J-S16039-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

GARY EUGENE SOLOMON,

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1331 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 23, 2018

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0001063-2017

BEFORE: OTT, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED: APRIL 30, 2019

Gary Eugene Solomon (“Solomon”) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed following his open guilty plea to two counts of cruelty to 

animals.1 We affirm.

In March 2017, the Lycoming County Humane Society received an 

anonymous tip that a dog at Solomon’s address was not being fed or receiving 

adequate care. Humane Society police officer Shawn McMonigle (“Officer 

McMonigle”) responded to Solomon’s home and found the deceased and frozen 

body of a terrier-mix dog, lying in an outdoor chain link kennel with insufficient 

shelter. Solomon informed Officer McMonigle that the dog had died seven 

days ago, the date of a large snowstorm, and Solomon was waiting for the 

ground to warm up before burying the dog’s body. Officer McMonigle observed 

that the dog’s body was extremely emaciated, and that there was no food 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5511(a)(2.1), (c).
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visible in the kennel. A necropsy revealed that the dog died from a 

combination of starvation and hypothermia.

On May 24, 2018, Solomon pled guilty to the above-described charges. 

The trial court deferred sentencing and ordered a pre-sentence investigation 

report (“PSI”). Subsequently, the trial court sentenced Solomon to an 

aggregate term of three months to two years, less one day, in prison. 

Solomon filed a post-sentence Motion, requesting reconsideration of his 

sentence, which the trial court denied. Solomon filed a timely Notice of Appeal 

and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters 

complained of on appeal.

On appeal, Solomon raises the following question for our review: “Did 

the trial court abuse its discretion when imposing an aggravated[-]range 

sentence on [Solomon] without fully stating the reasons on the record in 

reflection of consideration of an aggravated[-]range sentence?” Brief for 

Appellant at 7. 

Solomon challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. 

“Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an 

appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 

170 (Pa. Super. 2010). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary 

sentencing issue,

[this Court conducts] a four-part analysis to determine: (1) 

whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief 
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has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

* * *

The determination of what constitutes a substantial question 

must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A substantial 

question exists only when the appellant advances a colorable 

argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) 

inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or 

(2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the 

sentencing process.

Moury, 992 A.2d at 170 (quotation marks and some citations omitted).

Here, Solomon filed a timely Notice of Appeal, raised his sentencing 

claim in a post-sentence Motion, and included a Rule 2119(f) Statement in his 

brief. Further, Solomon’s claim that the sentencing court imposed an 

aggravated-range sentence, without stating on the record the reasons 

therefor, raises a substantial question. See Brief for Appellant at 10; see

also Commonwealth v. Booze, 853 A.2d 1263, 1278 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(stating that “an allegation that the court failed to state adequate reasons on 

the record for imposing an aggravated-range sentence ... raises a substantial 

question for our review.”). Thus, we will review Solomon’s claim.

Our standard of review is as follows:

Sentencing is vested in the discretion of the trial court, and will 

not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. An 

abuse of discretion involves a sentence which was manifestly 

unreasonable, or which resulted from partiality, prejudice, bias, or 

ill will. It is more than just an error in judgment.
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Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 792-93 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(citation omitted). 

The sentencing court is given broad discretion in 

determining whether a sentence is manifestly excessive because 

the sentencing judge is in the best position to measure factors 

such as the nature of the crime, the defendant’s character and the 

defendant’s display of remorse, defiance, or indifference. In order 

to find that a trial court imposed an unreasonable sentence, we 

must determine that the sentencing court imposed the sentence 

irrationally and that the court was not guided by sound judgment.

Commonwealth v. McClendon, 589 A.2d 706, 712 (Pa. Super. 1991) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

When imposing a sentence, a court is required to consider 

the particular circumstances of the offense and the character of 

the defendant. In considering these factors, the court should refer 

to the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal 

characteristics and potential for rehabilitation. It must be 

demonstrated that the court considered the statutory factors 

enunciated for determination of sentencing alternatives, and the 

sentencing guidelines. Additionally, the court must impose a 

sentence which is consistent with the protection of the public, the 

gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the 

victim and the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the 

defendant.

Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). 

Further, “where the trial court is informed by a [PSI], it is presumed that the 

court is aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and 

that where the court has been so informed, its discretion should not be 

disturbed.” Downing, 990 A.2d at 794 (quotation marks and citations 

omitted).
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Here, the record reflects that the trial court considered the PSI, the 

sentencing guidelines, the severity of Solomon’s crimes, Solomon’s lack of 

remorse for his crimes, the mitigating and aggravating factors, the protection 

of the public, and Solomon’s rehabilitative needs. See N.T., 7/23/18, at 2, 

13; Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/18, at 2-3 (pages unnumbered). During the 

sentencing hearing, the trial court noted that it was particularly concerned 

with the severity of the dog’s mistreatment, and Solomon’s lack of remorse. 

See id. at 13 (wherein the trial court stated that “I’m moved by this. And I 

can’t get by how no one in the family could do anything for this poor dog.”); 

Trial Court Opinion at 5 (unnumbered) (stating that Solomon “did not appear 

to appreciate the seriousness of the crimes he committed or the impact on 

others or the community.”). 

We agree with the court’s analysis, and additionally note the testimony 

of Officer McMonigle. At Solomon’s sentencing hearing, Officer McMonigle 

testified that this was one of the worst animal cruelty cases he had ever seen. 

See N.T., 8/22/18, at 3. Officer McMonigle stated that the dog’s stomach and 

intestines were void of any food or waste, and the dog’s body had no fat 

reserves remaining. Id. Pieces of wood were found between the dog’s teeth 

and gums, evidencing the dog’s attempt to consume the doghouse to stay 

alive. Id. at 4. Moreover, Officer McMonigle testified that at Solomon’s

preliminary hearing, Solomon asked if he could pay a fine for his offense, and 

leave. Id. at 4-5.
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We conclude that the trial court properly considered all the statutory 

factors before sentencing Solomon. See McClendon, supra. Moreover, 

because the trial court had the benefit of a PSI, it is presumed that the court 

was aware of relevant information regarding Solomon’s character, and 

weighed those considerations along with any mitigating factors. See 

Downing, supra; see also Commonwealth v. Fowler, 893 A.2d 758, 766 

(Pa. Super. 2006) (rejecting the appellant’s claim that the sentencing court 

had abused its discretion by imposing sentence without stating adequate 

reasons on the record, and holding that “[s]ince the sentencing court had and 

considered a [PSI], this fact alone was adequate to support the sentence[.]”). 

Accordingly, Solomon’s discretionary sentencing challenge fails.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/30/2019