PROVIDENT GROUPCONTINUUM PROPERTIES, 

L.L.C., A FLORIDA NOT FOR 

PROFIT LIMITED LIABILITY 

COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR 

THE USE AND BENEFIT OF 

THE UNIVERSITY OF 

FLORIDA,

Appellant,

v.

ED CRAPO, IN HIS CAPACITY 

AS ALACHUA COUNTY 

PROPERTY APPRAISER, AND 

VON FRASER IN HIS 

CAPACITY AS ALACHUA 

COUNTY TAX COLLECTOR,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D14-2655

_____________________________/

Opinion filed February 3, 2015.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.

Victor Lawson Hulslander, Judge.

David K. Miller, of Broad and Cassel, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

John C. Dent, Jr., and Jennifer A. McClain, of Dent & McClain, Chartered, 

Sarasota, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Provident Group-Continuum Properties, L.L.C., appeals an order 

dismissing its declaratory action against appellees, Ed Crapo, Alachua County 

Property Appraiser, and Von Fraser, Alachua County Tax Collector, seeking to 

establish immunity from liability for ad valorem taxes assessed for 2010, 2011, 

2012, 2013, and 2014, on a Gainesville property that appellant owns and operates 

as graduate student apartments for the University of Florida. We reverse and 

remand for further proceedings.

Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction 

under section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (2013), a statute of non-claim that 

requires actions to challenge tax assessments to be filed within 60 days from 

certification. The statute provides that its requirements are jurisdictional, barring 

any action filed beyond the deadline. Appellant contended that its otherwise 

untimely complaint was not time-barred, because appellant holds the property as 

trustee of an express trust for the use and benefit of the University of Florida, and 

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.210(a) permits the trustee of an express trust to 

prosecute an action for the real party in interest. The University, the real party in 

interest, is a subdivision of the state and thus is exempt from the 60-day time limit 

as stated in Cason v. Department of Management Services, 944 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 

2006) (the 60-day jurisdictional time limit in section 194.171(2) does not apply to 

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a challenge by the state or its political subdivisions that a tax assessment is void, 

because the state is not a “taxpayer” under the statute). 

The circuit court dismissed appellant’s action with prejudice for lack of 

jurisdiction. The only mention of a trust in the Operating Agreement provides: “All 

property of the Company will be imposed with a charitable trust in furtherance of 

these charitable purposes.” The court observed that this provision does not state 

that the property is held in trust, only that it will be imposed with a trust, citing 

Brevard County v. Ramsey, 658 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). In that case, the 

court found a valid trust based upon the owners’ written declaration that they held 

the property as trustees for the use and benefit of the beneficiary. The court 

concluded that the documents in the case did not establish that appellant is the 

trustee of an express trust.

This court reviews de novo whether the lower court had subject matter 

jurisdiction. See Washington County v. Northwest Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 85 So. 

3d 1127 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). A trust is a property interest held by the trustee at 

the request of the settlor for the benefit of the beneficiary. Black’s Law Dictionary, 

1740 (10th ed. 2014). An express trust is “created with the settlor’s express intent, 

usually declared in writing.” Id. at 1743. The circuit court was mistaken in 

concluding that an express trust can be created only in the manner described in 

Brevard County. On the contrary, the Fifth District merely concluded that the 

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method and form used in that case did establish a trust, characterizing this as “the 

simplest method of accomplishing [such] purpose.” Id. at 1194 (quoting William F. 

Fratcher, Scott on Trusts, § 17.1, at 226-28 (4th ed. 1988)). The court did not 

suggest that this is the only method. 

A more recent edition of Scott on Trusts provides:

An express trust may arise even if the settlor has never called 

it a trust, and even if the settlor does not understand what a 

trust is. It is sufficient if what the settlor appears to have had 

in mind is in its essentials what the courts mean when they 

speak of a trust. 

* * *

No particular words or conduct is necessary to 

manifest the intention to create a trust. Indeed, it is possible 

to create a trust without using either the word “trust” or the 

word “trustee.” 

1 Austin Wakeman Scott, William Franklin Fratcher, Mark L. Ascher, Scott & 

Ascher on Trusts, § 2.1.8, at 40; § 4.2, at 179 (5th ed. 2006). 

In Brevard County, the Fifth District observed that although the declaration 

of trust named the owners as trustees of the real property for the use and benefit of 

a particular corporation, the document was otherwise “silent as to any power or 

duties of the [owners] as trustees and as to the disposition of the trust estate.” 

Brevard County, 658 So. 2d at 1192. In contrast, the case at bar presents nearly the 

opposite situation: the documents don’t state that appellant was “trustee” of the 

property being held “in trust” for the University, but the documents are otherwise 

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replete with statements regarding the powers and duties of appellant for the benefit 

of the University, including provisions requiring ultimate disposition of the trust 

property to the University, all of which establish the creation of a trust. 

We conclude that the documents established a trust for the benefit of the 

University of Florida, and thus appellant, as trustee, has standing to contest the tax 

assessment and is not barred by the time limit of section 194.171(2).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

PADOVANO, CLARK, and MARSTILLER, JJ., CONCUR.

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