Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

LORINDA MEIER YOUNGCOURT GREGORY F. ZOELLER

DANIEL DIXON Attorney General of Indiana

Lawrence County Public Defender Agency

Bedford, Indiana JUSTIN F. ROEBEL

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

BRUCE E. PHILLIPS, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 47A01-1304-CR-148

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee. )

APPEAL FROM THE LAWRENCE CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Andrea K. McCord, Judge

Cause No. 47C01-1201-FA-60

April 4, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BAILEY, Judge
2

Case Summary

Bruce E. Phillips (“Phillips”) appeals his convictions and sentence for Conspiracy to 

commit Dealing in Methamphetamine, as a Class B felony,1and Possession of Chemical 

Reagents or Precursors with Intent to Manufacture Controlled Substances, as a Class D 

felony.2 We affirm. 

Issues

Phillips presents two issues for review:

I. Whether his convictions are supported by sufficient evidence; and

II. Whether his sentence is inappropriate.

Facts and Procedural History

On January 19, 2012, Phillips and his nephew, Eric Phillips (“Eric”), went into a 

Walgreens store in Bedford, Indiana. At the section where cards to request purchase of cold 

remedies containing pseudoephedrine were displayed, Eric took a card and handed it to 

Phillips.3 Phillips proceeded to the pharmacy with the card, and purchased a 96-count 

package of a store brand decongestant containing pseudoephedrine. Eric approached the 

display of lithium batteries and looked at them, but did not purchase any of them. 

These activities were brought to the attention of three Indiana State Police officers 

who were conducting surveillance of pseudoephedrine purchases in the area. Troopers 

 

1

Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-1.1(a)(1), 35-41-5-2. 

2

I.C. § 35-48-4-14.5(e).

3 Eric had, nine days earlier, reached his maximum legal allowance for the purchase of over-the-counter items 

containing pseudoephedrine. 
3

Joshua Allen, Jon Patrick, and Kent Rohlfing decided to follow Phillips and his nephew after 

they left Walgreens. The troopers followed the pair to a gas station, to a WalMart (where 

purchases of starting fluid and a cold pack were made), and then to Phillips’s residence.

In the driveway, Trooper Allen approached Phillips and told him that he “was there 

about his recent pseudoephedrine purchase.” (Tr. 383.) As Trooper Allen stood near the 

garage, he detected an organic solvent odor and questioned Eric about taking something into 

the garage. Eric advised that he had taken some starting fluid into the garage because he and 

his uncle were having problems getting a vehicle started. Trooper Allen decided to seek a

search warrant for the house and garage.

As the officers waited for the warrant, Eric volunteered: “If there’s a Meth lab in the 

garage, it’s mine.” (Tr. 451.) Ultimately, the search of the garage and residence yielded all 

items necessary for the production of methamphetamine (with the exception of salt or 

aluminum foil), specifically: drain opener (sodium hydroxide), a bottle of Liquid Fire, 

sulfuric acid, a four pack of lithium batteries, a box of Wal-Phed, a box of Sudafed, instant 

cold packs, and Prestone starting fluid. The sodium hydroxide lye was found on a 

workbench inside the garage. Also inside the garage, the officers found a backpack. It 

contained a reaction vessel, a glass jar, and drain opener, items consistent with manufacture 

of methamphetamine by a method commonly referred to as a “shake and bake” or “one pot” 

method. (Tr. 396.) There were black flakes in the reaction vessel indicating a prior use, but 

the residual contents were not “rolling” or active. (Tr. 341.) 
4

Eric pled guilty to Dealing in Methamphetamine. On February 5, 2013, Phillips was 

brought to trial before a jury on charges of Conspiracy to commit Dealing in 

Methamphetamine and Possession of Precursors. He was found guilty as charged, and 

received concurrent sentences of sixteen years and three years, respectively. This appeal 

ensued. 

Discussion and Decision

Sufficiency of the Evidence

The standard by which we review alleged insufficiency of the evidence to support a 

criminal conviction is well-settled:

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, 

“appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable 

inferences supporting the verdict.” McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 

(Ind. 2005) (emphasis added). It is the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate 

courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine 

whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 

904 (Ind. 2005). To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are 

confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it “most favorably to 

the trial court’s ruling.” Id. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless “no 

reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000) 

(emphasis added). It is therefore not necessary that the evidence “overcome 

every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 

(Ind. 1995). “[T]he evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be 

drawn from it to support the verdict.” Pickens v. State, 751 N.E.2d 331, 334 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007).

In order to convict Phillips of Conspiracy to commit Dealing in Methamphetamine, as 

charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Phillips intended to 

commit Dealing in Methamphetamine, agreed with Eric to do so and that either Phillips or 
5

Eric performed an overt act in furtherance of the agreement. See Bailey v. State, 717 N.E.2d 

1, 3 (Ind. 1999) (recognizing that conspiracy to commit a felony consists of three elements: 

intent to commit a felony, agreement with another to commit a felony, and an overt act 

performed by either). The State alleged, alternatively, that the overt act was either the 

purchase of chemical reagents or precursors or that Phillips “allowed [a] building to be used 

for manufacturing a controlled substance.” (App. 61.)

Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-48-1-18(1), “manufacturing” is defined as:

The production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion, or 

processing of a controlled substance, either directly or indirectly by extraction 

from substances of natural origin, independently by means of chemical 

synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and 

includes any packaging or repackaging of the substance or labeling or 

relabeling of its container.

In proving the element of agreement, the State is not required to show an express 

formal agreement. Bailey, 717 N.E.2d at 3. Rather, proof of a conspiracy may rest entirely 

on circumstantial evidence. Id.

The evidence in support of the verdict is as follows. Shortly after Eric had reached his 

thirty-day limit for the purchase of pseudoephedrine, Phillips drove Eric to a Walgreens and 

requested a cold remedy containing pseudoephedrine (by means of a card that Eric had 

handed to him). After the purchase, Phillips drove to a WalMart where additional purchases 

of potential precursors (starting fluid and a cold pack) were made. Eric testified at Phillips’s 

trial that he had assisted Phillips in finding the proper medication for a sickness, but 

acknowledged his prior admission that he and Phillips went to Walgreens to obtain 

“ingredients” to manufacture methamphetamine. (Tr. 439.) Eric further testified that State’s 
6

Exhibit 15 (depicting the items obtained upon execution of the search warrant) included 

everything needed to manufacture methamphetamine and the following exchange took place:

Prosecutor: At some point on January 19th, 2012 did you and Bruce Phillips 

have a conversation about your intention at some point to manufacture 

Methamphetamine?

Eric: Yes, ma’am.

Prosecutor: Tell me about that conversation. 

Eric: I said if we have all these I can do it another time. If we had all the 

ingredients.

Prosecutor: If you have all the ingredients you can do it when?

Eric: Another time. 

Prosecutor: Another time. When did that conversation take place? Or where?

Eric: On the way to his house.

(Tr. 458-59.) Eric explained that Phillips was to benefit by getting “a little bit” of the 

methamphetamine for smoking. (Tr. 459.) According to Eric, he had shared his product with 

Phillips in the past. Phillips acknowledged, while testifying on his own behalf, that he had 

previously smoked methamphetamine with his nephew. 

There is sufficient evidence from which the factfinder could conclude that Phillips and 

Eric agreed to manufacture methamphetamine; the State need not have presented specific 

evidence of a formal agreement. Bailey, 717 N.E.2d at 3. Too, there is sufficient evidence 

from which the factfinder could conclude that Phillips or Eric committed an overt act in 

furtherance of the agreement, by purchasing precursors or allowing the garage to be used for 
7

storage of precursors needed in the manufacturing process.4 Phillips suggests that only Eric 

intended to manufacture methamphetamine – because he was the intended cook – and that 

the fact-finder must disregard conversation taking place after the purchase of precursors. 

Such is merely an invitation to reweigh the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses. 

This we cannot do. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146. There is sufficient evidence to support 

Philips’s conviction of Conspiracy to commit Dealing in Methamphetamine.

Phillips also contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his possession 

conviction. He was convicted of violating Indiana Code section 35-48-4-14.5(e), which 

provides in relevant part that “[a] person who possesses two (2) or more chemical reagents or 

precursors with the intent to manufacture a controlled substance commits a Class D felony.” 

Phillips does not deny that he possessed items that could be used in methamphetamine 

production. Rather, he challenges the element of intent. According to Phillips, only Eric 

intended to cook a batch of methamphetamine, the requisite criminal intent must be 

“personal,” and the State failed to show that Phillips “intended to take part in this future 

manufacturing” planned by Eric. Appellant’s Brief at 12.

He rests his argument upon State v. Prater, 922 N.E.2d 746, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), 

trans. denied. Prater involved two defendants who stole anhydrous ammonia with the intent 

to sell it to an unidentified third party, presumably for the manufacture of methamphetamine. 

See id. at 747. Prater was charged with violating Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-14.5(c), 

 

4 The State may have theorized that Phillips and Eric intended to use the garage for cooking a batch of 

methamphetamine on January 19, 2012. As Phillips points out, the troopers’ arrival thwarted that opportunity. 

However, the garage was being used both for the storage of a reaction vessel and precursors other than those 

purchased at Walgreens and WalMart on that date. 
8

which criminalizes possession of anhydrous ammonia with the intent to manufacture 

methamphetamine. A jury found Prater guilty of the charged offense, but the trial court 

vacated the conviction for illegal possession of anhydrous ammonia, finding insufficient 

evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Prater had intent to manufacture 

methamphetamine. See id. at 748. 

The State appealed. A panel of this Court, according the words of the relevant statute 

their “plain, ordinary, usual” meaning, concluded that the Legislature did not intend to 

criminalize mere possession of anhydrous ammonia. Id. at 749. Rather, “the plain language 

of Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-14.5(c) requires that the person who possesses anhydrous 

ammonia have the intent to use that chemical in the manufacture of methamphetamine to 

commit a Class D felony.” Id. at 750.

More recently, in Gifford v. State, 995 N.E.2d 1083 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. 

denied, a panel of this Court reversed a conviction for possession of precursors where the 

defendant and his companions procured pseudoephedrine to sell to a then-undetermined 

methamphetamine manufacturer. The Gifford Court “acknowledge[ed] the clear 

applicability of Prater” and agreed that our legislature did not intend to criminalize mere 

possession of precursors even absent personal intent to manufacture a controlled substance. 

Id. at 1085. 

However, the holdings in Prater and Gifford do not afford Phillips the relief he seeks, 

that is, the reversal of his conviction for possession of precursors. There is no evidence 

suggesting that Phillips intended only to sell a precursor to a third party. Rather, the evidence 
9

is that Phillips was acting in concert with Eric to produce methamphetamine. In Indiana, “an 

accomplice is criminally liable for all acts committed by a confederate which are a probable 

and natural consequence of their concerted action.” Alvies v. State, 905 N.E.2d 57, 61 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2009). The statute criminalizing possession of precursors does not carve out an 

exception. “[W]e are obliged to suppose that the General Assembly chose the language it did 

for a reason.” Prater, 922 N.E.2d at 750. We will not engraft a requirement that an 

accomplice to methamphetamine manufacture must have possessed the intent to become 

personally involved in the cooking process, as Phillips suggests. There is sufficient evidence 

to support Phillips’s conviction for possession of precursors. 

Sentencing

A person who commits a Class B felony has a sentencing range of between six and 

twenty years, with ten years as the advisory term. I. C. § 35-50-2-5. A person who commits 

a Class D felony has a sentencing range of between six months and three years, with the 

advisory term being one and one-half years. I.C. § 35-50-2-7. As such, Phillips received a 

sentence of six years above the advisory for his Class B felony conviction and the maximum 

sentence for his Class D felony conviction, to be served concurrently. When imposing this 

sentence, the trial court found Phillips’s criminal history to be an aggravator, and found his 

role as a caregiver to a disabled adult son to be a mitigator.

The authority granted to this Court by Article 7, § 6 of the Indiana Constitution 

permitting appellate review and revision of criminal sentences is implemented through 

Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides: “The Court may revise a sentence authorized by 
10

statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the 

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.” In performing our review, we assess “the culpability of the defendant, the severity 

of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a 

given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). The principal role of 

such review is to attempt to leaven the outliers. Id. at 1225. A defendant ‘“must persuade 

the appellate court that his or her sentence has met th[e] inappropriateness standard of 

review.”’ Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Childress v. State, 

848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006)). 

The nature of Phillips’s offense is that he and his nephew entered into an agreement to 

produce methamphetamine and procured precursors in furtherance of that agreement. They 

gathered precursors into a garage which was in proximity to the residence where Phillips’s 

disabled son lived. The intent, as described by Eric, was to share in the product produced. 

Indeed, police officers recovered four glass smoking devices on a nightstand in Phillips’s 

locked bedroom.

Phillips has a significant criminal history, including prior felony convictions for child 

molesting, possession of marijuana, and driving while intoxicated. He also has six 

misdemeanor convictions and a long history of arrests related to substance abuse. His 

decision to forego substance abuse treatment and subject his disabled child to substance 

abuse in the home does not reflect favorably upon Phillips’s character.
11

Having reviewed the matter, we conclude that the trial court did not impose an 

inappropriate sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B), and the sentence does not warrant 

appellate revision. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the sentence imposed by the trial 

court.

Conclusion

Phillips’s convictions are supported by sufficient evidence. His sixteen-year 

aggregate sentence is not inappropriate.

Affirmed.

KIRSCH, J., and MAY, J., concur.