Cover: An AirAmerica helicopter (with "Marines" painted over), part of a 20-aircraft fleet that arrived in Udorn, Thailand, in 1961. At

this base, U.S. Marines provided ground support for civilian pilots and crews that flew missions in support of Royal Laotian troops

who were fighting against the Communist Pathet Lao. Photograph provided by the author.
OPERATION MILLPOND

u.s. Marines in Thailand, 1961

by

Colonel George R. HofmannJr.

U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

Occasional Paper

HISTORYDIVISION

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

QUANTICO, VIRGINIA

2009

Second Printing
Vietnam Histories Workshop: Plenary Session. Jack Shulimson, editor. 9 May1983. 31 pp.

Vietnam Revisited; Conversation with William D. Broyles, Jr. Colonel John G. Miller, USMC, editor. 11

December 1984. 48 pp.

Bibliography on Khe Sanh USMC Participation. Commander Ray W. Strubbe, CHC, USNR (Ret), compiler.

April 1985. 54 pp.

Alligators, Buffaloes, and Bushmasters: The History of the Development of the LVT Through World War II.

Major Alfred Dunlop Bailey, USMC (Ret). 1986.272 pp.

Leadership Lessons and Remembrances from Vietnam. Lieutenant General Herman Nickerson, Jr.,

USMC (Ret). 1988. 93 pp.

The Problems of U.S. Marine Corps Prisoners of War in Korea. James Angus MacDonald, Jr. 1988. 295

pp.

John Archer Lejeune, 1869-1942, Register of His Personal Papers. Lieutenant Colonel Merrill L. Bartlett,

USMC (Ret). 1988. 123 pp.

To Wake Island and Beyond: Reminiscences. Brigadier General Woodrow M. Kessler, USMC (Ret). 1988.

145 pp.

Thomas Holcomb, 1879-1965, Register of His Personal Papers. Gibson B. Smith. 1988.229 pp.

Curriculum Evolution, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1920-1988. Lieutenant Colonel Donald

F. Bittner, USMCR. 1988. 112 pp.

Herringbone Cloak-GI Dagger, Marines of the 055. Major Robert E. Mattingly, USMC. 1989.315 pp.

The Journals of Marine Second Lieutenant Henry Bulls Watson, 1845-1848. Charles R. Smith, editor.

1990. 420 pp.

When the Russians Blinked: The U.S. Maritime Response to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Major John M.

Young, USMCR. 1990.246 pp.

Marines in the Mexican War. Gabrielle M. Neufeld Santelli. Edited by Charles R. Smith. 1991.63 pp.

The Development ofAmphibious Tactics in the U.S. Navy. General Holland M. Smith, USMC (Ret). 1992.

89 pp.

James Guthrie Harbord, 1866-1947, Register of His Personal Papers. Lieutenant Colonel Merrill L.

Bartlett, USMC. 1995.47 pp.

The Impact of Project 100,000 on the Marine Corps. Captain David A. Dawson, USMC. 1995.247 pp.

Marine Corps Aircraft: 1913-2000. Major John M. Elliot, USMC (Ret). 2002. 126 pp.

Thomas Holcomb and the Advent of the Marine Corps Defense Battalion, 1936-1941. David J. Ulbrich.

2004.78 pp.

Marine History Operations in Iraq, Operation Iraq Freedom I, A Catalog of Interviews and Recordings,

LtCol Nathan S. Lowrey, USMCR. 2005. 254 pp.

With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003. No Greater Friend, No Worse Enemy, LtCol Michael S. Groen,

2006. 413 pp.

The History Division has undertaken the publication for limited distribution of various studies, theses,

compilations, bibliographies, monographs, and memoirs, as well as proceedings at selected workshops,

seminars, symposia, and similar colloquia, which it considers to be of significant value for audiences

interested in Marine Corps history. These "Occasional Papers," which are chosen for their intrinsic worth,

must reflect structured research, present a contribution to historical knowledge not readily available in

published sources, and reflect original content on the part of the author, compiler, or editor. It is the intent

of the Division that these occasional papers be distributed to selected institutions, such as service schools,

official Department of Defense historical agencies, and directly concerned Marine Corps organizations,

so the information contained therein will be available for study and exploitation.

ii

Other Publications in the Occasional Papers Series

Occasional Papers
George R. Hofmann Jr. experienced Operation Millpond firsthand as a young

enlisted Marine. He is now a colonel on the retired list and an instructor at George

Washington University, and we are indebted to him for this account of a little-known

aspect of U.S. Marine Corps history in Southeast Asia.

This operation highlights the role that the small country of Laos played in the

foreign policy calculations of the newly elected U.S. president, John F. Kennedy.

Gravely concerned that the Laotian government was in danger of being

overwhelmed by a growing Communist insurgency known as the Pathet Lao,

President Kennedy took the bold step of deploying Marine Air Base Squadron-16

(MABS-16) to nearby Thailand for the purpose of supporting a collection of

helicopters piloted by an organization called Air America. Hollywood later made a

movie about Air America, and it is now widely known that it was link~d to the Central

Intelligence Agency. The Marines of MABS-16 received no such fanfare. Working

behind the scenes in austere conditions, MABS-16 gave new meaning to the phrase

"in any clime and place." While Operation Millpond may seem like a small thing in

comparison with much larger operations that were soon to be conducted by Marines

in the Republic of South Vietnam, it nonetheless represents a clear beginning to a

growing U.S. military commitment to the region as a whole, one that did not end until

the last Marine left the roof of the American embassy in Saigon in 1975.

We are indebted to Colonel Hofmann for providing us with this account and for

sharing his personal papers and photo collection. While it has been nearly 50 years

since Operation Millpond took place, it is still relevant today as we see Marines

deployed across the globe in hundreds of far-flung locations. While many of these

places are usually hidden from public view at the time of the operations, the important

and various roles performed by our dedicated Marines will never be forgotten.

Dr.

e%.

Charles P.

0~~ Neimeyer

Director of Marine Corps His ory

iii

Foreword
iv
nearly 1961, Communist Pathet Lao military forces were coming

dangerously close to taking control of the Southeast Asian country of

Laos. A Pathet Lao victory over the Royal Laotian government not only

would have lost a pro-Western nation to the Communist Bloc but would have put its

neighbors-particularly pro-Western Thailand-at risk. To forestall this possibility,

newly elected President John F. Kennedy and his administration decided to

measurably increase U.S. support to the Royal Laotian government.

This increased support came in part in the form of a 20-helicopter fleet, flown

by civilian pilots and crews employed by Air America. This helicopter force covertly

flew Royal Laotian troops, weapons, supplies, and other war materiel in support of

the Royal Laotian government's anti-Communist military operations. A major

operational deficiency-Air America lacked any aircraft maintenance and flight-line

operational and maintenance capability-was resolved by assigning a military

organization with the required skills to playa supporting role. Marine Air Base

Squadron-16 (MABS-16), located at Marine Corps Air Facility (MCAF) Futema,

Okinawa, was assigned the mission. Operations were conducted from a bare-bones

airfield located outside of Udorn, a town in northeast Thailand approximately 40

miles south of the Laotian capital of Vientiane.

At that time, I was a private first class, telephone/teletype repairman (MOS

2639) assigned temporary additional duty from the Communications Company, 3d

Marine Division on Okinawa, to the MABS-16 communications detachment. I

deployed to Thailand on 22 March 1961 and returned to Okinawa on 18 October

1961.* In addition to personal recollections and original letters written by me to my

family, the sources for this occasional paper are the Operation Millpond after action

report and various newspaper and news magazine articles. I provided all of the

photographs that appear in this occasional paper. 1

I would like to thank the Marine Corps History Division for its assistance on

this paper and recognize the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation for the research

grant it provided to support this project.

•See my original orders in the appendix.

v

Preface

I
vi
Foreword ..................................................................iii

Preface v

Introduction 1

Laos in theYears FollowingWorld War II 1

The Situation in Laos Deteriorates, 1960-61 .4

President Kennedy Commits U.S. Forces ' 5

The Order to Deploy Marine Corps Forces is Issued 7

MABS-16 isTask Organized for its Mission 7

The Execute Order 8

The MABS-16 Mission 8

The Early Days ofOperation Millpond .

Your Only CommentWill Be "No Comment"

Aircraft Maintenance and Line Maintenance Operations-The FirstWeeks

. ..9

...... ..11

...... ..12

Camp Construction 13

Logistics 17

Medical. Support 18

Communications 20

Morale, Welfare, and People-to-People Programs 23

Aircraft and Line Maintenance Operations 27

EpUogu.e 32

Endnotes 32

Appendix 34

vii

Contents
viii
A little-known Marine Corps operation in Southeast Asia in 1961 began with

the March deployment of approximately 300 Marines to Udorn, Thailand.* There, for

a period of nearly seven months, the Marine force provided support to a small group

of Air America pilots, air crews, and support personnel whose mission was to fly

helicopters and fixed-wing transport aircraft in Laos in support of pro-Western

Laotian government forces. These Laotian government forces were fighting the

Pathet Lao, an indigenous but externally supported Communist guerrilla insurgent

group that was attempting to take over the country. The insurgency had been

growing since the end of the French Indochina war seven years previous.

Between April and July 1954, diplomats met in Geneva, Switzerland, to

negotiate a formal peace treaty in Korea and, following the surrender of the French

garrison at Dien Bien Phu to the Viet Minh on 7 May 1954, to negotiate conditions

that would bring the French colonial period in Indochina to an end. On 20 July 1954,

French and Viet Minh representatives signed an agreement effectively ending the

eight-year conflict in Indochina. The following day, Great Britain, the Soviet Union,

the Peoples Republic of China, Cambodia, and Laos joined the Viet Minh and

France in endorsing the cease-fire agreement.2

The Geneva agreements called for, among other things, an independent and

democratically governed Laos. However, events on the ground between the end of

World War II and mid-1954 made clear that such an outcome for this landlocked

nation would be unlikely. By the unfortunate fact of its geography, Laos was destined

to become a pawn in the Cold War. Strategically located in the middle of Southeast

Asia, Laos is slightly larger than the state of Idaho and has a population of

approximately 2 million people. Its neighbors to the north and east in 1954 were the

People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, both

Communist counties. Its other neighbors included South Vietnam to the east,

Cambodia to the south, Thailand to the south and west, and Burma to the west.

The contest for the allegiance of Laos and for control of its government began

in the late 1940s. Following the Japanese defeat in World War II, the French

reinserted themselves into Indochina in an attempt to reassert dominance over their

former colonies. In Laos, they encountered resistance to their return from forces

affiliated with a provisional "Free Lao" government. As the French reestablished

control, much of the leadership of the Free Lao forces, including many members of

the royal family, fled to Thailand. Most returned to Vientiane (the seat of the

• The commonly accepted name of the city is now Udon Thani. It is the capital of Udon Thani Province. The airfield became known as

Udorn Royal ThaiAir Force Base. It transitioned to a civilian airport in 1976 and is now Udon Thani (or Udonthani) InternationalAirport.

1

Introduction

Laos in the Years Following World War II
2
administrative government) and Luang Prabang (the royal capital) in the

southwestern part of the country and began to form a government following

semiautonomous independence within the French Union in 1949.

One leader, Prince Souphanouvong, aligned himself with Ho Chi Minh, who

was establishing the Communist-sponsored Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).

In September 1949, the DRV radio announced the formation of the Pathet Lao, a

resistance government within Laos. In the months that followed, the resistance

government elected Prince Souphanouvong as its prime minister and established a

Laotian National United Front and a People's Liberation Army.

Up through 1952, Laos remained relatively free of active fighting, aside from

sporadic guerrilla activity along the Laos-Vietnam border. The situation changed in April

1953 when Prince Souphanouvong and his Pathet Lao forces, supported by combathardened Viet Minh veterans, launched a full-scale invasion into Laos and soon

established control over the northern provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly. Efforts

by the Royal Laotian Government to dislodge the Pathet Lao forces ended in failure.

The April-July 1954 conference in Geneva, which was convened primarily to

bring the French Indochina conflict to a close, produced a series of agreements that

were designed to end all fighting in Indochina. Specifically for Laos, the agreements

provided for a cease-fire pending elections and called for the integration of the two

Pathet Lao-held provinces into the national government. To supervise the execution

of the Geneva agreements that pertained to Laos, an international commission with

representatives from Canada, India, and Poland was established, with headquarters

in Vientiane. Laos gained full sovereignty at the end of 1954.

The Pathet Lao initially refused to participate in elections and rebuffed all

attempts by the national government to reassert control over the provinces of Sam

Neua and Phong Saly. In 1958, however, the Pathet Lao did participate in elections,

and although the pro-government candidates won a resounding victory, the Pathet

Lao was able to elect more than 10 of its supporters.

The Geneva agreements ultimately did little to foster democracy in Laos; in

fact, they had the opposite effect. They conferred legality and respectability on the

Communist leaders and their party. The Communist party in Laos-the Neo Lao

Had Xat-gained status as a legitimate party and thus was well positioned to

employ its trained and disciplined Pathet Lao cadres. Their tactics, until fighting

escalated in the late summer of 1960, focused on infiltration, subversion, and

preparation for the complete takeover of the Laotian government.

By early 1961, much of the northeast of Laos was under the effective control

of the Pathet Lao (and North Vietnam), and these forces were seriously threatening

the administrative and royal capitals, Vientiane and Luang Prabang, respectively.

Supplies of heavy weapons and other war-fighting materiel were being provided in

3
large quantities by the Chinese and the Soviet Union. These supplies were being

trucked into northeastern Laos from the port city of Vinh in North Vietnam along one

of the only trafficable roads that connected the two countries. Other supplies were

being flown from Hanoi to Xiengkhouang, Laos, the site of an airfield under Pathet

Lao control in northeast Laos. The Royal Laotian Army was performing poorly

against the more aggressive and motivated Pathet Lao forces threatening its capital.

August 1960 saw the beginning of a chain of events that brought the United

States into active involvement in an attempt to keep Laos from falling into the

Communist camp. During that month, Captain Kong Le, a little-known paratroop

battalion commander, seized control of the capital of Vientiane. He passed control of

the government to Prince Souvanna Phouma, a member of the royal family who was

favorably disposed to the Pathet Lao. In its first actions, Souvanna Phouma's

proclaimed "neutralist" government invited the Soviet Union to open an embassy in

Laos and pledged to maintain friendly relations with North Vietnam and China. Over

the next four months, Communist influence within the government increased

steadily until, in late 1960, the Laotian army under a former defense minister,

General Phoumi Nosavan, retook the city. After losing it for a short period, the army

again retook Vientiane and in mid-December expelled the Communist forces. The

fighting, however, was not over.

As the Pathet Lao and Captain Kong Le's forces were being pushed back to

the east, reports began to surface that they were receiving massive support from

the North Vietnamese and the Soviet Union. With this support, which was reported

to include weapons, related war materiel, and North Vietnamese troops, the

resistance in areas held by the Communist forces stiffened. In early January 1961,

China's Radio Beijing reported that the Pathet Lao and Captain Kong Le's forces

had taken the strategic Plain of Jars, including the town of Xiengkhouang and its

airfield. In February, the Pathet Lao forces took control of the town of Muong Kassy,

severing the strategic road between Luang Prabang and Vientiane. In its efforts to

counter these advances, pro-Western forces continued to suffer "serious reverses

near Xiengkhouang," as reported on 30 March.3 From the positions they had

established, the Pathet Lao could threaten the administrative capital of Vientiane to

the south and the royal capital of Luang Prabang to the north.

The United States had been providing aid to the government of Laos since

the Geneva settlement in mid-1954, which totaled $300 million by the beginning of

1960.* This aid had gone to support the Laotian Army, the police, and other

governmental services. While Military Assistance Advisory Groups had been

established to oversee aid and advisory efforts in other countries, the relatively

• The $300 mil/ion in aid equates to around $2.25 billion in 2008 dollars.

4

De Situation in Laos Deteriorates, 1960-61
small assistance program in Laos was being administered by a Program Evaluation

Office. Personnel assigned to this office were mostly technicians whose principal

focus was training the Laotian army personnel in the technical and maintenance

aspects of the equipment being provided. 4 As the Laotian military faltered and the

Pathet Lao forces-with seemingly unlimited support from the Soviet Union, China,

and North Vietnam-gained strength and threatened to overrun the entire country,

the United States, its support clearly inadequate, was faced with the decision of

whether to make a greater commitment in an effort to reverse the unfavorable flow

of events.

In March 1961, newly elected President John F. Kennedy was briefed on the

deteriorating situation in Laos and U.S. force levels in the Pacific Theater by Admiral

Harry D. Felt, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Forces. The report was not

encouraging. The military situation in Laos was continuing to deteriorate, with the

pro-Communist forces making gains on all fronts. A small cadre of American civilian

pilots under contract to the Laotian government was flying resupply and troop

transport missions employing American-made helicopters and aging C-47 transport

aircraft.5 They had sustained several hits on their aircraft, and as the level of fighting

had intensified their support was becoming increasingly inadequate. A U.S.

embassy C-47 aircraft conducting an observation mission had been shot down by

hostile fire with the loss of all seven crew members-the first U.S. casualties of the

Laotian war. The sole survivor, a U.S. Army major, was reported captured by the

Communist forces. 6 During this same period, five members of the U.S. Program

Evaluation Office barely escaped injury when their twin-engine Beechcraft was hit

multiple times by Communist ground fire.? The small military assistance mission in

Vientiane was also proving inadequate to the job.

In view of the dire situation facing the pro-Western forces in Laos, President

Kennedy decided to substantially increase U.S. support. A major part of his plan

called for the employment of increased numbers of nonmilitary helicopters and

fixed-wing transport aircraft to be flown by civilian American pilots. Until this

expanded nonmilitary force could become self-sustaining, support for its operations

would be provided by U.S. military personnel, specifically Marines, who possessed

the requisite skills in airfield operations, flight-line and aircraft maintenance, base

support operations, and related functions. These U.S. military forces would deploy

from military bases in the Far East to an airfield in northeast Thailand,

approximately 40 miles south of the Laotian administrative capital of Vientiane.

5

President Kennedy Commits U.S. Forces
6

Adapted from Naval Historical Center Material
On 12 March 1961, Marine Air Base Squadron-16 (MABS-16), located at

Marine Corps Air Facility (MCAF), Futema, Okinawa, received its first message

alerting it for possible deployment.8 The message directed the squadron to be

prepared on 48 hours notice to move, employing theater airlift, a reinforced air base

squadron with supplies, equipment, and personnel, to Udorn, Thailand, and establish

an expeditionary base for operations and field maintenance for 20 HUS-1 helicopters.

The deployment was to be completed within six days of receipt of the order to

execute. Initially, MABS-16 was directed to establish and maintain a 30-day level of

spare parts for the 20 HUS-1 helicopters. Prior to deployment, that requirement was

increased to a 120-day supply. The deployment was named Operation Millpond.

MABS-16's initial deployment plans called for a total of 455 Marine Corps and

Navy personnel. However, a U.S. State Department-Royal Thai Government

conference imposed a ceiling of 300 as the maximum number of Marines that would

be allowed to enter Thailand in support of Operation Millpond. This limitation had a

serious impact on MABS-16's aircraft maintenance and flight-line operations

capabilities, but the ceiling was not adjusted. Further, with only two exceptions,

MABS-16 was directed to be completely self-sustaining with expeditionary

equipment. The first exception was petroleum, oil, and lubricants that would be

supplied by rail from Bangkok. The second was subsistence support, which as of 10

days after the Marines arrived would be provided by the Navy Commissary Store in

Bangkok. In addition to the support for its Marines, MABS-16 was directed to deploy

with additional camp equipment to support 80 Air America personnel.9

In addition to organic personnel and equipment, seven detachments also

deployed in support of MABS-16. They were:

*Detachment, Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron-16,

responsible for maintaining a Class C and D aircraft maintenance

facility.

*Detachment Marine Air Base Squadron-17, responsible for setting

up and maintaining a tactical airfield fuel dispensing system and an

air freight facility and supporting the crew of a Marine R4D-B aircraft.

*Detachment, Communications Company, 3d Marine Division.

*Infantry Platoon, 3d Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division.

*Engineer Platoon, 3d Pioneer Battalion, 7th Engineer Regiment.

7

De Order to Deploy Marine Corps Forces is Issued

MABS-16 is Task Organized for its Mission
*

Marine Aircraft Tactical Control Unit-1.

*Detachment, Marine Wing Headquarters Group-1, communications

and postal support.

The execute order for Operation Millpond was received on 19 March 1961. It

directed movement to begin on 22 March, with the airlift phase to be completed in

four days. MABS-16 was directed to be prepared to receive helicopters at the Udorn

airfield on 27 March and to begin supporting helicopter operations immediately

thereafter. Nine aircraft (five C-130s and four C-124s) carrying the most urgently

needed members of the deploying force were scheduled to depart Okinawa on the

evening of 22 March and arrive at Udorn, with intermediate stops at Clark Air Force

Base in the Philippines and Bangkok, on 23 March. Both organic 1st Marine Aircraft

Wing and U.S. Air Force (315th Air Division) aircraft participated in this airlift. Due to

mechanical problems, only seven of these aircraft made it to Udorn on 23 March.

Air Force transport planes from the MilitaryAir Transport Command brought many of the Marines and their equipment to the

airfield at Udom, Thailand.

MABS-16's mission, in part, read: "When directed, MABS-16 (-) (Rein) deploy

to Udorn ... for purposes of establishing an expeditionary base for operation and

flight maintenance of 20 HUS-1 helicopters.,,1o In fact, its mission demanded much

more from its 300-man force.

8

De Execute Order

De MABS-16 Mission
MABS-16 was to provide total aircraft maintenance and airfield services, plus

training in both of the aforementioned areas, and other support, to Air America, Inc.

Although Air America was publicly identified as a company under contract with the

U.S. government-an April 1961 New York Times article described it as a

"subsidiary of Civil Air Transport, a private company based in Taiwan,,11-it was in

fact covertly operated by the Central Intelligence Agency. Under its "contract," Air

America provided pilots, air crew members, executives, administrative support, and

other personnel. However, the company was initially unable to perform the

maintenance on its aircraft to keep them flight worthy, and it could not satisfactorily

execute airfield operations. It was expected that after a period of training by the

MABS-16 aircraft maintenance and airfield services Marines, Air America personnel

would assume full responsibility for the maintenance of their helicopters and airfield

operations. At that point, MABS-16's mission would be accomplished and it could

terminate operations and return to its home base on Okinawa.

Air America pilots had already been flying missions in Laos. Operating under

the control of the Program Evaluation Office, they had been flying four HUS-1 sin

Laos since December 1960. One had been lost to enemy fire, and all of the others

The monsoon season brings considerable amounts ofrain to northeast Thailand. The airfield is at the top of the picture. The initial,

temporary camp was located to the right of the airfield.

9

De Early Days of Operation Millpond
had been hit by enemy fire. 12 Under its new and expanded contract, Air America

was to receive 20 HUS-1 helicopters from the U.S. government. It was to operate

these aircraft in support of the Royal Laotian forces engaged in combat operations

against Pathet Lao insurgents that were being supported by North Vietnamese

ground troops and supplied by the Soviet Union and China.

Of the 16 additional aircraft made available (to bring Air America up to its 20

authorized aircraft), 13 flew into the Udorn airfield on 27 March.13 Although efforts had

been made to "sanitize" the aircraft, when the sun struck the fuselage of the arriving

HUS-1 s, a large white star and the word "Marines" were clearly visible under the light

coat of green paint that had been applied to each helicopter.14 With the arrival of the

final three helicopters a few days later, and the repair of the three that had been

provided the pervious December, Air America had 19 operational aircraft. The loss of a

second aircraft a short time later left Air America with 18 assigned as April approached.

AirAmerica's helicopters as they arrived for duty. Underneath the light coat ofgreen paint, a large white star and the word

"Marines" were clearly visible.

As maintaining Air America's operational capability was MASS-16's main

priority, among the first Marines to arrive were 2 officers and 30 enlisted Marines

from Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron-16's aircraft maintenance

detachment. They immediately set about establishing aircraft repair shops in an

empty hanger. Camp construction crews also arrived early. Communications was a

priority, and when the author arrived on 23 March, only two general purpose (GP)

tents had been set Up.15 Over the next few days, the remainder of the force flew in.

10
During the initial days of the operation, Lieutenant Colonel Richard W.

Johnson, the MABS-16 commanding officer, personally conducted an early morning

"all hands" meeting. Within limits, he briefed his Marines on the command's activities

and the importance of its mission. He emphasized at every meeting that while the

unit's mission was not classified, Marines were not to talk about it to anyone. He

noted that the secretary of defense had issued a directive making it clear that the

only comment that Marines were allowed to make was "no comment."

The first Marines to arrive were greeted with bare ground. As soon as tentage arrived, the Marines put up their own billeting and

work spaces.

This directive did not sit well with the many correspondents representing the

major print and television news services who began arriving from Vientiane, Laos,

on the evening of 23 March, shortly after they had been informed that U.S.

servicemen had landed at Udorn, Thailand. One correspondent, who filed a 25

March 1961 report for the Evening Star, a Washington, D.C., newspaper, noted that

"The Marines have landed in Thailand with their eyes open and their mouths firmly

shut.,,16 "The only comment I have to make is no comment," Lieutenant Colonel

Johnson told the visiting newsmen.17 Staff members from the U.S. embassy in

Bangkok were on the ground to ensure that no unauthorized photographs were

taken. Interviews with the Marines establishing the camp were forbidden. 18

11

Your Only Comment Will Be “No Comment”
Although the Marines were portrayed by one source as "disembarking on

their top-secret mission," there was nothing secret about it. Many correspondents,

including newsreel cameramen, were at the airfield to greet the Marines as they

arrived. Over the next several days, the newsmen filed many stories in major U.S.

newspapers and weekly news magazines. Many gave accurate accountings of what

was taking place; some, however, were well wide of the mark. An article from The

New York Herald Tribune, with a dateline of 6 April 1961 , ran with the headline "U.S.

Marines Fly Laotians into Battle."19 A 7 April 1961 Time magazine article published

a picture of several HUS-1 helicopters with the caption "U.S. Helicopters & Marines

in Thailand." The accompanying article noted inaccurately that "Five hundred U.S.

Marines unpacked their gear in Northeast Thailand.... They were equipped with 16

helicopters, ready to help fly men and supplies to the fighting front if they were

ordered into action."2o

As the airfield and adjacent areas were Thai property, the Marines had no

authority to restrict any correspondent's access. Accordingly, for the next few days,

newsmen mingled among the silent Marines attempting to glean information about

what was going on. By 27 March, however, most members of the media had

become discouraged and returned to Laos. The story and pictures that they most

coveted-the arrival of the helicopters-took place on 28 March. On that day there

were no correspondents or photographers in the vicinity of the airfield.

The local Thais were also curious about what was taking place at the airfield.

For several days during and after the Marines arrived, local citizens, often

numbering in the hundreds, stood on the main road adjacent to the airfield and

observed the Marines as they constructed their tent camp.

The Aircraft Maintenance Division's Marines faced a daunting dual mission.

They were tasked with providing aircraft maintenance and line maintenance for 20

HUS-1 helicopters with an anticipated utilization factor of approximately 120 hours a

month. While performing these functions-for a period expected to run for 90 to 120

days, but which in fact ran for more than six months-they were also tasked to train

Air America maintenance crews that would gradually phase in and assume all

aspects of aircraft maintenance and line functions.21 Further, the Marines of the

maintenance department were tasked with maintaining all shop and test equipment,

special support equipment, aircraft spares, tools, and general aircraft consumables

in sufficient quantity to sustain the operation.

12

Aircraft Maintenance and Line Maintenance

Operations —De First Weeks
The forced contraction of MABS-16's authorized personnel strength from the

desired 455 to a ceiling of 300 ensured that the aircraft maintenance department

was staffed to only spartan levels. To accomplish all of their tasks, only two officers,

to include one avionics officer, and 37 enlisted men were assigned from

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron-16 to perform the aircraft maintenance

functions. Initially, 56 Marines were assigned to perform line maintenance functions.

This number was reduced to 37 early in the operation. Wisely, in light of the

requirement to train Air America personnel, care was taken to assign experienced

and qualified staff noncommissioned officers.

Within two weeks, Air America had provided approximately 40 men to begin

training with the aircraft and line maintenance crews. About 15 were assigned to

shops or other hanger functions. Unfortunately, as the tempo of operations picked

up and backup helicopter crew chiefs were needed for actual flight operations into

Laos, some of these men became unavailable for maintenance training and

operations. Essentially, Air America's main effort remained on the flight line in the

servicing of aircraft. 22

Establishment of the camp began immediately upon the Marines' arrival and

proceeded in two phases. Phase I dealt with the initial, temporary camp. An area

was selected and marked off and as tentage arrived, the tents were put up in

predesignated areas. First priority was given to billeting. Once living areas had been

established, the mess hall, sick bay, and office tents were put up. In approximately

In the initial camp, all tents - including the Squadron Aid Station pictured - were pitched on the ground.

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Camp Construction
three weeks, the temporary camp had been completed. It served MABS-16's

Marines for more than two months until a more permanent-and more livablecantonment was constructed on the opposite side of the airfield.

Phase II involved construction of a second camp that, while still expeditionary

in nature, was more suited to protect the Marines from the monsoon rains that would

soon be upon them. Construction of this camp took about 11 weeks to complete. The

work was done by the engineer platoon with 1 officer and 21 enlisted Marines,

augmented by 21 additional carpenters from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Plans were

drawn up to build the camp above ground, as it was anticipated that the entire area

would be under water when the monsoon season began in the early summer. An area

of approximately eight acres, which was relatively flat and free of vegetation and also

in close proximity to the airfield, was selected as the site for the camp.

The squadron mess hall was located in one of the existing structures that had been rehabilitated by the engineers. Notice that it

was built up offof the ground to prevent flooding during the monsoon season.

Three buildings, all in extremely poor states of repair, existed in the area

chosen for the camp. During Phase II of the construction, these buildings were

renovated and put into service. The first was designated as the camp's future mess

hall. Renovation began with the removal of all internal partitions and the screening

of all windows. Storage areas were constructed on both ends of the building by

14