United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Honorable

David Pryor, U.S. Senate

December 1994 MILITARY

RECRUITING

More Innovative

Approaches Needed

GAO/NSIAD-95-22

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-257481 

December 22, 1994

The Honorable David Pryor

United States Senate

Dear Senator Pryor:

This report responds to your request that we examine Department of Defense recruiting

operations and identify areas in which military recruiting costs could be reduced.

Unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution

of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen

of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Air Force,

the Army, and the Navy; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Director, Office of

Management and Budget; and other interested parties. Copies will also be made available to

others upon request.

Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. If you or your staff have any

questions concerning this report, please call me on (202) 512-5140.

Sincerely yours,

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues
Executive Summary

Purpose In recent years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been recruiting

fewer people to support a smaller military force. Concerned about the size

of DOD’s recruiting budget and the efficiency of its recruiting operations,

Senator David Pryor asked GAO to survey military recruiting policies and

practices and highlight areas in which DOD could reduce its recruiting costs

without adversely affecting its ability to meet military personnel

requirements. Specifically, GAO’s objectives were to evaluate (1) recruiting

challenges the services face in the size of the youth market and its

propensity to join the military, (2) the services’ future plans for recruiting

staffs and organizations, and (3) the services’ management of their

recruiting facilities. GAO concentrated on recruiting for active-duty enlisted

personnel, which represented $1.1 billion of the $1.3 billion budget for

fiscal year 1994.

Background During the first several years following the creation of the All-Volunteer

Force, the military services had generally positive results in attracting new

recruits. However, by 1979, the services were achieving only 90 percent of

their numerical goals, and the quality of new recruits had declined

significantly. In the early 1980s, Congress and the services took several

actions to make military service more attractive. Congress granted a raise

in military pay, authorized the services to offer new recruits financing for

education, and allowed the services to spend more money on advertising.

The services, in turn, reemphasized to their recruiters the importance of

attracting recruits who had high school diplomas and who achieved scores

in the upper ranges on standardized military tests. By 1986, all services

were meeting or exceeding their numerical enlistment objectives, and

recruit quality had reached historically high levels. These levels were

maintained and, starting in 1990, increased significantly again.

The services target 17- to 21-year-old high school graduates as prime

candidates for enlistment. The services believe that individuals in this age

group are more likely to consider the military as a viable option. The

services also direct recruiting efforts toward parents, coaches, and

teachers, who may influence prospective recruits’ decisions to enlist.

Results in Brief Although the services have requested additional funds from Congress to

meet what they perceive as future recruiting challenges, GAO’s review

indicates that the services have overstated the potential challenges. As

evidence of future difficulties, the services cite decreases in the number of

potential recruits and in the propensity of youths to join the services.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Executive Summary

However, the number of people in the market is expected to grow steadily

until at least 2000, and the percentage of the market DOD needs to meet its

personnel requirements has steadily dropped. In addition, DOD’s surveys of

youths’ propensity to join the services have not in the past been good

indicators of who actually enlists.

GAO has identified the following areas in which DOD may not be maximizing

the cost-effectiveness of its recruiting resources:

• Currently, about one out of every three recruits does not complete the first

term of enlistment. This rate of attrition significantly increases the number

of people the services need to recruit each year. The services have

successfully completed various isolated experiments to reduce attrition;

however, these efforts have not resulted in DOD-wide initiatives.

• Even though the services need fewer recruits because they are

downsizing, some recruiting commanders are increasing or plan to

increase their numbers of recruiters. However, adding recruiters at this

time may not be cost-efficient.

• Numerous DOD and service studies have recommended ways to

consolidate or eliminate layers of management to reduce costs, but the

services have been reluctant to change existing organizational structures.

• DOD maintains an extensive network of about 6,000 recruiting offices

around the United States to obtain geographic representation for the

services. However, 50 percent of these offices provide just 13.5 percent of

the recruits. Technological advances have made the need for a number of

these offices less critical.

Principal Findings

Services May Have

Overstated Future

Challenges in Recruiting

DOD and the services are concerned about what they believe are recent

decreases in the size of the recruiting market. They also believe that, in the

foreseeable future, their ability to attract quality personnel may be limited

by a reduction in the propensity of young people to join the military (as

measured by the annual Youth Attitude Tracking Survey). In fact, the Army

and Navy recruiting commanders believe that they may need to lower their

current targets for the quality of their enlistees if the services are to meet

their requirements for numbers of personnel.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Executive Summary

When placed in historical perspective and viewed in the context of

predicted trends, the services’ concerns appear to be overstated. First,

although the size of the youth population shrank between fiscal years 1980

and 1989, it is now projected to grow steadily until at least 2000. Second,

the percentage of the market population DOD needs to meet its

requirements has steadily dropped and may reach a modern-day low by

2000. Third, though reported propensity to enlist in the military has

dropped in recent years, about half of the enlistees come from the groups

who express negative intentions to join the military. Finally, even as

propensity to join the military has dropped in past years, the services have

been able to exceed DOD-established benchmarks for recruit quality.

Between 1980 and 1984, the services were able to improve the quality of

their recruits and reduce first-term attrition from about 37 percent to

around 29 percent. Attrition since has risen to over 34 percent.1

 Much of

this attrition occurs in the first months of active duty. This rate of attrition

significantly increases the number of people the services need to recruit

each year. The services have, through various local experiments, found

ways to reduce attrition, but their efforts have not been initiated DOD-wide

or even throughout any of the services.

Services Have Resisted

Organizational Change

The services have not implemented DOD or service proposals that involve a

rethinking of recruiting organizations and functions. Some of these

proposals have involved eliminating recruiting management layers and

consolidating recruiting organizations or functional areas, such as

logistics, market research, and advertising. However, the services have

been reluctant to change existing methods. The services have consistently

rejected any merging of recruiting across service lines because they

believe that, as the Comptroller of the Army stated in responding to one

such DOD proposal, “there are tremendous differences in recruiting for

each of the Services, most of which are irreconcilable.”

The services have cut personnel from all levels of recruiting in response to

congressional direction to do so in 1992. At the time of our review,

approximately 22,000 personnel in all services were involved in recruiting.

However, some of the services now plan to add recruiters to their staffs.

Army, Navy, and Marine Corps recruiting commanders believe that these

additions are necessary to meet future recruiting goals. This report

1

GAO obtained data on attrition from the Defense Manpower Data Center. These data represent

attrition for personnel enlisted annually from 1974 through 1989 for a 4-year commitment. The 1989

group completed their enlistments in 1992. For this period, DOD-wide annual attrition ranged between

29 percent and 39 percent.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Executive Summary

presents evidence to the contrary, in that historical trends indicate that the

relationship between numbers of recruiters and accessions is unclear

because (1) quota systems discourage recruiters from exceeding quotas

for enlistees; (2) the services have not historically reduced numbers of

recruiters as accession needs have decreased; (3) numbers of accessions

per recruiter have declined over the years; and (4) service studies suggest

that after a certain number of recruiters are in place, it is more

cost-effective to invest in more advertising.

DOD Has Closed and

Realigned Recruiting

Offices, but Additional

Opportunities Exist for

Savings

During the late 1980s, DOD and the services began to reduce recruiting

facilities’ costs by closing or collocating recruiting offices and eliminating

excess space. However, DOD and the services have not questioned their

assumption that to recruit equitably, the services should maintain a

recruiting presence in most geographical areas, even if the recruiting

offices are unproductive or marginally productive. For example, rather

than close marginally productive offices, the Air Force has stretched its

recruiting resources thinly, maintaining 645 recruiting offices that are

staffed with only 1 active-duty Air Force recruiter.

The services have begun to explore various alternatives to fixed recruiting

facilities that could enable them to identify, contact, and respond to

inquiries from potential recruits. These alternatives, some of which involve

advances in technology, call into question the traditional functions of the

recruiting office.

The lease cost for DOD’s nearly 6,000 recruiting facilities is about

$86 million for fiscal year 1994. GAO’s analysis indicates that around

$13 million of this amount is spent on separate offices for supervisors. In

addition, 50 percent of DOD’s recruiting offices, which require the

assignment of about 2,800 recruiters and cost about $13.3 million annually

to lease, produce just 13.5 percent of accessions.

Recommendations GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the secretaries of the

military services to (1) use the results of current studies, and undertake

additional efforts if necessary, to develop a more cost-effective mix of

available recruiting resources; (2) aggressively test ideas to reduce

first-term attrition; (3) continue efforts to streamline the current recruiting

bureaucracy, eliminating layers where possible; (4) revalidate the

recruiting quota systems, which currently deter recruiters from

maximizing the numbers of enlistments; (5) encourage the development

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Executive Summary

and expansion, as appropriate, of new concepts in the management of

military recruiting facilities; and (6) routinely incorporate more in-depth

cost-benefit analyses in decisions to maintain or establish new recruiting

offices and to evaluate the costs and benefits of maintaining offices in less

productive areas of the country.

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD said that GAO had

provided a broad overview of very complex issues but did not

acknowledge the full scope of DOD’s initiatives to achieve recruitment

goals cost-effectively. DOD stated that it is committed to using modern and

effective business practices to attract and enlist young people and plans to

give priority to its ongoing evaluation of recruiting organizational

structures, consolidation of resources, and adaptation of new

technologies.

DOD concurred with GAO’s recommendations concerning the mix of

recruiting resources, the quota systems, and recruiting offices. While DOD

also concurred with the need to reduce first-term attrition, streamline the

bureaucracy, and encourage new concepts in the management of

recruiting facilities, it did not want to commit to major changes before

reviewing the results of several evaluative efforts recently started.

GAO appreciates the need for DOD to complete certain current initiatives

before changes are initiated in some areas. However, GAO continues to

believe that (1) more aggressive efforts than those cited by DOD are needed

to lower attrition on a DOD-wide basis in order to minimize the resources

required to support the services’ recruiting and training operations; (2) the

services should reevaluate the need for management layers that previous

studies have concluded could be eliminated, particularly since the Office

of the Secretary of Defense-directed study to examine the consolidation of

logistics support functions for the service recruiting commands could

result in reduced workloads at those layers; and (3) if tests prove

successful, expansion of the experimental process for consolidating

recruiting facilities in large metropolitan areas should be pursued rapidly.

DOD comments and GAO’s evaluation of them have been incorporated

throughout this report. DOD’s comments are presented in their entirety in

appendix II along with some added GAO notes.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

12

Advent of the All-Volunteer Force Necessitated Changes in

Military Recruiting

12

Recruiting Process 13

Services Target 17- to 21-Year-Old Youths 14

Services Use Advertising to Encourage Enlistments 14

Recruiting Trends 15

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 18

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 19

Chapter 2 

Future Challenges in

Recruiting May Have

Been Overstated

21

Services’ Concerns With Size of Youth Population Are Overstated 21

Negative Propensity Groups Provide About Half of DOD

Accessions

26

Despite Drops in Propensity, Quality Has Remained Well Above

Benchmarks

28

Attrition Has Increased During the Late 1980s 30

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33

Chapter 3 

Opportunities to

Streamline Recruiting

Staffs and

Organizations

35

Services’ Plans for Future Staffing 35

Adding Recruiters May Not Be Necessary to Meet Future

Accession Goals

36

Consolidation Proposals Have Been Rejected by the Services 38

Services Have Rejected Proposals to Eliminate Recruiting

Management Layers

40

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 42

Chapter 4 

Closing and

Realigning More

Recruiting Offices

Would Create

Opportunities for

Savings

43

Full-Time Recruiting Offices and Evolving Technology 43

Recruiting Facilities’ Costs Have Dropped 44

Services Are Constrained by Principle of Geographic Coverage 46

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 50

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Contents

Chapter 5 

Conclusions and

Recommendations

52

Recommendations 52

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 53

Appendixes Appendix I: Service Recruiting Organizations 56

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense 64

Appendix II: Major Contributors to This Report 85

Tables Table 2.1: Percentage of the Youth Population DOD Needed to

Meet Accession Requirements

26

Table 2.2: Legislative, DOD, and Service Targets for Recruit

Quality

30

Figures Figure 1.1: Services’ Recruiting Budgets for Active Enlisted

Personnel

16

Figure 1.2: Annual Accessions for Active Enlisted Personnel 17

Figure 1.3: Cost per Accession for Active Enlisted Personnel 18

Figure 2.1: Size of the Youth Population Between 1980 and 2000 24

Figure 2.2: Increase in the Quality of Recruits Since 1980 29

Figure 2.3: Historical Changes in First-Term Attrition Rates 31

Figure 3.1: DOD-wide Trends in Accessions per Recruiter 37

Figure 3.2: Organizational Recruiting Levels for the Military

Services

41

Figure 4.1: Relative Productivity of Counties in the United States

in Numbers of Accessions

49

Figure I.1: U.S. Army Recruiting Command and Brigades 57

Figure I.2: U.S. Navy Recruiting Command and Area

Headquarters

59

Figure I.3: Marine Corps Recruiting Command and Regions 61

Figure I.4: Air Force Recruiting Service Headquarters and Groups 62

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Contents

Abbreviations

AFQT Armed Forces Qualification Test

ASVAB Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery

BMT Basic Military Training

DEP Delayed Entry Program

DOD Department of Defense

MEPCOM Military Entrance Processing Command

MEPS Military Entrance Processing Station

RV recruiting vehicle

USAREC U.S. Army Recruiting Command

YATS Youth Attitude Tracking Survey

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Chapter 1 

Introduction

During the past several years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been

downsizing its forces substantially and recruiting fewer personnel to

support a smaller All-Volunteer Force. At the same time, total

expenditures for military recruiting have also been cut. For fiscal 

year 1994, the services’ recruiting budget for active-duty officers and

enlisted personnel is $1.3 billion. The cost of recruiting 189,600 active

enlisted personnel accounts for about $1.1 billion of this total.

Advent of the

All-Volunteer Force

Necessitated Changes

in Military Recruiting

During the first several years following the creation of the All-Volunteer

Force in 1973, the military services generally had success attracting

volunteers. However, the recruiting situation deteriorated rapidly

beginning in 1977. In fiscal years 1975 and 1976, the services had actually

exceeded their numerical goals for recruiting volunteers, yet by 1979, they

were achieving only 90 percent of their goals. Moreover, the quality of new

recruits had declined significantly.

Quality is measured in terms of (1) educational level (for example, high

school or general equivalency degrees) and (2) performance on the Armed

Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), which is a composite of 4 of the 

10 components of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB).

The services use the recruit’s educational level as a predictor of attrition

and AFQT scores as indicators of overall eligibility to enter the services and

of qualifications for specific military jobs. AFQT scores are stratified into

six levels—categories I, II, IIIA, IIIB, IV, and V—and are used as indicators

of trainability. Recruits placed in categories I, II, and IIIA represent those

who test in the top 50th percentile; those placed in categories IIIB, IV, and

V are those in the bottom 50th percentile.

In 1975 and 1976, about 5 percent of new recruits had scored in category

IV of the AFQT. By fiscal year 1980, over 35 percent were in this category.

Concern over recruit quality peaked in 1980, when DOD reported that it had

made an error in scoring the ASVAB in 1976. Because of DOD’s mistake in the

formula for scaling scores to establish norms, applicants who had tested in

the lower ranges of the ability distribution were given inflated scores

between 1976 and 1980. This meant that for 4 years, the services had been

enlisting individuals of poorer quality than they wanted.

Congressional concern over recruit quality was demonstrated in fiscal 

year 1981, when Congress passed legislation establishing the following

parameters:

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Chapter 1 

Introduction

• 65 percent of nonprior-service recruits1 must be high school graduates;

• after September 30, 1982, no more than 20 percent of annual accessions

can be individuals who score in category IV of the AFQT;

• category IV individuals who are enlisted must be high school graduates;

and

• category V individuals are not eligible for military service.

Also during the early 1980s, Congress increased military pay and recruiting

budgets to offer bonuses and funding for education for service applicants

and approved increases in advertising expenditures to attract higher

quality recruits.

By 1986, all services met or exceeded their overall enlistment objectives.

Recruit quality was at historically high levels. The percentage of recruits

with high school diplomas increased from 72 percent during the 1964-73

draft period to 92 percent in 1986. Also, 64 percent of new recruits in 1986

scored in the top categories of the AFQT. This percentage was up from

38 percent in 1980.

Recruiting Process While the services use advertising as a tool to increase prospective

applicants’ awareness of and propensity to enlist, the services believe that

face-to-face contact with a military recruiter is necessary to actually enlist

applicants. To provide this contact, the services maintain recruiting offices

throughout the country and overseas. Recruiting officials believe it is

essential that recruiters be uniformed representatives of their respective

services and that they accurately and positively portray military life. In

many cases, recruiters are applicants’ sole source of information on the

benefits of their services. Recruiters provide information on military jobs,

associated training, financial incentives, terms of enlistment, and the

unique lifestyles offered by the services. Recruiters convey their message

by several means, such as making presentations at area high schools,

canvasing places of employment, and contacting prospective enlistees

directly. The Army estimates that a recruiter makes over 100 contacts to

enlist a single quality recruit. In some services, recruiters are evaluated on

the numbers and qualifications of individuals they enlist.

Once applicants have decided to enlist in a military service, the recruiter

schedules them for processing at the nearest Military Entrance Processing

Station (MEPS). At the MEPS, applicants take the ASVAB—if they have not

already taken it at a high school or other testing site—and are given

1

According to the specific language in the legislation, this provision applies only to male recruits.

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Chapter 1 

Introduction

medical examinations. They also meet with representatives of their chosen

service. These service representatives provide lists of military occupations

for which the applicants are qualified on the basis of their AFQT scores and

certain other factors, such as medical or moral qualifications. For

example, applicants who are colorblind would not be eligible for positions

requiring perfect eyesight; however, they could still enlist.

Once an applicant has chosen a military job, the service representative at

the MEPS draws up a contract for either the Delayed Entry Program (DEP)

or immediate active or reserve duty. Nearly all applicants join the DEP; that

is, they do not immediately report for active duty until up to 1 year later.

The services require several months to complete background

investigations and await applicants’ completion of high school and receipt

of transcripts. During their time in the DEP, enlistees are members of the

inactive reserve, and they are required by the services to report to their

recruiters periodically. Recruiters may monitor their enlistees’ progress in

high school and attempt to sustain the enlistees’ interest in the service. At

the completion of the DEP, the enlistee returns to the MEPS, undergoes a

short medical examination, and is sworn into the service. After recruits are

sworn in, they are shipped to basic training locations.

Services Target 17- to

21-Year-Old Youths

All the services target 17- to 21-year-old high school graduates who score

in the upper categories of the AFQT. The services believe that individuals

between 17 and 21 years of age are more likely to consider joining the

military than they are at any other age. Since 1990, 83 to 88 percent of

those who joined the services each year have been in this age group. The

services have also found that individuals who graduated from high school

and score in the upper categories of the AFQT do better on a variety of

military performance measures than their lower scoring counterparts. The

services also believe that quality recruits are less likely to pose discipline

problems and are more likely to complete their first terms of enlistment.

Services Use

Advertising to

Encourage

Enlistments

The military services have a variety of marketing and advertising

techniques at their disposal to attract members of their target market. In

addition to the individuals the services ultimately hope to enlist, the target

market includes people who may influence a prospective recruit’s decision

to enlist. These “influencers” include parents, coaches, and teachers.

Service advertising is designed to appeal to both potential applicants and

their influencers. Each service employs an advertising agency to develop

and/or execute advertising programs. Advertising methods range from the

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Chapter 1 

Introduction

most visible and expensive form—paid national television—to public

service announcements, national and local radio spots, and mass mailings.

DOD’s advertising budgets increased through the mid-1980s. In particular,

between fiscal years 1980 and 1986, advertising expenditures for active

enlisted recruiting grew from $149.3 million to $180.7 million, an increase

of 21 percent in constant 1994 dollars. Advertising expenditures as a

percentage of the total DOD recruiting budget remained relatively stable

during the period, ranging from 10 to 11 percent. From their peak in fiscal

year 1986, however, active enlisted recruiting budgets were cut

significantly for all four services, from $180.7 million in fiscal year 1986 to

$73.8 million programmed for fiscal year 1994, a decline of almost

60 percent. Advertising as a percentage of the total DOD recruiting budget

fell below 7 percent by fiscal year 1994.

The services have studied advertising and its relationship to propensity

and have observed that the decline in youth’s propensity to enlist in the

military corresponds to the decline in advertising budgets. According to an

Army official, reductions in advertising budgets have reduced the services’

ability to generate a positive public image and counter negative

perceptions created by media coverage of downsizing and conflicts in

Somalia and Bosnia. The services believe that sufficient continuous

advertising will have a direct effect on reversing the decline in propensity.

Recruiting Trends Budgets for recruiting active enlisted personnel peaked in 1986 at about

$1.6 billion (in constant 1994 dollars)—a 23-percent increase over the 1980

total of about $1.3 billion. From 1986, the budgets fell to a low of

$1.1 billion in 1994—a reduction of about 31 percent. For fiscal year 1995,

DOD has requested over $1 billion. Figure 1.1 shows the four services’

active enlisted recruiting budgets from 1980 to 1995.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Figure 1.1: Services’ Recruiting Budgets for Active Enlisted Personnel

Constant fiscal year 1994 dollars in millions

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Fiscal year

Army

Navy

Marine Corps

Air Force

aData for 1995 are budget requests as of June 1994.

Between 1980 and 1994, annual enlistments for active force personnel also

dropped, by over 50 percent (see fig. 1.2).

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Figure 1.2: Annual Accessions for Active Enlisted Personnel

Active enlisted accessions

0

25000

50000

75000

100000

125000

150000

175000

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Fiscal year

Army

Navy

Marine Corps

Air Force

aData for 1995 are DOD accession targets as of June 1994.

Because funding between 1980 and 1994 went down about 15 percent and

accessions of active-duty enlisted personnel went down over 50 percent,

the average cost per accession rose—from $3,261 in 1980 to $5,401 in 1994,

an increase of over 65 percent. In fiscal year 1994, the Army had the

highest cost per accession at $6,956, and the Air Force the lowest at

$3,440. The Marine Corps’ cost per accession stood at $5,127, and the

Navy’s at $4,655. Figure 1.3 shows active enlisted costs per accession from

1980 to 1995.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Figure 1.3: Cost Per Accession for Active Enlisted Personnel

Cost per active enlisted accession

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

4500

5000

5500

6000

6500

7000

7500

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Fiscal year

Army

Navy

Marine Corps

Air Force

aCosts are calculated based on projected data for 1995 as of June 1994.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD concurred with all of the information discussed in this chapter with

the exception of our calculation of the costs per accession for the period

1980 through 1995. DOD commented that we distorted the overall cost

savings associated with the services’ recruiting programs by basing our

evaluation of the cost per accession only on basic recruiting costs.

Further, DOD stated that certain fixed costs would increase the average

cost per recruit during a drawdown and that projecting costs for

force-sustainment level recruiting would present a much more accurate

assessment of recruiting.

We believe that our analysis of cost per accession is both valid and proper.

Computing an average by dividing the total costs associated with a

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Chapter 1 

Introduction

particular output is a generally accepted method for identifying and

tracking trends in most organizations and operations.

Further, although DOD suggests that increases in the cost per accession can

be attributed to its drawdown, our analysis shows that the cost per

accession has generally been on an upward trend since 1980 and that a

substantial part of each service’s increase occurred before the drawdown

started.

Regarding a projection of costs for force-sustainment level recruiting, DOD

did not provide the data required to make such a projection. Moreover, on

the basis of our analysis of the costs and types of costs associated with

DOD’s recruiting operations, we doubt that sustainment-level recruiting

would have a major impact on the average cost per accession. We believe

that cost increases resulting from, among other things, additional military

pay for more recruiters, increased training and support for more

recruiters, and additional advertising would largely offset the lowering

effect that would result from increased accessions.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

Concerned about the size of DOD’s recruiting budget and the efficiency of

its recruiting operations, Senator David Pryor asked us to survey military

recruiting operations and identify areas in which DOD could reduce its

recruiting costs without adversely affecting its ability to meet military

personnel requirements. Specifically, GAO’s objectives were to evaluate

(1) recruiting challenges the services face in the size of the youth market

and its propensity to join the military, (2) the services’ future plans for

recruiting staffs and organizations, and (3) the services’ management of

their recruiting facilities. This report focuses on the largest consumer of

resources—recruiting for active enlisted personnel.

To obtain a general overview of recruiting results and cost-effectiveness,

we reviewed DOD and service research studies in the area of military

recruiting. We met with representatives of organizations such as the Rand

Corporation and the Army Research Institute, which also study recruiting.

We interviewed officials from DOD’s Office of Accession Policy; the Army,

the Air Force, and the Navy recruiting commands; and the Military

Entrance Processing Command to obtain their views on the evolution and

current status of recruiting and problems they have experienced or

foresee in adjusting to budget cuts and military downsizing. We also

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Introduction

interviewed officials from the Naval Audit Service and the Congressional

Budget Office.

We did very limited work on Marine Corps’ recruiting because during our

review, the Naval Audit Service was auditing the Marine Corps Recruiting

Command, and the Command was undergoing major restructuring. We

have, however, included the Marine Corps in most of the data and in

narrative, where possible.

To identify areas for potential cost savings, we obtained data on

(1) accessions by service and DOD-wide between fiscal years 1980 and

1994, (2) the quality of recruits between fiscal years 1980 and 1993,

(3) individual service budgets, (4) recruiters and support personnel,

(5) recruiting offices by county and their associated costs between fiscal

years 1991 and 1994, and (6) attrition by service and DOD-wide for

active-duty personnel between fiscal years 1974 and 1989.

We conducted our review between July 1993 and August 1994 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

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In a 1994 congressional testimony, the services’ recruiting commanders

stated that additional recruiting funds were essential to successfully

recruit the numbers and quality of enlisted personnel they would need in

the future. They expressed concern about a decrease in the size of the

youth population and in youths’ propensity to enlist in the military over

the past decade. They believe that recruiting will be more difficult than it

has been in the past and that advertising dollars are crucial in overcoming

these problems. Two of the services’ recruiting commanders also stated

that upcoming recruiting difficulties may force their services to lower the

current standards for the quality of their enlistees if the services are to

meet their requirements for numbers of personnel.

We found these concerns to be overstated because (1) the size of the

target recruiting population is growing; (2) DOD does not need as large a

percentage of the market to meet its requirements as it has in the past;

(3) although propensity to enlist in the military has dropped in recent

years, about half of the enlistees have come from the groups who

expressed negative intentions to join the military; and (4) even as

propensity has dropped in recent years, the services have maintained

recruit quality well above DOD-established benchmarks.

During the 1980s, the services improved the quality of their recruits and

therefore reduced first-term attrition from about 37 percent in 1980 to

around 29 percent in 1984. Attrition has since risen to over 34 percent.1

These attrition rates significantly increase the numbers of personnel DOD

must enlist each year. The services have undertaken various experiments

that have been successful in reducing attrition, but these efforts have not

resulted in DOD-wide initiatives.

Services’ Concerns

With Size of Youth

Population Are

Overstated

In recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee’s

Military Forces and Personnel Subcommittee, the services’ recruiting

commanders outlined the challenges their services face in meeting

recruiting targets, strategies for meeting these challenges, and funding

needs. All the commanders shared the view that recruiting is more difficult

than it has been in the past and that advertising dollars are crucial to

overcoming a reduction in the services’ target population and youths’

lowered propensity to join the military.

1

We obtained data on attrition from the Defense Manpower Data Center. These data represent attrition

for personnel enlisted annually from 1974 through 1989 for a 4-year commitment. The 1989 group

completed their enlistments in 1992. For this period, DOD-wide attrition ranged from a high of

39 percent to a low of 29 percent.

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During the testimony, the Commander of the Navy Recruiting Command

stated that “the pool of 17 to 21 year-old males and females has decreased

significantly over the past decade. . . and is now at its lowest point since

the inception of the All Volunteer Force.” The Air Force Recruiting Service

Commander stated that the market of those qualified to enter the Air

Force was 85 percent of what it was in the early 1980s.

Our review indicated that the services’ concern about a shrinking market

may be overstated. It is true that the target recruiting population

decreased between 1980 and 1989, from 20.5 million to 17.6 million. Since

fiscal year 1989, however, this population has increased, and continued

growth is projected until at least the year 2000, when it is estimated to

reach 19.6 million (see fig. 2.1).

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Figure 2.1: Size of the Youth

Population Between 1980 and 2000

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Note: Figures for 1980-89 are based on 1980 census data; figures for 1990-2000 are based on

1990 census data.

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

In addition, the percentage of the total target population that the services

must recruit to meet their accession needs has been decreasing, with some

fluctuations, since fiscal year 1980—from nearly 2 percent to around

1 percent in fiscal years 1994 and 1995 (see table 2.1). DOD projects that by

2000 the fraction of youth needed for recruiting will likely reach an

historical low.

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Table 2.1: Percentage of the Youth

Population DOD Needed to Meet

Accession Requirements

Fiscal year

Size of target

Population

Accession

requirement

Percentage of

population needed

to meet

requirement

1980 20,493,049 389,861 1.90

1981 20,327,668 367,240 1.81

1982 20,087,350 338,223 1.68

1983 19,539,986 330,815 1.69

1984 19,006,339 328,457 1.73

1985 18,415,983 316,676 1.72

1986 17,953,275 333,550 1.86

1987 17,740,140 316,826 1.79

1988 17,773,315 286,763 1.61

1989 17,586,928 293,896 1.67

1990 18,626,642 232,306 1.25

1991 18,354,717 206,617 1.13

1992 18,257,698 202,752 1.11

1993 18,256,680 206,927 1.13

1994 18,318,454 189,619 1.04

1995a 18,409,902 195,421 1.06

aFigures for 1995 are projections as of June 1994.

Source: GAO’s analysis of data from the Defense Manpower Data Center and the Office of the

Secretary of Defense.

Negative Propensity

Groups Provide About

Half of DOD

Accessions

The services consider propensity to enlist in the military, as measured by

the Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS), to be a crucial measure of the

difficulty of the recruiting environment. The services have found a

correlation between positive propensity and actual enlistment, and they

believe that the higher the percentage of youth who express a propensity

to enlist, the easier it is for recruiters to access personnel. The military

services have stated that youths’ propensity to enlist in the military is at its

lowest point in many years. They believe that this drop indicates that

recruiting will be even more difficult in the future. Though youths’

propensity to enlist in the military is indeed down, the services’ data on

propensity historically has not always been a reliable indicator of who

actually enlists in the military.

Each year for the last 18 years, DOD has sponsored a YATS to gather

information from American youth on their perceptions of the military and

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their future plans in general. Approximately 10,000 men and women

between the ages of 16 and 24 are interviewed for 30 minutes by

telephone. The questionnaire focuses primarily on enlistment propensity.

Youth are asked several questions about the likelihood of their serving in

the active or reserve military services in the near future. They are asked

how likely they are to join the military, and each service in particular, in

the next few years. Those who answer that they “definitely” or “probably”

will enlist are categorized as indicating “positive propensity”; those who

answer that they will “probably not” or “definitely not” or “don’t know” are

categorized as indicating “negative propensity.” Each year, DOD distributes

the results of this survey to the individual services.

Positive propensity to enlist in a military service has been falling for

several years. Positive propensity to enlist among 16- to 21-year-old males

decreased by almost 17 percent (from 32 percent to 26.6 percent) between

1989 and 1992. Service officials have attributed the drop to a number of

factors, including a decrease in advertising, a lack of knowledge on the

part of the public that the services are still hiring, concern over the

dangers of military service due to conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia, and

concern over DOD budget cuts that are perceived as making the services an

unsafe career choice.

However, propensity data are not always reliable indicators of what

people will do. According to a Rand study, though those who indicate

positive propensity are indeed more likely to join the military, about half

of DOD enlistees have come from the groups that expressed negative

intention. This is because those in the negative propensity group represent

a much larger percentage of the population and a much greater pool. The

Army, for example, projected that over 70 percent of its enlistments for

1993 came from those who had expressed negative propensity to join the

military. It also projected that almost 42 percent of Army enlistments in

1993 came from the group who said they would definitely not join, while

less than 9 percent of enlistments came from the group stating they would

definitely consider enlisting.

The services’ concerns about perceptions that the military is not hiring,

that it is now too dangerous, or that budget cuts make the military

unattractive as a career option have not been validated by YATS data. In the

1993 survey, for example, 81 percent of respondents said that they thought

the services were still recruiting, despite downsizing. This figure is up

from 79 percent in 1992. In addition, 56 percent of respondents in 1993

said that budget cuts would not affect their attitude toward enlistment, up

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from 54 percent in 1992. Finally, the percentage of respondents who stated

that danger was the single main reason for not considering enlistment fell

from 1990 to 1992.

Despite Drops in

Propensity, Quality

Has Remained Well

Above Benchmarks

Despite drops in propensity in recent years, recruit quality has remained

well above DOD-established benchmarks. Even so, in recent congressional

testimony, the Army and Navy recruiting commanders expressed the fear

that their services might have to lower enlistment quality targets to meet

upcoming accession needs. The Army’s recruiting commander stated that

the Army may need to reexamine whether it will be able to sustain its

current quality standards for new enlisted recruits as it approaches fiscal

year 1996, when its accession goals are expected to increase. Similarly, the

Navy’s recruiting commander believes that it may be necessary to review

the Navy’s targets for recruit quality in light of future recruiting challenges.

To help analyze the services’ quality requirements, DOD, in conjunction

with the National Research Council, concluded that having 90 percent high

school graduates and 60 percent scoring in categories I through IIIA were

benchmarks to which the services should aspire. Historical records of

recruit quality indicate that the services have generally remained above

these benchmarks since the mid-1980s. The percentage of enlistees who

have high school diplomas and who score above the 50th percentile on the

AFQT has grown steadily (see fig. 2.2). In fact, 1992 represented the highest

point since 1980 for recruit quality.

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Figure 2.2: Increase in the Quality of Recruits Since 1980

Percent

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Fiscal year

High school diploma graduates

AFQT categories I-IIIA

DOD benchmark

DOD benchmark

As recruit quality has improved, the services’ targets have correspondingly

increased. These targets have tended to move upwards to match the actual

results each service has experienced. For example, DOD’s 1985 report on its

quality requirements for the 5-year period 1985-89, basically reflected the

recruiting results of 1984. Stated requirements for high school graduates

ranged from 80 to 95 percent, with an average of 88 percent for DOD. The

requirements for enlistees in categories I through IIIA averaged 61 percent.

The percentage of category IV recruits ranged from 4 to 12, with a DOD

average of 9 percent. In the early 1990s, as the services were even more

successful in acquiring quality recruits, the targets moved upward to

reflect that experience.

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Table 2.2 shows the services’ current targets for recruit quality. All are well

above DOD’s benchmarks of 90 percent high school graduates and

60 percent scoring in AFQT categories I through IIIA.

Table 2.2: Legislative, DOD, and

Service Targets for Recruit Quality Percentages of enlisted accessions

Benchmark/ target

High school

graduates

Scorers in

categories I-IIIA

Scorers in

category IV

Legislative requirement 65 Not applicable <20

DOD benchmark 90 60 Not applicable

Army target 95 67 <2

Navy target 95 62 0

Air Force target 99 80 <1

Marine Corps target 95 63 <1

Attrition Has

Increased During the

Late 1980s

Between 1980 and 1984, the attrition rate for enlisted personnel during

their first term dropped from about 37 percent to 29 percent. However,

this rate has since risen to over 34 percent. First-term attrition is costly to

the services because replacements must be recruited and trained at an

average cost of over $20,000 each. As the services successfully lower

attrition rates, their enlistment needs and demands on recruiters

correspondingly decrease. Though the services have done studies of the

causes of attrition and have conducted experiments to lower the attrition

rate, they have not been able to lower it below its current plateau. At

present, about one of three recruits does not complete his or her first

enlistment term of duty, which typically is 4 years. Much of this attrition

occurs in the first months of active duty. Figure 2.3 shows attrition rates

from 1974 to 1989, which was the last year for which there was complete

data on personnel who completed their first terms.

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Figure 2.3: Historical Changes in First-Term Attrition Rates

30.0

35.0

40.0

39.5

39.0

38.5

38.0

37.5

37.0

36.5

36.0

35.5

25.0

25.5

26.0

26.5

27.0

27.5

28.0

28.5

29.0

29.5

30.5

31.0

31.5

32.0

32.5

33.0

33.5

34.0

34.5

1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

Attrition rate

0

Researchers have investigated several factors that influence attrition

during the first term of enlistment. These include educational credentials,

gender, age, race, enlistment term, and military occupational specialty.

According to DOD and the services, the most important of these variables in

determining a recruit’s attrition rate is educational attainment. Most

researchers equate high school degrees with lower attrition rates. A

second predictor of lower attrition rate is AFQT scores. Those who score in

the upper 50th percentile of the AFQT have historically also had lower

attrition rates. While the services have reduced attrition rates slightly by

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recruiting higher quality recruits, marginal increases in quality appear to

have limited potential for further reducing attrition.

Despite a considerable number of studies of attrition, DOD and the services

have not been able to define accurate predictors of attrition beyond

educational credentials and AFQT scores. That is, DOD and the services have

not successfully isolated causal linkages between recruiting methods and

targets and first-term attrition. Although research has been done to define

better predictors of attrition and provide information to recruiting staff on

attrition from basic military training, the services have not successfully

lowered attrition rates below their current plateau.

To reduce attrition from Basic Military Training (BMT), the Air Force

Recruiting Service attempts to ensure that recruits are physically prepared

for BMT; encourages recruiters to identify applicants’ medical conditions

that would prevent their success in BMT; and provides to groups,

squadrons, flights, and recruiters feedback on graduation rates and

numbers of honor graduates from BMT. According to recruiting officials,

these actions have had positive effects on BMT attrition rates. However,

they were not able to tie these effects directly to decreased attrition.

In the fall of 1993, the Air Force Recruiting Service did a study to

determine the reasons for that year’s increase in BMT attrition. (The rate

rose from about 6 percent in fiscal year 1992 to about 9 percent in fiscal

year 1993.) The study showed that lower recruit quality (in terms of AFQT

scores) played a very small role in the increase. The study instead

attributed most of the increase in BMT attrition to losses for medical

reasons. The primary reason for higher medical losses, according to the

study, was stricter application of medical standards by BMT medical

personnel. According to Air Force Recruiting Service officials, the Air

Force is now more lenient in releasing recruits from BMT because it is

concerned about preventing training deaths.

The Air Force is conducting research on better ways to use ASVAB

subscores to predict attrition. The Air Force now uses ASVAB subscores

that measure mechanical, administrative, general, and electronic ability.

The Air Force hopes to find alternate subscores that are more predictive of

attrition for various skills. Another program that may offer promise to all

the services in lowering attrition during BMT is the nonprior service

orientation now offered by the Oklahoma Army National Guard and Air

National Guard units. The program began in 1988 as an attempt to reduce

BMT attrition rates. The Air National Guard’s BMT attrition rate at that time

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was 17 percent, one of the worst rates in the nation. As a result of this

program, that rate has remained at less than 1 percent for 6 years.

The orientation lasts only 2 days and is taught at the Oklahoma Military

Academy. After recruits have joined the Guard but before they attend BMT,

they are put through a simulation of basic training, including some

lectures, but mostly marching, drills, and physical training.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on this chapter, DOD concurred with our findings on

attrition and the services’ success in increasing and maintaining recruit

quality rates. However, DOD disagreed with certain observations

concerning the size of the youth population and some of our observations

about propensity.

DOD took issue with our analysis of youth population trend data, based on

1980 and 1990 Census Bureau information, which indicates that the size of

the pool bottomed out in 1989 instead of 1993, as according to DOD. The

information contained in this report was the most current available when

we performed our analysis. More importantly, DOD acknowledged our key

point about youth population; that is, the size of the pool is projected to

increase in future years.

DOD addressed other factors it believes adversely affect any analysis of the

youth population and the services’ ability to recruit sufficient numbers.

Specifically, DOD commented that (1) the youth population will grow only

1 percent between 1994 and 1996, while projected accessions will grow

about 13 percent; (2) a change in the demographic characteristics of the

youth population, for example, an increasing percentage of Hispanics,

indicates increasing recruiting challenges; and (3) an increase in the

percentage of high school graduates going to college and those who are

medically or morally unfit to serve will reduce the numbers available to

recruit.

However, based on findings contained in a May 1994 RAND Corporation

study, “Recent Recruiting Trends and Their Implications: Preliminary

Analysis and Recommendations,” the factors DOD cites appear to be moot

in terms of their impact on the size of the pool of quality youth for

recruitment. This study estimated the potential supply of high quality

enlistees for 1994 and for fiscal year 1996 and compared these estimates

with the pre-drawdown levels of fiscal year 1989. The study found that the

prospective supply equals or exceeds that of pre-drawdown levels and

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concluded that the supply of high quality youth to recruit for military

service should be adequate.

Regarding propensity, DOD commented that we had reflected some of the

difficulties associated with recruiting in a negative propensity

environment but did not present a complete and accurate view of the

situation. DOD stated that propensity is not intended to identify who will

enlist but is a much broader tool for determining how much effort and

resources will be required to meet recruiting objectives. DOD also stated

that the 1994 RAND study confirmed that the lower the propensity of a

youth population to enlist, the more resources would be required for each

enlistment.

We agree that propensity data is useful for gaining insights on the

recruiting environment; however, we continue to believe that the services’

concerns about propensity trends have been overstated in the recent past.

Our view is supported by the recent RAND study, which concentrates on

the high quality component of the youth population, that is, those

individuals who are the services’ prime target for recruiting.

In the RAND study, propensity for the quality component of the youth

population was reestimated to correct a sampling change, implemented in

the 1991 YATS survey, which had the unexpected effect of lowering positive

propensity rates. Overall, the study concluded that the trends from 1989 to

1993 suggest that the propensity of high quality youth to enlist was

stabilizing. Specifically, propensity to enlist increased during the Persian

Gulf crisis, declined between 1991 and 1992, then leveled off or increased

slightly between 1992 and 1993, which placed the 1993 rate near or above

that of the late 1980s. In other words, the propensity of high quality youth

to enlist exceeded or equaled the pre-drawdown level during 1990-93.

The study also observed that (1) about 75 percent of the male youth

population expressed a negative propensity to enlist; however, this group

accounts for about half of all enlistees because of its large size and (2) the

potential supply of youth for enlistment will move up or down with the

propensity level, but the supply level would not change in proportion to

the change in the propensity level; that is, a 10-percent drop in propensity

would lead to only about a 3-percent drop in potential supply.

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Staffs and Organizations

Military budgets and accession requirements have been dropping for

several years, as the size of U.S. military forces has been reduced. During

this time, a number of initiatives to reduce the size of recruiting staffs have

been implemented, and several proposals to streamline recruiting

organizations have been made.

Most recently, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993

(which was enacted in October 1992) required the services to reduce by

10 percent the numbers of personnel carrying out recruiting activities in

the active forces and the National Guard. This cut was to be taken by the

end of fiscal year 1994 from 1992 levels. The services initially responded

by cutting personnel from all levels of recruiting, but some are now

planning increases in staff. Our review indicates that increasing the

number of recruiters may not be necessary.

Although the military services have reduced the size of different recruiting

management layers, the basic recruiting structure remains intact. Past DOD,

service, and congressional proposals include the elimination of certain

recruiting command management layers; the consolidation of common

logistical support functions into one support command; the establishment

of a joint DOD recruiting organization; the consolidation of each service’s

reserve, active, and Guard recruiting; and the consolidation of medical

recruiting activities. While such proposals have been discussed, few have

been implemented, generally because the services have been reluctant to

change organizations and methods that have worked in the past.

Services’ Plans for

Future Staffing

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 required the

services to cut their 1992 recruiting staffs by 10 percent by the end of fiscal

year 1994. However, the fiscal year 1995 National Defense Authorization

Act repealed this required reduction. While a few of the services had

stated at the time of our review that they had no specific plans to respond

to a repeal, three of the services believed that additions to recruiting staffs

would be necessary in the near future.

In response to the 1993 authorization act, all the services planned to cut

recruiting staffs by at least the required 10 percent. However, because

these cuts were to be made by the end of fiscal year 1994, at the time of

our review, most of the services’ cuts had not been finalized.

The Air Force is the only service that anticipates no near-term increases in

recruiting staff. The Air Force Recruiting Service Commander believes that

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no additions to recruiting staffs are necessary unless accession goals rise

substantially. Because the Navy had begun a 17-percent rather than a

10-percent cut to its recruiting personnel, it has now decided to

incrementally add back 360 people to its recruiting force by the end of the

year. The Marine Corps and the Army believe that additions to recruiting

staffs will alleviate difficulties they foresee in the future. The Army Deputy

Chief of Staff for Personnel has authorized 5,350 recruiters for fiscal year

1995. This represents about a 27-percent increase (1,150 recruiters) over

the earlier planned fiscal year 1994 level.

Adding Recruiters

May Not Be Necessary

to Meet Future

Accession Goals

We do not believe that more recruiters are required to meet projected

accession targets. The services’ belief that they need to add recruiters

suggests that current accessions per recruiter are maximized. Our

analysis, however, indicated that the relationship between numbers of

recruiters and accessions is unclear because (1) the recruiters’ quota

system places artificial constraints on their numbers of accessions; (2) the

services have not historically reduced numbers of recruiters as accession

needs have gone down; (3) the numbers of accessions per recruiter have

declined over the years; and (4) service studies suggest that after a certain

number of recruiters are in place, it is more cost-effective to invest in more

advertising.

According to Army officials, the quota system rewards recruiters and

recruiting organizations for achieving the missions they are assigned by

headquarters. Overproduction is not rewarded. In fact, in the current

system, a recruiter’s overproduction during one year could result in a rise

in the recruiter’s quota for the next year. The higher quota in subsequent

years would require more work from the recruiter and increase the

possibility of the recruiter’s missing the quota and receiving a

career-damaging performance evaluation. These effects of the quota

system and past performance suggest that recruiters could produce more

recruits than they are currently. Army officials told us that the Army is

experimenting with changes to the quota system to reward

overproduction.

Recruiter productivity has also been negatively affected by the fact that

most of the services have not reduced their numbers of recruiters as

accession needs have decreased. The number of accessions per recruiter

fell by almost half from 1980 to 1994 DOD-wide (see fig. 3.1). This decrease

is the direct result of a substantial drop in the numbers of enlisted

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accessions (over 50 percent), while the numbers of recruiters dropped

only slightly (13 percent).

Figure 3.1: DOD-wide Trends in Accessions Per Recruiter

Active enlisted accessions per recruiter

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Fiscal year

Numbers of accessions per recruiter demonstrated wide variations by

service between fiscal years 1980 and 1994. The decline in accessions per

recruiter was most striking in the Army, where it fell by over 60 percent.

The Navy’s accessions per recruiter fell over 34 percent, and the Air

Force’s by almost 35 percent. Marine Corps’ accessions per recruiter, on

the other hand, increased slightly. The Marine Corps, unlike the other

services, reduced its recruiting force as its accessions decreased.

Several recent Army studies suggest that after a certain point, adding more

recruiters may not result in added accessions. A preliminary study recently

done for the Army by the Naval Postgraduate School suggests that the

number of recruiters is only slightly correlated with the number of

accessions. An internal Army Recruiting Command study concludes that

the number of recruiters is negatively correlated with the number of

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accessions. Both studies found much higher correlations between

advertising budgets and numbers of accessions.

Consolidation

Proposals Have Been

Rejected by the

Services

Over the years, various proposals have been made to consolidate various

recruiting functions for all the services. The services, however, have

consistently rejected any merging of recruiting across service lines

because they believe that, as the Army’s Comptroller has stated in

responding to one such DOD proposal, “there are tremendous differences in

recruiting for each of the Services, most of which are irreconcilable.”

A Defense Management Review in fiscal year 1990 proposed two

alternatives involving the consolidation of service recruiting organizations

and functions. The first was to merge the services’ recruiting organizations

into one command. Recruiting offices would remain service-unique and be

staffed by individual service recruiters. DOD estimated that implementation

of this proposal could have resulted in a savings of $27 million in fiscal

year 1993 and over $240 million through fiscal year 1997. The second

alternative proposed the consolidation of support functions, including

advertising, under a recruiting support command. Implementation of this

alternative was estimated to save about $13 million in fiscal year 1992 and

over $150 million through fiscal year 1997.

In written comments, none of the service recruiting organizations favored

consolidating their recruiting headquarters functions. Rather than

responding with thorough analyses and rebuttals to the management

review, the services dismissed the proposal out of their reluctance to alter

methods that had succeeded for them in the past. For example, the Army’s

response was that “a major, radical change to our way of doing

business—combined with the turbulence of personnel reductions while

entering an era of uncertainty—will surely disrupt mission

accomplishment.” The Navy’s position was that “creating a single

recruiting bureaucracy would eventually erode [the] strong identification

with service, reduce the recruiter’s emotional involvement, and create an

atmosphere where quantity, not quality, is the major objective.”

Accordingly, the Assistant Secretary of Defense rejected the proposal and

stated that “to jeopardize the recruiting success we have enjoyed in recent

years would be unconscionable.”

While the services rejected combined service recruiting entirely, they

acknowledged that there might be some merit in consolidating various

support functions, such as the procurement and management of vehicles,

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telecommunications, and recruiting facilities. The services did not support

the consolidation of advertising. In January 1994, DOD officials began to

reconsider the issue of consolidating support functions for the recruiting

commands. DOD has tasked the Military Entrance Processing Command

with taking the lead on a task force to study the concept. The task force

was scheduled to begin its work in October 1994.

Another consolidation idea that DOD has discussed but not acted on is joint

medical recruiting. Although some DOD officials believe that joint medical

recruiting would help the services solve problems in attracting qualified

medical personnel, most service recruiting commands are opposed to this

concept. Some services believe that their needs for medical personnel

differ from those of the other services and that it would therefore not be

feasible to recruit jointly.

Though the Air Force and the Navy initiated their own proposals for

consolidating active and reserve recruiting, they ultimately rejected these

proposals in favor of continuing their proven successful ways of doing

business. In January 1992, the Air Force began a formal discussion on

combining its active, reserve, and Guard recruiting in response to (1) a

Senate report on the National Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993

directing the services to consider consolidating their recruiting functions1

and (2) Air Force program policy guidance. After extensive meetings

involving Air Force recruiting personnel at all levels, the working group

proposed three options that involved combining active and reserve

recruiting. Two options involved staffing savings of 191 personnel; a third

involved staffing savings of 234. Despite the staffing savings proposed by

these three options, the Air Force decided to make no changes. On

March 2, 1993, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Manpower and

Installations, justified the Air Force’s decision as follows:

“Based on the significant successes of the AF’s Active and Reserve recruiting organizations

relative to the other Services; on the significant differences between their missions; on the

significant savings and streamlining steps already taken and on the significant potential for

reductions in recruiting quality and quantity should consolidation be further pursued, all

efforts to consolidate Active, Reserve, and/or Air National Guard recruiting organizations

should be terminated.”

In June 1993, the Navy also completed a study of the feasibility of

consolidating active and reserve recruiting. This study, like the Air Force’s,

1

This provision was not included in the House version of the bill or the law that was eventually

enacted.

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was initiated at least in part as a result of congressional interest in

possibilities for cost savings. Also like the Air Force, the Navy decided not

to merge what it says are two very different programs. Navy officials told

us that Navy Reserve enlistment requirements are almost exclusively for

experienced prior-service personnel, while the active Navy targets those

without prior service.

Services Have

Rejected Proposals to

Eliminate Recruiting

Management Layers

As the military services’ recruiting organizations have downsized, they

have reduced the size of different management layers, but they have not

eliminated any. Their recruiting structures, therefore, remain intact. For

example, the Air Force has reduced its numbers of recruiting groups,

squadrons, and flights. The Navy has reduced its numbers of recruiting

districts and zones. The Air Force, the Army, and the Navy have

considered but rejected proposals to eliminate similar management layers

to improve efficiency and save costs. While the particular proposals thus

far circulated may not represent optimum recruiting organizations,

potential economies of scale and other efficiencies may be available

through the elimination of command structure layers. (Fig. 3.2 shows the

various service recruiting management layers.)

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Figure 3.2: Organizational Recruiting Levels for the Military Services

Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force

Army Recruiting


Command

Brigade


(4)

Battalion


(40)

Company


(210)

Recruiting Station


(1,732)

Navy Recruiting


Command

Area


(5)

District


(31)

Zone


(195)

Recruiting Station


(1,428)

Recruiting 


Substation


(1,520)

Recruiting Station


(1,221)

Marine Corps


Recruiting 


Command

Region


(2)

District


(6)

Recruiting Station


(49)

Air Force


Recruiting Service

Group


(4)

Squadron


(29)

Flight


(172)

Note: Numbers of recruiting offices and substations are taken from the Recruiting Facilities

Management Information System as of June 21, 1994. They include (1) battalion, district, and

squadron offices; (2) company, zone, and flight offices and Marine Corps recruiting stations;

(3) full-time recruiting offices; and (4) part-time recruiting offices.

Navy officials told us that though the Navy has considered eliminating

management layers, it ultimately determined that no layer could be

eliminated without negatively affecting the recruiting organization’s

overall operations. The area level, in particular, has constantly been under

consideration for elimination. However, considering that span of control

difficulties already challenge the Navy Recruiting Commander, Navy

officials concluded that if the areas were eliminated, the Navy would not

have adequate command and control over its 31 districts. The Navy

believes that taking such a big step would severely reduce recruiting

efficiency.

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As part of their study of the feasibility of consolidating active and reserve

Air Force recruiting organizations, various options—all recommending the

elimination of the group level—were developed. The Air Force’s final

decision was to maintain its 4 groups, each typically staffed with 

18 officer and enlisted personnel and 1 civilian. Air Force Recruiting

Service officials told us that eliminating the groups would have positioned

the Recruiting Service Commander as the direct supervisor for 29

squadron commanders. In the officials’ opinion, this direct supervision

would have been an unmanageable task and, functionally, would have

required too much direct involvement by Recruiting Headquarters in

operational issues.

An internal Army command study concluded that the elimination of the

Army brigade level would enhance efficiency and save money. The same

study also identified areas of competing and overlapping responsibilities

and redundant functions in the command. Brigade officials disagreed with

the internal study’s findings and recommendations and stated that their

level is necessary for command and control of field operations.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on this chapter, DOD stated that we had failed to recognize

the depth of the services’ cuts since the drawdown and that to meet

increased 1996 recruiting goals, most services must add a complementary

mix of recruiters, advertising, and enlistment incentives. According to DOD,

this mix is determined with the help of analytical models and informed

judgment.

We recognize that the services have made overall cuts in the numbers of

personnel associated with recruiting. However, before DOD expands its

recruiter staff, it should reevaluate its efforts to improve recruiters’

productivity and quality of life through more investments in advertising

and (as discussed in the next chapter) evolving technology. The recent

RAND study recommends a hedging strategy pending the outcome of

additional research to determine how recruiting resource management

and recruiting practices—areas which are important in the recruiting

process—have changed during the drawdown. While this study initially

recommended that DOD augment advertising and ask Congress to remove

the ceiling on recruiters, it also recommended that the implementation and

effects of any increases in advertising or in the number of recruiters be

carefully monitored.

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In general, DOD’s policy is to acquire and maintain the fewest recruiting

facilities at the lowest cost adequate to support the recruiting mission.

However, DOD and the services have not questioned the one principle that

drives the establishment of recruiting offices throughout the United States

and overseas: that to recruit equitably, a physical recruiting presence in

widespread geographical areas must be maintained, even to the point of

maintaining offices that have produced few new recruits annually. The

military services currently operate nearly 6,000 recruiting stations in

leased facilities located throughout the United States, its possessions, and

overseas at a cost of more than $86 million annually in direct lease costs.

Since 1989, the services have reduced the number of recruiting facilities by

25 percent and total facilities costs by 12 percent by closing and

collocating offices and reducing the amount of office space that is leased

in excess of what is authorized. Alternatives to fixed facilities, some of

which include evolving technologies and modern sales techniques, appear

to be changing the role and diminishing the importance of the traditional

recruiting office.

Full-Time Recruiting

Offices and Evolving

Technology

Full-time recruiting offices are leased by the services and used by

recruiters to prospect for new recruits, administer aptitude screening

tests, assess applicant qualifications, prepare applicant documentation,

store and display recruiting literature and publicity material, and conduct

routine administrative tasks. These offices are now located to maximize

their (1) access to public transportation, (2) pedestrian traffic,

(3) visibility, and (4) proximity to schools and other areas where

military-aged men and women congregate.

The evolution of computer and communication technologies appears to be

changing some of the conditions underlying the role and need for the

number of fixed facilities required in the past. For example, the services

believe that recruiting offices must be located in areas of high visibility to

make the offices more accessible to walk-in traffic and to provide a form

of advertising. However, officials told us that the percentage of accessions

gained from walk-in traffic is quite low. The services have found that these

individuals generally do not have other employment options available to

them and are not qualified to enlist. This fact apparently represents a

change from the past, as evidenced by the following statement from the

Army Recruiting Command’s recruiting manual:

“Since the advent of the AVF [All Volunteer Force], prospecting [for recruits] has become a

critical element of our success. In the days of the draft, it was not uncommon for

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applicants to walk into a recruiting station ready, willing, and able to enlist. Today’s

environment is much different.”

DOD and the services have recognized that the realities of the marketplace

are changing the role of the recruiter and the recruiting office. For

example, the Army is currently studying ways to enhance recruiter

productivity and reduce reliance on permanent facilities through the

development and introduction of state-of-the-art sales management and

processing equipment. These include the use of portable telephones and

fax machines as well as laptop computers that provide interactive sales

presentations at any location, including an applicant’s home. According to

the Army, these systems will allow recruiters to move their recruiting

activities away from recruiting stations and into schools, other public

areas, and homes and provide full support for recruiters where most

recruiting occurs, that is, away from the recruiting station. Such systems

should permit the number of stations to be reduced. Army officials told us

that the fixed recruiting office could then be used simply to pick up

messages or to meet with supervisors.

Recruiting Facilities’

Costs Have Dropped

Since fiscal year 1989, the number of recruiting facilities and the cost of

maintaining them have dropped. In 1989, over 8,000 recruiting offices were

leased; currently, about 6,000 offices are leased. In 1989, the total facilities

program cost was $118.4 million; in 1994, the cost is $104.2 million. The

reductions in space and cost were made possible by closing and

collocating offices and eliminating excess space. These efforts were the

result of actions taken by the Joint Recruiting Facilities Committee.

Program officials recognize the need to continue to improve the

management of the facilities program and intend to (1) continue the

cost/excess space reduction program, (2) implement consolidation efforts

wherever applicable, (3) validate all high-cost offices, and (4) review and

revise space standards.

Costs Associated With

Excess Office Space

The Corps of Engineers has been directed, as Executive Agent for

acquiring and maintaining recruiting facilities, to establish and execute a

program that reduces the cost of rent through the elimination of excess

space. The Corps’ guidance and a DOD directive establish uniform policies

and procedures for acquiring space for recruiting offices at all levels. DOD

and the Corps of Engineers stipulate how much square footage is

authorized for each type of office and the types of personnel who will

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occupy it. According to the Corps of Engineers’ guidance, every effort

should be made not to exceed the net authorized footage by more than

25 percent for multi-person recruiting facilities or by more than 50 percent

for full-time one- or two-person recruiting offices. DOD and the Corps

recognize that it is not always possible to acquire space that exactly fits

authorized footage, but they discourage excess space through these

limitations.

Although many recruiting facilities occupy less space than authorized by

the Corps of Engineers, our analysis of information in the Recruiting

Facilities Management Information System showed that overall the

services maintain excess office space. For example, in fiscal year 1994, the

services were maintaining more than 1,000,000 square feet of office space

over the amount they were assigned. Our calculation, which was based on

the average cost per square foot, showed that this excess space costs over

$17 million to maintain. According to DOD, the estimated 1,000,000 square

feet of space includes space required for common areas, such as hallways

and bathrooms, and that an average of 25 percent of the net authorized

space is allowed for common areas. DOD estimated that the total office

space for recruiting facilities currently exceeded the net authorized by 

33 percent or 8 percent over that allowed for common areas. According to

DOD, the 8 percent costs approximately $5 million.

The Philadelphia Project On January 28, 1994, DOD initiated a pilot project in Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania, as part of its effort to further reduce facility costs. DOD

chose Philadelphia for this project because recruiting offices in the area

had extensive amounts of excess space, were poorly located or

deteriorating, or were involved in unresolved disputes with landlords.

The pilot project involved comparing the cost of the 15 existing recruiting

facilities with 2 alternatives. Under the first alternative, the 15 offices in

the Philadelphia area would be collocated into 6 new ones. (The option

excludes from consolidation offices for battalions, districts, Marine Corps

officer stations, the Army company commander, and nurse recruiters.)

Under the second alternative, some already established stations would be

upgraded, some new stations would be opened, and others would be

closed.

DOD’s annual cost for the 15 facilities is about $398,000. Option 1 would

cost DOD about $326,000 after the first year, a savings of approximately

$71,000 annually, assuming there are no yearly increases in rent or

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services. Option 2 would cost about $314,000 after the first year, for an

annual savings of about $96,000.

Although several revisions have been made as a result of comments from

the services and others, DOD is seriously considering collocating the 

15 recruiting offices into 6 offices. We were told that the concept of the

Philadelphia project might in the future be considered for the cities of

New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles.

Services Are

Constrained by

Principle of

Geographic Coverage

One basic assumption underlying the military services’ recruiting

philosophies appears to drive much of their fixed recruiting costs. The

services believe that they must recruit equitably across the geographic

expanse of the country, and to do so they maintain 6,000 recruiting offices

throughout the country. They maintain these offices despite the fact that

some offices have not been productive. For example, according to some

Air Force recruiting officials, the Air Force would not need recruiting

offices in many areas of the country to meet its quota for 30,000 enlisted

accessions per year. However, because it accepts the principle of national

coverage, the Air Force stretches its recruiting resources thinly. According

to the Commander of the Air Force Recruiting Service in congressional

testimony on April 14, 1994, 981 full-time recruiter offices were distributed

in all 50 states and in several overseas locations, 645 of which had only 

1 active-duty Air Force recruiter.

If DOD needs to achieve further savings, it could consider closing

supervisory offices and offices in the least productive areas of the country

and using alternative recruiting methods. The services are beginning to

identify alternatives to leased facilities that would enable recruiters to be

as productive but at less cost.

Supervisory Offices Are

Costly

According to DOD, the lease cost for its nearly 6,000 facilities is about

$86 million for fiscal year 1994. Our analysis of information in the

Recruiting Facilities Management Information System covered $76 million

of this amount. Of the total number of facilities the services maintained in

fiscal year 1994, about 420 were separate offices for recruiters’ immediate

supervisors, and over 100 were separate offices for the next higher level of

supervisor. Offices for immediate supervisors cost $7.7 million, and offices

for the next level of supervisors cost $5.3 million, for a total of $13 million

annually.

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It is DOD’s policy to assign recruiters’ supervisors separate office space to

ensure fair treatment of their recruiters. The services, as a general rule,

encourage this policy. According to a DOD official who manages the

facilities program, all the Army’s, and about half of the Navy’s and Air

Force’s supervisory personnel occupy separate office space. The Marine

Corps, on the other hand, locates its supervisors in the same offices as its

recruiters.

According to a DOD official who manages the facilities program, because of

base closures and realignments, DOD has located some of its “main

stations” in space that is federally owned or is leased. Main stations are the

offices of those one level above the recruiter’s immediate supervisor.

If the services were to either collocate supervisors with recruiters or

relocate supervisors to existing offices on military bases or less expensive

space, DOD could reduce its facility leasing costs.

Services Maintain Offices

in Relatively Unproductive

Areas

The services have closed some recruiting offices in relatively unproductive

areas and moved offices to new locations. They also have concentrated

offices in areas of high productivity. But the services’ policy of maintaining

national coverage limits how much more they can do to reduce facilities’

costs. The relative productivity of recruiters (in terms of the numbers of

recruits they produce over a period of time) does not appear to be a

primary criterion for maintaining recruiting offices in their current

locations.

Our analysis of the relative cost of recruiting offices in various counties in

the United States was based on data from two sources: the Military

Entrance Processing Command’s database of accessions per county for

the United States and the Recruiting Facilities Management Information

System, which contains the costs of facilities. The Command’s data did not

include information on accessions per recruiting station. Therefore, we

tracked accessions by county and calculated the cost of facilities in each

county. Our database contained accessions from the 1,036 counties in the

United States where recruiting offices are located.

Our analysis showed that recruiting productivity is highest in areas of high

population density. It also showed that offices in the most highly

productive counties account for the bulk of the services’ accessions. For

example, according to our analysis, recruiting offices in the most

productive 25 percent of the counties accounted for about 70 percent of all

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accessions for the first 5 months of fiscal year 1994. Conversely, offices in

the least productive 25 percent of counties produced less than 4 percent of

DOD’s accessions for the period. Offices in the least productive 50 percent

of counties generated about 13.5 percent of accessions.

If DOD wanted to further reduce its recruiting costs, it could consider

closing or consolidating offices in its least productive counties and rely on

one or more of the alternatives to maintaining fixed recruiting offices. For

example, if the services had closed offices in the least productive 

25 percent of counties, they could have saved about $5 million in 1994

lease costs. The 1,100 recruiters in these offices could have been

reassigned to other recruiting locations. If the services had closed offices

in its least productive 50 percent of counties, it could have saved

$13.3 million in annual lease costs and reassigned 2,800 recruiters.

Our analysis also showed that between fiscal years 1991 and 1993, a large

number of counties produced only one recruit per year. This trend

continued into fiscal year 1994, as almost 28 percent of the counties in our

analysis produced only one recruit during the first 5 months. Figure 4.1

shows the most and least productive counties in the United States for the

first 5 months of fiscal year 1994. County lines are drawn for the 

1,036 counties in the United States where recruiting offices are located. In

areas where no county lines are drawn, there are no recruiting offices, or

Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) data were incomplete.

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Figure 4.1: Relative Productivity of Counties in the United States in Numbers of Accessions

Accessions

28 to 61

61 to 1807

1 to 14

14 to 28

Counties

274

259

259

244

Source: GAO’S analysis of MEPCOM data.

Lease costs for recruiting offices tend to increase with population density.

However, the distribution of productivity leads to wide disparities in the

cost per recruit. For example, in the first 5 months of fiscal year 1994, the

lease cost per recruit ranged from $18 to $14,355. As expected, unit costs

decrease with increasing productivity. The office where the cost per

recruit was lowest produced 26 recruits during the period; the two offices

where the cost per recruit was highest produced only 1 each. The least

productive 25 percent of counties had an average lease cost of almost 

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$900 per recruit, while the most productive 25 percent of counties had an

average cost of $350 per recruit.

Alternatives to

Fixed-Station Recruiting

Service officials have suggested a number of alternatives to maintaining

recruiting offices in unproductive areas without sacrificing either the

quality or quantity of recruits. We discuss two examples in this report.

Army recruiting officials told us that in certain less productive areas, a

fixed recruiting presence may not be needed. Instead, the Army could use

teams of traveling recruiters using recreational-type vehicles to visit these

areas on a periodic basis preceded by local advertising. This is called the

“wolfpack” concept. Similar to this method is the idea of “island

recruiting,” whereby small recruiting stations in relatively nonproductive

areas would be consolidated. These ideas have been discussed among

nonpolicy-making officials in the Army Recruiting Command; they have

not been fully developed or endorsed by upper level officials. Currently,

the Army’s Recruiting Support Command uses recreational-type vehicles

to make presentations to potential recruits. However, the presenters do

not take enlistment applications.

In an effort to close “itinerary stops,” or part-time recruiting offices that

are used only 1 or 2 days per week, the Air Force Recruiting Service has

considered the use of “Recruiting Vehicles (RV)” as mobile recruiting

stations. An RV, which would contain computers and communications

gear, would allow recruiters to visit communities in areas not conveniently

located near fixed recruiting stations. The Air Force Recruiting Service

told us it cannot afford these RVs at present. Air Force officials believe

that, in the current budget environment, the earliest they envision even a

test program using these vehicles would be 4 or 5 years from now. In the

meantime, it continues to lease facilities for offices that are unproductive

or marginally productive.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

While acknowledging that representation across America is a

consideration of some military services, DOD stated that there are no

efforts to ensure “equitable” geographic representation. DOD further stated

that the number of recruiters and location of recruiting offices are based

on the population of potential recruits in a specific geographic area and

that potential recruiter productivity is the primary concern in locating

recruiters.

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Although at an agencywide level DOD may not have any efforts to ensure

geographic representation, individual service recruiting command officials

told us that their decisions concerning where to open or close recruiting

offices are based on two principles: first, to offer enlistment opportunities

to all qualified Americans, regardless of where they live; and second, to

make recruiters physically available to offer those opportunities to

potential recruits. As indicated by our analysis of the productivity of

recruiting offices as now located, adherence to these principles may be

putting DOD in a situation where it is not capitalizing on more cost-effective

ways to recruit.

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Conclusions and Recommendations

Despite DOD’s downsizing of forces, the military services still need to

recruit thousands of quality men and women each year. To do this, the

services rely on a recruiting system built around public awareness through

advertising and enlistments through personal contacts.

The services predict that their recruiting goals will be more difficult to

achieve in the future because of smaller target markets and the reduced

propensity of young people to join the military. In addition, continued high

attrition of first-term recruits keeps enlistment goals high. To compensate,

the services are asking for more funds for advertising and more recruiters.

We believe the services have overstated the difficulties they may

experience in meeting enlistment goals. The number of people in the

recruiters’ target market is predicted to grow over the rest of the decade,

and the percentage of the market that DOD needs to enlist is decreasing.

Although overall positive responses to DOD’s propensity survey are at their

lowest levels in 15 years, these results do not necessarily indicate that

accession targets (for both quantity and quality) will not be met. In

addition, DOD appears not to have made serious attempts to tackle the

first-term attrition problem despite promising results from several isolated

studies.

We also believe that the services have not done all they can to make their

current recruiting operations more efficient and have not given serious

consideration to past recommendations aimed at eliminating

organizational layers. Some services suggest adding recruiters as the

principal means to achieve future enlistments, despite (1) indications in

studies that additional investments in advertising could be more

cost-effective than additional recruiters and (2) the fact that recruiters are

not as productive as they could be because of current quota systems.

Finally, DOD seems to recognize that fixed recruiting facilities are no longer

crucial for contacting and enlisting potential recruits, yet it has not been

aggressive in adopting cost-efficient alternatives involving the

consolidation of facilities in urban areas and the closing of facilities in less

productive areas.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the

military services to take the following steps to make their recruiting

programs more cost-effective before they request more funds for

additional recruiters or advertising:

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Conclusions and Recommendations

• in allocating resources, use the results of current studies, and undertake

additional efforts if necessary, to develop a more cost-effective mix of

available recruiting resources, including advertising, recruiters, bonuses,

and other elements affecting recruiting;

• aggressively test ideas to reduce first-term attrition;

• continue efforts to streamline the current recruiting bureaucracy,

eliminating layers where possible;

• revalidate the recruiting quota systems, which currently deter recruiters

from maximizing their numbers of enlistments;

• encourage the development and expansion, as appropriate, of concepts

such as the “Philadelphia project,” in the management of military

recruiting facilities; and

• routinely incorporate more in-depth cost-benefit analyses in decisions to

maintain or establish new recruiting offices and to evaluate the costs and

benefits of maintaining offices in less productive areas of the country.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD concurred or partially concurred with our six recommendations and

responded that it is committed to using modern and effective business

practices to attract and enlist young people and therefore plans to

continue to give priority to the ongoing evaluation of recruiting

organizational structures, consolidation of resources, and adaptation of

new technologies. While DOD agrees with the need to reduce first-term

attrition, streamline the bureaucracy, and encourage new concepts in the

management of recruiting facilities, it does not want to commit to major

changes before reviewing the results of several evaluative efforts recently

started.

We appreciate the need for DOD to complete certain recently initiated

studies before changes are initiated in some areas. However, we continue

to believe that (1) more aggressive efforts than those cited by DOD are

needed to lower attrition losses on a DOD-wide basis and thus minimize the

resources required to support the services’ recruiting and training

operations; (2) the services should reevaluate the need for management

layers that previous studies have concluded could be eliminated,

particularly since a recently initiated study to examine the consolidation

of logistics support functions for the service recruiting commands could

result in reduced workloads at those layers; and (3) if tests prove

successful, expansion of the experimental process for consolidating

recruiting facilities in large metropolitan areas should be pursued rapidly.

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Specific DOD comments on each recommendation and our views, where

appropriate, follow:

• DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop a more cost-effective

mix of recruiting resources. It said the RAND Corporation is conducting

research to ascertain how recruiting outcomes and their determinants

have changed in the recent past and to recommend changes in policies,

practices, and resource management, if necessary, to ensure adequate

numbers and quality of future recruits. According to DOD, the results of this

study are expected by October 1995. We believe this recently initiated

study is important because past research has shown that these areas can

have significant effects on recruiting.

• DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to reduce first-term

attrition. It said that its ongoing efforts were more diverse than we

recognized. It said that the military services have been and are engaging in

research and operational programs related to attrition with continuing

efforts to (1) develop measures of adaptability to military life, (2) improve

the prediction of training success and job performance, and (3) better

manage personnel in the DEP. We fully acknowledge that a number of

studies of attrition have been done and others are ongoing. Nevertheless,

attrition remained relatively high from 1980 to 1994 regardless of

prevailing economic conditions or the quality level of the force. In our

opinion, isolating the causal links for attrition is key to reducing attrition

rates.

• DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the military

services should continue to streamline their current recruiting

bureaucracy, eliminating layers where possible. It said that the services

have placed heavy emphasis on evaluation of their recruiting structures

during the drawdown; reducing management layers and streamlining

overhead. DOD also said it recognizes that continued evaluation of

recruiting structures and business practices is essential. According to DOD,

an Office of the Secretary of Defense-directed study, led by the MEPCOM,

was initiated to evaluate consolidation of recruiting support functions of

the service recruiting organizations. The study should be completed by

June 1995 and is to include an evaluation of joint advertising and

promotional support of the service recruiting organizations. We endorse

the recruiting support function study cited by DOD and further believe that

the services should, in conjunction with this effort, reexamine those

completed studies that recommended the elimination of management

layers in service recruiting organizations.

• DOD concurred with our recommendation to revalidate the recruiting quota

systems, which currently deter recruiters from maximizing their numbers

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Chapter 5 

Conclusions and Recommendations

of enlistments. It said that to revalidate recruiter quota systems, the RAND

Corporation has been asked to research recruiter incentive systems to

determine their current relevance and effectiveness. Also, the Army is

eliminating individual recruiter quotas in fiscal year 1995 and will

encourage each recruiter to write as many contracts as possible. We

endorse the examination of the services’ recruiting quota systems and the

Army’s decision to eliminate individual quotas following its evaluation of

this area—an effort that was ongoing during our fieldwork.

• DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to encourage the

development and expansion, as appropriate, of concepts such as the

Philadelphia Project in the management of military recruiting facilities. It

said that the Philadelphia Project is an experimental process, and while

the approach appears promising, the Joint Recruiting Facilities Committee

will not complete its evaluation of the project and lessons learned until the

end of 1994. The Committee has targeted a similar project for New York

and Chicago in fiscal year 1996 pending an evaluation of the Philadelphia

effort at the end of 1994. If this project proves to be successful, we believe

the concept should be implemented in appropriate metropolitan areas on a

expedited basis.

• DOD concurred with our recommendation to routinely incorporate more

in-depth benefit analyses in decisions to maintain or establish new

recruiting offices and to evaluate the costs and benefits of maintaining

offices in less productive areas of the country. It said that to evaluate the

costs and benefits of maintaining or establishing new recruiting offices,

the Joint Recruiting Facilities Committee will combine marketing

information with the recruiting facilities database and evaluate the relative

cost-effectiveness of the services’ recruiting offices. According to DOD, this

effort has begun and is expected to evolve into an integrated information

support system for resource decisions. We believe this system, if properly

implemented, could materially improve the cost-effectiveness of the

services’ recruiting facilities program management by eliminating

marginally productive leased office space and could help to optimize the

allocation and assignment of recruiter resources.

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix I 

Service Recruiting Organizations

The current Department of Defense (DOD) establishment for recruiting

enlisted personnel consists primarily of nine service recruiting

organizations1

 and one major support agency, the Military Entrance

Processing Command (MEPCOM).2

 To meet the enlisted mission, recruiting

organizations employ approximately 22,000 full-time personnel: more than

13,000 production recruiters and supervisors and 9,000 headquarters and

other personnel, about 3,000 of whom are MEPCOM personnel who induct

and medically process military recruits. Recruiting field operations consist

of more than 6,000 recruiting stations or site locations, in both leased and

government-owned facilities located throughout the United States, its

possessions, and overseas.

Army Recruiting

Structure

The U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), established in 1964, is

charged with meeting the Army’s requirements for enlisted and certain

officer accessions. The command is multilayered, consisting of a

headquarters and a field organization that itself contains 4 brigade

headquarters, 40 battalions, 210 companies, and 1,7323

 recruiting stations

(see fig. I.1).

1

These nine recruiting organizations include (1) the Air Force Recruiting Service, which is part of the

Air Education and Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas; (2) the Air Force Recruiting

Directorate, Air Force Reserve Headquarters, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia; (3) the Air National

Guard Recruiting and Retention Division, Air National Guard Readiness Center, Andrews Air Force

Base, Maryland; (4) the Navy Recruiting Command, Arlington, Virginia; (5) the Naval Reserve

Recruiting Command, New Orleans, Louisiana; (6) the Marine Corps Recruiting Command,

Washington, D.C.; (7) the Marine Corps Reserve Recruiting Command, Overland Park, Kansas; (8) the

Army Recruiting Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky; and (9) the Army National Guard, Arlington,

Virginia.

2

MEPCOM headquarters is located in Great Lakes, Illinois.

3

This total includes company, battalion, full-time, and part-time offices.

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix I 

Service Recruiting Organizations

Figure I.1: U.S. Army Recruiting Command and Brigades

USAREC is commanded by a major general and is responsible for the

worldwide recruiting of Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Special Mission

personnel.4

 It develops strategic plans, determines policies, and manages

subordinate command operations, including a nationwide advertising

program. Field operations are overseen at headquarters by the Deputy

Commanding General. Each recruiting brigade is commanded by a colonel

and performs managerial, administrative, operational, budgetary,

promotional, and logistical functions and serves as the liaison between the

command and the field. Battalions actively command and support

recruiting efforts by their assigned companies and stations and also

4

Special Mission personnel are health professionals such as Army Nurse Corps and Veterinary Corps

members.

Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix I 

Service Recruiting Organizations

provide administrative and managerial support. Each company consists of

a captain assisted by a first sergeant, who develops and executes plans to

ensure mission accomplishment. Companies are in daily contact with

production recruiters at the stations. Stations are located in communities

nationwide and carry out the mission of recruiting eligible candidates.

Navy Recruiting

Structure

The U.S. Navy Recruiting Command, which is located in Arlington,

Virginia, consists of a headquarters and a field organization that contains 

5 area headquarters, 31 districts, 195 zones, and 1,4285

 recruiting stations

(see fig. I.2).

5

This number includes zone, district, full-time, and part-time offices.

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix I 

Service Recruiting Organizations

Figure I.2: U.S. Navy Recruiting Command and Area Headquarters

The headquarters is commanded by a one-star admiral and is responsible

for the worldwide recruiting of men and women for enlisted, officer

candidate, and officer status in the Regular and Reserve components of

the Navy. The headquarters level develops policy, coordinates and

supervises Navy Recruiting Command support personnel, provides public

affairs guidance as required, responds to media inquiries regarding

recruiting matters, disseminates information concerning Navy and

command policies, and allocates resources necessary to achieve stated

command objectives.

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix I 

Service Recruiting Organizations

Area headquarters commanders are O-6s (captains) and coordinate and

oversee public affairs activities; provide guidance, training, and assistance

to district commanding officers in developing and executing public affairs

plans; identify issues and situations with potential impact on Navy

recruiting; provide responses to media inquiries concerning recruiting

matters; and allocate resources as necessary.

Navy recruiting district commanding officers are all O-5s (commanders)

and basically carry out the same type of recruiting activities as do the

Navy recruiting area commanders except within the assigned district.

Navy recruiting zones are headed by a Master Chief Petty Officer (an

E-9) or a Senior Chief Petty Officer (an E-8). Recruiting zones also employ

career recruiting personnel. This cadre of personnel does nothing but

recruit. The zone supervisor is responsible for 25 to 30 recruiters and

sometimes more, depending on the size of the zone’s geographical area.

Below the zone supervisory level are the stations. This level is made up of

recruiters functioning in the field. Navy stations are located throughout

communities worldwide and carry out the mission of recruiting eligible

men and women into the Navy.

Marine Corps’

Recruiting Structure

Effective January 1, 1994, the Marine Corps established the Marine Corps

Recruiting Command, which is located at the Marine Corps Headquarters,

at the Navy Annex in Arlington, Virginia. The new Command includes 2

regions, 6 districts, 49 recruiting stations, and 1,5206

 recruiting substations

(see fig. I.3).

6

This total includes recruiting station, district, full-time, and part-time offices.

Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix I 

Service Recruiting Organizations

Figure I.3: Marine Corps Recruiting Command and Regions

The Marine Corps’ recruiting organization is responsible for recruiting all

active-duty Marines and all nonprior-service Marines for the reserves. The

Command is headed by a major general. A brigadier general is located at

Parris Island, South Carolina, to head the Eastern recruiting region, while

another is located in San Diego, California, to head the Western recruiting

region.

Air Force Recruiting

Structure

The Air Force Recruiting Service is part of the Air Education and Training

Command, located at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas. It is responsible for

the recruitment of enlisted personnel, officers, and health professionals

into the active-duty component of the Air Force. The Recruiting Service

Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix I 

Service Recruiting Organizations

consists of a headquarters, 4 groups, 29 squadrons, 172 flights, and 

1,2217

 recruiting stations (see fig. I.4).

Figure I.4: Air Force Recruiting Service Headquarters and Groups

The headquarters, which is commanded by a major general, is made up of

operations, health professions, and support divisions. Consisting of 165

personnel, the headquarters oversees the 4 recruiting groups.

Headquarters establishes policy and procedures and provides guidance to

group management. Headquarters also provides assistance to the field in

the areas of advertising and promotion, flow/trend analysis, personnel, and

resources.

7

This total includes flight, squadron, full-time, and part-time offices.

Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix I 

Service Recruiting Organizations

The typical recruiting group is headed by a colonel and consists of about

19 personnel. As part of its supervisory duties over six to eight squadrons,

a group is responsible for executing all training workshops; for managing

squadron commanders, medical flight supervisors, and operations officers

and noncommissioned officers; for advertising and promotion; and for

allocating recruiting goals to the squadrons.

The typical squadron, which consists of about 21 staff, is headed by a

major or lieutenant colonel who reports to the group’s commander. A

squadron is responsible for five to seven flights, each of which is typically

120 miles from the squadron commander. Among its supervisory duties,

the squadron assigns its flights recruiting goals. The squadron commander

is responsible for meeting the squadron’s recruiting mission and for

managing 60 to 70 personnel and associated facilities and operations and

maintenance funds.

A flight, which is a unit of five to seven recruiters, is headed by a master

sergeant (E-7) or technical sergeant (E-6), who reports to the squadron

commander. This flight supervisor assigns individual recruiting goals and

provides on-the-job training to recruiters. A recruiter typically works

about 60 miles from the flight supervisor.

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 1.

Page 64 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 2, 12, and 13.

Page 65 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 13-14.

See comment 2.

Now on pp. 2 and 14.

Page 66 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 14-15.

See comment 3.

Now on pp. 15-18.

Page 67 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 3-4 and

21-25.

See comment 4.

See comment 5.

Page 68 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 6.

Now on pp. 26-27.

See comment 7.

Page 69 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 8.

Now on pp. 28-29.

Page 70 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 30-32.

See comment 9.

Now on pp. 35-36.

See comment 10.

Page 71 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 11.

See comment 12.

See comment 13.

Page 72 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 38-39.

See comment 14.

Now on pp. 40-41.

Page 73 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 43-44.

See comment 15.

See comment 16.

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Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 44-45.

See comment 17.

See comment 18.

Page 75 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 46-50.

Page 76 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 19.

See comment 20.

Now on pp. 5 and 53.

Now on pp. 5 and 53.

Page 77 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5 and 53.

Now on pp. 5 and 53.

Page 78 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5 and 53.

Now on pp. 6 and 53.

Page 79 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 80 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are comments on DOD’s letter dated October 7, 1994.

GAO Comments 1. We have discussed and addressed all appropriate DOD and service

initiatives that deal with the issues considered in this report and that were

available and in a usable state of completion at the time our review was

done.

2. The DEP is discussed in the first two chapters of this report, but it is not

addressed in an evaluative context.

3. We are not suggesting that advertising be used as an indication of

efficiency. This section in the introduction chapter simply describes the

funding history of advertising and summarizes service and DOD views of its

usefulness.

4. This population chart does indeed use two sets of data—one derived

from the 1980 U.S. census and the other from the 1990 U.S. census. The

use of both was necessary to reflect the trend of the youth pool available

for recruiting from 1980 to 2000. This information was provided to us by

DOD and was the most current available when we did our review and when

DOD submitted its official response to our draft report. Further, DOD’s

comment that a decrease in the propensity of youth to enlist caused more

recruiting challenges during the early 1990s is misleading. Actually,

RAND’s May 1994 study found that propensity for high quality

youth—those targeted by DOD for enlistment—appears to have stabilized at

pre-drawdown levels and, in fact, increased at one point in the early 1990s.

5. Since DOD recruits few non-high school graduates (service goals allow

just 1 to 5 percent annually), the fact that Hispanics—who, according to

DOD, have lower graduation rates than other ethnic groups—will make up

more of the target pool would appear to have a minimal effect on attrition.

Further, according to historical Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS)

data, Hispanic youth have one of the highest positive propensity rates of

any of the groups tracked by DOD.

6. An increase in the number of high school graduates who will attend

college should have limited impact on the target pool because a

substantial number of college students drop out (for a variety of reasons)

during the first year and thus effectively remain in the available population

pool of quality high school graduates.

Page 81 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

7. DOD implies that a basic shift or change in negative and positive

propensity has occurred, which will require that more people be recruited

from the negative category, thereby causing effort and cost to rise as

accessions increase to a steady state recruiting environment. A recent

study by RAND suggests this may not be the case because (1) the

projected youth supply available to meet the increased accession goals for

1996 equals or exceeds that available in the late 1980s or before the

drawdown started and (2) the propensity of the high quality youth targeted

by DOD for recruiting appears to have stabilized at pre-drawdown levels.

Further, the majority of youth available for enlistment have, historically,

expressed negative propensity—yet about half of all recruits have come

from this category.

8. As noted in comment 7 above, propensity for the high quality youth

targeted by DOD does not appear to have decreased. These YATS factors

have been stable or increased positively in recent years. Further, contrary

to DOD’s assertions about the negative impact of downsizing on recruiting,

81 percent of the respondents to the 1993 YATS (an increase from

1992) state that downsizing would not affect their enlistment propensity.

9. Our basic observations on the attrition rate are that (1) attrition

remained relatively stable from 1980 to 1994 regardless of prevailing

economic conditions or the quality level of the force and (2) DOD and the

services have not yet successfully isolated causal links needed to fully

evaluate attrition. We recognize DOD efforts to study attrition; however, we

believe that, if potentially significant savings in recruiting and training

resources are to be realized from a reduced attrition rate, the causal links

for attrition must be identified and addressed. Caption for Finding I was

subsequently revised by GAO.

10. We recognize that staffing cuts and limited reorganizations have been

made in the recruiting organizations; however, our point is that the basic

structure has remained intact, and efforts to eliminate management layers

and consolidate functions or organizations have not been implemented.

Further, there are now plans to increase the number of recruiting

personnel.

11. DOD has not offered credible evidence that substantial additional

resources will be required to achieve the planned increase in accessions.

The number of potential recruits available through 1996 is estimated to

equal or exceed the level available in 1989, when more than 293,000

recruits were enlisted, a level substantially above that planned for 1996.

Page 82 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

12. DOD agreed with our recommendation that the service quota systems

need to be reevaluated and stated that an effort to accomplish this, and

evaluate incentive systems as well, is now underway. We have already

discussed the extent of the evolving management changes. For example,

we acknowledge that the Army was experimenting with changes to its

quota system at the time of our review.

13. RAND recently concluded that important changes in resource

management and recruiting practices during the drawdown years are the

likely cause of difficulties now reported by the services. Planned

additional research by RAND into these areas could well show a positive

effect on recruiters’ quality of life. While an additional responsibility, voter

registration may affect the recruiting mission in a positive way by

providing a solid, civics-based means for recruiters to establish additional

face-to-face contacts with the target youth population.

14. The report has been changed to reflect more clearly that the Office of

the Secretary of Defense rejected consolidation of recruiting organizations

based on the adverse comments received from the individual services and

that the services did not acknowledge the merits of consolidating

advertising functions. However, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has

directed a new study to examine joint recruiting support concepts that

does include advertising and promotional support as an area to be

evaluated.

15. We cite pedestrian or “walk in” traffic as one of four basic factors used

by the services to locate recruiting offices, not the primary factor.

16. Our most recent reports on the CIM initiative are (1) AIMD/NSIAD-94-101,

April 12, 1994, and (2) NSIAD-95-25, October 21, 1994.

17. The excess space information presented in the report was provided to

us by DOD from the database maintained for leased recruiting facilities. The

information included data fields for assigned space and excess space but,

did not distinguish between space that exceeded the “net authorized” for

common areas and truly excess space. Additional information on facility

space has been added to the report.

18. We did not intend to imply that it was possible or necessarily practical

to eliminate all excess space in recruiting facilities, and we fully recognize

the types of situations DOD mentions. However, as cited in chapter 4,

facility program officials acknowledge the need to continue to improve

Page 83 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

management in this area through efforts to reduce excess space,

implement consolidation efforts, and review and revise space standards. In

addition, DOD agreed with our recommendation to develop the capability to

better analyze the cost-effectiveness of offices maintained in less

productive areas of the country. This should result in fewer offices overall

and less excess space as well.

19. Our analysis of recruiting facilities indicated that most supervisory

offices are located in leased facilities and not on military installations or

other government property.

20. In early May 1994, the Air Force officially informed us that a request

had been submitted to purchase an RV for each of the 29 recruiting

squadrons. According to the Air Force, the RV would (1) provide the

civilian community with the benefit of having a mobile recruiting facility in

its area instead of having to drive 2 or 3 hours to the nearest fixed facility

and (2) save leasing costs expended on maintaining the itinerary stops.

The Air Force subsequently stated that mobile recruiting offices could best

be characterized as an idea with potential that could not be afforded at the

present time. As cited in the report, the Air Force concluded that the

earliest even a test program could be envisioned would be 4 or 5 years

from now.

Page 84 GAO/NSIAD-95-22 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Norman Rabkin

Foy Wicker

Irene Robertson

Beverly Schladt

David Michaels

Carole Coffey

Jai Lee

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