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BOKO HARAM: THE ISLAMIST INSURGENCY IN

WEST AFRICA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 24, 2016

Serial No. 114–140

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ms. Jennifer G. Cooke, director, Africa Program, Center for International 

and Strategic Studies ........................................................................................... 4

Ms. Alice Hunt Friend, adjunct senior fellow, Center for New American 

Security ................................................................................................................. 15

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Ph.D., senior fellow, Foundation for Defense of 

Democracies .......................................................................................................... 26

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Ms. Jennifer G. Cooke: Prepared statement ......................................................... 7

Ms. Alice Hunt Friend: Prepared statement ......................................................... 18

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 44

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 45

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade: Statement of Mr. Jacob Zenn, fellow, African and Eurasian Affairs, 

The Jamestown Foundation ................................................................................ 46

(1)

BOKO HARAM: THE ISLAMIST INSURGENCY IN 

WEST AFRICA 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The subcommittee will come to order. Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record subject to the length 

limitation in the rules. I will make my opening statement at this 

time. 

Boko Haram has killed thousands throughout its reign of terror 

in Nigeria and neighboring countries. They strap bombs to little 

girls and send them into public markets to act as suicide bombers. 

On the screen in front of each member and the panel, there is a 

map of Nigeria. There are mostly Christians in the south, Muslims 

in the north, and while the vast oil reserves prop up the economy 

of the country, the economy in the north is bad. It has little natural 

resources, has bad infrastructure, some say lots of corruption. 

For years, the north has felt neglected. So when Boko Haram 

started in 2002 it was able to tap into that sense of disenfranchisement and frustration with government. Boko Haram means ‘‘Western education is sinful.’’ The goal is to create an Islamic caliphate 

in West Africa along the lines of ISIS’ caliphate in Iraq and Syria, 

and they will violently do anything to achieve the goal. 

Boko Haram, like ISIS, tell Christians to convert or die. Christian women are forced to marry them and convert to Islam. Christians have seen their schools burned to the ground, some schools 

burned to the ground with the children inside. Their homes are targeted, their churches are destroyed because they are Christians. 

We all remember the kidnapping of close to 300 schoolgirls, now almost 2 years ago, in April 2014. Many of those girls were reportedly forced to convert to Islam and they are still missing. There are 

growing concerns that Boko Haram might have forced some of 

these girls to carry out suicide attacks. 

Throughout 2014, the terrorist group successfully seized huge 

amounts of territory in northeastern Nigeria. Most of us are not familiar with how big Nigeria is, but Boko Haram is holding territory 

roughly the size of Belgium. To take in more territory, Boko Haram 

2

killed by the thousands, in 2014, Boko Haram killed nearly 7,000 

people—murdered is a better word than killed—making them the 

deadliest terrorist group in the world, even surpassing ISIS. 

Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2015 and rebranded 

its state as the Islamic State’s West Africa Province. Boko Haram 

has overextended itself, however, when it tried to hold territory in 

Nigeria and other West African militaries were destroying it in 

2015. Boko Haram was forced to give up on holding territory, but 

it has not been defeated. Boko Haram is still capable of launching 

deadly attacks throughout the Lake Chad Basin. My staff has 

tracked these attacks. There is hardly a day that goes by that there 

is not some sort of Boko Haram attack that kills innocent people. 

Over the past few years, relations between Nigeria and the 

United States have been strained. Joint military trainings were 

cancelled and the U.S. hesitated to supply weapons to Nigeria’s 

military citing other concerns about human rights abuses. The 

United States took 11 years to designate Boko Haram as a foreign 

terrorist organization, then on November 12th, 2013, ironically, the 

night before this subcommittee and the African Subcommittee had 

a joint hearing on Boko Haram on why it was not on the FTO list, 

State Department called to say it was going to designate the organization and put them on the Foreign Terrorist Organization list. 

That is an important step, but there are questions about the implementation of the designation. It does not seem that all the tools 

that this designation carries are being brought to bear on the 

group, especially when it comes to stopping the financing of Boko 

Haram. 

The United States has started to do more to help Nigeria combat 

Boko Haram since the election of Nigerian President Buhari in 

May 2015. Infantry training has restarted and we are seeing an increased level of cooperation between AFRICOM and Nigerian military. In October, the administration announced that it was sending 

troops and drones to Cameroon as well as surveillance aircraft to 

Niger, but like the FTO designation, these are steps that should 

have been taken years ago before Boko Haram was allowed to murder more people than ISIS. 

We must do more to support our African partners to stamp out 

this Islamic radical menace once and for all. The fighting against 

Boko Haram is essential to U.S. national security interests. In 

ISIS, we have already seen what happens when we underestimate 

a terrorist group. Boko Haram may not have the capability to attack the United States today, but neither did al-Qaeda in the years 

prior to 9/11. This hearing will help expose this deadly assault 

Boko Haram has committed against civilized peoples, and I will 

yield to the ranking member, Mr. Keating, from Massachusetts. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for conducting this important hearing, and I would like to thank our witnesses for being 

here today as well. 

While it was the heinous and vicious kidnapping in 2014 of 276 

schoolgirls from their dormitory in Chibok that first brought Boko 

Haram to the attention of much of the world, we know all too well 

that this group is responsible for the deaths of thousands of men, 

women and children since 2003. In fact, in 2014 alone, Boko 

Haram was responsible for approximately 7,000 deaths which is 

3

higher than the amount attributed to ISIL. ISIL killed, by comparison, 6,073 in 2014. 

In order to study, understand, and successfully combat Boko 

Haram, I believe we should view and respond to them as both an 

insurgency and as a terrorist organization. At its heart, Boko 

Haram is fed on the poverty, unemployment and disenfranchisement in the northeast part of Nigeria and surrounding areas as 

well, accumulating territory and widening its influence. The northeastern regions where Boko Haram has celebrated significant territorial gains is largely Muslim and trails the southern part of the 

country, which is largely Christian, in the scope of education and 

wealth. 

Since its establishment, Boko Haram has existed to marginalize 

Nigeria’s Muslim population and delegitimize its government. Recent years have borne witness to its graduation from smaller rudimentary attacks to targeting Nigerian Government to a full scale 

assault on Westernization and governance in Nigeria as well, with 

both Muslims and Christians among the victims of Boko Haram’s 

terrorism. 

Since 2009, Boko Haram has played a direct harmful role in destabilizing Nigeria. Its violent campaign against the government 

has left parts of the country in ruins. Nearly 1 year ago, in early 

March 2015, Boko Haram’s leader pledged allegiance to the Islamic 

State which led to the creation of the Islamic State’s West Africa 

Province. Boko Haram has long been linked to other terrorist organizations in Africa, including al-Qaeda, and this shift in the allegiance could be interpreted as a quest for increased recruitment 

and fundraising opportunities. 

It is clear that Boko Haram’s activities are at the heart of a 

broader regional crisis. The group has expanded its operations into 

neighboring Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and since 2014, these countries have increasingly been subject to attacks by this group. This 

instability has led to unprecedented food shortages and child malnutrition. According to the United Nations, more than 5.6 million 

people are facing a food crisis in Nigeria and bordering countries. 

While there has been more than successful efforts at the local 

level and efforts to combat Boko Haram, much work is still needed 

to restore peace and provide for the millions of people impacted by 

this devastation. This includes internal efforts to root out corruption within the government and military, protect and advance cooperation on human rights practices, and to revitalize subjugated 

regions within the country as well as establishing a Multinational 

Joint Task Force to combat the threat of the Islamist insurgency 

in West Africa. 

Finally, I am grateful for the work of many of my colleagues led 

by Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International 

Organizations’ groups as well, Subcommittee Ranking Member 

Karen Bass of California, Nigerian Caucus Chair Sheila Jackson 

Lee, and Representative Frederica Wilson, who advanced the regional strategy to eliminate the threat of Boko Haram and provide 

humanitarian relief to the affected regions. All three of these congresswomen have personally met with Nigerian officials and even 

traveled to the region to raise awareness through Bring Back Our 

Girls campaign. 

4

These efforts have made real gains in promoting equal access to 

education, economic opportunity for women and girls, and I look 

forward to hearing from our witnesses today on existing efforts by 

the Nigerian Government and regional task force where there must 

be increased focus and increased attention. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Higgins, do you want to make an opening statement? 

Mr. HIGGINS. I am good. Go to the panel. 

Mr. POE. All right. So without objection, all the witnesses’ prepared statements will be made part of the record. I ask that each 

witness keep their presentation to no more than 5 minutes. And 

just so you know, it is going to get cooler in here because the expert 

just showed up. 

I will introduce each witness and give them time for opening 

statements. Jennifer Cooke is the director of the Africa Program at 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She also manages a range of projects on political, economic and security dynamics in Africa. 

Ms. Alice Hunt Friend is an adjunct senior fellow at the Center 

for New American Security. She previously served as the principal 

director for African Affairs in OSD Policy where she focused primarily on Libya, South Sudan and the Great Lakes region. 

Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation 

for Defense and Democracies. We thank him for substituting for 

Mr. Jacob Zenn who is unable to make it from Nigeria, and especially the short notice that you came in on. Dr. Gartenstein-Ross 

did not provide a written testimony but will speak to us about Boko 

Haram broader counterterrorism issues in Africa. 

Ms. Cooke, we will start with you and you have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MS. JENNIFER G. COOKE, DIRECTOR, AFRICA 

PROGRAM, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AND STRATEGIC 

STUDIES 

Ms. COOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Keating and members of the subcommittee. Thank you very much 

for the opportunity to testify today on Boko Haram. This hearing 

could not be more timely or important. My testimony today draws 

substantially on recent travel in January to Maiduguri in northeast 

Nigeria, to Abuja and Niamey, and earlier travel to Northern Mali 

and Senegal. 

I would like to make two broad points. The first is on the urgency of the situation. Why is it such an important moment for the 

United States to engage and amplify its support against Boko 

Haram, and second, what should be some of the priority areas for 

U.S. support. 

So why the urgency? Nigeria and the governments of the region 

have unquestionably made important progress against Boko 

Haram. The group is largely being routed from territorial control, 

thousands of members and a number of its senior leaders have 

been captured or killed, thousands of women and girls have been 

rescued from brutal captivity, and the groups media operation, significant weapon in the terrorist arsenal, has gone largely quiet. 

That progress is real. It should be acknowledged and supported. 

5

But it is cold comfort for the victims and families of Boko 

Haram’s most recent attacks and the many communities and displaced persons in northeast Nigeria and the broader Lake Chad 

Basin region. These communities remain vulnerable to asymmetrical attacks, and eliminating the capacity for these attacks would 

be much more difficult than a territorial rout. 

The regional and global context makes this an even more critical 

moment for decisive action to prevent Boko Haram from regenerating or a successor group from taking its place. Every effort 

should be made to ensure that the Lake Chad region and the 

Sahel, more broadly, do not become proxy battleground for alQaeda and ISIL or broader ideological coalitions. 

Boko Haram and other Sahelian extremist groups have a long 

record of dynamism and opportunism. Alliance amongst these 

groups that include training, weaponry tactics are dangerous, but 

growing rivalries between them could prove equally dangerous. 

Boko Haram, as you have said, pledged allegiance to ISIL last 

year. At the same time, al-Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliates, al-Qaeda in 

the Islamic Maghreb, al-Mourabitoun and others, have reasserted 

themselves with high profile attacks in Bamako and Ouagadougou. 

After being temporarily on the defensive and losing ground to the 

ISIL brand, the quest for notoriety and one-upmanship among 

these various jihadist groups will have tragic human costs. 

The entrenchment of ISIL in Libya adds to the urgency. ISIL’s 

rising profile right now is a magnet for many fighters. Security 

forces have intercepted militants traveling from Nigeria, Niger, 

Chad, Mali, into Libya and we know that some have successfully 

managed to get to the front lines. Political stabilization and military intervention against ISIL in Libya may be good for Libya, but 

it will almost certainly drive these fighters back out into the region 

more battle hardened, better armed, and more ruthless than before. 

I am going to quickly move to priorities, areas for engagement. 

We know that a long term, comprehensive approach that puts economic opportunity and education at the center will be important, 

but it is not the time for that. We don’t have the degree of normalcy that allows that. Those need to be started with urgency, but 

we need some immediate steps before that can fully happen. 

Help prevent Boko Haram from regenerating. Essential to preventing regeneration of Boko Haram will be cooperation among Nigeria and its regional neighbors to block supply routes and 

exfiltration, eradicate rear bases and training camps, and share intelligence on movements of weaponry and supplies. The Multinational Joint Task Force is being riven by rivalries and recriminations. U.S. has to pressure those countries to come together for genuine cooperation. 

Blocking the financial supply routes, critically important. U.S. 

should mobilize significant resources to this end through the Department of Treasury’s Terrorist Financing Tracking Program, 

building the capacity of Nigeria and others to do the same. 

Third is to support an off ramp for Boko Haram fighters that 

makes surrender a more attractive option. They are not all there 

for their own will. Many of are being coerced, many including 

women are being kidnapped and indoctrinated. The U.S. State DeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:17 Mar 17, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\022416\98829 SHIRL
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partment and USAID should support Nigerian efforts to help sort 

these many fighters, fast track them through a judicial process and 

provide programming for reintegration, deradicalization where possible. 

The second big area is to support civilian protection and welfare. 

We have to support the capacity and professionalism of regional 

forces—more engagement not less. I know that human rights 

abuses by the Nigerian military have been a sticking point in U.S.-

Nigerian military engagement. The U.S. Government should continue to press for accountability, but it should also recognize that 

appropriate training and equipment can help mitigate the possibility of human rights abuse. As Nigerian troops have become more 

competent and better equipped, incidents of abuse have diminished. Boko Haram has killed more civilians in the last year than 

ISIL and it is not a good time to deny regional forces the access 

to the critical equipment that they need. 

My final point is to support internally displaced people and Boko 

Haram surviving victims. Some 3 million people in the region have 

been displaced because of Boko Haram. The vast majority are in 

Nigeria, but in the surrounding region as well. There is little certainty on when they will be able to return to their homes. The 

international community along with Nigerian Government and citizens need to rally to support these displaced communities ensuring 

that the many children among them are given the education and 

services they need to thrive and to eventually help rebuild the 

northeast region. 

Finally, the fate of these 219 girls kidnapped by Chibok remains 

an enduring and tragic mystery and the effort to locate and recover 

them should be sustained and supporting. But there are thousands 

of girls and women who have escaped and been rescued from captivity who have endured unthinkable brutality and trauma and 

they should not be neglected. The U.S. Government and indeed the 

American people should support and amplify the efforts of Nigeria 

and the region to give these survivors the psychosocial, economic 

and moral support that they very well deserve. Thank you very 

much. I will leave it at that and welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Cooke follows:]

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Mr. POE. Well, you are going to get those in a minute. 

Ms. Friend, I recognize you for your opening statement. Thank 

you. 

STATEMENT OF MS. ALICE HUNT FRIEND, ADJUNCT SENIOR 

FELLOW, CENTER FOR NEW AMERICAN SECURITY 

Ms. FRIEND. Thank you, Chairman Poe. Chairman Poe, Ranking 

Member Keating, members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to 

be here today to participate in the important ongoing discussion of 

the threat Boko Haram poses to Nigeria and the wider West African region. Throughout its almost 14-year history, Boko Haram has 

proven to be a ruthless and resilient organization, and it is wise 

to continue taking the threat the group poses seriously despite its 

recent setbacks. 

Since early 2015, Nigeria, joined by a multinational coalition has 

prosecuted an offensive against Boko Haram that has deprived the 

group of its territorial control and degraded its capacity to confront 

national security forces directly. This is the second retreat for the 

group since 2002 and demonstrates its comparative weakness when 

confronted with a well organized and determined military force. 

In an insurgency, however, the offense often has the advantage. 

Battered but undeterred, Boko Haram has turned again to asymmetric tactics and a rich array of targets. The group terrorizes public spaces that are notoriously difficult to secure such as markets 

and transit depots, attacks often feature multiple coordinated 

bombings and increasingly rely on kidnapped women and girls 

wearing suicide vests. These strikes have succeeded in reestablishing the group’s pre-2015 daily tempo of casualties, killing and 

injuring upwards of 50 to 100 people in an average attack. A mix 

of attacks on urban and rural areas gives the population a sense 

that there is no refuge from Boko Haram’s reign of terror. 

Despite their continued ability to menace daily life in the northeast, just how large and capable the group is today compared to 

late 2014 is difficult to assess. Boko Haram’s remaining members 

seem to be scattered throughout the Nigerian countryside and the 

border regions with Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Their use of kidnapped women to exercise suicide attacks, while tactically advantageous, also suggests a shrunken supply of adult male foot soldiers. The group has been reduced to ambushes along rural roads 

in lieu of territorial control. 

Perhaps as a way to distract from its battlefield losses, in March 

of last year Boko Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, publicly declared the group’s allegiance to the Islamic State. The practical effect of this allegiance is unclear so far. There is some evidence that 

the Islamic State may have attempted to support earlier improvements to Boko Haram’s media campaign, but there are fewer signs 

of financial support of capacity building flowing to the West African 

affiliate. Some analysts speculate that the alliance largely served 

propaganda purposes for both groups making the Islamic State look 

like it was expanding even under intense pressure in the Middle 

East, and making Boko Haram look relevant to the global Islamist 

terrorist network. 

Upon his election in 2015, Nigeria’s new President, Muhammadu 

Buhari, pledged to defeat Boko Haram by the end of the year and 

16

took several actions to advance toward this goal including ostensibly increasing resources for military personnel after years of 

underinvestment. At the same time, the Buhari administration has 

announced renewed efforts to investigate and prosecute military 

violations of human rights and corruption. It is unclear how far 

these anti-corruption efforts aimed at the security services will 

truly go, but Buhari’s efforts to date represent long overdue steps 

in the right direction. 

Nigeria’s revitalization of its counterterrorism operations has 

been aided by a regional and international push for collaboration 

to combat the threat. In the wake of the Chibok schoolgirl 

kidnappings in 2014, Benin, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria 

agreed to reactivate a longstanding but disused Multinational Joint 

Task Force structure. The MNJTF’s tasks include targeted operations against Boko Haram, capturing members of the terrorist 

group, border security, recovery of abductees, regional coordination 

and intelligence sharing. Unfortunately, the MNJTF has had an 

uneven start with budget and troop shortfalls and limited coordination efforts leading to questions about the task force’s sustainability. 

Task force members focus largely on their own border regions 

and it is unclear how much tactical, operational, or strategic level 

coordination actually occurs. Nevertheless, real operational gains 

have resulted from the combined, if not entirely coordinated, efforts. Just yesterday, for example, Nigerian and Cameroonian 

forces carried out a successful joint operation that reportedly resulted in 20 Boko Haram casualties and a rescue of 150 captives. 

Beyond these immediate security efforts, the conflict has displaced upwards of 2 million people, many of whom are children. 

This glut of refugees and the challenges behind reintegrating 

former Boko Haram captives indicate a humanitarian and social 

crisis that may long outlast the fighting. 

In this context, the Nigerian Government must take a strong 

lead in developing the political will and financial commitment to 

provide holistic security in areas ravaged by Boko Haram. Such a 

security plan should include an effective policing capacity to protect 

the population and deny Boko Haram’s successful attacks coupled 

with ongoing military operations to keep the terrorists on the defensive. Both forces should be bolstered by intelligence capabilities 

and linked to an efficient justice sector able to conduct detention 

operations and swift prosecutions according to international legal 

standards. 

All of this must be coupled with a robust development program 

that can provide basic services and infrastructure to long neglected 

communities. Nigeria does not have to do this work on its own. 

International assistance including from the United States offers a 

deep well of resources and expertise to the government and Boko 

Haram’s victims. 

Nigeria is a beneficiary of multiple U.S. security assistance programs through which the U.S. has recently provided communications gear, equipment and armored vehicles. The U.S. also supports 

efforts by other regional partners to combat Boko Haram including 

Niger and Cameroon, and frequently consults with European partners to coordinate efforts and share information. This broad apVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:17 Mar 17, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\022416\98829 SHIRL
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proach ensures that the counter-Boko Haram effort is a diversified 

and sustainable portfolio of investment in regional and international partners. 

But it is important to remember that international support efforts can only proceed at the pace set by Nigeria. The U.S. recently 

restarted infantry battalion training after a long hiatus with plans 

to build on such engagements and ongoing evaluations of Nigerian 

equipment requests. Continued accusations of human rights violations by Nigerian security forces and Nigerians’ own concerns 

about protecting its sovereignty mean that all external support is 

preceded with careful and mutual evaluations of both sides’ intentions. These engagements are complex but must continue in order 

to sustain pressure on Boko Haram. The U.S. and other Nigerian 

partners should continue to point out the connections between government conduct in the north and the resilience and support of the 

local communities sustaining an upper hand against Boko Haram. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Friend follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Gartenstein-Ross, it is your turn. 

STATEMENT OF DAVEED GARTENSTEIN–ROSS, PH.D., SENIOR 

FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Thank you, Chairman Poe, Ranking 

Member Keating, and distinguished members. As Chairman Poe 

mentioned, I was a last-minute addition to this panel, substituting 

in for Jacob Zenn whose written statement, I think, is very granular, and I very much recommend. 

I think the previous two statements do a very good job of providing, in detail, the situation on the ground, so what I want to do 

is take a somewhat broader look at the question of where is Boko 

Haram today compared to where it was in the past, and what do 

we need to do to more effectively address not just Boko Haram but 

the challenge of other militant groups as well? 

Ms. Friend referred to previous Boko Haram retreats. You can 

tabulate them in different ways. I count personally at least two 

since 2009. One of them in ’09 is when Boko Haram was essentially 

defeated. Its leader Mohammed Yusuf was killed, and around 1,000 

members were killed during that period. It was scattered and relied upon primarily al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb, but also alShabaab in Somalia to help it regenerate. In 2013, the Nigerian 

Government launched an offensive starting in May against Boko 

Haram which also pushed it back, though not as significantly. 

I think that, right now, Boko Haram is more vulnerable than 

what it was in 2013. President Buhari has more of a political incentive to maintain the Boko Haram than there was back in 2013. 

You have multiple states’ militaries going after the militant group. 

And a third thing is we have talked about the defection to the 

Islamic State. Now there is problems with the defection from our 

perspective, but also there is some opportunity. I think it makes 

them more vulnerable, because previously Boko Haram, when it 

was part of the al-Qaeda network, its major source of strength outside of Nigeria was in Mali. Today its major source of strength is 

in Libya which is further away. It was much easier for them to use 

surrounding territories when they were part of the al-Qaeda network. 

But the question really is, how effectively will we take advantage 

of this opening of these vulnerabilities and craft a solution? One 

sad conclusion that I have reached is that we as a government are 

just not very good at fighting against violent non-state actors. If 

you look at our record over the past decade and a half when this 

was a top strategic priority, we have not been effective. In the 21st 

century you have perhaps only two major violent non-state actor 

groups who have been defeated. One of them, the LTTE in Sri 

Lanka which was wiped out by the Sri Lankan Government, and 

the other one being the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan which was 

wiped out by the Taliban in recent months. Overall, we have trouble. 

So what I would point to as some of the source of our trouble is 

that violent non-state actors are very much, they are very old in 

conception, but in other ways they are a 21st century problem. If 

you look at the 20th century, it is what I call the Westphalian moVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:17 Mar 17, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\022416\98829 SHIRL
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ment when the state system inscribed in the Peace of Westphalia 

was so dominant that non-state actors who were launching 

insurgencies or who were nationalist terrorist groups couldn’t think 

of any other way to be. They wanted to be states, ranging from the 

anti-Colonial insurgencies to terrorist groups like the IRA, the 

LTTE, Palestinian terrorist groups, the ETA, all of these wanted 

to be states. In the 21st century you are seeing groups like ISIS, 

Boko, al-Qaeda, which are able to do many things states do—provide services, govern. They don’t want to have any part of the state 

system. 

I would analogize this to what we are seeing in the economics 

sphere because it is a very similar situation. In the economic 

sphere, going to the very end of the 20th century, conventional wisdom was that bigger was better; that when Blockbuster came into 

town it was going to drive your local video store out; that bookstores like Borders would be able to, with their megastores, dominate local markets. But these businesses failed to adapt to changing circumstances. They were too bureaucratic, too slow to adjust 

strategically. Borders didn’t even have a Web site until 1998, 3 

years after Amazon launched. When it finally put together its own 

e-reader to compete with Kindle, they made people come into the 

store to actually go to a download station which defeated the purpose of online shopping. 

That is what our Government is. We are very slow to adapt. Violent non-state actors are like start-ups in the political organizing 

sphere. They have the same advantages. They are able to adapt 

strategically, quickly, they don’t face our bureaucracy, and part of 

the move of ISIS into Africa, part of that story is ISIS actually convincing the media that they controlled a city in Libya that they 

didn’t, the city of Derna. 

They control Sirte today, but at the time that BBC, CNN and 

others reported on ISIS’ control of Derna, which helped show Boko 

how strong ISIS was, they did not control Derna. And one thing 

that was frustrating for me in talking to multiple people within the 

U.S. Government was that there was no one in place to puncture 

this myth, and it was bad for us. It was bad for us that they were 

able to sustain this myth. 

So looking at, I would say part of what we should be talking 

about, we should be talking about the policy solutions put forward 

here because these are very good, and as was said by Ms. Cooke, 

there is a sense of urgency. We need to act. But at the same time 

we have to think about our organizational structure, because many 

of the problems that we confront systemically in this area come 

down to lack of coordination, inefficient contracting rules, and not 

having the right people in place for this. 

We need to, just like big industries have adapted by understanding the principles of their competitors we need to do the same 

thing, because we have an organizational structure that is not well 

suited for 21st century challenges. Thank you. 

[Mr. Gartenstein-Ross did not submit a prepared statement.] 

Mr. POE. I thank all of our witnesses. I recognize myself for 5 

minutes of questions. Boko Haram was established in 2002. We 

had a hearing in 2013 wanting to know why they weren’t part of 

the Foreign Terrorist Organization. The day before the hearing, 

28

ironically, the State Department designated them as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. That brings with it certain status that we supposedly as a nation focus on that organization because they are a 

Foreign Terrorist Organization. 

My question to you, has anything happened to Boko Haram because they are now a Foreign Terrorist Organization? Have we imposed any of the things we can do such as sanctions and going after 

the finances against Boko Haram since that? Any of you want to 

weigh in on that? Ms. Cooke? 

Ms. COOKE. Sure. I think because of the nature of Boko Haram 

at that time and the fact that it doesn’t bank in the United States, 

its members don’t travel to the United States, it doesn’t bank 

through formal institutions, I think some of the tools of the Foreign 

Terrorist Organization declaration weren’t particularly helpful and 

didn’t add a great deal except perhaps drawing greater U.S. policymaker attention to the group. 

I think now, now that the Nigerian Government itself has made 

cutting the group’s financial sources a priority and President 

Buhari mentioned that in his inaugural address and we know that 

the group has expanded its regional connections, I think this is a 

moment where we can bring those tools much more into play to assist the Nigerians in doing that. That has to be done in coordination with other international and regional law enforcement agencies and financial institutions. That is a vital priority in preventing 

their eventual regeneration. 

Mr. POE. The Boko Haram has a reputation, and I think it is 

based on facts, unfortunately, of targeting young women, Christian 

women, and either forcing them to convert or pay the consequences 

of sex slavery or murder. Is this a fundamental principle of this 

specific terrorist organization? Dr. Ross, do you want to weigh in 

on that? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. It is a fundamental principle of a number of different jihadist organizations. It is a fundamental principle 

of Boko Haram. ISIS also has done the same thing if you look at 

their treatment of Yazidis. And if you look at the Nusra Front, 

which is al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, they also have a forced conversion program that they have imposed upon the Druze sect, 

which I read about in Foreign Affairs last year. So the answer is 

an unequivocal yes. 

Mr. POE. The activity of murdering folks, young females, Christians, would that in your opinion, any of you, fit the definition of 

genocide? Ms. Cooke, yes or no? 

Ms. COOKE. Well, I think they are less, they are indiscriminate 

in their attacks and we have to acknowledge that many, many of 

their victims, and perhaps the majority, have been Muslims who 

equally are forced to adapt this much, this very foreign version of 

Islam. So I don’t know that that label applies in this case. 

Mr. POE. Okay. Anybody else? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. I believe it applies, and much more so 

in Iraq and Syria where you actually have governance. Boko 

Haram’s most recent experience with governance in Borno was 

very short-lived, so you didn’t get to see the program get borne out. 

But the definition of genocide is intent to destroy in whole or in 

part. And that is absolutely what ISIS did to the Yazidis. It is abVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:17 Mar 17, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\022416\98829 SHIRL
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solutely what right now Nusra is doing to the Druze. And it, in my 

view, absolutely applies to what is being done to the Christians as 

well. 

You can see ISIS’ cancellation of the jizya, which is the tax that 

non-Muslims who are concerned People of the Book can pay to continue practicing their religion, they cancelled the jizya in Mosul 

thus causing all Christians to flee the city. In my view it is actually 

unequivocal. 

It is absolutely correct what Ms. Cooke said that they do also target Muslims, but the intent to destroy in my view is very clear. 

They are going to try to subjugate Muslims, but groups that are 

not like them with a few minor exceptions including Shia Muslims 

are groups that they are absolutely out to destroy. 

Mr. POE. Last question. Ms. Friend, you haven’t answered any 

of my questions, or I haven’t asked you any, but the world heard 

about those girls that were kidnapped and you mentioned in your 

testimony we don’t really know what happened to them. What happened to them? What do you think happened to them, those 200 

to 300 girls? 

Ms. FRIEND. Well, sir, I can only speculate what happened to 

them. And my personal speculation is that some of them were sold 

into human trafficking, some of them were taken on as child brides 

or sex slaves, and I fear that some of them have been used in these 

suicide bombings that we are now hearing about. Boko Haram has 

kidnapped so many children and so many people over time that it 

is very hard to sort out especially in suicide bombings who is who, 

but that is my fear and what makes logical sense to me. 

But it is true that, as far as we know, as far as the Nigerians 

know, members of the Joint Task Force that most of those girls are 

still unaccounted for. I believe something like 57 escaped at the 

time, so we are looking at closer to 200 girls that are still missing. 

But President Buhari recently also sounded a note of caution about 

being able to recover them. So even Buhari who is quite optimistic 

about defeat of the Boko Haram is not optimistic about recovery of 

the girls at this point unfortunately. 

Mr. POE. All right, thank you very much. My time is expired and 

I will yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts for his questions. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since Boko Haram’s 

pledge of allegiance to ISIL, has that had an effect on its recruitment and its retention capabilities? And also, where is it getting 

its financing? Where is it getting its weapons and supplies from 

specifically? You mentioned, I think, Ms. Friend, that some of it is 

selling, the human trafficking gain, financial gains from that. But 

what else, and where is it getting the weapons? 

Ms. FRIEND. Yes, sir. As far as financing goes, Jennifer and I 

were talking about it a little bit before the hearing began. Traditionally they got much of their financing through extortion, 

through bank robberies, through looting. Jennifer has some more 

insights, I think, on sort of more recent information about where 

they might be getting more support. But those have been their traditional sources. A lot of the kinds of attacks that they undertake 

are not high cost. They use very low tech IEDs, for example, so unfortunately a little bit of money goes a long way for this group. 

30

Mr. KEATING. A couple of, if I could, a couple of more recent developments in the last 2 or 3 months I just want to get your opinions on. Number one, in December the Nigerian military attacked 

and killed a number of Shia Muslims in the town of Zaria. And do 

you think that is an indication of future trends for sectarian violence, and what is the government doing to try and quell the 

Sunni-Shia tensions? 

Ms. COOKE. I think it is a very good question and there is still 

a lot that is not known about the circumstances of the Zaria attack 

that killed some 400 Shiite Muslims and grievously wounded the 

group’s leader Zakzaky. There is an investigation underway and 

that may give more clarity. Senior officials that I have spoken to 

hint at some kind of imminent and dangerous threat, but there is 

not a lot of public discourse on that. 

Mr. KEATING. The other thing that I just want to touch upon, the 

last couple of months there have been reports through separate 

media sources about Cameroonians committing human rights 

abuses inside Nigeria. Do you have any comments on that and 

what the effect could be and how legitimate those reports are? 

Ms. COOKE. I haven’t heard those reports. But in terms of the 

Shiite split, I think that the Nigerian Government needs to tread 

very carefully there. Iran called, President Rouhani called President Buhari shortly thereafter. The Saudi Arabian king called him 

shortly thereafter. What you don’t want to see is some ideological 

proxy playing out in the north of Nigeria. 

Mr. KEATING. That is my fear as well. Ms. Friend? 

Ms. FRIEND. Sir, if I may add, Nigeria also has had years and 

years of Christian-Muslim violence that is a major problem for stability in the country. Going further into sectarian violence amongst 

Muslims plays exactly into Boko Haram’s hands. 

And so I completely agree with Jennifer on this case. I think the 

government has to be very careful about this and not improve the 

narrative for Boko Haram while they are at it. 

Mr. KEATING. Another concern I had just recently is just what is 

occurring in terms of the shift, if there is a shift at all, with President Goodluck Jonathan using private forces, mercenaries as well? 

The President, Buhari, rather, he wanted to shift away from that. 

Is that happening, or is there still use of mercenaries at all, and 

are there difficulties because of the use of those mercenaries and 

having control over them and their conduct as well? 

Ms. COOKE. I am one of the people that think, actually, the 

South African contractors actually contributed a good deal to better 

tactics and more sustained and coordinated attacks to push Boko 

Haram out of the territories. 

Mr. KEATING. Are they still using those forces? 

Ms. COOKE. They are not still using them and they may recur. 

There may be private contractors brought on again, whether it is 

these same or not. So that is at an end right now. That was at a 

time that the United States, for example, did not want to provide 

certain materiel to the Nigerian Government because of human 

rights abuses. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, just quickly, listening to all of your testimony, I don’t think there is a conflict but it is worth commenting 

on. Ms. Cooke, you mentioned that some of the gains we made were 

31

with media, and part of that might be quelling their ability to do 

it, but Dr. Gartenstein-Ross mentioned our inability to deal with 

these issues of propaganda or media as well. Is there a way to reconcile those two things if indeed there is a conflict in your two 

statements? 

Ms. COOKE. Well, we believe that Abubakar Shekau has been 

taken out and he was—whether 2 years ago followed by imposters 

or just recently—and he was really the center of the media propaganda effort. He has not been seen on the scene since March. But 

regeneration will certainly entail a renewal of more nimble sophisticated media techniques. 

Mr. KEATING. And do you agree with Dr. Gartenstein-Ross that 

we have to do a better job of sort of puncturing the myths that are 

out there? 

Ms. COOKE. Absolutely. We are slower on that online stuff than 

these young militants. 

Mr. KEATING. My time is expired. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. 

Mr. Perry? 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Cooke, in your opinion, why did it take us so long to designate Boko Haram a terrorist 

organization? 

Ms. COOKE. Well, and I testified before this hearing some time 

back shortly after Boko Haram reemerged after 2009. At that time 

the group was extremely fractured. We didn’t really have a sense 

of what was Boko Haram. Nigeria at that time did not want it designated an FTO organization, in part because there were certain 

elements within it that it felt that it could peel away, and the potential of having talks with certain elements within Boko Haram 

was very popular in Nigeria, across Nigeria. 

To my mind, at that time the designation didn’t give you tools 

that would make, be more effective. As I said, they don’t bank in 

the United States, they don’t use banking institutions. But what it 

might have done at that time was give greater coherence to a group 

that was very fractured and ideologically and internally divided at 

that time. 

I think the eventual call was right. But at that time I think 

there is a legitimate difference of opinion on whether it should 

have happened or not. My sense was that, because the Nigerian 

Government didn’t want it, because it might have lent that greater 

coherence and brand name to the group, we should have postponed 

it. 

Mr. PERRY. I guess I understand. It is in their country and they 

had reservations about it, but in hindsight. 

Ms. COOKE. Well, there is no question——

Mr. PERRY. I mean, you are never going to know, right? You are 

never going to know if we would have designated it earlier whether 

it would have, would it be the advent of the coalescing of those desperate portions. 

Ms. COOKE. That is right. But we don’t know that it would have 

added any benefit in our fight against Boko Haram since the tool 

is directed at bank accounts, asset freezes, sanctions and so forth. 

Mr. PERRY. And that is the only thing as you understand it in 

designating——

32

Ms. COOKE. Well, I know, but it elevates attention to the group 

at that time. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. 

Ms. COOKE. As I said, I think there are legitimate differences of 

opinion. There was a trade-off. There was a chance at that time of 

dividing the group. And eventually as we know the designation was 

given. 

Mr. PERRY. So what is the trigger? So we are watching it. The 

government, the local government, state government doesn’t want 

them to be designated for whatever they see as legitimate reasons. 

We don’t want to increase the visibility and have these desperate 

organizations coalesce, but at what point do we say enough is 

enough? The ends would be that we don’t want them to be, these 

groups to become as powerful as this one has become and pervasive 

as it has, so what is the trigger point? What do we get out of this 

model for the next model? 

Ms. COOKE. Well, look, I think in every instance there is going 

to be a debate within the administration with the Congress on 

what makes most sense in that particular very unique context. And 

I don’t think there is going to be, there is no set trigger point in 

anything. I think you have to look at the totality of the benefits 

and the potential costs. 

Mr. PERRY. So fair enough. Which organizations have we not designated or that we have designated a terrorist organization that 

has caused the coalescing? Is there any empirical data? Is there 

anything to say that—these are going to keep springing up, right? 

If it is not here, it is going to be somewhere. 

Ms. COOKE. Well, some people thought that the designation of 

Shabaab kind of came at a poor moment, for example, and kind of 

elevated, gave them a propaganda tool. And as I said, I think in 

retrospect the FTO designation didn’t fundamentally change how 

we were dealing with Boko Haram at the time. 

Mr. PERRY. So do we need to change what the FTO designation 

means in real terms, what that construct is? Is it just banking or 

is it something—do we need take a look at that looking at—you 

were talking about earlier about how our Government—or maybe 

it was you, Dr. Ross, about how we are slow to react because of a 

bureaucracy and so on and so forth, and they are very quick to 

react. So is there something that we need to take a look at it in 

this paradigm that needs to change so that our reaction is meaningful in thwarting these organizations? 

Ms. COOKE. Well, I would have to reflect a little bit on what that 

might be. I think recognizing the danger and the potential of the 

group is important, and if the FTO designation does that that is 

a loss in retrospect. 

Mr. PERRY. But how many do we know that we haven’t designated that since we didn’t designate them they kind of fizzled out 

on their own? What does that look like? What is that——

Ms. COOKE. Well, I don’t know the record of debates on the FTO 

designation. 

Mr. PERRY. No, no. I am not talking about the record of the debates. I am talking about which organizations where we are saying, 

well, we are thinking about designating them in an FTO, but if we 

do it might heighten awareness to them and actually make them 

33

what they are aspiring to be, so let us hold off. How many of those 

are out there that we know of where we were successful by not designating them and then they fizzled out? Do we know what that 

number is? 

Ms. COOKE. I don’t. 

Mr. PERRY. And I will tell you, with indulgence, Mr. Chairman, 

the context is, is that it seems to me we keep waiting for whatever 

reason, maybe legitimate and maybe not, to designate some of 

these people that go around doing the horrific things that they do, 

and my experience has been from at least watching from afar is 

that we wait too long, they metastasize, they become very powerful 

and then we have got to deal with this. 

So if we are looking at this as a model for future operations and 

future decisions, it seems to me we ought to get something out of 

it, which is some kind of standard or trigger point or something, 

by which we say that is enough. We don’t want it to get—we don’t 

want to have this problem get any bigger than it is and then do 

something as opposed to, well, it is all episodic and today it is this 

one and tomorrow it is that one and we are just going to do it; we 

are going to wing it every time, because it seems to me we have 

been failing at winging it. That is my opinion. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Ross, you had indicated, you were talking about violent non-state actors before and 

you characterized Boko Haram as a violent non-state actor. Yet, 

they use brutal killings of innocent people as a method to demonstrate the incapacity of the Nigerian state. They terrorize local 

populations. They engage the military in bloody conflict. They seek 

to destabilize and overthrow the government and install an Islamic 

caliphate. So are they not, don’t they have a state controlled aspiration? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Absolutely they do. I use the term ‘‘violent non-state actor’’ because to me it is a catch-all term that could 

include different modes of military operation, right. We tend right 

now in discourse to refer to these groups as terrorist groups, which 

is accurate for most of them, but at the same time for Boko it is 

not just a terrorist group. Usually a terrorist group is relatively 

weak and can’t militarily engage, can’t hold territory. They use terrorism to try to provoke a state reaction and rally a community to 

their side. 

Boko, in contrast, was last year at this time the dominant force 

in Borno State in northeastern Nigeria. So they also could engage 

in insurgent warfare, they are also able to seize territory and govern. That is why I use that particular term. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes. Well, look at, I think on the whole of Africa 

as a continent it is 55 countries now including South Sudan, the 

newest country in the world. How many failed states are in the 

continent of Africa? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Off the top of my head and the fact that 

it is hard to tabulate, but a very easy answer is there is much more 

than we should be comfortable with and there is also those states 

which aren’t failed but are in danger of failing. Tunisia, for examVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:17 Mar 17, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\022416\98829 SHIRL
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ple, which nobody would call a failed state is fundamentally, existentially threatened by these attacks on its tourist industry which 

could send it into an economic death spiral. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Boko Haram which literally is ‘‘Western education 

is forbidden’’ aligns itself with ISIS. ISIS seems to have maybe not 

shifted, but emphasized less emphasis on oil revenues, more on territorial gains, because the more territory they can control the more 

they can impose taxes, they can preside over countries and using 

that as leverage to extract money to support their bloody deeds all 

over. 

Given the fragile state of affairs in Africa, particularly Central 

Africa, is Africa a means to provide for access to southern Europe? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Yes. That shouldn’t be overstated, but it 

certainly is something that has been discussed in ISIS propaganda. 

The degree to which Europe is able to control the flow in by sea 

is limited, and it seems that already terrorist groups to a limited 

extent are trying to place operatives amongst the refugee inflow. 

Mr. HIGGINS. What is the role, if any, of the African Union? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. I believe the African Union is charged 

obviously with a number of things including security. I mean, I 

think when you are looking at Africa there is two different models, 

right. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Security for whom? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Well, security for African states. So I 

was——

Mr. HIGGINS. All right. What is the population of the continent 

with its 55 countries of Africa? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Off the top of my head? 

Ms. COOKE. Billion-plus. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Billion-plus? Billion? How many African Union 

military personnel are engaged, activated? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. It is limited. I mean, you have——

Mr. HIGGINS. About? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Well, in Somalia it is about today, I 

think, sort of reaching 9,000 and 12,000. Then you have the 

Ecowas and Minusma contingents in Mali. The number is in the 

tens of thousands as opposed to——

Mr. HIGGINS. Let me ask this. Let me put it to you another way. 

How many stable countries are there in Africa? One, two? 

Ms. COOKE: Many. Many. 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Yes, 30, 40. The majority are stable. But 

I will say one thing to cap this, which is as you said, ISIS, its 

model right now is to seize territory and to hold territory. I mean, 

we have talked about al-Qaeda and how Boko went over from alQaeda to ISIS. To me, I am more worried about al-Qaeda’s strategy 

which seems to be a strategy of progressive destabilization. 

So if you look at Libya, for example, ISIS does hold territory. 

And one of the things that makes action, military action, against 

ISIS in Sirte, such a difficult thing for us to agree to is that if you 

were to push ISIS out, al-Qaeda could well be the beneficiary. So 

you retake a city from ISIS without actually winning anything for 

it. 

I am much more concerned about this progressive destabilization. 

Right now you can see Boko tried to control Borno State. It got 

35

pushed out. Sometimes you can get too greedy. But one thing, 

given population pressures, resource pressures including pressures 

on the water supply in numerous countries, one thing that you can 

bet on in the longer term is it is hard to keep these countries stable. So if I am looking at it, it is hard to prevent actors like this 

whose long term goal is to destabilize and to capitalize off of that 

destabilization. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Just a final thought, Mr. Chairman. Look at South 

Sudan. South Sudan became the newest country in the world in 

July 2011. And they were in a civil war with Sudan for 30 years, 

and they have become their own state and primarily Christian in 

the south, and now there is tribal battle between the Dinkas and 

the Nuers. And we just saw a Protection of Civilians facility attacked by government officials where some 20,000 people were essentially murdered and another 30,000 displaced, again, and you 

talk to officials in South Sudan who want to have diplomatic relations with us and they talk about how we have to get the U.N. out 

of there. Well, the only organization that is protecting people is the 

United Nations. It is the second largest mission in the world. 

So these corrupt governments, and if you look at the World Economic Forum, and you see that they only contribute about 5 percent of their budgets and they are oil-rich. I mean, South Sudan, 

most of the oil reserves are in the south, but the infrastructure is 

in the north. They have the potential. But less than 5 percent goes 

to education, to health care, to infrastructure. I mean, you can’t 

move around South Sudan but for about a 2-mile radius within the 

capital city of Juba. This is a major problem. And I don’t have a 

solution, but it obviously appears as though whatever strategy is 

being deployed has been an abject failure. It is going to continue 

to fail and so long as there is failed states they are going to serve 

as a breeding ground for groups like this and ISIS. 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. If I may, because I know that we are 

over time, I just want to refer back to what I said in my oral statement. That is why I think it is so important for us to think about 

our own internal structures for decision making, because what you 

are referring to—look, beating these groups militarily is in my view 

the easy part. The hard part is leaving behind something stable 

and pushing them back as part of a coordinated strategy. 

And within government my view is that we are absolutely dysfunctional in this regard. Like, we have a lot of trouble leaving behind something that is stable and we need to think about why that 

is. And a lot of it maybe comes down to our organizational structure is just not suited for a lot of these tasks. I believe it can be, 

but this is absolutely a problem and one that we shouldn’t push to 

the side when we are thinking about these regions and trying to 

think of what is a good policy. The fact that we have systemically 

been awful at executing, and leaving behind stability has to be a 

part of the discussion and something that we think about as we 

think about our own Government for the 21st century. 

Mr. HIGGINS: Who is we? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Well, we would be you all, policymakers 

who are in a very good position to hold hearings looking at this. 

Those of us who are outside of government working in the think 

tanks here and the like also are positioned to push the ball forVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:17 Mar 17, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\022416\98829 SHIRL
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ward, but ultimately, to me the people who are in the best position 

to ask these questions and to get action on them are elected members of the legislature. To me that is really where the center is for 

the kind of governmental reforms we need. I think the White 

House as well. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman’s time has expired. I have been very liberal on this issue, a word I don’t use very often. The chair will recognize the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Wilson, who is not a member of this subcommittee but is invited to ask questions because 

this is an important issue for her. The chair recognizes Ms. Wilson 

from Florida. 

Ms. WILSON. Thank you so much for having this hearing today. 

It is truly, truly needed. And I have several questions. I hope I 

don’t run out of time. 

But when President Buhari won the election in part because of 

his commitment to defeating Boko Haram, he contends that the 

group has been technically defeated. Is Boko Haram stronger or 

weaker since Buhari has taken over? That is number one. 

And number two, because of Nigeria’s human rights record—and 

we went to Nigeria twice and they were asking for the ability to 

buy arms and weapons from the United States and something 

called the Leahy Law prevents that. How do you get around the 

Leahy Law? How many people do you kill? Because Boko Haram 

according to all national newspapers is number one of the most terrorist, they have killed more people than any other terrorist group 

in the world. So when are we able to get the right people in the 

right places to defeat them? This is for anyone who can answer. 

Ms. COOKE. I think, and as I said in my remarks, I think Boko 

Haram is very much weaker, but that does not mean that it is any 

less lethal and dangerous for the communities of that region, and 

we have seen that in the horrific attacks of the last few weeks. So 

this is a moment to weaken them even further and to eliminate 

their ability to then regenerate. 

I think the asymmetrical attacks that they now launch that is a 

much more vexing problem because the area is so vast than just 

clearing them off of territory. And that requires very nimble responses, much better communication among military forces and 

with the communities and the capacity to move very quickly and 

respond. 

On the Leahy Law, I fully support the principles and the logic 

behind the Leahy Law. I do think there might be, there should be 

room for some flexibility in looking at this so it is applied less 

broadly to entire units. Perhaps focus on individuals or smaller 

units. You look at——

Ms. WILSON. I don’t want to cut you off, but that is the answer 

we got from, actually, the senator himself. 

Ms. COOKE. And as I said, I think——

Ms. WILSON. That this was something. And then I want to ask 

this. We met with senators here from Nigeria, senators who represent different parts of Nigeria, and we met with them in Nigeria. 

And they say that they know where the girls are and there is—is 

this true? Is there any truth about President Buhari actively bartering with the appropriate leader of Boko Haram in exchange for 

37

the girls; that they are held captive in a secluded, secure area in 

the forest? Is there any truth to that? 

Ms. COOKE. Well, there may be efforts to connect with the group 

to negotiate some release. No one of the thousands of members of 

Boko Haram that have been captured, of the thousands of women 

and girls that have been captured, no one has seen a Chibok girl. 

And that is just a remarkable mystery. I think many people I talk 

to think that they are broken into much smaller groups, married 

away, and possibly in the northern mountains of Cameroon, in 

Niger and elsewhere. This is just, it is a tragic mystery as to where 

they have gone. I am sure——

Ms. WILSON. Do you think if one of them, do you think that if 

they were, just one would appear, if they were married away, or 

someone out of all of those girls could have escaped, gotten back 

home or went and told someone that they were a Chibok girl, because that is all I am listening for. 

Ms. COOKE. It has not happened. 

Ms. WILSON. And I am looking for a mass grave to see where 

they all are, because this is——

Ms. COOKE. That has not been found, nor has any——

Ms. WILSON. That has not been found and they have not been 

found. So what do we do to sensitize the nation, sensitize America 

that this is an issue that is even threatening our homeland, because we don’t know what Boko Haram has in mind, just like we 

don’t know what ISIS has in mind with influencing African American boys in our inner cities. 

And all of this Internet activity back and forth, and has anyone 

looked into that? And it is my understanding that there is a whole 

department at the State Department that deals with Boko Haram, 

and there are analysts there who just track Boko Haram. Are you 

aware of that? 

Ms. COOKE. Well, I know that there is an interagency kind of cooperation group within the State Department and they have expanded their coordination and presence on Boko Haram. I don’t 

know the number. 

Ms. WILSON. What about the threat to the homeland, to our 

homeland from Boko Haram? Just like we are all afraid that ISIS 

is going to find its way in the United States, is anyone afraid that 

Boko Haram is going to find its way into our inner cities? 

Ms. COOKE. I don’t want to monopolize, but——

Ms. FRIEND. Ma’am, I don’t——

Ms. WILSON. Has it been discussed at all in your think tanks? 

Ms. FRIEND. I don’t think there is a huge concern about that. 

There of course is, because of the nature of these groups where you 

can get one or two operatives through by hook or by crook, it is always a concern. But I think in a rack and stack of groups around 

the world there is less concern that Boko Haram poses an immediate direct threat to the U.S. homeland, and more concern about 

the threat they pose to Nigeria and the surrounding region. And 

also, of course, concern about this newfound connection with the Islamic State and what that really implies and entails. 

One of the members earlier asked me, it was Mr. Higgins, asked 

about the threat to Europe. And of course our European allies are 

very concerned about a threat from ISIS coming especially out of 

38

Libya, but North Africa in general. So those are the immediate 

threats. But of course from my time inside the executive branch, 

everyone is always on the lookout for the metastasization of such 

groups and for the evolving threat that Boko Haram could be posing to us, but at this time right now my understanding is it is less 

of a concern that they pose a direct threat to the homeland. 

Ms. WILSON. When does it become an imminent threat, when it 

hits? 

Ms. FRIEND. No, ma’am. I think when you start seeing, and of 

course this would be in a closed hearing and I don’t have such information right now, but the kinds of things you would see would 

be direct communications between either foreign nationals in the 

United States or even American citizens with either facilitators 

that are talking to Boko Haram or with Boko Haram members 

themselves. I was never on the intel side so I am not as expert in 

that kind of thing, but when I saw finished intelligence that was 

the kinds of things that you look for. 

Ms. WILSON. All right, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentlelady. I want to follow up on a question she had about what happened to the girls. Have any of them 

been ransomed back to their families? 

Ms. COOKE. Not to my knowledge and not to the knowledge of 

the people I spoke to in Maiduguri and Abuja. 

Mr. POE. And the other question she had was regarding mass 

graves of these girls. Has there been any evidence that they have 

all been killed or murdered somewhere? I mean, is there any evidence of that or is it just like you have mentioned, Ms. Friend, that 

they have gone different ways, all bad ways, but they have disappeared in different ways other than this murder?. 

Ms. FRIEND. Yes, Mr. Chairman, my understanding from Amnesty International who I think has done the best work on looking 

for mass graves, mass graves have largely been found to have adult 

or teenage males in them. There was one that Amnesty identified 

outside the Giwa barracks, for example, that was largely males. 

Again my speculation is that young girls are financially valuable 

and so they would first try either to keep them themselves for domestic purposes or to sell them again into trafficking or slavery because they could make money that way. But again, that is my speculation. No one knows. It is truly a mystery. 

Mr. POE. Thank you. The chair also has another Member of Congress here as a guest, Ms. Jackson Lee from Texas, and the chair 

will recognize her for her questions. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, let me 

thank you very much. And I am going to probably make comments 

because I think Mr. Gartenstein-Ross, your pointing back to policymakers and legislators are very important. There is a level of frustration and we have joined a lot of colleagues in our frustration for 

Boko Haram which is particularly a unique entity. I went to Boko 

Haram with a number of members and we have since gone back 

to Nigeria and Borno State, the first time, when the girls were first 

taken, trying to raise the ante and before the election of President 

Buhari and Goodluck Jonathan was in office. 

39

So I just want—I think your title deals with the security issue, 

and I just want just a pointed yes or no of the capacity of the Nigerian forces to extinguish Boko Haram. 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. I think their capacity is low. But I also 

want to point to the fact that you have multiple nations’ militaries, 

of them I assess the Nigerians as being one of the less capable 

forces. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. That is unique, and I don’t want to interrupt 

you, because we, over the Bush administration and others, have relied upon the Nigerian forces in years back to be one of the strongest. So you are now thinking they are weakened? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Well, with the specific militaries going 

after Boko Haram, I think that they are the most challenged. One 

of the problems that the Nigerian military has today is corruption 

and lack of morale have made it a worse force than it was a decade 

ago. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So President Buhari has not been able to keep 

his word that they would be extinguished by December 2015? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Oh, unequivocally not. I mean, extinguished is a very particular thing. No one would say they are extinguished. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. It is a deafening word. As I look at the map, 

I see that the countries of Niger, Benin, and Cameroon, as I understand it Boko Haram has seeped over into those areas. Is that not 

accurate? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. They have crossed over the border and maybe 

even to Chad? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Because the coloration ends around Nigeria 

but they go in and out, do they not? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Yes, it has carried out major attacks in 

Niger, Chad and Cameroon. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Right. And so the forces that you were speaking of is some of these troops from the surrounding countries. 

Which would you be to see as seem to be the strongest? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. I would defer on that in that I would 

want to actually try to do an assessment. But just what I can say 

is that Nigerians are, their military is particularly challenged right 

now, and looking at kind of the battlefield others have been better. 

Perhaps one of my colleagues can speak to military capabilities, 

comparison of the four. 

Ms. FRIEND. Congresswoman, if I may. You are absolutely right 

that the Nigerians used to be one of the best militaries in Africa. 

There was at least a decade of underinvestment, however, in part 

because of concerns about a military coup. And so the forces that 

met with Boko Haram were incredibly under equipped, ill-trained, 

their morale was very low. 

What Buhari has done since coming into office which he hasn’t 

even been in for a year yet and these things take a long time, 

which is part of what I think the U.S. needs to remember is a little 

bit of patience to let them recapitalize. But I think one of the 

things he has done that has been particularly inspiring for the foot 

soldiers is clean out some of the brass at the top, say we are going 

40

to have a different kind of command climate. He is himself a retired major general in the army. 

So he has had a real focus on trying to improve morale, again 

personnel payment, and then equipment from sort of all sources he 

can get to build the forces back up again. But it is going to take 

time. So right now it is not the Nigerian military that you might 

remember from years past. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me conclude, and bells are ringing on me. 

Let me conclude, bells are ringing, by saying, and I am glad you 

gave me that opening. I do want to acknowledge the strength of 

President Buhari’s words and I would associate with his commitment. 

So I would like to leave the record—and I want to thank the 

chairman. I would like to leave the record with indicating that the 

map coloration, the bleeding of Boko Haram is outside the borders 

of Nigeria and so they are terrorizing many of the surrounding 

countries. I have offered that I believe this is an African Union 

issue, a United Nations issue. Comments were made about Africa. 

Most of the world is destabilized. The Mideast, it gives me pause 

to find outside of Israel one stabilized country in the Mideast, Jordan, let me not, and there may be one or two others, but we are 

facing an unusual terroristic siege, if you will. 

So I guess I would like to leave on the record that Boko Haram 

attention needs to be enhanced. It took great pride in associating 

itself with ISIL. It is as dangerous or worse as my colleague has 

said. And I do believe that we need to put pressure on Europe. 

We have the Africa Command, we have the Leahy rule, and we 

need to find some flexibility where we can work with those resources and those military resources in a way that says that we 

mean business in the terms of the security of those areas, because 

they will do nothing but grow and continue their siege of horrific 

violence. And I thank you all. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield 

back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentlelady, and I thank both Ms. Jackson 

Lee and Ms. Wilson for their being here today and also their strong 

interest in this very tragic situation. 

Without objection, the chair will recognize Mr. Keating for an additional question. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Just one final question that 

we had regarding your testimony and just as an overview. Over 

200 girls missing, a mystery, no trace of them alive or killed, no 

trace whatsoever. That makes me question the extent and capabilities of Nigeria’s domestic intelligence on the ground and U.S. intelligence on the ground. Can you comment on our current capabilities and what some of our needs might be and both Nigeria’s needs 

in terms of intelligence and our own? 

Ms. FRIEND. I can take a try at it. So immediately after the 

Chibok kidnapping, the Department of Defense announced that it 

was providing ISR supports which of course is overhead surveillance, and now there is also ISR support coming out of Cameroon 

as well. Again that is overhead surveillance. 

On the ground penetration into northern Nigeria by almost anyone who is not a resident there or part of a military contingent is 

very thin. Lots of NGOs can’t get in. And so my sense has always 

41

been that our on the ground intelligence has been really reliant on 

the Nigerians and on other sources, and that most of what we do 

and most of our support to Nigeria has been through ISR which is 

a huge technical capability that they of course do not have. 

In terms of intelligence sharing, again what we share has to be 

capitalized on by the Nigerians. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. And I would just say that given Boko 

Haram’s allegiance to ISIL, it is even more important, I think, the 

U.S. to have more active intelligence on the ground. Thank you 

very much. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. I thank all y’all for being here 

today. All y’all is plural to you all in case you are wondering. But 

thank you for the work that you do, and there may be other questions that members of the committee have for you more specific 

and they will file those questions within the next 5 days and we 

would appreciate your prompt response to those questions. And 

thank you for your expertise in this very tragic area. Thank you 

very much. The committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:19 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED POE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

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