Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and 

Kinser, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 

CHAUNCEY JACOB JACKSON 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record Nos. 971720 & 971721 SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 

 April 17, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

Lydia Calvert Taylor, Judge 

 In these appeals, we review a capital murder conviction, a 

sentence of death (Record No. 971720), and five other related 

felony convictions (Record No. 971721). 

I. PROCEEDINGS 

 On September 1, 1994, 16-year-old Chauncey Jacob Jackson 

was arrested and incarcerated on charges of capital murder and 

five other felonies.1 The alleged crimes had all occurred the 

day before. On September 21, 1994, the Norfolk Juvenile and 

Domestic Relations District Court issued transfer orders 

pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.1, certifying Jackson to the circuit 

court for criminal proceedings as an adult on those charges. 

On October 5, 1994, indictments were issued in the circuit 

court charging Jackson with the following six felonies: (1) the 

capital murder of Ronald Gene Bonney, Jr., while attempting to 

rob him (Code §§ 18.2-31(4), 18.2-10), (2) attempted robbery 

 

1

 Although Jackson's middle name is shown as "Jacob" in the 

pleadings and in many of the documents in the file, he described 

and spelled it as "Jabob" in his statements to the police. 
(Code §§ 18.2-58, 18.2-26), (3) and (4) two charges of the use 

of a firearm while committing the above-mentioned offenses (Code 

§§ 18.2-53.1, 18.2-10), (5) the conspiracy to commit a robbery 

(Code §§ 18.2-22, 18.2-58, 18.2-10), and (6) the receipt of 

stolen property (§§ 18.2-108, 18.2-95). The trial date was 

fixed and continued eight times, six times on Jackson’s motion 

and two times on joint motion of Jackson and the Commonwealth. 

During the 23-month interval between the date of the 

transfer order and August 21, 1996, when Jackson’s trial began, 

it was discovered that indictments had been issued before the 

circuit court conducted the review of Jackson’s transfer 

required by Code § 16.1-269.6. On June 23, 1995, after 

conducting the required review, a circuit judge other than the 

trial judge concluded that the applicable statutes had been 

complied with and authorized the Commonwealth to proceed against 

Jackson by indictment. However, Jackson was not indicted on 

these charges for the second time until December 6, 1995. 

 At the beginning of a bifurcated jury trial on August 21, 

1996, Jackson was arraigned on the December 1995 indictments. 

The trial was conducted pursuant to the provisions of Code 

§§ 19.2-264.3, -264.4, and –295.1, and Jackson was found guilty 

of all six charges. After hearing additional evidence, the jury 

fixed Jackson’s punishment for the capital murder conviction at 

death, based on the “future dangerousness” predicate. Code 

2
§ 19.2-264.2. After considering a report prepared by a 

probation officer pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.5, the court 

sentenced Jackson in accordance with the jury verdict in the 

capital murder case. Since he was a juvenile when the offenses 

were committed, the court sentenced Jackson on the remaining 

offenses in conformity with Code §§ 16.1-269.1 and -272 to terms 

of imprisonment aggregating 48 years. The court suspended 

eighteen years of the sentence for the conviction of receiving 

stolen goods, subject to 20 years’ probation. 

 Pursuant to Code § 17-110.1(F), we have consolidated the 

automatic review of Jackson’s death sentence with the appeal of 

right of his capital murder conviction. By order entered August 

14, 1997, Jackson’s appeal of his other convictions was 

certified from the Court of Appeals, Code § 17-116.06, and we 

have consolidated that appeal with the capital murder appeal and 

given them priority on our docket. Code § 17-110.2. 

II. THE EVIDENCE 

 We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the circuit court. Roach 

v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 329, 468 S.E.2d 98, 101, cert. 

denied, 519 U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 365 (1996). 

A. Guilt Phase 

The day after Bonney’s murder, Jackson made a series of 

four oral statements to police investigators. The first 

3
statement was not recorded, but the remaining three statements 

were recorded and transcribed. The following facts appear in 

one or more of those statements. 

On the evening of August 31, 1994, Jackson was riding in a 

Jeep Cherokee driven by his friend, Rashad Vick. Vick stopped 

the vehicle when three other friends, standing near a so-called 

"dope house" on Vine Street, waved at them. One of the three 

friends suggested robbing a man, later identified as Ronald Gene 

Bonney, Jr., who was within sight, seated in the driver’s seat 

of a Chevrolet Blazer parked nearby. Jackson and Vick agreed. 

Accordingly, two of the group acted as "lookouts." Jackson 

procured a .25 caliber Beretta handgun from the Jeep. 

Accompanied by Calvin Outlaw and Angelo Artis, the other two 

members of the group, Jackson approached the parked vehicle. 

Outlaw placed his leg against the driver’s door, next to Bonney, 

and later took the keys from the ignition switch when Bonney 

tried to drive away. Jackson, armed with the handgun, entered 

the front seat of the vehicle from the passenger’s side, and, 

according to his last statement, Jackson told Bonney to “[g]ive 

it up.” Bonney then “started patting his pockets and said, 

‘Give what up?’ . . . . And then [Bonney] said, ‘Shoot me, you 

little f--ker.’ And then I cocked the gun, and then Angelo 

stepped up, and the gun jammed, and I tried to unjam it, and it 

shot.” The gun fired three bullets which hit Bonney in the 

4
chest and arm and caused his death. 

Jackson fled in the Jeep. He was arrested late that night 

and brought to police investigators for an interview at 7:20 

a.m. 

B. Penalty Phase

The Commonwealth introduced evidence of Jackson’s criminal 

record. It began with a finding that he was not innocent of the 

theft of a car when he was 13 years old and included, a few 

months later, a finding that he was not innocent of receiving 

stolen property. When Jackson was 14 years old, he was also 

found not innocent of possession of cocaine. Additionally, 

Jackson was found not innocent of a number of offenses dealing 

with motor vehicles, such as unauthorized use of an inspection 

sticker, driving without a license, altered license plates, and 

speeding. Many of the offenses were committed while Jackson was 

on probation for earlier offenses. 

Jackson had been incarcerated for more than 13 months on 

the present charges when he was released on bond on October 24, 

1995. In December 1995, while free on bond awaiting trial for 

the subject offenses, Jackson was involved with several other 

persons in the unlawful entry of a house in Jackson’s 

neighborhood, and later convicted of the following 14 felony 

charges arising therefrom: statutory burglary, four abductions, 

5
robbery, attempted robbery, and seven charges of use of a 

firearm during the commission of those crimes. 

Additionally, an inmate testified that Jackson, again 

incarcerated after the December 1995 incidents, assaulted him in 

jail on February 9, 1996. This assault occurred less than two 

months after Jackson had committed the December 1995 crimes and 

before his capital murder trial in August and September 1996. 

Jackson called as witnesses Dr. Evan S. Nelson and Dr. 

Thomas Pasquale, both forensic psychologists, who had examined 

and evaluated him. Both testified that Jackson had an 

antisocial personality disorder, basing their diagnosis in part 

on Jackson’s history of aggressive acts. Dr. Nelson assessed 

Jackson as having a high number of “risk factors” for violent 

conduct and Dr. Pasquale at one time had evaluated Jackson as 

being a “moderate to severe [assault] risk.” However, both 

psychologists declined to say that Jackson would be a future 

danger to society. Dr. Nelson felt that an affirmative answer 

to the question required a psychologist to “predict with 

certainty that someone will commit an offense of violence in the 

future.” Dr. Pasquale “follow[ed] the guidelines of the 

American Psychological Association" which state that 

“psychologists are best not to make such predictions due to the 

fact that we have not developed the circumstances sufficiently 

to be able to do so.” 

6
Although both psychologists testified that an antisocial 

personality disorder cannot be cured, Dr. Pasquale opined that a 

person with such a disorder could be “amenable to management.” 

On the other hand, Dr. Nelson thought that Jackson’s history of 

continued violent acts, especially when under the constraints of 

probation, bond, and incarceration awaiting trial on these 

charges, was a “very negative indicator for how much change 

[from his violent acts against Bonney] we can expect from him 

over the years.” 

 Jackson’s mother and grandmother, with whom Jackson lived, 

testified that Jackson had been a normal child, and that they 

had a good relationship with him. The grandmother said that 

Jackson had been a good boy “until, you know, he got with the 

wrong bunch of kids.” And the mother testified that Jackson 

received a “long-term” suspension from school because, while 

waiting in the school office for some sort of a disciplinary 

interview, Jackson had told another student that he would kill 

“somebody” if he were suspended from school. 

Neighbors and persons who had contact with Jackson when he 

was living at home described him as “respectful,” “polite,” and 

“courteous.” A member of Jackson’s community also testified 

that Jackson called her to ask “how [she] was doing” after an 

operation. 

7
One of the members of the family that was burglarized and 

robbed by Jackson and other intruders in December 1995 testified 

that she knew Jackson and that he “just stood there” and “had 

some tears in his eyes” during the robbery. However, she also 

testified that Jackson had a gun and, like the other intruders, 

was wearing a hood that partially masked his face. 

III. WAIVER OF CERTAIN ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

Jackson did not brief, and has therefore waived, 

assignments of error 6, 9, 12, 21, 29, and 32. Rule 5:27; Rule 

5:17(c)(4); Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 537, 450 

S.E.2d 365, 372 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1161 (1995).2

IV. ISSUES PREVIOUSLY DECIDED 

 In the remaining assignments of error, Jackson raises a 

number of issues which we have previously decided adversely to 

his contentions. Because he offers no persuasive reasons to 

modify our previous conclusions, and we perceive none, we will 

adhere to our previous rejections of those contentions. Hence, 

we will not discuss these contentions beyond identifying the 

assignments of error to which we believe each contention relates 

and citing representative cases in which those arguments were 

 

2

 It has been difficult to ascertain which assignments of error 

have been briefed or which of the 37 assignments of error relate 

to the 29 questions presented by Jackson. Jackson has not given 

“a clear and exact reference to the particular assignment of 

error to which each question relates” as required by Rule 5:27 

8
expressly rejected. 

The death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 

Rejected in Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 453, 470 S.E.2d 

114, 122, cert. denied, 519 U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 222 (1996); 

Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 82, 452 S.E.2d 862, 865, 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 876 (1995). 

“[I]mposition of the death penalty based on ‘future 

dangerousness’ is unconstitutional because the use of [a] prior 

unadjudicated factor is permitted without any requirement that 

the conduct be established by any standard of proof.” Rejected 

in Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 74-75, 445 S.E.2d 670, 

675, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 97l (1994); Satcher v. Commonwealth, 

244 Va. 220, 228, 421 S.E.2d 821, 826 (1992), cert. denied, 507 

U.S. 933 (1993); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 192, 210, 402 

S.E.2d 196, 206, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902 (1991). 

The statute and the court’s instructions in conformity 

thereto which permit imposition of the death penalty based on 

“future dangerousness” are unconstitutional because they are 

“incomplete and vague” and do not provide “meaning and 

guidance.” Rejected in Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. at 

535, 450 S.E.2d at 371. 

Allowing the introduction of evidence of Jackson’s 

 

and 5:17(c)(4). Indeed, he rarely refers to the assignments of 

error by number in the arguments in his brief. 

9
convictions for other crimes in the sentencing phase to 

establish future dangerousness violates the double jeopardy 

clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 

Rejected in Mickens v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 395, 404, 442 

S.E.2d 678, 684-85, vacated on other grounds, 513 U.S. 922 

(1994); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 229, 427 S.E.2d 

394, 400, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 848 (1993); Yeatts v. 

Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 126, 410 S.E.2d 254, 258 (1991), 

cert. denied, 503 U.S. 946 (1992). 

This Court’s method of reviewing the proportionality of the 

sentence by considering the records only of those murder cases 

in which sentences of death were imposed and not of those murder 

cases in which lesser sentences were imposed is invalid. 

Rejected in Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 283-84, 257 

S.E.2d 808, 824 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980) (“test 

is not whether a jury may have declined to recommend the death 

penalty in a particular case but whether generally juries in 

this jurisdiction impose the death sentence for conduct similar 

to that of the defendant”). 

V. PRETRIAL MATTERS 

A. Discovery of Exculpatory Evidence

Jackson complains that the trial court did not “order 

appropriate relief” when it failed to require the Commonwealth 

to produce “exculpatory statements, evidence or admissions,” and 

10
to “ensure that no such evidence existed; or, in the event that 

it did exist, that it be provided for counsel for the 

defendant.” However, he does not state in what respects the 

court failed to provide such relief or how Jackson was 

prejudiced thereby. 

As the Commonwealth observes on brief, the record indicates 

that Jackson was supplied with all exculpatory evidence within 

the Commonwealth’s knowledge, which he used at trial. 

Accordingly, we find no merit in this contention. 

B. Suppression of Jackson’s Statements to Police

Jackson does not dispute the sufficiency of the 

Commonwealth's evidence indicating that before his in-custody 

interrogation by the police, he was fully advised of his Fifth 

Amendment rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 

436, 467-73, 479 (1966). Although a juvenile, Jackson was not 

unfamiliar with these rights as evidenced by his statement to 

Investigator John R. Malbon that he had previously been arrested 

and informed of his legal rights "about three times." Malbon 

testified that while being advised of his rights, Jackson 

appeared "calm" and "alert." In any case, Jackson does not 

contend that he failed to understand either his rights or the 

effect of a waiver but rather that the police engaged in a 

strategy designed to capitalize on Jackson's youth and 

isolation. His claim is that the police interrogated him for 

11
"approximately 25 to 28 hours" and placed him “in a situation 

where he was deprived of sleep, deprived of the advice and 

counsel of his mother, [and he] was placed in a small windowless 

interrogation room for hours on end, and denied repeated access 

by his parent to him despite her best efforts.” 

We find no support in the record for Jackson’s statement 

that he was deprived of sleep and interrogated for 25 to 28 

hours. Jackson was brought to the Norfolk Police Department on 

the night of Bonney’s murder and put in a temporary holding 

cell. Although he was awakened several times during the night 

and offered food, water, and use of the bathroom, Jackson was 

permitted to sleep until 7:05 the following morning. 

The investigators interrogated Jackson four separate times 

between 7:20 a.m. and 1:59 the next morning. These sessions, 

together with related contacts setting up the interviews and 

permitting Jackson to review the written transcripts of the 

preceding two interrogations, totaled four hours and thirtyeight minutes. The longest uninterrupted period of contact with 

Jackson was one hour and twenty minutes. After each contact, 

Jackson was left alone either in a locked cell or a locked 

interview room while police investigated the accuracy of his 

statements. 

Jackson decided not to testify at the pretrial hearing on 

the admissibility of his confession and called his mother, Carol 

12
Lee Jackson, as his only witness on this subject. Her testimony 

focused primarily on the alleged delay by the police in 

permitting her to see her son. 

Jackson does not claim that he asked for the presence of 

his mother,3 but suggests that police interrogation of a 16-yearold juvenile without the presence of one of his parents is a 

violation of his constitutional rights. In Wright v. 

Commonwealth, 245 Va. 177, 185-86, 427 S.E.2d 379, 385-86 

(1993), vacated on other grounds, 512 U.S. 1217 (1994), we 

rejected the contention of a juvenile capital murder defendant 

that his confession was involuntary in part because his mother 

was not present at the interrogation. Like Jackson, Wright had 

been advised of his rights when arrested on prior occasions and 

had knowingly waived those rights before making the statement at 

issue. Perceiving no significant difference between the 

situation in Wright and the situation in this case, we reject 

Jackson's suggestion. 

The alleged police delay in honoring Ms. Jackson’s request 

to see her son is irrelevant to the issue of the voluntariness 

of his statements. As the United States Supreme Court observed 

in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986), “[e]vents 

 

3

 Jackson did ask whether his mother was in the building during 

his interrogation and was told that she was not. Therefore, we 

do not consider the effect, if any, of a police officer's 

13
occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely 

unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to 

comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right." In 

Moran, the police failed to tell a suspect in custody that his 

attorney was trying to reach him. Id. at 433. Under these 

circumstances, the Constitution of Virginia provides no greater 

protection than the Fifth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution. See Walton v. City of Roanoke, 204 Va. 678, 682, 

133 S.E.2d 315, 318 (1963). Hence, we find no violation of 

Jackson’s rights under either constitution because of the 

failure of the police to permit Ms. Jackson immediate access to 

her son. For these reasons, we conclude that Jackson's 

statements were the product of his free will, made after a 

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda

rights. See Wright, 245 Va. at 185-86, 427 S.E.2d at 385-86. 

C. Change of Venue 

Jackson complains that the trial court denied him the 

opportunity to present evidence of pre-trial publicity. 

Jackson further alleges that the trial court had “clearly made 

up her mind on the issue of pre-trial publicity, and ultimately 

on the motion for change of venue.” 

 Contrary to these claims, the record shows that the trial 

 

failure to honor a request by a juvenile for the presence of a 

parent or guardian during an in-custody interrogation. 

14
court merely told Jackson’s counsel that his oral proffer was 

insufficient to schedule a hearing on this issue at that time. 

However, the court permitted counsel a period of more than three 

weeks in which to produce affidavits indicating that an 

impartial jury could not be selected in Norfolk, after which the 

court would consider fixing a date to hear evidence from both 

sides on that issue. No affidavits were produced and, in fact, 

Jackson filed no newspaper articles or other information with 

the court. 

Thus, the court was not presented with evidence sufficient 

to overcome the "presumption that a defendant can receive a fair 

trial from the citizens of the county or city in which the 

offense occurred.” Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 137, 

314 S.E.2d 371, 379, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984). Hence, 

we reject this contention. 

D. Jury Matters

1. Refusal to strike entire venire 

 As prospective members of the jury sat in the courtroom 

completing jury questionnaires, the court conducted sentencing 

proceedings in an unrelated matter and explained to those 

parties that, although a defendant in a pre-1995 case may be 

eligible for parole, an exact calculation of how much time he 

would serve was impossible. Jackson asked the court to strike 

15
the panel because this explanation was made within the hearing 

of his venire. 

As soon as Jackson raised the issue, the court asked the 

entire venire who among them had heard its discussion. Although 

20 panel members indicated that they had heard parts of the 

court’s explanations, none of them was among the venire 

comprising panel members from whom the jury was actually 

selected. Under these circumstances, we find no error in the 

trial court’s refusal to strike the entire venire. 

2. Peremptory strikes by the Commonwealth 

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986), the United 

States Supreme Court held that purposeful discrimination based 

on race in selecting jurors violates the Equal Protection 

Clause. If an accused makes a prima facie showing of the 

prosecution’s use of peremptory strikes on the basis of race, 

the burden shifts to the prosecution to articulate race-neutral 

reasons for such strikes. Chichester v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 

311, 323, 448 S.E.2d 638, 646 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 

1166 (1995). 

In exercising its peremptory strikes, the Commonwealth 

removed four black members of the venire. When challenged as to 

the reasons for three of the four strikes, the Commonwealth gave 

the following explanations: one prospective juror had “fairly 

recent DUI and CCW convictions,” another’s son had been 

16
convicted of firearm possession and for selling drugs, and the 

third was a social services employee. One of the prosecutors 

with experience with social services employees found them to be 

“fairly liberal” and without exception possessed of a belief 

that treatment rather than punishment was a more appropriate way 

of dealing with juvenile offenders. 

Jackson, who is black, does not attack the racial neutrality 

of these statements; instead he claims that they were pretextual 

explanations designed to mask racially discriminatory reasons 

for the peremptory strikes. Concluding that Jackson has failed 

to carry his burden of showing that the court abused its 

discretion in accepting those explanations, we find no merit in 

this contention. See James v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 459, 461-

62, 442 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1994). 

3. Refusal to grant Jackson’s strikes for cause 

In reviewing a trial court’s action in denying a motion to 

strike prospective jurors for cause, absent manifest error, we 

defer to the trial court’s exercise of discretion. Roach, 251 

Va. at 343, 468 S.E.2d at 109; Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 

at 134, 410 S.E.2d at 262. Applying this standard, we find no 

error in the trial court’s refusal to sustain Jackson’s motions 

to strike the following three prospective jurors for cause. 

Robert Lee was one of a group of five prospective jurors 

present when another member of the group asked whether the jury 

17
would be able to “say no to the death penalty and yes to life 

but life without parole?” The court responded: 

No. The jury has very limited things they’re told to 

do. They can only do what they’re told to do. They 

can say life or they can say death. That’s all 

they're allowed to do. 

The court offered to discuss the matter further with the five 

members of the venire and to ask them whether her explanation 

had affected the venire members in any way prejudicial to 

Jackson. Jackson declined both offers. Hence, he waived any 

objection he may have had to the court’s response. 

Prospective juror Elizabeth Huffman’s first cousin was the 

wife of the Commonwealth’s attorney for the City of Norfolk. 

The Commonwealth was represented throughout the trial by two 

assistant Commonwealth's attorneys; the Commonwealth’s attorney 

signed none of the pleadings and did not appear at trial. 

 Ms. Huffman testified that she generally saw her cousin’s 

husband only twice a year at family gatherings and that her 

limited association with him would not affect her ability to 

give Jackson a fair trial. However, Jackson claims that, 

because she indicated that these family gatherings were at 

Christmas and other important holidays, she “gave the 

insurmountable appearance of bias for a juror in a capital 

murder case.” We do not agree. 

18
The relationship Ms. Huffman had with the Commonwealth’s 

attorney does not disqualify her from sitting on this jury. See

Roach, 251 Va. at 343, 468 S.E.2d at 109 (Commonwealth’s 

attorney in capital murder case formerly represented prospective 

juror in matter and prospective juror still regarded him as his 

“personal attorney"); Wise v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 322, 325, 

337 S.E.2d 715, 717 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1112 (1986) 

(Commonwealth’s attorney “golfing buddy” and “long standing” 

friend of prospective juror). 

An illiterate juror was seated over Jackson’s objection. 

Recognizing that illiteracy does not disqualify a juror under 

any statute in Virginia, Jackson contends that seating such a 

person as a juror violates “his rights under the Fifth, Sixth 

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution” and 

the “strong public policy against seating illiterate jurors.” 

Jackson claims that such a policy is reflected in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1865, which requires a juror in the federal courts to be able 

to read, write, and understand the English language. Jackson 

argues that “he had the benefit of at most, eleven jurors [and] 

[i]t is unknown what one juror or more, may have said to [the 

illiterate juror] or whether they made any mistakes, intentional 

or unintentional, in reading the written materials.” 

We do not agree with Jackson. In Virginia, illiteracy does 

not automatically disqualify a person from serving as a juror if 

19
the trial court takes steps to assure that the illiterate juror 

has essentially the same opportunity to review the written 

material in the case as the other jurors. Here, the record 

indicates that virtually all the documentary evidence, the 

court’s instructions to the jury, and the verdict forms were 

read to the jury, and that the illiterate juror was able to have 

any documents read to her by the other jurors. And we assume 

that the other jurors accurately read the documents to the 

illiterate juror. 

E. Circuit Court Review of Juvenile Court

 Transfer Proceedings

Jackson raises a number of issues stemming from the ninemonth period before the circuit court reviewed the juvenile 

court’s transfer order. 

As relevant, Code § 16.1-269.6(B) in effect in September 

1994 provided that: 

The circuit court shall, within a reasonable time 

after receipt of the case from the juvenile court (i) 

examine all such papers, reports and orders; (ii) if 

either the juvenile or the attorney for the 

Commonwealth has appealed the transfer decision, 

conduct a hearing to take further evidence on the 

issue of transfer, to determine if there has been 

substantial compliance with § 16.1-269.1, . . . and 

(iii) enter an order either remanding the case to the 

juvenile court or advising the attorney for the 

Commonwealth that he may seek an indictment. 

As we have noted earlier, there was no such review before the 

October 1994 indictments were returned. The review occurred on 

20
July 23, 1995. 

Jackson maintains that the court should have sustained his 

motion to quash the October 1994 indictments on the ground that 

they were issued before the circuit court had entered its July 

1995 order authorizing the Commonwealth to proceed by indictment 

against him. The Commonwealth responds that no such review was 

required in this case because neither party appealed the 

transfer order. 

We do not agree with the Commonwealth. The statute clearly 

required this review, even if neither party filed an appeal to 

the juvenile court’s transfer order. If such an appeal is 

filed, the statute required the circuit court to schedule a 

hearing in addition to its review.4

Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court had no 

jurisdiction to try Jackson on the October 1994 indictments. 

Even so, the court had jurisdiction over Jackson following the 

required circuit court review of the transfer order and it could 

and did try him on the indictments issued thereafter. 

 This brings us to Jackson’s contentions that the court 

should have sustained his motion to dismiss the December 1995

indictments. The Commonwealth's attorney sought and obtained 

 

4

 The statute presently in effect does not require the review if 

the transfer decision is not appealed. Code § 16.1-269.6(B); II 

Acts of Assembly 1996, c. 755, p. 1338. 

21
those indictments in accordance with the circuit court’s 

authorization order entered after its transfer review in June 

1995. Jackson reasons that the circuit court never acquired 

jurisdiction over him because it failed to act upon the juvenile 

court’s transfer order within a reasonable time, as required by 

Code § 16.1-269.6(B), and he never had the benefit of a 

subsequent and more current juvenile court transfer review prior 

to his December 1995 indictments. We find no merit in either 

contention. 

Although the requirement of a transfer review is 

jurisdictional, the time within which that review must be made 

is procedural. Jamborsky v. Baskins, 247 Va. 506, 511, 442 

S.E.2d 636, 638-39 (1994). In Jamborsky, we concluded that, 

absent a showing of prejudice to the juvenile’s due process 

rights, a procedural error in conducting the review three days 

after the then statutorily specified 21-day period for review, 

did not invalidate the review. Id., 442 S.E.2d at 638. 

Here, the nine-month period before conducting the review 

was unreasonable and constituted a procedural error in failing 

to comply with the statute in effect at that time. However, 

Jackson does not claim that he was prejudiced by the delay in 

conducting the review. Indeed, the record indicates that 

Jackson treated the case as properly before the circuit court

and continued his preparation in the same manner before and 

22
after he was told on October 24, 1995, of the circuit court’s 

failure to conduct the review of his transfer order within a 

reasonable time. The record fails to disclose that the 

procedural error prejudiced Jackson in such a manner as to 

constitute a denial of due process. See id. Accordingly, we 

find no merit in this contention. 

F. Violation of Rights to a Speedy Trial

This brings us to Jackson’s contention that his 

constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial have been 

violated. Jackson’s trial did not begin within the periods 

fixed for a speedy trial by Code § 19.2-243 and it may not have 

begun within a period considered as constitutionally permissible 

under normal circumstances. 

However, we find no violation of those rights in these 

cases. As we have noted, every continuance was either on 

Jackson’s motion alone or a motion he made jointly with the 

Commonwealth. Under these circumstances, we conclude that 

Jackson has waived his statutory and constitutional rights to a 

speedy trial. O’Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 681, 364 

S.E.2d 491, 496, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988); see also

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 534 (1972). 

Nevertheless, since the circuit court had no jurisdiction 

to try him on the October 1994 indictments, Jackson contends 

that the waivers of his speedy trial rights before his release 

23
on bond in October of 1995 were as void as those indictments. 

In deciding whether to transfer Jackson for proper criminal 

proceedings, Code § 16.1-269.1(2) requires the juvenile court to 

find “that probable cause exists to believe that the juvenile 

committed the delinquent act as alleged.” The delinquent acts 

alleged were the commissions of six felonies referred to 

earlier. Accordingly, Jackson’s speedy trial rights attached 

upon that determination of probable cause. Compare Code § 16.1-

269.1(2) with Code § 19.2-243 (speedy trial rights of an accused 

attach upon general district court’s finding of probable cause 

“to believe that the accused has committed a felony”). 

It was those rights that Jackson waived in his motions for 

a continuance of the trial, not any right having to do with the 

validity of the indictments returned against him in the circuit 

court. For these reasons, we reject this contention. 

VI. THE TRIAL 

A. Guilt Phase Issues

1. Testimony of Lakisha Spruill 

Shortly before the expected close of the Commonwealth’s 

case in chief, it appeared that a recess until the next day 

would be required to obtain the presence of a witness for 

Jackson. To conserve trial time, the court suggested that the 

Commonwealth rest its case except for some evidence relating to 

Jackson’s failure to conform to court orders to appear in 

24
criminal matters and his flight to avoid arrest on an unrelated 

motor vehicle charge. Defense counsel responded that “I think 

procedurally we cannot do that.” When the court responded that 

it was “a perfectly acceptable procedure,” defense counsel made 

and argued the motion to strike, which the court considered and 

denied. 

The next day, the Commonwealth called Lakisha Spruill, an 

eyewitness to Jackson's encounter with Bonney. Jackson objected 

to this action on the ground that the Commonwealth had rested 

its case. Jackson did not claim that he would be surprised by 

Spruill’s testimony or that he had not talked to her about her 

testimony. In fact, he had summoned her as a witness. The 

court overruled the objection, assigning a number of reasons for 

its action, one of which was that it had the discretion to vary 

the order of trial. 

Jackson argues that he was prejudiced by the court’s action 

(1) in requiring him to argue the motion to strike in which he 

pointed out the lack of corroboration of Jackson’s attempted 

robbery of Bonney before the Commonwealth had actually rested 

its case, and (2) in permitting Spruill to testify after Jackson 

had made his motion to strike. 

In the absence of a showing of prejudice, a trial court 

may, in the exercise of its discretion, permit the Commonwealth 

to reopen its case after it has rested and the defendant has 

25
moved to strike the evidence. Hargraves v. Commonwealth, 219 

Va. 604, 608, 248 S.E.2d 814, 816-17 (1978). We will not 

reverse such a ruling, absent an abuse of discretion. Id. 

Under the circumstances of this case, and without necessarily 

approving the procedure followed, we are unable to say that the 

court abused its discretion in permitting the Commonwealth to 

call Spruill as a witness after it had rested its case. Nor can 

we say that the trial court erred in holding that Jackson was 

not prejudiced by its action. 

2. Rulings on sufficiency of evidence 

 Jackson contends that the court erred in overruling his 

motions to strike made at the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s 

case and after both parties had rested their case in the guilt 

phase because the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to 

convict him of the crime of attempted robbery. He bases his 

claim upon the Commonwealth’s alleged failure to sustain its 

burden of proving that this crime has been committed (the corpus 

delicti). Maughs v. City of Charlottesville, 181 Va. 117, 120, 

23 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1943) (Commonwealth must prove corpus 

delicti in every criminal prosecution); Nicholas v. 

Commonwealth, 91 Va. 741, 750, 21 S.E. 364, 366-67 (1895). 

(Commonwealth’s burden to establish corpus delicti); see also

Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 228-29, 294 S.E.2d 882, 

890-91 (1982). 

26
Jackson’s statements, as successively amended, show clearly 

that, pursuant to the agreement with his friends, Jackson 

retrieved the .25 caliber handgun from the Jeep for the purpose 

of robbing Bonney, and that, during the robbery attempt, when 

Bonney refused to give him his money, Jackson stepped out of the 

vehicle and fired the gun three times, killing Bonney.5 

While Jackson recognizes that his statements tend to show 

the corpus delicti of attempted robbery, he argues correctly 

that the corpus delicti cannot be established solely by his 

uncorroborated statements. Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 

665, 669, 66 S.E.2d 605, 607 (1951). However, only slight 

corroboration of an accused’s statements is required to 

establish the corpus delicti when the accused fully confesses 

that he committed the crime. Clozza v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 

124, 133, 321 S.E.2d 273, 279 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 

1230 (1985); Lucas v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 599, 603, 112 S.E.2d 

915, 918 (1960). 

Jackson’s confession of the attempted robbery and murder of 

Bonney was corroborated in many respects. The passenger who 

came to the scene in Bonney’s Blazer testified that, after 

 

5

 The jury was not required to accept Jackson’s statement that 

the gun fired accidentally while he was attempting to clear a 

jam. In fact, the pistol was fired three times at some distance 

from Bonney and a firearms expert testified not only that the 

gun would not fire when jammed but also that the trigger had to 

be pulled each time before the gun would fire a single bullet. 

27
discussing where to buy crack cocaine, Bonney and the passenger 

went to a house in Norfolk where the passenger knew he could buy 

drugs. When they arrived, the passenger directed Bonney to wait 

in the Blazer while he went into the house to make the purchase. 

Lakisha Spruill, an eyewitness who was seated on the porch of a 

house next door, saw the passenger leave the Blazer and enter 

the house while the driver remained in the Blazer. Spruill, who 

had known Jackson for some time, saw him get into the 

passenger’s side of the Blazer, talk to the driver, and the 

“[n]ext thing I heard was gunshots.” 

The circumstantial evidence at the scene of the murder also 

corroborated Jackson’s statements. A police investigator 

identified Outlaw’s palm print on the driver’s door of Bonney’s 

vehicle and also testified that the keys to Bonney's vehicle 

were not found in the Blazer, supporting Jackson’s statement 

that Outlaw had reached into the car and removed the keys to 

prevent Bonney from driving away. 

In our opinion, these circumstances corroborate Jackson's 

confession that he had killed Bonney during an attempted 

robbery. The evidence demonstrates that the defendant and a 

confederate converged upon a stranger and engaged in conduct 

designed to prevent the stranger from fleeing while the 

defendant spoke to him and carried a loaded pistol. This 

corroborating evidence is consistent with a reasonable inference 

28
that Jackson was attempting to rob Bonney when he shot him. 

Indeed, this corroborating evidence is more consistent with the 

commission of the offense than it is with its non-commission. 

See Wright v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. at 194, 427 S.E.2d at 390 

(confession to attempted rape corroborated by discovery of 

victim's underpants which had been removed and were found at 

crime scene); cf. Phillips v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 207, 212, 

116 S.E.2d 282, 285 (1960) (corroborating evidence "just as 

consistent with non-commission of the offense as it is with its 

commission"). 

B. Penalty Phase Issues

1. Subjecting 16-year-old defendants to death penalty 

 Jackson, who had attained his 16th birthday only six weeks 

before the offenses occurred, contends that execution of 16-

year-old defendants is not authorized by statute in Virginia. 

According to him, in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), 

the United States Supreme Court made it “very clear that it is 

up to each state to decide the minimum age for execution” and 

“provide[d] that each state must enact [death penalty statutes] 

with great specificity, especially dealing with juveniles, in 

order to allow for constitutionally sound punishments.” Since 

Code §§ 18.2-31, 19.2-264.2 and –264.5 do not specifically 

provide for the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles 

convicted of capital murder, Jackson concludes that the death 

29
penalty cannot be imposed upon him. We do not agree. 

Under the provisions of Code §§ 16.1-269.1 and –272, 

juveniles over the age of 14 years are, after proper proceedings 

in juvenile court and circuit court, subject to trial and 

possible punishment as an adult. Indeed, in the statute in 

effect at the time of the crime, the legislature provided for 

transfer hearings in the juvenile court when such a juvenile is 

charged with capital murder. Code § 16.1-269.1(B). In our 

opinion, Code § 16.1-269.1 addresses the prosecution and 

punishment of juveniles in as much detail as the similar 

Kentucky and Missouri statutes which are acknowledged in 

Stanford as sufficient to authorize those states to impose the 

death penalty upon juveniles 16 or 17 years of age. 

Jackson also argues that imposition of the death penalty 

upon a 16-year-old juvenile constitutes cruel and unusual 

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution. In Stanford, the Court stated, “[w]e 

discern neither a historical nor a modern societal consensus 

forbidding the imposition of capital punishment on any person 

who murders at 16 or 17 years of age.” 492 U.S. at 380. 

And we discern no such consensus in Virginia, as evidenced 

by its statutes subjecting juveniles over the age of 14 to 

punishment as adults. Code §§ 16.1-269.1, -272. Therefore, we 

conclude that a 16-year-old person who is convicted of capital 

30
murder may be subjected to capital punishment. 

2. Psychological evaluation under Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(1) 

Pursuant to the provisions of Code § 19.2-264.3:1(E), 

Jackson gave notice of his intent to present psychological 

evidence on the issue of mitigation of punishment during the 

penalty phase of the trial. In response, the Commonwealth 

requested the court to order Jackson to submit to a courtordered examination by a psychologist designated by the court as 

provided in Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(1) in the following relevant 

language: 

If the attorney for the defendant gives notice 

pursuant to [Code § 19.2-264.3:1(E)] and the 

Commonwealth thereafter seeks an evaluation concerning 

the existence or absence of mitigating circumstances 

relating to the defendant’s mental condition at the 

time of the offense, the court shall appoint one or 

more qualified experts to conduct such an evaluation. 

The court shall order the defendant to submit to such 

an evaluation, and advise the defendant on the record 

in court that a refusal to cooperate with the 

Commonwealth’s expert could result in exclusion of the 

defendant’s expert evidence. 

The succeeding paragraph states in pertinent part: 

If the court finds . . . that the defendant has 

refused to cooperate with an evaluation requested by 

the Commonwealth, the court may admit evidence of such 

refusal or, in the discretion of the court, bar the 

defendant from presenting his expert evidence. 

Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(2). 

Over Jackson’s objection, the court ordered him to submit 

to an evaluation by Dr. Nelson, a forensic psychologist, 

31
appointed under the provisions of these statutes. Jackson 

submitted to the evaluation. Although Jackson, not the 

Commonwealth, called Dr. Nelson as a witness in his own behalf 

in the penalty phase of the trial, he complains that the court 

erred in several respects in ordering his evaluation by Dr. 

Nelson. 

First, he contends that the evaluation should not have been 

ordered. According to Jackson, the statute violated his Fifth 

Amendment rights against self-incrimination and his Sixth 

Amendment rights to a fair trial because the statute required 

him to cooperate with a court-appointed psychiatrist or suffer 

the possibility that his expert evidence would be barred. We 

rejected similar contentions in Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 

at 243-44, 427 S.E.2d at 407-08, and we apprehend no reason to 

modify our opinion on those issues. 

Second, Jackson maintains that, in ordering the evaluation, 

the court failed to warn Jackson of the consequences of his 

failure to cooperate and ruled erroneously that Dr. Nelson could 

testify in the penalty phase even though Jackson never called 

his own expert on the issue of mitigation. We do not consider 

either contention because Jackson called Dr. Nelson as his own 

witness. A defendant in a criminal case cannot take advantage 

of an alleged error he has injected into the record. Saunders 

v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 399, 400, 177 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1970). 

32
Nevertheless, Jackson claims that the court erroneously 

"allowed Dr. Nelson to offer an opinion on Jackson’s future 

dangerousness," which was “an opinion on the ultimate issue of 

fact.” We do not agree for two reasons. 

First, Dr. Nelson merely testified as to the risk factors 

associated with violence that were exhibited in Jackson’s 

personality and caused him to diagnose Jackson as suffering from 

an antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Nelson testified 

further that Jackson exhibited more of the risk factors for 

future violent acts “than many of the other [criminal] 

defendants I have evaluated.” Dr. Nelson quantified neither the 

extent of those factors nor the probability of Jackson’s future 

dangerousness and he did not opine that Jackson would be a 

danger in the future. Jackson recognizes this in his later 

argument that Dr. Nelson “could not say that Jackson would be a 

danger in the future.” 

Second, even if Dr. Nelson had expressed an opinion of 

Jackson’s “future dangerousness,” such evidence would not have 

constituted an opinion as to the ultimate issue in this case. 

That issue is whether Jackson should be sentenced to death or 

imprisoned for life. Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460, 469-

70, 357 S.E.2d 500, 506, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933 (1987). 

Accordingly, we reject all of Jackson’s claims relating to 

his psychological evaluation and to Dr. Nelson’s testimony. 

33
3. Sufficiency of Evidence of Future Dangerousness 

Since neither psychologist was willing to predict that 

Jackson would commit criminal acts of violence in the future, 

Jackson argues that the court erred in submitting this issue to 

the jury since it “could only arrive at a verdict by speculation 

and guesswork.” We disagree. 

Expert opinion is not required on this issue if there is 

sufficient evidence to permit a lay person to conclude that an 

accused would commit criminal acts of violence in the future 

that would constitute a serious danger to society. Indeed, we 

have held that a jury is entitled to disregard an expert’s 

opinion that a defendant would not be dangerous in the future. 

Saunders v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 107, 114-15, 406 S.E.2d 39, 

43, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944 (1991). Rejecting Jackson’s 

contentions, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to 

permit a reasonable person to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Jackson would be dangerous in the future. 

4. Instructions refused 

 Jackson contends the court erroneously refused two 

instructions he tendered, one of which would have told the jury 

that it “must consider a mitigating circumstance if you find 

there is evidence to support it” and the other that the jury was 

not required to fix the punishment at death even if the jury 

found “beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of the 

34
aggravating circumstance(s).” The claim is that these theories 

were not covered by other instructions. 

We disagree. The only instruction granted in the penalty 

phase told the jury that if it found beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the Commonwealth proved future dangerousness, the jury may 

"fix the punishment of the defendant at death.” It further 

instructed the jury that “if you believe from all of the 

evidence that the death penalty is not justified," then the jury 

could fix Jackson’s punishment at life imprisonment or life 

imprisonment and a fine. Since both Jackson’s theories were 

covered by these instructions, he is not entitled to have 

duplicative instructions on those theories. See, e.g., Tuggle 

v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 493, 508, 323 S.E.2d 539, 548 (1984), 

vacated and remanded on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1096 (1985), 

aff'd on remand, 230 Va. 99, 334 S.E.2d 838 (1985), cert. 

denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986). Furthermore, we have held that 

instructions similar to those given by the court in this case 

"adequately stated the statutory framework and were sufficient." 

LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 595, 304 S.E.2d 644, 661 

(1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984). For these reasons, 

we find no error in the court's refusal of Jackson’s tendered 

instructions. 

VII. SENTENCE REVIEW 

35
 Under Code § 17-110.1(C)(1) and (2), we are required to 

determine “[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under the 

influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor," 

and “[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or 

disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 

considering both the crime and the defendant." 

A. Passion and Prejudice

 Jackson does not contend that the sentence of death was 

imposed under any of the impermissible factors and our 

independent review of the entire record fails to reveal that the 

jury’s death sentence “was imposed under the influence of 

passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.” Code § 17-

110.1(C)(1). 

B. Excessiveness and Proportionality

 Jackson argues that a review of similar capital murder 

cases “would reflect the excessiveness and disproportionate 

punishment inflicted on this 16 year old defendant.” We 

disagree. 

 In our proportionality review, we have considered “whether 

other sentencing bodies in this jurisdiction generally impose 

the supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes, 

considering both the crime and the defendant." Jenkins v. 

Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 461, 423 S.E.2d 360, 371 (1992), 

cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1036 (1993). Our comparison of the 

36
record in this case with the records in other capital murder 

cases, including those in which life sentences were imposed, 

fails to indicate that the death penalty imposed in this case is 

“excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar 

cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." Code 

§ 17-110.1(C)(2). 

 Since the jury based its death sentence solely on the 

“future dangerousness” predicate, we have given particular 

consideration to other capital murder cases in which robbery or 

attempted robbery was the underlying felony and the death 

penalty was based only on the “future dangerousness” predicate. 

Such cases were compiled in Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. at 

143, 410 S.E.2d at 267-68, and supplemented in Chichester, 248 

Va. at 332-33, 448 S.E.2d at 652, and Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 

Va. at 351, 468 S.E.2d at 113 (17-year-old defendant). 

 Our conclusion is that, while there are exceptions, juries 

in this Commonwealth generally impose the death sentence for 

crimes comparable to Jackson’s murder of Bonney. Jackson killed 

Bonney in cold blood simply because Bonney had refused to comply 

with Jackson’s demand for money. This killing demonstrates 

Jackson’s lack of respect for human life. 

 Although Jackson was only 16 years old when he killed 

Bonney, his criminal conduct on other occasions, especially the 

violent acts he committed while (1) on probation, (2) free on 

37
bond, and (3) in jail awaiting trial for these offenses, 

manifests an escalating pattern of violent criminal behavior 

that compels us to conclude that the imposition of the death 

penalty in his case is neither excessive nor disproportionate to 

the penalty imposed in similar cases.6

VIII CONCLUSION 

 We find no reversible error in the issues presented in this 

case. After reviewing Jackson’s sentence of death pursuant to 

Code § 17-110.1, we decline to commute the sentence of death. 

Therefore, we will affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Affirmed. 

JUSTICE HASSELL, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

 Code § 17-110.1(C)(2) requires this Court to consider and 

determine “[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or 

disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 

considering both the crime and the defendant.” 

 We have stated that “the test of proportionality is whether 

‘juries in this jurisdiction generally approve the supreme 

penalty for comparable or similar crimes.’” Davidson v. 

Commonwealth, 244 Va. 129, 136, 419 S.E.2d 656, 660, cert.

denied, 506 U.S. 959 (1992) (citing Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 

 

6

 Unlike the dissent, in resolving the issues of excessiveness 

and proportionality, we did not limit our comparison to the 

records in cases in which the defendants were 16 years old when 

38
Va. 243, 271, 389 S.E.2d 871, 886, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 

(1990) (quoting Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 284, 257 

S.E.2d 808, 824 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980))). 

Juries in Virginia generally have not approved of the imposition 

of the death penalty for 16-year-old capital murder offenders. 

 Since 1987, ten 16-year-old offenders have been convicted 

of capital murder, and only one defendant, Chauncey J. Jackson, 

has been sentenced to death. I agree with the majority that 

Jackson’s offenses are atrocious and that he has exhibited 

little, if any, regard for the value of human life or the 

consequences of his criminal conduct. However, my review of all 

capital murder cases involving 16-year-old offenders in Virginia 

leads me to the conclusion that the sentence of death imposed 

upon Jackson is excessive and disproportionate to penalties 

imposed in similar cases. 

 For example, in Novak v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 373, 

382, 457 S.E.2d 402, 406 (1995), a Virginia Beach jury refused 

to impose the penalty of death upon a 16-year-old defendant, 

Shawn Paul Novak, even though the jury convicted him of capital 

murder. The facts in Novak are more egregious than the facts in 

the present case. Novak killed two young boys, age 7 and age 9. 

The seven-year-old victim died from “three stab wounds which 

 

the offenses were committed. Instead, we considered Jackson’s 

age as one of many relevant factors. 

39
would have been a quick three thrusts resulting in 

incapacitation and . . . repeated cutting and slashing of the 

neck until it was almost decapitated . . . .” The nine-year-old 

victim “had been killed by a ‘blunt force injury’ and ‘multiple 

slashes’ on his neck.” Id. at 379-80, 457 S.E.2d at 405. 

 In Owens v. Commonwealth, No. 2259-95-1 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 

*19, 1996), the defendant, Marvin T. Owens, was convicted of 

capital murder. Owens killed four persons, including a 14-yearold boy, by using a pistol to shoot each victim in the head. 

Just as Jackson, Owens had an extensive juvenile criminal 

history, including commitments to the Department of Youth and 

Family Services for the following criminal offenses: conspiracy 

to distribute cocaine, possession of cocaine with the intent to 

distribute, and possession of cocaine. The jury fixed Owens’ 

punishment at life imprisonment. 

 The case of Reid v. Commonwealth, No. 1175-95-1 (Va. Ct. 

App. July 2, 1996), is very similar factually to the present 

case. There, the defendant, Dwayne M. Reid, then 16 years old, 

approached two males who were traveling in a truck in Suffolk. 

The men in the truck, Joseph Mehalko and Tommy Runyon, asked 

several young male pedestrians, including Reid, whether any of 

the pedestrians had “a twenty rock [of crack cocaine].” One of 

the pedestrians threw an item, about the size of a pebble, 

through a window into the truck, and Mehalko and Runyon, 

40
thinking the item was a rock of crack cocaine, began to search 

for it. As Runyon retrieved some money from his wallet, Mehalko 

noticed “a gun come through the passenger side window.” A 

struggle ensued, and Reid shot Runyon in the head. Runyon 

subsequently died as a result of the gunshot wound. 

 Reid had a prior criminal record, and he had been convicted 

of the following crimes: two counts of armed robbery and two 

different offenses of use of a firearm during the commission of 

robbery. At a bench trial, Reid was convicted of capital murder 

and sentenced to life imprisonment. 

 In Rea v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 940, 941, 421 S.E.2d 

464, 465 (1992), the defendant, Stephen Rea, was convicted, at a 

jury trial, of three separate counts of capital murder. Rea 

killed three persons, including a 17-year-old boy, by shooting 

them with a firearm. Rea had an extensive juvenile criminal 

history. He was arrested for petty larceny which was taken 

under advisement for six months. He was arrested and charged 

for disorderly conduct, vandalism, and “being a runaway,” and he 

was convicted and placed on supervised probation. He was 

arrested for trespass, which was resolved at the juvenile 

intake. He was arrested for violation of his probation. He was 

subsequently arrested for breaking and entering, petty larceny, 

and grand larceny, and placed on house arrest and ordered to pay 

restitution. He was also arrested for eluding police, reckless 

41
driving, and driving without a Virginia operator’s license. The 

jury fixed Rea’s punishment at life imprisonment for each of the 

capital murder convictions. See also Faulk v. Commonwealth, CR 

95J2 and CR95J4 (Southhampton County Cir. Ct. Sept. 17, 1996) 

(Defendant, 16 years of age at the time of the offenses, pled 

guilty to capital murder in the commission of robbery, capital 

murder in the commission of abduction, and robbery with a 

weapon, and sentenced to life imprisonment.); Prostell v. 

Commonwealth, No. J-1179 (Virginia Beach Cir. Ct. June 18, 1987) 

(The 16-year-old defendant, whose criminal history included one 

previous felony conviction as a juvenile, pled guilty to capital 

murder and received life imprisonment. The defendant killed the 

victim after being advised by a co-defendant that the defendant 

would receive $300 for the murder of the victim. At the time of 

the murder, the defendant was on probation after having been 

found guilty of robbery.); Campbell v. Commonwealth, No. 5559 

(Amherst County Cir. Ct. June 4, 1987) (The defendant was found 

guilty at a bench trial of capital murder and certain other 

related crimes. The defendant, 16 years old at the date of this 

offense, entered a pizza restaurant wearing a ski mask and armed 

with a loaded 12-gauge shotgun, ordered the employees to the 

floor, and shot a restaurant employee in the head, killing him. 

The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment.); Stewart v. 

Commonwealth, No. 2928-97-1 (Va. Ct. App. July 7, 1997) (This 

42
16-year-old defendant pled guilty in the Norfolk Circuit Court 

to capital murder and certain other related offenses and was 

sentenced to life without parole plus 18 years. The defendant 

killed the victim with a pistol during an attempted robbery.). 

Tross v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 362, 464 S.E.2d 523 (1995) 

(This 16-year-old defendant was convicted of capital murder, 

robbery, and using a firearm to commit murder and was sentenced 

to life imprisonment for the capital murder, 20 years’ 

imprisonment for the robbery, and two years’ imprisonment for 

the firearm charge. His prior record included convictions for 

petit larceny and possession of a beeper/pager on school 

grounds. He had been arrested and charged on two separate 

occasions for assault and battery, but those charges were nolle

prossed.). 

 Shawn Novak, age 16, killed two young boys, but he was not 

sentenced to death. Stephen Rea, age 16, killed three people, 

including a teenager, but he was not sentenced to death. Marvin 

Owens, age 16, killed four persons, but he was not sentenced to 

death. Dwayne Reid, who committed crimes substantially similar 

to Jackson’s crimes, was not sentenced to death. Upon 

comparison of Jackson’s sentence of death, along with his 

criminal history and facts surrounding his case, to the facts 

and criminal histories of the other defendants who committed 

capital offenses at age 16, I can only conclude that Jackson’s 

43
sentence of death is both excessive and disproportionate in 

violation of Code § 17-110.1 (C)(2). 

 I would reduce Jackson’s sentence of death to life 

imprisonment. In view of Jackson’s sentences for his other 

convictions, he would remain incarcerated for the remainder of 

his natural life. 

44