UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1972

PROTECTION STRATEGIES, INC., 

Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

STARR INDEMNITY & LIABILITY CO., 

Defendant - Appellee, 

v. 

JOSEPH RICHARDS; DAVID LUX; DAVID SANBORN; KEITH HEDMAN, 

Third Party Defendants. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District 

Judge. (1:13-cv-00763-LO-IDD) 

Submitted: April 30, 2015 Decided: May 27, 2015

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

John A. Gibbons, DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO LLP, Washington, D.C., for 

Appellant. Cara Tseng Duffield, Mary Catherine Martin, WILEY 

REIN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
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PER CURIAM: 

Protection Strategies, Incorporated, (PSI) appeals the 

district court’s order granting Starr Indemnity & Liability 

Company (Starr)’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to alter or amend 

the court’s prior order granting Starr summary judgment in PSI’s 

civil action. We conclude that PSI fails to establish 

reversible error in the district court’s judgment and affirm. 

In 2012, PSI and its officers were the subjects of criminal 

and civil investigations relative to the Small Business 

Administration’s Section 8(a) program, a program designed to aid 

businesses owned by certain socioeconomic groups in accessing 

the federal procurement market. In 2013, PSI’s former chief 

executive officer, former chief financial officer, former vice 

president, and former president pled guilty in the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to criminal 

charges for fraud or conspiracy to commit fraud in connection 

with the Section 8(a) program. 

Through a civil action filed in the district court, PSI 

sought reimbursement under insurance policies (the 2011 policy 

and the 2012 policy) issued by Starr of certain costs expended 

in connection with these investigations. Starr ultimately 

reimbursed to PSI $846,483.34. After the officers pled guilty, 

however, Starr sought recoupment of the amount paid through a 

counterclaim. The district court granted summary judgment in 
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Starr’s favor, concluding that the 2011 policy controlled, each 

of the four coverage exclusions on which Starr relied (the 

exclusions for profit, fraud, and prior knowledge and based on a

warranty letter) barred coverage under the policy, and that 

Starr was entitled to recoupment of costs reimbursed to PSI. 

Starr later moved pursuant to Rule 59(e) to alter or amend the 

district court’s judgment to reflect it was entitled to 

recoupment of the $846,483.34 sum, plus pre- and post-judgment 

interest. The district court granted Starr’s motion, awarded it 

judgment in the amount of $846,483.34 and awarded pre- and 

post-judgment interest. PSI appeals and challenges the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment in Starr’s favor. 

We review de novo the district court’s award of summary 

judgment and view the facts in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 873 

(4th Cir. 2013). “Summary judgment is appropriate only if the 

record shows ‘that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). 

The relevant inquiry on summary judgment is “whether the 

evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require 

submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one 

party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). To withstand a 
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summary judgment motion, the non-moving party must produce 

competent evidence sufficient to reveal the existence of a 

genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Thompson v. 

Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) 

(“Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice, nor does 

a mere scintilla of evidence in support of [the non-moving 

party’s] case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We will 

uphold the district court’s grant of summary judgment unless a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party 

on the evidence presented. See EEOC v. Cent. Wholesalers, Inc., 

573 F.3d 167, 174-75 (4th Cir. 2009). 

We conclude after review of the record and the parties’ 

briefs that the district court did not reversibly err in 

granting summary judgment to Starr. We reject as without merit 

PSI’s contention that the exclusion for prior knowledge in the 

2011 policy is not applicable to bar coverage in this case 

because the 2012 policy controls. Contrary to PSI’s suggestion, 

Starr did not waive its right to rely on and is not estopped 

from relying on the coverage exclusions in the 2011 policy. 

See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Atl. Nat’l Ins. Co., 329 F.2d 769, 

775-76 (4th Cir. 1964); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mabry, 

497 S.E.2d 844, 846 (Va. 1998); Stanley’s Cafeteria, Inc. v. 

Abramson, 306 S.E.2d 870, 873 (Va. 1983). We also reject as 

unsupported by the record PSI’s contention that the warranty 
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letter bars coverage in this case because the district court 

impermissibly resolved issues of fact regarding the 

circumstances under which the letter was executed to find it was 

part of the 2011 policy. We further reject as without merit 

PSI’s contention that the coverage exclusions relative to profit 

and fraud do not apply to bar coverage with respect to PSI’s 

general counsel and two employees because the exclusions were 

applicable to bar coverage for these individuals as a result of 

the guilty pleas of PSI’s former chief executive officer and 

chief financial officer. Additionally, as it is clear from the 

undisputed evidence of record that there were not Claims under 

the 2011 policy with respect to these individuals, PSI’s 

contention that the district court improperly resolved fact 

issues to reach this conclusion is without merit. Finally, we 

reject as both unsupported by the record and otherwise without 

merit PSI’s arguments challenging the district court’s 

determination that Starr was entitled to the remedy of 

recoupment under the terms of the 2011 policy. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED