DRUG CONTROL

DEA’s Strategies and

Operations in the

1990s

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

July 1999

GAO/GGD-99-108

United States General Accounting Office General Government Division

Washington, D.C. 20548

Page 1 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

B-279033

July 21, 1999

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

Chairman, Caucus on International

 Narcotics Control

United States Senate

The Honorable Bill McCollum

Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime

Committee on the Judiciary

House of Representatives

As you requested, this report discusses the strategies and operations of the Drug

Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the 1990s. Specifically, the report discusses (1) what

major enforcement strategies, programs, initiatives, and approaches DEA has implemented in

the 1990s to carry out its mission, including its efforts to (a) target and investigate national

and international drug traffickers and (b) help state and local law enforcement agencies

combat drug offenders and drug-related violence in their communities; (2) whether DEA’s

goals and objectives, programs and initiatives, and performance measures are consistent

with the National Drug Control Strategy; and (3) how DEA determined its fiscal year 1998

staffing needs and allocated the additional staff. It includes a recommendation to the

Attorney General regarding the development of measurable DEA performance targets for

disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations.

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Janet F. Reno, Attorney General; the

Honorable Donnie R. Marshall, Acting Administrator of the Drug Enforcement

Administration; the Honorable Barry R. McCaffrey, Director of the Office of National Drug

Control Policy; the Honorable Jacob J. Lew, Director of the Office of Management and

Budget; and the Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State. Copies will be made

available to others on request.
Page 2 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

B-279033

If you have any questions, please call me or Dan Harris at (202) 512-8777. Key contributors to

the report are acknowledged in appendix III.

Norman J. Rabkin

Director, Administration of

 Justice Issues
Page 3 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s
Executive Summary

Page 4 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

During the 1990s, the demand for and supply of illegal drugs have persisted

at very high levels and continued to adversely affect American society. The

Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), in its 1999 National Drug

Control Strategy, notes that illegal drugs cost our society about $110

billion annually. The costs of drug abuse include lost jobs and productivity,

health problems, and economic hardships to families. In addition, many

violent crimes are drug related, according to ONDCP.

Funding for federal drug control efforts has increased, in constant 1999

dollars, by about 49 percent in the 1990s to the fiscal year 1999 level of

about $18 billion. Funding for the Drug Enforcement Administration

(DEA) almost doubled, in constant 1999 dollars, from about $806 million in

fiscal year 1990 to about $1.5 billion in fiscal year 1999; the number of DEA

staff increased from about 6,000 in fiscal year 1990 to about 8,400 in fiscal

year 1998.

In view of the increased funding for federal drug control efforts and the

nation’s persistent drug problem, the Chairmen of the House Judiciary

Subcommittee on Crime and the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics

Control requested that GAO determine, among other things,

• what major enforcement strategies, programs, initiatives, and approaches

DEA has implemented in the 1990s to carry out its mission; and

• whether DEA’s strategic goals and objectives, programs and initiatives,

and performance measures are consistent with the National Drug Control

Strategy.

During the1990s, DEA has enhanced or changed important aspects of its

operations, i.e., its strategies, programs, initiatives, and approaches.

• DEA expanded its domestic enforcement operations to work more with

state and local law enforcement agencies and help combat drug-related

violent crime in local communities.

• DEA implemented an investigative approach, domestically and

internationally, focusing on intercepting the communications of major

drug trafficking organizations to target the leaders and dismantle their

operations.

• DEA started participating in two interagency programs to target and

investigate major drug trafficking organizations in Latin America and Asia.

• DEA changed its foreign operations by screening and training special

foreign police units to combat drug trafficking in certain key foreign

countries.

Purpose

Results in Brief
Executive Summary

Page 5 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

DEA has significant responsibilities for the drug supply reduction portion

of ONDCP’s National Drug Control Strategy. DEA’s strategic goals and

objectives, and its enhanced programs and initiatives, in the 1990s have

been consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy. However, DEA

has not developed measurable performance targets for its programs and

initiatives that are consistent with those adopted for the National Strategy.

As a result, it is difficult for DEA, the Department of Justice (DOJ),

Congress, and the public to assess how effective DEA has been in

achieving its strategic goals and the effect its programs and initiatives in

the 1990s have had on reducing the illegal drug supply. GAO is making a

recommendation to help improve this situation.

DEA’s overall mission is to enforce the nation’s drug laws and regulations

and to bring drug traffickers to justice. DEA is the lead agency responsible

for enforcing the federal drug control laws and for coordinating and

pursuing U.S. drug investigations in foreign countries. DEA’s primary

responsibilities include (1) investigating major drug traffickers operating

at interstate and international levels and criminals and drug gangs who

perpetrate violence in local communities; (2) managing a national drug

intelligence system; (3) seizing and forfeiting traffickers’ assets; (4)

coordinating and cooperating with federal, state, and local law

enforcement agencies on mutual drug enforcement efforts; and (5)

working on drug law enforcement programs with its counterparts in

foreign countries.

To carry out its responsibilities, in December 1998, along with its

headquarters offices, DEA had 21 field divisions throughout the United

States and its territories, each with numerous suboffices, and 79 offices in

56 foreign countries. At the end of fiscal year 1998, DEA had about 8,400

persons on board, including about 4,300 special agents.

Since it was established in 1973, DEA’s top priority has been to disrupt and

dismantle major drug trafficking organizations. During the 1990s, DEA

broadened the focus of its enforcement operations. DEA now focuses on

what it calls the “seamless continuum” of drug trafficking, with programs

and initiatives directed at major regional, national, and international

trafficking organizations; violent, street-level drug gangs and other local

community problems; and domestically cultivated and manufactured

illegal drugs.

Background

Principal Findings

DEA’s Enforcement

Operations Reach From the

International Level to the

Local Level
Executive Summary

Page 6 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

During the 1990s, DEA increased its emphasis on intercepting

communications between top-level drug traffickers and their subordinates

to identify and target the leaders and dismantle their operations. DEA also

started working with other federal agencies on two programs to target and

investigate major drug trafficking organizations in Latin America and Asia.

In 1996, to improve its effectiveness in several key foreign countries, DEA

began to screen and train special foreign police units. The intent of this

effort is to improve the capabilities of foreign police and to build

trustworthy and reliable foreign antidrug units with which DEA can work.

At the same time, DEA attempted to improve its effectiveness in the 1990s

by giving domestic drug trafficking a higher priority than in the past,

including focusing resources on regional and “local impact” drug

problems. In this regard, during the 1990s, DEA devoted more resources to

its State and Local Task Force Program. Also, in 1995, DEA established the

Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) Program to assist local police with

violent drug gangs and other local drug problems.

The principal objectives in the National Drug Control Strategy relating to

DEA are:

• combat drug-related violence, disrupt criminal organizations, and arrest

the leaders of illegal drug syndicates and

• disrupt and dismantle major international drug trafficking organizations

and arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate their leaders.

DEA’s strategic goals and objectives and its enhanced programs and

initiatives in the 1990s have been consistent with the National Strategy.

Both the National Strategy and DEA hope to reduce the illegal drug supply

and drug-related violence by disrupting and dismantling domestic and

international drug trafficking organizations.

For domestic drug trafficking organizations, the National Strategy calls for

increasing by 5 points the percentage of drug trafficking organizations

disrupted or dismantled by 2002 as measured against the percentage

recorded in the base year using a prioritized list of designated targets. It

calls for at least a 10 percentage point increase above the base year by

2007.

For international drug trafficking organizations, the National Strategy calls

for achieving by 2002 a 50 percent success rate in the number of

organizations disrupted or dismantled as measured against a designated

target list established in the base year. The Strategy also calls for

DEA Has Not Yet

Developed Performance

Targets Consistent With the

National Strategy
Executive Summary

Page 7 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

increasing the success rate to 100 percent by 2007 as measured against the

base year list. According to ONDCP and DEA, neither the domestic nor

international designated target lists referred to above have been

developed.

Unlike the National Strategy, DEA’s performance plans for fiscal years

1999 and 2000 do not contain performance targets for disrupting and

dismantling drug trafficking organizations. DEA has no annual, mid-, or

long-range measurable performance targets for disrupting and dismantling

drug trafficking organizations. In the absence of such targets, it is difficult

to quantitatively assess DEA’s overall effectiveness in achieving its

strategic goals.

GAO recommends that the Attorney General direct the DEA Administrator

to work closely with DOJ and ONDCP to develop measurable DEA

performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking

organizations consistent with the performance targets in the National Drug

Control Strategy.

DEA provided written comments on a draft of this report. These comments

are discussed at the end of chapters 2 and 3. DEA, along with ONDCP and

the Office of Management and Budget, also provided technical changes

and clarifications, which have been incorporated throughout this report

where appropriate.

DEA stated that, overall, the report provides a detailed and factual

background of DEA strategies and special operations. Although not

directly agreeing with GAO’s recommendation, DEA agreed with GAO’s

principal finding that DEA had not included measurable performance

targets for disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking organizations in its

fiscal years 1999 and 2000 performance plans. However, DEA disagreed

with GAO’s draft conclusion that little can be said about DEA’s

effectiveness in achieving its strategic goals in the absence of measurable

performance targets. DEA commented that this statement and supporting

information in chapter 3 implied that DEA had not attempted to develop

such targets.

DEA pointed out various actions it was taking relating to GAO’s

recommendation. DEA said that, among other things, it has developed

“preliminary performance targets,” which it included in its fiscal year 2001

budget submission to DOJ.

Recommendation

Agency Comments and

GAO’s Evaluation
Executive Summary

Page 8 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

DEA’s stated action is consistent with the intent of GAO’s

recommendation. However, because these targets are preliminary and

under review within the executive branch, they are subject to change until

February 2000 when DEA issues its annual budget submission and

performance plan, as part of DOJ’s submission, to Congress. Further, DEA

indicated that it cannot finalize its performance targets and measures until

a designated targeted list of drug trafficking organizations, as called for in

the National Strategy, is completed. Therefore, GAO is retaining its

recommendation until DEA’s preliminary performance targets are finalized

for inclusion in its annual performance plan and can be compared for

consistency with those in the National Strategy.
Page 9 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s
Page 10 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Contents

Executive Summary 4

16

Drug Use and Supply Trends in the 1990s 16

Federal Drug Control Budget in the 1990s 22

1999 National Drug Control Strategy 24

DEA’s Mission, Role, and Responsibilities 26

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 29

Chapter 1

Introduction

32

DEA Modified Its Operational Strategy in the 1990s 32

DEA More Involved With State and Local Police 34

DEA Developed an Investigative Approach Focusing on

the Communications of Major Drug Trafficking

Organizations

48

Key Changes in DEA’s Foreign Operations 54

Conclusions 59

Agency Comments 60

Chapter 2

DEA Expanded Its

Focus in the 1990s to

Target Local Drug

Dealers in Addition to

Major Drug Trafficking

Organizations

61

DEA’s Strategic Goals and Objectives, and Its Programs,

Are Consistent With the National Strategy

61

DEA Has Not Developed Performance Targets Consistent

With Those in the National Strategy

68

Conclusions 78

Recommendation 79

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 79

Chapter 3

DEA Has Not Yet

Developed

Performance Targets

Consistent With the

National Drug Control

Strategy

81

Federal Budget Formulation Guidance Provides Basis for

DEA Staffing Needs Determination Process

81

Fiscal Year 1998 Process for Determining DEA’s Staffing

Needs

82

Congress Added Staff for a New Caribbean Initiative and

Changed Staffing Recommended for Other DEA

Initiatives

95

Chapter 4

DEA's Staffing Needs

Determination and

Allocation Process for

Fiscal Year 1998

DEA’s Fiscal Year 1998 Allocation Process Considered a

Variety of Factors

96
Contents

Page 11 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Conclusions 97

Appendix I: Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field

Divisions and Foreign Offices

98

Appendix II: Comments From the Drug Enforcement

Administration

163

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 167

Appendixes

168

Performance Measurement Terms 168 Glossary

Table 2.1: Budget for and Number of DEA State and

Local Task Forces, Fiscal Years 1991 to 1999

35

Table 2.2: Number of Law Enforcement Officers on DEA

State and Local Task Forces, Fiscal Years 1991

Through 1998, as of the End of Each Fiscal Year

35

Table 2.3: Number of DEA State and Local Task Force

Case Initiations, Arrests, Convictions, and Seizures,

Fiscal Years 1991 to 1998

36

Table 2.4: Geographic Scope of State and Local Task

Force Cases Initiated During Fiscal Years 1997 and

1998

37

Table 2.5: Selected MET Program Data, Fiscal Years 1995

to 1999

39

Table 2.6: Selected Data on MET Deployments, Fiscal

Years 1995 Through 1998

41

Table 2.7: Geographic Scope of MET Program Cases

Initiated During Fiscal Years 1995 Through 1998

44

Table 2.8: Funding for DEA’s Domestic Cannabis

Eradication/Suppression Program, Fiscal Years 1990

Through 1999

46

Table 2.9: Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression

Program Statistical Results, 1990 Through 1998

47

Table 2.10: Number of Electronic Surveillance Orders and

Facilities Covered, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1998

51

Table 2.11: Number of Vetted Units and Officers on Board

by Country, as of September 30, 1998

57

Table 3.1: National Strategy Goals and Objectives for

Which DEA Has Responsibilities

63

Tables

Table 3.2: Comparison of DEA Strategic Goals With

National Strategy Goals

66
Contents

Page 12 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Table 3.3: Comparison of Selected DEA and National

Strategy Objectives

67

Table 3.4: National Drug Control Strategy Performance

Target and Performance Measure for Disrupting and

Dismantling Domestic Drug Trafficking Organizations

70

Table 3.5: National Strategy Performance Target and

Performance Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling

International Drug Trafficking Organizations and

Arresting Their Leaders

71

Table 3.6: National Drug Control Strategy Performance

Target and Performance Measure for Disrupting and

Dismantling Drug Trafficking Organizations in HIDTAs

71

Table 4.1: Comparison of DEA and DOJ Estimated

Additional DEA Total and Special Agent Positions for

Fiscal Year 1998

91

Table 4.2: Comparison of DOJ’s Estimates and the

President’s Request for Additional DEA Total and

Special Agent Positions for Fiscal Year 1998

94

Table 4.3: Comparison of the President’s Request and

Congress’ Appropriations Guidance for DEA Additional

Total and Special Agent Positions for Fiscal Year 1998

96

Table 4.4: Comparison of Congress’ Appropriations

Guidance and DEA’s New Staffing Allocation for

Additional DEA Staffing and Special Agent Positions

for Fiscal Year 1998

97

Table I.1: Drug Seizures for Washington Division and

Baltimore District Office for Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998

130

Table I.2: Caribbean Field Division’s Use of Wire

Intercepts

159

Table I.3: Arrests Reported by the Caribbean Division, by

Case Type, for Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998

161

Figure 1.1: Trend in the Number of Current Drug Users,

Aged 12 and Older, Since 1990

17

Figure 1.2: Trend in the Percentage of 8th, 10th, and 12th

Graders Reporting Current Drug Use Since 1991

18

Figure 1.3: Composition of Total Federal Government

Funding for Federal Drug Control Activities, Fiscal

Years 1990 Through 1999

23

Figures

Figure 1.4: Budget Trends in Programs for Federal Drug

Control Activities to Reduce Drug Demand and Drug

Supply, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1999

24
Contents

Page 13 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Figure 1.5: DEA’s Total Budget Authority, Fiscal Years

1990 Through 1999

27

Figure 1.6: DEA On-Board Staff, Fiscal Years 1990

Through 1998, as of the End of Each Fiscal Year

28

Figure 1.7: Composition by Position Type of Total

Number of DEA On-Board Staff, as of the End of Fiscal

Year 1998

29

Figure 4.1: Flowchart of DEA’s Fiscal Year 1998 Staffing

Needs Determination Process

84

Figure 4.1: Continued 85

Figure I.1: Los Angeles Division Map 100

Figure I.2: Miami Division Map 108

Figure I.3: New Orleans Division Map 118

Figure I.4: Washington, D. C. Division Map 125

Figure I.5: Bogota, Colombia Country Office Map 133

Figure I.6: La Paz, Bolivia Country Office Map 141

Figure I.7: Mexico City, Mexico, Country Office Map 148

Figure I.8: DEA Caribbean Division Map 156
Contents

Page 14 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Abbreviations

ASAC Assistant Special Agent in Charge

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

BNP Bolivian National Police

BTF Border Task Force

CA country attache

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CNP Colombian National Police

DAWN Drug Abuse Warning Network

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DOD Department of Defense

DOJ Department of Justice

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FELCN Fuerzas Especiales Para la Lucha Contra Narco-Trafico

FMP field management plan

HCL hydrochloride

HIDTA High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area

IRS Internal Revenue Service

JMD Justice Management Division

LSD lysergic acid diethylamide

MET Mobile Enforcement Team

OCDETF Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force

OMB Office of Management and Budget

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy

OPBAT Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos Islands

PCP phencyclidine

PME Performance Measures of Effectiveness

RET Regional Enforcement Team

SAC Special Agent in Charge

SAMHSA Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration

SIU Sensitive Investigative Unit or Special Investigative Unit

SOD Special Operations Division

TKO targeted kingpin organization

VCRP Violent Crime Reduction Program
Page 15 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 16 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

During the 1990s, the demand for and supply of illegal drugs have persisted

at very high levels and have continued to adversely affect American society

in terms of social, economic, and health costs and drug-related violent

crime. During the same period, funding for federal drug control efforts

overall and for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which is

dedicated to controlling the supply of illegal drugs, increased significantly.

According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), drug

use and its consequences threaten Americans of every socioeconomic

background, geographic region, educational level, and ethnic or racial

identity. Drug abuse and trafficking adversely affect families, businesses,

and neighborhoods; impede education; and choke criminal justice, health,

and social service systems. A report prepared for ONDCP showed that

drug users in the United States spent an estimated $57 billion for illegal

drugs in 1995.1

 Other costs to society include lost jobs and productivity,

health problems, and economic hardships to families. ONDCP, in its 1999

National Drug Control Strategy, noted that illegal drugs cost our society

approximately $110 billion each year.

On the basis of the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, the

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA)

estimated that in 1997 there were 13.9 million current users2

 of illegal

drugs in the United States aged 12 and older, representing 6.4 percent of

the total population. As figure 1.1 shows, this number has fluctuated

somewhat but has remained fairly constant overall since 1990, as have the

numbers of current users of cocaine and marijuana, with 1.5 million

cocaine users and 11.1 million marijuana users in 1997.

 

1

 What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, 1988-1995; prepared for the Office of National Drug

Control Policy by William Rhodes, Stacia Langenbahn, Ryan Kling, and Paul Scheiman; September 29,

1997.

2

 A current user is an individual who consumed an illegal drug in the month prior to being interviewed.

Drug Use and Supply

Trends in the 1990s
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 17 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Source: Preliminary Results from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, SAMHSA,

Department of Health and Human Services, 1996 and 1997.

Figure 1.1: Trend in the Number of

Current Drug Users, Aged 12 and Older,

Since 1990
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 18 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

As shown in figure 1.2, current drug use among youth rose significantly

from 1992 to 1996. The trend then improved, with drug use declining for

8th and 10th graders in 1997 and 1998.

Source: Monitoring the Future Study, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan (Dec.

1998).

Abuse of illegal drugs has serious consequences. For example, SAMHSA’s

Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) reported 9,310 drug-related deaths

in 1996, an increase of 65 percent from the 5,628 deaths reported in 1990.

The number of drug-related hospital emergency room visits reported to

DAWN rose 42 percent from 1990 to 1997. There were 371,208 emergency

room episodes in 1990 and 527,058 episodes in 1997.

According to DEA and ONDCP, illegal drugs, including cocaine, heroin,

marijuana, and methamphetamine, have inflicted serious damage and

continued to threaten our nation during the 1990s. National and

Figure 1.2: Trend in the Percentage of

8th, 10th, and 12th Graders Reporting

Current Drug Use Since 1991
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 19 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

international drug trafficking organizations continued to bring these drugs

into the United States, and certain illegal drugs are clandestinely produced

in this country. Drug trafficking gangs and individuals dealing in drugs, as

well as drug users, have caused violence in local communities.

DEA considers cocaine to be the primary drug threat to the U.S.

population. Cocaine use has remained at a relatively constant high level

during the 1990s, as indicated by the National Household Survey on Drug

Abuse. The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee

reported that the use of “crack,” a potent and highly addictive form of

cocaine that first became widely available in the 1980s, also remained at a

high level in the 1990s. ONDCP reported in the summer of 1998 that crack

was failing to attract new users, although established users persisted in

using it.

Regarding cocaine trafficking trends, DEA intelligence information shows

that Colombian trafficking organizations, although more fragmented than

in the past, continue to control the worldwide supply of cocaine. However,

Mexican organizations have played an increasing role in the U.S. cocaine

trade in the 1990s. The Southwest Border is now the primary entry point

for cocaine smuggled into the United States.

Heroin is readily available in major cities in the United States, and its use is

on the rise in many areas around the country, according to DEA. ONDCP

has noted that the increasing availability of high-purity heroin has made

snorting and smoking more common modes of ingestion than injection,

thereby lowering inhibitions to heroin use.

DEA intelligence information indicates that the heroin available in the

United States comes from Southeast Asia (principally Burma); Southwest

Asia/Middle East (Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey); Mexico;

and South America (Colombia). Although Southeast Asian heroin

dominated the U.S. market in the 1980s and into the 1990s, Colombian

heroin emerged as a significant problem in the mid-1990s. In 1997, 75

percent of the heroin seized and analyzed in the United States was

Colombian. DEA reported that independent Colombian drug traffickers

established themselves in the U.S. heroin market by distributing highquality heroin (frequently above 90-percent pure), undercutting the price

of their competition, and using long-standing drug distribution networks.

According to DEA, marijuana is the most readily available and commonly

used illegal drug in the country. Further, a resurgence of marijuana

trafficking and use has taken place in urban centers across the United

Cocaine

Heroin

Marijuana
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 20 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

States. ONDCP noted that this market is driven by a high level of demand,

with users from virtually all age groups, demographic groups, and income

levels.

According to DEA intelligence information, most of the foreign marijuana

available here is smuggled into the country across the Southwest Border.

Mexican drug trafficking organizations are responsible for supplying most

of the foreign marijuana, whether grown in Mexico or shipped through

Mexico from other locations such as Colombia. Marijuana is also grown

domestically in remote outdoor locations in the United States, including on

public lands, and indoors. In the 1990s, major outdoor marijuana growths

have been found in California, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, New York,

Tennessee, and Washington.

DEA uses the term “dangerous drugs” to refer to a broad category of

controlled substances other than cocaine, opiates such as heroin, and

cannabis products such as marijuana. The list of dangerous drugs includes

drugs that are illegally produced; drugs legally produced but diverted to

illicit use (e.g., pharmacy thefts, forged prescriptions, and illegal sales); as

well as legally produced drugs obtained from legitimate channels (e.g.,

legally and properly prescribed). Some of the dangerous drugs are

methamphetamine; lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD); phencyclidine (PCP);

diazepam (Valium); and flunitrazepam (Rohypnol), commonly called the

“date rape” drug.

DEA reports that methamphetamine use has increased in the 1990s,

resulting in a devastating impact on many communities across the nation.

A powerful stimulant, methamphetamine is the most prevalent synthetic

controlled substance clandestinely manufactured in the United States.

Historically, methamphetamine has more commonly been used in the

western United States, but its use has been spreading to other areas of the

country.

According to DEA, methamphetamine suppliers have traditionally been

motorcycle gangs and other independent groups. However, organized

crime groups operating in California, some with ties to major Mexicobased trafficking organizations, now dominate wholesale-level

methamphetamine production and distribution in the United States.

Mexican trafficking organizations use their well-established cocaine,

heroin, and marijuana distribution networks to smuggle methamphetamine

throughout the country. Although large-scale production of

methamphetamine is centered in California, it is increasingly being

produced in Mexico and smuggled into the United States.

Methamphetamine and

Other Dangerous Drugs
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 21 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Trafficking organizations have continued to supply domestic drug

consumers despite short-term achievements by both federal and foreign

law enforcement agencies in apprehending individuals and disrupting the

flow of illegal drugs. When confronted with threats to their operations,

drug trafficking organizations have become adept at quickly changing their

modes of operation. For example, as we previously reported,3 when law

enforcement agencies have successfully carried out efforts to intercept

drugs being smuggled by aircraft, traffickers have increased their use of

maritime and overland transportation routes.

In another example, DEA reported that a 1989 drug enforcement

operation, which involved the seizure of nearly 40 metric tons of cocaine,

led to a new arrangement between Mexican transportation organizations

and Colombian cocaine organizations. To reduce the complex logistics and

vulnerabilities associated with large cash transactions, Mexican

organizations started receiving part of the cocaine shipments they

smuggled for the Colombians in exchange for their transportation services.

By the mid-1990s, Mexican organizations were receiving up to one-half of a

cocaine shipment as payment. This arrangement radically changed the role

and sphere of influence of the Mexican organizations in the U.S. cocaine

trade. By relinquishing part of each cocaine shipment, the Colombian

organizations ceded a share of the U.S. cocaine market to the Mexican

traffickers.

In addition, although overall violent crime has steadily declined during the

1990s, many of the violent crimes committed are drug-related, according to

ONDCP. There are no overall quantitative data on drug-related violent

crime and the relationship between drug abuse or trafficking and violent

crime, but ONDCP has identified several qualitative indicators linking drug

abuse or trafficking and other crimes, including violent crimes.4

 According

to ONDCP, many crimes (e.g., murder, assault, and robbery) are

committed under the influence of drugs or may be motivated by a need for

money to buy drugs. In addition, drug trafficking and violence often go

hand in hand. Competition and disputes among drug dealers can cause

violence, as can the location of drug markets in disadvantaged areas where

legal and social controls against violence tend to be ineffective. In this

regard, DEA reported in 1996 that violent drug gangs, which were once

largely confined to major cities, had migrated to and/or emerged in rural

areas and small cities throughout the country. One example cited was

 3

 Drug Control: Observations on U.S. Counternarcotics Activities (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-249, Sept. 16,

1998).

4

 See ONDCP’s Fact Sheet: Drug-Related Crime (Apr. 1997, NCJ-163928).

Drug Trafficking

Organizations

Drug-Related Violent Crime
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 22 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Vidalia, GA, where a violent crack cocaine gang was linked to numerous

homicides and drive-by shootings.

Nevertheless, the Department of Justice (DOJ) reported that overall

violent crime in the United States in 1997 had fallen more than 21 percent

since 1993 and had reached its lowest level in at least 24 years. Similarly,

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported in its 1997 Uniform

Crime Reports that the murder rate in 1997 had declined 28 percent since

1993. It also reported that the number of drug-related murders decreased

by 7 percent between 1996 and 1997.5

According to ONDCP, from fiscal years 1990 through 1999 the federal

government spent about $143.5 billion, in constant 1999 dollars, on four

functional areas that can be divided between two categories—(1) those

that are aimed at reducing the demand for illegal drugs and (2) those that

are aimed at reducing the availability or supply of such drugs in the United

States. As figure 1.3 indicates, about 33.8 percent of the total funds were

used for drug demand reduction. About 66.2 percent of the total funds

were used for the three functional areas intended to reduce the drug

supply, with the largest share—49.5 percent—dedicated to domestic law

enforcement programs, 3.8 percent to international programs, and 12.9

percent to interdiction programs.

 

5

 Although the Uniform Crime Reports contain data on drug-related murder, they do not contain such

data for other types of violent crime, such as assault, robbery, or rape.

Federal Drug Control

Budget in the 1990s
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 23 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Note: This figure is based on budget amounts for each fiscal year converted to constant 1999 dollars.

Source: Developed by GAO from ONDCP data.

As figure 1.4 indicates, total funds for federal drug control activities

increased, in constant 1999 dollars, by about 49 percent—from about $12

billion to almost $18 billion—between fiscal years 1990 and 1999.

However, funding trends varied for the four functional areas. Although

funds for the drug demand reduction functional area generally increased

steadily overall by 50 percent from about $3.9 billion in 1990 to about $5.8

billion in 1999, funding trends for the three drug supply reduction

functional areas were mixed. Funds for domestic law enforcement

programs increased steadily overall by about 66 percent from about $5.4

billion in 1990 to almost $8.9 billion in 1999. Funds for interdiction

programs fluctuated within the time period, increasing overall by about 9

percent from about $2.2 billion in 1990 to almost $2.4 billion in 1999. Funds

for international programs increased by 23 percent from 1990 to 1992, to a

peak of $759.1 million; they then decreased by 60 percent to a low of

Figure 1.3: Composition of Total

Federal Government Funding for

Federal Drug Control Activities, Fiscal

Years 1990 Through 1999
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 24 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

$303.5 million in 1996; they rose by 163 percent to about $796.9 million in

1999.

Note 1: The budget amounts for fiscal years 1990 through 1998 are actual, and the fiscal year 1999

budget amount is as enacted.

Note 2: The budget amounts for each fiscal year are in constant 1999 dollars.

Source: Developed by GAO from ONDCP data.

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-690), as amended, established

ONDCP to set federal priorities for drug control, implement a National

Drug Control Strategy, and certify federal drug control budgets. The act

specifies that the National Strategy must be comprehensive and research

based; contain long-range goals and measurable objectives; and seek to

reduce drug use (demand), availability (supply), and related consequences.

Figure 1.4: Budget Trends in Programs for Federal Drug Control Activities to Reduce Drug Demand and Drug Supply, Fiscal

Years 1990 Through 1999

1999 National Drug

Control Strategy
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 25 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

ONDCP has produced annual strategic plans since 1989. These strategies

recognized that no single approach could solve the nation’s drug problem;

rather, drug prevention, education, and treatment must be complemented

by drug supply reduction actions abroad, on our borders, and within the

United States. Each strategy also shared a commitment to maintain and

enforce antidrug laws.

In 1998, ONDCP’s National Drug Control Strategy established performance

targets to reduce illegal drug use and availability in the United States by 25

percent by the year 2002 and 50 percent by 2007.6

 The strategy focuses on

reducing the demand for drugs through treatment and prevention and

attacking the supply of drugs through domestic law enforcement,

interdiction efforts, and international cooperation. ONDCP’s 1999 National

Strategy includes the performance targets and 5 goals along with 31

supporting objectives intended to serve as the basis for a coherent, longterm national effort.

• Goal 1: Educate and enable America’s youth to reject illegal drugs as well

as tobacco and alcohol.

• Goal 2: Increase the safety of America’s citizens by substantially reducing

drug-related crime and violence.

• Goal 3: Reduce the health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use.

• Goal 4: Shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.

• Goal 5: Break foreign and domestic sources of supply.

As discussed in detail in chapter 3, strategic goals 2, 4, and 5 address drug

supply reduction and involve drug law enforcement activities, including

those for which DEA is responsible. Goal 2 seeks, among other things, to

reduce the rate of drug-related crime and violence in the United States by

15 percent by the year 2002 and achieve a 30-percent reduction by the year

2007. Goal 4 seeks a 10-percent reduction in the rate at which illegal drugs

successfully enter the United States by the year 2002 and a 20-percent

reduction in this rate by 2007. Goal 5 seeks a 15-percent reduction in the

flow of illegal drugs from source countries by the year 2002 and a 30-

percent reduction by 2007. The goal also seeks a 20-percent reduction in

domestic marijuana cultivation and methamphetamine production by 2002

and a 50-percent reduction by 2007.

 

6

 The National Drug Control Strategy established 1996 as the base year for determining percentage

reductions in drug use and availability.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 26 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

The mission of DEA, which is a component of DOJ, is to (1) enforce the

drug laws and regulations of the United States and bring drug traffickers7

to justice and (2) recommend and support nonenforcement programs

aimed at reducing the availability of illegal drugs in domestic and

international markets. DEA is the lead agency responsible for federal drug

law enforcement and for coordinating and pursuing drug investigations in

foreign countries.

According to DEA, its primary responsibilities for drug law enforcement

include the following:

• investigating major drug traffickers operating at interstate and

international levels and criminals and drug gangs who perpetrate violence

in local communities;

• coordinating and cooperating with federal, state, and local law

enforcement agencies on mutual drug enforcement efforts, including

interstate and international investigations;

• managing a national drug intelligence system in cooperation with other

federal, state, local, and foreign agencies to collect, analyze, and

disseminate strategic and operational drug intelligence information;

• seizing and forfeiting drug traffickers’ assets;

• coordinating and cooperating with federal, state, and local law

enforcement agencies and foreign governments on programs designed to

reduce the availability of illegal drugs on the U.S. market through

nonenforcement methods, such as crop eradication, crop substitution, and

the training of foreign officials; and

• operating, under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State and U.S.

Ambassadors, all programs associated with drug law enforcement

counterparts in foreign countries.

To carry out its mission and responsibilities, DEA, along with its

headquarters office, had 21 domestic field divisions throughout the United

States and its territories, including Puerto Rico, as of December 1998.

Subordinate to these divisions, each of which was headed by a Special

Agent in Charge (SAC), were a total of 30 district offices, 115 resident

offices, and 46 posts of duty in the United States, with at least 1 office in

every state. Overseas, DEA had 79 offices in 56 foreign countries. This

included 56 country offices, each headed by a country attaché (CA), and 23

resident offices reporting to the country offices. (App. I contains profiles

 7

 Drug traffickers include those organizations and principal members involved in the growth,

manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the

United States.

DEA’s Mission, Role,

and Responsibilities
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 27 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

of the five field divisions and three country offices included in our review.)

In addition, DEA manages a multiagency intelligence center in El Paso, TX;

conducts training at Quantico, VA; and maintains seven drug analytical

laboratories in various regions of the country and a special drug testing

facility in McLean, VA.

As shown in figure 1.5, DEA’s budget almost doubled, in constant 1999

dollars, from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 1999 and totaled about $11.3

billion during that period.

Note 1: The budget amounts for fiscal years 1990 through 1998 are actual, and the fiscal year 1999

budget amount is as enacted.

Note 2: The budget amounts for each fiscal year are in constant 1999 dollars.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

Commensurate with its increased funding, as shown in figure 1.6, the size

of DEA’s staff also increased during the 1990s by 40 percent—from 5,995

employees in 1990 to 8,387 employees in 1998.

Figure 1.5: DEA’s Total Budget

Authority, Fiscal Years 1990 Through

1999
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 28 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Note: According to DEA, on-board positions are the number of persons employed by DEA at specified

time periods as opposed to the number actually authorized.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

During this period, the number of intelligence specialists increased by

about 116 percent, special agents by 40 percent, and other positions8

 by 32

percent. As shown in figure 1.7, of the total on-board positions in fiscal

year 1998, special agents made up about 51.4 percent, other positions

about 41.8 percent, and intelligence specialists about 6.9 percent.

 

8

 These include diversion investigators and various professional, administrative, technical, and clerical

positions.

Figure 1.6: DEA On-Board Staff, Fiscal

Years 1990 Through 1998, as of the End

of Each Fiscal Year
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 29 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Note: Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

The Chairmen of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and the

Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control requested that we

determine (1) what major enforcement strategies, programs, initiatives,

and approaches DEA has implemented in the 1990s to carry out its

mission, including its efforts to (a) target and investigate national and

international drug traffickers and (b) help state and local law enforcement

agencies combat drug offenders and drug-related violence in their

communities; (2) whether DEA’s strategic goals and objectives, programs

and initiatives, and performance measures are consistent with the National

Drug Control Strategy; and (3) how DEA determined its fiscal year 1998

staffing needs and allocated the additional staff.

We did our review at DEA headquarters, as well as at DEA offices in five

domestic field divisions and three foreign countries. We also obtained

information from officials representing DOJ, ONDCP, the Office of

Management and Budget (OMB), and the Department of State. Because the

funding and other statistical data we collected from DEA and other

agencies and used in this report were used primarily for background and

descriptive purposes and were not directly related to our findings,

conclusions, and recommendation, we did not independently validate or

verify their accuracy and reliability.

Figure 1.7: Composition by Position

Type of Total Number of DEA On-Board

Staff, as of the End of Fiscal Year 1998

Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 30 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

The five DEA domestic field division offices we visited are located in Los

Angeles, CA; Miami, FL; New Orleans, LA; San Juan, Puerto Rico (the

Caribbean Division); and Washington, D.C. We also visited one DEA

district office located in Baltimore, MD, which is part of DEA’s

Washington, D.C., Field Division. The three DEA foreign country offices

we visited are located in La Paz, Bolivia; Bogota, Colombia; and Mexico

City, Mexico. In Bolivia, we also visited resident offices in Santa Cruz and

Trinidad and the Chimore base camp. (See app. I.) In Mexico, we also

visited the Guadalajara Resident Office. These locations were judgmentally

selected on the basis of geographic location, differences in the drug threat

in these areas, and a variety of domestic and foreign drug enforcement

operational characteristics. We also obtained information from the U.S.

Attorneys’ Offices in Baltimore, Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, and

Puerto Rico; from local police agencies in Baltimore; Los Angeles; South

Miami, FL; Pine Bluff, AR; and Puerto Rico; and from State Department

officials in Bolivia, Colombia, and Mexico.

To determine what major enforcement strategies, programs, initiatives,

and approaches DEA has implemented to carry out its mission in the

1990s, we collected and analyzed pertinent DEA, DOJ, and ONDCP

documents. We also interviewed DEA headquarters officials, DEA officials

in the selected domestic field offices and foreign country offices, and DOJ

and ONDCP officials. We also collected ONDCP and DEA budget data for

each fiscal year from 1990 to 1999, which we adjusted to constant 1999

dollars where appropriate. In addition, we obtained and analyzed DEA

special agent work-hour statistics; case initiation data; statistical results

(e.g., arrests, convictions, and seizures) of investigations; and other

information relating to DEA’s enforcement programs. We did not evaluate

the effectiveness of the individual strategies, programs, initiatives, and

approaches discussed in chapter 2.

To determine whether DEA’s strategic goals and objectives, programs and

initiatives, and performance measures are consistent with the National

Drug Control Strategy, we analyzed and compared DEA’s annual

performance plans for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 with ONDCP’s 1998 and

1999 (1) National Drug Control Strategies, (2) National Drug Control

Budget Summaries, and (3) Performance Measures of Effectiveness

reports. We also reviewed DOJ’s (1) Strategic Plan for 1997-2002, (2)

performance plans for fiscal years 1999 and 2000, and (3) Drug Control

Strategic Plan. We interviewed DEA and ONDCP officials about their plans

and how they interrelated. We used the Government Performance and

Results Act as our basic criteria along with OMB, DOJ, and our guidance
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 31 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

on the act, including OMB Circular A-11 and our guides for assessing

agency annual performance plans and strategic plans.

To determine how DEA’s fiscal year 1998 staffing estimates for its

enforcement programs and initiatives were developed, we collected and

analyzed information on the process, criteria DEA used, and staffing

recommendations made during DEA’s budget formulation process. We

interviewed DEA officials in headquarters and in the selected domestic

field offices and foreign country offices, as well as DOJ, ONDCP, and OMB

officials to obtain information on how staffing needs were determined and

how the budget review process affected staffing estimates, requests, and

allocations. We reviewed documents dealing with staffing

recommendations and allocations; policies and procedures; DOJ, ONDCP,

and OMB budget reviews; and congressional appropriations.

We performed our work from December 1997 to May 1999 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards. In June 1999, we

provided a draft of this report to the Attorney General and the Director of

ONDCP for comment. We also provided relevant sections of the report to

OMB and State Department officials for a review of the facts that pertain

to those agencies. We received written comments on June 23, 1999, from

the Deputy Administrator, DEA, which are discussed in chapters 2 and 3

and reprinted in appendix II. In addition, DEA provided a number of

technical changes and clarifications, which we have incorporated

throughout the report where appropriate. On June 21, 1999, ONDCP’s

Acting Deputy Director, Office of Legislative Affairs, orally informed us

that ONDCP reviewed the report from a factual standpoint because the

overall conclusions and recommendation are directed at DEA. He stated

that the report was factually correct from ONDCP’s perspective and

provided a few technical clarifications, which we incorporated where

appropriate. On June 21, 1999, OMB officials responsible for examining

DEA’s budget orally communicated a few technical comments, which we

incorporated in chapter 4. The State Department’s liaison for GAO

informed us on June 21, 1999, that the Department had no comments.
Chapter 2

DEA Expanded Its Focus in the 1990s to

Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to

Major Drug Trafficking Organizations

Page 32 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Since its creation in 1973, DEA has focused its efforts primarily on

investigating the highest levels of national and international illegal drug

trafficking. In addition, DEA has supported state and local law

enforcement efforts directed at the lower levels of drug trafficking. In the

1990s, however, DEA revised its strategy to focus its operations on what it

refers to as the “seamless continuum” of drug trafficking, from

international drug trafficking organizations residing outside the United

States to local gangs and individuals illegally selling drugs on city streets.

Consequently, during the 1990s, DEA gave a higher priority than in the past

and increased resources to working with and assisting state and local law

enforcement agencies, including starting a new program to help combat

drug-related violent crime in local communities.

Concurrently, in the 1990s, DEA made the following enhancements to its

already high priority enforcement operations directed at national and

international drug trafficking organizations.

• DEA established the Kingpin Strategy, which evolved into the Special

Operations Division (SOD), placing greater emphasis on intercepting

communications between top-level drug traffickers and their subordinates

(i.e., attacking the “command and control” communications of major drug

trafficking organizations) to dismantle their entire trafficking operations.

• DEA started participating in two interagency programs to target and

investigate major drug trafficking organizations in Latin America and Asia.

• DEA helped establish, train, and fund special foreign police units to

combat drug trafficking in certain key foreign countries, primarily in Latin

America.

Since its establishment, DEA has directed its resources primarily toward

disrupting or dismantling major organizations involved in interstate and

international drug trafficking. DEA has concentrated on investigating those

traffickers functioning at the highest levels of these enterprises, often by

developing conspiracy cases for U.S. Attorneys to prosecute and seizing

the traffickers’ assets. Federal drug control policymakers considered this

investigative approach to be the most effective for reducing the illegal drug

supply in the United States.

Consistent with this approach, DEA’s operational strategy in the early

1990s was to identify and exploit trafficker vulnerabilities and to disrupt or

dismantle their organizations by conducting investigations leading to (1)

the prosecution, conviction, and incarceration of leaders and key players

in drug organizations and (2) the seizure and forfeiture of the assets of

these organizations. DEA’s enforcement operations were to focus and

DEA Modified Its

Operational Strategy in

the 1990s
Chapter 2

DEA Expanded Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major

Drug Trafficking Organizations

Page 33 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

apply pressure in four principal areas: source (production overseas and in

the United States), transit (smuggling of drugs and essential chemicals),

domestic distribution (sales of illegal drugs in the United States), and

proceeds (money and assets derived from distribution). DEA operations

were also to control the distribution of chemicals used to manufacture

illegal drugs and prevent the diversion of legally produced controlled

substances.

In 1994, the DEA Administrator undertook a review of DEA’s policies and

strategies to ensure that DEA was appropriately responding to the drug

trafficking problem and related violent crime. The results of the review

included recommendations by DEA SACs and senior managers that DEA

refocus its investigative priorities by increasing its efforts against domestic

drug trafficking, including violent drug organizations, street gangs, local

impact issues, regional trafficking organizations, and domestically

produced illegal drugs, while, at the same time, continuing to investigate

major national and international trafficking organizations. As a result, in

1995, the DEA Administrator established the Mobile Enforcement Team

(MET) Program, which focuses a small percentage of DEA’s resources on

drug-related violent crime in local communities. Then, in a 1997

memorandum to DEA’s field offices, he indicated that over the next 5 years

DEA was to focus its operations on the “seamless continuum” of the

organized crime systems that direct drug trafficking, with agencywide

programs and initiatives directed at

• major regional, national, and international cases;

• violent drug organizations, gangs, and local impact issues; and

• domestically cultivated and manufactured illegal drugs.

According to DEA, the international aspects of drug trafficking cannot be

separated from the domestic aspects because they are interdependent and

intertwined. The operations of major trafficking organizations can involve

the cultivation and production of drugs in foreign countries, transportation

to the United States, and eventual distribution on city streets. Accordingly,

the Administrator emphasized that DEA was to target the highest level

drug traffickers and their organizations, as well as violent, street-level drug

gangs operating in communities. To implement this strategy, DEA was to

pursue a vigorous international enforcement program, while domestically

using the MET Program and other enforcement approaches to combat the

threat and impact of drugs in local communities. The Administrator cited

cooperation with other agencies as a guiding principle for all aspects of

DEA’s international operations and domestic operations, which included
Chapter 2

DEA Expanded Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major

Drug Trafficking Organizations

Page 34 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

assisting state and local law enforcement agencies with their most serious

drug and drug-related violence problems.

Although DEA has always worked formally and informally with state and

local law enforcement agencies, it increased its involvement in, and

devoted more resources to, task forces and other multiagency operations

with state and local law enforcement agencies in the 1990s. Major DEA

programs for working with and assisting state and local police on

multiagency operations are the State and Local Task Force Program, MET

Program, and Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program.

Through its State and Local Task Force Program, which originated in 1970

with DEA’s predecessor agency, DEA coordinates with state and local law

enforcement agencies, shares information, participates in joint

investigations, and shares assets forfeited federally as a result of cases

made against drug dealers. In addition, state and local officers often

receive drug investigation training and enhanced drug enforcement

authority.

Throughout the 1990s, DEA substantially increased the number of its state

and local task forces and the number of special agents assigned to them.

DEA’s budget for state and local task forces also increased substantially

during this period. Table 2.1 shows DEA’s budget for its state and local

task forces and the number of task forces in fiscal years 1991 through

1999. As the table indicates, DEA spent $45.7 million, in constant 1999

dollars, on this program in fiscal year 1991 and budgeted $105.5 million for

fiscal year 1999. The total number of DEA-sponsored state and local task

forces increased by about 90 percent during these years.

DEA More Involved

With State and Local

Police

State and Local Task Force

Program
Chapter 2

DEA Expanded Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major

Drug Trafficking Organizations

Page 35 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Fiscal year Budget (millions)aFunded task forces Provisional task forcesbTotal task forcesc

1991 $45.7 71 23 94

1992 58.2 73 25 98

1993 82.1 75 25 100

1994 92.7 83 20 103

1995 107.5 79 36 115

1996 48.0 92 41 133

1997 158.0 100 51 151

1998 146.5 122 50 172

1999 105.5 131 48 179

a

The budget amounts for each fiscal year are in constant 1999 dollars. The budget amounts are

based on actual costs for fiscal years 1991 through 1998 and the approved budget for fiscal year

1999. The budget amounts for each year include DEA’s Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression

Program, which DEA could not separate out. The budget amounts for fiscal years 1997 through 1999

include approximated payroll costs.

b

Provisional task forces are operational in the field with assigned full-time agents but awaiting

authorized funding approval from DEA Headquarters under the State and Local Task Force Program.

c

The numbers of task forces include DEA’s state and local task forces in ONDCP's High Intensity Drug

Trafficking Area Program.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

Similarly, as shown in table 2.2, the number of special agents assigned to

DEA-sponsored state and local task forces increased by about 84 percent

between fiscal years 1991 and 1998, while the number of assigned state and

local law enforcement officers increased by about 34 percent during the

same time period. About 22 percent of DEA’s 4,309 special agents in fiscal

year 1998 were assigned to state and local task forces, compared to about

14 percent of the total 3,542 special agents at DEA in fiscal year 1991.

Fiscal year DEA special agents State and local officers

1991 511 1,153

1992 516 1,209

1993 566 1,226

1994 601 1,221

1995 616 1,251

1996 595 1,296

1997 721 1,435

1998 940 1,548

Note: The table includes the number of DEA special agents and state and local officers assigned to

DEA's state and local task forces in ONDCP's High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

The amount of time spent by DEA special agents overall on state and local

task forces also increased steadily in the 1990s. DEA special agents spent

Table 2.1: Budget for and Number of DEA State and Local Task Forces, Fiscal Years 1991 to 1999

Table 2.2: Number of Law Enforcement

Officers on DEA State and Local Task

Forces, Fiscal Years 1991 Through 1998,

as of the End of Each Fiscal Year
Chapter 2

DEA Expanded Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major

Drug Trafficking Organizations

Page 36 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

about 19.5 percent of all domestic investigative work hours on these task

forces in fiscal year 1998 compared to about 9.2 percent during fiscal year

1990.1

Table 2.3 shows the number of cases, arrests, convictions, asset seizures,

and drug seizures that resulted from the state and local task forces in fiscal

years 1991 through 1998.

Fiscal years

Activity 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

Cases initiated 5,294 6,323 5,265 4,256 5,738 5,684 6,622 6,853

Cases closed 4,992 5,383 5,993 5,167 5,130 5,172 5,668 5,854

Arrests 6,648 7,430 6,464 6,036 7,324 7,757 9,902 11,569

Convictions 4,524 4,800 4,987 4,274 4,161 4,597 4,705 5,477

Assets seized

(millions)a

$265 $149 $159 $122 $118 $85 $112 N/A

Heroin seized

(kilograms)

73 77 82 86 72 172 117 111

Cocaine seized

(kilograms)

8,683 14,102 5,433 6,031 6,269 7,460 9,687 8,695

Marijuana seized

(kilograms)

22,314 32,392 21,646 20,234 25,005 27,726 24,833 22,933

Methamphetamine

seized (kilograms)

214 145 205 192 254 251 444 464

Note 1: Other drugs were also seized.

Note 2: N/A means not available.

a

The amounts of assets seized each fiscal year are in constant 1999 dollars.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

DEA categorizes each case as local, regional, domestic, foreign, or

international, according to the geographic scope covered. 2 As shown in

table 2.4, a little over 50 percent of the task force cases initiated in fiscal

years 1997 and 1998 were local and regional. They involved suspected drug

violators operating in the geographic areas covered by the DEA offices

conducting the investigations, and most of them were local violators.Less

 

1

 The work-hour data that DEA provided us for fiscal year 1998 were not yet complete, and the

percentage of DEA special agent investigative work hours spent on state and local task forces in fiscal

year 1998 may have actually been greater than 19.5 percent.

2

 A local case involves a domestic target who operates principally within a local geographic area less

extensive than a regional case; a regional case involves a domestic target who is criminally active

throughout the geographic region of the DEA office conducting the investigation; a domestic case is an

investigation of a target who is active principally within the jurisdiction of the United States; a foreign

case involves a target active principally outside the jurisdiction of the United States; and an

international case involves a target whose criminal activities are both domestic and foreign.

Table 2.3: Number of DEA State and

Local Task Force Case Initiations,

Arrests, Convictions, and Seizures,

Fiscal Years 1991 to 1998
Chapter 2

DEA Expanded Its Focus in the 1990s to Target Local Drug Dealers in Addition to Major

Drug Trafficking Organizations

Page 37 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

than 10 percent of the task force cases targeted people suspected of drug

trafficking on an international scale.

Fiscal year 1997 Fiscal year 1998

Scope of case Number Percent Number Percent

Local 2,401 36.3 2,633 38.4

Regional 992 15.0 979 14.3

Domestic 2,606 39.4 2,612 38.1

Foreign 36 0.5 30 0.4

International 587 8.9 599 8.7

Total 6,622 100.1 6,853 99.9

Note: Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

The following are examples of state and local task force investigations

conducted by the Los Angeles; Miami; New Orleans; and Washington, D.C.,

field divisions, respectively, that DEA considered to be successful.

• DEA’s task force in Santa Ana, CA, targeted a Mexican methamphetamine

manufacturing and distribution organization operating throughout

southern California. The investigation employed wiretaps of nine

telephones, along with extensive surveillance, use of informants, and other

investigative techniques. Primarily on the basis of information from the

wiretaps, the task force conducted 11 raids in 4 cities resulting in the

arrest of 27 Mexican nationals on state drug charges and the seizure of 26

pounds of methamphetamine, 25 gallons of methamphetamine in solution

form (estimated to be the equivalent of 50 to 100 pounds of

methamphetamine), 100 pounds of ephidrine in powder form, an estimated

164 pounds of ephidrine in solution form, other chemicals used to

manufacture methamphetamine, 3 ounces of cocaine, and about $93,000 in

cash. Two methamphetamine laboratories and four ephidrine extraction

laboratories were seized and dismantled.

• In Operation Emerald City, DEA, along with state and local law

enforcement agencies and state regulatory agencies, targeted a drug

trafficking organization that was selling drugs in a Riviera Beach, FL, bar

in 1997. Some of the biggest known drug dealers in the greater West Palm

Beach area had used the bar and its attached property for drug dealing

since the 1960s; and numerous murders, stabbings, drive-by shootings, and

robberies had occurred there over the years. Two leaders of one drug

organization had been arrested, and another organization had taken

control of the bar. DEA obtained a court order allowing surreptitious entry

of the bar and installation of covert closed circuit television cameras to

record drug transactions, identify traffickers, and afford undercover

Table 2.4: Geographic Scope of State

and Local Task Force Cases Initiated

During Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998
Chapter 2

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Drug Trafficking Organizations

Page 38 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

officers the ability to buy drugs while under constant camera surveillance.

As a result, 38 people were arrested for violations of federal and state drug

laws. In addition, the bar’s liquor license was revoked, and the business

and surrounding property were forfeited to the government.

• DEA’s REDRUM (“murder” spelled backward) task force group, which

focuses on drug and drug-related homicide cases, targeted a violent heroin

trafficking organization operating in New Orleans, LA. DEA conducted the

investigation jointly with the New Orleans Police Department Homicide

Division and the FBI. As a result of the investigation, which included

wiretaps, surveillance, and debriefings of informants, 13 individuals were

indicted on a variety of federal drug, firearms, and murder charges. Ten

defendants pled guilty prior to trial, and the head of the organization was

found guilty of all charges and received a life sentence. In addition, five

homicides in the city of New Orleans were solved, and 359 grams of heroin

and $60,000 in drug-related assets were seized. According to DEA, the

investigation had a significant local impact by reducing violent crime and

disrupting the flow of heroin into New Orleans.

• DEA’s Richmond District Office City Strike Force in Virginia learned about

a trafficking organization bringing Colombian heroin to the Richmond and

Columbus, OH, areas from New York. Through the arrest and debriefing of

drug couriers, the task force obtained evidence regarding the

organization’s distribution of more than 100 pounds of Colombian heroin

in the Richmond area over approximately 1 year’s time. The task force

arrested the 2 heads of the organization and 24 co-conspirators. Three

kilograms of Colombian heroin and $17,000 were seized.

In February 1995, DEA established the MET Program to help state and

local law enforcement agencies combat violent crime and drug trafficking

in their communities, particularly crime committed by violent gangs. This

was consistent with the Attorney General’s Anti-Violent Crime Initiative,

which was initiated in 1994 to establish partnerships among federal, state,

and local law enforcement agencies to address major violent crime

problems, including gangs. The MET Program was also consistent with

ONDCP’s 1995 National Drug Control Strategy, which cited the program as

an example of how federal agencies would help state and local agencies

address drug trafficking and associated violence. According to DEA

officials, federal assistance through the MET Program was designed to

help overcome two challenges facing state and local agencies in drug

enforcement:

Mobile Enforcement Teams
Chapter 2

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Drug Trafficking Organizations

Page 39 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

• State and local police agencies did not have sufficient resources to

effectively enforce drug laws.

• Local law enforcement personnel were known to local drug users and

sellers, making undercover drug buys and penetration of local distribution

rings difficult and dangerous.

Unlike DEA’s traditional State and Local Task Force Program, previously

discussed, in the MET Program, upon request from local officials, DEA

deploys teams of special agents (referred to as METs) directly to

communities affected by drug-related violence. The METs are based in

DEA field divisions throughout the country. The METs are to work

cooperatively with the requesting local law enforcement agency—sharing

intelligence, coordinating activities, and sometimes combining staff and

other resources—to target drug gangs and individuals responsible for

violent crime.

Since its creation in fiscal year 1995, funds for the MET Program have

totaled about $173 million in constant 1999 dollars. Table 2.5 shows the

MET budget, the number of active METs, and the number of agents

authorized for those METs from the inception through fiscal year 1999.

Fiscal years MET

Program

data 1995a

1996 1997 1998 1999

METs 19 19 23 24 24

DEA special

agentsb

167 167 250 250 250

Budget

(millions) c

 d $55.1d $19.7 $46.9 $51.1

a

Fiscal year 1995 data are for a 6-month period.

b

The number of special agent positions were authorized as of the end of each fiscal year, except for

fiscal year 1999 positions, which were as of March 1999.

c The budget amounts for each fiscal year are in constant 1999 dollars. The budget amounts include

actual payroll costs for fiscal year 1996 and approximated payroll costs for fiscal years 1997 through

1999. Other costs are actual for fiscal years 1996 through 1998 and as approved for fiscal year 1999.

d

The fiscal year 1996 budget includes funds spent in fiscal year 1995.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

A typical MET is made up of 8 to 12 DEA special agents. Each MET

operation starts with a request to the local DEA field office from a police

chief, sheriff, or district attorney for assistance in dealing with drug-related

violence. DEA then evaluates the scope of the problem and the capability

of local law enforcement to address it. Each assessment is supposed to

give particular attention to the violent crime rate in the requesting

Table 2.5: Selected MET Program Data,

Fiscal Years 1995 to 1999
Chapter 2

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Drug Trafficking Organizations

Page 40 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

community and the impact of the identified drug group on the violence

occurring there. Once DEA decides to deploy a MET, an action plan is to

be developed, including identification of the suspects to be targeted.

Following this initial planning, the MET is to conduct the deployment

outfitted with the necessary surveillance and technical equipment.

During a deployment, the MET is to work with the local law enforcement

officials to investigate and arrest targeted violent drug offenders.

According to DEA officials, the MET generally collects intelligence,

initiates investigations, participates in undercover operations, makes

arrests, seizes assets, and provides support to local or federal prosecutors.

Evidence developed in MET investigations may also be used to prosecute

the same individuals for related crimes, including murder, assault, or other

acts of violence. According to DEA, each MET deployment plan

establishes a time frame of between 90 and 120 days for completing the

deployment.3

At the time of our review, DEA had 24 METs in 20 of its 21 domestic field

divisions (with the Caribbean Division being the only exception). Table 2.6

shows the number of MET deployments and their results from the

program’s inception in fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 1998.

 

3

 In discussing a draft of our report, DEA noted that a review of all 187 MET deployments completed as

of April 20, 1999, showed that the average deployment length was 167 days.
Chapter 2

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Drug Trafficking Organizations

Page 41 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Fiscal years

Selected data on MET deployments 1995 (6 months)-1996 1997 1998 Total

Requests 112 67 79 258

Deployments initiated 79 46 56 181

Deployments completed 79 45 34 158

Deployments active 0 1 22 23

Arrestsa 1,973 2,200 2,199 6,372

Convictionsb 240 415 1,071 1,726

Cocaine seized (pounds) 95 747 342 1,184

Methamphetamine seized (pounds) 68 115 199 382

Heroin seized (pounds) 3 31 18 52

Marijuana Seized (pounds) 158 493 646 1,297

Assets seized (millions)c $3.6 $2.7 $3.8 $10.0

a

In addition to DEA arrests, MET deployments from the program's inception through 1998 also led to a

total of 612 arrests by other law enforcement agencies.

b

According to DEA, actual convictions are higher than these numbers indicate due to sentencing

delays and the lack of reporting of prosecutorial dispositions in the state systems. Also, the conviction

totals may increase due to the delay between arrest and final disposition.

c The amounts of assets seized each fiscal year are in constant 1999 dollars. The yearly amounts,

when added, do not equal the total due to rounding.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

The DEA offices in Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, and Washington,

D.C., had completed 33 MET deployments at the time we made our visits

during 1998. In conducting our work at these offices, we spoke with local

police officials in selected cities—Baltimore, MD; Los Angeles, CA; Pine

Bluff, AR; and South Miami, FL—who had requested MET deployments.

The officials said they were pleased with the results of the MET

deployments and that the accomplishments met their expectations.

Following are summaries of the MET deployments in these four cities.

• A MET deployment conducted for about 2-1/2 months during 1996 in the

Rampart area of Los Angeles targeted six violent street gangs: 18th Street,

Mara Salvatruches, Orphans, Playboys, Crazy Riders, and Diamonds. In

addition to the MET, the Los Angeles Police Department, the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the California Department of

Corrections participated. The operation resulted in 421 arrests, including

144 by DEA’s MET, and seizures of 1,200 grams of heroin, 630 grams of

cocaine, 104 pounds of marijuana, 28 weapons, and $70,000 in currency.

According to a Los Angeles Police Department official, crime statistics

(e.g., homicides and aggravated assaults) in the Rampart area fell

immediately after the MET deployment was completed. However, DEA’s

post-deployment assessment of violent crimes in the area, comparing the 6

months after the deployment ended to the 6 months prior to the

Table 2.6: Selected Data on MET Deployments, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 1998
Chapter 2

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Drug Trafficking Organizations

Page 42 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

deployment, showed that homicides increased from 42 to 47, aggravated

assaults increased from 738 to 1,008, robberies increased from 1,091 to

1,275, and sex crimes increased from 130 to 207. In addition, the

assessment indicated that drug sales appeared to increase shortly after the

deployment was completed, approaching levels observed before the

deployment started. It further indicated that a significant number of drug

dealers reportedly changed the location of their distribution activities

while remaining in the Rampart area.4

• The South Miami Police Department requested DEA support in going after

crack cocaine dealers. Initially, the police collected intelligence, purchased

drugs, and arrested 17 street-level drug dealers. DEA’s MET then became

involved. The MET bought crack cocaine from drug dealers who came out

to sell the drugs after the initial arrests had been made. The MET, which

deployed for about 3 months in 1998, made 13 arrests (7 for federal

prosecution and 6 for state prosecution) and seized 386.7 grams of crack

cocaine. South Miami police officials said some of those arrested had

committed weapons violations and some violence (e.g., assaults, batteries,

and armed robberies) in the past. According to DEA’s post-deployment

assessment of violent crimes in the area, comparing the 6 months after the

deployment ended to the 6 months prior to the deployment, homicides

decreased from 1 to 0, assaults decreased from 11 to 4, aggravated

batteries decreased from 9 to 3, and robberies decreased from 14 to 5. The

assessment noted that illegal drug activity in the South Miami area had

been greatly reduced. The assessment further noted that the availability of

crack cocaine in the area had been reduced, as well as drug distribution in

surrounding areas.

• A MET deployment conducted for 6 months during 1997 in Pine Bluff

targeted violent organizations dealing in crack cocaine and

methamphetamine. A total of 46 people were arrested, including 15 who

were indicted by a federal grand jury. Four people were suspects in four

different homicides. Six ounces of crack cocaine were seized, along with

15 vehicles and $118,026. The Pine Bluff Police Chief told us that the MET

deployment had successfully helped reduce both the city’s homicide rate

and its crack cocaine problem. However, DEA’s post-deployment

assessment of violent crimes in the area, comparing the 6 months after the

deployment ended to the 6 months prior to the deployment, showed that

homicides increased from 4 to 7, assaults increased from 677 to 1,098,

rapes increased from 44 to 51, and robberies increased from 168 to 190.

 

4

 In discussing a draft of our report, DEA officials said this MET deployment was not typical. It was

conducted during a time when DEA was refining the program. The Los Angeles Rampart area

deployment focused on a specific area, and DEA now requires each MET deployment to focus on

targeted criminal drug organizations.
Chapter 2

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Drug Trafficking Organizations

Page 43 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

• A MET deployed in eastern Baltimore for 5 months during 1997

successfully targeted a drug organization—the M&J Gang—in a housing

project. This case resulted in 81 arrests, many of which were already “in

the works” before the MET deployment, according to Baltimore police

officials we contacted. The officials said the MET deployment also reduced

violent crime in that area. DEA’s post-deployment assessment showed

fewer major crimes overall in the area during the 6-month period starting

about 1 month before the deployment ended compared to the 6 months

prior to the deployment. Shootings decreased from 527 to 389, aggravated

assaults decreased from 3,273 to 2,950, robberies decreased from 4,888 to

3,889, burglaries decreased from 5,775 to 5,684, larcenies decreased from

16,475 to 15,976, and stolen automobiles decreased from 4,851 to 3,213.

However, murders increased from 143 to 156, and rapes increased from

175 to 202. DEA’s assessment also reported that narcotic activity in two

areas covered by the deployment was significantly reduced, and gangrelated criminal activity had decreased in the sections of Baltimore

controlled by the M&J Gang and another drug gang.

DEA officials we met with in the four field division offices told us that

although MET deployments typically focused on local violent drug

offenders, they sometimes led to investigations of higher level drug

traffickers. In response to our request for quantitative data on this, a DEA

headquarters official responded that it is difficult for DEA to provide

statistics on the exact number of deployments that have led to

investigations of higher level drug traffickers through MET operations

because this information was not systematically maintained in an

automated database. However, DEA did provide us with some examples of

MET deployments that led to higher level drug traffickers. For example,

DEA reported that a MET deployed from DEA’s Phoenix office identified

connections in Mexico to MET targets in Lake Havasu City, AZ, and family

members in southern California. The resulting intelligence revealed that

this Mexican-based organization was responsible for smuggling precursor

chemicals from Mexico to clandestine laboratory sites in southern

California, where methamphetamine was produced. Multiple-pound

quantities of methamphetamine were transported to Lake Havasu City.

According to DEA, the organization was also transporting large shipments

of methamphetamine to Oregon, Washington, Colorado, and New Mexico.

As shown in table 2.7, the MET deployments conducted in fiscal years 1995

through 1998 resulted in mostly local and regional drug cases. Local and

regional cases involve suspected drug violators operating in the geographic

areas covered by the DEA offices conducting the investigations. As

expected, given the MET program’s purpose, local cases were the single
Chapter 2

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Drug Trafficking Organizations

Page 44 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

largest category, making up about 47 percent of the total during that

period. About 6 percent of the MET cases involved criminals trafficking in

drugs on an international scale.

Fiscal year 1995aFiscal year 1996 Fiscal year 1997 Fiscal Year 1998 Total

Scope of case Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent

Local 21 40.4 52 40.0 87 54.4 69 48.6 229 47.3

Regional 18 34.6 38 29.2 32 20.0 38 26.8 126 26.0

Domestic 8 15.4 30 23.1 36 22.5 23 16.2 97 20.0

Foreign 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0

International 4 7.7 10 7.7 5 3.1 12 8.5 31 6.4

Other 1 1.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.2

Total 52 100.0 130 100.0 160 100.0 142 100.1 484 99.9

Note: Percentages may not total 100 percent due to rounding.

a

Fiscal year 1995 data are for a 6-month period.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

After completing a MET deployment, DEA may carry out efforts to help a

community maintain a lower level of drug trafficking and violent crime.

For example, DEA offers follow-up training to those communities carrying

out drug demand reduction activities. In addition, if feasible, DEA may

respond to a request for the re-deployment of a MET to prevent drugrelated violent crimes from resurging to the level that existed prior to the

initial deployment.

In a June 1998 memorandum to all SACs of domestic field offices, DEA

headquarters directed that the field divisions proactively promote the MET

Program to increase the number of requests for deployments. The

memorandum stated that despite the MET Program’s success, much more

could and should be done to stimulate interest in the program on the part

of state and local law enforcement agencies. The DEA offices were

instructed to collect crime statistics in specific areas within their

geographic boundaries to determine the existence of drug trafficking

problems related to violent crime. After making such determinations, the

DEA SAC or a designated assistant was to contact the local police chief or

sheriff in those areas to explain the benefits of a MET deployment in their

jurisdictions and inform them of the availability of MET resources. The

memorandum noted that each SAC or assistant was expected to visit local

police officials each month. The memorandum further noted that each

office’s proactive MET Program activities would be a significant factor in

the SACs’ annual performance appraisals. According to DEA, the proactive

contacts have generated numerous additional requests for MET assistance,

Table 2.7: Geographic Scope of MET Program Cases Initiated During Fiscal Years 1995 Through 1998
Chapter 2

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Drug Trafficking Organizations

Page 45 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

and the majority of recent deployments have been the result of such

proactive contacts.

With regard to the results of the MET Program, DEA officials reported

decreases in the number of murders, robberies, and aggravated assaults in

local areas covered by the program based on an analysis of local crime

statistics gathered from the targeted geographic locations before and after

133 deployments that had been completed as of April 20, 1999.5 According

to DEA, its post-deployment assessments cumulatively showed a 12-

percent decline in murders, 14-percent decline in robberies, and 6-percent

decline in aggravated assaults in the 133 deployment areas during the 6

months after the deployments ended when compared to the 6 months prior

to the deployments. Further, DEA’s analysis showed that 28 of the 133

deployment areas had decreases in all 3 major violent crime categories

(i.e., murder, robbery, and aggravated assault) during the 6 months after

the deployments ended, while only 5 of the areas had increases in all 3

crime categories. (These five deployments included two of the examples

summarized above). In commenting on these results, DEA noted that the

effectiveness of MET deployments in removing a specific, targeted violent

drug gang, for example, cannot by itself eliminate a community’s drug

trafficking problems because DEA cannot continue to control the

deployment areas to prevent other drug dealers from filling the void that a

MET deployment might have created.

DEA started assisting state and local law enforcement agencies in their

efforts to control domestically grown marijuana in 1979, when it helped

agencies in California and Hawaii. DEA’s Domestic Cannabis

Eradication/Suppression Program was established in 1982 to more

formally help the states eradicate domestic marijuana while building cases

leading to the arrest and prosecution of growers. The program became

active in all 50 states in 1985.

To implement the program, DEA provides funds to state and local law

enforcement agencies. The funds are to be used by these agencies for

program expenses, such as aircraft rentals and fuel, vehicles, equipment,

supplies, and overtime payments for state and local officers working on

eradication operations. As table 2.8 indicates, funds provided by DEA for

the program increased about 177 percent, in constant 1999 dollars, from

fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 1999.

 5

 According to DEA, 187 deployments had been completed as of April 20, 1999. However, DEA only had

FBI Uniform Crime Report statistical information for the 6-month period following 133 of the

completed deployments.

Domestic Cannabis

Eradication/Suppression

Program
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Drug Trafficking Organizations

Page 46 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year Dollarsa

1990 4.7

1991 16.2

1992 11.5

1993 11.2

1994 10.9

1995 10.7

1996 10.5

1997 13.9

1998 13.7

1999 13.0

a

The fund amounts for each fiscal year are in constant 1999 dollars. The fund amounts do not include

DEA's payroll costs.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

DEA encourages state and local agencies to assume the major

responsibility for eradicating domestic marijuana. In coordinating the

program in each state, DEA is to assist efforts to detect and eradicate

marijuana plants (including coordinating the support of other agencies,

arranging for needed equipment, and helping with surveillance); exchange

intelligence; investigate marijuana trafficking organizations; and provide

training.

Table 2.9 shows the statistical results of DEA’s Domestic Cannabis

Eradication/Suppression Program for 1990 through 1998.

Table 2.8: Funding for DEA’s Domestic

Cannabis Eradication/Suppression

Program, Fiscal Years 1990 Through

1999
Chapter 2

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Drug Trafficking Organizations

Page 47 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Output 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998a

Cultivated outdoor plants

eradicated (millions)

7.3 5.3 7.5 4.0 4.0 3.1 2.8 3.8 2.1

Indoor plants eradicated

(millions)

N/A 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2

Ditchweed plants

eradicatedb (millions)

118.5 133.8 264.2 387.9 504.4 370.3 419.7 237.1 127.9

Arrests 5,729 9,364 12,639 12,397 13,115 14,274 18,733 17,070 10,507

Weapons

seized

3,210 4,200 5,541 6,062 5,959 4,151 4,699 4,713 7,351

Assets seized (millions)c $47.7 $62.4 $79.7 $58.2 $62.1 $47.3 $39.7 $40.7 $20.9

Note: N/A means not available.

a

The 1998 data provided by DEA at the time of our work were not complete.

b

Ditchweed is uncultivated marijuana that grows wild.

c The amounts of assets seized each year are in constant 1999 dollars.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

In addition to its State and Local Task Force, MET, and Domestic Cannabis

Eradication/Suppression Programs, DEA also participates in other

multiagency task force operations involving state and local law

enforcement agencies. These include the following:

• The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Program

is coordinated by U.S. Attorneys. This program is designed to promote

coordination and cooperation among federal, state, and local law

enforcement agencies involved in drug enforcement in each task force

region. The goal of the OCDETF Program is to identify, investigate, and

prosecute members of high-level drug trafficking organizations and related

enterprises. In fiscal year 1998, DEA sponsored 847, or 62 percent, and

participated in 1,096, or 81 percent, of the 1,356 OCDETF investigations

that were initiated. DOJ reimburses DEA for its expenditures on OCDETF

investigations. For fiscal year 1998, DEA was reimbursed $94.4 million for

the OCDETF Program.

• The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Program is

administered by ONDCP. The mission of the HIDTA Program is to

coordinate drug control efforts among federal, state, and local agencies in

designated areas in order to reduce drug trafficking in critical regions of

the United States. At the time of our work in September 1998, ONDCP had

designated 20 areas as HIDTAs. According to ONDCP, a HIDTA

organization typically consists of a major task force led by federal

agencies, drug and money laundering task forces led by state or local

agencies, a joint intelligence center and information-sharing network, and

Table 2.9: Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program Statistical Results, 1990 Through 1998

DEA Works With State and

Local Agencies on Other

Multiagency Operations
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Page 48 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

other supporting initiatives.6 DEA receives funds from ONDCP based upon

its participation in the HIDTA Program. For fiscal year 1998, DEA received

$14.8 million in direct HIDTA funding.

Since it was established, DEA’s highest priority has been to investigate

major drug trafficking organizations, both domestic and foreign,

responsible for supplying illegal drugs consumed in the United States. Over

the years, DEA has adopted various techniques for focusing its efforts on

such investigations. In 1992, DEA started using an investigative approach

designed to identify and target drug kingpins and their supporting

infrastructures, primarily through the use of wiretaps and other types of

electronic surveillance within the United States and the use of intelligence

information. DEA called this approach the Kingpin Strategy. This

approach, which has led to the dismantling or disruption of major

trafficking organizations, was later adopted by SOD when it was

established in 1995. More recently, DEA has established the Regional

Enforcement Team (RET) initiative to address regional, national, and

international drug trafficking in small towns and rural areas within the

United States.

Developed in 1992, the Kingpin Strategy targeted major Colombian cocaine

and Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin trafficking organizations. This

strategy was DEA’s top priority and its primary enforcement approach for

addressing the national priority of reducing the availability of illegal drugs

in the United States. The Kingpin Strategy primarily targeted cocaine

trafficking organizations operating out of Medellin and Cali, Colombia,

with most of its focus on one organization referred to as the Cali cartel.

According to DEA, the heads of the Colombian organizations tightly

controlled all aspects of their operations and telephoned subordinates to

give directions. DEA concluded that this was a weakness in the operations

of these organizations. DEA decided to exploit this weakness by

monitoring their communications and analyzing telephone numbers called

to identify the kingpins and their key subordinates for U.S. and/or foreign

investigation, arrest, and prosecution and for seizure of their domestic

assets.

The Office of Major Investigations at DEA headquarters was responsible

for implementing the Kingpin Strategy. Various intelligence, financial, and

operational functions were consolidated within this office to facilitate

focusing DEA’s investigative resources and capabilities on targeted

 

6

 Drug Control: Information on High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program (GAO/GGD-98-188, Sept.

3, 1998).

DEA Developed an

Investigative Approach

Focusing on the

Communications of

Major Drug Trafficking

Organizations

The Kingpin Strategy
Chapter 2

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Drug Trafficking Organizations

Page 49 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

kingpin organizations (TKO). The office disseminated tips and leads,

collected from intelligence sources worldwide, to help agents in the field

carry out investigations and enforcement activities. The office centrally

directed, coordinated, oversaw, and funded investigations that were being

carried out in multiple U.S. cities and foreign countries in cooperation with

state, local, and foreign police.

DEA’s SOD and its investigative approach evolved out of the Office of

Major Investigations and the Kingpin Strategy. According to DEA, the

Kingpin Strategy was enhanced by the creation of SOD as a separate

division. SOD was established at DEA headquarters in August 1995 and

given its own budget and additional staff.7 As with the Kingpin Strategy,

SOD’s approach focuses on the command and control communications of

major drug trafficking organizations. However, a major difference is that

its scope was expanded beyond Colombian cocaine and Southeast and

Southwest Asian heroin trafficking organizations to coordinate and

support investigations of major organizations trafficking in

methamphetamine and Colombian heroin, as well as organizations

trafficking illegal drugs along the Southwest Border. SOD’s primary

emphasis currently is Colombian and Mexican organizations responsible

for smuggling illegal drugs into the United States.

Another major difference from the Kingpin Strategy is that representatives

from other law enforcement agencies, including the FBI and U.S. Customs

Service, are detailed to SOD. The FBI has had agents detailed to SOD since

1995, and the Deputy SAC of SOD is an FBI agent. Similarly, the Customs

Service has detailed agents to SOD since 1996. Most of SOD’s workload

supports cases being conducted by DEA field offices. However, the SOD

SAC told us that the workload was increasingly supporting FBI and

Customs Service cases. The intelligence agencies and the Department of

Defense (DOD) also participate by providing drug intelligence to SOD. In

addition, DOJ’s Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Section participates by

providing legal advice to SOD on investigations.

Like the Kingpin Strategy, SOD’s investigative approach and initiatives are

to support domestic and foreign investigations of major drug traffickers

and trafficking organizations in two principal ways. First, SOD is to

disseminate tips and leads collected from intelligence sources worldwide

to help agents in the field carry out investigations and enforcement

activities. Second, SOD is to assist agents in building and coordinating

multijurisdictional drug conspiracy cases that are based primarily on the

 

7

 The DEA Administrator approved 40 positions, including 31 Special Agent positions, for the new SOD.

Special Operations Division
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use of wiretaps. Multijurisdictional efforts, such as Operation Reciprocity

(described later) with 35 wiretaps in 10 U.S. cities, can involve many

different individual investigations across the country. In May 1999, the

SOD SAC estimated that SOD was supporting and coordinating about 240

cases throughout the United States. He said that SOD typically had

approximately six to eight ongoing major operations at any one time, each

having multiple related cases.

Similar to the Kingpin Strategy, SOD does not control the cases that it

supports; rather, decisionmaking on cases is left to field supervisors and

agents. According to DEA officials, if SOD determines that field offices in

different parts of the country are conducting investigations related to the

same major drug trafficking organization, it attempts to bring the

responsible agents together to develop the best cases for prosecution. In

so doing, it is to coordinate and guide the agents’ efforts, including their

intelligence and electronic surveillance operations, and assist with

intelligence collection and analysis.

SOD essentially funds the same types of investigative activities as the

Office of Major Investigations funded under the Kingpin Strategy.

According to the SOD SAC, SOD provides funds to DEA field offices

primarily for conducting electronic surveillance in support of

investigations. It also funds payments for informants and drug purchases if

doing so is essential to an investigation. However, he said it does so only

when an electronic surveillance is being conducted or planned and only in

connection with an ongoing case with which SOD is involved. (For

example, in the course of an investigation, an agent may acquire a phone

number that is determined to be connected with a current SOD-funded

investigation.) SOD does not fund individual FBI and Customs drug

investigations, but it does support some of those investigations through its

various activities.

SOD is responsible for the oversight of and guidance for DEA’s Title III

(electronic surveillance) program. In Title III of the Omnibus Crime

Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Congress set forth the circumstances

under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be

authorized (P.L. 90-351,18 USC 2510, et seq.). SOD is to help special agents

in the field focus their intercept operations on the best available targets,

choose the best telephone numbers for intercept, correctly conduct the

intercepts, make the best use of collected information, and make the most

efficient use of transcribers and translators. SOD also is to send teams to

the field to assist special agents with their wire intercept operations.

Collection, Analysis, and

Dissemination of

Intelligence Information

Enhanced
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According to DEA officials and data, since the Kingpin Strategy and SOD

initiatives have been in operation, DEA has greatly increased the number

of wiretaps and other electronic surveillances it conducts. The number of

electronic surveillance court orders requested and conducted by DEA, as

shown in table 2.10, increased by 183 percent; and the number of facilities

(e.g., telephone, pager, and fax machine) covered by the orders increased

by 158 percent, from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 1998. Most noteworthy

is that the number of orders increased by 30 percent between fiscal years

1991 and 1992 after the Kingpin Strategy was initiated, and they increased

by 65 percent between fiscal years 1995 and 1996 after SOD was

established.

Fiscal year

Orders requested and

conducted Facilities covered

1990 223 219

1991 256 311

1992 332 302

1993 320 320

1994 357 339

1995 330 284

1996 546 584

1997 592 544

1998 631 564

Note: The number of orders requested and conducted is sometimes greater than the number of

facilities covered because some DEA requests were for extensions of previous wiretap orders.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

DEA’s Special Intelligence Division is to support SOD’s operations by

collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence and other information

from a variety of sources. For example, the unit is to analyze and

disseminate information from telephone records and access and

disseminate information from DEA, FBI, and Customs computerized drug

intelligence systems. The unit has expanded both in size and computer and

other technological capability. There were 186 staff in October 1998,

including DEA, FBI, Customs, DOD, and contractor personnel.

According to the SOD SAC, although DEA did not systematically compile

results data on all of the Kingpin and SOD operations, cases supported,

and leads disseminated, DEA has used both initiatives to successfully

dismantle or disrupt drug trafficking organizations responsible for large

amounts of illegal drugs brought into the United States. For example,

according to DEA, the Kingpin Strategy contributed to dismantling the Cali

cartel, which DEA considered the most powerful criminal organization

that law enforcement has ever faced. Since 1995, all of the top Cali cartel

Table 2.10: Number of Electronic

Surveillance Orders and Facilities

Covered, Fiscal Years 1990 Through

1998

Major International Drug

Trafficking Organizations

Disrupted
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leaders have been captured by or surrendered to the Colombian National

Police (CNP), with the exception of one who was killed in a shoot-out with

CNP at the time of his arrest. According to DEA, evidence gathered

through years of investigations by DEA and other federal, state, and local

law enforcement agencies and CNP led to the identification, indictment,

arrest, conviction, and incarceration of the cartel leaders and some of their

subordinates on drug charges in Colombia and the United States.

According to DEA, a number of other successful operations have resulted

from the Kingpin Strategy and SOD initiatives. These include the following:

• Operation Tiger Trap was a joint operation carried out by DEA and the

Royal Thai Police in 1994. Tiger Trap produced U.S. indictments against

members of the 20,000-man Shan United Army, a heroin TKO that operated

the principal trafficking network in the Golden Triangle area of Thailand,

Burma, and Laos for decades.

• Zorro I and Zorro II were multijurisdictional operations involving DEA, the

FBI, Customs Service, and numerous state and local law enforcement

agencies. Zorro I targeted Colombian drug traffickers based in Cali,

Colombia, and their key subordinates operating in Los Angeles, New York,

and Miami. Zorro I operated from 1992 to 1994 and included 10 DEA

domestic field divisions. Zorro II targeted Mexican transportation groups

used by the Colombians, as well as Colombian distribution cells located

throughout the United States. It operated from 1995 to 1996 and included

14 DEA field divisions. The two operations relied heavily on the use of

wiretaps. There were 117 wiretaps conducted, generating leads that

identified Colombian distribution cells, Mexican traffickers’ command and

control networks, money laundering routes, cocaine cache sites, and other

important information. According to DEA, these operations disrupted both

Colombian and Mexican organizations. Specifically, Zorro I resulted in 209

arrests, 6.5 tons of cocaine seized, and $13.5 million seized. Zorro II

resulted in 182 arrests, 5.7 tons of cocaine and 1,018 pounds of marijuana

seized, $18.3 million seized, and $2.5 million in assets seized.

• Operation Limelight was a multijurisdictional operation involving DEA,

Customs, and numerous state and local law enforcement agencies. The

operation targeted a Mexican drug transportation and distribution

organization, which intelligence indicated was responsible for importing

over 1-1⁄2 tons of cocaine monthly into the United States. The operation,

which ran from 1996 to 1997, included the use of 37 wiretaps and other

electronically generated intelligence, which helped identify groups in

Houston and McAllen, TX; Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco, CA;

New York, NY; and Chicago, IL. The operation resulted in 48 arrests, 4 tons
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of cocaine seized, 10,846 pounds of marijuana seized, and $7.1 million

seized.

• Operation Reciprocity was a multijurisdictional investigation involving

DEA, the FBI, Customs Service, and numerous state and local agencies. In

this operation, DEA combined several independent, but related,

investigations being simultaneously conducted by federal, state, and local

agencies into one investigation and helped other offices start

investigations of other subjects by providing leads. The operation focused

on two independent group heads based in the Juarez, Mexico, area who

were responsible for importing, transporting, and distributing more than 30

tons of cocaine from Mexico to Chicago and New York. The operation

involved 35 wiretaps and other electronically generated intelligence

information in 10 cities. The operation, which ran from 1996 to 1997,

resulted in 53 arrests, 7.4 tons of cocaine seized, 2,800 pounds of marijuana

seized, and $11.2 million seized.

According to DEA, information from some of the above SOD operations

and other intelligence sources indicates that some major drug trafficking

organizations are adapting to drug law enforcement efforts in large U.S.

cities by shifting their operations to small towns and rural areas within the

United States. DEA investigations and other information have provided

evidence that these trafficking organizations have established command

and control centers, warehouses, and drug transshipment points in many

small communities. Consequently, according to DEA, these communities

have become major distribution centers, as well as production centers in

some cases, for illegal drugs, such as cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine,

and marijuana.

To respond to this threat, DEA established the RET initiative in fiscal year

1999, for which Congress provided $13 million and authorized 56 positions.

The RETs are designed to be proactive, highly mobile regional

investigative teams whose mission is to (1) target drug organizations

operating or establishing themselves in small towns and rural areas where

there is a lack of sufficient drug law enforcement resources and (2) better

develop and exploit drug intelligence developed by SOD and other sources.

The RET initiative’s objective is to identify and dismantle these drug

organizations before they become entrenched in the communities.

The RETs are similar to METs, previously discussed, only in that they are

mobile teams. The RET initiative differs significantly from the MET

Program in that the RETs are to only target major drug violators operating

at the regional, national, or international level; while the METs, upon

Regional Enforcement

Teams
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request from local authorities, are to assist urban and rural communities in

investigating and eliminating drug-related violence.

DEA is implementing two RETs, which are to become operational in

September 1999, one in Charlotte, NC, and one in Des Moines, IA.

According to DEA, each RET will consist of 22 personnel, including 15

special agents. In addition, the RETs are to be provided with the

investigative equipment and vehicles needed to ensure a high degree of

mobility and capability to support the performance of even the most

complex investigations.

According to DEA, international drug trafficking organizations have

become the most dangerous organized crime forces in the world, and

Colombian and Mexican organizations are the most threatening to the

United States. DEA documents state that such international trafficking

organizations are often headquartered in foreign countries where there is

little or no potential for extradition to the United States. Because of the

international nature of drug trafficking, DEA had 79 offices in 56 foreign

countries as of December 1998. DEA opened 16 offices in 15 foreign

countries, and closed 4 offices in 4 countries, from fiscal years 1990

through 1998.

Each foreign DEA office is part of the U.S. Embassy’s country team. As a

country team member, how DEA operates in a foreign country must be

consistent with the embassy’s Mission Program Plan, which is a strategic

plan required by the State Department for U.S. government activities

within each country where there is a U.S. Embassy. Mission Program Plans

discuss the embassies’ human rights, democratic, economic, law

enforcement, and other goals, strategies, and objectives, including efforts

to combat drug trafficking. The plan for each country is to be reviewed and

approved by DEA and other agencies represented on the country team.

DEA cannot operate in foreign countries as it does in the United States

because of various limitations. For example, DEA said its agents cannot

make arrests or conduct electronic surveillances in any foreign country,

nor can they be present during foreign police enforcement operations

without a waiver from the Ambassador.8

 DEA’s primary goal in the

countries where it operates is, through bilateral law enforcement

 

8

 The Mansfield Amendment, Section 481(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, 22 U.S.C.

2291(c), regulates the involvement of U.S. government personnel in foreign drug law enforcement

activities.

Key Changes in DEA’s

Foreign Operations
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cooperation, to disrupt and/or dismantle the leadership, command,

control, and infrastructure of drug trafficking organizations that threaten

the United States. To accomplish this goal, DEA engages in cooperative

investigations and exchanges intelligence with its host nation

counterparts. In addition, DEA provides training, advice, and assistance to

host nation law enforcement agencies to improve their effectiveness and

make them self-sufficient in investigating major drug traffickers and

combating the production, transportation, and distribution of illegal drugs.

In addition to SOD operations, DEA has been a participant in two

interagency investigative programs that were established during the 1990s

to address drug trafficking in certain foreign countries where major

trafficking organizations were based. They are the Linear and Linkage

Approach Programs.

This program was established in 1991 as a U.S. interagency forum to

disrupt and dismantle the key organizations in Latin America responsible

for producing and shipping illegal drugs to the United States. The

program’s foundation rests on three basic tenets: focus law enforcement

and intelligence community resources on key targets, foster community

collaboration, and enhance host nation capabilities. The Washington

Linear Committee, which comprises 15 organizations and is cochaired by

DEA, was designed to help better coordinate the counterdrug efforts of

U.S. Embassy country teams, field-based regional intelligence centers, and

U.S. Military Commands.

The Linear Approach Program initially focused on Colombian and Mexican

cocaine organizations. It has since been expanded to include other Latin

American trafficking organizations that are primary recipients of

significant amounts of drugs directly from the source countries of Bolivia,

Colombia, and Peru. Some of these organizations may traffic in heroin

and/or methamphetamine, in addition to cocaine. DEA reported that, for

the period of 1994 through 1998, 21 main targets of the Linear Program and

22 associates had been arrested.9

 All of the Cali cartel leaders who were

arrested as part of the previously discussed Kingpin Strategy were also

primary targets of the Linear Approach Program.

This program was established in 1992 and has been DEA’s principal

international strategy to address the heroin threat from Asia. The program

is cochaired by DEA. It focuses law enforcement and intelligence

community resources on efforts to disrupt and dismantle major Asian

 

9

 DEA did not track the number of Linear Approach Program arrests until 1994.

Interagency International

Investigative Programs

Linear Approach Program

Linkage Approach Program
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trafficking organizations producing heroin for distribution to the United

States.

Linkage Approach Program targets are to have a significant role in one of

the Southeast or Southwest Asian heroin trafficking organizations and be

subject to extradition to, and arrest and prosecution in, the United States.

According to DEA, prior to this program, which was designed to make use

of U.S. drug conspiracy laws, major Southeast and Southwest Asian

traffickers exploited the lack of conspiracy laws in their own countries by

insulating themselves from the actual drugs. The Linkage Program uses a

multinational and multiagency approach to gather evidence for use in the

U.S. judicial system, securing indictments in federal courts, and pursuing

the extradition of the targeted traffickers to the United States for

prosecution. DEA reported that through 1998, 33 Linkage Approach

Program targets had been arrested, 10 defendants had been extradited to

the United States, and 1 defendant was incarcerated pending extradition.

In 1996, DEA initiated its Vetted Unit Program, under which foreign police

participate in special host country investigative and intelligence collection

units in selected foreign countries. According to DEA officials, the foreign

police participants are screened and then trained by DEA with the

intention of enhancing their professionalism and creating an atmosphere

of increased trust and confidence between participating foreign police and

DEA agents working with the vetted units. DEA believes that these units

will (1) enhance the safety of DEA agents in those participating countries

and (2) increase the sharing of sensitive information between DEA and

foreign police.

All foreign police participating in the DEA program must be successfully

“vetted,” that is, pass a computerized criminal background investigation, a

security questionnaire and background interview, medical and

psychological screening, polygraph testing, and urinalysis testing. They

then attend a 4- to 5-week DEA investigative training course in Leesburg,

VA. After they are screened and trained, the vetted foreign police are to

receive ongoing training as well as random polygraph and urinalysis

testing.

The Vetted Unit Program initially began in Mexico in May 1996. After the

Government of Mexico approved the concept, 21 Mexican police were

screened and then trained by DEA. The vetting process was completed in

November 1996, and the Mexico National Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU)

became operational in January 1997.

Vetted Units of Foreign

Police Established
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DEA then expanded the program to other countries. For fiscal year 1997,

Congress appropriated $20 million to support vetted units in Bolivia,

Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. In March 1997, the DEA Administrator

authorized immediate implementation of vetting in Bolivia, Colombia, and

Peru. He also authorized programs in Brazil and Thailand for 1998. The $20

million appropriation for vetted units in fiscal year 1997 is now part of

DEA’s budget base and has recurred each subsequent fiscal year.

According to DEA, as of October 1998, vetted units, which were designed

to engage in intelligence collection, investigations of drug traffickers, or

both, were operational in Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Program

start-up costs in fiscal years 1997 and 1998 amounted to a total of $7.4

million for Bolivia, $5.3 million for Colombia, $4.6 million for Mexico, and

$4.4 million for Peru.10 According to a DEA official, it took an average of

about 6 months to complete the screening and training of the foreign

police from the time they were identified to DEA as candidates selected by

the host governments for the program, although the actual length of time

varied because of factors such as limited availability of polygraphers. As

shown in table 2.11, the number of vetted officers varied by country. Each

vetted unit had one or two DEA agents assigned for assistance, liaison, and

case support.

Country

Number of

vetted units

Number of

vetted officers

Bolivia 4 172

Colombia 4 112

Mexico 3 232

Peru 2 135

Total 13 651

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

The following summarizes the status and accomplishments of the existing

vetted units under the program as of September 30, 1998, according to

DEA.

• Bolivia had four SIUs with vetted personnel. Three SIUs each had 25

Bolivian National Police, and a fourth unit had 97 personnel. The SIUs

were located in La Paz, Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba. Two of the SIUs

collect intelligence, conduct investigations, and arrest targeted drug

traffickers, while the other two SIUs concentrate primarily on collecting

 10 Program start-up costs for the vetted units included expenditures for such items as recruiting,

vetting, training, equipment, facilities maintenance, salary supplements for foreign police, operational

support, and conducting investigations.

Table 2.11: Number of Vetted Units and

Officers on Board by Country, as of

September 30, 1998
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intelligence. DEA reported that the Bolivian SIUs’ efforts through fiscal

year 1998 resulted in 1,206 arrests and seizures of 3,201 kilograms of

cocaine hydrochloride (HCL), 5,392 kilograms of cocaine base, and $15.8

million in assets.

• Colombia had 4 vetted units consisting of 112 members. The Major

Investigations Unit in Bogota had 39 personnel, including both

investigators and prosecutors. This unit focused on drug trafficking in the

major cities of Colombia, such as Cali, Medellin, and Barranquilla. The

Financial Investigation Unit had 14 investigators who focused on money

laundering in financial institutions in Colombia’s major cities. The

Intelligence Group consisted of 39 personnel headquartered in Bogota and

operating in the major drug producing regions. This unit collected

intelligence to support investigations of Colombian drug trafficking

organizations by other CNP units. The fourth vetted unit, consisting of 20

members, monitors the diversion of precursor substances from legitimate

manufacturers for the production of illegal drugs. DEA reported that the

Colombian vetted units’ efforts through fiscal year 1998 resulted in 63

arrests and seizures of 6,398 kilograms of cocaine HCL and cocaine base, 6

kilograms of heroin, and $250,000 in U.S. currency.

• Mexico had 3 vetted units made up of 232 vetted and trained personnel.

The Mexico National SIU, operating out of Mexico City, had 14 Mexican

Federal Narcotics Investigators assigned to collect intelligence on Mexican

drug traffickers. The Border Task Forces had 106 Mexican Federal

Narcotics Investigators. The task forces operated out of regional

headquarters in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and Monterrey—all along the U.S.-

Mexico Border—and Guadalajara. The task forces had a mission similar to

the SIU, but the task force investigators were also responsible for

executing warrants and making arrests. The narcotics section of the

Organized Crime Unit was made up of 112 Mexican federal attorneyinvestigators and narcotics investigators. This unit’s mission was to use

information from court-ordered electronic intelligence collection to

investigate high-level drug trafficking groups, as well as drug-related

money laundering groups, throughout Mexico. The unit’s headquarters was

in Mexico City, but the assigned personnel were often located in other

cities. DEA did not report the number of arrests or seizures for the

Mexican vetted units, but noted there had been arrests made in three

major organizations, including one of the largest drug cartels in Mexico.

• Peru had 2 vetted units, with a total of 135 personnel. One unit, an

intelligence group, consisted of 52 vetted personnel and specialized in

collecting intelligence and targeting drug traffickers to support the second

unit, the investigation group with 83 vetted police. Both units were

headquartered in Lima and operated throughout the cocaine production

regions of Peru. DEA reported that the Peruvian vetted units’ efforts
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through fiscal year 1998 resulted in 199 arrests and seizures of 819

kilograms of cocaine HCL, 2,297 kilograms of cocaine base, 4,350 gallons

of precursor chemicals, and numerous weapons and ammunition.

In commenting on a draft of our report, DEA officials informed us that as

of April 1999, 2 vetted units with 25 and 75 vetted personnel, respectively,

were fully operational in Thailand; 1 vetted unit with a total of 16 vetted

personnel was operational in Brazil; and vetted antinarcotics police were

expected to be operational in Pakistan in early fiscal year 2000. The

officials also noted that assessments were scheduled for Ecuador and

Nigeria in May and June, respectively, to examine the future suitability of

vetted units in those countries.

DEA expanded its enforcement strategy in the 1990s to focus its

operations on what it refers to as the seamless continuum of drug

trafficking. It placed emphasis on investigating gangs, drug dealers, and

drug-related violence in local communities while continuing to target

higher level drug traffickers involved in major national and international

drug trafficking organizations. DEA’s programs and initiatives discussed in

this chapter—for example, its state and local task forces, its MET

Program, SOD’s initiatives, and its foreign operations—are consistent with

DEA’s mission and responsibilities to enforce the nation’s drug laws and

bring drug traffickers to justice, as described in chapter 1.

In carrying out its strategy, DEA’s domestic enforcement efforts placed

more emphasis on, and devoted more resources to, assisting and working

with local law enforcement agencies than in the past. Consequently, funds

and staff devoted to DEA’s State and Local Task Force Program increased

in the 1990s. Also, although not in substantial numbers in comparison to

DEA’s total dollar and staff resources, DEA began and continued to fund

and dedicate agents to the MET Program during the 1990s. These programs

targeted drug traffickers operating primarily at the local and regional

levels. DEA provided examples of what it considered to be successful

program operations at these levels and reported various program results,

including federal and state arrests and convictions and seizures of drugs

and assets.

To improve the effectiveness of its domestic and international efforts

directed at national and international drug trafficking organizations in the

1990s, DEA established and invested increased resources in SOD to

continue and enhance the investigative approach initiated under its former

Kingpin Strategy. SOD, like the Kingpin Strategy, emphasizes targeting the

Conclusions
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command and control communications of major traffickers. Consequently,

the number of DEA electronic surveillances rose significantly in the 1990s.

DEA documented the results of some Kingpin and SOD operations that it

considered to be successful in disrupting and dismantling major national

and international trafficking organizations. However, DEA did not compile

results data on all Kingpin and SOD operations, cases they supported, or

leads they disseminated.

DEA also made changes to improve its foreign efforts directed at

international drug trafficking organizations. In this regard, it has

participated in two major interagency programs established in the 1990s to

target major organizations in Latin America and Asia. The programs have

led to the arrests of some high-level drug traffickers. In addition, the

specially trained vetted units of foreign police initiated in recent years by

DEA may help increase the sharing of information and the trust level

between DEA and foreign police participating in those units. This, in turn,

may help DEA and its foreign counterparts in targeting major traffickers

and disrupting and dismantling trafficking organizations based in the

participating foreign countries, as indicated by the initial results reported

by DEA.

In its written comments on a draft of this report, DEA stated that, overall,

the report provides a detailed and factual background of DEA strategies

and special operations. DEA also provided a number of technical

comments and clarifications, which we incorporated in this chapter and

other sections of this report.

Agency Comments
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Control Strategy

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DEA’s strategic goals and objectives, along with its enhanced programs

and initiatives in the 1990s discussed in chapter 2, are consistent with the

strategic goals of ONDCP’s National Drug Control Strategy. Both the

National Strategy and DEA hope to reduce illegal drug supply and drugrelated crime and violence by disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking

organizations.

The National Strategy contains mid- and long-term measurable

performance targets1

 for 2002 and 2007 that identify the extent to which

the National Strategy seeks to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking

organizations. However, DEA has not yet established comparable

measurable performance targets for its operations.

Throughout this chapter, we use footnotes to explain various planning and

performance measurement terms as defined by OMB, ONDCP, and DOJ.

We also include a glossary at the end of this report, which provides an

alphabetical listing of the various planning and performance measurement

terms used in this report and their definitions.

DEA’s strategic goals and objectives, and enhanced programs and

initiatives in the 1990s for carrying out its mission are consistent with the

National Strategy’s strategic goals and objectives defining a 10-year

commitment to reduce drug abuse. DEA’s mission, as described in chapter

1, is an important element of the National Strategy and DEA, through the

implementation of its programs and initiatives as discussed in chapter 2, is

a major participant in the National Strategy. As discussed below, we

reviewed the National Strategy’s strategic goals and objectives, and

compared them with DEA’s strategic goals and objectives and its programs

for consistency.

ONDCP has produced National Strategies annually since 1989. Since 1996,

the National Strategy has included five strategic goals (listed in ch. 1) and

related strategic objectives. These goals and objectives are the basis for a

long-term national antidrug effort aimed at reducing the supply of and

demand for illicit drugs and the consequences of drug abuse and

trafficking. The goals define the major directives of the strategy. The

objectives, which are more narrowly focused, stipulate the specific ways in

which goals are to be obtained. The 1998 strategy provided a 10-year plan

to reduce illegal drug use and availability by 50 percent by the year 2007.

 1

 A performance target, as defined by ONDCP for the purpose of the National Strategy, means the

desired end state to be achieved; it is a measurable level of performance against which actual

achievement can be compared.

DEA’s Strategic Goals

and Objectives, and Its

Programs, Are

Consistent With the

National Strategy

National Strategy Goals and

Objectives
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The 1999 National Strategy also continued the goals but eliminated 1

objective, reducing the total number of objectives to 31.

The National Strategy is intended to guide the approximately 50 federal

agencies with drug control responsibilities. DEA has significant

responsibilities for helping to achieve the following three National Strategy

goals.2

• Strategy goal 2: Increase the safety of American citizens by substantially

reducing drug-related crime and violence.

• Strategy goal 4: Shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug

threat.

• Strategy goal 5: Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.

For these 3 strategy goals, the National Strategy has 15 supporting

objectives, at least 10 of which relate to DEA. Table 3.1 identifies the

strategy goals and objectives for which DEA has responsibilities.

 

2

 DEA has a small drug demand reduction program ($3.4 million for fiscal year 1999) that supports

strategy goal 1: Educate and enable America’s youth to reject illegal drugs as well as the use of alcohol

and tobacco.
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Strategy goals Strategy objectives

Strategy goal 2—Increase the safety of American citizens by

substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.

Objective 1—Strengthen law enforcement—including federal, state,

and local drug task forces—to combat drug-related violence, disrupt

criminal organizations, and arrest and prosecute the leaders of

illegal drug syndicates.

Objective 2—Improve the ability of High Intensity Drug Trafficking

Areas (HIDTA) to counter drug trafficking.

Objective 3—Help law enforcement to disrupt money laundering

and seize and forfeit criminal assets.

Strategy goal 4—Shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers

from the drug threat.

Objective 1—Conduct flexible operations to detect, disrupt, deter,

and seize illegal drugs in transit to the United States and at its

borders.

Objective 2—Improve the coordination and effectiveness of U.S.

drug law enforcement programs with particular emphasis on the

Southwest Border, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

Objective 3—Improve bilateral and regional cooperation with

Mexico as well as other cocaine and heroin transit-zone countries in

order to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.

Strategy goal 5—Break foreign and domestic drug sources of

supply.

Objective 1—Produce a net reduction in the worldwide cultivation of

coca, opium, and marijuana and in the production of other illegal

drugs, especially methamphetamine.

Objective 2—Disrupt and dismantle major international drug

trafficking organizations and arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate their

leaders.

Objective 3—Support and complement source country drug control

efforts and strengthen source country political will and drug control

capabilities.

Objective 4—Develop and support bilateral, regional, and

multilateral initiatives and mobilize international organizational

efforts against all aspects of illegal drug production, trafficking, and

abuse.

Source: GAO analysis of ONDCP’s 1998 Performance Measures of Effectiveness (PME) document

and DEA’s performance plan for fiscal year 2000.

Table 3.1: National Strategy Goals and Objectives for Which DEA Has Responsibilities
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Recently, as part of its reauthorization legislation,3 ONDCP became

responsible for monitoring the consistency between the drug-related goals

and objectives of drug control agencies to ensure that their goals and

budgets support and are fully consistent with the National Strategy. In its

National Drug Control Budget Summary for 1999, ONDCP reported that

DEA has various programs and initiatives that support strategy goals 1,4 2,

4, and 5.

DEA’s most recent planning document is its performance plan for fiscal

year 2000,5 which it issued in February 1999, in response to the

Government Performance and Results Act of 19936 (the Results Act).7 That

plan contains information on DEA’s vision, mission, strategic goals,

strategic objectives, and performance indicators.8

DEA listed three strategic goals and nine strategic objectives for carrying

out its mission:

• DEA strategic goal 1—disrupt/dismantle the leadership, command, control,

and infrastructure of drug syndicates, gangs, and traffickers of illicit drugs;

• DEA strategic goal 2—reduce the impact of crime and violence that is the

result of drug trafficking activity by providing federal investigative

resources to assist local communities; and

• DEA strategic goal 3—facilitate drug law enforcement efforts directed

against major drug trafficking organizations by cooperating and

coordinating with federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement and

intelligence counterparts.

 

3

 Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998, P.L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-

670 (1998).

4

 DEA has a small drug demand reduction program ($3.4 million for fiscal year 1999) that supports

strategy goal 1: Educate and enable America’s youth to reject illegal drugs as well as the use of alcohol

and tobacco.

5

 Drug Enforcement Administration GPRA Annual Performance Plan FY 2000, February 1999.

6

 P.L. 103-62.

7

 DOJ prepares strategic and annual performance plans to meet the requirements of the Results Act and

requires its component organizations, such as DEA, to prepare annual performance plans even though

they are not required to do so under the Act. DOJ considers its components’ performance plans to be

an integral part of the department’s annual summary performance plan.

8

 A performance indicator, as defined by OMB for the purposes of the Results Act, means a particular

value or characteristic used to measure output or outcome. Performance indicators are associated with

performance goals in the annual performance plan.

DEA’s Strategic Goals and

Objectives
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Along with its strategic goals, DEA listed the following nine strategic

objectives:

• DEA strategic objective 1—-attack the command and control of

international and domestic drug trafficking organizations through the

arrest, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration of their criminal leaders

and surrogates;

• DEA strategic objective 2—concentrate enforcement efforts along the

Southwest Border to disrupt, dismantle, and immobilize organized criminal

groups operating from Mexico;

• DEA strategic objective 3—direct enforcement efforts at the escalating

threat posed by heroin;

• DEA strategic objective 4—address the dual threats presented by

methamphetamine and resurgence in marijuana trafficking;

• DEA strategic objective 5—assist local law enforcement by deploying

METs into communities where drug trafficking and related violent crime

are rampant;

• DEA strategic objective 6—prevent the diversion of controlled substances

and control the distribution of chemicals used to manufacture illicit drugs;

• DEA strategic objective 7—enhance intelligence programs to facilitate

information sharing and develop new methods to structure and define drug

trafficking organizations;

• DEA strategic objective 8—support interdiction efforts to target drug

transshipments destined for the United States; and

• DEA strategic objective 9—-seize and forfeit assets and proceeds derived

from drug trafficking.

DEA did not align each of its objectives with any particular goals.

Because DEA is the nation’s lead drug enforcement agency, its strategic

goals and objectives and its programs should be consistent with the

National Strategy. Table 3.2 shows DEA’s strategic goals compared to

National Strategy goals for drug supply reduction.

Comparison of DEA

Strategic Goals and

Objectives, and Its

Programs, With the National

Strategy
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DEA strategic goals National Strategy goals for drug supply reduction

DEA strategic goal 1—In order to safeguard Americans, DEA

will disrupt/dismantle the leadership, command, control, and

infrastructure of drug syndicates, gangs, and traffickers of illicit

drugs that threaten Americans and erode the quality of life in our

communities.

DEA strategic goal 2—In order to reduce the impact of crime and

violence that is the result of drug trafficking activity, DEA will

provide federal investigative resources to assist local

communities.

DEA strategic goal 3—In order to facilitate drug law enforcement

efforts directed against major drug trafficking organizations, DEA

will cooperate and coordinate with our federal, state, local, and

foreign law enforcement and intelligence counterparts

National Strategy goal 2—Increase the safety of American citizens

by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.

National Strategy goal 4—Shield America’s air, land, and sea

frontiers from the drug threat.

National Strategy goal 5—Break foreign and domestic drug

sources of supply.

Source: GAO analysis of ONDCP’s 1999 National Drug Control Strategy and DEA’s performance plan

for fiscal year 2000.

DEA’s first strategic goal aimed at dismantling and disrupting drug

trafficking organizations is consistent with National Strategy goal 4, which

calls for shielding America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug

threat, as well as with goal 5, which calls for breaking foreign and

domestic sources of drug supply. DEA’s goal for dismantling and

disrupting trafficking organizations applies to all drug trafficking

organizations regardless of where they operate—in the United States, in

drug transshipment areas, at U.S. border areas, and in foreign countries.

Similarly, DEA’s strategic goal 2, which calls for providing federal

investigative resources to local communities for reducing drug-related

crime and violence, is consistent with National Strategy goal 2, which also

calls for reducing drug-related crime and violence.

DEA’s strategic goal 3, which calls for DEA to cooperate and coordinate

with federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement and intelligence

counterparts, is consistent with National Strategy goals 2, 4, and 5. By

coordinating and cooperating with other law enforcement and intelligence

groups, DEA’s coordinated efforts reach out in support of the National

Strategy’s three supply reduction goals.

As with its goals, DEA’s strategic objectives are also consistent with the

objectives of the National Strategy. For example, as can be seen in table

3.3, various DEA strategic objectives for dismantling and disrupting

domestic and international drug trafficking organizations, providing

Table 3.2: Comparison of DEA Strategic Goals With National Strategy Goals
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assistance to local communities to reduce drug-related violence, and

supporting drug interdiction efforts align with National Strategy objectives.

DEA strategic objectives National Strategy objectives

Assist local law enforcement by deploying METs into communities

where drug trafficking and related violence are rampant (DEA

strategic objective 5).

Concentrate enforcement efforts along the Southwest Border to

disrupt, dismantle, and immobilize organized criminal groups

operating from Mexico (DEA strategic objective 2).

Support interdiction efforts to target drug transshipments destined

for the United States (DEA strategic objective 8).

Attack the command and control of international and domestic drug

trafficking organizations through the arrest, prosecution, conviction,

and incarceration of their criminal leaders and surrogates (DEA

strategic objective 1).

Strengthen law enforcement, including federal, state, and local

drug task forces, to combat drug-related violence, disrupt criminal

organizations, and arrest and prosecute the leader of illegal drug

syndicates (National Strategy objective 1 for goal 2).

Conduct flexible operations to detect, disrupt, deter, and seize

illegal drugs in transit to the United States and U.S. borders

(National strategy objective 1 for goal 4).

Disrupt and dismantle major international drug trafficking

organizations and arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate their leaders

(National Strategy objective 2 for goal 5).

Source: GAO’s analysis of ONDCP’s 1999 National Drug Control Strategy and DEA’s performance

plan for fiscal year 2000.

In addition, as with its strategic goals and objectives, DEA’s programs and

initiatives in the 1990s as discussed in chapter 2 are also consistent with

the goals of the National Strategy. During the1990s, DEA has enhanced or

changed important aspects of its operations, that is, its strategies,

programs, initiatives, and approaches.

• DEA gave a higher priority than in the past to and increased resources for

working with and assisting state and local law enforcement agencies

through its State and Local Task Force Program and started the MET

Program to help combat drug–related violent crime in local communities.

• DEA established the Kingpin Strategy, which evolved into SOD, placing

greater emphasis on intercepting communications between top-level drug

traffickers and their subordinates (i.e., attacking the “command and

control” communications of major drug trafficking organizations) to

dismantle their entire trafficking operations.

• DEA started participating in two interagency programs—Linear Approach

and Linkage Approach—to target and investigate major drug trafficking

organizations in Latin America and Asia.

• DEA helped establish, train, and fund special foreign police units to

combat drug trafficking in certain key foreign counties, primarily in Latin

America.

Table 3.3: Comparison of Selected DEA and National Strategy Objectives
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These and other drug law enforcement programs and initiatives discussed

in detail in chapter 2 are consistent with National Strategy goals 2, 4, and 5

previously discussed in this chapter and described in table 3.1. For

example, DEA’s MET Program, started in 1995, is consistent with National

Strategy goal 2, which calls for increasing the safety of American citizens

by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.

The 1999 National Strategy established performance targets calling for

specific increases in the percentage of drug trafficking organizations

disrupted and dismantled. These targets are measurable and can be used

to assess the collective performance of drug control agencies responsible

for achieving them. However, although DEA is the lead drug enforcement

agency, it has not established similar measurable performance targets for

its own operations.

To measure the effectiveness and performance of the National Strategy,

ONDCP established 5 and 10 year performance targets and performance

measures.9 These performance targets and measures are intended, in part,

to enable policymakers, program managers, and the public to determine

efforts that are contributing to the strategic goals and objectives of the

National Strategy.

To track and measure progress in achieving the strategic goals and

strategic objectives of the National Strategy, ONDCP issued its

Performance Measures of Effectiveness (PME) system in February 1998.10

This system is a 10-year plan that identifies performance targets and

related performance measures as the means for assessing the progress of

the National Strategy in achieving its strategic goals and objectives. The

PME system contains 97 performance targets. Although originally

undertaken as a policy decision to bring more accountability to drug

policy, the PME system is now grounded in legislation. The Office of

National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998 requires ONDCP

to submit an annual report to Congress on the PME system. ONDCP issued

its first annual status report in February 1999.11

 

9

 A performance measure, as defined by ONDCP for the purposes of the National Strategy, means data,

variables, and events used to track progress toward performance targets. Measures show how progress

toward targets will be tracked.

10 Performance Measures of Effectiveness, A System for Assessing the Performance of the National

Drug Control Strategy, 1998–2007, Office of National Drug Control Policy, Feb. 1998.

11 National Drug Control Strategy 1999 Performance Measures of Effectiveness: Implementation and

Findings, Office of National Drug Control Policy, Feb. 1999.

DEA Has Not

Developed

Performance Targets

Consistent With Those

in the National

Strategy

National Strategy

Performance Measurement

System
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Beginning in 1996, interagency working groups involving federal agencies,

including DEA, along with outside experts developed the PME

performance targets through a consensual process. The performance

targets were incorporated into the PME plan issued in February 1998. After

the initial PME plan was issued, interagency working groups, including

those involving DEA, continued developing, refining, and implementing the

PME system during 1998. The working groups, among other things,

focused on

• developing specific action plans identifying the responsibilities of each

agency in working towards the PME performance targets and

• identifying annual targets that correspond to the achievement of the 5 and

10 year performance targets.

For each performance target, the PME system identifies a “reporting

agency” (or “agencies” when there is shared responsibility) and

“supporting agencies.” A reporting agency(s) is required to report to

ONDCP on progress in achieving the performance target. However, the

reporting agency is not necessarily the only agency responsible for

achieving the target. Supporting agencies are to assist with data collection

and assessment or have programs that contribute to achieving the target.

The initial 1998 PME system document identified performance targets

relating to disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations and

arresting drug traffickers. These performance targets called for specific

percentage increases in the number of domestic and international drug

trafficking organizations disrupted or dismantled and the number of drug

traffickers arrested by 2002 and 2007. DEA was designated as the sole

reporting agency for performance targets aimed at decreasing the

capabilities of domestic and international drug trafficking organizations

and traffickers. DEA shared reporting-agency responsibilities with HIDTAs

for the performance target aimed at drug trafficking organizations

identified in HIDTA threat assessments.

As a result of the PME implementation process in 1998, changes were

made to performance targets for drug trafficking organizations and drug

traffickers. These changes were reported in the 1999 PME report. The

performance target for domestic drug traffickers was deleted. The target

for international drug traffickers was combined with the target for

international drug trafficking organizations to focus on one manageable
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target. In addition, DEA was deleted as a reporting agency for the

performance target aimed at drug trafficking organizations identified in

HIDTA threat assessments.

Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 show the performance targets and related

performance measures for disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking

organizations, along with the current status of achieving the targets as

reported by ONDCP in its 1999 PME report.

Performance target Performance measure ONDCP current status statement

Target: By 2002, using a prioritized list

of domestic drug law enforcement

community designated targets, increase

by 5 points the percentage of drug

organizations disrupted, dismantled, or

otherwise rendered ineffective as

measured against the percentage

recorded in the 1997 base year. By 2007,

increase the target percentage by at

least 10 points above the base year.

Measure: The percentage of targeted

organizations on the counterdrug

community’s designated target list that are

disrupted, dismantled, or otherwise

rendered ineffective, measured annually.

Reporting agency: DEA

Supporting federal agencies: Department

of Defense (DOD), Department of State,

FBI, U.S. Customs Service, and the

Department of the Treasury.

Data source: To be determined.

Relevant data: None

Status: ONDCP will charter an interagency

working group to develop a consolidated

Major Drug Trafficking Organization Target

List. The working group will more clearly

define what constitutes a major drug

trafficking organization and what criteria will

be used to determine when an organization

has been disrupted, dismantled, or otherwise

rendered ineffective. Since no such list

currently exits, the base year will need to be

adjusted once the list has been developed.

Annual performance targets will be

constructed after the target list has been

developed.

Source: ONDCP’s 1999 National Drug Control Strategy PME report.

Table 3.4: National Drug Control Strategy Performance Target and Performance Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling

Domestic Drug Trafficking Organizations
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Performance target Performance measure ONDCP current status statement

Target: By 2002, measuring against the

prioritized list of community designated

targets established in the 1998 base year,

achieve a 50 percent success rate of

targeted organizations dismantled or

significantly disrupted by either (1) having

their principal leaders arrested and

incarcerated or otherwise rendered

ineffective; or (2) making substantial seizures

of those organizations’ narcotics, money, or

other assets, or arrests of their key network

associates, that significantly impair their

ability to operate at normal levels for an

extended period of time. By 2007, increase

the success rate to 100 percent as measured

against the 1998 base year list. For

additional targets added to the list after the

1998 base year, achieve a similar success

rate of at least 10 percent per year as

measured against the year in which they

were added to the list.

Measure: The percentage of designated

drug trafficking organizations dismantled or

significantly disrupted either through the

incarceration of their principal leaders or

through the substantial seizure of their

assets or the incarceration of their network

key associates, measured annually.

Reporting agency: DEA

Supporting federal agencies: Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA), DOD, FBI, and

the U.S. Customs Service.

Data Source: To be determined.

Relevant Data: None

Status: This target was revised by

combining two targets—trafficking

organizations and traffickers—identified in

the initial 1998 PME plan. Annual

performance targets are under

development.

Source: ONDCP’s 1999 National Drug Control Strategy PME report.

Performance target Performance measure ONDCP current status statement

Target: By 2002, increase the proportion of

drug trafficking organizations disrupted or

dismantled as identified in HIDTA threat

assessments by 15 percent above the

proportion in the 1997 base year. By 2007,

increase the proportion disrupted or

dismantled to 30 percent above the base

year ratio.

Measure: The proportion of identified drug

trafficking organizations disrupted or

dismantled by or within HIDTAs.

Reporting agency: Each HIDTA

Supporting federal agencies: DEA, DOD,

Department of State, FBI, U.S. Customs

Service, and the Department of the

Treasury.

Data Source: HIDTA threat assessments will

serve as the foundation of the list.

Relevant Data: The Bureau of Justice

Statistics collects data on the number of

traffickers convicted and sentenced. In 1991,

drug trafficking offenses accounted for 19

percent of all defendants convicted.

Status: The ONDCP HIDTA Director will

develop a consolidated list of the number of

drug trafficking organizations targeted by

each HIDTA. This HIDTA target will be

prepared prior to the beginning of each year.

At the end of each year, ONDCP will

measure the proportion of those targeted

organizations that have been disrupted or

dismantled. After the base year proportion

has been determined for 1997, the annual

target will be revised to reflect the target

proportion for each year.

Table 3.5: National Strategy Performance Target and Performance Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling International Drug

Trafficking Organizations and Arresting Their Leaders

Table 3.6: National Drug Control Strategy Performance Target and Performance Measure for Disrupting and Dismantling Drug

Trafficking Organizations in HIDTAs
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Source: ONDCP’s 1999 National Drug Control Strategy PME report.

As can be seen in the tables, the National Strategy performance targets and

measures are quantifiable and outcome oriented and can be readily used to

assess performance following collection of proposed baseline data on lists

of drug trafficking organizations. DEA, with assistance from supporting

agencies such as the FBI, is to report progress by the drug law

enforcement community in dismantling or disrupting a percentage of

identified domestic and international drug trafficking organizations.

However, ONDCP, in reporting on the current status of the performance

targets for which DEA is the reporting agency, noted that data on drug

trafficking organizations needed to assess performance had not been

identified nor had annual performance targets been established. Further,

according to ONDCP and DEA, neither the domestic nor international

designated target lists referred to in tables 3.4 and 3.5 have been

developed.

According to ONDCP officials, DEA and various supporting agencies are

working toward developing lists of domestic and foreign drug trafficking

organizations for use in pursuing the performance targets. ONDCP officials

said that the time frames for reporting on performance targets for

dismantling and disrupting drug trafficking organizations and their leaders

are (1) 1999 for defining organizations and developing trafficker lists, (2)

2000 for collecting data, and (3) 2001 for reporting on data and gauging

performance.

According to ONDCP’s 1999 report, its PME system tracks the

performance of the numerous programs that support each strategy goal

and objective. The accomplishment of National Strategy goals and

objectives generally require the contributions of many agency programs.

The PME system does not track an individual agency’s performance nor is

it designed to do so. According to ONDCP, agencies such as DEA are

required to track their own performance through their Results Act plans,

and these plans should be consistent with the National Strategy and the

PME system.

Over the years, DEA has used arrest and seizure data (drugs and assets)

along with examples of significant enforcement accomplishments, such as

descriptions of successful operations, to demonstrate its effectiveness in

carrying out its enforcement programs and initiatives. However, these data

are not useful indicators for reporting on results because arrest and

seizure data relate to outputs (activities) and not to outcomes (results).

These arrest and seizure data do not present a picture of overall

DEA Goals Do Not Include

Measurable Performance

Targets
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performance or of DEA’s level of success in achieving its goals. Further,

the use of arrest data as a performance indicator can be misleading

without information on the significance of the arrests and the extent to

which they lead to prosecutions and convictions. In addition, using arrest

data as a performance target can lead to undesirable consequences when

law enforcement agencies place undue emphasis on increasing the

numbers of arrests at the expense of developing quality investigations.

More recently, with passage of the Results Act, DEA has been attempting

to go beyond reporting outputs to reporting outcomes. In response to the

Results Act, DEA prepared annual performance plans for fiscal years 1999

and 2000 that contain information on its strategic goals and objectives and

its performance indicators.12

In its fiscal year 1999 performance plan issued in January 1998, DEA

described its strategic goals, strategies for achieving those goals, annual

goals, and performance indicators. DEA associated these goals, strategies,

and performance indicators with its various programs and initiatives.

For example, DEA’s strategic goals for “enforcement” provided that DEA

will

“... disrupt/dismantle the leadership, command, control, and infrastructure of drug

syndicates, gangs, and traffickers, of licit and illicit drugs that threaten Americans and

American interests.”

Under this goal, DEA’s primary strategy provided that DEA will

“... implement drug law enforcement strategies that target and attack the leadership and

infrastructure of major drug syndicates, gangs, and traffickers of licit and illicit drugs that

threaten America.”

Under its strategic goal for enforcement and related strategy, DEA listed

annual goals for its domestic enforcement program, including its

Southwest Border, Caribbean Corridor, methamphetamine, and heroin

initiatives. These annual goals generally stated that DEA would continue or

increase its investigative efforts leading to increased arrests and seizures

and a reduction in the trafficking capability of drug organizations. For

 

12 Among other requirements, the Results Act requires that performance plans (1) establish

performance goals; (2) express those goals in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form, unless

OMB approves otherwise; (3) establish performance indicators for assessing progress toward or

achievement of the goals; and (4) provide a basis for comparing actual program results with the

established goals.

DEA’s Performance Plan for

Fiscal Year 1999
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example, DEA’s annual goal for its general enforcement activities,

including its Southwest Border initiative, stated that:

“DEA will continue its investigative efforts, including the application of forfeiture laws,

especially along the Southwest border. This will produce an increase in the number of

arrests, removals, and seizures. The primary outcome will be a reduction in the trafficking

capability of drug organizations, particularly those associated with the Mexican Federation,

that use the southwest border in transshipment.”

To assess the extent to which it was accomplishing its strategic and annual

goals to reduce trafficking capability, DEA’s plan listed performance

indicators that were not results oriented. DEA planned to measure

performance, using data on total numbers of arrests and total number of

major criminal enterprises and other drug trafficking organizations

disrupted or dismantled. However, DEA did not identify performance

targets for its goals, such as the proportion of identified drug trafficking

organizations to be disrupted and dismantled, against which its

performance could be assessed. DEA’s fiscal year 1999 plan had no annual,

mid- or long-range performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug

trafficking organizations.

DEA noted in its performance plan for fiscal year 1999 that data on the

number of drug trafficking organizations had not been previously collected

and reported and would be available by March 1, 1998. But it never

reported these data in its subsequent performance plan for fiscal year

2000. DEA also pointed out that although several of its performance

indicators were in the developmental stage, their establishment would help

to provide the framework for future evaluations of DEA’s efforts.

DEA organized its fiscal year 2000 performance plan—issued in February

1999—differently from its 1999 plan to align it with its three major budget

activities—enforcement, investigative support, and program direction.

DEA organized its fiscal year 2000 plan around what it identified as its

three core business systems: (1) enforcement of federal laws and

investigations, (2) investigative support, and (3) program direction. Along

with information on its 3 core business systems and 15 subsystems, the

plan, as previously described, listed DEA’s strategic goals and objectives.

However, unlike its 1999 performance plan, the fiscal year 2000 plan did

not have clearly identifiable annual goals.

For its core business system for the enforcement of federal laws and

investigation, DEA listed the following:

DEA’s Performance Plan for

Fiscal Year 2000
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“Through effective enforcement effort, DEA will disrupt/dismantle the command & control,

and infrastructure of drug syndicates, gangs, and traffickers of licit and illicit drugs that

threaten Americans and American interests, including providing enforcement assistance to

American Communities to fight drug-related crime and violence.”

Related to its core business system for enforcement, DEA’s fiscal year

2000 performance plan listed a strategic goal and objectives for disrupting

drug trafficking organizations. DEA’s description of its core business

system and its strategic goal and objective are similar. However, as with its

fiscal year 1999 plan, DEA’s fiscal year 2000 plan does not include annual,

mid- or long-range measurable performance targets for disrupting or

dismantling drug trafficking organizations.

Although DEA does not have a performance target for dismantling

international drug trafficking organizations, it does have a performance

indicator that may lead to a performance target that is consistent with the

target in the National Strategy. DEA’s fiscal year 2000 performance plan

contains a performance indicator specifying that DEA plans to use data on

the number of targeted organizations disrupted or dismantled as a result of

DEA involvement in foreign investigations compared to the total number

of targeted organizations as a basis for measuring performance. The plan

notes, however, that DEA is currently not collecting data for this

performance indicator but expects to do so during fiscal year 1999.

For domestic drug trafficking organizations, DEA’s plan does not include a

performance indicator that is quantifiable and results oriented similar to

the one it specified for international drug organizations. DEA has no

performance indicator specifying that it will measure performance on the

basis of the number of targeted domestic organizations disrupted and

dismantled compared to the total number of targeted organizations.

Further, DEA’s fiscal year 2000 performance plan does not indicate that

DEA plans to collect data on domestic drug trafficking organizations for

development of a performance target that is consistent with the target in

the National Strategy. It is unclear whether DEA plans to develop a

performance target for its program aimed at disrupting and dismantling

domestic drug trafficking that would be consistent with the performance

target and the national effort called for in the National Strategy.

DEA’s fiscal year 2000 performance plan indicates that DEA will be

reporting on prior year arrests resulting in prosecutions and convictions as

a performance indicator for measuring its enforcement efforts. As required

by DOJ policy, to avoid perceptions of “bounty hunting” DEA and other

DOJ component organizations cannot specify performance targets for

arrests. However, DOJ’s policy would not preclude DEA from developing a
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performance target and performance indicator for domestic drug

trafficking organizations consistent with those in the National Strategy.

The National Strategy performance targets do not involve projecting

increased numbers of arrests; rather, they call for increasing the

percentage of targeted drug trafficking organizations dismantled or

disrupted.

In addition to the lack of result-oriented performance indicators and

performance targets for its programs aimed at domestic drug trafficking

organizations, DEA’s plan lacks performance targets and related

performance indicators for other mission-critical programs. For example,

DEA’s core business system for enforcement and one of its strategic goals

call for assistance to local communities to reduce drug-related crime and

violence. However, DEA has not established a performance target and

performance indicator that could be used to measure the results of its

assistance to local communities. In this regard, DEA has a strategic

objective calling for assistance to local law enforcement by deploying

METs, discussed in chapter 2, into communities where drug trafficking and

related crime are rampant. However, DEA has not identified a

performance target and performance indicator to measure the results of its

MET Program even though, as discussed in chapter 2, resources dedicated

to METs and other forms of assistance to local law enforcement have

continued to grow in the 1990s. Thus, it is unclear how DEA will measure

the results of its strategic objective calling for MET deployments.

In the program accomplishment and highlight section of its performance

plan for fiscal year 2000, DEA states that “[t]he effect of METs in reducing

violent crime has been clearly established in 1998.” The plan further points

out that a comparison of violent crime statistics before and after MET

deployments indicated reductions in violent crime in areas where MET

deployments occurred. Using this type of results-oriented data, DEA

should be able to specify a performance indicator that, when tied to a

measurable performance target, could be used to assess the results of the

MET Program in terms of actual versus expected performance.

In August 1998, DEA’s Chief for Executive Policy and Strategic Planning,

told us that DEA had not yet identified the performance goals and

indicators it will ultimately use. She told us that at the direction of the

Administrator, DEA was planning to bring its field representatives together

with headquarters officials to obtain their views and input on DEA’s goals,

strategies, and performance indicators. In April 1999, she told us that the

meeting with field representatives, which was initially planned for the fall

of 1998 but was delayed pending hiring of a contractor, was expected to be
Chapter 3

DEA Has Not Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National Drug

Control Strategy

Page 77 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

held by the summer of 1999. However, with the recent resignation of

DEA’s Administrator, these plans were placed on hold and not addressed

in DEA comments on a draft of this report.

In addition, in April 1999, DEA’s Chief for Executive Policy and Strategic

Planning told us that DEA would have to work with DOJ in developing

performance goals and indicators. In this regard, she said that DEA would

be following the direction provided by DOJ in its departmentwide drug

strategy.13 She also pointed out that ONDCP had not yet established a

baseline (agreed-upon target list) for its National Strategy performance

targets aimed at disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations.

In commenting on a draft of this report in June 1999, DEA pointed out that

DEA (1) has developed preliminary performance targets that were

included in DEA’s fiscal year 2001 budget submission to DOJ; (2) had

established a working group consisting of representatives from its

operations, strategic planning and executive policy, and resource

management staffs to further refine its performance targets; and (3) is

working with other DOJ components to develop performance targets and

measurements that will be consistent with the targets in the National

Strategy.

Measuring and evaluating the impact of drug law enforcement efforts is

difficult for several reasons. First, antidrug efforts are often conducted by

many agencies and are mutually supportive. It is difficult to isolate the

contributions of a single agency or program, such as DEA’s domestic

enforcement program aimed at disrupting and dismantling major drug

traffickers, from activities of other law enforcement agencies. Other

factors that DEA has little control over, such as drug demand reduction

efforts, may also affect drug trafficking operations.

Second, the clandestine nature of drug production, trafficking, and use

limits the quality and quantity of data that can be collected to measure

program performance. History has shown that drug trafficking

organizations continually change their methods, patterns, and operations

as law enforcement concentrates its resources and efforts on a specific

region or method. Drug law enforcement agencies must continuously deal

with unknown and imprecise data, such as the number of drug trafficking

organizations and the amount of illegal drugs being trafficked.

 

13 Drug Control Strategic Plan, U.S. Department of Justice, March 31, 1998.

Difficulties in Measuring

Drug Law Enforcement

Outcomes
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Control Strategy

Page 78 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Third, some of the data that are currently collected are not very useful in

assessing the performance of individual programs and agency efforts. As

previously mentioned, data collected on arrests, drug seizures, and assets

forfeited generally measure enforcement outputs but not outcomes.

Further, data collected on drug availability and consumption are generally

not designed to measure the performance of a single program or agency,

and such data are influenced by other factors in addition to enforcement

efforts.

DEA’s strategic goals and objectives as well as its programs and initiatives

are consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy. However, DEA has

not developed performance targets for its programs and initiatives aimed

at disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking organizations and arresting

their leaders.

We recognize the complexity and difficulty of measuring outcomes and

impact for drug law enforcement agencies operating in a clandestine drug

trafficking environment. Nevertheless, without measurable performance

targets and related performance indicators for its mission-critical

programs, it is difficult for program managers, policymakers, and others to

quantitatively assess DEA’s overall effectiveness and the extent to which

DEA’s programs are contributing to its strategic goals and objectives and

those of the National Strategy.

ONDCP has set specific measurable performance targets in the National

Strategy for achieving strategic goals that it shares with DEA. DEA has

worked with ONDCP and other federal drug control agencies to develop

performance targets for the National Strategy and for measuring the

progress of federal efforts toward those targets. However, although DEA is

the lead federal drug enforcement agency and reporting agency for several

National Strategy performance targets, it has not established similar

measurable performance targets for its own operations. In this regard,

DEA has not established similar measurable performance targets for its

operations in either its fiscal years 1999 or 2000 annual performance plans

although, as discussed below, it stated in its comments on a draft of this

report that it has developed preliminary targets for inclusion in its fiscal

year 2001 performance plan.

Measurable DEA performance targets, once finalized, coupled with

continued refinement of the National Strategy performance targets on the

basis of DEA input and leadership, along with DOJ guidance, should bring

DEA and ONDCP closer in pursuing their shared goals and objectives for

disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations. Such

Conclusions
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DEA Has Not Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National Drug

Control Strategy

Page 79 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

performance targets also should provide DEA with a better basis for

measuring its own progress in achieving its mission and for making

decisions regarding its resource needs and priorities as discussed in the

next chapter.

We recommend that the Attorney General direct the DEA Administrator to

work closely with DOJ and ONDCP to develop measurable DEA

performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking

organizations consistent with the performance targets in the National Drug

Control Strategy.

In its written comments on a draft of this report, although not directly

agreeing with our recommendation, DEA agreed with our principal finding

regarding measurable performance targets. However, it disagreed with our

draft conclusion relating to the finding, pointed out actions it was taking

relating to our recommendation, and requested guidance on bringing

closure to the recommendation.

DEA agreed with our principal finding that it had not included measurable

performance targets for disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking

organizations in its fiscal years 1999 and 2000 performance plans.

However, it disagreed with our draft conclusion that “In the absence of

such targets, little can said about DEA’s effectiveness in achieving its

strategic goals.” DEA indicated that this statement and supporting

information in this chapter gave the impression that DEA had not

attempted to develop performance targets.

DEA said that it has developed “preliminary performance targets” that

have been included in its fiscal year 2001 budget submission to DOJ and

that are to be refined for inclusion in subsequent budgets. To further refine

its performance targets, DEA said that it had established a working group

consisting of representatives from its operations, strategic planning and

executive policy, and resource management staffs. DEA also noted that it

is working with other DOJ components to develop performance targets

and measurements that will be consistent with the targets in the National

Drug Control Strategy. To recognize these actions, we added them to the

pertinent section of this chapter as an update to information previously

provided by DEA. We also modified our draft conclusion that little can be

said about DEA’s effectiveness without performance targets to clarify our

intent that it is difficult to quantitatively assess DEA’s overall effectiveness

without such targets.

Recommendation

Agency Comments and

Our Evaluation
Chapter 3

DEA Has Not Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National Drug

Control Strategy

Page 80 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

DEA’s stated actions are consistent with the intent of our

recommendation. However, because DEA performance targets are

preliminary and under review within the executive branch, they are subject

to change until February 2000 when DEA issues its annual budget

submission and performance plan, as part of DOJ’s submission, to

Congress. Further, DEA indicated that it cannot finalize its performance

targets and measures until a designated targeted list of international drug

trafficking organizations, as called for in the National Strategy, is

completed. Therefore, we are retaining our recommendation until DEA’s

preliminary performance targets are finalized for inclusion in its annual

performance plan and can be compared for consistency with those in the

National Strategy.

DEA and ONDCP also provided technical comments, which we

incorporated in this chapter where appropriate.
Chapter 4

DEA's Staffing Needs Determination and

Allocation Process for Fiscal Year 1998

Page 81 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

In order to carry out its mission and operations during the 1990s, including

the programs and initiatives discussed in chapter 2 and the strategies

discussed in chapter 3, DEA received funds to staff its operations through

several sources. These included its annual appropriations salaries and

expenses budget; DOJ’s Violent Crime Reduction Program (VCRP);1

 and

other reimbursable programs, such as OCDETF. This chapter focuses on

the process used to determine and allocate additional DEA positions

provided through its salaries and expenses budget. Specifically, it

discusses the process used in fiscal year 1998, which was, according to

DEA and DOJ officials, generally typical of the approach DEA has used in

other years.

The process used to determine the need for and to allocate additional DEA

staff is linked to the federal budget formulation and execution process and

reflects federal laws and budget guidelines promulgated by OMB. In fiscal

year 1998, the DEA process considered field input, changes in drug abuse

and drug trafficking patterns, and the Administrator’s priorities to prepare

its staffing enhancement estimates for its budget submission to DOJ.

DEA’s submission to DOJ estimated the need for 989 new total positions,

including 399 special agent positions. As a result of reviews by DOJ, OMB,

and ONDCP and consideration of the resources provided in DEA’s fiscal

year 1997 appropriation,2 the President’s fiscal year 1998 budget, which

was submitted to Congress in February 1997, requested a total of 345 new

positions for DEA, including 168 special agent positions. Congress

provided 531 additional positions, of which 240 were special agent

positions, with guidance as to how the positions were to be allocated. DEA

senior management then determined the allocation of additional staff,

considering congressional guidance and such other factors as field office

prior requests.

The process used to determine the staffing resources necessary to carry

out DEA’s mission is generally typical of the federal budget processes and

procedures that federal agencies are expected to follow. These processes

and procedures are established in federal law and budget guidelines

promulgated by OMB.

Each legislative session, the president is required by law to submit a

budget to Congress. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, as amended,

 

1

 VCRP was established by the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322,

as amended).

2

 See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation

Act, 1997, P.L. 104-208 and H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-863 (1996).

Federal Budget

Formulation Guidance

Provides Basis for

DEA Staffing Needs

Determination Process
Chapter 4

DEA's Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal Year 1998

Page 82 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

provides the legal basis for the president’s budget, prescribes much of its

content, and defines the roles of the president and the agencies in the

process. During budget formulation, the president establishes general

budget and fiscal policy guidelines. Policy guidance is given to agencies for

the upcoming budget year and later to provide initial guidelines for

preparation of agency budget requests. OMB Circular A-11 provides

instructions on the preparation of agency submissions required for OMB

and presidential review of budget estimates and for formulation of the

president’s budget.

The budget formulation process begins at the lowest organizational levels

of a federal agency and moves to the higher levels. A consolidated

agencywide budget is prepared for submission to OMB. This approach is

typical of federal agencies, although some have elaborate planning

processes that allow for objectives established at the top to guide budget

preparation. OMB reviews agency requests according to a process that

includes several stages—(1) staff review, (2) director’s review, (3)

passback, (4) appeals, and (5) final decisions. The final budget is prepared

and printed by OMB for submission to Congress no later than the first

Monday in February of each year, as required by law.

According to DEA and DOJ officials, the DEA fiscal year 1998 staffing

needs determination process began in the summer of 1995 and was typical

of DEA’s staffing determination process. Prior to the commencement of

the official budget formulation process, DEA domestic and foreign field

offices provided estimates of their staffing needs to DEA headquarters

program staff. Program and budget staff reviewed and considered these

estimates in the development of DEA’s budget submission with staffing

estimates, which were sent to DOJ in June 1996. In accordance with the

federal budget process, DOJ and OMB reviewed DEA’s budget submission

and staffing estimates, which resulted in some changes in the estimates.

ONDCP reviewed DOJ’s budget submission to OMB as part of the national

drug budget certification process,3

 which is distinct from, but occurs

simultaneously with, the budget formulation process and may also affect

DEA’s staffing estimates. Figure 4.1 depicts DEA’s fiscal year 1998 staffing

determination process.

 

3

 The Drug Budget Certification process was established by Congress in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of

1988, P.L. 100-690. The act required that the ONDCP director certify, in writing, that drug budget

submissions to ONDCP from program managers, agency heads, and department heads with national

drug control program responsibilities are adequate to implement the objectives of the National Drug

Strategy for the budget request year.

Fiscal Year 1998

Process for

Determining DEA’s

Staffing Needs
Chapter 4

DEA's Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal Year 1998

Page 83 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

[Figure 4.1 begins on the next page.]
Chapter 4

DEA's Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal Year 1998

Page 84 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May

1995

DEA

DOJ

OMB

Legend:

Pre-budget staffing estimate

preparation process

DEA: Aug.-Oct.

Domestic and foreign field

offices prepared and

submitted staffing estimates

to DEA headquarters.

1

Budget formulation process

1996

DEA: Apr.-May

In accordance with the

budget formulation process,

DEA headquarters program

and budget staff prepared

and revised, on the basis of 

the Administrator's 

comments, DEA's FY 98 

initiative-based submission 

and staffing estimates.

3 DEA: May

Administrator approved

the budget submission/

staffing estimates.

4

5 DEA: June

Budget submission/

staffing estimates were

sent to DOJ.

6 DOJ: June-Aug.

DOJ budget staff

received, reviewed,

and analyzed DEA

submission/staffing

estimates and sent

them back to DEA.

DEA: Dec.-Apr.

DEA headquarters

program and budget staff

reviewed field office

submissions and began

development of staffing

estimates.

2

1 23

4

Figure 4.1: Flowchart of DEA’s Fiscal Year 1998 Staffing Needs Determination Process
Chapter 4

DEA's Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal Year 1998

Page 85 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

DEA: Aug.

DEA reviewed DOJ's

budget staff analysis.

DEA administrator

participated in Attorney

General's hearing and

subsequently presented

DEA's appeal.

7

8 DOJ: Aug.-Sept.

Attorney General held

DEA budget hearing and

on receipt of DEA appeal

reviewed it and made her

final decision.

DOJ sent DEA budget

submission/staffing

estimates to OMB.

OMB: Sept.-Dec.

OMB budget staff

reviewed and analyzed

DEA's budget submission/

staffing estimates.

OMB staff sent their results

to the OMB Director.

OMB Director reviewed

examiners' recommendations.

OMB Director generally

discusses the overall

federal budget with

the President at this time.

OMB prepared DEA/DOJ

passback.

OMB sent DEA/DOJ

passback to DOJ

9 DOJ: Dec.

DOJ budget staff reviewed

OMB's passback and sent

DOJ's interpretation of the

passback to DEA.

10

11 DEA: Dec.

DEA prepared its appeal to

the OMB passback and

sent it to DOJ.

12 DOJ: Dec.

DEA submitted its appeal,

including the DEA appeal, to

OMB

13 OMB: Dec.

OMB reviewed DEA/DOJ's

passback appeal, including

staffing estimates.

DOJ and OMB agreed

on an overall spending

level for the department,

and DOJ distributed the

appeal amounts.

OMB: Dec.-Jan.

OMB prepared final budget

submission with assistance

from and review by DEA

and DOJ.

14

15 OMB: Feb.

OMB transmitted budget

submission to President

for submission to Congress

on Feb. 6th.

June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb.

1996 1997

5 11

6 8

7

10

9

13 14 15

12

$ Budget

Source: GAO analysis of DEA, OMB, and other information.

Figure 4.1: Continued
Chapter 4

DEA's Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal Year 1998

Page 86 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

DEA’s fiscal year 1998 staffing process began in the summer of 1995. Each

DEA domestic field division submitted a field management plan (FMP),

and foreign offices followed a less structured and more informal staffing

request process.

In an August 1995 memorandum to its domestic field divisions, DEA

headquarters provided direction and guidelines for preparation of the

fiscal year 1996-1997 FMPs. DEA requested detailed, specific, and realistic

enhancements for fiscal year 1998 for use in the formulation of DEA’s

fiscal year 1998 budget/staffing submission. According to DEA officials, an

FMP is supposed to be based on the Administrator’s vision statement,

which is provided to the field divisions; the local SAC’s vision statement,

which has previously been reviewed and approved by DEA headquarters;

and the drug threat that the division expects to confront. The 1995

memorandum directed each field division to indicate the resources it

would need. Through the FMPs, which were due in October 1995, DEA’s

domestic field divisions requested a total of 591 positions, including 369

special agent positions.

According to DEA officials, recommendations and requests for DEA

foreign office staffing enhancements and new foreign offices for fiscal year

1998 came from a variety of sources, including DEA country attachés (CA)4

and the foreign country through the U.S. Ambassador. Each of the four

foreign sections (Central America and the Caribbean, Europe and the

Middle East, Far East, and South America) within the Office of

International Operations at DEA headquarters was tasked with identifying

the issues, including staffing needs, within specific countries. In March

1996, according to a DEA official, the International Operations staff,

including the Chief, Deputy Chief, and section heads of International

Operations, met to discuss recommendations from the four sections. The

official said that to assess and justify staffing requests for their respective

regions, DEA foreign section staff used regional and individual DEA

country plans, as well as foreign situation and quarterly trends in

trafficking reports, which provided context and background. Foreign

operational needs were discussed in terms of DEA’s goals and objectives

and prioritized. DEA officials told us that International Operations

 

4

 DEA provided the following description of the National Security Decision Directive 38 (NSDD 38)

Process. NSDD 38 requires DEA to gain an ambassador’s approval prior to opening an office or adding

additional positions to an existing office. Before seeking ambassadorial approval under NSDD 38, DOJ

policy requires that DEA obtain approval from DOJ’s Executive Office of National Security. Various

bureaus within the State Department are to provide an ambassador with advice pertaining to any

NSDD 38 request, but the ambassador is the final approving authority. As a matter of course, an

ambassador is to seek host nation consent prior to granting NSDD 38 approval.

DEA Domestic and Foreign

Field Offices Provided

Staffing Estimates
Chapter 4

DEA's Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal Year 1998

Page 87 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

communicated the results of this meeting (as a discussion document) to

DEA’s budget section.

In accordance with the federal budget formulation process, DEA budget

staff prepared the agency’s spring budget submission to DOJ, including

staffing estimates. After review and approval by its executive staff and the

Administrator, DEA sent DOJ its budget submission, which included 6

initiatives with identified additional staffing needs of 9895 total positions;

399 were special agent positions, and 590 were support positions.

For preparing DEA’s budget submission to DOJ, DOJ budget officials said

DOJ provides instructions and usually guidance; and, according to DEA

officials, the DEA Administrator also usually provides guidance. Although

the documents sent to the agencies varied each year, DOJ provides written

planning guidance and instructions in April, about 17 months prior to the

beginning of the budget year. However, officials said that informal

guidance was usually available earlier. The DEA Administrator may also

issue a budget call memorandum to all program managers listing his

priorities. According to DEA and DOJ budget officials, for its fiscal year

1998 guidance, DOJ used an amended version of its fiscal year 1997

guidance. In addition, DEA budget officials said that the DEA

Administrator sent out a budget call memorandum in February 1996

indicating his priorities.

However, DEA budget officials said that they actually began to develop

DEA’s fiscal year 1998 budget submission/staffing estimates in December

1995, prior to the guidance, and continued to work through May 1996. As

part of this process, officials said that DEA budget staff considered the

needs of field and headquarters offices, analyzed information on emerging

drug trends, and held discussions with DEA program managers. Budget

staff said that after canvassing the program managers, they presented the

proposed budget submission and staffing request to the Administrator in

March 1996. According to these staff, on the basis of the Administrator’s

comments, they then prepared DEA’s final fiscal year 1998 budget

submission/staffing request to DOJ, which DEA’s Executive Staff and the

Administrator reviewed and approved in May.

In June 1996, DEA sent its fiscal year 1998 budget request with estimates

of additional staffing needs to DOJ. In its submission, DEA estimated a

 

5

 This number does not include positions to be funded through DEA’s Diversion Fee Account, which

are included in a separate program-specific budget request. DEA enforces the Comprehensive Drug

Abuse and Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-513) as it applies to the registration of handlers

of controlled substances (e.g., manufacturers, distributors, importers, exporters, and others).

DEA’s Fiscal Year 1998

Budget Submission to DOJ

Included Estimates of

Additional Staff Needed
Chapter 4

DEA's Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal Year 1998

Page 88 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

need for 989 additional positions, including 399 special agent positions and

590 support positions (e.g., diversion investigators, chemists, intelligence

analysts, and professional and clerical staff). DEA identified, prioritized,

and requested funding, including staffing enhancements, for six specific

initiatives.

• Countering violent crime: This included staffing estimates (193 total/98

special agents) for the MET Program and for converting 8 provisional state

and local task forces to program-funded status.

• Methamphetamine strategy: This initiative included estimated staffing

enhancements (279 total/127 special agents), including positions to convert

7 provisional state and local task forces to program-funded status, to fund

a comprehensive approach for attacking methamphetamine abuse.

• Southwest Border project: This included estimated staffing enhancements

(212 total/96 special agents) to continue DOJ’s interagency strategy against

drug trafficking on the Southwest Border.

• Domestic heroin enforcement: This initiative included estimated staffing

enhancements (104 total/53 special agents) to continue implementation of

DEA’s 5-year heroin strategy.

• International crime: This included estimated staffing enhancements (76

total/25 special agents) to (1) open DEA country offices in Tashkent,

Uzbekistan; Vientiane, Laos; Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; Lisbon,

Portugal; and Managua, Nicaragua; (2) provide additional support to DEA

offices in Mexico City, Panama City, New Delhi, Bangkok, and Hong Kong;

and (3) establish an International Chemical Control Center in order to

address the growing international aspects of drug production,

transshipment, and trafficking.

• Investigative shortfalls: This initiative included estimates of resources and

staffing enhancements (125 total) needed to replace lost asset forfeiture

revenues, provide support staff for domestic field offices, and provide

additional basic and refresher training for special agents and DEA support

staff.

The submission included justifications for each initiative and reflected

DEA’s internal budget/staffing determination process. For example, on the

basis of changing trends and input from the field, DEA’s fiscal year 1998

budget submission proposed a methamphetamine initiative,6

 including

domestic and international staff enhancements, to fund a comprehensive

 

6

 According to officials, however, DEA did not wait for the completion of the fiscal year 1998 budget

cycle to address the methamphetamine problem. Although DEA had no base budget for the

methamphetamine problem in 1996, it dedicated 405,000 agent hours, or the equivalent of 195 full-time

agents, to methamphetamine investigations in fiscal year 1995. The hours dedicated to

methamphetamine were expected to rise in fiscal year 1996.
Chapter 4

DEA's Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal Year 1998

Page 89 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

approach for attacking methamphetamine abuse. To justify its fiscal year

1998 estimates, DEA provided (1) DAWN data that indicated a steady

increase in the number of methamphetamine-related emergency room

episodes and deaths and (2) statistics indicating an increased use of and

trafficking in methamphetamine and the proliferation of clandestine drug

laboratories in both traditional and new locations.

In accordance with the budget formulation process, DEA’s fiscal year 1998

budget submission was reviewed by DOJ Justice Management Division

(JMD) budget staff and the Attorney General between June and August,

1996. According to DOJ budget staff, as in other years, to assess DEA’s

fiscal year 1998 enhancements and the corresponding justifications, the

budget staff considered the (1) overall illegal drug situation at the time,

including drug trends and patterns; (2) link between the specific request

and ONDCP, DOJ, and DEA goals, strategies, and indicators; (3) facts and

arguments used by DEA to justify the request; and (4) level of resources

requested relative to the justified need, including prior year appropriations.

As a result of their analysis of DEA’s fiscal year 1998 budget submission,

DOJ budget staff estimated that DEA would need 771 additional positions,

including 311 special agents, to support the 6 initiatives. This was 218

fewer total positions, including 88 special agent positions, than DEA

estimated. Over half of the difference between DEA’s and DOJ’s estimates

can be accounted for by DOJ’s not having included positions to convert

certain state and local task forces to permanent funding status under the

violent crime and methamphetamine initiatives. DOJ argued that (1) local

entities must continue to contribute to these efforts to maintain the

integrity of the intergovernmental relationship; (2) additional resources

were available to these entities through other DOJ state and local grant

programs; and (3) in the case of the methamphetamine initiative, further

assessment was needed before conversions were made. DOJ budget staff

recommended fewer positions than DEA for five of the DEA initiatives but

concurred with DEA’s staffing estimates for the investigative shortfall

initiative. These recommended changes in staffing estimates, including the

justifications provided, are summarized below.

• Violent crime: In addition to not including positions to convert state and

local task forces to permanent status, as previously discussed, budget staff

recommended fewer additional agent positions for the MET Program. DOJ

staff concluded that four new MET teams for deployment to areas with

higher numbers of outstanding requests were sufficient to keep the waiting

time for a MET deployment to acceptable limits.

DOJ Changed Staffing

Estimates for DEA’s

Initiatives
Chapter 4

DEA's Staffing Needs Determination and Allocation Process for Fiscal Year 1998

Page 90 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

• Methamphetamine: Most of the difference between DEA’s and DOJ’s

staffing estimates for this initiative can be attributed to DOJ’s not including

positions for state and local task force conversion. DOJ also did not

recommend additional chemists, concluding that DEA had sufficient

chemist resources; or an additional agent for demand reduction to increase

public awareness of methamphetamine, given DEA’s other critical needs.

Budget staff recommended 2 DEA clandestine lab regional training teams

to teach 26 classes annually, rather than 4 teams to teach 40 classes

annually.

• Southwest Border: DOJ budget staff did not recommend 5 additional

chemists and 14 additional support staff, which were included in DEA’s

submission. DOJ concluded that DEA had sufficient resources to meet

these needs.

• Domestic heroin: Asserting that DEA had sufficient chemists to meet its

desired staffing ratio, DOJ budget staff did not recommend the five

chemists and two clerical support positions included in DEA’s estimates

for this initiative.

• International: DOJ budget staff recommended 22 fewer total positions,

including 6 fewer special agent positions, than DEA estimated for this

initiative. More than half of these 22 positions (2 chemists, 4 foreign

diversion investigators, and 6 support staff) were to establish an

International Chemical Control Center. DOJ argued that DEA could use

chemists from other places to meet these needs and use diversion

investigators from key locations in other parts of the world to provide

intelligence to the Center. DOJ also did not recommend opening new DEA

offices in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, or Lisbon, Portugal,

contending that DEA lacked “substantive rationale” for offices in these

locations. DOJ’s estimates also included no staffing enhancements for

Bangkok, Thailand, asserting that DEA had sufficient staffing resources to

assist Thai police in collecting intelligence about the emerging

methamphetamine problem and no additional special agent for Panama,

concluding that DEA had not provided “substantive reasons” for that

agent.

The DOJ budget staff review was followed on August 2, 1996, by the

Attorney General’s hearing7 on DEA’s fiscal year 1998 budget submission.

Three working days before the hearing, DOJ budget officials provided their

analysis to DEA. According to DOJ budget officials, during the hearing

DEA had the opportunity to appeal DOJ’s proposed changes in DEA’s

 

7

 The hearing is usually attended by the Attorney General, the DEA Administrator, the DOJ budget

analyst, and JMD officials.
Chapter 4

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Page 91 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

submission and to provide additional information to justify its budget

initiatives and enhancements before the Attorney General’s final decision.

On August 12, 1996, the Administrator submitted an appeal to the Attorney

General in which he requested reconsideration of some of the DOJ budget

staff’s recommended changes. The appeal asserted DEA’s need for staff

positions to convert certain state and local task forces, associated with its

violent crime reduction and methamphetamine efforts, from provisional to

program-funded status. It also addressed DEA’s need for resources for its

clandestine laboratory cleanup efforts; items previously funded partially by

asset forfeiture funds, including awards to informants and marijuana

eradication efforts; and in-service training. Nevertheless, for fiscal year

1998, the estimates for additional staffing for DEA included in DOJ’s OMB

submission were the same as those recommended by DOJ budget staff and

previously discussed. Table 4.1 shows the differences between DEA’s

estimates for additional staffing and those proposed to OMB by DOJ.

Additional total and special agent positions

DEA staffing

estimates to DOJ

June 1996

DOJ’s DEA staffing

estimates to OMB

September 1996

Initiative Total

Special

agents Total

Special

agents

Violent crime 193 98 94 48

Methamphetamine 279 127 208 96

Southwest Border 212 96 193 96

Domestic heroin 104 53 97 53

International crime 76 25 54 18

Investigative shortfall 125 0 125 0

Total 989 399 771 311

Source: DEA Fiscal Year 1998 Spring Planning Estimates, June 1996, and DEA Fiscal Year 1998

Office of Management and Budget Submission, September 1996.

DEA’s fiscal year 1998 budget submission was sent to OMB for review in

September 1996 as part of DOJ’s budget request. According to OMB

officials, an OMB budget examiner initially reviewed the DOJ budget

submission, and the results were presented to and reviewed by the OMB

policy officials. Generally, a complete set of budget proposals is presented

to the president by early December for his approval. Subsequently, OMB

staff prepares the agency passbacks.

An OMB official described OMB’s approach to DOJ’s fiscal year 1998

budget submission as “flexible.” That is, as in other years, OMB made

suggestions regarding specific DOJ activities, providing DOJ with an

Table 4.1: Comparison of DEA and DOJ

Estimated Additional DEA Total and

Special Agent Positions for Fiscal Year

1998

OMB Specified Minimum

Funding for Certain DEA

Initiatives, but Indicated No

Staffing Levels
Chapter 4

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Page 92 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

overall dollar level and specifying minimum funding for certain funding

floors. OMB officials said that OMB did not make account-level

recommendations, leaving those decisions to the Attorney General to

ensure that the budget reflected DOJ’s priorities.

By early December 1996, OMB sent DOJ’s fiscal year 1998 passback in

which it recommended an overall DOJ budget lower than DOJ’s

submission. For DEA, the passback specified minimum funding for the

methamphetamine strategy, the Southwest Border project, and the

domestic heroin strategy, but it did not discuss specific staffing estimates

or foreign enhancements. Prior to the passback, DEA had received its

fiscal year 1997 appropriation, but we were unable to ascertain how it

affected the passback.

According to DOJ budget officials, DOJ reviewed OMB’s fiscal year 1998

DOJ passback to determine what could be funded according to the

Attorney General’s priorities. They said that as a result of OMB’s specifying

funding levels for DEA’s methamphetamine, Southwest Border, and heroin

initiatives, no funds for the enhancements in other initiatives were

available within the DEA budget submission. The DOJ budget officials said

that they then sent DOJ’s interpretation—which was based on the Attorney

General’s priorities—of the OMB passback to DEA.

According to DOJ budget section officials, DEA developed its appeal to the

OMB passback and then presented it to OMB, through DOJ, in early

December 1996. DEA’s specific staffing-related appeals and outcomes

were as follows:

• Methamphetamine initiative: DEA requested additional resources,

including 131 positions. DOJ and OMB agreed to a slight increase in the

funded amount to cover 74 positions.

• Southwest Border initiative: DEA sought 131 additional positions,

including 90 special agents. DOJ and OMB agreed to increase the funded

amount to cover the additional agents.

OMB and DOJ officials reported that the method used to settle appeals

varied from year to year. In fiscal year 1998, OMB and DOJ agreed on an

overall spending level on appeal and DOJ’s spread of the increase, which

provided DEA with funding to cover additional positions for both the

methamphetamine and Southwest Border initiatives described above.

DEA/DOJ Reviewed OMB

Passback and Appealed It

With Some Success
Chapter 4

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Page 93 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Concurrent with departmental and OMB reviews of budget submissions,

each agency with a drug mission is required by the drug budget

certification process to submit a drug control budget to ONDCP. However,

in 1996, due to the appointment of a new ONDCP Director and the

reformulation and consequent late release of ONDCP’s drug strategy, the

national drug budget certification process did not follow ONDCP’s

established procedures and schedule. Specifically, ONDCP requested only

one fiscal year 1998 budget submission in September 1996, coincident with

the OMB deadline.

On November 8, 1996, while OMB was reviewing DOJ’s budget submission,

DOJ sent its budget request to ONDCP. On November 18, 1996, for

consideration before finalizing DOJ’s fiscal year 1998 budget request, the

ONDCP Director advised the Attorney General of two DEA program

initiatives that did not appear to have been included in DOJ’s submission.

The initiatives in question were (1) the continued expansion of vetted law

enforcement units in key source and transit countries and (2) a request for

additional resources for DEA’s Domestic Cannabis

Eradication/Suppression Program. The Director’s letter did not specifically

discuss staffing related to the initiatives.8

 Final ONDCP budget

certification was withheld until ONDCP reviewed DOJ’s final budget

submission. According to DOJ and ONDCP officials, DEA received

sufficient resources in its fiscal year 1997 appropriation to address the

ONDCP Director’s concerns. Therefore, on the basis of ONDCP’s final

review, the Director notified the Attorney General on February 7, 1997—1

day after the President submitted the fiscal year 1998 budget request—that

the resources requested by DOJ were certified as adequate to implement

the goals and objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy.

The President submitted his fiscal year 1998 budget to Congress on

February 6, 1997. As a result of the iterative process between DEA/DOJ

and OMB over DEA staffing estimates and after consideration of the

resources provided in DEA’s fiscal year 1997 appropriation,9

 the

President’s budget requested 345 new positions, including 168 special

agents, for DEA domestic offices. As shown in table 4.2, the number of

total positions requested was approximately one-half the number DOJ

 

8

 Although no specific mention of DEA staffing was made in the ONDCP certification correspondence

for fiscal year 1998, DEA officials indicated that during fiscal year 1998, DEA acted on the ONDCP

Director’s recommendations for additional staffing for DEA offices in Santo Domingo, Dominican

Republic; Port-au-Prince, Haiti; and Nassau.

9

 DEA’s fiscal year 1997 appropriation, as part of DOJ’s appropriation, was enacted on September 30,

1996. See Department of Justice Appropriations Act of 1997, P.L. 104-208; and H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-

863.

ONDCP Certified DOJ/DEA

Budget Submission

The President’s Fiscal Year

1998 Budget Submission
Chapter 4

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Page 94 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

initially estimated in its OMB submission. The number of special agents

requested was approximately 50 percent of the original DOJ estimates.

Some of the differences between the DOJ estimates and the DEA staffing

request in the President’s budget submission reflected changes

recommended by DOJ or OMB, which were previously discussed.

However, other revisions took into account DEA’s fiscal year 1997

appropriation. For example, according to DOJ officials, although DEA’s

international crime initiative was not included in the President’s budget

submission for fiscal year 1998, DEA was able to staff the Vientiane and

Managua offices, included in that initiative, with fiscal year 1997 funds

from the Source Country Initiative.10 In addition, because Congress

provided almost twice the funds for the MET Program requested by DEA

in fiscal year 1997, the program was fully funded (130 agents were

provided) as of that year. Additional funds for the MET Program, which

had been included in the fiscal year 1998 violent crime initiative, were no

longer necessary.

Additional total and special agent positions

DOJ’s DEA staffing

estimates to OMB

September 1996

President’s DEA staffing

request to Congress

February 1997

Initiative Total

Special

agents Total

Special

agents

Violent crime 94 48 a a

Methamphetamine 208 96 74 60

Southwest Border 193 96 192 96

Domestic heroin 97 53 60 12

International crime 54 18 a a

Investigative shortfall 125 0 19 0

Total 771 311 345 168

a

The conference report for DEA's fiscal year 1997 appropriation provided an additional 75 agents for

source countries and 130 special agents for the MET Program, thereby addressing at least some of

DOJ's initial estimates for the violent crime and international crime initiatives (H.R. Conf. Rep. No.

104-863).

Source: DEA Fiscal Year 1998 Office of Management and Budget Submission, September 1996, and

DEA Fiscal Year 1998 Authorization and Budget Request to Congress.

 10 The conference report for DEA’s fiscal year 1997 appropriation included a source

country/international strategy, which provided an additional 75 agents, to increase on-site DEA agents

in source countries. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-863.

Table 4.2: Comparison of DOJ’s

Estimates and the President’s Request

for Additional DEA Total and Special

Agent Positions for Fiscal Year 1998
Chapter 4

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Page 95 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

As shown in table 4.3, the conference committee recommended 531

additional positions, of which 240 were special agent positions. On the

basis of the recommendations of the House and Senate Appropriations

Committees, the conference committee also provided guidance as to how

those positions were to be allocated, including a new Caribbean initiative.

During the fiscal year 1998 appropriations process, the House

Appropriations Committee recommended, and Congress approved as part

of the conference committee’s report on DEA’s appropriation, a new

Caribbean initiative, which was not included in the President’s budget.

According to the House Appropriations Committee report, this initiative

was proposed to address the increase in drug trafficking throughout the

Caribbean. The initiative provided 60 additional DEA special agents for

Puerto Rico, the Northern Caribbean, and south Florida.

In addition, the conference committee recommended additional positions,

above the President’s request, for the heroin and investigative shortfall

initiatives. On the basis of the Senate Appropriations Committee’s

recommendation, the Conference Committee’s report included 120 new

positions, 24 of which were special agents (twice the number of total and

special agent positions in the President’s budget request), to continue

efforts to reduce heroin trafficking within the United States. The

Conference Committee also identified the need for 85 additional

intelligence analysts for the investigative shortfall initiative.

The President signed DEA/DOJ’s fiscal year 1998 appropriation into law on

November 26, 1996.

Congress Added Staff

for a New Caribbean

Initiative and Changed

Staffing Recommended

for Other DEA

Initiatives
Chapter 4

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Page 96 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Additional total and special agent positions

President’s DEA staffing

request to Congress

February 1997

Fiscal year 1998 DOJ

appropriation conference

report with DEA staffing

guidance

November 1997

Initiative Total

Special

agents Total

Special

agents

Methamphetamine 74a 60 74 60b

Southwest Border 192 96 192 96

Domestic heroin 60 12 120 24c

Investigative shortfall 19 0 85 0

Caribbean N/A N/A 60 60

Total 345 168 531 240

Notes: N/A—Initiative not included at that point in the process.

a

Fourteen of the positions were requested through VCRP.

b

The conference report called for 54 special agents in accordance with the House report. The House

report also identified six additional agent positions to conduct clandestine lab training. Fourteen

positions were provided through VCRP.

c

The conference report called for 120 positions, in accordance with the Senate report. The Senate

language specified that 24 of the positions be special agents.

Source: DEA FY 1998 Authorization and Budget Request to Congress; the Departments of

Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, P.L.

105-119 (1997); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-405; H.R. Rep. No. 105-207; and S. Rep. No. 105-48.

After receipt of its annual appropriation, DEA is responsible for budget

execution and the allocation of new staff. In addition to the guidance

provided by Congress, DEA officials said they consider factors, such as

recently changing drug trends, to determine that allocation.

For fiscal year 1998, according to a DEA official involved in the allocation

process that year, DEA’s Executive Policy and Strategic Planning,

Operations Division, Financial Management Division, and Office of

Resource Management staff prepared a draft allocation for the additional

resources provided in DEA’s appropriation. The official indicated that

among the factors considered in determining the allocation of additional

staff were congressional direction; the number of agents added by

Congress, broken out by mission and team; FMPs and any other written

requests from the field divisions; DEA and DOJ strategies, initiatives, and

priorities, including the Southwest Border and methamphetamine plans;

actual hours worked by agents on particular types of cases; and drug

trends that had emerged since the original fiscal year 1998 budget

submission. The recommendations were sent to the DEA Administrator for

review and final approval.

Table 4.3: Comparison of the

President’s Request and Congress’

Appropriations Guidance for DEA

Additional Total and Special Agent

Positions for Fiscal Year 1998

DEA’s Fiscal Year 1998

Allocation Process

Considered a Variety of

Factors
Chapter 4

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Page 97 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

DEA allocated 531 new positions, including 240 special agent positions, for

the 5 initiatives included in its appropriation. As shown in table 4.4, DEA’s

fiscal year 1998 staffing allocation followed Congress’ appropriations

guidance.

Additional total and special agent positions

Fiscal year 1998 DOJ

appropriation conference

report and DEA staffing

guidance

November 1997

DEA fiscal year 1998

staffing allocation

February 1998

Initiative Total

Special

agents Total

Special

agents

Methamphetamine 74a 60 74 60

Southwest Border 192 96 192 96

Domestic heroin 120 24b 120 24

Investigative shortfall 85 0 85 0

Caribbean 60 60 60 60

Total 531 240 531 240c

a

The conference report called for the 54 special agents in accordance with the House report. The

House report also identified six additional agent positions to conduct clandestine lab training.

Fourteen positions were provided through VCRP.

b

The conference report called for 120 positions, in accordance with the Senate report. The Senate

language specified that 24 of the positions be special agents.

c

DEA also allocated 45 additional positions provided through other funding sources for a total of 576

positions allocated, of which 245 were special agents.

Source: The Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies

Appropriations Act, 1998, P.L. 105-119 (1997); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-405; H.R. Rep. No. 105-207;

S. Rep. No. 105-48; and DEA.

The process used for determining DEA’s staffing needs, as carried out in

fiscal year 1998, was systematically linked to its budget formulation

process. The DEA process was typical of and consistent with the

processes and procedures that federal agencies are expected to follow,

according to federal laws and regulations and procedures promulgated by

OMB. Moreover, the DEA process considered factors related to DEA’s

ability to carry out its mission, including emerging drug trafficking trends,

staffing requests from the field, the Administrator’s vision statement, and

the SAC’s vision statement from each field office. Once Congress approved

DEA’s fiscal year 1998 appropriation, DEA senior management

systematically determined the allocation of the additional staff to

headquarters and field offices, taking into consideration congressional

guidance and such factors as field office requests.

Table 4.4: Comparison of Congress’

Appropriations Guidance and DEA’s

New Staffing Allocation for Additional

DEA Staffing and Special Agent

Positions for Fiscal Year 1998

Conclusions
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field

Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 98 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

During our review, we visited four Drug Enforcement Administration

(DEA) domestic field divisions—Los Angeles, CA; Miami, FL; New Orleans,

LA; and Washington, D.C./Baltimore, MD. We also visited three foreign

country offices—Bogota, Colombia; LaPaz, Bolivia; and Mexico City,

Mexico—and the Caribbean (Puerto Rico) Division, which has both

foreign and domestic responsibilities. The following profiles provide a

snapshot of each division/office at the time we performed our work at

those locations between February and September 1998. The profiles

include information, as of that time (unless otherwise noted), on the (1)

geographic region covered by each division/office and its organizational

structure; (2) drug trafficking situation and threat faced by each

division/office; (3) enforcement response of each division/office in terms

of priorities, programs, and initiatives; and (4) enforcement statistics and

case examples. Many of the programs and initiatives referred to in the

profiles are generally described in chapter 2 of this report. We developed

the profiles on the basis of information—including various documents and

statistical data—provided by DEA field officials, although we could not

always obtain comparable information from all divisions/offices. We did

not independently verify the accuracy of the information provided.
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 99 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

DEA’s Los Angeles Division covers a vast geographic area that includes

portions of California and all of Nevada, Hawaii, Guam, Saipan, the

Republic of Palau, and American Samoa. Los Angeles has the busiest

maritime container port complexes in the United States at the ports of

Long Beach and Los Angeles. Los Angeles International airport is the third

busiest in the world. In addition, there are major airports in Orange and

San Bernardino Counties, Las Vegas, and Honolulu. California and Nevada

are also served by an extensive highway system.

The Los Angeles Division is headed by a Special Agent in Charge (SAC),

two Associate SACs, and seven Assistant SACs (ASACs). It includes the

division office, three district offices, four resident offices, and three posts

of duty, as shown in figure I.1.1

 

1

 The maps included in the profiles in this appendix are not drawn precisely to scale.

Los Angeles Division

Geographic Region and

Organizational Structure
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 100 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Reno

South Lake Tahoe

Las Vegas

Riverside

Los Angeles

Ventura

Santa Ana

Nevada

California

Division office

District office

Resident office

Post of duty

Guam

Pacific

Ocean

Hilo

Maui

Honolulu

Hawaii

Source: DEA’s Los Angeles Division.

Figure I.1: Los Angeles Division Map
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 101 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

At the time of our visit in February 1998, the division was authorized to

have 445 staff, including 283 special agents. There also were 114 state and

local officers from various law enforcement agencies assigned to task

forces operated by the division.

According to DEA, the region covered by the Los Angeles Division is one

of the most significant worldwide centers of drug trafficking, money

laundering, and drug-related violence. The region serves as a source,

transit area and distribution site for a variety of illegal drugs.

The division’s size, multiplicity of jurisdictions, and ethnic diversity all

pose law enforcement challenges, as do its myriad entry points and transit

corridors. The proximity to the Southwest Border makes the region easily

accessible to trafficking organizations bringing cocaine, heroin, and other

drugs into the United States. The region is also a major source of

methamphetamine clandestinely produced in laboratories and high-grade

marijuana cultivated in outdoor and indoor operations. In addition, DEA

reported that much of the region is plagued by drug-related violent crime,

often gang related, and that most of California’s violent gang activity is in

Los Angeles county.

At the time of our review, DEA considered cocaine to be one of the biggest

drug trafficking problems for the division. Los Angeles is a major

transshipment point for cocaine en route to other parts of the United

States and Canada. Cocaine is smuggled into Southern California primarily

across the U.S.-Mexico border.

According to DEA, Mexican drug trafficking organizations smuggle most of

the cocaine coming into and through Los Angeles. Although Colombian

traffickers control the worldwide supply of cocaine, they prefer to move

their cocaine into Mexico and sell it to Mexican organizations. Cocaine

traffickers use various means, such as automobiles and tractor-trailers

with hidden compartments, to move cocaine across the border. Other

points of entry for cocaine include airports and maritime ports in the

region.

DEA reported that traffickers were using “stash houses” to store cocaine in

Los Angeles and Riverside counties. From these stash houses, cocaine was

being distributed locally or moved to other destinations in the United

States and Canada. Mobile street gangs were involved in handling the local

cocaine distribution. These gangs were also transporting cocaine and

crack cocaine to other destinations.

Overview of Drug

Trafficking Situation and

Threat

Cocaine
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 102 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

At the time of our review, Mexican heroin was the heroin of choice for

users in the area covered by the Los Angeles Division, according to DEA.

Heroin was also coming into the region from Southeast Asia (principally

Thailand and the Philippines) and Canada, and to a lesser extent from

Southwest Asia/Middle East (Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon) and Colombia.

Although heroin was being smuggled into the country in a variety of ways,

DEA reported that most was arriving in maritime containers or aircraft for

passengers or cargo.

Also, according to DEA, black tar heroin and Mexican brown heroin, the

most available and popular form of heroin in the Los Angeles area, were

both supplied by Mexican traffickers. Trafficking in Southeast Asian

heroin, which was being imported into the Los Angeles area and

transshipped to the East Coast, was dominated by Thai nationals and

Thailand-based Nigerian traffickers.

At the time of our review, methamphetamine was the most manufactured

and distributed illegal drug in the geographic area covered by the Los

Angeles division, according to DEA. It is the division’s top enforcement

priority. Although methamphetamine trafficking takes place throughout

the region, it is predominantly concentrated in Riverside and San

Bernardino counties, where there has been a tremendous increase in

clandestine methamphetamine laboratories. These two counties have been

designated as the methamphetamine capital of the nation.

The division’s most serious methamphetamine threat is from Mexican drug

trafficking organizations that dominate the production of high-quality

methamphetamine in southern California. At the time of our review, DEA

reported that the number of Mexican methamphetamine laboratories was

increasing at an alarming rate. Other individuals were operating small,

unsophisticated methamphetamine laboratories that made up most of the

clandestine laboratories in southern California.

The diversion of legitimately produced controlled substances is also a

serious threat in the region, particularly in the Los Angeles area. Numerous

means are used to divert these drugs to local abusers and traffickers. At

the time of our review, traffickers were shipping the drugs throughout the

United States and abroad, according to DEA. Other dangerous drugs are

also trafficked in the area covered by the division, including PCP and LSD.

According to DEA, marijuana importation, cultivation, and trafficking

remain an ongoing enforcement challenge throughout the division.

Marijuana is prolific throughout the region, and Los Angeles is a major

Heroin

Methamphetamine and Other

Dangerous Drugs

Marijuana
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 103 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

transshipment area for marijuana destined for other parts of the United

States.

Mexican trafficking organizations smuggle marijuana into the region. DEA

reported that these organizations had cornered the wholesale and retail

distribution markets for marijuana in Southern and Central California.

Colombian organizations also were involved in marijuana trafficking, using

Mexican organizations to transport marijuana across the U.S.-Mexico

border.

Domestic cultivation also is a problem, with high-grade marijuana being

grown in outdoor gardens and on farms in Hawaii, California, and Nevada.

According to DEA, Hawaii leads the nation in domestic marijuana

cultivation. The division reported seeing an increase in the number of

large-scale indoor operations in California and Nevada.

At the time of our review, the Los Angeles Division reported operating

various programs and initiatives in response to the drug trafficking threat

in the region. The division was working with other federal, state, and local

law enforcement agencies to carry out its programs and initiatives. For

fiscal year 1998, the division’s goal was to focus available resources on

identifying, investigating, and prosecuting criminal drug enterprises, their

support systems, and the individuals responsible for their origin and

proliferation. Another priority of the division was to use federal asset

forfeiture laws to affect criminal organizations by seizing proceeds derived

from their criminal activity.

Division resources to carry out its programs and initiatives included task

force operations, an asset forfeiture group, an intelligence program, a drug

diversion control program,2

 investigative initiatives aimed at gangs

involved in drug-related violent crimes, Mobile Enforcement Team (MET)

Program operations, the Southwest Border Initiative, and a

methamphetamine initiative. At the time of our review, the division had

planned to continue expanding its Title III (electronic surveillance)

program; promote greater cooperation in developing joint investigations

with other federal, state, and local agencies aimed at the highest level of

drug trafficking; and widen the scope of interagency task forces.

 

2

 DEA’s drug diversion control program is designed to enforce federal laws and regulations controlling

the legal production and distribution of legitimately manufactured controlled substances; prevent and

detect, through criminal, civil, and administrative actions, the diversion of controlled substances from

legitimate channels; and control the diversion of legally produced precursor and essential chemicals to

the illicit manufacture of drugs.

Priorities, Programs, and

Initiatives
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 104 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

The division office in Los Angeles had nine enforcement groups at the time

of our review. According to the SAC, three of the groups were working on

the Southwest Border Initiative,3

 a major drug enforcement operation

along and across the Mexican border using resources from DEA, FBI, the

Customs Service, and state and local law enforcement agencies. The office

also had groups focusing on Southeast Asian heroin, Mexican heroin,

drugs primarily from Southeast Asia and Europe, methamphetamine, and

violent drug trafficking groups. In addition to the enforcement groups, the

division office had support groups, including technical operations, asset

removal, intelligence, and diversion control.

The division’s district offices, resident offices, and posts of duty all had

enforcement groups focusing primarily on specific drug trafficking

problems in their areas. For example, the Riverside district office, with

four enforcement groups, concentrated on methamphetamine trafficking

and the Southwest Border Initiative. These outlying offices are encouraged

to cooperate and conduct joint efforts with state and local law

enforcement agencies in developing cases and conducting other

operations.

The division had state and local task forces in Riverside, Santa Ana, Reno,

Las Vegas, Honolulu, Saipan, and Guam. Though not part of a DEA-funded

state and local task force, the Ventura office assisted three narcotics task

forces in its area. Also, DEA’s group at Los Angeles International airport

was an informal task force with officers from the Los Angeles Police

Department and Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office working together with

DEA special agents.

At the time of our review, the division had one MET that it was using to

target organizations engaged in violent drug-related crimes, particularly

with regard to cocaine and crack cocaine trafficking. In commenting on a

draft of our report, DEA officials informed us that a second MET was

established in October 1998. The officials also informed us that as of May

1999, the first MET had 10 special agents assigned to it, and the second

MET had 11 special agents assigned.

Further, as of May 1999, the first MET had received 19 requests for

assistance since 1995 and was deployed for 14. Since its inception, the

second MET had received two requests for assistance and was deployed

for both.

 

3

 In addition, four DEA special agents were assigned to a Southwest Border Initiative group located at

the Los Angeles FBI office.
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 105 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

The division is a major participant in the Los Angeles High Intensity Drug

Trafficking Area (HIDTA), which is the largest HIDTA in the country. At

the time of our review, a DEA Associate SAC headed the Southern

California Drug Task Force (SCDTF) in the HIDTA, and a DEA ASAC

headed one of three SCDTF divisions. The SCDTF is a multiagency,

integrated task force that comprised 105 federal, state, and local law

enforcement officers, including 40 DEA special agents, at the time of our

review. SCDTF’s primary objective is to conduct investigations targeting

major drug trafficking organizations that operate on a regional, national,

and international level. The Los Angeles HIDTA’s fiscal year 1998 strategy

referred to SCDTF as the “cornerstone” of the HIDTA. DEA also had an

intelligence group assigned to SCDTF, as well as staff assigned to other

Los Angeles HIDTA units.

Other major programs and initiatives being implemented by DEA’s Los

Angeles Division at the time of our review included the following: (1) the

Methamphetamine Strategy, which was aimed at major domestic and

Mexican traffickers involved in producing methamphetamine and other

dangerous drugs and was being carried out with state and local law

enforcement agencies; (2) money laundering investigations and seizures of

criminally derived drug-related assets, which were carried out in

conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Customs

Service, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and California Bureau of

Narcotics Enforcement; and (3) the Domestic Cannabis

Eradication/Suppression Program (marijuana program), particularly

initiatives conducted in cooperation with state and local law enforcement

agencies in Hawaii.

Most of the division’s resources have been devoted to cases involving

cocaine, methamphetamine, and other dangerous drugs. For example, in

fiscal year 1997, the division’s special agents spent about 35.7 percent of

their investigative work hours on cocaine cases and about 35.7 percent on

cases involving dangerous drugs, including methamphetamine. In fiscal

year 1998, they spent about 33.2 percent of their investigative work hours

on cocaine cases and about 41.8 percent on cases involving dangerous

drugs, including methamphetamine.

Enforcement activity results reported by the Los Angeles Division

indicated that the division initiated 1,573 cases in fiscal year 1997 and 1,446

cases in fiscal year 1998. The division reported 1,892 arrests in fiscal year

1997 and 2,214 arrests in fiscal year 1998. The division also reported

seizing approximately 4,500 kilograms of cocaine, 25 kilograms of heroin,

16,400 kilograms of marijuana, and 268 kilograms of methamphetamine in

Enforcement Statistics and

Case Examples
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 106 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

fiscal year 1997. For fiscal year 1998, the division reported seizing

approximately 4,656 kilograms of cocaine, 59 kilograms of heroin, 9,235

kilograms of marijuana, and 673 kilograms of methamphetamine. In

addition, the division reported seizing assets amounting to $52.4 million in

fiscal year 1997 and assets amounting to $122.2 million in fiscal year 1998.

Further, the division reported seizing 87 clandestine laboratories in fiscal

year 1997 and 90 clandestine laboratories in fiscal year 1998.

The following are two examples of what the Los Angeles Division

considered to be successful major investigations.

• DEA’s Los Angeles Division conducted an investigation targeting a

Mexican-based cocaine trafficking organization operating in the Los

Angeles area. The organization was responsible for smuggling large

quantities of cocaine into the United States from Mexico, stockpiling it in

the Los Angeles area, and distributing it throughout the United States.

Members of the organization collected drug proceeds and transported the

money to Mexico. The investigation involved the wire interception of 29

cellular telephones and the electronic interception of 19 digital paging

devices. It resulted in the arrest of 52 individuals and seizures of over $15

million, 3.5 tons of cocaine, and 570 pounds of marijuana. On the basis of

leads developed from this investigation, DEA offices in San Diego, San

Francisco, Chicago, New York, and Calexico, Mexico initiated related

investigations and wiretaps. Surveillance teams comprising state and local

agencies assisted DEA with this investigation.

• DEA’s Los Angeles Division and Islamabad Country Office worked with

the Pakistan Antinarcotics Force to conduct a controlled delivery4

 of

Southwest Asian heroin. DEA, U.S. Customs agents, local law enforcement

officers, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police were subsequently

involved in the arrest of several drug traffickers. The operation resulted in

the seizure of 106 kilograms of Southwest Asian heroin and approximately

$509,000 in U.S. currency, as well as three arrests in the United States,

three in Canada, and one in Pakistan.

 

4

 A controlled delivery is an investigative tool whereby law enforcement authorities monitor a shipment

of illegal drugs to its intended destination for eventual seizure.
Appendix I

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Page 107 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

DEA’s Miami Division is responsible for federal drug law enforcement in

Florida, the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, and Cuba. The division’s 8,462

miles of coastline and 14 deep-water ports have made it very attractive for

maritime smugglers, and its 18 commercial cargo and passenger carrier

airports also pose a smuggling threat. The Miami Division, which is headed

by a SAC, 2 Associate SACs, and 8 ASACs, includes the division office, 3

district offices, 10 resident offices, 1 post of duty, and 1 country office, as

shown in figure I.2.

Miami Division

Geographic Region and

Organizational Structure
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 108 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Division office

Country office

District office

Resident office

Post of duty

Panama

City

Tallahassee

Pensacola

Gainesville

Orlando

Jacksonville

Tampa

Freeport

Nassau

Bahamas

Florida

Cuba

Ft. Myers

Key Largo

Ft. Pierce

W. Palm Beach

Ft. Lauderdale

Miami

Key West

Source: DEA’s Miami Division.

Figure I.2: Miami Division Map
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 109 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

At the time of our visit in June 1998, the division was authorized to have

600 staff, including 400 special agents. In addition, there were 99 staff from

state and local agencies authorized for various task forces and groups in

the division, including 92 law enforcement officers.

According to DEA, at the time of our review, South Florida continued to be

one of the principal gateways for cocaine entering the United States. The

Miami Division reported that South American drug traffickers were

shifting their trafficking patterns back to routes in the Caribbean, as

evidenced by the amount of trafficking activity in the Bahamas and

Florida. Further, as Colombian traffickers have become increasingly

involved in heroin trafficking, Miami International Airport became the

principal port of entry for Colombian heroin into the United States.

Other drugs were also a concern of the division. For example, DEA

reported that marijuana trafficking through the Caribbean has traditionally

been a problem, and there had been an increase in the amounts of

marijuana and methamphetamine from the Southwest Border being

transshipped through central and northern Florida. DEA also reported an

increase in the production of methamphetamine in clandestine

laboratories in the Florida area.

The Miami Division reported that as drug law enforcement efforts

increased along the Southwest Border in recent years, South Florida

became the North American command and control center for major South

American trafficking organizations. Colombians dominate the major South

Florida drug-smuggling organizations, and they continued to finance and

control the wholesale cocaine distribution market in the area. The division

further reported that drug intelligence indicated that the Colombian

traffickers did not completely trust Mexican trafficking organizations;

consequently, cocaine trafficking patterns had begun to shift in 1997 and

1998. Once again, large shipments of cocaine were being sent from South

America, through Mexico and the Caribbean, to South Florida.

The Caribbean serves as a major transit zone for cocaine from Central and

South America, and Florida is a significant importation and transit area for

cocaine smuggled through the Bahamas. According to DEA, airdrops of

cocaine from planes coming directly from Colombia to the Bahamas were

taking place at an accelerating rate in 1998. The primary threat, however,

was “go-fast” boats and pleasure craft. Such vessels were being used to

carry up to 1,500 kilograms of cocaine through the Bahamas to the United

States. Small commercial cargo vessels were also being used to smuggle

drugs through the Bahamas.

Overview of Drug

Trafficking Situation and

Threat

Cocaine
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 110 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Cocaine was also smuggled in other ways into the area covered by the

division. For example, DEA reported that aircraft were used to smuggle

cocaine directly into Florida from the Eastern Caribbean. Maritime

smuggling continued to be a significant factor, including the shipment of

cocaine hidden within containerized cargo on ships travelling from South

America to Florida. There also were indications that the Florida Keys were

increasingly being used as an off-load point for Cuban traffickers.

According to DEA, crack cocaine was the most significant problem for the

division’s offices outside South Florida. South Florida traffickers were

supplying most of the state, except for the Florida panhandle area, which

was being supplied by trafficking organizations along the Southwest

Border.

According to DEA, the drug threat in the area covered by the Miami

Division has expanded to include increased heroin importation from South

America to the United States through Florida. Opium poppy cultivation

and heroin trafficking have become part of the Colombian illegal drug

trade, and Colombian traffickers were increasing their efforts to sell

multikilogram quantities of heroin to distributors in the United States.

Miami International Airport replaced New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport

as the principal port of entry for Colombian heroin into the United States.

Another significant heroin smuggling route was from the Caribbean

directly to Orlando, where the heroin was then transported through

Florida and on to large markets in major northeastern cities.

According to DEA, methamphetamine trafficking and use had increased

throughout Florida, particularly in central and northern Florida. Mexican

organizations in Florida were the primary sources of methamphetamine.

DEA reported that most of these organizations had ties to similar

organizations in Southern California and/or Mexico where they were

obtaining the drug. In addition to smuggling methamphetamine into

Florida, local organizations were becoming increasingly adept at

clandestinely manufacturing it. DEA also reported there was a great

amount of drug-related violence associated with the distribution and use of

methamphetamine.

The diversion of legal pharmaceutical drugs to illegal channels continued

to be a problem in Florida. Physicians and pharmacists were the source of

most of these drugs through activities such as indiscriminate and illegal

prescribing practices and forged prescriptions. In addition, numerous

chemical companies and brokers in Florida were diverting and supplying

Heroin

Methamphetamine and Other

Dangerous Drugs
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 111 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

chemicals used by clandestine laboratory operators to produce

methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin.

Marijuana was widely available throughout the area covered by the

division, according to DEA. Although marijuana trafficking through the

Caribbean has traditionally been a concern, the division also reported an

increase in the amount of marijuana coming from the Southwest Border

and being transshipped through central and northern Florida.

Traffickers were using a variety of smuggling routes and methods to bring

marijuana into Florida. For example, DEA reported that trafficking groups

were transshipping marijuana from Colombia through Florida using

private vessels. Other traffickers were using commercial trucks to bring

marijuana into Florida from Texas and Mexico. Smaller quantities of

marijuana were being dispatched in luggage on commercial airline flights

or via AMTRAK. Additionally, Federal Express and other package delivery

services were frequently used to transport small quantities of marijuana.

A large percentage of the marijuana consumed in South Florida was being

grown locally. DEA reported that indoor marijuana cultivation had reached

record levels. Typically, indoor growing operations were located in private

residences and consisted of about 200 to 300 plants. Larger indoor

operations consisting of up to 10,000 plants were becoming more

prevalent. Outdoor growing operations, sometimes amounting to several

thousand plants, were usually located on private property in more rural

areas or on protected forest land.

According to DEA, South Florida continues to be a major center for

Colombian drug traffickers’ money laundering activities. At the time of our

review, recent financial investigations indicated that traffickers were using

electronic fund transfers to move narcotics proceeds from the United

States to Central and South America. Traffickers were also using both

legitimate and illegitimate import/export businesses to purchase products

with illegal drug proceeds for export mostly to South America, thus hiding

the source of the proceeds and providing additional profit.

Intelligence also indicated that smuggling of large shipments of bulk

United States currency from Florida to Colombia has continued. In recent

cases, traffickers wrapped and shipped bulk currency in hollowed

appliances and containers. At times, these bulk shipments were sent to

Colombia via third countries, such as Venezuela or Panama.

Marijuana

Money Laundering
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 112 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

The Miami Division’s traditional priority has been regional, national, and

international investigations aimed at disrupting the ability of major South

American traffickers to import and distribute cocaine, as well as their

ability to move the proceeds of their operations to South America. The

division believes such investigations have become increasingly important

as drug trafficking through the Caribbean has increased.

In this regard, the division’s management plans, at the time of our review,

called for it to (1) direct investigative efforts towards major international

organizations, targeting every aspect of their operations; and (2) increase

cooperative efforts with foreign counterparts as well as other federal,

state, and local law enforcement agencies. The plan also called for the

division to (1) attack street-level drug gangs through the MET Program,

task forces, and drug enforcement training for state and local officers; and

(2) continue to take a proactive role with the media, business and

community groups, and schools to increase awareness of DEA’s mission

and the dangers of drug abuse.

At the time of our review, the division office in Miami had eight

enforcement groups as well as four HIDTA task force groups and two

METs. In addition to these groups, the division office had a diversion

control group and support groups, including technical operations, asset

removal, and intelligence. The division’s outlying district, country, and

resident offices had various enforcement groups, including eight state and

local task forces and a HIDTA task force group. Also, the Orlando and

Tampa district offices each had a diversion control group.

The Miami Division received 62 new positions in fiscal year 1998. Most of

these positions resulted from a congressional appropriation designed to

increase DEA’s efforts against drug trafficking in the Caribbean and

Florida (referred to as the Caribbean initiative). The additional positions

were added to offices throughout the division, particularly in South

Florida, the Bahamas, and the Florida Keys.

The division office’s four HIDTA task force groups were part of the Miami

HIDTA established in 1990. The Miami HIDTA’s fiscal year 1998 goals were

to reduce drug trafficking, money laundering, and drug-related crime and

violence as well as to prevent and reduce drug abuse. DEA officials said

that all four HIDTA groups focused primarily on Colombian cocaine cases.

However, one group also investigated indoor marijuana growing

operations, and another group also conducted “street sweeps” with City of

Miami and Miami-Dade police. Miami HIDTA task force group participants

Priorities, Programs, and

Initiatives
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 113 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

included special agents from DEA, Customs, IRS, and the FBI as well as

officers from various state and local law enforcement agencies.

The Central Florida HIDTA was established in Orlando, FL, in 1998. Its

fiscal year 1998 mission was to measurably reduce drug trafficking and

related money laundering and apprehend violent drug fugitives, thereby

reducing the impact of drug-related crimes in Central Florida. As part of

this HIDTA, the Miami Division’s Orlando District Office operated a

multiagency heroin task force, and its Tampa District Office managed a

multiagency methamphetamine task force.

Financial investigations are a priority of the division. Enforcement groups

have carried out investigations targeting money launderers, such as

Operation Cali-Man, and also initiated Operation Greenskeeper to

penetrate major trafficking organizations by offering money laundering

services to traffickers. In addition, the division reestablished its asset

removal group, whose primary goal was to provide asset forfeiture training

to special agents and task force officers. The division planned that this

group would expand its role to support the division’s financial

investigations and then eventually assume a proactive role in conducting

and assisting financial investigations.

The division’s efforts to combat marijuana trafficking included

investigations of organizations responsible for smuggling marijuana into

the United States, transporting marijuana to Florida from the Southwest

Border, and transporting marijuana to other locations within the United

States. DEA offices located in the Florida Panhandle, for example,

participated in Operation Pipeline with state and local agencies to interdict

marijuana being shipped on Florida highways.

In addition, the division participated in DEA’s marijuana eradication

program to assist in the detection and eradication of marijuana plants

grown in Florida. DEA provided the Florida Department of Law

Enforcement (FDLE) with $320,000 to implement this program in fiscal

year 1998. The division’s marijuana eradication program manager in

Tallahassee, along with DEA field coordinators in various district and

resident offices, are to work with the FDLE and maintain liaison with the

various federal, state, and local agencies involved in the program to

coordinate their activities. DEA also participates in eradication operations

and investigations of growers and provides program training.

The Miami Division had two METs at the time of our review. The first was

established in February 1995 and the second in February 1997. Each MET
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 114 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

had 12 special agents. According to the ASAC responsible for the METs, in

assessing a request from a police chief or sheriff for MET assistance, the

teams decide whether they can make an impact on the drug-related

violence in the community. The assessment includes, but is not limited to,

the extent of drug-related violence as measured by criteria such as the

murder rate and the number of violent gangs. At the time of our review,

the first MET had been deployed to four local communities in the

geographic area covered by the division; the second MET had completed

deployments to three local communities and was conducting a fourth.

At the time of our review, another major program conducted by the Miami

Division was Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos Islands (OPBAT).

OPBAT was designed to interdict illegal drugs being shipped through the

Bahamas to the United States. The division’s Nassau Country Office works

with the Bahamian police, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Army to carry out

this operation. The DEA ASAC responsible for OPBAT said it is basically a

response force. Some patrols are conducted, but OPBAT personnel

primarily react to specific intelligence about drug shipments.

Most of the division’s resources have been devoted to cocaine cases. For

example, in fiscal year 1997, the division’s special agents spent about 71.6

percent of their investigative work hours on cocaine cases. In fiscal year

1998, they spent about 70.6 percent of their investigative work hours on

cocaine cases.

The Miami Division reported 3,945 arrests in fiscal year 1997 and 3,417

arrests in fiscal year 1998. The division reported seizing 17,860 kilograms

of cocaine, 34.1 kilograms of heroin, and 14,935 kilograms of marijuana in

fiscal year 1997. For fiscal year 1998, the division reported seizing 24,484

kilograms of cocaine, 96 kilograms of heroin, and 26,849 kilograms of

marijuana. The division also reported that 108,178 marijuana plants were

eradicated in calendar year 1997, and 55,311 marijuana plants were

eradicated in calendar year 1998. In addition, the division reported seized

assets totaling $142 million in fiscal year 1997 and $68 million in fiscal year

1998.

Operation Zorro II is an example of what DEA officials considered a

successful major investigation by the Miami Division. Operation Zorro II

targeted Colombian drug trafficking organization cell or group heads

responsible for importing and distributing large shipments of cocaine and

laundering money throughout the United States. The groups were

associated with the Colombian Cali cartel. Operation Zorro II consisted of

joint investigations initiated by DEA offices in Miami, New York, and Los

Enforcement Statistics and

Case Examples
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 115 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Angeles in coordination with DEA Headquarters’ Special Operations

Division (SOD) and the Department of Justice, targeting the Colombian

group heads in their respective cities. In addition, DEA’s Miami Division

worked jointly with the City of Miami Police Department and received

assistance from several other local law enforcement agencies during this

operation.

Operation Zorro II was conducted in three phases. During the first phase,

Miami Division special agents arrested 26 group members responsible for

importing and distributing throughout the United States multithousandkilogram quantities of cocaine. During the second phase, the special agents

used Title III (electronic surveillance) intercepts to monitor the activities

of the money launderers associated with the organization. As a result of

this phase of the investigation, 11 Colombian money launderers were

indicted and arrested, and over $1 million in cash and assets were seized.

Finally, during the third phase, the special agents targeted the distribution

networks that were assisting the organization in distributing multikilogram

quantities of cocaine in the South Florida area. An additional 11

defendants were indicted. At the time of our review, a total of 47 arrests

had been made in Miami as part of Operation Zorro II.

Another example of what DEA officials considered a successful major

investigation involved the Miami Division’s district office in Orlando, FL.

Working in cooperation with the division’s Fort Lauderdale office, special

agents in Orlando identified a drug trafficking organization headed by two

individuals, including a transportation specialist for Colombian drug

traffickers. The transportation specialist’s primary role was to accept

delivery of drugs in Puerto Rico, store the drugs, and later transport the

drugs to central Florida and other regions of the United States.

The Orlando office led an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force

(OCDETF) investigation targeting this trafficking organization, and

representatives of the Customs Service, IRS, Marshal’s Service, Postal

Service, and local law enforcement agencies participated. The

investigation revealed that from 1994 through June 1998 (the time of our

visit), the organization had transported over 166,000 kilograms of cocaine

and about 200 kilograms of heroin from Colombia, via Puerto Rico, into

the United States. Cocaine and heroin were distributed and sold in Miami,

New York, Orlando, and Charleston, SC, as well as in Puerto Rico. The

investigation also uncovered numerous acts of violence committed by

organization members, including three homicides.
Appendix I

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Page 116 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

At the time of our review, DEA reported that the investigation had resulted

in the arrest of 61 individuals, including both of the principal targets. Fiftysix of the individuals had been convicted in federal court, and 4 were

convicted in state court. The drug transportation specialist and another

individual were each sentenced in federal court to life in prison, and

several organization members received prison sentences exceeding 20

years. Over 800 kilograms of cocaine; 1 kilogram of heroin; numerous

firearms; over $19 million in U.S. currency; and $4 million in real estate,

cars, and boats were seized. In addition, two of the homicides were solved.
Appendix I

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Page 117 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

DEA’s New Orleans Division is responsible for federal drug law

enforcement in the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi

and covers an area of 205,882 square miles within 10 federal judicial

districts. Although largely rural and heavily forested, the division has seven

metropolitan areas within its jurisdiction. Three of the states border the

Gulf of Mexico and provide substantial maritime access to the interior

portion of the region. The New Orleans Division, which is headed by a SAC

and five ASACs, includes the division office, two district offices, eight

resident offices, and three posts of duty, as shown on figure I.3.

New Orleans Division

Geographic Region and

Organizational Structure
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 118 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Fayetteville

Fort Smith

Little Rock

Shreveport

Jackson

Gulfport

Mobile

Oxford

Lafayette

Baton Rouge

New Orleans

Huntsville

Birmingham

Montgomery

Louisiana

Arkansas

Mississippi

Alabama

Division office

District office

Resident office

Post of duty

Source: DEA’s New Orleans Division.

Figure I.3: New Orleans Division Map
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 119 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

At the time of our visit in March 1998, the division was authorized to have

220 staff, including 136 special agents. In addition, there were 141 staff

from state and local agencies authorized for various task forces and groups

in the division, including 133 law enforcement officers.

According to DEA, the major drug-producing countries of Central and

South America have a significant impact on the New Orleans Division

because of its proximity to the Gulf Coast. Ports on the Gulf coastline and

vast waterways, which are not patrolled, provide opportunities for

smuggling, thereby making the area potentially attractive to drug

traffickers.

Cocaine and crack cocaine pose the most significant drug threats in the

area covered by the division, according to DEA. At the time of our review,

cocaine was readily available, with distribution and use trends either

stable at high levels or increasing in every metropolitan area, while crack

cocaine continued to make inroads into rural areas.

DEA reported that Colombian and Mexican organizations operating out of

Texas were responsible for bringing in most of the cocaine. Local cocaine

trafficking organizations varied widely. Some organizations were looseknit local violators with ties to traffickers in the source areas, while others

were well-organized small groups with well-established markets. Some of

the organizations were in the form of “street gangs” modeled after, and

affiliated with, certain Los Angeles gangs. Violence common with gang

activity was occurring in some areas within the division.

At the time of our review, heroin was not considered a significant threat to

most of the area covered by the New Orleans Division, according to DEA.

Heroin availability and trafficking were confined mainly to the Greater

New Orleans area. However, there were indications that higher purity

Colombian heroin in the New Orleans area was surfacing.

DEA reported that the manufacture and use of methamphetamine have

continued to grow. DEA identified several organizations that were bringing

methamphetamine into the area from California, Arizona, and Texas.

Methamphetamine laboratories have proliferated, especially in Arkansas.

The diversion of legal drugs to illicit use was occurring primarily at the

pharmacy and practitioner level, according to DEA. Such diversion

resulted from indiscriminate prescribing and dispensing of drugs,

forgeries, illegal call-ins of prescriptions, and people “doctor-shopping” to

Overview of Drug

Trafficking Situation and

Threat

Cocaine

Heroin

Methamphetamine and Other

Dangerous Drugs
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 120 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

obtain numerous prescriptions. Diverted drugs were either being sold or

used by individuals.

According to DEA, marijuana is the most widely abused drug in the area

covered by the division, and the profit margin for marijuana trafficking is

second only to that of cocaine. Although most of the marijuana

encountered was coming from Mexico, at the time of our review, DEA

reported that a substantial portion was domestically cultivated, and

marijuana cultivation was extensive in each of the four states in the

division’s area.

The New Orleans Division’s management plan called for it to focus

enforcement activities, beginning in fiscal year 1998, on (1) disrupting the

flow of drugs in the area covered by the division and (2) responding more

effectively to drug-related crime and the attendant violence plaguing its

communities. The plan’s domestic operational strategy attempted to strike

a balance between major regional cases with interstate ties and local

impact cases targeting violent drug organizations and gangs.

The cornerstone of the division’s plan is increased cooperation with

counterpart law enforcement agencies at all levels, making optimum use of

resources available in programs such as OCDETF, HIDTA, and MET.

According to the division’s SAC, although cooperation with state and local

police agencies has long been a hallmark of DEA, his intent was to make

DEA more visible, accessible, and “user friendly” to such agencies. He

noted that unilateral DEA investigations would become a thing of the past,

and every involved agency would benefit by pooling its resources.

As part of the plan, the SAC directed all the offices in the New Orleans

Division to develop a targeting strategy for all types of drugs in their areas.

Individuals and organizations are to be identified and prioritized for joint

investigations with federal, state, and local agencies. The division’s

enforcement components are to use the various resources available

through the OCDETF and HIDTA Programs. According to the SAC, he is

committed to aggressively pursuing joint federal, state, and local

investigations where productive and practical.

At the time of our review, the New Orleans Division had 12 state and local

task forces in the 4 states it covers.5

 Two of the state and local task forces

were at the division office in New Orleans, and, according to DEA, one of

 

5

 Four of the 12 task forces were provisional, awaiting authorized funding approval from DEA

Headquarters.

Marijuana

Priorities, Programs, and

Initiatives
Appendix I

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Page 121 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

these worked mostly OCDETF conspiracy cases. This task force was

staffed by four DEA special agents, including a supervisor, and seven

officers from local police and sheriff’s departments.

The other state and local task force at the division office was called the

REDRUM (“murder” spelled backward) task force. It was established in

1992 to identify and dismantle the most violent groups involved in drugrelated crimes in the city of New Orleans. At the time of our visit, the task

force was staffed by six DEA special agents (including a supervisor), a

deputy U.S. Marshal, an INS agent, a Louisiana state police officer, a New

Orleans police department homicide detective, and a National Guard

intelligence analyst. In addition to carrying out the REDRUM mission, the

task force sometimes conducts drug investigations that do not involve

violence.

The New Orleans Division had two METs at the time of our review.

According to the division’s management plan, the major portion of the

division’s response to the cocaine and crack cocaine problems is an

enhanced MET Program, with a second MET added. The division’s first

MET was established in 1995, and the second MET became operational at

the start of fiscal year 1998. Each MET was made up of 10 DEA special

agents. Between May 1995 and March 1998, the METs had been deployed

to nine local communities in the geographic area covered by the division.

The deployments were short-term operations conducted to identify and

arrest local violent drug dealers.

The division had six HIDTA task force groups in three states at the time of

our review. In December 1996, ONDCP established the Gulf Coast HIDTA

in the states of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana to reduce the impact

of Gulf Coast drug trafficking on other parts of the United States and to

reduce violent drug trafficking in the three-state area. DEA is one of many

agencies participating in the Gulf Coast HIDTA. In participating, DEA

carries out its own mission and strategies in coordination with other

agencies participating on multiagency teams.

The division office had one enforcement group made up entirely of DEA

special agents who concentrated primarily on interstate and international

drug investigations. According to DEA officials, most of the group’s cases

involve high-level drug traffickers and result in federal drug conspiracy

charges. This group had more OCDETF cases than any other group in the

division. The group was staffed with nine DEA special agents, including a

supervisor.
Appendix I

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Page 122 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Most of the division’s resources have been devoted to cocaine cases. For

example, in fiscal year 1997, the division’s special agents spent about 68.6

percent of their investigative work hours on cocaine cases. In fiscal year

1998, they spent about 71.9 percent of their investigative work hours on

cocaine cases.

The division made 1,864 arrests in fiscal year 1997 and 2,286 arrests in

fiscal year 1998. In addition, the division made 688 seizures of assets

valued at $12.5 million in fiscal year 1997 and 644 seizures of assets valued

at $11.5 million in fiscal year 1998. In fiscal year 1997, the division opened

839 cases and closed 563 cases. In fiscal year 1998, it opened 950 cases and

closed 356 cases.

An example of what the New Orleans Division considered a successful

major investigation involved the REDRUM task force. In 1996, the task

force initiated an investigation targeting a violent heroin trafficking

organization operating in the city of New Orleans. This case evolved into

an OCDETF investigation and was worked jointly with the New Orleans

Police Department Homicide Division and the FBI. Various investigative

techniques were used, including conducting two federally court-authorized

wiretaps. As a result, 13 people were indicted by a federal grand jury in the

Eastern District of Louisiana for violations including murder, engaging in a

continuing criminal enterprise,6

 conspiracy, and other drug-related

charges. Ten defendants pled guilty prior to trial. In June 1997, the head of

the organization was found guilty of all charges and received a life

sentence. According to DEA, as a result of this investigation five homicides

in the city of New Orleans were solved, and 359 grams of heroin and

$60,000 in drug-related assets were seized. DEA also reported that this

investigation significantly reduced violent crime locally and disrupted the

flow of heroin into the inner city.

Another example of what the division considered a successful major case

involved the Mobile, AL, resident office. In 1997, the resident office

collaborated with a U.S. Customs Service undercover group in “Operation

Skymaster” to initiate an investigation of an individual who was seeking

transportation for a multikilogram shipment of cocaine from South

America to the United States. After a series of undercover meetings in

Alabama and Florida, a fake delivery of cocaine took place. Since that

time, the investigation has resulted in the arrest of 26 individuals and the

 

6

 The federal Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute (21 U.S.C. 848) is directed at major drug

traffickers and the forfeiture of their assets. A person is considered as engaging in a continuing

criminal enterprise if he or she occupies a position of authority over five or more people engaged in a

series of drug violations from which substantial income is derived.

Enforcement Statistics and

Case Examples
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 123 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

seizure of approximately $145,000 in U.S. currency and 8 vehicles. The

investigation identified international smugglers of multikilogram quantities

of cocaine as well as the recipients of the cocaine in Alabama, Florida, and

Michigan. The case led to several domestic investigations in Florida,

Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania.
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 124 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

The Washington Division is located on the East Coast corridor between

two major drug import cities, Miami and New York. Its area of

responsibility extends through Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, and the

District of Colombia. Three international airports, two international

seaports, railway systems, and an extensive interstate highway network

provide commercial and noncommercial transit to and through the region.

The area’s population is ethnically diverse and international, with urban,

suburban, and rural communities. At the time of our July 1998 visit, the

division, which was headed by a SAC and five ASACs, comprised the

division office in Washington, D.C.; two district offices; three resident

offices; and seven posts of duty, as shown on figure I.4.

Washington Division

and Baltimore District

Office

Geographic Region and

Organizational Structure
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 125 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Division office

Roanoke

Norfolk

Newport News

Richmond

Winchester

Hagerstown

Wheeling

Baltimore

Salisbury

Clarksburg

Charleston

Virginia

West Virginia Washington, D.C.

Maryland

District office

Resident office

Post of duty

Abingdon

Source: DEA’s Washington Division.

As of March 1998, the Washington Division had 262 staff, including 158

special agents.

In response to the interests of the congressional requesters, this section

also provides information on the Baltimore District Office, which is part of

the Washington Division. At the time of our review, the office included two

of the division’s seven posts of duty, as shown on figure I.4. As of March

1998, it had 60 staff, including 39 special agents.

Figure I.4: Washington, D. C. Division Map
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 126 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

The Washington region, according to DEA officials, is both a drug transit

zone between Miami and New York and a final destination point for drugs,

serving as a secondary distribution region. Cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and

methamphetamine are available throughout the area. The most significant

threat is cocaine and crack distribution, dominated primarily by

Dominican traffickers, and the violence associated with these activities.

However, the division has recently seen a dramatic increase in heroin

trafficking and distribution. Jamaican traffickers also threatened the

region because of their wide-ranging distribution of marijuana and other

drugs. Also available are LSD, MDMA (Ecstasy), Rohypnol, Ketamine, and

GHB,7

 drugs that are consumed at “raves,”8 in nightclubs, and on college

campuses.

According to DEA officials, three levels of drug violators operate in the

Washington division’s area of responsibility. These include (1) major

international organizations; (2) mid-level organizations, which include

major national and regional organizations, usually made up of longtime

local traffickers; and (3) retail groups, including street-level violators and

violent drug gangs. The majority of the violators are mid- and retail-level.

Small neighborhood-based drug trafficking groups or “crews” use violence

to control their areas and protect their drug trafficking enterprises from

rival groups.

Baltimore, according to DEA, although primarily a consumer drug market,

is also a drug source for smaller Maryland cities and towns, including

Annapolis, Hagerstown, and Salisbury. Cocaine, heroin, and marijuana are

the primary drug threats to the area. Typically, drugs are transported into

Baltimore from Miami, New York, and other source states by car, train,

airline, bus, or sometimes via ship through the port. However, DEA

officials indicated that airports are relied upon less, possibly due to past

enforcement successes. Traffickers tended to be street- to mid-level

violators.

At the time of our review, according to DEA, cocaine was a major drug of

choice in the Baltimore area, and the urban crack threat was migrating to

smaller towns and cities throughout the surrounding suburban

jurisdictions. Generally, local independent dealers go to New York City

 

7

 MDMA (methylenedioxymeth-amphetamine) has hallucinogenic effects. Rohypnol (flunitrazepam),

smuggled primarily from Mexico, is a depressant not approved for sale in the United States. Ketamine

is an animal tranquilizer with legitimate uses in veterinary medicine. GHB (gamma hydroxy butyrate) is

used as a date rape drug.

8

 A rave is a party designed to enhance a hallucinogenic experience through music and behavior.

Overview of Drug

Trafficking Situation and

Threat

Baltimore Overview

Cocaine Trafficking in Baltimore
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 127 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

weekly, buy 2 to 3 kilograms of cocaine from Dominican sources, bring the

drugs back to Baltimore, and distribute them over a several block area.

These distributors have no ties to larger organizations. Law enforcement

officials reportedly believed that youth gangs were increasingly involved in

drug distribution and related criminal activity, primarily violent crime.

Baltimore is also one of the largest and most active heroin markets in the

country, according to both DEA and ONDCP. Dominican traffickers bring

wholesale quantities of high-quality Colombian heroin into the city, and

Nigerians distribute Southeast Asian heroin from Thailand. Traffickers are

street- to mid-level violators, distributing drugs in open-air drug markets

and in housing projects. Violence has increased, even at the lower level of

drug street sales. Moreover, in 1996, the Drug Abuse Warning Network9

(DAWN) reported that Baltimore had the highest rate of heroin-related

emergency room episodes per 100,000 population.

According to DEA, marijuana is transported into the Maryland area from

the Southwest border states and Mexico. Much of the marijuana entering

the area is conveyed by individuals using highways and mass

transportation. Jamaicans supply wholesale quantities of marijuana in

Baltimore. In addition, marijuana is also cultivated along Maryland’s

Eastern Shore.

At the time of our review, the majority of the Washington Division’s efforts

were, according to DEA, directed toward violent drug trafficking gangs. In

Baltimore, an Assistant U.S. Attorney said that since the mid-1990s, that

office had received cases involving violence from DEA. Moreover, DEA

and the U.S. Attorney were responding to requests for assistance and now

prosecuting cases from the state’s attorneys’ offices in order to obtain

higher federal penalties for defendants.

The division’s and Baltimore district office’s targeting of drug trafficking

gangs was reflected in the distribution of its investigative work hours. By

geographic scope, combined domestic and local cases for fiscal years 1997

and 1998 accounted for about two-thirds of the total investigative work

hours expended each year by the division and more than one-half and twothirds of the total investigative work hours, respectively, for those years,

expended by the district office. Investigative work hours expended on

international and regional cases, in contrast, accounted for approximately

30 percent of the division’s investigative work hours and almost 40 percent

 

9

 Since the early 1970s, DAWN has collected information on patients seeking hospital emergency room

treatment related to illegal drug use or nonmedical use of legal drugs.

Heroin Trafficking in Baltimore

Marijuana Trafficking in

Baltimore

Priorities, Programs, and

Initiatives
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 128 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

and 30 percent of the district’s investigative work hours in those years,

respectively. By type of organizations targeted, the division expended the

greatest portion of its investigative work hours on independent traffickers

(31 percent and 42 percent for fiscal years 1997 and 1998, respectively).

The Baltimore Office expended the greatest portion of its investigative

work hours on violent organizations (almost one-third) in both fiscal years

1997 and 1998.

As indicated above, cocaine and heroin presented the major drug threats

to the region. By drug, both the division and the Baltimore district workhour statistics for fiscal years 1997 and 1998 reflect the cocaine and heroin

threats. Each year, the division expended more than half its investigative

work hours on cocaine-related cases and about 20 percent of its

investigative work hours on heroin-related cases. The Baltimore office also

spent about half its investigative work hours each year on cocaine-related

cases and 33 percent on heroin-related cases.

As proposed in its 1998-2000 Field Management Plan, the number of

Washington Division cases accepted as OCDETF cases increased in fiscal

year 1998. During that year, the division had 73 of its cases accepted as

OCDETF cases compared to 36 cases in 1997, an increase of 103 percent.

Similarly, the percentage of the division’s investigative work hours, by

source of case, expended on OCDETF cases increased from about 29

percent in fiscal year 1997 to 31 percent in fiscal year 1998. Most of the

division’s higher level cases were handled through OCDETF. The

Baltimore District Office reported 6 cases accepted as OCDETF cases in

fiscal year 1997 and 22 in fiscal year 1998.

The Washington Division’s 1998-2000 plan also called for the continued

targeting of violent drug traffickers through the MET Program. The

division had 1 MET team that had 10 special agents. In fiscal years 1997

and 1998, the team conducted deployments in Washington, D.C.;

Baltimore, MD; Annapolis, MD; and Petersburg, VA.

Division officials emphasized to us the importance of their undertaking

enforcement efforts with state and local law enforcement agencies to

address the drug problems of the region. According to these officials, the

division worked with approximately 240 state and local law enforcement

agencies in Washington, D.C., and the 3 states in its area of responsibility.

In addition, the division was involved in training state and local law

enforcement personnel throughout the division. The Baltimore District

Office had a task force, including DEA agents and Baltimore City police
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 129 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

officers, which investigated major heroin distribution networks or

distributors in open-air markets.

In fiscal year 1998, 10 HIDTA task forces were operating within the

division’s area of responsibility, including 3 led by the Baltimore District

Office. The latter three comprised law enforcement officers from DEA, the

Baltimore Police Department, the Baltimore County Police Department,

the Maryland State Police, and other local police agencies. One task force

investigated violent drug traffickers and trafficking organizations that

affected safety in the Baltimore metropolitan area; the second

concentrated on major heroin and cocaine traffickers and targets of

opportunity; and the third conducted interdiction operations—“hit and

runs”—targeting the movement of drug and currency shipments at the

Baltimore/Washington International Airport and the train and bus stations.

During fiscal year 1998, the Washington Division also participated in

several special enforcement programs coordinated by DEA Headquarters.

The Division reported that in fiscal year 1998, 20 investigations had

resulted from its participation in a special enforcement program that

focused on traffickers operating in the United States under the direction of

Colombian, Dominican, and/or Mexican drug organizations. As part of

another such program, the Baltimore District Office investigated West

African drug trafficking organizations dealing in heroin, their foreign

sources of supply, and their distributors within the United States.

In addition, the division participated in DEA’s Domestic Cannabis

Eradication/Suppression Program. However, this effort was undertaken

state by state. The Baltimore and Richmond District Offices and the

Charleston, WV, Resident Office each provided assistance to drug

enforcement groups in their respective states.

As a result of its efforts, the Washington Division reported 2,056

defendants arrested in fiscal year 1997 and 2,156 defendants arrested in

fiscal year 1998. Approximately 60 percent of those arrested in both years

were categorized as being involved in cocaine-related cases. In fiscal year

1997, almost 50 percent (985) of the defendants arrested were categorized

as independent traffickers, 19 percent as associated with violent crime

organizations (382), and 15 percent (309) as involved in criminal

organizations. Fiscal year1998 data showed the continued predominance

of independent traffickers, 51 percent (1,093), among defendants arrested;

this compared to defendants associated with violent crime organizations,

13 percent (275), or criminal organizations, 12 percent (251).

Enforcement Statistics and

Case Examples
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 130 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

The Baltimore Office reported 745 arrests in fiscal year 1997 and 705

arrests in fiscal year 1998. For these fiscal years, respectively, 55 and 61

percent of these arrests were cocaine-related, and 22 and 20 percent were

heroin-related.

In addition, DEA reported defendants arrested in OCDETF cases in which

the Washington Division participated—409 in fiscal year 1997 and 729 in

fiscal year 1998. Over half of the arrests each year were cocaine-related.

The Baltimore Office reported 100 and 248 defendants arrested in

OCDETF cases in fiscal years 1997 and 1998, respectively.

For fiscal years 1997 and 1998, the division and the Baltimore Office

reported drug seizures of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, as well as other

dangerous drugs. These data are presented in table I.1.

Washington Division Baltimore District Office

Fiscal year Fiscal year

Drug seized 1997 1998 1997 1998

Heroin (Kgs) 17.7 14.8 12.4 9.6

Cocaine (Kgs) 1,158.2 125.9 1,053.6 56.8

Marijuana (Kgs) 254.8 401.4 159.3 127.8

Hashish (Kgs) 1.0 5.7 1.0 1.4

Stimulants (D.U.) 313,328 303,602 15,988 27,637

Depressants (D.U.) 10,936 1,799 782 587

Hallucinogens (D.U.) 13,922 10,860 305 43

Other narcotics (D.U.) 7,886 4,083 7,231 38

Note: D.U. refers to dosage unit.

Source: DEA.

As a result of its fiscal years 1997 and 1998 MET deployments in

Washington, D.C.; Baltimore, MD; Annapolis, MD; and Petersburg, VA, at

the time of our visit, the Washington Division reported 165 arrests, in total.

These deployments resulted in the seizure of about 2.5 kilograms of crack,

1.8 kilograms of cocaine, 176 grams of heroin, and 1.2 kilograms of

marijuana, as well as a number of weapons, more than $34,000 in cash, and

over $120,000 in assets. This included the Baltimore deployment, which

accounted for 81 defendants arrested and 950 grams of crack, 501 grams of

cocaine, 176 grams of heroin, and 453.5 grams of marijuana seized.

The Washington Division’s Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression

Program, carried out by the DEA office with state and local law

enforcement within the three states in the division’s area of responsibility,

resulted in the eradication of marijuana plants and arrests. For example, in

Table I.1: Drug Seizures for Washington Division and Baltimore District Office for Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 131 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

calendar year 1997, with the support of DEA’s Baltimore Office, DEA

reported that 4,826 marijuana plants (836 cultivated indoors and 3,990

cultivated outdoors) were eradicated; and 120 persons were arrested in

Maryland. In calendar year 1998, DEA reported that 3,442 marijuana plants

(2,724 cultivated indoors and 718 cultivated outdoors) were eradicated;

and 89 persons were arrested.

In addition, the Division also provided the following examples of cases it

considered successful.

• The Baltimore Office conducted an investigation with the Baltimore City

Police and the Offices of the U.S. Attorney and local State’s Attorney that

led to the conviction of local drug dealer on such charges as conspiracy to

murder and kidnap in aid of a racketeering enterprise, murder in aid of a

racketeering enterprise, attempted murder in aid of a racketeering

enterprise, conspiracy to retaliate against a witness, and conspiracy to

distribute heroin and cocaine. In addition, nine other members of the

organization were found guilty of a variety of charges, including

conspiracy to murder and kidnap in aid of a racketeering enterprise and

conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine. Evidence of 10 murders was

presented at the trials. Moreover, according to DEA, witnesses testified

that the dealer sold $30,000 worth of heroin and cocaine a day in the

Eastern District of Baltimore City. Sixty-six arrests were made during this

investigation. The Division identified this case as an OCDETF case.

• According to DEA, in the investigation of one trafficker, DEA, with other

state and local agencies—the Fairfax County, VA, Police Department;

Arlington County, VA, Police Department; Washington, D.C., Metropolitan

Police Department; and Maryland State Police—dismantled a violent drug

distribution organization in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area and

solved the attempted murder of a Maryland State trooper. In December

1995, while transporting a kilogram of cocaine from New York to

Washington, D.C., in a vehicle owned by the trafficker, a long-time

kilogram-level cocaine distributor in the District was stopped and arrested

by a Maryland State trooper. Subsequently, the distributor conspired with

other individuals to kill that trooper to eliminate him as a witness in an

upcoming trial; however, the wrong trooper was shot. During March 1997,

investigations by the Fairfax, Arlington, and Washington, D.C., Police

Departments focused on the trafficker’s cocaine activities. DEA reported

that the distributor was involved in a conspiracy, with others, to distribute

cocaine in the Washington, D.C., area, and launder the proceeds through

legitimate businesses. As a result of this investigation, a total of 18

individuals were found guilty of various charges, and nearly half a million

dollars in criminally acquired assets were seized.
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 132 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

At the time of our visit in July 1998, DEA’s Bogota, Colombia Country

Office was the second largest DEA office in South America. It covers the

country of Colombia, which is bordered by the Caribbean Sea, Pacific

Ocean, and four other countries and divided by the Andes Mountains. The

Bogota Country Office, which is headed by a Country Attaché, includes a

DEA resident office in Barranquilla, Colombia, as shown in figure I.5.

Bogota, Colombia,

Country Office

Geographic Regional and

Organizational Structure
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 133 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Country office

Resident office

Barranquilla

Colombia

Brazil

Peru

Ecuador

Venezuela

Bogota

North

Pacific

Ocean

Caribbean

Sea

Source: DEA’s Bogota, Colombia, Country Office.

The country office was staffed with 65 DEA personnel, including 43 special

agents. Also, representatives from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and

Firearms (ATF), Customs Service, FBI, IRS, Secret Service, and the

Department of Defense (DOD) were working with DEA in Colombia. DEA

had two enforcement groups and an intelligence group located in Bogota

and one enforcement group in the Barranquilla office.

Figure I.5: Bogota, Colombia Country

Office Map
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 134 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

DEA is a member of the U.S. Embassy’s Bogota Country Team, which is

headed by the Ambassador and consists of U.S. agencies attached to the

embassy in Colombia. DEA works with Colombian law enforcement

authorities, primarily the Colombian National Police (CNP), to carry out

drug enforcement and intelligence operations. However, DEA agents in

Colombia do not have police authority and cannot make arrests or seize

drugs in that country.10

According to DEA, Colombian drug traffickers continue to supply most of

the world’s cocaine. However, Colombian trafficking organizations had

become much more fragmented in the 1990s. In the past, large Colombian

cartels controlled the cocaine industry. There are now numerous

independent traffickers and organizations with decentralized operations.

According to DEA, clandestine laboratories in Colombia are used to

convert cocaine base into cocaine hydrochloride (HCL) for eventual

export to the United States and Europe. The cocaine base is either

imported from other countries, primarily Peru, or made from coca leaves

grown in Colombia. The cocaine laboratories are primarily located in

jungle areas southeast of the Andes Mountains in Colombia, referred to by

DEA as the Colombian Source Zone. After processing, the cocaine is

typically flown across the Andes mountains to northwest Colombia for

further transport out of Colombia.

The major cocaine transportation points in northwest Colombia, according

to DEA, are located in an area that includes the Pacific and Caribbean

coasts and all of Colombia’s major population centers. The transportation

points include clandestine airstrips, major airports, seaports, and locations

from which small “go-fast” boats and commercial containerized cargo

vessels can transport cocaine. Preferred transshipment areas for drugs

originating from Colombia are Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti,

Mexico, Panama, and Puerto Rico. Mexico- and Caribbean-based

transportation groups are involved in shipping cocaine to the United

States.

The diversion of chemicals essential to cocaine production continues to

increase in Colombia, according to DEA. For the most part, these

chemicals are legally imported into Colombia from the United States,

 

10 We recently reported on the narcotics situation in Colombia, U.S. and Colombian efforts to address

drug trafficking activities in Colombia, and the continuing challenges each government faces to combat

these activities: Drug Control: Narcotics Threat From Colombia Continues to Grow (GAO/NSIAD-99-

136, June 22, 1999).

Overview of Drug

Trafficking Situation and

Threat
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 135 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Europe, and the Far East. They are then diverted for the production of

cocaine.

The availability of heroin produced in Colombia and smuggled into the

United States dramatically increased in recent years, according to DEA. In

1997, 75 percent of the heroin seized and analyzed in the United States was

Colombian. The Colombian heroin trade is dominated by trafficking

groups operating independently of the major cocaine trafficking

organizations. Colombia’s climate allows for year-round cultivation of

opium poppies, from which opium gum is processed into heroin in

clandestine laboratories throughout the country.

At the time of our review, according to DEA, the majority of the heroin

produced in Colombia was being exported through the international

airports in Bogota, Medellin, Cali, and, to a lesser extent, Barranquilla.

DEA estimated that about 90 percent of the Colombian heroin destined for

the United States was transported via couriers (also known as “mules”) on

commercial airlines. Miami, Dallas, and New York City were principal

“gateways” for Colombian heroin entering the United States. Heroin

traffickers were also transporting heroin into the United States through

other countries in South and Central America and the Caribbean. The

primary method of smuggling heroin was ingestion or concealment on the

couriers’ bodies. The heroin might also have been concealed in such items

as false-sided luggage, clothing, food, or equipment.

Insurgent guerrilla groups have been associated with cocaine and heroin

trafficking in Colombia. Guerrillas have provided security for cocaine

laboratories, opium poppy fields, and clandestine airstrips. They have also

been known to charge a “tax” for guarding coca and opium poppy fields,

for permission to transport opium gum or morphine to sites for sale within

the guerilla territory, for kilograms of coca leaf sold to produce cocaine

base, and for kilograms of cocaine exported from the Colombian Source

Zone. The “tax” has often been paid in weapons instead of currency.

According to DEA, the guerillas have increased the risk of conducting drug

enforcement operations. For example, a guerilla ambush of a CNP unit at a

clandestine airstrip and cocaine storage complex in March 1998 left one

CNP officer dead, two officers wounded, and five officers captured.

According to DEA, marijuana is exported in tons from Colombia to the

United States and Europe. It is reportedly grown in mountain ranges near

the Colombian Caribbean coast and is usually compressed into bales. The

primary method of transportation is containerized commercial cargo and

commercial cargo vessels departing from ports on the northern coast of
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 136 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Colombia. It might be off-loaded at sea onto smaller ships or speedboats

for delivery to locations in Mexico and onward transport to the United

States.

The Bogota Country Office is involved in activities to combat the

Colombian drug trafficking threat and support DEA’s South America

Regional Plan.11 The September 1997 South America Regional Plan

contains the following seven objectives:

• identify, investigate, and dismantle major drug trafficking organizations;

• support U.S. domestic investigations;

• enhance host nation counterdrug capabilities;

• develop a country intelligence program;

• control essential chemicals;

• conduct financial investigations; and

• promote regional counterdrug cooperation.

DEA’s Bogota Country Office also supports the U.S. Embassy’s Flow

Reduction Strategy, which is designed to reduce the flow of cocaine and

heroin from Colombia. This strategy is carried out by the embassy’s

Bogota Country Team. The goal of the strategy, which focuses on the

Colombian Source Zone southeast of the Andes Mountains, is to reduce

the amount of cocaine crossing the Andes into northwest Colombia by 50

percent. The Flow Reduction Strategy concentrates on eradicating coca

plants and opium poppies, destroying cocaine laboratories, and controlling

the transportation of cocaine base and HCL into and out of the Colombian

Source Zone by aircraft or rivercraft. For its part, DEA focuses primarily

on the organizations responsible for controlling the manufacture and

transportation of cocaine, while the State Department is responsible for

eradication efforts.

At the time of our review, DEA was involved in three intelligence

initiatives focused on the Colombian Source Zone.

• Information Analysis/Operations Center (IA/OC): The IA/OC was created

to collect drug intelligence from U.S. and Colombian agencies and other

sources, particularly regarding the production and transportation of

cocaine in the Colombian Source Zone; serve as a focal point for U.S. and

Colombian agencies’ requests for information; and support drug

enforcement operations in the Colombian Source Zone. The center was

 

11 DEA’s South America Regional Plan, which is updated periodically, provides strategic guidance for

DEA’s operations in South American countries, including Colombia and Bolivia.

Priorities, Programs, and

Initiatives
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 137 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

staffed by DEA, Customs, and U.S. military personnel at the time of our

review.

• Operation Papagayo: The objective of this operation is to intercept

traffickers’ communications in the Colombian Source Zone to help identify

organizations controlling the manufacture and transportation of cocaine.

The operation is conducted by a vetted or screened CNP unit that is to

share the collected intelligence with DEA.

• Operation Selva Verde: The objective of this operation is to identify the

organizations manufacturing cocaine in the Colombian Source Zone, locate

and destroy their laboratories, collect evidence and intelligence, and arrest

those involved. CNP, Colombian military, and DEA personnel operating in

the Colombian Source Zone collect intelligence and provide it to IA/OC.

Using this and other intelligence, IA/OC identifies targets for enforcement

operations. CNP jungle units, in coordination with the Colombian military,

then raid the targeted cocaine laboratories. Evidence and intelligence

collected at the raided laboratories are used to help identify the trafficking

organizations involved.

The DEA office in Bogota had committed one of its enforcement groups to

investigations of major drug traffickers, including those on DEA’s list of

major targets in Colombia. The DEA agents in this group work with a CNP

Special Investigative Unit (SIU), which was vetted by DEA. The SIU

collects intelligence and targets and investigates major traffickers. At the

time of our visit, another Colombian SIU had been vetted by DEA and was

starting to work with this DEA enforcement group. This SIU was

established to target major money laundering organizations, and an IRS

agent assigned to the embassy was slated to assist the SIU. There were

three vetted Colombian prosecutors assigned to work with the two SIUs.

At the time of our review, DEA’s other enforcement group in Bogota was

committed to working with CNP on several different programs, including

the major programs discussed below.

• Aircraft Control Program (Operation Gemini Clipper): This is a CNPoperated general aviation aircraft inspection and enforcement program

designed to help identify trafficking organizations using aircraft to

transport illegal drugs. The program is based on a requirement by the

Colombian government that all general aviation aircraft in Colombia be

registered and inspected. Under the program, CNP inspects aircraft and

their registrations, immobilizes or seizes aircraft found to be illegal, and

collects information to help identify those responsible for using the

aircraft to transport drugs.
Appendix I

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Page 138 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

• Chemical Control Program: A DEA diversion investigator and special agent

were working with a CNP chemical control unit. This unit, which was

vetted by DEA in 1998, audits companies authorized to legally import the

chemicals essential to cocaine processing and companies that distribute

chemicals in Colombia. The unit is authorized to seize or immobilize

unauthorized or illegal chemicals and can coordinate with another

Colombian government agency to revoke the licenses of chemical

importers violating the law.

• Heroin Program: DEA and CNP established a heroin task force to focus on

Colombian heroin trafficking organizations. The CNP on this task force

were not vetted at the time of our visit. Although the task force primarily

concentrates on heroin transportation organizations, it has also identified

and targeted heroin laboratories, according to DEA.

The Bogota Country Office reported the following as significant

accomplishments for fiscal years 1997 and 1998.

• Operation Papagayo was established, and CNP officers assigned to this

operation identified 13 different drug trafficking organizations.

• Operation Selva Verde destroyed 189 cocaine laboratories.

• CNP vetted units carried out 10 major investigations with DEA domestic

offices. One of the vetted units’ investigations produced the first two

“controlled deliveries”12 of cocaine and heroin from Colombia to the United

States. This investigation resulted in 17 arrests in Cali, Colombia, as well as

wiretaps in Miami and Newark.

• The vetted units had a total of 17 investigations; 30 arrests that DEA

considered significant; and seizures of 2,666 kilograms of cocaine, 1.5

kilograms of heroin, 520 real estate properties, 17 vehicles, and $4.6 million

in U.S. currency.

• The Aircraft Control Program resulted in 29 aircraft seized by CNP in

calendar year 1997, with a value estimated at $57 million. During calendar

year 1998, 81 aircraft were grounded or seized, 10 of which were returned

due to innocent third party ownership. In addition, 5 stolen aircraft were

recovered in 1998.

• The Chemical Control Program produced the first two arrests of chemical

diverters in Colombia. In addition, the Colombian government revoked five

chemical licenses during this period. In fiscal year 1997, 26.7 tons of

chemicals were seized by the CNP chemical control unit; and in fiscal year

1998, the CNP unit seized 2,191 tons of solid chemicals and about 1.5

million gallons of liquid chemicals.

 

12 A controlled delivery is an investigative tool whereby law enforcement authorities monitor a

shipment of illegal drugs to its intended destination for eventual seizure.

Enforcement Statistics and

Case Examples
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Page 139 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

• The heroin task force destroyed 11 heroin laboratories and seized 237

kilograms of heroin, 55 kilograms of morphine, and 85.5 kilograms of

opium.

• Since its inception in October 1997, the Airport Passenger and Cargo

Inspection Program had yielded 175 arrests and seizures of 911 kilograms

of cocaine and 58 kilograms of heroin.

• The Barranquilla Resident Office reported drug seizures of 16,133

kilograms of cocaine, 18 kilograms of heroin, 22 kilograms of morphine, 17

kilograms of opium, and 17 metric tons of marijuana. This office also

contributed to the seizure of 12,741 kilograms of cocaine, 2 kilograms of

heroin, and 2 tons of marijuana being smuggled outside of Colombia.

According to DEA, a major success in Colombia was the dismantlement of

the Cali cartel, which DEA considered to be the most powerful criminal

organization that law enforcement had ever faced. Since 1995, all of the

top Cali cartel leaders have been captured by or surrendered to CNP, with

the exception of one who was killed in a shoot-out with CNP at the time of

his arrest. According to DEA, evidence gathered through years of

investigations by DEA, CNP, and other federal, state, and local law

enforcement agencies led to the identification, indictment, arrest,

conviction, and incarceration of the cartel leaders on drug charges in

Colombia.
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Page 140 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

At the time of our visit in July 1998, the La Paz, Bolivia, Country Office was

DEA’s second largest foreign office worldwide. The Office covers the

country of Bolivia, which is surrounded by the countries of Argentina,

Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Peru. The Office, which is headed by a

Country Attaché, included resident offices in Cochabamba, Santa Cruz,

and Trinidad, Bolivia, as shown on figure I.6.

La Paz, Bolivia,

Country Office

Geographic Region and

Organizational Structure
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 141 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Country office

Resident office

Trinidad

Santa Cruz

Cochabamba

La Paz

Brazil

Paraguay

Argentina

Chile

Peru

Bolivia

Source: DEA’s La Paz, Bolivia, Country Office.

The country office was staffed with 114 personnel, including 43 special

agents. Some of these personnel were located at a Bolivian police camp in

the Chapare region where coca is grown. In addition, representatives from

DOD were assigned to work with DEA in Bolivia.

The U.S. Ambassador is responsible for the drug control efforts of all U.S.

agencies in Bolivia. The U.S. Embassy gives a high priority to drug control

activities, such as the State Department’s crop eradication efforts, the U.S.

Agency for International Development’s support for alternative

Figure I.6: La Paz, Bolivia Country

Office Map
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 142 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

development activities enabling farmers to support themselves and their

families without the need to cultivate coca, and DEA’s drug enforcement

programs and operations. In carrying out its responsibilities, DEA works

with and assists Bolivian law enforcement authorities. However, DEA

special agents in Bolivia do not have police authority and cannot make

arrests or seize drugs in that country.

DEA reported that coca leaf cultivation continues in Bolivia. Bolivia is also

a source country for cocaine, which is processed from coca leaves and

smuggled into the United States and Europe.13

Coca cultivation in Bolivia occurs primarily in two areas—the Chapare

region in the Cochabamba Department and the Yungas region situated in

the Altiplano of the La Paz Department. DEA estimated that 90 to 95

percent of the coca leaves produced in the Chapare region, Bolivia’s major

cultivation area, is illegally processed into cocaine products. Most of the

coca leaf cultivated in the Yungas region is cultivated in accordance with

Bolivian law for legal consumption.

After Bolivian peasants harvest their coca fields, the leaves are dried and

packaged in 100-pound bags. Low-echelon producers or the coca growers

themselves process the dried leaves into cocaine base in clandestine

laboratories, mostly in the Chapare region. The cocaine base is sold to

buyers who act as agents for cocaine trafficking organizations and

consolidate shipments for transport out of the Chapare.

In the past, according to DEA, the cocaine base was primarily transported

out of Bolivia, usually to Colombia, for further processing into cocaine

HCL. In recent years, however, Bolivian trafficking organizations have

begun producing cocaine HCL in clandestine laboratories as well as

distributing Bolivian-produced cocaine. At the time of our review, DEA

reported that traffickers were moving cocaine base out of the Chapare

region, primarily to the Santa Cruz and El Beni regions of Bolivia, using a

variety of land, river, and air transportation methods. Once the cocaine

base reaches the Santa Cruz and El Beni regions, it is either processed

locally into cocaine HCL or transported into Brazil or Colombia for

processing.

 

13 Coca has deep cultural roots in Bolivia, where it has been cultivated for at least 2,000 years. Today,

coca cultivation and consumption still have considerable cultural and economic importance, and even

legal acceptance, in Bolivia. At the time of our review, it was estimated that 400,000 to 500,000

Bolivians chewed coca leaf to alleviate the effects of cold, hunger, fatigue, and altitude sickness. A type

of tea is also brewed from coca. In general, the leaf is a focus for rituals and social occasions.

Overview of Drug

Trafficking Situation and

Threat
Appendix I

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Page 143 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

According to DEA, at the time of our review, several Bolivian family-based

transportation/production networks dominated cocaine trafficking in the

country. The networks were managing the majority of cocaine moved

within Bolivia as well as the cocaine shipped out of the country. The

trafficking networks were financing cocaine base purchases from Chaparebased suppliers, arranging for transportation from the Chapare, operating

base purification and/or cocaine laboratories, and consolidating large

shipments for international transport. A few of these networks still dealt

with Colombian drug organizations; but Bolivians were also working with

traffickers from other countries, such as Brazil, Peru, Chile, Paraguay,

Mexico, and Nigeria.

During the 1990s, the La Paz Country Office shifted from conducting

predominantly “jungle operations” in Operation Snowcap—which

identified and destroyed cocaine base laboratories and interdicted cocaine

base shipments—to placing increased emphasis on identifying, targeting,

and investigating cocaine trafficking organizations. Using funds

appropriated for DEA’s Andean Ridge Initiatives and vetted Sensitive

Investigative Units (SIU) of the Bolivian National Police (BNP), DEA

reported that drug intelligence collection efforts in Bolivia have been

enhanced; and the investigative capabilities of BNP’s Special Forces for

the Fight Against Narcotics Trafficking (Fuerzas Especiales Para la Lucha

Contra Narco-Trafico, or FELCN) have been improved with more

personnel, additional equipment, and better training.

The La Paz Country office’s programs and initiatives were designed to

combat the Bolivian drug trafficking threat and support DEA’s South

America Regional Plan.14 The South America Regional Plan contains the

following seven objectives:

• identify, investigate, and dismantle major drug trafficking organizations;

• support U.S. domestic investigations;

• enhance host nation counterdrug capabilities;

• develop a country intelligence program;

• control essential chemicals;

• conduct financial investigations; and

• promote regional counterdrug cooperation.

According to DEA, at the time of our review, the country office’s priority

was investigating Bolivia-based drug trafficking organizations with

 

14 DEA’s South America Regional Plan, which is updated periodically, provides strategic guidance for

DEA’s operations in South American countries, including Bolivia and Colombia.

Priorities, Programs, and

Initiatives
Appendix I

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Page 144 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

connections to the United States. However, DEA officials said this has

become more difficult. In the past, there was a link from Bolivia to the

United States through Colombia. At the time of our review, however, fewer

Colombian drug traffickers were involved with the Bolivian cocaine trade,

and Bolivian traffickers were dealing with people from a number of

different countries. The country office was focusing most of its operations

in two areas: the Chapare region, where most of the cocaine base comes

from, and the Santa Cruz area, where most of the cocaine HCL comes

from.

The country office, according to DEA, was working closely with FELCN to

carry out drug enforcement and intelligence operations. FELCN exercises

operational control over various Bolivian drug law enforcement units, such

as the Mobile Rural Patrol Unit (Unidad Movil de Policia Rural, or

UMOPAR); Financial Investigative Unit (FIU); Grupo de Inteligencia y

Operaciones Especial (GIOE), FELCN’s intelligence arm; and Grupo

Investigaciones de Substancias Quimicas (GISUQ), FELCN’s Chemical

Investigations Group. The police units are supported by the Bolivian Air

Force’s Red Devil Task Force, which provides aviation support, and the

Bolivian Navy’s Blue Devil Task Force, which patrols rivers.

At the time of our review, FELCN/UMOPAR units were stationed

throughout Bolivia and were based primarily in the Chapare region,

Trinidad, and the Yungas region. Members of UMOPAR are considered

specialists in paramilitary counterdrug operations, including jungle patrol

and reconnaissance, air insertions, mobile roadblocks in rural areas, and

river operations. DEA started Operation Gatekeeper primarily to focus

UMOPAR resources on interdicting cocaine base leaving the Chapare. With

specialized teams of police conducting mobile roadblocks on highways,

Operation Gatekeeper provides a rapid response in areas of Bolivia where

intelligence indicates the movement of large quantities of drugs or

chemicals. In 1998, UMOPAR established new mobile enforcement teams

(called Border Enforcement Teams), headquartered in La Paz, to conduct

intelligence-driven drug interdiction operations, including roadblocks,

along Bolivia’s borders with Chile, Peru, Brazil, and Argentina. DEA refers

to this program as Operation GRIRMO.

At the time of our review, FELCN/GIOE had 3 SIUs with approximately 75

vetted personnel. The SIUs were located in Cochabamba, La Paz, and

Santa Cruz. They were collecting information through surveillance

operations, with special emphasis on violators operating at the highest

levels. The intelligence was being used to help investigate and dismantle
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 145 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

major drug trafficking organizations in support of both Bolivian and U.S.

drug enforcement objectives.

The La Paz, Bolivia, Country Attaché told us that he believed the Bolivian

SIUs are helping to create a DEA-like organization in Bolivia. He said the

vetting process for members of these units is similar to DEA’s hiring

process, and the SIUs consist of police with integrity, training, expertise,

equipment, and other tools needed to successfully conduct drug

enforcement operations. He said DEA is building the infrastructure of

FELCN and trying to do more intelligence-driven investigations of drug

trafficking organizations.

In addition, the following efforts were ongoing at the time of our review,

according to DEA:

• The country office had established a Major Violators Task Force with

FELCN officers. This program focused on arresting high-level traffickers

involved in transporting cocaine and dismantling their organizations. Task

force operations were being carried out in Cochabamba, La Paz, and Santa

Cruz.

• Operation Argus had consistently been the most valuable intelligence

resource in Bolivia, according to DEA. This FELCN intelligence operation

was feeding actionable intelligence to FELCN/GIOE, which led to arrests

and seizures in numerous cases. The program has been funded almost

entirely by DOD and the State Department and was expanded to several

locations in Bolivia.

• Operation Camba is an enforcement and intelligence-gathering program

that was targeting drug traffickers who used trains in Bolivia’s Santa Cruz

and Tarija Departments to transport cocaine and precursor chemicals to

and from the Bolivian frontiers with Brazil and Argentina. According to

DEA, Operation Camba enabled the country office and FELCN to gather

extensive intelligence that, combined with enforcement operations,

significantly increased seizures of cocaine and precursor chemicals being

transported on Bolivian trains.

• FELCN/FIU is responsible for investigating money laundering and other

links between finances and drug trafficking and for providing case support

when financial assets are seized in drug investigations. According to DEA,

the country office has been working with the FIU to refine a 1998 Bolivian

money laundering law to help make it fully functional.

• According to DEA, the country office had a diversion investigator working

with FELCN/GISUQ, which is responsible for investigating violations of

Bolivia’s laws against trafficking in chemicals essential to processing

cocaine. GISUQ intercepts contraband chemicals entering Bolivia from
Appendix I

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Page 146 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

foreign countries, develops intelligence concerning precursor chemical

diverters throughout Bolivia, has operated checkpoints to seize precursor

chemicals in the Chapare, and investigates established chemical handlers

in conjunction with the Bolivian National Directorate for the Control of

Chemicals.

• Operation Mugshot is an airport intelligence program that was being

conducted by the country office. In the program, names from passengers’

passports and airport employee lists were being run through DEA’s

worldwide computer database containing information on known and

suspected drug traffickers.

• Operation Civic Action Plan is a television, radio, and poster campaign that

advertised rewards for information about drug trafficking.

• Operation Education was designed to develop schools for Bolivian law

enforcement personnel to enhance their investigative capability through

specialized training.

• Through Operation Night Watch, the country office assisted in

restructuring FELCN to make it a more effective and less bureaucratic

organization.

The La Paz Country Office provided us with the results of drug

enforcement operations in Bolivia during fiscal years 1997 and 1998.

In fiscal year 1997, the country office initiated 219 investigations. Of this

total, 99 investigations involved cocaine HCL, 90 involved cocaine base, 26

involved cocaine-related chemicals, 3 involved marijuana, and 1 involved

heroin. The Santa Cruz Resident Office initiated 94 of the investigations;

the Cochabamba Resident Office initiated 93 investigations; and the office

in La Paz initiated 32 investigations. The country office reported that BNP

made 1,483 arrests and seized 11,452 kilograms of cocaine HCL and base

during fiscal year 1997 in association with DEA’s activities in Bolivia.

In fiscal year 1998, the country office initiated 487 investigations. Of these,

483 investigations involved cocaine, 3 involved marijuana, and 1 involved

heroin. The Santa Cruz Resident Office initiated 262 of the 487

investigations, the Cochabamba Resident Office initiated 156

investigations, the Trinidad Resident Office initiated 12 investigations, and

the office in La Paz initiated 57 investigations. BNP made 2,112 arrests and

seized 11,554 kilograms of cocaine base and HCL during fiscal year 1998 in

association with DEA’s activities in Bolivia.

An example of what DEA officials considered a successful investigation

involved the Santa Cruz resident office. In May 1997, DEA and BNP’s

FELCN initiated an investigation into the cocaine air shipment activities of

Enforcement Statistics and

Case Examples
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 147 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

a Bolivian trafficking organization. Intelligence revealed that the

organization was shipping multihundred-kilogram loads of cocaine to a

Brazilian organization located in Campo Grande, Brazil, several times a

month. In addition, through intelligence, DEA and FELCN were able to

identify the majority of the members of the organization and their

operating areas. In October 1997, information surfaced about a scheduled

air shipment of cocaine by the Bolivian organization. On the basis of this

information, in November 1997 a joint operation resulted in the arrest of

the Bolivian organization’s head and 17 members of his organization. In

addition, 354.4 kilograms of cocaine base and $1.4 million in traffickerowned assets were seized.

In another example provided by DEA officials, 602 kilograms of cocaine

base were seized in July 1997 at a checkpoint in the Yungas region. This

drug seizure, along with subsequent arrests and document seizures, led to

the discovery of a large, multifaceted trafficking organization. Document

analysis and related research of personal telephone directories, financial

documents, business papers, and personal papers seized from members of

the organization revealed a network of drug and illicit chemical traffickers

numbering over 100 persons. Investigative developments revealed that the

organization was responsible for the full range of cocaine trafficking,

including obtaining cocaine-essential chemicals, operating cocaine base

laboratories, transporting cocaine base out of the Chapare region for

further processing into HCL, and shipping the drugs out of Bolivia.

Although the majority of the organization members identified were

Bolivian nationals, other possible targets were located in Argentina, Brazil,

Chile, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Arrests tied to this

cocaine trafficking organization numbered over 55, and the value of seized

assets exceeded $1 million.
Appendix I

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Page 148 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

DEA’s Mexico City Country Office covers all of Mexico, which is

approximately 761,600 square miles in size, or about three times larger

than Texas. Mexico has a 2,000-mile border with the United States, 5,804

miles of coastline, and is situated between the United States and the South

American countries that supply much of the illegal drugs smuggled into the

United States.

At the time of our visit in September 1998, the Mexico City Country Office,

which was headed by a Country Attaché, included seven resident offices

spread throughout Mexico, as shown in figure I.7.15

Country office

Resident office

Guadalajara

Monterrey

Hermosillo

Mazatlán

Mexico City

Merida

Ciudad Juarez

Pacific

Ocean

Gulf of

Mexico Mexico

Tijuana

Source: DEA’s Mexico City, Mexico, Country Office.

 

15 The country office had resident offices in Guadalajara, Hermosillo, Ciudad Juarez, Mazatln, Merida,

Monterrey, and Tijuana.

Mexico City, Mexico,

Country Office

Geographic Region and

Organizational Structure

Figure I.7: Mexico City, Mexico, Country

Office Map
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 149 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

There were 88 DEA staff authorized, 45 of which were special agent

positions. The Government of Mexico limits the number of special agents

DEA can have in Mexico, and it permitted DEA to increase the number of

special agents in the country from 39 to 45 in July 1997. Also,

representatives from the FBI and DOD were assigned to the country office.

DEA is the principal U.S. agency for drug investigation and drug

intelligence coordination in Mexico. DEA works with Mexican law

enforcement authorities to carry out drug enforcement and intelligence

operations. DEA agents in Mexico do not have police authority and cannot

make arrests or seize drugs in that country.16

According to the State Department, no country poses a more immediate

drug threat to the United States than Mexico. Mexico is the principal

transit country for cocaine entering the United States, with an estimate of

almost 60 percent of the U.S. cocaine supply smuggled across the U.S.-

Mexico border in 1998, typically coming from Colombia through Mexico.

Mexico is also a major source country for heroin, marijuana, and

methamphetamine.

Since the late 1980s, according to DEA, the Mexican/Central American

corridor has been the primary smuggling route for cocaine destined for the

United States from source countries in South America. Cocaine is shipped

to Mexico in various ways (e.g., in fishing vessels, in containerized cargo

on commercial ships, and on small planes and trucks). Once in Mexico,

most of the cocaine is smuggled into the United States by vehicle.

In recent years, Mexican drug trafficking organizations have expanded

their cocaine operations. According to DEA, Mexican trafficking groups

were once solely transporters for Colombian cocaine traffickers. In the

early 1990s, however, major Mexican organizations began receiving

payment in cocaine for their services. These organizations ultimately

emerged as wholesale distributors of cocaine within the United States,

significantly increasing their profit margin.

Mexico has been a significant source of heroin used in the United States

for many years, according to DEA. Analysis of drug seizures indicates that

14 percent of the heroin available in the United Sates is produced in

Mexico. Opium poppy cultivation takes place in the central and

 

16 In June 1998, we reported on the status of counternarcotics activities in Mexico: Drug Control: U.S.-

Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts Face Difficult Challenges (GAO/NSIAD-98-154, June 30, 1998). We

later updated that report in congressional testimony: Drug Control: Update on U.S.-Mexican

Counternarcotics Activities (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-98, March 4, 1999).

Overview of Drug

Trafficking Situation and

Threat
Appendix I

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Page 150 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

southwestern parts of the country. Clandestine laboratories are used to

produce heroin from opium with essential chemicals that are widely

available in Mexico. DEA reported that Mexico has also been increasingly

used as a transit country for heroin from other source countries.

According to DEA, Mexico is the primary foreign supplier of marijuana to

the United States, and Mexican organizations have been involved with

marijuana trafficking for decades. Marijuana is cultivated in Mexico, with

the heaviest concentration in the western states. In recent years, growers

have increased their efficiency and are cultivating higher grade marijuana,

which commands a higher price in the United States.

Mexican drug trafficking organizations, according to DEA, have expanded

their methamphetamine operations, using their well-established cocaine,

heroin, and marijuana distribution networks to dominate wholesale-level

methamphetamine production and distribution in recent years. At the time

of our review, DEA estimated that the majority of the methamphetamine

available in the United States was either produced in Mexico and

transported to the United States or manufactured in the United States by

Mexican drug traffickers.

DEA reported that Mexican drug trafficking organizations are becoming

stronger. According to DEA, Mexican organizations have billions of dollars

in assets and have at their disposal airplanes, boats, vehicles, radar,

communications equipment, and weapons that rival the capabilities of

some legitimate governments. One such Mexican organization generated

tens of millions of dollars in profits per week.

The State Department reported that Mexico has become a major money

laundering center. Drug trafficking organizations launder the proceeds of

illegal drug sales in legitimate businesses in both Mexico and the United

States. They favor transportation and other industries that can be used to

facilitate drug, cash, and arms smuggling and other types of illegal

activities.

DEA reported that Mexican traffickers are also a growing threat to citizens

within Mexico and the United States because of their willingness to

murder and intimidate witnesses and public officials. According to the

Justice Department, the number of threats to U.S. law enforcement

officials in Mexico has also increased.
Appendix I

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Page 151 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

The Mexico City Country Office maintains liaison with Mexican law

enforcement and intelligence organizations, and it promotes interagency

cooperation and coordination in the areas of drug law enforcement

activities and intelligence collection and dissemination. The country

office’s mission is to (1) coordinate with Mexican law enforcement

authorities on investigations directed against major drug trafficking

organizations in Mexico, (2) collaborate in developing a connection to the

United States for the investigations initiated in Mexico, and (3) engage in

cooperative “institution building” to improve the capabilities and

effectiveness of Mexican drug law enforcement authorities.

The office’s work plan cited the following priorities for fiscal year 1998:

• develop focused intelligence-gathering activities,

• increase the impact of counterdrug efforts in Central America on drug

trafficking in the United States,

• enhance host nation counterdrug capabilities, and

• initiate regional counterdrug cooperation.

According to DEA’s Country Attaché, the country office focuses on

investigating major drug trafficking organizations in Mexico involved in

supplying illegal drugs to the United States. He said that at the time of our

visit, the Mexico City Country Office had a list of 10 major targets, and

virtually all of the office’s efforts were devoted to investigations of these

targets. In these investigations, the country office was attempting to attack

the “command and control” communications of targeted organizations and

was working closely with DEA’s Special Operations Division at

headquarters.

Another priority of the Mexico City Country Office has been the attempt to

locate a fugitive accused of participating in the June 1994 murder of a DEA

special agent in Arizona. According to DEA, the country office has

dedicated all available staff and equipment, in coordination with and in

support of the Mexican government, to apprehend this fugitive.

The Country Attaché told us that the key change to DEA’s operations in

Mexico in the 1990s was the establishment of Mexican vetted units for

drug law enforcement. He said this was a dramatic departure from the way

the country office previously operated and coordinated with Mexican law

enforcement authorities. At the time of our review, DEA’s Mexico office

was essentially working only with the vetted units, which are part of the

Mexican Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health (FEADS) and

include personnel assigned to the Organized Crime Unit (OCU) and the

Priorities, Programs, and

Initiatives
Appendix I

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Page 152 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Border Task Forces (BTF). FEADS reports to Mexico’s Office of the

Attorney General (PGR).

OCU, located in Mexico City, is the principal agency responsible for

enforcing a Mexican organized crime law passed in November 1996

covering drug trafficking, money laundering, conspiracy, electronic

surveillance, and organized crime corruption. The narcotics section of

OCU has vetted personnel whose mission is to investigate high-level drug

trafficking groups, as well as drug-related money laundering groups,

throughout Mexico.

OCU is also the umbrella agency for the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU),

which has vetted personnel. The SIU collects and analyzes intelligence

from various sources, develops investigations against major organizations,

and disseminates actionable information to other law enforcement units.

At the time of our review, the BTFs were investigating what DEA

considered the most significant drug trafficking organizations along the

U.S.-Mexico border as well as a major organization in Central Mexico

considered key to the booming U.S. methamphetamine trade.17 The

primary work of the BTFs is intelligence; i.e., they gather, analyze,

integrate, and interpret information from various sources. The FEADS

officers assigned to the BTFs are vetted; and, at the time of our work, they

were assigned to BTF locations in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, Monterrey, and

Guadalajara and their respective suboffices in several other locations in

Mexico.

Mexico passed a law in May 1996, and expanded it in December 1997,

establishing trafficking in precursor and essential chemicals as a criminal

offense. These chemicals can be used in the production of heroin, cocaine,

and synthetic drugs of abuse. The implementation of the law and

development of an administrative infrastructure for enforcing it were

under way at the time of our visit. As part of the U.S. assistance and

training to Mexico for carrying out the law, the country office was

participating in a Bilateral Chemical Control Working Group and

encouraging the establishment of Mexican chemical control programs. The

country office was also working with specialized chemical control units in

FEADS and CENDRO, a Mexican intelligence unit, to exchange chemical

import/export information and other intelligence. In addition, the BTF that

 17 The Guadalajara BTF was instrumental in apprehending two brothers who headed this organization

in June 1998. As of May 1999, the brothers were incarcerated in Mexico awaiting extradition to the

United States.
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Page 153 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

DEA works with in Guadalajara was considered to be the first Mexican

chemical task force and had targeted the Amezcua-Contreras organization,

which DEA reported as the most powerful and dominant

methamphetamine trafficking organization in Mexico.

The country office also participates in the U.S. Embassy’s Money

Laundering Task Force. Membership includes the FBI, Customs, IRS, and

the Economic, Political, and Narcotics Affairs sections of the embassy. The

task force oversees joint financial investigations, provides training to

Mexican counterparts, and coordinates an exchange of information with

Mexico. In addition, the task force encouraged the Mexican government to

develop major investigations to test Mexico’s May 1996 law making money

laundering a criminal offense.

Also located at the country office is an Information Analysis Center (IAC)

that develops tactical intelligence for interdicting drugs and chemicals

being smuggled. According to DEA, the IAC interacts daily with CENDRO

and an antismuggling unit of the Mexican military. The IAC is staffed with

DEA intelligence analysts, DOD analysts and computer support personnel,

a Customs air officer, and assigned liaison personnel from an intelligence

agency.

At the time of our review, DEA special agents in the Mexico City Country

Office were spending the majority of their investigative work hours on

programs and initiatives involving cocaine. During fiscal year 1997,

cocaine operations accounted for 71.4 percent of the special agents’

reported investigative work hours. In fiscal year 1998, the special agents

reported spending 62.8 percent of their investigative work hours on

operations involving cocaine.

The Mexico City Country Office provided us with a statistical summary of

the results of its operations during fiscal years 1997 and 1998.

In fiscal year 1997, the country office initiated 90 investigations. The

office’s operations resulted in 57 arrests, 26 of which were related to

cocaine and 23 of which were related to marijuana. The office reported

seizures of approximately 4,025 kilograms of cocaine, 3 kilograms of

heroin, 24,290 kilograms of marijuana, and 264,314 dosage units of

dangerous drugs such as amphetamines.

In fiscal year 1998, the country office initiated 77 investigations, 44 of

which were related to cocaine and 23 of which were related to marijuana.

The office’s operations resulted in five arrests, of which three were related

Enforcement Statistics and

Case Examples
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 154 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

to cocaine and two were related to marijuana. The office reported seizures

of 573 kilograms of cocaine, 26 kilograms of heroin, 860 kilograms of

marijuana, and 64,000 dosage units of dangerous drugs.

An example of what DEA considered a successful major investigation

involved the Mexican drug trafficking organization known as the Gulf

cartel. This organization transported cocaine, marijuana, and heroin into

the United States from Mexico and was closely aligned with the Colombian

Cali cartel. The organization was headquartered in both Matamoros and

Monterrey, Mexico, and had significant influence in the Mexican states of

Chihuahua, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, and Veracruz. DEA, in conjunction

with the FBI and the Customs Service, initiated an investigation that was

expanded to include task forces from U.S. federal, state, and local agencies

and international agencies. The Mexican Attorney General’s Office took

the lead in the investigation, arrested several key organization members,

and provided valuable information from cooperating defendants and

intelligence sources. DEA’s Monterrey resident office cultivated and used

informants, resulting in the arrest of other organization members and,

eventually, the head of the organization. The individuals were indicted on

30 counts of drug and money laundering violations.

After the arrest of the Gulf cartel’s leader, another individual took control

of the organization. DEA’s Monterrey office took the lead in an

investigation that involved DEA domestic offices, the FBI, U.S. Attorneys’

Offices, and Mexican law enforcement authorities. The new organization

head was arrested and charged with numerous drug and money laundering

violations. At the time of our review, he was incarcerated in a Mexican

prison.

Despite the incarceration of the second leader, the Gulf cartel continued to

bring ton quantities of cocaine into the United States, according to DEA.

Thus, at the time of our review, investigations of the remaining

organization members were being conducted and coordinated by U.S. and

Mexican law enforcement agencies, including DEA’s Monterrey office.
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 155 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Established in October 1995, the Caribbean Division is unique in that it has

both foreign and domestic responsibilities. The Division’s area of

responsibility is the entire Eastern Caribbean Corridor, including the

commonwealth of Puerto Rico;18 the U.S. Virgin Islands; and the countries

of Barbados, the Netherlands Antilles (Curacao), and Trinidad and Tobago,

as well as Hispaniola (the Dominican Republic and Haiti) in the Central

Caribbean and Jamaica in the Western Caribbean. At the time of our visit

in September 1998, the division’s field office, which was headed by a SAC

and two ASACs, was located in San Juan, Puerto Rico. It also had six

foreign county offices and three domestic resident offices, as shown in

figure I.8.

 

18 Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth, in union with the United States.

Caribbean Division

Geographic Region and

Organizational Structure
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 156 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Resident office

Colombia Venezuela

Puerto

Rico

Curacao (Netherlands Antilles)

Kingston Ponce

San Juan

St. Croix

St. Thomas

U.S. Virgin

Islands

Barbados

Trinidad

and

Tobago

Port-Au-Prince Santo Domingo

Bridgetown

Port of

Spain

Cuba

Haiti

Jamaica

Dominican

Republic

Division office

Country office

Source: DEA’s Caribbean Division.

As of March 1998, the division’s 161 staff (140 in domestic offices, 21 in

foreign offices) included 105 special agents (87 domestic and 18 foreign),

12 domestic intelligence staff, 13 diversion staff, and 31 other support

staff.19

According to DEA, in recent years the Caribbean Corridor has reemerged

as a major trafficking route between Colombia and the continental United

States. In 1995, the El Paso Intelligence Center estimated that

approximately 100 drug trafficking organizations were working in the

Caribbean area. Caribbean drug organizations are generally multinational,

but dominated primarily by Colombians, who were the command and

control managers, and Dominican nationals, who operated the

 

19 DEA’s Fiscal Year 1998 appropriation included a Caribbean initiative, which increased the number of

staff in the division (see ch. 4).

Figure I.8: DEA Caribbean Division Map

Overview of Drug

Trafficking Situation and

Threat
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 157 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

transportation networks. The traffickers transport cocaine, heroin, and

marijuana through the Caribbean corridor using private planes and yachts;

commercial airlines; cargo air; “motherships”; fishing vessels; small,

motorized, high-performance “go-fast” boats; cruise ships; and cargo

container vessels. Once in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, the

southernmost entry points of the United States, drugs are more easily

smuggled into the continental United States, because no additional

Customs inspections are required.

According to DEA, cocaine, in both powder and crack forms, continues to

be the drug of choice of both traffickers and users in the region. The

Caribbean basin is a major transshipment point for cocaine destined for

the continental United States and Europe. The primary routes are the

Western Caribbean (Jamaica-Bahamas), the Central Caribbean

(Hispaniola), and the Eastern Caribbean (Lesser Antilles-Puerto Rico). The

El Paso Intelligence Center has estimated that 140 tons of cocaine flow

through the Eastern Caribbean each year and, according to the Interagency

Flow Assessment Committee, approximately one-third of the cocaine

arriving in the continental United States comes through Puerto Rico, Haiti,

and the Dominican Republic. DEA also reported the emergence of new

local markets in Puerto Rico and the Caribbean due to Colombian

traffickers paying for services using drugs, not currency.

Cocaine traffickers use a variety of smuggling methods—via air, land, and

sea, according to DEA. For example, cocaine destined for the United

States may be dropped from private planes to waiting maritime vessels or

smuggled in “go-fast” boats into the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and

the U.S. Virgin Islands. From Puerto Rico cocaine may be transported into

the continental United States in airfreight cargo. Couriers on commercial

airlines from Colombia and Panama are also used to move cocaine through

the Dominican Republic, from Haiti to Miami, and from Puerto Rico to the

U.S. mainland.

DEA attributed the dramatic rise in drug-related violence in Puerto Rico to

the increased influx of cocaine into the region. Competition for control of

the domestic Puerto Rican cocaine market, which makes up an estimated

10 to 20 percent of the total cocaine smuggled onto the island, accounted

for some of the drug-related violence, according to DEA. Citing statistics

from the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD), DEA officials reported

that between 1995 and 1998, the percentage of homicides in Puerto Rico

that were drug-related had risen from 63 to 81 percent.

Cocaine
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 158 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

DEA sources indicated that Puerto Rico has become an arrival area and a

major transshipment point for high-purity Colombian heroin entering the

United States. The Eastern Caribbean island nations are used as

transshipment points for heroin, which is then transshipped through

Puerto Rico to the continental United States. Heroin is also transshipped

through Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic, with Puerto Rico as a

second transshipment point, and on to the United States. According to

DEA, heroin from Colombia may be transported through Central America

into Haiti via couriers on commercial airlines. Moreover, the availability of

heroin in Puerto Rico itself has also increased.

According to DEA, marijuana continues to be cultivated throughout the

Eastern Caribbean islands (particularly on St. Vincent and the

Grenadines), Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Puerto Rico. Jamaica is

one of the major marijuana producers in the world. Marijuana grown in

other parts of the Eastern Caribbean is transshipped through Puerto Rico

to external markets. In Puerto Rico, marijuana is not only cultivated both

indoors and outdoors in its central mountains, but also smuggled onto the

island from the continental United States. Containerized cargo ships have

been the preferred concealment and transportation method for large-scale,

well-established marijuana traffickers. Express mail is another method

used to smuggle marijuana into Puerto Rico.

At the time of our review, both the domestic and foreign priority of the

Caribbean Division was to stem the flow of drugs through the region into

the United States. In 1998, the division’s overall objective was to reduce

the capabilities of major drug trafficking organizations by immobilizing

their command and control centers and distribution networks through the

arrest, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration of both leaders and

members. Puerto Rico was considered to be the “linchpin” of DEA’s

strategy in the Caribbean because it is the outermost entry-point to the

continental United States.

As noted above, the Caribbean Division included both domestic and

foreign offices. The Domestic Subdivision included eight enforcement

groups and the diversion program. The Foreign Subdivision included six

Country Offices and the Foreign Operations Group.

The division’s response to the international and transit character of the

drug threat in the region was underscored by its work-hour statistics.

During fiscal years 1997 and 1998, more than 50 percent of its investigative

work hours, categorized by geographic scope of the case, were expended

on international cases, which involve both foreign and U.S. domestic

Heroin

Marijuana

Priorities, Programs, and

Initiatives
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 159 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

components. Moreover, during those same fiscal years, 52.6 percent and

39.9 percent, respectively, of the division’s investigative work hours,

categorized by case target, were expended on transportation-related cases.

In order to stem the flow of drugs into the region, the division’s

investigative priorities for fiscal year 1998 included: (1) cocaine-related

investigations involving violent organizations, (2) the initiation of major

heroin investigations, and (3) marijuana-related investigations. The

division’s investigative work-hour statistics for fiscal year 1998,

categorized by the drug involved indicated that 71 percent of investigative

work hours were expended on cocaine-related cases; 19 percent on heroinrelated cases (about double the previous year); and 10 percent on other

drugs, including marijuana. The increased investigative work hours

expended on heroin investigations corresponded to the changing drug

threat—the increased availability and use of heroin within, and

transshipment through, the region.

According to DEA officials, although the Caribbean Division used a variety

of investigative methods to accomplish its priorities, during the late 1990s

the division pursued a strategy that included the use of wire intercepts. For

example, in a 1995 DEA-led OCDETF case (See ch. 2 for discussion of

OCDETF), “Operation Omega,” DEA used undercover buys, on-site

surveillance, liaison with local law enforcement, confidential source

information, and cooperating defendant testimony to investigate the

Ponce-based Angela Ayala-Martinez cocaine-trafficking organization.

However, the 1996 DEA-led OCDETF investigation, “Operation Santa

Isabel,” used Title III (electronic surveillance) telephonic intercept orders

extensively in Puerto Rico. As in DEA generally (see ch. 2) and as shown in

table I.2, the division increased its use of wire intercepts from 1995

through 1998.

Fiscal year Wire intercepts

1995 0

1996 6

1997 12

1998 30

Source: DEA.

During 1998, the division worked domestically with various task forces

that included other federal and/or commonwealth and local agencies. In

Table I.2: Caribbean Field Division’s Use

of Wire Intercepts
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 160 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Puerto Rico, DEA carried out investigations with PRPD,20 Hacienda

(Treasury Department), and the Special Investigations Bureau21 of the

Attorney General’s Office. One DEA-led enforcement group, which

included FBI agents and officers from PRPD, worked at the airport. A task

force group, comprising DEA agents and members of PRPD, targeted

lower level individuals in drug organizations with the objective of working

toward the upper echelons of the organization.

In addition, in San Juan and Ponce, DEA led task forces, supported by

HIDTA funds from ONDCP (see ch. 2 for discussion of HIDTA). The San

Juan task force, which included DEA and the United States Immigration

and Naturalization Service among other federal agencies as well as officers

from the Puerto Rico Police Department, focused on major drug

organizations in San Juan and along the northern coast of Puerto Rico. The

Ponce task force, which included agents from DEA, FBI, IRS, and the

Customs Service, among others; a Coast Guard investigator; an Assistant

U.S. Attorney on site; local officials from PRPD and Hacienda; and a

special local prosecutor, focused on major drug organizations in the Ponce

area.

Investigative work-hour statistics for the division, when analyzed

according to source of cases, highlight the significance of its cooperative

efforts. State and local task force efforts accounted for 36.4 percent and

28.8 percent of the division’s investigative work hours expended in fiscal

years 1997 and 1998, respectively. Joint state and local cases accounted for

another 5.5 and 12.9 percent of its investigative work hours expended

during those years, respectively. In addition, investigative work hours

dedicated to OCDETF cases by the division almost doubled, from 7.9 to

15.1 percent, between fiscal years 1997 and 1998.

Internationally, the division’s six country offices in the islands worked

with their foreign counterparts in those countries to respond to the drug

threat in the region. Cooperative law enforcement efforts varied from

country to country. For example, in Haiti, DEA was engaged in vetting (see

ch. 2 for discussion of vetting) local law enforcement personnel. The

division was involved in a number of special operations. For example,

Operation Buccaneer, an ongoing campaign to eradicate marijuana, was

 

20 In Puerto Rico, the police are primarily commonwealth police, and law enforcement matters are

handled through them.

21 According to its director, the Special Investigations Bureau was formed 20 years ago and focuses on

organized crime and public corruption in Puerto Rico. At the time of our review, it had 250 agents, of

whom 40 were assigned to federal task forces. The bureau has a drug section, which develops cases.

Some of these cases are worked with DEA.
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 161 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

carried out by the Jamaicans and supported by DEA, DOD, and the State

Department. In Operation Summer Storm, the division and DEA’s Belize

Country Office worked with the 26 Caribbean nations, Belize, Suriname,

and Guyana to conduct a combined, coordinated air, land, and maritime

counternarcotics operation within each nation’s territorial borders to

interdict, disrupt, and dismantle the flow of drugs. In the Dominican

Republic, the DEA country office provided wire intercept assistance.

During fiscal years 1997 and 1998, joint federal foreign efforts accounted

for 35.3 percent and 24.2 percent, respectively, of investigative work hours

categorized by source of cases.

The Caribbean Division provided enforcement statistics for fiscal years

1997 and 1998. These data indicated the division’s involvement in 654

arrests in 1997 and 1,147 arrests in 1998. DEA also provided arrest data

reported by type of case—international, national, and foreign. Domestic

arrests were categorized as international or national and included arrests

related to OCDETF cases. Table I.3 below shows the distribution of the

division’s arrests by type of case.

Number of arrests

Type of cases

Fiscal year International a National a ForeignaTotal

1997 403 182 69 654

1998 483 556 108 1147

a

An international case includes targets involved in U.S. domestic and foreign criminal activities; a

foreign case includes targets operating principally outside the jurisdiction of the United States.

Source: DEA.

The division reported seizures of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana in both

domestic and foreign cases. For fiscal year 1997, the division reported total

seizures of 7,780.2 kilograms of cocaine, 25.3 kilograms of heroin, and

18,835.8 kilograms of marijuana. For fiscal year 1998, the division reported

cocaine seizures of 5,442.2 kilograms, heroin seizures of 40.2 kilograms,

and marijuana seizures of 5,910.8 kilograms.

DEA also provided information on the results of specific cases mentioned

above. Operation Omega, which targeted the Ponce-based Angela AyalaMartinez cocaine-trafficking organization, resulted in 77 arrests and the

seizure of more than $1 million in drug-related assets. Indictments against

another 20 defendants were expected in late 1998. In Operation Santa

Isabel, the Ponce Resident Office used information gathered through

traditional investigative techniques to apply for Title III wiretap orders for

12 telephones associated with the Rivera-Rosa cocaine importation and

Enforcement Statistics and

Case Examples

Table I.3: Arrests Reported by the

Caribbean Division, by Case Type, for

Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998
Appendix I

Profiles of Selected DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Foreign Offices

Page 162 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

cocaine and heroin distribution organization. These intercepts produced

more than 60 calls related to drug trafficking and resulted in a seizure of

1,300 kilograms of cocaine in November 1996. With information on RiveraRosa’s activities in the Dominican Republic gathered from these

intercepts, DEA’s Santo Domingo Country Office worked with Dominican

officials to arrest 25 members of the organization, including Rivera-Rosa,

and to seize cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and drug-related assets. As of

August 1998, DEA reported 81 arrests and the complete dismantling of this

drug organization.
Appendix II

Comments From the Drug Enforcement

Administration

Page 163 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Now on pp. 6.

See comment 1.

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.
Appendix II

Comments From the Drug Enforcement Administration

Page 164 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Now on p. 7.

See comment 3.

See comment 2.

See comment 4.
Appendix II

Comments From the Drug Enforcement Administration

Page 165 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

We did not reproduce the

enclosure.
Appendix II

Comments From the Drug Enforcement Administration

Page 166 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

The following are GAO’s comments on the Drug Enforcement

Administration’s letter of June 23, 1999.

1. We inserted the word “measurable” to cover any measurable level of

performance, whether numerical or percentage, against which actual

achievement can be compared.

2. We added the phrase “against the base year list” and a statement to

indicate that neither the domestic nor the international target lists of drug

trafficking organizations called for by the National Strategy have yet to be

developed.

3. We did not add DEA’s suggested statement. However, in our evaluation

of DEA’s comment at the end of chapter 3, we noted DEA’s inference that

it cannot finalize performance targets and measures until a designated

targeted list of drug trafficking organizations, as called for in the National

Strategy, is completed.

4. We revised the statement that little can be said about DEA’s

effectiveness without performance targets to clarify our intent that it is

difficult to quantitatively assess DEA’s overall effectiveness without such

targets.

GAO Comments
Appendix III

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 167 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Norman J. Rabkin, (202) 512-8777

Daniel C. Harris, (202) 512-8777

In addition to those named above, Ronald G. Viereck, Samuel A.Caldrone,

Lemuel N. Jackson, Barbara A. Stolz, Michael H. Little, Barry J. Seltser,

Ann H. Finley, Katherine M. Raheb, and Donna M. Leiss made major

contributions to this report.

GAO Contacts

Acknowledgments
Glossary

Page 168 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

This glossary contains definitions of performance measurement terms

used in this report. Because limited standard definitions exist, we used

definitions from a variety of sources, including OMB’s circular A-11, DOJ’s

guidance to components on the preparation of fiscal year 2000 budget

estimates and related annual performance plans, and ONDCP’s 1998

performance measure of effectiveness plan. Essentially, OMB and DOJ

definitions relate to measuring agency performance as provided for in the

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the Results Act).

ONDCP definitions relate to assessing the performance of the National

Drug Control Strategy (the National Strategy).

A performance goal, as defined by OMB for purposes of the Results Act,

means a target level of performance expressed as a tangible, measurable

objective, against which actual achievement can be compared. As used in

this report, the terms performance goal and performance target (defined

below) are largely interchangeable. DEA uses the term performance goal,

and ONDCP uses performance target.

A performance indicator, as defined by OMB for purposes of the Results

Act, means a particular value or characteristic used to measure output or

outcome (defined below). Performance indicators are associated with

performance goals in annual performance plans. As defined by DOJ,

performance indicators are signs that point to success or failure in

performance and answer the question, “How will we know when we have

been successful?” They refer to what specifically is to be measured. As

used in this report, the terms performance indicator and performance

measure (defined below) are largely interchangeable. DEA uses the term

performance indicator, and ONDCP uses performance measure.

A performance measure, as defined by ONDCP for purposes of the

National Strategy, means data and variables and events used to track

progress toward performance targets. Measures show how progress

toward performance targets will be tracked. As used in this report, the

terms performance measure and performance indicator are largely

interchangeable. ONDCP uses the term performance measure, and DEA

uses performance indicator.

A performance target, as defined by ONDCP for purposes of the National

Strategy, means the desired end state to be achieved. It is a measurable

level of performance against which actual achievement can be compared.

As used in this report, the terms performance target and performance goal

are largely interchangeable. ONDCP uses the term performance target, and

DEA uses performance goal.

Performance

Measurement Terms

Performance Goal

Performance Indicator

Performance Measure

Performance Target
Glossary

Page 169 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s

Outcomes, as defined by DOJ for purposes of guidance on the Results Act,

means an event, occurrence, or condition that indicates progress toward

achievement of the mission of the program. Outcomes can be measured in

terms of the extent to which they are achieved, or they can reflect the

quality of service delivery or customer satisfaction. Intermediate

outcomes are expected to lead to the desired ends but are not in

themselves ends. In many programs, a progression or sequence of

outcomes usually occurs. End outcomes are the desired end or ultimate

results that the agency hopes to achieve through its program activities.

These results are directly related to the agency’s mission.

Outputs, as defined by DOJ for purposes of guidance on the Results Act,

means the products and services produced by a program or process and

delivered to customers, whether internal or external. Outputs result from

internal activity or effort. Outputs are important for measuring internal

work performance, but they do not in themselves indicate the extent to

which progress has occurred toward the program’s mission or what impact

a program has had on a particular goal or objective.

A reporting agency, as defined by ONDCP for purposes of the National

Strategy, means the agency designated to report to ONDCP on progress in

achieving established performance targets. The reporting agency is not

necessarily the only agency responsible for achieving performance targets.

A supporting agency, as defined by ONDCP for the purposes of the

National Strategy, means the agency that is designated to assist the

reporting agency with data collection and assessment or that has programs

that contribute to achieving the performance target.

Outcomes

Outputs

Reporting Agency

Supporting Agency
Page 170 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s
Page 171 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s
Page 172 GAO/GGD-99-108 DEA Operations in the 1990s
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