Introduction

World War II was the largest and most violent armed conflict in

the history of mankind. However, the half century that now separates

us from that conflict has exacted its toll on our collective knowledge.

While World War II continues to absorb the interest of military scholars and historians, as well as its veterans, a generation of Americans

has grown to maturity largely unaware of the political, social, and military implications of a war that, more than any other, united us as a

people with a common purpose.

Highly relevant today, World War II has much to teach us, not

only about the profession of arms, but also about military preparedness, global strategy, and combined operations in the coalition war

against fascism. During the next several years, the U.S. Army will

participate in the nation’s 50th anniversary commemoration of World

War II. The commemoration will include the publication of various

materials to help educate Americans about that war. The works produced will provide great opportunities to learn about and renew

pride in an Army that fought so magnificently in what has been

called “the mighty endeavor.”

World War II was waged on land, on sea, and in the air over several

diverse theaters of operation for approximately six years. The following

essay is one of a series of campaign studies highlighting those struggles

that, with their accompanying suggestions for further reading, are

designed to introduce you to one of the Army’s significant military feats

from that war.

This brochure was initially prepared in the U.S. Army Center of

Military History by Theresa L. Kraus. I hope this absorbing account of

that period will enhance your appreciation of American achievements

during World War II.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE

Brigadier General, USA

Chief of Military History
China Offensive

5 May–2 September 1945

As victory in Europe appeared increasingly inevitable in the early

months of 1945, the Allies began to focus greater military resources on

the war against Japan. Throughout the spring of 1945 Allied forces

drove the Japanese from Burma and dislodged Japanese forces from key

islands in the central and southwest Pacific. With its sea power shattered

and its air power outmatched, Japan’s only remaining resource was its

relatively intact ground force. Although the land campaigns in Burma

and the Philippines had been disastrous for the engaged Japanese forces,

those and other outlying garrisons represented only a small percent of its

ground troops. The bulk of Japan’s army of over two million men was

on the mainland of Asia, primarily in China.

Suffering from the travails of a civil war that had begun in 1911,

and from pervasive economic problems, China had lost much of its

enthusiasm for the struggle against the Japanese. Since 1937, when the

Sino-Japanese conflict became an open war, China’s best troops had

been repeatedly defeated and its richest coastal and riverine cities captured by the Japanese. From the beginning of World War II, Allied

planners believed it would be essential to assist China in its war

against Japan, but had not regarded it as a decisive theater. Unable to

deploy ground forces for operations there, the United States provided

air and logistical support, technical assistance, and military advice to

the Chinese army for its continuing struggle against the Japanese. 

Strategic Setting

Although the ultimate goal of the Allies was the complete expulsion of the Japanese from Chinese soil, that proved a difficult task for

both political and economic reasons. Chinese military forces belonged

to two hostile camps, the Nationalist army of the pro-Western

Kuomintang government commanded by Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek, and the Communist “Red” Army of Mao Tse-tung. A latent civil

war between the Nationalists and Communists had sharply limited

efforts to protect Chinese territory from foreign aggression. Although

the two factions had agreed to fight the Japanese instead of each other,

the ensuing alliance was at best an uneasy truce. Attempts to coordinate their efforts against the Japanese were markedly unsuccessful. By

1945 Chiang’s army was centered at the emergency capital of
Chungking, 900 miles to the west of coastal Shanghai, and Mao’s

forces were based 500 miles north of Chungking in equally remote

Yenan. The Allies provided material assistance to the Nationalist army,

but dissension among the Nationalist factions made it impossible for

Chiang Kai-shek to consolidate his military forces in an effort to combat both the Communists and the Japanese. In fact, both the

Communists and the Nationalists held the major part of their armies in

reserve, ready to resume their civil war once Japan’s fate had been

decided elsewhere.

Severe economic problems made it difficult for Chiang Kai-shek

to sustain his army in the field. China had no industrial base to support

the prolonged war, and the Japanese occupation and blockade had

made it increasingly hard for the Allies to ship supplies into the country. For logistical support, the Nationalist army depended on the limited Allied tonnage flown over the 14,000-foot Himalayas mountain

chain, the so-called Hump, from India into southern China. Previously,

those supplies had been delivered by road, but the fall of Burma to the

Japanese in 1942 closed that route. No large-scale offensive could be

mounted as long as the supply situation remained critical. Early Allied

plans for the China theater thus concentrated on supporting Nationalist

forces with advice, training assistance, and critical supplies and on

establishing air bases from which to conduct strategic bombing attacks

against Japan. Eventually, Allied leaders hoped to seize the ports of

Hong Kong and Canton, some 700 miles southeast of Chungking,

allowing them to establish a maritime supply line to China.

U.S. leaders initially expected little from the Chinese Army.

Theoretically, Chiang’s army was the largest in the world. In reality, it

consisted mostly of ill-equipped, inadequately trained, poorly organized, and ineptly led units. Many soldiers suffered from malnutrition

and clothing shortages. Although an administrative system that was

primitive at best prevented western observers from making any useful

estimates of the precise size and capabilities of the somewhat amorphous mass of troops, clearly it had been unable to halt an enemy

advance or fight a modern war since the very beginning of the struggle. Mao’s forces, if better motivated, were even less well equipped

and, by 1945, were focusing most of their efforts at establishing guerrilla and clandestine political organizations behind the Japanese lines,

rather than opposing them directly. 

Command problems also plagued the Nationalist forces. All

operational plans and decisions originated from Chiang Kai-shek’s

headquarters in Chungking. But the Generalissimo had little contact

with his troops and was often completely out of touch with battle sit4
uations. Nevertheless, he generally refused to allow his field commanders to adjust their forces in response to local combat conditions

without his personal approval. Unable to coordinate large-scale operations, the Chinese generals normally committed their units in a

piecemeal fashion, accomplishing little against the Japanese. Mao’s

forces were not much better as their decentralized organization limited their ability to conduct conventional warfare. China’s only indigenous protection lay in the size of the country and the lack of a welldeveloped transportation network, which imposed severe handicaps

on the invaders.

5





 



 











 



Yellow R

Yangtze R

Yangtze R

45 Divs

320,000 men

4 Armies

100,000 men

9 Armies

67,000 men

4 National Divs

2 Yunnanese Divs

6 Y-Force Divs

3 Yunnanese Divs

12 Armies

225,000 men

8 Armies

160,000 men

46 Armies

920,000 men

1st Army

2 Inf Divs

6 Inf Brigs

2 Inf Divs

6 Inf Brigs

under Direct Control of

North China Area Army

KWANTUNG ARMY

NC AREA ARMY

XXXX

12th Army

3 Inf Divs

1 Armd Div

1 Inf Brig

14 Divs

Chinese

CHINA EXPEDITIONARY ARMY

34th Army

1 Inf Div

4 Inf Brigs 13th Army

4 Inf Div

2 Inf Brigs

under Direct Control of

China Expeditionary Army

11th Army 

10 Divs

23d Army

2 Inf Divs

5 Inf Brigs Part of Sixth Area Army

XXX

XXXX

NC AREA

XXXX

XXX

NC AREA

XXX

XXX

NORTH CHINA AREA ARMY

XXXX

MONGOLIA GARRISON ARMY

1 Inf Div

1 Inf Brig 

SIXTH AREA

SIXTH AREA ARMY

Peiping

KOREA

Hsian

Nan-cheng

Liang-shan

Chungking

Cheng-tu

Kunming

FRENCH

INDOCHINA

Nan-ning

Kweiyang

Kweilin

Liuchow

Nan-hsiung

Sui-chuan

Hong Kong

Canton

En-shih

Laohokow Ankang

Shanghai

FORMOSA

Fort Bayard

Foochow

Amoy

Swatow

Kaifeng

Yenan

Loyang

Hankow

Nanking

Wuchang

Heng-yang

Ling-ling

Chihchiang

LIUCHOW PENINSULA 

MANCHURIA

C H I N A

October 1944

SITUATION IN CHINA

0 300

Miles

Chinese Forces

 Allied Airfields
Japanese military forces occupied the eastern third of the country

and controlled all of the seaports and main railroads and highways.

General Yasuji Okamura commanded the undefeated, veteran China

Expeditionary Army, consisting of 1 armored division, 25 infantry

divisions, and 22 independent brigades—11 of infantry, 1 of cavalry,

and 10 of mixed troops. General Okamura divided those forces into

three separate groups: The North China Area Army occupied the north

China plain from the Yellow River to the Great Wall and kept watch,

along with the large Japanese army in Manchuria (Kwangtung Army),

on the Soviet forces in the Far East. To the south, the 13th Army held

the lower Yangtze River valley and the coast north and south of the

port city of Shanghai. The 6th Area Army was immediately west of the

13th Army and extended south to Canton and Hong Kong on the coast.

The 6th Area Army, which contained the elite of the Japanese units,

operated against the Chinese and Americans in central China. Despite

the large number of units, the size of the country and the absence of a

more developed transportation net immobilized much of the Japanese

army and limited the extent of its operations. With most of its troops

committed to pacification or occupation, and without strong air support or an adequate logistics system, the Japanese operated only with

difficulty outside of their lodgment areas. 

On 18 October 1944, President Franklin D. Roosevelt recalled the

U.S. commander of the China-Burma-India theater and chief of staff to

Chiang Kai-shek, Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, to the United States.

Stilwell, in command since March 1942, had long been at odds with

the Generalissimo. The American general’s low opinion of Chiang and

his troops was well known, keeping the relationship between adviser

and advisee perpetually strained. Not surprisingly, when President

Roosevelt had suggested that Stilwell be given command of the

Chinese forces in August 1944, the Generalissimo adamantly rejected

the proposal. Stilwell’s recall decided the resulting political and military deadlock in favor of Chiang, but the Generalissimo’s troubles

were far from over. 

Subsequently, Roosevelt divided the China-Burma-India Theater

of Operations into two parts. Lt. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan took command

of the India-Burma theater, and Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer arrived

in China on 31 October 1944 to become the commanding general of

the U.S. forces in the China theater and chief of staff to Chiang Kaishek. The Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed Wedemeyer to advise and

assist the Generalissimo on all matters pertaining to the conduct of the

war against the Japanese, including training, logistical support, and

operational planning for the Chinese Nationalist forces. 

6
Before World War II General Wedemeyer had served tours in the

Philippine Islands and in China. More recently, his experience as a

member of the War Plans Division of the War Department General

Staff gave him the perspective and experience needed to develop

strategic plans for China. Furthermore, he had become familiar with

the Chinese army and acquainted with Chiang Kai-shek while serving

as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Southeast Asia Command under Lord

Mountbatten, before his appointment to the China theater. Unlike his

predecessor, Wedemeyer quickly established an excellent working

relationship with Chiang.

The American forces in China were a varied lot, reflecting the

diverse nature of their missions. The B–29s of the XX Bomber

Command, under Maj. Gen. Curtis LeMay, were controlled by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, not General Wedemeyer. The long-range

bombers had a strategic offensive mission, striking from their bases in

India and China at targets as far away as Formosa, Manchuria, and

southern Japan. Wedemeyer also had no direct authority over the

China Wing, India-China Division, Air Transport Command, commanded by Brig. Gen. William H. Turner, charged with ferrying troops

and supplies within China and flying the Hump. 

Of those American forces under Wedemeyer’s direct control, the

Fourteenth Air Force, commanded by Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault,

was the most significant. Because of the weakness of Chiang’s army

and the lack of adequate roads and railways, Chennault’s mixed force

of fighters, medium and heavy bombers, and transport aircraft was

vital to keeping supplies flowing to the Chinese troops and their

American advisers and in attempting to halt Japanese excursions into

Chinese-held territory. Other than air units, Wedemeyer had only a

small number of ground force personnel. Most were advising and

training parts of the Chinese army, particularly a number of Americansponsored divisions. 

As much of the staff for the old China-Burma-India Theater of

Operations had been located in India, Wedemeyer’s new headquarters

was extremely small. Initially, he reorganized it into two main elements. A forward echelon in Chungking, the wartime capital of China,

dealt primarily with operations, intelligence, and planning. A rear echelon at Kunming, some 400 miles southwest of Chungking and the

China terminus for the Hump air supply line, handled administrative

and logistical matters. The commander of Wedemeyer’s Services of

Supply, Maj. Gen. Gilbert X. Cheves, headed the latter.

Almost immediately, Wedemeyer was faced with a major crisis. In

October 1944, provoked by American bomber raids from China on

7
8

southern Japan, the Japanese began a major offensive to eliminate the

airfields used for staging the air attacks. On 11 November, less than

two weeks after Wedemeyer’s arrival in China, the Japanese Eleventh

Army captured Kweilin, 400 miles southeast of Chungking and one of

the Fourteenth Air Force’s largest bases. The Twenty-Third Army, moving west from the Canton area, seized another air base at Liuchow, 100

miles southwest of Kweilin. From Liuchow the Japanese moved southwest toward Nanning, some 150 miles away. On 24 November the

town fell, allowing the Japanese to establish tenuous overland communications across all of eastern Asia between Korea and Singapore. By

mid-November many of the major airf ields used by the U.S.

Fourteenth Air Force and the XX Bomber Command in China had

been occupied, and Japanese forces shifted their advance westward

toward Kunming and Chungking. Both of these cities were critical: if

Kunming fell, the Hump aerial supply line would be cut; if

Chungking, Chiang’s wartime capital, was lost, the blow to Nationalist

prestige and authority might be fatal.

In attempting to halt the Japanese offensive, the Chinese forces

had performed poorly. Wedemeyer recognized that before the Chinese

army could be successful, at least part of it must be transformed into

an effective combat force. Under the threat of further Japanese

advances against Kunming and Chungking, Chiang agreed to the creation of a force of thirty-six infantry divisions under a single responsible Chinese field commander and a combined Chinese-American staff.

The divisions, which were referred to as the ALPHA Force after a plan

of defense, code-named ALPHA, would be equipped, trained, and supplied by Americans.

Although Chiang’s agreement to the ALPHA Force plan was a

major victory for the American advisory mission, Wedemeyer did

not achieve all that he had sought. Chiang, concerned that Mao Tsetung might turn some of his three-million-man Communist military

force against Nationalist strongholds, refused to permit the

Americans to train more than thirty-six divisions, only about 15 percent of the total Chinese army. More significant, the Generalissimo

kept many of his best soldiers out of the ALPHA divisions and in

reserve near Chungking.

For an immediate defense against the advancing Japanese,

Wedemeyer turned to Chennault’s Fourteenth Air Force and also

requested the return of two American-equipped and -trained Chinese

divisions from Burma and India. But, fortunately for the hastily

formed and relatively unprepared ALPHA force, the Japanese had outrun their supplies by mid-December and were forced to halt their
advance to the west. Chennault’s airmen now began systematically

attacking Japanese supply centers and railways to prevent a buildup of

supplies to support additional Japanese offensives. More and better

aircraft, including the new P–51 fighter-bombers with their great

range, along with an increased flow of supplies over the Hump,

allowed the Fourteenth to wage a heavy and sustained bombing attack

whose cumulative effect on the Japanese was serious. The 6th Area

Army, most immediately affected by the air strikes, concluded that the

severe shortage of fuel and the impending collapse of rail communications might soon force them to abandon south China, an estimate of

which the Americans and Chinese remained ignorant.

Japanese supply difficulties and the Fourteenth Air Force’s raids

had bought part of the time needed for the ALPHA divisions to be

turned into an effective combat force. Moreover, increased tonnage

flown over the Hump and the imminent success in Burma, which

would reopen the ground supply route to China, made it likely that the

equipment and supplies for the ALPHA divisions would arrive in a

timely manner. The missing piece in creating the ALPHA Force was a

9

“Welcome” China 1945 by John G. Hanlen. (Army Art

Collection)
more effective organization to train, supply, and control the operations

of the divisions. Recognizing this, General Wedemeyer, in January

1945, established the Chinese Combat Command and the Chinese

Training Command.

The Chinese Combat Command, headed by Maj. Gen. Robert B.

McClure, was designed to make the advisory effort more effective in

the face of Chinese practices and attitudes that had caused problems in

the past. The key issue was leverage. McClure wanted every Chinese

ALPHA Force commander down to regimental level to have an

American adviser. If a Chinese commander refused to accept the

advice of the American working with him, the matter would be

referred to their next higher Chinese and American superiors, ultimately ending up with Chiang Kai-shek and General Wedemeyer. Any

Chinese commander who continually refused to follow advice would

be replaced or have American support withdrawn from his unit.

Personnel shortages prevented the system from being extended to

the regimental level, but eventually all 36 divisions, 12 armies, and 4

group armies of the ALPHA Force received American advisers and liaison personnel, some 3,100 soldiers and airmen, all linked by radio.

Each advisory team had about twenty-five officers and fifty enlisted

men, picked from different arms and services so that qualified technicians from ordnance, logistics, and engineer specialties would be

available to help the Chinese. Advisers also furnished technical assistance to the Chinese in handling artillery and communications, and

American military medical personnel worked with Chinese medics,

nurses, and doctors who generally lacked formal training. Each advisory team also had an air-ground liaison section, operating its own

radio net to provide air support. At the unit level, the American advisers accompanied Chinese forces in the field, supervising local training

as best they could and working with Chinese commanders on plans

and tactical operations. In no case were Americans in command, and

their influence depended primarily on their own expertise and the willingness of Chinese commanders to accept foreign advice. And, not

surprisingly, in those Nationalist units which Chiang hoped to conserve for his expected postwar struggle against the Red army, operations against the Japanese were not pursued with great vigor.

Training, American officers believed, was the key to success.

While the Chinese divisions received unit training from personnel of

the Chinese Combat Command, U.S. troops assigned to the Chinese

Training Center, under the command of Brig. Gen. John W. Middleton,

trained individual soldiers and, in some cases, cadres of special units.

Training Center members established and then operated service

10
American soldiers attached to a Chinese division send a message from the field. (U.S. Army Military History Institute)
schools, prepared and distributed training literature, and gave technical

assistance to those assigned to the Chinese Combat Command.

Ultimately, General Middleton operated seven service schools and

training centers, the majority located near Kunming. Of those, the

Field Artillery Training Center was the largest and, at its peak some

one thousand Americans were instructing about ten thousand Chinese

in the use of American-supplied artillery. 

In addition, the China theater operated a command and general

staff school and a Chinese army war college; training centers for

infantry, heavy mortar, ordnance, and signal troops; and an interpreters’ pool to teach English to the large number of Chinese serving

as interpreters for the American advisers. Although the Americans

wanted as many of the Chinese senior officers as possible exposed to

the China Training Center coursework, only a small percentage of

those officers actually attended the schools. 

U.S. advisers also helped establish a Chinese services of supply

(SOS) logistical organization to support the ALPHA Force.

Emphasizing the movement of supplies from rear to front, it sought to

supplant the traditional Chinese practice of cash payments and foraging. Of the approximately 300 Americans serving in the Chinese SOS

headquarters, 147 officers and enlisted men worked in the Food

Department, 84 served in the Quartermaster Section, and the rest were

divided among ordnance, medical, transportation, communications,

and other staff departments. In the field, 231 Americans manned a

Chinese driver training school, and another 120 worked with various

Chinese service elements. In a departure from standard practice,

Chiang gave the American SOS commander, General Cheves, the rank

of lieutenant general in the Chinese army and command of the

Chinese SOS for the ALPHA divisions.

The ALPHA Force, concentrated around Kunming and commanded

by General Ho Ying-chin, the former chief of staff of the Chinese

army, gradually began to take shape. Wedemeyer hoped that U.S. assistance would transform its thirty-six divisions into a force capable of

seizing the initiative from the Japanese in China. He believed that each

one of the U.S.-sponsored divisions, with ten thousand men and its

organic artillery battalion, would be more than sufficient to defeat a

Japanese regiment. 

Ultimately, Wedemeyer hoped to lay the groundwork for a Chinese

offensive in the summer of 1945 that would recapture lost ground in

the Liuchow-Nanning area east of Kunming and then drive on to capture a port in southeast China. At a minimum, such an offensive would

tie down Japanese troops who might otherwise be sent back to defend

12
Japan against an Allied invasion. Once a port was captured, the

increased flow of supplies would enable Chinese armies to undertake a

general campaign to clear all Japanese forces from the Asian mainland. Wedemeyer’s plan, code-named Operation BETA, seemed especially desirable in early 1945, when some American strategists expected that the Japanese, even with their home islands overrun, might

make a final stand in China and Manchuria. 

On 14 February 1945, General Wedemeyer submitted his plan for

the Chinese offensive to Chiang Kai-shek, who immediately approved

it. Wedemeyer’s plan made a number of assumptions: the war in

Europe would come to an end in May; operations in the Pacific would

continue as planned, and would force the Japanese armies in China to

redeploy to the north and east; a four-inch pipeline under construction

from Burma would be completed by July; and the Hump and the land

route to China through Burma, which opened in February, would

together be able to deliver 60,000 tons of supplies per month. The plan

had four phases: the capture of the Liuchow-Nanning area; the consolidation of the captured area; the concentration of forces needed for an

advance to the Hong Kong–Canton coastal region; and an offensive

operation to capture Hong Kong and Canton. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

eventually approved the plan on 20 April, but by that time it had been

overtaken by other events in the China theater. 

In late January and early February, the Imperial General

Headquarters in Tokyo revised its China policy. With the situation in the

Pacific worsening, and with the increased possibility of both Japan and

China being attacked from the sea, it ordered the China Expeditionary

Army to focus on preventing an Allied invasion of China. Advance

American air bases in China were to be destroyed, but other than that,

only small forces would be permitted to launch raids into the interior.

Instead, the Japanese command wanted to strengthen its forces in central

and south China, particularly in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River

between Shanghai and Hankow, about 450 miles to the west. To execute

the new plan, General Okamura established three new divisions to reinforce the defenses along the coast of China. However, he also kept his

remaining units concentrated in the interior. In late March, a renewed

Japanese offensive began with the China Expeditionary Army attacking

westward on a broad front between the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers, with

the objective of capturing the American air bases at Laohokow, 350

miles northeast of Chungking, and at Ankang, some 100 miles west of

Laohokow. On 8 April, Laohokow fell.

The Chinese Army, 85 percent of which fell outside the ALPHA

Force, was unable to counter the Japanese advance in any meaningful

13
way. The heavily bureaucratic Nationalist government and army were

simply too cumbersome to direct any effective and immediate military

response. In the absence of coherent Chinese planning, Wedemeyer and

his staff filled the gap. U.S. planners believed that Okamura would next

move either toward the American air base at Chihchiang, 270 miles

southeast of Chungking, or continue the push westward beyond

Laohokow. General Wedemeyer thought the drive to Chihchiang more

likely and planned accordingly. He immediately took a series of defensive measures aimed at preparing the American-sponsored units for

quick action and ordered the Fourteenth Air Force to continue bombing

attacks on enemy communications lines. If the Japanese could be

delayed now, Wedemeyer hoped that beginning about 1 May a powerful

Chinese-American offensive could sweep them back toward the coast.

Operations

On 13 April, while the Chinese and American forces regrouped

for combat, the Japanese began the expected offensive aimed at the

Chihchiang air base, site of the Fourteenth Air Force’s largest forward base south of the Yangtze. Its capture would lay open the

approaches to Kunming, 500 miles to the west, and Chungking. In

addition to destroying the air base, Okamura, ignoring the orders

from Imperial General Headquarters, hoped to recapture the initiative in China by defeating the main body of the Chinese forces in the

area southeast of Chungking. 

Okamura deployed approximately 60,000 troops for the new

offensive against about 100,000 Chinese defenders. Previously,

China’s numerical advantage had been offset by the superior equipment and training of the Japanese. Such was still the case. The

Chinese units of the ALPHA Force were, in many respects, little better

than those that had suffered defeats in the past. Lack of time had prevented the completion of the planned twenty-three weeks of training

for combat divisions; not all had received American equipment, and

those that had were still unfamiliar in its use. 

Several changes were in place, however, which drastically affected

the combat potential of the ALPHA Force. A vastly improved supply

situation meant that not only was Chennault’s Fourteenth Air Force

now capable of sustained operations, but also that the Chinese would

receive food and ammunition on a regular basis. An American advisory system, tied together by radio, which could pass along timely information of enemy movements and coordinate more effective responses,

was present in most divisions. Perhaps of even greater importance, old

14
15

attitudes of suspicion were being replaced by a new spirit of mutual

cooperation between the Chinese and the Americans.

The Japanese drove directly against Chihchiang from the east

while two smaller forces to the north and south moved generally parallel to the main column. The Chinese Combat Command’s advisory and

liaison system was immediately called into play. At a meeting on 14

April, the day after the Japanese general advance began, Generals Ho

and McClure agreed on the basic plan to counter the enemy attack.

Chinese armies would be concentrated to the north and south to prepare to strike the enemy advance in the flanks and rear. The Chinese

center around Chihchiang would be strengthened by moving the new

6th Army, composed of two veteran divisions of the Burma campaign,

into the area. When Chiang Kai-shek attempted to become actively

involved by issuing orders directly to General Ho, General Wedemeyer

politely, but firmly, dissuaded him.

By late April, 6th Army forces began concentrating at Chihchiang.

Although their deployment from Burma diverted scarce fuel from the

Chinese soldiers await removal to a field hospital for rehabilitation. (U.S. Army Military History Institute)
Fourteenth Air Force, American airmen continued to fly repeated missions against the attacking Japanese. Meanwhile, other Chinese armies

moved into position, the 94th to the south and the 100th and 18th to

the north. And, perhaps most heartening, the 74th Army, defending the

Chinese center on a fifty-mile front, was putting up a stout resistance,

slowing the Japanese advance. 

On 3 May a Chinese-American staff conference decided to counterattack a Japanese detachment near Wu-yang, seventy miles southeast of Chihchiang. The subsequent engagement by the 5th Division of

the 94th Army on 5 and 6 May was completely successful. Over the

next few days, the 5th and 121st Divisions, also of the 94th Army,

repeatedly outflanked the Japanese and hustled them north. American

advisers commented on the aggressiveness of the Chinese commanders and the bravery of their men. Frequent airdrops of ammunition

and food had raised their morale, while the Chinese commanders had

reportedly sought the advice of the American liaison officers before

16



Seking Detachment

116th Div

Shigeniro

Detachment Chihchiang Lung-hui

Yung-feng

Tung-kou

Ching-hsien

Wu-yang

Wu-kang

Hsin-ning

HUNAN

KWANGSI

Ling-ling

Taohsein

Kweiyang

Heng-yang

Pao-ching

Siangtan

New 6th 

Army

100th Army

18th Army

73d Army

74th Army

94th

Army

THE CHIHCHIANG CAMPAIGN

ELEVATION IN FEET

0 200 500 1000 and Above 0 100

Miles

8 April–7 June 1945

Axis of Advance, Japanese Unit

Limit of Japanese Penetration

Axis of Advance, Chinese Army 
making decisions. To the north, the Chinese 18th and 100th Armies

moved into the Japanese rear. With the 94th Army threatening from

the south, the Japanese were forced into a general retreat and by 7

June were back at their initial starting positions. From the beginning of

the enemy advance in early April until its end in June, the Japanese

suffered 1,500 killed and 5,000 wounded. Chinese casualties were at

least 6,800 killed and 11,200 wounded, but for the first time the

Chinese losses were not in vain.

The Chihchiang campaign demonstrated that Chinese troops could

successfully face the Japanese if they had sufficient numerical strength,

coordinated their movements and actions, and received a steady supply

of food and ammunition. By aggressive maneuvering, the Chinese had

outflanked a determined foe and forced its retreat. Wedemeyer’s ALPHA

Force, whatever its shortcomings, had proved its worth.

In mid-April the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters had

more immediate matters to reflect on. American troops had landed on

Iwo Jima and Okinawa, which could provide staging bases for attacks

on Japan itself. Subsequently, Tokyo ordered the Kwangtung Army in

Manchuria to transfer one-third of its ammunition and some of its best

troops to the home islands. Tokyo also issued warning orders to the

China Expeditionary Army to prepare to concentrate its forces in the

Yangtze River valley between Shanghai and Hankow; around the main

ports of China, such as Shanghai and Canton; and across northern

China, joining with the remaining units of the Manchurian Kwangtung

Army. Okamura was to be reinforced with newly mobilized units from

Japan, bringing his total troop strength by the summer of 1945 to over

a million men south of the Great Wall, although the quality was less

than before. The redeployment in China would guard against anticipated American amphibious landings along the coast and a Soviet attack

from the north. The Japanese leaders hoped to deny the Allies staging

areas from which they could attack Japan and to protect Chinese

mines and factories, which could still supply Japan’s military forces.

Thus, when the Japanese drive on Chihchiang was blunted and

pushed back, reinforcements were not rushed to the area to retrieve

the situation, as the local commander demanded. Instead, the

Japanese prepared for further withdrawals. In mid-May, as the situation on Okinawa deteriorated, Imperial General Headquarters

ordered the evacuation of the southern rail line extending to Kweilin

and Liuchow, a branch of the main Hankow-Canton railway. Thus,

within a few days of the end of the Chihchiang campaign, General

Okamura had begun to move units from south China and redeploy

them into northern and central China. 

17
As the Japanese forces started pulling back, General Wedemeyer

and China theater planners began studies on how best to exploit the

withdrawal. Reviving the BETA plan for an advance to the coast to capture the ports of Canton and Hong Kong seemed a good possibility.

With U.S. forces now established in the Philippines, supplies could

quickly be brought to China from Manila. Furthermore, the evacuation

of the air bases in the Kweilin-Liuchow area, about 270 miles west of

Canton, which was expected to occur soon, would help solve the logistical problems of supporting the offensive. Supplies then could be

flown directly from India or the Philippines to east China.

The revised plan, renamed CARBONADO, called for a rapid advance

to the coast in August to seize Fort Bayard on the Liuchow Peninsula,

about 250 miles southwest of Canton. Once a forward supply base had

been established at Fort Bayard, Wedemeyer believed that the main

CARBONADO attack could begin on 1 September from the KweilinLiuchow area with a final assault on Canton on 1 November. Additional

combat aircraft arrived in China to prepare for and support

CARBONADO. The U.S. Tenth Air Force from India joined the Fourteenth

Air Force on 23 July to form the Army Air Forces, China theater, under

the command of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer. Logistical support was

another matter, and it proved to be no less troublesome than previously. 

As the Chinese followed the retreating Japanese, it quickly became

apparent that, while aerial resupply could provide ammunition, it

could not feed entire Chinese armies. Parts of the countryside contained no food, and a ground line of supply had to be established to

move food supplies forward. To organize an effective logistical system

for a sustained offensive, preparations had to be made all the way from

India to Kunming. To make matters even more difficult, operations

over the land route through Burma proceeded under monsoon conditions from late May until the end of the summer. Despite these problems, the troops of General Sultan, the commander of the India-Burma

theater, provided steadily increasing support for the China effort. With

combat operations in Burma drawing down, Sultan’s command

became, in effect, the support agency for Wedemeyer.

The Chinese armies slowly moved forward into the vacuum left by

the retreating Japanese. Northeast of Chungking, the Chinese armies

skirmished with the Japanese in June and July and then withdrew to

reorganize when it became apparent that the new Japanese defensive

line was strongly held. In central and south China, more minor fighting

occurred, but the Japanese troop movements into northern and central

China were largely unopposed, at least initially. Along the coast

between Shanghai and Canton, Nationalist Chinese forces moved into

18
Fukien Province, seizing the port of Foochow in May. Despite this success, the Japanese tightened their grip on Shanghai and also south of

Foochow, on Canton, by reinforcing the garrisons of the two ports with

troops withdrawn from Fukien and by sending additional troops to the

Swatow and Amoy coastal areas between the Canton–Hong Kong area

and Foochow. Although the Japanese hoped to reserve their main

strength for a defensive struggle in the north, they meant to conduct a

strong rearguard action against any Allied attempts to seize the southern coast from either the land or the sea.

On 26 June Chinese forces recaptured the airfield at Liuchow, but

sharp fighting ensued as the Chinese attempted to cut the Japanese line

of withdrawal near Kweilin, on the railway about one hundred miles

north of Liuchow. By the end of July, the Chinese had concentrated

sufficient troops in the area for an attack, but the Japanese, the bulk of

whom had cleared the area moving north, relinquished the city. As

August began, the Japanese had almost completed their redeployment

into the areas they intended to defend to the last.

19

The Chinese return to Liuchow in July 1945. (U.S. Army

Military History Institute)
Planning for the capture of Fort Bayard proceeded while the

Chinese followed up the retreating Japanese. At a conference on the

island of Guam on 6 August, representatives of the China and the

Pacific theaters met to make final arrangements for the seizure of

the area. At the time, Allied analysts estimated that the Japanese had

over 14,000 troops in the area, but in fact there were less than 2,000,

and even those were in the process of withdrawing toward Canton.

Nevertheless, a sharp action occurred on 3 August, about twenty

miles west of Fort Bayard as the Chinese drew near. That and poor

weather, which limited aerial resupply, held the Nationalist troops

short of the coast.

On 6 August 1945, the United States dropped the first atomic

bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, and three days later a second

bomb on Nagasaki. That same day, 9 August, the Soviet Union entered

the war against Japan with three Soviet army groups invading

Manchuria from the east, north, and west. With Japanese defenses

crumbling in Manchuria and the end of the war imminent, Wedemeyer

suspended the planned capture of Fort Bayard. On 14 August, the

Japanese government accepted the terms of the Allied demand for

unconditional surrender. 

Although warned by General Wedemeyer in July of the problems

that would result from a sudden surrender of the Japanese, Chiang

Kai-shek and his government were unprepared for the abrupt collapse.

Wedemeyer had alerted Washington to the impending crisis.

Recognizing that the U.S.-sponsored divisions of the ALPHA Force still

represented only a small percentage of the huge but unwieldy

Nationalist Chinese army, he judged that Chiang’s government could

not withstand an open civil war against the Communists. Nevertheless,

U.S. leaders were understandably reluctant to become directly involved

in a new war, although U.S. Army and Marine Corps troops soon

arrived in China to receive the surrender of the Japanese garrisons

there. Meanwhile, on 22 August, the China Theater suspended all

training under American supervision, an action that marked the beginning of the end for the elaborate system of American liaison, air and

logistical support, and advice. The armies of Chiang Kai-shek would

soon be on their own.

Moreover, diplomatic problems erupted between the Allies over

issues of control in China. As President Harry S. Truman issued the

cease-fire message to all Allied commands on 15 August, Marshall

Joseph Stalin’s Soviet troops established themselves in Manchuria and

sent an advance force to within thirty miles of the ancient Chinese

capital of Peiping. With the first rumors of peace, British vessels in the

20
Pacific sought release from the Allied Pacific Fleet so as to reestablish

British control over Hong Kong, while remnants of the French troops

who had retreated into China prepared to march back into Indo-China.

Simultaneously, Mao Tse-tung, no friend of either Chiang or Stalin,

sent his Red army troops scrambling for open control of northern and

central China, areas where Red army guerrilla units had already established a solid presence. 

The war with Japan finally came to an end in September 1945.

Following the 2 September official capitulation to the Allies on

board the battleship USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay, another ceremony

was held on 9 September in Nanking. Here, on the site of the famous

“Rape of Nanking,” General Okamura formally surrendered Japan’s

forces in China. But, for China, Japan’s defeat merely signaled the

resumption of the civil war between China’s Nationalists and the

Communists for control of the entire country, a contest that, ulti21

Allied victory drive along Nanking Road in Shanghai. (U.S.

Army Military History Institute)
mately, neither the Soviet Union nor the western Allies could influence in any appreciable manner.

Analysis

When General Wedemeyer arrived in China at the end of 1944, he

faced a still-powerful and intact Japanese ground army. Although

Allied leaders lacked sufficient resources to drive the Japanese entirely

out of China, they hoped that a Nationalist Chinese army, trained and

equipped by the United States, could succeed in tying down Japanese

armies in China and prevent their redeployment to Japan. 

By the force of his personality and by his determination,

Wedemeyer convinced Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of the need

not only to permit United States military advisers to train and equip

Chinese divisions, but also to create a more effective command and

control organization. Once Chiang Kai-shek had granted that authority to General Wedemeyer, the Army liaison officers and technicians

22

At a banquet to honor General Chennault are, from left facing:

Ambassador Hurley, Generalissimo Chang, General Chennault.

General Wedemeyer is in profile at extreme right. (U.S. Army

Military History Institute)
serving in the China theater, building on the foundation erected by

General Stilwell, clearly created a more capable Chinese military

force. But critical to their effort was the fighting that reopened the

land supply route through Burma and the hard work of U.S. aviators,

flying supplies over the Hump and providing direct support to the

Chinese forces in the field.

The success of Wedemeyer’s reforms, and of the revitalized

Chinese military forces, was seen in the failure of the Japanese

Chihchiang offensive. If the war had dragged on in China, the

Japanese would have had a more difficult task in dealing with the new

Chinese armies. However, there is no doubt that the American victory

over Japan was the product of a host of earlier battles in the Pacific.

The China theater remained at the end of the war, as it had since the

attack on Pearl Harbor, a sideshow, one whose fate was ultimately

determined by battles fought elsewhere. 

The American advisory effort in China not only aided the Allied

military effort, but also reinforced traditional United States interests in

China. From the beginning of the war, President Roosevelt wanted to

bolster Chiang and the Nationalist government to serve as a counterpoint against a potentially resurgent Japan. The President saw postwar

China as a major power and partner, protecting U.S. economic, diplomatic, and strategic interests in Asia. Although the United States subsequently provided massive amounts of economic and military aid to

Chiang Kai-shek, that assistance failed to create an effective, proWestern government or military force. Within four years of the war’s

end, Mao Tse-tung and his Communist forces overran China, forcing

Chiang and his Nationalist supporters to flee to the island of Formosa

and providing the last act in a drama that had begun forty years earlier.

23
Further Readings

Those who wish to study the China Offensive Campaign in more

detail should first turn to Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland,

Time Runs Out in CBI (1959), a volume in the U.S. Army in World War

II series, produced by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. The air

side of the campaign is covered in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea

Cates, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II (1950) and in the

United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Air Operations in China,

Burma, India, vol. 67 (1947). For the British perspective see Maj. Gen.

S. Woodborn Kirby, Surrender of Japan, vol. 5 in the series The War

Against Japan (1969). Wedemeyer tells his story in General Albert C.

Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (1958). A discussion of General

Chennault and his influence on the situation in China is found in Boyd

H. Bauer, “General Claire Lee Chennault and China, 1937–1958: A

Study of Chennault, His Relationship with China, and Selected Issues in

Sino-American Relations” (1973), a Ph.D. dissertation from American

University. Coverage of the events in China is also given in John H.

Boyle, China and Japan at War, 1937–1945 (1972) and in Frederick F.

Liu, A Military History of Modern China, 1924–1949 (1956).

CMH Pub 72–39

PIN : 073890–000

Cover: Chinese mechanics reassemble a lend-lease jeep under

the direction of an American liaison soldier. 

(U.S. Army Military History Institute)