Cite as 2017 Ark. 317



## SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CV

- 16

- 1080

GERALDINE HENSON, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTAT IVE OF THE ESTATE OF DAVID HENSON, DECEASED APPELLANT
V. KELLEY CRADDUCK, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; K EITH FERGUSON, INDIVIDUAL LY; JEFF ROBINS, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACIT Y; JEREMY GUYLL; OLIN RANKIN; JANNA HULET; MICHELE WILLS ; WARREN LAFFERTY; ASSOCIATIO N OF ARKANSAS COUNTIES; A ND JOHN OR JANE DOES 8

- 25 APPELLEES Opinion Delivered: November 16, 2017
APPEAL FROM THE BENTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [ NO. 04CV

- 15

- 1506

- 1 ]
HONORABLE MACKIE M. PIERCE , JUDGE

APPEAL DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

.

RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice Geraldine Henson appeals the circuit court’s order dismissing her case with prejudice based on the statute of limitations. W e cannot reach the merits of the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order. We must, therefore, dismiss the appeal. On October 5, 2015, Henson filed her original complaint that alleged her husband, David Henson, died while a prisoner in the custody of the Benton County j ail and under the supervision of the Benton County Sheriff’s Office. She subsequently filed four amended compla ints. The defendants differ in each complaint , and t he amended complaints are2

internally inconsistent

. 1 T he defendants listed in the case caption , the introductory paragraph of the complaint s , and those accused of specific acts within the complaint s d iffer

. The amended complaints do not state that they are incorporating the earlier complaints.
For example, the original complaint names the following defendants: Benton County Jail, Benton County Sh eriff’s Office, Kelley Cradduck , Jo hn Doe # 1 , John Doe #2, an d John Doe # 3. The first amended complaint’s case caption lists Cradduck, four named defendants (Jeff Robins, Jeremy Guyll, Olin Rankin, and Janna LNU) and John or Jane
Does 1

– 25

. The Benton County Jail and the Benton County Sheriff’s Office are not listed , although both had answered the original complaint. The body of the first amended complaint also lists Benton County, Arkansas, as a defendant, but it is not included in the

case caption

. Henson later filed a second amended complaint . The defendant s identified in its caption and body mirrored the first amended complaint. Next, Henson filed a third amended complaint

. The case caption lists Cradduck , Robin s , Guyll, Rankin, and Hulet (last name for Janna LNU as identified in the prior complaint) in addition to Keith Ferguson, Michele Wills, and Warren Lafferty

. She also named as defendants John or Jane Does 8

– 25. 2 The body of the complaint, however , does not list Cradduck as a defendant but again includes Benton County, Arkansas. In addition, she “ name[d] and substitute[d]” Robins, Guyll, Rankin, Hulet, Ferguson, Wills, and

1 The pleadings and motions spell several of the defendants’ names inconsistently. For example, Jeff “Robins” is also spelled Jeff “Robbins;” “Michele” Wills is also spelled “Michelle” Wills; Janna “Hulet” is also spelled Janna “Hulett;” and “Kelley” Cradd uck is also spelled “Kelly” Cradduck. For consistency, we use the spelling contained in the first pleading identifying the party.

2 The John and Jane Does numerical assignments also change in each amended complaint.3

Lafferty for “John Doe” defendants 1

– 7. The caption of Henson’s fourth amended complaint mirrors the third amended complaint ’s list of defendants with the exception of

a dd ing the Association of Arkansas Counties (AAC) as a defendant

. S everal motion s to dismiss were filed , including two motions to dismiss the fourth amended complaint

. Defendants argued that the statute of limitations warranted dismissal of Henson’s claims , that Henson had failed to state a claim against any defendant, and that the y were immune to tort and vicarious liability

. Following a hearing, the circuit court entered an order granting the motion to dismiss with prejudice because Henson’s complaints

we re time

- barred

. The order Henson appeals reads as follows : IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BENTON COUNTY, ARKANSAS CIVIL DIVISION GERALDINE HENSON
VS. BENTON COUNTY JAIL; BENTON COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; KELLY CRADDUCK; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2; and JOHN DOE #3
CASE NO. CV15

- 1506

- 5
ORDER The Plaintiff filed her Fourth Amended Complaint in this action on May 9, 2016. The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, to which the Plaintiff responded. After a hearing on the motion, and for the reasons set forth in the m otion and at the hearing, which the Court finds to be well

- founded, the Court finds and holds that Plaintiff’s claims are time

- barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. For the foregoing reasons, and for good cause shown, the Court hereby finds a nd Orders that the Defendant’s motion to dismiss should be, and hereby is, GRANTED, and tha t this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.4

Before addressing the merits of Henson’s claim on appeal, we must first analyze whether Henson appeals from a final orde r. Rule 2(a)(1) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure

– Civil provides that an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment or decree entered by the circuit court. An order is not final if it adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties , unless the circuit court enters a Rule 54(b) certification. Ark. R. App. P.

– Civ

. 2( a); McKinney v. Bishop , 369 Ark. 191, 252 S.W.3d 123 (2007). We may raise the issue of whether an order is final and subject to appeal sua sponte

. Id.
In the instant case, the order is no t final as to all parties. Even more problematic is the uncertain t y as to which defendants were actually dismissed. T he order’s caption is identical to the caption of the original complaint. It includes three named defendants

— Benton County Jail, Benton County Sherif f’s Office, and Kelley Cradduck

— and three John
Does. However, the body of the order references only the fourth amend ed complaint , which identifies different defendants. Additionally, the court granted “ the defendant ’s motion to dismiss

. ” We do not know which motion to dismiss. T he defendants who filed the first motion to dismiss the fourth amended complaint were Craddu ck, Robins, Guyll, Rankin, Lafferty, Wills, and Benton County. However, t he defendants who filed the second motion to dismiss the fourth amended complaint were Cradduck, Ferguson, Robins, Guyll, Rankin, Lafferty, Wills, Hulet and Benton County

. Therefore, we cannot determine whether the circuit court dismissed the defendants identified in the caption , the defendants identified in the fourth amended complaint , the defendants who filed the first motion to dismiss the fourth amended complaint, or the5

defendant s who filed the second motion to dismiss the fourth amended complaint

. W e refuse to speculate as to th is ambiguous order’s meaning

. 3 None of the before

- listed options include all the defendants , which results in a lack of finality. The dissent sua spont e challenges Henson filing a pro se complaint for wrongful death because t he circuit court lacked subject

- matter jurisdiction

. However, the dissent puts the cart before the horse. W e have repeatedly held that we cannot decide whether the ci rcuit

court lacked jurisdiction without a final order. See , e.g. , Tucker v. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips Cty

. , 323 Ark. 693, 697, 917 S.W.2d 530 , 533 (1996) (“Because we dismiss this appeal for lack of a final order, we need not reach the issues of whether the chancellor had jurisdiction to hear the case . . .”); String v. Kazi , 312 Ark. 6, 6, 846 S.W.2d 649 , 649 (1993) (“We have frequently held that we will not decide the merits of an appeal when the order appealed from is not a final order

. ”); Schueck Ste el, Inc. v. McCarthy Bro s . Co. , 289 Ark. 436, 436

– 37, 711 S.W.2d 820 , 821 (1986) (“We have frequently held that we will not decide the merits on an appeal when the order appealed is not a final one

. ”); McIlroy Bank & Trust v. Zuber , 275 Ark. 345, 346, 629 S.W.2d 304 , 304 (198 2 ) (“We do not reach the merits of this appeal as the order appealed from is not final and therefore, not appealable.”);

s ee also Hambay v. Williams , 335 Ark. 352, 356, 980 S.W.2d 263 , 265 (1998) (concluding that we could not determine whether the lower court lacked subject

- matter jurisdiction,

3 In their brief on appeal, appellees assert that the appellant “abandoned” her claims against Benton County Jail and Benton County Sheriff’s Office. However, a plaintiff cannot “abandon” a defendant that has been named and served. Ford Motor Co. v. Washington , 2012 Ark. 354 (2012). A defen dant remains until the circuit court enters an order dismissing it. Id. (“[Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure

— Civil 3] requires appellants and cross

appellants to abandon pending and unresolved claims, but it does not permit appellants and cross
- appell ants to dispose of parties in the same fashion.”)6

and then address the merits, because the order from which appellant appealed was not final)

. We cannot conclude that the circuit court lacked subject

- matter jurisdiction when we lack appellate jurisdiction. Nevertheless, subject

- matter jurisdiction is not at issue in this case. T he dissent summarily concludes that Henson filed the complaint on behalf of David’s estate as a personal representative

. However, the complain t does no t appear to bring the action in the name of the estate. Rather, the original complaint’s caption read s simply “Geraldine
Henson , ” suggesting she filed the original action on her own behalf as an heir. This may b e a potential standing issue, but not one of subject

- matter jurisdiction. See Rhuland v. Fahr , 356 Ark. 382, 155 S.W.3d 2 (2004) (affirming circuit court’s dismissal of a complaint because daughter lacked standing to bring wrongful death suit in her capacity as an heir). As the lack of standing doe s not deprive us of subject

- matter jurisdiction, we cannot raise it on our

own. Chubb Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Miller County Circuit Court , 2010 Ark. 119, 361 S.W.3d 809

. Standing was not considered by the circuit court, and we cannot address it now. See Hunt er v. Runyan , 2011 Ark. 43, 382 S.W.3d 643 (“Arguments not raised below, even constitutional ones, are waived on appeal.”)

. For these reasons, we find that the order from which the appellant appealed is not a final, appealable order because there are stil l claims pending against some defendants. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal without prejudice so that the circuit court may enter a final order. Appeal dismissed without prejudice.
B AKER , G OODSON , and H ART , JJ., dissent.K A R E N R. B A K E R , J U S T I C E , di s s enti ng. I m u st dissent from t he m ajorit y’s opinion b e c a u se I cannot agree w it h eit her t he m ajorit y’s analysis or it s conclusion t o dism iss t h i s appeal w it hout p rejudice for lack of a final appealable order. The court need not reach t he
issu e o f w h e t her the order i s f inal under Rule 54. Inst ead, I would affirm t he circuit court because a nonlawyer personal represent at ive is not aut horized t o file a pro se com plaint in a wrongful-deat h a c t ion, t he circuit court did not have jurisdict ion and Ark. Code Ann. §
16-62-102 correct ly dism issed t h is act ion wit h prejudice. Alt hough not raised by the part ies, “we m ust raise issues of subject -m at t er jurisdict ion even when such quest ions are not raised below.” K

oonce v. Mitch ell , 341 A r k. 716, 718, 19 S.W.3d 603, 6 05 (2000) (int ernal cit at ions

om i t t e d )

. The m ajorit y st at es t hat t he dissent “sum m arily concludes t hat H enson filed t he

com p laint on behalf of David’s est at e a s a p er s onal represent at ive, which it claim s raises an issue of subject m at t er jurisdict ion. B ut t h e com plaint does not appear t o b ring t he act ion in

t h e nam e of t he est at e. Rat her, t he original com plaint ’s capt i on reads sim ply ‘ Geraldine
H enson,’ suggest i ng she filed t he original act ion on her own b ehalf as an heir. This m ay be

a pot ent i al st anding issue, but not one of subject m at t er jurisdict i o n. See Rh uland v. Fah r , 356 Ark. 382, 155 S .W.3d 2 (2004) (affirm ing circuit court ’s d ism i ssal of com plaint because daught e r l acked st anding t o bring wrongful deat h suit in her capacit y as an heir).” H owever,

t h is posit ion is m i splaced. T he c om plaint unequ i v o c a lly st at es “Com plaint in Wrongful
Deat h” and t hat H enson is t he surviving spouse and “has been appoint ed as adm inist rat rix of

t h e est at e.” The r ecord dem onst rat es t hat H enson was appoint ed adm inist rat rix on August 14,
2014. Furt her, the wrongful deat h st at ut e under which H enson is suing specifically requires

7t h at “every act ion shall be brought by and i n t he nam e of t he personal represent at i ve of t he

deceased person. I f t here is no personal represent at ive, t hen t he act ion shall be brought by t he heirs at law o f t he deceased person.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-102; B r ewer v. Poole , 362 A rk. 1, 207 S.W.3d 458 (2005) (holding t hat “he i r s a t l aw” were t hose beneficiaries e nt it led to
recovery under the w r ongful deat h st at ut e. Where t here is no p ersonal represent at ive t o bring

a wrongful-deat h act ion, all st at u tory beneficiaries m ust be joined as plaint iffs t o t he act ion.).
H ere, Henson specifically pleaded t hat she had been appoint ed t he adm i nist rat rix of t he est at e,

t h us she w as required to bring her wrongful de a t h a c t i o n in t he nam e of the personal represent at ive of the est at e. Therefore, based on t he r eco r d a n d t h e com plaint , and giving effect t o t he subst ance of the pleading rat her than t he form , H enson sued as t he adm inist rat rix of t he est at e. See Fort Smith Symph ony O rch estra, Inc. v. Fort Smith Symph ony Association, Inc. , 285 A rk. 284, 686 S.W.2d 4 18 (1985), (“Pleadings shall be liberally const rued so t hat effect
is given Court s should not be guided b lindly by t it les but should l ook t o t he subst ance of

m ot ions to ascert ain w h at they seek. It w ould not be i n t he int e r est of just ice and fair play to be blindly guided by t he t i t le of a m ot i on o r pleading. We cont inue t o abide by t he well-est ablished rule t hat a pleading will not be j udged ent irely by what it is labeled but also b y w h at it cont ains.”) Finally, even assum ing the m ajorit y i s correct in it s assessm e n t t h a t
H enson int ended t o sue on her own behalf as heir, she could not , because t he w rongful deat h

st at ut e requires every act ion be brought by the personal represent at ive of t he e st at e. Only if

t h ere i s no personal represent at ive can a wrongful deat h act ion be m aint ained by t h e heirs at law. I n sum , whet her H enson int ended t o sue as an adm inist rat rix or a st at ut ory beneficiary,

t h e com plaint m ust be dism issed wit h prejudice.

8In Davenport v. Lee , 348 Ark. 148, 72 S.W.3d 85 (2002), we addressed t h e i ssue of t wo

nonlawyer adm inist rat ors of an est at e filing a p ro se com plaint on behalf o f an est at e in a wrongful-deat h act ion. The st at u te of lim it at ions e x pired on February 11, 1999. On May 28, 1999, t he adm inist rat or’s at t orney filed an ent ry of appearance, as w ell as a pleading ent it led “Addendum t o Com p laint

. ” The addendum claim ed t o change t he st yle of t he case t o reflect

t h e addit ion of anot her defendant and was t he first pl e a d i n g s igned by an at t orney in t he

act ion. Thereaft er, the circuit court dism issed the com plaint wit h prejudice aft er det erm ining

t h at the nonlawyer adm inist rat ors could not have filed a valid com plaint

. The adm inist rat ors appealed and we held t hat t he adm inist rat ors were n ot a u t horized t o file t he com plaint , affirm e d t he circuit court , and held t hat the adm inist rat ors’ pro se com p laint was t he “fruit of

t h e unaut horized pract ice of law and t hus a legal nullit y.” We explained as follows:

An adm inist r at or act ing on behalf of an e s tat e does so in a fiduciary capacit y. Ark ansas B ar Ass’ n v. Union Nat’ l B ank , 224 Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d 408 (1954). At issue in t hat case was whet her a bank act ing as t he personal represent at ive of an est at e had engaged i n t h e unaut h orized pract ice of law. T his c ourt concluded t hat “a p erson who is not a licensed at t orney and who is act ing as an adm inist rat or, execut o r or guardian cannot prac t i c e law in m at t ers relat i ng t o his t r ust eeship on the theory t hat he is pract icing for h i m self.” Id

. at 51–52, 273 S .W.2d at 410. In reaching t h is conclusion, t h e court not ed t hat a t rust ee o r personal represent at ive i s not act ing for him self and in connect ion wit h his o w n affairs, but t o t he cont rary i s act ing for ot hers who would ordinarily be t he beneficiaries. This court furt her discussed t he nat ure of t h e adm inist rat or’s role in B rewer v. Lacefield , 3 01 Ark. 358, 784 S.W.2d 156 (1990), and st at ed t h at an adm inist rat or act s only as a “t rust ee of conduit .” Id. at 362, 784 S .W.2d at 158 (cit i ng Duk e s v. Duk es , 233 Ark. 850, 853, 349 S.W.2d 339, 341 (1961); Ark. Code Ann. § 1 6

– 6 2

– 1 02(f) (1987)). This court furt her explained t hat proceeds from a wrongful-deat h act ion are for t h e sole benefit of t he st at ut ory beneficiaries and are held in t rust by t he adm inist rat or “for t h e benefit of t he widow and next of kin.” Doug las v. Holbert , 335 Ark. 305, 314, 983 S.W.2d 392, 396 (1998); see also B rewer , 3 01 Ark. 358, 784 S.W.2d 156. Thus, Appellant s as t he adm inist rat ors of Moore’s est at e were act ing on behalf of all t he heirs at law when t hey filed t his wrongful-deat h act ion.

9Davenport , 348 Ark. at 158–59, 7 2 S

. W

. 3 d a t 9 0–91; see also Jones ex rel. Jones v. Corr. Med.

Servs. , Inc. , 401 F.3d 9 50, 952 (8t h Cir. 2005) (The Eight h Circuit Court of Appeals affirm ed

t h e federal dist rict court ’ s dism issal of an act ion f iled by a nonlawyer adm i n ist rat or of an est at e

on behalf of a p risoner w h o had d i e d w h i l e incarcerat ed. “The d ist rict court dism issed, applying Arkansas l aw on survival act ions, which prohi b i t s ‘ a person who i s not a licensed

at t o rney and w ho is act ing as an adm inist r at or, execut or o r guardian [from ] pract ic[ing] law
in m at t ers relat ing t o his t r ust eeship on t he t heory t hat he i s pract icing for him self.” Davenport

v. Lee , 348 A rk. 1 48, 72 S.W.3d 85, 90 ( 2 0 0 2 ) , q u o t ing Ark ansas B ar Ass’ n v. Union Nat’ l
B ank of Little Rock , 224 Ark. 48, 2 73 S.W.2d 408, 410 (1954).

. . . Alt hough not bound by Arkansas law on t h e procedural quest ion of am endabilit y, t his court adopt s t he reasoning in Davenport

. Adrian Jones com m i t t e d t he unaut horized pract ice of l aw. B ecause ‘[p]rofessional

com p e t e n c e a n d p r ofessional responsibilit y are t he sine qua non of federal lit igat ion and effect ive judicial respons e , ’ t h e defect cannot be am ended.”); Ch ase v. City of Earle , No. 3:09CV00167, 2010 W L 1658610, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 21, 2010) (The federal d ist rict court dism issed an act ion filed b y a nonlawyer adm inist rat or on an est at e on behalf of a prisoner that died while incarcerat ed and held “[i]t is also im port ant t o not e t h at plaint iff filed t his act i on
pro se. Individuals who are not l icensed at t orneys can appear in t he court s and engage in t he pract ice o f law p r o v i d e d t hat t hey do so for t h em selves and in connect ion wit h t heir own business. Stewart v. Hall , 129 S.W.2d 238 (Ark.1939). When a no n
- l a w y e r at t em pt s to represent t he int erest s of o ther persons, the pract i ce c onst it ut e s t h e unaut h orized p ract ice of law and result s in a n ullit y. Jones , 401 F.3d at 952 (8t h Cir. 2005). Moreover, a lat er appoint ed

at t o rney cannot cure t he com plaint of it s original defect

. Davenport v. Lee , 3 48 Ark. 148, 155,

1072 S.W.3d 85, 88 (2002). This r u l e p r ot ect s t he court s int erest s i n e nsuring t h at part ies are

represent ed by people knowledgeable and t rained in t he law. Jones , 401 F.3d at 952.”)).
Furt her, the issue of what const it ut es t he unaut h orized pract ice of law was t h oroughly discussed by t his court in Ark ansas B ar Ass’ n , 224 Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d 408. We st at ed:
It h as been said in m any opinions t hat it is n ot possible t o g i v e a d e f i nit ion of what const it ut e s pract icing law that is sat isfact ory and a l l inclusive, and we m ake no such at t e m pt

. We do hold h o w e ver t hat when one appears before a c ourt of record for t he purpose of t ransac t i n g b u s i ness wit h t he court in connect ion wit h any pending lit igat ion or when any person seeks t o invoke the processes o f t he court in any m at t er pending b efore it , t hat person is engaging in t he pract ice of law. T o us t his conclusion is obvious. Court s are const it ut ed for t he purpose of int erpret ing and adm inist ering t he l a w s p a s sed by t he law m aking body and t he rules announced b y t he judiciary, a n d t h ey m ust necessarily be governed in t heir operat i on by rules of procedure. At t orneys are officers of t he court and are able b y special training and pract ice t o know t he law and rules of procedure, and are t hereby in posit ion t o render a service t o t h e c ourt

. Therefore anyone who assum es t he role of assist ing t he court in it s process or invokes t h e use of it s m echanism is considered t o be engaged in t he pract ice of law. Id . at 53, 273 S.W.2d at 411.
Wit h t hese st andards in m i nd, and reviewing H enson’s filings, it is clear t hat H enson invoked the processes of t he court when she filed her com plaint

. B ased o n t h e law discussed above, H enson’s act ions c onst i t ut ed an u naut horized pract ic e of law, and her original

com p laint is t herefore a nullit y. Alt hough t he m ajorit y st at es t hat I have “put the cart before

t h e horse,” t his is sim ply ina c c u r a t e
. The m ajorit y need not reach t h e finalit y of t he order because t he com plaint i s a n ullit y, void and of no effect and t h e c ircuit court ’s order t herefore properly dism issed t he m at t e r. Therefore, it is not necessary t o reach t he majorit y’s finalit y analysis because a valid com plaint was not filed wit hin t he st at ut e of lim it at ions. See Preston

v. Univ. of Ark

. for Med. Sciences , 354 Ark. 666, 128 S.W.3d 430 (2003) cit ing Davenport , supra (The dism issal was p r operly ent ered wit h p r e j udice because t he Prest ons’s com plaint was a
11nullit y, and by t he t im e it was dism issed, t he st at ut e of lim it at ions on t he m edical m alpract ice

had run, precluding t he filing of a new com plaint .) Finally, I m ust not e t h at despit e t he circuit c ourt ’s flawed reasoning, the circuit court reached t he correct result

. The issue p resent ed seeks a det erm inat i o n of t he correct st at ut e of lim it at ions—t wo years or t hree years. The record dem onst rat es t h at David H enson died

on Oct ober 7, 2012; t herefore, t he st at ut e of lim it at ions ran eit her on Oct ober 7, 2014, or on Oct ober 7, 2015. H o w ever, w h et her t he st at ut e of lim i tat ions was t wo years or t hree years is not i m port ant , because under e it her scenario H enson’s com plaint was not t im ely filed. On
Oct ober 5, 2015, Henson filed h er pro se com plaint on behalf of the est at e. On Novem ber 16, 2015, on b e half of H e n s o n , H enson’s lawyer filed an am ended com plaint

. H owever, because H enson’s original c om plaint m ust be treat ed as a nullit y, her am ended com plaint was

not t im ely; t herefore, t he c ircuit court lacked jurisdict ion. Sim ply p ut , t he f iling of a pro se

com p laint const it ut ed t he unaut horized pract i ce of law; t hus, rendered t he c om plaint a nullit y. Addit ionally, as discussed above, even if H enson were able t o file t he com plaint as a st at ut ory benef i ci a r y a s t he m ajorit y suggest s, all st at ut ory beneficiaries m ust be joined as plaint iffs to

t h e act ion, or t he com plaint is also a nullit y, and Henson did not com ply wit h t his m andat ory requirem ent

. 1 T herefore, because no valid com plaint w as filed prior t o t he expirat ion of t he

1 Here, if Henson had filed suit as a st at ut ory beneficiary pursuant t o Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-102 (b), H enson was required t o join the st at ut ory beneficiaries because “every act i on shall be brought by and in t he nam e of t he p ersonal represent at ive of t he deceased person. I f t h ere is no personal represent at ive, t hen t he act i o n shall be brought by t he heirs at l aw of t he deceased person.” The requirem ent t hat a w rongful-deat h suit m ust join all of t he st at ut ory beneficiaries as part ies is a m andat o r y r equirem ent

. In Ramirez v. W h ite Cty. Circuit Court , 343 Ark. 372, 381, 38 S.W.3d 298, 303 (2001) we explained, “t he language of A rk. Code Ann. § 16–62–102(b) is c lear and unam biguous. If t here is no personal represent at ive of t he deceased person, then the act ion shall be b rought by all t he heirs at law of the d eceased.

. . . 12t w o-year or t hree-year l im it at ions period, H enson was t im e-barred from b ringing suit against

Cradduck. In sum , a n o nexist e nt com plaint cannot be c orrect ed or salvaged, t he c ircuit court did not have jurisdict ion, and t herefore, it correct l y dism issed t he com plaint wit h prejudice. See Hack elton v. Malloy , 364 Ark. 469, 474, 221 S.W.3d 353, 357 (2006). Therefore, as discussed above, because the circuit court reached t he right r esult albeit for t he wrong reason, I would affirm t he circuitcourt ’s dism issal wit h prejudice.
G O O D S O N and H A R T , JJ., join in t his opinion.
Morris W

. Th o m p s o n Law Firm, P. A

. , by: M orris W

. Th ompson ; and B r

ett D. W atson, Attorney at Law, PLLC , by: B rett D. W atson , for appellant

. Rainwater, Holt &

Sexton , by: Jason E

. O wens , for appellees.

The W rongful Deat h St at ut e, A rk. C o d e Ann. § 16–62–102(b), requires t he act ion be brought by all of t he heirs at law.” “This rule dat es back t o t his court ’s decision in McB r ide v. B erman , 7 9 A r k

. 62, 94 S.W. 913 (1906). There, t he court st at ed, ‘[t ]hat i n default of a personal represent at ive an act ion brought under Lord Cam pbell’s Act must m ake the widow (if t here b e o ne) and t he heirs at law part ies t heret o.’ Id. at 65, 94 S.W. at 914.” Davenport , 348 Ark. at 160, 72 S.W.3d 85 at 91.

13