Serota's client was a defendant in an action by the SEC in 

federal court. In anticipation of a negotiated outcome in that case, the 

client paid Serota all of the monies due in advance, by way of fourteen 

checks totaling $319,901.59 written between July 2 and July 24, 2009, 

which were deposited in Serota's client trust account. Meanwhile, on July 

16, 2009, a check from Serota's client trust account was written to 

Beverage Plus, a company in which Serota had an ownership interest, for 

$225,000. Serota continued to accept checks from the client until the 

client had paid him the entire amount of the anticipated judgment. Then 

on July 28, 2009, a check from Serota's trust account was written to Clean 

Path Resources, another company in which Serota had an interest, for 

$94,000. 

On August 3, 2009, Serota's client signed a consent to entry of 

judgment, which was filed with the court on August 27, 2009. Pursuant to 

the signed consent, on September 25, 2009, final judgment was entered 

against Serota's client which ordered the client to, among other things, 

pay a total judgment of $319,901.59 within 10 business days. On October 

7, 2009, two days before the judgment was to be paid, Serota admitted his 

misappropriations to the state bar. 

Consequently, on December 29, 2009, the state bar filed a 

complaint against Serota alleging that his conduct violated RPC 1.15 

(safekeeping property), RPC 3.4 (fairness to opposing party and counsel), 

and RPC 8.4 (misconduct). At the formal disciplinary hearing held 

January 13, 2011, the state bar put on evidence of Serota.'s 

misappropriations and of aggravating circumstances it alleged were 

present in this matter; the defense focused primarily on mitigating 

circumstances which it alleged were present. On February 14, 2011, the 

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panel found unanimously that Serota had violated RPC 1.15 and RPC 8.4. 

It recommended, by a 4-1 vote, that Serota be disbarred and ordered to 

pay costs of the proceedings. 2 

2Serota's motion to set aside the recommendation of disbarment by 

the board, filed July 7, 2011, is denied. The State Bar's motion to strike 

or, in the alternative, opposition to Serota's motion to set aside the 

recommendation of disbarment by the board, filed July 20, 2011, is 

therefore denied as moot. 

Serota has communicated to this court by way of several letters 

addressed to the clerk of the court. He is admonished that any request for 

relief from this court must be presented by way of a formal, written 

motion, not by way of a letter addressed to the clerk of the court. Weddell 

v. Stewart, 127 Nev. , n.8, 261 P.3d 1080, 1085 n.8 (2011). In 

addition, Serota's briefs contain numerous factual assertions not 

supported by references to the record and references to facts which are 

outside the record altogether. This is improper and we must disregard 

such references. See NRAP 28(e)(1); SCR 105(3)(b); Carson Ready Mix, 

Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 97 Nev. 474, 476,635 P.2d 276, 277 (1981). In 

addition, Serota has improperly attempted to supplement the record with 

exhibits not before the disciplinary panel, which we cannot consider and 

have therefore disregarded. See NRAP 10; NRAP 30(b); SCR 105(3)(b); 

State, Dep't of Taxation v. Kelly-Ryan, Inc., 110 Nev. 276, 282, 871 P.2d 

331, 336 (1994). We direct the clerk of this court to return, unfiled, the 

document entitled "Appellant's Exhibit Supplement to Reply Brief," 

provisionally received on October 19, 2011; we further direct the clerk of 

this court to strike Exhibits 1-6 from Appellant's Reply Brief filed October 

21, 2011. 

Finally, on August 4, 2011, appellant filed an opposition to 

respondent's motion to extend the time in which to file the answering 

brief. At the time the opposition was filed, the extension of time had 

already been granted. We therefore elect to treat appellant's opposition as 

a motion for reconsideration of our order granting the requested extension 

of time, and we deny it. See NRAP 31(b)(3)(B); SCR 105(3)(b). 

3 
We review a decision of a hearing panel recommending 

disbarment automatically. SCR 105(3)(b). The panel's findings must be 

supported by clear and convincing evidence. SCR 105(2)(e); In re 

Discipline of Drakulich, 111 Nev. 1556, 1566, 908 P.2d 709,715 (1995). 

Although persuasive, the panel's findings and recommendations are not 

binding on us. In re Discipline of Droz, 123 Nev. 163, 168, 160 P.3d 881, 

884 (2007). Our review is conducted de novo, requiring us to exercise 

independent judgment to determine whether and what type of discipline is 

warranted. SCR 105(3)(b); In re Discipline of Stuhff, 108 Nev. 629, 633, 

837 P.2d 853, 855 (1992). The paramount objective of attorney 

disciplinary proceedings is "to protect the public from persons unfit to 

serve as attorneys and to maintain public confidence in the bar as a 

whole." State Bar of Nevada v. Claiborne, 104 Nev. 115, 129, 210, 219, 756 

P.2d 464, 473, 526, 533 (1988). In determining the proper disciplinary 

sanction, we consider four factors: (1) the duty violated, (2) the lawyer's 

mental state, (3) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's 

misconduct, and (4) the existence of aggravating or mitigating 

circumstances. In re Discipline of Lerner, 124 Nev. 1232, 1246, 197 P.3d 

1067, 1077 (2008). 

We conclude that the panel's findings are supported by clear 

and convincing evidence. Serota concedes that he violated RPC 1.15. 

Serota's client turned over money to him which was to be paid to the SEC 

to satisfy a judgment against the client, but instead of safeguarding those 

funds, Serota misappropriated them for his own purposes. He therefore 

failed in his duties to safekeep his client's property. Serota also concedes 

that he violated RPC 8.4(c). In addition to misappropriating the client's 

funds for his own purposes, he allowed the client to sign the consent to 

4 
entry of judgment despite knowing that he had already misappropriated 

the money intended to satisfy the judgment. He therefore engaged in 

conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 

Therefore, clear and convincing evidence supports the panel's findings 

that Serota violated RPC 1.15 and 8.4. 3 

We further conclude that, considering the four Lerner factors, 

disbarment is the appropriate disciplinary sanction in this case. Serota's 

conduct in this matter violated duties to his client, the profession, and the 

public. We conclude that his conduct was intentional and caused actual 

injury to his client. The egregiousness of his actions alone justifies 

disbarment. See American Bar Association Standards for Imposing 

Lawyer Sanctions, Compendium of Professional Responsibility Rules and 

Standards, at 429 (2010 ed.) (disbarment generally appropriate when 

lawyer knowingly converts client property causing injury or potential 

injury). 

The presence of aggravating circumstances further supports 

this conclusion. See SCR 102.5(1). One such circumstance is that Serota 

has a prior disciplinary offense. 4SCR 102.5(1)(a). In addition, we agree 

with the state bar that his conduct evinces a dishonest or selfish motive. 

SCR 102.5(1)(b). Furthermore, there was a pattern of misconduct where, 

3Because clear and convincing evidence supports the panel's findings 

regarding these rules of professional conduct, we need not consider the 

parties' remaining arguments regarding RPC 3.4 or subsection (d) of RPC 

8.4. 

40n August 18, 2008, Serota received a letter of reprimand for 

having violated RPC 1.1 (competence), RPC 3.1 (meritorious claims and 

contentions), and RPC 5.5 (unauthorized practice of law). 

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prior to each misappropriation, Serota accepted several payments from the 

client beforehand, and hid his misconduct afterwards until its discovery 

was imminent. SCR 102.5(1)(c). Finally, Serota concedes that he 

committed multiple offenses. SCR 102.5(1)(d). Even if Serota's conduct 

did not by itself warrant disbarment, the presence of these aggravating 

circumstances would justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be 

imposed. SCR 102.5(1). 

We further conclude that, although there are some mitigating 

circumstances present in this case, they do not justify a reduction in the 

degree of discipline to be imposed. SCR 102.5(2). To begin, Serota's 

contention that there is an absence of a dishonest or selfish motive is 

belied by his conduct. SCR 102.5(2)(b). In addition, though his medical 

condition may have contributed to personal or emotional problems, we 

conclude that these mitigating circumstances are insufficient to warrant a 

reduction in discipline in light of the egregiousness of his misconduct. 

SCR 102.5(2)(c), (h). We further conclude that his claimed mental 

disabilities are largely uncorroborated and, in any case, he failed to 

establish a causal connection between them and his misconduct. SCR 

102.5(2)(i). Although he was cooperative and self-reported, SCR 

102.5(2)(e), discovery of his misconduct was imminent and thus this does 

not warrant a reduction in discipline. We conclude that Serota's claimed 

rehabilitation is not supported by the record. SCR 102.5(2)(k). We further 

conclude that he failed to demonstrate genuine remorse, and instead on 

appeal attempts to blame the victim. SCR 102.5(2)(m). Finally, his claims 

of having done pro bono and other work to benefit the profession and the 

community are largely unsubstantiated, and in any case would not 

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6 
Pickering 

J. 

C.J. 

Gibbons 

Parraguirre 

Cherry 

, J. 

Saitta 

warrant a reduction in discipline in light of the seriousness of his 

misconduct. SCR 102.(5)(2). 

Accordingly, Serota is hereby disbarred from the practice of 

law in this state. 5Serota shall pay costs of the disciplinary proceedings in 

the amount of $2,142.75 within 30 days from the date of this order. Serota 

and the state bar shall comply with SCR 115 and SCR 121.1. 

It is so ORDERED. 

Hardesty 

5In light of this disposition, the other matters currently pending 

before this court regarding Serota have been rendered moot. Personhood 

Nevada v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010); NCAA v. 

University of Nevada, 97 Nev. 56, 57, 624 P.2d 10, 10 (1981). We therefore 

deny Serota's petition for dissolution of our order temporarily suspending 

him from the practice of law as moot. In re Discipline of Serota, Docket 

No. 60179 (Petition for Dissolution of Temporary Suspension, April 24, 

2012). Likewise, we deny the state bar's petition regarding Serota's felony 

conviction as moot. In re Discipline of Serota, Docket No. 59551 (Petition 

of Bar Counsel Pursuant to Reporting Requirements of SCR 111(4)). 

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cc: Ronald N. Serota 

David Clark, Bar Counsel 

Jeffrey R. Albregts, Chair, Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board 

Kimberly K. Farmer, Executive Director, State Bar of Nevada 

Perry Thompson, Admissions Office, United States Supreme Court 

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