IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-10723

TIMOTHY WHITE

 Plaintiff

 v.

REGIONAL ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INCORPORATED, doing business as 

RAB, Inc.

 Defendant – Appellee

 v.

MARSHALL MEYERS,

 Respondent – Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:11-CV-1817

Before REAVLEY, ELROD, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The underlying dispute in this case concerned claims under consumer

protection statutes by Dr. Timothy White, represented by Noah Radbil of the 

law firm Weisberg & Meyers, against Regional Adjustment Bureau, Inc. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 29, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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(“RAB”). The merits of that case were not appealed, but the case did spawn 

attorney sanctions that were appealed and ultimately split into two appellate 

cases. We recently resolved the appeal concerning Radbil by modifying the 

sanctions to a one-year suspension from practice in the Northern District of 

Texas (the “Northern District”) and affirming liability for attorneys’ fees.

White v. Reg’l Adjustment Bureau, Inc. (Radbil), No. 15-10655, 2015 WL 

7740524, at *1–2 (5th Cir. Dec. 1, 2015).

This appeal addresses sanctions issued against the managing partner of 

Radbil’s firm, Marshall Meyers. Following five hearings and full briefing, the 

district court entered an eighty-three-page order that, in addition to 

sanctioning Radbil by awarding reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees for 

time spent by RAB’s counsel addressing Radbil’s conduct and suspending 

Radbil from practice before the Northern District for three years, also assessed 

the same punishment against Meyers. Meyers did not personally appear at 

the underlying trial that gave rise to Radbil, but did personally appear at the 

sanctions hearings thereafter. As to Meyers, we VACATE the term of 

suspension, and MODIFY the award of attorneys’ fees.

The lengthy briefing and oral argument, as well as the previous 

discussion in Radbil, obviate the need for a protracted discussion here. We are 

certainly hopeful that the kind of interchange we witnessed here will not be 

repeated such that this opinion is written primarily for the parties. We adopt 

the reasoning of Radbil with respect to the standard of review and the issue of 

defense counsel’s involvement in advocating for sanctions beyond attorneys’ 

fees. We write only to summarize our disposition of Meyers’s other challenges 

as follows:

1. Meyers’s Role. At first blush, Meyers’s implicit argument that he is 

being punished for “guilt by association” seems appealing. But 

digging deeper, we conclude that Meyers’s role in the sanctions 

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hearings was not that of the disinterested attorney hired only as an 

advocate for an unrelated client. RAB sought sanctions against 

Meyers’s firm and Radbil. When Meyers appeared at the sanctions 

hearing, he stated that he was there “representing [Weisberg & 

Meyers], and to the extent the [c]ourt allows, Mr. Radbil as well.” 

Thus, any misrepresentations he made to the court cannot be excused 

as mere unwitting misstatements as part of advocacy for a client. 

2. Suspension. We previously modified the sanction against Radbil to 

one year (from three years). Meyers contends that he was not 

adequately notified of the potential for disbarment-like sanctions in 

this case. We need not decide this issue because we conclude that the 

conduct Meyers committed, while improper, is not as egregious as 

that of Radbil such that the sanction of suspension cannot stand. We 

VACATE that sanction.

3. Bad Faith Finding. The district court determined that Meyers 

himself made and perpetuated some of the same misrepresentations 

put forth by Radbil. At least to the extent of the sanctions affirmed 

herein, we conclude that the finding of bad faith was adequately 

explained and not clearly erroneous. See Crowe v. Smith, 261 F.3d 

558, 563 (5th Cir. 2001) (“A court [imposing inherent power sanctions] 

abuses its discretion when its finding of bad faith is based on an 

erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the 

evidence.”).1

 

1 Because only the attorneys’ fee sanctions remain at issue, we need not determine 

whether the bad faith finding is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Cf. Crowe, 261

F.3d at 563 (“In attorney suspension and disbarment cases, the finding of bad faith must be 

supported by clear and convincing proof.”).

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4. Attorneys’ Fees. We conclude that the evidence before the district 

court does not support that Meyers did anything to cause the original 

problems during the underlying trial that gave rise to the subsequent 

sanctions hearings. However, the district court determined that 

Meyers’s conduct after the first sanctions hearing included 

misrepresentations to the court that fomented the dispute and 

prolonged the proceedings, and that determination was not clearly 

erroneous. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in 

assessing joint liability for the trial attorneys’ fees but did not err in 

assessing joint liability for the attorneys’ fees from the second 

sanctions hearing to conclusion, to the extent that those fees were 

attributable to Meyers’s misconduct. The district court has not yet 

assessed an amount of those fees, and we leave to the district court in 

the first instance the question of how much of the fees related to the 

sanctions hearings, if any, should be properly assessed against 

Meyers. We note that “[t]he district court must demonstrate some 

connection between the amount of monetary sanctions it imposes and 

the sanctionable conduct by the violating party” and should not 

attribute to Meyers self-imposed costs unreasonably incurred by RAB 

in investigating and arguing extraneous matters. Topalian v. 

Ehrman, 3 F.3d 931, 937 (5th Cir. 1993).2

Suspension VACATED; liability for attorneys’ fees MODIFIED.

 

2 We note also that RAB has not sought an award of attorneys’ fees against Meyers on 

statutory grounds; the sole basis for an award of fees against Meyers is the district court’s 

inherent authority.

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