SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2935-16T2

HSBC BANK U.S., NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION as trustee for

WELLS FARGO ASSET SECURITIES

CORPORATION, MORTGAGE ASSETBACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATE

SERIES 2007-AR9,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JULIO WEXLER,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

MRS. JULIO WEXLER, WIFE OF

JULIO WEXLER, WELLS FARGO

BANK, NA; TD BANK, NA, and

RHINA WEXLER,

Defendants.

_____________________________________

Submitted May 1, 2018 – Decided July 31, 2018

Before Judges Sumners and Moynihan.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Bergen County, Docket No. 

F-026003-12.

Julio Wexler, appellant pro se.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2935-16T2

Reed Smith, LLP, attorneys for respondent 

(Henry F. Reichner, of counsel and on the 

brief; David G. Murphy, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this residential mortgage foreclosure action, defendant 

Julio Wexler appeals a February 3, 2017 order denying his objection 

to entry of final judgment of foreclosure in favor of HSBC Bank 

U.S., National Association as trustee for Wells Fargo Asset 

Securities Corporation, Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through 

Certificate Series 2007-AR9 (HSBC). We affirm.

On September 18, 2007, Wexler executed a mortgage to Wells 

Fargo Bank, N.A. to secure a promissory note for $716,704 payable 

to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. to purchase a home in Edgewater Park.

The mortgage was properly recorded.

Due to Wexler's payment default on February 1, 2011, 

foreclosure proceedings were subsequently initiated on November 

9, 2012 by HSBC, which had been assigned the mortgage. After the 

trial had been adjourned on several occasions at the request of 

Wexler's counsel, the parties and Chancery Judge Robert P. Contillo 

executed a consent order entered on December 30, 2013, which 

provided that the answer filed by Wexler was "deemed non-contesting 

and that [the] matter shall be transferred to the Foreclosure Unit 

to proceed as an uncontested foreclosure." The order also stated 
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that HSBC "shall not apply for Final Judgement prior to expiration 

of 150 days from the date of this Order."

Wexler, no longer represented by counsel, tried to prevent 

an unfiled motion to enter foreclosure by filing an order to show 

cause that sought to vacate the consent order; alleging the 

settlement was entered in bad faith because he was under duress 

or coerced into signing the order when his additional adjournment 

request was denied. Judge Contillo denied the request on May 9, 

2014, as well as Wexler's motion for reconsideration on September 

11, 2014.

Three months later, in accordance with the consent order, 

HSBC moved for entry of final judgement. Wexler objected, arguing 

the consent order was signed under psychological and economic 

pressure. He also challenged HSBC's ability to foreclose, 

contending: the Notice of Intent to Foreclose was defective and 

violated the Fair Foreclosure Act of 1995; the promissory note was 

robo-signed; HSBC was without standing – it failed to show that 

it had possession of the note at the time the foreclosure complaint 

was filed, it failed to show that its assignment was authenticated, 

and the true owner of the note had not been identified; HSBC 

violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act; and there was improper

service of defendant Rhina Wexler.
4 A-2935-16T2

Judge Contillo denied Wexler's objections with entry of an 

order and a letter decision on February 3, 2017. The judge stated 

that Wexler's numerous objections were without merit because under

Rule 4:64-1(d)(3),

1 objection to entry of foreclosure is limited 

solely to the amount due and Wexler failed to contest the amount 

due with any specificity. The judge further found Wexler did not 

present any credible evidence to contradict any information 

contained in HSBC's motion. And, as to allegations of coercion 

or duress in agreeing to the consent order, the judge indicated 

he had previously determined that there was no merit to the 

allegations.

2

On March 10, Judge Contillo denied Wexler's motion for 

reconsideration; rejecting challenges, raised for the first time, 

regarding the amount due as untimely. Entry of an uncontested 

final judgment of foreclosure and a writ of execution was entered 

on March 31.

On appeal, Wexler argues:

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A[] HARMLESS ERROR 

BELOW BECAUSE IT[S] FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

WER[E] UNSUPPORTED AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE 

COMPETENT, RELEVANT, CREDIBLE AND 

 

1 Miscited as Rule 4:64-1(d)(1)(A); paragraph (d) was amended 

effective September 1, 2014.

2 Denial of motion was not included in Wexler's Notice of Appeal.
5 A-2935-16T2

UNCHALLENGED EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE 

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT.

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A[] HARMLESS ERROR 

BELOW BECAUSE IT[S] FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

WER[E] UNSUPPORTED AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE 

COMPETENT, RELEVANT, CREDIBLE AND 

UNCHALLENGED EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE 

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT AND APPROVED A CONSENT 

ORDER MADE IN BAD FAITH TO COVER UP 

PLAINTIFF'S VIOLATIONS OF CASE LAW, RULES AND 

STATUTES.

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A[] HARMLESS ERROR 

BELOW BECAUSE IT[S] FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

WER[E] UNSUPPORTED AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE 

COMPETENT, RELEVANT, CREDIBLE AND 

UNCHALLENGED EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE 

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT AND IMPROPERLY DENIED THE 

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT TO REPRESENT HIMSELF IN A 

CIVIL TRIAL.

Considering Wexler's arguments in light of the record and 

applicable legal principles, we conclude that they are without 

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We affirm substantially for the reasons 

expressed in Judge Contillo's well-reasoned oral decision. We 

further add that Wexler's arguments that were not raised before 

the judge will not be considered on appeal because they do not 

involve jurisdictional or public interest concerns. Zaman v. 
6 A-2935-16T2

Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 226-27 (2014) (quoting Nieder v. Royal Indem. 

Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)).

Affirmed.