### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE June 11, 200 9 S es sio n BO B F A N N ON , in di vid ua lly an d as a C it y C ou nc ilm an f or t he C it y of La Fol le tte v . CITY OF La FOLLE TTE , ET AL 

### . Appeal from t he Circuit Court for C ampbell Coun ty No. 13947 John D. McAf ee, Judge

No. E2008-01616-COA- R3-CV - FILED JANUAR Y 11, 2010

In this action for de clar atory judgment against the Cit y of LaFollette, the City Coun ci l , and thre e City Cou nc ilm e n, the tr ia l c ou rt a wa rd e d the plaint if

f a tto rn e y’ s f

e e s, c os ts anddis c re tio na

ry c os ts. On appe al, the defe ndants argue that the trial court e rre d in finding the plaintiff as the “ preva iling party” in the litigation and that the trial court’s awar d was unwarranted and err oneous. We hold that the pl aintiff was not a prevailing party, and there fore , the t rial court err ed in awarding the plaintiff a tto rn e y’ s f

e e s a ndc os ts o n th a t ba sis

. Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Cir cuit Court

Reve rsed; CaseRem anded
J OHN W. M C C LARTY , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which C H A RL ES D. S US ANO , J R
. and D. M I CHAEL S W I NEY , JJ., joined.
Jon G. Roach a nd Emily A. Cleveland, Knoxvill e, T en n es s ee, f or Appe llants, Cit y of LaFollette, Hansfor d Hatmake r, Mike Stanfield, a nd Ken Snodder ly.
David H. Duna way, LaFollette, Tennessee , for Appe llee, Bob Fannon.

OP IN ION
I. BACKGROUND

This declar atory judgment ac tion was brought by the plaintiff, Bob Fannon, a Councilman for the City of LaFollette (“City”), asserting a violation of the Tenne ssee Ope n Meetings Act, Te nn. Code Ann. § 8-44- 103 (2002 ). The rele vant fa cts involved in this lawsuit occurre d in June of 2007.-2-

Ac c or din g to the c omp la int , Coun c ilm e n Ha ns fo rd Hatma ke r andMik e Sta nf

ie ld m e t w ith va ri ou s e mpl oy e e s in a

City a dmi nis trati ve off

ic e , at w hic h ti me , r a ise s w e re plann e d f or c e rt a in e mploy ees of the City a nddis c us sio ns we re he ld o n f ill ing the po sit ion s o f C ity Cle rk a ndCity Trea surer . Brad Myer s, the Data Processing Mana ger f

or t h e C ity, testified at a later hearing that Mr. Hatmake r wa s “asking questions” a nd Mr. S tanfield “maybe made one or two statements.” The meeting, ac cording to the witness, wa s not a regula rly schedule d or “c alled meeting,” but was more of a private af

fair. On the issue of whe ther the ge t-together w as a me eting in the “Ope n Meeting” sense, Mr. Mye rs ac knowledged that the gener al publ ic had not been invited to attend the mee ting. He op ine d th a t he wa s inv ite d to the me e tin g so that the of fi c ia ls i n atte nd a nc e c ou ld n e go tiate his sa lary . H e te sti fi e d a s f

oll ow s: A. The only que stion that was rea lly addresse d t o m e, i f I wa s willing to t ake a c e rt a in s a lary a ndthat w a s it

. A. Okay.
THE COURT: What salary?
THE WI TNESS: They h ad -- I was off ere d -- they a sked me if I would stay for $2 5, 00 0 a ndI r e fu se d to do that. THE COURT: So they were negotiating with you?
TH E W IT NE SS: Y e s. THE COURT: So who offe red you a $25,000 salary?
THE WI TNESS: That was Mr. Hatmaker.

City Ad min ist

rator Da vidYoung t e sti fi e d th a t w hil e it w a s h is r e sp on sib ili ty a s th e City Administrator to rec ommend salary increa ses, prior to the “private” meeting at issue, these potential raises w ere not discussed with him. Mr. Young indicated that he wa s in Canada whe n the meeting in qu e sti on wa s he ld; he re turne d the day be fo re the re gu larl y sc he du le d me e tin g of the City Cou nc il.

At the re gularly sche duled city counc il meeting on June 28, 2007, Councilm an Ke n Snodderly moved to amend the rea ding of the budget to add those c hanges that purportedly had be en fashioned at the earlier “me eting.” Mr. Stanfie ld seconde d the motion and he, Mr. Snodderly, and Mr. Hatmake r voted a ffirmatively for the motion’s passage . The sala ry incre ase s th at w ere discussed and allege dly approve d at the informa l meeting wer e then pa ssed by the full City C ouncil at its next regula rly schedule d meeting the following month.
Th is l a ws uit

wa s in sti tut e d a ft e r M r. Fa nn on c on c lud e d tha t the De fe nd a nts ha d impr op e rl y fra med and approved the budge t amendments in order to provide ra ises for City employees in a-3-

manner that purportedly failed t o comply with the City C harte r and the Tenne ssee Ope n Meetings Ac t. I n h is c omp la int , M r. Fa nn on a sse rt e d a s f oll ow s: 3. That this is a proce eding for a decla ratory judgment a n d t h e enforce ment of Tennes see ’s Op e n M e e tin g L a w andto o the rw ise ha ve de c lare d il le ga l a ndvo id va ri ou s a c tio ns wh ic h w e re take n b y th e De fe nd a nts a ndthe City Cou nc il fo r the City of LaFollette at a meeting held on June 28, 2007, at which time c erta i n p ay raises wer e granted by the Def

endants a nd the City Council . . . t o various employee s . . .

. 4. . .

. [P]rior to June 28, 2007, and at a time whe n the City Admini strator wa s awa y from the City

. . . on business matters in Canada , the Def endants, Hansford Hatmaker a ndMik e Sta nf

ie ld, me t w ithva

ri ou s empl oy e e s at . . . [ a City ] .

. . me e tin g r oo m, at which t i m e ra i s es were planne d for c erta in employees of the City . . . and discussions were held for the filling of the positions of C ity Clerk and City Trea surer
. Th a t a t th e e n d o f th e me e ti n g , a d e c is io n w a s ma d e th a t a mo tion would be introduced at the next City Council m eeting . . . to include pay raises, a s well as the filling of positi ons by the C ity . . . . This motion was made by the De fendant, Ken Snodderly. 5. . . . [T]he discussions c oncerning pay raises and the f illing of posit ions with the City

. . . were of

su c h p e rv a siv e imp orta nc e that pr op e r n oti c e c on c e rn ing the se discussions should have bee n given to the gene ral public, as well as to the Mayor, the entire City Council, and the City Administrator . . . in ac cordance w ith Tennessee ’s Pub lic Me e tin gs Ac t.
6.

. . . [ T] he me e tin g h e ld d uring the we e k o f the City Ad min ist rator ’s abs e nc e in Canada and betwe en City Councilman Hansford H atmaker , and Mike Stanfield, and various employee s of the City .

. . , and the planning of the introduction of a motion by the Def

endant, Ke n Snodd erly, to gra nt raises a nd fill positi ons for the City . . . was in violation of the following-desc ribed statutes for the State of Tenne ssee, whic h are incorporated by re fer ence here in and will be re ad in their e ntirety at the trial of thi s c aus e to w it: T.C.A. § 8-44-103 - Notice of Public Meetings 7. . . . [T]he planning of ra ises

. . . [and] . . . the filling of positions of Ci ty Clerk and City Treasure r we re of

such pervasive importanc e that ade quate notice should have be e n g ive n to the pu bli c , th e Ma yo r, a nd the City Adm ini str a tor

. . . [ ;] a de qu a te notice with re gard to the matters to be discussed by the City Council . . . on June 28, 2007, should have also been given to the public pursuant to T.C.A. Section 8-44-103. Th a t th e iss ue s c on c e rn ing the gr a nti ng of raise s a nd the fi lli ng of

the po sit ionof

City Clerk and City Trea surer wer e of suc h perva sive i m p o rt an ce f or citize ns and r e s i d e n t s o f t h e C i t y
. . . , t h a t t h e p u b l i c w a s o t h e r w i s e e n t i t l e d t o k no w o f t his meeting and the disc ussions which were held.-4-

8. . . . [T]he actions t aken by the C ity Council

. . . at t he mee ting on June 28, 2007, wer e ar bitrary, c apric ious, u n rea sonable, a nd intentional, and such a ctions were otherwise ir

responsible be cause the ra i s es an d fi lling of positi ons of the City . . . e mpl oy e e s h a d b e e n p rev iou sly pr e arr a ng e d a s a la st m inu te plan to su bs ta nti a lly inc re a se the pay f

or a ha nd fu l of

City

. . . e mpl oy e e s. 9.

. . . [ W ]h ile oth e r as pe c ts of the bu dg e t f

or the City

. . . w e re dis c us se d at le ng th and deliber ated thoroughly at the meeting held on June 28, 2007, the pla n to spend $42,000.00 in salary incr ease s and the c reation of a new part-time posit ion was thrown in as a last minute pla n to substantially incr ease the pay f or a se lect handf

ul of City employees at the e xpense of the taxpaye rs of the City . . . .
10

. . . . [T ]h e plan to gra nt sa lari e s to a ha nd fu l of e mpl oy e e s, a s w e ll a s a

plan to a me ndthe bu dg e t, w a s o f s uc h p e rv a siv e imp ortance th a t a de qu a te no tic e sh ou ld have be en given to the public, the Mayor, and the City Administrator . . . , and that adequate notice of

the meeting to be he ld and the age nda to be discusse d on June 28, 2007, should ha ve also been given to the public pursuant to T .C.A. Section 8-44-103. . . . [N]o notice was given t o t h e p u b l i c in adva nce of the motion to amend the bu dg e t a ndoth e rw ise gr a nt an in c re a se in s a lary to this ha nd fu l of e mpl oy e e s.
* * * Among Mr. Fannon’s dema nds, he stated, inter alia, the f

ollowing:
2. That the mee ting held by the Defen dants prior to June 28, 2007, a nd the ac tion taken by the D efe ndants on June 28, 2007, to o t h erwise amend the budge t for the City

. . . a ndto grant pay r a ise s to the e mpl oy e e s a s o the rw ise de sc ri be d intho se budget amendme nts be dec lare d illegal, null, and void.
* * *
5. That a Te mp or ar y R e st r ain ing Or d er b e is sued a ga inst th e De fe ndant s, rest raining th em from granting pay increase s to a hand ful of selec ted em ployees and oth erw ise exte ndi ng salary in cre ases in the bu dget ame ndments that wer e otherw ise adopted by th e De fendants at the me eting of the City Council held on June 28, 2007.
6. That a hearing othe rwise be schedule d on the Court docket to nullify and void the budget amendme nts and ac tion taken by the De fendants at the June 28, 2007 meeting.
* * *
8. Th a t th e Pla int if

f b e a wa rd e d c os ts andre a so na

ble a tto rn e y f

e e s.-5-

9. That the Plaintiff be a war ded compensatory damage s and such other, further, a nd gener al r el i ef

including rea sonable c osts and attorney f ees unde r the doc trine of implied indemnity i n the State of Te nnessee
. * * *

(Emphasis adde d). Afte r a he ari n g wa s h el d on Mr. Fannon’s motion for a te mporary r estraining or de r, the tr ia l c ou rt

state d a s f

oll ow s: Obviously, the city, through the cha rter system he re unde r Article VI, ha s the right to make appointments to the -- these posit ions, chief of pol ice, public works, street and sanitation, oper ations manage r, code enfor ceme nt office r, etc eter a. It doesn’t say that they have the right to supervise. It doesn’t say they have the right to do certain things. It just says they have the right [to] a ppoint these people.
If yo u look ba c k at Artic le V, I thi nk it’ s A rt ic le V o f the c ha

rt e r, a ndwh a t th e c ity charter doe s is they basically incorpor ate . . . the Tenne ssee Code A nnotated la ng ua ge that says wh a t th e du tie s a nd res po ns ibilit ie s o f the c ity a dmi nis tr a tor is. Shall have the duty [t]o a dminist er, supe rvise and c oo rdinate a ll administ rative activities of the a ffa irs of the c ity. All, you s e e th e w o r d “ a ll , ” th a t me a n s a ll

. I t c o u ld h a v e s a id a ll e x c e p t for that that’s bee n prec luded or [e xcepte d] out by the cha rter, e tceter a, I don ’t k n o w. B ut it s a ys “ a ll” be c aus e it i nc lud e d a ll the a dmi nis tr a tiv e fu nc tio ns
. Sub 4 of th at sect ion , p ara gr aph 4 s a ys to r e c omm e ndto the c ity c ou nc il emp l o y m en t , d i s m i s s al , p ro m o t i o n , d em o t i o n o f a n y em p l o y ee , wh i ch wo u l d i nclude city cler k, city attorney, e tceter a. Six, to revie w, approve, recommend to the city council a budget for e ach de partment of the c ity coming under t h e supervision of the city council. To re view, appr ove, re c omm e ndto the c ity c ou nc il a bu dg e t f or e a c h d e pa

rt me nt.
And then it down her e in the bottom section it says 1-406, which part of the c ode that was gi v e n to me , it

is in c lu d e d inth e s e c ti o n w h ic h I th in k is th e n e x t p aragr aph down, this section 5.
Section 5 of the c harte r on page C-13, t h e ci t y council and its member s shall deal wi th the a dmi nis tr a tiv e se rv ic e s of th e city on ly thr ou gh , o nly thr ou gh the c ity administr at o r ex cept f

or the purpose s of inquir[y]. N either the city council or a ny me mbe r the re of

sh a ll g ive order s o r i ns truc tio ns to any su bo rd inate s o f the c ity administrator.-6-

There is a purpose f

or that, t o maintain discipline and st ructure and function of the city so that you don’t have a bunch of pe ople running ar ound telling - - and you ge t c ity e mpl oy e e s sc are d to de a th b e c a us e the co un cilman sa id I want y ou to d o th is, and then a nother one says, no, you better not do that, I’ m gonna fire you, I’ll show you.
An d s o th a t is so rt

of the way it ’s se t up . A ndso cou nci l for th e c ity sa ys , w e ll, Ju dg e , w e ha ve ov e ra ll auth ority . W e pa ss the -- we hav e the pu rs e string s - - i s basica ll y th e ar g u me n t, I th in k , f r o m th e c it y ’ s p o s it io n , w e h a v e th e p u r s e strings and bec ause w e have the purse strings w e have the right to do anything we want to. Now, I disagr ee w ith that assertion. I d o n ’t t h i nk that assertion is correc t. I think that they have -- obviously they have the purse strings for the over all function of the budget. They don’t nece ssar[ily] -- it’s not -- I don’t think you jump from saying that we ha ve th e pu rse string s ju mpi ng to s a yin g w e ’r e -- we de c ide sa lari e s a ndin individual ca s e s w e d e c id e w h o is h ir e d h e r e , f ir e d

. A n d w e d o n ’ t g o th r o u g h , we don’t have to run and tell the c ity administ rator e verything that we do. That appe ars to me to be in c onflict with Article V by saying that. So that being said, wh e r e [ ar e ] w e a t ? B e c au s e t h e a d m i n i s tr at o r s a y s I w a s n ’ t t o l d of a ny of thi s information. This was just run through the night of the me eting of June the 28th. I t wa s n e ve r s ub mitte d to me fo r c on sid e ratio ns fo r b ud ge t pu rp os e s.
Because I think the administrator w ould have to cr unch number s and say that isn’t in the budget, that’s not going to balance . That budget will not balan ce if you add this, and that there, and all this other stuff.
* * *

. . . Artic le V is wh a t th e c ity a dmi nis tr a tor ’s re sp on sib ili tie s a re . O kay? W e c a n s it here and talk until we ar e blu e i n t he fa ce. I t is my i mpression, unless you all ca n show me something else in t he charter -- the c harte r says that the c ity council can hir e and appoint these people. Then it goes in Article VI, then he g o es bac k to Article V and says what the administrator does, what his or her re sponsibili ties are

. An d th e n inthe e ndit s a ys , w e ll, the y have the l e gis la tiv e , th e y h a ve the pu rs e string s. Does that nece ssarily give t hem t he right to walk in the night of June 28th a nd decide we ’r e g o i n g to give this person five thousand, that person thre e thousand, that one a thousand, that one five thousand an d j u st pass it without the administrator be ing a wa re of the bu dg e t be c aus e it s a ys he is s up po se d to re vie w t he bu dg et? He is supposed to administer. He is supposed to re commend.-7-

No th ing is ev e r sa id to the adm inis tr at orpr ior to th at me e ti ng. That

has to be in conflict with Artic le V of the charte r. If it’ s not, I don ’t know why it’s not.
* * *

. . . Let’s do this. The c harte r is in conflict. We can sit her e until we’r e blue in the fac e. I’ m g oin g t o g r ant

yo urinj unc ti on.
* * * . . . I think that, again, I think that there is two issues here

. There is an issue about the cha rter, whether or not the charter in some way or anothe r wa s not complied with, if there is a conflict with the c harte r in ref ere nce to whe ther or not this information should have be en sent through or been prese nted to the city administrator prior [to] its consideration on June 28th.
And then the open meetings violation. Well, the open mee tings violation , we have not even got t o that issue yet. . . . . . . [I]f w e can re solve the conflict issue with the charte r, I don’t eve n get into th e iss ue of

th e Ope n M e e ti ngs Ac t. . . . I ma y be wr ong by do ing th is, at le as t the impression I get is that the i n form ation be provid ed to the c ity [a dm inis trat or], th at i t go es b ack u p b efor e th e com mi ss io n , th e fu ll c om mi ssi on. The y a ppar e nt ly g ot

th e vo te s t o t ake c ar e of th is and th at

it c om plie s w it h t he c onf lic t - - that

r e so lve s t he c onf

lict wit h t he c har te r , c om ple te ly r e so lve s t he iss ue abo ut th e Ope n M e e ti ngs Ac t be c aus e we don’ t e ve n ge t into th at i ss ue be c aus e it

be c om e s a mo ot

iss ue onc e it

go e s ba c k dow n and c om e s ba c k up.
* * *
And no counc ilman has to testify under oath as t o wh at t hey did, be put in a compromising positi on or not . . . .
But I think that obvious ly th e l aw is quite clear that the law doe sn’t preve nt councilmen f

rom having discussions about budgetary things. T h ey h av e got t o go answe r questions and do things. I mean they have got to go and investigate be fore they d o th in g s
. A n d th e la w d o e s n ’ t p r o h ib it th a t f r o m g o in g o n
. Bu t I think the open mee tings viol ation just simply preve nts those informal meetings taking place to decide w hat we’ re going to do at the next public mee ting. And that -- we haven’ t even gone down that roa d.-8-

We a r e j u s t

t r y i n g t o r e s o l v e w h a t

a p p e a r s t o [ b e ] a c o n f

l i c t i n t h e c h a r t e r . If th e r e is a con fl ic t i n t he c har te r , j ust subm it th e num be r s, r e -s ubm it th e numb ers t o the city admini strat or. He s ays there is money there to t ake careof it, and i t is just re -submitted and they vote on it.
* * * . . . [I]f it goes back down an d it’s corr ect ed, that the administratoris in form ed of th e b u dgetary numbers and as to what has b een proposed and it goes back up an d it’s voted on, it makes the open mee tings violation before , it seem s to me , to be moot . It’s done, it’s done.
* * *
. . . I think the order

needs to show that the Court f ound a conf

lict existing withi n the c ity char ter its e lf

in r e fe re nc e to A rt ic le V andArtic le VI a ndwi th the ov e ra ll le gis la tiv e fu nc tio n o f the c ity c ou nc il.
Furthermore , t h e C o u rt found that it is the opinion of the Court, because of the conflict that this budgetary information, these pay raises, should have been submitted within a rea sonable period of time to the city administrator for his c onsideration prior to the meeting of June 28th. It -- and this doesn’t nece ssarily have to be there , and there fore , the city i s enjoined from instit uting these pay raises until , I guess, a nother wo rk sh op , that the se nu mbe rs are fo rm a lly pr e se nte d to the c ity a dmi nis tr a tor a ga in for c onsideration[]

. And then the number s are basica lly run back up the flagpole –

(Emphasis adde d). The ne xt day, the trial court grante d Mr. Fannon’s motion for a te mporary re str a ini ng or de r. Th e tr ia l c ou rt pr ov ide d th a t
the Pla int if

f h a s o the rw ise de mon str a te d th a t ir re pa ra ble ha rm or inj ury w ill oc c ur

to the Plaintiff, as we ll as the taxpaye rs of the City o f L aF o l l et te, and it furthe r appea ring to the C o u rt t h at the Plaintiff has the pr obability of succe eding on the me ri ts i n th e abo ve c aus e of a c tio n, it i s ORDERED that t h e Defendants ar e her eby enjoined f rom making budget a me nd m e n t s t o th e b u d g e t f o r t h e C i t y o f L a F o l l e t t e g r a n t i n g r a i s e s s p e c i f i c a l l y to Jim Mull ens, Public Works, Johnny Burge, Recre ation Direc tor, Stan Foust, Anim al Control, Nancy Gr eene , Librarian, Ter ry Sweat, Fi n an cial, Wanda Dowe r, Tre asure r, Amanda Ma ssengill, Front Off i ce, Lynda White, City Clerk, and Da vid Young, Administrator, until the same has be en done in c ompliance with the City Charter for the City of LaFollette, and that the granting of pay ra ises to these em p loyees, a s specific ally set out in the minutes for the meeting of the City C ouncil for the City ofI n N e e se v . P a ris S p e c ia l S c h o o l D ist. , 8 1 3 S

. W

. 2 d 4 3 2 (T en n
. C t

. A p p
. 1 9 9 0 ), t h i s co u rt ex p l ai n ed t h e “cu re 1 d o ct ri n e. ” W h en a pu b l i c b o d y re- en act s o r r ed o es a prev i o u s act i o n aft er a full an d pu b l i c d i scussi o n of t h e m at t ers di s cus s ed i n m ee t i ngs he l d a l l ege dl y i n vi ol at i on of t he O pen M ee t i ngs A ct , t he new ac t i on or or di nanc e w i l l not be
n u lli fie d e v e n if it o rig in a lly w a s a d o p te d o r ta k e n w ith o u t co m p lian c e w ith th e A c t. Id. a t 436. -9- LaFol le tte date d Jun e 28 , 200 7, sh a ll be e njo ine d an d the De fe nd a nts are oth e rw ise restric ted from taking any further a ction to grant these pay raises until there has bee n c omp lia nc e wi th the City Cha rt e r f or the City of LaFol le tte a nd a re vie w by the City Administrator and the City Council for the City of LaFollette.
All other matters a

re r eserved pending a

final hea ring and trial of

this cause of

action.
Th e c ou rt c os ts o f this a c tio n to date sh a ll b e ta xe d to the De fe nd a nts

.

At the ne xt r egu larly s c he du le d me e tin g o f the City Cou nc il o n A ug us t 7, 20 07 , in compliance with the Charter and af ter re view by the City Administrator, the pay r aises at issue were enac ted once again by a 3-1 vote. Six days later, Mr. Fannon filed a motion for p ar t i al s u m m ary judgment for the a lleged viol at i o n of the Ope n Meetings Act a ddresse d in the complaint. The following month, the Def endants moved the trial court to dismiss the matter on the grounds of moo tne ss. On Dec ember

11, 2007, the trial court denied Mr. Fannon’ s m otion for par tial summary judgm e n t an d g r a n te d th e D e f e n d a n ts ’ mo ti o n to d is mi s s th e a c ti o n a s mo o t. T h e tria l c ourt conclude d that the Ci t y C o u n cil cure d any fla ws and the r aises we re le gislated properly and eff ectively by the a ction taken at the August 7, 2007 meeting. The re quest for attorney’s fe es wa s 1
re se rv e d f or fu tur e pr oc e e din gs
. In Februa

ry 2008, Mr. Fannon sought atto rn ey ’s fees and discr etionary c osts as reimburse ment for ( a) ha ving to mount the l awsuit beca use of the Def

endants’ a lleged wr ongdoing; and (b) achie ving the goal of e ns u ri n g that those raise s were implemented in a manne r that wa s faith fu l to la w. Ina

he ari ng on Ju ne 2, 20 08 , th e tr ia l c ou rt state d a s f

oll ow s:

[T ]h e Op e n Me e tin gs Ac t w a s n ot l iti gate d, prima ri ly b e c a us e it w a s o bv iou s to me in the first hea

ring that part of

the cha rt er h ad n o t b een c omplied with where the administrat o r wa s n ot made aw are of the pay raises that were grante d and which appea red in the c harte r to requir e that to have been done

. Th e Cou rt , I be lie ve , imme diate ly dir e c te d tha t tha t be co mpl ie d with , tha t the c ity councilmen go ba ck and ha ve another meeting, appa

rently, if ther e wa s a def

ect. And the Court didn’t find a def ect in re fer ence to the Open Me etings Act; simply found an open an d o b v io u s d e f e c t in r e f

e r e n c e to th e c h ar te r it s e lf

. H o w e v e r , the subsequent mee ting of the city counc ilm en resolved the Open Me etings violation, which basic ally made that issue moot. And this matter wa s resolved.-10- * * * [H]ere we ha ve Mr. Fannon who brings a suit concerning certain violations of the charter a nd the Open M ee t i n g s S tatute. And it appea rs to me he pr evailed on the issue in refe renc e to the cha rter, and t he Open Meetings Act be came moot after the c ity ha d a su bs e qu e nt m e e tin g inre fe re nc e to the iss ue abo ut p a y r a ise s.
* * *
The Co ur t s pe c if

ic all y fi nds th at M r . Fa nnon ac te d in hi s o ff ic ial c apa c it y. The Court r elies upon the Dobson de c isi on o f 1 98 0, th e de c isi on o f J udge God dar d. It appea rs th at Ju dge God dar d’ s r e as oni ng a ppe ar s t o be r at ion al a nd r e as ona ble c onc e r ning th e fa c ts and c ir c um st anc e s. And th is c as e appe ar s t o be on poi nt with th a t. . . . But for the Dobson opin ion, the Court would h ave to deny attorney’ s fee s in thi s case. The Court r elies upon that ruling.
* * *
The Court b el i ev es a fee of $250 an hour is appr opriate in this case . Multipl y that by 30 hours, and that c omes to $7,500. . . .
* * * [T ]h e Co ur t r e lie s upon M r . Fa nnon br ing ing suit in his o ff ic ial c apa c it y, als o that he was the prevailing .
. . party in thi s matte r. The Court further finds that this case appear s to be on point with Judge Goddard’ s ruling and adopts the c ase of 1980. Until that matter is overrule d, the Court is bound to follow that ruling.

(E mph a sis a dd e d) . I n a

se c on d h e ari ng , th e tr ia l c ou rt a wa rd e d M r. Fa nn on the su m of $6 38 .0 5 in dis c re tio na

ry c os ts, fi nd ing that “ the Pla int if f is e nti tle d to re c ov e r d isc re tio na ry c os ts o n th e ba sis that when a

public officia l sues or has be en sued in his offic ial capa city, he is entitled to be repr esente d at the public expe nse.” The Def endants timely appe aled.

II. I SSUES
Th e De fe nd a nts raise the fo llo wi ng iss ue s, wh ic h a re re state d a s f

oll ow s: A. Whe ther Mr. Fannon ha d standing to pursue his claims aga inst the Cit y. B. Whether

Mr. Fannon is the prevailing party.
C. Whether

the trial court erre d in awar ding attorney’s f ees and discretionary costs to Mr. Fannon.-11- III . STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our re view is de novo upon the record of the proceedings below; howeve r, t hat re cord c omes to us with a presumption that the trial court’s fac tual findings are corr ect. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). We must honor that pr esumption unless we find that the e vidence preponde rate s against the trial court’s factua l findings. Union Carbide Corp. v. H uddleston , 854 S.W.2d 27, 91 (Tenn. 1993) . The sc op e of re vie w of the tr ia l c ou rt ’s c on c lus ion s o f l a w i s d e no vo wi th n o p re su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss acc ompanying the t rial court’s decision. Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp. , 919 S.W.2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996).
Th e stand ardof re vie w fo r an a wa rd of a tto rn e y fe e s and dis c re tio na ry c os ts is d e fe re nti a l, beca use “a war ds of attorne y’s fees ar e lar gely discre tionary with the trial court.” Keyt v. Key t , 244 S.W.3d 321, 333 (Tenn. 2007) . On appe al, the party who takes issue with the trial court’ s decision re ga rd ing disc ret io nary c os ts a ssu me s th e bu rd e n o f d e mon str a tin g th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt abu se d it s discretion. Duran v. Hy undai Motor America, I nc. , 271 S.W.3d 178 , 2 1 5 (T en n
. Ct. App. 2008). The a buse of discr etion standard doe s not permit the appellate court to substitut e its judgm ent for that of the trial c ourt. Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001)

. The issue of w hether

one is a “pre vailing pa

rty” in the litigation is a matter re serve d to the trial court’s exer cise of discre tion. C.S.C. v. Knox County Bd. of Educ ., No. E2006-01155- COA-R3- CV, 2007 WL 1519543(Te nn. Ct. App. E.S., May 25, 2007).

IV. DI SCUS SION
Dec laratory Judgment Mr. Fannon sought review under the Dec laratory Judgment Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14- 103 (2000): Any per son . . . whose rights, status, or other le gal re lations are a ffe cted by a

. . . municipal ordinanc e . . . may ha ve dete rmined any que stion of construction or validity arising under the . . . or dinance

. . . and obtain a decla ration of rights, status or other le gal re lations thereunde r.
De c laratory judg me nt ac tio ns e na ble pa rt ie s who se ri gh ts ar e a t stake to inv ok e the a id of the c ou rt s to remove unc erta inty from the l egal relations and to clarify these rights befor e irre trievable , or at least pre judic i al , ac t s ar e taken. Delaneyv. Carter Oil Co. , 174 F.2d 314, 317 (10th Cir. 1949). De c laratory ju dg me nt s ta tut e s a re re me dia l in natur e a nd sh ou ld be constr ue d b ro a dly in o rd e r t o a c c omp lis h th e ir

pu rp os e
. Te nn
. Cod e An n. § 2 9- 14 -1 13 (2 00 0) ; Shelby County Bd. of Comm’rs v

. Sh e lbyCou nty Qu ar

te rly Cou rt , 392 S.W.2d 935, 941 (Tenn. 1965)

.-12-

A plaintiff in a de clar atory judgm en t ac t i o n need not show a prese nt injury, but an actua l “ca se” or “contr oversy” is stil l require d. Cardinal C hem. Co. v. M orton Int’l , 5 0 8 U. S

. 8 3 , 95 (1993). A bona

fide disagr eeme nt must exist; that is, some rea l interest must be in dispute. Go e tz v . Smi th , 278 S.W. 417, 418 (Tenn. 1925) . The justiciability doctrine of standing is a viable defe nse. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan , 263 S.W.3d 827, 838 (Tenn. 2008)

.
Open Me etings Act
The Tennessee Open Me etings Act provides that “ade quate public notice ” must be given of meetings by any gove rnmental body. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-44-103. The Ac t is remedial in nature and permits courts “to issue injunctions, impose penalties, and otherwise enforc e the pur poses of” the Act. Te nn. Code Ann. § 8-44-106( a). The enforc ement tool s of Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-44- 106 are available and/or re quired only if a violation of the Act is found to have occur red.

A. Standing Mr. Fannon filed suit “individually and as a City C ouncilman for the City of LaFollette,” and he is “ a citize n an d re s i dent of Campbell County, Tennesse e” and “a ta xpayer of the City of LaFollette.” Mr. Fannon a sserted that he, “a long with the other ta xpayer s of LaFollette, Tenne ssee will be irrepa

rably ha rmed a n d t h ey will suffer f rom the willful and unlawf ul conduct of the Def endants.” He also claimed that he qualifies as “any citizen” under Tenn. C ode Ann. § 8-44-106 to enforc e the Ope n M eetings Ac t. Mr. Fannon noted, in particula r, that he ha s standing to assert an Ope n Meetings Act c laim challenging a closed meeting to deliberate the budget f or the City, as well as e xpending re venue f or salary incre ases. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 8- 44-106(a ).
In his aff idavit of February 2008, in relation to his fee claim, M r. F an n o n swore the following: 10. That upon the discovery of the irregula rities in the meeting held to initially grant pay r a ise s to the abo ve -d e sc ri be d indi vid ua ls, I ca lle d upo n the City At torne y, Re id Tr ou tma n, to a ssi st m e in f ili ng a c a us e of a c tio n a ga ins t th e De fe nd a nts

. 11. That due to a

conflict of inter est, the City Attorney, Reid Troutman, could not repr esent me in this matter.
12. That I ha d to secur e the services of David H. Duna way in order to per form my duties as an elec ted City Councilman and to oth er wi s e fu lfill my fidu ciary responsibi lities to the Cit y of LaFollette
. (Emphasis adde d). In Mr. Fannon’ s counsel’s a ffidavit, the f ollowing was provided:-13-

As part of my r epre sentation of Mr. Fannon, it wa s agre ed that I would seek attorney fee s on Mr. Fannon’s beha lf as a re sult of his h av ing to fi le th is c aus e of ac ti on i n his official capacity as a City Councilman for the C ity of LaFollette
. (Emphasis adde d).
A c iti z e n’ s st a nd ing to s ue a go ve rn me nta l e nti ty i s typ ically a thr e sh oldiss ue that sh ou ld be resolved befor e addr essing the merits of the c ase. See P hillips v. County of Anderson , No. E2000- 0 1 2 0 4-COA-R3-CV, 2001 W L 456065 (Te nn. Ct. App. E.S., April 30, 2001). In Co b b v. Shelby Cou ntyBd

. o f Co mm ’r

s , 771 S.W.2d 124 (Tenn. 1989) , the Tenne ssee Supre me Court stated:
Because citize ns’ s uits do burden the conduct of public aff airs, a defe ndant entit y or office r should not be obliged to defe nd on the merits if he is e ntitled to a dismissal fo r la c k of

stand ing . N or

sh ou ld the c ou rt

c ri tiq ue the c on du c t of

pu bli c of fi c ia ls i f the cause is not justi ciable.
Id. at 125. As a policy justification for this rule, the Court explaine d:
On the o n e h an d , it is undeniably the right of a taxpayer to know that his taxes are expende d properly and ar e not unlawf ully diverted or misused. On the other ha nd, the c ou rt s h a ve lon g r e c og niz e d th e ne c e ssi ty o f a llo wi ng mu ni cipal of fi c ia ls t o perf orm their duties without inte rf er ence from f

reque nt and possibly frivolous lit igatio n a ndthe ine xp e die nc e of pu tti ng mun ic ipa l of

fi c e rs a t haz ardto d e fe ndthe ir acts whe never any member of the c ommunity s ees f

it to make the assault, whe ther fo r h on or abl e mo ti ves or no t. T he c ou rt s h a ve be e n c omm e ns ur a te ly r e luc ta nt t o usurp or super sede the discretion of municipa l authorities to determine w hich municipal undertakings are ne cessa ry and a ppropriate

. Ba dg e tt v . R og e rs , 4 36 S.W .2 d 2 92 , 2 93 -9 4 ( Te nn . 1 96 8) ; see also Parks v . Alexande r , 608 S.W.2d 881, 885 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) ( “The gener al l y acknow ledged pur pose of this requir ement of sp e c ia l dama ge or

private ha

rm to the ind iv id ual res ts i n th e pu bli c po lic y o f p ro te c tin g p ub lic corpor ations from a pr ofusion of suits.”).
I n th e in s tan t c a s e , th e tria l c o u r t n e v e r a d d r e s s e d w h e th e r M r
. Fa n n o n h a s standing. A standing inq u i ry requires a c ourt to decide whether a party has a suff

icient per sonal state in the outcome of the controve rsy to war rant the ex er cis e of the court’s pow er on its beha lf. Browning Ferris Ind. v. City of Oak R idge , 6 44 S .W. 2d40 0, 40 2 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 2) . “ Th e ru le in Te nn e sse e is w e ll e sta

bli sh e d th a t c iti z e ns a ndta xp a ye rs are wi tho ut s ta nd ing to m a int a in a la ws uit to restra in or direc t governmenta l action unless they fir s t allege and establish that they will suffer some specia l injury not common to citizens and ta xpayer s gener ally.” LaF oll e tte Me d. Ctr

. v . Ci ty of L aF oll e tte , 115 S.W.3d 500, 503 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (c iting Patton v. City of Chat tanooga , 65 S.W .4 14 , 4 20 -2 1 ( Te nn . 1 90 1) ); se e als o B ad ge tt , 436 S.W.2d at 294. To establish standing, a party must demonstrate:-14-

(1) That the party ha s sustained a distinct and palpa ble injury; (2) That the injury was ca used by the c hallenged c onduct; and (3) That the injury is capable of being addre ssed by a r emedy the c ourt is prepa red to give. Metropolitan Air Research Testing Auth., Inc. v . Metro politan Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cou nty , 842 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). T he primary focus of a st anding i nquiry is on the party, not the merits of the cla im. Id. , 842 S.W.2d at 615. The pa rty’s standing does not depe nd on the likelihood of succe ss of his or her c laim on the merits. Id. Howeve r, whe ther a party ha s standing “often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted.” Id. Thus, a “c are ful judicial e xa min a tio n o f the c omp la int ’s a lle gatio ns to a sc e rt a in w he the r the pa rt ic ula r p la int if f i s e nti tle d to an adjudication of the particula r cla ims asserted” is require d. Id. City Councilman
Th e Cha rt e r doe s not spe c if

ic a lly gr a nt Mr . Fan no n the po we r to sue on be ha lf of the City Cou nc il, no r d oe s it gr a nt him the po we r t o s ue onbe ha lf of the City . T he Cha

rt e r g rants the City the power to “sue a nd be sued.” The City Council, composed of a Mayor a nd four Councilmen, a re ve ste d w ith“ a ll l e gis la tiv e po we rs ou tli ne d in this Cha rt e r an d th e statut e s o f this state ” c a n in sti tut e a lawsuit. The Charter makes clea r that a City Councilman only ha s the authority to act through the legislative body, the City Council, by m ajority vote. De fendants contend a single member of the City C ouncil there fore does not have the authority to sue within his official c apac ity .
T h e D e f e n d a n ts r e ly on A b el v. We lch , 3 15 S.W .2 d 2 68 (T e nn . 1 95 8) , to su pp ort th e ir contention. In Abel me mbe rs of the Rhe a Cou nty Pur c ha sin g an d Fina nc ing Com mis sio n fil e d s uit in their offic ial capa city against the Rhea County S upervisor of

Roads in his official capac ity. The Tenne ssee Supre me C ourt held that the membe rs of the Purc hasing and Financing Commission had no legal existenc e separa t e an d ap art fr om the governme ntal authority of Rhea County, that the Commi ssion had no implied authority to maintain an action against the Supervisor of Roads, and that the Commiss ion had no power to employ an attorne y to bring the ac tion. Abel, 315 S.W.2d at 270.
The Abel Cou rt

loo ke d to the Pr ivate Ac t th a t c re a te d th e Com mis sio n a ndthe tit le Supervisor of Roads. The Court noted that both the plaintiff and the def endant we re “ cre ature s . . . of Rhea County,” and both “hold their respe ctive office s pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 313 of the Private Acts of 1955 and e xerc ise their authority accor dingly.” 315 S.W.2d at 268. The court found that the way the Act wa s structured, it was the plaintiff and the defe ndant together that composed the Rhea County Supervisory Committee. Id. Thus, in essenc e, the lawsuit was filed by opposing members of the same governmental body.
The De fendants assert that as in Abel , a sin gle me mbe r of the City Cou nc il ha s n o auth ority to file a law suit on behalf of the C ity Council. By purporting t o sue i n his “off icial ca pacity,” the De fe nd a nt s cla im Mr. Fann on fi le d a la ws uit on be ha lf

of the City Cou nc il. Th e y a rg ue that a member of

the City Council cannot take such a ction witho u t fo l l o wing the steps outlined in the-15-

Charter . They furth er as s er t that a single member of the City Council is not authorize d under the Charter to maintain a l aw s uit on behalf of the City C ouncil. Thus, like the plaintiff in Abel , the Def endants c ontend that Mr. Fannon has no implied authority to ma intain the lawsuit and cannot sue in his “officia l capa city.”
This court has he ld that status a s a city councilman is not a sufficie nt pe rsonal stake in the outcome of a controve rsy to demonstrate sta nding. Se e Ma lon e v . Ci tyof K no x v ill e , E2002-00734- COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21018633 ( Tenn. C t

. Ap p
. E .S., May 5, 2003) (c iting MARTA v. M etro. Gov’ t , 842 S.W.2d 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)) . In Malo ne , the counc il members asserted two grounds in support of their c laims of possessing proper sta nding. First, t hey c l ai med the require ments of their oaths of office provid ed s t an d i n g to sue. Second, they c ontended standing existed “be cause of their unique status as Knoxvil le C ity Council Members.” The a ppellants relied on the pre cede nt of Pee ler v. Luther , 135 S.W.2d 926 (Tenn. 1940). Discussing the significanc e of Pee ler , the Malone c ou rt

ob se rv e d a s f

oll ow s:
In Pee ler the plaint if

f w a s a c ou nty of

fi c ia l a c tin g a s Ch a ir ma n o f the Cou nty Highway Commission. The Tennesse e Supreme Court found that h e had sta nding to sue for r ecove ry of f

unds that had been illegally diverted by his pre dece ssor. The Court noted that the plaintiff in Pee ler was “ more than a

private c itizen and taxpayer” a ndthe Ap pe lla nts arg ue thi s lan gu a ge “ se e min gly e le vate s the status of the c ou nty officia l in Pee ler , giving him t he nec essary standing to bring suit i n his o ff i cial capa city.” Howeve r, reading this language in the c ontext of the c ase a s a whole w e are c omp e lle d to c on c lud e that it wa s n ot me re ly the plaint if f’ s p os iti on a s a

c ou nty officia l that authorize d him to prosecut e t h e lawsuit for rec overy of

the funds, but rathe r his singular position as highway commissioner. By virtue of his employment as highway c ommissi oner the plaintiff in Pee ler wa s sp e c if

ic ally ve ste d w ith supervision of thos e funds he was seeking to recover and he w as spec ifically given the power to employ attor n ey s i n t h at regard by the a ct which c reated the boar d of highway commissioners. . . .
Malone , 2003 WL 21018633, at *3. The Malone c ou rt we nt o n to ho ld that “ [t ]h e du tie s to up ho ld state law a nd the state a nd fede ral c onstitut ions which the Appe llants assert arise from their oaths of off ice a n d th e A p p e ll a n ts ’ s tatu s a s me mb e r s o f th e c it y c o u n c il a n d b e e r b o ar d ar e, in our opinion, too genera l to give them standing . . . .” Id. The c ourt specif ically noted that “[ w]hile the court in the Pee ler

case emphasize d that the Plaintiff wa s a co unty official in addition to being a private c itizen, the court did not give an y re as o n to believe that suc h ‘public off icial’ status constituted an exc eption in itself to the gener al rule prohibiting a public wrong suit absent a spe cial interest or injury.” Id. (quoting trial court observation rega rding Pee ler).
Mr. Fannon ar gues that the fac ts and circ umstances in Malone are differ ent than the f acts of the instant case . He c ontends that it is not the substantive terms of the legislative e nactment that wa s the ob je c t of the litigatio n but rathe r the pr oc e ss that led to the ma tte r be ing be fo re the City Cou nc il for a vote. Th u s, acc ording to Mr. Fannon, the diffe renc e betwe en this case and Malone is the dif fe re nc e be tw e e n p ro c e ss andre su lt. He c on te nd s th a t a s a City Cou nc il m e mbe r, he ha s a particula r intere st in the process by whic h measure s come before him for a vote. He argues that he-16-

ha s st a nd ing to o bje c t le ga lly to a fl a we d p ro c e ss, a ndthi s sp e c ia l in te re st i n th e pr oc e ss se ts h im apa rt fr om the ge ne ra l pu bli c
. Mr . Fa nn on a dmi ts t hat if a c ity c ou nc il m e mbe r h a s n o o bje c tio n to the proc ess but only to the result, then the member has no more spe cia l i n t er es t t h an the genera l public. Mr. Fannon cites no case law in support of his theory, and our re sear ch has r evea led none.

An ac tion questioning a municipality’s conduct or its office rs is ordinarily depe ndent upon averment o f a spe cial injury or inter est. Ba dg e tt , 436 S.W.2d at 294. In view of our pr evious decision in Malone , we find that the wrong alleged by Mr. F annon in his complaint -- a violation of the Open Me etings Act -- is no more individually griev o u s t o him than any other c itizen and taxpaye r. Furthermore , Mr. Fannon’s posi tion as a City Councilman is not enough to confer spe cial status to maintain this action.

Taxpayer Ex ception
In Ba dg e tt , the Tenne ssee Supre me C ourt noted “whe re it is asserted t hat t he asse ssment or le vy of a ta x is ill e gal or

tha t pu bli c fu nd s a

re mis us e d o r u nla wf

ull y d ive rt e d f

ro m st a te d p ur

po se s” is an exce ption to the genera l rule re garding standing. Ba dg e tt , 436 S.W .2 d at 2 94 ; LaFollette Med. Ctr ., 115 S.W.3d at 504. This power is not based on any statute expre ssly authorizing such ac tion.
In orde r for a t ax p ay er t o have sta nding to challenge the legality of a public f unds expenditure the foll owing elements must exist: (1) the pl aintiff/taxpaye r has taxpaye r status; (2) the taxpaye r allege s a spec ific illegality in the expenditure of public funds; and (3) the taxpaye r has made a prior demand on the governmental entity asking it to correc t the alleged illega lity. Cobb v. Sh e lbyCou ntyBd

. o f Co mm ’r

s , 7 71 S.W .2 d 1 24 , 1 26 (T e nn . 1 98 9) ; Ra gs da le v . City of M e mp his , 70 S.W.3d 56, 62-3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). To satisfy the prerequisite of prior demand, a plaintiff must “have notified a

ppropriate officials of the illegality and given them an opportunity to t ake corr ective a ction short of litigation.” Id.
Inthe c a se a t ba

r, Mr . Fa nn on ha s a

rg ua bly a lle ge d a

mis us e or di vers io n of p ub lic fu nd s. The De fendants assert, howe ver, that Mr. Fannon has not a lleged that he madea prior de mand on the City, and he has f

ailed to sho w o r al l eg e t hat a de mand upon City officials would have been futile. The Ba dg e tt

Court noted that “such a demand is e xcused wher e the status and re lation of the involved officia ls to the transac tion i n q u es t i o n i s such that any de mand would be a formality.” B ad ge tt , 43 6 S .W.2da t 29 5 ( c itatio ns omi tte d) . I n th is c a se , w e fi ndthat a prior de ma ndwo uld have be en a f

ormality and should be excuse d. Thus, under the rationale of Ba dg e tt a ndsim ila

r c a se s, we f ind that the rec ord supports a f inding that Mr. Fannon has standing as a ta xpayer
.

B. Pr e va ili ng Part y Mr. Fannon contends that he is entitled to attorney’ s fee s. “He contends that the trial court corr ectly aw arde d attorney’ s fee s because Plaintiff succe ssfully demonstrated his right to obt ain a-17-

temporary injunction which was granted by this Court pursuant to an Or der e ntere d July 19, 2007 . . . and be c au s e th e Pl a in ti f f w a s s u c c e s s f

u l in th is c a u s e o f a c ti o n a s a n e le c te d o f f ic ia l. ” Mr. Fa nn on arg ue s th a t th e te mpo ra ry re str a ini ng or de r a c hie ve s th e go a l of his la ws uit

. The De fendants claim that the trial court erre d in finding that Mr. Fannon was a pre vailing pa rty b e c aus e a ny su c c e ss o n th e me ri ts of his c la ims wa s n on -e xis te nt o r v e ry lim ite d, e sp e c ia lly after t he trial c ourt denied Mr . Fannon’s partial motion for summary judgment on the Open Meeting s Ac t and gra nted the De fendants’ motion to di smiss. They note that of the e leven de ma nd s Mr

. Fa nn on ma de in his c omp la int , he arg ua bly on ly “ pr e va ile d” on on e de ma nd , b e c aus e the trial court did gr ant a tempor ary r estraining orde r. The D efe ndants stress, nonethe less, that the trial court made no findings of liability. In the pre sent ca se, there is no question that Mr. Fannon “pre vailed” on his a pplication for a tempora ry injunction. Howeve r, ac cording to 20 Am.Jur. 2d Cos ts § 16 (2005): [T]he gener al rule is that no allowanc e is pr ovided for in favor of a party who may prevail on an intermediate motion or pr ocee ding. Thus, the fac t that plaintiffs are gr ante d a temp ora ry res trai n in g o rd er d oes n ot n eces sa ril y g iv e th em p reva ili ng par ty st at us, sinc e th e r e st r ain ing or de r is not a de te r mi nat ion on th e me r it s but me r e ly a n at te mp t t o pr e se r ve th e st at us quo pe nding a de te r mi nat ion on t he mer its of their c ause. (Emphasis adde d). A grant of a temporary restraining or der that preserves the situation of the pa rties in s ta tus qu o u nti l a

fi na l de te rm inatio n o f the c on tr ov e rs y is me re ly i nd ic a tiv e of a “ pr oc e du ra l” succe ss and will not qualify a plaintiff for attorney’ s fee s. Sutton v. Ev ans , 845 F.Supp. 1192, 1197 (M.D. Te nn. 1994), see H astings v. Kelley , 181 P.3d 750, 753 (Ok. Ci v. App. 2008). In the instant case , the trial court did not hold t hat the De fendants violated the Open Me etings Act. Rather , the trial court f

ound that a conflict existed between Article F ive and Article Six of the Charter. The trial court subseque ntly denied Mr. Fannon’s motion for pa rtial summary jud g m en t on the alleged vio la tio n o f the Te nn e sse e Op e n M e e tin gs Ac t and grante d th e De fe nd a nts ’ m oti on to d ism iss beca use of mootness. We believe Mr . Fannon’s “suc cess” was just a proc edura l victory -- the rea soning for the granting of injunctive relief was to ma intain the status quo in order to permit the Def endants time to “re do” the legislatio n at i s s ue and ma ke any issue r egar ding an allege d Open Meetings Act violation moot. The trial court’s rul i n g i n v o l v ed neither aff irmative re lief to Mr. Fannon or a f

inal determination on the merits in favor of M r. F an n o n . Procuring a te mporary restraining order in which the court doe s not address the me rits of the case is not sufficient to give a plaintiff pr evailing party status. See, e .g., J.O. v . Orange Twnshp. Bd. of Educ. , 287 F.3d 267, 272- 74 (3 d Ci r. 20 02 ); Fo re ma n v . D all as Cou nty , 193 F.3 d 314 , 323 (5 th C ir . 1 99 9) ; Christ opher P. v. Norma P. , 915 F.2d 724, 805 (2d Cir. 1990). In our view, Mr. Fannon’ s relief repr esente d the mere “proc edura l” succ ess that does not re sult in Mr. F annon bec oming a “pre vailing party.”

C. A tto rn e y Fe e s/D isc re tio na ry Cos ts-18-

The trial court’s awar d of attorne y’s fe es and c osts in reliance upon Dobson v. Carter (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1980) wa s clea rly based on Mr . Fannon’s role a s a City Councilm an. In Dobson , members of

the Hamilton Coun t y S ch ool Board cha llenged the a war d of attorne y fee s to the Sup e ri nte nd e nt. Th is c ou rt he ld a s f oll ow s:
In the pr e se nt c a se [atto rn e y’ s fe e s] are a jud gme nt re nd e re d up on a cou nt e r- c la im premised, not on t he fa ct that the Superintende nt preva iled, but rather that when su ing or be ing su e d inhis of

fi c ia l c apa c ity , h e ha s a rig ht to be re pr e se nte d at pu bli c expense
. . . .

. . . Be c aus e we thi nk

it u nli ke ly a

su pe ri nte nd e nt w ou ld f

inance li tig a tio n o f this type from his own resour ces, a holding to the contrary w ould have a chilling effe ct upon the dispo s ition of a superintende nt to require a school board to f

ollow the mandates of

the Legislature , and would -- if not encour age - - at lea st permit the board to violate state statutes with impunity. Slip op. at 3-4. The trial court in this case found the decision to be the sole grounds supporting an a wa rdto M r. Fa nn on of

a tto rn e y’ s f

e e s a ndc os ts. Th us , th e tr ia l c ou rt ru le d a s f oll ow s: The Court spec ifically finds t hat M r. F annon ac ted in his official c apac ity. The Court relies upon the Dobson decision of 1980, the decision of Judge Godda rd. It appe ars that Judge Godda

rd’s re asoning appe ars to be rational and rea sonable conce rning the fa c ts andc ir c ums ta nc e s. Mr. Fannon allege s that he is entitled to reimburseme nt of his attorney’s f ees be cause he

“ wa s a c ity c ou nc il m e mbe r w ho wa s su ing the ve ry bo dy in w hic h h e se rv e d. Un der th os e circ umstances, he could har dly expec t the City Att orney t o repr esent him.” Bec ause Mr . Fannon brought this suit in his official ca pacity, he c ontends that he shoul d be represe nted at publi c expe nse. Mr . Fa nn on a sse rt s a s f

oll ow s:
Because it is u n l ikely that a City Councilman would finance litigation of thi s type from his or her

own re source s, this court should grant t he Plaintiff, Bob Fannon, attorney f ees and discretionary costs bec ause a holding to the contrary w ould have a chilling eff

ect upon the di sposition of a City Councilman to otherwise re quire the City of L a Fo ll e tt e o r

it s Bo ar d M e mb e r s to f

o ll o w th e man d a te s o f

th e le g is la ture and/or its Charter and would, if not encourage , at least pe rmit the City C ouncil and/or the City of LaFollette to violate state statut es an d the Charter of the City of LaFollette with [ ] impunity.

Te nn e sse e a dh e re s to t he we ll- e sta bli sh e d “ Am e ri c a n r

ule ,” wh ic h p ro vid e s th a t “ lit igants pay their ow n attorney’ s fee s absent a statute or an a gree ment providing otherwise.” Sta te v . B ro wn & Williamson T

obacco Corp. , 18 S.W .3 d 1 86 , 1 94 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; se e als o Ta y lor v . F e ze ll , 158 S.W.3d 3 5 2 , 359 (Tenn. 2005) . Under the American r

ule, a pa rty in a civil ac tion may rec over attorney’ s fee s only if (1) a co n t ra ct u al o r statutory provision cre ates a right to recove r attorne y’sRepor t ed ca s e l aw i n t hi s s t at e r eve al s t hat proc ee di ng i n “of f i ci al ca pac i t y” doe s not re s ul t i n t he paym ent 2

o f a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. S ee S t a t e ex re l S h elb y C o u n t y E l ec t i o n C o m m ’n v. S h elb y C o u n t y B d

. o f C o m m ’rs , 656 S. W

. 2d 9, 1 0 (T en n
. C t

. A p p
. 19 8 3 ). -19- fee s; or (2) some other rec ognized exce ption to the Americ an rule applies, allowing for rec overy of such fe es in a particula

r case
. Taylor , 1 58 S.W .3 d at 35 9; John Kohl & Co. v. Dearborn & Ewing , 977 S.W.2d 528, 534 (Tenn. 1998) . As a ge nera l principle, the A merican rule re flec ts the idea that public policy is best served by litigants bea ring their own lega l fee s rega rdless of the outc ome of the case
. House v . Estate of Edmondson , 245 S.W.3d 372, 377 (Tenn. 2008)

. In Cracker Barre l Old Country Store, Inc. v. E pperson , 284 S.W.3d 303, 313 (Tenn. 2009) , the c ur re nt T e nn e sse e Sup re me Co urt no ted that “ [m ]o st T e nn e sse e c a se s .
. . ha ve sp e c if ic a lly de nie d th e a wa

rdof a tto rn e y f

e e s w he re no pr ov isi on fo r atto rn e y f e e s w a s sp e c if

ic a lly or e xp re ssl y included in the statutory language .” The Cracker Barre l Court held “statutory c onstruction has been consistent with contrac t construction in requiring a clear intent to allow attor ney fee s to a prevailing p arty bef

ore such fe es may be awar ded.” Id. (empha sis add ed ). T h e statutory la ng ua ge be fo re us in this c a se d oes no t inc lud e a re fe re nc e to the pr ov isi on fo r atto rn e y’ s f e e s. Neither the Tenne ssee Open Meetings Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-44-101, e t seq., nor the De clar atory Judgment Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14-101, e t seq., provide f or the a war d of attorne y’s fe es to a succe ssful liti gant proce eding under either Act. Thus, even if Mr. Fannon was a

preva iling party, the tr ia l c ou rt

abu se d it s d isc re tio n ina wa rd ing a tto rn e y’ s f

e e s to Mr . Fa nn on on that ba sis

. We likew ise find Mr. Fannon’s r eliance upon the unreported opinion in Dobson unavailing. As was noted in Malone , we find a distinction betwe en the singular position of the Superintende nt in Dobson c ha

rg e d w ithle a din g a sc ho ol boa rd a nd Mr . Fan no n’ s membe rs hip on a fo ur -p e rs on c ity council. See M

alone, 2003 WL 21018633, at *3. Mr. F annon’s claim to “off icial capacity” ba sed on his “ sp e c ia l int e re st” in e ns uring that th e la w i s f oll ow e d d oe s n ot “ de ri ve fr om s uc h s pe c if ic ity of auth o ri ty” as wa s possessed by the Superintende nt in Dobson

. See id., at *3. Thus, we f ind 2 Dobson inapplicable to this ca se.

As to the iss ue of

dis c re tio na

ry c os ts, the tr ia l c ou rt

ru le d a s f oll ow s: The Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to rec over the se discre tion ar y co s t s on the basis that when a

public officia l sues or has be en sued in his offic ial capa city, he is entitled to be repr esente d at public expe nse. Th e c ou rt c os ts o f this c aus e sh a ll b e ta xe d to the De fe nd a nts

. The trial c ourt aga in based its ruling on Dobson

. Pursuant to Rule 54.04 of the Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce dure, the following dis c re tio na

ry c os ts a re a llo wa ble :-20-

re a so na ble a ndne c e ssa

ry c ou rt re po rt e r e xp e ns e s fo r d e po sit ion s o r t ri a ls, re a so na

ble a ndne c e ssa

ry e xp e rt wi tne ss f e e s fo r de po sit ion s (o r sti pu la te d r e po rt s) a ndfo r t ri a ls, rea sonable a nd nece ssary interpr eter fee s for de positions or t ri als, and gua rdian a d lit e m f e e s; t ra ve l e xp e ns e s a

re no t a llo wa

ble dis c re tio na

ry c os ts.
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2). The legal standards applicable to a decision on discretionary c osts have be e n s e t ou t a s f

oll ow s: When de ciding whether

to awar d discretionary costs under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2), the courts should (1) dete rmine whe ther the pa rty reque sting the costs is the “pre vailing pa

rty,” (2) limit awa

rds to the costs specific ally identified in the rule, (3) determine whether the re quested c osts are ne cessa ry and r easona

ble, and ( 4) determine whether the prevailing party has e ngaged in c onduct during the litigation that war rants depriving it of the discretionary c osts to which it m i g h t o t herw ise be entitled.
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Jefferson , 104 S.W .3 d 13, 35 -3 6 (T e nn . Ct. App . 2 00 2) ; se e als o Tru nd le v . P ar k , 210 S.W.3d 575, 582 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
The Rule wa s designed as an attempt to m ak e t h e p re vailing party whole. Ma ssa c hu se tts Mut. Life I

ns. Co. , 104 S.W.3d at 33. Because Mr. Fannon was not the prevailing party, he is not entitled to an awa

rd of discr etionary c osts. Even if M r. F annon was the prevailing party, expense s expende d in prepa

ring for a pretria l hearing on a mot ion for a temporary restraining order would not qualify under

the Rule.

V. CONCLUSION
For the a fo re me nti on e d r e a so ns , th e jud gme nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt is re ve rs e d a nd thi s c a se is rema nded to the trial c ourt for f urther pr ocee dings as may be ne cessa ry
. C o s t s of the appe al ar e assessed to Appe llee, Bob Fannon.

___________________________________ JOHN W . McCLARTY, JUDGE-21-