[Cite as State v. Guy, 2016-Ohio-619.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 SANDUSKY COUNTY 

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. S-15-019 

 

 Appellee Trial Court No. 11 CR 215 

v. 

James D. Guy DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: February 19, 2016 

* * * * * 

 James D. Guy, pro se. 

* * * * * 

 YARBROUGH, J. 

I. Introduction 

{¶ 1} Appellant, James Guy, appeals the judgment of the Sandusky County Court 

of Common Pleas, dismissing his petition for postconviction relief. We affirm. 

A. Facts and Procedural Background 

{¶ 2} The underlying facts of this case were briefly summarized in our decision in 

State v. Guy, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-11-034, 2013-Ohio-7, as follows: 
2.

 On March 18, 2011, appellant was indicted on four counts of 

felonious assault and two counts of attempted murder in connection with an 

incident that occurred on February 18, 2011, in which two men were 

stabbed outside a Clyde, Ohio, bar. On May 18, 2011, appellant entered a 

plea of guilty to two counts of felonious assault, second degree felonies, 

and the remaining counts were dismissed. Appellant was sentenced to eight 

years on each count to be served consecutively. 

{¶ 3} On August 10, 2011, appellant timely appealed his convictions to this court, 

asserting four assignments of error relating to the trial court’s imposition of consecutive 

sentences. On January 4, 2013, we affirmed appellant’s convictions. Id. at ¶ 12. 

Appellant was represented on appeal by the same counsel that represented him during the 

trial court proceedings. 

{¶ 4} On February 15, 2013, appellant, acting pro se, filed a notice of appeal with 

the Supreme Court of Ohio. In his memorandum in support of jurisdiction, appellant 

raised the same issues concerning the trial court’s imposition of sentence that were 

asserted in his appeal to this court. Two months later, the Supreme Court declined to 

accept jurisdiction over the appeal. 

{¶ 5} Almost one year after the Supreme Court dismissed appellant’s appeal, 

appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for 

the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division. Once again, the issues raised in the 

petition were exclusively related to the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. 
3.

Ultimately, the federal court dismissed appellant’s petition on March 9, 2015. Guy v. 

Kelly, N.D.Ohio No. 3:14 CV 00792, 2015 WL 1036487 (Mar. 9, 2015). 

{¶ 6} While appellant’s habeas petition was pending before the federal court, he 

filed a pro se “Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Judgment of Conviction or Sentence.” In 

his petition, appellant argued that he was entitled to postconviction relief based upon his 

trial counsel’s ineffective assistance. More specifically, appellant asserted that his guilty 

plea was involuntary in that it was predicated upon his counsel’s false advice that he 

could receive a sentence of life in prison if he was convicted of the charges contained in 

the indictment.1

 

{¶ 7} As a follow-up to his postconviction petition, appellant, on February 20, 

2015, filed a motion to supplement the petition with an additional basis for 

postconviction relief, namely that the trial court violated his constitutional rights in 

accepting his guilty plea without complying with the mandates of Crim.R. 11. Three 

days later, the trial court ordered the state to file a response to appellant’s petition and 

supplemental motion within 30 days. Thereafter, the state filed three separate requests to 

extend the deadline for its response. The court granted each of these motions, ultimately 

extending the deadline to April 29, 2015. Despite the extensions, the state did not file its 

response until April 30, 2015, at which time the state moved to dismiss appellant’s 

postconviction petition as untimely filed. 

 

1

 Notably, the indictment included two counts of attempted murder in violation of R.C. 

2903.02 and 2923.02, felonies of the first degree, which were punishable by prison 

sentences of 15 years to life. 
4.

{¶ 8} Because the state filed its response after the deadline set by the trial court, 

appellant moved the court to strike the state’s response. Without ruling on appellant’s 

motion to strike, the trial court, on May 29, 2015, issued its decision granting the state’s 

motion to dismiss. In its decision, the trial court found that appellant’s petition was filed 

outside the 365-day window under R.C. 2953.21(A)(2). Further, the court determined 

that appellant’s petition failed on the merits. Appellant’s timely appeal followed. 

B. Assignments of Error 

{¶ 9} On appeal, appellant raises the following assignments of error: 

 First Assignment of Error: The trial court failed to make a ruling on 

Mr. Guy’s motion to strike the [state’s] motion to dismiss. The trial court 

abused their [discretion] when it made a ruling dismissing Guy’s petition 

without [considering] his motion to strike, in violation of his due process 

rights to redress his claims in a court of law. 

 Second Assignment of Error: The trial court failed to issue a finalappealable order when they did not support their ([May] 29, 2015) 

judgment entry with both findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

 Third Assignment of Error: The trial court abused their [discretion] 

when they dismissed Mr. Guy’s constitutional claim [number one]. 

 [Fourth Assignment of Error:] The trial court abused their 

[discretion] when they dismissed Mr. Guy’s constitutional claim [number 

two.] 
5.

 Fifth Assignment of Error: The trial court abused their [discretion] 

when they dismissed Mr. Guy’s constitutional claim [number three.] 

II. Analysis 

{¶ 10} In appellant’s assignments of error, he asserts that the trial court erred in 

dismissing his petition for postconviction relief. He raises several arguments in support 

of his assignments of error. However, as a threshold matter, we must consider the 

timeliness of appellant’s petition. 

{¶ 11} Under R.C. 2953.21(A)(2), absent certain exceptions that are inapplicable 

in this case, a petition for postconviction relief must be filed “no later than three hundred 

sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in 

the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction or adjudication * * *.” The filing time 

limit requirement is jurisdictional. R.C. 2953.23(A). “Therefore, if the petition has been 

untimely filed, the trial court cannot consider the substantive merits of the petition and 

must summarily dismiss it without addressing the merits of the petition.” State v. 

Unsworth, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-14-1238, 2015-Ohio-3197, ¶ 16. 

{¶ 12} Here, appellant acknowledges that the trial transcript in his direct appeal 

was filed with this court on September 19, 2011. Therefore, his postconviction petition 

was untimely as it was not filed with the trial court until November 6, 2014, well beyond 

the 365-day period set forth in R.C. 2953.21(A)(2). 

{¶ 13} Appellant attempts to avoid the dismissal of his postconviction petition on 

timeliness grounds by referencing the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Gunner v. Welch, 
6.

749 F.3d 511 (6th Cir.2014). There, the Sixth Circuit determined that the federal district 

court erred in dismissing Gunner’s habeas petition on procedural grounds. The district 

court’s dismissal was predicated upon a finding that habeas relief was procedurally 

forfeited since Gunner failed to file a petition for postconviction relief in state court. Id.

at 515. However, the Sixth Circuit excused Gunner’s failure to file a postconviction 

petition because it found that Gunner’s appellate counsel on direct appeal failed to inform 

him of the timetable for filing the petition under R.C. 2953.21, or notify him when the 

trial transcript was filed with the appellate court. Id. at 520. Consequently, the district 

court’s dismissal of Gunner’s habeas petition was reversed and the matter was remanded 

to the trial court for consideration of the petition on the merits. Id. 

{¶ 14} Having examined appellant’s timeliness argument in light of the Sixth 

Circuit’s decision in Gunner, we remain unpersuaded that his postconviction petition was 

timely filed. We read the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Gunner as allowing federal habeas 

petitions to go forward despite a defendant’s failure to file a postconviction petition under 

the unique circumstances that were applicable in that case. We do not find Gunner

relevant to our determination of whether an untimely postconviction petition should be 

accepted by Ohio courts where appellate counsel fails to inform the defendant of the 365-

day time period under R.C. 2953.21(A)(2). In so finding, we are in agreement with the 

Eighth District’s decision in State v. Taylor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102020, 2015-Ohio1314, wherein the court considered the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Gunner, but found that 

its holding was limited to federal habeas claims. Id. at ¶ 14. The court went on to find 
7.

that Gunner was in conflict with Ohio law to the extent that it could be read to create an 

exception to the time limit for filing postconviction petitions under R.C. 2953.21(A)(2). 

Id. at ¶ 15. 

{¶ 15} Even if we were to extend the applicability of the exception set forth in 

Gunner to postconviction petitions, our finding that appellant’s petition was untimely 

would remain. As noted above, we issued our decision in appellant’s direct appeal on 

January 4, 2013. Appellant did not file his postconviction petition until November 6, 

2014. Given the fact that appellant waited approximately 22 months after we affirmed 

his convictions to file his postconviction petition, we reject his argument that his 

untimely petition should be accepted based upon appellate counsel’s failure to notify him 

when the trial transcript was filed with this court in his direct appeal. Appellant knew or 

should have known that the record was filed no later than the date we released our 

decision. Therefore, appellant’s assertion that his appellate counsel’s alleged 

shortcomings caused him to file his petition in an untimely fashion lacks credibility. 

{¶ 16} Having concluded that appellant’s petition for postconviction relief was 

untimely filed, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing it. 

Further, because the petition was untimely filed, we are unable to reach the merits of the 

petition. Unsworth, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-14-1238, 2015-Ohio-3197, at ¶ 16. 

{¶ 17} Accordingly, appellant’s assignments of error are not well-taken. 
8.

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 18} In light of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the Sandusky County 

Court of Common Pleas. Costs are hereby assessed to appellant in accordance with 

App.R. 24. 

Judgment affirmed. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Stephen A. Yarbrough, J. 

_______________________________ 

James D. Jensen, P.J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE 

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.