[Cite as In re R.W., 2014-Ohio-1950.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 100158

IN RE: R.W.

A Minor Child 

JUDGMENT: 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Juvenile Division 

Case No. DL-12120828 

BEFORE: Rocco, J., Boyle, A.J., and S. Gallagher, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 8, 2014 

-i- 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 

Brooke M. Burns 

Sheryl Trzaska 

Office of the Ohio Public Defender 

250 East Broad Street 

Suite 1400 

Columbus, OH 43215 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 

For State of Ohio

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Carl Mazzone 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

The Justice Center 

1200 Ontario Street - 9th Floor 

Cleveland, OH 44113 
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J.: 

{¶1} In this appeal we are asked whether R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g), a firearm 

specification sentencing provision, is applicable to juvenile offenders who are charged 

with firearm specifications. For the reasons that follow, the answer is no. Because the 

juvenile court in this case entered its disposition on the mistaken belief that R.C. 

2929.14(B)(1)(g) applied, we reverse and remand the juvenile court’s order. 

{¶2} Following a trial, seventeen-year-old appellant, R.W. was adjudicated 

delinquent on two counts of felonious assault (R.C. 2903.11(A)(2)) with one- and 

three-year firearm specifications attaching to each count (R.C. 2941.141; R.C. 2941.145). 

{¶3} On June 19, 2013, the juvenile court committed R.W. to the Ohio Department 

of Youth Services (“ODYS”) for a minimum period of one year on each felonious assault 

offense, to be served concurrently. The juvenile court also committed R.W. to one year 

on each of the three-year firearm specifications. The juvenile court ordered that the two 

firearm specifications merged, and that the time would run consecutively with and prior 

to the felonious assault commitment. There was no additional time imposed for the 

one-year firearm specification. In total, R.W. would be committed for two years. 

{¶4} But on June 26, 2013, the juvenile court “reopened” R.W.’s disposition and 

held a second hearing. At that hearing, the juvenile court informed the parties that it 

“was brought to his attention” that our decision in State v. Vanderhorst, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 97242, 2013-Ohio-1785, necessitated a change to R.W.’s disposition. 
Specifically, the juvenile court told the parties that because R.W. was adjudicated 

delinquent on two counts of felonious assault, that R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) required the 

court to impose multiple and consecutive commitments for the most serious firearm 

specifications, and that the statute permitted the court to impose additional commitments 

on the lower specifications as well. 

{¶5} The juvenile court then vacated its earlier disposition and entered a new 

disposition. As in the previous disposition, R.W. was committed to the ODYS for a 

minimum period of one year on each felonious assault offense, to be served concurrently. 

 The juvenile court removed the language from the previous entry regarding merger and 

instead noted that R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) required the imposition of two consecutive 

commitments for the three-year firearm specifications under R.C. 2941.145. R.W. was 

committed to one year on the first three-year firearm specification and to one year on the 

second three-year firearm specification. These periods of commitment would run 

consecutive to one another and consecutive to the one year for the underlying offenses. 

Once again, there was no additional time imposed for the one-year firearm specifications. 

Under the new disposition, R.W. was committed for a total of three years. 

{¶6} R.W. filed a notice of appeal, setting forth a single assignment of error for 

our review: 

The juvenile court erred when it found that State v. Vanderhorst, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 97242, 2013-Ohio-1785 and R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) required 

it to commit R.W. to ODYS for multiple, consecutive terms for firearm 

specifications under R.C. 2941.145. 

For the reasons that follow, we sustain the assignment of error. 
{¶7} Under R.C. 2152.19(A)(4), a juvenile court has broad discretion in crafting 

a disposition for a child adjudicated delinquent. In re D.S., 111 Ohio St.3d 361, 

2006-Ohio-5851, 856 N.E.2d 921, ¶ 6. We review a juvenile court’s disposition for an 

abuse of discretion. Id. 

{¶8} R.C. 2929.14(B) is Ohio’s adult felony sentencing statute. See State v. 

D.H., 169 Ohio App.3d 798, 2006-Ohio-6953, 865 N.E.2d 90, ¶ 70 (10th Dist.). When a 

trial court sentences an adult felony offender, the court must impose an additional 

three-year prison term if the offender “had a firearm on or about [his] person or under 

[his] control while committing the offense and displayed the firearm, brandished the 

firearm, indicated that [he] possessed the firearm, or used it to facilitate the offense.” 

R.C. 2941.145(A); R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a). 

{¶9} Generally, when a defendant is indicted on multiple firearm specifications, 

those specifications must be merged at sentencing if the offenses were committed as part 

of the same transaction. R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b). But in Vanderhorst, we 

acknowledged that the legislature carved out an exception as set forth in R.C. 

2929.14(B)(1)(g). The statute provides as follows: 

If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to two or more felonies, if one 

or more of those felonies are aggravated murder, murder, attempted 

aggravated murder, attempted murder, aggravated robbery, felonious 

assault, or rape, and if the offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a 

[firearm] specification * * * in connection with two or more of the felonies, 

the sentencing court shall impose on the offender the prison term specified 

under division (B)(1)(a) of this section for each of the two most serious 

specifications of which the offender is convicted or to which the offender 

pleads guilty and, in its discretion, also may impose on the offender the 
prison term specified under that division for any or all of the remaining 

specifications. 

{¶10} In Vanderhorst, the defendant was convicted on multiple counts of 

kidnapping, aggravated robbery, attempted murder, and felonious assault, as well as 

firearm specifications. Vanderhorst, 2013-Ohio-1785, at ¶ 1. We concluded that under 

R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g), the trial court was required to impose consecutive prison terms for 

the two most serious firearm specifications, and that the merger rule did not apply. Id. at 

¶ 11. 

{¶11} In the instant case, if R.W. were an adult, there would be no question that 

Vanderhorst and R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) would apply. But R.W. is not an adult, and 

there is no authority for applying R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) to his case. That provision is 

part of the adult felony sentencing statute, and nowhere does it state that it applies to 

juveniles. 

{¶12} In contrast, R.C. 2941.145(C) provides that the firearm specification 

provision “may be used in a delinquent child proceeding in the manner and for the 

purpose described in section 2152.17 of the Revised Code.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 

2941.145(C). Accordingly, R.C. 2152.17, not R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g), governs 

commitments for firearm specifications in juvenile cases. 

{¶13} In the instant case, the juvenile court’s only stated reason for vacating its 

original disposition and entering the new one was its belief that it was required to comply 

with R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) as set forth in Vanderhorst. The trial court abused its 
discretion in basing the disposition on this body of law, because it is inapplicable to a 

juvenile disposition. Accordingly, we sustain the sole assignment of error. 

{¶14} But we also conclude that application of R.C. 2152.17 could lead to the 

same result that was reached by the juvenile court in this case. Under R.C. 

2152.17(A)(2), if the juvenile court finds that a R.C. 2941.145 firearm specification 

applies, then “the court shall commit the child to the department of youth services for the 

specification for a definite period of not less than one and not more than three years,” in 

addition to the commitment for the underlying offense. Under R.C. 2152.17(E): 

The court shall not commit a child to the legal custody of the department of 

youth services for a specification pursuant to this section for a period that 

exceeds five years for any one delinquent act. Any commitment imposed 

pursuant to division (A), (B), (C), or (D)(1) of this section shall be in 

addition to, and shall be served consecutively with and prior to, a period of 

commitment ordered under this chapter for the underlying delinquent act, 

and each commitment imposed pursuant to division (A), (B), (C), or (D)(1) 

of this section shall be in addition to, and shall be served consecutively 

with, any other period of commitment imposed under those divisions. If a 

commitment is imposed under division (A) or (B) of this section and a 

commitment also is imposed under division (C) of this section, the period 

imposed under division (A) or (B) of this section shall be served prior to the 

period imposed under division (C) of this section. 

(Emphasis added.) According to R.C. 2152.17(E), if a juvenile offender is adjudicated 

delinquent for multiple firearm specifications, the terms of commitment for those firearm 

specifications must run consecutively to each other, as well as consecutively to the 

underlying delinquent act.1

 

 1

Furthermore, under R.C. 2152.17(F), the juvenile court has discretion in this case to order 

that each of the underlying felonious assault commitments run consecutive to each other as well. 
{¶15} In the instant case, R.W. was adjudicated delinquent on two counts of 

felonious assault with one- and three-year firearm specifications attaching to each count. 

On remand, the trial court is instructed to enter a new disposition in accordance with R.C. 

2152.17(E) and (F). 

{¶16} This cause is reversed and remanded to the lower court for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

________________________________________ 

KENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE 

MARY J. BOYLE, A.J., and 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR