SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1608-19

CLIFFORD GRAF,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE

PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent.

Submitted March 22, 2021 – Decided May 13, 2021

Before Judges Sabatino and Currier.

On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.

Clifford Graf, appellant pro se.

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Suzanne Davies, Deputy Attorney 

General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant Clifford Graf appeals from the final administrative decision of 

the New Jersey State Parole Board (Board), denying parole and setting a thirtysix-month future eligibility term (FET). We affirm. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-1608-19

In 1986, appellant was convicted by a jury of two counts of murder and 

other offenses and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment with a minimum 

parole ineligibility period of thirty-two years. While incarcerated, appellant 

committed twenty-five disciplinary infractions, including one "asterisk" (most 

serious) infraction. Appellant's most recent infraction occurred in October 2009. 

Appellant first became eligible for parole in 2017. In April 2017, the 

Board denied parole and set a thirty-six-month FET. 

After appellant became eligible for parole for the second time in 2019, a 

hearing officer referred his case to a two-member Board panel for a hearing. On 

February 22, 2019, the panel conducted a hearing and referred the matter to the 

Board for parole consideration. However, several days later, a member of the 

panel recused himself after he recalled being involved in the investigation of 

appellant's criminal case while he was employed by the State police. Therefore, 

the Board vacated the February 2019 decision and recommendation and 

scheduled a new hearing. 

Appellant's new hearing took place on March 15, 2019 before a twomember panel. The panel denied parole and established a thirty-six-month FET. 

Its denial was based on: (1) the facts and circumstances of appellant's offense, 

specifically the commission of murder; (2) his extensive prior offense record; 
3

A-1608-19

(3) his repetitive offense record; (4) his criminal record becoming increasingly 

more serious in nature; (5) his commitment to incarceration for multiple 

offenses; (6) his prior opportunities on community supervision had failed to 

deter criminal behavior; (7) his prior incarcerations did not deter criminal 

behavior; (8) his institutional infractions that were numerous, persistent, serious 

in nature, and resulted in loss of commutation time and administrative 

segregation; (9) his insufficient problem resolution, specifically a lack of insight 

into his criminal behavior; and (10) an objective risk assessment evaluation 

indicating he had a moderate risk of recidivism. 

The two-member panel also found several mitigating factors: (1) appellant 

completed all opportunities on community supervision without violations; (2) 

his participation in programs specific to his behavior; (3) his participation in 

institutional programs; (4) his institutional reports reflected favorable 

institutional adjustment; (5) he had achieved/maintained minimum custody 

status; (6) he had commutation time restored; and (7) his letters of support and 

accomplished academic degrees. 

Thereafter, appellant appealed the panel's decision to the full Board. The 

Board issued a final agency decision on November 13, 2019 affirming the 

panel's denial of parole and imposition of a thirty-six-month FET. The Board 
4

A-1608-19

rejected appellant's arguments and found the panel's decision was "based upon 

a determination that a preponderance of the evidence indicate[d] that there [was] 

a substantial likelihood that [appellant] would commit a crime if released on 

parole at [that] time." 

On appeal, appellant argues that the Board acted arbitrarily and violated 

his right to procedural due process by vacating the panel's February 2019 

decision after a member of the panel improperly recused himself. We disagree. 

Our standard of review of administrative decisions by the Board is limited 

and "grounded in strong public policy concerns and practical realities." Trantino 

v. N.J. State Parole Bd. (Trantino II), 166 N.J. 113, 200 (2001). "The decision 

of a parole board involves 'discretionary assessment[s] of a multiplicity of 

imponderables . . . .'" Id. at 201 (alteration in original) (quoting Greenholtz v. 

Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10 (1979)). "To a greater 

degree than is the case with other administrative agencies, the Parole Board's 

decision-making function involves individualized discretionary appraisals." 

Ibid. (citing Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 358-59 (1973)).

Consequently, this court "may overturn the Parole Board's decisions only 

if they are arbitrary and capricious." Ibid. With respect to the Board's factual 

findings, we do not disturb them if they "could reasonably have been reached on 
5

A-1608-19

sufficient credible evidence in the whole record." Id. at 172 (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd. (Trantino I), 154 N.J.

19, 24 (1998)).

Because appellant committed the offenses for which he is incarcerated in 

1985, his parole eligibility is governed by N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a), which states 

that an inmate shall be released on parole unless "by a preponderance of the 

evidence . . . there is a substantial likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime 

under the laws of the State of New Jersey if released on parole." N.J.S.A. 30:4-

123.53(a), L. 1979, c. 441, § 9; N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.10(a); see Perry v. N.J. State 

Parole Bd., 459 N.J. Super. 186, 194 (App. Div. 2019) (explaining that "[p]arole 

for a conviction imposed on offenses committed before August 18, 1997, 'is 

governed by the standard[s] in N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) and 30:4-123.56(c) prior 

to the amendment of those statutes on that date.'") (quoting Williams v. N.J. 

State Parole Bd., 336 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div. 2000)). The State has the 

burden to meet the standard. Trantino II, 166 N.J. at 197.

In its determination of parole eligibility, the Board must consider the 

aggregate of all pertinent factors, including twenty-four enumerated, nonexhaustive factors. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(a) to (b). We are satisfied the Board 
6

A-1608-19

properly reviewed the relevant evidence and statutory factors in considering and 

denying appellant parole. The Board also considered several mitigating factors.

In considering the FET, when a panel denies parole to an inmate serving 

a sentence for murder, the standard FET is twenty-seven months. N.J.A.C. 

10A:71-3.21(a)(1). However, the FET "may be increased or decreased by up to 

nine months when, in the opinion of the Board panel, the severity of the crime 

for which the inmate was denied parole and the prior criminal record or other 

characteristics of the inmate warrant such adjustment." N.J.A.C. 10A:71-

3.21(c). Here, the panel increased the standard FET by nine months. In doing 

so, the panel considered the nature and circumstances of appellant's offense, his 

institutional adjustment, and his insufficient problem resolution. 

The Board's findings are neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, but rather are 

supported by credible evidence. The Board has authority to make the assessment 

as to the expectation that an inmate will commit a crime if released on parole. 

The Board's decision to deny parole and set a thirty-six-month FET is supported 

by sufficient credible evidence in the record and consistent with the applicable 

law.

We discern no merit in appellant's argument that he was denied his due 

process rights by the panel member's recusal or the Board's subsequent decision 
7

A-1608-19

to vacate the panel's 2019 decision. As an initial matter, it was proper for the 

panel member to recuse himself given the requirement in Section IX of the New 

Jersey Uniform Ethics Code that a state employee is "required to recuse

him/herself on an official matter if he/she had any involvement in that matter, 

other than on behalf of the State, prior to commencement of his/her State 

service." Because the panel member had been involved in investigating 

appellant in 1985, it was appropriate for him to recuse himself. Once the 

original panel member was disqualified, the Board was required to vacate the 

panel's decision, assign a new Board member and reconvene the panel. See

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-1.5(e). Accordingly, the Board appropriately applied its 

discretion in vacating the panel's February 2019 decision. 

To the extent we have not addressed all of appellant's contentions, we find 

they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written decision. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.