2014 UT App 264

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### T H E 

### U TA H 

### C O U RT O F 

### A P P E A L S

A ND RE W V EYS E Y

, Peti tioner and Appellee,

v. A L E XI S V E YS E Y

, Respondent and Appellant.

Opin i on No. 20130726-CA Filed N ov ember 14, 2014

Thi rd Di stric t Co urt, S alt Lake Depart ment The Honorable L.A. Dever No. 984907587

Alexis Veysey, Appellant Pro Se Rebecca Long Okura and Jenna Hatch, Atto rneys

for Appellee
J UD G E J AM E S Z. D AVI Sauthore d thi s Opini on, i n whi ch J UD G E S G RE G OR

Y K. O R M Eand J. F RE D E RI C V OR O S J R . concu rr ed.

DAVIS, Judge:

¶1 Alexis Veysey (Mot her) challen ges the d istric t court’s adoption of t he domesti c commi ssi oner’ s recommendati on reg ardin g reimb ursement of daycare expenses for the parties’ chi ldren. We vacate the di stric t court’s or der and remand for further pr oceedings.

BACKGRO UND

¶2 The parties di vo rced in Sept ember 1999. Pursu ant to Utah Code secti on 78B-12-214, the parties’ di vo rce decree required Andrew Veysey (Fathe r ) t o reimb urse Mot her for half of “all reasonable monthly day care expenses actually pai d by [Mo ther] and incu rr ed on behalf of the parties’ minor chi ldren as a result of [Mot her’s] emplo yment and/or occupati onal or career tr aining.”Veysey v. Veys ey

The decree di d not require Father to pay a defined mo nt hly amount of daycare expenses, but rat her required hi m to reimb urse Mot her wi thi n ten days of receiving a receip t for daycare expenses. The decree contained no prov i si on requiring Mother to prov i de

such recei pts wi thi n a particular tim e frame. 1

¶3 On Mar ch 5, 2013, Mot her fi led a Mot i on for Or der to Show Cause requestin g a judgment for daycare arr earag es accrued between Sept ember 2002 and June 2006. D uri ng some of thi s tim e period, the chi ldren atte nded full- day kin derg art en at Challenger,

a private sch o o l

. A hearin g was held before a domesti c commi ssi oner on April 1, 2 0 1 3

. The commi ssi oner i ssu ed a recommendati on conclu ding, “The statute of li mit ations on chi ld

care expenses and the prin ci ple of laches preclude[] the court from

1. Follo wing an or der to show caus e he a r ing in 2000 before a di fferent commi ssi oner, that commi ssi oner recommended as follows: 2. Fr om thi s poin t forward, if fami ly members prov i de chi ld car e, [Father ] do es no t need t o pay. If [Mot her’s] n e i gh

b or p ro vi d e s the chi l d c are, [Mot her] i s to prov i de ver i fi cati on wi thi n 30 days and [Father ] i s to pay 1/2 the amount wi thi n 5 days. [Mot he r ] to prov i de copi es of chec ks to show ver i fi cati on of payment. 3. Parties sti pulate to mo d ify the decree of di vo rce wi th the language tha t ver i fi cati on of chi ld care expenses i s to be pro vided. Nei ther party objecte d to thi s recommendati on. See generally Utah R. Ci v. P. 108(a) (explaining th a t a c om m i s s i one r’ s re c om m e n d ation “i s the or der of the court unti l modi fi ed by the court” and outlin ing the procedure for objecting to the recommendati on). The parties di sagree as to whether the commi ssi oner’ s ex p l ici t refer ence to Mot her’s nei ghbor indi ca t e s that the modi fi ed ver i fi cati on requirements were intended to apply only to daycare e x p enses associ ated wi th the nei ghbor or whether they can be interpr eted to apply to all daycare expenses. We need not resolv e thi s di spute for purpo se s of our analysi s, but i t may be relev ant to the di stric t court’s dete rminati on on r emand.

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consi dering chi ld care expenses more than 8 year s old.” The recommendati on there fore or dered that Father “pay one half o f any pre-school or ext ended care expenses incu rr ed between April 1, 2005 and June of 2006.” The calc ul ation ulti mately adopted by the commi ssi oner excluded Mot her’s clai ms for reimb ur se ment relat ing to full- day kindergart en at Challenger and inclu ded only p reschool expenses for the youngest chi ld incu rr ed befor e sh e enter ed kin derg art en in September 2005.

¶4 Mot her objecte d to the commi ssi oner’ s recommendati on, and a hearin g was held before the di stric t co ur t on June 20, 2013. Follo wing t he he aring, the di stric t court i ssu ed a minute entry statin g on l y , “ [T]he deci si on of the Commi ssi oner i s corr ect.” Mot her appeals.

ISS UES AND STANDARDS O F REVIEW

¶5 Mot her fi rst arg ues that the di stric t court err ed in adopting the commi ssi oner’ s employment of an e ig ht-year statute of li mi tations to bar her clai ms for reimb ursement. “The tr i al court’s

a p p l icati on of a statute of li mi tations presents a questi on of l a w whic h we rev i ew for corr ectness.” Estes v. Tibbs , 1999 UT 52, ¶ 4, 979 P.2d 823.

¶6 Mot her next asserts that the di stric t court err ed in adopting the commi ssi oner’ s det e r minati on that the doctrine of laches appli es to thi s case. “[T] he questi on of laches pres e nt s a mi xed que st io n of law and fact.” Johnson v. Johnson , 2014 UT 21, ¶ 8, 3 3 0 P.3d 704. Although “we typical ly grant some level of deference to the tr i al court’s appli cati on of law to the facts,” Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, ¶ 9, 144 P.3d 1147, the court’s deter minati on mus t be supp or ted by adequate factua l f in d in gs, A nde rs o n v
. Thompson , 2008 UT App 3, ¶ 42, 176 P.3d 464.

¶7 Fin ally, Mot her arg ues that the dist ric t court’s approv al of the commi ssi oner’ s reimb ursement calculati on err oneously excluded fu l l -day kin derg art en expenses that should have been

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reimb ursed as work -related daycare expenses under the statute.

“ The proper interpr etat i on and appli cati on of a statute i s a questi on of law whi ch we rev i ew for corr ectness, affordi ng no deference to the di stric t court’s legal conclu si on.” Gutierrez v. Medley, 97 2 P.2d 913, 914–15 (Utah 1998).

ANALYS IS

I. St atute o f Li mi tations

¶8 Mot her asserts that we should employ the statu t e of li mi tations a p pli cable to chi ld supp or t or ders and sum -certain judgments for past-due supp or t. That statute of li mi tations permi ts enforcement wi thi n the longer of four year s after the youngest chi ld reaches major i ty or ei ght year s from the d a t e o f e nt ry of a
sum -certain judgment. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-202( 6) (Lexi sNexi s 2012). Father arg ues that we should employ the gener al ei ght-year statute of li mi tations for judgments. See id. § 78B-5-202( 1). When two statutes of li mi tations confli ct, the statute applying to a speci fi c t y p e of acti on contro ls ov er a more gener al statute of li mi tatio ns

. Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Suppl y Co. , 681 P.2d 214, 216 (Utah 1984). Thus, the r e soluti on of thi s di spute turns on the questi on of whether daycare e xpenses c onsti tute chi ld su pport

. ¶9 Th e Utah Code i s ambi guous as to whether daycare costs that have not been reduced to a judgment fall wi thi n the defini tion of chi ld supp or t. First, the Utah Code mandates that a requirement “that each parent sh are equally the reasonable work -related chi ld

care expenses of the parents” be inclu ded in “ [ t ] h e child support order .” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12 -214(1) (Lexi sNexi s 2012) (emphas i s added). A chi ld supp or t or der i s defined as an or der that “establi shes or modi fi es ch i ld su pport ” or “reduces chi ld su pport

arr earag es to j udgment.” Id. § 78B-12-102( 9)(a) –(b)

. ¶10 Chi ld su pporti s defined as

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[1] a base chi ld su p p or t award, or [2] a monthly financi al award for un insu red medi cal expenses,
or der e d by a tr ibunal for the supp or t of a chi ld, inc luding [3] current periodi c payments, [4] a l l

arr earag es whi ch accrue under an or der for current periodi c payments, and [5] sum certain judgments awarded for arr earag es, medi cal expenses, and chi ld care costs.

Id. § 78B-12-102( 8). “Base chi ld support awar d” i s defin ed as “t he award that may be or dered and i s calculat e d us ing the [ch i ld supp or t] guid e l ines” and explic i tly excludes “medi cal expenses 2 and work -related chi ld care costs.” Id. § 78B-12-102( 4 ). The other types of supp or t i denti fi ed in the defini tion contemplate only fi xed amounts—monthly financi al awards, curr ent periodi c payments,

arr earag es, and sum-c e rt ain judgments. Mother urges us to interpr et “current periodi c payments” as encompas sing the type of

var i able “r easonable monthly day care expenses actually pai d” prov i ded for in the parties’ di vo rce decree. However , var i able daycare e x p e nses cannot be clas si fi ed as “periodi c” becau se they

are based on actual expenses incu rr ed, whi ch may var y from week t o we e k and month to month. Sim i larly, the phrase “arr earag e s whi ch accrue under a n or der for current periodi c payments” contemplates the exi stence of an or der defi ning a speci fi c amount to be paid peri odic ally.

¶11 Thus, altho ugh the Utah Code requires court s t o or der the payment o f work -related daycare expenses as part of the chi ld supp or t or der, i t a ppears to exclude such expenses (at least unti l they are reduced to judgment) from the defini tion of chi ld supp or t. We resolv e thi s inconsi stency by look ing at t he chi ld supp or t statute as a whole and by consi dering the intent and purpose of the

2. The chi ld supp or t gui delines are contai ned in se c ti on s 7 8 B

- 1 2-201 to -219 of the Utah Code. U t a h Code Ann. § 78B-12-102( 12) (Lexi sNexi s 2012). See generally id

. § § 78B-12-201 to -219 (2012 & Supp. 2013).

20130726-CA 5 2014 UT App 264Veysey v. Veys ey legis lature in enacting the defini tion. See Carter v. Unive rsity of Utah Med. C tr. , 2006 UT 78, ¶¶ 9, 1 3 , 150 P.3d 467 (explaining that “we seek to render all parts [of t he statute] relev ant and meaningful, and we accordingly avo i d interpr etat i ons that wi ll render port i ons of a st atute superflu ous or inoperat i ve,” and that “[w] e read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpr et i ts prov i si ons in harmony wi th other statutes in the same chapter and relat ed chapters” (alterat i ons in or i gin al) (ci tations and inter nal quotat i on marks omitted)).

¶12 Until 2000, the chi ld supp or t statu te’s defini tion of chi ld supp or t merely stated, “‘Chi ld supp or t’ i s defined in Section 62A11-401.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-2( 7) (Lexi s Supp. 1999); see also Act of Mar ch 13, 2000, ch. 1 6 1 , § 2 2 , 2000 Utah Laws 558, 570. Section 62A-11-401 i s contai ned in the statute r e l a t ing to income wi thholdi ng by the Offi ce of Recove ry Ser vic es (ORS) an d p ro vides defini tions relev ant to that statute. See Utah Co de Ann. § 62A-11- 4 0 1 (Lexi sNexi s 2011). ORS ’s ro le in collecting chi ld supp or t is li mi ted to speci fi c dollar amounts contai ned in a supp or t or der and judgments for arr earag es; O R S d oes not collect ongo ing medi cal and daycare expenses where the dollar amount of those expenses i s not speci fi ed in th e di vo rce decree or reduced to a judgment. Utah Department of Human Ser vic es, Offi ce of Recove ry Ser vic es/Chi ld Suppor t Ser vic es, Notice of Servic es , 2 (Ju ly 1, 2014), availab le at http://www.ors.utah.gov /documents/ANIAFor m.pdf. Thus, i t stands to reason th a t t he defini tion of chi ld supp or t contai ned in the ORS statute inclu des only forms of suppo r t that ha ve a fi xed dollar amount; we can conceive of no such rat i ona l e for excluding var i able supp or t, i .e., supp or t d e fined by catego ry rat her t ha n by dollar amount, from the chi ld supp or t statute’s defini tion.

¶13 Although the legis lature added an exp l i c i t d e fini ti on of chi ld supp o r t t o t he chi ld supp or t statute in 2000, that defini tion sti ll relied on the language used in the ORS statute rat her than creating

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a di stinct defini tion for purposes of the chi ld supp or t statute. 3 CompareAct of Mar ch 13, 2000, ch. 161, § 14, 2000 Utah Laws 558, 5 66, with id. ch. 161, § 22, 2000 Utah Laws 558, 570. Becaus e t he legis lature si mply adopted an al ready -exi sting defini tion, i t does not appear to hav e made a consc i ous deci si on to exclude variable medi cal and daycare expenses from the defini tion of chi ld supp or t in the context of the chi ld supp or t statute, and indeed, i ts requirement that reimb ursement for daycare e xp e n s e s b e prov i ded fo r in the child support order suggests the opposi te. See Utah Cod e Ann. § 78B-12- 214(1).

¶14 The exclusi on o f medi cal and daycare expenses from the defini tion of base chi ld supp or t also does not appear to stem from the legis lature’s deter minati o n t ha t these expenses do not consti tute chi ld supp or t, but from i ts desi re to di stingui sh these two catego ries from other catego ries of chi ld-r e a ring expenses presumabl y cover ed by the base chi ld supp or t award. See Davis v. Davis , 2011 UT App 311, ¶ 17, 263 P.3d 520 (“[C]hi ld-rearing expenses not statutor i ly di stingui shed from reg ular chi ld supp or t should be consi dered part and parcel of the chi ld supp or t award.” (ci tat io n a nd internal quotat i on marks omi tte d)). Indeed, the fact that the legis lature felt the need to di stingui sh “base chi ld supp or t” fro m “chi ld supp or t” on thi s basi s suggests that i t expected medi c a l and daycare expenses to fall wi thi n the gener al defini tion of chi ld supp or t and that a di fferen t t erm was needed to refer to the base award “calculated using the [ch i ld supp or t] gui delines.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1 2 -1 0 2 (4) (Lexi sNexi s 2012); see also Wardle v. Bowen , 2005 UT App 226U, para. 11 (“[T ]here i s no questi on that

. . . medi cal and daycare expenses are in the nature of chi ld supp or t.”); Black’s Law Dictionary 274 (9th ed. 2009) (defining chi ld supp or t as,

3. The o nl y current di fference between the two defini tions i s that the ORS defini tion “inclu des obli gations or dered by a tr ibunal for t he su pport of a spouse or former spouse wi th whom the chil d resi des i f the s pousal supp or t i s collected wi th the chi ld supp or t.” Compare Utah Code Ann. § 62A-11-401 (LexisN exis 2 0 1 1 ), with i d. § 78B-12-102( 8) (2012)

.

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inter alia, “the money legally owed by one pare nt to the other for the expenses incu rr ed for chi ldren of the marr i age”).

¶15 In short, we conclu de that var i able daycare expenses consti tute ch ild suppor t and that the statute of li mi tations gov ernin g enforcement of chi ld supp or t or ders appli es to Mot her’s clai m for reimb ursement. Becaus e the statute of li mi tations permi ts enforcement of the di vo rce d ecree’s order on daycare expenses at least unti l four y e a rs after the youngest chi ld reaches major i ty, i t does n ot preclude Mot her from seeki ng reimb ursement for the pre2005 daycare expenses. See Uta h C ode Ann. § 78B-5-202( 6) (Lexi sNexi s 2012).

II. Laches

¶16 The commi ssi oner alter nati vely deter mined that t he prin ci ple of laches bar red Mot her from recov ering expenses incu rr ed prior to April 2005. “To suc cess fully assert a laches defense, a defendant mus t establi sh both th a t t he plainti ff unreasonably delayed in bri ngi ng an acti on and that the defendant

was p rej udi ced by that delay.” Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987). “The length o f t ime that consti tutes a lack of di li gence depend[s ] on the ci rcums tances of each case, becau se the propr i ety of refusing a clai m i s equally predic ated upon the gr avity of the prej udi ce suffered

. . . and the length of delay.” Fun damentalist Churc h ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Lin dberg, 2010 UT 51, ¶ 28, 238 P.3d 1054 (alterat i on and omi ssi on in or i gin al) (ci tation and internal quotat i on marks omit ted). Thi s i ssu e i s t he refor e hi ghly fact-depend ent, requiring consi derat i on of “t he relat i ve harm caus ed by the petiti oner’ s delay, the relat i ve harm to the petiti oner, and whether or not the r e sp o ndent acted in goo d fai th.” Id.

¶17 The commi ssi oner’ s r ecommendati on contai ns no findings supp or tin g a deter minati on that laches appli es in thi s case. It merely states that both the statute of l imit a tions and the prin ci ple of laches pr e cl ud e the court from consi dering daycare expenses
more than ei gh t y ears old. First, thi s deter minati on i s err oneous

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inasm uch as i t suggest s t ha t t he pass age of a particu lar length of tim e was alone suffi ci ent to invok e the doctrine of laches

. Se e id. Second, the findings made by the commi ssi oner at the hearin g do not address the tw o e l e ments of a laches defense. The 4 commi ssi oner di d not explic i tly find that Mot her unreasonably delayed in bri ngi ng her acti on. Instead, the co mm issi oner was equi vo cal on thi s poin t, merely observing that the parties di sputed t his issue and that “[i ]t appears that [Mot her] has not prov i d e d proo f of these expenses unti l recent l y .” (Emph asi s added.) The commi ssi oner made no findings reg ardin g the prej udi ci al i mpact of any delay on Father

. See id. ; Borland, 733 P.2 d a t 1 4 7. Wi thout speci fi c findings supp or tin g a deter minati on that laches appli ed in thi s case, the commi ssi oner’ s recommendati on—and, accordingly, the di stric t court’s adoption of tha t recommendati on —was 5

err oneous.

4. In fact, although the or der adopted by the c om mi ssi oner asserted laches as a justifi cati on for her ruling, he r o r al ruling di d not appear to rely on laches

. The commi ssi oner focus ed prim arily on the statute of li mi tations and asserted only that “there ’s a prin ci ple of laches that indi cates that, if a party si mply does not prov i de proo f for a si gni fi cant perio d o f t ime and, si mply, does not make any requests whatsoever wi th regard to those expenses, that they

can wai ve that merely by the p a ss age of tim e.” Although the commi ssi oner di scu ssed laches, she di d not explic i tly det e r mine that it appli ed in thi s cas e unti l she approved t he wri tte n order

.
5. Although we conclu de that the di strict co ur t’s findings were ulti matel y inadequate to supp or t i ts deter minati on that laches appli ed, our deter minatio n is based on the inadequacy of the commi ssi oner’ s findings, not the fact that the di str i ct court
sum mari ly adopted those findings as i ts own

. C ontr a ry to Mot her’s asserti on, i t i s not e r ro neous for a di stric t court to adopt a commi ssi oner’ s findings rat her than making it s own separate findings where i ts deci si on and re a soning do not di ffer from that of the commi ssi oner. Where the d ist r ict court does so, we wi ll si mply evaluate the c ommi ssi oner’ s findings as though they were made by the di stric t court

.

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¶18 The absenc e of more speci fi c findings i s perhaps understandable in li ght o f the fact that the commi ssi oner relied prim arily on the statute of li mi tations in denyi ng Mot her’s clai m for reimb ursement of pre-2005 e xp e n s e s

. Se e s up ra n ot e 4. However , given o ur r ever sal of that deter minati on, addi tional findings are
necess ary to deter mine whi ch of Mot her’s ex p e nses may be proper ly reimb ur se d

. If supp or ted by adequate findings, a deter minati on that some port i on of Mot her’s clai ms are barred by laches would not necess arily be inappro p r iate. Alter nati vely , 6 based on adequate findings, the di stric t court may exer ci se it s di screti on to deny Mot her’s clai ms if i t deter mines t hat she f a ile d to comply wi th Utah Code secti on 78B-12-214( 2)(b ), whi ch outlin es the ver i fi cati on requirements a parent mus t comply wi th to obtain reimb ursement for daycare exp e ns e s, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B- 7 12-214(2) –(3) (Lexi sNexi s 2012), or wi th the requirements of the parties’ di vo rce decree, see supra ¶ 2 & note 1. Or the di stric t court may conclu de that all of Mot her’s clai ms are reimb ursable becau se they were brought wi thi n the statute of li mi tations. In any eve nt , addi tional findings a r e needed to supp or t the di stric t court’s deter minati on.

6. Relying on Utah Code se ct i on 78B-12-109, Mot her asserts that laches i s inappli cable t o claim s for supp or t made pursuant to a court or der. However , thi s secti on precl ud e s only wai ver and estoppel defenses and says nothin g about laches

. See U t ah Code Ann. § 78B-12-109 (Lexi sNexi s 2 0 1 2). Whi le the doctrines of estoppel and laches may be si mi lar, they ar e st i ll di stinct legal doctrines wi th di fferent elements. Compare CECO Corp. v. Concrete Speci alists, In c

. , 7 72 P.2d 967, 969–70 (Utah 1989) (outlining the elements of e quit able estoppel), with Papa nikolas Bros. Enters. v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs. , 535 P. 2 d 1 2 5 6, 1260 (Utah 1975) (outlining the elements of laches ). We decline to read s ecti on 78B

12-109 more bro adly than i t is wri tte n.

7. The commi ssi oner suggested as much at the hearin g but di d not base her ruling on thatgr ound.

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III . Extended-Care Expenses

¶19 Fin ally, although Mot her acknowledges that private-sch ool tui tion does not fall wi thi n the scope of reimb ursable daycare expenses, she arg ues that she should be entitled to reimb ursement for one-fourth of the cost o f fu l l -day kin derg art en becau se the second half of the day consti tutes “ext ended care expen ses,” for whi ch the commi ssi oner acknowledged Mot her should receive reimb ursement. The commi ss i oner indi cated that “ext ended care prior to or after the co r e t ime period i s also a type of day care expense[]” and that the parties should “ wo r k tog ether ” to deter mine what port i on of the clai med full- day kin derg a r ten tui tion, i f any, consti tu te d d a yc a re e xp e n ses. Becaus e the “core tim e period” for kin derg art en i s only half of the reg ular sch ool day, Mot her asserts that the other half should be catego rized as daycare. 8

¶20 Mot her clai ms t ha t she has always sought reimb ursement for only one-fourth o f the kin derg art en expenses becau se the fi rst half o f the cost of full- day kin derg art en i s attr ibutable to the reg ular kin derg art e n sc hool day. However , when Mot her sub mi tte d a propo sed or der to the commi ssi oner, i t c ontained the

same calcul ation that the commi ssi oner had acknowledged to be

err oneous, whi ch inclu ded the entire cost of the youngest chi ld’s full- day kin derg art en tui tion. Thus, when Father sub mi tte d an
or der that excluded the kin derg art en expenses co mp letely, the commi ssi oner adopted that or der. Whi le Father i s not responsible for the cost of reg ular half- day kin derg art en tui tion, a ny ext ra tu i ti on pai d for full- day kin derg art en may quali fy as ext end e d

- c a re

8. Mot her does not demonstrate that the cost of an addi tional half day of kin derg art en would be no more expensi ve than a half day of ext ended care or other daycare.

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expenses. On reman d , t he di stric t court should take thi s into

9 consi derat i on i n calculating the amount o wed by Father

.

CONCLUS ION

¶21 The di stric t court err ed in adopting the commi ssi oner’ s recommendati on that Mot her’s pre-2005 reimb ursement clai ms
were barred by the statute of li mi tatio ns a nd laches

. The di stric t court’s adoption of the commis si oner’ s calculati on excluding ext ended-c are costs associ at ed wi th the youngest chi ld’s full- day kin derg art en was li kewi se erro neous. Acc or dingly, w e vacate the di stric t cour t ’ s or der and remand for addi tional findings and conclu si ons, in accordance wi th t his opin i on, reg ardin g Mot her’s clai ms for reimb ursement.

9. That sai d, we ar e no t convin ced that Mot her’s one-fourth calculati on accu ra t ely repr esents Father ’s share of the daycare obli gation. Father would not be required to pay any port i on of the chi ldren’s tui tion fo r half- day kin derg art en. Thus, hi s port i on should be, at most, half of the di fference between the cost of fullday kin derg art en an d the cost of half- day kin derg art en, whi ch may not be the same a s o ne -fourth of the tot al cost of full- day kin derg art en. And i t may be that some further adjustment i s
necess ary i f fu ll-day ki ndergar ten i s si gni fi cantly more ex pensi ve than tr adi tional daycare and Father di d not at least taci tly agr ee to the use of ful l-day kin derg art en as daycare.

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