62140 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 173 / Friday, September 8, 2023 / Notices 

1On September 1, 2023, RRVW filed an errata to 

its verified notice of exemption to note that the Line 

is an approximately 0.4-mile rail segment, rather 

than a 0.5-mile rail segment as previously indicated 

in its notice filed on August 23, 2023. 

2RRVW states that, in 1987, it received authority 

from the agency to acquire the tracks, physical 

assets, and common carrier obligation for 656 miles 

of various rail lines from BNSF. See Red River 

Valley & W. R.R.—Acquis. & Operation 

Exemption—Certain Lines of Burlington N. R.R., FD 

31071 (ICC served July 22, 1987). According to 

RRVW, the Line was not part of that original 

transaction but provides a connection from the lines 

acquired in 1987 to one of RRVW’s customers, 

Tharaldson Ethanol. 

3RRVW is not seeking retroactive effectiveness 

for the exemption. 

** This figure does not represent actual costs that SSA is imposing on recipients of Social Security payments to complete this application; rather, these are theoretical opportunity costs for the additional time respondents will spend to complete the application. There is no actual charge to respondents to complete the 

application. 

Dated: September 1, 2023. 

Naomi Sipple, 

Reports Clearance Officer, Social Security 

Administration. 

[FR Doc. 2023–19371 Filed 9–7–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4191–02–P 

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD 

[Docket No. FD 36719] 

Red River Valley & Western Railroad 

Company—Acquisition and Operation 

Exemption—Rail Line of BNSF Railway 

Company 

Red River Valley & Western Railroad 

Company (RRVW), a Class III rail 

carrier, has filed a verified notice of 

exemption under 49 CFR 1150.41 to 

acquire from BNSF Railway Company 

(BNSF) and to operate an approximately 

0.4-mile rail line, extending from 

milepost 54.55 to milepost 54.95 in 

Casselton, Cass County, N.D. (the Line).1

According to the verified notice, 

RRVW reached an agreement with BNSF 

in 2006 for acquisition and operation of 

the Line. RRVW states that the parties’ 

transaction was consummated in 2006 

and that RRVW has been operating over 

the Line since that time.2 RRVW states, 

however, that it recently discovered that 

it inadvertently neglected to seek 

acquisition and operation authority for 

the Line from the Board when it 

acquired the Line from BNSF. RRVW 

now seeks after-the-fact Board 

authorization for its prior acquisition 

and operation of the Line.3

RRVW certifies that the proposed 

acquisition of the Line does not involve 

any interchange commitments. RRVW 

further certifies that its projected 

revenues as a result of this transaction 

will not (and did not) result in the 

creation of a Class II or Class I rail 

carrier. Pursuant to 49 CFR 1150.42(e), 

if a carrier’s projected annual revenues 

will exceed $5 million, it must, at least 

60 days before the exemption becomes 

effective, post a notice of its intent to 

undertake the proposed transaction at 

the workplace of the employees on the 

affected lines, serve a copy of the notice 

on the national offices of the labor 

unions with employees on the affected 

lines, and certify to the Board that it has 

done so. However, RRVW has filed a 

request for partial waiver of the 60-day 

advance labor notice requirements to 

allow the exemption to take effect as 

soon as its waiver request is granted, but 

no earlier than 30 days after the filing 

of RRVW’s notice of exemption. 

RRVW’s waiver request will be 

addressed in a separate decision. The 

Board will establish the effective date of 

the exemption in its separate decision 

on the waiver request. 

If the verified notice contains false or 

misleading information, the exemption 

is void ab initio. Petitions to revoke the 

exemption under 49 U.S.C. 10502(d) 

may be filed at any time. The filing of 

a petition to revoke will not 

automatically stay the effectiveness of 

the exemption. Petitions for stay must 

be filed no later than September 15, 

2023. 

All pleadings referring to Docket No. 

FD 36719 should be filed with the 

Surface Transportation Board either via 

e-filing on the Board’s website or in 

writing addressed to 395 E Street SW, 

Washington, DC 20423–0001. In 

addition, one copy of each pleading 

must be served on RRVW’s 

representative, William A. Mullins, 

Baker & Miller PLLC, 2401 Pennsylvania 

Avenue NW, Suite 300, Washington, DC 

20037. 

According to RRVW, this action is 

categorically excluded from 

environmental review under 49 CFR 

1105.6(c)(1)(i) and from historic 

reporting requirements under 49 CFR 

1105.8(b)(1). 

Board decisions and notices are 

available at www.stb.gov. 

Decided: September 5, 2023. 

By the Board, Mai T. Dinh, Director, Office 

of Proceedings. 

Jeffrey Herzig, 

Clearance Clerk. 

[FR Doc. 2023–19443 Filed 9–7–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4915–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration 

[Docket No. NHTSA–2023–0038] 

Initial Decision That Certain Frontal 

Driver and Passenger Air Bag Inflators 

Manufactured by ARC Automotive Inc. 

and Delphi Automotive Systems LLC 

Contain a Safety Defect; and 

Scheduling of a Public Meeting 

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration (NHTSA), 

Department of Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Notice of initial decision and 

public meeting. 

SUMMARY: NHTSA will hold a public 

meeting regarding its initial decision 

that certain frontal and passenger air bag 

inflators manufactured by ARC and 

Delphi through January 2018 contain a 

defect related to motor vehicle safety 

and should be recalled. 

DATES: The public meeting will be held 

at DOT headquarters in Washington, 

DC, beginning at 9:30 a.m. on October 

5, 2023. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit written 

submissions to the docket number 

identified in the heading of this 

document by any of the following 

methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

online instructions for submitting 

comments. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility: 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

Washington, DC 20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery or Courier: 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, between 

9 a.m. and 5 p.m. ET, Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

Instructions: All submissions must 

include the agency name and docket 

number. Note that all written 

submissions received will be posted 

without change to https://

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information provided. Please 

see the Privacy Act discussion below. 

We will consider all written 

submissions received before the close of 

business on Friday, October 20, 2023. 

Docket: For access to the docket to 

read background documents or written 

submissions received, go to https://

www.regulations.gov at any time or to 


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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 173 / Friday, September 8, 2023 / Notices 62141 

1The Delphi entity that manufactured these 

inflators no longer exists. NHTSA indicated in its 

April 27, 2023 recall request letter that it was 

acquired by Autoliv ASP, Inc. (‘‘Autoliv’’). Autoliv 

has since provided NHTSA with some information 

indicating that it may not have legal liability for the 

Delphi-manufactured inflators. At this time, 

NHTSA has not verified the entity that has legal 

responsibility under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 for those 

inflators. However, as described herein, the vehicle 

manufacturers that used the inflators as original 

equipment would be responsible for carrying out 

any recalls. 

2NHTSA’s April 27, 2023 recall request letter 

estimated the number of subject inflators as 

approximately 67 million. Since that time, NHTSA 

has lowered its estimate of the population to 

approximately 52 million inflators, correcting for 

over-inclusive responses reported to the agency by 

certain manufacturers over the course of the 

investigation. The exact population of inflators and 

vehicles (including the specific vehicle makes, 

models, and model years) subject to any recall that 

may result will be determined by the 

manufacturers. See 49 CFR 573.6(c)(3). 

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, West 

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal Holidays. Telephone: 

202–366–9826. 

Privacy Act: In accordance with 49 

U.S.C. 30118(b)(1), NHTSA will make a 

final decision only after providing an 

opportunity for manufacturers and any 

interested person to present 

information, views, and arguments. 

DOT posts written submissions 

submitted by manufacturers and 

interested persons, without edit, 

including any personal information the 

submitter provides, to 

www.regulations.gov, as described in 

the system of records notice (DOT/ALL– 

14 Federal Docket Management System 

(FDMS)), which can be reviewed at 

www.transportation.gov/privacy. 

Confidential Business Information: If 

you wish to submit any information 

under a claim of confidentiality, you 

must submit your request directly to 

NHTSA’s Office of the Chief Counsel. 

Requests for confidentiality are 

governed by 49 CFR part 512. NHTSA 

is currently treating electronic 

submission as an acceptable method for 

submitting confidential business 

information (CBI) to the agency under 

part 512. If you would like to submit a 

request for confidential treatment, you 

may email your submission to Ashley 

Simpson in the Office of the Chief 

Counsel at Ashley.Simpson@dot.gov or 

you may contact her for a secure file 

transfer link. At this time, you should 

not send a duplicate hardcopy of your 

electronic CBI submissions to DOT 

headquarters. If you claim that any of 

the information or documents provided 

to the agency constitute confidential 

business information within the 

meaning of 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4), or are 

protected from disclosure pursuant to 

18 U.S.C. 1905, you must submit 

supporting information together with 

the materials that are the subject of the 

confidentiality request, in accordance 

with part 512, to the Office of the Chief 

Counsel. Your request must include a 

cover letter setting forth the information 

specified in our confidential business 

information regulation (49 CFR 512.8) 

and a certificate, pursuant to § 512.4(b) 

and part 512, appendix A. In addition, 

you should submit a copy, from which 

you have redacted the claimed 

confidential business information, to the 

Docket at the address given above. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Ashley Simpson, Office of the Chief 

Counsel, National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590; 

(202) 366–8726. Persons wishing to 

attend the public meeting or make oral 

statements must register at https://

www.nhtsa.gov/events/public-meetingarc-delphi-air-bag-inflators before the 

close of business on September 22, 

2023. Please refer to the SUPPLEMENTARY

INFORMATION section for additional 

information on registering for the public 

meeting. 

The publicly available information on 

which this initial decision is based will 

be available on the agency’s website at 

https://www.nhtsa.gov/ 

recalls?nhtsaId=EA16003, https://

www.nhtsa.gov/ 

recalls?nhtsaId=PE15027, and on the 

public docket under Docket No. 

NHTSA–2023–0038. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant 

to 49 U.S.C. 30118(a) and 49 CFR 

554.10, NHTSA has made an initial 

decision that certain frontal driver and 

passenger air bag inflators manufactured 

by ARC Automotive Inc. (ARC) and 

Delphi Automotive Systems LLC 

(Delphi) through January 2018 contain a 

defect related to motor vehicle safety. 

These air bag inflators may rupture 

when the vehicle’s air bag is 

commanded to deploy, causing metal 

debris to be forcefully ejected into the 

passenger compartment of the vehicle. 

A rupturing air bag inflator poses an 

unreasonable risk of serious injury or 

death to vehicle occupants. At least 

seven people have been injured and one 

person has been killed by these 

rupturing air bag inflators within the 

United States. Based on its 

investigation, NHTSA believes that 

ruptures may result from the weld slag 

produced by the friction welding 

manufacturing process. Should weld 

slag of a sufficient size become 

dislodged, it can cause a blockage of the 

inflator exit orifice when the air bag 

deploys. A blockage of sufficient size 

will cause an over pressurization and 

rupture of the inflator, leading to the 

potential forced propulsion of shrapnel 

or metal fragments from the inflator into 

the passenger compartment. Additional 

inflator ruptures are expected to occur 

in the future, risking more serious 

injuries and deaths, if they are not 

recalled and replaced. 

A. Inflators Subject to This Initial 

Decision 

The inflators subject to this initial 

decision are hybrid, toroidal inflators 

manufactured by ARC and Delphi for 

use in driver and passenger air bag 

modules, subsequently incorporated 

into passenger vehicles. ARC has been 

manufacturing driver hybrid, toroidal 

inflators since 2000. In July 2001, ARC 

granted Delphi a license to manufacture 

driver inflators for use in Delphi’s driver 

air bag modules.1 Delphi stopped 

manufacturing the inflators in 2004, 

having manufactured approximately 11 

million inflators under the agreement. 

ARC continued to manufacture the 

driver inflators and began to 

manufacture passenger inflators in 2010. 

In January 2018, ARC fully 

implemented an automated borescope 

examination process on its production 

lines that manufactured toroidal 

inflators, which is used to detect 

excessive weld slag or other debris in 

the inflator center support, mitigating 

the risk of a field rupture due to exit 

orifice blockage. The agency is unaware 

of a field rupture of a frontal hybrid, 

toroidal inflator manufactured after the 

implementation of the borescope 

examination process. 

Therefore, the inflators subject to this 

initial decision are the approximately 41 

million frontal hybrid, toroidal driver 

and passenger inflators manufactured by 

ARC from 2000 through the 

implementation of the borescope 

examination process in January 2018, 

and the approximately 11 million driver 

hybrid, toroidal inflators manufactured 

by Delphi under its licensing agreement 

with ARC.2 For simplicity, the inflators 

subject to this initial decision are 

described as the ‘‘subject inflators.’’ The 

subject inflators were incorporated into 

air bag modules used in vehicles 

manufactured by 12 vehicle 

manufacturers: BMW of North America, 

LLC, FCA US LLC, Ford Motor 

Company, General Motors LLC, 

Hyundai Motor America, Inc., Kia 

America, Inc., Maserati North America, 

Inc., Mercedes-Benz USA LLC, Porsche 

Cars North America, Inc., Tesla Inc., 

Toyota Motor North America, Inc., and 

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. 


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3The two inflation stages can deploy sequentially 

or simultaneously. Typically, the first stage is 

approximately 80% of the full force of the air bag, 

and the second stage is approximately 20% of the 

full force of the air bag. The second stage can 

deploy simultaneously with the first stage should 

the severity of the impact warrant dual deployment. 

The second stage can deploy subsequent to the 

deployment of the first stage for lower severity 

impacts. 

4 In the largest air bag inflator recall, TK Holdings, 

Inc. (Takata) issued recalls after determining that 

certain driver and passenger inflators ruptured 

when activated. See, e.g., 15E–040, 15E–041, 15E– 

042, 15E–043. In fact, NHTSA’s recall request letter 

to Takata identified six inflator ruptures, one less 

than identified here. In that case, the safety defect 

was degradation of propellant. Takata subsequently 

recalled certain non-azide driver inflators (NADI) 

due to rupture risk caused by excess moisture in the 

propellant. 19E–080. Other inflator ruptures have 

also been addressed through recalls. In 2021, Key 

Safety Systems, Inc. d/b/a Joyson Safety Systems 

recalled certain curtain air bag inflators which 

carried a risk of rupture due to moisture corrosion. 

21E–080. In 2021, FCA recalled certain Mopar side 

curtain air bag inflators for risk of separated inflator 

cap or rupture. 21E–740. Volvo Car USA, LLC 

conducted a recall in 2021 of certain vehicles 

equipped with inflators manufactured by ZF North 

America, Inc. for susceptibility to rupture due to 

excess moisture and propellant degradation. See 

21V–766, 21V–800. 

5Failure of an air bag module to deploy in a crash 

when it should have deployed also puts vehicle 

occupants at risk and therefore has resulted in 

recalls. See, e.g., 22V–031. The severity of risk of 

a module that ruptures is even greater in that it not 

only fails to protect vehicle occupants from crash 

forces, but itself becomes the cause of injury or 

death by shooting metal shrapnel into the occupant 

compartment. 

B. Known Inflator Ruptures Resulting 

in Death and Injuries 

The agency is currently aware of 

seven confirmed subject inflator 

ruptures in the United States. These 

seven ruptures involve both single stage 

and dual stage air bag inflators (as 

explained below), inflators 

manufactured at different times and in 

three different manufacturing facilities, 

and inflators incorporated into air bag 

modules by four different module 

suppliers and used in four different 

vehicle manufacturers’ vehicles: 

• On January 29, 2009, a driver side 

air bag inflator ruptured in a Model Year 

(MY) 2002 Chrysler Town and Country 

minivan in Ohio. The air bag module 

was produced by Key Safety Systems, 

Inc. later d/b/a Joyson Safety Systems 

and used a dual stage ARC inflator. The 

inflator was manufactured in Knoxville, 

Tennessee. The driver was severely 

injured during the incident. 

• On April 8, 2014, a driver side air 

bag inflator ruptured in a MY 2004 Kia 

Optima in New Mexico. The air bag 

module was manufactured by Delphi 

and had a single stage ARC inflator. The 

inflator was manufactured in Knoxville, 

Tennessee. The driver sustained injuries 

to the face and legs. 

• On September 22, 2017, a driver 

side air bag inflator ruptured in a MY 

2010 Chevrolet Malibu in Pennsylvania. 

The air bag module was produced by 

ZF–TRW and used a dual stage ARC 

inflator. The inflator was manufactured 

in Xian, China. The driver sustained 

injuries to the face and head. 

• On August 15, 2021, a driver side 

air bag inflator in a MY 2015 Chevrolet 

Traverse ruptured in Michigan. The air 

bag module was produced by Toyoda 

Gosei and used a dual stage ARC 

inflator. The inflator was manufactured 

in Reynosa, Mexico. The air bag module 

was a replacement module. The vehicle 

had been in a prior frontal collision and 

the original air bag module deployed 

with no issue. The original air bag 

module was also produced by Toyoda 

Gosei and used a dual stage ARC 

inflator. The driver was killed. 

• On October 20, 2021, a driver side 

air bag inflator in a MY 2015 Chevrolet 

Traverse ruptured in Kentucky. The air 

bag module was produced by Toyoda 

Gosei and used a dual stage ARC 

inflator. The inflator was manufactured 

in Reynosa, Mexico. The driver 

sustained injuries to the face. 

• On December 18, 2021, a passenger 

side air bag inflator ruptured in a MY 

2016 Audi A3 e-Tron in California. The 

air bag module was produced by Key 

Safety Systems, Inc. d/b/a Joyson Safety 

Systems and used a dual stage ARC 

inflator. The inflator was manufactured 

in Reynosa, Mexico. The driver and 

passenger were injured. 

• On March 22, 2023, a driver side air 

bag inflator in a MY 2017 Chevrolet 

Traverse ruptured in Michigan. The air 

bag module was produced by Toyoda 

Gosei and used a dual stage ARC 

inflator. The inflator was manufactured 

in Reynosa, Mexico. The driver 

sustained injuries to the face. 

NHTSA is also aware of at least two 

confirmed field ruptures outside of the 

United States, again involving the same 

universe of inflators of varying origins 

and uses: 

• On July 11, 2016, a driver side air 

bag inflator ruptured in a MY 2009 

Hyundai Elantra in Canada. The air bag 

module was produced by Mobis and 

used a single stage ARC air bag inflator. 

The inflator was manufactured in Xian, 

China. The driver was killed. 

• On October 16, 2017, a passenger 

side air bag inflator ruptured in a MY 

2015 Volkswagen Golf in Turkey. The 

air bag module was produced by Key 

Safety Systems, Inc. later d/b/a Joyson 

Safety Systems and used a single stage 

ARC inflator. The inflator was 

manufactured in Knoxville, Tennessee. 

The driver sustained no injuries. There 

was no passenger in the vehicle. 

C. Background Regarding Air Bags 

Air bags are safety equipment 

designed to protect vehicle occupants in 

the event of a crash. Air bags have been 

used in passenger vehicles since the 

1970s and were mandated by NHTSA in 

1991. All new vehicles were required to 

have frontal air bags by September 1998. 

Paired with seat belts, air bags control 

the movement of the occupant’s upper 

body and head during a moderate to 

severe crash—defined as a frontal or 

near-frontal impact with a solid, fixed 

barrier at 8 to 14 mph or higher. Upon 

such an occurrence, a signal to the air 

bag system’s electronic control unit 

initiates the ignition of the inflator 

propellant to generate the gas to 

immediately fill the air bag cushion. 

The subject inflators are hybrid, 

toroidal inflators. A hybrid inflator uses 

stored gas that is excited by the 

propellant to fill the air bag cushion. 

Toroidal inflators are round, noncylindrical inflators. The subject 

inflators include both single stage and 

dual stage inflators. Single stage 

inflators deploy at a preset speed and at 

full force. Dual stage inflators deploy at 

two different stages depending on the 

size of the occupant as measured by the 

load sensor in the front seat and the 

severity of the impact.3 The subject 

inflators were incorporated into air bag 

modules produced by multiple 

suppliers. The air bag ‘‘inflator’’ is a 

component of the air bag ‘‘module’’— 

the inflator is the part that generates the 

gas that fills the air bag cushion. The air 

bag module is typically comprised of a 

mounting bracket, inflator, cushion (bag 

that fills with gas), cover (the decorative 

part that matches the interior of the 

vehicle), and connecting wires. 

Although air bags, when properly 

deployed, provide significant safety 

benefits—NHTSA estimates that frontal 

air bags have saved more than 50 

thousand lives over the past 30 years— 

the rupture of an air bag inflator during 

deployment is rare and extremely 

dangerous. Although the incidence of 

rupture is rare, NHTSA and the industry 

have acted to address confirmed 

ruptures through recalls. Other 

confirmed inflator field ruptures in the 

United States, excluding illegal 

counterfeit products, have resulted in 

recalls.4 There is widespread acceptance 

in the industry that rupturing air bag 

inflators are safety defects requiring a 

recall.5


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6Approximately 11 million of the subject 

inflators were designed by ARC but manufactured 

by Delphi. 

7The term field rupture refers to an inflator 

rupture that occurs when a vehicle is in a crash. 

8A lot acceptance test refers to the random testing 

of completed air bag inflators. This test is 

conducted at the beginning, middle, and end of a 

manufacturing shift, or at any time the assembly 

line is shifted to production of a different part. If 

an inflator ruptures or fails in some way during a 

lot acceptance test, the entire lot of inflators is 

quarantined. The term ‘‘lot’’ refers to the number of 

inflators that were manufactured in an identified 

manufacturing plant on a specific assembly line for 

a specific shift. 

9A hydroburst test is a destructive examination 

of the strength of the inflator housing. An inflator 

subject to a hydroburst test is filled with water until 

its housing fails. The housing is instrumented to 

measure the water pressure attained. An inflator 

that bursts prior to attaining the pressure 

specifications for its housing fails the test. 

10An assembly line gas fill refers to the process 

of filling the inflator with compressed gas. During 

that process, ruptures may occasionally occur when 

the compressed gas is exposed to the heat generated 

during the gas fill and welding of the burst disc. 

11See Recalls 17V–189, 17V–529, 19V–019, 21V– 

782, 22V–246, 22E–040, and 22V–543. These recalls 

collectively cover a population of 6,289 vehicles 

and 74 service parts. 

12See Recall 23V–334. This recall covers 995,085 

MY 2014–2017 Buick Enclave, Chevrolet Traverse, 

and GMC Acadia vehicles. 

D. Legal Background on Safety Defects 

and Recall Responsibilities 

The National Traffic and Motor 

Vehicle Safety Act (Safety Act), as 

amended, requires manufacturers to 

conduct a recall for safety defects in 

motor vehicles and motor vehicle 

equipment. See 49 U.S.C. 30118–20. 

Specifically, a manufacturer must notify 

NHTSA, owners, dealers, and 

distributors of any ‘‘defect . . . related 

to motor vehicle safety.’’ 49 U.S.C. 

30118. The Safety Act defines ‘‘defect’’ 

as ‘‘includ[ing] any defect in 

performance, construction, a 

component, or material of a motor 

vehicle or motor vehicle equipment.’’ 49 

U.S.C. 30102(a)(2). ‘‘Motor vehicle 

safety’’ means ‘‘the performance of a 

motor vehicle or motor vehicle 

equipment in a way that protects the 

public against unreasonable risk of 

accidents occurring because of the 

design, construction, or performance of 

a motor vehicle, and against 

unreasonable risk of death or injury in 

an accident, and includes 

nonoperational safety of a motor 

vehicle.’’ Id. § 30101(a)(8). A safety 

defect therefore may be determined to 

exist without knowing its precise cause. 

A motor vehicle or component 

contains a ‘‘defect’’ if it is subject to a 

significant number of failures in normal 

operation. See United States v. General 

Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420, 427 (D.D.C. 

1975). To establish that a significant 

number of failures exists, the agency 

need only show that the figure is more 

than de minimis. See id. at 438 n.84. 

The agency must also show that the 

failure condition occurred under 

circumstances which, in the absence of 

a defect, would not have occurred. See 

United States v. General Motors Corp., 

841 F.2d 400, 412 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 

Any safety defect determination, 

whether made by NHTSA or by a 

manufacturer, requires notification to 

owners pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30119 and 

a free remedy pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 

30120. Under the Safety Act, an air bag 

inflator installed in a new vehicle is 

original equipment. See id. 

§ 30102(a)(8), (b)(1)(C). For recall 

purposes, ‘‘a defect in original 

equipment . . . is deemed to be a defect 

. . . of the motor vehicle in which the 

equipment was installed at the time of 

delivery to the first purchaser.’’ Id. 

§ 30102(b)(1)(F). 

When a safety defect exists in original 

equipment used by more than one 

vehicle manufacturer, as in this case, 

the equipment supplier and each 

vehicle manufacturer must notify the 

agency by filing a recall report pursuant 

to 49 CFR part 573. 49 CFR 573.3(f). 

Vehicle manufacturers are then 

generally responsible for carrying out 

recalls for their vehicles containing 

defective parts, such as air bag inflators, 

by notifying vehicle owners and 

providing a free remedy. See 49 U.S.C. 

30102(b)(1)(F), 30118–20. An equipment 

manufacturer is responsible under the 

Safety Act for recalling its replacement 

equipment. See id. 30118. Replacement 

equipment is ‘‘motor vehicle equipment 

. . . that is not original equipment.’’ Id. 

§ 30102(b)(1)(D). 

E. The Agency’s Investigation 

On July 13, 2015, NHTSA’s Office of 

Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a 

Preliminary Evaluation (PE) defect 

investigation, identified as PE15–027, to 

investigate an alleged safety defect in 

hybrid, toroidal inflators designed and 

manufactured by ARC6 for use in 

vehicles sold or leased in the United 

States. 

NHTSA’s investigation was prompted 

by reports of driver air bag inflator 

ruptures in a MY 2002 Chrysler Town 

& Country and a MY 2004 Kia Optima. 

Both vehicles were equipped with 

inflators manufactured by ARC in 

Knoxville, Tennessee. During the PE 

phase of the investigation, NHTSA 

obtained information from ARC 

identifying the air bag module 

manufacturers to which it supplied 

inflators during the time period of June 

2000 through October 2004. The time 

frame for the initial inquiry was 

bracketed by the date that ARC 

commenced production of the hybrid 

toroidal inflator and the build date of 

the Kia Optima. NHTSA then obtained 

information from the module 

manufacturers to identify the vehicle 

manufacturers that used the inflators. 

NHTSA also ordered vehicle and 

inflator manufacturers, including ARC, 

to report to the agency information 

related to any inflator field ruptures.7

Standing General Order (SGO) 2015–02. 

The agency also began to work with the 

involved manufacturers to conduct a 

field recovery program to better 

understand the potential failure modes. 

On July 11, 2016, the ARCmanufactured inflator in a MY 2009 

Hyundai Elantra ruptured in Canada. 

That rupture, which resulted in a 

fatality, prompted ODI’s upgrade of the 

investigation to the Engineering 

Analysis phase, then identified as 

EA16–003, on August 4, 2016. The 

ruptured inflator was manufactured by 

ARC in Xian, China. ARC confirmed 

that the ruptured inflator was 

substantially similar to the inflator at 

issue in the prior Kia Optima rupture in 

that the inflators underwent the same 

assembly and manufacturing process. 

The agency continued its 

investigation, issuing information 

request letters to the manufacturers and 

issuing Standing General Order 2016– 

01. Standing General Order 2016–01 

requires ARC to notify the agency of an 

inflator rupture occurring during a lot 

acceptance test,8 hydroburst test,9 or 

assembly line gas fill.10 This initial 

notification must be made within 24 

hours of ARC’s notice of such an event. 

The order also requires ARC to make 

additional reporting about the rupture 

as its investigation into such a rupture 

progresses. SGO 2016–01 was 

superseded by SGO 2017–01, which 

revised the reportable rupture incidents 

to include only those occurring during 

lot acceptance tests. 

Since issuing these Standing General 

Orders, vehicle manufacturers have 

confirmed and reported to the agency 

five additional field ruptures in the 

United States involving the subject 

inflators. To date, manufacturers have 

generally conducted small lot-specific 

recalls to address inflator ruptures.11 In 

May 2023, General Motors LLC also 

initiated a recall to address a somewhat 

broader scope of vehicles by model and 

model year.12 The vast majority of the 

subject inflators covered by this notice 

are not covered by these existing recalls. 

NHTSA’s investigation revealed a 

potential failure mechanism most likely 

causing the ruptures. ARC designed and 

manufactured the subject inflators using 

a method called friction welding to join 


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13See ARC’s May 11, 2023 response to NHTSA’s 

Recall Request letter, page 2. 

the inflator upper and lower pressure 

vessels. The friction welding process, in 

some circumstances, produced excess 

weld slag, which, if loose, will be 

propelled toward the inflator exit orifice 

during an air bag deployment, along 

with any other debris in the inflator 

center support. As explained in the 

agency’s recall request letter to ARC: 

ARC’s inflator design is such that during a 

triggered deployment, the stored gas, excited 

by the propellant, has a single path through 

the exit orifice to exit the inflator and fill the 

air bag cushion. Should any debris of 

sufficient size be in the inflator center 

support, the exit orifice could become 

blocked. Blockage of the exit orifice could 

cause over pressurization of the air bag 

inflator. Over pressurization of the inflator 

has the potential to cause it to rupture 

resulting in metal fragments being forcefully 

propelled into the passenger compartment. 

NHTSA’s April 27, 2023 Recall 

Request Letter to ARC, page 2. This 

occurrence can lead to injury or death 

of the vehicle occupants in what would 

otherwise be a normal and safe air bag 

deployment. 

ARC took steps to address this issue 

in January 2018, when it completed the 

borescope installation on its toroidal 

inflator manufacturing lines. The 

borescope examination process 

effectively allows ARC to detect the 

occurrence of excess weld slag or other 

debris in its inflators, and there are no 

known field ruptures in ARC’s hybrid, 

toroidal inflators manufactured after 

January 2018. However, prior to the 

implementation of the borescope 

inspections, ARC and Delphi 

collectively manufactured and sold 

approximately 52 million subject 

inflators for use in vehicles sold or 

leased in the United States that may 

contain excess slag. 

NHTSA continued its investigation, 

with further testing and coordination 

with the involved manufacturers, to 

determine appropriate next steps to 

address the risk associated with these 

inflators. A field recovery program of 

the subject inflators concluded in April 

2018, in which subject inflators in MY 

2001–2005 vehicles were collected from 

salvage yards and tested at ARC’s 

Knoxville facility. None of the over 900 

inflators ruptured in that testing 

program. 

Further work determined that any 

loose debris in the center support will 

follow the air flow during a deployment 

to exit through the center support exit 

orifice. If the debris is smaller than the 

exit orifice, the debris will not block the 

airflow and result in a rupture. 

However, if the debris is larger than the 

diameter of the exit orifice, it will not 

be able to pass through the exit orifice, 

causing a blockage. A blockage of 

sufficient size will lead to an over 

pressurization of the inflator that results 

in an inflator rupture. 

Despite no ruptures observed in the 

field recovery program testing of 

inflators removed from MY 2002–2005 

vehicles and described above, 

manufacturers subsequently reported 

and confirmed three field ruptures of 

the subject inflators in 2021. The agency 

continued its investigation and although 

2022 passed with no known incidents, 

another field rupture occurred in March 

2023. 

F. The Agency’s April 2023 Request 

That ARC Conduct a Recall 

After learning of a March 22, 2023, 

driver-side air bag inflator rupture in a 

MY 2017 Chevrolet Traverse in 

Michigan, in which the driver was 

injured, the agency determined that the 

then current response to the incidents 

(lot recalls) was insufficient and advised 

ARC by letter on April 27, 2023 of its 

tentative conclusion that the subject 

inflators pose an unreasonable risk of 

death and injury and therefore contain 

a safety-related defect within the 

meaning of the Safety Act. The earlier 

lot recalls were insufficient to address 

the safety risk, as new ruptures 

continued to occur outside of the 

recalled populations. In the April 27, 

2023 letter, ODI requested that ARC 

initiate a recall of all subject inflators, 

in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 30118–20. 

In its May 11, 2023 response to ODI, 

ARC declined to submit a Part 573 recall 

report for the subject inflators, arguing 

that the agency lacks sufficient evidence 

to find the existence of a safety defect 

and minimizing the seven confirmed 

ruptures in the United States as merely 

‘‘occasional or isolated failures that are 

an inevitable part of any volume 

manufacturing process.’’ 13 Additional 

arguments raised by ARC in its response 

are addressed further below. 

G. Additional Information on the Initial 

Decision of a Safety Defect 

Based on its investigation, NHTSA 

has made an initial decision, pursuant 

to 49 U.S.C. 30118(a) and 49 CFR 

554.10, that the subject inflators contain 

a safety-related defect. Air bag inflators 

that rupture when commanded to 

deploy are plainly defective, as they 

both fail to protect vehicle occupants as 

they should, and, themselves, pose an 

unreasonable risk of serious injury or 

death to vehicle occupants. Air bags are 

essential and required items of motor 

vehicle equipment. See 49 CFR 571.208. 

Absent a defect, an air bag inflator 

inflates the air bag, helping to minimize 

or avoid injury to occupants in a crash. 

An air bag inflator that fails by rupture 

not only does not perform its job as a 

safety device, but instead actively 

threatens injury or death, even in a 

crash where the vehicle occupants 

would otherwise have been unharmed. 

This defect poses an unreasonable risk 

of injury or death from metal fragments 

forcibly propelled into the passenger 

compartment of a vehicle when the 

inflator ruptures. 

As explained in NHTSA’s April 27, 

2023, recall request letter, identifying 

the root cause of the failure is not 

necessary to make a safety defect 

determination. See United States v. Gen. 

Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420, 432 (D.C. 

Cir. 1975). A defect can occur in the 

‘‘performance, construction, a 

component, or material of a motor 

vehicle or motor vehicle equipment.’’ 49 

U.S.C. 30102(a)(3). Similarly, ‘‘motor 

vehicle safety’’ is ‘‘the performance of a 

motor vehicle or motor vehicle 

equipment in a way that protects the 

public against unreasonable risk of 

accidents occurring because of the 

design, construction, or performance of 

a motor vehicle, and against 

unreasonable risk of death or injury in 

an accident, and includes 

nonoperational safety of a motor 

vehicle.’’ 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(9). The 

D.C. Circuit explained that ‘‘a 

determination of ‘defect’ does not 

require any predicate of a finding 

identifying engineering, metallurgical, 

or manufacturing failures.’’ Gen. Motors 

Corp., 518 F.2d at 432. 

Here, NHTSA believes that the 

evidence does identify a likely cause. 

The manufacture of the subject inflators 

included a friction welding process that 

in some inflators produces weld slag. 

Upon normal deployment of an air bag 

in a crash, any debris, if larger than the 

5-millimeter diameter of the exit orifice 

of the inflator center support, can 

become lodged in that exit orifice and 

block the air flow required to fill the air 

bag cushion. The inability of the air to 

exit the inflator due to the blocked exit 

orifice can lead to over pressurization of 

the air bag inflator. The over 

pressurization can lead to a rupture of 

the air bag inflator. A rupture of the air 

bag inflator will forcefully propel metal 

fragments into the passenger 

compartment, likely causing significant 

injury or death to the vehicle 

occupant(s). 

ARC’s argument that the root cause 

‘‘has not been confirmed,’’ or 

purportedly is not the cause of some of 

the ruptures, is not a reason for delaying 

a recall. ‘‘A determination of ‘defect’ 


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14 ‘‘ARC recognizes, however, that even with 

appropriate industry standards . . . and efforts by 

manufacturers to minimize the risks of failures, the 

manufacturing processes may not completely 

eliminate the risk of occasional or isolated failures.’’ 

ARC June 14, 2023 Special Order Response at 5. 

15As noted above, the estimated population is 

now corrected to approximately 52 million. 

16This estimate assumes that: (1) In any given 

year, 0.4% of the vehicles with subject inflators on 

the road experience a frontal impact with a deltaV of 15 mph or more. (This figure was derived from 

the light trucks in the 2015 Fatality Analysis 

Reporting System (FARS), 2015 General Estimates 

System (GES), 2016 vehicle registration data from 

S&P Global Mobility’s (f/k/a R.L. Polk, Inc), and 

2015 Crashworthiness Data System.); (2) The 

subject inflators deploy at about a change in 

velocity of 15 mph, regardless of other conditions 

(such as, in the case of passenger air bags, whether 

a person of a threshold weight is in the passenger 

seat); and (3) the vehicles with subject inflators 

remain on the road according to the average of the 

car and class 1–2a light truck attrition models from 

NHTSA’s 2016 CAFE Model. 

17November 26, 2014 Recall Request Letter to TK 

Holdings Inc., https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2014/ 

INRM-PE14016-60978.pdf. 

may be based exclusively on the 

performance record of the vehicle or 

component.’’ Id. ‘‘[T]he Government 

need only establish a significant number 

of . . . failures’’ where significant is 

defined as a ‘‘non-de minimis number of 

failures.’’ Id. at 438. Here, there is no 

dispute that ARC inflators have 

repeatedly ruptured and that those 

ruptures have severely injured and 

killed vehicle occupants. 

While establishing the root cause is 

unnecessary for a recall determination, 

these ruptures certainly constitute 

evidence of failure in the performance 

of motor vehicle equipment. The seven 

ruptures confirmed thus far in the 

United States are not de minimis in 

equipment that is specifically 

manufactured to save lives and 

minimize or prevent injuries, but 

instead have caused deaths and injuries 

in survivable crashes. For these reasons, 

ARC’s attempts to distinguish the 

ruptures from each other misses the 

point. The fact that the subject 

population has experienced seven 

confirmed ruptures, no matter the root 

cause, warrants the initial determination 

of a safety defect. 

A failure of an air bag inflator has far 

more serious safety consequences than 

that of most other vehicle equipment. 

Therefore, fewer failures are necessary 

to exceed the de minimis threshold. 

This is acknowledged by the industry 

based on the prior history of recall 

precedents addressing confirmed field 

ruptures of other air bag inflators, as 

described above. 

ARC inappropriately minimizes the 

severity of risk from its rupturing 

inflators by describing these events as 

manufacturing anomalies or a part of 

normal business.14 Specifically, ARC 

characterized the ruptures as ‘‘isolated 

events’’ and ‘‘an inevitable part of any 

volume manufacturing process.’’ 

NHTSA rejects any suggestion that the 

seven inflator ruptures are in some way 

normal or to be expected, absent a safety 

defect. Indeed, the industry has 

recognized the serious safety impact of 

inflator ruptures even in this specific 

case by conducting the eight recalls that 

have already occurred for parts of the 

subject inflator population. An inflator 

that explosively ruptures, propelling 

metal fragments at a high velocity into 

an occupied passenger compartment of 

a motor vehicle—and into the occupants 

themselves—cannot simply be 

dismissed as a normal manufacturing 

anomaly, with vehicle owners left 

uninformed yet bearing the risk of the 

peril they and their occupants face. 

Nor are after-the-fact recalls of subpopulations of the subject inflators 

enough to address the unreasonable 

risk. The subject air bag inflators have 

repeatedly ruptured in vehicles, injuring 

and killing vehicle occupants. Those 

rupturing inflators were manufactured 

at different times in plants located in 

three different countries, used in air bag 

modules manufactured by four different 

suppliers, and installed in vehicles 

produced by four different 

manufacturers. New ruptures have 

unpredictably occurred outside the subpopulations of vehicles recalled, and it 

is expected that additional ruptures will 

occur in the future. See United States v. 

General Motors, 565 F. 2d 754, 758 (D.C. 

Cir. 1977) (‘‘[W]here a defect—a term 

used in the sense of an ‘error or 

mistake’—has been established in a 

motor vehicle, and where this defect 

results in hazards as potentially 

dangerous as a sudden engine fire, and 

where there is no dispute that at least 

some such hazards, in this case fires, 

can definitely be expected to occur in 

the future, then the defect must be 

viewed as one ‘related to motor vehicle 

safety.’ ’’) (footnotes omitted). The 

Safety Act is preventive, and a recall of 

the subject inflators should not wait for 

more injuries or deaths to occur. See, 

e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 

565 F.2d 754, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (‘‘The 

purpose of the Safety Act . . . is not to 

protect individuals from the risks 

associated with defective vehicles only 

after serious injuries have already 

occurred; it is to prevent serious injuries 

stemming from established defects 

before they occur.’’). 

The large size of the subject 

population involved here does not 

negate the need for a recall. ARC 

suggested that the rupture risk of the 

subject inflators is properly captured by 

noting that only 7 of the then estimated 

67 million subject inflators have been 

known to rupture, concluding that the 

rupture rate is 7 out of 67 million.15

ARC argued that— 

the existence of seven (or, more accurately, 

five) field incidents among the 67 million 

toroidal driver and passenger inflators 

produced for the U.S. market during the 18- 

year period referenced in the RRL across 

multiple manufacturing lines in different 

plant locations does not support a finding 

that a systemic and prevalent defect exists 

across this population. 

ARC’s May 11, 2023 Response to 

NHTSA’s Recall Request Letter, page 2. 

However, ARC’s use of the entire subject 

inflator population as the baseline 

results in an inaccurate assessment of 

the risk. As crashes are relatively 

uncommon events, the vast majority of 

the subject inflators have not 

experienced a command for 

deployment, and the defect manifests 

itself only upon air bag deployment. 

Therefore, the rupture rate of the subject 

inflators is properly estimated as the 

ratio of inflators ruptures to total field 

air bag deployments—not to the total 

subject inflator population. NHTSA 

estimates that approximately 2,600,000 

of the subject air bag inflators have 

deployed in the field.16 A more accurate 

representation of the rupture risk of the 

subject inflators is, therefore, 7 out of 

2.6 million. 

Finally, in response to ARC’s 

argument that it was not a proper 

recipient of the recall request letter 

(which it mischaracterizes as 

‘‘procedurally faulty’’), NHTSA notes 

that its recall request was based on 

ARC’s legal obligation to file notice of 

a safety defect with NHTSA (See 49 CFR 

573.3(f)) and in accordance with 

established practice. NHTSA previously 

sent a recall request letter to Takata 

concerning six identified ruptures of its 

air bag inflators, which ultimately 

resulted in recalls carried out by the 

vehicle manufacturers that used the 

approximately 67 million defective 

Takata inflators.17 As described above, 

when a safety defect is identified in 

original equipment supplied to more 

than one manufacturer, the equipment 

manufacturer and each manufacturer of 

vehicles in which the equipment has 

been installed must file Part 573 recall 

reports with NHTSA, which are each 

assigned a unique recall number. See 49 

CFR 573.3. 

To be clear, the vehicle manufacturers 

that used the subject inflators as original 

equipment would be legally responsible 

for carrying out any recalls of those 

inflators, including providing notice to 


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18Any entity determined responsible for the 

Delphi-manufactured inflators may also be subject 

to this order. 

vehicle owners and a free remedy. See 

49 U.S.C. 30118–20. That does not 

excuse ARC—the manufacturer and 

designer of the inflators—from 

complying with its own obligations 

under the Safety Act and regulations. 

To address the risk that additional 

vehicle occupants will be killed and 

injured from these rupturing inflators, 

the agency has made this initial 

determination that the subject hybrid, 

toroidal inflators designed by ARC and 

manufactured by ARC and Delphi from 

2000 through January 2018 are defective 

and pose an unreasonable risk of death 

or injury, and therefore should be 

recalled. 

Pursuant to the Safety Act, NHTSA 

may make a final decision ‘‘only after 

giving the manufacturer[s] an 

opportunity to present information, 

views, and arguments showing that 

there is no defect or noncompliance or 

that the defect does not affect motor 

vehicle safety. Any interested person 

also shall be given an opportunity to 

present information, views, and 

arguments.’’ 49 U.S.C. 30118(b)(1). If 

NHTSA makes a final decision that the 

subject inflators contain a safety defect, 

NHTSA will order ARC to comply with 

the obligation to file notice of the safety 

defect with the agency 18 and will order 

the vehicle manufacturers to carry out 

recalls by providing notice and a free 

remedy. See id. § 30118(b)(2). 

H. Public Meeting 

Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30118(b)(1) and 

49 CFR 554.10(b), NHTSA will conduct 

a public meeting, beginning at 9:30 a.m., 

October 5, 2023, in the West Atrium, 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC, at which time ARC, 

the manufacturers that used the subject 

inflators in their vehicles, and other 

interested persons will have an 

opportunity to present information, 

views, and arguments on the issue of 

whether the subject inflators contain a 

safety defect. A transcript of the public 

meeting will be taken. 

The public meeting will also be 

livestreamed on NHTSA’s website. The 

livestream will allow viewing only. 

Interested persons are invited to 

participate in this proceeding through 

written and/or oral statements. Written 

submissions must be submitted with the 

docket number identified in the heading 

of this document through the Federal 

eRulemaking Portal, mail, hand 

delivery, or fax as outlined above before 

the close of business on Friday, October 

20, 2023. 

Persons wishing to attend the public 

meeting or make oral statements must 

register at https://www.nhtsa.gov/

events/public-meeting-arc-delphi-airbag-inflators before the close of business 

on September 22, 2023. Each person 

wishing to attend must provide his or 

her name, organization, and country of 

citizenship. Non-U.S. citizens must also 

provide date of birth, title or position, 

and passport or diplomatic ID number, 

along with expiration date. Media is 

invited to attend in-person or watch the 

event’s livestream. Members of the 

media should register by emailing 

NHTSAMedia@dot.gov with their name, 

outlet, and attendance preference. 

Anyone wishing to make an oral 

statement must attend the public 

meeting in person and should specify in 

registering the amount of time that the 

statement is expected to last. Any 

exhibits should be submitted into the 

public docket in accordance with the 

instructions in this notice rather than be 

presented during the public meeting. 

The agency will prepare a schedule of 

oral statements. Depending upon the 

number of persons who wish to make 

oral statements and the anticipated 

length of those statements, the agency 

may limit the length of oral statements 

to ensure the public meeting may be 

completed on October 5. Registrants 

who request to make oral statements 

will be notified in advance, on or about 

September 29, 2023, with additional 

details. 

NHTSA is committed to providing 

equal access to this event for all 

participants, and people who need 

accommodations should send a request 

to Carla Bridges, Office of the Chief 

Counsel, National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration by email at 

Carla.Bridges@dot.gov before the close 

of business on September 22, 2023. 

This will not be a formal adjudicatory 

proceeding. There is no crossexamination of witnesses. 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30118(a), (b); 49 

CFR 554.10; delegations of authority at 

49 CFR 1.50(a) and 49 CFR 501.8. 

Issued on: September 5, 2023. 

Cem Hatipoglu, 

Acting Associate Administrator for 

Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. 2023–19441 Filed 9–5–23; 4:15 pm] 

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Office of the Secretary 

[Docket No. DOT–OST–2016–0023] 

Extension of a Previously Approved 

Collection: Public Charters 

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, 

Department of Transportation. 

ACTION: Notice and request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: In accordance with the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, the 

Department of Transportation (DOT) 

invites the general public, industry and 

other governmental parties to comment 

on Public Charters. A Federal Register 

Notice with a 60-day comment period 

soliciting comments on the following 

information collection was published on 

April 21, 2023. No comments were 

received. 

DATES: Written comments should be 

submitted by October 10, 2023. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments regarding 

the burden estimate, including 

suggestions for reducing the burden, to 

the Office of Management and Budget, 

Attention: Desk Officer for the Office of 

the Secretary of Transportation, 725 

17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503. 

Comments may also be sent via email to 

OMB at the following address: oira_

submissions@omb.eop.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. 

Reather Flemmings (202–366–1865) and 

Mr. Brett Kruger (202–366–8025), Office 

of the Secretary, Office of International 

Aviation, U.S. Air Carrier Licensing/ 

Special Authorities Division–X44, 1200 

New Jersey Ave. SE, Washington, DC 

20590. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

OMB Control Number: 2106–0005. 

Title: Public Charters, 14 CFR part 

380. 

Form Numbers: 4532, 4533, 4534, 

4535. 

Type of Review: Extension of a 

Previously Approved Collection: The 

current OMB inventory has not 

changed. 

Abstract: 14 CFR part 380 establishes 

regulations embodying the Department’s 

terms and conditions for Public Charter 

operators to conduct air transportation 

using direct air carriers. Public Charter 

operators arrange transportation for 

groups of people on chartered aircraft. 

This arrangement is often less expensive 

for the travelers than individually 

buying a ticket. Part 380 exempts 

charter operators from certain 

provisions of the U.S. code in order that 

they may provide this service. A 

primary goal of part 380 is to seek 


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