### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A pr il 5, 200 5

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. BOBB Y N ELSON

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Sequ atchie County No. 4270 Thomas W. G raham , Judge

No. M2004- 01720-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Jun e 9, 2005

T h e D e f e n d a n t , B o b b y N e l s o n , u p o n h i s p l e a o f g u i l t y, w a s c o n v i c t e d o f

ar s o n , a C l a s s C f

e l o n y. Pursuant to the plea a g ree ment, the trial court was to establish the l eng th and manner of se rvice of the Def endant’ s sentence . The sente nce f or ar son was to be se rved c oncurr en t l y wi t h another

s en t en ce t h e D ef

en d an twa s al re ad y

s er v i n g fo r pr i o r co n v i ct i o n s

. Fo l l o wi n g a s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g, the trial court found the De fenda nt was a R an ge I , standard of fende r, sentenc ed him to four and a half y ear s, and orde red the Def endant se rve his e ntire sentenc e with the Te nnessee Depa rtment of Correc tion ( TDOC). On appea l, the Def endant a rg ues two issues pertaining to se ntencing : (1) the trial court e rre d by

imposing an e x cessive se ntence , and (2) the trial court e rre d in de ny ing pr obation

or a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing . We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., and J. C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.

B. Jeffe ry Harmon, Assistant P ublic Def ender
, J asper , Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, B obby

Nelson.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Mic ha e l Ma rk ha m, A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; and J. Mi chae l Tay lor, District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

F AC TS

Acc ording to the State’s re prese ntations at the plea acc eptanc e hea ring , the fa cts surrounding the of fe ns e a t is su e in this c a se c a n b e su mma ri zeda s f oll ow s:

The State would be showing that on Fe bruary t h e 14th, 2003, a business known as Signal Mountain Auto Sales, whic h was owne d by W i l l i e Goi ns was dama g ed byW h ile th e c a se a t issu e inv o lve s o n ly o n e c o n v ic tio n fo r ar so n in S e q u a tc h ie C o u n ty, the re c o rd re v e a ls this 1

c o n v ic tio n s te m m e d fro m a “ c rim e s p re e ” in w h ic h the D e fen d a n t co m m itt e d o the r a rs o n s, va n d a lism , an d m u lti p le the fts

a n d se t f ire to p e rs o n a l p ro p e rty a ll w ithin a few w e e k s’ tim e

. A t t h e se n te n c ing he a rin g , t h e D e fen d a n t, thr o u g h c o u n se l, di d not deny hi s offens e wa s par t of a “ cr i me s pree ” but pre fer r ed t hat i t be t er med “ a mes s of t r oubl e. ”

-2- fire. T he fire was started inside the building, c aused a ppare ntly pretty extensive damag e to them. That Hamilton County detec tives were investigating other arsons
a ndthe y c on du c te d a n inte rv ie w of Mr . Ne lso n, that af te r ad vis ing him

of his ri g hts

e t c ete ra he a dmi tte d to a

-- so me c ri min a l a c tiv ity in H a mil ton Cou nty . H e a lso

a dv ise d th a t he a nda no the r i nd ivi du a l br ok e int o th e Jame s Sh e ll A uto loc a te d in S eq u at ch i e Countywhich wa s owned by Mr. Goins, and set the pla ce on f ire. He said that they

started the f

ire by p o u ri n g gasol ine on the wa ll heater inside the bu sin e ss. Th a t pr oo f w ou ld s ho w that th e bu sin e ss s uf fe re d e xten siv e da ma g e a s a result of the f

ire.

The De fenda nt confirmed the above f acts we re true

.

I n May of 2003, the De fenda nt was indicted by a Sequatchie County g rand jury for one count of ar son. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-14- 301. I n April of 2004, the De fenda n t en t er ed a p l ea of

1
g uilty to one count of arson, and ag ree d to be sentenc ed by the trial court. At the plea he aring , the

c ou rt fo un d th a t th e De fe nd a nt u nd e rs too d th e c on sti tut ion a l ri g hts he wa ive d by e nte ri ng a g uil ty ple a , a ndha d don e so bo th kno wi ng ly a nd vo lun tari ly

. Th e c ou rt a c c e pte d th e De fe nd a nt’ s g uil ty plea a nd convicted the Def endant of one count of

Class C felony

arson.

I n May of 2004, a se ntencing hearing w as conducted t o determine both the leng th and manner of service of the Def

endant’ s sentenc e. At this he aring
, Annette Millwood, the D efe ndant’s mother, testified that t he Defenda nt had a long history of alcohol abuse “ from a y oung ag e.” She a lso stated that she believe d he was sorry for his c riminal activity and was ref orming his w ay s. She noted that afte r ser ving a

y ear in “the pen,” the Def

endant “ learnt [ sic] a lesson beca use he - - it rea lly

scar ed him .” Ms. Mil lw oo d a lso a dmi tte d th a t sh e ha d ta ke n s te ps wi th h e r s on be fo re to t ry a ndke e p h im out of trouble, with little success.

Ms. Amy Sanders, the D efe ndant’s aunt, testified that the Def endant was helpful and “g ood he art e d. ” He wa s g oo d w ith c hil dr e n, a ndsh e wo uld ha ve no he sit a tio n in a llo wi ng him to b aby sit her thre e childre n. She also stated that she w ould help the De fe n d an t at t end any court-or dere d reha bilitation programs or counseli n g should he be g rante d some form of a lternative se ntencing . The Def endant’ s uncle, Mr. Sande rs, also testified at the sen te n c in g h earing, stating that he would employ the Def endant in his tree trimming business as soon as the Def endant wa s relea sed fr om prison.

The De fenda nt testified at the sente ncing hearing that h e “a cts diffe rent” when unde r the influence of alc ohol. He said that he was sorry for what he did, that he conf essed e verything to the po lic e , a nd that he wa nte d a no the r c ha nc e to p ro ve heha s r e fo rm e d. Th e De fe nd a nt s ta te d th a t w hil e in prison he attende d alcohol abuse and ang er ma n age m en t prog rams and w as involved in churc h-3-

a c tiv iti e s. He fu rthe r s ta te d th a t he ha d p la c e d h ims e lf in “ Go d’ s h a nd s, ” and was “try ing to straig hten up.” On cross-e x amination, the Def endant admitted that he knew the victims of his arson be c a us e he ha d ob ta ine d a c ar fr om the m, a nd a “ c ou ple of mon ths la te r” the tr a ns mis sio n w e nt o ut. As fo r his oth e r fi re -r e la te d of fe ns e s, the De fe nd a nt a dmi tte d that he bu rn e d d ow n h is f ri e nd ’s ho us e beca use he w as ang ry

at him, and he burned his ex-gir lfriend’ s father ’s truck to de stroy evidenc e of his theft. He also admitted that he ha d rec eived a lcohol and drug counseling befor e as a juvenile.

At the conc lusion of the sentenc ing hearing, the trial court de termined that the D efe ndant was

a Ra ng e I
, st and ard of

fe nd e r. Sta

rt ing a t th e min imu m w ith in the statut ory rang e of thr e e to s ix y ear s, t h e trial court found three enhanc ement fa ctors applica ble and e nhance d the Def endant’ s
se nte nc e by

tw o y e ars . H ow e ve r, the c ou rt fo un d tw o mi tig a tin g fa c tor s a pp lic able , a lth ou g h w ith littl e we ight, a nd reduc ed the se ntence by six months thereby

imposing an e ffe ctive sentenc e of f our and a ha lf y ear s. The trial court denied both pr obation and alternative sentenc ing, and order ed the Def endant to ser ve his sentenc e in the TDO C. The Def endant timely

filed a notice of appe al.

AN AL YSI S On appe al, the Def

endant claims the trial court err ed in imposing an excessive sentenc e and in deny ing him probation or other alternative sente ncing . Specifica lly , the Def endant claims that the trial court failed to apply

two mitigating fac tors and misapplied seve ral e nhance ment fac tors. The De fe nd a nt a lso arg ue s th a t he sh ou ld h a ve re c e ive d pro batio n be c a us e he c a n b e re ha bil itate d, or

in the alternative, he should not have been se ntence d to total confinement. The Def endant a sserts that he wa s a pr e su mpt ive c a nd idate fo r an a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc e , a nd the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in fi nd ing his

case met criteria which ne g ated this presumption. We disag ree

.
I. Stand ard of Review Be fore a trial court imposes a sentenc e upon a convic ted criminal defenda nt, it mus t consider (a) the evidenc e adduc ed at the trial and the sentencing hearing; ( b) the pre -sentenc e re port; (c) the principles of se ntencing and ar g uments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (d) the nature and char acte ristics of the criminal conduct involved; (e) evidenc e and inf ormation offe red by

the parties on the enha nceme nt and mitigating fac tors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated sec tions 40-35- 113 and 40-35- 114; and (f) any statement the de fenda n t wi s h es to make in the def endant’ s own behalf about s entenc ing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(b); State v. I mfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 704 (T e nn . 2 00 2) . T o f

a cil it ate app e llate re vie w, the tr ia l c ou rt is r e qu ir e d to pla c e on the re c or d it s
rea sons for imposin g t h e specific sente nce, inc luding the ide ntification of the mitigating a nd enhanc ement fa ctors found, the specific fac ts supporting e ach e nhance ment fac tor fo u n d
, an d the

me tho d b y

wh ic h th e mitigatin g an d en ha nc e me nt f a c tor s h a ve be e n e va luate d a ndba la nc e d in determining the se ntence . See State v. Samuels, 44 S.W.3d 489, 492 (Tenn. 2001).

When a convicte d defe ndant challeng es t he manner of service of a sentence , this Court has a duty to conduct a de novo revie w of the se ntence with a presumption that the determinations made by the tr ia l c ou rt

are c or re c t. S e e Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ). Ho we ve r, thi s p re su mpt ion “ is conditioned upon the aff

irmative showing in the rec ord that the trial court considere d the sentenc ing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances.” State v. Ashby
, 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn.-4-

1991). I f our r eview refle cts that the t rial court followed the statutory sentenc ing proce dure, that the court imposed a lawf

u l s entenc e af

ter ha ving g iven due c onsideration and pr oper w eig ht to the fac tors and princ iples set out under the se ntencing law, and that the trial court’ s findings of fac t are adequately

supported by

the re cord, the n the pre sumption i s applicable , and we may not modify the sentenc e eve n if we w ould have pr efe rre d a diffe rent re sult. S ee State v. F letcher , 805 S.W . 2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) . We will uphold t he sente nce imposed by the trial court if (1) the sentenc e complies with the purpose s and principles of the 1989 Sentencing Act, and ( 2 ) t h e trial

c o u r t’ s f in d in g s ar e a d e q u a te ly s u p p o r te d b y th e r e c o r d

. Se e St a te v

. A r n e tt , 4 9 S.W.3d 250, 257 (Tenn. 2001) . The burde n of showing that a sentenc e is imprope r is upon the appe aling party . See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401 Sentenc ing Commission Com ments; Arnett, 49 S.W.3d at 257.

The pre sentenc e re port ref lects that at the time of sentenc ing the Def endant wa s twenty -two y e ars olda ndun marrie d. He ha s a c hil d f ro m a prior re la tio ns hip
, wh om h e state d h e he lps su pp ort, althoug h no support order has eve r bee n enter ed. He dropped out of sc hool in the tenth g rade . He do e s n ot h a ve a

his tory of ste a dy e mpl oyme nt.

II. Excessive Sentence I n c a lc ulatin g a

se nte nc e fo r a Cla ss C f

e lon y c on vic tio n, the “ pr e su mpt ive se nte nc e

. . . s ha ll be the minimums e n te n c e in th e r a n g e if th e r e ar e n o e n h a n c e me n t o r mi ti g a ti n g f

a c to r s

. ” T e n n. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( c). I f there are enhanc ement, but no mitigating fac tors, the trial court may set the sentenc e above the m i n i m um, but sti ll within t he ra ng e. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35- 210(d). A se ntence involving both enha nceme nt and mitigating fac tors for a Class C felony require s the cour t t o s ta

r t at th e mi n imu m, n e xt a s s ig n th e p r o p e r w e ig h t f o r a n y ap p li c ab le e n h a n c ement fac tor(s), a nd finally

apply a reduc tion within the rang e as a ppropriate for a ny

mitigating fac tor(s). See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(e)

. T h e s entenc e for a Class C felony

as a Rang e I , standard offe nder is “not less than thr ee ( 3) nor more than s ix (6) y ear s.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-112(a )(3)

. There fore , the Def

endant’ s presumptive sentence for hi s Class C felony conviction for arson is the min imu m in the rang e , o r th ree y ear s. Th e De fe nd a nt n ow c la ims his se nte nc e wa s impr op e rl y enhanc ed and not a

ppropriate ly

mitigated.

A. Enh ancem ent F actor s Whil e no t e nti re ly

c le ar, the De fe nd a nt s e e ms t o a rgue that th e tr ia l c ou rt

imp ro pe rl y enhanc ed his sentenc e by finding he h as a “pr evious history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior .” See T enn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 2). The D efe ndant ar g ues that, contra ry to the trial

c ou rt ’s c on c lus ion , h e do e s no t ha ve a “ lon g his tory of c ri min a l c on du c t a s a n a du lt, ” bu t rathe r a ll of his “ criminal conduct occur red in a short period of time.” We note that the Def endant doe s not have an extremely long history of criminal conduct as an adult; howeve r, he has been an adult for only a fe w y ear s. Nonethele ss, in the four y ear s since tur n i n g age e ighte en, the De fenda nt has

ma na g e d to ob ta in n o l ess than te n c ri min a l c on vic tio ns . We fi nd the tr ia l c ou rt

didno t e rr

in enhanc ing the Def

endant’ s sentence based upon his pre vious criminal history . This issue is without merit.-5-

The De fenda nt also claims that the trial court err ed b y enhancing his sentence based upon its own findings of f

act that the “ amount of dama g e to prope rty . . . taken f

rom th e v i ct i m was particula rly g reat,” and he has “a previous history of unwillingne ss to comply with the conditions of a se ntence involving re lease in the community .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 7) and (9). The Def endant a rg ues that his Six th Amendment rig ht to a trial by jury was impu gn ed wh en the trial court made determinations of fac t for sentence enhanc ement purposes that were not submit ted to a jury or admitted by

him, citing B lakely

v. Washingt o n , 1 2 4

. S .Ct. 2531 (2004). Howe ver, our supreme court has r ece ntly held that the enhanceme nt component of Te nnessee ’s sentenc ing structure does not violate a defe n dant’s Six th Amendment rig ht to a trial by jury . See State v. Go me z, _

__ S.W. 3d

__

_, No . M 20 02 -0 12 09 -S C- R 1 1

- C D
, 2 0 0 5 W L 8 5 6 8 4 8 ( T e n n

. , N a s h v i l l e , A p ri l 15, 2005). Rather , our supreme court he ld that Tennesse e’s se ntencing structure “mer ely require s jud g e s to c on sid er enh a nc e me nt f a c tor s, ” a ndun lik e the se nte nc ing g uid e lin e s st ru c k d ow n in Blakely , “does not mandate an i ncre ased sentence upon a judge’ s finding of an enhanceme nt fac tor.” Gomez, ___ S.W .3d at___, 2005 WL 856848, at *20. Thus, re ly ing on B lakely as cla rified by States v. Booke r, __ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), our supreme court has determined that Tenne ssee’ s sentenc ing struc ture provide s the type of “ ‘intermediate, ’ non-mandatory , advisory sentenc ing scheme ” that the United States Supre me Court has ex p re s s ly ruled a cce ptable, ther eby permitting judge s to ex erc ise the ty

pe of se ntenc i n g discretion applied in the c ase at hand. Gomez at * 20. There fore , the Def

endant’ s claim of a Sixt h Amendment rig ht v i o l at i on based on the trial court’ s
e nh a nc e me nt o f h is s e nte nc e is w ith ou t me ri t
B. Mitigating Fac tors The De fenda nt also arg ues that t he trial c ourt err ed whe n it declined to apply two mitigating fac tors and fa iled to reduc e his sentenc e ac cording ly . We no t e t h e t rial court did reduce the Def endant’ s sentence by

six months because it found t hat he lacke d judgme nt due to his y oung ag e, and he ha d assisted the authorities by implicating his co- defe ndant in the ar son. See Tenn. Code A n n

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 3 ( 6 ) a n d ( 9 )

. H o w e v e r , th e D e f e n d a n t n o w ar g u e s th a t h is s e n te n c e s h ould have be e n f urthe r r e du ced becaus e his “ c ri min a l c on du c t ne ith e r c a us e d n or thr e a te ne d s e ri ou s b od ily injury ,” and beca

use he had attended alcohol abuse and a ng er ma nag ement cla sses while in prison. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 113(1) a nd (13).

The trial c ourt was pr esente d with the Def endant’ s arg uments as to mitigating fac tors (1) a nd (13) a nd reje cted both. We fi n d t h at fa ctor (1) would not be applica ble considering the inhere nt da ng e r i n s e tti ng fi re to a bu ild ing

. Ce rt a inl y , a

fi re of su c h ma g nitud e thr e a te ns bo dil y inj ury to unknown persons that may have been in the building, persons ne arby , and the e merg ency personne l who must respond to the fire . We conclude the trial court did not er r in dec li n i n g t o m i t igate the Def endant’ s sentence based on f actor (1), that his crime did not threaten se rious bodily injury

.
Whil e a tr ia l c ourt mayc on sid e r v ari ou s f a c ts a ndc ir c ums ta nc e s u nd e r the “ c a tc h a ll” provision of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-113(13), it is not require d to consider suc h fa c tor s. Se e Sta te v. Willi a ms, 92 0 S. W.2 d 2 47 , 2 61 (T e nn . Crim . App . 199 5) . M or e ov e r, we no te that the Def

endant admitted he also rec eived drug and alcohol abuse counseling sever al y ear s prior to these crimes while in juvenile detention, y et he continues t o drink to excess and commit criminal-6-

of fe ns e s. Th e De fe nd a nt h a s f a ile d to c on vin c e us that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in de c lin ing to m iti g a te his sentence due to his attendanc e of alc ohol abuse a nd ang er ma nag ement cla sses while in prison for prior criminal convic tions. This i ssue has no merit.

III. Manner of S ervic e The De fenda nt al s o ar gu es t h at t he trial c ourt err ed in denying him probation, and in the alternative, err ed in denying him alternative sente ncing . We disag ree

.
A. Denial of Probation A d e fe nd a nt i s e li gibl e fo r p ro batio n if the a c tua l se nte nc e imp os e d u po n th e de fe nd a nt i s eig ht y ear s or less and the of fense for whic h the defendant is sentenc ed is not specific ally excluded by statute. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 303(a) . The tr i al court shall automatica lly consider probation as a

sentenc ing a lternative f

or elig ible defe ndan ts ; h o w e v e r , th ed e f e ndant bea

rs the burde n of pr ov ing his or

he r s uit abil ity

fo r p ro batio n. Se e id. § 40 -35 -30 3(b) . N o c ri min a l de fe nd a nt i s automatically

entitled to probation as a m att er of law. See id. § 40- 35-303(b) , Sentencing Commi ssion Com ments; St ate v. Da vis, 940 S.W .2d 558, 559 (Tenn. 1997)

. Rather, the de fenda nt must demonstrate that probation would serve the e nds of justice and the best interests of both the public and the de fenda nt. See State v. Souder, 105 S.W.3d 602, 607 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).

I n determining whe ther to g rant probation, the court m u s t consider the nature a nd circ umstances of

the offe nse; the def

endant’ s cr iminal recor d; his or her ba ckg round and soc ial his tory ; hi s o r h e r p re se nt c on dit ion , b othph y sic a l a nd me nta l; the de te rr e nt e ff e c t on the de fe nd a nt;

a ndthe de fe nd a nt’ s p ote nti a l f or re ha bil itatio n o r t

re a tme nt. Se e id. I f the c ou rt de te rm ine s th a t a period of pr obation is appropriate, it shall sent en ce the def endant to a spe cific se ntence but then suspend that sentenc e and pla ce the defe ndant on supervise d or unsuper vised probation either immediately

or af ter the se rvice of a period of confine ment. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40- 35-303(c ), -306(a ).

We beg in by noting that the Defenda nt is elig ible for pr obation. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-303(a ). Howe ver, the Def endant ha s failed to demonstrate that probation would both serve the ends of justice a nd would be in the best interests of the public and the Def endant. See Souder, 105 S.W .3d at 607. The tria l c ourt found that “[p] robation has not be en very succe ssful over the y ear s with this defendant. He just has had problems com p l y i n g an d s o I don’t think probation is --

certainly straig ht probation is not involved here.” The re cord r evea ls that the Defe ndant has violated the ter m s o f pre vious periods of proba tion on numerous occa sions. I n 2002, his probation was revoke d, and he w as plac ed under house ar rest. The Def

endant then “c u t o ff h is ankle bra cele t

mon ito r, thu s a lso vio la tin g his ho us e arr e st. ” I n 20 03
, the De fe nd a nt vio la te d p ro batio n tw o ti me s. Additionally , the re cord r evea ls the Defe ndant violated probation twice as a juvenile.

I n short, the evidenc e contained in the rec ord is sufficie nt to justify denial of probation; the Def endant ha s an extensive criminal re cord, his bac kg round re veals his mother has tried to pre vent his criminal activity

to no a vail, and probation has provided no deter renc e for the Def

endant in the-7-

past. Thus he has demonstrated remar kably littl e potential for

reha bilitation. According ly , we f ind the trial court did not err in denying the Def endant pr obation. This issue has no merit.

B. D e nia l of A lt e r nat iveSe nt e nc ing A def endant who does not posse ss a criminal history showing a cle ar disre g ard f or society ’s laws and mora ls, who has not failed pa st rehabilitation eff orts, and who “is an e specia lly mitigated

or sta nd ardof

fe nd e r c on vic te d o f a

Cla ss C , D , o r Efe lon y

is p re su me d to be a

fa vo ra ble c a nd idate for a lternative se ntencing options in t he abse nce of evidenc e to the contrary .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102( 6). See a lso St ate v. F ields
, 4 0 S

. W

. 3 d 4 35, 440 (Tenn. 2001) . The following

c on sid e ratio ns pr ov ide g uid a nc e re g ard ing wh a t c on sti tut e s “ e vid e nc e to the c on tr ary ” wh ic h w ou ld

re b u tt h e p re s u m p t i o n o f a l t er n at i v e s en t en ci n g:
(A) Confine ment is nece ssary to protect socie ty

by restra ining a defe ndant who has

a lon g his tory

of c ri min a l c on du c t; (B ) Confinement is nece ssary to avoid depreciating the se riousness of the of fense or
c on fi ne me nt i s p art ic ula

rl y su ite d to pr ov ide a n e ff

e c tiv e de te rr e nc e to oth e rs lik e ly to commit si milar offe nses; or (C) Mea sures less re strictive than conf inement have fre quentlyor re cently been applied unsucc essfully

to the defe ndant[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-103(1) ; see a lso St ate v. Hoope r, 29 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2000).

Additionally , the principles of sentenc ing ref lect that the sentenc e should be no g reater than that deser ved for

the offe nse committed and should be the least sever e measure nece ssary to achieve the purposes f

or which the sentenc e is imposed. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 103(2), ( 4 ). The court should a lso c onsider the defe ndant’s potential for reha bilitation or treatment in d et er m i n i ng the appr opriate se ntence . See id. § 40-35-103( 5).

The Def endant was convicted as a Rang e I
, standard offe nder of a Class C fel o n y , an d we acknow ledg e the presumption that he is a favorable candidate for alternative sentenc ing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 2 ( 6 )

. H o w e v e r , th e tria l c o u r t p r o p e r ly f o u n d th a t d e n ia l o f

a lt e r n a ti ve
se nte nc ing wa s a

pp ro pria te up on c on sid e ratio n o f the thr e e se nte nci ng guidel ine s p e rt a ini ng to sentenc es of c onfinement.

First, the c ourt found that the Def endant’ s confineme nt was nec essary to protect socie ty

from an individual with a

long history

of criminal conduct. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 103(1)( A). The

e vid e nc e c on ta ine d in the re c or d sup po rt s this c on c lus ion . T he De fe nd a nt, no w i n h is e arl y tw e nti e s, has no less than ten c riminal convictions collecte d in only four y ear s’ time. These inc lude seve n mis de me a no r c on vic ti on s fo r o ff e ns e s su c h a s p ub lic int oxic a tio n, va nd a lis m, ande va din g arr e st. Ho we ve r, the De fe nd a nt’ s c ri min a l a c tiv ity has in creasedin i ts s e ve ri ty a s h e ha s a g e d, a ndhis

rec ord now include s three r ece nt felony convictions for a

rson, theft ove r $1 0
, 0 0 0 , and setting fire to personal pr operty . The c ourt noted that it is “hard to have a long history when y ou’re 21 y ear s oldor 22 y e ars old , b ut h e do e s. ” Ad dit ion a lly , the reco rd reve a ls that th e De fe nd a nt h a d at le a st-8-

twelve juvenile a djudications betwee n the y ear s of 1996 to 1999. The trial court concluded that the Def endant ha d a “ve ry

strong rec ord with reg ard to c rim i n al co n d u ct , so that certainly arg ues for incar cer ation.” We find the re cord supports the court’s c onclusion that the Defendant ha s a long history of criminal conduct, and ther efor e inca rce ration is nece ssary

to protect the public.

Second, the tria l court found the D efe n d an t s hould be conf ined to avoid depr eciating the seriousness of the offe nse. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 4 0-35-103( 1)(B ). The c ourt noted that the Def endant’ s offe nse wa s “about a s serious an of fense as y ou can g et, a pe rs o n al attack on somebody ’s business, livelihood, burning some thing down of that nature , that’s serious. That’s

rea lly serious . . . .” The court a lso noted that the Def endant ha d burned struc t u re s and per sonal property befor e, further hi g h li g h ti n g the nee d to avoid depre cating the seriousne ss of the De fenda nt’s crime in this case

.
The De fenda nt arg ues on appe al that there was no proof that his crime of arson r ose to the level of “ ‘espe cially

violent, horrif

y i n g, s h o cking , repr ehensible, of fensive or

otherwise of

an excessive or e x ag g erated deg ree ,’ and the nature of t he offense must outweig h all fac tors favoring probation,” c iting State v. C leavor
, 691 S.W .2d 541, 543 (Tenn. 1985). Howeve r, as the trial court stated for the re cord, the Def

endant ha d on more than one occas i o n b u rn ed down the home or business of a pe rson he wa s ang ry with. His offense in this case is ce rtainly a re prehe n s i b l e and offe nsive crime appar ently trig g ere d by dissatisfaction over a used car

. As the trial court noted, the Def endant’ s crime thre atene d the livelihood o f t h e v ictims as well as the lives of those in the community

and those e merg ency

personne l force d to fig ht the fire. We f ind th e fa ct s and circ umstances of

the Def endant’ s crime we re se rious

. Ac cordingly , the re cord supports the trial court’s f inding that a

sentenc e of confine ment is ne cessa ry to a void de prec ating the seriousness of the Def endant’ s offe nse. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 103(1)( B)

. Finally , the t ri al co urt found that mea sures less re strictive than conf inement had be en fre quently

or re ce n t l y ap p l i ed unsuccessfully to the Def

endant. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35- 103(1)( C). As noted above , the record r evea ls the Defe ndant violated the terms of his probation or house ar rest no less than f

our times in the few y ear s he has a ccumulate d his adult criminal rec ord, and violated pr obation twice as a juvenile. Thus, we f ind the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support the trial court’ s conclusion that m easur es l ess restrictive than confinement have proved unsuc cessf ul for the Def endant in the pa st, and a sente nce of confine ment is theref

ore a ppropriate

.

Th e De fe nd a nt a lso arg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt c omm itt e d a Blak ely e rr or wh e n it ma de its own finding s relate d to the imposit ion of a sente nce of confine ment rathe r than submitt ing the issue to a j ury

. As stated above, our supre me court has rec ently held that Tenne ssee’ s sentencing structure does not trig g er a

Blakely violatio n , t h er efore this claim is also without merit. See Gomez, ___ S.W. 3d

__

_ ( Te nn . 2 00 5) . We a lso no te that even pri or to our su pr e me c ou rt ’s re c e nt r uli ng in Gomez, this court had held that B lakely ap plied only

to the leng th of a sente nce, and not to the

man n e r o f s e r v ic e

. Se e St a te v

. E ar ic e R oberts, N o

. W2 0 0 3

- 0 2 6 6 8

- CC A

- R3

- CD
, 2 0 0 4 WL 2715316, at *12 (Te nn. Crim. App., J ackson, N ov. 23, 2004).-9-

Ad dit ion a lly , a ft e r c on sid e ri ng the De fe nd a nt’ s e xten siv e c ri min a l hi sto ry , we fi ndhis

se nte nc e of

c on fi ne me nt i n th is c a se is not g re a te r tha n th a t de se rv e d f or the of fe ns e , a ndis the le a st

sever e mea sure ne cessa

ry to ac h i ev e t h e purpose of his sentenc e. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35- 10 3( 2)
, (4 ). Mo re ov e r, the De fe nd a nt’ s e xten siv e c ri min a l his tory e arn e d in on ly a fe w y e ars , a s w e ll as multiple probation violations, both i ndicate a clea r lac k of pot ential for reha bilitation. S ee T enn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 103(5).

We find the Def

endant’ s ext ensive c riminal history , the seriousne ss of his curre nt offense as
we ll a s h is p ro pe ns ity to c omm it e ve r mor e se ri ou s c ri me s, a ndhis failu re to s uc c e ssf ull y c omp le te previous forms of alternative sentenc ing, a ll support the trial court’s impositi o n o f a sentence of confine ment. Acc o rd i n gl y , t he trial c ourt did not err in de ny ing the Def endant a lternative sentenc ing. T his issue is without merit.

CO NC LU SION F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e fi nd the tr ia l c ou rt did no t e rr in i ts d e te rm inatio n o f the le ng th of the De fenda nt’s sentenc e or the manner in w hich it is to be served. Thejudgme nt of the trial court is affirme d.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE