### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00689- CR

Jo se Bor ja Vi lle ga s, App e lla nt
v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF BASTRO P COUNTY , 21ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT

NO. 11137 , HO NORAB LE H. R. TOW SLEE, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N A jury found appe llant J ose B orja Vill eg as guilty of possession of mar ihuana in an amount g rea t er t h an four ounc es but less than five pounds. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.121(b)( 3) (West 2003). Villeg as wa s sentence d to nine m onths in state j ail and asse ssed an $875 fi ne. In his first issue, Villega s argues that the State’s e x erc ise of its pere mptory challeng es
wa s r a c ia lly

dis c ri min a tor

y and the tr ial cou rt e rr e d in

ov e rr uli nghis Batson c ha lle ng e s. I n h is
s e c o n d an d th ir d is s u e s , V il le g a s c h a ll e n g e s th e le g a l a n d f a c tu a l s u f f ic ie n c y o f th e e v id e n c e . We aff irm the judg ment of convic tion.
BACK GR OUND

On the evening of Fe bruar y 20, 2004, Offic er Gar

y Santee of

the Smithvi lle Police Depa rtment stopped a c ar in Elg in for fa iling to sig nal a turn. Vi l l ega s was sit ting in the f rontThe State introduce d a videota pe re cordingof the stop made by a ca mera in Office r 1 Santee’ s patrol ca

r. The tape was play ed before the jury and the audio portion is transcr ibed in the repor ter’s r ecor d. 2 passeng er se at. A fe w minutes befor e the stop, the drive r had seen his friend Villega s walking along the roa d and off

ere d him a ride. At the sto p, Of

fi c e r S ante e a sk e d th e dr ive r f or his lic e ns e and re g ist

ratio n. Whil e

1 the driver rea ched into his g love box, Officer Santee used his flashlig ht to ill uminate the inside of the c ar. He no tic e d a

pla sti c ba g parti all y

sti c kin g ou t f

ro m un de r t

he pa sse ng e r’ s se a t, b e ne a th Vi lle g a s’ s le g s. Of

fi c e r S ante e te sti fi e d at tr ia l th at Vi ll ega s w a s atte mpt ingto u se his le g s to
conce al the plastic ba g and push it under the pa sseng er se at. W hen conf ronted on c ross examination with the fac t that he left this detail out of hi s police report, Officer Santee asserted that he only used
s u c h r e p o rt s t o r e f

r e s h h i s m e m o r

y. Of fi ce r S an t ee wa l k edar o u n d t h e c ar an d as k edVi l l ega s ab o u t t h e p l as t i c b ag. Villeg as answe red that he did not know what the officer was t alking about. The office r also noticed
a ca n of bee r betwe en Villeg as’s leg s and aske d him to remove it. As Villeg as was doingso, Offic er Santee shined his fla shlight and observe d a g ree n leaf y substance in the plastic bag that he believe d to be marihua

na. Af ter a sking V illega s to hand t h e b ag t o h i m, Office r Santee rea ched down and picked it up, conf

irming that the bagcontained ma rihuana . Villeg as c o n t i n u ed to deny any knowledg e or ow nership of the marihuana
. Offic er Santee then took V illega s into custody and ca lled fo r ba c ku p. Af te r so me ini tia l c on fu sio n o ve r who sh ou ld b e arr e ste d, Of fi c e r S ante e arr e ste d b oth men for posse ssion of marihuana . Charg es ag ainst the driver wer e later

dropped.3 At trial, the driver testified t hat he did not place the bag of marihuana in the car and that the bag was not there be fore he picke d Villeg as up. The f irst time the driver sa

w the bagwas when Of fice r Santee pointed it out. The driver a lso testified that no one else ha d used t he car that d ay o r h a d r e g u l ar a c c e s s t o i t , a l t h o u g h t h e l i s t e d o w n e r o f t h e c ar w a s t h e dr i v e r ’ s f a t h e r . F i n a l l y, the driver testified that he notice d Villeg as was holding a can in a paper sack w hen he e ntere d the
car but did not noti ce V illega s car rying a ny thing e lse. Th e jur y fo un d V ill e g a s guil ty

and the tria l c ou

rt e nte re d ju dg me nt o n th e ve rd ic t. Villeg as bring s this appeal.
DI SCU SSIO N Legal and F actual Suf

fi ciency I n his second and third issues, Villeg as challeng es the leg al and fa ctual suff iciency of the e vidence of marihua na possession. When there is a cha lleng e to t he suff iciency of the evidenc e to sustain a cr iminal conviction, the question prese nted is whether a rational tr ier of fa ct
c o u ld h a v e f

o u n d th e e s s e n ti a l e le me n ts o f th e o f f e n s e b e y o n d a r e a s o n a

b le doubt. Jack

son v. Vi rg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 3 24 (1 97 9) (l e g a l su ff ic ie nc y ); G r i f f i n v . Sta te , 6 1 4 S .W.2d 155, 158-59 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 81 ) ( le g a l su ff ic ie nc y ); Zun iga v . S

tate , 144 S.W .3d 477, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (f actua l sufficienc y

). In a l egal sufficienc y

revie w, all the evide nce is re viewed in the lig ht
m o s tf a v o r a b l e t o t h e v e r d i c t ; i t i s a s s u m e d t h a t t h e t r i e r o f f a c t r e s o l v e d c o n f

l i c t s i nt h e t e s t i m o n y, weig hed the e vidence , and dre w re asonable infere nces in a manner that supports the verdic t. Gr iff in , 6 1 4 S
. W
. 2 d

at 1 5 9 (c i t i n g Jack

son , 443 U.S. at 318-19).4 I n a fa ctual sufficiency revie w, all the evide nce is c onsidered e qually , including the testimony of def ense w itnesses and the e x istence o f alt ernative hy potheses. Or on a v . S

tate , 836 S.W .2d 319, 321 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no pet.). Although due defere nce still must be acc orded the fa ct finder ’s de t er m i n ations, particular ly those conc erningthe weig ht and cr edibility of the evidenc e, the r eviewingcourt may disag ree with the result in order to preve nt a manife st injust ice. J oh ns on v . S

tate , 2 3 S. W.3 d 1 , 9 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ). Th e e vid e nc e wi ll b e de e me d f a c tua lly insufficient to sustain the convic tion if the evidenc e of g uilt, considere d alone, is t oo weak to support
a fi nd ingof g uil t be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t, o r i f t

he str e ng th o f t

he c on tr ary

e vid e nc e pr e c lud e s a finding of g uilt bey ond a re asonable doubt. Zuniga , 144 S.W .3d at 484-85. In conductinga leg al or fa ctual suff

iciency revie w, we c onsider all the e vidence , rig htly or wrong ly

admitted. Cam ar ill o
v . S tat e , 82 S.W .3d 529, 537 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.).

The off ense of marihuana

possession is commit ted when a person knowing ly

and intentionally

possesses a usa

ble quantity

of marihua

na. Te x . Hea l t h & Saf ety Code Ann. § 481.121(a) (West 2003). The State must prove the leg al eleme nts of the offe nse by showing that (1) the de fenda

nt exercised ac tual car e, custody , control, or manag ement over the drug s, and (2) the defe ndant knew he possessed a c ontrolled substance
. Brown v. State, 9 1 1 S. W. 2 d 7 4 4 , 7 4 7 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ); Ar

ms tro ng v . S tate , 82 S.W .3d 444, 449 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2002, pe t. ref’ d). I f the de fenda

nt did not ex cl u s ively

possess or control the pla ce where the drug s were found, the State must present “a ffirmative links” that connec t t h e d ef en d an t to the drug s. Armstrong , 82 S.W .3d at 449. The State’ s evidenc e doe s not have to exclude eve ry rea sonable hy

pothesis other5

than the def

endant’ s g uilt. Id. But the totality of t he circumstance s must indicate that the def endant had knowledg e and c ontrol over the dr ug s. Id
. Some of the fa cts and c ircumstance s the S tate may use as aff irmative links include the def endant’ s proxi mity

to the drug s when the dr

ug s are found; any noticeable drugodor; any other contra band on the de fenda

nt; any incriminating statements, fur t i v e ges tures, or attempts to flee; whether the drug s or other c ontraba nd are in plain view; whether t he defenda nt was int ox icated when the drug s were found; whethe r the spac e in questi on was e nclosed; and w hether the per son had a rig ht to possess the place wher e the dr ug s were found. Id
. (citations omitted). I n evaluating whe ther the leg al eleme nts wer e established, the number of f actor s prese nt in each c ase is less important than th e o v e r a ll “ lo g ic a l f

o r c e ” c r e a te d b y the fac tors. Ma rtinets v. State, 8 8 4 S. W. 2 d 1 8 5 , 1 8 8 ( T e x. App.—Austin 1994, no pet.).

Vi lle g a s a sse rt s th a t th e State ’s e vid ence is l e g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt b e c a

us e it f a ile d to show that he e x erc ised dominion and control over the marihua

na . He points out that he wa s in the
car for a short time; that the driver did not notice a ny marihuana

when Villeg as g ot in; that Villeg as responde d to Office r Santee ’s questions about the m ar i h u an a by saying he did not know what the office r wa s talking a

bout; and that neither Offic er Santee nor the driver testified that Villeg as owne d the marihua

na or pla ced it in the ca

r. The a ffirmative links in t his case inc lude the close proxi mity and ac cessibility of the
mari hu ana to Vi lle g a s, the e nc los e d s pa c e of the c ar, and

the fa c t th a t th e mari hu ana wa s in pla in view. Of fice r Santee ’s testi mo ny

th a t V il leg as wa s making furtive attempts to concea l the marihuana is another a ffirmative link tending to e stablish Villeg as’s knowledg e and control of the marihua na.6

See A rmstrong , 82 S.W .3d at 449. Finally , the driver ’s testimony that no one else had used the car that day and that ther e wa s no marihuana in the car befor e he picked up Villeg as is circ umstantial
e vid e nc e that im

pl ica tes Ville g a s. Th e tot a lity of the c ir c ums tanc e s p re se nts so me e vid e nc e to indicate Villega s ’s knowledg e and c ontrol of the mar ihuana. See A rmstrong , 82 S.W .3d at 449. Vi e we d in

the lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the ve rd ic t, t

he c omb ine d f

or c e of the e vid e nc e in t

his c a se would have a llowed a r ational juror to find the le g al eleme n t s o f marihuana possession bey ond a
rea sonable doubt. Having f ound the evidenc e leg ally sufficie nt to supp o rt the conviction, we
overr ule Villeg as’s sec ond issue. As with his leg al s ufficie ncy point, Villeg as bases much of his fa ctual insuffic iency arg ument o nth e in a

b il it y o f e it h e r O f f ic e r Sa n te e o r th e dr iv e r

to te s ti f y d e f in it iv e ly th a t V il le g as
ow ne d th e mari hu ana , k

ne w o f i ts e xiste nc e , or pla c e d it in the c ar. I n a dd iti on , V ill e g a s p oin ts t o the fa c t th a t O ff

ic e r S ante e did

no t me nti on

that he saw Vil le g a s tr

yingto c on c e a l th e mari hu ana wi th his leg s in the police re port. Villeg as conte nds tha t t h i s d i s cre pancy rende rs Off

icer Santee’ s testimony “inher ently

unreliable .” F inally , Villegas ar gues that Off icer Santee’ s testimony

that Villeg as wa s “in possession” of the ma rihuana was a n improper leg al conc lusion by a non-e x pert witness. See Tex. R. Evi d. 701; Gr os s v. S tate , 730 S.W .2d 104, 106 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1987, no pet.). Viewingthe evidence neutrally , there is evidenc e of Villeg as’s c lose proxim ity to the marihuana ; the driver te stified that no one had been in the car or use d it that day and no mar ihuana was in the c ar be fore he picke d up Villeg as; and O ff icer Santee testified a

bout Villega s’s furtive attempts to conce al the mar ihauna. Villeg as points to no authority standing for the proposition thatVilleg as’s race is not at issue beca use the va lidity

of a Batson challeng e does not de pend 2 on the exis tence of rac ial identity betwee n the defe ndant and the venire member. Se e Me ad v . S tate , 8 1 9 S
. W
. 2 d

8 6 9 , 8 7 0 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 1 ) ( ci t i n g Po we rs v . O hio , 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991)). 7 an omission in a police repor t w ill re nder an office r’s testimony “inher ently unreliable ” as a matter of law. This is a matter of w itness cre dibilit y , which is solely in the province of the jury. See J ones
v . S tat e , 944 S.W .2d 642, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Furthe rmore, V illega s’s point that Office r Santee of fer ed improper

leg al conc lusions is irrele vant bec ause both rig htly and wr ong ly

admitted evidenc e may be considered unde r a f actua l sufficienc y

revie w. Se e Cam ar ill o , 82 S.W .3d at 537. After revie wing all of the e vidence in a neutra l lig ht, w e find that the evidenc e is fac tually sufficie nt
and a jur y wo uld be ratio na lly

jus tif ie d in fi ndin g guil t be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. We ov e rr

ule Villeg as’s third issue.
Batson Cha lle nge s

I n h is f ir st i ssu e , V ill e g a s arg ues th a t th e State wa s r a c ia lly dis c ri min a tor

y in i ts
e xer c ise of pe re mpt or

y c ha lle ng e s and

the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in ov e rr uli nghis Batson challeng es. See U.S. Const. amend. XI V; Batson v. Kentuck y , 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Af ter Vill ega s o b

j ected to the State’s use of pere mptory challeng es t o strike t he only three Afric an-A merica n males on t he venir e panel, the prosec utor was plac ed under oath by the t rial j udg e for

direc t examination by

Villeg as’s 2 attorney . The prose cutor testified that two of the venire members we re str u ck fo r demeanor a nd y outh r ea s o n s , whi le the third wa s struck for lack of competenc e and a g e re asons. The tria l court
overr u l ed all three Batson challeng es, allowing the strikes to stand. We must decide whe ther the8

prosec utor offe red le g itimate r ace -neutra l r easons for e ach strike , and, if so, whe ther the tria l court’s decision to ac cept the pr osecutor’ s expl anations should be sustained.

We examine Batson ch al l eng es under a “c lear ly

err oneous” standa

rd of r eview,
v ie w in g th e e v id e n c e in th e li g h t mo s t f a v o r a b le to th e tr ia l c o u rt’ s r

u ling
. Gi bs on v . S

tate , 144 S
. W
. 3 d 5 3 0 , 5 3 4 ( T e x. C r i m A p p . 2 0 0 4 ); Man dujan o v . S tate , 9 6 6 S. W. 2 d

8 1 6 , 8 1 9 ( T e x. Ap p. —A us tin

19 98 , p e t. r ef’d ) (c itatio ns omi tte d) . Atr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on is c le arl y e rr on e ou s if it leaves a “def inite and firm convic tion that a mistake has bee n committed.” Va rg as v . S tate , 838 S.W .2d 552, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). I f no cle ar error is found, we must uphold the t rial cour t’s
ru lin g s, e ve n if we mig ht have we ig he d the e vid e nc e dif fe re ntl y ha d w e se rv e d a s th e tr ie r o f f a c t. Lop e z v . State , 940 S.W .2d 388, 390 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, pet. ref ’d)) . Be cause Batson
c ha lle ng e s c on c e rn

the c re dib il i t

y o f t h e p r o s e c uto r’ s r a c e -n e utr a l e xplanatio ns , g re a t de fe re nc e mus t b e gi v en t o t h e t ri al co u rt ’s ru l i n gs . Mandujano , 966 S.W .2d at 819.

A Batson challeng e is analy zed in three steps. Se e id
. a t 81 8; se e als o Hernande z v. Ne w York, 500 U. S. 352 , 364 -6 5 (19 91 ). Th e fi rs t ste p re qu ir e s the de fe nd ant t o ma ke a pr ima fa c ie
case o f rac ial discrimination. Mandujano , 966 S.W .2d at 818. This require ment can be met by minimal evidence to support a rational infe renc e that the pr osecution exercise d its perem p to r y s tr ikes in a discriminatory

manner . Id
. I f t he defenda nt makes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the p r o s e c u ti o n to g iv e a r a c e - n e u tr a l e xp la n a ti o n f o r th e s tr ik e s . Id . To be ra ce- neutra l, the prosec utor’s explanation must be cle ar, r easona bly specific , and re levant to the ca se at ha nd. Id
. If the prosec ution offer s a ra ce- neutra l rea son, the burden the n shifts ba ck to the def endant in the third9

step. Id
. He re , the de fe nd ant mus t de mon str a te that the e xplanatio n is a pr e te xt an d th e str ike is, in fac t, rac ially

motivated. Id
. Th e re vie w o f a

pr os e c uto r’ s r a c e -n e utr a l re a so n is me ant t o f oc us on the g e nu ine ne ss of the prose cutor’s motive, not the re asonable ness of the ex planation. Id
. at8 2 0 (c i t i n g Purkett v. Elem , 5 14 U. S. 7 65 , 7 69 (1 99 5) ). A “ le g iti mate re a so n” do e s no t me an a se ns ibl e re a so n; i t si mpl y
means a rea son that does not deny eq u al protec tion. Pu rk e tt , 514 U.S. at 768. The prose cutor’s
rea son does not even ha

ve to be pe rsuasive or

plausible. Id
. This focus on the prosec utor’s intent is supported by

the view t h at “[a] ruling on a Batson objection is a cr edibility deter mination.” Mandujano , 966 S.W .2d at 820 (quoting Mo rri s v . S tate , 94 0 S
. W
. 2 d 610, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). B eca

use intent is cruc ial, a discriminatory impact is not enoug h to find a Batson violation without a discriminatory

motive. See id. (c i t i n g Hernande z , 500 U.S. at 362). Th e se c on d s te p r e qu ir e s th e pr os e c uto r t o p re se nt a fa c ia lly ne utr a l and

re a so na bly specific explanation. Id
. The prosec utor cannot satisfy the second step by simply making a g ener al denial of discriminatory motive or asser ting g ood faith. Pu rk

e tt , 514 U.S. at 769. The prose cutor’s
e xplanatio n w ill be de e me d a fa c ia lly va lid , ra c e -n e utr a l r e a so n unle ss a dis c ri min a tor

y int e nt i s i n here nt in the expl anation. Hernande z , 500 U.S. at 360

. T h e s p e c if ic it y r e qu ir e me n t, in turn,
cause s a prosec utor’s g ener al statement, such as, “I didn’t like the way

he looked,” to fail under the
s ec o n d s t ep . T h e mo re s p ec i fi c st at em en t , “I d i d n ’t l i k e th e wa y h e lo o k ed b ec au s e h e h a d l o n g, unkempt hair a

nd wore both a mustache and a g oatee ,” would likely pass muster. Mandujano , 966 S
. W
. 2 d at 8 2 1 (c i t i n g Pu rk

e tt , 514 U. S. at 76 7- 70 ); se e als o Le e v . S tate , 9 4 9 S. W. 2 d 8 4 8 , 8 5 1 ( T e x. App.—Austin 1997, pet. ref ’d).I nan y ca s e, o n ce t h e p ro s ec u t o r h as o ff er ed an ex p l an at i o nfo r t h e s t ri k e a n d t h e t ri al j u d ge 3 has ruled on the Batson challeng e as a whole, the first step bec omes moot. Ma nd uja no v . S tate , 966 S
. W
. 2 d 8 1 6 , 8 1 9 ( T e x . Ap p . —

Au s t i n1 9 9 8 , p et
. re f’ d ) ( ci t i n g Rh oa de s v . S tate , 934 S.W .2d 113, 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). 10

I f the prose cutor off

ers a rac e-ne utral re as o n , the opponent of the pere mptory
c h a ll e n g e h a s th e b u r d e nto p e r s u a d e th e tr ia l c o u rt t h a t t h e p r o s e c u to r ’ s r e a s o n is , in f a c t, a p r e te xt for r acia l discrimination. See H ernandez , 500 U.S. at 359. Ob je c tiv e fa c tor s th e op po ne nt m ay us e to support a cl ai m o f p re t ex t ag ainst the prosec utor include a lack of questions or a lac k of meaning ful questions directe d to the ven i re m em b er; disparate tre atment or e x amination of other
ve nir e me mbe rs wi th t

he same or

sim ila r c ha ra c te ri sti c s a s the str ic ke n v e nir e me mbe r; fa ilure to demonstrate that a g roup trait applies to the venire member when t he reason for the strike wa s based
on a g roup bias; and the absenc e of a r ational re lationship between the rea sons for the strike a nd the
case . Ke e ton v . S

tate , 749 S.W .2d 861, 868 (T ex . C ri m . App. 1988); se e W ill iam s v . S

tate , 804 S
. W
. 2 d 9 5 , 1 0 6 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 1 ) ( ap p ro v i n g Keeton fa c tor s und e r “ c le arl y e rr on e ou s” standard of

revie w). How ever , these fa ctors ar e not deter minative upon revie w of a Batson ru l i n g; the over riding standard is still whether the trial cour

t’s decision wa s clea

rly err oneous. Vargas , 838 S.W .2d at 554. I n this case , the i ssue is whether the trial cour

t clear ly err ed in over

ruling Villeg as’s Batson challeng es to the prosec ution’s use of three strikes ag ainst the only three Afric an-A merica

n males on the venire panel. At the first step of the Batson te st, it s e e ms l ike ly that a pr ima fa c ie c a se is established when a ll Africa n-Amer i ca n m al es ar e struck f rom the venire
. See Y

arborough v. 3 Sta te , 947 S.W .2d 892, 904 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (collec ting c ases)
.11 I n the second step, the prosec ution was requir ed to pre sent a ra ce- neutra l rea son for
eac h strike. To justify

the strike of the first v enire member, the prosec utor explained that her impression was that Eric Hay wood slouched the whole time, was not intere sted in be ing the re, a nd did not make ey e con t ac t wi th the prosec utor. The pr osecutor r elated that another pr osecutor ha d
a lso fo un d H ay

wo od to b e a vo idi nge y e con ta c t. M or e ov e r, the oth e r p ro se c uto r a pp are ntl y sa id Hay wood looked a n gry

and had his a

rms crosse d. The prose cutor c ommented to the cour t that be c a us e of “ his ho sti le de me ano r, c ou ple d with his y ou th, we fe lt that he wo uld be a ho sti le jur or in this case a

nd that’s why

we struc k him.” For

venire member A llen Warren, the prosec utor’s testimony was much the same. The prosec utor found that Warren “ was ve ry hostile towards me a

nd my entire pr esentation.” This host i l i t y , “c o u p l ed with his y outh, is why we struc k him,” the prosec utor said.

As fo r t he thi rd ve nir e me mbe r, Da rs c he Re e se , th e pr os e c uto r e xpla ine d th a t Re e se was stricke n “bec ause he indicated on his juror que stionnaire that he lived in a c ounty that he did not liv e in. ” Th is m ist a ke wa s c or re c te d b y the c ourt

duri ngvo ir

dir e , b ut t

he pr os e c uto r e xpla ine d to the cour t that she considered the mistake “possibly dece ptive” or “neg lige nt” and that she did not fee l Reese w ould be a c ompetent juror. The p r o s e c utor also expressed conc ern a

bout the venire member’ s ag e. Th e pr os e c uto r’ s e xplanatio ns of e a c h s tr ike do no t di sc lo se any inh e re ntl y discriminatory

intent, and the explanations are rea sonably specific
. See M

andujano , 966 S.W .2d at 820. This Court has re cog nized elsewher e that deme anor- related re asons for pe remptory challeng es must b e ex am i n ed wi th “a he althy skepticism.” W

oo ds v . S tate , 8 0 1 S. W. 2 d

9 3 2 , 9 3 7 ( T e x.12

Ap p . — Au s t i n 1 9 9 0 , p et
. re f’ d ) ( qu o t i n g Da nie ls v . S tate , 768 S.W .2d 314, 317 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1 9 8 8 , p e t. r e f

’ d ) )
. N o n e th e le s s , h o s ti le d e me an o r s s im il ar to th e o n e s p r e s e n te d

in th is c a s e h ave been he ld to be rac e-ne utral. See Y arborough , 947 S.W .2d at 896. I n addition, juror mistake and age h av e also been dete rmined to be ra ce- neutra l in severa l appellate c ourt dec isions. S e e, e .g. , Sa tte rwh itev . S

tate , 8 58 S.W. 2d

41 2, 42 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ) (f a ilure to fi ll o ut j ur or

c ard va lid
rea son for strike) ; Br own v . S tate , 960 S.W .2d 265, 269 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.) (ag e valid re ason for

strike) (c ollecting case s). After the prosec utor prese nted leg itimate rac e-ne utral r ea s ons for the State’ s pere mptory

challeng es, the burden s hifted bac k to Villega s in the third step. Here , Villeg as fa iled to car ry his burden bec ause he did not present evide nce t h at the prosec utor’s explanations were prete x ts for ra cial discrimination. Villeg as’s pretext argument relies mainly on the prosec utor’s lac k of qu e sti on s to the thr e e ve nir e me mbe rs , wh ich is of sli g ht s ig nif

ic anc e in t

his c a se . V ill e g a s d id not show, for ex ample, that the prosecutor di sparately treated or que stioned non-Afr ican- Americ an venire members who wer e also exhibi ting hostile body lang uag e. See, e .g. , Miller-El v. Dre tke , 125 S. Ct . 2317, 2325 (2005) ( discussing importa nce of side-by -side compa

risons in showing pur

poseful
rac ial discrimination).

Over all, Villeg as fa i l s t o show any thing in the r ecor d that would contra dict the prosec utor’s ra ce- neutra l explanations and prove prete x t in fac t. Villeg as may have disbe lieved the prosec utor’s asser

tions that venire members Hay wood and Warren wer e hostile or that R ee s e w as incompetent, but simple disbelief is not enoug h to show a pre text on the par t of the prose cutor. See Mandujano , 966 S.W .2d at 821. Moreove r, this C o u rt has re cog nized that “evaluation of the13

prosec utor’s state of mind ba sed on demea nor and cre dibilit y lies ‘pec uliarly within a trial judg e’s province .’” Id
. at 8 1 9 (q u o t i n g Hernande z , 500 U.S. at 365). We find that the prosec utor offe red le g itimate, rac e-ne utral re asons f o r each pe re mpt or

y c ha lle ng e and

that Vill e g a s fa ile d to mee t his b ur de n to sh ow the se re a so ns to b e pr e te xts for r acia l discrimination. The decision of t he trial judge doe s not leave us with the f irm conviction that a mistake ha s been c ommitt ed. We over rule Villeg as’s fir st issue.
CO NC LU SION The e vidence of marihuana possession w as leg ally and fac tually sufficie nt to support Vi lle g a s’ s convic tio n. Th e tr ia l court did no t c le arl y

e rr in o ve rr uli ngVi lle g a s’ s Batson c ha lle ng e s. Havingoverr

uled all of Villeg as’s thre e issues, we aff irm the conviction.

B e a Ann Sm ith Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pemberton Affir med Filed: Oc tober 20, 2005 Do No t Pu

bli sh