2014 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-28-2014

New Jersey Carpenters and Trus v. Tishman

Construction Corp of N

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 13-3005

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 13-3005

_____________

NEW JERSEY CARPENTERS AND THE TRUSTEES 

THEREOF, as assignees of Edward Chatten and other 

similarly situated workmen,

 Appellant

v.

TISHMAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION OF NEW 

JERSEY 

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(No. 2-13-cv-00379)

District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton

_____________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

February 14, 2014

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, CHAGARES, and 

SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: July 28, 2014)

Seth Ptasiewicz, Esq.

99 Wood Avenue South

Metro Corporate Campus I, Suite 307

Iselin, NJ 08830

Counsel for Appellants

Gregory R. Begg, Esq.

Alexander X. Saunders, Esq.
2

Peckar & Abramson

70 Grand Avenue

River Edge, NJ 07661

Counsel for Appellee

____________

OPINION

____________

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

In this case, we must decide whether the New Jersey 

Prevailing Wage Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56.25, et seq.

(“PWA”) is completely preempted by either the Employee 

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 

U.S.C. § 1001, et seq., or the Labor Management Relations 

Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 141, et seq. Because we 

conclude that neither statute completely preempts the PWA, 

the District Court was without jurisdiction to dismiss the 

plaintiffs’ complaint. We will therefore vacate the judgment 

of the District Court and remand the action with instructions 

to remand it to state court.

I.

A.

The PWA provides that laborers on certain public 

works projects are to be paid the prevailing wage. N.J. Stat. 

Ann. § 34:11-56.27. It was enacted to “establish a prevailing

wage level for workmen engaged in public works in order to 

safeguard their efficiency and general well-being and to 

protect them as well as their employers from the effects of 

serious and unfair competition resulting from wage levels 

detrimental to efficiency and well-being.” Id. § 34:11-56.25; 

see also Best v. C&M Door Controls, Inc., 981 A.2d 1267, 

1271 (N.J. 2009). A “public work” falls within the PWA if it 

is “paid for in whole or in part out of the funds of a public 

body” (except work done pursuant to rehabilitation 

programs), or if at the time of entering into the contract, the 

property where the labor is performed is owned or 

substantially leased by a public body. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 

34:11-56.26(5). The PWA applies to all contracts where the 
3

total value of the project exceeds $14,187.00 if the work is 

being done for, or on the premises of, any municipality, or 

$2,000.00 if the work is being done for, or on the premises of, 

any other public entity. N.J. Admin. Code § 12:60-1.4(b) 

(2009).

The “prevailing wage” is defined as the “wage rate 

paid by virtue of collective bargaining agreements [“CBAs”]

by employers employing a majority of workers of that craft or 

trade subject to said [CBAs], in the locality in which the 

public work is done.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56.26(9). It is 

set every two years by the New Jersey Commissioner of 

Labor and Workforce Development (“Commissioner”). Id. § 

34:11-56.30. To set the prevailing wage rate for each 

locality, the Commissioner references the rates paid in 

various CBAs — cash and benefits (including employer 

contributions) — in different parts of the state. Id. The 

prevailing wage must be specified in the contract between the 

awarding entity and contractor or subcontractor. Id. § 34:11-

56.28. The actual amount of compensation cannot be below 

the prevailing wage rate, but may exceed it. Id. 

The prevailing wage schedule that the Commissioner 

publishes for each locality contains a wage rate per hour and a 

fringe benefit rate per hour. Employers may count certain 

types of fringe benefits bestowed upon employees against the 

fringe benefit rate per hour. Employers providing benefits 

worth less than the fringe benefit rate per hour (or no benefits 

at all) must pay the balance to the employee in cash. The 

PWA does not mandate any specific types of fringe benefits, 

nor does it mandate that an employer provide fringe benefits 

at all.

In addition, the PWA requires that every contractor 

and subcontractor keep a record detailing the worker’s name, 

his or her craft or trade, and actual hourly rate of wages paid 

to each worker. Id. § 34:11-56.29. The employer must 

preserve these records for two years. Id. 

If a worker believes that he or she has been paid less 

than the prevailing wage, that worker may file a complaint 

with the Commissioner, who has the authority to investigate 

and administratively sanction violators. Id. §§ 34:11-56.34; 
4

34:11-56.35. Such worker may also initiate a civil action to 

recover the full amount of the prevailing wage (less any 

wages actually received), regardless of any contract to the 

contrary. Id. § 34:11-40. The right to prevailing wages is 

inalienable, as “any agreement between such workman and 

the employer to work for less than such prevailing wage shall 

be no defense to the action.” Id. Workers may bring this 

civil action themselves or “may designate an agent or 

representative to maintain” such an action on their behalf. Id.

B.

We take the following facts from the plaintiffs’ 

complaint, which we assume to be true for the purposes of a 

motion to dismiss. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 

224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). The workers at issue in this case 

were carpenters hired to work on the Revel Casino Project in 

Atlantic City, New Jersey. They contend that the Revel

Casino Project is a “public work” within the meaning of the 

PWA because it received financial assistance in the form of 

incentives, tax exemptions, and tax reimbursements from the 

New Jersey Economic Development Authority (“EDA”). 

They claim that the EDA is a “public body” within the 

meaning of the Act. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56.26(4). 

The carpenters contend that their employer, 

Simon/Watt, did not pay them fringe benefits as required by 

the PWA. They assigned these claims for unpaid prevailing

wages to the plaintiffs, who describe themselves as employee 

benefit plans within the meaning of ERISA and trust funds 

within the meaning of the LMRA. The plaintiffs allege that 

the defendant, Tishman Construction Corp. of New Jersey, 

was the general contractor and/or construction manager on 

the Revel Casino Project and subcontracted certain carpentry 

work to Simon/Watt.

The plaintiffs initially brought suit in New Jersey state 

court, alleging violations of the EDA Act and PWA.1 The 

 

1

The EDA Act simply requires that the New Jersey 

Economic Development Authority adopt rules requiring 

workers to be paid at least the prevailing wage (as defined by 

the Commissioner pursuant to the PWA) in connection with 
5

defendant removed the case to federal court, asserting subject 

matter jurisdiction pursuant to the “complete preemption” 

doctrine. It contended that the complaint was completely 

preempted pursuant to ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), 

because the plaintiffs’ cause of action was actually one to 

collect benefits due. The defendant also claimed that the 

plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, 29 

U.S.C. § 185, because resolution of the dispute involved 

interpretation of a CBA. After removal, the plaintiffs moved 

to remand, and the defendant moved to dismiss.

The District Court agreed with the defendant’s 

characterization of the action and held that the plaintiffs’ 

claims were completely preempted under ERISA § 502(a). It 

concluded that the action was properly removed because the 

plaintiffs “are ERISA participants seeking rights under an 

ERISA plan.” Appendix (“App.”) 15a. Although it did not 

directly address LMRA complete preemption, the court also 

noted that the complaint “seeks interpretation of the collective 

bargaining agreement.” Id. 

The District Court also concluded that the action was 

expressly preempted by ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144, and 

dismissed the complaint. It reasoned that because the 

plaintiffs themselves were employee benefit plans and 

fiduciaries within the meaning of ERISA, and because they 

sought to collect fringe benefits, their claims “relate[d] to” an 

ERISA-governed benefit plan and were preempted. Id. The 

plaintiffs timely appealed.

II.

We have jurisdiction over the final decision of the 

District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of 

the District Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss based on 

ERISA preemption is plenary. Pryzbowski v. U.S. 

 

EDA projects (provided certain conditions are met). N.J. 

Stat. Ann. § 34:1B-5.1. In other words, it governs the scope 

of projects that are subject to the PWA. For our purposes, the 

substantive analysis is the same as that of the PWA: if the 

EDA Act applies, then the defendant owed the plaintiffs 

compensation as defined by the PWA.
6

Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 268 (3d Cir. 2001). To 

survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint has facial 

plausibility when there is enough factual content “that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court must accept all factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231.

III.

Before we can reach the issue of whether the plaintiffs’ 

claims are expressly preempted by ERISA § 514, we must 

first determine whether there is subject matter jurisdiction 

over the plaintiffs’ PWA claims in federal court. Complete 

preemption under § 502(a) is a “jurisdictional concept,” 

whereas express preemption under § 514 is a “substantive 

concept governing the applicable law.” In re U.S. Healthcare, 

Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 160 (3d Cir. 1999). Because subject 

matter jurisdiction involves “a court’s power to hear a case,” 

we have an “independent obligation to determine whether 

subject-matter jurisdiction exists.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 

546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (quotation marks omitted). 

A cause of action does not typically “arise under” 

federal law unless a federal question appears on the face of a 

well-pleaded complaint. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr.

Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983). 

The existence or expectation of a federal defense is 

insufficient to confer federal jurisdiction. Pryzbowski, 245 

F.3d at 271. There exists a “narrow exception” to the wellpleaded complaint rule for instances where Congress “has 

expressed its intent to completely pre-empt a particular area 

of law such that any claim that falls within this area is 

necessarily federal in character.” U.S. Healthcare, 193 F.3d 

at 160 (quotation marks omitted). 

While other types of preemption operate only as 

federal defenses to state law claims, complete preemption 

“operates to confer original federal subject matter jurisdiction 
7

notwithstanding the absence of a federal cause of action on 

the face of the complaint.” Id. The Supreme Court has 

recognized the “complete preemption” doctrine in only three 

instances: § 301 of the LMRA, see Avco Corp. v. 

Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968); § 502(a) of ERISA, see

Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987); and §§ 85 

and 86 of the National Bank Act, see Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. 

Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003). The former two are relevant 

here.

A.

We begin with ERISA § 502(a), the only ground for 

complete preemption that the District Court found. ERISA 

provides for uniform federal regulation of pension benefit 

plans and welfare benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3). 

Congress enacted ERISA to ensure that benefit plan 

administration was subject to a single set of regulations and to 

avoid subjecting regulated entities to conflicting sources of 

substantive law. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue 

Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 657 (1995). 

These concerns generally arise only when the provision of 

benefits requires “an ongoing administrative program.” Fort 

Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987). 

ERISA included “expansive” preemption provisions, see

ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144, “which are intended to 

ensure that employee benefit plan regulation would be 

exclusively a federal concern,” Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 

542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (quotation marks omitted). 

Congress preempted “state laws relating to plans, rather than 

simply to benefits.” Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 11.

ERISA’s civil enforcement mechanism, § 502(a), “is 

one of those provisions with such extraordinary pre-emptive 

power that it converts an ordinary state common law 

complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the 

well-pleaded complaint rule,” and permits removal. Aetna 

Health, 542 U.S. at 209 (quotation marks omitted). We have 

held that a claim is completely preempted, and thus 

removable, under ERISA § 502(a) only if: (1) the plaintiff 

could have brought the claim under § 502(a); and (2) no other

independent legal duty supports the plaintiff’s claim. Pascack 

Valley Hosp. Inc. v. Local 464A UFCW Welfare 
8

Reimbursement Plan, 388 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 2004); see 

also Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 210. Because the test is 

conjunctive, a state-law cause of action is completely 

preempted only if both of its prongs are satisfied. See

Montefiore Med. Ctr. v. Teamsters Local 272, 642 F.3d 321, 

328 (2d Cir. 2011).

The defendant contends that the suit is preempted 

because the plaintiffs seek to collect “delinquent fund 

contributions.” Defendant’s Br. 15. It contends that this 

cause of action overlaps with two portions of ERISA’s 

comprehensive enforcement scheme: § 502(a)(1)(B), which 

allows a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due 

“under the terms of his plan,” and § 502(a)(3), which allows a 

participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to seek equitable relief in 

order to enforce any provision of a plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). 

According to the defendant, because the remedies that the 

PWA offers mirror or supplement those that are provided for 

in ERISA’s comprehensive enforcement scheme, ERISA 

completely preempts the PWA.

We disagree. Turning to the Pascack Valley test’s 

second prong, courts have held that a legal duty is 

“independent” if it is not based on an obligation under an 

ERISA plan, or if it “would exist whether or not an ERISA 

plan existed.” Marin Gen. Hosp. v. Modesto & Empire 

Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941, 950 (9th Cir. 2009). In other 

words, if the state law claim is not “derived from, or 

conditioned upon” the terms of an ERISA plan, and 

“[n]obody needs to interpret the plan to determine whether 

that duty exists,” then the duty is independent. Gardner v. 

Heartland Indus. Partners, LP, 715 F.3d 609, 614 (6th Cir. 

2013); accord Stevenson v. Bank of N.Y. Co., Inc., 609 F.3d 

56, 62 (2d Cir. 2010).

The PWA creates just such an independent legal duty. 

The defendant’s duty to pay prevailing wages derives from 

the PWA, not any ERISA plan. No interpretation of any 

ERISA plan is necessary in order to determine whether the 

carpenters were paid prevailing wages. The defendant would 

be required to pay prevailing wages regardless of whether any 

ERISA plan existed.
9

The PWA’s independence is best understood by 

looking to the what the plaintiffs must prove to prevail. To 

determine whether the defendant is liable, a court must 

simply compare the amount that the carpenters were paid to 

the amount that they were owed under the PWA. If there is a 

deficiency, the defendant can make it up through cash, even if 

the deficiency concerns the benefit prong of the PWA. No 

reference to any ERISA plan is necessary. The statute simply 

requires that the Commissioner set a prevailing wage, and 

that employers engaged in public works projects pay it.

As such, the PWA is a law that regulates wages. 

“States have traditionally regulated the payment of wages,”

not the federal government. Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 

U.S. 107, 119 (1989). Congress did not intend for ERISA to 

displace statutes that govern wages. See Keystone Chapter, 

Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Foley, 37 F.3d 

945, 959 (3d Cir. 1994). State actions to recover unpaid 

wages generally are not expressly preempted by ERISA, 

much less completely preempted. Cf. id. (viewing the 

Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act as an instance of wage 

regulation and concluding that it was not expressly preempted 

by ERISA § 514).

Pascack Valley provides an illustration of a similar 

independent duty. There, a hospital brought suit in state court 

against an ERISA plan for breach of contract. Pascack 

Valley, 388 F.3d at 395. The hosptial contended that it was 

not paid the proper amount for services rendered pursuant to 

the terms of a contract that was separate from any ERISA 

plan. Id. at 396. The plan removed the case to federal court, 

contending that the breach of contract claim was actually for 

benefits owed pursuant to an ERISA plan, and therefore 

completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a). Id. at 397. We 

held that removal was improper because resolution of the 

hospital’s claim turned on the terms of an agreement that was 

separate from the ERISA plan. Id. at 402. In order to resolve 

the dispute, a court simply needed to compare the prices 

provided for in the agreement to the amounts that the hospital 

was paid. No analysis of the plan’s terms was required. This 

was sufficient to create an independent legal duty, even 

though the patients who received services at the hospital 
10

received them pursuant to the terms of the plan. Id. at 403-

04.2

As the obligation to pay prevailing wages is an 

independent legal duty, the second prong of the Pascack 

Valley test is not met.3 Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claims are 

not completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a), and that 

section cannot provide the basis for federal court jurisdiction.4 

 

2

The District Court in this case also found the fact that one of 

the parties in this case was an ERISA plan was significant. 

We rejected a similar argument in Pascack Valley. There, the 

plan argued that removal was proper because suits between 

plans and third parties that implicate benefit administration 

necessarily “arise under ERISA’s federal common law.” 

Pascack Valley, 388 F.3d at 399 (quotation marks omitted). 

We held that it was not the identity of the parties to the 

dispute that mattered, but whether the federal common law of 

ERISA provided an “element — essential or otherwise” of the 

plaintiff’s state law claim. Id. Our focus was on the nature of 

the cause of action, not the identity of the parties.

3 Because we conclude that the defendant cannot meet the 

second prong of the test, we need not decide whether it could 

have met the first prong.

4 As we conclude that the District Court was without 

jurisdiction to consider whether the PWA is expressly 

preempted by ERISA § 514, we have no occasion to address 

that portion of the District Court’s opinion. See Dukes v. 

U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 355 (3d Cir. 1995)

(“When the doctrine of complete preemption does not apply, 

but the plaintiff’s state claim is arguably preempted under § 

514(a), the district court, being without removal jurisdiction, 

cannot resolve the dispute regarding [express] preemption.”). 

Upon remand to state court, the defendant may still raise 

express preemption as a defense to the plaintiffs’ PWA claim. 

We note, however, that we have held that Pennsylvania’s 

PWA, which is substantially similar to the New Jersey PWA, 

was not expressly preempted, and that every other Court of 

Appeals to answer this question with respect to similar PWAs 

has found them not expressly preempted. See Keystone 

Chapter, 37 F.3d at 945; see also Associated Builders &

Contractors, Saginaw Valley Area Chapter v. Perry, 115 F.3d 

386, 392-93 (6th Cir. 1997) (Michigan PWA not preempted 
11

B.

The District Court did not decide whether removal was 

proper under LMRA § 301, or whether the LMRA completely 

preempted the plaintiffs’ claims. The failure to reach the 

LMRA issue does not necessarily preclude us from 

addressing it on appeal. See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Basell 

USA Inc., 512 F.3d 86, 97 (3d Cir. 2008). It is appropriate 

for us to reach an issue that the district court did not if “the 

issues provide purely legal questions, upon which an 

appellate court exercises plenary review.” Hudson United 

Bank v. LiTenda Mortg. Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 159 (3d Cir. 

1998). Had the District Court reached these issues, our 

review would have been plenary. See Kline v. Sec. Guards, 

Inc., 386 F.3d 246, 251 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (exercising plenary 

review over the question of whether removal was proper 

under LMRA § 301).

LMRA § 301 provides exclusive federal jurisdiction 

for suits concerning “violation of contracts between an 

employer and a labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). 

Similar to ERISA § 502(a), LMRA § 301 converts state 

causes of action into federal ones and allows removal “when 

the heart of the state-law complaint is a clause in the 

collective bargaining agreement.” Caterpillar Inc. v. 

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987) (quotation marks 

omitted). “[T]he pre-emptive force of § 301 is so powerful as 

to displace entirely any state cause of action for violation of 

contracts between an employer and a labor organization. Any 

such suit is purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding 

the fact that state law would provide a cause of action in the 

absence of § 301.” Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 23 

(quotation marks and footnote omitted). 

LMRA § 301 completely preempts a state cause of 

action only when the resolution of said action is “substantially 

dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made 

 

by ERISA); Burgio & Campofelice, Inc. v. NYS Dep’t of 

Labor, 107 F.3d 1000 (2d Cir. 1997) (New York); WSB 

Elec., Inc. v. Curry, 88 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 1996) (California); 

Minn. Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. 

Minn. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 47 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 1995) 

(Minnesota).
12

between the parties in a labor contract.” Allis-Chalmers 

Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985); see also Lingle v. 

Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988) 

(“[A]n application of state law is pre-empted by § 301 of the 

Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 only if such 

application requires the interpretation of a collectivebargaining agreement.”). By contrast, when resolution of the 

state law claim is “independent” of a CBA and does not 

require construing one, the state law claim is not preempted 

by § 301. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 410; accord Antol v. Esposto, 

100 F.3d 1111, 1117 (3d Cir. 1996).

The plaintiffs’ claim under the PWA is not preempted 

by the LMRA because it exists independent of any CBA. 

Proving a PWA violation does not require any reference to or 

analysis of any CBA. It simply requires comparing the wages 

that plaintiffs were paid to those provided in the PWA. This 

is a factual question that, just as it does not turn on the 

interpretation of any ERISA plan, does not turn on the 

interpretation of any CBA. The carpenters’ right to 

prevailing wages is grounded in the PWA and would exist 

even in the absence of any CBA. 

Although the amount owed to the employees under the 

PWA may be the same amount owed by virtue of their CBA, 

such “parallelism” does “not render the state-law analysis 

dependent upon the [CBA] analysis.” Kline, 386 F.3d at 254 

(quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has explicitly 

held that even if dispute resolution pursuant to a CBA and a 

state law would require addressing “precisely the same set of 

facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without 

interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of 

the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes.” Lingle, 486 

U.S. at 410.

Furthermore, “§ 301 cannot be read broadly to preempt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees 

as a matter of state law.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 

123 (1994). The right to prevailing wages is just such an 

inalienable right. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56.40 (allowing 

workers to bring private actions to recover wages under the 

PWA and providing that “any agreement between such 

workman and the employer to work for less than such 
13

prevailing wage shall be no defense to the action.”); accord

Cipparulo v. David Friedland Painting Co., 353 A.2d 105, 

106 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). “[Section] 301 preemption merely ensures that federal law will be the basis for 

interpreting collective-bargaining agreements, and says 

nothing about the substantive rights a State may provide to 

workers when adjudication of those rights does not depend 

upon the interpretation of [CBAs].” Lingle, 486 U.S. at 409. 

The plaintiffs have asserted a substantive right under the New 

Jersey PWA to be paid prevailing wages. This right is not 

preempted by the LMRA.5

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 

Court’s order dismissing the case and remand the action with 

instructions for the District Court to remand the action to state 

court.

 

5 Because we hold that the neither ERISA nor the LMRA 

completely preempts the PWA in these circumstances, and 

that the District Court lacked removal jurisdiction over the 

plaintiffs’ claims, we will not opine on any of the other 

arguments raised by either party, such as whether the 

workers’ claims were properly assignable to the plaintiff 

funds. Such questions may be properly raised in the New 

Jersey state court upon remand.