62392 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 174 / Monday, September 11, 2023 / Notices 

In making this prescription, notice is 

hereby given that whoever 

manufactures, sells, or possesses this 

insignia, or any colorable imitation 

thereof, or photographs or prints or in 

any other manner makes or executes any 

engraving, photograph or print, or 

impression in the likeness of these 

insignia, or any colorable imitation 

thereof, without written authorization 

from the United States Department of 

the Interior is subject to the penalty 

provisions of section 701 of Title 18 of 

the United States Code. 

Authority: National Trails System Act, 

16 U.S.C. 1246(c); and Protection of 

Official Badges, Insignia, etc., 18 U.S.C. 

701. 

Carole Wendler, 

Acting Superintendent, National Trails, 

National Park Service. 

[FR Doc. 2023–19544 Filed 9–8–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4312–52–C 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Antitrust Division 

United States v. ASSA ABLOY AB, et 

al.; Response of the United States to 

Public Comments on the Proposed 

Final Judgment 

Notice is hereby given pursuant to the 

Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 

15 U.S.C. 16(b)–(h), that the Response of 

the United States to Public Comments 

on the Proposed Final Judgment in 

United States of America v. ASSA 

ABLOY AB, et al., Civil Action No. 22– 

2791–ACR, has been filed in the United 

States District Court for the District of 

Columbia, together with the response of 

the United States to the comment. 

Copies of the public comment and the 

United States’ Response are available for 

inspection on the Antitrust Division’s 

website at http://www.justice.gov/atr. 

Suzanne Morris, 

Deputy Director Civil Enforcement 

Operations, Antitrust Division. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff, v. ASSA ABLOY AB, et al., 

Defendants. 

Civil Case No. 22–2791–ACR 

RESPONSE OF PLAINTIFF UNITED 

STATES OF AMERICA TO PUBLIC 

COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED 

FINAL JUDGMENT 

As required by the Antitrust 

Procedures and Penalties Act (the 

‘‘Tunney Act’’), 15 U.S.C. 16(b)–(h), 

Plaintiff United States of America 

hereby responds to the public comment 

received about the Proposed Final 

Judgment, ECF No. 128–4. After careful 

consideration of the comment received, 

the United States will move the Court 

for entry of the Proposed Final 

Judgment after the public comment and 

this Response have been published in 

the Federal Register, pursuant to 15 

U.S.C. 16(d), and believes that the Court 

will conclude that the Proposed Final 

Judgment is in the public interest under 

the Tunney Act. 

I. Procedural History 

On September 8, 2021, Defendant 

ASSA ABLOY AB (‘‘ASSA ABLOY’’) 

agreed to acquire the Hardware and 

Home Improvement division of 

Defendant Spectrum Brands Holdings, 

Inc. (‘‘Spectrum’’) for approximately 

$4.3 billion. On September 15, 2022, the 

United States filed an antitrust lawsuit 

to stop the proposed acquisition from 

being consummated. The United States’ 

Complaint alleged that the proposed 

acquisition may substantially lessen 

competition in the markets for two types 

of residential door hardware (premium 

mechanical door hardware and smart 

locks) in the United States, in violation 

of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 

U.S.C. 18. 

The parties vigorously litigated the 

case for more than seven months, 

culminating in a bench trial that began 

on April 24, 2023. On May 5, 2023, 

while the trial was ongoing, the United 

States filed a Proposed Final Judgment, 

Competitive Impact Statement, ECF No. 

129, and Asset Preservation Stipulation 

and Order (‘‘Stipulation’’), ECF No. 

128–1. The Competitive Impact 

Statement described the transaction and 

the Proposed Final Judgment. Through 

the Stipulation, which the Court entered 

on May 5, 2023, the parties and nonparty divestiture buyer Fortune Brands 

Innovations, Inc. (‘‘Fortune’’), consented 

to the entry of the Proposed Final 

Judgment after compliance with the 

requirements of the Tunney Act. Under 

the Stipulation, Defendants and Fortune 

also agreed to abide by and comply with 

all the terms of the Proposed Final 


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Judgment until it is entered by the 

Court. 

The United States caused the 

Complaint, the Proposed Final 

Judgment, the Competitive Impact 

Statement, and directions for the 

submission of written comments 

relating to the Proposed Final Judgment, 

to be published in the Federal Register 

on May 15, 2023. See 88 FR 31007 (May 

15, 2023). The United States also caused 

notice of the same, together with 

directions for submission of comments, 

to be published in The Washington Post 

for seven days, from May 12–18, 2023. 

The 60-day period for public comments 

has ended. During the public comment 

period, the United States received one 

comment, which is described below in 

Section IV and attached in Appendix A. 

II. Standard of Judicial Review 

Under the Clayton Act, as amended 

by the Tunney Act, proposed final 

judgments, or ‘‘consent decrees,’’ in 

antitrust cases brought by the United 

States are subject to a 60-day comment 

period, after which the Court shall 

determine whether entry of the 

proposed final judgment ‘‘is in the 

public interest.’’ 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1). In 

making that determination, the Court, in 

accordance with the statute as amended 

in 2004, is required to consider: 

(A) the competitive impact of such 

judgment, including termination of 

alleged violations, provisions for 

enforcement and modification, duration 

of relief sought, anticipated effects of 

alternative remedies actually 

considered, whether its terms are 

ambiguous, and any other competitive 

considerations bearing upon the 

adequacy of such judgment that the 

court deems necessary to a 

determination of whether the consent 

judgment is in the public interest; and 

(B) the impact of entry of such 

judgment upon competition in the 

relevant market or markets, upon the 

public generally and individuals 

alleging specific injury from the 

violations set forth in the complaint 

including consideration of the public 

benefit, if any, to be derived from a 

determination of the issues at trial. 

Id. In considering these statutory 

factors, the Court’s inquiry is 

necessarily a limited one because the 

government is entitled to ‘‘broad 

discretion to settle with the defendant 

within the reaches of the public 

interest.’’ United States v. Microsoft 

Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 

1995); United States v. US Airways Grp., 

Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69, 75 (D.D.C. 2014) 

(‘‘court’s inquiry is limited’’ in Tunney 

Act settlements); United States v. InBev 

N.V./S.A., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, 

at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009) (similar). 

Under the Tunney Act a court 

considers, among other things, the 

relationship between the remedy 

secured and the specific allegations in 

the United States’ Complaint, whether 

the proposed final judgment is 

sufficiently clear, whether its 

enforcement mechanisms are sufficient, 

and whether it may positively harm 

third parties. See Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 

1458–62. With respect to the adequacy 

of the relief secured, a court may not 

‘‘make de novo determination of facts 

and issues.’’ United States v. W. Elec. 

Co., 993 F.2d 1572, 1577 (D.C. Cir. 

1993); see also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 

1460–62; United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 

152 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2001); 

United States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. 

Supp. 2d 10, 16 (D.D.C. 2000); InBev, 

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3. 

Instead, ‘‘[t]he balancing of competing 

social and political interests affected by 

a proposed antitrust decree must be left, 

in the first instance, to the discretion of 

the Attorney General.’’ W. Elec. Co., 993 

F.2d at 1577. ‘‘The court should also 

bear in mind the flexibility of the public 

interest inquiry: the court’s function is 

not to determine whether the resulting 

array of rights and liabilities is the one 

that will best serve society, but only to 

confirm that the resulting settlement is 

within the reaches of the public 

interest.’’ Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460; see 

also United States v. Deutsche Telekom 

AG, 2020 WL 1873555, at *7 (D.D.C. 

Apr. 14, 2020). More demanding 

requirements would ‘‘have enormous 

practical consequences for the 

government’s ability to negotiate future 

settlements,’’ contrary to congressional 

intent. Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1456. ‘‘The 

Tunney Act was not intended to create 

a disincentive to the use of the consent 

decree.’’ Id. The ultimate question is 

whether ‘‘the remedies [obtained by the 

final judgment are] so inconsonant with 

the allegations charged as to fall outside 

of the ‘reaches of the public interest.’ ’’ 

Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (quoting W. 

Elec. Co., 900 F.2d at 309). 

Moreover, the Tunney Act does not 

authorize the Court to ‘‘construct [its] 

own hypothetical case and then 

evaluate the decree against that case.’’ 

Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459; see also US 

Airways, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 75 (‘‘[A] 

court must simply determine whether 

there is a factual foundation for the 

government’s decisions such that its 

conclusions regarding the proposed 

settlements are reasonable.’’); InBev, 

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *20 

(‘‘[T]he ‘public interest’ is not to be 

measured by comparing the violations 

alleged in the complaint against those 

the court believes could have, or even 

should have, been alleged’’). Because 

the ‘‘court’s authority to review the 

decree depends entirely on the 

government’s exercising its 

prosecutorial discretion by bringing a 

case in the first place,’’ it follows that 

‘‘the court is only authorized to review 

the decree itself,’’ and not to ‘‘effectively 

redraft the complaint’’ to inquire into 

other matters that the United States did 

not pursue. Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459– 

60. 

In its 2004 amendments to the 

Tunney Act, Congress made clear its 

intent to preserve the practical benefits 

of using judgments proposed by the 

United States in antitrust enforcement, 

Public Law 108–237 § 221, and added 

the unambiguous instruction that 

‘‘[n]othing in this section shall be 

construed to require the court to 

conduct an evidentiary hearing or to 

require the court to permit anyone to 

intervene.’’ 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2); see also 

US Airways, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 76 (court 

is not required to hold an evidentiary 

hearing or to permit intervenors as part 

of its review under the Tunney Act). 

This language explicitly wrote into the 

statute what Congress intended when it 

first enacted the Tunney Act in 1974. As 

Senator Tunney explained: ‘‘[t]he court 

is nowhere compelled to go to trial or 

to engage in extended proceedings 

which might have the effect of vitiating 

the benefits of prompt and less costly 

settlement through the consent decree 

process.’’ 119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) 

(statement of Sen. Tunney). ‘‘A court 

can make its public interest 

determination based on the competitive 

impact statement and response to public 

comments alone.’’ US Airways, 38 F. 

Supp. 3d at 76 (citing Enova Corp., 107 

F. Supp. 2d at 17). 

III. The Complaint and the Proposed 

Final Judgment 

The Proposed Final Judgment is the 

culmination of approximately twentyone months of thorough investigation 

and vigorous litigation by the Antitrust 

Division of the U.S. Department of 

Justice concerning ASSA ABLOY’s 

proposed acquisition of Spectrum’s 

Hardware and Home Improvement 

division (‘‘Spectrum HHI’’). As alleged 

in the Complaint, ASSA ABLOY and 

Spectrum HHI were, at the time the 

Complaint was filed, close competitors 

with enormous market shares. 

Significant head-to-head competition 

between Defendants to sell residential 

door hardware historically generated 

lower prices, higher quality, exciting 

innovations, and superior customer 

service. The Complaint alleged that the 

combination of ASSA ABLOY and 


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Spectrum HHI would have eliminated 

those benefits. 

The Proposed Final Judgment is 

designed to mitigate as many risks to 

competition alleged in the Complaint as 

possible. Principally, the Proposed Final 

Judgment requires ASSA ABLOY divest 

to Fortune, or to another entity 

approved by the United States in its sole 

discretion, assets that the Defendants 

previously used to compete against each 

other in the United States. In connection 

with those divestitures, the Proposed 

Final Judgment mandates a specific 

transition period for entanglements 

between ASSA ABLOY and Fortune. It 

also subjects ASSA ABLOY to 

significant financial penalties if ASSA 

ABLOY fails to transfer the divestiture 

assets by December 31, 2023. 

Additionally, the Proposed Final 

Judgment provides for the appointment 

of a monitoring trustee to oversee 

Defendants’ compliance with the terms 

of the Proposed Final Judgment. 

Importantly, the Proposed Final 

Judgment also provides that the 

monitoring trustee can investigate 

whether the divestiture buyer will have 

replicated the competitive intensity in 

the residential smart locks market that 

existed pre-divestiture. If the monitoring 

trustee determines at least three years 

following the divestiture that the 

divested smart lock assets have 

diminished in competitive intensity and 

that such diminishment is in material 

part due to limitations on the acquirer’s 

right to use the Yale brand name or 

trademarks in the United States and 

Canada, then the United States may seek 

divestiture of additional ASSA ABLOY 

Yale-related assets. 

IV. Summary of Public Comment and 

the United States’ Response 

During the 60-day public comment 

period, the United States received one 

comment from an individual. After 

reviewing this comment, the United 

States continues to believe that the 

Court will conclude that the Proposed 

Final Judgment is in the public interest 

under the Tunney Act. 

A. Summary of Public Comment 

The commenter states that he believes 

the two transactions contemplated by 

the Proposed Final Judgment—ASSA 

ABLOY’s divestiture of assets to Fortune 

and ASSA ABLOY’s acquisition of 

Spectrum HHI—would violate the 

antitrust laws and harm both consumers 

and ‘‘the industry as a whole.’’ The 

commenter states that Fortune ‘‘has a 

track record of moving in a direction 

that is not always in the best interest of 

consumers and end users,’’ and that 

‘‘Fortune’s business model relies less 

and less on small business 

relationships.’’ Based on these views, 

the commenter states that the 

divestiture of the EMTEK brand to 

Fortune ‘‘could result in reduced 

competition and innovation.’’ He also 

posits that Fortune could obtain a ‘‘one 

sided market position’’ with respect to 

padlocks if ASSA ABLOY’s ‘‘Yale 

Mechanical hardware’’ is included in 

the divestiture. And, more generally, the 

commenter states that the transactions 

‘‘could give’’ ASSA ABLOY and Fortune 

‘‘a dominant market position,’’ 

apparently based on his belief that the 

transactions would bring Yale, Kwikset, 

Baldwin, and other brands under 

‘‘common ownership.’’ 

B. Response of the United States 

Nothing in the comment casts doubt 

on the United States’ determination that 

the Court will conclude that the 

Proposed Final Judgment is in the 

public interest under the Tunney Act. 

The commenter’s comment raises 

concerns that (1) misapprehend the 

nature of the Proposed Final Judgment, 

(2) reach beyond the scope of the harms 

alleged in the Complaint, and (3) are 

abstract and speculative. 

First, some aspects of the comment 

appear to misapprehend the nature of 

the Proposed Final Judgment. In 

particular, the commenter’s concern that 

the two transactions contemplated by 

the Proposed Final Judgment would 

result in Yale, Kwikset, and Baldwin 

‘‘shar[ing] common ownership’’ 

misunderstands which assets are being 

sold and retained by ASSA ABLOY. 

Under the Proposed Final Judgment, 

ASSA ABLOY is divesting the Yale 

brand in the United States and Canada 

to Fortune for all current and future 

residential and multifamily uses, and it 

requires ASSA ABLOY to stop using the 

Yale brand entirely in the United States 

and Canada following a transitional, 

wind-down period. Therefore, in the 

United States and Canada, contrary to 

the commenter’s statements, Baldwin, 

Yale, and Kwikset would not be under 

the control of the same company. 

Second, the comment raises concerns 

that go beyond the harms alleged in the 

Complaint. For example, the commenter 

expresses concern about concentration 

in a market for padlocks, potential harm 

from ‘‘reliance on overseas 

manufacturing,’’ and the inability of 

smaller distributors to ‘‘sustain[] healthy 

business practices,’’ none of which was 

alleged in the Complaint as a harm 

arising from the proposed transaction. 

The Complaint did not allege a product 

market that included padlocks. 

Therefore, these concerns extend 

beyond the permissible scope of Tunney 

Act review. See supra Part II. 

Third, the comment provides no 

specific basis to suggest that the Court 

will not find the Proposed Final 

Judgment to be in the public interest 

under the Tunney Act or any basis for 

‘‘exceptional confidence that adverse 

antitrust consequences will result.’’ 

Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460. The 

commenter does not elaborate on his 

concerns about Fortune’s ‘‘track record’’ 

and ‘‘business model.’’ Nor does the 

comment provide information sufficient 

to meet the Microsoft standard that 

demonstrates potential harm to 

competition in the market for premium 

mechanical door hardware or adverse 

effects on consumers. 

V. Conclusion 

After careful consideration of the 

comment received, the United States 

continues to believe that the Court will 

conclude that the Proposed Final 

Judgment is in the public interest under 

the Tunney Act. The United States will 

move the Court for entry of the 

Proposed Final Judgment after the 

public comment and this Response have 

been published in the Federal Register, 

pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 16(d). 

Dated: September 1, 2023 

Respectfully submitted, 

/s/Matthew R. Huppert 

lllllllllllllllllllll

Matthew R. Huppert (DC Bar #1010997) 

Miranda Isaacs 

Trial Attorneys, United States Department of 

Justice, Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth Street 

NW, Suite 8700, Washington, DC 20530, 

Telephone: (202) 476–0383, Email: 

Matthew.Huppert@usdoj.gov 

Counsel for Plaintiff United States of 

America 

APPENDIX A 

Dear Chief, Defense, Industrials, and 

Aerospace Section, 

I am writing to express my concern not 

only about the proposed acquisition of 

Spectrum Brands’ Hardware & Home 

Improvement (HHI) Division by Assa Abloy, 

but also about the divestiture of Emtek to 

Fortune Brands. I believe that both of these 

transactions would violate the antitrust laws 

of the United States and have a negative 

impact on consumers and the industry as a 

whole. There is not sufficient clarity if the 

Yale business unit (mechanical door 

hardware) will be included in divestiture or 

retained by Assa Abloy, either situation begs 

further consideration. 

In the case of Emtek and Schaub, the 

divestiture to Fortune Brands could result in 

reduced competition and innovation in the 

lock and hardware industry. Fortune Brands 

has a track record of moving in a direction 

that is not always in the best interest of 

consumers and end users, which could have 

a negative impact on the industry as a whole. 

This could result in fewer options for 


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consumers, lesser quality products that do 

not have the longevity consumers have come 

to expect and ultimately harm the industry. 

Fortune’s business model relies less and less 

on small business relationships, rather they 

are actively moving away from these smaller 

companies in favor of larger distributors, big 

box stores, online retailers, etc. Since it is not 

clear if Yale Mechanical hardware (different 

from Smart locks) will be included in the 

divestiture, please note that the Masterlock 

Brand along with Yale’s padlocks could make 

for one sided market position. Also of note, 

Schaub’s product offering is not considered 

Mechanical door hardware. 

Furthermore, the combination of Assa 

Abloy’s acquisition of Spectrum Brands’ HHI 

division and Fortune Brands’ acquisition of 

Emtek could give these companies a 

dominant market position in the residential 

lock and hardware industry. This could lead 

to higher prices, reduced innovation, and 

further reliance on overseas manufacturing 

where quality is often sacrificed and 

corporate profits are favored. The harm small 

and medium-sized businesses could 

experience is not conducive to sustaining 

healthy business practices that rely on these 

companies for their lock and hardware needs. 

Specifically, regarding the acquisition of 

Spectrum Brands’ HHI division by Assa 

Abloy, consideration must be given to the 

reduced intensity of competition that could 

take place should the following door 

hardware brands share common ownership: 

Yale, Kwikset, Baldwin, Weiser, National 

Hardware, EZset. 

I urge the Department of Justice to carefully 

consider the implications of both the 

proposed acquisition of Spectrum Brands’ 

HHI division by Assa Abloy and the 

divestiture of Emtek and Schaub to Fortune 

Brands. The value of small businesses to our 

economy, especially in the Residential 

housing market is not to be taken lightly. 

The antitrust laws are in place to protect 

the American people, and I trust that the 

Department of Justice will take the necessary 

steps to ensure fair competition in the 

market. 

I wish to thank Attorney General Merrick 

Garland and Deputy Attorney General Lisa 

Monaco for their high level of service to the 

American People. 

Thank you for your time and consideration 

in this matter. 

Sincerely, 

Joseph Storrs 

[FR Doc. 2023–19530 Filed 9–8–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–11–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Notice of Lodging of Proposed 

Consent Decree Under the Toxic 

Substances Control Act 

On September 5, 2023, the 

Department of Justice lodged a proposed 

Consent Decree (the ‘‘Consent Decree’’) 

with the District Court of the Southern 

District of New York in a lawsuit 

entitled United States of America v. 

Apex Building Company, Inc., Civil 

Action No. 23–cv–007838. 

In this action, the United States seeks, 

as provided under Toxic Substances 

Control Act (‘‘TSCA’’), injunctive relief 

from Apex Building Company, Inc., 

among others, in connection with the 

defendant’s unlawful work practices 

during renovations governed by an 

implementing regulation of the TSCA— 

the Renovation, Repair, and Painting 

Rule, 40 CFR part 745. The proposed 

consent decree resolves the United 

States’ claims, requires Apex Building 

Company, Inc. to pay $606,706, and 

imposes injunctive relief. 

The publication of this notice opens 

the public comment on the proposed 

settlement. Comments should be 

addressed to the Assistant Attorney 

General, Environment and Natural 

Resources Division, and should refer to 

United States of America v. Apex 

Building Company, Inc., DJ #90–5–2–1– 

12388. All comments must be submitted 

no later than 30 days after the 

publication date of this notice. 

Comments may be submitted either by 

email or by mail: 

To submit 

comments: Send them to: 

By email ....... pubcomment-ees.enrd@

usdoj.gov. 

By mail ......... Assistant Attorney General,U.S. DOJ—ENRD, 

P.O. Box 7611, Washington, D.C. 20044–7611. 

During the public comment period, 

the settlement may be examined and 

downloaded at this Justice Department 

website: https://www.usdoj.gov/enrd/ 

Consent_Decrees.html. We will provide 

a paper copy of the settlement upon 

written request and payment of 

reproduction costs. Please email your 

request and payment to: Consent Decree 

Library, U.S. DOJ–ENRD, P.O. Box 7611, 

Washington, DC 20044–7611. 

Please enclose a check or money order 

for $13.00 (25 cents per page 

reproduction cost) payable to the United 

States Treasury. 

Henry S. Friedman, 

Assistant Section Chief, Environmental 

Enforcement Section, Environment and 

Natural Resources Division. 

[FR Doc. 2023–19532 Filed 9–8–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–15–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

[OMB Number 1117–0009] 

Agency Information Collection 

Activities; Proposed eCollection 

eComments Requested; Extension of a 

Previously Approved Collection; 

Controlled Substances Import/Export 

Declaration 

AGENCY: Drug Enforcement 

Administration, Department of Justice. 

ACTION: 60-Day notice. 

SUMMARY: The Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA), Department of 

Justice (DOJ), will be submitting the 

following information collection request 

to the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) for review and approval in 

accordance with the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995. 

DATES: Comments are encouraged and 

will be accepted for 60 days until 

November 13, 2023. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If 

you have additional comments 

especially on the estimated public 

burden or associated response time, 

suggestions, or need a copy of the 

proposed information collection 

instrument with instructions or 

additional information, please contact 

Scott A. Brinks, Regulatory Drafting and 

Policy Support Section, Drug 

Enforcement Administration; Mailing 

Address: 8701 Morrissette Drive, 

Springfield, Virginia 22152; Telephone: 

(571) 362–3261, Email: scott.a.brinks@

dea.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Written 

comments and suggestions from the 

public and affected agencies concerning 

the proposed collection of information 

are encouraged. Your comments should 

address one or more of the following 

four points: 

—Evaluate whether the proposed 

collection of information is necessary 

for the proper performance of the 

functions of the Bureau of Justice 

Statistics, including whether the 

information will have practical utility; 

—Evaluate the accuracy of the agency’s 

estimate of the burden of the 

proposed collection of information, 

including the validity of the 

methodology and assumptions used; 

—Evaluate whether and if so how the 

quality, utility, and clarity of the 

information to be collected can be 

enhanced; and 

—Minimize the burden of the collection 

of information on those who are to 

respond, including through the use of 

appropriate automated, electronic, 

mechanical, or other technological 


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