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S. HRG. 114–218 

UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY IN EUROPE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 28, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

APRIL 28, 2015

Page 

UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY IN EUROPE ....................................................... 1 

Stavridis, ADM James G., USN [Ret.], Dean of the Fletcher School of Law 

and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Ma ................................................ 5 

Brzezinski, Ian J., Resident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC ....................................... 6 

Sestanovich, Stephen, Ph.D., George F. Kennan Senior Fellow for Russian 

and Eurasian Studies, Council on Foreign Relations ....................................... 14 

(III) 

(1) 

UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY IN 

EUROPE 

TUESDAY, APRIL 28, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:06 a.m., in SD–G50, 

Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Ayotte, 

Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Reed, Nelson, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, 

Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, good morning. This committee meets a 

little earlier than usual today since we have a briefing at 11 a.m. 

today on the recent unfortunate tragedy of the deaths of an American and another one in a drone strike. The committee meets today 

to receive testimony on U.S. security policy in Europe. I would like 

to thank each of our witnesses for appearing before us. 

Admiral James Stavridis, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and 

Diplomacy at Tufts University and former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; Ian Brzezinski, resident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center at the Atlantic Council; and Stephen Sestanovich, the 

George Kennen senior fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies at 

the Council on Foreign Relations. 

Just like the United States, Europe confronts a diverse and complex array of crises that are making the world a more dangerous 

place. Already this year radical Islamists attacked Paris and Copenhagen. Last week in the Mediterranean, over 700 migrants perished tragically in a shipwreck fleeing the conflict and instability 

of North Africa. Then there is Russia. In 2012, the Defense Strategic Guidance argued that the changing global security environment offered a chance to rebalance the U.S. military investment in 

Europe while building a closer relationship with Russia. 

The Obama administration eliminated two heavy brigades stationed in Europe and pursued a so-called reset policy towards Russia. Two years later, Russia’s invasion and dismemberment of 

Ukraine should remind everyone of the true nature of Putin’s ambitions and the fragility of peace in Europe. Since the end of the Cold 

War, U.S. policy toward Russia was based on a bipartisan assumption that the Russian government sought to integrate peacefully 

into the international order in Europe and to forego a constructive 

2 

relationship with the United States based on mutual national interests. 

The events of this past year have overturned that assumption. 

For the first time in 7 decades on the European continent, a state 

has sent its military forces across an internationally recognized 

border and forcibly annexed the sovereign territory of another 

state. Now, American strategy must adjust to the reality of the revisionist Russia that is undergoing a significant military modernization, and that is willing to use force not only as a last resort, 

but as a primary tool to achieve its neo-imperial objectives. In 

Ukraine, Russia has continued to violate the February ceasefire 

agreement. In fact, news today indicates an increase in the conflict. 

Rather than comply and withdraw from Ukraine, President Putin 

has maintained sizable numbers of artillery pieces and multiple 

rocket launchers in Ukraine. 

According to the State Department, the Russian military has deployed additional air defense systems near the front lines in Eastern Ukraine, the highest amount since last August, and a disturbing sign that another offensive may be imminent. In response, 

it is not that the United States and our European allies have done 

nothing. It is that nothing we have done has succeeded in deterring 

Putin’s aggression and halted his slow motion annexation of Eastern Ukraine. 

The Ukrainian people do not want U.S. or western troops to fight 

for them. They are simply asking for the right tools to defend 

themselves and their country. Senator Reed and I, along with 

members of this committee on both sides of the aisle, have called 

on the administration to provide defensive lethal assistance to 

Ukraine. Unfortunately, the President’s continued inaction incredibly for fear of provoking Russia is seen by Putin as weakness and 

invites the very aggression we seek to avoid. 

Of course there is no military solution in Ukraine, but there is 

a clear military dimension to achieving a political solution. As 

three major think tanks wrote recently, ‘‘Assisting Ukraine to deter 

attack and defend itself is not inconsistent with the search for a 

peaceful political solution. It is essential to achieving it.’’ Only if 

the Kremlin knows that the risks and costs of further military action are high will it seek to find an acceptable political solution. 

The failure to raise the cost of Putin’s aggression in Ukraine only 

increases and makes it more likely that this aggression could expand to places like Moldova, Georgia, the Baltic States, and Central Asia. 

This is even more worrisome in light of Russia’s increasing emphasis on nuclear weapons. Putin has personally presided over nuclear weapons drills in recent months, deployed Icelander missiles 

to Kaliningrad capable of carrying nuclear warheads and claiming 

the right to deploy nuclear weapons on the Crimean peninsula. 

Russia continues to violate the IMF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear 

Forces] treaty as nuclear weapons become more prominent in its 

military doctrine. 

Equally concerning, Russia’s military buildup also appears designed to deny the United States and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization] access to key parts of Europe, especially the Baltic 

and Black Sea regions, as a way of trying to make U.S. security 

3 

commitments to our allies too costly to fulfill. Russia is clearly 

learning from China in this regard. 

Russia’s intensifying military activity in contempt of international law also extends to the Arctic where it has stood up a new 

military command with more troops and aircraft military infrastructure and increased military exercises. One exercise last month 

included nearly 40,000 troops and more than 55 ships and submarines. The administration needs to address this problem as the 

United States assumes the chairmanship of the Arctic Council over 

the next 2 years. 

In response to the broader challenge that Russia poses to security in Europe hereto, it is not that the United States and NATO 

have done nothing. We have created a modest rapid reaction force, 

increased air policing and sea patrols, expanded training and exercises, and deployed small numbers of additional forces to Estonia, 

Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. The problem is the actions we have 

taken seem inadequate to the scope, scale, and seriousness of the 

challenges we face. 

I would especially highlight the fact that too many of our NATO 

allies continue to fail to provide for their own defense despite promises at the Wales Summit to ‘‘reverse the trend of declining defense 

budget.’’ Soon Poland and Estonia may be the only other allies 

meeting our alliance’s commitment to spend 2 percent of GDP on 

defense. 

None of us want to return to the Cold War, but we need to face 

the reality that we are dealing with a Russian ruler who wants exactly that, especially as a way of enhancing Russian relevance 

amid systemic demographic collapse and economic crisis. The reason for maintaining a strong U.S. military presence in Europe is 

the same as ever. To deter conflict and aggression, we must forget 

this lesson at our peril. Ultimately, we must lift our sights and recognize that we are facing the reality of a challenge that many had 

assumed was resigned to the history books: a strong militarily capable state that is hostile to our interests and our values and seeks 

to overturn the international order in Europe that American leaders of both parties have sought to maintain since World War II. 

I hope today’s hearings will help us to better understand the 

magnitude of this challenge and what to do about it. I thank each 

of our witnesses for joining us today, and I look forward to their 

testimony. I would note in the audience we have parliamentarians 

from Ukraine, Kosovo, and Nepal who are with us today. I welcome 

them to our hearing. I especially want to express my appreciation 

for our legislators from Ukraine who are here on behalf of their 

country. 

Senator Reed? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you, gentlemen, Admiral Stavridis, Mr. Brzezinski, and Dr. 

Sestanovich, welcome. Let me thank the chairman for setting up 

this hearing to review the security situation in Europe. It will inform our upcoming deliberations on the annual defense authorization bill. On Thursday we will hear from General Breedlove, the 

Commander of U.S. European Command and NATO Supreme AlVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:11 Apr 05, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\99668.TXT JUNE
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lied Commander, and this hearing will be a wonderful way to begin 

that discussion with General Breedlove. 

The transatlantic relationship remains central to the United 

States and global security. Our NATO allies and European partners have been the primary contributors to the United States-led 

coalition operations in the Middle East and South Asia. In Afghanistan, European countries have deployed more than 260,000 personnel since 2007, accounting for more than 90 percent of the nonU.S. forces participating in the ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] mission that ended last December. 

Today, however, our European partners face security challenges 

closer to home. As noted at the NATO Summit in Wales last September, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has challenged the alliance’s vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Russia has engaged in hybrid warfare to seize Crimea and back separatist forces 

in Eastern Ukraine in violation of the ceasefire agreement signed 

in September of last year and this February. According to the U.S. 

and military leaders, Russia continues to flow heavy weapons and 

equipment into the separatist areas, sparking fears of renewed 

heavy fighting within the coming weeks. 

One step this committee and Congress have supported is providing Ukraine the military assistance, including defense weapons, 

necessary for it to defend itself against further attacks. A recent report by leading think tanks, which Dr. Sestanovich co-authored, argues that ‘‘Assisting Ukraine to deter attack and defend itself is 

not inconsistent with the search for a peaceful political solution. It 

is essential to achieving it.’’ 

I hope our witnesses will address whether they believe there is 

a coalition of countries willing to provide assistance to Ukraine, 

and whether preparing such a coalition effort would help or harm 

compliance with the ceasefire agreements. At the NATO Wales 

Summit, members approved a Readiness Action Plan to enhance 

the alliance’s ability to respond quickly to security challenges. This 

year’s budget request includes $800 million on top of the $1 billion 

approved last year for the European Reassurance Initiative, to enhance the United States’ military presence and activities in Europe. 

A key issue over the coming years will be how U.S. forces should 

be postured in Europe to reassure allies and provide for a collective 

defense. This will depend in part on whether our NATO allies live 

up to their pledges on defense spending and the levels of host nation support for U.S. forces in Europe. 

NATO is facing security challenges along its other borders as 

well. Countries along the Mediterranean border are grappling with 

the prospect of tens of thousands, possibly more, of migrants fleeing instability in Libya, Syria, Eritrea, and elsewhere. Efforts to respond to this crisis have been mixed to date, and it is clear more 

must be done soon because the flow of migrants is not likely to subside given increasing violence in Libya and other conflict zones. 

To the southeast, the flow of foreign fighters across Turkey’s border into Syria and back heightens the risk of future anti-western 

attacks like those in Paris and Brussels, and raises the question 

as to whether ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] has 

more broadly infiltrated Europe’s cities. In the north, Russia is exVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:11 Apr 05, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\99668.TXT JUNE
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panding its military activities in the Arctic, potentially challenging 

international norms and laws governing that region. 

I look forward to our witnesses’ testimony on these and other security challenges in Europe, and, again, I thank them for their willingness to appear this morning. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I welcome the witnesses. Admiral Stavridis? 

STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN [RET.], DEAN 

OF THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY, 

TUFTS UNIVERSITY, MEDFORD, MA 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, 

members of the committee, it is a delight to be back with you. Last 

time I was dressed somewhat more glamorously than I am today. 

It is a pleasure to share some ideas and thoughts on the situation 

in Europe, which have, as we heard in those statements from the 

chairman and the ranking member, have taken a turn for the 

worse in a security dimension over the last 24 months since I left 

my post as the Supreme Allied Commander. 

I want to just begin by saying, why does Europe matter? I get 

that question. Does Europe really matter for the United States? We 

talk a lot about a pivot to the Pacific and so on, and we should 

globally. But I would argue Europe matters for a wide variety of 

reasons. 

First and foremost, we share enormous values, our values: democracy, liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of religion. These come 

from Europe, from the Enlightenment. Second, NATO, this alliance, 28 nations, 52 percent of the world’s GDP, 3 million men and 

women under arms, almost all of them volunteers, 24,000 military 

aircraft. This is a terrific partner for the United States in Europe. 

Third, the bases. Sometimes people will say, oh, those are Cold 

War bases. Not so in my view. These are forward-operating stations of the 21st century. We need them to move our forces into Africa, into the Levant, into the Middle East, into Central Asia. They 

are irreplaceable. 

Fourth, the economy. The largest trade flow in the world goes 

across the Atlantic. It is about $5 trillion. So, this economic bridge 

across the Atlantic is of enormous importance to us. Then finally, 

as we look at Europe, it is a place full of high tech, of well-trained 

military. It is a wealth of resources. So for all those reasons, Europe matters. 

I think the challenges were well laid out by the chairman and 

the ranking member. It is Russia which has invaded a nation and 

annexed its territory. We cannot understate the gravity of that experience, and we should not understate how that ghost rattles 

through the Europe zeitgeist. 

The ranking member, I think, correctly drew a line under ISIS 

[the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and its threat to Europe. I am 

deeply concerned about it not only across the NATO borders in 

Turkey, but across the sea routes from Italy. Last year, some 

200,000 migrants; this year on track to double that. Within those 

numbers will be some group of violent extremists, Islamic radicals 

who come to strike at highly symbolic targets, probably starting in 

Italy. The Arctic was well covered by the opening statements. 

6 

I would add only the Balkans, which we tend not to think about 

a great deal these days. They were a place of great tension and 

danger 15 years ago, yet today tensions continue in Kosovo, across 

its borders to Serbia, and, most notably, in Bosnia, a very fragile 

tripartite structure. Yesterday Muslim extremist terrorists struck 

in the Serbian portions of Bosnia. That is still a place where we 

need to keep a weather eye. 

So I will close by saying as we look at all this, our own U.S. security presence in Europe is diminished greatly, certainly since the 

end of the Cold War. We are down 75 percent in personnel. We are 

down 75 percent in the number of bases that we have. We have, 

in my view, come to a line that we should not continue to diminish 

that presence further. I would argue in the end we need to stay engaged in Europe for the reasons about which I have spoken as well 

as for the challenges so well articulated by the chairman and the 

ranking member. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. Mr. Brzezinski? 

STATEMENT OF IAN J. BRZEZINSKI, RESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, BRENT SCOWCROFT CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you, Chairman McCain, thank you, 

Ranking Member Reed, members of the committee. I really appreciate this opportunity to participate in this hearing on the state of 

U.S. security interests in Europe. 

NATO is the institutional cornerstone of transatlantic security, 

and today that alliance faces challenges on multiple fronts of unprecedented complexity and increasing urgency. To the east, Europe confronts Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and increasingly provocative military conduct across the region. To its north, the transatlantic community faces Russia’s militarization of the Arctic, a region rich in resources, but also of contested sovereignty. To its 

south, the alliance faces a treacherous combination of state sponsors of terrorism, failed states, and extremist organizations in an 

arc stretching from the Middle East across North Africa. ISIS 

atrocities and refugee flows to Europe are tragic manifestations of 

that front. 

In an age of globalization, NATO cannot afford to be a regionally 

focused alliance. It must address a global front. It must remain 

prepared and ready to take on challenges well beyond the North 

Atlantic area in a world that is increasingly interconnected and 

volatile. 

Allow me to focus my remarks on the first front, a sort of returning back to the future driven by Russia’s confrontational approach 

toward the west. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has disrupted the 

order that has kept peace in Europe since World War II. It is a direct threat to the credibility of NATO and the vision of a Europe 

whole, free, and secure. It is but one element of a revanchist policy 

intended to reestablish Russian hegemony, if not full control, over 

space akin to the former Soviet Union. 

Toward this end, Moscow has applied the full suite of Russian 

power to weaken and dominate its neighbors: military force, economic and energy embargos, political subterfuge, information and 

7 

cyber warfare, separatist groups, and frozen conflicts. The campaign history includes Moscow’s attempt to subvert the 2004 

Ukraine Orange Revolution, its 2007 cyberattack on Estonia, and 

the 2008 invasion of Georgia. 

It is a campaign that pursues 20th century objectives leveraging 

21st century techniques, and old-fashioned brute force. It rests on 

a $750 billion defense modernization plan that is upgrading Russian conventional and nuclear forces. It is a strategy that involves 

provocative military actions beyond Ukraine intended to intimidate, divide, and test the capabilities of members and partners of 

the NATO alliance. You know well these actions: the increase in 

assertive naval and air patrols; violations of allied and partner sea, 

air, and ground space; harassment of military and civilian aircraft 

and ships; and a steady stream of nuclear threats from Russian officials, including President Putin himself. 

Russian military exercises have been an important part of these 

shows of force. They are notable for their magnitude and the frequency of spot exercises, sudden and unannounced mobilization deployment of forces. As indicated in the attached chart and the ones 

I think are in the testimony I submitted, over the last 3 years Russia has conducted at least 6 major military exercises, and these 

have ranged from 65,000 personnel to 165,000 personnel. They 

dwarf in comparison to the size of NATO exercises, and raise in my 

mind questions about the alliance’s political and operational ability 

to mobilize comparable forces. 

The west’s response to Russia’s military assertiveness has consisted of limited, incremental escalations of economic sanctions and 

military deployments. This incrementalism conveys hesitancy and 

the lack of unity and determination. It has failed to convince Putin 

to reverse course. Indeed, it may have actually emboldened him. 

For these reasons, continued incrementalism not only promises 

continued conflict in Ukraine, but also an increased danger of 

wider war. 

This is underscored when one considers what will be the likely 

state of Ukraine and Russia if the west holds to its current policies. 

Where will Ukraine be in 6 to 12 months? It is likely to experience 

a further loss of territory. Its economy will be further crippled. Its 

population and government will be at risk of being more disillusioned. This is a Ukraine more vulnerable and more enticing to 

Putin’s revanchist ambitions. 

Where will Russia be in 6 to 12 months? Its economy will likely 

be somewhat weaker, its leaders marginally more internationally 

isolated. Under such circumstances, President Putin can be expected to be more irrationally nationalist and more brazen. That is 

a Russia more likely to attempt incursions further into Ukraine 

and escalate its provocative military actions against the west. 

Under such a scenario, not only are Ukraine’s prospects more dire, 

the prospects of a collision, albeit inadvertent, between Russian 

and western forces are increased. The very risk of conflict escalation that current policy has been designed to avert will actually 

be more likely. 

Calibrated engagement with the Russian government is needed 

to explore avenues by which to modulate tensions and to return to 

Ukraine’s territories. However, to be effective these efforts will reVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:11 Apr 05, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\99668.TXT JUNE
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quire more immediate and longer-term initiatives that will impose 

higher economic costs on Moscow, deter it from further provocative 

conduct, and reinforce the security of Central Europe. Toward 

these ends, I recommended that U.S. policy aim to do the following. 

First, we should impose stronger economic sanctions on Russia. 

Sectorial sanctions are needed to more aggressively shock the Russian economy by shutting off its energy and financial sectors from 

the global economy. 

Second, the alliance should do more to reinforce NATO’s eastern 

frontier. I believe the alliance should station a brigade-level combat 

capability permanently in Poland and Romania. It should station 

battalion-level capabilities in each of the Baltic states, and it 

should provide NATO’s military commander, SACEUR [the Supreme Allied Commander Europe], the authorities necessary to deploy forces in real time in response to provocative military actions. 

NATO has never responded to any of the exercises and provocative 

actions I mentioned. It has been passive. 

More has to be done to reinforce Kiev’s capability for self-defense. 

The deployment of U.S. and allied military trainers is a good step 

that occurred this last month, but it is overdue. The west should 

also arm Ukraine with air defense and anti-tank weapons and 

other capabilities it has been requesting so it can better defend 

itself. The west should deploy intelligence and surveillance capacities to Ukraine to enhance Ukraine’s situational awareness, and it 

should conduct military exercises in Ukraine just as EUCOM 

[United States European Command] did last summer to help train 

Ukraine’s armed forces, and to demonstrate the west’s solidarity 

with Ukraine. 

None of these recommendations present a territorial threat to 

Russia. They would help erase the red line the west has allowed 

Russia to redraw in Europe. They would present Moscow the possibility of a costly and prolonged military conflict. Let me add, the 

United States should be also front and center with the Europeans 

in the negotiations addressing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Washington’s absence from the Minsk process is a clear opportunity cost 

in the effort to bring this conflict to a peaceful and just end. 

Fourth, similar security assistance should be offered to other 

countries threatened by the shadow of Putin’s assertive policies. 

Here I am thinking particularly of Moldova and especially of Georgia because of its strategic location. Finally, the west needs to reanimate the vision of a Europe whole and free. Because of NATO 

enlargement, Europe has been better able to manage the aggression the continent has experienced over the last year. We need to 

ensure the alliance’s open door policy has not devolved into a passive phrase or empty slogan. 

Let me close by a simple point—with a simple point. The most 

effective way to counter hegemonic aspirations is to deny them the 

opportunity for actualization. Security in Central Europe is critical 

not only for peace in Europe, it is also a key element of an effective 

strategy to forge a normal relationship, if not eventually a partnership, with Russia. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brzezinski follows:] 

9 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. BRZEZINSKI

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee, I am honored to speak at this hearing on the state of U.S. security interests in Europe. 

We meet today some eight months after the September 4, 2014 NATO summit in 

Wales, United Kingdom. That meeting of Allied heads of state proved to be an important inflection point for the Alliance. When planning for that summit began, its 

primary objective was to mark the end of NATO’s combat operations in Afghanistan. 

Some were even concerned about the future relevance of NATO, anticipating that 

it was about to enter a period of unprecedented operational inactivity following decades of defending against the Soviet Union, managing conflict in the Balkans, and, 

more recently, contributing to out-of area undertakings in Afghanistan and even 

Iraq. 

Instead, the Alliance’s agenda that Fall was dominated by events that most policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic failed to anticipate. These, of course, include Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the sudden and bloodthirsty rise of ISIS in 

Syria and Iraq. 

A read of the summit communique ́ reflects other challenges confronting the Alliance: missile proliferation, chaos in Libya, crises in Mali and the Congo African Republic, threats to the global commons—including its cyber and maritime domains, 

and Iran’s nuclear program, among others. 

That list gives real credence to former NATO Secretary General Fogh 

Rasmussen’s repeated assertions that we face a more connected, more complex, 

more chaotic and more precarious world. He is right. In this world, the political and 

military capacities that NATO can leverage has become only more vital to the 

shared interests and values that define the transatlantic community. 

I would like today to focus on four urgent and emergent fronts before the NATO 

Alliance: • An Eastern Front driven by a Russia’s provocative military actions; • An emergent Arctic Front driven by Moscow’s militarization of the High North; • A Southern Front, a region stretching from Iran across the Middle East and 

North Africa wrought by a dangerous combination of failed states and extremist 

organizations; and, • A Global Front defined by the upheaval generated by the rapidly evolving dynamics of globalization. 

THE EASTERN FRONT: RUSSIA’S INVASION OF UKRAINE

Let me start with the front that is sort of a return back to the future. Fourteen 

months ago, President Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine with the incursion 

of 20–30,000 Russian troops into the Crimean peninsula. That was followed by the 

cross-border operation into Eastern Ukraine involving Russian provocateurs and 

Special Forces who seized buildings and armories and terrorized the local population. The latter were soon reinforced by Russian conventional forces. Both operations were backed by the massing of Russian conventional forces on Ukraine’ border, under the guise of a 150,000 man military exercise. 

Russia’s invasion caused over 6000 Ukrainians deaths in eastern Ukraine and displaced over 1.6M people. More than 20% of Ukraine’s industrial capability has been 

seized or destroyed. Crimea and regions of Donetsk and Luhansk remain occupied 

and are being politically purged. Russia is reinforcing its presence in Crimea with 

Special Forces, aircraft, and ships and has announced plans to deploy nuclear capable SS–26 Iskander missiles. In Eastern Ukraine where fighting continues, Putin 

violates the Minsk II peace accords by deploying additional heavy combat equipment, personnel and military supplies to his forces. 

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine presents a significant challenge to the security and stability of Europe and to the credibility of NATO. As an unprovoked aggression against the territorial sovereignty of a European nation, the invasion of 

Ukraine disrupts the order that has kept peace in Europe since World War II. By 

asserting the unilateral right to redraw borders on the grounds he is protecting ethnic Russians and by promoting the concept of a ‘‘Novorossiya,’’ Putin has reintroduced the principal of ethnic sovereignty, a principal that wrought death and destruction across Europe in the last century and those before. 

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, one motivated significantly by his opposition to the 

country’s long-standing desire to be a fully integrated part of Europe, is a direct 

threat to the vision of a Europe whole, free and secure. If allowed to succeed, Putin’s 

invasion of Ukraine will create a new confrontational divide in Europe, between a 

community defined by self-determination, democracy, and rule of law and one burdened by authoritarianism, hegemony and occupation. In these ways, Putin’s aggression against Ukraine – and his increasingly provocative military actions elseVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:11 Apr 05, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\99668.TXT JUNE
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where in Europe – are direct challenges to NATO and U.S. leadership, ones intended to portray the Alliance and Washington as lacking the diplomatic, economic, 

and military capacity to counter Russian power. 

Putin’s Revanchist Ambitions: The invasion of Ukraine is but one element of 

a revanchist policy that President Putin has articulated and exercised since taking 

office in 1999. His objective has been to reestablish Russian hegemony, if not full 

control, over the space of the former Soviet Union. 

Toward this end, Moscow has applied the full suite of Russian power to weaken 

and dominate its neighbors: economic embargoes, political subterfuge, information 

and cyber-warfare, separatist groups, frozen conflicts as well as military shows of 

force and incursions. Putin’s campaign history includes Moscow’s attempt to subvert 

Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2007 cyber attack against Estonia, the separatist movement in Moldova, energy embargoes against Lithuania and Ukraine, and 

the 2008 invasion of Georgia. 

President Putin’s strategy is one that pursues 20th-century objectives through 

21st-century techniques and old-fashioned brute force. With regard to the latter, 

Russia has undertaken a determined modernization of its armed forces. Some $750B 

has been dedicated over this decade to expand the Russian fleet, introduce 5th generation aircraft, deploy new missiles, modernize his nuclear arsenal, increase his nation’s SOF capabilities, and militarize the Arctic. When one compares the Russian 

forces that invaded Georgia in 2008 to those that led the invasion of Crimea last 

year, the modernization campaign is clearly yielding improved capabilities. 

As part of his strategy, Putin has deployed his military forces in provocative ways 

across the Baltic region, the Black Sea, the Arctic and elsewhere to demonstrate capability, intimidate and divide Russia’s neighbors, and probe the resolve of the 

West. These actions have steadily escalated over time, and include challenges to the 

airspace of Sweden, the cross-border seizure of an Estonian law-enforcement officer, 

harassment of military and civilian aircraft and ships in the Baltic and Black Seas, 

and an exponential increase in assertive air and sea patrols by Russian aircraft and 

ships on both sides of the Atlantic. 

Russian military exercises have been an important part of these shows of force 

and are notable for their magnitude and for the frequency of ‘‘spot’’ exercises – the 

sudden and unannounced mobilization and deployment of forces. As indicated in the 

attached chart, over the last three years, Russia has conducted at six major military 

exercises involving between 65,000 and 160,000 personnel. In comparison, these 

dwarf the size of NATO and Allied exercises, and raise questions about the Alliance’s comparable ability to mobilize comparable forces in no-notice situations. 

Russia’s assertive military conduct has been complemented by an increase in nuclear threats against the West made by senior Russian commanders and civilian officials, including President Putin. In the last several weeks, Moscow threatened to 

target Romania, Poland and Denmark with nuclear weapons for their contributions 

to transatlantic missile defense. The Times of London recently reported that in a 

meeting with U.S. officials, Russian generals threatened ‘‘a spectrum of responses 

from nuclear to non-military’’ if the Alliance deployed additional forces to the Baltic 

states. 

The West’s Response: To date, the West’s response to Russia’s territorial aggression and provocative military actions consists of limited incremental escalations of 

economic sanctions and military deployments. The failure of this response to convince Putin to reverse course is rooted in this incrementalism which communicates 

hesitancy and a lack of unity and determination. Indeed, it may have actually 

emboldened Putin. Today, Moscow’s provocative exercises and assertive military 

conduct continue, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine remain occupied, and Russia’s forces 

appear poised to strike deeper into Ukraine. 

Calibrated engagement with the Russian government is needed to explore avenues by which to modulate tensions and return to Ukraine its territories. However, 

to be effective these efforts will require more immediate and longer-term initiatives 

that will impose economic costs on Russia, deter Moscow from further provocative 

conduct, reinforce Central and Eastern Europe’s sense of security, enhance 

Ukraine’s capacity for defense, and help it transform into a successful, democratic, 

and prosperous European state. These include: 

1) Stronger economic sanctions on Russia. The current approach of targeting 

specific Russian individuals and companies has not changed Putin’s course of action, 

not is it likely to do so. Russia is a country that rightfully takes great pride in its 

history of enduring economic and military hardship. An authoritarian regime will 

always be more resistant to economic sanctions than a democratic system. Sectoral 

sanctions are needed to more aggressively shock the Russian economy by shutting 

off its energy and financial sectors from the global economy. 

11 

2) Stronger reinforcement of NATO’s eastern frontier. Russia repeatedly 

mobilized ten of thousands of troops for its invasion of Ukraine and in its shows 

of force. NATO’s response has been far more limited, involving dozens of aircraft, 

company level deployments (and the occasional battalion) and a few ships. The gap 

is noticeable to Putin, our Allies and our partners. The Alliance should: • Base a brigade level combat capability permanently to Poland and Romania; • Base battalion level capacities to each of the Baltic states; • Provide NATO’s top military commander, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, authorities necessary to deploy forces in real time against provocative 

Russian military operations; and, • Expand the mission of NATO missile defense and the U.S. European Phased 

Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to address the threat posed by Russian ballistic missiles 

3) Military Assistance to Ukraine: Greater effort must be made to reinforce 

Ukraine’s capability for self-defense. By denying Kyiv’s request for needed military 

weapons, the West not only precludes Ukraine the ability to better defend itself, it 

is de facto accepting Putin’s effort to draw a new red line in Europe, allowing the 

reemergence of a grey zone in Europe. 

This has been deeply disillusioning for Ukrainians who so courageously expressed 

their desire on the Maidan for freedom and a place in Europe. It threatens to shatter the bipartisan/transatlantic vision of a Europe whole, free and undivided that 

has guided U.S. and European security policy for the last 25 years. 

The United States and other keys allies are to be commended for the long-overdue 

step of deploying military trainers to Ukraine, but they should also: • Provide military equipment to Ukraine, including air defense and anti-tank 

weapons as well as key enablers, such as drones, that would enhance Ukraine’s 

ability to leverage the capabilities of its armed forces • Deploy intelligence and surveillance capabilities • Conduct military exercises in Ukraine, as EUCOM did in the Summer of 2014, 

to help train Ukraine’s armed forces and to demonstrate solidarity with 

Ukraine 

None of these recommendations would present a territorial threat to Russia, but 

they would complicate Putin’s ambitions regarding Ukraine. They would help erase 

the red line that Moscow has been allowed to redraw in Europe. They would assure 

Ukrainians that they are not alone and demonstrate that Putin is unable to intimidate the West. They would present Moscow the possibility of a costly and prolonged 

military conflict. 

The United States should also be front and center with the Europeans in the negotiations addressing Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The absence of the 

United States at the negotiating table signals a lack of commitment to European 

security and thus devalues the presentation of transatlantic solidarity against this 

invasion. It has been an opportunity cost to the effort to bring this conflict to peaceful and just end. 

4) Support to Ukraine’s economic transformation. In this regard, the United 

States and the West has been constructive, providing significant EU, IMF, and bilateral economic assistance packages. However, the goals of such economic assistance are difficult if not impossible to realize when Ukraine is subject to a violent 

invasion as well as to political, economic and other pressures from Russia. 

5) A Reanimation of the Vision of Europe Whole and Free: For much of the 

post-Cold War period, U.S. policy was clearly guided by the vision of a Europe, undivided, secure, and free. For over two decades, Washington wisely supported the indigenous ambitions of Central European democracies for membership in NATO and 

the European Union. Those processes of enlargement have benefited all parties in 

Europe, expanding the zone of peace, stability, and prosperity across the continent. 

The United States needs to reanimate the process of NATO enlargement, making 

clear that the Alliance’s ‘‘open-door policy’’ for membership is no passive phrase or 

empty slogan. Doing so would be an important way to underscore Washington’s commitment to the security of Central and Eastern Europe. For these reasons, no decision or recommendation should be permitted or advanced that would in any way 

limit its applicability to any country of Europe, including Ukraine. 

The Risks of Incrementalism: There are real risks that flow from the West’s 

current strategy of incrementalism against President Putin’s aggression: Continued 

incrementalism not only promises continued conflict in Ukraine but also an increased danger of wider war. 

This is underscored when one considers what will be the likely state of Ukraine 

and Russia if the West holds to its current course. 

What will be the state of Ukraine in 6–18 months? It is likely to experience a 

further loss of territory. Its economy will be further crippled, thereby rendering the 

12 

nation less able undertake reform. Its population is at risk of being more disillusioned, and government consequently weaker, if not divided. That is a Ukraine more 

vulnerable and more enticing to Putin’s revanchist ambitions. 

What will be the state of Russia in 6–18 months? Its economy will likely be somewhat weaker, if it is not bolstered by a rise in energy prices. It may be marginally 

more isolated. Under such circumstances, President Putin can be expected to be 

more irrationally nationalistic and more brazen. That is a Russia more likely to attempt incursions further into Ukraine and escalate its provocative military actions 

against the West. 

Under such a scenario, not only are Ukraine’s prospects more dire, the prospects 

of collision, albeit inadvertent, between Russian and Western forces are increased. 

The very risk of conflict escalation that the current policy has been designed to 

avert will be more likely. 

THE ARTIC: AN EMERGING FRONT

The resource rich Arctic has become a high priority of President Putin’s security 

policy. Russia’s ensuing militarization of the High North has made it an emergent 

front affecting transatlantic security. 

Moscow has established an Arctic Military command backed by a joint Arctic task 

force. It has re-opened Cold War naval and air bases and is building a string of new 

military facilities across the Arctic. It is reinforcing the Northern Fleet with more 

ice-breakers, surface combatants and submarines. Russia has stepped-up Cold War 

military operations in the region, including the testing of missiles and aggressive 

naval and air patrols that prod the territories of the U.S. and other allies. 

Enhancing NATO’s role in the Arctic: If the High North is to remain a zone 

defined by peace and stability, the West will have to introduce a more robust security dimension into its Arctic policies, and a centerpiece of that effort should include 

a greater role for NATO. Indeed, as more non-Arctic nations start to operate in the 

Arctic, it will be useful to leverage the geopolitical weight that comes with a community of like-minded North Atlantic democracies. 

NATO should expand its political and operational role in the Arctic, leveraging 

its maritime and air capacities. The Alliance can serve as a useful vehicle to coordinate and execute Arctic security cooperation, including intelligence exchanges, surveillance operations, military training and exercises, air policing, and disaster response. It can also foster the development of capabilities necessary for Arctic operations. 

In these ways, NATO can fill a security gap that exists in the Arctic and do so 

without undermine existing useful institutions like the Arctic Council. This does not 

preclude Arctic cooperation with Moscow, particularly in areas such as search and 

rescue and disaster response. Indeed, the region can serve as an avenue of mutually 

beneficial engagement with Russia, even in this time of increased tension. 

The bottom line is that if the Alliance plays a greater role in Arctic security today, 

the transatlantic community is going to be able to manage, if not prevent, a serious 

security crisis tomorrow. 

THE SOUTHERN FRONT: FAILING STATES AND IDEOLOGICAL UPHEAVAL

NATO faces a Southern front—an arc of instability stretching from Iran to the 

shores of North Africa. It is a realm in which societal upheavals and regional power 

struggles have generated challenges of varying levels of urgency—from Tehran’s nuclear programs, to the chaos traumatizing Syria and Iraq to the tragic flood of refuges flowing to Europe from Africa and Middle East. 

Among the more urgent of these crises lies south of Turkey, caused by the sudden 

and savage rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Because of the links of ISIS and other 

violent groups in this region to Europe and North America, this is an urgent threat 

to transatlantic security. The West’s goal must be more than the degradation or destruction of ISIS and other like-minded groups. It must be the prevention of Iraq, 

Syria and other areas from serving as havens and breeding grounds for such extremism. That is going to require a comprehensive, long-term strategy that will require 

considerable military, economic and political resources. 

That response will have to be a multi-lateral undertaking and not just transatlantic undertaking. It must executed in partnership with key powers of the Muslim world—Turkey, of course, but also Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, in addition 

to Iraq and moderate elements within Syria. It should leverage the various capacities of NATO, the European Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Arab 

League, among others. Only then will one be able to leverage the cumulative 

strengths of the West and mitigate the historic baggage many Allies have in the region. 

13 

It will require sustained military action and security assistance. The tip of the 

spear addressing threats like ISIS has to be local forces. The Iraqi security forces, 

the Peshmerga, and moderate Syrian factions stand among these elements, but they 

will need to be backed by foreign airpower, reinforced by foreign equipment, intelligence, combat advisors and trainers as well as special forces prepared for direct 

action. 

The multi-lateral effort will require significant humanitarian assistance. This is 

needed to assist not just those displaced in Iraq, but also to assist the governments 

of neighboring countries—particularly Turkey and Jordan—whose state structures 

and societies are at risk of being overburdened, if not destabilized, by refugees fleeing the region’s violence. 

The strategy will have to include a long-term effort to help enable the crippled 

states and societies of Europe’s North African and the Middle Eastern periphery to 

benefit from economic growth and sound governance. Those are the most powerful 

weapons against extremism. Military strikes and humanitarian assistance may 

often be required, but they are tactical actions, necessary but not sufficient to tackle 

a strategic problem. Good governance and prosperity are ultimately the best ways 

to ensure that these societies do not serve as breeding grounds for extremism and 

terrorist recruits. 

THE GLOBAL FRONT

These aforementioned three fronts to Europe’s East, North and South are affected 

by a fourth NATO front—the front generated and sustained by the dynamics of 

globalization. 

Globalization clearly has it is positive sides. Advances in transportation and communications have facilitated the spread of prosperity, respect for human rights, and 

democratic principles of governance, among other positive attributes of modernity. 

However, these benefits have also been accompanied by challenges. The proliferation of weapons technologies and the emergence non-state actors with global reach— 

such as ISIS, al Qaeda and others—constitute some of the threats facilitated by 

globalization. 

The profusion of communications technologies, a key dynamic of globalization, 

contributes to what Zbigniew Brzezinski (my father) calls a global political awakening that has been evident in the velvet revolutions of 1989, the orange revolution 

in Ukraine, and the Arab Spring. 

Communication technologies are empowering societies in ways can bring down 

dictators, end corrupt autocracies, and create opportunities for democracy, reform 

and accountability in government. However, a political awakening can also be an 

impatient force, one prone to destructive violence when it is driven primarily by sentiments flowing from inequity and injustice and lacks leadership with a platform of 

clear objectives. In those cases, societies are often left vulnerable to organized 

groups leveraging dangerous ideologies. 

Another key dynamic of globalization has been a profound shift in the global balance of power. A more complex constellation of actors with global reach and ambitions is emerging. These include China, India, and Brazil, and could well include 

others in the future. 

As a result, we are entering a world where the predominance of the United 

States, even in collusion with Europe, is not what it was in the past. The emergence 

of new powers with regional, if not global, aspirations is often accompanied by territorial claims, historic grudges, and economic demands that can drive geopolitical 

tension, competition and collision. 

Together these three dynamics increase the likelihood of regional conflicts. They 

make consensual decision-making more difficult among nation states, including 

within NATO, and they yield a world that is more volatile and unpredictable. 

Many of these tensions and collisions are and will occur both near and far from 

the North Atlantic area, but in an age of globalization their economic and security 

implications can be immediate to both sides of the transatlantic community. 

These global challenges make it all the more important for the transatlantic community to work together on all fronts. A vital underpinning of the NATO Alliance 

in this new century is the Transatlantic Bargain, one in which the United States 

sustains its commitment to European security and in return our Allies remain 

steadfast in their commitment to address with the United States threats and challenges that emanate from well beyond the North Atlantic area. 

Protecting and promoting transatlantic security and values amidst these four 

NATO fronts—the East, the Arctic, the South and the challenges of global upheaval—stand among the defining challenges of our time. They present complex, 

long-term and costly undertakings that require: 

14 

• Economic resources that can be readily mobilized to in times of crisis and dedicated to economic development; • Military capabilities that are expeditious and can be readily integrated with civilian efforts; and, • Political legitimacy that is optimized through multilateral versus unilateral action. 

In each of these requirements, the transatlantic community is preeminent. Its 

economies account for over 50% of the global GDP—some five times that of China 

and fourteen times that of Russia. Its military establishments are second to none, 

and NATO remains the worlds most successful and capable military Alliance 

Above all, the transatlantic community presents a collective of likeminded democracies—and herein lies a vision for its role in the global order of today and tomorrow: NATO can and should serve as the core of a geographically and culturally expanding community of democracies that act collectively to promote freedom, stability 

and security around in what is an increasingly dynamic globalized environment. But 

it will require all of us to do more together. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much. Dr. Sestanovich? 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN SESTANOVICH, PH.D., GEORGE F. 

KENNAN SENIOR FELLOW FOR RUSSIAN AND EURASIAN 

STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, members of 

the committee, thank you for today’s opportunity to join your discussion. 

Admiral Stavridis gave a number of reasons why Europe matters. I agree with him. I would add one more: what it can contribute to the global balance of power. A united west can have more 

confidence in our ability to defend our interests worldwide. Divided 

we can be much less sure. 

The past year has been a frustrating one for anyone trying to anticipate Russian moves. Time and again, many of us failed to gauge 

Vladimir Putin’s motives. Often we thought he would be ready to 

unwind this crisis when he was just about to double down. He 

made promises that he did not keep and created a powerful case 

for western sanctions. Putin has personally antagonized American 

and European leaders in a manner that has few precedents in the 

history of Russia’s relations with the west. 

After a year like this, where do we stand and what should we 

think? I would like to focus on four issues that have produced considerable debate. They bear directly on choices that your committee 

must make. First is the question of Putin’s aims and calculations; 

second is the effectiveness of sanctions; third is the question of 

helping the Ukraine military; and finally a fourth, fear of where 

this confrontation is heading. Many people worry that Putin will 

turn against neighbors especially our Baltic allies. 

Our debate on all of these issues has brought many truths to the 

surface, but I think we have not got the whole story. To develop 

the right strategy, we need a fuller picture. First, on the nature of 

Putin’s commitment to this—your phrase, Senator, was neo-imperialist policy. We should neither minimize nor exaggerate it. When 

separatist forces were about to be defeated by the Ukrainian army 

last summer, we saw that Putin was not prepared to let that happen, but he was also unwilling to deploy large Russian units into 

Ukraine to defend the separatists. 

Why do he and his associates lie about having troops there and 

about the casualties that they have taken? Because neither foreign 

nor domestic audiences would be happy with the truth. Putin’s acVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:11 Apr 05, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\99668.TXT JUNE
15 

tions to date do not tell us what his future aims will be. Saving 

the separatists and himself from defeat does not mean that he is 

prepared to back them as they try to take more territory. We know 

they want to do so. They are completely open about this. But we 

should not assume that Putin will pay any price to support them. 

We should not assume that Putin cannot be deterred. Many people 

think he cannot be. This is a misunderstanding. 

Second, about sanctions, Putin and sophisticated Russian economists are not of one mind about the impact that sanctions have 

had. Some call it marginal. Others consider it significant. But no 

one denies that sanctions have had some impact or that over the 

past year Russia’s economic outlook has deteriorated. The only 

question is whether sanctions affect Russian actions on the ground. 

I believe sanctions do affect policy. Putin may well hope that if 

fighting in Eastern Ukraine stays below the peaks it reached last 

year, the west will start to roll back sanctions. There are many indications of this. 

But he must also know that if fighting increases, new sanctions 

are likely and a rollback will be impossible. It is hard for me to believe that this awareness does not constrain Russian support for 

separatist leaders, and we should make clear how high the cost will 

be of further enlargement of the separatist enclaves. 

Third is the much disputed issue of whether and how to support 

the Ukrainian military. A sudden infusion of western arms will not 

turn the tide when fighting is in full swing. It might even lead Russia to escalate its own involvement. Those have been reasons that 

many have brought forward not to provide lethal assistance to the 

Ukrainian military. But the problem that the United States and its 

allies face now is somewhat different. Their primary goal, as I said 

a moment ago, is to keep the separatist enclaves from becoming a 

larger part of Ukraine. Our goal now should be to deter a new 

wave of violence in Ukraine, and in particular an effort by separatists to expand their holdings. 

That is a goal that western military aid can help to achieve. 

Without its separatist enclaves, Eastern Ukraine will grow. The 

country’s political and economic disintegration will continue, and 

Russia’s involvement will increase. We have to be smart about 

strengthening Ukraine’s army, and we have to be careful, but a 

Ukraine that can defend itself is essential to a strategy of restabilization. Expecting the conflict in the East to freeze itself is wishful 

thinking. 

Finally, about where Putin will strike next. His Ukrainian policy 

is a threat to the security of NATO members. The alliance has been 

right to reinforce and reassure frontline states, and it must do 

more. We cannot afford the luxury of unpreparedness. All the 

same, as long as the Ukrainian crisis continues, my judgment is 

that Russian military pressure against other neighbors is remote. 

Being bogged down in Ukraine makes it harder for Putin to pick 

other fights, yet the unfolding conflict in Ukraine will surely affect 

his calculus down the road. If Putin emerges the victor in this conflict, if a pro-western government is kept from succeeding, if Russia’s nationalist mood deepens, if the rich and powerful countries— 

democratic countries of Europe and the United States fail to stay 

the course, if this is where we end up, Putin will draw his own conVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:11 Apr 05, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\99668.TXT JUNE
16 

clusions. The Putin we face in the future could be even more dangerous than the one we face today, both for his neighbors and for 

us. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to our discussion. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Sestanovich follows:] 

THE PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. SESTANOVICH

Chairman McCain, Senator Read, members of the Armed Services Committee: 

Thank you for today’s opportunity to discuss Russia’s confrontation with the West 

over Ukraine. This is a subject of fundamental importance for the future of European—and indeed global—security. 

The past year has been a frustrating one for both policymakers and policy analysts—in fact, for anyone trying to anticipate Russian moves. Time and again, many 

of us failed to gauge Vladimir Putin’s motives. Often we thought he would be ready 

to unwind the crisis when he was actually about to double down. He made promises 

that he did not keep and created a powerful case for Western sanctions. Putin has 

personally antagonized European and American leaders in a manner that has few 

precedents in the history of Russia’s relations with the West. 

After a year like this, where do we stand and what should we think? I’d like to 

focus on four issues that have produced considerable debate. They bear directly on 

choices that your committee must make. 

• First is the question of Putin’s aims and calculations. I often hear it said that 

he cares more than we do about Ukraine. Because he feels that the stakes for 

Russia are high, he may be hard to deter. 

• Second is the effectiveness of sanctions. Many say these have not worked well. 

Putin, we hear, will not be swayed by economic pressure; he has convinced the 

public that Russia must not be pushed around. 

• A third much-debated issue has to do with helping Ukraine militarily. Giving 

arms, it is said, will only escalate the fighting—and bolster Putin’s claim that 

the West is seeking to bring Russia down. 

• Finally, a fourth fear, about where this confrontation is heading. Many people 

worry that Putin will turn against other neighbors, especially our Baltic allies. 

There is a kernel of truth in each of these claims. But they do not tell the whole 

story. To develop the right strategy, we need a fuller picture. 

First, on the nature of Putin’s commitment: we should neither minimize nor exaggerate it. When separatist forces were about to be defeated by the Ukrainian army 

last summer, we saw that Putin was not willing to let that happen. But he was also 

unwilling to deploy large Russian units in Ukraine to defend the separatists. Why 

do he and his associates lie about having troops there, and about the casualties they 

have taken? Because neither foreign nor domestic audiences would be happy with 

the truth. 

Putin’s actions to date do not tell us what his future aims will be. Saving the separatists—and himself—from defeat does not mean he is prepared to back them as 

they try to take more territory. We know they want to do so; they are open about 

it. But we should not assume Putin will pay any price to support them. 

Second, about sanctions. Putin and sophisticated Russian economists are not of 

one mind about the impact that sanctions have had. Some call it marginal; others 

consider it significant. But no one denies that sanctions have had some impact, or 

that over the past year Russia’s economic outlook has deteriorated. The only question is whether sanctions affect Russian actions on the ground. 

I believe sanctions do affect policy. Putin may well hope that, if fighting in eastern Ukraine stays below the peaks it reached last year, the West will start to roll 

back sanctions. But he must also know that, if fighting increases, new sanctions are 

likely and a rollback will be impossible. It is hard for me to believe that this awareness does not constrain Russian support for separatist leaders. 

Third is the much-disputed issue of whether and how to support the Ukrainian 

military. A sudden infusion of Western arms will not turn the tide when fighting 

is in full swing; it might even lead Russia to escalate its own involvement. But the 

problem that the United States and its allies face now is slightly different. Their 

primary goal should be to deter a new wave of violence and, in particular, an effort 

by separatists to expand their holdings. 

This is a goal that Western military aid can help to achieve. Without it, separatist 

enclaves in eastern Ukraine will grow, the country’s political and economic disintegration will continue, and Russia’s involvement will increase. We have to be smart 

about strengthening Ukraine’s army, and we have to be careful. But a Ukraine that 

17 

can defend itself is essential to a strategy of re-stabilization. Expecting the conflict 

in the east to freeze itself is wishful thinking. 

Finally, about where Putin will strike next: his Ukraine policy is a threat to the 

security of NATO members. The alliance has been right to reinforce and reassure 

front-line states, and it must do more. We cannot afford the luxury of unpreparedness. All the same, as long as the Ukrainian crisis continues, my judgment is that Russian military pressure against other neighbors is remote. Being bogged down in 

Ukraine makes it harder for Putin to pick other fights. Yet the unfolding conflict 

in Ukraine will surely affect his calculus further down the road. If Putin emerges 

the victor, if a pro-Western government is kept from succeeding, if Russia’s nationalist mood deepens, if the rich and powerful democracies of Europe and the United 

States fail to stay the course—if this is where we end up, Putin will draw his own 

conclusions. The Putin we face in the future could be even more dangerous than the 

one we face today—both for his neighbors and for us. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to our discussion. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, thank you very much, and thanks to all 

the witnesses for their very important comments and, frankly, 

thought-provoking assertions. There is a Michael Gordon piece on 

April 22nd: ‘‘In a sign that the tense crisis in Ukraine could soon 

escalate, Russia has continued to deploy air defense systems and 

built up its forces near the border.’’ ‘‘This is the highest amount of 

Russian air defense equipment in Eastern Ukraine since August,’’ 

Marie Harf, the State Department spokeswoman said. ‘‘Combined 

Russian separatist forces continue to violate the terms of the Minsk 

II Agreement signed in mid-February.’’ Of course we are seeing indications of renewed fighting, and there are many who believe that 

Mariupol is the next target for Vladimir Putin. It also seems, at 

least to this observer, that the price that Vladimir Putin has paid 

is not very high, and the benefit, at least in Russian public opinion, 

has been rather beneficial to him. 

Mr. Brzezinski stated in his prepared statement and verbal 

statement, ‘‘We should provide military equipment, including air 

defense and anti-tank weapons, as well as key enablers, deploy intelligence surveillance capabilities, and conduct military exercises 

in Ukraine as EUCOM did in the summer of 2014.’’ Then in addition to that in your comments, Mr. Brzezinski, you said we should 

increase sanctions and have rapid response capability, and also assist other countries, specifically you pointed out Georgia. 

Admiral, do you and Dr. Sestanovich agree with those comments, 

Admiral, or do you want to add or subtract from those recommendations? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I certainly would not subtract at all. I agree 

with them. I think that just to put specificity on it in terms of the 

aid, we ought to be providing lethal, in particular anti-tank weapons, anti-armor weapons. That is a very visible, relatively easy to 

operate, and sensible system in addition to all the other UAV and 

so forth, things we should do. I will add one other, which is cyber. 

We should be assisting the Ukrainians in cyber. They are under 

continuous attack. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Sestanovich? 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. I am broadly sympathetic with those ideas. Let 

me mention, though, that I think in looking at the list of measures, 

we should focus primarily right now on steps that will increase the 

operational effectiveness of Ukrainian forces. I am not so sure that 

having exercises in Ukraine is going to do very much along those 

lines. I could be persuaded, but I would really want to focus on 

18 

what you can do to increase the fighting capability of Ukrainian 

forces. 

I mention this for a reason that goes beyond just the deterrence 

factor and the ability to resist when separatists push out from 

where they are. I think it also affects the internal politics of 

Ukraine in an important way. If the Ukrainian government cannot 

hold the line against separatist offensives, they will lose ground— 

it will lose ground politically, and the people who will gain politically are the informal militias often with, to be honest, somewhat 

extreme ideologies and aims of their own. That is an outcome that 

will be terrible for Ukraine’s future. So we are not looking simply 

to produce a military result by offering assistance to the Ukrainian 

military. We are trying to stabilize and support a democratic government. 

Second, I would add about sanctions. I think right now increasing sanctions is going to be a very heavy lift. The crucial aim has 

to be to prevent the rollback because that is actually a rather 

pressing danger right now. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I agree, and as long as they are dependent 

on Russian energy, I do not think you are going to see. We forget 

Crimea. We forget the shoot-down of the Malaysian airliner, et 

cetera. Mr. Brzezinski, first of all, there is one other area, that is 

the intense propaganda campaign that Russia is waging in the Baltics in particular, but also Moldova and other countries. Do you 

have a response to that because I do not think, frankly, that our 

Radio Free Europe and other capabilities that we had during the 

Cold War is in the 21st century. I think it more like 20th century. 

My other question is, suppose the status quo remains and we do 

not implement the procedures that you and the other members of 

the panel have largely supported. What do you think Vladimir 

Putin’s next move is? Is it Mariupol? Is it Moldova? Is it areas even 

further? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Regarding Russia’s 

information campaign, they are crushing us. Russia spends billions 

of dollars in sending out cyber messages, TV messages, radio messages. It has lobbyists all over western capitals pushing out the 

Russian line, some of it accurate, some of it blatantly false. We 

have nothing in comparison, and I actually think this is where we 

need to go back to the Cold War and think about lessons learned. 

We actually had a very sophisticated information campaign. It 

was led by the U.S. Information Agency, an independent structure 

in the U.S. Government that actually was responsible for doing 

nothing but messaging, and it has separate offices in our embassies 

all around the world. That is the kind of level of effort that we are 

going to have to put into if we are going to counter this Russian 

information campaign, and it is a campaign that is going to have 

to be mirrored by our allies. 

Regarding Russia’s next move, my sense is that Putin is just positioning himself as an opportunist. I was struck by how his strike, 

unsuccessful albeit, but his strike against Mariupol earlier this 

year coincided with the Greek elections because he clearly knew 

that the west was not going to really be able to develop the consensus necessary to respond forcefully to that violation of the 

19 

Minsk Agreement. It was not going to be able to generate the consensus necessary to impose additional sanctions. 

So when I look down the road, I actually think that the most 

likely move by Putin will occur when there is another economic crisis or political crisis in the west or in Ukraine, and Putin will move 

quickly to seize and exploit that opportunity. I think it will be towards Mariupol if not all the way down towards Crimea. It is possible it could be other parts of Donetsk and Luhansk. 

A second contingency I keep my eyes on is Kharkiv. Kharkiv is 

the technological center of Ukraine famous for its aviation and aeronautics industry. There has been an ongoing campaign of terrorist 

attacks by Russian proxies, by Russian forces operating in that 

area, bombs going off in metro stops and such. So I think what is 

happening there is Russia is continuing to see they can soften up 

that region so it could become like another Luhansk. 

Looking beyond Ukraine, I am less worried about a strike 

against the Baltics, but more against Georgia. Why Georgia? Because Georgia is a weak state. It is a small state. We have precedent in 2008 of Russia trying to take over Georgia. Also Georgia 

is strategically important. It is the cork that goes into the Caspian 

Sea of oil and gas. It is the pathway for the southern corridor that 

is going to bring Caspian gas into Europe. If Putin really wanted 

to do something strategically significant to mitigate the southern 

corridor, well, you take Georgia and you shut down the southern 

corridor that way. That is what I keep my eyes on. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, gentlemen. One of the 

issues that arises along with sanctions is the declining price of oil 

because of, frankly, the actions of the Saudis. I might suggest it is 

more powerful than formal sanctions. There are some indications— 

I have spoken to Dr. Sestanovich before—of the effect within Russia where there are strikes. They are building sort of. I think there 

is too much to suggest that we have reached a turning point, but 

there is some indications of turbulence because of this situation. 

So, Admiral and your colleagues, comment on the effectiveness of 

the sanctions, but also the effectiveness of continued low oil prices. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think Dr. Sestanovich has it about right. 

They are neither catastrophic nor are they de minimus. They are 

kind of in the middle. Mr. Brzezinski has it right in that if you 

really want to get attention with sanctions, there is another level 

you have to go to. He mentioned a couple of things. I would throw 

into the mix more targeted individual sanctions at high level individuals in the Putin circle. 

In terms of the oil pries, anything that depresses oil prices does, 

in fact, have, I think, perhaps a higher immediate effect than the 

sanctions. The two in combination are powerful, and I think over 

time will be possibly the way in which we finally get Vladimir 

Putin’s attention. 

Senator REED. Mr. Brzezinski? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, my sense is that when we think of sanctions 

in the west, we have a terrible tendency to try to mirror our decision making and political processes upon Russia. You know, when 

Russia suffers—when we suffer a negative 1, negative half percent 

GDP growth, we have a political crisis. Governments fall. When 

20 

Russia suffers negative 2 or negative 3 percent growth, they look 

back on their history, a rich history, a proud history, of enduring 

great economic and military hardship: Napoleonic wars, Hitler’s invasions, and such. 

They have a much heartier approach to economic endurance than 

we do, in part because of history, in part also because of the political structure. Russia is an autocracy. It is a one-man state. Not 

a one-party state, a one-man state. It is much more capable of enduring that kind of hardship that comes with economic sanctions. 

I have to say, if I could, that when I think about our unwillingness to impose harsher sanctions, I am very, very surprised. It is 

rooted very much, I think, in Europe’s unwillingness to suffer the 

blowback that would come with those sanctions. But if you look at 

the economic balance between Europe and Russia, between the 

west and Russia, it is pretty surprising. Senator McCain has described Russia as a $2 trillion gas station. Well, that $2 trillion gas station has one customer. It is the EU 

[European Union] primarily. The EU is a $12 trillion economy. It 

is backed by a $16 trillion economy, the U.S. economy. How is it 

that a $2 trillion gas station is able to intimidate an economic entity, the EU and the United States, that is 15 times its size? I think 

that is rooted in strategy shortsightedness, I think more 

fecklessness, allowing the neighbor to be invaded and doing not as 

much as we could. To a certain degree, corporate greed, an unwillingness to take on the financial costs of what one needs to do for 

moral and strategic reasons. 

Senator REED. Dr. Sestanovich? 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. There is no doubt that Russia is an autocracy, 

but I do not think we should exaggerate the stability of that system. This is a strong but brittle political order. The kinds of tremors that you referred to, Senator, with the wave of strikes, for example, are a reminder that the legitimacy of an order of that kind 

is always precarious. 

About sanctions. They have been much more powerful than we 

expected because of their interaction with oil prices, just as you 

suggest. The effect of the oil price drop would have been less if 

Russian banks and corporations had had an easy option of refinancing through the west. The partial closure of access to western 

capital markets has made the problems of Russian state corporations and other businesses that much greater. 

It is probably right, at least many Russian friends of mine say 

what Admiral Stavridis said. Just if you want to sharpen the impact of sanctions, the easiest option available is to add sanctions 

on individuals. We always think that the broader sanctions are 

going to have the bigger bite, but people in Putin’s circle, who will 

see that sanctions against them are their reward for being supporters, will, you know, have to ask—whether the boss knows what 

is doing. 

One other thing about individual sanctions is that they do not require the same degree of unanimity to have an effect. We can take 

actions of that sort ourselves, and that can send a powerful message about where we are going with our policy. 

Senator REED. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Rounds? 

21 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank 

you for your testimony this morning. I would make two assumptions, number one that the situation in the Ukrainian is not acceptable in its current way. The status quo is not acceptable, and that 

it should be reversed. The second assumption would be that the 

United States should not go this alone. If those two assumptions 

are correct, does NATO, assuming that NATO is the appropriate 

entity to take action, does NATO have the current capabilities to 

respond appropriately to the aggression that has been shown by 

Mr. Putin? Second of all, does NATO through the individual membership, do they have the political will to get it done? Is that what 

is slowing it down today? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think the short answers are yes and no. 

NATO has the military capability. It over matches Russia in essential every military area, particularly in its high tech, its number of 

troops, its combat aircraft, et cetera. But it does not—because it is 

a consensus-built organization, which means all 28 have to agree 

with anything, I think it is highly unlikely that the alliance would 

step into Ukraine in a significant way and respond to Vladimir 

Putin on the ground. 

I do think if Putin came after a NATO country, Estonia being the 

sort of classic scenario that is bandied about, I do believe the alliance would respond strongly and aggressively to that. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, I would second what the Admiral said fully. 

Let me go one step further and say that if the alliance—not the alliance. If we in the west want to do some of the things that the 

committee has supported, like arm the Ukrainians, and some have 

argued more severe sanctions, I think we are going to have to move 

out of institutions like NATO and the EU and go into coalitions of 

the willing. 

That has risks because it underscores a certain amount of disunity, but it has the advantages of actually actions being taken. I 

am confident that if the United States were able to pull together 

a coalition of the willing, and I think it could, for example, in arming Ukraine, I would look to the UK, I would look to Poland, I 

would look to that Balts, I would look to some of the Scandinavian 

countries. 

Canada? Thank you. That coalition of the willing could provide 

weapons that are needed by Ukraine. It would demonstrate that 

such moves are actually constructive, and it would eventually pull 

the alliance along. 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. I would add only that we should not over focus 

on military support for Ukraine. Military support is extremely important, but the crisis that Ukraine faces is a much broader one. 

Given the severity of the economic disaster that is happening there, 

it is not too much to call it an existential crisis. 

We can build up the Ukrainian military and still find that the 

Ukrainian economic order collapses. To deal with that problem, we 

are, in fact, going to need, as you suggest and as my colleague suggests, multilateral support. We need the IMF [International Monetary Fund] to step up as it has, and Congress should understand 

that what lies between the status quo in Ukrainian and the unthinkable collapse of the Ukrainian economy is probably going to 

be that institution, plus other creditors helping out. This is going 

22 

to have to be a pretty broad-based international effort to rescue the 

Ukrainians, and it is going to be expensive. 

Senator ROUNDS. Which in this particular coalition does not exist 

today. 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. Well, I would not actually say that. The core 

of it exists. There has been a good IMF response, and western governments have been helpful, but it is probably going to have to 

draw in Ukraine’s creditors. The Ukrainian Government is reaching out to try to reach understandings with its creditors so as to 

build up its—strengthen its balance sheet. But this is something 

that is an ongoing process, and I do not mean to say that the business of the Armed Services Committee is not the only element of 

saving Ukraine. I do mean to say that actually. I think it is important for the Armed Services Committee to understand how much 

the work of other arms of the U.S. Government will be crucial in 

keeping Ukraine afloat. 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Manchin? 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of 

you for being here today. I just came back from Berlin a few weeks 

ago, and it was the Aspen Group that met with Ukraine and Russian scholars and leaders. First of all, the thing I walked away 

with is the Cold War today is colder than the Cold War when we 

had declared a Cold War. If anybody could touch on that, how we 

build the relations, if there is something we did not know about or 

do not know about it. But seems like there is a very little conversation, dialogue trying to build any relations with the United States 

and Russia. First and foremost that. 

Next of all, exporting oil is something we are talking about in 

our Energy Committee. Do we export crude? We have not done it 

since the 1970s with the OPEC [Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries] situation we ran into back in the early 1970s. 

Could we use this strategically for our Nation? I think it would be 

hard for me to explain in West Virginia that we ought to export 

more crude and it will make prices cheaper at the gas pump. That 

is a hard lift to explain. Strategically they would back it 100 percent if we knew that we were putting—bring those nations who 

have oil that they have used their energy for the wrong reasons. 

So to touch on that one. 

Finally, we were told at this conference we had for a week that 

we should be very careful if we arm the Ukrainians, even defensive 

weapons, because it gives Putin really a reason to do what he 

would like to do anyway and be more aggressive. So they were very 

cautious. I took the approach that in West Virginia if a bully is 

picking on somebody who is undersized or taking advantage, you 

just want to make sure they have the ability to fight back. So I 

would have said let us give Ukrainian all the weapons. I have a 

second thought and a pause button on that one because of what I 

had heard, and it could just escalate things much worse than what 

they are today. I do not know if they will get much better, and 

maybe that is the only recourse we have. 

So first of all, on the relationship of crude and then basically the 

Ukraine arming—arming Ukraine. 

23 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I am going to go with West Virginia on the 

approach. I have difficulty with this argument that says we should 

not arm them because we will provoke Vladimir Putin. I think he 

has demonstrated he is the bully in the neighborhood, and I do not 

think acquiescing to a bully is ever the right way to go. I say that 

as a guy who stands a towering 5-foot-5. 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. I think, second, on the dialogue with Russia, 

we still have zones of cooperation with Russia. We cooperate with 

them to some degree in counterterrorism, a bit in counter piracy. 

We have reasonable dialogue at the moment with the Iranian nuclear negotiation. We will see. We have also seen Russia turn 

around and give advanced anti-air warfare weapons. So I would 

say that portion of the dialogue is breaking or about to break further. But we do have some minor areas where we can continue to 

talk, and we should do so. 

In terms of the crude oil, I think it makes sense in the broadest 

context of energy to try and alleviate others’ dependence on Russian gas and oil, back to the $2 trillion gas station that the chairman has, I think, correctly identified. Thanks. 

Senator MANCHIN. Mr. Brzezinski? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, thank you. Regarding energy security, energy security remains a key vulnerability for Central Europe. They 

are very dependent upon Russian oil and gas. In Poland I think it 

is 80 percent, 90 percent of its oil from Russia, over 60 percent of 

its gas from Russia. Ukraine, of course, the numbers are much 

higher. The same in the Balkans. So we have to make addressing 

Central Europe and Europe’s energy security a key priority, and I 

think U.S. policy has done that. We helped drive forward the 

southern corridor that will bring Caspian gas to Europe. 

I think the next big project really should be fostering the infrastructure necessary to integrate the energy markets of Central Europe together because they all remain certain islands, separate nations, separate energy markets, and to integrate them into that of 

a wider European energy market. That is a key long-term project. 

As for U.S. exports, I think it can only help Europe’s energy security situation if we unleash our oil and gas upon the global market, 

but we should have also realistic expectations of how that will affect European security. Most of those exports probably would not 

go to Europe. They would probably go to Asia and elsewhere where 

the prices are higher. But by flooding the global market, it would 

actually push more global oil and gas towards Europe, helping diversify Europe’s energy sources, and that has already been the case 

to a certain degree with LNG [liquified natural gas]. 

Regarding arming Ukraine, I stand with West Virginia without 

question. I look at not only is it a strategic requirement because, 

you know, weakness can actually attract aggression certainly when 

you have a neighbor like Putin, but I also look at it as a moral imperative. I have to say I look back prior to the attack and remember—the attack of Ukraine. I remember how the Ukrainians actually sent a company of their own soldiers to a NATO Article 5 exercise. They have actually sent more soldiers than we have to Steadfast Jazz in Poland and Latvia. 

24 

Then I think about the protestors on the Maidan who risked 

their lives, some lost their lives, expressing their desire to be part 

of Europe, their desire to be part of the EU, and their desire to be 

part of NATO. For us to kind of stand and look at our shoes in a 

way and limit our assistance to MREs [meals ready-to-eat] and 

blankets when they are being attacked by an aggressor I think is 

morally indefensible. 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. Well, West Virginia seems to be carrying the 

day here. But I would say, first of all, we are not limiting our assistance to MREs and blankets, and you know that, Ian. We do 

need to be smart and careful here because getting involved with 

weapons assistance can be destabilizing. We need to make sure 

that is not. I am completely in favor of providing this assistance, 

but I think that it is silly to say there are no risks involved. There 

are risks, and that is why we have got to be smart about it. But 

the risks are very, very great doing nothing, so we have got to 

watch it. 

About a Cold War, Admiral Stavridis is right that there are plenty of areas where we still can manage to sit across from the Russians and talk to them. But this is a real Cold War suddenly, and 

we need kind of strong nerves for it. The message to the Russians 

has got to be you brought this on yourselves, and the principal responsibility for finding a way out of it to start with is not ours. It 

is yours because you began this. That I think it is really quite important for us to have the strength of that conviction. 

Finally, about energy, I agree with a lot of what has been said 

here. I would give you an operational suggestion. Secretary Kerry 

last summer said it is a goal of American policy to reverse—reduce 

European energy dependence on Russia. How is it coming? I would 

like some regular progress reports. I would say that is something 

to ask about in a persistent way to make sure that our government 

does better here what it does not always do, and that is follow 

through. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, Doctor, the risk of destabilization assumes that the situation is stable. Senator Ernst? 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, very much for being here today. We appreciate your testimony. I would also like to extend my congratulations to Senator 

Cotton, who is not with us today. Late last evening they welcomed 

an addition to their family. Baby boy Cotton was born last night. 

Anna is doing very well. So congratulations. 

Chairman MCCAIN. He should be here this morning then. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator ERNST. Yes, her work is over, at least for the time being. 

Anyway, I would like to shift just a little bit and talk a little bit 

about Turkey just while I have you here, Admiral, if we could. It 

seems to me and to many others that Turkey has been maybe not 

such a strong ally as they should have been. We see that ISIL and 

al-Nusra seem to have extensive lines of communication within 

Turkey, and I would contend that there are those within the administration that tend to turn a blind eye to those types of activities going on within their own country. 

So, Admiral and others, if you could address Turkey and the situation as it stands with these different terrorist organizations. 

25 

Maybe what the United States and others could do to discourage 

this type of activity. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Senator, thank you. There is some good news 

in the overall stature of Turkey in the Alliance, and we should remember that. I am going to criticize Turkey momentarily. But we 

should remember that in every NATO operation—Afghanistan, 

Libya, the Balkans, counter piracy—Turkey has been there. They 

have sent troops. They have been very engaged and involved. What 

is happening now, you are absolutely correct, is a different story. 

Despite having obviously a lengthy and extensive border that abuts 

both Syria and Iraq, among others, they have, in my view, failed 

to step up in the anti-Islamic State campaign. They should be 

much more involved at every level beginning with open access to 

their bases, more intelligence sharing, more use of their military 

capability against the Islamic State up and including ground 

troops, which I think are inevitable against the Islamic State. So 

in all of those dimensions Turkey is falling short. 

The reason is they are conflicted about objectives. They really 

want to see the end of the Assad regime. The Islamic State is nominally fighting the Assad regime. They have failed to recognize that 

the greater danger at this moment is, in fact, the Islamic State, A, 

and B, we can do both of those things. We can see the end of Assad 

and defeat the Islamic State. It requires will, coordination, cooperation. Turkey needs to do more. 

Senator ERNST. Gentleman, any other input? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I guess the only thing I would add, and I completely agree with Admiral Stavridis’ points about what we could 

be expecting of Turkey. Also I think we have to take into account 

Turkey’s perspective in its relationship with the west, which I 

think has caused it to kind of, to a certain degree, and I do not 

want to overstate this, disenfranchise itself, particularly within the 

European community. It has been frustrated now by over a decade 

of basically a cold shoulder from the EU and its aspirations. So, it 

has been almost kind of let free to a certain degree, and it is pursuing, not surprisingly, a more independent policy. Our challenge 

is how to pull Turkey in a constructive way fully into the fold. 

Senator ERNST. Very good. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. May I add one point? It is simply that we 

should give Turkey credit for dealing with an enormous humanitarian challenge. There are 2 million Syrians who are being—the 

bill for whom is being footed by Turkey, and that is a contribution 

to humanity. It does not, in my view, diminish their shortfall in reacting militarily. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. If we could turn back to Ukraine and 

Russia just for a moment. We have talked extensively today about 

arming the Ukrainians, and I take the West Virginia approach 

also, very much so. But are there other types of programs that 

maybe we could assist the Ukrainians with? We have talked about, 

of course, energy. Are there agricultural programs, other types of 

things where we can just continue to assist them and build up 

their own economy in the meantime? 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. Well, Ukraine could be an agricultural powerhouse rivaling the greatest Midwestern producers. So watch it. 

Senator ERNST. Yes, they could. 

26 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. Watch out what you wish for. 

[Laughter.] 

Surely the failure to develop Ukrainian agriculture has probably 

been as big as any failure of the past 25 years in sort of unlocking 

the potential of the Ukrainian economy. The Ukrainian economy is 

in such terrible shape that almost anything would help. The good 

news is that you have a team in place in Ukraine that really gets 

it, that understands what needs to be done. It is not as though we 

need to go there and tell them have you thought about Ukrainian 

agriculture. They know what the potential is and they know what 

the problems are. 

They need the resources. They need the political will. They need 

the time to let some of their measures take hold. But they are pretty serious about what they are doing, and they are implementing 

the kinds of policies that make some of them nervous actually 

about the political viability of it. That is why the prime minister 

calls himself a kamikaze appointment. He figures he ultimately is 

going to go up in flames. But I think the most important ingredient 

in this is time. They need to be able to hang in there long enough 

for the measures—the very sensible and path-breaking measures 

that they are taking to have some effect. 

Senator ERNST. Great. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all 

very much for being here. Most of our discussion this morning is 

focused on Russia, which is the elephant in the room. But as we 

look at threats to Europe’s security, how concerned should we be 

about the economic situation that particularly parts of Europe are 

facing, the rise of nationalist parties in some of the—Greece, Spain, 

some of the other countries of Europe, and the potential for that 

to provide fertile ground for ISIS and terrorist attacks and Russia 

to agitate in a way that is a threat to European security? How do 

you assess that with respect to what is happening with Putin? Anybody. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Senator, I think you have hit on an underlying 

foundation element of Europe’s security situation, and that is the 

fragility of its economy. The fragility of its economy is contributing 

to some of these emerging kinds of nationalist xenophobic parties. 

They are certainly not constructive. 

When I think of how this relates to Russia, I watch very much 

what is going on in Greece because I really feel that that could 

have a powerful impact on the European economy. There is a 

Grexit. There are going to be shutters, and they are going to go 

particularly through Southern Europe. It could even push Europe 

back into a recession. 

A Europe that is back into recession is a Europe that is going 

to be less able to mobilize as a whole to take on the challenges that 

we are discussing today, be it Russia’s aggression to the East, be 

it the extremism we see in the Middle East, the extremism we see 

in North Africa and the refugee flows. It is going to be harder for 

us to act as a transatlantic community in a unified way. I really 

believe that I think Putin watches this closely. I think he times to 

a certain degree his moves according to when he thinks the alliVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:11 Apr 05, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\99668.TXT JUNE
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ance, the community, the transatlantic community, will be least 

able to respond forcefully and cohesively. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So what more—I am assuming that, Admiral 

Stavridis and Dr. Sestanovich, that you both basically agree with 

that assessment? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I do. If I could just add, I think this is an 

area where we mentioned earlier that Putin was crushing us in the 

social networks and strategic communications. The Islamic State is 

crushing us as well. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. We need a countervailing strategic communications focus there along with all the other things that Ian has 

talked about. I think it is extremely concerning. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So that is what my next question was going 

to be. What can we do to better shore up what is happening in 

those areas? Obviously a better social media information campaign 

that can help respond. What else? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The economic piece is enormous here, and I 

would start with the T–TIP, the Transatlantic Trade [and Investment] Partnership that is coming. I think that is a way that we 

can help the European economy directly. Putin hates it because it 

ties Europe to the United States, and I think it would have a very 

salutary effect. 

Thirdly, we ought to continue to do within the military domain 

the NATO things that you know so well, Senator. I think there is 

no single point solution here, but we need to continue to be engaged militarily, politically, economically, and in a communications 

sense. Otherwise, storm clouds ahead. 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. Could I just add one kind of encouraging word 

about—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Please. 

Dr. SESTANOVICH.—you know, these bumbling, passive—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Encouragement would be helpful. 

Dr. SESTANOVICH.—spineless, underperforming Europeans as we 

tend to portray them. Putin does watch this carefully, but he exaggerates the impact of it. That is why he has been so surprised by 

the extent of the European reaction to what he has done in 

Ukraine. He thought this would basically be forgotten within 

months. His view has been the European cannot tie their shoes. 

They cannot do anything collectively. In fact, the European Union 

has regularly reaffirmed a sanctions policy that Putin never saw 

coming. 

It gets me to the question of marketing because what you need 

from marketing is a good product. The most important part of developing a consistent public relations line is having a unified policy. 

So far we have been pretty good at that, and I think if we can hold 

that we have the solid foundation on which to build a more effective marketing policy. But the crucial ingredient, and I think this 

is—this hangs in the balance over the next 6 to 8 months is to keep 

a policy across the board—military, economic, political support for 

Ukraine. That can unravel. Putin may not turn out to be totally 

wrong about the disunity of the west. But if by the end of the year 

he looks up and discovers that actually he has not been able to diVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:11 Apr 05, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\99668.TXT JUNE
28 

vide Europe and the United States, that will be a powerful message 

for him. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So when you say ‘‘we,’’ you are talking about 

Europe and the United States together. 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. I am, yes. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have other 

questions, but I will—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King? 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to be a bit 

of a contrarian here and try to create an alternative scenario. I am 

trying to figure out whether this is the Sudetenland in 1938 or Sarajevo in 1914, and bear with me for a minute. 

Putin has a very weak economy. Domestically everything stinks. 

He has got an 80 percent approval rating in Russia principally because of nationalism and his strong man image of standing up to 

the west. Is it not possible that arming the Ukrainians, which 

would obviously be public in some way, shape, or form, whether it 

is anti-tank weapons or something else, would be playing into 

hands? It would be—he would say, see, I am standing up against 

America. They are trying to invade our region of the country—our 

region of the world. They are putting their troops and arms— 

maybe not troops, but arms, and it would embolden him. 

The second piece of my question is, you guys, it seems to me, are 

assuming a static universe. We arm the Ukrainians and nothing 

else happens. He would obviously respond in some way, and he is 

sitting on the side of the poker table with most of the chips because 

this is on his turf. 

I guess to throw one other historical analogy into the mix, Cuba. 

We were willing to take the world to the brink of nuclear because 

of perceived Russian, not aggression, but placement of weapons in 

our sphere of influence off of our country. I think we have got to 

think and put ourselves in his shoes, and I am just concerned. I 

have not made any firm decision on this, but I just do not think 

it is as easy as you say. 

We arm the Ukrainians. Then what happens? That is my question. Mr. Brzezinski, do you want to tackle that one? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. First, I would say that arming the Ukrainians 

is not the sole answer. I think it is a critical element of a strategy. 

Senator KING. But what does he do if we arm the Ukrainians? 

What is the next—it is not just going to be, oh, they armed the 

Ukrainians. What does he do next? What happens next? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. If he moves further into Ukraine after we arm 

the Ukrainians, the Ukrainians will impose higher costs on the aggressor forces, on the Russian forces. I think that is going to be— 

Senator KING. But he controls the media in Russia. Does he 

care—I mean, he is not responsive. As you said, if your economy 

went down 1 percent we would have, you know, people in the 

streets. Over there they are not even going to know that there are 

more troops dying in the Ukraine. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. You know, again, it is not the sole answer, but 

if there are more Russians, to put it crassly, dying in Ukraine, I 

think it is going to cause a political problem for Putin. One thing 

that I have been struck by watching this crisis politically or this 

even in Russia, is the steadfast, earnest, determined effort of the 

29 

Russian Government to cover up Russian deaths in Ukraine. They 

do not have the equivalents of Faces of the Fallen. They deny that 

anyone has died. They deny their forces are there. They intimidate 

families who have lost their sons or their daughters in Ukraine 

telling them to be quiet. They move them out of their homes. They 

threaten to take away their death benefits. It is really interesting— 

Senator KING. So is it your position then that we arm the 

Ukrainians and Putin does not respond. There are no further weapons for the separatists. There are no further troops. I mean, this 

is a fact—in fact a status universe. We arm—there is no response. 

I find that impossible to believe. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. No, what happens is that, one, the Russians face 

a more complex situation, a more lethal situation. They face the 

prospect of a prolonged and costly conflict. That, I think, will probably deter them trying to push further in Ukraine. It also might 

make it possible they would be more willing to back out of Ukraine, 

at least out of Eastern Ukraine. It would also demonstrate to Putin 

the west is serious about sustaining the post-World War II security 

order, that we are not going to tolerate unilateral revisions of orders by force. I think those are dynamics that we are not trying— 

we are not leveraging, and we should be leveraging. 

Senator KING. Others have thoughts about my question? I hope 

you appreciate that this is not easy. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I totally do, and I think the key word Ian 

used was ‘‘probably.’’ This is a—— 

Senator KING. Yes, I heard that word, too. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. This is a calculus just like any decision you 

make, particularly when you use lethal force in any dimension. We 

always say in the Navy, when you release ordnance, everything 

changes. You are taking a gamble. But my assessment is that this 

is the right choice. In terms of what happens, I think Putin then 

has a much harder choice. He can either bring Russian forces 

under their flag into Ukraine and face, I think, overwhelming 

world approbation, or I think at that point he does start to unwind 

and reaches for the frozen conflict solution. I think that is probably 

the best we get out of this. 

But, no, of course, it is not static, Senator. There will be changes, 

and it is a risk, and it could go very badly. But I still recommend 

that we do it. 

Senator KING. Sir? 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. Senator, since I am the member of the panel 

who has expressed the most unease about this, let me try to bring 

you around to my way of thinking about it since I do support it. 

I think you mentioned a static universe. You should not assume 

that the universe is static as long as the United States does not 

do anything. This is a fluid situation right now in which separatists are trying to push out in all directions, whether it is along the 

coast, to the north, to the west. They only control about a third of 

Donetsk Province and half of Luhansk, and they have said they 

want it all. 

They are definitely going to try to get the rest of these provinces, 

and they are going to try to expand their control across along the 

coast. It is just a certainty. I mean, if there is anything that one 

30 

can regard as a law in this universe, that is going to happen. So 

the question—— 

Senator KING. I certainly understand that there are risks on both 

sides. There is a risk of inaction, and the universe is not static in 

either way. I do understand that. I am just trying to assess the 

risks, the relative risks. 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. The best scenario in which to try to have some 

effect of bolstering the operational capabilities of the Ukrainian 

forces is when there is a lull. The fact that Putin has agreed, even 

while not abiding by it much, but there is something of a lull. That 

is the moment in which we have to try to make sure that when 

people start to challenge that lull, to push out from what they hold 

now to what they want to hold, that they will be stopped, that they 

will face more resistance. 

I mean, the thing that finally makes me think, yes, of course you 

have to support these forces is without greater capability, there is 

no way that the separatists are not going to push out. So here is 

the question I would put to you, and I think you should put it to 

people in the administration because they plainly do not want to 

do this. What is your plan for stopping the separatist offensives 

that are going to go, you know, west, north, and south from the 

land that they hold now? What is your theory of the case? 

Senator KING. Right. 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. If you have got a theory of the case that enables the Ukrainian forces to hold the line, great, you know. Let 

us hear it. I think if there were such a case that could avoid 

the—— 

Senator KING. The risk. 

Dr. SESTANOVICH.—the uncertainty and the risk that you identified, great. I just do not think there is that. But I would say challenge people in the administration because my sense is from your— 

what you said, that you do not want that to happen. I think they 

do not want it to happen either, but I do not think they have any 

answer to how they are going to keep it from happening. 

Senator KING. It seems to me the answer is that we have to 

game out what happens in both directions. Particularly I am concerned, as I expressed, that when you are playing chess with a 

Russian, you had better think three moves ahead, not just react 

and no reaction, and I think that is a very important point. I am 

sorry, Mr. Chairman, I have gone over, but a very important point 

that we also have to game out the results of doing nothing, and see 

is there a strategy or is the strategy just to not act. 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. Gaming it out and doing nothing is totally 

easy. The separatists will expand their territory. 

Senator KING. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, I think, Doctor, you have just answered 

my question, and I would ask the other two witnesses, and I am 

sure I know the answer. Is there any doubt that there will be attempts and, for no reason to believe they are not going to be successful under the present scenario to expand the Russian influence 

through the separatists throughout Ukraine? Admiral, is there any 

doubt in your mind? 

31 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. None whatsoever, and I suspect sooner rather than later. I think the mortars and the artillery are shelling the 

villages outside of Mariupol right now. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I completely agree with the Admiral. It is going 

to happen. 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. I think the separatists are determined to have 

this happen. What we do not know is how much the Russians really want it to happen. I think the Russians are unwilling to let the 

separatists be defeated, and the game that is going on between 

them is the separatists want to push out, and then when there is 

a counter response, they want to say to the Russians you have got 

to defend us. You have got to keep us from losing any of the ground 

that we have taken. So what our interest is is to make sure that 

they cannot actually take new ground because once they do, that 

will draw in more Russian support. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Could I follow up, sir? 

Chairman MCCAIN. Sure. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Actually I get very concerned about what I feel 

is a tendency to exaggerate the gap between the separatists and 

Moscow. I never saw—was able to observe any significant separatist movement in Eastern Ukraine prior to this invasion. I firmly 

believe that ‘‘the separatists’’ are not separatists. They are an extension of the Russian polity. They were sent in to destabilize Eastern Ukraine. They were led by Russian provocateurs. They were 

backed by Russian soft [power], and they were ultimately backed 

by Russian conventional forces. 

So it is not really—there is not a tension that we can really exploit between separatists and Moscow. They are one and the same. 

It is an external invasion of Ukraine. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I would also add that apparently if I were 

Vladimir Putin, and I do not pretend to understand him totally, 

but it seems that you achieve a degree of success, and that becomes 

the status quo. Things quiet down, then Europeans talk about relaxing sanctions and trying to find that out, and things are quiet 

for a while. Now, at least according to General Breedlove, we are 

starting to see an increase in activities after a period of lull. It 

seems to me that that has been pretty successful so far for Vladimir Putin. Doctor, is there anything to that theory, do you think? 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. Putin thinks he has got more endurance than 

the Europeans do and than the Americans do. You are right. As I 

said to Senator Shaheen earlier, his gamble is that whatever miscalculations he has made and how much greater the resistance has 

been, we will crack first. So, that is the test for us is not to crack 

first. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. Jack, did you want to—— 

Senator REED. I just have just a brief comment. I think as has 

been indicated by the panel and particularly Mr. Brzezinski, that 

Putin is an opportunist. If there is an opportunity, he takes it. But 

he is also—I think, his timing is influenced by things like the 

Olympics. I think he was very reluctant to get involved in the 

Ukraine while the Maidan Square demonstrations were going on 

because he had another audience he was playing to. He was the 

world leader. 

32 

I think similarly at his juncture we might be having a lull because they are in the process of celebrating the end of the Great 

Patriotic War, and he wants everyone to come and pay homage to 

him, et cetera. But after that, which is within a few weeks, there 

is no more, sort of him personally, reason to hold back, so that 

might be a factor also. 

But I think, and I will go in a second, I think your point, Doctor, 

which is this becomes ultimately a test of wills against this individual. He has the advantage of being an individual. We have a collective will we have to sustain and hold together. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I do not mean to prolong this dialogue too 

much longer, but it seems to me energy is still a key item. We 

could develop within a couple of years an ability to get energy from 

the United States over to that part of the world, which I think 

would have a significant impact. That has nothing to do with arms 

or weapons. Finally, could I ask if there is an agreement on that, 

Admiral? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I agree with that, Senator. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sure. 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. Absolutely. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank the witnesses for a very—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Mr. Chairman, can I—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. No. Yes. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SHAHEEN. Can I ask a couple more questions? 

Chairman MCCAIN. Absolutely. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. I want to go back, Dr. 

Sestanovich, to your comment about providing lethal weapons because I think there is a lot of agreement on this committee that 

we should provide those weapons, but you said we have to do it 

very carefully. So you talked about doing it during the lull. What 

other things do you think we should be doing as we are looking at 

providing those weapons to do it carefully? 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. Training is crucial. Intelligence capabilities 

are crucial. Those are the two that would come to my mind right 

off the bat. Then of course the economic backdrop means that we 

have to make sure that while we are getting those Ukrainians in 

smart formation on the front lines in good looking new uniforms, 

and knowing their tasks, the home front does not just collapse. 

That is—you know, if there is anything that is more desperate than 

the military outlook, it is the economic outlook. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Yes. I certainly think that is pretty clear to 

this committee. But let me ask because one of the things that I 

think that you all have alluded to is the importance of acting unilaterally with the United States and Europe, being united in our 

approach to the crisis. One of the reports about the European reaction to lethal weapons is that they do not support that, and that, 

therefore, this could be a potential area where we would disagree 

in a way that might have an impact. So how do you assess that 

as you look at the need to provide weapons? Admiral? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Disagreement within NATO is unknown terrain at all, Senator, as you know quite well from your deep experience in NATO. Think back on the Libyan operation where we saw 

33 

a group of nations leaning forward, very, very involved, a group of 

nations supportive, and then some who were essentially opposed, 

but willing to kind of come along. I think that is how this would 

play out. 

I do not accept the argument that this would somehow shatter 

the Alliance. I think at the end of the day you can do it within a 

NATO context with the Nations who want to, or as Mr. Brzezinski 

has said, you could create a coalition of the willing. He listed some 

states. I agree with that. I think there are mechanisms to deal with 

that argument. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Any other—Mr. Brzezinski? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes, I would like to make two points, Senator. 

First, I would add to the Admiral’s list of how coalitions fell together into NATO without collapsing the Alliance. Missile defense 

is an example. Iran sanctions is another. I have two words of caution on strategy for arming Ukraine or two things we need to think 

about is, one, I think it is important that we avoid incrementalism. 

I am a little bit worried that our administration and our European allies’ approach is first we will do some MREs, then we will 

do some Humvees, then we will do some counter-artillery radar 

and such. I think that is a mistake because I think that just maps 

out to Putin were the future is headed, and that actually will encourage him, embolden him to act while he is most effective, has 

the power balance most in his favor in Ukraine. 

Then second, I think we would be naı ̈ve to assume just arming 

the Ukrainians and the Russians will not do anything. They are 

going to counter react. So we have to have a plan that goes beyond 

just arming Ukraine, so that if we provide good, robust security assistance to Ukraine, we are prepared for a sudden Russian offensive. For example, one step half-cocked and ready to go is really 

harsh economic sanctions that would be driven in either by the EU 

or by coalition like-minded nations to hit the Russians and then 

know in advance this is going to happen if they all of a sudden try 

and counter react aggressively to an effort to provide more needed 

security assistance to Ukraine. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. If I could, I would add, Senator, cyber. We 

need to add that to our shopping list as we think about how to help 

the Ukrainians. Thanks. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. I want to switch topics for my 

time that is left because one of the things that happened last week 

is that European regulators imposed antitrust charges as Gazprom. 

Do you think that is going to have any impact on the energy situation? 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. Yes. It has been a principle of Russian policy 

that Europe does not get to impose its rules on its energy trade 

with Russia. The result has been that Gazprom has had a very advantageous negotiating position with all European customers. It 

has been able to insist on separate negotiations with all customers 

with the result that its prices across Europe vary dramatically according to that bilateral relationship. 

For Europe to say we care about our policies and we are going 

to enforce them in our energy trade would be of immense importance. Europe has done that in kind of tentative ways, for example, 

with respect to energy transportation and pipelines. It has manVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:11 Apr 05, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\99668.TXT JUNE
34 

aged to block the Russian South Stream Pipeline by saying this 

does not meet our rules. The Russians have time and again 

laughed at that and said, oh, no, those rules are not in effect because we can buy off this or that individual customer or transit 

country. 

If the Europeans are going to turn around their energy relationship with Russia, they have got to start enforcing their rules, and 

it is has got to go beyond transportation. If it gets to the issue of 

negotiating about pricing, there will have been an energy revolution, so that is fundamental. But as you surely know from having 

EU events, one announcement does make a policy. The Europeans 

have opportunities for many procedural hurdles, reversals, and so 

forth. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ayotte? 

Senator AYOTTE. I want to thank all of you for being here. You 

know, having been to Ukraine twice last year and having had the 

privilege of overseeing the presidential elections, you know, I am 

just wondering, are we at a tipping point because many of us have 

been calling, and on a very strong bipartisan basis, for providing, 

you know, the lethal support for Ukraine to defend itself, as well 

as economic assistance, as well as increased NATO support, additional sanctions. 

At some point, I mean, I have just—it is really appalling to me. 

It is hard to express how I feel about it because we have been in 

almost uniformity here in the Congress on this, on things that, you 

know, we do not always agree on, so many things. On this we have 

sort of on a bipartisan basis thought this was the right thing to do, 

and I am just worried. 

Are we not at a critical moment where—I feel like in having listened to—I was at the Munich Security Conference having listened 

to, for example, the Germans speak about their objections to providing lethal arms. It is almost like I feel like that in some ways 

Ukraine is being written off, and I hate to be so cynical about it. 

But if we do not act soon, where is this going? I mean, is there 

not a huge urgency for this? I thought there was an urgency last 

May. But can you help us understand how urgent is this situation 

where you are—you know, we have got Ukraine with the economic 

situation, and in addition having to defend their territory. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think we are at a critical point, and I think 

what will happen in the next two to four weeks, maybe the next 

two to four months, is going to be another bite out of Ukraine by 

the separatists. I am hopeful that that will be the tip that pushes 

us over to come in with not only the lethals, but really the entire 

package of things we have talked about today. 

As of yesterday, as I mentioned to the chairman, mortar and artillery fire at the villages outside of Mariupol. That is what you do 

first when you soften up for a land advance. We may be there now. 

We will know more in the next couple of weeks. We have to get 

going on this if we are going to have impact. 

Senator AYOTTE. I just wanted to also follow up. One of the 

things that struck me about this whole thing, and just correct me 

if I am wrong in my thinking, and it has really bothered me in 

35 

terms of our foreign policy from the beginning, and that has been 

the Budapest Memorandum. It seems to me that we are not stepping up to help provide this kind of assistance that we have talked 

about here. We signed this agreement. As we look at, for example, 

even the context of Iran, other goals that we have of nuclear nonproliferation, does this not in the big picture undermine—I just 

still do not understand why other countries would want to give up 

their nuclear weapons when their territory is invaded, and yet 

we—you know, our signature on that memorandum seems to mean 

nothing in this context. Are you worried about that in the picture 

as we look at our larger foreign policy here? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Senator, I agree with you. I think there are two 

important issues at stake here in the violation of the Budapest 

Memorandum. I was a volunteer in Ukraine working in Kiev when 

that was signed, and I remember the impressions in Kiev intimately. It was celebrated in Ukraine as an affirmation of the west’s 

commitment to its independence and its sovereignty. It was even 

seen as an affirmation of its attempts to become a European—an 

integrated member of the Europe ‘‘Community of Democracies’’, because they were giving something up that was recognized as kind 

of potentially very important to their own security, nuclear weapons. 

Now 25, 30 years later, we are in a situation in which that 

Memorandum has been blatantly violated. Every country around 

the world that has or is aspiring to weapons of mass destruction 

is looking at it very carefully. What are the consequences if you 

give up such aspirations or such weapons? Well, you become more 

vulnerable? Will someone back you up? Not necessarily clear that 

they would. 

Then I think it is a real hit to the west’s credibility because it 

was really seen a document driven by the United States and Great 

Britain, Europe and the United States. That is what the Ukrainians back when I was there in 1994 were looking to for assurances. 

Not to Russia, but to the United States and to Europe, and they 

are not getting it. It has really undercut our standing, the credibility of our security commitments. 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. Senator, I agree with you, but if it does not 

loom large in my thinking it is because it seems to me the case for 

supporting Ukraine is so strong. 

Senator AYOTTE. Right. Well, it is compelling. 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. No matter what. 

Senator AYOTTE. I mean, it is compelling. 

Dr. SESTANOVICH. Yes. I do not think we should in any way have 

the view that if there had been no Budapest Memorandum, we 

would be less interested in this case, or that we would be less interested in other cases where there is not that same issue. 

You are right that the commitment of the United States has been 

shown to have been made perhaps without full thought as to what 

we really meant by it. But I think—to me it is not the central 

issue. The broader question is the interest that we had in the entire order that we were trying to create in Europe after the Cold 

War. 

This is—the reason this is a fundamental threat to that interest 

has less to do with the disposition of Soviet nuclear forces. The 

36 

truth is the Ukrainians did not really want to keep those things, 

and it has much more to do with more fundamental considerations 

of war and peace and our future relations with Russia. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, I hope—I know my time is up, but I know 

how dedicated the chairman has been to this issue, and how passionate he is, and I share his passion for this. I hope that—I hope 

that the administration is listening to the testimony of all of you 

today. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I want to thank the witnesses for being here 

today. It has been very helpful. The meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:51 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

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