IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15–1456

Filed June 30, 2017

DAKOTA, MINNESOTA & EASTERN RAILROAD 

d/b/a CANADIAN PACIFIC,

Plaintiff,

vs.

IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR LOUISA COUNTY,

Defendant.

Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Louisa County, Michael J. 

Schilling, Judge.

The owner of a railroad right-of-way and bridge challenges a 

district court order finding it in contempt for violating a 1977 judgment 

imposing an injunction against a prior owner of the right-of-way and 

bridge. WRIT SUSTAINED; CONTEMPT ORDER VACATED. 

Kerry A. Finley and Nancy J. Penner of Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, 

P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, and Daniel P. Kitchen, Washington, for plaintiff.

William Scott Power of Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Engberg & 

Helling, P.L.C., Burlington, for defendant.
2

HECHT, Justice.

An injunction was issued by judgment in 1977 against the owner 

of a railroad right-of-way directing it to reconstruct a dike designed to 

channel creek water under the railroad’s bridge and away from adjacent 

farmland. Nearly forty years later, a drainage district that was joined as 

a defendant in the earlier litigation asked the district court to hold a 

subsequent purchaser of the right-of-way in contempt for willfully 

violating the injunction. The district court found the subsequent 

purchaser in contempt for failing to reconstruct and maintain the dike. 

In this certiorari proceeding, we must determine whether a 1977 

judgment granting an injunction of unspecified duration against a former 

owner of the right-of-way is enforceable nearly forty years later through a 

contempt action against a subsequent purchaser. Because we conclude 

the 1977 judgment expired under Iowa Code section 614.1(6) (2013) 

before this proceeding to enforce it was commenced, we sustain the writ 

and vacate the decision of the district court. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background.

A. Whiskey Creek and Bridge 110. Dakota, Minnesota & 

Eastern Railroad (DM&E) purchased the railroad right-of-way and bridge 

that is the subject of this dispute in 2008. Initially owned by the 

Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad (CRI&P), the right-of-way runs in 

a generally east–west direction through Muscatine and Louisa Counties 

in Eastern Iowa. In 1872, CRI&P built a bridge in Louisa County, 

referred to in the record as Bridge 110,1 to allow the railroad tracks to 

1The record also refers to Bridge 110 as Bridge 2187, the internal identification 

number of DM&E.

 
3

pass over Whiskey Creek,2 a natural stream flowing east from the 

Mississippi River bluffs, along the northern edge of the right-of-way, past 

Bridge 110, and into the Muscatine Slough.3 At times in the past, a dike 

turned the creek water under Bridge 110 and across farmland to the 

south until it drained into the Muscatine Slough. 

B. The Drainage Problem. In the 145 years since Bridge 110 was 

constructed, the creek water has not consistently passed under the 

bridge and drained to the south. Whiskey Creek “has a steep grade” as it 

leaves the bluffs. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Lynch, 163 Iowa 283, 

285, 143 N.W. 1083, 1084 (1913). Especially during heavy rains, it 

carries significant quantities of sediment and debris that plug the 

channel under Bridge 110, causing water to flood and damage fields 

north of the bridge. In addition, the dike constructed to direct water 

under the bridge has repeatedly failed, causing water and debris to move 

parallel to the bridge, instead of under it, until it eventually drained into 

the slough. 

Silt and debris flowing through Whiskey Creek are deposited in the 

Muscatine Slough, inhibiting the flow of water into and through that 

2References to this waterway in the record designate it alternatively as “Whiskey 

Creek,” “Whisky Creek,” “Whiskey Hollow Creek,” and “Indian Creek.” Because the 

parties generally use the name “Whiskey Creek,” we also use this name for purposes of 

this certiorari action. 

3The Muscatine Slough is a closed drainage system maintained by the drainage 

district. It runs fourteen miles from the City of Muscatine in the north to a Louisa 

County pumping station in the south. It is fed by subditches and by creeks such as 

Whiskey Creek carrying runoff from nearby farm and timberland. In recent years, 

water from the City of Muscatine’s storm sewers has also been pumped into the 

Muscatine Slough. 

The Muscatine Slough is maintained by Drainage District No. 13. Organized in 

1909, Drainage District No. 13 is responsible for maintaining drainage ditches, 

subditches, and settling basins in Muscatine and Louisa Counties. Bridge 110 is 

located within the district. 

 
4

waterway. Over the course of a season or occasionally after a single 

substantial rain, the silt and debris plug the Muscatine Slough, causing 

water to flood and damage crops in fields north of the plugs. The 

drainage district has repeatedly cleared the plugs and enabled the water 

to again empty into the slough.4 

C. Prior Drainage Litigation. The responsibility for maintaining 

drainage in the vicinity of Bridge 110 and the surrounding area within 

the drainage district has been a subject of recurring litigation for more 

than a century. In 1907, CRI&P closed the channel under Bridge 110, 

which had gradually been filling with sediment and debris, forcing the 

creek water to change course and travel east, parallel to the right-of-way. 

Id. at 286, 143 N.W.2d at 1084. As a consequence of this change in the 

channel of the creek, land to the north of the railroad right-of-way 

occasionally flooded. Id. 

1. 1911 injunction. In 1911, CRI&P filed an action against 

landowners on both sides of the bridge, seeking a declaration that CRI&P 

was no longer obligated to maintain the flow of water under Bridge 110 

because the natural flow of Whiskey Creek had changed.5 Chi., 

Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Lynch, No. 6304, at *2 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Sept. 16, 

1911). The district court ruled against CRI&P, determining the natural 

flow of Whiskey Creek remained through the railroad’s right-of-way and 

4The parties dispute the frequency with which the drainage district has 

undertaken this task. The direct testimony of a drainage district trustee suggested the 

slough needs cleaning after every hard rain. On cross-examination, however, the 

trustee testified that the drainage district typically cleans out the slough once per year 

as part of its annual maintenance of the slough. 

5The drainage district intervened in the litigation but its claim was dismissed on 

the ground that no right or equity of the district was at issue in the litigation between 

the railroad and the private landowners. See Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Lynch, No. 

6304, at *2 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Sept. 16, 1911); see also Lynch, 163 Iowa at 289, 143 N.W. 

at 1086 (affirming district court’s dismissal).

 
5

to the south under Bridge 110. Id. The district court ordered CRI&P and 

the landowner to the south of the railroad’s right-of-way to promptly,

remove from the old bed of said creek on their respective 

lands all obstructions to the natural flow of the water down 

and through [Bridge 110], and [directed they] shall not 

further or hereafter permit upon their respective properties 

such conditions of obstruction to exist[ ] and [shall] take 

such steps and perform such acts as will in a proper manner 

provide against the further or future diversion from its 

natural channel [under Bridge 110].

Id. at *3. We affirmed the district court’s decision, but modified it to 

allow CRI&P and the owner of the land south of the bridge ninety days to 

remove the obstructions to the free flow of water through their 

properties. Lynch, 163 Iowa at 289–90, 143 N.W. at 1086.

2. 1922 covenant restriction. In 1922, Lynch—the owner of land 

situated northwest of the railroad’s right-of-way—conveyed land to 

CRI&P to be used for the fortification of the dike directing water under 

the railroad’s bridge. The deed from Lynch to CRI&P included the 

following conditional language: 

This Deed made on the further condition that [CRI&P] will at 

all times protect and compensate the Grantor, M.F. Lynch, 

his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns for failure to 

reasonably maintain a channel of sufficient capacity to give 

free flow to the water under the ordinary conditions, and to 

be of no less capacity than the channel of Whiskey Hollow 

Creek immediately above and below where said Creek 

channel enters and leaves the property of [CRI&P]. 

CRI&P maintained the course of Whiskey Creek under Bridge 110 

for several decades thereafter by maintaining the dike that turned the 

flow south and under the bridge, raising the elevation of the rails, and 

repeatedly dredging the creek bed southeast of Bridge 110. The dike 

occasionally ruptured, however, and in 1973, CRI&P stopped repairing it. 

3. 1976 judgment. Another lawsuit—cause no. 14926—was 

commenced in 1973. The plaintiffs, the Downers and the Baars, who 
6

owned property northwest of Bridge 110 sued Dutton, the owner of land 

on the north and south side of the railroad right-of-way. The plaintiffs 

alleged Dutton had built a dike south of Bridge 110 and redirected the 

flow of Whiskey Creek across Dutton’s land to the east, instead of to the 

south. This redirection of the creek, the plaintiffs alleged, caused the 

railroad’s dike to fail, the former creek bed south of Bridge 110 to again 

fill with sand and silt, and the plaintiffs’ land to flood. The Downers and 

the Baars sought damages for the flooding and a permanent injunction 

precluding Dutton’s further obstruction of the natural flow of the creek 

south of Bridge 110. CRI&P intervened in the action, asserting its own 

claim for damages and injunctive relief against Dutton for causing 

Whiskey Creek to back up and damage the dike. The Downers and the 

Baars then added a claim for injunctive relief mandating that CRI&P 

maintain the dike and later added the drainage district as a defendant, 

seeking injunctive relief against that entity as well. 

In late 1976, the district court issued its findings of fact and 

conclusions of law. The court concluded the railroad’s right-of-way 

impeded the natural flow of water to the south and east according to the 

laws of gravitation, and instead redirected it to the north and east along 

the right-of-way. The court determined the railroad, by constructing an 

elevated right-of-way, assumed an obligation “not to obstruct the free 

passage of surface water.” This obligation, the court concluded, requires 

a passageway that is “reasonably sufficient for the passage of water[,] 

taking into consideration” that “[t]he creek has always carried silt, sand, 

mud, trees, stumps and limbs” and “has always had a tendency to fill 

with silt and sand.” The court further concluded CRI&P had a duty to 

construct opportunities at reasonable intervals for the water to cross its 
7

right-of-way, meaning “more bridges [may be] required.”6 Noting that 

Lynch, the Downers’ and Baars’ predecessor-in-interest, had conveyed 

real estate to CRI&P on the condition it be used for the construction of a 

dike, the court concluded the plaintiffs were “entitled to an injunction 

against CRI&P restraining it from continuing to allow the flowage of 

Whiskey Creek upon plaintiffs’ land and requiring it to reconstruct its

collapsed dike so as to channel the creek under bridge 110.” The court 

also concluded the plaintiffs were “entitled to a prescriptive easement for 

the flow of Whiskey Creek under bridge 110.”

In early 1977, the court entered judgment against CRI&P enjoining 

it “from continuing to allow the flowage of Whiskey Creek upon plaintiffs’ 

land” and requiring it “to reconstruct the collapsed dike in order to 

channel the Creek under Bridge 110.” The court also granted the 

plaintiffs “a prescriptive easement for the flow of Whiskey Creek under 

Bridge 110.” 

D. 1984 Contempt Proceeding Against Chicago, Milwaukee, 

St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company (Milwaukee Road). After the 

entry of the 1977 judgment, CRI&P began to rebuild the dike. The 

structure washed out again, however, before the project was completed. 

Meanwhile, CRI&P filed a bankruptcy petition, and in 1982 ownership of 

the railroad right-of-way was transferred to the Milwaukee Road. 

In 1984, the drainage district filed an application in cause 

no. 14926—the court file in which the 1976 judgment was rendered—

6In describing the railroad’s duty, the district court cited Estes v. Chicago, 

Burlington & Quincy Railroad, 159 Iowa 666, 141 N.W. 49 (1913). In that case, we 

approved a jury instruction stating “it is the duty of a railway company, where it crosses 

a stream, to provide passageways for the water of the stream reasonably sufficient to 

allow it to flow through without being diverted from its natural course, or being banked 

up so as to cause damage to the property of another.” Id. at 670, 672, 141 N.W. at 51–

52.

 
8

asking the district court to find the Milwaukee Road in contempt for 

failing to rebuild the dike. The district court entered a judgment holding 

the Milwaukee Road in contempt because the company willfully failed to 

comply with the injunction even though it knew of the 1977 judgment 

against CRI&P in 1982 and was thus on notice of the injunction 

mandating maintenance of the dike to permit the creek to flow under 

Bridge 110. The court deferred sentencing, however, giving the 

Milwaukee Road six months to purge itself of contempt. The Milwaukee 

Road rebuilt the dike and the contempt was purged. 

E. Acquisition by DM&E. Soon after it was rebuilt by the 

Milwaukee Road, the dike failed yet again. Ownership of the railroad 

right-of-way was transferred several times thereafter. The dike had not 

yet been rebuilt when the Iowa, Chicago, and Eastern Railroad Company 

(IC&E) took ownership in 2002. During the period of IC&E’s ownership, 

counsel for the trustees of the drainage district corresponded with IC&E, 

notifying it of the injunctions entered against prior owners of the right-ofway. The correspondence also communicated the drainage district’s view 

that the dike was not functional and urged prompt repairs to restore the 

flow of the creek, consistent with the 1977 injunction. When DM&E 

acquired ownership of the railroad right-of-way and Bridge 110 in 

December 2008 through a merger with IC&E, the dike was still in 

disrepair and the drainage problem in the vicinity of the bridge had not 

been solved.

Communications continued between DM&E, the drainage district 

trustees, and affected property owners about the dike’s condition of 

disrepair and the persistent disruption of drainage across the railroad 

right-of-way. DM&E retained an engineering consultant to recommend 

design alternatives for redirecting and maintaining the flow of Whiskey 
9

Creek under Bridge 110. The consultant generated a report proposing 

three redesign alternatives in December 2010; however, DM&E did not 

undertake remediation, and more litigation ensued. 

F. Application for Order to Show Cause. On February 25, 2013, 

the drainage district initiated this proceeding against DM&E—again in 

cause no. 14926. The drainage district’s application asserted the 1977 

judgment imposed upon DM&E “a continuing obligation to keep the 

collapsed dike adjacent to Bridge 110 in good and proper repair.” The 

drainage district alleged DM&E was a “successor” to the Milwaukee Road 

with actual or constructive knowledge of “its continuing obligation to 

channel Whiskey Creek under Bridge 110” and urged the court to order 

the railroad to “take immediate action in compliance with the [1977] 

order requiring [DM&E] to keep the collapsed dike adjacent to Bridge 110 

in good and proper repair” and “assess fines and/or orders” deterring 

DM&E from future noncompliance. The district court issued a rule to 

show cause ordering DM&E to appear before the court and demonstrate 

“wh[y] [it] should not be held in contempt.”

DM&E filed a motion to dismiss the proceeding, contending a civil 

action, rather than a summary contempt proceeding, “is the proper 

means of establishing the legal rights and responsibilities related to a 

decades-old railroad bridge and a dike that washed out many years ago.” 

DM&E raised several other arguments in support of its motion, including 

that (1) the 1977 judgment was against CRI&P, a different railroad and 

named party; (2) DM&E was not a party to the action in which the 

injunction was issued and is not a corporate successor of the enjoined 

railroad; (3) the 1977 district court decision appears in the court’s 

records as a “judgment entry” and was described as a judgment in the 

1984 contempt citation; (4) the 1977 judgment was satisfied when the 
10

dike was rebuilt by another railroad in 1985; (5) enforcement of the 

judgment is time-barred by the statute of limitations under Iowa Code 

section 614.1(6); (6) the judgment is based in part on the enforceability of 

a real property covenant contained in the 1922 deed from Lynch to 

CRI&P that is unenforceable under the statute of limitations in Iowa 

Code section 614.24; (7) indispensable parties affected by the complex, 

overarching drainage issues cannot be joined in a contempt proceeding; 

(8) the complexity of the case and relief sought makes the contempt 

remedy inappropriate under the circumstances; (9) the drainage district 

lacks standing to bring this contempt proceeding because the 1977 

judgment granted no injunctive or other relief in its favor; and (10) this 

contempt proceeding is preempted by the Interstate Commerce 

Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101–16106.7 The 

district court denied the motion to dismiss. 

On September 30 and October 1, 2014, the court held a hearing on 

the application for rule to show cause. In an order filed July 31, 2015, 

the district court found DM&E was in contempt for violating the 

injunction granted by the 1977 judgment against a prior owner of the 

right-of-way, CRI&P. The court determined DM&E was under a legal 

duty to comply with the 1977 judgment enjoining CRI&P because DM&E 

7The ICCTA was enacted in 1995 to restructure the country’s rail system. 

DM&E argued that state and federal courts have held that common law claims seeking 

damages or injunctive relief related to floodwater or storm water caused by the 

operation or construction of rail beds or railroad right-of-ways are preempted under 

ICCTA. DM&E concluded that under the ICCTA’s definitions of “regulation” and 

“transportation,” the drainage district’s attempt to force DM&E to restore the dike 

adjacent to Bridge 110, through the exercise of the district court’s equitable or 

contempt powers under state law, is “regulation” of “transportation” and is thus 

preempted under ICCTA’s express preemption clause at 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b). DM&E 

does not press the preemption claim in its brief filed with this court, and we do not 

discuss it further. 

 
11

is a successor in interest to CRI&P and the Milwaukee Road, because 

DM&E stands in privity with the prior owners of the right-of-way, and 

because DM&E had actual notice of the 1977 judgment and injunction 

well before the rule-to-show-cause proceeding was commenced. The 

court found DM&E in contempt because it concluded the drainage 

district had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that DM&E willfully failed 

to reconstruct the collapsed dike, channel Whiskey Creek under 

Bridge 110, and prevent Whiskey Creek from flowing onto the property of 

adjacent private landowners. The court ordered DM&E to file a plan for 

purging itself of contempt by September 4, 2015. 

G. Subsequent History. DM&E filed an application for 

interlocutory review and alternatively a petition for certiorari, seeking 

review of the district court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

order finding contempt. We granted certiorari review and stayed further 

proceedings below. See Iowa Code § 665.11; Iowa R. App. P. 6.107(2). 

II. Scope and Standards of Review. 

“Although there is no statutory right to appeal from an order to 

punish for contempt, the proceeding may, in the proper case, be reviewed 

by certiorari.” In re Inspection of Titan Tire, 637 N.W.2d 115, 131 (Iowa 

2001). We review a certiorari action for correction of errors at law 

because it is an action at law. Id. Under this standard, we accept the 

district court’s well-supported factual findings as binding but give no 

deference to its legal conclusions. State Pub. Def. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 886 

N.W.2d 595, 598 (Iowa 2016). 

“A writ of certiorari lies where a lower board, tribunal, or court has 

exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise has acted illegally.” Id. (quoting 

State Pub. Def. v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Plymouth Cty., 747 N.W.2d 218, 220 

(Iowa 2008)). “Illegality exists when the court’s findings lack substantial 
12

evidentiary support, or when the court has not properly applied the law.” 

Id. (quoting State Pub. Def., 747 N.W.2d at 220). Because contempt 

requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, substantial evidence in this 

context consists of “such evidence as could convince a rational trier of 

fact that the alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Den Hartog v. City of Waterloo, 891 N.W.2d 430, 435 (Iowa 2017) 

(quoting Reis v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 787 N.W.2d 61, 66 (Iowa 2010)). “In the 

absence of statutory regulation, we have long held the general rule to be 

that decisions regarding contempts are within the sound discretion of the 

trial court, and unless this discretion is grossly abused, the decision 

must stand.” State v. Lipcamon, 483 N.W.2d 605, 607 (Iowa 1992).

III. Analysis. 

Among other arguments, DM&E asserts that under Iowa Code 

section 614.1(6), the 1977 judgment enjoining CRI&P to permit the flow 

of water under Bridge 110 expired in 1997, after twenty years. See 

Whitters v. Neal, 603 N.W.2d 622, 623–24 (Iowa 1999). Because the 

judgment granting injunctive relief was not renewed before it expired, 

DM&E contends it may not be held in contempt for failing to perform its 

mandates. We agree. Since we conclude the contempt proceedings 

purport to enforce an injunction that lapsed in 1997, we do not reach the 

other statutory, constitutional, and prudential issues raised in the 

district court. 

A. Background Principles. The power to grant and enforce 

injunctive relief is inherent in the constitutionally vested equitable 

jurisdiction of a district court but may also arise by statute. See Iowa 

Const. art. V, § 6; see also Ney v. Ney, 891 N.W.2d 446, 450–51 (Iowa 

2017). When a statute extends or restricts the remedy of injunctive 

relief, statutory requirements supersede equitable principles governing 
13

the injunction’s effect. Ney, 891 N.W.2d at 450–51; see also Worthington 

v. Kenkel, 684 N.W.2d 228, 233 (Iowa 2004). 

At equity, a permanent injunction could last in perpetuity, “so long 

as the conditions which produce the injunction remain” in effect. 

Condura Constr. Co. v. Milwaukee Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council AFL, 99 

N.W.2d 751, 755 (Wis. 1959). The duration of a permanent injunction, 

however, may also be subject to time limits imposed by court order or 

statute. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 664A.5 (limiting the duration of a 

permanent no-contact order to “five years from the date the judgment is 

entered”); Bear v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 540 N.W.2d 439, 441–42 (Iowa 1995) 

(enforcing a 1981 injunction in a 1994 contempt proceeding because the 

order creating it did not limit its duration). 

B. Iowa Code Section 614.1(6). DM&E asserts that Iowa Code 

section 614.1 statutorily limits the time period during which the 1977 

injunction against CRI&P may be enforced. Section 614.1 provides that 

“[a]ctions may be brought within the times herein limited, 

respectively . . . and not afterwards, except when otherwise specially 

declared.” Iowa Code § 614.1. Under Iowa Code section 614.1(6), an 

action “founded on a judgment of a court of record” must be brought

“within twenty years.” Id. § 614.1(6). The only “specially declared” 

exception to this rule concerns “an action to recover a judgment for child 

support, spousal support, or a judgment of distribution of marital 

assets.” Id. 

When interpreting a statute, we seek to ascertain the legislature’s 

intent. See Exceptional Persons, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 878 

N.W.2d 247, 251 (Iowa 2016). In so doing, we interpret what the 

legislature said, not “what it should or might have said.” Iowa R. App. P. 

6.904(3)(m). Absent an ambiguity or absurdity, we generally apply the 
14

ordinary meaning of a statute’s express terms. See Brakke v. Iowa Dep’t 

of Nat. Res., ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2017). In assessing whether an 

exception to the plain-meaning rule should apply, we read the language 

in context, considering the statute’s “subject matter, the object sought to 

be accomplished, the purpose to be served, underlying policies, . . . and 

the consequences of various interpretations.” See Exceptional Persons, 

878 N.W.2d at 251 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Albrecht, 657 

N.W.2d 474, 479 (Iowa 2003)). 

C. Discussion. We turn first to the question of whether an 

application to show cause used to enforce an injunction initiates an 

“action” under section 614.1. The Iowa Code defines an “action” as 

“[e]very proceeding in court.” Id. § 611.1. The use of the inclusive term 

“every” means that “proceeding” is intended to be a comprehensive term. 

In its most comprehensive sense, a “proceeding” is “[a]ny procedural 

means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency.” Proceeding, 

Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see also 1A C.J.S. Actions § 22, 

at 265 (“As ordinarily used, [proceeding] is broad enough to include all 

methods of invoking the action of courts . . . and is generally applicable 

to any step taken to obtain the interposition or action of a court.” 

(Footnotes omitted.)) 

The decision-making process initiated by an application to show 

cause constitutes an “action” because it is a procedural means for 

seeking redress from a court that has previously ordered the remedy 

sought and thus a “proceeding” within the plain-meaning of the word. 

See Iowa Code § 611.1. An application to show cause commences a 

proceeding invoking the court’s contempt power to force a party to 

comply with the terms of a judgment. A finding of contempt can only be 

made against a party before the court, and only a court may punish acts 
15

or omissions as contempt. Id. §§ 665.2, .3, .7. In a case like this in 

which the alleged contemnor is not already in the court’s presence, the 

alleged contemnor is entitled to notice via personal service, an 

opportunity to appear before the court, and reasonable time to prepare 

an explanation under oath. Id. § 665.7. An application to show cause is 

a means of seeking a court’s redress; it thus initiates a “proceeding.” 

Because the process initiated by an application to show cause is a 

“proceeding,” we conclude it constitutes an “action” within the meaning 

of section 614.1. See id. § 611.1; see also Johnson v. Masters, 830 

N.W.2d 647, 654, 660–61 (Wis. 2013) (plurality opinion) (concluding 

postjudgment motions to enforce a judgment through entry of a qualified 

domestic relations order (QDRO) are subject to twenty-year statute of 

repose on actions to enforce a judgment or decree, but the repose period 

is tolled if the judgment on which relief is sought is not statutorily 

permitted); id. at 671–73 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (opining postjudgment 

motions to enforce a judgment through entry of a QDRO are subject to 

twenty-year repose period that is not tolled if the judgment on which 

relief is sought is not statutorily permitted). 

Iowa Code section 611.1 provides that civil, special, and criminal 

proceedings are all actions. Iowa Code § 611.1. Section 611.2 defines a 

“civil action” as 

[a] proceeding in a court of justice in which one party, known 

as the plaintiff, demands against another party, known as 

the defendant, the enforcement or protection of a private 

right, or the prevention or redress of a private wrong.

Id. § 611.2. Civil actions also include proceedings to recover a plurality 

or forfeiture. Id. A “special action” is any “other proceeding in a civil 

case.” Id. 
16

At common law, contempt proceedings were either criminal or civil. 

Phillips v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 380 N.W.2d 706, 708 (Iowa 1986). Criminal 

contempt was an “[o]ffense[ ] against the dignity or process of the court, 

whether committed in or out of the presence of the court.” Knox v. Mun. 

Ct., 185 N.W.2d 705, 707 (Iowa 1971). Civil contempt was an “[o]ffense[ ] 

against the party for whose benefit a court order was made.” Id. Under 

early Iowa law, civil contempt was a proceeding of a special character, 

meaning the procedural rules that applied to civil actions also applied to 

contempt proceedings in the absence of specific statutory requirements

to the contrary. Kramer v. Rebman, 9 Iowa 114, 118 (1859) (citing Iowa 

Code §§ 1515, 2516 (1851)). 

Iowa Code chapter 665 (2013), located in the subtitle on “special 

actions,” “constructively repealed the common law of contempt.” Phillips, 

380 N.W.2d at 708. The chapter treats “all actions for contempt [as] 

quasi-criminal, even when they arise from civil cases,” meaning 

“contempt must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Reis, 787 N.W.2d at 68; see also Phillips, 380 N.W.2d at 708. Contempt 

proceedings in civil cases impose penalties; they do not involve 

adjudication of private rights or the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture. 

Thus, contempt proceedings remain of a special character and are 

classified as “special actions” under Iowa law.8 Cf. Blomdahl v. 

8Because a contempt proceeding is a “special action” under Iowa law, it is not 

subject to the requirement in Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.301 that “a civil action is 

commenced by filing a petition with the court.” See Johnson, 830 N.W.2d at 654 

(plurality opinion) (rejecting argument that since civil actions commence with the filing 

and service of a summons and complaint, a postjudgment motion is not an “action 

upon a judgment or decree”). Further, because Iowa Code section 611.1 expressly 

defines “action,” we find no merit in the proposition that “a motion within the context of 

the original action” should be distinguished from an “independent action” for purposes 

of this rule. Cf. id. at 654–55 (quoting Hamilton v. Hamilton, 661 N.W.2d 832, 836 n.4 

(Wis. 2003)).

 
17

Blomdahl, 796 N.W.2d 649, 652 (N.D. 2011) (concluding that contempt 

actions are “special proceedings” but that by statute, special proceedings 

are expressly not “actions” under North Dakota statutory law). 

Thus, we conclude the decision-making process initiated by an 

application to show cause is an “action” under the Iowa Code and subject 

to any relevant limitations periods in section 614.1. This is consistent 

with the holdings of other courts that have concluded contempt 

proceedings are “actions” for purposes of statutes governing the life of 

judgments and rules of civil procedure governing actions. See, e.g., 

Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 566 F.2d 8, 23 (7th Cir. 

1977) (concluding an order to show cause constituted “a subsequent 

proceeding to enforce the judgment (and injunction) rendered in 1970” 

and thus was a pending action for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 25, which applied only to pending actions); Moseley v. Smith, 

180 So. 3d 667, 674 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (“Because Smith’s action is to 

enforce a court-entered judgment, and not merely a private contract, she 

had seven years to file her contempt action once the seven-year statute of 

limitations began to run.”); Simmons v. Simmons, 290 N.W. 319, 320 

(S.D. 1940) (concluding a 1939 contempt proceeding to enforce a 1918 

judgment was not barred by the twenty-year statute of limitations on 

enforceability of judgments because the 1918 judgment was modified in 

1936, resetting the limitations period). 

We next consider whether an application to show cause to enforce 

an injunction is “founded on a judgment of a court of record” under 

section 614.1(6). District courts in Iowa are courts of general jurisdiction 

and also courts of record. Marsh v. Hanna, 219 Iowa 682, 684, 259 N.W. 

225, 226 (1935). A “judgment” is defined as “[e]very final adjudication of 

any of the rights of the parties in an action.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.951. In 
18

other words, it is a judicial act that settles issues, defines rights or 

interests, or determines the liabilities of parties. Giltner v. Stark, 252 

N.W.2d 743, 745–46 (Iowa 1977); accord Van Gorden v. Schuller, 192 

Iowa 853, 858, 185 N.W. 604, 606 (1921). Although historically the term 

“judgment” may have applied only to a decision at law and “decree” to a 

decision in equity, we have long interpreted the term “judgment” in the 

statute on the limitations of actions to apply “to a final adjudication in an 

equity proceeding as well as to a judgment at law.” See Kramer, 9 Iowa 

at 118–19 (reasoning to hold otherwise would exclude final chancery 

adjudications from every Iowa Code provision concerning judgments); see 

also Burke v. Burke, 142 Iowa 206, 210–11, 119 N.W. 129, 130–31 (1909) 

(finding statute on entries of decisions does not distinguish between 

judgments and decrees); 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 1, at 25 (noting terms 

“judgment” and “decree” are interchangeably used). 

The 1977 judgment underlying this contempt action was entered 

by the Iowa District Court for Louisa County, a court of record. See 

Marsh, 219 Iowa at 684, 259 N.W. at 226. It constitutes a “final 

pronouncement which adjudicate[d] and determine[d] the issues in the 

case and define[d] and settle[d] the rights and interests of the parties so 

far as they relate to the subject-matter of the controversy.” Van Gorden, 

192 Iowa at 858, 185 N.W. at 606. This contempt action seeks judicial 

enforcement of an injunction granted in that judgment. Thus, this 

action is one that is founded on a judgment entered by a court of record. 

Finally, we must assess whether this contempt proceeding qualifies 

for a “specially declared” exception under Iowa Code section 614.1. Iowa 

Code section 614.1(6) has no exception other than for “an action to 

recover a judgment for child support, spousal support, or a judgment of 

distribution of marital assets.” Id. § 614.1(6). Our research discloses, 
19

and the parties cite, no other exception “specially declared,” and in 

particular, no exception excluding judgments granting injunctions, 

whether temporary or permanent, from the durational limitation on 

judgments prescribed in section 614.1(6). 

We conclude the drainage district’s application for order to show 

cause filed in February 2013 was an action seeking enforcement of the 

judgment entered in 1977. It was therefore an action subject to the 

twenty-year statute of limitations on enforcement of judgments under 

Iowa Code section 614.1(6). The twenty-year period commenced when 

the judgment was entered. Because the 1977 judgment was not 

renewed, it expired in 1997, well before the attempt to enforce it against 

DM&E was commenced. See Iowa Code § 614.1(6) (providing limitation 

period for actions on judgments); Whitters, 603 N.W.2d at 624–25 

(discussing renewal by suit on a judgment). To hold otherwise would be 

to determine that proceedings to enforce an injunction initiated by an 

application to show cause or other postjudgment motion would be 

subject to no limitations period and thus “forever hold the defendant in 

fear of enforcement with no hope of repose.” Donovan v. Burgett 

Greenhouses, Inc., 759 F.2d 1483, 1486 (10th Cir. 1985) (“But we do not 

conclude that the secretary can, by obtaining an injunction, forever hold 

the defendant in fear of enforcement with no hope of repose. . . . Once 

the cause of action is reduced to judgment, the . . . . issue then becomes 

one of the life of the judgment.”); see also Johnson, 830 N.W.2d at 672 

(Prosser, J., dissenting) (“[A]n interpretation that [the statute of 

limitations on actions to enforce a judgment] is inapplicable to motions, 

orders to show cause, and other proceedings not requiring a ‘complaint’ 

would mean, in effect, that there would be no time period for a party to 

bring certain kinds of actions upon a judgment.”). 
20

Our conclusion is not inconsistent with our determination in Bear 

that an injunction is enforceable in a contempt proceeding thirteen years 

later if the order creating the injunction did not limit its duration. 540 

N.W.2d at 441–42. That case concerned the scope of our equitable 

authority to enforce an injunction that was well within the twenty-year 

statutory period to enforce judgments. See id. Our statements in that 

case suggesting a permanent injunction is not limited by the passage of 

time are correct statements of the principles of equity that govern 

injunctions, see id. at 441, but they are subject, of course, to limitations 

imposed by statute, see Ney, 891 N.W.2d at 450–51 (noting that 

statutory requirements supersede equitable requirements). Because the 

statute of limitations on judgments was not at issue in Bear, our 

reasoning in that case is not inconsistent with our holding today. 

We acknowledge that an Illinois court has decided a similar issue 

differently. In People ex. rel. Illinois State Dental Society v. Norris, the 

court rejected an argument that a writ of injunction lapsed under a 

statute of limitations on judgments, stating, 

On appeal the defendant first argues that the 1968 

writ of injunction lapsed and became unenforceable because 

the injunction judgment had not been renewed by the 

plaintiffs through scire facias or other proceedings within 

seven years of its issuance. The defendant further contends 

that since the injunction expired prior to November of 1976, 

he should not have been subjected to contempt proceedings 

for acts allegedly committed in November and December of 

that year. We disagree. An injunction remains in full force 

and effect until it has been vacated or modified by the court 

which granted it or until the order or decree awarding it has 

been set aside on appeal. Such a decree or order must be 

obeyed, even if erroneous, until it is overturned or modified 

by orderly processes of review. An injunction can be 

modified or dissolved when the court finds that the law has 

changed or that equity no longer justifies a continuance of 

the injunction. 
21

398 N.E.2d 1163, 1168 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (citations omitted). Because 

we believe our statutory framework requires a different outcome, we do 

not find the Illinois court’s decision persuasive. 

“Limitation periods for causes of action are legislative

pronouncements of policy barring actions for various policy reasons 

regardless of the merit of the action.” Hamilton, 661 N.W.2d at 842. 

Limitations statutes 

represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to 

fail to put the adversary on notice to defend within a 

specified period of time and that “the right to be free of stale 

claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute 

them.” 

United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117, 100 S. Ct. 352, 356–57 

(1979) (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 

321 U.S. 342, 349, 64 S. Ct. 582, 586 (1944)). The Iowa legislature has 

expressly constrained the duration of judgments by prescribing that 

“[a]ctions may be brought within the times herein limited . . . and not 

afterwards, except when otherwise specially declared.” See Iowa Code 

§ 614.1 (emphasis added). The legislature has elected to exempt only 

certain family-law judgments imposing ongoing obligations from the 

reach of section 614.1(6). Finding no ground in this record for exempting 

the 1977 judgment from the operation of the statutory limitation period, 

we conclude the district court abused its discretion in enforcing the 

judgment through the court’s contempt power. 

IV. Conclusion. 

The contempt proceeding in this case was an untimely action 

brought by the drainage district to enforce the 1977 judgment. Because 

our resolution of this issue is dispositive of this appeal, we do not 

discuss or decide the other issues raised and argued on appeal. 
22

Accordingly, we sustain the writ and vacate the contempt order against 

DM&E. 

WRIT SUSTAINED; CONTEMPT ORDER VACATED.