U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

81–248 PDF 2002

S. HRG. 107–611

THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN PREVENTING

THE ENTRY OF TERRORISTS INTO THE UNITED

STATES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY, TERRORISM, 

AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 12, 2001

Serial No. J–107–43

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

JON KYL, Arizona 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Majority Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

SHARON PROST, Minority Chief Counsel 

MAKAN DELRAHIM, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY, TERRORISM, AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairwoman 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

JON KYL, Arizona 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

DAVID HANTMAN, Majority Chief Counsel 

STEPHEN HIGGINS, Minority Chief Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page

Cantwell, Hon. Maria, a U.S. Senator from the State of Washington ................ 41

DeWine, Hon. Mike, a U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio ................................ 11

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, a U.S. Senator from the State of California ................. 1

Kyl, Hon. Jon, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona .................................... 6

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont .................... 105

WITNESSES 

Camarota, Steven A., Director of Research, Center for Immigration Studies, 

Washington, D.C. ................................................................................................. 54

Collier, M. Paul, Executive Director, Biometrics Foundation, Gaithersburg, 

Maryland ............................................................................................................... 89

Doonan, Tony, Vice President, Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems; 

accompanied by Greg Spadorcio, Director, Business Solutions, NEC Technologies, Inc., Gold River, California .................................................................. 74

Fine, Glenn A., Inspector General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. .. 13

Ryan, Mary A., Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, Department of State, 

Washington, D.C. ................................................................................................. 33

Ward, David, President, American Council on Education, Washington, D.C. .... 65

Ziglar, James W., Commissioner, Immmigration and Naturalization Service, 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. .......................................................... 24

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Goode, Ted, Director of Services for International Students and Scholars, 

University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, California, statement ........... 104

Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, Washington, 

DC, visa information on terrorist hijackers of September 11, 2001, list ......... 105

Oracle Corporation, Larry Ellison, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, 

Redwood Shores, CA, letter ................................................................................. 106

(1)

THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN PREVENTING 

THE ENTRY OF TERRORISTS INTO THE 

UNITED STATES 

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12, 2001

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY, TERRORISM, AND

GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Dianne Feinstein, 

chairman of the subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Feinstein, Cantwell, Kyl, and DeWine. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. If I might, I would like to call this hearing 

to order. 

There will be two panels. All written statements will be placed 

in the record. The ranking member is Senator Jon Kyl, who sits to 

my right. We will begin with opening statements and then proceed 

directly to the panels. 

Today, the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information is holding a hearing on the role of technology in 

preventing the entry of terrorists into the United States. We hold 

this hearing in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on 

our Nation. These events have triggered concern about the shortcomings of the immigration and visa system of our country. 

Just yesterday, the Department of Justice released information 

indicating that 13 of the 19 terrorist hijackers had entered the 

United States legally with valid visas. Of the 13, 3 of the hijackers 

had remained in the United States after their visas had expired. 

The INS had no information on six of the hijackers. 

I would like to enter that information into the record. 

Clearly, something is wrong with our system. The purpose of this 

hearing is to determine the extent to which gaps in our visa and 

admission system have frustrated efforts to identify and bring to 

justice the perpetrators of these attacks. More importantly, we 

would like to determine the extent to which these vulnerabilities 

will expose us to future attack. 

Today, I see three areas of vulnerability in our immigration system: first, an unregulated visa waiver program in which 23 million 

people arrive in this country annually from 29 different countries 

with little scrutiny; second, an unmonitored non-immigrant visa 

2

system in which 7.1 million tourists, business visitors, foreign students and temporary workers arrive. To date, the INS does not 

have a reliable tracking system to determine how many of these 

visitors left the country after their visas expired. 

Third, among the 7.1 million non-immigrants, 500,000 foreign 

nationals entered on foreign student visas. The foreign student visa 

system is one of the most underregulated systems we have today. 

I believe most foreign students legitimately come to the United 

States to study, and indeed they provide a great contribution, certainly a financial contribution as well as others, to our institutions. 

However, I do have a concern that in the last 10 years more than 

16,000 students came from terrorist-supporting states such as Iran, 

Iraq, Sudan, Libya and Syria. 

Let me give you an example of why this is a problem. In the 

early 1990s, officials at six colleges, three of which were in California, were convicted of taking bribes, providing counterfeit education documents, and fraudulently applying for foreign student 

visas so that more than 100 foreign nationals could gain easy entry 

to the United States. The officials from the six colleges were convicted. Some served time in prison, others paid monetary fines and 

restitution. It is unclear what steps INS took to find and deport the 

foreign nationals involved in the scheme. 

There are other examples of the potential for gross misuse of the 

visa system. In 1991, the Washington Post reported that United 

Nations weapons inspectors in Iraq discovered documents detailing 

an Iraqi government strategy to send students to the United States 

and other countries to specifically study nuclear-related subjects to 

develop their own program. One of these students, Samir Al Araji, 

received his doctorate in nuclear engineering from Michigan State 

University. He then returned to Iraq to head its nuclear weapons 

program. 

In 1998, the Richmond Times and New York Times did extensive 

reports on Rihab Taha, the mastermind of Saddam Hussein’s germ 

warfare arsenal. Also known as ‘‘Dr. Germ,’’ Taha studied in England on a student visa. England is one of the participating countries in the visa waiver program, which means if she could have 

gotten a fraudulent passport from England, she could have come 

and gone without a visa in the United States. 

Now, why do I mention all of this? I think this sounds a wakeup call that there are many things in our system that are clearly 

broken. And this isn’t a new problem. We have had plenty of warning of the weaknesses of our immigration system that helped lead 

to the September 11 attack. In fact, vulnerabilities in the system, 

for example, have been documented as far back as 1979, when during the Iranian hostage crisis the INS was unable to locate 9,000 

of the estimated 50,000 Iranian students studying in the United 

States. 

Now, this is a much bigger problem than just students because 

overall more than 30 million temporary visitors enter the United 

States, and that number doesn’t take into account the 500 million 

entries at our land borders and ports of entry each year. These are 

people coming into the country, leaving the country, some of whom 

are United States nationals, many of whom are from other countries as well. Actually, two-thirds of these are non–U.S. citizens. 

3

What these numbers show is that without an adequate tracking 

system, our country becomes a sieve, which it is today, creating 

ample opportunities for those who would do us harm to enter and 

to establish their operation without detection. 

What I would like to get from this hearing is new solutions to 

the ongoing problems. One, the porous nature of our borders, along 

with INS’ unreliable recordkeeping, have contributed to the agency’s inability to keep out criminals and terrorists, and certainly 

their inability to track their whereabouts once they are here. 

Secondly, in an era in which terrorists use satellite phones and 

encrypted e-mail, the INS, our Nation’s gatekeeper, is considered 

by many observers to still be in the technological dark ages. The 

agency is still using paper files and archaic computer systems that 

are often non-functioning. They do not communicate with each 

other and they do not integrate well with other law enforcement 

systems. 

Third, about 40 to 50 percent of the estimated 7 to 9 million illegal immigrant population are visa overstayers. These are people 

who enter the United States legally but violate the terms of their 

visas by staying beyond the permitted time. 

Fourth, unlike most countries, the United States does not require 

exit visas—only a firm filled out by the visa-holder that is often not 

entered into an INS database for months, and in some cases a year 

later. 

Fifth, the names of applicants are fed into a lookout system, a 

computerized database of some 5.7 million names fed and reviewed 

by the INS, U.S. Customs and the State Department. But this system is not failsafe. Because the lookout system used by American 

consular offices is based on a name check alone, it is vulnerable to 

evasion, not to mention document fraud and identity theft. An example of that is two of the alleged hijackers, Khalid Almidhar and 

Hawaf Alhazmi, made the watch list only after they gained entry 

to the United States. 

And the watch list has not always helped. Sheik Omar Abdel–

Rahman, the spiritual leader of the men involved in the 1993 

World Trade Center bombing, legally entered the country on a visa, 

although he was already on a watch list of suspected terrorists. He 

was subsequently convicted in a conspiracy to blow up the New 

York World Trade Center. 

Now, what is the conclusion? We are here to examine ways in 

which we can better utilize existing technologies to assist these 

agencies in preventing those who have the intent and who would 

carry out the goal of mass destruction from entering and staying 

in the United States. 

In particular, I am interested in learning more about the feasibility of creating tamper-resistant visas and passports and establishing a non-immigrant tracking system using biometric data to 

verify the identity of persons seeking to enter the United States. 

Along this line, yesterday I met with Larry Ellison, the CEO of 

Oracle. Senator Kyl did, as well. Mr. Ellison has offered—and I 

hope I will have a written statement from him and read that when 

I receive it at a point—well, I do have it. ‘‘Oracle takes seriously 

our responsibility in these difficult times. As we discussed, Oracle 

is prepared to provide, free of charge, the Oracle software licenses 

4

for both testing and production of a complete national identification 

database.’’ Now, what he is saying is that they are prepared to devote some 

1,500 engineers in a very timely way to put together the software 

of a database which could be entirely voluntary that would interrelate with other databases the United States has to form a national database. 

One of the things that I think both Senator Kyl and I have discovered is that the credit industry of our country has the biggest 

database, and that the credit card is a much better identifier than 

anything we have nationally. Even a pilot’s license today is just a 

scrap of paper that the pilot tears out of an overall piece of paper, 

very easily reproduced and certainly not at all fraud- or tamper-resistant. 

So we would like to examine today how these new technologies 

could be used to establish an entry/exit system that could be integrated with the current lookout systems used by the INS, the State 

Department, and Federal law enforcement agencies. 

Finally, we hope our panelists will offer concrete suggestions on 

the steps Congress should take to build the technological infrastructure of our Federal agencies so that they can better protect 

the United States ports of entry and our borders from future terrorist attack. 

I would like particularly to commend my colleague on my right. 

Senator Kyl and I have worked closely on this subcommittee for a 

number of years, for the past 2 or 3 years under his chairmanship, 

and it has been a great pleasure for me. I think his leadership in 

this area has been important and significant, and we look forward 

to working together to craft bipartisan legislation that can come 

out of this committee to solve some of the problems I have just 

mentioned. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Feinstein follows.]

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE

CALIFORNIA

INTRODUCTION

We hold this hearing in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks on the 

United States. Those horrific events have triggered concern about the shortcomings 

of the immigration and visa system. 

Just yesterday, the Department of Justice released information indicating that 13 

of the 19 terrorist hijackers had entered the U.S. legally with valid visas. Of the 

13, three of the hijackers had remained in the U.S. after their visas had expired. 

The INS had no information on 6 of the hijackers. 

Clearly, something tragically went wrong in our immigration system. 

The purpose of this hearing is to determine the extent to which gaps in our visa 

and admissions systems have frustrated our efforts identify and bring to justice the 

perpetrators of the terrorist attacks. More importantly, we would like to determine 

the extent to which these vulnerabilities will expose us to future terrorist attacks. 

Today, I see three areas of vulnerability in our immigration system: 

(1) an unregulated visa waiver program, in which 23 million people arrived with 

little scrutiny in FY 2000 from 29 different countries. 

(2) an unmonitored nonimmigrant visa system, in which 7.1 million tourists, business visitors, foreign students, and temporary workers arrived. To date, the INS 

does not have a reliable tracking system to determine how many of these visitors 

left the country after their visas expired. 

(3) Among the 7.1 million nonimmigrants, 500,000 foreign nationals entered on 

foreign student visas. The foreign student visa system is one of the most under-regulated systems we have today. 

5

I believe most foreign students legitimately come to the U.S. to study and, indeed, 

they provide a great contribution to our institutions of higher learning. 

However, I do have a concern that in the last 10 years, more than 16,000 students 

came from such terrorist supporting states as Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, and Syria. 

Let me give you an example of why this is a problem for me: 

In the early 1990s, officials at six colleges, which of which were in California, 

were convicted of taking bribes, providing counterfeit education documents and 

fraudulently applying for foreign student visas so that more than 100 foreign nationals could gain easy entry in to the U.S. 

The officials from the six colleges were convicted; some served time in jail, others 

paid monetary fines and restitution. It is unclear what steps the INS took to find 

and deport the foreign nationals involved in this scheme. 

There are other examples of the potential for gross misuse of the foreign student 

visa. 

In 1991, the Washington Post reported that the United Nations weapons inspectors in Iraq discovered documents detailing an Iraqi government strategy to send 

students to the United States and other countries to specifically study nuclear-related subjects to develop their own program. One of those students, Samir AI Araji 

(Sa-meer Al A- rah- hee), received his doctorate in nuclear engineering from Michigan State University and then returned to Iraq to head its nuclear weapons program. 

In 1998, the Richmond Times and New York Times did extensive reports on Rihab 

Taha, the mastermind of Saddam Hussein’s germ warfare arsenal. Also known as ‘‘Dr. Germ,’’ Taha studied in England on a student visa. 

England is one of the participating countries in the Visa Waiver program, which 

means if she could have gotten a fraudulent passport from England, she could have 

come and gone without a visa in the United States. 

These instances should have provided a wake-up call that something in our system was clearly broken: 

This is not a new problem. We have had plenty of warning of the serious weaknesses in our immigration system that led to the horrific September 11 attacks. 

In fact, vulnerabilities in the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s monitoring 

system, for example, have been documented as far back as 1979, when during the 

Iranian hostage crisis, the INS was unable to locate 9,000 of an estimated 50,000 

Iranian students studying in the United States. 

Overall, more than 30 million temporary visitors enter the U.S. each year. That 

number does not take into account the 500 million entries at our land borders and 

ports of entries each year. Two thirds of those entrants are non-U.S. citizens. 

What these numbers show is that without an adequate tracking system, our country becomes a sieve, creating ample opportunities for terrorists to enter and establish their operations without detection. 

What I’d like to get from this hearing is new solutions for the following ongoing 

problems: 

(1) The porous nature of our borders along with the INS’s unreliable record keeping, have contributed to the agency’s inability to keep out criminals and terroristsand to track their whereabouts once they are here. 

(2) In an era in which terrorists use satellite phones and encrypted e-mail, the 

INS-our nation’s gatekeeper-is considered by many observers to still be in the technological dark ages. The agency is still using paper files and archaic computer systems that are often non-functioning, do not communicate with each other, and do 

not integrate well with other law enforcement systems. 

(3) About 40 to 50% of the estimated 7 to 9 million illegal immigrant population 

are visa overstayers-people who entered the U.S. legally, but later violated the 

terms of their visas by staying beyond the permitted period of time. 

(4) Unlike most countries, the United States does not require exit visas-only a 

form filled out by the visa holder that is often not entered into an INS database 

for months and, in some cases, a year later. 

(5) The names of applicants are fed into a ‘‘lookout’’ system, a computerized database of some 5.7 million names fed and reviewed by the INS, U.S. Customs and the 

State Department. This system is hardly failsafe. 

Because the look-out system used by American consular offices is based on a 

name check, alone, it is vulnerable to evasion, not to mention document fraud and 

identity theft. 

For example:

Two of the alleged hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Hawaf Alhazmi, made 

the watch list only after they had gained entry into the United States. And 

the watch list has not always helped: Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, a spiritual leader of the men involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, 

6

legally entered the country on a visa, although he was already on the 

‘‘watch list’’ of suspected terrorists. He was subsequently convicted in a conspiracy to blow up the World Trade Center. 

CONCLUSION

We are here today to examine the ways in which existing technologies could assist 

these agencies in preventing those who are intent on carrying out the goal of mass 

destruction from entering and staying in the United States. 

In particular, I would be interested to learn more about the feasibility of creating 

tamper-resistant visas and passports and establishing a nonimmigrant tracking system using biometric data to verify the identity of persons seeking to enter the U. 

S. 

We will also examine how these new technologies could be used to establish an 

entry-exit system that could be integrated with the current look-out systems used 

by the INS, State Department and federal law enforcement agencies. 

Finally, I will ask our panelist to offer concrete suggestions on the steps Congress 

should take to build the technological infrastructures of our federal agencies so that 

they may better protect the U.S. ports of entry and our borders from future terrorist 

attacks. 

As we enter into these discussions today, it is important to recognize that increased technology, alone, is not a substitute for adequate number of personnel, adequate training for that personnel, and a cooperative relationship and spirit among 

the agencies charged with protecting our nation’s borders, as well as our national 

security. 

Today’s hearing will examine the use of technology. Future hearings will examine 

some of the other important steps we can take to achieve these goals. 

I look forward to hearing today’s testimonies.

So, Senator Kyl, if you have some comments. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JON KYL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE 

STATE OF ARIZONA 

Senator KYL. Thank you very much, Senator Feinstein. 

Much has been made of the unity that has existed since September 11, including here in Washington. As Senator Feinstein just 

said, that unity on this subcommittee existed from the very beginning, going back several years ago. We have jointly sponsored legislation, held hearings, made recommendations, and we will continue 

to do so. 

I will tell you that there will not be one iota of difference between the position of the chairman of the subcommittee and my position. We will move together exactly together, and I think we will 

be able to ensure that our colleagues will be with us. 

So a message to the administration and our witnesses here: we 

really appreciate your presence here, but we are going to be offering some ideas that haven’t been implemented in the past by the 

administration, by any administration. And since all of you don’t 

have to take credit or blame for positions of the past, don’t; be willing to think openly about new ideas that may come from the Congress because we are going to be united in what we are recommending. 

I agree with absolutely everything that the chairman just said 

and will just summarize some additional thoughts here. 

Just as the bill that we passed last night is not the answer—I 

think Don Rumsfeld said there is no one silver bullet here in this 

war against terrorists, but there are a lot of individual pieces. Just 

like we see the FBI putting its case together meticulously, taking 

one little bit of data here and another bit of data there and connecting it all up and then finally they know what the threat is, we 

7

too will put together a mosaic of things that will enable us to win 

this war. 

The bill that we passed last night is one step. The proposals that 

Senator Feinstein has made here will be another important step. 

Do they solve everything? No, but they certainly deal with this immigration component. 

Look at the headline in the Washington Post this morning: ‘‘INS 

Stumped on How Some Hijackers Entered the United States.’’ No 

reflection on Mr. Ziglar. Obviously, he had nothing to do with the 

policies that bear on the deficiencies in INS at this moment, but 

obviously we are going to have to fix this problem. 

Senator Feinstein alluded to the statistics, and one question I 

will ask you, Commissioner Ziglar, is do we know anything more 

about the actual status. I think on six of the people there is no 

record of any entry into the country, but I will get to that question 

later. In any event, obviously this cannot continue to be the case 

if we are going to ensure that bad elements are not permitted to 

be guests in the United States. 

Senator Feinstein mentioned three specific things. The visa waiver program; we have clearly got to reform that. The unmonitored 

visa system generally, with no tracking, and so on, and the exit/

entry component of that; we clearly have to fix that. The student 

visa program specifically; we clearly have to have more monitoring 

and reporting on that. 

In addition to that, we have infrastructure needs, and I am sure 

this is music to some of your ears. You will tell us what they are 

and we hopefully will respond by providing you the resources that 

you need, both in terms of personnel—and by the way, this is personnel at the borders, at our immigration offices, our consular offices all around the world—we need more personnel as well as infrastructure. 

We need to develop and use new technology that Senator Feinstein alluded to, including fraud-proof documents. This is an absolute must now. We are not talking about a national I.D. card, but 

we are talking about a method by which the United States can ensure that its laws are enforced with respect to the guests that we 

invite into the country. We are going to have to resolve conflicts 

that currently exist between information systems in the INS and 

the State Department. 

Finally, let me just mention a few other quick questions and then 

I really want to hear from the witnesses. Here are some of the 

questions we are going to need to get some answers to. 

Should INS replace its computer information system at all borders and put in the same system used by the State Department? 

How much would it cost? Should the State Department consider 

using facial recognition biometrics for all visa applicants? Should 

the INS consider using facial biometrics at points of entry? How 

about the role of fingerprint biometrics? What would the cost be to 

do that? 

Should U.S. authorities receive background information on every 

visa-holder before he or she is allowed to exit an airport and enter 

the United States? I mentioned the exit/entry system. What is the 

status there, and how can we get that completed? 

8

On foreign student visas, will the new system be maintained 

jointly by the State Department and INS? Will it have an automated linkage to the educational institutions? Will it require reporting and compliance, and how will this perhaps relate to the H– 1B visa, the employment visa system? Regarding the waiver program, should we restrict participation to countries that only issue 

machine-readable passports? 

Those are just a few of the questions that I think we need to deal 

with here. 

Madam Chairman, I will ask that my full statement be put in 

the record. Let me just close with this comment. Last night, the 

President was asked a question at his news conference by one of 

the reporters. She said, well, you are asking us to support the Government’s efforts here, but this is a war and I am just wondering 

when we are going to have to make some sacrifices in this war. 

Let me add something to what the President said. I don’t think 

it is much of a sacrifice for institutions that benefit from U.S. laws, 

like higher education—I hope there are some of you out here that 

are representing institutions of higher learning. You all benefit 

from these programs. The tuition you charge the foreign students 

really helps your coffers. 

I was dismayed when the first reaction to Senator Feinstein’s 

suggestion that maybe we needed to have a time-out here on these 

foreign student visas was, no, we can’t do that; that will really hurt 

us financially. Well, what do you think has happened to the entire 

United States of America, our economy? Everybody was hurt dramatically by what happened and I don’t think it is too much of a 

sacrifice to at least help us enforce the laws that you are benefitting from. Is that too much to ask? 

We don’t want to terminate these. We don’t even, I suspect, at 

the end of the day, want to have a moratorium, but we are going 

to have an enforceable system. And you will have to help us or else 

there will have to be some kind of limitation. That is the way it 

is going to have to be throughout the rest of this country. 

We are all living under a threat. My family is worried. My 

daughter is worried about her two little kids, and so on, and I will 

be darned if I am going to let them grow up and for decades, like 

we did during the Cold War, lead a life that is a life of fear, under 

constant threat, because they will never know what is going to hit 

them next. 

We have got to win this war, and win it fairly quickly, and that 

means we have got to root out the base of terrorist support. That 

means we have got to protect our homeland. We all have to do that 

and it is not too much of a sacrifice for us to get together and figure out what kind of systems we can put together, not be turf-conscious. 

It took us a long time to develop this INS system and so this has 

got to be the be-all and end-all. Maybe, maybe not. We have got 

to start thinking as a unified people to solve this problem because 

I don’t want to live this way for the rest of my life and I don’t want 

my kids and grandkids to. 

So let’s not think parochially here. Let’s think about what we can 

do to band together and solve the problem. And I just want to say 

again there will not be one iota of difference between Senator FeinVerDate Feb 1 2002 13:52 Aug 19, 2002 Jkt 081248 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\HEARINGS\81248.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
9

stein and me. I hope I haven’t said anything here that she is going 

to disagree with now. But if so, then I agree with her, okay? 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KYL. We are going to work this through together, and we 

have got to work quickly. These reforms are not going to be easy 

or quick. They are going to cost some money, but we are going to 

have to do them as quickly as we can. 

You yourselves answered the question that the President asked 

last night. What can we do? Well, every one of you now are thinking, okay, yes, there is something I can do to help here. Let’s do 

it. Let’s get together and do it and defeat this terrible scourge that 

is threatening us right now. 

I really appreciate again all the witnesses who are here today. 

We will look forward to working with you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Kyl follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. JON KYL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA

Madam Chairwoman, thank you very much for holding this hearing today, one 

month and one day after the tragic events of September 11. I look forward to hearing the testimony of Inspector General Fine, Commissioner Ziglar, Ambassador 

Ryan, and the rest of the witnesses from the private sector—I am hopeful that all 

of these witnesses might shed some needed light on ways to fix our immigration and 

visa processing systems so that terrorists cannot enter or remain in the United 

States in violation of our laws. 

The law enforcement and immigration enforcement provisions of the antiterrorism 

legislation that we are about to pass here in the Congress will provide many of the 

tools needed to weed out and stop terrorism. 

Even with the passage of these provisions, however, the United States will continue to face overwhelming infrastructure and personnel needs at our consular offices abroad, along both our southern and northern border, and in our immigration 

offices throughout the United States. In conjunction with increasing personnel and 

infrastructure, the U.S. must, among other things, deprive terrorists of the ability 

to present altered international documents, and improve the dissemination of information about suspected terrorists to all appropriate agencies. 

So legislative, and administrative, action in the coming months must go beyond 

the scope of the anti-terrorism package. 

With regard to border and immigration personnel, it is encouraging that most everyone now agrees that a lot more personnel are needed. Over the past several 

years, many of us in Congress have worked hard to increase Border Patrol, Customs, and INS personnel. For the saddest of reasons, I hope the commitment to 

dedicate the funds for such personnel is finally there. All relevant agencies must 

also work hard to develop ways to effectively recruit and retain such personnel. 

Such efforts will be tracked by the Congress. With respect to State Department employees, significant increases in consular personnel must be made. 

These personnel, whether they are inspectors, agents, or consular officers, must 

be equipped with the investigatory and security resources to weed out terrorists 

from ever getting into the country, and to stop them from staying here undetected, 

if they do get in. Finally, the many programs that we have, affecting immigration 

and the granting of visas, must be examined and changed, if they actually make 

abuse of the system by terrorists more possible. 

Many questions need to be asked about the procedures in place on the ground. 

We must employ our technology better—or develop new technology—to catch alien 

terrorists:

• Should the INS replace its computer-information system at all borders 

and put in the same system used by the State Department? How much 

would it cost to do this? The current system is not equipped to accept all 

the information available from the State Department about a visa applicant 

or recipient. 

• Should the State Department consider using facial recognition biometrics 

for all visa applicants, whether issued a visa or not, since the State Department requires a photograph for all visa applicants already? Should the INS 

consider using facial feature biometrics at its ports of entry? Are facial bioVerDate Feb 1 2002 13:52 Aug 19, 2002 Jkt 081248 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\81248.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
10

metrics superior to fingerprint biometrics? What would be the cost of implementing either a facial or fingerprint system? 

• Should U.S. authorities receive background information on every visa 

holder before he or she is allowed to exit an airport and enter the United 

States? 

• Where is the INS in its effort to develop the entry-exit system at airports 

and seaports? At land ports?

Many questions also need to be asked about nonimmigrant programs and the Visa 

Waiver Program. We should determine whether, without reform, such programs 

make it easier for terrorists to get here and stay here. 

• Regarding foreign student visas, does the new INS-proposed student 

tracking system reflect concerns raised after the September 11 attack? Will 

the system overcome current deficiencies in processing and tracking? Will 

the new system be jointly maintained by the State Department and the 

INS? Will the new system have an automated linkage to educational institutions, so that they can inform INS when a student drops out or does not 

show up in the first place? Will a quarterly report be required of all educational institutions, including those that accept F, M, and J visas? Could 

other programs, such as the H1–B employment visa program, realistically 

be a part of such a system? 

• Regarding the Visa Waiver Program, should we restrict participation to 

countries that issue only machine-readable passports? How can we be assured that the passport numbers of all Visa Waiver participants are entered into a database by the INS at ports of entry—even when the passport 

is not machine readable? Should the holders of non-machinereadable passports be required to go to ‘‘secondary’’ inspection at all ports?

Obviously, border, immigration, and visa-processing policies are very complex. To 

be sure of the utmost security, and also fairness to law-abiding immigrants, we are 

all going to have to work hard on these problems. 

I am happy to report that a few things that we all knew needed to be done are 

included in the anti-terrorism package that will be passed and sent to the President 

soon. The legislation clarifies that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is authorized 

to share data from its ‘‘wanted lists,’’ and any other information contained in its national crime-information system, with the State Department and the INS. This will 

help the INS and State Department identify suspected terrorists before they come 

to the United States, and, should they gain entry, will help track them down on our 

soil. It also allows the State Department, during a U.S. criminal investigation, to 

give foreign governments information on a case-by-case basis about the issuance or 

refusal to issue a U.S. visa. The anti-terrorism bill also will also clarify and toughen 

U.S. law prohibiting the entry of, and requiring the removal of, individual alien terrorists. In addition, the bill will give the Attorney General a newly designated, and 

reasonable, amount of time during which he may detain an alien believed to be inadmissible or deportable on terrorism grounds. Finally, the bill authorizes $36.8 

million for quick implementation of the INS foreign student tracking system, a program I have long urged be reformed. 

As ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee’s Terrorism Subcommittee, I have 

long suggested, and strongly supported, many of the anti-terrorism and immigration 

initiatives now being advocated by Republicans and Democrats alike. In my sadness 

about the overwhelming and tragic events that took thousands of precious lives, I 

am resolved to push forward on all fronts to fight against terrorism. As I have outlined, changing our immigration and law- enforcement systems will be a complex 

undertaking, but it is absolutely necessary. Necessary, so that justice can be delivered to those who are responsible for the lives lost on September 11. And, so that 

the institutions of government can be reorganized in order that Americans can continue to live their lives in freedom. 

Thank you, I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thanks very much. 

Before I turn to Senator DeWine for an opening comment, I just 

want to respond. I think Senator Kyl and I and Senator DeWine 

and the other members will be on the same page. 

The reason I initially proposed that we take that time-out to get 

our student visa program in shape was because it was very apparent to me, particularly after I reviewed the convictions that took 

place in San Diego, California, that we had a real problem there. 

11

There was a resistance earlier on from schools to participate in providing the kind of information that was necessary. 

The proposal for a 6-month time-out or moratorium or whatever 

you want to call it certainly got their attention. They have come 

in; there have been two meetings with my office. The school association will testify today. I believe they will testify that they want 

to be cooperative, that they are prepared to play a major role in 

providing the State Department, as well as INS, with the necessary 

information and to make bi-quarterly reports. So I think we have 

in the past two weeks made a great deal of progress in that regard. 

Senator DeWine, do you have some comments you want to make? 

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE DEWINE, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF OHIO 

Senator DEWINE. Very briefly, Madam Chairman, I have a full 

statement which I would ask permission to be part of the record. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. So ordered. 

Senator DEWINE. Just briefly, let me thank you very much for 

holding this hearing. I thank our panelists for being here. We look 

forward to their testimony. 

There are so many different aspects of the whole issue of terrorism and the whole issue of our borders, and let me just mention 

at the beginning one of the things that I have been thinking of. 

In the Senate’s anti-terrorism package that we were able to pass 

last night, I have asked the Attorney General, in consultation with 

appropriate agencies, to report back to us, to report back to the 

United States Congress, on how we as a country can use our national biometric systems, such as the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, more commonly known as the IAFIS 

system, which is maintained by the FBI, to better identify a person 

who holds a foreign passport or a visa when that person may be 

wanted in connection with a criminal or intelligence investigation 

in the United States or abroad before the issuance of a visa or their 

entry or exit from the United States. 

Now, Madam Chairman, I recognize that INS technology is outdated and it is insufficient to meet these new demands. I believe 

that we should leverage the substantial investment taxpayers have 

made in the IAFIS system already to go ahead and expand that 

and to create a system of identification and verification that is fully 

integrated with all relevant Federal, State and local agencies, and 

to do that in real-time. 

Currently, IAFIS has more than 48 million images, and exchanges information with almost all Federal, State and local law 

enforcement agencies. I am not saying that this system is perfect, 

but I am saying that we should use all of our available resources 

at our disposal. I think this is a tremendous resource and we need 

to build on that resource. 

The days are long past when we have the luxury, if we ever did, 

of having different departments and different agencies in the Government using different systems. Those days are over and we have 

to build on the best system that we have, and I candidly believe 

that we have to look to the IAFIS system to build what we need 

to help all of us to keep our country more secure. 

12

Madam Chairman, I thank you and I thank Senator Kyl and others who have expressed a real interest in this issue and I look forward to the testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Senator DeWine follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE DEWINE, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

Madam Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing on the ‘‘The Role 

of Technology in Preventing the Entry of Terrorists in the United States.’’ I thank 

the witnesses for coming to testify today as well. 

It seems to me that Congress has to make an important decision here—a decision 

about where to focus our resources. Today, every agency needs more resources to 

confront the challenges that Sept 11 has raised—INS and the State Department 

have the most pressing needs. The questions for these agencies is: Do we focus on 

trying to keep track of aliens we allow into the United States—or do we focus our 

resources on screening those who have asked permission to enter our country? The 

fact is that we have to walk and chew gum at the same time—we must do both. 

We must do a better job of screening aliens who enter the country, while at the 

same time keeping track of when and where those aliens enter and exit, and where 

they are while they are here. 

Let me talk for a moment about the scope of the problem. Last year, the INS performed 529.6 million inspections of individuals who crossed our borders—by land, 

sea, and air. As noted in Commissioner Ziglar’s written testimony, over a half billion 

personal contacts were made with INS inspectors at our ports-of-entry. After deducting American citizens who were inspected, 352 million aliens were inspected in 

2000. A little less than a third of those aliens are permanent residents. That leaves 

255 million inspections of temporary ‘‘non-immigrant’’ aliens who are crossing at 

U.S. ports-of-entry. 

It appears that this is the pool of entries we are searching to find terrorists and 

others who are coming into the United States for illicit purposes. Out of 255 million 

inspections how on earth are our law enforcement and other agencies that are responsible for these individuals’ entry supposed to identify 19 terrorists? 

It’s a vast challenge. But we expect it to be met. Congress expects you to be able 

to identify these people. Moreover, the American people expect the federal agencies 

who are responsible for these individuals to do it. Today we want to know how you 

plan to meet this challenge. 

We know that it can be done—but it can only be done with technology. I would 

like to hear our panelists’ ideas about how it can be done with technology. What 

is your plan for using all available technology to address this problem? 

Let me tell you what I have been thinking. In the Senate’s antiterrorism package, 

I have asked the Attorney general, in consultation with appropriate agencies, to report to Congress on how we can use our national biometric systems, such as the 

Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) maintained by the 

FBI, to better identify a person who holds a foreign passport or a visa and may be 

wanted in connection with a criminal or intelligence investigation in the United 

States or abroad—before the issuance of a visa or their entry—or exit—from the 

United States. 

I recognize that INS technology is outdated and insufficient to meet these new 

demands. We should leverage the substantial investment taxpayers have made-the 

IAFIS system to create a system of identification and verification that is fully integrated with all relevant federal, state, and local agencies—in real-time. Currently, 

IAFIS has more than 48 million images, and exchanges information with almost all 

federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. I am not saying that this system 

is perfect, but I am saying that we should use all of our available resources at our 

disposal. 

Again, thank you for participating today. I am looking forward to hearing the witnesses.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thanks very much, Senator DeWine. 

One of the best sets of written testimony that I have seen in the 

time I have been in the Senate is the first person on the panel I 

am going to introduce, and that is the Inspector General of the 

United States Department of Justice, Mr. Glenn Fine. I would like 

to commend to everybody to read his full statement because it has 

got some very excellent specifics documenting where the systems 

fail today. 

13

Mr. Fine is a Harvard Law graduate. He is a Rhodes Scholar. He 

has worked for the Inspector General’s office since 1995. Before 

joining the Office of Inspector General, he was an attorney specializing in labor and employment law in Washington. From 1986 to 

1989, he served as Assistant U.S. Attorney in Washington, D.C. He 

prosecuted more than 35 criminal jury trials, handled numerous 

grand jury investigations, and argued cases in the District of Columbia and the United States courts of appeals. 

Mr. Fine, welcome to the committee. 

STATEMENT OF GLENN A. FINE, INSPECTOR GENERAL, 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. FINE. Thank you. Madam Chairwoman, Senator Kyl, Senator 

DeWine, members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me 

to appear before the subcommittee. My testimony this morning will 

focus on the work of the Office of the Inspector General that relates 

to the subject of technology and preventing the entry of terrorists 

into the United States. 

Technology, particularly effective and reliable information technology systems, is a critical component in this effort, and nowhere 

are we more in need of effective IT systems than in the INS. Yet, 

the OIG’s extensive work in the INS has revealed significant problems with that agency’s development and implementation of its IT 

systems. 

Two OIG audit reports concluded that the INS could not sufficiently track the status of its IT projects to determine whether 

progress was acceptable, given the amount of time and funds spent. 

We found that estimated completion dates for projects were delayed 

without explanation, costs continued to spiral upward with no justification for how funds were spent, and projects neared completion 

with no assurance for meeting performance and functional requirements. General Accounting Office reviews reached related conclusions about the INS IT systems. 

These problems in managing and implementing technology systems affect the ability of the INS to fulfill its critical mission. Let 

me provide the subcommittee with one example of a specific INS 

system that I discuss in my written statement. 

The INS’ automated biometric identification system, known as 

IDENT, is used in part to identify individuals whom the INS apprehends or comes in contact with. It is an important system that 

scans two fingerprints and a photograph of an alien and compares 

them against records in the IDENT lookout and recidivist databases. 

The INS envisioned that most of its operations, including the 

Border Patrol, investigations, detention and deportation, intelligence and inspections, would benefit from IDENT through its 

quick and accurate identification of individuals. However, an OIG 

inspection raised concerns about the quality of data placed in 

IDENT and INS training of its employees on the system. In a later 

review, the OIG again found problems with IDENT under tragic 

circumstances. 

Rafael Resendez–Ramirez was a Mexican national accused of 

committing several murders in the United States. When local police 

searching for Resendez contacted INS investigators in Houston, 

14

none of the INS investigators placed a lookout for him in IDENT. 

Consequently, when Border Patrol agents apprehended Resendez 

as he attempted to illegally cross the border into New Mexico, 

nothing in IDENT alerted them to the fact that he was wanted for 

murder or had an extensive criminal record. The Border Patrol 

therefore followed its standard policy and voluntarily returned him 

to Mexico. Resendez returned to the United States within days of 

his release and murdered several more people before surrendering. 

A review of the Resendez case showed problems that were indicative of, and partly caused by, larger failings in the design and implementation of this information technology system. We found that 

training on IDENT for INS employees, particularly outside the Border Patrol, was ineffective or nonexistent. INS program offices, 

such as Investigations and Intelligence, viewed IDENT as a Border 

Patrol initiative and were not educated on how it could be useful 

to its mission. Also, IDENT was not, and still is not linked with 

the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, 

which Senator DeWine discussed, and the FBI’s National Crime Information Center 2000 system. 

The Resendez case vividly illustrated the need for sharing of information among Government agencies, and it spurred the FBI and 

the INS to begin to develop an integration plan. That plan is still 

under development. 

In another OIG review, we assessed the INS’ efforts to reduce 

the risks of the visa waiver program. This program permits citizens 

from 29 countries to enter the United States as visitors without 

first obtaining visas or being screened in any way prior to their arrival. 

INS inspectors have, on average, less than one minute to check 

and decide on each applicant. Our review found that INS inspectors did not check all passports of visa waiver applicants against 

the INS computerized lookout system. We also noted that terrorists, criminals and alien smugglers have attempted to gain entry 

into the United States through the visa waiver program. 

INS inspectors told the OIG that terrorists and criminals believed they would receive less scrutiny during the inspection process if they applied under the program. INS officials also told the 

OIG that the theft of passports from visa waiver countries was a 

serious problem. We tested a sample of stolen passports and found 

that almost 10 percent may have been used to successfully enter 

the United States. In addition, we found that 53 percent of the stolen passports in our sample had no lookout record in the INS system. We recommended that the INS take steps to systemically collect information about stolen passports and enter them into the 

lookout system. 

Another OIG review examined the INS’ tracking and identification of non-immigrant visa overstays. As Senator Feinstein discussed, these are visitors who enter the United States legally but 

fail to depart when required. The INS estimates that 40 to 50 percent of the approximately 7 million or more illegal aliens in the 

United States fit into this category. 

Our review found that the principal INS system for tracking visa 

overstays, the Non–Immigrant Information System, was not producing reliable data either in the aggregate or on individuals. We 

15

also found that the INS had no specific enforcement program to 

identify, locate, apprehend and remove overstays, and that using 

the INS data was of little use for locating them. 

Also related to the issue of non-immigrant visa overstays, the 

OIG recently examined INS efforts to meet congressional directives 

to develop an automated entry and exit control system that would 

collect a record for aliens arriving in the United States from an I–

94 card and automatically match these with I–94 departure cards. 

The OIG found that the INS has not properly managed the project. 

Despite having spent $31 million on the system, the INS was operating it at only a few airports and does not have clear evidence 

that it would meet its intended goals. 

Other OIG reviews discussed in my written statement discuss 

problems in the FBI’s information technology systems and the specific case of how two men entered and remained in the United 

States before being arrested on charges of attempting to bomb the 

Brooklyn subway system. 

Technology alone, however, is not sufficient to prevent the entry 

of terrorists into the United States. In February 2000, the OIG 

issued a report that systematically examined the Border Patrol’s efforts to control illegal activity along the northern border. We found 

that nearly 4,000 miles of border between the United States and 

Canada were woefully understaffed. 

The Border Patrol realized this risk but, because of the low numbers of agents assigned to northern Border Patrol sectors, could not 

cover all shifts 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Most Border Patrol 

officials we interviewed believe that around-the-clock coverage was 

the minimum acceptable level of coverage for northern Border Patrol stations. Force multipliers such as cameras, sensors and other 

technology can aid the Border Patrol in its surveillance and interdiction activities, but northern border sectors do not have adequate 

amounts of this equipment. 

In sum, the effective implementation and management of technology is critical to helping prevent terrorists from entering this 

country. Among other recommendations cited in my written statement, we urge the INS and the FBI to ensure that their databases 

share information both with each other and with other Government 

agencies. It is also abundantly clear that more resources need to 

be devoted to the northern border. Technology can help in this effort, but there are too few agents and inspectors along this border. 

We recognize that the issues involved in this problem are complex with no easy solutions and that the task is enormous. Solutions require strategic vision, strong leadership, individual and organizational accountability, and sustained follow-through. Implementation of effective technology needs to be a top priority of the 

INS, the FBI and other Government agencies because it is essential to protecting the integrity of the immigration system and the 

national security. 

That concludes my prepared statement and I would be pleased 

to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fine follows:]

16

STATEMENT OF GLENN A. FINE, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Madame Chairwoman, Senator Kyl, and Members of the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information: 

I. INTRODUCTION

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee on Technology, 

Terrorism, and Government Information to discuss the role of technology in preventing the entry of terrorists into the United States. My testimony this morning 

will focus primarily on programs and related technologies in the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service (INS), including problems in INS information technology systems, the Visa Waiver Program, controlling the northern border, and the potential 

for immigration document fraud. I also will address briefly information technology 

systems in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 

Conducting comprehensive oversight of INS programs, including reviews relating 

to information technology, has been a longstanding priority for the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). We have expended such effort in response to concerns expressed within the Department of Justice (Department) and Congress, as well as 

our own assessment, about how the INS was handling its important and diverse responsibilities. As the INS’s budget and workforce have increased to more than $5 

billion and 33,000 staff, the need for concerted OIG oversight similarly has increased. 

At the outset of my remarks, I want to stress that while the OIG has noted serious deficiencies in INS operations and systems over the years, this should in no way 

diminish the important contributions thousands of INS employees make on a daily 

basis. These employees perform diligently, under very difficult circumstances, and 

their mission is critical to the proper functioning of our government. 

Yet, as this statement will discuss, our reviews of INS programs and their associated information technology systems have revealed significant problems that leave 

gaps in the INS’s attempts to secure the nation’s borders. Over the past decade, the 

OIG has found serious process and management deficiencies in the INS. Many OIG 

reviews of INS programs have questioned the reliability of the agency ’s automated 

information systems and the accuracy of the data produced by those systems. We 

see separate automated systems planned for almost every function in the INS, but 

many of these systems do not ‘‘talk’’ to each other and therefore cannot be used to 

meet other important agency missions. Furthermore, given the INS’s track record 

in acquiring and managing information technology systems, the OIG is concerned 

that the INS will not have the managerial expertise or ability to bring all of its automation initiatives successfully to completion, particularly in a timely and cost-effective fashion. 

I turn now to OIG reviews that relate to information technology problems and immigration issues that affect the INS’s ability to prevent terrorists from entering the 

country. 

II. OIG REVIEWS

A. INS MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS

According to Department of Justice estimates, the INS has spent more than $290 

million on automated systems in fiscal year (FY) 2001 and more than $260 million 

in FY 2000. All told, through fiscal year 2001, the INS planned to spend approximately $2.6 billion on its automation programs. However, two OIG reviews of the 

INS’s management of its automation initiatives found lengthy delays in completing 

many automation programs, unnecessary cost increases, and a significant risk that 

finished projects would fail to meet the agency’s needs. 

A March 1998 OIG audit found that the INS did not adequately monitor its automation programs. We concluded that the INS lacked comprehensive performance 

measures and insufficiently tracked the status of its projects. Consequently, the INS 

could not determine if progress towards the completion of the projects was acceptable. As a result, we stated that the INS faced risks that: (1) completed projects 

would not meet the overall goals of the automation programs; (2) completion of the 

automated projects would be significantly delayed; and (3) unnecessary cost increases would occur. 

In July 1999, the OIG issued a follow-up report which again found that the INS 

was not adequately managing its automation programs. In the 1999 audit, we noted 

that the INS still could not sufficiently track the status of its automation projects 

to determine whether progress was acceptable given the amount of time and funds 

17

already spent. We reported that: (1) estimated completion dates for projects were 

delayed without explanation; (2) costs continued to spiral upward with no justification for how funds were spent; and (3) projects neared completion with no assurance 

for meeting performance and functional requirements. 

We identified three causes for these problems. First, INS managers did not have 

a common base line of automation projects by which to focus their collective efforts. 

In fact, the INS had substantial difficulty providing us with a complete list of their 

automation projects. Second, project information needed for effective management 

and decision-making was not readily available. Third, INS managers did not develop, document, or implement basic management control processes necessary to ensure that projects would be completed on schedule and meet performance and functional requirements. The ultimate cost for the INS’s automation programs was uncertain because actual costs incurred were unreliable and projected cost estimates 

were unsupported. 

Furthermore, we found that the INS had not implemented adequate safeguards 

to ensure the accuracy of existing data that would be used by systems being developed or re-engineered, or the adequacy of future data inputs. As a result, new or 

existing INS systems could contain inaccurate or unreliable data. 

Since these audits, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued reports in August 

2000 and December 2000 that reached related conclusions about the INS’s management of its information technology programs. Those reports concluded that the INS 

does not have an enterprise architecture to ensure that the hundreds of millions of 

dollars it spends each year on new and existing technology will optimally support 

the INS’s mission. The GAO also concluded that the INS did not have adequate 

processes in place to effectively manage its planned and ongoing information technology programs. 

B. THE VISA WAIVER PROGRAM

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 created the Visa Waiver Pilot 

Program (VWPP), which permitted citizens from certain countries to enter the 

United States as visitors without first obtaining visas. The law allowed VWPP visitors to stay in the United States for up to 90 days per visit and required them to 

possess a round trip ticket and waive their rights to appeal immigration officers’ determinations of admissibility or contest any deportation actions. 

In October 2000, the program became permanent and is now known as the Visa 

Waiver Program. Currently, visa requirements are waived for citizens of 29 countries who wish to visit the United States. 

In 1999, the OIG assessed the INS’s efforts to minimize illegal immigration and 

security threats posed by abuse of the VWPP. Because visitors traveling for business 

or pleasure under the VWPP were not required to obtain visas, they were not 

screened in any way prior to their arrival at U.S. ports of entry. Instead, VWPP 

visitors presented their passports to INS inspectors on arrival. The inspectors observed the applicants, examined their passports, and conducted checks against a 

computerized lookout system to decide whether to allow applicants entry into the 

United States. This review by INS inspectors was the principal means of preventing 

illegal entry. INS inspectors had, on average, less than one minute to check and decide on each applicant. 

As a result of our review, we found that INS inspectors did not query all VWPP 

passport numbers against the INS’s computerized lookout system. In addition, our 

inspection noted that terrorists, criminals, and alien smugglers have attempted to 

gain entry into the United States through the VWPP. 

INS inspectors told the OIG that terrorists and criminals believed they would receive less scrutiny during the inspection process if they applied under the VWPP 

and consequently would have a greater chance of entering the United States without being intercepted. In addition, several of these terrorists and criminals had 

criminal records that would have prevented them from obtaining a visa if they were 

required to apply for one. For the Subcommittee’s information, I provide several examples of terrorists and criminals who have attempted entry into this country under 

the VWPP.

• One of the conspirators in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing entered 

the country on a photo-substituted Swedish passport in September 1992. 

When the terrorist arrived at John F. Kennedy International Airport in 

New York City, an INS inspector suspected that his passport had been altered. A search of his luggage revealed instructional materials for making 

bombs. The subject was detained and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for passport fraud. In March 1994, he was convicted for his role in 

the Trade Center bombing and sentenced to 240 years in prison. 

18

• Two Irish VWPP applicants attempted to pass through an INS overseas 

pre-inspection facility in August 1998. INS inspectors questioned both applicants, one of whom admitted that he had served jail time for possession 

of explosives and had been a member of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). 

Irish immigration authorities informed the INS inspectors that this applicant was a current member of the Real IRA—a terrorist group that had 

broken away from the original IRA. INS inspectors felt that there was sufficient evidence to deny entry and both applicants were refused admission to 

the United States. 

• In July 1988, the United Kingdom (U.K.) became the first country to join 

the VWPP. Seventeen months later, the INS’s New York District Office reported a trend in which Nigerian drug couriers were using photo-substituted U.K. passports to facilitate their drug-smuggling activities. An INS 

intelligence report documented the apprehension of four Nigerian drug 

couriers within a four-day period by U.S. Customs officials. Two of the applicants presented photo-substituted passports. The INS report stated that 

‘‘[t]he travel document of choice is an altered British passport.’’

During our review, the INS informed the OIG that the theft of passports from 

VWPP countries was a serious problem. Because these stolen passports are genuine 

documents, their fraudulent use is difficult for INS inspectors to detect. During our 

review, we tested a sample of 1,067 passports stolen from VWPP countries and 

found that almost 10 percent may have been used to successfully enter the United 

States. We also identified problems with the way the INS maintains its lookout system, including its failure to enter information about stolen VWPP passports into the 

lookout database in a timely or accurate manner. As a result, 567 stolen passports 

in our sample of 1,067 (53 percent) had no lookout record in the INS system. Of 

the 500 passport numbers that had lookout records, 112 (22 percent) were not entered accurately. This missing or inaccurate information reduced the effectiveness 

of the lookout system and increased the possibility that inadmissible VWPP applicants could enter the United States. 

C. BORDER PATROL EFFORTS ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER

In February 2000, the OIG issued a report that systematically examined the Border Patrol’s efforts to control illegal activity along the northern border, reviewed 

how the Border Patrol collects and assesses information about illegal activity and 

responds to it, and evaluated the allocation of Border Patrol resources to the northern border. 

The nearly 4,000 miles of border between the United States and Canada are managed by 8 of the Border Patrol’s 21 sectors. As of September 30, 1999, 311 of the 

national total of 8,364 Border Patrol agents (3.7 percent) were assigned to northern 

border sectors. In keeping with the INS’s strategic plan, the Border Patrol deployed 

7,706 Border Patrol agents (92.1 percent of the total) to its nine southwest Border 

Patrol sectors. The remaining 347 agents were assigned to the coastal sectors, headquarters, INS regional offices, and the Border Patrol Academy. Currently, according 

to the INS, there are 334 Border Patrol agents assigned to the northern border. 

Border Patrol sectors on the Canadian border face significant challenges, even 

though the volume of known illegal alien entries is much less than along the Mexican border. The OIG review reported an increase in illegal activity along the northern border, including an increase in alien and drug smuggling. But the INS was unable to assess the level of illegal activity along the northern border, given the limited personnel and equipment resources allotted to its eight northern Border Patrol 

sectors. However, it is clear that the level of illegal activity exceeds the Border Patrol’s capacity to respond. We also found that other factors, such as the detailing 

of agents from the northern to the southwest border and lack of detention space to 

house apprehended aliens, further diluted the Border Patrol’s enforcement capabilities along the northern border. 

We concluded that the number of agents assigned could not adequately patrol the 

entire length of the northern border. Shifts with no Border Patrol coverage left the 

northern border open. INS Intelligence officers also told us that criminals monitor 

the Border Patrol’s radio communications and observe their actions. The criminals 

know the times when the fewest agents are on duty and plan their illegal operations 

accordingly. The Border Patrol realized this risk but, because of the low numbers 

of agents assigned to northern border sectors, it could not cover all shifts 24 hours 

a day, 7 days a week. Most Border Patrol officials we interviewed believed aroundthe-clock coverage was the minimum acceptable level of coverage for northern Border Patrol stations. 

19

‘‘Force-multipliers’’ such as cameras, sensors, and other technology aid the Border 

Patrol in its surveillance and interdiction activities, but we found that northern border sectors do not have adequate amounts of this equipment. For example, at the 

time of our inspection, one northern border sector had identified 65 smuggling corridors along the more than 300 miles of border within its area of responsibility, but 

the sector had only 36 sensors with which to monitor these corridors. 

The Border Patrol’s Strategic Plan, issued in 1994, does not address the northern 

border until the plan’s fourth and final phase. Phase I of the Strategic Plan was 

designed to control the San Diego and El Paso Corridors; Phase II to control South 

Texas and Tucson corridors; Phase III to control the remainder of the southwest 

border; and Phase IV to control the rest of the borders, including the northern border. At the time of our inspection in 2000, the Border Patrol was in Phase II of its 

strategic plan, and no date had been set for implementation of Phase IV. In addition, the strategic plan did not articulate the strategies that the Border Patrol 

would eventually use to control the northern border once it has achieved control of 

the southwest border. 

The OIG recommended that the INS Commissioner outline the approach the Border Patrol would take to secure the northern border, including determining the minimum number of Border Patrol agents required to address existing gaps in coverage, 

determining the amount of intelligence resources needed to more accurately assess 

the level of illegal activity, and identifying and implementing accurate data collection methods to support decisions about personnel and equipment. INS eventually 

wrote a strategic plan regarding the northern border, but we understand that it has 

not been implemented. We also recommended that the Commissioner evaluate 

whether there was a continuing need to detail Border Patrol agents out of northern 

sectors. 

D. NONIMMIGRANT OVERSTAYS

The INS estimates the number of illegal aliens in the United States at 5 million 

to 6 million, while others estimate the number to be even higher. A common perception about illegal aliens is that the vast majority enter the United States by surreptitiously crossing our land borders, primarily from Mexico. In fact, the INS estimates that approximately 40 to 50 percent of the illegal alien population entered 

the United States legally as temporary visitors but simply failed to depart when required. The INS refers to these illegal aliens as nonimmigrant ‘‘overstays.’’ More 

than 90 percent of overstays are tourists or business visitors, but overstays also include students and temporary workers. 

In a 1997 inspection, the OIG found that the principal INS record-keeping system 

for tracking nonimmigrant overstays, the Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS), 

does not produce reliable data, either in the aggregate or on individual nonimmigrants. Normally, passengers arriving in the United States fill out an I–94 

form and present it to the INS inspector upon arrival. The inspector collects the arrival portion of the form and returns the departure portion to the passenger. The 

arrival portion is sent to an INS contractor, who inputs the data into NIIS. When 

the person leaves the United States, the airlines are supposed to collect the departure portion of the I–94 form and provide it to the INS for input into NIIS. The 

data is then matched by NIIS to identify nonimmigrant overstays. 

We found that the NIIS data is incomplete and unreliable due to missing departure records and errors in processing of the records. NIIS does not contain departure 

records for a large number of aliens, most of whom the INS assumes have left the 

United States. The INS believes that unrecorded departures result from airlines 

failing to collect departure forms, from aliens departing through land borders, from 

data entry errors, from records being lost through electronic transmission or tapeloading problems, or from the failure of the system to match arrival and departure 

records. 

We also found that the INS had no specific enforcement program to identify, locate, apprehend, and remove nonimmigrant overstays, and we concluded that NIIS 

data would be of little use for locating aliens. 

E. THE INS’S AUTOMATED I–94 SYSTEM

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 directed the Attorney General to develop an automated entry and exit control system 

that would collect a record for every alien departing the United States and automatically match these departure records with the record of the alien’s arrival. This 

proposal was designed to replace the manual system of collecting I–94 cards and enable the INS, through on-line searching procedures, to identify lawfully admitted 

nonimmigrants who remain in the United Sates beyond the period authorized. In 

20

2000, however, Congress extended the deadline for implementing the system for airports and sea border ports of entry until December 31, 2003, and for high-traffic 

land border ports of entry until December 31, 2004. 

In response to this congressional requirement, the INS introduced a pilot system 

in 1997 to automate the processing of air passenger I–94 forms. This automated I– 94 system captures arrival and departure data electronically and uploads non-U.S. 

citizen data to the INS’s NIIS. 

This summer, the OIG completed an audit of the design and implementation of 

the automated I–94 system and found that the INS has not properly managed the project. Despite having spent $31.2 million on the system from FY 1996 to FY 2000, 

the INS: (1) does not have clear evidence that the system meets its intended goals; 

(2) has won the cooperation of only two airlines; (3) is operating the system at only 

a few airports; and (4) is in the process of modifying the system. INS officials estimated that an additional $57 million would be needed for FY 2001 through FY 2005 

to complete the system. These projections include development, equipment, and operation and maintenance costs. 

As a result of our concerns, we made a series of recommendations to help ensure 

that the INS rigorously analyzes the costs, benefits, risks, and performance measures of the automated I–94 System before proceeding with further expenditures. 

F. AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (IDENT)

In 1989, the INS began to develop an automated biometric identification system 

to identify quickly individuals who are apprehended or have come into contact with 

the INS. Biometrics are biological measurements unique to each person, such as fingerprints, hand geometry, facial patterns, retinal patterns, or other characteristics, 

that are used to identify individuals. Fingerprints are the most common biometric 

used by law enforcement agencies. Historically, without a biometric system, the INS 

had to rely upon the names provided by aliens who were apprehended when checking against their databases or other records. But aliens often used false names or 

different names during different apprehensions. Also, many persons have similar 

names, and spelling errors can result in problems identifying individuals accurately. 

After several studies, in 1994 the INS began implementing the Automatic Biometric Identification System, called IDENT. IDENT was first deployed in the San Diego 

Border Patrol Sector and subsequently throughout the southwest border. IDENT 

workstations consist of a personal computer, camera, and a single-fingerprint scanner. During enrollment of individuals into IDENT, INS agents scan an individual’s 

two fingerprints, take the individual’s photograph, and enter basic apprehension information about the individual into the automated system. When this information 

is saved, IDENT matches the fingerprints of the individual against the corresponding fingerprints of all individuals in two central IDENT databases, the lookout database and the recidivist database. 

In the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Congress directed the INS to expand the use of IDENT to ‘‘apply to illegal or criminal 

aliens apprehended Nationwide.’’ INS officials envisioned that most of the agency’s 

programs and operations—including the Border Patrol, Investigations, Detention 

and Deportation, Intelligence, Inspections, Benefits Adjudication, and the INS Service Centers—would benefit from the IDENT system through its quick identification 

of individuals and its ability to obtain information about them from previous encounters with the INS, including any criminal history. 

In 1998, the OIG evaluated the INS’s implementation of IDENT and found that 

the INS was enrolling less than two-thirds of the aliens apprehended along the U.S.-

Mexico border into the IDENT system. In addition, the INS was entering the fingerprints in the IDENT lookout database of only 41 percent of the aliens deported and 

excluded in FY 1996; of these, only 24 percent had accompanying photographs even 

though the INS relies on photographs to confirm identification. We found virtually 

no controls in place to ensure the quality of data entered into the IDENT lookout 

database. As a result, we found duplicate records and invalid data. We also raised 

concerns that the INS had not provided sufficient training to its employees on the 

use of IDENT. These failures hampered the INS’s ability to make consistent and 

effective use of IDENT. 

G. THE RAFAEL RESENDEZ-RAMIREZ CASE AND THE OPERATION OF IDENT

In March 2000, the OIG issued another review that implicated the IDENT system 

in tragic circumstances. The OIG examined how the INS handled its encounters 

with Rafael Resendez-Ramirez (Resendez), a Mexican national accused of committing several murders in the United States. Resendez was known as ‘‘the railway killer’’ because he allegedly traveled around the United States by freight train and comVerDate Feb 1 2002 13:52 Aug 19, 2002 Jkt 081248 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\81248.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
21

mitted murders near railroad lines. In early 1999, Texas police obtained a warrant 

for Resendez’s arrest in connection with a brutal murder in Houston, Texas. The police mounted an extensive search to find Resendez and contacted several INS investigators in Houston seeking assistance in the search for him. However, none of those 

INS investigators placed a lookout notice‘ for Resendez in IDENT. Instead, the INS 

investigators referred the police to other agencies or databases. 

Consequently, when Border Patrol agents apprehended Resendez on June 1, 1999, 

as he attempted to illegally cross the border into New Mexico, nothing in IDENT 

alerted them to the fact that Resendez was wanted for murder or had an extensive 

criminal record. As a result, the Border Patrol followed its standard policy and voluntarily returned Resendez to Mexico. He returned to the United States within days 

of his release and murdered several more people before surrendering on July 13, 

1999. 

The OIG review concluded that the failings by the INS employees who did not 

place a lookout for Resendez in IDENT were indicative of and partly caused by larger failings in the INS’ s design and implementation of IDENT. We found that the 

training that was given to INS employees on IDENT, particularly outside the Border Patrol, was ineffective or non-existent. In the 1998 OIG report, we had noted 

problems with IDENT training and recommended that the INS develop and implement a strategy for sufficiently training INS personnel using IDENT. Unfortunately, 

the INS largely rejected this recommendation, claiming that its IDENT training was 

adequate. We found in the Resendez review that INS program offices, such as Investigations and Intelligence, viewed IDENT as a Border Patrol initiative and were not 

educated on how IDENT could be useful to their mission. 

When we interviewed INS employees in various offices involved with the 

Resendez case, we found that their knowledge of IDENT was severely lacking. The 

INS investigators who were contacted by police searching for Resendez did not think 

of IDENT, even when they were asked to place a lookout in INS databases for 

Resendez. Although the INS had distributed a lookout policy, it provided no training 

on the policy and did little to ensure that the policy was understood or read. 

IDENT was not, and still is not, linked with FBI databases. The INS’s IDENT 

system and the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System 

(IAFIS) and the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) 2000 system were developed separately and along different time lines. Although the INS and the FBI 

periodically discussed integration of their systems as they were being developed, 

there was never a sustained effort to achieve that goal and no agreement on integration was reached. We were told that the INS and the FBI made little effort to understand the operational requirements of the other agency. Each agency focused on 

meeting its own requirements and did not pursue integration. As a result, when the 

FBI finally deployed IAFIS and NCIC 2000 in July 1999, the FBI fingerprint systems were not linked to IDENT. 

The Resendez case vividly illustrated the need for integration of the INS and FBI 

systems and spurred the FBI and the INS to develop an integration plan. The plan 

required studies to help determine the feasibility of integration of the systems, 

which initially would allow the fingerprints of aliens apprehended by the INS to be 

searched against a subset of the FBI’s Criminal Master File and eventually against 

the entire master file. However, an integration plan is still in the process of being 

developed and may take years to implement fully. 

H. THE OIG’S ‘‘BOMBS IN BROOKLYN’’ REPORT

In a report issued in March 1998, the OIG examined how two individuals, Gazi 

Ibrahim Abu Mezer and Lafi Khalil, entered and remained in the United States before their July 1997 apprehension in Brooklyn for allegedly planning to bomb the 

New York City subway system. Mezer was subsequently convicted and sentenced to 

life imprisonment. Khalil was acquitted of charges stemming from the bombing plot 

but found guilty of immigration violations. 

In our report, we described how both men were able to enter the United States 

and remain here. Khalil, who had a Jordanian passport, applied to the U.S. Consular Office in Jerusalem for a visa to travel through the United States en route 

to Ecuador. The consular official gave him a 29-day, C–1 transit visa after a threeminute interview. When Khalil arrived in New York on December 7, 1996, an immigration inspector mistakenly granted him a 6-month, B–2 tourist visa. He overstayed that visa and was arrested in Brooklyn, along with Mezer, in July 1997. 

Mezer, who claimed Jordanian nationality, received a visa from the Canadian Embassy in Israel to study in Canada. Shortly after arriving in Canada in September 

1993, he applied for convention status, which is similar to political asylum in the 

22

United States, based on his claimed fear of persecution in Israel. Mezer later admitted that he had traveled to Canada with the intent to reach the United States. 

In 1996, Mezer was detained by the Border Patrol twice while attempting to cross 

the border into Washington State. Each time the Border Patrol voluntarily returned 

him to Canada. In January 1997, the Border Patrol apprehended Mezer in Washington a third time and initiated formal deportation proceedings. Mezer then filed 

an application for political asylum in the United States and was later released on 

a $5,000 bond. In his asylum application, Mezer claimed that Israeli authorities had 

persecuted him because they wrongly believed he was a member of Hamas. The immigration court requested comments from the State Department about Mezer’s asylum application, and the State Department returned the application with a sticker 

indicating that it did not have specific information on Mezer. Mezer’s attorney later 

withdrew the asylum application, stating that Mezer had returned to Canada. 

Mezer was arrested shortly thereafter in Brooklyn for plotting to bomb the subway 

system. 

During our review, we did not find any information that Mezer was a known terrorist. However, we found systemic problems that were revealed by his case. Our 

review found that Mezer had entered and remained in Canada despite two criminal 

convictions there, which highlighted the ease of entry into Canada and the difficulty 

of controlling illegal immigration from Canada into the United States. We also noted 

the inadequacy of Border Patrol resources to address illegal immigration along the 

northern border. In addition, Mezer’s case reflected confusion between U.S. government agencies as to which agency would conduct a check for information on whether 

an asylum applicant was a terrorist. We recommended that the INS and the State 

Department coordinate more closely on accessing and sharing information that 

would suggest a detained alien or asylum applicant may be a terrorist. 

I. FBI SYSTEMS

Findings from a July 1999 OIG report that examined aspects of the FBI’s com- puter systems are particularly relevant in light of the ongoing terrorism investigations. In most criminal investigations—and certainly in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks—the FBI must be able to rapidly identify and disseminate pertinent intelligence information to the law enforcement community. Failure to capitalize on leads in its possession can delay or seriously impede an investigation. 

In our 1999 review, the OIG examined why classified intelligence information pertaining to the Department’s Campaign Finance Task Force investigation was not appropriately disseminated within the FBI and the Department and subsequently to 

congressional oversight committees. The OIG found that a series of problems, including deficiencies in the use and maintenance of the FBI’s computer database systems, ultimately contributed to this failure. 

A key feature of the FBI’s Automated Case Support (ACS) system—the agency’s primary case management database that contains leads and other FBI documents—

is a user’s ability to retrieve information regarding particular individuals, including 

whether they have been the subjects of other investigations. However, we found that 

FBI agents often did not enter important information into the database and that 

agents often did not conduct appropriate searches for information using the database. The end result was that the FBI could not be confident that a search for information in the ACS databases would, in fact, provide all pertinent information in the 

FBI’s possession. In the Campaign Finance investigation, this meant that many of 

the documents that were later discovered regarding two key subjects of the Task 

Force investigation could not have been found using the FBI’s databases. We found 

that the FBI’s information management problems were caused by a variety of factors, including inappropriate policies and insufficient training, and we made recommendations to address both of these issues. 

J. DOCUMENT FRAUD

While the focus of today’s hearing is on technology’s role in helping prevent the 

entry of terrorists into the United States, it is important to recognize that even if 

the INS or other government agencies had foolproof systems—which they do not—

these systems can be defeated by document fraud. For example, visa fraud can allow 

terrorists and others to illegally enter the country. There is little hard data, however, to judge the magnitude of such fraud. Common types of nonimmigrant visa 

fraud or fraud include:

1) a person uses fraudulent documents to obtain a legitimate visa; 

2) a person obtains a fraudulent visa (for example, an individual can attempt to use the passport and visa of a person who has similar looks and 

biographical characteristics or can purchase an altered document); or 

23

3) an individual may not meet the spirit or intent of the specific visa program. 

Historically, the OIG has played an important role in attempting to combat one 

aspect of immigration fraud. The OIG’s Investigations Division has spent significant 

resources investigating immigration document-related corruption in the INS. It is 

important to stress that corruption by a very few INS employees should not taint 

the other hardworking, honest employees of the INS who faithfully perform their 

duties. But any such criminal conduct can affect the integrity of our lawful immigration system and, ultimately, our national security by potentially allowing criminals 

or terrorists to enter the country through corrupt means. 

Moreover, in several reviews, the OIG has found deficient INS business practices 

that could open the agency to document fraud. We have found that the INS does 

not do a good job of safeguarding the tools used to create official documents, such 

as official certificates, INS authorizing stamps, and special ink. In addition, we have 

found that there is easy access to INS computers in order to change an entry, to 

order the issuance of an INS card or benefit, or to erase a disqualifying entry from 

an applicant’s history. Computer passwords are shared and systems are unable to 

create an audit trail necessary to identify the users who accessed and amended a 

file. These deficiencies make it easier to make false computer entries that could result in the issuance of seemingly genuine INS documents. 

As the INS and State Department apply greater scrutiny in adjudicating applications for nonimmigrant visas, the OIG is concerned about an increased risk of organized criminal or terrorist groups attempting to gain entry into this country by corrupting INS employees. 

For the Subcommittee’s information, I highlight several examples of fraud and 

bribery investigations worked by the OIG that involve the use of INS documents to 

improperly enter the country:

• Two INS immigration inspectors and two civilians were arrested on 

charges of conspiracy; transporting undocumented aliens; fraud and misuse 

of visas, permits, and other documents; and bribery. The investigation revealed that the INS employees and civilians assisted foreign nationals in 

entering the United States illegally by selling INS documents for $300—

$500. The majority of aliens entered the United States through the INS employees’ inspection lanes at the Brownsville, Texas, Port of Entry using the 

documents. 

• A retired INS supervisory district adjudications officer in San Jose, California, a civilian immigration consultant, and a businessman each received 

prison sentences stemming from an extensive fraud scheme involving immigration documents. The investigation developed evidence that the adjudications officer, while working for the INS, accepted approximately $400,000 

in bribes from a civilian immigration consultant and the businessman, his 

wife, and his sister-in-law to approve applications for permanent residency 

for at least 275 of their clients. The aliens entered the United States on 

nonimmigrant visas and the corrupt INS employee created false records in 

INS databases indicating that they had changed their status from ‘‘nonimmigrant’’ to ‘‘immigrant’’ (i.e., permanent resident). 

• An INS immigration inspector assigned to the San Francisco International Airport was sentenced to one year in prison after pleading guilty 

to charges of bribery, fraud, and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents. A joint investigation by the OIG and the INS revealed that the immigration inspector stole two INS immigration stamps and two bottles of 

security ink and agreed to sell the items to confidential informants for 

$85,000. One of my concerns about this case is the fact that the INS employee was willing to sell a middleman the INS stamps and security ink 

without any knowledge as to the identity of intended recipient of these 

items. 

• An INS supervisory asylum officer in New York was convicted at trial on 

21 counts of bribery and obstruction of justice and was sentenced to 21 

months’ incarceration. A joint investigation by the OIG and the FBI revealed that the supervisory asylum officer altered hundreds of decisions in 

the INS’ computer systems causing the original assessments written by asylum officers to change from a court referral to a grant of political asylum. 

Albanian and Yugoslavian nationals paid several middlemen $1,000 to 

$4,000 for each political asylum decision fraudulently granted by the INS 

supervisory asylum officer. Four middlemen and four Albanian and Yugoslavian nationals were arrested on charges of bribery, conspiracy, and document fraud. 

24

• An INS assistant district director for examinations in New Jersey was 

convicted at trial and sentenced to 41 months’ incarceration for document 

fraud and other charges. A joint OIG/FBI investigation disclosed that Lebanese nationals in the Boston area were able to obtain genuine INS advance 

parole documents through a middleman with an inside connection at an 

INS district office. The middleman fled the United States after being indicted and was a fugitive for one year. Upon his return to this country, he 

cooperated with the government, pleaded guilty, and identified the assistant district director as his inside connection. 

• An INS immigration inspector assigned to the San Ysidro Port of Entry 

in southern California was sentenced to more than 12 years in prison after 

a federal jury convicted him for conducting a criminal enterprise through 

a pattern of racketeering activity, alien smuggling, and importation of controlled substances. An investigation by the San Diego Border Corruption 

Task Force developed evidence that the immigration inspector used his position in the INS to allow multiple loads of aliens and 3,500 pounds of marijuana to cross the border without proper inspection in exchange for approximately $350,000. 

III. CONCLUSION

The issue of technology is critical to preventing terrorists from entering this country. From our past work, we have found that the INS has not managed its diverse 

information technology systems well, and that its systems do not do all that they 

should to help INS employees fulfill their critical mission. The OIG believes that the 

INS needs to more stringently manage and establish priorities for the development 

of its systems rather than spend enormous resources and effort to develop so many 

systems for so many different purposes. 

Among other recommendations, based on our work we urge the INS and the FBI 

to ensure that their databases share information, both with each other and with 

other government agencies. 

It is also abundantly clear that more resources need to be devoted to the northern 

border. Technology such as cameras and sensors can help in this effort, but there 

are too few agents and inspectors along the northern border. 

The INS also must improve its tracking of nonimmigrant visa overstays. The current system for identifying overstays—manual I–94 cards inputted into the NIIS 

database—does not produce reliable or accurate information, either as a whole or 

on individual overstays, and the automated I–94 project has not worked. 

We recognize that these are complex issues with no easy solutions, and that the 

task is enormous. It requires strategic vision, strong leadership, individual and organizational accountability, and sustained follow-through. This effort needs to be a 

top priority of the INS and other agencies, because effective use of technology is essential to protecting the integrity of the immigration system and the national security. 

This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thanks very much, Mr. Fine. 

We will proceed along. I would like to introduce James Ziglar, 

who is Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. He was confirmed to this post after distinguished service as the 

Senate Sergeant–At–Arms, where he managed a staff of 750 and 

a budget of $120 million. Today, he oversees one of the largest Federal agencies, with a staff of more than 34,000 employees and a 

budget in excess of $4 billion. 

We welcome you, Mr. Ziglar. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES W. ZIGLAR, COMMISSIONER, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF 

JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. ZIGLAR. Madam Chairwoman and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to come today to discuss 

technology in terms of how we use that and employ that in our 

fight against terrorism. 

25

I must add that I am always pleased to be back in the Senate. 

It is like home, and I am grateful for that opportunity to serve as 

your Sergeant at Arms for almost three years. 

When I started this job two months ago, I knew I had a big challenge in front of me. Never would I have thought that things would 

have turned so dramatically. The goals that the President set for 

me and that the Senate endorsed and many of you I talked to during my confirmation process—and you set some other goals for me, 

also—those goals were threefold: first, to restructure the INS in a 

way that it would be better focused on its two missions. One is enforcement, the other one is service. 

The second goal was to modernize the management structure 

and the processes at the INS in a way that would allow it to 

achieve those two goals of enforcement and service. 

The third was—and this was clearly talked about at great 

length—to modernize, synchronize and rationalize the information 

technology systems at the INS in a way that, again, we could carry 

out our missions of enforcement and service. 

Madam Chairwoman, I can tell you that those goals have not 

changed as a result of September 11, and the reason that they 

haven’t changed is because an effective and an efficient INS is one 

of the ways, along with other Government agencies, to protect the 

American people against the horror that we experience on September 11. 

Madam Chairwoman, I can tell you, based upon what I have 

learned in two months, that the INS is a willing, enthusiastic and 

cooperative partner in the fight against terrorism. I am firmly convinced that the INS has the will, it has the determination, and we 

have the human resources—we need more of them, but we have 

the human resources to make the changes that we need to make. 

And we are moving rapidly to make those changes even as we 

speak, and I would like to talk a little bit about some of the things 

we are doing. 

My friend, Glenn Fine, gave you a retrospective view of the INS. 

I want to give you a prospective view and I want to give you a view 

of what we are doing today and how we are addressing some of 

these problems because I think—and I am deviating from notes in 

front of me—there is an awful lot of criticism that is absolutely justified toward the INS. Some of the criticism that is leveled at it is 

not justified, based upon my review of this institution, and I think 

we need to step back and look at what it is doing right going forward and figure out exactly how we do integrate all of these agencies and this information in an appropriate way. 

Just for your information, very shortly I will be coming up here 

and providing you with a draft of a reorganization, restructuring 

plan for the INS that the Attorney General has personally approved and that is in the final stages of approval at OMB. When 

we are finished with it—and it is substantial and it is significant, 

and we have continued to develop it notwithstanding the events of 

September. When you see it, I think you are going to understand 

that we are serious about making changes at the organization, and 

we need your help on that. 

We are at this very moment, and well before September 11, aggressively in the position of developing an information technology 

26

enterprise architecture based upon the recommendations and the 

guidance and the current help from the General Accounting Office. 

We are hard at work with both private contractors and our people 

inside at developing a platform so that our technology, and our information technology especially, is integrated, the many parts of 

the INS, not only integrated at the INS, but we will also be integrated with other Federal organizations that we have to interact 

with. We are building that platform, we are designing that platform. 

At the same time, we are not sitting still in terms of developing 

our systems. We have an investment review process there that is 

using what we call interim technology architecture, and it is an architecture that allows us to build pieces of this system that will fit 

on that enterprise architecture platform that is being developed, 

and will be consistent with it. So we are moving ahead even as we 

are developing the baseline projects that we are working on here. 

Madam Chairman, with your support, we are moving ahead and 

will move ahead—and I know we are going to have your support 

on this—with the SEVIS system, and that is the student tracking 

system which was also known as the CIPRIS system. 

As you know, and as Senator Kyl pointed out and as you pointed 

out, the development of a student tracking system has been the 

subject of much concern, opposition and other things particularly 

from the academic establishment, and frankly from Congress, fighting about the fees and how they are allocated and how they are collected and that sort of thing. Mysteriously, that opposition seems 

to have now disappeared since September 11 and we are prepared 

to move ahead, but we need your support. 

Let me make one point about the development and deployment 

of the SEVIS system. As the statute is now, that system has to be 

funded out of the fees collected. So we have to go to the exam fee 

account that we have and fund it as those fees come in. That obviously means that we can only fund what we have got money to 

fund. 

We need appropriations up front to develop that system. If we 

have appropriations to support it, I think we can have that system 

up and running in advance of the deadline that you have given us, 

which is December of 2002, January of 2003. I believe that we can 

get that done and I think we can have an effective system in place, 

but we need your help. 

Let me talk to you a little bit about something else that we are 

doing at the INS that is very important, and it addresses some of 

the very issues that you talked about in your opening statements, 

all of you did, and that is that we have lots of different systems, 

we have lots of different information databases at the INS and they 

are in stovepipe form. That is true; no arguing about that. 

One of the legitimate criticisms has been that we have information here and it is needed there, but there is no way of getting it 

there. That is true, but I am going to tell you that is not going to 

be true for long and it is not as true today as it was yesterday or 

the day before, because we are putting in place and have put in 

place something called the ENFORCE system. 

The ENFORCE system is a general database, if you will, where 

all of the other databases from the INS sources will go into and are 

27

going into, not all of them. We are putting the modules in as we 

speak. It also is designed to reach out to the FBI and the CIA and 

other sources of information, the Department of State, and bring 

their information into one place. 

What we have also done is we have taken that and fully integrated the ENFORCE system with the IDENT system. Now, people 

are confused sometimes about what IDENT is. IDENT is like 

IAFIS; it is an identification system. It is not a database system 

of information about people. It is simply a system that tells you is 

this person who we think this person is by use of fingerprints. 

So what we have done is integrate our fingerprint I.D. system 

with, if you will, a name and date of birth system so that once we 

figure out who this person is biometrically, then we can access the 

information, which is the way it always works. IAFIS is an identification system and it acts as NCIC. 

Well, we have integrated those and we are now putting in these 

stovepipes, if you will, of other information into the ENFORCE system. In a very short time, we will be rolling out the first transitional work station that ultimately will integrate IDENT and 

IAFIS. 

Senator DeWine, I know you and I have talked about this on occasion. It will integrate IDENT and IAFIS, two identification systems, so that when we have somebody come forward we have information on who that person is either from the FBI or from our files, 

but it is integrated. Then we will access the ENFORCE system, 

which is the database which draws not only from our databases internally but from the databases outside. 

We have not been standing still at the INS in terms of developing these systems, and this isn’t something that happened starting on September 11. This is something that was happening before 

September 11 and it was happening before I got there. When I got 

there, I came with the same assumption that we weren’t doing anything and that we didn’t care and all of the stuff I had been hearing. 

I have done a lot of due diligence in two months and I am going 

to tell you there are lots of things that we need to change in this 

organization. But the idea that this organization is sitting around 

and doesn’t care and hasn’t been approaching these problems is not 

true; it is not true. We need to do a lot of things a lot better, but 

it is not true that we are not. We are doing that. 

We are also moving forward aggressively to implement the entry/

exit system. We are going to use the IBIS system, which we share 

with the Department of State and others, as our baseline for the 

entry/exit system. 

Now, let me make one point, Madam Chairwoman, that you 

made, and that is that we have over 300 million non–U.S. citizens 

coming into this country every year. Two hundred-plus million of 

those come in through land borders. It is real easy for us to develop 

an entry/exit system coming through airports and seaports. I say 

easy. Nothing is real easy in the technology area, but it is easier. 

That is something that we are developing and we are going to use 

advance passenger information that we will put into the IBIS system and that sort of thing. 

28

But working with the land borders is a much more difficult 

thing, particularly when you have land borders like Canada where 

have a lot of people going back and forth, and how you track them 

and yet not create enormous backups. So that is an issue that is 

going to have to be dealt with at a policy level. Systematically, we 

can do that. Policy-wise, that is a different issue, how we do that 

and balance the interests of commerce and the interests of security. 

Madam Chairwoman, with your support we can do a number of 

things. We can complete the deployment of the border crossing card 

system, which we need money for. We can complete the deployment 

of the IDENT system, which the IG has mentioned is a good system. The failure in the IDENT system, and particularly in the 

Resendez case that he mentioned, was not a failure of the technology. It was a f failure of INS to train its people and to have 

those people understand that they need to put information into the 

system. 

The IG testified yesterday with me and he said the IDENT system needs to be fully deployed. There is a moratorium by Congress, 

as you may know, on any further deployment. We have not deployed any more work stations in IDENT in two years. As a result 

of the Resendez case, there is a moratorium. We have 1,100 other 

places that we can deploy that system, but we need that moratorium lifted. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Could you stop for a minute? 

Mr. ZIGLAR. Yes, ma’am. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. You said a moratorium on deployment of 

IDENT? 

Mr. ZIGLAR. Of the IDENT system, yes, ma’am. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Could you explain what you mean by that? 

Mr. ZIGLAR. In the appropriations process, the Congress has prohibited us from installing any more IDENT machines at any more 

ports of entry, and it has been on there two years. The first year, 

it was because of the Resendez case. The second year that it has 

been in effect was because until we had the IAFIS and the IDENT 

system integrated, you folks didn’t want us to do any more. 

We need to deploy 1,100 more work stations at our ports of entry 

so that our people have access to this, and not only at the ports 

of entry but also at our service centers and other places where we 

interview people so we can identify who these people are. We need 

that help. 

One last thing I would like to mention, Madam Chairwoman, is 

something that Ambassador Ryan and I—by the way, we have 

worked together extremely cooperatively. Ambassador Ryan is 

doing a great job at the Department of State. We arrived yesterday 

at an agreement that we are going to deploy what is called the consolidated consular database that the Department of State has developed. 

What the Department of State does is it now has a database 

where, when they have an application for a visa, all that information goes in there and they take a picture of this person. That picture is a digitized picture that shows up on the visa, but it is also 

in an electronic database. So when they issue a visa, say, in Rome, 

when that person shows up at Newark Airport today—and that is 

the only place it has been deployed on a test basis—when they 

29

show up at Newark Airport, if they go into secondary especially, we 

can pull up on a screen the information from the visa and the person’s picture to identify whether that is a fraudulent visa or whether that is the person. 

It has worked well. It has been an experimental process that has 

gone on between INS and DOS. As of yesterday, Ambassador Ryan 

and I have agreed that we are going to deploy that, and we at INS 

believe that we can get this done in three months at all of our ports 

of entry and we are moving ahead on it. It is a done deal we start 

today. 

Madam Chairman, I know I have gone way over my time. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. If you could wrap it up, we will move on 

and then have questions. 

Mr. ZIGLAR. I just want you to know and I want this subcommittee to know and I want the American people to know that 

the INS is moving forward, and we were moving forward before 

September 11 and we are a full partner in this fight against terrorism. 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here and I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ziglar follows:]

STATEMENT OF JAMES W. ZIGLAR, COMMISSIONER, IMMIGRATION AND

NATURALIZATION SERVICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Madame Chairwoman and Members of The Committee, I want to thank you for 

the opportunity to testify on the important issue of how technology can be better 

employed to prevent the entry into our country of persons who wish to do harm to 

our people and institutions. I am always pleased to return to the Senate. I shall 

always be grateful for the opportunity I had to serve as the Senate Sergeant at 

Arms from November 1998 to August 2001. 

Although I have served as Commissioner for only two months, I have not viewed 

that as a liability in responding to the tragic events of September 11, primarily because of the highly professional career public servants who have provided me with 

mature advice and assistance. These tragic events, however, have provided an opportunity for me to examine, with a fresh eye, the management, personnel, technology, and policy needs capabilities of the INS. 

STEPS TO IMPROVE SECURITY

Mr. Chairman, the questions you have—and the reason, I believe, you called this 

hearing—are straightforward: You and most Americans would like to know what 

steps we can take to improve our security consistent with our values and constitutional liberties. 

Even before September 11, we were examining that question in depth at how we 

can improve the INS, at all levels, and especially in the area of technology. We recognize that technology is a huge ‘‘force multiplier’’ that we must employ effectively 

at the INS if we are to accomplish our mission. 

Pursuant to the mandates of the Clinger-Cohen legislation, in response to the recommendations of the General Accounting Office (GAO), and because it makes good 

business sense, the INS is currently in the process of developing its Enterprise Architecture. This project represents our long-term, strategically-oriented approach to 

accomplishing the information driven aspects of the INS mission. We began the 

planning for this project in October 2000 and I expect the final delivery of this 

project, the transition plan to our target architecture, to be ready at the beginning 

of the 3rd quarter of FY 2002. 

In addition, as part of our overall restructuring initiative, I encouraged our employees at all levels to think ‘‘outside the box’’ as to how we can better accomplish 

our mission. They responded with a number of creative ideas, some of which we are 

still evaluating. However, within the context of what is already known to be ‘‘doable’’ and effective, we have arrived are considering at a series of measures that 

would strengthen our enforcement capabilities. We are working within the Administration to determine how to implement these measures. Some of our ideas are as 

30

follows: Mr. Chairman, I suggest for your consideration, and that of the entire Congress, the following actions: 

BORDER PATROL

As requested in the President’s budget, increase the number of Border Patrol 

agents and support staff along the northern border, while not neglecting the continuing needs along the southwest border. Such increases should also include necessary facilities, infrastructure and vehicles. 

Provide additional agent support equipment and technology enhancements. Unfortunately, neither the Senate nor the House currently is funding the President’s re- quest at $20 million for ‘‘force multiplying technology.’’

Significantly increase the number of Border Patrol agents and support staff 

along the northern border, while not neglecting the continued needs along 

the southwest border. It is important that such increases include necessary 

facilities infrastructure, vehicles and support personnel, and that Border 

Patrol personnel assigned to the northern border represents a net increase 

of agents nationwide.

Expand INS access to portable wireless biometric identification systems, such as 

mobile IDENT. 

Increase funding for roads, lights, fences, and vehicle barriers. 

INSPECTIONS

In the Inspections area, as we proposed in our FY 2002 budget, we believe we 

should increase the number of Inspectors at our Ports of Entry. 

In the Inspections area, increase the number of inspectors to fully staff land borders, airports, and seaports, allowing our ports-of-entry to operate without jeopardizing security or officer safety. 

Require inspection of all International-to-International Transit Passengers (ITI) so 

that all travelers who arrive in the United States are inspected. 

Increase the number of criminal investigators and intelligence analysts to enhance investigative capabilities and develop more information on possible national 

security threats. A substantially enhanced investigative and intelligence force would 

make it possible to begin to address the concern about nonimmigrants who illegally 

enter, overstay or otherwise violate the immigration laws of the United States. 

INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVES

Require carriers to submit Advance Passenger Information before boarding passengers (whether the passenger is heading to the United States or attempting to depart the United States) to assist in preventing known or suspected terrorists, criminals, and inadmissible passengers from boarding. 

Make Advance Passenger Information data widely available to law enforcement 

agencies, enhancing the ability to identify potential threats prior to departure from 

or arrival in the United States, as well as to prevent the departure of individuals 

who may have committed crimes while in the United States. This would require additional personnel and equipment. 

Implement the National Crime Information Center Interstate Identification Index 

(NCIC III) at all ports of entry so that aliens with criminal histories can be identified prior to or upon arrival in the United States. NCIC III should also be available 

at all consular posts, INS service centers and adjudication offices to help identify 

aliens who pose a potential threat. 

Improve lookout system checks for the adjudications of applications at INS service 

centers. This would require additional personnel. 

Improve INS infrastructure and integration of all data systems so that data from 

all sources on aliens is accessible to inspectors, special agents, adjudicators, and 

other appropriate law enforcement agencies. This initiative is ongoing. 

but will require substantial investment to complete. 

PERSONNEL ISSUES

Provide statutory authority to waive the calendar-year overtime cap for INS employees to increase the number of staff-hours available by increasing the overtime 

hours people can work. This proposal is included in the Administration’s Terrorism 

Bill. 

OTHER INITIATIVES This onerous provision that has not been imposed on most 

other federal agencies has created a serious problem during the current heightened 

security posture. For example, the continued availability of Border Patrol Agents for 

security at major airports is significantly impacted by this provisio 

31

Re-examine and potentially eliminate the Transit Without Visa Program (TWOV) 

and Progressive Clearance to prevent inadmissible international passengers from 

entering the United States. 

Reassess the designation of specific countries in the Visa Waiver Program to ensure that proper passport policies are in place. This initiative will require the concurrence of and joint participation by the Department of State. 

Obtain from the Department of State visa data and photographs in electronic form 

at ports of entry so that visa information will be available at the time of actual inspection. 

Explore alternative inspection systems that allow for facilitation of low risk travelers while focusing on high-risk travelers. 

And review the present listing of designated ports of entry, in concert with the 

U.S. Customs Service, to eliminate unnecessary ports. This will allow the INS to 

deploy more inspectors to fewer locations making for a more efficient use of resources. 

DATABASE IMPROVEMENTS

In addition to the measures cited above, I have instructed my staff to move forward expeditiously on two database improvement projects mandated by Congress. 

While neither is a panacea, both would be an improvement over the status quo. 

First, there has been much attention paid to student visas in recent weeks. Today, 

the INS maintains limited records on foreign students and is able to access that information on demand. However, the information is on old technology platforms that 

are insufficient for today’s need for rapid access. That is why we are moving forward 

with the Student Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), formerly known as 

CIPRIS. Objections, primarily by the academic establishment, have delayed its development and deployment. However, with the events of September 11, that objection has virtually disappeared and the INS, with your help, will meet, and intends 

to beat, the Congress’ date of December 20, 2003 to start implementation of SEVIS 

with respect to all foreign nationals holding student visas. I hasten to add that 

there is a critical need to concurrently review and revise the process by which foreign students gain admission to the United States through the so-called I–20 certification process as we build the system. To revise and rationalize this process will 

require cooperation between the Department of State and the INS. 

Second, substantial attention also has been paid to entry and exit data. Currently, 

the INS collects data on the entry and exit of certain visitors. The data, most of 

which is provided to the INS in paper form to meet our manifest requirements, first 

must be transferred by hand from paper to an electronic database. This is an extremely inefficient way of processing data which delays access to the data by weeks 

and months. Knowing who has entered and who has departed our country in real 

time is an important element in enforcing our laws. The Data Management Improvement Act, passed in 2000, requires the INS to develop a fully-automated integrated entry-exit data collection system and deploy this system at airports and seaports by the end of 2003, the 50 largest land ports of entry by the end of 2004, and 

completing the deployment to all other ports of entry by the end of 2005. The legislation also requires a private sector role to ensure that any systems developed to 

collect data do not harm tourism or trade. The INS is moving forward to meet, or 

beat, those deadlines. 

The INS already uses limited airline and cruise line data that is now provided 

voluntarily as an integral part of the inspection process at airports and seaports. 

We will work closely with Congress, other agencies, and the travel industry in the 

coming months to expand our access to needed data and to enhance our use of that 

data to ensure border security and more complete tracking of arrivals and departures. 

There has also been a great deal of focus on the databases used to identify persons who are inadmissible to the United States or who pose a threat to our country. 

The INS, the Customs Service, and the Department of State’s Bureau of Consular 

Affairs have worked diligently over the past decade to provide our ports of entry 

and consular posts with access to data needed by our officers. The data contained 

in the National Automated Immigration Lookout System (NAILS), the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS II), and the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) are uniformly available to our ports of entry through a shared 

database called the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) that is maintained 

on the U.S. Customs Service mainframe computer. 

Through IBIS, the officers at our ports of entry can also access limited data from 

the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). Immigration and Customs officers 

have long had the capability to check NCIC wanted persons data on a limited basis. 

32

Only recently have immigration inspectors been authorized to routinely use NCIC 

criminal history data (NCIC III) to identify criminal aliens in advance of their arrival. This capacity now exists at two ports of entry. Before September 11, the INS 

was working to expand the availability of this valuable data source to additional locations. Legislation is being considered to ensure this expansion is successful. I 

strongly support this legislation. To expedite this process, we will require the assistance of Congress for additional communications and mainframe capacity so that we 

may obtain real-time NCIC III data. 

Many people who cross our land borders do so with a Border Crossing Card 

(BCC). The INS and State Department have been working aggressively over the 

past several years to replace the old Border Crossing Cards with the new biometric 

‘‘laser visa.’’ Based on the statutory deadline, holders of the old BCC can no longer 

enter the country. The new BCC has many security features that make it a much 

more secure entry document. 

Both at and between our ports of entry, the INS has used a fingerprint identification system known as IDENT to track immigration violators. This system has provided the INS with a significant capacity to identify recidivists and impostors. Congress has directed the Department of Justice to integrate IDENT with access to the 

FBI’s automated fingerprint system, IAFIS, and we have been proceeding toward 

that objective with the FBI and under the Department’s direction. 

THE LIMITS OF TECHNOLOGY

There is no quick fix, technological or otherwise, to the problems we face. We 

must work with advanced technology and do all we can to improve our systems. But 

we should not mislead ourselves into thinking that technology alone can solve our 

problems. Technology must be coupled with a strong intelligence and informationgathering and distribution system if we are to leverage our resources and maximize 

our capabilities. That will require the seamless cooperation among the many government agencies involved. 

It should be noted that more than five hundred million inspections are conducted 

at our ports of entry every year, and hundreds of millions of people enter the United 

States without visas, either because they are U.S. citizens, through visa waiver programs, or other exemptions from the normal visa process; the INS has only 4,775 

Inspectors to process these hundreds of millions of visitors and approximately 2,000 

investigators and intelligence agents throughout the country who are available to 

deal with persons who have entered illegally, are criminal aliens, or have overstayed 

their visas or otherwise have violated the terms of their status as visitors in the 

United States. 

If we are to meet the challenges of the future, we need to make changes at the 

INS and we are in the process of making those changes. The structure of the organization and the management systems that we have in place are outdated and, in 

many respects, inadequate for the challenges we face. Our information technology 

systems and related processes must be improved in order to ensure timely and accurate determinations with respect to those who wish to enter our country and those 

who wish to apply for benefits under our immigrations laws. The management restructuring of the INS is on its way—a mandate the President and the Congress 

have given me—and the improvement of our information technology systems is moving ahead and can be accomplished with the help and support of Congress. 

Madame Chairwoman, I would like to say one word about INS employees and the 

events of September 11. Within hours of the attacks, the INS was working closely 

with the FBI to help determine who perpetrated these crimes and to bring those 

people to justice. Within 24 hours, under ‘‘Operation Safe Passage,’’ The INS deployed several hundred Border Patrol agents to eight major U.S. airports to increase 

security, prevent further terrorist incidents and restore a sense of trust to the traveling public. At America’s ports of entry, INS inspectors continue to work tirelessly 

to inspect arriving visitors, while ensuring the flow of legitimate commerce and 

tourism. Meanwhile, despite the tragedies and the disruptions, our service operations have managed to complete over 35,000 naturalizations nationwide and process thousands of other applications since September 11. America should be proud 

of the extraordinary effort of these men and women. 

LOOKING AHEAD

It has been said that after September 11 ‘‘everything has changed.’’ I hope that 

is not true. America must remain America, a symbol of freedom and a beacon of 

hope to those who seek a better life for themselves and their children. We must increase our security and improve our systems but in doing so we must not forget 

what has made this nation great—our openness to new ideas and new people, and 

33

a commitment to individual freedom, shared values, innovation and the free market. 

If, in response to the events of September 11., we engage in excess and shut out 

what has made America great, then we will have given the terrorists a far greater 

victory than they could have hoped to achieve. 

Thank you for this opportunity to appear, Madame Chairwoman. I look forward 

to your questions.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

I would like to acknowledge the fact that Senator Cantwell has 

joined the subcommittee. 

Perhaps after Mary Ryan testifies, if you have some comments 

you would like to make, we will go to you. 

Let me properly introduce you. Mary Ryan is Assistant Secretary 

of State for Consular Affairs. She entered the Foreign Service in 

1966 and has had a long and distinguished career at the State Department. In her post, Ambassador Ryan is charged with overseeing the issuance of visas to foreigners wishing to enter the 

United States. She assumed these duties in 1993. 

Welcome, Ms. Ryan. 

STATEMENT OF MARY A. RYAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR 

CONSULAR AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Ms. RYAN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today 

to explain the role of the Bureau of Consular Affairs, and most particularly our visa processing system, in our country’s border security program. 

I have a longer statement which I would like to submit for the 

record, if I have your permission. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Please. Thank you. 

Ms. RYAN. The resolve of the Department of State and the Bureau of Consular Affairs to be full partners in the war against terrorism is stronger than ever. In my testimony today, Madam Chair, 

I will describe what we are doing to make our consular name check 

systems the best in the world and our plans to make them even 

better in the future. I will also address procedures for visa issuance 

and the scope of the Department’s data-sharing with intelligence 

and law enforcement communities. 

One of the points that I want to stress most especially to all of 

you here in the subcommittee is that we must have information. 

We are only as good as the information that goes into the system. 

If we have no information on the aliens from other agencies, then 

the name check system is not as good as it could be. So if there 

is one point that I can leave with this subcommittee today, it is 

that we must have more information-sharing. 

I can say with confidence that we are using today a state-of-theart visa name check system and we continue to seek and exploit 

new technologies to strengthen our capabilities. 

Let me begin by noting that all visa cases are processed by using 

automated systems which prompt a name check through the Department of State’s centralized lookout system known as CLASS. 

A consular officer must review all hits before the case can be formally approved for printing. There is no override to this feature. 

Simply stated, it is not possible to issue a visa unless the name 

check has been completed and reviewed by an officer. 

34

The Department also has in place special headquarters clearance 

procedures for nationals of certain countries, including students, 

such as those on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, as well as 

for those whose planned travel raises concerns about unauthorized 

access to sensitive technologies. 

Once approved, a visa containing numerous security features and 

a digitized photo is placed in the alien’s passport. Now, I point out 

that the validity of the visa has nothing to do with the period for 

which the alien may remain in the United States. What a visa does 

is to allow the alien to apply at the port of entry for admission to 

the United States, and INS only may authorize such entry and INS 

determines how long the alien can stay in the United States. 

I want to describe our name check database for you. CLASS, 

which stands for the Consular Lookout and Support System, contains about 5.7 million records concerning foreigners, most of which 

originate with visa applications at our consulates and embassies 

overseas. But INS, DEA, the Department of Justice and other Federal agencies also contribute to our system. We, in turn, provided 

approximately 500,000 lookout records to other agencies through 

real-time electronic links to the Interagency Border Inspection System which the Commissioner mentioned, the IBIS system. 

In the aftermath of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 

Bureau of Consular Affairs funded a counterterrorism tool called 

TIPOFF. This utilizes sensitive intelligence and law enforcement 

information from the CIA, from the NSA and from the FBI and 

from our overseas posts concerning known or suspected terrorists. 

The TIPOFF staff screens all incoming intelligence reports and 

other sources of information for the names and biographic data of 

known or suspected terrorists. Permission is obtained from the relevant agencies to declassify identifying data of suspected terrorists 

and that data is then entered into the CLASS system and into 

IBIS. 

We also have a program which we call Visas Viper, another integral part of the TIPOFF system. The Visas Viper staff, in close coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, solicits information 

on suspected terrorists from overseas posts for inclusion in this 

database. 

Beginning in 1996, with the help of Congress through the retained machine-readable visa fees, Consular Affairs undertook a 

major modernization of our systems. By 2001, all visa data collected abroad, including photos of the applicants, was being replicated to the consular consolidated database and made available to 

posts abroad. 

This year, we deployed a pilot program to share limited non-immigrant visa data with INS inspectors at Newark. We are very 

pleased that INS will soon expand the use of this replicated data 

to all ports of entry. This will provide each INS inspector with a 

photo to compare with the person in front of them, a system cheaper than fingerprints and just as effective. In the meantime, INS inspectors have access to our electronic database through the INS Forensic Documents Laboratory. 

The Consular Lookout and Support System is modern and it is 

extendable. Our name check system remains robust because we 

35

continue to upgrade it. Let me give you a few of the initiatives underway related to this goal. 

For many years, we sought access to FBI criminal records data 

on aliens applying for non-immigrant visas, and I am very grateful 

to the members of Congress that legislation has been introduced finally in both Houses that would permit us access to this data. 

We will soon introduce an improved field backup name check system for use when the telecommunications links are interrupted. By 

the summer of 2002, every visa processing post will have a local 

backup that closely approximates the abilities of the CLASS mainframe. 

Photographs are our key to our exploration of biometrics. Because very visa application contains a photograph, we already capture a biometric identifier for all applicants. For this reason, we 

have been for some time investigating the use of facial recognition 

technology for identification purposes. 

Pilots at posts in India and Nigeria have proven very promising, 

and in late August we launched a pilot at the Kentucky consumer 

center aimed at detecting invalid diversity visa applications. We 

will soon the test the abilities of facial recognition software to compare visa applicants to a sample database of photographs of suspected terrorists. We seek to expand the pool of such photographs 

through liaison with other Government agencies, and we are also 

consulting with the private sector on facial recognition technology. 

We will soon complete field-testing a new, more secure non-immigrant visa, and design a machine-readable secure immigrant visa 

that will, in conjunction with the data share program, virtually 

eliminate photo substitution. We are planning to develop a forensic 

documents laboratory in the Bureau of Consular Affairs to give us 

an independent capacity to detect and counter fraudulent or counterfeit U.S. and foreign visas and passports. 

Madam Chairwoman, all of these initiatives, past, present and 

future, have been made possible through a very wise decision by 

the Congress a few years ago to permit us to retain a machinereadable visa fee. Since 1994, when we were given this authorization to charge and to keep the fee, we have spent every penny sensibly and judiciously. 

We continue to rely upon machine-readable visa fees to finance 

the salary and basic benefits of virtually all American employees 

who provide consular services. Permanent and uncapped MRV fees 

are essential to continuing our efforts to enhance our Nation’s border security. 

Madam Chairwoman, in our free society we must continue improving the security of our borders, while keeping our hearts and 

our minds and our economy open to new people, to new ideas, and 

to new markets. The Bureau of Consular Affairs has been, and will 

continue to be a full partner in the battle against terrorism. 

I close with the point that I made at the outset. We cannot be 

the effective outer ring of border security if we do not get information on people who seek to harm our country from the intelligence 

and law enforcement agencies. Information-sharing is key to our 

protecting our Nation. 

36

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and members of the subcommittee, for the opportunity to appear before you and I would be 

happy to try to answer any questions that you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ryan follows:]

STATEMENT OF MARY A. RYAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Madam Chair and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to explain the role of 

the Bureau of Consular Affairs, and most particularly our visa processing system, 

in this country’s border security program. I only wish, Madam Chair, that the context for this hearing could be different. In that case I could open these remarks by 

saying how happy I am to appear before you, because I am proud of the systems 

we have developed over the past several years and that we work very hard to improve each and every day. I would convey again my appreciation for the help that 

the Congress has given the Department to improve our consular systems by allowing us to retain machine-readable visa (MRV) fees. However, I appear before you 

today keenly aware of the terrible tragedy that befell our country and all civilized 

countries on September 11. 

In my testimony, Madam Chair, I will outline for you what we have been doing 

to make our consular systems the best in the world and our plans to make those 

systems even better in the future. During my tenure as Assistant Secretary, the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) has been continually engaged in efforts to design, deploy, and improve the systems that help flag for our consular officers terrorists and 

criminals among visa applicants. I can say with confidence that ours is a state-ofthe-art system that functions as it was designed. At the same time, we continue to 

seek and exploit new technologies to strengthen our capabilities. If there is any single point I can leave with the committee, it is that that any namecheck system is 

and will be only as good as the information we receive to put in it. 

VISA PROCESSING

I will first focus on non-immigrant visa processing and explain briefly how applicants are processed so that you will understand the environment in which our systems operate. Applicants for non-immigrant visas submit a written application, with 

a passport and photo, for adjudication by a commissioned consular officer or other 

designated U.S. citizen. Locally engaged staff assist in visa processing but are not 

authorized to approve and issue visas. 

Visa applications are processed using sophisticated automated systems. Data 

entry automatically prompts a namecheck through the Department of State’s cen- tralized lookout system (CLASS, the details of which I will discuss later in my testimony). A consular officer must review all hits before the case can be formally approved for printing. There is no override for this feature; it is not possible to print 

a visa unless a namecheck has been completed and reviewed by an officer. 

Consular officers evaluate applications by looking at the full range of criteria established by U.S. immigration law. They review the credibility of professed plans 

for travel to the U.S. For most visas, applicants must establish that they intend to 

visit the U.S. only temporarily, are qualified for the visa classification sought, and 

will undertake only activities consistent with the particular visa status. Applicants 

must also establish that they are not otherwise ineligible to receive a visa under 

one of the specific grounds of ineligibility in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 

including terrorism, drug trafficking and alien smuggling. 

In addition to namecheck results, consular officers use a combination of experience, knowledge of local economic, political and cultural conditions, and common 

sense to evaluate applications. Supporting documentation may be solicited and reviewed as needed. When there are specific signs of fraud or deception, an investigation may be conducted using consular anti-fraud resources. 

The ever-growing numbers of visa applications has meant that consular officers 

must reach decisions in individual cases rapidly. To assist them in doing so, our 

namecheck technology provides results in real-time. We have used outside linguistic 

experts to make our search criteria for ‘‘hits’’ as helpful as possible. We have instituted sophisticated Arabic and Russian/Slavic algorithms to identify names regardless of transliteration variations, and are presently developing a similar algorithm 

for Hispanic names. 

Once approved, a visa containing numerous security features and a digitized 

photo is placed in the alien’s passport. The maximum period of visa validity is ten 

years for multiple entries. The validities of different types of non-immigrant visas 

37

are determined on the basis of reciprocity with each foreign government. I should 

point out, Madame Chair, that the period of visa validity has nothing to do with 

the period for which an alien may remain in the United States. A visa permits an 

alien to apply for entry to the U.S., but only the INS may authorize such entry and 

determine the alien’s length of stay. 

Visa data, including photos and pertinent biographic data, is electronically forwarded to the Consolidated Consular Database maintained in Washington. This 

database also contains information on refused applications. 

Immigrant visas are for persons intending to reside permanently in the United 

States. U.S. citizens and legal permanent resident aliens, as well as prospective employers, file with the INS petitions on behalf of certain relatives and employees. A 

special element of U.S. immigration law is the Diversity Visa (DV) for which ‘‘winners’’ are chosen by lottery. Like non-immigrant visa applicants, immigrant visa and 

DV applicants must undergo namechecks. In addition, an FBI employee at the National Visa Center does a National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) criminal 

history check of these applicants. 

I should note that, while immigrants are covered by NCIC screening, non-immigrants are not. I’ll return to the solution to this problem, which I hope is imminent, 

in the context of our namecheck system. 

THE NAMECHECK SYSTEM

Integral to visa processing is the namecheck system. CA is well aware of the importance of sharing and receiving critical intelligence and criminal data from intelligence and law enforcement agencies. In addition to ensuring that no visa is issued 

without a namecheck, we have worked hard over the past decade to deliver more 

information from other agencies to our visa officers via the namecheck system. 

Our lookout database, the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), contains about 5.7 million records on foreigners, most of which originate with the visa 

application process at our consulates and embassies overseas. A variety of federal 

agencies contribute lookouts to our system. INS has provided over one million 

records, and DEA about 330,000. Customs is working with us to provide 20,000 or 

more lookouts from its serious drug violator records by the end of this year. We in 

turn provide Customs, INS and other agencies using the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) with approximately 500,000 lookout records through a real-time 

electronic link. 

We also provide our officers, and the INS, with data on lost and stolen foreign 

passports to prevent the use of such passports by impostors. 

TIPOFF AND VISAS VIPER

In the aftermath of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the Bureau of Consular Affairs—as part of the Department of State’s border security program—funded 

a border security and counterterrorism tool known as TIPOFF. It was developed, 

and is managed, by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), utilizing sensitive intelligence and law enforcement information from the CIA, NSA, FBI and our 

overseas posts concerning known or suspected terrorists. TIPOFF’s objective is to 

detect these individuals either as they apply for visas overseas, or as they attempt 

to pass through U.S., Canadian, and Australian border entry posts. (Data-sharing 

programs were implemented with Canada in 1997, and with Australia in 2000.) 

The TIPOFF staff in INR screens all incoming intelligence reports, embassy cables and other sources of information for those documents containing the names and 

biographic data of known or suspected terrorists. Following strict procedures approved by the respective intelligence and law enforcement agencies, permission is 

obtained to declassify names, nationalities, passport numbers and dates of birth of 

suspected terrorists. This data is then entered into CLASS and the INS and Custom 

Service’s IBIS system. Consular officers overseas encounter ‘‘hits’’ based on TIPOFF 

data in the regular course of their work. The CLASS database contains over 48,000 

such records. TIPOFF has passed approximately 23,000 records to INS and other 

inspection services at ports of entry via IBIS, which uses a higher standard of biographic data for its entries. 

The Visas Viper program is an integral part of TIPOFF. The TIPOFF/Viper staff 

works in close coordination with CA to solicit information about suspected terrorists 

from overseas posts. This data is included in the TIPOFF database and watchlisted 

in CLASS and IBIS. A procedural adjunct to the Visas Viper program, called 

TIPPIX, incorporates terrorists’ photographs into the TIPOFF and IBIS databases. 

TIPOFF performs the following important functions:

38

It helps preclude the inadvertent issuance of visas to terrorists whose 

names are known to intelligence and law enforcement agencies; It warns 

embassies and consulates that certain applicants may pose a security risk; 

It alerts intelligence and law enforcement agencies that a suspected terrorist is applying for a visa; 

It provides a means for informed decisions to be made on whether to issue 

a visa for operational or other policy considerations, or deny the application; 

It enables INS and Customs to detect suspected terrorists who may have 

obtained a visa prior to being watchlisted in CLASS, or who are attempting 

to enter the U.S. through the Visa Waiver Program (VWP); 

And it provides operational opportunities at border entry points through 

use of ‘‘silent hits’’ or other handling codes.

We are also comparing new TIPOFF hits in the Consular Lookout and Support 

System with visa issuance information in the Consolidated Consular Database, to 

determine if a subject of derogatory information was issued a visa before the hit was 

created. 

SECURITY ADVISORY OPINIONS

We also address cases posing potential security threats using Security Advisory 

Opinion procedures. We have concluded a series of agreements with law enforcement and national security agencies concerning categories of individuals of concern. 

Such persons are the subjects of a cable prepared by a consular officer and disseminated electronically to all appropriate agencies for an in-depth clearance. 

The Department of State has designated Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, 

Sudan, and Syria as state sponsors of terrorism. Visa applications by officials and 

diplomats of these countries for the most part must be submitted to the Visa Office 

for review and an advisory opinion as to ineligibility before a visa can be issued. 

(This requirement does not presently extend to diplomatic/official visa applicants 

from Syria.) Non-official visa applicants from these countries are also subject to a 

wide range of special clearance procedures based on their background, the nature 

of their proposed visit, and the type of visa they are seeking. 

Based on agreements with the FBI, we also maintain a variety of special clearance procedures—beyond the regular CLASS namecheck—for numerous other nationalities, including Afghanistan. The reasons for these special clearance procedures vary, but include concerns related to espionage, technology transfer, economic 

sanctions, and human rights violations. 

In addition to these nationality-specific clearance requirements, we universally require special clearance for applicants of any nationality who are the subject of the 

most serious CLASS lookouts. We similarly require special clearance for applicants 

whose planned travel to the United States raises concerns about unauthorized access to sensitive technologies, even if there is no lookout entry for the individual. 

Consular officers are also asked to submit for a security advisory opinion any other 

cases that they feel raise security concerns, regardless of namecheck results. 

THE CONSULAR CONSOLIDATED DATABASE

Our data-sharing efforts are not, however, limited to the namecheck system. We 

are now delivering more information to our visa officers via a globalized database 

of visa records. Beginning in 1996, thanks to the help of Congress with retained 

MRV fees, Consular Affairs undertook major modernization of our systems. By 

March 2001, all visa data collected abroad was being replicated to the Consular 

Consolidated Database. In May 2001, we made the Consular Consolidated Database 

available to all our visa officers abroad. The photo and details of visa issuance, once 

only available locally to the post taking action, are now available in real-time to all 

visa offices worldwide. Visas can be checked at any point in the issuance process 

against all issued and refused visas worldwide, and consular management in Washington now has access to up-to-the-minute information about visa and passport 

issuance around the world. 

DATA-SHARING WITH THE INS AND OTHER FEDERAL INSPECTION SERVICES

We are working to widen the flow of information to relevant Federal Inspection 

Services. We are mindful of the challenges that INS faces in inspecting millions of 

foreign visitors at ports of entry. We have a number of initiatives underway to share 

additional information with INS in order to improve border security. As I mentioned 

earlier, the Consolidated Consular Database allows us to make visa information, including digital non-immigrant visa photographs, immediately available both in 

Washington and at all consular sections worldwide. We want INS to be able to make 

39

good use of this data, in particular photos of each individual who has been issued 

a visa. 

Since the mid-1990’s, State and INS have had a cooperative program which has 

resulted in State forwarding to INS, for use at ports of entry, electronic data on 55% 

of all immigrant visa recipients. The two agencies have cooperated in exchanging 

information at all stages of the immigrant visa process, from approving petitions to 

issuing legal permanent residence cards. We are about to make certain software 

changes that should allow complete sharing of immigrant visa information with INS 

within the next year. 

The Department has for some time been prepared to share all of its replicated 

non-immigrant visa files with INS as soon as the Service is ready to receive it. Towards that end, in July 2001, we deployed a pilot program to share limited nonimmigrant visa data with INS inspectors at Newark and with the INS forensic document lab. The program was expanded to Miami in September, and INS will make 

the data available to several other ports of entry soon. We look forward to the day 

when we can share this information will all INS ports of entry, as it will give INS 

inspectors near real-time access to data that will allow them to better detect fraud 

and facilitate legitimate travelers. In the meantime, INS inspectors have access to 

our electronic visa data via telephone contact with the Visa Office 

LOOKING AHEAD: IMPROVING AND EXTENDING OUR SYSTEMS

The Bureau of Consular Affairs has staff specifically dedicated to technical development to ensure we maintain state-of-the-art tools for adjudicating visas. The Consular Lookout and Support System is modern and extendible. Our namecheck system remains robust because we continue to upgrade it. We are committed and are 

actively working to expand datasharing with INS, other federal inspection services 

and law enforcement agencies. 

A. Gaining Access to FBI NCIC III Data 

We need access to FBI criminal record data (NCIC III) on aliens to assist consular 

officers in their adjudication of visa applications and have been seeking authority 

for such access for many years. We already screen our immigrant applicants using 

FBI information and want to do the same for non-immigrant applicants. We envision a system of index records on aliens (excluding all U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents) that is added directly to the CLASS lookout system and that will 

signal there may be derogatory FBI information on an applicant. I am grateful to 

Members of Congress that this legislation has been introduced in both Houses of 

Congress. We appreciate the support of Congress on this important legislation. 

B. Short-term improvements to Visa Systems 

This winter we will introduce improved field backup namecheck systems. By summer 2002 we plan to deploy a ‘‘real time update’’ feature for these systems that will 

give every visa processing post a local back-up that closely approaches the abilities 

of CLASS mainframe. 

Before the end of this year, we will modify our existing database of lost and stolen 

blank foreign passports to accommodate entries by Foreign Service posts of individual, foreign passports that are reported as lost or stolen. Lost and stolen passport 

data will continue to be shared with federal inspection agencies through IBIS. 

Specific enhancements aimed at giving visa officers more detailed lookout information have been in the works over the past year. By spring 2002, we will deploy 

features in our nonimmigrant visa system that will increase the scope of data associated with our lookout entries. Using scanning, we will begin augmenting the lookouts with global, electronic access to refusal files (and photos) now kept at individual Foreign Service posts. 

C. Facial Recognition 

As I have said, Madame Chair, every visa application contains a photograph, 

which means we already capture a biometric indicator for every applicant. Accordingly, we have been investigating the use of emerging facial recognition technology 

in the consular business process. 

Evaluations comparing non-immigrant visa photos at posts in India and Nigeria 

proved promising in identifying impostors presenting fraudulent applications. In 

late August, we launched a pilot at the Kentucky Consular Center for Diversity 

Visas aimed at detecting invalid applications from persons working around our procedures. We will soon test the capability of facial recognition software to compare 

a sample database of photographs of suspected terrorists to those of visa applicants. 

We seek to expand the pool of photographs available for this use through efforts 

with other USG agencies. 

40

D. Document Security 

We soon will complete field-testing a new, more secure non-immigrant visa. Laboratory tests have shown that it is much more tamper-resistant than the current 

version. We will also complete design of a machine-readable, secure immigrant visa 

that will, in conjunction with the data-share program, virtually eliminate photo-substitution. We will provide our consulates with special secure ink with which to cancel visas, so that efforts to ‘‘wash’’ or ‘‘recycle’’ genuine visas will be much more difficult. 

We are planning to develop within the Bureau of Consular Affairs an independent 

capacity to detect and counter fraudulent or counterfeit U.S. and foreign visas and 

passports by creating a new office built around a forensic document laboratory. This 

office also would coordinate all Bureau efforts to assess biometrics technologies. 

E. Human Resources 

Using MRV fees, the Department currently funds the salaries and benefits of 

2,130 full-time positions. MRV funds will also be required to increase consular staffing worldwide, to address growing demands in the visa adjudication process. We are 

committed to an effective training program for consular employees, including an intensive one-week training course for consular field officers on namecheck systems 

and linguistic concepts. 

MACHINE-READABLE VISA FEES PROVIDE THE MEANS FOR IMPROVEMENTS

Madam Chair, all of these initiatives—past, present and future—have been made 

possible because of a very wise decision by Congress a few years ago to permit us 

to retain machine-readable visa (MRV) fees. Since 1994, we have spent every penny 

of these fees sensibly and judiciously. As I mentioned, the Bureau of Consular Affairs relies upon MRV fees to finance the salary and basic benefits of virtually all 

American employees who provide worldwide consular services as well as to make 

improvements to our systems. Permanent and uncapped MRV fees are essential to 

continuing our efforts to enhance the nation’s Border Security Program. With this 

funding authority, we can ensure we have sufficient personnel to cover staffing and 

training gaps and to help meet peak season workloads. We can also adjust staffing 

to compensate for additional anticipated steps in the visa adjudication process and 

other changes to increase security. 

This funding allowed us to modernize our consular systems, and some of our future proceeds will go into further system upgrades, such as the scanning of our refusal files to augment lookout information. Other major expenditures looming include establishing additional back-up capabilities for the sophisticated automated 

systems that support both CLASS and the Consolidated Consular Database. 

The level of resources available to federal border agencies greatly affects our 

progress, particularly in interagency sharing of visa information. We must continue 

to work closely with other agencies on data-sharing to ensure full access to information for consular officers. We are anxious to provide visa data to federal inspection 

services and would like to see more rapid progress. Modernization of other agencies’

systems—including more modern protocols in data exchange and more secure, flexible connectivity—is key to significant progress. We actively participate in the Border 

Agency Partnership (formerly IBIS), which aims to tackle these problems. 

CLOSING

Madam Chair, we live in a free and open society. These characteristics, so precious to all Americans, make our country a magnet to those who seek greater political, economic and social opportunities, as well as a target for those who hate us 

and seek to do us harm. We must continue improving the security of our borders 

while keeping our hearts and our economy open to new people, ideas and markets. 

CA has been and will continue to be a full partner in the battle against terrorism. 

Although the freedom and openness we value so much make totally foolproof systems virtually impossible, I am confident that our current system is state-of-the-art 

and functions as it was designed. I am also confident that we are on the right track 

with our efforts to find new technologies and institute data-sharing arrangements 

with other agencies. 

I close, Madam Chair, with the point I made at the outset of these remarks—the 

effectiveness and success of our systems rely not only on the quantity, but also on 

the quality and timeliness of the information that goes into it. 

Thank you, Madam Chair and members of the committee, for permitting me to 

share my thoughts with you today. I would now be pleased to answer any questions 

you have for me.

41

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thanks very much, Ambassador Ryan. 

What I would like to do now is have a brief opening statement 

from Senator Cantwell and then we will begin the questions. 

Senator Cantwell? 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I do want to 

express my great appreciation to you and to Senator Kyl for your 

longstanding interest in this issue and your work. Clearly, this 

hearing is a product of not just a reaction to September 11, but a 

tremendous amount of work and focus by this subcommittee, and 

I applaud you for that and the legislation that you have put forth 

in the past. 

To the people that we are hearing from today, obviously the message is not that we haven’t been doing anything. The message is 

that we need to move faster, and you have articulated some of the 

ways in which we need to move faster. 

Clearly, Congress has not always been consistent in the message 

as it relates to immigration and our borders, and hopefully this 

committee can play a leadership role in making sure that our colleagues realize that if we are going to be effective in this area, we 

need to send a consistent and effective message, and the resources 

to go along with that. 

Last night, we passed major anti-terrorism legislation that contained a specific new tool, a requirement that State and Justice develop a visa standard to secure our borders and to make sure that 

individuals who are seeking entry into our country can be identified, and that that information can be used in a system that makes 

sure that people who have known activities are kept out of our 

country. 

Having had the Ressam case in the Northwest where someone 

entered Canada on falsified papers and was detained but was successful enough after being detained to create a new identity by getting a Canadian birth certificate and then getting a Canadian passport and, in reality, loading up a vehicle with explosives and then 

traveling to the Blaine border in Washington State, we have a situation here where we have to have a system that is focused on point 

of origin, not point of entry. 

We need to be able to track people with certainty, not 100-percent certainty that their name and identification absolutely match 

at that point, but at point of origin knowing exactly who we are 

dealing with at that point by a biometric standard that then can 

be used to track these individuals on their various routes from that 

point. 

I believe that citizenship in our country has its privileges, and 

those privileges are the right to privacy. Those individuals who are 

seeking access to our country should also have the responsibility of 

providing us with the information that we need to make sure that 

our borders are safe. 

So I appreciate the attention that all of you are giving to this 

critical issue, and the challenge that you all have on your shoulders, given the recent responsibilities in this new post and the 

42

huge history that we all have to deal with in this legacy of not 

being able to adequate meet the hurdles that are before us. 

So I look forward with enthusiasm to working with all of you and 

this subcommittee on this very challenging issue about how we 

focus our anti-terrorist activities on making sure that we do a better job abroad, giving access only to those people that we know we 

can have some data and background on their activities, and making sure that that system is fool-proof. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thanks very much, Senator Cantwell. 

Let us now proceed with the questions. If it is agreeable, I would 

suggest five-minute rounds and if we need a second round, we can 

go ahead and do that. 

Mr. Fine, I would like to ask you this question. Do you believe 

that the dangers presented by the visa waiver program, particularly in light of the recent attacks, warrant its continued existence 

as currently structured? 

Mr. FINE. Senator Feinstein, that is a difficult question. It does 

allow the flow of individuals more freely into the United States, but 

it creates incredible risks that the inspectors at the port of entry 

do not have adequate information about suspected terrorists, criminals and others who should not be here. 

I think we need to look at that program, and one thing we need 

to look at is whether the countries that are participating in it are 

providing sufficient information to us, information about intelligence about the suspected terrorists, machine-readable passports, 

biometric information about their individuals. I would suggest that 

we look at that before canceling the program totally, but there does 

need to be significant attention paid to that program. 

Another issue is—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Can I stop you right there? 

Mr. FINE. Sure. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Supposing the passport was required to be 

machine-readable, tamper-resistant, and had certain biometric data 

included on it, with the numbers coming through, could all of that 

be handled in a timely way? 

Mr. FINE. That would be a difficult issue. There are approximately 17 million visitors from visa waiver programs coming in 

each year. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I understand it is 23 million. 

Mr. FINE. My understanding is it was 17. It could be higher. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Okay. 

Mr. FINE. That would be a burden on the INS to do that. It 

would require sacrifices. It would require waiting, it would require 

longer lines. There are currently restrictions on the INS. They are 

required to clear planes in a certain period of time, 45 minutes. I 

don’t think they could possibly do that with that kind of restriction 

on them. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Is that an arbitrary restriction? 

Mr. ZIGLAR. No, no. It is in the law. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. You have to clear a plane? 

Mr. ZIGLAR. An international arrival has to be cleared by INS in 

45 minutes under the law. 

43

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. We could certainly change 

that. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. ZIGLAR. And we appreciate that. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Let me ask this question of INS. You are spending approximately $300 million a year on information systems. As I understand it, the Inspector General found that INS has 

spent $80 million on IDENT. The FBI has spent around $40 million for its new fingerprint system, which we understand is much 

better. 

Perhaps, Senator Kyl, you would want to chime in right now on 

what you learned about the hold-up of the IDENT system. 

Senator KYL. From the staff—and this would be directed to you, 

Commissioner Ziglar—our understanding is that the program was 

moved to full Justice last year to ensure that IAFIS and IDENT 

are married together before any more IDENT systems were put in 

place, which was consistent with what you said. 

The note from staff says no one from Justice/INS has told the appropriators that the goals have been achieved, if they have been 

achieved. So it would be important to get something in writing to 

them about the status of this so that if they have been achieved, 

the moratorium can be eliminated. If you could get information regarding the status of that to the Congress—as you know, we are 

right in that time period right now, so that might be very helpful. 

Mr. ZIGLAR. Senator Kyl, what I mentioned was that we are 

about to deploy the transitional work stations that will marry these 

two. So we would be glad to give you all the facts and figures on 

that. 

The IDENT system, Madam Chairwoman, was deployed in, I believe, 1989 and we actually have 800 work stations out there. Over 

that period of time, we obviously had the development cost of it, 

we had the deployment costs, and then we have the O&M maintenance costs which have been running about $10 million a year, all 

in. So there is a longer-term investment horizon that is associated 

with IDENT than there is with respect to the IAFIS system. 

By the way, just so people understand what the difference is, the 

IAFIS system is a ten-print system, as opposed to a two-print system. But the reliability of two fingerprints is very close to the reliability of ten fingerprints, if you will. The IAFIS system is designed 

for a somewhat different reason, and that is identifying criminal 

aliens, marrying it up with that, and prosecution. Our system is to 

identify who the person is and the reliability of it is very high. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I don’t want to run out of time. 

Mr. ZIGLAR. Sure. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Mr. Fine, let me ask you this question. You 

hear about all these systems. I mean, there is IAFIS, there is 

IDENT, there is ENFORCE. You can go right through it. None of 

them seem to talk to each other. They all seem to be different and 

none of them seem to put data in a central data bank from which 

all can call. 

Is that correct, first of all? Secondly, would you take a look at 

what Senator Kyl just stated, whether it is, in fact, necessary to 

get something in writing to the appropriators to proceed with that 

system? 

44

Mr. FINE. I would be happy to do that, Senator Feinstein. There 

are many systems. There are too many systems. Within the INS, 

there must be a hundred systems that don’t talk to each other. 

Within the Government, there are many systems. There are some 

that do. The Interagency Border Information System does marry 

information from the State Department, from the FBI, from the 

INS. But that is a name-based system and that is one example of 

it. 

It needs to happen more often and it needs to happen with biometric identifiers so that we are not relying on people’s names. 

People use false names; people’s names are similar. There has to 

be a greater coordination of effort in that regard. 

With regard to IDENT, the problems with IDENT and IAFIS 

being married up started very early. These systems started in development in 1989. Both the FBI and the INS started their parallel 

systems, and the problem was that they both went their separate 

ways because they believed they needed different requirements. 

So when the INS implemented its first IDENT system in 1994, 

the FBI was behind schedule. The FBI eventually brought it into 

fruition in 1989 without an adequate plan to have them married 

up, and that is the system we faced in 1999 and that is the system 

we still face today. They are developing plans. There are pilot studies going on, there are operational studies going on, but there is 

not an effective plan to bring them to fruition. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. What would you recommend? 

Mr. FINE. I would recommend that they exert concerted effort on 

being able to decide what the operational requirements are, the 

funding needed, and implement that initially in a pilot project, but 

then move forward rapidly. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Is there a need for everybody to have a different fingerprint mechanism? Can you not have one standard requirement for everybody with respect to fingerprints and then they 

go into a central base so that if something comes up and you need 

that instant communication between State, between INS, between 

FBI, and maybe even between CIA, you have got the ability to access it immediately? 

Mr. FINE. I don’t think there needs to be a separate standard for 

fingerprint systems. The problem is we have developed separate 

standards and now they need to be integrated, which is harder to 

do. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. My time is up. 

Senator KYL. Take some more. I took some of yours. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Let me just ask Ms. Ryan this question. 

Three of the 13 terrorists who received valid visas overstayed those 

visas but were not detected or removed from the United States. 

What, in your view, went wrong in the issuance of valid visas 

that permitted these 13 terrorists to legally enter the United 

States, or do you view their entry as acceptable risk? 

Ms. RYAN. What went wrong is that we had no information on 

them whatsoever from law enforcement or from intelligence, and so 

they came in, they applied for visas. They were interviewed and 

their stories were believed. I think, like most Americans, I was surprised at how much we learned about some of these terrorists in 

the immediate aftermath of the September 11 atrocities, and my 

45

question in my own mind is why didn’t we know that before September 11. 

We were asked by the FBI to revoke visas on August 23rd of 

2001, and we found that one person that they asked us to revoke 

we had no record of. Another had been refused. A third one, his 

visa had expired, and the fourth one obviously we revoked, but he 

was already in the United States. 

We have had a struggle with the law enforcement and intelligence communities in getting information. We have tried in the 

Bureau of Consular Affairs my whole time in Consular Affairs to 

get access to NCIC III information from the FBI and we were constantly told we were not a law enforcement agency and so they 

couldn’t give it to us. Other agencies fear compromise of sources 

and methods. 

I really think that now that we have seen what people can do 

to us that we have to figure out how we can get this information 

that protects sources and methods, although I must say in the immediate aftermath of the plane crashes and the killings that the 

American people were told that a couple of these people had been 

at a meeting with Osama bin Laden operatives in January of the 

year 2000. 

Mohammed Atta, who was alleged to be the ring-leader of this 

group, applied for and was issued a visa in May of 2000. Now, my 

question is when did we have this information as a Nation, as a 

Government. When did we know that he had met with Osama bin 

Laden operatives? And if it were known before we issued a visa, 

why didn’t we know? 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. How do you answer that yourself? 

Ms. RYAN. I don’t know, Madam Chairwoman. Either it is a colossal intelligence failure, in which case we had no information 

about them, and so that is what I would have to regard it as, a 

colossal intelligence failure, or there was information that was not 

shared with us who are the outer ring of border of security. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. But unless somewhere there is some common database, you might put restrictions on access to that common 

database and you might want to just limit it to the world of terrorism, but at least everybody would be feeding their information 

into a common database. 

Ms. RYAN. Absolutely. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. If that were the case, then there could be 

a number of red lights that would go on with respect to certain people who present a hazard to the United States. 

Ms. RYAN. Precisely. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Absent this, it seems to me there is a piece 

in this agency, there is a piece in that agency, there is another 

piece in a third agency, and it never develops into a complete picture that can ring a bell and say, whoops, there is a problem here. 

Ms. RYAN. I think after September 11 what we have seen is that 

just what you are describing must take place. I don’t think there 

is any more turf business or any more worry about sources and 

methods. Information can be put into our system that exists right 

this minute, the system I described to you as a name check system, 

that can be put in in codes, the way the blind sheik was in the system but was not checked. Now, we have automated it, so it is imVerDate Feb 1 2002 13:52 Aug 19, 2002 Jkt 081248 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\HEARINGS\81248.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
46

possible not to check—a double zero, which means you must refer 

the case to the visa office in Washington. 

The visa office in Washington, of the Bureau of Consular Affairs 

in the State Department, then goes to the agency that put that person in and says this person has applied for a visa at this post. Do 

you want to admit them? Do you want us to refuse them? What do 

you want us to do with that case? That is what we need, Madam 

Chairwoman. That is what we have to get. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I think that Ambassador Ryan has hit the 

nail on the head. I think, Senator Kyl, that that is what we need 

to strive for. Let me turn it over to you. 

Senator KYL. Thank you. I agree. It is a cut-out system, it is 

known. We use it all the time. 

I have got a couple of specific things which I will get out of the 

way, but then I think the overall question—and I think I want to 

address this primarily to you, Mr. Fine, at least first—we could 

easily get bogged down into the details. I mean, I have got so many 

questions here about the biometric border cards and all this kind 

of thing. 

Frankly, with our five-minute questioning rounds and short attention span to this, and so on—and we lack the expertise—about 

the best thing we can do is to bring people together, shine some 

light on an issue, express a general policy direction and then turn 

to some people and say, now, please work this out, get something 

done, get recommendations to us with respect to any law changes 

or money that you need, and then we can move forward. 

So I will let you think about my question for a minute. All three 

of you, of course, are welcome to respond, but with the new terrorism czar, Governor Ridge, taking office, maybe this is a place for 

this to be done. 

It seems to me that a group needs to be convened of all of the 

relevant players, which would include all of the law enforcement 

and intelligence groups, the State Department, the INS with all of 

its different groups, Border Patrol, and Treasury with Customs, 

and the inspectors general of every one of these departments, and 

the Attorney General and others, and say, all right, we have a limited period of time to get everything coordinated and everything up 

to speed, how is this going to get done, and have a specific tasking 

group, a special group with that specific responsibility with respect 

to the issue that we are just talking about here today. 

I mean, there are all kinds of issues that have to be dealt with, 

but this is a fairly discreet, although large, problem. I will recommend that to Governor Ridge, but I would like your response to 

that. 

Just a couple of things back on this other issue. As you all know, 

the appropriators can be your friends. Here you have two right 

here. I think it is a matter of get information to them, don’t wait 

for them to ask, don’t wait to think about. 

Again, from staff I have a note here that $27 million is in the 

bill this year for the integration of IDENT and IAFIS. And according to staff of Appropriations, this should ‘‘pretty well do it.’’ Well, 

based upon what you said, Mr. Fine, maybe no amount of money 

can do it. I don’t know. Is this right? 

47

I think you need to get a report to them while the CJS bill is 

still extant and it hasn’t been resolved yet, and sit down with 

them, in light of the new circumstances. I would say to the extent 

it is appropriate—I know there is a policy firewall here between 

the inspectors general and the departments, but you do make recommendations and if there is some way to break down a few of 

those barriers and get recommendations about how to deal with 

this specific problem and then figure out the money that you need, 

that is just one way to begin to think outside the box, as you yourself, Mr. Ziglar, have said we have got to do. This is a new era and 

we have just got to sit down and work these things out. 

I was struck by your comment that 300 million non–U.S. citizens 

come into the United States every year. That obviously includes repeats of the same person, I presume. 

Is that correct? Three hundred million non–U.S. citizens come 

into the United States every year? 

Mr. ZIGLAR. It is actually more than that. It is probably closer 

to 350 million, Senator. I just said 300-plus because we have—

Senator KYL. And this is the legal entries. 

Mr. ZIGLAR. These are people that come across our borders, yes, 

sir. 

Senator KYL. Well, no. 

Mr. ZIGLAR. Yes, yes. 

Senator KYL. Okay, because we have another— Mr. ZIGLAR. You have got to remember, Senator, only maybe half 

of the non–U.S. citizens that come here come on visas, or way less 

than half come on actual visas. Then they come under the visa 

waiver program, and then they have the exemption if they are Canadians, for example. So a lot of people come into this country that 

the State Department never sees. 

Senator KYL. Right. Now, we have to make a couple of quick 

points. First of all, the vast, vast majority of those people come to 

this country and contribute to our country. We want them here. All 

of that goes without saying, but I am just going to say it because 

we are focusing here on part of the problem. It is also a limited 

part of the terrorist problem with respect to people who are here 

illegally. 

But given the nature of this war that has been declared now, we 

can expect that this is going to be a significant component of fighting this war, making sure that we don’t allow guests to come into 

this country who are going to cause us harm. So clearly we have 

a right to focus on these people, and I think that is the point I 

want to make. 

With regard to this subcommittee’s jurisdiction, clearly we have 

a huge technology challenge with respect to that. Now, with that 

in mind, and understanding that technology isn’t the only way to 

fight this, but in one way or another we keep coming back to that, 

let me start with you, Mr. Fine. 

If you were the President of the United States here and you had 

to figure out a way—and you are talking to Governor Ridge now 

and you are saying, Governor, I want you to get this part of the 

problem fixed. So what would you recommend we do so that we 

have got something in place here within the next 90 days, or whatever period of time, that we can get all of this information inteVerDate Feb 1 2002 13:52 Aug 19, 2002 Jkt 081248 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\HEARINGS\81248.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
48

grated, the systems can be integrated, everything we need in terms 

of information gets in and we begin to operate in a more secure 

way? What would the recommendation be? 

Mr. FINE. I agree with your recommendation. It is a problem that 

crosses agencies and it needs to be dealt with across agencies. And 

we need to bring together the knowledgeable people from the various agencies—the information technology people, the operational 

people, the policy people—and figure out a way to address this 

issue because it involves systems in the Justice Department, in the 

Treasury Department, in the State Department. We have too often 

dealt with these systems individually rather than in a coordinated 

fashion. So that does seem to be an area that Governor Ridge 

should and could deal with. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Just one quick comment. Unless you have 

got the data from all of the agencies in one place, with some criteria for a potential terrorist definition to pop up, you are never 

going to be able to identify people who are potential threats. That 

is my concern in this, that we go on and we build a multiplicity 

of systems and they all fail dramatically because there isn’t enough 

in any one system to identify a potential threat. 

Senator Cantwell? 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you, Madam Chair. Again, thank you 

for your leadership on this issue and conducting these hearings. 

Commissioner Ziglar, your enthusiasm in your new challenge has 

been noted, and your great relationship with the Hill. The challenge for us is going back over some of these problems that we 

have had before and I just wanted to make sure I understood some 

of your testimony. 

The laser visa program that we have at our southern border 

which really was the first step in a biometric visa with, I believe, 

two-fingerprint information and a photograph—we haven’t implemented that fully, because we are not using that system now at our 

southern borders because we don’t have the readers. 

Could you explain to me where we are on that program? 

Mr. ZIGLAR. That is partly correct. The laser card is now in effect, and as of October 1 we were no longer accepting the old border 

crossing cards unless they had been—with respect to those people 

who been approved and hadn’t actually received the card, we 

stamped it and clipped it, and they can use it until they get their 

new card. 

That card has information about the folks in it. There have been 

4 million of them, roughly, that have been approved for this and 

cards issued, thanks to Ambassador Ryan’s operation. They did the 

approval. We actually did the production through of a contractor of 

the cards. 

Senator CANTWELL. So somebody is actually crossing the border 

using this technology? 

Mr. ZIGLAR. Yes, ma’am. The card has a photograph on it. What 

is not in place are the machine readers for these cards, and has 

been really an issue of money. 

Senator CANTWELL. So we have a sophisticated card, but no technology, so an individual border agent or INS inspector is looking 

at this? 

49

Mr. ZIGLAR. They look at the picture, but the fact is that these 

cards are pretty tamper-resistant and in a primary inspection mode 

that is what the cards would be used for. It is in a secondary mode 

that you would actually go and access the data and the biometrics 

of it. The machine readers for that have not been purchased and 

it has been a simple matter of not having the money appropriated. 

The INS has in its budget requests since 1999 has asked for the 

money for this. Now, I am not blaming Congress. I have seen the 

budget submissions. They asked for it, the OMB cut them out, and 

they were never part of the President’s budget coming up here. So 

the money has never been appropriated for it. 

There is actually some good news in that. I know it sounds 

strange, but because of the advance in technology and because of 

the effectiveness, believe it or not, of the IDENT system, what we 

have in these little cards are the fingerprints of these folks that 

have applied for them. Those fingerprints have now been put into 

our IDENT system so that we can actually use a biometric through 

the IDENT system out of the process for using these cards, which 

means that we can now go to a more—I hate to use the word ‘‘generic’’ machine reader that can read lots of different kinds of biometric information out of different kinds of cards. 

That is what we are proposing to do, is to buy a somewhat different machine than we would have employed earlier and integrate 

our IDENT system into the border crossing card system. 

Senator CANTWELL. Is there a problem with IAFIS and IDENT 

on this in the sense that one is a two-fingerprint and the other is 

a ten-fingerprint role? Aren’t there some integration issues? 

Mr. ZIGLAR. That is a totally different issue. 

Senator CANTWELL. But if we go down this one path with these 

two-fingerprint standards in one part of the system and then try 

to integrate it with another part of our information gathering—

Mr. ZIGLAR. No, it is really not. What we are trying to do is access the fingerprints that IAFIS has, and they will access the fingerprints that we have in IDENT. We have only two. They have 

ten, but the reliability of a two-print system is very, very high. 

Notwithstanding what my friend the Inspector General said, the 

system is much further along. The Justice Management Division is 

actually honchoing the integration of this between the FBI and the 

INS, and we are going to be deploying transitional work stations 

that integrate the IAFIS and IDENT systems. The integration of 

IAFIS and IDENT does not in any way impede the effectiveness of 

the border crossing card or laser visa system at all. 

Senator CANTWELL. Commissioner Ziglar, I want to get one more 

question in. We passed this legislation last night with authorizing 

language for tripling of border personnel—INS, Customs and border agents. Shouldn’t we use some of the $10 billion that has already been appropriated by Congress to get started on that project 

so that we can meet the challenge that we have right now with increased security levels at our borders, the challenge of actually 

doing exit interviews at our borders, and the sheer lopsidedness of 

the number of people that are at our Canadian border? 

Mr. ZIGLAR. Bless you for passing that and, yes, we should use 

some of that money. 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you. 

50

Mr. ZIGLAR. By the way, just for your information—you will be 

interested, since you are on the northern border—the day before 

yesterday, I redeployed 100 Border Patrol agents that had been 

part of the contingent we sent to the airports around the country 

that are now being phased out because of the National Guard. I 

have redeployed them to the northern border. 

We obviously have sent more inspectors up there. We now have 

24/7 on all of our ports of entry on the border, in conjunction with 

the Customs Service. So we are moving rapidly and we have got 

some other ideas, some of them out of-the-box ideas about how we 

can upgrade our northern border security in a very short time 

frame. 

Could I take one other second to say something? I couldn’t endorse more what Mary Ryan just said about intelligence information being available. From a technological point of view, we can get 

access to this information in one place. That is not something that 

can’t be done. We have the capacity to do that, but it doesn’t matter how much capacity you have got if the information that you 

need in the system is not there. 

What I saw before September 11 was a bunch of agencies with 

a bunch of territorial prerogatives that wouldn’t share information. 

We didn’t get NCIC III until fairly recently, and we only now have 

it at two of our ports of entry. Ambassador Ryan doesn’t get it at 

all where she needs it. 

Well, now, finally the Congress has mandated it, but we have to 

have Government agencies working together for the interests of the 

American people. And after September 11, I see something happening that should have happened a long time ago, and that is that 

we are working together, and that is very positive. We can solve 

the technology problems. We need the personnel, we need the 

money, but we can fix it. 

Senator CANTWELL. Well, I know my time is expired, but using 

some of the $10 billion that has already been appropriated, as opposed to waiting until next January or February to address this 

issue and coming back to Congress on the second $10 billion that 

has yet to be detailed out, would be a very positive step. 

Senator KYL. [Presiding.] Thank you very much. I will wait for 

the chairman to excuse this panel and call the next, though she 

had authorized me to do so, but I will express my personal thanks. 

I think we are probably going to quickly write a letter, probably to 

Governor Ridge, but we also will need to have you all be talking 

to the people you work with in support of this effort that we talked 

about here today. 

Mr. ZIGLAR. Senator Kyl, if I could make one comment, don’t get 

the idea that the executive branch isn’t working in a coordinated 

fashion to do exactly what you are talking about. I am very involved in that. I haven’t gotten much sleep in the last month, but 

I am going to tell you I am very involved in that. This administration, this executive branch—and this isn’t partisan—is working 

very hard to try to bring together all of the things that you were 

talking about. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. [Presiding.] If I might, I would like to 

thank this panel and I would like to—you haven’t asked your questions. I beg your pardon, Senator DeWine. 

51

Senator DEWINE. You know, Madam Chairman, they were getting ready to leave. Mr. Ziglar was almost out the door. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. ZIGLAR. I thought I had escaped, Senator. 

Senator DEWINE. He thought he had escaped me, but he hasn’t. 

Thank you very much. 

Commissioner, what role has the INS played in the recent investigation after September 11, and how well have you all done? Give 

us just a quick summary. 

Mr. ZIGLAR. We have played a very significant role, particularly 

with respect to the FBI. We have worked side by side with them 

both in the investigations and the interviews and the informationsharing. Notwithstanding the fact that we hadn’t had really good 

information-sharing electronically speaking, if you will, we do now 

because there are plenty of ways that you can patch together systems that will make them work. They may not be as efficient as 

you would like them, but we clearly have done that. 

We have generated an enormous number of leads independently 

of the FBI in this. I am not going to reveal numbers at this point, 

but I can tell you that this organization has responded magnificently to this. 

Senator DEWINE. Well, good for you and good for your team. 

Mr. ZIGLAR. It is not me; it is my team. 

Senator DEWINE. Ambassador Ryan, whose job is it to see that 

all countries are complying with the visa waiver program, and are 

they? In other words, if we have somebody out of compliance, one 

of our partners, who is screaming about that? 

Ms. RYAN. It is a joint responsibility that we share with the Department of Justice. In fact, the Commissioner and I met with our 

staffs immediately after September 11 to review the visa waiver 

program to take a look at countries that might be of more concern 

to us now after September 11. 

We are going to have reassessment teams go out to six countries 

to discuss with them their passport controls and border patrols. We 

have pushed very hard. All the countries but one now issue machine-readable passports, the one being Switzerland, and they plan 

to introduce it in early 2003. But we have pushed very hard on all 

of those countries, and we look forward to working with the Department of Justice and the Immigration Service in going out to 

these countries, the six that are of concern to us, to discuss with 

them and perhaps to drop countries from this program. 

Senator DEWINE. That was my next question. Do you have the 

authority to do that? 

Ms. RYAN. After the reassessments are done, yes, sir. 

Senator DEWINE. You don’t need any permission from anybody? 

You can do that? 

Mr. ZIGLAR. Well, we do it together. 

Senator DEWINE. I understand, but you administratively do 

that? 

Ms. RYAN. What we would do would be to make a recommendation to the Secretary of State and to the Attorney General that the 

Attorney General remove these countries from the program. 

Senator DEWINE. Let me just say as one member of the United 

States Senate, please don’t hesitate to do it if the facts are there. 

52

Mr. ZIGLAR. We can and we will. 

Senator DEWINE. If the facts are there. 

Ms. RYAN. Exactly. 

Senator DEWINE. We are through messing around. 

Ms. RYAN. Indeed. 

Senator DEWINE. All right. I think I can speak for most of my 

colleagues on that as well. 

You mentioned the program on the visa fee and the ability to 

keep the visa fee. What are you able to keep on each visa? 

Ms. RYAN. I can’t thank you enough for what you have done for 

us. In the aftermath of the World Trade Center bombing, when the 

Congress recognized that we had a systemic problem—it wasn’t a 

problem of a delinquent officer; it was a systemic problem that we 

were not automated—Congress gave us an authorization in fiscal 

year 1994 to charge a fee for every application for a non-immigrant 

visa and to keep the money. 

That fee is now $45, and that is an application fee; that is not 

an issuance fee. Just about everybody who applies for a non-immigrant visa pays a $45 fee and we are able to keep that money. With 

that money, over the years since fiscal year 1994, we have automated the world. 

Every visa-issuing post is online, in real-time, with the consular 

lookout system. It is a tremendous advance, a major advance in the 

protection of our borders, and it is because you all gave us that authorization and we were able to keep the money. Consular Services 

would have collapsed in the 1990s without that money. 

I don’t know if you have paid attention to what was happening 

to the State Department budget in the decade of the 1990s. 

Senator DEWINE. Yes, I have. 

Ms. RYAN. We were savaged. We are not even able to hire to attrition, let alone anything more than attrition. It was terrible. But 

with the money through the machine-readable visa fee which is 

paid for by aliens, by foreigners—not one cent of American taxpayer money has improved that system; it is paid for by the foreigners applying for visas—we are able to automate the world and 

to protect our Nation. 

Senator DEWINE. Well, it is a good model. 

Ms. RYAN. It is a tremendous, wonderful model. 

Senator DEWINE. I think it makes a lot of sense and we ought 

to continue to look at different ways of doing that that do make 

sense. 

One final comment and maybe a question to you, Mr. Ziglar. A 

lot of the theme of this hearing understandably has been on the integration of our systems and one part of the Government knowing 

what another part knows. It is an age-old problem. It is not unique 

to the INS. It is part of the way Government unfortunately operates, particularly in this country with all kinds of different agencies at the local, State and Federal level. I saw it as a county prosecutor and I have seen over the years in the law enforcement area 

at the local community level, having a judge in front of him or her 

and this person is a repeat offender and the data is not there and 

they don’t know it. They have got a DWI in Indiana and we don’t 

know it in Ohio, and it just goes on and on. 

53

Ultimately, we can talk about it up here and we can have hearing after hearing, but you all are going to be the ones that have 

to fix it. I have looked at this for over 20 years and I think I know 

a lot about it, but there is an awful lot I don’t know about it. I can’t 

really get into the weeds and the other members of the panel can’t 

get into the weeds. You have to fix it. 

Our obligation, though, is, when you come to us, to give you the 

resources that you need. And my final comment would simply be— and as Senator Kyl has said, we have a few members of the Appropriations Committee here, and, Mr. Ziglar, you know an awful lot 

of people on the Hill—please don’t hesitate to let us know what you 

all need. The climate is right to get it done. Let’s get it done as 

fast as we can. God bless our friends at OMB, but I hope their priorities are set correctly this time. 

Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Let me thank the panel and let me just 

say that from my perspective, one overwhelming thing comes 

through. Thirteen out of 19 terrorists obtained valid visas. Clearly, 

our system is not able to prevent a terrorist from getting a visa legally to come into this country. That ought to be a sobering fact 

for all of us. 

The more I listen to testimony, the more I come to the conclusion 

that we are never going to do it the way we are going, unless every 

agency of Government is able to enter into one terrorist-oriented 

database certain factors that they know about given individuals 

and that database is programmed to ring a bell when enough factors coincide, whatever the experts decide. 

I am really concerned about continuing to appropriate money for 

systems that don’t talk to each other. This is a colossal failure of 

our visa system. It doesn’t keep out people who would come in and 

destroy us. So what else would you have a visa system for if not 

to do that? We might as well do away with it all and let everybody 

just come and go as they want to. 

Ms. RYAN. I have to say that it is a failure of intelligence rather 

than a failure of the visa system. If we had the information, we 

would not have issued visas to these people. We did not have the 

information. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Then that information on individuals has 

to go into that centralized system. 

Ms. RYAN. Absolutely, but please don’t say it is a failure of the 

visa system. I have visa officers all over the world who are devastated by the fact that they issued to these people. One of them 

told me you can tell me it is not my fault because we didn’t have 

the information, but it is just as if a child ran in front of my car 

and I killed the child and everybody said it wasn’t my fault; I have 

to live with that for the rest of my life. 

So it isn’t a failure of the visa system. It is a lack of informationsharing, a lack of intelligence. We have to fix that, Madam Chairwoman. We have to fix it. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. It is a failure of the system. You know, I 

hear one agency blame another and it is very upsetting to me. We 

don’t have a system that works. 

I would like to thank you all, and any ideas that you might have 

as to how the system can be made to work I think this subVerDate Feb 1 2002 13:52 Aug 19, 2002 Jkt 081248 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\HEARINGS\81248.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
54

committee would very much appreciate receiving. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. ZIGLAR. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. FINE. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I would like to welcome the witnesses of 

our second panel. They are going to be, after listening to the discussion, describing some of the potential technological solutions to 

the problems identified, I think, by the first panel. 

We will begin with Mr. Steven Camarota. He is the Director of 

Research at the Center for Immigration Studies. He holds a master’s degree in political science from the University of Pennsylvania 

and a Ph.D. in public policy analysis from the University of Virginia. He has testified before Congress on prior occasions and published widely on the political and economic effects of immigration. 

His articles on the impact have appeared in both academic publications and the popular press. 

We are delighted to have him here today, and hopefully he is 

going to be able to shed some light on the vulnerabilities of our system and what might be done to correct them. 

Mr. Camarota? 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. CAMAROTA. Thank you very much. I would like to first, of 

course, thank the subcommittee for inviting me to testify today on 

an issue of critical importance to the future of our country. 

As we consider our responses to the horrific attacks of September 

11, we are clearly going to have to take action in many different 

areas. While it is absolutely essential that we not scapegoat immigrants or immigration, especially Muslim immigration, it is equally 

important that we recognize the most obvious fact: The current terrorist threat to the United States comes almost entirely from individuals who arrive from abroad. Thus, our immigration policy is 

critical to reducing the chance of future terrorist attacks. 

There are a number of changes that seem obvious and that are 

clearly needed. To start with, we need a fundamental change in attitude. Unfortunately, some Americans have come to see our borders as simply an obstacle to be overcome by travelers and businesses. This attitude clearly has to change. 

Most Americans certainly understand that our border is a critical 

tool for protecting our national interests. And by ‘‘border’’ I mean 

anyplace where foreign citizens enter the United States. A Zogby 

International poll taken in the—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Mr. Camarota, let me interrupt you. I am 

going to ask them to strictly enforce the five-minute limit so that 

we can have some discussions among us. 

Mr. CAMAROTA. Sure, okay. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Mr. CAMAROTA. A Zogby International poll taken in the wake of 

the attack found that the overwhelming majority of Americans felt 

that lax screening of immigrants and border control contributed to 

the attack. 

55

Now, in addition to a change in attitude, there are a number of 

practical things we can obviously do. First, there is visa processing 

overseas. Clearly, our consular staff of about 900 is extremely overworked, with 7.1 million non-immigrant visas or temporary visas 

being processed. The numbers are enormous and they are growing 

rapidly. Because of this ballooning of consular work, most consular 

officials only have a few minutes to interview each applicant. 

Clearly, more staff is needed. 

Now, to successfully handle such a caseload and keep those out 

whom we need to keep out, the watch list, which is, of course, a 

compilation of names of people who are not to be issued visas, is 

our most important tool. To the extent possible, we need to integrate, as we have already heard, biometric measures in there. 

Many individuals who are on the watch list have already been arrested in their home countries or on prior stays in the United 

States, and to the extent possible we need to add fingerprints and 

photos to the list. 

Of course, the next layer of defense is our borders. As we have 

heard, hundreds of millions of people cross our borders each year. 

Many more inspectors obviously need to be hired and we need more 

inspection stations. But most important, we need a system whereby 

all entries and exits are recorded to the United States. 

The whole notion of a temporary visa is pointless if we don’t 

know whether the time limit has been honored, and to do that we 

need an entry/exit system. Our visas should use smart card type 

technology containing a photo and fingerprints that can be scanned 

each time a person enters or exits the country. 

Of course, these changes will be meaningless if it continues to be 

easy to cross the border illegally between crossing points. An inspector general report found that on the Canadian border, large 

sections of the border continue to be unmonitored. 

Of course, again, technology can be very useful here. Not every 

inch of the border has to be manned. Advanced sensors designed 

to detect motion can be valuable force multipliers, but as we have 

already heard, they won’t be very useful if there aren’t enough of 

them and they don’t cover the whole border and not enough agents 

are there to respond if one of them is triggered. 

Of course, we also need to do something more in terms of interior 

enforcement. Current proposals for a tracking system for students 

must be extended to all non-student temporary visa-holders. Tracking is desirable because these long-term visitors reside here for 

long periods of time in legal status. Thus, they have time to hatch 

sophisticated plots. 

While a tracking system is certainly important, the centerpiece 

of any interior enforcement strategy has to be in enforcing the prohibition on hiring illegal aliens. Worksite enforcement, as it is commonly called, is critically important for several reasons. 

First, in terms of gaining control of the border, it will only be 

possible to do that if we reduce the number of people who are trying to come here looking for jobs. If they don’t think the jobs are 

available, then they won’t be crossing the border. Thus, it is critical 

to have worksite enforcement to gain control of the illegal crossing 

points of our border. Moreover, it will be much harder for terrorists 

56

who overstay their visas to blend into the normal life of the United 

States if finding a job is made much more difficult. 

Now, to have effective worksite enforcement, we need a national 

computerized system that allows employers to verify instantly that 

a person is legally entitled to work in the United States. Such a 

system would also have the advantage of letting us know where 

many legal immigrants, here on permanent residency visas, are 

working. At present, we have no idea where they are because they 

wouldn’t be included in any temporary tracking system. So worksite enforcement could be a powerful tool for tracking people on 

permanent immigrant visas before they become citizens. Several 

terrorists in the past have been in that status, so this would be another important factor. 

The last change that is needed is that we might need to consider, 

at least temporarily, a reduction in the number of permanent and 

temporary visas. The most important reason to do this is that the 

INS clearly needs time to have some breathing room to deal with 

the implementation of all the new technologies. 

We are talking about increasing the size of its staff, and this 

kind of training and new investment requires a breathing space for 

the INS so that it can get up to speed. That is why I think we want 

to look at a reduction in the number of visas that we are issuing. 

Some, of course, may object to a more tightly controlled border 

that uses the latest technology because it is looking for a needle in 

a haystack. But the point is all technology and all border enforcement and all kinds of security measures are always aimed at the 

tiny fraction of people who want to cross. 

I see that I am out of time, so I will stop my comments now. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Camarota follows:]

STATEMENT OF STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH CENTER FOR

IMMIGRATION STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC 20005

INTRODUCTION

The nation’s responses to the horrific attacks of September 11 will clearly have 

to be in many different areas: including military retaliation, freezing terrorist assets, diplomatic initiatives, improvements in intelligence gathering, and expanded 

security measures at airports, utilities and other public places. But one aspect of 

increased preparedness must not be overlooked—changes in immigration and border 

control. Though alll the details have been released, it seems clear that the 19 terrorists of September 11 were all foreign citizens and entered the United States legally, 

as tourists, business travelers, or students. This was also true of the perpetrators 

of previous terrorist acts, including Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the first World 

Trade Center bombing in 1993, Mir Amal Kasi, murderer of two CIA employees the 

same year, and Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, convicted in 1995 of plotting a terror 

campaign in New York. 

While it is absolutely essential that we not scapegoat immigrants, especially Muslim immigrants, we also must not overlook the most obvious fact: the current terrorist threat to the United States comes almost exclusively from individuals who arrive from abroad. Thus, our immigration policy, including temporary and permanent 

visas issuance, border control, and efforts to deal with illegal immigration are all 

critical to reducing the chance of an attack in the future. 

Much has been written about how we are involved in a new kind of war. In this 

new kind of conflict, America’s borders are a major theater of operations. This is 

because the primary weapons of our enemies are not aircraft carriers or even commercial airliners, but rather the terrorists themselves—thus keeping the terrorists 

out or apprehending them after they get in is going to be an indispensible element 

of victory. The simple fact is that if the terrorists can’t enter the country, they won’t 

be able to commit an attack on American soil. 

57

1The results of the Zogby International poll on immigration and terrorism can be found at 

www.cis.org/articles/2001/terrorpoll.html. 2Former State Department employee Nikolai Wenzel describes conditions at overseas consulates in a report public by the Center for Immigration Studies. The report is available at 

www.cis.org/articles/2000/back800.html 

The president implicitly acknowledged this fact in announcing the creation of a 

new Office of Homeland Security, which ‘‘will lead, oversee and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard our country against terrorism.’’ In a very 

real sense, we already have a homeland security agency—it’s called the Immigration 

and Naturalization Service (INS). The precursor of the INS was established in the 

Treasury Department in 1891 and moved to the new Department of Commerce and 

Labor in 1903. But in 1940, as war neared, it was moved to the Department of Justice. As Cornell professor Vernon Briggs has written, the move was done because 

‘‘It was feared that immigration would become a way of entry for enemy spies and 

saboteurs,’’ and President Roosevelt himself said the change was made solely for 

reasons of ‘‘national safety.’’ A history of the INS describes its war-related duties: 

‘‘Recording and fingerprinting every alien in the United States through the Alien 

Registration Program; . . . constant guard of national borders by the Border Patrol; 

record checks related to security clearances for immigrant defense workers. . .’’

A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN ATTITUDE ABOUT OUR NATION’S BORDERS

Most Americans understand that our border is a critical tool for protecting America’s national interests. (By border I mean any place where foreign citizens enter 

the United States.) A Zogby International poll taken in the wake of the attacks 

found that the overwhelming majority of Americans, across all races, regions, incomes, and political beliefs blamed lax border control and screening of immigrants 

for contributing to the attacks and believed that improved immigration enforcement 

would reduce the likelihood of future atrocities.1 There can be little doubt that 

greatly stepped-up efforts to control the border would be met with overwhelming 

support by the American people. Unfortunately a small but politically very influential portion of America’s leadership has come to see our borders as simply an obstacle to be overcome by travelers and businesses. This attitude clearly has to change. 

If we take the physical safety of our people seriously, our mechanisms for controlling and monitoring the movement of foreign citizens across our borders must be 

improved in three places: overseas, at the border itself, and inside the country. 

VISA PROCESSING OVERSEAS

Entry to the United States is not a right, but a privilege, granted exclusively at 

our discretion. For the most part that discretion is exercised by members of the 

State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, often referred to as the Consular 

Corps. Among their other duties, these men and women make the all-important decisions about who gets a visa to enter the United States, making them the forward 

guard of homeland defense—America’s other Border Patrol. 

Recent improvements. Unfortunately, the Consular Corps has neither the manpower, nor the tools to fulfill this heavy responsibility properly. Most importantly, 

management of the consular corps offers distorted incentives to officers in the field. 

Mary Ryan, who became Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs in 1993 

and is in charge of visa issuance and the other consular responsibilities, has overseen genuine technical improvements in the issuing of visas. These changes have 

included making visas machine-readable and more difficult to forge than in the past. 

Also, the ‘‘watch list’’ of people who should not be granted visas is now computerized, rather than the old microfiche-based system in place until just a few years ago. 

The American people and not visa applicants is the customer. But along with improvements, the Consular Corps has also adopted a culture of service rather than 

skepticism, in which visa officers are expected to consider their customers to be the 

visa applicants. Thus, satisfying the customer—the foreign visa applicant—has become one of the most important goals, leading to pressure to speed processing and 

approve marginal applications. As one former Foreign Service officer has written, 

‘‘State Department procedures call for supervisory review of refusals, but not 

issuances—thus, relatively inexperienced junior officers are trusted to issue visas 

but are second-guessed on refusals.’’ 2 Visa officers are judged by the number of 

interviews conducted each day and politeness to applicants rather than the thoroughness of screening applicants. This is especially ironic given that the law requires precisely the opposite approach, placing the burden of proof on the applicant 

for a temporary non-immigrant visa. 

58

A Conflict of interest between visa processing and diplomacy. Responsibility for 

issuing visas fell to the State Department because it was the only agency with offices overseas, where the demand was. But it is difficult to imagine two less complementary functions than diplomacy and immigration enforcement. The diplomat’s goal of promoting cooperation and compromise is sometimes in conflict with the 

gatekeeper’s goal of exposing fraud and ensuring compliance with the law. This systemic mismatch is likely to persist regardless of management changes and may only 

be remedied by transferring all visa-issuing responsibilities overseas to the INS or 

perhaps a new ‘‘Visa Corps.’’ A new separate ‘‘Visa Corps?’’ A new free-standing visa issuing agency would have 

offices in consulates around the world, and would issue visas and be answerable not 

to the local ambassador, but to the head of this new agency or perhaps even the 

head of homeland security. If INS was to take control of visa processing overseas, 

then the Visa Corps could be answerable to INS headquarters in Washington. Moreover, if visa processing was the career choice of all visa officers, those who would 

work in this area would be able to hone their skills at spotting fraud or security 

risks. Visa officers need to be highly trained professionals, specializing in their function, respected by their agency, and insulated, to the extent possible, from political 

pressure. Such a system would be an invaluable asset in making our nations safer 

from terrorism. 

More resources are needed. Administrative changes, of course, won’t matter much 

if there aren’t enough people to handle the work. The Bureau of Consular Affairs 

has only 900 Foreign Service officers overseas, assisted by 2,500 foreign nationals, 

and the demand for visas to visit the United States is enormous. Last year, the 

State Department issued 7.1 million non-immigrant visas, up 15 percent from 1995, 

and more than triple the number issued 30 years ago, when the majority of visas 

were issued to citizens of countries (mainly Western Europe and Japan) which now 

no longer need visas when arriving on short visits. 

Because of this ballooning workload, all junior Foreign Service officers are required to adjudicate visa applications for a year or more, turning this profound responsibility into a dreaded rite of passage for new Foreign Service officers. Consular 

officers often have no more than a few minutes to assess each application. What’s more, visa responsibilities are held in such low regard institutionally that consular 

ranks are often filled by unemployed spouses of local Foreign Service officers. 

Watch lists and biometric identification. But even with adjusted incentives and 

adequate personnel, successfully handling such an enormous workload, and keeping 

out those who would do us harm requires the right tools. The primary tool in flagging terrorists is the ‘‘watch list,’’ (also called the ‘‘look out’’ system) a compilation 

of several million people who are not to be issued visas. Obviously, effective intelligence is required for the watch list to be valuable, but based as it currently is solely on names, rather than also using a biometric identifier like a fingerprint, means 

that many possible terrorist might slip through. While fingerprints will never be 

available on most of those on the list, many persons on the watch list have been 

arrested or detained by authorities in other countries or on previous stays in the 

United States. To the extent possible we need to obtain these fingerprints and make 

them part of the watch list database. 

To be most effective, the visa process should start with each applicant’s fingerprints being digitally scanned into an integrated system which can be accessed by 

everyone involved in the immigration process—overseas, at the border, and within 

the country. These fingerprints should be checked against the watch list. Ideally, 

visitors’ fingerprints should be scanned again when they enter the country, and 

again when they leave. This wouldn’t be cheap to establish, but the technology is 

already widely used; in fact, the Border Patrol has been scanning fingerprints of illegal aliens apprehended on the Mexican border for several years now. Gathering 

applicant fingerprints and scanning them again when a person enters and leaves 

the country would serve many purposes: First, it would be a way of definitively determining that someone has entered the country and also that they have left when 

they are supposed to. Second: it would be a way of excluding those on the watch 

list for whom we have fingerprints. Third, it would establish identification, ensuring 

that the person issued the visa is the same person entering the country. Fourth, 

it would prevent individuals from going from consulate to consulate using different 

identities if they have been denied a visa at one location. Fifth, providing the U.S. 

government with fingerprints would by itself be a significant deterrent to would-be 

terrorists who certainly would be reluctant to give the government this information. 

To the extent possible we also need to put photos of suspected terrorists on the 

watch list as well. If we took a digital photo of every visa applicant and ran it 

through facial recognition software, (which is already pretty well developed), along 

with fingerprints for each applicant, we might also be able to identify suspected 

59

torrorists even if they apply for a visa using a false identity. While something like 

a facial recognition system would take time to implement, there are other simpler 

things we can do right away to make the list much more effective. the State Department’s watch list could include access to the FBI criminal database, at present it 

does not. With the right management, staffing, and technology, the process of 

screening those we want to keep out would be much more effective. A number of 

procedural and legal changes would also help. 

Exclude all enemies of America. Visa officers should be instructed to deny visas 

to people who are clearly enemies of America, but who have not actually committed 

a terrorist act. Currently, the law makes it extremely difficult to turn down an applicant because of his ‘‘beliefs, statements, or associations, if such beliefs, statements, or associations would be lawful within the United States.’’ As the law now 

reads, keeping out a terrorist sympathizer, who publically organize demonstrations 

calling for the destruction of America or actively distributes Osama bin Laden videos, but who as far as we know, hasn’t yet raised money for terrorist groups or 

planned out an assault, requires the Secretary of State to personally make the decision and then report each individual instance to congress. As a result, few if any 

individuals are excluded based on their anti-American beliefs. 

We will not, of course, know the political beliefs of most applicants. However, just 

has we learn about the possible terrorist links of some individuals from friendly governments as well as our own intelligence, we will also learn of those who express 

strong anti-American views. These individuals can then be added to the watch list. 

Some may object to the idea of excluding people based only on their political beliefs, 

but it is important to remember that getting a visa to come to America is a privilege, not a right, and it is only common sense to exclude those who advocate violence 

towards our country. This is especially true during a time of war when the only way 

for the terrorist to attack us on our own soil is if we allow them into the country. 

Moreover, being denied a visa does not prevent such a person from continuing to 

express their views. He or she is free to do so in their own country. One can only 

imagine the American public’s reaction if it is revealed in the aftermath of another 

attack that the anti-American views of the terrorist were know and he was still 

issued a visa to come to America. It is simply irresponsible not exclude all such individuals. 

More through screening for applicants from some countries. Additionally, citizens 

of those countries whose governments do not sponsor terrorism, but whose citizens 

have come here as terrorists (Egypt or Saudi Arabia, for example) should have to 

pass a much higher bar for visa issuance, including a thorough security clearance 

(working with local authorities) and confirmation with universities of each student 

visa application. This should also apply to visa applicants born in these countries 

but now holding other citizenship. In addition, no visas should be issued to citizens 

of Middle Eastern countries at U.S. consulates outside their home countries; this is 

because an American visa officer in Germany is less likely to be able to identify a 

problem applicant from Saudi Arabia than his counterpart based in Saudi Arabia. 

There is nothing unprecedented about such country-specific temporary visa policies; for instance, a person from Poland currently needs a visa to vacation in the 

United States, whereas a persons from Japan does not, because Poles are more likely to overstay their visas than Japanese. It is true that these provisions apply only 

to temporary visas, but a much higher bar for both temporary and permanent visas 

for nationals from some countries is simply a logical extension of this kind of policy. 

Excluding persons based on religion or nationality is not justified. The fact that 

the terrorist attacks of September 11 were perpetrated by foreign-born Muslims may 

tempt some to support the elimination of visas for all Muslims or Middle Easterners 

in an effort to reduce or eliminate the foreign terrorist threat in the future. While 

more vigorous backgrounder checks for persons born in some countries makes sense 

and may result in a higher percentage being denied visas, efforts to exclude entire 

countries or religions should be resisted. Changes of this kind would harken back 

to immigration law prior to 1965 when the number of permanent residency visas 

were severely restricted for southern and eastern European countries, while immigration from Western Europe was much less restricted. Using religion or nationality 

as a basis for issuing visas is not only inconsistent with American values but may 

also anger Middle Eastern countries whose cooperation we very much need in the 

war on terrorism. 

There may well be compelling national security or other reasons to reduce both 

temporary and permanent immigration, but changes should apply equally to all 

countries not just those in some parts of the world. Later in my testimony I explore 

some of the reasons why we may wish to reduce the overall level of immigration. 

Selective enforcement of immigration law also must not be undertaken. For example, we should definitely not pursue visa overstayers who are from the Middle East 

60

more vigorously than those from other counties. Instead, we need to develop enforcement strategies that apply forcefully to all overstayers. By definition all those who 

have overstayed their visas or entered the country without permission have broken 

the law and should be made to leave the country. Signaling out one group for enforcement is not only unfair and un-American but it is probably unconstitutional as 

well. 

CONTROLLING THE BORDER

The next layer of protection is the border itself, which has two elements—‘‘ports 

of entry,’’ which are the points where people traveling by land, sea, or air entering 

the United States, and the stretches between those entry points. The first are 

staffed by immigration and Customs inspectors, the second monitored by the Border 

Patrol and the Coast Guard. 

The need for improvements at the ports of entry is dire. Last year there were 

more than 500 million entries at these legal entry points, mostly at land bordercrossings and many of them commuters. Close to half of these entries are returning 

U.S. citizens, and others are border commuters, but the number of foreign visitors 

is still enormous. In 1999, there were more than 31 million ‘‘non-immigrant’’ admissions (not counting Canadians and Mexicans on short visits), almost triple the number of 20 years ago. These were mostly tourists (24 million) and business travelers 

(4.5 million), but also included nearly a million students and exchange visitors and 

about the same number of ‘‘temporary’’ workers and corporate transferees. In fact, 

the INS states of the above numbers, ‘‘Inspections data for land passenger traffic 

are estimates that may contain unspecified margins of error.’’ Put simply, the INS 

does not know how many people are entering the country. 

A greater investment in manpower and infrastructure at the border. The land 

crossing points are often not fully staffed, and not every car or truck is examined. 

Part of the solution here is straightforward—many more inspectors and more inspection lanes at crossing points. Immigrant smuggling through ports of entry, 

using fake papers or hiding in secret compartments, was almost completely shut 

down when security along the borders was tightened in the wake of the September 

11 attacks. The problem, of course, was that inadequate staffing and infrastructure 

caused long waits—but thorough checking plus additional inspectors can equal better security without excessive delay. 

This attitude toward border security should have changed in December 1999, 

when one Ahmed Ressam was stopped by a border inspector at a crossing in Washington state. It turns out that he had trained at bin Laden’s terrorist camps in Afghanistan and had a car full of explosives with which he was going to disrupt millennium celebrations in Seattle and blow up Los Angeles International Airport. He 

had entered Canada with a forged passport, requested political asylum, and was released into the population, pending a court date. This is standard practice in Canada, and underlines the importance of better border control. 

Entry Exit System. There is also a long-standing and very real problem that the 

INS also does not know whether foreign visitors admitted on visas actually leave 

the country when their visas expire. There is no mechanism for tracking land departures, and the system for tracking arrivals and departures by air, which is how most 

visa-holders travel, is completely broken. The current system requires foreign visitors to fill out a two-part form with their name, passport number, destination. The 

visitor then hands one part to the U.S. immigration inspector upon arrival. The 

other half is collected by the flight attendants on the outbound flight and later 

transferred to the INS. The opportunities for failure are enormous: airlines often 

don’t collect the forms or forward them to INS; visitors may enter by air but leave 

by land, leaving no trace of their departure; the information on the paper forms may 

be improperly keyed in. This system is so dysfunctional that the INS’s own statistics 

division considers any departure data after 1992 to be worthless. 

Time-limited visas are pointless with out entry-exit system. Temporary visa are 

only meaningful if we know whether the deadline has been honored. Because we do 

not collect accurate exit information, we have no way of knowing if someone has left 

the country. The result of this situation is a list of millions of people who appear 

not to have left, most of whom really have. Because of this, it is impossible to pick 

out the actual ‘‘visa over-stayers.’’ As a result, if the FBI asks the INS if a particular 

individual is in the country, in may cases the INS must respond they simply do not 

know. In total, there are an estimated 3 to 4 million people living in the United 

States who entered the country legally, but never left, accounting for perhaps 40 

percent of the total illegal-alien population. 

The bipartisan U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, headed by the late Barbara Jordan, in 1994 called for computerized tracking of all arrivals and departures 

61

3The entire report is available www.usdoj.gov./oig/i200004/i200004.htm. 

by land, sea, and air (including Canadians who don’t need visas). Congress in the 

1996 immigration law directed the INS to develop such a system, but partly at the 

behest of the business community in border-states, this provision was postponed and 

in 2000 effectively shelved. The concern was that the system would create interminable traffic jams as people lined up to enter and leave the United States—but a 

technologically modern system with an adequate number of scanners should not significantly impede traffic at all. This, of course, would mean greatly increased investment in equipment, personnel, and infrastructure at the border as well. For example, where there are now 10 lanes of traffic and inspection stations there may need 

to be 20 and where there are now 20 lanes there may need to be 40. The only other 

alternative is to expose the country to unacceptable risk. 

Border Patrol is grossly inadequate. The situation isn’t much better between the 

ports of entry. Better screening of visa applicants and a tightly monitored entry-exit 

system would be almost meaningless if it continues to be easy to cross the border 

illegally. A serious attempt has been made in recent years to increase the Border 

Patrol, although the total number of agents there is still only about 9,000 overall, 

and on any given shift, there are only about 1,700 agents on duty at the southern 

border or an average of less than one agent per mile. Moreover, there are only a 

few hundred agents patrolling the entire Canadian border, and this is where terrorists are more likely to enter for a variety of reasons, including the fact that immigrant communities in many Canadian cities provide excellent cover, whereas someone from the Middle East could not blend in so easily on the Mexican border. 

A February 2000 report by the Justice Department’s Inspector General sheds light 

on how inadequately the northern border is patrolled. It found that at one 300-mile 

sector of the border, agents identified 65 smuggling corridors but had only 36 sensors to monitor them.3 Such sensors, designed to detect motion or heat or metallic 

objects, can be a valuable force-multiplier, but they will not be useful unless there 

are enough of them to cover the border and enough agents to respond when they 

are triggered. What’s more, the IG report found that in some short-handed sectors, 

there are times when there are no agents on duty at all, a fact which quickly becomes apparent to various kinds of smugglers and terrorists trying to cross the border. 

The answer, of course, is increased personnel and a serious commitment to border 

security. The Border Patrol has actually increased significantly since the mid-90s, 

and has been doing a much better job of patrolling the southern border, dramatically reducing illegal crossings near major cities and forcing smugglers to resort to 

more remote areas, where they are more easily detected. These successes need to 

be expanded upon while improving coverage of the northern border as well. The 

Border Patrol could be increased from its current total of less than 10,000 up to 

30,000 or 40,000 people without even nearing the point of diminishing returns. This 

cannot be accomplished overnight, however, because it takes time to build a trained 

and experienced force. Nonetheless, failure to properly police the border between 

crossing points would be a huge invitation to terrorists rendering all our other efforts at immigration enforcement irrelevant. 

Increased Border Patrol is not militarization. Some may object to such measures, 

and even to the increased border enforcement that has already taken place, as ‘‘militarization’’ of the border. Such objections highlight the important difference between 

the respective roles of soldiers and law enforcement; soldiers are supposed to find 

and kill the enemy, while law enforcement agencies, like the Border Patrol (and the 

Coast Guard), deter or apprehend wrongdoers. Assigning troops to patrol our borders would indeed be a militarization of border enforcement, and should be a very 

last resort (although using military support capabilities, such as radar and roadbuilding, to assist the Border Patrol is appropriate, even necessary). But the way 

to avoid militarization is to build up the capacity of the Border Patrol such that 

there would be no reason to call for troops on the border. 

INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT

The final layer of effective immigration control lies inside the country. As already 

discussed, the federal government has no idea whether foreign visitors have left 

when their visas expire. In addition, it has no idea where foreign citizens live when 

their visas are still valid. 

Tracking tourists and business travelers would be difficult—even in the current 

environment, it is unrealistic to require all foreign visitors to submit their passports 

every time they check into a hotel and to expect hotels to report that information. 

Currently, foreign travelers are required to write down their destination upon enterVerDate Feb 1 2002 13:52 Aug 19, 2002 Jkt 081248 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\81248.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
62

4 Because the INS does not carefully track enter and exits, these figures include an unknown 

number of reentries by the same individual. 5 A copy of the report can be found at the institute’s web page www.washingtoninstitute.org 

ing the United States, but no effort is made to verify the information; in fact, two 

of the September 11 jihadists listed ‘‘Marriott Hotel, New York’’ as their destination. 

Resources could be more fruitfully spent elsewhere. Of course, this is why more 

stringent controls on issuing visas and real-time tracking of visa overstays are so 

important. But even with better screening and tracking of overstays, if we continue 

to almost entirely neglect enforcement of immigration law and allow millions of 

illegals to live in the country, we will also continue to expose our country to very 

significant terrorists threats. Fortunately there are a number of steps that can be 

taken to enforce the law within the United States. 

A tracking system for temporary visa holders. Tracking of foreign citizens residing 

here for extended periods of time, affiliated with some American institution responsible for their whereabouts, is both possible and desirable. It’s desirable because 

these long-term visitors (here from one to six years, or more) reside here for long 

periods of time in a legal status, whereas short-term visitors are less likely to have 

the time to hatch sophisticated plots before their visas expire. In our open society, 

there has been only the most perfunctory oversight of such long-term foreign students and workers—so perfunctory, in fact, that at least one of the September 11 

terrorists entered the country on a student visa but never showed up for class, without triggering any concern anywhere. 

And although short-term tourists and business travelers, who are not attached to 

any American institution, make up the majority of non-immigrants, the number of 

long-term visa holders requiring oversight is still quite large. In 1999, there were 

more than 923,000 foreign students and exchange visitors admitted (including their 

spouses and young children), up 45 percent just from 1995. The number of long-term 

foreign workers, plus family members, was about 1 million in 1999, up 123 percent 

from 1995.4

The 1996 immigration law mandated the INS to develop a computerized tracking 

system for foreign students, to replace the current manual, paper-based system. Unfortunately, the system has not gone beyond the pilot stage, and is only tested in 

a couple of dozen southeastern schools, largely because of opposition from universities and colleges. Institutions have opposed it, fearing the extra administrative 

burden associated with such a system. Many also do not like the idea of treating 

foreign students differently from their American counterparts. But given the very 

real threats we face, tracking all visitors makes perfect sense. 

The problem with the whole foreign students program is not simply one of visa 

fraud or overstays; the nature of their studies is also a matter of concern. In 1997, 

the Washington Institute for Near East Policy published a report highlighting the 

weaknesses in our efforts to prevent students from terrorism-sponsoring states from 

studying subjects that would benefit those countries’ weapons programs.5 Not only 

are very few students denied visas based on their desired fields of study, but the 

lack of monitoring allows them to declare their intention to study some innocuous 

social science, for instance, but then change majors to nuclear engineering or the 

like, without anyone in the government being alerted to this fact. 

Tracking system for foreign students must be expanded to non-students. The experimental INS system to track foreign students will almost certainly be accelerated 

in the wake of September 11. But this will not address the fact that there are an 

additional million temporary workers and trainees and intra-company transferees 

who are not included in the system, and they are not effectively tracked by any 

other means. Expanding the new tracking system to cover both foreign students and 

foreign workers is needed to ensure the system is as comprehensive as possible. 

In a nutshell, to effectively control our border the government needs an integrated 

system that uses a biometric identifier like a fingerprint to create a single file for 

each foreign citizen planning to visit the United States, and track that person during the entire process—at each step in the visa process, each land border crossing, 

each entry and exit at airports, each change in status at school or work, each arrest, 

each application for government benefits. This file should be accessible to law enforcement and linked to the databases of the FBI, IRS, Social Security, Selective 

Service, and other federal agencies. There is no other way to keep admitting large 

numbers of foreign citizens and maintain security as well. 

It is important to emphasize that at a time when there is much discussion of 

curbs on the civil liberties of Americans, better tracking of foreign citizens not only 

addresses the core of the security problem but should also be especially appealing 

because it does not effect the civil liberties of any Americans, only guests from overseas whose presence here is a privilege. 

63

Ending Section 245(i) Another change regarding immigrants that would enhance 

homeland security would be the permanent elimination of a provision in the immigration law known as section ‘‘245(i).’’ This allows illegal aliens on the waiting list 

for a green card (because, for instance, they have married an American) to undergo 

visa processing and receive their permanent residence visa without having to leave 

the country and go to the U.S. consulate in their home country. 

This provision is problematic not only because it rewards immigration line-jumpers but because it compromises homeland security. The INS official who processes 

the visa in the United States is much less likely to detect a possible terrorist or 

criminal among applicants than is a consular officer in the alien’s home country, 

who is familiar with the local language and has contacts with local law enforcement. 

Not only does 245(i) undermine efforts to screen out terrorists, but it also negates 

our ability to keep out those judged to be dangerous—because they’re already here, 

whereas an alien who went home only to be found ineligible would, in effect, have 

deported himself. 

Enforcing the ban on hiring illegals aliens. The centerpiece of any interior enforcement strategy has to be enforcing the prohibition on hiring illegal aliens. While 

worksite enoforcement, as it is commonly called, may not seem to be vital to national security at first glance, it is in fact critically important to reducing the terrorist threat. In 1986, Congress prohibited the employment of illegal aliens, although enforcement was at first spotty and has been virtually non-existent for the 

past couple of years. Although it is obviously directed at turning off the magnet of 

jobs attracting conventional illegal aliens, such worksite enforcement is also important for anti-terrorism efforts. Gaining control of the border between crossing points 

is probably only possible if we dramatically reduce the number of illegal job seekers 

who routinely cross into the United States. If prospective illegal aliens knew there 

was no job waiting for them in the United States, many fewer would try and cross 

illegally. 

In addition, it would be much harder for terrorists who overstay their visas to 

blend into normal life if finding a job is made much more difficult. Of course, they 

could still come with wads of cash and some might still live undetected, but doing 

so would be much harder to pull off if getting a job is much more difficult. 

Even if one favors a guestworker program for workers from Mexico or elsewhere 

as the solution to illegal immigration, it would still be absolutely necessary to put 

in place a strong work site enforcement regime before implementing a guest worker 

program. Otherwise, there would be no incentive for those illegals already in the 

country or those thinking about entering illegally to sign up for such a program. 

How would such a system work? There are two steps that are needed to make 

worksite enforcement effective. First, a national computerized system that allows 

employers to verify instantly that a person is legally entitled to work in the United 

States needs to be implemented. Employers would submit the name, date of birth, 

Social Security Number (SSN) or alien registration number to the INS of each new 

hire. Much of this information is already collected on paper, but is not used by the 

INS. After an instant check of its database, the employers would then receive back 

from the INS an authorization number indicating that the person is allowed to work 

in the United States. The authorization number from the INS would provide the employer with an iron-clad defense against the charge that they knowingly hired an 

illegal alien. Tests of such systems have generally been well received by employers. 

Document fraud, of course, is widespread, but a computerized system would be 

a key tool in uncovering it. For example, a valid SSN that is attached to different 

names submitted to the INS or a SSN and name that show up in many different 

employers across the country would both be indications that a worker is trying to 

skirt the law. The INS could develop procedures to identify potential problems of 

this kind. When a potential problem is found, the INS would then go out to the employer and examine all the paperwork for the employee, perhaps conduct an interview with the worker and determine the source of the problem. This would require 

the second important change that is needed: a dramatic increase in the number of 

worksite inspectors. At present there are only the full-time equivalent of 300 INS 

inspectors devoted to worksite enforcement, whose job it is to enforce the ban on 

hiring the 5 or 6 million illegal immigrants now working in the country. These numbers would have to be increased to perhaps 3,000. 

These inspectors would perform two main tasks: they would go out to employers 

identified by the verification system as having a potential problem and secondly 

they would randomly visit worksites to see that employers were filing the paperwork for each worker as required by law. Those employers found to be knowingly 

hiring illegals would be made to pay stiff fines. Because the data needed for such 

a system is already collected and the law already forbids the hiring of illegals, all 

that is need is a verification system and significantly more resources for worksite 

64

inspectors. Failure to developed such a system means that millions of illegal immigrants will continue to work and live in the United State facing little or no penalty. 

Not only does this make a mockery of the rule of law, it also exposes the country 

to significant security risks. 

Employment verification and alien registrations. Most of the recommendations 

outlined above have dealt with temporary visa holders or efforts to reduce illegal 

immigration. More effective monitoring is also needed of permanent residents, i.e., 

legal immigrants, with ‘‘green cards,’’ who will after a time become eligible for citizenship. Several past terrorist attackers have been legal immigrants, and that may 

well increase as a result of military reprisals against terrorists overseas. In 1940, 

as a homeland security measure, Congress required all non-citizens living in the 

United States to register annually their whereabouts with the INS. This provision 

was repealed in the 1980s and should probably not be revived in that form. Potential terrorists cannot be expected to dutifully send in their addresses. However, the 

employment verification system outlined above could be a very effective tool in locating non-citizen legal immigrants. This is especially important when a person is 

placed on the watch list after he has entered the country. At present, there is often 

no way for the INS to know where that individual lives. However, the employment 

verification process would provide the INS with the employer for non-citizen legal 

immigrants who work. Thus, if it became necessary to arrest or at least undertake 

surveillance of a non-citizen, their last known employer would be a place to start. 

The verification system would in effect be alien registration for most resident aliens. 

Integrated databases. One reform that would probably be relatively easy to undertake would be for the INS to integrate all of its various databases. At present, separate databases are maintained for non-immigrants, immigrants, citizenship applications, and deportations. The INS needs to establish a single integrated file on each 

foreign citizen that uses a biometric identifier like a digital fingerprint. This file 

would contain information from each step in the visa process: including each land 

border crossing, each entry and exit at airports, each change in status at school or 

work, each arrest, as well any application for permanent residence. This file should 

be accessible to law enforcement and would remain open until the person becomes 

a citizen. 

REDUCE THE NUMBER OF PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY VISAS? 

The responses outlined above, whether overseas, at the border, or inside the 

United States, would not catch all malefactors. But the improvements outlined 

above would almost certainly be very helpful in alerting us to large conspiracies like 

the September 11 attacks. If only a few of the dozens of conspirators had been identified by consular officers or border inspectors, it is very likely that the entire conspiracy would have unraveled. 

Less immigration means better enforcement. But what of the actual number of people we admit via these mechanisms? There are two fundamental reasons to consider 

reducing the number of student, exchange and worker temporary visas, and permanent residence visas: the fewer visas we issue the more thorough the background 

checks that can be conducted. Moreover, fewer visas also mean fewer foreign nationals living in the United States, making it much easier to keep track of those allowed 

into the country. 

It seems very unlikely that the INS and State Department can undertake the necessary reforms and expansions if they also have to continue processing hundreds of 

thousands of new immigrant, foreign student, exchange and worker visas each year. 

The General Accounting Office reported in May that the receipt of new applications 

(green cards, citizenship, temporary workers, etc.) has increased 50 percent over the 

past six years, while the backlog of unresolved applications has quadrupled to nearly 4 million. Few if any government agencies could be expected to handle such a 

crush of new work while assuming added responsibilities, even if provided with increased resources. The INS in particular has had a great deal of difficulty in modernizing and using additional resources. Its computer systems, for example, are 

among the most outdated in any part of the federal government. This stems from 

a decision in the 1970s not to automate the files so as to preserve low-level clerical 

jobs. As then-Commissioner Doris Meissner told Government Executive magazine in 

a 1999 interview, ‘‘You don’t overcome a history like that in four to five years.’’

Solving the many problems with our immigration system will not be easy. There 

have been various plans to reorganize the INS altogether, including splitting the 

service and enforcement functions, either into two agencies or two separate chains 

of command within the current INS. But money and institutional reorganization 

won’t be enough on their own. The best way to give the INS the breathing room 

65

it needs to put its house in order and to address homeland security concerns is to 

reduce its workload by reducing temporary and permanent immigration. 

CONCLUSION

The fundamental changes in our immigration system proposed above should be 

an especially attractive option because not only would they be politically popular, 

but they also would not involve any infringement on the civil rights of American 

citizens. The American people are going to have to wait in much longer lines at airports and in other public places from now on, it is not too much to ask foreign citizens to do the same. 

Some may object to greatly increased screening, interior enforcement and border 

control because only an tiny fraction of the millions of immigrants and visitors (or 

non-immigrants) who come to the United States each year represent a security 

threat. We are, some would say, looking for ‘‘a needle in a hay stack’’ by focusing 

on immigration reforms. But this objection makes little sense. All security measures 

are directed at only the tiny fraction of the population who wish to break the law. 

Every persons who boards an airplane, for example, must pass through a metal detector and have his baggage x-rayed. This is done not because most or many intend 

to hijack the plane, but rather for the one out of a million who is planning to do 

so. It is the same with screening immigrants and controlling the border. 

To be sure, no steps to reform immigration will catch all those who mean us 

harm. But a lower level of immigration and dramatic improvements in visa processing and border security could make an enormous difference. If only a few of the 

dozens of people involved in the September 11 plot had been identified by consular 

officers or border inspectors, or been apprehended when their visas expire it is very 

possible that the entire conspiracy would have been uncovered. Persistent terrorists 

will, of course, continue to probe our immigration system for weaknesses. It is for 

this reason that we cannot, for example, improve visa processing but leave large sections of our land border undefended. Only a vigorous, well-funded, integrated border 

management infrastructure which employs the latest technology and enjoys sustained political support can be expected to adapt to the every changing terrorist 

threat. Moreover, only a well funded and run immigration system will be able to 

utilize the new information that is expected to result from the added resources that 

are now being devoted to intelligence gathering. Today’s underfunded and fragmented border control system, using out-of-date technology, will certainly not be 

able to respond to the shifting challenges of the future. 

There can be little question that the suggested changes outlined above would cost 

taxpayers billions of dollars to implement. But the alternative is to expose the country to very significant risks that could be avoided. If we want the American people 

to continue to support legal immigration, then we must make every effort to reduce 

the possibility of terrorism in the future.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thanks very much, Mr. Camarota. 

We will now turn to David Ward, the President of the American 

Council on Education. He has served for 8 years as the 25th Chancellor of the University of Wisconsin. He was born in Great Britain, 

and he will testify on the responsibilities of American schools and 

universities to keep track of students from other countries. 

Mr. Ward, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID WARD, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN 

COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. WARD. Thank you, Madam Chairman and members of the 

subcommittee. 

ACE represents 1,800 public and private colleges and universities. And in addition to that organization, of which I am the 

president, I am speaking on behalf of many other higher education 

associations and the more than 6,800 institutions of higher education and the 15 million students we represent. 

I am also accompanied by Mr. Ted Goode, Director of Services for 

International Students and Scholars at the University of California 

at Berkeley and an expert in the trenches on the complex process 

66

by which international students are admitted to the United States, 

a matter in which I have a kind of personal interest. 

I first came to the United States on a student visa in 1960 to attend the University of Wisconsin. I was interviewed for 15 minutes 

by the consulate in London. When I arrived here, I registered my 

address and my program every January 1, and when I completed 

my Ph.D. in 1963, the university reported that fact and I received 

a note that it would be useful for me to leave in one month, which 

I did. I later returned as an emigrant because I enjoyed that experience and I, in fact, became a Bicentennial citizen in 1976. 

I strongly believe that our Nation as a whole benefits from having international students on our campuses, but I also understand 

that the opportunity to study in our Nation comes with rules and 

responsibilities that affect both students and our institutions. 

American colleges and universities have to understand this, and we 

certainly accept our role wholeheartedly. 

Let there be no doubt of our position. The Federal Government 

has the right and the responsibility to protect the safety and security of the United States by deciding who should receive a student 

or exchange visa. Colleges and universities have an obligation and 

a responsibility to work cooperatively with the Federal Government 

in admitting students to this country and keeping track of them 

when they are enrolled on our campuses. 

We believe the single most important step in improving our ability to monitor international students and work with Federal authorities will come from the prompt implementation of CIPRIS, 

now known as SEVIS, the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System. SEVIS has an important mission. However, it has 

long suffered from an exceptionally complex funding and administrative structure that has delayed its development and deployment. 

Indeed, INS’ efforts with respect to this system have created a 

great deal of apprehension and mistrust about the agency’s ability 

to establish an electronic system without seriously compromising 

the ability of our colleges and universities to attract international 

students in competition with other nations. 

Because of our reservations about the fee collection system, we 

strongly support your proposal, Madam Chair, to authorize an appropriation to cover the costs of developing this database. We believe that such a step will accelerate implementation. We appreciate the fact that you have sent a letter to the President asking 

that he allocate funding from the emergency supplemental appropriations package to speed the development and implementation of 

this system, and we have also sent a letter to the President endorsing your suggestion. 

I would like to, however, make three additional points with respect to SEVIS. First, we believe that the implementation of the 

system will require that INS establish a clear timetable with interim goals. Because of the delays that have plagued the system 

from the beginning, we believe Congress should insist that INS 

specify the deadlines it will meet so that our institutions can also 

in a parallel way be responsive. 

Second, INS has not yet provided us with adequate information 

about the computer system capabilities that will be required to implement SEVIS on campuses. This information is essential for inVerDate Feb 1 2002 13:52 Aug 19, 2002 Jkt 081248 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\HEARINGS\81248.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
67

stitutions that need to reassess their computer systems’ and data 

systems’ capabilities in the light of these new responsibilities. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. If you will allow me to interrupt you, explain a little bit more about what you need to do it. 

Mr. WARD. Well, it would be the software to connect our personnel data systems with those the INS has, and that will probably 

be a private sector development and we don’t know what those 

specifications are yet. If this implementation is going on, we would 

like full notice of that so we can give specifications to vendors to 

develop the data system connection. The data system connection is 

the challenge. 

We have gone through a revolution in higher education in personnel systems in the 1990s. We have our data. We need to get the 

data to INS, so we need to have a schedule and specifications. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Mr. WARD. We can therefore speed implementation, but we do require reciprocity from INS, and I am sure we will get that on the 

basis of this morning’s testimony. 

Third, we believe it is essential to provide a modest appropriation to cover annual operating costs when the system is in place. 

This will eliminate the fee collection problems which are quite serious—about where to collect them, who should collect them, whether it should be the Department of Justice, the universities, the Immigration Service. It is a great challenge, and that really has been 

the problem with CIPRIS to date. 

We also understand something else, Madam Chairman, which we 

have not really thought enough about—and we value your contribution to our debate over the last week—and that is your concern 

that potential international students may receive more than one I–

20 form if they apply to or are admitted by multiple colleges in the 

United States. Just like your children and grandchildren, you 

never apply to one college. There are always multiple applications, 

and therefore there are multiple I–20 forms. 

I have brought a chart which thinks outside of the box. It suggests a change in the way the whole I–20 system could be developed. We believe, in fact, that the only way to ensure that potential 

students do not get more than one I–20 is to avoid giving them the 

I–20 in the first place. 

Therefore, rather than sending an I–20 directly to the student, 

as is done at present from the university to the student, we strongly recommend that the colleges send the I–20 form directly to a 

U.S. embassy or consulate identified by the potential student. This 

approach will also provide an easy way to ensure that students 

who receive a visa to study at a particular institution actually enroll there. 

We recommend that each American embassy or consulate be 

asked to identify a student and exchange visitor visa coordinator. 

The name and address and information for this person should be 

posted on the State Department Web page to permit schools with 

questions about specific visas to be able to contact the appropriate 

person directly, should there be a problem. 

My colleagues and I look forward to discussing these ideas with 

you in more detail in the very near future. 

68

Madam Chair, you come from the State with the greatest number of international students and you know firsthand the benefits 

of international education. In California alone, 66,300 students 

were enrolled from abroad in 1999–2000. The overwhelming majority will leave as fans of California, or maybe USC, or even, heaven 

forbid, Stanford—true friends of the United States, leaders of government and industry in their home countries, and supporters of 

the benefits of personal freedom and democracy. 

I believe that the proposals in the legislation you have prepared 

and the ideas I have laid out today to address your concerns about 

the I–20 form will, in both the short and the long term, be important steps in this direction. 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you today and I 

would be happy to answer any questions at the appropriate moment. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ward follows:]

STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID WARD, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

My name is David Ward and I am President of the American Council on Education (ACE), an association representing 1,800 public and private colleges and universities. I am speaking today on behalf of nearly 50 higher education associations 

and the more than 6,800 institutions of higher education and 15 million students 

we represent. 

I am accompanied by Mr. Ted Goode, the Director for International Students and 

Scholars at the University of California, Berkeley, and an expert in the complex 

process by which international students are admitted to U.S. colleges and receive 

visas to study here. 

The recent terrorist attacks on the United States have prompted a top to bottom 

review of all sorts of government and institutional activities. This reassessment includes questions about the international students who come to this country on a student visa to study at our colleges and universities. At present, it appears that none 

of those directly involved in the terrorist attacks entered the United States on a student visa. However, this does not obviate the need for a careful review of the policies and procedures affecting student visas. Madam Chair, we appreciate the chance 

to participate in this review and thank you for your leadership in this area. 

I am-particularly interested in this issue for professional and personal reasons. 

Before assuming the presidency of the American Council on Education a month ago, 

I was Chancellor of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, for eight years, where I 

was a faculty member for 25 years prior to that. As one of the nation’s leading research universities, UW Madison always had a large number of foreign students on 

campus, often more than 4,000. Without exception, I found them to be diligent and 

hardworking individuals who contributed significantly to the academic and social 

life of the campus. 

I also have a deeply personal interest in this issue. I first came to the United 

States on a student visa in 1960 to earn a Ph.D. in geography at Wisconsin. At the 

conclusion of my Ph.D. program, I was given thirty days to leave the country in accordance with the terms of my visa. After living abroad for three years, I returned 

to the United States as an immigrant and became a citizen in 1976. 

These experiences have given me a fairly unique position to appreciate the benefits that accrue to international students, American students, and the university 

community when we invite foreign students to study at our colleges. 

The nation as a whole also benefits from having international students study on 

our campuses. For example, the enormous advances in computational sciences in the 

1980s that helped fuel the American economy in the 1990s, would not have occurred 

without student and faculty exchange programs that brought so many talented people to this county. 

We deeply appreciate the strong expression of support shown by the Senate in recently passing S. Con. Res. 7, which advocates the establishment of an international 

education policy to further our national security, foreign policy, and economic competitiveness. We hope the House will soon pass this measure. Now, more than ever, 

Congressional leadership is essential in ensuring that we equip the best and the 

69

brightest—from our own nation and from abroad—to meet the challenges of an increasingly complex—and may I say more dangerous—world. 

In this spirit, we understand that the opportunity to study in our nation comes 

with rules and responsibilities that affect both students and institutions. American 

colleges and universities understand this and accept our role wholeheartedly. 

Let there be no doubt of our position: the federal government has the right and 

the responsibility to protect the safety and security of the United States by deciding 

who should receive a student or exchange visa. Colleges and universities have an 

obligation and a responsibility to work cooperatively with the federal government 

in keeping track of international students when they are enrolled on our campuses. 

I assure you that we take this responsibility very seriously. Any college or university with significant numbers of foreign students maintains an international students’ office and devotes considerable resources to continual in-service training in 

order to keep staff responsible for foreign students up to date on the large and constantly expanding body of regulation that governs this area. 

On the Wisconsin, Madison, campus alone, over 20 full time employees are devoted to monitoring international student visa documentation issues. Nationwide, 

more than 3,000 higher education administrators have primary responsibility for 

foreign students on our campuses. 

Our shared responsibilities are not in conflict and the relationship between the 

colleges and the government is generally constructive and collaborative. At present, 

colleges are required to maintain more than a dozen types of information on each 

international student and to make that information available to federal authorities 

upon request. The question before this committee is how our relationship can be 

made more proactive and how can we increase our emphasis on safeguards. 

We believe that the single most important step in improving our ability to monitor 

international students and work with federal authorities will come from the prompt 

implementation of the Coordinated Interagency Partnership Regulating International Students (CIPRIS), now known as the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS). 

As you well know, this is an electronic tracking system that will enable colleges 

to notify the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) whenever there is a 

‘‘change of status’’ that may affect a student’s visa. Under the law, when SEVIS is 

fully operational, the INS will be notified of: the identity and current address of all 

foreign students enrolled at our institutions; their nonimmigrant classification and 

any change therein; the date their visa was issued or extended; their current academic status, including whether they are maintaining status as a full-time student; 

and any disciplinary action taken by the school as a result of their having been convicted of a crime. 

Because it is an electronic system, this information will be transmitted to federal 

officials for appropriate action almost immediately. SEVIS will stand in stark contrast to the obsolete paper and pencil system that is currently in use. 

SEVIS has an important mission. However, it has long suffered from an exceptionally complex funding and administrative structure that has significantly delayed 

its development and deployment. Indeed, the INSs efforts with respect to this system have created a great deal of apprehension and mistrust on campus about the 

agency’s ability to establish an electronic system without seriously compromising 

the ability of American colleges to serve international students. 

Unfortunately, Commissioner Ziglar testified on October 3‘d and again on October 

11’ that that the ‘‘academic establishment’’ is responsible for the delay in SEVIS’s 

development and deployment. This is not true. This system has been over budget 

and behind schedule since it was begun in 1995. However, the history of SEVIS is 

not what we are here to discuss today. 

Let me be clear. The American Council on Education has never opposed the underlying idea behind SEVIS—an electronic exchange of information about international students to facilitate monitoring and tracking. As I noted above, we strongly believe that the federal government has the right and responsibility to do this 

and colleges have an obligation to help provide this information. However, we have 

consistently and strongly opposed the INSs efforts to implement the fee collection 

system that is designed to cover the cost of developing SEVIS. The first INS proposal would have turned colleges into bill collectors for the federal government and 

we vigorously opposed that plan. Eventually, Congress blocked the INS from moving 

in that direction. 

The INS is now considering another approach that we believe would seriously undermine the ability of most foreign students to enroll at American colleges. The new 

plan would require that students pay the fee using the Internet and a credit card 

or in American dollars before obtaining a visa. Many international students do not 

70

have access to credit cards, American dollars, or the Internet. We believe that this 

proposal is worse than the initial plan that Congress blocked. 

We strongly support your proposal to authorize an appropriation to cover the costs 

of developing this database. This step will result in much faster implementation 

than would otherwise be the case. We appreciate that you have asked the President 

to allocate funding from the Emergency Supplemental appropriations package (P.L. 

10738) to speed the development and implementation of this system. We have sent 

the President a letter endorsing your suggestion. 

I would make three additional points with respect to SEVIS. First, the timely implementation of SEVIS will require that the INS establish a clear timetable with 

interim goals so that Congress and the education community can measure the agency’s progress against its own timetable. Based on our experience to date and the 

delays that have plagued this system from the beginning, we would ask that Congress insist on accountability in meeting this critical deadline. 

Second, despite repeated requests, INS has not provided us with adequate information about the computer system capabilities that will be required to implement 

SEVIS on campuses. This information is essential for the private sector vendors who 

will develop and sell the software and for institutions that need to reassess their 

system capabilities in light of the new responsibilities. Within a week, we will share 

a detailed list of questions about the computer systems necessary to implement 

SEVIS and we would greatly appreciate your assistance in getting answers to these 

questions. Again, we will do all we can to speed implementation, but we require reciprocity from INS to make that happen. 

Third, in addition to funding the development of SEVIS as your legislation provides, we believe it absolutely essential that a modest authorization be available to 

cover the annual operating costs when the system is in place. As I noted earlier, 

the primary barrier to acceptance of SEVIS has been the inability of INS to devise 

a workable method of financing the system. Because neither the State Department 

nor the INS has been willing to collect the money, the INS has been forced to develop terribly convoluted payment systems. I strongly urge you to add language to 

your legislation that will provide the modest amount of money needed to operate 

SEVIS when it is operational. 

We believe that SEVIS is ultimately the only way to obtain the information that 

the federal government wants and needs. However, since this system will not be 

operational for several years, we believe that several additional steps could be taken 

to improve the government’s oversight of student visas in the interim. We have already shared these ideas with your office and I have appended a copy of them to 

this testimony. (See Appendices One and Two.) 

In some cases, we propose that new responsibilities be given to institutions of 

higher education. In other cases, we believe that the INS should be given additional 

assignments. Moreover, we believe that it is desirable to provide special scrutiny for 

potential students from countries on the State Department’s watch list of states supporting terrorism. 

Finally, we strongly recommend that the federal government increase funding for 

Department of State consular affairs offices to enable a more extensive review of 

student and all other visa applicants. These civil servants are the individuals responsible for making decisions about whether or not to grant a visa and we feel 

strongly that these offices ought to have the resources to accomplish their mission. 

At present, most of them do not. 

We understand your concern about the possibility that potential international students may receive more than one I–20 form if they apply to and are admitted by 

multiple colleges in the United States. The multiple I–20s can be used to obtain 

more than one visa. 

To address this problem, we propose that colleges send the I–20 form directly to 

a U.S. embassy or consulate identified by the potential student rather than the current practice of sending an I–20 directly to the student. We believe that the only 

way to ensure that potential students do not get more than one I–20 is to avoid giving them any I–20s in the first place. In addition, this approach will provide an easy 

way to ensure that students who receive a visa to study at a particular institution 

actually enroll there. 

Under our plan, an institution of higher education would provide an I–20 for 

every international student admitted to an embassy or consulate, identified by the 

student. As under current practice, a potential student would go to the appropriate 

embassy or consulate to receive a visa and a visa would only be issued if a valid 

I–20 were on hand. If a visa were awarded, the embassy or consulate would return 

a copy of the I–20 to the sending institution to alert the college to expect the student. Such a step would provide an additional mechanism to help schools and the 

INS identify the small number of students who receive a visa but who fail to enroll. 

71

We recommend that each American embassy or consulate be asked to identify a ‘‘Student and Exchange Visitor Visa Coordinator.’’ The name and address information for this person should be posted on the State Department Web page to permit 

schools with questions about specific visas to contact the appropriate person directly. 

My colleagues and I look forward to discussing this idea with you in more detail 

in the near future. 

Madam Chair, you come from the state with the greatest number of international 

students and you know first hand the benefits of international education. In California alone, 66,305 students were enrolled from abroad in 1999-2000 and they 

brought $1.6 billion dollars into the state’s economy. The overwhelming majority 

will leave as fans of California and as true friends of the United States. 

Over the last 50 years, efforts to enable foreign students to study on our campuses 

have paid great dividends for our nation. Most will leave the U.S. at the conclusion 

of their studies and will become leaders in government and industry in their home 

countries. However, all of those who study here will leave with a deep appreciation 

of the benefits of personal freedom and democracy. 

Education increases familiarity and understanding. Familiarity and understanding are incompatible with terrorism. Indeed, if we wish to increase international understanding, we ought to increase the opportunities for students from 

other countries to study in the United States. Important as this goal may be however, the most important assignment of the federal government and higher education is to ensure that students who come here to study pose absolutely no threat 

to American safety and security. I believe that the proposals in the legislation you 

have prepared and the ideas I have laid out today will—in both the short and long 

term—be important steps in this direction. 

On behalf of:

Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange 

American Association of Colleges of Nursing 

American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers 

American Association of Community Colleges 

American Association of Presidents of Independent Colleges and Universities 

American Association of State Colleges and Universities 

American Council on Education 

American Dental Education Association 

American Society for Engineering Education 

Associated Colleges of the Midwest 

Association of American Colleges and Universities 

Association of American Medical Colleges 

Association of American Universities 

Association of Chiropractic Colleges 

Association of Community College Trustees 

Association of Governing Boards 

Association of Independent California Colleges and Universities 

Association of Independent Colleges of Art and Design 

Association of International Education Administrators 

Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities 

Association of Proprietary Colleges 

California Community Colleges 

California State University System 

Career College Association 

Coalition of Higher Education Assistance Organizations 

Consortium of Universities of the Washington Metropolitan Area 

Council for Advancement and Support of Education 

Council for Christian Colleges & Universities 

Council for Higher Education Accreditation 

Council for Higher Education of the United Church of Christ 

Council of Graduate Schools 

Council of Independent Colleges 

Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities 

Lutheran Educational Conference of North America 

NAFSA: Association of International Educators 

National Association of College and University Business Officers 

National Association of Graduate-Professional Students 

National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities 

National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges 

National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators 

72

National Association of Student Personnel Administrators 

The College Board 

University Continuing Education Association 

University of California System

APPENDIX 1

HIGHER EDUCATION’S PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THE ISSUANCE AND TRACKING OF

FOREIGN STUDENT VISAS

New Responsibilities for Institutions 

Within 30 days of the end of the enrollment period at the start of each academic 

term, supply an electronic update to INS of the most recent data on enrolled international students covering the following items: date of commencement of studies; 

degree program and field of study; termination date and reason; and status (i.e. fulltime or part-time). 

Require higher education institutions to report to the INS within 30 days of the 

start of an academic term the non-appearance of any such student indicated by the 

INS to have entered the country on that institution’s I–20 form or who accepted an 

offer of admission but did not enroll. 

Require designated school officials (DSOs) to comply with any ‘‘revised responsibilities’’ outlined by INS or lose authority to issue I–20s. 

New Responsibilities for INS 

Notify a higher education institution within 15 days of a foreign student’s entry 

into the United States using that institution’s form I–20. 

Issue a ‘‘revised statement of responsibilities’’ for DSOs that takes into account 

new reporting requirements. 

Funding and Oversight 

Guarantee the rapid implementation and effective operation of the Student and 

Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) by replacing the current fee system 

with a permanent authorization and necessary appropriations. 

Increase the budget for consular affairs at the Department of State to provide additional staffing, improve facilities where necessary, and mandate more effective use 

of information technology. 

Provide sufficient funding for the expeditious implementation of an electronic 

arrival/ departure system for all visa classifications, as mandated by Section 110 of 

IIRAIRA. 

Provide clarification that data disclosures to the INS regarding foreign students 

are not subject to restrictions under the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act. 

Special scrutiny for limited categories of applicants. 

Require consular officials to conduct more extensive background checks on student 

visa applicants from countries on the State Department’s watch list of states supporting terrorism. 

Delay the issuance of an I–20 form until after a prospective student from watch 

list countries has formally accepted admission. 

Mandate a 30-day delay on issuance of all student visas for individuals from countries on watch list.

73

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thanks very much, Mr. Ward. 

Mr. Tony Doonan is Vice President and Director, if I understand 

it, of the Automated Fingerprint Identification System at NEC 

Technologies. This is headquartered in Gold River, California, so 

welcome, sir. He is accompanied by Greg Spadorcio, who is Director 

of the Automated Fingerprint Identification System’s Division. 

NEC Technologies, AFIS Division, is one of the industry leaders 

in biometric technologies, having developed some of the first automated methods of identifying people by their fingerprint and palm 

print characteristics. They will testify about their work with law 

enforcement agencies and the FBI, and various technologies available to help verify identity. 


107441.eps
74

Senator Kyl, you should know that when I was Mayor of San 

Francisco, NEC did a large system for us, and did it very well. 

They sent people over at that time, I think, from Japan to work 

with the city and put this system in. It was really, I think, a wonderful example of how the private sector can interface with the 

public sector and really provide a level of expertise that is not easily available to public sector people. 

Mr. Doonan, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF TONY DOONAN, VICE PRESIDENT, AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS; ACCOMPANIED BY GREG SPADORCIO, DIRECTOR, BUSINESS SOLUTIONS, NEC TECHNOLOGIES, INC., GOLD RIVER, CALIFORNIA 

Mr. DOONAN. Madam Chairwoman, members, thank you very 

much for this opportunity. You actually stole my thunder there. I 

was going to comment that in 1983 I was associated with that 

project in San Francisco when, under your leadership, the San 

Francisco Police Department automated their fingerprint process. I 

at the time was with the California Department of Justice and 

worked closely with the police department in planning and implementing that system. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. We did this by bid, as I recall, and by far 

it really was the best, most comprehensive bid. I just want to say 

how important the software was to really get it developed in the 

right way up front and spent the time to do it. 

Mr. DOONAN. That system has been a model for law enforcement 

for nearly 20 years. It is currently part of an interstate network 

that actually was responsible for identifying Mr. Resendez, the railroad killer. A latent fingerprint at one of the crime scenes was 

identified in that network. 

Much of the technology that is in San Francisco today is applicable to the problems that you are discussing. Mr. Spadorcio is going 

to overview some concepts that we have developed that we think 

would help focus on the terrorism problem and how technology can 

be brought to bear. 

We are also reaching out to Oracle, because we use their products, and Larry Ellison to see how we might, in concert, be able to 

bring solutions forward or ideas forward that might be able to address these issues. 

Finally, for me, we also would be very happy to bring an operational system to the Capitol to demonstrate the technology to 

members and staff at a point that it was convenient for you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. That would be very useful. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. DOONAN. I will turn it over to Mr. Spadorcio. 

Mr. SPADORCIO. Thank you. Madam Chairwoman and members, 

thank you very much for being here. My discussion today highlights two programs that would benefit significantly from the introduction of biometrics by providing an added level of security to the 

issuance of passports and visas. Also discussed is a border control 

system that would verify each person at a port of entry against a 

database of known or suspected terrorists, compiled from data from 

Federal agencies and potentially other governments. 

75

If you would refer to the application process for biometrics-enabled passport and visa diagram that I believe was provided in 

your package, I will walk through that quickly. 

Ultimately, the traditional paper-based document passports and 

visas will be replaced by more secure smart card technology which 

will contain personal information, passport and visa information, 

and the digital biometric data of the card-holder; however, since 

substantial dollars have already been invested in the current passport and visa infrastructure, a phased approach that leverages the 

public’s initial investment but yet adds significant security improvement to the passport or visa by adding biometric authentication. 

Applicants for passports and visas will be required to capture a 

biometric sample in the form of a fingerprint that ultimately would 

be linked to the passport and visa records system. The passport collection centers—for example, the U.S. post office and the U.S. consulate office for visas—would process and transmit the fingerprint 

data electronically to a management database. The process would 

require all visa applicants to make their application in person, 

which is currently not a requirement of the visa process, so that 

their biometric sample could be collected. 

The passport and visa management database of fingerprints 

would be used to compare against existing fingerprints of known or 

suspected terrorists prior to issuing or renewing a passport or visa. 

If a match against the database of known or suspected terrorists 

were not found, then the applicant could be granted a passport of 

visa consistent with current guidelines. If a match were found, the 

proper authorities would be notified for enforcement action. 

The biometric information would ultimately be stored in a passport and visa management database so that it could be used for authentication and be accessed at any port of entry, consulate office, 

or other location that requires authentication of identity for passports or visas. 

For approximately 30 countries that currently participate in the 

visa waiver pilot program, a fast-track immigration process could 

be enabled at ports of entry to allow holders of machine-readable 

passports who have pre-registered the biometric sample to pass 

through the immigration process rapidly. This approach would 

allow INS to focus their time and resources on those individuals 

that have not been pre-qualified and that may require additional 

time. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Sir, I am going to interrupt you. You heard 

the Commissioner say that there is a law requiring that every 

plane be dealt with in 45 minutes. 

Mr. SPADORCIO. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. If you had the biometric data in the passport of the system with respect to visa waivers, how much time 

would it take for that to register for each person coming off a 

plane. 

Mr. SPADORCIO. And passing through some type of a checkpoint? 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Yes. 

Mr. SPADORCIO. Literally seconds. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Seconds? 

76

Mr. SPADORCIO. Yes. At that point, it is really comparing the 

data in the passport versus the sample that was presented by the 

person. So it is making a one-to-one comparison of that person’s 

identity at that moment, so it would be very rapid response. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Mr. SPADORCIO. By utilizing the existing passport and visa, its 

information and infrastructure, the authentication system could be 

implemented quickly. In addition, smart card technology could be 

issued to augment the existing passport and eventually even replace the paper-based system without having to rebuild the entire 

authentication system. 

There is also another diagram that is in your package. It is the 

port of entry diagram, and I will describe that quickly. 

With the high volume of people crossing the U.S. border annually, providing for a secure border is paramount to our national security. However, immigration officials are often faced with dealing 

with competing demands: process the flow of people fast with minimal interference, but also with accuracy and diligence to ensure 

that no one is admitted that should not be admitted. While this is 

a heavy burden to carry, it has never been so important and vital 

to our country as today. 

One way to ensure that the port of entry is secure from individuals that should not be admitted is through the use of a biometricsenabled port of entry system. For passports or visas that are biometrically-enabled, the passport or visa would be scanned through 

a machine reader, as is currently done, and the passport- of visaholder would then be requested to scan their finger and a query 

would be made to the passport and visa management database to 

verify that the person presenting the passport is the same person 

that was originally registered. 

If a match were confirmed, the individual would be allowed to 

proceed through the port of entry. If a match could not be confirmed, then further investigation of the passport credentials would 

need to be conducted by enforcement personnel. 

The passport and visa management database would be linked to 

an entry and exit system that would record all visa applicants’

entry into the U.S. border, and would also be used to confirm their 

exit from the U.S. border. This system could either augment or replace the current I–94 form, which oftentimes is inconsistently collected by airlines and other transportation carriers, which results 

in erroneous visa exit data and makes the enforcement process almost impossible. A Web-based interface with a fingerprint scanner 

would be located at colleges and universities and other schools, and 

would require confirmation of students with visas’ actual enrollment and participation in those programs. 

For non-biometrics-enabled passports, visas and visa waiver program countries such as Canada, the goal would be to utilize a database of known or suspected terrorists and match it against people 

entering the U.S. at a port of entry. This system would be required 

for all entry into the U.S., unless the individual is already utilizing 

a biometrics-enabled passport, visa or smart card. 

At the port of entry location, a person would be required to scan 

their finger to capture a fingerprint image that ultimately would 

be compared to the database. The port of entry system would be 

77

designed to provide responses within a short time period after receiving the scanned fingerprint. For capturing fingerprints from 

cars, trucks or other transportation means, portable wireless scanners would be employed that could capture from one to multiple 

images for processing. 

If a match were not found for a person’s fingerprint at the port 

of entry system, they would be allowed to proceed through Customs 

as currently structured. If a match were found, enforcement agents 

would be notified for proper action. 

In conclusion, while biometrics alone do not solve all the problems or issues associated with permanent or temporary immigration, it does add a significant level of trust to those documents that 

we rely on for entry to the United States. It also provides a means 

to ensure that a known or suspected terrorist would not be admitted into the United States. This alone is a worthy goal. 

Thank you very much, and I would be glad to answer questions 

that you may have later. 

[The prepared statement of Messrs. Doonan and Spadorcio follows:]

STATEMENT OF TONY DOONAN, VICE PRESIDENT, AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT IDENTI- FICATION SYSTEMS; ACCOMPANIED BY GREG SPADORCIO, DIRECTOR, BUSINESS SOLU- TIONS, NEC TECHNOLOGIES, INC., GOLD RIVER, CALIFORNIA

INTRODUCTION

With the growth of the global economy, the demand placed on the United States 

borders and its systems for managing permanent and temporary immigration is unprecedented. The Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) conducted over 500 

million inspections last year at nearly 300 land, air, and sea ports of entry. In approximately the same time period, the U.S. Department of State issued about 7 million U.S. Passports, over 6 million nonimmigrant visas, and close to 500,000 immigrant visas. It is clear that with these demands placed on the Nations borders, a 

more robust, secure and consistent form of border access is required. 

Most countries, including the United States use traditional paper-based documents for passports and visas. Because of the passport and visas functionality and 

purpose, it is an important and trusted identification document that nations around 

‘ the globe rely on. However, inherent to the design of the paper-based document 

system, it can easily be forged using advanced computer imaging and printing technologies. Ultimately, the confirmation of a person’s identity in many situations relies on the information presented at the time of border crossing and the professional 

opinion of the border agent. A requirement of any secure border system is the ability to replicate the security screening process at every port-of-entry in a systematic 

and consistent manner, and since it ultimately will rely on human intervention, provide the appropriate technology to support the agent’s efforts in trusting the document provided. Not surprisingly, national governments across the globe continue to 

search for a more secure method of providing passports and visa to avoid the security threats of a breached border. 

This paper highlights two programs that would benefit significantly from the introduction of biometrics by providing an added level of security to the issuance of 

passports and visas, as well as provide the added benefit of an entry-exit tracking 

system for visa holders. The system would interface with the existing passport and 

visa process and thereby take advantage of the existing infrastructure. Also discussed is a border control system that would verify each person at a port-of-entry 

against a database of known our suspected terrorist or criminals that would be compiled of data from CIA, INS, FBI, DOD, Interpol and other cooperating agencies as 

specified. 

BIOMETRICS ENABLED PASSPORTS

Ultimately, the traditional paper-based document passports and visas will be replaced by smart card technology which will contain personal information, passport 

and visa information, and the digital biometric data of the card holder. However, 

since substantial dollars have already been invested in the current passport infraVerDate Feb 1 2002 13:52 Aug 19, 2002 Jkt 081248 PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\81248.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
78

structure, a phased approach that leverages the initial investment, but adds significant security improvement to the passport system by reducing the ability to tamper 

with the passport authentication process is described below:

1. When issuing or renewing a passport, an applicant would follow the established requirements for providing documentation, the appropriate identity information, passport photograph, and descriptive information. The applicant would also be required to capture a biometric sample in the form 

of a fingerprint that would be linked to the passport transaction number 

and ultimately become part of the passport authentication system linked to 

their passport. 

2. The passport collection centers (Post Office, etc.) would process and 

transmit the biometric sample electronically to a main processing database 

where it would be compared against existing fingerprints of known or suspected terrorists or criminals prior to issuing or renewing the passport. If 

a match were not found, then the applicant would be granted a new passport or renewal. If a match were found, the proper authorities would be notified for enforcement action. It is estimated that the database would contain less than 500,000 fingerprints of known or suspected terrorists or 

criminals and be compiled from data from CIA, INS, FBI, DOD, Interpol, 

and other cooperating agencies. 

3. The biometric information would ultimately be stored in a central database (or distributed database depending on design requirements, i.e. identical databases can be stored in additional locations to speed the system’s 

response) for passport authentication and would be accessed at any portof-entry, consulate office, or other location that requires authentication of 

an individual’s passport. 

4. To utilize the biometric capability, once a passport was scanned through 

a machine-reader, the passport holder would be requested to scan their finger and a query would be made on the central server database to verify 

that the person presenting the passport is the same person registered to 

that passport. If a match were confirmed, the individual would be allowed 

to proceed through the port-of-entry. If a match could not be confirmed, 

then further investigation of the passport credentials would need to be conducted.

By utilizing the existing passport, its information, and the passport infrastructure, the passport authentication system could easily be implemented today with little disruption and retooling of the existing infrastructure. In addition, smart card 

technology could be issued to augment the existing passport and eventually even replace the paper-based system without having to rebuild the entire authentication 

system. Both a smart card approach and the current passport systems could be implemented in parallel until the smart card infrastructure was fully developed. 

An additional benefit of this system is that any country that has passports that 

utilize the machine-readable passport number, could participate in the authentication system. For the approximately 30 countries that currently participate in the 

Visa Waiver Pilot Program, a ‘‘fast-track’’ immigration process could be enabled at 

ports-of-entry to allow holders of machine-readable passports who have pre-registered their biometric sample with INS to pass through the immigration process 

rapidly. Essentially, their passport credentials will be authenticated by their fingerprint, which has already been ‘‘pre-qualified’’ by INS. This approach would allow 

INS to focus their time and resources on those individuals that have not been ‘‘prequalified’’, and that may require additional time to properly verify their credentials. 

Part of the pre-qualification phase would be to match their fingerprint sample to 

the database of know or suspected terrorists or criminals. If there is not a match, 

then their biometric account would be enabled and they would have the privilege 

of using a fast track system with their biometrics. Each time a new fingerprint of 

known or suspected terrorists or criminals is added to the matching database, that 

specific fingerprint would be searched against the database of pre-approved passport 

and visa holders to ensure that there is not a match against the pre-approved database. If a match is found, that biometric account could be disabled and the appropriate enforcement personnel would be notified. Additional information could also be 

collected for statistical purposes. 

Biometrics Enabled Port-of-Entry System 

With the volume of people crossing the U.S. border annually, providing for a secure border is paramount to our national security. However, immigration officials 

are often faced with dealing with competing demands; process the flow of people 

fast, with minimal interference, but also with accuracy and diligence to ensure that 

no one is admitted that should not be admitted. While this is a heavy burden to 

79

carry, it has never been so important and vital to our country as it is today. INS 

and other federal agencies have deployed several initiatives to help control and process the influx of people entering the U.S., in many cases without the benefit of coordination. One way to ensure that the port-of-entry is secure from individuals that 

should not be admitted is through the use of biometrics. 

Currently, several databases of fingerprint data exist in different systems that do 

not necessarily coordinate or share important information that could help secure our 

borders. The goal of the biometrics enabled port-of-entry system would be to create 

a database of known or suspected terrorists or criminals from fingerprint information contained in INS, FBI, DOD, CIA, Interpol and potentially other agencies systems, that could be used to match against people at the port-of entry. The systems 

would require that an individual capture their finger on a scanning device as they 

pass through the port-of-entry for land, sea, and air locations. This system would 

be required for all entry into the U.S., unless the individual is already utilizing a 

biometrics enabled passport or visa. 

At the port-of-entry location, a person would be required to scan their finger to 

capture a fingerprint image that ultimately would be compared to the database of 

known or suspected terrorist or criminals. The port-of-entry system would be designed to provide responses within second of receiving the scanned fingerprint. The 

output result from the matching process could be configured in several ways depending on the intended use. For walk-up situations, the system could be designed 

to activate turnstiles, gates, green or red lights, display based information, printed 

-material, or voice-activated commands. For capturing fingerprints from cars, 

trucks, or other transportation means, portable wireless scanners would be employed that could capture from one to multiple images for processing. The output 

result from the scanning device could include green or red lights, displayed information, or printed material. 

If a match were not found for a persons fingerprint in the port-of-entry systems, 

then they would be allowed to proceed through customs as currently structured. If 

a match were found, the border agent would be notified for proper actions. The portof-entry system would be very beneficial on the port-of-entry for countries that participate in the Visa Waiver Pilot Program. At a minimum, the system would be able 

to confirm that somebody in the database of known or suspected terrorist or criminals would not be able to make entry into the U.S., even if they provided fraudulent 

documents. 

The system would be setup on a distributed basis to ensure redundancy capabilities and high speed processing. The central system would provide updates and 

housekeeping chores for each port-of-entry system to ensure accuracy and security. 

BIOMETRICS ENABLED VISAS

The visa process would be very similar to the process described for passports. An 

applicant would be required to provide the appropriate information to the consulate 

office to process the visa as is currently required, however they will also be required 

to provide a biometric sample, such as a fingerprint at the time of their application. 

The fingerprint would be linked to the visa and passport record information. This 

process would require all visa applicants to make their application in person, which 

is currently not a requirement. 

The consulate office would transmit the biometric sample electronically to a U.S. 

based main database where it could be compared against existing fingerprints of 

know or suspected terrorists or criminals prior to issuing or renewing the visa. If 

a match were not found, then the applicant would be granted a new visa or renewal. 

If a match were found, the proper authorities would be notified for enforcement action. It is estimated that the database would contain less than 500,000 fingerprints 

of known or suspected terrorists or criminals and be compiled from data from CIA, 

INS, FBI, DOD, Interpol, and other cooperating agencies, including local authorities. 

The biometric information would ultimately be stored in a central database (or 

distributed database depending on design requirements) for passport authentication 

and would be accessed at any port-of-entry, consulate office, or other location that 

requires authentication of an individual’s visa, including a web link for colleges, universities, and various schools to confirm visa participant’s enrollment. 

To utilize the biometric capability, once a visa was scanned through a 

machinereader, the passport holder would be requested to scan their finger and a 

query would be made on the central server database to verify that that the person 

presenting the passport is the same person registered to that visa. If a match were 

confirmed, the individual would be allowed to proceed through the port-of-entry. If 

a match could not be confirmed, then further investigation of the passport credentials would need to be conducted. 

80

By utilizing the existing visa, its information, and the passport and visa infrastructure, the visa authentication system could easily be implemented today with 

little disruption and retooling of the existing infrastructure. In addition, smart card 

technology could be issued to augment the existing passport and visa and eventually 

even replace the paper-based system without having to rebuild the entire authentication system. Both a smart card approach and the current passport and visa systems could be implemented in parallel until the smart card infrastructure was fully 

developed. 

Part of the pre-qualification phase would be to match the visa applicants fingerprint sample to the database of know or suspected terrorists or criminals. If there 

is not a match, then their biometric account would be enabled and they would have 

the privilege of using a fast track visa system with their biometrics. Each time a 

new fingerprint of a know or suspected terrorists or criminals is added to the matching database, that specific fingerprint would be searched against the database of 

preapproved passport and visa holders to ensure that there is not a match against 

the pre-approved database. If a match is found, that biometric account could be disabled and the appropriate enforcement personnel would be notified. 

The fingerprint database would be linked to and entry and exit system that would 

record all visa applicant’s entry into the U.S. border and would also be used to confirm their exit from the U.S. border. This system could either augment or replace 

the current I-94 form. One of the deficiencies of the I-94 form is that often times 

it is inconsistently collected by airlines and other transportation carriers. The biometrics enabled entry-exit system would be automatically updated with entry and 

exit information on a real time basis. The systems would be able to deactivate the 

biometric account for certain visa types once they have been scanned at the entry 

point, thus ensuring that the visa holder would not be able to reenter the U.S. border without obtain the proper visa or visa renewal. Enforcement personnel could 

easily receive reports on all expired visas with no exit data for their action. Additional information could also be collected for statistical purposes. 

BIOMETRICS BACKGROUND

Since biometrics identifies people by unique human characteristics, such as a fingerprint, or facial recognition, it is considered highly reliable, accurate and secure. 

Most biometric technologies, like fingerprints, are beyond the ‘‘proof-of-concept’’ stage and are currently being implemented throughout the world to secure identity 

documents like passports, and national identification programs. 

In recent years, the price of biometric technology and its infrastructure (processors, imaging electronics, and software) has dropped dramatically while the accuracy of biometrics technology has increased. Some biometrics technology, like have 

proven to be extremely reliable and accurate by law enforcement use for the last 

30 years with largescale fingerprint applications. Many state and federal agencies 

are expanding the use of biometrics technology into applications aimed at entitlement fraud, driver licenses and state identification, and applicant processing. 

ABOUT NEC TECHNOLOGIES’ AFIS DIVISION

NEC Technologies’ AFIS Division is recognized as an industry leader in biometrics 

technologies having developed some of the first and finest automated methods of 

identifying people by their fingerprint and palmprint characteristics. NEC Technologies AFIS Division provides identification solutions for law enforcement, government, and commercial applications requiring network security. Headquartered in 

Gold River, California, NEC Technologies, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of NEC 

Corporation is a leading manufacturer of computer peripherals and other technology 

products for the North American market. 

ATTACHMENT 1

WHITE PAPER—THE BIOMETRIC SCENE

PREPARED BY: NEC TECHNOLOGIES

Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS) Division 

WHAT ARE BIOMETRICS

‘‘A biometric is a unique, measurable characteristic or trait of a human being for 

automatically recognizing or verifying identity’’

Biometrics refers to the statistical analysis of biological characteristics. Biometric 

technologies are concerned with the physical parts of the human body or the perVerDate Feb 1 2002 13:52 Aug 19, 2002 Jkt 081248 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\81248.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
81

sonal traits of human beings. With today’s technology, biometrics is used as an automated method whereby an individual’s identity is confirmed by examining a unique 

physiological trait or behavioral characteristic, such as a fingerprint, or voice signature. 

Physiological traits typically do not change; they are stable over time and somewhat unalterable and do not require frequent updates. A behavioral characteristic 

such as one’s signature or voice is influenced by both controllable physical actions 

and less controllable psychological factors. Because behavioral characteristics can 

change over time, the biometric template must be updated each time it is used. Both 

techniques provide a significantly higher level of identification than traditional passwords. 

Because biometric traits are unique to each individual, they can be used to prevent theft or fraud. Unlike a password, a biometric trait cannot be lost, stolen, or 

forgotten. Today’s biometric identifiers include fingerprint, face recognition, facial 

thermo-gram, body odor, DNA, ear dynamics, keystroke patterns, palm print, retinal 

scan, iris patterns, signature, vein-scans, and voice patterns. Each of these biometric 

identifiers offers strengths and weaknesses for use in various situations. 

In the security industry biometrics is regarded as providing the highest level of 

security. The methods for verifying an individual’s identity are commonly broken 

down into the following three security levels:

Lowest level of security—something you have, such as a photo ID 

Second level of security—something you know, such as a password or a personal identification number (PIN) 

Highest level of security—something you do/ something you are, such as 

physiological and/or behavioral biometrics, including fingerprints, face recognition, signatures, etc. 

HOW BIOMETRICS WORK

Most biometric systems operate in a similar fashion. The system captures a sample of the biometric characteristic for the purpose of enrolling the person in the system. During this enrollment phase some biometric systems may require a number 

of samples in order to build a profile of the biometric characteristic or to ensure that 

the system has captured the highest quality characteristic for later comparison purposes. Unique features are then extracted and converted by the system into a mathematical representation of the data. This mathematical representation of the data 

is then stored as the biometric template. The template may reside within the biometric system itself, in memory storage, such as a computer database, a smart card, 

or even barcode for later use. 

When the user interacts with the biometric system to have their identity checked, 

the system will make a comparison of the stored template to the new offered biometric sample. If the template and the new sample match, the user is granted permission or access. Almost all biometric systems operate from this basic premise—a sample of the person’s biometric data (finger-image) is captured and the biometric system decides if it matches with another confirmed sample of biometric data (fingerprint). 

Because characteristics can change slightly over time, the biometric system must 

allow for some reasonable level of variation; typically a threshold is set that accounts for this variation. The comparison between the template and new sample 

must exceed the system’s threshold before a match or confirmation is recorded. If 

not, the system will not record a confirmation or match and will not grant the user 

access or permission. 

All biometric systems use the four-stage process of capture, extraction, comparison, and match (non-match). The core of the biometric system is the biometric engine, a proprietary process that extracts and processes the biometric data. This applies an algorithm to the extracted data. Essentially the system extracts the data, 

creates a template, and computes whether the data from the template and the new 

sample match. 

The following process illustrates the way biometric systems typically operate:

Capture—a sample is captured by the system during enrollment 

Extraction—data is extracted from the sample and a template is generated 

Comparison—the template is then compared with a new sample 

Match/Non-Match—the system determines if the features extracted from 

the new sample are a match or a non-match to the stored template

Within the biometrics industry, a distinction is made among the terms identification and verification. With identification, a sample is submitted to the biometric system during enrollment, this is stored as a template. Then during use, the system 

82

receives a new biometric sample and then attempts to find out whom the sample 

belongs to, by comparing the sample against the entire database of templates in the 

hope of finding a match (this is known as a one-to-many or 1:n comparison). 

Verification is a one-to-one (1:1) comparison in which the biometric system attempts to verify an individual’s identity. In this example, a new biometric sample 

is captured and compared with the previously stored template. If the two samples 

match, the biometric system confirms that the applicant is who he/she claims to be. 

For a one-to-one comparison to work, the system must have access to some data 

that tells the system what record or template to compare against. 

Identification—involves matching a sample against a database of many 

(Who is this?) 

Verification—involves matching a sample against a database of one (Is this 

person who he/she claims to be?) 

WHY BIOMETRICS

Government agencies, businesses, and individuals are recognizing the limitations 

of passwords and/or PIN numbers. As we see more examples of computer hacking, 

identity theft and other forms of fraudulent crimes, it is becoming more important 

to protect systems from unwanted intrusion. Biometric protected security offers a 

higher level of security because it verifies physiological or behavioral characteristics 

that are unique to each individual and are difficult to steal, alter, or otherwise 

forge. Biometrics systems, on average, can do a better job of protecting systems than 

other traditional forms of security. 

A biometric record is a mathematical representation of an individual’s unique 

characteristic (template), stored in electronic form. It cannot be used to reconstruct 

an image or to reveal a person’s identity. When used for authentication, it serves 

as a comparison of the registered persons true form of identity—only one person can 

be registered with any unique biometric parameter. Compared to other methods of 

identity proof, biometrics is a tool that can actually enhance privacy and prevent 

abuse. 

As more and more personal information is stored on computers, on network servers, within business systems, and healthcare facilities, it becomes increasingly important to ensure that only certain individuals have access to that information. Currently passwords are used almost exclusively for authentication on individual computers, networks, or across the Internet. While passwords are easy to develop and 

for the most part manage, they are far from being secure:

Passwords are easily forgotten 

Passwords can be shared with others, allowing multiple individuals access 

to a secured environment 

Multiple web accounts, email services, online stores, message boards, etc., 

require multiple password or worse, the same password for all environments 

Typing passwords is inconvenient, bothersome, and often leads to poor 

password choice

Biometric authentication has the potential to solve many of these problems by 

eliminating passwords. By comparison, biometric characteristics (such as your fingerprint) offer enhanced convenience and security and are easy to use. 

WHY FINGERPRINTS

Fingerprint technology has been utilized for decades to provide identification and 

verification of an individual. Today, the largest application of fingerprint technology 

is in Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS) used by law enforcement 

agencies throughout the world. These are some of the largest and most complex fingerprint systems available, with hundreds of millions of fingerprint images in their 

systems. Most recently, finger-image technology has gained a significant following 

as the biometric technology most widely accepted and used for access control and 

enhanced security. Finger-image technology is currently in use for many applications, including military facilities, the Pentagon, financial institutions, large corporate networks, government and commercial laboratories, and almost anywhere 

that requires enhanced security. 

The finger-image’s strength is its user acceptance, convenience and reliability. It 

takes very little time (approximately the same time it takes to type-in a password) 

and effort for somebody to have their finger-image scanned and compared. 

Fingerimage identification is the least intrusive of all biometric techniques and one 

of the easiest to use. Users experience fewer errors when they use their finger-image 

versus many other biometric methods. In addition, a finger-image scanner requires 

83

very little space on a desktop or in a machine. Several companies today have produced capture units small enough to fit on keyboards, embedded in a mouse device 

or laptop computer. 

Finger-image technology also provides one of the lowest false acceptance ratios 

(FAR) (The probability that the system will incorrectly identify an individual or will 

fail to reject an individual when it should have) of all the biometric technologies, 

with less than one in a million. One of the biggest fears of fingerprint technology 

is the theft of someone’s fingerprints. Concerns are that latent or residual prints left 

on the fingerprint scanner may be copied and used to gain access. However, good 

fingerprint identification devices will only detect live fingers and will not acknowledge fingerprint copies or other forgeries. 

The practical applications of finger-image or other biometric technologies are diverse and ever expanding, however most non-law enforcement uses are for some 

type of access control. This will either involve the physical access of people to secure 

areas, or securing the access of privileged data or resources on servers. Whether securing government social benefit programs from fraud, preventing illegal immigrants from entering a country, or securing corporate networks from non-users, controlling access is the underlying strength of most biometrics, including finger-imaging. 

BIOMETRICS APPLICATION EXAMPLES

AIR TRAVEL SECURITY

Biometric technology can be used to authenticate passengers and airline representatives for commercial air travel. The use of biometrics can ultimately be utilized for all aspects of travel from the initial reservation through baggage pick-up. 

The benefit to air travel is that once a person’s identity has been verified at the 

initial check-in process and a biometric sample was captured, the biometric sample 

can be used to authenticate a person identity throughout the travel process. The 

cost to implement an air travel program would be negligible in comparison to the 

overall cost of travel. 

DRIVER LICENSES AND STATE IDENTIFICATION

A driver license and identification card (ID cards) provides residents identification 

documents for host of uses where a person’s identity needs to be confirmed. Driver 

licenses and ID cards are invaluable in our day-to-day life for providing identification to somebody who is usually unfamiliar to us or needs to verify that we are who 

we say we are. As such, the level of trust given to the driver license and ID card 

is enormous, and our reliance on these trusted documents must be ensured through 

a rigorous issuing process and the introduction of biometrics. A Department of 

Motor Vehicles (DMV) can easily introduce the use of biometrics to secure documents so that an individual cannot have a duplicate identity with state issued documents such as driver licenses and ID cards. 

SOCIAL BENEFIT PROGRAMS

Social benefit programs are very vulnerable to fraud and misuse. Many social welfare departments throughout the world are utilizing biometrics to control access to 

the systems and reduce the fraud potential of these systems. A variety of technologies are deployed, however finger-image technology is most widely accepted. 

Many of these systems require large-scale AFIS type systems to manage the information and workflow requirements of these government organizations. 

Another related area is the payment of benefits through the use of Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT), which involves the use of a credit card type device that is secured with biometrics (finger-image template). The card can then be used to purchase items in retail stores tied to special point-of-sale smart card readers. Through 

the use of biometrics, the smart card devices can be secured from unauthorized 

users and for only allowed transactions. Biometrics is well placed to serve this market opportunity. 

IMMIGRATION SYSTEMS

Illegal immigration and an increase in travelers throughout the world are requiring that immigration officials look for ways to control and manage the ever increasing volume of people. Biometrics is being employed in a number of diverse applications throughout the world to enable safe and easy travel. The U.S. Immigration 

and Naturalization Service (INS) are a major user and evaluator of biometric techVerDate Feb 1 2002 13:52 Aug 19, 2002 Jkt 081248 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\81248.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
84

nologies for immigration control. Many governments are issuing immigration and 

work permits through the use of biometrics (mostly finger-image). 

NATIONAL IDENTITY PROGRAMS

Governments are utilizing biometrics to identify citizens for national ID programs; 

these systems also lend themselves to voter registration systems to help prevent 

fraud during local and national elections. Often these systems involve storing a biometric template on a smart card or 2D card, which ultimately becomes a national 

identity document. Finger-image scanning is particularly strong in this area and 

programs are already underway in many countries. 

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Financial institutions have been evaluating a range of biometric technologies for 

many years to control fraud and for general security issues. Automated teller machines (ATMs) and transactions at the point of sale are particularly vulnerable to 

fraud and are excellent candidates to be secured by biometrics. Related markets include remote access banking (Internet banking), remote access financial trading, financial document management, and other services that require a high level of security for both the institutions and consumers. 

COMPUTER/NETWORK ACCESS

The single most active area for biometrics (finger-image) is to control the access 

to computer systems and network resources. This market area has enormous potential for enterprise wide applications. Also, as the biometrics industry migrates their 

technology to large-scale Internet applications to support, the use of biometric control will grow rapidly. The faster the user community accepts internet related transactions, the greater the need will become to secure this information from unauthorized uses. Biometrics will be a major source of security for these areas. 

BUILDING PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL

The potential applications for access control are almost endless, from home use 

to nuclear power plants. Many organizations today are using biometrics to secure 

the physical movement of people throughout facilities or secure areas. Military facilities, theme parks, hospitals, offices, schools, government buildings, and other 

areas are employing biometrics to increase security. As security becomes more important for organizations, employers, governments and other groups, biometrics will 

be seen as a more acceptable and reliable tool. 

INMATE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

Prisons are utilizing biometrics to ensure that prisoners are managed with secure 

identities. Prisoners’ finger-images are enrolled during their registration into a prison system and are used throughout the system to manage access, court management, transportation, commissary privileges and even pharmacy programs. Perhaps 

the most beneficial to society is that an inmate’s finger-image can be scanned and 

verified prior to release. A wide range of biometrics is now being deployed worldwide 

to secure prison access, home confinement, and regulate the movement of probationers and parolees, and manage court appearances. Many of the prison management systems can be tied to the large-scale AFIS systems that are employed by the 

law enforcement community for even greater accuracy and control. 

TIME & ATTENDANCE SYSTEMS

Employers are always looking for ways to improve the recording and monitoring 

of employees time as they arrive at work, take breaks, and leave for the day. Someone ‘‘punching in or out’’ for someone other then themselves can deceive traditional 

‘‘time clocks’’. The theft of ‘‘time’’ costs companies millions of dollars annually. Replacing the traditional ‘‘time clock’’ with biometrics helps to prevent abuses of a 

companies time management system. Once an organization develops a biometric 

time and attendance system, there are many opportunities open to them for reporting, employee monitoring, or other management systems. 

BIOMETRIC MARKET POTENTIAL

Various organizations have devoted their resources to analyze the approximate 

size and velocity of the security market, including biometrics. The data varies, but 

the trend is consistent between all the studies—the biometric market is on a steep 

upward trend. Frost & Sullivan believes that the ‘‘U.S. User Authentication Device 

85

Markets’’ generated revenues of over $200 million in 1999 and predicts that the fig- ure will reach $2.6 billion by 2006. 

The biometrics segment of the market is the most interesting and relatively new 

part of the security market. Up until the mid 1990’s, the biometric market was almost non-existent commercially. Biometrics have become mainstream and more acceptable for a variety of government and commercial uses. Industry-wide standards 

are currently being developed, with participation from Microsoft, the International 

Biometric Industry Association (IBIA), BioAPI consortium, Intel and a host of other 

major players. Ultimately we will see the integration of biometric authentication 

technology into the next version of Windows, laptop computers, handheld computer 

devices, cell phones, and a host of other products thereby validating the technology 

and it application as a security tool. 

ATTACHMENT 2

SUMMARY 

As the demand for higher security for both passenger and air travel support personnel increase, the need for an accurate, reliable, and secure method of authenticating people becomes core to the security process. Airlines are looking into various ways to ensure that they can still provide a high level of service to their customers, while providing secure passage. Convenience and security can now go handin-hand by utilizing fingerprint technology to verify the identity of passengers and 

air travel personnel. Fingerprint technology can be used to authenticate passengers 

and airline representatives for commercial air travel. The use of fingerprint technology can ultimately be utilized for all aspects of travel from the initial reservation 

through baggage pick-up. A typical passenger authentication system can be easily 

deployed with proven biometric technology and available hardware and software 

systems. Figure 1 describes an overview of an airport authentication system. 

AIRPORT AUTHENTICATION

The goal of this program is to ensure that the passenger’s identity is confirmed 

throughout the airport experience. Even the Security Checkpoint can provide another level of authentication at which point additional security measures can be accomplished with cooperation of state and federal agencies. Airport security checkpoints can be implemented with the use of smart travel cards, proximity cards, key 

cards, bar codes, or other products that support fingerprint data. The fingerprint 

template that was created at the airline ticket counter can be sent via the network 

to match against a database of known or suspected terrorists or criminals. The database of known or suspected terrorists or criminals would need to be maintained in 

cooperation with Federal and State agencies. Any positive match in this scenario 

would alert authorities of a potential security issue and the passenger would not 

be allowed to pass through the security checkpoint. With the rapid acceptance of 

smart card technology around the globe, airline travel security and convenience can 

be enhanced with the issuance of smart travel cards for frequent travelers. Smart 

card technology can also be implemented and would allow enhanced security for use 

in a variety of ways for travel, including obtaining boarding passes, checking baggage, picking up baggage, updating and providing frequent flyer information, providing credit card information and verification of identity to obtain boarding passes, 

board aircraft and at security checkpoints. 

The finger-image’s strength is its user acceptance, convenience and reliability. It 

takes very little time and effort for somebody to have their finger-image scanned 

and compared. Finger-image identification is the least intrusive of all biometric 

techniques and one of the easiest to use. Whether protecting airline travel, social 

benefit programs from fraud, or preventing illegal immigrants from entering the 

country, the underlying strength of NEC’s finger-imaging technology is its core algorithms and its ability to verify authorized access controls. 

AIRPORT SECURITY APPLICATIONS 

PASSENGER AUTHENTICATION

The use of fingerprint technology can ultimately be utilized for all aspects of travel from the initial reservation through baggage pick-up. A typical passenger authentication deployment is described in Figure 1 and listed below:

1. The passenger enters the airport and proceeds to the ticket counter. The ticket 

agent will access the airline passenger reservation record and confirm the boarding 

details such as flight, gate and seat assignment. The ticket agent will also process 

86

checked luggage and other necessary preflight details. At this point the system 

prints a boarding card and any baggage receipts. 

2. The passenger will be asked to provide appropriate identification (state or 

other government issued photo identification, passport, etc.) and will be asked to 

place their finger on the fingerprint scanner. An image will be captured and processed into a fingerprint template. The ticket agent will then enter the flight number 

and gate code into the fingerprint scanner workstation. The fingerprint template 

that was just created will be sent via the network to the appropriate gate and stored 

in the cache of the fingerprint workstation at the gate. The use of this system 

should not impact the time it currently takes the airline ticket counter to process 

a passenger’s ticket. 

3. The passenger will then proceed to the security check where they will be 

asked to provide appropriate picture identification and their boarding pass. After 

the security check, the passenger will proceed to their departure gate. 

4. At the departure gate and during the boarding process, passengers will hand 

their boarding pass to the ticket agent and then be asked to place their finger on 

the fingerprint scanner. The fingerprint workstation will capture a new finger-image 

and process it into a new fingerprint template and then conduct a search of the passenger database for a match on each passenger. If a match is found, the passenger 

will be allowed to board the plane. The finger image verifies the passenger’s identity 

as the same person that received the boarding pass from the ticket agent. If a match 

is not found, then alternate identification methods will be deployed. This system will 

process the fingerprint data in seconds. 

5. Airline representatives will assign flight representatives to individual flights 

through a developed user interface. The flight representatives would be required to 

scan their finger prior to boarding the aircraft to ensure that they are employees 

of the airlines and that they are actually scheduled for the assigned flight. 

6. Passengers transferring from other flights will proceed to the appropriate departure gate where the process performed at the original ticket counter will be repeated for checking identification and capturing a fingerprint (Note: transferring 

passengers can be issued boarding passes with their fingerprint template stored on 

either a magnetic stripe, two dimensional barcode, or other supporting technology 

and not have to re-register at the gate prior to boarding). Each transfer would be 

handled as a separate event and require the passenger to show proper identification 

to the ticket agent and register their fingerprint prior to boarding. The fingerprint 

security system can be developed to automatically route the appropriate fingerprint 

templates to other airports and departure gates, as the infrastructure is developed 

to support this workflow. 

117. Passengers that already have reservations and would prefer to proceed directly to the boarding area to obtain their boarding pass may do so as current security regulations permit. The passenger would follow the same check-in procedures 

outlined for the ticket counter at the departure gate. 

8. Once the plane has arrived at its destination, the captured fingerprint templates that were used to verify the passenger’s identity to board the aircraft would 

be purged from the respective airlines database. 

SECURITY CHECKPOINT AUTHENTICATION

The Security Checkpoint can provide another level of authentication at which 

point additional security measures can be accomplished with cooperation of state 

and federal agencies. 

1. At the airline ticket counter, passengers will be asked to provide appropriate 

identification (state or other government issued photo identification, passport, etc.) 

and will be asked to place their finger on the fingerprint scanner. A finger-image 

will be captured and processed into a fingerprint template. The fingerprint template 

will be sent via the network to a matching server containing a database of known 

or suspected terrorists or criminals fingerprint templates and used to match against 

each passenger fingerprint template that was created during the ticketing process. 

The use of this system should not impact the time it currently takes the airline ticket counter to process a passenger’s ticket. The database information will be passed 

to the security checkpoint system for authenticating passengers. 

2. The ticket counter representative will then provide to the passenger a smart 

travel card, proximity card, key card, bar code, or other product that supports finger-image data for use at the security checkpoint. Passengers will proceed to a gated 

or turnstile security checkpoint where they will be prompted to provide their smart 

travel card, proximity card, key card, bar code, or other product that supports finger-image data to an electronic reader. The passenger will then place their finger 

on a scanner where a new fingerprint will be captured and compared to the fingerVerDate Feb 1 2002 13:52 Aug 19, 2002 Jkt 081248 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\81248.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
87

print on the smart travel card, proximity card, key card, bar code, or other product 

that supports fingerimage data that was provided at the ticket counter. All approved 

passengers (no match found in the database) fingerprint templates will be sent to 

the appropriate gate fingerprint system for confirmation of passenger boarding. If 

during the matching process on the known or suspected terrorist or criminal database, a match is found of a ticketed passenger and a record in the database, the 

security checkpoint system will be alerted. 

3. After the security checkpoint, the passenger will proceed to their departure 

gate. At the departure gate and during the boarding process, passengers will hand 

their boarding pass to the ticket agent and then be asked to place their finger on 

the fingerprint scanner. The fingerprint workstation will capture new finger-image 

and process it into a new fingerprint template and then conduct a search of the passenger database for that flight. If a match is found, the passenger will be allowed 

to board the plane. If a match is not found, then security will be deployed to resolve 

the issue. This process will take less time then it currently takes to confirm passenger’s identity through traditional means.

TRAVEL SMART CARDS

Travel smart cards issued utilizing a unique numbering sequence similar to that 

adopted by Visa and MasterCard that identifies the individual’s account and the 

issuing organization would provide added functionality over traditional frequent 

travel programs or conventional smart card programs. The unique numbering system would allow the travel smart cardholder to extend its use for authentication at 

any security checkpoint, ticket counter, kiosk, or departure gate. Frequent travel 

programs, affiliations and alliance members can use the same travel smart card instead of the traditional frequent travel program cards. This system also has the a 

potential for reduced costs through consolidated travel program management, program adoption, and increase the speed at which travelers could access services. 

By applying a unique numbering system to travel smart cards, frequent traveler 

programs could be streamlined, consolidated, and ultimately managed and issued by 

a third party organization and utilized by all organizations with frequent travel programs. The unique number assigned to an individual account would ensure that the 


107442.eps
88

associated fingerprint and account is registered only once in the record management 

system. This approach will allow for faster authentication for secure usage. The registration process would be a rigorous process to ensure the person’s identity, credit 

card information, physical address, and biometrics (finger-image templates, and 

other) data are accurate and reliable. The travel smart card would become a trusted 

source of information when presented with a Personal Identification Numbers (PIN) 

and or biometrics (finger-image technology). 

The benefits of utilizing travel smart cards is that frequent travelers preferences 

could be embedded in the travel smart card along with the individual’s descriptive 

information, travel requirements, issuing organization information, travel program 

affiliations and alliance information, credit card, other relevant information, and biometric (finger-image template) data. The travel smart card can be used in a variety 

of ways for travel, including obtaining boarding passes, checking baggage, picking 

up baggage, updating and providing frequent flyer information, providing credit card 

information, and verification of identity to obtain boarding passes, board aircraft, 

and at security checkpoints. A travel smart card would help to speed-up the transaction time it takes to confirm somebody’s identity and process their transaction. 

1. A frequent traveler completes the registration process (paper-based, web 

based, kiosks at travel locations, etc.) that includes descriptive information, choice 

of primary frequent traveler programs, secondary frequent traveler programs, travel 

preferences, credit card information (optional), and other information as subscribed 

or required. To add the biometric feature to the travel smart card, a frequent traveler will be asked to place their finger on the fingerprint scanner. A finger-image 

will be captured and processed into a fingerprint template. The fingerprint template 

will be captured to the travel smart card and also sent to a matching server containing the main database of known or suspected terrorists or criminals fingerprint 

templates. A check of the database will be conducted on a one-to-many (1:N) basis 

to ensure that every travel smart card cardholder is not represented in the known 

or suspected terrorist or criminal database. 

2. Since each travel smart cardholder has a unique number assigned to their account, any updates to the database of known or suspected terrorists or criminals fingerprints can easily be searched across the travel smart cardholders account. If a 

match is found, the appropriate authorities will be notified and the travel smart 

card would become invalid and placed on alert. 

3. Frequent travelers entering the airport will proceed to a kiosk, ticket counter, 

or directly to the assigned gate. At the gated or turnstile security checkpoint the 

passenger will be prompted to provide their smart travel card to the electronic reader. The passenger will then place their finger on a scanner where a new fingerprint 

will be captured and compared to the fingerprint on the smart travel card. All approved passengers (no match found in the database) will proceed to their appropriate gate. 

4. At the departure gate, the smart travel cardholder will obtain their boarding 

pass from the attendant by following the same check-in procedures outlined for the 

ticket counter. During the boarding process, passengers will hand their boarding 

pass to the ticket agent and then be asked to place their finger on the fingerprint 

scanner. The fingerprint workstation will capture a new fingerimage and process it 

into a new fingerprint template and then conduct a search of the passenger database for that flight. If a match is found, the passenger will be allowed to board the 

plane. If a match is not found, then security will be deployed to resolve the issue. 

4. Once the plane has arrived at its destination, the captured fingerprint templates that were used to verify the passenger’s identity to board the aircraft would 

be purged from the respective airlines database. 

ADDITIONAL AIRPORT SECURITY OPTIONS

Physical Access Control Throughout Airport 

Airlines Human Resource Systems 

Time and Attendance Systems 

Time and Attendance Systems integrated with Physical Access Controls

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very, very much. That was very 

helpful. 

Our final witness is Paul Collier. He is the Executive Director of 

the Biometrics Foundation. He is a founding member of the International Biometrics Industry Association and served on its board of 

directors for two years. He is here to speak about some of the techVerDate Feb 1 2002 13:52 Aug 19, 2002 Jkt 081248 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\HEARINGS\81248.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
89

nologies available to identify and capture terrorists before they 

enter this country and disappear. 

Please proceed, Mr. Collier. 

STATEMENT OF M. PAUL COLLIER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

BIOMETRICS FOUNDATION, GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND 

Mr. COLLIER. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and members of 

the subcommittee, for inviting me to be a part of this distinguished 

panel today. My testimony will focus on how the Federal Government has used biometric technology in the past and how the technology available today can offer a significant advance in controlling 

access at our borders and serve as an effective tool in our mission 

to combat terrorism. 

A biometric is a quantitative measurement of a unique human 

attribute or behavioral characteristic, such as fingerprints, face, 

voice, iris recognition, hand geometry, et cetera. Using fingerprints 

as an example, a finger is placed on a sensor and then scanned. 

The image of the fingerprint is then processed by a series of algorithms which convert it into a binary representation or template. 

This template is then compared to a reference template stored either on a computer or card-based storage data medium. Like most 

biometrics, you cannot reverse-engineer this binary representation 

to re-create the scanned image. 

Further, biometric methodologies can be categorized as two 

types: contact and passive. A contact biometric is one that requires 

an individual to interact with or touch a sensor, such as fingerprint 

or a hand geometry scanner. A passive biometric is one that does 

not require any action on the part of the individual, such as facial 

recognition. 

Biometrics have been used in many civil and government programs worldwide for over 10 years. They have been very effective 

in reducing fraud, eliminating multiple identities, and securing access to sensitive areas. These wide-scale deployments have served 

as a real-world proving ground for this technology and involve 

many millions of people. Knowledge gained from these programs 

and applied to improvements and cost reductions helped produced 

many of the commercial products available today. 

Traditionally, the primary applications for biometrics in the Federal Government and military have been physical and logical access and fraud reduction programs. Though many successful pilots 

and proof of concept studies have been done, wide-scale deployment 

has been slow. A complete list of all the Federal Government and 

military applications would keep us here probably for several days, 

but I have highlighted a few examples. 

The U.S. Department of Defense initiated a real-time automated 

identification system, known as RAPIDS, and the Defense Enrollment and Eligibility Reporting System, DEERS, as its positive 

identification system for the Department of Defense for all active 

and retired military personnel. At the same time, they implemented a program known as Operation Mongoose which was designed to combat military retirement fraud primarily overseas. 

The Department of Defense also initiated a program known as 

the Biometric Identification System, or BIDS, which is actually an 

evacuation system that is deployed in South Korea that can be 

90

used in the event of our need to evacuate U.S. personnel from that 

theater. The National Security Agency uses it for access control to 

sensitive areas and systems. 

The Department of Energy has used biometrics for years to control access to nuclear plants. The Immigration and Naturalization 

Service’s IDENT program which was discussed earlier, as well as 

their INSPAS program, is used to speed passengers through immigration screening. 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation uses biometrics for access 

control at the Clarksburg, West Virginia, facility; the General Services Administration for logical access to computer networks. The 

State Department—we have discussed the border crossing card 

project. The Secret Service initiated the Treasury Recipient Integrity Program, or TRIP, as an anti-fraud mechanism for recipients 

of Federal entitlement monies. 

In addition to projects such as these, both the Federal Government and military are in the process of evaluating and deploying 

commercial off-the-shelf biometrically-based log-on products to protect computers, networks and sensitive data. 

It should be noted that the Federal Government, in partnership 

with industry, has made a significant contribution to the evolution 

of biometric technology. Biometrics would not have advanced to 

their present level without the help of the Department of Defense, 

the National Security Agency, the Departments of Justice, Energy, 

Treasury, and the National Institute for Standards and Technology. 

Despite the fact that the United States has pioneered the development of many biometric technologies, we lag behind the rest of 

the world in their deployment. Many other countries use biometric 

authentication features in national identification cards, bordercrossing documents, voter registration, drivers’ licenses, et cetera. 

Domestically, some efforts have been made to incorporate biometrics into government-issued identification cards, but they have 

fallen short of realizing the full potential of the technology which 

was pointed out earlier today. 

An example: We have approximately 11 million drivers’ licenses 

in the United States and 5 million border-crossing cards, almost, 

already issued which include biometric data. Currently, there are 

no systems in place to read the biometric data and authenticate the 

card-holders. The use of biometrics in the border entry application 

process would significantly—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Excuse me. You are saying that there is 

this huge investment already in drivers’ licenses and border-crossing cards that have the biometric data on the card, but there is no 

system to read that? 

Mr. COLLIER. Correct. There are several companies that have 

produced products to do so, but the products have not been purchased and deployed by the government agencies, whether they be 

State or Federal. 

The use of biometrics in the border entry application process 

would significantly augment security when compared to current 

lookout list systems. Databases such as fingerprints and photographs already exist worldwide. Encoding biometric data in passports, visas, identification cards and other travel documents can 

91

provide positive identification of the bearer and speed the entry 

process, as was pointed out earlier. 

At the same time, passive biometric technologies such as facial 

recognition can play a significant role as a surveillance tool at our 

airports, ports of entry, and virtually any potential high-threat-condition facility or event. This technology is easily integrated into 

many existing surveillance camera systems, and unlike individual 

profiling, biometric technology is neutral, as opposed to a subjective 

assessment that is prone to human error. 

Biometrics alone are not a panacea, nor can any single biometric 

meet all application requirements. Successful applications require 

the selection of the proper technology that can be integrated into 

existing solutions. Biometrics offer great promise for a significant 

advancement in security, while protecting our privacy and maintaining a low impact on how we go about our daily activities, and 

play a significant role in our Nation’s critical infrastructure, and 

have applications in virtually all aspects of our society. 

As an emerging technology, significant advances have been made 

in establishing industry standards—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Could you wrap it up, Mr. Collier, because 

we need to move on? 

Mr. COLLIER. —and addressing issues of interoperability. The efforts of the Biometric Consortium, co-chaired by NSA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the International Biometric Industry Association, the Biometric Foundation and West 

Virginia University have all played an important role. 

In closing, for biometric technologies to realize their full potential 

will require an accelerated pace in the work of these institutions. 

In light of the events of September 11, wide-scale deployment of biometric solutions becomes more critical and time is of the essence. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Collier follows:]

STATEMENT OF M. PAUL COLLIER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, BIOMETRICS FOUNDATION, 

GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND

Madame Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to 

be a part of this distinguished panel. My testimony will focus on how the federal 

government has used biometric technology and how technology available today can 

offer a significant advance in controlling access at our borders and serve as effective 

tool in our mission to combat terrorism. 

A biometric is quantitative measurement of a unique human attribute or behavioral characteristic such as fingerprints, face, voice, iris, hand geometry, etc. Using 

fingerprints as an example; a finger is placed on a sensor and then scanned. The 

image of the fingerprint is then processed by a series of algorithms, which convert 

it into a binary representation, or template. This template is then compared to a 

reference template stored either on a computer or card based data storage medium. 

Like most biometrics, you cannot reverse engineer this binary representation and 

recreate the scanned image. 

Biometric methodologies can be categorized as two types, contact and passive. A 

contact biometric is one that requires an individual to interact with or touch a sensor such as fingerprint or hand geometry. A passive biometric is one that does not 

require any action on the part of an individual such as facial recognition. 

Biometrics have been used in many civil and government programs worldwide for 

over ten years. They have been very effective in reducing fraud, eliminating multiple identities and securing access to sensitive areas. These wide-scale deployments 

have served as real world proving grounds for this technology and involved many 

millions of people. Knowledge gained from these programs and applied to improvements and cost reductions helped produce many of the commercial products available today. 

92

Traditionally, the primary applications for biometrics in the federal government 

and military have been physical and logical access control and fraud reduction programs. Though many successful pilots and proof of concept studies have been done, 

wide scale deployment has been slow. 

A complete listing of all federal government and military applications would be 

quite extensive, but a few examples of successful deployments are: 

US Department of Defense—Real-time Automated Identification System (RAPIDS) 

& Defense Enrollment and Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) (positive identification) 

US Department of Defense—Operation Mongoose (military retirement anti-fraud) 

US Department of Defense—Biometric Identification System (BIDS) (evacuation 

system deployed in South Korea) 

National Security Agency—access control to sensitive areas and systems 

US Department of Energy—access control in nuclear plants 

Immigration and Naturalization Service—IDENT System (illegal entry control on 

our southwest border) 

Federal Bureau of Investigation—access control at Clarksburg, WV facility 

General Services Administration—logical access to computer networks 

US Department of State—Border Crossing Card Project 

US Secret Service—Treasury Recipient Integrity Program (TRIP) (anti-fraud) 

In addition to projects such as these both the federal government and military are 

in the process of evaluating and deploying commercial-off-the-shelf biometric logon 

products to protect computers, networks and sensitive data. 

It should be noted that the federal government, in partnership with industry has 

made a significant contribution to the evolution of biometric technology. Biometrics 

would not have advanced to their present level without the help of the Department 

of Defense, National Security Agency, Department’s of Justice, Energy, Treasury 

and the National Institute for Standards and Technology. 

Despite the fact that the United States pioneered the development of many biometric technologies, we lag behind the rest of the world in their deployment. Many 

other countries use biometric authentication features in national identification 

cards, border crossing documents, voter registration, driver’s licenses, etc. Domestically, some efforts have been made to incorporate biometrics into government issued 

identification cards but they have fallen short of realizing the full potential of the 

technology. In example; we have approximately 11 million driver’s licenses and five 

million border crossing cards already issued which include biometric data. Currently, there are no systems in place to read the biometric data and authenticate 

the cardholders. 

For instance, the use of biometrics in the border entry application process would 

significantly augment security when compared to current ‘‘look-out’’ list systems. 

Databases such as fingerprints and photographs exist worldwide. Encoding biometric data in passports, visas, identification cards and other travel documents can provide positive identification of the bearer and speed the entry process. 

At the same time, passive biometric technology such as facial recognition can play 

a significant role as a surveillance tool at our airports, ports of entry and virtually 

any potential ‘‘high threat condition’’ facility or event. This technology is easily integrated into many existing surveillance camera systems. Unlike individual 

‘‘profiling’’, biometric technology is neutral as opposed to a subjective assessment 

that is prone to human error. 

Biometrics alone is not a panacea, nor can any single biometric technology meet 

all application requirements. Successful applications require selection of the proper 

technology that can be easily integrated into existing solutions. Biometrics offer 

great promise for a significant advancement in security while protecting our privacy 

and maintaining a low impact on how we go about our daily activities. Biometrics 

can play a significant role in the protection of our Nation’s critical infrastructure 

and have applications in virtually all aspects of our society. 

As an emerging technology, significant advances have been made in establishing 

industry standards and addressing issues of interoperability. The efforts of the government’s Biometric Consortium, co-chaired by National Security Agency and the 

National Institute for Standards and Technology working with the General Services 

Administration, the International Biometric Industry Association, The Biometric 

Foundation, West Virginia University—Center for Identification Technology Research along with it’s other academic partners and the member companies of the 

BioAPI Consortium have been instrumental bringing the industry to it’s present 

level. To date, most of this work has been accomplished with little, or no funding 

from the government or outside institutions. 

For biometric technologies to realize their full potential will require an accelerated 

pace in the work of these institutions. In light of the events of September 11th, wide 

93

scale deployment of biometric solutions becomes more critical and time is of the essence. 

Thank you Madame Chairman


107443.eps
94

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. Let me thank everybody. I think the testimony was excellent. 

Mr. Ward, let me particularly thank you and your organization 

for really being helpful in this. However, I don’t want you to think, 

because I sent that letter, that I don’t believe that there should be 

a fee system and that the fees should be collected by the schools 

and sent into the government, because I do believe that. I think 

that is extraordinarily important for everybody to understand. 

I would like to go on to Mr. Doonan. I would like to ask a question and hopefully you will be able to give me some ball-park answer, and that is the cost of implementing the programs recommended in your written statement. You recommend the impleVerDate Feb 1 2002 13:52 Aug 19, 2002 Jkt 081248 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\HEARINGS\81248.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC

107444.eps
95

mentation of three new programs—a biometric-enabled U.S. passport, a biometric-enabled port of entry system, and a biometric-enabled visa system. 

Do you have a ball-park estimate of the cost of implementing 

these systems, software and hardware? 

Mr. DOONAN. It is really quite difficult. First of all, we would 

have to define how large is the database of suspected or known terrorists because you have to put their fingerprint records in it, and 

the size of the database, as you know from your experience in San 

Francisco, relates largely to the cost. 

Next, we would have to determine how quickly we could establish the biometrically-enabled documents because once you have 

that, the process of entering and leaving the country is really a 

one-to-one verification of the fingerprint and does not require much 

technical horsepower, if you will. 

The real problem comes from the visa waiver program, where 

you have large numbers of people that are crossing the border and 

you have to search every one of them against that known or suspected terrorist database. So until we were able to sit down with 

appropriate Government representatives and try to define the 

scope of this thing and have some implementation plan, it is very 

difficult to say. Now, I believe that Senator Bond had referenced recently $500 

million. I would not quarrel with that number at all. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. What is the best biometric data to use? 

Our purpose here is not to present a problem for the legitimate citizen, but our problem is to get at the person that may, by virtue 

of his associations, his or her background, criminal record, cause 

harm to the United States. Is a fingerprint or is a facial I.D. the 

best biometric information for that purpose? 

Mr. DOONAN. We are in the process of developing facial recognition technology. As Mr. Collier said, that is typically a passive biometric. The real issue is, on a one-to-one verification basis, that 

technology may be very reliable, but if you are searching a large 

database, I don’t know that anybody has accurate statistics about 

how accurate it would be. 

The fingerprints have been historically the most acceptable biometric in terms of accuracy and availability. Also, on facial recognition, I guess I would be concerned if 19 people were willing to kill 

themselves to do what they did on September 11, they might be 

able to significantly change their facial profile and actually defeat 

the system. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I remember conversations that I had with 

NEC about fingerprints and improving fingerprint technology. Has 

the state of the art advanced to the extent that a single print is 

now adequate? 

Mr. DOONAN. We would probably recommend the storing of two 

fingerprints in the database, one because it gives you a backup in 

case the other one is damaged. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. It gives you what? 

Mr. DOONAN. A backup in case one of them is damaged. Also, in 

terms of designing a system, if you have two fingers, it is less expensive to search the entire database than if you have one. So 

there are considerations, but in terms of accuracy on a one-to-one 

96

basis, you can be virtually given hundred-percent accuracy. When 

you are searching the database, it is in the very, very high 90-percent range. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I would like to ask Mr. Collier this question: How would you compare the biometric systems used on the 

United States side of the border with that being used on the Canadian side? 

Mr. COLLIER. The Canadians have not deployed a full biometric 

system for controlling the border. They have a few systems designed for province-level identification cards, as well as, again, entitlement programs. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Let me just stop you. It is my understanding Canada passed an anti-terrorism package of $91 million 

that includes $8 million for some 65 fingerprint scanners to be set 

up at high-risk border crossings. That is essentially what I am 

talking about. 

Mr. COLLIER. I don’t believe they have deployed yet. I was in a 

conversation actually with someone last week and I understand 

that they were looking to the United States to see what we were 

going to do first. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I see. 

Senator Kyl has to leave, so I would like to defer to him. 

Senator KYL. Thank you very much, and I will just tell you I 

have to leave here in about 6 or 7 minutes. 

First of all, thank you. Mr. Camarota, you had some very good 

suggestions. David Ward, let me ask you just a couple of questions 

and then I have a general question regarding the same subject we 

were just discussing, the digital facial versus fingerprint. 

Just to give us a point of reference, at the University of Wisconsin what is the out-of-state tuition that a foreign student would 

pay? 

Mr. WARD. Well, last year it would have been about $14,000 and 

this year it is going to be $18,000. 

Senator KYL. When does the—

Mr. WARD. Senator, if I could interrupt, many of these students 

do get teaching assistants or scholarships that help. 

Senator KYL. Sure, sure. I am just trying to get a rough idea. 

When would they pay their tuition, or at least a part of it? 

Mr. WARD. As they register. 

Senator KYL. Okay. One of the concerns that you expressed 

about the INS approach to a fee—and I agree with Senator Feinstein that the student and the university have to bear part of the 

expense, just like American businesses do. For someone that they 

bring in to assist them, they pay a pretty healthy fee for that, and 

I don’t think that is unreasonable to ask these students to do. 

You have said the plan would seriously undermine the ability of 

most foreign students to enroll at American colleges, and I think 

that may be a little overstated. You say the plan would require students to pay using either the Internet, a credit card or American 

dollars, and many international students don’t have access to credit 

cards, American dollars or the Internet. 

Now, it seems to me that anybody that is going to be coming to 

the United States could easily get access to American dollars. I 

97

mean, they are going to be in a country where you can exchange 

whatever they have for American dollars. 

In any event, if that is too hard, there is nothing to prohibit the 

university from paying the fee and then collecting it from the student once they arrive. Of course, they are obviously going to be 

good credit risks or you wouldn’t have them come. 

So I think it would be helpful to us for you to work out a system 

that would be easiest for universities and other schools to implement, least cost, most efficient, and share that with us, because nobody wants to impose something that is not going to work. Come 

up with an idea that will work, with the assumption that there has 

to be some expense borne by the student and the institution. 

Mr. WARD. Could I ask my colleague if he has any reaction? He 

is on the front line of—

Senator KYL. Sure, but may I do this? I apologize for this, but 

unfortunately I have a live radio interview I have to do and I have 

to leave here in just a minute, but we would appreciate anything 

in writing. Give us a call, stop by and visit, or just any ideas you 

have, because I am sure you can come up with something that we 

can make work. So thank you. 

To any of the rest of you here, we have different needs. Both 

Senator Feinstein and I, and actually Senator Cantwell as well, 

want to make it very easy for people to get back and forth, because 

we are all from border States and for commerce and all the other 

reasons we are for that. 

Secondly, we know that there are different needs here. We have 

photographs of a lot of terrorists, but we don’t have fingerprints. 

So even though a fingerprint system may be best for most honest 

people and Americans and a lot of people coming in here from foreign countries, it may not work best for the one thing we are really 

focusing on here, and that is the terrorist. 

So given that question and the fact that you have existing databases that are very large with certain kinds of systems, what 

would you recommend? Is it possible to make different kinds of systems work together, or does there have to be one integrated system? What would you recommend in that regard? 

Mr. COLLIER. Senator Kyl, the good news is that the Biometric 

Consortium and the National Institute for Standards and Technology and their standards efforts have come up with a common biometric exchange file format. That would allow you to put either 

multiple or layered biometrics of many types on a single document 

or in a single database that would give you the groundwork for 

interoperability. 

Additionally, most biometrics have small, reduced template sizes 

for one-to-one verification. That means it is not a real estate issue 

anymore with the amount of data storage you have got either on 

a card or in a database. 

Senator KYL. And is that going to be readable? The problem we 

have understood here is that you can have the fraud-proof document, perhaps, but we don’t have the readers. 

Mr. COLLIER. Well, there are readers out there. Fingerprint readers have actually, I think come down inexpensively for smart card 

applications. Some of the card technologies, however, require a 

much more expensive reader. The laser card that was mentioned 

98

earlier—a reader for that device that I had viewed some time ago 

was over ten times as much as it would cost to have done that with 

a smart card. 

Senator KYL. Given that we are concerned here about quickly 

getting something in place that will work as best as we can make 

it work, and efficiencies are important here—we don’t want to 

break the bank on it—are you saying that we could quickly put together a relatively inexpensive system that has the multiple features to it and have readers available for that? 

Mr. COLLIER. It can be done, yes, sir. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Would that system be a smart card system? What would that system be? 

Mr. COLLIER. That would be the cost issue, Senator. Smart card 

reader technology is much less expensive than, say, an optical card 

reader or a two-dimensional bar code card reader. For instance, the 

raw components to make a smart card reader are under $20. The 

raw components to make a two-dimensional bar code reader are 

under $500. The system, again, that I viewed as prototypical for a 

laser card was almost $4,000 and as big as two bread boxes. 

The other thing is where it is going to go. I mean, if you are 

going to put it in a turnstile, it is very doable, doable tomorrow 

with smart card technology and fingerprints or hand geometry, or 

even iris scanning. The card is really the issue more than the biometric is. 

Senator KYL. May I just say thank you? I have got to run right 

now. Thank you, all of you, for helping us out today. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thanks, Jon, very much. 

Mr. DOONAN. As the ambassador pointed out this morning, the 

real key to protecting against terrorism is having the database that 

has known or suspected terrorists in it. The general public crossing 

the borders—you could identify them and validate that identity as 

they move. The terrorist portion is probably less than 1 percent of 

the actual people you are talking about. 

So the real challenge is sharing intelligence information between 

national and international law enforcement agencies. Somebody 

mentioned that most of these people have been arrested or 

fingerprinted at some point. It is a matter of collecting the biometric, whether it is a facial photograph that can be reliably matched 

or a fingerprint, and building that database so that the agencies 

that have to access it can do it. 

Mr. CAMAROTA. One thing I wanted to add real quickly is that 

it might be important as soon as possible to start gathering fingerprints on all visa applicants, and part of the reason to do that is 

simply the deterrent effect. If you are considering coming to the 

United States to do harm, you are probably going to be very reluctant to give us all your fingerprints, as well as your photo, and so 

forth. So that could be very useful even if every component of the 

system is not entirely in place immediately. 

Mr. SPADORCIO. Madam Chairman, may I add one other quick 

thing? 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Yes, please, and then I am going to go to 

Senator Cantwell. 

Mr. SPADORCIO. I think the wise decision is really not to look at 

this as a an either/or, either fingerprints or facial or other biometVerDate Feb 1 2002 13:52 Aug 19, 2002 Jkt 081248 PO 00000 Frm 00102 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\HEARINGS\81248.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
99

ric standards. I think the reality is which biometric fits the situation best for what you are trying to accomplish. The technology is 

moving in a direction that ultimately we will have multiple biometrics that we will be using in smart card approaches or other 

types of environments. So I think it really is what is the best technology to solve a particular problem. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And what do you advise is the best technology to solve our particular problem? 

Mr. SPADORCIO. Well, I really think it is probably two-fold. I 

think facial does a real good job for surveillance where you can actually passively scan crowds and look and see if you find somebody 

that matches the database. Fingerprints are absolutely wonderful 

for quick confirmation and authentication. So they both serve a little bit of a different purpose there, and I think you would almost 

want to do it in combination because you have two different means 

you are trying to serve. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And so you could do both of those in a 

smart card? 

Mr. SPADORCIO. Not necessarily in a smart card. Airports could 

introduce facial recognition systems that scan the crowd that are 

entering the airport. That is one way to do that. The smart card 

would be a great application for fingerprints for entry in and out 

of systems to verify identity. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Senator Cantwell? 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Just to follow up on that line of questioning, I think it is important to note that the State Department has the ability to require 

fingerprints now, but they don’t, on a standard basis. So the question becomes implementing that system and then integrating the 

databases. 

Madam Chairman, I think the most successful Fortune 500 companies in our country even focused on information systems would 

find this problem before us challenging, not so much from the technology perspective but from the policy perspective of creating a 

standard—and I want to get to that question for Mr. Collier in a 

second about how do you do that on an international basis because 

once we develop this, we are not just talking about us—and then 

the coordination and decisionmaking between these various agencies. 

So I think our panelists are pointing out quite specifically how 

the technology exists. It is a matter of us making decisions and 

then creating what layers of the database we want to have 

accessed by various people. 

If I could, Mr. Doonan, I wanted to ask you about your specific 

fingerprint technology. What law enforcement are you currently 

working with now on your—what clients are you working with now 

on your fingerprint system? 

Mr. DOONAN. We have about 34 systems in North America. The 

largest is the State of California that has a database of nearly 14 

million fingerprints. We have the seven Western States that are in 

a consortium to share data amongst themselves. We have the State 

of Texas, the State of Illinois, Michigan, Virginia, Georgia, Pennsylvania. We have municipal systems throughout the country that all 

100

interact with the State that they are resident in. Virtually all of 

our State systems interact with IAFIS to send the electronic fingerprint record of an arrested person or an applicant to the FBI. 

Senator CANTWELL. Are you involved with driver’s license records 

or not? 

Mr. DOONAN. Actually, we are doing some preliminary testing of 

drivers’ records. 

Senator Feinstein, you seemed a little shocked that people would 

collect biometrics and not use them. Unfortunately, the State of 

California has about 30 million fingerprints that they collect for all 

their drivers, but they are never matched against anything. 

Senator CANTWELL. What is your technology called? 

Mr. DOONAN. The Automated Fingerprint Identification System. 

It basically matches the unique characteristics of the fingerprint 

against a database of any size. 

Senator CANTWELL. And you have a patent of that technology? 

Mr. DOONAN. Our technology. All of the AFIS vendors, their technology is proprietary, the actual matching algorithm. The interoperability between systems is achieved by utilizing what is called 

a NIST standard, the National Institute of Standards and Technology. We transmit image data that has been pre-defined in a 

standard format so that the different vendors can read and access 

their own databases on an image basis. 

Senator CANTWELL. And only you have access to that algorithm, 

only NEC, or do NEC customers have access? 

Mr. DOONAN. NEC customers use our algorithm to do the matching. 

Senator CANTWELL. But I mean the code, the source code. 

Mr. DOONAN. The source code is an NEC proprietary, just like it 

is for any other AFIS vendor. 

Senator CANTWELL. Mr. Collier, you represent a group of businesses who are involved, but you are also a member of the consortium which has NIST and others involved, is that correct? 

Mr. COLLIER. Correct. 

Senator CANTWELL. And they are trying to establish this standard, somewhat like the W3C or IETF would come up with a standard that the industry can optimize around or use as a standard to 

build their various platforms. Is that right? 

Mr. COLLIER. Yes. We have been engaged in standards development for some time, but it should be noted that the biometric industry has done a phenomenal job in putting together a consensus 

to arrive at standards both for exchange and interoperability of 

data. 

We have currently the standard I mentioned earlier known as 

CBEFF, which is the Common Biometric Exchange File Format; 

the Bio API, which is primarily geared to the computer industry, 

which was one reason I think the biometric industry was motivated 

to move forward quickly because you can’t play in that arena without standards. 

X–984 is our current ANSI standard for fingerprints, and you did 

mention a minute ago about how does that roll into an international standard. That is actually being taken to the International 

Standards Organization, ISO, at this time. That governs all of our 

101

bank cards and how biometrics would be stored on a credit card or 

an ATM card. 

Senator CANTWELL. But ISO is only focusing on private sector 

adoption, or is there a government involvement? 

Mr. COLLIER. There are government standards and guidelines, 

Senator, that are adopted by both commercial and government entities. NIST is an umbrella organization for the development of 

those standards. B10.8, which is another ANSI standard, affects 

drivers’ licenses and credential-type applications. That, too, will 

move to an ISO standard. So the United States is leading the world 

in establishing international standards. 

Senator CANTWELL. My question was about the international organizations. How do we get support from the Canadian government 

and others? Our system will only be as good as the protection that 

our allies will also give us, and while we are having lots of discussions with them on cooperation in our battles overseas, I think we 

should be having discussions with them about our cooperation on 

our various visa programs so that someone doesn’t, like in the 

Ressam case, enter into Canada and then create more falsified information and enter the United States. 

So is there a successful forum right now for that international 

dialogue as it relates to governments? Do we need to charge someone here within the administration to make sure that that dialogue 

is elevated to the level that it needs to be? 

Mr. COLLIER. I think the best place for that to take place would 

be at the Biometric Consortium of the U.S. Government, which is 

led by the National Security Agency and the National Institute for 

Standards and Technology. They have been at this the longest and 

they have established cooperative efforts with other similar bodies 

overseas in the European Union as well as Asia. I don’t know if the 

creation of a separate entity specifically aimed at standards would 

be necessary. 

Senator CANTWELL. My question is how do we make sure that 

this gets elevated to the level—I am glad to hear that you think 

that we are having success there, so I would take it that you mean 

you think we are getting European cooperation. 

Mr. COLLIER. Certainly, the groundwork have been laid for that 

and several meetings have been held for that. The Biometric Foundation and the International Biometric Industry Association also 

foster these relationships with other standards bodies overseas. 

I think the change of importance of biometrics moving forward 

quickly with relevance to international standards is here on the 

front burner now. The activities of the agencies and organizations 

and institutions that I named have been terribly underfunded, with 

little or no funding for the past 10 years. 

If they are expected to accelerate their pace and to bring about 

a consensus and that is going to require them to bear the burden 

of the expense of doing that, then that might be helpful as something that the Government could do. 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you. I see my time is up. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thanks, Senator. 

Mr. Doonan, one of the most helpful things we have, I think, is 

this because I can actually understand it, this application process 

for biometrics-enabled passports and visas. You have one which is 

102

a central database of known or suspected terrorists, and you have 

one that is a passport/visa management database. Then you have 

the non-biometric-enabled passport with a central database of 

known or suspected terrorists. 

Does all of that get entered into one database, or do they remain 

as discreet databases? 

Mr. DOONAN. Well, the known terrorist database typically would 

probably be a relatively small database; we are thinking 250,000 

to 500,000. When a person applies for a visa or a passport, that fingerprint would be searched against that database to see if they enrolled. If they are enrolled, of course, you are not going to issue— Chairman FEINSTEIN. And that would have intelligence information, as well as criminal records? 

Mr. DOONAN. Yes. It may not have a fingerprint. It may have intelligence information that the ambassador spoke about. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Right. 

Mr. DOONAN. But it would be one database that national and 

international agencies could register data to. If the person applied 

and you identified them in some fashion, or suspected you identified them, you, of course, would not issue the document and you 

would notify the appropriate authorities. 

If you did not identify them, you would enroll them then not in 

the terrorist database, but in a management database that then 

would allow you to manage—once the visa is issued, you would be 

able to manage the time frame that the person is supposed to be 

in the country. You would be able to scan their fingerprint when 

they left the country to know that they were out of the country. 

For the student visa program, we would suggest a Web-enabled, 

inexpensive capability for the institution to be able to take a fingerprint when a person enrolled and confirm to that database that, in 

fact, they are a student enrolled in a university in the United 

States. 

So the real problem is establishing a database of known terrorists and then establishing or moving from our current legacy system, where there is no biometric associated with millions of documents, and over time changing that so that we actually know who 

is in the country and we know that, in fact, the person holding that 

passport and that visa is who they say they are and the document 

was issued under the proper authority. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, that is very interesting and it appears to be very doable. 

Mr. DOONAN. It is quite doable. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. If you or any company were to come in and 

say we can do this for you, Federal Government, for all your agencies, what would be the length of time it would take to get that 

database, particularly with respect to terrorists, which is what we 

are interested in? 

Mr. DOONAN. Of course, not being in the intelligence community, 

it is hard for me to say, but certainly we would work with all those 

agencies. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Take your field, which is about 250,000, 

let’s say. 

Mr. DOONAN. Well, establishing the database shouldn’t take a 

few months, I wouldn’t think. Identifying the data to put in the 

103

database should not be that difficult. The total implementation of 

this system and the maintenance system literally is a project that 

would never stop because you have to transition from a current situation where none of our documents are biometrically-enabled. And 

if you have 20 million or 25 million documents, through the normal 

attrition process or renewal process it would take years to actually 

do it. 

But I don’t think you have to look at that as something that is 

taking too long because if you establish the database and focus on 

the visa program, where the problem seems to be, I think a system 

could be operational and contain most of the problem literally within months or a little over a year, a few years, something like that. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And you would use the systems that 

exist—IDENT, IAFIS, all of the other systems that are being put 

in place? 

Mr. DOONAN. No, I would probably not recommend trying to do 

that. These systems are too large. They serve a different function. 

They are not anti-terrorist systems. They are large-scale identification systems. The interface between them is certainly something 

that is desirable, but I don’t truly know how doable that would be. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Truly what? 

Mr. DOONAN. I don’t know how doable that would be. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. In other words, these stovepipes that people spoke about, you don’t think they could interrelate? Is that 

what you are saying? 

Mr. DOONAN. Well, I don’t have any specific information about 

those stovepipes. I am just saying that building a system like that 

and having that full integration is going to be a very difficult task. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. So it is easier to begin just with an identifiable system aimed at getting at this world of terrorism and who 

might be associated with that world? 

Mr. DOONAN. Focus on the problem; that is, the terrorist problem. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Now, just for that system, do you have any 

sense of cost? 

Mr. DOONAN. Well, again, the database—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Unless, of course, NEC, like Oracle, wants 

to do it for nothing. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. DOONAN. Where is Larry Ellison when you need him? 

The FBI system was $400 million. Somebody earlier said $40 

million. It was actually $400 million. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I said that. I had the wrong information. 

Thank you. 

Mr. DOONAN. Again, the real problem is the number of times you 

have to search that database. Quite honestly, the biggest problem 

is the visa waiver program, the number of people that are coming 

into the United States that have not pre-applied for a visa, to have 

that searched against the database. 

Again, I mentioned earlier the $500 million that Senator Bond 

had quoted. I would not quarrel with that number at all. It could 

easily be that, or more, but it would work. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

104

Does anyone have a last comment? I have found this very illuminating in a number of different respects, and very helpful. I 

think we know where we have to go. 

Mr. DOONAN. Well, simply, NEC would like to thank yourself and 

the members for giving us the opportunity to speak with you. We 

are committed to the technology, we are committed to our country 

and company. Again, I would like to repeat the offer that if you 

would like us to bring an operational system here, it doesn’t take 

a lot of room and we would be happy to bring it in and demonstrate 

that the technology does currently exist for yourselves, members 

and your staff. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, I would like to take you up on that 

offer. 

Mr. DOONAN. We will follow up with your staff. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. We will set something up. 

Thank you all very, very much. Thank you for coming. The testimony has been excellent. 

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for your attention. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Submissions for the record follow.]

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Statement of Ted Goode, Director of Services for International Students 

and Scholars, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, California 

All schools approved to issue I–20’s are aware of the regulatory and statutory requirements to collect and maintain information on foreign students as specified in 

the regulations. Reporting to INS has been and remains an expectation by schools. 

The interface between schools and INS to accomplish the transfer of information has 

changed over the years. In the ‘70’s schools sent to the local INS office a part of 

the I–20 document (a small card) to report a student’s end of program. In the ‘80’s 

INS was instructed to collect and maintain a larger amount of information on each 

student and in response created a computer based information system. INS collected 

the required information at the time of arrival in the U.S. and entered the information in a database. Schools were asked to review, verify and/or correct a report of 

students at that school prepared by and returned to INS. INS soon concluded that 

the system was neither efficient nor effective. The SEVIS electronic information system is the most recent attempt by INS to construct a system to collect and maintain 

required information. Schools have been prepared and remain prepared to be a partner with government to facilitate implementation of an efficient, effective and useful 

information system. Using the capability of current technology is clearly the way 

this objective should be met. A carefully crafted system that provides timely and accurate information is of interest to both schools and government. To ensure the success of such a system it must be user friendly for schools and government, usable 

across all computer platforms, and it must be reliable. I am confident that SEVIS 

can be crafted into this type of system through a close partnership between schools 

and government. The University of California supports Senator Feinstein’s request 

to President Bush for the designation of 36.8 million to implement SEVIS. Appropriations to cover final development, implementation and maintenance must be sufficient to achieve this important goal. 

The University of California appreciates your strong interest, support and leadership, Senator Feinstein, on this important issue. The University looks forward to the 

opportunity of close cooperation with you and your staff on this and other issues 

related to higher education.

f105

Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, visa information on terrorist hijackers of September 11, 2001

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (1NS) compiled this information 

based on material provided by the FBI. Where applicable, known variations of common surnames were also checked. For some names (numbers 7 and 19 below), several name matches were found with different dates of birth, but INS was able to 

confirm admission as a nonimmigrant. In other cases (numbers 12 and 14-16), several name matches were found with different dates of birth, but INS was not able 

to confirm any information concerning those individuals. 

(1) Khalid Al-Midhar was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor in July, 2001. He appears to have been in lawful status on September 11, 2001. 

(2) Majed Moqed was admitted as a nonimmigrant visitor in May, 2001. He appears to have been in lawful status on September 11, 2001. 

(3) Nawaq Alhamzi was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor 

in January, 2000. He appears to have overstayed the period of authorized time and 

was out of legal status on September 11, 2001. 

(4) Salem Alhamzi was admitted as a nonimmigrant visitor in June, 2001. He appears to have been in lawful status on September 11, 2001. 

(5) Hani Hanjour was admitted as a nonimmigrant student in December, 2000. 

We are unable to determine at this time whether this subject was in lawful status 

on September 11, 2001. 

(6) Satam A1 Suqami: We are unable to find any record relating to this name 

(7) Waleed M. Alshehri was admitted in June, 2000 as a nonimmigrant, and appears to have been in illegal status on September 11, 2001. 

(8) Wail Alshehri: We are unable to find any record relating to this name, 

(9) Mohamed Atta was admitted as a nonimmigrant visitor in July, 2001 and appears to have been in legal status on September 11, 2001. 

(10) Abdulaziz Alomari is believed to have been admitted as a nonimmigrant visitor in June, 2001, He appears to have been in lawful status on September 11, 2001. 

(11) Marwan Al-Shehhi was admitted as nonimmigrant visitor in May, 2001 and 

appears to have been in lawful status on September 11, 2001. 

(12) Fayez Ahmed: We are unable to confirm any relating record based on current 

information available. 

(13) Ahmed Alghamdi is believed to have been admitted as a nonimmigrant student and appears to have overstayed his authorized period of time in the United 

States before September 11, 2001. 

(14) Iiamza Alghamdi: We are unable to confirm any relating record based on current information available. 

(15) Mohald Alshehri: We are unable to confirm any relating record based on current information available. 

(16) Saeed Al ghamdi: We are unable to confirm any relating record based on current information available. 

(17) Ahmed Alhaznawi was admitted as a nonimmigrant visitor in June, 2001 and 

appears to have been in legal status on September 11, 2001. 

(18) Ahmed Alnami was admitted as a nonimmigrant visitor in May, 2001 and 

appears to have been in legal status on September 11, 2001. 

(19) Ziad Jarrahi was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant in July, 

2001 and appears to have been in legal status on September 11, 2001.

Statement of Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, a U.S. Senator from the State of 

fVermont 

I am pleased that Senator Feinstein is holding this hearing on a critical matter 

of concern. After the events of September 11, no one can doubt that we need to do 

a better job of preventing terrorists from entering our nation, and this hearing will 

provide valuable options for the Senate to consider. I would like to thank all of our 

witnesses for their testimony today. In particular, I would like to welcome Commissioner Ziglar, who has certainly endured a baptism by fire over the last month. 

First, I would like to point out that one of the major security issues we face involves our border with Canada. The USA Act, the bipartisan anti-terrorism legislation that I co-sponsored and the Senate approved Thursday night by a vote of 96–

1, includes important provisions that protect the chronically understaffed northern 

106

border. While the number of border patrol agents along the southern border has increased over the last few years to more than 8,000, the number at the northern border has remained the same as a decade ago at 300. This remains true despite the 

fact that Admad Ressam, the Algerian who planned to blow up the Los Angeles 

International Airport in 1999, and who has been linked to those involved in the September 11 attacks, chose to enter the United States at our northern border. It will 

remain an inviting target until we dramatically improve our security. 

The USA Act triples the number of Border Patrol, INS inspectors, and Customs 

Service employees in each of the States along the 4,000-mile northern border. I was 

gratified when 22 Senators—Democrats and Republicans—wrote to the President 

supporting such an increase, and I am pleased that the Administration agreed that 

this critical law enforcement improvement should be included in the bill. Senators 

Cantwell and Schumer in the Committee and Senators Murray and Dorgan have 

been especially strong advocates of these provisions and I thank them for their leadership. Now more than ever, we must patrol our border vigilantly and prevent those 

who wish America harm from gaining entry. At the same time, we must work with 

the Canadians to allow speedy crossing to legitimate visitors and foster the continued growth of trade that benefits both countries. 

Beyond increasing security at our northern border, we need to take additional 

steps to protect our country. For example, we need to enhance information sharing 

between our intelligence agencies and the agencies that determine who gets into the 

United States—the State Department and the INS. The USA Act gives the State 

Department and INS access to the FBI’s National Crime Information Center database, but we must go further to enhance the sharing of information from other agencies. 

We also must make sure we develop the best possible biometric technology to 

identify potential terrorists entering the United States, such as facial recognition or 

fingerprint systems. The USA Act includes a section requested by Senator Cantwell 

that requires the Attorney General to report to Congress on the feasibility of enhancing FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System and other 

identification systems to better identify people with foreign passports or visas who 

may be wanted in connection with criminal investigations in the US or abroad. 

In short, we need to examine the methods the State Department and the INS use 

to prevent terrorists from entering the United States, and provide those agencies 

with the enhanced resources they may need. We should also remember that although we need to call those agencies to make necessary improvements, they cannot 

bear all of the burden. To prevent future terrorist attacks, we must improve our intelligence-gathering capabilities, and make sure that intelligence about potential 

terrorists is shared with necessary actors throughout the government. 

I am glad that Senator Feinstein is shedding light on these issues through this 

hearing, and I am very interested in hearing the testimony of today

f ’s witnesses.

ORACLE CORPORATION

REDWOOD SHORES, CA, 

October 11, 2001

The Honorable Diane Feinstein 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20005

Dear Dianne: 

It was great to see you see you yesterday. I enjoyed our conversation about a voluntary national ID system and the way different government agencies can share information to better protect our national security. 

Oracle takes seriously our responsibility in these difficult times. As we discussed, 

Oracle is prepared to provide, free of charge, the Oracle software licenses for both 

testing and production of a complete national identification database. 

I look forward to staying in close contact with you on these and other ideas as 

we all work to recover from the horrifying events of last month

Sincerely,

LARRY ELLISON

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

Æ