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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TRAVIS LANIER

(SC 20620)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,

Ecker and Alexander, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of the crime of burglary in the second degree, the defendant

appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court

had violated his constitutional rights to confrontation, to present a

defense, and to a fair trial when it limited defense counsel’s crossexamination of the victim with respect to matters pertaining to the

victim’s bias and motive to fabricate allegations against the defendant.

The victim, who had been serving probation for a felony conviction,

encountered the defendant, with whom he was acquainted, and another

individual, M, at a bar, when the defendant asked the victim if he could

borrow some money. The victim gave the defendant twenty dollars and

remarked that he had additional money at home that he was saving for

his rent. When the bar closed, they all went to the defendant’s apartment,

where M struck the victim several times and accused him of stealing

his wrist watch. The defendant and M then ordered the victim to take

them to the victim’s apartment, and, when they arrived, the defendant

demanded that the victim give him his money. The victim gave the

defendant an envelope containing $800 in $100 and $50 bills. The defendant took some of the money and told the victim that he would hurt

him if he contacted the police. Once the defendant and M departed, the

victim called 911. A police officer responded to the call and encountered

the defendant and M walking near the victim’s apartment. The defendant

continued to disregard the officer’s multiple orders to stop and continued

walking around a corner and onto a side street. A second police officer

arrived on the scene, and, while that officer secured the defendant and

M, the first officer searched the side street and discovered two $100

bills. In anticipation of trial, the defendant sought permission to question

the victim concerning his prior felony conviction, his probationary status

at the time of the incident, his arrests while on probation, and the

specific conditions of his probation, which required that the victim

undergo substance abuse treatment and that he not be arrested. The

defendant argued that the victim’s probationary status was a legitimate

area of inquiry because the jury reasonably could infer from it that the

victim had an interest in currying favor with the state and that the

specific conditions of the victim’s probation were relevant to his state

of mind at the time of the incident and his motive to fabricate the

allegations against the defendant. Specifically, the defendant argued that

the victim was motivated to fabricate the allegations to avoid being

accused of stealing M’s watch and to recover the money that was taken

from him as payment for M’s watch. The trial court ultimately permitted

defense counsel to question the victim about his prior felony conviction,

his probationary status, and his financial concerns and hardships at the

time of the incident but prohibited her from cross-examining the victim

about his recent violation of probation, his arrests while on probation,

or the specific conditions of his probation. In doing so, the trial court

determined that the defendant’s proffered theory in support of the prohibited lines of questioning, namely, that the victim had fabricated his

allegations to recover the money the defendant took from him and to

avoid being arrested for stealing M’s watch, which could have affected

his probationary status, was too speculative. The Appellate Court

affirmed the judgment of conviction, concluding that, because the trial

court had allowed defense counsel to conduct an extensive and robust

cross-examination of the victim, during which she emphasized the victim’s felony probationary status and the many inconsistencies in the

victim’s testimony, the trial court did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights or otherwise abuse its discretion by limiting defense counsel’s cross-examination. On the granting of certification, the defendant

appealed to this court. Held:

1. The trial court did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights to
confrontation, to present a defense, or to a fair trial:

The trial court’s restriction on defense counsel’s cross-examination did

not foreclose her from cross-examining the victim on matters tending

to show the victim’s motive, bias, or interest to fabricate his allegations

against the defendant but merely set reasonable limits on the scope of

that inquiry, and defense counsel was permitted to expose facts from

which the jury could have appropriately drawn inferences relating to

the victim’s credibility.

Defense counsel was afforded an adequate opportunity to cross-examine

the victim, which included questions about M’s allegedly stolen watch

and the victim’s financial difficulties, and to present the defense’s theory

of the case, namely, that the victim was motivated to fabricate the

allegations against the defendant so that he could recover the money

the defendant had taken from him and avoid arrest for allegedly stealing

M’s watch.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court had

abused its discretion by limiting defense counsel’s cross-examination

of the victim because, even if the trial court had abused its discretion,

the defendant failed to demonstrate that the error was harmful:

Although the victim’s testimony was critical to proving that the defendant

had committed the burglary, the state’s case was strong, and there was

ample corroborating evidence demonstrating that the defendant had

unlawfully entered and remained in the victim’s apartment while placing

the victim under threat of physical harm and with the intent of stealing the

victim’s money, and that evidence included photographs of the victim’s

injuries, medical records, and testimony from emergency room personnel; M’s testimony that the victim had been assaulted, that the defendant

was present for the assault, and that the defendant and M walked the

victim to his apartment to get his money; and dispatch call sheets,

testimony from a police dispatcher, and 911 call transcripts all indicating

that the victim had not led the defendant and M back to the victim’s

apartment voluntarily.

Moreover, the defendant’s conduct upon encountering the police, including his ignoring the officers’ commands, his walking away from one of

the officers, and his disposal of two $100 bills on the sidewalk before

returning to the officers, supported the inference that the defendant had

acted in that manner because the money was evidence of the burglary,

and he did not want the police to find it on his person or to observe

him disposing of it.

Defense counsel was otherwise permitted to conduct cross-examination

and to introduce evidence to adequately advance the defense’s theory

that the victim had fabricated the allegations against the defendant, as

counsel elicited testimony from the victim that he had been convicted

of a certain felony, that he was on probation, and that he faced certain

financial difficulties at the time of the incident, counsel impeached the

victim’s credibility by highlighting the many inconsistencies in his statements, M’s testimony provided a basis for the defendant’s claim that the

victim had stolen M’s watch and offered him money as compensation

for the theft, and defense counsel’s closing argument, which drew from

the testimony elicited during cross-examination of the victim and direct

examination of M, demonstrated that counsel was able to cogently present the defense’s theory of the case.

Furthermore, there was no merit to the defendant’s contention that the

prosecutor’s rebuttal argument that the defendant had failed to show

any motive for the victim to fabricate his allegations compounded the

harm allegedly caused by the trial court’s limits on defense counsel’s

cross-examination of the victim, as the trial court mitigated any potential

harm by instructing the jury that statements made by counsel during

closing arguments are not evidence and by reminding the jury to draw

its own conclusions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, and the

prosecutor’s rebuttal argument did not change the fact that defense

counsel, during her own closing argument, relied on the evidence that

she was able to introduce to argue that the victim had been motivated

to fabricate the allegations against the defendant due to the victim’s

probationary status.

In addition, this court could not conclude that the trial court’s limits on
defense counsel’s cross-examination would have had any meaningful

impact on the jury’s verdict, as it was unlikely that testimony regarding

the specific conditions of the victim’s probation would have made

defense counsel’s presentation of the defense’s theory of the case any

more persuasive, as the jurors reasonably could have surmised, on the

basis of their own common knowledge, that a probationer would seek

to avoid arrest.

Argued October 11, 2022—officially released July 11, 2023

Procedural History

Two part substitute information charging the defendant, in the first part, with the crimes of robbery in the

first degree, robbery in the second degree, conspiracy

to commit robbery in the first degree, conspiracy to

commit robbery in the second degree, assault in the

second degree, and burglary in the second degree, and,

in the second part, with being a persistent felony

offender, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial

district of Middlesex, where the first part of the information

was tried to the jury before Suarez, J.; verdict of guilty

of burglary in the second degree; thereafter, the defendant was tried to the court on the second part of the

information; finding of guilty; subsequently, the court,

Suarez, J., rendered judgment in accordance with the

verdict and the finding, from which the defendant

appealed to the Appellate Court, Bright, C. J., and Moll

and Bear, Js., which affirmed the trial court’s judgment,

and the defendant, on the granting of certification,

appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Pamela S. Nagy, supervisory assistant public defender,

for the appellant (defendant).

Melissa L. Streeto, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom were Russell Zentner, senior assistant

state’s attorney, and, on the brief, Michael A. Gailor,

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

ALEXANDER, J. In this certified appeal, the defendant, Travis Lanier, challenges the judgment of the

Appellate Court, which affirmed the defendant’s conviction of burglary in the second degree in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-102 (a). The defendant claims

that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that (1)

the trial court did not violate his constitutional rights

to confrontation, to present a defense, and to a fair

trial under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the

United States constitution, and (2) the trial court did not

abuse its discretion when it limited defense counsel’s

cross-examination of the victim, Alejandro Marrinan.1

We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts. On the evening of January 28, 2018, the victim

went to the Corner Pocket, a bar in Middletown, where

he encountered the defendant, who was there with a

small group, including Mason Moniz. The defendant,

who was acquainted with the victim, bought him a drink

and, at some point, asked if he could borrow some

money. The victim gave the defendant $20 and remarked

that he had additional money at home that he was saving

for his rent. After the bar closed at 1 a.m., the defendant

invited the victim and Moniz back to his apartment.

When they arrived at the defendant’s apartment, Moniz

struck the victim several times2 and accused him of

stealing his watch. Moniz testified that, about two

weeks prior to the night in question, the victim had

been at his apartment and stolen a watch while Moniz’

back was turned. Moniz further testified that, when he

confronted the victim about the watch, the victim had

denied taking it but offered to pay Moniz $300 as compensation for it. The victim testified that he ‘‘had no

idea what [the defendant and Moniz] were talking

about’’ when they confronted him about the watch.

He further testified that the defendant and Moniz had

demanded that he take them to his apartment to get

money or they were going to hurt him.

While the three men walked to the victim’s apartment,

the victim secretly dialed 911 on his cell phone in his

pocket, hoping that the call would alert the police to

his location.3 When the three men arrived at the victim’s

apartment, the defendant ordered him to open the door,

and the defendant and Moniz forced him inside. Once

inside, the defendant demanded that the victim give

him his money. The victim had $800 in a bank envelope

in his bedroom closet, in denominations of $100 and

$50 bills, that he was saving for his rent payment. After

the victim removed the envelope from the closet, the

defendant grabbed it, removed a portion of the money,

and told the victim that he would hurt him if he talked

to the police. He then invited the victim back to his

apartment to drink some more beer, which the victim

declined to do.
After the defendant and Moniz left the apartment,

the victim again called 911 and told the operator that

two individuals had just robbed him and that these

individuals were walking down the street. The victim

said that he was afraid for his life because one of them

had threatened to shoot him if he talked to the police.

He also informed the operator that, before leaving his

apartment, the individuals had invited him back to their

apartment. After receiving the 911 dispatch, Officer Kyle

Pixley of the Middletown Police Department encountered the defendant and Moniz walking down Main

Street, a short distance from the victim’s apartment.

When Pixley ordered them to stop, both men continued

walking. After Pixley ordered them to stop several more

times, Moniz complied, but the defendant continued to

disregard Pixley’s orders and walked around the corner

from Main Street onto Rapallo Avenue. A second officer

arrived and ordered the defendant to comply several

times, after which the defendant walked back toward

Main Street. While the second officer secured the defendant and Moniz, Pixley walked over to Rapallo Avenue

to see whether the defendant had disposed of something

when he had walked around the corner. Pixley discovered two $100 bills on the sidewalk.4 The officers also

found two $50 bills on Moniz.

Middletown police officers interviewed the victim at

his apartment and then took him in a police cruiser

to the area where the defendant and Moniz had been

detained. After the victim identified the defendant and

Moniz as the individuals who stole his money, the police

took him back to his apartment. He subsequently was

transported by ambulance to a hospital after complaining to an officer about a head injury. The hospital medical staff observed blunt trauma to the victim’s face and

determined that he had a broken nose. At the hospital,

the victim conveyed to the emergency department staff

that he was concerned that he might have been drugged.

The defendant was arrested and charged in a six

count information with committing various crimes.5

‘‘[I]n count six, the state alleged that the defendant

committed burglary in the second degree [in violation

of § 53a-102 (a)] by entering or remaining unlawfully

in the victim’s apartment sometime between 1 and 2:50

a.m. on January 29, 2018, while the victim was present,

with the intent to commit a crime therein . . . .’’ State

v. Lanier, 205 Conn. App. 586, 594, 258 A.3d 770 (2021).

‘‘Following a jury trial . . . the defendant [was found]

guilty of burglary in the second degree as alleged in

count six and not guilty of the charges in counts one

through five.’’ Id.

The victim was the state’s key witness at trial. At the

time of the incident, the victim was on probation for a

2017 felony conviction for operating a motor vehicle

while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs

(felony DUI conviction). Id., 595. Prior to trial, the
defendant filed a motion in limine, seeking permission

to question the victim concerning (1) his 2017 felony

DUI conviction, (2) his probation status during the

events underlying the defendant’s criminal charges, (3)

his arrests while on probation and his violation of probation,6 and (4) the specific conditions of his probation.

In the motion in limine, the defendant argued that

the jury reasonably could infer that the victim may

‘‘wish to curry favor with the prosecuting authorities’’

because of his probation status, and, therefore, it was

a legitimate area of inquiry for cross-examination. He

further argued that the specific conditions of the victim’s probation were relevant to the victim’s state of

mind at the time of the incident and his motive to

fabricate the allegations against the defendant. Specifically, the defendant sought to ask the victim ‘‘whether

. . . he knew that one of the conditions of his probation

was substance abuse treatment’’ and that the authorities

could find that he violated his probation if they became

aware that he had been intoxicated on the night in

question. He also sought to ask the victim ‘‘whether

one of the standard conditions of his probation was

not to be arrested.’’ The defendant argued that this

question was relevant because, if the victim knew that

one of the conditions of his probation was not to have

any new arrests, he may have been motivated to fabricate his allegations against the defendant to avoid being

accused of ‘‘stealing [Moniz’] watch.’’ In addition to

establishing any concerns the victim may have had due

to his probationary status, the defendant sought to

establish that the victim fabricated his allegations to

recover the money that the defendant and Moniz took

from him as payment for the allegedly stolen watch.

At trial, the prosecutor moved to preclude defense

counsel from cross-examining the victim on whether

he believed that his consumption of alcohol on the night

in question could result in a violation of his probation.

The prosecutor also objected, on relevancy grounds, to

defense counsel’s questioning the victim on whether an

arrest would violate the victim’s probation.

The trial court allowed defense counsel to question

the victim about his prior felony conviction, his current

probation status, and his financial concerns and hardships at the time of the incident, but prohibited him from

cross-examining the victim about his recent violation

of probation, his prior arrests while on probation, or the

specific conditions of his probation. The court reasoned

that the defendant’s proffered theory in support of those

lines of questioning was ‘‘too speculative.’’ As to the

questions regarding the victim’s possible fear of a future

violation of probation, the court observed that ‘‘[t]here

are many reasons why somebody can get violated [on]

probation’’ and that the proposed questions were ‘‘speculative.’’7

Consistent with the court’s rulings, during cross-
examination of the victim, defense counsel elicited testimony that, at the time of the incident, the victim had

been on probation for a prior felony DUI conviction

and that he was still on probation at the time of the trial.

Defense counsel also asked questions eliciting responses

revealing that, at the time of the incident, the victim

had been experiencing financial difficulties arising from

an ‘‘expensive’’ divorce, a desire to provide for his son,

and employment that he believed ‘‘wasn’t giving [him]

what [he] needed for money.’’ Additionally, defense

counsel drew attention to several inconsistencies in the

victim’s testimony, including what beverages he drank

on the evening in question, how many drinks he consumed, how much money was actually stolen from him,

and the fact that the victim told hospital staff that he

might have been drugged but never brought that concern to the attention of the 911 operator or the police.

The Appellate Court concluded that, because the trial

court allowed defense counsel to conduct an ‘‘extensive

and robust cross-examination of the victim,’’ during

which she emphasized the victim’s felony probationary

status and the ‘‘many inconsistencies in the victim’s

testimony,’’ the court did not violate the defendant’s

constitutional rights by declining to permit cross-examination regarding the victim’s recent violation of probation, his prior arrests while on probation, or the specific

conditions of his probation. State v. Lanier, supra, 205

Conn. App. 614. The Appellate Court also held that the

trial court had not abused its discretion in excluding

the line of inquiry as speculative and, consequently,

irrelevant. Id., 613–15.

I

We first address the defendant’s claim that the trial

court’s limitations on defense counsel’s cross-examination of the victim violated the defendant’s constitutional

rights. ‘‘[T]he sixth amendment to the [United States]

constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a

criminal prosecution to confront the witnesses against

him.8

. . . The primary interest secured by confrontation is the right to cross-examination . . . . [P]reclusion of sufficient inquiry into a particular matter tending

to show motive, bias and interest may result in a violation of the constitutional requirements of the sixth

amendment. . . . Further, the exclusion of defense

evidence may deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense. . . .

‘‘However, [t]he [c]onfrontation [c]lause guarantees

only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not

cross-examination that is effective in whatever way,

and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. . . .

Thus, [t]he confrontation clause does not . . . suspend

the rules of evidence to give the defendant the right to

engage in unrestricted cross-examination. . . .

‘‘Although [t]he general rule is that restrictions on
the scope of cross-examination are within the sound

discretion of the trial [court] . . . this discretion

comes into play only after the defendant has been permitted cross-examination sufficient to satisfy the sixth

amendment. . . . The constitutional standard is met

when defense counsel is permitted to expose to the

jury the facts from which [the] jurors, as the sole triers

of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness. . . .

Indeed, if testimony of a witness is to remain in the

case as a basis for conviction, the defendant must be

afforded a reasonable opportunity to reveal any infirmities that cast doubt on the reliability of that testimony.

. . . [A] claim that the trial court unduly restricted

cross-examination generally involves a two-pronged

analysis: whether the aforementioned constitutional

standard has been met, and, if so, whether the court

nonetheless abused its discretion . . . .’’ (Emphasis

added; footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leconte, 320 Conn. 500, 510–12, 131 A.3d

1132 (2016).

Our review of the record reveals that the trial court’s

restriction of defense counsel’s cross-examination of

the victim did not violate the defendant’s constitutional

rights. The trial court did not foreclose defense counsel

from cross-examining the victim on matters tending to

show motive, bias, or interest, but merely set reasonable

limits on the scope of that inquiry regarding the victim’s

probationary status, conditions, and the like. Compare

State v. Francis, 228 Conn. 118, 122–24, 635 A.2d 762

(1993) (trial court’s prohibiting all inquiry into probationary status of state’s witness to show bias violated

defendant’s constitutional rights), with State v. Gibson,

340 Conn. 407, 422–23, 264 A.3d 83 (2021) (limiting

defense counsel’s cross-examination of state’s witness

regarding his pending criminal charges to show bias

was appropriate when trial court did not prohibit all

inquiry about them). In cases such as the present one,

in which the trial court did not foreclose cross-examination of the witness to show motive, bias, or interest,

we inquire whether the limitations imposed by the trial

court permitted defense counsel to expose facts from

which the jury could appropriately draw inferences

relating to the witness’ credibility or reliability. See,

e.g., State v. Bermudez, 341 Conn. 233, 271, 267 A.3d

44 (2021).

In the present case, the trial court allowed defense

counsel an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the

victim and to introduce evidence supporting the defense’s

theory of the case—that the victim fabricated his allegations against the defendant to recover the money the

defendant took from him and to avoid being arrested

for stealing Moniz’ watch, which could have affected

the victim’s probationary status. See, e.g., State v. Torres, 343 Conn. 208, 218, 273 A.3d 163 (2022) (‘‘[i]n order

to determine whether a defendant’s constitutional right
to cross-examination has been satisfied, [w]e consider

. . . whether the field of inquiry was adequately covered by other questions that were allowed’’ (internal

quotation marks omitted)). Defense counsel also crossexamined the victim about the stolen watch and his

financial difficulties at the time of the incident to show

that the victim was motivated to make false allegations

against the defendant to recover his money and to avoid

arrest. The trial court also permitted defense counsel

to cross-examine the victim about his felony DUI conviction, as well as the victim’s current probationary status.

During closing argument, defense counsel relied on

this testimony and other evidence to make the very

argument that the defendant now claims the trial court’s

rulings prevented him from being able to make. Specifically, defense counsel argued: ‘‘[The victim] testified

that, at the time this happened, he was on a supervised

probation for a felony DUI [conviction]. He testified

that he had been drinking that night. . . . He owed

money. His rent was due. He was so concerned about

money . . . . How badly did he need that $300 back?

. . . He had been accused of stealing some watch, and

what if [Moniz] had reported the stolen watch to the

police? What would happen if [the victim] had been

arrested and charged with stealing that watch? What

would be the consequence to him? Does it make sense

that he’d want to get ahead of it? Now, he didn’t know

that [Moniz] wasn’t going to report the stolen watch

because [Moniz] had [outstanding] warrants [for his

arrest]. [The victim] had no way of knowing that.’’

Thus, the evidence of the victim’s prior felony conviction, his probationary status, his financial difficulties,

and his inconsistent statements were sufficient to allow

the jury to draw appropriate inferences relating to the

victim’s alleged bias and motive to fabricate his allegations against the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Mark R.,

300 Conn. 590, 614–15, 17 A.3d 1 (2011) (restriction on

cross-examination of state’s witness for alleged motive

to fabricate was not constitutional violation when permitted cross-examination and closing argument gave

jury fair opportunity to consider facts supporting defendant’s theory of case); see also Barresi v. Maloney, 273

F. Supp. 2d 144, 154 (D. Mass. 2003) (‘‘[w]hen a [witness’] credibility is at issue, the trial court may impose

limits on [cross-examination] without violating a defendant’s confrontation right so long as the court grants the

defendant sufficient leeway to establish a reasonably

complete picture of the [witness’] bias and motivation

to fabricate’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). A

court is not constitutionally obligated to permit a defendant to present every piece of evidence that might support his theory of defense. See, e.g., State v. Jordan,

329 Conn. 272, 287 n.14, 186 A.3d 1 (2018) (‘‘[t]he constitutional right to present a defense does not include

the right to introduce any and all evidence claimed to
support it’’). Because the trial court permitted defense

counsel sufficient latitude in her cross-examination of

the victim to present evidence that the victim was motivated to fabricate the allegations due to his probationary status, the trial court’s ruling permitted the defendant to expose to the jury the facts from which it could

appropriately draw inferences relating to the victim’s

credibility or reliability. Accordingly, we conclude that

the defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated.

II

We next address the defendant’s evidentiary claim

that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting

defense counsel’s cross-examination of the victim on

the ground that the proffered line of questioning was

speculative. We need not consider whether the trial

court’s restriction on defense counsel’s cross-examination of the victim constituted an abuse of discretion

because, assuming, without deciding, that the trial court

abused its discretion, we conclude that the defendant

has failed to satisfy his burden of proving harm.

‘‘When an improper evidentiary ruling is not constitutional in nature, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the error was harmful. . . . [W]hether

[an improper ruling] is harmless in a particular case

depends [on] a number of factors, such as the importance of the witness’ testimony in the [defendant’s] case,

whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence

or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting

the testimony of the witness on material points, the

extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and,

of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.

. . . Most importantly, we must examine the impact of

the . . . evidence on the trier of fact and the result of

the trial. . . . [T]he proper standard for determining

whether an erroneous evidentiary ruling is harmless

should be whether the jury’s verdict was substantially

swayed by the error. . . . Accordingly, a nonconstitutional error is harmless when an appellate court has a

fair assurance that the error did not substantially affect

the verdict.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Mark T., 339 Conn. 225, 251, 260 A.3d 402 (2021).

The defendant claims that the trial court’s restriction

on defense counsel’s cross-examination of the victim

was harmful because it prevented him from demonstrating to the jury that the victim was motivated to fabricate his allegations against the defendant, which was

central to the defendant’s defense. The defendant contends that the state’s case was weak, relying primarily

on the victim’s testimony, which exhibited several

inconsistencies.9 Lastly, the defendant contends that

the harm resulting from the trial court’s restriction was

compounded by the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument

insofar as he emphasized that the defendant had failed

to present any such motive, thereby capitalizing on the

defendant’s inability to fully expose the victim’s motive
to fabricate. We disagree.

The state’s case for burglary was strong. In order to

prove that the defendant committed burglary in the

second degree in violation of § 53a-102 (a), the state

had to prove that the defendant entered or remained

unlawfully in a dwelling, while a person other than a

participant in the crime was actually present in such

dwelling, with the intent to commit a crime therein.

Undoubtedly, as the state’s key witness, the victim’s

testimony was critical to proving that the defendant

had committed the offense. Ample evidence introduced

at trial, however, corroborated his testimony, demonstrating that any error in excluding the testimony sought

by the defendant was harmless.

The state produced evidence demonstrating that the

defendant had unlawfully entered and remained in the

victim’s apartment by forcing the victim to provide the

defendant and Moniz access under threat of physical

harm with the intent of stealing the victim’s money.

Photographs of the victim’s injuries, medical records,

and testimony from emergency room personnel indicated that the victim had shown signs of blunt trauma

and sustained a broken nose, substantiating the victim’s

testimony that he had been assaulted. Moniz provided

testimony confirming that the victim had been assaulted, that the defendant was present for the assault, and

that the defendant and Moniz walked the victim to his

apartment to get his money. Dispatch call sheets, testimony from the Middletown police dispatcher, and 911

call transcripts confirmed that the victim had made a

silent 911 call, followed by a second call immediately

after the defendant and Moniz left his apartment, indicating that the victim had not led Moniz and the defendant back to his apartment voluntarily.

Furthermore, the defendant’s actions upon encountering police officers—ignoring commands to stop,

walking away from Pixley and around the corner, and

disposing two $100 bills on the sidewalk—supported

the inference that the defendant had entered and

remained in the victim’s apartment with the intent to

unlawfully obtain the victim’s money. It is reasonable

to infer that the defendant disposed of the $200 because

it was evidence of the burglary that he did not want to

have found on his person. Moreover, the defendant

continued walking to round the corner on Main Steet,

in defiance of several orders to stop, only to turn back

around and to comply after dropping the two $100 bills,

which created a strong inference that he did so to dispose of the money without being observed by the police.

Notwithstanding the trial court’s restriction of portions of defense counsel’s cross-examination of the victim, she was otherwise permitted to conduct crossexamination and to introduce evidence to adequately

advance the defense’s theory that the victim had fabricated the allegations against the defendant. To demon-
strate the victim’s motive to fabricate, defense counsel

elicited testimony from the victim that he had been

convicted of a felony DUI in 2017 and was on probation.

Defense counsel was also permitted to cross-examine

the victim about the financial difficulties he faced at

the time of the incident. Moniz’ testimony provided the

basis for the defendant’s claim that the victim had stolen

a watch from Moniz and offered him money as compensation for the theft. Defense counsel also highlighted

many inconsistencies in the victim’s statements, including his testimony relating to the amount of money taken

and his consumption of alcohol, and that he did not

tell the 911 operator or the police that he believed that

he may have been drugged, but only made the assertion

to medical personnel. By exposing these inconsistencies, defense counsel impeached the victim’s credibility,

thereby strengthening the defense’s theory that the victim had fabricated his allegations. See, e.g., State v.

Bermudez, supra, 341 Conn. 278 (exclusion of testimony was harmless when defense counsel was granted

ample opportunity to impeach witness). Moreover,

defense counsel’s closing argument, which drew from

the testimony she had elicited during cross-examination

of the victim and direct examination of Moniz, demonstrated that she was able to cogently present the

defense’s theory that the victim was motivated to fabricate his allegations. See, e.g., State v. Lugo, 266 Conn.

674, 696, 835 A.2d 451 (2003) (erroneous exclusion of

testimony to support defendant’s theory of defense was

harmless when defense counsel presented theory of

defense through other testimony and closing argument).

Additionally, the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, that

the defendant had failed to show any motive for the

victim to lie, did not compound the harm that the defendant claims he suffered.10 The prosecutor specifically

argued: ‘‘What possible motive or reason did [the

defense] try to explore through either [the victim’s or

Moniz’] testimony as to why [the victim] would accuse

the defendant . . . of these crimes if it didn’t happen?

There’s no motive presented. You know why? Because

they have none, why [the victim] would make it up.’’

The prosecutor further argued: ‘‘When you look at all

[the evidence] and key here, no motive was ever brought

out through the cross-examination or questioning of

[the victim] or . . . Moniz as to what motive [the victim] would have [had] to accuse [the defendant] of

crimes like this if it didn’t happen. No motive was ever

presented through their testimony. You know why? I

would respectfully submit they have none. They have

no motive for him to fabricate that.’’

The defendant correctly notes that ‘‘it [is] significant

in evaluating harm to look to see how the state use[s]

. . . evidence in its closing argument.’’ State v. Ayala,

333 Conn. 225, 235, 215 A.3d 116 (2019). Here, the prosecutor was clearly responding to defense counsel’s asser-
tion that a motive, in fact, existed—namely, the victim’s

desire ‘‘to get ahead of’’ the situation by reporting the

defendant and Moniz to the police before they could

report him for stealing the watch, which could have

affected the victim’s probationary status. See, e.g., State

v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693, 717, 793 A.2d 226 (2002) (‘‘[t]he

state may . . . properly respond to inferences raised

by the defendant’s closing argument’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). The jury, however, would have

recognized that the prosecutor’s argument that the

defense had presented no motive as to why the victim

would fabricate his charges was incorrect. The defense

did present a motive—the victim’s precarious financial

situation and desire to get ahead of any allegations

about the watch. It would have been more accurate for

the prosecutor to argue that the defense had presented

no persuasive argument as to motive. In any event, the

trial court mitigated any potential harm by instructing

the jury that statements made by counsel during closing

arguments are not evidence and reminding the jury to

draw its own conclusions concerning the credibility of

witnesses.11 See, e.g., State v. Daniel W. E., 322 Conn.

593, 613, 142 A.3d 265 (2016) (‘‘[t]he jury is presumed,

in the absence of a fair indication to the contrary, to

have followed the court’s instructions’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Importantly, the prosecutor’s

rebuttal does not change the fact that defense counsel,

during her closing argument, relied on the evidence she

was able to introduce to make the very argument that

the defendant is now claiming the trial court’s evidentiary rulings precluded him from presenting to the jury.

We cannot conclude that the excluded cross-examination would have had any meaningful impact on the

jury’s verdict. It is unlikely that testimony regarding the

specific conditions of the victim’s probation would have

made defense counsel’s presentation of the defense’s

theory any more persuasive, as the jury reasonably

could have surmised that a probationer would seek to

avoid arrest. We have repeatedly stated that ‘‘[j]urors

are not expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own observations and experiences, but

rather, to apply them to the facts as presented to arrive

at an intelligent and correct conclusion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Abraham, 343 Conn. 470,

478, 274 A.3d 849 (2022). The notion that a probationer

would have been motivated to avoid an arrest—a point

that defense counsel was given adequate opportunity

to make—was within the jurors’ common knowledge.

Indeed, defense counsel leveraged this precise intuition

in asking the jury, ‘‘[w]hat would happen if [the victim]

had been arrested and charged with stealing that watch?

What would be the consequence to him? Does it make

sense that he’d want to get ahead of it?’’ For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the defendant has failed

to prove that the trial court’s restriction on defense

counsel’s cross-examination of the victim was harmful.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 We granted the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal from the

judgment of the Appellate Court, limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did the

Appellate Court properly uphold the trial court’s restriction of defense counsel’s cross-examination of the complainant about matters relevant to the

complainant’s motive to fabricate his allegations?’’ State v. Lanier, 338 Conn.

910, 910–11, 258 A.3d 1280 (2021). We agree with the state that the certified

issue is imprecisely worded in that it presumes to resolve in the defendant’s

favor the central issue raised by this appeal, the relevance of the line of

questioning defense counsel sought to introduce during cross-examination.

Accordingly, we reword the certified issue to add ‘‘allegedly’’ before ‘‘relevant.’’ See, e.g., State v. Lavigne, 307 Conn. 592, 594 n.1, 57 A.3d 332 (2012)

(‘‘this court may modify certified [issues] to render them more accurate in

framing issues presented’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2 There was conflicting evidence as to whether the defendant also struck

the victim. The victim claimed that both Moniz and the defendant assaulted

him. According to Moniz, however, he alone assaulted the victim. Moniz

testified that, prior to the defendant’s trial, he had pleaded guilty to the

assault under the Alford doctrine. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.

25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).

3 Dispatch call sheets and testimony from a Middletown police dispatcher

presented at trial corroborated the victim’s testimony that he had made this

911 call without speaking to an operator.

4 Moniz’ testimony at trial confirmed that the defendant had had two $100

bills on him.

5

‘‘[I]n a third substitute information [the defendant was charged] with

. . . committ[ing] the following crimes: in count one, conspiracy to commit

robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and

53a-134 (a) (1); in count two, conspiracy to commit robbery in the second

degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-135 (a) (1) (A);

in count three, robbery in the first degree in violation of § 53a-134 (a) (1);

in count four, robbery in the second degree in violation of § 53a-135 (a) (1)

(A); in count five, assault in the second degree in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (1); and in count six, burglary in the second degree in

violation of § 53a-102 (a).’’ State v. Lanier, 205 Conn. App. 586, 593–94, 258

A.3d 770 (2021).

6 The record indicates that the victim was arrested twice while on probation, that he was charged with violation of probation on October 20, 2017,

and that he admitted the violation and was resentenced on January 8, 2018.

See State v. Lanier, supra, 205 Conn. App. 596 n.4.

7 We address two ancillary rulings by the trial court regarding the crossexamination sought by the defendant. First, the trial court evaluated the

admissibility of the requested cross-examination under § 6-7 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, which governs the admissibility of evidence of a prior

conviction. Although the trial court’s ruling under that section was pertinent

to questions about the victim’s prior felony conviction, it was inapposite

in determining the admissibility of the additional inquiries sought by the

defendant. Second, notwithstanding its ruling that the defendant’s proffered

line of inquiry was inadmissible, the trial court also ruled that the probative

value of the proposed cross-examination was outweighed by its prejudicial

effect. Given the trial court’s determination that the evidence was inadmissible, it was unnecessary for the court to take the additional step of weighing

its probative value against any prejudicial effect. Cf. State v. Hill, 307 Conn.

689, 698, 59 A.3d 196 (2013) (‘‘evidence is admissible . . . if, first, it is

relevant, and second, its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect’’

(emphasis added)); State v. Pappas, 256 Conn. 854, 887, 776 A.2d 1091 (2001)

(‘‘evidence . . . is properly excluded if its prejudicial impact outweighs its

probative value, even if it is otherwise admissible’’ (emphasis added; internal

quotation marks omitted)).

8 The sixth amendment right to confrontation is made applicable to the

states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the

United States constitution. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403,

406, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965).

9 The defendant further asserts that the fact that the jury found him not

guilty on five out of the six charges illustrates that it did not find the victim’s

testimony to be reliable, undermining the strength of the state’s case. We

are unpersuaded. We have repeatedly recognized that a split verdict does

not necessarily signal that the state’s case against a defendant is weak but
may instead indicate that a defendant was not prejudiced by the conduct

that is challenged as harmful on appeal. See, e.g., State v. David N.J., 301

Conn. 122, 154, 19 A.3d 646 (2011) (‘‘[W]e disagree with the defendant’s

claim . . . that [a] split verdict, acquitting the defendant of [some] charges

. . . but convicting him on the other counts, demonstrates the weakness

of the state’s case and prejudice to the defendant from the impropriety. In

the absence of reports of deadlock . . . our cases have relied on split

verdicts as evidence that a jury was not so prejudiced . . . that it could

not treat the defendant fairly.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); State

v. Long, 293 Conn. 31, 52–53, 975 A.2d 660 (2009) (jury’s finding of not guilty

of more serious charge indicated that defendant was not prejudiced).

10 The defendant has not challenged the prosecutor’s remarks on the basis

of prosecutorial impropriety.

11 The trial court instructed the jury: ‘‘You should keep in mind that arguments and statements by the attorneys in final arguments or during the

course of the case are not evidence. You should not consider as evidence

their recollection of the facts nor their personal belief as to any facts or as

to the credibility of any witness nor any facts that any attorney may have

presented to you in argument from the attorney’s knowledge that was not

presented to you as evidence during the course of this trial.’’