IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Stephen L. Allen and :

Linda L. Allen, husband and wife :

:

v. : No. 680 C.D. 2017

: Argued: September 12, 2018

Juniata County Board of :

Assessment Appeals :

:

v. :

:

Juniata County and Juniata County :

School District :

:

Appeal of: Juniata County :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: October 22, 2018

Juniata County (County) appeals from an order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of the 41st Judicial District (Juniata County Branch) (trial court)1

that determined a new structure on the property of Stephen L. Allen (Allen) and 

Linda L. Allen, husband and wife (collectively, Taxpayers), was not taxable under 

the Consolidated County Assessment Law (Assessment Law).2 The County argues 

that the trial court erred by determining that Taxpayers’ new structure was not 

 

1 The Honorable Keith Quigley, Senior Judge, presided over this case. Judge Quigley has 

since retired. 

2

53 Pa. C.S. §§8801-8868. 
2

taxable, denying the change in assessment value based on the improvement, and 

precluding the County from presenting evidence of fair market value for the entire 

tax parcel. Discerning no error, we affirm. 

I. Background

Taxpayers own a 279-acre parcel of woodlands in Juniata County 

(Property). Taxpayers’ home is located next to the Property, but on a separate tax 

parcel. In 2016, Taxpayers added a small structure to the Property, after clearing an 

area in preparation for placement of the structure. The County’s Assessment Office 

issued a change in assessment for the Property, increasing the assessed value of one 

acre of land from $75.00 to $1,500.00, and assessing the structure, which it described 

as a cabin, at a value of $1,700.00. Reproduced Record (R.R.), Volume I,3 at 8.

Taxpayers appealed the assessment to the County Board of Assessment 

Appeals (Board), which denied relief. Taxpayers further appealed to the trial court. 

The issue before the court was whether the structure on the Property was taxable 

under Section 8811(a)(1)(iii) of the Assessment Law, which subjects to taxation 

“buildings permanently attached to land or connected with water, gas, electric or 

sewage facilities.” 53 Pa. C.S. §8811(a)(1)(iii). Taxpayers argued that the structure 

was merely a shed, which was not attached to the ground or connected to water, 

sewer, gas or electric facilities, and thus not taxable. The County and Juniata County 

School District argued that the structure was a cabin serviced by a propane tank and 

thus met the definition of a taxable building. The parties presented documentary 

evidence and the testimony of the County’s Deputy Chief Assessor and Allen. 

Based on the evidence presented, the trial court found that the structure 

was placed on a bed of limestone, was readily removable and was not connected to 

 

3 The Reproduced Record contains two volumes. 
3

municipal services such as water, gas, electric or sewer. The trial court further found 

that the structure lacked plumbing and was not wired for electricity. However, the 

trial court found that the structure was serviced by a portable heater fueled by a 20-

pound capacity propane tank. Notwithstanding, the trial court determined that the 

use of a portable propane tank did not constitute a gas connection. The trial court 

reasoned that the non-permanent nature of the gas and its accoutrements, together 

with the portable heater, was akin to a portable electric generator used occasionally 

to run something within the shed. On this basis, the trial court concluded that the 

structure was not “connected with . . . gas” for purposes of Section 8811(a)(1)(iii) 

of the Assessment Law and was not taxable. 

As a result of this ruling, the trial court did not permit the County to 

present evidence of the fair market value of the Property. The trial court surmised 

that the entire Property has surely increased in value since the last countywide 

reassessment, which occurred in the 1960s. However, the trial court explained that 

to open the door to hear valuation testimony as to the entire Property would 

essentially penalize Taxpayers for exercising their right to challenge the limited 

issue regarding the taxability of the structure. The trial court reasoned that such 

would create an “impermissible chill” to a taxpayer exercising the right to challenge

a reassessment. Trial Court Op., 6/28/17, at 2. Thus, the trial court upheld 

Taxpayers’ appeal, denying any change to the assessed value of Property. 

II. Issues

From this decision, the County filed the instant appeal.4 The County 

 

4 Our review in a tax assessment appeal is limited to determining whether the trial court 

abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or made findings unsupported by substantial
4

argues that the trial court erred in finding Taxpayers’ structure is not taxable under 

Section 8811(a)(1)(iii) of the Assessment Law because the evidence clearly showed 

it was a “building . . . connected with . . . gas.” It also claims that the trial court erred 

in denying the change in assessment value of the site because the woodland was 

cleared and improved by the addition of the new structure. Finally, the County 

argues that the trial court erred by not permitting the County’s proffered evidence of 

the fair market value of Property because the trial court is statutorily required to 

make that determination in any appeal.

III. Discussion

A. Gas Connection

First, the County claims that the trial court erred in finding that 

Taxpayers’ structure is not taxable under Section 8811(a)(1)(iii) of the Assessment 

Law. According to the County, the evidence shows that the structure was connected 

to a propane gas tank. Consequently, it maintains that the structure is a taxable 

addition to the real estate. 

Section 8811(a) of the Assessment Law provides:

(a) Subjects of taxation enumerated.—Except as provided 

in subsection (b), all subjects and property made taxable 

by the laws of this Commonwealth for county, city, 

borough, town, township and school district purposes 

shall, as provided in this chapter, be valued and assessed 

at the annual rates, including all:

(1) Real estate, namely:

* * *

 

evidence. Fasnacht v. Board of Property Assessment Appeals of Schuylkill County, 156 A.3d 365, 

368 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). 
5

(iii) buildings permanently attached to land 

or connected with water, gas, electric or sewage facilities;

. . . .

In Pedersen v. Monroe County Board of Assessment Appeals, 84 A.3d 

402 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014), this Court considered the taxability of storage sheds. The 

taxpayer owned a 1300-square-foot home and placed a storage shed on the property. 

Pedersen, 84 A.3d at 403. The shed was prefabricated with a garage-style rolling 

door and wooden floor. Id. The structure was delivered to the property on a rollback 

truck. The shed was placed on support beams sitting on a bed of stones. Id. The 

shed lacked windows, heat, electricity, and plumbing. Id. The shed matched the 

exterior of the home. Id. The shed was not physically affixed to the ground in any 

manner and could be moved to another location in the same way it was delivered. 

Id. The local assessment office increased the assessed value of the property based 

on the addition of the shed. The taxpayer challenged the assessment. The 

assessment board and court of common pleas denied relief. In concluding that the 

shed was taxable, the court of common pleas placed primary emphasis on the 

taxpayer’s site preparation, which included installation of a rock bed, and the 

taxpayer’s intention to use the shed for an indefinite period of time. Id. at 404.

On appeal to this Court, we examined the language of Section 

8811(a)(1)(iii) and applied common and approved usage for the terms not defined. 

Id. at 405-06. We determined that a shed clearly constitutes a “building” for 

purposes of Section 8811(a)(1)(iii). Id. at 405. However, we concluded the shed 

was not “permanently attached.” Id. at 406. We opined that the term “attached” 

“require[s] more than mere placement of a structure on the ground, leaving it held 

in place by weight alone.” Id. at 406. “[T]he common and approved usage of the 

word connotes a more affirmative or substantial connection, requiring connection 
6

methods such as fastening or affixing the building to the land.” Id. (emphasis added). 

To conclude otherwise would render the General Assembly’s express requirement 

for “permanent attach[ment]” meaningless. Id. Upon determining that the credited 

evidence failed to establish that the shed was attached in a manner sufficient to 

render it assessable under the Assessment Law, we reversed the assessment. Id. at 

406-07.

The County relies on Lazor v. Board of Assessment Appeals of 

Armstrong County, 986 A.2d 219 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009), which was decided under 

former Section 201(a) of The Fourth to Eighth Class County Assessment Law

(Former Assessment Law),

5 which permitted the taxation of “All real estate, to wit 

. . . mobile homes permanently attached to land or connected with water, gas, 

electric or sewage facilities . . . .”

6

 We opined that “whether a mobile home is 

attached to the land is governed by the physical facts, and whether a mobile home 

is permanently attached is primarily a matter of intent.” 986 A.2d at 221 (emphasis 

added). “However, the self-serving statements of the owners are not controlling; the 

intention of the owners must be determined from all the circumstances.” Id. Based 

on the record, we determined that the mobile home in question was permanently 

attached to the land by the concrete porch and roof. Id. The addition of exterior 

features such as concrete steps leading to the porch, landscaping with shrubs and 

bricks, and connection to cable television service all indicated the intent of the 

taxpayers to use the mobile home as a permanent and taxable seasonal residence, as 

opposed to a travel trailer. Id. The taxpayers’ stated intent to move the mobile home 

 

5 Act of May 21, 1943, P.L. 571, as amended, formerly 72 P.S. §5453.201(a). 

6 This section was repealed and replaced by Section 8811(a)(ii) of the Assessment Law, 

which similarly permits taxation of “house trailers and mobile homes permanently attached to land 

or connected with water, gas, electric or sewage facilities.” 53 Pa. C.S. §8811(a)(ii).
7

in the future did not negate their intent to leave the home permanently attached to 

the land for the relevant tax year. The Court noted that the home’s attachment to 

utilities was only for part of the year and, thus, was not dispositive. Id. at 221 n.4. 

Our focus in this case is the second part of Section 8811(a)(1)(iii), i.e., 

“buildings . . . connected with water, gas, electric or sewage facilities.” The term 

“connected” is not defined by the Assessment Law. Applying common and 

approved usage to the term, “connected” means “joined or linked together.” 

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 278 (9th ed. 1987); see Black’s Law 

Dictionary 302 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “connected” as “joined” and “connect” as 

“to unite or link together, as in an electrical circuit; establish a bond or relation 

between”); see also SugarHouse HSP Gaming, L.P. v. Pennsylvania Gaming 

Control Board, 162 A.3d 353, 376 (Pa. 2017) (in determining the common and 

approved usage or meaning of undefined statutory terms, courts may turn to standard 

dictionary definitions). Like the term “attached” in the same subsection, the word 

“connected” must “connote[] a more affirmative or substantial connection” 

conferring permanence. See Pedersen, 84 A.3d at 406. 

The other critical element in the statute is that the connection must bear 

a relation to the building itself, i.e., “buildings . . . connected with water, gas, electric 

or sewage facilities.” 53 Pa. C.S. §8811(a)(1)(iii) (emphasis added). It is only 

logical to require that the connection with water, gas, electric or sewage facilities be 

fastened or affixed to the building in such a way that the building is on par in terms 

of permanence with a building attached to the land. In other words, there must be 

some type of electrical wiring, plumbing or other fitting connecting the building to 

electric, water, gas or sewage facilities. To conclude otherwise would mean that the 

mere presence of a portable gas grill with a propane tank or a rechargeable battery 
8

connected to a camping lantern would somehow qualify an otherwise nontaxable 

building as taxable. 

Here, there is no dispute that the structure is a building that is not 

permanently attached to the land. R.R., Volume II, at 53-56, 60. The record 

evidence shows that the structure rests on a bed of stones. Id. at 38. The structure

has no plumbing or sewage disposal system attached to it and it is not connected to 

a water source. Id. at 50-51, 56, 78-79. It also has no wiring and is not connected 

to an electric source. Id. at 50, 79. There are no heating ducts or heating fixtures 

affixed to the structure. Id. at 56-57, 79. 

However, at one point, there was a portable heater in the structure that 

was attached to a portable, refillable propane cylinder or tank, located outside. Id.

at 57, 74. Allen testified that he ran a “hose” connecting the heater to the propane 

tank. Id. at 40-41, 79-80, 117. The hose ran through a hole drilled into the structure. 

Id. at 74, 79-80, 117. The portable heater, propane tank and connection hose were 

not permanently affixed to the structure and were readily removable. Id. at 57-58, 

76, 79, 117. Allen testified he primarily used the structure for storage. Id. at 38-73, 

82. At one point, he attempted to heat the structure to germinate chestnut tree seeds, 

but since the structure is not insulated and the heater did not work well, his 

germination efforts failed. Id. at 73-75, 82. Consequently, he unhooked the hose 

from the propane tank and heater; removed the items from the structure; and 

relocated them to his residence. Id. at 75. Allen described the process of unhooking 

the propane tank the same as unhooking propane from a gas grill. Id. at 76. Upon 

review, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the structure was

not connected with gas for purposes of the Assessment Law. Thus, we conclude that 
9

the trial court did not err in determining that the structure on Taxpayers’ Property is 

a nonpermanent building not subject to taxation. 

B. Improvement

Next, the County claims that the trial court erred in denying a change 

to the assessed value of the Property. By clearing the woodland and adding the 

structure, Taxpayers improved the Property. The County asserts that a change in 

assessment may be made when improvements are made. 

Section 8817 of the Assessment Law provides that “the assessors may 

change the assessed valuation on real property . . . when improvements are made to 

real property or existing improvements are removed from real property or are 

destroyed.” 53 Pa. C.S. §8817. The Assessment Law does not define 

“improvements.” However, our Supreme Court has adopted the following definition 

for tax reassessment purposes:

Not every bit of work done to change a building 

constitutes an improvement. “Improvement” has been 

defined as a “permanent addition to or betterment of real 

property that enhances its capital value and that involves 

the expenditure of labor or money and is designed to make 

the property more useful or valuable as distinguished from 

ordinary repairs.”

Groner v. Monroe County Board of Assessment Appeals, 803 A.2d 1270, 1273 (Pa. 

2002) (quoting Spahr-Alder Group v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of City of 

Pittsburgh, 581 A.2d 1002, 1004 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (emphasis added))7; accord In 

re Delphais, 903 A.2d 80, 83 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). 

 

7 Although the Supreme Court in Groner was construing former Section 602a of the Former

Assessment Law, added by the Act of January 18, 1952, P.L. (1951) 2138, as amended, formerly

72 P.S. §5453.602a, which has since been repealed and replaced by Section 8817 of the 
10

The County’s argument in this regard ignores when reassessments may 

occur. The structure is exempt from taxation under Section 8811(a)(1)(iii) of the 

Assessment Law because it is not “permanently attached to land or connected with 

water, gas, electric or sewage facilities.” Consequently, it is not a permanent 

addition to the real property. Thus, we conclude that the structure is not an 

improvement subject to reassessment under Section 8817 of the Assessment Law. 

C. Fair Market Value

Finally, the County claims that the trial court erred by not permitting 

the County to present evidence of the fair market value of the entire tax parcel. The 

Court is statutorily required to make that determination in “any appeal.” Section 

8854(a)(2) of the Assessment Law, 53 Pa. C.S. §8854(a)(2). Because Taxpayers

initiated this assessment appeal, the taxing authorities may argue higher fair market 

value. 

Section 8854(a)(2) of the Assessment Law provides: 

(2) In any appeal of an assessment the court shall make 

the following determinations:

(i) The market value as of the date the appeal was 

filed before the board. In the event subsequent years have 

been made a part of the appeal, the court shall determine 

the market value for each year.

(ii) The common level ratio which was applicable in 

the original appeal to the board. In the event subsequent 

years have been made a part of the appeal, the court shall 

determine the applicable common level ratio for each year 

published by the State Tax Equalization Board on or 

before July 1 of the year prior to the tax year being 

appealed.

 

Assessment Law, the Court’s construction is equally applicable here because Section 8817 

contains the identical improvements provision. 
11

53 Pa. C.S. §8854(a)(2) (emphasis added). 

The County cites In re: Harrisburg Park Apartments, Inc., 489 A.2d 

996 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985), for the proposition that the Assessment Law “requires the 

Court to determine fair market value of the property under appeal as of the date the 

appeal was filed before the Board . . . .” Appellant’s Brief at 13. However,

Harrisburg Park merely holds that where both the taxpayer and the Board present 

fair market value evidence, the trial court determines the credibility and evidentiary 

weight of the testimony. Harrisburg Park, 489 A.2d at 997. It further requires the 

trial court to make an independent assessment of fair market value. Id. Notably, the 

taxpayer therein challenged the assessed value of the property itself. Id. at 996. The 

case did not involve a challenge of the taxing authority’s right to reassess as 

presented here. 

Technically, Taxpayers did appeal an assessment for purposes of 

Section 8854. However, they challenged the County’s authority to reassess the 

Property on the basis that the structure was not subject to taxation under Section 

8811(a)(1). Because the Property was not improved for purposes of Section 8817, 

the County did not have authority to reassess under Section 8854 in the first place. 

Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in excluding valuation evidence.8 

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

 

8 To conclude otherwise and allow Taxpayers’ limited challenge to serve as the impetus 

for the County’s full reassessment of Taxpayers’ 279-acre parcel seems patently unfair, 

particularly since the last countywide reassessment was conducted in the 1960s. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Stephen L. Allen and :

Linda L. Allen, husband and wife :

:

v. : No. 680 C.D. 2017

: 

Juniata County Board of :

Assessment Appeals :

:

v. :

:

Juniata County and Juniata County :

School District :

:

Appeal of: Juniata County :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 22nd day of October, 2018, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of the 41st Judicial District (Juniata County Branch), dated May 12, 

2017, is AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge