NDP 2: NAVAL DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 2 - NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (U)

Naval Doctrine Publication 2

(U) Naval Intelligence

Naval Intelligence

"(I)nstitute rigorous, continuous examination of enemy capabilities and potentialities, thereby getting 

the utmost value of information of the enemy and enabling our forces to be used with the greatest 

effectiveness. It is particularly important to comprehend the enemy point of view in all aspects."

-- Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S. Navy (Ret.), 1952

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NDP 2: NAVAL DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 2 - NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (U)

30 September 1994

FORWARD (U)

(U) As in the past, naval intelligence is on watch today, supporting U.S. Navy and Marine 

Corps forces deployed around the world. Naval intelligence provides vital threat information 

on the location, disposition, capabilities, and intentions of our adversaries--actual and 

potential. It supports directly the naval commander's requirements for planning and executing 

combat opertations. When applied effectively, naval intelligence focuses the commander's 

effort for decisive action against the enemy. It reduces risk to friendly forces and supports all 

levels of naval, joint or multinational operations, in peace and war.

(U) Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 2, Naval Intelligence, is the second in a series of six 

capstone documents that articulate naval doctrine and provide the foundation for the 

development of tactics, techniques and procedures. NDP 2 outlines broad guidance for Navy 

and Marine Corps intelligence. All who serve in--or are served by--naval intelligence must 

understand its contents.

C.E.MUNDY,JR. J.M.BOORDA

General, U.S.Marine Corps Admiral, U.S.Navy

Commandant of the Marine Corps Chief of Naval Operations

INTRODUCTION 

(U) Our nation faces an array of geopolitical, social, and technological changes that are 

fundamentally altering the course of world events. In response to these challenges, we have 

articulated a new naval strategy that changes the way U.S. Naval forces operate. The focus of 

naval warfighting has shifted to operations in littoral regions of the world, where outcomes 

can be controlled or influenced from the sea. This new focus makes the nature of potential 

threats more difficult to predict. Because of this increased uncertainty, the need for naval 

intelligence has never been greater.

(U) Naval intelligence provides insights into this uncertain world, both in peace and in war. 

Properly employed, intelligence can give us an accurate estimate of the situation, forecast 

likely adversary courses of action, and allow us to apply selective but decisive combat power 

throughout the battlespace. The fog of war precludes us from having a complete picture of 

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the battlespace, but naval intelligence can lessen the unknowns and reduce risk for friendly 

forces.

(U) More than any other service, naval forces deploy forward in harm's way. Around the 

world, naval forces promote regional stability and stand ready to respond to crisis. Every day 

we train and operate within range of potential adversaries whose military capabilities pose an 

immediate threat. These circumstances create a unique operational environment for naval 

intelligence. Embedded in units, staffs, theater and national agencies, it provides around-theclock support to widely dispersed forces. Its hallmark is tailored, fused, all-source 

intelligence, provided directly to supported operating forces.

(U) Naval intelligence provides indications and warning, cuing for surveillance efforts, and 

discrimination between friendly, neutral, and potentially hostile forces. It gives the 

commander, his staff, and subordinate commands the information they need to plan and 

execute combat action, and to evaluate the results. A commander, for his part, must 

understand fully the capabilities and limitations of the overall process to employ intelligence 

resources effectively throughout his battlespace.

(U) Naval operations demand both general military and naval-specific intelligence, provided 

by Navy and Marine Corps intelligence professionals, and specialized technical expertise 

provided by a cadre of career cryptologists.

(U) This publication defines naval intelligence and outlines its enduring principles. It 

describes the ways naval intelligence supports military planning for routine peacetime 

operations, operations other than war, and combat. Finally, it identifies specific challenges 

for naval intelligence in the future.

CHAPTER ONE (U) The Nature of Naval Intelligence

(U) Definitions

(U) Scope

(U) Purposes

(U) Support to Operating Forces

CHAPTER TWO (U) Fundamentals of Naval Intelligence

(U) Principles

(U) Key Attributes

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NDP 2: NAVAL DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 2 - NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (U)

(U) Sources of Intelligence

(U) The Intelligence Cycle

CHAPTER THREE (U) Naval Intelligence Operations

(U) Functions of Naval Intelligence

(U) Structure of Naval Intelligence

(U) Support to Planning

(U) Support to Operations

CHAPTER FOUR (U) New Direction - Future Challenges

(U) Support for Expeditionary Forces

(U) Training and Readiness

(U) Coordination and Cooperation

(U) Intelligence and the Information Revolution

(U) Support to Information Warfare/Command and Control Warfare

(U) Intelligence Emphasis

CONCLUSION (U)

APPENDIX A: (U) JOINT AND NAVAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS THAT SUPPORT 

NAVAL OPERATIONS

GLOSSARY (U)

SUGGESTED FOLLOW-ON READINGS (U)

NEXT 

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NDP 2

CHAPTER ONE 

(U) The Nature of Naval 

Intelligence

(U) "Nimitz's concept of intelligence was dynamic: Facts were high grade ore to be sifted 

carefully, the pure metal of knowledge extracted and forged into a weapon to defeat the enemy."

-- Gordon W. Prange, Miracle at Midway

(U) The United States is a maritime nation that relies on naval forces to support its 

national interests. The readiness, mobility, and forward deployments of these forces make 

the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps ideally suited to serve as primary instruments of national 

resolve during peace, crisis, and war. Depending on the mission, naval forces can form the 

nucleus of a Joint Task Force, operate as an enabling force for joint operations afloat and 

ashore, or act independently. To perform such operations successfully, naval intelligence 

is required. It provides a fused, all-source picture of the battlespace to support operations 

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at sea, from the sea, and ashore.

(U) The focus on operations in littoral regions has created new and dynamic challenges 

for naval intelligence. Despite a reduced threat of global confrontation, political instability 

persists around the world, creating increasingly complex and unpredictable regional 

threats to national interests. Meanwhile, rapid advances in technology have changed the 

nature of modern warfare and increased the demands on intelligence. In response, the 

Navy and Marine Corps employ a highly capable organization of intelligence and 

cryptologic personnel-afloat and ashore-closely linked to and integrated with other 

service, joint and national intelligence operations.1 

1

 (U) The Navy and Marine Corps have different intelligence and cryptologic career paths. 

Regardless of the service distinctions, both disciplines are essential to successful intelligence 

support.

(U) Definitions

(U) "By 'intelligence' we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country-the 

basis, in short, of our plans and operations."

-- Karl von Clausewitz: On War, 1832

(U) At the outset, it is important to understand the distinction between information and 

intelligence. Information is the assimilation of data that has been gathered, but not fully 

correlated, analyzed, or interpreted. While not fully analyzed or correlated, information 

still has significant value to the tactical commander and plays a key role in threat warning 

and target acquisition. For example, combat information is "unevaluated data, gathered by 

or provided to the tactical commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the 

criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy 

the user's tactical intelligence requirements" (Joint Publication 1-02). Organic, theater and 

national level cryptologic sensors provide a significant portion of combat information.

(U) Intelligence, on the other hand, is "the product resulting from the collection, 

exploitation, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available 

information concerning foreign countries or areas." Integration and analysis, combined 

with a thorough understanding of mission requirements, convert information into usable 

intelligence. Thus, intelligence is the product we derive from analyzing all available and 

relevant information.

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(U) To the commander, intelligence is an essential element in planning and executing both 

combat and non-combat operations. It provides an assessment of an adversary's 

capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions, enabling the commander to employ combat 

power more effectively in attaining specific military objectives. Intelligence helps a 

commander identify an adversary's center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, so he can 

bring maximum force to bear on key adversary weaknesses.2 It also helps the commander 

assess the effects of military operations. Intelligence strives to reduce the uncertainty 

facing the commander, thus reducing risk to friendly forces. The commander's information 

requirements always must be the principal driver of the intelligence effort. By clearly 

articulating his intent, the commander sets the tone for successful integration of 

intelligence within the command. 

2 (U) Centers of gravity are "those characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a military 

force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight (Joint Pub 102)." Critical 

vulnerabilities are those elements of a military force that are vulnerable to attack and whose 

degradation or destruction will lead to defeating the center of gravity and, ultimately, his ability to 

resist. (See NDP 1, Naval Warfare, for further discussion of critical vulnerabilities.)

(U) Naval intelligence is a system of personnel, procedures, equipment, and facilities, 

both afloat and ashore. It supports both naval and joint operations. It is embedded in all 

major echelons of command and is deployed continuously with naval forces. It 

encompasses not only dedicated intelligence elements such as a Marine Radio Battalion, 

but those having other primary functions as well, an example being a destroyer at sea 

sending a surface contact report. In fact, naval forces are unique in that intelligence 

collection capabilities are resident in many of our weapons platforms; at the tactical and 

operational levels of warfare, intelligence collection is just one more capability of ships, 

submarines, and aircraft. Naval intelligence includes centers ashore for maritime, 

scientific and technical intelligence, training, administration of intelligence programs, and 

systems acquisition. Naval intelligence is a part of the joint intelligence architecture in 

current theaters of operations, connecting naval forces to theater joint intelligence centers, 

national intelligence agencies, service intelligence centers, and cooperative foreign 

governments.

(U) Scope

(U) Naval forces are prepared to operate at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of 

warfare. Naval intelligence provides evaluated intelligence on an adversary's capabilities 

and intentions to support planning and operations at all levels of warfare.

-- Strategic Intelligence is required for the formation of policy and military plans 

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at national and international levels. At the strategic level, intelligence is oriented 

toward national objectives and supports the formulation of policies and 

determination of priorities. Strategic intelligence focuses first on discerning the 

capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries as well as considering the 

strategic intentions of allies and other potential multinational partners. Strategic 

intelligence plays a central role in identifying an adversary's center of gravity.

-- Operational Intelligence is required for planning operations within 

regional theaters or areas of operations. It concentrates on intelligence 

collection, identification, location, and analysis to support the operational 

level of warfare, which includes identifying an adversary's operational 

critical vulnerabilities. Further, it assists the commander in deciding how 

best to employ forces while minimizing risk.

-- Tactical Intelligence is required for planning and conducting tactical 

operations at the component or unit level. It focuses on a potential 

adversary's capabilities, his immediate intentions, and the environment. It is 

oriented more toward combat than long-range planning. Far more than at 

any other level, tactical intelligence support is the primary focus of naval 

intelligence.3

(U) Footnote 3. "OPINTEL" is the term previously used in the Navy to refer to tailored, all-source 

intelligence provided directly to naval operating forces. "OPINTEL" equates to tactical 

intelligence; it should not be confused with intelligence support at the operational level of 

warfare.

(U) The three levels of intelligence were evident during Operations Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm. Strategic intelligence led to the identification of Iraq as a potential enemy - 

with its leadership and command and control as centers of gravity; operational 

intelligence identified the Iraqi air defense system as a critical vulnerability that, if 

destroyed, would neutralize the Iraqi military's capability to counter coalition air power; 

tactical intelligence supported plans for destroying or neutralizing critical command and 

control vulnerabilities, such as the Iraqi radar sites destroyed with highspeed anti-radiation 

missiles by Navy tactical aircraft at the outset of the air war.

(U) Purposes

(U) "You are supposed to tell us what the Japanese are going to do, and I will then decide 

whether it is good or bad and act accordingly."

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 -- Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, U.S. Navy

 CinCPacFlt, 1942

(U) Naval intelligence, which supports all aspects of naval operations, has the following 

primary purposes:

-- Supporting the Commander. Commanders require intelligence as a tool to evaluate the 

feasibility of, or determine risk factors associated with, objectives, plan and direct 

operations, and evaluate the effects of their actions. As the commander's primary advisor 

for intelligence matters, the intelligence officer must support the commander, his staff, 

and lateral and subordinate commands-not only with tailored intelligence, but by 

accurately conveying the capabilities and limitations of the intelligence system as well. 

The commander and his forces must have a clear understanding of what intelligence can 

and cannot provide, and how it will support the operation.

To be effective, intelligence support must have credibility which is attained by gaining the 

trust of the commander. This trust is usually gained over time, after a track record of 

accurate intelligence assessments has been established. Intelligence allows the commander 

to fight smarter by supporting his selection of the best courses of action. This includes 

advising the commander when an objective or planned course of action is probably not 

obtainable, even if this advice goes against the conventional wisdom. Each intelligence 

estimate should reflect clear analysis and sound judgment. The ultimate goal is to provide 

the commander and his forces the intelligence support needed to prevail in combat.

-- Identifying Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities. Naval intelligence strives 

to provide an accurate picture of the battlespace from which we can identify clear and 

attainable objectives. For instance, at the operational level, the force commander may 

decide that to accomplish his objective, a particular target set-such as enemy command 

and control facilities-must be destroyed. At the tactical level, intelligence support is 

needed to plan an effective strike against a specific element of that target set, such as a 

radio-relay site. This tactical intelligence may consist of detailed, analyzed target 

photographs from tactical reconnaissance or national collection systems, pinpointing 

essential aim points for the strike leader.

-- Supporting Planning and Execution of Operations. Naval intelligence provides staff 

support in both deliberate and crisis action planning.4 During planning, collection 

resources are identified and tasked to meet intelligence requirements in support of the 

operation. Gaining knowledge of an adversary's capabilities and intentions may alter 

operational plans significantly. Similarly, changing operational tasking may in turn 

modify intelligence requirements. A close partnership between the intelligence and 

operations officers will keep operations efforts focused on the mission and ensure that 

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intelligence requirements are met. Throughout all phases of planning and execution, 

intelligence and operations are critically interdependent. 

4 (U) Deliberate planning is conducted primarily in peacetime to develop operations plans for 

contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Crisis action planning is the 

process of formulating and implementing plans and orders in response to timesensitive crises 

(Adapted from Joint Pub 5-03.1)

-- Protecting the Force. Naval intelligence provides early warning of impending hostile 

action and reduces risk by detecting adversary actions that have an impact on friendly 

planning assumptions. Effective force protection enables us to limit the adverse effects of 

deception and surprise. Force protection efforts, supported by vigorous counterintelligence 

operations, can limit or distort the adversary's assessment of friendly capabilities and 

intentions. Further, naval intelligence provides the information needed to conduct 

successful deception measures against the adversary. These measures require detailed 

knowledge of the adversary's perceptions, vulnerabilities, intelligence-gathering 

capabilities and limitations, tactics, techniques and procedures, and the physical 

characteristics of the battlespace. Moreover, intelligence can reduce the likelihood of 

fratricide by helping to clear the fog of war.

(U) NAVAL INTELLIGENCE IN DESERT STORM 

(U) In response to Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, U.S. forces, under General H. 

Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command, began deployment 

to the Gulf. The Office of Naval Intelligence's Strike Projection Evaluation and Anti-Air 

Warfare Research (SPEAR) group was tasked to provide critical node analysis to support 

combat preparations.

(U) After a thorough review, SPEAR concluded that Saddam Hussein, aware of the 

coalition's vastly superior air forces, would likely not send his entire 950-plane armada 

against the attackers. Rather, he would use them sparingly, relying on hit-and-run tactics, 

and dispersal to hardened shelters around the country, to enhance their survival.

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(U) SPEAR assessed the primary threats to coalition aircraft to be numerous anti-air 

artillery weapons, man-portable air defense missiles, and radar-guided surface-to-air 

missiles, supported by a formidable air defense command and control network. 

Knowledge of Iraq's lethal low-tomedium altitude threat resulted in coalition aircrews 

modifying their tactics in order to operate at higher altitudes. Iraq's reliance on its air 

defense network made the system a critical vulnerability. Therefore, neutralizing this 

enemy capability became an objective of the allied air operation.

(U) Armed with this vital intelligence, the commander, his air staff, and the operating 

forces were able to plan and conduct operations that not only helped to protect the force 

better, but reoriented it toward more punishing strike missions as well. A post-war study 

commissioned by the U.S. Air Force concluded that SPEAR's analysis was "perhaps the 

best assessment of the Iraqi air force and air defense system" in Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm.

-- Supporting Combat Assessment. Naval intelligence is essential in developing combat 

assessments that can help the commander decide whether to redirect friendly forces or end 

operations. Combat assessment is the procedure by which the commander weighs the 

effectiveness of military operations by considering battle damage assessment, munitions 

effectiveness, and reattack recommendations. Analysis of the enemy's reaction to friendly 

operations gives us insights into his morale, materiel status, and ability to continue 

hostilities.

(U) Support to Operating Forces

(U) Support to operating forces is the cornerstone of naval intelligence. Because of their 

mobility and forward deployment, as well as the unique nature of surface, subsurface, air, 

special and landing force operations, naval forces have special requirements for tailored 

intelligence on potential threats in both the maritime and littoral environments. Naval 

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intelligence is designed to support operations at sea, from the sea, and ashore-through an 

organization closely linked with joint and national intelligence centers.

(U) Naval forces engaged in operations are supported by theater Joint Intelligence Centers 

(JICs). The theater JIC serves as a focal point to ensure that operating forces receive 

intelligence support from national and service intelligence centers such as DIA, CIA, NSA 

and the National Maritime Intelligence Center. Naval forces also maintain such organic 

intelligence capabilities as photographic interpretation, communications intelligence 

analysis, and finished intelligence production, which support not only the commander and 

embarked forces, but theater and national decisionmakers as well.

(U) Communications are key to ensuring that intelligence is available to the commander 

and his forces at every level throughout the battlespace. Relevant intelligence must be 

pushed to the commander on the basis of preplanned essential elements of information; 

similarly, because naval forces must be able to respond quickly to any crisis, the 

commander must be able to pull timely and relevant intelligence at any time, from any 

location as well. Rapid, concurrent dissemination of intelligence ensures that an accurate, 

complete, and common picture of the battlespace is available to all tactical users. The 

commander can improve the effectiveness of his forces by exercising his intelligence and 

cryptologic capabilities realistically, and by ensuring that reliable communications deliver 

the product to the user.

(U) Naval intelligence personnel and systems are co-located with decisionmakers at nearly 

every echelon of command. Similarly, cryptologic personnel and systems are woven into 

the fabric of operating forces-from specially configured surface ships, submarines, and 

naval aircraft to Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF). Embedding intelligence and 

cryptologic personnel, equipment, and communications at the unit, afloat staff, theater and 

national levels contributes to effective intelligence support under virtually all 

circumstances. That said, effective intelligence support can be assured only when the 

commander and the members of his intelligence organization have a clear understanding 

of the fundamentals of intelligence.

TOC PREVIOUS NEXT 

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CHAPTER TWO 

(U) Fundamentals of Naval 

Intelligence

"To lack intelligence is to be in the ring blindfolded."

 -- General David M. Shoup, U.S. Marine Corps

 Commandant of the Marine Corps, 1960

(U) The fundamentals of naval intelligence, distilled from years of operational experience, guide 

both the commander and the intelligence officer. The commander who understands these 

fundamentals can employ intelligence to his best advantage; the intelligence officer who 

understands these fundamentals can support the commander's requirements better. The 

fundamentals of naval intelligence include principles, key attributes, intelligence sources and the 

process of the intelligence cycle. They apply across the spectrum of military operations--from 

peacetime, to operations other than war, to combat.

(U) Principles

(U) The principles of naval intelligence provide enduring guidelines for effective intelligence 

operations. Understanding and applying these principles will give decisive advantages to naval 

commanders.

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(U) "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. When 

you are ignorant of the enemy, but know yourself, your chances of winning and losing are equal. If 

ignorant of both your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril."

 -- Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ca. 500 B.C.

-- Know the Adversary. Since the time of Sun Tzu, knowing the adversary has been the 

paramount principle. Identifying the adversary is the first step in gaining this knowledge. 

Knowing how the adversary thinks (especially how the adversary perceives success and failure) 

is essential in forecasting his likely courses of action. We know our adversary better by 

understanding his goals, objectives, strategy, intentions, capabilities, methods of operation, 

vulnerabilities, and values. We gain this understanding by studying his character, culture, social 

mores, customs and traditions, language, and history. Only then will the intelligence officer be 

able to provide the commander a full assessment.

(U) Because naval forces often will be first on the scene in a crisis, naval intelligence must 

identify potential adversaries in peacetime and prepare intelligence for anticipated crises. We will 

not always have the luxury of planning against a single adversary. Naval forces may be called 

into action in a variety of contingencies-against a conventional armed force, a terrorist group, or 

in response to civil or natural disasters. Under these conditions, we must seek to know all 

potential adversaries, while focusing our intelligence efforts against the most likely one.

(U) "The commander must appreciate and shoulder his intelligence responsibilities or fail in the 

discharge of his operational functions."

 --BGEN James M. Masters, U.S. Marine Corps

A C/S-Intelligence, HQMC, 1958

-- The Commander's Needs are Paramount. No commanding officer approaches port without 

knowing the tides and shoals that may endanger ship and crew. Similarly, no fleet, battle group 

or MAGTF commander approaches combat without first understanding the opponent. 

Intelligence, the heart of our combat decisionmaking, enables us to fight smarter by reducing our 

uncertainty about the adversary. Armed with this knowledge, the commander can then determine 

his best courses of action and articulate his continuing intelligence needs. Thus, intelligence 

directly influences operations, from the earliest phases of planning through execution.

(U) The commander involves his intelligence staff early in the planning phase to ensure that 

intelligence will support his effort. In turn, the intelligence staff must keep the commander 

advised of any changes in adversary activity and any gaps in knowledge that may develop.

-- Ensure Unity of Intelligence Effort. In any theater of operations, unity of effort ensures that 

intelligence supports the commander's objectives. Clearly stating and prioritizing information 

requirements are important steps in ensuring unity of effort. This becomes a particular challenge 

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in multinational operations, where naval forces may encounter major differences in language and 

culture, limitations imposed by bilateral agreements, and differing strategic objectives. In 

building unity, we should recognize national differences, promote complementary intelligence 

operations and-most importantly-enable the exchange of intelligence. We can achieve all of this 

through the coordinated efforts of a joint or multinational intelligence center and the exchange of 

intelligence liaison personnel and systems.

-- Plan for Combat. Forward deployed naval forces can be thrust into combat with little warning; 

thus, naval intelligence resources must be able to function continuously in diverse operational 

environments. Realistic and continuous intelligence planning and training must support the full 

range of naval operations. Naval and national intelligence systems must be reliable and give 

commanders timely access to the intelligence they need. At the same time, the commander must 

understand the essential nature of this support and prioritize resources to satisfy his needs. For 

example, automated data processing interoperability should be a key goal, so that own-service 

systems can talk to other-service, other-theater or national systems via common protocols and 

formats. Intelligence personnel must ensure that all databases and communications are in place 

(or readily surged) to support combat operations, afloat and ashore.

-- Use an All-Source Approach. Developing an intelligence assessment is comparable to 

completing a jigsaw puzzle without all the pieces. To develop the full picture, the intelligence 

analyst should seek as many pieces as possible. This is known as the principle of "all-source" 

analysis.

(U) Rarely will a single source or sensor provide the entire picture of the battlespace. Historical 

examples exist in which a single source provided the key intelligence, such as the 

communications intercept that led to the shootdown of Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's 

aircraft during World War II. However, even that key intercept was fused with other known data 

- location of enemy airfields, likely course and speed of the aircraft, and other current 

intelligence - to plan the shootdown. The most useful and complete intelligence assessments 

usually emerge after a fusion of data from multiple sources. To preclude being deceived by our 

own analytical errors or by adversary deception, we use an all-source technique that permits the 

development of corroborating data. Further, all-source analysis can disclose conflicting data, 

which demand additional analysis to discern a more accurate picture. Most often, however, the 

all-source approach develops complementary data, where information from one source confirms 

information provided by another.

(U) All-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE AND THE NAVAL 

EMBARGO OF IRAQ 

(U) The operations of the maritime interception force during Desert Shield and Desert Storm 

clearly demonstrate the importance of allsource intelligence analysis. The embargo of Iraq's 

overseas trade, mandated by a U.N. resolution, directly involved the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard 

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and eleven other coalition navies. Coalition naval forces patrolled the Arabian Gulf, northern 

Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea in search of merchantmen carrying munitions, petroleum, and 

other contraband. Thousands of suspect ships were located, intercepted, and inspected. This 

complex task required timely and accurate intelligence on the nationalities and characteristics of 

the merchant vessels, the origins and destinations of their cargoes, and the orders under which 

their masters operated.

(U) U.S. maritime intelligence activities provided a wealth of intelligence derived from 

international shipping registers, vessel sightings, electronic intelligence, cryptologic reporting, 

open sources, satellite imagery, human intelligence, and aerial reconnaissance photographs. This 

information was collated, analyzed, and fused into intelligence products that were provided to 

naval operating forces. Complementing this intelligence with information from organic radar, 

cryptologic sensors, and other surveillance assets, the maritime interdiction patrol force 

intercepted more than 10,000 ships by the spring of 1991. This enabled the Gulf War coalition to 

maintain, in the words of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, a "steel wall around the waters 

leading to Iraq" that helped hasten the defeat of the Iraqis on the battlefield.

(U) Key Attributes

(U) Effective intelligence has several mutually supportive attributes or qualities. In certain cases 

these qualities can appear as competing goals. For example, although both thoroughness and 

timeliness are attributes of any intelligence product, a goal of thoroughness for any one product 

could actually hinder timeliness. To be effective, naval intelligence must strike a proper balance 

among the following - sometimes conflicting - attributes:

-- (U) Timeliness. Intelligence should be timely enough to support policymaking or 

decisionmaking, to enhance the prospect of mission accomplishment. Timeliness is most 

essential during the formulation of the commander's estimate and when handling highly 

perishable data normally called Indications and Warning intelligence. To ensure that timeliness 

requirements are met, the commander must prioritize his information needs.

-- (U) Objectivity. From the facts on hand, the intelligence analyst must be free to assess and 

report the situation without the influence of bias, distortion, or political constraint. Intelligence 

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analysts should be meticulous in their efforts to discount preconceived notions, and not allow 

these to influence, much less drive, the intelligence effort.

(U) "Tell me what you know. . .tell me what you don't know. . .tell me what you think. . . always 

distinguish which is which."

 -- General Colin L. Powell, U.S. Army

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990

-- (U) Usability. A commander needs intelligence that is easy to understand and apply to 

operational decisions. Usability demands timeliness, relevance, and proper format or form. The 

speed and complexity both of modern threats and our own telecommunications systems place a 

premium on rapid intelligence dissemination. Commanders need this intelligence in time to react 

to threats and make better decisions.

-- (U) Availability. To support the commander's planning and operations, intelligence should be 

available when and where needed. Availability requires foresight, an ability to predict, a clear 

understanding of objectives, and thorough intelligence training. In order to respond to rapidly 

emerging intelligence requirements, the intelligence officer should anticipate, collect, evaluate, 

produce, and store information. In naval operations, we depend on reliable, interoperable, up-todate, on-line intelligence databases. We must be able to receive current, meaningful, 

appropriately classified intelligence to support changing operational requirements rapidly. 

Recognizing the need to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods, we must guard 

against excessively restrictive classification of intelligence, which would deny it to the 

commander or operator who truly needs it. Many intelligence items can be "sanitized" by 

removing references to the highly-classified source of the data, and released at a lower 

classification.

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-- (U) Thoroughness. Thorough intelligence contributes directly to successful combat planning 

and execution. Proper identification and prioritization of the commander's essential elements of 

information help to clarify the scope and detail of the intelligence required.5 The intelligence 

effort should give us the information we need - nothing more, nothing less. Since the intelligence 

picture never will be complete, the commander should be aware of gaps in available information. 

By recognizing both the known and the unknown, a commander can apply appropriate judgment 

to reduce risk. 

5 (U) Essential elements of information (EEI) are the critical items of information regarding the enemy 

and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available 

information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision (Joint Pub 1-02).

-- (U) Accuracy. Intelligence should be factually correct and convey sound estimates of the 

adversary's intentions and capabilities. Accurate intelligence reduces uncertainty, thus increasing 

the commander's confidence in his understanding of the battlespace. Comparison of information 

received from multiple sources improves the ability to verify information and reduces 

susceptibility to deception. The dissemination process must not reduce accuracy.

-- (U) Relevance. Intelligence should pertain directly to the operations at hand and to the level of 

command for which it is intended. For example, the commanding officer of a destroyer 

conducting maritime interdiction operations would find it important to learn that a merchant ship 

with a history of arms smuggling is entering his area of responsibility. The National Command 

Authorities might find the same intelligence somewhat less relevant. If intelligence does not 

support the needs of the intended user, it has little value.

(U) BATTLE OF MIDWAY - THE ATTRIBUTES OF NAVAL 

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INTELLIGENCE 

(U) Before the Battle of Midway, Admiral Chester Nimitz asked his intelligence officer, 

Commander Edwin Layton, to forecast as closely as possible the time and method of the 

anticipated Japanese attack on Midway. With the objective thus defined, Layton set to work. A 

decoded message from the Japanese aircraft carrier command contained the phrase, "we plan to 

make attacks from a general northwest direction," but did not specify the target. Layton thus 

assumed that the Japanese force would approach Midway from the northwest on an approximate 

bearing of 315 degrees. He estimated that they would approach under cover of darkness, just as 

they had at Pearl Harbor six months earlier, and launch their bombers at first light. He knew, too, 

that the U.S. forces on Midway would launch their search planes at first light.

(U) Using available intelligence, Layton's analysts discerned that the attack would occur on June 

4th. Knowing the time of sunrise on June 4th and the approximate course and speed of the 

American search planes, Layton was able to forecast with accuracy and timeliness when and 

where they would detect the Japanese carriers. Layton provided Admiral Nimitz usable

intelligence by estimating that the Japanese would approach Midway on bearing 315 degrees and 

that they would be sighted 175 miles from Midway at about 0600. Nimitz was reportedly 

surprised by the thoroughness of Layton's forecast, but immediately grasped the relevance of the 

estimate. He ordered his staff to plan a course of action that would take this intelligence into 

account.

(U) Shortly after 0600 on 4 June 1942, Admiral Nimitz received an urgent message from 

Midway, "Plane reports two carriers and main body ships bearing 320, course 135, speed 25, 

distance 180." The battle that followed broke the Japanese initiative in the Pacific and changed 

the course of the war. As Admiral Nimitz later remarked to Layton, "Well, you were only five 

miles, five degrees, and five minutes off."

(U) Sources of Intelligence

(U) Intelligence sources vary greatly in capability, method, sophistication, and utility, ranging 

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from a local informant to a billion-dollar reconnaissance satellite system. All sensors possess 

capabilities that make them unique. All have limitations, as well. For instance, reconnaissance 

satellites may provide broad area coverage not available from any other sensor, yet collection 

over the desired area may be affected by adverse weather or orbital geometry. As a rule, 

however, the utility of the source is not a function of its sophistication; the best intelligence often 

can come through the simplest collection means. To be effective, intelligence must use all 

available sources; it cannot simply concentrate on the most familiar. Further, naval intelligence 

must be ready to function in an environment where some sensor data may be missing.

(U) INTELLIGENCE SOURCES 

Counterintelligence CI

Imagery Intelligence IMINT

 Photographic Intelligence PHOTINT

Human Intelligence HUMINT

Measurement and Signature Intelligence MASINT

 Acoustic Intelligence ACINT

 Electro-optical Intelligence ELECTRO-OPTINT

 Infrared Intelligence IRINT

 Laser Intelligence LASINT

 Nuclear Intelligence NUCINT

 Unintentional Radiation Intelligence RINT

 Open Source Intelligence OSINT

 Radar Intelligence RADINT

 Signals Intelligence SIGINT

 Communications Intelligence COMINT

 Electronic Intelligence ELINT

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 Foreign Instrumentation 

 Signals Intelligence FISINT

 Scientific and Technical Intelligence S&TI

 Medical Intelligence MEDINT

(U) Intelligence collection is naturally constrained by resource allocation, the nature of the threat, 

technology, and the environment. Collection resources are normally managed so that they remain 

focused on areas perceived as enduring threats. Refocusing the intelligence system on emerging 

threats may take time. Intelligence assets are necessarily finite and competition for them can be 

extremely keen, thus, they should be managed carefully.

(U) Sensor selection and employment, processing, and timeliness depend on the nature and 

characteristics of the target. For example, electronic intelligence (ELINT) may provide us little 

information when directed against an adversary with unsophisticated weapons; on the other hand, 

human intelligence (HUMINT) might bring some results in the same case. A proper mix of 

sensors and sources is the key. Another important factor is the rapid processing of sensor data. 

The intelligence effort must have enough trained personnel to interpret data within the context of 

ongoing operations. Finally, we must carefully and continually assess the timeliness of sensor 

data.

(U) Sensor data can be corrupted and erroneous; therefore, we should not be mesmerized by a 

display of data on a screen. Such data requires careful analysis and ambiguity must be resolved. 

Some sensors produce data enabling weapons or tactics to be employed directly, such as ELINT 

data used to guide an anti-surface missile attacking an enemy ship. In such cases procedures 

should be in place to disseminate data immediately and ensure that forces acting upon that 

information will understand what it is, how it will arrive, and what it will look like. Other 

intelligence sources, however, often produce information that requires careful consideration and 

analysis before forces can be committed on the strength of it.

(U) The Intelligence Cycle

(U) Intelligence products result from a series of interrelated activities termed the intelligence 

cycle. Figure 1 illustrates the process through which the commander levies intelligence 

requirements, information is collected and converted into intelligence, and intelligence is 

disseminated to users. This cycle normally consists of five steps: planning and directing, 

collection, processing, production and dissemination. This cycle greatly simplifies a dynamic and 

complex process, but it is useful to illustrate how the intelligence process works. Naturally, 

intelligence efforts do not always flow sequentially through the cycle. For example, a request for 

imagery generates planning and direction, but may not involve new collection if the request can 

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be satisfied from archival imagery.

-- (U) Planning and Direction. During this phase of the cycle, the commander must identify and 

prioritize his information requirements. This phase is instrumental to the cycle's success. Because 

a great number of intelligence requirements may have to be satisfied, planning and directing 

determines the effort required to meet our needs. After the commander identifies his 

requirements, the intelligence officer formulates a collection plan, taking into account the 

collection assets available and the commander's essential elements of information. One of the key 

elements in the planning phase is assessing current intelligence to ensure that it meets our 

requirements. Early discovery of any requirements that cannot be satisfied through organic, 

theater or national intelligence collection resources will highlight potential intelligence gaps. 

Planning further includes the identification of personnel, transportation and communications 

requirements.

-- (U) Collection. Collection involves tasking organic, attached, and supporting collection 

resources to gather information.6 The collection process determines what will be--and what will 

not be--available to support decisionmaking. Since few collection requirements can be met fully 

by organic assets alone, collection resources available at the theater and national level will 

normally be tasked, as well. To do this effectively, the intelligence staff must know the 

capabilities and limitations of available collection resources, must understand the requirements 

validation process to obtain desired collection approval, and must identify the collection 

resources that can contribute to fulfilling mission requirements. 

6 (U) Organic intelligence resources are intelligence assets or capabilities permanently assigned to a 

particular command. Attached resources are separate assets attached to the joint force to support a 

particular operation or phase of the operation. Supporting intelligence resources are those from another 

AOR, theater, combatant command, or national organization providing support to the commander from 

outside his AOR (Joint Pub 2-0).

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-- (U) Processing. Processing is the conversion of collected information into a form suitable for 

producing usable intelligence, such as translating foreign languages, developing film from 

tactical reconnaissance aircraft, generating hard- or soft-copy images provided by electro-optical 

or infrared sensors, and converting raw electronic intelligence data into a standard message 

format suitable for automated handling. Timeliness and accuracy are especially relevant during 

processing.

-- (U) Production. Intelligence production is the integration, analysis, evaluation, and 

interpretation of information from all available sources into tailored, usable intelligence. A key 

principle in production is the fusion of information from various sources to form a complete and 

accurate product. Fusion is essential for an effective intelligence production process that 

accurately reflects and supports the commander's prioritized essential elements of information 

(EEI). Because of the uncertain nature of combat, the commander, operations officer and 

intelligence officer should review EEIs periodically to ensure that intelligence assets are 

supporting mission needs.

-- (U) Dissemination. The goal of the dissemination process is to provide the right amount of 

appropriately classified intelligence when, where, and how it is needed. Getting the product to 

the user is the last step in the intelligence cycle; but, because the cycle is dynamic, the process 

does not end with dissemination. First, intelligence personnel must ensure that the product is 

actually used. This is a particular obligation of intelligence personnel who are members of 

operational staffs. They are in the best position to demonstrate the value of intelligence products 

to commanders and other staff members. Second, intelligence personnel must see to it that 

dissemination is refined by gathering feedback from the commander or other users to ensure that 

intelligence requirements have been satisfied and the finished intelligence products are usable. If 

not, then the intelligence staff must take corrective measures to meet the needs of the 

commander. The dissemination process should not overwhelm the tactical user with massive 

amounts of data. Instead, intelligence dissemination should follow established procedures 

designed to push time-sensitive, threatwarning data to the commander, while allowing him to 

pull less timesensitive intelligence required for his mission.

(U) An accurate display of intelligence data is essential to achieving effective employment of 

intelligence products. Increasingly, tactical commanders prefer to view crucial data in the context 

of the larger scenario in progress. Effective display of intelligence information is essential in 

order to translate usable products into modern command and control, and weapons targeting 

systems. This process should include, as necessary, sanitization of classified data and 

reformatting into specific compatible data fields.

(U) Intelligence lays the groundwork for naval operations in peace and war. By understanding 

the fundamentals of naval intelligence, the commander is best able to ensure that intelligence is 

fully integrated into operations. This integration enables intelligence to support both planning 

and execution effectively.

TOC PREVIOUS NEXT 

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CHAPTER THREE 

(U) Naval Intelligence Operations

(U) "The great military victory we achieved in Desert Storm and the minimal losses sustained by U.S. 

and Coalition forces can be directly attributed to the excellent intelligence picture we had on the Iraqis."

 -- General H. Norman Schwarzkopf III, U.S. Army

 Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command, 1991

(U) As an integral part of naval forces, naval intelligence resources are forward deployed around 

the world. Because of this forward deployment, naval intelligence must always be at a high state 

of readiness, with unparalleled situational awareness of the operating theater. To maintain that 

awareness, naval intelligence operations in peacetime closely parallel those in war and in 

operations other than war. More than any other service, naval intelligence supports peacetime 

operational decisionmaking on a daily basis.

(U) Since its formal establishment in 1882, the Office of Naval Intelligence has been a major 

player in many successful operations that have meant the difference between ultimate victory 

and defeat. During World War II, an intensive cryptanalytic effort by the Navy's 

Communications Security Group - forerunner of today's Naval Security Group - led to the 

breaking of the Japanese Navy's code system and played a pivotal role in attaining final victory 

in the Pacific. The naval cryptanalytic efforts of World War II foreshadow similar cryptologic 

tasks that will be required for operations against future adversaries including signals search 

methodology, language skills, and signal access.

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(U) In the Cold War era, the Navy established the Ocean Surveillance Information System 

(OSIS). OSIS focused naval intelligence efforts on the Soviet Navy threat and provided 

intelligence support to fleet and headquarters units. OSIS was a synergistic blend of intelligence 

and cryptologic personnel that provided tailored, fused, all-source intelligence to operating 

units. More recently, the naval intelligence system has served as a model for the establishment 

of Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs). These joint organizations matured during Operations Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm and today help meet the intelligence requirements of naval 

commanders in multiple theaters and in multiple roles. Regardless of the theater or mission, 

however, certain basic functions of naval intelligence remain constant.

(U) Functions of Naval Intelligence

(U) Naval intelligence reduces risk by identifying adversary capabilities, vulnerabilities, and 

intentions. It attempts to impart thorough knowledge of the situation through the application of 

certain basic intelligence functions. These intelligence functions form the foundation of required 

analytical support to the commander. Mission, threat, time, and resources available will 

determine the priority and level of effort applied to specific intelligence functions in any given 

situation. The effective incorporation of the following functions into the intelligence process 

will produce the highest quality support throughout planning and execution.

-- (U) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace 

(IPB) is the systematic and continuous analysis of the adversary, terrain, and weather in the 

assigned or potential battlespace. It is a significant element in the Commander's Preparation of 

the Battlespace and a key part of our decisionmaking process.7 Its goals include understanding 

the adversary's forces, doctrine, tactics, and current and probable courses of action, together 

with the physical and environmental characteristics of the target area. IPB identifies gaps in 

knowledge that require intelligence collection efforts. It consists of five elements: 

7 (U) Commander's Preparation of the Battlespace is used to mean analysis of the physical 

characteristics of an area and its affects on our ability to establish superiority in every dimension of the 

battlespace, as well as a detailed study of adversary capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of 

action.

● (U) Define the Battlespace Environment: Defines the area of operations and focuses 

intelligence assets on the battlespace. 

● (U) Describe the Battlespace's Effects: Evaluates physical characteristics of the 

battlespace and their effects on friendly and adversary capabilities to maneuver, attack, 

employ sensors, and communicate. 

● (U) Evaluate the threat: Encompasses a detailed study of the threat, identifying adversary 

capabilities and vulnerabilities. 

● (U) Determine Threat Courses of Action: Ties the previous steps together providing a 

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predictive analysis of probable adversary courses of action - and friendly force 

survivability in each case. 

(U) IPB is of great importance to all aspects of combat planning. It is not limited to supporting 

planning, but is a long-term, continuous effort directed against potential adversaries as well. We 

use IPB to plan action and manage the risk to friendly forces. Risk will always be inherent in 

military operations, but IPB seeks to reduce that risk. We assess risk by weighing adversary 

capabilities and intentions against friendly forces and assigned missions. This risk is then 

analyzed to determine whether additional information or intelligence could alleviate it. Our 

management of risk thus depends on a clear understanding of both what is known and what is 

not known.

(U) INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE 

BATTLESPACE 

(U) Desert Shield/Desert Storm 

(U) During Operation Desert Shield and throughout air operations of Desert Storm, U.S. Navy 

and Army special operations personnel and force reconnaissance Marines established a series of 

observation sites along the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian border. Tasked to conduct surveillance of the 

border and intelligence collection in support of follow-on operations, these sites were manned 

by Navy SEALs, Army Special Forces and Marine Corps force Reconnaissance teams, 

augmented with Marine Corps and Army SIGINT personnel. Through nightly patrols and 

continuous visual and electromagnetic monitoring of Iraqi forces, the surveillance teams were 

able to conduct all-source collection of army activity across the border. Their efforts laid the 

groundwork for a thorough IPB that was instrumental in planning for the forthcoming ground 

offensive to liberate Kuwait.

-- (U) Indications and Warning. The goal of Indications and Warning (I&W) is to provide early 

warning of potential hostile action. To accomplish this goal, intelligence must convey 

understanding of the adversary. This understanding is gained through Intelligence Preparation of 

the Battlespace and allows us to interpret indications, thus allowing adequate warning. I&W 

prevents surprise and reduces risk by detecting adversary actions that may threaten friendly 

forces. It can support strategic, operational, or tactical levels of warfare. Strategic I&W is 

concerned primarily with detecting a potential adversary's preparations for war, policy shifts, 

advances in military capability, or acquisition of new technology. By focusing on reduction of 

surprise and threat avoidance, I&W supports operational and tactical commanders.

(U) I&W is essential for naval forces because of their forward presence in areas of potential 

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crisis. Threat response times are greatly decreased in the littoral regions, making I&W crucial 

for avoiding or countering threats. Early investment in collection, regional threat analysis, target 

databases, and training help build a coherent picture of the adversary's capabilities and 

intentions. The commander's requirements must be anticipated and understood in order to 

identify potential organic collection deficiencies and to focus theater or national intelligence 

assets on potential adversaries far enough in advance.

-- (U) Situation Development. Analysts use situation development to build on the IPB process. 

Situation development helps us assess and predict an adversary's actions. For example, current 

intelligence may reveal that an adversary is removing coastal defense missiles from storage. 

Intelligence must evaluate intentions: Is the activity merely proficiency training-or is there 

hostile intent? If it is training, are there opportunities to collect intelligence? If hostile intent is 

assessed, are any friendly forces at risk?

(U) Predicting an adversary's future actions is difficult. We may lack complete information 

because of gaps in our collection ability, or due to adversary concealment efforts. Nevertheless, 

situation development can reduce risks by assessing capabilities and likely courses of action. In 

the example of coastal missiles, intelligence can give an accurate picture of the threat by 

calculating where the missiles might go, how quickly the adversary can fire them, and which of 

our naval forces are in the threat envelope. The intelligence analysts use IPB as background; 

they then place the threat in context by assessing location, current operating patterns, training 

cycle status, and geopolitical situation. Situation development is especially critical in hightempo operations when time is short and the cost of miscalculation is high. Although they are 

unable to foresee the future, intelligence personnel can make judgments that help the 

commander make better decisions.

(U) "The credit must be given to Nimitz. Not only did he accept the intelligence picture, 

but he acted upon it at once."

 --Admiral Raymond Spruance, U.S. Navy (Ret), 1982

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-- (U) Targeting. Targeting is a function of intelligence and operations, by which an adversary's 

critical vulnerabilities are identified for possible attack or disruption. The primary goal of 

targeting is to enable us to use resources effectively in defeating the adversary. Targeting is 

more than a function of planning the physical destruction of enemy facilities. Targeting is an 

analysis process in which the components of a target, or target system--and their vulnerabilities 

and relative importance--are assessed to determine what effect their loss or impairment would 

have on the adversary. Intelligence can indicate where selective employment of force can have a 

major effect on the adversary.

(U) During the targeting process, we first develop and then select targets in accordance with the 

commander's guidance, objectives and the results of the Intelligence Preparation of the 

Battlespace. Targets may be either physical targets, such as bridges and command centers, or 

functional targets, such as enemy command and control capability. Operations personnel then 

match the targeting information to the appropriate instruments of force in a process commonly 

termed weaponeering. Continuous involvement of intelligence personnel in targeting 

deliberations may identify gaps in available data that a weapon requires for proper operation. 

Early identification of such shortfalls can activate intelligence collection to fill the gaps. Timely 

feedback from battle damage assessment is crucial to targeting because it allows us to assess 

mission effectiveness and permits us to husband resources and eliminate needless risk.

(U) INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO TARGETING - 

OPERATION DENY FLIGHT 

(U) Beginning in April 1993, the Navy has flown many F-14 Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance 

Pod (TARPS) sorties over Bosnia-Hercegovina as part of Operation Deny Flight. Operating 

from aircraft carriers stationed in the Adriatic Sea, the TARPS aircraft photographed hundreds 

of square miles of disputed territory, using thousands of feet of film. After the aircraft recovered 

aboard the carrier, Intelligence Specialists quickly and accurately provided the commander and 

other senior decisionmakers the location and types of belligerent arms, equipment, and forces. 

The Intelligence Specialists also produced annotated TARPS photos for carrier and shore-based 

strike team leaders to assist in planning potential contingency operations.

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-- (U) Battle Damage Assessment. Battle damage assessment (BDA) is an element of Combat 

Assessment.8 BDA evaluates the effectiveness of friendly force operations by exploiting and 

analyzing intelligence on enemy forces, facilities and functions. BDA includes not only physical 

damage assessments, but functional damage assessments as well. Physical damage assessments 

quantify the extent of damage to a material target, such as imagery indicating the center span of 

a targeted bridge has been destroyed, thus severing an enemy resupply line. Functional damage 

assessments determine the disruption to operational targets, for example, determining the 

effectiveness of electronic jamming on enemy command and control capabilities. BDA helps 

determine the impact of friendly operations on enemy combat effectiveness. 

8 (U) Combat Assessment (CA) is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment 

during military operations. CA is composed of three major components, (a) battle damage assessment, 

(b) munitions effects assessment, and (c) reattack recommendations. The objective of CA is to identify 

recommendations for the course of military operations. (Joint Pub 1-02).

(U) Verification of combat effectiveness is essential, especially for subsequent planning and 

reporting purposes. BDA may require analyzing large amounts of data, with limited or imprecise 

information available to fully evaluate results. Therefore, all-source intelligence is essential to 

the BDA function. The commander must consider BDA throughout all phases of mission 

planning and execution, for all levels of warfare. At the tactical level, BDA supports reattack 

decisions; at the operational level, BDA determines the extent of achievement of operations and 

campaign objectives; at the strategic level, BDA provides key information for senior 

decisionmakers with regard to campaign progress-and attainment of national security objectives.

-- (U) Intelligence Information Management. Intelligence must be delivered to the user on time 

and in a usable format. By providing a push-pull information capability to the commander, 

intelligence information management seeks to ensure timeliness, availability, and usability of 

intelligence. Intelligence information management monitors the flow of intelligence, from 

collector to customer, identifying chokepoints and single points of failure across all intelligence 

cycle activities.

(U) Effective dissemination of intelligence requires knowledge of communications systems 

architecture and equipment. As a management tool, intelligence information management 

facilitates the dissemination of intelligence to support operations as the battlespace expands. It 

helps the intelligence officer understand and articulate intelligence dissemination requirements 

to the communications and operations officers. Such interaction ensures that the intelligence 

dissemination needs are met.

-- (U) Force Protection. Force protection is both offensive and defensive. It is supported by all 

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intelligence functions, but is executed primarily through counterintelligence operations and 

force security measures. To neutralize or destroy the effectiveness of hostile intelligence 

collection activities, counterintelligence and security are essential. These protect information 

against espionage, personnel against subversion and terrorism, and installations and material 

against sabotage. Adversary forces can be expected to use every available means to thwart or 

otherwise impede the operations of our naval forces. Counterintelligence and security measures 

aid in identifying our own vulnerabilities and reducing risks, and are essential in achieving 

surprise during military operations.

(U) Naval intelligence identifies adversary intelligence collection capabilities, assesses friendly 

vulnerabilities, identifies risk, and enables the commander to plan for operational security, 

deception and surprise. Force protection encompasses the measures taken by the commander to 

protect his forces, posture and information, and to deny such protection to his adversary. The 

commander must consider force protection in every aspect of planning and tailor it to the 

intended operations and the adversary's capabilities.

(U) Security addresses both the protection of information and its dissemination. Sensitive 

intelligence requires protection, but commanders should be denied neither the intelligence they 

require to fight effectively, nor intelligence that might keep friendly forces from being placed at 

risk. Decisions regarding releasability of intelligence must be made early--balancing operational 

requirements with the need to protect sensitive sensors or sources. Sanitization may be a viable 

option which would make the information available while still protecting the source or sensor.

(U) Structure of Naval Intelligence

(U) Naval intelligence forces have been designed as an integrated system of personnel, 

procedures, facilities and equipment structured to support naval, joint and multinational 

operations. To be effective, naval intelligence must be structured to ensure both top-down and 

bottom-up intelligence support. Top-down intelligence support leverages national or theater 

intelligence resources to support the tactical commander; bottom-up support ensures that organic 

intelligence supports operations while contributing to the larger intelligence effort.

(U) To support naval forces engaged in littoral operations, the primary work of naval 

intelligence is conducted at the tactical level in dedicated intelligence centers afloat, such as a 

Carrier Intelligence Center, or deployed ashore with the MAGTF command element. These 

forward deployed intelligence centers are staffed by personnel from embarked flag staffs, ships' 

company, carrier air wings and MAGTF intelligence organizations. Personnel assigned produce 

not only current intelligence, but other finished intelligence products that support a variety of 

contingency operations. Intelligence centers provide assessments of the adversary's capabilities 

and build and maintain threat intelligence files and databases. Depending on mission 

requirements, these centers may be augmented with liaison personnel from other services or 

national intelligence agencies.

(U) Naval intelligence centers serve as fusion centers where information from various sources 

(cryptologic sensors, tactical airborne reconnaissance, units in contact with the enemy, etc.) is 

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validated, correlated, analyzed, and disseminated to support operations. These centers also use 

links to theater and component sensors and to the joint intelligence centers, to complement 

organic capabilities and to facilitate national, theater, and tactical intelligence support to a wide 

range of operations. A fundamental operating principle of the intelligence center is that allsource intelligence must be integrated with operations and contribute to our common tactical 

picture. These operations are facilitated by reliance on a wide variety of automated data 

processing systems.

(U) Because naval forces will normally operate as a component of joint forces, both afloat and 

ashore intelligence centers are integral parts of an intelligence architecture that connects the 

commander to joint and service intelligence centers, national intelligence agencies, and the 

intelligence centers of other nations.9 Interoperability, cooperation in resource management, and 

intelligence sharing throughout this architecture is essential to support the commander's 

decisionmaking.

9 (U) For a description of some of the joint and naval intelligence organizations that support naval 

operations, see Appendix A.

(U) Support to Planning

(U) Intelligence is the cornerstone of planning. During all phases of planning, intelligence on 

capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions of potential adversaries is essential. Intelligence 

reduces the unknowns that planners must face and forms the basis for both deliberate and crisis 

action planning. Early involvement of the intelligence staff in planning (including exercise 

planning) is essential to ensure that intelligence continuously supports the entire operation.

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(U) In deliberate planning, the commander's emphasis is on developing a carefully crafted plan 

for military operations. As shown in Figure 2, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) 

is the predominant intelligence function during development of the commander's estimate and 

concept of operations. IPB identifies information requirements and shortfalls and permits 

refocusing collection and production resources to accomplish the plan. Planning must be 

sufficiently flexible to accommodate and respond to new information as it becomes available.

(U) Targeting is an essential task in developing an operational plan. Throughout plan 

development, targeting materials are built and maintained as appropriate. During the entire 

deliberate planning cycle, intelligence information management (to include communications and 

dissemination architectures) and force protection (to include information security) are essential 

to ensure that the intelligence portion of the plan is executable. Indications and Warning 

generally do not support deliberate planning.

(U) In crisis action planning, the commander's emphasis is on developing a course of action to 

respond to an emergent crisis. As depicted in Figure 3, intelligence is especially vital in crisis 

action planning since the crisis itself often grows and evolves while planning is underway. 

Indications and Warning play a key role in detecting events that generate crisis action planning. 

Situational development guides the modification of plans-both as the crisis unfolds and 

subsequent to selection of the preferred course of action. Because planning timelines are greatly 

reduced during crisis action planning, 

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intelligence preparation of the battlespace and targeting become the key tasks in support of the 

commander. Battle damage assessment is especially important during the execution planning 

and execution phases, but must be considered throughout all phases. As with deliberate 

planning, intelligence information management and force protection are ongoing concerns. 

Continuous involvement of intelligence, from planning to mission completion, guarantees the 

full integration of intelligence with operations in support of the commander's effort.

(U) SUPPORT TO PLANNING - THE INCHON LANDING 

(U) In July 1950, only a few weeks after North Korean forces stormed across the 38th parallel 

and pushed South Korean and U.S. forces into the southeast corner of the Korean peninsula, the 

supreme allied commander in Korea considered a major counterstroke. After a prototypical 

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, General Douglas MacArthur decided that naval 

forces could dramatically alter the course of the war by seizing Inchon, a major port on Korea's 

Yellow Sea coast. Possession of Inchon would enable the allies to recapture a key air base, and 

mount a major ground offensive on Seoul which would cut off North Korean forces in the south.

(U) The North Koreans recognized the potential harm a landing at Inchon could do, but they 

believed the area was entirely unsuitable for a major amphibious operation. Tides rose and fell 

an average of 32 feet daily; the current ran swiftly in the narrow, winding waterways; and the 

approaches to the harbor were easy to mine, lined by defensible islands, and marked by 

extensive mud flats, high seawalls, and dominating hills. Moreover, harbor facilities were 

rudimentary, with little room in the roadstead to deploy logistic shipping.

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(U) In planning for the amphibious operation, the allies capitalized on high quality intelligence 

to overcome these disadvantages and take the enemy by surprise. Aerial photographs, the 

testimony of former inhabitants, and first-hand reports of naval special warfare teams that went 

ashore to conduct reconnaissance of the Inchon area shaped the operational planning of the 

amphibious task force commander, Rear Admiral James Doyle and his staff. Naval intelligence 

helped Admiral Doyle, select the best water approach, set the time for the amphibious assaults, 

and identify the North Korean Army line of communication as a critical vulnerability.

(U) This comprehensive planning bore fruit on 15 September, when the allied amphibious task 

force launched its initial assault from the sea. By the 19th, the 1st Marine Division seized the air 

base at Kimpo and began the assault on Seoul. U.S. Army troops pushed out from the Inchon 

beachhead and on the 27th linked up with their comrades advancing north from the Pusan 

perimeter. Two days later, the Marines captured Seoul. Thus, by skillfully incorporating 

intelligence into operational planning, in a little more than two weeks, allied forces were able to 

oust the invaders from the Republic of Korea.

(U) Support to Operations

(U) Naval forces have unique, multidimensional intelligence requirements. Countering threats to 

air, surface, subsurface, and landing forces requires in-depth knowledge of the threat, weather, 

hydrography, terrain, ports, and airfields. The sophisticated nature of the threat in naval warfare 

causes naval forces to demand detailed technical intelligence on an adversary's weapon systems. 

The intelligence picture is formed from all sources in the battlespace, including dedicated force 

intelligence collection resources, national and theater assets, liaison officers, and units in contact 

with the enemy. Naval forces also have unique intelligence collection capabilities, especially in 

their ability to collect intelligence covertly. Such collection can take place at the tactical, 

operational, or strategic levels.

(U) During peacetime, naval intelligence plays an important role by supporting day-to-day 

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decisionmaking for forward deployed naval forces. It also supports policy formulation and 

decisionmaking on force structure, systems acquisition, and doctrine and tactics development. 

Intelligence resources monitor foreign nations and regions to detect and characterize threats to U.

S. national interests. Further, peacetime intelligence enhances naval training and exercises by 

providing realistic threat scenarios to train against.

(U) Military operations other than war take place in a world populated by a growing number of 

impoverished and unstable nation-states seeking wealth, power, and security. Operations other 

than war can include combat or non-combat actions in the following areas: arms control, 

combating terrorism, nation assistance, non-combatant evacuation operations, other civil support 

operations such as disaster relief or humanitarian assistance, sanctions enforcement, 

international peace operations, support to insurgency and counterinsurgency, and counterdrug 

operations. In addition, a deteriorating situation may demand that naval forces quickly make the 

transition from such operations to sustained combat operations. Great demands can be placed on 

the intelligence system during operations other than war; these might include requirements for 

such nontraditional intelligence as determining the projected level of flood water or the local 

infant mortality rate. To build a picture of the adversary, we must have a broad understanding of 

the theater of operations and the underlying reasons for conflict. To gain this understanding, 

naval intelligence personnel must seek nontraditional sources of information with unique access, 

such as open sources, academia, emigres, and civilian area experts. Reliance on organic 

intelligence collection assets will increase and may require early deployment of such collection 

resources as tactical counterintelligence, HUMINT, and cryptologic teams. Littoral operations 

also may increase requirements for rapidly identifying and deploying specialized linguists and 

area experts.

(U) Cryptologic operations play a key role in supporting naval expeditionary operations. Naval 

cryptologic personnel, afloat and ashore, employ tactical sensor systems that provide the 

commander timesensitive combat information on an adversary's composition, disposition, 

location and intent. This information can be disseminated as electronic warfare support data 

directly to the tactical decisionmaker or processed into SIGINT by afloat or ashore analysis 

cells. Cryptologic operations can provide unique situational awareness by giving the commander 

insight into an adversary's decisionmaking cycle. For this reason, cryptology plays an important 

role in Command and Control Warfare. Cryptologic efforts rely increasingly on a 

complementary mix of tactical, theater, and national assets.

(U) INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS 

OTHER THAN WAR 

(U) - Since the standup of Joint Task Force Four in 1989, naval cryptologic operations have 

played a major role in the detection and monitoring of illicit drug trafficking in the Caribbean 

Sea and Pacific Ocean.

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(U) - During Operation Restore Hope in 1993, Marine Corps tactical HUMINT operations 

proved to be indispensable. By "taking the pulse" of the local populace, HUMINT personnel 

were able to determine which indigenous forces were friendly, neutral or potentially hostile, 

where weapons caches were located and where threat situations might develop. Additionally, 

they provided the Joint Task Force Commander an appreciation of Somali perception of, and 

reaction to, United Nations' support and relief operations.

(U) - During the Mississippi River flooding in the summer of 1993, naval tactical aircraft flew 

photographic reconnaissance missions over the Mississippi River Valley, mapping the extent of 

flood damage and providing that information to the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

and other civil authorities charged with flood relief efforts.

(U) Combat operations place unique demands on naval intelligence personnel for innovation, 

initiative, and intensity of effort. Employing the same tools and structures used during peacetime 

and operations other than war, the intelligence staff carries out the primary intelligence 

functions to support ongoing combat operations. Intelligence during combat must identify 

enemy capabilities, intentions, and critical vulnerabilities in a timely and accurate manner, 

providing the commander maximum leverage in applying combat power against the enemy. 

During combat, the timeliness, tactical relevance, and accuracy of intelligence are especially 

vital.

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CHAPTER FOUR 

(U) New Direction - Future 

Challenges

(U) "Our world without the Cold War confrontation is a safer world, but it is no 

Garden of Eden. . . Intelligence remains our basic national instrument for 

anticipating danger: military, political, and economic."

 --President George Bush, 1991

(U) U.S. national security planning focuses on the uncertain environment of regional 

conflict. Many factors promote regional instability: the breakup of multiethnic nations, 

state-sponsored terrorism, drug trafficking, proliferation of advanced weapons technology 

(including weapons of mass destruction), and militant religious fundamentalism. U.S. 

military strategy necessarily emphasizes operations in littoral regions of the world to 

support national and international security interests.

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(U) We face a world characterized by political disorder and confrontation, intense 

economic competition among nations, and a growing technological threat. Potential 

adversaries now can buy sophisticated surveillance, communications, and weapon systems 

on the world market at affordable prices. New centers of power and influence are 

emerging, sometimes threatening U.S. interests. Naval intelligence professionals must 

anticipate and understand these changes. Multiple threats worldwide present other new 

challenges, and naval intelligence must employ new methods and procedures so that naval 

forces can meet them.

(U) At present, naval intelligence organizations are reorienting their efforts to meet future 

needs. These include facing significant challenges with respect to supporting 

expeditionary forces, keeping training and readiness at a high level, coordinating and 

cooperating with other services and nations, exploiting the opportunities of the 

information revolution, and preparing for future operations. These challenges are 

interrelated and require skilled, mission-oriented intelligence professionals who can 

manage multiple intelligence disciplines to provide the commander a tailored, all-source 

assessment of the battlespace.

(U) Support for Expeditionary Forces

(U) Forward deployed naval forces will continue to be the National Command Authorities' 

force of choice to remain engaged overseas. Unrestricted by host nation access, naval 

forces continue to provide a strong and flexible overseas presence to deter potential 

aggression or respond to crises. Naval forces may be called upon for forcible entry into 

areas defended by integrated air, sea, and ground weapon systems. Some defenses will 

consist of forces in fixed positions; others will include mobile combined-arms units 

backed by naval forces and aircraft. A future adversary may employ the newest missiles, 

mines, and military technology against our aircraft, ships, submarines, and landing forces. 

The proliferation of these modern weapons and the spread of emerging technologies have 

made these threats more lethal, placing U.S. and multinational forces at greater risk. As 

the lessons of military history show, we cannot afford to discount the Third World threat.

(U) Intelligence requirements in littoral regions are significantly different from those of 

open-ocean operations. Our proximity to littoral threats will mean less warning and 

reaction time for friendly forces. Any potential adversary's acquisition of advanced 

technology is a significant concern as well. Consequently, naval intelligence must 

maintain detailed databases on potential threats and develop methods to exploit each 

adversary's weaknesses.

(U) Identifying those areas where military operations may be conducted is vital. Detailed 

information on the environment and local infrastructure (bathymetry, weather, 

topography, ports, air facilities, etc.) will be required to support the full range of 

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expeditionary operations. Nontraditional intelligence sources, collection means, and 

dissemination methods must be explored and employed. Open-source intelligence may be 

especially important. In addition, forces deploying to areas known for infectious diseases 

must have advance information about local medical conditions. Forward deployed 

expeditionary forces must incorporate medical intelligence as a force protection measure.

(U) The naval command and control architecture must ensure connectivity between naval 

forces afloat and ashore (including theater and national support agencies)--and must be 

useable by the warfighter. Intelligence databases and communications must be 

interoperable with other services, non-DOD government agencies, and joint intelligence 

centers to ensure the uninterrupted flow of intelligence to the commander. Naval 

intelligence must be prepared to support amphibious operations during sustained 

operations ashore, while simultaneously supporting requirements of the ships, submarines, 

and aircraft that maintain battlespace dominance in the littoral area of operations. To be 

most effective in expeditionary operations, naval intelligence personnel should be 

integrated into national, theater, and service intelligence organizations to articulate naval 

capabilities and operational philosophies, influence decisions, and optimize intelligence 

support to naval forces. This support requires extensively trained naval intelligence 

professionals.

(U) Training and Readiness

(U) To remain ahead of the challenges associated with geopolitical upheavals, 

socioeconomic crises, and rapid technological innovation, naval intelligence personnel 

must receive comprehensive and specialized training. Intelligence training should be 

updated continuously, reflecting tomorrow's challenges. Basic, intermediate, and 

advanced training, both ashore and afloat, should include non-institutional methods--such 

as on-the-job training--and should develop well-rounded, career-oriented professionals 

who will have credibility within the intelligence and cryptologic communities, the naval 

Service, and external agencies and organizations.

(U) Training underpins broad professional experience. Personnel rotation policies and 

deployment cycles must enable intelligence personnel to maintain career paths that 

provide them experience in naval, joint, and multinational operations. Of particular 

concern is adequate foreign-area and language expertise. Operations in littoral regions of 

the world create unprecedented specialized language requirements, thus adequate 

language training should be made available. Foreign language proficiency, especially in 

languages not commonly studied, must be emphasized continually in training programs.

(U) As naval professionals, we must train the way we fight. To be effective during realworld operations, naval intelligence must be integrated into all aspects of operational 

training. Such training increases exposure to operations and provides the intelligence 

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professional a deeper understanding of capabilities and limitations--essential in advising 

the commander on ways to counter adversary capabilities.

(U) Another cost-effective way to train is to capitalize on modeling and simulation to test 

concepts, doctrine, and connectivity--without having to deploy actual forces. Intelligence 

must be used in exercises and simulations--especially free-play sessions--to maintain the 

skills necessary to support all forms of naval, joint, and multinational operations. 

Intelligence training is the prerequisite for real-time intelligence support to operations.

(U) Other intelligence assets that enhance training and readiness are reserve intelligence 

and cryptologic personnel. These personnel are trained and readily available, and can be 

integrated quickly into the active component. They include academics, business 

executives, and country-area experts whose civilian jobs may place them in close contact 

with influential foreign leaders or littoral regions of particular interest. Identifying and 

establishing databases of unique reserve skills and expertise will enhance intelligence 

support to naval expeditionary operations. In concert with these actions, the active 

component should ensure that unique reserve skills and expertise, able to support combat 

operations and contingencies, are identified early in the planning process. The reserves 

represent a large pool of talent that can significantly augment the commander's 

intelligence effort.

(U) Coordination and Cooperation

(U) In the future, closer coordination and cooperation with other services and other 

nations will assume even great importance than they have today. Future joint and 

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multinational operations will require compatible intelligence systems that complement 

those employed by other services, multinational forces, and national agencies, including 

non-DOD government agencies.

(U) Experience in operational theaters around the world demonstrates that early planning 

for intelligence sharing improves intelligence support and shortens delays in 

dissemination. Simple procedures should exist--and be exercised often--to handle sharing 

of classified material. Sometimes multinational partners may have more current data or 

better access to specific information about an adversary or the environment than our own 

forces. Exchanging personnel and systems can improve the flow of information, minimize 

misunderstandings, and improve the efficacy of operations as well as aid in area stability. 

Liaison officers act as bridges between cultures, languages, doctrines and methodologies. 

Coordination and cooperation among intelligence personnel facilitate planning and 

execution. Naval intelligence personnel should strive to provide intelligence support under 

simulated wartime or crisis conditions to ensure they can do so under the strain and 

confusion of combat.

(U) Intelligence and the Information Revolution

(U) Naval commanders today must orchestrate combined arms operations across the 

dimensions of air, land, surface, subsurface, space, and time. To fight and win in this 

multidimensional battlespace, the naval commander must harness sophisticated 

information technology.

(U) Emerging communications, computer and reconnaissance technology is 

revolutionizing the commander's ability to maintain situational awareness and control his 

forces effectively. Since naval forces are forward deployed, the naval intelligence system 

should be flexible and responsive to the commander's needs. The communications 

architecture for intelligence dissemination must provide the naval commander a global, 

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instantaneous, secure, and survivable capability that includes:

❍ Responsive surveillance of selected geographic areas 

❍ Real-time information transfer to commanders at various echelons 

❍ Responsive, secure communications between decisionmakers and operational 

commanders 

❍ Intelligence push/pull with automatic over-the-air database update for forward deployed 

forces 

(U) Driven by technological advances, naval expeditionary forces are now part of an 

electronic web that ties sensors, decisionmakers and operating forces together in an 

integrated, global network. To provide the commander timely and accurate information to 

operate amid the chaos of battle, management and tailoring of information will be crucial 

to success in future conflicts.

(U) The commander relies on electronic information and communication systems to gain 

situational awareness, select a course of action, and direct military operations. Naval 

intelligence systems must provide continuous, comprehensive support to the commander. 

Potential adversaries possess or seek similar decisionmaking capabilities that can provide 

them combat advantage over their adversary. Establishing command and control 

dominance will give the commander a complete and transparent view of the battlespace, 

while the adversary still struggles to peer through an opaque lens.

(U) Naval intelligence must seize the opportunities offered by the technological 

revolution. Because of the vast amount of sensor data available today and the high speed 

at which it is processed and displayed, superior intelligence analysis, fusion and 

dissemination capabilities are needed to gain best leverage from the information 

advantage. Quality of intelligence always must take precedence over quantity. To be 

effective, intelligence must be processed and presented as an integral part of the 

commander's tactical picture. Only through accurate depiction will the commander's needs 

be satisfied. Accordingly, data displays must be revised and updated continually to ensure 

the information remains accurate.

(U) Support to Information Warfare/Command and Control Warfare

(U) Information Warfare/Command and Control Warfare (IW/C2W) offers the 

commander an additional means to engage adversarial forces. IW/C2W seeks to deceive, 

disrupt or destroy the adversary's information infrastructure and command and control 

process in order to subdue the opposition rapidly. At the same time, IW/C2W seeks to 

protect our information infrastructure and command and control process from attack.

(U) To be successful, IW/C2W must be based on sound intelligence. Current and precise 

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knowledge of the adversary's information and command and control systems--especially 

their critical and vulnerable nodes--is paramount in IW/C2W planning and execution.10

Intelligence plays a vital role by identifying essential and vulnerable adversary nodes, as 

well as by recommending those nodes that we should not degrade or destroy because of 

the intelligence gained through their exploitation. Naval intelligence gives the commander 

the ability to strike an adversary at precise times and places--to blind, cripple, deceive, or 

destroy him. 

10 (U) In this context, nodes are points within the command and control system where personnel, 

equipment and procedures converge to perform command and control functions. Nodes can 

include command centers, radar and surveillance sites, intelligence facilities, communications 

stations, as well as the supporting infrastructure. Nodes are linked together by communications or 

data networks. Critical nodes are the essential elements of a command and control system whose 

disruption or destruction immediately degrades the ability of a force to command, control or 

effectively conduct combat operations.

(U) IW/C2W relies on fused, all-source intelligence to plan and execute operations. It 

requires complete all-source databases, sound analysis, and rapid and reliable 

communications. Further, without accurate knowledge of the adversary's weaknesses, 

strengths, disposition, and intentions, the commander may find that his efforts are 

ineffective. Standard intelligence functions must be applied innovatively and meticulously 

to support all aspects of IW/C2W: deception, operations security, psychological 

operations, electronic warfare, and destruction.

(U) Naval cryptology, in particular, is essential in IW/C2W efforts to disrupt the 

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adversary's decisionmaking process and sever the links between the adversary commander 

and his forces. Dominance of the electromagnetic battlespace lies at the heart of IW/C2W. 

Cryptologic operations characterize and map this battlespace. By detecting, locating, 

exploiting, and attacking threat emitters, cryptology supports immediate decisionmaking 

for employment of electronic attack, threat warning and avoidance, and targeting.

(U) Intelligence Emphasis

(U) "It is my desire to conserve, to the maximum practible extent, the DNI [Director of Naval 

Intelligence] organization and strength and if possible to get them more help. The greater the 

contractions of the Navy-the more important our DNI and Communications Intelligence become."

 --Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, U.S. Navy

 Chief of Naval Operations, 1947

(U) The unpredictable nature of future threats demands that naval intelligence invest 

wisely in areas that will enhance the capabilities of naval expeditionary warfare. An area 

that continues to show promise is an active and dedicated involvement in the use of 

national sensors for operational and tactical intelligence support. We must ensure that 

sensors and collection methods, afloat and ashore fusion centers, and dissemination 

systems are highly capable and responsive to support operations. These capabilities are 

required to provide the commander and his forces the broad area coverage they need, 

along with timely Indications and Warning.

(U) Since naval expeditionary forces must be fully integrated with national and theater 

collection platforms, a dedicated effort should be made to provide timely, accurate, and 

complete sensor-to-shooter connectivity. To complement these capabilities, naval forces 

require an organic collection and intelligence-processing capability to locate high-value 

targets and gaps in adversary defenses quickly and accurately, through an integrated 

network of organic reconnaissance systems. Competition for national sensors, orbital 

limitations, or other factors may sometimes preclude adequate support to operating forces; 

therefore, the commander must have alternate capabilities. This need is particularly 

compelling when projecting power ashore in littoral regions where adequate charts and 

maps are lacking.

(U) The spread of highly sophisticated telecommunications systems in littoral regions 

today presents a major challenge to naval cryptology. Rapidly evolving technology and 

equipment will increase the complexity of this threat and its supporting infrastructure. 

Naval cryptologic systems must be able to exploit the target threat, maintain a high state 

of readiness, be as survivable and mobile as the forces they support, and have the 

flexibility to allow tailoring of cryptologic direct support units for specific mission 

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requirements.

(U) Although we live in an age of instantaneous communications, technical collection is 

not the only way to gather intelligence about an adversary. For instance, 

counterintelligence operations can neutralize and degrade an adversary's intelligence effort 

while HUMINT operations can provide unique intelligence, normally not accessible by 

other means, about adversary activity--to include rare insight into his intentions. Recent 

operations demonstrate that naval expeditionary forces need to have a strong tactical 

HUMINT capability.

(U) The HUMINT capability must be expanded to meet the operational requirements of 

the future without decreasing the counterintelligence force protection role--collection, 

investigations, operations, multidiscipline analysis, and support to operations security and 

counter-reconnaissance. Employed as part of an all-source intelligence effort, HUMINT 

and counterintelligence operations provide the commander unique information.

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NDP 2: CONCLUSION (U)

CONCLUSION 

(U) In an increasingly multi-polar world, naval intelligence professionals face many new 

and profound challenges. Mission success depends on dedicated personnel with 

intellectual curiosity, initiative, integrity and a detailed understanding of operations. 

Closely aligned to the need for dedicated personnel is the need for unsurpassed 

intelligence capabilities that are relevant and operationally responsive.

(U) The strength and lasting character of naval intelligence lie in its integration with naval 

operating forces. This union will enable the commander to achieve decisive combat 

results. In order to accomplish this, naval intelligence must be able to survey the 

battlespace and anticipate the commander's requirements by understanding an adversary's 

capabilities, assessing his intentions, and identifying his center of gravity and critical 

vulnerabilities.

(U) NDP-2, Naval Intelligence, articulates those time-honored and battle-tested principles 

which have been derived from more than a century of experience. Naval commanders 

must consider intelligence as an integral part of their combat power--and the potential 

difference between victory and defeat.

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NDP 2: APPENDIX A: (U) JOINT AND NAVAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS TH

APPENDIX A: (U) JOINT AND NAVAL INTELLIGENCE 

ORGANIZATIONS THAT SUPPORT NAVAL 

OPERATIONS

1. (U) The joint intelligence architecture normally exists at four levels:

(U) National. The National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) is the central body 

for management of national intelligence operations. Closely tied to the Defense 

Intelligence Agency (DIA), the NMJIC supports the intelligence needs of the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the needs of the unified commanders. The NMJIC focuses 

mainly on global Indications and Warning, operational intelligence, national targeting 

support, production and database management. The National Security Agency/Central 

Security Service (NSA/CSS) also provides signals intelligence, combat information and 

information security devices and assistance in its role as a Combat Support Agency.

(U) Unified Command. The theater Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) supports the Unified 

Commander, service components and subordinate Joint Task Forces (JTFs). Its functions 

are similar to those of the NMJIC, although limited to the Unified Commander's 

geographic or functional area of responsibility. The theater JIC is the primary source for 

target area intelligence assessments and databases.

(U) Joint Task Force. At the JTF level, the JIC supports the intelligence needs of the JTF 

commander and subordinate warfighting component commands. The JTF JIC is normally 

established to support and focus on a specific military operation and is typically collocated 

with the JTF commander and staff. It may be afloat or ashore and is usually composed of 

intelligence personnel from the JTF staff augmented by personnel from the theater JIC, 

component services, and national agencies.

(U) Service Component. At the component level, service intelligence centers, such as an 

amphibious flagship's JIC, support the intelligence needs of the component commander 

and subordinate units. Although closely linked to the larger joint intelligence architecture, 

naval intelligence centers, afloat or deployed ashore as part of a MAGTF, focus their 

efforts on executing naval operations. During joint operations in littoral regions, when a 

naval commander is commander of the JTF, naval intelligence centers may function as 

both the service component intelligence center and a JTF JIC simultaneously.

2. (U) The Department of the Navy has established intelligence organizations that provide 

unique and continuous intelligence support to naval maritime and expeditionary 

operations.

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NDP 2: APPENDIX A: (U) JOINT AND NAVAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS TH

(U) National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) - The National Maritime Intelligence 

Center incorporates the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Marine Corps Intelligence 

Activity, and the Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center, and is the national 

resource for all maritime and expeditionary intelligence-related issues.

(U) Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) - The Office of Naval Intelligence organizes and 

trains intelligence personnel, provides highly specialized, maritime-related intelligence 

analysis, and administers intelligence oversight, security, and intelligence manpower 

issues. Its day-to-day operations include liaison with both DOD and non-DOD agencies, 

long-term analysis of foreign military and naval forces and operations, foreign liaison 

support, scientific and technical analysis, strategic trade analysis, and intelligence systems 

acquisition.

(U) Commander, Naval Security Group (COMNAVSECGRU) - The Commander, Naval 

Security Group Command is the Navy's executive agent for cryptology and information 

warfare/command and control warfare. COMNAVSECGRU is responsible for cryptologic 

planning and programming, systems acquisition, training, and administration of the Naval 

cryptologic field activities around the world. Marine Corps participation within the Naval 

Security Group is provided by the Marine Support Battalion that collocates companies at 

selected naval cryptologic field activities. Marine Support Battalion provides support to 

naval expeditionary operations through augmentation of Fleet Marine Force Radio 

Battalions.

(U) Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) - The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity 

focuses on crises and predeployment support to expeditionary warfare. It complements 

and coordinates the efforts of theater, other service, and national intelligence organizations 

providing unique threat, technical, and terrain-analysis products that are tailored to Marine 

Corps tactical units preparing to deploy to a theater of operations. The activity functions 

as the service collection and production manager, and as the primary coordination link 

with ONI for expeditionary intelligence analysis and production. Additionally, MCIA 

provides threat and technical intelligence assessments supporting the Concept Based 

Requirements System in areas of service-unique doctrinal development, force structure, 

force modernization, training and education, and acquisition.

(U) Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) - The Intelligence Coordination 

Center, a Coast Guard tenant command at the NMIC, provides strategic intelligence 

support to Coast Guard law enforcement, military readiness, port security, marine safety, 

and environmental protection missions. The ICC serves as the Coast Guard's 24-hour 

I&W watch, maintaining a current picture of all maritime threats. It serves as the Coast 

Guard's primary interface with the collection, production, and dissemination elements of 

the national intelligence and law enforcement communities.

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NDP 2: GLOSSARY (U)

GLOSSARY (U)

(U) Acoustic Intelligence (ACINT): Intelligence derived from the collection and 

processing of acoustic phenomena. (Joint Pub l-02)

(U) All-source Intelligence: Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that 

incorporate all sources of information, including, most frequently, HUMINT, IMINT, 

MASINT, SIGINT, and open source data, in the production of finished intelligence. (Joint 

Pub 1-02)

(U) Battlespace: All aspects of air, surface, and subsurface, land, space, and the 

electromagnetic spectrum that encompass the area of influence and area of interest. (NWP 

1-02)

(U) Commander's Estimate of the Situation. A logical process of reasoning by which a 

commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a 

decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission. (Joint Pub 102)

(U) Communications Intelligence (COMINT): Technical and intelligence information 

derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients. (Joint Pub 1-

02)

(U) Counterintelligence (CI): Information gathered and activities conducted to protect 

against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or 

on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign 

persons, or international terrorist activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Critical Vulnerability: That element of a military force that is vulnerable to attack 

and whose degradation or destruction will lead to defeating the enemy's center of gravity 

and, ultimately, his ability to resist. (NWP 1-02)

(U) Deception: Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, 

distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his 

interests. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Electronics Intelligence (ELINT): Technical and geolocation intelligence derived 

from foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than 

nuclear detonations or radioactive sources. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Electro-optical Intelligence (ELECTRO-OPTINT): Intelligence other than signals 

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intelligence derived from the optical monitoring of the electromagnetic spectrum from 

ultraviolet (O.O1 micrometers) through far infrared (l,OOO micrometers). (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT): Technical information and 

intelligence information derived from the intercept of foreign instrumentation signals by 

other than the intended recipients. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Fusion: In intelligence usage, the process of examining all sources of intelligence and 

information to derive a complete assessment of activity. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Fusion Center: In intelligence usage, a physical location to accomplish fusion. It 

normally has sufficient intelligence automated data processing capability to assist in the 

process. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Human Intelligence (HUMINT): A category of intelligence derived from 

information collected and provided by human sources. (Joint Pub 102)

(U) Imagery Intelligence (IMINT): Intelligence derived from the exploitation of 

collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors 

such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or 

electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Indications and Warning (I&W): Those intelligence activities intended to detect and 

report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve 

a threat to the United States or allied military, political, or economic interests or to US 

citizens abroad. It includes forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of 

hostilities; insurgency; nuclear/nonnuclear attack on the United states, its overseas forces, 

or allied nations; hostile reactions to United States reconnaissance activities; terrorists' 

attack; and other similar events. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Infrared Intelligence (IRINT): Intelligence derived from information collected by 

infrared sensors. (NWP 1-02)

(U) Intelligence: The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, 

analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign 

countries or areas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Intelligence Estimate: The appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available 

intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the 

courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the order of probability of 

their adoption. (Joint Pub 1-02)

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NDP 2: GLOSSARY (U)

(U) Intelligence Requirement: Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a 

need for the collection of information, or the production of intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Joint Intelligence Center (JIC): The intelligence center of the joint force 

headquarters. The joint intelligence center is responsible for providing and producing the 

intelligence required to support the joint force commander and staff, components, task 

forces and elements, and the national intelligence community. (Joint Pub 1-02).

(U) Laser Intelligence (LASINT): Technical and geolocation intelligence derived from 

laser systems; a subcategory of electro-optical intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Littoral: 1. Seaward: Area from the shore to open ocean that must be controlled to 

support operations; 2. Landward: Area inland from shore that can be supported and 

defended directly from the sea. (NWP 1-02)

(U) Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT): Scientific and technical 

intelligence obtained-by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, 

spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived 

from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features 

associated with the source, emitter, or sender and to facilitate subsequent identification 

and/or measurement of the same. (Joint Pub 102)

(U) Medical Intelligence (MEDINT): That category of intelligence resulting from 

collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign medical, bio-scientific, and 

environmental information which is of interest to strategic planning and to military 

medical planning and operations for the conservation of the fighting strength of friendly 

forces and the formation of assessments of foreign medical capabilities in both military 

and civilian sectors. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) National Intelligence Support Team (NIST): A nationally sourced team composed 

of intelligence and communications experts from either Defense Intelligence Agency, 

Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, or any combination of these 

agencies. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Naval Cryptology: Action taken to exploit and attack foreign communications and 

other electromagnetic signals, while protecting our own, for the purposes of command and 

control warfare, electronic warfare, signals intelligence, and signals security. (NWP 1-02)

(U) Nuclear Intelligence (NUCINT): Intelligence derived from the collection and 

analysis of radiation and other effects resulting from radioactive sources. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Information of potential intelligence value that 

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is available to the general public. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Operational Intelligence: Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting 

campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas 

of operations. (Joint Pub l-02)

(U) Photographic Intelligence (PHOTINT): The collected products of photographic 

interpretation, classified and evaluated for intelligence use. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Radar Intelligence (RADINT): Intelligence derived from data collected by radar. 

(Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Reconnaissance: A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other 

detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential 

enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic 

characteristics of a particular area. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&TI): The product resulting from the 

collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign scientific and technical 

information which covers: a. foreign developments in basic and applied research and in 

applied engineering techniques; and b. scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, 

and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems, and materiel, 

the research and development related thereto, and the production methods employed for 

their manufacture. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): A category of intelligence comprising either 

individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, 

and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Strategic Intelligence: Intelligence that is required for the formulation of strategy, 

policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Surveillance: The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, 

places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (Joint 

Pub 1-02)

(U) Tactical Intelligence: Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting 

tactical operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Targeting: 1. The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response 

to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. 2. The analysis of 

enemy situations relative to the commander's mission, objectives, and capabilities at the 

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commander's disposal, to identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, 

will accomplish the commander's purpose through delaying, disrupting, disabling, or 

destroying enemy forces or resources critical to the enemy. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Target Materials: Graphic, textual, tabular, digital, video, or other presentations of 

target intelligence, primarily designed to support operations against designated targets by 

one or more weapons system(s). Target materials are suitable for training, planning, 

executing, and evaluating military operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Technical Intelligence (TECHINT): Intelligence derived from exploitation of 

foreign material, produced for strategic, operational, and tactical level commanders. (Joint 

Pub 1-02)

(U) Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT): Technical intelligence derived from the intercept, 

processing, and analysis of foreign telemetry. Telemetry intelligence is a category of 

foreign instrumentation signals intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Unintentional Radiation Intelligence (RINT): Intelligence derived from the 

collection and analysis of non-information-bearing elements extracted from the 

electromagnetic energy unintentionally emanated by foreign devices, equipment, and 

systems, excluding those generated by the detonation of nuclear weapons. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Validation: A process normally associated with the collection of intelligence that 

provides official status to an identified requirement and confirms that the requirement is 

appropriate for a given collector and has not been previously satisfied. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(U) Weaponeering: The process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or 

nonlethal weapons required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target, 

considering target vulnerability, weapon effect, munitions delivery accuracy, damage 

criteria, probability of kill, and weapon reliability. (Joint Pub 1-02)

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NDP 2: SUGGESTED FOLLOW-ON READINGS (U)

SUGGESTED FOLLOW-ON READINGS (U)

Joint Publication 2-0, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations" (Washington, D.C.: Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, 1993).

Joint Publication 2-02, "Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Intelligence Support to Joint Task 

Force Operations" (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993 (Proposed Publication-Secret Noforn)).

Naval Doctrine Publication 1, "Naval Warfare" (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1994).

Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-20, "Commander's Guide to Intelligence" (Washington, D.C.: Department 

of the Navy, 1991).

Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-21, "MAGTF Intelligence Operations" (Washington, D.C.: Department of 

the Navy, 1991).

Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-25, "Counterintelligence" (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 

1991).

Field Manual 34-1, "Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations" (Washington, D.C.: Department of 

the Army, 1993).

Field Manual 34-130, "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield" (Washington, D.C.: Department of the 

Army, 1994).

Handel, Michael I. ed. Intelligence and Military Operations. (London, England, Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 

1990).

Handel, Michael I., ed. Leaders and Intelligence. (London, England, Frank Cass & Co., Ltd. 1989).

Handel, Michael I., ed. War, Strategy and Intelligence. London, England, Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1989).

Holmes, W.J. Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific during World 

War II. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979).

Layton, Edwin T., et al. And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and MidwayBreaking the Secrets. (New York, 

NY: William Morrow and Co., 1985).

Wohlstetter, Roberta. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 

1962).

(U) Naval Doctrine Command was established by the Department of the Navy in 1993. Its primary 

missions are to develop naval concepts and integrated naval doctrine; provide a coordinated Navyfile:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/jkdavis/M...02%20SUGGESTED%20FOLLOW-ON%20READINGS%20(U).htm (1 of 3)8/22/2007 5:09:22 PM
NDP 2: SUGGESTED FOLLOW-ON READINGS (U)

Marine Corps voice in joint and multinational doctrine development; and address naval and joint 

doctrine with respect to training, education, operations, exercises, simulations, and war games. To ensure 

doctrine remains relevant we encourage your feedback on this publication and other doctrinal issues. 

Address your comments to:

Commander, Naval Doctrine Command

1540 Gilbert Street

Norfolk, VA 23511-2785

(U) Additional copies of this publication may be obtained through the following distribution centers:

Navy Publications and Forms Directorate

5801 Tabor Avenue

Philadelphia, PA 19120-5099

re: SN 0700LP0000200

Marine Corps Logistic Base Atlantic

Warehouse 1221, Section 5, M/F: Pubs Stock

Albany, GA 31704-5001

re: PCN 14100020000

(U) This publication may be purchased by non-government personnel by writing to: ADO/NPFD Attn: Cash 

Sales Code 1013, 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia PA 19120-5099 or National Technical Information Services, 

5285 Port Royal RD., Springfield, VA 22161, Attn: Military Publication

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NDP 2: SUGGESTED FOLLOW-ON READINGS (U)

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