United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

September 1995 AIRCRAFT

REQUIREMENTS

Air Force and Navy

Need to Establish

Realistic Criteria for

Backup Aircraft

GAO/NSIAD-95-180

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-257832 

September 29, 1995

The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman

Chairman

The Honorable Norman Sisisky

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Readiness

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Robert K. Dornan

Chairman

The Honorable Owen B. Pickett

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Personnel

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Ike Skelton

House of Representatives

Since 1977, numerous audits by the Department of Defense (DOD) and us

have reported that the military services overstate the number of backup

fighter/attack1

 aircraft needed for training, test and evaluation, and as

replacements for combat-designated aircraft that are in maintenance or

lost through attrition. As of the end of fiscal year 1993, the Air Force and

the Navy/Marine Corps operated and maintained 2,954 combat-designated

fighter/attack aircraft and 1,623 similar, equally capable backup aircraft.

The former Chairmen of the Subcommittee on Readiness and the

Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel were concerned that

backup forces were not efficiently managed and that this mismanagement

adversely affected funds available for combat-designated forces. The

Chairmen requested that we identify

• trends in the number of backup aircraft maintained by the services,

• actions that DOD and the services have taken in response to prior

recommendations by others and us to validate backup aircraft

requirements, and

1

Fighter/attack aircraft include the Air Force F-4, F-15, F-16, F-111, F-117, and A-10 and the Navy and

the Marine Corps F/A-18, F-14, A-6, and AV-8B.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
B-257832 

• opportunities to remove unneeded backup aircraft from the force to

minimize the cost of operating and maintaining combat-designated

aircraft.

Background Backup aircraft account for about 35 percent of the Air Force’s and

Navy/Marine Corps’ fighter/attack aircraft inventory. Operations and

maintenance funds appropriated to support these aircraft are allocated

based on the number of combat-designated aircraft, and the test and

evaluation, and training aircraft in the backup force. There is no additional

allocation for maintenance and attrition aircraft in the backup force.

Those backup aircraft are operated and maintained with the same funds.

This affects the budget, because maintenance and attrition backup forces

siphon off funds from the combat-designated force.

DOD’s October 1993 Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era required the

services to reduce and reshape their forces. The Bottom-Up Review

specified 20 Air Force wings, 11 Navy air wings, and 4 Marine Corps air

wings. DOD’s goals for the services include reducing combat-designated

fighter/attack aircraft forces to 2,230 aircraft by 1999, a reduction of

25 percent from 1993 levels.2

Since 1977, audits by us and DOD have recommended that DOD (1) develop

supportable criteria to justify backup aircraft inventories and

procurement, (2) reduce the number of these assets, and (3) improve the

management and oversight of these aircraft.

In 1993, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported that each service

continues to use its own methodology, terminology, and philosophy to

determine backup fighter/attack aircraft requirements.3

 The report

recommended the services use standard terminology and inventory

definitions and thereby help ensure that procurement and maintenance

funds be spent only on necessary aircraft.

The Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) is a mechanism for

reporting material management weaknesses, such as unsupported

inventory criteria, to agency heads, Congress, and the President. FMFIA also

2

This goal was set forth in the Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and the Congress,

January 1994. The goal was subsequently increased to 2,262 fighter/attack aircraft in the Secretary’s

February 1995 report.

3

See Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, February 1993.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
B-257832 

requires a corrective action plan be devised and milestones established to

correct identified problems.

Results in Brief The Air Force and the Navy/Marine Corps operate and maintain about one

backup aircraft for every two combat-designated fighter/attack aircraft.

The Air Force’s and the Navy/Marine Corps’ plans to reduce the size of the

combat-designated aircraft forces will, if implemented, essentially achieve

the Bottom-Up Review’s force level goals by the end of fiscal year 1996.

Backup forces will also be reduced but will still make up about one-third

of all fighter/attack aircraft operated and maintained by the services.

The Air Force has not developed supportable criteria for structuring and

managing the backup forces and justifying the procurement of backup

aircraft. The Navy/Marine Corps have begun to revise their criteria.

Realistic criteria are essential today because both the Air Force and the

Navy plan to buy expensive new aircraft systems in the near future—the

F-22 and the F/A-18E/F, respectively. If realistic criteria for backup aircraft

are not established soon, the Air Force and the Navy could buy more

aircraft than needed.

If attrition aircraft in excess of short-term needs were stored until needed,

the Air Force could reduce operation and maintenance costs.

Services’ Plan to

Significantly Reduce

Combat-Designated

and Backup Aircraft

by 1996

By fiscal year 1996, the services’ force structure plans show significant

reductions in combat-designated fighter/attack aircraft. These reductions

are summarized in table 1 and appendix I. If these reductions are achieved,

the ratio of combat-designated aircraft to backup aircraft will not

significantly change. The relative number of combat-designated aircraft

will increase slightly compared with backup aircraft, from 64.5 percent of

the total active force in fiscal year 1993 to 66.5 percent of the total force in

fiscal year 1996.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
B-257832 

Table 1: Comparison of Planned

Fighter/Attack Aircraft Reductions and

Bottom-Up Review Goals

Bottom-Up

Review

requirementa

Actual inventory

(fiscal year 1993)

Planned inventory

(fiscal year 1996)

Service

Combat

aircraft

Combat

aircraft Backup

Combat

aircraft Backup

Air Force 1,440 1,872 1,034 1,446 761

Navy/Marine Corps 822 1,082 589 963 453

Total 2,262 2,954 1,623 2,409 1,214

aThe Bottom-Up Review force structure, planned for fiscal year 1999, will be virtually achieved by

fiscal year 1996.

Appendix II shows reductions by type of aircraft.

DOD Has Not Acted

on Recommendations

to Validate Backup

Criteria

Over many years, there has been concern that the services’ criteria for

backup fighter/attack aircraft overstate requirements and need to be

validated. In most cases, DOD responded that the existing criteria were

relevant or that DOD would study the matter. Subsequent studies by others

and us have repeatedly found that little has been done to validate the

criteria.

• In 1977, we examined inventories of F-15s and F-14s and found that

backup requirements for training, maintenance, and attrition aircraft were

overstated. We recommended that Congress require DOD to base its

justification for backup aircraft on realistic and supportable data. DOD

agreed and responded that a review was underway to validate the

requirements.4

• In 1983, we again questioned criteria used by the services to justify backup

F-14, F-15, F-16, and F/A-18 training, maintenance, and attrition aircraft.

Further, we reported DOD had not initiated a review to validate the criteria.5

• In 1992, the Naval Audit Service reported that the Navy had overstated the

need for F-14 training aircraft.6

4

Need to Strengthen Justification and Approval Process for Military Aircraft Used for Training,

Replacement, and Overhaul (GAO/LCD-77-423, Oct. 28, 1977).

5

Opportunities to Reduce the Number of Combat Aircraft Purchased for Noncombat Purposes

(GAO Testimony, June 2, 1983).

6

F-14 Aircraft Requirements (Naval Audit Service, 050-S-92, May 19, 1992).

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
B-257832 

• In 1993, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported that the services’

requirements for combat-designated and backup aircraft were

inconsistent, outdated, and in need of revision.7

See appendix III for a list and discussion of our previous audits and DOD

audits of backup aircraft inventories and criteria.

Despite recommendations to validate backup aircraft criteria, the Air

Force continues to use unvalidated criteria. The Navy/Marine Corps has

made progress toward justifying the number of aircraft needed to support

the combat-designated force.

Backup Aircraft

Criteria

The Air Force and the Navy/Marine Corps used standard planning factors

or percentages to determine the number of backup aircraft required to

support the combat force. More recently, the Navy/Marine Corps has used

student volume, flying hour requirements, and aircraft utilization rates to

determine the need for training backup aircraft, and a Test and Evaluation

Master Plan to determine the need for test and evaluation backup aircraft.

Table 2 summarizes the Air Force’s and the Navy/Marine Corps’ planning

factors used to determine the need for backup aircraft.

Table 2: Air Force’s and Navy/Marine

Corps’ Planning Factors for Backup

Aircraft by Function

Function Planning factors

Training The Air Force uses 25 percent of the authorized combat force.

The Navy/Marine Corps uses the student volume, anticipated

flying hours, and aircraft utilization rates.

Test and evaluation The Air Force uses 3 percent of the authorized combat and

training force. The Navy/Marine Corps bases needs on a Test

and Evaluation Master Plan.

Maintenance The Air Force uses 10 percent of authorized combat, training,

and test and evaluation forces. The Navy/Marine Corps

computes needs based on a 5-year average.

Attrition The Air Force rate is based on an annual average peacetime loss

rate and the number of years the aircraft will be supported in the

inventory. The Navy uses a 5-year running average.

Valid Criteria Needed Prior

to Procurement of the F-22

and FA-18E/F

The Air Force plans to spend over $72 billion to procure 442 F-22

fighter/attack aircraft (4 fighter wing equivalents): 288 combat-designated

aircraft and 154 backup aircraft. Table 3 shows the breakout of backup

7

Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

February 1993.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
B-257832 

F-22 aircraft given (1) backup aircraft required using current Air Force

backup aircraft criteria and (2) the procurement plan.

Table 3: Comparison of the Air Force’s

Requirements and Procurement Plan

for Backup F-22s

Backup function Requirement Procurement plan

Training 72 66

Test and evaluation 11 17

Maintenance 37 35

Attrition 63/86a 36

aAssumes the same attrition rate as the F-15 aircraft (0.72 aircraft per fighter wing equivalent per

year) and a service life of either 22 years or 30 years, respectively.

If the F-22 experiences the same attrition rate as the F-15, the Air Force

will be able to sustain four fighter wing equivalents for 12.5 years with a

force of 36 attrition aircraft. Conversely, if the F-22 experiences one-half

the attrition rate of the F-15, the Air Force will be able to sustain four

fighter wing equivalents for 25 years with a force of 36 attrition aircraft.

DOD plans to spend $89 billion to procure 1,000 F/A-18E/F aircraft. The

Navy’s planned inventory distribution for the F/A-18E/F would continue to

increase the relative number of fighter/attack aircraft used for combat

versus backup categories. For example in fiscal year 1993, 65 percent of

the Navy/Marine Corps fighter/attack aircraft were categorized for combat.

In fiscal year 1996 that is planned to increase to 68 percent. The

distribution of the planned F/A-18E/F aircraft procurement would increase

the fighter/attack combat aircraft proportion to 70 percent.

Navy Uses FMFIA to

Report Its Aircraft

Requirements Process as a

Material Management

Weakness

FMFIA requires ongoing evaluations of internal agency management

controls and accounting systems and annual reports to the President and

Congress on the condition of those systems. FMFIA is not limited to

accounting or administrative matters. Rather, it is intended to address the

entire range of policies and procedures that management employs to

perform its mission efficiently and effectively. In February 1994, the

Secretary of Defense directed all Assistant Secretaries of Defense to

improve implementation of the FMFIA.

Numerous audits by DOD and us, reports, and congressional testimony

have shown that the Air Force and the Navy need to validate their backup

aircraft criteria. In our view, the lack of valid criteria is a material

weakness reportable under the FMFIA. In addition, to the extent that other

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
B-257832 

program analyses rely on backup aircraft criteria, those analyses would

share the same weakness. The Navy acknowledged this when it reported

aircraft acquisition requirements processes (which used current backup

aircraft criteria) as a material management weakness in its fiscal year 1993

and 1994 FMFIA reports.

Managing Attrition

Aircraft Differently

Could Be More

Cost-Effective

Attrition aircraft are used to replace combat-designated training, and test

and evaluation aircraft lost in peacetime mishaps. In 1994, the Air Force

Materiel Command developed a concept that could be used to support the

services’ aircraft needs. Although the report on which that

recommendation was based offered no specific cost savings, a 1992 Air

Force-sponsored study compared 8 years of storage costs plus

reconstitution costs to 8 years of operating costs for selected aircraft,

including the F-15 and the F-16. The study concluded that storage and

reconstitution costs were only 1.9 percent of the operating and

maintenance costs for an F-15 and 2.1 percent of operating and

maintenance costs for an F-16. Neither the Air Force nor the Navy/Marine

Corps had exercised this option as of 1994.

The services’ fiscal year 1996 plans show 218 attrition aircraft. Past

attrition rates, however, show that some of these aircraft will not be

needed for over 7 years. For example, over the past 5 years, the Air Force

lost an average of about 17 F-16 aircraft per year to peacetime mishaps. On

the basis of this rate, some of those F-16s will not be needed until the year

2002. However, the Air Force operates and maintains those aircraft in the

same manner as combat-designated aircraft. That is, attrition aircraft are

assigned to active and reserve units and the Air Force uses operation and

maintenance funds that are appropriated for combat-designated, training,

and test and evaluation aircraft to support attrition aircraft. In essence,

funds that are expected to be used to operate and support

combat-designated aircraft are being siphoned off to support attrition

aircraft.

Attrition aircraft operating and maintenance costs are difficult to

determine. However, in 1994 the Air Force Logistics Management Agency

estimated the annual incremental cost of one attrition F-16 in operating

units to be $13,366.8

 In fiscal year 1994, the Air Force provided Air

National Guard units about $75,000 for each additional attrition aircraft in

excess of the first three aircraft supported by the units. However,

8

This estimate included costs associated with manpower and parts requirements due to

calendar-driven and other non-program flying-hour-related maintenance requirements. It did not

include depot-maintenance costs or the operation and maintenance costs of flying the aircraft.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
B-257832 

individual Guard units estimate annual operation and maintenance costs

range from about $120,000 to $400,000 for each aircraft. According to Air

National Guard and Air Force officials, as the number of authorized

combat-designated aircraft assigned to each unit decreases,9

 supporting

attrition aircraft becomes more difficult. One unit has already reported a

potential degradation of its combat-designated aircraft operation as a

result of attrition aircraft that have been assigned to that unit.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the

Air Force to (1) develop and use supportable and consistent criteria to

justify backup aircraft inventories and future procurement of backup

aircraft as the Navy is doing and (2) report the lack of valid backup

fighter/attack aircraft requirements criteria as a material management

weakness, in compliance with FMFIA, until these criteria are developed and

put in use.

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of

the Air Force and the Secretary of the Navy to adjust backup aircraft

inventories, where needed, to conform to supportable and consistent

criteria once established.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

The comments DOD provided on a draft of this report appear in

appendix IV. DOD partially concurred with the report. DOD believes more

progress has been made in developing sound backup aircraft criteria than

we describe. DOD agreed, however, that additional improvements may be

necessary. Accordingly, DOD will undertake a review of the backup aircraft

criteria.

DOD concurred with our description of the trends in the number of backup

aircraft maintained by the services, but commented there were

inaccuracies in the report, apparently referring to the process we describe

that arrived at the specific number of combat-designated aircraft in the

forces. We believe our description of how the number of

combat-designated aircraft was determined is accurately summarized,

including reference to the Secretary of Defense’s January 1994 Annual

Report to the President and the Congress.

9

In recent years, the number of fighter/attack aircraft assigned to Air National Guard squadrons has

been reduced from a maximum of 24 aircraft in 1992 to 15 aircraft in 1995.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
B-257832 

DOD only partially agreed with our analysis of actions taken in response to

prior audit recommendations by others and us to validate backup aircraft

requirements. According to DOD, both services have recognized a need to

review their criteria. We believe this is a positive step. We also believe,

however, that, in light of previous, largely unsuccessful efforts by others

and us to persuade DOD and the services of the need to formulate valid

backup aircraft criteria, actions now underway need to be part of a larger

process to ensure those actions are fully implemented. The

recommendations in this report are intended to help achieve that

objective.

The Air Force does not accept that past criticisms of its criteria, or

revisions currently being made to its policies, reflect a material weakness

reportable under FMFIA. We disagree. The Air Force’s and the Navy’s lack

of supportable criteria has been the long-standing subject of numerous

reports and recommendations by others and us for corrective action.

Based on those reports, the Navy has identified the aircraft requirements

process as a material weakness and established a time frame for

corrective action. In light of new Air Force aircraft procurements

potentially costing over $72 billion, we continue to believe the lack of valid

backup aircraft criteria constitutes a material management weakness and

reportable under FMFIA. DOD concurred with our conclusion that the

procurement of F-22 and F/A-18E/F aircraft should be based on valid

criteria.

DOD partially agreed with our conclusion that unneeded attrition aircraft

should be placed in storage. DOD, while citing Navy policy to store

unneeded aircraft to save costs, noted the Air Force contention that the

incremental cost to maintain such aircraft with the active forces is

relatively small and these aircraft would be available for emergencies or

other temporary needs. However, according to DOD, conclusive cost data is

not yet available to support the Air Force’s contention. In light of the

Navy’s retention policy, the analysis discussed in this report that compare

storage and reconstitution costs against operating costs, and the need to

base backup aircraft requirements on quantifiable needs, we continue to

believe unneeded aircraft should not be operated and maintained with

funds intended to support the authorized forces.

DOD partially concurred with the recommendation that the Secretary of the

Air Force develop supportable and consistent criteria to justify backup

aircraft inventories and future procurements, and did not concur with a

similarly directed recommendation to report backup fighter/attack aircraft

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
B-257832 

requirements criteria as a material management weakness under FMFIA.

Further, DOD partially concurred with the recommendation that the Air

Force and the Navy adjust backup aircraft inventories to conform to

supportable and consistent criteria. Considering the (1) lengthy history of

reports concerning the need to strengthen the backup aircraft

requirements determination criteria, (2) numerous recommendations to

strengthen that process, (3) slow progress in that direction, and

(4) planned procurements of costly F-22 and F/A-18E/F aircraft, we are

retaining recommendations that identify the known weaknesses, and

establish time frames for resolving those weaknesses through the FMFIA

mechanism.

Scope and

Methodology

We analyzed directives and other pertinent documents and interviewed

agency officials regarding backup aircraft procurement planning criteria,

inventory management requirements, and force reduction goals. We

documented past findings and recommendations regarding backup

inventories and criteria. We documented changes to backup criteria and

other actions taken as a result of prior recommendations.

Using the services’ fiscal years 1995 and 1996 programming plans and

other service provided aircraft inventory data, we documented and

compared reductions in combat and backup aircraft inventories for fiscal

years 1993 and 1994 and projected inventories for fiscal years 1995 and

1996.

We interviewed management officials at the Aerospace Maintenance and

Regeneration Center at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, and

reviewed studies regarding the potential for storing attrition aircraft until

needed. We also visited operational units responsible for operating and

maintaining backup aircraft, including active wings and squadrons, a

training command, and Air National Guard units, to discuss the impact of

these aircraft on unit operations and costs. We reviewed backup aircraft

procurement plans to determine whether the standardized backup aircraft

planning factors, previously reported as outdated and in need of revision,

had been changed.

We reviewed FMFIA reports prepared by the Air Force, the Navy, and DOD

for fiscal years 1993 and 1994 to determine whether material weaknesses

were reported in the area of aircraft requirements.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
B-257832 

We performed our review between October 1993 and February 1995 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the Air

Force, and the Navy; the Director of the Office of Management and

Budget; and other appropriate congressional committees. We will also

make copies available to other interested parties upon request.

Please contact me at (202)512-3504 if you have any questions concerning

this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Air Force and Navy

Fighter Aircraft

Inventories

14

Appendix II 

Air Force and Navy

Fighter Aircraft

Inventories by Type of

Aircraft

16

Appendix III 

Past Audits

Addressing Backup

Aircraft Requirements

20

Appendix IV 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

22

Appendix V 

Major Contributors to

This Report

30

Tables Table 1: Comparison of Planned Fighter/Attack Aircraft

Reductions and Bottom-Up Review Goals

4

Table 2: Air Force’s and Navy/Marine Corps’ Planning Factors for

Backup Aircraft by Function

5

Table 3: Comparison of the Air Force’s Requirements and

Procurement Plan for Backup F-22s

6

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
Contents

Figures Figure I.1: Comparison of Air Force and Navy Combat-Designated

and Backup Aircraft for Fiscal Years 1993 and 1996

14

Figure I.2: Comparison of Air Force and Navy Backup Aircraft for

Fiscal Years 1993 and 1996

15

Figure II.1: Air Force Fiscal Year 1993 Combat-Designated and

Backup Aircraft by Type of Aircraft

16

Figure II.2: Air Force Fiscal Year 1996 Combat-Designated and

Backup Aircraft by Type of Aircraft

17

Figure II.3: Navy Fiscal Year 1993 Combat-Designated and

Backup Aircraft by Type of Aircraft

18

Figure II.4: Navy Fiscal Year 1996 Combat and Backup Aircraft

Inventory by Type of Aircraft

19

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

FMFIA Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
Appendix I 

Air Force and Navy Fighter Aircraft

Inventories

Figure I.1: Comparison of Air Force

and Navy Combat-Designated and

Backup Aircraft for Fiscal Years 1993

and 1996

Number of aircraft

0

250

500

750

1000

1250

1500

1750

2000

2250

2500

2750

3000

Air

Force

Navy Air

Force

Navy

1993 1996

Backup aircraft

Combat designated

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
Appendix I 

Air Force and Navy Fighter Aircraft

Inventories

Figure I.2: Comparison of Air Force

and Navy Backup Aircraft for Fiscal

Years 1993 and 1996

Number of aircraft

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

F-16A/B

F-16C/D

F-15A/B/C/D

F-15E

A-10

F-117

F-111

F-4G

Type of aircraft

Combat designated

Backup

Note: The Air Force did not separate maintenance and attrition reserve aircraft for fiscal year 1993

and earlier.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
Appendix II 

Air Force and Navy Fighter Aircraft

Inventories by Type of Aircraft

Figure II.1: Air Force Fiscal Year 1993

Combat-Designated and Backup

Aircraft by Type of Aircraft

Number of aircraft

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

F-16A/B

F-16C/D

F-15A/B/C/D

F-15E

A-10

F-117

F-111

F-4G

Type of aircraft

Combat designated

Backup

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
Appendix II 

Air Force and Navy Fighter Aircraft

Inventories by Type of Aircraft

Figure II.2: Air Force Fiscal Year 1996

Combat-Designated and Backup

Aircraft by Type of Aircraft

Number of aircraft

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

F-16A/B

F-16C/D

F-15A/B/C/D

F-15E

A-10

F-117

F-111

F-4G

Type of aircraft

Combat designated

Backup

Note: Backup F-16 A/B aircraft will be primarily used for test and evaluation.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
Appendix II 

Air Force and Navy Fighter Aircraft

Inventories by Type of Aircraft

Figure II.3: Navy Fiscal Year 1993

Combat-Designated and Backup

Aircraft by Type of Aircraft

Number of aircraft

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

F14 F18A/B F18C/D AV8B A6

Type of aircraft

Combat designated

Backup

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
Appendix II 

Air Force and Navy Fighter Aircraft

Inventories by Type of Aircraft

Figure II.4: Navy Fiscal Year 1996

Combat and Backup Aircraft Inventory

by Type of Aircraft

Number of aircraft

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

F-14 F-18A/B F-18C/D AV-8B A-6

Type of aircraft

Combat coded

Backup

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
Appendix III 

Past Audits Addressing Backup Aircraft

Requirements

F-14 Aircraft Requirements Naval Audit Service (050-S-92, May 19, 1992).

The Naval Audit Service reported that the Navy had overstated its need for

backup F-14 training and maintenance aircraft. The Navy did not concur

with the methodology the Naval Audit Service proposed to calculate

training aircraft requirements, nor with a recommendation to reduce F-14

depot maintenance funding. The Navy did concur, in principle, with the

recommendation that it develop plans to remove nonessential F-14s from

its active inventory.

Opportunities to Reduce the Number of Combat Aircraft Purchased for

Noncombat Purposes (GAO Testimony, June 2, 1983). We questioned

criteria used by services to justify the number of non-combat aircraft

required. We questioned the training, maintenance, and attrition categories

for the F-14, F-15, F-16, and F/A-18 and reported that the Department of

Defense (DOD) had never reviewed support aircraft justifications as it said

it would in 1977. DOD stated that, regardless of the justification, the support

aircraft were necessary and would be used in war.

F-16 Integrated Logistics Support: Still Time to Consider Economical

Alternatives (GAO/LCD-80-89, Aug. 20, 1980). We questioned the Air Force’s

stated requirement for a 10-percent increase in F-16 aircraft to compensate

for aircraft in depot maintenance, since the aircraft was designed to

eliminate planned depot maintenance. DOD stated that the 10-percent

factor had been historically accurate for tactical fighter aircraft.

The Congress Should Require Better Justification of Aircraft for

Noncombat Missions (GAO/LCD-80-93, July 22, 1980). We recommended to

Congress, on the basis of past work, that appropriations be withheld for

procurement of F-14s, F-15s, F-16s, F/A-18s, and A-10s until the services

justified their noncombat aircraft needs with current and realistic data.

Operational and Support Costs of the Navy’s F/A-18 Can Be Substantially

Reduced (GAO/LCD-80-65, June 6, 1980). We determined that the Navy

overstated the need for F/A-18 maintenance backup aircraft because they

had not fully factored in the F/A-18’s reliability and maintainability

characteristics.

Unnecessary Procurement of A-10 Aircraft for Depot Maintenance Floats

(GAO/LCD-79-431, Sept. 6, 1979). We found that, despite the A-10’s design to

eliminate depot-level maintenance, the Air Force continued to use the

standard 10-percent reserve for maintenance to justify procurement. We

recommended that DOD direct the Air Force to come up with more

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
Appendix III 

Past Audits Addressing Backup Aircraft

Requirements

meaningful estimates to justify procurement. The Air Force responded

they would study how to develop backup aircraft numbers. However, they

generally felt the additional aircraft were needed.

Letter to the Secretary of Defense (GAO/LCD-79-420, May 22, 1979). We

restated our findings from our 1977 report and recommended that action

be taken immediately to affect procurement of F-14s and F-15s.

Need to Strengthen Justification and Approval Process for Military Aircraft

Used for Training, Replacement, and Overhaul (GAO/LCD-77-423, Oct. 28,

1977). We examined inventories of F-15s and F-14s and found that backup

requirements for training, attrition, and maintenance were overstated. We

recommended that Congress require DOD to justify requirements for

noncombat aircraft on realistic and supportable data. DOD agreed that all

programs should be based on supportable data and announced that a

review was underway to determine whether this was the case.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 3 and 4.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 4 and 5.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5 and 6.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 7 and 8.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 8.

Now on p. 8.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
Appendix V 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Jerry Herley, Assistant Director

Norfolk Regional

Office

Hugh E. Brady, Evaluator-in-Charge

Frank R. Marsh, Evaluator

Jeffrey C. McDowell, Evaluator

(701024) Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-95-180 Aircraft Requirements
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