No. 85-232 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1985 

CITY OF HAMILTON, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-vsBYRON CRAIG HAYDEN, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

In and For the County of Ravalli, 

The Honorable John S. Henson, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Judith A. Loring, Hamilton, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Koch, McKenna, Goheen & Boggs; D.W. McKenna, Hamilton, 

Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Oct. 3, 1985 

Decided: November 14, 1985 

Filed: NUI/ 14 1985 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice Franlr B. Morrison, Jr. delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

Defendant Byron Hayden appeals his April 29, 1985, jury 

conviction in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 

District, for driving under the influence of alcohol. We 

reverse the District Court judgment and dismiss the cause. 

Defendant was arrested and charged with DUI on July 2, 

1983, in Hamilton, Montana. Defendant waived his right to a 

speedy trial at the city court level on November 10, 1983. 

Subsequently, he was tried and convicted in City Court on 

January 26, 1984. Defendant filed a defective notice of 

appeal to the District Court on February 2, 1984; an amended 

notice of appeal was filed on March 15, 1984. On April 5, 

1984, the City of Hamilton (City) moved to dismiss the appeal 

as being untimely. An order denying the motion to dismiss 

was entered on May 11, 1985. 

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of speedy 

trial on August 21, 1984. This was denied on August 30, 

1984, and defendant applied to the Montana Supreme Court for 

a writ of supervisory control on September 4, 1984. The writ 

was denied on October 22, 1984, and the matter returned to 

the District Court. Defendant filed a second motion to 

dismiss for lack of speedy trial on March 6, 1985, which was 

denied April 5, 1985. 

Defendant failed to appear at the jury trial scheduled 

on April 8, 1985, and the matter was reset for April 29, 

1985. Trial was held on April 29, 1985, and the jury found 

defendant guilty of DUI. On appeal., the sole issue is 

whether defendant was denied his constitutional right to a 

speedy trial. 
In State -- v. Knox (1984), 675 P.2d 950, 41 St.Rep. 126, 

we held that a defendant who appeals a lower court decision 

to the district court level has a constitutional right to a 

speedy trial. Whether or not a defendant has been deprived 

of this right involves a balancing of four factors: 1) 

length of delay; 2) reason for the delay; 3) defendant's 

assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and 4) prejudice to 

the defendant. Applying these factors to the present case, 

we find the defendant was denied his constitutional right to 

a speedy trial at the district court level. 

Defendant's amended notice of appeal was filed March 15, 

1984, and his first trial date was set for April 8, 1985, 

over one year later. A delay of nearly 13 months is 

sufficient to shift the burden to the City to explain the 

reason for the delay and the absence of prejudice to the 

defendant. State v. Tiedemann (1978), 178 Mont 394, 584 P.2d 

1284. 

The City cites the District Court opinion denying 

defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial in 

asserting the major reasons for delay were the motions filed 

by the defendant. The District Court opinion is not 

supported by the facts, in that it ignores the "deadtime" in 

this case from May 11, 1984 to August 21, 1984, and October 

23, 1984, to March 6, 1985. We find an unintentional 

institutional delay of 236 days is unacceptable where the 

City has offered no reason for the delay. 

The City argues there has been no showing of prejudice 

against the defendant caused by the delay in getting the case 

to trial. In Tiedemann, we said prejudice would be presumed 

where there is excessive delay between the date of the 
occurrence and the time of trial. 178 Mont. at 407, 584 P.2d 

at 1292. In this case, the City has presented no substantial 

credible evidence showing that the delay has not prejudiced 

the defendant. 

The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the