[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

_______________________

No. 15-10006

_______________________

Agency No. 10-CA-038782

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 

Petitioner

Cross Respondent,

versus

GAYLORD CHEMICAL COMPANY, LLC,

Respondent

Cross Petitioner,

UNITED STEEL PAPER AND FORESTRY, RUBBER,

MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND

SERVICE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO-CLC,

Intervenor.

____________________

Petitions for Review and Enforcement of a Decision of the

National Labor Relations Board

____________________

(June 3, 2016)

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Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, JILL PRYOR, and RIPPLE,* Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge:

The United Steelworkers International Union (“USW”) and its Local 887 

(collectively “the Union”) filed a complaint alleging that Gaylord Chemical 

Company, LLC (“Gaylord” or “the Company”), had failed to bargain collectively, 

had failed to provide information relevant to bargaining, had created a new job 

position without engaging in bargaining, and had interrogated employees about 

their union sympathies, all in violation of sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National 

Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (1). Following a 

hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Gaylord had committed 

the charged unfair labor practices and ordered Gaylord to bargain with the Union 

and to take other remedial measures. The National Labor Relations Board 

(“NLRB” or “Board”) affirmed the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law

and also adopted the recommended order. The NLRB now petitions for 

enforcement of the Board’s order. Gaylord cross-petitions for review of the 

 * Honorable Kenneth F. Ripple, United States Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit, 

sitting by designation.

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Board’s order and asks that we deny the Board’s application for enforcement. For 

the reasons set forth in the following opinion, we grant the NLRB’s application for 

enforcement and deny Gaylord’s cross-petition. 

I

A. Facts

From 2007 to 2010, Gaylord operated a chemical manufacturing facility in 

Bogalusa, Louisiana, where it produced Dimethyl Sulfoxide (“DMSO”) and 

Dimethyl Sulfide (“DMS”). It employed approximately twenty production and 

maintenance workers in the facility. For decades prior to Gaylord’s acquisition of 

the Bogalusa operation, the workers were represented by the USW and its 

designated local, which negotiated a series of collective bargaining agreements 

(“CBAs”) on the workers’ behalf. The most recent CBA, entered in 2009, 

provides that “[t]his Agreement [is] made and entered . . . by and between Gaylord 

Chemical Company, L.L.C., located at Bogalusa, Louisiana, hereinafter called the 

Company, and the United Steel Workers International Union and its Local No. 

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13-0189, hereinafter called the Union.”1 The recognition clause of the CBA states 

that “[t]he Company hereby recognizes the Union as the sole collective bargaining 

agent for all employees in the single bargaining unit as defined in the Agreement.”2

The CBA was signed by all of the officers of the USW; District Director for 

District 13, Michael Tourne; and the leadership of Local 189. 

In February 2009, Gaylord informed its employees that it would close the 

Bogalusa plant and open a new facility in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, over 200 miles 

away. Gaylord extended job offers to all bargaining unit employees who wished to 

relocate. Gaylord and the Union also bargained regarding the effects of the 

relocation. Tourne negotiated on behalf of the workers, as he had with respect to 

earlier contracts.3 During these negotiations, Claude Bloom, Gaylord’s then vice 

president of manufacturing, advised the bargaining committee that Gaylord 

preferred to operate its Tuscaloosa facility without union representation. 

 1 J. Ex. 2 at 1. The local union’s number designation has changed over the years, as has 

ownership of the facility.

2 Id.

3 He also had represented union members in arbitration and grievance matters.

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Beginning in September 2010, Gaylord moved substantial parts of the 

machinery and equipment necessary for production to the Tuscaloosa facility. In 

December of that year, the Tuscaloosa plant began producing DMSO, the only 

product produced at that facility. The Bogalusa facility closed in January 2011. 

Twelve bargaining unit employees permanently transferred from Bogalusa to 

Tuscaloosa. These twelve employees constituted almost ninety percent of the full 

complement of production and maintenance employees at the new Tuscaloosa 

facility, and they performed job functions “substantially similar to those previously 

performed by bargaining unit employees in Bogalusa.”4

Even before the move began, Daniel Flippo, the USW’s director for the 

district encompassing Tuscaloosa (District 9), sent a letter to Gaylord on August 

31, 2010, requesting “to meet and bargain at your newly opened Tuscaloosa, 

Alabama facility.”5 “United Steelworkers,” the USW’s registered trademark, and 

“District 9” appeared on the letterhead.6 The bottom of the letter stated “United 

 4 J. Ex. 1(a) ¶12.

5 J. Ex. 4.

6 Id.

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Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and 

Service Workers International Union”; it provided the address for District 9 and 

also the USW’s website.7 Gaylord did not respond to the request. 

Flippo sent a second letter on September 23, 2010, requesting that Gaylord 

meet and bargain regarding the Tuscaloosa facility. On September 30, Gaylord’s 

president, Paul Dennis, responded that he had conferred with counsel and was 

“uncertain as to the legal basis of District 9’s status as the collective bargaining 

representative for our employees.”8 Dennis also requested that Flippo explain this 

legal basis to Gaylord so that it could “assess [its] position.”9 Flippo responded by 

letter dated October 19, 2010, which stated that “[t]he USW International Union is 

the certified bargaining representative of the employees at both of your plants 

located in Bogalusa, Louisiana and Tuscaloosa, Alabama. As you know, the USW 

has requested to bargain the Bogalusa, Louisiana unit’s relocation to Tuscaloosa, 

 7 Id.

8 J. Ex. 6.

9 Id.

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Alabama.”10 Dennis responded by letter of October 25, 2010, in which he 

announced “Gaylord’s position that neither the International nor District 9 is the 

certified bargaining representative for Gaylord’s employees working at our 

Tuscaloosa, Alabama facility” and declined the request for bargaining and 

information.11

After the move to Tuscaloosa, Marc Smith, Vice President of Manufacturing 

for Gaylord, asked an employee, Doug Mitchell, to his office, purportedly to 

discuss leadership. During this conversation, Smith asked Mitchell “why [he] 

thought [the employees] needed a union.”12 Mitchell replied, “why not[?]”13 Smith 

explained that there was more flexibility and fewer expenses without a union. 

When Mitchell pressed Smith as to what those expenses were, Smith responded 

that there were union dues for the employees and legal fees for Gaylord.

 10 J. Ex. 7 at 1. The letter was written on the same letterhead previously used.

11 J. Ex. 8 (emphasis added).

12 Hr’g Tr. 177.

13 Id. at 178.

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B. Administrative Proceedings

After Gaylord’s refusal of its request to bargain, the USW filed a charge 

with the NLRB on January 11, 2011, alleging that Gaylord had violated the NLRA. 

A second charge was filed in April 2011. The USW first reiterated the allegations 

concerning the failure to bargain contained in the initial charge. It also contained 

two additional allegations: that Smith had interrogated employees about their 

union sympathies and that Gaylord had made unilateral changes in working 

conditions, namely creating the new position of “Lead Shipper,”14 without notice 

or bargaining.

An ALJ conducted a two-day hearing on the charges during which the 

General Counsel called two current Gaylord employees, Ronald Talley and

Mitchell, as well as Flippo and Tourne. Although Smith was present during the 

hearing, Gaylord did not call him or any other witness. During the hearing, the 

General Counsel submitted, for in camera review, eight authorization cards signed 

 14 G.C. Ex. 1(g) ¶19.

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by employees from the Tuscaloosa facility in early 2011 indicating their continued 

support for representation by the USW.

15

The ALJ ruled in favor of the Union. He found the General Counsel’s 

witnesses to be credible and accepted their testimony. He then turned to the legal 

standards:

The Board has long held that, following an employer’s 

relocation, a union is entitled to continued recognition and to have an 

existing collective-bargaining agreement remain in effect, provided 

operations and equipment remain substantially the same at the new 

location, and a substantial percentage of employees at the old facility 

transfer to the new location. Rock Bottom Stores, 312 NLRB 400, 402

(1993), enfd. 51 F.3d 366 (2nd Cir. 1995), Westwood Import Co., 251 

NLRB 1213, 1214 (1980), enfd. 681 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1982). The 

“substantial percentage” requirement is met if the transferees from the 

old facility constitute at least approximately 40 percent of the new 

facility’s employee complement. Rock Bottom Stores at 402; Harte & 

Co., 278 NLRB 947, 948 (1986); Westwood Import Co. at 1216

fn.8.[16]

Here, the ALJ continued, Gaylord had continued to operate the Tuscaloosa facility 

in basically unchanged form, and the majority of its Tuscaloosa employees had 

 15 See Hr’g Tr. 249.

16 ALJ at 5–6.

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been employed at the Bogalusa facility. Moreover, Gaylord had not offered any 

evidence that the Union ever lost the support of a majority of unit employees.

The ALJ then addressed Gaylord’s argument that, based on a combination of 

factors, it was absolved of the duty to bargain with the USW. With respect to the 

first of these—“the conjunctive definition of the certified bargaining representative 

as both the International and its designated Local 189”—the ALJ noted that “[t]he 

Respondent’s collective-bargaining relationship has been with the USW 

International, not separately with its subordinate components, whose bargaining 

authority and representational authority derived entirely from their affiliation with 

the USW International.”17 He “therefore deem[ed] wholly lacking in merit 

[Gaylord’s] assertion that the conjunctive definition of the certified bargaining 

representative in the labor agreement, and/or the post-relocation change in union 

district or local jurisdiction, stripped the Union of its representational status.”18

 17 Id. at 6.

18 Id.

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The distance between the old and new facilities also did not affect the 

Union’s status. “To hold otherwise,” the ALJ explained, “would be to allow an 

employer to evade its collective-bargaining obligations simply by moving further 

away—leading to the untenable result of making relocation more onerous on 

unionized employee[s].”19 

Concerning Gaylord’s other points, the ALJ observed:

The Respondent’s brief fails to specify any evidence supporting 

its claim that the Union has an internal requirement that employees 

continue to express a desire for unionization. . . .

Although the geographic definition in the collective-bargaining 

agreement was Bogalusa, there was no language “at no other 

locations,” and other provisions in the agreement unequivocally 

demonstrate that the parties envisioned a dismantlement of the 

Bogalusa plant and transfer of its operations elsewhere. Moreover, the 

parties signed [a Memorandum of Agreement] regarding postrelocation employment of Bogalusa employees. As noted, the 

Respondent does not allege that [the] Union ever waived any rights to 

represent them after the relocation.

Finally, the Union’s decision to collect authorization cards in 

no way serves as an admission against interest or supports the 

Respondent’s suggestion that the Union was required to file a 

representation petition to establish post-relocation majority status. 

 19 Id.

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Indeed, the card check revealed that the Union continued to enjoy 

such status after the move to Tuscaloosa.

Accordingly, I conclude that the Respondent was required to 

continue to recognize the Union and bargain with it as the collectivebargaining representative of the plant’s Tuscaloosa unit employees 

and that its failure to do so since on [or] about October 25 violated 

Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.[20]

The ALJ similarly concluded that Gaylord had failed to supply information 

requested by the Union, that Gaylord had unilaterally created a new position 

without bargaining with the Union, and that Smith’s summoning of Mitchell to his 

office and querying him concerning his desire for a union interfered with 

Mitchell’s rights, all in violation of the NLRA. Gaylord filed exceptions to the 

ALJ’s decision.

The NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s findings and conclusions and adopted his 

recommended order. The Board petitioned to enforce the order, and Gaylord 

cross-petitioned for review. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. 

Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014), in which the Court ruled that the NLRB 

lacked a legally sufficient quorum for almost all of 2012, the General Counsel

 20 Id. at 7.

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moved to vacate the NLRB’s order, which had been issued during this timeframe. 

The General Counsel asked for an immediate remand for reconsideration by the 

NLRB, which now had a full complement of Senate-confirmed members. We 

granted the motion.

On remand, the NLRB considered de novo the ALJ’s decision and the 

record. It then affirmed the ALJ’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and adopted 

his recommended order for the reasons set forth in his decision. The NLRB again 

petitioned to enforce its order in this court; Gaylord filed a cross-petition for 

review; and the USW filed a motion to intervene, which was granted.

II

We now turn to an analysis of the issues brought to us by the parties. The 

general principles governing our evaluation are well established. “The Board’s 

finding of an unfair labor practice ‘must be upheld if it is based upon substantial 

evidence contained in the record taken as a whole, and based upon reasonable 

inferences drawn from the facts as found.’” Shore Club Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. 

NLRB, 400 F.3d 1336, 1338 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting NLRB v. Imperial House 

Condo., Inc., 831 F.2d 999, 1006 (11th Cir. 1987)). Moreover, “[b]ecause of the 

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Board’s special competence in the field of labor relations,” we accord its 

interpretation of the Act “substantial deference” and give “special respect” to its 

chosen remedy. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). With respect to the 

Board’s factual determinations, as long as its inferences from the record are 

“plausible . . . , we will not overturn [them], even if we would have made different 

findings upon a de novo review of the evidence.” Id. at 1338–39 (quoting

Cooper/T. Smith, Inc. v. NLRB, 177 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 1999)).

A.

1.

The principal focus of the parties is whether Gaylord had a duty to bargain 

with the USW and Local 88721 after the relocation to Tuscaloosa. “Generally, if an 

employer relocates and the new plant is considered merely a continuation of the 

old one, the employer must continue to recognize and bargain with the union 

which represented the employees at the old plant.” Lammert Indus. v. NLRB, 578

 21 Gaylord’s Tuscaloosa plant falls within the geographic jurisdiction of District 9 of the 

USW. The parties, therefore, sometimes speak in terms of the duty to bargain with District 9, as 

opposed to with the Tuscaloosa local, Local 887.

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F.2d 1223, 1225 (7th Cir. 1978). “[T]he continuity requirement ensures that 

despite changes in management, plant location or production techniques, 

workplace conditions remain sufficiently unchanged such that ‘the union can still 

fairly be presumed to command majority support in the unit.’” Leach Corp. v. 

NLRB, 54 F.3d 802, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. 

Local Union 1329 v. NLRB, 812 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). The inquiry 

centers “on whether the employees who have been retained will understandably 

view their job situations as essentially unaltered.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted); Tree-Free Fiber Co., 328 NLRB 389, 398 (1999) (same). 

In assessing whether this continuity has been established, the Board looks to 

whether the employer has maintained the same “operational methods, managerial 

hierarchy, customers, and services or products,” as well as “changes in either the 

size, makeup, or the identity of the employee complement.” King Soopers, Inc. v. 

NLRB, 254 F.3d 738, 743 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Westwood Imp. Co. v. NLRB, 

681 F.2d 664, 666 (9th Cir. 1982)).22 

 22 In King Soopers, Inc. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 738, 743 (8th Cir. 2001), the court also 

identified “distance between the old and new plants” as a relevant factor. In support of this 

(continued...)

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Here, the parties stipulated that Gaylord “relocate[d] its equipment, supplies,

materials and product to Tuscaloosa, Alabama.”23 The Tuscaloosa facility 

produced DMSO, as had the Bogalusa facility. Twelve employees from Bogalusa 

transferred to Tuscaloosa, where they “perform[ed] job functions substantially 

similar to those previously performed by bargaining unit employees in 

Bogalusa.”24 The ALJ’s conclusion that Gaylord “has continued to operate the 

 

(...continued)

factor, the court relied upon Westwood Import Co. v. NLRB, 681 F.2d 664, 666 (9th Cir. 1982). 

In Westwood Import, the court did not discuss how distance factored into its analysis, but relied 

upon Tricor Products, Inc., 239 NLRB 65, 68 (1978). The issue in Tricor was whether Tricor, a 

successor corporation, had a continuing duty to bargain with a unit of patternmakers that had 

been employed by C & J, the assets of which Tricor had acquired. In describing the differences 

in operation, the Board noted that “Tricor is located several miles from the former location of 

C & J.” Id. The Board nevertheless concluded accordingly: 

Tricor’s patternmaking operation is almost identical with that of C & J. When 

C & J closed, it transferred its operation to Tricor. C & J’s machinery and 

equipment were moved to Tricor, and all C & J’s patternmakers were transferred 

to Tricor. All work pending at C & J was moved to Tricor and finished there by 

using the same machinery, equipment, and employees formerly used on that work 

at C & J. It is found that Tricor’s patternmaking operation is a continuation of, 

and the same as, the patternmaking business of C & J.

Id. We read Tricor, therefore, as standing for the proposition that the nature of operations and 

complement of workers are the most important factors in assessing the continuity of operations.

23 J. Ex. 1(a) ¶10.

24 Id. ¶12.

(continued...)

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Tuscaloosa facility in basically unchanged form,” therefore, is supported by the 

record.25

With respect to the size, makeup, and identity of the employee complement 

at the new facility, former Bogalusa employees constitute nearly ninety percent of 

the employees at Gaylord’s Tuscaloosa plant. This is more than double the forty 

percent threshold that the NLRB usually applies to determine if there is a 

continuity of workforce. See NLRB v. Rock Bottom Stores, Inc., 51 F.3d 366, 370 

(2d Cir. 1995) (employing the NLRB’s rule that, if transferees “constitute 

approximately 40% or more of the employee complement at the new facility,”

continuity of the bargaining unit has been shown). Substantial evidence, therefore, 

supports the view that there was a continuity in Gaylord’s operations.

2.

Gaylord does not dispute seriously that there was a continuation of 

operations between the Bogalusa and Tuscaloosa plants.26 Instead, the Company

 

(...continued)

25 ALJ at 6.

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maintains that it is no longer obligated to bargain with the USW because the CBA 

governing the Bogalusa employees “narrowly defined” the bargaining 

relationship.27 It notes that the CBA identifies the contracting parties as “Gaylord 

Chemical Company, L.L.C., located at Bogalusa, Louisiana,” and “the Union,” 

defined as “United Steel Workers International Union and its Local No. 

13-0189.”28 According to Gaylord, the “use of the conjunctive phrasing is

significant because it identifies the specific local that is the certified 

representative,” and “this phraseology is not what the union typically uses in its 

contracts.”29 Therefore, it maintains, when Gaylord moved outside the 

geographical reach of Local 189, Local 189 no longer could represent its 

 

(...continued)

26 In the statement of facts in its brief, Gaylord does note that, in Bogalusa, it 

manufactured both DMSO and DMS, but only manufactures DMSO in Tuscaloosa. It does not 

argue, however, that this fact undermines the Board’s determination that there was a continuation 

of operations. The Company stipulated that it “relocate[d] its equipment, supplies, materials and 

product to Tuscaloosa,” and that, at Tuscaloosa, the “employees were hired to perform job 

functions substantially similar to those previously performed by bargaining unit employees in 

Bogalusa.” J. Ex. 1(a) ¶¶10, 12. 

27 Resp’t/Cross-Pet’r’s Br. 4.

28 J. Ex. 2 at 1 (emphasis added).

29 Resp’t/Cross-Pet’r’s Br. 7.

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employees, and Gaylord’s bargaining obligations necessarily ceased. It points to 

the testimony of Flippo, as well as other evidence in the record, to establish both 

that the language of the CBA is unique and that it represents a tripartite 

relationship between the employer, the USW, and Local 189.30

We do not believe that this evidence undermines the NLRB’s determination.

We do not read Flippo’s testimony as suggesting that the contractual relationship 

between Gaylord, the USW, and Local 189 was in any way unique. During the 

hearing, Flippo testified: 

Q: And who are the parties to the collective bargaining 

agreements between—

A: The international—the company, the international union 

on behalf of its locals, so its really between the company and the 

international, and we do it on behalf of the local.

Q: And is there any other language that you see used in that 

collective bargaining agreement[] when it’s talking about the local 

and the international?

A: Some of the older contracts actually say the company and 

the international and its local or and the local or and its local. Most 

say on behalf of its local. The company and the United Steelworkers 

 30 See id. at 7–8.

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International on behalf of its local. Some say the company and the 

international and its local or for its local. I mean, it depends on the 

company counsel and depending on who’s sitting there talking and 

how you write the words . . . .[31]

Thus, according to Flippo, while the relationship between the USW, its locals, and 

the employees remains constant, different language may be used to describe the 

same relationship.32

 31 Hr’g Tr. 87–88.

32 At oral argument, Gaylord argued belatedly that International Union, United 

Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) v. NLRB, 394 

F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1968), supports its claim that, given the conjunctive language of the contract, 

it did not have a duty to bargain with the USW or its District 9 director. We perceive nothing in 

UAW that assists Gaylord; indeed, we agree with the General Counsel that UAW supports the 

Board’s action here. 

In UAW, Pierce Governor Company operated a production facility in Anderson, Indiana, 

where the employees were represented by Local 940; for several decades, the “contracts had 

been made between the Company ‘and the International and its Local 940, jointly (herein called 

“the Union”), as the “exclusive bargaining agency” for the employees . . . .’” Id. at 761 

(emphasis added). The company decided to move its Anderson operation to Upland, Indiana, 

some thirty-five miles away. It bargained the effects of the move with Local 940, but refused “to 

recognize Local 940 for any purpose other than at Anderson”; the company was willing, 

however, to bargain with the UAW International at the new location. Id. The UAW later filed 

an unfair labor practice charge in which it alleged that the company had violated the NLRA “[b]y 

refusing to bargain with the Anderson local (while willing, for a time, to bargain with a different 

UAW local at the new location).” Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The court first affirmed the NLRB’s finding that the UAW International was the certified 

bargaining agent of the employees. As in this case, the record did not reveal “[h]ow the Local 

became engrafted into the process”; nevertheless, the court held that, despite the conjunctive 

(continued...)

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Gaylord’s claim also is undermined by the Board’s decision in Tree-Free 

Fiber Co., 328 NLRB 389 (1999). In that case, the relationship between Statler 

 

(...continued)

language in the contract, Local 940 was not an “independent bargaining entity,” but “at most it 

was a de facto agent” of the International. Id. It would appear, therefore, that UAW does not 

support Gaylord’s claim that the conjunctive contract language evidences a bargaining obligation 

with the Bogalusa local independent of the obligation with the USW. 

In UAW, the court also considered whether, under the factual circumstances presented to 

it, the company had an obligation to bargain with Local 940 following the move. It observed 

that, prior to the relocation, only forty (of more than 200) employees had expressed interest in 

transferring. Moreover, when the new production facility opened, “[n]o Anderson employee . . . 

presented himself at Upland for employment at the Upland plant.” Id. at 763 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). It also was clear “that employees formerly at Anderson who were members of 

Local 940 did not constitute a majority of employees at Upland.” Id. From these facts, the court 

concluded that 

the Company had reasonable grounds to believe that a majority of the people who 

applied and were hired at Upland did not belong to Local 940. When the 

Company reflected its concern and posed the question by offering to recognize 

any union which could show membership of a majority of its employees, the 

burden would seem to shift to the Union to make such a showing. Certainly the 

burden does not rest with the Company to show a lack of majority. If the question 

had been membership in the International, perhaps a different question would be 

presented. But in the situation here depicted it would seem correct to say, as the 

Board did, that the Union had failed to sustain its charge that the Company 

committed an unfair labor practice by failing to recognize Local 940 as the 

bargaining agent of its Upland employees.

Id. (emphasis added). UAW, therefore, held that an employer does not violate the NLRA by 

refusing to bargain with a local following a relocation in which the majority of the employees 

chose not to transfer. The company in UAW, however, had agreed to meet and bargain with the 

international concerning the new facility. The court, therefore, did not address the issue 

presented here—whether the company’s refusal to bargain with the international—was a 

violation of the NLRA.

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Industries and its employees was governed by a CBA which provided that “this 

agreement is made by and between the Augusta plant of Statler Tissue Div. of 

Statler Industries and the United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIOCLC and its Augusta Locals No. 82 and 57.” Id. at 397 (emphasis added) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The CBA further provided that the employer 

“recognize[d] the signatory Locals as the sole collective bargaining agent for its 

employees in the work which properly comes under its jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis 

added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Statler later declared bankruptcy, and

Tree-Free Fiber Company purchased the mill. Following a hiatus of approximately 

one year, Tree-Free Fiber Company began operations. When Tree-Free Fiber 

Company was well into the hiring process for new employees—most of whom had 

been employees of Statler—the International Union sent a letter requesting that it 

be recognized as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the mill 

employees. Tree-Free Fiber Company refused and argued that, “because the 

Union’s May 8 letter demanding recognition was authored by the International 

Union, and the parties’ CBA recognizes the signatory locals as the sole collectivebargaining agent for the employees, the demand for recognition is inappropriate,” 

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and it was relieved “from any obligation to bargain with or recognize the Union.”

Id. 

The ALJ disagreed and concluded that the employer’s refusal to recognize 

and bargain with the International Union was a violation of the NLRA. While 

acknowledging the language on which Tree-Free Fiber Company rested its 

argument, the ALJ noted that the CBA “contains provisions that provide for the 

International Union to be specifically involved in settlement discussions at the last 

step of the grievance procedure prior to the matter being referred to arbitration.” 

Id. at 398. This language indicated that the International Union was a party to the 

CBA. Additionally, there was a long history of the representatives of the 

International Union being involved in contract negotiations and administration. 

Given this history, the International Union, and not the individual locals, was the 

collective-bargaining representative of the Statler mill employees. The NLRB 

affirmed: “The judge also properly found that the Respondent refused to recognize 

and bargain with the Union as the employees’ collective-bargaining representative, 

in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1).” Id. at 389.

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In the present case, the argument that Local 189 is the sole bargaining agent

based on the contract language is not nearly as strong as it was in Tree-Free Fiber 

Company: Nowhere does the CBA designate Local 189 as the “sole collective 

bargaining agent” for Gaylord’s Bogalusa employees. Moreover, the history of the 

USW’s involvement in the negotiation and administration of CBAs at Bogalusa is 

just as strong as in Tree-Free Fiber Company. We therefore cannot accept

Gaylord’s argument that the contract language requires it to bargain only with 

Local 189.

3.

Gaylord also points to other evidence to support its assertion that its 

obligation to bargain extended only to the USW in conjunction with Local 189. 

This evidence does not undermine the NLRB’s conclusion that Gaylord had an 

obligation to bargain with the USW in Tuscaloosa. For instance, the fact that a

local has its own attorney, officers, and finances does not establish that it is a 

separate “union” for bargaining purposes. USW locals are chartered by the USW 

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and must comply with its by-laws and directives.33 The USW dictates what 

officers a local may have, their terms of office, and their responsibilities—

including the local treasurer’s responsibilities to track “[a]ll initiation fees and 

dues” and deposit them “in a separate bank account to be designated as a trust fund 

for the International Union.”34 Perhaps most pertinent to the issues before the 

court, the USW Constitution also provides that “[t]he International Union shall be 

the contracting party in all collective bargaining agreements and all such 

agreements shall be signed by the International Officers.”35

Gaylord also points to an email from Tourne to Flippo. According to 

Gaylord, the email includes a statement by Tourne “that the employees desire 

union representation.”36 On the basis of this statement, Gaylord submits that there 

was no pre-existing duty to bargain with the employees in Tuscaloosa. The 

context does not support this reading of the email. In the email, Tourne informs 

 33 See G.C. Ex. 12 at 40.

34 Id. at 47. 

35 Id. at 69.

36 Resp’t/Cross-Pet’r’s Br. 8.

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Flippo where the “‘demand to bargain’ letter should be sent.”37 Tourne then 

concludes with the following observations: “The local officer for the group talked 

to all the employees to make sure everyone is on board. Let me know if you need 

anything else or if I can help in any way. I have also attached a copy of the 

CBA.”38 In short, the USW acted responsibly in confirming that it continued to 

enjoy support from the Bogalusa employees. Indeed, the fact that Tourne sent the

Bogalusa CBA to Flippo is further evidence that Tourne believed the bargaining 

relationship survived the relocation.

Gaylord also maintains that the USW’s collection of new authorization cards 

from the Tuscaloosa employees is evidence that the USW had doubts about its 

continued status as the employees’ bargaining agent. It is equally plausible,

however, that the USW, facing an employer resistant to bargaining, simply was 

trying to make its rights as clear as possible. The ALJ thus was on solid ground in 

 37 G.C. Ex. 14.

38 Id.

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concluding that “the card check revealed that the Union continued to enjoy 

[majority] status after the move to Tuscaloosa.”39

4.

Finally, Gaylord argues that the NLRB’s order “improperly sanctions the 

United Steelworkers International’s transfer of jurisdiction from District 13 to 

District 9 without any evidence establishing that a majority of affected employees 

ratified such a transfer.”40 It points to two cases, Hermet, Inc., 222 NLRB 29 

(1976), and The Gas Service Company, 213 NLRB 932 (1974), for the proposition 

that, had it acknowledged and bargained with the USW’s District 9 Director in 

Tuscaloosa, it would have been violating the NLRA. 

Gaylord’s assertion is undermined, of course, by the fact that the USW 

collected cards from the majority of the Tuscaloosa facility indicating support for 

its continued representation. However, even if such evidence were not in the 

record, neither Hermet nor The Gas Service Company would control here. 

 39 ALJ at 7.

40 Resp’t/Cross-Pet’r’s Br. 10 (emphasis added).

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In Hermet, two unions affiliated with the same international were vying to 

represent workers at a facility which was scheduled to be moved from the 

geographic jurisdiction of the first local (Local 455) to the jurisdiction of the 

second (Local 545). During a strike designed to compel the company to execute a 

CBA, several employees signed a petition authorizing Local 455 to represent them; 

other employees signed cards distributed by a representative of Local 545, but the 

space on the cards where the local number was supposed to be written was left 

blank. The agreement reached at the end of the strike designated “Shopmen’s 

Local Union No. 455 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural and 

Ornamental Iron Workers (AFL-CIO)” as “the Union”; the CBA explicitly stated 

that “[t]he International . . . is not a party to this agreement.” Hermet, 222 NLRB at 

32 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A dispute soon arose between the locals concerning which would represent 

the employees once the operation was moved. With mediation from the 

international, the locals concluded that jurisdiction should be transferred to Local 

545. When the employees discovered this development, however, forty-two of the 

sixty-eight members of the bargaining unit signed a letter expressing their 

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preference to remain with Local 455. The company nevertheless acquiesced in the 

transfer and began treating Local 545 as the employees’ collective-bargaining 

representative; the employees were required to transfer their membership to Local 

545 as a condition of continued employment. The employees then filed an unfair 

labor practice charge against Local 545 and the company. The NLRB concluded 

that the transfer of jurisdiction violated the employees’ rights under the NLRA: 

[T]he Company and Local 545 entered into an agreement which in 

effect recognized Local 545 as the employees’ exclusive bargaining 

representative and required membership therein as a condition of 

employment, notwithstanding the employees’ preference for the 

Brooklyn local as manifested by their letter to the International before 

Respondents announced to the employees that a purported transfer of 

bargaining rights was to take place. Moreover, thereafter Respondents 

maintained and enforced that agreement.

Id. at 37. Such evidence, the NLRB concluded, constituted at least a prima facie 

case that the company and Local 545 had violated the NLRA.

Gaylord maintains that had it, like the employer in Hermet, negotiated with 

the District 9 Director in Tuscaloosa, it would have violated the NLRA. Here, 

however, the USW was a party to the CBA and its employee, Tourne, had been

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active in negotiations and arbitrations on behalf of the employees at Bogalusa. 

Indeed, Gaylord stipulated to the following facts:

At all material times, since at least 2007, the International 

Steelworkers Union, through Michael Tourne, who also is and was at 

all times affiliated with District 10, sub-district 3, of the International 

Steelworkers Union has been a signatory to all collective bargaining 

agreements between the Respondent and the Union, has actively 

participated in all contract negotiations as the chief Union negotiator 

for such agreements, has engaged in contract administration and 

participated in grievance meetings and arbitrations on behalf of the 

bargaining unit.[41]

In the present case, therefore, bargaining rights were not being transferred to an 

organization that was a stranger to the contract. Moreover, in Hermet, there was 

affirmative evidence that the employees had chosen a specific local as their 

bargaining agent, to the exclusion of the international, and they did not agree with 

the transfer of jurisdiction. Here, by contrast, all evidence points to the conclusion 

that the employees wanted the USW to continue to represent their interests at the 

new facility in Tuscaloosa.

 41 J. Ex. 1(a) ¶5.

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Equally unhelpful to Gaylord is The Gas Service Company, 213 NLRB 932

(1974). In that case, Local 1613 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical 

Workers (“IBEW”) prevailed in an election against a competing union, and Local 

1613 negotiated a CBA with the employer. Local 1613’s business manager, 

however, became overwhelmed trying to represent both The Gas Service 

Company’s employees and the employees at Kansas City Power and Light 

Company, and both groups of employees complained that the business manager 

was devoting insufficient time to their needs. These complaints came to the 

attention of a representative of the IBEW, who was aware that another local had an 

assistant business agent with several years’ experience in representing clerical 

employees. The IBEW representative contacted the assistant business agent, 

William James, to see if he could assist Local 1613’s business manager, and James 

agreed. James then met with the clerical employees of the company and told them 

that Local 53 would assume all assets and liabilities of Local 1613, including its 

current contract with The Gas Service Company. Local 1613 would revert to the 

task of representing only the clerical employees of Kansas City Power and Light 

Company as it had before. On March 26, 1974, Local 1613 conducted an election 

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among the employees as to their preference for Local 1613 or Local 53. According 

to Local 1613, the vote was in favor of Local 53.

Local 53 and Local 1613 then filed a joint petition with the Board seeking to 

substitute Local 53 for Local 1613 as representative of the office clerical 

employees. The NLRB denied the petition. It noted that 

Local 53’s officials, with the exception of James, have generally 

represented only outside electrical field and line employees in a wide 

variety of units in Missouri and Kansas. They are generally unfamiliar 

with Local 1613’s contract with the Employer and the ordinary 

problems faced by [the] Employer’s clericals in their daily routine. 

Local 1613, on the other hand, has been administering the contract 

and is familiar with the problems and conditions.

Id. at 933. It could not conclude, therefore, that this was simply an 

“administrative” matter, which could be addressed through a petition to the Board. 

The NLRB further explained that

[t]he petition does not assure the employees of the continuity of their 

certified bargaining representative, but rather seeks to substitute a new 

and different labor organization with its own officers and a complete 

change in the representative. Such a proposed change would raise a 

question concerning representation....[T]hat question may only be 

considered upon the timely filing of a representation petition and a 

secret ballot of the employees concerned.

Id.

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Again, the factual differences between the present case and The Gas Service 

Company are marked. Here, Gaylord stipulated that the USW has been actively 

involved in the representation of Gaylord employees for many years. Its 

representative had negotiated CBAs with Gaylord and had participated actively in 

administering those CBAs on behalf of Bogalusa employees. The USW is 

“familiar with the problems and conditions” faced by Gaylord employees, and, 

therefore, would provide continuity of representation to the employees that Local 

53 could not provide to the employees in The Gas Service Company.

42

 42 Gaylord also cites at length two advice memoranda from the Office of the General 

Counsel. “Such memoranda are intended to serve as internal instruction for use by the Office of 

the General Counsel, and have no precedential value or authoritative weight for administrative 

law judges.” U.S. Postal Serv., 345 NLRB 1203, 1214 n.17 (2005). Moreover, like the cases 

cited by Gaylord, the factual circumstances in the advice memoranda are different from the ones 

presented here. In Crescent Bay Convalescent Hospital, No. 31-CA-25999, 2003 WL 26072163 

(NLRB G.C. February 26, 2003), Local 399 of the Service Employees International Union was 

the certified bargaining representative of employees of a convalescent home; there was no 

evidence that the international was a party to the CBA. At some time later, the international 

transferred jurisdiction over convalescent homes in Southern California to Local 434B. The 

General Counsel concluded that “the Employer did not have a duty to recognize Local 434B 

because that Union never had a majority showing. The Employer did, however, have a 

continuing duty to recognize Local 399 because that Union never disclaimed interest.” Id. at 3. 

Here, by contrast, it is clear that the USW is a party to the CBA, that the Bogalusa local no 

longer is asserting an interest, and that a majority of the employees in Tuscaloosa desires that the 

USW continue to represent their interests. 

(continued...)

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B.

We turn now to the other issues raised by the parties. As previously 

discussed, Gaylord’s sole argument in its cross-petition is that, following the 

transfer to Tuscaloosa, it no longer had the duty to bargain with the USW. It does 

not contest the factual bases underlying the other unfair labor practices related to 

bargaining. Specifically, it does not dispute that, on August 31, September 23, and 

October 19, 2010, Flippo requested that Gaylord provide the USW information 

related to the terms and conditions of its Tuscaloosa employees. It also does not 

dispute that failure to provide this information violated the NLRA if it had a duty 

to bargain with the USW. See NLRB v. U.S. Postal Serv., 888 F.2d 1568, 1570 

(11th Cir. 1989) (holding that an employer violates the NLRA when it fails “to 

provide information that is needed by the bargaining representative for the proper 

performance of its duties” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Similarly, Gaylord 

 

(...continued)

The second advice memorandum involving Centra, Inc., “raise[d] the novel question of 

whether, after an international union has made a decision to transfer jurisdiction from one local 

to another, the second local succeeds to the representational rights of the first local.” Centra,

Inc., No. 8-CA-27564, 1996 WL 138065, at *2 (NLRB G.C. January 22, 1996). The General 

Counsel, however, never reached this issue because there were pending representation petitions 

before the Board that would resolve the issue. See id.

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does not contest that it created a new position of “Lead Shipper” without notifying 

the USW or providing it an opportunity to bargain, or that creating a new position 

in the bargaining unit is a mandatory subject of bargaining, see Spurlino Materials, 

LLC v. NLRB, 645 F.3d 870, 879 (7th Cir. 2011). We therefore enforce the 

NLRB’s order with respect to these bargaining issues.

The NLRB also found that Smith had interrogated Mitchell about his union 

sympathies in violation of the NLRA, and it seeks enforcement of its order on this 

issue. Although Gaylord denies that “it unlawfully interrogated employees,”43 it 

makes no argument in support of this assertion. A party must make more than a 

“passing reference[]” to an issue to preserve it for review. See, e.g., United States 

v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003). Moreover, when a party 

fails to contest a violation, the NLRB is entitled to summary enforcement. NLRB 

v. Dynatron/Bondo Corp., 176 F.3d 1310, 1313 n.2 (11th Cir. 1999).

Even if this were not the case, we would affirm the NLRB’s order. “An 

employer violates section 8(a)(1) of the Act by coercively interrogating its 

 43 Resp’t/Cross-Pet’r’s Br. 5.

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employees about their union activities. An interrogation is coercive if, when 

viewed in all the surrounding circumstances, ‘its probable effect’ tends to interfere 

with the employees’ free exercise of their Section rights.” NLRB v. E.I. DuPont 

De Nemours, 750 F.2d 524, 527 (6th Cir. 1984) (quoting Larand Leisurelies, Inc. 

v. NLRB, 523 F.2d 814, 819 (6th Cir. 1975)).

In determining whether certain interrogation tends to be coercive in 

the totality of the circumstances, the following factors are to be 

considered: (1) the history of the employer’s attitude toward its 

employees; (2) the nature of the information sought; (3) the rank of 

the official of the employer in the employer’s hierarchy; (4) the place 

and manner of the conversation; (5) the truthfulness of the employees’ 

reply; (6) whether the employer has a valid purpose in obtaining 

information concerning the union; (7) whether this valid purpose, if 

existent, is communicated to the employees; and (8) whether the 

employer assures the employees that no reprisals will be taken if they 

support the union.

TRW-United Greenfield Div. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 410, 416 (5th Cir. Feb. 1981);44

NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Servs., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir. 1993) (same). 

Here, Gaylord representatives had indicated their interest in not having a 

union at the Tuscaloosa facility. Once in Tuscaloosa, Smith, a vice president, 

 44 In Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this 

Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior 

to close of business on September 30, 1981.

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summoned Mitchell to his office, questioned him directly about his support for a 

union, and attempted to persuade him that he and Gaylord would be better off 

without union representation. During the meeting, Smith did not give Mitchell any 

assurances that there would not be reprisals for his responses. Moreover, before 

the ALJ, Gaylord did not call Smith (or anyone else) as a witness to establish that 

Smith had a valid purpose in posing these questions to Mitchell. The ALJ relied 

on this evidence in concluding that “Smith’s questions had the reasonably 

foreseeable effect of discouraging employees from supporting the Union and 

thereby constituted unlawful interrogation.”45 That conclusion is amply supported 

by the record.

Conclusion

The evidence in the record supports the Board’s conclusion that Gaylord had 

a bargaining relationship with the USW that pre-dated the move to Tuscaloosa, that 

Gaylord’s operation in Tuscaloosa was a continuation of its operation in Bogalusa, 

and therefore that Gaylord had an obligation to bargain with the USW concerning 

its Tuscaloosa employees. Moreover, the record supports the NLRB’s conclusion 

 45 ALJ at 8.

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that Smith interrogated Mitchell about his union sympathies in violation of the 

NLRA. We therefore grant the NLRB’s petition to enforce its order and deny 

Gaylord’s cross-petition for review.

PETITION FOR ENFORCEMENT GRANTED; CROSS-PETITION DENIED

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