IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :

:

v. : No. 2050 C.D. 2013

:

Robert Ansell, :

Appellant :

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :

:

v. : No. 2051 C.D. 2013

: Submitted: July 25, 2014

William Ansell, :

Appellant :

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM FILED: August 13, 2014

Robert Ansell and William Ansell (collectively, Appellants), pro se,

appeal from orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial 

court) finding them guilty of non-traffic summary offenses for violating Section 

308.1 of the Ross Township (Township) Property Maintenance Code1and Section 

1606.1 of the Township Zoning Ordinance2and imposing fines of $300 plus costs 

 

1

That section, “Accumulation of rubbish or garbage,” provides that “[a]ll exterior

property and premises, and the interior of every structure, shall be free from any accumulation of 

rubbish or garbage.” (Emphasis in original).

2

That section, “Prohibited Signs,” provides, in relevant part:

(Footnote continued on next page...)
2

and $100 plus costs, respectively.

3

 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial 

court.

Robert Ansell is the owner of 109 Fairley Road (property), a singlefamily residence located in the Township, while William Ansell resides at the 

property. In 2013, Robert Muchenski (Muchenski), the Township’s Code 

Enforcement Officer, issued a citation to Appellants for violating Section 308.1 of 

the Township Property Maintenance Code and Section 1606.1 of the Township 

Zoning Ordinance due to the accumulation of objects in the property’s yard and the 

 

(continued...)

1. All signs not expressly authorized under this Part or exempt 

from regulation hereunder in accordance with previous sections are 

prohibited in the Township. Prohibited signs shall include, but are 

not limited to:

***

N. Any sign or structure which constitutes a hazard to 

public safety or health.

***

R. Signs which make use of words such as “stop,” “look,” 

“one-way,” “danger,” “yield,” or similar words, phrases, symbols, 

lights or characters in such a manner as to interfere with, mislead 

or confuse traffic.

***

Y. No signage shall contain pornographic or lewd messages 

or messages intended to incite riots.

3 By order dated January 29, 2014, this Court consolidated the appeals.
3

presence of numerous signs hanging from the property’s front deck. After a 

Magisterial District Judge found Appellants guilty of the cited violations, 

Appellants filed summary appeals of their convictions with the trial court.

Before the trial court, Muchenski testified regarding the condition of

the property. He stated that the property’s yard contained children’s toys, 

swimming pools and playhouses; lawn ornaments covered by plastic bags; several 

plastic tarps; figures of Santa Claus, including one which appeared to be urinating;

and figures of a choir with their heads removed. Muchenski further testified as to 

the numerous signs located on the property. He explained that there were two 

signs on the property with arrows that were intended to direct traffic, and also 

described several signs containing derogatory language which were directed at 

Appellants’ neighbors and the Township Commissioner.

4

 Muchenski also

 

4

These signs stated:

 “The fat [expletive] lied and died. Good move [neighbor’s 

name]. You killed the fat old [expletive].”

 “Beware, [neighbor’s names] are disgusting dirty little 

liars.”

 “[Neighbor’s name] is a [expletive]”

 “[Neighbor’s name] is a [expletive] mailbox thief.”

 “[Neighbor’s name] is a [expletive] thief. If he steals a 

mailbox what next a church plate.”

 “Neighbor is a thief” (with an arrow pointing in the 

direction of the neighbor’s home).

(Footnote continued on next page...)
4

introduced photographs which he took on October 25, 2013, depicting the objects 

in the property’s yard and the signs. He ultimately opined that the property, in its 

current state, violated the Township ordinances at issue. Appellants testified that 

the objects in the property’s yard were part of a Christmas display and did not 

constitute rubbish. They also introduced photographs from 2008 depicting the 

Christmas display. Appellants admitted to displaying the aforementioned signs on 

the property, but argued that the signs were protected by the First Amendment.

Following the hearing, the trial court issued orders finding Appellants 

guilty of violating Section 308.1 of the Township Property Maintenance Code and 

Section 1606.1 of the Township Zoning Ordinance. The trial court also fined 

William Ansell $300 plus costs and fined Robert Ansell $100 plus costs. In its 

subsequent opinion,5the trial court explained that Appellants violated Section 

308.1 of the Township Property Maintenance Code because the objects 

accumulated in the property’s yard – particularly, the tarps, garbage bags and 

dismembered figurines – clearly constituted rubbish, which is prohibited by that 

section. The trial court held that the signs on the property violated Section 1606.1 

of the Township Zoning Ordinance because they could confuse passing drivers and 

 

(continued...)

 “I would call my Commissioner an [expletive] but an 

[expletive] has a purpose.”

(See October 29, 2013 Hearing Transcript, Commonwealth photo exhibits).

5 Because the offenses arose from the same set of circumstances at the same property, the 

trial court addressed both matters in one opinion.
5

contain expletives and inflammatory language, thereby constituting a hazard to 

public health or safety. Moreover, the trial court noted that, contrary to 

Appellants’ contention, the signs were not constitutionally protected because “the 

right to freedom of speech is not absolute [and] does not include written 

communications which contain inflammatory and derogatory comments about 

named individuals.” (Trial Court’s January 23, 2014 Opinion at 4). This appeal6

followed in which Appellants essentially argue that the trial court erred in holding 

that the items on the property constituted rubbish and that the signs on the property 

were not constitutionally protected political speech.

7

Section 202 of the Township Property Maintenance Code defines 

“rubbish” as:

Combustible and noncombustible waste materials, except 

garbage. The term shall include the residue from the 

burning of wood, coal, coke and other combustible 

materials, paper, rags, cartons, boxes, wood, excelsior, 

rubber, leather, tree branches, yard trimmings, tin cans, 

metals, mineral matter, glass, crockery and dust and other 

similar materials.

 

6 Our review of a trial court’s determination on appeal from a summary conviction is 

limited to whether there has been an error of law or whether competent evidence supports the 

trial court’s findings. Commonwealth v. Nicely, 988 A.2d 799, 803 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). In 

considering whether the evidence is sufficient to convict, the Court must view all of the evidence 

admitted at trial, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth. Id.

7 Appellants also take issue with the fact that the trial court judge who authored the 

opinion was not the same judge who presided over the hearing. However, “[w]here the issue 

involved is one purely of law, the fact that someone other than the hearing judge wrote the 

opinion would be of little significance.” Armbruster v. Horowitz, 744 A.2d 285, 289 (Pa. Super. 

1999) (quoting Commonwealth v. Yogel, 453 A.2d 15, 16 (Pa. Super. 1982)).
6

Here, the evidence clearly demonstrates that the property was littered 

with, among other things, plastic tarps, lawn ornaments covered by garbage bags 

and dismembered figurines. While these items are not expressly included in the 

definition of “rubbish,” the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth, supports the trial court’s finding that Appellants violated 

Section 308.1 of the Township Property Maintenance Code.

We also find no error in the trial court’s holding that the signs on the 

property violated the Township Zoning Ordinance. The evidence clearly shows 

two signs on the property intended to direct traffic, which alone violate Section 

1606.1 of the Zoning Ordinance. Moreover, the evidence shows numerous signs 

on the property containing derogatory language that are directed at Appellants’ 

neighbors and the Township Commissioner. These signs also clearly violate the 

Township Zoning Ordinance. Appellants’ contention that these signs were 

constitutionally protected speech is without merit, because, as the trial court noted, 

the right to freedom of speech is not absolute. As the courts of this 

Commonwealth have recognized:

There are certain well defined and narrowly limited 

classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 

which have never been thought to raise any 

Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and 

obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 

‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance 

inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the 

peace. ... Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in 

any proper sense communication of information or 

opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its 

punishment as a criminal act would raise no question 

under that instrument.
7

Commonwealth v. Lutes, 973 A.2d 949, 962 (Pa. Super. 2002) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, 414 A.2d 54, 58 (Pa. 1980)) (quotations omitted).

Accordingly, the trial court’s orders are affirmed.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :

:

v. : No. 2050 C.D. 2013

:

Robert Ansell, :

Appellant :

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :

:

v. : No. 2051 C.D. 2013

:

William Ansell, :

Appellant :

O R D E R

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 13th day of August, 2014, the orders of the Court 

of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, dated October 29, 2013, at Nos. SA 1375 

and 1491 of 2013, are affirmed.