1

Proposed Changes to DOE Part 810

Assistance to Foreign Nuclear Activities
Outline

• Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security 

Administration 

Mr. Richard Goorevich

• Department of State 

Mr. Richard J. K. Stratford

• Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Ms. Brooke Smith, Mr. Mark Resner

• Department of Commerce 

Mr. Steven Clagett

2
Scope of Part 810

• Part 810 implements Sec. 57 b. of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) 

• Sec. 57 b. Unlawful for any person to directly or indirectly 

engage in the production of any special nuclear material 

[SNM] outside of the United States except:

• Upon authorization by the Secretary of Energy after a 

determination that such activity will not be inimical to the 

interest of the United States. 

• Covers SNM activities whether for weapons or commercial 

purpose

3

Inimicality determination is key
Scope of Part 810

• Part 810 classifies assistance as:

• Exempt (§810.2) – in scope of §57 b. but regulation unnecessary

• “Generally Authorized” (§810.6) – broad categories of assistance that 

are not inimical and do not require specific approval

• Requiring a Specific Authorization (§810.7) and inimicality 

determination by the Secretary 

4

Part 810 establishes pathways to authorization
General and Specific Authorizations

• Assistance requiring specific authorization means:

• Preparation of application

• DOE and Interagency review

• Host country assurances on proliferation compliance

• Transaction-specific finding by Secretary on inimicality

• Generally authorized assistance

• Requires reporting only

• Available for most foreign nuclear transactions

5

General authorizations make regulation efficient:

Higher walls only for riskier transactions
Part 810 Changes were Needed

• No comprehensive update since 1986

• Global nuclear market has expanded and changed

• New markets, particularly in Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe

• New vendors competing with U.S. companies 

• New technologies for reactors and fuel cycles

• New multi-national business arrangements 

• Global market dynamics =

• New proliferation threats

• New political relationships

• New regulations

6
Fundamental Approach Unchanged

• The Secretary has discretion to make general authorization or 

require specific authorization based on inimicality finding

• Inimicality determination factors (§810.9) include:

• U.S. relationship to host country

• National security considerations

• Diplomatic considerations

• Trade considerations

• Sensitivity of technology – enrichment and reprocessing always 

require specific authorization

• Inimicality well supported if:

• POTUS 123 agreement decision

• Congress 123 oversight 

• Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements (NPAS) 

7
Goals of Proposed Changes

• Effective Threat Reduction. Maintain effective controls in the face of 

changing nuclear geopolitics, economics, technologies and relationships 

since 1986

• Effective Nuclear Trade Support. Support U.S. companies competing to 

provide nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in global civil nuclear 

reactor markets

• Efficient Regulation. Create a licensing process that is efficient, 

transparent, timely, and predictable. The cost of regulation should not 

exceed the benefits. Avoid duplicative or unnecessary regulatory 

requirements 

8

Striking a balance to promote trade 

without increasing proliferation risk
DOE Proposed Regulations

• Initial notice of proposed rulemaking (NOPR)

• September 2011

• Meant to address concerns about outdated regulations

• Outdated inimicality determinations

• Outdated terminology

• Provoked considerable adverse public comments

• Supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNOPR)

• Comments carefully considered 

• Proposed regulations revised in response 

• Proposed regulations prepared in consultation with interested 

agencies

9

SNOPR regulations responsive to comments
What We Learned from Comments

• Leading Concerns

• Proposed change to generally authorized country list from 

restricted country list 

• Perceived increase in proposed activities subject to specific 

authorization 

• Applicability unclear regarding some activities

• Specific authorization process slow, opaque and unpredictable

• Explanations not clear

10

Process concerns appeared to drive 

concerns about substance
How the SNOPR Responds to Comments

• More open, better explanation of proposed changes

• Proposed destination reclassification retained with 

minor changes – minimal adverse trade impact

• Proposed to generally authorize or exempt more 

activities

• Improve process

11

Process improvement is key to better regulation
Key Proposed Change: 

Destination Classification

• Current regulation identifies destinations requiring specific 

authorization, others generally authorized

• Proposed regulation identifies generally authorized 

destinations, others would require specific authorization 

• No change proposed for 117 destinations

• 44 major nuclear trading partners would remain generally authorized

• 73 destinations presenting proliferation issues would continue to 

require specific authorization

• Russia, China, and India would continue to require specific 

authorization

• Certain projects in Mexico and Chile would continue to be authorized 

12
Classification Change Proposed for 

80 Destinations

• Key basis for proposed classification: 123 Agreement

• Kazakhstan, Ukraine, UAE would be generally 

authorized

• 123 Agreements in place

• Countries have dynamic nuclear markets 

• Specific authorization would be required for 77 

countries with:

• Little or no nuclear trade

• No 123 Agreement

• No experience managing proliferation issues

13
Future Reclassifications

• As nuclear programs emerge in countries requiring specific 

authorization, and would benefit from U.S. nuclear partnership, 

host countries may enter 123 Agreements

• 123 Agreements support inimicality determination

• Generally authorized status may be granted upon inimicality 

determination

14

Proposed classifications facilitate trade with growing 

markets, would have

little impact on smaller nuclear markets
Key Proposed Change: 

Deemed Exports

• SNOPR exempts lawful permanent residents and protected 

foreign nationals

• SNOPR generally authorizes access to nuclear technology to 

foreign nationals employed at U.S. nuclear facilities if:

• Employee signs confidentiality agreement;

• Access is authorized in accordance with NRC standards; and

• Employer reports authorized access to DOE

• Would cut delays, and duplicative regulation

• No changes are proposed for deemed re-exports

15

Would benefit U.S. Nuclear employers
Key Proposed Change: 

Commercial Power Reactor Support

• Existing rule expressly covers “production” reactors but covers 

all reactors because:

• All reactors produce SNM and can be operated to 

maximize SNM output

• Part 810 has always been applied to all reactor 

technology

• SNOPR expressly covers all reactors, but narrows scope to 

reactor technology related to SNM production (nuclear island, 

primary coolant)

• Consistent with NRC and Commerce coverage

16

SNOPR clarifies scope nexus to §57 b. 
Key Proposed Change: Operational 

Safety

• Existing rule provides “fast track” authorization for 

operational safety and nuclear emergency assistance

• NOPR eliminated operational safety fast track

• SNOPR would: 

• retain fast track 

• tie definition of “operational safety” to established safety standards

• authorize safety exchange and benchmarking programs

• Extend DOE period to respond to request for fast track approval from 30 days 

to 45 days , but if no response in 45 days automatically generally authorized 

17

SNOPR promotes U.S. nuclear 

safety engagement
Other Proposed Changes

• Commerce and State approved exports would be exempt from 

part 810 in order to avoid duplicative regulation

• Transfer of Public Information would be generally authorized. 

SNOPR proposes standardized definition and would make 

transfers exempt

• Activities with remote connection to SNM would be authorized 

or not covered: mining, medical isotope production, fusion, 

and back-end

• Activities carried out by IAEA personnel would be generally 

authorized except for employees from restricted countries 

working on sensitive technology

18

Unnecessary regulatory burdens would be reduced
Part 810 Process Issues

• Specific authorization process unduly protracted

• Processing delays may put U.S. suppliers at a 

competitive disadvantage in other countries 

• Processes should be more transparent, predictable, 

and efficient 

19

Reduce Process Times
Current Specific Authorization 

Process

20

Stage I Initial Review

NA-24: Analysis and 

recommendation

 ~2 days

Reviews

* NNSA Staff

* DOE Nuclear Energy

* Legal

Send approval recommendation 

to interagency for review

<30 days

Stage II Agency Review

• Interagency review

• State, Commerce, NRC and 

DoD

• <30 days

• State requests formal 

assurances from host 

government

• Assurances received

• 1-24+ months

Stage III Approval

• NA-24 draft license 

approval 

recommendation

• ~2 days

• Review: NNSA staff, DOE 

NE and other staff Legal

• Secretary approval

• Issue license

• 30+ days

Major time 

reduction 

opportunity

Some reduction 

opportunity

Minimal time 

reduction 

opportunity
Part 810 Process Improvements 

• DOE

• Committed to process improvement program

• Goal is to make process ISO 9001 compliant

• “Talk to customer” interviews

• Ideas on the table include:

• Publish Part 810 guide including advisory opinions 

• Reduce the response times for foreign government assurances 

• Develop and implement an e-licensing system 

• Create fast track procedures for authorization of activities that present 

the lowest proliferation risk.

• Reduce time for internal DOE and inter-agency reviews

21
Conclusion

Improving Part 810

• Facilitate nuclear trade

• Update and modernize to be more open, effective 

and efficient

• No compromise of proliferation controls

22

Striking a balance to promote trade 

without increasing proliferation risk
Outline

• Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security 

Administration 

Mr. Richard Goorevich

• Department of State 

Mr. Richard J. K. Stratford

• Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Ms. Brooke Smith, Mr. Mark Resner

• Department of Commerce 

Mr. Steven Clagett

23
Department of State

Office of Nuclear Energy, Safety and 

Security (NESS)

• NESS develops U.S. policy related to peaceful nuclear 

cooperation, nuclear safety, nuclear export controls, 

and the physical protection of nuclear materials and 

facilities

• USG Lead on Nuclear Suppliers Group

• Lead for 123 Agreements Negotiations

• Responsible for concurring in Part 810 authorizations, 

include responsibility for obtaining foreign government 

assurances

24
Department of State’s Role in Part 

810s

• The 1954 Atomic Energy Act (AEA) requires DOE to seek 

concurrence from the Department of State (DOS) for 

approval of specific authorizations of nuclear technology 

transfers

• Prompt and careful consideration for each application

• Make every effort to expedite internal review process

• Foreign government nonproliferation assurances are required 

25
Foreign Government Assurances

• Foreign government nonproliferation assurances are 

required in accordance with long-standing U.S. policy 

and U.S. obligations to adhere to the provisions of the 

multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines:

• Nuclear technology transfers are only for civil nuclear power 

use and not for nuclear weapons, other explosive devices, or 

for any military purpose; and 

• No retransfer without prior written consent of US government

• Proactive facilitation, coordination, and engagement 

with DOE, U.S. Embassies, and foreign governments 

26
Why China, India and Russia are not 

proposed to be Generally Authorized?

• Nuclear transfers to China, India and Russia would 

require specific authorization based upon longstanding U.S. diplomatic and national security policy

• Reporting requirements in the Hyde Act make it 

infeasible to grant India generally authorized status

• Pursuing new approaches to expedite issuing of 

assurances, given U.S. company expansion and 

involvement in large civil nuclear programs abroad, 

i.e. China

• Obtaining agreement from recipient governments to apply 

existing assurances to new nuclear projects

27
Guiding Principles

• Recognizes critical importance of nuclear technology 

transfers to the U.S. nuclear industry

• Strongly supports need to balance nonproliferation 

controls, transparency and greater supplier 

responsibility without hindering legitimate trade and 

international cooperation on peaceful uses of 

nuclear energy

• DOS works to ensure expeditious processing of 

nuclear technology transfers while protecting the 

common defense and security 

28
Outline

• Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security 

Administration 

Mr. Richard Goorevich

• Department of State 

Mr. Richard J. K. Stratford

• Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Ms. Brooke Smith, Mr. Mark Resner

• Department of Commerce 

Mr. Steven Clagett

29
Brooke G. Smith 

Senior International Policy Analyst

Office of International Programs

Mark Resner 

Senior Security Specialist

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

August 5, 2013
 Atomic Energy Act of 1954

 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978

 Treaties, Conventions and Agreements including:

◦ Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

◦ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards

◦ Conventions: Nuclear Safety; Waste and Spent Fuel; Physical 

Protection; Early Notification; Assistance; and Liability

◦ 123 Agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation

31
 Exports: reactors; fuel cycle facilities; 

components; nuclear grade graphite for 

nuclear end use; deuterium; source, special 

nuclear and byproduct materials including 

when contained in spent fuel or radioactive 

waste

 Imports: reactors; fuel cycle facilities; 

source, special nuclear and byproduct 

materials including when contained in spent 

fuel or radioactive waste

32
33
 Items within or attached directly to the 

reactor vessel

 Equipment which controls the level of power 

in the core

 Components which normally contain or come 

in direct with or control the primary coolant 

of the reactor core

34
 Reactor pressure vessels, i.e., metal vessels, 

as complete units or major shop-fabricated 

parts

 On-line reactor fuel charging and discharging 

machines

 Complete control rod drive system

 Reactor primary coolant pumps

35
 Reactor pressure tubes, i.e., tubes especially designed or 

prepared to contain fuel elements and the primary coolant

 Zirconium tubes

 Reactor internals, .e.g., core support structures, control and 

rod guide tubes, thermal shields, baffles, core grid plates and 

diffuser plates

 Reactor control rod drive mechanisms, including detection 

and measuring equipment to determine flux levels

 Any other components especially designed or prepared for 

use in a nuclear reactor or in any of the components 

described

36
37
 Appendix B – Gas Centrifuge Enrichment

 Appendix C – Gaseous Diffusion Enrichment

 Appendix D – Aerodynamic Enrichment

 Appendix E - Chemical or Ion Exchange Enrichment

 Appendix F – Laser-Based Enrichment

 Appendix G – Plasma Separation Enrichment

 Appendix H – Electromagnetic Enrichment

 Appendix I – Reprocessing

 Appendix J – Uranium Conversion 

 Appendix K – Plants for the Production of Heavy Water, Deuterium and Deuterium 

Compounds

 Appendix N – Lithium Isotope Separation; Appendix O – Fuel Fabrication

38
 In 2005, Part 110 was amended to address the IAEA 

Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of 

Radioactive Sources and its Import/ Export Guidance

 If a device or a source for use in a device contains 

Appendix P radionuclides (Am-241, Am-241/Be, Cf252, Cm-244, Co-60, Cs-137, Gd-153, Ir-192, Pu238, Pu-239/Be, Pm-147, Ra-226, Se-75, Sr-90, 

Tm-170 or Yb-169) a specific NRC export license 

may be required

39
 “...any such determination by the Secretary of 

Energy shall be made only with the concurrence 

of the Department of State after consultation with 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission...”

 NRC, with rare exceptions, provides its input 

within 30 days of receiving a request for views

 Collaborative process 

◦ NRC works closely with DOE throughout the review 

process

40
 10 CFR 810.6(b) of SNOPR – Transfer of 

technology to a citizen or national of a 

country or territory not listed in the Appendix 

to Part 810 and working at an NRC-licensed 

facility

41
42

Questions 
NRC’s Access Authorization 

Program for Nuclear Power 

Plants

August 5, 2013

Mark Resner

Access Authorization Program Coordinator

Office of Nuclear Security & Incident Response
Introduction

Nuclear power plants licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) are required by regulations codified 

in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) to provide 

an access authorization program that provides high 

assurance that individuals are trustworthy and reliable, 

such that they do not constitute an unreasonable risk to 

public health and safety or the common defense and 

security, including the potential to commit radiological 

sabotage.

 

1
Defense-In-Depth 

Strategy

•NRC uses a layered, defense-in-depth approach that 

incorporates three primary rings of protection at nuclear power 

plants

•The outer ring is the owner controlled area (OCA)

•Proceeding inward, the next ring is the protected area (PA) 

•The vital area (VA) is the inner most ring

•The OCA, PA, and VA, have progressively more stringent 

requirements as you proceed into the nuclear plant from the 

OCA to the VA

•In addition to physical security, other components of Access 

Authorization include Behavioral Observation, Fitness-for-Duty, 

and Insider Mitigation

 2
Illustration of OCA, PA & VA

3
Types of Access

•Unescorted Access (UA)

•Licensees may grant unescorted access if all required program 

elements are met 

•Unescorted Access Authorization (UAA)

•Licensees may grant UAA only for access to Safeguards 

Information as opposed to plant access 

•Escorted Access

•Licensees may grant escorted access to protected and vital 

areas with a trained escort if the required criteria are met

4
Elements Requried

for Initial Access Authorization

 Unescorted Escorted

 Consent and Advisement Procedures for processing, controlling, and 

escorting visitors

 Personal History Questionnaire Visitor control register

 Verification of True Identity Confirmation of visitor’s identity

 Employment History Evaluation Verify any prior denials of access 

 Credit History Visitor badges

 Character and Reputation Evaluation Escort Training

 Criminal History Review Communication with security staff

 Psychological Assessment Escort should be knowledgeable of any 

work the individual may perform

5
Elements Required

for Reinstatement of Unescorted

Access Authorization

 Within 365 days Within 30 days

 Consent and Advisement Consent and Advisement

 Personal History Questionnaire Personal History Questionnaire

 Verification of True Identity Verification of True Identity

 Employment History Evaluation 

6
NRC Regulations 

Access Authorization regulations are codified in: 

10 CFR 73.55 “ Requirements for physical protection of 

licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological 

sabotage”

10 CFR 73.56 “Personnel access authorization requirements 

for nuclear power plants”

10 CFR 73.57 “Requirements for criminal history checks of 

individuals granted unescorted access to a nuclear power facility or 

access to Safeguards Information by power reactor licensees”

10 CFR 26 “Fitness for Duty Programs”

7
Recent Enhancements

to the Regulations 

• Licensees required to implement enhancements by 

 March 31, 2010.

•Enhancements to the psychological assessments requirements

•Requires information sharing between reactor licensees 

•Expanded behavioral observation requirements

•Requirements for reinvestigations of criminal and credit history records for all individuals 

with unescorted access

•5-year psychological reassessments for certain critical job functions

8
NRC Guidance 

Regulatory Guide 5.66 “Personnel Access 

Authorization for Nuclear Power Plants” 

Regulatory Guide 5.77 “Insider Mitigation Program” 

• Minimum IMP elements for all personnel with UA to the 

protected and vital areas of a nuclear power plant: 

(1) a security determination (clearance or access authorization)

(2) initial and random substance abuse testing 

(3) psychological assessments which may include a medical

evaluation

(4) review by the immediate supervisor at least annually 

(5) periodic reinvestigation security determinations

9
Industry Guidance

•NEI 03-01 (Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorization 

Program)

•Prepared by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) in 

coordination with the industry

•Endorsed by the NRC

•Access authorization guidance in NEI 03-01 is committed 

to and implemented by NRC licensees in their site physical 

security plans that must be approved by the NRC

•NEI 03-01 and physical security plans are updated as new 

requirements emerge 

10
Industry Guidance

(continued)

NEI 03-04 (Guideline for Plant Access Training)

•Pre-access training with a score of at least 80% on the 

exam required before unescorted access can be 

granted

•The Behavior Observation Program (BOP) is covered 

in this guidance

1.BOP is currently being updated to incorporate behavior 

indicators associated with radicalization 

11
Integration of Insider Mitigation, 

Fitness-for-Duty, & 

Behavior Observation Programs 

Insider Mitigation Fitness-for-Duty Behavior 

Observation

Prevention Pre-access drug & alcohol Continuing assessment of 

reliability & trustworthiness 

Detection Inclusion in random drug 

testing pool

Detection of illegal use of 

drugs, alcohol, aberrant 

behavior, and fatigue

Denial Self-disclosure Training for all individuals 

with unescorted access & 

annual supervisory reviews

12
Trustworthiness

&

Reliability

Behavior Observation 

Program

Fitness 

for Duty 

Program

Insider 

Mitigation 

Program

Background Investigation

Criminal History Check

Integration of Human Reliability Components

 

NRC Inspection & Oversight

13
Other Program 

Elements of Access Authorization

•NRC Data Demographic Project 

• Implemented in August 2002 and memorialized in a 

January 2006 MOU between NRC and the Terrorist 

Screening Center (TSC)

• Data set of biographic information from PADS 

includes data for all individuals entered into PADS by 

the NRC licensee

• All new individuals granted initial UA

• All individuals with current UA status

14
Other Program 

Elements of Access Authorization

(continued)

•NRC Data Demographic Project (continued)

• All individuals who are eligible for UAA

• All individuals who have been reinstated with 

UA within 30 days or less, or within 31-365 

days

• The frequency of providing the data to TSC is 

monthly with a 12-month retrospective look

15
Enhancement Initiatives 

With Federal Partners

•Engaged with FBI CJIS Interoperability Unit, US Visitor and 

Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US VISIT), and DoD 

Biometrics Identity Management Agency (BIMA)

•Goal is to participate in pilot program for rap back feature 

and acquire ability to screen licensee fingerprints through 

CJIS, IDENT & BIMA databases as part of the Access 

Authorization Program

16
Outline

• Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security 

Administration 

Mr. Richard Goorevich

• Department of State 

Mr. Richard J. K. Stratford

• Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Ms. Brooke Smith, Mr. Mark Resner

• Department of Commerce 

Mr. Steven Clagett

60
Bureau of Industry and Security 

U.S. Department of Commerce

61

DOC Export Controls and 

Civil Nuclear Trade

By Steven B. Clagett
Bureau of Industry and Security 

U.S. Department of Commerce

62

Agency Jurisdiction

Process Agency Jurisdiction Advisory Agencies

Part 810 Department of 

Energy

Nuclear technology 

and services related 

to the production of 

Special Nuclear 

Material

Departments of 

Commerce, 

Defense, State, and 

the NRC

Part 110 Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC)

Nuclear equipment 

and material

Departments of 

Commerce, 

Defense, State, and 

Energy

Export 

Administration 

Regulations 

Department of 

Commerce

Dual-use items

listed on the 

Commerce Control 

List

Departments of 

Defense, Energy, 

and State
63

• Balance of plant – turbines, generators, 

switching gear, pipes and valves

• Health and safety equipment – radiation 

detection and monitoring, fire safety, facility 

security

• General infrastructure, telecommunications, 

tools and maintenance equipment

• Materials and Manufacturing Equipment

Bureau of Industry and Security

U. S. Department of Commerce

Commerce Jurisdiction

(nuclear power related items)
Bureau of Industry and Security 

U.S. Department of Commerce

64

Commerce Jurisdiction

(NSG dual-use items)

Pressure Transducers (2B230) – Used for pressure measurement 

in a multitude of industrial processes as well as in the uranium 

hexafluoride gas in the centrifuge process for isotope separation

Mass Spectrometers (3A233) – Determine 

composition of chemical samples as well as the 

chemical make-up of uranium, plutonium, etc

Machine Tools (2B001) – Product manufacturing 

in virtually every industry including nuclear 

explosive device components and uranium 

enrichment equipment
Bureau of Industry and Security 

U.S. Department of Commerce

65

List Based Controls

• Export Control Classification 

Number (ECCN): 

2B231

• Vacuum pumps having all of the 

following characteristics.

• Input throat size equal to or greater than 380 mm

• Pumping speed equal to or greater than 15 m3/s

• Capable of producing an ultimate vacuum better 

than 13.3 mPa

• Reason for Control

 Nuclear Nonproliferation (NP1), 

Anti-terrorism (AT 1)

 
Bureau of Industry and Security 

U.S. Department of Commerce

66

• Section 744.2 (Catch-All/EPCI)

• License required if the item will be used directly or indirectly in 

any of the following:

• Nuclear explosive activities

• Unsafeguarded nuclear activities

• The following activities, whether safeguarded or unsafeguarded:

• Facilities for the chemical processing of irradiated special nuclear or source 

material

• Facilities for the production of heavy water

• Facilities for the separation of isotopes of source and special nuclear material

• Facilities for the fabrication of nuclear reactor fuel containing plutonium

Nuclear End-Use Controls
Bureau of Industry and Security 

U.S. Department of Commerce

Not Subject to 744.2 Controls

• Mining and Milling

• Fusion Reactors (Tokamak and Iter)

• Most Trade with IAEA Safeguarded 

Facilities

67
End-Use/End–User Based 

Controls

Recently, we received an export 

inquiry for stainless steel pipe for 

use in a nuclear power plant in 

PRC.

Do I need to apply for a license 

under Part 744.2 of the EAR?

68
I am a distributor of college textbooks. 

I often get requests for foreign customers 

for textbooks on nuclear engineering. 

Should I be worried about Part 744 

controls?

End-Use/End-User Based 

Controls

69
Bureau of Industry and Security 

U.S. Department of Commerce

70

Entity List

• The Entity List notifies exporters of requirements for 

exports/re-exports to specified end users

• See Supplement Number 4 to part 744 of the EAR
Bureau of Industry and Security 

U.S. Department of Commerce

71

Deemed Export Rule

• The obligation to get a license before releasing 

controlled technology or source code to a foreign 

person is informally referred as the “deemed 

export” rule

• Releases of controlled technology or source code to 

foreign persons in the U.S. are “deemed” to be an 

export to the person’s country or countries of 

nationality
Bureau of Industry and Security 

U.S. Department of Commerce

72

Nationality

• Commerce Department looks to a 

foreign person’s most recent country 

of citizenship or permanent resident

• Exempted from the Deemed Export 

Rule

• A person granted U.S. citizenship

• A person granted permanent residence 

status (i.e. “ Green Card” holders)

• A person granted status as a “protected 

individual” under 8 U.S.C. 1324b(a)(3)
Bureau of Industry and Security 

U.S. Department of Commerce

73

Part 6 of Form I-129: Export 

Certification Requirement
Bureau of Industry and Security 

U.S. Department of Commerce

74

Deemed Exports and I-129 –

How much of an issue?

• What if I am a nuclear power plant operator?

• What if I am a valve manufacturer?

• Are Chinese or Indian nationals possible?
Bureau of Industry and Security 

U.S. Department of Commerce

75

Licensing Deadlines

The President

EARB

ACEP

OC

Dept. of

Defense

Dept. of

State

Dept. of

Energy

Other 

Export Application

Submitted to Dept.

of Commerce Day 1

Day 9

Day 39

Day 53

Day 69

Day 85

Day 90
Bureau of Industry and Security 

U.S. Department of Commerce

76

QUESTIONS ?

steven.clagett@bis.doc.gov