748 P.2d 494 (1987), aff'd sub nom. Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 

538 (1989). In those exceptional cases, a defendant must prove that 

statutory penalties in addition to the maximum authorized period of 

incarceration "are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative 

determination that the offense in question is a 'serious' one." Blanton, 489 

U.S. at 543. 

Lambey claims that various collateral consequences of a 

conviction for domestic battery support his contention that it is a serious 

offense: (1) NRS 432B.157 and NRS 125C.230 create a rebuttable 

presumption that the perpetrator of domestic violence is unfit for sole or 

joint custody of his children; (2) he could lose the right to possess a firearm 

under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) and carry a concealed weapon under NRS 

202.3657(4)(g); and (3) a conviction would render a misdemeanant 

deportable under federal immigration law.' Lambey also contends that 

the penalty scheme reflects the Legislature's determination that the 

offense is serious. Notably, in addition to the six-month sentence, there 

are fines, fees, community service, counseling, civil liability, and reduced 

discretion on the part of the prosecutor and police. 2 

1Lambey concedes that he is a United States citizen, and we 

therefore conclude that he has not demonstrated that he could suffer 

deportation. 

2Lambey also argues that other courts have concluded that a 

significant suspension of one's driver's license has necessitated a jury trial. 

However, Lambey has not demonstrated that he faces such a penalty if 

convicted of first-offense domestic battery. 

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2 
3 

=MEM 

While Lambey states that his interest in raising his child and 

his right to bear arms are important fundamental rights, he offers no 

convincing support for the proposition that the collateral consequences of a 

conviction—those imposed by Nevada courts other than the sentencing 

court, other states, or by the federal government—are relevant to 

determine whether the offense is "serious." Compare Foote v. United 

States, 670 A.2d 366, 372 (D.C. 1996) ("Blanton's presumption that 

offenses carrying no more than six months incarceration are petty cannot, 

in our view, be effectively rebutted by reference to the potential remedies 

in hypothetical civil or administrative proceedings which have not been 

instituted."), and Smith v. United States, 768 A.2d 577, 580 (D.C. 2001) 

(concluding that potential termination of employment following conviction 

is collateral and therefore cannot elevate petty offense to serious one), 

with Richter v. Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1990) (concluding 

that, although maximum jail term was six months for DUI conviction, 

offense was serious because statute also included possible 15-year driver's 

license revocation). Further, we note that this court has previously 

rejected the proposition that collateral consequences of a conviction should 

be considered in determining its seriousness. See Blanton, 103 Nev. at 

633-34, 748 P.2d at 500-01. In addition, Lambey has not demonstrated 

that the fines, fees, community service, and counseling that may be 

mandated by statute are so onerous that he has overcome the presumption 

that the legislature considers this a petty offense. See Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 

at 4-5 (concluding that monetary fines and terms of probation were not as 

severe a penalty as six months in jail). 

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EIMMEISTMN it.ie:MBIN 
We therefore conclude that because Lambey cannot overcome 

the presumption that the offense is petty, the district court did not 

manifestly abuse its discretion by denying his request for a jury trial, see 

NRS 34.160; Round Hill Gen. Imp. Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 637 P.2d 

534 (1981), nor is his liberty being unlawfully restrained, see NRS 34.360. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 

Gibbons 

Douglas 

cc: Hon. Valorie J. Vega, District Judge 

The Pariente Law Firm, P.C. 

• Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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