Filed 9/13/23 P. v. Heim CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JACOB DANIEL HEIM,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D080735

 (Super. Ct. No. SCD290089)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

David L. Berry, Judge. Affirmed.

John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy 

Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

The People charged appellant Jacob Daniel Heim with six counts of 

committing lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, 

subd. (a)) and one count of exhibiting to a minor harmful matter depicting 
2

sexual conduct of a minor (Pen. Code, § 288.2, subd. (a)), along with two 

aggravating circumstances as to each count (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

4.421(a)(3), (a)(11)). 

During pre-trial hearings, Heim presented his sovereign citizen beliefs 

to the trial court and argued the court lacked jurisdiction over him. The 

court ordered a psychiatric evaluation of Heim. The psychiatrist determined 

that although Heim held sovereign citizen beliefs, he did not suffer from 

mental illness that caused such beliefs, and he was competent to stand trial.

Heim’s appointed defense counsel stated he had spoken with Heim and had 

no doubt as to his competence. 

On two occasions prior to trial, Heim waived his right to counsel after 

extensive warning from the trial court. The trial court found that his waiver 

was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 

Heim proceeded to trial without an attorney. He took an active role in 

voir dire, questioned some witnesses, and made a closing argument, arguing 

that the prosecution’s case left doubt as to his guilt. The jury found Heim 

guilty on all counts and found true both aggravating circumstances as to all 

counts. 

Despite his repeated assertions to the trial court that he understood the 

proceedings and desired to represent himself, Heim now argues the trial 

court erred under federal and state law by allowing him to represent himself. 

We disagree and conclude: (1) by permitting Heim to represent himself, the 

trial court did not commit federal constitutional error because Heim was 

competent to stand trial and made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent 

waiver of counsel; and (2) California provides courts discretion to deny a 

competent-to-stand-trial defendant his right to self-representation when 

severe mental illness prevents him from accomplishing the basic tasks 
3

necessary to present a defense, and Heim has conceded that he did not suffer 

from a severe mental illness. Consequently, we affirm the judgment.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Heim was charged with six counts of committing lewd acts on a child 

under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) and one count of 

exhibiting to a minor harmful matter depicting sexual conduct of a minor 

(Pen. Code, § 288.2, subd. (a)). The People further alleged two aggravating 

circumstances: that Heim took advantage of a position of trust and 

confidence in the commission of these crimes (Cal. Rules of Court, rule

4.421(a)(11)) and that the victim was particularly vulnerable (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 4.421(a)(3)). We omit the facts underlying these offenses because

they are not challenged on appeal or relevant to our resolution of the issues 

presented.

On December 3, 2021, the trial court held a hearing regarding Heim’s 

decision to represent himself. The Deputy Public Defender representing 

Heim had provided him with a Lopez waiver; counsel provided Heim’s waiver 

to the court. (See People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568, 571 (Lopez) 

[Courts should provide certain warnings “designed to ensure a clear record of 

a defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel.”]; People v. Koontz

(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1070 [Citing Lopez and describing the proper 

warnings: “First, the court recommended the defendant be cautioned (a) that 

self-representation is ‘almost always unwise,’ and the defendant may conduct 

a defense ‘ “ultimately to his own detriment” ’ [citation]; (b) that the 

defendant will receive no special indulgence by the court and is required to 

follow all the technical rules of substantive law, criminal procedure and 

evidence in making motions and objections, presenting evidence and 

argument, and conducting voir dire; (c) that the prosecution will be 
4

represented by a trained professional who will give the defendant no quarter 

on account of his lack of skill and experience; and (d) that the defendant will 

receive no more library privileges than those available to any other selfrepresented defendant, or any additional time to prepare. Second, the Lopez

court recommended that trial judges inquire into the defendant’s education 

and familiarity with legal procedures, suggesting a psychiatric examination 

in questionable cases.”].) 

At the hearing, the trial court questioned Heim about his education and 

background. Heim explained that he received a bachelor’s degree, worked in 

banking for four years, and then worked for an airline for 10 years. The trial 

court then questioned Heim about the charges and maximum sentence he 

faced, explaining that “it’s important to know these things if you’re going to 

represent yourself.” Heim accurately responded that he was charged with 

five counts, including lewd counts, for a maximum of 16 years. The trial 

court asked Heim if he had any legal experience, and Heim answered that he 

did not. 

The trial court then had the following exchange with Heim:

The court: . . . So this would be a first time. You’re looking 

at 16 years [in] prison. You do understand that you have 

an attorney who went to law school, who’s been practicing 

for some time, who’s handled very complex cases. You have 

that attorney available to you free of charge. You 

understand that?

[Heim]: I do.

[¶] . . . [¶]

The court: Why do you think you’ll be in a better position 

to [represent] yourself?
5

[Heim]: I know – I know more of the facts because I was 

there, and I also am very calm about the situation.

[¶] . . . [¶]

The court: ... [G]enerally, this is a very poor idea to 

represent yourself. It ends up turning out very badly in 

most cases . . . and [if] you’re convicted . . . you can’t then 

turn around and say, ‘Hey, Appellate Court, I didn’t know

what I was doing . . . .’ You do realize that’s not available 

to you?

[Heim]: I do.

[¶] . . . [¶]

The court: You will be opposed by a trained prosecutor who 

specializes in prosecuting these types of crimes. Do you 

understand that?

[Heim]: I’m aware.

[¶] . . . [¶]

The court: And you do realize that this case will not be 

delayed because you need more time to figure out exactly 

how all this works.

[Heim]: Yes. I’m ready.

The court: . . . [O]nce again, you have an attorney who’s 

standing right in front . . . of you . . . and you can look him 

right in the eye and say, ‘No. I don’t want to do it that 

way,’ and he has to listen to you. . . . But you don’t want 

that; you want to do it alone?

[Heim]: Correct. 

The trial court then determined that Heim’s decision to represent 

himself was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, with full awareness of the 
6

risks. Heim then attempted to present the trial court with a sovereign citizen 

“claim of rights” filing, which the court declined to accept at that time. Heim 

confirmed that he would be ready for the January preliminary hearing. 

On January 10, 2022, the trial court held a preliminary hearing. Heim 

presented his sovereign citizen argument, objecting to the “jurisdiction” of the 

court. The trial court found that Heim’s understanding or interpretation of 

the court’s jurisdiction was incorrect, and the court denied the motion. The 

trial court stated that Heim was “very competent to stand trial” based on his 

college degree and his papers, that he understood the proceedings despite 

saying he did not, and that he was merely using a tactic to prevent the case 

from proceeding. The People proceeded with the preliminary hearing. 

On January 25, 2022, the trial court held a hearing, and Heim refused 

to stand, make eye contact with the court, or participate in the hearing. 

Based on Heim’s interference with and intentional disruption of the 

proceedings, the trial court revoked Heim’s self-represented status and 

reappointed the Public Defender. Heim’s attorney declared a doubt as to 

Heim’s competence, and the trial court suspended the proceedings pending an 

evaluation for competency to stand trial under Penal Code section 1368. 

Dr. Matthew Carroll, a forensic psychiatrist for the County of San 

Diego, conducted the evaluation. Although Heim refused to participate in an 

interview, Dr. Carroll reviewed recordings of Heim’s multiple phone calls 

between January 7, 2022, and January 27, 2022, the District Attorney file, 

court transcripts, and Heim’s writings to the court. Dr. Carroll noted: “In 

the phone calls, the defendant speaks clearly. He does not exhibit any 

psychotic symptoms. He discusses his case and going to the law library and 

reading up on options and possibilities for his case. He discusses wanting to 

represent himself.” During the phone calls, Heim discussed sovereign 
7

citizenship. As to Heim’s writings, Dr. Carroll opined: “These documents are 

sovereign citizen claims. They are well organized. These issues may be 

legally and factually inaccurate, but they are not psychotic. Many of the 

statements are copied from other documents that are available on the 

internet.” Dr. Carroll concluded: 

Based on the available evidence, there is no evidence to 

suggest that the defendant is suffering from a mental 

illness that would compromise his ability to understand the 

nature of the proceedings against him or to cooperate with 

his attorney in a rational manner in his own defense.

The defendant is using the sovereign citizen argument. 

This is a relatively common argument that defendants have 

used over the years. This is not based on psychosis or a 

mental illness. This is an argument based on the 

defendant’s perception that he can use the sovereign citizen 

arguments that the court does not have jurisdiction over 

him in this matter.

He is making a voluntary choice to use the sovereign citizen 

argument. 

Following Dr. Carroll’s evaluation, in March 2022, the trial court held a 

hearing regarding Heim’s competence. The parties stipulated to the 

qualifications of Dr. Carroll and to move his report into evidence. Heim’s 

counsel stated: 

[Dr. Carroll] did opine that he found no evidence of a 

mental condition that would prevent Mr. Heim from 

understanding the court proceedings or assisting counsel in 

his representation.

I have spoken with Mr. Heim. As of right now, I have no 

doubts as to his competency. 
8

Based on the parties’ stipulations and Dr. Carroll’s report, the trial court 

found Heim competent to stand trial. 

In May 2022, the parties again appeared before the court. The People 

presented a plea offer. Heim declined the offer and expressed his desire to 

represent himself again. The trial court again questioned Heim at length: 

The court: . . . You want to represent yourself again?

[Heim]: I would like to be self-represented.

The court: . . . You won’t have an attorney to consult. Do 

you understand that?

[Heim]: That is correct.

[¶] . . . [¶]

The court: . . . Let me go back to your original Lopez waiver

. . . . You understand what you’re charged with? Do you 

know what the max[imum sentence] is?

[Heim]: I believe it’s gone up.

The court: What do you believe it is?

[Heim]: 18 years, eight months.

The court: Is that correct?

[The People]: Yes.

The Court: Okay. You have a bachelor’s degree. You have 

some employment. This Lopez waiver was signed before. 

Once again, giving you the warning. You have a seasoned 

Public Defender. They’re yours free of charge. You don’t 

have to do what they say, but they’re there to advise you 

since they handle hundreds of cases and have a great 

amount of expertise. That’s for you at your disposal. 
9

Heim then stated that he had non-barred “legal counsel”, and the trial 

court explained that person would not be able to assist Heim during trial. 

Heim reiterated: “I’m very clear I do not want a – I have my assistance of 

counsel. I want to be self-represented.” The trial court then accepted Heim’s 

waiver of counsel. 

Prior to trial, Heim renewed his “jurisdictional challenge” and made a 

“request for default.” After permitting Heim to make his sovereign citizen 

argument, the trial court found that it had jurisdiction and denied the 

request for default judgment. 

Despite Heim’s belief that the court did not have authority to conduct 

the proceedings and his disagreement with the rules of the court, he 

repeatedly expressed that he understood statements by, rules of, and 

proceedings in the court. For example, he stated, “I understand everything in 

the Court, I just disagree with it.” 

Heim’s conduct throughout the proceedings was consistent with his 

expressed understanding. He exhibited an ability to conduct coherent 

conversations with the court. Prior to trial, Heim objected to evidence that 

would harm his case, including photographs of young girls that had been 

deleted from his cellular phone and the People’s expert witness, who he noted 

had a “quite impressive resume” but would “bias[ ] the jury.” Heim engaged 

in a discussion with the court regarding an audio recording that he believed 

would impeach the character of the victim’s mother. 

During voir dire, Heim asked questions of the prospective jurors, 

including whether the jurors believed direct and circumstantial evidence had

the same weight and whether jurors would be emotional about a sexual topic. 

Heim questioned prospective jurors with children if they would be able to be 

fair in such a case. Heim successfully challenged for cause multiple 
10

prospective jurors, including several victims of sexual abuse, parents and 

foster parents who did not believe they could be fair to Heim, and mental 

health professionals who work with abused women and children. 

During trial, Heim cross examined the victim’s mother and the 

investigating detective. He attempted to impeach the victim’s mother by 

establishing that she lied to him in text messages and during a pretext call 

she had with him at the direction of the investigating detective. 

Heim gave a closing argument. He argued there was no evidence that 

he touched the victim. He argued that the victim’s mother had lied to him, 

and the investigating detective had coached her to make that lie. He 

addressed many aspects of the trial, including the deleted photos of the 

victim on his phone, the child abuse expert testimony, and the pretext call, in 

which he denied committing the charged crimes. He argued doubt remained 

after the prosecution’s evidence. 

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Heim contends that the trial court erred under federal and 

state law by allowing him to represent himself. He argues Indiana v. 

Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 (Edwards), in which the United States 

Supreme Court upheld a state’s denial of the right to self-representation to a 

severely mentally ill defendant, should be extended to apply in this case. He 

also argues that People v. Floyd (1970) 1 Cal.3d 694 articulates the standard 

for competence to conduct trial under California law. We disagree and affirm 

the judgment.

A. No Federal Constitutional Error Occurred

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 

criminal defendants both the right to assistance of counsel and the right to 

self-representation, and “[t]he tension between these two rights often places 
11

[trial] courts on a tightrope.” (United States v. Ziegler (4th Cir. 2021) 

1 F.4th 219, 226.) That tension is evident in a series of United States 

Supreme Court cases defining these constitutional rights and establishing 

when they may be waived, as well as in this case.

First, in Faretta v. California, the United States Supreme Court 

established that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution provide criminal defendants the right to self-representation 

when they competently, knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive 

counsel. (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.) With the proper waiver, 

the Court ruled that it is unconstitutional for states to “force a lawyer upon [a 

defendant], even when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense.” 

(Id. at p. 807.) The Court further explained that “a defendant need not 

himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order [to] competently 

and intelligently to choose self-representation.” (Id. at p. 835.) 

Subsequently, in Godinez v. Moran, the Court clarified that the 

standard for competence to waive counsel is identical to the standard for

competence to stand trial announced in Dusky v. United States (1960)

362 U.S. 402. (Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 396, 400–401

(Godinez).) Under Dusky, “the standard for competence to stand trial is 

whether the defendant has ‘sufficient present ability to consult with his 

lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and has ‘a 

rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” 

(Godinez, at p. 396.) 

Later, in Edwards, the United States Supreme Court faced the 

question of “whether the Constitution required the trial court to allow 

Edwards to represent himself at trial.” (Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 169, 

italics added.) The Court distinguished the question before it, which followed 
12

a court’s refusal to permit self-representation and thus implicated the right 

to self-representation, from the issue in Godinez, which followed a court’s 

permitting a defendant to represent himself and thus implicated the 

constitutional right to representation by counsel. (Edwards, at p. 173

[“Godinez involved a State that sought to permit a gray-area defendant to 

represent himself. Godinez’s constitutional holding is that a State may do so. 

But that holding simply does not tell a State whether it may deny a gray-area 

defendant the right to represent himself—the matter at issue here.”].) 

The Edwards Court proceeded to create an exception to Faretta in

which states may “forc[e] representation” and deny a “gray area” defendant’s 

request to represent himself without violating the constitutional right to selfrepresentation: “[T]he Constitution permits States to insist upon 

representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under 

Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they 

are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.” (Edwards, 

supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 171, 177–178, italics added.) A defendant is not 

competent to conduct trial when he is “unable to carry out the basic tasks 

needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel.” (Id. at 

pp. 175–176.) In establishing this exception, the Edwards court explicitly 

declined to overrule Faretta. (Edwards, at p. 178.) 

As the language of Edwards makes clear and the California Supreme 

Court has confirmed, Edwards allows states to adopt a higher standard for 

competency to conduct trial than the Dusky standard for competency to stand 

trial, and only when the defendant’s severe mental illness inhibits the 

defendant’s competency to conduct the trial proceedings alone. (Edwards, 

supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 177–178; People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 877–

878 (Taylor).) However, Edwards “ ‘does not mandate the application of such 
13

a dual standard of competency for mentally ill defendants.’ ” (Taylor, at 

p. 878.) As long as the defendant is competent to stand trial and makes a 

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of counsel, there can be no federal 

constitutional error in permitting the defendant to represent himself or 

herself. (Ibid.) 

Heim concedes he was competent to stand trial, as is evident in his 

description of himself in his brief as a “gray area” defendant. By definition, 

as a “gray area” defendant, he believes he was competent to stand trial, but 

not to conduct trial. Likewise, Heim does not contest the trial court’s finding 

that his waiver of counsel was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 

Had Heim not conceded these points, the result would not change. We 

review the trial court’s determination of the defendant’s competence for 

substantial evidence, and we review de novo whether the waiver was 

voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. (People v. Orosco (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 

348, 358 (Orosco).) 

Substantial evidence supports Heim’s competence under Dusky 

through: (1) Heim’s college degree and fourteen years of experience working 

in two regulated industries; (2) Heim’s awareness of the maximum sentence 

he faced, even after it increased; (3) the psychiatrist’s determination of 

Heim’s competence after evaluation of his recent behavior; and (4) defense

counsel’s absence of doubt that Heim was competent after speaking with him. 

The record supports the court’s finding of a voluntary, knowing, and 

intelligent waiver. On two occasions, the court explained that Heim had 

experienced counsel available at no cost. The court also stated: it was a poor 

idea for Heim to represent himself, self-representation usually turns out very 

badly for the defendant, the prosecutor is trained and experienced, and he 
14

would have no recourse on appeal for his choice to waive counsel. Heim 

repeatedly assured the court he wanted to proceed self-represented.

Consequently, the trial court did not commit federal constitutional 

error by permitting Heim to represent himself.

B. California Only Permits Courts to Deny a Defendant’s Request for Selfrepresentation as Permitted by Edwards

The absence of federal constitutional error does not end our inquiry. 

Although we reject Heim’s contention that Edwards required the court to 

force representation by counsel, the United States Supreme Court permitted

states to establish a heightened competency standard above the federal 

constitutional minimum when the defendant’s severe mental illness prevents 

the defendant from conducting the trial. In People v. Johnson, the California 

Supreme Court announced a standard for denying self-representations in line

with what Edwards permitted: “[W]e believe the standard that trial courts 

considering exercising their discretion to deny self-representation should 

apply is simply whether the defendant suffers from a severe mental illness to 

the point where he or she cannot carry out the basic tasks needed to present 

the defense without the help of counsel.” (People v. Johnson (2012) 

53 Cal.4th 519, 530 (Johnson).)

Heim concedes that he did not suffer from severe mental illness that 

triggered discretion to deny him the right to self-representation directly 

under Johnson and as permitted by Edwards. Nonetheless, he contends 

Edwards should be extended to apply to “defendants in appellant’s situation 

who are not necessarily severally mentally ill” but whose “delusional beliefs” 

prevent them from conducting trial proceedings. 

We decline to so extend Edwards. In Johnson, our high court explained 

that the Edwards rule should be applied with restraint and only as provided 
15

in that case, so as to avoid running afoul of the constitutional right to selfrepresentation: 

Trial courts must apply this standard cautiously. The 

Edwards court specifically declined to overrule Faretta[.]

[Citations.] Criminal defendants still generally have a 

Sixth Amendment right to represent themselves. Selfrepresentation by defendants who wish it and validly waive 

counsel remains the norm and may not be denied lightly. A 

court may not deny self-representation merely because it 

believes the matter could be tried more efficiently, or even 

more fairly, with attorneys on both sides. Rather, it may 

deny self-representation only in those situations where 

Edwards permits it.

(Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 531, italics added; Orosco, supra, 

82 Cal.App.5th at p. 360 [“Edwards and Johnson both require that the 

defendant’s incompetence to represent himself derive from a ‘severe mental 

illness.’ ”].) Our high court has recently confirmed that, except as provided in 

Johnson, competence to waive counsel, like competence to stand trial, is 

governed by the Dusky competence standard. (People v. Wycoff (2021) 

12 Cal.5th 58, 89, 96 [citing Godinez, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 398, and Dusky, 

supra, 362 U.S. at p. 402].) 

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has rejected the argument that a 

defendant’s sovereign citizen ideology is a sufficient basis to overcome the 

defendant’s constitutional right to self-representation. (U.S. v. Neal (9th Cir. 

2015) 776 F.3d 645, 658 [“Neal clearly endorsed the ‘sovereign citizen’ 

ideology. Neal’s request to represent himself could not be denied solely 

because he adhered to such beliefs. The right to represent oneself, like the 

right to counsel, is secured by the Constitution.”].) We agree.

Even if the Constitution were to permit California to grant the trial 

court discretion to deny a self-representation request based on a defendant’s 
16

beliefs, and even if California elected to do so, the record supports a finding 

that Heim was able to perform basic tasks in his defense. The evaluating 

psychiatrist determined that there was no evidence that Heim suffered from 

mental illness or that his sovereign citizen beliefs were the result of mental 

illness or psychosis. Prior to the waiver of counsel, Heim’s attorney agreed 

that there was “no doubt” as to Heim’s competence. Heim’s conduct during 

the proceedings demonstrates that Heim’s sovereign citizen beliefs did not 

render him unable to perform the tasks of trial. To the contrary, the record 

shows that he knew precisely the maximum sentence he faced, even when it

had increased; he engaged in coherent conversation with the court regarding 

evidence; he questioned prospective jurors and appropriately challenged them 

based on the charges against him; he attempted to impeach a witness by 

introducing evidence where she lied to him; and he argued in closing that 

doubt remained after the prosecution’s evidence. Throughout, he assured the 

court that he understood the proceedings, he just disagreed with them. 

Finally, Heim contends that People v. Floyd provides the standard for 

competence to conduct trial under California law. Floyd states that “a 

defendant may waive counsel and choose to represent himself only if the 

defendant has an intelligent conception of the consequences of his act 

[citation] and understands the nature of the offense, the available pleas and 

defenses, and the possible punishments.” (Floyd, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 703.) 

Heim fails to explain and we fail to see how the language of Floyd would 

require a different result here. 

Regardless, the California Supreme Court has explained that Floyd did 

not articulate a standard for self-representation competence, and that, had it

done so, it would not have survived Faretta. (Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at 

p. 872, fn. 9 [“Before Faretta, then, we had referred to self-representation 
17

competence, but had not articulated any standard under California law for its 

assessment.”; “In People v. Floyd, [citation] this court included the 

seriousness of the charges and the defendant’s youth and limited education 

as factors against allowing waiver of counsel. To the extent we intended this 

as a competence standard, however, it could not have survived Faretta.”].)

Rather, our high court has confirmed that courts do not have discretion 

to deny self-representation under pre-Faretta state law: 

But we are constrained by the circumstance that what is 

permissible is only what Edwards permits, not what preFaretta California law permitted. In other words, because 

of federal constitutional constraints, in considering the 

defendant’s mental state as a reason to deny selfrepresentation, a California court may not exercise the 

discretion permitted under California law but solely that 

permitted in Edwards. 

(Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 530.) As we concluded above, the trial court 

did not commit error based on Edwards in permitting Heim to represent 

himself.

IV. DISPOSITION

We affirm the judgment.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.