U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFF ICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

BJA NI J OJJDP BJS OVC

Research Forum

➤

Cosponsored by

Police Executive Research Forum

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Washington, D.C., October 6, 1997

Civilian Police and

Multinational Peacekeeping—

A Workshop Series

A Role for Democratic Policing
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

Janet Reno

Attorney General

Raymond C. Fisher

Associate Attorney General

Laurie Robinson

Assistant Attorney General

Noël Brennan

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Jeremy Travis

Director, National Institute of Justice

Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice

World Wide Web Site World Wide Web Site

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij
National Institute of Justice

James Burack

William Lewis

Edward Marks

Workshop Directors

 Washington, D.C., October 6, 1997

Cosponsored by the

Center for Strategic and International Studies

and the Police Executive Research Forum

January 1999

NCJ 172842

➤

Civilian Police and

Multinational Peacekeeping—

A Workshop Series

A Role for Democratic Policing
Opinions or points of view expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the

official position of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Jeremy Travis

Director

James Finckenauer

Marvene O’Rourke

Program Monitors

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the

Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

The Professional Conference Series of the National Institute of Justice supports a variety

of live, researcher-practitioner exchanges, such as conferences, workshops, planning and

development meetings, and similar support to the criminal justice field. The Research

Forum publication series was designed to share information from these forums with a larger

audience.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a research institution that

analyzes and measures the impact of public policy. With resident experts on all the world’s

major geographical regions, CSIS covers such key functional areas as international finance,

U.S. domestic and economic policy, and U.S. foreign policy and national security.

The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), a national, nonprofit research institute and

membership organization of police executives, is dedicated to improving the delivery of

police services and crime control and to encouraging discussion of police and criminal

justice issues.
iii

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Foreword

Few of us who came of age during the Cold War expected to witness the end of the

bipolarity that for so long was the central organizing principle of world politics. We

have seen a relaxation of that superpower rivalry, which formed the subtext of so

many conflicts, but we have not seen it replaced by a long hoped-for era of global

harmony. On the contrary, what has taken its place is a multipolarity generated by

several new and unfamiliar variables, among them the centrifugal forces unleashed

by the breakup of the Soviet Union, the abrupt shift to an unregulated market

economy (accelerated by globalization), the abandonment of former client states to

their own devices, and the struggle within those states to rebuild governmental and

other institutions on the basis of democracy and the rule of law.

The many and widely scattered crises ensuing in the wake of these developments

have created unprecedented opportunities for third-party intervention. The good

news is that intervention no longer entails the prospect of a clash between superpower patrons of the parties in conflict. The downside is that the major paradigm

shift to the new world order has forced the international organizations that deal with

regional and intrastate conflict to proceed with outdated “roadmaps.”

Increasingly, civilian police have been introduced into international peacekeeping

operations as a deterrent or stabilizing factor, joining the traditionally deployed civilian and military participants. In this context, the roadmap problem translates as a

lack of systematic, indepth analysis of the role of civilian police. In response, the

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), with support from the National Institute of Justice, joined

forces to tap the experience and expertise of specialists in the government, nongovernmental organizations, the military, academia, and private-sector organizations in

identifying specific problem areas and possible remedial actions.

A series of workshops begun in 1997 under CSIS and PERF sponsorship is addressing the roles of civilian police in “complex emergencies,” the juridical mandate of

civil policing in multinational operations, and how the relationship of the civilian police to other participants (such as the military) in these operations should be defined.

Professor David H. Bayley, Dean and Professor in the School of Criminal Justice at

SUNY-Albany and a specialist in international criminal justice with a particular interest in policing, presented the keynote address at the second workshop in the series.

His paper on the distinguishing features of democratic policing, as well as other major addresses from the workshop, are reproduced here.

The National Institute of Justice sponsors studies of all aspects of policing—enforcement, prevention, management, and organizational issues—under its broad mandate

to conduct criminal justice research. NIJ supported the workshop and is disseminating the results because advancing the understanding of policing issues has always

been a major priority and, more recently, the Institute has recognized international

justice reform as a topic meriting increased attention by researchers and practitioners

alike.
iv

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For law enforcement officials in countries either struggling with complex emergencies or making the transition to democracy, Professor Bayley’s analysis of responsiveness and accountability as the distinguishing

features of democratic policing has much value. It also provides pertinent information for their counterparts in the United States.

The number of situations in which the police are called on to assume responsibility in the context of international peacekeeping is likely to increase, making it all the more important to clearly define their peacekeeping role. Our three organizations are confident that the workshop papers and the exchange of ideas

will generate knowledge that can make a useful contribution toward that end.

Jeremy Travis

Director

National Institute of Justice

Joe Montville

Director, Preventive Diplomacy Program

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Chuck Wexler

Executive Director

Police Executive Research Forum
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Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Overview

by William Lewis and Edward Marks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Contemporary Practices of Policing: A Comparative View

by David H. Bayley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Managing U.S. Participation in International Police Operations

by Robert M. Perito . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Practical Issues in Providing Policing Assistance Abroad

by Michael Berkow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Participants’ Comments—A Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Compendium of Participants’ Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Appendixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Workshop Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Biographies of Presenters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Workshop Attendees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Contents
William Lewis and Edward Marks

1

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Overview

William Lewis and Edward Marks

The number of states experiencing internal unrest

has multiplied since the end of the Cold War. Not

uncommonly, the unrest has been accompanied by

the breakdown of internal order, the failure of governing institutions, and the emergence of displaced

and refugee populations—numbering some 45 million people according to United Nations estimates.

In these circumstances, a growing need for an effective civilian police force has become evident if

reasonably stable internal order is to be maintained.

The burgeoning roles of international civilian police

in monitoring and helping to direct the formation of

public safety forces present a unique challenge to

the international community. To address the issues

arising out of complex humanitarian emergencies

and the roles of international civilian police, the

Center for Strategic and International Studies

(CSIS), in collaboration with the Police Executive

Research Forum (PERF) and with the support of

the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), brought

together public safety specialists with experience

in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Somalia,

Haiti, and Central America. Also participating in

the workshop were Federal Government officials

and researchers who are concerned with building

public safety institutions in conflict areas of the

world. Held on October 6, 1997, the workshop was

the second in a series on civilian policing and international peacekeeping.

Democratic policing

principles elaborated

Professor David H. Bayley, Dean of the School of

Criminal Justice in the State University of New

York at Albany and a leading comparative police

scholar with extensive experience in international

affairs, presented the keynote address. The theme

was rebuilding and reforming police institutions

on the basis of democratic policing principles. The

central question Professor Bayley addressed was

how to define the term “democratic policing.” In

doing so, he focused on identifying elements

common to all democratic police forces around the

world and found two: responsiveness and accountability.

Responsiveness requires that the police take their

cue about what they do from the disaggregate

public—not from the state and not from the government. What problems the public brings to the police

to resolve and how the police respond are a clear

indications of the extent to which democratic policing practices have been adopted.

Similarly, accountability to oversight institutions,

independent of ruling regimes, is an important

underpinning of democratic policing. These institutions may include courts, legislatures, the media,

and complaint review boards or independent

ombudspersons. Democratic police can be distinguished, ultimately, by their submission to and

acceptance of outside supervision and examination.

In seeking to encourage the establishment of police

forces abroad dedicated to responsiveness and accountability, there are four guiding principles. First,

focus on elements critical to democratic policing,

and avoid the temptation to replicate in whole or

in part other existing systems or procedures simply

because they come from police forces in democratic

countries.

Second, recognize that substantive, lasting reform

requires sensitivity to and understanding of local

policing traditions and, more important, the host

country’s basic cultural values. Reform that disregards cultural norms is hazardous and very likely

destined to fail. Similarly, superficial reforms, such

as transfers of advanced technologies to embryonic

police forces, are unlikely to make a significant impact on the ability of the indigenous force to engage

in democratic policing.

Third, recognize that police play a central role in

the political life of any society. As a result, successful reform of the police will require either the active
Overview

2

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support or, at the very least, passive acquiescence of

the political forces in the host nation. Police reform

cannot occur if the host nation’s political powers

are opposed.

Fourth, understand that pressures from competing

constituencies and interests can subvert reform.

These pressures come from various sources, including the imperative for police to provide internal

security to the government, the international law

enforcement community’s conflicting aims, the

personal interests of the individual members of the

indigenous police force, and the diverse interests of

the local population.

Opportunities for

improvement identified

The workshop addressed a range of issues related

to the weaknesses of the United Nations (U.N.)

CIVPOL (civilian police) unit, particularly its inability to provide effective oversight and logistical

support for field operations. Comparable shortfalls

in U.S. support for international policing were identified and evaluated. The need for effective integration of military and civilian policing planning was

accorded special attention by workshop participants. They also made several recommendations for

remedial action on the part of the U.N., as well as

the United States and other member states. These

recommendations merit serious consideration by

governments involved in past and current civilian

police operations called in response to complex

humanitarian emergencies.
David H. Bayley

3

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The Contemporary Practices of

Policing: A Comparative View

David H. Bayley

The purpose of this workshop is to examine what

countries such as ours can do to reconstruct and

reform foreign police forces, when the need arises,

so that they can provide security for their populations in a humane and democratic way. This is a

new mission for the international community, one

that has grown enormously since the end of the

Cold War.1 Efforts to construct an effective but

democratic police come after peacemaking; that is,

after fundamental conditions of security have been

achieved but before responsibility for maintaining it

is returned to the indigenous forces. This rebuilding

and reform is sometimes referred to as institution

building. It constitutes a separate agenda of activities for the international community after military

intervention and the forceful stabilization of domestic security.

In this paper, I will address the issue of rebuilding

and reforming police institutions abroad by examining three topics:

● The varieties of world policing.

● The distinguishing features of democratic policing.

● The process of managing democratic change

abroad.

Varieties of world policing

When I was approached to address this workshop,

I was asked to summarize the varieties of police

experience around the world, evidently in the hope

that this tour d’horizon would help policymakers

understand what models of policing they might

select from and also might need to replace. Frankly,

the more I thought about this idea, the less I liked

it. Classifying police systems globally is an intellectual game that I think is better left to the academics. I say this not because police systems

cannot be classified globally, but because such

schemes will not inform the work of this workshop

in a useful way.

For example, police systems have been classified as

“democratic” as opposed to “colonial,” depending

on whether they were established to serve indigenous populations or to maintain control by foreign

powers. Curiously, Great Britain created the model

for both, which shows the complexity of police history. Another common classification distinguishes

Anglo-Saxon policing (decentralized, accountable

to law, limited in functions, democratically controlled) from Continental policing (centralized rulemaking power, multiple functions, democratic or

authoritarian control) and from communist policing

(centralized, political rather than legal control, omnibus regulatory functions, authoritarian polity).2

I tried my own hand at this several years ago, coming

up with “Anglo-Saxon,” “Authoritarian,” and “Oriental,” the latter category distinguished by the sharing of

responsibility for security between government and

populace in social systems founded on communitarian

as opposed to individualist principles.3

In my judgment, all these schemes are unsatisfactory for informing policy, not because they are

wrong, but because they are arbitrary. The police is

a complex institution; it can be classified in terms

of a very large number of elements. Any method for

classifying police systems depends entirely on the

elements chosen. For example, one arrives at different classification schemes depending on whether

one focuses on the national structure of policing,

involvement of the military, range of functions,

accountability, forcefulness, operational strategies,

recruitment requirements, rank structure, training,

pay and benefits, social composition, equipment,

organizational specialization, and so forth. In the

computer world we are familiar with the expression

“garbage in, garbage out.” The analog here would

be “criteria in, classification out.” To be useful for
The Contemporary Practices of Policing: A Comparative View

4

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policymaking, the classification exercise needs

to be tied to a particular set of interests. Because

reform of the police needs to involve so many

different facets of organization and practice, any

classification scheme is bound to be limited, superficial, arbitrary, and problematic.

Furthermore, all the classification schemes I know

miss what may be the most important trend in

world policing, namely, the rise of private policing.

They do so because they focus on state policing—

on police created by governments. All over the

world, however, in developed and underdeveloped

countries alike, the state is rapidly losing its monopoly on policing; that is, on the task of providing

security.4

 After centuries of increasing state control

of policing, it is now being denationalized. Indeed,

it is only a slight exaggeration to say that the authority to provide security within countries is being

refeudalized among businesses, industrial establishments, gated communities, neighborhood crimeprevention organizations, and for-profit security

services.

This seems to be occurring for three main reasons.

First, fear of crime has increased, sometimes

reflecting genuine crime and disorder crises consequent on rapid social change, at other times reflecting the exploitation of crime by commercial media

in democratic, market-centered economies. Second,

“mass private property” has increased as a result

of the expansion of free-enterprise worldwide.5

(“Mass private property” refers to space used by

the public that is privately owned, such as shopping

malls, banks, office buildings, sports stadiums, and

condominiums.) Although all mass private property

is subject to policing by the state, security is being

provided increasingly in all of it under private auspices. Third, states themselves, paradoxically, are

encouraging communities to participate in policing

through a variety of neighborhood-based crime

prevention programs such as Neighborhood Watch,

civilian patrols, police reserves, crime prevention

councils, and police-citizen problem solving. This

sort of public-state partnership is the hallmark of

policing in Japan, Korea, China, and Singapore, and

has been rediscovered in the West under the banner

of community-oriented policing.

If our purpose in this workshop is to explore how to

create democratic police forces more successfully

abroad, I believe our time is better spent not in

reviewing various classifications of world police

experience but in examining, first, what democratic

policing looks like substantively and, second, what

problems are involved in creating its specific features abroad.

Distinguishing features of

democratic policing

What makes a police force democratic? I think

there are two features—responsiveness and accountability. Everything else is unimportant in the

sense that it may be compatible with both democratic and undemocratic forms of policing.

A police force is democratic when it responds to

the needs of individuals and private groups as well

as the needs of government. Most police forces

in the world are what I call “regime police,” concerned primarily with doing what the government

requires. Democratic police, on the other hand,

orient their activities primarily to the needs of the

disaggregate public. The clearest sign of this orientation is the emergency telephone numbers that citizens may use to call for police assistance. Through

this device, individuals command the services of

government in the form of a uniformed and often

armed police officer who will attend to their immediate problems, whatever they may be. This is a

remarkable development in the evolution of government. It constitutes, I believe, an advance in

civilization.

A democratic police force is organized to be responsive downward; an undemocratic police force

is organized to be responsive upward. I suggest,

therefore, two tests for the “democraticness” of any

police force. First, what proportion of its work is

generated by requests from the disaggregate public?

Second, do people call the police only at times of

desperate need or whenever they feel the need for

authoritative intervention or effective assistance,

regardless of whether laws have been violated?

Although police in the developed democratic countries frequently complain about the burden of responding to trivial calls from the public, I submit

that those calls are a vital indicator of the contribution the police are making to the political health of

the country.
David H. Bayley

5

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The second distinguishing feature of democratic

police forces is that they are accountable to multiple audiences through multiple mechanisms. Police in developed democratic countries are watched

and supervised by elected politicians; by civil,

criminal, and administrative courts; by the media;

and increasingly by independent ombudspersons

and civilian complaint-review boards. All of these

are supported by accountability to written, democratically enacted law. In other words, democratic

police forces are open to monitoring by outsiders.

They may not always like being watched and

second-guessed, but they recognize that this is

inevitable in a democracy. Indeed, reflective police

officers understand that their effectiveness in providing security depends almost entirely on their

willing acceptance of outside supervision.

In this connection, I would suggest that a solid

indicator of the democraticness of the police is

whether a country gives visas to foreigners to study

its police operations, because this suggests openness to outside examination.

In summary, then, our efforts to reform foreign

police forces to make them humane and democratic

should concentrate on making them responsive to

the needs of individuals and private groups and

accountable to multiple external audiences.

Process of managing

democratic change abroad

As foreign reformers try to implement these

changes abroad, they should keep four principles

in mind.

1. Isolate the substance of democratic

policing. First, reformers must separate what is

essential substantively to democratic policing from

what is not. There is a strong tendency for foreign

advisers to advocate the practices they are familiar

with at home. The logic seems to be that since they

come from democratic countries, whatever their police forces do must be in the interests of democracy.

This is what the Allied Powers did in Germany and

Japan after World War II. Indeed, the United States,

Britain, France, and Russia set up replicas of their

own police systems in each of their zones of occupation. As soon as they left, however, both Germans

and Japanese went back to their historical pattern of

organization.

The favorite reforms that American advisers urge

upon foreign police are decentralizing policing to

local control; combining uniformed patrol and

criminal investigation functions within a single

organization; establishing a nonstratified rank

structure, with recruitment only at the bottom

rank; adopting technological modernization; and,

most recently, incorporating community-oriented

policing. Close examination of contemporary and

historical experience will show, however, that

democratic policing is compatible with the absence

of all of these. None of these necessarily leads to

enhanced responsiveness or accountability. Indeed,

technological enhancement and communityoriented policing may in various circumstances be

inimical to the development of democratic policing.

Technology may simply make more efficient a

police force whose primary purpose is serving a repressive regime. It empowers the repressors, not the

forces of democratic evolution. Community policing, too, rather than empowering local communities

vis à vis the police, may become a device for instructing the populace rather than for listening to it.

It becomes an instrument whereby authoritarian

regimes mobilize and monitor populations, as in

Cuba, China, and the former Soviet Union. In short,

American police advisers must understand what is

democratic in what they do at home. Unfortunately,

very few bring this sort of perspective to their

customary activities.

Another feature that American advisers frequently

insist on is the separation of the police from the

military. This is correct and exceedingly important,

in my view. When I recently reviewed the extent to

which the military participated in policing in more

than 120 countries,6

 I found that policing was more

heavily penetrated by the military in Latin America

than in any other region of the world. Only Africa

south of the Sahara came close. Police in the Western democracies, as well as in communist countries,

carefully excluded the military from internal policing. It would appear, therefore, that the separation

of the military from the police is necessary but not

sufficient for enhancing responsiveness and accountability. So reformers must understand that

while penetration of policing by the military inhibits democratic development, separation is not an

end in itself. It is only the beginning of democratic

reform.
The Contemporary Practices of Policing: A Comparative View

6

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2. Balance the democratic with the achievable. Foreign reformers must frame their agenda

carefully. They must avoid doing what is easy but

inconsequential, such as pursuing technological

modernization. And they should avoid what is

impossible because of local traditions. Probably

the most resistant feature of policing, but one

that Americans have insisted on trying to change

abroad, is the national structure of the police. It is

an article of faith among Americans that a decentralized system based on autonomous local police

forces is the hallmark of democracy. This is what

we tried to bring about in Japan and Germany

immediately after World War II, and it is what we

tried again in Bosnia under the Dayton Accords.

I predict that in the latter case, as in the former,

we will fail.

For institutional reform to succeed abroad, we must

study, therefore, what is democratic in our own policing and what is achievable given local traditions

abroad. Both of these require careful comparative

analysis. The implication for reform operations is

that the reform agenda must be carefully planned

before intervening abroad. A successful CIVPOL

operation requires the same sort of advanced planning that the military requires in foreign operations.

Curiously, the American government has a much

greater capacity to anticipate problems of military

involvement where, arguably, it has overwhelming

power, than in civilian involvement, where it has

hardly any power.

3. Keep in mind the link of policing to

politics. Reformers must never forget that policing

cannot be separated from politics. Reform will go

only as far as the local political situation will allow.

If the indigenous government is hostile to the

democratic reform of policing, go home. Democratic reform of the police cannot take place in the

face of undemocratic governments. The police are

not the tail that wags the governmental dog.

At the same time, police can become downwardly

responsible and more widely accountable through

their own actions if governments are either ambivalent

or indifferent to police affairs. Reform requires permission from political regimes, not active direction.

Police officials frequently argue that they cannot

undertake reform unless the political establishment is

engaged. This is an avoidance of responsibility.

Indifference by the political establishment can be an

opportunity. It provides space for courageous leaders

in the police to work. Hostility on the part of government, however, is hopeless. In that case, instituting

reform is like beating a dead horse.

4. Recognize the pressures under which the

police operate. Reformers must recognize the

pressures on any foreign police force, regardless of

local histories, that will inhibit democratic reform.

Police are susceptible to pressure from the following four constituencies, all of them legitimate and

all of them potentially able to impede democratic

reform:

● Governments. Governments always put their own

security interests ahead of the public’s. It is naive

to expect governments that are under violent attack, or the threat of violent attack, not to require

the police to protect them first. One sees this in

Sri Lanka, the Punjab, Israel, Northern Ireland, and

apartheid South Africa. This is not cynical selfishness on the part of political leaders. Reform of

governmental institutions cannot take place unless

there is a stable political center. Unstable governments rarely create democratic police forces.

● The international community. The members of this

community have law enforcement interests that vie

with democratic reform for precedence. The government of the United States, for example, wants to

enlist foreign nations in combating terrorism, drug

trafficking, money laundering, and illegal immigration. Its specialized agencies, such as the FBI,

DEA, and INS, are more interested in maintaining

or establishing close working relations abroad

than in pressing for uncomfortable reforms. The

enhancement of law enforcement capability takes

precedence over democratic reform. Their advocacy is not wrong; they are being true to their

mission. But it means that the international community, including the United States, often sends

conflicting signals to foreign police about what is

important at any given moment. So, too, do international human rights groups. Their pressure for

the investigation of human rights violations and the

prosecution of war criminals supports the effectiveness agenda and, paradoxically, may deflect local

attention, from longer range reforms involving

responsiveness and accountability.
David H. Bayley

7

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● The police themselves. The police themselves have

both corporate and personal interests that must be

served, among them levels of remuneration, immunity from legal harassment, stability of livelihood,

and professional standing within the community.

Policing is an occupation, and its practitioners cannot realistically be expected to be more selfless

than others.

● The public. The agenda of the public rarely coincides altogether with the agendas of any of the previously described constituencies. It overlaps but is

distinct in emphasis, tending to focus on personal

crimes, disorderly events that are inconvenient and

threatening but not necessarily criminal, and services that are urgently required but beyond their

own ability to provide. Unfortunately, this agenda,

which constitutes the heart of democratic police

reform, tends to come last.

The key to democratic reform, therefore, is to move

rapidly from the agendas of the regime, the international community, and the police themselves to the

agenda of the dissagregate public. All are legitimate, all are important. The last, however, may be

the surest way to achieve the others, although it

takes unusual courage on the part of local police

officials to act on this insight.

Conclusion—being smart

To be successful in achieving democratic police reform abroad, foreign CIVPOL agents must, above

all things, be smart. The reform enterprise is highly

demanding intellectually. Reformers need to be

smart about:

● What is essential to democratic policing.

● What is democratic in our own police experience.

● What is unchangeable in local police traditions.

● The connection between politics and policing.

● Our own conflicting pressures on foreign policing.

Democratic police reform abroad is difficult and

demanding. It cannot be successful if its practitioners are intellectually lazy. Although the United

States has the intellectual capacity to succeed in

this enterprise, it will do so only if the issue is

given the attention it deserves.

Notes

1. Myall, James, ed., The New Interventionism, 1991–

1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former

Yugoslavia, and Somalia, LSE Monographs in International Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1996; and Zartman, William, Collapsed States: The

Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority,

Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995.

2. Mawby, R.I., Comparative Policing Issues: The British and American Experience in International Perspective, London: Unwin Hyman, 1990.

3. Bayley, David H., “A World Perspective on the Role

of the Police in Social Control,” in The Maintenance of

Order in Society, Toronto: The Canadian Police College,

1982; and Bayley, David H., Patterns of Policing, New

Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1985.

4. Bayley, David H., and Clifford Shearing, “The Future

of Policing,” Law and Society Review 30 (3) (1996):

585–606.

5. Shearing, Clifford, and Philip Stenning, “Private

Security: Implications for Social Control,” Social Problems 30 (1983): 493.

6. Bayley, David H., “What’s in a Uniform?

A Comparative View of Police-Military Relations in

Latin America,” in Between Public Security and National Security: The Police and Civil-Military Relations

in Latin America, proceedings of the 1994 conference,

Miami, Florida: Florida International University

(forthcoming).
Robert M. Perito

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Managing U.S. Participation in

International Police Operations

Robert M. Perito

More than 3,000 international police officers from

53 countries are currently engaged in United Nations peace operations in 8 countries. The largest

operation is in Bosnia, with 2,027 officers; the

smallest and oldest operation is in Cyprus, with

35 officers. These operations, in which police

from around the world are engaged in monitoring,

mentoring, training, and generally assisting their

local counterparts, provide a useful perspective

from which to view the issues raised in Professor

Bayley’s presentation. While a scholarly analysis

is beyond the scope of these brief remarks, I would

like to make a few observations on how the actual

experience in these operations appears to either

support or raise questions concerning Professor

Bayley’s conclusions. This approach is fair, as Professor Bayley was an active participant in crafting

the U.N. International Police Task Force’s (IPTF’s)

program for police reform in Bosnia.

Defining democratic policing

In a recent address to a United Nations (U.N.)

seminar on the role of police in peacekeeping,

former IPTF Commissioner Peter Fitzgerald

recalled his experience when he informed the

Bosnian police they would have to adopt international police standards. When the Bosnians asked

for a copy of the standards, Fitzgerald and his

fellow IPTF officers, who came from different cultures, traditions, and policing philosophies, discovered that standards varied widely and determined

that there must be something else they had in common. That something was a set of democratic principles that were reflected in the “Commissioner’s

Guidance for Democratic Policing in the Federation

of Bosnia-Herzegovina” in May 1996. Professor

Bayley aided in drafting the “Guidance,” which includes model codes of conduct and guidelines on

how policing should be carried out in a democratic

society. These principles formed the basis of subsequent training programs for the Bosnian police and

are among the most important contributions the

United Nations has made to the peace implementation process in Bosnia. Now when someone asks,

“What is democratic policing?” there is an answer.

Managing democratic

policing

Professor Bayley is both right and wrong about the

approach taken toward managing democratic police

reform in Bosnia. He believes Americans have a

“knee jerk” reaction in favor of decentralization.

In the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, public

security was the responsibility of 10 cantons with

ethnically segregated police forces. IPTF, with strong

U.S. support, used a common police certification

process. U.S. advisers pressed the cantons to adopt

common procedures, standards, and codes of conduct. With U.S. backing, IPTF promoted common

institutions such as a civil disorder management unit

made up of police officers from all cantons and the

Federation. All this was done in an effort to ensure

as much commonality as possible in a situation in

which central control would be anathema.

Before the conflict, the Yugoslavian police force

contained paramilitary units. Consistent with Professor Bayley’s belief in the importance of separating the police from the military, the IPTF program

in Bosnia stressed the importance of creating a

completely civilian police force. This involved rigorous vetting and testing to remove former fighters;

providing new, Western-style civilian police uniforms; and training in respect for human dignity

and basic police skills for every police officer.

It also included visits to Germany and the United

States to introduce the new Bosnian police leadership to community policing. After observing U.S.

police officers operating community centers and

providing other community-related services, some
Managing U.S. Participation in International Police Operations

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of the Bosnians have introduced similar programs

in their own police agencies.

Finally, the international police assistance effort in

Bosnia has been anything but high-tech. U.S. equipment donations have been limited primarily to

training materials and replacements of basic equipment and furniture destroyed during the war. One

U.S. police adviser created a sensation by introducing a preprinted, standard incident report form at

Sarajevo’s Centar Station. The new form replaced

the form previously in use—a blank sheet of paper.

U.N. appeals for international equipment donations

for the police program have gone unheeded. Of necessity, the emphasis has been on low-technology,

labor-intensive efforts such as Community Watch to

deal with a growing crime problem.

Planning police operations

While civilian police in emerging democracies

should be separated from the military, Professor

Bayley was correct in pointing out that international

police operations require a degree of planning equal

to if not greater than international military operations, and that the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is ill equipped to perform

this function. As many speakers noted during the

U.N. seminar referred to earlier, the CIVPOL office

in DPKO is extremely understaffed (there is only

one U.N.-funded position) and overwhelmed by

its “mission impossible” of managing eight police

operations. Seminar speakers noted that DPKO has

no police planners and police officers have been excluded from assessment missions. This is a problem

that should be solved now by member states requiring that the United Nations create and fund positions for the CIVPOL office in DPKO. The first

task of these new police officers would be to develop a generic plan for police operations. The plan

would serve as a template for future operations,

providing an overall framework that could be modified in response to local conditions.

It is also time to address our own shortcomings in

managing U.S. participation in international police

operations. With some 18,000 independent police

departments, the United States has no national

police force to provide expertise and personnel.

Instead, responsibility for policy formulation, organization, implementation, funding, and training for

international police operations—including the raising of U.S. contingents—is divided among the National Security Council, three Federal Government

departments, a large number of bureaus and offices,

and several civilian contractors. This situation is

awkward at best and costly and confusing at worst.

In my view, there is a need to identify one Federal

department in which a single office would be fully

responsible for managing and funding all aspects of

U.S. participation in international police operations.

This unit would be staffed by law enforcement professionals and diplomats with experience in handling international police operations. With our own

house in order, the United States would be better

able to work with Sweden, Canada, and other

countries concerned with improving CIVPOL

operations.

Training for roles and

missions

In my judgment, among the areas that require attention is training for potential CIVPOL officers, particularly training in how to perform their roles and

missions. The common experience of CIVPOL personnel is that they arrive in country, are sent to their

stations, and then spend a good deal of time trying

to figure out what to do. The 5-day orientation that

the United Nations provides for IPTF in Bosnia is a

start, but this needs to be supplemented by training

in the tasks CIVPOL personnel are expected to perform. Such training would require prior agreement

among donor countries on doctrine, standards, and

procedures for operating CIVPOL stations and performing basic tasks. This would take time to work

out, but it is absolutely essential. In peace operations, CIVPOL normally takes months to deploy

and even longer to become operational. By the time

it is functioning effectively, the initial period of the

operation is over, and the best chance for effecting

change is lost.

These recommendations for improving CIVPOL

performance are not expensive nor are they beyond

the capacity of the international community. It

would, however, take political will on the part of

concerned states to effect change. Attendees at the

U.N. seminar on the role of police in peacekeeping

indicated a strong interest in improving CIVPOL

performance. We should take advantage of the

current environment to see what can be done.
Michael Berkow

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Practical Issues in Providing Policing

Assistance Abroad

Michael Berkow

This workshop on civilian policing and international peacekeeping was proposed as a way to bring

to the table some of the various stakeholders in

international policing ventures and examine what

the United States can and should be doing in the

international context. I have been asked to speak to

the practical: What are the issues in the delivery of

police development assistance abroad, and how

can we begin to address them?

I offer my comments in the context of a “growth

industry”: the United States’ role in international

police assistance. That role has grown tremendously since 1986, and it continues to expand.

Expansion covers all aspects of our assistance and

includes State Department aid funneled through

the International Criminal Investigative Training

Assistance Program (ICITAP), State Department

grants to various NGOs in support of specific

projects in selected countries, and training and

assistance provided by the operational agencies

overseas (i.e., the DEA, FBI, and U.S. Customs

Service). In all areas, the U.S. Government is

increasing its assistance to law enforcement

agencies in foreign countries.

Although the U.S. role is a growth industry, we are

operating without either a vision or a business plan.

We are committing increased amounts of money

from myriad agencies and providers—and we are

doing it without agreement on the scope, the intent,

or the desired result, let alone any coordination

or any discussion about what it is that the United

States has to offer other countries in the way of

policing.1

 Moreover, many of the key U.S. players

do not agree on the fundamental aspects of policing

assistance or the ways to deliver it.

Situations calling for

policing assistance

Because of the lack of agreement, I want to start

with the basics—some definitions and specifics of

the different types of policing missions. Why is it

we commit ourselves to policing assistance overseas, and what is it that we strive to do once there?

Broadly speaking, there are two types of situations

in which the U.S. is providing police assistance:

transitional situations and what experts call “complex humanitarian emergencies,” or failed-states

situations. While both have separate and distinct

characteristics, they are not totally unconnected.

Rather, they can occupy different points on a

continuum of policing. This is especially true for

complex humanitarian emergencies: If the rescue

mission is successful, at some point the emergency

will downgrade to a transitional situation.

Transitional situations. Briefly, transitional

efforts involve aid and assistance to a country’s internal security forces (read “police”) as they move

from one political system—communist, socialist,

whatever—to a democratic system based on the

rule of law. Professor Bayley suggests that the two

key features of democratic policing are responsiveness and accountability. I would agree: Democratic

policing means the police are responsive to the laws

of the country and the public—not a specific regime

or government—and they are held accountable for

their actions as measured against the laws of the

state.

Our efforts to assist police agencies in transitional

situations are going on around the world but have

recently been most prominent in Latin America

and in the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the
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former Soviet Union, as well as in Eastern European countries emerging from totalitarian rule.

The common elements of a state where transitional

assistance is being offered are:

● An existing, functioning government.

● An existing, functioning police force of some

type. This police force does not have to be great or

even very effective. It only has to be one in which

people put on uniforms and go to work charged

with the mission of internal or public security.

● The U.S. efforts generally aim to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the other government’s

police force. Examples include provision of training in Honduras to control auto theft or in the

Newly Independent States to control money laundering. There may be a security gap in these countries but there is not an absence of security. We are

not serving as the police nor are we assuming responsibility for law enforcement. Rather, we are

strengthening the local capacity that is already

providing police safety.

As I mentioned, this is both a growing arena and a

confused one. The money is being spread among a

variety of providers but the essential coordination—

what is the goal of our assistance—is not as clear.

For example, in 1997, the State Department in its

State and Local Law Enforcement Programs provided more than $7 million for initiatives ranging

from Project Harmony (law enforcement exchanges

between Russia/Ukraine and police departments

in New England), to Florida State University’s

exchange program and annual seminar with the

Czech Republic, to Connect/US-Russia (a program

focused on domestic violence, with exchanges and

conferences in Moscow and Minnesota). These

projects were in addition to the ICITAP programs

(also funded by the State Department) and the work

being done by the operational agencies in various

countries (for example, $10,000 in crime scene

photography training provided by the FBI to

Antigua or $20,000 in training provided by the

ATF in Bolivia).

Thus, the U.S. Government is throwing millions of

dollars into transitional policing efforts through a

variety of sources but without an overall game plan

or desired end state. What is lacking is an analysis

of the process of managing democratic change

abroad similar to the one Professor Bayley conducted. This is especially true in regard to consideration of what we ought to be helping to create

overseas or, as Professor Bayley put it, “What is the

substance of democratic policing that we ought to

be exporting?”

Complex humanitarian emergencies. But that

is not the primary topic here. We are focused on

the more critical and larger complex humanitarian

emergencies—the situations in which a true crisis

or disaster has occurred. These situations, while not

occurring frequently, tend to be much more costly

and require a more extensive U.S. commitment than

do the situations calling for transitional assistance.

And they tend to have a much higher profile.

We have to agree on what a “complex humanitarian

emergency” is. I would suggest that the best definition is the one provided by Andrew Natsios, who

identified five characteristics that each of these situations possesses with varying degrees of intensity:2

● The most visible characteristic is civil conflict,

which is rooted in traditional ethnic, tribal, or

religious animosities.

● The authority of the national government deteriorates to such an extent that public services disappear and political control over the country passes

elsewhere; for example, to regional centers of

power or warlords.

● Mass population movements occur because internally displaced people and refugees want to escape

conflict or search for food.

● The economic system suffers massive dislocation.

● Food security declines, a situation to which the

first four characteristics contribute.

I cannot say it better than Natsios, who wrote,

“Communal violence is not only the most common

of the five characteristics, but frequently the earliest

sequentially.”

Thus, in these complex humanitarian emergencies,

the key common element is the absence of a safe

and secure environment. This creates an immediate
Michael Berkow

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problem in the attempt to create a democratic police

force. As Professor Bayley pointed out in his paper,

“Reform of governmental institutions cannot take

place unless there is a stable political center.

Unstable governments rarely create democratic

police forces.”

Policing and other assistance

in complex emergencies

The number of complex humanitarian emergencies

is growing, and the U.S. response now includes

police assistance almost as a matter of course. The

past 10 years have seen a number of these major

assistance efforts, starting with Panama in 1989 and

continuing with El Salvador, Somalia, Haiti, and

Liberia—and then Bosnia, which bears elements of

both a failed state and a transitional effort.

Defining the role. In each crisis, we must consider the nature of the policing role that the international community is playing. Are we entering the

country to assume the law enforcement function

(true operational responsibility) or are we expected

to provide assistance to other entities—local entities—that will then undertake the policing chores.

In each of the recent large-scale complex humanitarian emergencies that has included a U.S. policing

response, our role has been different.

In Somalia, the international community program

(and especially the U.S. Government program) consisted strictly of training, assistance, and infrastructure. There was no operational staff, and the U.N.

CIVPOL contingent was neither equipped nor

staffed for law enforcement operations. In contrast,

in the early stages of the Haiti intervention, there

was significant assumption of responsibility for

delivery of law enforcement services by the international community, including certain aspects of the

U.S. assistance. With Bosnia, CIVPOL has returned

to the training/assistance role rather than the provision of law enforcement services.

There are substantial differences between the two

roles—provider of law enforcement services and

provider of training and other transitional assistance. We need to be explicit at the outset about

what role the international police are to assume,

and we need to avoid having our assistance efforts

play roles in which they cannot succeed.

Progression to the transitional stage. I would

suggest that in a perfect world, a complex emergency should serve merely as the starting point on a

continuum that leads to the transitional side of the

equation. If done well, any response to a complex

emergency should result, ultimately, in transitional

assistance as the host country moves out of the

crisis stage.

El Salvador and Panama are key examples of

this progression. Initially, both countries had no

functioning police/internal security force; both had

experienced a major change in political system and

direction; and in both there were major U.S. interests

at stake and hence U.S. commitments. In both countries, our initial efforts were aimed at establishing an

interim security force and then moving to fill the security gap long-term. Finally, in both countries, over

time, our effort has shifted from the creation and

support of a new internal police force to efforts that

enhance, strengthen, and realign the force.

Perspective of the military

My key point in addressing these various roles

is that at the outset of any response to a complex

emergency, the end result must be kept in mind.

We cannot simply focus on the short-term issue

of the security gap at the onset of the problem or,

alternatively, at the onset of U.S. entry into the

problem area.

A number of “fundamental truths” (or “hard

truths”) derive from considering the onset of our

involvement:

● The military drives these major interventions at

the outset. The Department of Defense is the major

player here and the Department of Justice has

tended to be a bit player in the planning and initial

execution.

● That first fundamental, or hard truth, has proven

very problematic for my second hard truth: the military views civilian policing as an exit strategy and

hence does everything in its power to accelerate

effective civilian policing’s arrival/operation.
Practical Issues in Providing Policing Assistance Abroad

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Within that second truth several key points are

hidden:

● The military does not “do” civilian policing or internal security. There may well be a security gap on

the ground, but traditionally the U.S. military does

not want to fill it, even in the short run. This causes

a variety of problems depending on the specific

situation. For example, in Haiti it was a problem

until the interim force had been trained.

Indeed, the primary reason for the creation of an

interim public security force was to fill this initial

“security gap.” Part of the former Haitian military

was recycled into this force because there was no

one else to fill the void. The U.S. military, although

ultimately providing significant assistance to the

interim force, wanted to avoid the public safety

mission. In Somalia, day-to-day public safety was

a constant problem because of the extreme level of

violence coupled with the type of weapons and

their numbers throughout the country.

● Civilian policing is not the same as creating a military force. This fact tends to be ignored. Civilian

policing takes longer. It requires key agreements

with political elements of the host government, the

civilians, and others. If they are developed well,

these agreements provide the foundation for enduring change. The need for speed, however, can prevent them from developing as needed.

From the outset, a public security force is engaged

in its primary mission. As the members of the force

graduate from training and are deployed, they are

“in action.” In contrast, when a military operation

is set up in a foreign country, rarely is the new

military pressed into immediate operation.

Generally, it is standing by, ready to go to work as

needed. Thus, the new policing organization has

no time for rigorous training, testing, “shakeouts,”

practice missions, and the like. It goes to work and

the mistakes it makes during early development are

seen as failures. To be convinced of this, one only

has to read the early reports of the newly created

Haitian police force.

Vastly divergent views. Let me share a short

story that illustrates these different perspectives.3

It involves a writing assignment in which university

students were asked to pair off and work cooperatively to construct a short story. The purpose was to

teach the students something about the importance

of consistent plot and characterization. A woman

and a man paired up, with the following result:

Woman: Eleanor sat with her legs curled under

her. As she watched her teabag steeping,

her mind drifted to thoughts of Peter.

Could relationships really be this difficult? Was it really as arduous a task to

know the soul and heart of another as it

now seemed?

Man: Meanwhile, out in the cosmos, unknown

to Eleanor, on the planet of Zorgan, the

evil Zorgonians were planning an assault

on the earth that would render Eleanor’s

interpersonal difficulties insignificant.

For, in a few moments, Eleanor, Peter,

and all the other luckless inhabitants of

their fair city would be vaporized along

with the other hapless earthlings.

Woman: Fortunately, in Eleanor’s travels as

an astronaut, she had befriended the

Zorgonians and, using her special satellite hookup to Zorgan, she brokered

a peace treaty just moments before

the earth was to be obliterated. The

Zorgonian space crafts returned to their

planet, happy and content that they now

could live peacefully with their sisters

and brothers on earth.

Man: Unfortunately, the Zorgonians were

not to be trusted. After making a loop

around the earth’s moon, they hid on the

dark side, planning their merciless surprise attack.

Woman: I can’t continue this. It is a mockery of

literature . . . and you are an insensitive,

macho jerk.

Man: And you are a neurotic, self-absorbed,

narcissistic navel gazer.

Woman: Jerk!

Man: Idiot!
Michael Berkow

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And so forth. The nature of the communication

between civilian police and the military often resembles this scenario. We do not speak each other’s

language; nor have we created the necessary interface between our senior military command and our

policing institutions. The creation of police forces

in certain foreign cultures is new, and we are struggling to get a handle on it. We are just beginning to

establish the requisite studies and baseline requirements. More importantly, we are wrestling with

the questions that Professor Bayley has focused on:

What are the distinguishing features of democratic

policing and how can we “export” them? The

civilian policing side of the equation is working to

establish its protocol and, as it does so, it must

convince the military of the legitimacy of its

operating style.

This dichotomy of focus takes us back to my story:

the woman wanted to write about relationships; the

man, about action and war. The two do not fit together. The civilian police development experts are

thinking about what will happen down the road and

envisioning the transitional phase; the military is

thinking, “When do we get out of this peacekeeping

role and get back to our primary mission?”

No ready forces for

deployment

Another hard truth about these missions is that on

the civilian police side, two key elements are required: personnel and logistics. Civilian police have

neither ready for immediate deployment; we lack a

surge capacity. A fundamental difference with the

military is that the police are actively engaged in

their primary mission. The military, in contrast, is

training, preparing, and standing ready for their

primary mission—war (national defense). Every

police officer removed from the street of any city

or town is removed from active engagement. In the

military, this would be the equivalent of taking soldiers from the battlefield in the midst of an engagement and sending them elsewhere. Our towns and

cities are our battlefields, and police officers are our

soldiers. We simply do not have personnel who are

not engaged. The transfer of any personnel to foreign duty is a diminution of effort at a time when

the Federal Government, among others, has tried

to increase the numbers of “cops/soldiers” in the

battle. Just consider the billions of dollars provided

by the Federal Government to the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services for hiring

100,000 police officers. The goal was to get more

officers in the field in the United States, not to

provide them for overseas missions.

We do not even have a single pool of police to draw

from—we have no national police force and thus

no trained cadre ready for deployment. Rather, we

have to implore the chiefs of more than 17,000

agencies to give us personnel on “loan,” or we hire

retired officers.

These are critical issues that have not been resolved. In Haiti, for the first time, the United States

committed to provide personnel for the CIVPOL

force tasked with actual operational law enforcement responsibilities. Yet there was (and is) no

system to obtain the appropriate staffing for these

positions. This situation was repeated in Bosnia:

We obtained officers from a variety of locales

across the country on short-term assignments.

Police lack support systems. Civilian policing

also lacks the logistical support to respond to these

situations. The police do not have the field kitchens,

and the water systems, and the portable buildings

that the military have. The police do not have

transport capacity for movement to remote, hostile

locations around the world. Yet most of the major

policing missions have been in exactly these types

of locales. In the absence of developing an independent logistical support system, the police need the

help and support of the military. They need to be

viewed as a critical element of the force package,

not an add on or a burden.

Criminal justice operations

Finally, both the police and the military tend to forget another hard truth: The police are merely one

part of a criminal justice system. You need prosecutors, judges, and prisons to complete the system. In

every mission we have been involved in we forgot,

ignored, or did not deal with this problem at the

outset. It is only after we start policing operations—start arresting people—that we stop and say,

“Oops! We need some judges, some prosecutors,

and some jails.” Our failure to think of the operations as requiring a criminal justice “system”
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creates serious problems in executing the support

activities.

Part of this is extremely unfair to the military. In the

worst situations, it is the military that is first on the

ground. It is the military that must deal with people

who are imprisoned, many times unjustly, in horrific

conditions. In Haiti, it was courageous and thoughtful military officers who dealt with the people imprisoned there. The same was true in Somalia.

Implications for future

operations

In thinking about and improving future civilian policing operations, we might consider the following:

● Encouraging the police and the military to better

understand each other’s systems and capabilities.

The military needs to learn something about civilian policing and vice versa.

● Developing a better sense of who we need and

when we need them in an operation, based on a

hard assessment of the on-the-ground reality. Do

we need regular civilian police? Do we need paramilitary civilian police like the Carabinière? Do we

have the logistical support we need?

● Determining at the outset the specific role of the

international police—support, training and assistance, or actual law enforcement operations—and

providing appropriate staff and equipment.

● Developing the capacity to bring the systems into

play—prisons at the outset and prosecutors/judges/

courts shortly after the police are operational.

● Ensuring that the political will is there—both in the

United States and in the host country—to carry out

the ultimate mission.

As I noted, civilian policing in this context is a

growth industry. Just as the military has truly “gone

to school” on peacekeeping missions amid a recognition that they will be increasingly frequent, so too

will the police need to work on their response to

international peacekeeping missions as an integral,

timely, effective part of the force package. Civilian

policing has a large and growing role in these endeavors, one that we must “get right.”

Notes

1. This last point is addressed very effectively by

Professor Bayley in his paper.

2. Natsios, Andrew, “U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four

Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Humanitarian Relief in

Complex Emergencies,” The Washington Papers, Vol.

170, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1997.

3. I would like to thank Dr. Steven Vicchio for “lending”

me this story.
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Participants’ Comments—

A Summary

Problems in the makeup of

the international civilian

police force

Workshop participants believe the experience in

Bosnia has underscored the need for a more effective international civilian police infrastructure to

organize, direct, and maintain standards for international civilian police deployments. As the Bosnia

operation has demonstrated, the 30-plus participating countries that contributed police “monitors” did

not universally subscribe to a common recruitment

standard, and as a result it was not uncommon for

unqualified personnel to be deployed to the operation. This necessitated the establishment of a timeconsuming vetting process. In addition to language

difficulties (English was the official language of the

mission), some recruits could not meet minimum

standards for policing, such as the ability to drive a

car. Further complicating factors, according to the

workshop participants, include the differing political agendas of some contributing nations, the limited material and financial resources available to

some contingents, and time constraints that affected

the ability to fully train personnel.

Military and civilian

police functions

Panama and Haiti presented different challenges,

according to workshop participants. In both instances, at the time of intervention, primary police

functions were carried out by corrupt, poorly supervised police agencies, which has sometimes been

the case in parts of Latin America and Africa. In

many cases, policing institutions, frequently in collaboration with the military, were directly protecting and sustaining the undemocratic ruling elites.

Privatization of the police

In growing proportions both in the United States

and elsewhere, private security agencies and other

nontraditional policing institutions are promoting

public safety in societies threatened by crime. In

South Africa, Liberia, and a number of other countries, some staff in these private organizations originally were trained by public police agencies. Defections from public police agencies for higher pay in

the private sector may weaken the performance of

public police. The proliferation of private police

may also fragment spans of control and weaken the

perceived legitimacy of regular civilian police. Participants felt that while private police may contribute to a higher level of law and order, at least in

some areas, they may also contribute to diminished

authority of the public police and, by extension,

already fragile governing institutions.

Technology

In many complex emergency situations, police

needs are frequently at the low end of the technology spectrum. Haiti in the period 1994 to 1996 was

cited by participants as a classic example. With the

removal of the military establishment and creation

of a national civilian police force, the basic support

requirement was for uniforms; vehicles; radios (the

police have few telephones); and riot control gear

such as shields, batons, and other basic equipment.

Advanced technology could not be used effectively

in the emergent police force, and when it was, it

was frequently not cost-effective. For rural police,

for example, horses and bicycles were preferable

to motor vehicles. Because of the difficulty of

maintaining vehicles in less developed areas of the

world, and because of the poor state of the roads in

many rural areas in those countries, motor vehicles

are frequently not the best way to provide local

police with reliable transport to reach the bulk of

the population.
Participants’ Comments—A Summary

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Postoperation diagnosis

Several participants voiced concern about the absence of a centralized U.S. authority to monitor performance and measure outcomes to create effective

and responsive local police abroad. The U.S.

military’s “lessons learned” process is exceptionally

valuable in capturing useful knowledge from past

U.S. military operations. However, these participants say there is no system that can provide comparable information for nonmilitary operations.

They cited legislative constraints as part of the reason, and the absence of central oversight authority

within the executive branch of the U.S. Government

as another part. They felt serious consideration

should be given to corrective legislation, but pending that development, some additional analysis and

evaluation capability could be introduced.

The justice triad

Participants noted that a one-dimensional approach

relying primarily or exclusively on postcrisis development of the police will invariably fail if two other

institutional requirements—development of an

independent judiciary and development of an effective penal system—are not met. Frequently, priority

is given by the intervening international community

to civilian police reform, with penal and judicial

matters treated as marginal issues. For example, the

failure of the Somali police, despite their best intentions, is partially attributable to the absence of the

penal and judicial “legs” in the justice triad.

According to workshop participants, there were

comparable shortcomings in contemporary Haiti

and Bosnia. Contributing to this absence of a balanced triad are the personnel and institutional gaps

in the international agencies and governments

responsible for the intervention.

Strategic and operational

integration

In many complex emergency and humanitarian

assistance situations, the United States and various

international agencies must likely deal with a mix

of failed governments and collapsed institutions.

Security for the intervening forces, or “force protection,” will compete for resources needed to provide extensive and abundant humanitarian relief.

It can be expected in the initial phase of operations

that military peacekeeping forces will be present,

along with civilian U.N. assets, nongovernmental

and international organizations and, perhaps, indigenous resources and personnel. This collection of

assets, capabilities, interests, agendas, and programs must be coordinated and priorities established. This in turn requires some measure of

strategic planning to determine the roles and

missions of participants, including those of international civilian police. Concomitantly, the establishment of an effective multinational police force

requires that agreement on standardized street-level

and patrol procedures be reached by all contributing

national police forces. Establishing this coordination at both the strategic and the tactical level will

prove to be the challenge.
19

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Compendium of Participants’ Views

“Police skills are fundamentally different from those that we train our

soldiers in.”

Robert E. Houdek

“Police can undermine democracy and they can reinforce it, but they

cannot create it.”

David H. Bayley

“One of the things we need in Washington is what I refer to as the ‘center of gravity’ in terms of centralizing and coordinating our [international

policing] activities.”

William Lewis

“This business of ‘feudalization’ of private law enforcement is an amazing phenomenon. And it’s really making life a lot more difficult for us.”

Robert Perito

“The only tradition that exists in policing in many countries is the

military one. . . . But you have got to tell them that policing is not a war.

Policing is something else.”

Rachel Neild

“The police in Bosnia are not going to change until the entire criminal

justice system has moved in the right direction.”

Bob Edwards

“I think we need to be careful about simply assuming that, for example,

community policing works well in Prince George’s County [in the

United States]; therefore, we will send it to Bosnia and do it over there.”

Chuck Wexler
21

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Workshop Agenda

Appendix A: Workshop Agenda

9 a.m. Welcome and Introduction

Mark Sakaley, Acting Director

National Institute of Justice International Center

Joe Montville, Director, Preventive Diplomacy Program

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Dr. Chuck Wexler, Executive Director

Police Executive Research Forum

 9:15 a.m. Opening Remarks: “Cops and Crises”

Ambassador Robert E. Houdek, Adviser to USAID Greater Horn of Africa

Initiative and former Ambassador to Eritrea and Uganda

 9:30 a.m. Keynote: “The Contemporary Practices of Policing: A Comparative View”

Dr. David H. Bayley, Dean, School of Criminal Justice

State University of New York at Albany

 10:30 a.m. Responses to Keynote and Group Discussion

Moderator: Dr. William Lewis

Professor Emeritus, George Washington University

Donna Hansen, Former Chief, Fort Myers [Florida] Police Department

Former Chief, Support Unit, International Police Task Force, United

Nations, Zagreb, Croatia

Robert Perito, Deputy Director

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)

U.S. Department of Justice

Rachel Neild, Senior Associate

Washington Office on Latin America

 12 noon Lunch and Presentation: “Is There International Police Power?

The Legal Basis for International Intervention”

Introduction: James Burack, Counsel, Police Executive Research Forum

Colonel F.M. Lorenz, U.S. Marine Corps, Industrial College of the Armed Forces

National Defense University
Appendix A

22

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Appendix A: Workshop Agenda

1 p.m. Discussion: “Civilian Policing—Across the Spectrum of Crisis”

Moderator: Ambassador Edward Marks (ret.)

Michael Berkow, Chief, South Pasadena [California] Police Department

Former Police Project Manager in Somalia and Haiti for ICITAP, U.S. Department of Justice

Colonel Larry Forster, U.S. Army

Director, U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute

Colonel Michael J. Dziedzic, U.S. Air Force

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

2:15 p.m. Adjournment
23

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Appendix B: Biographies of Presenters

David Bayley is dean and professor in the School

of Criminal Justice, State University of New York at

Albany. A specialist in international criminal justice

with a particular interest in policing, he has conducted extensive research in India, Japan, Australia,

Canada, Britain, Singapore, and the United States.

Professor Bayley’s research on policing has focused

on strategies of policing, the evolution of police organizations, organizational reform, accountability,

and the tactics of patrol officers in discretionary law

enforcement situations. Recently he served as a

consultant to the U.S. Government and the United

Nations on police reform in Bosnia. His most recent book, Police for the Future, is based on field

research in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Japan,

and the United States. Professor Bayley holds a

B.A. degree from Denison University, an M.A.

degree from Oxford University, and a Ph.D. from

Princeton.

Michael Berkow is the police chief of Coachella,

California. He served previously as Police Project

Manager in Somalia and Haiti for the International

Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program

of the U.S. Department of Justice. In the missions

to both countries he was responsible for creating

police academies, providing technical assistance,

and helping to establish local civilian police forces.

He spent 13 years with the Rochester [New York]

Police Department, leaving with the rank of lieutenant. He was an adjunct professor at the State University of New York-Brockport and taught at a

number of police academies and other institutions,

including the Connecticut State Police Academy,

the Orlando [Florida] Police Academy, and

Northwestern University. Chief Berkow received a

bachelor’s degree from Kalamazoo College in arts,

sociology, and public policy; and a J.D. from Syracuse University. He also is a graduate of the FBI

National Academy.

James Burack is Counsel with the Police Executive Research Forum. He participated in two U.S.

State Department projects related to the United

Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) in

Bosnia, including working on recruitment and

selection issues for the U.S. contingent, managing

technical assistance provided to the IPTF, and

serving briefly with the IPTF planning staff in

Sarajevo. Before assuming a position with PERF,

he was a Marine Corps judge advocate and served

as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney. He is currently

serving as a civil affairs officer in the Marine Corps

Reserve. Mr. Burack was a patrol officer with the

Westminster [Colorado] Police Department for 4

years and graduated from the Senior Management

Institute for Police. He received an A.B. degree in

government and history from Dartmouth College

and a J.D. degree from the University of Colorado.

Michael Dziedzic is currently a senior military fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies,

where his principal issue areas are peace operations

and security affairs in the Western Hemisphere. Previously, he was a member of the faculty at the National War College. He also served as air attache in

El Salvador from 1992 to 1994, during the implementation of the peace accords. Before that posting,

he was a political-military planner in the Western

Hemisphere Division of the Air Staff (1992), a tenured professor in the Department of Political Science of the U.S. Air Force Academy (1988 to

1991), and a visiting fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (1987 to 88).

His writings include Mexico: Converging Challenges and a number of articles on Mexican defense

policy, the transnational drug trade, hemispheric

security matters, and current

U.S. peace operations.

Larry Forster is director of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute. Colonel Forster has been commander of the Military Coordination Center in

Zakho, Iraq; Provost Marshal/Force Protection Officer in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, Rwanda;

and a U.N. military observer in the Sinai and Lebanon. As a Military Police (MP) officer, he was chief

of MP operations for U.S. Army Europe; Commander of the 701 MP Battalion; Director of Law

Enforcement/Commander of the 291 MP Company,

Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; Provost Marshal of the

Yakima Firing Center; and Provost Marshal, Pleiku

Province, Vietnam. From 1995 to 1996 he was a

fellow at the Harvard Center of International Affairs

and taught history at the U.S. Military Academy at

West Point. Colonel Forster earned an M.A. degree
Appendix B: Biographies of Presenters

24

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in criminal justice from John Jay College of Criminal Justice and an M.A. degree in history from the

University of California, Davis. He also is a 1988

graduate of the FBI National Academy.

Donna Hansen, a consultant in criminal justice,

recently returned from a 1-year assignment in the

former Yugoslavia, where she served as chief of the

U.N. Support Unit. In that capacity she was responsible for the training and rotation of more than

2,000 international civilian police who monitored

the activities of local police in three U.N. missions.

Ms. Hansen’s law enforcement career includes

4 years as the chief of police for the City of Fort

Myers, Florida, and 21 years with the Metro-Dade

Police Department, Miami, Florida. Ms. Hansen

holds an M.A. degree from Florida International

University and is a graduate of the Southern Police

Institute Senior Management Program.

Robert E. Houdek is an adviser to the USAID

Greater Horn of Africa Initiative and former U.S.

ambassador to Eritrea and Uganda. Ambassador

Houdek returned to the United States in 1996 to

assume his current position after having served 3

years as the first U.S. ambassador to Eritrea. Before

his posting there, he served as the Deputy Assistant

Secretary of State for African Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Ambassador Houdek has served in

Belgium, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Jamaica, Kenya,

Uganda, and Ethiopia. In 1991, he was awarded the

President’s Exceptional Service medal for his role

in evacuating Ethiopian Jews to Israel in the last

days of the Ethiopian civil war. In 1997 Ambassador Houdek was on special assignment in Eastern

Zaire, where he served as a negotiator and liaison

officer for an AID Disaster Assistance Response

Team that was assisting in the evacuation of

Rwandan refugees and the resettlement of Congolese people internally displaced by the civil war.

William Lewis is professor emeritus in political

science and international relations at George Washington University, where he taught from 1978 to

1994. He was the founder and director of the Security Studies Program and was a visiting professor at

the University of Michigan and Georgetown University. In addition to having served as Deputy

Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance,

U.S. Department of State, he was assigned to the

policy planning staff in the Office of the Secretary

of Defense, the Presidential Task Force on Foreign

Aid, and the State-Defense Departments strategy

planning group. He currently provides consulting

services to several government and research institutions, including the U.S. Departments of State

and Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency, Science Applications, Inc., and CSIS. He

is a graduate of Johns Hopkins University and received a doctorate from The American University.

Frederick M. Lorenz is a colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps. He currently occupies the Marine Chair

at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. He served as the senior

legal adviser in Somalia for Operation Restore

Hope from 1992 to 1993 and for United Shield in

1995, and was on the legal staff of Operation Joint

Endeavor in Sarajevo in early 1996. Colonel Lorenz

has lectured and written widely on operational law

issues such as the rules of engagement and the use

of force in peacekeeping operations. As a Marine

judge advocate, he has held a wide variety of positions, including prosecutor, defense counsel, military

judge, and rifle company commander. Additional

assignments, focusing on environmental law issues,

led to his current research on international environmental security. Colonel Lorenz received his undergraduate and law degrees from Marquette University

and a Master of Law degree from George Washington University.

Edward Marks retired in 1995 from the U.S. Foreign Service with the rank of Minister-Counselor in

the Senior Foreign Service. His most recent assignments were as Visiting Senior Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the

National Defense University, Deputy U.S. Representative to the Economic and Social Council of

the United Nations, Deputy Chief of Mission in Sri

Lanka and the Republic of Maldives, Senior Visiting Fellow at CSIS, Deputy Director of the Office

for Combating Terrorism and Emergency Planning,

and Ambassador to Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.

Ambassador Marks continues to provide consulting

services to INSS; CSIS; Booz, Allen and Hamilton;

Cubic International; and the U.N. Development

Fund. He received his bachelor’s degree from the

University of Michigan and his master’s degree

from the University of Oklahoma. He is also a

graduate of the Foreign Service Institute and the
25

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National War College. Ambassador Marks has

taught at New York University and served in the

U.S. Army.

Joe Montville is the Director of CSIS’s Preventive

Diplomacy Program, which specializes in community-building and support of peacemaking in

countries affected by serious ethnic conflict. Mr.

Montville was a career diplomat, serving in Iraq,

Lebanon, Libya, and Morocco. He spent a year in

Egypt as a Fulbright Scholar. At the State Department, Mr. Montville was regional policy adviser in

the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

and was Near East Division Chief and Director,

Office of Global Issues, in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He also was research director

at the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs at the

Foreign Service Institute. Mr. Montville has been a

consultant to the Department of Defense and currently cochairs a State Department open forum

working group on conflict resolution, civil society,

and democracy. During the past 15 years, Mr.

Montville has been developing expertise in and

writing about cultural diversity and ethnic conflict

resolution theory and practice. His field work has

included South Africa, Slovakia, Serbia, Slovenia,

Croatia, Northern Ireland, Russia, the Baltic countries, Romania, Hungary, Cyprus, and the Middle

East. A founding member of the International Society of Political Psychology, Mr. Montville is also

author and editor of Conflict and Peacemaking in

Multiethnic Societies and coeditor of The Psychodynamics of International Relationships. He holds

faculty appointments at the Center for the Study of

Mind and Human Interaction at the University of

Virginia Medical School and, as a lecturer on

psychiatry, at the Harvard Medical School. Mr.

Montville graduated from Lehigh University and

did graduate work at Harvard and Columbia Universities.

Rachel M. Neild is a Senior Associate with the

Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), a

nonprofit organization that promotes international

and national policies to advance human rights, democracy, and social and economic justice in Latin

America and the Caribbean. Ms. Neild is responsible for WOLA’s work on comparative issues in

police reform in Haiti and edits Enlace, a quarterly

Spanish-language bulletin. She has published

numerous papers and two major reports on police

reform in Haiti and edited “Demilitarizing Public

Order; the International Community, Police Reform

and Human Rights in Central America and Haiti.”

She also has written reports on human rights training programs of the U.S. military and on human

rights and democratization issues in Chile and Paraguay. Ms. Neild has a master’s degree in international affairs from the University of Colombia, and

a bachelors’ degree in philosophy and literature

from the University of Manchester. She previously

worked with the Comision Andina de Juristas in

Lima, Peru; the Inter-American Institute for Human

Rights in San Jose, Costa Rica; and Americas

Watch [now Human Rights Watch/Americas] in

Washington, D.C., and New York.

Robert Perito is Deputy Director of the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance

Program (ICITAP), U.S. Department of Justice.

He is retired from the State Department, where he

served in numerous diplomatic posts around the

world.

Chuck Wexler is the Executive Director of the

Police Executive Research Forum. He previously

worked for the Boston Police Department, where he

helped develop and manage the community disorders unit, which earned a national reputation as a

model for the investigation and prosecution of racially motivated crime. He also headed the professional development division for the International

Association of Chiefs of Police. In addition, he

served as special assistant to the Nation’s first

“drug czar,” managed a national project for the

President’s Drug Advisory Council, and worked for

the Partnership for a Drug-Free America, where he

collaborated with major corporations on the drugfree workplace initiative. Dr. Wexler earned a

bachelor’s degree from Boston University, a

master’s degree in criminology from Florida State

University, and a doctorate in urban studies and

planning from the Massachusetts Institute of

Technology.
27

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Appendix C: Workshop Attendees

Professor David Bayley

Dean, School of Criminal Justice

State University of New York at Albany

135 Western Avenue

Albany, NY 12222

518–442–5214

518–442–5212 (Fax)

Chief Michael Berkow

South Pasadena Police Department

1422 Mission Street

South Pasadena, CA 91030

818–799–1121

818–441–3985 (Fax)

mjberkow@earthlink.net

Mr. Anne Willem Bijleveld

Representative, United Nations

High Commissioner on Refugees

1775 K Street N.W., Suite 300

Washington, DC 20006

202–296–5191

202–296–5660 (Fax)

usa.wa@unhr.ch

Mr. Jim Burack

Counsel

Police Executive Research Forum

1120 Connecticut Avenue N.W., Suite 930

Washington, DC 20036

202–466–7820

202–466–7826 (Fax)

jburack@PoliceForum.org

Mr. Ray Dalland

International Security and Peacekeeping

Bureau of Political and Military Affairs

U.S. Department of State

2201 C Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20520

202–736–7747

202–647–4055 (Fax)

Colonel Michael Dziedic

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Fort McNair S.W.

Washington, DC 20319–6000

202–685–2220

Ms. Wendy Eaton

Defense Forecasting, Inc.

21 Dupont Circle N.W.

Washington, DC 20036

202–785–9041

Mr. Bob Edwards

943 Jennifer Street

Incline Village, NV 89451

702–832–7181

702–832–7191 (Fax)

Mr. Steven Edwards

Program Manager

Office of Research and Evaluation

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington DC 20005

202–307–0500

202–307–6394 (Fax)

Colonel Larry Forster

Director

U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute

Army War College

Carlisle, PA 17013–5050

717–245–3740

717–245–3279 (Fax)

forsterl@csl-emh1.army.mil

Mr. Eliot M. Goldberg

National Defense University

Fort McNair, Bldg. 62 S.W.

300 Fifth Avenue

Washington, DC 20319–5066

202–685–2375

202–685–3972 (Fax)

goldberge@ndu.edu
Appendix C: Workshop Attendees

28

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Ms. Donna Hansen

P.O. Box 247

Ft. Myers, FL 33902

hansup@worldnet.att.net

Mr. Glenn Hodes

Research Analyst

Overseas Development Council

1875 Connecticut Avenue N.W.

Washington, DC 20009

202–234–8701

202–245–0067 (Fax)

hodes@odc.org

Ambassador Robert E. Houdek

2030 Rhode Island Avenue

McLean, VA 22101

703–534–4761

703–534–9170 (Fax)

Ms. Ruby Kahn

Center for Strategic and International Studies

1800 K Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20036

202–775–3179

202–775–3199 (Fax)

rdk@csis.org

Mr. Robert J. Kaminski

Social Science Analyst

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

202–616–9135

202–307–6394 (Fax)

rkaminski@aol.com

Ms. Lorelei E. Kelly

Research Fellow

Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiations

Stanford University

Stanford, CA 94305–8610

650–723–2574

650–723–9421

Dr. William Lewis

Professor Emeritus

1101 S. Arlington Ridge Road, #307

Arlington, VA 22202

703–521–0881

Colonel Fred Lorenz, USMC

Industrial College of the Armed Forces

Fort McNair S.W.

Washington, DC 20319

202–685–4202

202–685–4175 (Fax)

lorenzf@ndu.edu

Ambassador Edward Marks (ret.)

2737 Devonshire Place N.W.

Washington, DC 20008

202–588–1632

edwardmarks@msn.com

Mr. Bill Maudlin

Administrator, International Programs

International Association of Chiefs of Police

515 Washington Street

Alexandria, VA 22314

703–836–6767, ext. 325

703–836–4543 (Fax)

Mr. Sam McQuade

Social Science Program Manager

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington DC 20531

202–307–0200

202–307–6394 (Fax)

Ms. Johanna Mendelson

USAID/BHR/OTI

Room 5314A NS

U.S. Department of State

2201 C Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20523–0059

202–647–3990

202–647–0218 (Fax)

Mr. David C. Mitchell

Policy and Missions Office

Secretary of Defense

Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

2500 Defense Pentagon, Room 2B525

Washington, DC 20301–2500

703–693–2897

703–693–0615 (Fax)

mitchellda@osd.pentagon.mil
29

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Mr. Joe Montville

Director

Preventive Diplomacy Program

Center for Strategic and International

Studies

1800 K Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

202–775–3277

202–775–3199 (Fax)

jvm@csis.org

Ms. Rachel Neild

Senior Associate

Washington Office on Latin America

400 C Street N.E.

Washington, DC 20002

202–544–8045

Ms. Diane Paul

Human Rights Watch

321 St. Dunstans Road

Baltimore, MD 21212

410–323–1055

410–435–8003 (Fax)

pauls@charm.net

Mr. Robert Perito

Deputy Director

International Criminal Investigative

Training Assistance Program

U.S. Department of Justice

1331 F Street N.W., 5th Floor

Washington, DC 20004

202–305–4234

202–616–8429 (Fax)

Mr. Richard Rankin

Program Manager

BETAC International Corporation

2001 N. Beauregard Street

Suite 1100

Alexandria, VA 22311

703–824–3207

703–825–3130 (Fax)

Mr. Mark Sakaley

Acting Director

International Center

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

202–305–2698

202–307–6394 (Fax)

sakaleym@usdoj.gov

Mr. Thomas Schiller

International Networking Liaison

National Criminal Justice Reference

Service

Aspen Systems Corporation

2277 Research Boulevard

Rockville, MD 20850

202–305–1294

301–519–5932

301–519–5313 (Fax)

tschiller@ncjrs.org

schiller@ojp.usdoj.gov

Mr. Frank Severs

Assistant to Head of Delegation

International Committee of the Red Cross

2100 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Suite 545

Washington DC 20037

202–293–9430

303–293–9431 (Fax)

Lieutenant Colonel Louis Thompson

Senior Fellow

Atlantic Council

910 17th Street N.W., 10th Floor

Washington, DC 20006

202–778–4980

202–463–7240 (Fax)

lthompson@acgate.acus.org

Mr. J. Matthew Vaccaro

OAS S&R PK-HA

Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs

U.S. Department of Defense

2900 Defense Pentagon

Washington, DC 20301–2900

703–614–0446

703–614–0442 (Fax)

jmvaccaro@aol.com
Appendix C: Workshop Attendees

30

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Ms. Heather Ward

Vera Institute of Justice

377 Broadway

New York, NY 10013

212–334–1300

212–941–9407 (Fax)

hward@vera.org

Colonel Kim Ward

Baltimore County Police Department

700 East Joppa Road

Towson, MD 21286

410–887–2206

410–887–4581 (Fax)

kimward@bellatlantic.net

Mr. Chuck Wexler

Executive Director

Police Executive Research Forum

1120 Connecticut Avenue N.W., Suite 930

Washington, DC 20036

202–66–7820

202–466–7826 (Fax)

cwexler@policeforum.org

Dr. Susan Woodward

Foreign Policy Studies

Brookings Institution

1771 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.

Washington, DC 20036

202–797–6092

202–797–6003 (Fax)

swoodward@brook.edu

Mr. Donald Zoufal

General Counsel

Chicago Police Department

111 South State Street, Suite 400

Chicago, IL 60605

312–747–7972

312–747–2430 (Fax)
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