SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3315-18T3

ALBERTO TRONCOSO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SAMIRA ZAMEL,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________

Argued telephonically May 13, 2020 –

Decided June 9, 2020

Before Judges Whipple, Gooden Brown, and Mawla.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, 

Docket No. FM-07-2327-06.

Paul C. Lomberg argued the cause for appellant 

(Lomberg & DelVescovo, LLC, attorneys; Paul C. 

Lomberg and Francine DelVescovo, on the briefs).

Brian M. Schwartz argued the cause for respondent 

(Schwartz Vinhal & Lomurro Family Law, LLC, 

attorneys; Brian M. Schwartz, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
A-3315-18T3 2

Defendant Samira Zamel appeals from a February 25, 2019 order entered 

following a post-judgment plenary hearing, adjudicating the parties' obligation 

for college expenses, child support, medical insurance, and counsel fees. 

Defendant also challenges an April 26, 2019 order addressing her obligation to 

reimburse plaintiff Alberto Troncoso for these expenses. We affirm.

The parties divorced in 2009 following a nearly fourteen-year marriage, 

which produced a son and a daughter, who are now twenty-one and nineteen 

years of age, respectively. Pursuant to the parties' Matrimonial Settlement 

Agreement (MSA), plaintiff paid defendant $2166 per month in child support 

from January 2009 to January 2011, based on an agreed upon gross income of 

$500,000 for plaintiff and no earned income for defendant. Thereafter, in 

accordance with the MSA, plaintiff agreed to pay defendant $3000 per month 

in child support from 2011 to 2016. This sum was based on plaintiff's gross 

income of $500,000, and an agreed upon imputed income for defendant of 

$45,000. The MSA stipulated the parties could apply to modify child support 

after January 2011 based upon a substantial change in circumstances. 

Under the MSA, plaintiff also paid defendant term alimony starting at 

$180,000 per year for two years following the divorce, and thereafter reducing 

to $90,000 per year plus fifteen percent of plaintiff's earnings over $350,000 

until 2015, at which point alimony terminated. Alimony was based on an 
A-3315-18T3 3

imputed income of $45,000 to defendant, and the parties agreed she could earn 

up to $100,000 per year without her earnings triggering an alimony 

modification. The MSA imputed income to defendant because she was 

unemployed at the time of the divorce, having left her career in corporate 

finance after the birth of the parties' daughter. Defendant enrolled in nursing 

school in 2015, and in July 2017, commenced full-time employment as an 

emergency room nurse. 

Pertinent to the issues raised on this appeal, the MSA also stated: 

6.1(D). Upon graduation from high school of any 

child, the amount of child support shall be reviewed 

by the parties taking into consideration the parties'

respective contribution to post-secondary education, 

the parties' respective incomes and the Child Support 

Guidelines, effective at that time as adopted by the 

State of New Jersey.

. . . . 

6.3. The parties acknowledge that each of them shall 

have an obligation to contribute toward the 

undergraduate college, junior college, vocational or 

trade school education of any child of the 

marriage . . . . Such payments shall include all 

necessary charges for application fees, pre-admission 

standardized tests, tuition, room, board, activity fees, 

lab fees, books and supplies, transportation, etc. . . . 

The proportion of each party's contribution toward 

such expenses shall be governed by the factors as set 
A-3315-18T3 4

forth in Newburgh v. Arrigo1 or other statutory and 

case law that may then exist. 

. . . .

6.4(D). It is the expectation of the parties that 

[defendant] shall obtain employment for which she 

receives a wage. 

. . . . 

6.9. Work-related child care. Should the [defendant] 

obtain full time employment, which employment 

requires reasonable work-related child care with an 

accredited or otherwise agreed-upon child care 

provider, [plaintiff] shall pay [sixty-six percent] of 

said cost directly to the provider, and the [defendant] 

shall pay [thirty-four percent] of said cost. The 

percentage contribution toward child care may be 

reviewed and reallocated at any time alimony and/or 

child support is reviewed and/or reallocated. 

The parties' son enrolled at Rutgers University beginning in Fall 2017, 

and in September 2017 plaintiff moved to enforce the college contribution 

provision of the MSA and modify child support due to the son's residence on 

campus. Defendant cross-moved to deny the motion and compel plaintiff to 

pay the college expenses in full and continue paying her $3000 per month in 

child support. Alternatively, defendant sought an increase in child support if

the court determined both parties were to contribute to college, arguing the 

parties' son would be home 177 days during the school year. She also argued 

 

1 88 N.J. 529 (1982). 
A-3315-18T3 5

an increase was warranted based on a change in circumstances, including the 

children's maturation and the termination of alimony. 

The trial judge conducted a three-day plenary hearing, during which 

each party testified and entered the February 2019 order, making all relief 

retroactive to the motion filing date. The judge ordered: (1) the parties to pay 

college expenses for their son in proportion to their income, allocating eightythree percent of expenses to plaintiff and seventeen percent to defendant; (2) 

child support of $458 per week; (3) plaintiff continue to pay for the children's 

automobile, extracurricular, cellular telephone, computer, college prep and 

tutor, medical and dental insurance, and unreimbursed medical expenses; (4) 

defendant pay $10,000 representing twenty-five percent of plaintiff's counsel 

fees; and (5) if the parties could not agree on a payment schedule for the 

college costs and reimbursement of child support, they could submit 

certifications setting forth their proposed repayment schedules for the judge to 

decide. 

The judge also issued detailed written findings. She addressed each 

Newburgh factor and concluded the factors favored defendant's contribution to 

the college expense. She stated:

The only real issue regarding the cost of the 

children's education is that the [d]efendant thought 

that she did not have to pay her fair share of the cost 

because she believed that [p]laintiff was going to pay 
A-3315-18T3 6

for the entire cost for both children. . . . There was 

nothing in the proofs presented at the [p]lenary 

[h]earing or in the parties' MSA that would lead 

anyone, including the [d]efendant, to believe that the 

[p]laintiff planned to pay for the entire cost of college 

without some contribution from the [d]efendant. 

Also, [d]efendant lacked credibility when 

discussing her financial information. Defendant 

intentionally misrepresented facts in her initial 

[c]ertification filed with the court. For example, 

[d]efendant alleged that she was unable to maintain 

employment earlier than 2017, because no provision 

had been made for work related childcare in the MSA. 

Paragraph 6.9 of the parties' MSA specifically 

provides for a [sixty-six percent]/[thirty-four percent]

allocation of work[-]related childcare expenses. 

Defendant represented to the court that [p]laintiff had 

unilaterally set up tutors for [the son]. Several text 

exchanges were provided to the court, which clearly 

showed [d]efendant's involvement in the selection and 

scheduling of tutoring. Defendant represented to the 

court that [p]laintiff did not approach her about the 

college decision process until [the son] had decided to 

attend Rutgers. Again, text messages were provided 

to the court that showed [p]laintiff approached 

[d]efendant regarding college selection as early as 

February 2016. 

Defendant provided conflicting accounts in her 

Case Information Statement [CIS]. In her May 14, 

2018 CIS, [d]efendant claims that her extra expenses 

for the children amount to [$4285] per month. Upon 

cross-examination of her testimony, many of the 

expenses [d]efendant claimed as extra expenses were 

already being paid by [p]laintiff, including car 

insurance for the children, car payment for [the son], 

vacations, weekly spending money and college costs. 

. . . Defendant claimed expenses she never incurred 

and that she tried to have this court believe that she 
A-3315-18T3 7

only earned $29,000 per year when in fact, that 

amount constituted her salary for less than one-half of 

the year. Her projected income for 2018 based upon 

her weekly salary is approximately $71,500[], not the 

$29,000 that she claimed. . . .

In determining each parties' responsibility in 

relation to [the son]'s college tuition and costs, the 

[c]ourt calculated the proportionate share based on the 

parties' incomes for 2018 attributing $465,423[] that 

he earned in 2017 to [p]laintiff and $71,500[] to 

[d]efendant . . . . Accordingly, [p]laintiff shall pay 

[eighty-three percent] of [the son]'s college costs and 

tuition per year and [d]efendant shall pay [seventeen 

percent] of [the son]'s college tuition and costs per 

year, which the [c]ourt finds is affordable for 

[d]efendant to pay. The cost of tuition at Rutgers is 

$29,088[] per year, and [d]efendant's [seventeen 

percent] share of the cost is approximately [$4900] per 

year. Defendant would have to pay approximately 

$412.00 per month, which is affordable for the 

[d]efendant. 

The judge addressed each factor of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) governing 

child support and concluded the factors favored plaintiff. She found:

The parties' son . . . is in college and resides 

there during the school year with the exceptions of

some weekends and the [p]laintiff pays for many of

the expenses that are provided for in the [g]uidelines 

or that the [d]efendant would have a responsibility to 

contribute. Instead of seeking contribution, [p]laintiff

has decided not to require contribution from the 

[d]efendant to pay those expenses she would be 

responsible to pay under the parties' MSA and the . . . 

[g]uidelines. In addition, it is clear to the [c]ourt that

the parties followed the . . . [g]uidelines in 

establishing the initial [c]hild [s]upport and the 

increase that was effective on January 15, 2011. The 
A-3315-18T3 8

support was established at [$2166] per month. The 

calculation included an imputation of $45,000[] to 

[d]efendant and [p]laintiff was earning $500,000[]. 

Since that time, the parties' son is in college, the 

[d]efendant's income increased to $71,000[] and the 

[p]laintiff's income has decreased to $465,423[]. 

Defendant sought [c]hild [s]upport in excess of

the [g]uidelines and argued that the children's

expenses and lifestyle warrant an increase over the

[g]uidelines. The [c]ourt finds that [d]efendant was 

less than candid with this [c]ourt during her testimony 

regarding her lifestyle, her income and expenses. She

exaggerated her expenses incurred in maintaining the

children's lifestyle and testified to expenses that the 

[p]laintiff pays for [to] which she has not contributed. 

Defendant's current lifestyle exceeds the lifestyle 

enjoyed by the parties during their marriage. 

. . . This [c]ourt cannot ignore the fact that 

almost all of the extra expenses for the children, some 

of which are substantial, are paid by the [p]laintiff 

without contribution from the [d]efendant. The 

additional needs of the children are being met by the 

[p]laintiff. Since the parties' incomes are so disparate, 

a deduction in support for [the son] because he is 

away at college at times would be unfair. The school 

is located close to the [d]efendant's home and the child 

is home often during the weekends. 

The children's overnights with the [p]laintiff are

not as specified in the MSA. Since they have grown 

older, the children have less regimented time with the 

[p]laintiff. Plaintiff testified that the children spend 

many overnights with him especially during their 

breaks in school and during the summer when they 

participate in internships that he arranges. Based upon 

the testimony of the [p]laintiff, which this court finds 

to be credible, the court will use [fifty-two] overnights 
A-3315-18T3 9

as a reasonable amount to be credited to the [p]laintiff 

for the determination of [c]hild [s]upport.

Therefore, in applying the . . . [g]uidelines, the 

[p]laintiff shall pay the [d]efendant $458[] per week 

effective on September 19, 2017, the date of the filing 

of the [m]otion, directly to [d]efendant.

The judge also assessed the Rule 5:3-5(c) factors. She concluded:

Plaintiff shall be awarded counsel fees. The [c]ourt 

made this finding based on [d]efendant's lack of 

credibility . . . [and] explicit acknowledgement of her 

obligation to contribute to [the son]'s higher education 

costs in the MSA, yet her unwillingness to contribute 

any funds toward the cost when the time came to do 

so, and [her] bad faith. 

Defendant's choice to wait until 2017 to return 

to the work force caused her to be in a position of 

having less assets, as she chose not to work from the 

date of the [final judgment of divorce] until 2017, 

even though she could have earned up to $100,000 per 

year without deduction from her alimony. Defendant 

not only could have acquired more assets by returning 

to work . . . but she would have been earning more 

than she is presently earning, as she would have been 

receiving increases in her salary as her experience 

grew. Furthermore, she could have saved her entire 

salary during the period that [a]limony was being 

paid, as the provisions of the MSA clearly permitted 

her to make up to $100,000 and still receive alimony. 

Defendant clearly entered into the MSA and 

ignored the provisions that she was required to 

contribute and chose to leave herself in an economic 

position that was substandard to the [p]laintiff's. She 

lives far above her means and the marital lifestyle. 

She benefitted from the provisions of the MSA that 

the plaintiff was responsible to pay, such as alimony 
A-3315-18T3 10

and child support, yet she steadfastly refused to 

contribute to the cost of college even though she was 

required to do so. Defendant certainly could have 

accumulated more assets and increased her salary if 

she returned to work as agreed to instead of waiting 

until 2017 to obtain employment. 

Defendant continued to hold the unreasonable 

position throughout the pendency of this matter that 

she should not have to contribute toward the cost of 

college and the [c]hild [s]upport should not be reduced

because she could not afford the reduction. She filed 

misleading statements in her initial CIS and was 

deceitful in her testimony regarding her involvement

in the college decision process, including the 

[p]laintiff[']s alleged unilateral decision to enroll the 

child in tutoring and her income.

It was evident to the [c]ourt that the 

[d]efendant's focus was on her own needs and 

lifestyle, not on the children's. Plaintiff more than 

fairly asks for [twenty-five percent] of the cost of his

counsel fees, in the amount of $10,000[] for 

[d]efendant's bad faith. This Court finds the 

certification of counsel fees in the amount of

$39,337[] along with costs of $889.85 to be fair and 

reasonable and [d]efendant should be responsible to

pay $10,000[] toward the cost. 

Even though the [p]laintiff earns significantly 

more than the [d]efendant does, an award of counsel 

fees based upon bad faith may be awarded. 

The parties could not agree upon a repayment schedule. Therefore, the 

trial judge entered the April 2019 order compelling defendant to re-pay 

plaintiff at a rate of $200 per month for defendant's share of the 2017-2018 

tuition in the amount of $9764.28, and credited plaintiff's child support in the 
A-3315-18T3 11

amount of $5470 representing his overpayment of child support. The judge 

reasoned as follows:

[T]his court does not believe a substantial deduction in 

the [p]laintiff's weekly child support obligation is an 

equitable or reasonable solution to crediting the 

[p]laintiff for overpayments he is owed. This [c]ourt 

is cognizant of the [d]efendant's position that she 

cannot afford to meet the financial obligations of the 

parties' children, while also satisfying other financial 

requirements set forth by the [c]ourt, if the [p]laintiff's 

[c]hild [s]upport obligation is drastically, albeit 

temporarily, reduced in order to provide him with a 

credit for overpayment. However, the [p]laintiff is 

still entitled to said credit, and a slight modification to 

his [c]hild [s]upport obligation is necessary.

I.

"When reviewing decisions granting or denying applications to modify 

child support, we examine whether, given the facts, the trial judge abused his 

or her discretion." Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109, 116 (App. Div. 

2012). We apply the same standard of review when determining a parent's 

obligation to contribute to a child's college costs. Avelino-Catabran v. 

Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. 574, 588 (App. Div. 2016). "We must accept the 

Family Part's determination concerning a parent's obligation to contribute 

toward college tuition, provided the factual findings are supported by 

substantial credible evidence in the record and the judge has not abused his or 

her discretion." Ibid.
A-3315-18T3 12

Counsel fee determinations also rest within the trial judge's sound 

discretion. Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 233 (1971). We will disturb a 

trial court's counsel fee determination "only on the 'rarest occasion,' and then 

only because of clear abuse of discretion." Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 

298, 317 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 

(1995)).

A.

Defendant argues the trial judge's allocation of college expenses was 

"unsupported by the evidence, the testimony of the parties, or the findings of 

fact by the [t]rial [c]ourt," and asserts the judge failed to consider the 

children's needs or best interests. She argues the judge gave no "reason[s] as 

to the weighing of the twelve Newburgh criteria," and failed to consider 

plaintiff's ability to pay the entire expense, defendant's inability to contribute 

as a result of the additional costs she incurred related to the son's education,

and the disparity in the parties' incomes. Defendant also argues the judge 

erroneously concluded defendant misrepresented her income in an effort to 

intentionally mislead the court, inaccurately recounted the parties' 

conversations regarding tutors and the college selection process, and

mistakenly concluded defendant believed plaintiff would pay the entire college 

expense regardless of the circumstances. 
A-3315-18T3 13

Defendant's claims regarding the judge's Newburgh factor findings lack 

merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Setting aside the fact the parties' MSA clearly and 

unambiguously obligated them to contribute to college, the judge addressed 

each Newburgh factor and concluded the majority favored a contribution by 

defendant to the expense. In addition to the MSA language, the factual 

evidence did not support defendant's argument that plaintiff shoulder the 

college burden alone. The parties' communications and testimony revealed 

plaintiff raised the issue of college contribution as early as November 2016,

defendant was involved in the college selection process, and encouraged the 

parties' son to attend Rutgers, which both parties agreed was the proper choice. 

Likewise, we find no error in the judge's allocation of the college 

expense in proportion to the parties' incomes, which contrary to defendant's 

argument, did consider the disparity in the parties' incomes. However, the 

judge's decision was based on more. The judge concluded defendant should 

bear her proportionate share of the college expense because she misrepresented 

many of the children's expenses plaintiff paid for as her own. Because the 

evidence proved otherwise, the judge concluded defendant could afford to pay 

her proportionate share of the college expense.

Although we agree with defendant the trial judge mistakenly found 

defendant misrepresented her year-to-date 2018 income as her total yearly 
A-3315-18T3 14

income, this finding was not the sole basis for assessing defendant's credibility 

and did not outweigh the MSA language, which committed the parties to the 

college expense contribution. Moreover, the finding did not mathematically 

affect the ultimate decision made by the judge on the college expense issue

and defendant does not contest the $71,000 income figure attributed to her. As 

we have previously stated, where there is "surplusage in terms of the decisional 

result and not essential to support the judgment" it does not constitute harmless 

error. Roe v. Roe, 253 N.J. Super. 418, 431 (App. Div. 1992); R. 2:10-2. 

B.

Defendant challenges the child support determination, claiming the 

judge used incorrect figures for work-related childcare expenses, inaccurately 

recounted the parties' conversations regarding tutors and the college selection 

process, improperly concluded defendant's CIS misrepresented the children's 

needs, and credited plaintiff with fifty overnights, where there was no such 

testimony adduced at trial. Defendant further argues the trial judge erred in 

reducing child support and should have awarded child support above the 

guidelines because she did not account for plaintiff's "good fortune," and 

instead reduced child support without plaintiff showing a substantial change in 

circumstances. Defendant also asserts plaintiff failed to include his current 

CIS or any prior CIS with his motion, and therefore did not demonstrate a 
A-3315-18T3 15

change in circumstances to modify child support. On the other hand, 

defendant argues the termination of alimony demonstrated a change in 

circumstance warranting an increase in child support.

A "child's attendance at college is a circumstance warranting review of 

the child support amount." Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. at 113. "'The guidelines 

are not applicable when determining the parental obligation for child support 

of unemancipated college students[,]' and instead, the child support amount is 

to be set 'in light of all the financial circumstances of the parties and 

children.'" Id. at 120 (alterations in original) (quoting Raynor v. Raynor, 319

N.J. Super. 591, 614 (App. Div. 1999)). If the parties' income exceeds the 

maximum under the guidelines, the trial court has discretion in the 

methodology it "employ[s] in arriving at a child support award" with the goal 

of calculating an award "in the best interest of the child after giving due 

consideration to the [N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a)] statutory factors and the 

guidelines." Caplan v. Caplan, 182 N.J. 250, 272 (2005). 

At the outset, we note the MSA specifically provided for a review of 

child support once the parties' son graduated from high school, and considering 

"the parties' respective contribution to post-secondary education, the parties'

respective incomes, and the Child Support Guidelines . . . ." Even without this 

language, the son's residence at college represented a change in circumstance. 
A-3315-18T3 16

It was also reasonable for the judge to conclude plaintiff demonstrated 

changed circumstances based on the parties' incomes. The evidence and 

testimony revealed plaintiff's income decreased ten percent from the $500,000 

figure in the MSA and defendant's income increased fifty-eight percent from 

the $45,000 set forth in the MSA to a projected $71,500. 

Furthermore, the trial judge analyzed each N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) factor 

in detail, considered plaintiff's income in excess of the guidelines, and 

concluded there was no basis to award support beyond the guidelines because 

plaintiff paid for many of the above-guideline expenses, "some of which are 

substantial," without a contribution from defendant. Moreover, the judge did 

not substantially reduce the child support payable to defendant, finding a 

reduction unwarranted due to the disparity in the parties' incomes, the 

proximity of the son's college residence to defendant's home, and the 

likelihood of concomitant expenses borne by defendant as a result of his ability 

to return home. The judge fulfilled her obligation to consider the children's 

best interests, statutory factors, and the guidelines under Caplan. 

The judge did not err by crediting plaintiff with fifty-two overnights in 

the child support calculation. Although plaintiff testified there was "no set 

[parenting time] schedule" he testified the children spent an average of "one 

night over weekends" and lived with him during school breaks and the summer 
A-3315-18T3 17

and commuted with him to internships he had arranged for them. This 

evidence outweighed defendant's testimony that the children spent only one 

night per month with plaintiff. We discern no abuse of discretion. 

We also find no abuse of discretion because the judge did not increase 

child support to account for the termination of alimony. The trial judge 

rejected this argument because defendant's budget showed she lived above her 

means, failed return to work during the time she was receiving substantial 

sums of alimony and did not save despite plaintiff paying substantial expenses 

for the children. This and the remaining arguments we have not addressed 

relating to child support, lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

C.

Defendant challenges the $10,000 counsel fee award to plaintiff,

asserting the judge did not conduct an analysis of his counsel's affidavit of 

services or the reasonableness of the fees. She argues her inability to pay her 

own fees and plaintiff's superior financial position require reversal. We 

disagree.

Typically, "the party requesting the fee award must be in financial need 

and the party paying the fees must have the financial ability to pay, and if 

those two factors have been established, the party requesting the fees must 
A-3315-18T3 18

have acted in good faith in the litigation." J.E.V. v. K.V., 426 N.J. Super. 475, 

493 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Guglielmo v. Guglielmo, 253 N.J. Super. 531,

545 (App. Div. 1992)). However, "'where one party acts in bad faith, the 

relative economic position of the parties has little relevance' because the 

purpose of the award is to protect the innocent party from unnecessary costs 

and to punish the guilty party." Yueh, 329 N.J. Super. at 461 (quoting Kelly v. 

Kelly, 262 N.J. Super. 303, 307 (1992)). See also J.E.V., 426 N.J. Super. at 

493 (quoting Kelly, 262 N.J. Super. at 307) ("fees may be used to prevent a 

maliciously motivated party from inflicting economic damage on an opposing 

party by forcing expenditures for counsel fees.") 

The trial judge performed a detailed analysis of the Rule 5:3-5(c) factors 

and concluded they preponderated in plaintiff's favor. The judge awarded fees 

"based on [d]efendant's lack of credibility [and] explicit acknowledgement of 

her obligation to contribute to [the son]'s higher education costs in the MSA, 

yet her unwillingness to contribute any funds toward the cost when the time 

came to do so, and [d]efendant's bad faith." The judge characterized 

defendant's position on college and child support as "misleading" and 

"deceitful." The substantial credible evidence in the record supports these 

findings.
A-3315-18T3 19

Contrary to defendant's argument, the judge considered the parties' 

income disparity, noting "[d]efendant has the ability to pay her own counsel 

fees but has less ability to pay [p]laintiff's." However, the judge also found 

defendant "could have accumulated more assets and increased her salary if she 

returned to work as agreed to instead of waiting until 2017 to obtain 

employment." Under these circumstances, the award of twenty-five percent of 

plaintiff's fees was reasonable and not an abuse of discretion.

II.

Defendant challenges the April 2019 order on grounds it lacked proper 

findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 1:7-4(a). She asserts 

plaintiff's lack of immediate need for repayment and the fact reimbursement of 

defendant's share of the college contribution equals nineteen percent of her net 

monthly income requires we reverse the court-imposed repayment schedule. 

Enforcement and collection of support arrears is left to the sound

discretion of the court. In re Rogiers, 396 N.J. Super. 317, 327 (App. Div.

2007). The trial court's obligation is to consider an obligor's ability to pay. 

See Crespo v. Crespo, 395 N.J. Super. 190, 195 (App. Div. 2007) (holding 

collection of arrears may be suspended until "such time as defendant has the 

ability to pay the arrears from income or assets, actual or imputed . . . ."). 
A-3315-18T3 20

Here, the trial judge reviewed defendant's financial circumstances and 

ordered a reimbursement of tuition in the amount of $200 per month, allowing 

a grace period of slightly more than a month before the repayment 

commenced. This did not constitute an abuse of discretion.2 

III.

Finally, because we affirm the trial judge in all respects, defendant's 

request to remand to a different trial judge is moot.

Affirmed.

 

2 Similarly, although the April 2019 order did not provide a repayment amount 

for the counsel fee award, the trial judge on an application by either party can 

address the matter, considering defendant's other court-ordered obligation.