NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 21-2886

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EMILIO ROMERO,

 Appellant

v. 

TOWNSHIP OF TOBYHANNA; CHIEF OF POLICE CHRIS WAGNER; DETECTIVE 

LUCAS BRAY; DETECTIVE MARK WEBB; BOROUGH OF MOUNT POCONO; 

TOWNSHIP OF COOLBAUGH; TOWNSHIP OF TUNKHANNOCK; TOWNSHIP OF 

BARRETT; TOWNSHIP OF PARADISE; ADA MICHAEL RACKACZEWSKI 

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D. C. No. 3-19-cv-01038)

District Judge: Honorable Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.

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Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

on October 20, 2022

Before: GREENAWAY, JR., MATEY and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 31, 2023)

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OPINION*

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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

ROTH, Circuit Judge

Emilio Romero brought a civil rights action, arising from his arrest on rape and 

related charges. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the 

District Court. Romero appealed. He contends on appeal that the District Court improperly 

granted summary judgment and that it abused its discretion by striking his statements of 

facts and deeming the defendants’ statements of facts admitted. For the reasons below, we 

will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

I.

Romero was arrested and charged with rape and other offenses after a sexual 

encounter with his wife, which he recorded on his cellphone.1 Police recovered various 

graphic videos that Romero produced of his wife without her knowledge, using hidden 

recording devices. Romero was tried by a jury in state court and acquitted on the sex 

offenses but convicted on related charges.

2 He was sentenced to serve five to twelve years 

in prison followed by three years’ probation.

Romero subsequently brought federal civil rights claims against law enforcement 

officials and municipal entities, primarily under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1981, as well as 

1 Because we write primarily for the parties, we only discuss the facts and proceedings to 

the extent necessary to resolve this case.

2 The other charges included criminal use of a communication facility, possession of the 

instrument of a crime with intent to employ it criminally, possession of a controlled 

substance, interception of communications, possession of a device for intercepting 

communications, invasion of privacy, and tampering with evidence.
3

several state-law tort claims. Defendants moved for summary judgment.

3 Romero, 

however, failed to file responsive statements of facts pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)

and M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. Nor did he file timely briefs, responding to defendants’ motions 

to have their statements of facts deemed admitted for the purposes of summary judgment, 

despite the court’s explicit instructions and multiple extensions of time to do so. As a 

result, the court ordered Romero’s statements of facts stricken from the record and 

defendants’ statements of facts admitted for the purposes of summary judgment.

The District Court then granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. That 

evening, Romero filed two motions to vacate the District Court’s order striking his 

statements of facts and deeming defendants’ statements admitted. Romero cited no rule or 

other legal basis for the motions. The District Court construed them to be motions to 

reconsider under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) because they were filed after entry of final judgment. 

The court denied them.

Romero appeals both the District Court’s order, striking his statements of facts and 

deeming the defendants’ statements admitted, and the grant of summary judgment. 

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s application and 

3 Defendants sorted themselves into two separately represented groups in response to 

Romero’s complaint in the District Court and on appeal: The Township defendants and 

the County defendants. For the purposes of this opinion, we refer to all defendants 

collectively. 
4

interpretation of its local rules for abuse of discretion.

4 We review orders, granting 

summary judgment, de novo.5

First, we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s order to strike Romero’s 

statements of facts and to deem defendants’ statements admitted. “[L]ocal rules play a 

‘vital role in the district courts’ efforts to manage themselves and their dockets,” and 

“facilitate the implementation of court policy. . ..”

6 For this reason, it is both fitting and 

“beyond question that the District Court has the authority to strike filings that fail to comply 

with its local rules.”

7 Local Rule 56.1 makes plain that “[t]he papers opposing a motion 

for summary judgment shall include a separate, short and concise statement of the material 

facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the [moving party’s] statement.”8 

The Rule further requires such statements to “include references to the parts of the record 

that support the statements.”9 As we have previously observed, “the Rule ‘is essential to 

the Court’s resolution of a summary judgment motion’ due to its role in ‘organizing the 

evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating precisely how each side 

proposed to prove a disputed fact with admissible evidence.’”10

4 Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 2018).

5 Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2017).

6 Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Rev., 922 F.2d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 1990)

(quoting Smith v. Oelenschlager, 845 F.2d 1182, 1184 (3d Cir. 1988)). 

7 Weitzner, 909 F.3d at 614.

8 M. D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. 

9

Id. 

10 Weitzner, 909 F.3d at 613 (quoting Kramer v. Peerless Indem. Ins. Co., No. 3:CV-08-

2096, 2010 WL 11553711, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2010)). 
5

Here, the District Court was well within its discretion in striking Romero’s untimely 

responses to the defendants’ statements of material facts. The responses failed to include 

required references to the record. Also, Romero failed to file a brief in opposition to the 

defendants’ motions, as explicitly directed both by Local Rule 7.6 and the court’s own 

order.

11 We note that the court granted Romero multiple extensions of time to comply with 

these requirements, including one sua sponte extension entered three weeks after the 

expiration of Romero’s time to respond. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court

properly struck Romero’s statements of facts.

We also conclude that the District Court’s Sept. 15, 2021 Order, denying Romero’s 

motions to reconsider, was proper.12 We discern no error (and Romero indicates none) in 

the court’s construction of his filings as motions to reconsider under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). 

On appeal, Romero presents no factual or legal basis for his claim that the District Court 

abused its discretion in denying these motions. Instead, he appears to assert that the District 

11 See Md. Pa. L.R. 7.6 (“Any party opposing any motion . . . shall file a brief in 

opposition within fourteen (14) days after service of the movant’s brief . . . . Any party 

who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion.”); Feb. 4, 

2021, Minute Order ECF No. 93. (“[O]pposition briefs to Docs. 84, 86 and 88 due 

within 14 days of date of Order or motions shall be deemed unopposed.”).

12 See Order (Sept. 15, 2021), ECF No. 106. We generally review a denial of a motion 

for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, and we review the District Court’s underlying 

legal determinations de novo and factual determinations for clear error. Howard Hess

Dental Labs., Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Max’s

Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining “the 

purpose of a motion for reconsideration . . . is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or 

to present newly discovered evidence” and noting a court may alter or amend a judgment 

if the moving party demonstrates “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) 

the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court granted the motion 

for summary judgment; [and/]or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to 

prevent manifest injustice.’”).
6

Court’s denial constituted an abuse of discretion simply because he filed his motion to 

vacate within the filing deadlines contemplated by Local Rules 7.1 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. 

Such a position is facially meritless. Romero’s claim that the District Court’s denial will 

result in manifest injustice is not supported by any factual basis or legal authority, and we 

find none in the record. 

Finally, both the record and relevant case law support the District Court’s grant of

summary judgment. On appeal, Romero raises four challenges, each reliant on the

underlying premise that the District Court improperly found there was probable cause for 

his arrest and prosecution. Reviewing the District Court’s determination de novo, we agree 

with the District Court that “it is clear from the record on summary judgment that, on June 

22, 2017, authorities had probable cause to initiate the criminal proceedings against 

Romero.”13 Even the facts set forth in Romero’s own appellate brief would support such 

a result, including the graphic, detailed witness statement provided by his wife to the 

investigating detective shortly after the sexual encounter that precipitated his arrest, and 

the corroborating evidence police found in Romero’s home upon execution of a duly-issued 

search warrant.

14 Romero’s remaining contentions are without merit. 

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

13 Op. 28–31. 

14 See Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 790 (3d Cir. 2000) (Without “[i]ndependent 

exculpatory evidence or substantial evidence of the witness’s own unreliability that is 

known by the arresting officers” to outweigh it, “a positive identification by a victim 

witness, without more, would usually be sufficient to establish probable cause.”); Sharrar 

v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997) (“When a police officer has received a 

reliable identification by a victim of his or her attacker, the police have probable cause to 

arrest.”).