**Language:**

**Sponsor:**

**Authoring Institution:**

**Identifiers - Laws, Policies, & Programs:**

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### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN NO. 03-0 8 -00 588 -CR De r r ic k Ha ll , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 427TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- DC-08 -30 0013 , HO NORAB LE MELI SSA YO UNG G OO DWI N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N De r r i c k H a l l p l e a d e d g u i l t y t o t h e o f f e n s e o f a t t e mp t e d f

a i l u r e t o r e g i s t e r a s a sex offender . See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102 (West 2006). Punishment was assessed a t si x mont

hs ’ i mpr iso nme nt i n s tate ja il. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ha s c e rt if ie d th a t th is is a

ple a -b arg a in case , and the de fenda

nt has no rig ht of appe al. A cc o rd i n gl y , we dism iss the appea l. SeeTe x. R. App. P. 25.2(a)( 2), (d) .

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Dismissed Filed: January

28, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh
No. 431.

#### Hardcastle et al. *v.*Western Greyhound Lines et al.

*Jay A. Darwin*for petitioners.

*Marion B. Plant*for Western Greyhound Lines, and *Duane B. Beeson*for Rhodes et al., respondents.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
The 11thAnnual Clean AirAnnual Clean AirExcellence AwardsExcellence AwardsEPAOffice of Air and RadiationOffice of Air and RadiationAshleaPage10 Years of Excellence10 Years of Excellence•The Clean Air ExcellenceThe Clean Air ExcellenceAwards Program was establishedAwards Program was establishedin 2000 at the recommendationin 2000 at the recommendationof the CAAAC.of the CAAAC.•Since 2000 CAAAC has honoredSince 2000 CAAAC has honored152 outstanding and innovative152 outstanding and innovativeefforts that help make progressefforts that help make progressin achieving cleaner air.in achieving cleaner air.Awards CategoriesAwards Categories•6 Categories6 Categories:–Clean Air TechnologyClean Air Technology,–Community ActionCommunity Action–Education/OutreachEducation/Outreach–Regulatory/ Policy InnovationsRegulatory/ Policy Innovations–Transportation Efficiency InnovationsTransportation Efficiency Innovations•2 special awards2 special awards:–Thomas W.Thomas W.ZoselOutstanding Individual Achievement AwardOutstanding Individual Achievement Award–Gregg Cooke Visionary Program AwardGregg Cooke Visionary Program AwardClean Air Excellence Awards 2010Clean Air Excellence Awards 2010•Applications were due August, 13, 2010Applications were due August, 13, 2010–This year we have received 75 promising applicationsThis year we have received 75 promising applications–12-15 winners will likely be chosen15 winners will likely be chosen•Applications will undergo review byApplications will undergo review by–EPA Headquarter and Regional StaffEPA Headquarter and Regional Staff–CAAAC Awards Workgroup (volunteers needed)CAAAC Awards Workgroup (volunteers needed)–EPA Office of EnforcementEPA Office of Enforcement•Final Decisions by Assistant Administrator byFinal Decisions by Assistant Administrator byJanuary 2011January 2011The Awards Ceremony: Past andThe Awards Ceremony: Past andFuture•Awards will be presented at the May 2011 CAAACAwards will be presented at the May 2011 CAAACmeetingmeeting•Typically event has been held in the evening afterTypically event has been held in the evening aftersubcommittee meetingssubcommittee meetings•Concern has been raised by CAAAC members andConcern has been raised by CAAAC members andEPA staff over attendanceEPA staff over attendance•Suggestion made to have awards during lunch of FullSuggestion made to have awards during lunch of FullCAAAC meetingCAAAC meetingday?•Otherideas?
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6921
ERIC A. BRICE, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus VIRGINIA BEACH CORRECTIONAL CENTER; FRANK DREW; JOHN NIEVES, Deputy Sheriff, Defendants - Appellees, CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH, Defendant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. William T. Prince, Magistrate Judge. (CA-91-583) Submitted: October 31, 1997 Decided: January 20, 1998 Before RUSSELL and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Eric A. Brice, Appellant Pro Se. Abram William VanderMeer, Jr., CLARK & STANT, P.C., Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellees.* The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1994). 2 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM: Eric A. Brice appeals the magistrate judge's order * reentering judgment and once again denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint. In this case, we previously vacated themagistrate judge's order adverse to Brice and remanded for reconsideration of the possibility that Brice had shown sufficient facts to survive a motion for summary judgment with regard to his claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. See Brice v. Virginia Beach Correctional Ctr. , 58 F.3d 101 (4th Cir. 1995). We have reviewed the record and the magistrate judge's specific and careful findings of fact and find no reversible error. Accordingly,we affirm on the reasoning of the magistrate judge. Brice v. Virginia Beach Correctional Ctr. , No. CA-91-583, (E.D. Va. Dec. 19, 1995). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAYENDRA A. SHAH, M.D.,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 10-56284

D.C. No. 2:08-cv-06499-CAS-CW

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 7, 2012** 

Pasadena, California

Before: FARRIS, CLIFTON, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s action for failure to

state a claim on which relief may be granted.

FILED

MAR 16 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the

defendant “deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities” under color of

state law. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2005)

(internal quotation marks and indications of alteration removed). A local

government’s retaliation against a plaintiff for suing the local government may

deprive the plaintiff of his First Amendment right to petition the courts. Sorrano’s

Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). A public employee’s

litigation, however, “must involve a matter of public concern in order to be

protected by either the Petition Clause or the Speech Clause of the First

Amendment.” Rendish v. City of Tacoma, 123 F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 1997);

see also Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2493-2501 (2011). 

Plaintiff’s litigation involved his private employment grievances, not matters

of public concern. Additionally, Plaintiff’s complaint does not adequately allege

that his prior litigation against the County was “a substantial or motivating factor

in the [County’s] decision” not to ratify Plaintiff’s settlement. Sorrano’s Gasco,

874 F.2d at 1314 (internal quotation marks removed). Accordingly, the County’s

conduct did not deprive Plaintiff of his First Amendment rights. 
3

The district court’s order explains why the County’s conduct did not deprive

Plaintiff of his Due Process and Equal Protection rights. We agree with the district

court’s reasoning and conclusions, and therefore need not repeat them here.

AFFIRMED.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED FEBRUARY 13, 2019

NO. 03-17-00271-CR

Thomas Ritchie McBride, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 27TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE, JUSTICES GOODWIN AND KELLY

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART—

OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction entered by the district court. Having reviewed 

the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was reversible error in a portion 

of the district court’s judgment of conviction. Therefore, the Court affirms the portion of the 

district court’s judgment adjudicating McBride’s guilt, reverses the portion of the judgment 

imposing punishment, and remands this cause for a new punishment hearing. Because appellant

is indigent and unable to pay costs, no adjudication of costs is made.
From: gautrea2@aol.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 12:19:11 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Gary Gautreaux

Denham Springs, LA 70706
EXHIBIT 32.1


                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

                    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE

                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Annual Report of Marwich II, Ltd. (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB/A, Amendment No. 1, for the period ending January 31,
2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Timothy Morris, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



By:  /s/ Timothy Morris
     ---------------------------------------------
         Timothy Morris
         Chief Executive Officer


August 22, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

JAMES M. FRANCIS,

Respondent

v.

LCP NORTH THIRD, LLC,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 193 EAL 2023

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

JAMES M. FRANCIS,

Respondent

v.

LCP NORTH THIRD, LLC,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 194 EAL 2023

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 20th day of December, 2023

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED

.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-7724

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

GUISEPPE L. WALLACE, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Thomas E. Johnston,

Magistrate Judge. (5:02-cr-00101-2; 5:05-cv-00252)

Submitted: May 22, 2008 Decided: May 27, 2008

Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Guiseppe L. Wallace, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. John Lanier File,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES, Beckley, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Guiseppe Wallace, Jr., seeks to appeal the district

court’s order rejecting the recommendation of the magistrate judge

and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The

order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Wallace has not

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny Wallace’s motion

for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED