2017 UT App 64

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ANTONIO O. VALDEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

LABOR COMMISSION AND 

UNIFIED POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Respondents.

Opinion

No. 20150424-CA

Filed April 6, 2017

Original Proceeding in this Court

Ronald Ball, Virginius Dabney, and Stony Olsen, 

Attorneys for Petitioner

Camille N. Johnson, Kenneth L. Reich, Maralyn M.

English, and Harry H. Souvall, Attorneys

for Respondents

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and KATE A. TOOMEY concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 Antonio O. Valdez, a police officer, experienced back pain 

after his patrol car came to an abrupt stop during an accident. 

The Labor Commission’s Appeals Board denied him permanent 

total disability benefits, and Valdez now seeks judicial review of 

the denial. We decline to disturb that order.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Valdez worked as a police officer for the Unified Police 

Department. In June 2010, as he was working a graveyard shift, a 

car and a motorcycle raced past his patrol car. Intending to pull 

over one or both of the drivers for speeding, Valdez pulled out 
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of the parking lot where he had been finishing a report. Around 

the same time, the speeding car turned in front of the speeding 

motorcycle, and the motorcycle hit the car. Part of the 

motorcycle, presumably dislodged during the collision, lay in 

the street. Valdez was traveling seventy miles per hour in 

pursuit of the vehicles when he ran into the dislodged 

motorcycle part, and his vehicle came to an abrupt stop.

¶3 Valdez reported feeling a ‚crack‛ in his neck upon 

impact. He also felt pain in his lower back as he exited his 

vehicle. Valdez’s supervisor sent him home early because of his 

neck and back pain, and when he woke up ‚later that day, he 

had a very difficult time getting out of bed because his back was 

so stiff.‛

¶4 Over the next two years, Valdez received treatment from 

several doctors for back pain he attributed to the accident. 

During the course of treatment, in December 2011, one doctor 

concluded that Valdez ‚suffered from pre-existing diffuse 

idiopathic skeletal hyperostosis (DISH) of the thoracic spine, 

multilevel degenerative joint disease of the lumbar spine and 

cervical degenerative changes.‛ His physical difficulties were 

exacerbated when, in May 2012, he hit his head against a vehicle 

door during ‚PIT maneuver‛1training. Then, in August 2012, 

Valdez ‚suffered a back strain at work when he had hand to 

hand contact with a suspect during apprehension.‛

¶5 Ultimately, Valdez’s doctors restricted his work activities. 

Because Valdez suffers from DISH, they concluded it would not 

be ‚safe *for+ him to be exposed to potentially violent 

 

1. ‚*A+ PIT (precision intercept technique) is a maneuver in 

which an officer giving chase pushes the rear fender of the 

suspect’s vehicle with the patrol car’s opposite front fender, 

causing the suspect’s vehicle to spin out of control and come to a 

stop.‛ Latits v. Phillips, 826 N.W.2d 190, 192 n.1 (Mich. Ct. App. 

2012).
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encounters.‛ He was further limited from lifting more than ten 

pounds, ‚stooping, pushing, pulling or prolonged standing or 

sitting.‛ Given the practical implications of these restrictions on 

the career of a police officer, Valdez filed for workers’ 

compensation benefits in December 2012. He requested medical 

expenses, medical care, travel expenses, temporary total 

disability compensation, and, eventually, permanent total 

disability benefits. The Unified Police Department denied that 

the accident was the legal or medical cause of Valdez’s current 

condition.

¶6 The Utah Labor Commission (the Commission) submitted 

the medical issues to an independent medical panel, asking it ‚to 

conduct an impartial evaluation of the medical aspects of this 

case.‛ Specifically, the Commission asked the medical panel: 

(1) whether there was ‚a medically demonstrable causal 

connection between‛ the accident and Valdez’s then-current 

back problems; (2) ‚the date when, if ever, *Valdez’s+ medical 

problems caused by [the accident] stabilized‛; (3) what 

‚medical/functional restrictions, if any, from all conditions, 

whether industrial or non-industrially caused‛ Valdez suffered; 

and (4) what ‚medical/functional restrictions, if any, as the result 

only of [the accident]‛ Valdez suffered.

¶7 The medical panel determined that the accident 

aggravated Valdez’s preexisting DISH and degenerative joint 

disease of the spine. It also concluded that all medical problems 

related to the accident had stabilized by November 2011. The 

more recent problems, the panel concluded, were attributable to 

‚the ongoing progression of his pre-existing conditions,‛ and it 

was this progression that ‚limited his ability to continue to work 

as a police officer.‛ The medical panel acknowledged that 

Valdez ‚should not be exposed to violent encounters, manual 

physical training, or heavy lifting, twisting, prolonged standing, 

which will aggravate DISH. In effect, [Valdez] is limited to 

sedentary work.‛ But in response to the Commission’s final 

question regarding what medical or functional restrictions 
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Valdez suffered as a result of the accident, the medical panel 

answered, ‚None.‛

¶8 The Commission issued its findings of fact, conclusions of 

law, and order in December 2014. Relying on the medical panel’s 

report, which the Commission determined was ‚supported by a 

preponderance of the evidence,‛ the Commission concluded that 

Valdez’s ‚current physical limitations are related to *Valdez’s+ 

pre-existing DISH condition, not the industrial accident.‛ Thus, 

because the accident did not cause Valdez’s ‚inability to perform 

former work,‛ the Commission denied Valdez’s claim for 

permanent total disability compensation.2

¶9 Valdez appealed the Commission’s decision to the 

Commission’s Appeals Board. The Appeals Board adopted the 

findings of fact and conclusions of law that the Commission had 

set forth and affirmed the Commission’s order. Valdez now 

seeks judicial review of that decision.3

 

2. Valdez received temporary disability compensation pursuant 

to an agreement with the Unified Police Department, which 

covered ‚from the date of the accident through the date of the 

agreement‛ in February 2012. The Commission determined that 

because Valdez’s accident-related injuries were resolved by 

November 2011, Valdez was ‚not entitled to any additional 

temporary total disability compensation. He became medically 

stable during the period covered by the Compensation 

Agreement.‛ The Commission did, however, award Valdez 

‚medical expenses incurred to treat his spinal condition through 

November 2, 2011.‛

3. We review the decision of the Appeals Board. But because that 

decision adopted the order of the Commission in its entirety, 

throughout the rest of this decision we refer to both the 

Commission and the Appeals Board simply as ‚the 

(continued<)
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20150424-CA 5 2017 UT App 64

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10 Valdez asks us to decide just one issue: ‚Whether *the 

Commission] was correct when it concluded that a minor disease 

was the sole cause of [his] conditions and thus denied 

permanent total disability . . . .‛ But this is not the sort of 

administrative agency decision we review for correctness. Cf. 

Fogleman v. Labor Comm’n, 2015 UT App 294, ¶ 18, 364 P.3d 756 

(reviewing the Commission’s interpretation of a statute for 

correctness). The question is one of fact, albeit a factual question 

best informed by expert testimony or evidence. See Hutchings v. 

Labor Comm’n, 2016 UT App 160, ¶ 23, 378 P.3d 1273 (‚Medical 

causation is fundamentally a factual determination.‛); Virgin v. 

Board of Review of the Indus. Comm’n of Utah, 803 P.2d 1284, 1287 

(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (‚Medical causation, including whether an 

industrial accident aggravated a pre-existing condition, is a 

factual matter.‛). Because medical causation is a question of fact, 

Valdez’s challenge rests on whether the Commission’s decision 

is ‚supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of 

the whole record before the court.‛ See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-

403(4)(g) (LexisNexis 2016). ‚A finding is supported by 

substantial evidence when a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate the evidence supporting the decision.‛ Bailey v. 

Retirement Board, 2012 UT App 365, ¶ 2, 294 P.3d 577 (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. Compensability of Aggravated Injuries

¶11 Before we address the merits of Valdez’s challenge, we 

consider the legal standard involved in compensating injured 

 

(<continued)

Commission.‛ Cf. Martinez-Ferrate v. Department of Commerce, 

2016 UT App 176, ¶ 18 n.6, 379 P.3d 923.
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parties for the aggravation of preexisting conditions. In 

Hutchings v. Labor Commission, we explained:

Under our Workers’ Compensation Act, industrial 

accidents that aggravate or ‚light up‛ a preexisting 

condition are compensable. In order to qualify for 

compensation, the claimant must demonstrate 

(1) that the injury occurred ‚by accident‛ and 

(2) that the conditions and activities of the job were 

the cause of the injury. The key causation question 

is whether, given this body and this exertion, the 

exertion in fact contributed to the injury. The 

answer to this question has two components. The 

claimant must show that the work exertion was 

both the legal cause and the medical cause of the 

injury or disability.

2016 UT App 160, ¶ 16 (footnote, citations, and additional 

internal quotation marks omitted). This test, the history of which 

was examined in Hutchings, see id. ¶¶ 16–20, is commonly called 

the Allen test, see, e.g., Acosta v. Labor Comm’n, 2002 UT App 67, 

¶ 1, 44 P.3d 819; see also Allen v. Industrial Comm’n, 729 P.2d 15, 

18 (Utah 1986).

¶12 In Acosta, we considered whether the Allen test applies to 

scenarios like the one present here, where an employee suffers 

from an asymptomatic preexisting condition that becomes 

symptomatic as a result of an industrial accident. 2002 UT App 

67, ¶ 18. We determined that, when evaluating ‚whether an 

injury arose out of and in the course of employment, it matters 

not at all, from the standpoint of legal causation, whether the 

preexisting condition was symptomatic or asymptomatic.‛ Id.

¶ 27. We therefore concluded that ‚the Allen test applies—

whether anyone knew prior to the accident that the condition 

existed or not.‛ Id. Thus, a claimant may be compensated for

injuries that aggravate a preexisting condition. Allen, 729 P.2d at 

25–27. That said, a claimant seeking compensation for 
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20150424-CA 7 2017 UT App 64

aggravation of a preexisting condition—whether asymptomatic 

before the accident or not—must also demonstrate that the 

accident was the medical cause of the injury for which he seeks 

compensation. This means that if permanent total disability is 

sought on the basis of an aggravated preexisting condition, the 

claimant must demonstrate that the accident medically caused 

permanent aggravation. 

¶13 In one of our recent decisions on this issue, we looked at 

the compensability of aggravated preexisting conditions that 

were aggravated only temporarily. See Petersen v. Labor Comm’n, 

2016 UT App 222, 385 P.3d 759. In Petersen, the appellant argued 

that ‚it does not matter whether the accident caused only a 

temporary injury‛ and that ‚causation does not end because it’s 

temporary . . . ; it goes on forever. It’s lifetime medical provisions 

and the treatment attaches to [the] claim forever; [it is] lifetime 

medical care forever.‛ Id. ¶ 16 (alterations in original) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). We rejected this argument, explaining 

that ‚it runs contrary to Utah law.‛ Id. We reiterated that

Allen makes clear that there must be a nexus 

between the accident and the injury for which 

treatment is sought. Only medical expenses for 

injuries resulting from an industrial accident are 

compensable. Requiring a nexus between the 

accident and injury prevent[s] an employer from 

becoming a general insurer of his employees and 

discourage[s] fraudulent claims.

Id. ¶ 18 (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted).

¶14 In short, while a claimant may be compensated for the 

aggravation of preexisting conditions caused by an industrial 

accident, regardless of whether the condition was symptomatic 

prior to the accident, see Acosta, 2002 UT App 67, ¶ 27, that 

entitlement ends when the aggravation stops being attributable 

to the industrial accident, see Petersen, 2016 UT App 222, ¶ 16. In 
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20150424-CA 8 2017 UT App 64

other words, if a preexisting condition is only temporarily 

aggravated by an industrial accident, a claimant may only 

recover for the temporary aggravation, and not for unrelated 

symptoms or complications he may experience down the road.

II. Compensability of Valdez’s Injuries

¶15 We now turn to the question of whether the Commission 

erred when it denied Valdez permanent total disability benefits. 

We consider this question in light of the Commission’s findings 

that Valdez suffered from a preexisting condition, that the 

condition was aggravated by the accident, that the aggravation 

was resolved as of November 2011, and that Valdez suffered no 

permanent restrictions as a result of the accident.

A. Temporary Aggravation of Valdez’s DISH

¶16 Because the Allen test governs our analysis, we begin 

there and decide ‚(1) *whether+ the injury occurred ‘by accident’ 

and (2) [whether] the conditions and activities of the job were the 

cause of the injury.‛ See Hutchings v. Labor Comm’n, 2016 UT App 

160, ¶ 16, 378 P.3d 1273 (footnote omitted). In this case, we have 

no occasion to move beyond the first prong of the Allen test.

¶17 DISH is not a condition that can be said to have ‚occurred 

‘by accident.’‛ See id. And while the crash that aggravated 

Valdez’s DISH did occur by accident, Valdez does not seek our 

review of the compensation he received for the temporary 

aggravation of his DISH following the accident. Instead, he 

contends that the Commission should have further compensated 

him because ‚he can no longer perform the duties of an active 

police officer, due to the potential danger of further spinal 

injuries.‛ At oral argument before this court, Valdez encouraged

us to consider this case under the following framework: Before 

the accident, Valdez was a police officer; after the accident, he 

can no longer work as a police officer. But in this regard, Valdez 

conflates the permanent nature of his condition with the 

compensability of it. 
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¶18 Simply because the accident led to the discovery of 

Valdez’s DISH does not mean that the accident caused the end of 

his career as a police officer. Instead, because he is now aware of 

his DISH, he is aware that work as a police officer would be 

particularly dangerous for him. As the Commission found, ‚it is 

not safe [for] him to be exposed to potentially violent 

encounters . . . . [B]ut for the DISH, [Valdez] could return to 

work as a police officer.‛4

¶19 Valdez argues that this conclusion is incorrect because 

‚any aggravation of DISH is permanent.‛ But rather than 

analyzing the specifics of this case, he focuses generally on DISH 

and the law regarding aggravation of preexisting conditions. 

This focus is immaterial to our decision, because the medical 

panel—the report of which the Commission adopted—

concluded that any aggravation of DISH caused by the accident 

was resolved and is not the medical cause of Valdez’s ongoing 

limitations. If that conclusion is supported by substantial 

evidence, Valdez’s claim fails.

B. Evidence Supporting the Commission’s Decision

¶20 All we have left to determine, then, is whether the 

Commission’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. See 

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g) (LexisNexis 2016). We 

conclude that it is.

¶21 In urging us to reject the Commission’s decision, Valdez

misconstrues the evidence before us. He argues that the 

Commission erroneously concluded ‚that the Medical Panel had 

decided that DISH was not aggravated,‛ while ‚the Medical 

 

4. As the Unified Police Department points out, Valdez ‚was 

released to return to work absent any exposure to ‘potentially 

violent encounters.’ This is not an aggravation but an 

acknowledgement by Mr. Valdez’s physicians that his preexisting condition requires him to find a new profession.‛
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Panel specifically found that the industrial accident aggravated 

[Valdez’s] DISH condition, and then attributed his current 

medical condition to that aggravated DISH condition.‛ In reality, 

the medical panel concluded that the accident caused 

‚aggravations of pre-existing [DISH] and degenerative joint 

disease of the spine‛ but that those aggravations were resolved 

by November 2011. And the Commission’s decision did not, as 

Valdez contends, conclude that the medical panel found 

otherwise.

¶22 The Commission determined that any aggravation of 

Valdez’s DISH condition caused by the accident was temporary. 

The medical panel, in its report, came to this very conclusion. 

We have held that a medical panel’s report alone can be enough 

to conclude that a Commission’s determination was supported 

by substantial evidence. See Hutchings v. Labor Comm’n, 2016 UT 

App 160, ¶ 32, 378 P.3d 1273 (explaining that in that case ‚the 

medical panel’s report alone provide[d] substantial evidence to 

support the Commission’s medical causation determination‛). 

Such is the case here. The medical panel addressed all of 

Valdez’s impairments, both current and resolved, and how the 

accident contributed or did not contribute to them. It addressed 

his subsequent work-related injuries. And it explained how 

Valdez’s preexisting conditions affected his limitations. This 

alone is sufficient for us to conclude that the Commission’s 

decision was supported by substantial evidence.

¶23 Moreover, the Commission’s decision was supported by 

evidence beyond the medical panel’s report. This evidence 

included Valdez’s return to ‚full work duties as a police officer 

following the industrial accident with no physical limitations,‛

the progressive nature of DISH, and the testimony of a doctor 

not on the medical panel who also concluded that Valdez’s 

accident-related problems were resolved by November 2011. 

Considering the medical panel’s report along with this evidence, 

we have no difficulty concluding that the Commission’s decision 

was supported by substantial evidence.
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20150424-CA 11 2017 UT App 64

CONCLUSION

¶24 Valdez was injured in an industrial accident that

aggravated his previously asymptomatic DISH disease. But that 

aggravation was only temporary, and he is not entitled to 

compensation beyond the point when the aggravation was 

resolved. The Commission determined that point was November 

2011 and denied Valdez compensation beyond that date. 

Because the Commission’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence, we decline to disturb it.