Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 15A01-1607-CR-1509 | February 8, 2017 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Leanna Weissmann

Lawrenceburg, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Michael Gene Worden

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

James Sturgel,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 8, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

15A01-1607-CR-1509

Appeal from the Dearborn 

Superior Court

The Honorable Sally McLaughlin, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

15D02-1404-FB-24

Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] James Sturgel (“Sturgel”) was convicted of one count of Class B felony Child 

Molesting1 and one count of Class C felony Child Molesting.2 Sturgel now 

appeals, contending that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted 

evidence that Sturgel had admitted to molesting a different child. We reverse 

and remand for a new trial.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Six-year-old J.S. was placed into foster care in October 2006. Her foster parent 

was Deborah Chaney (“Chaney”), and J.S. stayed with Chaney until April 

2007. A few years later, in 2011, J.S. told her grandmother that she was

molested in foster care, and an investigation ensued. During a forensic 

interview, J.S. said the molestation occurred on multiple occasions, and 

indicated that the molestation may have occurred twenty-six times. The 

investigation led law enforcement to Sturgel, who was related to Chaney.

[3] On April 24, 2014, the State charged Sturgel with four counts of Child 

Molesting but later reduced the charges to two counts. On April 13, 2016, the 

State notified Sturgel of its intent to introduce evidence under Indiana Evidence 

Rule 404(b) regarding, inter alia, Sturgel’s child molesting conviction involving a 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a).

2

I.C. § 35-42-4-3(b).
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different child. Sturgel filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit introduction 

of such evidence, and the trial court initially granted Sturgel’s motion.

[4] A jury trial commenced on April 19, 2016. Throughout the trial, the State 

sought permission to introduce evidence of Sturgel’s conviction but the trial 

court sustained Sturgel’s objections. Late in the trial, however, the trial court 

permitted testimony regarding Sturgel’s admission to molesting a different child 

in Chaney’s care. The trial court allowed the evidence on only the issue of 

whether Sturgel had the opportunity to molest J.S. The trial court accordingly 

admonished the jury and gave a limiting instruction.

[5] Sturgel was found guilty as charged, and the trial court later sentenced Sturgel.

[6] This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Sturgel argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence 

that he admitted to molesting a child. He urges that admission of the evidence 

was contrary to Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) and that, even if admissible, its 

probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect in 

violation of Indiana Evidence Rule 403.

[8] “In deciding whether to admit or exclude evidence, we trust trial courts to 

exercise sound discretion, and we will reverse such a decision only if we believe 

the court abused its discretion, meaning its decision is clearly against the logic 

and effect of the facts in the record.” Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1264 (Ind. 
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2015). Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, 

wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to 

show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the 

character.” The evidence, however, “may be admissible for another purpose, 

such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 

identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Ind. Evidence Rule 

404(b)(2). In evaluating the admissibility of 404(b) evidence, “a trial court must 

‘(1) determine that the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a 

matter at issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act 

and (2) balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect 

pursuant to Rule 403.’” Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1270 (Ind. 2002) 

(quoting Ortiz v. State, 716 N.E.2d 345, 350 (Ind. 1999)).

[9] Here, the State sought to introduce evidence of Sturgel’s prior child molesting 

conviction. The trial court was made aware that Sturgel had pleaded guilty to 

molesting a child in 2008.3 The molestation apparently occurred while the child 

was in Chaney’s care and while others were in the same household. 

Throughout the trial, the State made a number of arguments for admission of 

the evidence. Among them, the State argued that the evidence spoke to 

Sturgel’s opportunity to molest J.S. The State focused on three moments in 

Chaney’s testimony. First, when Sturgel asked Chaney whether she saw him 

 

3 The trial court reviewed certified copies of the judgment of conviction, probable cause affidavit, and other 

documents relating to Sturgel’s 2008 conviction. These documents were identified as Exhibits A(1) and A(2), 

but they are not in the appellate record.
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and J.S. wrestling around, Chaney said that “would have been inappropriate.” 

(Tr. Vol. I at 220.) Second, when the State asked Chaney whether Sturgel 

could have tickled J.S., Chaney responded, “With three (3) adults sitting in the 

house?” (Tr. Vol. I at 224.) Last, when the State asked Chaney about her 

reaction to the instant investigation in 2011, Chaney said she “couldn’t believe 

this was happening.” (Tr. Vol. I at 238.)

[10] In ultimately deciding to allow evidence of Sturgel’s act on the issue of 

opportunity, the trial court referred to Chaney’s testimony, which the State had 

characterized as indignant at times. The trial court felt that Chaney’s responses

left the impression “that [Chaney] is a completely appropriate foster parent.” 

(Tr. Vol. II at 79.) The trial court reasoned that “[t]he evidence presented by 

the foster parent is there’s always other people around . . . so there is still the 

issue of opportunity, and I think that’s what makes this evidence probative.” 

(Tr. Vol. II at 79.) The trial court further explained that the probative value 

substantially outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice because “it [was] unfair 

for the jury to make a decision thinking that this could never happen; that it 

would be shocking in 2011 when it was reported to the foster parent that this 

happened, when the foster parent was aware [that] the exact type of situation 

did happen under her care.” (Tr. Vol. II at 80-81.)

[11] To address the “prejudicial nature” of the evidence, the trial court said it would 

“limit how this is presented to the jury” (Tr. Vol. II at 81), and gave an example 

of the line of questioning it would permit, which the State modeled:
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Q: Ms. Chaney, yesterday you told the jury that in 2011 when 

the police came to question you that you were shocked . . . 

[b]y the allegations, isn’t that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: You also said that you had discussed with Brenda Sturgel 

that you couldn’t believe this was happening, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Yet weren’t you aware at the time you were questioned by 

the police that in 2008[,] [Sturgel] . . . admitted to 

molesting a five (5) year old under your care at the home 

of Brenda Sturgel, while others [were] present in your 

home?

A: Yes.

(Tr. Vol. II at 84-85.) Following the admission of the evidence, the trial court 

informed the jury that the evidence was received solely on the issue of 

opportunity, and the trial court also later gave a limiting instruction.

[12] The State argues that Sturgel “opened the door” to the introduction of the 

evidence. “[O]therwise inadmissible evidence may become admissible if a 

party ‘opens the door’ to questioning on that evidence in order to correct a 

‘deceptively incomplete disclosure.’” Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 471 (Ind.

2015) (quoting Gilliam v. State, 270 Ind. 71, 383 N.E.2d 297, 301 (1978)). The 

evidence that “opened the door” must leave the trier of fact with a false or 

misleading impression of the facts related. Id. Sturgel did state in his opening 
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argument that the alleged acts “could not have happened” (Tr. Vol. I at 76), 

noting that he was in Oregon during much of the relevant timeframe and that 

others were present on the few occasions J.S. and Sturgel were in the same 

home. Yet, Sturgel’s argument and later lines of questioning seemed to focus 

on challenging J.S.’s credibility as to the number of occasions, in that J.S. had 

posited that the molestation may have occurred twenty-six times. The State 

also points out that Sturgel asked Chaney whether Chaney saw him tickle J.S., 

and Sturgel evidently tickled the other child before molesting her. But we 

cannot say that Sturgel’s question to the State’s witness, or Sturgel’s other 

remarks at trial, generated a false or misleading impression of the facts such that 

would warrant evidence that he admitted to molesting a different child.

[13] As to admissibility under Rule 404(b), the evidence that Sturgel molested a 

different child in Chaney’s care is at best marginally relevant to the issue of 

opportunity—Sturgel acknowledged in his opening statement that he and J.S. 

were in the same household on more than one occasion, and the evidence 

indicated as much. Nonetheless, as the trial court reasoned, Chaney’s 

responses did suggest that Sturgel would have had a limited opportunity to 

harm a child in her care because others were present. Even if relevant, 

however, the evidence’s probative value with respect to opportunity must not be 

substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. Evid. R. 403. We 

review the trial court’s Rule 403 balancing under an abuse of discretion 

standard. Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 223 (Ind. 1997).
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[14] Here, the trial court seemingly admitted the evidence for two purposes. First, 

the trial court admitted the evidence because the evidence shed light on whether 

a child in Chaney’s care could have been molested while others were in the 

home. The trial court also admitted the evidence because it called Chaney’s 

credibility into question, refuting her suggestion that she was an appropriate 

foster parent and that she was shocked by the investigation. However, evidence 

that someone—anyone—had molested a child in Chaney’s care, with others in 

the home, would have served both purposes. Yet, the admitted evidence 

identified Sturgel as the molester and identified the victim as of a similar age to 

J.S.’s. The evidence went too far. Neither Sturgel’s identity nor the victim’s 

age necessarily related to the stated purposes for admission of the evidence. See 

Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 236 (Ind. 1997) (“Unnecessary and 

inflammatory detail may require reversal.”). Moreover, the extraneous 

information admitted here was plainly prejudicial. Indeed, even if the 

challenged evidence was relevant and otherwise admissible, the prejudice from 

the “forbidden inference” Wickizer v. State, 626 N.E.2d 795, 797 (Ind. 1993) 

substantially outweighed its probative value, in relation to the “opportunity to 

commit the crime” rationale given for its admission.

[15] We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that 

Sturgel admitted to molesting a different child. Nonetheless, the erroneous 

admission of evidence only warrants reversal for a new trial where the 

admission affected the substantial rights of the party. Evid. R. 103(a); Ind. Trial 

Rule 61; Buchanan v. State, 767 N.E.2d 967, 970 (Ind. 2002). “In determining 
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whether the introduction of this evidence warrants reversal, we must assess the 

probable impact of the evidence upon the jury.” Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 

1334, 1341 (Ind. 1992). “The improper admission is harmless error if the 

conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying 

the reviewing court there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence 

contributed to the conviction.” Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1238 (Ind. 

2012).

[16] Here, the only independent evidence of Sturgel’s guilt consisted of J.S.’s 

testimony. Further, shortly after the trial court admitted the challenged 

evidence, the trial court received a jury question inquiring about Sturgel’s arrest

history and requesting a copy of his charges. The question was telling; we

cannot say the error here was harmless.

Conclusion

[17] The trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that Sturgel had 

admitted to molesting a child.

[18] Reversed.

Najam, J., and May, J., concur.