COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Coleman and Senior Judge Cole 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

CLARENCE JUNIOR THOMAS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1690-96-2 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

 APRIL 22, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 

James E. Kulp, Judge 

 (H. Pratt Cook, III, on briefs), for 

appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General; 

Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on 

brief. 

 Clarence Junior Thomas appeals his sentence for operating a 

motor vehicle after having been declared an habitual offender. 

Thomas argues that the trial court coerced his waiver of his 

presentence report and that consequently, it is in the best 

interests of justice to remand his case for re-sentencing. 

Holding that Thomas failed to properly preserve this issue for 

appeal and that the ends of justice nor good cause shown justify 

waiver of the Rule 5A:18 bar, we affirm. 

 On April 9, 1996, Thomas pled guilty to operating a motor 

vehicle after having been declared an habitual offender (second 

offense). At the conclusion of his trial, Thomas requested that 

a presentence report be completed. The report was ordered, and 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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Thomas was released on bond with a return date of June 11, 1996. 

 On June 4, 1996, Probation Officer Patricia A. Shaw, in a 

letter to the trial judge, stated: 

 This Officer was assigned to complete the 

Presentence Report on April 16, 1996, and a 

social history questionnaire was mailed to 

the subject's residence on that same date. 

Although several attempts were made to reach 

the subject, this Officer did not have any 

contact with the subject until May 21, 1996. 

 The subject telephoned the district office 

and an appointment was scheduled that day, 

for any time except between 12:00 and 1:00. 

The subject arrived at the district office at 

12:00 and did not have the social history 

questionnaire completed. He was told he 

could remain at the district office to 

complete the questionnaire and this Officer 

would see him after 1:00, but he was not able 

to wait. This Officer was going to be in 

training for the remainder of the week, so 

the subject was given an appointment for May 

28, 1996, and was told to bring in the 

completed questionnaire. On May 28, 1996, 

the subject did report to the district 

office, however, he had only filled out the 

first three (3) pages of the questionnaire. 

Some information was obtained from the 

subject and the remaining portion of the 

questionnaire was returned to the subject, 

with instructions to complete the same and 

return prior to his sentencing date. 

Requests for verifications were sent out, but 

none have been returned to date, thus the 

Presentence Report will not be completed as 

ordered. 

 On June 11, 1996, Thomas appeared for sentencing but after 

learning that his presentence report had not been filed, he 

requested the court grant a continuance until such time as the 

report could be completed. After reviewing Shaw's letter, the 

court stated that "[t]he letter seems to indicate that it's the 

fault of the defendant [that the report wasn't completed], 
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doesn't it?" Thomas' counsel proffered that many of Thomas' 

relatives had been out of town which caused some difficulty in 

completing the questionnaire and that as of the time of the 

hearing, Shaw had all the information required to complete the 

report. The following exchange then occurred between the Court 

and Thomas' counsel: 

 The Court: All right, Mr. Cook, I'm willing to 

continue the matter for the 

presentence report, but I'm going 

to revoke Mr. Thomas' bond. 

 Mr. Cook: Your Honor, may I have a second to 

talk to Mr. Thomas to see if he 

would like to proceed? 

 The Court: All right, because this matter 

occurred in November and this 

matter is going to be over. We're 

not putting it off any further. 

 Mr. Cook: Yes, Judge. May I have an 

opportunity to talk to him to see 

if he would like to proceed today 

on sentencing? 

 The Court: All right. 

 Mr. Cook: Your Honor, in light of that, Mr. 

Thomas would like to proceed with 

sentencing. 

 Thomas' assertion that the trial court coerced his waiver of 

the presentence report is raised for the first time on appeal. 

At no time during the sentencing hearing was the trial judge 

asked to vacate Thomas' sentence because of a coerced waiver of 

the presentence report nor was any other indication made to the 

trial court that Thomas waived under duress. Rule 5A:18 provides 

that "[n]o ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as 
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a basis for reversal unless the objection was stated together 

with the grounds therefor at the time of the ruling . . . ." 

McQuinn v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 753, 755, 460 S.E.2d 624, 

626 (1995) (en banc). Having failed to properly raise the issue 

at trial, Rule 5A:18 bars Thomas from raising this argument now 

except for good cause shown or to meet the ends of justice. 

 The record establishes that Thomas was made aware of his 

unequivocal right to have a presentence report completed and 

submitted to the court prior to his being sentenced. He was also 

made aware that the sentencing guidelines had been completed and 

that a recommendation of thirteen months, a period only slightly 

greater than the one year minimum, had been made. Thomas was 

informed that the trial judge and the Commonwealth were willing 

to proceed with only the guidelines if Thomas was willing to 

waive the presentence report. 

 "Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right 

with both knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish 

it." Sink v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 544, 547, 413 S.E.2d 658, 

660 (1992). Here, Thomas waived his right to a presentence 

report after being informed that it was the court's intention to 

revoke his bond in the event that the court granted Thomas' 

request for a continuance. It is undisputed on the record that 

Thomas was aware of his right and that he had the necessary 

intent when he waived that right. That Thomas was required to 

decide if he wished to waive his presentence report does not 

amount to coercion, even where the trial court announced that it 
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would revoke bond in the event that the continuance was granted. 

 "Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional 

dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the 

Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him 

to choose." Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), sentence 

vacated, 408 U.S. 941 (1972). Had Thomas decided to await the 

presentence report, the trial court's decision to revoke Thomas' 

bond on that basis would have been subject to immediate appeal. 

 Because the record does not show any obvious miscarriage of 

justice, neither the ends of justice nor good cause permit waiver 

of the Rule 5A:18 bar. Commonwealth v. Mounce, 4 Va. App. 433, 

436, 357 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1987). Accordingly, we do not reach 

the only issue raised by Thomas on brief and affirm. 

 Affirmed.