GERMANY, FRANCE AND NATO

Dr. Peter Schmidt

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

Ebenhausen, Federal Republic of Germany

With a Summary of Discussion by

Ms. Maria Alongi

Foreign Policy Consultant

Sponsored by

The Strategic Studies Institute

and

The American Institute

for Contemporary German Studies

Washington, DC

October 17, 1994
ii

*****

This document was edited by Dr. Thomas-Durell Young and LTC

William T. Johnsen of the Strategic Studies Institute, who served

as organizers of this roundtable. This report is approved for

public release, distribution is unlimited.

*****
iii

FOREWORD

U.S. national strategy and U.S. Army doctrine explicitly

establish the overwhelming need for, and value of, coalitions and

alliances in the post-cold war era. Two generations of U.S. civil

officials and military officers have been inculcated with the

precept of NATO's importance to security and stability in Europe.

Free of the confines of the cold war, competing national

interests and different national perceptions have transformed the

Alliance. While NATO retains its value to U.S. national interests

in Europe, the lack of a common threat now is producing a

different Alliance. Clearly, if the Alliance is to survive and

remain meaningful, an understanding of NATO and its political

subtleties will be essential.

To provide a wider understanding of the changed nature of

the Alliance, Dr. Peter Schmidt of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und

Politik in Ebenhausen, Germany, examines the current policies of

France and Germany, the two largest continental NATO powers,

toward NATO. Dr. Schmidt presented this paper in June 1994 to a

roundtable sponsored by the American Institute for Contemporary

Germany Studies and the Chief of Staff of the Army's Strategic

Outreach Program. Approximately two dozen European experts

participated in this roundtable ably recorded by Ms Maria Alongi.

On behalf of the Strategic Studies Institute, I would like

to extend my sincere gratitude to the American Institute for

Contemporary German Studies for cosponsoring this profitable

exchange.

EARL H. TILFORD, JR.

Director of Research

Strategic Studies Institute
iv

SUMMARY

Rapporteur: Maria R. Alongi

I. European Perspectives on NATO.

• During NATO's recent evolution, two major perspectives

have emerged in Europe. One, espoused most prominently by

Germany, holds that NATO should provide the framework for

U.S.-European security relations. In this view, the European

security identity should be subordinate to NATO. The other major

viewpoint, represented by France, holds that NATO should

eventually give way to a more distinct European relationship on

matters of security that need not be expressed in a NATO

framework.

• In the opinion of some, closer cooperation between France

and NATO's integrated military command, although mutually

beneficial, is aimed at facilitating the development of a closer

bilateral relationship between France and the Alliance.

Arrangements such as the Combined/Joint Task Forces (C/JTF) can

further this goal by allowing NATO resources to be used by a

European security entity, such as the Western European Union

(WEU), when the latter wishes to act without the United States in

a crisis situation.

• Many European countries, including the United Kingdom,

have accepted the objective of a European security identity

embodied in the Maastricht Treaty. Although not all European

allies share this vision of transatlantic security relations,

their interest in promoting further integration in the European

Union may lead to the same outcome.

• No conceptual link has been made, however, between the

process of developing a Common European Foreign and Security

Policy and the development of NATO. Unless this link is made

explicitly, the result will be a bilateral security relationship

between the United States and Europe outside the framework of the

Alliance.

II. France and NATO.

• The French position on NATO has evolved since 1990. France

has moved toward closer military cooperation with NATO, as

demonstrated, for example, by the subordination of French troops

in the EUROCORPS to SACEUR when a crisis demands it.

• Yet France has also undertaken a series of initiatives

that mirror NATO activities in Central and Eastern Europe. Some

have perceived these actions as intended to balance NATO's

influence in this region and in European security affairs more

generally. The association agreements reached by the European

Union and the WEU with the countries of Central and Eastern
v

Europe, for example, appear to be European alternatives to the

North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). In addition, the

Stability Pact proposed by French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur

seems aimed at counterbalancing NATO's Partnership for Peace

(PfP).

• On the other hand, the French policy shift regarding NATO

also reflects the altered transatlantic political and security

context. The change in administration in France, the

disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the problems encountered in the

implementation of the Maastricht Treaty have brought about

adjustments in French foreign policy priorities.

• The new French approach toward NATO reflects a calculation

that the new European political and security environment requires

a continued U.S. presence on the continent. This, in turn,

requires a recognition of the future role of NATO, the vehicle

for U.S. involvement in Europe, in European security.

• The evolution of transatlantic security relations toward a

bilateral U.S.-European relationship is occurring de facto

because of the difficulty in reaching consensus among the 16

members of NATO in response to the conflict in Bosnia. The

individual actors agreed to commit troops after bilateral

consultations.

III. Future Security Relationships.

• Transatlantic security arrangements are likely to evolve

toward a "variable geometry" pattern, with groups of NATO

countries forming ad hoc coalitions in response to particular

crisis situations. The C/JTF arrangement is designed to

accommodate this potential development.

• The French accept the development of a "variable geometry"

approach to European security and have supported the C/JTF plan

on the basis of WEU's access to it. Security relationships in

this new context, however, will not necessarily reflect current

patterns. The strong Franco-German partnership in security

matters may not carry over into the future. Greater cooperation

may develop between France and the United Kingdom, particularly

in nuclear matters, as indicated in the French White Paper on

defense.

• In addition, French and German security interests may

diverge. Germany is increasingly concerned about the political

and economic stability of regions east of its borders. It has

provided 40 percent of total Western financial aid to Central and

Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. With its resources

tied to economic assistance to the East, Germany may find itself

less capable and less inclined to sustain its leadership on

European security matters with France.
vi

• Germany's concern with promoting stability in Central and

Eastern Europe may also result in a more flexible German

relationship with NATO and Western Europe more generally. In

addition, it may lead to the development of a bilateral

relationship with Russia.

• This will not mean a renationalization of German security

policy. Although Germany recently intervened as a national actor

in U.N. operations in Cambodia and Somalia, the need to integrate

German foreign and security policy within a wider European

framework remains deeply entrenched in the German political

consciousness.

• Since Adenauer, Germany has followed policies that embed

it firmly in European political and economic integration. The

Kohl government continues this course. When Germany began the

transition to unification, it pressed to further the integration

of the European Union, to make a unified Germany more palatable.

In addition, because Kohl viewed NATO as evolving into a looser

structure, he promoted the WEU, which he perceived as more viable

in the long term.

• Furthermore, a potential change in government will not

alter the German commitment to a European policy. The Social

Democratic Party (SDP) and its possible coalition partner, the

Green Party, both favor European integration.

• With the prospect of EU enlargement, however, the

character of the European Union is changing. The eventual

accession of Central and East European states comports changes to

the decisionmaking process of the European Union, its spending,

and policies. It will be a much more diverse organization and one

less likely to achieve consensus easily.

• A more independent German approach to foreign and security

policy may, thus, result not from a proclivity to act outside a

wider European framework, but from a potentially looser European

Union.

• French security interests are tied less to developments in

Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. For

France, a more immediate goal remains developing European

security structures and the capability to intervene in regional

crises where European interests are at stake. Ironically, France

is now confronted by a Europe less able, and perhaps less

willing, to act than originally intended by the European

Community when it sought to establish a Common Foreign and

Security Policy.

• The failure of the European Union to intervene

meaningfully in the Yugoslavia crisis highlights the need for

France to look outside of Europe for a strategic partner. The

unexpected result has been, and may continue to be, a closer

relationship with the United States.
vii

IV. The U.S. Role in Europe.

• There is strong support in both France and Germany for a

continued, prominent U.S. role in European security. Germany

traditionally has endorsed U.S. presence for security and

political reasons. The German White Paper on defense restates

this position. Given its current limitations on military

capabilities and diversion of financial resources, German support

for a U.S. role in Europe will continue.

• The crisis in Bosnia highlighted for French policymakers

the need for continued U.S. involvement in European security

matters. As stated above, the inability to muster a meaningful

European response to the conflict in the Balkans, particularly

from Germany and the United Kingdom, convinced the French of the

importance of having the United States as a partner in developing

a viable strategy towards Bosnia.

• French support for a U.S. role in Europe, however, is not

necessarily coincident with support for a preeminent role for

NATO in European security. In the French view, the United States

should become a bilateral partner to the European Union on

security matters.

V. NATO Membership Expansion.

• Due to the economic imbalance between Western Europe and

the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the early

enlargement of the European Union is unlikely. The enlargement of

NATO, however, is both possible and desirable.

• Extending full NATO membership to Central and East

European Countries will provide a framework for their continued

integration into the West, which the EU currently cannot provide.

In addition, expanding NATO membership now will avoid dealing

with the issue at a time of crisis, when tensions probably would

be heightened by extending the influence of the Alliance

eastward.

• The question of NATO's relationship with Russia has been a

more difficult issue within the Alliance. The prospect of a

reversal to authoritarian government or Russian intervention in

its "near abroad" has led to uncertainty about NATO's future

relationship with Russia.

• PfP is a successful compromise between two very different

views on this issue. It allows NATO to form a relationship with

Russia and thus avoids creating a new dividing line on the

European continent. On the other hand, it preserves the integrity

of NATO's core functions in the event of an undemocratic turn in

Russia or of Russian aggressive policies in the near abroad.
viii

VI. Challenges to Future Transatlantic Cooperation.

• If transatlantic security relations evolve into a

bilateral arrangement involving the United States on one side and

a European entity, perhaps the WEU or the EU, on the other, the

challenge for both sides will be to facilitate the development of

Europe into a viable strategic partner for the United States.

• Currently, Europe lacks certain capabilities, including

strategic airlift and intelligence assets. In addition, defense

spending in Europe has been on a steady decline. German spending,

for example, fell from 2.6 percent of GDP to 1.6 percent. This

situation may ignite a new burden-sharing debate in the U.S.

Congress.

• On the other hand, in the current geopolitical context, it

is in U.S. interests to retain Europe as a strategic partner.

Thus, both sides must work together to ensure that the

transatlantic relationship does not deteriorate as Europe builds

its security identity. This will require analyzing transatlantic

relations not in terms of burden-sharing, but

responsibility-sharing.

• The contribution of Europe to the continent's stability

must be viewed in a wider, more strategic context. And, the

contribution of the European allies to transatlantic security

must include an assessment of expenditures and efforts aimed at

stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe.
1

GERMANY, FRANCE AND NATO

Peter Schmidt

Introduction.

Current German and French relations with NATO are subject to

(at least) two different interpretations. Due to the special role

France has played since 1966 inside (and outside) the Atlantic

Alliance, the main difference between these two views is the way

in which the French relationship with the Alliance is perceived

today.

The dominant school of thought maintains that France has

gotten much closer to NATO.1

 This has paved the way for a new

transatlantic bargain which enables the Alliance to undertake new

missions. As proof for this new French attitude toward NATO,

proponents of this interpretation point out that France has

endorsed the following collective defense and collective security

missions:

• the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC),

• Partnership for Peace (PfP),

• NATO-sponsored peace operations,

• SACEUR's "operational command" of the EUROCORPS when

agreed to by the participating countries.

• Moreover, France is participating in Military Committee

discussions related to peacekeeping operations.

This school of thought also holds that Germany, while

remaining fully committed to NATO's military integration and

political structure, has played an essential role in this change

in French policy by dampening traditional Franco-American

rivalries. Hence, some argue that Bonn has helped considerably to

draw France closer into the Alliance's reform process than French

political instincts may have accepted without this German effort.

U.S. support in January 1994 for European endeavors to

develop a European security and defense identity is another

important milestone in drawing France closer to NATO.2

 According

to this interpretation, the basis has been laid for a new

transatlantic bargain which now allows a new and stable strategic

partnership between Europe and North America in the post-cold war

era.

The minority school of thought evaluates the relationship

among France, Germany and NATO in a different way. This school

argues that France has gotten what it has wanted.3 From this

school's perspective, NATO's role and functions in today's
2

overall security structure fits much better into traditional

French interests and views than those of former days. Thus,

France actively pursued this policy based on its own national

interests. The proponents of this position argue that France

remains apart from NATO's military integration and maintains its

special status, while NATO's political role, a matter of constant

French complaints, has diminished. Major political decisions are

taken outside the Atlantic Alliance, e.g., like in the Security

Council of the U.N., on a bilateral basis between the United

States and the EU (within the context of its Command Foreign and

Security Policy), or within flexible groupings. Even those taken

within the Alliance are done in the North Atlantic Council where

France remained even after its departure from the integrated

military structure. Moreover, there is a clear tendency to

separate political negotiation structures from implementing

institutions (where NATO belongs more and more), while

increasingly having to vie with new competitors in this field. In

other words, NATO's role is more or less limited to the

implementation of political decisions taken elsewhere.

Against the argument that NATO has assumed collective

security functions (i.e., NACC and PfP),4 proponents of this

interpretation argue that these new political functions remain

limited by the CSCE framework and by the EU's Common Foreign and

Security Policy initiatives toward eastern Europe (e.g., the

stability pact plan as offered by French Prime Minister Edouard

Balladur).5 Moreover, according to this more modest view, the

EUROCORPS-SACEUR agreement is not an indicator of a major French

rapprochement toward NATO. Rather, it represents an extension of

Gaullist policy of a limited relationship between NATO and other

European nations, especially Germany, but also Spain and Belgium,

who are participating in the EUROCORPS.

Furthermore, these observers contend that even where the

Alliance has a political role to play, France has successfully

restrained NATO's reach by promoting parallel European

institutions. NACC, offered to all former Warsaw Pact countries

in November 1991, for example, has been succeeded by the

Consultative Forum of WEU, created in June 1992, and the Balladur

plan a year later. And, the European answer to NATO's PfP has

been the creation of associate partner status for Central

European countries with WEU.

Finally, certain analysts have argued that Germany's overall

relationship with NATO has shifted toward the French position.

Certainly, most of the Bundeswehr remains assigned to NATO, but,

by and large, Germany has gone along with Paris by accepting the

French type of NATO relationship, e.g., in the framework of the

EUROCORPS and by double-hatting military forces to both NATO and

WEU.

Thus, from this perspective, since the Alliance's January

1994 Summit, the United States has opted not to play an important

role in the Alliance. Furthermore, the United States has
3

acquiesced to French leadership in European security affairs by

accepting the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy

and WEU's policy of independence. The Alliance's new policy of

providing NATO assets for European-led operations, which only

further accentuates NATO's future insignificance, lends credence

to this view.

Schools of Thought Put To the Test.

A reasonable way to test these two lines of interpretation

in a differentiated fashion is to ascertain their different

approaches to three key roles and functions of the Atlantic

Alliance:

• Collective defense role (Article 5 of the Washington

Treaty),

• Cooperative security functions, i.e., NACC and PfP, and,

• NATO's role in regional crisis management.

Collective Defense. The German Defense White Paper argues

that collective defense remains the key function of the

Alliance.6 For Germany, this position justifies the continued

existence of the integrated military structure of NATO, in which

Germany plays a major role. This pronouncement is also meant to

stem criticism of shifts in German security policy which might be

interpreted as leading towards a renationalization of German

defense policy. Thus, until recently, German leaders have

emphasized Article IV of the WEU Treaty which declares as

undesirable any duplication of NATO and WEU military staffs and

deferring to NATO authorities. With WEU's Petersberg Declaration

of June 1992, however, Germany has accepted that one of WEU's

tasks is the collective defense of the WEU countries.7

Nevertheless, the WEU has not yet developed a functioning

operational structure suitable for this task. The recently

established WEU Planning Cell is too small to fulfil this

function. In addition, the regular meetings of Chiefs of Defense

Staff cannot overcome the lack of a permanent WEU military

headquarters.8

 On a practical level, NATO remains the only

framework within which the collective defense of the Western

European countries can be reasonably executed.9

NATO's importance, however, is diminished by a number of

factors:

• Due to the end of a direct threat to Western Europe by the

Warsaw Pact there is a perception of a reduced importance of

collective defense missions. NATO's concentration on collective

defense, therefore, only adds to the lessened political standing

of NATO.
4

• The readiness to develop an operational role for WEU,10

which includes the dual-hatting of NATO forces,11 detracts

attention from the Atlantic Alliance, and might reduce the number

of exercises and the intensity of interaction among the armed

forces within the NATO framework.

• The endorsement of the traditional French type of

relationship with NATO (e.g., the Lemnitzer-Ailleret agreements

and others)12 in EUROCORPS affairs could reduce the importance of

NATO procedures in the military field.

• Due to the newly-assumed long warning time available to

Alliance members, there is even less reason to contribute forces

to, let alone participate in, the integrated command structure.

In sum, as regards NATO's collective defense function, the

French attitude has not changed. France still accepts NATO's role

in this field, but remains apart from NATO's integrated military

structure. Thus, those hoping for change in French policy toward

NATO may be disappointed. The only, if indeed minor French

concession in this regard is that of the command relationship of

the EUROCORPS with NATO. Whereas the Lemnitzer-Ailleret agreement

specifies that French forces should come only under the

operational control of SACEUR, the EUROCORPS-SACEUR arrangement

place the French forces within this formation under SACEUR's

operational command.

The nature of the French and German relationship with NATO

today is, therefore, determined much more by the new functions

and missions of the Alliance with regard to cooperative security

and NATO's role as a mandate organization of the United Nations

in a collective security framework.

The cooperative security dimension. The first practical step

in institutionalizing the cooperative security function was the

creation of the NACC in December 1991, which included the former

Warsaw Pact member countries.13 This proposal was based on a

German-American initiative, as Germany in particular was keen to

provide the Alliance with an all-European function for at least

two reasons:

• to establish a framework to push disarmament by including

the former Warsaw Pact countries into a joint institutional

framework,14 and

• to make German unification more "digestible" for its

Eastern neighbors (especially Russia) by attaching these states

to a formerly purely Western organization.

France, however, held very skeptical views on this

development. In Paris, the NACC has been seen mostly as a

German-American attempt to provide NATO with new political

missions in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, it was

highly symbolic that the initiative bypassed France, while
5

encouraging Washington to become a "partner in leadership."15

President Mitterrand's statement following the Rome summit in

December 1991 was typical of French attitudes in this regard.

Isolated after his criticism of NACC and NATO reform, he said: "I

didn't know that NATO has a political role to play."

Nevertheless, having no coalition partners to turn to in this

matter, France slowly accepted this new political role for the

Alliance.16

However, at the same time, France successfully strove to

develop countermeasures to balance and downgrade NATO's increased

political reach. These initiatives were based much more on

Realpolitik than the all-European concept of NATO, as they aimed

only at extending Western Europe's influence toward Central

Europe, while excluding Eastern Europe. Thus, the WEU's

Consultative Forum and the EU's European Agreements have been

based on the understanding that only a belt of countries from the

Baltic states to Romania fall within a zone of EU-influence,

whereas NACC included all former Warsaw Pact countries. Later,

the WEU offered associate partnership status, again only to this

group of countries,17 whereas participation in NATO's PfP program

is open to all European countries.18 While Germany is interested

in stabilizing this potential crisis area, France was motivated

to support this policy because it saw these measures as a

counterpoise against NATO's influence in Central Europe.

Though NATO's capabilities are much more extensive than

those of the WEU, and, therefore, provide more opportunities for

Central and East European countries, the WEU has a double

advantage. First, the WEU is able to concentrate on nine

countries. Second, close relations with WEU are regarded as a

means to improve the chances of these states for EU membership.

NATO's role in regional crisis management. One of the

reasons why Germany still considers NATO as its primary

multilateral military organization has resulted from the problem

of using German armed forces outside NATO. Until the German

constitutional court in June 1994 decided to permit the

employment of German forces outside the NATO area, a

well-established political interpretation of the German Basic Law

(Grundgesetz) proscribed the possibility of employing the

Bundeswehr outside of NATO's scope. In addition to this problem,

NATO (due in large part to significant American military

capabilities in crucial areas) has been seen as the only

effective military multilateral organization for possible

"out-of-area-missions."19 The German government has been,

therefore, quite keen not only to maintain NATO's traditional

collective defense function, but also to give the Alliance a role

in regional crisis management, well beyond the NATO area.

France, on the other hand, driven by its traditional,

restrictive understanding of NATO as a collective defense

organization of last-resort, accepted this new task for NATO only

with great reluctance. Again, the French have been willing to
6

support a regional crisis role of NATO beyond the alliance's

traditional area only when the European partners create measures

to counterbalance NATO. This policy is clearly laid down in the

new French White Paper on Defense, where the French government

pointedly repeats the Gaullist principles of 1966, while

indicating that it will take part in NATO's reform primarily

where these efforts promote the development of independent

European security and defense structures.20

An expression of this French policy is found in the WEU's

1992 Petersberg declaration. Thus, at least on paper, WEU became

legitimized to undertake military actions of all kinds. These

include the defense of Europe and peace operations. The latter of

these can be undertaken without the explicit consent of the U.N.

Security Council; instead they can be based solely on Article 5

of the U.N. Charter.21

Germany supported this policy under two conditions:22

• NATO should maintain collective defense as one of its key

functions, and

• WEU should intervene only in regional crises when NATO is

not prepared to act.

In reality, however, WEU activities have paralleled NATO

activities or the WEU has acted alone. For example, in the

Adriatic, "NATO" and "WEU" ships enforce the U.N. embargo in

parallel actions under a common command and, supposedly, under

the joint political control of NATO and the WEU Council.23 NATO

has enforced the no-fly zone over Bosnia, but, on the Danube, the

WEU controls actions in a complementary way. In addition, many

military activities, especially on the soil of the former

Yugoslavia, have been undertaken under the auspices of the U.N.

and beyond the scope of both institutions. Here again, France

tries to balance NATO's reach by supporting the establishment of

a greater military expertise for the Secretary General of the

United Nations.24

To understand the changing role of NATO, it is indispensable

to recall NATO's traditional basis of strength: the strong

political-military link built into its institutional structure.

This, however, is changing. France very much favors a bilateral

European-U.S. relationship inside the Alliance, where the

European side is based on the EU's Common Foreign and Security

Policy. Germany, by and large, accepts this view.25 It needs to

be recalled, however, that this does not hinder France from

maintaining very close bilateral relations with the United

States.

Assessing the Bosnian affair underscores this major change.

Most of the negotiations, as in the case of the so-called "action

plan" for Bosnia, are going on between the EU and the United

States. Other major frameworks include the U.N. Security Council
7

and the Contact Group consisting of Russia, the United States,

France, Germany and the United Kingdom. This development weakens

the political functions of the Atlantic Alliance. In addition,

there is an overall tendency to separate negotiating structures

from implementing institutions, which works to NATO's

disadvantage as can be demonstrated in the Bosnian "case."

Negotiating a political settlement.

• effected by states on a unilateral basis, primarily the

United States,26

• effected by the U.N. in cooperation with the EU

(Stoltenberg, Owen), as well as the EU on a unilateral basis,27

and

• through ad-hoc structures (the London Contact Group,

International Conference on Former Yugoslavia).

Implementation and control of certain measures.

• United Nations: peacekeeping and possibly enforcement,

humanitarian and economic aid, arms control;

• CSCE: monitoring, conflict prevention in nearby areas;

• EU: monitoring, conflict prevention, economic sanctions

and incentives, humanitarian aid;

• WEU: embargo control, limited peace operations; and,

• NATO: monitoring, embargo control, peace operations.

Certainly, the above situation is caused not only by French

policy ambitions. The momentum also stems from objective trends

in the international system and the necessity to include Russia

in these endeavors in order to find political solutions for

regional problems. Nevertheless, since 1992 a certain French

political strategy is discernible which can be understood as a

multiple bi- and multilateralism, one aim of which is to

downgrade NATO's political reach.28

Conclusions.

In summary, I am inclined to support the argument that

changed security conditions in Europe have allowed France to

pursue initiatives that limit NATO's role and potential for

success. In the field of collective defense, NATO today has a

looser structure than in former days. But even under these

changed circumstances France does not participate in the

Alliance's military structure. With regard to cooperative

security NATO has attracted new functions, but France has ensured

that in cases with a purely European character, the EU and WEU
8

balance NATO's possibilities.

Although NATO members accepted a new Alliance role in

regional crises beyond the traditional NATO geographical area,

other parallel European institutions such as the CSCE also have

developed. The main political trend points to a bilateral

European-American relationship outside NATO, which perfectly fits

into traditional French interests. The new French White Paper on

Defense is quite clear in this regard: priority is given to the

development of Europe as a strategic actor; NATO plays only a

secondary role. The key question remains whether this result is

good or bad for Atlantic relations. And what are the problems of

a relationship where European interests meet American interests

in a fully organized way?

The first difficulty is that the actors involved, the EU and

the United States, are of different character. The EU with its

Common Foreign and Security Policy still is an intergovernmental

framework with its odd moments of "communitarianism." The United

States represents an integrated structure (where certainly

indecisiveness and lack of coordination are constant features),

but with the constant potential for structuring decisive

guidance. This situation brings about a structural tendency for

frictions and misunderstandings.

A second problem is that a bilateral structure renders

NATO's political fora obsolete. A new structure, which reflects

this bilateralism, would be the logical consequence. This

structure might be based on similar regulations like the EU-U.S.

bilateral talks based on the agreement of 1990.29 This might

encourage a tendency to regard NATO solely as a military "tool

box"; a trend which was advanced by the agreement during NATO's

January 1994 summit that WEU should have access to NATO assets,

including Combined/Joint Task Force structures. One may argue

that bureaucratic inertia may give NATO a good chance to survive

with such a limited function. My view, however, is that NATO

could hardly stay alive if the military structures are not

embedded into a functioning political framework which is able to

create the necessary political consensus for possible military

actions. Hence, there is a need for a consensus-stimulating

institutional framework in which political procedures are able to

overcome, at least to a certain extent, the differences of

interest between the nations involved.

Despite all talk of an independent West European capability

for regional actions beyond NATO, there is no doubt that the West

European countries will be unable to mobilize the resources

necessary to realize this option in the near future. The reason

for this is due in part to a lack of combat force multipliers in

such key areas as command, control, communication and

intelligence, as well as in the field of strategic transport.

This will hardly change at a time when almost all countries want

to enjoy a peace dividend.30 Taking into account the likely need

to address the issue of anti-ballistic missile defense, a very
9

costly proposition, reasonable doubts about far-reaching European

independence of military action exist. This might explain why

France is still ready to accept NATO's existence and to exploit,

like in the case of Bosnia, its capabilities. Nevertheless, the

impression prevails that France continues to try to downgrade the

Alliance's political (and military) functions as far as possible

and to bypass NATO's political structure by putting much more

emphasis on other fora and even on a prosperous bilateral

French-American relationship.31

ENDNOTES

1. With regard to this view on French politics, see Michael

Meimeth, "France Gets to NATO," The World Today, Vol. 50, No. 5,

May 1994, pp. 84-85; and, Philip H. Gordon, Die

Deutsch-Französische Partnerschaft und die Atlantische Allianz,

Arbeitspapiere zur internationalen Politik (Europa-Union Verlag

Bonn) 1994. For the official view see Wolfgang Ischinger,

"Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Thesen zur

deutsch-französischen Vorreiterrolle" in Ingo Kolboom, ed.,

Frankreich in Europa: ein deutsch-französischer Rundblick (Europa

Union Verlag, Bonn) 1993.

2. The decisive sentences in the declaration of the NATO

Summit Meeting are:

We support strengthening the European pillar of the

Alliance through the Western European Union, which

is being developed as the defence component of the

European Union. The Alliance's organization and

resources will be adjusted so as to validate this. .

. . We therefore stand ready to make collective

assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of

consultations in the North Atlantic Council for WEU

operations undertaken by the European Allies in

pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy.

See "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government

Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council,"

January 10-11, 1994, Bruxelles, NATO Press Service, Press

Communique M-1(94)3, January 11, 1994.

3. This group is much more diverse than the first one. Major

elements of the "ideal typus" can be found in: Erich Hauser,

"Geschicktes Fingerspiel auf vier Klavieren" in Frankfurter

Rundschau, June 8, 1993, p. 7; Roland Höhne, "Frankreichs

Stellung in der Welt. Weltmacht oder Mittelmacht" in Aus Politik

und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament, B

47-48/91, November 15, 1991, pp. 37-46; and, Peter Schmidt,

"French Security Policy Ambitions," Aussenpolitik, No. 4, 1993,

pp. 334-343.

4. See "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government

Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council"; and,
10

"Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the North

Atlantic Council, Istanbul", June 9, 1994, Bruxelles, NATO Press

Service, Press Communique M-NAC-1(94)46, June 9, 1994.

5. See "Concluding Document of the Inaugural Conference for

a Pact on Stability in Europe", Paris, May 26-27, 1994.

6. Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper on the Security

of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future

of the Bundeswehr, Bonn, April 5, 1994, p. 50.

7. See Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the

Federal Government, Bonn, No. 68, June 23, 1992, pp. 649-655.

8. For a critical assessment of the capacity of the WEU

Planning Cell, see Assembly of the Western European Union, The

WEU Planning Cell, Document 1421, 19th May 1994, First Part,

Fortieth Ordinary Session, Report submitted on behalf of the

Defence Committee by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Rapporteur.

9. The WEU has the authority to activate operational

headquarters in case there is a real need for one. Nevertheless,

the WEU has to draw on existing NATO staffs to do so in an

efficient way.

10. This includes the creation of a Planning Cell, the

establishment of a Satellite Centre for the interpretation of

satellite data and meetings of the Chiefs of Defense Staff at

least twice a year before the Ministerial Councils of WEU.

11. Nevertheless, the member countries have only reluctantly

made "forces answerable to WEU" (FAWEU). Currently FAWEU consists

of the EUROCORPS (French, German, Belgian and Spanish forces),

the Multinational Division Center (Belgian, British, Dutch and

German units), and the UK-Netherlands amphibious force.

12. The Lemnitzer-Ailleret agreement of 1967 was the first

agreement made between the French Chief of Defense Staff and the

SACEUR after France left the NATO military integrated command

structure. This agreement served as the basis for the possible

participation of French forces in the defense of Germany and

clarified in a detailed manner the specific role French forces

could play in a war in Germany (reserve function), specific

military operations which French forces would be ready to

undertake in case of a Warsaw Pact attack, and the command and

control arrangements in this case.

13. Following the "Rome Declaration on Peace and

Cooperation," Issued by the Heads of State and Government

participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome,

November 7-8, 1991, Bruxelles, NATO Press Service, Press

Communique S-1(91)86, November 8, 1991.

14. The creation of an international environment providing a
11

positive framework for unification represented an outstanding

German interest. This included the implementation of the treaty

on conventional disarmament.

15. See George Bush, Speech at the Rheingold-Halle Mainz,

May 31, 1989.

16. For greater details for this period see Peter Schmidt,

"Partners and Rivals: NATO, WEU, EC and the Reorganization of

European Security Policy: Taking Stock" in Peter Schmidt, ed., In

the Midst of Change: Approaches to West European Security and

Defence Cooperation (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992) pp. 187-228.

17. See the Kirchberg Declaration of WEU of May 9, 1994.

18. Nevertheless, the hope is that a self-selecting process

will take place, thereby limiting the number of participants in

this program.

19. A RAND study came to the following conclusions:

The modest systems of the low case ($27 billion over

25 years) provide some independent capability, but

for many uses, they will require the aid of robust

U.S. systems to minimize risk. The high case ($95

billion over 25 years) will provide more robustness,

but even this will not match the level of US

robustness . . . . Thus, the question becomes

whether the greater capability afforded by the high

case is worth the 150 percent cost increase over the

low case.

M.B. Berman and G.M. Carter, The Independent European Force.

Costs of Independence, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, Project AIR FORCE,

Arroyo Center, National Defense Research Institute, 1993.

20. These principles are: nonparticipation in NATO's

military integration, free disposition of French forces on French

territory, independence of the French nuclear force, independent

assessment of crisis situations including the independent choice

of means to cope with the crisis. See Ministère de la Défense,

Livre Blanc sur la Défense, 1994, Paris, Service d'Information et

de Relations Publiques des Armées, p. 37. See as well the

statement by President Mitterrand reported under the title: "Le

nouveau "ni-ni" de François Mitterrand" in Le Figaro (Paris),

January 10, 1994.

21. See Strategic Outreach Conference Report, The Western

European Union in the 1990s: Searching for a Role, SSI Special

Report, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic

Studies Institute, May 6, 1993.

22. See White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic

of Germany, p. 54.
12

23. See Assembly of the Western European Union, An

Operational Organization for WEU: Naval and Maritime

Co-operation, Document 1415, 10th May 1994, Fortieth Ordinary

Session (First Part), Report submitted on behalf on the Defence

Committee by Sir Keith Speed, Rapporteur, p. 6.

24. See Livre Blanc sur la Défense, p. 42.

25. At the same time, however, France seems to stand back

from the idea favored by the German government to integrate the

WEU into the EU in 1998. The Livre Blanc gives a clear indication

for the French approach of a flexible bi- and multilateralism

(see especially p. 32) with regard to defense policy.

26. See the Croatian-Muslim Agreements under the sponsorship

of the United States, signed March, 1, 1994. U.S. Policy

Information and Texts, No. 25, March 3, 1994.

27. See, for example, the EU's action plan of November 1993

in Atlantic News, No. 2573, November 24, 1993, p. 2.

28. For a detailed elaboration of this thesis, see my

article, "French Security Policy Ambitions," pp. 335-343.

29. See Declaration on EC-US Relations, Europe Documents,

No. 1622, November 23, 1990.

30. Only France plans to increase slightly its military

expenditures in the years to come. All other European states will

experience substantial cuts in defense expenditures.

31. See, for example, the report on the French-American

"rapprochement" in the case of Serbia in Le Figaro, February

1994, p. 4.