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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 35436

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SCOTT ERICKSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2010 Opinion No. 14

Filed: March 1, 2010

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Bear 

Lake County. Hon. David C. Nye, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for two counts of sexual abuse of a child, vacated, and 

case remanded for new trial.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Heather M. Carlson, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Heather M. Carlson argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Rebekah A. Cudé, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Rebekah A. Cudé argued.

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LANSING, Chief Judge

A jury found Scott Erickson guilty of two counts of sexual abuse of a child. Erickson 

appeals from the judgment of conviction, asserting numerous instances of prosecutorial 

misconduct during trial. He also argues that the district court erred in holding that the State did 

not make discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to exclude male jurors and erred in 

admitting improper character evidence. Erickson asserts that these errors individually and 

cumulatively deprived him of his right to a fair trial. 

I.

BACKGROUND

Erickson was charged with three counts of lewd conduct with a minor child under 

sixteen, Idaho Code § 18-1508, based upon allegations of sexual conduct with his stepdaughter, 

L.H., and his biological daughter, C.E., when each was about ten years old. A jury found him 
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guilty of two counts of the lesser offense of sexual abuse of a minor, I.C. § 18-1506, and not 

guilty of the third count. Erickson contends on appeal that many errors, some objected to and 

some not, were made during his trial, including multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct, 

errors in the admission of evidence, and the allowance of gender discrimination through the 

State‟s use of peremptory challenges to prospective jurors. 

II.

ANALYSIS

A. Error in Admitting Evidence of Nonpayment of Child Support

Erickson first contends that the district court erroneously admitted evidence that he was 

not paying child support after separation from his estranged wife, Tammy. Erickson called 

Tammy to testify regarding the volatility of their separation in an effort to support his defense 

that the children‟s allegations against him were prompted by Tammy or were otherwise simply a 

result of this very tempestuous relationship. Some of the testimony centered around a dispute 

between Erickson and Tammy over who should have possession of a truck. The evidence 

showed that Tammy took the truck from the residence of Erickson‟s parents, after which 

Erickson retrieved the truck with the assistance of a sheriff‟s deputy. On rebuttal, the State 

called Tammy as a witness and asked her to explain the circumstances of her taking the truck. 

The prosecutor asked, “Now at that time were you getting any child support?” Erickson objected 

that this called for improper character evidence. The prosecutor responded that he was just 

trying to show Tammy‟s “desperate need for a vehicle.” The court overruled the objection, and 

Tammy responded that she was not receiving any child support. Erickson argues that the 

admission of this evidence was error. 

We agree that this evidence should have been excluded because it was not relevant to any 

issue in the case. To be relevant, evidence must have a “tendency to make the existence of any 

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than 

it would be without the evidence.” Idaho Rule of Evidence 401. Whether evidence is relevant is 

a question of law that we freely review. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228, 178 P.3d 28, 32 

(2008). Whether Erickson was paying child support has no relevance to whether he committed 

the charged crimes. Even if Tammy‟s state of poverty had some marginal relevance to explain 

why she took the truck--a matter that was placed in evidence by Erickson--the testimony in 
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question did not indicate that she was impoverished; it merely indicated that she had no income 

from Erickson. The district court erred by admitting this evidence.

B. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Erickson claims there were numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct in the 

opening statement, closing argument, and evidentiary stages of his trial. Because we conclude 

that at least three of these claims are meritorious and, along with the evidentiary error discussed 

in Section A above, cumulatively constitute reversible error, we do not address the remaining 

instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. 

The Idaho Supreme Court recently discussed the responsibility of prosecutors and the 

standard of review applied to appellate claims of prosecutorial misconduct:

As public officers, prosecutors have a duty to ensure that defendants 

receive fair trials. State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44, 71 P. 608, 610-11 (1903). In 

carrying out this duty, a prosecutor must “guard against anything that would 

prejudice the minds of the jurors, and tend to hinder them from considering only 

the evidence introduced.” Id. at 44, 71 P. at 611. A prosecutor must also ensure 

that the jury receives only competent evidence. State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 

463, 469, 163 P.3d 1175, 1181 (2007). Under certain circumstances, a 

prosecutor‟s failure to fulfill these duties will result in reversal of the defendant‟s 

conviction. Id.

On appeal, the standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial 

misconduct depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial. 

As a general rule, we will not consider arguments made for the first time on 

appeal. State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 503, 616 P.2d 1034, 1039 (1980). When 

the alleged error constitutes a fundamental error, however, review on appeal is 

permissible. State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 251, 486 P.2d 260, 262 (1971). 

Accordingly, when an objection to prosecutorial misconduct is not raised at trial, 

the misconduct will serve as a basis for setting aside a conviction only when the 

“conduct is sufficiently egregious to result in fundamental error.” State v. Porter, 

130 Idaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997). Misconduct will be regarded as 

fundamental error when it “goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant‟s rights 

or . . . to the foundation of the case or take[s] from the defendant a right which 

was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to 

waive.” State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 423, 776 P.2d 424, 432 (1989) 

(quoting State v. Garcia, 46 N.M. 302, 128 P.2d 459, 462 (1942)). “However, 

even when prosecutorial misconduct has resulted in fundamental error, the 

conviction will not be reversed when that error is harmless.” State v. Field, 144 

Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007). Under the harmless error doctrine, a 

conviction will stand if the Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

same result would have been reached by the jury had the prosecutorial misconduct 

not occurred. State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 844, 655 P.2d 46, 51 (1982). 
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Conversely, when an objection to alleged prosecutorial misconduct is 

raised at trial, we use a two-part test to determine whether the misconduct requires 

reversal. See, e.g., State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 448, 816 P.2d 1002, 1005 

(Ct. App. 1991). First, we ask whether the prosecutor‟s challenged action was 

improper. State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 202, 75 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Ct. 

App. 2003). If it was not, then there was no prosecutorial misconduct. Id. If the 

conduct was improper, we then consider whether the misconduct “prejudiced the 

defendant‟s right to a fair trial or whether it was harmless.” Id. The defendant 

carries the burden of proving prejudice. State v. Wright, 97 Idaho 229, 232, 542 

P.2d 63, 66 (1975). When a defendant is unable to demonstrate prejudice, the 

misconduct will be regarded as harmless error. State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 

111, 594 P.2d 146, 149 (1979).

State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715-16, 215 P.3d 414, 435-36 (2009).

1. Questioning witness in violation of a prior district court ruling

Before trial, Erickson sought to exclude any evidence of his history of drug use. The 

district court held that any evidence pertaining to Erickson‟s use or possession of illegal drugs

could not be presented to the jury unless the court permitted it after conducting a hearing outside 

the jury‟s presence. During trial, Erickson called his father, Glade Erickson (Glade), to testify 

about the strained relationship between Erickson and Tammy as a possible motive for the victims 

to fabricate their allegations of lewd conduct. Glade testified to the incident where Tammy took 

the truck from Glade‟s house. Glade said that later, after Erickson was arrested on the lewd 

conduct charges, Glade told Tammy that she could come and get the truck. On crossexamination, the prosecutor asked whether Glade knew if there were any illegal substances 

found in that vehicle. Before Glade answered, Erickson objected and, after the jury was excused, 

the prosecutor explained he was presenting the testimony to support his theory that Erickson and 

his family turned over the truck with drugs in it in order to frame Tammy for possession of the 

drugs. The court sustained Erickson‟s objection to this evidence, but no jury instruction to 

disregard the question was asked for or given. Erickson argues on appeal that the question itself 

amounted to prosecutorial misconduct because it violated the prior district court ruling.

We agree. Violation of a district court order governing the presentation of evidence may 

constitute misconduct. Field, 144 Idaho at 572, 165 P.3d at 286; State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 

521, 525, 37 P.3d 18, 22 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587, 594-97, 903 P.2d 

752, 759-62 (Ct. App. 1995). Misconduct may also occur through the interjection of 

inadmissible evidence into a trial by phrasing a question in a manner that allows the jury to infer 
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what the answer would have been. In State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469, 163 P.3d 1175, 

1181 (2007), our Supreme Court said:

We long ago held, “It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant has a 

fair trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to the jury.” State 

v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 44, 71 P. 608, 611 (1903). They should not “exert their skill 

and ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, [because] 

generally in so doing they transgress upon the rights of the accused.” Id. 

Prosecutorial misconduct includes asking questions where the answer is 

inadmissible, but the jury can infer what the answer would have been simply from 

the questioned [sic] asked. Id.

Although Erickson‟s objection to the prosecutor‟s question was sustained, the question itself 

informed the jury that drugs were found in Erickson‟s vehicle. This evidence of drug possession 

was highly prejudicial and irrelevant to the charges that were being tried against Erickson, and 

was therefore inadmissible under Idaho Rules of Evidence 402, 403 and 404(b). 

We are not persuaded by the State‟s argument that the prosecutor‟s question did not 

directly imply that Erickson used or possessed drugs or that there was no prosecutorial intent to 

create that impression. The jury very likely would infer that the drugs belonged to Erickson. 

Moreover, even the prosecutor‟s claimed purpose for introducing the evidence--ascribing to 

Erickson or his father the misconduct of trying to frame Tammy--appears to be irrelevant to the 

issues at trial. Whatever the prosecutor‟s intent, it was misconduct for him to violate the court‟s 

pretrial order concerning this evidence. 

2. Fifth Amendment violation

Erickson alleges the prosecutor‟s elicitation of testimony that Erickson refused to be 

interviewed regarding the investigation was misconduct amounting to fundamental error. At 

trial, Erickson presented testimony from Detective Toni Vollmer that the alleged victims had 

initially made some false statements to investigators and that the victims‟ descriptions of 

Erickson‟s misconduct given to the detective differed from their trial testimony. On crossexamination, the prosecutor asked Detective Vollmer whether she had ever attempted to 

interview Erickson concerning the girls‟ allegations and whether Erickson cooperated with those 

attempts. She testified that she telephoned Erickson twice, but he refused to be interviewed. The 

prosecutor also asked whether soliciting an accused‟s side of the story is a typical investigative 

technique. The prosecutor did not refer to this testimony in closing arguments, and did not ask 

any other follow up questions that would indicate a purpose for eliciting this information. 

Although Erickson made no objection to this line of inquiry at trial, he now argues that the 
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prosecutor violated his right against self-incrimination by informing the jury that Erickson 

declined to talk to investigators about the charges. Because this issue was not preserved by 

objection below, we review it only for fundamental error. 

The State may not use evidence of a defendant‟s refusal to speak with law enforcement 

authorities--an exercise of the defendant‟s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent--to raise an 

inference of the defendant‟s guilt. State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 820-21, 965 P.2d 174, 180-81 

(1998); State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 701, 132 P.3d 455, 458 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. 

Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 677, 67 P.3d 1283, 1289 (Ct. App. 2003). A prosecutor‟s violation of 

this constitutional prohibition constitutes fundamental error. Id. at 678, 67 P.3d at 1290. A 

defendant who has testified at trial may be impeached, however, with evidence of his or her 

silence before receiving Miranda warnings. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 628 (1993);

Moore, 131 Idaho at 820, 965 P.2d at 180; State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 577, 114 P.3d 133, 135 

(Ct. App. 2005). 

In this case, the evidence of Erickson‟s refusal to speak with police was not offered for 

impeachment purposes, for Erickson did not testify. Its only use was for the impermissible 

purpose of implying that Erickson‟s non-cooperation evidenced his guilt. The prosecutor‟s effort 

to cloak this evidence as an inquiry into standard investigative practices is of no avail, for the 

nature of standard investigative techniques was of no relevance in Erickson‟s trial. The 

elicitation of evidence that Erickson exercised his right to remain silent is a clear constitutional 

violation. Indeed, the State on appeal does not dispute that this was fundamental error; it argues 

only that the error was harmless, a matter that we discuss in Section C below. 

3. Misconduct in closing argument

We next consider Erickson‟s argument that the prosecutor committed misconduct 

amounting to fundamental error in closing argument when he urged the jury to apply a 

diminished burden of proof. Closing argument is an opportunity for the attorneys on each side to 

clarify the issues that must be resolved by the jury; to review the evidence and discuss, from the 

parties‟ respective standpoints, the inferences that jurors should draw therefrom; and to discuss 

the law set forth in the jury instructions as it applies to the trial evidence. State v. Beebe, 145 

Idaho 570, 576, 181 P.3d 496, 502 (Ct. App. 2007). “Urgings, explicit or implied, for the jury to 

render a verdict based on factors other than the evidence admitted at trial and the law contained 

in the jury instructions have no place in closing arguments.” Id. Misconduct may occur by the 
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prosecutor diminishing or distorting the State‟s burden to prove the defendant‟s guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769, 864 P.2d 596, 607 (1993); State v. 

Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007). 

The requirement that the State prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

is grounded in the constitutional guarantee of due process. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

309 (1979); State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 942, 188 P.3d 867, 884 (2008); State v. Crowe, 135 

Idaho 43, 47, 13 P.3d 1256, 1260 (Ct. App. 2000). This standard of proof “plays a vital role in 

the American scheme of criminal procedure” because it “provides concrete substance for the 

presumption of innocence--that bedrock „axiomatic and elementary‟ principle whose 

„enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.‟” In re Winship, 

397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)). It follows 

that a misstatement to a jury of the State‟s burden rises to the level of fundamental error because 

it goes to the foundation of the case and would take away from a defendant a right essential to 

his or her defense. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho at 769, 864 P.2d at 607. 

In the present case, near the conclusion of his rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor 

made the following statements: 

You set the standard for law enforcement. We look at these cases very carefully. 

What is the standard in Bear Lake County by a jury on what they’re going to 

accept as proof of child molestation? That’s all it’s about.

And if you‟re saying Mr. Helm, [L.H.], [C.E.], Officer Martinez, it‟s just 

not there, I‟ve got to have more than this, we understand that, but there is also a 

downside to it. I can’t bring you the perfect case. There will always be the 

possibility there. I bring you two people molested by their father at pretty much 

the same age. One gives credibility to the other. One collaborates [sic] the other. 

The pattern is similar. You as a juror are saying I don‟t believe either one of them.

Ladies and gentlemen, I tell you this is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Justice demands that this father, this defendant, be convicted. 

Erickson correctly asserts that the italicized portions of this argument were improper because 

they misrepresented and diminished the State‟s burden of proof. In suggesting that the jury 

should “set the standard” for the prosecutor and law enforcement in Bear Lake County “on what 

[a jury is] going to accept as proof of child molestation,” the prosecutor invited the jury to create 

its own standard of proof instead of applying the reasonable doubt standard stated in its jury 

instructions. Then by stating “there is a downside” to finding the defendant not guilty because 

the prosecutor could never bring a “perfect case” for child molestation crimes, the prosecutor 

implied that the jury should find the evidence in Erickson‟s case sufficient to convict because it 
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was the best the prosecutor could do. It also implied that if the jury did not convict in this case,

the standard would be such that no one accused of this type of offense could be convicted. 

Because misstating the burden of proof deprives the defendant of a right essential to his defense 

and goes to the foundation of the case, this was fundamental error.

C. Harmless Error Analysis

We have found trial court error in admitting evidence of Erickson‟s nonpayment of child 

support, prosecutorial misconduct in the prosecutor‟s violation of a pretrial order by questioning 

a witness about the presence of drugs in Erickson‟s truck, misconduct amounting to fundamental 

error in the elicitation of evidence that Erickson declined to speak to a detective, and 

fundamental error in the prosecutor‟s mischaracterization of the burden of proof during closing 

argument. The next question is whether these errors require reversal of Erickson‟s conviction or 

whether they are harmless. 

Error will be deemed harmless if the appellate court can conclude, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that the result of the trial would have been the same absent the error. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 

at 230, 178 P.3d at 33; Phillips, 144 Idaho at 88, 156 P.3d at 589; State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359, 

368, 972 P.2d 737, 746 (Ct. App. 1998). We need not determine whether each of the identified 

errors, standing alone, would have been harmless because an accumulation of irregularities, each 

of which might be harmless in itself, may in the aggregate reveal the absence of a fair trial in 

contravention of the defendant‟s right to due process. See State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 568, 

199 P.3d 123, 143 (2008); Moore, 131 Idaho at 823, 965 P.2d at 183; State v. Timmons, 145 

Idaho 279, 292, 178 P.3d 644, 657 (Ct. App. 2007). 

In this case, we have little difficulty in concluding that the evidentiary error and the 

prosecutor‟s misconduct cumulatively prejudiced Erickson and necessitate a new trial. Although 

the trial court sustained Erickson‟s objection to a question about the discovery of drugs in his 

truck, the question itself conveyed to the jury very negative but irrelevant information about 

Erickson. The admission of evidence that Erickson had not been paying child support likewise 

impugned Erickson on a subject irrelevant to the case. By presenting evidence that Erickson 

chose not to speak with police, the prosecutor also improperly permitted the jury to infer 

evidence of guilt from Erickson‟s exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. 

Finally, the prosecutor‟s distortion of the State‟s burden of proof in closing argument is highly 

prejudicial. The State‟s evidence at trial, while certainly sufficient to support a finding of guilt, 
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was not overwhelming. The principal evidence against Erickson was the testimony of the two 

alleged victims, both of whom had initially given statements to police that were inconsistent with 

their trial testimony. The charged offenses were reported to authorities during a time when there 

was a highly antagonistic relationship between Erickson and the mother of the alleged victims. 

On this record, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the outcome of the trial would 

have been the same absent the trial errors and prosecutorial misconduct that occurred. Therefore, 

Erickson must be afforded a new trial.

D. Peremptory Challenges to Jurors

For guidance on remand, we will address one additional claim of error asserted by 

Erickson in this appeal--that the prosecutor impermissibly used peremptory challenges to 

exclude males from the jury panel. 

During juror voir dire, the State exercised nine peremptory challenges, using all of them 

to exclude male jurors. Erickson objected that this constituted impermissible gender 

discrimination, and he subsequently moved for a mistrial on this basis. The prosecutor 

responded that it exercised its peremptory challenges with the intent to empanel parents and 

grandparents, regardless of gender. It was only coincidence, the prosecutor said, that those who 

did not fit into either of those categories happened to be male. The trial court then overruled 

Erickson‟s objection. The court reasoned that: (a) because the jury was composed of seven men 

and six women, it was not a discriminatory panel, and (b) because white men are not a protected 

class, their exclusion was permissible. Erickson asserts that the trial court erred in its reasoning 

and that the State did not demonstrate a gender-neutral use of its peremptory challenges. 

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that 

discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to exclude persons from jury service on account of 

their race is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 

85. In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 141-42 (1994), the Court extended this 

application of the Equal Protection Clause to challenges that discriminate on the basis of gender. 

Not only the litigants, but the jurors themselves have a right to a nondiscriminatory jury selection 

process, and “this right extends to both men and women.” Id. at 141.

To establish a Batson violation, a defendant must first make a prima facie showing of 

purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98; State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 87, 856 

P.2d 872, 877 (1993). The burden then shifts to the State to produce a race-neutral or gender-
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neutral explanation, related to the case to be tried, for challenging the prospective juror. Batson, 

476 U.S. at 97-98; see also Araiza, 124 Idaho at 87, 856 P.2d at 877. It is not enough for the

prosecutor to represent that he or she did not exercise its challenges on an impermissible basis; 

the State must provide a clear and reasonably specific explanation of legitimate reasons for 

exercising the challenges. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 98 n.20; Araiza, 124 Idaho at 87, 856 P.2d 

at 877. Where the defendant objects on the ground of gender discrimination, the State‟s 

explanation must be based on a juror characteristic other than gender, and it may not be merely 

pretextual. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 145. It is then for the trial court to determine whether the State‟s 

explanation has overcome the inference of purposeful discrimination established by the 

defendant‟s prima facie showing. Id. “In deciding if the defendant has carried his burden of 

persuasion, a court must undertake „a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct 

evidence of intent as may be available.‟” Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (quoting Arlington Heights v. 

Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)). A trial court‟s findings 

concerning the validity of the State‟s explanation for exercising the peremptory challenges is 

reviewed on appeal for clear error in light of the facts as a whole. Araiza, 124 Idaho at 87, 856 

P.2d at 877; State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 933, 935 P.2d 183, 196 (Ct. App. 1997). 

In this case, the trial court held that the defendant had not shown a prima facie case of 

purposeful discrimination because white men are not a protected class and because the jury 

empanelled was gender-balanced. The district court‟s reasoning was erroneous. The United 

States Supreme Court held in J.E.B. that the right to nondiscriminatory jury selection applies to 

males as well as females. Further, the correct query is whether the State engaged in purposeful 

discrimination, not whether it succeeded in obtaining an unbalanced panel. 

Erickson made a prima facie showing of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to 

exclude male jurors. The prosecutor then articulated a specific gender-neutral reason for its 

challenges--that it was trying to empanel parents and grandparents. Erickson argues, however, 

that the State‟s gender-neutral explanation is belied by the fact that two of the nine challenged 

jurors had children. Because the court rejected Erickson‟s Batson challenge for incorrect 

reasons, it did not go forward to determine whether the State‟s rationale for its peremptory 

challenges was plausible and legitimate or only a cover for an effort to minimize the number of 

males on the jury. If at a trial on remand a similar use of peremptory challenges is shown, it will 
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be up to the trial court to determine whether any gender-neutral explanation given by the 

prosecutor is legitimate or merely pretextual.

III. 

CONCLUSION

Due to prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous admission of evidence, the judgment of 

conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.

Judge GRATTON and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.