COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis 

RHONDA MURPHY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

v. Record No. 1474-99-1 PER CURIAM 

 DECEMBER 7, 1999 

NORFOLK DIVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

William F. Rutherford, Judge 

 (Mitchell D. Broudy; Broudy & Broudy, P.C., 

on brief), for appellant. 

 (Bernard A. Pishko, City Attorney; Martha G. 

Rollins, Deputy City Attorney, on brief), for 

appellee. 

 Rhonda Murphy appeals the decision of the circuit court 

terminating her residual parental rights to her son Jamaal 

McPherson Faison. Murphy raises three issues on appeal. First, 

she contends the trial judge erred by failing to hold that the 

Norfolk Division of Social Services was collaterally estopped 

from introducing evidence that it provided services to Murphy 

prior to August 1995. Second, Murphy contends the trial judge 

erred by finding that Social Services made reasonable efforts to 

prevent the child's removal. Third, Murphy contends the trial 

judge erred by finding that Social Services presented clear and 

convincing evidence sufficient to meet the requirements of Code 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
§ 16.1-283. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the 

parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial 

court. See Rule 5A:27. 

Standard of Review

 "[T]ermination of the legal relationship between parent and 

child is a grave proceeding [which] . . . renders the parent 'a 

legal stranger to the child' and severs 'all parental rights.'" 

Weaver v. Roanoke Dep't of Human Resources, 220 Va. 921, 926, 

265 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1980) (citation omitted). "The 

preservation of the family, and in particular the parent-child 

relationship, is an important goal for not only the parents but 

also government itself." Id. "When addressing matters 

concerning a child, including the termination of a parent's 

residual parental rights, the paramount consideration of a trial 

court is the child's best interests." Logan v. Fairfax County 

Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 

(1991). "In matters of a child's welfare, trial courts are 

vested with broad discretion in making the decisions necessary 

to guard and to foster a child's best interests." Farley v. 

Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990) (quoted 

in Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463). On appeal, we 

presume that the trial judge "thoroughly weighed all the 

evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its 

determination based on the child's best interests." Id. at 329, 

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387 S.E.2d at 796. We view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to Social Services, the party prevailing below, and 

grant to that evidence all reasonable inferences fairly 

deducible therefrom. See Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d 

at 463. 

Collateral Estoppel

 Murphy contends that Social Services was collaterally 

estopped from relitigating the 1995 decision of the juvenile 

court, which found that Social Services failed to provide Murphy 

with adequate services prior to 1995. This argument lacks merit. 

Whether Murphy received adequate assistance from Social Services 

prior to 1995 was a factual question expressly addressed by court 

orders. 

 By order entered April 12, 1994, the juvenile and domestic 

relations district court granted Social Services' petition to 

approve of a foster care plan with the goal changed from returning 

the child home to adoption. See Code § 16.1-281. On Murphy's 

appeal to the circuit court, the circuit judge found as follows in 

an order dated April 6, 1995: 

[N]umerous services have been provided by 

[Social Services] to [Murphy] since August 

1993 to stabilize her family situation and 

assist her in parenting another child. 

Psychological testing relevant to [Murphy's] 

ability to parent [the child] was provided. 

In addition, [Social Services] continued to 

evaluate [Murphy's] requests for visitation 

and provided two supervised visits between 

[Murphy] and [the child]. To date, [Murphy] 

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has been included in administrative meetings 

planning for [the child's] future. 

The circuit judge found that Social Services "has made adequate 

and appropriate efforts to provide notice and the services 

required" to Murphy and approved the foster care plan changing 

the goal to adoption. This order was endorsed "Seen" by 

Murphy's counsel and became a final order. 

 The juvenile court could find, as it did in a later 

proceeding, that Social Services failed to present evidence 

meeting the statutory standard for termination of Murphy's 

parental rights. It could not, however, reconsider or reverse the 

previously made and final factual determination in April 1995 that 

Social Services had provided Murphy with adequate services. See

generally Glasco v. Ballard, 249 Va. 61, 64, 452 S.E.2d 854, 855 

(1995). 

 Furthermore, the child remained in the custody of Social 

Services after 1995. His status languished unresolved for four 

years until Social Services filed a new petition in 1999 seeking 

to terminate Murphy's parental rights. The trial judge based the 

current decision to terminate Murphy's parental rights upon the 

petition filed in 1999 and supporting evidence presented at trial. 

The prior decisions did not preclude Social Services from bringing 

a new petition based upon additional evidence. Therefore, 

collateral estoppel is not a bar to the termination of Murphy's 

parental rights. 

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Reasonable Efforts to Prevent Removal

 Murphy contends that the trial judge erred in finding that 

Social Services proved by clear and convincing evidence that it 

made reasonable efforts to remedy the underlying conditions which 

led to the child's foster care placement. Citing Weaver v. 

Roanoke Dep't of Human Resources, 220 Va. 921, 265 S.E.2d 692 

(1980), and Cain v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 42, 402 S.E.2d 682 

(1991), Murphy contends that Social Services erroneously relied 

upon the fact of her incarceration to justify its failure to 

provide her with adequate services. We have ruled, however, as 

follows: 

[W]hile long-term incarceration does not, 

per se, authorize termination of parental 

rights or negate the Department's obligation 

to provide services, it is a valid and 

proper circumstance which, when combined 

with other evidence concerning the 

parent/child relationship, can support a 

court's finding by clear and convincing 

evidence that the best interests of the 

child will be served by termination. 

Ferguson v. Stafford County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 14 Va. App. 

333, 340, 417 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1992). See also Tullos v. Roanoke 

City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 12 Va. App. 617, 405 S.E.2d 433 

(1991). 

 The evidence proved that when Murphy was incarcerated for 

approximately two years between 1991 and 1993, Murphy's 

stepgrandfather had custody of the child. He relinquished 

custody to Social Services in November 1991. The foster care 

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plan goal at that time was to return the child to his 

stepgrandfather, who last had custody. Appropriate services 

were offered to the stepgrandfather. Murphy was incarcerated, 

and the biological father's location was unknown; therefore, 

neither parent was in a position to have the child returned to 

his or her custody. 

 Upon Murphy's release from prison, Social Services 

reassessed the situation and treated the case as a new case. 

Through Social Services, Murphy received therapy, home-based 

services, anger management, drug rehabilitation, and job 

placement. Although Murphy sought visitation after her release 

from prison, serious questions arose whether visitation was in the 

child's best interests. A report prepared in 1994 following 

psychiatric testing recommended "extreme caution in returning any 

parenting role" to Murphy due to "very serious psychological 

problems which relate to a lack of consistent reality testing, 

paranoid delusions and extremely poor judgment and impulse 

control." The judge denied Murphy's request for visitation. 

 Evidence also proved that Murphy received services in 

connection with her two older children. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) 

provides, in pertinent part that "[t]he court shall take into 

consideration the prior efforts of such agencies to rehabilitate 

the parent or parents prior to the placement of the child in 

foster care." 

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 This record clearly demonstrates that Social Services 

provided numerous services to Murphy following her release from 

prison. Therefore, we find no merit in Murphy's contention. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence under Code § 16.1-283 

 The circuit court found that Social Services presented 

clear and convincing evidence that termination of Murphy's 

parental rights was in the child's best interests and that the 

requirements of Code § 16.1-283 had been met. The evidence 

proved the child had been with the same foster parents since 

1992. The evidence was uncontroverted by all except Murphy that 

he wanted to be adopted. 

 Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that the 

residual parental rights of a parent of a child placed in foster 

care may be terminated if the trial judge finds, based upon 

clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the child's best 

interests and that the following circumstances exist: 

The parent . . . , without good cause, [has] 

been unwilling or unable within a reasonable 

period of time not to exceed twelve months 

from the date the child was placed in foster 

care to remedy substantially the conditions 

which led to or required continuation of the 

child's foster care placement, 

notwithstanding the reasonable and 

appropriate efforts of social, medical, 

mental health or other rehabilitative 

agencies to such end. Proof that the parent 

. . . , without good cause, [has] failed or 

been unable to make substantial progress 

towards elimination of the conditions which 

led to or required continuation of the 

child's foster care placement in accordance 

with [her] obligations under and within the 

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time limits or goals set forth in a foster 

care plan filed with the court or any other 

plan jointly designed and agreed to by the 

parent or parents and a public or private 

social, medical, mental health or other 

rehabilitative agency shall constitute prima 

facie evidence of this condition. 

 The evidence established that, despite the passage of time, 

Murphy had not yet resolved the problems that initially led to 

the child's foster care placement. In her testimony, Murphy 

expressed no sense of her responsibility regarding the 

underlying causes of the child's foster care placement. The 

initial custody order noted that Murphy's home lacked 

electricity, water, and adequate food and that Murphy was about 

to be evicted. At the termination hearing, Murphy claimed, 

however, that Social Services had failed to look in the room she 

was renting and only looked at the wrong part of the house. 

Murphy also testified that she was incarcerated on a "false 

arrest charge." Moreover, at the time of the hearing, which was 

more than eight years after Social Services obtained custody, 

Murphy was receiving daily services through the Norfolk 

Community Services Board for adult living skills. In that 

setting her counselors were "trying to assist her currently with 

obtaining some type of income, whether it's through a job, and 

to assist her with her appeal process and with her SSI." 

 "The trial court's judgment, 'when based on evidence heard 

ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong 

or without evidence to support it.'" Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 

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409 S.E.2d at 463 (citation omitted). The record supports the 

trial judge's finding that Social Services presented clear and 

convincing evidence satisfying the statutory requirements of 

Code § 16.1-283 and establishing that termination of Murphy's 

parental rights was in the child's best interests. Accordingly, 

we summarily affirm the decision. 

 Affirmed. 

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