****South Asia 2020:Future Strategic Balance and Alliances**
Compiled byLieutenant Colonel Debra R. LittleU.S. Army War College
**Conclusions**:. September 11 presents an opportunity to improve South Asian security relationships.. An economically strong and politically stable South Asia is in U.S. national interests.. Resolving Indo-Pakistani tensions is critical to ensuring regional stability; Kashmir is a keyissue that must be addressed. . The United States must remain engaged in South Asia even after the conclusion of hostilities inAfghanistan. . The United States should maintain robust military-to-military relationships in SouthAsia.
The U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and Stanford University's Asia/PacificResearch Center and Center for International Security and Cooperation cosponsored a conference inPalo Alto, California, on January 4-5, 2002. Its purpose was to examine the current situation inSouth Asia and to sharpen understanding of the longer-term assumptions, players, and events thatwill shape the future strategic environment in the region and to offer policy considerations. Thefocus was mainly on India and Pakistan, with some attention on China. There were approximately 75participants, including former policymakers, uniformed and civilian members of the DoD, theintelligence and diplomatic communities, business world, and academia. This brief highlights themain points raised and discussed. 
Challenge for U.S. Policy.
Participants agreed that recent world events only serve to demonstrate that an economicallystrong and politically stable South Asia is vital to international security and U.S. interests.Several consequences resulted with the establishment of the coalition against the War onTerrorism. Pakistan's perceived status was elevated commensurate with its importance relative toAfghanistan and to the Islamic world. Indo-Pakistani tensions over Kashmir increased, and thewider dangers of the Indo-Pakistani conflict became more apparent. 
Historically, the United States has had limited involvement in South Asia. During the Cold War,the United States established a security relationship with Pakistan. American interest inAfghanistan and, hence Pakistan, was high during the period of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.After the Soviet withdrawal and in response to congressional legislation aimed at averting aPakistani nuclear weapons program, the United States withdrew support for Pakistan. Concern aboutsecurity in the region heightened with the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998, but eventhen Washington did not pay concentrated attention until September 11. Participants agreed thatthe events of September 11 are likely to influence U.S. policy on engagement with South Asia, butthe directions of this policy are still being developed. Although there is cause for optimism,the opportunity to shape the regional security environment is fleeting.
Future Scenarios.
One speaker suggested three possible scenarios for South Asia's future. In the first and least-desirable scenario, the region reverts to pre-September 11 conditions. Pakistan is preoccupiedwith India, but India is not nearly as concerned with Pakistan because it believes that time ison its side. According to this speaker, Pakistan concludes that brinksmanship is the mosteffective way to bring attention to its high priority issues, so it will tend to play the"crisis" card. Most agree that any clash could escalate to the nuclear level.
A nuclear exchange in South Asia would cause a major jolt in great power relations and exacerbateproblems between the West and the Muslim world. This scenario portends the most dangerousoutcome, but it may be difficult to prevent reversion to pre-September 11 assumptions and the oldstatus quo as the furor of the War on Terrorism diminishes. 
In the speaker's second scenario, the United States would involve itself in Asia intensely butintermittently. Taiwan would remain the key flashpoint between the United States and China. Japanwill want to avoid involvement but would be forced to from time to time. The United States wouldtry to have positive relations with Russia and India, while China and Pakistan would remainallied. Economic aid would help bind Pakistan and Indian policy to patrons, and the patrons wouldpush Pakistan and India to resolve Kashmir. This scenario would be less dangerous than the first.
The most benevolent but least probable scenario would be a configuration of the United States"plus eight." A U.S.-led coalition of Russia, China, Japan, India, Brazil, Germany, France, andthe United Kingdom would assume a mandate independent of the U.N. Security Council, especiallyregarding terrorism. One focus of this coalition could be the reduction of tensions in the Muslimworld.
Trends. 
Several speakers discussed economic development, political dynamics, and demographic trends thatwill have a significant impact on future scenarios for South Asia in 2020. Pakistan's and India'seconomic growth has slowed in recent years, Pakistan's much more so. Both countries realize that,without growth, their ambitions to join the international elite will not be achieved. This willput considerable pressure on both countries to resolve their disputes and focus resources oneconomic growth. 
The exigent political landscape of India is one of coalition building and rebuilding. Thisdynamic political structure is characteristic of a distant central government and makes nationallevel policymaking a very tough proposition. 
At the same time, Islamabad is struggling to manage economic development while deterringperceived aggression from India, both of which compete for scarce resources.
Most participants agreed that population growth rates will continue to be complicated to manage.Age distribution will have a very deleterious effect on Asian societies. The "graying" of thelabor force will create problems in economic productivity and social security. One speakercontended that World Bank statistics fail to take into account sex ratios resulting frompopulation control measures such as selective abortion. This has profound implications for futuremarriage trends in family-centric Asian cultures.
Nuclear Weapons.
Participants agreed that India and Pakistan can take two paths in the future: pursue an arms raceor concentrate on economic development under an arms control regime. The large scale use ofnuclear weapons on the subcontinent would be a humanitarian disaster of monumental proportions. Anuclear exchange would also have a strong negative impact on U.S. efforts to curb globalproliferation, since other nuclear states may feel compelled to break out of nonproliferationregimes. 
The realm of nuclear security programs is one area where there might be an opportunity for theUnited States to initiate tangible cooperation. Pakistan is very open to the idea of learningabout critical aspects of America's nuclear security such as the Personnel Reliability Program(PRP). Several participants agreed that the United States at times has acted in a condescendingmanner, and that feasible mechanisms to share ideas versus patronizingly doling out assistanceexist. Others argued that the United States could be seen rewarding those who acquire theseweapons.
Influence of Strategic Culture. 
Strategic culture--core interests, motivations, and how security policymaking elites of statesact in international and regional environments--offers an analytic framework to understand howcountries view the utility of force and how they develop their security strategy. Regionalplayers have difficulty understanding each other's world views and cultural milieu. Decipheringthe differences between perceptions and reality is tough.
According to one participant, China perceives itself as always acting in a defensive manner, andtends to be somewhat "tone deaf" to contrary perceptions of Beijing's actions by its neighbors.China perceives India to be a rival great power aspirant, belligerent and expansionist, and willlikely continue to be unwilling to confer great power status upon it.
Another participant explained that India has three distinct schools of thought that cover a broadrange of concepts of the utility of force and the nature of its adversaries. On the one side isthe Nehruvian approach, which tends to be patient and believes that war is only one choice in arange of choices that includes cooperation and compromise. On the opposite end of the spectrum isthe nationalist approach that views war as a constant shadow and a natural and important tool ofstatecraft. The more moderate neo-liberal approach considers force to be of declining utility,while economics and trade have more credibility as instruments of national power. This widespectrum of approaches, coupled with India's fluid domestic political scene, makes it difficultto predict how India may act toward China or Pakistan.
Most participants agreed that Pakistan suffers from an acute sense of insecurity and a strongdistrust of India. Islamabad has a tough balancing act. How can it allocate enough resources tothe military to enable it to withstand attack, while steering a course toward sustainabledevelopment? Its strategy is to gain external support against an adversary it considers stronger.Pakistan saw the U.S. response in Afghanistan as posing both a threat and an opportunity. Thethreat was American hostility if it did not cooperate with the U.S. effort; the opportunity waseconomic and political support from it. The cost of not joining the coalition would have beenprohibitively high.
Future Alliance Politics in Asia. 
One participant explained that a multiplicity of forces and powerful trends will continue toaffect the patterns of alignment and antagonism in South Asia. Liberalization and other marketmechanisms will help mold the dynamics of power politics.
Participants examined three prospects for alliance relationships involving South Asia. An Indo-Russian alliance would be unlikely due to Russia's preoccupation with domestic issues, and itwouldn't make sense for India to ally with a debilitated partner. Russia's possibleunreliability, if faced with pressure from China, is particularly troublesome. 
An alliance between India, Russia, and China focused against the United States seems improbable,even though these countries share common grievances. China would be reluctant to accord Indiagreat power status, and India would find it difficult to overlook its border disputes with China.In contrast, Indo-U.S. relations may improve dramatically in the years ahead. Both are wary ofChina; India is seeking to promote economic development, and the United States is the principalsource of foreign investment in India. Both sides would need to get beyond their history ofstrained bilateral relations. Nonproliferation issues are not wholly resolved, and the UnitedStates must strike a balance to preserve good relations with Pakistan and India. 
Conference participants felt that China will likely maintain its long-standing relationship withPakistan. Pakistan is weak and values support from China, and China values having a friendlyneighbor in Pakistan. Supporting Pakistan also helps to counter India as a competitor (althoughthe Chinese have made it evident they do not want to get involved in an Indo-Pakistan war). Anenormous range of possible futures in South Asia exists, but a key constraining factor will beoverlapping networks of pressure and influence by outside powers.
U.S. Military Perspectives. 
The key national security interests for the United States in South Asia are access to the areafor the global War on Terrorism and stability operations; elimination of terrorism within theregion and beyond Afghanistan; and prevention of the use of weapons of mass destruction. 
Participants agreed that U.S. military-to-military engagement in the region supports theseinterests. It reassures our allies, makes it disadvantageous to compete against the United Statesor its allies, deters potential enemies of the United States or its allies, and it could beinstrumental in decisively defeating our enemies. More generally, military-to-military engagementprovides access to decisionmakers via the influence of the military as well as opportunity toimprove interoperability and mutual understanding in bilateral military relationships, thusavoiding strategic miscalculation. Military-to-military engagement also provides long-termexposure to American values and provides opportunities for functional exchanges that will benefitboth the United States and partner countries. 
In the view of several participants, the U.S. military can play a more active role in promotingstability and regional security. Military-to-military engagement is not a zero-sum game, allplayers can benefit. The U.S. military needs to design a new paradigm of engagement encompassingthe whole spectrum of military-to-military activities, including foreign military sales,military-to-military exchanges, International Military Education and Training (IMET) andhumanitarian assistance cooperation. The enduring relationships established at the militaryservice schools go a long way toward fostering high-level relationships as the officers advancethrough the ranks to positions of influence. Severing military-to-military ties as a punishmentis at best ineffective, at worst counterproductive and damaging to U.S. interests.
Conclusion. 
War in South Asia is not in the interests of any country and would be disastrous for allconcerned. Not only would large scale use of nuclear weapons be a humanitarian disaster ofmonumental proportions, but also would have a negative impact on U.S. efforts to curb globalproliferation. Most participants were fairly optimistic that the events of September 11 havepresented India, Pakistan, and the international community a chance to shift the regionalsecurity environment in South Asia for the better. However, the opportunity to effect this changemay be fleeting. The War on Terrorism has implications for Afghanistan-Pakistan relations and mayexacerbate India-Pakistan tensions in the short term. The international community must seize theopportunity to help advance rapprochement between India and Pakistan. For significant progress tobe made, the issue of Kashmir must be addressed. 
Washington must resist the temptation to cite the military successes in Afghanistan asconstituting a resounding victory in Phase One of the War on Terrorism, shift focus to anotherregion, and place South Asia on the inbackburnerln once again. The window of opportunity to shapethe future of South Asia may be fast closing.
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The views expressed in this conference brief are those of the author and do not necessarilyreflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense,or the U.S. Government. This conference brief is cleared for public release; distribution isunlimited.
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