### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

DERICK ROSENWALD, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee

.

No. 4D19

- 2886

[ October 23, 2019 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; Andrew L. Siegel , Judge; L.T. Case No. 06

- 10400CF10A

.

J. David Bogenschutz and Jaclyn E. Broudy, of J. David Bogenschutz & Associates, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

No appearance required for appellee.

F ORST

, J

.

Appellant filed a petition in this c ourt seeking expedite d review of the

trial c ourt’s August 27, 2019 order that summarily denied his motion for postconviction relief. By separate order, we have determined to treat this petition as both a timely

- filed no tice of appeal and initial brief

, and the appendix as the record on appeal. Upon review of the record and Appellant’s arguments , w e affirm the trial court’s order , noting that the

2014 change in sentencing law at issue has not been declared retroactive by the Legislature.

In his “Motion for Resentencing on Retroactive Change in Punishment Statutes,” Appellant asked to be resentenced under a law enacted in 2014 for the drug trafficking offense he committed in 2006. The 2014 law changed the mandatory minimum for the amount of oxycodone that Appellant possessed from 15 years to 7 years. Ch. 2014

- 176, § 1, Laws of Fla. (creating section 893.135(1)(c)3.b

. , Florida Statutes). Appellant

arg ued that the 2018 amendment of Article X, section 9 of the Florida Constitution required that he be resentenced under the 2014 law.

Article X, s ection 9 of the Florida Constitution (referred to as the2 “Savings Clause”) previously provided: “Repeal or ame ndment of a criminal statute shall not affect prosecution or punishment for any crime previously

committed.” (emphasis supplied). However, i n 2018, pursuant to a proposal by the Florida Constitutional Revision Commission, the voters approved an amendment to the clause, so that it now reads: “Repeal of a criminal statute shall not affect prosecution for any crime committed before such repeal.” Art. X, § 9, Fla. Const. (2018).

In light of this amendment to the Savings Clause , Appellant argues that

retro active application of the 2014 law to his 2006 offense is required

. He appears to be arguing that the 2018 amendment, which eliminated the prohibition on retroactive application of amended criminal statutes, actually mandates such retroactive application. This argument, however,

has no merit. Retroactive application is neither prohibited nor mandatory; it is permissive and requires a declaration of statutory intent.

The 2014 change to the punishments for certain trafficking offenses expressly provided t hat the effective date of this new law would be July 1,

2014. Ch. 2014

- 176, § 5, Laws of Fla. The re is no indication in the 2014

law that the Legislature either declared or intended this change in sentencing law to apply retroactively.

“The effective date of the statute has meaning and represents the will of the legislature. A statute that provides an unambiguous effective date is clear and controlling evidence of legislative int ent.” Hight v. State

, 253 So. 3d 1137, 1142 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). See also A NTONIN S CALIA & B RYAN
A. G ARNER
, R EADING L AW : T HE I NTERPRETATION OF L EGAL T EXTS 261

- 62 (2012) (footnote omitted) ( Declar ing the “Presumption Against Retroactivity”

canon that stat utes “typically pronounce what the law becomes when the

statutes take effect ” is “ basic to our rule of law

, ” and noting “ a statute reducing the penalties for a crime will be presumed to apply only to acts occurring after the statute’s effective date, even though there is no constitutional difficulty in applying it to prior acts.”)

.

Affirmed.

L EVINE
, C.J.

, and T AYLOR

, J., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.