United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

September 1995 CUBA

U.S. Response to the

1994 Cuban Migration

Crisis

GAO/NSIAD-95-211

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-265830 

September 18, 1995

The Honorable Jose E. Serrano

The Honorable Lamar Smith

House of Representatives

In response to your request, we reviewed the U.S. government’s actions to

address the mass exodus of people from Cuba in the summer of 1994. Our

objectives were to (1) describe how U.S. policy toward those seeking to

leave Cuba has changed since that time, (2) identify the agencies and costs

to the U.S. government associated with the exodus of Cubans, (3) assess

the capabilities of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana to process

applicants seeking legal entry into the United States, and (4) evaluate the

adequacy of living conditions at the Cuban safe haven camps at the U.S.

Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay.

We briefed your staff on the results of our review on June 30, 1995. This

report summarizes and updates the information provided during that

briefing.

Results in Brief For over 30 years, fleeing Cubans had been welcomed to the United States.

However, the U.S. government reversed this policy on August 19, 1994,

when President Clinton announced that Cuban rafters interdicted at sea

would no longer be brought to the United States. Instead, they would be

taken to safe haven camps at the U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay,

Cuba, with no opportunity for eventual entry into the United States other

than by returning to Havana to apply for entry through legal channels at

the U.S. Interests Section. On September 9, 1994, the U.S. and Cuban

governments agreed that the United States would allow at least 20,000

Cubans to enter annually in exchange for Cuba’s pledge to prevent further

unlawful departures by rafters. On May 2, 1995, a White House

announcement was released stating that Cubans interdicted at sea would

not be taken to a safe haven but would be returned to Cuba where they

could apply for entry into the United States at the Interests Section in

Havana. The announcement also stated that eligible Cubans in the safe

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haven camps would be paroled into the United States1 and that those

found to be ineligible for parole would be returned to Cuba.2

Several U.S. agencies have been involved in implementing the U.S. policy

regarding Cubans wishing to leave their country. The predominant

agencies are (1) the Department of Defense, which will spend about

$434 million from August 1994 through September 1995 operating the safe

haven camps; (2) the U.S. Coast Guard, which spent about $7.8 million

interdicting Cubans at sea from August 1994 to the present; (3) the

Department of Justice’s Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and

Community Relations Service (CRS), which together will spend about

$48.3 million for the Cuban migration crisis from August 1994 through

September 1995; and (4) the Department of State, which will spend an

estimated $7.1 million during this same period.3

The U.S. Interests Section in Havana has been able to meet the workload

of processing applicants seeking legal entry into the United States. As of

June 9, 1995, it had approved 16,305 Cubans for U.S. entry. However, not

all those approved for travel will leave Cuba by September 1995, the

anniversary of the September 1994 agreement.

The Cubans’ living conditions at the Guantanamo Bay safe haven camps

are difficult but, we believe, adequate based on our observations at the

camps. We found no internationally accepted standards of what the living

conditions should be at refugee camps, but we noted that conditions in all

camps generally exceeded U.N. inspection guidelines for minimal shelter,

food, and water.

U.S. Policy Toward

Fleeing Cubans

For decades Cubans have fled Cuba, often by raft, seeking freedom in the

United States. For example, during the first 6 months of 1993, the U.S.

Coast Guard picked up about 1,300 rafters and brought them to the United

States. This number increased to about 4,700 during the same period in

1

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended, 8 U.S.C. sec. 1182, grants the Attorney

General the discretionary authority to temporarily parole aliens into the United States for

humanitarian or public interest reasons. Under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Cuban parolees

may apply for permanent resident alien status after 1 year in the United States. Permanent resident

aliens are generally eligible to apply for U.S. citizenship after 5 years residence in the United States.

2

In accordance with 8 U.S.C. sec. 1182 (the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended),

camp residents can be determined ineligible for parole for reasons such as criminal history; medical,

physical, or mental conditions; or commission of acts of violence while in the camps.

3

These figures represent incremental costs that would not have been incurred had there been no

migration operation.

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1994. At that time, Cuba was maintaining its strict policy of forbidding its

citizens from illegally exiting the country.

In June 1994, violence by both the Cuban authorities and would-be asylum

seekers escalated when, for example, Cuban authorities shot and killed a

Cuban who was attempting to escape the island. From July 13 through

August 8, 1994, at least 37 asylum seekers and 2 Cuban officials were killed

in a series of boat hijackings. In addition, a riot erupted in Havana on

August 5 when police attempted to disperse a crowd that had gathered

when a false rumor circulated that a flotilla of boats was on its way to pick

up people seeking to leave. On August 13, Fidel Castro gave a televised

speech blaming the United States for the riots and violence and threatened

to remove restrictions on Cubans exiting the country if the United States

did not take steps to deter boat departures and return those hijackers who

had reached the United States.

Not receiving the response he anticipated from the United States, Castro

indicated he would not prevent Cubans from leaving. Over the next week,

Cubans flocked to the beaches, where they constructed make-shift vessels

and set out to sea.

As the flow of rafters increased, President Clinton announced on 

August 19, 1994, that the Coast Guard would no longer bring interdicted

Cubans to the United States but would hold them at Guantanamo Bay. The

President and the Attorney General indicated at that time that those

Cubans taken to Guantanamo Bay would have no opportunity for eventual

entry into the United States. This announcement reversed a 3-decade

policy of welcoming Cubans seeking refuge into the United States. Many

Cubans did not believe that the United States would actually enforce the

new policy and consequently continued to leave Cuba. About 

33,000 Cubans were picked up at sea and taken to Guantanamo Bay.4

Concerned about the continuing exodus, on September 9, 1994, the United

States and Cuba signed an accord under which the United States agreed to

admit at least 20,000 Cubans per year directly from Cuba through legal

channels.5

 The U.S. Interests Section in Havana estimated that this number

4

This number included 8,763 who were subsequently transferred to a Panama safe haven from

September 1994 through February 1995.

5

The United States also agreed that during the first year of the agreement, it would parole those

currently on the immigrant visa waiting list, raising the total to be admitted in 1995 to about 26,700.

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would comprise approximately 7,000 refugees and family members,6

8,000 immigrant visa recipients and their families, and 5,000 paroled

through the Special Cuban Migration Program—a special lottery. The

Cuban government agreed “to prevent unsafe departures using mainly

persuasive methods.” Within days the Cuban police again were patrolling

the roads leading to the beaches, under orders to arrest persons carrying

rafts or the materials to build them, and Cubans stopped departing by raft.

The United States later began granting parole to certain categories of

Cubans in the safe haven camps at Guantanamo Bay. On October 14, 1994,

President Clinton announced that parole would be granted to those over

age 70, unaccompanied minors, or those with serious medical conditions

and their caregivers. On December 2, 1994, the Attorney General

announced that parole would be considered on a case-by-case basis for

children and their immediate families who would be adversely affected by

long-term presence in safe havens. These four categories became known

as the “four protocols.”

On May 2, 1995, the White House Press Secretary announced that Cubans

interdicted at sea would no longer be taken to safe haven at Guantanamo

Bay but would be returned to Cuba where they could apply for entry into

the United States through legal channels at the U.S. Interests Section. In

discussing this announcement, the Attorney General stated that measures

would be taken to ensure that persons who claimed a genuine need for

protection, which they believed could not be satisfied by applying at the

U.S. Interests Section, would be examined before their return to Cuba. She

also announced at that time that remaining Cubans at Guantanamo

Bay—about 18,500 as of June 7, 1995—would be considered for parole into

the United States, excluding those found to be ineligible for parole due to

criminal activity in Cuba, in the United States, or while in safe haven and

those with certain serious medical conditions.

Agencies Involved

With Cuban Migration

Within the executive branch, an interagency working group is responsible

for developing strategies for implementing the Cuban migration policy.

The working group is chaired by the National Security Council and

includes representatives from the State Department’s Bureaus for

Inter-American Affairs and Population, Refugees, and Migration and the

Legal Advisor’s Office; the Department of Justice’s INS and CRS; the Defense

6

In 8 U.S.C. sec. 1101 (a) (42) a refugee is defined as a person who has fled his or her home country

because of persecution, or a well-founded fear of persecution, for reasons of race, religion, nationality,

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

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Department’s Offices of the Secretary of Defense (Humanitarian and

Refugee Affairs) and Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Coast Guard.

The U.S. Interests Section in Havana is responsible for processing the

more than 20,000 expected Cuban applicants for U.S. entry, annually. As of

August 1995, the Interests Section had increased its processing staff to 

6 full-time consular officers and about 3 temporary-duty consular officers,

4 INS officers, about 40 local nationals, and 4 U.S. and third country

contract hires. Consular officers at the Interests Section process

immigrant visa applications and prescreen parole applicants; the Refugee

Coordinator prescreens refugee applicants. INS adjudicates refugee and

parole applications in Havana and parole applications at Guantanamo Bay.

The Defense Department is responsible for carrying out the safe haven

program at Guantanamo Bay. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and

the Joint Chiefs of Staff oversee safe haven operations, and the U.S.

Atlantic Command has operational responsibility. Joint Task Force

(JTF)-160 executes the safe haven mission at Guantanamo—caring for the

inhabitants, providing for their security and protection, and preparing

them for travel to the United States. JTF-160 is also charged with the safety

and security of U.S. personnel at Guantanamo Bay and the security of the

station itself. The U.S. Coast Guard interdicts rafters at sea and, until

May 2, 1995, it took them to safe haven at Guantanamo Bay. Since May 2,

1995, most Cubans interdicted at sea have been returned by the Coast

Guard to Cuba.

Civilian agencies implement various components of the safe haven

program. The Department of State’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and

Migration provides assistance to the safe haven population at Guantanamo

Bay through a grant to the World Relief Corporation. At Guantanamo Bay,

CRS assists in parole processing and provides human resource services,

such as family reunification, conciliation and mediation assistance and

training, and recreation and education. CRS also provides resettlement

assistance to parolees when they arrive in the United States. The State

Department also maintains an officer in Guantanamo Bay as a liaison with

the military and civilian agencies.

Other organizations are also involved in Cuban migration operations at

Guantanamo Bay. The World Relief Corporation, a nongovernmental

organization, provides public health and social services, vocational

training, mail services, and coordination of private donations. The

International Organization for Migration (IOM), an intergovernmental

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B-265830 

organization based in Geneva, Switzerland, arranges resettlement for

Cubans wishing to migrate to countries other than the United States.

Pursuant to an agreement with the Cuban government to allow some

voluntary repatriation over land rather than flying to Havana, IOM also

arranges voluntary repatriation through the station’s Northeast Gate. IOM

was also working with the remaining Haitians in camps at Guantanamo

Bay.

Considerable military and civilian personnel resources are at Guantanamo

Bay to support the safe haven operation. As shown in table 1, more than

5,000 personnel were providing security and services to Cubans in the safe

haven camp at the time of our visit in June 1995.

Table 1: Organization and Assigned

Personnel Providing Security and

Services at the Cuban Guantanamo

Bay Safe Haven Camps

Organization Assigned personnel

Department of Defense (JTF-160) 4,897

Department of Justice

INS 13

CRS 57

Department of State 1

World Relief Corporation 40

IOM 15

Total 5,023

INS planned to increase its personnel to at least 18 by the end of summer to

augment parole eligibility determination. IOM, on the other hand, expects to

decrease its presence to six as the remaining Haitians are repatriated or

allowed entry into the United States.

Costs Associated With

Cuban Migration

We estimate that the total cost of the U.S. response to the Cuban exodus

from August 1994 through fiscal year 1995 will exceed $497 million (see

table 2). This represents incremental costs, which are costs that agencies

would not have incurred had there been no Cuban migration crisis.

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Table 2: Estimated Costs of Cuban

Migrant Operations From August 1,

1994, Through September 30, 1995

Dollars in millions

Agency Cost

Defense Department $434.0

Coast Guard 7.8

State Department 7.1

INS 8.8

CRS 39.5

Total $497.2

Defense costs include procuring construction materials, food, medical

supplies, and miscellaneous items for camps at Guantanamo Bay and in

Panama; shipping food and supplies; transporting military personnel to the

camps and about 500 to 550 parolees to Homestead Air Force Base,

Florida, each week; and moving 8,763 Cubans from Guantanamo Bay to

Panama in September 1994 and 7,291 back again in February 1995.

Defense does not budget for such migrant operations, and it requested a

$370-million supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 1995 to minimize

the impact of these activities on military operations. Coast Guard

expenses cover the costs of patrolling the waters between Cuba and

Florida and bringing people to Guantanamo Bay and Cuba. CRS’ costs

primarily cover resettlement assistance to parolees arriving in the United

States (about $31.3 million). State Department costs include expanding

consular processing in Havana and providing a liaison officer at

Guantanamo Bay and a grant to the World Relief Corporation to provide

services at the safe haven camps.

Processing Capability

in Havana

Our review of the processing workload at the Interests Section indicates

that it will process 20,000 applicants for U.S. entry and the additional 

6,700 applicants on the waiting list by September 8, 1995—the end of the

first year under the agreement.7

 As of June 9, 1995, the Interests Section

had approved 16,305 for entry into the United States. This number

included 7,693 refugees, 40 paroled family members of refugees,

3,601 immigrant visas, 3,073 paroled family members of immigrant visa

recipients, and 1,898 parolees selected through a lottery. An additional

4,451 applicants for immigrant visas who were on the noncurrent

preference lists had been approved for parole and 1,269 of their immediate

relatives had been issued immigrant visas, pursuant to the September 1994

agreement. From 1996 through 1998, the workload will be somewhat

7

On August 21, 1995, the U.S. Interest Section announced that the first-year commitment agreed to in

the Migration Accord had been achieved as of August 15.

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reduced because the 20,000-person requirement will be offset each year

for 3 years by up to 5,000 as a result of the May 2 announcement that all

eligible Guantanamo Bay camp applicants would be paroled into the

United States.

Resettlement From

Guantanamo Bay

Resettlement processing continues, as about 500 to 550 Cubans enter the

United States from Guantanamo Bay each week. As of June 27, 1995,

14,746 had been paroled into the United States under the four

humanitarian protocols, including 1,270 paroled from the temporary

Howard Air Force Base safe haven in Panama from October 1994 through

February 1995. Another 622 had returned to Cuba through diplomatic

channels, 139 had resettled in third countries, and 1,000 had returned to

Cuba on their own, either over land or by water. Sixty Cuban rafters had

been interdicted and repatriated to Cuba as of that date, pursuant to the

May 2 announcement that such individuals would be returned to Cuba.

At the time of our visit to Guantanamo Bay, 18,802 Cubans remained in the

camps. Of these, 5,856 qualified for parole under the four protocols, and

12,946 were eligible to apply for parole consideration under the May 2

announcement. The INS officer-in-charge noted that JTF-160 had compiled

about 4,500 camp incident reports involving camp infractions that INS staff

will review for impact on individual parole eligibility. However, INS

estimates that only a small number of those involved will be ineligible for

parole.

Conditions at the

Guantanamo Bay

Camps

While detention in safe haven camps is undoubtedly difficult, our review at

the Guantanamo Bay camps indicated that living conditions were

adequate. While we found no internationally accepted criteria for minimal

refugee living standards,8

 we noted that the U.S. Atlantic Command had

developed standards for safe haven conditions based on inspection

guidelines of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

and standard military regulations and manuals’ requirements. The

Command developed a camp construction model for migrant operations

based on a population of 10,000 that could be adapted for population

changes and issued corresponding operational guidelines, including camp

organization, services, construction, and logistics.

We found that conditions generally met or exceeded Atlantic Command

standards and UNHCR inspection guidelines. For example, minimal UNHCR

8

Refugees: Living Conditions are Marginal (GAO/NSIAD-91-258, Sept. 11, 1991).

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B-265830 

inspection guidelines include 3.5 square meters of living space per

migrant. Using this as guidance, the Command recommended using

medium-sized tents to house up to 15 Cubans.9

 We found no indication

that these tents housed more than 15 persons.

Camp conditions have improved since the influx of Cubans in the summer

of 1994, due to decreasing population density and a Defense Department

“Quality of Life” facilities upgrade. In late August 1994, thousands of

people were arriving daily at the Guantanamo Bay camps. Together with

about 12,000 Haitians, the camps’ population totaled about 45,000 in

September 1994. At that time, living conditions were marginal, according

to Atlantic Command officials, as JTF-160 was erecting tents and installing

portable toilets as quickly as people arrived. Crowded conditions began

easing as most Haitians were repatriated to Haiti following President

Aristide’s return in October 1994, and more than 8,000 Cubans were

relocated to safe haven camps in Panama for 6 months. Also, Cubans

began leaving via parole following the October and December protocol

announcements.

The Defense Department had intended to spend almost $35 million to

upgrade facilities to accommodate a longer term camp operation.

However, the May 2 announcement that most camp inhabitants would be

eligible for parole lessened the urgency to improve conditions. As a result,

the Defense Department spent about $25.3 million for its upgrade

program.10 Not all camps were upgraded; some camps were scheduled to

be disassembled as populations decreased. Upgrades included elevated

hardback tents, plumbing, tension fabric structures as multipurpose

buildings, and electricity. (See figs. 1 through 3.)

9

The military services use medium-sized tents to house 10 to 20 personnel, depending upon the quality

of life desired.

10The upgrade program, begun in December 1994, was well underway when the May 2 announcement

altered the program’s scope.

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Figure 1: Elevated Hardback Tents

Figure 2: Tension Fabric Structure

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Figure 3: Women’s Rest Room

In general, those who are expected to be paroled in late 1995 and early

1996 are located in the newer camps. Those eligible for parole under the

first four protocols are scheduled to leave by the end of summer 1995 and,

for the most part, are located in the camps that have not been upgraded

(see fig. 4).

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Figure 4: Non-Upgraded Camp Area

In addition to adequate shelter, camp residents receive breakfast, a hot

dinner prepared by Cuban cooks, and Meals Ready to Eat (MRE) for lunch.

Cubans with whom we spoke said that the food was better than when they

first arrived, when they mostly received rice. They also receive medical

treatment at camp clinics and in military medical and surgical units as

necessary. Recreational activities include baseball, basketball, pool,

ping-pong, movies, music, arts and crafts, and libraries. In addition, adults

can attend English and vocational classes coordinated by World Relief.

Most children have left the camps, but the few remaining receive basic

schooling organized by CRS. Many of these services are provided by camp

residents with special skills.

Security is professional but not overtly oppressive. Camp residents are

relatively free to move around within camp areas. When they first arrived,

the Cubans were restricted to smaller areas behind razor concertina wire.

According to military personnel, tensions have eased since the May 2

announcement that the Cubans would not be detained indefinitely but

could apply for parole.

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Travel From Cuba to

the United States Is

Being Delayed

Although by September 1995 the Interests Section will likely have

processed for U.S. entry the 20,000 Cubans called for in the September 9,

1994, agreement as well as the 6,700 on the noncurrent immigrant visa

preference list,11 it is unlikely that this number will travel to the United

States by that date. Of the 7,693 refugees approved for travel, only 1,494

had left as of June 9, 1995. While this partly reflects the normal lag in

obtaining sponsorship for approved refugees, the relatively small number

who have left also reflects the adverse impact of steep Cuban

government-imposed air fare increases and fees for migration-related

services. In February 1995, the Cuban government raised the one-way fare

from Havana to Miami from $150 to $990.12 When the rate was increased,

the Interests Section refused to pay the higher amount and negotiated

rates with commercial airlines for regularly scheduled flights to Miami

through Mexico and Costa Rica. The number of such seats was limited,

resulting in 5,267 refugees waiting to travel at the time of our visit. The

remaining 932 refugees had been adjudicated but had not yet obtained all

documents required for travel.

Unlike refugees, immigrant visa holders and parolees must arrange and

pay for their own transportation to the United States. Because they

arrange their own travel, the Interests Section does not track the number

that has departed from Cuba. Although INS will report in 1997 on numbers

of Cubans coming through U.S. ports of entry in 1995, these numbers will

reflect country of nationality, not country of departure.

The U.S. government repeatedly voiced its concern to the Cuban

government about the exorbitant airfare. Cuba agreed to lower the fare;

however, it also imposed additional fees in June 1995, including $400 for

the medical examination required for all people seeking U.S. entry ($250

for children), $250 for an exit permit and related documents, and $50 for a

passport. U.S. officials told us that they believe that some fees for these

previously free services may be reasonable, but the fees imposed (even

with reduced air charters) will pose serious obstacles for Cubans seeking

to emigrate.

At the time of our visit to Guantanamo Bay, the backlog of those approved

for travel from there was estimated by INS at about 1,200. Parolees leave

Guantanamo Bay on three charter flights each week, and depending on the

11According to the U.S. Interests Section, the first-year commitment agreed to in the Migration Accord

was achieved as of August 15.

12The U.S. government normally provides transportation for refugees who sign a promissory note to

reimburse the government for these costs within 4 years.

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size of the aircraft, 500 to 550 parolees depart each week. At this rate, the

camps should be empty by March 15, 1996. However, the availability of

transportation is not the limiting factor in more rapidly reducing the

camps’ population. Despite the backlog and the continuing cost to operate

the camps, the weekly departure rates are not expected to increase.

According to Defense, State, and Justice officials, state of Florida officials

maintain that the state can accommodate no more than 550 parolees per

week. Defense, State, and Justice officials said that senior Clinton

administration officials have agreed not to exceed that figure. According

to Defense Department officials, if departures could be accelerated to 

690 per week, they could empty the camps by December 15, 1995, and save

about $22.2 million in operating expenses.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

The Departments of Defense, Justice, and State provided oral comments

on this report. Their technical comments have been incorporated where

appropriate. State Department officials suggested that it would have been

useful to have compared costs incurred with those that might have been

incurred by both the federal and state of Florida governments had no

action been taken to stem the flow of Cubans to the United States. Such an

analysis may be interesting, but it was not within the scope of work we

were requested to perform. Furthermore, such analysis would be highly

subjective because the cost would depend on many unknown factors such

as the number of Cubans who would have fled to the United States had no

action been taken to stem the flow, and what benefits and services would

have been provided. Also, we found no evidence that the decision to

reverse a 30-year policy of welcoming fleeing Cubans to the United States

was based on cost consideration.

Scope and

Methodology

We identified U.S. policies toward Cubans seeking U.S. entry through

discussions with State, INS, and CRS officials and reviewing documentation

such as agreements with the Cuban government, joint communiques,

administration announcements of parole and safe haven positions, and

pertinent legislation. To determine the processing capabilities of the

Interests Section, we interviewed INS officials in Washington, D.C., and

visited the Interests Section in Havana. In Havana, we discussed with

consular, INS, and senior post officials the various screening and

adjudication processes for refugees, immigrants, and parolees; reviewed

sample case files; and observed ongoing screenings.

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To determine living conditions at Guantanamo Bay, we visited the U.S.

Atlantic Command in Norfolk, Virginia, to discuss its oversight of migrant

operations and how it developed criteria for living standards. We also

visited Guantanamo Bay, where we observed camp conditions, examined

the parole processing procedures, and monitored the weekly meeting with

the JTF Commander and the Cuban representatives from each camp. In

addition, we met with JTF-160 operations and logistics officers and officials

from CRS, INS, State, World Relief Corporation, IOM, and UNHCR to discuss

their activities at Guantanamo Bay.

To determine program costs, we obtained estimated actual and projected

Cuban migrant program incremental cost data for fiscal years 1994 and

1995 from the Departments of Defense and State, INS, CRS, and the Coast

Guard. We did not verify the accuracy of the agencies’ estimates.

We conducted our review between April and August 1995 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Unless you announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution

of this report until 15 days after its issue date. At that time, we will send

copies to the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice and to interested

congressional committees, and to others upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please

contact me at (202) 512-4128. Major contributors to this report were David

R. Martin, Assistant Director, and Audrey E. Solis, Senior Evaluator.

Harold J. Johnson, Director

International Affairs Issues

(711131) Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-211 Cuba
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