UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4370

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

FAYE DENISE HEGGINS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,

Chief District Judge. (5:10-cr-00119-D-1)

Submitted: November 3, 2011 Decided: November 17, 2011

Before GREGORY and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Faye Denise Heggins appeals her convictions, following 

her guilty plea to two counts of fraud and false statements in a 

tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), (2) (2006), and 

the twenty-four-month sentence she received. Heggins’ attorney 

filed this appeal pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), averring that there are no meritorious issues for 

appeal, but questioning the substantive reasonableness of 

Heggins’ sentence. Although advised of her right to file a pro 

se supplemental brief, Heggins has not done so. The Government 

has moved to dismiss the appeal on the basis of the waiver of 

appellate rights contained in Heggins’ plea agreement. We grant 

the Government’s motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal of 

Heggins’ sentence, and we affirm her convictions.

We first conclude that Heggins has waived her right to 

appeal her sentence. A defendant may, in a valid plea 

agreement, waive the right to appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 

(2006). United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 

1990). This court reviews the validity of an appellate waiver 

de novo, and will enforce the waiver if it is valid and the 

issue appealed is within the scope thereof. United States v. 

Blick

An appeal waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly 

and intelligently agreed to the waiver. Id. at 169. To 

, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005).
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determine whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, this 

court examines the background, experience, and conduct of the 

defendant. United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146 

(4th Cir. 1995). Generally, if the district court fully 

questions a defendant regarding the waiver during the Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11 plea colloquy, the waiver is both valid and 

enforceable. United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 

(4th Cir. 1991). The record establishes that the district court

fully discussed the terms of the waiver and questioned Heggins 

to ensure her understanding of those terms. Accordingly, we 

conclude that Heggins knowingly and intelligently entered into 

the plea agreement and understood the waiver. See United States 

v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002). 

We next consider whether Heggins’ challenge to the 

substantive reasonableness of her sentence falls within the 

scope of the waiver. According to the plea agreement, Heggins 

waived the right “to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,” save 

for a sentence in excess of the Guidelines range determined at 

sentencing. (J.A. 11).*

 * Citations to “J.A.” refer to the joint appendix submitted 

by the parties. 

 The twenty-four-month sentence Heggins 

received was within her Guidelines range. Accordingly, we 

conclude the waiver bars appellate review of the substantive 
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reasonableness of Heggins’ sentence, and thus grant the 

Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal of Heggins’ sentence. 

The appellate waiver does not, however, preclude 

appellate review of Heggins’ convictions. Although no challenge 

to Heggins’ convictions is raised, because this case is before 

us pursuant to Anders

We have examined the entire record in accordance with 

the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues 

for appeal. We thus grant the Government’s motion to dismiss as 

to Heggins’ sentence and affirm Heggins’ convictions. This 

court requires that counsel inform Heggins, in writing, of the 

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Heggins requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Heggins. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

, we have reviewed the Rule 11 hearing and 

discern no infirmity in that proceeding. Accordingly, we affirm 

Heggins’ convictions.

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;

DISMISSED IN PART