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ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE

February 10, 2020

2020 CO 9

No. 19SA118, In re Chessin v. Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel—Subject 

Matter Jurisdiction—Jurisdiction of Courts—Attorney Discipline.

In the lawsuit underlying this original proceeding, a complainant filed an 

action in district court under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), seeking an order compelling the 

Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (“OARC”) to investigate the complainant’s 

allegations of attorney misconduct. After OARC moved unsuccessfully to dismiss 

the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it sought relief under C.A.R. 21. The 

supreme court has long held that as part of its inherent powers, it has exclusive 

authority to regulate and supervise the practice of law in Colorado, including the 

structure and administration of attorney discipline proceedings. The court’s rules 

governing attorney discipline proceedings do not contemplate district court 

review of OARC intake decisions. Accordingly, the supreme court holds that the 

district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review Regulation Counsel’s 

decision not to proceed with an investigation into allegations of attorney 

misconduct. The supreme court therefore makes the rule to show cause absolute.
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado

2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203

2020 CO 9

Supreme Court Case No. 19SA118

Original Proceeding Pursuant to C.A.R. 21

District Court, City and County of Denver, Case No. 19CV30251

Honorable Michael A. Martinez, Judge

In Re

Plaintiff:

Paul Chessin,

v.

Defendant:

Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel.

Rule Made Absolute

en banc

February 10, 2020

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

Vedra Law LLC

Daniel J. Vedra

Denver, Colorado

Gill & Ledbetter, LLC

Anne Whalen Gill

Castle Rock, Colorado
2

Attorneys for Defendant:

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General

Christopher P. Beall, Deputy Attorney General

Robert Finke, First Assistant Attorney General

Denver, Colorado

JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.

CHIEF JUSTICE COATS does not participate.
3

¶1 In this case, an attorney was dissatisfied with the decision of the Office of 

Attorney Regulation Counsel (“OARC”) not to pursue further investigation of his

allegations of professional misconduct against opposing counsel, so he filed a 

complaint in district court under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), seeking an order compelling 

Regulation Counsel to investigate the matter more fully. OARC moved to dismiss 

the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the supreme court has 

exclusive jurisdiction over attorney discipline matters. After the district court 

issued an order holding OARC’s motion to dismiss in abeyance pending 

resolution of the complainant’s motion to disqualify OARC’s counsel, OARC 

petitioned this court for relief under C.A.R. 21.

¶2 We issued a rule to show cause. Because we have long held that this court, 

as part of its inherent powers, has exclusive authority to regulate and supervise 

the practice of law in Colorado, including the structure and administration of 

attorney discipline proceedings, we hold that the district court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction to review Regulation Counsel’s decision not to proceed. Accordingly, 

we make the rule absolute and remand the matter to the district court with 

directions to dismiss the C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) complaint against OARC.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶3 The following facts are derived from the underlying C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)

complaint. Paul Chessin is a former Senior Assistant Attorney General who was 
4

involved in an investigation of an internet payday lending enterprise. Over the 

course of that investigation and contentious litigation that followed, Chessin came 

to believe that opposing counsel committed various violations of the Colorado 

Rules of Professional Conduct. In November 2017, Chessin filed a request for 

investigation with OARC under C.R.C.P. 251.9(a)(1), alleging that opposing 

counsel “prepared and submitted perjurious affidavits to Colorado’s courts, 

concealed and withheld pertinent information, misled and deceived the courts, 

and otherwise perpetrated a fraud on the courts,” thus violating Rules of 

Professional Conduct 1.8(f), 3.3, 3.4, 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). OARC ultimately chose not 

to bring disciplinary charges and closed the request for investigation into the 

alleged misconduct approximately a year later.

¶4 Chessin then filed a complaint in district court under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) in 

January 2019, alleging that OARC’s preliminary inquiry was unreasonably 

cursory and that it sought and reviewed information from only one of the several 

attorneys identified in his complaint before declining to pursue an investigation. 

Chessin argued that OARC abused its discretion and requested an order 

compelling OARC to “fully, thoroughly, and completely investigate the alleged 

misconduct.” Upon Chessin’s motion, the district court ordered OARC to certify 

the record “starting with Plaintiff’s November 14, 2017 Request for Investigation 

through the December 26, 2018 OARC letter closing and dismissing the matter.” 
5

¶5 Through its counsel at the Attorney General’s Office,1 OARC moved to 

dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), 

arguing that the Colorado Supreme Court has exclusive authority over matters of 

attorney regulation and has not provided district courts with any role in the 

process. Accordingly, OARC contended, district courts have no subject matter 

jurisdiction over such matters. 

¶6 Chessin did not respond to OARC’s C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion; instead, he 

moved to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing OARC, 

contending that the office had a conflict of interest under Colo. RPC 1.7(a), which 

states that “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a 

concurrent conflict of interest.” Chessin argued that the Attorney General’s Office

was the victim of the allegedly unethical conduct that he had reported and 

therefore could not defend OARC’s decision not to pursue an investigation into 

that conduct. Chessin also filed a motion to hold OARC’s C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion 

to dismiss in abeyance until the court first resolved his motion to disqualify the 

Attorney General’s Office. The district court granted this latter motion before 

OARC filed a response. 

 

1 The Attorney General’s Office serves as counsel to OARC in such matters. See 

§ 24-31-101(1)(a), C.R.S. (2019).
6

¶7 OARC moved the court for reconsideration, arguing that the court should

first determine whether it had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. When the 

court did not rule on the motion to reconsider, OARC petitioned this court for 

relief under C.A.R. 21, maintaining that the district court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction to review a decision by Regulation Counsel to dismiss an investigation 

at the intake stage. OARC further argued that the confidentiality provisions of 

C.R.C.P. 251.31 governing attorney discipline proceedings prevented it from even 

acknowledging, much less certifying a record of, Chessin’s request for 

investigation and thus severely constrained its ability to defend itself against the 

motion to disqualify and the suit as a whole. 

II. Original Jurisdiction

¶8 “The choice whether to exercise this court’s original jurisdiction is entirely 

within its discretion.” Vinton v. Virzi, 2012 CO 10, ¶ 9, 269 P.3d 1242, 1245. We 

have previously recognized that “we may exercise original jurisdiction [under 

C.A.R. 21] to review whether a trial court acts in excess of its jurisdiction or without 

jurisdiction,” City of Colorado Springs v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 147 P.3d 1, 2 (Colo. 

2006), and “where appellate review would be inadequate,” Vinton, ¶ 9, 269 P.3d at

1245. 

¶9 In this case, OARC’s motion to dismiss challenges the district court’s subject

matter jurisdiction to hear the matter and therefore plainly affects the court’s
7

authority to proceed with the case. See Hagan v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2015 CO 6, 

¶ 13, 342 P.3d 427, 432 (exercising original jurisdiction to review trial court orders 

relating to venue). Relatedly, judicial economy favors exercising our original 

jurisdiction to resolve the issue because, if the district court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction, no other issues in the case—including the motion to disqualify—need 

be resolved. See Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. City of Woodland Park, 2014 CO 35, ¶ 9, 

333 P.3d 55, 58 (exercising original jurisdiction to review a district court’s order 

denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the interest 

of judicial economy). In addition, we have exercised original jurisdiction under 

C.A.R. 21 “when a procedural ruling will have significant effect on a party’s ability 

to litigate the merits of the controversy.” McConnell v. Dist. Court, 680 P.2d 528, 

530 (Colo. 1984). Here, OARC contends it is effectively unable to defend itself 

against the motion to disqualify or the C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) complaint without 

violating C.R.C.P. 251.31(b), which states that “[b]efore the filing and service of a 

complaint[,] . . . proceedings are confidential within the Office of the Regulation 

Counsel,” with certain enumerated exceptions that are inapplicable here. Thus, 

we conclude that this matter warrants exercise of our original jurisdiction.

III. Analysis

¶10 OARC argues that this court has the inherent power to regulate the practice 

of law and the rules that we have prescribed for attorney discipline proceedings 
8

do not allow for review of OARC intake decisions in district court. Therefore, it 

contends, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute. We 

agree.

¶11 It is well settled that “[t]he Colorado Supreme Court, as part of its inherent 

and plenary powers, has the exclusive jurisdiction over attorneys and the 

authority to regulate, govern, and supervise the practice of law in Colorado to 

protect the public.” People v. Kanwal, 2014 CO 20, ¶ 6, 321 P.3d 494, 495 (alteration 

in original) (quoting Colo. Supreme Court Grievance Comm. v. Dist. Court, 850 P.2d 

150, 152 (Colo. 1993)); see also Smith v. Mullarkey, 121 P.3d 890, 891 (Colo. 2005) 

(observing that the supreme court’s jurisdiction to regulate and control the 

practice of law in Colorado is “exclusive”); Petition of Colo. Bar Ass’n, 325 P.2d 932, 

937 (Colo. 1958) (stating that the supreme court has “full responsibility” over 

matters of attorney regulation and discipline). In connection with this exclusive 

jurisdiction, this court has “the ultimate and exclusive responsibility for the 

structure and administration of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers.” 

Kanwal, ¶ 6, 321 P.3d at 495–96 (quoting People v. Susman, 587 P.2d 782, 786 (Colo. 

1978)).

¶12 We have exercised this authority through Rule 251 of the Colorado Rules of 

Procedure Regarding Attorney Discipline and Disability Proceedings, Colorado 

Attorneys’ Fund for Client Protection, and Mandatory Continuing Legal 
9

Education and Judicial Education, which provides the procedural mechanism for 

attorney discipline proceedings. See C.R.C.P. 251.1 to 251.34; see also Kanwal, ¶ 6, 

321 P.3d at 496. Although the attorney discipline process created by Rule 251 “has 

much in common with criminal prosecution, and has in fact been characterized as 

‘quasi-criminal’ in nature,” we have followed a largely civil model for the conduct 

of discipline proceedings. Kanwal, ¶ 7, 321 P.3d at 496 (quoting In re Fisher, 

202 P.3d 1186, 1199 (Colo. 2009)). Discipline proceedings therefore are “not strictly 

civil or criminal cases.” Colo. Supreme Court Grievance Comm., 850 P.2d at 152. 

Instead, we have characterized such proceedings as “unique, or sui generis, having 

been designed for the precise, and sole, purpose of exercising this exclusive 

jurisdiction and fulfilling this responsibility of the supreme court.” Kanwal, ¶ 7, 

321 P.3d at 496.

¶13 We have allocated the authority to impose discipline among various officers 

and bodies, all created, appointed, and reviewable by this court. Id. at ¶ 10, 

321 P.3d at 497. The supreme court appoints Regulation Counsel, who serves at 

the pleasure of the court. C.R.C.P. 251.3(a). Among other powers and duties, 

Regulation Counsel, along with her staff, shall, in accordance with the rules of 

procedure, conduct investigations into allegations made against an attorney, 

prepare and prosecute disciplinary and disability actions against attorneys, and 

negotiate dispositions of pending matters. C.R.C.P. 251.3(c). Discipline
10

“proceedings,” in the general sense of opening an inquiry into particular attorney 

conduct, may be commenced by a request for investigation. Kanwal, ¶ 11, 321 P.3d 

at 497; C.R.C.P. 251.9(a)(1). However, “formal proceedings for public discipline 

may be prosecuted only by Regulation Counsel, in the name of the People of the 

State, C.R.C.P. 251.14; and only upon authorization by the [Attorney Regulation] 

Committee.”2 Kanwal, ¶ 11, 321 P.3d at 497 (citing C.R.C.P. 251.12). 

¶14 At the intake stage, Regulation Counsel has broad discretion in determining 

whether to investigate an attorney. “Immediately upon receipt of a request for 

investigation,” the matter is referred to Regulation Counsel for a determination of 

whether to proceed with an investigation. Regulation Counsel considers whether 

“the attorney in question is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the [Colorado] 

Supreme Court”; whether “there is an allegation made against the attorney in 

question which, if proved, would constitute grounds for discipline”; and whether 

“the matter should be investigated . . . or addressed by means of an alternative to 

 

2 The Attorney Regulation Committee consists of a chair, vice-chair, four members 

of the Colorado Bar, and three members of the public, all appointed by the 

supreme court. C.R.C.P. 251.2(a)(1)–(3). In addition to its role in reviewing 

Regulation Counsel’s investigatory decisions, the committee may enlist the 

assistance of members of the Bar to conduct or assist with investigations and, 

among other powers, recommend to the Supreme Court Advisory Committee 

proposed changes or additions to the rules of procedure for attorney discipline 

and disability proceedings. C.R.C.P. 251.2(b).
11

discipline.” C.R.C.P. 251.9(b). “In making a determination whether to proceed, 

the Regulation Counsel may make inquiry regarding the underlying facts and 

consult with the Chair of the [Attorney Regulation Committee].” Id. 

¶15 Importantly, C.R.C.P. 251.9(b) provides that “the decision of the Regulation 

Counsel [regarding whether to proceed] shall be final, and the complaining 

witness shall have no right to appeal.” In this sense, Regulation Counsel’s decision 

is at least somewhat analogous to a prosecutor’s discretionary decision not to bring 

criminal charges against a person, which generally “may not be controlled or 

limited by judicial intervention.” People v. Dist. Court, 632 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Colo. 

1981). This court’s rules governing attorney discipline proceedings do not allow 

for district court review of Regulation Counsel’s decision not to pursue an 

investigation.3

¶16 Instead, the check on OARC’s power rests with this court, which has a 

“unique” and supervisory role in attorney discipline proceedings. Kanwal, ¶ 8, 

321 P.3d at 496. We have reserved plenary power “to review any determination 

 

3 Similarly, district courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to review the 

dismissal of a complaint filed with the Judicial Commission on Discipline. See 

Higgins v. Owens, 13 P.3d 837, 838 (Colo. App. 2000) (holding that “district courts 

do not have subject matter jurisdiction [under Rule 106(a)(4)] to compel the 

Commission or its Executive Director to investigate a complaint alleging judicial 

misconduct”).
12

made in the course of a disciplinary proceeding and to enter any order with respect 

thereto, including an order directing that further proceedings be conducted.” 

C.R.C.P. 251.1(d). 

¶17 In short, whether OARC successfully prosecutes a case to the Hearing Board 

or decides to dismiss the matter, we are the only court authorized to review the 

case. 

¶18 The foregoing principles demonstrate that we have exclusive authority over 

matters of attorney discipline and, as we stated in Colorado Supreme Court Grievance 

Committee when analyzing the procedural rules then in effect, we “did not provide 

for district courts to perform any role in the process.” 850 P.2d at 153. Thus, the 

district court is without jurisdiction over cases that involve oversight of the 

attorney discipline process.

¶19 Chessin counters that this court’s procedural rules “cannot deprive a district 

court of the jurisdiction that the constitution provides and that no statute limits.” 

He points to article VI, section 9 of the Colorado Constitution, which provides that 

“district courts shall be trial courts of record with general jurisdiction, and shall 

have original jurisdiction in all civil, probate, and criminal cases, except as 

otherwise provided herein, and shall have such appellate jurisdiction as may be 

prescribed by law.” Chessin brought his claim under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), which 

permits district court review of whether “any governmental body or officer or any 
13

lower judicial body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has exceeded its 

jurisdiction or abused its discretion.” Thus, he contends, his claim falls within the 

district court’s jurisdiction.

¶20 We disagree. The grant of subject matter jurisdiction to district courts “is 

very broad, [but] it is not unlimited.” Colo. Supreme Court Grievance Comm., 

850 P.2d at 152. We have previously held that “district courts do not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings” precisely because they are “not 

strictly civil or criminal cases,” but are “sui generis.” Id. This remains true when a 

discipline proceeding becomes the subject of a civil suit, as we concluded in 

Colorado Supreme Court Grievance Committee. Id. at 153. There, we considered 

whether a district court had jurisdiction over a respondent attorney’s challenge to

the constitutionality of a disciplinary rule while discipline proceedings against the 

respondent attorney were pending. Id. at 151. We acknowledged that the 

constitutional challenge to the rule was a civil proceeding, which ordinarily falls 

within the district court’s general jurisdiction, but we nonetheless concluded that 

“district courts may not exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over a civil action if 

such exercise of jurisdiction interferes with ongoing disciplinary proceedings and 

the inherent power of the Colorado Supreme Court to regulate, govern, and 

supervise the practice of law.” Id. at 153. To have ruled otherwise would have 
14

allowed the respondent attorney to effectively circumvent the rules of procedure

governing discipline proceedings. Id. 

¶21 Our holding in Colorado Supreme Court Grievance Committee applies here as 

well. Though Chessin’s C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) action is a civil proceeding, he 

effectively seeks review of Regulation Counsel’s decision not to pursue an 

investigation against an attorney. As in Colorado Supreme Court Grievance 

Committee, a district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over such a claim would 

interfere with the inherent power of this court to regulate, govern, and supervise 

the practice of law because it would directly circumvent the rules we have 

prescribed, which provide that “the complaining witness shall have no right to 

appeal” Regulation Counsel’s decision not to pursue further investigation of a 

particular complaint. 

¶22 Chessin contends that Colorado Supreme Court Grievance Committee is 

distinguishable because we concluded our opinion by saying that the “narrow 

exception to the subject matter jurisdiction of district courts that we delineate 

today is described no more broadly than necessary to resolve the case before us.” 

Id. at 154. He points out that, unlike that case, there are no pending discipline

proceedings here. Further, he contends that Colorado Supreme Court Grievance 

Committee stands for the limited principle “that courts will not entertain actions 
15

that raise issues more properly adjudicated in a prior pending proceeding between 

the parties.” 

¶23 However, we have not interpreted our holding in Colorado Supreme Court 

Grievance Committee so narrowly. Indeed, in Smith, an applicant who was denied 

admission to the Colorado Bar brought suit in Denver District Court, raising a 

constitutional challenge to the denial of his application for admission. 121 P.3d at 

891. We affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the case for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. Id. After recognizing that Colorado Supreme Court Grievance 

Committee “involved an attorney disciplinary proceeding,” we proceeded to 

import its reasoning. Id. at 892. We observed that “constitutional challenges to 

the Bar admission process are inextricably intertwined with the procedural 

mechanism used to determine Bar admission qualifications,” which we have the 

“exclusive and inherent power” to establish. Id. Thus, challenges to the Bar 

admission process, in which we provided no role for district courts, fall “squarely 

within [our] exclusive and inherent power” and outside the jurisdiction of the 

district courts. Id. The same holds true regarding the rules of procedure governing 

attorney discipline proceedings.

IV. Conclusion

¶24 In sum, we hold that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 

Chessin’s claim. Accordingly, we make the rule absolute and remand the matter 
16

to the district court with directions to dismiss Chessin’s C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)

complaint against OARC.

CHIEF JUSTICE COATS does not participate.