United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Secretary of Defense

September 1995 UNMANNED AERIAL

VEHICLES

Maneuver System

Schedule Includes

Unnecessary Risk

GAO/NSIAD-95-161

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-260440 

September 15, 1995

The Honorable William J. Perry

The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We are currently reviewing the Joint Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

(UAV) program, including (1) the Hunter UAV system; (2) a variant of the

Hunter, referred to as the Maneuver system; and (3) another Hunter

variant for shipboard use. These systems are expected to cost about

$4.2 billion.

We are issuing this interim report to bring to your attention certain aspects

of the program status and the Joint Tactical UAV Project Office’s proposed

acquisition strategy for the Maneuver system that we believe will

unnecessarily increase the Department of Defense’s (DOD) risk on the

program.

Background Both the Hunter and Maneuver UAVs are intended to perform

reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and other military

missions by flying over enemy territory and transmitting imagery back to

ground stations for use by commanders. The Maneuver UAV, formerly

called the Close-Range UAV, is to be smaller and have less range capability

than the Hunter. The Maneuver UAV is to be used by Army and Marine

Corps units operating in the forward battle area.

Each Maneuver system is to include four air vehicles and a downsized

version of ground support equipment used with the Hunter. The ground

support equipment is already being developed, and development of the

Maneuver air vehicle, which is to include a low-rate production phase, is

planned to start about September 1995.

Results in Brief Past UAV acquisition programs have been marked by premature entry into

production that resulted in extensive and costly system redesigns in

attempting to achieve acceptable system performance. Nevertheless, the

Joint Tactical UAV Project Office plans to begin production of the

Maneuver system without adequate assurance that it can meet operational

performance requirements. As a result, DOD will again risk becoming

committed to acquiring an unsatisfactory system.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-95-161 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
B-260440 

Adverse Impact of

Premature Production

on Other UAV

Systems

Despite the importance of operational testing as a management control to

ensure adequate system performance, DOD started producing two UAVs, the

Pioneer and more recently the Hunter, before subjecting them to any

operational testing. (See figs. 1 and 2.) These two systems, both acquired

as nondevelopmental items1

 from the same foreign contractor, clearly

illustrate the adverse consequences of beginning production without

having adequate assurance of satisfactory system performance. For

example, premature production of the Pioneer resulted in a doubling of

the costs for the nine acquired systems that do not meet service

requirements. DOD has also spent $627 million to acquire and support

seven Hunter systems that are experiencing problems and an uncertain

future.

Figure 1: Pioneer UAV

1

Nondevelopmental item means any item that is (1) commercially available, (2) in use by a U.S. agency

or foreign government with which the United States has a mutual defense cooperation agreement, or

(3) any of the items in (1) or (2) that require only minor modification.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-161 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
B-260440 

Figure 2: Hunter UAV

Importance of Operational

Testing

Operational testing is DOD’s primary means of evaluating weapon system

performance in a combat representative environment. It is supposed to be

structured to determine a system’s operational effectiveness and

suitability2

 and to determine if the minimum acceptable operational

performance requirements have been satisfied.

Thus, operational testing can be an effective internal control over the

acquisition process to ensure that DOD managers have adequate knowledge

2

Operational effectiveness refers to the ability of a system to accomplish its mission in the planned

operational environment. Suitability is the degree to which a system can be placed satisfactorily in

field use considering such factors as reliability and maintainability.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-161 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
B-260440 

about a system’s performance before authorizing production. If used

effectively, it can minimize the risk of producing a defective system that

later requires costly redesign and retrofit to achieve satisfactory

performance.

Experience With Pioneer DOD did not use operational testing as an effective internal control over the

Pioneer acquisition and later paid the consequences. Because Pioneer’s

predecessors had been used successfully by Israeli forces, the Navy

procured the Pioneer without testing it and deployed the system to

operational forces. As we reported in 1990,3

 numerous problems ensued

that led the Navy to redesign and modify virtually the entire system at a

cost of about $50 million. These redesign and modification costs about

matched the Navy’s cost of $56 million to initially procure its nine systems.

Four years after the initial procurement, the Navy was still buying

replacement hardware, such as completely modified air vehicles, to bring

Pioneer systems up to a minimum essential level of performance. Despite

this effort, Pioneer was assessed as being unable to meet service

requirements. So, DOD started acquiring the Short-Range Joint Tactical UAV,

now called Hunter.

Experience With Hunter Undeterred by the experience with Pioneer, DOD has also started

production of Hunter without subjecting it to operational testing. As a

result, DOD has so far spent $627 million acquiring and supporting a faulty

system whose future is uncertain.

In 1992, we reported4

 that DOD’s plans to start the Hunter system’s

production before operational testing would result in premature

commitment to production of an unproven system. We recommended that

the Secretary of Defense require that limited production be deferred until

realistic operational testing provided reasonable assurance that the system

would perform satisfactorily. DOD disagreed, maintaining that the system

had already been tested sufficiently to warrant a commitment to

production. Accordingly, in February 1993, DOD awarded a $171 million

contract for production of 7 systems with 56 air vehicles.

3

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Realistic Testing Needed Before Production of Short-Range System

(GAO/NSIAD-90-234, Sept. 28, 1990).

4

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: More Testing Needed Before Production of Short-Range System

(GAO/NSIAD-92-311, Sept. 4, 1992).

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-161 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
B-260440 

Since then, the system has undergone some 180 major hardware and

software design changes in an attempt to solve its performance problems.

The system has been grounded for much of the time and government

acceptance of the first production system was delayed for almost 1 year

because of the system’s inability to pass tests. DOD finally accepted the

system in April 1995 but only after granting numerous waivers to contract

specifications and performance requirements. Meanwhile, the program is

still being restructured to allow additional time for enhancing the system’s

chances for passing operational tests.

Unnecessary Risk on

Maneuver Program

Despite this history, the Joint Tactical UAV Project Office is planning to

begin a 3-year development program for the Maneuver system in fiscal

year 1995 that includes starting low-rate production before the system’s

performance is proven in operational testing. The low-rate production is

scheduled to begin in fiscal year 1997 and is to include manufacture of 

6 systems, including 24 air vehicles, that are not needed for operational

testing. Further increasing the risk on the Maneuver program is the fact

that the system is to use a downsized version of Hunter ground support

equipment as well as Hunter software that is so far unproven. Moreover,

the development program is also to include manufacture of 5 prototype

Maneuver systems with 20 air vehicles. Three of these systems with 12 air

vehicles are to be production-representative and could be used for

operational testing before beginning low-rate production.

Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of Defense change the Maneuver

system’s acquisition strategy to require that sufficient operational testing

be conducted before the start of low-rate production. The purpose of this

change is to demonstrate that without any major or costly design changes,

the system can achieve its primary mission and meet requirements for

performance and suitability.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD cited various tests identified

in the Maneuver system’s proposed acquisition strategy and stated that it

would ensure that sufficient testing occurs to demonstrate satisfactory

performance before low-rate production. However, DOD stopped short of

committing to have the system undergo operational testing before low-rate

production. We believe that operational testing can be used as a

management control to ensure that the Maneuver system meets its key

performance parameters before a production commitment. We, therefore,

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-161 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
B-260440 

affirm our recommendation. DOD comments are presented in their entirety

in appendix I along with our evaluation of them.

Scope and

Methodology

Our evaluation included an examination of the Joint Tactical UAV Project

Office plans and proposed schedule for acquiring the Maneuver System.

We also discussed the program with officials of the Joint Tactical UAV

Project Office in Huntsville, Alabama, and the UAV Joint Project Office in

Washington, D.C. We conducted our work from March 1995 to May 1995 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional

committees; the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy; the Commandant of

the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We

will make copies available to others on request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were Jack Guin,

Mark Lambert, John S. Warren, and Charles A. Ward.

Sincerely yours,

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Systems Development

 and Production Issues

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-161 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-161 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of

Defense.

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-161 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of

Defense.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-161 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of

Defense.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-161 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of

Defense.

See comment 3.

See comment 7.

See comment 8.

See comment 4.

See comment 9.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-161 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of

Defense.

See comment 4.

See comment 4.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-161 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of

Defense.

The following are GAO’s comments to the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

letter dated July 10, 1995.

GAO Comments 1. Although the Navy maintains the Pioneer was procured as an interim

system, this does not negate the need to test prior to procurement. The

testing referenced by DOD occurred after the Navy had procured the

Pioneer. When the testing revealed problems, the Navy employed a costly

trial-and-error effort trying to overcome the problems. The necessary

changes included a modified engine, new foam-filled wings so that crashed

vehicles could float until salvaged, a new landing recovery system, new

flight control software, and a new propeller. DOD records reveal that in the

4 years following initial procurement, the Navy spent $28 million in

research and development funds and an additional $22 million in

procurement funds for replacement hardware trying to get Pioneer’s

performance up to the minimum essential level.

2. The legislative history of the 1988 National Defense Appropriations Act

shows that Congress limited procurement of Pioneer to foster

commonality among service Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) programs. As

we reported in a December 1988 report on UAVs (GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR, Dec. 9,

1988), during fiscal year 1988 budget proceedings, Congress refused to

authorize funding for procurement of separate Navy and Army short-range

systems and provided that funds were available only for a joint program.

This led to curtailment of Pioneer and initiation of the Short-Range UAV

program, now called Hunter.

3. Although originally scheduled for 1992, the Hunter system has not

undergone any operational testing, which is now scheduled for 1997.

Hunter tests that most resembled operational testing were called “limited

user tests.” Even so, these tests did not qualify as operational tests. First,

the system was maintained by contractor technicians during the tests

rather than by military personnel expected to maintain the system when

deployed. Thus, use of the contractor technicians detracted from the

realism of the tests. Also, DOD and the Army’s test agencies stated they

could not fully evaluate the test results because of a lack of performance

criteria. For 81 of 97 measures of performance established for the tests,

the test agencies only gathered related test data because no performance

criteria were established for evaluation purposes; that is, the system could

not be judged as having passed or failed the tests. These tests and the

developmental testing were not an adequate basis for starting Hunter’s

low-rate production because the testing was not intended to evaluate the

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-161 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of

Defense.

system’s effectiveness and suitability in a realistic operational

environment.

4. As currently planned, the tests to be done before low-rate production

will include various developmental tests and limited user tests similar to

those conducted on Hunter. In our view, these tests will not be an

adequate basis for committing the Maneuver system to production. See

comment 3.

5. We could identify no information in these DOD comments that conflicts

with or refutes what we said about the acquisition of Pioneer. See

comment 1.

6. The Pioneer’s performance in Desert Storm was not without problems.

For example, according to after action reports, Pioneer’s lack of reliability

resulted in excessive maintenance and support requirements. Further,

electromagnetic interference from other systems caused crashes in some

cases and sometimes prevented video imagery from being transmitted to

the ground control station so it could be used. The system was also too

slow to keep up with mechanized forces and was determined to have

inadequate range and endurance. Among other problems, Pioneer also

encountered difficulties when trying to fly in the rain and required lengthy

improved runways for operations.

7. The instability of Hunter’s design, as evidenced by the 176 significant

modifications referred to by DOD, convinces us that the system had not

demonstrated its readiness for production. The many deficiencies detected

in acceptance testing of the first of the seven production systems and the

numerous waivers to specifications and performance requirements,

despite the many design changes, are further evidence that Hunter was not

ready for production. We would also point out that DOD recently granted

numerous waivers in accepting the second of the seven systems.

8. We believe that these controls could be strengthened by requiring the

system to demonstrate satisfactory performance during operational testing

before the production commitment.

9. Our report does not criticize the planned use of downsized Hunter

ground support equipment and software with the Maneuver system. Our

point is that the downsized version is based on Hunter’s unproven and

rapidly changing design, which reinforces the need for adequate

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-161 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of

Defense.

operational testing of the Maneuver system before the production

commitment.

(707097) Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-161 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
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