United States General Accounting Office

GAO Briefing Report to the Majority Leader,

U.S. Senate

May 1995 PEACE OPERATIONS

Update on the

Situation in the Former

Yugoslavia

GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-261202 

May 8, 1995

The Honorable Robert Dole

Majority Leader

United States Senate

Dear Senator Dole:

As requested, we are providing you an update on the situation in the

former Yugoslavia.1

 Specifically, you asked us to assess (1) progress in

resolving the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter

referred to as Bosnia) and (2) the United Nation’s effectiveness in carrying

out Security Council mandates in these countries. On April 3, 1995, we

briefed your staff on the results of our work. This report presents the

information provided at that briefing.

Background War began in the former Yugoslavia in June 1991, after two of its

republics—Slovenia and Croatia—declared their independence. Serbia,

the largest republic of the former Yugoslavia and in control of the

Yugoslav National Army (JNA), forcibly tried to prevent the other republics

from becoming independent. The JNA assisted the Croatian Serbs and

fought against the new Croatian government. After fierce fighting, Serbia

and Croatia signed an unconditional cease-fire in November 1991. In

February 1992, the U.N. Security Council established the United Nations

Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and mandated it to help (1) supervise the

withdrawal of the JNA and demilitarize the areas in Croatia occupied by the

Croatian Serbs, (2) return the displaced who fled from their homes in

these areas, and (3) monitor human rights in these areas. UNPROFOR in

Croatia was authorized primarily under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter,

which allows only peaceful means to carry out mandates.

In March 1992, the Bosnians voted for independence, and fighting broke

out among the new Bosnian government and Bosnian Serbs who were

opposed to independence. Bosnian Serbs quickly captured most of the

territory.

In June 1992, the United Nations and the United States recognized Croatia

and Bosnia as independent states. The U.N. Security Council then

extended UNPROFOR’s mission to Bosnia, and over the past 3 years has

1

This report follows up on some issues discussed in our 1994 report, Humanitarian Intervention:

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations in Bosnia (GAO/NSIAD-94-13BR, Apr. 13, 1994).

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
B-261202 

mandated UNPROFOR to (1) facilitate and protect the delivery of

humanitarian aid; (2) use necessary means, including air power from

regional organizations, to deter attacks against six safe areas (i.e., areas,

such as Sarajevo to be protected against armed attacks and any other

hostile actions); and (3) other actions to support an environment leading

to peace. Most of UNPROFOR’s activities in Bosnia, such as deterring attacks

on safe areas, are authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which

allows forceful means to carry out mandates.

Results in Brief Little progress has been made in resolving the major issues of conflict in

Croatia and Bosnia. In Croatia, fundamental differences divide the warring

parties. The Croatian Serbs still demand an independent state within

Croatia, and the internationally recognized Croatian government demands

control of its occupied territory. The Croatian Serbs still maintain an army

with heavy weapons and fighter planes and face the Croatian government

along confrontation lines. In Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs control 70 percent

of the territory and no territory has been returned to the Bosnian

government, as proposed in the international peace plan.2

 Moreover, many

thousands of Bosnians have been killed since the beginning of the conflict;3

widespread human rights violations have been committed; and the guilty

parties have not answered for their crimes. As of May 1995, fighting

continues in Bosnia.

UNPROFOR has been ineffective in carrying out mandates leading to lasting

peace in the former Yugoslavia. In Croatia, UNPROFOR was unable to

demilitarize the territory controlled by the Croatian Serbs, return

displaced persons to their homes, or prevent the use of Croatian territory

for attacks on Bosnia. In Bosnia, UNPROFOR made an assertive stand with

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to protect Sarajevo in

February 1994. However, UNPROFOR lost credibility as a peacekeeping force

when it

2

The plan was proposed by the Contact Group, which is composed of the United States, Russia,

Germany, France, and England. The plan calls for 51 percent of Bosnia to be controlled by the Bosnian

Muslims and Croats and 49 percent controlled by the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian government has

accepted the plan; the Bosnian Serbs have not.

3

Estimates of those killed in Bosnia range from 250,000 (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

for 1994, report submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and the House Committee

on International Relations by the Department of State in February 1995) to 167,000 (Bosnian Institute

of Public Health). Other experts estimate a lower number.

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B-261202 

• requested little NATO air support after Gorazde was attacked in April 1994,

and Bosnian Serbs killed civilians, shelled the hospital, and took

peacekeepers hostage and

• failed to deter attacks on the Bihac area in December 1994, when Bosnian

and Croatian Serbs launched air and missile attacks on the area, wounded

several U.N. peacekeepers, and killed one.

As a result of UNPROFOR’s ineffectiveness, Croatia announced in

January 1995 that it would not agree to a renewal of UNPROFOR’s mandate.

Croatia only recently agreed to a new U.N. mandate that authorizes

peacekeepers to monitor Croatia’s international borders and internal

confrontation lines.

UNPROFOR’s limited effectiveness to deter attacks and provide protection

stems from an approach to peacekeeping that is dependent on the consent

and cooperation of the warring parties. Although UNPROFOR has authority

to use force, it tries to negotiate when attacked, and has called sparingly

for NATO air support. UNPROFOR has requested NATO close air support five

times for limited purposes during attacks on U.N. personnel and safe

areas. The effectiveness of this approach has been minimal and the lack of

consistent assertive response to aggression has left UNPROFOR little

credibility.

In some areas, U.N. actions have been more effective. The U.N. High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in coordination with UNPROFOR,

international humanitarian organizations, and allied operations, has

provided food for thousands living in the region over the past several

winters. For its part, UNPROFOR monitors the situation on the ground,

maintains roads, and escorts convoys to the safe areas. UNPROFOR

previously escorted many aid convoys, but U.S. diplomatic initiatives

helped bring about a Bosnian federation of Muslims and Croats, which

allows convoy deliveries to many parts of Bosnia without protection.

UNPROFOR also operates Sarajevo airport and undertakes

confidence-building measures, such as joint patrols and monitoring of

cease-fires. If UNPROFOR withdraws, UNHCR and some other humanitarian

organizations plan to continue providing aid, but believe some activities

will be curtailed if not halted.

Agency Comments

and Our Analysis

We obtained comments on a draft of this report from the U.S. Department

of State, the U.S. Mission to NATO, the U.N. Secretariat, and UNPROFOR. The

Department of State commented that UNPROFOR would be more effective if

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B-261202 

member states provided more resources for the operation. UNPROFOR

commented that it has proposed actions that could improve its

performance in safe areas. These include providing more troops for

UNPROFOR to deter attacks, better defining safe areas, and demilitarizing all

warring parties in and around the safe areas.

Given the U.N.’s approach to peacekeeping—to fully rely on the consent

and cooperation of the parties—it is questionable that further resources or

a better definition of safe areas would improve UNPROFOR’s performance.

Moreover, there are many crises in the world that compete for finite

peacekeeping resources and UNPROFOR is the largest peacekeeping

operation in U.N. history. Member states have thus far paid more than

$3 billion in assessments for UNPROFOR, provided billions more in voluntary

contributions, provided 40,000 U.N. troops, and committed NATO air power

to the operation. Under current conditions and given UNPROFOR’s lack of

credible deterrent to attacks, demilitarizing the safe areas does not seem

to be practical. We have incorporated other comments in the report, as

appropriate.

Scope and

Methodology

We had the full cooperation of the U.N. Secretariat, UNPROFOR, and UNHCR

and were assisted by the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, the U.S.

Missions to the United Nations and NATO, and the U.S. Agency for

International Development’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

To review the status of peace efforts in the former Yugoslavia, we

conducted fieldwork in Bosnia and Croatia. During our visit, we met with

senior officials of UNPROFOR and UNHCR and visited several UNPROFOR troop

contingents. We also interviewed U.S. officials in both countries, including

the U.S. Ambassadors, the Commander of the Joint Task Force Forward,

and members of the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Disaster

Assistance Response Team. We also met with senior officials of both the

Croatian and Bosnian governments. On three separate occasions we tried

to interview Bosnian and Croatian Serb officials but were unsuccessful. To

analyze U.N. operations, we obtained Security Council resolutions and

reports and documents from the U.N. Secretariat, UNHCR, and UNPROFOR.

We analyzed data from UNHCR’s convoy database and reviewed UNHCR

situation reports. To analyze air operations in the former Yugoslavia, we

analyzed data on air sorties and air strikes. We also discussed air

operations and NATO decisions with the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, members

of his senior staff, and other national representatives to NATO in Brussels,

Belgium. In Naples, Italy, we met with the Commander in Chief, Allied

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
B-261202 

Forces South and his senior staff and the Commander of the Joint Task

Force, Provide Promise.

Further information regarding U.N. activities in the former Yugoslavia and

this report is in appendixes I-III. Appendix I lists all U.N. Security

Resolutions on the former Yugoslavia, as of April 15, 1995. Appendix II

provides information on peacekeeping contingents; appendix III provides

selected sources of information used for this report.

We conducted our work from December 1994 to May 1995 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional

committees; the U.N. Secretariat; the Special Representative of the

Secretary-General of the Former Yugoslavia; the Permanent

Representative to NATO; the Secretaries of State and Defense; and the

Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development. Copies will

also be made available to others upon request.

This report was prepared under the direction of Joseph E. Kelley,

Director-in-Charge, International Affairs Issues, who can be reached at

(202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions. Other major

contributors to this report were Tet Miyabara, John E. Tschirhart, and

Barry J. Deewse.

Sincerely yours,

Henry L. Hinton, Jr.

Assistant Comptroller General

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Contents

Letter 1

Briefing Section I 

Background

8

U.N. Mandates—Croatia 10

U.N. Mandates—Bosnia 13

U.N. Operations in the Former Yugoslavia 15

Briefing Section II 

Effectiveness of U.N.

Operations

17

Mandates Were Not Carried Out in Croatia (through Mar. 1995) 17

Croatia Rejects UNPROFOR; Accepts New U.N. Mandate 19

U.N. Response in Safe Areas: Initial Assertive Stand in Sarajevo 21

U.N. Response in Safe Areas: Minimal Protection in Gorazde 23

U.N. Response in Safe Areas: Loss of Credible Deterrent in Bihac 25

Human Rights Violations 28

U.N. Provides Important Humanitarian Aid 30

UNPROFOR Undertakes Other Activities 32

Briefing Section III 

Observations on

UNPROFOR and U.N.

Peacekeeping

34

U.N. Approach to Peacekeeping Undercuts Ability to Protect 34

NATO Air Power Used Sparingly 36

Operational Limits of UNPROFOR and U.N. Peacekeeping 38

UNPROFOR Withdrawal Issues 40

Appendix I 

U.N. Security Council

Resolutions in the

Former Yugoslavia

42

Appendix II 

UNPROFOR Troop

Deployments and

Contributing

Countries (as of

March 1995)

44

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Contents

Appendix III 

Selected Sources

45

Figure Figure 1: Factional Control in the Former Yugoslavia 8

Abbreviations

CAS Close air support

CSCE Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

ECOSOC Economic and Social Council

JNA Yugoslav National Army

KSA Krajina Serb Army

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PVO Private Vountary Organizations

UNCRO United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in

Croatia

UNPREDEP United Nations Preventive Deployment Force

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNPA United Nations Protected Area

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

Figure 1: Factional Control in the Former Yugoslavia

Bosnian Serb

Bosnian Muslim and Croat

Croatia, controlled by 


Croatian Serb (mostly the former U.N. Protected Areas)


*Serbia and Montenegro have asserted a joint independent state.


 The United States has not recognized this entity.

Austria Hungary

Romania

Bulgaria

Greece

Albania

Former Yugoslov


Republic of 


Macedonia

Serbia*

Kosovo

Montenegro*

Italy

Italy

Adriatic


Sea

Slovenia

Croatia

Zagreb

Bihac Banja Luka

Tuzla

Srebrenica

Zepa

Gorazde

Mostar

Sarajevo

Vitez

Metkovic

Split

Sibenik





 





Knin

Zadar

Belgrade

Bosnia


and


Herzegovina

Former


UNPA

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

Little change has taken place in the factional control of Bosnian and

Croatian territory since 1993. Croatia remains divided between the

government and Croatian Serbs in the former U.N. Protected Areas (UNPA).1

 Croatia recently agreed to a new U.N. operation, the U.N. Confidence

Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO). However, the Croatian Serbs

have not agreed to the terms and remain mobilized.

In Bosnia, Bosnian Serbs still control about 70 percent of the territory and

the Bosnian government enclaves of Bihac, Gorazde, Srebrenica, and

Sarajevo are still isolated and cut off from Central Bosnia. Bosnian

Muslims and Croats agreed to form a federation, following diplomatic

initiatives by the United States in March 1994. Although there has not been

full cooperation within the federation, it has allowed the relatively

unobstructed delivery of humanitarian assistance to Central Bosnia and

other locations. (We will discuss the federation later.) In December 1994,

the Bosnian government and Bosnian Serbs agreed to a cessation of

hostilities but an extension was not agreed to. As of May 1995, conflict in

Bihac, increasing violations in Sarajevo, new offensives around Tuzla, and

shelling in the other safe areas were taking place.

1

The term UNPA was dropped in the new U.N. mandate for Croatia because it implied a special status

for this part of Croatia.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

GAO U.N. Mandates--Croatia

12 Security Council Resolutions

focus on Croatia (3 under Chapter VII)

UNPROFOR mandate 

Verify withdrawal of JNA 

 Ensure UNPAs are demilitarized

 Facilitate return of displaced persons

 UNCRO mandate (Apr. 1995)

Monitor cease-fire agreement

Monitor international borders

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

As of mid-April 1995, 12 U.N. Security Council Resolutions focussed on

Croatia. These mandates are authorized primarily under Chapter VI of the

U.N. Charter, although the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)

received Chapter VII authority to protect itself and ensure its own freedom

of movement. The mandates were primarily to implement a U.N. peace

plan designed to end the conflict in Croatia. Under this peace plan,

UNPROFOR’s mandate was to

• verify the withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) from Croatia,

• ensure the demilitarization of the UNPAs and protect persons in them from

fear of armed attack,

• help ensure respect by the local police for the human rights of UNPA

residents, and

• facilitate the safe and secure return of displaced persons to their homes in

the UNPAs.

UNPROFOR was also to monitor and verify compliance with the March 29,

1994, cease-fire agreement between the government and Croatian Serb

forces.

On March 31, 1995, the U.N. Security Council replaced UNPROFOR with a

new mission, UNCRO. Under the mandate, UNCRO forces will be deployed to

monitor Croatia’s international borders with Bosnia and the former

Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); UNCRO will also monitor

the cease-fire within Croatia.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

GAO U.N. Mandates--Bosnia

20 Security Council Resolutions

focus on Bosnia (11 under Chapter VII)

UNHCR--coordinate and distribute aid 

UNPROFOR mandate 

Protect Sarajevo airport

Protect humanitarian aid delivery

Deter attacks on safe areas

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

Overall, 20 Security Council Resolutions focus on Bosnia and 11 are

authorized under Chapter VII. In November 1991, the U.N.

Secretary-General designated UNHCR the lead agency for humanitarian

relief in the former Yugoslavia. One of UNHCR’s major responsibilities is to

manage an extensive logistics and distribution network to move food and

other relief supplies to persons affected by the conflict. UNHCR maintains

large warehouses and arranges convoys to transport aid to those in need.

As fighting shifted from Croatia to Bosnia in early 1992, the Security

Council extended UNPROFOR’s mandate to Bosnia. The first task given

UNPROFOR in that country was to ensure the security of the Sarajevo

airport. UNPROFOR was to help unload humanitarian cargo at the airport and

to ensure the safe movement of aid and relief workers. UNPROFOR’s

humanitarian role in Bosnia was expanded in late summer 1992 when it

was mandated to protect UNHCR convoys. UNPROFOR was explicitly

authorized to use force in situations where armed people attempted to

prevent the U.N. from carrying out its mandates.

In June 1993, UNPROFOR was mandated to deter attacks against six safe

areas in Bosnia—Sarajevo, Bihac, Gorazde, Tuzla, Srebrenica, and Zepa.

These enclaves were surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces. The safe areas

were to be “free from armed attacks” and UNPROFOR was authorized under

Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to take necessary measures to ensure this,

including the use of air power provided by regional organizations or

member states.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

GAO

(as of April 1995)

U.N. Resolutions 70 (38 Chapter VII)

UNPROFOR cost $3.3 billion

U.S. assessment $1.1 billion

(Est. FY 95) $ 506 million

Other U.S. costs $1.4 billion

UNPROFOR staff 44,034

Fatalities 155

Casualties 1,382

U.N. Operations in the 

Former Yugoslavia

a

b

c

d

aTotal assessments for UNPROFOR thru March 31, 1995.

bTotal estimated U.S. assessments fiscal years 1992-1995.

cEstimated U.S. assessment for fiscal year 1995.

dIncludes U.N. troops civilian police and UNPROFOR civilians. This total does not include all U.N.

workers, such as UNCR staff.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

The U.N.’s mission in the former Yugoslavia is by far the largest in its

history, authorized in 70 Security Council resolutions, of which 38 are

authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Thirty-five resolutions

apply generally to the former Yugoslavia, 20 focus primarily on Bosnia, 

12 focus on Croatia, and 3 apply to Macedonia. The 44,000 staff in

UNPROFOR exceeds that of any other U.N. peace operation. UNPROFOR has

about 37,000 troops, 4,600 civilians, and 1,500 civilian police and military

observers. U.N. member states have been assessed more than $3.3 billion

for UNPROFOR as of March 31, 1995. Separate budget estimates for UNCRO

and UNPROFOR were not available at the time of our review.

Total U.S. government costs for operations in the former Yugoslavia are

estimated to be $2.5 billion for fiscal years 1992 through 1995.

Assessments for UNPROFOR were about $1.1 billion and the costs of

humanitarian assistance and air operations such as enforcing the no-fly

zone over Bosnia were an additional $1.4 billion. The estimated U.S.

assessment for UNPROFOR for fiscal year 1995 is $506 million.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) activities in

the former Yugoslavia have also been unparalleled in U.N. history in terms

of size, breadth, and hazards encountered. It has spent over $1.0 billion in

the former Yugoslavia. At the end of 1994, about 740 of its staff or about 15

percent were working in this region. At the start of 1995, it was providing

food aid for over 2.2 million people in all parts of the former Yugoslavia.

By April 1995, UNPROFOR forces had suffered 1,382 casualties, 155 of them

fatal. Over 560 of the casualties were war-related, with mines, shelling, and

direct fire each accounting for about one-third of this number. Thirteen

UNHCR staff have been killed, including several convoy drivers.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

GAO Mandates Were Not Carried Out in 

Croatia (through Mar. 1995)

JNA officially withdraws, but soldiers and 

weapons remain.

UNPAs were not demilitarized. 

Conditions do not permit displaced to return.

Number of cease-fire violations increased.

Economic agreement stalled. 

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

The JNA officially withdrew from Croatia in 1991. But according to the

Croatian government, the JNA only partially withdrew. In a December 1994

report, the U.N. Commission of Experts on the former Yugoslavia found

that the JNA transferred massive amounts of weapons to Croatian Serbs to

help them form an army. Also, many JNA soldiers remained in the former

UNPAs and reconstituted themselves as part of the new Croatian Serb

army—formally called the Krajina Serb Army (KSA).

Although given mandates to help demilitarize the UNPAs and return

displaced persons to them, UNPROFOR was not able to disarm the KSA. The

KSA initially placed heavy weapons in UNPROFOR storage depots, but the KSA

later broke into these sites and reclaimed their weapons, partially in

response to Croatian government initiatives in January 1993. As of

May 1995, troop movements by both the KSA and the Croatian government

were occurring in the former UNPAs. Because of potential fighting,

UNPROFOR has returned very few of the estimated 360,000 to 450,000

refugees and displaced persons. According to the U.N. Secretary-General,

present conditions do not permit voluntary return of displaced persons.

In 1994, UNPROFOR in Croatia emphasized monitoring the cease-fire

agreement. To accomplish this, it interposed its forces between the KSA

and the Croatian government in a 2-kilometerwide, 740-kilometer long

buffer zone and established about 300 observation and control posts.

However, the number of cease-fire violations steadily increased from 70 on

October 1, 1994, to 212 on March 1, 1995. UNPROFOR was especially

concerned about the number of serious violations by Croatian Serbs

involving the use of heavy weapons. In addition, a growing number of

UNPROFOR vehicles were hijacked at gunpoint within the UNPAs.

The Croatian government and the Croatian Serbs reached an economic

agreement in December 1994 and it has produced tangible results. The

Zagreb-Belgrade highway was opened on December 21, 1994, in two

sectors of the former UNPAs, with UNPROFOR forces providing security along

part of the route. Traffic quickly rose from under 1,000 vehicles per day in

late December to over 5,000 by mid-January 1995. However, progress to

implement the agreement slowed after Croatia announced it would no

longer accept UNPROFOR’s mandate.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

GAO Croatia Rejects UNPROFOR;

Accepts New U.N. Mandate 

UNPROFOR viewed as barrier to a 

unified Croatia.

Croatia's international boundaries not 

protected; and UNPAs served as 

launching point for attacks on Bosnia.

UNCRO created; redeploys troops to 

monitor international borders.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

The failure to achieve the goals of the original peace plan led the President

of Croatia to announce the termination of UNPROFOR’s presence in Croatia

as of March 31, 1995. According to Croatia’s Foreign Ministry, UNPROFOR’s

presence was a buffer that effectively established a sovereign state in the

UNPAs for the Croatian Serbs. Moreover, since sections of the UNPAs are

adjacent to the highway along Croatia’s Dalmatian coast, Croatian Serbs

could close the highway and cut Croatia off from its coast.

Croatia also acted to terminate UNPROFOR’s presence because UNPROFOR did

not stop violations of Croatia’s international borders from the UNPAs. For

example, in November 1994, Croatian Serbs launched air, missile, and

ground attacks from the UNPAs into Bihac in Bosnia. On March 10 and 11,

1995, Croatian Serbs removed heavy weapons from a storage site in the

sector east UNPA, crossed into Serbia with the weapons, and then reentered

the UNPA farther north. According to the U.N. Under Secretary-General for

Peacekeeping Operations, this was a violation of Croatia’s international

borders and was reported to the Security Council. Overall, UNPROFOR has

not emphasized control of Croatia’s international borders. Most UNPROFOR

troops in Croatia are deployed well within Croatia as a buffer between

Croatian government and Croatian Serb forces. U.N. reports further show

that the UNPROFOR observers are frequently denied access to the

international borders and cannot monitor them.

After considerable pressure from U.S. officials, who were concerned that a

termination of UNPROFOR would lead to war, the Croatian government

agreed to permit U.N. forces in Croatia under a new mandate. On

March 31, 1995, the U.N. Security Council approved a new mandate for

Croatia and a new mission, UNCRO. UNCRO will monitor Croatia’s

international borders with Bosnia and the former Republic of Yugoslavia

(Serbia and Montenegro) as well as continue monitoring the internal

cease-fire line. The concept of U.N. Protected Areas has been dropped

from the new mandate. UNCRO forces will monitor and report on the

crossing of military personnel, equipment, supplies, and weapons at 25

border posts. In addition, it will continue to facilitate the delivery of

humanitarian aid through Croatia into Bosnia. Overall force levels for

UNCRO will be reduced from the roughly 12,000 troops currently deployed

to about 8,750. However, as of early May 1995, neither the Croatian

government nor the Croatian Serbs had agreed to specific terms of UNCRO’s

deployment.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

GAO U.N. Response in Safe Areas:

Initial Assertive Stand in Sarajevo 

Estimated 10,000 killed; 60,000 

wounded in Sarajevo.

Assertive stand - Feb. 1994

NATO gives ultimatum to Serbs; 

Serbs withdraw most heavy weapons.

Bosnian Muslims and Croats agree to 

Federation.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

Since April 1992, an estimated 10,000 residents of Sarajevo have been

killed and nearly 60,000 wounded. This total includes over 1,500 children

killed and nearly 15,000 wounded according to a report by the U.N.

Commission of Experts on the former Yugoslavia. Because of attacks on

civilians, the U.N. Security Council designated Sarajevo and five other

locations safe areas, “free from armed attacks and any other hostile acts.”

On February 5, 1994, 68 civilians were killed and 142 wounded by a mortar

round fired at the central market in Sarajevo. This followed a similar

attack a day earlier in the suburbs of Sarajevo where 10 people were killed

and 18 injured. Responding to these attacks, the U.N. Secretary-General

asked the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for air strikes to lift

the siege of Sarajevo. On February 9, NATO issued an ultimatum to Bosnian

Serb forces to withdraw their heavy weapons 20 kilometers from the

center of Sarajevo or place them under UNPROFOR control within 10 days, or

they would be subject to air strikes. The Security Council broadly

supported the ultimatum as a key effort to achieve a negotiated settlement

of the conflict.

In the face of NATO’s threat, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to withdraw their

heavy weapons within 2 days. By the evening of the deadline set by NATO,

the United Nations reported that the Bosnian Serbs had substantially

complied with the ultimatum. Some heavy weapons had not been

withdrawn beyond the 20-kilometer zone, but UNPROFOR planned to

monitor them in place. As a result of these actions, no air strikes were

carried out.

Following the assertive response by NATO and UNPROFOR, the siege of

Sarajevo was lifted, and the United States was able to initiate discussions

for a federation of Bosnian Muslims and Croats. A framework for the

federation was signed in Washington in March 1994 and constitutional

arrangements were agreed to in May 1994. The agreement called for

federal units with equal rights and responsibilities, and also envisioned

that areas with a majority of Serb residents would ultimately join the

federation after peaceful negotiations. Although the federation has not yet

resulted in the political reintegration of all communities, humanitarian aid

passes relatively unobstructed through territory under federation control.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

GAO U.N. Response in Safe Areas:

Minimal Protection in Gorazde 

Bosnian Serb infantry and artillery 

attacked (Mar. - Apr. 1994).

Hospitals and refugee centers targeted.

NATO close air support limited; NATO 

issues ultimatum. 

Bosnian Serbs withdraw heavy weapons 

but remain in exclusion zone. 

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

At the end of March 1994, Bosnian Serb forces launched an infantry and

artillery offensive against the Gorazde enclave. The city of Gorazde was

subject to intermittent shelling and sniper fire by the Bosnian Serb Army,

resulting in a steady stream of casualties and injuries. Attacks became

more serious with the Serb offensive of March 28 and 29, which involved

artillery, tanks, and infantry. No distinction was made between military

and civilian targets. Serb shelling also caused damage to the U.N. refugee

center and U.N. equipment. The Bosnian Serb Army steadily invaded the

safe area from all sides; numerous villages were destroyed and burned and

their inhabitants killed or driven out. The city’s hospital was reported to be

overcrowded, understaffed, unsanitary, and the frequent target of shelling.

Evacuation of urgent medical cases was rarely permitted. During this time

period, the local population staged a protest against UNPROFOR’s inaction

UNHCR communications staff were concerned that reports did not portray

the seriousness of the situation.

On April 6, 1994, the Security Council demanded that the Bosnian Serbs

cease their attack. Subsequently, UNPROFOR asked NATO for air support to

protect several endangered U.N. military observers in Gorazde. In

response, NATO aircraft bombed Serb positions on April 10 and 11 and

destroyed a tank shelling Gorazde. However, heavy shelling of Gorazde

continued. Over the next few days, Bosnian Serbs tested UNPROFOR’s will

by taking hostages—at one point removing 16 peacekeepers from their

posts—targeting the city, wounding several U.N. personnel, and killing

two. Further air support was not requested until April 22. On that date, the

North Atlantic Council of NATO authorized air strikes against Bosnian Serb

targets and issued an ultimatum establishing (1) a 3-kilometer exclusion

zone from which Bosnian Serb military forces were to pull back and (2) a

20-kilometer zone from which Bosnian Serb heavy weapons were to be

withdrawn. Air strikes did not take place because UNPROFOR reported that

Serb forces had withdrawn their heavy weapons from the 20-kilometer

zone. However, some Serb soldiers with small arms remained within the

3-kilometer zone after the date of the ultimatum.

During the next few weeks, these forces harassed and obstructed

UNPROFOR convoys and humanitarian aid deliveries, detained UNPROFOR

forces, and stole UNPROFOR weapons and equipment. U.S. Agency for

International Development officials visiting the enclave in July noted that

the Serbs still maintained a presence within the 3 kilometer zone, having

simply changed their military uniforms for police or civilian attire.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

GAO U.N. Response in Safe Areas:

Loss of Credible Deterrent in Bihac 

Bosnian government attacks Bosnian 

Serb forces surrounding Bihac

(Aug. 1994).

Serbs launch ground, missile, and air 

attacks on Bihac pocket from Croatia 

(Nov. - Dec. 1994).

UNPROFOR troops are virtual hostages.

U.N. requests minimal air power.

Fighting is continuing.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

The northwest Bosnian enclave of Bihac was declared a safe area by the

Security Council in May 1993. In October 1993 an opposition Bosnian

Muslim leader declared Bihac to be autonomous from the Sarajevo

government. Fighting broke out between forces loyal to the Bihac leader

and the Bosnian government, with the rebel forces finally defeated in

August 1994. Government forces then began an offensive against Bosnian

Serb forces surrounding Bihac, but were forced back into Bihac in

September 1994.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

In early November 1994, Serbs from within Croatia launched missile and

air strikes on the Bihac pocket. Bosnian Serbs and the rebel Muslim forces

attacked the Bihac pocket from Croatia. During an attack on November 18,

these forces used napalm and cluster bombs, which the Security Council

noted was “in clear violation of Bihac’s status as a safe area.” The air

attacks from Croatia led the Security Council to authorize the use of NATO

air power on targets in Croatia. Shortly thereafter, NATO aircraft struck

Ubdina airfield in Croatia, damaging only the runway at UNPROFOR’s

request. However, the military advance of the Bosnian Serbs continued,

with the assistance of the Croatian Serbs. NATO informed UNPROFOR it was

prepared to use wider air strikes upon request, but UNPROFOR did not

request them, choosing instead to negotiate a possible cease-fire. During

this period, UNPROFOR personnel throughout Bosnia were being taken

hostage. On successive days in early December, Bosnian Serb forces

detained or held hostage between 316 and 439 UNPROFOR personnel.

By early December the borders of the enclave had been infiltrated

everywhere, and the towns surrounding Bihac had fallen to the Bosnian

Serb Army. Shelling of the center of Bihac occurred daily and by

mid-December, a large part of Bihac lacked water. Access for

humanitarian convoys was almost impossible. The UNPROFOR troop

contingent in the Bihac pocket lacked food and did not have fuel to fully

move around the area. On December 12, 1994, some of the contingent was

attacked; five peacekeepers were wounded and one was killed. This

contingent had deployed to Bihac in June as a replacement for another

contingent and was not fully equipped. According to UNPROFOR’s Deputy

Operations Commander, only about one-quarter of the unit had rifles.

UNPROFOR had planned to send the remaining weapons and equipment by

convoy. But Bosnian Serbs obstructed UNPROFOR convoys and would not

allow the equipment to be delivered. On December 16, UNHCR reports

characterized the situation in Bihac as a siege, with UNHCR and UNPROFOR

officials virtual hostages. The city of Bihac did not fall, however, and in

late December 1994, a cease-fire agreement was signed for all of Bosnia.

Nonetheless, UNPROFOR and humanitarian aid convoys were still

obstructed. According to U.N. reports, fighting continues in Bihac as of

May 1995.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

GAO Human Rights Violations

Full magnitude of human rights violations 

is unknown.

U.N. documents widespread human 

rights violations, primarily by Bosnian 

and Croatian Serb authorities.

War Crimes Tribunal issues first 

indictments in Feb. 1995.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

The full magnitude of human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia

from 1991-94 is unknown because the United Nations and other

organizations do not have access to all areas. However, the Chairman,

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, testified that

“Despite the absence of a smoking gun, like the files left by the Nazis

documenting the Holocaust, what has happened in Bosnia is genocide.”2

He also provided some indication of the magnitude of violations in Bosnia

and Croatia—151 mass graves with 5 to 3,000 bodies in each, over 

20,000 rape victims, and over 50,000 torture victims. During our work, we

saw destroyed hospitals and schools in Bihac and bombed residences and

buildings in Sarajevo. We also saw extensive tracts of burned and bombed

housing in the protected areas in Croatia. According to victims and U.N.

officials, many Croatians living in the former protected areas were killed

and others had their homes destroyed.

In November 1994, the United Nations reported that widespread violations

of human rights in areas controlled by Bosnian Serb authorities continued.

These violations included the displacement, murder, beating, torture, and

rape of Bosnian Muslim and Croats in areas such as Banja Luka, Prijedor,

and Bijeljina. A Human Rights Watch report documented similar violations

in other locations in Northern Bosnia and said that “non-Serbs have been

murdered with impunity.” Witnesses to the crimes stated that those

committing the crimes were often dressed in uniforms belonging to the

Bosnian Serb army, military police, or civilian police. In December 1994,

the U.N. Commission of Experts on the former Yugoslavia reported on the

killing of civilians, mass gravesites, rapes, torture, ethnic cleansing, and

prison camps. The Commission concluded that all parties had committed

grave breaches of international humanitarian law. But most violations

were committed by Serbs against Bosnian Muslims. Croats were the

second largest group of victims. Serbs were also victims, but to a much

lesser extent than the others. The Commission also said the chain of

command in committing the crimes was blurred, but “the absence of

preventive action by military commanders and other purposeful omissions

. . . creates a clear basis for command responsibility.”3

In February 1995, the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former

Yugoslavia issued its first three indictments naming 22 people for genocide

in death camps run by Bosnian Serbs. In April 1995, the Special Prosecutor

named Bosnian Serb leaders as suspects in an investigation of war crime.

2

“Statement of the Honorable Christopher H. Smith,” Chairman, Commission on Security and

Cooperation in Europe,” at the Hearing on the UN, NATO, and the Former Yugoslavia, April 6, 1995.

3

Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council

Resolution 780 (U.N. Security Council, S/1994/674/Add.2, Vol I, December 28, 1994).

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

GAO U.N. Provides Important

Humanitarian Aid 

UNHCR leads efforts to provide aid.

Food requirements met in 1994:

All Bosnia--85%, Central Bosnia--95%; 

Bihac--33%; Eastern enclaves--65%

UNPROFOR provides some convoy 

escort and other assistance; operates 

Sarajevo airport.

UNHCR will try to continue if 

UNPROFOR withdraws.

Although unable to bring lasting peace to Bosnia and Croatia, U.N. actions

have provided vital humanitarian assistance. Over the past three winters,

UNHCR has led efforts by national governments, other U.N. agencies, and

nongovernmental humanitarian organizations to deliver vital food aid,

particularly in Bosnia. In 1994, about 356,000 metric tons of food, or about

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

85 percent of their estimated food requirements, were delivered to

Bosnians. However, the success rate was not uniform to all parts of the

country or at all times of the year. For example, Bihac received only

33 percent of its estimated food requirements in 1994, with no food

delivered in November 1994. Bihac has an estimated population of 180,000

to 205,000. The eastern enclaves (Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica), received

65 percent of food requirements; these safe areas have an estimated

population of 104,000.

UNPROFOR has an important role in ensuring the delivery of aid, but the

overall benefit provided by UNPROFOR varies. In 1994, about 77 percent of

the aid convoys in Bosnia were successful. However, on routes where

UNPROFOR escorts were needed and provided, such as the safe areas, the

success rate was much lower. For example, in 1994, the convoy success

rate to Bihac was 44 percent and to the eastern enclaves it was 62 percent.

Overall, 59 percent of convoys to the safe areas were successful. Although

UNPROFOR escorts do not ensure successful aid deliveries, UNHCR officials

said escorts to Bihac, Sarajevo, and the enclaves are essential. Without

UNPROFOR escorts, convoy drivers would refuse to deliver aid to safe areas.

By contrast, some local UNHCR officials noted that UNPROFOR escorts are

considered by Bosnian Serbs to be a provocation.

UNPROFOR contributes to humanitarian aid efforts in other ways. In many

parts of Bosnia, UNPROFOR provides engineering assistance, such as

opening up new routes, maintaining existing roads in the harsh climate,

and repairing bridges. In some cases, UNPROFOR has loaned fuel to UNHCR

when there were fuel delivery problems in Bosnia. UNPROFOR also provides

information to UNHCR on route conditions and potential fighting. Finally,

UNPROFOR operates and provides security at Sarajevo airport. Over 

55,000 metric tons of aid were delivered there in 1994, more than twice the

amount coming into the city by land routes. According to the chief of

UNHCR’s Sarajevo office, it would be virtually impossible to provide aid to

Sarajevo without UNPROFOR’s services.

UNHCR has indicated that despite UNPROFOR’s importance to its

humanitarian mission, it intends to continue operations in Bosnia if

UNPROFOR withdraws. At the same time, it recognizes that the level of

fighting and tension could jeopardize or halt the delivery of aid to

Sarajevo, Bihac, and the eastern enclaves.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

GAO UNPROFOR Undertakes Other

Activities

Confidence-building 

Observation and monitoring

Facilitation between warring parties

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

In Bosnia and Croatia, UNPROFOR has undertaken specific measures to build

confidence among the parties. It monitored the cease-fire between

Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces and participated in local security

monitoring when requested by the parties, such as 24-hour patrols in a

Croat community in Zenica and joint patrols with local Croat and Bosnian

police to deter banditry on roads near Vitez. Throughout the two

countries, UNPROFOR also monitors fragile cease-fires and observes

movements of forces. UNPROFOR has also fostered discussions among local

political leaders, some of which have led to agreements to allow greater

freedom of movement for people and goods or to permit improvements to

local water, telephone, sewer, gas, and power utilities. Some meetings of

local civil and military leaders are chaired by UNPROFOR and allow these

officials to discuss matters of mutual concern.

Public transport through the region has improved as UNPROFOR provides

security to rail passengers and a new public bus system that is operating in

most of the Federation territory. UNPROFOR has also been involved in

infrastructure improvements, such as repairing numerous damaged and

destroyed bridges, with a focus on routes used by aid convoys or which

link the two communities.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section III 

Observations on UNPROFOR and U.N.

Peacekeeping

GAO U.N. Approach to Peacekeeping 

Undercuts Ability to Protect 

U.N. doctrine of peacekeeping relies on 

consent and cooperation of warring 

parties.

Reliance on consent and cooperation 

impedes effective protection. 

Interpretation of neutrality minimizes use 

of NATO airpower in response to attacks.

Presence of UNPROFOR staff narrows 

response to aggression.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section III 

Observations on UNPROFOR and U.N.

Peacekeeping

According to U.N. Secretary-General reports, UNPROFOR has been guided by

the U.N. doctrine of peacekeeping, which relies on all parties’ consent and

cooperation to implement Security Council resolutions. This approach has

limited UNPROFOR’s effectiveness. For example, although UNPROFOR has

Chapter VII authority to ensure its freedom of movement, all vehicles

obtain movement clearance from the warring factions before driving from

one area to another. Also, UNPROFOR does not challenge roadblocks that

prevent the delivery of aid or even the resupply of its own troops, as in

Bihac. Relying on the parties’ consent has also hampered deployment. For

example, Bosnian Serbs have influenced which troop contingents are

stationed along confrontation lines. According to the former U.N.

Commander in Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs clearly stated which national

troop contingents were acceptable, and which were not. UNPROFOR’s

Bosnia Chief of Operations said these views, as well as the preferences of

the other warring parties, must be considered in UNPROFOR deployment

and, as a result, the force is not as effectively used as it could be.

According to the Secretary-General, UNPROFOR must also remain strictly

neutral in carrying out its mandate. UNPROFOR’s interpretation of neutrality

has led it to restrict air power in response to attacks on peacekeepers and

on safe areas. The UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia said more assertive

action to protect and deter attacks would make UNPROFOR appear to take

the side of the party under attack. This has led to relatively ineffectual use

of air power. Air support in Gorazde and Bihac was minimal even when

civilians living in safe areas were being killed. After attacks on U.N.

peacekeepers in Gorazde, Bihac, and Sarajevo, UNPROFOR sparingly called

for air support and only against the specific violating weapon.

Finally, UNPROFOR’s staff structure reflects the doctrine of peacekeeping.

The staff consists of 37,000 troops. But UNPROFOR also consists of 

2,600 local civilian staff, 2,000 international staff such as public affairs and

information officers, 800 civilian police, and 700 military observers. These

personnel are unarmed, many work throughout Croatia and Bosnia, and

many are periodically taken hostage. The Secretary-General cites the

vulnerability of these personnel as a reason to act only with the consent of

the warring parties. He said UNPROFOR’s mandate is peacekeeping;

aggressive action would be a fundamental shift from the logic of

peacekeeping and would entail unacceptable risks to the mission.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section III 

Observations on UNPROFOR and U.N.

Peacekeeping

GAO NATO Air Power Used Sparingly

NATO controls no-fly zone.

U.N. controls close air support.

Dual-key used for airstrikes.

U.N.-NATO differ on underlying mission 

of airpower.

U.N.-NATO differ on alternative targets 

and warnings to parties.

Restricted use of airpower raise 

questions about effectiveness.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section III 

Observations on UNPROFOR and U.N.

Peacekeeping

NATO operates three air missions in Bosnia. In April 1993, NATO began to

independently enforce a “no-fly” zone over Bosnian airspace, under U.N.

Security Council Resolution 843. In August 1993, NATO agreed to provide

close air support (CAS) for UNPROFOR. NATO provides CAS only at U.N.

request and targets specific military weapons attacking UNPROFOR

personnel. In August 1993, NATO also agreed to support UNPROFOR with air

strikes to deter attacks on safe areas. Unlike CAS, air strikes could be used

more broadly as a deterrent. Authorization for air strikes is

dual-key—requiring both NATO and U.N. approval.4

As of March 1995, NATO had conducted over 17,000 sorties related to air

strikes or CAS. However, only four air strikes had been formally authorized

and five CAS operations requested.5

 According to NATO officials, the 17,000

sorties did not necessarily respond to formal UNPROFOR requests, but were

flown under NATO initiatives. In this regard, NATO has encouraged more

assertive use of air power. For example, NATO typically has aircraft

patrolling on a regular basis so it can respond quickly to formal U.N.

requests. In November 1994, NATO urged a more assertive use of air power

to deter attacks on Bihac. After NATO aircraft were targeted by Croatian

Serb missiles, NATO began reconnaissance for expanded operations.

UNPROFOR, however, requested NATO to cease reconnaissance, temporarily

halt the air interdiction over much of Bosnia, and halt further air strikes.

The limited use of air power stems from a difference in mission between

the United Nations and NATO. According to NATO and U.N. documents and

officials, the U.N. believes that the robust use of air power is inconsistent

with ensuring the cooperation of all parties. NATO believes sufficient air

power should be used to accomplish the mission of deterring attacks on

U.N. personnel and safe areas. Thus NATO has insisted that UNPROFOR

provide pilots with several targets of military significance, whereas

UNPROFOR insists on symbolic targets to send a political message. NATO has

also disagreed with UNPROFOR on policy regarding tactical warning. NATO

insists that tactical warnings of air strikes should not be provided because

it endangers pilots and compromises the mission. UNPROFOR insists on

having contact with all parties and believes that general warnings of air

strikes must be given. Based on these different approaches, NATO military

officials think air strikes in the former Yugoslavia lack credible deterrent.

4

Once air strikes are approved, the operational keys are delegated to the Secretary-General’s Special

Representative for the former Yugoslavia, and the Commander in Chief, NATO’s Southern Command.

5

Air strikes were against Serbian targets near Sarajevo, and against a Croatian Serb airfield that was

use to launch against attacks the Bihac pocket in late 1994.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section III 

Observations on UNPROFOR and U.N.

Peacekeeping

GAO Operational Limits of UNPROFOR and 

U.N. Peacekeeping 

U.N. command and control limits 

effective action.

Troop contingents vary in preparedness 

and equipment.

U.N. has shortfall in authorized troop 

strength. 

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section III 

Observations on UNPROFOR and U.N.

Peacekeeping

As with other peacekeeping missions, UNPROFOR’s command and control

hampers operations.6

 For example, in 1994, a troop contingent was

requested to deploy to Mostar where intense fighting was taking place.

According to the troop contingent, it had discretion in carrying out this

order and decided not to deploy immediately. The issue was not resolved

and the Security Council and the troop contingent’s government

exchanged letters over the issue. According to the Chief of Operations in

the Bosnia Command, the inability to effectively deploy and move troops

poses a problem in a war environment. Currently, UNPROFOR informally

asks troop contingent commanders their views on redeploying or changing

the contingent’s operation. The contingent commander will then contact

his capital and ask for advice. If the response is positive, the U.N.

Commander, Bosnia, will formally order the redeployment.

As of April 1995, 28 nations contributed U.N. troop contingents for the

former Yugoslavia; and differences in their readiness posed a problem.

Some contingents, for example, arrived without needed equipment,

supplies, or maintenance capabilities. According to UNPROFOR officials, one

contingent initially arrived without sleeping bags, flak jackets, or winter

clothing. Others arrived without vehicles and armored personnel carriers.

These troops could not be deployed in Bosnia without transport

equipment and had to remain in Croatia while awaiting donated

equipment. The troop contingent in Bihac in December 1994, deployed

without weapons and basic equipment for each soldier. When Bihac came

under siege, U.N. convoys could not deliver the equipment to the

contingent.

UNPROFOR’s troop strength is less than that authorized by the Security

Council. As of April 1995, its actual strength of nearly 39,000 was almost

6,000 short of authorized levels. Most of this shortfall is in logistics and

support troops. According to the UNPROFOR Commander, even authorized

troop levels are insufficient to carry out UNPROFOR’s mandate. However,

given the peacekeeping approach underlying U.N. operations in the former

Yugoslavia, the U.N. belief that assertive action could compromise its

neutrality, and a desire to negotiate a solution, it is an open question how

greater troop strength would change UNPROFOR’s approach.

6

For a discussion of weaknesses in command and control, see Peace Operations: Information on U.S.

and U.N. Activities (GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR, February 1995); U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in

Recent Missions (GAO/NSIAD-94-9, Dec. 1993).

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section III 

Observations on UNPROFOR and U.N.

Peacekeeping

GAO UNPROFOR Withdrawal Issues

Different scenarios

Bosnia requires NATO assistance.

Croatia also requires NATO help.

There are uncertainties in:

Command and control,

benign vs. hostile environment, and

NATO commitment and cost.

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section III 

Observations on UNPROFOR and U.N.

Peacekeeping

Both UNPROFOR and NATO have begun to plan for a possible withdrawal of

UNPROFOR forces from all or parts of the former Yugoslavia. Initial

withdrawal plans centered on Bosnia, reflecting intensified fighting and

frustration with the lack of progress on a peace agreement. Planning also

focussed on a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia.

Most planning was based on a contingency of a hostile withdrawal, since

UNPROFOR personnel had periodically been taken hostage during air strikes.

Moreover, UNPROFOR weapons and equipment would be valuable to all

sides, and during withdrawal, the parties might try to seize the equipment.

Although not finalized or approved, draft NATO withdrawal plans have been

completed. NATO involvement would only occur at the request of the

United Nations. Estimates are that NATO would have to provide seven to

nine brigades.

But major issues remain undecided. For example, decisions about the

command and control of a U.N.-NATO withdrawal above theater level, have

not been fully agreed upon. This issue is complicated by the presence of

non-NATO forces in UNPROFOR, and humanitarian workers, U.N. military

observers, and civilian police throughout Croatia and Bosnia. In addition,

various NATO nations have differing views on the mix of NATO-U.N. funding

that would finance the withdrawal. The cost and duration of a withdrawal

would be strongly influenced by whether its nature is benign or hostile and

how much equipment is withdrawn.

The United States has agreed in principle to assist NATO in an UNPROFOR

withdrawal, pending congressional consultation.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Appendix I 

U.N. Security Council Resolutions in the

Former Yugoslavia

Resolution

number Date Area Purpose

U.N.

Charter

713 9/25/91 FY Weapons embargo against all former Yugoslavia VII

721 11/27/91 FY Preliminaries to establishing UNPROFOR VI

724 12/15/91 FY Establishes sanctions Committee VII

727 1/8/92 C Deployment of 50 liaison officers VI

740 2/7/92 C Increases in liaison officers VI

743 2/21/92 C Establishes UNPROFOR VI

749 4/7/92 C Authorizes full deployment of UNPROFOR VI

752 5/15/92 B Demands all cease fighting in Bosnia VI

753 5/18/92 C Admits Croatia to the U.N. VI

754 5/18/92 FY Admits Slovenia to the U.N. VI

755 5/20/92 B Admits Bosnia to the U.N. VI

757 5/30/92 FY Imposes sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro VII

758 6/8/92 B Authorizes UNPROFOR deployment to Sarajevo VI

760 6/18/92 FY Exempts humanitarian aid from sanctions VII

761 6/29/92 B Additional UNPROFOR deployment to Sarajevo; mandate to ensure security of

airport

VI

762 6/30/92 C Additional UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia “pink zones” VI

764 7/13/92 B UNPROFOR reinforcements in Sarajevo VI

769 8/7/92 C Enlarges UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia to perform customs functions VI

770 8/13/92 B Asks member states to facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid in Bosnia VII

771 8/13/92 B Demands unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations VII

776 9/14/92 B Enlarges UNPROFOR mandate to protect humanitarian convoys in Bosnia VI

777 9/19/92 FY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no longer U.N. member VI

779 10/6/92 C Enlarges UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia — Prevlaka peninsula VI

780 10/6/92 FY Establishes war crimes commission VI

781 10/9/92 B Bosnia no-fly zone VI

786 11/10/92 B Enlarges UNPROFOR mandate to authorize and monitor flights into Bosnia VI

787 11/16/92 FY Restricts transshipments VII

795 12/11/92 M UNPROFOR deployment to Macedonia VI

798 12/18/92 B Condemnation of war crimes VI

802 1/25/93 C Demands cessation of attacks on UNPROFOR and end of cease-fire violations VI

807 2/19/93 FY Demands respect for UNPROFOR’s security and extends mandate until 3/3/93 VII

808 2/22/93 FY Establishes war crimes tribunal VI

815 3/30/93 FY Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 6/30/93 VII

816 3/31/93 B Authorization to enforce no-fly zone VII

817 4/7/93 M Admits Macedonia to the U.N. VI

819 4/16/93 B Designates Srebrenica as safe area VII

(continued)

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Appendix I 

U.N. Security Council Resolutions in the

Former Yugoslavia

Resolution

number Date Area Purpose

U.N.

Charter

820 4/17/93 FY Strengthens embargo on Serbia and Montenegro VII

821 4/28/93 FY Excludes Serbia and Montenegro from ECOSOC VI

824 5/6/93 B Designates six safe areas in Bosnia VII

827 5/25/93 FY Establishes International War Crimes Tribunal VII

836 6/4/93 B Enlarges UNPROFOR mandate to deter attacks on safe areas VII

838 6/10/93 B Requests report on deploying monitors on Bosnia’s borders VII

842 6/18/93 M Authorizes U.S. to deploy in Macedonia VI

843 6/18/93 FY Requests to examine financial impact of sanctions VI

844 6/18/93 FY Authorizes reinforcement of UNPROFOR VII

845 6/18/93 M Urges Greece and Macedonia reach settlement VI

847 6/30/93 FY Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 9/30/93 VII

855 8/9/93 FY Calls for continuation of CSCE missions in Serbia and Montenegro VI

857 8/20/93 FY Candidates for judges of War Crimes Tribunal VI

859 8/24/93 B Calls for cease-fire VII

869 9/30/93 FY Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 10/1/93 VII

870 10/1/93 FY Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 10/5/93 VII

871 10/5/93 FY Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 3/31/94 VII

877 10/21/93 FY Appoints international tribunal prosecutor VI

900 3/4/94 B Appoints Special Coordinator for Sarajevo VII

908 3/31/94 FY Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 9/30/94 VII

913 4/22/94 FY Demands immediate release of U.N. personnel VII

914 4/27/94 FY Increases UNPROFOR personnel by 6,550 VII

936 7/8/94 FY Appoints prosecutor of international tribunal VII

941 9/23/94 B Condemns Bosnian Serb ethnic cleansing VII

942 9/23/94 B Imposes economic sanctions on Bosnian Serbs VII

943 9/29/94 FY Lifts some sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro VII

947 9/30/94 FY Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 3/31/95 VII

958 11/19/94 C Extends air strike authority to Croatia VII

959 11/19/94 C Clarifies safe area regime VII

967 12/14/94 FY Permits Serbs to export diphtheria serum VII

970 1/12/95 FY Continues suspensions of some sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro VII

981 3/31/95 C Establishes UNCRO mission for Croatia VII

982 3/31/95 B Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 11/30/95 but only for Bosnia VII

983 3/31/95 M Establishes UNPREDEP mission for Macedonia VI

Legend

B = Bosnia

C = Croatia

M = Macedonia

FY = Former Yugoslavia Areas

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Appendix II 

UNPROFOR Troop Deployments and

Contributing Countries (as of March 1995)

Country Croatia Bosnia Macedonia Total

France 843 3,781 4,624

Jordan 3,283 100 3,383

United Kingdom 3,155 3,155

Pakistan 2,983 2,983

Canada 1,218 820 2,038

Netherlands 148 1,482 1,630

Malaysia 1,545 1,545

Turkey 1,469 1,469

Spain 1,372 1,372

Russia 856 472 1,328

Bangladesh 1,238 1,238

Denmark 953 280 1,233

Sweden 128 1,030 1,158

Poland 1,141 1,141

Ukraine 555 460 1,015

Kenya 974 974

Czech Republic 957 957

Nepal 898 898

Belgium 769 100 869

Argentina 862 862

United States 299 540 839

Norway 111 636 747

Slovakia 567 567

Nordic 556 556

Egypt 418 418

New Zealand 249 249

Indonesia 220 220

Finland 43 43

Subtotal 14,825 21,590 1,096 37,511

Hdqs. units 404

Total troop strength 37,915

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Appendix III 

Selected Sources

1. U.N. Headquarters

 Documents:

 Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General Reports,

 International Conference on Former Yugoslavia

 reports, Commission on Human Rights reports

 Officials:

 Special Assistant to the Under Secretary-General for

 Peacekeeping; Director and military briefers, U.N. Situation Center

2. UNPROFOR

 Documents:

 Situation reports, U.N. military observer reports

 Officials:

 Special Representative of the Secretary-General

 Force Commanders, UNPROFOR and B-H Command

 U.N. Special Coordinator for Sarajevo

 Chief, Civilian Affairs

 Deputy Chief Inspector, Civilian Police

 Chief Military Observer

 Chief of Staff, Logistics

 Other military and civilian officers at UNPROFOR Headquarters,

 B-H Command, Sarajevo, Sector North, and troop contingents

3. UNHCR

 Documents:

 Field situation reports, field office responses of UNPROFOR

 services

 Officials:

 Chief of Mission, Bosnia

 Head of Office, Sarajevo

 Field staff in various locations

4. NATO

 Officials:

 U.S. Ambassador to NATO

 Deputy Permanent Representatives to NATO of Turkey, United

 Kingdom, and France

 Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe

 Senior and other staff, Allied Forces, Southern Europe

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
Appendix III 

Selected Sources

5. Department of Defense

 Officials:

 Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe

 Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe

 Deputy Commander in Charge, United States European

 Command

 Commander, Joint Task Force, Provide Promise

 Commander, Joint Task Force Forward

 Documents:

 Briefing slides on U.S. and U.N. operations in the former

 Yugoslavia

 Reports and studies on peace operations

6. Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and Agency

 for International Development

 Documents:

 Cables, reports

 Officials:

 U.S. Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission to Bosnia

 U.S. Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission to Croatia

 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, International Organization

 Affairs

 Director, Office of Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement

7. Statistical Information

 Budget data on U.S., UNPROFOR, and UNHCR actions in the former

 Yugoslavia

 UNPROFOR casualities and causes

 Cease-fire violation analyses

 Chronolonogy of CAS and air strikes

 Convoy success rates

 Days Sarajevo airport closed

 UNPROFOR deployment and troop numbers

 Monthly food distribution reports

 Sorties flown related to Deny Flight

 Sorties flown related to CAS and air strikes

 U.N. personnel detained during selected time periods

(711127) Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR Peace Operations
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