appeal of the judgment by the judgment debtor triggers the shift in interest rate. 

This includes a situation where, as here, the judgment debtor appeals the 

judgment, the judgment is reversed with instructions to hold a new trial, and the 

judgment debtor incurs a new money judgment at the retrial. 

In sum, if the judgment debtor doesn’t appeal the judgment, the nine 

percent interest rate applies from accrual of the claim through satisfaction of the 

final judgment. But if the judgment debtor appeals the judgment, then: (1) the 

nine percent interest rate applies from accrual of the claim through the date of the 

appealed judgment, and (2) the market-based postjudgment interest rate applies 

from the date of the appealed judgment through satisfaction of the final judgment. 

Because the court of appeals concluded otherwise, the supreme court 

reverses. The matter is remanded for recalculation of interest on the sum to be 

paid. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado

2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203

2022 CO 32

Supreme Court Case No. 20SC947

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals

Court of Appeals Case No. 19CA1243

Petitioner:

Ford Motor Company,

v.

Respondent:

Forrest Walker.

Judgment Reversed

en banc

June 21, 2022

Attorneys for Petitioner:

Wheeler Trigg O’Donnell LLP

Theresa Wardon Benz

Kristen L. Ferries

Edward C. Stewart

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent:

Purvis Gray Thomson, LLP

John A. Purvis

Michael J. Thomson

Boulder, Colorado
2

Chalat Hatten & Banker, PC

Evan P. Banker

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae American Tort Reform Association:

Evans Fears & Schuttert LLP

Lee Mickus

Denver, Colorado 

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Colorado Defense Lawyers Association and 

Colorado Civil Justice League:

Messner Reeves LLP

Kendra N. Beckwith

Darren D. Alberti

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers Association:

McDermott Law, LLC

Timothy M. Garvey

Denver, Colorado

Ogborn Mihm, LLP

Kylie M. Schmidt

Denver, Colorado

JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF 

JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, and JUSTICE GABRIEL joined.

JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, joined by JUSTICE HART, dissented.

JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER did not participate.
3

JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Watch TV long enough and you’ll eventually encounter a well-known 

figure of our justice system—the personal injury plaintiff. It’s now common 

knowledge that a person who sustains personal injuries as a result of a tort may 

sue the responsible party for damages. But few people are aware that when such 

a plaintiff prevails, interest is available on the sum of the judgment. That interest 

generally runs at the statutorily fixed rate of nine percent from the date of the 

claim’s accrual through satisfaction of the judgment. In some circumstances, 

however, the interest rate changes to a market-based postjudgment rate, which is 

currently lower than nine percent. In this appeal, we explore when that switch 

takes place and how the market-based postjudgment interest is calculated. 

¶2 The plaintiff in this product liability case obtained a money judgment to 

compensate him for personal injuries he sustained in a car accident. The judgment 

debtor, the manufacturer of the plaintiff’s car, appealed, and a division of the court 

of appeals reversed the judgment. We affirmed the division’s judgment on 

different grounds and remanded the matter for a new trial. On remand, the 

plaintiff prevailed again, obtaining a new money judgment. The parties agree that 

the nine percent interest rate applies from the date of the accident until the date of 

the appealed judgment (the first judgment). But the parties cross swords on the 
4

applicable interest rate between entry of that judgment and satisfaction of the final 

judgment (the second judgment). 

¶3 So, when a personal injury judgment debtor successfully appeals the

judgment and obtains a new trial but ultimately incurs another money judgment

at that new trial, which interest rate applies between the date of the appealed 

judgment and the date the final judgment is satisfied? Is it the nine percent fixed 

rate or the market-based postjudgment interest rate? The difference matters—in 

this case, for nearly two million reasons. A division of the court of appeals said 

that the nine percent fixed rate governs. We disagree and therefore reverse. 

¶4 Guided by the General Assembly’s intent in section 13-21-101, C.R.S. (2021) 

(“Interest on damages”), which we discern from the statute’s legislative history, 

we hold that whenever the judgment debtor appeals the judgment, the interest 

rate switches from nine percent to the market-based rate. The outcome of the 

appeal is of no consequence; the filing of any appeal of the judgment by the 

judgment debtor triggers the shift in interest rate. We further hold that the marketbased postjudgment interest on the sum to be paid must be calculated from the 

date of the appealed judgment. Thus, the market-based postjudgment interest rate 

applies from the date of the appealed judgment (the first judgment) through the 

date the final judgment (the second judgment) is satisfied. Accordingly, we 

remand for recalculation of interest on the sum to be paid ($2,929,881.20) from the 
5

date of the appealed judgment (April 1, 2013) until the date the final judgment was 

satisfied (March 10, 2020) using the market-based postjudgment interest rate. 

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶5 In 2009, Forrest Walker was stopped at a red light in his 1998 Ford Explorer 

when he was rear-ended by a car traveling thirty-five miles per hour. The driver’s 

seat in the Explorer yielded rearward, causing Walker to sustain permanent 

injuries. 

¶6 Walker sued the other driver for negligence. He also brought a product 

liability action against Ford, alleging that the driver’s seat in his Explorer was 

defective because its yield during the crash caused or contributed to his injuries. 

Ford denied liability, arguing that the seat’s yield was an intentional safety feature 

aimed at absorbing crash forces. In April 2013, after settling his claim with the 

other driver, Walker proceeded to trial against Ford. 

¶7 At the jury instructions conference, Walker asked for the pattern instruction 

addressing design defects, which permitted the jury to find a design defect under 

either a “consumer expectation” test or a “risk-benefit” test. Ford objected, 

contending that longstanding precedent required the court to use the risk-benefit 

test. The court overruled Ford’s objection and gave the jury the pattern 

instruction. After deliberations, the jury awarded Walker $2,915,971.20 in 

compensatory damages. The court then entered judgment. 
6

¶8 Ford appealed the 2013 judgment, and a unanimous division of the court of 

appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. Walker v. Ford Motor Co.

(“Walker I”), 2015 COA 124, ¶ 3, 410 P.3d 609, 611. While the division disagreed

with Ford that the jury could not be “instructed at all on the consumer expectation 

test,” it agreed with Ford that the jury shouldn’t have been “instructed separately”

on that test. Id. at ¶ 14, 410 P.3d at 613. 

¶9 Walker petitioned our court for certiorari, and we agreed to review the case. 

We affirmed the division’s judgment, albeit on different grounds. Walker v. Ford 

Motor Co. (“Walker II”), 2017 CO 102, ¶ 2, 406 P.3d 845, 847. We held that “the 

proper test under which to assess the design’s dangerousness was the risk-benefit 

test, not the consumer expectation test.” Id. (footnote omitted). In so doing, we 

explained that we had concluded, more than thirty years earlier, that the riskbenefit test is the applicable test in determining whether a product is unreasonably 

dangerous due to a design defect where, as here, the dangerousness of the design 

is defined primarily by technical, scientific information. Id. Because the trial court 

had instructed on both tests, we concluded that it had improperly allowed the jury 

to base the verdict on the consumer expectation test alone. Id. 

¶10 The case was retried to a jury in 2019, six years after entry of the appealed

judgment and nearly a decade after the crash. The second jury awarded Walker 

$2,929,881.20 in compensatory damages, $13,910 more than the first jury. 
7

¶11 Walker thereafter requested that the district court award him interest on the 

final judgment amount at the statutory rate of nine percent for the entire timespan 

between accrual of his claim in 2009 and satisfaction of the 2019 final judgment in 

2020. Ford conceded that it owed interest at the nine percent statutory rate for the

period between accrual of Walker’s claim in 2009 and entry of the appealed 

judgment in 2013. But Ford maintained that the lower, market-based

postjudgment interest rate applied from entry of the appealed judgment in 2013. 

In other words, according to Ford, the nine percent interest rate applied from 

accrual of Walker’s claim up until the date of the first judgment, and the marketbased postjudgment interest rate applied thereafter for the remainder of the

proceedings through satisfaction of the second judgment. 

¶12 The district court sided with Walker and ordered Ford to pay $3,629,792.85 

in interest, nearly one hundred and twenty-five percent more than the actual 

damages award, bringing Walker’s recovery to just under $7,000,000.00. It 

reasoned that, since the appealed judgment had neither been affirmed nor 

modified or reversed with instructions to enter a money judgment on remand, the 

provisions of section 13-21-101(2)(a) and (b) addressing market-based 

postjudgment interest did not apply. Apparently realizing that subsections (2)(a) 

and (b) don’t expressly address reversal of an appealed judgment with 

instructions to hold a retrial, the district court filled the gap by applying the fixed 
8

nine percent “prejudgment” interest rate from accrual of the claim through 

satisfaction of the final judgment (i.e., from 2009 through 2020). 

¶13 Ford did not appeal the second judgment, but it did appeal the amount of 

interest ordered. A different division of the court of appeals unanimously 

affirmed. Walker v. Ford Motor Co. (“Walker III”), 2020 COA 164, ¶ 1, 490 P.3d 996, 

997. The division observed that the switch from “prejudgment to postjudgment 

interest” doesn’t depend on the judgment debtor’s appeal of the judgment. Id. at 

¶ 8, 480 P.3d at 998. Rather, explained the division, the shift from the nine percent

interest rate to the market-based postjudgment interest rate is outcomedependent: The latter interest rate kicks in only if the appealed judgment is 

(1) affirmed or (2) modified or reversed with instructions to enter a money 

judgment on remand. Id. at ¶ 9, 490 P.3d at 998. Because the appealed judgment

here was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial, and because 

subsections (2)(a) and (b) don’t expressly address that situation, the division filled 

the gap the same way the district court did: It ruled that the nine percent 

“prejudgment interest” continued to apply after the date of the appealed

judgment. Id. at ¶ 1, 490 P.3d at 997. 

¶14 Elaborating, the division stated that, following the mandate in Walker II, the 

parties returned to their prejudgment posture, with “nothing for postjudgment 

interest to accrue on while the retrial was pending.” Id. at ¶ 9, 490 P.3d at 999. At 
9

that point, reasoned the division, the appealed judgment ceased to exist and the 

postjudgment proceedings reverted to prejudgment proceedings. Id. at ¶ 10, 

490 P.3d at 999. And, added the division, whatever postjudgment interest had 

already accrued before issuance of the mandate vanished along with the appealed 

judgment, but only until a new judgment entered at the retrial, at which time it 

reappeared as prejudgment interest. Id. at ¶ 11, 490 P.3d at 999. 

¶15 Ford timely sought review in our court, and we granted its petition for 

certiorari. We agreed to consider the following issue:

Whether the court of appeals erred in applying the nine percent 

prejudgment interest rate under section 13-21-101, C.R.S. (2021), 

during the pendency of a successful appeal. 

 

II. Analysis

¶16 We begin by discussing the governing standard of review and the relevant 

rules of statutory interpretation. Using those guardrails to direct our analysis, we 

examine section 13-21-101 and determine that it is ambiguous. In the process, we 

reject Walker’s contention that the statute is susceptible of only one reasonable 

interpretation—his. We then conclude that the division erred in dodging the 

ambiguity question and filling the gap in subsection (2) in a manner that 

contradicts subsection (1). Because we find that the statute is ambiguous, we next 

consult its legislative history to discern our General Assembly’s intent. 

Effectuating that intent leads us to hold that the division mistakenly applied the 
10

nine percent interest rate, instead of the market-based postjudgment interest rate,

between entry of the 2013 appealed judgment and satisfaction of the 2019 final

judgment in 2020. We end by demonstrating that the interpretation we usher in 

today is the only one that effectuates all of section 13-21-101’s provisions without

contravening any of them. 

A. Governing Standard of Review and Relevant Rules of 

Statutory Interpretation

¶17 Resolution of this appeal hinges on our interpretation of section 13-21-101. 

It is paradigmatic that the interpretation of a statute “is a question of law, which 

we review de novo.” McCulley v. People, 2020 CO 40, ¶ 10, 463 P.3d 254, 257. 

¶18 Our mission when interpreting a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the 

legislature’s intent. Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88, ¶ 18, 477 P.3d 694, 698. To do 

so, we read the statute’s words and phrases in accordance with their plain and 

ordinary meaning. Id. Additionally, “we look to the entire statutory scheme in 

order to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts, and we 

avoid constructions that would render any words or phrases superfluous or that 

would lead to illogical or absurd results.” Id. 

¶19 If the statutory language is unambiguous, we apply it as written and go no 

further. Nieto v. Clark’s Market, Inc., 2021 CO 48, ¶ 12, 488 P.3d 1140, 1143. 

However, if the statutory language is ambiguous—meaning that it is susceptible 

of more than one reasonable interpretation—“we turn to other interpretive aids to 
11

discern the legislature’s intent.” Id. at ¶ 13, 488 P.3d at 1143. Such interpretive 

aids include “analysis of the statute’s legislative history,” People v. Sprinkle, 

2021 CO 60, ¶ 22, 489 P.3d 1242, 1246, but do not include adding our own words 

or deleting any the legislature has chosen, Nieto, ¶ 12, 488 P.3d at 1143; see also 

Dep’t of Revenue v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 2019 CO 41, ¶ 16, 441 P.3d 1012, 1016 (“[W]e 

must respect the legislature’s choice of language, and we will not add words to a 

statute or subtract words from it.”). 

B. Section 13-21-101

¶20 Section 13-21-101(1) provides that plaintiffs in personal injury cases 

stemming from a tort may claim interest on the damages alleged “from the date 

the action accrued.” When a plaintiff claims interest, “it is the duty of the court” 

to add interest on the amount of damages assessed. Id. Such interest must be

“calculated at the rate of nine percent per annum” up until “the date of satisfying 

the judgment.” Id. Further, this calculation “must include compounding of 

interest annually from the date the suit was filed.” Id. 

¶21 But section 13-21-101 doesn’t end there. As relevant here, it contains three

additional provisions—a general one in the last sentence of subsection (1) and two 

more specific ones comprising subsections (2)(a) and (b)—that instruct courts to 

apply a market-based annual rate of interest, instead of the nine percent annual 

rate of interest, in certain circumstances: 
12

Subsection (1):

[I]f a judgment for money in an action brought to recover damages 

for personal injuries is appealed by the judgment debtor, postjudgment 

interest must be calculated on the sum at the [market-based rate] from 

the date of judgment through the date of satisfying the judgment and 

must include compounding of interest annually.1

Subsection (2)(a):

If a judgment for money in an action brought to recover damages for 

personal injuries is appealed by a judgment debtor and the judgment is 

affirmed, postjudgment interest [at the market-based rate] is payable 

from the date of judgment through the date of satisfying the 

judgment.

Section (2)(b):

If a judgment for money in an action to recover damages for personal 

injuries is appealed by a judgment debtor and the judgment is modified or 

reversed with a direction that a judgment for money be entered in the trial 

court, postjudgment interest [at the market-based rate] is payable 

from the date of judgment through the date of satisfying the 

judgment. This postjudgment interest is payable on the amount of 

the final judgment. 

§ 13-21-101(1)–(2) (emphases added).

2

 

¶22 The interplay among this trio of provisions requires us to navigate a 

jurisprudential Bermuda Triangle—all the while ensuring that none of the 

1 For the sake of convenience, we refer to this provision as “subsection (1).”

2 All three provisions call for calculation of postjudgment interest based on the 

annual rate set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of the statute. “Subsections (3) 

and (4) provide a market-based method for calculation of interest.” Sperry v. Field, 

205 P.3d 365, 367 (Colo. 2009). 
13

provisions mysteriously disappear. Of course, the first step in our analysis is to 

determine whether these provisions are ambiguous. 

C. Is Section 13-21-101 Ambiguous?

¶23 Walker maintains that section 13-21-101 is clear and unambiguous. Ford 

disagrees. And so do we. 

1. Section 13-21-101 Is Susceptible of Two Reasonable 

Interpretations and Is Thus Ambiguous

¶24 At the outset, we note that this court has declared more than once that 

section 13-21-101 is “not a model of clarity.” Seaward Constr. Co. v. Bradley, 

817 P.2d 971, 975 (Colo. 1991); Morris v. Goodwin, 185 P.3d 777, 780 (Colo. 2008). 

The statute hasn’t become any clearer since we last uttered those words. 

¶25 Whereas subsections (2)(a) and (b) require application of the market-based 

postjudgment interest rate following specific outcomes on appeal—affirmance of 

the judgment and modification or reversal of the judgment with directions to enter 

a money judgment on remand—subsection (1) applies whenever the judgment 

debtor appeals the judgment. The following question naturally flows from this 

trifecta of provisions: What happens if, as here, the judgment debtor appeals the 

judgment, thereby coming within the purview of subsection (1), but the outcome 

of the appeal is neither the one set forth in subsection (2)(a) (affirmance of the 

judgment) nor one of those set forth in subsection (2)(b) (modification or reversal 

of the judgment with directions to enter a money judgment on remand)? What if, 
14

as occurred here, the judgment debtor appeals the judgment and obtains a reversal 

of the judgment and a new trial? 

¶26 Walker’s position, which is subsection (2)-centric, is that the market-based 

postjudgment interest rate is inapplicable because the outcome of Ford’s appeal 

was neither affirmance of the judgment nor the judgment’s modification or 

reversal with directions to enter a money judgment on remand. Ford pushes back 

and redirects our attention to subsection (1), arguing that the market-based 

postjudgment interest rate applies whenever the judgment debtor appeals the 

judgment, regardless of the outcome of the appeal. Walker then counters that 

subsection (1) cannot be construed as Ford proposes because requiring application 

of the market-based postjudgment interest rate whenever the judgment debtor

appeals the judgment would render the outcome-specific provisions in 

subsections (2)(a) and (b) superfluous. 

¶27 But subsection (1) says what it says: The trial court must apply the marketbased postjudgment interest rate “if a judgment for money in an action brought to 

recover damages for personal injuries is appealed by the judgment debtor.” 

Subsection (1) isn’t tethered to the outcome of the appeal. It plainly requires 

applying the market-based postjudgment interest rate whenever the judgment 

debtor appeals the judgment. 
15

¶28 No matter, says Walker; that can’t be what the legislature meant. If the 

legislature had intended for the market-based postjudgment interest rate to apply 

whenever the judgment debtor appeals the judgment, asks Walker, why did it 

include the two outcome-specific provisions in subsection (2)? 

¶29 According to Walker, subsections (2)(a) and (b) present the two “specific 

and clearly defined situations” in which the interest rate shifts. In this regard, 

Walker invokes the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon3 and invites us to 

interpret the inclusion of the two specific scenarios in subsections (2)(a) and (b) as

excluding all others not specified. As Walker puts it, section 13-21-101 should be 

read as sanctioning two, and only two, exceptions to the nine percent interest 

rate—those set forth in subsections (2)(a) and (b). In the event the judgment debtor 

appeals the judgment, obtains a reversal and a new trial, and incurs another 

money judgment on retrial, as happened here, Walker would have the judgment 

debtor go back to square one: The trial court on remand would add nine percent

interest from the date of the action’s accrual until the date the final judgment is 

3 Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of construction that holds that when 

one thing is expressed or included, it “implies the exclusion of the other, or of the 

alternative.” Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 

2019). 
16

satisfied. Thus, asserts Walker, when section 13-21-101 is considered as a whole, 

it is unambiguous, internally harmonious, and complete. 

¶30 But try as Walker might, he cannot get around subsection (1)’s command to 

apply the market-based postjudgment interest rate “[i]f a judgment for 

money . . . is appealed by the judgment debtor.” We’re not permitted to disregard 

the plain and ordinary meaning of these words, much less speculate that they

mean something completely different. See Elder, ¶ 18, 477 P.3d at 698. 

¶31 Moreover, while Walker urges us to reject Ford’s interpretation in order to 

avoid rendering subsections (2)(a) and (b) superfluous, Ford asks us to accept its

interpretation in order to avoid doing the same to subsection (1). And Ford asks

the inverse of Walker’s question: If the legislature intended for the market-based 

postjudgment interest rate to apply only in the two situations specified in 

subsections (2)(a) and (b), why did it include the general directive in subsection (1)

calling for the market-based postjudgment interest rate to apply whenever the 

judgment is “appealed by the judgment debtor”? 

¶32 To our mind, contrary to Walker’s claim, section 13-21-101 is susceptible of 

two reasonable interpretations. 

¶33 On the one hand, it is reasonable to read section 13-21-101 as Walker does: 

The market-based postjudgment interest rate applies only in the outcome-specific 

situations identified in subsections (2)(a) and (b). This is the interpretation the
17

division embraced. The division stated that section 13-21-101 would require 

application of the market-based postjudgment interest rate to every appeal of the 

judgment by the judgment debtor only if subsection (1) were “considered in 

isolation.” Walker III, ¶ 8, 490 P.3d at 998. But, explained the division, when that 

provision is considered together with subsections (2)(a) and (b), “it becomes clear” 

that whether “prejudgment or postjudgment interest” applies depends on the 

outcome of the appeal. Id.

¶34 On the other hand, it is reasonable to read section 13-21-101 as Ford does: 

The market-based postjudgment interest rate applies whenever the judgment is 

appealed by the judgment debtor. Under this interpretation, subsection (1) is

effectuated without canceling out subsections (2)(a) and (b); subsections (2)(a) and 

(b) are simply treated as enumerated but inexhaustive examples of the situations 

governed by the broader subsection (1).

¶35 Given these different interpretations, both of which are reasonable, we 

conclude that section 13-21-101 is ambiguous and that the plain-meaning rule 

cannot decode the statute’s legislative intent. We are not persuaded otherwise by 
18

Walker’s contention that we are restricted to the plain language of the statute 

because, in his view, his interpretation is the only reasonable one.4

2. Ford’s Interpretation of Section 13-21-101 Is at Least as 

Reasonable as Walker’s 

¶36 Walker insists that Ford’s interpretation is unreasonable and thus cannot 

render section 13-21-101 ambiguous. According to Walker, the market-based

postjudgment interest rate cannot be applied from the date of the judgment Ford 

appealed in 2013 because that judgment never became a final judgment (or “a

judgment that is to be paid”). While the parties both believe that the market-based 

postjudgment interest rate generally applies from the date the appealed judgment 

enters, Walker adds a condition—only if the appealed judgment eventually 

becomes the final judgment. In this regard, Walker argues that only an appealed 

judgment that eventually becomes the final judgment can serve as a “dividing 

line” between “prejudgment interest” and “postjudgment interest” and thus 

activate the shift from the nine percent rate to the market-based rate.5 

4 For Walker to be right, not only must his interpretation of section 13-21-101 be 

reasonable, Ford’s interpretation must also be unreasonable. See Magana v. People, 

2022 CO 25, ¶ 27, __ P.3d __ (noting that an interpretation that’s unreasonable 

cannot render a statute ambiguous). 

5 Walker seeks nine percent interest through satisfaction of the final judgment in 

2020, not through entry of the final judgment in 2019, explaining that Ford did not 
19

¶37 Before proceeding to discuss the merits of Walker’s position, we pause to 

address his prejudgment/postjudgment “dividing line” hypothesis. Part of the 

confusion in this area of the law lies in the perception that section 13-21-101 creates

a perfect dichotomy between “prejudgment interest” and “postjudgment 

interest.” Attorneys and judges may do well to stop thinking about the statute as 

establishing a fork in the road that leads to either “prejudgment interest” or 

“postjudgment interest.” The word “prejudgment” is nowhere to be found in 

section 13-21-101. And when the judgment debtor doesn’t appeal the judgment, 

the nine percent interest rate applies beyond the date of the judgment—until the 

judgment is satisfied—including during any postjudgment proceedings held by 

the trial court. In other words, absent an appeal of the judgment, the nine percent

interest rate applies both prejudgment and postjudgment; it doesn’t stop applying 

when the judgment enters. Hence, it is not accurate to characterize the nine 

percent interest rate as the “prejudgment” interest rate. 

¶38 True, section 13-21-101 contains multiple references to “postjudgment 

interest” to describe the interest that applies during certain postjudgment 

proceedings. For that matter, so does our opinion; doing our best to track the 

appeal that judgment and, thus, the market-based postjudgment interest rate 

never kicked in. 
20

statute, we refer to “postjudgment interest.” But the statute doesn’t extend its 

postjudgment interest provisions to all postjudgment proceedings. Indeed, as we 

just mentioned, if there is no appeal, the postjudgment provisions have no 

application at all, even if the trial court holds postjudgment proceedings. 

¶39 The distinction section 13-21-101 actually draws is between the judgment 

debtor appealing the judgment and the judgment debtor not appealing the 

judgment. Cf. Rodriguez v. Schutt, 914 P.2d 921, 928 (Colo. 1996) (explaining that 

the 1982 amendment to section 13-21-101, which implemented the triumvirate of 

provisions before us, “created the distinction between judgments which the 

judgment debtor appeals and those which the judgment debtor does not appeal”). 

Whether to continue to apply the nine percent interest rate or switch to the 

market-based interest rate is anchored to that line of demarcation, not to the 

prejudgment/postjudgment distinction Walker makes. We therefore avoid 

viewing the statute as creating a binary choice between prejudgment and 

postjudgment interest. 

¶40 With that understanding, we return to the merits of Walker’s position. He 

contends that his is the sole reasonable statutory construction because, under the 

plain language of section 13-21-101, an appealed judgment cannot precipitate the 

change in interest rate unless that judgment eventually becomes the judgment that 

is to be paid (i.e., the final judgment). But the statute isn’t so clear. In fact, it can 
21

be read as directly undercutting Walker’s position and reinforcing Ford’s. To 

illustrate the point, we find it helpful to dissect subsection (1): 

[I]f a judgment for money in an action brought to recover damages for 

personal injuries is appealed by the judgment debtor, postjudgment interest 

must be calculated on the sum at the [market-based rate] from the date 

of judgment through the date of satisfying the judgment and must 

include compounding of interest annually.

6

¶41 The italicized language above (in electric green) spells out when the marketbased postjudgment interest rate replaces the nine percent interest rate: “[I]f a 

judgment for money in an action brought to recover damages for personal injuries 

is appealed by the judgment debtor, postjudgment interest must be calculated.” 

Stated differently, the nine percent interest rate applies starting with accrual of the

claim, but if the judgment debtor appeals the judgment, the market-based 

postjudgment interest rate kicks in, regardless of whether the appealed judgment 

is eventually upheld and becomes the final judgment “that is to be paid” or if a 

different money judgment eventually enters.7 Once the court has resolved that the 

market-based postjudgment interest rate applies because the judgment debtor 

6 Subsections (2)(a) and (b) contain similar language that may be dissected in 

comparable fashion.

7 It hardly bears stating that our analysis is relevant only if there is ultimately a 

money judgment against the judgment debtor. If there is no money judgment, 

there is necessarily no interest.
22

appealed the judgment (i.e., the when inquiry), the underlined language above (in 

aqua blue) tells us how to calculate such interest: (i) “on the sum,” (ii) at the marketbased rate, (iii) “from the date of judgment through the date of satisfying the 

judgment,” and (iv) including “compounding of interest annually.” 

¶42 We focus on part (iii) of the how inquiry—the period during which the

market-based postjudgment interest must be calculated (“from the date of 

judgment through the date of satisfying the judgment”). There is no real 

disagreement over the meaning of parts (i), (ii), and (iv) of the how inquiry—the 

“sum” on which the market-based postjudgment interest is to be calculated, the 

market-based rate, and the annual compounding of interest, respectively.8 

¶43 The phrase “from the date of judgment through the date of satisfying the 

judgment,” which also appears in subsections (2)(a) and (b), sets the starting line 

(“the date of judgment”) and the finish line (“the date of satisfying the judgment”) 

8 Contrary to Walker’s suggestion, the “sum” is relevant to the how, not the when, 

inquiry in subsection (1)—i.e., it goes to how to calculate the market-based 

postjudgment interest, not to when such interest applies. Nevertheless, we agree 

with Walker that “sum” necessarily refers to the amount of the judgment to be 

paid. Any interest must logically be calculated on the amount of the final

judgment. Subsection (2)(b) buttresses this conclusion. That subsection specifies 

that when the judgment debtor appeals a judgment and the judgment is modified 

or reversed with directions that a money judgment enter on remand, the marketbased interest is payable “on the amount of the final judgment.” 
23

for any market-based postjudgment interest calculation. Ascertaining the finish 

line is a walk in the park; after all, “the date of satisfying the judgment” is always 

the date the judgment debtor pays off the judgment. But ascertaining the starting 

line is not so easy. The question is: What did the legislature mean by “judgment” 

in “the date of judgment”? More to the point, is Walker right that the legislature 

meant to require market-based postjudgment interest only if an appealed 

judgment eventually becomes the final judgment?9 In a word, no. 

¶44 If there is only one judgment because there was an affirmance on appeal, see 

§ 13-21-101(2)(a), there is obviously only one option: The market-based 

postjudgment interest rate applies “from the date of [the only] judgment,” which 

is the date of the appealed judgment that eventually became the final judgment. Neither 

side picks a bone with this conclusion. It gets trickier, though, if the judgment 

debtor appeals the judgment and the judgment is modified or reversed with 

instructions to enter a money judgment on remand, à la subsection (2)(b).

¶45 Walker acknowledges that subsection (2)(b) requires applying the marketbased postjudgment interest rate from the date of the appealed judgment. But 

9 As he does with the word “sum,” Walker mistakenly implies that “the date of 

judgment” is relevant to determine when the market-based postjudgment interest 

applies, as opposed to how to calculate such interest when it applies. 
24

how does that jibe with Walker’s theory that only an appealed judgment that 

eventually becomes the final judgment can trigger the switch in interest rates? 

After all, under subsection (2)(b), the appealed judgment is modified or reversed 

with instructions to enter a new money judgment on remand. As we show next, 

subsection (2)(b) proves to be a fly in the ointment for Walker. 

¶46 Per Walker, just as in subsection (2)(a), in subsection (2)(b), an appealed 

judgment always becomes the final judgment—it’s just that the judgment debtor 

may simply be required to pay the appealed judgment “in part.” But Walker goes 

too far. Under subsection (2)(b), the appealed judgment doesn’t become the final 

judgment because the appealed judgment is modified or reversed with instructions 

for the trial court to enter a new money judgment on remand. The final judgment 

entered in this situation is necessarily different from the appealed judgment: The 

final judgment is either a modified version of the appealed judgment or, in the 

event of a reversal, a completely new judgment. That’s not the same thing as 

paying the appealed judgment “in part.” Even assuming for the sake of argument 

that a modified money judgment could be deemed to be the same judgment as the 

appealed judgment, how can a new money judgment be deemed to be the same 

judgment as the appealed judgment after the appealed judgment has been 

reversed? Given subsection (2)(b), Walker can’t be right in asserting that only an 

appealed judgment that eventually becomes the final judgment may trigger the 
25

switch from the nine percent interest rate to the market-based postjudgment 

interest rate. 

¶47 In any event, Walker’s hypothesis hits another insurmountable snag when, 

as here, a judgment is reversed and a new trial is ordered.

10 In such a scenario, 

says Walker, there is no judgment on which to apply the market-based 

postjudgment interest rate, and thus, if a new money judgment enters following 

the remand trial and that second judgment is not appealed, the “prejudgment” 

nine percent interest rate continues to apply after entry of the appealed judgment

(the first judgment) up until satisfaction of the final judgment (the second 

judgment). 

¶48 However, Walker provides no persuasive justification for his disparate 

treatment of a situation in which a judgment is reversed with instructions to enter 

a new money judgment on remand (subsection (2)(b)) and a situation in which a

judgment is reversed with instructions for a new trial and the retrial results in a 

new money judgment (this case). A reversed judgment is a reversed judgment,

10 Walker attempts to distance this case from subsection (2)(b) by referring to the 

appealed judgment as a judgment that was “vacated,” not “reversed.” For our 

purposes, we perceive no substantive difference between a vacated judgment and 

a reversed judgment. Regardless, the appealed judgment in this case was 

reversed, not vacated. 
26

regardless of whether, as in subsection (2)(b), it is accompanied by instructions to 

enter a new money judgment on remand or, as here, it is accompanied by 

instructions to hold a new trial on remand. In both scenarios, the judgment is 

reversed. 

¶49 Even more concerning, Walker offers no compelling explanation as to why 

the judgment debtor who fully succeeds on appeal (by obtaining a reversal of the 

judgment and a new trial) should pay the nine percent interest rate during the 

pendency of the appeal while the judgment debtor who is only partially successful 

on appeal (by obtaining a reversal of the judgment with instructions to enter a new

money judgment on remand) should pay the lower market-based interest rate 

during the same timeframe. Differently put, Walker doesn’t effectively address 

why the judgment debtor who fully succeeds on appeal should be worse off (at 

least when the market-based interest rate is below the nine percent rate) than the 

judgment debtor who only partially succeeds on appeal. The legislature could not 

have intended such an absurd result. Thus, even if Walker were right about the 

plain language of the statute, we would still “look to the legislature’s intent” to 

ward off this absurd result. See Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 CO 13M, ¶ 28, 506 P.3d 828, 

833; accord AviComm, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 955 P.2d 1023, 1031 (Colo. 

1998) (indicating that “the intention of the legislature will prevail over a literal 

interpretation of the statute that leads to an absurd result”). 
27

¶50 In our view, a different interpretation of “the date of judgment”—one that’s

as reasonable as, if not more reasonable than, the one Walker advances—is that it

always means the date of the appealed judgment, regardless of whether the appealed 

judgment eventually becomes the final judgment or the judgment to be paid. As we just 

explained, subsection (1) calls for the switch between the nine percent interest rate 

and the market-based postjudgment interest rate when the judgment debtor

appeals the judgment. Consequently, a way to construe the how portion of 

subsection (1) so as to be congruous with the when portion is to understand “the 

date of judgment” as the date of the appealed judgment. 

¶51 The phrase “from the date of judgment through the date of satisfying the 

judgment” in the three provisions under scrutiny can thus reasonably be 

understood as requiring calculation of postjudgment interest from the date of the 

appealed judgment through the date of satisfying the final judgment—be that satisfied 

final judgment the same judgment as the appealed judgment (in the event of an 

affirmance of the appealed judgment) or a different judgment from the appealed 

judgment (in the event of a modification of the appealed judgment or a reversal of 

the appealed judgment—with or without a retrial).11 Putting it all together, then, 

11 We realize that this construction gives two different meanings to the word 

“judgment” in the phrase “from the date of judgment through the date of 

satisfying the judgment”—with the first “judgment” referring to the appealed 
28

section 13-21-101 can reasonably be read as Ford reads it: Postjudgment interest 

applies whenever the judgment debtor appeals the judgment, including when the 

judgment is affirmed, modified, or reversed with instructions to enter a new 

money judgment, as well as when the judgment is reversed with instructions to 

hold a new trial (the when inquiry); and if postjudgment interest applies, it must 

be calculated on the amount to be paid at the market-based rate from the date of 

the appealed judgment through the date of satisfaction of the final judgment (the 

how inquiry). 

¶52 Walker nevertheless protests that where, as here, a judgment has been 

reversed and a new judgment has entered at the retrial, the legislature could not

have intended to require application of the market-based postjudgment interest 

rate from the date of the appealed judgment because that judgment ceased to exist

the moment it was reversed. But subsection (2)(b) belies Walker’s surmise 

regarding the legislature’s intent. In some subsection (2)(b) situations, there is no 

judgment on which to grant postjudgment interest either. For example, when the

judgment and the second “judgment” referring to the final judgment. But 

subsection (2)(b) reflects that this is what the legislature intended. Under 

subsection (2)(b), the appealed judgment can never be the same judgment as the 

final judgment that’s eventually satisfied because the appealed judgment is 

modified or reversed and a different money judgment enters. 
29

judgment debtor’s appeal results in the judgment being reversed and a new 

money judgment entering on remand pursuant to an appellate court’s 

instructions, the appealed judgment ceases to exist upon issuance of the mandate. 

Yet neither party contests that, pursuant to subsection (2)(b), postjudgment 

interest accrues between the date of the mandate and the date of the final judgment

on remand. In fact, the parties agree that, under subsection (2)(b), postjudgment 

interest accrues between the date of the appealed judgment and the date of the

final judgment’s satisfaction, even though the appealed judgment is reversed. 

¶53 If the legislature intended to apply the market-based postjudgment interest 

rate in the absence of a judgment in some subsection (2)(b) situations, why 

couldn’t it have had the same intent in the situation we face here? We are aware 

of no authority, and Walker has unearthed none, that stands for the proposition 

that, unlike an appellate court’s remand for entry of a new judgment, an appellate 

court’s remand for a retrial bars postjudgment interest because it turns back the 

clock and transforms the proceedings and any interest from “postjudgment” to 

“prejudgment.” We are equally unaware of any authority that allows vanished 

postjudgment interest to reappear as prejudgment interest. 

¶54 Walker’s position is inherently flawed. He sees section 13-21-101 through 

the prejudgment/postjudgment prism we cautioned against earlier. According to 

Walker, our mandate in Walker II returned the parties to a prejudgment posture and 
30

thus only the statute’s “prejudgment” interest provisions could apply at that point; 

the statute’s “postjudgment” provisions became inapposite then, he says, because 

there was no judgment on which to accrue postjudgment interest. This was the 

linchpin—and, as it turns out, the hamartia—of the division’s decision. 

¶55 Viewed through a different lens, market-based postjudgment interest could 

more reasonably be understood as Ford submits: interest that applies during those 

postjudgment proceedings identified in the statute—i.e., following the judgment 

debtor’s appeal of the judgment, regardless of whether the appeal results in 

affirmance of the judgment or in the judgment’s modification or reversal, and 

regardless of whether there is a retrial. Even if the appealed judgment is ultimately 

reversed and thus null and void, and even if there is a retrial that yields a new 

money judgment, the interest that accrues between the appealed judgment and 

satisfaction of the final judgment could still fit within the “postjudgment interest”

provisions of the statute. That is to say, if we deem the “judgment” in 

“postjudgment” to be the appealed judgment—and we already demonstrated that 

it is sensible to use the appealed judgment as the benchmark to start running 

market-based postjudgment interest—all of the proceedings that follow that 

judgment, including on remand, can reasonably be considered “postjudgment.” 

¶56 That American jurisprudence generally treats reversed judgments as null 

and void is of no consequence. First, any such case law was clearly not an obstacle 
31

for our legislature’s promulgation of subsection (2)(b), which requires marketbased postjudgment interest in some situations in which the appealed judgment 

is reversed and thus null and void. And second, the cases on which Walker relies 

arose in inapposite contexts. Not one of those cases supports the idea that the date 

of an appealed judgment cannot serve as the switch between a fixed rate and a 

market-based rate in calculating interest on a damages award. 

¶57 Certainly, neither party questions the legislature’s authority to require

interest on a judgment long before the judgment ever sees the light of day—recall 

that nine percent interest starts running from accrual of a claim. Does the 

legislature lack the power to do the same with market-based postjudgment interest 

simply because of the “postjudgment” nomenclature? Any concern grounded in 

the fact that “postjudgment” means “after judgment” evaporates when 

“judgment” is understood as the appealed judgment (the first judgment). And 

we’ve illustrated that such an interpretation is reasonable. 

¶58 In short, we are convinced that section 13-21-101 is susceptible of different 

reasonable interpretations. It is thus ambiguous. 

¶59 The division didn’t wade into this fray. Instead, it circumvented the 

ambiguity question altogether. 
32

3. The Division Erred in Skirting the Ambiguity Question

and Filling the Gap in Subsection (2) in a Manner That 

Contradicts Subsection (1)

¶60 The first step in interpreting a statute is to make a call on whether its 

language is ambiguous. The division did not determine whether section 13-21-101 

was ambiguous. Instead, it sidestepped the question by simply ruling that the 

district court’s interpretation was consistent with the statute’s plain language. 

Walker III, ¶ 13, 490 P.3d at 999. But, as we have shown, Ford’s interpretation is 

likewise consistent with the statute’s plain language. 

¶61 The division exacerbated its error by filling the gap in subsection (2) in a 

manner that directly contradicts subsection (1). It used the legislature’s silence in 

subsection (2)—regarding what happens when the judgment appealed by the

judgment debtor is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial—to infer the 

opposite of what subsection (1) says. Whereas subsection (1) expressly requires 

application of the market-based postjudgment interest rate whenever the 

judgment debtor appeals the judgment, the division held that when the judgment 

debtor appeals the judgment and the judgment is reversed with instructions to 

hold a new trial on remand, the nine percent interest rate continues to apply.

12 

12 The American Tort Reform Association’s amicus brief relies on the gap in 

subsection (2) to posit that no interest accumulates at all “during the period of an 
33

¶62 Significantly, the division declined to delve further into whether its 

interpretation of section 13-21-101’s plain language was consistent with the 

legislature’s intent because it was afraid of repeating history. Id. But that concern, 

while no doubt well-intentioned, was misguided. 

¶63 Leaning on then-Justice Eid’s concurrence in Sperry v. Field, 205 P.3d 365 

(Colo. 2009), the division explained that “[j]udicial attempts to construe 

section 13-21-101 in a manner that aligns with perceived legislative intent have, in 

the past, created more problems than they have solved.” Walker III, ¶ 13, 490 P.3d 

at 999 (citing Sperry, 205 P.3d at 370–71 (Eid, J., concurring in the judgment)). What 

has proven problematic in the past, however, hasn’t been our attempts to ascertain 

and effectuate the legislative intent in section 13-21-101; it’s been our rewriting of 

the statute on two separate occasions—once in Rodriguez, 914 P.2d at 927–29, to 

cure a constitutional infirmity, and once in Sperry, 205 P.3d at 369–70, to cure an

ambiguity that our redrafting in Rodriguez inadvertently created. Hence, the 

division misapprehended Justice Eid’s concurrence in Sperry. See Sperry, 205 P.3d 

at 370 (Eid, J., concurring in the judgment) (characterizing our “redrafting effort” 

in Rodriguez as “less than successful,” criticizing the majority’s decision to 

appeal that results in a vacated judgment.” Neither party has offered this radical 

construction, and we see no basis for it. 
34

“redraft[] even more of the statutory language,” and expressing a preference for 

avoiding additional “‘interpretive’ efforts . . . that further redraft the statutory 

language”). 

¶64 We undertake no rewriting of section 13-21-101 here. Instead, because we 

conclude that the statute is ambiguous, we turn to its legislative history to discern 

the General Assembly’s intent. 

D. Relevant Legislative History 

¶65 We have previously peered beneath the textual façade of section 13-21-101

to glean the legislature’s intent in requiring application of the market-based 

postjudgment interest rate in certain circumstances. More than a quarter of a 

century ago, we observed that the statute’s 1982 amendment reflected the General 

Assembly’s intent to apply the market-based postjudgment interest “only to 

judgments which the judgment debtor appeals.” Rodriguez, 914 P.2d at 928; see also 

Ackerman v. Power Equip. Co., 881 P.2d 451, 452 (Colo. App. 1994) (“In 1982, the 

General Assembly amended § 13-21-101 to apply a variable market rate of interest 

if the judgment is appealed by the judgment debtor.”). And we inferred dual 

purposes animating this amendment: “to eliminate the financial incentive (or 

disincentive) to appeal and to ensure that the judgment creditor whose satisfaction 

is delayed due to an unsuccessful appeal receives the time value of his or her 

money judgment.” Rodriguez, 914 P.2d at 929. The statements of the bill sponsors, 
35

we said, revealed the legislature’s desire “to neutralize the economic benefits and 

detriments of appeal under the statutorily-set rate of interest.” Id. at 928. 

¶66 In 2009, we echoed the comments we made in Rodriguez. We stated in Sperry 

that the overall purposes of the personal injury interest statute were “to eliminate 

any financial incentive or disincentive to appeal and to ensure that the judgment 

creditor receives the time value of his or her money judgment.” 205 P.3d at 370. 

¶67 Because the statute’s legislative history reveals the General Assembly’s

intent, we are dutybound to give that intent effect. We do so now. 

E. Effectuating the Legislative Intent in Section 13-21-101

¶68 The only way for us to effectuate the purposes of the three provisions under 

the microscope is to apply postjudgment interest whenever the judgment debtor 

appeals the judgment and to calculate that interest using the market-based rate

from the date of the appealed judgment until the date of the final judgment’s 

satisfaction. Hence, in a situation like the one here—where the judgment debtor 

appeals the judgment, obtains a reversal and a new trial, and incurs a new money 

judgment at the retrial—postjudgment interest must be calculated using the 

market-based rate from the date of the appealed judgment until the date of the 

final judgment’s satisfaction. No other interpretation neutralizes the economic 

benefits and detriments of an appeal. 
36

¶69 Applying the fixed statutory rate during the judgment debtor’s appeal of 

the judgment would provide judgment debtors an incentive to appeal whenever

the market rate is higher than the fixed rate. In that situation, judgment debtors

could capitalize on the difference in the two interest rates because of the potential 

to continue to earn the higher market rate on the judgment while appealing. By 

doing nothing more than filing a notice of appeal, and without regard for the 

merits of the appeal, judgment debtors could enjoy the higher market return on 

the value of the judgment while paying the lower fixed rate to the judgment 

creditor if the judgment is eventually affirmed. Talk about an incentive to file an 

appeal, including a frivolous one. 

¶70 Of course, on the flip side, whenever the market rate is lower than the fixed 

statutory rate, judgment debtors would be dissuaded from pursuing an appeal. 

Filing an appeal when the fixed statutory rate is higher than the market rate would 

cause judgment debtors to rack up interest over and above what they could earn 

in the market during the pendency of the appeal. Talk about a disincentive to file 

an appeal, including a meritorious one. 

¶71 These incentives and disincentives are out of whack and are precisely what 

the legislature sought to eliminate by requiring a market-based postjudgment

interest rate whenever the judgment is “appealed by the judgment debtor.” By 

switching from the fixed interest rate of nine percent to the market-based 
37

postjudgment interest rate whenever the judgment debtor appeals the judgment, 

the legislature ensured both that the successful plaintiff would be fairly 

compensated for the time value of the judgment13 and that any incentive or 

disincentive to appeal would be neutralized. 

¶72 Relatedly, application of the market-based postjudgment interest whenever 

the judgment debtor appeals the judgment compels the conclusion that “the date 

of judgment” starting line for calculating such interest is the date of the appealed 

judgment. Otherwise, it would defeat the purpose of applying the market-based 

postjudgment interest whenever the judgment debtor appeals the judgment. 

¶73 Suppose that the judgment debtor appeals the judgment and the judgment 

is reversed with instructions for a new trial. Suppose further that a new judgment 

enters at the retrial. If the market-based postjudgment interest were calculated

from the time of the final judgment, it would render subsection (1) and its 

compatriot provisions as useful as an ashtray on a motorbike. The undesirable 

13 The market-based interest rate, which is two percentage points above the 

discount rate, see § 13-21-101(3), compensates the successful plaintiff for the time 

value of the judgment; indeed, the “time value” of the judgment is determined by 

the market rate. Walker’s argument to the contrary ignores that, even under 

today’s interpretation, he will be entitled to: nine percent interest (eight points 

above the discount rate) from the date of the accident in 2009 until entry of the 

appealed judgment in 2013, and market-based postjudgment interest thereafter. 
38

incentives and disincentives discussed above would remain. What would be the 

point of applying the market-based rate after the appeal and retrial have been 

completed? And in a subsection (2)(b) situation involving a reversal, what would 

be the point of applying the market-based rate between the date of the new money 

judgment and the date that judgment is satisfied? Limiting application of the 

market-based rate to such small windows would turn subsections (1) and (2)(b) 

into negligible provisions. 

¶74 Walker nevertheless claims that using the market-based postjudgment 

interest rate only serves as a neutralizer for the judgment debtor’s decision to 

appeal if the judgment debtor ultimately ends up owing the judgment creditor 

money. Sure. But this is a red herring. At the time the decision to appeal is made, 

the judgment debtor has no way of forecasting the final outcome of the case. Nor 

would it be fair to expect the judgment debtor to gaze into a crystal ball before 

deciding whether to appeal the judgment. 

¶75 This case illustrates the point. Ford appealed the judgment, not because it 

channeled its inner Nostradamus and prognosticated that it would owe Walker no 

money in the end, but because it was convinced that the trial court’s jury 

instructions, which were given at Walker’s request, deprived it of a fair trial. As 

it turned out, Ford was spot-on. And imposing an additional five years of nine 

percent interest to reward Ford for taking a meritorious appeal and winning it 
39

would be the most pyrrhic of victories. Had Ford known that a fixed, abovemarket interest rate would apply until satisfaction of any new money judgment at 

the retrial, it would have been financially disincentivized to appeal the judgment. 

The risk of having a nine percent interest rate throughout the pendency of this case 

(more than a decade) may have scared Ford off from pursuing its meritorious 

appeal. 

¶76 Not only would Walker’s proposed application of the nine percent interest 

rate affect the rights of judgment debtors, it would also impact the development 

of the law. If judgment debtors were dissuaded from pursuing meritorious 

appeals of trial errors, those errors would never be corrected and would likely be 

repeated. In the case at hand, the trial court’s error on an issue of law—how to 

properly instruct juries in design defect cases—would have gone uncorrected, as

neither Walker I nor Walker II would have been penned. The public has an interest 

in the “development of decisional law.” Austin v. Ford, 181 F.R.D. 283, 285 

(S.D.N.Y. 1998). 

¶77 To recap, because section 13-21-101 is ambiguous, we rely on the statute’s 

legislative history to discern the General Assembly’s intent. Guided by such 

intent, we hold that whenever the judgment debtor appeals the judgment, the 

interest rate switches from nine percent to the market-based rate. The outcome of 

the appeal is of no consequence; the filing of any appeal of the judgment by the 
40

judgment debtor triggers the shift in interest rate. We further hold that the marketbased postjudgment interest on the sum to be paid must be calculated from the 

date of the appealed judgment. Thus, the market-based postjudgment interest rate 

applies from the date of the appealed judgment through the date the final 

judgment is satisfied. 

¶78 The chart below reflects our understanding of section 13-21-101. We hope 

that this illustration will be of some assistance moving forward.
41
42

F. The Interpretation We Adopt Today Is the Only One 

That Effectuates All the Provisions in Section 13-21-101 

Without Contradicting Any of Them

¶79 Our holding that the market-based postjudgment interest rate kicks in

whenever the judgment debtor appeals the judgment reflects our view that

subsection (1) establishes a general rule and subsections (2)(a) and (b) set forth 

specific instances or examples of that rule’s application. This reading of section 

13-21-101 admittedly leads to some redundancy. But redundancy isn’t a “silver 

bullet” in the realm of statutory construction. Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 

139 S. Ct. 873, 881 (2019). As the Supreme Court recently explained in Rimini Street: 

If one possible interpretation of a statute would cause some 

redundancy and another interpretation would avoid redundancy, 

that difference in the two interpretations can supply a clue as to the 

better interpretation of a statute. But only a clue. Sometimes the 

better overall reading of the statute contains some redundancy.

Id.; see also White v. United Airlines, Inc., 987 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2021) (noting 

that the presence of some redundancy “is rarely fatal on its own to a statutory 

reading”). 

¶80 Of course, we are not asked to choose between an interpretation that carries 

some redundancy and an interpretation that avoids redundancy altogether. The 

choice we face in the unique situation before us is between interpretations that 

both create some redundancy. However, the one Walker backs would effectuate 
43

subsection (2) while downright contradicting subsection (1), even though they 

don’t pose an either-or proposition. 

¶81 We cannot read section 13-21-101 as Walker urges and still give effect to all 

three provisions. His reading of the statute would force us to choose 

subsections (2)(a) and (b) over subsection (1). That’s because construing 

subsections (2)(a) and (b) as he does necessarily means contravening 

subsection (1). Put differently, it is impossible to conclude that the only situations 

in which the market-based postjudgment interest rate applies are those set forth 

in subsections (2)(a) and (b), while simultaneously effectuating subsection (1)’s 

command to apply such a rate whenever the judgment debtor appeals the 

judgment. 

¶82 Faced with these two possible paths, the one that gives effect to all three 

provisions and doesn’t contravene any of them is clearly preferable. Whether the 

legislature included the examples in subsections (2)(a) and (b) as a way to provide 

clarity or emphasis or for some other reason is neither here nor there. What’s 

important for our purposes is that we give effect to all the provisions in 

section 13-21-101 without contravening any of them. And, critically, for the 

reasons we’ve set out at length, this is the only statutory construction that’s faithful 

to the legislative intent. 
44

III. Conclusion

¶83 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the division. We 

conclude that the market-based postjudgment interest rate controls during the 

period between entry of the appealed judgment and satisfaction of the final 

judgment. We thus remand for recalculation of interest on the sum to be paid

($2,929,881.20) from the date of the appealed judgment (April 1, 2013) through the 

date the final judgment was satisfied (March 10, 2020) using the market-based 

postjudgment interest rate. 

JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, joined by JUSTICE HART, dissented.
1

JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, joined by JUSTICE HART, dissenting.

¶84 The text of section 13-21-101(1) is unambiguous as applied to the facts of this 

case. Under that provision, Walker, as a successful tort plaintiff, is entitled to 

statutory nine percent interest on the damages assessed by the jury, compounded 

annually, “calculated from the date the suit was filed to the date of satisfying the 

judgment.” § 13-21-101(1), C.R.S. (2021). The wrinkle here is, “Which judgment?” 

Walker obtained a judgment against Petitioner Ford Motor Company in 2013, but 

Ford won reversal of that judgment on appeal and the case was remanded for a 

new trial. Following a second trial in 2019, Walker again prevailed and obtained 

a slightly higher judgment against Ford. So, which judgment? The answer is 

simple. Because the 2013 judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for 

a new trial, the judgment that was entered was nullified; it ceased to exist. The 

only legally valid judgment in this litigation to which any interest can attach is the 

judgment that entered in 2019. Accordingly, under a straightforward application 

of section 13-21-101(1), the district court properly awarded statutory nine percent 

interest, compounded annually, to Walker from the date that he filed suit through 

the date that it entered judgment in 2019 following the jury’s verdict. Such a result 

comports with this court’s repeated recognition that “the legislative purpose 

behind awarding interest under section 13-21-101 is to compensate the [successful 
2

tort] plaintiff for the time value of his or her judgment.” Morris v. Goodwin, 

185 P.3d 777, 780 (Colo. 2008). 

¶85 Rather than apply the statute as written, the majority rewrites the last 

sentence of section 13-21-101(1) to reach a policy result it surmises reflects 

legislative intent. Although it acknowledges that we do not add words to statutes, 

maj. op. ¶ 19, and claims that it “undertake[s] no rewriting of section 13-21-101 

here,” id. at ¶ 64, the majority proceeds to do just that. Focusing on language 

addressing the calculation of postjudgment interest when a judgment is appealed, 

the majority treats the legislature’s use of the same word—“judgment”— to mean 

two different things in the same sentence. Specifically, it rewrites the phrase “from 

the date of judgment through the date of satisfying the judgment,” § 13-21-101(1), 

to instead say, “from the date of [the appealed] judgment through the date of 

satisfying the [final] judgment,” expressly adding the bracketed words. In so 

doing, the majority holds that “whenever the judgment debtor appeals the 

judgment, the interest rate switches from nine percent to the [postjudgment] 

market-based rate,” maj. op. ¶ 4, and thus summarily renders subsections (2)(a) 

and (2)(b) of the statute entirely superfluous. Moreover, in applying its rewritten 

statute to the facts of this case, the majority ignores the fundamental legal principle 

that a judgment that is reversed is void and of no effect. 
3

¶86 The majority’s holding in this case is especially troubling given this court’s 

regrettable history of tinkering with this very statute. In Rodriguez v. Schutt, 

914 P.2d 921, 929–30 (Colo. 1996), we excised language from the same section at 

issue to preserve the statute’s constitutionality. However, we later lamented that 

our attempt to do so only “amplified the [statute’s] ambiguity” and “highlight[ed] 

the problem that occurs when courts [redraft] statutory language.” Sperry v. Field, 

205 P.3d 365, 369 (Colo. 2009); see also id. at 370 (Eid, J., concurring) (noting that 

our attempt in Rodriguez to “redraft[]” the statute was “less than successful”). 

Apparently, we have not learned from our past mistakes. By rewriting the statute 

to address the specific scenario presented here (i.e., where a personal-injury 

judgment debtor obtains reversal of the original judgment but ultimately loses on 

retrial and incurs another judgment), the majority usurps the role of the General 

Assembly. Should the legislature wish to amend section 13-21-101, it is free to do 

so. I recognize that there are strong policy arguments on both sides; indeed, the 

majority discusses policy implications at great length. But such policy decisions, 

and any amendments to the statute, properly rest with the legislature—not this 

court. Absent further direction from the General Assembly, I would simply apply 

the statute as written. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
4

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶87 In 2009, Walker sustained injuries in a car accident and brought a product 

liability action against Ford. He proceeded to a jury trial in 2013 and was awarded 

$2,915,971.20 in damages. Ford appealed, arguing that there was a jury instruction 

error, and a division of the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. 

We granted Walker’s petition for certiorari review but affirmed the court of 

appeals. In short, the original verdict and judgment was set aside, thereby 

returning the parties to the positions they were in prior to the first trial.

¶88 In 2019, the case was retried. Walker again prevailed, and the second jury 

awarded him $2,929,881.20 in damages. Pursuant to section 13-21-101(1), Walker 

requested prejudgment interest at the statutory rate of nine percent from the date 

of injury in 2009 until the date of suit in 2011, and prejudgment interest at the 

statutory rate of nine percent, compounded annually, from the date of suit to the 

satisfaction of judgment in 2019. The district court granted Walker’s requests. 

Ford did not appeal the 2019 judgment but did appeal the district court’s ruling 

regarding the interest award, contending that the lower, market-based 

postjudgment interest rate should apply from the date of Ford’s appeal of the 2013 

judgment through the satisfaction of the 2019 judgment. A division of the court of 

appeals affirmed, and we granted Ford’s petition for writ of certiorari to review 

the division’s decision. 
5

II. Analysis

A. Legal Principles

¶89 Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Goodwin, 

185 P.3d at 779. We begin our interpretation by looking to the plain language of 

the statute. If the plain language is unambiguous, we look no further. Nieto v. 

Clark’s Market, Inc., 2021 CO 48, ¶ 12, 488 P.3d 1140, 1143. “[W]e do not add words 

to or subtract words from a statute.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting People ex 

rel. Rein v. Meagher, 2020 CO 56, ¶ 22, 465 P.3d 554, 560). “[A]nd we avoid 

constructions that would render any words or phrases superfluous . . . .” Elder v. 

Williams, 2020 CO 88, ¶ 18, 477 P.3d 694, 698.

B. Section 13-21-101

¶90 The issue in this case is how to apply section 13-21-101 to assess interest on 

personal injury damages when a judgment debtor successfully obtains reversal of 

the original judgment on appeal but loses on retrial and incurs a new judgment. 

The applicable statutory provisions read as follows:

Section 13-21-101(1): “[W]hen . . . interest is claimed, it is the duty of 

the court in entering judgment for the plaintiff in the action to add to 

the amount of damages assessed by the verdict . . . interest on the 

amount calculated at the rate of nine percent per annum . . . [I]f a 

judgment for money in an action brought to recover damages for 

personal injuries is appealed by the judgment debtor, postjudgment 

interest must be calculated . . . from the date of judgment through the date 

of satisfying the judgment and must include compounding of interest 

annually.” (Emphasis added.)
6

Section 13-21-101(2)(a): “If a judgment for money in an action brought 

to recover damages for personal injuries is appealed by a judgment 

debtor and the judgment is affirmed, postjudgment interest . . . is 

payable from the date of judgment through the date of satisfying the 

judgment.”

Section 13-21-101(2)(b): “If a judgment for money in an action to 

recover damages for personal injuries is appealed by a judgment 

debtor and the judgment is modified or reversed with a direction that 

a judgment for money be entered in the trial court, postjudgment 

interest . . . is payable from the date of judgment through the date of 

satisfying the judgment. This postjudgment interest is payable on the 

amount of the final judgment.”

§ 13-21-101(1)–(2).

¶91 The majority determines that with respect to postjudgment interest, these 

provisions are susceptible to two reasonable interpretations. First, they can be 

read to require postjudgment interest only in the outcome-specific situations 

identified in subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b)—that is, when the judgment is 

“affirmed,” “modified,” or “reversed with a direction that a judgment for money 

be entered in the trial court.” Id. at (2)(a)-(b); see maj. op. ¶ 33. Second, they can 

be read to require that postjudgment interest apply anytime “a judgment for money 

in an action brought to recover damages for personal injuries is appealed.” § 13-

21-101(1); see maj. op. ¶ 34. Under this reading, postjudgment interest applies 

under subsection (1) “from the date of the appealed judgment [in the instant case, 

the 2013 judgment] through the date of satisfying the final judgment [the 2019 
7

judgment].” Maj. op. ¶ 51 (emphases added). Ultimately, the majority finds the 

second reading more persuasive.

¶92 The problem with the majority’s analysis is that it finds ambiguity only by 

adding words to the statute. The General Assembly did not include the term “final 

judgment” in section 13-21-101(1). It referred to only a single judgment, “the 

judgment.” And it required interest to be calculated on “the sum” of that judgment. 

§ 13-21-101(1). In short, “[w]e do not add words to . . . a statute” to create 

ambiguity where there is none. Nieto, ¶ 12, 488 P.3d at 1143 (quoting Meagher, 

¶ 22, 465 P.3d at 560). 

¶93 When the statute is read as written, without adding words to 

section 13-21-101(1), the statute is unambiguous. The meaning of “judgment” as 

used in section 13-21-101(1) can be straightforwardly gleaned from basic principles 

of appellate procedure and the remainder of the statute. 

¶94 It is well established that when a judgment is reversed or vacated, it ceases 

to exist for all purposes. See Schleier v. Bonella, 237 P. 1113, 1113 (Colo. 1925) (A 

judgment of reversal “leaves the parties in the same position as they were before 

the judgment of the lower court was rendered.”); Butler v. Eaton, 141 U.S. 240, 244 

(1891) (A vacated judgment is “without any validity, force, or effect, and ought 

never to have existed.”); Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 250 F.3d 
8

482, 491 (6th Cir. 2001) (“When a judgment is vacated it is legally void and 

unenforceable.”). 

¶95 As the court of appeals has explained, “[u]nder Colorado law, if a judgment 

is reversed, the parties are put in the same position they were in before the 

judgment was rendered. Thus, when an appellate court reverses a judgment, 

‘upon remand, that judgment no longer exists.’” Sharon v. SCC Pueblo Belmont 

Operating Co., LLC, 2019 COA 178, ¶ 17, 467 P.3d 1245, 1251 (citations omitted) 

(quoting Bainbridge, Inc. v. Douglas Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 55 P.3d 271, 274 (Colo. 

App. 2002)). And crucially, “the reversal of the judgment also nullifies ‘an award 

that is dependent on that judgment for its validity.’” Id. (quoting Bainbridge, 

55 P.3d at 274). 

¶96 Applying this principle, “the judgment,” referred to in section 13-21-101(1) 

cannot refer to the 2013 judgment. That judgment ceased to exist for all purposes 

when it was reversed by the court of appeals, Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 2015 COA 

124, ¶ 3, 410 P.3d 609, 611, and we affirmed that reversal, Walker v. Ford Motor Co.,

2017 CO 102, ¶ 2, 406 P.3d 845, 847. Any obligation to pay the 2013 judgment, let 

alone the postjudgment interest that had been accruing on “the sum” of the 2013 

judgment that was appealed, was also nullified. The parties were restored to the 

positions they occupied prior to trial. Instead, “the judgment” under section 

13-21-101(1) must refer here to the 2019 judgment, the only judgment that still 
9

exists and to which interest can attach. Thus, statutory nine percent prejudgment 

interest was properly applied from the accrual of the claim in 2009 to the entry of 

judgment after the retrial in 2019. 

¶97 The majority’s reading of section 13-21-101(1) ignores this principle. The 

logic of the majority’s opinion necessarily assumes that the initial judgment has 

legal effect and, that therefore, interest can be calculated with respect to it. But the 

basic principle that a vacated judgment has no legal effect for any purpose (a 

principle against which the General Assembly drafted the statute) plainly counsels 

against the majority’s interpretation. And absent a clear indication of legislative 

intent to define “judgment” differently than it is normally understood, I see no 

reason to ignore well-established law. 

¶98 The majority’s reading also does harm to the plain language of the statute. 

For the majority’s reading to work, the word “judgment” must have two different 

meanings within the same phrase of the same sentence. As the majority posits, the 

“date of judgment” refers to the “appealed judgment” (here, the nonexistent 2013 

judgment), but “date of satisfying the judgment” refers to the “final judgment”

(here, the only existing, 2019 judgment). But although the last sentence of 

section 13-21-101(1) concerns a judgment that is appealed, it does not use the term 

“final judgment.” And we know from neighboring section 13-21-101(2)(b) that 

when the legislature intended to use this term, it did so expressly. See 
10

§ 13-21-101(2)(b) (“This postjudgment interest is payable on the amount of the final 

judgment.”) (emphasis added). The majority’s reading of the final sentence in 

section 13-21-101(1) also makes no practical sense as applied here, because the 

provision expressly requires the postjudgment interest to be calculated on “the 

sum” of the judgment being appealed. § 13-21-101(1) (“[I]f a judgment . . . is 

appealed by the judgment debtor, postjudgment interest must be calculated on the 

sum at the [market-based rate in subsections (3) and (4)] . . . .”). Even the majority 

recognizes that any postjudgment interest cannot be calculated based on “the 

sum” of the 2013 judgment that was appealed. 

¶99 Importantly, as the majority seems to admit, maj. op. ¶ 31, its reading 

renders subsections 13-21-101(2)(a) and (2)(b) entirely superfluous. These 

subsections lay out the circumstances under which postjudgment interest applies 

when a party appeals. Under subsection (2)(a), if the “judgment is affirmed, 

postjudgment interest . . . is payable from the date of judgment through the date 

of satisfying the judgment.” (Emphasis added). And under (2)(b) if the “judgment 

is modified or reversed with a direction that a judgment for money be entered in the trial 

court, postjudgment interest . . . is payable from the date of judgment through the 

date of satisfying the judgment.” (Emphasis added). It is unclear why the General 

Assembly would include two subsections explicitly providing the circumstances 

under which postjudgment interest applies if a party appeals if—as the majority 
11

concludes—it simply intended for postjudgment interest to apply anytime a party 

appeals. Had it chosen to, the General Assembly could easily have written that 

postjudgment interest applies after any appeal. Alternatively, it could have 

included a subsection (2)(c) providing that where the judgment debtor succeeds 

on appeal and the initial judgment is vacated but later incurs a second judgment, 

postjudgment interest runs from the date of the initial judgment appealed. But the 

legislature has not chosen to do either of these things, and it is not this court’s role 

to rewrite the statute for the General Assembly.

¶100 Rather than read the last sentence of section 13-21-101(1) to render all of 

subsection (2) superfluous, I would instead apply the statute as written. 

Section 13-21-101(1) explains generally how postjudgment interest must be 

calculated: “at the [market] rate set forth in subsections (3) and (4)” including 

compounded annual interest.1 Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b) provide the detail. 

1 Under the 1982 version of the statute, subsection (1) specified the trigger date for 

of accrual of interest (“the date the action accrued”) but did not identify an end 

date. Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b) added the details to complete the calculation 

(“until satisfaction of the judgment”). § 13-21-101, C.R.S. (1982). The 2018 

amendments to section 13-21-101 to codify this court’s holdings in Rodriguez and 

Sperry were grafted onto the 1982 statute, but in doing so, the legislature added 

the interest calculation endpoint to subsection (1) (from the date “of judgment to 

the date of satisfying the judgment”), replicating what was already present in 

subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b). § 13-21-101, C.R.S. (2018). 
12

These provisions explain when postjudgment interest should be calculated if a 

party appeals and the judgment is affirmed, modified, or reversed with 

instructions that a new judgment be entered. 

¶101 Thus, when a judgment is appealed and affirmed, we look to 

subsection (2)(a). This subsection provides that when a judgment is affirmed,

postjudgment interest applies from the date of the judgment through the date 

satisfying that same judgment. Because there is only one judgment in this 

scenario, the one affirmed on appeal, this provision plainly requires postjudgment 

interest to be applied throughout the appellate process and until the judgment is 

satisfied.

¶102 When a judgment is effectively upheld in part—that is, the judgment is 

modified on appeal, or is reversed with instructions to enter a new judgment—we look 

to subsection (2)(b). This subsection explains that we apply postjudgment interest 

“from the date of judgment through the date of satisfying the judgment.” From 

the remainder of subsection (2)(b), we can infer that postjudgment interest is 

calculated from the date of the modified or new judgment because 

subsection (2)(b)’s final sentence explicitly tethers the amount of damages to the 

“final judgment.” § 13-21-101(2)(b) (“This postjudgment interest is payable on the 

amount of the final judgment.”) (emphasis added). This language indicates that 

“judgment,” as used in subsection (2)(b), refers to the “final judgment” (i.e., the 
13

modified or new judgment), not the initial judgment. Interpreting the provision 

this way gives the term “judgment” a single, consistent meaning throughout the 

provision, and it also comports with the principle of appellate jurisprudence that 

reversed judgments cease to exist for all purposes.2 

¶103 The General Assembly did not address what happens when a judgment is 

simply reversed on appeal. Of course, there was no need to, because reversal 

nullifies any obligation to pay the judgment, including any associated interest. 

There is nothing to calculate. But the legislature likewise did not draft a 

subsection (2)(c) explaining how to calculate interest where, as here, a judgment is 

reversed on appeal but the judgment debtor incurs a new judgment following 

retrial. Subsection (2) simply does not provide for this particular scenario. But the 

answer lies in section 13-21-101(1). As previously explained, that section provides

that a successful tort plaintiff is entitled to statutory nine percent prejudgment 

2 I note that current market conditions create very different incentives than existed 

in 1982 when the legislature established this structure. At that time, the market 

rate for postjudgment interest under the statute was eleven percent, higher than 

the nine percent prejudgment interest rate. See Elizabeth A. Montgomery, Rates of 

Interest on State and Federal Court Judgments: An Update, 12 Colo. Law. 437, 451 

(1983). While it may be tempting to rewrite the statute to account for different 

incentives that exist under the current lower market interest rate, the job of 

updating statutes to account for such policy considerations lies with the General 

Assembly, not this court.
14

interest on the damages assessed by the jury, compounded annually, “calculated 

from the date the suit was filed to the date of satisfying the judgment.” § 13-21-

101(1), C.R.S. (2021). The only existing judgment here is the 2019 judgment, which 

Ford has not appealed. There is no postjudgment interest to calculate.

¶104 Interpreting the statute this way comports with the principles of statutory 

interpretation that guide this court. It provides each provision of the statute with 

an independent purpose, does not render any of provision of the statute 

superfluous, and does not require us to add words to the statute. It also comports 

with the fundamental principle of appellate procedure that judgments that are 

vacated no longer exist. Because section 13-21-101 can be straightforwardly 

applied according to its plain language, I see no reason to create ambiguity where 

there is none.

C. Legislative Intent

¶105 Instead of applying the plain language of the statute, the majority attempts 

to redraft the statute to better comport with what it presumes to be the General 

Assembly’s intent. However, it is not obvious that the legislature would make the 

same revisions put forward by the majority.

¶106 To the contrary, the majority’s holding may well cut against the statute’s 

dual legislative purpose. As the majority notes, the statute was designed “to 

neutralize the economic benefits and detriments of appeal under the statutorily-set 
15

rate of interest” and to ensure that the judgment creditor “receives the time value 

of his or her money judgment.” Maj. op. ¶ 65 (quoting Rodriguez, 914 P.2d at 

928–29). Regarding the first rationale, the majority’s holding may incentivize 

judgment debtors to draw out second trials and then file frivolous appeals to take 

advantage of the (currently lower) postjudgment market interest rate. Regarding 

the second rationale, the majority’s holding may cut against the legislative intent 

to ensure that parties are made whole. The General Assembly may well have 

intended that injured parties receive the statutory nine percent interest rate on the 

judgment under these circumstances to ensure that they are adequately 

compensated for the time value of their judgment. Morris, 185 P.3d at 780. Walker 

was injured in 2009 and has waited over a decade to be finally fully compensated 

for his injuries. 

¶107 The majority contends that applying the prejudgment interest rate during 

the pendency of a successful appeal is unfair to Ford and so absurd that the 

legislature could not possibly have intended it. But the result here is not 

necessarily unfair. Ford successfully appealed and got exactly what it asked for: 

reversal of the 2013 judgment, which returned the parties to the status quo prior 

to trial. Once returned to that position, the parties could have settled the case. 

Instead, Ford proceeded to trial and opted to roll the dice. Unfortunately for Ford, 
16

the trial did not come out as hoped. But that outcome does not necessarily render 

the proceedings unfair or render the statute absurd.

III. Conclusion

¶108 How to fashion an interest scheme that neutralizes the financial incentives 

(or disincentives) to appeal while ensuring that a successful tort plaintiff is fully 

compensated is a complex policy issue. Perhaps, as Justice Scott suggested in his 

dissent in Rodriguez, the best solution is to do away with the distinction between 

prejudgment and postjudgment interest altogether and simply apply “a marketdetermined rate of interest on both appealed and nonappealed judgments.” 

914 P.2d at 932 (Scott, J., dissenting). However, I would leave the role of balancing 

these competing legislative objectives where it properly belongs, with the General 

Assembly, and simply apply the statute as written. I respectfully dissent.