AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

A P u b l i c at i o n o f t h e A f r i c a C e n t e r f o r S t r at e g i c S t u d i e s

n o . 2 6 / A u g ust 2 0 1 3

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Mitigating Radicalism in Northern Nigeria

By Michael Olufemi Sodipo

u Boko Haram and other violent Islamist groups have been able to tap grievances over widespread 

poverty, government corruption, ethno-religious divides, and abuses by security forces to fuel a rise in 

Islamic radicalization in northern Nigeria. 

u Active engagement of youth and communities in peacebuilding programs that facilitate interactions 

among individuals of disparate backgrounds, teach values of tolerance, and promote nonviolent conflict 

resolution have been effective in diminishing prejudice and mitigating the appeal of radical ideologies.

u Countering radicalization requires a full spectrum of initiatives, including apprehending extremist 

leaders, sustained development investments in marginalized communities, promotion of values of 

inclusivity to mitigate the spread of extremist ideology, and the rehabilitation of radicalized former 

fighters. H I G H L I G H T S

Northern Nigeria has been the locus of an upsurge 

in youth radicalization and virulent militant Islamist 

groups in Nigeria since 2009. Nigeria’s ranking on 

the Global Terrorism Index rose from 16th out of 158 

countries in 2008 to 6th (tied with Somalia) by the end 

of 2011.1 There were 168 officially recorded terrorist 

attacks in 2011 alone. Bombings across the northeast 

prompted President Goodluck Jonathan in May 2013 to 

declare a state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno, and 

Yobe States. Many Nigerians have come to question 

whether the country is on the brink of a civil war.2 

Prime among the groups behind this spike in 

violence is Boko Haram, a militant Islamist sect that 

seeks to impose shariah law throughout Nigeria. An 

air of apprehension now pervades daily life in northern 

Nigeria. Many are afraid to openly mention “Boko 

Haram,” whose name has become synonymous with 

violence and destruction. The group has launched 

hundreds of coordinated attacks across the northern 

region since July 2009 that have resulted in the deaths 

of over 6,000 people and the displacement of tens of 

thousands more. Boko Haram’s targets include the 

security forces, Christians, and Muslims accused of 

cooperating with the government.3 It bribes children 

to report neighbors who are unsympathetic to the group 

and forces prisoners it frees from jail to join regardless of whether they share the group’s ideology.4

 Its 

numerous attacks have struck police stations, military 

facilities, churches, schools, beer halls, newspaper offices, and the United Nations building in the capital, 

Abuja. Ordinary citizens fear both Boko Haram and 

the state security forces, with the latter accused of human rights abuses. With each battle between security 

forces and Boko Haram insurgents, civilian casualties mount. When security forces redeploy elsewhere 

claiming to have repelled Boko Haram, the militants 

return, regroup, and seek revenge. As a result, social 

and economic activities in the northern states are diminishing markedly, communities are fracturing, and 

general anxiety is growing.
Michael Olufemi Sodipo is the Founder and Coordinator 

of the Peace Initiative Network in Kano, Nigeria. 

2

grown, signifying enhanced planning and funding. Boko 

Haram’s February 2013 kidnapping of French tourists, 

Ansaru’s killing of seven foreign construction workers 

in northern Nigeria, and the participation of fighters 

from these groups in the conflict in Mali, moreover, 

reveal their international outlook. 

Nigeria’s strategic importance to the global jihadist 

movement should not be underestimated. With a population of 167 million, 19 percent of which is aged 15-24, 

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. Its Muslim population (roughly 75 million) is the sixth largest 

worldwide. Nigeria is also Africa’s largest producer of oil 

and is home to the continent’s second largest economy. 

Nigerians have been linked to international terrorist 

plots, and jihadists from beyond Africa have sought to 

recruit in Nigeria.5

 Unless Nigeria and its partners can 

address the growing radicalization of Nigeria’s youth and 

the festering ethno-religious tensions across the country, 

many poor and marginalized northern Nigerians will 

The insurgency in northern Nigeria is a security 

concern not just for Nigeria but for the broader SubSaharan region and the international community. Boko 

Haram’s violent campaign has grown in terms of capabilities (the use of suicide bombers and improvised 

explosive devices), membership (which now includes 

foreign fighters from Chad, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia, 

and Sudan), and the formation of splinter factions. The 

most prominent of these is Ansaru (its full Arabic name 

is Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan and means 

“Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa”), which was formed in January 2012 and targets 

Westerners in Nigeria and neighboring countries. The 

frequency and sophistication of attacks have steadily 

Ni g e r ia’s Ge opo l i t i cal Re g i o ns
3

continue to gravitate toward radical Islamist groups, 

turning the north into a hub of insecurity. This, in turn, 

has security and economic implications for the broader 

region and international partners. 

Genesis of Radicalization in 

Northern Nigeria

Though violent Islamist radicalism in northern 

Nigeria has surged in the past decade, the notion of 

jihad in Nigeria has long historical roots. From 1802 

to 1812, Usman dan Fodio launched a jihad and ultimately founded the Sokoto Caliphate that spanned 

northern Nigeria and part of Niger.6 Dan Fodio’s social 

and political revolution against what he saw as the greed 

and violation of shariah law by African Muslim elites 

was widely popular. The Caliphate also represented an 

Islamic banner of resistance to colonial conquest, the 

rejection of secular government, and the regional networking of Islamic movements in Nigeria and beyond. 

In the early 1900s, the British colonists extended 

their control northward, including over the Sokoto 

Caliphate. Yet the resulting northern and southern 

protectorates of Nigeria were governed separately due 

to their cultural differences until 1914 when both were 

finally amalgamated by the British for economic reasons. 

Even after unification, north and south remained separate as the colonial system of indirect rule—governing 

the protectorates through indigenous rulers—merely 

institutionalized existing divisions. With the building 

of infrastructure—such as new railway lines—immigrant 

laborers and traders from the south settled into cantonments in most major northern cities. The effect of 

these sabon gari (“strangers’ quarters” in Hausa), was the 

concentration of southern Igbo and Yoruba Christians 

in homogenous pockets within Hausa-Fulani Muslim 

cities. This initiated a sharp indigene/settler dichotomy 

that became a powerful tool through which politicians 

mobilized supporters for narrow political motives.

The rapid growth of Islamic and Christian revivalism in the 1970s laid the foundation for contemporary 

radicalism in northern Nigeria. The puritanical tendency 

among the adherents of both religions in northern Nigeria gave rise to increasingly zealous political actors. The 

Iranian revolution of 1979, which led to the emergence 

of an Islamic government, inspired many northern Nigerian Muslims. Radical Islamist movements, such as the 

Muslim Brothers, later renamed the Islamic Movement 

in Nigeria, led by Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky of Kaduna 

State, introduced a militant pro-Iranian Shiite version 

of Islam into northern Nigeria in the 1980s. 

Meanwhile, the Maitatsine movement, which had 

been active since the early 1970s, became Nigeria’s 

first violent extremist group.7 The sect was ideologically opposed to modernization and abhorred the use 

of anything perceived as Western. The founder of the 

movement, Muhammadu Marwa, an Islamic preacher 

who migrated from Cameroon to Kano in 1945, earned 

the name Maitatsine (“he who curses” in Hausa) for his 

provocative preaching against moderate Muslims and the 

government. Maitatsine’s group harassed the established 

Islamic order and incited marginalized sections of the 

population against urban elites. The resulting outburst of 

riots that began in Kano in the summer of 1980 spread 

to other parts of northern Nigeria even after Marwa was 

killed by Nigerian security forces in December of that 

year. The riots claimed the lives of 4,177 people. The 

Maitatsine movement introduced many of the tactics 

that became common in Nigeria’s current Islamic radicalization, including the mobilization of poor communities 

against established urban Muslims, the justification of 

violence against non-Muslims, the identification with 

global Islamic movements, and the incorporation of 

global jihadist tactics into local operations. 

Nigeria’s part in the post-September 11, 2001, 

global radicalization surge is evident in various ways. 

Nigerian nationals were among the few Africans arrested in Afghanistan for allegedly fighting alongside 

the Taliban. In the months following the September 

11th attacks, 7 out of 10 boys born at a hospital in Kano 

were named Osama.8 In 2002, Osama bin Laden called 

on Muslims to rise up in rebellion in only two African 

countries: Morocco and Nigeria.9 Other occurrences 

that brought northern Nigeria’s religious radicalization 

to the attention of the world included: resistance to 

polio eradication campaigns, which were perceived as 

a Western plot to sterilize Muslims; deadly riots in 2002 

sparked by a national newspaper article making light of 

Muslims’ objection to Nigeria hosting the Miss World 

beauty pageant; and in 2006 violent protests following the publication of Danish cartoons of the Prophet 

Mohammed, which resulted in 130 deaths in Nigeria, 

more than any other country. 

Boko Haram, founded around 2002 by Mohammed 

Yusuf, is the latest incarnation of these long-running 

trends. Espousing the same goal of Islamization of Nigeria 

as earlier jihadists, Boko Haram claims that rampant 

government corruption, political exclusion, and social 
4

inequality would be remedied with adherence to Boko 

Haram’s puritanical view of Islam. It also seeks to link 

with the international jihadist network. Since 2009 

Boko Haram has surpassed the Maitatsine movement’s 

level of violent expression.

Underlying Dynamics of 

Radicalization

Radicalization is a process by which an individual 

or group adopts extreme political, social, or religious ideals that reject the status quo, undermine contemporary 

ideas regarding freedom of choice and expression, and 

condone violence to achieve ideological ends, including 

undertaking terrorist acts. It typically starts with changes 

in one’s self-identification. Grievances, frequently driven 

by personal or group concerns regarding local issues as 

well as international events, fuel this change.10 

Upon independence in 1960, mutual distrust and 

strong ethno-religious identities in both north and south 

prevented a truly pan-Nigerian identity from developing. Nigerian politics were and remain characterized by 

a keen competition for socioeconomic resources with 

the state seen as the main dispenser of these benefits. 

“This competition...encourages recourse to sectional 

identities, so much so that loyalty to ethnic communities 

takes precedence over national loyalty.”11 In the competition for allocation of political power and resources, 

ethno-religious sentiments are exploited. 

The resonance of groups like Boko Haram in northern Nigeria has much to do with the relationship between 

youth unemployment, limited economic opportunities, 

and the emergence of terrorism.12 Almajiri—poor children sent far from their homes to study Islam with a 

Koranic teacher—find themselves destitute, with little 

or no formal education, begging to survive, and often 

swept into religious clashes. In 2006, there were 1.2 

million almajiri in Kano State alone. Pervasive poverty 

is also another driver. In a country that officially earned 

approximately $50 billion in revenue from its oil reserves 

in 2012,13 70 percent of the northern population lives 

under the poverty line, and the mostly Muslim north 

has higher unemployment than the national average 

(see table).14 

Mitigating the Radicalization of 

Youth and Ethno-religious Tensions 

The Peace Club, a project of the Peace Initiative 

Network (PIN), was inaugurated in Kano on May 27, 

2006—Children’s Day in Nigeria. The Club aims to 

promote tolerance, dialogue, and understanding through 

peace education and team sports among young people 

from diverse communities and backgrounds in northern 

Nigeria—Muslims and Christians, indigenes and settlers. The Club started with 50 members (30 boys and 

20 girls) from 7 high schools in Kano. Currently, the 

Club has over 8,000 members from 60 high schools and 

colleges (with 1,625 graduates) in 4 northern states: 

Kano, Kaduna, Plateau, and Gombe.

The Club was designed to: 1) promote interaction 

between young people from disparate backgrounds to 

ease ethno-religious tensions; 2) strengthen a peaceful 

society in Nigeria; and 3) help members develop leadership, collaborative problem solving, and cross-cultural 

relationship-building skills. 

Muslim and Christian youths from diverse ethnic 

groups are trained as peer mediators and life coaches to 

encourage values of tolerance and nonviolent conflict 

resolution. Drawing on models and best practices from 

Northern Ireland and other conflict-affected societies, the mediators, coaches, and, at times, respected 

Region

Youth 

Literacy 

(%, Age 

5-16)

Primary 

School 

Attendance 

(%)

Secondary 

School 

Attendance 

(%)

Access to 

Improved 

Drinking 

Water (%)

Access to 

Improved 

Sanitation 

(%)

Small & 

Medium 

Businesses 

per 100,000

Watches 

Television 

Once a Week 

(%)

Reads a 

Newspaper 

Once a Week 

(%)

North East 18 43 24 39 28 9 19 9

North West 24 37 21 47 37 13 21 10

North Central 43 67 41 51 27 18 49 19

South West 78 79 64 73 26 20 73 21

South South 70 80 59 63 32 14 75 30

South East 66 79 58 71 41 15 52 27

Sources: Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria National Population Commission, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Survey figures for “Drinking Resources” and “Sanitation” are from 2012, all others are from 2010.

Re g i o nal Di v e r g e n c es i n Q ual i t y o f Li f e
5

community leaders teach members to question ethnic 

stereotypes and prejudices—to think and act as global 

citizens. Through organized public lectures, interschool 

programs, and summer peace camps, the Club also promotes a constructive approach to inclusion and diversity 

by embracing religious, ethnic, gender, and linguistic 

differences. This emphasis is particularly important 

since most schools in Kano are separated by gender 

and ethnicity. 

Peace Club members meet once a week. The meetings usually start with a game of sport. When inequities 

arise during a game—such as when the ball is not passed 

to the younger players or the girls—the coach interrupts 

the match. The members then put their heads together 

to think about how to change the rules of the game to 

make it fairer. They can decide, for example, that a 

goal scored by a girl counts as double. This is how the 

members learn to help one another think outside the box 

and inclusively. The effect of this approach is impressive: 

the youths often assume the role of coach themselves.

In the early days of the Club, physical altercations 

periodically broke out among members from different 

backgrounds. But fights, too, raised important opportunities, such as how to deal with differences, intercultural 

prejudices, and diverse values. Today, every dispute and 

club activity ends with a group discussion about these 

topics. In other words, there would be no learning process 

without some conflict. 

The life skills learned through the Club have empowered the young members, enhanced their psychosocial well-being, and increased their resiliency, selfesteem, teamwork, respect, and connections to others. 

Attitudes of tolerance by Peace Club members towards 

other identity groups have become the norm. Yusuf 

Ibrahim, age 17, reflected this transformation during 

a project assessment: “Before attending this program, 

I used to hate people who are Christians. But now I 

have learned through Peace Club to love and appreciate them.”

Peace Club facilitators (trained instructors drawn 

from member schools, local nongovernmental organizations, and religious groups) work hard to build trust 

among members. They also independently plan activities, 

such as interfaith dialogues and town hall meetings in 

which parents, community leaders, and religious groups 

participate to build a sustainable peaceful coexistence 

among all groups. A measure of the project’s impact is its 

influence on members’ parents, many of whom initially 

did not want their children to participate. Acquaintances among parents, which had evaporated during 

decades of ethno-religious tensions, were revived as a 

result of Peace Club programs. Adults from different 

ethnic groups now invite each other to child naming 

ceremonies, weddings, and funerals, which was hitherto 

uncommon. Children who previously never would have 

played together now visit one another’s homes regularly, 

reducing ethno-religious tensions and building community resilience to future conflict triggers. 

Deradicalization and Disengagement 

Programs Elsewhere

While the Peace Clubs have been successful at 

mitigating the emergence of ethno-religious animosity, 

they are insufficient, on their own, to counter the scale 

and scope of youth radicalization in northern Nigeria. 

A more comprehensive approach is needed. Lessons 

of deradicalization and disengagement programs undertaken by Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Indonesia, 

among other countries, provide insights into the reTHE PEACE CLUB PROJECT

I learned to see things from [fellow Peace Club members’] point of view. I’ve made a whole lot of friends, but one–

Dayo–she’s from the western part of the country and I myself am from the northern part of the country. We started 

together, we joined Peace Club together. And I got to learn a whole lot about the people of the west, and she also learned 

a whole lot about people from the north. We’re different, we’re all living in the same country, but we have so many 

wonderful things to share.15

- Abdulmalik, 19

“the Club also promotes a 

constructive approach to inclusion 

and diversity by embracing religious, 

ethnic, gender, and linguistic 

differences”
6

habilitation of individuals who are already under the 

influence of radical ideologies. By seeing radicalized 

youth as “misled” or victims rather than irredeemable 

miscreants, this approach undermines extremist views 

and disrupts the activities of those who promote violence. These programs expose radicalized Islamists’ flawed 

understanding of fundamental Islamic tenets by waging 

campaigns about shariah principles, and the true values 

of the Islamic faith, and the importance of tolerance. 

In Saudi Arabia, this is done through media, national 

campaigns of solidarity against terrorism, strengthening 

public education, the monitoring of preaching, national 

dialogue conventions, establishing standards for charities, 

and increased international cooperation. In Bangladesh, 

the government works through the country’s extensive 

network of nongovernmental organizations to ensure 

the program is grassroots-led and responsive to each 

community’s specific situation.16 Many countries also 

host interfaith dialogues—a framework in which policymakers, scholars, and religious leaders exchange views 

on religious, social, and cultural issues in the spirit of 

respect, mutual tolerance, and understanding. 

For those already imprisoned due to extremist 

activities, the Saudi program has determined that 

only 10 percent are hardcore militants. The other 90 

percent can be rehabilitated.17 For these individuals, 

the Saudi program provides intense religious reeducation, rehabilitation (fostering a socially secure future 

through job training and educational opportunities), and 

counseling. The program also places great emphasis on 

providing social support not only for those incarcerated, 

but also for their families who may be experiencing 

severe financial hardships due to the imprisonment of 

an income earner. Such social support also helps prevent the radicalization of family members. The Saudi 

government has established special correctional facilities 

that not only separate radical Islamist prisoners from 

other common criminals, but from one another so as 

to prevent prisons from becoming breeding grounds 

for terrorist networking.

Lessons from a review of 15 countries’ programs 

for already incarcerated extremists indicate that a mix 

of religious reeducation, vocational training, and credible interlocutors (clerics and former radicalized youth) 

who can relate to prisoners’ personal and psychological needs are essential. This psychological outreach is 

complemented by efforts to facilitate prisoners’ transition into social networks away from extremism and 

systematic fostering of long-term commitments toward 

family, community, and country to raise the personal 

costs of recidivism.18 This recognizes that in addition 

to the economic and ideological drivers, youths join 

radical groups for the sense of belonging they provide.

Saudi Arabia and Singapore’s models are both 

highly successful—and are well resourced. But programs, 

such as those in Indonesia and Bangladesh, can achieve 

success despite limited resources. The key is having the 

program respond to the local context. A reeducation 

and rehabilitation program will work only if a former 

radical can find a meaningful alternative social network. 

Family is usually key but so too is a supportive community and employment. The Saudi program found that 

maintaining the relationship between former radicals 

and their prison counselors helped reintegration after 

their release. Also important to consider is the environment into which former radicals will reintegrate. In 

Indonesia, conflicts were winding down, which helped 

former radicals transition peacefully into society. In Yemen, on the other hand, local conflicts were escalating 

when former radicals were reintegrated, thus radicalizing 

influences awaited them.

Recommendations

Redressing violent extremism in northern Nigeria 

will require interventions at every stage of the radicalization spectrum, from the measured use of force, to 

proactive development investments to alleviate socioeconomic grievances, to countering extremist ideologies, 

to rehabilitating individuals who have been radicalized. 

Smarter response from the security sector. Recognizing that the leaders of violent radical Islamist groups 

are a threat to security, government efforts to identify 

and apprehend these individuals and limit their destabilizing influence is warranted. However, while violent 

responses may temporarily quell insurgency, when done 

in an indiscriminate manner they also radicalize already 

at-risk youths and produce new offshoots of extremist 

groups. Nigeria’s security sector, thus, must reassess its 

“by seeing radicalized youth as 

‘misled’ or victims rather than 

irredeemable miscreants, this 

approach undermines extremist views 

and disrupts the activities of those 

who promote violence”
7

counterinsurgency strategy. Intelligence-driven operations require continuous engagement with the local 

population. To establish government credibility and 

trust among local communities needed to elicit this 

level of cooperation, prompt and thorough investigations must be conducted into allegations of arbitrary 

detention, use of torture, and extrajudicial killings by 

Nigeria’s security forces. 

The international community could provide guidance on best practices to Nigeria’s security sector. International actors also have a role to play in interdicting 

external enablers—sources of funding, foreign fighters, 

jihadist propaganda, and training and the cross-fertilization of tactics from other radicalized groups. Combined 

with government efforts to develop credible ties with 

local communities, such initiatives will reduce levels 

of violence and slow youth recruitment.

Intensive investment in development in the north.

The vast majority of those in radical groups are merely 

followers or sympathizers motivated primarily by economic hardship. Many are from northern Nigeria’s large 

population of destitute youths with no formal education 

nor economic opportunities who regularly witness recurring ethno-religious clashes. The government and 

civil society actors should concentrate more resources to 

address these drivers of radicalization. A demonstrated 

commitment to the drastic reduction of poverty and 

under-enrollment in public education is critical to eliminating violent radicalism. Empowering citizens to acquire 

basic education and vocational skills would prepare them 

to be functional and active members of society. Finding 

purpose within a community would prevent many youths 

from seeking identity through radical Islamist ideology. 

Address endemic corruption and poor governance. 

Radical organizations prey on disillusioned youth who 

feel violated by the culture of impunity and abuses of 

office by the political class. Widespread corruption is 

responsible for the absence of trust in the government 

and the general feeling of hopelessness in many northern 

communities. The potent combination of socioeconomic 

and political inequalities fosters violent expressions of 

radicalization in northern Nigeria. The Nigerian government should collaborate more with religious leaders, traditional elders, and civil society actors already established 

in northern communities to improve oversight of and 

trust in the government. The Kano State government, 

which engages local nongovernmental organizations in 

monitoring and evaluation of state projects, provides an 

innovative model in this regard. 

Provide a safe space for moderate voices to be 

heard. Preventive efforts to counter the appeal of 

radical ideologies among youth must also be expanded. 

The government should encourage and facilitate more 

public discourse and transformative dialogue between 

Muslims, Christians, and security sector leaders on the 

ground in northern Nigeria to foster interfaith harmony 

and develop mutual understanding. Small steps, such 

as the work of the Peace Clubs, have made dramatic 

improvements in the lives of the communities. By inviting moderate Muslims and Christians to participate in 

facilitated interfaith dialogues and town hall meetings 

as well as engaging youth in creative ways to confront 

stereotypes and biases, Peace Club communities are now 

open to discussions and public debates about ethnoreligious divisions and the conflict in northern Nigeria. 

This needs to be scaled up to engage members of the 

military, local police, and community leaders. By fostering facilitated engagements away from the inflammatory 

messages of certain exploitative politicians and Islamist 

radicals, ethno-religiously mixed communities can find 

their own voice and power through dialogue. With more 

consistent support and protection from police and the 

security sector in general, such communities will become 

safe havens for moderation.

Reform of radicalized prisoners. For members of 

radical groups who have been incarcerated, systematic 

rehabilitation programs are needed so that they can play 

constructive roles in society. The government should 

emulate that which it can afford from the Saudi and 

Singaporean examples to reform radicalized fighters who 

have been incarcerated. These programs have shown that 

it is important to have an interlocutor or counselor for a 

radicalized prisoner—someone who can provide constant 

dialogue and understanding, who can lead him through 

religious reeducation and counseling—so that he may 

come to understand his misinterpretations of Islam and 

how his actions run counter to Islamic tenets. Such a 

counselor should be a respected figure such as a moderate cleric or a reformed radical leader. Meanwhile, care 

must be exercised to ensure that prisons do not become 

recruiting grounds for extremists. 

“a reeducation and rehabilitation 

program will work only if a former 

radical can find a meaningful 

alternative social network”
8

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports United States 

foreign and security policies by strengthening the strategic capacity 

of African states to identifiy and resolve security challenges in ways 

that promote civil-military cooperation, respect for democratic 

values, and safeguard human rights. Toward these aims, ACSS is 

committed to building networks of African, American, European, and 

international military and civilian leaders and articulating African 

perspectives to U.S. policymakers.

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of ACSS, 

the U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the U.S. 

Government.

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http://www.africacenter.org

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Strategic Studies

Acting Director: 

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National Defense University

300 Fifth Avenue, Building 20

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ISSN 2164-4047

A commonality among successful reform programs 

is vocational training and preparing former insurgents 

for a return to society with skills to create a productive 

livelihood. Similarly, setting up a social network away 

from radicalizing influences is key to keeping former 

insurgents meaningfully engaged in community and 

family life, making it harder for an individual to revert.

Implementation of many of these activities would 

not have to rely on the government. Nigeria has a 

rich civil society through which deradicalization and 

disengagement programs could be organized. The 

international community could provide funding to 

these nongovernmental programs as well as technical 

experience.

Reform of communities. No matter what is done 

for former insurgents, if radicalizing influences are still 

present when they are released back into their communities there will be a higher chance of recidivism. 

For the community’s sake alone, it is much better to 

engage each individual and provide a sense of belonging so as to prevent radicalization in the first place. 

Thus, the government should pilot programs to change 

the collective mindset away from radicalization—from 

national campaigns of solidarity against terrorism, to 

interfaith tolerance curricula for public education, to 

holding national dialogue conventions. 

Notes

1 2012 Global Terrorism Index: Capturing the Impact of Terrorism for 

the Last Decade (Sydney: Institute for Economics & Peace, December 

5, 2012), available at <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/pdf/gti/2012_

Global_Terrorism_Index_Report.pdf>.

2 Roz Ben-Okagbue, “Drum Beats of War,” Premium Times 

(Nigeria), May 18, 2013.

3 Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses 

in Nigeria (New York: Human Rights Watch, October 2012).

4 “Nigeria’s Northern Insurgence: A City under Seige,” The 

Economist, May 25, 2013.

5 “Nigeria Seeks Extradition of al Qaeda Suspect to U.S.,” 

Reuters, August 6, 2013.

6 Democracy in Nigeria: Continuing Dialogue(s) for Nation-Building, 

Capacity Building Series No. 10 (Stockholm: International Institute 

for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001), 3.

7 Abiodun Alao, “Islamic Radicalization and Violence in 

Nigeria: Country Report,” Economic and Social Research Council, 

January 1, 2009, 16, available at <http://www.securityanddevelopment.

org/pdf/ESRC%20Nigeria%20Overview.pdf>.

8 “Osama Baby Craze Hits Nigeria,” BBC, January 3, 2002.

9 Alao, 5.

10 Alex S. Wilner and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz, “Homegrown 

Terrorism and Transformative Learning: An Interdisciplinary Approach 

to Understanding Radicalization,” Global Change, Peace and Security 

22, no. 1 (February 2010), 38. 

11 Richard A. Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: 

The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic, (Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 1988), 43.

12 Raul Caruso, “Youth Unemployment and Terrorism,” in 2012 

Global Terrorism Index: Capturing the Impact of Terrorism for the Last 

Decade.

13 Hamisu Muhammad, “Nigeria’s Oil Revenue Fell by N761BN 

in 2012—CBN,” Daily Trust (Nigeria), April 26, 2013.

14 Paul Rogers, Nigeria: The Generic Context of the Boko Haram 

Violence, Monthly Global Security Briefing, (Oxford: Oxford Research 

Group, April 30, 2012), 4. 

15 “Nigerian Youth Use Sports to Bridge Religious Divide,” PBS 

NewsHour Extra, March 26, 2010, available at <http://www.pbs.org/

newshour/extra/speakout/world/jan-june10/nigeria_03-26.html>.

16 Tackling Extremism: De-Radicalisation and Disengagement, Policy 

Briefing (London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, London, 2012), 20.

17 Abdullah F. Ansary, “Combating Extremism: A Brief 

Overview of Saudi Arabia’s Approach,” Middle East Policy 15, Issue 

2 (Summer 2008).

18 Peter R. Newmann, Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and 

De-radicalisation in 15 Countries (London: The International Centre for 

the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2010), 47.