United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on Military Personnel, Committee on

National Security, House of

Representatives

June 1995 MILITARY

PERSONNEL

High Aggregate

Personnel Levels

Maintained

Throughout Drawdown

GAO/NSIAD-95-97

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-260797 

June 2, 1995

The Honorable Robert K. Dornan

Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This report responds to your request that we assess how the military drawdown has affected

the services’ ability to staff their active duty combat and support units. It concludes that the

Department of Defense (DOD) managed its drawdown in ways enabling it to keep a high

percentage of its authorized positions filled throughout the drawdown. The report also

identifies factors contributing to personnel shortages at selected U.S. military installations and

factors that could lead to personnel shortages in the future.

This report refers to our earlier recommendations on DOD’s civilian and military force mix and

U.S. participation in peace operations. To permit DOD time to respond to these

recommendations, we are making no additional recommendations in this report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen, House Committee on National Security

and Senate Committee on Armed Services, and the Secretaries of the Army, the Air Force, and

the Navy. We will also make copies available to other interested parties upon request.

Please contact me on (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this

report. Appendix III lists the major contributors to this report.

Sincerely yours,

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues
Executive Summary

Purpose The largest military drawdown since the end of the Vietnam conflict is

now about 80 percent complete. By the end of fiscal year 1999, the

Department of Defense (DOD) will have reduced its military and civilian

personnel by almost a third. Concerned that this large drawdown might

have degraded readiness, the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military

Personnel, House Committee on National Security, asked GAO to identify

(1) the extent to which the services were able to fill authorized positions

in their active duty combat and support units, (2) factors contributing to

personnel shortages at selected U.S. installations and units, and (3) factors

that could lead to personnel shortages in the future. GAO reviewed

personnel trends in the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy for fiscal years

1987 through 1993. The Marine Corps could not provide automated

historical data and was excluded from GAO’s data analyses.

Background The services used a variety of personnel management tools to achieve

reductions. They decreased their recruiting, restricted the number of

personnel permitted to reenlist in overstaffed specialties, and offered early

separation to individuals near the end of their first enlistment. Congress

also authorized financial incentives for early separation, a reduction in

time-in-grade requirements for voluntary retirements, and a 15-year

retirement option for selected military personnel. Reductions-in-force

were to be used only as a last resort.

The services sought to maintain a high percentage of their authorized

positions filled (referred to as fill rates) in each rank and military

specialty. DOD considers units with personnel fill rates above 90 percent as

able to perform their missions. Personnel officials become concerned if fill

rates for specific military specialties fall below 80 percent.

Results in Brief Despite major personnel reductions, the services generally kept over

95 percent of their authorized positions filled throughout the drawdown.

They also maintained high fill rates for most ranks and kept over

90 percent of authorized positions filled in a large majority of their military

specialty categories. The major area of concern was a continuing shortage

of field grade officers (Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps majors,

lieutenant colonels, and colonels and Navy lieutenant commanders,

commanders, and captains), especially in the Army where fill rates

generally remained between 80 percent and 85 percent. Although Army

and some Air Force personnel trends improved in fiscal year 1993,

aggregate and enlisted personnel fill rates declined in the Navy. These

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Executive Summary

trends suggest that the Navy, which began its drawdown later, may just

now be experiencing the impacts that the Army and the Air Force

encountered earlier.

Many factors that contributed to personnel shortages at units and

installations were directly related to the drawdown and could dissipate as

the drawdown concludes. For example, not all personnel in units being

withdrawn from Europe and not all those in units affected by U.S. base

closure and realignment decisions were required to transfer with their

units. These policies created shortages in some units and led to multiple

personnel transfers. Also, some officials permitted personnel in critical

shortage categories to participate in early out programs because they

feared that limiting participation would adversely affect morale.

Other factors contributing to shortages were less directly related to the

drawdown. Without changes in operating policies, procedures, and

legislative requirements, such shortages could persist. For example,

shortages were created because (1) personnel had to be transferred

between units to meet the requirements of operations other than war,

(2) military personnel had to be temporarily assigned to duties formerly

handled by civilians whose positions were eliminated, and (3) scarce field

grade officers had to be assigned to joint duty and reserve units before

other operational positions could be filled.

GAO’s Analysis

High Personnel Fill Rates

Maintained

The Marine Corps has finished its drawdown, the Army and the Air Force

expect to complete all or most of their reductions by the end of fiscal year

1996, and the Navy expects to finish by the end of fiscal year 1999. The

Army, the Navy, and the Air Force have generally kept over 95 percent of

their authorized positions filled, although the Air Force’s fill rate dipped to

94 percent in 1990. The Army’s lowest rate of 97 percent occurred in

1992—the height of its drawdown. Aggregate fill rates in the Army and the

Air Force improved by 3 percentage points in fiscal year 1993. However,

this rate in the Navy, which began its drawdown later, declined by an equal

amount.

The services also kept a high percentage of their authorized officer

positions filled, except in fiscal year 1992 when the Army’s rate fell to

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Executive Summary

92 percent. This decline was offset by an 8-percentage point improvement

the following year, which brought its rate to close to 100 percent.

Aggregate personnel levels for enlisted categories remained over

95 percent and even exceeded 100 percent in some years. For any given

year of the drawdown, the services filled over 90 percent of the positions

in about three-fourths of their military specialties.

The only real area of concern during the drawdown has been continuing

low personnel fill rates for field grade officers. This shortage was

especially acute in the Army, where fill rates for field grade officers

remained between 81 percent and 83 percent from fiscal years 1988

through 1992 before recovering to 91 percent in fiscal year 1993.

Some Units

Disproportionately

Affected by Shortages

Despite generally positive aggregate trends, shortages occurred unevenly

across the force, with some units more adversely affected than others.

Three key factors led to these shortages. First, the European drawdown

created temporary imbalances at some installations and units because

personnel were permitted to remain in Europe to complete their assigned

tours. As a result, some units returned to the United States with as few as

one-quarter to one-half of their authorized personnel. Some shortages

persisted for up to 2 years. Similar dislocations were created from base

closure and realignment decisions.

Second, early separation programs led to some shortages that might have

been avoided. Although the services restricted personnel in certain

specialties and ranks from separating early, they had only limited control

over the number of participants from any one unit or installation. As a

result, disproportionate shortages in specific specialties occurred at some

installations and units.

Third, some installations have not adjusted to civilian personnel

reductions. At most installations, military personnel were temporarily

assigned to carry out functions formerly performed by civilians. Although

DOD eliminated 196,000 civilian jobs between fiscal years 1987 and 1993,

the duties performed by those civilians were not always eliminated. As a

result, some military personnel had to be temporarily assigned to cut

grass, serve as lifeguards, and work in gymnasiums.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Executive Summary

Other Factors Suggest

Continuing Shortages

A key factor contributing to shortages is the current high level of

operations other than war, which has required personnel transfers

between units. According to DOD officials, these transfers have adversely

affected combat readiness, training, and morale in units that have had to

contribute personnel. Gaining units have also been affected because

transferred personnel do not always possess the proper specialty required

in their new positions. For example, infantrymen were trained for use as

military police in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Although all services have been affected, the problem is especially acute in

the Army because a large percentage of its support forces are in the

reserves. To meet the requirements of these operations, the Army had to

deploy most of its active duty support units of some types and to fill

vacancies with personnel from other active units and reserve volunteers.

Because support units are often not authorized to be fully staffed in

peacetime, the Army had to transfer personnel between units. For fiscal

year 1994, 31 percent of the Army’s active support units were authorized to

have 80 percent or fewer of their required personnel.

Shortages in some ranks may also continue as a result of legislative

requirements that limit the services’ flexibility in correcting identified

shortages. For example, the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act

and annual DOD authorizations establish the number of field grade officers

each service may have at each rank. Additionally, the services have been

expected to maintain their fiscal year 1990 officer-to-enlisted ratios during

the drawdown. As a result, the services could not always adjust their

authorizations at specific ranks and had to leave some positions vacant or

fill them with lower graded personnel.

The need to fill joint duty assignments is yet another factor that has placed

increasing demands on the limited pool of field grade officers. As of

November 1994, the services were assigning between 11 percent and

17 percent of their field grade officers to these positions. Because these

positions must be filled first, other key leadership positions must be either

left vacant or filled with lower graded officers.

In an attempt to improve training in reserve units, the Army is now

required to assign additional active duty officers and senior graded

warrant and noncommissioned officers to reserve units. During fiscal year

1994, the Army assigned 899 active duty officers, 99 warrant officers, and

1,002 noncommissioned officers to reserve units. Due to the minimum

experience level required, many of the best trained and most qualified

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Executive Summary

captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels must be assigned to these

positions before active duty positions are filled.

Recommendations GAO has made recommendations related to some of its findings in other

reports. (See pp. 28 and 34.) To permit DOD time to address these earlier

recommendations, GAO is not making any further recommendations.

Agency Comments DOD concurred with GAO’s findings. (See app. I for a copy of DOD’s

comments.)

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

10

Services Have Made Substantial Progress in Implementing Their

Downsizing Programs

10

Services Used Various Personnel Tools to Manage the

Downsizing

12

Congress Provided Additional Tools 14

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 14

Chapter 2 

Aggregate Fill Rates

Remained High

Throughout the

Drawdown

17

All Services Maintained High Personnel Fill Rates 17

Fill Rates for Most Officer and Enlisted Categories Remained

Steady

19

Fill Rates Have Declined in Some Specialties 23

Conclusions 24

Chapter 3 

Drawdown Adversely

Affected Some

Installations

25

European Drawdown and Base Closures Led to Some Shortages 25

Civilian Drawdown Adversely Affected Some Installations 26

Early Release Programs Led to Some Personnel Shortages 28

Services Lacked Flexibility to Correct Shortages 30

Chapter 4 

Personnel Shortages

Are Likely to Continue

Due to Factors

Unrelated to the

Drawdown

31

Operations Other Than War Have Required Substantial Transfers

of Army Personnel

31

Assignments Must Be Made in Concert With Legislative

Requirements

34

Conclusions 37

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 40

Appendix II: Total Personnel Compared With Personnel Included

in Our Analyses by Service, Fiscal Years 1987 Through 1993

41

Appendix III: Major Contributors to This Report 43

Tables Table 1.1: Size of Selected Elements of DOD’s Force Structure 10

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Contents

Table 2.1: Number of Military Specialties in Each Fill Rate Range

at Fiscal Year End

23

Table 4.1: Percentage of Active Duty Army Combat, Combat

Support, and Combat Service Support Units at Selected

Personnel Authorization Levels

33

Table I.1: Total 41

Table I.2: Army 41

Table I.3: Air Force 41

Table I.4: Navy 42

Figures Figure 1.1: Authorized Personnel at Fiscal Year End by Service 11

Figure 2.1: Percentage of Authorized Positions Filled at Fiscal

Year End by Service

18

Figure 2.2: Fill Rates for Officers at Fiscal Year End by Service 20

Figure 2.3: Fill Rates for Field Grade Officers at Fiscal Year End

by Service

21

Figure 2.4: Fill Rates for Enlisted Personnel at Fiscal Year End by

Service

22

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

SORTS Status of Resources and Training System

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 1 

Introduction

The largest military drawdown since the end of the Vietnam conflict is

now about 80 percent complete. By the end of 1999, the Department of

Defense (DOD) will have cut its major force structure elements roughly in

half and will have reduced its military and civilian personnel by almost a

third. The sheer size of this drawdown has particularly challenged DOD to

maintain a future military force that is balanced, prepared, and ready to

discharge its mission. An important aspect of this challenge has been to

avert personnel shortages that could adversely affect readiness. The

services have used a variety of tools to conduct the drawdown and

preserve readiness.

Services Have Made

Substantial Progress

in Implementing Their

Downsizing Programs

DOD’s downsizing program has significantly reduced force structure and

authorized personnel levels. With respect to force structure, the services

have made substantial reductions, and further reductions are planned. In

March 1993, the Secretary of Defense began a DOD-wide review “from the

bottom up” to define the appropriate defense strategy, force structure,

modernization programs, and supporting industrial base and infrastructure

to meet U.S. security requirements in the post-Cold War era. The results of

this review, announced in October 1993, continued the downward trend in

military force structure that began in the late 1980s with the improvement

in U.S.-Soviet relations. Table 1.1 compares the actual size of selected

force structure elements in fiscal years 1987 and 1993 with the levels

recommended for fiscal year 1999 by the Bottom Up Review.

Table 1.1: Size of Selected Elements of

DOD’s Force Structure

Number of each elementa

Fiscal Years 1987, 1993, and 1999

DOD force structure element 1987 1993 1999

Active Army divisions 18 14 10

Air Force fighter wings 25 16 13

Navy carriers 14 13 12b

Navy ship battle forces 568 435 346

Marine divisions 3 3 3

aNumbers include active component forces only and are actual as of the end of fiscal years 1987

and 1993 and planned as of the end of fiscal year 1999.

bIncludes one carrier in the Navy reserve.

Source: DOD, Report on the Bottom Up Review (Oct. 1993).

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 1 

Introduction

DOD is making corresponding reductions in the services’ authorized

military and civilian personnel levels. By fiscal year 1999, DOD’s total

authorized active duty military personnel will have been reduced from

about 2.17 million in fiscal year 1987 to about 1.43 million, as shown by

figure 1.1. DOD will also reduce its civilian personnel from about 1.1 million

in fiscal year 1987 to about 758,000 by the end of fiscal year 1999.

Figure 1.1: Authorized Personnel at

Fiscal Year End by Service (fiscal

years 1987 through 1999) 

Personnel in thousands

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999

Fiscal years

Army

Air Force

Navy

Marine Corps

Note: Actual personnel through fiscal year 1994; planned personnel for fiscal years 1995 through

1999.

Source: DOD Comptroller data as of February 1995.

As shown, the services have reduced their forces by different amounts.

The Army and the Air Force will have each reduced their personnel by

about 30 percent. The Air Force began a steady drawdown in fiscal year

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 1 

Introduction

1987, and it plans to achieve most of its reductions (97 percent) by the end

of fiscal year 1996. To deal with budgetary pressures, the Army began

accelerating its drawdown in fiscal year 1992, and it plans to complete its

drawdown by the end of fiscal year 1996. The Navy initiated a long-term,

steady downsizing program in fiscal year 1989, and it plans to complete its

drawdown in fiscal year 1999. The Marine Corps was required to reduce

the least—about 25,500 personnel—and completed its downsizing in fiscal

year 1994. By fiscal year 1999, the Army and the Air Force will have

reduced their authorized military personnel levels by 37 percent each, the

Navy by 33 percent, and the Marine Corps by almost 13 percent.

Services Used Various

Personnel Tools to

Manage the

Downsizing

The services could have theoretically achieved their mandated personnel

reductions by severely cutting back their recruiting programs and simply

relying on normal attrition and retirements to reach desired personnel

levels. In the past, it was common for the services to lose more than

15 percent of their personnel each year through attrition and retirements,

even when their personnel authorizations remained relatively constant.

However, achieving reductions in this manner could have created

imbalances in certain ranks and specialties, according to DOD officials.

Thus, the military services continued their recruiting programs and used a

variety of personnel management tools to target certain ranks and

specialties for reductions. Their intent was to preserve a balanced staff in

terms of rank and specialties and protect career advancement

opportunities. Congress, concerned about the impact of force reductions

on military personnel, encouraged the services to use voluntary means

whenever possible to achieve the needed reductions.

Recruiting Efforts Were

Reduced

The services’ normal practice is to vary the rate at which they recruit

personnel and assign specialties depending on projected needs. During the

downsizing program, all of the services reduced, but did not stop, their

recruiting programs. By continuing their recruiting programs, the services

ensured a steady flow of personnel for future needs.

Use of Early Releases

Continued

Under their normal early release programs, the services allowed

individuals to separate before the end of their first enlistment period.

Personnel separated under this authority were usually released in the

same year that they were scheduled to separate. In fiscal year 1992, with

the availability of financial separation incentives, participation in these

programs declined. However, because early releases can reduce salary

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 1 

Introduction

costs for the year in which they are used and do not involve any severance

pay, all of the services, except the Marine Corps, continued to use this tool

to reduce personnel with less than 6 years of service. Additionally, the

services used the early release programs to reduce participation in

overstaffed specialties.

Reenlistment Programs

Were Tightened

The services tightened the requirements for first-term enlisted personnel

to reenlist. Specifically, greater attention was given to ensure individuals

who wished to reenlist met physical fitness and weight standards. Also,

personnel in overstaffed specialties who wished to reenlist had to be

willing to train for an understaffed specialty. These requirements reduced

the number of personnel allowed to reenlist.

Involuntary Methods Were

Used Sparingly

When necessary, the services used a variety of involuntary personnel

management tools. For example, the services substantially reduced

personnel by continuing their “up or out” policies. In contrast to other

organizations that hire individuals at various levels depending on their

qualifications and experience, military personnel join at the entry level and

are then promoted. Thus, the military “grows its personnel from within.”

To ensure that they retain only high quality personnel, the services operate

an up or out policy that requires officers to be promoted within specific

time frames. Also, the services modified their retention control programs.

These programs establish the maximum number of years that enlisted

personnel in a given rank can continue in the service before being denied

the opportunity to reenlist. Each service reduced the maximum years of

service for promotion. For example, Navy enlisted personnel formerly had

to be promoted to the rank of E-6 (Petty Officer First Class) within 

23 years; this was reduced to 20 years.

The services also used formal Selected Early Retirement Boards to select

specific personnel for retirement before their normal mandatory time

frames. These boards, which were used to reduce the number of officer

and enlisted personnel eligible to retire, focused on specific overstaffed

ranks and selected those individuals with the lowest performance ratings.

Because reductions in force were to be used only as a last resort, the Air

Force and the Army each used formal reduction-in-force boards only once

to involuntarily separate officers in specific ranks.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Congress Provided

Additional Tools

In the National Defense Authorization Acts for fiscal years 1991, 1992, and

1993, Congress authorized additional measures to encourage voluntary

separation. It

• authorized two special categories of separation pay—providing either a

one-time lump sum payment or annual payments—to induce voluntary

separations for servicemembers who had completed 6 or more, but less

than 20, years of service;

• reduced time-in-grade requirements for voluntary retirements among

officers having already completed the 20 years of total time needed to

retire;

• provided DOD with the authority to offer a 15-year retirement option for

selected members of the military, effective in fiscal year 1993; and

• extended lump sum separation pay and transition assistance to enlisted

personnel who were separated.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

Based on concerns that major reductions in DOD spending at a time of high

levels of military activity might degrade readiness, the Chairman,

Subcommittee on Military Personnel, House Committee on National

Security, asked us to assess how the military drawdown had affected the

services’ ability to staff their active duty combat and support units. In

assessing this key indicator of readiness during the drawdown, our

objectives were to determine (1) the extent to which the services were

able to fill their authorized positions, (2) factors contributing to personnel

shortages at selected U.S. installations and units, and (3) factors that could

lead to personnel shortages in the future.

To obtain background information on drawdown policy, procedures, and

management, we received briefings from officials in Washington, D.C.;

from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and

Readiness; Joint Staff; the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel for the Air

Force, the Army, and the Navy; and Headquarters, Marine Corps. To

identify the roles and responsibilities of major commands with respect to

the drawdown, we interviewed officials of the Air Combat Command,

Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; Army Forces Command, Fort

McPherson, Georgia; Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe,

Virginia; Atlantic Fleet, including its air, surface, and submarine groups,

Norfolk Naval Base, Virginia; and Marine Forces Atlantic, Camp Lejeune,

North Carolina.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 1 

Introduction

To measure the extent to which the services were able to fill their

authorized military personnel positions during the drawdown, we obtained

data on the services’ authorized and actual personnel for combat and

support specialties, by rank and specialty, for fiscal year end 1987 (the

beginning of the drawdown) through fiscal year end 1993 (the latest

available data). The services determined the specialties typically found in

combat units and units that provide direct support to combat units

(support units). Our analysis included all enlisted and officer personnel in

these categories, except for warrant officers and general officers. We

excluded warrant officers because the Air Force does not use them, and

their use in the Army and the Navy varied during the period of our

analysis. Based on these criteria, personnel in general support positions,

such as those in the Pentagon and in individual or overhead accounts

(transients, trainees, patients, and prisoners), were excluded from our

analysis. Our analysis included about 82 percent, 92 percent, and

83 percent of the total personnel in the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy,

respectively. (See app. I.) The Marine Corps was unable to provide

accurate data because it had not maintained automated historical data on

personnel levels. Accordingly, we excluded the Marine Corps from our

data analyses. However, we discussed the effects of downsizing on Marine

Corps installation and unit personnel levels and included this information

in our report.

We identified data sources or obtained data from officials of the Defense

Manpower Data Center-West, Monterey, California; Air Force Military

Personnel Center, Randolph Force Base, Texas; Total Army Personnel

Command, Washington, D.C.; U.S. Navy Enlisted Personnel Management

Center, New Orleans, Louisiana; Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington,

D.C.; and Headquarters, Marine Corps, Manpower Personnel Center,

Washington, D.C. Although we did not conduct a reliability assessment of

the computer systems the services used to extract the data, we reviewed

the data to ensure that it was generally consistent and accurate.

Our data analyses included statistical analyses of aggregate personnel fill

rates by service for individual ranks and for military specialties as of the

end of fiscal years 1987 through 1993. In addition, we analyzed the fill rates

for selected specialties to determine if they declined or remained low

during the drawdown. We also conducted a separate data analysis to

determine variances in personnel authorizations among Army combat,

combat support, and combat service support units between fiscal years

1991 and 1994. Army headquarters provided this data.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 1 

Introduction

To identify factors contributing to personnel shortages at units and

installations and factors that could lead to shortages in the future, we

interviewed unit commanders and personnel officers and reviewed

pertinent personnel data at selected combat and support units in all of the

military services. These units included the Army’s III Corps headquarters,

13th Corps Support Command, 6th Aviation Brigade, 3rd Finance Group,

1st Cavalry Division, and 2nd Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas; 

XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and 4th

Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson, Colorado; the Air Force’s

7th Wing, 7th Support Group, 7th Logistics Group, and 7th Operations

Group at Dyess Air Force Base, Texas; and the Navy’s U.S.S. Stump, U.S.S.

Saipan, U.S.S. Hunley, and U.S.S. Scranton at Norfolk Naval Base, Virginia,

and VF-43 Fighter Attack Wing and VA-75 Medium Attack Wing at Oceana

Naval Air Station, Virginia.

We conducted our work between August 1993 and January 1995 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 2 

Aggregate Fill Rates Remained High

Throughout the Drawdown

Our analysis of DOD data for military personnel in combat and support

specialties for fiscal years 1987 through 1993 indicated that the services

filled over 95 percent of their authorized personnel positions by using

various personnel management tools. They also maintained relatively high

personnel fill rates for most ranks and military specialties. However, the

historical shortage of field grade officers1

 continued during the drawdown.

All Services

Maintained High

Personnel Fill Rates

Our analysis of fiscal years 1987-93 personnel data for military personnel

in combat and support specialties2

 showed that the services were able to

keep a relatively high percentage of their authorized personnel positions

filled (referred to as “fill rate”) during the drawdown. As shown by 

figure 2.1, each service maintained an aggregate fill rate of 95 percent or

higher for each of the 7 years analyzed with one exception: the Air Force’s

fill rate dipped to 93 percent in 1990. The aggregate fill rates of the Army

and the Air Force improved in fiscal year 1993—dramatically in the Army.

The Navy, which initiated the major portion of its drawdown in fiscal year

1992—later than the other services—experienced a sharp decline in its

aggregate fill rate in fiscal year 1993. The high Navy fill rates in the earlier

years of the drawdown most likely reflect the sharp reductions in the

number of naval ships, while personnel levels were declining more slowly.

1

Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels and Navy lieutenant

commanders, commanders, and captains.

2

Enlisted specialties analyzed included Army military occupational specialties, Air Force specialty

codes, and Navy ratings.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 2 

Aggregate Fill Rates Remained High

Throughout the Drawdown

Figure 2.1: Percentage of Authorized

Positions Filled at Fiscal Year End by

Service (fiscal years 1987 through

1993) 

Fill rate in percent

90

95

100

105

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Fiscal year

Army

Air Force

Navy

Note: Analysis includes personnel in combat and combat support positions. It excludes personnel

in general support positions.

Source: Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel data.

Service personnel specialists could not provide a criterion for an

acceptable aggregate personnel fill rate. However, in measuring the

readiness of units, the services often use criteria established in the Status

of Resources and Training System (SORTS)—the readiness report most

commonly referred to by the services. The services do not rely solely on

SORTS data to assess unit readiness, but rather supplement it with other

data and information. SORTS measures four broad indicators of

readiness—personnel on hand, training, equipment on hand, and

equipment maintenance. A unit’s overall readiness rating in SORTS is based

on a composite score of all four indicators coupled with the commanders’

subjective judgment. According to the SORTS criteria for personnel on

hand, units with 90 percent or more of their personnel are considered

prepared to conduct all required missions. In terms of actual numbers, the

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 2 

Aggregate Fill Rates Remained High

Throughout the Drawdown

Army’s 1987 fill rate of 101.6 percent, for example, represents a surplus of

9,690 personnel out of 621,418 total authorized positions; its 1993 fill rate

of 99.1 percent represents 4,594 vacant positions out of 486,844 total

authorized positions. The Air Force’s fill rate of 94.9 percent in 1992—the

height of the drawdown—represents a personnel shortfall of 22,723 out of

447,528 total authorized personnel positions.

Fill Rates for Most

Officer and Enlisted

Categories Remained

Steady

The Army, the Air Force, and the Navy were able to maintain high fill rates

for officer and enlisted personnel at each rank. By allowing early releases,

offering early retirements, and restricting the number of initial enlistments

and reenlistments, the fill rate for each rank has remained fairly constant.

Officer fill rates in the Air Force and the Navy never fell below 95 percent

in the aggregate, as shown in figure 2.2. However, the Army’s supply of

officers remained below the other services and precipitously dropped by

the end of fiscal year 1992—the height of its drawdown. In actual numbers,

the shortfall in Army officers increased from 1,063 to 4,648 between fiscal

years 1987 and 1992, while total authorized positions fell from 62,748 to

54,455. Despite this decline, the supply of Army officers rebounded in

fiscal year 1993, and its aggregate officer fill rate increased by 8 percent in

that single year.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 2 

Aggregate Fill Rates Remained High

Throughout the Drawdown

Figure 2.2: Fill Rates for Officers at

Fiscal Year End by Service (fiscal

years 1987 through 1993) 

Fill rate in percent

90

95

100

105

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Fiscal year

Army

Air Force

Navy

Note: Analysis includes personnel in combat and combat support positions. It excludes personnel

in general support positions.

Source: Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel data.

The greatest shortages in each of the services usually occurred in field

grade officers, the category in which all the services have historically

experienced shortages, as shown by figure 2.3. However, the Army

experienced the greatest shortages; fill rates remained between 81 percent

and 83 percent between fiscal years 1988 and 1992 before rebounding in

fiscal year 1993. Much of this improvement is attributable to a 5-percent

reduction in authorizations for majors combined with a 10-percent

increase in the number of majors.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 2 

Aggregate Fill Rates Remained High

Throughout the Drawdown

Figure 2.3: Fill Rates for Field Grade

Officers at Fiscal Year End by Service

(fiscal years 1987 through 1993) 

Fill Rate in percent

80

85

90

95

100

105

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Fiscal year

Army

Air Force

Navy

Note: This analysis includes field grade personnel in combat and combat support positions and

excludes personnel in general support positions.

Source: Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel data.

Because a minimum number of years of service is required to reach the

field grade officer level, almost all field grade officers were eligible for

early retirement, and many took advantage of this option. In addition, the

services reduced their time-in-grade requirements for voluntary

retirements among officers who had completed the 20 years needed to

retire. This requirement change prompted many other eligible officers to

retire. Because the services advance their personnel from the entry level

through the ranks, it will take several years for lower rank officers to

reach field grade. Although the Army had the lowest officer fill rates, its

enlisted fill rates remained between 99 percent and 102 percent, thereby

significantly offsetting these shortages. The exception occurred in fiscal

year 1992—the height of its drawdown program—when the fill rate dipped

to 97 percent. As figure 2.4 shows, fill rates for enlisted personnel in each

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 2 

Aggregate Fill Rates Remained High

Throughout the Drawdown

service remained above 95 percent throughout the period, except for 1990

when the Air Force’s rate dropped to 93 percent.

Figure 2.4: Fill Rates for Enlisted

Personnel at Fiscal Year End by

Service (fiscal years 1987 through

1993) 

Fill rate in percent

90

95

100

105

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Fiscal year

Army

Air Force

Navy

Note: Analysis includes personnel in combat and combat support positions. It excludes personnel

in general support positions.

Source: Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel data.

In terms of actual personnel, the Army had a surplus of 10,753 out of

558,670 authorized enlisted positions in 1987. However, by the end of fiscal

year 1992, it had 12,811 vacancies out of its authorized 469,297 enlisted

positions. The Army experienced a recovery in its enlisted personnel fill

rate by the end of fiscal year 1993, with 432,426 of its 436,720 positions

filled.

For this same period, enlisted personnel levels in the Air Force fell from a

surplus of 4,461 airmen out of 465,005 authorized positions in fiscal year

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 2 

Aggregate Fill Rates Remained High

Throughout the Drawdown

1987 to a shortage of 20,092 airmen out of 364,816 positions in fiscal year

1992—a decline of 6.5 percent. Like the Army, the Air Force’s fill rate for

enlisted personnel improved significantly in fiscal year 1993.

In contrast to the improvements shown in the Army and the Air Force in

fiscal year 1993, the Navy’s fill rate declined by 3 percent in that year.

Again, this may reflect the fact that the Navy did not begin the major

portion of its drawdown until fiscal year 1992. Although inconclusive

without further data, these trends suggest that fill rates in the Navy could

ultimately improve as they did in the Army and the Air Force as its

drawdown progresses.

Fill Rates Have

Declined in Some

Specialties

To determine if the services had shortages in specific combat and support

specialties during the drawdown, we analyzed the fill rates for all

specialties in our database. We excluded officers from our analysis of

specialty fill rates because officer assignments are often based on factors

beyond their specific occupational specialty. To account for changes in

specialty codes and weapon systems, we selected only those skills that

had authorizations in each year that our data covered. Our analysis of the

resulting 427 enlisted combat and support specialties showed a slight

decline, as shown by table 2.1. For example, whereas only 19 specialties

had fewer than 80 percent of their authorized personnel in 1987, this

number increased to 34 in 1993. Moreover, while most specialties

maintained fill rates over 90 percent, the number of specialties with this

higher level of fill rate declined from 363 in 1987 to 302 in 1993.

Table 2.1: Number of Military

Specialties in Each Fill Rate Range at

Fiscal Year End

Fiscal year Fill rate range

(in percents) 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

80 percent or less 19 18 13 16 19 28 34

Between 80 percent and

90 percent 45 64 73 72 73 93 91

90 percent or over 363 345 341 339 335 306 302

Note: Includes 427 enlisted specialties.

Source: Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel data.

The majority of the specialties with fill rates below 80 percent were

prevalent in support units rather than combat units. For instance, in fiscal

year 1993, 22 of the 34 specialties with fill rates below 80 percent were

support specialties. Many of these support specialties—such as wire

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 2 

Aggregate Fill Rates Remained High

Throughout the Drawdown

system installers—were in small quantities in these units. As a result, the

fill rates of these “low density” specialties fluctuated greatly since a small

change in the number of personnel in the specialty created a large change

in the fill rate. Support units are sometimes significantly affected by

shortages in these low density specialties because they are frequently

authorized to fill only 90 percent or fewer of their wartime personnel

requirements in peacetime. (See ch. 4.)

Conclusions The services managed their drawdowns in ways that have preserved

generally high fill rates in the aggregate, for officer and enlisted categories

and for most military specialties. The Army and the Air Force, having

begun their personnel drawdowns earlier than the Navy, appear to have

weathered the heaviest impacts of their personnel drawdowns. Their

trends generally improved in fiscal year 1993. Shortages in the Navy, on

the other hand, may persist since its drawdown began later. Its relatively

high fill rates until recently may reflect the significant reduction in the

number of ships (and the related personnel authorizations) in relation to

personnel levels, which were declining more slowly.

The primary trend suggesting concern during the drawdown has been

continuing shortages of Army field grade officers. However, even this

statistic improved dramatically by the end of fiscal year 1993.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 3 

Drawdown Adversely Affected Some

Installations

Although aggregate personnel fill rates have remained relatively high

during the drawdown, personnel shortages have occurred unevenly across

the force, with some installations and units more adversely affected than

others. Factors contributing to the shortages included policies related to

the relocation of personnel from Europe as well as base closures and

realignments. In addition, shortages in critical specialties occurred at

some installations because commanders were reluctant to restrict

participation in the early release programs. Some military personnel were

temporarily assigned to perform functions formerly done by civilians,

whose positions were eliminated in the drawdown. Because these factors

were directly related to the drawdown, shortages caused by these factors

may subside as the drawdown concludes.

Installation and unit officials complained of personnel shortages at most

installations we visited. However, available information was generally

insufficient for us to determine how pervasive these shortages were

because it did not capture the extent of temporary duty assignments or the

extent to which positions were filled with personnel without the required

rank and/or specialty. Nevertheless, officials in all four services at the

wide range of installations and units we visited consistently cited the same

types of shortages.

European Drawdown

and Base Closures

Led to Some

Shortages

Policies related to the relocation of personnel from U.S. force reductions

in Europe created personnel imbalances at some military installations.

According to DOD officials, personnel affected by the drawdown were

permitted to remain in Europe to complete their tours if they had been in

their assignments less than a year. In some cases, they were reassigned to

another European unit if their unit was inactivated. The intent of this

policy was to avoid excessive turbulence. As a result, units frequently

returned to U.S. installations with substantially fewer personnel than

authorized—some with as few as one-quarter to one-half of their

authorized personnel.

To illustrate, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson, Colorado,

received five units from inactivating divisions in Europe. Those units

arrived with most of their equipment, but with only one-half of their

authorized personnel. According to the division’s personnel officer, it took

almost 2 years to fully staff the new units, train them, and develop their

cohesiveness. He noted that it was particularly difficult to fill shortages in

combat service support units because many of the involved support

specialties were understaffed throughout the Army.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 3 

Drawdown Adversely Affected Some

Installations

Fort Hood, Texas, received transportation, military police, and

maintenance units from Europe. Those units arrived with 27 percent,

47 percent, and 63 percent of their authorized personnel, respectively.

According to III Corps headquarters personnel officers, filling those units

to acceptable levels caused other units throughout Fort Hood to

experience temporary shortages in selected specialties.

The bulk of the imbalances created by the European drawdown should be

over by now. Legislation requires DOD to reduce its forces in Europe to

approximately 100,000 by the beginning of fiscal year 1996. However,

similar imbalances resulting from U.S. base closure and realignment

actions are likely to continue. DOD is currently engaged in a third round of

base closure and realignment decisions that will necessitate relocating

personnel over the next several years.

As with the European drawdown, personnel affected by base closure and

realignment decisions were not always transferred with their unit if they

had been assigned at the installation for a short time. Instead, to avoid

excessive family relocations, such personnel were often reassigned to

another position at the installation. This practice created shortages in the

relocating units.

Other base closure actions created temporary shortages in some

specialties. For example, the Air Force experienced a temporary shortage

of active duty navigators because trained replacements were not available

in the proper ranks. Because the Air Force’s navigator school was

scheduled to be closed for 2 years due to a base closure and realignment

decision, the Air Force temporarily filled these vacancies with staff

officers and reservists of different ranks until appropriate personnel

became available.

Civilian Drawdown

Adversely Affected

Some Installations

In some cases, the services used military personnel to perform functions

previously done by civilians and other military personnel whose positions

were eliminated under the civilian drawdown. According to military

officials, this shifting occurred because many tasks formerly conducted by

civilians have continued, even though the positions have been eliminated.

These officials said that civilian positions have declined at certain

installations at the same time that the number of military personnel

assigned to these bases has increased. Soldiers have sometimes been given

temporary “special duty” assignments such as cutting grass, serving as

lifeguards, and working in gymnasiums to compensate for the civilian

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 3 

Drawdown Adversely Affected Some

Installations

personnel losses. In some cases, stopgap measures were taken to

temporarily deal with this problem. For example, when Dyess Air Force

Base lost civilian personnel positions, local retired Air Force personnel

volunteered to fill the vacancies.

Some bases gained military personnel due to the European drawdown and

base closure and realignment actions at the same time that their civilian

support personnel were being reduced. For example, Fort Hood added a

division with two maneuver brigades, an aviation brigade, a division

support command, and other assets, resulting in a growth in military

personnel, yet did not receive additional funding for civilian personnel.

Between fiscal years 1987 and 1994, its military personnel grew from

38,000 to 45,000 while its civilian personnel declined from 3,100 to 2,200.

To compensate for these losses, military units at the base began providing

personnel to temporarily cover tasks formerly done by civilians. At the

time of our visit, 1 infantry battalion had 21 infantrymen temporarily

assigned to jobs that would ordinarily have been filled by civilians. For

example, five were used as lifeguards and four as clerks.

Fort Carson experienced three reductions-in-force in its civilian positions

between 1988 and 1993 due to budgetary constraints. However, after the

first two reductions, officials at Fort Carson soon recognized that some

functions previously handled by civilians needed to continue and

proceeded to hire more civilian personnel. The division’s assistant

commander cited the drawdown of civilians, coupled with an influx of

military personnel, as the reason it used military personnel in these special

duty assignments.

The commander of the civil engineering squadron at Dyess Air Force Base

said that his backlog for installation building maintenance had increased

due to the cutback in civilian employees and losses in military personnel

who separated early or were deployed. His backlog increased from 30 days

in fiscal year 1992 to 110 to 115 days in 1993. According to this officer,

maintenance personnel were no longer able to perform routine repairs and

maintenance on the installation’s facilities due to the backlog.

Our discussions with Navy commanders and personnel officers did not

reveal similar shortages. According to personnel officials in the Atlantic

Fleet Command, the shortage of base support personnel was partly

alleviated by decommissioning ships, which freed up large numbers of

personnel for reassignment. For instance, according to Atlantic Fleet

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 3 

Drawdown Adversely Affected Some

Installations

statistics, during fiscal year 1993, the fleet had approximately 10 percent

more personnel assigned to shore duty billets than were authorized.

Our October 1994 report1

 on DOD’s military and civilian force mix pointed

out disparities in the ways civilian personnel were used between the

individual services and highlighted the lack of service criteria for assigning

positions to civilian personnel. The report recommended that DOD assess

its mix of military and civilian personnel. The National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 requires DOD to review its military

support positions and report to Congress by April 30, 1995, on the

potential for converting military to civilian positions.

Early Release

Programs Led to

Some Personnel

Shortages

Because participation in DOD’s drawdown programs was voluntary, the

services had only limited control over who left individual units and

installations. Even though unit commanders had the authority to

recommend that an individual in a critical specialty be precluded from

participating in the programs, they were either unaware of their authority

or reluctant to use it. As a result, some units had higher losses than others

and critical specialty skills were lost.

Some Units Were

Disproportionately

Affected

Army support units were particularly affected by the early release

program. The majority of these units are in the reserves, and few support

units of some types exist in the active Army. In addition, the majority of

the Army’s specialties that exist in small quantities are prevalent in

support units. For these reasons, the impact of shortages on active Army

support units was particularly acute. To illustrate, at one Army Corps

Support Command, nearly 60 percent of the soldiers that separated early

during fiscal year 1994 were from one of its nine battalions. Additionally,

80 percent of the individuals in the command that left early were in rank

E-5. The impact of these departures was compounded by the historic

20 percent to 30 percent turnover rate in support units. By comparison, the

turnover rate of combat units averages about 10 percent. The personnel

readiness of this active duty support unit was particularly important

because about 60 percent of the Army’s support units were in the reserves

and accessible only in the event of a reserve call-up.

Although less affected than the Army, the Air Force also experienced

acute shortages at some installations. For example, commanders said that

1

DOD Force Mix Issues: Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support Roles Could Provide Significant

Benefits (GAO/NSIAD-95-5, Oct. 19, 1994).

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 3 

Drawdown Adversely Affected Some

Installations

13 of the 20 eligible personnel career field airmen and one-half of the

airmen in a contracting squadron participated in the program. The supply

squadron commander at the installation said that contracting operations at

the installation were disrupted for 6 months after these losses.

The services did not keep statistics on early release program participants

by unit or installation. However, commanders at the Air Force and the

Army installations we visited told us that these high concentrations

adversely affected their operations.

Commanders Were

Reluctant to Restrict

Participation in Early Out

Programs

To prevent the loss of critical personnel in individual units and

installations, the services allowed unit commanders to recommend that

individuals be precluded from separating early if their departures would

create personnel shortages. However, some of the unit commanders were

unaware of that authority, while others said they were reluctant to use it.

These latter commanders told us they were concerned that denying an

individual the opportunity to take an early out might adversely affect unit

morale. As a result of this practice, some units—particularly in the

Army—lost a higher-than-average percentage of personnel in critical

specialties during the drawdown.

The Navy and the Marine Corps were the services least affected by the

early release program because commanders frequently required personnel

to complete their next scheduled deployment before they could separate

early. Army and Air Force commanders said that, although they sometimes

attempted to dissuade individuals with critical skills from taking early

outs, none had recommended denial from participation in the program.

However, according to the personnel officer of the 1st Cavalry Division,

commanders did ask some personnel to delay their departures until their

units completed scheduled deployments to the National Training Center.

As with the European drawdown, the bulk of the personnel imbalances

created by the early release programs should have already occurred. The

Army and the Air Force plan to complete their drawdowns in fiscal year

1996, and the special authorities to offer this option is scheduled to expire

on October 1, 1999.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 3 

Drawdown Adversely Affected Some

Installations

Services Lacked

Flexibility to Correct

Shortages

Air Force officials noted that the cost of relocating personnel between

installations limited their flexibility in filling vacancies, even though

surplus personnel elsewhere could have been reassigned. These officials

noted that the impact of personnel shortages was heightened because

mission requirements remained the same or increased with the transfer of

missions from closing installations without any additional personnel to

carry them out.

Budgetary constraints also forced the Navy and the Marine Corps to

restrict the number of transfers between the east and west coasts and to

assign shorebound personnel to the same port they came from. These

practices were intended to save relocation costs but reduced the services’

ability to correct personnel shortfalls throughout the force.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 4 

Personnel Shortages Are Likely to Continue

Due to Factors Unrelated to the Drawdown

Even after the drawdown concludes, certain personnel shortages are likely

to persist for a variety of reasons, including the following:

• The services primarily structure their forces to meet wartime

requirements, not the high level of operations other than war that have

continued for several years. Because wartime and peacetime requirements

differ, personnel shortages will continue unless current structuring

practices change or the current level of operations other than war

subsides.

• Staffing decisions must be made within the constraints of legislative and

other requirements. As a result, the services will be limited in how much

they can rectify identified shortages in affected personnel categories.

Operations Other

Than War Have

Required Substantial

Transfers of Army

Personnel

The high level of operations other than war during the past several years

has led to substantial transfers of military personnel to meet the

requirements of these operations. Vacancies have thereby been created in

the losing units. The Army has been the most affected due to the way it has

structured its forces and the manner in which it has staffed its various

types of units.

Personnel Transfers The recent high levels of operations other than war have challenged all the

services in meeting their requirements. Task forces to support operations

other than war are typically formed with a limited number of units or

personnel. However, over time, such task forces have tended to grow and

require additional personnel. In addition, some operations have continued

longer than anticipated, thereby requiring rotations of new units. Although

entire units are usually deployed, the services often have had to transfer

individuals from other units to fill the places of individuals who, for

various reasons, could not deploy.

Individuals also had to be transferred into deploying units if those units

were not authorized to be fully staffed. For example, in the case of the

operation in Somalia, Forces Command’s policy was that Army units

would deploy with the personnel on hand. However, commanders in

Somalia required that all units be staffed at 100 percent. As a result, truck

drivers were transferred from units throughout the United States to fill

deployed units to 100 percent of their wartime requirements.

As requirements increase, personnel with specific skills are also

sometimes added. One Air Force official noted that such requests are often

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 4 

Personnel Shortages Are Likely to Continue

Due to Factors Unrelated to the Drawdown

for “fully trained” personnel, such as instructor pilots and navigators, and

as a result, units often lose key personnel that are difficult to replace.

Combat support units are especially affected by these requests since they

have many different specialties and only a few personnel in each skill. As a

result, losses of even a few individuals can adversely affect these units.

The number of requests for individuals with specific specialties to serve in

such operations has dramatically increased, according to officials at the

Marine Corps’ Marine Forces-Atlantic Command. For example, in fiscal

year 1993, the command received requests for 9 individuals in 8

specialties; in fiscal year 1994, it received requests for 260 people in 

87 specialties. Similarly, Army III Corps officials said that they fielded

requests for about 50 to 60 personnel a month in fiscal year 1993. The

following year, the monthly average was about 130, with a high of 300 in a

single month.

The division personnel officer at Fort Carson said the division often lacked

flexibility in meeting the needs of task force commanders when they

requested individuals in specific ranks and specialties. He added that

filling the requests routinely caused turbulence within affected units. For

example, to support operations in Somalia, one infantry battalion was

asked to provide helicopter door gunners and maintenance personnel. Due

to the large number of personnel taken from the battalion, the division had

to transfer personnel from other battalions to preserve personnel

readiness.

Army Is Structured for

Wartime Requirements

The substantial personnel transfers that have been required to meet the

requirements of operations other than war were due, in part, to the

manner in which the Army structures and staffs its forces. Because the

Army structures its forces to meet its wartime requirements, substantial

numbers of its support units are in the reserves. For example, 97 percent

of its civil affairs units, 76 percent of its quartermaster units, 69 percent of

its engineer units, and 63 percent of its transportation units are in the

reserves. Also, the active Army has few support units of some types. For

example, the Army has only one active duty civil affairs unit and only six

psychological operations units.

In the event of a crisis, the Army depends on the President’s authority to

call up reserves to support its combat forces. If the President does not

exercise this authority, the Army must fill vacancies in its active duty

support units with reserve volunteers or else transfer active duty

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 4 

Personnel Shortages Are Likely to Continue

Due to Factors Unrelated to the Drawdown

personnel from other nondeploying units into deploying units. These

individuals are not always in the needed military specialty categories. For

instance, the Army had to provide special training to several infantry

companies before deploying them to work as military police in the refugee

camps in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Another related problem is that the Army does not generally authorize its

support units to have all the personnel they would need in wartime. The

Army is the only service that authorizes the extent of wartime

requirements each of its units may have in peacetime. Under this system,

the Army has generally authorized support units to have 90 percent or less

of their personnel in peacetime. These units will receive additional

personnel from the reserve components if they are called up for war or a

national emergency.

In contrast, Army combat units are generally authorized to have all their

personnel in peacetime. The Army gives staffing priority to its combat

units because they are considered the chief means of deterrence. Also,

Army officials believe that it is more prudent to understaff support units,

rather than combat units, since it cannot fully staff all of its personnel

requirements.

As table 4.1 shows, 85 percent of the Army’s combat units were staffed at

100 percent, while only 58 percent of its active combat support units and

55 percent of its combat service support units were authorized to be fully

staffed.

Table 4.1: Percentage of Active Duty

Army Combat, Combat Support, and

Combat Service Support Units at

Selected Personnel Authorization

Levels (Fiscal Year 1994) 

Percentage of units

Unit type

Staffed at 100

percent

Staffed at 90

percent

Staffed at 80

percent

Staffed at 70

percent or

lessa

Combat 85 11 3 1

Ccmbat support 58 27 13 2

Combat service support 55 13 18 13

Note: Data is the authorized level as of the end of fiscal year 1994. Detail may not add to

100 percent due to rounding.

aExcludes special authorization categories such as cadre status. These categories represent less

than 2 percent of the Army’s active duty force.

Source: Army Force Accounting System, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
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Personnel Shortages Are Likely to Continue

Due to Factors Unrelated to the Drawdown

These force structuring and staffing practices are long-standing, dating

back to the late 1970s and early 1980s when the Army began to rely more

heavily on its reserve components. The impact of these practices was felt

during the Persian Gulf War, when the Army had to resort to substantial

transfers of personnel to meet its support force requirements.1

 The current

high levels of peacetime military activity, combined with the small number

of active duty units of some types, have led the Army to use a wide array

of techniques to meet the personnel requirements of these operations. It

has had to transfer personnel between various types of units, assign

personnel who did not possess the desired military specialty, and seek

volunteers from the reserves.

We recently issued a report on U.S. participation in peace operations that

also noted the stresses being placed on Army support forces.2

 That report

recommended that the Secretary of the Army reexamine whether high

priority support units should still be staffed at less than 100 percent of

their authorized personnel levels in peacetime.

Assignments Must Be

Made in Concert With

Legislative

Requirements

Certain legislative requirements establish ceilings on the number of

personnel that the services may have at specific ranks. The services must

also fill a growing number of joint duty assignments before they fill other

requirements and must also assign substantial numbers of active duty

personnel to reserve units. These requirements, while important, have

limited the services’ flexibility in correcting shortages because their

staffing decisions must remain within these constraints. In addition, the

continuing shortage of field grade officers has meant that some positions

must be left vacant or be filled with lower graded personnel.

Officer and Enlisted

Personnel Ceilings

Military personnel legislation has limited the flexibility of the services in

trying to correct identified personnel shortages. For example, legislation

establishes the percentage of enlisted personnel in the E-8 and E-9 ranks

(senior noncommissioned officers) each service may have. Through fiscal

year 1994, the services could have no more than 2 percent and 1 percent,

respectively, of their enlisted personnel in the E-8 and E-9 ranks. However,

the Army’s stated requirement for personnel in the E-8 rank totals nearly

3 percent of its authorized enlisted force. As a result, the Army cannot fill

1

Operation Desert Storm: Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active Reserve Support Forces

(GAO/NSIAD-92-67, Mar. 30, 1992).

2

Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Ability to Respond to Regional Conflicts

(GAO/NSIAD-95-51, Mar. 8, 1995).

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 4 

Personnel Shortages Are Likely to Continue

Due to Factors Unrelated to the Drawdown

its E-8 noncommissioned officer requirement. To alleviate its E-8 senior

noncommissioned officer shortage, the Army was granted temporary relief

from these limitations for fiscal year 1995.

Similarly, the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, as updated by

annual DOD authorization acts, establishes the number of officers each

service may have at each rank. These ceilings effectively established the

number of field grade officers the services had to release to reach their

mandated personnel levels. As a result, the services could not always

increase personnel authorizations at a specific rank, even though

shortages were identified. The services have historically had a shortage of

field grade officers. These shortages continued throughout the drawdown

because requirements for personnel at these levels increased without a

corresponding increase in authorized positions, as noted in the following

sections.

Joint Duty Requirements

Have Increased Demand

for Field Grade Officers

Among the highest priorities that the services must fill are Unified

Command3

 and defense agency and activity positions, commonly called

joint duty positions. These positions often have minimum requirements

regarding the rank, education, specialty, and command experience of

those assigned. Because the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense

Reorganization Act of 1986 requires officers to have served in a joint duty

position to advance above field grade ranks, they usually must serve in

these positions if they are to be considered for promotion. As a result,

officers assigned to these positions are generally those with the highest

potential.

DOD officials said that joint duty requirements have placed increasing

demands on the limited pool of field grade officers because these positions

generally require personnel at these ranks. As previously stated, the

drawdown has led to a continuing shortage of these officers. Part of the

difficulty in filling these requirements stems from the fact that DOD has

centralized some functions in defense agencies and activities that were

formerly conducted by the services. While reducing requirements in the

services, these actions sometimes increased the demand for these officers.

Whereas the services sometimes staffed these functions at less than

100 percent of their authorized positions, these same functions that

became joint duty positions were often required to be filled at 100 percent.

As a result, the services were sometimes required to provide more

3

Positions controlled by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 4 

Personnel Shortages Are Likely to Continue

Due to Factors Unrelated to the Drawdown

personnel to the joint duty function after the transfer than when it was a

service function.

As of November 1994, total joint duty requirements accounted for more

than 16 percent of the services’ field grade officer authorizations. The Air

Force had over 17 percent of its field grade officers assigned to joint duty

assignments as of that date. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps requirements

had assigned 17 percent, 13 percent, and 11 percent of their authorized

field grade officers respectively to joint duty assignments.

Active Duty Army

Personnel Assigned to

Reserve Units Increasing

Two provisions in DOD authorization legislation required the Army to

assign active duty personnel to provide everyday support and training to

National Guard and Army Reserve units. The intent of these provisions

was to ensure that reserve units—especially combat units—would be

ready to deploy when called up.

Under these provisions, the Army assigned 2,000 active duty soldiers,

consisting of 899 officers, 99 warrant officers, and 1,002 noncommissioned

officers, to support reserve units in fiscal years 1993 and 1994. An

additional 3,000 active duty soldiers are to be assigned to support reserve

units. This initiative is scheduled to be carried out in fiscal year 1995.

The officers that the Army has assigned to these positions have been some

of its best trained and most qualified captains, majors, and lieutenant

colonels due to the experience requirements for these positions. The

initiative also required that senior ranked warrant and noncommissioned

officers be assigned to reserve units.

Congress did not authorize additional active duty personnel to carry out

these provisions. Although 800 positions were filled by personnel already

supporting reserve units, the remaining 1,200 personnel were diverted

from assignments in other active duty units. Although this program is

important in that it is intended to improve reserve component training and

to increase active-reserve integration, its requirements have compounded

the Army’s shortage of officers and senior noncommissioned officers to

meet active component requirements.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 4 

Personnel Shortages Are Likely to Continue

Due to Factors Unrelated to the Drawdown

Conclusions Personnel shortfalls and imbalances associated with policies related to the

European drawdown and base closure and realignment decisions appear

to be temporary imbalances that will correct themselves as the drawdown

concludes. Likewise, personnel shortages that resulted from the services’

implementation of early release programs will abate as the drawdown is

completed.

Nevertheless, certain personnel shortages are likely to persist because

their underlying causes are not directly related to the drawdown. The

increasing number of active duty officers that the services must devote to

joint duty assignments and reserve units—although clearly important

requirements—leave fewer officers available to fill other key leadership

positions. Moreover, the need to temporarily assign military personnel to

cover tasks formerly carried out by civilians could continue until the

services arrive at the appropriate mix of military and civilian personnel. As

noted in chapter 3, our October 1994 report recommended that DOD

examine whether some military positions should be converted to civilian

positions. DOD is expected to report to Congress on the potential for such

conversions.

In addition to these factors suggesting that personnel shortages may

continue, Army force structuring and staffing practices are also likely to

contribute to shortages. If the current level of operations other than war

continues without a change in force structure practices, the Army will

continue to have to transfer personnel into deploying units, thereby

creating vacancies in other units. Not only are these transferred personnel

not always of the appropriate rank or specialty, they also may not have

received the desired training. Losing units, in turn, are less ready to

achieve their missions due to the vacancies created and the resultant

impact on unit training. As noted in this chapter, our recent report on

peace support operations raised the issue of the understaffing of Army

support forces and recommended that the Army reassess this policy with

respect to high priority support units.

Providing additional funding for military personnel may not be the best

solution to the types of shortages identified in this report. Even without

increased funding, the shortages related to the drawdown are likely to

dissipate once the drawdown concludes. Moreover, shortages unrelated to

the drawdown could be reduced through other means, such as changes in

operating policies, procedures, and legislative requirements. For example,

DOD could reduce the need to transfer personnel to meet the requirements

of operations other than war by structuring its forces to better match these

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Chapter 4 

Personnel Shortages Are Likely to Continue

Due to Factors Unrelated to the Drawdown

requirements. Reducing the military’s involvement in such operations or

reducing its level of overseas presence is another alternative that could

reduce the need for such transfers. Finally, Congress could enact

legislation temporarily waiving from some legislative requirements for the

remainder of the drawdown period. Both DOD and Congress would need to

weigh the merits of these actions.

To permit DOD sufficient time to address the recommendations contained

in our two earlier reports previously mentioned, we are not making any

further recommendations at this time.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Appendix II 

Total Personnel Compared With Personnel

Included in Our Analyses by Service, Fiscal

Years 1987 Through 1993

Table I.1: Total (Army, Air Force, and

Navy) Officers Enlisted

Fiscal

year Total

Included

in our

analyses Percent Total

Included

in our

analyses Percent

1987 287,340 212,742 74.0 1,673,862 1,470,191 87.8

1988 284,516 210,515 74.0 1,642,627 1,429,591 87.0

1989 282,727 206,886 73.2 1,637,050 1,409,742 86.1

1990 278,996 200,104 71.7 1,580,156 1,365,852 86.4

1991 274,110 197,520 72.1 1,520,240 1,326,124 87.2

1992 254,689 183,303 72.0 1,355,896 1,201,200 88.6

1993 238,264 175,463 73.6 1,275,938 1,136,442 89.1

Table I.2: Army

Officers Enlisted

Fiscal

year Total

Included

in our

analyses Percent Total

Included

in our

analyses Percent

1987 107,964 61,685 57.1 668,410 569,423 85.2

1988 106,963 60,172 56.3 660,445 564,453 85.5

1989 106,877 59,172 55.4 658,321 558,469 84.8

1990 104,862 56,505 53.9 641,341 543,263 84.7

1991 106,256 56,156 52.9 614,848 529,702 86.2

1992 95,201 49,807 52.3 511,834 456,486 89.2

1993 87,845 49,824 56.7 480,379 432,426 90.0

Table I.3: Air Force

Officers Enlisted

Fiscal

year Total

Included

in our

analyses Percent Total

Included

in our

analyses Percent

1987 107,338 95,367 88.9 495,244 469,466 94.8

1988 105,126 93,581 89.0 466,856 437,781 93.8

1989 103,697 91,300 88.0 462,831 429,754 92.9

1990 101,046 87,691 86.8 433,846 399,599 92.1

1991 96,702 86,508 89.5 409,765 380,349 92.8

1992 90,376 80,081 88.6 375,684 344,724 91.8

1993 84,073 73,545 87.5 356,126 328,627 92.3

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Appendix II 

Total Personnel Compared With Personnel

Included in Our Analyses by Service, Fiscal

Years 1987 Through 1993

Table I.4: Navy

Officers Enlisted

Fiscal

year Total

Included

in our

analysis Percent Total

Included

in our

analysis Percent

1987 72,038 55,690 77.3 510,208 431,302 84.5

1988 72,427 56,762 78.4 515,326 427,357 82.9

1989 72,153 56,414 78.2 515,898 421,519 81.7

1990 73,088 55,908 76.5 504,969 423,030 83.8

1991 71,152 54,856 77.1 495,627 416,073 84.0

1992 69,112 53,415 77.3 468,378 399,990 85.4

1993 66,346 52,094 78.5 439,433 375,389 85.4

Note: Total personnel shows actual end strengths at the end of each fiscal year and excludes

cadets and midshipmen. Our analyses included authorized personnel positions in combat and

support units. Specifically excluded from the analyses were general officers, warrant officers, and

personnel in general support positions.

Source: DOD Comptroller provided service totals; the individual services provided data on

authorized combat and support positions.

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Sharon A. Cekala

Carol R. Schuster

Barry W. Holman

Dallas Regional Office Thom Barger

Robert D. Malpass

Andy C. Clinton

Dorothy M. Tejada

(703029) Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-95-97 Military Personnel
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