THE IMPACT OF THE MEDIA

ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY DECISION MAKING

Douglas V. Johnson II

October 7, 1994
ii

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

The author wishes to thank Colonels Barry E. Willey and

Larry C. Icenogle; Lieutenant Colonels William H. Harkey and

James O. Kievit; Drs. Stephen C. Pelletiere, and Steven K. Metz

for their thoughtful review and comments. Colonel William J. Doll

contributed significantly to the study by providing materials and

thoughtful questioning throughout the study development.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed directly to the author by calling commercial (717)

245-4057 or DSN 242-4057.
iii

FOREWORD

What is the impact of the media upon national security

policy decision making? Do network news personalities exert

genuine power over the national command authority? Does the

photograph of a mob dragging the body of a dead American soldier

through the streets drive policy decisions? If the answers to

these questions are "Yes," then the claim made by William

Randolph Hearst is correct, and national policy is at the mercy

of the media.

In asking whether, or to what extent, these questions might

be answered in the affirmative, the author of this study has

raised as many additional questions. The impact of the

Information Age is being felt right now, but what the long-term

impact may be requires considerable further study. The mere fact

that personal computers are proliferating and with them FAX and

E-mail capability does not necessarily mean that we are moving

into an age of increased public involvement in government nor

that the groups actively interested in foreign affairs will

change dramatically. But it might.

This study is presented in order to explore the result of

nearly simultaneous presentation of information around the world.

The world is changing, and the processes by which national policy

is developed may also be changing. That is important.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies

 Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON II is an Associate Research Professor,

Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College. He

served in SSI as a Strategic Research Analyst for seven years

before retiring from the U.S. Army with 30 years service and has

continued since then in his present capacity. He is a 1963

graduate of the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), received his

master's degree in history at the University of Michigan. He took

his Ph.D. in history from Temple University in 1992. While on

active duty he served in a variety of field artillery and staff

positions, taught at USMA and is a co-founder of the School of

Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), U.S. Army Command and General

Staff College. Dr. Johnson has coauthored SSI studies on a wide

range of subjects, the last three focusing on Iraq and the Gulf.
v

SUMMARY

This project was undertaken to produce a strategic level

study which would lay the foundation for deeper examination of

specific issues relating to the impact of the media on national

security policy decision making. It is not intended to provide

answers, although some emerge.

The opening quotation from one of America's most notorious

news figures will stimulate argument, for it is equally

preposterous and accurate; suggests abuse of the First Amendment

protection of free speech, yet lies within the heart and soul of

republican government. Insofar as Hearst claims for the media the

power to make war, it impinges upon national security.

Some areas of suggested research will require the passage of

several years as American society and its political processes

adapt to the exploding potential of the Information Age; the

study asks if the growth of communications technology could

inaugurate the advent of true democracy.1

This study employs a relatively narrow definition of

national security issues as only those which are concerned with

national survival and preservation of our way of life. The

problem with a broader definition is that national prestige or

image often become confused with national interests. Such a

definition is too inclusive to be useful.

The media affects us as individuals and as a collective

body. The collective body expresses itself as "public opinion"

and has been extensively studied and measured. The effects on

individuals are not as easy to determine without extensive

research, which has not been undertaken.

The measurability and control of media influence is highly

situational. The most prominent examiner of the media-public

opinion interaction, Professor Benjamin I. Page, concludes that

much more study is required to understand fully this interaction;

likewise, the conclusions herein are couched in tentative terms.2

The issue of influence on the National Command Authorities

(NCA) concerning questions of national security may be addressed

in part by recourse to the process of American government. In

this process, the media "informs" the people who then "speak" to

their elected representatives in a wide variety of ways including

letters, telephone calls, FAXes, and political action groups. The

Congress then "speaks" to the president, who in turn may speak to

the people through the media. In matters of foreign affairs,

media, people, and the Congress expect the president to lead. If

the administration is unsure of its own goals or if it finds it

is at odds with the mood of the people, it will be like the

"double minded" man who is "like a wave of the sea, driven with

the wind and tossed," in this case by the winds of the news.3
vi

Daniel C. Hallin wrote, "The behavior of the media . . . is

intimately related to the unity and clarity of the government

itself, as well as to the degree of consensus in the society at

large."4 This conclusion seems to be as valid now as when it was

written of a period now 20 years past.

The most important questions from this study are those which

can not yet be answered for they deal with the future. They are

listed separately in the hope that other researchers will

undertake their study.
1

THE IMPACT OF THE MEDIA

ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY DECISION MAKING

The force of the newspaper is the greatest force in

civilization. Under republican government,

newspapers form and express public opinion. They

suggest and control legislation. They declare wars.

They punish criminals, especially the powerful. They

reward with approving publicity the good deeds of

citizens everywhere. The Newspapers control the

nation because they represent the people. (emphasis

added)

 William Randolph Hearst5

INTRODUCTION

There are only a few certainties about the news. The first

is that there is likely to be more of it available to more of us.

Another certainty is that major news media are still going to be

driven by the profit motive; consequently, whatever sells they

will purvey. Since its inception as a mass phenomenon, what sells

is spectacular, titillating, eye catching, or sensational; truth,

accuracy or context can become secondary.6

Considering the impact of the Information Age, Americans may

be facing a new phenomenon in the news arena– interactive news

tailored to individual interest. This may allow the truly

interested "reader/viewer" the opportunity to get beyond

headlines and into the "facts" at a depth and breadth hitherto

unknown. Of course we must realize that while this opportunity

will be generally available, participation is unlikely to be much

above current levels of "active" public interest. The cold fact

is that reading and thinking about the news takes time and that

is what most people are unwilling to give up for something that

may not affect them directly.7 Interactive news is also likely to

generate more discrete interest levels or focus. Currently,

several major newspapers are shifting their overseas coverage to

directly accommodate their readership. Marketing areas heavy with

Hispanic readers are closing European offices in favor of South

and Central American locations.8

Another aspect of the Information Age that could have an

impact on policy is the possibility of enhanced public

responsiveness to events. As the FAX and E-mail become

increasingly available, the power of public opinion may be

enhanced. "On Air," real-time polling is already in place on

major television networks. These two avenues of public expression

may well serve two different groups of citizens. The first group

is the computer-literate, foreign policy aware. The second group

is synonymous with the television viewing public, not necessarily

synonymous with those informed of and active in foreign affairs.
2

Those people with access to FAX and E-mail are increasing

dramatically, but their identity and involvement in public

affairs is yet to be defined. It is already possible and

acceptable to FAX or E-mail one's opinion to the White House

directly, but who are the people who do? What impact a surge of

FAX traffic will have is probably going to be governed by the

same factors that govern the impact of public opinion now. If an

election is imminent, public reactions will likely be voiced more

frequently and are likely to be followed more closely; if the

domestic situation is threatening, likewise. If a genuine

national security interest is threatened, president and public

are likely to draw together if the White House leads; if the

administration is weak or unpopular, the impact of a flood of

public expression may have unforeseen consequences.

The point is that the potential of the public to become

informed and to make its voice heard in response to events

portrayed in the media is increasing dramatically, but the

potential must pass through the filter of public interest, a

filter of episodically varying permeability.

For purposes of this study, the supposition is that the

media exert influence through two channels, direct and personal,

and indirect and collective. The direct and personal aspect is

difficult to investigate and minimal effort was devoted to it in

this study. The indirect and collective is the realm of public

opinion, a battleground of politics unique to democratic

societies. This study concentrates upon the latter arena.

THE "YELLOW PRESS" AND THE WAR WITH SPAIN: AN EPISODE

One of the first instances where the power of the press was

said to be truly decisive was the Spanish-American War. Even

though the electronic media was not a factor in this war, the

basic factors of the direct and personal, and indirect and

collective impacts of the media are evident. An examination of

this episode, like the study of the classic battles of ancient

times, simplifies insights. This event was chosen for the

similarities in public reaction, media activity, and humanitarian

impulses then and in the present. Then as now, media depictions

of innocent people undergoing gross suffering at the hands of

tyrannical powers always raised a clamor for government to "do

something!"

Understanding President McKinley's role requires an

appreciation of his leadership philosophy which was, simply,

leadership by personal example. However, control of the national

agenda or manipulation of public opinion was contrary to his

concept of the function of the presidency, and McKinley acted

strictly in accord with this concept.9

The President.
3

Current research strongly suggests that McKinley was not

actually "driven" to war by the "Yellow Press." A full nine weeks

elapsed between the sinking of the battleship USS MAINE in Havana

harbor and the move to war, and during that time there was more

than sufficient furor, venom and provocative language in the

media to test the susceptibility of the national security

apparatus (then the person of the president) to media pressure.10

In an accompanying incident, the very capable Spanish Ambassador

to the United States was driven to resign by the publication in a

newspaper of a stolen, private letter to a friend in Havana which

was highly critical of McKinley. As Harold U. Faulkner puts it,

The damage . . . had been done–not so much in

arousing public resentment . . . as in removing from

the scene the patient, skillful, and tireless de

Lome, whose efforts in Washington had neutralized

the anti-Spanish propaganda of the jingo press. . .1

(emphasis added)

The press won that skirmish and thereby opened the door of

influence a bit wider.

Although McKinley actually moved with due deliberation

toward resolution of the crisis on peaceful grounds, it appeared

he was being "stampeded into war" by his unwillingness to gain

control of public opinion, because he did not see it as his

function.12 The insistent drumming of the media had an impact upon

the public, the public upon the Congress, and thus, by the

indirection established in the Constitution of the United States,

on the president and national security policy. Angered by media

commentary on Cuba and Spain, McKinley simply stopped reading the

newspapers, but that did not stop the people from reading them13

Up to the very end, McKinley sought to avoid war and only

reluctantly placed the ultimate decision in the hands of the

Congress, as the Constitution requires. Thereafter he regretted

having "had" to do so.14 Had he possessed a different conception

of the presidency, he had tools to make a fight of the issue.15

Here the impact of the media on the national security

process was indirect but traceable along the lines established by

the principles of republican government. In the process of going

to war, the president lays the matter before the Congress for

ultimate decision and the Congress, as the elected

representatives of the people, determine whether the people's

blood shall be shed or not. Having declined to lead, McKinley

could not conceive of another option than to bow to the will of

the people expressed through the Congress.

The Media.

The traditional function of the media in a free society is
4

to inform. The responsible exercise of democratic citizenship

involves a desire to be informed. "Informed" is, of course, the

key word.16 It has always been a matter of despair that the free

people of this country, as individuals, have been so willfully

ill-informed. Even the founding fathers had a deep suspicion of

the "knowledge" of the masses, while at the same time trusting in

their innate genius as an article of republican faith. The Senate

exists as a counterweight to the House of Representatives as a

concrete demonstration of the dilemma.17

That people can be misled is a continuing possibility.18

McKinley experienced a "misled" voting public when defeated in

his bid for a seat in the House in 1890.19 But believing as

strongly as he did in the ultimate sound judgment of the American

people, and holding with equal conviction that the role of the

president was to affirm and commend, it is easy to conclude that,

in this case, the media was given a free hand in the market-place

of ideas and, through its eventual influence upon the people,

prevailed. If this were so, then, as Hearst claimed, the media

had indeed brought about the war.

Yet the press could not have created war sentiment

out of nothing; it could not have persuaded the

public that war was desirable if the public had not

wanted to be persuaded of it. The country was in a

receptive mood.20

Current research suggests that media influence on public

opinion is still an important phenomenon though difficult to

assess.21 The strongest factor at work in this episode was the

unwillingness of the Executive Office to do anything to guide

public opinion.22

The Congress.

Although the press screamed for action, it was from the

Congress that the most effective appeals came for presidential

leadership and not for leadership into war–simply for

leadership.23 There was substantial anti-war sentiment in many

centers of influence including the Congress. Negotiations with

the Spanish government were in progress when the MAINE was sunk,

but Harold Faulkner notes, "The sinking of the Maine did not ruin

these negotiations, as one might have supposed it would."24 The

negotiations continued despite the 1898 version of television

coverage in the form of dramatic drawings, violent cartoons and

inflammatory rhetoric.25 In the end, however, "Congress, . . .

would not leave the matter in the President's hands. Congress

wanted war, and McKinley was not the man to resist."26 Was this a

triumph of the press?

The principal deciding factor in the swing to war, in the

Congress, was an address by Senator Redfield Proctor upon his
5

return from a "fact-finding" trip to Cuba. It is strange that his

30-minute recitation should have done so for:

Proctor advanced no new facts, no new perspective on

events in Cuba. He urged no specific course of

action. He spoke without passion. Nor do the data of

his life reveal any unusual force of personality or

impressive weight of accomplishment in themselves

capable of riveting the nation's attention. Although

he enjoyed the public reputation of a man of

character, dignity, and solid reliability, it was

one that could be matched by tens of his colleagues.

Still, some combination of the man and his words

struck a deep emotional resonance in American

society and rapidly demolished the last important

resistance to war.27

It is remarkable how closely this passage aligns with

current public opinion studies which find that the strongest

influence upon public opinion is that of a respected commentator

or "expert."28 Senator Proctor's address received additional

weight by the mistaken impression that the president had sent him

on his fact-finding tour. That was a falsehood Proctor studiously

denied, but many people thought it to be so nevertheless.

Analysis of the speech itself yields little reason for fastening

upon it as the battering ram against the door of restraint. It is

warmly factual and couched in language that allows attachment of

passion although none was intended. The unexpected reaction to

this relatively unemotional presentation is another phenomenon

which accords with studies of public opinion "moods."29

Current research suggests that the influential shaper of

public opinion must have three qualities: (1) personification of

certain values, (2) competence, and (3) a strategic position.

Procter fulfilled all three of these conditions. He was (1)

regarded as a man of upright character, was (2) competent by

virtue of having just returned from a search for truth at its

source, and was (3) a U.S. Senator in a particularly visible

position for the moment.30 Thus, not the medium, nor the message,

but the messenger appears to have been the most significant

influence.

Other Factors.

Particular note must be made of the improved distribution

capacity of the press and the change in style at this moment in

history. Changes in printing technology made low cost newspapers

available to practically everyone, and a combination of "images"

in the form of cartoons and dramatic drawings, and a more popular

style of writing aimed at mass consumption created a situation

similar to the change wrought by the advent of television and

particularly by CNN-type coverage. In both cases mass appeal was
6

activated by a simplistic portrayal of events in emotive images.31

Dewey's victory in Manila Bay was made known to the

Secretary of the Navy by a World telegram.32 Today, many in

government, and in the Department of Defense, monitor CNN as the

first source of a great deal of fast breaking news. But this kind

of instantaneous reporting is just that. It is raw events taking

place within the focal plane of a specific camera lens and thus

often lacks any significant context. It is there that both

problems and opportunities exist.

The Result.

In the movement to war with Spain, the focus of all emotion,

except for a short time immediately following the sinking of the

USS MAINE, was on the brutal treatment of the Cubans by their

Spanish rulers. That, not the MAINE, was the core of Redfield

Proctor's speech. Matters of national security, or even of

economic losses to resident American industries, which were

considerable, were nearly incidental. Had President McKinley been

willing to take the lead, there is ample reason to support the

proposition that his leadership could have forestalled all the

frantic ragings of the press. Those disclaimers notwithstanding,

war for humanitarian and expansionist reasons became entangled

with popular emotion and the press had a hand in shaping that

emotion. It was at this intersection that the decision lay. The

president had the opportunity to shape public and congressional

opinion, but, left uninfluenced by his leadership, the Congress

and public in their turn forced the president's policy to change

for war.

TIANANMEN SQUARE AND CHINA POLICY: A CURRENT EPISODE

What has just been described is an episode of the printed

media. Since we are now in a more visual age, the next episode

rests on the power of the video image. For seven weeks, Chinese

student demonstrators took control of Tiananmen Square and staged

a protest in favor of democracy. They set up a copy of the Statue

of Liberty and captivated the entire world through their evident

devotion to the ideals of liberty in the face of one of the few

remaining communist governments. On June 4, 1989, the Chinese

government moved to crush the demonstration. We will remember for

all time the televised image of a lone Chinese man confronting a

column of tanks, bringing them to a halt merely by standing

before them. The entire free world thrilled to the sight, but by

evening the mood turned sour and the firing began. In full view

of television cameras and hidden camcorders, the Chinese

government blasted the students from the square, killing

hundreds.33 They then instituted a reign of terror, rounding up

all the ring-leaders and putting them on trial. Some were

doubtless executed, many remain in prison. The world was

revolted. Surely such blatant acts of inhumanity would be
7

rewarded by serious counteraction by the United States. The

president made it clear, however, that he was not going to

scuttle the long and hard work that he and others had undertaken

to establish an open channel to the Chinese and to foster the

growing trade with them, or to compromise the intelligence

gathering efforts on the Russians from stations on Chinese soil

by any ill-advised sanctions against the Chinese government.

Military-to-military contacts were interrupted and sales of

certain high-tech computer equipment was delayed, but little

else.34 The images that so powerfully moved viewers across America

faded from view despite reruns by the television networks. Not

only did they fade from view for that administration, but when a

new administration took power and was confronted with the legacy

of the Chinese atrocities when discussing renewal of

most-favored-nation trade status, it too chose to ignore the

pictures. Why? What was at work? An issue of national security

policy was under discussion and the power of the image and the

press proved insufficient to change the policy. Arguably, these

two examples suggest that the power of the press, acting alone,

be it written words or dramatic images, is not as powerful as

might be supposed when it comes to serious matters of national

security. Rather, genuine national security issues are left to

the president as the nation's leader. The evidence on this

requires more study, but a working hypothesis might be that a

mature administration can manage even the worst news about

national security issues because the people naturally give the

lead to the president in such matters.

SO WHAT?

The connection between the media and national security

policy is both direct and indirect. In the case of a strong

administration, news is news and policy is policy and the twain

are only remotely connected in a causal way.35 Less certain

administrations with low approval ratings, and certainly

administrations whose policies are undeveloped or who do not have

a solid philosophical basis of operation, are subject to greater

degrees of influence by dramatic reporting.36

The media street is two way.37 While reporting may have an

impact on policy, a savvy president will use the media to educate

and press his own agenda on the public. This may be done

particularly in the arena of foreign affairs where presidential

leadership is expected and both people and press are inclined to

follow.

Although there is a good deal of study yet to be done to

confirm it, evidence suggests that as the general public becomes

increasingly aware of media influence, it begins to do its own

interpretation. During the Gulf War, despite all its claims of

limitation, the media provided what the American people wanted to

see, and in the media's whining about not being allowed to show

more, it discredited itself in the eyes of its own viewing
8

public. This attitude has led to considerable self-criticism

within the media establishment, but its deeper import is that it

tends to support Dan Rather's and Tom Brokaw's evaluations that

claims of media influence are overblown.

It is a "given" that the viewing public, who make up most of

those who represent "public opinion," are, as individuals,

largely ignorant of the issues, often ignorant of much of the

context and apparently have to be fed information in sound- bites

if the message is to get across. That notwithstanding, the public

is generally skeptical of the media and, furthermore, as

President McKinley believed (a thoroughly Jeffersonian belief)

that the people seem somehow to know when major issues are in the

balance, what is right and what is not. This phenomenon is borne

out by current research which sharply contrasts individual

understanding to the collective understanding. Page and Shapiro

have demonstrated that the wisdom of the masses–the indirect and

collective–is superior to that of the elites–the direct and

personal. This is a matter beyond short-term policy formulation;

it is an issue fundamental to democracy.38

Part of the skepticism toward the press is soundly based on

repeated exposures of media manipulation of the news. The most

egregious recent example was the filming of "defective" trucks–a

completely staged event.39 In time, it will become clear that many

of the dramatic photographs from the Third World are set-ups put

together by Third World stringers. But stringers, those

freelance, independent, sometimes part-time reporters, are

increasingly commissioned to gather news and photos in remote and

dangerous places where, as Peters suggests, high paid/profile

journalists are loath to go. Thus, there is an increasing need to

make clear who is behind the camera and what is going on outside

the camera's view.40 The education of the public in this matter is

indirect but widespread enough that even the television show

"Hollywood 90210" aired an episode depicting willful distortion

of news to increase its impact.

A distortion of the news took place recently, not through

manipulation of pictures as much by unwillingness to follow

through and report the second half of the story. This happened

during coverage of the last Ranger operation in October 1993 in

Mogadishu, Somalia; "the media failed to cover the "thousands of

Somalis who had demonstrated in support of the United States

after [the 3 October fighting with 18 U.S. casualties.]"41 The

Somalis suffered grievous losses in that action and the

demonstrations suggested a signal to the United States that the

Somalis were ready to come back to more peaceful avenues of

discourse. This serves to heighten the need for the government to

make known the facts which counter the image. An activist

administration can gather sufficient information quickly enough,

if it is attuned to such things, to launch a coordinated

counterattack with some hope of success. While the military or

other on-the-scene agency can gather and forward the facts, it is
9

not their place to publish them.

In almost all of these situations, the media can be seen

simply as a conduit of information. However, that information

will be conditioned by who comes forward to comment on the event,

the obvious nature of the event and whether attempts to call good

evil or vice versa are clearly disingenuous, how the government

reacts, and what the domestic climate is at the moment.

Daniel C. Hallin concluded his study of the impact of the

media on the war in Vietnam with this observation: "The behavior

of the media . . . is intimately related to the unity and clarity

of the government itself, as well as to the degree of consensus

in the society at large."42 This observation, derived from a

thorough study of the media and policy during that war, was

enunciated in 1986. From all the evidence currently available it

still appears to be the key consideration. There will doubtless

be times when new or badly organized administrations find

themselves unable to articulate their goals as well as others,

but the unity and clarity described above are those which come

from what the military call the "Commander's intent." However

inarticulate the administration or inept in its handling of the

press, the inner focus or lack thereof will come across and the

American people will see or hear through it.

THE STATE OF CURRENT RESEARCH

Some other general observations about the impact of the

media, when taken together with the preceding comments, may

provide further understanding.

• There is little doubt that the media influence public

opinion; the arguments revolve around how much and in what way.43

Additional research is required into how much information,

presented in what format, under what conditions is likely to move

the public to act in some measurable fashion or direction. Mere

opinion shifts are not necessarily an indicator of the will to

act; something else must take place. Determining what that

something else is presents another research topic. Where the past

differs from the present is that the mechanisms to act are now

more broadly available.

• Several studies demonstrate that respected commentators

and experts have the greatest ability to sway public opinion.44

Additional research is necessary to examine this phenomenon in

reaction to the current proliferation of commentators/network

talk shows. An investigation of their effect should include

issues of host personality, guest reputation, and on-air

performance by the interviewees.

• Popular presidents can sway public opinion, but their

ability to do so decays over time–as a general rule.45 President

Clinton is the first president to attempt to harness the power of
10

television and the Rooseveltian weekly "Fireside Chat" technique

to gain support for his programs. His success in merging the

technique and the technology in support of his agenda deserves

further investigation.

• Presidents can exert stronger influence on public opinion

in matters of foreign affairs.46 The present administration offers

another important case study since, like the Roosevelt

administration of the 1930s, its focus on domestic concern is

internal and economic. The international scene of the 1930s was

no less unsettled than it is today, but now the United States is

the only possible global leader. How public opinion and national

security policy will respond to presidential management in the

next decade is worth extensive investigation.

• Presidents with low popularity polls are ineffective in

influencing public opinion. If they are so-called "zone three"

presidents (less than 50 percent approval ratings), their

attempts at intervention usually bring about negative effects.47

Here the present administration offers another case study since

its popularity has hovered close to that dividing line.

• "Good luck" issues–issues which give even unpopular

presidents a chance to regain some positive influence over public

opinion–include foreign use of force against the United States.

These generate a "rally 'round the president" mood.48 Further

investigation should be undertaken seeking comparative analysis

of this phenomenon between "isolationist" and "internationalist" periods.

• Presidents have the opportunity to shape the public debate

much of the time through their ability to "inform" the press and

people personally and through their extensive staff and appointee

networks.49 The relatively secret nature of national security

issues generally keeps them from public debate unless something

goes wrong and allows the administration to use "national

security" as an excuse or reason not to be forthcoming. This is a

highly complex issue involving a broad assortment of pressures

and interests, and must be conditioned in part by the credibility

of the NSC spokespersons and staff. Here the negative legacy of

Irangate may have an effect.

• As a general rule, in Third World matters, the fact that a

Third World issue makes the news at all indicates that the White

House has sent a signal that the issue is temporarily important.50

There is plenty of solid research in this area, but it bears

watching as the primacy of the big three television networks

declines and alternative news sources with regional focus

proliferate in response to consumer interest. "The Family

Channel," which carries programs sponsored by Christian

evangelical organizations, had been carrying the starving Somalia

story for several years, because Somalia was a mission field,

before the big three picked up on it.
11

Two articles in Army Times also indicate the need for

further research. In a May 1993 article, Ralph Peters listed six

reasons why the media should not wield the influence that he

believes it does. He complained about the manner by which some

events are selected for media coverage at the expense of others:

(1) sympathetic subjects–they [the subjects of the event] are

like us or are inherently photogenic; (2) the endemic cowardice

of reporters which encourages them to avoid the rural and brutish

where they could be killed or suffer discomfort. (This assertion

ignores the growing casualty count of reporters killed in line of

duty.)51; (3) reporters need a supporting communications

infrastructure; (4) the media have developed their own

group-think which restricts their interpretational range; (5)

most reporters utterly lack any grasp of history which would

allow them to interpret events in context; and (6) there are no

longer any meaningful controls on the media, either internal or

external–profit drives.52 There appears to be enough truth to

Peters' claims that further investigation would be helpful, but

the more important reason to determine the validity of these

observations is that the structure and conduct of news-gathering

is changing so that where Peters may be right today, tomorrow he

may be wrong. What is germane about this article is that it

raises a critical question about what will be covered.

Conversely, Harry Summers argues, as do several respected

news commentators, that the supposed influence of the media is a

myth. He cites extracts from an article in TV Guide, January

16-22, 1993, which "bragged": "Somalia is an American foreign

policy first: a military operation launched by the evening news,"

and cited remarks by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake that

"American foreign policy is increasingly driven by where CNN

points its cameras." Then Summers cites Dan Rather who said,

To give television credit for so powerful an

influence is . . . wrong . . . Reporters sometimes

feel strongly about the stories they cover, and so

me may wish for the power to direct public opinion

and to guide American policy–but they don't have

it.53

What is required here is deeper investigation of mediapolicy linkages in the national security arena, not so much to

determine the "if," but "how" or "why." Several commentators

suggest that television is gradually producing a change in public

awareness of foreign policy issues. Is that awareness real,

episodic, or connected to some current domestic theme?

All of the above refer to interactions in the collective

realm, but, as noted earlier, some interaction occurs in the

direct and personal realm. As an example of what can happen in

that realm, John Simpson claims that:
12

Awareness of what the TV pictures of the slaughter

at Mutlah Gap might do to public opinion at home

played an important part in President Bush's

decision not to pursue the Iraqi troops any further.

. . .

To date, none of the principal players, from President Bush,

Generals H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell, former Secretary

of Defense Cheney or former National Security Advisor Brent

Scowcroft have testified exactly how that decision came about. If

those photographs had that much power, military commanders had

best take notice and be prepared, for nothing in war is pretty.

Whether it is as Simpson states or not, the remainder of his

comment, "and certainly not to take the war to Baghdad," reflects

an ignorance of the basic fact that the latter decision, at

least, had been made well before the gruesome event.54 George Will

opined that "if there had been television cameras at Gettysburg,

there would be two countries" today.55 The potential of the image

for impacting operational and/or strategic decisions is a cause

for deep concern. The Highway of Death image-decision connection

provides one example of the effectiveness of the direct-personal

media channel.56

ANSWERING THE BASIC QUESTIONS

A number of questions must be addressed. First among them is

to what extent is national security decision making unique and by

its nature more or less responsive to media impact? National

security decision making is different partly by virtue of the

structure of government, partly by virtue of public expectations.

The Constitution established a system by which foreign affairs

(which is the realm of most national security issues) were to be

conducted principally by the president, but were to be

consummated only "with the advice and consent of the Senate."

Traditionally the president has led in such matters and, of

special importance, the American people expect him to do so.57

Thus, the tendency has been to allow the president to lead (if he

will) in a manner which satisfies the basic desires of the

people, a criterion sometimes difficult to determine.58 Especially

in matters of serious foreign policy issues which involve vital

national interests, the "rally 'round the president" factor

usually can be exploited. However, matters of genuine vital

national security interest are more often and more readily

handled in secret than others, provided all parties are conscious

of operational security (OPSEC) and dedicated to the private

conduct of those affairs. Thus, national security issues are

different from ordinary issues and may lend themselves to a

certain degree of insulation from media impact. Generally they

are handled through the mechanism of the National Security

Council (NSC) which was established by the 1947 National Security

Act for just that purpose.59 Further, the public seems generally

willing to concede the lead to the administration when such

issues become public. If the Gulf War is any indicator, the
13

public is not willing or anxious to see the media in the lead.

Another issue is that of "raw news." Perhaps the greatest

problem with "raw news" is the visual images that accompany it.

Just how important is the phenomenon of raw news that CNN

presents in the near real time? Who presents the images is also

important. Many of the most graphic images are shot by "foreign

stringers," people whose connection to the media is part-time,

opportunistic, and possibly biased. They shoot photographs or

videos as the occasion presents itself and then market their

wares to the highest bidder. (Some are on contract to major media

organizations, but they are paid for piece work.) This goes to

the heart of influencing the public. To influence public opinion,

the commentator must be a respected, credible figure. A

well-established anchor wields more weight with the viewing

public than do some presidents.60 But anchors do not present "raw

news" and thus benefit from the delay between an event and the

evening report, during which time the president or an

administration spokesperson may have taken the lead. In foreign

policy, and by implication national security, the public expects

the president to lead and will usually "stand by" for some

reaction from the White House. The media will be "at the door" as

quickly as possible seeking some administration reaction and in

their hunger for newsworthy comments or indicators of policy

decisions exert some pressure upon the administration to speak.

This pressure may force a premature reaction and some

policymakers have complained that they have no time to think

things through.61 The existence of reasonably well-developed

policy or a clear philosophy make reaction to surprise events

more manageable.

All this, of course, involves the impact of visual images.

How powerful are the visual images in the news media? Only a

tentative answer can be given to this question. It is certain

that there is shock value in some photographs.62 The video footage

of Somalis dragging the body of a dead American through the

streets of Mogadishu had two effects. Public opinion polls

reflected a demand to commit forces in strength and "teach them a

lesson they won't forget." Instead, within four days and under

intense congressional pressure, the administration issued

statements committing itself to a withdrawal by a certain date

and convinced the United Nations to withdraw its "Most Wanted"

posters of Mr. Aideed. The impact of the photos appears to have

been decisive in the direction exactly opposite that of public

opinion. As the more recent, horrifying photographs from Rwanda

have flashed on the television screen, the administration has

sought to energize others to the task of restoring order. Rwanda

has no national security value to the United States so the

pictures, as awful as they are, elicit only humanitarian demands

to quell the slaughter. On the other hand, genuine national

security issues are not normally the subject of dramatic

photographs and those which are dramatic in the national security

arena are often highly classified.
14

One issue which should be of particular concern, and which

may require government legislation, is the evidence of media

manipulation of images. Students of the media know that this is

not a new phenomenon, but the evidence of sophisticated technical

manipulation of images is growing and there is a possibility that

the normally skeptical American public will come, in time, to

view the picture "worth a thousand words" today, as containing

750 lies or potential lies tomorrow. Conversely, the MTV

generation may come to believe the image anyway. It is easy to

handle images whereas reading or thinking rationally takes work.63

Even as alternative periodicals abound in academe,

alternative news sources are increasing. It is possible that the

500-channel, interactive media center, which seems on the verge

of replacing the family television, may well give interested

viewers access to alternative interpretations of news, but unless

there is an accompanying increase in the number of reporters in

the field, all 500 channels will likely carry the same pictures.

Notwithstanding all the above, the public will continue to

react to dramatic images more strongly than to mere words of

outrage. If the Somali incident is any indicator, the reactions,

though immediate and visceral, may well be only of short

duration. Ultimately, Americans wanted their soldiers out of

Somalia and the administration read that desire correctly and

moved contrary to the public opinion survey without significant

outcry being raised.

Then, how important is the mood of the country in responding

to news events? Obviously, it is very important. The American

people will follow their president in national security issues so

long as the threat is palpable and his actions conform to the

general limits of the national interest as they understand them.

Internal discord makes it difficult to focus on external issues,

but external threatening issues may serve as a rallying point for

national unity. Bosnia, as an example, has little or no apparent

national security value to the American public. Neither did

Somalia, but while it appeared easy to take action in Somalia on

the heels of PROVIDE COMFORT (the relief of the Kurds), there

seems to be a general understanding that Bosnia could become very

disruptive of American economic recovery and, horrifying

photographs and news notwithstanding, the public does not want to

be led into the Balkans. In his classic work The First Summit:

Roosevelt & Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941, Theodore A. Wilson

recounts a period in 1940 when President Roosevelt felt that the

mood of the country had turned sour to the point where even his

remarkable persuasive powers had become ineffective. So strongly

did he feel this that he avoided any attempt to change it.64

It is significant that Franklin D. Roosevelt was a popular

president. Lyndon B. Johnson, on the other hand, was not;

especially when compared to his predecessor. What, then, is the
15

role of presidential popularity? The American people expect a

very high standard of performance from their president,

particularly in matters of national security, especially when it

involves the spilling of American blood. Whereas the tendency

exists to allow the president to lead in foreign matters, a "zone

three" president will essentially be unable to lead or influence

public opinion on any significant issue unless he is handed a

"good luck" issue—something as unequivocal as Pearl Harbor.65

Self-assured presidents seem far better able to handle the media,

but are best able to do so when they have a stated framework, a

previously articulated philosophical orientation upon which to

lean. Ronald Reagan had such a base and was able to operate from

it with relative impunity from media probing.

In the last few years, TV news has carried some stories for

extended periods. At some point, any news story grows stale.

There is a fatigue factor which affects public responsiveness to

otherwise dramatic news, but when that fatigue factor begins to

affect any given story will vary. The networks are profit driven

to keep the public attention, and a dip in ratings will result in

an automatic shift of news to more dramatic events regardless of

the apparent importance of the first event. Further, with the

advent of CNN, high drama can be continuously covered, but as CNN

coverage of the Gulf War demonstrated, there needs to be at least

a broad enough backdrop against which the networks can portray a

host of peripheral issues in those otherwise interminable periods

of waiting for the next event to begin. Conversely, CNN's

coverage of the Gulf War suggests that when a real national

security issue is involved, public fatigue is not a factor. This

may have been a unique event since it was the first of its kind,

but it is possibly significant that as an event it held public

interest for almost six months. In any case, it is a phenomenon

that requires further study.

Is there a predictable public opinion response time? So long

as the chain of influence runs conventionally from event to news

media to citizen to elected official to the Congress to the

president, time will be manageable to some degree. But with the

advent of public access to the White House via FAX and E-mail, it

is possible that reaction time will be compressed. Given the

growing sophistication of Political Action Committees (PACs), it

is highly likely they will employ the most immediate response

avenues and will attempt to mobilize their supporters to do

likewise. (The author was solicited by telephone once and twice

by mail, once with E-mail addresses and instructions, within one

10-day period while writing this study.) The popularity of the

"jam the White House switchboard" maneuver is growing and, as the

media continue to report on its effectiveness, it is likely to

increase as a political signalling tactic at the very least.

Whether this "pressure tactic" will translate into action remains

to be seen–especially in matters of foreign affairs for which

there are only a few PACs or interested and influential groups.

Cubans braving the Florida Straits get the attention of the media
16

while Hmong refugees trying to swim the Mekong to find safety in

Thailand go totally unnoticed.

How important is the context of an event? It appears that

context is one thing generally absent from most televised media

reports.66 Further, as fewer reporters are stationed on foreign

assignments for any length of time, the ability of the media to

provide relevant context will diminish. On the other hand, access

to varied data bases may eventually reverse this situation.

Despite the huge growth of information/news services, most

Americans remain locally focused and see international events

through the lens of their own particular situation. Consequently,

while Americans see Bosnia as morally awful, they also understand

that physical involvement there would interfere with the

reorientation of the American economy and would result in the

growth of the defense sector which has just been so painfully

dismantled. As an example of the problem of split focus, the

American Jewish community has been the voice to highlight the

issue of genocide against the Bosnian Muslims. Genocide is

genocide they rightly argue, but the arguments have not resulted

in sustained public outcry, probably because there are other more

pressing issues confronting the Jewish community at the moment.

Ironically, it appears that former President Jimmy Carter

may have used the context of international uncertainty over what

to do with North Korea, coupled to an international television

address to preempt administration plans to put serious pressure

on the North Koreans. Whether or not his negotiations with

President Kim Il-Sung would have borne fruit without the public

disclosure that accompanied it will never be known. What is

certain is that the context of growing international tension and

an ambivalent American public disposition to go to war with North

Korea again made Mr. Carter's announcement significant enough to

alter administration deliberations.67

How susceptible is the media to foreign manipulation? How is

that manipulation received? International opinions/attitudes are

frequently displayed in the American media sometimes simply

because they are newsworthy, sometimes because foreign nations

are seeking overtly to influence American policymakers through

the the American public. Sometimes these attempts to influence

are done crudely in which case most Americans dismiss the

attempt, sometimes, as Egyptian President Sadat demonstrated,

with craftiness which yields some results.68

Finally, some policy elites matter more than others. How

responsive/susceptible are these elites to the media? While there

may be a good deal of prejudice involved in any answer to this

question, the research appears sparse.69 An estimated two million

Americans are actively involved in foreign policy either as

participants or involved reader/viewers/writers. But as business

has become more multinational or international, issues of

American national security increasingly resonate in more distant,
17

more diffuse antechambers. In a speech at a media conference held

at a small college in Pennsylvania, Daniel Schorr made it clear

that current media management is more attuned to its profit

motivation than to reaching any particular body per se.70 One may

interpret from this that the mere hope of pandering successfully

to an influential body that does not otherwise generate high

volume sales is not likely to occur. However, among the two

million who "count" in such matters, there is a good deal of

elitist flavor. Yet, Page and Shapiro state that

"characterizations of public opinion as ignorant fall very wide

of the mark."71 "Collective opinion has responded rapidly and in

sensible ways [given the information provided] to international

[and other] events. . . ."72 A policy elite exists, but the

judgement of the American public must be attended to.

The second part of the answer must also come from Page and

Shapiro who state, "lack of available information does often give

elites leeway to act in unpopular ways." And that "the

availability of key facts . . . may be low, for reasons of chance

or design."73

CONCLUSIONS

These appear to be the truths associated with the interplay

between the media and the government.

The Relationship is Complex and Situational.

Media impact in itself may not be sufficient to alter

government policy. But it is not clear how the public,

increasingly becoming aware that it may make its voice heard

directly in reaction to a media event, through E-mail access to

the White House, will affect the Executive Branch. On the other

hand, it is possible that as certain news organizations conduct

their own on-air polls for immediate interpretation, the White

House will begin its own polling operation.

The popularity of the administration is a fundamental factor

in how well it relates to the press. A strong administration can

turn the media to its service in matters of national security

because the people tend to want the president to lead in that

area.

A president with low public opinion ratings can only gain

public and media support through dramatic action in response to

dramatic events. Otherwise, zone three presidents are generally

unable to positively influence public attitudes. Mature

administrations are generally better able to deal with dramatic

events and may be better able to gain control of the focus of

reporting so that the administration rather than the media sets

the agenda.
18

Respected commentators and "experts" have the capacity to

move public opinion dramatically, generally somewhat beyond what

even a popular president can do. However, as a general rule, the

media takes its lead in foreign policy from the Oval Office. An

active administration can seize direction of the media reporting

by "providing many opportunities" to the press. This amounts to a

saturation operation.

Images Play a Role.

Strong video images can engage the attention of the American

people if there is a humanitarian theme or a clear and present

threat to U.S. national security; however, the images are only

part of the complex of interactions and may have only transient

effect.

It is not yet common knowledge that some news is "doctored"

or that what is happening before the camera may be only what is

taking place in one small area. As stringers are employed more

and more in the Third World, it is increasingly likely that

activity may be staged or filmed selectively. When the biased

nature of video coverage becomes common knowledge, televised

dramatic events may well lose impact.

The Media is the Messenger.

The media claim, with some supporting evidence, that they

are simply the medium for the message and the people react

however they will. Others, including policymakers, sometimes

claim that they feel hamstrung by the media. "Media pressure" is

a call to action for which some immediate response is required,

thus reducing the time for thoughtful consideration. The evidence

that time for reflection generates better decisions is

ambivalent.

Political Action Committees can now activate the public to

"SHOUT" electromagnetically! The motivation may come from mailed

appeals to call congressmen or senators or the White House; to

telephonic appeals; or televised appeals. To date, few such

appeals have appeared in the print media. A televised appeal may

have only transient impact. A letter allows time for reflection

and consideration while in an active mode whereas television

usually finds the viewer in a passive mode. In all these cases

the media is the messenger and appeals for action are clearly

identified with their proper source.

Ultimately, the media's impact upon national security

decision making is a complex, situational equation consisting of

a host of variables from the prestige, personality and

credibility of the news commentators, president, other prominent

government figures and the "enemy" if there is one; to the depth

of focus of the public on domestic issues.
19

National Security is Different.

What does all this mean for national security? The answer,

like much of what has been presented here, is that it depends.

The elements that come together to determine whether the media

has an impact upon national security decision making include the

ability of the media to gain access to the important information,

the manner in which they choose to present it to the people, and

how that presentation resonates with the public mood. Operating

in harmony with or in opposition to the media portrayal of an

issue is the level of administration control which is, in its

turn, strengthened or compromised by the factor of presidential

popularity. In a true national security episode, both press and

people are likely to hold back to see whether the administration

will lead. If it leads in a direction compatible with the general

mood of the people, both will likely be supportive. If either the

president fails to lead, or attempts to lead in a direction

contrary to the popular mood, there is likely to be trouble for

the administration. But in matters of national security, the

government has the advantage of secrecy and a horde of salesmen

should it choose to attempt to sell an issue. Always operating

within and alongside this rather ambiguous process is the element

of personal conviction. Those with direct access to the president

or to his principal advisers have the opportunity for

disproportionate influence. This applies as well to advisory

organs like the NSC. But they, like individuals, operate in roles

that vary from administration to administration. There is, then,

no certain answer to the question. A different calculus is

required for each episode and the variables are no more static

than the mind of man.

ENDNOTES

1. W. Russell Newman, "Mass Audiences," Media Studies

Journal, Fall 1991, p. 157; also see Gladys Ganley, "Political

Uses of Personal Electronic Media," p. 175, and Michael C.

Janeway, "Power and Weakness of the Press," p. 3.

2. Benjamin I. Page, "Democratic Responsiveness? Untangling

the Links Between Public Opinion and Policy," Political Studies

Quarterly, March 1994, pp. 25-28.

3. James 1:6, The Holy Bible, King James Version.

4. Daniel C. Hallin, The "Uncensored War": The Media and

Vietnam, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 213; also

Ted Koppel, "The Perils of Info-Democracy," New York Times, July

1, 1994, A25.

5. William Randolph Hearst as quoted in Gerald F. Linderman,

The Mirror For War: American Society and the Spanish-American
20

War, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974, pp. 165-166,

from a signed editorial in the Journal on September 25, 1898.

6. Ken Auletta, Three Blind Mice: How the Networks Lost

Their Way, New York: Random House, 1991. Author details the shift

in direction of the networks toward the pure profit motivation of

ordinary big business. The Hearst and Pulitzer competition was

likewise market-share driven, but, says Aulette, the current

trend is a disturbing turn away from any attempt toward reporting

truth.

7. W. Russell Neuman, "Mass Audiences," Media Studies

Journal, Fall 1991, p. 157. Neuman suggests that the public

attention span responds in a variety of ways which require

further investigation.

8. Alicia C. Shephard "An American in Paris (and Moscow and

Berlin and Tokyo...)," American Journalism Review, April 1994,

pp. 25-26.

9. Gerald F. Linderman, The Mirror of War: American Society

and the Spanish-American War, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan

Press, 1974, pp. 25-27. For a slightly contrary view, see Harold

U. Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion: 1890-1900, The New

American Nation Series, New York: Harper Torch Books, 1959, pp.

27 and 223 and footnote 31.

10. Robert Beisner, From the Old Diplomacy to the New:

1865-1900, second edition, The American History Series, Arthur S.

Link gen. ed., Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc.,

1986, pp. 128-129.

11. Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion: 1890-1900, p.

227.

12. Linderman, The Mirror of War: American Society and the

Spanish-American War, p. 28, cites Frederick Merk, Manifest

Destiny and Mission in American History, A Reinterpretation, New

York: Alfred Knopf, 1963, p. 250, "...his philosophy was that a

President obeys, does not resist, public opinion"; also

Linderman, p. 27, "He believed the people knew more than any man.

He never tried to lead but studied so constantly public opinion

that he became almost infallible in its interpretation." Quoting

Chancy M. Deep in "Memorial Address on President McKinley at the

Lincoln Anniversary Banquet of the Republican Club of New York,

February 12, 1902." (footnote 57)

13. Linderman, The Mirror of War: American Society and the

Spanish-American War, p. 28.

14. Ibid., pp. 30-31.

15. Ibid., p. 35.
21

16. It has never been for lack of information nor of access

to it–which must temper our enthusiasm for the perhaps

exaggerated promise of the Information Age, except that viewing

television requires little initiative and insofar as diversity in

programming develops, diversity of information may likewise grow.

17. Jordan and Page, "Shaping Foreign Policy Options,"

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 36, No. 2, June 1992, p.

227. Page and Jordan's research demonstrates that in fact the

collective public usually gets the issues right. How is unclear

and demands further research.

18. Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational

Public: Fifty Years of Trends in American Policy Preferences,

Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 394-396.

19. Linderman, The Mirror of War: American Society and the

Spanish- American War, pp. 30-32.

20. Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion: 1890-1900, p.

228.

21. James A. Stimson, Public Opinion in America: Moods,

Cycles and Swings, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.

22. Gabriel Weinam, "The Influentials: Back to the Concept

of Opinion Leaders," Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1991, p.

276. One must take into account Robert Beisner's thesis that

McKinley was always in charge of himself and had simply accepted

the fact that only war was going to bring about the peace he

desired above everything else. Beisner, From the Old Diplomacy to

the New: 1865-1900, p. 129.

23. Linderman, The Mirror of War: American Society and the

Spanish- American War, p. 32.

24. Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion: 1890-1900, p.

231.

25. Linderman, The Mirror of War: American Society and the

Spanish-American War, pp. 156-157. Linderman cites a shift toward

emotionalism, lavish illustration, mass appeal vs class, a

substitute literacy with potential danger somewhat akin to what

many observers are reporting about the MTV generation in America

today. Despite the shallowness of this type of appeal, there is

evidence which needs further development that more Americans are

becoming more aware of foreign affairs. Qualitative judgements

have not been forthcoming.

26. Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion: 1890-1900, p.

232.
22

27. Linderman, The Mirror of War: American Society and the

Spanish- American War, p. 38.

28. Jordan and Page, "Shaping Foreign Policy Options,"

Journal of Conflict Resolution, p. 228.

29. Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of

Trends in American Policy Preferences, p. 172, begins a

discussion of mood theory as it is known in the realm of public

opinion studies. Page and Shapiro, among others, strongly suggest

that public moods are much less fickle than previously portrayed.

30. Linderman, The Mirror of War: American Society and the

Spanish- American War, pp. 52-59.

31. Ibid., pp. 156-157. Among the unique aspects of the time

was the fact that the government was not yet in the habit of

collecting and disseminating information in any systematic way.

Most Americans were focused on local issues. When interest in

Cuba began, the newspapers provided all the information that did

not come out of geography or history books. The media were, in

fact, the only ones with the information, with "the facts."

Lacking any counter-facts, media facts were whatever the

newspapers chose them to be and they chose them with a purpose in

mind–war! Had President McKinley chosen to attack the media

facts, the odds are that he would have had a very unsubstantial

basis from which to do so. His "truth" would have been purveyed

through the conservative media and it would have been

well-received by much of the business establishment. This is

another aspect of the phenomenon of influence by experts. Perhaps

there is a deeper trend at work which acknowledges that there is

too much to know for most people to be expert in any but a few

areas, and only the opinion of "experts" may be relied upon.

32. Linderman, The Mirror of War: American Society and the

Spanish- American War, p. 163; also for an evaluation of the

relative speeds of reporting today, see Robert J. Donovan and Ray

Scherer, Unsilent Revolution: Television News and Public Life,

1948-1991, Woodrow Wilson Center Series, New York: Press

Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1992, p. 317.

33. Mark Mohr quoted in Turmoil at Tiananmen: A Study of

U.S. Press Coverage of the Beijing Spring of 1989, Foreword by

Marvin Kalb, Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press,

Politics and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government,

Cambridge: Harvard University, June 1992, p. 191; also George

Ladner Jr. and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Intelligence Ties Endure

Despite U.S.-China Strain," The Washington Post, June 25, 1994,

pp. A1, A25.

34. Robert J. Donovan and Ray Scherer, Unsilent Revolution:

Television News and Public Life, 1948-1991, Woodrow Wilson Center

Series, New York: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge,
23

1992, p. 310.

35. W. Russell Newman, "Mass Audiences," Media Studies

Journal, Fall 1991, p. 157; also Michael C. Janeway, "Power and

Weakness of the Press," Media Studies Journal, Fall 1991, p. 3.

36. Ted Kopel, "The Perils of Info-Democracy," New York

Times, July 1, 1994, A25.

37. Patrick O'Heffernan, Mass Media and American Foreign

Policy: Insider Perspectives on Global Journalism and the Foreign

Policy Process, Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp., 1991.

O'Heffernan establishes the position that one must view the

media-government interaction as a two-way street. While it is

certainly well established that the media do exert influence, it

is equally clear that they are used by a wide variety of agents

for an equally wide range of purposes. In O'Heffernan's Chapter

8, "Insider's Model," there are three principal actors: Chiefs,

Staffers and Implementers. These are all domestic figures and as

suggested earlier, they all have varying degrees of influence.

Further, outside actors–the foreign press, foreign chiefs,

staffers and implementers also play a role.

38. Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of

Trends in American Policy Preferences, Chicago: The University of

Chicago Press, 1994. This entire book, the summation of research

covering a 50-year period, pounds home the point that the framers

of our democratic institutions, though themselves skeptical of

the "wisdom of the masses," nevertheless held to the theory of

participative government. And, when not intentionally misled by

government or influential factions, the wisdom of the people has

usually proven superior to the elites.

39. Dale Davenport, "Credibility Crashed With NBC's Fakery,"

Harrisburg Patriot-News, February 14, 1993, B11. In this episode,

a major network filmed a crash test of a certain line of trucks,

but they "enhanced" the effects of the crash to be certain that

they obtained a dramatic picture–they added firing mechanisms to

insure the crash resulted in a firey explosion. Although the

trucks may have been defective, the video footage presented on

the news was as phoney as if it had been created in Hollywood.

40. Jacqueline Sharkey, "When Pictures Drive Foreign

Policy," American Journalism Review, p. 17; also see Bert Quint,

"Absentee Journalism," Forbes Media Critic: The Best and Worst of

America's Journalism, Summer 1994, pp. 92-94.

41. Ibid.

42. Daniel C. Hallin, The "Uncensored War": The Media and

Vietnam, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 213. Ted

Koppel shares this conclusion stating "If an Administration fails

to set a clear agenda of its own, it will become the prisoner of
24

somebody else's." And further, "For an administration, the

absence of a clearly enunciated policy is the political

equivalent of a vacuum." Ted Koppel, "The Perils of

Info-Democracy," New York Times, July 1, 1994, A25.

43. Patrick O'Heffernan, Mass Media and American Foreign

Policy: Insider Perspectives on Global Journalism and the Foreign

Policy Process, Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1991,

pp. 103-109; 159-174; 175-213. Two major case studies consume

half of O'Heffernan's book. In the first the author studied

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's skillful use of the American

media to influence the American government, an act which the

author claims contributed ultimately to the Camp David Accords.

His second case study examines Israel's careless disregard of the

media during the early stages of the intifada which contained

dramatic images, an underdog struggle, and had considerable

duration. Here he makes the case that the raw media images

inflamed world opinion which resulted in a condemning vote in the

U.N. Media images may not have been the sole cause of the shift

in U.S. policy towards Israel, as there was ample disquiet on

that issue to begin with, but the video footage of Israeli

soldiers' brutality toward Palestinian children crystalized that

disquiet. The United States could have obstructed the vote, but

instead chose to abstain–a clear slap in Israel's face. Media

images of Israeli brutality were clearly instrumental in turning

U.S. policy away from its customary full support of Israel.

Israeli reactions to media coverage finally resulted in a news

blackout, recommended by Henry Kissinger. Included in these case

studies, is a third case study on the TWA hijacking, in which the

role of the media varied considerably. There was little doubt,

however, that the terrorists were attempting to use the media to

further their own particular ends. To an uncomfortable extent

they were successful.

44. Donald L. Jordan and Benjamin I. Page, "Shaping Foreign

Policy Opinions: The Role of TV News," Journal of Conflict

Resolution, Vol. 36, No. 2, June 1992, pp. 227-240. Also W.

Russell Neuman, "The Threshhold of Public Attention," Public

Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 2, Summer 1990, pp. 159-172; and

Donald L. Jordan, "Newspaper Effects on Policy Preferences,"

Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1993, p. 191.

45. Paul Brace and Barbara Hinckley, "The Structure of

Presidential Approval: Constraints Within and Across

Presidencies," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 53, No. 4, November

1991, pp. 996 and 998; also Charles W. Ostromand and Dennis M.

Simon, "Managing Popular Support: The Presidential Dilemma,"

Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 12, No. 4, June 1984, pp. 680-687.

46. Lee Seligman, "Disarming the Opposition: The President,

the Public, and the INF Treaty," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol.

54, No. 1, Spring 1990, p. 46.
25

47. Jordan and Page, "Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions: The

Role of TV News," Journal of Conflict Resolution, p. 231; also

Charles W. Ostromand and Dennis M. Simon, "Managing Popular

Support: The Presidential Dilemma," Policy Studies Journal, pp.

680-687.

48. Brace and Hinckley, "The Structure of Presidential

Approval: Constraints Within and Across Presidencies," The

Journal of Politics, p. 999.

49. Jordan and Page, "Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions: The

Role of TV News," Journal of Conflict Resolution, p. 231.

50. Ken Silverstein, "Follow the Leader: When Covering the

Third World, Major U.S. Newspapers Take Their Cue From the White

House," American Journalism Review, November 1993, pp. 30-36;

also Mark Hertgaard, "On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan

Presidency," American Journalism Review, November 1993, p. 31.

Whereas both of these references carry the same theme, an

excellent work of more general nature is Nicholas O. Barry,

Foreign Policy and the Press: An Analysis of the New York Times

Coverage of U.S. Foreign Policy, Contributions to the Study of

Mass Media and Communications No. 20, Bernard K. Johnpoll Series

ed., Westport: Greenwood Press, 1990. This author particularly

distinguishes between the developmental phase of a foreign policy

issue and the later reporting on that same issue.

51. Shephard, "An American in Paris (and Moscow and Berlin

and Tokyo . . .)," American Journalism Review, pp. 26-27.

52. Ralph Peters, "Media Shouldn't Choose Where Troops Go To

Die," Army Times, May 24, 1993, p. 31. Barry, Foreign Policy and

the Press, goes some distance in elaborating on several of Peters

allegations citing five variables which inhibit reporting

quality; also see Robert M. Batscha, Foreign Affairs News and the

Broadcast Journalist, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. Batscha

addresses some of the important characteristics of the medium

which may be in the process of changing as non-news news shows

grow in number and popularity. For a definitive discussion of the

schools of thought surrounding the question of the media's role

in "agenda setting," see Maxwell E. Mabombs, Edna F. Einsiedel

and David H. Weaver, Contemporary Public Opinion Issues and the

News, Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum, 1991; and the classic work of

Bernard Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy, Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1963.

53. Quoted in Harry Summers, "The Media's Mythical Legacy of

Influence," Army Times, November 29, 1993, p. 62.

54. Quoted in Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media:

Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War, Manchester: Manchester

University Press, 1992, p. 259.
26

55. Quoted in George H. Roeder Jr., The Censored War:

American Visual Experience During World War Two, New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1993, p. 5.

56. John Prados, Keeper of the Keys: A History of the

National Security Council from Truman to Bush, New York: William

Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991, pp. 469-470. Prados claims that

one day Michael Deaver went directly to President Reagan and told

him he was going to have to leave the administration. When asked

why by the surprised president, Deaver replied that he could no

longer stand to watch the nightly news reports with their photos

of the dead and dying in the streets of Beirut. (An example of

the direct and personal impact.) The president, according to

Prados, picked up the telephone and spoke directly to Prime

Minister Begin who immediately ordered a cessation of operations.

(Some of the work on these questions will continue in the normal

course of events as media symposia such as the annual event at

Dickinson College in Carlisle, PA, demonstrate. But there is a

need to address the media impact in the narrower realm of

national security issues more effectively. Organizations like the

Joan Shorenstein Barone Center at Harvard and The Freedom Forum

Media Studies Center at Columbia University provide effective

settings for collaborative efforts.)

57. Ostromand and Simon, "Managing Poplar Support: The

Presidential Dilemma," Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 12, No. 4,

June 1984, pp. 680-687.

58. Jordan and Page, "Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions: The

Role of TV News," Journal of Conflict Resolution, pp. 227-240.

59. Prados, Keeper of the Keys: A History of the National

Security Council from Truman to Bush, pp. 559-569.

60. Jordan and Page, "Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions: The

Role of TV News," Journal of Conflict Resolution, p. 228.

61. Jacqueline Sharkey, "When Pictures Drive Foreign

Policy," American Journalism Review, December 1993, p. 19; The

Media and Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World, New York:

Freedom Forum Media Studies Center Research Group, 1993, p. 28;

and Brian Hall, "Blue Helmets and Empty Guns," New York Times

Magazine, January 2, 1994, pp. 19-29.

62. Sharkey, Ibid., p. 17. This is a good article but one

which calls for a deeper, more thoroughgoing development

incorporating diplomatic and defense exchanges and policy

debates.

63. William J. Mitchell, "When is Seeing Believing?"

Scientific American, February 1994, pp. 68-73. For another angle

on the issue of truth in reporting and the role and function of

the editor, see Paul H. Weaver, "Editocracy," Forbes Media
27

Critic: The Best and Worst of America's Journalism, Summer 1994,

pp. 72-81.

64. Theodore A. Wilson, The First Summit: Roosevelt and

Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941, rev. ed., Manhattan: University

Press of Kansas, 1991.

65. Jordan and Page, "Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions: The

Role of TV News," Journal of Conflict Resolution, p. 235.

66. Sharkey, "When Pictures Drive Foreign Policy," American

Journalism Review, pp. 14, 19.

67. R. Jeffrey Smith and Ann Devroy, "One Small Concession

Looms Large," Washington Post, June 26, 1994, p. A1.

68. O'Heffernan, Mass Media and American Foreign Policy:

Insider Perspectives on Global Journalism and the Foreign Policy

Process, Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1991, pp.

103-109.

69. Bernard Gwertzman, quoted in The Media and Foreign

Policy in the Post-Cold War World, New York: The Freedom Forum

Media Studies Center Research Group, 1993, p. 20; also Prados,

Keeper of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council

from Truman to Bush, pp. 469-470.

70. Letter from Daniel Schorr to the author, April 5, 1994.

71. Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of

Trends in American Policy Preferences, p. 388.

72. Ibid., p. 389.

73. Ibid., p. 393.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel John W. Mountcastle

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler