ILLEGAL

IMMIGRATION

Status of Southwest

Border Strategy

Implementation

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

May 1999

GAO/GGD-99-44

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

General Government Division

Page 1 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

GAO

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May 19, 1999

The Honorable Orrin G. Hatch

Chairman

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on the Judiciary

United States Senate

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde

Chairman

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on the Judiciary

House of Representatives

Illegal immigration is a long-standing problem, and it has been exacerbated

by the pull of the strong domestic economy, economic and/or political

turmoil in the developing world, and recent natural disasters in Central

America. To address this continuing problem, the Attorney General in

1994 announced a broad, five-part strategy to strengthen the nation’s

immigration laws including, among other things, strengthening border

enforcement. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act of 1996 (1996 Act) requires us to track, monitor, and

evaluate the Attorney General’s strategy and to report our findings to

Congress annually for 6 years. Our first report1 discussed the Immigration

and Naturalization Service’s (INS) progress toward implementing the

Attorney General’s strategy for reducing and deterring illegal entry along

the southwest border. This, our third report, 2 provides additional

information on the key issues raised in our first report. Specifically, this

report addresses (1) INS’ progress in implementing the southwest border

strategy during fiscal year 1998, (2) interim results of the strategy, and (3)

actions taken on our recommendation that the Attorney General develop

and implement a plan for a formal, cost-effective, comprehensive, and

systematic evaluation of the strategy.

 

1

 Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More Evaluation Needed

(GAO/GGD-98-21, Dec. 11, 1997).

2

 Our second report, Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Alien Employment

Exist (GAO/GGD-99-33, April 2, 1999), focused on the strategy’s objective to enforce workplace

immigration laws.
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INS is continuing to implement its southwest border strategy. Although

some of the expected interim results continue to occur, available data do

not yet answer the fundamental question of how effective the strategy has

been in preventing and deterring illegal entry.

In fiscal year 1998, INS' Border Patrol transitioned into the second phase

of its four-phased approach, which called for increasing Border Patrol

agents and resources to sectors in Arizona and South Texas. Consistent

with this planned approach, INS allocated 740 of 1,000 new agent positions

authorized in fiscal year 1998 to sectors in these locations. INS also added

18 miles of fencing in California and Arizona, increased both the

proportion and total amount of time Border Patrol agents at the southwest

border spent collectively on border enforcement, and deployed additional

technologies such as remote video surveillance cameras. In addition, in

January 1999, INS was testing a resource and effectiveness model to help it

determine the right mix of staffing, equipment, and technology for all of its

Border Patrol sectors.

To complement the Border Patrol's efforts between ports of entry, INS

Inspections added 179 inspectors to southwest land-border ports of entry

in fiscal year 1998 and undertook training and enforcement efforts in

conjunction with other agencies located at these ports. INS also began

testing an inspections program designed to measure how well it conducted

inspections of travelers.

Although evaluative data on the overall impact of the strategy continue to

be limited, available data suggested that several anticipated interim effects

of the strategy have occurred. For example, apprehensions of illegal aliens

continued to shift from traditionally high entry points like San Diego and

El Paso to other locations along the border, as resources were deployed.

Also, southwest border ports of entry inspectors apprehended an

increased number of persons attempting fraudulent entry and there were

reports of higher fees being charged by smugglers, which INS said

indicated an increased difficulty in illegal border crossing. However, data

were not available on whether the other expected results--a decrease in

attempted reentries by illegal aliens who previously have been

apprehended and a reduction in border area crime--had occurred.

Available information on the interim results of the strategy does not

provide answers to the most fundamental questions surrounding INS’

enforcement efforts along the southwest border. That is, given the billions

of dollars that INS has invested in implementing the strategy, how effective

has the strategy been in preventing and deterring aliens from illegally

Results in Brief
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crossing the border? Pursuant to our 1997 report recommendation to

conduct a comprehensive evaluation, INS contracted with private research

firms in September 1998 for evaluative studies. As of April 1999, according

to INS, one contractor was working on an evaluation design and analysis

plan. INS could provide us with no other information on the contractor’s

progress. Consequently, we do not know to what extent the contractor’s

evaluation plan will provide the information needed to determine the

extent to which the Attorney General's strategy has been effective.

In February 1994, the Attorney General and INS Commissioner announced

a five-part strategy to strengthen enforcement of the nation’s immigration

laws. The strategy’s first priority was to strengthen enforcement along the

southwest border. The strategy to strengthen the border called for

“prevention through deterrence,” that is, raising the risk of apprehension

for illegal aliens to “make it so difficult and so costly to enter this country

illegally that fewer individuals even try.”3

 The objectives of the strategy

were to close off the routes most frequently used by smugglers and illegal

aliens (generally through urban areas) and shift traffic through the ports of

entry that inspect travelers or over areas that were more remote and

difficult to cross. With the traditional routes disrupted, INS expected that

illegal alien traffic would either be deterred or forced over terrain less

suited for crossing, where INS believed it would have the tactical

advantage.

To carry out the strategy, the Border Patrol was to

• concentrate personnel and resources in a four-phased approach4

 starting

with the areas of highest illegal alien activity,

• increase the time Border Patrol agents spend on border-control activities,

• make maximum use of physical barriers, and

• identify the appropriate quantity and mix of technology and personnel

needed to control the border.

To complement the Border Patrol’s efforts, the strategy called for INS

Inspections to enhance efforts to deter illegal entry at the ports of entry

and increase the use of technology to improve management of legal traffic

and commerce.

 

3

 Building A Comprehensive Southwest Border Enforcement Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Immigration

and Naturalization Service, June 1996), p. 3.

4

 Phases I, II, and III pertain to Border Patrol sectors on the southwest border; phase IV pertains to all

other Border Patrol sectors.

Background
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INS’ Border Patrol and Inspections are the two components chiefly

responsible for deterring illegal entry along the southwest border. These

two components represented 28 percent of INS’ total budget of $3.8 billion

in fiscal year 1998. INS also provides support for the strategy by allocating

funds to other INS programs for computer automation, technology

procurement, construction of facilities and barriers, and detention and

removal of illegal aliens.

INS’ Border Patrol is responsible for preventing and detecting illegal entry

along the border between the nation’s ports of entry. The Border Patrol is

divided into 21 sectors, 9 of which are along the southwest border. The

Border Patrol’s budget for fiscal year 1998 was $877 million, a 20-percent

increase over its fiscal year 1997 budget of $730 million. As of September

1998, there were about 8,000 Border Patrol agents nationwide. About

7,400, or 93 percent, were located in the 9 sectors along the southwest

border. (App. I contains detailed staffing and selected workload data for

the Border Patrol.)

INS Inspections and the U.S. Customs Service5

 share responsibility for

inspecting all applicants seeking admission at U.S. ports of entry. Among

other things, these inspections are to prevent the entry of inadmissible

applicants by detecting fraudulent documents, including those

representing false claims to U.S. citizenship or permanent residence status.

INS’ Inspections fiscal year 1998 budget for land-border inspections was

about $171 million, a 12-percent increase over its fiscal year 1997 budget of

about $152 million. As of September 30, 1998, Inspections had about 2,000

inspectors at land ports of entry nationwide, of which about 1,500 were

located at the southwest border land ports of entry. In fiscal year 1998,

INS and Customs inspectors along the southwest border inspected about

303 million people, including 213 million--or 70 percent--who were aliens,

and 90 million--or 30 percent--who were U.S. citizens. (App. I contains

detailed staffing and selected workload data for INS Inspections.)

To determine the progress made in implementing the strategy during fiscal

year 1998, we (1) analyzed INS staff allocations to determine if they were

consistent with its strategy, (2) reviewed INS performance reviews of its

fiscal year 1998 Priorities and Performance Management Plan, (3) analyzed

INS’ budget and Border Patrol and Inspections workload data, and (4)

interviewed INS Border Patrol and Inspections headquarters officials.

 5

 INS and Customs inspectors perform inspections at the primary inspection booths at land ports of

entry. INS and Customs inspectors are cross-trained and cross-designated to carry out both agencies’

inspection responsibilities at U.S. land ports of entry.

Scope and

Methodology
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Also, we reviewed a study commissioned by the Office of National Drug

Control Policy (ONDCP), which estimated the number of Border Patrol

agents needed to control the southwest border. In addition, we reviewed a

Department of Justice Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) report on INS’

implementation of its automated biometrics identification system (IDENT)

along the southwest border.

To determine the strategy’s interim effects, we analyzed INS data on

apprehensions made along the southwest border and the number of

persons apprehended while attempting to enter the United States illegally

at the southwest border land ports of entry. We also reviewed sections

from INS’ performance reviews of its fiscal year 1998 Priorities and

Performance Management Plan that reported on the strategy’s interim

effects.

To determine what actions have been taken to implement our

recommendation that INS develop and implement a comprehensive

evaluation of the strategy, we obtained written comments on INS’

evaluation plans from INS’ Executive Associate Commissioner for Policy

and Planning; and we discussed the comments with an official from INS’

Office of Policy and Planning.

We did not independently verify the validity of INS computer-generated

workload or apprehensions data. However, as we did for our first report,6

we discussed with INS officials their data validation efforts. These

officials were confident that the data could be used to accurately portray

trends over time.

We conducted our work between August 1998 and February 1999 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We

requested written comments on a draft of this report from the Attorney

General. The Attorney General did not provide comments but instead

requested INS to respond to our request. INS’ oral comments are

discussed on page 28.

During fiscal year 1998, INS continued to make progress toward

implementing the Attorney General’s strategy. As called for in the strategy,

INS allocated its new Border Patrol agent positions according to its fourphased approach and increased the amount of time agents spent on border

enforcement activities. INS constructed additional fencing along the

southwest border and continued to deploy technologies such as night

 

6

 GAO/GGD-98-21, p. 10.

INS Continued to

Implement the

Attorney General’s

Strategy
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vision devices and remote video surveillance systems. Further, INS was

testing a computer model designed to determine the appropriate mix of

staffing, equipment, and technology in Border Patrol sectors.

During fiscal year 1998, INS completed phase I of its strategy, which called

for concentrating resources in the San Diego, CA, and El Paso, TX, sectors,

and transitioned to phase II, which called for increasing resources in the

Tucson, AZ, sector and three sectors in south Texas—Del Rio, Laredo, and

McAllen, according to INS officials. Consistent with the strategy, INS

allocated 740 (74 percent) of the additional 1,000 Border Patrol agent

positions authorized in fiscal year 1998 to phase II sectors in Arizona and

Texas.

The strategy was designed to allow for flexibility in responding to

unexpected changes in the illegal immigration flow. To address an

increase in the number of apprehensions of illegal aliens in the El Centro,

CA; Yuma, AZ; and Marfa, TX, sectors, INS allocated 215 agents authorized

in fiscal year 1998 to these sectors, even though these sectors were not

originally scheduled to receive resources until phase III of the strategy.

As a result of these and previous staff increases, the number of agents

along the southwest border increased from 3,389 as of October 1993 to

6,315 as of September 1997 to 7,357 as of September 1998, an increase of

117 percent between October 1993 and September 1998. Figures 1, 2, and

3 show the increase in the number of agents in sectors along the southwest

border during this period.

New Agents Allocated

According to Strategy
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Source: INS.

Figure 1: Number of On-Board Border

Patrol Agents Increased in Phase I

Sectors Between October 1993 and

September 1998
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Source: INS.

Figure 2: Number of On-Board Border

Patrol Agents Increased in Phase II

Sectors Between October 1993 and

September 1998
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Source: INS.

To accommodate the increased number of Border Patrol staff, INS

budgeted almost $29 million in fiscal year 1998 for the expansion and

replacement of older Border Patrol facilities. INS’ hiring of Border Patrol

agents is slowing, despite congressional direction that INS continue hiring

and a study that estimated that the Border Patrol may need substantially

more agents along the southwest border. The 1996 Act7

 states that the

Border Patrol shall hire 1,000 agents each year for fiscal years 1997

through 2001. In addition, a study commissioned by ONDCP estimated

that the Border Patrol would need about 16,100 agents in the 9 southwest

border sectors to control and deter unauthorized crossings.8

 This number 7

 P.L. 104-208, sec.101.

8

 F. Bean, R. Capps, and C.W. Haynes, An Estimate of the Number of Border Patrol Personnel

Necessary to Control the Southwest Border (Austin, TX: Center for U.S.-Mexico Border and Migration

Research, University of Texas), July 1998.

Figure 3: Number of On-Board Border

Patrol Agents Increased in Phase III

Sectors Between October 1993 and

September 1998
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is more than twice the 7,357 agents on board along the southwest border

as of September 1998.

INS does not expect to meet Congress’ requirement that it hire 1,000

Border Patrol agents each year. INS brought on board 449 new Border

Patrol agents between the end of September 1998 and the middle of March

1999. However, INS lost 377 agents during the same time period, resulting

in a net gain of 72 agents. An INS headquarters official said that INS

expects to fall short of its fiscal year 1999 Border Patrol agent hiring goal

by 600 to 800 agents. In addition, the administration’s fiscal year 2000

budget does not request any additional Border Patrol agent positions. In

March 1999, the INS Commissioner testified9

 that nearly 48 percent of the

Border Patrol agents had less than 3 years of experience, and law

enforcement experts had indicated that it is risky to allow an agency’s

overall ratio of inexperienced to experienced officers to exceed 30

percent. Also, according to an INS official, INS lacks adequate facilities to

support the increased number of agents along the southwest border.

Therefore, according to INS, maintaining staffing at the fiscal year 1999

level will give INS time to develop more experienced agents and allow INS

to allocate the funds it needs to improve facilities.

The strategy also called for the Border Patrol to increase the amount of

time agents spend on border enforcement activities, as opposed to

program support activities--such as processing aliens who have been

apprehended—supervision, and training. During fiscal year 1998, agents in

the nine sectors along the southwest border collectively spent 66 percent

of their total time on border enforcement activities, 6 percent more than

the 60 percent spent in fiscal year 1997.

Due to the increase in the number of on-board agents, INS also has

increased the total amount of time agents spend on border enforcement

activities. The fiscal year 1998 Priorities Implementation Plan set a goal

that 8.1 million hours nationwide should be devoted to border enforcement

activities.10 According to INS data, the Border Patrol spent about 9 million

hours on border enforcement in fiscal year 1998, exceeding its goal by

about 11 percent and representing a 32 percent increase over the 6.8

million hours spent on border enforcement in fiscal year 1997.

 

9

 Testimony of Commissioner Doris Meissner, Immigration and Naturalization Service Concerning the

President’s FY 2000 Budget Request before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on

Commerce, State, and the Judiciary, United States Senate, March 16, 1999.

10 Border enforcement operations include activities such as, patrolling the immediate border areas,

examining vehicles at traffic checkpoints, and boat and air patrol.

Amount of Time Spent on

Border Enforcement

Activities Has Increased
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The strategy called for “maximum utilization of lighting, fencing, and other

barriers” to deter illegal entry. In our 1997 report,11 we stated that as of

July 1997, INS had about 46 miles of fencing in place and another 23 miles

under construction. A Border Patrol official told us that between August

1997 and September 1998, INS constructed about 18 miles of fencing in the

Yuma, Tucson, and San Diego sectors.12 INS also built barriers between

the ports of entry to prevent vehicles from driving across the border

illegally.

It is not clear how much additional fencing and other barriers INS plans to

build. The House report accompanying INS’ fiscal year 1999

appropriations13 required INS to prepare a report by November 15, 1998, on

its plans for road and fencing improvements along the New Mexico border.

INS reported to Congress on February 12, 1999,14 that it is developing initial

assessments of border fence and road improvements for New Mexico and

other border areas for archaeological and other environmental

considerations. INS expects to complete these assessments in the summer

of 1999.15 According to an INS headquarters official, the final report will

include an integrated plan for lighting and technology in urban corridors

along the southwest border and will be phased in over a 3 to 5 year period.

Two specific border projects are currently scheduled for fiscal year 1999 in

New Mexico. Both projects were funded with military engineering support

funds.16

With respect to automation and technology, INS received $47 million in

fiscal year 1998 for increases in these areas at the border.17 Of these funds,

 

11 GAO/GGD-98-21.

12 The San Diego sector built 9 miles of fencing (including 3 miles of secondary fencing), Tucson built 5

miles, and Yuma built 4 miles.

13 H.R. 105-636 at 34 (1998).

14 According to an INS official, INS was granted an extension to February l5, 1999.

15 INS is performing these assessments as part of an update to a Programmatic Environmental Impact

Statement done in 1994 for projects along the entire southwest border, in order to comply with the

National Environmental Policy Act.

16 Department of Defense (DOD) engineers provide engineering and construction services to construct

roads and fences along U.S. borders as authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 1991, sec. 1004. DOD assistance is provided to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies,

such as the Border Patrol, which may request assistance in controlling the flow of illegal drugs across

the southwest border.

17 The House report accompanying INS’ fiscal year 1999 appropriations required INS to develop and

submit a plan by December 1, 1998, on its long-term modernization plan “for the development, testing,

and deployment of all current technologies, as well as any other additional technologies that the INS is

pursuing.” The report also directed “that this plan address INS’s plans to train Border Patrol agents in

New Barriers and

Technology Deployed Along

the Border
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INS spent $16.2 million to expand IDENT18 and ENFORCE,19 systems

designed to track and identify illegal crossers and criminal aliens, $7.5

million to purchase 26 remote video surveillance systems, $3 million to

upgrade its integrated sensor and mapping system, and $1 million to

purchase additional sensors.

INS also used its automation and technology funds for the Border Patrol to

initiate, along with the Army Corps of Engineers, the Geographical

Information Systems (GIS) project. The goal of the GIS project is to

develop a computerized mapping system for the Border Patrol

nationwide,20 adapting technology originally designed for military use. The

Border Patrol anticipates that GIS will be used for such purposes as (1)

displaying where apprehensions are made, (2) displaying where agents or

ground sensors are deployed, (3) analyzing intelligence data, and (4)

displaying the terrain agents will be patrolling to help ensure officer safety.

The first of three phases of GIS—developing system requirements—began

in January 1999 at a cost of $800,000.

To identify the appropriate quantity and mix of personnel, equipment, and

technology needed to control the border, in January 1999, INS

headquarters was testing a Resource and Effectiveness Model designed to

measure how changes in resources affect the Border Patrol’s effectiveness

in apprehending illegal aliens and seizing narcotics. In fiscal years 1997

and 1998, INS spent approximately $1.37 million on contractor costs to

develop the computer model, according to a Border Patrol official. At the

time of our review, the model was not yet operational in any of the

southwest border sectors. The Border Patrol official stated that INS plans

to issue another contract to deploy the model to sectors at a cost of

$700,000 in fiscal year 1999.

 the use of these technologies and how current operational doctrine would need to be adjusted to

effectively utilize the information gathered with high technology systems” (H.R. 105-36 at 34). INS

submitted its report to Congress on February 19, 1999.

18 IDENT is an automated fingerprinting system that uses a personal computer, camera, and single

fingerprint scanner. IDENT captures left and right index fingerprints, photographs, and basic

apprehension data for illegal aliens apprehended by INS.

19 ENFORCE is a computer-based system, which standardizes INS processing forms into one

centralized database. ENFORCE is intended to provide the full range of case-tracking information

from arrest processing through deportation.

20 The Del Rio, Laredo, Tucson, and San Diego sectors developed independent mapping applications,

and did not use standardized data or formats. The GIS project proposes to use field experiences to

develop a standardized nationwide system.

INS Is Testing a Model to

Help Identify Appropriate

Resource Mix
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The model uses data such as the number of apprehensions; the amount of

technology and equipment--such as lighting, fencing, and barriers--used to

deter and detect aliens; and the number of agents. In addition, the model

is to include an estimate of the number of aliens who eluded INS

apprehension. The model is designed to help identify the appropriate mix

of personnel and technology by measuring the impact that any changes in

either of these factors would have on the level of effectiveness, with

effectiveness defined as the proportion of the estimated number of illegal

aliens who had entered the United States and were apprehended.

We did not review the model; therefore, we cannot assess how well it is

likely to measure the Border Patrol’s effectiveness. However, one of the

factors in the model--an estimate of the number of aliens who eluded

apprehension--historically has not been amenable to reliable measurement.

The strategy postulated that increased enforcement between the ports of

entry would cause an increase in port-of-entry activity, including increased

attempts to enter through fraudulent means. Since March 1997, INS added

179 inspectors to ports along the southwest border to handle this

anticipated increased activity, bringing its inspector staffing level to 1,454

as of September 1998, just short of the 1,485 inspectors that were

authorized. These land ports of entry are under the jurisdiction of five INS

district offices located along the southwest border. (See fig. 4 for the

number of inspectors in southwest border districts.)

Inspections Activities

Continued to Support

Strategy
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Source: INS.

According to an INS official, during fiscal year 1997, INS and Customs

officials began discussing the level of staffing necessary to conduct

primary inspections along the southwest border. As of April 1999, no

staffing decisions had been made. Consequently, INS did not request any

additional southwest land-border inspector positions in its fiscal year 1998

and 1999 budgets.

According to INS’ fiscal year 1998 review of its Priorities and Performance

Management Plan, at land-border crossings, INS Inspections has

concentrated on increasing the use of technology to facilitate the entry of

Figure 4: Number of On-Board Inspectors Increased at Land Ports of Entry in INS District Offices Along the Southwest Border

Between September 1994 and September 1998
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legal traffic into the United States. One such effort has been the

construction of dedicated commuter lanes that use technology to

automatically identify vehicles and validate the identity of occupants who

have passed a preclearance process.21 The goal of the dedicated commuter

lanes is to reduce the time it takes to complete an inspection at ports of

entry by segregating high frequency, low-risk, prescreened travelers from

other traffic. Construction delays prevented INS from adding two

dedicated commuter lanes at the San Ysidro, CA, port of entry as originally

planned. INS plans to complete these two lanes and a new lane in El Paso,

TX, during fiscal year 1999.22

To increase enforcement efforts, southwest border ports continued

activities such as using joint enforcement teams to inspect travelers and

conducting multiagency cross-training, according to INS reports.

To improve its effectiveness in deterring illegal entry, in July and August

1998, INS conducted a 2-month test of the Inspections Travelers’

Examinations (INTEX) process. INTEX consists of reinspecting a

randomly selected number of travelers to determine if the primary

inspector made the correct decision.23 The INTEX test included 10 air and

10 land ports of entry. Of the 3,511 travelers inspected during the INTEX

test, 3,452 people, or 98 percent, were correctly admitted into the United

States by the primary inspector. Primary inspectors incorrectly admitted

59 people or about 2 percent. According to an INS official, while the

preliminary INTEX test was satisfactory, the sample was too small for INS

to be able to project the results to the universe of nearly 500 million

inspections INS conducts yearly.

By the end of fiscal year 1999, INS plans to have conducted enough

random inspections to be able to project the results. Contingent on INS’

appropriations, INS plans to expand INTEX to 65 additional ports in fiscal

year 2000, bring the total number of ports using INTEX to 85 ports. INTEX

is to be used to suggest how the inspection process can be improved as

well as help INS comply with the Government Performance and Results

 

21 The Secure Electronic Network for Travelers’ Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) program is an interagency

initiative that uses automated technology to process individuals who have been prescreened for the

program. The automated photo identification and card system is designed to allow registered vehicles

and occupants to pass through the port of entry quickly.

22 A dedicated commuter lane is operational in the Otay Mesa port of entry in the San Diego sector.

23 A primary inspector can either admit the traveler or refer the traveler to “secondary,” where other

inspectors conduct a more detailed inspection.
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Act of 1993,24 which requires agencies to establish systems for measuring

program performance.

As the strategy along the southwest border is carried out, the Attorney

General has anticipated the following interim effects: (1) an initial

increase in the number of illegal aliens apprehended in locations receiving

an infusion of Border Patrol resources, followed by a decrease in

apprehensions; (2) a shift in the flow of illegal alien traffic from sectors

that traditionally accounted for most illegal immigration to other sectors;

(3) increased attempts by aliens to enter the United States illegally at the

ports of entry; (4) increased fees charged by alien smugglers and the use of

more sophisticated smuggling tactics; (5) an eventual decrease in

attempted reentries by illegal aliens who previously have been

apprehended; and (6) reduced violence at the border.

Although evaluative data continue to be limited, available data indicated

that some of the anticipated effects continued to occur since our last

report. INS’ apprehension data indicated a continued shift in illegal alien

traffic from traditionally high illegal entry points to other areas as INS

resources were deployed according to the planned approach. Such shifts

in apprehensions have been associated with a change in the causes and

locations of alien deaths along the border, leading INS to initiate a Border

Safety Initiative in cooperation with the Mexican government. Inspectors

at southwest border ports of entry apprehended an increased number of

persons attempting fraudulent entry and, according to an INS report,

smugglers in the Tucson sector were charging higher fees.

However, data are inconclusive or lacking on certain key aspects of the

strategy. For example, INS has not analyzed data on whether the

strategy's prediction of an initial increase in apprehensions followed by a

decrease, as resources are applied, has occurred in sectors receiving

resources in phase II of the strategy. Further, data were unavailable on

whether there has been a decrease in attempted reentries made by illegal

aliens who previously have been apprehended. In addition, crime data

being collected do not appear to be useful for gauging the strategy’s impact

on reducing border violence.

 

24 P.L. 103-62 (1993).

Interim Effects of the

Strategy
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The strategy anticipated an initial increase in the number of apprehensions

of illegal aliens in locations that had received an infusion of Border Patrol

resources, followed by a decrease in the number of apprehensions when a

“decisive level of resources” had been achieved, indicating that illegal

aliens were being deterred from entering. INS had not defined the criteria

for achieving a “decisive level of resources” in a particular area, so the

timing of such changes in apprehension levels remains unclear. In

addition, INS had not analyzed apprehension data over time to determine if

the predicted pattern of increases followed by decreases had occurred in

the phase II sectors that received resources in fiscal year 1998.

Figures 5 through 7 present data on apprehensions by Border Patrol sector

and strategy phase. It is difficult to determine the meaning of these

numbers at this time, because INS is still implementing phase II of the

strategy. Apprehension levels in fiscal years 1997 and 1998 in the two

phase I sectors (San Diego and El Paso) were considerably lower than they

were in fiscal year 1993. (See fig. 5.)

Changes in Illegal Alien

Apprehensions
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Source: INS.

In two of the phase II sectors (Tucson and Del Rio), apprehension levels

increased in both fiscal years 1997 and 1998. In the other two phase II

sectors (Laredo and McAllen), apprehension levels increased between

fiscal years 1993 and 1997, then decreased in fiscal year 1998. However in

fiscal year 1998, apprehension levels in these two sectors were still higher

than in fiscal year 1993. (See fig. 6.)

Figure 5: Number of Apprehensions

Decreased in Phase I Border Patrol

Sectors Between Fiscal Years 1993 and

1998
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Source: INS.

In two of the three phase III sectors (El Centro and Yuma), apprehension

levels increased in both fiscal years 1997 and 1998, as compared with fiscal

year 1993, whereas in Marfa apprehension levels have remained relatively

constant during these 3 years. (See fig. 7.)

Figure 6: Number of Apprehensions Increased in Phase II Border Patrol Sectors Between Fiscal Years 1993 and 1998
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Page 20 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

Source: INS.

The strategy also anticipated a shift in the flow of illegal alien traffic from

sectors that had traditionally accounted for most illegal immigration

activity to other sectors as well as shifts within sectors from urban areas,

where the enforcement posture is greater, to rural areas. Our analysis of

INS apprehension data indicated, since our previous report, that such a

shift continued to occur. We found that apprehensions in San Diego and

El Paso—sectors that had traditionally accounted for the most illegal alien

traffic—decreased 9 percent, from 408,265 apprehensions in fiscal year

1997 to 373,127 apprehensions in fiscal year 1998. As a percentage of all

southwest border apprehensions, apprehensions in El Paso and San Diego

decreased from 68 percent in fiscal year 1993 to 30 percent in fiscal year

1997 to 24 percent in fiscal year 1998. (See fig. 8.)

Figure 7: Number of Apprehensions

Increased in Two of Three Phase III

Border Patrol Sectors Between Fiscal

Years 1993 and 1998

Shift in Illegal Alien

Apprehensions
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Page 21 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

a Other sectors include El Centro, Yuma, Tuscon, Marfa, Del Rio, Laredo, and McAllen.

Source: GAO analysis of INS data.

The percentage of southwest border apprehensions increased significantly

in some sectors. For example, the Tucson sector’s percentage of all

southwest border apprehensions increased from 8 percent in fiscal year

1993 to 26 percent in fiscal year 1998. Similarly, the percentage in the El

Centro sector, east of San Diego, increased from 2 percent of all southwest

border apprehensions to 15 percent over the same time period.

Some data indicated that preventing illegal entry in certain traditional

entry points along the southwest border and shifting illegal alien traffic to

areas that are more remote and difficult to cross has resulted in an

unanticipated effect--that is, a change in the causes and locations of the

deaths of some illegal aliens who attempt to cross the border at these

remote border areas. A 1998 University of Houston study estimated the

number of undocumented migrant deaths at more than 1,600 between 1993

Figure 8: Percentage of Southwest

Border Apprehensions Decreased in

San Diego and El Paso Border Patrol

Sectors Between Fiscal Years 1993 and

1998
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Page 22 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

and 1997.25 Although the study did not find that the overall number of

migrant deaths had increased significantly over the 5-year period, it

concluded that the causes and locations of the deaths had changed

markedly. Death from environmental causes, such as hypothermia and

dehydration, increased in California and Texas, as did deaths from

drowning in the All-American Canal in Imperial County, CA. Deaths from

automobile/pedestrian accidents, homicides, and drowning in the San

Diego area decreased.

According to INS officials, reports of migrant deaths prompted the INS

Commissioner to announce, in June 1998, a Border Safety Initiative

designed to reduce injuries and prevent fatalities along the southwest

border. INS developed the initiative in cooperation with the Mexican

government and state and local officials in border communities to (1)

prevent deaths and injuries by informing and warning potential illegal

aliens of the realities and dangers of crossing the border at particular

routes, (2) target search and rescue operations in hazardous areas, and (3)

establish procedures and resources to help local officials identify the

bodies of persons who have died while attempting to cross the border.

INS developed a methodology to track migrant deaths in 40 counties that

are contiguous to the border or have historically been known for migrant

deaths due to routes of travel and environmental conditions. INS

estimated that 254 migrants died while trying to cross the border in fiscal

year 1998. INS was also developing a model to track Border Patrol rescues

along the border, beginning in fiscal year 1999.

The strategy postulated that there would be increased attempts by illegal

aliens to enter the United States illegally at the ports of entry as it became

more difficult to enter between the ports. No direct indicators of the

number of illegal entry attempts currently exist. However, land ports of

entry along the southwest border experienced a 17-percent increase in the

number of fraudulent documents intercepted, from 70,155 in fiscal year

1997 to 82,101 in fiscal year 1998. These ports of entry also had a 4-percent

increase in the number of false claims to United States citizenship, from

19,667 in fiscal year 1997 to 20,496 in fiscal year 1998. It is difficult to

determine whether the increases in the number of fraudulent documents

intercepted and false claims to U.S. citizenship were a result of actual

increases in illegal entry attempts at the ports and/or a result of greater

efforts made to detect fraud.

 

25 K. Eschbach, J. Hagan, N. Rodriguez, R. Hernandez-Leon, and S. Bailey, Death at the Border

(Houston: Center for Immigration Research, University of Houston), October 1998.

Increases in Fraudulent

Entries
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Page 23 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

As it became more difficult to cross the border illegally, INS anticipated an

increase in fees charged by alien smugglers and the use of more

sophisticated smuggling tactics. There is some evidence that these interim

effects have occurred. For example, a January 1999 report by the Tucson

Border Patrol sector indicates the cost of smuggling and the sophistication

of smuggling techniques through that sector increased.26 According to this

report, based on interviews with apprehended illegal aliens conducted by

personnel from Tucson’s Anti-Smuggling Unit, the cost of being smuggled

from the border to the interior of the United States had increased. For

example, the cost of being smuggled 1,000 miles reportedly increased from

about $1,000 in fiscal year 1996 to an estimated $1,350 in fiscal year 1998.

At the same time, the Tucson report also stated that alien smugglers were

using more sophisticated smuggling tactics. The report attributed these

changes to the increase in Tucson sector personnel that resulted from the

implementation of the border strategy.

Currently, INS is expanding data collection on smuggling fees across the

entire southwest border. In fiscal year 1998, the El Paso Intelligence

Center27 collected baseline data for a 2-month period, on fees charged for

smuggling Central American and Mexican aliens from the southwest

border to secondary staging areas and final destination points or work

locations. A summary of the findings in INS’ fiscal year 1998 Priorities and

Performance Management Plan review stated that smuggling fees from

border areas to various cities in the interior of the United States, such as

New York and Los Angeles, ranged from $600 to $1,200. Although the

review stated that “the quantity and quality of the data were not

comprehensive,”28 INS intends to refine its data collection efforts in fiscal

year 1999. INS officials also cited concerns that INS’ collection and

analysis of intelligence data on alien smuggling is limited because some

INS offices do not have full-time intelligence officers.

The strategy postulated that there would be a decrease in recidivism--that

is, in attempted reentries by illegal aliens who previously had been

apprehended--as control was gained in particular locations. According to

INS, this would be an indicator that the strategy was deterring illegal alien

 

26 Managing the U.S. Attorney General’s Strategy for Controlling Illegal Immigration in the Tucson

Sector Area of Operations (Tucson, AZ: Tucson Sector Strategy Response to the Government

Performance and Results Act (GPRA)), January 1999.

27 The El Paso Intelligence Center is responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating

intelligence information related to drug, alien, and weapons smuggling.

28 Fiscal Year 1998 Fourth Quarter Performance Review: Border Enforcement (Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service), December 1998, p. 7.

Some Evidence of Increased

Smuggling Fees

INS Beginning to Measure

Attempted Reentries
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Page 24 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

entry. INS planned to use IDENT, its automated fingerprinting system, to

identify recidivists and analyze their crossing patterns along the southwest

border.

In our 1997 report, we stated that computer problems had affected the

usefulness of IDENT data and INS’ ability to track recidivism over several

years.29 At that time, INS officials told us that although IDENT data

gathered since January 1996 were reliable and accurate, they had not done

any analysis to examine trends in recidivism.

In April 1999, INS officials told us that since IDENT began as a prototype

in October 1994, several modifications have been made to the system’s

hardware and software, which have resulted in improved matching and

data accuracy. In addition, the proportion of apprehended aliens enrolled

in IDENT has been increasing as more Border Patrol sectors have begun

using IDENT. For example, during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1998,

85 percent of the illegal aliens apprehended by southwest border sectors

were enrolled in the IDENT system compared with 56 percent during the

fourth quarter of fiscal year 1997.

As a result, INS determined that IDENT data beginning in October 1997

were sufficiently complete and reliable for internal analysis. INS officials

said that, as of April 1999, INS’ Statistics Branch was analyzing this more

recent IDENT data. An INS official stated that the contractor currently

evaluating the southwest border strategy for INS (see page 26 for a

discussion of this evaluation) is also using recent IDENT data as part of its

report.

Data continue to be limited on the strategy’s effects on decreasing

attempted reentries by illegal aliens. A March 1998 review of IDENT

implementation on the southwest border by Justice’s OIG found that less

than two-thirds of apprehended illegal aliens were being enrolled in

IDENT.30 The OIG reported that, although IDENT and related biometrics

technologies could be useful in many INS operations, “INS is not yet

making consistent and effective use of IDENT as a tool for border

enforcement.” The report said that (1) not all apprehended aliens were

enrolled in IDENT, (2) INS was not entering the fingerprints of all deported

 

29 GAO/GGD-98-21, p. 43.

30 Review of the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Automated Biometric Identification System

(IDENT) (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Inspections

Division, Report No. I-98-10), March 1998.
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Page 25 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

aliens and known criminal aliens into the IDENT lookout database,31 and

(3) INS needed to coordinate with the U.S. Attorneys for each district

along the southwest border to establish a border enforcement and

prosecution strategy that takes advantage of IDENT. The report also

noted that “there were virtually no controls in place to ensure the quality

of the data entered into the IDENT lookout database."

In March 1999, an official with the Justice OIG told us that INS had

satisfactorily responded to most of the report’s recommendations. For

example, INS was entering a greater proportion of apprehended aliens into

IDENT. To ensure deported and criminal aliens were in IDENT, INS

established new procedures and criteria for placing individuals in the

IDENT lookout database. INS instructed Border Patrol Sector chiefs to

initiate contact with their local U.S. Attorney to inform them about the

usefulness of IDENT in prosecuting recidivists and alien smugglers.

Lastly, according to this official, INS added additional data integrity checks

to ensure the accuracy of data entered into IDENT.

INS plans to deploy IDENT systems nationwide. According to INS’ fiscal

year 1998 Priorities and Performance Management Plan review, INS

deployed IDENT at 194 additional locations in fiscal year 1998, exceeding

its goal of 100 locations and bringing the total IDENT locations nationwide

to 370. However, the use of IDENT has been uneven at these locations.

During fiscal year 1998, the percentage of apprehended aliens enrolled in

the IDENT system at locations nationwide varied from 17 to 90 percent,

with an average of 85 percent, just short of INS’ targeted goal of 88

percent. Until IDENT is fully implemented, INS will not have complete

estimates of the number of attempted reentries.

The strategy anticipated a reduction in border violence as border control

was achieved. INS officials told us that they anticipated that crime would

decline in sections of the border where INS invested more enforcement

resources. However, INS does not have data that would reliably measure

the impact of the strategy’s implementation on border crime.

 31 According to the March 1998 OIG review of IDENT implementation, INS’ lookout database contains

information on deported and criminal aliens. Fingerprints for these aliens are entered in the lookout

database at a central location in Washington, D.C., from 10-print cards sent by INS offices around the

country. Index fingerprints, photographs, and basic text information are scanned and retyped from the

10-print cards to create individual lookout records in the database. At the time of the OIG’s review,

INS had entered the fingerprints of 41 percent of the aliens deported and excluded in fiscal year 1996 in

the IDENT lookout database; 24 percent of the fingerprint records in the IDENT lookout database were

accompanied by the aliens’ photograph.

Strategy’s Effects on Border

Violence Remains Unknown
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Page 26 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

During the first half of fiscal year 1998, the Border Patrol began contacting

local law enforcement agencies in certain southern border locations32 to

collect crime statistics to determine the impact that the national border

control strategy has made on crime in target cities. The crime statistics

from these locations identify crimes committed—such as homicide, rape,

robbery, burglary—but not persons arrested or their immigration status.

In its fourth quarter report on the 1998 Priorities, INS raised concerns

about using these data as a measure of effectiveness because it could not

determine the extent to which illegal aliens accounted for violent crimes

along the border.

Although the interim results of the strategy indicate that the strategy to

date has made certain areas of the southwest border more difficult to

breach, large numbers of illegal aliens continue to make their way into the

United States. Given the intractability of the problem and the billions of

dollars invested in border-control measures, it is important for INS to

assess which aspects of the strategy are most effective. Similarly, if the

strategy’s goals are not being achieved, INS should determine the reasons

they are not. Thus, in our 1997 report33 we recommended that the Attorney

General develop and implement a plan for a formal, cost-effective,

systematic evaluation of the strategy.

Pursuant to our recommendation, INS entered into agreements in

September 1998 with three independent contractors to provide evaluative

studies. The Executive Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning

wrote us that these agreements “will enable INS to develop a southwest

border strategy evaluation and to initiate the analysis that fulfills these

evaluation plans.”

INS contracted with Advancia Corporation of Lawton, OK, to (1) design an

evaluation strategy, (2) identify data needs and analytical approaches, and

(3) conduct a study of the southwest border strategy. The contract is in

the amount of $340,000 and the final report is due May 1, 1999. In April

1999, an official with INS’ Office of Policy and Planning said that the

contractor was developing a formal analysis plan intended to assess the

effectiveness of the southwest border strategy to date, as well as an

evaluation design and analysis plan for continuing evaluation of the

strategy. These results would, in part, be used to provide a baseline for

future evaluation of the strategy.

 32Locations include San Diego East County and Calexico, CA; Yuma, Nogales, and Douglas, AZ; and El

Paso, Laredo, and Brownsville, TX.

33 GAO/GGD-98-21.

INS Is Responding to

Our Recommendation
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Page 27 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

INS also contracted for $200,000 with CNA Corporation in Alexandria, VA,

to study how illegal migration and alien and drug smuggling in the

Caribbean affect the southern coast of the United States, including Puerto

Rico. A final report on this project is due August 1, 1999. An additional

contract for $60,000 was made with San Diego Dialogue, of the University

of California, San Diego, to study issues related to the ports of entry. At

the time of our review, this study was still under way. INS could provide us

with no other information on the contractors’ progress.

INS continued in fiscal year 1998 to implement its 1994 strategy by

allocating additional personnel in accordance with the strategy, increasing

the time Border Patrol agents spend on border enforcement activities, and

attempting to identify the appropriate quantity and mix of technology and

personnel needed to control the border.

Data on the interim effects of the Attorney General’s strategy along the

southwest border continue to be limited. The available data indicated that

some of the changes anticipated by the strategy have occurred. For

example, traditional routes of entry for illegal immigration, such as San

Diego and El Paso, have shown significant declines in illegal alien

apprehensions, while apprehensions in other areas have increased. While it

does not appear that there has been an increase in the overall number of

undocumented migrant deaths, some evidence exists that deaths resulting

from attempted crossings in remote areas are increasing, which is an

unintended consequence of the strategy. In addition, there is some

evidence of increases in the number of attempted illegal entries at the

ports of entry and increased smuggling fees. However, data are still

lacking on some key aspects of the strategy, including the impact of the

strategy on reducing attempted reentries of illegal aliens and reducing

crime in border cities.

As we recommended in our 1997 report,34 a comprehensive and systematic

evaluation of the border strategy would go a long way towards providing

information about the effectiveness of the strategy in reducing and

deterring illegal entry. The evaluation studies that INS is funding, and INS’

plans to use findings from these studies as a baseline for future evaluation,

could potentially begin to provide such needed information. However,

information on these studies was too limited at this stage for us to assess

 

34 GAO/GGD-98-21.

Conclusions
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Page 28 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

whether they will provide the information needed to comprehensively and

systematically evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy.

On April 13, 1999, we obtained oral comments on a draft of this report

from INS’ Assistant Director for Internal Audit and officials from the

following INS offices: Border Patrol, Policy and Planning, Budget, General

Counsel, Communications, and Inspections.

INS officials gave us updated information on the independent testing of the

IDENT database and INS plans for using IDENT to measure attempted

reentries. We revised our draft to reflect that INS is now beginning to

measure attempted reentries. INS officials generally agreed with the other

information presented in this report. They also provided other technical

comments that we incorporated into this report.

We are sending copies of this report to The Honorable Janet Reno,

Attorney General; The Honorable Doris Meissner, Commissioner of the

Immigration and Naturalization Service; The Honorable Raymond Kelly,

Commissioner of the Customs Service; The Honorable Jacob Lew, Director

of the Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We

will also make copies available to others upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please

contact me on (202) 512-8777. This report was done under the direction of

Evi L. Rezmovic, Assistant Director, Administration of Justice Issues.

Other major contributors are listed in appendix II.

Richard M. Stana

Associate Director, Administration

of Justice Issues

Agency Comments
Page 29 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy
Page 30 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

Contents

1 Letter

Appendix I 32

INS Border Patrol and

Inspections Staffing

and Selected Workload

Data

36

General Government Division, Washington, D.C. 36

Office of the General Counsel, Washington, D.C. 36

Los Angeles Field Office 36

Appendix II

Major Contributors to

This Report

Table I.1: Authorized Border Patrol Agent Positions in

Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 1993

Through 1998

32

Table I.2: Apprehensions by Southwest Border Patrol

Sector, Fiscal Years 1993 Through 1998

32

Table I.3: Border Patrol Hours by Southwest Border

Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 1993 Through 1998

33

Table I.4: INS Inspections, Selected Workload and

Enforcement Data by Southwest Border District

Offices, Fiscal Years 1994 Through 1998

34

Tables

Figure 1: Number of On-Board Border Patrol Agents

Increased in Phase I Sectors Between October 1993

and September 1998

7

Figure 2: Number of On-Board Border Patrol Agents

Increased in Phase II Sectors Between October 1993

and September 1998

8

Figure 3: Number of On-Board Border Patrol Agents

Increased in Phase III Sectors Between October 1993

and September 1998

9

Figures

Figure 4: Number of On-Board Inspectors Increased at

Land Ports of Entry in INS District Offices Along the

Southwest Border Between September 1994 and

September 1998

14
Contents

Page 31 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

Figure 5: Number of Apprehensions Decreased in Phase I

Border Patrol Sectors Between Fiscal Years 1993 and

1998

18

Figure 6: Number of Apprehensions Increased in Phase II

Border Patrol Sectors Between Fiscal Years 1993 and

1998

19

Figure 7: Number of Apprehensions Increased in Two of

Three Phase III Border Patrol Sectors Between Fiscal

Years 1993 and 1998

20

Figure 8: Percentage of Southwest Border Apprehensions

Decreased in San Diego and El Paso Border Patrol

Sectors Between Fiscal Years 1993 and 1998

21

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

GIS geographic information system

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service

INTEX Inspections Traveler Examination

OIG Office of the Inspector General

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy

SENTRI Secure Electronic Network for Travelers' Rapid Inspection
Appendix I

INS Border Patrol and Inspections Staffing

and Selected Workload Data

Page 32 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

Border Patrol sector

Authorized agents

FY 93a

 Authorized increases each year

 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 FY 98

Total authorized

agents

FY 98

San Diego 980 300 229 428 278 0 2,215

El Centro 194 0 0 0 50 134 378

Yuma 178 0 0 0 0 56 234

Tucson 281 0 128 246 228 140 1,023

El Paso 602 50 93 101 107 45 998

Marfa 131 0 0 0 0 25 156

Del Rio 290 0 100 0 52 135 577

Laredo 347 0 75 0 49 205 676

McAllen 386 0 75 25 228 260 974

Total 3,389 350 700 800 992b1,000 7,231 a

According to INS officials, the number of on-board agents as of September 30, 1993, is considered to

be the fiscal year 1993 authorized Border Patrol staffing level for comparison purposes.

b

Does not include eight agents deployed to Puerto Rico for the Attorney General's Anticrime initiative.

Source: INS.

Border Patrol

sector FY 93 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 FY 98

San Diego 531,689 450,152 524,231 483,815 283,889 248,092

El Centro 30,058 27,654 37,317 66,873 146,210 226,695

Yuma 23,548 21,211 20,894 28,310 30,177 76,195

Tucson 92,639 139,473 227,529 305,348 272,397 387,406

El Paso 285,781 79,688 110,971 145,929 124,376 125,035

Marfa 15,486 13,494 11,552 13,214 12,692 14,509

Del Rio 42,289 50,036 76,490 121,137 113,280 131,058

Laredo 82,348 73,142 93,305 131,841 141,893 103,433

McAllen 109,048 124,251 169,101 210,553 243,793 204,257

Total Southwest

border 1,212,886 979,101 1,271,390 1,507,020 1,368,707 1,516,680

Source: INS.

Table I.1: Authorized Border Patrol Agent Positions in Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 1993 Through 1998

Table I.2: Apprehensions by Southwest Border Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 1993 Through 1998
Appendix I

INS Border Patrol and Inspections Staffing and Selected Workload Data

Page 33 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

Border Patrol sector FY 93 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 FY 98

San Diego

General enforcement 59,050 72,240 43,884 26,695 20,080 23,171

Program support 917,149 933,549 1,030,319 1,255,970 1,553,100 1,326,847

Border enforcement 1,067,872 1,004,232 1,361,983 1,756,647 2,098,474 2,480,964

Total 2,044,071 2,010,021 2,436,186 3,039,312 3,671,654 3,830,982

El Centro

General enforcement 27,396 24,871 19,252 14,648 8,426 3,491

Program support 149,095 138,529 143,259 148,241 156,925 246,252

Border enforcement 246,289 249,180 248,206 251,101 247,829 644,741

Total 422,780 412,580 410,717 413,990 413,180 894,484

Yuma

General Enforcement 34,645 29,259 20,087 16,511 10,134 6,040

Program support 104,368 102,467 112,633 105,227 105,214 118,950

Border enforcement 255,330 258,137 249,374 257,871 222,916 277,342

Total 394,343 389,863 382,094 379,609 338,264 402,332

Tucson

General enforcement 25,418 20,756 15,768 17,557 16,855 33,689

Program support 264,022 250,294 316,267 395,867 582,792 524,167

Border enforcement 315,541 344,813 365,489 500,349 752,079 1,246,943

Total 604,981 615,863 697,524 913,773 1,351,726 1,804,799

El Paso

General enforcement 84,231 37,365 50,331 34,967 34,220 26,828

Program support 414,470 273,088 361,939 477,792 560,523 645,719

Border enforcement 810,929 1,023,146 964,533 1,028,846 1,065,002 1,234,208

Total 1,309,630 1,333,599 1,376,803 1,541,605 1,659,745 1,906,755

Marfa

General enforcement 46,467 42,755 36,854 13,757 3,044 2,911

Program support 99,873 93,757 89,693 91,170 85,811 85,618

Border enforcement 172,732 173,084 167,585 157,773 182,437 190,833

Total 319,072 309,596 294,132 262,700 271,292 279,362

Del Rio

General enforcement 30,854 26,073 22,077 17,742 8,610 12,370

Program support 226,377 222,617 233,946 310,483 321,543 366,278

Border enforcement 396,972 382,607 399,761 501,760 531,672 577,536

Total 654,203 631,297 655,784 829,985 861,825 956,184

Laredo

General enforcement 25,342 24,199 19,884 19,664 11,565 12,430

Program support 188,928 165,711 175,005 210,034 218,320 260,515

Border enforcement 566,219 568,169 536,463 615,189 666,257 782,262

Total 780,489 758,079 731,352 844,887 896,142 1,055,207

McAllen

Table I.3: Border Patrol Hours by Southwest Border Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 1993 Through 1998
Appendix I

INS Border Patrol and Inspections Staffing and Selected Workload Data

Page 34 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

Border Patrol sector FY 93 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 FY 98

General enforcement 47,543 45,016 39,511 23,261 19,888 9,084

Program support 358,910 355,743 353,511 418,905 460,536 620,383

Border enforcement 482,576 470,671 470,868 551,726 615,514 1,082,107

Total 889,029 871,430 863,890 993,892 1,095,938 1,711,574

Southwest border

General enforcement 380,946 322,534 267,648 184,802 132,822 130,014

Program support 2,723,192 2,535,755 2,816,572 3,413,689 4,044,764 4,194,729

Border enforcement 4,314,460 4,474,039 4,764,262 5,621,262 6,382,180 8,516,936

Total 7,418,598 7,332,328 7,848,482 9,219,753 10,559,766 12,841,679

Note: General enforcement includes duties indirectly related to deterrence, detection, and

apprehensions of illegal aliens, such as investigations of employers, criminal aliens, and smugglers.

Program support includes hours that support enforcement duties, such as air operations, intelligence,

administrative/supervisory, special operations, and training. Border enforcement includes duties

directly related to the deterrence, detection, and apprehension of illegal aliens and interdiction of

drugs and other contraband along the border, such as patrolling the immediate border area, traffic

check, transportation check, and boat and air patrol.

Source: INS.

INS District Office FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 FY 98

San Diego

U.S. citizens inspected a 28,808,845 26,776,081 26,342,930 28,952,299 28,644,148

Aliens inspecteda 63,152,638 59,387,840 57,278,208 61,149,254 63,620,553

Total persons inspecteda 91,961,483 86,163,921 83,621,138 90,101,553 92,264,701

Pedestrians inspected b 16,744,829 19,420,202 19,013,607 17,871,910

Vehicles inspected b 28,094,028 26,152,680 29,495,749 30,180,317

Fraudulent documents intercepted 41,974 46,515 41,221 35,719 44,751

Oral false claims to U.S. citizenship 15,403 19,368 12,633 8,603 8,928

Individuals smuggled 6,565 5,377 6,581 7,976 11,656

Phoenix

U.S. citizens inspected a 11,717,738 8,299,518 8,313,959 8,317,647 8,480,693

Aliens inspecteda 23,268,288 23,072,110 23,035,160 23,716,873 24,577,651

Total persons inspecteda 34,986,026 31,371,628 31,349,119 32,034,520 33,058,344

Pedestrians inspected b 7,806,361 7,657,480 7,651,290 7,209,033

Vehicles inspected b 8,951,615 8,984,091 9,311,850 9,752,364

Fraudulent documents intercepted 7,599 6,367 5,338 4,461 5,503

Oral false claims to U.S. citizenship 825 686 772 916 1,073

Individuals smuggled 279 253 427 408 355

El Paso

U.S. citizens inspected a 27,230,751 24,975,450 22,481,928 22,178,758 22,729,667

Aliens inspecteda 42,033,208 39,821,598 36,339,994 36,178,016 38,316,842

Total persons inspecteda 69,263,959 64,797,048 58,821,922 58,356,774 61,046,509

Pedestrians inspected b 4,578,798 4,571,073 4,578,644 6,982,414

Vehicles inspected b 18,143,401 17,529,375 17,534,880 17,741,105

Fraudulent documents intercepted 8,173 8,754 11,034 11,777 11,309

Oral false claims to U.S. citizenship 4,567 5,887 6,725 6,980 5,429

Table I.4: INS Inspections, Selected Workload and Enforcement Data by Southwest Border District Offices, Fiscal Years 1994

Through 1998
Appendix I

INS Border Patrol and Inspections Staffing and Selected Workload Data

Page 35 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

INS District Office FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 FY 98

Individuals smuggled 751 599 611 578 602

San Antonio

U.S. citizens inspected a 18,668,021 13,979,554 14,355,119 14,998,041 15,935,580

Aliens inspecteda 39,567,895 41,165,203 39,708,171 46,218,306 46,931,023

Total persons inspecteda 58,235,916 55,144,757 54,063,290 61,216,347 62,866,603

Pedestrians inspected b 7,289,530 5,219,599 7,003,458 7,782,173

Vehicles inspected b 11,454,275 13,026,781 13,432,433 14,274,699

Fraudulent documents intercepted 6,338 6,100 7,636 8,899 10,046

Oral false claims to U.S. citizenship 1,467 1,284 1,541 1,897 2,619

Individuals smuggled 1,559 1,224 1,349 1,228 1,601

Harlingen

U.S. citizens inspected a 20,831,853 12,920,985 12,849,749 13,740,688 14,534,702

Aliens inspecteda 40,564,252 39,536,870 40,258,253 41,632,438 40,022,402

Total persons inspecteda 61,396,105 52,457,855 53,108,002 55,373,126 54,557,104

Pedestrians inspected b 7,348,097 7,943,636 7,798,241 7,551,773

Vehicles inspected b 14,412,630 15,195,266 16,059,800 16,896,525

Fraudulent documents intercepted 9,176 7,100 9,681 9,299 10,492

Oral false claims to U.S. citizenship 1,264 1,549 1,702 1,271 2,447

Individuals smuggled 1,394 897 1,299 1,256 1,703

Total Southwest border

U.S. citizens inspected a 107,257,208 86,951,588 84,343,685 88,187,433 90,324,790

Aliens inspecteda 208,586,281 202,983,621 196,619,786 208,894,887 213,468,471

Total persons inspecteda 315,843,489 289,935,209 280,963,471 297,082,320 303,793,261

Pedestrians inspected b 43,767,615 44,811,990 46,045,240 47,397,303

Vehicles inspected b 81,055,949 80,888,193 85,834,712 88,845,010

Fraudulent documents intercepted 73,260 74,836 74,910 70,155 82,101

Oral false claims to U.S. citizenship 23,526 28,774 23,373 19,667 20,496

Individuals smuggled 10,548 8,350 10,267 11,446 15,917 a

Estimate based on periodic sampling of the number of occupants per vehicle entering the port of

entry.

b

INS did not collect data on these categories in fiscal year 1994.

Source: INS.
Appendix II

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 36 GAO/GGD-99-44 Southwest Border Strategy

Evi L. Rezmovic, Assistant Director

Katherine M. Wheeler, Publishing Advisor

Ann H. Finley, Senior Attorney

Michael P. Dino, Evaluator-In-Charge

Tom Jessor, Senior Evaluator

Nancy K. Kawahara, Senior Evaluator

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