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S. Hrg. 113–783 

EVALUATING PORT SECURITY: PROGRESS MADE 

AND CHALLENGES AHEAD 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 4, 2014 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

GABRIELLE A. BATKIN. Staff Director 

JOHN P. KILVINGTON, Deputy Staff Director 

MARY BETH SCHULTZ, Chief Counsel 

JASON M. YANUSSI, Senior Professional Staff Member 

JASON T. BARNOSKY, Senior Professional Staff Member 

KEITH B. ASHDOWN, Minority Staff Director 

ANDREW C. DOCKHAM, Minority Chief Counsel 

PATRICK J. BAILEY, Minority Counsel 

MARK K. HARRIS, Minority U.S. Coast Guard Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

LAUREN M. CORCORAN, Hearing Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 1 

Senator Coburn ................................................................................................. 3 

Senator Ayotte .................................................................................................. 13 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 39 

Senator Coburn ................................................................................................. 41 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 4, 2014 

Ellen McClain, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transborder Policy, Office 

of Policy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............................................ 5 

Rear Admiral Paul F. Thomas, Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, 

U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............................. 6 

Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ......................................... 8 

Brian E. Kamoie, Assistant Administrator for Grant Programs, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............. 10 

Stephen Sadler, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence and Analysis, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security . 11 

Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 12 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Caldwell, Stephen L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared statement with attachment ............................................................. 57 

Kamoie, Brian E.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Joint prepared statement with attachment ................................................... 42 

McAleenan, Kevin K.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8 

Joint prepared statement with attachment ................................................... 42 

McClain, Ellen: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Joint prepared statement with attachment ................................................... 42 

Sadler, Stephen: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 11 

Joint prepared statement with attachment ................................................... 42 

Thomas, Rear Admiral Paul F.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Joint prepared statement with attachment ................................................... 42 

APPENDIX 

Additional statements for the Record: 

Hon. Janice Hahn, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................ 130 

Kurt J. Nagle, President, American Association of Port Authorities ........... 133 

American Trucking Associations, Inc. ............................................................. 138 

Colleen M. Kelley, National President, National Treasury Employees 

Union ............................................................................................................. 144 

Henry H. Willis, RAND Corporation .............................................................. 149 
Page

IV 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Ms. McClain ...................................................................................................... 157 

Admiral Thomas ............................................................................................... 165 

Mr. McAleenan ................................................................................................. 175 

Mr. Kamoie ....................................................................................................... 187 

Mr. Sadler ......................................................................................................... 194 
(1) 

EVALUATING PORT SECURITY: PROGRESS 

MADE AND CHALLENGES AHEAD 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 4, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:32 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R. Carper, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Carper, Coburn, and Ayotte. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CARPER 

Chairman CARPER. Good morning, everyone. We are happy to 

welcome you today and thank you for joining us. 

Dr. Coburn and I have called this hearing, and this is a hearing 

he has had a whole lot of interest in. I have, too. It is a shared 

interest. But, we want to take a look at the current state of port 

security in these United States of America. We want to find out if 

we are heading in the right direction. I hope we can also focus on 

the work that needs to be done over the next few years to try to 

ensure that our port security efforts maintain the proper balance 

between security, safety, and trade facilitation. It is important, because our focus as a Congress cannot solely be on security, but also 

on maintaining and enhancing our economic competitiveness. 

As we all know, port security is no easy job. It involves the maritime security provided by the United States Coast Guard (USCG) 

when its men and women patrol our coasts and our waterways. It 

involves the physical security of port facilities like the ferry terminal in Lewes, Delaware, or an energy refinery along the Gulf of 

Mexico or Delaware City, Delaware, that is safeguarded by State 

and local authorities. It involves the cargo security provided by the 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which screens cargo to 

prevent dangerous goods from entering the United States while 

also facilitating the flow of trade and transportation. 

That last part is a particularly important piece. And, even as we 

build and maintain strong layers of port security, we need to take 

care not to impede transportation or commerce. Our ports and waterways are the lifeblood of our economy. I am told that more than 

95 percent of all U.S. trade is handled by our seaports. And these 

ports account for over 30 percent of U.S. gross domestic product 

(GDP). That is more than $5 trillion in trade each and every year. 

As the former Governor of Delaware and someone who was ultimately responsible for running a major port, the city of Wilmington 
2 

owned and ran that Port of Wilmington for many years. They ran 

out of money and the State had some money, so we took it over 

when I was Governor. This is something I know a little bit about, 

but care a whole lot about. 

The Port of Wilmington, located along the Delaware River in the 

northern part of my State—it is just south of Philadelphia—is the 

No. 1 seaport in North America, believe it or not, for the importation of fresh fruit, bananas, and juice concentrate. If you had a banana this morning for breakfast, it probably came through the Port 

of Wilmington. We call our port—our nickname is ‘‘Top Banana,’’ 

the ‘‘Top Banana Port.’’ 

The Port of Wilmington is not just important for the State of 

Delaware, where it serves as a key economic engine in New Castle 

County. It is also a key port for the entire United States. So, protecting our ports, safeguarding our economic opportunity, is a responsibility that we take very seriously. 

As the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and other experts have noted, U.S. port security has come a long way. Shortly 

after September 11, 2001, the Maritime Transportation Security 

Act of 2002 (MTSA) became law and empowered the Coast Guard 

with new authorities to ensure commercial vessels and port facilities meet minimum security standards. A few years later, the Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 authorized key cargo and supply chain security programs enforced by U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection. Since that time, these cargo security programs have matured and taken root. Not only that, many 

of our international trading partners and international trading security organizations have created similar security programs emulating the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) good work. 

But, we should not and we cannot stop here. We want to use this 

hearing as an opportunity to explore how the threat to ports has 

evolved and what the next steps for DHS should be. I also do not 

want to imply that there is no room for improvement. As I frequently say, everything I do, I know I can do better. I think that 

is true for all of us, and I think that is true for the way we handle 

port security. 

In a recent letter to the Congress, our new Secretary, Jeh Johnson, indicated he believed the 100 percent scanning mandate for inbound cargo shipping containers was impractical, and not the best 

use of taxpayer resources. If that is the case, we must look for a 

better way to address security risks while preserving the necessary 

speed of moving containers through our ports. So, I welcome the 

Secretary’s pledge to make a good faith effort to improve the Department’s capabilities without getting in the way of legitimate 

flow of trade. I look forward to discussing this issue with some of 

our witnesses today. 

I also look forward to hearing how the Department of Homeland 

Security plans to address emerging threats, how it can make programs more effective and efficient, and how the agencies represented here today can work with international organizations and 

our foreign partners to raise the global standard for port security. 

As you can see from our lineup of witnesses—it is quite a lineup—port security is a team sport. It is a perfect example of why 

bringing all these agencies together into the Department of Home-
3 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Hahn appears in the Appendix on page 130. 

land Security was the right thing to do. The components present 

here today work seamlessly with one another to develop and implement the Department’s layered risk-based strategy for port security. From the Coast Guard to Customs and Border Protection, 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA), and DHS’s Office of Policy, each of 

you play a critical role and you have to work together. So do we. 

I am also glad we have GAO here with us today. We are always 

happy to have GAO with us. You have done a whole lot of work 

in this area. We are grateful for that and we will be looking to you 

for further help. 

Again, thanks to everyone for coming. As Dr. Coburn knows, we 

are going to start voting in a little bit and we are going to do one 

of those deals that we have perfected, where voting starts and 

maybe he will go vote the first time, and when he has voted, he 

will come back and I will go vote, and then we will just swap back 

and forth. Hopefully, we will be able to keep going and make it all 

work and be done in a punctual way. 

But, this is important. We are happy that you are here. Let me 

just now turn to Dr. Coburn, just to thank him for insisting that 

we have this hearing and make this a priority. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN 

Senator COBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, welcome to all of you. This is an interesting area for 

us to be talking about. Sitting on the Intelligence Committee, our 

threats are greater, not less, in terms of risks, and getting it right 

is important. 

One of the commitments I made to Congresswoman Janice Hahn 

from L.A.—she has the L.A. port, which is one of our busiest, biggest, and probably greatest vulnerability in terms of ports—that we 

would have this hearing and do the oversight that is necessary to 

try to improve what we are doing. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I would like unanimous consent to put her 

testimony in the record.1 The House is out this week, and we would 

not have scheduled this hearing at this time had we known that, 

but we did and I am happy that we are having the hearing. So, 

I would ask unanimous consent to have her testimony included in 

the record. 

Chairman CARPER. Happy to include it. 

Senator COBURN. I would also note that the House has passed 

legislation that the Senate has not even taken up or considered, 

the Gauging American Port Security (GAPS) Act, and what we 

need to do is address today to find out where our weaknesses are, 

what we need to improve it. And, as Senator Carper mentioned, the 

100 percent scanning obviously is not viable, or may not be viable, 

but we need to have a better approach than 2 to 4 percent scanning 

that we are seeing today. 

We know that a successful attack on one of our ports would be 

devastating. The RAND Corporation gave an example that it could 

have a trillion-dollar effect on our economy. That is a possibility. 

We cannot stop every attack that is going to come to this country, 
4 

but we can certainly make it much more difficult and markedly decrease the likelihood. Everybody knows the history of how we came 

together after 9/11. We created the Port Security Grant Program 

(PSGP). We mandated 100 percent cargo screening, and the 9/11 

Commission recommended that, as well. We also created the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), which has had 

some significant difficulties and is still not implemented. 

So, my goal for this hearing is to review all the initiatives that 

were initially set out, assess how well they are working and whether or not they are working, and determine if our ports are as secure 

from a potential terrorist attack as we can make them feasibly and 

economically. 

I would say, we have spent $2.9 billion on the Port Security 

Grant Program with no metrics to measure whether or not we have 

actually improved our security. There are no metrics, so we do not 

know. We spent $2.1 billion on CBP cargo programs to meet a 

scanning mandate that we are told will never be met. So, there is 

$5 billion we have spent. We have no assessment of what we have 

gotten for that money. The TWIC Program was intended to create 

an ID card for transportation workers to enter secure areas, including the ports. We will talk about TWIC, and some of my questions 

will relate to some of the problems associated with it. In general, 

I think it is unclear, and, hopefully, this hearing will help us to 

know how much improvement we have actually made in securing 

our ports. 

So, I, No. 1, want to thank each of you for being here, preparing 

the testimony, which I have read, and being available. I apologize 

that we are going to have votes, but we will keep this moving as 

fast as we can. We have, I think, four votes starting at 11. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you, as well, Mr. Top Banana. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman CARPER. I have been called worse things. 

We will make this work. We appreciate, again, all of you being 

here. I am going to just briefly introduce our witnesses. 

Ellen McClain, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transborder Policy at DHS’s Office of Policy, also served as DHS’s Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement. She began her career with the U.S. 

Customs Service, where she served, I believe, as Deputy Associate 

Chief Counsel, is that right? 

Ms. MCCLAIN. [Nodding head.] 

Chairman CARPER. Rear Admiral Paul Thomas joins us from the 

Coast Guard, where he is the Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy. He is a specialist in marine safety, security, and environmental protection, a graduate of the Coast Guard Academy and 

of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where I am 

proud to say that one of our boys attended. When I went to Ohio 

State, I could barely spell MIT. The idea of having a kid that went 

to school there, I could not imagine. But, congratulations on that. 

Thanks for your service. 

Kevin McAleenan, Acting Deputy Commissioner at the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Previously, he served as the Acting 

Assistant Commissioner of the CBP Office of Field Operations, 

leading the agency’s port security and trade facilitation operations. 
5 

1The joint prepared statement of Ms. McClain, Admiral Thomas, Mr. McAleenan, Mr. Kamoie 

and Mr. Sadler appears in the Appendix on page 42. 

Brian Kamoie, appointed as the Assistant Administrator for 

Grant Programs at FEMA in April 2013. Before that, Mr. Kamoie 

served as Senior Director for Preparedness Policy on the White 

House National Security Staff from 2009 to 2013. 

Stephen Sadler has been the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence and Analysis at the Transportation Security Administration 

since October 2011. He joined TSA in 2003 and has held several 

leadership positions. Prior to that, he spent 25 years in the commercial maritime industry. 

And, finally, last but not least, Stephen Caldwell. Stephen, nice 

to see you. He joins us from GAO, where he is Director of Issues 

on the Homeland Security and Justice Team. Mr. Caldwell has 

over 30 years of experience at GAO and has worked on numerous 

reports on port and supply chain security. 

Thank you all. Your entire statements will be made a part of the 

record, and feel free to summarize as you go along. I will ask you, 

try to stay within about, what did we say, 5 minutes, if you could. 

If you go way over that, we will have to rein you in. Thank you 

for joining us. 

Ellen, why do you not go ahead. 

TESTIMONY OF ELLEN MCCLAIN,1 DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR TRANSBORDER POLICY, OFFICE OF POLICY, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. MCCLAIN. Good morning, Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Coburn. I am a career civil servant and testifying before Congress for the first time. As this has long been on my career bucket 

list, I appreciate this opportunity, along with my colleagues, to testify on a matter of singular importance to the Department, port security. 

Since 2007 and the passage of the SAFE Port Act, we now have 

several key strategic documents that shape and guide our efforts 

on port security: The National Strategy on Global Supply Chain Security, the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA), and the 

soon-to-be-released 2014 DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). 

DHS is focused on enhancing port security through prevention, 

protection, and resilience, pursuant to a risk-based approach. While 

strengthening the global supply chain system, including the maritime transportation network, we are ever mindful that it is critical 

to do so by promoting the efficient and secure movement of legitimate goods. 

Guided by the principles in these overarching documents, DHS’s 

approach embraces five elements for a layered system of maritime, 

port, and cargo security. 

One, understanding the risk to better defend and protect against 

radiological and nuclear risks. 

Two, obtaining advance information and using advance targeting 

techniques. 

Three, increased collaboration with other Federal agencies, foreign governments, and private stakeholders. 
6 

1The joint prepared statement of Ms. McClain, Admiral Thomas, Mr. McAleenan, Mr. Kamoie 

and Mr. Sadler appears in the Appendix on page 42. 

Four, implementing strong domestic security regimes. 

And, five, promoting preparedness by sustaining grant programs. 

Within this strategic context, DHS can point to several key developments in the past 7 years: Risk assessments to aid us in understanding the threat environment and prioritization of resources; 

Significant progress with international and private partners to incorporate risk management principles and leverage Trusted Trader 

Programs; The assessment of more than 1,500 foreign ports, 200 

alone in 2013, under the International Port Security Program; Establishment of 360 comprehensive Port Security Plans by port operators; And, grant awards to achieve interoperable communications, 

installation of surveillance cameras at port facilities, and funding 

for other similar physical security equipment and projects. 

Looking forward, we face challenges of increased trade from the 

expansion of the Panama Canal and increased activity in the Arctic. With increasing trade and shifting trade patterns, we must also 

confront aging infrastructure for a broad range of DHS assets, from 

Coast Guard cutters to X-ray and radiation and nuclear detection 

inspection systems. In forging the path for progress, DHS will concentrate on improving information collection, targeting, and dissemination, expanding global capacity to secure the supply chain, 

and addressing risk across all modes of transportation. 

With a continued focus on enhancing the capabilities of our components and our partners to address current and future challenges 

to securing our ports, DHS will continue to dedicate substantial attention and resources to implementing a layered risk management 

approach to security across all transportation pathways in an efficient and cost-effective way and building essential partnerships at 

home and abroad. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify about DHS’s 

progress on enhancements to port security. I will be happy to entertain any questions. 

Chairman CARPER. Good. Thanks, and we are going to have 

some, so thank you. 

Ms. MCCLAIN. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. Thanks for your testimony. 

Admiral Thomas, please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL PAUL F. THOMAS,1 USCG, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR PREVENTION POLICY, U.S. 

COAST GUARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Admiral THOMAS. Thank you, Chairman Carper, Dr. Coburn, and 

thank you both for your continued support of our Coast Guard and 

the opportunity to discuss this really important topic with you this 

morning. 

The Coast Guard, in coordination with the other Department of 

Homeland Security components, the interagency, and the industry, 

implements a layered maritime security system. Our goal is simple. 

We want to detect, interdict, and mitigate threats as far from our 

shores as possible. 
7 

1The slide referenced by Admiral Thomas appears in the Appendix on page 56. 

And, we accomplish this through the layered system that is depicted on the slide before you and displayed to my left.1 As you can 

see on the slide, maritime security of U.S. ports does not start and 

finish in the United States. Rather, the opposite is true. The security of our ports begins in foreign ports, at foreign facilities and terminals. This is the first layer of our integrated system. 

The Coast Guard’s International Port Security Program conducts 

assessments of foreign ports to ensure they meet international security standards and to build the capacity of our trading partners. 

So, just as you cannot enter U.S. airspace unless the flight originated from an airport that meets minimum security standards, you 

cannot enter U.S. seaports unless that voyage originated from a 

foreign port that meets security standards as certified by the Coast 

Guard. 

Additionally, the Coast Guard-led Foreign Port Threat Assessments bring together information from law enforcement and intelligence communities to assess the level of governance, crime, terrorist activities, and other factors that may help us determine 

which threats emanate from those ports. 

And, finally, overseas activities by our colleagues from the Customs and Border Protection and other DHS components help to ensure the safety and security of cargo and people before they depart 

foreign ports. 

If you look at the next several layers on the slide, the international waters, the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone, and U.S. territorial seas, I will call these the offshore layer. Our regulations require that each ship en route to a U.S. port provide the Coast 

Guard at least 96 hours’ advance notice of arrival. This notice includes information about the vessel, the cargo, the crew and passengers. Customs and Border Protection also requires advance notice with information about the cargo, the shipper, the consolidator, 

the receiving agent, among other information. And, other Federal 

agencies, like the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), may also require advance notice of arrival under certain circumstances. 

All of this information is collected and shared at both the national and the port level. It is screened and assessed so that, prior 

to arrival of any vessel, the Coast Guard Captain of Port has a consolidated, comprehensive assessment of all risks associated with 

that ship. And, when I say all risks, I mean all risks, everything 

related to safety, security, and the environment, as diverse as 

invasive species in ballast water or cargo, or crew members on a 

watchlist, passengers exhibiting signs of illness, or damage to the 

ship that might compromise safety or the environment. 

The Captain of Port then is able to coordinate a single interagency, local, State, and Federal risk mitigation plan for each ship 

that arrives. For the vast majority of these ships, local coordination 

is required to plan the necessary control, inspection, or enforcement 

actions. In some cases, the threat rises to the level that interagency 

coordination at the national level is required and we activate the 

Maritime Operational Threat Response Protocols. 

In some cases, the risk will be mitigated by interdicting the ship 

in the offshore zone. In other cases, the ship is allowed to enter the 
8 

1The joint prepared statement of Ms. McClain, Admiral Thomas, Mr. McAleenan, Mr. Kamoie 

and Mr. Sadler appears in the Appendix on page 42. 

port, but is subjected to inspection and oversight prior to beginning 

cargo or passenger operations. These boardings are most often led 

by the Coast Guard, but they may include personnel from other Department of Homeland Security components or the interagency who 

can bring their special capabilities to bear on a given threat. 

In all cases, the vessel arrives at a port facility that complies 

with the requirements of the Maritime Transportation Safety Act 

and the SAFE Port Act. These facilities, by law, have security staff 

trained to specific standards. They have an access control system 

that includes credentials for each employee. They have approved 

plans in place to prevent and respond to security incidents. And, 

they execute a declaration of security with the foreign ships, when 

appropriate, to ensure the security and communications protocol at 

that ship-port interface are clear. 

And then beyond the individual port facilities, the port community as a whole is prepared and resilient and are capable of coordinated port-wide prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery 

activities. This is due in large part to the combined impact of investment through our Port Security Grant Program, establishment 

of the Area Maritime Security Communities, and development of 

the Area Maritime Security Plans (AMSP). 

In summary, Mr. Chairman, we have used the authorities in the 

Maritime Transportation Security Act and the SAFE Port Act to 

implement a security system that begins in foreign ports, continues 

in the offshore area as a vessel transits to our waters, and then remains ever vigilant in our ports that have robust interagency, local, 

State, and Federal coordination to mitigate threats, facilitate commerce, and respond to all incidents. 

Thank you. I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman CARPER. You took one second too long. [Laughter.] 

You are off your game today, huh? 

Admiral THOMAS. Yes, sir. 

Chairman CARPER. Actually, that is very good. Thanks for that 

testimony. 

All right. Kevin, you are up. Please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF KEVIN K. MCALEENAN,1 ACTING DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Good morning, Chairman Carper, Ranking 

Member Coburn. It is a privilege to appear before you again today. 

Thanks to your continued support, along with effective collaboration with Federal, international, and private sector partners, DHS 

and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have made significant advancements in maritime cargo security. CBP has established security partnerships, enhanced targeting and risk assessment programs, and invested in advanced technology, all essential elements 

of CBP’s multi-layered approach to protecting the Nation from the 

entry of potentially dangerous or volatile shipments, while expediting legitimate and economically vital commerce. I would like to 

highlight the progress of a few of these efforts for you today. 
9 

In the first few years after 9/11, CBP created several key programs to enhance our ability to assess maritime cargo for risk, examine shipments at the earliest possible point, and increase the security of the supply chain. The Customs Trade Partnership Against 

Terrorism (C–TPAT), was established in 2001 in the wake of the 

9/11 terrorist attacks. C–TPAT provides facilitation benefits to vetted members of the trade community who volunteer to adopt tighter security measures throughout their entire international supply 

chain. C–TPAT has grown from seven initial members to over 

10,000 members today. 

The National Targeting Center (NTC), also started in 2001, has 

developed world leading capabilities to assess cargo shipments, 

crew, and travelers for risk before they are laden or board vessels 

destined for the United States. At the NTC, CBP utilizes the automated targeting system, intelligence, commercial information, and 

traveler data to identify and mitigate potential threats. 

DHS and CBP have also strengthened detection equipment capabilities at domestic seaports. Since 2001, CBP has acquired 1,387 

radiation portal monitors and has increased its inventory of largescale non-intrusive inspection systems from 64 to 314. These valuable systems help CBP officers detect radiological materials, weapons, and illicit substances. 

The support of Congress, specifically through the SAFE Port Act, 

has been a key catalyst in advancing CBP’s trade security and facilitation capabilities beyond these signature efforts. The Act codified and made importer security filings mandatory. Building on the 

24-hour rule, this program provides CBP additional advanced insight into the supply chain, allowing us to identify potential risks 

earlier and more accurately. 

The Act also codified the Container Security Initiative (CSI). 

Under CSI, CBP works with foreign authorities to identify and examine potentially high-risk U.S.-bound maritime containers before 

they are laden on vessels. CBP’s 58 CSI ports now pre-screen over 

80 percent of all maritime containerized cargo imported into the 

United States. 

CBP will continue to build on our progress by exploring and expanding new roles for industry stakeholders and international 

partners, such as Trusted Trader Mutual Recognition Agreements. 

We will continue to refine our targeting to better identify high-risk 

cargo, and we will work to increase the percentage of containers 

scanned abroad. And, we will continue to help lead the effort in developing increasingly effective and sophisticated global standards 

for cargo security. By utilizing risk-based strategies and applying 

a multi-layered approach, we can focus our resources on the very 

small percentage of goods or shipments that are potentially highrisk. CBP’s use of advance information, technology, and partnerships improves global supply chain integrity and reduces transaction costs for U.S. businesses. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy to answer your questions. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Thank you for that testimony, 

Kevin. 

Brian Kamoie, welcome. 
10 

1The joint prepared statement of Ms. McClain, Admiral Thomas, Mr. McAleenan, Mr. Kamoie 

and Mr. Sadler appears in the Appendix on page 42. 

TESTIMONY OF BRIAN E. KAMOIE,1 ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR GRANT PROGRAMS, FEDERAL EMERGENCY 

MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Mr. KAMOIE. Thank you, Chairman Carper, Ranking Member 

Coburn. I appreciate the opportunity to be with you and to join my 

colleagues from the Department to talk about the Port Security 

Grant Program, which we believe is a critical part of the Department’s efforts to enhance the security and resilience of our Nation’s 

ports. 

Senator Coburn, as you mentioned, we have invested $2.9 billion 

since 2002. And while I agree with you that we certainly can continue to improve our measurement of both the effectiveness of 

those investments and our administrative management of the programs, we have clear evidence of the value of these investments 

across the program’s priorities, which include maritime domain 

awareness. 

We have invested in over 600 port-wide projects that include 

port-wide coordination and collaboration, interoperable communications, and surveillance systems that assist in domain awareness. 

We have invested $161 million just in interoperable communications. We have also invested in improvised explosive device (IED) 

capabilities and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities, cybersecurity capabilities as that threat continues to 

evolve, planning at the port level training and exercises, and, of 

course, the implementation of the Transportation Worker Identification Card Program. 

So, in addition to these programmatic achievements and, for example, just in vessels that patrol our waterways, we have invested 

in over 500 vessels. In New York City, for example, the Port of 

New York used vessels, over 30 vessels, the day Hurricane Sandy 

made landfall and rescued over a thousand people. 

So, we know these dollars are making a difference. And, these investments also facilitate increased partnerships, not just at the 

Federal level with my colleagues here, but at the State and local 

level and with port owners and operators, and we have seen in a 

variety of instances—you can assure Congresswoman Hahn that 

we continue to make investments in the Port of Los Angeles for information sharing and collaboration, and Chairman Carper, in the 

Port of Wilmington, the investments there, not just in interoperable communications, but in information sharing between the port 

and the Fusion Center in Delaware that has allowed the building 

of relationships with State and local law enforcement and the port. 

I thought I would also tell you where we are in the fiscal year 

(FY) 2014 grant cycle. A hundred million dollars was appropriated 

for the program this year. Applications came in on May 23. The 

field reviews—as the Admiral mentioned, we work very closely 

with the Coast Guard. We have a two-tiered review process. Captains of the Port work with the port area, the local and State government, through Area Maritime Security Committees to prioritize 

projects. Those applications are under that field review right now 
11 

1The joint prepared statement of Ms. McClain, Admiral Thomas, Mr. McAleenan, Mr. Kamoie 

and Mr. Sadler appears in the Appendix on page 42. 

and will be referred for a national panel review here at the headquarters level later this month, and then we expect to announce 

awards by the end of July. 

And so I will close by saying we look forward to the continuing 

dialogue about how we can continue to make these investments in 

the most effective and efficient way possible. We think they have 

made a real difference. And, I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

Chairman CARPER. Good. Thanks. Nice job. 

Stephen Sadler, please proceed. Thank you. Welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN SADLER,1 ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. SADLER. Good morning, Chairman Carper, Ranking Member 

Coburn, distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for 

the opportunity to testify today about the TWIC Program. 

TWIC is a fee-based program that provides a uniform, industrywide, tamper-resistant, biometric credential to eligible maritime 

workers requiring unescorted access to secure areas of port facilities and vessels regulated under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. 

TSA administers the TWIC Program jointly with the United 

States Coast Guard. TSA is responsible for enrollment, security 

threat assessments, and technical systems related to TWIC cards. 

The Coast Guard is responsible for enforcement of TWIC card use. 

Since TSA launched a program in October 2007 at Wilmington, 

Delaware, we have conducted security threat assessments and 

issued cards to more than 2.9 million workers, including longshoremen, truckers, merchant mariners, and rail and vessel crews. The 

TWIC Program is the first and largest Federal program to issue a 

standard biometric credential for use in diverse commercial settings across the Nation. Working closely with industry and our 

DHS partners, the TWIC Program has evolved over the years to 

address concerns over the applicability of Federal smart card best 

practices to a working maritime environment, such as the requirement for two trips to an enrollment center for card enrollment and 

activation. TSA reformed the program by launching OneVisit in 

June 2013 in Alaska and Michigan. This provides workers the option to receive their TWIC through the mail rather than requiring 

in-person pick-up and activation. Last month, TSA moved from the 

pilot phase of the program to a phased implementation for all 

TWIC applicants. We have added call center capacity for applicants 

checking on their enrollment status. We have enabled web-based 

ordering for replacement cards. We have increased quality assurance at our enrollment centers. We have opened multi-program enrollment centers across the country to allow individuals to apply for 

the TWIC, the Hazardous Material Endorsement, and TSA PreCheck. We will expand the number of TWIC enrollment centers to 

over 300 this year, adding to the convenience of workers. 
12 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Caldwell appears in the Appendix on page 57. 

TSA continues to evolve and modernize our credentialing programs through these initiatives, strong collaboration at the Department, partnership with industry, and the support of this Committee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I look forward 

to answering your questions. 

Chairman CARPER. Thank you, Mr. Sadler. 

And now, Stephen Caldwell, please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN L. CALDWELL,1 DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. CALDWELL. Chairman Carper and Senator Ayotte, thank you 

for asking GAO to testify on port security. 

We have issued almost 100 reports on port security since 9/11. 

Our most recent comprehensive report on port security was issued 

in the fall of 2012 to note the 10-year anniversary of the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act. 

Let us start with planning. There was a National Strategy for 

Maritime Security issued in 2005. GAO reviewed that strategy and 

its eight supporting plans and generally found they met much of 

the criteria that GAO has laid out for a good national strategy. We 

have also looked at some of the more detailed functional strategies, 

and in some cases, we have found those to be wanting. At the port 

level, we found that some of the plans specific to the ports have included the SAFE Port Act’s requirement that they also cover recovery issues. 

Going back to some of the functional plans, we found some deficiencies in those. For example, DHS, after issuing the Small Vessel 

Security Strategy and laying out an implementation plan for that, 

has not been tracking the progress of the components in actually 

implementing it. That leaves some opportunities unrealized due to 

the lack of disseminating any potential lessons learned or even be 

able to track their overall progress on that strategy. 

In terms of maritime domain awareness, there have been a number of improvements. The Coast Guard through its Common Operating Picture Program, has provided additional data sources to the 

users; allowed Blue Force Tracking, which is the ability to track 

our own vessels; and also increased access across the Coast Guard 

to more users. However, many of the original systems used to increase maritime domain awareness have fallen short of the capabilities that were originally planned for those. Many of these shortcoming are due to acquisition problems that our reports have 

noted, such as not developing complete requirements at the beginning, not updating cost or schedule baselines, and not monitoring 

performance through initial operations. 

Regarding the security of our domestic ports, DHS components, 

especially the Coast Guard, have come quite a ways in implementing the Maritime Transportation Security Act. Key provisions 

of that Act call for security planning at the port, facility, and vessel 

level. It also calls for the Coast Guard to then inspect those facilities to make sure that those planned security activities are indeed 
13 

in place. GAO has audited those programs. We have found 

progress, and most of our recommendations in those areas have 

been implemented. 

But, some areas remain problematic, and as noted in our reports, 

we have concerns about the Port Security Grant Program and the 

extent that DHS is monitoring the effectiveness of the actual 

projects. Going back to 2005, GAO found that the program lacked 

an adequate risk assessment process. It also lacked a mean to 

measure the effectiveness of the projects and the grants. Our more 

recent work did find that the grants are based on risk using the 

process that Mr. Kamoie had described here at both the port and 

the national level. 

However, more than a decade after the program’s start, there are 

really no performance measures in place to determine whether the 

program at the port or facility level has improved security. In fact, 

in many cases, FEMA lacks project-level visibility to know whether 

the projects were, indeed, implemented as described. 

Regarding global supply chain security, there has also been a lot 

of progress, especially by CBP. We have reviewed these programs 

and noted that their management and operations have matured 

over time. We concur with CBP that implementing 100 percent 

scanning, as defined in the SAFE Port Act and 9/11 Act, is extremely challenging. However, we are less convinced that the existing risk-based program does not have room for improvement. Our 

recent reports have found that CBP has not been timely in terms 

of measuring the effectiveness of its targeting system or evaluating 

the supply chain risks in foreign ports, including CSI ports. We did 

see the May 5 letter from the Secretary to you, Mr. Chairman, and 

note that both of those issues are discussed as potential improvements. 

In closing, GAO will continue to review port security programs 

for Congress, for this Committee and others. For example, we have 

ongoing work on port cybersecurity as well as the disposition of 

high-risk containers. 

That concludes my remarks. I am happy to answer any questions. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. Good. Thanks so much for that testimony. 

Senator Ayotte, nice to see you, and why do you not lead us off. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AYOTTE 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

I just wanted to get a followup, Assistant Administrator Sadler, 

and certainly Mr. Caldwell, about the TWIC Program. So, you testified about the OneVisit pilot, and now it is going to a nationwide 

mailing system. So, how do you assess it is going, and are you able 

to do this without concerns about fraud? So, just can you give us 

a quick update? Obviously, I appreciate the steps you have taken 

on this, but just in terms of substance. 

And then I would like to hear from Mr. Caldwell about how effective you think, overall, the TWIC Program is in helping protect 

port security and what other—I mean, GAO has been quite critical 

in past reports about what we need to do to improve this program 

and its effectiveness. So, that is really the issue I was hoping to 

get a little more insight on. Thank you. 
14 

Mr. SADLER. Good morning, Senator. So, we started the pilot for 

TWIC OneVisit last year, or 2012 to 2013, in Alaska and Michigan. 

And then what we did, as we transitioned to our new technical system, we started the implementation nationwide. So, we started implementing the OneVisit in May of this year, May 12. So, we plan 

to have a phased schedule to implement it across the Nation and 

we should have it done by this summer. 

So, we think it is going fairly well. We do mail the cards out. I 

believe we have about 3,000 cards for TWIC OneVisit right now 

that have been mailed out of about 5,000 enrollments. So, what we 

do is we send the card out separately and then we send the PIN 

in a different letter. So, we try and send them out in two different 

letters. 

Senator AYOTTE. So, you have not seen fraud yet on that program? 

Mr. SADLER. On the mailing itself? 

Senator AYOTTE. Yes. 

Mr. SADLER. Not yet, Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. OK. 

Mr. SADLER. But, we are still in the early stages of the implementation. 

Senator AYOTTE. OK. Thank you. 

And, Mr. Caldwell, I know we are in the middle of a vote, so I 

just wanted to get a quick thought on—one of the things I think 

we have worried about overall about the TWIC Program, is it making us more secure? Are we improving this system so that we can 

have some reliability with it? 

Mr. CALDWELL. Well, two things. The TWIC OneVisit pilot, is a 

tradeoff between security and convenience. It is more convenient to 

use the mail but you are losing at least one of your internal controls of being able to verify the person’s identity by having them 

pick it up in person. Congress directed TWIC to go in that direction 

and—— 

Senator AYOTTE. They did—— 

Mr. CALDWELL [continuing]. So, that is what TSA did. 

Senator AYOTTE. But, it is also good for us to followup—— 

Mr. CALDWELL. Yes. 

Senator AYOTTE [continuing]. To make sure that we did not— 

that the choice we made there, that I was obviously a supporter 

of—— 

Mr. CALDWELL. Yes. 

Senator AYOTTE [continuing]. That we make sure that we are following up on it, as well. 

Mr. CALDWELL. Yes. I do think it is a good idea to follow up on 

that to see if there is fraud. 

Senator AYOTTE. But what I am worried about overall is, are we 

really doing anything with TWIC? I am not trying to be funny 

about this. 

Mr. CALDWELL. Yes. 

Senator AYOTTE. I get the goal of it. It makes sense. But, obviously, the concern has been, how are we enhancing port security 

overall? 

Mr. CALDWELL. We have those concerns, as well. We have had 

concerns with the program pretty much from day one and the ways 
15 

it was implemented. For example, the reader pilot that was done 

recently, we thought the evaluation of that was done quite poorly 

and left out a lot of things that would be used to evaluate the nature of any problems. What were the problems that were coming 

up? Was it the card itself? Was it the reader? Was it the person 

that was manning the security gate? When they did their test of 

the reader pilot, they did not include this kind of detailed data you 

need to know to get answers to such questions. 

Obviously, there are some additional concerns in terms of the 

shooting down in Norfolk Navy Base. 

Senator AYOTTE. Yes. That was raised in the Commerce Committee. 

Mr. CALDWELL. And the Navy now is not accepting TWIC, at 

least by itself, as an acceptable card to get on that base. So, they 

had some concerns with it. 

There has been an assertion that the TWIC has improved security, and we have seen that reported in the latest DHS report to 

Congress. But we have not seen strong evidence supporting it in 

terms of evaluating metrics. 

Senator AYOTTE. So, you want better metrics and you want—— 

Mr. CALDWELL. GAO always wants better metrics, but—— 

Senator AYOTTE. Yes. 

Mr. CALDWELL. But, I suspect we will be asked to look at it again 

as it continues to be implemented. 

Senator AYOTTE. Are we doing better? I mean, that is a good 

question. 

Mr. CALDWELL. Well, compared to nothing, having a pass that is 

unique, that is used in multiple places and with the background 

check, is useful. You can have felons because past crimes can be 

waived, so they still have those cards. But you do not have people 

getting the cards that have committed espionage against the 

United States or terrorism crimes. That is a pretty high bar. But 

one other way to look at it is that TWIC was put in—— 

Senator AYOTTE. Yes, that would be important. 

Mr. CALDWELL. TWIC was put in as part of MTSA, as a series 

of protections, to prevent a transportation security incident. That 

is where its a judgment call, about whether someone getting in, 

committing a crime, committing murder, an whether would that 

rise the level of a transportation security incident? Not likely. 

Senator AYOTTE. If there is anything else you want to add. I 

know we have to run to vote, but—— 

Mr. SADLER. Just quickly. The first thing I want to say is, for a 

TWIC OneVisit, you have to go in and confirm your identity when 

you go in to—— 

Senator AYOTTE. The first time. 

Mr. SADLER. The first time. 

Senator AYOTTE. Absolutely, yes. 

Mr. SADLER. You have to do that. The other thing I would say 

is that this is the first time that the maritime population has been 

defined. Prior to TWIC, there was no definition as far as I know, 

and I spent 20 years going in and out of ports. So, I am not sure 

who knew nationally who was going—— 

Senator AYOTTE. Who was going in and out of the ports. 

Mr. SADLER. And who was not going in. 
16 

Senator AYOTTE. We now know that answer. 

Mr. SADLER. We now have a population of three million people, 

and I vetted port workers before TWIC, a name-based vet with information that was submitted by ports. We vetted 900,000 people. 

We did that prior to the implementation of TWIC as a mitigation 

strategy. Now, we are up to three million people, all right. So, the 

first thing is that we have defined the population. We recurrently 

vet them, every single day. 

Senator AYOTTE. Mm-hmm. 

Mr. SADLER. We have one common standard—put the biometric 

aside—one common credential, one common background check. 

That did not happen prior to the TWIC across the country. And 

some places, you had to buy a multiple credential within the same 

State. 

Senator AYOTTE. Right. 

Mr. SADLER. So, if you went to one port, you had to buy a credential. You went to another port, you had to buy a credential. And, 

I cannot tell you what the background check was. So, we think 

there is improvement in security just by virtue of the fact of those 

things that I just mentioned. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CARPER. Not at all. 

I am going to slip out and run and vote and then come back, so 

Dr. Coburn and I can go back and forth. I just want to telegraph 

my pitch. When I come back, among the questions I will be interested in asking, so you can be thinking about them, are how do we 

measure success? I want to see if there is some consensus on how 

we measure success and if there is some consensus around common 

metrics. Then, how are we doing? What are we doing especially 

well? What are we not doing so well? And, finally, I always like to 

ask, what can we do to help? 

All right. Dr. Coburn. Thank you all. 

Senator COBURN. [Presiding.] Thank you. Have fun voting. 

Let us keep talking about TWIC for a minute. I would just like 

your assessment on somebody with a TWIC card that gets into a 

port and shoots people. How does that happen? No system is perfect, and I am not laying blame. I am just saying, how did we miss 

that? 

Mr. SADLER. At the time that individual was vetted, Senator, the 

standard for manslaughter included all manslaughter, voluntary 

and involuntary. So, when the individual came through—the crime 

had been committed in 2005. The conviction occurred in 2008. I believe he served about 800 days on his conviction, so he served 

about 21⁄2 years. He was released from incarceration in 2011. We 

encountered him in December 2013. And, based on the standards 

that we were using at the time, that voluntary manslaughter 

charge was not a disqualifier. So, he got his card in January 2014. 

As far as him using the card at the base, I would defer to the 

Department of Defense (DOD), but the one point I have to make 

is that the TWIC in and of itself does not give you access to a port. 

You have to have the TWIC and you have to have a business need. 

Senator COBURN. Yes. 

Mr. SADLER. So, we have gone back. We are scrubbing all the 

cases we had for disqualifications and involuntary manslaughter, 
17 

voluntary manslaughter. And, we changed our policy now that if 

you come in with a voluntary manslaughter charge, that is going 

to be an interim disqualifier—— 

Senator COBURN. Yes. 

Mr. SADLER [continuing]. Interim, meaning that you are still eligible to appeal. You are still eligible to request a waiver. 

Senator COBURN. Right. 

Mr. SADLER. You are still eligible to request an Administrative 

Law Judge (ALJ) review. And, you are eligible to go to court if you 

do not agree with the finding that we make. 

Senator COBURN. OK, great. That is the kind of answer I was 

wanting. 

Talk to me about TWIC readers. 

Mr. SADLER. I will defer to my colleague in the Coast Guard, but 

to Senator Carper’s point about what we can do to increase security 

and how we can be more successful, that is one way we can be 

more successful, is by implementing the TWIC readers, because we 

have a biometric credential. We believe that it works. Right now, 

it is being used as a visual identification card, but it needs to be 

used as the biometric credential, and it needs to be used on a riskbased basis, as well. So, we believe that it is critically important 

to install readers in ports. 

Senator COBURN. Admiral. 

Admiral THOMAS. Thank you, Doctor. I really appreciate the opportunity to answer that question, because as the agency responsible for implementing security at our port facilities, and as a previous Captain of Port myself, I think it is important to recognize 

that TWIC and the TWIC reader are part of a greater access control system for a facility, which has its own security system, which 

is in itself part of a greater system to secure our ports and the entire chain that I discussed. 

So, when you are going to put an access control system in a facility, you are going to include fences, gates, guards, lights, cameras, 

a credential of some sort, and in some cases, a biometric reader for 

that credential. So, it is just a matter of layering the security. 

As the Chairman noted in his opening comments, if this was security at all costs, we would have readers everywhere. But, because 

we are trying to balance, as we should, the risk with the benefit 

and facilitate commerce, we have done an exhaustive analysis, 

which I am happy to explain to you, that has ensured that the 

readers go at the highest-risk facilities. And I think that the Coast 

Guard’s proposed rule puts those readers where the cost-benefit is 

currently the best. I think as we expand the use of TWIC and 

TWIC-like credentials beyond the maritime domain, because right 

now, it is the only place we have transportation credentials, reader 

costs will come down, card costs will come down, and the cost-benefit may change in a way that it just makes sense to put readers 

at more facilities. Thank you. 

Senator COBURN. Do you have a proposed date where your first 

round will be completed and then an assessment made of TWIC 

readers? 

Admiral THOMAS. We are currently working on the rule. We put 

out a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. We have received about 

2,600 comments. So, we are currently working through those com-
18 

ments. We are going to make some adjustments to the rules and 

we will go through the process. Hopefully, it will be published probably some time next year, and then there will be a 2-year implementation date before the readers have to be in place. 

Senator COBURN. So, we are 21⁄2 years away from the completion 

of what the present plans of the Coast Guard are? 

Admiral THOMAS. We are 21⁄2 years or so away from the date 

that I anticipate readers will be required at certain port facilities. 

Senator COBURN. OK. Thank you. 

Let me go back for a minute. Ms. McClain, one of your statements in your opening statement was spending money in a cost-effective way. If you all do not have metrics on the effectiveness of 

grant money that is spent, how do you know it is cost effective? 

Ms. MCCLAIN. Senator, I appreciate the question. I think it is a 

little outside my lane. I would prefer to take that question back 

and get you an answer, working with my colleague from FEMA, on 

where we are in developing metrics or answering that particular 

question. 

Senator COBURN. Well, I do not think anybody will dispute that 

we have done some good with the money we have spent, OK. I am 

not saying that. I am just saying—and anybody can answer this 

that wants, and I would love for GAO to comment on it, as well. 

We have a port system where we tier risks and the vast majority 

of money have gone to tier one ports. And, under the system you 

are utilizing today, without any recognition of the money that has 

already been spent, we continue to spend the same money on the 

same risk because there is no risk reduction recognized in your 

tiering. 

So, if you do not have metrics associated with the money that is 

being spent in the Port Security Grant Program, when do we stop 

spending money at tier one ports? In other words, how much is 

enough, and how do we know when we have the best cost-benefit 

analysis, the most cost-effective program, based on the risks and 

mitigation and the other goal that we have, how do we know that 

if we do not have a metric-based system? 

In other words, here is why we are spending this $2.9 billion. 

Here is what we are hoping to get, and here is how we are going 

to measure whether we got it, because there are all sorts of examples—I will not in this hearing—but privately—give you all the 

lists of money that you spent on stuff that a common sense person 

would say, does not have anything to do with port security. I mean, 

I can think of—the two ports we have in Oklahoma, the Port of 

Muskogee and the Port of Catoosa, and we have two 27-foot boats 

for the Oklahoma Highway Patrol on that river. And in terms of 

the risks associated with those ports, those are low priority to me 

compared to what the higher priority things are on that port, those 

two ports. 

So, my question is, if we do not have metrics to measure, and 

when we look at this in total—and I think you all have done a wonderful job in terms of laying this out—but, how do we know, and 

how do we know when to quit spending money that gives us a diminishing return on the Port Security Grant Program? 
19 

Mr. KAMOIE. Senator, I am happy to field that question. Improved measurement is absolutely an area where we see a lot of 

opportunity. 

Senator COBURN. But, let me interrupt you there. 

Mr. KAMOIE. Please. 

Senator COBURN. What is your measurement now? 

Mr. KAMOIE. Sure. In fiscal year 2013, we, for the first time, instituted measures related to sustainment of existing capabilities 

versus building new ones. We took the GAO and Mr. Caldwell’s reports and recommendations quite seriously and are looking very 

closely at what ports are doing with the funding. We, for the first 

time, in the fiscal year 2012 application cycle are requesting 

project-level data going in. You probably are aware of the history 

of the program and the flexibility that had been given at the local 

level against Area Maritime Security Plans. There remains a lot of 

flexibility, but we are increasing the oversight to request projectlevel data up front so that we can start to get that information to 

form even more effective measures of outcomes. 

On the grants management side, Senator, we certainly have 

measures now, and even over fiscal year 2012, measures of our 

monitoring. Mr. Caldwell mentioned the level of monitoring. One 

hundred percent of our Port Security Grants now undergo some 

level of monitoring. We have a tiered monitoring system where our 

program staff on a routine basis look at every award, look at the 

history of the grantee, the history of the outcomes achieved, their 

financial measures, from draw-down, rate of expenditure, rate of 

deobligation, and that, then, is reviewed, and we do prioritize 

based on the risks we see in their management of the grants all 

the way up to desk reviews, where we request a lot of additional 

information from grantees, and then site visits. 

So, what I would tell you, Senator, is I look forward to continuing 

to work with you to continue to get the data we need to form more 

effective measures. I agree with you that everybody can point to 

the examples, and there are really some stunning examples of how 

useful and effective this funding has been. But, I think you would 

also agree with me the plural of anecdote is not data, and we will 

continue to refine our measures to get that data. 

Senator COBURN. Yes. As I noted, I think it has improved, but 

I think my underlying concern, somebody is going to be sitting up 

here 10 years from now, and the amount of money to spend on this 

kind of program is not going to be there. So, how we spend the 

money today is really important, because there is going to come a 

time—I will repeat for you, Social Security Disability runs out of 

money at the end of next year. Medicare runs out of money in 

2026. Social Security runs out of money in 2032. By 2030, the entire budget will be consumed of Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and the interest on the Federal debt. 

So, my questions are all based on the future, and if we spend 

money really well now, we will not need to be spending money in 

the future. So, that is the basis of the question. It is not a criticism. 

It is just that we need the best cost-benefit value for every dollar 

that you send out in the Port Security grant. 

Mr. KAMOIE. We agree with you and we are working with our 

partners on the Vulnerability Index, which is one of the things you 
20 

mentioned, and how do we understand what risk we have bought 

down, and we will continue to look at that to make sure we are 

spending the money as effectively as possible. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you. 

Admiral, one of my concerns, and I cannot go into detail, but let 

me give you a hypothetical and you give me the answer. Let us say 

somebody leaves one of our certified ports overseas and arrives 

here, but in between there and now, something was added to that 

cargo. Do we have the capability to know that? 

Admiral THOMAS. Well, Doctor, I am not exactly sure. If they 

leave a foreign port—— 

Senator COBURN. They leave a foreign port that is one of our certified ports, one of our allies, meeting all the requirements that you 

all have, and someplace between when they left and when they arrived at the Port of Los Angeles, somebody has added a package. 

Admiral THOMAS. So, if that occurred at another foreign port, 

so—— 

Senator COBURN. No, not in the port—— 

Admiral THOMAS. Just in transit. 

Senator COBURN. In transit. 

Admiral THOMAS. Well, the only way that we would be able to 

determine—a couple things would have to happen. Probably, the 

entire crew would have to be complicit with this individual that is 

carrying this out, because it is difficult to access particularly a container in transit without a significant amount of effort, and that 

would require probably more than one person. 

Senator COBURN. Let us not worry about the details of that. 

Admiral THOMAS. Sure. 

Senator COBURN. Let us say it happens. 

Admiral THOMAS. If it happens, the only way we would know is— 

and, really, this is a better question for my colleague from Customs 

and Border Protection—would be because the container has been 

opened and we would be able to determine that, but maybe you 

can—— 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Sure. Senator, we have two elements that I 

think would be germane here. One, the Import Security Filing 

gives us the stow plan for the vessel, so we know where each container is on a vessel, whether that is going to be accessible during 

a voyage or not. We do see drug smugglers attempt to use what we 

call rip loads, where they break the Customs seal, put a load just 

inside the doors of the container, and lock it back up. That is really 

only doable on a vessel in transit around the deck area. So, we 

know which containers could be accessed. And then we do routine 

seal checks upon arrival to see whether those containers have been 

tampered with, whether those doors have been opened. So, there 

are different steps in our layer of processes to address it. 

Senator COBURN. Can somebody duplicate counterfeit your seal? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. They can try to, yes, and we have detected dozens of attempts to do that pretty effectively. 

Senator COBURN. So, they have not been able to do that as of 

yet? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. I will not say, Senator, that—— 

Senator COBURN. That you are aware of. 
21 

Mr. MCALEENAN [continuing]. There have been no successful 

counterfeit attempts, but we do train our personnel to detect what 

our seals are supposed to look like, whether they have been tampered with, and there are number sequences and other kind of 

safeguards in this process. 

Senator COBURN. This is a long time ago, but I will just share 

an experience with you. I bought a company in Puerto Rico, put it 

into four containers, all the equipment, everything that was there. 

All four containers arrived at one of my plants here. All the seals 

were there. And when we opened the containers, everything of significant value that could have been marketed was gone, but the 

seals were still there. So, the fact is—and that is way before 9/11. 

That was in the 1970s. But, the fact is that people will try and do 

it. 

I guess my question is really this. Do we have the capability to 

track ships from the time they leave a port until the time they arrive here and know whether or not they have been boarded or 

accessed between disembarkment and embarkment here? 

Admiral THOMAS. That is a question I probably cannot answer in 

this venue, sir. 

Senator COBURN. Got you. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. CALDWELL. Senator, did you want me to touch upon the 

metrics issue? 

Senator COBURN. Yes, please. 

Mr. CALDWELL. We have seen a weakness in metrics at the strategic level. Whether it is the national strategy or the more detailed 

functional plans, we have not seen metrics laid out early as to what 

the end state is and how we are going to measure that. We have 

also seen problems, particularly at the program level, because 

those are easier for GAO to look for and find. 

We have found an improvement of the metrics of how the programs are run, i.e., process metrics. One of the first things that we 

do when we look at a program is ask how the program is being run 

and obtain those metrics. A lot of times, we will find weaknesses 

in those process internal controls. Those have improved across the 

board, and so when I say some of these programs have matured, 

a lot of this is better management of the program. Where we have 

not seen large improvements is in the area of actually measuring 

the results of the program and what they are trying to achieve. 

I would also agree with you on the importance of cost-benefit 

analysis. We will get a push back from the agency that our recommendations could be expensive and they do not have enough 

money to implement them. But FEMA ends up spending $3 billion 

on port security grants. GAO has had an outstanding recommendation for 9 years now, that FEMA come up with performance measures on the Port Security Grants. So, maybe a couple of million dollars to do some analysis to develop those metrics on performance, 

in hindsight, looks like it might have been money well spent. 

One example of cost-benefit analysis having a positive impact involves the advanced spectroscopic portals (ASP) that the Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was developing. The first testing 

that DNDO did it was very light—it was not very rigorous. We 

pointed that out. When they did the rigorous testing and then they 

looked at how much those ASPs would cost compared to the mar-
22 

ginal capability they were going to add, DHS canceled the whole 

program. They canceled it after spending $280 million, but eventually, they were planning to spend, $3 billion, so that was a case 

where whatever the testing or analysis cost in the end it led to a 

good result. 

Senator COBURN. All right. OK. Let me ask Mr. Kamoie, do you 

all have plans to reinsert the fiduciary agents into the PSG? 

Mr. KAMOIE. We do not, Senator. 

Senator COBURN. And why is that? 

Mr. KAMOIE. When the fiduciary agent model was used, it was 

at a time when the appropriations levels for the program were 

much higher, and was several—I think it was starting in 2007 and 

after rounds of stimulus funding. The agent model was absolutely 

necessary to assist the agency in distributing and monitoring the 

funds. 

Over time, however, as the appropriations level has gone down 

and our internal capability with staffing has increased to manage 

the program, the fiduciary agent model has become less necessary. 

And in terms of monitoring performance, there was a varying level 

of performance by fiduciary agents in monitoring, and so given our 

increased staffing, our increased capabilities, we think it is more 

appropriate that we monitor and oversee the grant funding and 

how it is spent. 

The other thing I will say is that the allowability of management 

and administration costs from the grant program to fiduciary 

agents of 3 to 5 percent would result, for example, just this year 

in $3 to $5 million in overhead costs that we think are better invested in actual port security projects. 

Senator COBURN. Do you have the flexibility under the appropriation bills to use some of that grant money for grant management? 

Mr. KAMOIE. Senator, I will have to check the language and get 

back with you on that. 

Senator COBURN. But, would that help you? In other words, rather than spending $3 to $5 million on a fiduciary, if we spent an 

extra $1 or $2 million on managing grants, especially cost effectiveness of grants, and then looking at that—I am pleased with the 

progress that is being made. I just do not think we are there yet, 

and so I would love to know what we need to do to help you to be 

able to get to the point where a model for grants at the Federal 

Government is, the Division of Library and Museum Sciences. If 

you get a grant from them, you can guarantee that they are going 

to check on you. They are going to do a metric. They are going to 

know whether you followed your plan in the grant. And if you are 

not, they pull the grant and you do not ever get another one again. 

So, everybody has a different expectation, and so the fact that some 

grant money is going to things that are not really for security, if 

you had that reputation, I guarantee you, everything would be put 

down the way you want it put down, even though you have flexibility. 

Mr. KAMOIE. I will absolutely take a look at that. We are willing 

to learn lessons from wherever we can. 

Senator COBURN. They are the best run grant program in the 

government. It is not big. 
23 

Mr. KAMOIE. I appreciate that. 

Senator COBURN. The other thing is the spend down. We are 

still, in terms of what—we have granted, but we have still got a 

long ways to go on spend down. Where are we on that, and is that 

because these are long-term programs? 

Mr. KAMOIE. So, that is getting better, as well, and early on in 

the program, when ports were doing larger capital project infrastructure building with multi-phase, complicated projects, it took a 

long time to spend down. A lot of those projects have been completed and we have taken a number of steps to assist grantees in 

the spend down. One, we remind them quarterly. 

Senator COBURN. Yes. 

Mr. KAMOIE. We are in touch, asking them to draw down. Two, 

we have shortened the period of performance for grants to 2 years. 

But, your question was where are we. In August 2012, for—and 

we can followup in writing with these numbers, but for the program years 2008 to 2011, 80 percent of the available funds were 

not yet drawn down. A year later, for fiscal year 2008 to 2012— 

of course, every year, one goes off the books—but, we moved the 

needle down to 44 percent of funds not being drawn down. And, we 

did a check at the end of April, and right now, we are at 39.3 percent not yet drawn down from 2008 to 2013. 

Senator COBURN. All right. I am going to have to recess this and 

go vote. Senator Carper will be back in a moment. 

Mr. KAMOIE. Thank you, Senator. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman CARPER. [Presiding.] Let us just see if there is any 

consensus on the metrics that we are using, how do we measure 

success. Let us just start with you, Ms. McClain. What are the 

metrics that we are using or ought to be using, and using that metric or metrics, how are we doing? 

Ms. MCCLAIN. Mr. Chairman—— 

Chairman CARPER. Well, and maybe not so well. 

Ms. MCCLAIN [continuing]. I think there are several indicators 

that evidence success and progress in securing the ports. I would 

note that in the last 7 years, our relationships, our programs internationally, those global partnerships, the capacity building, the 

agreements, everything that is necessary to supply the whole global 

supply chain, I think there have been significant advancements in 

that area. I also think that our improvements in the advance data 

and targeting area make us more secure, the Coast Guard’s port 

assessments, 1,500 ports. I think there are a lot of indicators that 

there is a global recognition of the need to tackle this issue on a 

broader basis. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Same question, Admiral Thomas. 

Admiral THOMAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was Captain of 

Port in Galveston, Texas, on September 11, 2001, and then for the 

3-years that followed as we scrambled to figure out what it meant 

to secure our ports, and so from my perspective, it is clear that we 

have achieved a lot. But, I think one of the first things we did, and 

Mr. Caldwell mentioned the strategies that were out there, we recognized that in order to build a secure port, we had to first build 

the regimes. We had to do that locally. We had to do it nationally. 

We had to do it internationally. Then we had to build awareness 
24 

so we could figure out what was going on and be able to pick out 

anomalies. And then we needed the capability to respond to those 

anomalies. 

So, if you look at those three building blocks and you compare 

to where we were on September 11, 2001, to where we are today, 

it is clear there has been progress, and there are clear metrics 

within each of those. 

So, with regard to regimes, certainly thank you to the Congress 

for the Maritime Transportation Security Act and the SAFE Port 

Act, but that was the impetus for the international regime, which 

is the International Ship and Port Security Code, as well as regimes that now have been implemented as far down as individual 

port authorities. And, I am not talking about just regimes that are 

required by the law. I am talking about they understand that security is now part of their business product. So, I think in that regard, there are clear measures. 

Really, an intangible, probably, from here to see, but as the Captain of Port, I can tell you, there was no awareness or recognition 

that security really was part of the product in the port. We had 

gotten the message across with regard to safety and environment, 

but now they get it. It is part of their business, as well. So, I think 

there is a metric there. 

And certainly with regard to awareness and capability, we have 

built the capabilities federally, locally, internationally, all of which, 

I think, are clear evidence that we have been effective in terms of 

enhancement. 

I am with you. I think we need to do more. I think we can never 

rest on our laurels. I am concerned about emerging threats like 

cyber. We need to develop some metrics there. 

Chairman CARPER. We will come back. We will finish first. But, 

how are we doing? What are we doing well? What metrics are we 

doing? How do they demonstrate where they are doing better? But, 

I want to come back and see what is on this ‘‘to do’’ list for us. 

Kevin. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Mr. Chairman, I will touch on five areas. 

Broadly, our ability to identify and mitigate risk is the metric we 

seek to measure ourselves on. 

First, on the data front, as Ellen alluded to, we are getting advance information on all cargo shipments destined for the United 

States—manifest information, entry information, an Importer Security Filing, which is another 12 data elements that are critical. 

In terms of targeting and assessing that risk, category two, we 

are analyzing all of it with our automated targeting system, which 

we think is a very sophisticated capability that is constantly and 

iteratively approved, and we are currently working on responding 

to the GAO’s ideas on identifying the effectiveness of those targets 

with more granularity. 

Three, examining at the earliest possible point in the cycle. Currently, 85 percent of shipments that we identify as potentially 

high-risk are examined before they are laden onto vessels destined 

for the United States. Our examination requests of our CSI foreign 

partners at our 58 ports are accepted 99 percent of the time, and 

we think those are very solid metrics. One hundred percent of containers identified as potentially high-risk are examined before they 
25 

are let into the United States stream of commerce. So, 85 percent 

prior to lading and the rest of the 15 percent before they are allowed to enter the United States on arrival. 

Securing the supply chain, category four. Over 50 percent of all 

cargo containers by value are part of our C–TPAT partnership with 

our 10,750 partners. We have increased the security of the supply 

chain through that partnership. We are also mutually recognizing 

other countries’ systems, including the European Union and six 

other agreements, to ensure broader visibility globally, as Ellen alluded to, the international partnerships. 

And, five, our efforts to address the highest consequence threats. 

Rad/nuc, we are scanning 99.8 percent of all arriving containerized 

cargo through—— 

Chairman CARPER. Say that again. What percent? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Ninety-nine-point-eight percent, so just about 

everything arriving into seaport is scanned through a radiation 

portal monitor, sophisticated, sensitive technology for identifying 

radiological and nuclear materials. 

The other part of this coin, sir, the facilitation piece that you referenced, the vast majority of cargo arriving in the United States is 

released before it even touches the dock. Our C–TPAT partners are 

getting fewer exams because they have secured their supply chains. 

We have established mobile technology options for agriculture specialists to clear shipments right there on the dock instead of waiting hours and having those bananas sit in Wilmington. The U.S. 

Chamber of Commerce and 71 others just wrote to the Secretary 

this week in an open letter saying that this regime is working well 

and that the facilitation piece, in particular, we have achieved 

through this layered risk approach. 

So, those are the metrics we look at. I am happy to elaborate on 

any specifics. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Fine. Mr. Kamoie. 

Mr. KAMOIE. Mr. Chairman, I think while you were out, what we 

agreed is that in the Port Security Grant Program, that we have 

measures, we have made progress, but that we agree we can continue to make progress. 

On the programmatic side of the effectiveness measures, we look 

very carefully at the six priorities of the grant program: Enhancing 

maritime domain awareness; enhancing improvised explosive device detection; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive prevention, protection, response, and recovery capabilities; enhancing cybersecurity capabilities; maritime security risk mitigation projects; planning training exercises; and the Transportation 

Worker Identification Credential implementation. 

Right now, we have a measure that we are looking at building 

new capabilities across those six areas and sustaining existing capabilities. But, again, that measure can be better. 

On the administrative management side, we have made progress 

in measuring our ability to effectively and efficiently release the 

funding, monitor programmatic use of these funds, monitor grantee 

financial management of the funds, monitor the closing of awards 

and grantee draw-down. We are making progress, Mr. Chairman, 

and we have an opportunity to make even more. 

Chairman CARPER. Good. Thanks. Mr. Sadler. 
26 

Mr. SADLER. Yes, sir. For us, I think it is about getting good, 

quality information and data for us to make the right decisions on 

when we issue a card. It is about continuing to get that information 

after we issue the card so we can monitor the individual to ensure 

that they have not done something as to disqualifying, whether it 

is on a Terrorism Watch List or through some type of criminal 

issue. 

I think the other thing that is going to make us better is installing readers. We believe that the Coast Guard, who we are very 

close partners with, as we are with everyone else on the panel, 

made the right decision to take a risk-based approach and put 

readers where they need to be and we think that is going to be a 

major improvement for our program, considering it is a biometric 

credential. 

And I think the last thing that we have to do is share information, which we do on a daily basis. So, we need good quality information to make good decisions with. We need the information to 

keep on coming, so we can continue to make good decisions after 

we issue the credential. We need to install readers. And, we need 

to continue to share information, which we do on a daily basis with 

our partners. 

Chairman CARPER. Mr. Caldwell. 

Mr. CALDWELL. Thank you very much. The most difficult question is how do you measure security and risk, and I think we have 

looked at that quite a bit across these programs. One of the better 

measurement programs that we have found is a Coast Guard program called the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model. They can 

actually, at the facility level, try to measure the risk based on 

vulnerabilities and threats and various scenarios and like that. 

The Coast Guard also took a step trying to develop a more sophisticated measure of how much Coast Guard programs actually 

reduced risk in the port environment—their estimated percentage 

reduction of maritime security risk subject to Coast Guard influence. We were critical of this, because in the end, it was subject 

matter experts in the Coast Guard sitting down and thinking about 

what those reduction measures are and then putting a single point 

of percentage on that. 

We had a couple of criticisms in terms of ways they could try to 

make that better. When there is so much judgment, you want to 

give a range instead of a point estimate. But, I do not want to be 

too critical of the Coast Guard in the sense that they certainly were 

trying to think larger about their suite of programs and to what 

extent they reduce risk. 

They are looking at whether they want to keep that measure or 

not. It was a measure they were using within the Coast Guard. But 

they actually were not really using it to direct resources or conduct 

operations. So, if you have a performance measure but you are not 

really using it to monitor things or prioritize resources, you have 

to question whether it is a useful metric in the end. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Some of you began to answer the second 

part of my question, but I want to take another shot at it. My staff 

and my colleagues oftentimes hear me say these words. The road 

to improvement is always under construction, and that is true here, 

as well. I just want to, in terms of, again, thinking of metrics, but 
27 

thinking of areas, not where we are making progress but areas 

maybe where we have not made nearly enough—there has been 

some allusion to this, but some areas where we have not made 

nearly enough, and we can actually measure that we have not 

made nearly enough—are there any of those—think about it out 

loud—who can help enable us to make the progress that is needed? 

Us, the Legislative Branch? This Committee? The President in his 

budget? Who needs to help out? 

Ellen, do you want to go first? 

Ms. MCCLAIN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think that, just to sort of set 

the scene here, we certainly need an approach that is flexible, innovative, so that we can take on the adaptive adversary, and we need 

something that—an approach that is risk-based so that we can 

make the most cost effective use of our resources. That said, we 

recognize that we do not want to have negative impacts on global 

trade. 

So, we are looking in the near term to specific improvements in 

the area of the targeting algorithms, reducing the false alarms, 

working with our partners at some of the CSI ports to increase the 

percentage of scanning that is undertaken. We are looking at, and 

I think this is a key point that I hope does not get lost in today’s 

discussion, across all pathways, focusing on a single pathway does 

not necessarily reduce overall risk. So, as we go forward, we need 

to consider improving security across all transportation pathways. 

And, last, I would note that we are continuing the dialogue with 

stakeholders to see what additional or expanded roles they might 

take in improving the security of our ports. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Thanks. Admiral. 

Admiral THOMAS. I think there are a couple areas that I would 

be concerned about. The first is complacency. As we get further 

from 9/11, I think the sense of urgency decreases. And so from the 

Congress on down to the security guard at a facility, we have to 

make sure we maintain the sense of urgency with regard to port 

security, because the threat is adaptive, and as good as the physical security systems that we have in place are, there are emerging 

threats like cyber that we have not yet addressed. We have begun 

to address them. I believe the Coast Guard has the authorities that 

we need to do that and we are working on what the resources 

might be, so you may hear about that. 

The other area that would be of concern is the real high-end 

threat that needs to be intercepted as far offshore as possible. We 

need to maintain the ability to get out there and do something 

about some identified threat that is bound for our shores, and that 

is a real challenge because it requires ships and helicopters and 

people that are not only capable of getting there, but are present 

at the time when you need them. 

So, those two things are areas where we need to make sure that 

we continue to build our capability and to build our plans for action. 

Chairman CARPER. Great. Thank you. Kevin. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Mr. Chairman, I would echo a couple of the 

comments that Ms. McClain made. On the targeting side, there is 

always an opportunity to improve our analytics and our capabilities 

to assess risk and we are pursuing that aggressively. We have a 
28 

good system for taking in current intelligence, manipulating the 

data elements against it, and identifying risk, but we want to continue to get better. So, that is an area, and we do get Congressional 

support to continue to improve in that area. 

With the radiation portal monitors, we need to be able to dial the 

algorithm so they are very sensitive for the threat materials we are 

worried about, but they reduce the naturally occurring radiological 

material alarms that we face on normal commodities, like bananas, 

for instance, and granite, and other things that do hit on our radiation portal monitors. We do not want to waste time on those 

alarms. We want to focus on what could potentially be dangerous 

material. 

I think there are continued opportunities globally. We are currently working with partners on broadening the scope of CSI, security first, but also looking at other threats to the goal of supply 

chain—contraband, commercial fraud that can support criminal activity, and so forth. Enhancing global supply chain security standards—we did that after 9/11 with the World Customs Organization 

and the same framework of standards. There are always opportunities to take that to the next level and to build capacity with those 

governments and customs services that are willing to step forward 

but do not have the internal capacity or funding. 

And then, of course, the private sector, continued opportunities 

there, not only on the supply chain side with C–TPAT, but looking 

at whether, from a terminal operator perspective, there might be 

a return on investment to do greater security work prior to lading 

from a private sector perspective that we could then share and benefit in. So, we are pursuing all of these angles as the Secretary 

noted in his letter. 

Chairman CARPER. Those are great points. I really appreciate 

your responses. I will come back and we will ask the same question 

of the last three witnesses, and I will be right back, Tom. 

Senator COBURN. Do you want them to answer those, or do you 

want to—— 

Chairman CARPER. No, I will do that when I come back. 

Senator COBURN. [Presiding.] OK. Thank you. 

Let us talk about the 100 percent mandate and the fact that we 

are at 2 to 4 percent. I think those numbers are right. Please correct me if I am wrong. And, GAO, I would love for you to get in 

on this. There is no question, the 9/11 Commission said, for port 

security, we need 100 percent screening. And what we hear is, that 

is not practical. 

So, the question is somewhere between 2 to 4 percent and 100 

percent, where do we need to be? How do we need to decide where 

we need to be? How do we become more effective in terms of container inspection? Admiral. Kevin. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Senator, I will start, and I am sure colleagues 

will want to chime in. On the 100 percent mandate, I think the key 

question for us is not the percentage itself, but are we inspecting 

the right percentage. Are we inspecting and identifying those containers that are high-risk and mitigating that threat at the earliest 

possible point? 

While you had to step out to vote, Senator, we talked about some 

of the metrics that we are following and whether we are accom-
29 

plishing that and I would just like to reiterate one of those elements for you, sir. On those containers that we identify as potentially high-risk through our Automated Targeting System (ATS), 

we are currently examining, with our foreign partners under the 

Container Security Initiative, 85 percent of those containers before 

they are ever laden on a vessel destined for the United States So, 

within that—— 

Senator COBURN. So, that is 15 percent that are not getting inspected. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. They are getting inspected fully at the first 

port of arrival in the United States. So, we are checking them before they enter the stream of commerce to the United States, and 

we are getting 85 percent of them before they are even on a ship 

destined for the United States. 

Senator COBURN. OK. But, if that 15 percent, one of them has 

a nuclear weapon in it, it is a little late, is it not? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Yes, but that is not the only layer that we have 

in place prior to lading. 

Senator COBURN. I understand, but when we think about this, 

you are saying 85 percent of those deemed high-risk. So, what is 

our goal to get to 100 percent of those deemed high-risk? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. So, our goal there, sir, is to increasingly target 

with the right foreign ports—how we can encourage them to examine anything that we think is high-risk before lading. So, we have 

58 CSI ports covering over 80 percent of cargo destined for the 

United States. We think we have placed those CSI locations in the 

right places. We are currently, though, assessing how the threats 

have changed. Are there certain strategically important ports that 

we can add capability? Can we work with additional countries to 

encourage them to take some measures before lading? 

Also, just mentioning as you came in, sir, working with terminal 

operators in the private sector. Is there a way that we can encourage terminal operators to increase the overall inspection if they 

think there is a return on investment, working with their customers to sell a security benefit that we could then benefit from 

and share in the information, also. 

Senator COBURN. All right. Admiral, any comments on that? 

Admiral THOMAS. The container inspection world really does belong to Customs and Border Protection, although I can certainly attest to the impracticality of looking at every container as it comes 

through our yards. I have seen the targeting that we do jointly on 

cargo and the automated processes really are very effective and 

very adaptable. So, if there is a new intelligence stream that comes 

in, we can very quickly, or CBP can very quickly change their targeting and identify cargo that might be associated with a newly 

identified threat. 

Senator COBURN. All right. So, here is the question, as a common 

sense Okie, we are saying it is not capable to do 100 percent 

screening. Where is the study that says, here is what this will cost 

and here is what this will slow down commerce? Has that been 

done? 

Mr. MCALEENAN. A number of studies in that regard have been 

done, and I would offer the GAO might want to comment, as well. 

We have done a study and provided several papers to Congress es-
30 

timating up to $16 billion in costs. The European Union has done 

a study. The private sector has done several studies. 

The challenge is, sir, there are 800 or so initial ports of lading 

for containerized cargo destined for the United States, an average 

of three to five lanes per port, an average of five million to implement this kind of system prior to lading in each lane, and that 

scope just makes it very challenging to get to that level. There are 

a lot of questions on who pays, who is responsible, how it is monitored, and so forth. 

Senator COBURN. So, if you take the RAND study, even though 

it is dated now, and say, if one sneaks in and you have the tragedy 

that they spoke about at the Port of Los Angeles, estimating a trillion-dollar effect on our GDP, $16 billion does not seem that great. 

So, where do we go, GAO? 

Mr. CALDWELL. Senator, thank you. We have done several studies on it. As far as the type of study you are asking for, the only 

place I have seen it is in a recommendation we have made. I think 

that CBP and the Department would have been better off if, at that 

point, they just said, OK, we will do the required feasibility study. 

This would have included a cost-benefit analysis. CBP could have 

done it then and tried to put this thing to bed, or at least show 

what those tradeoffs are. Certainly, there have been multiple small 

pieces of analysis, so I feel bad. Because I think the Department, 

in all the little pieces of analysis they have done since then, have 

almost gotten there. 

I would also like to stop to talk about one popular myth. The 

9/11 Commission Report never called for the 100 percent scanning 

of maritime cargo. 

Senator COBURN. What did they call for? 

Mr. CALDWELL. They called for 100 percent scanning of air cargo. 

The report said almost nothing about ports and maritime security. 

Senator COBURN. OK. That is great to know. 

Mr. CALDWELL. But, moving on, we do think the challenges to 

100 percent scanning are likely insurmountable. The SAFE Port 

Act left a lot of things undefined, and I think through the pilots, 

CBP tried to understand what those undefined things would actually be in terms of cost, and who does it. 

But, there is also a concern that it would create a false sense of 

security. You could scan a container. If it is done within a customs 

regime that we trust, a port terminal that we trust, then we have 

some confidence that after the container is scanned and gets on 

that ship, it is going to be monitored. But, a lot of times, we will 

not have that case. In a lot of the cases, because of how ports are 

laid out, scanning is done offsite. If that truck with the container 

has to drive three to five miles to an from the scanner a lot can 

happen in that distance. 

The former Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen said he 

thought it was more likely that a weapon of mass destruction 

would come in to the United States not through a highly regulated 

regime like containers, but into the United States in some small 

vessel coming in or snuck in some other way. 

I also agree that intelligence will, in the end, be the key, to revealing any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that terrorists are 

trying to smuggle in. I am not sure ATS by itself would catch that. 
31 

They have looked at millions and millions of containers and used 

the risk-based analysis. Yet they are still finding contraband, but, 

it is not like when they find drugs in these containers that there 

is a one-to-one match between, we had rated that containers as 

high-risk. There are many cases where they find illegal stuff in 

containers that had gotten through their ATS system, drugs or 

other contraband. 

Our approach at GAO has been to look at the programs that we 

have. We still would have liked to have seen DHS and CBP do that 

feasibility analysis of 100 percent scanning. At this point, we have 

closed that recommendation as not implemented. I think that is 

water under the bridge. We would like to see CBP doing better 

with the programs we have, recognizing that we are not going to 

have a perfect system. One improvement would be optimizing your 

targeting system, which means that you are monitoring it on a regular basis. You are testing it to see how it is doing. Another improvement is having the best CSI footprint you can in terms of 

some of the CSI program focusing on high-risk ports. If not, maybe 

CBP should pack up and shake hands with those partners. Those 

partners will keep helping us, but CBP could move some of those 

CSI operations to other ports. 

Senator COBURN. Do you have specific recommendations on ports 

from the GAO? 

Mr. CALDWELL. Yes, we do. We have a recommendation that CBP 

use the port risk model they had used in 2009 to initially plan the 

100 percent scanning, or a similar type model to figure out what 

ports they should actually be in. We tried to reproduce that type 

of analysis and found that about 12 of the CSI ports CBP was in 

were low-risk ports. More than half of the CSI ports were in highrisk ports. We recognize that there are some ports that are not 

going to let us in. I mean, you have some nasty players out there 

that are not going to let a joint U.S. program into their ports—I 

am not at liberty to disclose details of individual ports, but there 

is movement in terms of additional CSI ports, both opening and 

closing. 

Senator COBURN. OK. Let us go back to grants and the tiered 

port system for a minute. If we are not doing analysis on progress, 

do we reevaluate the ports in terms of tiers? Here is tier one, tier 

two, tier three, tier four. Is that done routinely? Yearly? Biannually? How often do we reanalyze high-risk ports, one? No. 2 is, 

without the metrics, but they are getting better, how do we take 

what we have improved and measure it to show a decreased risk 

for a tier one port so that the dollars that you have can go to where 

the risks are the greatest? 

Mr. KAMOIE. Thanks for the question, Senator. We reassess the 

risk of the Nation’s ports every year, and we use the risk formula 

that incorporates the most recent data we have available on threat, 

vulnerability, and consequence. And, there have been times where 

changes in that risk data have resulted in the changes in the 

grouping of ports. For example, last year, in fiscal year 2013, there 

are eight tier one ports. San Diego had a change in its relative risk 

formula, because these are relative to one another, and so this 

year, it is not a tier one port. So, we are making those adjustments. 

We work very closely with the Department’s Intelligence and Anal-
32 

ysis unit to populate the risk formula with the most recent data. 

So, yes, we are looking at that continually. 

Your second question, as to what the measurement and, really, 

what I would consider to be buying down of that risk and the vulnerability, I agree, we have some progress to make there in terms 

of agreement on measurements and metrics to show that progress, 

and show it in a way, and when the Chairman comes back, his 

question was about how can the Congress help, and here, I think, 

my ask of the Chairman and you, Senator, is that we have a continued dialogue about the types of data that would enable you to 

have more confidence and the American people have more confidence that we are making that progress and that we are being effective stewards of the taxpayer dollars. I agree with you that we 

certainly have made progress and we have plenty of good examples, 

but we would like to continue to work with you to get at the data 

and the measurement that would show that in a more compelling 

way. 

Senator COBURN. Each port has a Port Security Plan, right? 

Mr. KAMOIE. Yes. 

Senator COBURN. All right. Has Homeland Security done an 

analysis of what the total cost would be to bring it up, on a costeffective benefit, how much total for all the tier one ports would we 

need to spend to bring them to where they need to be? Do we have 

that? Do we know that? 

Mr. KAMOIE. I am not aware of that analysis—— 

Senator COBURN. Well, that is—— 

Mr. KAMOIE. We will have to followup. 

Senator COBURN. That is an important question, because if you 

do not know what they need, we will never get there, and—— 

Mr. KAMOIE. Well, so, I mean, we certainly, at the Captain of the 

Port level—— 

Senator COBURN. I know you know where the weaknesses are, 

and I know that is where the grant money is going, but I am saying, in the big picture—— 

Mr. KAMOIE. Sure. 

Senator COBURN [continuing]. If we are going to spend $100 million this year on Port Security Grants, and the total bill for bringing our tier one ports is $2.5 billion, we are 121⁄2 years from bringing them, and by that time, you are going to have replacement 

needs. So, the question is, do we not think it is important to really 

know by port, here is the total cost to get us where we want you, 

and which one, out of those top eight ports, which one has the 

greatest vulnerability basis and should we not be spending maybe 

$70 million at one port and $30 million at the other eight on the 

basis of what the total need is to bring them to that level where 

we feel confident? 

Mr. KAMOIE. Sure. We will absolutely take a close look at that. 

We have moved the entire suite of grant programs toward performance measurement against the core capabilities that are in the National Preparedness Goal, following up, implementing Presidential 

Policy Directive 8 on National Preparedness. We continue to find 

the performance measures for those. But, we are through the 

threat hazard identification and risk assessment process. We are 

asking grantees to do a lot of what you are talking about in terms 
33 

of identifying capabilities and then using the investments to close 

the capability gaps. 

So, we are moving in that direction, but I am not aware of a single analysis where we have put a price tag on, by port, what it 

would take to close the gap in every port against one level, but we 

will certainly take a look at that. 

Senator COBURN. Well, I just think that would be really important to know, because you are going to have limited funds—— 

Mr. KAMOIE. Yes. 

Senator COBURN [continuing]. From here on out. It is not going 

to change. And, sending the dollars where this is all risk-based, 

right? 

Mr. KAMOIE. Yes. 

Senator COBURN. Sending the dollars where the greatest risk is 

should be our priority. So, I would just recommend you look at 

that. I do not know if the GAO has any comments on that or 

not—— 

Mr. KAMOIE. Senator, if I might, we will take a close look at that. 

I think the threat hazard identification risk assessment process 

and the Area Maritime Security Working Groups at the port level, 

I think they are getting at a lot of that. But, I agree with you. We 

could make even more progress. 

Admiral THOMAS. If I could, on two of your points: The first had 

to do with how do you account for risk bought down with previous 

grant money in determining the risk ranking for the next—we actually do that as part of the Coast Guard’s Maritime Security Risk 

Assessment Model that GAO mentioned. If we have invested in a 

system that reduces the vulnerability or mitigates the consequences of an attack on a facility, it gets reflected in our model. 

That data is part of the risk formula that DHS then uses to determine the tiers for the next year. So, it is in there. 

The other piece that you asked about is have we defined what 

a secure port is and when will we know that we get there. That 

is an interesting question. What I can tell you, though, as a Captain of Port, is I watched the initial focus be on securing individual 

facilities, so, let us make sure we have fences and cameras and 

guards and Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) and get facilities. 

And then I saw it evolve to, well, we need to really secure this 

port as a system, as well, so how do we link these fences together? 

So, we invested in things like communications systems that will 

allow everyone—and surveillance systems that were focused on the 

common infrastructure, not on the private sector infrastructure. 

And, we said, well, that is good, but have we been able to address what we are going to do if we get attacked and we need to 

recover? So, we invested in trade resumption plans. 

And so it has been a natural evolution. I believe we are still in 

that evolution because we have emerging threats such as cyber. I 

think the next round of grants is putting money toward cyber vulnerability assessments so that we can then understand what it is 

going to take to secure the cyber infrastructure of the maritime— 

I do not know that we will ever be able to say we are there, but 

I do see a very logical progress on how we focused our planning 

and our investment. 
34 

Senator COBURN. We have a diagnostic system for cyber within 

Homeland Security. Is the TWIC system applicable to that system? 

Mr. SADLER. Let me take that one, sir. 

Senator COBURN. Yes. 

Mr. SADLER. So, right now, the way the TWIC system works is 

that the contractor provides the enrollment equipment and then 

they connect to a system that eventually gets back to TSA, and 

that system, whether it is on the enrollment side, the data center 

side, up to the TSA side, is built to Federal standards. They have 

to go through a certification and accreditation. They go through auditing. They go through testing. So, it is not monitored within the 

DHS system. It is monitored through the TSA operations center. 

So, everything from the contractor’s data center practices—— 

Senator COBURN. You have answered my question. Got it. Mr. 

Sadler. OK. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. [Presiding.] I would like to come back and 

ask Mr. Kamoie, Mr. Sadler, and Mr. Caldwell to answer my earlier question, please. 

Mr. KAMOIE. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CARPER. And then, just so you will know, the next 

question I am going to ask of all of you is what do we need to do? 

What is our ‘‘to do’’ list on this Committee and in the Congress to 

make sure we continue to make progress? Thank you. 

Mr. KAMOIE. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Mr. Kamoie. 

Mr. KAMOIE. My ask of you and the Committee is for continued 

dialogue—and I shared this with Ranking Member Coburn before 

he stepped out—a continued dialogue about the types of data and 

the types of measures that would give you the confidence, give the 

American people the confidence that we are investing the grant 

dollars in a way that is most efficient and most effective and that 

we are all good stewards of these resources. 

I agree with Admiral Thomas. The threat is evolving. So, too, 

have our measurement of where we are headed next. So, I would 

appreciate a continued dialogue with you about how we define the 

measures of success that will give you the confidence that we are 

all looking for. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Thanks. 

Mr. Sadler, something for our ‘‘to do’’ list to help continue to 

make progress. 

Mr. SADLER. I think it is just continued support and helping us 

get, from TSA’s point of view, the readers out, and the Coast 

Guard’s point of view, understanding that the Coast Guard is promulgating the rule, but there were a lot of things that had to happen before they got to the point where they can do that. So, when 

I say we need the readers, we need the readers. That is not in any 

way insinuating that there is some delay on the rules side. There 

was a lot of work that went into getting to this point. So, we would 

ask for the continued support so we could put readers in place, we 

could buy down some risk, we can use the full capabilities of the 

card. 

And, I think, to the Admiral’s point before, it is critical that we 

maintain mission focus. It is also critical that we make risk-based 

decisions so we protect the right areas. And then for our look at 
35 

it, it is data quality, it is identity verification, it is reduction in 

fraud, it is ensuring that the right people get the card and the 

right people keep the card after it has first been issued. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Thank you. Mr. Caldwell. 

Mr. CALDWELL. So, I am going to provide a combo answer because I am still trying to answer the question you asked before, I 

have three things, two for the agencies to do and one for the Committee to do. 

First off is for agencies keeping the programs flexible. The Coast 

Guard is trying to make their infrastructure security patrols less 

predictable so you improve the level of deterrence. I like what I see 

at CBP as well when they are doing what they call their quayside 

or dockside scanning. In such cases a ship will come in and CBP 

will target that ship. It will not be based on whether the containers 

are high-risk or not. CBP will be scanning every seventh one or 

tenth one container coming off. They could be a little more flexible 

in CSI and the footprint they have and think about whether they 

need to shift that footprint a little bit to cover different countries 

and ports, if possible. 

I think cyber is the growing area. That is an area where DHS 

and the Coast Guard have been monitoring the situation, and they 

are talking about taking action. We will have a report we are 

issuing tomorrow for the Senate Commerce Committee that will 

have a lot more detail on that. 

And then something for this Committee, and I think it is starting 

to show up on the radar of the agencies. We do have to sustain current equipment. You have vessels and you have scanners and you 

have aircraft that are pretty important in this security regime. 

This is true particularly in terms of some of the interdiction and 

the deterrence missions and just the daily things like scanning containers. Some of these assets are reaching the end of their life. I 

know that CBP is trying to extend the range of their scanners 

from, say, 10 years to 13 years. But, at some point, you are going 

to have to replace them. Now that you have built this security regime and all the things that go with it; sustainability will translate 

into resource requirements just to keep what we have. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. The last three witnesses have pretty 

much sort of gotten to my last question, which was, what is our ‘‘to 

do’’ list? And, I do not know that, Ms. McClain, you and Admiral 

Thomas and Mr. McAleenan had a chance to do that. Our ‘‘to do’’ 

list—do you—— 

Ms. MCCLAIN. Chairman, I think I just echo some of the points 

that were made earlier and emphasize that in moving forward, 

anything we do needs to take into consideration that DHS confronts a multitude of threats. And so to be cost effective and efficient, we need to always bear that in mind. 

I think the second point we made earlier is that, big picture, we 

must focus security across all pathways, to buy down risk, we do 

not want to encourage sort of a balloon effect where we put all our 

security assets over here and the agile adversary just circumvents 

that. So, the picture has to be across all pathways. 

And then echoing Mr. Caldwell’s point about support to address 

the aging infrastructure and funding DHS in accordance with the 

President’s budget. Thank you. 
36 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Thanks. 

Admiral Thomas, anything you have that we should be doing on 

the legislative side. 

Admiral THOMAS. Thank you, Chairman. I do not have much to 

add to what has been said. There may be some very specific authorities and capabilities that we identify as we continue to analyze 

the threat in the ports, but I think we have the right access 

through the staffs to get that information to you. 

I would say that this type of oversight and continued focus by 

this Committee on this issue is really important to stave off that 

complacency that I am concerned about, so we do appreciate that. 

Chairman CARPER. Thank you. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. Four quick things, echoing several things that 

Mr. Caldwell mentioned. We need continued support for the key 

programs we have discussed today, the Automated Targeting System, CSI, and we are actively working on the recommendations 

that Mr. Caldwell mentioned. 

Recapitalization and sustainment of our critical technology, radiation detection equipment and Non-Intrusive Inspections, along 

with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, we will be working 

with your team on those plans. 

Three, what you articulated at the beginning, Mr. Chairman, understanding the critical economic, expeditious, and facilitated 

movement of cargo aspect of our mission. That continues to be critical and needs to be understood. 

And then, four, working with the Secretary and the Department 

on an agreed path forward on scanning, keeping us honest on the 

good faith efforts you identified and we discussed today, but also 

working together on the best framework for the future. 

Chairman CARPER. Good. Thanks. 

I think Dr. Coburn, when I was out voting, asked a question 

dealing with fiduciary agents, and I just want to come back and— 

he asked part of my question. I just wanted to come back and say 

the second half of the question. Maybe you all could take a shot 

at it. I need to be someplace else, in 8 minutes, so whoever would— 

Brian, I am going to ask you to take the shot at this one—— 

Mr. KAMOIE. Absolutely—— 

Chairman CARPER. Rather than ending the use of fiduciary 

agents for all ports, why not let ports decide for themselves if they 

would like to use one? 

Mr. KAMOIE. We have considered that proposal and do not think 

it is in the best interests of the program if some are using fiduciary 

agents and others not. I mean, the benefit we have derived by moving away from the fiduciary agent model is, as the appropriations 

have gone down and our capabilities internally have grown in 

terms of program oversight, management, and monitoring, we have 

gotten a pretty good window into the project level data and the approach grantees are taking. And, we lost some of that visibility, as 

you might expect. There was a variety of performance, varying levels of performance across the fiduciary agent model. 

And then the other thing is with the management and administration fee, the fiduciary agents had access to 3 to 5 percent of the 

funds. We think those funds are better invested in actual security 

projects. 
37 

So, I know that there is a range of opinions in the port community about the fiduciary agent model, but we have decided that the 

best thing for the most effective and efficient management of the 

program is to bring that management in-house and not use the fiduciary agent model. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Thanks. 

And, this last question would be for Ms. McClain, Admiral Thomas, and Mr. McAleenan. Really short answers, if you would. The 

first question is, what effect has increased security along our land 

borders had on maritime border security? Ellen, if you could just 

take 30 seconds. 

Ms. MCCLAIN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Two quick points. I think the 

Trusted Trader Programs that we developed in the land border 

context informed how we deal with those programs in the maritime 

context. 

And, second, I think it pointed out to us, and I will quickly go 

back to South Florida in the 1980s, how you need a risk-based approach across all pathways to secure any single pathway. Thank 

you. 

Chairman CARPER. Thank you. Admiral. 

Admiral THOMAS. Well, somewhat outside of the realm of port security, but certainly, we have seen the balloon effect on particularly 

the Southern part of the West Coast and also in the Caribbean. As 

we secure our land borders for illegal drugs and contraband and 

other illegal activities, they have taken to the water, and so we 

have adjusted our forces and that is really the impact that we have 

seen there. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Thank you. 

Mr. MCALEENAN. I agree with the Admiral. We have not seen a 

significant impact in terms of changes in the threat within commercial flows. We have seen the effect of security between ports of 

entry push activity out into the littorals on the West Coast as well 

as up through Puerto Rico. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. There is a second half to that question, 

but I do not have time to ask it. You may not have time to answer 

it. 

I am just going to wrap it up here. I am really glad that Dr. 

Coburn encouraged us to have this hearing. This is timely. There 

is a fair amount of progress to be reported on and there is still 

plenty of work to do. I am encouraged that the sense of team is at 

play, and that certainly helps, and we are part of that team. But, 

thank you all for your preparation today, for coming and helping 

to make this a very great hearing. 

It is clear to me that one of the most important take-aways from 

today’s hearing is that it is critically important that we strike the 

right balance. It is not an easy thing to do. It is easy to say, but 

it is hard to do, strike the right balance between security, trying 

to make sure we do not unduly impede the flow of transportation 

and trade. As we all know, what did we say, 95 percent of our 

trade moves on the water, but the port surge is vital to our Nation’s well-being and they are a conduit for a lot. 

With that, I am going to call a halt to this. Some of my colleagues are going to have some questions to ask, and we may have 

some ourselves, so the hearing record will remain open for 15 days. 
38 

That is until June 19 at 5 p.m., for the submission of statements 

and questions for the record. 

With that, I would say to our Republican staff and our Democrat 

staff and all my colleagues, thank you very much for your help in 

this, and to each of you for joining us today. I think one of you, 

it was maybe you, Admiral, said oversight is a good thing, and we 

hear that a lot, so we will not disappoint you. Thanks so much. 

With that, we are adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 
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