United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-10437

____________

Isimeme Anita Horak, 

Plaintiff—Appellant, 

versus

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 

Defendant—Appellee. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:21-CV-1925

______________________________

Before Clement, Engelhardt, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) 

denied Isimeme Anita Horak’s application for naturalization after it 

determined that Horak’s marriage to her ex-husband—which she had used 

to obtain permanent resident status in the United States—was a sham. The 

district court denied Horak’s petition for judicial review. We AFFIRM. 

* * *

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 4, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 23-10437

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Horak, a Nigerian citizen, entered the United States on a six-month 

tourist visa in December 2005. In January 2006, she started a relationship 

with Cecil Lofton Jr., a United States citizen, and they married eight months 

later, in August 2006. Horak obtained Conditional Permanent Resident 

status as the spouse of a United States citizen in November 2006 and 

Permanent Resident status in May 2009. Horak filed for divorce from Lofton 

in October 2010, citing “discord or conflict of personalities.”

In December 2014, Horak applied for naturalization. USCIS flagged 

Horak’s application on suspicion of marriage fraud and, after investigation, 

determined that Horak’s marriage to Lofton was a sham. USCIS therefore 

denied Horak’s application for naturalization. After Horak requested and 

received an administrative hearing, USCIS adhered to its denial. Horak then 

petitioned for judicial review.

The district court conducted a two-day bench trial at which both 

Lofton and Horak testified. Lofton testified that he learned of Horak’s 

immigration status “after a month or two of dating” and that he married 

Horak because he “wanted to help her.” Lofton explained that, after the 

wedding, he and Horak “never lived together,” were never intimate with 

each other, and that shortly after he signed Horak’s application for 

Conditional Permanent Resident status in October 2006, the two “went 

[their] separate ways.” According to Lofton, by the time Horak filed her 

petition to remove the conditions on her residence in August 2008, Lofton 

was living with another woman—Miriam Suarez—who gave birth to the 

couple’s first child that September. Lofton and Suarez would go on to have 

two more children together and lived as a family until her death in 2020.

Horak, on the other hand, testified that she and Lofton loved each 

other, were regularly intimate, and were living together through early 2009, 

when Lofton finally revealed to Horak his relationship with Suarez and the 

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child they had together. Horak testified that she and Lofton separated in

April 2009 due to Lofton’s alleged infidelity, but she also conceded that this 

date was inconsistent with the November 2009 separation date she had listed 

in her divorce petition and that she had said nothing about any infidelity in 

her divorce petition or in her initial interviews with USCIS.

Ruling from the bench, the district court explained that it found 

Horak’s testimony “not to be credible” and determined that Horak was 

ineligible for naturalization because she had engaged in a sham marriage.

1

On appeal, Horak does not contest the legal basis for the district 

court’s ruling. Nor could she. To be eligible for naturalization, Horak was 

required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence2 that, among other 

requirements, she was “lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 

U.S.C. § 1427(a). Horak had been granted permanent residence by virtue of 

her status as an “alien spouse,” i.e., the spouse of a United States citizen. See 

8 U.S.C. § 1186a. However, a “marriage that is entered into for the primary 

purpose of circumventing the immigration laws, referred to as a fraudulent 

or sham marriage, has not been recognized as enabling an alien spouse to 

obtain immigration benefits.” Brown v. Napolitano, 391 F. App’x 346, 351 

_____________________

1 The court also held that Horak was ineligible for naturalization because she had 

submitted false statements in support of her application. However, because we find no clear 

error in the district court’s determination that Horak was not lawfully admitted for 

permanent residence in the United States, we need not and do not address this alternative

basis for denying Horak’s petition.

2 Horak claims that, despite the fact that the parties both used the preponderanceof-the-evidence standard in their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and that 

the district court repeatedly stated it was applying the preponderance-of-the-evidence 

standard during its oral ruling, “in reality, [the district court] applied [the] beyond a 

reasonable doubt standard.” We see nothing in the record substantiating Horak’s argument 

and therefore reject it. See Barto v. Shore Const., LLC, 801 F.3d 465, 471–72 (5th Cir. 2015)

(rejecting argument that district court “somehow sua spontesettled upon an incorrect legal 

standard” “[u]pon a review of the entire record”). 

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(5th Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Laureano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2 (B.I.A. 1983)).

So, if the district court correctly concluded that Horak’s marriage to Lofton 

was a sham, then she was not “lawfully admitted to the United States for 

permanent residence” and was therefore ineligible for naturalization. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1429.

Horak disagrees with the district court’s finding that her marriage was 

a sham, arguing that the district court should have credited her testimony 

over that of Lofton. But the district court’s determination that Horak’s 

marriage was a sham is a finding of fact that we review for clear error. Luwisch 

v. Am. Marine Corp., 956 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 2020); see also Al-Saadoon v. 

Lynch, 816 F.3d 1012, 1014 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Hovsepian, 359 

F.3d 1144, 1165 (9th Cir. 2004). And where, as here, “a trial judge’s [factual] 

finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more 

witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that 

is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally 

inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error.” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 

470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). 

Horak has not established that Lofton’s facially plausible story is 

contradicted by extrinsic evidence or that the district court’s credibility 

finding is internally inconsistent. Instead, she simply asks this court to 

reweigh the evidence presented at trial, which we will not do. See Deloach 

Marine Servs., LLC v. Marquette Transp. Co., 974 F.3d 601, 607 (5th Cir. 

2020) (“[W]e employ a strong presumption that the [district] court’s 

findings must be sustained even though this court might have weighed the 

evidence differently.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

AFFIRMED.

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