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*********************************************** 
IN RE DELILAH G.*

(AC 45058)

Bright, C. J., and Elgo and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed to this court from the judgment of the

trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor

daughter, D. The petitioner father and the mother had married while

he was in the United States Navy in California. After his deployment to

the east coast, he and the mother divorced in 2014, and the mother was

granted physical custody of D and the father was granted visitation

rights. After a separate custody trial in the District of Columbia, the

court granted the father physical custody of D and visitation rights to

the mother. In 2015, after the father married S, a court in Maryland

modified the custody and visitation order, permitting the father to move

to Connecticut. The mother’s last visit with D occurred in 2017, before

the father moved to Connecticut and the mother moved back to California. Twice while the father, S and D lived in Connecticut, the Navy

deployed him for periods of approximately six months at sea, which

the mother claimed interfered with her ability to establish a relationship

with D. In 2018, D began behavioral health treatment with L, an advanced

practice registered nurse. In March, 2018, the Superior Court in Norwich

held a hearing on a motion the father had filed to modify the Maryland

custody and visitation order. After a hearing, which the mother did not

attend, the court ordered that the father would maintain sole legal and

physical custody of D and that the mother would be permitted to visit

D at the father’s discretion upon proof of substance abuse counseling,

completion of a parenting course and reunification therapy. The father

then filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights with respect

to D on, inter alia, the statutory (§ 45a-717 (g) (2) (C)) ground that

she had no ongoing parent-child relationship with D. Prior to trial, the

Department of Children and Families completed a social study in which

it recommended termination of the mother’s parental rights. The trial

court, in terminating the mother’s parental rights, found that D, who

was nine years old at the time of the termination hearing, did not have

any present positive memories of her mother, whom she referred to at

times as her ‘‘other mother,’’ her grandmother and her father’s sister,

and that D’s memories of her mother did not involve pleasant things,

which included her memory that the mother had pushed the father down

some stairs. The trial court further concluded that the interference

exception to the ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination of parental rights was inapplicable and that the mother had made

minimal efforts to maintain a relationship with D. On appeal, the mother

claimed, inter alia, that the trial court, in concluding that she had no

ongoing parent-child relationship with D, failed to consider the father’s

interference with the development of that relationship and D’s positive

feelings toward her. Held:

1. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claim that the trial court

improperly concluded that the petitioner father had established the

ground of no ongoing parent-child relationship by clear and convincing

evidence: the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to justify

the trial court’s determinations that D had no present, positive memories

of the respondent mother and, thus, that there was no ongoing parentchild relationship between them; moreover, contrary to the mother’s

assertion that D had many present, positive memories of her, including

that D referred to the mother as her other mother, that she spoke with

the mother on S’s phone when she was six years old, that D sometimes

discussed with L her memories of the mother, but with no contexts or

time frames, and that D stated that one time the mother gave her a lot

of toys, that evidence could not be construed as evidence of present

memories or feelings that was positive in nature, especially as there

was evidence that the mother gave D the toys after she had hit D in

the mouth with a hairbrush.

2. The trial court properly determined that the respondent mother failed to
establish that the actions of the petitioner father rendered inevitable

her lack of a relationship with D: contrary to the mother’s contention,

the 2018 court order did not bar her from visiting with D but, rather,

permitted visitation at the father’s discretion upon proof that she had

completed substance abuse counseling, a parenting course and reunification therapy, the court order did not preclude the mother from speaking

with D by phone or mailing her letters or gifts, and the mother produced

no credible evidence that she had engaged in the services prescribed

in the court’s order or that she sought to modify the court order before

the filing of the termination of parental rights petition; moreover, the

father’s insistence that she abide by the court’s orders, his refusal to

let her visit D when she did not adhere to the court-ordered visitation

schedule, and his deployments at sea and their effects on the mother’s

ability to visit with D, which the court considered, did not constitute

interference with her relationship with D; furthermore, the mother presented no evidence regarding the quality and nature of her relationship

with D before the father’s alleged interference, and she made minimal

effort to maintain a relationship with D, as she had custody of her for

the first three years of her life, court-ordered visitation in the years

since the original judgment transferred custody to the father, and the

opportunity to maintain contact and a relationship with D through phone

calls, letters and gifts.

3. The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that

allowing further time for the reestablishment of a parent-child relationship between D and the respondent mother would be detrimental to

D’s best interests: the court did not improperly rely on L’s statement,

as the mother claimed, that D could experience emotional distress if

she had contact with her mother, as the court was entitled to give great

weight to the statements of professionals such as L, other evidence such

as the department’s social study supported the court’s determination,

and the court already had found that D had no relationship with her

mother; moreover, D had negative memories of or feelings toward her

mother, who presented no evidence that she ever engaged in the services

prescribed in the court’s 2018 visitation order or sought to modify that

order and the evidence showed that the mother had hit D and pushed

the petitioner father down some stairs; furthermore, the evidence

showed that D had lived with her father and S since they married, and

that her father and S, whom D referred to as her mother, were meeting

her needs.

Argued February 28—officially released August 24, 2022**

Procedural History

Petition by the father to terminate the parental rights

of the respondent mother with respect to their minor

child, brought to the New London Regional Children’s

Probate Court and transferred to the Superior Court in

the judicial district of New London, Juvenile Matters

at Waterford, where the petition was withdrawn in part;

thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Hoffman, J.;

judgment terminating the respondent mother’s parental

rights, from which the respondent mother appealed to

this court. Affirmed.

Benjamin M. Wattenmaker, assigned counsel, for the

appellant (respondent mother).

Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appellee

(petitioner).
Opinion

ELGO, J. The respondent mother, Amanda L., appeals

from the judgment of the trial court granting the petition

of the petitioner father, Juan G., to terminate her parental rights with respect to her minor daughter, Delilah

G. On appeal, the respondent claims that the court

improperly determined that (1) there was no ongoing

parent-child relationship between her and Delilah pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-717 (g) (2) (C)1 and (2)

she had abandoned Delilah pursuant to § 45a-717 (g)

(2) (A). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the respondent’s appeal. The petitioner and the

respondent met in 2010 in Norfolk, Virginia. In the

spring of 2011, the petitioner learned that the respondent was pregnant with Delilah. At the time, the petitioner, who had enlisted in the United States Navy in

November, 2007, was preparing to move to California

due to a military relocation. In August, 2011, the petitioner moved to San Diego, California, in accordance

with the orders he had received from the Navy. Delilah

was born in December, 2011, in Oregon while the petitioner was deployed. When the petitioner completed

his deployment in March, 2012, he visited the respondent and Delilah in Oregon. Shortly thereafter, in May,

2012, the respondent2 and the petitioner married.3 The

respondent and Delilah then moved to San Diego to live

with the petitioner. When the petitioner was deployed

to the east coast in August, 2013, the family relocated

to the Washington, D.C., area.

Throughout their marriage, the respondent and the

petitioner’s relationship was filled with ongoing problems and domestic violence. In May, 2014, the parties

divorced. At that time, Delilah was approximately two

and one-half years old. While the divorce was pending,

the respondent had physical custody of Delilah and the

petitioner had visitation time with Delilah. Later in 2014,

a separate custody trial took place. The Superior Court

of the District of Columbia issued a custody order on

November 14, 2014, granting the petitioner physical custody of Delilah and providing the respondent with visitation rights. At the time the petitioner was granted physical custody of Delilah, she was almost three years old.

Thereafter, on October 9, 2015, both parties agreed

to modify the custody and visitation order. Pursuant

to the parties’ agreement, and based on the evidence

presented, on October 14, 2015, the Superior Court of

the District of Columbia ordered that ‘‘the [respondent]

shall have visitation with the minor child on alternate

weekends. [The respondent] shall pick up the minor

child from her school at the end of the school day on

Fridays and drop off the minor child on Sundays at 6

p.m. at the visitor’s center on [the] base . . . . [I]f [the

respondent’s] visitation with the minor child coincides
with a Monday holiday, the minor child shall remain

with [the respondent] during the Monday holiday. [The

respondent] shall drop off the minor child on Monday

at 6 p.m. at the visitor’s center on [the] base . . . .’’

(Footnote omitted.) At the time this order was issued,

Delilah was almost four years old.

In 2015, the petitioner married Sara G., who has four

children from a previous marriage. The petitioner and

Sara G. also have two children from their marriage.

On September 29, 2016, when Delilah was almost five

years old, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County,

Maryland, modified the previous visitation order. The

order prescribed that, ‘‘during every even number of

years, [the respondent] will have the child during

Thanksgiving, and Thanksgiving will be defined as Tuesday evening to Sunday evening . . . . [D]uring every

odd number of years, [the respondent] will have the

child from December 23 to December 30 . . . . [D]uring the summer, the [respondent] will have the child

from the last week of June until the second week of

August . . . . [T]he [petitioner] shall have the child on

Father’s Day weekend, and the [respondent] shall have

the child on Mother’s Day weekend . . . .’’ The order

also permitted the petitioner to relocate to Connecticut.

Specifically, the court order provided that the petitioner

‘‘shall have permission to relocate to Connecticut, and

after [he] has relocated, the [respondent] will have visitation with the minor child, Delilah . . . any three day

weekend (no school) . . . .’’ The order also stated that,

‘‘[u]ntil the [petitioner] deploys or relocates out of state,

the [respondent] will maintain every other weekend

visitation . . . . [A]fter relocation, the [respondent] is

responsible for the pickup of the child and the [petitioner] is responsible for the return of the child . . . .’’

Thus, the petitioner maintained custody of Delilah while

the respondent maintained visitation rights.

The respondent’s last in-person visit with Delilah

occurred in February, 2017, before the petitioner moved

to Connecticut in March of that year. At the time of

that last in-person visit, Delilah was five years old. The

respondent continued to live in the Washington, D.C.,

area until the spring of 2018, at which point she moved

back to California.

Delilah currently resides with the petitioner, her stepmother, Sara G., and her seven siblings in Connecticut.

She has received behavioral health treatment from Amy

Lane, an advanced practice registered nurse, since 2018.

Since moving to Connecticut, the petitioner has been

deployed twice—once in 2017 and once in 2019—both

times for a period of approximately six months.

In February, 2018, the petitioner filed a motion in

Connecticut for modification of the custody and visitation order. A hearing on the motion was held at the

Superior Court in the judicial district of New London
at Norwich on March 29, 2018,4 at which the respondent

was not present.5

In a written order, the court found

that the respondent had actual notice of the proceeding

but had elected not to appear. The court ordered that

‘‘[the petitioner] shall maintain sole legal and physical

custody of the minor child Delilah . . . . [The respondent] shall have access at the [petitioner’s] discretion

following proof of substance abuse counseling, completion of a parenting course and reunification therapy.’’

When this court order was issued, Delilah was six

years old.

On March 25, 2019, the petitioner filed the petition

to terminate the parental rights of the respondent in

the New London Regional Children’s Probate Court. At

the time the petition was filed, Delilah was seven years

old. In the petition, the petitioner alleged: (1) no ongoing

parent-child relationship existed between the respondent and Delilah pursuant to § 45a-717 (g) (2) (C); (2)

the respondent had abandoned Delilah pursuant to

§ 45a-717 (g) (2) (A); and (3) the respondent had failed

to rehabilitate herself pursuant to § 45a-717 (g) (2)

(D) (i).

A Probate Court study for termination of parental

rights (study) was completed on June 13, 2019, by Marcus Hilario, a social worker for the Department of Children and Families (department). The study recommended that the parental rights of the respondent be

terminated with respect to Delilah. On January 14, 2020,

Hilario completed an addendum to the study (addendum). The addendum also recommended that the

respondent’s parental rights be terminated.

The petition was transferred to the Superior Court

for Juvenile Matters at Waterford. The respondent contested the petition, and a trial was held on April 1, 2021.6

Delilah was nine years old at the time of trial. At the

start of trial, counsel for the petitioner withdrew the

failure to rehabilitate ground. The court then heard

testimony from the petitioner, the respondent, Sara G.,

and Hilario. Six exhibits were entered into evidence

by the petitioner, and five exhibits were entered into

evidence by the respondent.7

In its memorandum of decision dated July 28, 2021,

the court found that the petitioner had proven, by clear

and convincing evidence, the grounds of no ongoing

parent-child relationship pursuant to § 45a-717 (g) (2)

(C) and abandonment pursuant to § 45a-717 (g) (2) (A).

The court, thus, terminated the parental rights of the

respondent as to Delilah, and this appeal followed.

On appeal, the respondent claims that the court

improperly determined that (1) there was no ongoing

parent-child relationship between her and Delilah pursuant to § 45a-717 (g) (2) (C); and (2) she had abandoned Delilah pursuant to § 45a-717 (g) (2) (A).

Before considering those claims, we begin by setting
forth the legal principles and standards of review that

govern our analysis. ‘‘[Section] 45a-715 (a) (2) permits

a child’s guardian, among others, to petition the Probate

Court to terminate the parental rights of that child’s

parent(s). In order to terminate a parent’s parental

rights under § 45a-717, the petitioner is required to

prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that any one

of the seven grounds for termination delineated in § 45a717 (g) (2) exists and that termination is in the best

interest of the child. . . . Those seven grounds are:

abandonment, acts of parental commission or omission,

no ongoing parent-child relationship, neglect/abuse,

failure to rehabilitate, causing the death of another

child, or committing a sexual assault that results in the

conception of the child.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jacob

W., 178 Conn. App. 195, 203–204, 172 A.3d 1274 (2017),

aff’d, 330 Conn. 744, 200 A.3d 1091 (2019).

‘‘Nonconsensual termination proceedings involve a

two step process: an adjudicatory phase and a dispositional phase. . . . In the adjudicatory phase, the trial

court determines whether one of the statutory grounds

for termination of parental rights exists by clear and

convincing evidence. . . . If the trial court determines

that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In the dispositional

phase, the trial court determines whether the termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the

child. . . . The dispositional phase, like its adjudicatory cousin, also must be supported on the basis of clear

and convincing evidence.’’ (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) In re Alissa N., 56 Conn.

App. 203, 207–208, 742 A.2d 415 (1999), cert. denied,

252 Conn. 932, 746 A.2d 791 (2000). Section 45a-717 (i)

requires the court, in all cases except those in which

termination is based on consent, in determining

whether termination is in the child’s best interest, to

consider and make written findings regarding six separate factors.8

Our Supreme Court has cautioned that, ‘‘[i]n interpreting the parameters of [§ 45a-717 (g)], we must be mindful of what is at stake. [T]he termination of parental

rights is defined, in [what is now General Statutes § 45a707 (8)], as the complete severance by court order of the

legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities,

between the child and [the] parent . . . . It is, accordingly, a most serious and sensitive judicial action. . . .

Although the severance of the parent-child relationship

may be required under some circumstances, the United

States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the interest of parents in their children is a fundamental constitutional right that undeniably warrants deference and,

absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jacob W., 330

Conn. 744, 756, 200 A.3d 1091 (2019); see also In re

Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 295, 455 A.2d
1313 (1983) (noting that ‘‘it is both a fundamental right

and the policy of this state to maintain the integrity of

the family’’). ‘‘Termination of parental rights does not

follow automatically from parental conduct justifying

the removal of custody. The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because

they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the [s]tate. Even when

blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital

interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of

their family life.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re Jessica M., 217 Conn. 459, 465, 586 A.2d 597 (1991).

‘‘Section [45a-717 (g)] carefully sets out . . . [the]

situations that, in the judgment of the legislature, constitute countervailing interests sufficiently powerful to

justify the termination of parental rights in the absence

of consent.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re

Oreoluwa O., 321 Conn. 523, 532, 139 A.3d 674 (2016).

‘‘[The petitioner], in petitioning to terminate those

rights, must allege and prove [by clear and convincing

evidence] one or more of the statutory grounds.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Michael M., 29

Conn. App. 112, 118, 614 A.2d 832 (1992). ‘‘Clear and

convincing proof is a demanding standard denot[ing] a

degree of belief that lies between the belief that is

required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in

issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is

required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . .

[The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the

mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts

asserted are highly probably true, that the probability

that they are true or exist is substantially greater than

the probability that they are false or do not exist.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Carla C., 167

Conn. App. 248, 258, 143 A.3d 677 (2016). ‘‘In contrast

to custody proceedings, in which the best interests of

the child are always the paramount consideration and

in fact usually dictate the outcome, in termination proceedings the statutory criteria must be met before termination can be accomplished and adoption proceedings

begun.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re

Michael M., supra, 118.

On appeal, we review the court’s conclusion that a

ground for termination of parental rights has been

proven for sufficiency of the evidence. See, e.g., In

re Tresin J., 334 Conn. 314, 322, 222 A.3d 83 (2019)

(‘‘Although the trial court’s subordinate factual findings

are reviewable only for clear error, the court’s ultimate

conclusion that a ground for termination of parental

rights has been proven presents a question of evidentiary sufficiency. . . . That conclusion is drawn from

both the court’s factual findings and its weighing of the

facts in considering whether the statutory ground has

been satisfied. . . . On review, we must determine

whether the trial court could have reasonably con-
cluded, upon the facts established and the reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect

of the evidence was sufficient to justify its [ultimate

conclusion]. . . . When applying this standard, we

construe the evidence in a manner most favorable to

sustaining the judgment of the trial court.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.)); see also In re Mariana A.,

181 Conn. App. 415, 428, 186 A.3d 83 (2018) (‘‘In an

appeal from the granting of a petition [to terminate

parental rights], our Supreme Court has indicated that

the court’s ultimate conclusion as to whether a ground

for termination of parental rights has been proven presents a question of evidentiary sufficiency. . . . Thus,

in reviewing the granting of a petition, we must determine whether the trial court could have reasonably

concluded, upon the facts established and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that the cumulative

effect of the evidence was sufficient to justify its [ultimate conclusion].’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)).

To the extent we are required to construe the terms

of a ground for termination of parental rights or its

applicability to the facts of the case, however, our

review is plenary. See, e.g., In re Tresin J., supra, 334

Conn. 322; see also In re November H., 202 Conn. App.

106, 132, 243 A.3d 839 (2020) (‘‘[t]he applicability of

the interference exception under the facts of this case

presents a question of law over which we exercise plenary review’’).

Last, to the extent that we are required to review

the court’s subordinate factual findings, we apply the

clearly erroneous standard of review. See, e.g., In re

Jacob W., supra, 330 Conn. 754 (explaining that applicable standard of review for subordinate factual findings

is clear error). ‘‘A [subordinate factual] finding is clearly

erroneous when either there is no evidence in the record

to support it, or the reviewing court is left with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

made. . . . [G]reat weight is given to the judgment of

the trial court because of [the trial court’s] opportunity

to observe the parties and the evidence. . . . [An appellate court does] not examine the record to determine

whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . . [Rather] every

reasonable presumption is made in favor of the trial

court’s ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In

re November H., supra, 202 Conn. App. 123. With these

legal principles in mind, we turn to the respondent’s

claims.

The respondent claims that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the court’s conclusion

that there was no ongoing parent-child relationship

between her and Delilah pursuant to § 45a-717 (g) (2)

(C). Specifically, the respondent claims that the court

improperly concluded that the petitioner had estab-
lished the ground of no ongoing parent-child relationship by clear and convincing evidence because (1) Delilah has present positive memories of her, (2) the

petitioner interfered with her relationship with Delilah,

and (3) allowing additional time for the reestablishment

of the parent-child relationship would not be detrimental to Delilah’s best interests. We address each of the

respondent’s claims in turn.9

I

We begin with the respondent’s claim that the court

improperly granted the petition to terminate her parental rights pursuant to § 45a-717 (g) (2) (C) because Delilah has present positive memories of her.

The following additional procedural history is relevant to our resolution of the respondent’s claim. Evidence relating to whether Delilah has present positive

memories of the respondent was presented at trial. This

evidence includes the testimony of Hilario, the petitioner, Sara G., and two exhibits—the study and addendum—both composed by Hilario.

At trial, Hilario testified as to his interactions with

Delilah. Hilario had interviewed Delilah alone on two

separate occasions—once in preparation for composing

the study and again in preparation for composing the

addendum. According to Hilario, Delilah ‘‘had very few

memories of [the respondent].’’ At trial, when asked

whether Delilah had made any statements regarding

any positive memories of the respondent, Hilario

responded, ‘‘[n]o.’’

In the study, Hilario reported that he conducted a

visit to Delilah’s home on May 29, 2019. During this visit,

he conducted an interview of Delilah alone. Consistent

with his trial testimony, Hilario noted in his study that,

during the interview, ‘‘Delilah referred to [the respondent] as her father’s sister. Delilah reported that she

saw [the respondent] a long time ago, but could not

remember a time frame. Delilah indicated that [the

respondent] was mean and one time pushed [the petitioner] down some stairs. Delilah stated that she could

not remember other mean things that [the respondent]

did.’’ Hilario also had spoken with Delilah’s counselor,

Lane, on June 10, 2019, in preparation for composing

the study. According to the study, ‘‘Lane indicated that

Delilah briefly stated that [the respondent] hit her in

the face with a hairbrush, however, Delilah did not

disclose any further details and did not have a time

frame as to when this happened.’’ Hilario testified at

trial that Lane had informed him that ‘‘Delilah had some

memories of [the respondent], I believe, like getting hit

in the face with a brush . . . .’’

During Hilario’s second interview with Delilah, the

two again discussed the respondent. When Hilario

asked Delilah if she knew who the respondent was, the

addendum notes that Delilah stated that ‘‘[the respon-
dent] is my other mother.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Hilario wrote in the addendum, ‘‘Delilah

reported that [the respondent] pushed [the petitioner]

down a flight of stairs but did not have a time frame

as to when this incident occurred. Delilah also stated

that [the respondent] gave her a lot of toys and a bloody

something when she was a baby. Delilah did not provide

further details as to what the bloody something was.

Delilah stated that she last spoke to [the respondent]

when she was six years old on mommy’s phone (referring to [Sara G.]). Delilah did not have a time frame

as to when she last visited with [the respondent] but

indicated that [she] lived in another state.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Hilario testified at trial that

Delilah ‘‘remembered [the respondent] giving her a

bloody something but then had no details after that.’’

The addendum further stated that Lane had reported

to Hilario that Delilah does not discuss the respondent

with her. According to Hilario’s testimony, ‘‘[Lane]

reported that the topic of [the respondent] was not

discussed.’’

The petitioner also testified at trial. According to his

testimony, while he and the respondent were living in

San Diego, the respondent had pushed him down a

flight of stairs in the presence of Delilah. Sara G. also

testified at trial. She averred that, during one therapy

session in which she was present, Delilah told her therapist that ‘‘[the respondent] was mean to her, and that

[the respondent] had hit her in the mouth with [a] hairbrush and made her mouth bleed and then took her to

the store to buy her toys. And then, after that incident,

she refused to talk about anything related to [the

respondent].’’

The petitioner further testified that, after he moved

with Delilah to Connecticut in 2017, ‘‘[t]here was one

phone call in which [the respondent] spoke with Delilah, and it was for approximately thirty seconds.’’ At

the time, the petitioner was on deployment, and so the

phone call was facilitated by Sara G. The petitioner

testified that, while he was deployed, he would leave

a cell phone at his home and Sara G. would check the

phone at least once a week. The petitioner testified that,

on one occasion, Sara G. had allowed the respondent

to speak by phone with Delilah in a call that lasted

for thirty seconds. The petitioner testified that the call

lasted only thirty seconds because ‘‘Delilah did not

know who she was talking to and, after a brief conversation, said okay, goodbye grandma or I love you, too,

grandma.’’ Sara G. similarly reported that, after the

respondent had sent a text message to the petitioner’s

phone on Delilah’s birthday requesting to speak with

Delilah, the respondent and Delilah spoke by phone for

thirty seconds. When asked why the phone call was so

short, Sara G. testified: ‘‘I couldn’t tell you why. I gave

the phone to Delilah. [The respondent] told her happy

birthday and that she loved her, and—then Delilah said
goodbye, and at the end of the phone call she said, I

love you, grandma, and handed the phone back.’’

On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the

court found the following facts in its memorandum of

decision: ‘‘Delilah refers to [the respondent] as her

‘other mother.’ Delilah reported [that] she remembers

[the respondent] pushing [the petitioner] down a flight

of stairs but does not have a time frame and that [the

respondent] gave her a lot of toys and a ‘bloody something’ when she was a baby. Delilah also remembers

talking to [the respondent] on ‘mommy’s phone,’ referring to Sara G.’s phone, when she was six years old.

Delilah ended the call saying goodbye to ‘grammy.’ . . .

Delilah has not had an in-person visit with [the respondent] since 2017, and therefore no relationship that

ordinarily develops as a result of the parent having met

the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of

the child. Delilah does not recognize [the respondent’s]

voice on the phone and refers to her as her ‘other

mother.’ Delilah has no relationship with [the respondent].’’ On the basis of these factual findings, the court

concluded that ‘‘Delilah has no present positive memories of [the respondent], and her memories are not of

pleasant things.’’

On appeal, the respondent contends that there is

insufficient evidence in the record to support the court’s

conclusion that Delilah does not have present positive

memories of the respondent. We disagree.

Section 45a-717 (g) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[T]he

court may approve a petition terminating the parental

rights . . . if it finds, upon clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the termination is in the best interest

of the child, and (2) . . . (C) there is no ongoing parentchild relationship which is defined as the relationship

that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having

met on a continuing, day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to

allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child . . . .’’ Our

Supreme Court has ‘‘explained that the inquiry under

§ 45a-717 (g) (2) (C) is a two step process. First, the

court must determine whether the petitioner has proven

the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship. Only

if the court answers that question in the affirmative

may it turn to the second part of the inquiry, namely,

whether allowance of further time for the establishment

or reestablishment of the relationship would be contrary to the child’s best interests.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Jacob W., supra, 330 Conn. 755.

This statutory ground for termination of an individual’s parental rights was created via No. 74-164, § 6, of

the 1974 Public Acts (P.A. 74-164) and was intended to

be a ‘‘no-fault’’ statutory ground for termination. See

In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648,
669, 420 A.2d 875 (1979) (referring to no ongoing parentchild relationship ground for termination of parental

rights as ‘‘ ‘no-fault’ statutory ground’’); see also In re

Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 645, 436

A.2d 290 (1980) (‘‘[i]t is clear that the legislature

intended that even without fault on the part of the

parent a child should be able to be freed for adoption

where there is no ongoing child-parent relationship and

where the period of time predictably necessary to establish or reestablish a parent-child relationship with the

natural parent would be detrimental to the child’s best

interest’’). The prior version of the statute, enacted into

law by No. 73-156, § 7, of the 1973 Public Acts, allowed

petitions for the termination of parental rights to be

filed in the Probate Court, in the absence of consent,

based only on certain ‘‘fault’’ grounds such as abandonment, neglect, or physical or mental disability. Probate

Judge Glenn Knierim, head of the committee of probate

judges and clerks, and a representative of the then Welfare Department, drafted P.A. 74-164. Judge Knierim

explained at the March 19, 1974 hearing before the

legislature’s Joint Standing Committee on the Judiciary

that the no ongoing parent-child relationship ground

for termination ‘‘allows [a] judge to terminate parental

rights if [the court] believes that no parent/child relationship exists and [that] to allow time to [develop]

such a relationship would be detrimental [to] the child.’’

Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary,

1974 Sess., p. 195, remarks of Judge Knierim.

Since its creation in 1974, this statutory ground for

termination ‘‘has evolved in light of a sparse legislative

history . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In

re Jacob W., supra, 178 Conn. App. 208. ‘‘In its interpretation of the language of § 45a-717 (g) (2) (C), this court

has been careful to avoid placing insurmountable burden[s] on noncustodial parents. . . . Because of that

concern, [our Supreme Court has] explicitly rejected a

literal interpretation of the statute, which defines the

relationship as one that ordinarily develops as a result

of a parent having met on a continuing, day-to-day basis

the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs

of the child . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re Jacob W., supra, 330 Conn. 757. Rather, our

Supreme Court has explained that ‘‘[i]t is reasonable

to read the language of ‘no ongoing parent-child relationship’ to contemplate a situation in which, regardless

of fault, a child either has never known his or her parents, so that no relationship has ever developed

between them, or has definitively lost that relationship,

so that despite its former existence it has now been

completely displaced. In either case the . . . question

is whether the child has no present memories or feelings

for the natural parent.’’10 In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), supra, 177 Conn. 670.

The term ‘‘for,’’ as used in the phrase ‘‘present memories or feelings for the natural parent,’’ has been inter-
preted to mean ‘‘what is said or felt in favor of someone

or something: pro.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re Juvenile Appeal (84-6), 2 Conn. App. 705, 709,

483 A.2d 1101 (1984), cert. denied, 195 Conn. 801, 487

A.2d 564 (1985). Thus, ‘‘the phrase ‘feelings for the natural parent’ refers to feelings of a positive nature. It does

not encompass . . . extreme, psychologically corrosive and destructive feelings . . . .’’ Id.; see also In

re Jessica M., supra, 217 Conn. 470 (‘‘[T]he standard

contemplates a relationship that has some positive attributes. It is not unlikely that most parent-child relationships in which state intervention is required, including

custody disputes incidental to divorce, will exhibit signs

of strain. While evidence of a child’s ambivalent feelings

toward a noncustodial parent would not alone justify

a finding that no ongoing parent-child relationship

exists, it is nevertheless reasonable to construe this

statutory ground for termination to require a finding

that no positive emotional aspects of the relationship

survive.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

Thus, our case law makes clear that the test for

determining whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists is whether the ‘‘child [has] some present

memories or feelings for the natural parent that are

positive in nature.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 469; see also In re Tresin J., supra, 334 Conn. 325

(‘‘[t]he ultimate question is whether the child has some

present memories or feelings for the natural parent

that are positive in nature’’ (emphasis omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted)); In re Jacob W., supra, 330

Conn. 757 (same); In re Emily S., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Juvenile Matters, Docket

No. CP-18-012507-A (April 22, 2001) (same) (reprinted

at 210 Conn. App. 585, 613, 270 A.3d 819), aff’d, 210

Conn. App. 581, 270 A.3d 797, cert. denied, 342 Conn.

911, 271 A.3d 1039 (2022). ‘‘[T]he . . . question is

whether the child has no present [positive] memories

or feelings for the natural parent.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Carla C., supra, 167 Conn. App.

266; see also In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn. App. 516, 525,

777 A.2d 695 (2001) (‘‘[f]eelings for the natural parent

connotes feelings of a positive nature only’’ (internal

quotation marks omitted)); In re John G., 56 Conn. App.

12, 23, 740 A.2d 496 (1999) (same); In re Tabitha T.,

51 Conn. App. 595, 602, 722 A.2d 1232 (1999) (same);

In re Kezia M., 33 Conn. App. 12, 21, 632 A.2d 1122

(same), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993).

Our Supreme Court has also clarified that ‘‘[d]ay-today absence alone . . . is insufficient to support a finding of no ongoing parent-child relationship’’ and has

‘‘rejected the notion that termination may be predicated

on the lack of a meaningful relationship, [because] the

statute requires that there be no relationship.’’ (Citation

omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re Jacob W., supra, 330 Conn. 757–58. It

thus follows that, ‘‘evidence of a troubled parent-child
relationship [is], without more, insufficient to justify

termination on the basis of no ongoing parent-child

relationship . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jessica M., supra, 217 Conn. 469–70; see also

In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), supra, 177 Conn.

671 (‘‘[t]he statute does not authorize the termination

of parental rights upon a showing of a troubled relationship, but only upon a showing of no relationship’’).

The statute also does not authorize a court to terminate parental rights simply because the biological parent is not the ‘‘psychological parent’’ of the child, as

such authorization would place an insurmountable burden on noncustodial parents. See In re Jessica M.,

supra, 217 Conn. 470 (‘‘If a court were authorized to find

that day-to-day absence alone proved that no ongoing

parent child relationship existed, a parent whose child

needed a temporary placement would otherwise have

to consider the risk that his or her parental rights might

be terminated if the guardian subsequently wished to

adopt. Such a standard for termination would create

an incentive for a parent to yield temporary custody to

a stranger rather than to an interested relative who

might develop a strong bond with the child. Creating a

disincentive for a parent to choose the guardian most

likely to love and protect the child while the parent

was unable to provide daily care would contravene the

state’s interests in protecting both family integrity and

the best interests of the child.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)); In re Juvenile Appeal

(Anonymous), supra, 177 Conn. 675 (‘‘The fact that the

child may have established a loving relationship with

someone besides [the parent] does not prove the

absence of a [parent-child] relationship. It is insufficient

to prove that the child has developed emotional ties

with another person. Certainly children from two-parent homes may have two psychological parents; even

children whose parents are divorced may retain close

emotional ties to both, although the relationship to one

is maintained solely through visitation. . . . The statute, however, quite clearly does not authorize termination upon a showing of no meaningful relationship, but

rather requires that there be no relationship.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)).

As to noncustodial parents, our Supreme Court has

emphasized that ‘‘[t]he evidence regarding the nature

of the respondent’s relationship with [the] child at the

time of the termination hearing must be reviewed in

the light of the circumstances under which visitation

had been permitted.’’ In re Jessica M., supra, 217 Conn.

473. The fact that a noncustodial parent has had some

contact with the child, however, does not ‘‘preclude a

determination that there [is] no ongoing parent-child

relationship . . . .’’ In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), supra, 181 Conn. 646.

In the present case, the respondent argues that the
court’s conclusion that Delilah has no present positive

memories of her is ‘‘belied by the substantial record

evidence that Delilah has many present positive memories of [her].’’11 In support of this contention, the respondent relies on the following evidence: (1) when asked

by Hilario if she knew who the respondent was, Delilah

stated that the respondent was her ‘‘ ‘other mother,’ ’’

(2) Delilah did not have a time frame as to when she

last visited with the respondent but indicated that they

lived in another state, (3) Delilah stated that she last

spoke with the respondent when she was six years

old on ‘‘ ‘mommy’s phone’ ’’ (referring to Sara G.), (4)

Delilah sometimes discusses her memories of the

respondent with Lane but with no contexts or time

frames, and (5) Delilah stated that the respondent gave

her a lot of toys. We address each piece of evidence

in turn.

As previously explained, in his addendum, Hilario

reported that, during his second interview with Delilah,

he had asked her if she knew who the respondent was,

and she stated that ‘‘[the respondent] is my other

mother.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The

respondent asserts that this evidence supports the conclusion that Delilah has present positive memories of

her. We are unpersuaded.

That Delilah may recognize the respondent as her

‘‘ ‘other mother’ ’’ is not evidence of a present positive

memory of the respondent. The statement simply indicates that Delilah may recognize who the respondent

is, not that she has any present memories of the respondent that are positive in nature. Our case law instructs

that ‘‘[t]he ultimate question is whether the child has

some present memories or feelings for the natural parent that are positive in nature.’’12 (Emphasis omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Tresin J.,

supra, 334 Conn. 325. Thus, the respondent’s reliance on

Delilah’s statement that the respondent is her ‘‘ ‘other

mother’ ’’ does not support her assertion that Delilah

has present positive memories of her.13

The addendum composed by Hilario also provided

that ‘‘Delilah did not have a time frame as to when she

had last visited with [the respondent] but indicated

that they lived in another state.’’ This evidence likewise

cannot reasonably be construed to be a present positive

memory. The evidence merely suggests that Delilah

could not remember when the respondent had visited

her last but that Delilah knew that the respondent lived

in a different state. Nothing in this evidence indicates

that Delilah has some present memories or feelings

toward the respondent that are positive in nature. We,

therefore, find the respondent’s reliance on this evidence misplaced.

Hilario also reported in his addendum that Delilah

stated that she last spoke with the respondent when

she was six years old on ‘‘ ‘mommy’s phone’ ’’ (referring
to Sara G.).14 Again, there is no evidence in the record

that this memory is positive in nature. We, thus, find

unavailing the respondent’s contention that Delilah has

a present positive memory of her last phone call with

the respondent.

Similarly, evidence that Delilah ‘‘sometimes discusses her memories of [the respondent] with [Lane]

but with no contexts or time frames’’ does not support

the respondent’s contention that Delilah has present

positive memories of her because there is no evidence

in the record as to whether these memories are positive

in nature.

Last, the respondent relies on evidence that ‘‘Delilah

also stated that [the respondent] gave her a lot of toys

. . . .’’ The respondent argues that ‘‘Delilah reveals that

she has a present memory that [the respondent] gave

her a lot of toys’’ and that, ‘‘[u]ndoubtedly, this is a

present positive memory of [the respondent].’’ The

respondent acknowledges, however, that ‘‘in this same

sentence, Delilah also recalled that [the respondent]

gave her a ‘bloody something,’ although the child did

not provide any clarifying details regarding this memory.’’ The respondent isolates Delilah’s statements and

argues that ‘‘some of Delilah’s memories of [the respondent] are positive while others are ambiguous or negative. The mere fact that some of Delilah’s memories of

[the respondent] are ambiguous or negative does not

vitiate the fact that she has many present positive memories of [the respondent].’’

Although we agree with the respondent’s contention

that not all of a child’s memories of the parent must

be positive in order for the court to conclude that there

is an ongoing parent-child relationship, we emphasize

that at least some of the child’s present memories or

feelings of the parent must be positive in nature. See,

e.g., In re Jessica M., supra, 217 Conn. 470 (‘‘[T]he

standard contemplates a relationship that has some

positive attributes. It is not unlikely that most parentchild relationships in which state intervention is

required, including custody disputes incidental to

divorce, will exhibit signs of strain. While evidence of

a child’s ambivalent feelings toward a noncustodial parent would not alone justify a finding that no ongoing

parent-child relationship exists, it is nevertheless reasonable to construe this statutory ground for termination to require a finding that no positive emotional

aspects of the relationship survive.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.)).

When we review in context Delilah’s statement that

‘‘[the respondent] gave her a lot of toys and a ‘bloody

something’ when she was a baby,’’ we conclude that it

cannot reasonably be construed as a positive memory.

Hilario testified that Lane told him that ‘‘Delilah had

some memories of [the respondent], I believe, like getting hit in the face with a brush . . . .’’ Sara G. likewise
averred that, during one therapy session in which she

was present, Delilah told her therapist that ‘‘[the respondent] was mean to her, and that [the respondent] had

hit her in the mouth with [a] hairbrush and made her

mouth bleed and then took her to the store to buy her

toys. And then, after that incident, she refused to talk

about anything related to [the respondent].’’ Hilario also

reported in both his study and addendum that Delilah

indicated that the respondent was mean, and, at some

point, had pushed the petitioner down some stairs. The

petitioner also testified that, while he and the respondent were living in San Diego, the respondent had

pushed him down a flight of stairs in the presence of

Delilah. We, therefore, conclude that this evidence does

not demonstrate that Delilah has a present positive

memory of the respondent.

Our careful review of the record leads us to conclude

that the court could have reasonably concluded, on

the basis of the facts established and the reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect

of the evidence was sufficient to justify its conclusion

that Delilah has no present positive memories of the

respondent. Accordingly, we will not disturb this conclusion.

II

The respondent next claims that the court erred in

concluding that the interference exception did not apply

to preclude the petitioner from relying on § 45a-717 (g)

(2) (C) as a ground for termination. We disagree.

The following additional procedural history is pertinent to our analysis of this claim. At the trial on the

petition to terminate the respondent’s parental rights,

the respondent argued that the interference exception

should apply and prohibit the petitioner from relying

on the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship

between her and Delilah. In support of this argument,

the respondent relied on certain evidence presented at

trial. For example, evidence was presented that the

petitioner had filed a motion to modify the visitation

order, resulting in a court order, dated March 29, 2018,

providing that the respondent would be permitted to

visit Delilah ‘‘at the [petitioner’s] discretion following

proof of substance abuse counseling, completion of a

parenting course and reunification therapy.’’ Evidence

also was presented regarding a request made by the

respondent to visit with Delilah in March, 2018, and the

petitioner’s corresponding refusal to permit such a visit

based on his contention that it was not the respondent’s

visitation time. Testimony was heard regarding the petitioner’s deployments and the respondent’s ability to

contact Delilah during those deployments. Evidence

also was admitted concerning whether the respondent

had the petitioner’s address in Connecticut in order to

send cards and gifts to Delilah and whether the petitioner refused to provide the respondent with his
address. In his closing argument, the respondent’s counsel argued that this evidence showed that the petitioner

had interfered with the respondent’s relationship with

Delilah.

In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded

that the interference exception did not apply to the

facts of the case. The court found that the respondent’s

claims that the petitioner had interfered with her ability

to maintain an ongoing relationship with Delilah were

not credible. The court noted that it had taken into

consideration the petitioner’s 2017 and 2019 deployments and the effect that they may have had on the

respondent’s ability to visit with Delilah. The court also

pointed out that it had considered the respondent’s

assertion that she did not have the petitioner’s address,

which, she claimed, prevented her from contacting Delilah and filing anything with the court. The court found

that this assertion was not credible and determined that

the respondent had been provided the petitioner’s new

address in 2017. Last, the court concluded that ‘‘the

fact that [the petitioner] has taken a hard line, requiring

[the respondent] to abide by the court orders does not

rise to the level of interference. The exchange of text

messages between [the respondent] and [the petitioner]

in 2018 . . . highlights [the petitioner’s] frustration and

concerns of accommodating the respondent’s efforts

to see her child. The text messages indicate [that the

respondent] had previously indicated she had planned

to see the child but did not follow through. [The petitioner] expressed his concerns over [the respondent’s]

not having a [driver’s] license and the possible exposure

of his child to a stranger. [The petitioner’s] insisting

[that the respondent] follow the court-ordered visitation

schedule under these circumstances was not unreasonable. . . . [The respondent] has done nothing to comply with the court orders or seek to change the orders to

be in a position to see her daughter.’’ (Citation omitted.)

We begin our analysis by briefly setting forth the

case law regarding what has become known as the

‘‘interference exception’’ to the no ongoing parent-child

relationship ground for termination. Recently, in In re

Jacob W., supra, 330 Conn. 754–69, our Supreme Court

clarified the parameters of the interference exception.

The interference exception, the court explained,

‘‘applies when the petitioner has engaged in conduct

that inevitably has led to the lack of an ongoing parentchild relationship between the respondent parent and

the child. This exception precludes the petitioner from

relying on the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship as a basis for termination. Under these circumstances, even if neither the respondent parent nor the

child has present positive feelings for the other and,

even if the child lacks any present memories of the

respondent parent, the petitioner is precluded from

relying on § 45a-717 (g) (2) (C) as a basis for termination.’’ In re Jacob W., supra, 763–64. The ‘‘inquiry prop-
erly focuses not on the petitioner’s intent in engaging

in the conduct at issue, but on the consequences of

that conduct. In other words, the question is whether

the petitioner engaged in conduct that inevitably led to

a noncustodial parent’s lack of an ongoing parent-child

relationship. If the answer to that question is yes, the

petitioner will be precluded from relying on the ground

of no ongoing parent-child relationship as a basis for

termination regardless of the petitioner’s intent—or

not—to interfere.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 762.

Further clarification of the interference exception

was provided in In re Tresin J., supra, 334 Conn. 331–33.

The court in that case opined that ‘‘the interference

exception is akin to the equitable doctrine of clean

hands . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,

332. It also made clear that the interference exception

‘‘is triggered only by the conduct of the petitioner rather

than that of a third party or some other external factor

that occasioned the separation.’’ Id. Then, the court

explained that ‘‘[t]he interference exception . . .

applies when the actions of the petitioner rendered

inevitable the initial lack of a relationship . . . .’’

(Emphasis omitted.) Id., 332 n.12.

Our cases involving the interference exception demonstrate that the exception does not apply if the actions

of the petitioner do not inevitably lead to the lack of

a relationship between the respondent and the child.

Compare id. (interference exception was inapplicable

where actions of petitioner did not render inevitable

lack of relationship between incarcerated respondent

father and child because lack of relationship occurred

several years before alleged interference by petitioner),

and In re November H., supra, 202 Conn. App. 134

(same), and In re Alexander C., 67 Conn. App. 417,

424–25, 787 A.2d 608 (2001) (interference exception

was inapplicable because, although child was placed

in foster care within days of birth, incarcerated respondent father, rather than petitioner, created circumstances that caused and perpetuated lack of ongoing

parent-child relationship and because respondent made

no attempt to modify protective order barring contact

with child, which did not require extraordinary and

heroic efforts by respondent), aff’d, 262 Conn. 308, 813

A.2d 87 (2003), with In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492,

531–35, 613 A.2d 748 (1992) (interference exception

was applicable where department took temporary custody of child essentially upon birth and termination

hearing took place only few months later because finding of lack of ongoing parent-child relationship was

inevitable in absence of extraordinary and heroic efforts

by incarcerated respondent mother), and In re Carla

C., supra, 167 Conn. App. 276 (interference exception

was applicable because, short of extraordinary and

heroic efforts by incarcerated respondent father, who

had filed numerous contempt motions in attempt to
enforce visits with child, petitioner mother was able to

completely deny father access to child by obtaining

order from prison precluding him from initiating communication with her and child, discarding letters he

sent to child and filing motion to suspend child’s visitation with father). Consequently, the respondent has the

burden of proving that the petitioner’s interference and

conduct caused her initial lack of relationship with

her child.

In the present case, the respondent contends that the

interference exception should apply to preclude the

petitioner from relying on the ground of no ongoing

parent-child relationship to terminate her parental

rights because, according to the respondent, the petitioner engaged in conduct that inevitably led to her lack

of an ongoing parent-child relationship with Delilah.

Specifically, the respondent contends that the petitioner interfered with her relationship with Delilah by

(1) obtaining the March 29, 2018 court order effectively

barring her from having any visits with Delilah,15 (2)

refusing to allow the respondent to visit Delilah when

she traveled to Connecticut in March, 2018, (3) leaving

the respondent with ‘‘virtually no way to contact [the

petitioner] to arrange visits or speak with Delilah’’ during the petitioner’s 2017 and 2019 deployments, and (4)

refusing to provide the respondent with his address.16

We address each instance of alleged interference in

turn and conclude that the actions of the petitioner did

not inevitably lead to the lack of an ongoing parentchild relationship between the respondent and Delilah.

Cf. In re Jacob W., supra, 330 Conn. 763 (‘‘[t]he [interference] exception . . . applies when the petitioner has

engaged in conduct that inevitably has led to the lack

of an ongoing parent-child relationship between the

respondent parent and the child’’).

The respondent first contends that the petitioner’s

procurement of the March 29, 2018 court order inevitably led to the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship between her and Delilah. As previously described,

the March 29, 2018 court order provides that ‘‘[the petitioner] shall maintain sole legal and physical custody

of the minor child Delilah . . . . [The respondent] shall

have access at the [petitioner’s] discretion following

proof of substance abuse counseling, completion of a

parenting course and reunification therapy.’’ According

to the respondent, the order ‘‘effectively barred [her]

from having any visits with Delilah’’ because, ‘‘even if

[she] completed these services, the [petitioner] would

still have unfettered discretion to deny visitation . . .

for any reason, or for no reason at all.’’ (Emphasis

added.) We are not persuaded that the March 29, 2018

court order required ‘‘ ‘extraordinary and heroic

efforts’ ’’ by the respondent in order to maintain an

ongoing parent-child relationship with Delilah. In re

Carla C., supra, 167 Conn. App. 273. We find it significant that, unlike in In re Carla C., the order did not
bar the respondent from visiting with Delilah, speaking

with her by phone, or sending her letters or gifts in

the mail. See id., 253–56 (lack of ongoing parent-child

relationship was inevitable where petitioner mother

obtained order from prison in which respondent father

was incarcerated barring him from all oral or written

communication with her and child, discarded cards and

letters he sent to child and obtained court order suspending his visitation with child pending outcome of

proceedings on petition to terminate father’s parental

rights). Furthermore, the respondent produced no credible evidence that she engaged in the services prescribed by the court order or sought to modify the order

prior to the filing of the termination petition. Compare

id., 273 (interference exception applied where respondent filed number of motions for contempt against petitioner seeking to enforce his visitation time with child

because, ‘‘short of extraordinary and heroic efforts by

the respondent . . . petitioner was able to completely

deny him access to [child]’’ (internal quotation marks

omitted)), with In re Alexander C., supra, 67 Conn.

App. 425 (interference exception did not apply where

respondent made no attempt to modify court order

prohibiting him from contacting child to one of supervised visitation, as it did not require extraordinary and

heroic effort to take affirmative step of attempting to

modify protective order). We are also unpersuaded by

the respondent’s attempt to equate the petitioner’s insistence that the respondent abide by the court order with

the respondent’s actions in In re Carla C., supra, 273.

In In re Carla C., the respondent refused to facilitate

visits with the petitioner as required by the court’s custody order and never told the minor child that the petitioner was her father or showed her photographs of

the petitioner. See id. There is no evidence in the present

case that the petitioner engaged in any such conduct.

We also disagree with the respondent’s assertion that

the petitioner interfered with her relationship with Delilah by refusing to let her visit with Delilah when she

was in Connecticut in March, 2018. The court, in its

memorandum of decision, found that, in refusing to

permit visitation on this particular occasion, it was not

unreasonable for the petitioner to insist that the respondent follow the court-ordered visitation schedule that

was in place at the time. In so doing, the court specifically acknowledged the petitioner’s concerns and frustrations over the respondent’s failure to follow through

with previously planned visits, her lack of a driver’s

license and possible exposure of his child to a stranger.

Because she failed to follow the court-ordered visitation

schedule, we find unavailing the respondent’s assertion

that the petitioner interfered with her ability to have

and maintain a relationship with Delilah.

The respondent also contends that the petitioner

interfered with her relationship with Delilah because,

‘‘when the [petitioner] was deployed at sea for six
months in 2017 and again in 2019, [she] had virtually

no way to contact the [petitioner] to arrange visits or

speak with Delilah.’’ The court specifically noted that

it had taken into consideration the petitioner’s 2017 and

2019 deployments and the effect they may or may not

have had on her ability to visit with Delilah and found

that her claims were not credible.

Last, the respondent argues that, by refusing to provide her with his address, the petitioner interfered with

her ability to maintain an ongoing parent-child relationship with Delilah. In her reply brief, the respondent

contends that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that [the respondent] lacked credibility when she testified that the [petitioner] refused to provide her with his address is clearly

erroneous.’’ The court, however, explained that it had

‘‘considered the [respondent’s] claim that she did not

have [the petitioner’s] address in order to contact the

child or the ability to file anything in court concerning

the child and further finds those claims not creditable.

[The respondent] was provided with [the petitioner’s]

new address in 2017.’’ An email from the petitioner to

the respondent, dated July 14, 2017, was entered into

evidence at trial. In the email, the petitioner informed

the respondent of his new address. Thus, because there

is evidence in the record to support the court’s factual

finding, we will not disturb this finding on appeal. See

In re Jacob W., supra, 330 Conn. 770 (‘‘Appellate review

of a trial court’s findings of fact is governed by the

clearly erroneous standard of review. . . . A finding

of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence

in the record to support it . . . or when although there

is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the

entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

While we reiterate that the court did not find credible

the evidence the respondent proffered in support of

her interference claims, we also observe that the

respondent presented no evidence whatsoever with

respect to the quality and nature of her relationship

with Delilah before the petitioner allegedly sought to

interfere with it. Unlike the respondents in In re Valerie

D. and In re Carla C., who did not have a fair opportunity to begin and develop a relationship with their child,

the respondent had custody of Delilah for the first three

years of her life, had court-ordered visitation in the

years since the original judgment transferred custody

to the petitioner and the opportunity to maintain contact and a relationship through telephone calls, letters

and gifts, even after she moved to California in 2018.

Moreover, the court specifically found that the respondent made minimal effort to maintain a relationship

with Delilah, a finding that is supported by the petitioner’s testimony that the respondent had failed to follow

through with scheduled visitations and, by 2018, had

attempted only once to schedule a visit with Delilah.
We conclude that the respondent has failed to meet

her burden of showing that the actions of the petitioner

rendered inevitable the lack of a relationship between

her and Delilah. As the court found by clear and convincing evidence, there was minimal effort on the

respondent’s part to maintain a relationship with the

child. See In re Alexander C., supra, 67 Conn. App. 424

(‘‘[T]he respondent, rather than the [petitioner], created

the circumstances that caused and perpetuated the lack

of an ongoing relationship between the respondent and

[the child]. . . . It was the respondent’s action, which

resulted in his incarceration, that occasioned his separation from the child.’’ (Citation omitted.)).

In light of the court’s conclusion that the respondent

made minimal efforts to maintain a relationship with

Delilah and because the respondent failed to prove that

the petitioner’s conduct, rather than her own conduct,

rendered inevitable the lack of a relationship between

her and Delilah, we conclude that the court properly

determined that the interference exception was inapplicable in the present case.

III

The respondent also argues that the court improperly

concluded that allowing additional time for the reestablishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to Delilah’s best interests. We disagree.

In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded

that further time for the reestablishment of a parentchild relationship between Delilah and the respondent

would be detrimental to Delilah’s best interests. The

court explained: ‘‘Delilah has no present positive memories of [the respondent], and her memories are not of

pleasant things. Delilah has not had an in-person visit

with [the respondent] since 2017, and therefore no relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of the parent

having met the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child. Delilah does not recognize

[the respondent’s] voice on the phone and refers to her

as her ‘other mother.’ Delilah has no relationship with

[the respondent]. The [advanced practice registered

nurse, Lane], with whom Delilah has received her

behavioral treatment since 2018, stated [that] Delilah

could experience emotional distress if there is contact

between [the respondent] and Delilah because it has

been so long since they have seen each other. Therefore,

the court also finds by clear and convincing evidence

that to allow further time for the reestablishment of

the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to

the best interests of Delilah.’’

As previously noted, termination of parental rights

pursuant to § 45a-717 (g) (2) (C) requires the court to

find that ‘‘there is no ongoing parent-child relationship

. . . and to allow further time for the establishment or

reestablishment of the parent-child relationship would
be detrimental to the best interests of the child . . . .’’

Thus, this ground for termination ‘‘requires the trial

court to make a two-pronged determination. First, there

must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists; and second, the court must look into the

future and determine whether it would be detrimental

to the child’s best interests to allow time for such a

relationship to develop.’’17 In re Juvenile Appeal (84-

3), 1 Conn. App. 463, 479, 473 A.2d 795, cert. denied, 193

Conn. 802, 474 A.2d 1259 (1984). ‘‘Although a petitioner

must establish both prongs by clear and convincing

evidence, and, accordingly, a petition may fail under

either prong, the inquiries under the two prongs are

intertwined. That is, logic dictates that the question

of whether it would be detrimental to the children’s

interests to allow further time for the development of

a parent-child relationship will depend to some extent

on the findings made and reasoning employed by the

trial court in resolving whether there was an ongoing

parent-child relationship.’’ In re Jacob W., supra, 330

Conn. 769–70.

In the present case, the respondent argues that the

court, in concluding that to allow further time for the

reestablishment of the parent-child relationship would

be detrimental to Delilah’s best interests, improperly

relied on Lane’s statement that ‘‘Delilah could experience emotional distress if there is contact between [her

and the respondent] because it has been so long since

they have seen each other.’’ Specifically, the respondent

contends that Lane’s ‘‘statement that visitation could

result in emotional distress is entirely speculative and

lacks any probative value. . . . Lane’s statement

means only that there is a possibility, rather than a

probability, that the child could experience distress if

she has contact with [the respondent]—in other words,

less than a 50-50 chance. . . . Thus, Lane’s statement

is insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that

additional time is contrary to Delilah’s best interests

by clear and convincing evidence.’’18 (Emphasis in original.) In support of this argument, the respondent relies

on Aspiazu v. Orgera, 205 Conn. 623, 632, 535 A.2d 338

(1987), for the proposition that ‘‘[a]ny expert opinion

that describes a condition as possible or merely fiftyfifty is based on pure speculation.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.)

We note that ‘‘[c]ourts are entitled to give great weight

to professionals in parental termination cases.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)In re Shane M., 318 Conn.

569, 590, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015). We also note that, in

addition to Lane’s statement that ‘‘Delilah could experience emotional distress if there is contact between [the

respondent] and Delilah because it has been so long

since they have seen each other,’’ other evidence was

admitted at trial that supports the court’s conclusion

that allowing further time for the development of a

parent-child relationship would be contrary to Delilah’s
best interests. For example, both the study and the

addendum prepared by the department, which were

admitted into evidence at trial, recommended that the

parental rights of the respondent as to Delilah be terminated and that Sara G. be allowed to adopt Delilah.

Evidence also was presented at trial that Delilah has

negative memories of or feelings toward the respondent. See In re Jacob W., supra, 330 Conn. 771–72 (deeming negative feelings that children had expressed

toward respondent relevant in determining whether

allowing more time to reestablish parent-child relationship would be detrimental to best interests of children).

Specifically, evidence was admitted at trial that Delilah

had stated that the respondent was mean to her and,

at one point, had pushed the petitioner down some

stairs. Further evidence indicated that Delilah had

reported that the respondent had hit her in the face

with a hairbrush and had given her a ‘‘ ‘bloody something’ . . . .’’ According to Sara G.’s testimony, during

one therapy session in which she was present, Delilah

told her therapist that ‘‘[the respondent] was mean to

her, and that she had hit her in the mouth with [a]

hairbrush and made her mouth bleed . . . .’’

The respondent has not claimed or presented evidence that she ever attempted to have the March 29,

2018 order modified, nor has she presented evidence

that she sought to comply with the order by engaging

in substance abuse counseling, a parenting course, or

reunification therapy.19 See In re Jacob W., supra, 330

Conn. 773 (deeming whether respondent has attempted

to modify protective order precluding respondent from

visiting children relevant to whether additional time to

reestablish parent-child relationship would be detrimental to best interests of children).

Evidence also was presented that, at various times,

Delilah has referred to the respondent as her father’s

sister, her ‘‘ ‘other mother,’ ’’ and her grandmother.20

The court found that Delilah has no relationship with

the respondent. Additional evidence was presented that

Delilah has resided with the petitioner, Sara G., and her

siblings since 2015. Evidence was admitted at trial that

the petitioner and Sara G. are meeting Delilah’s needs.

The court found that Delilah refers to Sara G. as her

mother. See In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous),

supra, 181 Conn. 646 (explaining that because best interests of child are controlling in determining whether

to allow time for development of ongoing parent-child

relationship, evidence as to child’s relationship with

foster parents and their availability and suitability as

adoptive parents is clearly relevant); see also In re

Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn. App. 526 (deeming fact

that child had bonded with his maternal grandparents

and was making progress with them relevant in concluding whether it was in child’s best interest to allow further time to establish parent-child relationship). Fur-
thermore, ‘‘[t]his court has repeatedly recognized that

stability and permanence are necessary for a young

child’s healthy development.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re Jacob W., supra, 330 Conn. 774.

We thus conclude, on the basis of our thorough

review of the record, that there is sufficient evidence

in the record to support the trial court’s conclusion that

to allow further time for the reestablishment of the

parent-child relationship would be detrimental to Delilah’s best interests.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the Appellate Court.

** August 24, 2022, the date that this decision was released as a slip

opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 Although § 45a-717 (g) was the subject of technical amendments in 2019;

see Public Acts 2019, No. 19-189, § 10; those amendments have no bearing

on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the

current revision of the statute.

2 The respondent also has two children from a previous marriage.

3 Delilah is the only child born of the petitioner and the respondent’s

relationship.

4 Neither the respondent nor the petitioner was represented by counsel

during the March 29, 2018 hearing.

5 At the trial on the petition to terminate the respondent’s parental rights,

the respondent testified that she was not aware of the March 29, 2018 court

date and had learned of the scheduled hearing only after it already had

occurred. According to the respondent, she was in Connecticut the week

of March 29, 2018, but only to visit Delilah.

In its memorandum of decision, the court found that the respondent’s

testimony that she was unaware of the court date was not credible given

the fact that she ‘‘ ‘just happened’ ’’ to be in Connecticut at the time of

the hearing. On appeal, the respondent does not contest the propriety of

this finding.

6 Both the petitioner and the respondent were represented by counsel

during the trial on the petition to terminate the parental rights of the respondent.

7 The court also took judicial notice of the New London Regional Children’s

Probate Court file.

8 The court must consider: ‘‘(1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by

a child-placing agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent;

(2) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon

by any individual or child-placing agency and the parent, and the extent to

which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order; (3) the

feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child’s parents,

any guardian of the child’s person and any person who has exercised physical

care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom

the child has developed significant emotional ties; (4) the age of the child;

(5) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances,

conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return

the child to the parent’s home in the foreseeable future, including, but not

limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with

the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided

the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with

the guardian or other custodian of the child; and (6) the extent to which a

parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with

the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the

child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic

circumstances of the parent.’’ General Statutes § 45a-717 (i).

9 The respondent also claims that the court improperly determined, pursu-
ant to § 45a-717 (g) (2) (A), that she had abandoned Delilah. We note that,

‘‘[i]n the present case, for the respondent to prevail, [she] must successfully

challenge both of the bases of the judgment terminating [her] parental rights.

. . . If either of the grounds on which the trial court relied are upheld on

appeal, the termination of parental rights must stand.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Lukas K., 120 Conn. App. 465, 484

n.11, 992 A.2d 1142 (2010), aff’d, 300 Conn. 463, 14 A.3d 990 (2011). Because

we conclude that the court did not err in terminating the respondent’s

parental rights based on the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship

between her and Delilah, we do not address whether the court erred in

terminating her parental rights based on abandonment.

10 Although In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), supra, 177 Conn. 648,

concerned General Statutes § 17-43a, the predecessor of General Statutes

§ 17a-112, rather than § 45a-717, it and other cases concerning § 17a-112

are pertinent to our understanding of § 45a-717. ‘‘Because the provisions

governing the termination of parental rights under § 17a-112, which governs

petitions regarding children previously committed to the custody of the

department, and § 45a-717, which is the correspondent statute for proceedings in the Probate Court that governs such petitions brought by private

parties . . . are virtually identical, case law applying either statute is

instructive in termination of parental rights cases.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Tresin J., supra, 334 Conn. 324 n.8; see

also In re Jessica M., supra, 217 Conn. 468 n.6 (explaining that prior cases

construing no ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination

found within § 17-43a were applicable to no ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination found within General Statutes § 45-61f, now

codified at § 45a-717, as statutory language is identical and each statute

‘‘was enacted by [P.A. 74-164], and nothing in the legislative history suggests

that they should be construed differently’’); In re Carla C., supra, 167 Conn.

App. 257 n.12 (‘‘[t]his court has applied the same analytical framework to

petitions to terminate parental rights pursuant to §§ 17a-112 and 45a-717,

the relevant language of which is nearly identical’’ (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

11 The respondent also contends that, by noting that ‘‘Delilah has not

had an in-person visit with [the respondent] since 2017, and therefore no

relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of the parent having met

the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child,’’ the trial

court ignored our Supreme Court’s holding in In re Jacob W., supra, 330

Conn. 757, which explained that the court had ‘‘explicitly rejected a literal

interpretation of the statute, which defines the relationship as one that

ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing dayto-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the

child . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) We disagree.

Although the trial court noted that ‘‘no relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of the parent having met the physical, emotional, moral and

educational needs of the child’’ existed between Delilah and the respondent,

it went on to conclude in its memorandum of decision that ‘‘Delilah has no

present positive memories of [the respondent], and her memories are not

of pleasant things.’’ Thus, the trial court clearly did not ignore the holding

of our Supreme Court in In re Jacob W., as the respondent suggests. See

In re Jacob W., supra, 330 Conn. 757 (‘‘The ultimate question is whether

the child has some present memories or feelings for the natural parent that

are positive in nature. . . . [W]e have explicitly rejected a literal interpretation of the statute, which defines the relationship as one that ordinarily

develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing, day-to-day basis

the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)).

12 The respondent contends that ‘‘positive’’ means ‘‘explicitly laid down;

express; direct; explicit; precise; specific’’ or ‘‘absolute; real; existing in fact

or by the presence of something and not by its absence.’’ We disagree.

‘‘Positive,’’ as used in the context of our cases concerning the no ongoing

parent-child relationship ground for termination, means ‘‘having a good

effect . . . favorable’’ or ‘‘marked by optimism.’’ Merriam-Webster Online

Dictionary, available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/positive (last visited August 19, 2022). For example, in In re Juvenile Appeal

(84-6), supra, 2 Conn. App. 709, this court explained that the term ‘‘for,’’

as used in the phrase ‘‘no present memories or feelings for the natural

parent,’’ means ‘‘what is said or felt in favor of someone or something: pro.’’

(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) This court went on to

explain that ‘‘the phrase ‘feelings for the natural parent’ refers to feelings
of a positive nature. It does not encompass . . . extreme, psychologically

corrosive and destructive feelings.’’ Id. Thus, if ‘‘positive’’ meant ‘‘express,’’

‘‘absolute,’’ or ‘‘real’’ as the respondent contends, then ‘‘positive feelings’’

would encompass even psychologically corrosive and destructive feelings.

Because this court previously has made clear that such feelings cannot

properly be characterized as ‘‘positive feelings’’ necessary to show an ongoing parent-child relationship, we decline to apply the definition of ‘‘positive’’

that the respondent suggests.

13 The respondent also notes that ‘‘there is no evidence that Delilah had

any difficulty with the notion that she has two mother figures in her life:

[the respondent], her biological mother, and Sara G., her custodial mother.

See In re Caleb P., [53 Conn. Supp. 329, 346, 113 A.3d 507 (2014)] (finding

that [respondent] father maintained an ongoing parent-child relationship

with his child where the child ‘did not have any difficulty in the notion that

he has two daddies’).’’

In In re Caleb P., which is not binding precedent on this court, the trial

court concluded that the child ‘‘ha[d] present memories or feelings for his

father. He did not have any difficulty in the notion that he has two daddies.’’

In re Caleb P., supra, 53 Conn. Supp. 346. In the present case, evidence that

Delilah acknowledges two mother figures in her life does not obviate the

court’s conclusion that she has no present positive memories or feelings

for the respondent. We, thus, find the respondent’s reliance on In re Caleb

P. unavailing.

14 Evidence was presented at trial as to a phone conversation between

the respondent and Delilah. Sara G. testified that the phone call lasted only

thirty seconds and that, at its conclusion, Delilah referred to the respondent

as her grandmother.

15 The respondent also contends that the petitioner obtained the March

29, 2018 visitation order ‘‘by means of his fraud upon the court.’’ Specifically,

the respondent argues that, during the hearing, the petitioner made several

material misrepresentations to the court on which the court relied. According

to the respondent, the petitioner’s false and misleading statements are relevant to the issue of interference because ‘‘the interference exception is akin

to the equitable doctrine of clean hands . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re Tresin J., supra, 334 Conn. 332.

The respondent, however, never filed a timely appeal from the March 29,

2018 postjudgment order modifying visitation that she now alleges was

obtained by fraud. Nor did she file a motion to open the order within the

requisite four month period. See General Statutes § 52-212a; Practice Book

§ 17-4 (a). As a result, the respondent cannot now mount a collateral attack

on the March 29, 2018 order. See In re Teagan K.-O., 212 Conn. App. 161,

182, 274 A.3d 985 (explaining that failure to appeal from order precluded

respondent from launching collateral attack on order in later proceedings),

cert. denied, 343 Conn. 934, 276 A.3d 974 (2022), and cert. denied, 343 Conn.

934, 276 A.3d 974 (2022); see also In re Ja’Maire M., 201 Conn. App. 498,

505, 242 A.3d 747 (2020) (‘‘We will not . . . review claims that are collateral

attacks on prior judgments. With regard to the statutory scheme set forth

in § [45a-717], the child’s need for stability places an emphasis on the need

for litigants to follow proper procedural avenues in order to obtain review.’’),

cert. denied, 336 Conn. 911, 244 A.3d 563 (2021); In re Stephen M., 109 Conn.

App. 644, 664, 953 A.2d 668 (2008) (‘‘[t]he best interests of the children,

especially their interests in family stability and permanency, support the

conclusion that findings in earlier child welfare proceedings cannot be

attacked collaterally in later proceedings’’).

As our precedent recognizes, the relationship between a parent and child

is premised on a parent, including a noncustodial parent, exercising her

right and responsibility to cultivate and nurture that relationship. That

includes taking a timely appeal of or filing a timely motion to open and/

or modify an adverse judgment precisely because of the long established

principle that time is of the essence in the life of a child. In the absence of

a modification of an otherwise valid judgment that presumably was premised

on the finding that it was in the best interests of the child, it was incumbent

upon the respondent to comply with whatever orders were required for her

to cultivate, maintain, and nurture that relationship. As such, a collateral

attack on a prior judgment as a defense to the termination petition is not

only impermissible but does not remedy the time lost in the life of the child

and the relationship that could and should have been developed due to the

failure to seek a timely modification of an allegedly fraudulent judgment.

16 The respondent also argues that the court applied an incorrect legal

test in determining whether the interference exception should apply.
According to the respondent, ‘‘[t]he trial court’s memorandum of decision

improperly focuse[s] on the [petitioner’s] intentions in refusing [to] allow

the [respondent] to visit with Delilah and, thus, erred as a matter of law.’’

Although the court noted in its memorandum of decision that ‘‘[the petitioner’s] insisting [that the respondent] follow the court-ordered visitation

schedule under these circumstances was not unreasonable,’’ the court also

noted that ‘‘[the respondent’s] last in-person visit with Delilah was in February of 2017. The court note[d] that [the petitioner’s] and [the respondent’s]

relationship [was] difficult, but the fact that [the petitioner] ha[d] taken a

hard line, requiring [the respondent] to abide by the court orders does not

rise to the level of interference.’’

Whether the court applied an incorrect legal test is a question of law over

which we exercise plenary review. See In re Jacob W., supra, 330 Conn.

754 (‘‘We first consider whether . . . the trial court applied an incorrect

legal test to determine whether the petitioner had proven by clear and

convincing evidence the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship.

Because that question presents a question of law, our review is plenary.’’).

‘‘[W]e read an ambiguous trial court record so as to support, rather than

contradict, its judgment. . . . We have repeatedly stated that it is the appellant’s responsibility to provide an adequate record for review. . . . [W]here

the factual or legal basis of the trial court’s decision is unclear, the appellant

should file a motion for articulation pursuant to Practice Book § [66-5]. . . .

In the absence of such action by the [appellant], we must presume that the

trial court considered all the facts before it and applied the appropriate

legal standards to those facts.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Walton v. New Hartford, 223 Conn. 155, 164–65, 612 A.2d 1153

(1992). Although the court characterized the reasonableness of the petitioner’s conduct, it did so in reference to the court orders governing the parameters of the respondent’s visitation rights, suggesting its acknowledgment of

the inapplicability of the interference exception in the context of third-party

actions as well as the respondent’s own conduct in needing to comply with

those orders. Given that record, we presume that the court applied the

appropriate legal standard.

17 Although our Supreme Court in In re Tresin J. did not say so explicitly,

it clarified that the second prong—whether it would be detrimental to the

child’s best interests to allow time for such a relationship to develop—is

part of the adjudicatory phase rather than the dispositional phase. See In

re Tresin J., supra, 334 Conn. 326–27 (‘‘[T]he proper legal test to apply when

a petitioner seeks to terminate a parent’s rights on the basis of no ongoing

parent-child relationship . . . is a two step process. In the first step, a

petitioner must prove the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship by

clear and convincing evidence. . . . If, and only if, the petitioner has proven

a lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship does the inquiry proceed to

the second step, whereby the petitioner must prove by clear and convincing

evidence that to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment

of the relationship would be contrary to the best interests of the child. Only

then may the court proceed to the disposition phase.’’ (Emphasis added;

internal quotation marks omitted.)).

18 The respondent also contends that ‘‘the fact that Delilah has many

present positive memories of [the respondent] indicates that allowing additional time is not contrary to Delilah’s best interests.’’ In part I of this

opinion, we concluded that the court did not err in determining that Delilah

had no present positive memories of the respondent. We, therefore, are

unpersuaded by the respondent’s contention.

19 In her appellate brief, the respondent notes that she will not be allowed

to visit with Delilah until and unless she successfully moves to modify the

March 29, 2018 court order. As previously noted, however, no evidence

was presented that the respondent has sought to challenge the order since

its issuance.

20 The respondent also contends that, ‘‘even if [she] is eventually allowed

to resume her visits with Delilah, and these visits result in some emotional

distress for Delilah, this is not enough, standing alone, to establish that

allowing further time for the reestablishment of the parent-child relationship

would not be in Delilah’s best interests.’’ The respondent relies on In re

Zakai F., 336 Conn. 272, 306 n.21, 255 A.3d 767 (2020), which, she argues,

‘‘strongly suggested that such evidence would not be sufficient, by itself, to

show that reinstatement is not in the child’s best interests.’’

We find the respondent’s reliance on In re Zakai F. unavailing. The present

case is procedurally distinct from In re Zakai F., which involved a motion

for reinstatement of guardianship rights. See id., 275. The present case
involves a petition for the termination of parental rights. Thus, unlike In re

Zakai F., in the present case, there is no presumption regarding what is in

the best interests of the child. See id., 306 (‘‘we conclude that a third party

seeking to rebut the presumption that reinstatement of guardianship rights

to a parent who has never been found to be unfit is in the best interests of

the child must do so by clear and convincing evidence’’).