FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT J UNE 2, 2005 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 04- 1380 9 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 02-03056 -CV -CO -S SUSAN CLARK, Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant, ve rs us AL ABA MA, ST AT E O F, LE E E AKIN S, D ef en dants -Appe lle es , JEFF ERSON COUNTY HEA LTH DEPARTMENT, D ef en dant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ Appe al f ro m the U nit ed

S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt f o r th e N o rth e rnD i s tr i c to f

A l ab a ma

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ ( June 2, 200 5) Be fo re A N D E RS O N , MA RC U S an d F A Y , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M:Clark also asse rted in her amende d complaint a cla im based on the state’ s non-pay ment 1 of over time, in violation of the Fair L abor Standa rds Act ( “F L SA”); and a

state-law claim of a ssa ult and batte ry a g a ins t E akin s. Ho we ve r, on Cla rk ’s mot ion , th e c ourt

dis mis se d h e r F L SA c la im. Mo re ov e r, a ft e r t

he c ourt g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt o n Cl ark ’s fe de ra l c la ims , it de c lin e d to e xer c ise su

pp le me nta l juri sd ic tio n o ve r C lark ’s re ma ini ngstate -l aw c la im. B e c a us e Clark has not cha lleng ed these decision, we deem them a bandoned. See Acc ess Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (issues not ar gued in initial brief are deeme d abandone d). 2 Susan Clark appeals through coun sel the district court’ s grant of summ ary j udgm ent in favor of her e m ploy er, the State of A labam a (“ the state”), in her re ta liatio n c la im , f

ile d purs uant t o T itl e V II of the Ci vil Ri ght s A ct

of 196 4, 42 U . S. C. § 20 00e -3 ; and i n f av or of he r fo rm er

sup er vis or , L ee E ak ins ( “ E ak ins ”) , in her equal-protection claim , f iled pursuant to 42 U.S .C. § 1983 . On appeal, Clark argues that the district court erre d in conclud ing th at no genuin e issue of m aterial fact ex is te d a s t o t he se cla im s. Forth e rea so ns set for th m or e fu ll y be lo w, we 1 af fi rm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r gr an tin g th e de fe ndants sum m ar y j udgm en t o n Cl ar k’ s T itl e V II and § 198 3 r et al ia tio n c la im s. Cl ar k, an e m plo y ee of the state w ho s er

ve s a s aD ise as e In te rv en tio n Sp ec ia lis t ( “ D IS ”) , f

ile d ac ouns el ed

a m en de d c om

pla int a ga ins t the state and E ak ins , a lle gin g, a m ong oth er c la im s, that the state r et al iate d a ga ins t he r, in vio la tio n of

T itl e V II , f

or e nga gin g inthe pr ote ct ed a ct ivi ty of te sti fy ing a t tri al on be ha lf o f a co -em

pl oyee an d h ers el f as pa rt o f a p rio r Tit le VII act io n (“ Cl arkI”). Cl ar k a lso c ont en de d th at , on F eb ru ar y 22, 200 2, E ak ins vio la te d he r equa l-Th is p oli c y on se xua l ha

ra ssm e nt i ns tr

uc te d th at: 2 Every employ ee ha s a right to work in an environme nt free of har assment on the ba sis of g e nd e r. I t is and

sh a ll c ontin

ue to b e the po lic y

of thi s D e pa

rtme nt t hat it s employ ees a

nd their work e nvironment shall be fr ee f rom all forms of se x ual hara ssment and intimidation. Verbal and phy sical conduc t of a sexual nature including se x ual adva

nces, r equests for

sexual favors, or othe r conduc t which tends to cre ate a

n intimi dating , hostile, or offe nsive work e nvironment by any employ ee, supe rvisor, or mana g er is strictly prohibited . . ..” 3 pr ote ct ionr igh ts, und er

§ 19 83, by

“phy sic al ly

gr ab b[ ing ] and r es tr ai n[ ing ] [ he r] in retaliation for [her ] com

plaints o f ra ce discrim ination , r etaliation and/o r her testim ony in [Clark I ] .” Inaj oin t st at

us r ep ort, the part ie s a gr ee d onthe f oll ow ing f

ac ts. I n 19 94, Cl ar k a cc ep te d e m

plo ym en t w iththe state a s aD IS w iththe D al la s C ounty H ea lth D ep ar tm en t ( “ D CH D ”) . A s ac ondi tio n of he r em plo ym en t, Cl ar

k w as sub j ec t t o the state ’ s po lic ie s and p ro ce dur es , w hic h in cl ude d th e state ’ s po lic y pr ohi bit ing se xua l hara ssm en t i n th e w orkpl ac e. I n 19 96, ba se d onase ttl em en t a gr ee m en t i n 2 Cl ar k I , Cl ar k w as tr an sf

er re d to w ork a t the Je ff

er son Co unty

H ea lthD ep ar

tm en t (“ JC HD”), as a DIS in th e Sex ua ll y Tran sm it te d Di se as e (“ STD”) Pro gr am . Alt ho ug h C la rkrem ai ne d a n e m pl oyee of th e st at e, em

pl oyees o f th e JC HD supe rv ise d he r w ork. ( Id . ). C lark ’ s du tie s a s aD IS inc lud ed ( 1) que sti oni ng pe rs ons w ho t es te d po sit ive f or S T D s onthe ide nti tie s of the ir se xua l and/ or needle-sharing partners; (2) locating these partners and attem pting to have them te ste d; ( 3) c om

ple tin g a cc ur at e fo rm s and d oc um en ts; and ( 4) m ai nta ini ng a cc ur at e4

in di ces of c li en ts , su sp ect s, an d p art ne rs . This report f

urther included that, from 1996 through August 200 1, L ee E ak ins , anothe r D IS e m

plo y ed by the JC H D , se rv ed

a s C lark ’ s im

m ed ia te supe rv iso r. F ro m

Augus t 20 01 unti l C lark ’ s tr an sf er in 2002 to the T usc al oosa Co unty H ea lthD ep ar

tm en t ( “ T CH D ”) , Br idg et N orm an , af

ed er al e m plo y ee w ho wa s on assig nm ent as a Supervisory Public He alth Advisor with the JCHD , ser ved as Cl ar k’ s im m ed ia te sup er

vis or . Mo re ove r, f

ro m 199 6 th ro ugh 2002 , T er

ri e Ou t l i n , t h e S TD P ro g ra m Ma n ag erfo r t h e J CH D, s up erv i s edb o th o f C l ark ’s supe rv iso rs . I n F eb ru ar

y 200 2, Cl ar

k f ile d ac harg e w iththe E qua l E m plo ym en t OpportunityCom

m issio n (“ EE OC” ), alleging that, since 1996 , the state had

“ hara sse d, int im idate d, and s ubj ec te d [ he r] to dif fe ri ng t er m s and c ondi tio ns o f em pl oym en t an d d is ci pl in e,” i n re ta li at io n a ga in sthe r te st ifyin g i n C la rkI. Ci tin g to the se f

ac ts and t o e vid en ce it

ga the re d duri ng d isc ove ry , the state fi le d asum

m ar y j udgm en t m oti on and a

sup portin g br ie f. T he state a sse rt ed in the ar gum en t se ct ionof

it s br ie f that, in atte m

pti ng t o e sta

bli sh a pr im a fa ci e ca se of re ta liatio n, Cl ar

k on ly ha d a lle ge d tw o a ct s th at arg uably c oul d qu al if

y a s “ adve rs e em plo ym en t a ct ion s, ” that i s, the sus pe nsi on and transf er of he r em plo ym en t. T he state also asserted that Clar k could n ot sho w that her protected activity

wa s causally relate d to her adverse em ploym ent actions because these events wer eAl tho ugh th e state a lso argue d in the dis tr ic t c ourt

that it wa s n ot a

pr op e r d e fe nd ant i n 3 this action, it has failed to cha lleng e in a c ross-appe al the district cour t’s deter mination to the contra ry . Thus, we c onclude that this issue is waived. See Pierre v. Rivkind, 825 F.2d 1501, 15 06 n. 3 ( 11 th C ir . 1 98 7) (“ a pp e lle e wh o h a s f

a ile d to c ro ss- a

pp e a l ma y no t atta c k a

de c re e to enlar g e his own rights thereunde r or attack the r ights of his a dversa ry”). 5 separated by

six y ears. T he state sim ilarly argued that no evidence showed that Cl ar k’ s di sc ipl inary

a ct ion s w er e lin ke d to he r pr ior te sti m ony . I n a ddi tio n, the state c ont en de d no inf

er en ce of c au sa tio n e xis te d be ca

use the pe rs ons w ho req ue st edCla rk ’s tra ns fer d idno t k no w of h er p ro te ct edact iv it y . Furtherm ore, the state argued that, even if the court concluded that Clark ha d e sta bli she d apr im a fa ci e ca se of r et al ia tio n, the state ha d pr es en te d le git im at e re as ons fo r Cl ar

k’ s su spe nsi on and transf er . T he state e xpl ai ne d th at the se a dve rs e em ploym ent actions were taken because Clar k had a history

of disciplin ary pr obl em s. T he state a lso arg ue d th at , be ca use the JC H D w as not

adiv isi on o f the state , D r. D ona ld E . W ill iam son, M. D . , the state ’ s H ea lthD ir ec tor , ha d “ little choice” but to hon or the JCHD ’ s request that Clark be re assigned to another of fi ce . R eg ar dle ss, the state arg ue d th at Cl ar k ha d pr oduc ed

no e vid en ce sho w ing that Dr. W illiam son’s decision to sus pend and transfer Clar k’ s em ploym ent was linked to Clark’ s prior protected activity in Clark I. 3 Th e s t at e i n tro du ce di n s up p o rto f i t s s u m m ary ju d g m en t

m o t i o nCl ark ’s de posi tio n, in w hic h C lark te sti fi ed that, a s th e re sul t of

aJun e 7, 199 6, se ttl em en t6

ag re em en t i n C lark

I , Cl ar k w as tr an sf

er re d to w ork a t the JC H D . T he state a lso intro duc ed

E ak ins ’ s de posi tio n, in w hic h he te sti fi ed that hi s on ly

kno w le dge about Clark I w as “ what S usan Clark has said,” and that Clark had toldhim that she ha d te sti fi ed

on b eh al f of

som e em plo y ee . E ak ins state d, how ev er , that he did not kno wthat C lark

ha d be entr an sf

er re d to the JC H D ba se d onase ttl em en t ag re em en t i n C lark

I . S im ila rl y , O utl in t es tif

ie d duri ng h is d ep osi tio n th at , althoug h Clark “ m ade statem ents . . . during h er tim e w ith [the JCHD ] that she was there by court order, ” O utlin “ wa s told th at [these statem ents wer e] not true.” O n C lark ’ s di sc ipl inary

a ct ion s, the state intro duc ed doc um en ts s how ing that, on June 9, 199 9, E ak ins iss ue d C lark aw ri tte n w ar

nin g f or ins ubor din at ion , statin g th at

Cl ar k ha d a tte nde d an or ganiz at ion al m ee tin g w ithG ir l’ s I nc or por at ed , af te r havin g be enins tr

uc te d no t t o a tte nd the m ee tin g. O n N ove m be r 15 and 2 8, 2000 , O utl in i ssu ed

Cl ar k w ri tte n w ar

nin gs f or be ing abse nt w ith out

le av e (“ A W O L ”) , w he n C lark

a tte nde d am ee tin g of

the G ove rn or ’ s C om

m iss ionon A ID S. I n Augus t and S ep te m be r 2001 , N orm aniss ue d C lark tw o ve rb al w ar

nin gs fo r (1 ) be in g AWOL fro m he r work s it e, an d (2 ) ex ces si ve us e o f le av e. On D ec em be r 6, 200 1, N orm aniss ue d C lark ave rb al w ar

nin g f or f ai lur e to s ubm it ca se s inati m el y

m anne r. O n F eb ru ar

y 1, 200 1, N orm aniss ue d C lark a m em or an dum , c ouns el ing he r on t im e m an ag em en t and “ the num be r of de lin que nt7

pa pe r[ s] in [h er ] pou ch . ” F ina lly , on F eb ru ar y 22, 200 2, N orm aniss ue d C lark a m em or an du m , st at in g t ha t an e-m ai l Cl arkha d fo rward edto fou r JC HD em plo y ee s, inc lud ing E ak ins , w hic h de pic te d anud e m anw ithhis pe nis c au ght in a gla ss s how er

doo r (“ se xua l e -m ai l” ), vio la te d st at e pol ic ie s, inc lud ing tho se on el ect ro ni c co m

m un ic at io n, p ro fes si on al co nd uc t, an d s ex ua l h aras sm en t. During Clark’ s deposi tion, she conceded that she forwarded the sexual em ai l t o JC H D e m

plo y ee s, and tha t an in te nti ona l f or w ar din g of

suc h an e -m ai l w oul d vi olate the state ’ s se xua l hara ssm en t po lic y , but she a sse rt ed

that sh e se nt i t by m ist ak e. C lark

a lso state d tha t, on F eb ru ar y 25, 200 2, she a ske d E ak ins w hy he ha d f or w ar de d th e se xua l e -m ai l t o O utl in, a ft er w hic h he y el le d a t he r an d gr ab be d he r ar

m . T ha t sam e day , Cl ar

k f ile d an E E O C c om

pla int and l odge d a co m pla int a ga ins t E ak ins w iththe Bi rm ing ham P oli ce D ep ar

tm en t, a lle gin g th at

he gr ab be d h er arm

du rin g aco nv ers at io n abo ut th e e-m ai l. A ddi tio na l e vid en ce inc lud ed aMarc h 15 , 200 2, m em or an dum f ro m Norm an to Dr. W illiam son, which w as sent throug h Outlin and Dr. Michael Fleenor, M.D ., the He alth Off icer f or the JCHD , in which Norm an requested that the state sus pe nd C lark

f or f ive day s w ith out

pay , ba se d onCl ar

k’ s se ndi ng the se xua l e -m ai l, ins ubor din at ion , e xc es siv e use of le av e, and f

ai lur e to c om

ple te w ork a ssi gnm en ts i n ati m el y m anne r. D r. W ill iam son re spon de d by inf orm ing8

Cl ar k th at adue pr oc es s he ar ing w oul d be c ondu ct ed on M ar ch27, 200 2, to determ ine whether she shou ld be susp ended. I n additio n, on Marc h 19, 2002 , D r. F l e e n o r w r o t e al e t t e r

t o D r . Wi l l i a ms o n , o u t l i n i n g C l ark ’s d i s c i p l i n ary p r o b l e ms an d e xp res si ng hi s d es ire th atCla rkbe tra ns ferr ed . O n Apr il 9, 200 2, a ft er

the state c ondu ct ed

adue pr oc es s he ar ing , D or oth y Norwoo d, t he he ari ng off ic er, d et erm in edth atth e ev id en ce o ffer edby the JC HD supp orte d it s r ec om

m en da tio ns. N or

w ood, thu s, r ec om

m en de d th at

Cl ar k be (1 ) sus pe nde d f

or thr ee day s w ith out

pay , and ( 2) r ea ssi gne d pe rm an en tly to the TC HD . In m aking her finding s and recom m endations , N orwood summ arize d Cl ar k’ s di sc ipl inary

inc ide nts , a lon g w ithnot ing that the JC H D ha d f oll ow ed it s pr og res si ve di sc ip li ne po li cy , andth atDr. Flee no r ha d re qu es te d t he tra ns fer. Furthe rm or e, on Apr il 11, 200 2, a ft er r ev ie w ing thi s r ep or

t, D r. W ill iam son se nt Cl arka le tt er, i nf

orm in g h er t ha t h e h adad op te d t he se reco m m en da ti on s. T he state a lso intro duc ed Jam es Mi ch ae l O ’ Ca in’ s de posi tio n, in w hic h he te sti fi ed that ( 1) a s af

ed er al e m plo y ee e m

plo y ed by the F ed er al Ce nte rs f

or Disease Control, he w as assigned, from April 1990 unti l he retire d in January 2003 , a s th e state ’ s S T D D ir ec tor ; ( 2) a lth oughhe did not sup er vis e Cl ar k w hil e she w as a ssi gne d to the JC H D , he w as inf orm ed of he r dis ci pli nary

pr obl em s; and (3 ) he dis cu sse d th es e pr obl em s and r es pond ed to que sti ons fr om

O utl in o nWil liamson further a ttested in his affidavit that (1) his decision to suspend Clark’s 4 employ ment was ba sed on Norw ood’s re commendation; (2) his de cision to transfer Clark temporar ily

to Tuscaloosa County

was ba sed on the re quest from JC HD that Clark be remove d, and on the state ’s nee d for a n additional DI S in Tuscaloosa; (3) “ [o] nce [Dr. F leenor ] asked that Ms. Clark be re assig ned, [Dr. Will iamson] felt itincumbent on [him ] t o do that”; (4) his de cision to permane ntly

rea ssign Clark w as base d on Norwood’ s rec ommendation; (5) these decisions “had nothingto do with Ms. C lark’s involveme nt in a lawsuit more than f ive y ear s ear lier”; (6) the state Hea lth Depar tment and the county

health depa

rtments wer e “se parate and distinct e nti tie s” ; and

(7 ) whil e Dr . Wil liamso n e xer c ise d g e ne ra l su pe rv iso ry a uth or ity ov e r c ounty health off icer s under state law and c ould remove a health off

icer under limited circ umstances, he did no t be lie ve that Cla

rk ’s sit uatio n w ou ld h ave wa

rr ante d h is e xer c ise of

thi s a uth or ity in requiringthat Clark stay

at J CHD. 9 dis ci pli nary

pr oc ed ur es . O ’ Ca in, how ev er , c lari fi ed that any ne ga tiv e co m

m en ts he m ad e w er e not

r el at ed to Cl ar k’ s pr ote ct ed

a ct ivi tie s inCl ar

k I . D r. W ill iam son sim ilarly attested to these facts in his affidavit, a long with asserting that (1) O ’ Cain wor

ked with, but did not directly supervise, Clar

k; and (2) O’ Cain wa s supe rv ise d by

f ed er al , ins te ad

of state e m plo y ee s. 4 Eakins also filed a m otion for sum m ary j udgm ent, arguing, am ong o ther thi ngs, that no ge nui ne iss ue of m at er ia l f

ac t e xis te d a s to the § 19 83 c la im because Clar

k had failed to show that Eakins wa s acting und er c olor of state law when he com

m itted the alleged retaliatory act. E akins also con tended that he was entitled to q ualified im

m unitybecause Clar

k had failed to show that he violated cl ea rl y es t ab l i s h edl aw . Ea k i n s ex p l ai n edth at , a s s u m i n g th e v al i d i ty o f C l ark ’s al le gatio n, ( 1) she f

ai le d to sho wac onne ct ionbe tw ee n th e ac t and h er pr ior te sti m ony in Cl ar k I ; and ( 2) thi s C ourt ha d no c le ar ly de fi ne d lawa t the ti m e ofAlthough the state objec ted to Clark’s filingof this brief a s untimely , the cour t 5 imp lic itl y ov e rr ule d th is o bje c tio n, a s d e mon str ate d b y its state me nt i n gra

nti ngthe de fe nd ants ’ summa ry jud g me nt a s f

oll ow s: “ [t]he fa c ts s e t out be low are g le ane d f

ro m th e pa

rt ie s’ su bmi ssi on s o f f

a c ts c la ime d to be un dis pute d, the ir re sp e c tiv e re sp on se s to tho se su bmi ssi on s, and the c ourt ’s own e xami natio n o f t he e vid e nti ary

re c or d. Al l r e a so na

ble do ub ts a

bo ut t he fa c ts have be en re solved in favor of the nonmovingparty .”

10 the inc ide nt s ta tin g th at

the a ct of gr ab bin g he r ar

m in re ta liatio n f

or he r te sti m ony in a tr ia l si x y ears e ar lie r, w ith out m or e, vio la te d he r co nst itu tio na l r igh ts. E ak ins cited to, am ong o ther evidence, his depos ition testim ony that he (1) did not tou ch Cl ark , and(2) was n ot di rect edto tak e p ers on ne l ac ti on ag ai ns t h er. Clark filed a

com bined respon se to the defendants’ m otion s for sum m ary j udgm ent. Clar

k argued that a genuine issu e of m aterial f act existed as to whether 5 she e sta bli she d ac au sa l c onne ct ionbe tw ee n he r pr ote ct ed a ct ivi ty and the a dve rs e em plo ym en t a ct ion s and, the re fo re , apr im a fa ci e ca se of r et al ia tio n be ca

use O’C ai n t es t i fi edth at (1 ) h e b el i ev edan di n fo rmedo th erp er s o n s th at Cl ark ’s supp ort of the plaintiff in Clark I wa s for the purpose of diverting attenti on away from her ow n problem s, lea ding him to believe that Clark w as a “ troublem aker”; (2) af ter Clark testified in Clark I, O’ Cain followed her em ploym ent and toldher d i ff er en ts up erv i s o rs th at s h e w as a p ro b l em em p l o yee; (3 ) d es p i t e C l ark ’s re pe at ed c om pla int s of dis cr im inatio n and r et al ia tio n, the state did not inv es tig at e them . Clark f

urther contended that she sh owed that E akins kn ewof her protecte d activity by (1) testify ing du ring her depositi on that Eakins too k a phone call that11

w as m eant f

or he r fr om the pla int if

f in C lark I , a ft er w hic h he a ske d he r ab out the ca lle r, and ( 2) a tta ch ing a ff idavit s f ro m A nth one ri a Mc E lr oy

and June W ils on, in w hic h th ey

a tte ste d th at

e m plo y ee s of

the JC H D kne wabout

the f ac ts s ur ro undi ng Cl ar k’ s tr an sf er to the JC H D . C lark

a sse rt ed , a s w el l, that sh e show ed a continu ing pattern of retaliation throug hout her em ploym ent and establish ed an in fere nc e o f ret al ia ti on fro m O’ Cai n’s re pe at eddi sp arag in g c omm en ts ab ou t h er. Ina ddi tio n, Cl ar

k arg ue d th at

the state ’ s r ea sons f

or the a dve rs e em plo ym en t a ct ion s w er e pr et ex tua l be ca use the dis ci pli nary

a ct ion s onw hic h it relied w ere unsupported bythe rec ord. C lark specifically contended that (1) her attendance at the June 1999 m eeting occurred during her lunch break; (2) her dis ci pli nary

a ct ionin A ugus t 20 01 f

or be ing A W O L oc curr ed

de spi te that sh e rece ived perm issio n from Norm an to return late f

rom lunch; (3) her Se ptem

ber 2001 w ar nin g a bout he r use of

le av e re sul te d f

ro m he r ina bil ity to re -e nte r the country for a we ek after

the terror ist attack on Septem ber 11, 2001; (4) her De cem ber 2001 warning for fa ilure to subm it cases in a tim ely m anner w as contradicted by

Outlin’ s testim ony

that the JCHD ’ s records showed otherw ise; ( 5 ) O u t l i n a g r e e dth a tC l ark ’s F e b r u ary 2 0 0 2 me mo r an du m c o u n s e l i n g h e r o nt i me m an ag em en t w as not

adis ci pli nary

w ri te -u p; and ( 6) he r Fe br

uary 200 2 w ar

nin g on the se xua l e -m ai l w as unr ea sona ble be ca use she se nt the e -m ai l by m ist ak e, the12

e- m ai l w as not

pr ohi bit ed

by any c ounty or state pol ic ie s, and e m

plo y ee s of

the JC H D de al t w ithsim ilar pic tur es on a da ily ba sis a s part

of the ir j ob d uti es . L as t, Cl ar k a sse rt ed

that sh e es ta

bli she d apr im a fa ci e ca se a ga ins t E ak ins be ca use , by a sse rt ing that he w as e nti tle d to qua lif ie d im m uni ty , E ak ins e sse nti al ly conceded that he wa s “ acting und er c olor of law” when he attacked her. Clar k al so c ont en de d th at

E ak ins w as not

e nti tle d to qua lif

ie d im m uni ty be ca use “ it [w as ] c le ar ly

unl aw fu l f

or asup er vis or y e m plo y ee to phy sic al ly

a tta ck one of his subo rdinates” and to “ create a hostile work environm ent.” T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d th e state ’ s m oti on f or sum m ar y j udgm en t “ in a ll re spe ct s, ” an d E ak ins ’ s m oti on i n part . I n e xam ini ng whe the r Cl ar k ha d sh ow n a prim a fa cie ca se of T itle VI I re taliation against the state, the court discuss ed that the parties had not dis puted th at Clar k’ s participation in Clark I constitu ted protected activity . The c ourt also foun d that Clark’ s discipl inary actions and her ult im at e sus pe nsi on and transf er to an oth er

de partm en t c onst itute d a dve rs e em ploym ent actions. In addition, the court determ ined that Clark provided su ffi ci en t ev id en ce t o s ho w th atth e st at e was aware o f he r pr ot ect edact iv it y . N ev er the le ss, the c ourt c onc lud ed that C lark

f ai le d to e sta

bli sh a pr im a fa ci e ca se be ca use she f ai le d to sho wac au sa l c onne ct ionbe tw ee n he r pr ote ct ed a ct ivi ty an d th e adve rs e em

plo ym en t a ct ion s. I n r ea ch ing thi s c onc lus ion , the c ourt f ound13

that the sub stanti al ti m e la pse , that i s, six y ears , be tw ee n C lark ’ s pr ote ct ed a ct ivi ty in C lark I and the sus pe nsi on and transf er of he r em plo ym en t “ hin de re d he r ab ili ty to p ro ve c au sa l c onne ct ion . ” T he c ourt di sc uss ed that, a lth oughCl ar

k a lso ide nti fi ed a s r et al ia tor

y a ct s he r supe rv iso r’ s un fo unde d di sc ipl inary a ct ion s ag ai nst he r, she ha d no t e sta

bli she d th at

the y e ith er da te d ba ck

to 1996 , or occurred on a c ontin uous basis. T he court also determ ined that (1) Clark had failed to show that all of the disciplinary acts w ere unwarr anted, and (2) her

“ intervening violatio ns of state policies [had] operate[d] to sever any causal co nne ct ion . ” T he c ourt c onc lud ed , a s su ch , that C lark ha d f ai le d to e sta

bli sh a pr im a fac ie cas e o f Tit le VII ret al ia ti on . On Clar k’ s claim s against Eakins, the court deter m ined that summ ary j udgm en t w as w ar

rante d a s to Cl ar

k’ s § 1 983 equa l- pr ote ct ionc la im to the e xte nt she w as se ek ing m one tary dam ag es . I n do ing so, the c ourt e xpl ai ne d th at , al tho ugh the r igh t t o be f

re e fr om r et al ia tio n w as ac le ar ly

e sta bli she d F ir st A m en dm en t r igh t un de r T itl e V II , it w as not ac le ar ly e sta bli she d e qua l- pr ote ct ion rig ht . Mor eo ve r, al th ou gh th e co ur t re co gn iz edth atCla rk ’s fai lu re t o s ho w a violatio n of a clearly

established cons titutio nal right didnot bar her corollary cl ai m f or inj unc tiv e re lie f, the c ourt c onc lud ed that this r eque st f

or r el ie f w as m oot because Clar

k was no longer under Eakins’s supervision . Finally , the c ourt14

declined to exercise supplem ental j urisdictio n over Clark’ s rem aining st ate-law cl ai m of a ss au ltan d b at te ry . Iss ue 1: R et ali at ion C lai m Cl ar k arg ue s f

or the f ir st t im e on a

ppe al that the c ourt e rr ed in gr an tin g th e state sum m ar y j udgm en t onhe r T itl e V II r et al ia tio n c la im be ca use , by intro duc ing O’ Cain’ s testim ony

that he believed and inform ed Clark’ s superviso rs that Clark w as a“ tr oubl em ak er , ” Cl ar k sh ow ed dir ec t e vid en ce of

r et al ia tio n. I n th e al te rn at ive , Cl ar

k c ont en ds tha t sh e se t f

orth a pr im a fa ci e ca se of

r et al ia tio n be ca use , de spi te the six -y ear ga p be tw ee n he r pr ote ct ed

a ct ivi ty of te sti fy ing in Cl ar k I and the sus pe nsi on and transf er of he r em plo ym en t, she e sta

bli she d a ca usa l c onne ct ionthr ough( 1) e vid en ce sho w ing apa tte rnof c ont inu ed

r et al ia tio n, (2 ) O ’ Ca in’ s te sti m ony

that he c om

m uni cate d hi s be lie f that sh e w as a

“ tr oubl em ak er ” to h er

sup er vis or s, and ( 3) Cl ar

k’ s te sti m ony

that sh e co nsi ste ntl y com plained of retaliation. A fter discussing th e circ um stances surroundi ng her

“ bogu s” disciplin ary

actions, Clar

k also argues that the state failed to provide a le gi ti m at e rea so n fo r su sp en di ng an d t ran sf erri ng he r em

pl oym en t. Ac ourt’ s gr an t of

sum m ar y j udgm en t i s r ev ie w ed

de nov o, “ vie w [i ng] a ll ev ide nc e an d a ll fa ct

ua l i nf er en ce s th er ef

ro m in the li ght

m ost f av or ab le to the no n- m ov in g p art y .” Mi ll er v . Kin g, 3 84 F.3d12 48 , 12 58 -5 9 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 4) .15

“ Issues of credibility

and the weight aff

orded to certain evidence ar e de te rm inatio ns a

ppr opr ia te ly

m ad e by af ind er of f ac t and n ot a

c ourt de ci din g sum m ar y j udgm en t. ” I d. ( quot at ionom itt ed ). “ Sum m ar y j udgm en t i s a

ppr opr ia te w he n ‘ the ple ad ing s, de posi tio ns, answ er s to int er ro ga tor ie s, and a dm iss ion s on fi le , tog ethe r w iththe a ff idavit s, if any , sho wthat the re is no g enuin e iss ue a s to any m at er ia l f

ac t and tha t the m ovi ng p ar ty is en tit le d to aj udgm en t a s am atte r of la w.’ ” Id . (qu ot at io n o m it te d) . It is unlawful under T itle VI I for an em ploy er to re taliate against an em plo y ee “be ca

use [ the e m

plo y ee ] ha s op pose d any

pr ac tic e m ad e anunl aw fu l em plo ym en t pr ac tic e . . . or

be ca use he ha s m ad e a ch ar ge , te sti fi ed , a ssi ste d, or part ic ipate d inany

m anne r in an in ve sti ga tio n, pr oc ee din g, or he ar ing und er

thi s subc ha pte r [o f T itl e V II ] . ” S ee 42 U . S. C. § 20 00e -3 (a ). I n c as es inv olv ing ci rc um stanti al e vid en ce of r et al ia tio n, onc e a pla int if f em plo y ee suc ce ssf

ull y al le ge s apr im a fa ci e ca se , “ the bur de n sh if ts t o th e de fe ndant t o r eb ut the pr es um pti on o f re ta liatio n by

pr oduc ing le git im at e re as ons fo r the a dve rs e em plo ym en t a ct ion . ” S ull ivan v. N at ion al Ra ilr oa d P as se nge r Co rp . , 170 F . 3d 1056 , 1059 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation om itted). “ If the def endant offers legitim ate re asons, the presum ption of reta liation d isappears.” Id. “ The plaintiff the n m ust sho wthat the e m

plo y er ’ s pr of

fe re d r ea sons f

or takin g th e adve rs e ac tio nThe Supreme Court set out this burden-shifting f rame work in McDonne ll Dougla s 6 Corp. v. Gre en, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L .Ed.2d 668 (1973), a nd Texas Dept. of Community

Affa irs v. Bur dine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L .Ed.2d 207 (1981). 16 we re a ctually

a prete xt for prohibitedretaliatory conduct.” I d. “ If the plaintiff does not proffer

sufficient evidence to cre ate a genuine issue of m aterial f act re gard ing w he the r ea chof the de fe ndant’ s art ic ulate d r ea sons is pr et ex tua l, the [d ef en dant] is en tit le d to sum m ar y j udgm en t. ” Ch ap m anv. A I T ranspo rt , 229 F. 3d 1 012, 102 4- 25 ( 11th C ir . 200 0) ( enbanc ) (d isc uss ing pr et ex t i n c ont ex t of age and disabilit y

discrim ination ). 6 a. Wh et he r C lar k

of fe re d di re cte vid en ce of

r et ali at ion To the extent Clar

k is arguing that the court err ed in granting summ ary j udgm en t onhe r T itl e V II r et al ia tio n c la im be ca use she of

fe re d di re ct

e vid en ce of retaliation, she ar guablywa ived this argum ent by failing to raise it in the district co urt. Se e St av ro poul os v . F ir es ton e, 361 F . 3d 6 10, 616 n. 6 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) (declining to con sider a legal theory that wa s not presented to the district court), pe tit ionf or c er t. f ile d, N o. 04- 1099 ( U . S. F eb . 11, 200 5) . R eg ar dle ss, thi s ar gum en t i s w ith out

m er it. A s C lark

c ont en ds, “ [w ] he re the non -m ovant p re se nts dir ec t e vid en ce that, if

be lie ve d by

the j ur y , w oul d be suf

fi ci en t t o w in at tri al , sum m ar y j udgm en t i s no t a

ppr opr ia te e ve n w he re the m ovant p re se nts c onf lic tin g ev id en ce.” M erri ttv. Di ll ardPap er Co ., 12 0 F .3d11 81 , 11 89 (11 th Cir . 19 97 ).17

W e, how ev er , e xpl ai ne d inMe rr itt that di re ct

e vid en ce is “ ev ide nc e, w hic h if be li ev ed , pro ve s ex is te nc e o f fac t i n i ss ue wit ho ut in fere nc e o r pr es um pt io n. E vid en ce that on ly

sug ge sts dis cr im inatio n, or that i s su bj ec t t o m or e than on e int er pr et at ion , doe s no t c onst itu te dir ec t e vid en ce . ” I d. ; se e al so W ils on v . B/ E A er ospa ce , I nc . , 376 F . 3d 1 079, 108 6 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) ( “ onl y the m ost blatant rem arks . . . c onsti tute direct evidence”) . Inthe ins tant c as e, Cl ar

k ha s c ite d a s di re ct

e vid en ce to O ’ Ca in’ s te sti m ony that he be lie ve d, and i nf

orm ed Cl ar k’ s su pe rv iso rs , that C lark

w as a

“ tr oubl em ak er . ” H ow ev er , O ’ Ca in, w ho w as af ed er al e m plo y ee a ssi gne d to se rv e at the D irector of the state’ s ST D program , did not sup ervise Clar k, and, thus, wa s not r es pons ibl e fo r dis ci pli nin g he r. Mo re ove r, O ’ Ca in t es tif ie d th at , in dis cu ssi ng Cl ar k’ s pe rf orm an ce or

be havio r w ithoth er

sup er vis or s, any

ne ga tiv e co m

m en ts he m ad e w er e not

r el at ed to he r pr ote ct ed

a ct ivi ty of te sti fy ing in Cl ar

k I . C lark , the re fo re , f

ai le d to sho wthat O ’ Ca in’ s te sti m ony e vid en ce , if

be lie ve d, “pr ove [d ] [the] existence of [the r etaliatory m otive] without inference or pr esum ption .” See Merr itt, 120 F.3d at 1189. T hus, the recor d does no t refle ct that Clark pre sented dir ec t e vid en ce in re spon se to the state ’ s sum m ar y j udgm en t m oti on. b. Wh et he r th e st at e’ s ad ve rs e em pl oym en t ac ti on s wer e ca us all y related to C lark ’s prote cted activities, such t hat she established a pr im a f ac ie c ase of

Ti tl e V II r et ali at ion18

Furthe rm or e, the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e rr in co nc lud ing that C lark f ai le d to es ta bli sh a pr im a fa ci e ca se of

T itl e V II r et al ia tio n. T o su cc es sf ull y a sse rt suc h a claim , a plaintiff m

ust sh ow that (1) she e ngaged in s tatutorily protected expr es sio n; ( 2) she suf

fe re d an a dve rs e em

plo ym en t a ct ion ; and ( 3) the a dve rs e act io n was cau sa ll y

rel at edto th e p ro te ct edex pr es si on . Coo pe r v. So ut he rn Co ., 3 9 0 F. 3 d6 9 5 , 7 4 0 (1 1 th Ci r. 2 0 0 4 ). As th e p ar t i es d o n o tco n t es tth e c o u rt ’s determ ination that Clark satisfied the fir st two elem ents of this prim a fa cie ca se, th e o nl y is su e fo r us to de te rm in e is cau sa ti on . In establishin g that the state’ s adverse actions of im posin g a three- day sus pe nsi on and transf

er ri ng h er e m plo ym en t t o th e T CH D w as c au sa lly r el at ed to he r pr ote ct ed

a ct ivi ty of te sti fy ing in Cl ar

k I , Cl ar k on ly ne ed ed to showthat “ the decision-m aker[s] [w ere] aw are of the protected conduct,” and “ that the protected ac tiv ity and the a dve rs e ac tio n w er e not w hol ly unr el at ed . ” S ee G upt a v. F lor ida Bd . of R eg en ts , 21 2 F .3d57 1, 5 90 (11 th Cir . 20 00 ) (quo ta ti on om it te d) . Mor eo ve r, “ [a ] pla int if

f sa tis fi es thi s [ ca

usatio n] e le m en t i f she pr ovi de s su ff ic ie nt ev ide nc e of

kno w le dge of

the pr ote ct ed

e xpr es sio n and tha t the re w as ac los e te m por al pr oxi m ity

be tw ee n th is aw ar en es s and the a dve rs e ac tio n. ” H igd on v . Ja ck son, 393 F . 3d 1 211, 122 0 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) ( quot at ionand m ar ks o m itt ed ) (r ev ie w ing gr an t of

sum m ar y j udgm en t i n c la im

f ile d un de r the anti -r et al ia tio n19

provisi on of the Am ericans with Disabilities Act) . How ever, this “ tem poral pr oxi m ity ” m

ust be “ ve ry c los e. ” I d. “ If

the re is a subs tanti al de lay be tw ee n th e protected expression and th e adverse a ction[,] in the absence of other evidence tending to show causation, the com plaint of retaliation fails as a m atter of law. ” Id . a t 12 20- 21 ( co nc lud ing that thr ee -m onth pe ri od b etw ee n th e pr ote ct ed a ct ivi ty an d th e adve rs e em

plo ym en t a ct ion , in the abse nc e of oth er e vid en ce of

c au sa tio n, wa s insu fficient to establishing a prim a fa cie ca se of T itle VI I re taliation). Si m il arl y , in Man ic ci a v . Bro wn, 1 71 F.3d13 64 (11 th Cir . 19 99 ), we concluded th at the district court did no t err in determ ining that the em ploy ee f ailed to establish this causation elem ent. I d. at 1370. I n Maniccia, the em ploy ee w as re as sig ne d to adif

fe re nt p osi tio n 15 m onths a ft er she f ile d ase xua l hara ssm en t gr ie vanc e ag ai nst

he r supe rv iso r, and h er

e m plo ym en t w as te rm inate d 21 m onths la te r. I d. a t 13 69- 70. W e de te rm ine d th at ( 1) ins te ad

of r ep re se nti ng a

pa tte rnof re ta liator y a ct ivi ty , the se tw o e m

plo ym en t a ct ion s w er e iso la te d e ve nts that ha d no te m por al r el at ion shi p to he r pr ote ct ed a ct ivi ty ; and ( 2) “ [t ] he m or e than 15 -m onth pe ri od tha t e la

pse d be tw ee n [ he r] gr ie vanc e an d th e al le ge d a dve rs e em plo ym en t act io ns be li e[d ] he r as se rti on th atth e fo rm er ca us edth e la tt er.” Id . at 1 37 0. Moreover, we explained that the em ploy ee f ailed to show any

other evidence su gg es ti ng th is cau sa ti on . Id.20

Co m pare d w iththe 3- m onth de lay in H igd on, and the 15- m onth de lay in Manic ci a, the 6- y ear ga

p be tw ee n C lark ’ s pr ote ct ed a ct ivi ty and the sus pe nsi on an d te rm inatio n of

he r em plo ym en t w as an e ve n gr eate r “ de lay . ” Mo re ove r, in the ab se nc e of

“ a cl ose te m

por al r el at ion shi p, ” Cl ar

k f ai le d to pr oduc e suf

fi ci en t al te rn at ive e vid en ce sho w ing that he r pr ote ct ed a ct ivi ty and the e m

plo ym en t actions were “ not whollyunrelated.” See Gupta, 212 F.3d at 590. A lthou gh Clark cites to a continued p attern of disciplinary acts against her, a three -y ear gap ex ist ed be tw ee n C lark ’ s te sti m ony in Cl ar k I and h er

f ir st wri tte n w ar

nin g inJun e 1999 . Moreover, althoug h O’ Cain conceded that he inform ed Clark’ s superviso rs that C lark w as a“ tr oubl em ak er , ” the se dis cu ssi ons w er e co nduc te d a s part of O’C ai n ’s du t i es as th e s t at e’s ST D Di re ct o r a n dwe re s up p o rt edb y Cl ark ’s dis ci pli nary

r ec or d. T hus, Cl ar

k f ai le d to a lle ge suc ce ssf

ull y apr im a fa ci e cl ai m of T itl e V II r et al ia tio n. S ee H igd on, 393 F . 3d at 12 20- 21. (c) Wheth er C lark

established that the state’s p roffer ed n onretaliatory reasons for t he adver se em ploym ent actions w ere pr et ex tu al E ve n if Cl ar k e sta bli she d apr im a fa ci e ca se of T itl e V II r et al ia tio n, the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e rr

in gr an tin g sum

m ar y j udgm en t be ca

use Cl ar k f ai le d to showthat the state ’ s pr of fe re d no n- dis cr im inator

y r ea sons f or takin g th es e ac tio ns w er e not pr et ex tua l. S ee A dm ir al I ns. Co . v. Cr es en t H ill s Apartm en ts, 328 F . 3d21

1310 , 131 2 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) ( “ w e m ay a ff irm adis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n [ to g rant sum m ar y j udgm en t] on a

ny a de quate gr ound , e ve n if it is oth er than th e one on w hic h th e co urt a ct

ua lly r el ie d” ). A s di sc uss ed

above , onc e a pla int if

f suc ce ssf ull y al le ge s apr im a fa ci e ca se of r et al ia tio n, and o nc e the e m plo y er art ic ulate s a le git im at e, non -d isc ri m inator y r ea son fo r the c ha lle nge d e m plo ym en t a ct ion , the plaintiff m

ust proffer suffic ient evidence to create a genuine issue of m aterial f act re gard ing w he the r ea chof the de fe ndant e m

plo y er ’ s art ic ulate d r ea sons is pretextual. S ulliv an, 170 F. 3d at 105 9. I n determ ining whether the plaintiff has m et thi s burd en , c ourts e xam ine w he the r “ suc h w eakne sse s, im pla usi bil iti es , inconsi stencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the em ploy er’ s proffer ed le git im at e re as ons fo r its a ct ion[ ex ist , suc h] that a r ea sona ble f ac tf ind er c oul d f ind [a ll of the r ea sons ] unw orthy

of c re de nc e. ” W atkin s v. S ve rd ru p T ec h. , I nc . , 153 F.3 d 1 30 8, 1 31 4 (1 1t h C ir. 1 99 8) (in te rn al qu ot at io n o m it te d) . As a prelim inary

m atter, a plaintiff m

ust establis h that “ the em ploy er w as ac tua lly aw ar e of the pr ote ct ed

e xpr es sio n a t the ti m e it too k a dve rs e em plo ym en t ac tio n. ” Br

ungart v. Be llS outh T el ec om

m uni catio ns, I nc . , 231 F . 3d 7 91, 799 ( 11th Ci r. 200 0) ( re as oni ng tha t “ a de ci sio n- m ak er c annot have be enm oti va te d to retaliate by

som ething u nkno wn to him ”). T o the extent the state is arguing that the pe rs ons w ho, ult im at el y , de ci de d to sus pe nd and transf er Cl ar k’ s e m plo ym en t22

did not have kno w le dge of

he r pr ote ct ed

a ct ivi ty , the state arg uably w ai ve d th is iss ue by f ai lin g to c ro ss- ap pe al the c ourt’ s de te rm inatio n, a t l ea st i n th e co nte xt o f de te rm ini ng whe the r Cl ar k e sta bli she d apr im a fa ci e ca se , that su ff ic ie nt knowledge existed. See Rivkind , 825 F. 2d at 150 6 n.3. Although the rec ord inc lud es D r. W ill iam son’ s a tte statio n th at his ult im at e de ci sio n to sus pe nd and tr an sf er Cl ar k’ s e m plo ym en t “ ha d no thi ng t o do w ithMs . Cl ar k’ s in vol ve m en t i n a law sui t m or e than f

ive y ears e ar lie r, ” he did

not state that he ha d no kno w le dge about Clark I. Moreover, Clark produced evidence showing that Eakins and other JC HD em

pl oyees k ne w of t he fact s s urro un di ng Cla rk ’s tra ns fer t o t he JC HD. W e, however, need not determ ine whether this iss ue is waived or whether suf fi ci en t kn ow le dge e xis te d be ca use Cl ar k f ai le d to sho wthat the state ’ s r ea sons for the em

ploym ent actions were pretextual. De spite Clark’ s argum ents that pr et ex t w as sho w n by

the f ac t tha t he r sus pe nsi on and transf er w er e ba se d on unfoun ded discipl inary

acts against her, at least som e of the conduct for which Cl arkwas d is ci pl in edwas fo rb id de n i n t he st at e’s writ te n p ol ic ie s an d p ro cedur es . See Nix v. W LC Y R adio/Rahall Com m unication s, 738 F. 2d 11 81, 1187 (11t h Cir. 1984 ) (“ T itl e V II doe s no t t ak e aw ay an e m plo y er ’ s r igh t t o in te rp re t i ts r ule s a s it s ch oose s, and t o m ak e de te rm inatio ns a s it se es f it unde r tho se r

ule s” ). I nde ed , the part ie s st ipu la te d th at

Cl ar k w as sub j ec t t o th e state ’ s po lic ie s, w hic h in cl ude d a23

policy prohibit ing sexu al harassm ent in the workplace. Clar k also conceded that she f or w ar de d, a lbe it m ist ak en ly , the se xua l e -m ai l t o JC H D e m plo y ee s. Clark contested, a s well, whether these disciplin ary

acts w ere warranted be ca use ( 1) he r use of

le av e did not vio la te the JC H D ’ s po lic ie s; ( 2) he r use of leave in part w as because of her inabilityto re-e nter the country for a we ek after Se pte m be r 11, 200 1; ( 3) he r pr oduc tio n r ec or ds c ontra dic te d he r w ar nin g f or f a i l u r e t o s ub mi tr e c o r d s ; ( 4 ) h e r F e b r u ary 2 0 0 2 me mo r an du m o nt i me m anagem ent was not a “ discipli nary wr ite-up”; and (5) the negative eff ect of her se xua l e -m ai l w as be lie d by the f ac t tha t JC H D e m

plo y ee s r eg ularl y

de al t w ith sim ilar pictures as part of their j ob du ties. H owever , “ a plaintiff em ploy ee m ay not e sta bli sh tha t an e m

plo y er ’ s pr of

fe re d r ea son is p re te xtu al m er el y by questio ning the wisdom

of the em

ploy er’ s reason, so long as the reason is one that m igh t m oti va te ar ea sona ble e m plo y er . ” S ee P ennin gto n v. Ci ty of H unt svi lle , 261 F. 3d 1 262, 126 7 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ( int er na l qu otatio n and m ar

ks o m itt ed ). I nde ed ,

“ [f] ederal c ourts do not sit to second-guess th e business judgm ent of em ploy ers. ” See Com bs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 151 9, 1543 (11th Cir. 1997 ). A lth oughCl ar

k a lso spe cu la te d th at

she e sta bli she d an in fe re nc e of re ta liatio n f

ro m O ’ Ca in’ s r ep eate d di spara gin g r em ar ks a bout he r, she f

ai le d to co unt er a sse rt ion s by

O ’ Ca in o r D r. W ill iam son that O ’ Ca in d id n ot d ir ec tly24

supe rv ise Cl ar

k. “ Me re c onc lus or

y a lle ga tio ns and a sse rt ion s w ill not suf fi ce ” to es ta bli sh p re te xt. S ee E ar le y v. Ch am pio n I nte rn . Co rp . , 907 F . 2d 1 077, 108 1 (1 1thCi r. 199 0) ( ci ta tio n om itt ed ). Mo re ove r, the r ec or d sh ow s th at the state did not sus pe nd and t er

m inate Cl ar

k’ s e m plo ym en t un til a ft er

( 1) it c ondu ct ed

adue pr oc es s he ar ing ; and ( 2) ahe ar ing of fi ce r iss ue d ade ta ile d w ri tte n r ep ort, out lin ing w hy

the se r ec om

m en de d e m

plo ym en t a ct ion s w er e ne ce ssary . ( Se e R1 - 64 at Exhs. 13, 19, 20). Thus, e ven if the district court erre d in conclud ing th at Clark fa iled to establis h a prim a fa cie ca se of re taliation, Clark f ailed to show that a ge nui ne iss ue of

m at er ia l f

ac t e xis te d a s to pr et ex t. T he c our t, the re fo re , did

not err i n g ran ti ng th e st at e su m m ary jud gm en t o n C la rk ’s Titl e VII ret al ia ti on cla im . Iss ue 2: Se ct ion 198 3 E qu al- P ro te ct ion C lai m Clark also argues that the district court err ed in granting Eakins s umm ary j udgm en t onhe r § 19 83 e qua l- pr ote ct ionc la im . C lark c ont en ds tha t sh e show ed a vio la tio n of

ac le ar ly e sta bli she d c onst itu tio na l r igh t thr oughte sti m ony that sh e wa s assaulted in retaliation agains t her testify ing in the prior litigation , which was spe ec h pr ote ct ed

by the F ir st A m en dm en t. C lark a lso arg ue s th at

the c ourt e rr ed

in de te rm ini ng tha t he r re que st f or inj unc tiv e re lie f w as m oot be ca use ( 1) she presented evidence of consistent past d iscrim ination ; and (2) because she w as se ek ing r ei nst at em en t t o he r fo rm er pos iti on and l ike ly

w oul d ne ed

j ob25

recom m endations in the future, ther e w as a re asonable probabil ity of further no nc om pl ia nc e wit h t he law.

“ A governm ent official who is su ed under § 198 3 m ay seek sum m ary j udgm en t onthe gr ound

that he is en tit le d to qua lif ie d im m uni ty . ” Cr osby

v. Monro e Co unty , 394 F . 3d 1 328, 133 2 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) . “ Q ua lif ie d im m uni ty pr ote ct s go ve rn m en t of

fi ci al s pe rf

orm ing dis cr et ion ar

y f unc tio ns f

ro m li ab ili ty if the ir c ondu ct doe s no t vi olate ‘ cl earl y

e sta bli she d st at

uto ry or c onst itu tio na l r igh ts of w hic h ar ea sona

ble pe rs on w oul d have kno w n. ’ ” S nid er v. Je ff er son St at e Co m m uni ty Co lle ge , 344 F . 3d 1 325, 132 7 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) ( quot ing H ope v. Pe lz er , 536 U . S. 730 , 739 , 122 S . Ct . 250 8, 251 5, 153 L . E d. 2d 6 66 ( 2002 )) . “ T he burden rests on th e plaintiff to show that qualified imm unityis not approp riate. ” Sn ide r, 344 F . 3d at 13 27. W e have c onc lud ed

that, “ [t ] he r igh t t o be f

re e fr om r et al ia tio n is c le ar ly es ta bli she d a s af

ir st am en dm en t r igh t and a s astatut or y r igh t un de r T itl e V II ; bu t no c le ar ly e sta bli she d r igh t e xis ts unde r the e qua l pr ote ct ionc lause to be f re e fr om re ta liatio n. ” Ratli ff

v. D eK al b C ounty , G a. , 62 F . 3d 3 38, 340 ( 11th C ir . 199 5) (e m pha sis in or igi na l) . B ec au se the pla int if f in R at lif f onl y a lle ge d an e qua lprotection claim

of reta liation u nder § 1983 , w e re versed the district court’ s denial of qua lif ie d im m uni ty a s to that c la im . I d. a t 34 1. S im ilarl y , be ca use Cl ar k on lyAlthough E akins did not appea r to argue in the district cour t the defe nse of mixed 7 motives, this C ourt should note that, in both Titl e VI Iand § 1983 re taliation claims, “an employ er c an avoid liability if it can prove it would have made the same de scribed e mploy ment decision in the abse nce of the alleg ed bias.” See Penning ton, 261 F.3d 1269.

26 as se rt ed in he r am en de d c om

pla int an e qua l- pr ote ct ionc la im und er § 19 83, the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e rr

in co nc lud ing that C lark f ai le d to a lle ge a“ cl earl y established st atutory

or constitut ional right” and th at qualified im m unitywa s w ar rante d, se e Ratli ff

, 62 F . 3d at 34 0. 7 Mor eo ve r, e ve n if

Cl ar k ha d a lle ge d aF ir st A m en dm en t c la im of r et al ia tio n, to successfully

state such a claim , “ a public em ploy ee m ust sh ow that her em plo y er r et al ia te d a ga ins t he r be ca use of he r spe ec h onam atte r of pub lic co nc er n. ” S tavr opou los , 361 F . 3d at 61 8. Apub lic e m plo y er r et al ia te s whe n he take s an a dve rs e em

plo ym en t a ct ionthat i s li ke ly to ch ill the e xe rc ise of co nst itu tio na lly

pr ote ct ed

spe ec h. I d. T o be c onsi de re d an a dve rs e em plo ym en t action in a First A m endm ent retaliation case, the challenged act “ m ust inv olve an im portant c ondi tio n of

e m plo ym en t, ” w hic h in cl ude s su cha ct s a s di sc harg es , dem otion s, r efusals to hire or prom ote, and reprim ands. Id. at 619. Be cause Clar k failed to explain why

Eakins’s alleged grabbing and restraining her “ invo lved an im portant c ondi tio n of

e m plo ym en t, ” she a lso w oul d no t have be enable to es ta bli sh a F ir st A m en dm en t c la im

of r et al ia tio n. T hus, thi s di str ic t c ourt a lso did no t err in gra nt in g Eak in s s umm ary jud gm en t o n C la rk ’s § 1 98 3 c la im .27

Finally , to the extent Clar k is challengin g the court’ s determ ination that her re que st f or inj unc tiv e re lie f w as m oot , w e re vie wthe que sti on o f m ootne ss d e novo , Co ra l S pr ing s S tr ee t S y ste m s, I nc . v. Ci ty of S unr ise , 371 F . 3d 1 320, 132 8 (1 1thCi r. 200 4) . “ St an din g ha s th re e co nst itu tio na l e le m en ts. Apla int if f se ek ing to i nvok e a fe de ra l c ourt’ s j ur isd ic tio n m ust sho w : ( 1) it

ha s su ff er ed an ‘ inj ur y in fa ct ’ that i s ( a) c onc re te and p ar tic ulari ze d and ( b) a ct

ua l or im m ine nt, not conje ctural or hy

poth etical; (2) the inj ury

is fairly trace able to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely , a s oppo sed to m erely speculative, that the inj ur y w ill be r edre sse d by

af av or ab le de ci sio n. ” K oz iara v. Ci ty of Cas se lb erry, 392 F.3d13 02 , 13 04 (11 th Cir . 20 04 ) (ci ta ti on om it te d) . Mor eo ve r, a pla int if f se ek ing inj unc tiv e or

de cl ar at or

y r el ie f m ust pr ove not

onl y an in j ur y , but al so “ a re al and i m

m ed ia te thr eat of

f uture inj ur

y in or de r to s at isf

y the inj ur y in fa ct r equir em en t. ” I d. a t 13 05. T hus, apla int if f se ek ing pr ospe ct ive r el ie f “ m ust showasuf

fi ci ent l ike lih ood that he w ill be a ff ec te d by the a lle ge dly

unl aw fu l co nduc t i n th e fu tur e. ” I d. a t 13 05- 06 ( co nc lud ing that pl ai nti ff f ai le d to a sse rt , m uch less sho w, that a re al and im m ediate threat of future inj ury ). A s di sc uss ed

above , Cl ar

k is a sse rt ing that a

“ re al and i m

m ed ia te thr eat of fu tur e inj ur

y ” ex ist s be ca

use she w ish es to be r ei nst at ed to he r fo rm er

pos iti on and m ay ne ed f uture j ob r ec om

m en da tio ns. T o th e ex te nt C lark did not w ai ve the se28

ar gum en ts b y

f ai lin g to arg ue the m

in the dis tr ic t c ourt, se e St av ro poul os, 361 F . 3d at 616 n. 6, she ha s f

ai le d to sho whowthe se c onc er ns r el at ed to he r § 19 83 e qua lprotection claim . Furtherm ore, the parties conceded in their j oint st atus report that, a ft er 200 2, E ak ins no l onge r se rv ed a s C lark ’ s su

pe rv iso r. T hus, sim ilar to the pla int if

f in K oz iara , Cl ar

k f ai le d to sho w“ a suf

fi ci en t l ike lih ood that [ s] he [w ould ] be aff

ected by the allegedly

unlawful conduct in the future,”and the court did no t err in conclud ing th at Clar k’ s request for inj unctive relief w as m oot. See Koz ia ra, 3 92 F.3dat 1 30 5- 06 . A cc or din gly , w e co nc lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e rr in gr an tin g th e de fen da nt s s umm ary jud gm en t o n C la rk ’s Titl e VII an d § 19 83 ret al ia ti on cla im s. W e, th eref

or e, affi rm . AF FIRMED .