UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-5041

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ABDULLAH MATTOCKS, a/k/a Abdul-Nur Zaid, a/k/a Abdul Zaid, 

a/k/a Abdul Nur, a/k/a Abdullah Ebin Zaid Mattocks,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District 

Judge. (1:08-cr-00387-GBL-1)

Submitted: July 29, 2011 Decided: August 5, 2011

Before SHEDD, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Daniel T. Lopez, BRIGLIA HUNDLEY NUTALL & KAY PC, Vienna, 

Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States 

Attorney, Michael P. Ben’Ary, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM: 

Abdullah Mattocks appeals his convictions for 

conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and possession of firearms 

in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006). His sole contention on appeal is 

that the district court erred in denying his motions to withdraw 

his guilty plea and for reconsideration of that order. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm. 

The Government suggests that Mattocks’ appeal be 

dismissed as barred by the appellate waiver in Mattocks’ plea 

agreement. Pursuant to a plea agreement, a defendant may waive 

his appellate rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006). United 

States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990). A waiver 

will preclude appeal of a specific issue if the waiver is valid 

and the issue is within the scope of the waiver. United States 

v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005). Whether a 

defendant validly waived his right to appeal is a question of 

law that this court reviews de novo. Id. at 168. “The validity 

of an appeal waiver depends on whether the defendant knowingly 

and intelligently agreed to waive the right to appeal.” Id.

Although the Government is correct that Mattocks 

agreed to waive his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, 

at 

169 (citation omitted).
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where, as here, an appellant challenges the denial of his motion 

to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that the plea was not 

knowing or voluntary, an appeal waiver does not prevent this 

court from hearing the appeal. United States v. Craig

Turning to the merits of Mattocks’ appeal, the 

district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is 

reviewed for abuse of discretion. 

, 985 F.2d 

175, 178 (4th Cir. 1993). We therefore decline the Government’s 

invitation to dismiss the appeal. 

United States v. Ubakanma, 

215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000). “[A] defendant does not have 

an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, even before 

sentencing.” United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th 

Cir. 1991). Instead, he must show a “fair and just reason” for 

withdrawing his plea. Id. “[A] ‘fair and just’ reason . . . 

is one that essentially challenges . . . the fairness of the 

Rule 11 proceeding.” United States v. Lambey

In determining whether Mattocks has carried his 

burden, the court considers six factors: 

, 974 F.2d 1389, 

1394 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc). 

(1) whether the defendant has offered credible 

evidence that his plea was not knowing or not

voluntary, (2) whether the defendant has credibly 

asserted his legal innocence, (3) whether there has 

been a delay between the entering of the plea and the 

filing of the motion, (4) whether the defendant has 

had close assistance of competent counsel, (5) whether 

withdrawal will cause prejudice to the government, and 
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(6) whether it will inconvenience the court and waste 

judicial resources. 

Moore, 931 F.2d at 248. Although all the factors in Moore must 

be given appropriate weight, the key in determining whether a 

motion to withdraw should be granted is whether the Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11 hearing was properly conducted. United States v. 

Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995). This court closely 

scrutinizes the Rule 11 colloquy and attaches a strong 

presumption that the plea is final and binding if the Rule 11 

proceeding was adequate. Lambey

We have reviewed the 

, 974 F.2d at 1394. 

Moore factors and conclude that 

Mattocks has not carried his burden. The district court 

substantially complied with the mandates of Rule 11 in accepting 

Mattocks’ guilty plea, ensuring that Mattocks’ plea was knowing 

and voluntary and supported by a sufficient factual basis. 

United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 

1991). Moreover, Mattocks informed the district court during 

the plea colloquy that he had not been threatened or coerced to 

plead guilty, and his statements at the plea hearing indicated 

that he entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily. Blackledge 

v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977); see Fields v. Attorney Gen., 

956 F.2d 1290, 1299 (4th Cir. 1992) (“Absent clear and 

convincing evidence to the contrary, a defendant is bound by the 

representations he makes under oath during a plea colloquy.”). 
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Despite Mattocks’ claims to the contrary, our review of the 

record convinces us that Mattocks had close assistance of 

counsel and was not coerced by counsel into pleading guilty. 

Thus, Mattocks has not “offered credible evidence that his plea 

was not knowing or otherwise involuntary.” Ubakanma

Moreover, Mattocks has not credibly asserted his 

innocence, there was a significant delay between the entry of 

the plea and the motion to withdraw the plea, and both the 

Government and the court would be burdened by allowing him to 

withdraw his guilty plea. Based on our consideration of the 

, 215 F.3d 

at 424. 

Moore

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal conclusions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

factors, therefore, we conclude the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying either the motion to withdraw

the guilty plea or the motion for reconsideration. 

AFFIRMED