1

08-2741-c v Ac ze l v . La bo nia 1 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS 2 F OR THE SE CO ND CI RC UI T
3 August Term, 2008 4 (Argued: May

27, 2009 Dec ided: October 9, 2009)
5 Docke t No. 08-2741-c v
6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 7 JohnAc zel , 8 Plaintif f-Appellant , 9 v
. 10 L eonar d L abonia a nd Ethan Mable, 11 De fe nd an ts- Ap pe lle es. 12 13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X 14 15 16 17 Be fore : L EVAL , POOL ER, B.D. PARKER, Circuit Judges
. 18 19 Plaintiff J ohn Aczel appe als from the r uling of the United States District Court for the 20 District of Connecticut ( Dorsey , J. ), wh ic h gra nte d ju dg me nt a s a

matte r o f l aw t o D e fe nd ant, 21 Pol ic e Of

fi c e r L e on a

rd L a bo nia , o n Pl a int if

f’ s c la im, un de r 4 2 U .S. C. § 19 83 , o f v iol atio n o f h is 22 constitutional rights by use of e x cessive f

orce . The district cour

t gr anted judg ment to Defe ndant 23 afte r a jury

trial in which the jury

found that De fenda

nt used excessive for ce a

nd that damag es of 24 $1 2, 07 8. 61 we re pr oximate ly c a us e d b y De fe nd ant’ s a c ts b ut t

hat D e fe nd a

nt w a s e nti tle d to2 1 qualified immunity beca use of his g ood faith objec tively rea sonable be lief that his actions we re 2 rea sonable unde r the c ircumstance s. Be cause the jurors una nimously found that De fenda

nt had 3 proven e ntitlement to qualified immuni ty and bec ause the re w as no flaw which re quired 4 invalidation of that finding , the Court of Appe als (L eval, J. ) a ff ir ms t he g ra nt o f j ud g me nt. 5 J udg e Pooler dissents by separ ate opinion. 6 7 KEI TH P. STURGES, Goldst ein and Pec k, P.C., 8 Br idge port, CT (Will iam J . Kupinse, Jr., on the 9 brief) , for Plaintif f-Appellant
. 10 TH OM AS R . G ERA RD E, Ho wd & Lud or f, L L C, 11 Har tford, CT (B eatr ice S. J ordan, on the brief) , for 12 Defendants-A ppellees
. 13 L EVAL , Circuit Judge : 14 Plaintiff J ohn Aczel appe als from the judg ment of the United States District Court for the 1 5 D i s tr i c to f

C o n n e c t i c u t( D o r s e y, J. ) g rantingjudgme nt to Defe ndant, Police Off icer L eonar d 16 L abonia, on Plaintiff’s c laim of use of e x cessive f orce . The c ase pr esents an unusua l proce dural 17 history . The jury answe red inter

rog atories in a spe cial ver dict form, findingthat Plaintiff had 18 pr ov e d th at L a

bo nia us e d e xce ssi ve fo rc e and that $1 2, 07 8. 61 in d ama g e s w e re pr oximate ly 19 cause d by

L abonia’ s acts but that L abonia wa s entitled to qualified immunity beca use he ha d an 20 objectively

rea sonable be lief that his conduct wa s justified under the c ircumstance s. Treating the 21 jury ’s fa ctual findingthat $12,078.61 in damag es we re pr ox imately cause d by

Def endant’ s 22 e xce ssi ve fo rc e a s if it w e re a g e ne ra l ve rd ic t awarding damag es under

Rule 49(b), F ed. R. Civ. 23 P., which would be inconsistent with the jury ’s findingthat Def endant wa s entitled to qualified 24 immunit y , the district court initially reje cted the ve rdict and or dere d a new trial. Both sides3 1 appea led. Upon re mand by this court, which lef

t the district court fr ee to r econside r its initi al 2 ruling , the district court g rante d L abonia’ s motion for rec onsideration and f or judg ment. 3 Pla int if

f a pp e a le d a g a in. B e c a

us e the jur

y un anim ou sly

fo un d th at D e fe nd ant w a s e nti tle d to 4 qualified immunity and ther e wa s no flaw in the f inding that r equire d the cour t to rejec t it, the 5 district court ac ted within its di scre tion in enteringjudgme nt for De fenda nt and deny

ing 6 Pla int if

f’ s mo tio n f

or a ne w tri a l. We the re fo re a ff ir m th e jud g me nt. 7 BACK GR OUND 8 Aczel brought this action ag ainst L abonia a nd Ethan Mable, both police office rs of the 9 city

of Da nbury , Connecticut, alleg ing inter alia fede ral c onstitut ional claims of fa lse arr est and 10 use of e x cessive f orce and state la

w claims of a ssault, false imprisonment, and a buse of pr ocess. 11 The matter

was tried be fore a jury

in the district court. Plaintiff testified that he did not ac t 12 imp ro pe rl y

at any tim e . H e c onte nd e d th at th e de fe nd ants ha d n o ju sti fi c atio n f or arr e sti nghim 13 on char g es of inter fer ing w ith a police off icer and bre ach of

the pea ce in violation of Connec ticut 14 Gene ral Statutes §§ 53a- 167a and 53a -181 and that, while arr estinghim, the defe ndants choke d 15 him, kneed him in the head, a nd kicked him re peate dly . Def endant L abonia of

fer ed evide nce that 16 Ac zel wa s intoxic ate d a nd re sis te d a rr e st a nd that th e of

fi c e rs too k n e c e ssa

ry inc re me nta l st e ps to 17 re str a in a

nd su bd ue him
. 18 Th e c ourt ins tr uc te d th e jur

y wh at f a c ts Pl a int if

f n e e de d to pr ov e to e sta

bli shthat a 19 de fe nd ant h a d v iol ate d h is r ig hts . T he n, on the su bje c t of qu a lif ie d immun ity

wi th r e sp e c t to 20 Plaintiff’s fede ral c ivil rights claims, the c ourt proper ly instructed the jury , in acc ord with the 21 Supreme Court’s rulingin Ha rlo w v . F itz ge ra ld , 457 U.S. 800 (1982), and w ithout objection 22 from Plaintiff, to the ef fec t that a def

endant ha d an absolute de fense to liabilit y if, at the time of4 1 his interaction with Plaintiff, the def endant ha d an objec tively rea sonable be lief that his actions 2 we re jus tif

ie d und e r t

he c ir c ums tanc e s. 3 Wit h respe ct to damag es, the c ourt instructed a s follows, 4 The fa ct that I char g e you as to damag es should not be taken a s a sug g estion that y ou 5 should reac h the question of dama g es. I do so only

in case y ou decide the question of 6 liability ; that is, in favor of the pla intiff. You should not consider the que stion of 7 d am a g e s un l e s s an d un t i l yo ud e c i d e th e i s s u e o f l i a b i l i ty in o neor

mo rere sp e c ts in favor 8 of the plaintiff. 9 (Emphasis adde d). 10 Withthe c on se nt o f t he pa rt ie s, the c ourt

dis tr ibute d to the jur or s a sp e c ia l ve rd ic t f

or m, 11 in acc ordanc e with Rule 49(b)( 1), F ed. R. Civ. P. Thi s was in the for m of a que stionnaire, which 12 asked the jurors to answe r spec ific fa ctual questions from whic h the ultimate verdic t and 13 judgme nt might be de rived. In Part A, as to ea ch of Plaintiff’s c laims, the form aske d whether 14 Plaintiff had prove d the fa cts nec essar y to establish a violation of his rig hts. As to each c laim of 15 violation of a fe dera l constituti onal rig ht that the jury found Plaintiff had e stablished, the form 16 asked whether

Def endant ha d proved e ntitlement to qualified immuni ty . For example, as to the 17 claim of use of

excessive forc e, question A2(a ) aske d whether Def endant ha d proved e ntitlement 18 to qualified immunity by proving“a r easona

ble and objec tive belief that the forc e used w as 19 rea sonable unde r the c ircumstance s at the time of the a rre st.” Consistent with i ts oral instructions 2 0 t o c o n s i d e r

th e qu e s t i o no f

d am a g e s i f

th e j ur y d e c i d e d th e i s s u e o f

l i a b i l i ty in o neor

mo re 21 re

sp e c ts in favor of

the plaintiff, Part B then instructed the jur y to state the amount of 22 c omp e ns ator

y dama g e s th at w e re pr oximate ly c a us e d b y the a c ts o f D e fe nd ant f

or any c la im a s to 23 which the jury

had answ ere d “Ye s” to the interr og atory in Part A. Thus, under the direc tions of 24 the qu e sti onna ir e , th e jur or s w e re re qu ir e d to state the c omp e ns ator y dama g e s p ro ximate ly5 1 c a us e d b y a de fe nd ant’ s wro ng fu l c on du c t no tw ith sta nd inga fi nd ingof

qu a lif ie d immun ity

a s to 2 su c h c la im. 3 After

a per iod of deliberations, the jury announce d that it had rea ched a decision and 4 returne d the ver dict form, sig ned by the fore person. The jury completely

exonerated the 5 defe ndant Mable. It exonerated L abonia on e very claim except use of e x cessive f orce , answe ring 6 “Ye s” to question A2, thus indicatingits finding that L abonia violated Plaintiff’ s rig ht under the 7 F ourt

h A me ndme nt t o b e fr e e of e xce ssi ve fo rc e . A s to thi s c la im, ho we ve r, the jur y a lso 8 answe red que stion A2(a) statingthat L abonia “ proved . . . e ntitlement to qualified immuni ty by 9 proving[hi s] reasonable a nd objective be lief that the for ce use d was re asonable under the 10 circ umstances at the time of the ar rest.” Consistent with the instruction to answer question B1 on 11 proxi mately

cause d damag es if the jury g ave a “Ye s” answe r to any

question in Part A, the jury 12 enter ed $12,078.61 as the “amount of c ompensatory damag es [Pl aintiff has] proved w ere 13 pr oximate ly

c a us e d b y” L a

bo nia ’s wr on g fu l a c ts. 14 The c ourt then polled the juror s and, on the ba sis of the jury ’s “No” answe rs as to eve ry 15 claim other tha

n the claim of e x cessive f orce ag ainst L abonia, a cce pted the ver dicts as re solving 16 the se oth e r c la ims . A s f or the c la im that L a

bo nia us e d e xce ssi ve fo rc e , e a c h ju ro r a ff ir me d th at it 17 was the juror ’s intention to answer that L abonia violated Plaintiff’ s rig ht to be fre e fr om 18 excessive forc e and that L abonia wa s entitled to qualified immunity for the c laim of excessive 19 fo rc e on

the ba sis of

his ob je c tiv e and

re a so na ble be lie f t

hat th e fo rc e he us e d w a s r e a so na ble in 20 the c ir c ums tanc e s. Th e c ourt the n in str

uc te d th e jur

y that no dama g e s c ou ld b e awa rd e d a g a ins t 21 L a

bo nia if he pr ov e d a

n e nti tle me nt t o q

ua lif ie d immun ity . T he c ourt

tol d th e jur or s to re tur

n to 2 2 th e i r

d e l i b e r at i o n s t o a s s ur e th e m s e l v e s th atth e y h a d an s w e r e d

th e p e rt i n e n tqu e s t i o n s c o r r e c t l y.6 1 Treating the jur

y ’s answe r to question B1 a s if it repre sented a g ener al ver dict (an a

war d of 2 $12,078.61 in damag es) r ather than the answ er to a

specia l verdict que stion asking the f actua l 3 question what dama g es we re pr ox imately cause d by

Def endant’ s use of e x cessive f orce , 4 ir re sp e c tiv e of

De fe nd ant’ s e nti tle me nt t o q ua lif ie d immun ity , th e c ourt

ins tr uc te d th e jur

y to 5 strike the answ er to B 1 if L abonia wa s entitled to qualified immunity on the claim of e x cessive 6 forc e. 7 The jury

then sent the c ourt a note stating , “We wer e try ing to c ompromise amongvery 8 rig id positi ons - wante d expenses incurre d paid to Mr. Aczel and the policeman a bsolved of 9 liability . Now we believe w e ca n’t do both - is this true? ” The district court conf irmed that the 10 jur

y c ou ld n ot d o b oth . T he jur y ’s no te a lso a sk e d whe the r t he jur or s c ou ld r e op e n c la ims the ir 11 ve rd ic t ha d r e so lve d, wh ic h th e c ourt re fu se d. Th e c ourt

ins tr uc te d th e jur

y to r e sume 12 deliberations on the ex cessive f orce claim. When the jurors a dvised that they could g o no 13 further , the cour

t discharg ed the jury . As the jury had made no chang e to its findings on the 14 verdic t form, it continued to repor t the finding s that L abonia use d excessive forc e, that his use of 15 excessive forc e ca used dama g e to Aczel in the amount of $12,078.61, a nd that L abonia ha d 1 6 p r o v e d

e n t i t l e m e n tt o i m mun i ty. 17 Def

endants moved f

or judg ment as a matter of law , and Plaintiff moved for a new trial as 18 to all claims, contendingthe ver dicts should be voided by rea son of inconsistency . The district 19 court de nied Def endants’ motion for judg ment as a matter of law and g rante d Plaintiff’s motion 20 for a

new tria l. Both par

ties appea led. 21 Duringpendenc y of that first appe al, the district cour t issued an additional orde r 22 clar ifying a

nd articulating the r easons f or its decisions on the par ties’ motions for judg ment and7 1 ne w tri a l. T he dis tr ic t c ourt e xpla ine d th at th e ne w tri a l w a s g ra nte d o nly wi th r e sp e c t to 2 Plaintiff’s claim of e x cessive f orce ag ainst L abonia a

nd L abonia’ s entitlement to qualified 3 immunit y . The district cour t also noted that the ver dicts on excessive forc e and on qua lified 4 immunit y

wer e not inconsistent. Potential inconsistency exis ted only

beca use, as the c ourt 5 viewed it, the jury awa rded c ompensatory

damag es. Expressing se cond thoug hts on the wisdom 6 and propr iety

of its new trial orde r, the c ourt furthe r stated, “ In retrospe ct, it may have be en more 7 proper

for the Court to simply

have a cce pted the ver dict as to the excessive for ce a nd qualified 8 immunit y

claims and to have reje cted the da mag es aw ard, the reby

eliminating the inc onsistency .” 9 On Marc h 27, 2008, this court issued an unpublished summary order , which af

firmed the 10 denial of L abonia’ s motion for judgme nt as a matter of law, dismissed the re mainder of the 11 a pp e a ls f or la c k o f a pp e llate jur isd ic tio n d

ue to l a c k o f a

fi na l ju dg me nt, and

re mand e d th e c a se 12 to the district court. Ac ze l v . La bo nia , 271 Fe d.Appx. 73 (2d Ci r. 2008). As f or the de nial of 13 judgme nt based on qua lified immunit y , we e x plained that, once the cour t had vac ated the jur

y ’s 14 decision on this issue, it was left with a re cord of conflictingevidenc e and no jur y finding , which 15 prec luded judg ment as a matter of law
. Id. at 75 . H ow e ve r, no tin gthe dis tr ic t c ourt ’s int e ri m 16 expression of misgiving s about its resolution of the ca se, we hinted, “Nothingin this decision 17 bars the district c ourt from re visiti ngits earlier rulingas to whethe r the ve rdict for m responses 18 can be rec onciled.” Id. 19 L a

bo nia the n mo ve d und e r F e d. R. C iv. P. 6 0( b) fo r r e c on sid e ra tio n a nd fo r j ud g me nt a s a 20 matter of la

w. The district c ourt conc luded that its proper c ourse of action wa s to acc ept the 21 jury ’s findingthat L abonia wa s entitled to qualified immunity , and on this basis enter judg ment 22 in L a

bo nia ’s fa vo r. Pla int if

f b ro ug ht t

his a pp e a l.8 1 DISCUSSIO N 2 I. P laintif f’s Motion f

or Ne w T rial 3 P l a i n t i f

f c o n t e n d s th e d i s tr i c tc o urte r r e d i nd e n yi n gh i s m o t i o nf

o r a n e wtr i a l
. T h e j ur

y, 4 howeve r, found f

acts whic h entitled Def

endant to qualifie d immunit y . Unless some flaw in the 5 pr oc e e din g s n e c e ssa ri ly inv a lid ate d th at f

ind ing , th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a c te d w ith in i ts d isc re tio n in 6 re lyingon

it t o g ra nt j ud g me nt t o D e fe nd ant. 7 Plaintiff argues that the jury ’s ver dict cannot be sustained or re lied on in any respe ct 8 beca

use it exhi bited internal inconsistenc y in awar ding da

mag es while at the same time finding 9 that Def

endant wa s entitled to qualified immunity . He r elies on Fi nn e ga n v . F ou nta in , 915 F.2d 10 817 (2d Cir. 1990), in which this court va cate d a judg ment enter ed pursua nt to a jury

verdic t due 11 to the irrec oncilability of the jury ’s finding s. His relianc e on Finnegan is unju sti fi e d, a s th e fa c ts 12 here are quite differ ent. In Finnegan , the jury found that the de fenda

nt police offic er w as entitled 13 to qualified immunity beca use he “ rea sonably

believed that he was a ctingin good f aith.” Id. at 14 819. The followingday , howeve r, the jury awa rded punitive damag es ag ainst that office r finding 15 that he ac ted “maliciously or wa ntonly or oppre ssively .” Id. We expl ained that the latter finding 16 plainly

contra dicted the f

ormer. We ther efor e re manded f or a ne w trial. Id. at 821. 17 Although the re is super ficial similarity , the diffe renc e betwe en this case and Finnegan is 18 cruc ial. The Finnegan jury ’s findingthat the def endant “ rea sonably

believed that he was a cting 19 in good f

aith” could not be r econc iled with its finding that he a cted “ maliciously or wa ntonly or 20 op pr e ssi ve ly .” B y de fi nit ion , o ne wh o a c ts “ ma lic iou sly” do e s n ot r e a so na bly be lie ve he is 21 “ a c tin gin g oo d f a ith .” B e c a

us e the fi nd ingof

the de fe nd ant’ s r e a so na

ble be lie f t

hat he a c te d in 22 g ood faith wa s contradic ted by the jury ’s findingthat he ac ted maliciously , the findingof g ood9 1 faith could not be c redited, so that no ba sis remained f or findingqualified immunity . The finding 2 of malice was similarly undermined by

the findingof g ood faith. Upon invalidation of the jur y ’s 3 mutually

contra dictory

finding s, there w ere no surviving f acts found by

the jury that mandated 4 any

resolution of the c ase. A ccor dingly retria l was the solution. 5 Her e, in contra st, there wa s no inconsistency in the jury ’s fa ctual finding s. Those fa ctual 6 finding s were (a) that L abonia use d excessive forc e and (b) that Plaintiff suffe red some da mag es 7 cause d by

that use of e x cessive f

orce , but that (c) L abonia r easona bly believed his c onduct was 8 justified in the circumstanc es and w as there fore entitled to qualified immunity . There is no 9 inconsistency

in those findings. I f a police office r uses e x cessive f orce in violation of a 10 pla int if

f’ s c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts , it is t o b e e xpe c te d th at th e vic timwi ll s uf fe r h arm pr oximate ly 11 c a

us e d b y the e xce ssi ve fo rc e . I f, ho we ve r, the po lic e of fi c e r p ro ve s th e fa c ts that e nti tle him to 12 qualified immunity , under Harlowjud g me nt m us t be e nte re d in

his fa vo r, no tw ith sta

nd inghis 13 havin gvio late d th e pla int if f’ s r ig hts and

c a us e d d ama g e s. 14 Th e c ru c ia l f ind ingwa s o f f

a c ts that e nti tle L e bo nia

to i mmunit

y . I f t he jur y ’s fi nd ing s to 15 that eff

ect a re c redited, unde r Harlowthe y mand ate jud g me nt i n f

avo r o f D e fe nd ant, re g ard le ss 16 of whe ther De fenda nt violated Plaintiff’s rig hts and ca used him damag es. In Finnegan , we r uled 17 that the compar able f inding c ould not be cre dited beca use it was contr adicted by the jury ’s 18 findingof malice . Her e, the jury made no inconsistent findingto cast doubt on whethe r it had 19 truly

found entitlement to immunit y . 20 In his effor t to persuade us that the jury ’s findingof entitlement to immunity was 21 contra dicted and should not be c redited, Plaintiff mischar acte rizes the verdic t form and the 22 sp e c if

ic qu e sti on s and

ins tr uc tio ns wr itt e n o n it . Pl a int if f c ha ra c te ri zes the ans we r t o B 1 a s if it10 1 wer e a g ener al ver dict, awarding c omp e ns ator

y dama g e s to Pla int if

f. Hi s a rgume nt r un s, 2 essentially : The jury was told that Def

endant c ould not be held liable for damag es if De fenda

nt 3 acte d with a re asonable g ood faith belief which entitled him to qualified immunity . Thus, the 4 jury ’s awa

rd of a g ener al ver dict g iving damag es to Plaintiff nece ssarily implies a finding that 5 De fe nd ant w a s n ot e nti tle d to qu a lif ie d immun ity . T hat f

ind ingne c e ssa

ri ly c ontr a dic ts, 6 discredits, and inva lidates the findingthat Def endant wa s entitled to qualified immunity , and, as 7 in Finnegan , require s a newtrial. 8 The proble m with Pl aintiff’s a rgument is that it i s based on a mischara cter ization of the 9 jury ’s answe rs on the ver dict form. Que stion B1 did not call for a g ener al ver dict. The que stion 10 was not whe ther the jury found De fenda

nt liable to Plainti ff, much le ss what compensatory 11 dama g e s it awarded on the basis of that liability . The ve rdict for m give n by

the cour t to the jury 12 called f

or a spe cial ver dict askingthe jury to determine the fac ts, as authorized by Rule 49(a)
. 13 See Fe d. R. Civ. P . 49(a) (“The court may require a jury

to return only

a spec ial verdic t in the 14 fo rm

of a sp e c ia l w ri tte n f

ind ingon e a c h is su e of

fa c t.” ); als o Bla ck’s L aw Dic tionary 1696-97 15 (9th ed. 2009) ( defining“g ener al ver dict” as “ A ver dict by which the jury

finds in favor of

one 16 party

or the other , as opposed to re solving spec ific fa ct questions” and “ specia l verdict” as “A 17 verdic t in which the jury makes finding s only

on fac tual issues submitt ed to them by the judg e, 18 who then dec ides the leg al ef fec t of the ver dict”). The form instructed the jury to state the 19 amount of dama g es proximately cause d by

Def endant’ s use of e x cessive f orce . Acc ordingto the 20 form, the jury

was to follow that instruction re g ardle ss of whethe r the jury found De fenda

nt 21 entitled to qualified immunity . The jury ’s filling in of a dollar amount re prese nting ha rm ca used 22 by

the excessive for ce the ref ore in no wa

y contra dicted the jury ’s findingthat Def endant wa sI t is not surprising that Plaintiff has misconstrued the jury ’s ver dict in view of the f act 1 that, at least tempora

rily , the district court did so as we ll. On rec eipt of the ve rdict for m, the court wa s appar ently

surprised to re ceive an answ er statingPlaintiff’s damag es tog ether with an answe r findingqualified immunity that require d judgme nt in favor of Def endant. The court failed at that point to recog nize that its instructions written on the ver dict form ca lled for a n answe r to the dama g es question by rea son of the “Y es” a

nswer a s to the use of e x cessive f orce , n o tw i th s t an d i n gth e f

i n d i n go f L a b o n i a ’ s e n t i t l e m e n tt o qu a l i f i e d i m mun i ty. 11 1 entitled to immuni ty . The jury ’s answe r re prese nted a f inding of fac t as to the damag es ca used 2 by L abonia’ s use of for ce a

nd not an awa

rd of damag es, which the verdic t form did not reque st or 3 call for . The findingthat L abonia’ s use of e x cessive f orce cause d damag e to Aczel in the amount 4 of $12,078.61 did not contradic t the findingof fa cts which e ntitled L ibonia to immuni ty from 5 jud g me nt. Th e y

a dd re sse d d if fe re nt i ssu e s. 1 6 Nor is this conclusion aff ecte d by the jury ’s note re sponding to the c ourt’s supplemental 7 comments. In its note, the jury expressed fr

ustration arisingfrom conf licting objec tives which 8 the jury

wished to compromise. The jury said it wanted to re imburse Plaintiff for e x penses he 9 inc ur

re d b ut w ante d a lso to a

bs olv e Of fi c e r L a bo nia . T he jur

y re c ognize d in

its no te that it

c ou ld 10 not do both, and ultimately made no c hang e in its verdict for m. The fa ct that the jury

expressed a 11 de sir e to r e imb ur se Ac zel ’s e xpe ns e s d id n ot d isc re dit its fi nd ingthat L a

bo nia wa s e nti tle d to 12 qualified immunity , which ea ch juror c onfirmed upon the pollingof the jury , and which the jury 13 left untouche d when the c ourt offe red the opportunity to chang e the f

indings. 14 J udg e Pooler, in her dissenting opinion, ar gues first that, contr ary to what was 15 unmis ta

ka bly wr itt e n o n th e ve rd ic t f

or m, w e sh ou ld c on str

ue the ans we r t o Q ue sti on B 1 a s a 16 g e ne ra l ve rd ic t awa rd ingdama g e s b e c a

us e the c ou

rt ’s ins tr uc tio ns to t

he jur y oc c a sio na lly 17 re fe rr e d to an a

wa rd . I f t he jur y wa nte d to awa

rd dama g e s to Pla int if

f a nd tr ie d to do so in 18 enter ing the figure $12,078.61, Judge Pooler argues, that contra dicts its finding of qua lified12 1 immunit y

beca use the jury

had bee n told that Pl aintiff could not win a ve rdict if L abonia wa s 2 e n t i t l e d

t o qu a l i f i e d i m mun i ty. 3 We rejec t her a rgument for two r easons. As a first response , J udg e Pooler’s c ontention 4 that the answe r to Question B 1 expressed an a nomalous awa

rd of damag es, rather than the 5 answe r to a fa ctual question put by the form is mere speculation. An appellate c ourt should not 6 invalidate a judg ment enter ed on the ba sis of a fa cially valid and prope r jury

verdic t and re quire a 7 costly

and wa steful re trial mere ly beca use of a speculative possibili ty

that fac ially

consistent jury 8 finding s might have repr esente d an inconsistency
. See A kerm anis v. Sea-Land Serv ., 688 F.2d 9 89 8, 90 6 ( 2d

Cir . 1 98 2) (“ [A]bs e nt o bv iou s in c on sis te nc ie s” in t he sp e c ia l ve rd ic t, a

c ourt sh ou ld 10 presume the jury

acte d lawfully

and should not order

a re trial.). 11 Judg e Poo le r’ s argume nt s uf fe rs fr om a

fu rt he r f law. Ev e n if

we vie we d th e ans we r t o 12 Qu e sti on

B 1 a s e xpre ssi ngthe jur

y ’s de sir e to a

wa rd dama g e s, that w ou ld n ot n e c e ssa ri ly 13 contra dict and invalidate its findingof the fa cts supportingL ebonia’ s immuni ty , which ea ch juror 14 re c on fi rm e d whe n p oll e d. Th e c a se wo uld sti ll b e dif

fe re nt f ro m Finnegan, wher e one c rucia l 15 jur

y fi nd ingwa s unr e c on c ila

bly c ontr a dic te d b y

ano the r. At

mos t, b y awa rd ingdama g e s in 16 circ umstances whe re the court ha d explained to the jury that Def endant c ould not be liable, the 17 jury

would have r aised a

possibili ty

that it did not really

find the fa cts underly

ing immunity

as 18 stated in its answer to que stion A2(a). It would be at lea st equally likely , howeve r, that the jury 19 found the fa cts which g ave r ise to qualified immunity , as it said it did, but nonetheless out of 20 sy

mpathy hoped to make a

n awa rd that would re imburse Plaintiff’s expenses. The jury ’s desire 21 to awar d damag es in spite of its finding of Def endant’ s entitlement to imm unity would be 22 contra

ry to law. The district c ourt could prope rly strike it and enter

judgme nt on the basis of the13 1 f a c tu a l f i n d i n g s w h i c he n t i t l e d

D e f e n d an tt o i m mun i ty. 2 The Rules expressly provide that whe n a g ener al ver dict is inconsistent with t he jury ’s 3 finding s in the special ve rdict, amongthe options available to the c ourt is to approve a n 4 a pp ro pr iate jud g me nt a c c or din gto t he fa c ts e sta

bli sh e d b y

the sp e c ia l ve rd ic t ans we rs , 5 no tw ith sta

nd ingthe g e ne ra l ve rd ic t. F e d. R. C iv. P. 4 9( b) (3 )( A) . Wh e re the c ir c ums tanc e s r a ise 6 no more than a

speculative possibili ty

of incompatible inconsistenc y in the jury ’s ver dict and the 7 trial judg e has c oncluded that the e x plicit finding of f acts e stablishing entitlement to qualified 8 immun ity

sh ou ld b e c re dit e d, the jud g e sure ly a c ts w ith in t

he pe rm iss ibl e sc op e of

dis c re tio n in 9 sustaining the jur

y ’s findingand ente ringjudgme nt on it, rather than sc rappingthe re sults of the 10 trial and orde ringthat the ca se be r etried. I f the jury ’s awa rd of damag es may

repr esent a

desire 11 on the jury ’s par

t to make an a

war d of dama g es that wa s not justi fied by the law or

the cour t’s 12 instructions, there is no impropriety or abuse of discre tion in the dist rict cour t’s striking of

the 13 illega l awar d and ente ringjudgme nt in favor of the def endant ba sed on the jury ’s findingof 14 entitlement to qualified immunity
. See G allick v. Balt. &Ohio R.R. Co. , 372 U.S. 108, 119 15 (1 96 3) (C ourt s sh ou ld h arm on ize a jur y ’s sp e c ia l ve rd ic t ans we rs “ if it i s p os sib le un de r a

fa ir 16 rea ding of

them.”); als o T

u r l e yv . P o l i c e D e

p ’ t o f Ci t yo f N
. Y. , 167 F.3d 757, 760- 61 (2d Cir. 17 1999) (When fa ced w ith inconsistent special verdic ts, a court g ener ally should try

to interpret the 18 verdic t in a manner which allows re conciliation and upholdingof the jury ’s ver dict, if possible.). 19 An instructive, if improbable , analogy might be f

ound if a district cour

t judge , at a be nch 20 trial, found that the de fenda nt was not liable to the plaintiff but nonethe less awa rded da mag es 2 1 b a s e d

o nth e j u d g e ’ s p e r c e p t i o nth atth e d e f e n d an th a d

b e h av e d n a s t i l y ( a l th o u g hn o ti l l e g a l l y) 22 toward the plaintiff. On appe al, in all likelihood, we would not order a new trial by rea son of the14 1 inconsistency , but would merely strike the illeg al damag es aw ard a nd direc t the entry

of 2 judgme nt in favor of the def endant. The answe r should not be diffe rent whe re a jury 3 unanimously

makes fa ctual finding s which re quire judg ment in the defe ndant’s fa vor but 4 nonetheless insists on making a leg ally basele ss awar d of dama g es to the plaintiff. 5 J udg e Pooler a sserts that this analog y to a trial judg e is not apt bec ause, unlike the case of 6 the judg e who make s fac t findings but re nders a verdic t that is not compatible with the facts he 7 has found, the jur

y here found no fa cts, but rather compromised the c onflictingviews of diff ere nt 8 jurors. Judge Pooler’ s insist ence that the jurors, c ontrary to their answe rs on the ver dict form and 9 to the court’s poll, we re r eally in disag ree ment on L abonia’ s entitlement to imm unity is based on 10 nothing more than spec ulation. I t is indeed possible that th e ve rd ic t r e pr e se nte d a c omp ro mis e 11 betwee n jurors who be lieved L abonia ha d proved e ntitlement to im munity and other s who 12 believed he had not. In fac t, that possibil ity exis ts in virtually

ever y case in which a plaintiff 13 rec eives a

jury awa rd of less than the plaintiff was se eking . One ne ver know s for sure what has 14 happene d in the secr ecy of jury deliberations. J udg e Pooler’s spe culation, howeve r, is not the 15 only

possible expl anation, nor e ven the most likely explanation for the jurors’ answe rs. We see 16 no rea son to consider it more likely than that the jurors w ere mere ly followingthe instructions on 17 the spec ial verdic t form, answe ringeac h question as instructed; nor is it more likely than that the 18 jur

y un anim ou sly

fo un d L a bo nia ’s e nti tle me nt t o immun ity , b ut n on e the le ss w ante d to g ive so me 19 compensation to the abused plaintiff. While it is i ndeed possible that c erta in jurors lied when 20 rec ordingand re portingtheir findingthat L abonia ha d proved e ntitlement to im munity , the 2 1 d i s tr i c tj u d g e d i d n o tb e l i e v e th i s t o b e th e c a s e , an d w e s e e n o r e a s o nt o r e

j e c th i s an a l y s i s . If 22 new tria ls were require d whene ver a possibili ty

exis ts that jurors with conflictingviews had15 1 c omp ro mis e d, tr ia l w ou ld b e c ome a ho pe le ss a

nd ine ff e c tua l w ay

to s e ttl e dis pute s. 2 In support of her asser tion that the verdict re prese nted an imprope r compromise be tween 3 jurors who disagree d on L abonia’ s entitlement to imm unity , J udg e Pooler re lies heavily on the 4 fa c t th at th e jur

y se nt t he jud g e a

no te sa ying , “ We w e re tr

yingto c omp ro mis e amon gve ry ri g id 5 positions - wanted expenses incurr ed paid to Mr. Ac zel and the policeman a bsolved of liability .” 6 J udg e Pooler re ads the use of the word “ compromise” a s nece ssarily meaningthat the 7 c omp ro mis e in q

ue sti on wa s b e tw e e n ju

ro rs wh o d isa g re e d whe the r L a bo nia wa s e nti tle d to 8 immun ity . Wh ile the wo rd “ c omp ro mis e ” is o ft e n u se d in the c onte xt of

re so lvi ngdis a g re e me nts 9 amon gdif

fe re nt p e rs on s, that is no t it s o nly me anin g . Asin g le ind ivi du a l c an s e e k a c omp ro mis e 10 as amongconflictingdesires, a nd so can a

unanimous jury , notwithstanding its unanimity on a 11 c ru c ia l f

a c tua l f ind ing . T he jur

y ’s no te ne ith e r s a id, no r s ug g e ste d, that so me jur or s w ante d to 12 rule for

Plaintiff and others f

or De fenda

nt. Rather, on its fac e, the note a ppear s to say

that the 13 jury

(as a whole) w as strug g ling to find the pr oper c ompromise betwee n the jury ’s desire to cover 14 Plaintiff’s expenses and to absolve the police off icer , while re cog nizi ngthat, under the law 15 e xpla ine d b y

the jud g e , it

c ou ld n ot d o b oth . Jud g e Poo le r’ s c onte nti on that th e jur

y no te 16 reve aled a

n illega l compromise betwe en jurors who would awa rd dama g es to Plaintiff and jurors 17 who would exonerate Def endant is base d on mere specula tion and does not justify

our mandating 18 a re tr ia l. See A

jax Hardware Mfg. Corp. v. Indus. Plants Corp. , 569 F.2d 181, 184 ( 2d Cir. 19 1977) (Eve n if juror misconduct suc h as a c ompromise verdic t is a possibil ity in a g iven ca se, a 20 new tria l cannot be sustaine d when “ there is an equa lly rea sonable a

nd perha ps even be tter 21 explanation which involves no jury misconduct.”). 22 In s umm ary , th e dis tr ic t c ourt c re dit e d th e jur

y ’s fi nd ingof

fa c ts t hat e nti tle De fe nd ant t o16 1 immunit y

and ente red judg ment on that basis. We see no illog ic or a buse of discr etion in that 2 a c tio n. B a se d o n a py ra mid of sp e c ulatio ns , Jud g e Poo le r c onte nd s th e c ourt c ou ld n ot l awf

ull y 3 c re dit

the jur y ’s fi nd ingof

fa c ts s up po rt ingL e bo nia ’s immun ity . Sh e sp e c ulate s th at, c ontr ary to 4 the express terms of the jur y ’s finding s, these finding s rea lly expressed an a

war d. She further 5 sp e c ulate s th at th e jur y ’s “ awa rd ” of dama g e s c ann ot b e un de rs too d a s a de sir e to r e imb ur se 6 Plaintiff’s expenses notwithstanding De fenda nt’s entitlement to immuni ty but must be 7 un de rs too d a s r e pr e se nti ngfi nd ing s th at c ontr a dic t th e jur y ’s e xpre ssl y

state d f ind ingof the fa c ts 8 g iving r ise to L abonia’ s immuni ty . Finally , J udg e Pooler invokes the f urther spe culation that the 9 jur or s w e re ne ve r i n a g re e me nt o n L a bo nia ’s immun ity

but im pr op e rl y c omp ro mis e d th e ir 10 dif

fe re nc e s. We e xpre ss n o v ie w o n whe the r t he dis tr ic t c ourt

wo uld have a c te d w ith in i ts 11 dis c re tio n if

it h a d r e g ard e d Jud g e Poo le r’ s sp e c ulatio ns a s su ff ic ie ntl y lik e ly to a dh e re to i ts 12 initial ruling orde ringa new trial. The district cour

t instead cre dited the jury ’s finding s at fac e 1 3 v a l u e an d

e n t e r e d j u d g m e n to nth atb a s i s . T h e r e w a s n o a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o ni nth atd e c i s i o n . In 14 fac t, it was eminently sensible. 15 II. Motion for Reconsideration 16 Plaintiff also argues that the district cour t erre d proce durally

and substantively

in gr anting 17 L abonia’ s motion for rec onsideration. We disag ree . A motion for re consideration may be 18 g rante d for “ any

. . . rea son that justifies relief.” Fe d. R. Civ. P . 60(b)( 6). The Supre me Court 19 has noted that this catc h-all provision of Rule 60(b) allows courts to vac ate judg ments whene ver 20 nece ssary

to acc omplish j ustice, althoug h such re lief should be g rante d only in ext raor dinary 21 circ umstances. Lilj eberg v . Health Serv . Acquisition Corp. , 486 U.S. 847, 863 (1988). “A 22 mot ion

se e kin gsu c h r e lie f i s a dd re sse d to the so un d d isc re tio n o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

wi th a pp e llate17 1 revie w limited to determining whether that discretion has be en abuse d.” Nemaizer v. Bak er , 793 2 F.2d 58, 61- 62 (2d Cir. 1986). 3 Plaintiff first contends that L abonia’ s motion for rec onsideration should have been de nied 4 as untimely . A motion for re consideration under F ed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) “must be ma de within a 5 re a so na

ble tim e .” F e d. R. C iv. P. 6 0( c )( 1) . T he dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e De fe nd ants ’ p ri or po st6 tr ia l mo tio n f

or jud g me nt a s a

matte r o f l aw o n Se pte mbe r 2 2, 20 06 and De fe nd ants tim e ly 7 appea led this ruling. While the appe al was pe nding, the district court wa s without jurisdi ction of 8 the ca se. Fo rt K

no xMu sicIn c . v . B ap tis te , 257 F.3d 108, 111 ( 2d Cir. 2001). This court 9 rema

nded the c ase to the district c ourt on Marc h 27, 2008. Four day s later, on Ma

rch 31, 2008, 10 L abonia f

iled his moti on under Rule 60( b) for rec onsideration. The motion was made within a 1 1 r e a s o n a

b l e t i m e an d

w a s th e r e f

o r e t i m e l y. 12 Pla int if

f n e xt co nte nd s th at th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in g ra nti ngthe mot ion

be c a us e L a bo nia 1 3 d i d

n o te s t a b l i s he x tr a o r d i n ar

y c i r c um s t an c e s , a s r e qu i r e d b y Lilj e be rg . We dis a g re e . Wh ile 14 Def

endants’ initial appe al was pe nding in this ca se, the district cour t issued an orde r in which the 15 dis tr ic t c ourt

e xpre sse d th at “ [i]n r e tr os pe c t, i t ma y have be e n mo re pr op e r f or the Court

to 16 sim

ply have a c c e pte d th e ve rd ic t a s to the e xce ssi ve fo rc e and qu a lif ie d immun ity

c la ims and

to 17 have r ejec ted the dama g es aw ard, the reby eliminating the inc onsistency .” This cour t then 18 rema

nded the c ase to the district c ourt and stated, “Nothing in this dec ision bars the district court 19 from re visiti ngits earlier rulingas to whethe r the ve rdict for m responses c an be r econc iled.” 20 Aczel , 271 Fe d.Appx. at 75. I n light of the district court’s re consideration while the appea l was 21 pending , this court’s explicit permissi on to the district court to revisit its earlier ruling , and the 22 ve ry

unus ua l f a c ts o f t his c a se , th e dis tr ic t c ourt wa s w ith in i ts p ro pe r r ang e of dis c re tio n in18 1 consideringthe circ umstances suff iciently extraordinary
. 2 CO NC LU SION 3 The judg ment of the district cour t is affirmed.1

P OO L E R , C i rc u i tJ u d ge, d i s s en t i n g: Irespe ctfully

dissent from the pane l’s opinion. I n this case, the jur y ’s initial verdict wa s an impermissible compromise be tween jur ors who wa nted to find that defe ndant-a ppellee L e on ard L a bo nia wa s e nti tle d to qu a lif

ie d immun ity

and jur or s who wa

nte d to awa

rd dama g e s to plaintiff-a ppellant J ohn Aczel. Afte r the leg al inconsistency was e x plained by

the judg e, the jury was invited to strike its damag e aw ard, if it indee d ag ree d that L abonia wa s entitled to qualified immunit y . The jury

could not rea ch agree ment to do so. Nonetheless, the district c ourt set aside the jury ’s damag es aw ard. N ever befor e have we pe rmitted a district court to re concile a jury ’s inconsistent verdict, whe re the jury was a sked to do so itself, but was unable to rea ch agree ment. Th is r e su lt u surp s th e ro le of the jur y and fa ils to a c c or d p ro pe r d e fe re nc e to A c zel ’s Se ve nth Amendment rig hts. Iwould vaca te the district cour

t’s judgme nt as to Aczel’s cla ims of
e xce ssi ve fo rc e and

a ssa ult and batte ry a g a ins t L a

bo nia and re mand fo r a ne w tri a l on

tho se counts. I. The Jury’s Ver dict A. Inconsis tency

“ [T]he pr op e r a

pp ro a c h whe n f

a c e d w ithse e min g ly

inc on sis te nt v e rd ic ts i s n ot t o c re dit one findingand vac ate the othe r.” H arr is v. Niag ara Mohawk Power

Corp., 252 F.3d 592, 598 (2d Cir. 2001). “[P] roper defe renc e to the par

ties’ Seventh Amendme nt rig hts to trial by jury prec ludes entry

of a judg ment that disreg ards a ny materia l jury

finding .” Tolber

t v. Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 74 ( 2d Cir. 2001). In Finneg an v. F ountain, 915 F.2d 817, 820 ( 2d Cir. 1990), a jury conclude d that an off

icer used excessive for ce “ in good f aith” but awa

rded punitive damag es. The a

war d of punitive damag es re lied on a findingof bad f aith. We concluded that the2

verdic t could not be log ically rec onciled. I d.; see a lso Brooks v. B rattleboro Me m’l Hosp., 958 F.2d 525, 529 ( 2d Cir. 1992) (ver dict findingdefe ndants liable for neg lige nce in c ausingpain and suffe ringbut awar ding zer o in damag es irre concilable ). The majority

holds that Finneg an is not controlling be cause a findingthat a plaintiff suffe red da

mag es as a

result of a

defe ndant’s excessive f

orce is not inconsist ent with a findingof qualified immunity . Her e, the ter ms of the ver dict sheet a sked only the amount of damag es proxi mately

cause d by

L abonia’ s conduct, not whe ther the jury had found L abonia liable a nd
c ho se n to g ra

nt a n a wa rd of dama g e s. Th e pr ob le m w iththe ma jor ity ’s re a so nin gis that it considers the verdic t sheet in a va cuum, without reg ard f or (1) the district court’s c lear instructions that the question of qualified immunity went to the issue of liability and the jury

was
no t to c on sid e r d ama g e s “ un le ss a nd until ” it f ound lia bil ity , ( 2) the jur

y ’s ina bil ity to r e c on c ile its ve rd ic t on c e the inc on sis te nc y wa s ma de c le ar, and

(3 ) t he no ta ble a bs e nc e of the argume nts advanc ed by

the majority

from the pa

rties’ brie fs and the district c ourt’s opinion. The jury ’s ver dict must be understood in the conte x t of the ver dict sheet’s struc ture of the court’s instruc tions. The verdic t sheet wa s divided into a section for liability and a se ction for damag es. In the liability

section, question A2 aske d whether L abonia ha d violated Aczel’s Four th Amendment rig ht to be fre e fr om excessive forc e. The jury marke d “yes.” The jury

was then direc ted to answe r subquestion A2(a ) – whe ther L abonia ha d proved “ a re asonable and objective be lief that the for ce use d was re asonable under the circ umstances at the time of the
arr est.” The jury

marke d “yes” in re sponse to that question as well. Prior to deliber ations, the jury was instructe d that the “qua lified immunit y defe nse” w as a de fense “to liability for damag es.” ( emphasis adde d). The pla ceme nt of these que stions on the verdict shee t and theThe majority emphasizes the phra se “in one or more r espec ts” as thoug h it somehow impli ed 1 that the jury

could re ach the damag es question notwithstanding a findingof qualified immunity
. The phra se “one or more r espec ts” ref ers to a f inding of liability on one or more counts. The jury was instructe d that a findingof liability on any fede ral c laim entailed a f inding that the of

fice r w a s n o te n t i t l e d

t o qu a l i f i e d i m mun i ty. 3 district court’s instructions made c lear that both questions pertained to liability
. On the dama g es sec tion of the verdic t sheet, question B 1 asked, “ if any , of Interrog atories A1-A6 you have a

nswere d ‘y es,’ what amount of compensatory damag es has Plaintiff prove d
wer e proximately

cause d by

the ac ts of any

Def endant? ” In connec tion with thi s inquiry , the d i s tr i c tc o urti n s tr

u c t e d th e j ur y: Now in the next part these instructions shall cove r the que stion of damag es, if you rea ch that question. The f act that I char g e you as to damag es should not be taken a s a su g g e sti on

that you sh ou ld r e a c h th e qu e sti on of dama g e s. Ido so on ly

in case y ou decide the question of liability ; that is, in favor of the pla intiff. You should not consider the que stion of damag es unless and until you decide the issue of liability

in one or more respe cts in favor of the plaintiff. 1 The instructions re peate dly ref err ed to the jury ’s damag es dete rmination as an “ awa rd” to be
re nd e re d b y

the jur y , f or purp os e s o f “ c omp e ns atio n. ” De fe nd ants did no t ob je c t to the se instructions, or protest that the ver dict form only called f or a spe cial ver dict. The damag es question did not state that a findingof qualified immunity in response to subquestion A2(a ) would prec lude an a

war d. The jury

awa rded $12,078.61 in damag es, notwithstanding its finding of qualified immunity
. Th e ma jor ity a sse rt s th at it

is “ sp e c ulat[io n]” to c on c lud e that “ the jur y ’s ans we r t o Question B1 e x presse d an anoma lous awar d of dama g es.” The majority conclude s that the jury ’s $12,078.61 awa

rd re prese nts a simple response to the ve rdict shee t’s reque st for a f actua l finding as to the amount of Ac zel’s damag es that we re “ proxi mately cause d” by

L abonia. I

would ag ree ,4

if the ver dict sheet wa s the only evidenc e in the re cord. B ut the majority ignor es the c ourt’s cle ar instructions. No “spec ulation” is require d to rea ch the c onclusion that the jury did as instructed. We presume jurie s follow instructions. See, e.g ., United States v. Stewart, 433 F .3d 273, 307 (2d Cir. 2006). Perhaps the majority would have district c ourts do awa y with the prac tice of instructing jur ors on the law. Moreove r, no par

ticipant in this t rial eve r adva nced the majority ’s strict interpre tation of the text of the verdict shee t. The judg e, jury , and par ties all ag ree d that the jury ’s $12,078.61 damag es findingwas a

n “aw ard” of dama g es inconsistent with a findingof qualified immunity
. As the dis tr ic t c ourt

a c kn ow le dg e d, the jur

y ’s c on fu sio n r e su lte d f

ro m “ the ov e rl y

sim pli sti c instruction that led to [ its] answe ringQuestion B.1 [damag es].” Indeed, the majority rec og nizes that “[o] n rec eipt of the ve rdict for m, the court wa s appar ently surprised to re ceive an answ er stating Plaintiff’s da

mag es tog ether

with an answe r findingqualified immunity that require d judgme nt in favor of

Def endant.” The de fenda

nts also ag ree d that the district court “inadve rtently

misle[ ]d t he jury

as to their ability

to awar d compensatory

damag es upon a f

inding of qu a lif ie d immun ity

ba se d u po n ambi guit

y in t he ve rd ic t f

or m.” Ne ith e r i n th e dis tr ic t c ourt , nor on appe al, has L abonia e ver a dvance d the ar gument made by the majority

– that the jury ’s dama g e s awa

rd is c on sis te nt w itha

fi nd ingof

qu a lif ie d immun ity . A s f

or the jur y , it se nt a no te
e xpla ini ngthat by

its ve rd ic t, i t “ wa

nte d e xpe ns e s in c ur

re d p a id t o M r. Ac zel ,” makin gc le ar i t intended to awa

rd dama g es. I f there had bee n any

doubt at the time the jury returne d the ver dict, the fa ct that the jury
was una ble to ag ree to the same ve rdict af ter the la w was c larified makes the inconsistenc y of the initial verdict undeniable . The c ourt informed the jury that if L abonia wa s entitled to qualified5

immunit y , “that’s the e nd of the c ase, a nd there would be no dama g es to be a war ded.” U

pon
rec eivingthe district court’s c larifica tion, the jury

fore person r esponded that she now under stood “complete ly .” Without obj ection fr om the parties, the district judg e sent the jury “bac k in the jury room,” stating , “I

have not a cce pted your ver dict as fa r as A.2. [excessive for ce] and A.2.a
. [qualified immuni ty ] i s conce rned, nor B.1 [damag es] . . . and . . . y ou should reconside r what y ou have indicated to me that is inconsistent.” He a lso sugg ested that the jury could “r emove the inconsistency

. . . simply

by lining out [the damag es number] you’ve put in B .1 . . . .” Having failed to objec t to the district court’s dec ision to resubmit t he ca se to the jury , defe ndants waive d any argument that the jury ’s initial verdict wa s consistent. Af t er fu rt h er d el i b er at i o n , th e j ury

s en ta n o t e s t at i n g: We were trying to c ompromise amongvery rig id positi ons – wanted e x penses incurre d paid to Mr. Aczel and the policeman a bsolved of liability . Now we believe w e ca

n’t do both – I s this true? I f we keep g oing, w e mig ht want to chang e other parts of the verdic t alrea dy a dm i t t e d
. I s th i s p o s s i b l e ? Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a g a in i ns tr

uc te d th e jur

y that it c ou ld n ot a

wa rd dama g e s if

it f ound L a bo nia entitled to qualified immunity , and re fused the jur y ’s re quest to “cha

ng e other parts of the verdic t
a lr e a dy a dmi tte d. ” Th e jur or s r e tur ne d to c ontin

ue de lib e ra

tio ns , b ut w e re ult imate ly un a ble to
rea ch any ag ree ment to resolve the ve rdict’s inconsistenc y . There afte r, the district cour t (1) denie d L abonia’ s motion for judgme nt as a matter of law, (2 ) gra nte d A c zel ’s mot ion

fo r a ne w tri a l un de r R

ule 59 (a ) o f t

he F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ivi l Procedur e as to his claim of e x cessive f orce , and (3) denied Ac zel’s motion for a mistrial as moot. W hile the dec ision was on appea l, the district judge had a c hang e of he art, a nd invitedIn Ratiga n, the majority

conclude d that the jury ’s leg al conc lusion that a defe ndant’s 2 neg lige nce w as “pa ssive” did not invalidate its fac tual findingthat the def endant ha d committed an ac t of neg lige nce which was “ active” as a matter of law . I d. at 555. This logic is inconsistent wi th o ur mor e re c e nt d e c isi on

in F inn e g an v . F ounta in, 91 5 F .2 d 8 17 , 8 20 (2 d Ci r. 19 90 ), in which we looked to the fa ctual pre dicates f or the jury ’s dec ision to award punitive dama g es awa rd (a rgua bly a le g a l c on c lus ion ) a

nd de c ide d th at th e ve rd ic t c ou ld n ot b e log ic a lly rec onciled. More over, a s J udg e F riendly noted, in Ratiga

n, the district judge did not give the jury an o pp or tun ity to r e c on c ile the ve rd ic t it se lf . I d. at 55 6. He re , th e jur y wa s g ive n th e op po rt

un ity to r e c on c ile its inc on sis te nt v e rd ic t, whic h it c ou ld n ot d o. In n on e of the c a se s c ite d b y

L a bo nia on setting a side a damag es aw ard w as there such a c ircumstance . See infra n.5. Ac zel a lso argue s th at du e to t he jur y ’s re qu e st t o r e c on sid e r t he a dmi tte d p or

tio ns of its 3 verdic t, a new tr ial was re quired a s to all claims and all def endants. I

do not ag ree . The inconsistencies in the jury ’s ver dict perta ined to one def endant, L abonia, a

nd only two counts: (1) e xce ssi ve fo rc e and

(2 ) a ssa ult and batte ry . With r e sp e c t to the a ssa ult and batte ry c ount, L abonia himself a

rgues that, under

the circ umstances of

this case, the jur

y ’s conc lusion that L abonia wa s not liable for a ssault and batter y is inconsistent with an awar d of dama g es for 6 L abonia to move f

or re consideration of its decision to gra nt a new tr ial. L abonia did not then and does not now ra ise the ar gument that forms the ba ckbone of the majority

opinion – the disti nction betwee n a g ener al and a

specia l verdict unde r Rule 49(a ) of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure. Nor doe s the district court’s opinion g rantingL abonia’ s motion for rec onsideration re fer to that distinction. Un de rs too d in

c onte xt, th e jur

y ’s dama g e s a

wa rd wa s th e bo tto m li ne – e mbo dyingits ult imate a sse ssm e nt o f t

he c a se . T he Se ve nth

Am e ndme nt i mpl ic atio ns are ampl if ie d b e c a us e the dis tr ic t c ourt

re c on c ile d th e inc on sis te nt v e rd ic t by se tti nga sid e the jur

y ’s ult imate
c o n c l u s i o n . S e e R at i g anv . N
. Y
. C e n t . R
. R
. C o . , 2 9 1 F
. 2 d 5 4 8 , 5 5 7
- 5 8 ( 2 d

C i r . 1 9 6 1 ) ( F r i e n d l y, J., d iss e nti ng ) ( arguin gthat th e re wa s n o r e a so n to str ike the jur y ’s ans we r t o th e ult imate question in the case , a mix ed question of law and fa ct, on the basis of its re sponse to a fa ctual question, beca

use the re sult would be one “quite e vidently opposed to the re sult the jury int e nd e d. ” ). Thus , I

c on c lud e the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in de nyingAc zel ’s mot ion

fo r a ne w tri a l. 2 3e xce ss f

or c e . D e fs .’ B r. at 44 -4 6. Thus , I wo uld va c ate the jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

a s to defe ndant L abonia a s to Count 2, ex cessive f orce , and Count 3, assault and battery , and re mand this matter for a

new tria l as to those counts ag ainst L abonia. 7 B. Mistrial Iwould also hold that the district court er red in de nying A czel’s motion for a mistrial. The district cour

t impermissibl y

disreg arde d the jury ’s inability to rec oncile its verdict a

nd reinstated voide d finding s of fa ct. We have he ld: I f [an] i nconsistency

betwee n specia l verdict a nswers is noticed pr ior to the dismiss al of the jury , the trial cour t has the discre tion to resubmit the issues to t he jur y wi th a re qu e st f or c lari fi c atio n, wh e the r o r n ot t he pa rt ie s th e mse lve s r e qu e st clar ification. I f the c ourt elec ts not to seek clar ification fr om the jury , or if the inc on sis te nc y

is n ot n oti c e d unti l a ft e r t he jur y ha s b e e n d ism iss e d, the c ourt mus t take one of two ac tions. [ 1] I t is the duty of the c ourt to attempt to harmonize the answe rs, if it is possibl e under a fa ir rea ding of

them. Thus, wher e ther e is a view of the c ase that makes the jury ’s answe rs to specia l interrog atories c onsistent, they mus t be re so lve d th at w ay . [2] I f t he re is n o w ay

to h arm on ize the jur

y ’s ans we rs , the c ourt mus t or de r a

ne w tri a l. Auwo od v. Ha rr y B ra ndt B oo kin gOf

fi c e , Inc ., 85 0 F .2 d 8 84 , 8 91 (2 d Ci r. 19 88 ) ( c itatio ns , quotation marks, and a lterations omitted). No authority supports the position that a district court may rec oncile a jur

y ’s inconsistent verdic ts after the inconsistency

was e x plained to the jury , the j ur y w a s g i v e nth e o p p o rtun i ty t o r e c o n c i l e i t s v e r d i c t , an d th e j ur y w a s un a b l e t o d o s o i t s e l f

. In
su c h a c ir c ums tanc e , th e a

pp ro pr iate c ours e of

a c tio n is to d e c lare a

mis tr ia l. This problem ca

nnot be avoided by

arguing that the district court committed plain err or when it re submitt ed the c ase to the jury – rathe r than e nteringan appr opriate judg ment based on the fa c ts e sta

bli sh e d b y

the sp e c ia l ve rd ic t ans we rs un de r R ule 49 (b )( 3) (A ). Th is i s n ot t he fi rs t time an ambiguous verdict she et has c onfused a jury to believe it could aw ard da mag es
no tw ith sta

nd inga fi nd ingof

qu a lif ie d immun ity . In L ars on

v. Ne imi , 9 F .3 d 1 39 7, 14 01 (9 th8

Cir. 1993), the same pr oblem occur red, the case was re submitt ed to the jury , and the jury ag ree d to c ha ng e its ve rd ic t to fi nd

the of fi c e r w a s n ot e nti tle d to qu a lif ie d immun ity . T he Ni nth Cir c uit he ld t hat, g ive n th e fa c t th at th e pa rt ie s su bmi tte d th e pr op os e d v e rd ic t sh e e t and did no t ob je c t to resubmission of the ca se to the jury , any err or wa s invited. I d. L ikewise, L abonia did not object to resubmission of the ca se to the jury , and ther efor e ca nnot (and doe s not) now ar gue that the district court abuse d its discretion in resubmitting the c ase to the jury . The Ninth Circuit found the ar gument that the district judge “should have first tried to re concile the answe rs . . .
un pe rs ua siv e .” I d. at 14 01 -0 2. I t c on c lud e d th at: Of c ourse, it makes a

g ood deal of

sense to re quire trial a

nd appellate courts to do a ll the y c an to re c on c ile sp e c ia l ve rd ic t ans we rs wh e n th e on ly a lte rn ativ e is order ing a

new tria l. Howeve r, whe n the ver y body that issued the ambiguous or inc on sis te nt v e rd ic t is sti ll ava ila ble to c lari fy

its me anin g , a

re qu e st that it

do so comports with common sense a s well as ef ficienc y and fa irness. That is not to say that a cour

t could never

abuse its discre tion when it resubmitted a ca se to the jury with an appr opriate e x planation of the r eason. That case might possibly exis t, but it i s n ot t he c a se be fo re us . Id
. at1 4 0 2
. H e r e , th e d i s tr i c tc o urta c t e d w i th i ni t s d i s c r e t i o ni nr e s u b m i t t i n gth e c a s e t o th e j ur y, in light of the te nsion, if not manifest inconsistency , in the verdic t. The problem is that unlike the judg e in L arson, this district court chose not to abide by the ultimate result – the hungjury
. This was er

ror. Th e ma jor ity re lie s h e avil y

on the fa c t th at, b e fo re the jur y ha d b e e n in fo rm e d th at it could not compromise as to qua lified immunit y and dama g es, the jury

was polled, a

nd all the jur or s st ate d th e ir

a g re e me nt o n q

ua lif ie d immun ity . I

c on c lud e that th is i nit ia l ve rd ic t w a s v oid for two r easons. F irst, before he sent them to deliber ate a g ain, the judg e informe d the jury that he ha d n ot a c c e pte d th e ir

ve rd ic t a s to wh e the r L a

bo nia us e d e xce ssi ve fo rc e , whe the r L a bo nia9

was e ntitled to qualified immuni ty , or whe ther Ac zel was entitled to damag es. Second, onc e the law w a s c lari fi e d f

or the jur y , th e y we re un a ble to c on fi rm

the ir int e nt t o r e tur

n a ve rd ic t in L a bo nia ’s fa vo r o n q ua lif ie d immun ity

by str iki ngout th e dama g e s a wa rd . T hu s, we mus t presume that, but for their mistake a s to the law, the jury would not have be en unanimous on the fa c tua l f ind ingthat L a

bo nia wa s e nti tle d to qu a lif

ie d immun ity

in t he fi rs t pl a c e . I g no ri ngthe se fac ts, the majority

char acte rizes the jury ’s dec ision to m ake “ no chang e to its findings on the verdic t form,” a s a dec ision to “continue[] to report” the same f indings that the jury

had bee n instructed we re irr econc ilable and void. B ut the jury did not continue to report a ny ag ree ment. Be fore the jury

was e x cused, it wa s not polled ag ain to deter mine whether

eac h juror still ag ree d to the prior finding s. The jury had re ache d “an unr esolvable impasse .” Insofar as the jury ’s initial verdicts as to qualified immunity and dama g es we re void, there was nothingfor the district c ourt to rec oncile, and its dec ision to do so was rever sible err or. Cf. Rios v. Empresas L ineas Mar itimas Arg entinas, 575 F .2d 986, 990 (1st Cir. 1978) (“Since the trial court r efuse d to acc ept the first ve rdict, there wer e not two ver dicts here .”). C. Co m pr om ise Ev e n a ssumin gthe dis tr ic t ju dg e ha d n ot e rr on e ou sly re ins tate d a

vo id v e rd ic t, I

wo uld conclude that the district court’s post hoc a ttempt to harmoniz e that ver dict was a n abuse of dis c re tio n, be c a

us e we mus t pr e sume the jur y ’s ini tia l ve rd ic t w a s th e re su lt o f a n inva lid compromise. “Acompromise ver dict results when juror s resolve the ir inability to make a de te rm inatio n w ith

any c e rt a int y or un anim ity

on the iss ue of

lia bil ity by fi nd ingina de qu ate damag es.” Me kdeci v. Me rre ll Nat’l L abs., 711 F .2d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir. 1983) (c iting F reig ht Terminals, Inc. v. Ryder Sy s., Inc., 461 F .2d 1046, 1053 (5th Cir. 1972)). Indicia of a n improper10

c omp ro mis e ve rd ic t ma

y inc lud e wh e the r t

he size of the ve rd ic t c or

re sp on ds wi th t

he fa c ts
a dd uc e d at tr ia l, t

he le ng th o f d e lib e ratio ns , th e de g re e to whic h li a bil ity wa s c onte ste d at tr ia l, and the jury ’s communications with the judg e. Mekde ci, 711 F.2d a t 1515; see also Atkins v. New Y ork City , 143 F.3d 100, 104 ( 2d Cir. 1998). Where these indicia g o to show that a “jury compromised the issues of liability and dama g es, there fore rende ringthem insepara ble,” a new trial may be re quired. Mekde ci, 711 F.2d at 1515. We do not need to look hard at the circ umstantial evidence in this case to deter mine whether a compr omise occur

red – the jurors sent the district judg e a note stating pla inly that they “we re try ing to c ompromise amongvery rig id positi ons – wanted e x penses incur red pa id to Mr. Aczel and the police man absolved of liability .” The note does not spec ify which jurors subscribed to whic h “rig id positi ons.” The “ compromise” c ould be explained in one of two way s: (1) some jurors thoug ht L abonia wa s not entitled to qualified immunit y and re ache d a compromise with those who did not (Ac zel’s positi on), (2) the whole jury ag ree d L abonia wa s entitled to qualified immunity , but wanted to aw ard da mag es any

way (L abonia’ s position). The majority muses that, “[w]hi le the wor d ‘compromise’ is often used in the c ontextof re solving disag ree ments amongdiffer ent per sons, that is not i ts only meaning . A sing le individual can seek a compromise as a

mong c onflictingdesires, a nd so can a

unanimous jury

. . .” I f t he jur y ha d me ant t

he wo rd “ c omp ro mis e ” in t

he se ns e of

a the or e tic a l c omp ro mis e betwee n conflictingideas, pre sumably , it would have bee n able to re concile its ver dict once informed that its theore tical compromise wa s not permitted by law. The district court assumed the jury ’s ultimate inability to rea ch a ve rdict wa s a re sult of the desire of some jurors to eva de the cour t’s instructions and awa

rd dama g es out of sy

mpathy , rathe r than disagree ment as to theIn A

jax, bo th p art ie s a g re e d th at if the pla int if

f w a s e nti tle d to dama g e s at a ll, it w a s e nti tle d to 4 a liquidated sum, and the jury found liability

but awar ded dama g es of less than ha lf the amount of the liquidated damag es. 569 F .2d at 183-84. We held that “ the re asonable possibili ty of a compromise ver dict war

rante d a new

trial on all issues.” I d. at 185.

11 operative fac t question of qualified immunity . The majority ag ree s that the sy

mpathy verdic t explanation is “at least equa lly likely ” as the explanation that the jurors compromised a s to the qualified immunity

finding , and ther efor e, the district cour t “could prope rly

strike” the jur

y ’s damag es aw ard a s “contra ry to law.” Ido not ag ree with this condescendingchar acte rization of the jury ’s dec ision to award damag es. We ca

nnot acc ept an e x planation of a jury ’s ver dict that relies on jury misconduct wher e ther e is “a

n equally rea sonable a

nd perha ps even be tter explanation which involves no jury misconduct.” Ajax Har dwar e Mfg . Corp. v. Industrial Plants Corp., 569 F.2d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1977). The be tter explanation here is that the jury rea ched a

n impermissible compromise verdic t 4 due not to misconduct, but to confusion about the law resultingfrom the district cour t’s i n s tru ct i o n s . Af

t er th e c o n fu s i o nwa s cl ea re d u p , th e j ury

hun g. The majority

notes that an “ instructive” a nalog y might be if

a district cour

t “at a be nch trial, found that the de fenda nt was not liable to the plaintiff but nonethe less awa rded da mag es b a s e d o nth e j u d g e ’ s p e r c e p t i o nth atth e d e f e n d an th a d

b e h av e d n a s t i l y ( a l th o u g hn o ti l l e g a l l y) toward the plaintiff.” In that situation, Iag ree that “in all likelihood, we would not orde r a ne w trial by rea son of the inconsistency , but would merely strike the illeg al damag es aw ard a nd direc t the e ntr y of jud g me nt i n f

avo r o f t he de fe nd ant. ” Th e dis tr ic t ju dg e in t he e xamp le is a

sin g le de c isi onmake r. Th e e rr or wo uld be a sim ple e rr or of law. A una

nim ou s jury

ve rd ic t, b y

c ontr a st, must be rea ched thr oug h the agree ment of multiple jurors who must be instructed on the la w byTh e c a se s L a bo nia c ite s f ro m ot he r c ir c uit s o n s e tti nga sid e an il le g a l da ma g e s a wa rd a ll 5 involve juries that re turned ve rdicts that wer e not in compliance with the court’s una mbiguous instructions, without a misl eading verdic t sheet like the one in this case, which ma de it seem that a c omp ro mis e wa s p e rm iss ibl e , a nd wh e re no c lari fi c atio n w a s r e qu e ste d f ro m th e jur

y pr ior to discharg e. See F loy d v. L aws, 929 F .2d 1390, 1398 (9th Cir. 1991) (“ ‘[I ]f the district court has corr ectly found that the jury ’s answe r to a que stion that was supposed to terminate f urther inquiry is c le ar a nd dis po se s o f t

he le g a l is su e s, on

re vie w w e mus t igno re the jur y ’s ne c e ssa

ri ly conflictinganswe rs to any other que stions.’” (quotingWhit e v. Gr infas, 809 F .2d 1157, 1161 (5 th C ir . 1 98 7) (e mph a sis omi tte d) ); Ka va na ugh v . G re e nle e To ol C o. , 9 44 F .2 d 7 , 1 0- 11 (1 st Cir. 1991) (“A ll of the alleg ed inconsistencie s in the special ve rdicts stem from the jury ’s fa ilure to comply with the written instructions on the spec ial verdic t form and with the c ompanion explanations given in the c harg e to the jury .”); c f. Duk v. MGM Gr and Hotel, Inc., 320 F .3d 10 52 , 1 05 8 ( 9th

Cir . 2 00 3) (c on c lud ingthat “ re su bmi tti ngan in c on sis te nt v e rd ic t” is p re fe ra ble wher e the jury

has not bee n discharg ed, althoug h “[a]n entirely differ ent situation is present wher e the jury

has bee n dismiss ed. The re, dismissal of surplusag e . . . make s sense.” ). 12 the district court. This situation car ries the r isk of impermissible compromises as to fac t questions based on misleadinginstructions as to the law – exactly what occ urre d here
. 5 Ido not base my

dissent on a “py

ramid of spe culations” a

bout what transpire d in the jury room. Rather, my

conclusions follow fr om the well-e stablished rules that we presume jur ies follow instructions and do not eng ag e in misconduct. Nor doe s my approa ch re quire a

new tria l whene ver “ a possibility

exis ts that jurors with conflictingviews had c ompromised.” Rather , I would hold that where (1) the c ourt finds a jury ’s ver dict inconsistent, (2) the c ourt resubmits the
case to the jury

to rec oncile the inconsistent ver dict, (3) the jur y informs the cour

t that its i nitial
ve rd ic t w a s a

“ c omp ro mis e []” b a se d o n th e c ourt ’s c on fu sin gins tr uc tio ns , a nd (4 ) t he jur y is
un a ble to r e c on c ile the ve rd ic t, t he n th e c ourt

mus t or de r a

ne w tri a l. P art ie s w ish ingto a vo id “costly and wa steful re trial[s] ” ar e we ll advised to object to misleadingjury instructions and specia l verdict shee ts. To save c osts, it s eems the ma jority would assume the wor st of this jury
and dis re sp e c t it s u lti mate ina bil ity to r e a c h a

de c isi on in t his c a se . I

c ann ot a g re e wi th t

his
re su lt.13

II. Rul e 60 (b ) Ialso disag ree with the majority ’s conc lusion that L abonia’ s motion for rec onsideration was timely

under Rule 60( b) of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure. That motion was not filed until March 31, 2008, eighteen months afte r the district cour t’s orig inal rulingon the motion for judgme nt as a matter

of law on Septe mber 22, 2006. A motion for r econside ration brought under Rule 60(b)(1) , which provide s for re lief fr om a judg ment based on “ mistake, inadver tence , surprise or

excusable neg lect,” must be ma de “no mor e than a y ear afte r the e ntry

of the judg ment or orde r or the da

te of the pr ocee ding.” Fe d. R. Civ. P . 60(c) . L abonia’ s motion for
rec onsideration did not state which subse ction of Rule 60(b) it wa s brought under, but the district
c ourt ba se d it s d e c isi on

on the c atc h- a ll p ro vis ion

of Rul e 60 (b )( 6) , whic h c an b e us e d “ to
a c c omp lis h ju sti c e ,” and

do e s n ot t

ri g g e r t he on e -ye ar l imi tatio n. Se e Gr a c e v. B ank L e umi Tr

us t Co. of N.Y., 443 F .3d 180, 190 n.8 (2d Cir. 2006). Rule 60(b)(6) g rants “grants fe dera l courts broa d authority to relieve a par

ty from a f inal jud g me nt ‘ up on

su c h te rm s a s are jus t,’ pr ov ide d th at th e mot ion is m a de wi thi n a

re a so na ble t i m e a n d i s n o tp re m i s edo no n e o f t h e gr o un d s fo r r el i ef en um er at edi ncl au s es (b )( 1 ) t h ro u gh (b )( 5) .” L ilj e be rgv. He a lthSe rv . A c qu isi tio n Co rp ., 48 6 U .S. 84 7, 86 3 ( 19 88 ) ( e mph a sis
a dd e d) ; se e a lso Ne ma ize r v . B ake r, 79 3 F .2 d 5 8, 63 (2 d Ci r. 19 86 ) ( “ As (b )( 6) a pp lie s o nly when no other

subsection is available , g rounds for r elief ma y not be mistake, inadve rtenc e, surprise or

excusable neg lect.”) . In this case, the district c ourt invited the Rule 60(b) motion upon rea liz ation of its own purported mistake as to whethe r the inconsistenc y in the jury ’s ver dict could have been e liminated. “Mistake” is a g round under

Rule 60(b)(1) . Thus, despite theNor did we “hint[] ” as to how this appe al would be r esolved. We ar e not an or acle that offe rs 6 vague prophe cies to litiga nts and district courts throug h oblique rema rks in summary

order s. 14 dis tr ic t c ourt ’s tr e atme nt o f t he mot ion

a s o ne br ou g ht i n th e fa c e of e xtra or din ary

c ir c ums tanc e s, the one- y ear

limit ation must apply , and L abonia’ s motion was untimely
. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

re a so ne d th at L a

bo nia ’s mot ion

wa s n ot u

nti me ly be c a us e its

“ Se pte mbe r 2 2n d Ru lin gwa s n ot f ina l w he n e nte re d b e c a

us e it w a s a

pp e a le d. F ina lity

c ame wi th the de c isi on

of the Court

of Ap pe a ls, wi thi n f

our d ay s o f whic h D e fe nd ant L a bo nia fi le d h is p re s en tm o t i o n . ” T h i s i s i n co rr ec t . T h e p en d en cy o f a nap p ea l d o es n o tt o l l th e t i m e f o r f i l i n g a Rule 60(b) motion. Kingv. First Am. Investig ations, Inc., 287 F .3d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2002) (“ King argues that an a

ppeal of the judg ment tolls t he one year period for

filing a Rule 60(b) motion . . . . The rule is to the contrar

y .”). “ Either bef

ore or afte r filinghis appea l, the litigant may also file a Rule 60(b) motion for re lief with the district court.” Stone v. I .N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 400 (1995);
se e a lso F or

t K no x Musi c Inc . v . B a

pti ste , 2 57 F .3 d 1 08 , 1 11 (2 d Ci r. 20 01 ) ( ho ldi ngthat a dis tr ic t c ourt

ha s juri sd ic tio n to de ny

Rul e 60 (b ) m oti on s d

ur ingthe pe nd e nc y

of an a pp e a l or to indicate intent to g rant a

Rule 60(b) motion upon remand) ; Toliver v. County of Sullivan, 957 F.2d 47, 49 ( 2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (same ). This Court’s summary

order , which denie d defe ndants’ appe al of the district c ourt’s initial gra nt of a ne w trial, provided that “[n] othing in this decision bar s the district court fr om revisiting its ea

rlier r uling a s to whether the verdic t form re sponses ca n be re conciled.” Aczel v. L abonia, 271 F . App’x 73 (2d Cir. 2008). The issue of whether a motion for re consideration would be timely

under Rule 60( b) wa s not before this Court at that ti me. Our or der did not re ach any holding on the que stion. 615

To prese rve his right to Rul e 60(b) relief , L abonia should have filed such a motion. The district court’s de cision to allow L abonia’ s late motion was base d on an er ror of law, and there fore , Iwould conclude that it is an abuse of discr etion. Imus t th e re fo re re sp e c tf

ull y dis se nt.