1 The Disciplinary Rules and Procedures for Adult Inmates

defines extended lockdown as:

An indeterminate period of lockdown characterized by

routine 90 day classification reviews to determine

eligibility/suitability for release from this status.

This type of segregation is used primarily after a

Disciplinary Hearing for an inmate found guilty of

violating one or more serious rules, or of being

dangerous to himself or others, or of being a serious

escape risk, or of posing a clear threat to the

security of the facility.

1 United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 94-30433

Summary Calendar.

Claude E. WOODS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Edwin W. EDWARDS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Claude E. WOODS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Andrew J. DUNN, Corrections Major and Chairman of Lockdown Review

Board, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

May 10, 1995.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of Louisiana.

Before WISDOM, KING and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Claude Woods, incarcerated in the Louisiana State Penitentiary

at Angola, brought this § 1983 action alleging that his current

status at the prison in "extended lockdown", 1 a form of

d isciplinary isolation, was motivated by racial animus or was in2 The plaintiff argues that his due process rights were

violated in two ways. First, he alleges that the disciplinary

board is biased against him. Second, he contends that the prison

has violated the consent decree rendered in Ralph v. Dees, CA-71-

94 (M.D.La.1975).

2 retaliation for his resorting to the courts for relief. Further,

Woods contended that his continued confinement was wrongful, that

some conditions of his confinement were unconstitutional, and that

his due process rights were violated. The district court concluded

that the plaintiff's claims lacked sufficient evidentiary support

and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Because

we agree with the conclusions of the district court, we AFFIRM.

I

On July 23, 1991, Woods was placed in "extended lockdown"

after a prison discip linary board concluded that he had written

threatening letters to individual s outside the prison and forged

the n ame of another prisoner as the author. According to prison

guidelines, the plaintiff's status is reviewed every 90 days and,

until now, the board has decided to leave Woods in extended

lockdown citing the serious nature of his offenses.

Woods filed this § 1983 action alleging that the prison now

refuses to release him from extended lockdown because of his race

or, alternatively, in retaliation for his prosecution of this case

and several grievances he pursued throu gh internal prison

procedures. The plaintiff also alleges that his continued

confinement is wrongful, that he has been subjected to

unconstitutional conditions during his time in extended lockdown,

and that his due process rights 2 have been violated.3 The four defendants include Edwin Edwards, the governor of

Louisiana, and Tillery, Vannoy, and Butler, three officials of

the Louisiana Corrections Department. None of these officials

had any direct contact with Woods or his case. Rather, Woods

alleged that they were responsible for the acts of their

subordinates.

3 Both the plaintiff and the defendants made motions for summary

judgment. The magistrate recommended that the defendants' motion

be granted and, after dismissing the plaintiff's objections to the

magistrate's report, the district court accepted this

recommendation. In his report, the magistrate concluded that there

is no evidence that the prison authorities' o n-going decision to

keep the plaintiff in extended lockdown is motivated by the

plaintiff's race or is in retaliation for his resorting to relief

in the courts and to availing himself of the prison's grievance

procedures. Also, the magistrate held that a remedial order is not

a basis for § 1983 liability. Further, the magistrate found that

the plaintiff's due process rights have not been violated by either

his continued confinement or by the action of a biased disciplinary

board. Finally, the magistrate dismissed four defendants 3 because

the plaintiff had alleged no act by them that was causally

connected to any alle ged violation of his constitutional rights.

The plaintiff contends on app eal that these decisions were

erroneous and argues that the judgment in favor of the defendants

should be reversed. This Court granted the plaintiff's motion to

proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

II

A. Equal protection4 As the district court noted, the plaintiff does not

identify his own race, which is presumably black, nor does he

point to any specific incident where a white prisoner was treated

more favorably.

5 Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561,

583 n. 16, 104 S.Ct. 2576, 2590 n. 16, 81 L.Ed.2d 483 (1984);

National Association of Government Employees v. City Public

Service Board of San Antonio, Texas, et al., 40 F.3d 698, 715

(5th Cir.1994); United States v. Galloway, 951 F.2d 64, 65 (5th

Cir.1992).

6 Galloway, 951 F.2d at 65.

4 The plaintiff alleges that prison officials have maintained

his status in extended lockdown while releasing similarly situated

white prisoners in violation of his equal protection rights. 4 To

prove a cause of action under § 1983, the plaintiff must

demonstrate that prison officials acted with a discrimina t ory

purpose. 5 "Discriminatory purpose in an equal protection context

implies that the decisionmaker selected a particular co urse of

action at least in part because of, and not simply in spite of, the

adverse impact it would have on an identifiable group". 6

T he defendants, in moving for summary judgment, pre sented

summaries of Wood's review hearings which indicate that his status

in extended lockdown has been maintained because of the seriousness

of his actions in writing threatening letters and forging the name

of another prisoner. The plaintiff has alleged no specific act of

discrimination nor has he offered proof of discriminatory intent on

the part of prison officials. Rather, the plaintiff rests his

claim on only his personal belief that discrimination played a part

in his continued residency in extended lockdown.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment7 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th

Cir.1994) (en banc).

8 Hale v. Towney, 19 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (5th Cir.1994).

5 under the same standard applied by the district court and in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. If the party moving

for summary judgment has shown that no genuine issue of material

fact remains and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law, "the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings and designate the

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial". 7

Woods has failed to respond to the defendant's evidence and

indicate a material issue that is unresolved. And, as concluded by

the district court, Woods has failed to present evidence of

discriminatory intent on the part of prison officials. The

district court, therefore, did not err when it granted the

defendants' motion for summary judgment.

B. Retaliation for accessing the courts

Woods also alleges that his status in extended lockdown has

been maintained in r etaliation for pressing this case and for

pursuing grievances within the prison. It is settled that prison

officials cannot act against a prisoner for availing himself of the

courts and attempting to defend his constitutional rights. 8 As

with his equal protection claim, however, Woods has offered no

evidence, oth er than a personal belief that he is the victim of

retaliation. The defendants, in response, have presented summaries

of the review board's conclusions. Their stated reason for

maintaining the defendant's status in exten ded lockdown is the9 Farmer v. Brennan, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1970,

1976, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).

10 Id. The Supreme Court noted that:

In its prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments,"

the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison

officials, who may not, for example, use excessive

physical force against prisoners. The Amendment also

imposes duties on these officials, who must provide

humane conditions of confinement; prison officials

must ensure that inmates receive adequate food,

clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must "take

reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the

inmates."

Id. (citations omitted).

6 seriousness of his original violation of the rules. The defendant

has offered no evidence to oppose the prison's characterization of

his treatment as fair and according to the guidelines of the

prison. Woods has failed to respond to the defendant's evidence

and indicate a material issue that is unresolved. In the light of

the record, the d istrict court did not err when it granted the

summary judgment motion of the defendants.

C. Unconstitutional conditions of confinement

"The Constitution "does not mandate comfortable prisons'

...

but neither does it p ermit inhumane ones, and it is now settled

that "the treatment a prisoner receiv es in prison and the

conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under

the Eighth Amendment' ". 9 The Eighth Amendment's prohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment imposes minimum requirements

on prison officia ls in the treatment received by and facilities

available to prisoners. 10

A constitutional violation, however, occurs only when two11 Harris v. Angelina County, Texas, 31 F.3d 331, 334 (5th

Cir.1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 111 S.Ct. 2321,

115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991)).

12 Farmer, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1977; see e.g.,

Harris, 31 F.3d at 334-36.

13 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303-05, 111 S.Ct. at 2327.

7 req uirements are met. First, there is an objective requirement

that the condition "must be so serious as to "deprive prisoners of

t he minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,' as when it

den ies the prisoner some basic human need". 1 1 Second, under a

subjective standard, we must determine whether the prison official

responsible was " "deliberately indifferent' to inmate health or

safety". 12 The deliberate indifference standard can be

appropriately applied to the plaintiff's allegations regarding the

conditions of confinement as well as to his allegations regarding

the failure of the prison to provide him adequate medical care. 13

In this case, the plaintiff contends tha t the conditions of

his confinement in extended lockdown at Angola violate the Eighth

Amendment. Wood alleges that his cell was inadequately cooled and

that the hi gh temperature, while uncomfortable in itself, also

contributed to the plaintiff's health problems. Specifically, the

plaintiff contends that his sinus condition was aggravated by the

cell's high temperature. The defendants, in response, presented

evidence that the portion of the jail housing prisoners in extended

lockdown is equipped with fans used to circulate the air.

The plaintiff argues that the district court erroneously

granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim.14 Wilkerson v. Maggio, 703 F.2d 909, 911 (5th Cir.1983).

15 Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467, 103 S.Ct. 864, 869, 74

L.Ed.2d 675 (1983).

16 Id. at 467-70, 103 S.Ct. at 869-71.

8 Woods, however, has fai led to present medical evidence of any

significance nor has he identified a basic human need that the

prison has failed to meet. While the temperature in extended

lockdown may be uncomfortable, that alone cannot support a finding

that the plaintiff was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in

violation of the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, we affirm the

district court's grant of the def endants' motion for summary

judgment.

D. Wrongful confinement

The plaintiff argues that his continued residency in extended

lockdown is wrongful and that the prison has no valid reason for

maintaining his current status. "Classification of inmates in

Louisiana is a duty of the Louisiana Department of Corrections and

an inmate has no right to a particular classification under state

law". 14 Generally, prison officials are given broad discretion in

administering prisons and prisoners are seen to "retain only a

narrow range of protected liberty interests". 15

In Hewitt v. Helms, the Supreme Court held that the Due

Process Clause alone does not grant inmates a protectable interest

in being in the general population of the prison. 1 6 The Supreme

Court, however, further held that a liberty interest may be created

by state law which places mandatory limitations on prison officials17 Id. at 469-70, 103 S.Ct. at 870-71; see e.g., McCrae v.

Hankins, 720 F.2d 863, 866-68 (5th Cir.1983) (holding that the

Disciplinary Rules and Procedures for Adult Inmates places

procedural limitations on a Louisiana prison's ability to place a

prisoner in extended lockdown); Green v. Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765

(5th Cir.1986) (examining limitations created by Mississippi

law); Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir.1989) (examining

limitations created by Texas law).

18 The Disciplinary Rules provide:

No prisoner can be placed in extended lockdown for any

reason unless he has been afforded a full hearing

before the Disciplinary Board and was found guilty of

violating one or more serious rules, or being dangerous

to himself or others, or of being a serious escape

risk, or of being in need of protection, or of posing a

clear threat to the security of the facility, or of

being the subject of an investigation conducted by

non-institutional authorities into a serious felony.

No Disciplinary Board hearing is necessary when a

prisoner has signed a written request for protection

and is transferred there by the Disciplinary Officer or

a prisoner is initially classified as maximum security.

Prisoners in extended lockdown will be reviewed by an

appropriate review board for possible release to a

lesser custody status at least every ninety (90) days.

19 Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-73, 103 S.Ct. at 871-72 (holding

that the prison was "obligated to engage only in an informal,

nonadversary review of the information supporting ... [the

prisoners] administrative confinement ...").

9 in determining a prisoner's status. 17 In Louisiana, a manual, "The

Disciplinary Rules and Proced ures for Adult Inmates" governs the

administration of prisons. This manual does place limits on when

a prisoner may be place d in extended lockdown. 1 8 The protectable

interest base d on these rules, however, requires only that a

prisoner be afforded appropriate process before being placed in

extended lockdown. 19

In this case, the plaintiff was afforded the full process

required by the Disciplin ary Rules, including notice, a hearing,20 Id. (holding that the prison was "obligated to engage only

in an informal, nonadversary review of the information supporting

... [the prisoners] administrative confinement ...").

21 CA-71-94 (M.D.La.1975).

22 Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1124 (5th Cir.1986).

23 Collins v. King, 743 F.2d 248, 253 (5th Cir.1984) (quoting

Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.1970)).

10 and regular review of his status. This process represents more

than the Due Process clause, in conjunction with Louisiana state

law, requires of prison officials. 20 Accordingly, the plaintiff has

no basis upon which to argue that his confinemen t was or is

wrongful. The district court did not err when it granted the

defendants' summary judgment motion.

E. Due process

The plaintiff attempts to rely on the consent decree issued

in Ralph v. Dees to argue that his due process rights have been

violated. 2 1 As noted by the district court, however, a remedial

court order, standing alone, does not serve as a basis for section

1983 liability. 22 Thus, the district court was not in error when

it dismissed this portion of the plaintiff's complaint.

Woods also argues that his due process rights were violated

when the prison allowed the formation of an allegedly biased review

board. It is true that the plaintiff is entitled to have his

review hearings "conducted before a tribunal having at le ast "an

apparent impartiality towards the charges' ". 23 Woods, however, has

offered no evidence of any bias. The defendants Dunn and Meredith

are the board members who are the focus of Wood's allegations24 The four defendants include Edwin Edwards, the governor of

Louisiana, and Tillery, Vannoy, and Butler, three officials of

the Louisiana Corrections Department. None of these officials

had any direct contact with Woods or his case. Rather, Woods

alleged that they were responsible for the acts of their

subordinates.

25 Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir.1983) (citing

Douthit v. Jones, 641 F.2d 345 (5th Cir.1981)).

11 regarding bias. The record shows that one of them did not, as the

plaintiff contended, always a ct as the chairperson of the review

board. In the face of the defendants' evidence showing the

plaintiff was accorded a hearing and that the plaintiff's status is

reviewed every 90 days by boards whose membership varies, the

plaintiff's claim of bias in violation of due proc ess was

appropriately dismissed.

F. Dismissal of Edwards, Tillery, Vannoy, and Butler

Finally, the plaintiff challenges the dismissal of four

defendants, including Edwin Edwards, governor of Louisiana. 24 The

p laintiff, however, has failed to allege any act on the pa rt of

these defendants which contributed to the violation of his

constitutional rights. Rather, Woods argues that as officials of

the Louisia na state government and the Louisiana Department of

Corrections, these four defendants are responsible for the acts of

all the officials below them that directly affected Woods.

In order to state a cause of action under section 1983, the

plaintiff must identify defendants who were either personally

involved in the constitutional violation or whose acts are causally

connected to the constitutional violation alleged. 25 Woods failed

to make suc h allegations as to these four defendants and,12

therefore, their dismissal was proper.

III

The district court correctly determined that the plaintiff's

claims lacked merit. While Woods has stated recognizable claims,

he has not advanced evide nce to support his allegations.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary

judgment in f avor of the defendants. Nevertheless, the Court

points out that Woods has been in extended lockdown for almost four

years and that it would be appropriate for the review board and the

magistrate to give es pecially careful attention to the need for

continuing to keep Woods in that status.