United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-30386

____________

Sharon Lewis, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Vicki Crochet, Individually; Robert Barton, Individually, also 

known as Bob, 

Defendants—Appellants. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:21-CV-198

______________________________

Before Stewart, Duncan, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Carl E. Stewart, Circuit Judge:

Vicki Crochet and Robert Barton (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal 

the district court’s order compelling evidentiary disclosures and depositions 

implicating the attorney-client privilege. For the reasons set out below, we 

REVERSE and REMAND. 

 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 17, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I. Factual Background and Procedural History

Sharon Lewis (“Lewis”), an African-American woman, worked as an 

assistant athletic director for Louisiana State University’s (“LSU”) football 

team until 2022. Lewis’s role included the authority to hire and manage 

student workers in the football team’s administrative offices. Lewis alleges 

that she experienced and witnessed numerous instances of racist and sexist 

misconduct from former head football coach Les Miles (“Miles”) and that 

she received complaints of sexual harassment from student workers that she 

oversaw. Lewis ferried those complaints to the heads of the athletics 

program, often with no action taken.

A. The 2013 Investigation

In 2013, LSU retained Appellants, partners of the law firm Taylor, 

Porter, Brooks & Phillips LLP (“Taylor Porter”), to conduct a Title IX 

investigation of sexual harassment allegations made against Miles. That 

report and its contents were kept confidential, and allegations brought by the 

student complainants were privately settled.1 The relevant documents

generated in that investigation were two memoranda, the Student Complaint 

Memo (“Student Complaint Memo”) and the Memo to File (“Memo to 

File”), that summarized the factual allegations in sexual harassment 

complaints against LSU football staff. After the investigation, Miles was 

“cleared of any wrongdoing”; nevertheless, LSU urged Miles to refrain from 

one-on-one contact with student employees, a recommendation that was

memorialized in an August 13, 2013 Directive Letter (“Directive Letter”).

During the 2010s, sexual assault allegations against LSU football 

players, coaches, and staff were the subject of news media stories across the 

_____________________

1 See Lewis v. Danos, 83 F.4th 948, 951–52 (5th Cir. 2023). 

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nation. On November 16, 2020, USA Today published an article asserting 

that there was widespread sexual misconduct in LSU’s athletics program.2

Following the release of the article, LSU retained the law firm Husch 

Blackwell LLP to conduct an independent review of LSU’s Title IX 

compliance and the incidents reported in the USA Today article. The article 

also prompted Lewis to bring Title VII and Title IX claims against numerous 

members of LSU’s Board of Supervisors (“Board”) and athletics 

department. She also filed civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organization Act (“RICO”) claims against Appellants. The alleged RICO 

claims arose from Appellants’ conduct in the Title IX investigation and an 

alleged scheme to suppress sexual harassment and misconduct complaints 

against Miles and LSU football players and staff.

On June 16, 2022, the district court dismissed the RICO claims against 

Appellants because Lewis’s claims were time-barred and she failed to 

establish proximate causation. On appeal of the dismissal order, a panel of 

this court affirmed the district court on the grounds that Lewis knew of her 

injuries from alleged racketeering as early as 2013, and thus the four-year 

statute of limitations had expired before she filed suit in 2021.3 The panel 

further held that the causal chain from the alleged concealment of the Taylor 

Porter Report to Lewis’s alleged injuries—the loss of her job, future 

_____________________

2 Kenny Jacoby et al., LSU Mishandled Sexual Misconduct Complaints Against 

Students, Including Top Athletes, USA Today (Jan. 28, 2021, 9:20 AM), 

https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/sports/ncaaf/2020/11/16/lsu-ignored-campussexual-assault-allegations-against-derrius-guice-drake-davis-other-students/6056388002/ 

[https://perma.cc/65D9-K4Y9].

3 See Danos, 83 F.4th at 956.

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opportunities, and reputational damage—was too attenuated to sustain her 

civil RICO claims.4

B. The Crime-Fraud Exception Order

During the appeal of the dismissal order, Lewis’s Title VII and Title 

IX claims against the Board proceeded to a heated discovery period. In 

October 2022, the Board moved for a protective order to prevent depositions 

of Appellants and the disclosure of documents from Taylor Porter’s Title IX 

investigation because they were irrelevant to Lewis’s remaining Title VII and 

Title IX claims. The Board further asserted that the attorney-client privilege 

and the work product doctrine applied. In opposition, Lewis countered that 

the unredacted Student Complaint Memo, unredacted Taylor Porter billing 

records, and other supporting documents were discoverable under the crimefraud exception. Lewis pointed to several federal and state laws regarding 

concealing public records, bribery, or influencing or preventing testimony in 

support of her argument.

After the motion was submitted, the parties urged the district court to 

decide the crime-fraud exception issue before addressing the rest of the 

Board’s motion for a protective order. The district court released its opinion 

on the crime-fraud exception issue on March 14, 2023 (the “Crime-Fraud 

Exception Order”). It determined that Lewis made a prima facie showing 

that the Board violated Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:132(B) because she 

provided evidence that “the Board intentionally concealed the Memo to File, 

Student Complaint Memo, and [any] Attachments beginning on May 15, 

2013, at Taylor Porter’s law offices.” The district court noted that Lewis 

further demonstrated that Crochet wrote the “Memo to File, documenting 

the discussion by some members of the Board regarding Taylor Porter’s 

_____________________

4 See id. at 956–58. 

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investigation . . . and the method by which the Student Complaint Memo and 

Attachments were to be preserved.”

In its reasons, the district court pointed out that Appellants and 

several members of the Board met on May 15, 2013, and received hard copies 

of all the relevant documents before “return[ing] their hard copies to the 

Taylor Porter lawyers” for storage at their office. It then noted the Student 

Complaint Memo’s language that analyzed whether the memo would be 

subject to public records requests or requests for production in any legal 

proceeding and “attempt[ed] to minimize the possibility of” such by 

requiring “any written directive [letter]” to Miles “to be maintained 

exclusively in the law offices of Taylor Porter.” It then concluded that Lewis 

also made a prima facie showing that the May 15, 2013 meeting, Memo to 

File, Student Complaint Memo, and its attachments were made in 

furtherance of violating La. R.S. 14:132(B) and that the Board failed to rebut 

the showing. But upon review of the alleged criminal conduct and the 

withheld information in the redacted Student Complaint Memo and Taylor 

Porter billing records, the district court held that the unredacted documents

did not reasonably relate to the concealment of the alleged public records. 

Thus, it determined that the unredacted memo and billing records did not 

fall within the crime-fraud exception. The district court then deferred ruling 

on whether any related documents associated with the Memo to File and 

Student Complaint Memo could be reasonably related to the crime of injury 

to the public record. In sum, the district court’s Crime-Fraud Exception 

Order accepted Lewis’s theory that the Board violated La. R.S. 14:132(B) as 

plausible and deferred its express ruling on whether the privilege could be 

pierced. 

The day after it issued its Crime-Fraud Exception Order, the district 

court held a status conference to discuss the status of the case and ordered 

the parties to prepare letters identifying any additional discovery requests. 

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After receiving those letters, the district court ordered Lewis to file a motion 

to compel addressing the lingering “issues of discoverability and the 

application of [its Crime-Fraud Exception Order].” The Board sought a writ 

of mandamus from this court to reverse the Crime-Fraud Exception Order.5

The panel denied mandamus relief because it was “confident [that] the 

[district] court will take reasonable measures to monitor the depositions and 

ensure the witnesses are not required to reveal privileged information that 

does not bear a ‘reasonable relationship’ to the Board’s alleged concealment 

of public records.”6

C. The April 11, 2023 Motion to Compel

On April 11, 2023, Lewis filed a motion to compel the depositions of 

Appellants and the disclosure of the redacted portions of the Taylor Porter 

Report and other information alleged to have been concealed at Taylor 

Porter’s offices. That same day, Appellants sought a protective order to 

prevent the disclosure of legal advice and communications between LSU and 

Appellants as governed by attorney- and work-product privileges. The Board 

and two of its members also filed oppositions to Lewis’s motion to compel.

The district court denied Appellants’ motion for a protective order 

and compelled the depositions of Appellants and the disclosure of documents 

drafted during the 2013 investigation (“Disclosure Order”). It began by 

stating that Appellants’ arguments that the Crime-Fraud Exception Order 

was erroneous were “a request for reconsideration of th[at order] under Rule 

59(e), which the [d]ismissed [Appellants] lack standing to make.” It further 

stated that Appellants “stood idly by while the Board and [Lewis] extensively 

litigated the crime-fraud exception issue.” It determined that Appellants’ 

_____________________

5 Case No. 23-30441, R. Doc. 2-1 at 2. 

6 Case No. 23-30441, R. Doc. 47-1 at 3–4. 

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attempt to “question[] the correctness of [its] ruling on the basis of new 

arguments or cleaned-up versions of already considered arguments flies in 

the face of the Fifth Circuit’s prohibition on using a Rule 59(e) motion to 

relitigate old matters and raise issues that‘could, and should, have been made 

before [a ruling was] issued.’” It went on to consider Appellants’ arguments 

based on relevance and proportionality in its order.

The district court ultimately determined that the contested 

documents and deposition testimony requested were relevant to Lewis’s 

Title VII and Title IX claims. It then rejected the Board’s argument that 

Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 491 (5th Cir. 1999) barred the 

depositions of Appellants because Theriot addressed requests for depositions 

of the defendants’ counsel in a then-pending case. With respect to the 

document discovery that Lewis sought, the district court “compelled [the 

Board] to produce documents responsive7 to” Lewis’s requests related to 

“alleged efforts by the Board to conceal sexual harassment allegations made 

against [] Miles.” Appellants timely appealed.

II. Standard of Review

Ordinarily, this court’s “appellate jurisdiction generally extends only 

to ‘final decisions of the district courts.’” La Union del Pueblo Entero v. 

Abbott, 68 F.4th 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291). 

However, we also have jurisdiction over a “narrow class of decisions” that 

are “immediately appealable as collateral orders even if no final judgment has 

been rendered.” Vantage Health Plan, Inc. v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 913 

F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, 

_____________________

7 The document requests sought emails between LSU, the Board, and Taylor 

Porter “discussing opposing the release of the Student Complaint Memo and Directive 

Letter” in the public records request litigation initiated by USA Today in the Nineteenth 

Judicial District Court of the State of Louisiana.

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Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994)). The legal issue of a non-party’s “[s]tanding 

is reviewed under a de novo standard.” Castillo v. Cameron County, 238 F.3d 

339, 347 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Tex. Off. of Pub. Util. Couns. v. FCC, 183 F.3d 

393, 419 n.34 (5th Cir. 1999)). “Because the application of the attorney-client 

privilege is a fact question to be determined in light of the purpose of the 

privilege and guided by judicial precedents, [] the district court’s finding 

[that the crime-fraud exception applies is reviewed] for clear error only.” In 

re Grand Jury Subpoena, 419 F.3d 329, 335 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting United 

States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 2002)). A factual determination 

is not clearly erroneous if it is “plausible in light of the record as a whole.”

Id. at 337 (quoting Edwards, 303 F.3d at 645 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted)). Clear error exists where a review of the record results in a 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States 

v. Lima-Rivero, 971 F.3d 518, 520 (5th Cir. 2020).

III. Discussion

As a preliminary matter, the parties dispute whether this court has 

jurisdiction to hear the instant interlocutory appeal and whether Appellants 

have standing to appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for a 

protective order. On the merits, Appellants contend that the district court 

clearly erred in determining that the crime-fraud exception applied to the 

documents produced by Appellants and their communications with LSU’s 

Board. We begin with jurisdiction and standing before addressing the merits 

of this appeal. 

A. Jurisdiction

At issue is whether the instant interlocutory appeal is permissible 

under the collateral order doctrine. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides that our 

appellate jurisdiction extends only to “final decisions of the district courts.” 

However, in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949), 

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the Supreme Court established the collateral order doctrine, a narrow

exception to § 1291, for “a small set of prejudgment orders that are ‘collateral 

to’ the merits of an action and ‘too important’ to be denied immediate 

review.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 103 (2009) (quoting 

Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546). Lewis contends that “[d]isclosure orders adverse to 

the attorney-client privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the 

collateral order doctrine” based on the Court’s decision in Mohawk, 558 U.S. 

at 108–09. We disagree.

We have recently explained that interlocutory “[o]rders are 

immediately appealable under [the collateral order doctrine] only if they ‘(1) 

conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue 

completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) [are] effectively 

unreviewable on appeal.’” La Union, 68 F.4th at 232 (quoting Henry v. Lake 

Charles Am. Press, LLC, 566 F.3d 164, 171 (5th Cir. 2009)). It is important to 

note that the first two factors of this test are easily satisfied here, as the

Disclosure Order is conclusive and the issue regarding the attorney-client 

privilege is completely separate from the merits of Lewis’s Title VII and Title 

IX claims. See Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 108 (holding same). Thus, we are left with 

the question of whether the Disclosure Order and the Crime-Fraud 

Exception Order are “effectively unreviewable on appeal.” Lake Charles Am. 

Press, LLC, 566 F.3d at 171. We hold that they are. 

In Whole Woman’s Health v. Smith, 896 F.3d 362 (5th Cir. 2018), 

reproductive health organizations sued Texas officials after the passage of a 

bill regulating the disposal of fetal remains. Id. at 364. The plaintiffs sought 

internal communications from a non-party who had testified at the 

emergency injunction stage and the district court ordered the non-party to 

turn over the requested documents. Id. at 366–67. The non-party appealed. 

Id. at 367. Citing Mohawk, the plaintiffs countered that the court lacked 

appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory discovery order. Id. 

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We disagreed and held that the consequences of forced discovery were 

“effectively unreviewable” on appeal from the final judgment because the 

appellant was a non-party to the case. Id. Mohawk was inapposite because it 

relied on the fact that a party could “remedy erroneously ordered discovery” 

through appeal by moving a court to “remand[] the case for a new trial.” Id.

We reasoned that “Mohawk does not speak to the predicament of third 

parties, whose claims to reasonable protection from the courts have often 

been met with respect.” Id. at 368. Ultimately, we concluded that the case 

was distinguishable from Mohawk because “a new trial order can hardly avail 

a third-party witness who cannot benefit directly from such relief.” Id. at 

367–68. 

Whole Woman’s Health is instructive here. Appellants’ claims are 

effectively unreviewable after final judgment because, unlike parties to an 

action, they can sustain no relief from a new trial order. See id.; see also 

Vantage Health Plan, Inc., 913 F.3d at 449–50 (holding the same with respect 

to compelled disclosure of a non-party’s sensitive commercial documents). 

Mohawk was a case addressing a party’s interlocutory appeal of a disclosure 

order adverse to the attorney-client privilege and thus does not apply to bar 

appellate jurisdiction here. Accordingly, we conclude that we have appellate 

jurisdiction over this appeal because the Disclosure Order and the CrimeFraud Exception Order are effectively unreviewable on appeal, and 

Appellants’ appeal otherwise suits the criteria for collateral order review. See 

Vantage Health, 913 F.3d at 449–50.

 B. Standing

Lewis argues that Appellants lack standing to bring this appeal 

because (1) they were not parties to the case at the time of the Crime-Fraud 

Exception Order and (2) the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, 

not the attorney. We are unpersuaded by these arguments. 

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The Supreme Court has held that “only parties to a lawsuit, or those 

that properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment.” Marino v. 

Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988). Nonetheless, some exceptions exist to allow 

third-party standing to appeal orders injurious to their interests. United States 

v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 358–59 (5th Cir. 1983). Where review is sought of 

orders issued after a party is dismissed from the underlying suit, that party 

“is often allowed to appeal” if the order affects its interests. Id. at 359 

(citation omitted); see also In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 589 F.2d 786, 788 

(5th Cir. 1979). A non-party may appeal where it “actually participated in the 

proceedings below, the equities weigh in favor of hearing the appeal, and the 

non-part[y] ha[s] a personal stake in the outcome.” Castillo, 238 F.3d at 349 

(citations omitted). 

In Castillo v. Cameron County, the State of Texas was a partydefendant listed in the original complaint that sought appellate review of 

orders issued after it was dismissed from the case. 238 F.3d at 343. The 

plaintiffs brought § 1983 claims against Texas and local county jailers for 

overcrowding of county jails. Id. at 343–44. The district court entered a 

temporary injunction ordering the county to reduce the jail population and 

renewed the injunction several times. Id. at 344–46. Because Texas satisfied 

its obligations in preventing the overcrowding attributable to their inaction, 

it was dismissed from the action. Id. at 346. A few days after Texas was 

dismissed, the district court denied the motion to terminate the injunction 

against the county, and Texas appealed the denial. Id. at 347. On appeal, we 

held that Texas had standing because it “ha[d] been an active participant in 

the proceedings,” maintained its position prior to its dismissal, and it risked 

“being found in civil contempt” if it violated the order, thus providing it a 

personal stake in the outcome of the appeal. Id. at 350–51. 

Castillo is instructive here. Appellants actively participated in the 

proceedings prior to their dismissal, the equities weigh in their favor, and 

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they have a personal stake in the outcome as they must comply with the order 

or risk contempt or sanctions.8 See id. at 350. Furthermore, Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 26(c)(1) gives any person or entity from which discovery is 

sought, regardless of whether they are a named party to an action, the right 

to move for a protective order. Appellants expressly invoked Rule 26(c)(1) in 

their motion. The district court considered this motion in the Disclosure 

Order, rejected Appellants’ arguments, and compelled Appellants’ 

compliance with Lewis’s discovery requests. Thus, Appellants have standing 

to bring the instant appeal. 

C. Crime-Fraud Exception

The attorney-client privilege “exists to encourage full disclosure of 

pertinent information by clients to their attorneys.” In re Int’l Sys. & Controls 

Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1982). This privilege extends 

“to past criminal violations” because “the client, given the nature of [an] 

adversary system, has a legitimate interest in securing informed 

representation without fear of forced disclosure.” Id. However, a client “has 

no legitimate interest in seeking legal advice in planning future [or ongoing] 

criminal activities.” Id. (citation omitted). The crime-fraud exception 

vitiates attorney-client privilege if “the client consults an attorney for advice 

that will assist the client in carrying out a contemplated illegal or fraudulent 

scheme.” Id. 

The district court used a three-step analysis to determine whether the 

crime-fraud exception applied to Lewis’s discovery and deposition requests. 

In its Crime-Fraud Exception Order, it evaluated whether (1) Lewis made a 

_____________________

8 “A party commits contempt when he violates a definite and specific order of the 

court requiring him to perform or refrain from performing a particular act or acts with 

knowledge of the court’s order.” Travelhost, Inc. v. Blandford, 68 F.3d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 

1995) (citing SEC v. First Fin. Group of Tex., Inc., 659 F.2d 660, 669 (5th Cir. 1981)). 

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prima facie showing that Appellants committed a crime, (2) the privileged 

communications were held in furtherance of that crime, and (3) the 

communications were reasonably related to the fraudulent or criminal 

activity. We address each step in turn. 

i. Prima Facie Case

“In order to invoke [the crime-fraud] exception, the party seeking to 

breach the walls of privilege must make out a prima facie case.” Id. To make 

such a showing, the party must produce evidence that will satisfy the 

determination that the exception applies until contradicted or overcome by 

other evidence. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings in the Matter of Fine, 641 F.3d 

199, 203 (5th Cir. 1981). On appeal, Lewis contends that she set out a prima 

facie case that the Board utilized Appellants to violate La. R.S. 14:132(B). We 

disagree. 

To evaluate this issue, we must examine the statutory text of the 

alleged crime. Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:132(B) provides that:

Second degree injuring public records is the intentional 

removal, mutilation, destruction, alteration, falsification, or 

concealment of any record, document, or other thing, defined as 

a public record pursuant to R.S. 44:1 et seq. and required to be 

preserved in any public office or by any person or public officer 

pursuant to R.S. 44:36.

La. R.S. 14:132(B) (emphasis added). The Louisiana Public Records Act sets 

out the definition of a public record: 

All books, records, writings . . . memoranda, and papers, and all 

copies, duplicates [of such], . . . having been used, being in use, 

or prepared, possessed, or retained for use in the conduct, 

transaction, or performance of any business, transaction, work, 

duty, or function which was conducted, transacted, or 

performed by . . . order of any public body . . . are “public 

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records”, except as otherwise provided in this Chapter or the 

Constitution of Louisiana.

La. R.S. 44:1(A)(2)(a) (emphasis added). It is uncontested that the Board is 

a public body. See La. R.S. 44:1(A)(1). The Student Complaint Memo, Memo 

to File, and its supporting documents were created by the Board’s retained 

counsel, and thus likely qualify as public records unless some exception in the 

Louisiana Public Records Act applies. See La. R.S. 14:132(B). Louisiana 

courts have observed that La. R.S. 44:4.1(C) makes clear that “attorneyclient communications are an exception to the Public Records [L]aw and are 

not a public record.” Council of City of New Orleans v. Washington, 2009-

0389, p.3 n.4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/12/09), 13 So.3d 662, 664 n.4, vacated, 2009-

1067 (La. 5/29/09), 9 So.3d 854 (vacating on grounds that arguments were 

inappropriately raised for the first time on appeal); see also Talley v. La. Dep’t 

of Transp. & Dev., 2022-0983, p. 11 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/24/23), 361 So.3d 1041, 

1049 (“Records that contain privileged information, by definition, are not a 

public record.”).

Based on this persuasive authority, we conclude that the unredacted 

copies of the Student Complaint Memo, Memo to File, and supporting 

documents were not public records at the time of the alleged concealment. 

See Washington, 361 So.3d at 1049. Furthermore, Appellants correctly point 

out that the student complainant who is mentioned in the Student Complaint 

Memo and Memo to File consistently expressed that she would not consent 

to the disclosure of the unredacted report. This demonstrates that the 

documents may also be exempted from inclusion under the Public Records 

Act based on the student’s right to privacy afforded to her under Article I, 

Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution. See, e.g., E. Bank Consol. Special Serv. 

First Prot. Dist. v. Crossen, 2004-838 (La. App. 5th Cir. 12/28/04), 892 So.2d 

666, writ denied, 897 So.3d 608 (La. 2005); La. Const. art. I, § 5; La. R.S. 

44:31 (providing that the right to examine records is subject to statutory and 

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Constitutional restrictions); La. R.S. 44:4.1 (stating same); La. R.S. 

44:1(2)(a). 

Although the Public Records Act’s exceptions are to be construed

narrowly to ensure the public right of access,9 there is minimal evidence 

supporting the district court’s conclusion that the Board and Appellants 

actually concealed the documents. In its Crime-Fraud Exception Order, the 

district court stated that Board member Joe Alleva (“Alleva”) testified that 

the Board members chose to preserve the documents in the law offices of 

Taylor Porter to “stop [the Taylor Porter Investigation] from becoming 

public information.” Our close review of the record demonstrates the district 

court’s error in this determination. 

Alleva testified that he believed that the Board chose to preserve the 

unredacted copies of the documents at Taylor Porter’s offices to “protect

the name of the young lady and to stop it from becoming public information.” 

In its Crime-Fraud Exception Order, the district court shortened this 

response to only mention that the Board wished to “stop [the Taylor Porter 

investigation] from becoming public information.” This discrepancy 

between the actual testimony and the district court’s interpretation of the 

testimony raises doubt as to the correctness of its determination. See LimaRivero, 971 F.3d at 520. Beyond this inconsistency from the record, Lewis 

presented little other evidence demonstrating actual concealment of the 

alleged public records. Thus, we conclude that the district court clearly erred 

in determining that Appellants and the Board criminally concealed public 

records as contemplated under La. R.S. 14:132(B). See id.

_____________________

9 Landis v. Moreau, 2000-1157, p. 4 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So.2d 691, 694 (citing Title 

Rsch. Corp. v. Rausch, 450 So.2d 933 (1984)). 

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ii. Furtherance of a Crime or Fraud

Looking beyond the prima facie case, the district court’s ruling on the 

crime fraud exception constitutes clear error. “Under the crime-fraud 

exception to the attorney-client privilege, the privilege can be overcome 

where communication or work product is intended to further continuing or 

future criminal or fraudulent activity.” Edwards, 303 F.3d at 618 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). In other words, the 

client must have consulted their counsel “for advice that will assist the client 

in carrying out a contemplated illegal or fraudulent scheme.” In re Int’l Sys., 

693 F.2d at 1242 (citation omitted). Appellants argue that Lewis 

misrepresented a Board member’s deposition testimony to prove that the 

Board “sought legal advice from” Appellants regarding whether the storage 

of the Miles documents in Taylor Porter’s office would be a violation of La. 

R.S. 14:132(B). Thus, they argue that “Lewis has not made and cannot make 

any showing that LSU sought advice from” Appellants “for the purpose of 

furthering the crime of second degree injuring of a public record in violation 

of La. R.S. 14:132(B).”

Appellants are correct. As discussed above, the district court gave 

undue weight to the truncated version of Alleva’s testimony that it was 

presented. Beyond this strained interpretation of the deposition testimony, 

Lewis presented no evidence that the Board sought to fraudulently conceal

public records through the attorney-client relationship. Thus, we conclude 

that the district court clearly erred in determining that the Board sought 

Appellants’ counsel “for advice that w[ould] assist [it] in carrying out a 

contemplated illegal or fraudulent scheme.” See In re Int’l Sys., 693 F.2d at 

1242.

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iii. Reasonable Relationship

The district court’s determination as to the last step of the analysis 

fares no better. The third step askswhether the privileged information sought

was reasonably related to the alleged fraudulent activity. In re Grand Jury 

Subpoena, 419 F.3d at 436 (citation omitted). In its Disclosure Order, the 

district court compelled written discovery from and depositions of 

Appellants regarding the Taylor Porter Investigation because they were 

reasonably related to Lewis’s hostile work environment claims. On appeal, 

Lewis contends that it did not err in doing so. We disagree.

In In re Grand Jury Subpoena, this court determined that discovery of 

privileged communications and work product is limited to that which is 

“reasonably related to the furtherance of the ongoing or future crime or fraud 

at issue.” 419 F.3d at 347. This court has consistently rejected looser 

limitations. See id. at 346 (collecting cases); see also In re Int’l Sys., 693 F.2d 

at 1242–43 (citation omitted) (requiring “some valid relationship between 

the work product under subpoena and the prima facie violation”). Otherwise, 

“the crime-fraud exception [would] swallow[] the privilege rule.” In re 

Grand Jury Subpoena, 419 F.3d at 347. With respect to the reasonable 

relationship, Lewis did not make “the proper showing” that the documents 

are reasonably related “to the furtherance of the ongoing or future crime or

fraud.” Id. Nonetheless, the district court accepted a looser limitation on the 

scope of the reasonable relationship prong of the Crime-Fraud Exception 

analysis without detailed reasoning. Thus, the district court clearly erred in 

holding that Lewis had proven that a reasonable relationship existed between 

the documents and the alleged prima facie violation of La. R.S. 14:132(B). 

IV. Conclusion

In sum, the district court clearly erred in holding that Lewis 

established a prima facie case that the Board violated La. R.S. 14:132(B) and 

Case: 23-30386 Document: 120-1 Page: 17 Date Filed: 06/17/2024
No. 23-30386

18

that the alleged privileged communications were made in furtherance of the 

crime and reasonably related to the alleged violation. Thus, we REVERSE

the district court’s Crime-Fraud Exception Order and REMAND for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Case: 23-30386 Document: 120-1 Page: 18 Date Filed: 06/17/2024