Filed 10/17/22 Galicia v. Izaguirre CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

GUADALUPE GALICIA,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL IZAGUIRRE,

Defendant and Respondent.

B316092

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 19WHPT00465)

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, May Santos, Temporary Judge. Affirmed.

Guadalupe Galicia, in pro. per.; and Robert Smith for 

Plaintiff and Appellant. 

No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.

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2

Guadalupe Galicia (mother) appeals from a judgment 

following trial regarding child custody, visitation, and child 

support for her daughter, H., with Michael Izaguirre (father). 

Mother contends that the trial court committed evidentiary 

and procedural errors at trial, but we conclude mother has failed 

to show prejudice from any of these alleged errors. Mother also 

challenges the trial court’s visitation order, but we conclude the 

order, which divided visitation equally between mother and 

father, was within the bounds of the trial court’s wide discretion. 

Last, mother contends the trial court erred by relying on 

the representations of father’s counsel at trial regarding the 

calculations required by the statewide uniform child support 

guidelines (Fam. Code, § 4055), and by failing to make required 

findings for ordering an amount of child support different from 

the amount that is presumptively appropriate under those 

guidelines (Fam. Code, § 4056, subd. (a)(1)–(3)). We conclude 

mother has forfeited these challenges by failing to raise them 

before the trial court. 

We therefore affirm the judgment.

Background

Mother’s brief does not provide a full description of the 

procedural background of this action, and she has not provided a 

full record to this court of the proceedings before the trial court. 

Nor are we aided by father, who has not filed a respondent’s 

brief. 

Nevertheless, we can discern the following from the record 

that mother has provided to us. Mother, unrepresented by 

counsel, filed a petition under the Uniform Parentage Act, Family 

Code section 7600 et seq., in September 2019 to establish a 

parental relationship between father and H., then three months 
3

old, and sought orders regarding physical and legal custody, and 

visitation. According to the trial court docket, various 

proceedings occurred prior to the trial at issue in this appeal. 

Despite describing nothing about these earlier proceedings, 

mother provided us with a reporter’s transcript from proceedings 

on November 6, 2020, and April 19, 2021, which we summarize 

below.

I. November 6, 2020 hearing

On November 6, 2020, mother and father, each represented 

by counsel, appeared at a hearing before Commissioner May 

Santos1 to set a trial date on mother’s petition and to determine 

whether to increase father’s visitation schedule. The parties 

agreed that the issues for trial were child custody, visitation, and 

child support.2 The court set a trial date of April 19, 2021. 

At the time of that hearing, it appears that mother had 

physical custody of H., except for when father had custody twice a 

week from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. the following day.3 Father was 

responsible for picking up and dropping off H. at mother’s 

residence. 

At the hearing, father contended visitation was going well, 

and sought an increase in visitation and to share equally with 

1 The docket includes an entry titled “Stipulation –

Appointment of Court Commissioner.” A minute order indicates 

the parties stipulated that Commissioner Santos “may hear this 

matter as Judge Pro Tem.”

2 Mother’s petition to establish parental relationship claimed 

that Michael I. was H.’s father, and the record before us indicates 

there is no current dispute as to father’s parental status.

3 According to the transcript of the November 6 hearing, the 

court had established that visitation schedule on September 10, 

2020.
4

mother in transportation duties. Mother sought a decrease in 

father’s visitation, contending father had failed to adequately 

care for H. while in his custody. Following brief testimony from 

mother and father and argument from counsel, the court initially 

decided not to make any changes to the existing visitation 

arrangement. 

Later during the hearing, the court reconsidered father’s 

visitation schedule. Father explained that he traveled from 

Apple Valley to Norwalk to drop off H. with mother and that the 

existing schedule interfered with H.’s naps and meals. To 

accommodate those concerns, the court extended father’s 

visitation schedule by two hours to allow a drop-off at 7:00 p.m. 

instead of 5:00 p.m. 

The court also amended the existing transportation 

arrangements. Whereas father had been responsible for both 

pick-up and drop-off at mother’s residence, the court ordered 

mother to meet father halfway between their residences for dropoff. The court found this would allow father to spend more time 

at home with H.

Child support was also discussed at the hearing. It appears 

that prior to the hearing, mother paid father monthly child 

support of $157. It further appears that the court had previously 

ordered father to file an income and expense declaration along 

with copies of pay stubs for the prior two months, but that as of 

the November 6 hearing father had failed to do so.4 The court 

therefore ordered father, then unemployed, to file an income and 

4 Mother appears to have filed an income and expense 

declaration on July 20, 2020. It is not included with mother’s 

appendix.
5

expense declaration, tax returns for the past two years, and 

evidence of his efforts to find employment. 

The court also discussed father’s prior employment and his 

current unsuccessful efforts to find work. The court concluded it 

would impute income to father based on his former employment

and prepare a DissoMaster5 report to determine an appropriate 

level of child support. The report is not in the record. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, mother’s counsel asked, 

“Support is zero?” The court responded, “Yes. I’m not going to 

change support right now.”6

II. April 19, 2021 trial

A. Preliminary matters

The court held trial on April 19, 2021. Mother and father 

appeared and were represented by counsel. At the start of trial, 

the court noted receipt of mother’s trial brief and exhibit list and

that father had not filed either one.

Mother’s trial brief asserted that father’s visitation should 

be reduced and that he should not have joint legal custody of H. 

because he was failing to meet her basic needs. Regarding child 

support, mother’s trial brief stated that “[i]f the court is inclined 

to deal with support, it can be dealt with at trial.” 

Prior to testimony, the court identified three issues for 

trial—child custody, visitation, and child support. Although 

5 DissoMaster is computer software used by the courts and 

parties in family law proceedings to determine child support in 

accordance with statutory guidelines. 

6 While the court’s statement suggests it declined to change 

mother’s child support at the hearing, the transcript from the 

April 19, 2021 trial indicates that at the November 6, 2020 

hearing, the court decreased mother’s monthly child support from 

$157 to $0.
6

mother’s trial brief acknowledged that child support could be 

addressed at trial, mother’s counsel responded that he believed 

trial was limited to child custody and visitation because the court 

had already determined child support earlier in proceedings. The 

court responded that it had yet to receive father’s income and 

expense declaration or tax returns, but that “since child support 

is not an issue, I won’t be addressing that today.”

Father’s counsel promptly objected, noting the absence of 

any “waiver of the issue of the child support at the last hearing, 

given that the parties were—my client was not employed, and he 

got employment in January. I thought the issue of support is 

always going to be an issue at trial, and that was the guideline 

issue.” Father’s counsel further informed the court that he had 

father’s current income and expense declaration with him, had 

“mailed in” the declaration to the court the week before, and had 

exchanged it with mother’s counsel. Father’s counsel concluded 

by stating that child support was a “guideline support issue. 

Once we figure out what the custodial time is, we run the 

numbers. I don’t have a problem with ordering guideline.” The 

court responded, “Let’s conduct the trial as to custody and 

visitation then.”

B. Mother’s testimony

Mother testified that father had missed six visits with H. 

that year and was late to drop off H. on several occasions. On 

December 28, 2020, father was five hours late; on February 1, 

2021, father’s mother (who dropped off H. on that date) was 30 

minutes late; and on March 29, 2021, father was ten minutes 

late. Mother claimed that father never gave her advance notice 

when he was going to be late.
7

On cross-examination, mother acknowledged father missed 

only six visits in the 15 months since the court first ordered 

visitation in February 2020, and that he had given mother 

advance notice—albeit short notice on some occasions—each 

time. Mother also agreed that on December 28, 2020, when 

father was five hours late, he called mother 20 minutes before the 

drop-off time to notify her he would be late, and that the parties 

spoke again at about 10:15 p.m. to discuss father’s anticipated 

arrival time. She further admitted that traffic reports from that 

day showed at least a two-hour traffic delay.

Mother also testified H. was often dirty and had rashes and 

bruises following visits with father. According to mother, H. 

never developed rashes or bruises while under her care. Mother 

also testified that father’s mother and brother smoked, that H.’s 

doctor had advised mother to keep H. away from allergens such 

as smoke, and that H. had been sick five times in the prior three 

months.

According to mother, H. would often cry and push away 

from father when he picked up H. from mother’s residence. But 

mother admitted not being able to see H.’s demeanor once she 

was in father’s car.

Mother also explained why she claimed father did not 

adequately care for H.’s medical needs. In December 2020, for 

example, father informed mother he could not find an available 

doctor in Victorville (where father lived at the time of trial) who 

accepted H.’s health insurance, and that H. had to see a doctor in 

Norwalk (where mother lives) to address H.’s cold and cough. 

Mother testified that even after she gave father contact 

information for H.’s pediatrician, father did not arrange a doctor’s 

appointment for H. Mother then had to leave work to schedule 
8

the doctor’s appointment, and although both parents attended 

the doctor’s appointment, mother paid the out-of-pocket costs for 

the visit.

Mother also described an instance involving an allergy 

medication for H. When father arrived to pick up H. on March 

17, 2021, mother gave him allergy medication that had recently 

been prescribed for H. Father returned H. the following day but 

forgot to return the medication. Mother then had to take H. to a 

doctor’s appointment and pay additional costs to obtain 

replacement medication. Following a visit several days later, 

father returned the medication unopened to mother.

Last, mother complained that H., then almost two years 

old, had started using curse words. Mother, who lived with her 

parents and two older brothers, denied cursing around H.7

C. Father’s testimony

Father’s testimony primarily focused on rebutting mother’s 

claims. For example, he explained that he was late to drop off H. 

on December 28, 2020, because it was snowing on the Cajon Pass. 

Father also explained that he missed visits on January 10 and 

April 14, 2021, because he was sick, and gave mother advance 

notice both times. He missed visits on February 7, April 4, and 

April 11, 2021, because he was unable to arrange transportation, 

and gave mother advance notice each time. And he missed a visit 

on March 10, 2021, because of car trouble and snow on the Cajon 

Pass, and again gave mother advance notice.

Father also addressed mother’s testimony regarding H.’s 

health care. Regarding the December 2020 doctor’s visit, father 

explained that he took H. to urgent care because of H.’s cold and 

7 At the time of trial, mother’s family cared for daughter 

when mother was at work.
9

cough, but that the urgent care would not accept H.’s health 

insurance. Father also explained that he did not give H. her 

allergy medication during her March 17, 2021 visit because H. 

was sick, he was focused on treating her fever, and he did not 

clearly understand the instructions for the allergy medication.

8

Like mother, father testified that when he received H. from 

mother, H. often had rashes, scratches, bruises, dirty hair, and a 

dirty diaper. He explained he always made sure to give H. a 

clean diaper, feed her, and treat any rash before returning her to 

mother. Father also testified that his mother and brother did not 

smoke around H.

Regarding mother’s claim that H. appeared unhappy when 

father picked her up, father testified H. cheered up quickly 

during his visits and that she was also happy to be with father’s 

family. Father denied using curse words around H.

Father also testified that he was currently employed and 

that his mother or sister could care for H. if he was at work 

during H.’s visit. Moreover, because H. was asleep for most of 

father’s shift, his work schedule did not interfere with his visits

with H. Father also confirmed that H. was eligible for medical 

insurance through his employment.

8 Father testified that he contacted the office of H.’s 

pediatrician to get information about the allergy medication. 

According to father, the pediatrician’s office informed him that 

the medication was a five-week treatment. Mother’s counsel 

moved to strike father’s testimony, arguing it was hearsay. The 

court denied the motion, noting it had allowed mother “to talk 

about what the prescription was and what [father] was supposed 

to be giving her,” and that it would therefore give father “a little 

bit of leeway.”
10

Regarding transportation, father requested that the parties 

equally share pick-up and drop-off duties. He testified it would 

be easier to have mother pick up H. from his house, in case he 

does not have an available vehicle or is working.

D. Court’s ruling and subsequent judgment

Following testimony and argument from counsel, the court 

ordered joint legal and physical custody of H. The court 

emphasized that father was employed, had acted responsibly by 

notifying mother if he was unable to visit H., and could more 

easily coordinate medical care for H. now that he had medical 

insurance. The court also explained that it was not persuaded 

father was to blame for H.’s rashes or illnesses.

Finding H. was in no “higher danger” with father than she 

was with mother, the court rejected mother’s request to limit 

father’s visitation to 20 or 25 percent. The court concluded it 

would be in H.’s best interest to equally divide visitation between 

father and mother.

9 The court also ordered each parent to pick 

up H. from the other parent’s residence, to share the 

transportation burden and alleviate mother’s concerns with 

father being late. 

After resolving visitation, father’s counsel asked the court if 

it wanted the parties to “go out and do a DissoMaster or does the 

court want to set a date?” Mother’s counsel objected, stating, “It’s 

not an issue today,” and that “if [father] wants to seek support, 

he can do it on a later date.” The court disagreed, stating, “This 

is trial, and that was one of the trial issues. Custody, visitation, 

9 Under the new visitation schedule, H. would be with 

mother from 10:00 a.m. on Monday to 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, 

with father from 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday to 10:00 a.m. on 

Friday, and alternate weekend visits.
11

and child support. Go out in the hallway and use the 

DissoMaster.”

After a brief recess, father’s counsel described his child 

support calculations, which resulted in mother paying $349 in

monthly child support to father. The transcript does not clearly 

indicate if the court had a copy of the DissoMaster report after 

the recess, but the court’s minute order indicates it did.

10

Mother’s counsel did not object to that calculation or offer 

any competing calculations or figures. Instead, he requested that 

mother’s income be reduced for purposes of calculating child 

support because mother would lose a day of work due to the new 

transportation arrangement. In response, the court reduced 

mother’s monthly child support payment to $300.11

Mother’s counsel then noted that “at the last hearing, we 

were told support would not be at issue. And so we’re coming 

here today, and they haven’t filed an income and expense 

declaration. I mean, we didn’t file one for that reason. So I think 

this procedure is unfair.”

The court again rejected mother’s argument, noting that at 

the prior hearing it “was told that this was for custody, visitation, 

and child support. . . . This was for trial . . . on those issues.” 

10 The minute order states that “[t]he Court, after reviewing 

the dissomaster and hearing oral argument, finds and rules as 

follows: Petitioner/Mother is ordered to pay to the 

Respondent/Father as and for child support for the minor child 

the sum of $300.00 per month . . . .”

11 Mother included with her appendix a DissoMaster 

calculation that was initially filed on April 19, 2021. It includes 

handwriting stating “$300—Court’s order; 1st $150, 15th $150; 

effective 5-1-2021 mom pay dad,” and includes a stamp with 

Commissioner Santos’s name and the date May 19, 2021.
12

The court further noted that both parties had been “reluctant to 

update their [income and expense declarations]. So now that we 

have them, rather than have another case filed to determine child 

support, here we are.” Mother’s counsel responded, “Submitted.”

The court entered judgment on July 23, 2021, consistent 

with its ruling at the April trial. Regarding child support, the 

judgment incorporated an attached DissoMaster report 

consistent with the one described by father’s counsel at the April 

2021 trial.

Discussion

Mother raises several issues in her appeal. She contends 

the trial court (1) made evidentiary errors at trial, primarily by 

allowing father’s counsel to ask leading questions; (2) committed 

procedural errors at trial, including unfairly limiting her 

presentation of evidence; (3) erred by granting father equal 

visitation with H.; and (4) committed procedural errors in 

granting child support. Regarding this last contention, mother 

argues the court mistakenly relied on the representations of 

father’s counsel at trial regarding the child support guideline 

calculations, and failed to make required findings supporting its

reduction of mother’s monthly child support from $349 to $300.

I. Applicable law and standards of review

Mother filed her action under the Uniform Parentage Act 

(UPA). (See Fam. Code, § 7600, et seq.12) In a UPA proceeding, 

the court may issue a judgment concerning child custody, child 

support, visitation, “or any other matter in the best interest of 

the child.” (§ 7637.) “Under California’s statutory scheme 

governing child custody and visitation determinations, the 

12 All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to 

the Family Code.
13

overarching concern is the best interest of the child.” 

(Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 255.) 

Custody and visitation determinations under the UPA are 

governed in part by section 3020, et seq. (§ 3021, subd. (f).) 

When making custody and visitation orders, a court’s “primary 

concern” is to ensure “the health, safety, and welfare of children.” 

(§ 3020, subd. (a).) Unless doing so is contrary to a child’s best 

interests, a court must also ensure that “children have frequent 

and continuing contact with both parents” after the parents have 

ended their relationship. (§ 3020, subd. (b).) Subject to these and 

other relevant considerations, a trial court has “the widest 

discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of 

the child . . . .” (§ 3040, subd. (d); In re Sofia M. (2018) 24 

Cal.App.5th 1038, 1044 [trial court is vested with “ ‘wide 

discretion’ ” in making custody and visitation orders].) 

“The standard of appellate review of custody and visitation 

orders is the deferential abuse of discretion test.” (In re Marriage 

of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 32.) “The precise measure is 

whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the 

order in question advanced the ‘best interest’ of the child.” (Ibid.) 

“We are required to uphold the ruling if it is correct on any basis, 

regardless of whether such basis was actually invoked.” (Ibid.) 

We “apply the substantial evidence standard to the court’s factual 

findings” in support of custody and visitation orders. (In re 

Marriage of Fajota (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497.)

Court-ordered child support is determined by statewide 

uniform guidelines. (§§ 4050–4077.) Section 4053 identifies 

several principles that courts shall adhere to in implementing the 

statewide uniform guideline, including that “[a] parent’s first and 

principal obligation is to support the parent’s minor children 
14

according to the parent’s circumstances and station in life” 

(§ 4053, subd. (a)), that “[b]oth parents are mutually responsible 

for the support of their children” (§ 4053, subd. (b)), that the 

“guideline takes into account each parent’s actual income and 

level of responsibility for the children” (§ 4053, subd. (c)), and 

that “[e]ach parent should pay for the support of the children 

according to the parent’s ability” (§ 4053, subd. (d)).

Section 4055 sets forth a mathematical formula for 

determining the appropriate amount of child support based on 

both parents’ incomes.13 (See § 4055, subds. (a), (b).) The 

support amount determined by the guidelines is “presumptively 

correct in all cases,” and “only under special circumstances 

should child support orders fall below the child support mandated 

by the guideline formula.” (§ 4053, subd. (k); see also § 4057, 

subd. (a) [“The amount of child support established by the 

formula provided in subdivision (a) of Section 4055 is presumed 

to be the correct amount of child support to be ordered.”].) 

When a court departs from the guideline formula for child 

support, it “shall state, in writing or on the record,” the “amount 

of support that would have been ordered under the guideline 

formula” (§ 4056, subd. (a)(1)), the “reasons the amount of 

support ordered differs from the guideline formula amount”

(§ 4056, subd. (a)(2)), and the “reasons the amount of support 

ordered is consistent with the best interests of the children” 

(§ 4056, subd. (a)(3)).

13 Because the calculation required by that section “involves, 

literally, an algebraic formula,” trial courts may use a computer 

program called DissoMaster to accomplish the child support 

calculation pursuant to the guidelines. (In re Marriage of Schulze

(1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 519, 523–524, fn. 2.)
15

“A trial court child support order is reviewed under the 

abuse of discretion standard of review, and the trial court’s 

findings of fact in connection with a child support order under the 

substantial evidence standard of review.” (In re Marriage of 

Zimmerman (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, 906.) Even so, we are 

mindful that “ ‘determination of a child support obligation is a 

highly regulated area of the law, and the only discretion a trial 

court possesses is the discretion provided by statute or rule.’ ” (In 

re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 283.)

“We apply the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing 

the trial court’s rulings on evidentiary objections.” (Twenty-Nine 

Palms Enterprises Corp. v. Bardos (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1435, 

1447.) “[A]n erroneous evidentiary ruling requires reversal only 

if ‘there is a reasonable probability that a result more favorable 

to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of 

the error.’ ” (Id. at p. 1449.)

Finally, a “judgment or order of a lower court is presumed 

to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions 

are indulged in favor of its correctness.” (In re Marriage of 

Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133; Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 218 

Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408 [“An appealed judgment is presumed 

correct, and the appellant must affirmatively demonstrate 

error.”].)

II. Evidentiary rulings

Mother first challenges several of the court’s evidentiary 

rulings. She contends the court erred by allowing father’s 

counsel to ask certain leading questions at trial. She also 

contends the court unfairly admitted hearsay evidence introduced 

by father regarding his conversation with H.’s doctor’s office, but 

excluded similar evidence she attempted to introduce.
16

We have reviewed the trial transcript and are not 

persuaded that reversal of the judgment is warranted because of 

any allegedly incorrect evidentiary rulings. We disagree with 

mother’s contention that the “whole trial” was characterized by 

impermissible leading questions by father’s counsel. Although 

mother identifies several exchanges between father and his 

counsel involving allegedly leading questions, based on our 

review of the transcript they fall well short of constituting the 

“whole trial.” 

Furthermore, mother did not object to some of the 

questions she now appears to contend were impermissibly 

leading. That failure to object resulted in a forfeiture of her 

ability to challenge such evidence on appeal. (Crouch v. Trinity 

Christian Center of Santa Ana, Inc. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 995, 

1020 [“The failure to object or move to strike evidence at trial 

forfeits any challenge to the evidence on appeal.”].) 

Last, with respect to those evidentiary rulings to which 

mother did object, mother has not demonstrated, and we are not 

convinced—even assuming the trial court erred—that there is a 

reasonable probability the court would have reached a result 

more favorable to her regarding custody, visitation, or child 

support in the absence of the alleged errors. (Twenty-Nine Palms 

Enterprises Corp. v. Bardos, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1449; 

see also Evid. Code, §§ 353, 354.) 

III. Procedural fairness

Next, mother complains that certain aspects of trial were 

procedurally unfair. She contends the court unfairly reminded 

her counsel to be “brief” in the presentation of mother’s rebuttal 

testimony; interrupted her counsel’s closing argument by asking 

him to place his mask over his nose; and failed to clearly identify 
17

whether certain photographs offered by mother were admitted as 

exhibits.

As with mother’s arguments regarding the trial court’s 

allegedly improper evidentiary rulings, she fails to demonstrate 

how these alleged procedural errors caused her prejudice. (See 

Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [“No judgment shall be set aside . . . for 

any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an 

examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court 

shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted 

in a miscarriage of justice”]; Waller v. TJD, Inc. (1993) 12 

Cal.App.4th 830, 833 [“Prejudice is not presumed, and the burden 

is on the appealing party to demonstrate that a miscarriage of 

justice occurred.”].) 

For example, mother fails to identify any rebuttal 

testimony she was prevented from presenting notwithstanding 

the court’s request that her counsel be “brief.” Mother likewise 

fails to identify what her counsel was prevented from arguing in 

his closing statement as a result of the court’s minor interruption 

regarding his mask. Mother also failed to provide us with any of 

the trial exhibits, let alone those exhibits she is concerned may 

not have been admitted or considered by the trial court. In any 

event, it appears from the transcript that the court identified and 

described the photographs mother sought to introduce as 

exhibits, and then entered them all as a single exhibit without 

objection by her counsel.
18

In short, we are not persuaded that any of the alleged 

procedural errors mother complains of resulted in prejudice and 

warrants reversal of the judgment.14

IV. Visitation schedule

Next, it appears mother challenges the court’s visitation 

order. She contends the court erred by dividing visitation equally 

between both parents because H. is young, mother and father live 

far apart, father had a history of missing and being late for visits, 

and father did not adequately care for H.

We conclude the trial court’s visitation order was not an 

abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th 

at p. 32.) The court’s order divided visitation equally between 

father and mother consistent with the Family Code preference for 

ensuring that children have “frequent and continuing contact 

with both parents.” (§ 3020, subd. (b).) Nor are we persuaded a 

different visitation order was required by evidence that father 

had been late or missed visits in the past. Father provided

reasonable explanations for those occasions when he missed or 

was late to visits and acted responsibly by ordinarily giving 

14 We disagree with mother that Elkins v. Superior Court

(2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337 (Elkins), supports her argument that the 

trial court conducted an unfair trial. In Elkins, our Supreme 

Court held that a trial court’s application of a local rule and order 

calling for the admission of declarations in lieu of direct 

testimony at a marital dissolution trial conflicted with the 

hearsay rule. (Id. at pp. 1344, 1359–1360.) The trial court’s 

application of that rule and order resulted in it excluding 34 of 36 

exhibits offered by one of the parties. (Id. at pp. 1344–1345.) By 

contrast, mother and father testified at trial under oath subject to 

cross-examination, and mother fails to identify any exhibits or 

evidence she was prevented from offering at trial.
19

mother advance notice. Additionally, by requiring the receiving 

parent to pick up H. at the other parent’s residence, the court 

minimized the potential disruption to H. if a receiving parent is 

late. 

The record also supports the conclusion that father 

adequately cared for H., contrary to mother’s claim. Among other 

things, the court found that father was not solely to blame for 

H.’s illnesses or rashes, could more easily coordinate medical care 

for H. because she would be covered by his medical insurance, 

and that H. was not in “any higher danger with [father] than she 

is with [mother].” Father also testified that H. was happy to be 

with him and his family during their visits. 

Although we are sympathetic to mother’s concern that H. is 

young and that travel between the parents’ residences may be 

disruptive, mother fails to explain how those considerations make 

the visitation order detrimental to H.’s “health, safety, and 

welfare” or outweigh the legislative preference for “frequent and 

continuing contact with both parents.” (§ 3020, subds. (a), (b).) 

Nor does mother adequately explain how those factors render the 

trial court’s visitation order, well-supported by the record, an 

abuse of discretion. 

V. Child support order

Mother raises two challenges to the trial court’s child 

support order. She contends the court impermissibly relied on 

the calculations of father’s counsel regarding appropriate child 

support. She also contends the court departed from the uniform 

guideline formula for child support set forth in section 4055 

without making findings required by section 4056. We conclude 

that reversal of the judgment is not warranted for either reason.
20

As noted, after a brief recess near the conclusion of trial to 

allow the parties to calculate child support under the guideline 

formula, the court adopted the representations of father’s counsel 

regarding the amount of support required by the guidelines. 

Mother contends reversal of the judgment is required because the 

trial court lacked authority to adopt father’s representations at 

trial regarding the guideline formula calculation.

We disagree. Even assuming the court accepted the 

representations of father’s counsel at trial regarding the amount 

of child support required by the guideline formula,15 father filed 

both his income and expense declaration and DissoMaster report 

the same day trial concluded. The court did not enter judgment 

until July 23, 2021, more than three months after trial. Hence, 

even if the court did not have the DissoMaster report at trial, we 

presume the court reviewed the parties’ income and expense 

declarations and the DissoMaster report prior to entering 

judgment and did not simply rely on the representations of 

father’s counsel at trial regarding appropriate child support 

under the guidelines. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux, supra, 51 

Cal.3d at p. 1133 [lower court judgment “presumed to be correct 

on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in 

favor of its correctness.”].)

Furthermore, despite the opportunity to object, mother did 

not challenge any of the figures supporting the guideline formula 

calculation, or the guideline calculation itself. At trial, the court 

instructed both parties to “go out in the hallway and use the 

DissoMaster” and return with their calculations. After that 

15 As noted earlier, the court’s minute order suggests the 

court had a copy of the DissoMaster report prepared by father’s 

counsel following the recess.
21

recess, mother’s counsel failed to challenge any of the guideline 

figures or calculations identified by father’s counsel or offer any 

competing guideline figures or calculations. Nor does the record 

indicate that mother challenged those guideline figures or 

calculations during the more than three-month period between 

when father filed his income and expense declaration and 

DissoMaster report, and the court’s subsequent entry of 

judgment.16

In these circumstances, we conclude mother has forfeited 

any challenge to the figures or calculations underlying the court’s 

child support order. (In re Marriage of Hinman (1997) 55 

Cal.App.4th 988, 1002 [failure to raise challenges to child support 

calculations waives right “to challenge the computation of the 

child support award on appeal”]; In re Marriage of Whealon

(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 132, 144 [“[T]o conserve judicial resources, 

any errors [in child support calculations] must be brought to the 

trial court’s attention at the trial level while the error can still be 

expeditiously corrected.”].) 

We similarly reject mother’s contention that reversal of the 

judgment is warranted because the trial court failed to state in 

writing or on the record the information required for departing 

from the guideline formula in determining child support for H. 

(See § 4056, subd. (a)(1)–(3).) 

16 For this same reason, we reject mother’s suggestion that 

she was prejudiced by father’s failure to file his income and 

expense declaration until after trial. The trial transcript 

indicates that even though father did not file his income and 

expense declaration until after trial, he provided it to mother’s 

counsel prior to trial. Also, mother had ample time to object to or 

challenge father’s income and expense declaration prior to entry 

of judgment, but did not do so. 
22

“A trial court persuaded by the evidence that a downward 

departure from the guideline is justified because the guideline 

amount exceeds the child’s needs must comply with the 

procedural requirements” of section 4056, subdivision (a). (Y.R. 

v. A.F. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 974, 984.) Some cases have 

concluded that a trial court’s failure to provide the information 

required by section 4056, subdivision (a), warrants reversal if the 

missing information is not otherwise discernable from the record. 

(See, e.g., Y.R. v. A.F., at p. 985 [“the court’s failure to comply 

with the statute’s procedural requirements, standing alone, 

constitutes grounds for reversal of a child support order and 

remand for compliance”]; In re Marriage of Hubner (2001) 94 

Cal.App.4th 175, 183 [failure to make findings required by 

section 4056, subd. (a) “precludes effective appellate review and 

may constitute reversible error if the missing information is not 

otherwise discernible from the record”]; In re Marriage of Hall

(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 313, 318 [“[G]iven the facial noncompliance 

of the judgment with sections 4055 and 4056, the judgment must 

be reversed and remanded for further proceedings in conformity 

with those statutes.”]).

However, at least one case concluded that if a trial court 

issues a child support order that fails to supply the information 

required by section 4056, subdivision (a), a dissatisfied party may 

not “simply appeal and ask for reversal because the court has not 

supplied the necessary information when it varied from the 

guideline support formula,” but is “required to bring the missing 

information to the trial court’s attention and give it an 

opportunity to supply it.” (Rojas v. Mitchell (1996) 50 

Cal.App.4th 1445, 1451 (Rojas).) 
23

We conclude Rojas is persuasive here. The record fails to 

show that mother raised any objection to the trial court regarding 

its failure to supply the information required by section 4056, 

subdivision (a). Mother did not object after the court announced 

its child support ruling at trial. Nor did she object after trial, 

even though the court entered its judgment more than three 

months later. And mother had a further opportunity to object by 

filing a motion to vacate the judgment (see Rojas, supra, 50 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1451–1452) but did not do so. We therefore 

conclude the issue is not preserved for our review.17

17 Although we conclude mother has forfeited her challenge to 

this issue, we note that mother requested the downward 

departure from the guideline formula amount and the court 

granted her request. Mother fails to explain how she is 

prejudiced by the absence of findings supporting that departure. 

Indeed, she did not dispute the guideline figures or calculations 

described by father’s counsel at trial, and the court’s decision to 

depart from the guideline formula benefitted her, the child 

support payor, not father. (Cf. Tracy v. Tracy (1963) 213 

Cal.App.2d 359, 363 [noting “ ‘ “ ‘fundamental rule of appellate 

procedure that a judgment or order will not be disturbed on 

appeal prosecuted by a party who consented to it.’ ” ’ ”].)
24

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Mother shall bear her own costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

LAVIN, J.

ADAMS, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.