alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0000731947
<NAME>                        Swiss Army Brands, Inc.
<MULTIPLIER>                  1,000
<CURRENCY>                    US Dollars

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                  JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                    DEC-31-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                       1
<CASH>                            1,078
<SECURITIES>                          0
<RECEIVABLES>                    29,199
<ALLOWANCES>                        975
<INVENTORY>                      27,438
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                 64,144
<PP&E>                           10,958
<DEPRECIATION>                    7,207
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                   94,051
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>            18,343
<BONDS>                               0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                 0
<PREFERRED>                           0
<COMMON>                            882
<OTHER-SE>                       74,826
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>     94,051
<SALES>                         118,743
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                118,743
<CGS>                            76,020
<TOTAL-COSTS>                    49,639
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                    554
<LOSS-PROVISION>                     57
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                  (40)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                  (6,401)
<INCOME-TAX>                     (2,376)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>              (4,025)
<DISCONTINUED>                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                       0
<CHANGES>                             0
<NET-INCOME>                     (4,025)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                      (.49)
<EPS-DILUTED>                      (.49)



</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                          180036
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    76060
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      73950
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                353795
<PP&E>                                         1288866
<DEPRECIATION>                                  362210
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                22063067
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           487430
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                          1166
<OTHER-SE>                                    16914250
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  22063067
<SALES>                                        1266082
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               1266082
<CGS>                                           471874
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  5083021
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                6033
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (4295026)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (734371)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (3560655)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (3560655)
<EPS-BASIC>                                   (0.33)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.33)


</TABLE>
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-76,179-03

EX PARTE HIGHTOWER OBRYANT, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 1105383-A IN THE 179TH DISTRICT COURT

FROM HARRIS COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Applicant was convicted of possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance and

sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. The First Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. 

Obryant v. State, No. 01-08-00740-CR (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 10, 2009) (not

designated for publication). Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county

of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.

11.07.

Applicant contends, among other things, that trial counsel was ineffective. The trial court

entered a timely order designating issues and ordered trial counsel to respond to Applicant’s claim. 

This application was forwarded, however, before the trial court made findings of fact and
2

conclusions of law. We remand this application to the trial court to complete its evidentiary

investigation and make findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law within ninety days from

the date of this order. The district clerk shall then immediately forward to this Court the trial court’s

findings and conclusions and the record developed on remand, including, among other things,

affidavits, motions, objections, proposed findings and conclusions, orders, and transcripts from

hearings and depositions. See TEX.R.APP.P. 73.4(b)(4). Any extensions of time must be requested

by the trial court and obtained from this Court. 

Filed: April 1, 2020

Do not publish
Exhibit 99.1

Report of Independent Accountants

To the Shareholders and Trustees of NSTAR:

We have reviewed the accompanying condensed consolidated balance sheet of NSTAR and its subsidiaries as of September 30, 2003, and the related condensed consolidated statements of income, comprehensive income, and retained earnings foreach of the three-month and nine-month periods ended September 30, 2003 and September 30, 2002, and the condensed consolidated statements of cash flows for the nine-month periods ended September 30, 2003 and September 30, 2002.  These interim financialstatements are the responsibility of the Company’s management.

We conducted our review in accordance with standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.  A review of interim financial information consists principally of applying analytical procedures andmaking inquiries of persons responsible for financial and accounting matters.  It is substantially less in scope than an audit conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, the objective of which is the expression of an opinion regardingthe financial statements taken as a whole.  Accordingly, we do not express such an opinion.

Based on our review, we are not aware of any material modifications that should be made to the accompanying condensed consolidated interim financial statements for them to be in conformity with accounting principles generally acceptedin the United States of America.

We previously audited in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the United States of America, the consolidated balance sheet as of December 31, 2002, and the related consolidated statements of income, comprehensiveincome, retained earnings and of cash flows for the year then ended (not presented herein), and in our report dated January 22, 2003 we expressed an unqualified opinion on those consolidated financial statements.  In our opinion, the information set forth in theaccompanying condensed consolidated balance sheet as of December 31, 2002 is fairly stated in all material respects in relation to the consolidated balance sheet from which it has been derived.

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLPBoston, MassachusettsNovember 7, 2003

The “Report of Independent Accountants” included above is not a “report” or “part of a Registration Statement” prepared or certified by an independent accountant within the meanings of Sections 7 and11 of the Securities Act of 1933, and the accountants’ Section 11 liability does not extend to such report.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.1

I, Robert K. Cole, certify that:

1.   I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of New Century Financial
     Corporation;

2.   Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of
     a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
     statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
     were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
     report;

3.   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
     information included in this report, fairly present in all material
     respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of
     the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.   The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
     establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
     in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

     a)   Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
          disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
          supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
          registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to
          us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in
          which this report is being prepared;

     b)   Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
          and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
          effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end
          of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

     c)   Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
          control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's
          most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is
          reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal
          control over financial reporting; and

5.   The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on
     our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
     the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board
     of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

     a)   All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
          operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
          reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to
          record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

     b)   Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
          employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
          control over financial reporting.




Date: August 12, 2003


          /s/ ROBERT K. COLE
------------------------------------------
              Robert K. Cole
   Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
From: jnmom@msn.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 12:16:06 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Laura Hodge

Dallas, TX 75252
**EXHIBIT 32.2**
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANTTOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
In connection with the Quarterly Report of Vail Banks, Inc. (the "Company") onForm 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Peter G. Williston,Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:-  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)  or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 
-  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all  material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the  Company.

 
/s/ Peter G. Williston     
Peter G. WillistonSenior Executive Vice President and Chief Financial OfficerAugust 13, 2003
From: Thomas.Johnson@genesishcc.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 12:27:18 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

"TOM" Johnson

Middle River, MD 21220
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed April 19, 2024.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D24-0629

Lower Tribunal No. F22-15805

________________

Jose A. Martinez,

Petitioner,

vs.

The State of Florida, 

Respondent.

A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Prohibition.

Coffey Burlington, P.L., Kendall Coffey, Law Offices of Neil G. Taylor, 

P.A., Neil G. Taylor, Kuehne Davis Law, P.A., and Benedict P. Kuehne, for 

petitioner.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

Before SCALES, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ. 

MILLER, J.
2

Petitioner, Jose A. Martinez, seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent the 

assigned trial judge from further presiding over his case. The allegations 

advanced in his disqualification motion relate to events that occurred outside 

the presence of the jury. Incanting the familiar mantras that a judicial 

admonishment or “the judge’s efforts to control her courtroom,” Fetzner v. 

State, 219 So. 3d 834, 838 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), standing alone, and 

“[d]isbelief in the witness’s testimony, as evidenced by a trial judge’s 

discomforting inquiry, . . . [are] ordinarily no basis for disqualification,” 

Nateman v. Greenbaum, 582 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), we 

conclude the trial court properly determined the motion was legally 

insufficient and therefore deny relief. See Correll v. State, 698 So. 2d 522, 

524 (Fla. 1997) (“A motion to disqualify will be dismissed as legally 

insufficient if it fails to establish a well-grounded fear on the part of the 

movant that he will not receive a fair hearing.”); see also Nateman, 582 So. 

2d at 644 (denying petition because “[d]isqualifying a judge because his 

examination of a witness on relevant matters gives a clue as to how he may 

be inclined to rule at the end of the evidence would wreak administrative 

havoc in the circuit court by inviting mid-hearing motions for recusal”); Braddy 

v. State, 111 So. 3d 810, 834 (Fla. 2012) (determining appellant’s factual 

allegations of judge’s bias were legally insufficient to require disqualification
3

when trial judge made comments to defendant in response to defendant’s 

behavior); Fetzner, 219 So. 3d at 838 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (finding 

appellant’s allegations of trial judge’s behavior did not show prejudice, but 

rather efforts to control her courtroom and were therefore legally insufficient);

Koelemij v. State, 285 So. 3d 376, 382 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (affirming trial 

court’s denial of defendant’s motion for disqualification as legally insufficient 

because “the court’s reprimand did not give rise to a reasonable belief that 

the court was biased and that [a]ppellant would not receive a fair trial”). 

Petition denied.
```

[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1252 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

107th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1252

 To amend title 18, United States Code, to make unlawful the tampering 
with computers of schools and institutions of higher education, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 26, 2001

Mr. Torricelli introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title 18, United States Code, to make unlawful the tampering 
with computers of schools and institutions of higher education, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``School Website Protection Act of 
2001''.

SEC. 2. TAMPERING WITH COMPUTERS OF SCHOOLS AND INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER 
              EDUCATION.

    (a) Offense.--Subsection (a) of section 1030 of title 18, United 
States Code, is amended--
            (1) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (7) and 
        inserting ``; or''; and
            (2) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following new 
        paragraph (8):
            ``(8) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, 
        information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, 
        intentionally affects or impairs without authorization a 
        computer of an elementary school or secondary school or 
        institution of higher education;''.
    (b) Penalties.--Subsection (c) of that section is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking ``or (a)(6)'' and 
        inserting ``(a)(6), or (a)(8)''; and
            (2) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ``or (a)(7)'' and 
        inserting ``(a)(7), or (a)(8)''.
    (c) Definitions.--Subsection (e) of that section is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (8), by striking ``and'' at the end;
            (2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting a semicolon; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
            ``(10) the terms `elementary school' and `secondary school' 
        have the meanings given such terms in section 14101 of the 
        Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
        8801); and
            ``(11) the term `institution of higher education' has the 
        meaning given that term in section 101 of the Higher Education 
        Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001).''.
                                 <all>
```