United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on Environment, Energy, and Natural

Resources, Committee on Government

Operations, House of Representatives

December 1994 CHEMICAL WEAPONS

DISPOSAL

Plans for Nonstockpile

Chemical Warfare

Materiel Can Be

Improved

GAO/NSIAD-95-55

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-253645 

December 20, 1994

The Honorable Mike Synar

Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment,

 Energy, and Natural Resources

Committee on Government Operations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This report responds to your request that we review the Department of the

Army’s disposal program for chemical munitions, materiel, and facilities

that are not specifically included in the U.S. stockpile of unitary chemical

weapons.1

 These items are referred to as nonstockpile chemical warfare

materiel and consist of binary chemical weapons, miscellaneous chemical

warfare materiel, recovered chemical weapons, former chemical weapon

production facilities, and buried chemical warfare materiel. As requested,

we collected and analyzed information on (1) the status of the Army’s

planning process for the nonstockpile disposal program, (2) the Army’s

estimated disposal cost and schedule, and (3) lessons learned from the

Army’s ongoing stockpile disposal program that may also apply to the

proposed nonstockpile program. Our scope and methodology are

described in appendix I.

Background In November 1985, the Congress directed the Army to destroy the

Department of Defense’s (DOD) stockpile of unitary chemical weapons.

The stockpile is stored at eight Army installations in the continental

United States and one installation on the Johnston Atoll in the Pacific

Ocean. It consists of various lethal weapons, such as rockets, bombs, and

projectiles, and bulk containers that contain nerve and mustard agents.

Exposure to the agents can result in death.

In 1993, the United States signed the U.N.-sponsored Convention on the

Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and the Use of

Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, commonly referred to as the

Chemical Weapons Convention. The United States agreed to dispose of

(1) binary chemical weapons, recovered chemical weapons, and former

chemical weapon production facilities within 10 years and

(2) miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel within 5 years of the date the

convention becomes effective. If ratified by the U.S. Senate, the

1

A unitary chemical weapon is a munition containing a single lethal chemical agent.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
B-253645 

convention becomes effective 180 days after the 65th nation ratifies the

treaty, but not sooner than January 13, 1995. Under the terms of the

convention, chemical weapons buried prior to 1977 are exempt from

disposal as long as they remain buried. In the United States, burial was a

common disposal method for chemical warfare materiel until the late

1950s. Should the United States choose to excavate the sites and remove

the chemical weapons, the provisions of the convention would apply. DOD

officials estimate that the convention will enter into force in fiscal year

1996.

In the fiscal year 1993 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 102-484),

the Congress directed the Army to report on its plans for disposing of all

nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel within the United States. In 1993,

the Army issued a report describing the nonstockpile chemical materiel,

potential disposal methods, transportation alternatives, and disposal cost

and schedule estimates.2

 The report concluded that it would cost the Army

$1.1 billion ($930 million in direct project disposal costs and $170 million

in programmatic costs) to destroy, primarily by incineration, demolition,

and neutralization,3

 the nonstockpile chemical materiel required by the

convention within the required time frames. Programmatic costs are

associated with more than one disposal project or program category. For

example, the portion of management and personnel costs that support

more than one project is considered programmatic costs. Also, estimated

costs to procure and test equipment to be used at more than one site are

included in the programmatic cost estimate. The Army also reported that it

would cost $16.6 billion ($12.04 billion in direct disposal costs and

$4.56 billion in programmatic costs) to recover and destroy, primarily by

incineration and neutralization, buried chemical materiel within 40 years.

These estimates are considered rough order of magnitude estimates,

typically used when a program is not fully developed. According to

program officials, the Army plans to issue a supplement to its 1993 survey

and analysis report, which will include revised cost and schedule

estimates, in mid-1995. Appendix II describes the Army’s nonstockpile

chemical warfare materiel.

The Army Chemical Demilitarization and Remediation Activity, formerly

named the Army Chemical Materiel Destruction Agency, is responsible for

2

Survey and Analysis Report: Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Program, U.S. Army Chemical Materiel

Destruction Agency (Nov. 1993).

3

The neutralization process involves altering the chemical, physical, and toxicological properties of the

chemical agent to render it ineffective for use as intended. The process may be followed by

incineration of the remaining materiel.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
B-253645 

storing, transporting, and disposing of nonstockpile chemical warfare

materiel. The extent to which other federal and state agencies will be

involved in the program depends on the location and particulars of the

nonstockpile chemical materiel. Appendix III describes federal and state

agencies’ roles and responsibilities for the nonstockpile disposal program.

Results in Brief The Army’s plans for destroying nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel

are not final and, as a result, its $17.7-billion cost estimate is uncertain and

cannot be used for budget purposes. This uncertainty is largely because

the amount of materiel to be disposed of has not been fully identified and

the disposal methods cannot be selected until the Army is further along in

the environmental assessment and permitting process. Although the Army

has good information about some categories of nonstockpile materiel, the

amount and condition of other materiel are unknown. For example, the

Army knows little about the agents inside recovered chemical weapons or

the nature of contaminated materiel at former production facilities. Also,

the Army has limited and often imprecise information about the nature

and extent of buried chemical warfare materiel, which are estimated to be

located at 215 sites in 33 states, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Washington,

D.C. Although the Army has determined that 30 of the 215 burial sites

warrant no further remediation activity, the nature and extent of buried

chemical warfare materiel at the other sites will remain unknown prior to

excavation, and additional burial sites may be identified.

The Army’s cost and schedule estimates, and its ability to complete the

nonstockpile chemical disposal program, are likely to be affected by issues

similar to those experienced in the stockpile disposal program. These

include actions necessary to comply with federal, state, and local laws and

requirements; obtain the necessary environmental approvals and permits;

and address the strong public opposition to chemical weapons

incineration.4

 In addition, the Army has limited experience destroying

nonstockpile chemical materiel and is unfamiliar with what types of

environmental and technical problems to expect. Based on the difficulties

experienced in the stockpile disposal program, the Army’s estimated cost

of the nonstockpile disposal program is likely to increase and its proposed

schedule to slip.

4

The baseline incineration process involves a disassembly procedure that breaks down munitions into

their component parts. Once disassembled, the chemical agent and components are burned separately

in high temperature furnaces.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
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The Army’s Planning

Process and Cost and

Disposal Estimates

Are Affected by

Uncertainties

As of November 1994, the Army had not issued a comprehensive

implementation plan to dispose of nonstockpile chemical warfare

materiel. Moreover, based on the Army’s experience with the stockpile

disposal program, it is likely to be several years before the Army can

develop a disposal plan that includes reliable cost and schedule estimates.5

The Army’s 1993 report provides an initial scoping of the magnitude of

effort required to safely destroy all nonstockpile chemical materiel in the

United States if so directed. However, because of uncertainties about the

nature and magnitude of the materiel or the disposal methods to be used,

the Army recognizes that its $17.7-billion cost estimate for the

nonstockpile disposal program cannot be relied on for budget purposes.

Appendix IV lists the disposal methods used by the Army to develop its

program cost and schedule estimates.

Whenever possible, the Army plans to dispose of nonstockpile chemical

materiel on-site. However, there may be occasions when it is not feasible

or practical for the Army to do so, and transportation to another disposal

location may be required. Factors the Army intends to consider are

population proximity and density, chemical weapon type, condition of the

munitions, and public safety and environmental policy. In addition, the

opinions and concerns of the affected states, local governments, and the

public will affect the Army’s decisions. For example, there is strong public

opposition to incineration and transportation of chemical weapons across

state boundaries.

The Army’s level of knowledge and stage of planning by category of

nonstockpile materiel are summarized in table 1.

5

In November 1985, the Congress directed the Army to destroy the DOD stockpile of unitary chemical

weapons. Nine years later, the stockpile disposal program continues to experience cost growth and

schedule slippages.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
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Table 1: Summary of the Army’s Level of Knowledge and Stage of Planning, Including Disposal Cost and Schedule

Estimates

Dollars in billions

Category Characteristic

Number of

sites

Disposal

cost

estimate

Time

frame

(years)

Binary chemical weapons The locations and quantities are well-documented. The

nature of the chemical elements and the components

are understood by the Army.

4 $0.19 10

Miscellaneous chemical warfare

materiel

The locations and quantities are well-documented, and

most materiel are not contaminated with a chemical

agent.

10 0.21 5

Recovered chemical weapons The locations and quantities are well-documented, but

the inventory will change as additional weapons are

recovered. The chemical fill of 25 percent of the

weapons is unknown, and the weapons are likely to be

in deteriorated condition.

6 0.11 10

Former chemical weapon

production facilities

The facilities that are to be destroyed have been

identified. However, the levels of contamination and

deterioration are unknown.

4 0.42 10

Buried chemical warfare materiel The actual amount, chemical agent, condition, and type

of materiel are unknown, and the number and locations

of potential burial sites are uncertain. The Army has

limited experience in disposing of buried chemical

materiel.

215 12.04 40

Programmatic costs The estimated programmatic costs are based on little

actual experience, limited data, and key uncertain

assumptions.

a 4.73 a

Total cost $17.70

aNot applicable.

Source: Based on the Army’s 1993 Survey and Analysis Report.

Binary Chemical Weapons The locations and quantities of binary chemical weapons are

well-documented and understood by the Army. Binary weapon systems

principally involve an artillery projectile and components of the bigeye

bomb. The projectile is composed of chemical elements, a metal casing,

and explosive components. Although the bigeye bomb was never

produced or stockpiled, some associated chemical elements must be

destroyed.

Although the method for destroying binary chemical weapons has not

been determined, the Army estimates that, subject to the availability of

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
B-253645 

funds, it can destroy the binary weapons within 10 years for $190 million.

According to Army officials, the chemical elements in binary weapons are

not lethal agents until they are combined during flight to a target;

therefore, handling and disposing of the chemical elements and

components should not pose any major problems. Some of the disposal

options being considered for binary weapon components are incineration,

landfill, crushing, and smelting. The actual disposal method will be

selected by the Army after a comprehensive environmental review.

Miscellaneous Chemical

Warfare Materiel

The Army has a good understanding of miscellaneous chemical warfare

materiel to be destroyed and has documented them by location,

configuration, quantity, and type. However, changes are likely to occur as

materiel is added or deleted as a result of the Chemical Weapons

Convention verification process. The materiel is predominantly metal

containers and munitions components. Some of the components contain

explosive charges that may need to be extracted before disposal.

Despite an uncertainty about the disposal method, the Army estimates

that, subject to the availability of funds, it can destroy the miscellaneous

chemical warfare materiel within 5 years for $210 million. According to

Army officials, disposal options are numerous since most of the materiel is

not contaminated with a chemical agent. The options include incineration,

smelting, and crushing. However, the decision on disposal methods will be

based on (1) the location, configuration, and type of materiel, (2) results of

the required environmental analyses and studies, and (3) input from the

affected states, local governments, and the general public.

Recovered Chemical

Weapons

The Army has some information on the recovered chemical weapons that

it must dispose of, but the inventory will change as additional weapons are

recovered. According to Army documents, chemical weapons have been

recovered from range-clearing operations, chemical burial sites, and

research and development test areas. As of November 1993, there were

7,056 recovered chemical items in the Army’s inventory, consisting of

mortar cartridges, projectiles, bombs, German rockets, chemical agent

identification sets, and bulk containers.

With appropriate funding, the Army estimates that the destruction of

recovered chemical items can be completed within 10 years, at a cost of

$110 million. The Army believes that handling and disposing of recovered

chemical weapons will be difficult as (1) they are more likely to have

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
B-253645 

deteriorated than other nonstockpile materiel and (2) the identity of the

agent is unknown in 25 percent of the weapons. The Army is studying

several destruction options, including transportable incineration and

neutralization systems. However, the actual method for destroying the

recovered chemical weapons cannot be selected until after the Army

completes the required technical and environmental studies.

Former Chemical Weapon

Production Facilities

The Army has identified former chemical weapon production facilities that

need to be cleaned up. They consist of buildings and equipment for

producing, loading, storing, and assembling chemical munitions and

agents. These facilities are located in four states and are in various degrees

of contamination and deterioration.

The Army estimates that it will take 10 years and $420 million to dispose of

former chemical weapon production facilities. However, the Army has no

experience in destroying former production facilities in compliance with

the Chemical Weapons Convention. It is still in the process of determining

the levels of contamination, identifying potential problems in the

demolition process, and determining how to safely dispose of the buildings

and their components. Some of the disposal options being considered are

incineration of contaminated materiel and demolition of uncontaminated

facilities and equipment. The final disposal decision will not be made until

comprehensive environmental studies are completed with the

participation of the affected states, local governments, and the public.

Buried Chemical Warfare

Materiel

The Army has limited and often imprecise information about the nature

and extent of buried chemical materiel. However, it has begun to develop

site characterization, excavation, removal, and treatment procedures for

the burial sites. Since burial was considered to be the final disposal act,

little record-keeping was done for burial activities and additional sites are

likely to be identified. Available records indicate that some burial sites

may still contain active chemical agents and explosives; therefore, they

pose a threat to human health and the environment.

According to Army officials, the lack of knowledge about buried chemical

warfare materiel has created considerable difficulty in selecting

appropriate disposal methods. The Army has conducted various analyses,

including comprehensive documentation surveys, site visits, and

interviews, to identify potential burial sites. Even at well-documented

sites, the actual amount, chemical agent, condition, and type of buried

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
B-253645 

materiel will remain relatively unknown prior to excavation and visual

identification. Based on preliminary analyses, the Army has identified

potential chemical warfare materiel at 215 burial sites in 33 states, the U.S.

Virgin Islands, and Washington, D.C. (See fig. 1.) The Army has determined

that 30 of the 215 potential burial sites warrant no further remediation

activity. This determination is based on the Army’s site assessment, prior

completed remedial work, or the restricted accessibility of the site.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
B-253645 

Figure 1: Potential Chemical Warfare Materiel Burial Sites

States with potential burial sites. 


WA

OR

ID

NV CA

UT

AZ

CO

NM

SD

NE

KS

TX AR

LA

MT

WY

ND

MN

IA

MO

OK

WI

IL

MI

IN

KY

TN

MS

OH

GA

FL

SC

NC

VA

WV

PA

NY

VT

NH

ME

MA

RI

CT

NJ - 

MD - 

DC -

AL

(1)

(1)

(1)

(1)

(1)

(1)

(1)

(1)

(4)

(4)

(3)

(11) (1)

(4)

(11)

(4)

(4) (3)

(6)

(1)

(2)

(2)

(5) (35) (4)

(9)

(2)

(2)

(5)

(12)

 (2)

VI - (9)

HI (5)

AK

(9)

(48)

( ) Number of potential burial sites.

Note: According to Army officials, the potential burial sites in Kansas, New York, Virginia, and

Washington do not require additional remediation activities. The remaining 29 states contain one

or more potential burial sites that require further analyses and appropriate actions.

The Army is studying (1) several different on-site disposal technologies,

(2) the plausibility of leaving the materiel in the ground while controlling

access to the site and containing potential contamination, and

(3) transportation of the materiel to an Army facility capable of storage

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
B-253645 

and destruction. Prior to excavation, the Army will conduct soil samples

and metal detection surveys as well as install monitoring wells to estimate

the nature and extent of contamination and develop remedial alternatives.

The Army could excavate by hand, which has been frequently used in the

past. It is also studying the use of robotics in excavating buried materiel,

although acceptable technology is not readily available. According to

Army officials, mechanical means are more likely to cause a chemical

release or detonation. The actual excavation method for recovering buried

chemical warfare materiel cannot be selected until the Army completes

further technical and environmental studies and the public has been

involved in the Army’s selection.

The Army estimates that it will cost $12.04 billion, plus $4.56 billion in

programmatic costs, and take 40 years to recover and dispose of the

buried chemical materiel. It included the estimated costs (1) of fixed

incinerators for three of the four large burial sites, (2) for capping the

remaining large site, and (3) of transportable incineration and

neutralization systems for small sites. The transportable incineration and

neutralization systems, when developed, will comply with safety and

environmental requirements and be capable of moving or being moved

from one disposal site to another. The Army expects the systems will use a

batch-style process to treat relatively small quantities of chemical warfare

materiel.

Appendix V contains our case study of the Army’s investigation and

disposal activities at the Spring Valley chemical burial site in Washington,

D.C. Remediation of the Spring Valley site took 2 years and cost

$20.22 million. The recovered chemical warfare materiel has not yet been

destroyed.

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Lessons From the

Stockpile Disposal

Program Should Be

Applied to the

Nonstockpile

Planning Process and

Cost and Schedule

Estimates

Because both chemical disposal programs involve similar environmental

requirements and potentially similar disposal methods, many of the

lessons learned from the stockpile disposal program may apply to the

nonstockpile program. In the 1990s, we reported that the Army did not

adequately anticipate and plan for (1) the time needed to obtain the

necessary environmental approvals and permits for the stockpile disposal

program and (2) the strong public opposition to the chemical weapons

incineration process.6

 Further, we reported that the stockpile program had

been delayed by design, equipment, and construction problems at the new

disposal facility at Johnston Atoll. As a result of these factors, the

estimated cost of the stockpile disposal program increased and the Army’s

destruction schedule slipped.

According to Army officials, they have applied some lessons learned, such

as the Army’s experience with environmental compliance procedures and

research of alternative disposal methods from the stockpile program, to

the nonstockpile disposal program. However, lessons learned were not

discussed in the Army’s 1993 survey and analysis report on the

nonstockpile program. In addition, because the Army based its disposal

program and estimates on numerous assumptions as well as generic cost

categories and work statements, we could not determine the effects of the

lessons on the Army’s nonstockpile planning process and estimates.

Obtaining Environmental

Approvals and Permits

May Take Longer Than

Anticipated

Prior to recovering, storing, moving, or destroying nonstockpile chemical

warfare materiel, the Army must comply with federal and state

environmental laws and regulations. These laws and regulations differ

from state to state and change frequently. In its 1993 report, the Army

reported that changes to environmental regulations could significantly

affect its estimated disposal cost and schedule for the nonstockpile

disposal program. Even when state regulatory agencies grant the Army

permission to recover, move, or dispose of nonstockpile materiel, the

Army is not insulated from legal actions by concerned citizens and groups.

Previously, we reported that because of the Army’s difficulty in

anticipating the time needed to comply with environmental requirements

and to obtain environmental approvals and permits, the chemical stockpile

disposal program cost more and took longer than planned.

6

Chemical Weapons: Obstacles to the Army’s Plan to Destroy Obsolete U.S. Stockpile

(GAO/NSIAD-90-155, May 24, 1990); Chemical Weapons: Stockpile Destruction Cost Growth and

Schedule Slippages Are Likely to Continue (GAO/NSIAD-92-18, Nov. 20, 1991); Chemical Weapons

Destruction: Issues Affecting Program Cost, Schedule, and Performance (GAO/NSIAD-93-50, Jan. 21,

1993); and Chemical Weapons Destruction: Advantages and Disadvantages of Alternatives to

Incineration (GAO/NSIAD-94-123, Mar. 18, 1994).

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
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Army facilities must have environmental permits for the storage and

disposal of the nonstockpile chemical materiel, and the methods for

transporting and disposing of the materiel must adhere to appropriate

environmental regulations and be based on comprehensive studies. In

general, state governments are authorized, under federal environmental

statutes, to adopt federal concepts and to promulgate and implement

additional rules and regulations, which in some instances, are more

stringent than federal standards. For example:

• The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, as amended, is likely to

apply to most aspects, including transportation and storage, of the

nonstockpile disposal program. Under the act, the Environmental

Protection Agency may authorize individual states to administer and

enforce hazardous waste programs in lieu of the federal program. The act

also allows states to establish requirements more stringent than federal

standards. For example, the states of Kentucky and Indiana enacted

legislation that require the Army to demonstrate the absence of any acute

or chronic health or environmental effects from incineration of chemical

weapons before an environmental permit will be granted. There are

miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel, former chemical weapon

production facilities, and five potential burial sites located in these states.

• The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

Liability Act provides overall cleanup procedures for nonstockpile sites

and incorporates the standards of other federal and state statutes if they

are applicable or relevant and appropriate to the cleanup process. A

specific sequence of activities, guaranteeing the participation of federal

and state agencies and the public in key decisions, must be followed

before cleanup of a nonstockpile site proceeds.

• The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act governs the transportation of

most nonstockpile chemical materiel and limits the movement of the

materiel without special permits, licenses, and authorizations. The act

delegates regulatory and enforcement responsibilities to the states but

limits some state regulations. Nevertheless, states may still implement

routing restrictions, transportation curfews, notification deadlines, and

public right-to-know requirements. The Army anticipates that each state

the materiel originates in, passes through, or terminates in will have some

jurisdiction over part of the transportation program.

The nonstockpile disposal program has not reached the stage where

appropriate laws, regulations, and concerns can be specifically identified

for each location with nonstockpile chemical materiel. The applicability of

laws and regulations to the recovery, transportation, storage, and disposal

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
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of nonstockpile materiel ultimately depends on the circumstances of the

materiel. The participation of the states, local governments, and the public

also affects the Army’s decisions concerning the transportation and

disposal of the nonstockpile materiel. With respect to the nonstockpile

program, the Army’s planning process must cover at least 185 potential

burial sites with various environmental conditions and considerations, 

29 different states with state-oriented environmental laws and regulations,

numerous local governments, and the general public.

Strong Public Opposition

to Incineration

As demonstrated in the stockpile disposal program, there is considerable

public opposition to the incineration of chemical munitions or agents.

However, the Army based its 1993 preliminary cost and schedule estimates

on the use of incinerators to destroy potentially large portions of its

nonstockpile chemical materiel. The opposition centers around concerns

about adverse health effects and environmental hazards. This opposition,

which has come from several citizen groups, environmental organizations,

and state governments, has extended the environmental review and

approval process and resulted in postponing the construction and

operation of fixed incinerators. The actual disposal methods for the

nonstockpile program will be selected by the Army after comprehensive

environmental reviews are completed with the participation of the

affected states, local governments, and public.

In our 1994 report on the stockpile disposal program, we concluded that

alternative technologies were unlikely to reach maturity in time to destroy

the chemical weapons stockpile because they are in the initial

development stages and over a decade away from full operations.

Similarly, it is unlikely that these alternative technologies, if ever

operational, will be available within the Chemical Weapons Convention’s

established time frames for the nonstockpile disposal program. According

to Army officials, they believe that the neutralization process will be

operational in the 1996-97 time frame. The Environmental Protection

Agency has stated that any proposed chemical disposal technology would

have to undergo the same type of rigorous analysis and evaluation that the

incineration process has gone through—a process that has required at

least 9 years.

Potential Technical and

Mechanical Problems

The nonstockpile disposal program is vulnerable to change because it

depends on disposal methods and destruction rates that have not been

demonstrated. In our 1991 report on the stockpile program’s cost growth

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
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and schedule slippages, we concluded that the Army had limited

experience with destroying stockpile chemical weapons and was

unfamiliar with types of technical and mechanical problems to expect. As

a result of these problems, the Army has not achieved its expected

disposal rates for the stockpile program. Similarly, no nonstockpile

chemical disposal project has been completed. Therefore, little procedure,

cost, schedule, or engineering data are available, and the Army’s proposed

disposal methods and estimated destruction rates have not yet been

demonstrated. In its 1993 report, the Army concluded that the technical

risk for the nonstockpile disposal program was high because none of the

disposal projects were completed. The Army also concluded that if

effective processes or procedures were not discovered, it would have to

fund “a major research and development program.”

The Army has reported that unforeseen events, such as an accidental

chemical release or explosion, would increase the cost and duration of the

nonstockpile disposal program. For example, the Army’s stockpile

disposal facility at Johnston Atoll was shut down on March 23, 1994, and

restarted again on July 12, 1994, because of a chemical agent release.

According to Army officials, the release was small—approximately 

11 milligrams. In addition, because of a hurricane and subsequent damage,

the Johnston stockpile disposal facility was shut down on August 25, 1994,

for more than 2 months.

Recommendations to

the Secretary of the

Army

We recommend that the Secretary of the Army

• ensure that lessons learned from the stockpile disposal program are

systematically incorporated into the nonstockpile planning process and

• establish milestones for developing accurate and complete cost data to

effectively plan for and control future program expenditures.

We conducted our review from June 1993 to November 1994 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Unless you publicly announce this report’s contents earlier, we plan no

further distribution until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we will

send copies to the Chairmen, House and Senate Committees on Armed

Services and on Appropriations; the Secretaries of Defense and the Army;

the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and other interested

parties. We will make copies available to others upon request.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
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Please contact me at (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any questions.

Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.

Sincerely yours,

Donna M. Heivilin

Director, Defense Management

 and NASA Issues

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Scope and

Methodology

18

Appendix II 

Description of the

Army’s Nonstockpile

Chemical Warfare

Materiel

19

Appendix III 

Roles and

Responsibilities for

the Nonstockpile

Chemical Warfare

Disposal Program

21

Appendix IV 

Disposal Methods

Used by the Army to

Develop the 1993

Program Cost and

Schedule Estimates

24

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
Contents

Appendix V 

Case Study:

Investigation and

Disposal Activities at

the Spring Valley Site

in Washington, D.C.

25

Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to

This Report

32

Tables Table 1: Summary of the Army’s Level of Knowledge and Stage of

Planning, Including Disposal Cost and Schedule Estimates

5

Table V.1: Disposition of Materiel Removed From the Spring

Valley Site During Phase I

27

Table V.2: The Army Corps of Engineers Costs of Operation Safe

Removal

30

Figure Figure 1: Potential Chemical Warfare Materiel Burial Sites 9

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
Appendix I 

Scope and Methodology

In reviewing the Army’s nonstockpile chemical disposal program, we

interviewed and obtained data from officials of the Department of Defense

(DOD), the Department of the Army, the Army Chemical Demilitarization

and Remediation Activity, the Army Chemical and Biological Defense

Agency, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. We also met with U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency officials to discuss and collect data on

environmental and legal issues related to the nonstockpile disposal

program. We did not include overseas abandoned chemical warfare

materiel in our review.

To identify lessons learned from the Army’s stockpile disposal program,

we reviewed our previous reports and testimonies and their supporting

documentation. To assess the estimated disposal cost and schedule, we

analyzed pertinent documentation and discussed the estimation

methodology and problems that could affect the cost and duration of the

program with Army and contractor officials. To assess the extent and

nature of the nonstockpile disposal program, we visited Aberdeen Proving

Ground, Maryland; Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado; the former Raritan

Arsenal, New Jersey; and the Spring Valley site, Washington, D.C.

As requested, we did not obtain official agency comments, but we

discussed our findings with officials from DOD and the Army and

incorporated their views where appropriate.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
Appendix II 

Description of the Army’s Nonstockpile

Chemical Warfare Materiel

Binary chemical weapons: Chemical weapons formed from two nonlethal

elements (called precursors) through a chemical reaction after the

munitions are fired or launched. Binary weapons were manufactured,

stored, and transported with only one of the chemical elements in the

weapon. The second element was to be loaded into the weapon at the

battlefield. As of November 1993, the precursors for the binary chemical

weapons are stored at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; Pine Bluff

Arsenal, Arkansas; Tooele Army Depot, Utah; and Umatilla Depot Activity,

Oregon.

Miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel: Materiel designed for use in the

employment of chemical weapons, including unfilled munitions and

components and support equipment and devices. According to Army

records, miscellaneous materiel are stored at the Aberdeen Proving

Ground, Maryland; Anniston Army Depot, Alabama; Blue Grass Army

Depot, Kentucky; Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; Johnston Atoll, Pacific

Ocean; Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Indiana; Pine Bluff Arsenal,

Arkansas; Pueblo Depot Activity, Colorado; Tooele Army Depot, Utah; and

Umatilla Army Depot Activity, Oregon.

Recovered chemical weapons: Chemical weapons recovered from

range-clearing operations, chemical burial sites, and research and

development test areas. According to the Army’s 1993 report, recovered

items are stored at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; Anniston Army

Depot, Alabama; Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; Johnston Atoll, Pacific

Ocean; Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas; and Tooele Army Depot, Utah.

Former chemical weapon production facilities: Government-owned or

-contracted facilities used to (1) produce chemical agents, precursors for

chemical agents, or other components for chemical weapons or (2) load or

fill chemical weapons. These facilities are located at Aberdeen Proving

Ground, Maryland; Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Indiana; Pine Bluff

Arsenal, Arkansas; and Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado.

Buried chemical warfare materiel: Chemical warfare materiel, which are

buried on both private lands and military installations, consisting of

various munitions, bombs, rockets, and containers that may have been

contaminated with nerve, blister, blood, or choking agents. At some sites,

chemical munitions and agents were drained into holes in the ground,

covered with lime or burned in an open pit, and finally covered with earth.

Based on preliminary analyses, the Army has identified potential chemical

warfare materiel at 215 burial sites in 33 states, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
Appendix II 

Description of the Army’s Nonstockpile

Chemical Warfare Materiel

Washington, D.C. The Army has determined that 30 of the 215 potential

burial sites warrant no further remediation activity. This determination is

based on the Army’s assessment of the potential burial site, prior remedial

work, or accessibility to the site.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
Appendix III 

Roles and Responsibilities for the

Nonstockpile Chemical Warfare Disposal

Program

The U.S. Army Chemical Demilitarization and Remediation Activity is

responsible for implementing the destruction of all U.S. chemical

warfare-related materiel, including the chemical weapons stockpile and

nonstockpile chemical materiel, and for ensuring maximum protection to

the environment, general public, and personnel involved in the

destruction. The activity’s office of Program Manager for Nonstockpile

Chemical Materiel is responsible for

• collecting and analyzing data on nonstockpile chemical materiel;

• identifying and assessing sites with possible buried chemical warfare

materiel;

• coordinating the transportation of recovered chemical weapons to

locations for interim storage;

• destroying recovered chemical warfare materiel on-site as needed to

protect the general public and environment;

• researching, developing, evaluating, and selecting disposal methods for all

nonstockpile chemical materiel;

• destroying binary chemical weapons, miscellaneous chemical warfare

materiel, recovered chemical weapons, and former production facilities in

accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, in compliance with

public safety and environmental requirements and regulations, and in

coordination with the potentially affected public; and

• reclaiming and destroying buried chemical warfare materiel in the interest

of safeguarding the general public and environment.

Although the Army Chemical Demilitarization and Remediation Activity

has overall responsibility for disposing of nonstockpile chemical materiel,

other organizations within or outside DOD contribute to the disposal

program. The involvement of the following organizations depends on the

location and particulars of the materiel, storage area, or burial site:

• The Army Corps of Engineers provides technical support for site

investigations, recoveries, and site restorations to Army and DOD

organizations and is responsible for cleaning up formerly used defense

sites. Restoration activities concerning the handling and disposal of

nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel are coordinated with and

authorized by the Army Chemical Demilitarization and Remediation

Activity.

• The Technical Escort Unit, the Army Chemical and Biological Defense

Agency, is responsible for the escort of nonstockpile chemical materiel,

emergency destruction of chemical munitions, and emergency response to

chemical agent incidents.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
Appendix III 

Roles and Responsibilities for the

Nonstockpile Chemical Warfare Disposal

Program

• The Army Environmental Center develops and oversees environmental

policies and programs for the Army.

• The Army Surgeon General’s office provides advice to Army commands on

health and safety issues related to handling, transporting, and processing

chemical agents and materiel.

• The Air Force Civil Engineer provides program management and technical

support to Air Force commands and installations on environmental

compliance and restoration programs.

• The Environmental Protection, Safety & Occupational Health Division,

Office of Naval Operations, provides environmental policy and

management support to Navy activities on environmental or safety-related

programs.

• The Office of Installation Services and Environmental Protection, Defense

Logistics Agency, provides environmental policy and management support

to the agency’s field commands and installations.

• The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency enforces federal laws

protecting the environment and ensures that regulations mandated by

federal statutes are followed.

• The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reviews and provides

recommendations on the Army’s plans to transport or destroy chemical

warfare materiel in order to help ensure public health and safety.

• The Occupational Safety and Health Administration oversees and regulates

safety and health conditions at the workplace.

• The U.S. Department of Transportation enforces regulations governing the

transportation of hazardous or nonhazardous materiel.

State governments and communities affected by the nonstockpile disposal

program provide information for and have input into the Army’s

decision-making process. They also review and comment on the Army’s

planning and decision documents; grant necessary permits; and monitor

and enforce their state, regional, and local statutes.

The responsibilities for remedial activities differ between burial sites

located on active defense installations and formerly used defense sites. At

active installations, the installation commander has overall responsibility

for remedial activities at the potential burial sites. The Army Corps of

Engineers and the Army Environmental Center support the installation

commander in site investigation, excavation, and environmental cleanup.

At formerly used defense sites, the Corps of Engineers has overall

responsibility for site investigations, planning, excavations, and

environmental cleanups of the potential burial sites. In both instances, the

Army Chemical Demilitarization and Remediation Activity is responsible

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
Appendix III 

Roles and Responsibilities for the

Nonstockpile Chemical Warfare Disposal

Program

for the transportation, interim storage, and destruction of recovered

chemical warfare materiel. The activity is also responsible for the

development of the equipment and technologies to safely dispose of the

materiel.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
Appendix IV 

Disposal Methods Used by the Army to

Develop the 1993 Program Cost and

Schedule Estimates

Category Disposal method

Binary chemical weapons

Liquid precursors Off-site incineration

Sulfur Landfill

Metal bodies and other

uncontaminated materiel

Crushing and smelting

Miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel

Energetic materiel, such as fuses,

bursters, and propellants

Incineration

Uncontaminated metal parts and

materiel

Crushing and smelting

Recovered chemical weapons Neutralizationa

Former chemical weapon production facilities

Contaminated materiel Incineration

Uncontaminated equipment and

facilities

Demolition

Buried chemical warfare materiel

Large quantity, explosive sites Large fixed incineration

Small quantity, explosive sitesb Portable incineration

Small quantity, nonexplosive sitesb Portable neutralizationa

Chemical agent identification sets Portable neutralizationa

aThe neutralization process may be followed by incineration of the remaining materiel.

bSmall sites are less than 10 acres, and the total excavation volume is less than 1,000 cubic

yards.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
Appendix V 

Case Study: Investigation and Disposal

Activities at the Spring Valley Site in

Washington, D.C.

In January 1993, a construction crew unearthed World War I-era chemical

and high-explosive munitions during routine residential construction

activities in an area known as Spring Valley in Washington, D.C., setting in

motion emergency recovery and removal operations, called phase I of

Operation Safe Removal. Over 140 items, including mortars, projectiles,

and debris, were recovered and removed from the area by the Army’s

Chemical and Biological Defense Agency during this phase. Some of the

recovered items were subsequently analyzed and determined to contain

chemical agents. The Army Corps of Engineers is currently proceeding

with phase II of Operation Safe Removal, which is the comprehensive

investigation and cleanup of the Spring Valley site under the Defense

Environmental Restoration Program.

History of the Spring

Valley Site

In 1917, the Chemical Warfare Service of the U.S. Bureau of Mines leased

92 acres from American University to establish the American University

Experiment Station. The station was used by the Chemical Warfare

Service, with personnel from the Army and the Navy, to research and

conduct testing of chemical warfare items. Subsequently, additional land

was leased northwest of American University to field test the chemicals

and munitions developed at the station. In 1918, the Chemical Warfare

Service was transferred from the Bureau of Mines to the War Department,

and the station was renamed Camp American University Experiment

Station, encompassing a total of 425 acres. During this period, the War

Department also leased 84 acres northeast of American University to

establish Camp Leach. This camp had mainly tents and barracks, along

with staging and training areas for troops. According to the Army, no

chemical testing was conducted at Camp Leach.

From mid-1917 through 1918, 100,000 troops were trained in trench

warfare and the handling of chemical munitions at Camps American

University and Leach. In addition, mortars and projectiles were test-fired

and chemical munitions were tested in various areas of the camps. The

American University Experiment Station was also used to

• prepare and test chemical warfare agents and munitions for possible use

in gas warfare;

• develop procedures and methods to produce chemical warfare agents and

munitions; and

• develop gas masks, protective clothing, canisters, incendiaries, smokes,

and signals.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
Appendix V 

Case Study: Investigation and Disposal

Activities at the Spring Valley Site in

Washington, D.C.

In December 1918, the War Department discontinued using Camps

American University and Leach and burned all temporary buildings that

had become unusable. In 1920, the department vacated the remaining

buildings. The trenches and pits were filled in and the land returned to the

original owners. Between 1942 and 1946, the Department of the Navy

leased 5 acres and 15 buildings from American University to establish the

Navy Bomb Disposal School. The Navy used the property and buildings for

educational purposes.

Description of the

Spring Valley Site

The Spring Valley site is a residential community located in northwest

Washington, D.C., near the American University, schools, churches, a

community park, hospital, a theological seminary, a new housing

development project, and approximately 1,200 residences. The community

is comprised of upper middle and upper income families, and the houses

are valued from $600,000 to $1 million. The area immediately surrounding

the initial discovery site consists of recently constructed or

under-construction homes. Since the initial discovery of the munitions, the

area of concern expanded to approximately 616 acres based on archival

records.

Two Phases of

Operation Safe

Removal

Operation Safe Removal is conducted under the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act procedures and

provisions in two operational phases. The Chemical and Biological

Defense Agency was responsible for phase I, or the emergency recovery

and removal operational phase. Phase I was completed on February 2,

1993. The Army Corps of Engineers is proceeding with phase II, or the

long-term investigation and cleanup operational phase of the site with the

fieldwork scheduled to be completed in January 1995.

Phase I Is Completed On January 5, 1993, a construction crew unearthed a World War I-era

chemical and high-explosive munitions disposal pit while installing a

sewer line in the Spring Valley area. This discovery set in motion phase I of

Operation Safe Removal.

Shortly after the discovery, the Army’s emergency response force

confirmed that several of the unearthed munitions were filled with

chemical warfare materiel. Personnel in protective clothing recovered the

visible munitions, sifted through the dirt piles, and segregated the liquidPage 26 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
Appendix V 

Case Study: Investigation and Disposal

Activities at the Spring Valley Site in

Washington, D.C.

and solid-filled munitions. During this period, residents of the Spring

Valley area were evacuated. On the third day of the initial discovery, the

Army activated a service response force to complete the removal

operation. The service response force consisted of specialists to

coordinate the on-site safety, security, and medical support; historical

research; public affairs; hazard analysis; legal advice; environmental

issues; and transportation of the recovered munitions. Within a few days,

specialists from the Army Corps of Engineers, Army Chemical

Demilitarization and Remediation Activity, Environmental Protection

Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Centers for Disease

Control, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, American

National Red Cross, local police and fire departments, and others were

on-site.

Numerous miscellaneous items, tons of scrap, and over 140 munitions

were removed from the Spring Valley site during phase I. Most liquid-filled

munitions were flown off-site by helicopter to Andrews Air Force Base,

Maryland, and then air-shipped to Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas, for

storage. The solid-filled munitions were flown to Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia,

for explosive destruction. The miscellaneous items were moved off-site for

testing, and the scrap materiel were sent to a landfill in New York. Both

on-site and off-site analyses confirmed that some of the recovered

munitions contained or at one time contained chemical or toxic smoke

agents. Table V.1 shows the disposition of the recovered materiel.

Table V.1: Disposition of Materiel

Removed From the Spring Valley Site

During Phase I Recovered materiel

Amount

removed Destination Purpose

Suspected chemical

rounds

35 rounds Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas Storage

9 rounds Aberdeen Proving Ground,

Maryland

Testing

Conventional

explosive rounds

and components

97 items Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia Detonation

Miscellaneous items Several items Aberdeen Proving Ground,

Maryland

Testing

Scrap materiel Several tons Landfill site in New York Disposal

Phase II Fieldwork Is

Scheduled to Be

Completed in January 1995

The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for the overall project

management, investigation, design, and construction activities during

phase II of Operation Safe Removal. Its mission is to investigate and verify

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
Appendix V 

Case Study: Investigation and Disposal

Activities at the Spring Valley Site in

Washington, D.C.

that no additional World War I-era munitions remain in the Spring Valley

area and, if necessary, to excavate, remove, and destroy any munitions

discovered.

Site Investigation The decision to continue the investigation of the Spring Valley site was

based on research of archival data, topographic maps, aerial photographs,

and anecdotal information, which indicated that more areas of interest

existed. The Army also conducted geophysical investigations, including

ground conductivity surveys, magnetometer sweeps, and soil and water

sampling at the Spring Valley site. A computer system merged these data

and maps and allowed the Corps of Engineers to create visual composite

maps that summarized the investigations. Based on the results of the

process, the Corps located suspected anomalies that required excavation

to verify the presence or absence of munitions.

Excavation The excavation process, which was approved in a safety plan, began with

a Corps contractor mechanically digging to within 12 inches of the

suspected anomaly, and then the process was turned over to the Army

Technical Escort Unit for final excavation, exposure, identification, and

removal. The excavation recovered several munitions and potential

chemical warfare materiel. A brief description of some of the recovered

materiel follows:

• A corroded piece of pipe, similar to shipping containers for liquid and

gases during World War I, was recovered and moved to Pine Bluff Arsenal,

Arkansas, for storage in June 1993.

• A 75-mm projectile, identified as a suspected chemical weapon, was

recovered and flown to Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas, for storage in

October 1993.

• Shrapnel from several expended 75-mm projectiles were recovered and

disposed of as scrap.

• A Livens smoke projectile was recovered and destroyed by incineration as

waste munition in April 1994.

• Three glass vials, containing a clear liquid, were recovered and moved to

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, for testing in November 1994.

Also, various nonmilitary metallic materiel encompassing ferrous rocks, a

bundle of 14-gauge wire, a 28- by 10-foot steel plate, and construction

debris were recovered and moved to other locations.

Interim Holding Area As part of the Spring Valley Safety and Work Plans, an interim holding area

and helicopter pad were constructed at a cost of $284,000. They were

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
Appendix V 

Case Study: Investigation and Disposal

Activities at the Spring Valley Site in

Washington, D.C.

designed to provide immediate, although temporary safe storage, for any

recovered munitions prior to being moved by Army helicopter out of the

Spring Valley area. The holding area and pad contain a fire suppression

system, air filtration system, lightning arrester system, and beacon lights.

They are located on federal property and are government controlled for

security reasons.

The interim holding area contains three storage magazines, one for

high-explosive munitions and two for chemical munitions. The two

chemical magazines are modified to include fire suppression and air

filtration systems. The magazines are enclosed by a timber structure and

earth embankment that provides a minimum of 3 feet of soil encompassing

the magazines. No munition will remain in the interim holding area for

longer than 10 consecutive days. The Corps of Engineers intends to

demolish the holding area and helicopter pad once excavations at Spring

Valley are completed.

Transportation Recovered chemical weapons were moved by helicopter from the interim

holding area to Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, and then flown to Pine

Bluff Army Arsenal, Arkansas, for storage and future destruction.

Recovered high-explosive, conventional munitions were moved by

helicopter from the area and transported to Letterkenny Army Depot,

Pennsylvania. No shipment of other hazardous waste will be moved into or

out of the interim holding area.

Investigation and

Cleanup Costs of

Operation Safe

Removal

As of November 29, 1994, the Army Corps of Engineers estimated that the

investigation and cleanup of the Spring Valley site would cost

$20.22 million. (See table V.2.) The estimate includes the costs of

completing phase I operations, researching and investigating the site,

constructing and operating the interim holding area, removing and

sampling the recovered munitions and materiel, fulfilling safety and

environmental requirements, and performing management activities.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
Appendix V 

Case Study: Investigation and Disposal

Activities at the Spring Valley Site in

Washington, D.C.

Table V.2: The Army Corps of

Engineers Costs of Operation Safe

Removal Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Cost element 1993 Actual 1994 Actual

1995

Estimated Total

Phase I reimbursement $4.06 $0.20 $4.26

Baltimore District 2.31 1.94 $0.50 4.75

Huntsville Division 5.56 5.15 0.50 11.21

Total $11.93 $7.29 $1.00 $20.22

The Army Corps of Engineers costs include support costs for the Army

Technical Escort Unit; the Army Chemical and Biological Defense Agency;

Washington, D.C., government; resident office facilities; community

evacuation; and others.

Community Issues

and Concerns

According to the Army Corps of Engineers, the primary issues and

concerns of the residents in Spring Valley are related to

• their personal safety,

• the effects of the presence of chemical munitions on the value of their

property,

• the length of time their lives will be disrupted by the ongoing investigation

and cleanup of the site,

• when the Spring Valley site will be certified safe and clear of dangerous

munitions after Operation Safe Removal is completed, and

• the question of whether the Army is telling all that is known about or going

on at the site.

To address these issues and concerns, the Corps of Engineers developed a

public involvement and response plan to promote efficient and effective

communication among the Corps; various federal, city, and local agencies

and officials; property owners; the housing development corporation;

general public; and news media. The primary objectives of the plan are to

(1) provide for clear and open exchange of information regarding current

and planned investigation and cleanup activities, (2) address local

community issues and concerns, (3) provide government agencies and the

public the opportunity to participate in the Corps of Engineers’ planning

and decision-making process, and (4) provide government agencies and

the public with a centralized point of contact. According to the Corps of

Engineers, the plan is flexible and can be modified as events, community

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
Appendix V 

Case Study: Investigation and Disposal

Activities at the Spring Valley Site in

Washington, D.C.

issues and concerns, and situations change. We did not evaluate the

effectiveness of the Army’s public involvement and response plan.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

David R. Warren, Associate Director

Thomas J. Howard, Assistant Director

Glenn D. Furbish, Senior Evaluator

Mark A. Little, Evaluator-in-Charge

Pauline F. Nowak, Evaluator

(709005) Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-95-55 Army’s Nonstockpile Chemical Weapons
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