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HONORING AMERICAN MILITARY AVIATION THROUGH FLIGHT, EXHIBITION & 

REMEMBRANCE

PETITION FOR LHFE EXEMPTION 

September 21, 2016 

The Commemorative Air Force (CAF) is requesting an exemption from §§ 91.9, 91.315, 

91.319(a), 119.5(g), and 119.21(a) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) to allow 

CAF to operate certain aircraft for the purpose of carrying passengers for compensation or hire 

under the Living History Flight Experience (LHFE) program IAW FAA policy posted on 

07/21/2015 ID: FAA-2015-0517-0001.

Operating aircraft under the LHFE program has been accepted by the FAA as in the public 

interest for nearly 20 years and is reaffirmed in the July, 2015 policy. This petition for an 

exemption under the new policy explains how our policies and procedures meet the specific 

criteria of the new LHFE program, which provides the required Safety Risk Management (SRM) 

and Equal Level of Safety (ELoS).

David Oliver

V.P. of Safety, Operations, & Maintenance

Commemorative Air Force

214-330-1700 ext.127

Cell: 630-853-9624

doliver@cafhq.org
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A. Aircraft Requested for the Exemption 

We are currently operating under LHFE exemption 6802M which is valid until November 

2017. The reason we are submitting this request under the new policy is we want to add 

back our T-33 N9124Z (which was left off our renewal request [around 2007?] when it 

was in static status and TBM N53503 which was removed from our exemption when a 

pilot raised the gear on the ground resulting in an accident (March, 2014); it has 

returned to service. Additionally, we want to add TBM N40402 which has returned to 

service after extensive restoration.

This request does not include thee aircraft currently in our exemption which have 

standard category counterparts: PT-17 N1387V, C-46 N53594 and C-45 N4207. We have 

also removed A-26 N626SH which is in restoration.

The aircraft in the following table were U.S. operated, are no longer in military service

and their original type designs are more than 50 years old. The number of each model 

produced/put into service are shown in the table, as are the number of aircraft 

registered in the US. They represent very small percentages of the numbers produced 

and therefore meet the criteria for fragility. The only one of these aircraft models with 

examples registered in the standard category is the T-28A (see note below the table).

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Number Model # In 6802M

Inspection 

Type Category # Produced

# Registered 

US

% 

Remaining

240P A-26 x AAIP LIMITED 2,452 29 1%

9682C A-26 x AAIP LIMITED 2,452 29 1%

7227C B-17 x AAIP LIMITED 12,731 19 <1%

9323Z B-17 x AAIP LIMITED 12,731 19 <1%

24927 B-24/LB30 x AAIP EXPER 19,256 3 <1%

125AZ B-25 x Annual LIMITED 9,816 86 <1%

25YR B-25 x AAIP LIMITED 9,816 86 <1%

27493 B-25 x AAIP LIMITED 9,816 86 <1%

345TH B-25 x AAIP LIMITED 9,816 86 <1%

5865V B-25 x Annual LIMITED 9,816 86 <1%

9643C B-25 x AAIP LIMITED 9,816 86 <1%

529B B-29 x AAIP EXPER 3,970 3 <1%

10601 P-51 x Annual LIMITED 15,000 159 1%

44727 P-51 x Condition LIMITED 15,000 159 1%

5428V P-51 x Condition LIMITED 15,000 159 1%

61429 P-51C x Annual LIMITED 15,000 159 1%

92879 SB2C x AAIP EXPER 7,140 1 <1%

82GA SBD x Annual LIMITED 5,936 4 <1%

70743 T-28A x Condition EXPER 1,194 79 6.60%

9124Z T-33 Condition EXPER 6,557 68 1%

40402 TBM-3 Annual LIMITED 9,839 50 <1%
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5264V TBM-3 x AAIP LIMITED 9,839 50 <1%

53503 TBM-3 AAIP LIMITED 9,839 50 <1%

Sources:

Number Produced: Wikipedia

Number US Registered: http://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/acftref_inquiry.aspx

NOTE on T-28A:

The policy specifically uses it as an example of aircraft which will not be considered, 

because the model achieved certification as a standard aircraft. We are requesting reconsideration of the T-28A for these reasons: 1. There are only 79 of these in the FAA 

registration data base; 45 are registered as experimental, 13 are restricted and 16 are 

shown as unknown. Only 5 are registered as standard category. 2. There were 1,194 “A” 

models built, so only 7% remain registered in the US and only 6% of those are registered 

standard category. 3. There is no established path for converting the experimental T28As to standard category. 4. The aircraft is fragile 5. The aircraft were not standard 

category converted too experimental (which we agree should not be permitted) 6. 

Limiting the public’s opportunity to “experience” the T-28A in the only 5 aircraft 

converted from their original design seems contrary to the purpose of the program 

when the original configurations can meet the standards of the new policy.

B. Responsible Person and Operational Control Structure

The responsible person for the CAF is the Vice President for Safety, Operations and 

Maintenance (hereafter referred to as the VP) David Oliver, 214-330-1700 ext.127 

doliver@cafhq.org, who reports directly to the President/CEO. The HQ staff in the 

Operations Department includes a Director of Operations, Director of 

Maintenance/Quality Assurance (Vacant), Designated Employer Representative (for 

91.147 Drug and Alcohol program), Operations Office Manager, Director of Flight Safety 

(volunteer) and a Director of Industrial and Ground Safety (volunteer). The 

Organizational structure of the CAF, its subordinate corporations and the responsibilities 

of the staff are defined in CAF Regulation 21-1.

The Chain of Command in the CAF is similar to the military because we have 165 

airplanes operated by 60 units located in 26 states. Each of our units have elected staff 

officers and three of these are the Operations Officers, Maintenance Officers and the 

Safety Officers. These unit officers work directly with their counterparts in the HQ

Operations Department. The qualifications and duties for these unit officers (and the 

additional management positions) are defined in the CAF Unit Manual, Section 2.

Our FSDO for the organization is the North Texas FSDO.
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C. Safety and Risk Management

Use of SRM Principles: The Commemorative Air Force Safety Program was built upon 

the pillars of Safety Management Systems (SMS), before SMS became the standard for 

aviation safety programs. SMS models have matured with significant tools to improve 

management of risk as an ongoing business objective. However, most were created for 

organizations of significant size with full time employees and require a lot of paperwork 

which provide little benefit in our organization. We are operating with common 

structures and standards of Aviation Safety Management Systems, but have not 

restructured our programs just to make them look like one of the models. Our “Safety 

Management System Guide # 11” is a simple explanation of our safety program history 

and how our regulations and manuals functions as a safety system. During the annual 

training required for all of our pilots, mechanics and helpers it is explained how their 

specific regulations and manuals tie into the SMS. This enforces the concept of how all 

of our policies and procedures tie together for the overarching effect of risk reduction. 

Mitigation Process: The identification of risk happens in the field; mitigation and 

reporting are handled in various ways. The members most frequently work with their 

Unit Safety Officers, Operations Officers and Unit Leaders and solve things on the spot. 

However, we do have an anonymous process (Safety Reporting System Guide #4) to 

elevate things directly to the VP if the member feels it is necessary. The fortunate thing 

about our culture is, members and unit officers are totally comfortable calling on the 

phone, sending a quick email to the VP to report issues they can’t handle at their level, 

or are of a nature other units should be made aware of.

Risk elevated to the HQ are evaluated by the VP, the CAF Staff and Ad Hoc Safety 

Committees. Mitigations are implemented specifically to the risk, or are incorporated 

into CAF policies and procedures if the risk is recurring, or wide spread. 

All aircraft accidents and incidents are reported to HQ. The VP, or the Director of 

Operations will proceed to all major accidents and if there is an NTSB field investigation, 

they will be Party to the investigation. The lead investigators have always allowed us to 

release information to our units for prevention many months before a probable cause is 

established by the Board. 

For accidents involving pilot error, the Standardization and Evaluation Committee is part 

of the process to consider sanctions, re-training of the pilot or if our policies and 

procedures need to be changed.
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D. Manuals System

The Safety, Operations and Maintenance manuals and documents have evolved over 

many years and have proven to be appropriate for our organization of volunteers in the 

field (where the aircraft operations and maintenance occur). The individual documents 

are designed for easy use according to the subject area, but as a whole, constitute the 

“Policies and Procedures” as the third element of the Risk Management Pillars in our 

SMS.

Regulations and Manuals:

- CAFR 55-7 Procedures for Air show and Event Approvals

- CAFR 60-1 Procedures for Flight Operations (General Operations Manual)

- CAFR 60-3 Drug and Alcohol policy

- CAFR 66-1 Aircraft Maintenance Policies and Procedures

- Marshaller’s Training Manual

NOTE: Training requirements for crews are in CAFR 60-1 and for Maintenance in 

CAFR 66-1

Guides:

- CAF Safety Management System (Guide # 11)

- CAF Anonymous Flight Safety/Ground Hazard Reporting (Guide # 4)

- Safety for CAF Pyro Units

- Ground Safety Guide

E. Other Considerations

We are not requesting additional considerations.