### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nuary 26, 200 5

RIC KY EAR LS v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Marshall County No. 14185 Lee R ussell, Ju dge

No. M2003- 03011-CCA -R3-P C- F iled April 19, 2005

Th e De fe nd a nt, Ric ky

Ly nn Ea rl s, wa s c on vic te d b y

a jury of fou r cou nts of

fo rg e ry , Cl a ss E fe lon ie s, a ndon e c ou nt o f the ft un de r $ 50 0, a Cla ss A mis de me a no r. Th e tr ia l c ou rt su bs e qu e ntl y

me r g e d tw o o f

th e f o r g e r y c o u n ts in to th e r e main in g tw o c o u n ts

. A f te r a h e ar in g , th e tria l c ourt sentenc ed the De fenda nt as a c are er of fende r t o an eff

ective se ntence of twelve y ear s. The Def endant’ s sentence was a ffirme d on direc t appea l. S ee S t at e v. R icky Ly nn Earls, No. M2001- 001 1 2

- CC A

- R3

- CD
, 2 0 0 2 WL 1 5 8 6 2 8 6 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p

. , N a s h v il le
, Ju ly 1 8
, 2 0 0 2 )

. The De fe nd ant subse qu e ntl y

fi le d f or po st- c on vic tio n r e lie f a lle g ing ine ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l. Af te r a he ari ng , th e tr ial cou rt den ied r e lie f. Th is a pp e a l f oll ow e d. Th e so le iss ue be fo re us is whether the Defenda nt suffe red from the i neff ective assistance of counsel due to defe nse counse l’s failure to file t imely a mot ion for new t rial. We find that the Defenda nt is entitled to relief on the g rounds of inef

fec tive assistance of counse l. Accor dingly , we r ever se the trial court’s ruling and

rema nd this cause with instructions that the trial court gr ant the De fendant a delay ed appe al.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t R e ve r se d; Rem anded

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

N. An dy My ri c k, Jr., F a y e tte vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Ric ky

Ea rl s.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Da vid H. F ind le y , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Mike McCown, D i s t ri ct Attorney Gene ral; and Weakley

E. Ba rnar d, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.-2- OP IN ION

Th e De fe nd a nt w a s trie d in fr on t of a jury a nd c on vic te d of fo ur c ou nts of fo rg e ry , Cla ss E felonies, a nd one count of theft, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merg ed two of the forg ery counts into the remaining two forg ery counts. See State v. Ricky Ly nn Earls, No. M2001- 00112- CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL1586286, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App., Nashville, J uly 18
, 2002). The Def endant’ s sentencing hearing w as held on September 7, 2000, and a judg ment of convic tion was there upon enter ed. De fense counsel did not file a motion for ne w trial until Dece mber 6, 2000. The

m o t i o n ra i s ed t wo i s s u es : s u ff i ci en cyo f t h e e v i d en ce an d t h e p ro p ri et y o f t h e s en t en ce

. Al t h o u gh clea rl y fi l ed b ey ond the thirty -day time limi t, see Te nn. R. Crim. App. 33(b), a he aring on the Def endant’ s motion for new trial took plac e on De cembe r 7, 2000, during which the De fenda nt testified. T h e S t at e d i d n ot raise a n objection base d upon the timeliness of the motion. The trial court overruled the motion, finding the issues ra ised there in, along with other issues ra ised during the hea ring , to be without merit. The De fendant subsequently appeal ed h i s judgme nt, raising the propriety of his sentenc e as the only issue. This Court a ffirme d the Def endant’ s sentence . See Ricky Ly nn Earls, 2002 WL

1586286, at *2.

At the hea

ring o n t h e De fenda nt’s petition for post-conviction re lief, the De fendant’s trial lawy er ( “Counsel”) testified that he pr epar ed a motion for ne w trial in the De fendant’s ca se. He acknow ledg ed that he did not file it, ex plaining that he was “ out during that period of time” and that he “spe nt some time in the hospital.” Counsel testified t hat Donna Har g rove took over the case at that point.

Do nn a Ha rg ro ve , a n atto rn e y

in the P ub li c De fe nd e r’ s o ff ic e wi th C ou ns e l, t e sti fi e d th a t, shortly afte r Counsel’s illness, it “came to [ her] attention that [t he De fe n d an t ’s ] case had be en schedule d f

o r a mo ti o n f

o r n e w tria l. ” Sh e r e trie v e d th e D e f e n d a n t’ s f il e a n d d is c o v e r e d th a t no mot ion fo r n e w t

ri al had “ac tua lly

be e n r e du c e d to writi ng .” She ha d d isc us se d th e c a se wi th Counsel, however , and so she pr epar ed and f iled the motion. She did not rea d the transc ript of the trial prior to doing so. Rather, she looke d throug h the file a n d t he trial notes, a nd rec alled her discussion with Couns el about the motion. S h e h ad no discussions with the Defe ndant about the motion unti l the day

of the he aring . Ms. Harg rove a cknowledg ed that, bec ause the motion was filed

u n t i m el y , s h e co u l d n o t ra i s e i n i t an y i s s u es o t h er t h an s u ff i ci en cy o f t h e ev i d en ce an d s en t en ci n g. Howeve r, she ha d rea ched an ag ree ment wi t h the district attorney that the Def

endant would be allowed to testi fy at t h e hearing on the motion for new trial and add any issues he fe lt should be raised.

The De fenda nt testified that, afte r he w as convic ted, he mailed “ numerous letter s ” to Counsel

re g ard ing iss ue s h e wa nte d r a ise d in his mot ion fo r ne w tri a l. Whe n ask e d on dir e c t e xami natio n to state what those issues were , the Def endant testified that his right of c onfrontation had be en violated; there had bee n “[j] ury misconduct”; the for g ery statute was unc onstitut ional; and a lesse r-include d offe nse should have be en cha rg ed.-3-

I n its order de ny ing the Def endant’ s petition for post-c onviction relief, the trial court f ound

a s f oll ow s:

The Motion for Ne w Trial wa s filed lat e, and althoug h this was unde r s tan d ab le in v ie w o f [C o u n s e l’ s ] h e ar t att a c k
, it d o e s f a ll b e lo w a n objective

s t andar d of re asonable ness and wa s outside the rang e of c ompetence demande d of attorney s in criminal case s. Howeve r, t he re cord r evea ls that no issue was waive d or lost which would have r esulted in a re versa l of the convic tion. The i s s u es t h at the [Defenda nt] believed should have be en raised in a motion for new trial or in a dire ct appea l have be en dea lt with hereinabove . I t was cle ar f rom his testimonyat the evidentiary

hearing on the P[ ost] C[ onviction] that . . . the lawy er on a ppeal, f ound the orig ina l tria l to ha ve be e n “ c le a n” a ndfo un d n o is su e to a pp e a l. [Co un se l] b e l i e v e d t h a tt h e tr i a l w a s “ c l e a n ” a n d s o d i d a n d d o e s t h e u n d e r s i g n e d j u d g e

. It cannot be found that but for the failure to file timely a m o t i on for ne w trial, the [De fe nd a nt] w ou ld h a ve ha d a be tte r o utc ome on a

pp e a l.

Essentially , the trial court determined w ithin the context of t he post -convic tion procee ding that the issues the Def

endant had wa nted to raise on dir ect a ppeal would ha ve bee n unsucce ssful in gaining him relief, a nd that the Def endant ha d there fore demonstrated no pr ejudice arising from Counsel’s defic ient perf

ormanc e in f

ailing to file timely

the motion for new trial. Acc ording ly , the trial court denied post-conviction relief

. The Defendant now contends that, in so doing, the tria l court er red.

AN AL YSI S Both the Six th Amendment to the United States Constit ution a nd Article I , Section 9 of the Tenne ssee Constitution guar antee a criminal defendant the rig ht to r epre sentation by counsel. See State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999); Ba x ter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)

. Both the United States Supreme Court and the Tenne ssee Supre me Court have r ecog nized that the rig ht to such repr esentation include s the rig ht to “re asonably eff ective” assistance , that is, within t he rang e of c ompetence demande d of attorne y s in c riminal case s. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); B urns, 6 S.W.3d at 461; Baxt er, 523 S.W.2d at 936.

A l a wy e r’ s a ssi sta nc e to hi s or her c lie nt i s in e ff

e c tiv e if the la wy e r’ s c on du c t “ so undermined the proper

functioning of the a dversa rial proc ess that the tria l cannot be r elied on as having produce d a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. This over all standard is c omprised of two components: defic ient perf ormanc e by

the def endant’ s lawy er, and ac tual prejudice to the defe nse caused by

the def icient per formanc e. See id. at 687; B urns, 6 S.W.3d at 461. The defe ndant bear s the burden of

establishing both of

these components by clea r and convincing evidenc e. S ee Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110( f); Burns, 6 S.W .3d at 461. The defenda nt’s failure to prove e ither defic iency

or prejudice is a suff

icient basis upon which to deny relief on an inef

fec tive assistance of counsel c laim. See B urns, 6 S.W.3d at 461; Goad v. State, 938 S.W .2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996)

.

I n evaluating a

lawy er’ s perf

ormanc e, the rev i ew ing c ourt uses an obje ctive standa rd of “re asonable ness.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; B urns, 6 S.W .3d at 462. The r eviewing court-4-

must be highly

defe rential to counse l’s choice s “and should indulg e a strong presumpti on that counsel’s c onduct fa lls withi n the wide r ang e of r easona ble profe ssional assistance. ” Bu rn s , 6 S.W .3d at 462; see a lso St rickland, 466 U .S

. at 6 8 9

. T h e court should not use the benef it of hindsight to second- g uess trial st ra t egy o r to criticize counse l’s tactics, see Hellar d v. State, 629 S.W .2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982), and counsel’s alleg ed err ors should be judge d in lig ht of all the fa cts and circ umstances a s of the time they wer e made , see Strickland, 466 U .S. at 690; Hicks v. State, 983 S.W .2d 240, 246 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)

.

A t rial court’s determination of an ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel claim pre sents a mix ed qu e sti on of

la w a ndfa c t on app e a l. S e e F ie lds v. Stat e, 40 S .W.3d45 0, 45 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) . T his Court review s the trial court’s finding s of fa ct with reg ard to the eff ectivene ss of counsel unde r a de novo standard, a ccompa nied with a pre sump t i o n t h at those finding s are corr ect unless the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is otherwise

. See id. “Howe ver, a trial c ourt’s conc lusions of law-- such as whe ther c ounsel’s per formanc e wa s deficie nt or whether that def iciency was pre judicial--a

re

rev i ew ed u n d er a pure ly

de novo standa

rd, with no presumption of cor rec tness g iven to the trial court’s c onclusions.” I d.

Our supre me court has rec ently issued an opinion in a ca se bea ri ng close similarity to the Def endant’ s. See Wallace v. State, 121 S.W .3d 652 (Tenn. 2003) . I n that case , the def endant ha d
reta ined counse l to defend him ag ainst a char g e of first deg ree murder. T heir a g ree ment included a provision that counse l woul d b e re s p o n sible only for the de fendant’s repr esentation at trial and would not be re sponsible for h andli ng any potential appea ls. See id. at 654. The de fendant was convicted a s char g ed afte r a jury trial. I d. After

the conviction, counse l sent the defe ndant a letter instructing him on how to file a motion for new tria l and the issues he should include. H oweve r, counsel did not obtain court approva l to withdraw. I d. at 654-55. The de fendant timelyfiled his pro se motion for new trial. I d. at 655. Be cause the def endant still had counsel of rec ord, the trial c ourt ref used to consider

the def endant’ s pro se filing . I d. Counsel subse quently filed a late motion for

ne w t ri a l a nd so ug ht to be re lie ve d fr om his re pr e se ntatio n of the de fe nd a nt. I d. Th e de fe nd a nt a lso filed a se c o n d p r o s e mo ti o n f o r n e w tria l, w h ic h mo ti o n w a s a ls o n o t t im e ly

. T h e d e f endant’ s second motion i n cl u d ed i s s u es other tha n sufficie ncy of the e vidence . I d. (The r ecor d befor e the supreme c ourt did not include the d ef en d ant’s first mot ion. I d. at n.3). The trial court g rante d counsel’s r equest to be relieve d from further re prese nting the de fendant but did not gra nt either of the late- filed motions for a ne w trial. I d. at 655.

The de fenda nt pursued his direc t appea l but this Court concluded that, because the motions for ne w trial had been untimely
, all issues wer e waived except for suff iciency of the e vidence . See id. This Court determined that the evidence was insuffic ient to support the defe ndant’s first de g ree murder c onviction, and thus modified the conviction to sec ond deg ree murder. T his Court

rema nded the matter

to the trial court to rese ntence the defendant for second deg ree murder. See id.

Eventually
, the defendant filed f or post-convic tion relief a lleg ing that his trial counsel had been ine ffe ctive in fa iling to file a timely motion for new tria l. I d. After a hea ring , the trial court-5-

ag ree d and g rante d the def endant a delay ed appe al. I d. This Court then d i s m i s sed the de lay ed appea l, concluding that the def endant ha d rec eived a

direc t appea l, albeit onl y upon the suffic iency of t he evidence, and t hat t he defenda nt had therefor e not been pr ejudiced. See id. at 655-56. Our supreme c ourt subsequently reve rsed this Court and re instated the def endant’ s delay ed appea l. I d. at 660.

I n revie wing the def endant’ s case , our supre me court initi ally concl u d ed t h at “c ounsel’s failure to file a tim el y m o t i o n fo r new tria l, as well as his fa ilure to withdraw so a s to allow the defe ndant to file a pr o se motion for new trial, was de ficient.” I d. at 657. Acc ording ly , the def endant

sa tis fi e d th e fi rs t pr on g of the S tr ick lan d tes t. I d. With re sp e c t to the se c on d p ro ng , o ur su pr e me court fir st determined that “ the pre judice prong of the a naly sis can [not] b e re s o l v ed s implyby

rea soning that [t he defe ndant] had direct r eview on the issue of suffic iency of evide nce a lone.” I d.

a t 65 8. F urtherm ore, un de r the c ir c ums ta nc e s o f the de fe nd a nt’ s c a se , h e wa s n ot r e qu ir e d to demonstrate a ctua l prejudice from his lawy ers’ s deficie nt performance . I d. Rather, “ [c] ounsel’s defic ient perf

ormanc e wa s . . . presumptively prejudicia l” bec ause

[ c] o u n s el ’s ab an d o n m en t o f h i s c l i en tats u ch a c ri t i ca l s t age o f t h e p ro ce ed i n gs resulted in the f

ailure to prese rve and pursue the available post-trial reme dies and the complete f

ailure to subjec t the State to the adversarial appellate proce ss. Counsel’s defic ient perf

ormanc e wa s, the re fore, presumptively prejudicia l and supported the trial court’ s g rant of a delay ed appeal under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40- 30-113.

I d. (c itatio n omit te d)

. Ou r hig h co urt re c og nize d tha t “th e ke y iss ue is the failu re of tr ia l c ou ns e l to file the spec ified plea ding r esulting in the de fendant being deprive d of complete appellate revie w on direc t appea l.” I d. at 659 (e m p h as i s ad d ed ). Thus, the c ourt conc luded, “[a]s a direct r esult of counsel’s ine ffe ctive assistanc e, the de fendant was proc edura lly barr ed fr om pursuing iss u es on appea l, and the State’s c ase w as not subjected to a dversa rial scr utiny upon appea l.” I d. at 660.

Sig nif ic a ntl y , o ur

su pr e me c ou rt

re je c te d a pe r se ru le re g ard ing a

tr ia l la wy e r’ s f

a ilu re to f ile a motion for new trial. Rather, in orde r t o be entitled to re lief, “a petitioner in a post-c onviction proce eding must establish that he or she i ntended to file a motion for ne w trial and that but for the de fi c ie nt r e pr e se ntatio n o f c ou ns e l, a mot ionfo r n e w t

ri a l w ou ld h a ve be e n f

ile d r a isi ng iss ue s in addition to sufficienc y

of the e vidence .” I d. at 659.

I n the instant case , we ha v e n o h es itation in agr eeing with the trial court that Counsel’s failure to file timely

a motion for new trial on behalf of the De fendant was def icient per formanc e. Thus, the Def

endant ha s satisfied t he first prong of t he S trickland test. We further conclude that the Def endant ha s established both of the pr ere quisites for a fi n d i n g o f pre sumed prejudice resulting from this deficien t p er fo rm ance . The De fendant testified about four issues othe r than suff iciency that he wa nted ra ised in his moti on for ne w t rial. Neither of t he De fendant’s lawy ers testified that these we re not a

ppropriate issues to have raised. I ndeed, the State conce des in its brief that, under Wal la c e , th e De fe nd a nt i s e nti tle d to a de la y e d mo tio n f

or a ne w t ri a l.-6-

We hasten to point out that, at the time it issued its ruling in this case, the trial court did not have the benef

it of our supreme court’s Wallac e dec ision. The trial court a naly zed the Def endant’ s

c la im b y e xami nin g wh e the r the De fe nd a nt h ad dem on str a te d a c tua l pr e jud ic e re su lti ng fr om h is lawy er’ s deficie nt perfor

mance , as set forth in St rickland. A s set forth above , howeve r, Wallace pr ov ide s f

or a pr e su mpt ion of

pr e jud ic e un de r thefa c ts o f this c a se . H a vin g satis fi e d b oth require ments of deficient performanc e and prejudice
, the Defenda nt is entitled to relief based upon the ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of c ou ns e l. Ac c or din g ly , we re ve rs e the tr ia l c ou rt ’s ru lin g a ndre ma ndthi s

ma tte r w ith ins truc tio ns to the tr ia l cou rt that it g rant the De fe nd a nt a de la y e d a pp e a l, b e g inn ing wi th the ri g ht t o f

ile a de la y e d mo tio n f

or a ne w t ri a l.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE