2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 1

Policy Statements

Cresencio Arcos, “U.S.–Latin American Security 

Ties: Episodic Relationships”

María Luisa Parraguez Kobek, “Securing 

Defense and Cooperation in South America: 

Geopolitical Changes, UNASUR, and the SDC”

R. Evan Ellis, “The United States and China in 

Latin America: Cooperation and Competition”

Country and Regional Issues

Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, “Political Acumen and 

Geopolitical Anxiety in Suriname”

David Spencer, “The Evolution and 

Implementation of FARC Strategy: Insights from Its 

Internal documents”

Sérgio Luiz Cruz Aguilar, “A Particição SulAmericana Nas Operações de Paz da ONU: 

Algumas Consideracões”

Strategic and Security Issues

Jaime García Covarrubias, “Liderazgo 

Estrategico en Defensa”

W. Alejandro Sánchez, “Sangre Joven: 

Understanding the new wave of Armed Groups in 

Latin America”

Vicente Torrijos, “La Legítima Defensa en 

Perspectiva” 

Juan Carlos Gómez, “La Utilización de las 

Fuerzas Militares en un Ambiente Criminal y no de 

Guerra: Desafíos del Siglo XXI”

Cooperation and Controversy

Kevin Newmeyer, "The Honduran 

Coup of 2009 and the Inter-American 

Democratic Charter"

Howard J. Wiarda and Hilary 

Collins, "Constitutional Coups? 

Military Intervention in Latin America"

Hernán Castillo,"Cultura Política y 

Fuerzas Armadas en Venezuela"

Luis Hernández, "El Control Civil de 

las Fuerzas Armadas en el Ecuador. 

¿Intento Fallido?"

Book Reviews

Matthew Finger: Review of Jodi 

Vittori, Terrorist Financing and 

Resourcing

Joanna Gillia: Review of Cristina 

Marcano and Alberto Barrera Tyszka, 

Hugo Chávez

Patricia Kehoe: Review of Hal 

Brands, Latin America’s Cold War

Celina Realuyo: Review of Joseph 

Nye, The Future of Power 

Richard W. Taylor: Review of Jorge 

G. Castañeda, Mañana Forever: 

Mexico and the Mexicans

Volume 12, Numbers 1 & 2

Fall – Winter 2011

ISSN: 1533-2535
Security and Defense Studies Review

Staff and Editorial Board

Richard D. Downie, Ph.D.

Director, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies

Howard J. Wiarda, Guest Editor

CHDS Associate Director for Research and Publications

Yamile Kahn, Managing Editor

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies

Patricia Kehoe, Assistant Guest Editor

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies

Vivian Rodríguez, Graphic Designer

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies

Raúl Benítez Manaut, Investigador

Centro de Investigaciones Interdisciplinarias en Ciencias y Humanidades

Universidad Autónoma de México

J. Samuel Fitch, Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science

University of Colorado at Boulder

Ivelaw Griffith, Provost and Senior Vice President

York College/ City University of New York

Oswaldo Jarrín, Former Professor and Minister of Defense Chair

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies

General (R) Julio Hang, Director

Institute of International Security and Strategic Affairs

Jennifer Holmes, Associate Professor of Political Science

University of Texas at Dallas

Hal Klepak, Professor of War Studies and Latin American History

Royal Military College of Canada

Richard Millett, Professor of History Emeritus

Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville

Patricia Olney, Associate Professor of Political Science

Southern Connecticut State University

Eliezer Rizzo de Oliveira, Profesor Núcleo de Estudos Estratégicos

Universidade de Campinas, São Paolo, Brasil

Carlos Ospina, Professor and Chief of Defense Chair

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies

Orlando J. Pérez, Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science

Central Michigan University
Security and Defense 

Studies Review

An Interdisciplinary Journal

Volume 12, Numbers 1 & 2 Fall–Winter 2011

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies

National Defense University

260 5th Avenue, S.W.

Building 64, Lincoln Hall

Fort Lesley J. McNair

Washington, D.C. 20319-5066

3

Security and Defense Studies Review

Volume 12, Numbers 1 & 2, Fall–Winter 2011

Contents

Message from the Director, Richard D. Downie 5

Guest Editor Introduction, Howard J. Wiarda 7

Policy Statements

U.S.–Latin American: Security Ties: Episodic Relationships

Ambassador (R.) Cresencio Arcos 13

Securing Defense and Cooperation in South America: Geopolitical Changes,

 UNASUR, and the SDC

María Luisa Parraguez Kobek 17

The United States and China in Latin America: Cooperation and Competition

R. Evan Ellis 37

Country and Regional Issues

Political Acumen and Geopolitical Anxiety in Suriname

 Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith 47

The Evolution and Implementation of FARC Strategy: Insights from 

 Its Internal Documents 

 David Spencer 73

A Particição Sul-Americana nas Operações de Paz da ONU: Algumas Consideracões 

 Sérgio Luiz Cruz Aguilar 99

Strategic and Security Issues

Liderazgo Estratégico en Defensa 

 Jaime García Covarrubias 119

Sangre Joven? Understanding the New Wave of Armed Groups in Latin America 

 W. Alejandro Sánchez 135

La Legítima Defensa en Perspectiva 

 Vicente Torrijos 155

La Utilización de las Fuerzas Militares en un Ambiente Criminal y no de Guerra:

 Desafíos del Siglo XXI 

 Juan Carlos Gómez 167
4 Security and Defense Studies Review

Cooperation and Controversy

The Honduran Coup of 2009: Application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter 

 Kevin Newmeyer 177

Constitutional Coups? Military Intervention in Latin America 

 Howard J. Wiarda and Hilary Collins 189

Cultura Política y Fuerzas Armadas en Venezuela 

 Hernán Castillo 199

El Control Civil de las Fuerzas Armadas en el Ecuador ¿Intento Fallido?

 Luis Hernández 217

Book Reviews

Terrorist Financing and Resourcing, by Jodi Vittori

Reviewed by Matthew Finger 229

Hugo Chávez, by Cristina Marcano and Alberto Barrera Tyszka

Reviewed by Joanna Gillia 231

Latin America’s Cold War, by Hal Brands

Reviewed by Patricia Kehoe 233

The Future of Power, by Joseph S. Nye Jr.

Reviewed by Celina B. Realuyo 235

Mañana Forever: Mexico and the Mexicans, by Jorge G. Castañeda

Reviewed by Richard W. Taylor 237

Contratapa (English/Spanish Abstracts) 243

Contributors 251

The opinions expressed in the Security and Defense Studies Review do not necessarily reflect those of the 

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the National Defense University, or the U.S. Department of Defense.
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 5

Message from the Director

In the Fall–Winter 2011 volume, the Center for Hemispheric 

Defense Studies is pleased to offer the research and writing of 

several CHDS scholars as well as the contributions of a number 

of our alumni, friends, and collaborators. We think it is a rich and 

thought-provoking issue and we hope it stirs your interest. We 

are pleased to report that the Review continues to attract growing 

reader interest in both North and Latin America and that the previous issue on “Women in Defense and Security” has been our 

most popular issue and attracted a great deal of attention.

We are grateful that Prof. Howard J. Wiarda, one of the 

country’s leading scholars of Latin America, agreed to step in in 

emergency circumstances to serve as Guest Editor of this issue. His assistant, Ms. Patricia 

Kehoe of Georgetown University, did unselfish and yeoman service in helping get this issue 

out in a timely fashion. We are also pleased to announce the addition of Ms. Yamile Kahn, 

formerly of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, as the new Managing 

Editor of the Review. 

We begin this issue with three policy statements. Former Ambassador Cresencio Arcos, Political Advisor at CHDS, offers a provocative statement about U.S. policy in Latin 

America as well as his own policy recommendations. Prof. María Luisa Parraguez Kobek 

provides an analysis of the Council of Defense Ministers of the Americas meeting in Santa 

Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, in 2010, as well as the emergence of such new and perhaps rival 

defense and security institutions as ALBA and UNASUR. CHDS Scholar R. Evan Ellis 

then updates his highly regarded book on the same subject with his analysis of the possibilities for cooperation as well as competition between the United States and China in 

Latin America.

Next comes a section of detailed country and regional studies. Prof. Ivelaw Griffith 

of York College of the City University of New York is a longtime Caribbean expert and a 

longtime friend of CHDS; he contributes an insightful article on Désiré Bouterse and the 

little-known but deeply troubled country of Suriname. Then CHDS’s own David Spencer, 

former Professor of International Security Studies, adds a penetrating analysis of Colombia’s revolutionary guerrilla group, the FARC. Spencer’s analysis is part of a larger study 

on Colombia carried out by CHDS that includes a recently published monograph, “Colombia’s Road to Recovery: Security and Governance 1982-2010,” as well as a book and 

several articles and occasional papers in process. Finally in this section we include Sérgio 

Luis Cruz Aguilar’s fascinating study of South American participation in UN peace operations since 1947.

There follow four articles on security and strategic issues. Prof. Jaime García of 

CHDS deals with the complex issue of strategic leadership in national defense. Then comes 

an article by W. Alejandro Sánchez of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs with the intriguing title, “Sangre Joven.” Dr. Vicente Torrijos next weighs in with an article on “legitimate 

defense” in which he assesses the laws of war on preventive or preemptive action. Dr. Juan 

Gómez then deals with the complex issue of using the armed forces, as distinct from the 

police, to combat domestic violence, crime, and gangs. 

Our next section is designed to raise questions and discussion about military coups. 
6 Security and Defense Studies Review

First, CHDS Professor Kevin Newmeyer offers a critique of the Honduran coup of 2009 

and proceeds to the strong inter-American condemnation of it. Next, CHDS analyst Howard J. Wiarda and his collaborator Hilary Collins reveal that 12 of the 20 Latin American 

countries (60%) include articles in their constitutions that could be used to justify military 

intervention in the political process. We end with two articles, one on Venezuela by Dr. 

Hernán Castillo and the other on Ecuador by Dr. Luis Hernández, that illustrate the complexity of these issues. Every country is different and the history, sociology, and politics of 

civil-military relations are different in each. 

We include five book reviews here, all by CHDS scholars and associates: Matthew 

Finger’s on Jodi Vittori’s Terrorist Financing and Resourcing; Joanna Gillia on Cristina Marcano and Alberto Barrera Tyszka’s Hugo Chávez; Patricia Kehoe’s review of Hal 

Brands’ Latin America’s Cold War; Celina Realuyo on Joseph Nye’s The Future of Power; 

and Robert Taylor’s review of Jorge Castañeda’s Mañana Forever. 

We invite our friends, readers, officials, and scholars throughout the Hemisphere, 

North and South, to explore the ideas and themes presented in this issue of SDSR and to 

consider the possibility of contributing to our journal. 

With best regards,

Richard D. Downie, Ph.D.

Director, CHDS
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 7

Introduction

I was honored when Dr. Richard Downie, Director of the Center 

for Hemispheric Defense Studies, asked me to serve as Guest 

Editor of this issue of the Review. CHDS has been seeking to 

elevate its research, publications, and scholarly research efforts, and I was pleased to be able to assist in this process. In 

putting together this issue on short notice, I was happy to have 

the outstanding assistance of Ms. Patricia Kehoe, a student at 

Georgetown University who has provided heroic work and good 

judgment. Thanks Trish; we wish you all the best in your future 

career. 

We begin this issue with an important and intriguing 

policy statement by Ambassador (Ret.) Cresencio Arcos, who 

also holds the position of Political Advisor to the Director at CHDS. Amb. Arcos’s article 

began as a speech at London’s Royal College of Defence Studies, and has been refined into 

the article we publish here. Amb. Arcos begins with a brief history of U.S.–Latin American 

relations, then analyzes with first-hand and high-level insight the time period and countries 

he knows best, Mexico and Central America in the 1980s. Amb. Arcos argues intriguingly 

that U.S. defense policy has not been retooled after the Cold War, nor has foreign policy 

paid much attention to Latin America. He concludes by analyzing the lack of a skillful and 

powerful lobby to elevate Latin American interests in the United States and urges a mature, 

long-term consistent policy toward the region.

Next comes a policy paper by Prof. María Luisa Parraguez Kobek of the Technical University of Monterey in Mexico City. Prof. Parraguez Kobek, who holds a Ph.D. 

in international relations, provides an analysis of the regional concerns and challenges 

presented in the Declaration of Santa Cruz de la Sierra as a result of the IX Conference of 

Defense Ministers of the Americas (CDMA) held in Bolivia in 2010. The paper focuses 

on the importance of cooperation in defense and security matters in the region, specifically 

on the advancement and the implementation of measures of confidence promotion and 

security recently approved by the South American Defense Council (SDC) of the Union of 

South American Nations (UNASUR). Intriguingly, Prof. Parraguez Kobek also analyzes 

the emergence within both UNASUR and ALBA of security studies programs intended to 

compete with CHDS. 

Adding to the policy commentary, Prof. R. Evan Ellis provides us with an overview 

of both the cooperation and the competition in U.S.-China relations in Latin America. Ellis is Professor of National Security Studies at CHDS; his book on U.S.-China relations in 

Latin America is recognized as the best volume on the subject. Here, Prof. Ellis updates 

his earlier analysis in the light of recent developments. He notes that while both the departments of State and Defense have expressed concern about rising Chinese investment in 

Latin America, they have refrained from calling it a threat. He looks at the areas of cooperation between the U.S. and China in Latin America but warns that competition between the 

two powers may also lead to misunderstandings. Overall, he hopes for a win-win situation 

in which both the U.S. and China forge new and constructive relationships with the region.

Turning to country and regional studies, we begin with Prof. Ivelaw Griffith of York 

College of the City University of New York and his study of the reemergence of Désiré 
8 Security and Defense Studies Review

Bouterse as political leader of Suriname. Not many people study the former Dutch colony 

or its neighbors, English-speaking Guyana and French-speaking Guiana. Though geographically a part of South America, culturally, sociologically, and politically they are not; 

nor are they treated in many textbooks on Latin America, and few of us know much about 

them.

Griffith, a longtime student of the Caribbean, to which the three former Guianas are 

often closer than they are to their Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking neighbors, concentrates on Suriname and the emerging threat there. Suriname is a troubled country politically, racially, and economically; it is one of the main sources of drugs for Europe and North 

America. It also has disputes with its neighbors over borders and could become—maybe 

already is—a failed state. Now it is under the control of Bouterse, an elected leader but 

usually thought of as a thug, a murderer, a coup-maker, a convicted (in the Netherlands) 

felon, and a narco-trafficker. Griffith helps us understand Suriname and wrestles with the 

hard questions of what to do about Bouterse.

Next, Prof. David Spencer, formerly of CHDS and now serving as Colombia Country Director at OSD, provides a detailed—and disturbing—history of FARC strategy in 

Colombia. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is one of the oldest 

and longest-lasting revolutionary guerilla armies in Latin America. Even after the end of 

the Cold War, which doomed a number of other revolutionary groups, FARC continued to 

grow. Largely cornered, defeated, and destroyed by President Álvaro Uribe and Plan Colombia, FARC still hangs on, a shadow of its former self but still lethal. Based on FARC’s 

own captured internal documents to which he has been given access, Prof. Spencer traces 

FARC’s history from the 1980s to today and suggests that it has the capacity not to win, 

but nevertheless to survive indefinitely. 

Expanding our analysis from country case studies to regionwide analysis, we now 

have Prof. Sérgio Luis Cruz Aguilar’s study of South American participation in United 

Nations peacekeeping operations. Between 1948 and 1988 the UN engaged in 13 peacekeeping operations; since 1988 the number has increased to 67, involving more than a 

million police, military, and civilian officials. The South American countries, especially 

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay have been a significant presence in these operations. 

The author presents a balance sheet of the South American countries in peacekeeping and 

the legal requirements that regulate their participation. In his conclusion he offers some 

considerations about this accumulated experience and explores the rationale for the South 

American countries’ participation in peacekeeping.

We now turn to a series of four articles dealing with general strategic and security issues. Our leadoff article in this section is by Dr. Jaime García, Professor of National Security at CHDS. Prof. García’s focus is the role of strategic leadership in defense. He argues 

that whether you are leading a small or large country, the importance of implementing a 

system of strategic leadership in governance is the same. The components of an effective 

system of strategic leadership are: the definition of a strategic political model, planning and 

direction (both strategic and administrative), execution, and strategic communication. The 

article includes examples and explanations of how to carry out these components to greatest effect. Strategic leadership, Prof. García argues, occurs at all levels of government and 

in the military, from a country’s president down to lower-level leaders, and good strategic 

leaders exploit the channels of communication among different levels. Ultimately, the best 

strategic leader should be able to influence the conduct of the organizations under his or her 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 9

command through understanding and proper exploitation of the components of a system 

of strategic leadership.

The next article in this section is by W. Alejandro Sánchez, Research Fellow at the 

Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA). Sánchez’s title, “Sangre Joven,” is intriguing; 

by that he means the new revolutionary groups in Latin America that have replaced, joined 

forces with, or grown up alongside the older guerilla groups. In general, Sánchez finds 

Latin America to still be a violent area, and he provides an overview of the security situation in the region. Though the Cold War is over and Latin America is more developed and 

democratic than before, he posits that new revolutionary groups may emerge again. He 

then examines the trajectory of the long-established groups as well as the ideology of the 

newer ones, such as the Mexican EPR or the Paraguayan EPP. He provides a useful classification ranging from terrorist organizations to insurgencies to criminal organizations. In the 

same vein as Prof. Spencer’s article above, Sánchez concludes that, despite recent defeats, 

violence and violent groups in Latin America may be with us for a long time to come.

Prof. Vicente Torrijos, of the University of Rosario in Bogotá, Colombia, explores 

the concept of “legitimate defense” in a context where the European Union, the United 

Nations, and many nations have increasingly, except in exceptional circumstances, sought 

to rule out the use of force in solving either domestic or international conflicts. Dr. Torrijos 

begins with a historical treatment of the classical concept of self-defense. He explores its 

main features and requirements. But the heart of his analysis is the evolution of this legal 

institution in recent times, particularly in response to the newer doctrines of preventive or 

preemptive self-defense. Writing from the perspective of international law, Dr. Torrijos sets 

forth the concept and argues for a newer strategy of “preventive self-defense.” 

The final article in this section, by Dr. Juan Gómez, recently named Director of the 

Colombian Air Force Post-Graduate School and a former CHDS visiting fellow, deals with 

the increasing use of the armed forces, as distinct from the police, to fight not classical 

war and in the defense of national borders and security, but to combat domestic criminal 

activity. Gómez is aware of the pressures pushing governments to employ the armed forces 

in opposition to domestic criminal activity, rising violence, and armed gang activity. In 

countries such as Colombia and Mexico, the regular armed forces have been deployed in 

the wars against drugs and revolutionary armed groups when the police, with their smaller 

weapons, proved inadequate. Dr. Gómez recognizes the dangers of using the armed forces 

for domestic missions but he believes such use to be viable and necessary. What is important, he says, is to know when and how to employ them.

We include a special section in this issue entitled “Cooperation and Controversy.” We 

begin in this part of the Review with an article by CHDS Professor of National Security 

Kevin Newmeyer on the Honduran coup d’état of 2009 and the inter-American response to 

it. Prof. Newmeyer is strongly critical of the coup and supportive of both the inter-American Charter of Democracy, which condemns such military takeovers, and the Organization 

of American States (OAS), which imposed sanctions on Honduras. 

More controversial is the article by Hilary Collins and this author, reprinted in revised 

form from a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) publication, entitled 

“Constitutional Coups?” The authors begin with a comment by one of the giants of Latin 

American studies in the United States, the late Kalman Silvert, that coups and revolutions 

are a normal, recurrent, and regular part of the political process. Instead of being approving 

or disapproving, the authors go back to the original language of their constitutions, discov-
10 Security and Defense Studies Review

ering that 12 of the 20 countries have articles that allow the armed forces to play a political 

role as almost a fourth branch of government. Depending on your point of view, you can 

interpret these articles as (1) providing a constitutional justification for military takeovers; 

(2) contradicting the inter-American democracy charter; (3) providing a realistic picture of 

Latin American civil-military relations; or (4) all of these. 

But the issue is more complicated than that. Every country is different. The countries 

differ in terms of their economies, sociologies, politics, level of development, as well as 

civil-military relations. Generalizations that purport to cover all the countries are often 

inaccurate. Every situation is nuanced and the context of civil-military relations changes 

over time. What may have been more or less “acceptable” behavior (staging a coup) in an 

earlier period may no longer be so in the present circumstances.

For that reason we include two articles here on two different countries that illustrate 

these points. First, Dr. Hernán Castillo of Simón Bolívar University in Caracas analyzes 

“Cultura Política y Fuerzas Armadas en Venezuela.” Then, Luis Hernández, an independent political-military analyst and former Ecuadorean constituyente assembly member 

discusses, “El Control Civil de las Fuerzas Armadas en el Ecuador.” Both authors are thoroughly familiar with their own countries’ history and politics. Both discuss civil-military 

relations within the dynamics of these two very different countries. And both come to 

complementary but very different conclusions. The same could likely be said about civilmilitary relations in every country: every country is different—there are no hard rules that 

apply to all of them. We are left with the age-old dilemma: Can we generalize about all 

of Latin America or must every country be treated differently? One clear generalization 

emerges out of these four articles: the less developed the country, the less institutionalized 

it is, and the weaker the civil society, the more likely it is that the armed forces will or will 

be called upon to step into domestic politics. 

We conclude this issue with a section of book reviews: Matthew Finger’s review 

of Jodi Vittori’s Terrorist Financing and Resourcing; Joanna Gillia on Cristina Marcano 

and Alberto Barrera Tyszka’s Hugo Chávez; Patricia Kehoe’s review of Hal Brands’ Latin 

America’s Cold War; Celina Realuyo on Joseph Nye’s The Future of Power; and Robert 

Taylor’s review of Jorge Castañeda’s Mañana Forever. 

We think this is an exciting, readable, and stimulating issue of the Review; we invite 

our readers, scholars, and practitioners in Latin America, the United States, and worldwide 

to offer their comments or to submit a contribution of their own. 

Howard J. Wiarda

Guest Editor
Policy Statements

2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 13

U.S.–Latin American Security Ties: 

Episodic Relationships*

Ambassador (R.) Cresencio Arcos 

Anyone who attempts to address the current state of U.S.–Latin American security relations first encounters the “existential” conundrum: Does the United States truly have a 

defined strategic interest in the region and does it place it as a priority? Another challenge 

is the difficulty in explaining U.S. stated policy and its historical underpinnings. It is necessary first to review the somewhat “muddled” relations in their historical context.

In the aftermath of the Louisiana Purchase (1803) and the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America moved toward independence. The United States shortly after began showing expansionist interest in Texas, California, and Florida. By the start of 

the U.S.-Mexican war (second of five constitutionally declared wars) in 1846, both Texas 

and California had already been admitted into the Union. The peace treaty with Mexico 

(Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1848) ratified this acquisition along with the New Mexico Territory. 

During the United States Civil War, President Lincoln, who had previously decried (while 

in Congress) the Mexican War (1846–48) as “unjust,” provided political and logistical 

support to President Benito Juarez to repel the French-supported incursion. In the 1898 

war with Spain (third declared war) the United States acquired Cuba, Puerto Rico, and 

the Philippines, along with the Chamorro Islands (Guam) and the Mariana Islands. This 

added significantly to the U.S. Pacific presence. Almost immediately after, the U.S. role in 

helping Panama “break away” from Colombia became evident. Subsequently the Panama 

Canal became the avowed strategic interest of the United States

Plainly, as the 20th century began, the United States had demonstrated a predominant 

position in the Western Hemisphere over its southern neighbors and continued a series of 

intermittent interventions in the region (Nicaragua, Venezuela, Panama, Mexico, Haiti, 

and others). During the Mexican Revolution (1910–20) the United States became alarmed 

about German interest (Zimmerman letter) in recruiting Mexico as an ally in the event 

of a world war. Moreover, a U.S. envoy (Lane Wilson) purportedly was involved in the 

removal (assassination) of Mexican President Madero. Hence, the American ambassador 

became the poster child for U.S. meddling in Mexico. Later, President Franklin Roosevelt, 

in his inaugural address, introduced the Good Neighbor Policy as the first conciliatory and 

considerate overall treatment of Latin America. The result was that Mexico, Colombia, and 

Brazil actively sided with the Allies during World War II by sending combat units to the 

Pacific and Europe.

In the wake of the Allied victory, the U.S. retooled its defensive capabilities as it 

anticipated the Cold War. This included the 1947 National Security Act, which created 

the CIA, the National Security Council, and the Defense Department, which includes the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. In Latin America, the United States led the Pan-American Union in 

becoming a redefined and politically strengthened Organization of American States (OAS). 

Additionally, the Rio Treaty was forged as a hemispheric collective defense commitment 

*This policy statement has been adapted from a presentation given at The Royal College of Defence Studies 

London, UK, on April 14, 2011.
14 Security and Defense Studies Review

to the Western Bloc in the Cold War. In 1952, in a policy recommendation memorandum 

to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, George Kennan (father of the Containment Policy) 

identified the Latin American military establishment as the only institution in the region 

capable of an effective role in the Cold War. The Guatemalan episode (1954), with U.S. 

participation, resulted in the toppling of leftist President Arbenz. Additionally, the 1954 

U.S. Military Assistance Act evolved from this period. This policy arrangement provided 

the ideal vehicle for U.S. military support in the region. The second Cold War event in 

Latin America to cause U.S. direct involvement was Fidel Castro’s ascendency in Cuba 

(1959). It resulted in the Bay of Pigs fiasco for the United States (1961) and culminated 

with the most serious U.S.-Soviet direct confrontation of the entire Cold War: the Cuban 

Missile Crisis (1962). This denouement brought the superpowers to the brink of a thermonuclear exchange. In addition, it should be noted that the Alliance for Progress, a massive 

economic infusion of U.S. aid, was created by President Kennedy out of the perceived 

Soviet-Cuban threat to the region. With the increasingly costly U S involvement in Vietnam, however, the Alliance sputtered and had lost its way by the late 1960s.

The third and final U.S. Cold War direct engagement in the Hemisphere was again 

in Central America (1979–91). The Soviet Union had opportunistically supported the successful Sandinista Revolution (1979). At the same time, the Cubans encouraged and supported the Farabundo Martí National Liberation insurgency (FMLN) in El Salvador. This 

involvement in the Central American region included U.S. support of the Nicaraguan Resistance (Contras), who had a stated goal of arms interdiction but informally sought to 

undermine the Sandinista Regime. This decade-long support of the Contras (circa 20,000 

strong) helped nudge the Sandinistas to ultimately seek an electoral process, which they 

lost. The United States opted to support a “political” solution (elections) in Nicaragua. The 

GHW Bush administration recognized that the Reagan administration policy with regard to 

Nicaragua was one of “insufficiency.” A defeat or weakening of the Sandinista Regime by 

the Contras was not feasible with the inadequate and inconsistent congressionally approved 

military assistance. The situation was further exacerbated by the lack of any meaningful effort to attain a political or diplomatic solution. However, the notable feature of U.S. policy 

in this final Cold War encounter was “rollback.” The Reagan administration exceeded a 

“containment” policy effort. It sought to roll back the Soviet Bloc out of the Central American isthmus. It was a parallel policy to U.S. efforts in rolling back the Soviets in Afghanistan. Unlike in Afghanistan, the declining Soviet power welcomed the electoral defeat of 

the Sandinistas (1990) as a face-saving way out. Subsequently, the Cuban-backed FMLN 

(1992) agreed to a cessation of hostilities in El Salvador. The Soviet Union’s impending 

demise doubtlessly influenced both Soviet and Cuban support for liberation movements. 

Eventually, Moscow central resources effectively disappeared, whereas the United States 

was able to extricate itself with satisfactory results in the region.

The post–Cold War period (1991–2001) revealed a “non-retooling” of U.S. military 

capabilities corresponding to the emerging “asymmetrical” threats: organized crime, international terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking. This last challenge has helped to underwrite 

and replace formerly Soviet-Cuban financed insurgencies. Moreover, the 9/11 terrorist attack refocused U.S. policy and engagement in the world. 

Meanwhile, in Latin America this horrific event coincided with the rise of Hugo 

Chávez in Venezuela and its subsequent Bolivarian and ALBA initiatives. Chávez’s political behavior and foreign policy objectives became suffused with anti-Americanism. His 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 15

windfall petroleum earnings have enabled him to defiantly oppose U.S. policy and have 

increased his potential for political and security mischief in the region. This has resulted in 

a challenge to the hegemony of the United States, which has lessened its commitment of 

resources to the region significantly. Both the second Bush and the Obama administrations 

have seen U.S. influence diminished in the hemisphere. In the early days of these challenges it could be heard as “In Latin America the Left no longer fears the Americans, and 

the Right has lost its respect for the United States. Both ideological camps have incorrectly 

assumed that the United States would readily smash the Left, and when nothing occurred 

this sentiment became pervasive. Chávez’s oil billions greatly enabled him to win friends 

and keep his enemies in check owing to their dependence on oil (12 percent of U.S. oil 

imports). Chávez is perceived as a threat by many security analysts, but currently it is the 

insidious nature of illicit drug cartels that has gathered momentum and become the greater 

immediate challenge for the entire region. 

As for Colombia, together with the United States it has achieved great success in 

quelling and weakening the FARC insurgency, but has not eliminated the cultivation, production, and trafficking of cocaine. The narcotics criminal enterprise continues to expand 

throughout the region. Nonetheless, Colombia under former President Uribe is generally 

thought to have achieved great success restoring stability to the country. This success could 

well be a Pyrrhic victory, however.

Recently, Mexico’s drug cartels have caused a great deal of insecurity and violence. 

There is no recognized insurgency in Mexico. Organized crime, which engenders violence 

and widespread corruption, persists. Ironically, the criminal threat to the Mexican state 

is further aggravated by its proximity to the United States, which is the largest narcotics 

market in world, and the easy access to sophisticated firearms along the U.S.-Mexico border. In sum, the cartels, with enormous capacity for corrupting institutions and generating 

widespread violence, have weakened Mexico’s fledgling democracy. 

Additionally, Central America, suffering from endemic official corruption, is today 

a narcotics transit area increasingly becoming a criminal zone of contention. Some political observers are predicting that Mexico and Central America may become candidates for 

failed-state status. This has compelled the United States to seek a Colombia-like solution 

for these countries to overcome these asymmetrical criminal threats. But unlike Colombia, 

this northern part of Latin America has not produced an effective leader along the lines of 

Álvaro Uribe. Furthermore, Mexico’s national will has not yet effectively manifested a 

robust demand for successful government control of the violence. Clearly, the post–Cold 

War security challenge in Latin America has become fundamentally a law enforcement 

issue that is further magnified by endemic corruption and in some cases by incipient insurgencies. 

Lastly, the strategic threat for the United States in the region that looms in a more 

traditional fashion is China. Its economic development needs require enormous quantities 

of basic commodities, such as oil, bauxite, lithium, and uranium, which are present in Latin 

America in sizable amounts ready to be extracted. In fact, the Western Hemisphere is second only to Asia in terms of Chinese investment in these resources. One difficulty afflicting 

the United States is its lack of clarity in its policy toward China. The U.S. ambiguity has 

not allowed a clear definition of China’s position, which oscillates from being regarded 

as a competitor, a rival, or an enemy. Furthermore, the role of China as a significant U.S. 

creditor further vexes U.S. policy-makers. The Chinese challenge may become strategic in 
16 Security and Defense Studies Review

nature as it threatens U.S. traditional influence in Latin America. Hence, the United States’ 

focus should be in seeking a mature and equal partnership with the countries of the Western 

Hemisphere. The United States should further encourage its southern neighbors to promote 

civil-military engagement in developing sound national security strategies. 

Another element to consider is the Iranian presence in the region, which, though limited, serves as a reminder of its potential capacity to carry out terrorist activities. This will 

undoubtedly require not only strategic consideration but a pragmatic approach to counter 

the possibility. Iran may seem to be interested in the Hemisphere, but currently the nature 

of its efforts suggests they are purposely limited. Currently, it appears Teheran may be 

seeking a position in the region to merely rattle the United States. 

In conclusion, a U.S. perceived retreat or abdication from Latin America along with 

a lack of an adequate security/defense retooling to address the looming asymmetrical and 

conventional threats is counterproductive. It should be noted that in Washington, Latin 

America has not attracted powerful and influential domestic constituencies as has Europe, 

the Middle East, the Asia-Pacific, and even Africa with numerous and effective U.S. NGOs. 

As a result, Latin America lacks the influential presence of a powerful and skillful “lobby” 

to ensure that U.S. policy makers stay consistently focused on the region.
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 17

Securing Defense and Cooperation in South America:

Geopolitical Changes, UNASUR, and the SDC

María Luisa Parraguez Kobek

ABSTRACT

This academic paper provides an analysis of the regional concerns and challenges 

presented in the Declaration of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, as a result of the IX 

Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas (CDMA) held in Bolivia in 

2010. It focuses on the importance of cooperation in defense and security matters 

in the region, specifically in the advancement of the implementation of measures 

of confidence promotion and security recently approved by the South American 

Defense Council (SDC) of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).

The South American Region in Perspective

Hemispheric integration is not a new idea. Its inspiration dates back to Simón Bolívar 

at the Congress of Panama in 1826, where he first proposed joining the region’s nations 

against external imperial domination. This initiative was followed up at the First International Conference of American States in 1889-1890 in Washington, D.C., which gave birth 

to what in 1948 became a regional organization under the Charter of the Organization of 

American States, thus making the OAS the oldest regional organization in the world. Article 1 of the OAS Charter states that the goal of the member nations in creating the OAS 

is: “to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their 

collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence.”1

 Currently, the Organization is composed of 35 independent states of the Western 

Hemisphere, and its current agenda includes: strengthening democracy; working for peace; 

defending human rights; fostering free trade; fighting the drug trade; and promoting sustainable development.2

Following the attacks on Pearl Harbor during World War II, the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) was established in 1942 as a regional organization for the protection 

of and collective defense against extra regional threats in the Western Hemisphere. It is 

considered the oldest permanent organ for military cooperation in continuous operation 

in the world. Its chairmanship has only been held by two nations: the United States of 

America (1942-2006) and Brazil (2006-present). 

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, there have been attempts to modernize and to expand its original perspectives on territorial integrity. In 2006, with elected 

governments in the region holding sway, the IADB was officially recognized as part of the 

OAS, making it subject to its statutes: “The Board and the Organization of American States 

share common objectives under the OAS Charter and respect for the principle of civilian 

oversight of the armed forces within the context of representative democracy.”3

 Made up 

of the Council of Delegates, the Secretariat, and the Inter-American Defense College for 

advanced academic training of its members, the IADB is an advisory body with headquarters in Washington, D.C., that provides technical advice and services to the OAS.
18 Security and Defense Studies Review

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and a change in the international system, the 1991 

Santiago Commitment to Democracy4 became a cornerstone of the renewal of the InterAmerican System, initiating a process of consultation on hemispheric security. It was followed up by the First Summit of the Americas5

 in Miami, Florida, in 1994. There the 

member nations instructed the OAS to: 

...follow up on and expand topics relating to confidence and security building 

measures; analyze the meaning, scope, and implications of international security 

concepts in the Hemisphere, with a view to developing the most appropriate 

common approaches by which to manage their various aspects, including 

disarmament and arms control; and pinpoint ways to revitalize and strengthen 

the institutions of the inter-American system related to the various aspects of 

Hemispheric Security.6

As a result of this process, in 1995 the OAS institutionalized the Committee on Hemispheric Security (CHS) as a Committee of the Permanent Council of the OAS. 

In addition, and as a response to the post 9/11 challenges, the new security agenda 

for the hemisphere assumed a multidimensional approach with regard to security. This was 

discussed and adopted at the Special Conference on Security held in Mexico City in 2003, 

which stated that the security of states of the Hemisphere is affected by traditional and new 

threats including: terrorism, transnational organized crime, the global drug problem, corruption, asset laundering, and illicit trafficking in weapons. It also mentions that extreme 

poverty erodes social cohesion and undermines the security, stability and democracy of 

states. Other challenges and threats include natural and man-made disasters, HIV/AIDS 

and other diseases, other health risks, environmental degradation, trafficking in persons, 

attacks to cyber security, the potential for damage to arise in the event of an accident or 

incident during the maritime transport of potentially hazardous materials, including petroleum and radioactive materials and toxic waste, and the possibility of access, possession, 

and use of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by terrorists.7

The Secretariat for Multidimensional Security of the OAS was established in 2005 

with the mandate to coordinate the cooperation of the member States to fight against threats 

and secure the protection of human beings. It is composed of the Executive Secretariat of 

the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) established in 1986; the 

Secretariat of the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) established in 

1999; the Department of Public Security (DPS) established in 2006, and the Department 

of Defense and Hemispheric Security (DDHS) established in 2011. All of these agencies 

were designed to promote cooperation and coordination of the member countries in their 

respective areas. 

The Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas (CDMA)

The DDHS also provides support to the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, which is to be convened next in Uruguay in 2012. Following the 1994 Summit of 

the Americas held in Miami, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, invited the 

Defense Ministers of the Americas to meet in Williamsburg, Virginia, to discuss post–Cold 

War cooperation in the region. In the closing statement of the Conference, Secretary Perry 

declared that “by dedicating our countries to democratic values, active support for confidence building measures, and greater bilateral and regional cooperation in defense, we 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 19

will establish a solid foundation to meet the Hemisphere ́s security challenges of the 21st

century.”8 Its focus on democracy, cooperation, transparency, and security-building measures, and the establishment of its guiding values have been referred to thereafter as the 

“Williamsburg Principles.”

The Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas was set up “to provide a valuable forum of debate for the countries of the Hemisphere with the purpose of increasing 

cooperation in the areas of Defense and Security.”9 Its guiding foundation has been the 

Williamsburg Principles: 

1. To uphold the promise of the Santiago Agreement, that the preservation of democracy 

is the basis for ensuring our mutual security; 

2. To acknowledge that military and security forces play a critical role in supporting and 

defending the legitimate interests of sovereign democratic states; 

3. To affirm the commitments of our countries in Miami, and again at the Conference 

of Defense Ministers held in Managua in 2006, that our Armed Forces should be 

subordinate to democratically controlled authority, act within the bounds of national 

Constitutions, and respect human rights through training and practice; 

4. To increase transparency in defense matters through exchanges of information, 

through reporting on defense expenditures, and by greater civilian-military dialogue; 

5. To set as a goal for our hemisphere the resolution of outstanding disputes by negotiated settlement and widespread adoption of confidence building measures, all of this 

in a time-frame consistent with the pace of hemispheric economic integration, and 

to recognize that the development of our economic security profoundly affects our 

defense security, and vice versa; and

6. To promote greater defense cooperation in support of voluntary participation in UNsanctioned peacekeeping operations, and to cooperate in a supportive role in the fight 

against narco-terrorism.10

The three central themes throughout the history of the CDMA have been democracy, 

civilian/military dialogue, and transparency. 

The preservation of democracy is the basis for ensuring our mutual security. 

Acknowledge that military and security forces play a critical role in supporting 

and defending the legitimate interests of sovereign democratic states. Increase 

transparency in defense matters through exchanges of information, through 

reporting on defense expenditures, and by greater civilian-military dialogue.11

The CDMA has dealt with various issues including disaster relief, peace support 

operations, civil-military relations, and emerging threats such as transnational organized 

crime and terrorism. These were the agenda items discussed at the Conference of Defense 

Ministers of the Americas in Banff, Canada, in 2008 and in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, in 2010.

The Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas–Banff, Canada, 2008

The main focus of the Banff, Canada, Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas 

was terrorism. The crux of the declaration expressed the ministers’ most vehement con-
20 Security and Defense Studies Review

demnation of terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, as they considered it criminal 

and unjustifiable under any circumstances, regardless of where and by whom it is committed, and because it constituted a serious threat to international peace and security and to 

democracy, stability, and prosperity of the countries of the region.12 The participants also 

rejected the presence or action of illegal armed groups that carry out or promote violence, 

regardless of their origin or motivation. 

Finally, the declaration stated that there was a commitment to fight transnational organized crime, including illicit trafficking in weapons, trafficking in drugs and their precursor chemicals, trafficking in human beings, human smuggling, corruption, money laundering, and other related crimes. It underscored that these affect human rights and constitute a 

threat to international peace and security, to institutions and democratic values, and to the 

determination of the member States to confront them in a cooperative, decisive, and comprehensive manner. The struggle against these threats, it added, must furthermore ensure 

the full respect for international law, human rights, and due process standards, in accordance with each member State’s constitutional order and national legislation. 

The Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas–Santa Cruz de la Sierra, 

Bolivia, 2010

The Defense Ministers Conference in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, included a few 

additional points that were at its focus (Table 1). First, the ministers agreed to support a 

system of tracking expenditures on conventional arms in both the United Nations and the 

Organization of American States. Second, they settled on developing cooperative mechanisms to speed military aid to civil authorities in disaster response. Finally, they decided 

to strengthen civilian competency in managing defense ministries. There were also matters of importance to the United States, such as: “counternarcotics, curbing unnecessary 

weapons purchases, boosting cooperation in disaster response, and strengthening the competency of civilians now working in most of the hemisphere’s defense ministries.”13 In 

addition, disaster response made up the bulk of the substantive articles of the Declaration.

Table 1—The Main Principles of the Santa Cruz Declaration

Democracy The recognition of civil contributions, including those of the academic sector on defense and 

security; in compliance with the OAS Charter and the UN Charter

Peace The promotion of peace under UN principles for the countries of the Americas

Security The strengthening of abilities for humanitarian assistance; the adoption of International Human 

Rights 

Solidarity Support provided to nations affected by natural and anthropogenic disasters

Cooperation Support provided to nations in addition to prevention, preparation, and recuperation

The Environment A commitment to sustainable activities

Source: Elaborated with information obtained from La Declaración de Santa Cruz, retrieved on April 20, 2011,from http://

www.flacso.org/uploads/media/Declaracion_de_Santa_Cruz.pdf.

Despite mutual confidence-promotion efforts in the region, a perception of weak and 

inefficient institutions in facing transnational threats has become an important issue in 

South America. Both the OAS and the IADB are considered by some countries to be ineffective in preventing regional crises and dealing with them once they have occurred.14 The 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 21

Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the South American Defense Council 

(CDS) were born, in part, due to this perception and as an attempt to facilitate strategic and 

operational regional cooperation.

The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)

Rich and unique in many different ways, the South American region holds important geographical, economic, and social potential (Table 2). It is spread out over a large land mass 

with a population of some 400 million inhabitants and holds one of the largest fresh water 

reserves on the planet, as well as the Amazon as a regulating force of global ecological 

equilibrium, oil and gas reserves for the next 100 years, an amazing biodiversity, and what 

many claim is a backdrop of ethnic encounters that represent a culture and a cosmovision.15

Table 2 — The Potential of the South American Region (UNASUR)

Geographical Economic Social

• Land mass more than 17 million km2

• 27% of the fresh water 

reserves in the world

• 8 million km2 of forests and 

2 oceans

• Hydrocarbons for 100 years

• GDP of US$973,613 

million placing it as the 

fifth largest power in the 

world 

• Its exports reach 

US$181,856 million 

• Produces and exports the 

most amount of food in 

the world

• Population of 361 million inhabitants, 

4th in the world

• 95% of its inhabitants practice a single 

religion

• Its inhabitants speak two similar 

languages 

• A common history and shared values

Source: Elaborated with information obtained from the Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR), retrieved on April 22, 

2011, from http://www.comunidadandina.org/sudamerica.htm.

The region has undergone several important processes. The initial stage of an economic and political integration occurred from the 1960s to the 1990s with the Latin American Integration Association (Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración, ALADI), the 

Andean Community of Nations (Comunidad Andina de Naciones, CAN), and the South 

American Common Market (Mercado Común Suramericano, MERCOSUR). In 2000, the 

region entered into a new model of regional integration, and in 2004 the Union of South 

American Nations (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, UNASUR) was created following 

the example of the European Union (Map 1, Diagram 1). Its Constitutive Treaty, signed on 

May 23, 2008, at the Third Summit of Heads of State in Brasilia, Brazil, entered into force 

on March 11, 2011. 

UNASUR was in part the result of the integration of two existing customs unions: 

the MERCOSUR and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) (Table 3), but it was 

also created to address the perception that hemispheric and regional institutions were not 

meeting the demands of South American states. UNASUR seeks to build upon the existing 

sub-regional processes and promotes political and financial, infrastructure, security, and 

the resolution of conflicts. All the significant cooperation efforts in the region focus on 

democracy, human rights promotion, security, and development, and they all converge in 

the most recent integration efforts, the UNASUR.
22

Map 1— Member Countries of UNASUR

Source: Information obtained from the Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, retrieved on April 22, 2011.
23

Diagram 1 — Organogram of UNASUR

Source: UNASUR Constitutive Treaty, Retrieved on June 15, 2011, from http://www.pptunasir.com/inicio.php.
24

Table 3 — South American Integration

1960 – 1980 1983 – 1994 1996 – 1999 2000 – 2011

Initial Stage of 

Integration

South American 

Economic Integration

South American 

Political Integration

New Model of South American 

Integration

Latin American 

Integration Association (ALADI)

Latin American 

Free Trade Association (LAFTA) 

(TM60) (1960)

Caracas Protocol 

(1969)

Montevideo Treaty 

Latin American 

Integration Association (TM80) 

(1980)

Economic Complementation 

Agreement CAN-MERCOSUR 

(2003)

Andean Community of Nations 

(CAN)

Cartagena 

Agreement 

(1969) 

Venezuela joins 

the Treaty (1973)

Chile withdraws 

from the Treaty 

(1976)

Andean Court 

of Justice, 

Andean Parliament, and the 

Andean Council 

of Foreign Affairs Ministries 

(1979) 

Principle of 

applicability of 

communitarian 

rules (1983)

Andean nations 

adopt an open 

model of integration (1983)

Free Trade Area 

(Peru abstains 

(1993)

Customs Union 

(1994)

Political direction 

to the integration 

process (1997)

Peru starts its gradual incorporation to 

the Free Trade Area 

(1997)

Framework Agreement for the creation 

of a Free Trade Area 

between the Andean 

Community and 

MERCOSUR (1998)

Andean-American 

Council on Commerce and Investment (1998)

Andean Charter for Peace and 

Security (2000)

Economic Complementation 

Agreement signed between the 

Andean Community and MERCOSUR to the establishment of a 

Free Trade Area (2002)

Economic Complementation 

Agreement CAN-MERCOSUR 

(2003)

Integral Plan of Social Development (2003)

South American Community of 

Nations (2004)

Guidelines for the Common Foreign Security Policy (2004)

Andean Strategy for Disaster 

Prevention and Attention (2004)

Venezuela’s withdraw (2006)

Chile’s incorporation/Mixed 

Commission Andean CommunityChile (2006)

The Andean Community activates 

the Satellite Network “Simón 

Bolívar” (2010)

Andean Passport (2010)
25

South 

American 

Common 

Market 

(MERCOSUR)

Declaration of Foz 

de Iguazú 

(ArgentinaBrazil) 

(1985)

Asunción 

Treaty (The 

creation of 

MERCOSUR) 

(1991)

Formalization of the 

Common 

Market 

Ouro Preto 

Protocol 

(1994)

Declaration on 

Democratic 

Commitment 

in MERCOSUR (Bolivia 

and Chile join) 

(1996)

Customs 

Union (1999)

Framework 

Agreement for 

the creation of 

a Free Trade 

Area between 

the Andean 

Community 

and MERCOSUR (1998)

Labor and 

Social Declaration (1998)

Ushuaia 

Protocol on 

Democratic 

Commitment 

(1998)

Political 

Declaration of 

MERCOSUR, 

Bolivia y 

Chile as a 

Peace Region 

(1998)

Economic Complementation Agreement signed 

between the Andean Community and MERCOSUR 

for the establishment of a 

Free Trade Area (2002)

Agreement on Residence 

for Nationals of States 

Parties of MERCOSUR, 

Bolivia and Chile (2002)

Olivos Protocol for the 

settlement of Disputes 

(2002)

Economic Complementation Agreement ACN-MERCOSUR (2003)

South American Community of Nations (2004)

Fund for Structural Convergence of MERCOSUR 

(FOCEM) (2004)

Constitutive Protocol of the 

MERCOSUR Parliament 

(2005)

Protocol of Accession of 

Venezuela (2006)

Democracy Observatory 

of MERCOSUR (MDGs) 

(2007)

MERCOSUR Action Plan 

for Cooperation on Biofuels 

(2007)

MERCOSUR Social Institute (ISM) (2007)

Union of 

South American Nations 

(UNASUR)

South American Community of Nations (2004)

Margarita Declaration 

(2007)

Signature of the Treaty 

Establishing UNASUR 

(2008)

South American Defense 

Council (2009)

UNASUR acquires legal 

status (2011)

Source: Elaborated with information obtained from the Comunidad Andina de Naciones, May 16, 2011; ¿Quiénes Somos?: Cronología por fechas, Comunidad Andina de Naciones, retrieved on May 16, 2011, from http://www.comunidadandina.org/quienes/

crono.htm; A. Martinez, Noticias: Ratifican Tratado Constitutivo del UNASUR, from El Nuevo Herald, retrieved on May 16, 

2011, from http://www.elnuevoherald.com/2011/03/12/901940/ratifican-tratado-constitutivo.html; Mercado Común Suramericano, Acerca del Mercosur. Secretaría General del Mercosur, retrieved on May 16, 2011, from http://www.mercosur.int/t_generic.

jsp?contentid=655&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=2#antecedentes; Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, May 16, 2011. Sobre UNASUR, retrieved on May 16, 2011, from http://www.pptunasur.com/contenidos.php?menu=1&submenu1=12&idiom=1.
26 Security and Defense Studies Review

UNASUR Gains Legitimacy

One of the first significant actions shortly after the creation of UNASUR was its involvement in the aftermath of events of Pando, Bolivia, in 2008. It engaged in the resolution process following the peasant protests and encounters with mercenary forces of the prefectures 

in the wealthiest part of Bolivia, Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, Chuquisaca, and Pando. According to the UNASUR Commission Report, there were 18 casualties.16 The rapid response 

and execution of the Moneda Declaration in support for the Government of President Evo 

Morales was a key element in avoiding an escalation of the conflict. The active role of 

UNASUR as an external figure of authority through its Pando Events Commission assisted 

in legitimizing the process and in reducing the tension on both sides. Considered a success, 

UNASUR consolidated itself with how it engaged in this event and gained the approval of 

the member nations as a useful and necessary organization in the region.

The Moneda Declaration of September 15, 2008, brought together the heads of State 

in the region only four days after the Pando events. It declared that: (1) They expressed 

their full backing to the Constitutional Government of the President of the Republic of Bolivia, Evo Morales, whose mandate was ratified by a large majority in a recent referendum; 

(2) They warned that their respective governments rejected any attempt of a civil coup, the 

disruption of the institutional order, or that any group should compromise the territorial 

integrity of the Republic of Bolivia; (3) The ministers condemned the attack on the government installations and public security forces by groups that sought to destabilize Bolivian 

democracy, requesting for a prompt return of the installations as a condition to begin the 

dialogue process.17

In addition, they recommended a call to all the political and social actors involved 

to take the necessary measures to immediately cease violent actions, intimidation, and 

disregard of institutional democracy, and established the rule of law. In this context, they 

expressed their firm condemnation for the massacre at Pando and supported the call made 

by the Bolivian government for a UNASUR Commission to be created for an impartial 

investigation that would shed light on this regrettable event and provide recommendations 

to guarantee that it would not be left unpunished. They asked for all the members of the 

Bolivian society to preserve the national unity and the territorial integrity of the country, the basic principles of the State, and to reject any attempt to undermine them. They 

called for dialogue to establish the conditions that would allow for the situation to improve 

and to search for a sustainable solution within the framework of respect for the law. The 

presidents of the member states of UNASUR agreed to create a commission open to all 

its members, coordinated by the pro-tempore presidency, to carry out the work of a roundtable dialogue led by the government of Bolivia. They created a commission to support 

the Bolivian government in its operations, including a specialized human resource staff. 

Engaging in Pando gave UNASUR regional legitimacy. 

The South American Defense Council (SDC)

The South American Defense Council (SDC) was created within UNASUR and is made up 

of 12 member nations and two observers.18 It was established in 2009 under the Declaration 

of Santiago de Chile and is founded on the principles of respect for sovereignty and selfdetermination, the territorial integrity of the States, and nonintervention in internal affairs. 

Its objectives are: (a) to consolidate South America as a zone of peace, which is the base 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 27

for democratic stability and development, and to contribute to world peace; (b) to build 

a South American identity in matters of defense that takes into account the sub-regional 

and national characteristics, and that contributes to the strengthening of the unity of Latin 

America and the Caribbean; and (c) to generate consensus to strengthen regional cooperation in matters of defense.

The Defense Minister of Brazil, Nelson Jobim, announced in 2008 to the United 

States Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, and the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, 

and then to the Inter-American Defense Board the initiative to form a South American Defense Council. Minister Jobim presented the alliance as a continental security organization 

that, unlike the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), did not anticipate the creation 

of combat units and would be based on the principle of “non-intervention, sovereignty and 

territoriality.”19 Minister Jobim undertook the task of traveling across South America to 

promote the idea of military integration. His mission was to meet with the president of each 

country in the Southern Cone, as well as the defense ministers of each nation, thus promoting the initiative to adopt it. Although this was a challenging undertaking, the defense ministers had been meeting regularly since 1995 at the Conference of Defense Ministers of the 

Americas and on a bilateral basis, and he managed to convene the nations of the UNASUR.

The SDC in principle is not designed as a Latin American NATO. One of the main 

elements that stands out between the two is the concept of security (Table 4). NATO considers security maintenance from the perspective of active growth in military strength, unilaterally or with all of the member states. The SDC observed security as a means of peace 

promotion where there is no need for an increase in military capacity. 

Table 4 — Comparative Graph of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the South American Defense Council (SDC)

NATO SDC

Key Action Document Strategic Concept 2010

(in force for one decade)

Plan of Action 2009

Fundamental Principles Individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and 

the rule of law

Peace promotion, democracy, cooperation, military training, and complementarity

Central Activities Collective defense, multinational crisis management operations, cooperative securityMilitary cooperation, humanitarian 

action, and peace operations

Leadership Clear United States leadership, important though 

secondary role of European nations

Brazil is deemed as the most probable 

leader; not officially declared as such 

by the rest of the members

Military Vision It was conceived through a common enemy It was conceived with a common 

objective 

Source: Elaborated with information obtained from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2010). Strategic Concept. NATO’s 

official Web site, retrieved on June 15, 2011, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_56626.htm?#1; North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (2010). Collective Defence. NATO’s official Web site, retrieved on June 15, 2011, from http://www.nato.

int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2010); The North Atlantic Treaty. NATO’s 

official Web site, retrieved on June 15, 2011 from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_59378.htm?; Plan de Acción 2009, 

Consejo de Defensa Suramericano (CDS) de la UNASUR, January 2009.

The difference between cooperative security maintained by the SDC is what points 

toward the standard of military practices and protocols. For example, points d and g in the 

Plan of Action 200920 of the SDC provide an interesting analysis. While NATO maintains 
28 Security and Defense Studies Review

a unified command, it does not seek for its member states the sharing of its military forces 

to maintain a collective process in matters such as communication protocols. Points h and 

i of the Plan of Action 2009 establish a framework for sharing experience with regards to 

strategic sources of information for humanitarian action and natural disasters.

While NATO has been a collective security force since 1949, made up of multiple 

military apparatus but different in shape and substance, the SDC seeks to bring into line its 

strategic objectives; that is, multiple military forces with different processes. Although it 

is still too soon to consider, this maintains a favorable position for the possible creation of 

a unified military force. NATO has observed conventional security means and focuses on 

conflict. The SDC maintains a different vision of security; for example, the protection of 

the environment as a security exercise. 

Conclusions

Sovereignty and intervention are the center of the current debate in international affairs, 

especially when it comes to the discussion of the “justified use of force” in dealing with 

human rights and international humanitarian assistance. Thus far there appear to be more 

questions than answers regarding the most recent trend in regional integration on security 

and defense matters in South America. 

The question of defining sovereignty, whether on traditional terms or newly defined 

terms, will be an interesting challenge for SDC member nations. The SDC is a defense 

council, not a security council. Taking into account the marked historical and ideological 

differences between the South American nations, it will be interesting to follow the type of 

military exercises and activities carried out by the SDC. Considering the level of success of 

previously established institutions in the region, the SDC has an enormous task of bringing 

forward the impetus of the council. Its relations with other regional security councils, such 

as the IADC or Southern Command, will make future developments in the region even 

more interesting. These are some of the issues that still need to be addressed as the integration process develops over time. 

In addition, one must consider the latest development of the ALBA nations21 to create 

a Defense Academy near Santa Cruz, Bolivia, announced in May 2011. Its stated objective 

is to promote the peace and cooperation processes of the region and to design strategies to 

respond to the threat of foreign intervention on the continent.22 This is in reference primarily to the role of the United States and its allied nations in the region. The ALBA Academy’s 

activities include military training on security and defense for both military and civilians of 

member nations. Based on the ideology of President Hugo Chávez’s socialism of the 21st

century, it challenges in particular the former School of the Americas, but also the schools, 

centers and institutes of hemispheric security studies that are currently providing “imperialist training.”23 There is also a perception by the ALBA nations that drug trafficking in the 

region is a problem of the United States and not necessarily an issue that South American 

nations need to address. The larger geopolitical scenario was also displayed in the relation 

between Venezuela and Iran, as one of the invited guests to the inauguration of the ALBA 

Defense Academy was the Defense Minister of Iran.24

The Closure Act of Santa Cruz (Acta de Clausura y Declaración de Santa Cruz de la 

Sierra, 2010) states that the mutual trust and security measures recently approved within 

the South American Defense Council of UNASUR with its corresponding application, 

guarantees and verification mechanisms and procedures are: (1) the exchange of informa-
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 29

tion on the organization of national defense systems; (2) military expenditures; (3) military 

activities within and outside the region; and (4) the reporting of maneuvers, deployment, 

and exercises in the border zones, among others. It recognizes the importance of generating 

consensus for defense and security in the region. Likewise, the SDC promotes the idea of 

a South American vision and identity in defense matters. It proposes to share experiences 

and to approve humanitarian actions; for example, demining, prevention, mitigation, and 

assistance to victims of natural disasters in the region. This was the case as it declared 

solidarity with the people of Haiti and Chile after the earthquakes that occurred in those 

countries in 2010.

The Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas—respecting the Charter of 

the Organization of American States (1948), Williamsburg Agreements (1995), the InterAmerican Democratic Charter (2001)—recognizes that the military and security forces 

take on a critical role in supporting and defending the legitimate sovereign interests of 

democratic states. These must be subordinated to the authority of democratic control, act 

within the limits of national constitutions, and display respect for human rights through 

training and practice. Likewise, it seeks to increase the level of transparency in defense 

matters through the exchange of information through reports of defense spending and a 

greater civil-military dialogue.

The idea of regional integration began with Simón Bolívar and continues in the 21st 

century. The most recent attempt is called UNASUR. In South America there is a marked 

difference between security and defense, even at the constitutional level. The South American Defense Council (SDC) has several important challenges of origin and design that 

need to be addressed. First, the world in the 21th century has taken on new challenges, 

with contemporary international relations theory today taking into consideration a series 

of factors not conventionally included in an analysis. South American nations have not 

traditionally applied these new concepts specifically with regard to the classic definition 

of state and sovereignty. In addition, one must analyze the purpose of establishing a South 

American Defense Council in an age in which international affairs has more to do with 

security matters than with defense—drug trafficking, organized crime, illegal immigration, 

for example. Likewise, there is a long and deep history of confidence-building measures 

linked to sovereignty issues that may present important challenges to this integration. 

Notes

1 The Organization of American States, Article 1, retrieved on March 1, 2011, from http://

www.tjsl.edu/slomansonb/3.5_OASChart.pdf.

2 The Organization of American States has 35 independent member states and 66 permanent observer countries. Certain countries have been excluded or suspended, for example: 

Cuba was excluded in 1962 and the suspension was lifted in 2009 with conditions attached 

for readmission; and Honduras was suspended after the coup d ́état that expelled President 

Manuel Zelaya in 2009. 

3

 The Organization of American States, Committee on Hemispheric Security, retrieved on 

March 1, 2011, from www.oas.org/consejo.
30 Security and Defense Studies Review

4

 Declaration of Santiago on Democracy and Public Trust: A New Commitment to Good 

Governance for the Americas, retrieved on March 15, 2011, from http://www.oas.org/

xxxiiiga/english/docs/agdoc4224_03rev3.pdf.

5

 The First Summit of the Americas was held in Miami, Florida, USA, in 1994, followed by 

the Second Summit in Santiago, Chile, in 1998; the Third Summit in Quebec City, Quebec, 

Canada, in 2001; the Fourth Summit in Mar del Plata, Argentina, in 2005; the Fifth Summit in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, in 2009; and the Sixth is scheduled to be held in 

Cartagena, Colombia, in 2012.

6

 Organization of American States, Special Conference on Security, Mexico City, Mexico, October 27-28, 2003. Retrieved on July 31, 2011, from http://www.oas.org/en/sms/

docs/DECLARATION%20SECURITY%20AMERICAS%20REV%201%20-%2028%20

OCT%202003%20CE00339.pdf.

7

 Ibid., p.4.

8

 U.S. Department of State, retrieved on March 15, 2011, from http://www.state.gov/p/wha/

rls/71001.htm.

9

 Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, retrieved on March 20, 2011, from 

http://www.cdamericas.org.

10 Ibid.

11 Defense Ministerial of the Americas, retrieved on April 5, 2011, from http://www.summit_americas.org.

12 U.S. Department of State, Declaration of Banff, September 2008, retrieved on April 8, 

2011, from http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/109304.htm.

13 America’s Forum, “Shouts and Whispers at the Defense Ministerial of the Americas,” retrieved on March 26, 2011, from http://americasforum.com/content/shouts-andwhispers-defense-ministerial-americas. 

14 Nil Nikandrov, “The Organization of American States (OAS) without the US: An Alternative,” Global Research, Center for Research on Globalization, retrieved on March 26, 

2011, from http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=18275.

15 E. Velit Granda, “Los desafíos de la unión sudamericana,” 29 de mayo 2008, El Comercio de Perú, Comunidad Andina, Secretaría General, retrieved on March 31, 2011, from 

http://www.comunidadandina.org/prensa/articulos/elcomercio29-5-08.htm.

16 Pando, Bolivia is considered one of the first significant actions of UNASUR. Retrieved 

on May 24, 2011, http://www.comunidadandina.org/unasur/15-9-08com_bolivia.htm; 

http://eju.tv/2008/10/unasur-entregar-a-fines-de-noviembre-informe-final-sobre-masacreen-pando/.

17 The Moneda Declaration, retrieved on April 15, 2011, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/

spanish/latin_america/newsid_7618000/7618033.stm. 

18 The members of the South American Defense Council are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 

Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 

The two Member States with Observer Status are: Mexico and Panama. UNASUR, retrieved on June 5, 2011, from http://www.pptunasur.com-contenidos.php.

19 Consejo de Defensa Suramericano de la UNASUR, retrieved on June 26, 2011, from 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 31

http://www.cdsunasur.org/.

20 Consejo de Defensa Suramericano, Action Plan, Defense Policies, retrieved on June 30, 

2011, from http://www.cdsunasur.org/.

21 The countries that make up the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América 

(Alba) are: Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Dominica, Antigua & Barbuda, 

and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 

22 Escuela del Alba es una respuesta a los riesgos para la soberanía de los pueblos, retrieved 

on July 31, 2011, from http://laradiodelsur.com/?p=28073.

23 Rompiendo Fronteras Correo del Alba, June 2011, pp. 12 and 13, retrieved on July 31, 

2011, from https://mailattachment.googleusercontent.com/attachment?ui=2&ik=b54e070

c29&view=att&th=132019694950a4cc&attid=0.1&disp=inline&safe=1&zw&saduie=A

G9B_P9Wmc1R6_-jNyaa0f-Ecddv&sadet=1314592978921&sads=gTjfUolmVgKSwBez

L8mgJM52Qho&sadssc=1.

24 Ibid.
32 Security and Defense Studies Review

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2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 37

The United States and China in Latin America: 

Cooperation and Competition* 

R. Evan Ellis

Introduction

The expanded presence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Latin America has attracted the attention not only of a generation of political leaders, businessmen, and students 

in the region, but also of their counterparts in the United States, long accustomed to a dominant and relatively exclusive political and economic position in the Americas. With respect 

to China, both the U.S. State and Defense Departments have registered concern over the 

expansion of PRC engagement in the hemisphere, but have refrained from interpreting 

such engagement as a threat. 

Following his first trip to China, former Assistant Secretary of State Arturo Valenzuela expressed his belief that PRC trade with and investment in Latin America could 

contribute to the prosperity of the region, consistent with U.S. interests and objectives,1

although he also expressed concerns over the ability of the region to take advantage of the 

opportunities afforded by that trade and investment to generate economic diversity and sustainable growth. Similarly, the Department of Defense official responsible for the Western 

Hemisphere, Dr. Frank Mora, noted that economic engagement between the PRC and Latin 

America could generate benefits for Latin America, such as infrastructure improvements 

and increased revenues to the state, both of which could help governments of the region 

to address the challenge of “ungoverned spaces.” Secretary Mora also acknowledged that 

Chinese arms sales to Latin America were not inherently a problem, insofar as they could 

help states of the region address legitimate security challenges, often in an economical 

fashion. Nonetheless, like Secretary Valenzuela, Secretary Mora also tempered such positivism by expressing concern over the lack of transparency with regard to certain PRC activities in, and intentions toward, the region.

U.S. Policy toward Latin America

Under the administration of President Barack Obama, the United States has generally tried 

to forge a new partnership with Latin America, as reflected by the President’s speech in 

Trinidad in April 2009. President Obama has visited the region three times. Secretary of 

State Hillary Clinton has traveled there several times and regularly meets with Latin ambassadors in Washington.2

 

Despite sincere intentions, however, there continue to be complaints of Washington’s neglect throughout the region. The demands of U.S. military involvement in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, the global financial crisis, and, most recently, challenges associated with 

the Arab Spring have limited the amount of time and resources devoted to the region. In 

general, under the Obama administration, the United States has attempted to improve its 

*Paper presented to the Fifth Symposium on U.S.-China Relations in Global Context, Beijing, People’s Republic 

of China, June 1–3, 2011.
38 Security and Defense Studies Review

relationship with the region, engaging it as a partner rather than as a superior.3 It has focused on working together to build capability in areas such as institutions of democratic 

governance and economic management. In working with regional partners like Mexico on 

transnational issues such as drug trafficking and gun violence, the United States has accepted shared responsibility for the problems and sought to work more collaboratively with 

institutions such as the Mexican federal police, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry 

of the Navy. Notably, the United States has also refrained from intervening in the face of 

regimes that have openly challenged U.S. interests, and, arguably, regional norms of democratic practices and nonintervention in the affairs of neighboring states, such as Venezuela, 

and to a lesser extent, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia, preferring instead to allow the 

region to evaluate and react to such behaviors on its own. 

At the official level, the authoritative statement of U.S. interests in Latin America 

comes from the U.S. Secretary of State,4 with elaboration from the State Department Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs.5

 The website of the Director for Western Hemisphere 

Affairs refers to four areas: democracy, trade, sustainable economic development, and fostering cooperation.

6

 Within this broad framework, however, it is possible to identify multiple overlapping perspectives from different U.S. government organizations, businesses, 

and other relevant actors framing those interests. 

Although the United States has many sincerely stated objectives with respect to Latin 

America, such as democracy, development, and respect for human rights, the core U.S. 

interests in the region may be understood in terms of three imperatives, in roughly the following order of importance: 

1. The region does not present a security threat to the United States.

2. The region supports commercial interactions consistent with the health of the U.S. 

economy.

3. Conditions in the region are consistent with U.S. values concerning democracy, respect for human rights, and a decent standard of living for all.

Through its advocacy and programs, the United States seeks to nurture in the region 

countries that share an outlook with the United States on important issues such as democracy, human rights, or the fight against terrorism, and can serve as trusted partners for the 

United States throughout the world. This includes not only support within the international community, but regimes with mature institutions, who are able to cooperate with the 

United States and uphold international norms on a range of issues, from the fight against 

terrorists, transnational criminal organizations, and money laundering, to respect for intellectual property rights and contract law. 

While some U.S. leaders in both the executive branch and Congress have expressed 

their discomfort with PRC advances in the region, by contrast to the orientation toward 

the Soviet Union during the Cold War, they have consistently refrained from casting the 

PRC as an “opponent” in the hemisphere. Indeed, the continuation of the “Latin America” 

segment of the U.S.-China strategic dialogue by Assistant Secretary of State Arturo Valenzuela under the presidential administration of Barack Obama illustrates the consistent 

desire under both Republican and Democratic presidents to eliminate sources of misunderstanding and conflict arising from China’s expanding engagement with Latin America, 

and to work together with respect to policies and initiatives toward the region in areas 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 39

where interests shared by the United States, the PRC, and the nations of the region permit 

outcomes beneficial to all. 

While both the Bush and Obama administrations have noted that the United States is 

not intrinsically concerned about the Chinese presence in the region, senior Department of 

State and Department of Defense officials from both administrations have indicated that 

the United States is monitoring these activities very closely for signs of emerging threats to 

U.S. national security interests in the region.7

No Security Threat to the United States from Latin America 

The primary interest of the United States with respect to Latin America is that the region 

does not present a security threat to the United States or its citizens. The September 11, 

2001, attacks against the United States and the subsequent “war against terrorism” arguably broadened the nation’s focus with respect to national security threats, shifting attention from state actors seeking to challenge the United States globally, to harm emanating 

from nonstate actors and natural disasters. While the United States does not face a traditional security threat from an opposing state in the region, it does face a variety of pressing nontraditional security threats. In this context, and in the absence of a declared global 

opponent, the United States began to give new attention to longstanding problems in the 

region with respect to poverty, inequality, and badly functioning institutions, which could 

nurture phenomena that could ultimately damage the United States, including the activities 

of narcotraffickers and other transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), refugees, or terrorists operating from the region’s weakly governed spaces. 

There are three principal concerns with respect to the countries that form the land and 

maritime “southern approaches” to the United States: (1) that violent criminal activity currently destroying these societies, including violence associated with Mexican cartels and 

Central American violence, will spill over into the United States; (2) that violence and state 

failures associated with these regions will produce a flood of refugees with accompanying 

economic and public health impacts on the United States; and (3) that the flow of migrants 

and contraband goods to the United States, in the context of weak states, could provide the 

opportunity for smuggling terrorists and associated devices into the United States. 

In general, U.S. security concerns in Latin America have primarily focused on three 

areas: (1) the populist states of the Andean region, including Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia; (2) weakly governed spaces such as the “Tri-Border Area” between Paraguay, Brazil, 

and Argentina; and (3) the land and maritime “southern approaches” to the United States, 

including the states of Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean.

Commercial Interactions Consistent with the Health of the U.S. Economy

Beyond its direct national security concerns, the United States seeks to maintain a legal, 

political, and economic environment in the region that supports commercial interactions 

in support of the health and stability of the U.S. economy. Such an environment includes 

the ability of U.S. producers to sell their goods to the region. This includes a functional 

banking system and a legal framework that afford predictability and that equally protect the 

rights of entities entering into contracts or making investments in the region. The openness 

and efficiency of the trade infrastructure of Latin America is important, including government regulations, tax policies, and currency exchange rates that are not prejudicial to U.S. 
40 Security and Defense Studies Review

companies seeking to sell their goods to the region. While the displacement U.S. products 

by those of China raises concerns, the U.S. culture of “fair play” and “equal rules for all” 

leads to a distinction in the U.S. discourse between that which may be “undesirable” (e.g., 

being beaten out by other competitors), and that which is “unjust” (e.g., losing market 

share because the playing field is biased against U.S. sellers, or because non-U.S. firms 

have achieved a monopoly position blocking access by others). In this regard, the stability 

and prosperity of the region is also important to the United States, both because of U.S. 

interest in the welfare of the people of the region, and also because such a prosperous Latin 

America is also a good market. 

In addition to sales of its goods, the United States has a stake in the continuing ability 

of its companies to purchase goods from the region, including both commodities such as 

petroleum, metals, and agricultural goods, as well as intermediate goods that form a part 

of U.S. production chains. The U.S. culture of laissez faire capitalism puts significant faith 

in the ability to supply fungible goods at a price that reflects the balance between supply 

and demand. Nonetheless, there is recognition that the ownership of supply chains and 

government policies influences who gets priority to a stable supply of goods, and at what 

price. The efforts of regimes openly hostile to U.S. interests, such as that of Hugo Chávez 

in Venezuela, who is willing to incur higher costs and less advantageous conditions to 

explicitly avoid selling products to the United States, are thus a long-run concern, as are 

countries whose national companies purchase assets in tightening commodity markets such 

as petroleum, decreasing the pool available for purchase on the spot market and creating 

the risk of high or volatile prices that could be disruptive to U.S. and global consumers 

depending on those goods. 

Such concerns are heightened where there are relatively limited sources of supply for 

the goods, and they play a key role in production chains in strategic industries, such as rare 

earth elements. Other elements of the supply chain are also important, such as efficient and 

functional infrastructure, as well as stability in the legal framework and economic conditions. Political crises, economic downturns, and nationalizations are each of concern because of their ability to cause supply disruptions that adversely impact production chains, 

and ultimately the U.S. economy, in the modern globalized economy. 

Democracy, Human Rights, and a Decent Standard of Living in the Region 

While a Latin America characterized by free trade and respect for property rights is beneficial to U.S. economic performance, the U.S. interest in democracy, respect for human 

rights, and a decent standard of living reflects a more generalized human compassion for 

the people of the region by the United States, reflecting an important dimension of the 

culture of the people of the United States and not just its government. Although such compassion is occasionally viewed cynically in other parts of the world, and may benefit U.S. 

interests, it is also genuine. The current U.S. administration sees Latin America making 

significant progress on issues of democracy and human rights, although it has expressed 

concern regarding the usurpation of legislative powers by the Executive in Venezuela as 

“circumscribing the popular will” in violation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter.8

Similarly, the U.S. views Latin America’s strong economic growth as a key vehicle for 

improving the conditions of its people, and views crime and violence, particularly that tied 

to transnational criminal organizations in Mexico and Central America, as undermining 

those conditions. 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 41

Areas of Potential Competition

China’s rapid emergence on the Caribbean and Latin American stage can potentially 

threaten U.S. interests in three areas: national security, commerce, and political values. 

The competition in the political realm, on its face, appears less directly conflictual, yet if 

not carefully managed it has a greater capacity in the short term to damage the relationship 

between the United States and the PRC.

With respect to national security, the United States is particularly sensitive to PRC 

military relationships with the region. Arms sales, such as K-8 aircraft, JYL-1 radars, and 

command and control equipment to Venezuela; K-8s and MA-60s, small caliber arms, 

buses, trucks, and motorboats to Bolivia; YLC-2V-3D radars and MA-60s to Ecuador; and 

WMZ-551 armored vehicles to Argentina, are closely monitored. While acknowledging 

that arms may contribute to the legitimate security needs of governments, the U.S. administration is concerned that arms sales to regimes such as Venezuela could contribute to the 

destabilization of the region, including the diversion of arms to terrorists and transnational 

criminal organizations. Similarly, training of Latin American personnel in the Defense 

Studies Institute in Changping, the PLA Army Command College and Navy Command 

School near Nanjing, in PLA facilities in Shijiazhuang, and other locations, in the absence 

of transparency, raises questions about the nature of the military relationships being forged. 

With respect to Cuba, while the United States is not concerned by China’s commercial 

relationship with the Castro regime, reports that PRC personnel are operating in Soviet-era 

facilities in Bejucal, Lourdes, and Santiago de Cuba raise concern, given the proximity to 

the U.S. mainland and the absence of information about such activities. Given emerging 

competitions in space and cyberspace, China’s role in constructing the space and telecommunications architectures of regimes hostile to the United States, such as Venezuela and 

Bolivia, also raise concerns.

On the commercial side, the competition with China comes in three forms. First, 

the advances of Chinese companies in selling products to the region have come partly at 

the expense of U.S. companies. This is particularly the case with respect to higher valueadded items such as consumer appliances, cars, heavy machinery, and electronics, although 

European and Latin American manufacturers such as Brazil have also lost market share 

to China. Although the loss of market share by U.S. companies to Chinese competitors 

is a politically charged issue in the United States, which has received significant media 

and Congressional attention in recent years, the globalization of production chains in recent years to some extent blurs who is being helped or hurt by this phenomenon. It is not 

necessarily unfair that an increasing portion of the value generated by economic activity 

is flowing to Chinese companies, rather than Western ones, and to a great extent it reflects 

U.S. mismanagement of its own economic house. Nonetheless, it is a world that the United 

States is not accustomed to, and an emerging reality for which the implications are only 

beginning to be understood.

A second dimension of the U.S.-China commercial competition involves access to 

energy resources, minerals, and raw material commodities. In recent years, Chinese companies have purchased and/or built significant positions in Latin American upstream petroleum assets and mineral deposits, including a $40 billion commitment to develop the Junin 

1, 4, and 8 blocks in the Orinoco belt; the Andes Petroleum and Petroriental positions in 

Ecuador; the acquisitions of Bridas ($3.1 billion), Oxy ($2.4 billion), and Pan American 

($7.1 billion) in Argentina; the Brazilian holdings of Statoil ($3.1 billion) and Repsol YPF 
42 Security and Defense Studies Review

($7.1 billion); and commitments of almost $11 billion to develop five mines in Peru (Marcona, Toromocho, Rio Blanco, Galleno, and Pampa de Pongo). In addition, loans such as 

the copper advance purchase agreement with the Chilean state mining company, Codelco, 

the two $1 billion loans to Petroecuador, the recent $20 billion loan to Venezuela, and the 

offer to loan the Bolivian government $15 billion to develop the El Mutun iron field each 

involve repayment in petroleum or minerals. Even in Colombia, the initially modest investment by CNPC to form Mansrovar Energy has expanded to account for almost 24 percent 

of the country’s oil production.

Although traditional trade theory suggests that in perfect markets all commodities are 

available at some price, markets are not, in reality, perfect, and in tightening commodity 

markets, the entities with ownership stakes in those resources have a significant advantage, 

while the price and reliability with which those commodities are available to the rest may 

not be consistent with their continuing economic health.

Similarly, in the domain of free trade, the proliferation of bilateral agreements between China and Latin American trading partners, such as those with Chile, Peru, and 

Costa Rica, do not preclude U.S. access to those markets, but clearly privileges Chinese 

companies and purchasers, and thus accelerates the ongoing shift of global value added 

from the West, toward China.

Turning to the political dimension, while there is no overt “ideological competition” 

between the PRC and the United States, China’s role as an alternative market and source of 

loans and investment, coupled with its policy of “non-interference” in the affairs of other 

states, indirectly undercuts the ability of the United States to advance its beliefs regarding 

“democratic practices” and “human rights in the region,” as well as contributing to the 

survival of regimes such as Venezuela, which actively work against U.S. interests in the 

region.

Shared Interests and Possibilities for Collaboration

Despite the inherent competition between Chinese and U.S. interests in Latin America and 

various possibilities for conflict, China and the United States also have multiple shared 

interests in the region, which creates the basis for the two countries to cooperate for the 

benefit of all parties. These shared interests fall into three areas:

1. Strengthening of the rule of law and administrative efficiency in countries of the 

region;

2. Creating a secure and stable security environment for all; and

3. Achieving an efficient and effective commercial infrastructure.

Strengthening of the Rule of Law and Administrative Efficiency

As companies from the PRC, the United States, and other states invest in and operate on the 

ground in Latin America, all benefit from contractual relationships that are clear and predictable, judicial mechanisms that can resolve disputes in a fair and timely fashion, and efficient processes that allow investors to move quickly from signing agreements to initiating 

work that generates value. Indeed, the desire for such an environment for doing business 

has been an important factor behind the signing of reciprocal investment protection agreements between the PRC and various countries of the region. By extension, it is also in the 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 43

interest of both the PRC and the United States, as well as other actors, to uphold free trade 

and property rights. While the tendency of certain regimes such as Venezuela, Ecuador, 

and Bolivia to revise legal and constitutional structures has created short-term opportunities for previously excluded actors, such as Chinese companies, to enter new markets, the 

administrative and legal unpredictability of such regimes ultimately works against Chinese 

goals of achieving markets and securing sources of supply.

Stable Security Environment for All 

Both Chinese and U.S. companies benefit from a Latin American security environment in 

which competent military and police institutions can provide protection to foreign workers 

and immigrants of all nationalities living in the country. Both also benefit from an environment in which their facilities in the country can operate without threat of extortion, terrorist 

attacks, and other risks to their operations, including professional, appropriately trained, 

and adequately equipped security forces who can respond effectively to the challenges that 

inevitably arise. There are areas, such as economically priced security equipment, in which 

China may be able to make a particular contribution, while in other areas, such as training, 

the United States may be particularly effective in leveraging its knowledge of, and special 

relationships with, the region. Working together to strengthen the security environment and 

the capability of partner institutions in the region is likely to generate unexpected synergies 

for all sides.

Achieving an Efficient and Effective Commercial Infrastructure 

As the volume of trade between Latin America and all countries of the world expands, 

efficient and secure ports, airports, and road and rail infrastructures serve to lower transport cost, achieve greater security of supply, and increase customer responsiveness. Such 

infrastructure also supports development of the region, including remote mountain and 

jungle regions of the countries involved, by providing them with improved access to the 

rest of the national economy and opportunities to participate in supporting industries. Both 

the United States and China have important resources to bring to the table to help Latin 

America develop its commercial infrastructure, including both financial resources, capable 

companies, and knowledge of the region. Working together, potentially through the establishment of a joint projects fund, could serve to increase collective resources and likelihood 

of success with respect to infrastructure projects, while helping to overcome concerns over 

issues such as transparency and the use of financial leverage to gain work for one’s own 

companies.

Conclusions

China’s expansion into Latin America can be understood in terms of the pursuit of legitimate national security goals such as diversification of markets and the pursuit of secure 

sources of supply. At the same time, despite an inherent dimension of commercial and 

political “competition” between the PRC and the United States in the region, the United 

States is open to identifying ways to collaborate with China in Latin America for the benefit of all sides, and in the interest of preventing the inherent competition between the 

United States and China in the region from evolving into a new “Cold War” style conflict. 

Nonetheless, the expansion of PRC interests in the region and the imperative to defend 
44 Security and Defense Studies Review

them in the context of a fluid Latin American political and security environment will create 

numerous opportunities for misunderstanding. If those risks can be overcome, however, 

there are more than sufficient shared interests between the United States and China in the 

region to forge a win-win partnership, and, in the process, allow both the United States and 

China to forge new and constructive relationships with the region.

Notes

1 “China ‘Not a Threat’ in L. America,” People’s Daily Online (Beijing, China), http://

english.peopledaily.com.cn, August 19, 2010.

2 See Ginger Thompson and Simon Romero, “Clinton Seeks to Improve Ties with Latin 

America,” New York Times, May 18, 2011.

3 In the words of former Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Arturo 

Valenzuela, “The best framework for engaging with the Americas is one based on mutual 

partnership and co-responsibility...there is no senior partner and junior partner in our relations; there is simply engagement based on mutual respect and common interest and shared 

values.” Arturo Valenzuela, “Testimony of Arturo A. Valenzuela, Assistant Secretary of 

State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA), Department of State, before the 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States 

House of Representatives, February 15, 2011. Assistant Secretary Valenzuela resigned his 

position in May 2011 and has not yet been replaced.

4 Hon. Hillary Rodham Clinton. “Our Opportunity in the Americas,” remarks to the Center 

for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, March 18, 2011.

5 See, for example, Valenzuela, “Testimony,” February 15, 2011.

6 “Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs.” U.S. Department of State. Official Website. 

http://www.state.gov/p/wha/, accessed April 13, 2011.

7 This includes statements by Roger Noriega and Thomas Shannon, each of whom served 

as assistant secretaries of state under the George W. Bush administration, and most recently, by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Mora of the Obama administration.

8 Valenzuela, “Testimony,” February 15, 2011.
Country and Regional Issues

2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 47

Political Acumen and

Geopolitical Anxiety in Suriname 

Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith

Introduction

Although Roberto Espíndola’s analysis of Latin America’s contemporary political dynamics does not include Suriname, his simple but prescient observation resonates powerfully 

with that country: “Elections in Latin America [and the Caribbean] keep showing that the 

region retains its capacity to surprise observers, as well as a potential to generate expectations” (Espíndola 2009, 141). Suriname’s 2010 elections surely had surprising outcomes, 

the most significant of which was the re-emergence of Désiré Delano (Desi) Bouterse as 

national leader, this time through democratic means. 

Bouterse’s re-emergence has both local and foreign implications. Internally, it has 

generated hopes about political unity and improved quality of life, among other things. Externally, it has raised geopolitical anxieties because of his colorful history and unenviable 

profile: a two-times coup-maker and authoritarian ruler (1980-1987; 1990-1991); the only 

world leader with the dubious distinction of an 11-year prison sentence for drug trafficking, issued in absentia by a Dutch court, with extradition foreclosed because Suriname and 

Holland lack mutual extradition treaties; and a defendant (along with others) in a domestic 

trial for ordering the murder of 15 political opponents in 1982. 

Thus, more than any other Caribbean nation except Haiti (and a few Latin American 

ones) that held elections within the last decade, Suriname’s electoral outcomes situate it 

at a noteworthy historical juncture. This juncture has fascinating internal and external aspects, reflecting, in theoretical terms, Political Adaptation and Intermestic—nexus between 

domestic and international—dynamics.1 In order to appreciate some of the adaptation and 

dynamics, it is important to examine a few contestation issues and some of the anxieties 

that have surfaced because of the results of the contestation. 

Political Contestation and Interest Aggregation 

In 1996 the late Gary Brana-Shute, cultural anthropologist and Suriname expert, noted 

the following in the penultimate paragraph of a study on Suriname’s civil-military relations: “Can we expect any more coups in Suriname? No, I am absolutely sure of that. Will 

Bouterse and his allies go away? No, I am very certain of that too, now that they have wellfunded political machine—the NDP—that has surprisingly wide support” (Brana-Shute 

1996, 482). Brana-Shute was eerily prophetic. Not only did Bouterse not go away, but he 

returned in 2010 to the pinnacle of political power, and this time legitimated through a key 

democracy factor: elections.2

 I attribute a significant aspect of this outcome to his political 

acumen in (a) exploiting the country’s political vicissitudes, especially the ethnic plurality 

and the shortcomings of the ruling group; and (b) aggregating various political interests to 

deliver De Mega Combinatie (Mega Combination) as a coalition force. And, by political 

acumen I mean the use of a mixture of shrewdness, charisma, and organizational skills to 

gain political outcomes both for him and the individuals and groups whose interests he aggregates and represents. 
48 Security and Defense Studies Review

In terms of political system, Suriname is a constitutional republic, with an executive 

branch headed by a president, a 51-member unicameral legislature called the National 

Assembly that is popularly elected for five-year terms on the basis of proportional representation, and a judiciary. The president is elected by a two-thirds majority of the National 

Assembly or, failing that, by a majority of the People’s Assembly, for a five-year term. 

If at least two-thirds of the National Assembly cannot agree to vote for one presidential candidate, a People’s Assembly is formed from all National Assembly delegates 

and regional and municipal representatives who were elected by popular vote in the most 

recent national elections. A vice president, normally elected at the same time as the president, needs a simple majority in the National Assembly or People’s Assembly to be elected 

for a five-year term. The president serves as head of state and head of government, and is 

supreme commander of the armed forces. As well, he presides over the Council of State, 

which oversees the execution of government policy, and the National Security Council.3

The May 25, 2010, elections were contested by seven political parties:

• AC A Combinatie (A Combination)

• BVD Basispartij voor Vernieuwing en Democratie (Basic Party for Renewal 

and Democracy)

• MC Mega Combinatie (Mega Combination) 

• NDP Nationale Democratische Partij (National Democratic Party) 

• NFDO Nieuwe Front voor Democratie en Ontwikkeling (New Front for 

Democracy and Development)

• PDOE Partij voor Democratie en Ontwikkeling door Eenheid (Party for 

Democracy and Development through Unity)

• VVV Volksalliantie voor Vooruitgang (People’s Alliance for Progress).

As with most elections in the Americas—and elsewhere—over the last few decades, 

the Suriname elections were monitored by international observers. The observers found 

no evidence of fraud. Indeed, they offered commendations for the conduct in some areas. 

Although the Organization of American States (OAS) team did offer six specific recommendations for future improvement, their report noted: “The electoral process and the election event itself took place in a peaceful and proper environment and complied with all 

international election standards, without any irregularities being reported” (OAS 2010, 4).

Moreover, said the report: “Congratulating the Government and the peoples of Suriname for an excellent electoral process and recognizing the many positive attributes of 

the Surinamese electoral system, the OAS Electoral Observation Mission, in the spirit of 

constructive engagement, would like to make some preliminary recommendations, which 

could serve to improve on this already strong electoral process” (OAS 2010, 5). The CARICOM monitors indicated: “The team is of the view that the people of Suriname must be 

commended for their maturity throughout their General Election. ... Based on our observations, the CARICOM Electoral Observer Mission is of the view that all was in place, and 

the authorities conducted the business of the day freely, fairly and transparently” (CARICOM 2010).

As often happens in plural societies where race and ethnicity are just as important 

as—and sometimes more important than—substantive issues when it comes to interest 

articulation and voting, race and ethnicity featured in Suriname. The results were widely 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 49

mixed, with no single majority winner. Seventy three percent of the 324,490 eligible voters cast their votes. The A Combination group won 4.7 percent of the votes and seven 

parliamentary seats; BVD, 5.1 percent and no seats; Mega Combination, 40.2 percent and 

23 seats; NFD, 31.7 percent and 14 seats; PDOE, 5.1 percent and one seat; and VVV, 13 

percent and six seats.4 In political science vernacular that was a plurality outcome and not 

a majority one. 

Thus, since no political party won a decisive mandate, coalition-building became 

necessary. After almost two months of political negotiations, on July 19, 2010, Dési Bouterse emerged as head of the Mega Combination slate and the Ninth President of the Republic, having fashioned a multi-ethnic coalition that delivered 36 votes. Robert Ameerali, an 

independent and former head of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, was elected as 

vice president. Ameerali’s nomination itself demonstrated Bouterse’s acumen; it resulted 

from a deal stuck with a political nemesis, Ronnie Brunswijk, former head of the guerrilla group called the Jungle Commandos that battled Bouterse’s military government in 

the 1980s and later became the leader of the A Combination group (Republic of Suriname 

2010, Carroll 2010, West Indian News 2010, and Kock 2010). 

Even before the final deal was consummated, one sensed a mixture of muted admiration of Bouterse’s political acumen and anxiety about what his victory might portend. One 

June 2010 editorial in Guyana’s Stabroek News captured this mixture thus: 

Bouterse is still perceived as a charismatic and pragmatic man of action and his 

alliance appealed to the young and poor with sugary promises for easy jobs and 

cheap housing. 

Memories are short. The young have no recollection of Bouterse’s blotchy record 

of governance. He seized power in a coup d’état in 1980 and left office only under 

intense international pressure in 1987 but seized power again in another coup 

d’état in 1990. He still faces criminal charges for his role in the extra-judicial 

execution of political opponents in 1982. He was convicted in a court in the 

Netherlands for trafficking cocaine from Suriname to the Netherlands in 1999, 

but avoided serving a sentence because both countries prohibit extradition of 

each others’ citizens.

Bouterse’s party was also part of President Jules Wijdenbosch’s 1996 coalition 

administration. Wijdenbosch embarked on internal policies which practically 

bankrupted the country and on external policies which provoked aggression 

against Guyana and defied the Caribbean Community.

It was no surprise, therefore, that the election results have generated uneasiness 

and despondency. Outgoing President Ronald Venetiaan who leads the minority 

New Front for Democracy and Development alliance confirmed that his group 

would not work with the Combinatie as long as Bouterse remained in control. 

Dutch Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen said that the Netherlands respected the 

will of the electorate but added that “the past cannot be forgotten...Mr. Bouterse 

has been sentenced to an 11-year prison term in the Netherlands for drug dealing 

and, in Suriname, a case about the murders of December 1982 is still proceeding. 

We cannot brush all that away” (Stabroek News 2010a).5

Of course, Bouterse’s political victory did not just happen; it derived from a combina-
50 Security and Defense Studies Review

tion of shrewdness, charisma, and organizational skills. The point was made in The Economist that “Mr. Bouterse proved a surprisingly adept campaigner. Despite his 64 years, he 

wisely courted voters too young to ‘remember 1982,’ as Mr. Venetiaan’s advertisements 

suggested. ‘Bouta,’ as his supporters call him, set his rallies to Bob Marley tracks, breezily 

delivered jokes in a mix of official Dutch and the widely spoken Sranan Tongo language, 

and boasted of the factories built under his rule (most of which later went bust). He managed to convince many under-35s that he was a candidate of change, in contrast to the 

stodgy Mr. Venetiaan” (Economist 2010). 

Anxiety and Geopolitics

Expectedly, this mixture of awe of Bouterse’s political acumen and anxiety about some 

implications of his triumph has both internal and external aspects. As one writer put it, 

Bouterse’s victory “indicates not just how shallow the pool of political leadership is in 

Suriname; it’s also left many inside and outside the country wondering if an addiction to 

the iron fist still lingers in Latin America” (Padgett 2010). Moreover, there is curiosity in 

some quarters about the likely outcome of Bouterse’s trial, including speculation that his 

presidential quest was partly intended to foreclose facing justice ultimately. 

The concern in this section is not with the internal aspects, but with some external 

ones. Of course, internal and external dynamics are never entirely divorced, especially 

when geopolitics is involved. The concept of geopolitics is defined here as the relationship 

between physical and political geography on the one hand and national power on the other, 

with key factors being the possession of strategic materials, ownership of or access to strategic lanes of communication, and the possession or location of military bases and other 

security installations. Geopolitics provides the context in which threats and vulnerabilities 

may develop or be heightened, or national power enhanced directly or indirectly.6

Free and fair elections, which are essential to democracy, sometimes result in outcomes that lead to both awkwardness and anxiety. Such is the case with Dési Bouterse’s 

re-emergence. The international manifestation of this awkwardness and anxiety was first 

evident at the August 12, 2010, presidential inauguration, which was not attended by a 

single foreign head of state. Initially, two foreign leaders accepted the inauguration invitation: Presidents Bharat Jagdeo of Guyana and Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, two key neighbors. However, they both skipped the event. Jagdeo sent Prime Minister Samuel Hinds, 

and Chávez sent Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro. The United States was represented by 

its ambassador in Paramaribo, John Nay. Understandably, Holland was not invited to the 

event, and they made it known that they would not attend even if invited. Indeed, said one 

report, “When Bouterse was elected last month Dutch Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen 

said in a statement he would only be welcome in the Netherlands to serve his 11 year sentence” (Daily Herald 2010, Fox 2010). 

Albert Ramdin, the Suriname-born Assistant Secretary General of the OAS, who 

headed the OAS delegation at the inauguration, captured the awkwardness and anxiety 

well: “... the leaders’ absence was understandable because ... it was not every day that a 

soldier who has led a coup is later democratically elected as president.” Further, “In the 

Americas some people are still hesitant about Bouterse. They still do not know how to deal 

with the situation in Suriname. Latin American and Caribbean countries will be looking to 

see how the policies of President Bouterse’s government unfold over the next six months” 

(Stabroek News 2010c). 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 51

While it is not feasible to examine all the possible international-level anxieties with 

security ramifications, it is necessary to pay some attention to at least three matters: relations with Guyana, notably in relation to the territorial disputes; illegal drug operations; 

and foreign policy engagement with Venezuela. 

On Suriname’s Western Front

Although the political elites in Guyana will not openly acknowledge this, Guyana likely is 

the nation with the most significant geopolitical anxieties deriving from Bouterse’s election, and for several reasons: the existence of a territorial dispute over the New River 

Triangle; a recently settled dispute over maritime boundaries, which at one point in June 

2000 saw the use of military power by Suriname in ejecting a Canadian oil rig that had 

been granted exploration license by Guyana in its maritime space; and longstanding immigration tensions, among other things. In addition, all of this is in the context of weakening 

defense and diplomatic establishments in Guyana over the last decade and a half. 

However, it also is true that precisely because of his profile, the anxiety his elections has generated, and Suriname’s national security interests related to the territorial and 

other issues mentioned above, Dési Bouterse regards Guyana as vital to his foreign policy 

engagement. Thus, it was not entirely surprising that his first international presidential trip 

was to Guyana: a one-day working visit on September 6, 2010,7 that touched on several 

matters, including climate change, information technology, mining, infrastructure development, energy, agriculture, fisheries, and tertiary education.

The wealth of topics and paucity of concrete deliverables make for credible conjecture that the summit was more about symbolism than substance. In referring to the Communiqué issued as the end of the visit, one observer noted that it amounted to “a literary 

masterpiece of verbal acuity” which “succeeded in skimming ever so lightly atop every 

conceivable topic that officials could think about—with the obvious exception of the territorial question—without leaving a trace of the slightest solution to any matter of substance” 

(Stabroek News 2010d).8 Further, it was noted that “the Jagdeo-Bouterse encounter...was 

not the first time that Guyana threw a lifeline to Suriname which was swimming in a sea of 

international opprobrium” (Stabroek News 2010d).9

During the visit Bouterse declared, “Suriname is at a crossroads now and we want to 

share new ideas with Guyana. We have a special movement and aspiration towards South 

America and the Caribbean” (West Indian News 2010). (See also Stabroek News 2010d 

about the visit overall.) President Bouterse visited again two months later, on November 

20, 2010, this time to Berbice, which borders Suriname, rather than the capital, Georgetown. Jagdeo reciprocated on November 20, 2010, to Nickerie and not the capital, Paramaribo (Demerarawaves 2010).10 Bouterse visited Guyana again on February 26, 2011, on 

the way back home after attending the CARICOM Summit in Grenada.11

The matter of lifeline—and an aspect of the anxiety over Bouterse’s election given 

his profile—surfaced again in January 2011 when President Jagdeo dropped a bombshell 

during the Guyana Defense Force annual officers’ conference. In response to a question 

following his speech, he declared: “A foreign mission asked us if we will arrest the president of Suriname when he comes here because he is wanted some where else, and I said to 

them ‘No’.” (Demerarawaves 2011) Jagdeo declined to name the nation involved, but his 

revelation generated understandable speculation about what country had made the request. 

This led the United States to issue a statement through its embassy in Georgetown indicat-
52 Security and Defense Studies Review

ing that it had not been the nation involved. 

At the end of the day, any “life-lining” in Guyana’s dealings with Suriname and the 

geopolitical anxiety occasioned by Bouterse’s election are driven by what in essence is the 

elephant in the room for both nations—the territorial issues and the attendant political heat 

they generate domestically. There are two sets of issues: one is about land—the unresolved 

New River Triangle; the other pertains to the maritime dispute that was resolved in 2007 

but still has some residual aspects. Figure 1 shows the two areas.

Figure 1: Guyana-Suriname Disputed Areas

 The New River Triangle dispute, which involves 15,540 km2 (6,000 square miles) 

of territory, dates to the 19th century. The area is resource-rich, with timber and minerals 

and indications of the presence of bauxite and aluminum. The Border Mixed Commission, 

established in 1989 as a framework for rapprochement and to move the parties progressively toward resolution, has been dormant for several years. Meanwhile, over the last few 

decades there have been many diplomatic and security twists and turns in the territorial 

saga.12 Perhaps the most significant—and daring for Suriname—development was Suriname’s action in presenting to the world what it had long done within Suriname: cartographically portraying the area as part of its territory. The occasion was the World Bank Low 

Carbon Development Strategy Forum, held in October 2009 in Washington, D.C. Suriname 

upped the ante by including in its submission the map shown in Figure 2.13. (See http://

www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/Node/175.)

Guyana’s feeble protest of this audacious move and its inability to secure a retraction of the map reflect its relative diplomatic (and military) ineffectiveness.14 More sig-
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 53

nificantly, Suriname’s bold chess move has set the stage for eventual de facto acceptance 

internationally of its cartographic definition of the nation, irrespective of the status of the 

dispute or the de jure ownership of Triangle. My prediction is this: now that Suriname’s 

redefinition of itself has had an international debut, especially having been presented at a 

World Bank forum, this new map will be reproduced and used by others and, by default, 

slowly will become the geographic definition of Suriname in the eyes of the world. This is 

all the more so since Suriname also recently began to depict itself as inclusive of the New 

River Triangle on the web site of its embassy in Washington, D.C.15

Figure 2: Suriname Redefined by Suriname

Source: Suriname’s Presentation to the World Bank Low Carbon Development Forum, October 2009.

The maritime zone’s geopolitical value in terms of resources is perhaps greater 

than the New River Triangle’s given the hydrocarbons there. One study notes that: 

The disputed maritime area between Guyana and Suriname, called the Guyana 

Basin, is an under-explored area on the continental shelf of South America 

extending from present day Venezuela to Suriname. The Guyana Basin is 

geographically next to Trinidad and Venezuela, both important oil producers 

on the Caribbean plateau and the Venezuelan extension, which are two large 

and productive oil fields. Throughout this area, large commercial petroleum 

consortiums such as Exxon, Agip, and Burlington have successfully drilled for 

petroleum.
54 Security and Defense Studies Review

Limited exploration in the Guyana Basin has been carried out to date. However 

in June 2000, the United States Geological Survey’s World Petroleum Assessment 

2000 estimated that the resource potential for the Guyana Basin is 15.2 billion 

barrels of oil. This estimate indicates that the Guyana Basin is the second most 

important unexplored region in the world in terms of oil potential. If the potential 

is reached, it would be the twelfth most productive site in the world (Donovan 

2003, 48).

The zone in question was 31,600 km2 (5,251 square miles) in size. The dispute over 

it also witnessed several dramatic high points, perhaps the most notable of which was 

the ejection in June 2000 by Suriname Defense Force naval vessels of the oil platforms 

of a Canadian-owned company, CGX, which had been licensed by Guyana to drill in the 

Guyana Basin. The episode witnessed the humiliation of the Guyana Defense Force—once 

larger and better trained than the Suriname Defense Force. One report also noted: “To add 

insult to injury, Paramaribo had deployed its naval vessels in the area in a show of strength, 

declared itself ‘the power in the river’ and led Georgetown on a meaningless diplomatic 

waltz which ended on 18 June, with the then–Foreign Minister Clement Rohee conceding 

failure in his quest to restore the status quo ante. The next year, Mr. Rohee was removed 

from the ministry” (Stabroek News 2008).

Interestingly, Suriname’s use of force was itself a manifestation of Intermestic dynamics. Up until early May 2000, about a year after CGX began its exploration in the area, 

Surinamese authorities voiced no concern about the presence or purpose of CGX in the 

Basin. Things began to change later that month as the campaign for the impending elections—set for May 25—heated up. Opposition figures began accusing the ruling coalition 

of condoning Guyana’s intrusion into “Surinamese territory” and plundering its oil wealth. 

As Shridath Ramphal put it, “political machoism was stirring the nationalist plot; and the 

Government was not going to be outdone” (Ramphal 2008, 146). On May 11, Suriname 

delivered a Note Verbale16 to Guyana through Guyana’s ambassador in Paramaribo, demanding that Guyana cease operations in what it deemed its territory. 

Guyana replied six days later asserting that the exploration was being undertaken 

within its maritime space. Suriname ignored Guyana’s response and found it politically 

expedient not to acknowledge having received it. The May 25, 2000, elections resulted in 

a loss of power for the ruling coalition and a victory for the New Front coalition, although 

it was some time before the new National Assembly elected a president. Then on May 31, 

with the new president not yet agreed on, Suriname’s foreign minister—whose president 

had just lost power—issued a new Note Verbale to Guyana’s ambassador. It reasserted its 

allegation about Guyana’s illegal actions, demanded immediate cessation of activities, and 

promised to use “all avenues” if Guyana did not comply with its demands. 

 Simultaneously, Suriname ordered CGX to cease operations or face appropriate 

sanctions. Guyana replied to the May 31 Note Verbale on June 2, offering to host highlevel talks within 24 hours. That same day Guyana Defense Force Coast Guard patrolling 

the Guyana Basin near the rigs reported Surinamese military aircraft flying threateningly 

over the rig and Coast Guard vessels. Guyana protested the airspace intrusion and renewed 

the offer to hold talks, to no avail. Just after midnight on June 3 the Surinamese navy arrived in the CGX concession area, circled the rig, trained spotlights on the platform, and 

repeatedly issued orders to “leave the area within 12 hours, or the consequences will be 

yours” (Ramphal 2008, 149). Understandably fearful for their physical safety and destruc-
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 55

tion of their equipment, the CGX operators detached the rigs and departed the area under 

Surinamese naval escort. Suriname also forced oil companies Esso and Maxus to end their 

operations in the Basin.

Incidentally, the affair also highlighted CARICOM’s limitations as a dispute-resolution mechanism. CARICOM tried but failed to resolve the disagreement between two 

of its members. Guyana then took the matter to arbitration under the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) in February 2004. The case took three years, 

with the composition of the five-member Tribunal alone taking nine months. Both sides 

mounted formidable teams of international lawyers, geographers, and diplomats. Guyana 

had a 21-member team, and Suriname a 25-member team.17 (For details of the two teams, 

see Ramphal 2008, 341-342.) Suriname challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the 

validity of the established international legal principle of equidistance in fixing boundaries, 

and it attempted to justify the June 3, 2000, use of force. 

Not only did that strategy fail in the extant case but it facilitated the strengthening of 

“the Constitution of the Oceans” in relation to future cases. Says Ramphal: “ In all three 

areas, the UNCLOS Tribunal in this case made decisions of major significance not only 

to the outcome of the Arbitration, but also to the development of international law generally. The Guyana-Suriname Maritime Award is likely to likely to be an arbitral precedent 

much drawn upon in international jurisprudence in years ahead”18 (Ramphal 2008, 17; 

my emphasis). The Tribunal announced the award on September 20, 2007, finding that 

Guyana was entitled to two-thirds of the disputed zone and Suriname one-third. Beyond 

this, Guyana felt vindicated in relation to the June 3, 2000, use of force with the Tribunal’s 

declaration: “As a result of this Award, Guyana now has undisputed title to the area where 

the incident occurred” 19 (Ramphal 2008, 17). 

As with other dispute settlement cases, the Tribunal’s decision did not remove all 

frictions. One source indicated, “With the ink barely dry on the historic maritime jurisdiction ruling by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Guyana 

and Suriname are at it again, this time, following the October 14, 2008, seizure by Suriname navel vessels of the Lady Chanrda, a privately owned Guyanese boat on the Corentyne River” (Stabroek News 2008). Nevertheless, the settlement enabled resumption of oil 

exploration by CGX. Joining later was Tullow Oil, a Britain company, in a joint venture 

with REPSOL of Spain. Indications are that production could begin as early as 2014. (See 

Caribbean News Now 2010 and World Countries News 2011.) 

Given the sensitivity in the Americas to how territorial disputes are dealt with—

partly because of wars caused by them and because of the large number of existing disputes—it is not just Guyana that would be concerned about Bouterse’s conduct in relation 

to territorial matters. But it also is true that Bouterse’s election has created international 

anxiety about other matters. One such matter relates to illegal drug operations, to which 

we turn attention next.

On the Geonarcotics Front 

This writer originated the concept of geonarcotics in the early 1990s as a way to examine the drug phenomenon holistically. I first outlined it in 1993 in International Journal, 

Canada’s premier international affairs scholarly periodical and later applied it empirically 

in a study on the Caribbean (See Griffith 1993-1994 and Griffith 1997). The concept suggests the dynamic interaction of four factors: drugs, geography, power, and politics; that 
56 Security and Defense Studies Review

the narcotics phenomenon is multidimensional, with four main problem areas (drug production, consumption-abuse, trafficking, and money laundering); that these problem areas 

give rise to actual and potential threats to the security of states; and that drug operations 

and the activities they spawn precipitate both conflict and cooperation among various state 

and non-state actors. The geonarcotics approach does not view the “war on drugs” purely 

as a military matter. 

Apart from Bouterse’s conviction, over time his son and several senior military officials have been implicated in narcotics smuggling. For instance, in 1986 Etienne Boerenven, then the Suriname Defense Force’s second-in-command, was arrested in Miami, convicted of drug trafficking, and sentenced there. He was deported from Florida in May 1991 

after serving five years of a 12-year prison sentence. In March 1998, Ronnie Brunswijk, a 

former Bouterse bodyguard who later became his nemesis, was convicted of drug trafficking in Holland and sentenced in absentia to eight years in prison.20

In April 1999, Brazil’s TV Globo reported allegations that Rupert Christopher, Suriname’s ambassador in Brazil and a former defense minister under Bouterse, was implicated 

in the drug trade with Bouterse. Earlier that year, Bouterse’s son, Dino, reportedly was 

recalled from Suriname’s embassy in Brazil after authorities found evidence that he had 

been using his diplomatic immunity to smuggle drugs. In August 1999 Interpol issued an 

international arrest warrant on Belgium’s behalf for Ruben Peiter, commander of the Suriname police mobile unit. Belgium suspected that Peiter was shipping cocaine in timber 

consignments. In August 2005 Dino Bouterse was convicted in Paramaribo and sentenced 

to eight years in prison for trafficking in drugs and weapons. He secured an early release. 

(See Griffith 1997, Bohning 1999, Brana-Shute 2000, and Kuipers 2010.)

This profile suggests that as regards the matter of drugs, the international spotlight 

likely will be more on trafficking and less on production, consumption-abuse, and money 

laundering, although these three other aspects are important. In relation to money laundering, for example, a director of the Suriname Central Bank once was indicted (in absentia

in Holland) for money laundering. (See Brana-Shute 2000, 107.) 

Marijuana is cultivated in Suriname, although mostly for domestic consumption. But 

Suriname produces no cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamines, which feature prominently 

in trafficking there, as shown in Table 1, a small portrait for the last five years. Like any 

such portrait, Table 1 is subject to the reality everywhere—including in the United States—

that what is seized is a mere fraction of what is trafficked. Thus, an understandable question 

in terms of geonarcotics is: what explains Suriname’s deep involvement in trafficking? As 

with any nation so involved, there is no single-factor explanation. Corruption, economic 

deprivation, and law enforcement resource constraints are relevant factors. Nevertheless, 

geography is a major factor, and in several respects. 
57

 Table 1—Drug Trafficking Portrait of Suriname 2006-2010

Year Seizures and Arrests 

2006 577 kilograms (kg) of cocaine and 42 kg of cannabis; 571 persons were arrested for drugrelated offenses. While seizures and arrests decreased compared to 2005, this is due to the 

government’s focus on targeting major traffickers. Within the last five years authorities 

have rounded up eight of the ten known major criminal organizations. Through September authorities arrested 112 people carrying cocaine in their stomachs. Many who evade 

detection in Suriname were arrested at the airport in Amsterdam, which since 2004 has 

implemented a 100 percent inspection of all passengers and baggage arriving from Suriname. In a major success Guyanese Shaheed “Roger” Khan, suspected of drug trafficking, 

was arrested on false documents charges. He was set to return to Guyana via Trinidad and 

Tobago, but was deported, instead, to the United States. [Khan was later convicted in New 

York and sentenced in October 2009 to 40 years for drug smuggling and illegal arms possession. Two months later his attorney, Robert Simels, was given 14 years for trying to kill 

witnesses. See Griffith 2009, 16.] 

2007 206 kg of cocaine, 131 kg of cannabis, 3,154 ecstasy tablets, and 81 grams of ecstasy powder. 

A total of 667 people were arrested for drug-related offenses and 462 cases were sent to the 

Office of the Attorney General for prosecution. While the cocaine seizures are far below 

2006’s, the decrease is attributed to the establishment of the Airport Narcotics Team and 

anti-narcotics training provided for customs and police officers, which forced traffickers to 

develop alternatives to getting drugs through the airport. 

2008 228.1 kg of cocaine, 123 kg of cannabis, 785 ecstasy tablets, and 3,346.4 grams of heroin. 

While 2008 seizures were on par with previous year, authorities continued targeting large 

trafficking rings (with direct links to South American and European rings). United States 

intelligence shows that traffickers have changed their routes and methods of operations 

in response to the efforts of Surinamese authorities. Drug trafficking organizations have 

moved their landing strips further into the interior and changed trafficking tactics, such as 

using one landing strip for a very short period of time and then moving to another strip. 

A total of 582 people were arrested on drug-related offenses. The authorities also noted a 

slight decrease in the number of drug mules arrested, from 99 in 2007 to 66 in 2008. Traffickers continued the use of postal services to mail packages containing household items or 

foodstuff (ginger roots, noodles, and syrup) containing drugs. There was a notable increase 

of African nationals arrested at Suriname’s Johan Adolf Pengel airport carrying drugs intended for Africa, through Holland. The most significant arrest trend in 2008 was the arrest 

of several members of different Surinamese entertainment groups. 

2009 238.2 kilograms of cocaine, 158.5 kilograms of cannabis, 4,711.2 grams of hash, and 5.8 

grams of heroin. In the second half of 2009 Suriname launched Operation Koetai, which 

focused interdiction on the border with Guyana. This operation resulted in 94.1 kilos of 

cocaine seized and eight arrests as of October 30. People who attempted to bypass Operation Koetai by landing their boats in the district of Saramacca also were apprehended, 

resulting in seven additional arrests and the seizure of 77.5 kilos of cocaine. Operation 

Koetai forced an increase in the market price of cocaine from $3,500 to $7,000 per kilo 

in the area. During the year, Suriname installed a urine testing machine at the airport to 

identify suspected drug mules and introduced three Dutch-trained dogs to detect drugs on 

Amsterdam-bound flights. This enhanced effort may have contributed to the downward 

trend in the number of drug mules arrested—from 99 in 2007, to 66 in 2008, to 49 in 2009. 

One Surinamese drug mule was arrested at the airport in Holland after having swallowed 

182 cocaine capsules, weighing nearly 2.2 kilos. Although the majority of the trafficking 

out of Suriname via the airport occurs mainly on Netherlands-bound flights, drugs also 

were intercepted on the US-bound flights in Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and the United 

States. For example, drugs were discovered on a US-bound Suriname Airways flight by US 

Customs in Aruba. Nationalities arrested in Suriname in 2009 for drug-related offenses included Filipinos, Spaniards, Dutch, Guyanese, Belgians, British, Brazilians, Ghanaians, Columbians, Venezuelans, and Nigerians. As of October 30 that year 454 people were arrested 

for drug-related offenses of which 323 cases were sent for prosecution. As of November 5 of 

the year, 293 people had been prosecuted for drug-related offenses.
58

2010 342.7 kg of cocaine, 32.5 liters of liquid cocaine, 146 kg of marijuana, 4.5 grams of hashish, 

and 2 grams of heroin. During 2010, 542 people were arrested for drug-related offenses, 

compared to 454 arrests in 2009. Suriname authorities focused significant interdiction resources on the western border with Guyana, a key route for cocaine trafficking by land, air, 

and water. In 2010 this effort yielded limited success, with fewer interdictions than in 2009. 

One officer posted at this checkpoint was arrested on corruption charges and this investigation is ongoing. A downward trend continued in the number of drug mules arrested—from 

99 in 2007, to 66 in 2008, to 49 in 2009, to 34 in 2010. The use of foodstuff to move drugs out 

of Suriname continued in 2010, with cocaine discovered in prunes, dried fish, souvenirs, 

and syrup bottles. The bulk of the cocaine movement out of Suriname to Europe and Africa 

is via commercial sea cargo, including both larger boats and smaller fishing vessels that carry drugs out to sea and transfer them to larger freight vessels in international waters. There 

were several drug seizures in 2010 of cocaine found in sea cargo originating from Suriname, 

including: 166 kilos from a container at the port of Tilbury in the United Kingdom, where the 

drugs were concealed within industrial machinery parts; 266 kilos discovered by Pakistani 

Customs at the port of Karachi in the shipping container of plywood; and 147 kilos of liquid 

cocaine discovered by Dutch Customs officials, concealed within a cargo container of syrup. 

Source: U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report; various years. 

The world of real estate has the mantra “Location! Location! Location!” That mantra 

has some applicability here. Suriname is just a “stone’s throw” away from Colombia, a 

major cocaine and heroin production (and marijuana cultivation) center. It also is close to 

Venezuela, a major drug conduit, and it shares a 600 km-border with Guyana and a 593 kmborder with Brazil, both of which feature prominently in drug trans-shipment from South 

America to the United States, Europe, and Africa, often for re-routing to Europe and the 

United States. Also, Suriname is less than 3,000 miles away from most places in the United 

States, a key demand country. For instance, Paramaribo is just 2,154 miles from Miami 

and 2,655 miles from Washington, D.C. Although it is further away from key drug demand 

countries in Europe—4,659 miles from Amsterdam, and 4,437 miles from London, for 

instance—there are commercial and social networks in those countries that make the trafficking journeys worthwhile for the illegal operators.21

Yet, is not merely a matter of physical geography; social geography also is a factor. 

Suriname has fewer than 500,000 people in its 163,270 square kilometers of territory. It is 

about the same size of the state of Georgia in the United States, which has a little fewer than 

10 million people. Thus, Suriname has a very low population density. In addition, as with 

French Guiana to its east and Guyana to its west, Suriname’s population lives mostly along 

the coast. Consequently—and this is true of Guyana and French Guiana, as well—most of 

the nation’s territory is both under-peopled and under-policed. This combination provides 

vulnerability to drug trafficking (and other illegal activities) as well as opportunity for traffickers and other illegal operators.

Thus, a second understandable geonarcotics question is this: In light of the factors described above, is Bouterse likely to establish a narco-state?22 This salience of this question 

increased for some individuals with the January 2011 WikiLeaks cable revelation. It was 

alleged that United States embassy officials in Suriname had filed reports to headquarters 

that Bouterse had continued his drug dealings even after his 1999 conviction, supposedly 

until 2006, when he still was a member of parliament, and that some of his ventures involved links with Guyanese Roger Khan (Daily Herald 2011). As noted in Table 1, in October 2009 Khan was sentenced to 40 years in prison in New York having been convicted 

on drug trafficking and related charges. 

Clearly, with unemployment almost 10 percent, per capita GDP being under 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 59

US$10,000, and three-quarters of the population engaged in the low-wage service sector, economic deprivation is still a major challenge for Suriname. Indeed, as noted earlier, 

Bouterse won partly because of a pledge to improve the economic and social conditions 

of Surinamese. It is true that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts a 5 percent 

economic growth this year. (See RJRnewsonline 2011.) But, corruption still exists, and the 

conditions that conduce to it are unlikely to be eliminated in the near future. Moreover, the 

economic, political, and geographic conditions of proximate countries such as Guyana, 

Venezuela, and Brazil are not such as to reduce their contribution to Suriname’s vulnerability to trafficking. 

For all this, I do not envisage the creation of a narco-state in Suriname, and for several reasons. First, the very political acumen that helped Bouterse reemerge legitimately 

should enable him to appreciate the inexpediency of such a pursuit. Such would hurt both 

his political self-interest as a world leader and the national interests of his nation. Second, 

Bouterse must know of the special spotlight both he and Suriname are now under. Thus, he 

is more likely to try to compensate for his history and negative image by being aggressive 

against trafficking than to become complicit (again) in it. Perhaps we already are seeing the 

makings of this with the quest for international assistance from Britain, the Netherlands, 

Bulgaria, Pakistan, and elsewhere. (See Stabroek News 2011.) Finally, although Bouterse 

is in good health, he is in a chronological zone —age 65—when leaders begin to ponder 

both their mortality and their legacy.23 He must know that enabling the development of a 

narco-state would damage his legacy. 

Consider, though, that even if President Bouterse were to compensate for his drug 

trafficking history and image by being aggressive against traffickers, he might well want to 

establish a legacy outside the geonarcotics arena. The foreign policy arena can plausibly be 

that desired legacy area. In such a case, for understandable reasons, his primary zone of engagement would have to be the Caribbean, Brazil, and Venezuela, although Europe and the 

United States will continue to be important for trade, aid, and immigration.24 As was noted 

earlier, in his first international trip—to Guyana in September 2010—Bouterse declared 

having “a special movement and aspiration towards South America and the Caribbean.”25

Indeed, as part of its South American engagement, Suriname joined UNASUR (Unión de 

Naciones Suramericanas or Union of South American Nations) in January 2011.26 It is in 

that context that we turn next to some dynamics related to a possible Venezuelan embrace.

On the Venezuelan Front 

A Venezuelan embrace of Suriname now that Bouterse is president is under way. This is 

explained by a few secondary factors and one primary one. One secondary factor is the 

fact that both Dési Bouterse and Hugo Chávez are political mavericks, and perhaps bond at 

that level. Moreover, there is ostensibly an ideological affinity, as they both are left of the 

ideological spectrum. However, clearly Bouterse no longer has the strident left orientation 

he had during the 1980s and 1990s, when the overall ideological climate in the hemisphere 

and beyond was different. It is true that Suriname recognized the State of Palestine in 

February 2011, and hosted Chen Fengxiang, vice head of the Communist Party of China 

a month later (Suriname.net 2011 and DevSur 2011). It also is true that Suriname is facilitating the deepening of China’s presence and positioning in the Caribbean (and Latin 

America) but that deepening began long before Bouterse’s presidency began.

For instance, the Suriname embassy in Beijing is reported to have issued almost 
60 Security and Defense Studies Review

3,300 visas for Chinese nationals to enter Suriname between 2007 and 2010. This is apart 

from the thousands of Chinese who allegedly were smuggled into the country illegally 

(Stabroek News 2011d). Consider also that not only does China now have an embassy in 

Paramaribo that “dwarfs the aging United States embassy,” but that “the Foreign Ministry’s 

elegant new headquarters here is a gift from the Chinese government.” In addition, “Chinese signs on hundreds of businesses, from casinos to grocery shops and furniture stores, 

beckon the residents of this capital. Chinese work crews are paving roads cutting through 

the jungle” (Romero 2011). Moreover, writes Simon Romero, “While the economic aid 

has certainly been welcome in Suriname, formerly known as Dutch Guiana, the growing 

political and demographic profile of the Chinese here has created concerns, ranging from 

xenophobic calls from some political leaders here to investigate what they call ‘a Chinese 

Invasion’ to more tempered efforts to decipher what effect China’s rising influence will 

have on a country that is already distant linguistically and culturally from the rest of South 

America” (Romeo 2011).27

However, Bouterse seems not be interested in ideological posturing, but in pragmatism. For example, in outlining his five-year policy projections in the National Assembly 

in October 2010, he declared: “Our foreign policy will be aimed at Suriname agricultural 

produce gaining access to Caribbean markets. We will pursue a more intensive cooperation 

with Cuba in educating doctors, in order to bring health care within reach of each Surinamese. We will work more closely with Venezuela as regards the further development of our 

oil sector, with Japan and Korea on the fisheries sector, with the USA and Canada in the 

mining sector, and with India in the area of ICT” (Bouterse 2010b, 6). Interestingly, Cuba 

and Suriname established diplomatic relations in 1979, but after the United States invasion 

of Grenada in 1983 those relations were frozen until 1995. Cuba reopened an embassy 

in Paramaribo in 2006, and Suriname reopened one in Havana in January 2010, several 

months before Bouterse assumed the presidency.

Understandably, Suriname’s pragmatism does not mean that Chávez might not wish 

for or push ideological stridency—perhaps, over time and as he tightens the embrace, he 

hopes. Neither is it being argued that Bouterse can totally escape the embrace having accepted Chávez’s largesse during the 2010 elections campaign. Moreover, anxiety in some 

quarters within Suriname about Venezuelan influence led one group, called “No Murderers 

for President,” to begin protesting alleged interference by Venezuela in Suriname’s domestic politics. They even wrote to all UNASUR members, except Venezuela, of course, about 

this (Stabroek News 2011b). 

What, then, is the primary factor involved in the Venezuelan embrace of Suriname 

under Dési Bouterse? That factor is national interest. Suriname finds it in its national interest to enhance its relationship with Venezuela as part of its South American thrust, which 

was noted earlier, and because of aid and oil. The latter relates to getting it on concessionary terms and securing technical assistance for Suriname’s own small oil operations. For 

its part, Venezuela considers it in its national interest to expand its zone of influence by 

using oil, part of its Bolivarian strategy. The instrument for using oil as part of this strategy 

is PetroCaribe. Chávez announced Suriname’s inclusion in PetroCaribe while on a fivehour visit to Suriname on November 26, 2010, after leaving a UNASUR conference in 

Guyana. He also signed agreements on agriculture and housing. Venezuela also will supply 

fertilizers for Suriname’s rice sector and the two nations will pursue a joint venture on rice 

farming. In addition, Venezuela also will provide an undisclosed number of prefabricated 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 61

houses to Suriname. Later the houses will be built in Surname with Venezuelan assistance 

(Caribbean 360 2010).

PetroCaribe itself was established in 2005 under Venezuela’s PetroCaribe Energy 

Agreement. It finances a portion of the value of imports of Venezuelan crude oil on a sliding scale: above $30 per barrel, 25 percent; above $40, 30 percent; above 50, 40 percent; 

and above $100, 50 percent. Participating countries pay the balance over 25 years at a 2 

percent interest rate, which reduces to 1 percent at prices above $40 per barrel along with 

a two-year repayment grace period (Girvan 2011, 122). PetroCaribe has six key terms of 

engagement:

1. Oil sold at concessionary terms.

2. Only part of the payment is paid in cash up front. The rest is converted into a loan, used 

for development purposes, to be repaid in 25 years at 1 or 2 percent interest.

3. No conditions are attached to the loans.

4. Portions of the loan can be repaid in the form of goods or services.

5. No private entities are permitted; all transactions are done on a state-to-state basis.

6. Transportation, docking facilities, and upgrades to refining and storage capabilities are 

included (Maingot 2011, 104).

As of September 2011, the following 17 countries were PetroCaribe participants: 

Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, 

Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, St. Kitts and Nevis, 

St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname. They receive about 145,000 barrels daily, down from the 300,000 barrels initially envisaged, with some 95,000 barrels 

going to Cuba alone. This leadership of this list of nations is not all leftist in orientation. 

Indeed, only the leaders of Cuba and Nicaragua are left of the political spectrum, although 

Prime Minister Ralph Gonsalves of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, President Dési Bouterse of Suriname, and a few others were solidly so at an earlier time. 

Thus, even though PetroCaribe is manifestly a part of Hugo Chávez’s Bolivarian 

strategy, the participating nations are drawn to it not because of ideological affinity with 

Chávez but for pragmatic national interest reasons.28 Anthony Maingot’s assessment is, 

therefore, fully supportable: “This is the main lesson learned from Venezuela’s efforts in 

the region: countries will seldom turn down economic assistance when they need it, but 

how they respond politically to that assistance will depend on their own political culture 

and realities” (Maingot 2011, 114). 

However, there are risks, especially for those Eastern Caribbean nations with monocultural economies and, therefore, significant economic vulnerability. This vulnerability is 

accentuated in 2011 by developments in the Middle East, which have driven the price of 

oil up considerably. In April 2011 the world price of crude was US$121 per barrel, up from 

US$84 a year earlier, and it likely will rise further if the turbulence in the Middle East does 

not end soon.29 As such, reliance on PetroCaribe likely will increase—so, too, will possibly Venezuela’s influence. At least Suriname has a more diversified economy, including 

some oil production, and can resist diplomatic or ideological pressures if it feels such are 

not consonant with its national interests. Dominica, St. Lucia, and other Eastern Caribbean 

states are less able to do. Further, Suriname is not—yet, at least—part of ALBA.

I support Maingot’s view that fundamentally Hugo Chávez’s strategy is about creat-
62 Security and Defense Studies Review

ing alternatives “to U.S. imperialism, capitalism (in its neoliberal, free trade, and privatization dimensions), and traditional oligarchies (often defined in racial terms)” (Maingot 

2011, 112). My worry, then, is that as middle-power Venezuela pursues its “great game” 

against hyper-power United States, small Caribbean nations might become unwitting victims. Geopolitically, ALBA and the Bolivarian strategy highlight several political and economic vulnerabilities of Caribbean countries, in relation to CARICOM and the United 

States, which is Venezuela’s nemesis. It is in this context that the re-emergence of Bouterse 

and the strengthening of relations with Venezuela have raised some geopolitical anxieties. 

Nevertheless, so far all indications are that Suriname’s pursuits are guided by pragmatism and national interest rather than left ideological affinity. In this respect, Bouterse’s 

articulation of his Development Diplomacy approach in Suriname’s National Assembly in 

October 2010 bears noting: 

The realization of the national development goals will be central in our 

interactions with other countries and international organizations, mindful of the 

policy principle that foreign policy must contribute to national development. 

The foreign policy will serve to support sectors that are central to the national 

development, such as agriculture and mining, education, health care, rural 

development, poverty alleviation and environmental protection. With regard to 

Suriname this implies a reorientation of the regular diplomacy to a developmentoriented diplomacy, with more attention being paid to new subjects such as 

poverty alleviation, food security, the protection of upcoming business and 

industries, and the impact of climate change. In this concept the contribution 

of recognized NGOs and Surinamese will be of great value in the Diaspora. 

This development diplomacy will be aimed at optimizing effectiveness and 

productivity of international cooperation on behalf of national development30

(Bouterse 2010b, 6).

Conclusion

Suriname is clearly at a crossroads partly because the major outcome of the 2010 elections 

has caused some geopolitical anxieties—in Guyana with which there is a territorial dispute, regarding drug trafficking, and vis-à-vis relations with Venezuela. This is essentially 

because of the triumph of erstwhile authoritarian ruler and convicted drug trafficker Dési 

Bouterse, who made good use of his political acumen to re-emerge as the nation’s chief 

political helmsman, this time legitimately. 

Yet, it is important to bear in mind the broader context of political adaptation and democracy in the extant case. Samuel Huntington reminds us that: “Elections, open, free, and 

fair, are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non. Governments produced by 

elections may be inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated by special interests, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good. These qualities may 

make such governments undesirable but they do not make them undemocratic” (Huntington 

1991, 9-10). There is every reason to hope that not only will Suriname sustain its democratic 

trajectory, but that the government of President Dési Bouterse will pursue such domestic 

and international policies and programs as to make his government desirable within the 

country and embraced as a valuable member of the regional and global comity of nations. 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 63

Notes 

1 See Huntington 1968 regarding Political Adaptation. See Manning 1977 for the initial use 

of Intermestic, and Lowenthal 1992 for the first application in relation to Latin America 

and the Caribbean. 

2

 It is widely agreed that elections are necessary but not sufficient for democracy. Elsewhere, I have argued that democracy requires not only free and fair elections but also the 

unencumbered exercise of civil and political rights, the right of parties and interest groups 

to operate, access to decision-makers and institutions of government and responsiveness 

by them, functional judiciaries, and uncensored media. See Griffith and Sedoc-Dahlberg 

1997. 

3

 For a full discussion of the structure and operation of Suriname’s political system 

and some contemporary political aspects, see Dew 1994, Sedoc-Dahlberg 1997, Singh 

2007, and Inter Parliamentary Union at http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/

search?q=cache:Rki69QfL7zgJ:www.ipu.org/parline/reports/2299.htm+mega+combinati

on+composition&cd=10&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&source=www.google.com. 

4

 Understandably, the results also reflected the plural society nature of the nation. The 

National Assembly comprises 17 Hindustani, 11 Creole, 10 Maroon, 9 Javanese, 2 Amerindian, and 2 Chinese. Interestingly as well, 31 of the 51 new parliamentarians were elected 

for the first time.

5

 For more expressions of admiration and anxiety, see Fox 2010, Padgett 2010, and Associated Press 2010. 

6

 For more on the subject, see Ronfeldt 1983, Serbín 1990, Griffith 1993, Ch. 7, and Griffith 

2004, 26-30.

7

 Bouterse fell ill with dengue fever a few weeks before the planned visit but he insisted on 

making the trip even though he had not fully recovered. 

8

 This writer wonders whether some of the symbolism and the flurry of activities are influenced by the fact that Jagdeo, who is term-limited, is in the final year of his presidency and perhaps hopes to compensate for the unremarkable dealings with Suriname as he 

thinks about his legacy. One survey of Guyana-Suriname relations offers the credible view 

that “By any measure, the nadir of Guyana-Suriname relations occurred during President 

Bharrat Jagdeo’s tenure of office” (Stabroek News 2008). 

9

 As evidence, it was noted “President Desmond Hoyte had agreed to a similar ‘working 

visit’ by President Johannes Kraag in January 1991 at Plantation Skeldon on the Corentyne. 

Mr. Kraag has recently been installed by Suriname’s National Army’s Acting Commander 

Colonel Ivan Graanoogst—then Colonel Bouterse’s trusted deputy—after the 24th December 1990 ‘Telephone Coup.’ Two days after Bouterse’s resignation as Army Commander, 

the Army telephoned President Ramsewak Shankar to inform him that he and his cabinet 

had been removed from office” (Stabroek News 2010d). 

10 Jagdeo’s November visit generated criticism because of the composition of his team. 

Foreign Minister Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett was conspicuously absent, although Suriname’s Foreign Minister, Winston Lackin, was part of Bouterse’s delegation. Included in 

Jagdeo’s team was Donald Ramotar, government parliamentarian and General Secretary of 

the ruling People’s Progressive Party (PPP). Criticism came both from opposition parties 
64 Security and Defense Studies Review

and from within the PPP, as Ramotar was a contender for the PPP’s presidential nomination for the elections, due by the end of 2011. Jagdeo had taken Ramotar on other foreign 

trips, using government funds. Other PPP presidential contenders saw his inclusion in such 

trips as competitively advantaging him, both in signaling “anointment” as successor and 

in providing him with practical foreign policy experience. As anticipated, the PPP Central Committee eventually chose the 61-year-old Ramotar (born October 22, 1950) as the 

presidential candidate, on April 4, 2011. Noteworthy, too, is that after press and opposition 

party protests that followed the announcement that Jagdeo and Ramotar were to make a 

campaign fund-raising visit to New York later that month (using state funds), Jagdeo legitimated the use of the funds by simply appointing Ramotar as one of his political advisors. 

See Guyana Chronicle 2011.

11 Bouterse and Jagdeo reportedly discussed the bridging of the Corentyne River, crime, 

and immigration. On immigration, they agreed to regularize the river-boat system whereby 

Guyanese land in Suriname and Surinamese touchdown in Guyana through the unregulated 

speed boat system (Newspress 2011).

12 For a discussion of the historical antecedents and legal and political dynamics of this 

dispute, see Donovan 2003, Ferguson 2007, Pollard 2007, and Stabroek News 2010c.

13 It is worth noting that Jagdeo allowed himself to be humiliated in January 2002 when, as 

part of an official visit to Suriname, he was invited to address the National Assembly and 

he spoke from a position in the Assembly where the map of Suriname with the New River 

Triangle as part of Suriname was part of the backdrop. See Guyana Chronicle 2002.

14 I mention military effectiveness not to suggest that military measures should have been 

used but because in the international arena—whether for big, medium, or small states—the 

possession of military assets and sometimes just the perception of that possession—even 

without the use of gunboat diplomacy—can influence outcomes as national interests are 

pursued, especially when such fundamental interests as territorial possession (or the definition of it) are involved. 

15 See http://www.surinameembassy.org/. This is a variation of Venezuela’s approach where 

it portrays Essequibo, the five-eighth of Guyana it claims, as part of its territory but as Zona 

en reclamación. See, for example, http://www.venezuelatuya.com/geografia/mapavenezuela.htm. Noteworthy, too, is the fact that in June 2011 President Bouterse reasserted the 

claim to the New River Triangle. 

16 This is a form of communication used in the diplomatic community that is unsigned 

and written in the third person. It is less formal than a Note but more formal than an AideMémoire. 

17 Interestingly, CGX footed most of Guyana’s legal bill. According to one report, “Toronto-based CGX Energy Inc. paid $8.9 million in fees--the majority of Guyana’s legal 

bill--incurred in a maritime border dispute with Suriname over rights to the undersea basin, President Bharrat Jagdeo said late Monday. ‘This is no secret,’ Jagdeo told reporters 

outside his offices Georgetown. ‘I’m very grateful to CGX for footing the bill, because it 

didn’t come from the treasury. But that doesn’t mean that they have any preferences’” (Associated Press 2007). 

18 Suriname also pursued a “denial of access” strategy. Although Guyana and Britain allowed Suriname unlimited access to all historical archives, Suriname sought to deny access 

by Guyana to Dutch archives for the period June 1937 to March 1959, leading the Tribunal 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 65

to declare in its first Procedural Order that: “The Tribunal shall not consider any document 

taken from a file in the archives of the Netherlands to which Guyana had been denied access” (Ramphal 2008, 222). 

19 For the case’s historical, political, and legal dynamics, see Ramphal 2008. Shridath 

Ramphal is an international lawyer with a distinguished career: former Attorney General 

and then Foreign Minister of Guyana under Forbes Burnham (founder of the People’s 

National Congress that is now the main opposition party), former Commonwealth Secretary General, and former Chancellor of both the University of the West Indies and the 

University of Guyana. He led Guyana’s team. Suriname’s team was led by then Minister of 

Foreign Affairs, Lygia Kraag-Keteldijk.

20 As noted earlier, Brunswijk now heads the A Combination group. He is a member of the 

National Assembly, representing Marowijne district, in north-east Suriname, near French 

Guiana.

21 See Griffith 1997, 57-62 for data on the distances between and among source, transit, 

and destination countries in the Caribbean, South America, North America, and Europe. 

22 The term refers to situations where (a) the political elites of a country either act in complicity with drug barons or are so fearful of them that they turn a blind eye to their pursuits, 

or (b) drug dealers exercise effective control over parts of the nation, thereby undermining 

the governability of the nation by the elites who reputedly rule it. An example of the first 

case is Afghanistan under Taliban rule. An example of the second case is Colombia for 

much of the 1960s-1990s and contemporary Mexico in several states. 

23 He was born on October 13, 1945, in Paramaribo, the capital of Suriname. 

24 Suriname announced in February 2011 that it was changing its gateway to Europe from 

the Netherlands to France. See Stabroek News 2011c.

25 Suriname assumes the six-month Chairmanship of CARICOM in January 2012. 

26 The other members of UNASUR are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 

27 In the same article Simon Romero quotes Yuan Nansheng, the Chinese Ambassador in 

Suriname, as saying, that China has no problem with President Bouterse’s past in relation 

to drug trafficking or with the trial for the murder of political opponents, and would like to 

have him visit China.

28 Central to the Bolivarian strategy is ALBA—Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de 

Nuestra América (The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, also called 

the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas)—which was formed in 2004 and of which 

Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and St. Vincent and 

the Grenadines are members, along with Venezuela. See Clem and Maingot 2011 for an 

examination of ALBA and of the Bolivarian strategy.

29 See United States Energy Administration, Petroleum and Other Liquids, available at http://

www.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=WTOTWORLD&f=W. Accessed May 14, 2011. 

30 Some of his key diplomatic selections can be viewed as furthering this approach. In 

January 2011, Subhas Mungra was appointed as ambassador to the United States. Mungra 

is an economist who once served as Permanent Representative to the United Nations, as 
66 Security and Defense Studies Review

Foreign Minister, and as Finance Minister. Marlon Mohammedhoessein, a career diplomat 

with over 20 years of service and who was trained in Brazil’s Rio Branco Institute, also was 

appointed as ambassador to Brazil (Caribbean News Now 2011). 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 67

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—––. 2010b. “Frontiers: Suriname’s Seismic Moment,” June 24; available at http://www.

stabroeknews.com/2010/guyana-review/06/24/frontiers-suriname%e2%80%99sseismic-moment/. (Accessed November 23, 2010.)

—––. 2010c. “Frontiers: Why Should Guyana Trust Suriname,” August 31; available at 

http://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/guyana-review/08/31/frontiers-why-shouldguyana-trust-suriname/ (Accessed November 23, 2010.)

—––. 2010d. “Suriname Desperately Seeks Acceptability,” September 30; available at 

http://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/guyana-review/frontiers/09/30/suriname-desperately-seeks-acceptability/. (Accessed November 26, 2010.)

—––. 2011a. “Suriname Seeks International Help in Drug Seizures,” February 22; available at http://www.stabroeknews.com/2011/news/breaking/02/22/suriname-seeksinternational-help-on-drug-seizures/. (Accessed March 5, 2011.)

—––. 2011b. “UNASUR Should Probe Venezuelan Interference in Suriname—Group’” 

February 11; available at http://www.stabroeknews.com/2011/news/breaking/02/15/

unasur-should-probe-venezuelan-interference-in-suriname-group/. (Accessed March 

8, 2011.) 

—––. 2011c. “Suriname Chooses France as Europe Gateway,” February 11, 2011; available at http://www.stabroeknews.com/2011/news/breaking/02/11/suriname-choosesfrance-as-europe-gateway/. (Accessed March 8, 2011). 

Surinamenewsonline.com. 2011. “Institutionalizing of First Lady a Hot Topic;” January 

17, available at http://www.surinametimesonline.com/index.php?articleid=6428. 

(Accessed January 29, 2011.) 

Suriname.net. 2011. “Suriname’s Recognition of State of Palestine,” February 2; available 
72 Security and Defense Studies Review

at http://www.surinam.net/content/%E2%80%94-welcomes-surinames-recognitionstate-palestine-daily-times-0. (Accessed March 12, 2011.)

U.S. Department of State. 2011. 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. 

Available at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2011/index.htm. (Accessed March 

3, 2011.) 

West Indian News. 2010. “’We Are More Attracted to Guyana’—Says Bouterse as Guyana and Suriname Concretize Relations,” September 7, available at http://www.thewestindiannews.com/%E2%80%9Cwe-are-more-attracted-to-guyana%E2%80%9D-

%E2%80%93-says-bouterse-as-guyana-and-suriname-concretise-relations. 

(Accessed November 26, 2010.)

World Countries News. 2011. “Oil Production in Guyana Likely by 2014, Analysts say,” 

January 30; available at http://world-countries.net/archives/14768. (Accessed February 23, 2011.) 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 73

The Evolution and Implementation of FARC Strategy: 

Insights from Its Internal Documents*

David Spencer 

FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) is one of the most remarkable, yet 

opaque, Marxist guerrilla organizations in existence today. For nearly half a century, it has 

maintained an insurgency against the Colombian government that has defied trends elsewhere in the region. For example, its greatest period of growth and power was during the 

1990s, after the end of the Cold War, when most Marxist insurgencies in the region were 

dwindling and after Colombia adopted a much more inclusionary democracy. Its power has 

been derived from significant economic assets through drug trafficking and kidnapping, 

rather than through popular support, of which it enjoy very little. In fact, FARC is probably 

one of the least popular guerrilla groups in Colombian history and deliberately carries out 

terrorist attacks against the population to cow them into submission. Yet it continues to survive and defy efforts to destroy it. Military defeats, which have greatly reduced its power, 

and the loss of principle leaders, which have crippled and caused the collapse of past guerrilla organizations, seem to have barely dented FARC’s will to continue the struggle. As 

will be seen, although acknowledging its setbacks, it has developed a strategy to recover its 

former power and is doing everything it can to carry out its plan. What keeps it going is a 

mystery to many. Some claim that its members are no longer insurgents, but drug traffickers. Others claim that it fights for local power and has lost interest in national power. Most 

of this is based on speculation, not what FARC says to itself about its intentions. 

This paper will attempt to provide some insight into this fascinating yet formidable 

group by examining its strategic decisions since 1982 and then comparing them to its ensuing actions. FARC develops its strategic guidelines through a series of conferences and 

plenums. The conclusions of these meetings are carefully recorded and distributed to the 

dispersed fronts to provide strategic guidance. Fortunately, many copies of these documents have been captured from FARC by the Colombian security forces. The author was 

given generous access to these documents by the Colombian authorities. 

Why 1982? FARC developed its strategy to take power in its Seventh Conference, 

held in 1982. This has been its guiding document since that date, and continues to shape 

how and why FARC does what it does. While strategic decisions were made before 1982, 

the first six FARC conferences will not be covered for two reasons: One, because the organization was then more focused on ensuring the survival of the group, rather than taking 

power, and, two, because this time period has been adequately covered by others. Between 

1964 and 1982 FARC was essentially in survival mode; it lived mostly on extortion and 

some kidnapping. Some sources indicate that the initial relationship with drug trafficking 

began as early as 1980, when drug traffickers offered to pay FARC to provide security to its 

drug processing laboratories.1

 Over these 16 years FARC grew slowly to 1,200 combatants 

organized in 16 fronts.2

* This article is the product of a broader study on Colombia conducted by CHDS, looking at the government’s 

success at restoring security and governance to a significant degree between 2002 and 2010. 
74 Security and Defense Studies Review

1982–1994

In May 1982 during its Seventh Conference, FARC developed a strategy for taking power. 

It had been inspired by international events. The Soviets seemed to have the United States 

on the defensive. The Sandinistas had overthrown Somoza in Nicaragua. The FMLN in El 

Salvador was advancing rapidly and seemed close to victory. In Guatemala, the revolution was growing strongly. Cuba was again actively supporting and encouraging groups to 

organize and attack.

FARC reasoned: “In our case, directly or indirectly, we benefit from the change of 

correlation of forces that are facing each other in conflict at this moment in Latin America.”3

 Before it could advance it own revolution, however, it needed to have a correct strategy first. As Marulanda stated, “We can make tactical mistakes, we can even make operational mistakes, but we can never make strategic mistakes that will lead any military force 

to defeat.”4 It needed to create a revolutionary army and new tactics it designated the “new 

mode of operations.” The latter was the equivalent of what Mao called “mobile warfare.” 

It would go on the offensive, seek out, isolate, surround, and destroy enemy forces.5 To 

demonstrate the qualitative change, the FARC decided to add the term Ejército del Pueblo 

(People’s Army) to its name, becoming FARC-EP. It was hoping to gain international support to fund the army, and having a serious strategy was a way to convince international 

donors. However, until the FARC could build that international support, it had to resort to 

other methods. Drug trafficking was flourishing in the territories in which FARC operated, 

and they offered too tempting a target. Taxing the “evil capitalists” was the solution. The 

drug trafficking industry also offered a pool of migrants in search of work from which to 

recruit a guerrilla army.6

Finally, FARC discussed the incoming Betancur government, which was making 

overtures to FARC to participate in peace talks. FARC saw it as a plot: “As everything 

indicates, the incoming government will carry out gestures and maneuvers [for the purpose 

of]—if not destroying the guerrilla movement—then destabilizing and weakening it.”7

FARC then outlined what its response would be within the strategic plan: “FARC-EP can 

attend conversations and will carry out diplomatic and political struggles in the sense that 

the guerrilla problem cannot be solved except linked to the resolution of the fundamental 

problems of the Colombian people.”8

 It did not see negotiations as an alternative to its war 

strategy, but rather as a complementary area of struggle that could supplement battlefield 

gains. It also developed a military plan known as the National Eight-Year Plan, which was 

supposed to culminate with the building of a vast army and the creation of a provisional 

government.9 For several years only the members of the secretariat knew its contents.10

The eight-year plan was divided into four two-year phases. During the first phase 

FARC was to grow more than 10 times to 60 fronts with 300 combatants each, for a total 

of 18,000 combatants. During the second phase it was to grow to 80 fronts with 400 combatants each, for a total of 32,000 guerrillas. Phase 3 was to be a general offensive. Half 

of FARC was to carry out guerrilla warfare in the front areas, while the other half was to 

be organized into mobile companies and columns to attack along what FARC called the 

Center of Strategic Deployment, the Eastern Cordillera, which connected the Sierra of Macarena in southeastern Colombia to Bogotá. The purpose of dividing the force this way was 

so that the first would carry out intensive guerrilla warfare locally to force the government 

to stretch its resources to defend everything. Then the other half, the mobile companies and 

columns, would concentrate to develop local superiority against the spread out forces in 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 75

the direction of its final objective. Finally, as the FARC conquered territory it was to form 

militias to defend its conquests from “dirty war.” If this failed to provoke insurrection in 

the cities, FARC was to withdraw to favorable positions and organize a second general offensive. This was Phase 4.11

Soon after the Seventh Conference, FARC began an aggressive expansion into the 

eastern plains and southern jungle. In particular, it began to encroach on these drug trafficking zones both to recruit and to acquire more money from the drug traffickers in accordance 

to its plan. Its advance was marked by a rash of murders and kidnappings as it imposed its 

will to gain territorial control.12

 At the same time it began discussions with the Betancur government. In May 1984, 

FARC and the government signed the La Uribe Accords, in which both parties agreed 

to a ceasefire and to begin the search for a political solution to the conflict. FARC was 

to cease all “terrorist” operations, including kidnapping. In return FARC received very 

generous terms. This included being allowed to form a political party, amnesty for guerrillas who chose to rejoin normal society, government promises to seek agrarian reform and 

to strengthen rights for labor unions, and so forth.13 In addition, the government allowed 

FARC leadership to live and work unmolested at a camp in La Uribe known as Casa Verde. 

Here, the peace commission, journalists, and others could visit and consult with them without fear of military or police operations. 

During the ceasefire, FARC continued pushing forward its strategic plan, working on 

two tracks. On the one hand, it began to expand its recruiting of new guerrillas and creating 

new fronts. When FARC signed the ceasefire it had 27 fronts. By the end of the process, 

FARC would nearly double to 48 fronts. On the other hand, FARC created its new political 

party, the Union Patriótica (Patriotic Union), known by the acronym UP. The UP was an 

end run around the Communist Party, which essentially forced the Communists to participate without having been consulted.14 In this way, the party became subsumed by FARC 

rather than the other way around. Despite some harassment and a couple of murders, the 

UP initially prospered. 

Although the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) was part of the UP, from the beginning there were clear differences in how FARC and the PCC conceived of the UP. The 

Communist Party XIV Congress had concluded that “it was evident that we do not find 

ourselves in a revolutionary situation for the struggle of the Colombian people” and that 

the opening offered by the Betancur government meant that the struggle for power must 

become purely political.15 Jacobo Arenas vehemently disagreed, characterizing the new political opening as not freedom but a “caricature of freedom.” Furthermore, while admitting 

that things had changed, he asserted that it was a tactical, rather than a strategic, change. He 

discussed two forms of power: “formal power” and “real power.” Formal power consisted 

of the institutional structures of the state, which were democratic, but the “real power” was 

economic-military interests and the United States in the shadows. Arenas admitted that 

while formal power was opening up, this was essentially a trick to disarm the revolutionaries and make them vulnerable and that real power had unleashed and intensified a dirty 

war.16 He was referring to the new paramilitary organizations that were beginning to cause 

havoc for FARC in the Middle Magdalena and eastern Antioquia. 

How FARC conceived of the party was made clear in the October 1983 Broadened 

Plenum. This was not a party to substitute for armed revolution, but rather a party to create 

the revolution: “Nobody should be fooled into believing that here in Colombia an open-
76 Security and Defense Studies Review

ing can be created toward bourgeoisie democracy.”17 To the FARC, to demobilize and 

become a party within the government system was to fall into the trap of being boxed into 

“restricted democracy made in USA,” where the rich and the military would keep the revolutionary party subordinated through a combination of terror and political and economic 

submission. Instead, creating the UP was vital for developing the mass struggle to build 

the insurrectionary situation necessary for revolution.18 This required temporarily ceasing 

military action.

However, many of the commanders had difficulty understanding this new focus because of the prolonged inactivity due to the ceasefire. Many seemed to think that the ceasefire and the focus on building the UP meant that the prospect of demobilization and conversion to a political party was a reality. The Secretariat had to remind its forces continually 

that this was not the case. “For many people the Ceasefire is the beginning of Peace.”19 “We 

should be clear that the ceasefire plan for each one of the fronts is not part of the Eight-Year 

Strategic Plan, but is the basis to create all of the conditions for its execution which will 

start in case of the breaking of the Ceasefire.”20 Arenas was very explicit that participating 

in politics was not an alternative to violent revolution: “So it is clear that political space is 

the conceptual foundation for the military strategy that we propose.”21 In FARC’s thinking, 

the UP was not an alternative to violent revolution, but rather a catalyst for its ultimate 

political-military triumph.

Initially the ceasefire was supposed to last from May 1984 to December 1, 1985, after 

which the eight-year plan would go into effect, but the FARC and the government decided 

to extend the ceasefire. UP was growing. In the elections of May 1986, the UP did very 

well, winning 350,000-plus votes: 5 out of 114 senate seats, 23 out of 199 congressmen, 

23 mayors, and 351 aldermen. Some within FARC began to believe that electoral politics 

could replace violent revolution. The Secretariat had to set them straight. It wrote, “In our 

case we are surely clear that the Ceasefire is a form of war and not a form of peace,”22 to 

“prepare the instruments of war that have been damaged in the confrontation, introduce 

new combat elements, improve in every sense the force so that when the ceasefire has 

ended to begin again in better conditions for war.”23

At about this time FARC stole cocaine from the Medellín drug cartel’s Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha. Despite the admonitions of the drug lord, war began between FARC and the 

Medellín cartel, who took revenge on FARC by murdering leaders of the UP. Sometimes it 

was assisted by individuals in the military, police, and government. 

The dirty war against the UP propelled FARC to join the Simon Bolívar Guerrilla 

Coordinator (Coordinadora Guerrillera Simon Bolívar) or CGSB24 and resume fighting: 

“From now on we will carry out a tenacious fight.”25 The purpose of joining the CGSB 

was to unify the guerrilla movement, and in this way contribute to unifying the Colombian people for revolution.”26 Despite its efforts, the FARC was not ready to implement 

the eight-year plan. It needed time. Instead it implemented what it called the “Emergency 

Plan.” First, all of the fronts had to mobilize. The Secretariat oversaw the creation of mobile companies. Preparations for urban plans were made. Experiments were conducted of 

grouping fronts together into blocs, particularly in the southeast.27 The Secretariat began to 

abandon the UP and ordered the fronts to create instead clandestine political and support 

structures known as the solidarity nuclei and the popular militias. This new clandestine political project was given the name “Bolivarian Meeting of the People.”28 In addition, FARC 

raised the stakes by ordering each front to form at a minimum one special group to “elimi-
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 77

nate the guiders, financiers and the executioners of the ‘dirty war.’”29 While the FARC had 

employed death squads before, the formalization of this type of unit within FARC caused 

civilian deaths in Colombia to spiral. 

Between 1987 and 1989 FARC implemented its emergency military plan. Toward the 

end of 1988 several army convoys were ambushed, and an attack was made on the defense 

minister General Manuel Jaime Guerrero Paz. Despite its return to military operations, 

President Virgilio Barco refused to attack FARC headquarters at Casa Verde in La Uribe 

in the hopes of restarting peace talks, despite urgings from future president César Gaviria 

to do so.

The emergency military plan produced mixed results. Besides killing many members 

of the UP, the paramilitaries had been very successful against FARC in Middle Magdalena, 

Antioquia, and parts of the eastern plains where the Medellín cartel was strong. Furthermore, the peace negotiations between the M-19 and the government were threatening to 

disrupt the CGSB, not only because of the loss of the M-19 but also because it was taking 

with them several of the smaller organizations, such as the Quintin Lame indigenous movement and a large portion of the EPL. FARC considered this a huge betrayal.30

Despite the mixed results, in 1989 the FARC decided to implement the national eightyear military plan. Renamed the Bolivarian Campaign for the New Colombia, it was supposed to run between 1989 and 1997. Many analysts made the mistake of thinking that this 

was a rigid plan with a rigid schedule. FARC has never approached its plans this way. As 

the Secretariat wrote: “Revolutionary processes never occur in a straight line to the pace of 

the flow of popular action. Always, such processes occur in a succession of ebbs and flows.

For example: In Colombia the ‘dirty war,’ the generalized violence and terror, are forcing 

the popular masses to retreat.”31 The dates then were no more than general goals. 

Politically FARC began to focus on the formation of solidarity unions32 over support 

of the UP, although the party was not totally abandoned. Unlike the UP’s, the solidarity union’s activities were to be clandestine. In addition, orders were given to intensify 

the formation of Bolivarian militias whose mission it was to defend the masses from the 

“dirty war.”33 Militarily, the fronts were to apply the new mode of operations against the 

government forces. In this sense FARC began efforts to accumulate the forces capable of 

carrying out these types of operations. It aggressively recruited new guerrillas. In part this 

was facilitated by the dirty war against the UP. Party members and idealistic youth who felt 

that there was no other option joined FARC in large numbers.34 In addition, it began to seek 

large-scale arms purchases and as importantly set up a sort of command and general staff 

school where it trained the leaders capable of executing the plan.

In August 1990, shortly after the election and inauguration of César Gaviria as President of Colombia, Jacobo Arenas, FARC political theorist and its informal co-leader died. 

In addition, the international repercussions of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the 

disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc between 1990 and 1991 severely weakened the Colombian Communist Party and socialist political development. 

FARC’s political thinking essentially froze after the loss of Arenas and the fall of the Soviet 

Union and took on a much more military character under the sole leadership of Manuel 

Marulanda. FARC and ELN under the CGSB carried out a series of increasingly violent 

attacks, culminating with the attack on the military base of Taraza in November 1990. This 

provoked President Gaviria to take a harder line towards FARC, and he ordered the military to take Casa Verde in December 1990. While the military did take the camp, it was not 
78 Security and Defense Studies Review

successful in killing or capturing any of the FARC leadership.

In response, the CGSB (FARC, EPL, and ELN) launched a series of offensives in 

the first half of 1991. While the vast majority of the actions were small-scale guerrilla and 

terrorist actions, a couple of things distinguished them from previous guerrilla actions. 

First, its scale: The CGSB was able to launch up to two dozen simultaneous attacks across 

multiple departments of the country.35 It was able to sustain this effort for several months. 

Attacks against the infrastructure increased, particularly the electrical grid and the oil pipeline. Finally, kidnapping became a common feature. A few more spectacular attacks were 

attempted, such as the taking of the Girasoles base in March 1991. The increased intensity 

of the fighting was evident because of the increase of government casualties. In 1991 the 

guerrillas carried out 425 attacks on the security forces, versus 169 in 1990. This included 

61 attacks against installations, 195 harassment attacks, 100 ambushes, and 69 urban attacks. Members of the military killed were 461, versus 339 in 1990, and 276 members of 

the security forces were captured.36

In the midst of this offensive, the government attempted to renew peace negotiations. 

In February 1991, the CGSB sent a letter to the government indicating that it was willing 

to negotiate. In May 1991, the government met with representatives of the CGSB in Cravo 

Norte, Arauca. Because of the combat operations, it was agreed that talks would be held in 

Caracas, Venezuela, where the dialogue was renewed in June of the same year. The government’s objective was for the guerrillas to demobilize, as the M-19 did. The guerrillas were 

interested in negotiating profound changes in the Colombian political system. FARC developed what it called the Agenda of 10 Points. While the government offered guarantees 

for demobilization and reintegration into society, the CGSB rejected them because it said 

that only by negotiating the 10 points would the causes of the insurgency be eliminated. 

Since there was no agreement, discussions revolved around the mechanics of a ceasefire 

and around zones of concentration for guerrilla demobilization. The major sticking point 

was the ceasefire, which neither side could agree on. Meanwhile, offensive operations by 

both sides in Colombia continued. In February 1992, the coup attempt in Venezuela caused 

the parties to move the discussions to Tlaxcala, Mexico. Here the talks lingered on through 

May 1992. After it was discovered that ex-minister Argelino Durán Quintero, kidnapped 

by the EPL, had died in captivity,37 the government suspended the talks in May 1992. The 

demise of the peace talks also signaled the demise of the CGSB, with each of the organizations gradually going its separate ways.

At the end of March through early April 1993, FARC held its Eighth Conference, 

significant because it was there that FARC really operationalized its strategy developed 11 

years earlier. This is why it was called the conference “Jacobo Arenas, we are fulfilling.”38

In addition to planning the insurrections, it developed a concrete proposal for a replacement 

government it called a New Government of Reconciliation and National Reconstruction. 

FARC analyzed its political situation. The demise of the UP was blamed mostly on 

the dirty war, what it called the alliance of the military, paramilitaries, and drug traffickers. However, there was also a second problem: the differences between FARC and the 

UP directly related to the discrepancies between FARC and the Communist Party, which 

formed much of the leadership of the UP. Much of the discrepancy was over the continued 

utility of the armed struggle. The party’s position was heavily influenced by events in the 

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. FARC vehemently defended the armed struggle, accusing Gorbachev of treachery and claiming that no matter what was going on in Europe, it 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 79

didn’t apply in Colombia because deep social problems still existed that were not going 

to be solved by the current political system.39 Essentially this conference signaled FARC’s 

definitive break with the UP and the PCC. It would now focus its political efforts on the 

creation of a clandestine political apparatus and the recovery of whatever legal political 

apparatus that it could.40

The conference analyzed organizational achievements. Since the end of the ceasefire 

it had grown from 48 to 60 fronts, but very few if any had achieved the desired strength of 

300 combatants. Reaching this number was the first priority, so that half could operate locally and the other half attack in the direction of Bogota via the Eastern Cordillera or Center of Strategic Deployment. Its strategy had called for the creation of the urban networks, 

particularly in Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, and Barranquilla. While this had been done, the 

networks were still very weak. This was a critical priority that needed to be addressed because the capability to direct the insurrection of the masses lay with the urban networks.41

The militias were to play the critical role of protecting the clandestine political organization and to control the terrain conquered by the regular guerrillas. FARC admitted that 

it was weak in this area and that more needed to be done to strengthen the militias.42

Developing international relations, particularly to gain material support had been one 

of the priorities of the Strategic Plan. The Eighth Conference created FARC’s international 

commission. FARC had experienced many difficulties in this area. It had only been able 

to formalize relations with three countries: Cuba, Nicaragua, and Vietnam. Cuba had provided limited military training and agreed to treat FARC casualties. Nicaragua had allowed 

FARC to use its territory for administrative purposes, and Vietnam had held discussions to 

compare experiences and teach about its successes. FARC was especially appreciative of 

the Vietnamese assistance.43 It had not been able to acquire any material support from any 

country, however.

In addition to developing international relations with countries, FARC had also advanced a policy of solidarity with revolutionary parties and movements. FARC had given 

military training to Venezuelans, Ecuadoreans, Brazilians, and Peruvians. The Chilean 

Communist Party sent members of the FPMR to Colombia to provide training, but FARC 

found them intolerably arrogant. FARC had carried out financial operations in Venezuela 

and Panama and in a mistaken application of its border policy military operations in Brazil, 

Ecuador, and Peru. It warned that it needed to be careful to prevent these countries from 

unifying against them.44

Militarily, FARC emphasized several points. First, while the organization of blocs 

had been ordered as early as 1987, it apparently had only been implemented first in the 

east and later in the south. Blocs allowed FARC to coordinate multiple tactical efforts at 

the operational level, such as in military divisions. The experience of these two blocs had 

been very positive, so FARC ordered that the rest of the organization be arranged in similar 

blocs. In total five blocs were created: the José María Cordoba Bloc, also known as the 

Northeastern Bloc; the Caribbean Bloc; the Middle Magdalena Bloc; the Eastern Bloc; 

and the Southern Bloc. In addition, two organizations similar to blocs were created, the 

Western Joint Command and the Central Joint Command.45 The Southern Bloc’s objective 

was essentially to liberate Caquetá and Putumayo for FARC. This was a strategic area for 

economic resources and logistics. The Eastern Bloc was to focus its efforts on advancing 

up the Eastern Cordillera or Center of Strategic Deployment to attack Bogotá. The rest of 

the blocs were to stretch Colombian government resources by attacking and isolating the 
80 Security and Defense Studies Review

major regional cities. The immediate task for all the blocs was to attack and clear mobility 

corridors for the maneuver of the mobile companies. To make sure that the blocs were run 

correctly and were carrying out the strategic plan, a member of the secretariat was to be 

assigned to each.46 To carry out the strategic plan, FARC pushed for the creation of 600 

mobile companies. These companies were to operate in the direction of the final strategic 

objective, Bogotá, while the fronts operated locally. The blocs and fronts were to carry out 

its first major offensive on August 7, 1994 (probably to welcome in the new president).47

The creation and operation of FARC’s army required large amounts of resources. 

FARC contemplated that each of the phases of the eight-year plan would cost an additional 

$52 million each or a total of $208 million. Acquiring this additional money was a major 

concern to the FARC leadership. Fronts were encouraged to gain more resources from the 

oil, mining, and electrical industries. Essentially, they were to do this through extortion 

and kidnapping. “All of the fronts and blocs should examine carefully the different places 

where there is mining, etc., so we can send units to begin controlling the area and in this 

way see how we can begin to force them to pay taxes for our sustainment.” They were 

also told to generate their own economy by investing in local businesses such as gold mining and the cattle market. Drug trafficking was mentioned, but euphemistically referred 

to as an “unpopular” method of financing.48 It was understood that it delegitimized the 

organization. FARC had been conflicted from the very beginning over the immorality of 

the business and constantly encouraged the fronts to attempt to lower their dependence on 

this method. However, nothing else provided as much money, and, rather than decreasing, 

FARC’s dependence on this method of financing continually increased. 

1994–1998

During the Samper administration FARC began to systematically increase the tempo of its 

operations. In keeping with the Conclusions of the Eighth Conference, the blocs began to 

carry out operations. They were unable to carry out the contemplated 7th of August offensive, but did begin to systematically clear mobility corridors. While they did not implement 

the new mode of operations, they began repeated attacks on police stations in small towns 

in the rural areas. While few police stations were actually taken, the repeated attacks damaged the stations and attrited the garrisons to the point that many towns were abandoned 

either because they were no longer tenable or because it was more important to reinforce 

more critical locations. In this way, large swaths of the countryside were abandoned to 

guerrilla control or influence. 

Politically, FARC developed the concept of co-government. Either directly or through 

its clandestine party, it influenced local politics and government spending. In this way it 

controlled politics by endorsing different candidates, by forcing a variety of policies to be 

adopted, and by controlling who could practice politics. In some cases it insinuated its own 

people into the local political parties. FARC interpreted this as exercising real political 

power and popular support. It reasoned that because of this it didn’t need a formal political 

party. What it failed to realize is that this influence was largely resented and only tolerated 

because the locals had no choice.

At the end of August 1996, FARC finally launched its first big offensive. On the night 

of August 30th the seven blocs launched 22 simultaneous attacks across the country. Most 

were relatively small-scale ambush and harassment attacks, but two, La Carpa in Eastern 

Bloc and Las Delicias in Southern Bloc, were meant to overrun military bases. The assault 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 81

against BRIM 2 at La Carpa failed. The attack at Las Delicias succeeded, the first time 

that FARC was able to isolate and overrun a company-size base. During the operation, 26 

soldiers were killed and 60 captured. This was the beginning of what the guerrillas themselves called “the war of movement.” While most of the action continued to be traditional 

guerrilla warfare, ambushes, and assaults on police stations in small towns, what was new 

was the intensity. There were actions on nearly a daily basis in multiple locations across 

the country. These were punctuated by truly mobile warfare actions, such as San Juanito 

in February 1997 and the assault on Patascoy Hill in December of the same year. The 

military had been incapable of liberating the 60 prisoners captured at Las Delicias, so the 

government made a deal with FARC to demilitarize Cartagena del Chaira and Remolinos 

del Caguan in June 1997 and send representatives to receive the soldiers. In addition to the 

60 from Las Delicias, another 20 were flown in who had been captured in Antioquia. These 

actions sent a message to the Colombian people that the military were incapable of fighting 

the guerrillas and that things could be accomplished through demilitarizing special zones 

and negotiations. 

At the end of 1997, the FARC High Command held a plenum during which it affirmed its strategy (referring to the eight-year plan), but now referred to it as a prolonged 

strategy. While the phases were ratified, they were now described as having no time limit, 

versus occurring in two-year increments.49 FARC admitted that it was far short of its goal, 

having created only 200 mobile companies (approximately 10,000 combatants) out of the 

600 (30,000 combatants) contemplated, and that it was having problems getting the fronts 

to implement the New Mode of Operations. However, it continued its plans and discussed 

the formation of mobile blocs, essentially groupings of 10 or more mobile companies to 

act in strategic directions. It had discovered that the simultaneous offensives against objectives across the country achieved the best strategic results. This was to be the model for 

upcoming operations. In addition, it added an objective to the strategic plan, which was 

to liberate the departments of Caquetá and Putumayo, where it would set up a provisional 

government and attain the status of belligerence and international recognition. From this 

moment forward the subject of belligerence became a FARC obsession. 

Financially it had fallen short as well. It had only been able to raise a third of the 

reserve money for the first phase of its strategic plan. In addition, it was having trouble 

getting weapons because the government had detected all the routes. Finally, it was well 

aware that it was weak politically. It had totally failed with the legal party, the Communist 

Party, which was experiencing an ideological crisis. It had to look for alternative ways to 

build a political mass base.50 Despite these serious shortfalls and setbacks, FARC decided 

to forge ahead with mobile warfare. 

In 1998 the intensity of the FARC offensives increased. In March it introduced a new 

and terrifying weapon known to the FARC as the “rampla” but which the press immediately dubbed the “gas cylinder bomb.”51 It consisted of small tanks filled with up to 20 kilos 

of explosives and scrap metal for shrapnel to make the bombs that were fired from larger 

tanks, cut off at the top to make a convenient barrel. Propelled by a black powder charge, 

the bombs could fly up to 450 meters, although with a very large margin of error for accuracy. However, when fired in numbers and in battery, they could sweep anything in their 

paths and could penetrate the government fortifications of the day. As a consequence, they 

were terrifying weapons to both security forces and civilians. The raw materials to make 

the ramplas existed in quantity all over Colombia and could be acquired on short notice. 
82 Security and Defense Studies Review

Furthermore, since they were disposable, they could be abandoned once surprise was lost 

during the retreat, the most vulnerable part of any guerrilla action. 

Using these new weapons, FARC shocked the nation in March 1998, shortly before 

the elections. This was considered an even greater disaster than the defeat at Las Delicias, 

with, at 65, twice as many dead; but more importantly, it had been against one of the army’s 

elite units. This loss combined with a photographed meeting between Victor G. Ricardo, 

future peace counselor to Andres Pastrana, led voters to believe that the military was incapable of stopping FARC and that a negotiated settlement was the best option for ending 

the conflict. 

On August 4, 1998, FARC launched its biggest offensive of the war, more than 30 

attacks in 17 departments. While most failed to overrun their objectives, much damage 

was caused with the ramplas and the new mobile warfare tactics. However, the Miraflores 

counternarcotics base in Guaviare department as well as a base in Pavorando, Antioquia, 

were overrun. Dozens of soldiers and policemen were killed, wounded, or taken captive 

by FARC. Many FARC operations were a deliberately aimed at taking army and police 

prisoners. FARC was obsessed with the idea of official status as a belligerent force. In 

particular, belligerent status allowed it to establish formal relations with foreign countries 

and purchase weapons as if it was an official government. One of the conditions for belligerent status was the ability to take and exchange prisoners. FARC hoped to capture enough 

soldiers to force the government into a prisoner exchange. In addition, FARC continued to 

be weak in numbers of cadre necessary for its 32,000-combatant army. Many guerrillas in 

jail were eligible for those cadre positions, and getting them out was part of the obsession.52

1998–2002

As President Pastrana took office, the military continued to reel. Only days after he took 

office, an operation to rescue the soldiers captured at Pavorando stepped into a prepared 

kill zone. Several dozen soldiers were killed or wounded, and a Blackhawk helicopter was 

damaged. FARC made agreements with the Pastrana administration to begin a peace process. Like previous processes, it called for a demilitarized zone (DMZ) where the guerrillas 

could maintain its negotiators without fear of government attack. FARC requested and was 

granted an area of 42,000 square kilometers, just under twice the size of the El Salvador. 

The military did not in concept have a problem with this, but it did with the location. The 

zone asked for by the FARC straddled the Eastern Cordillera, the Center for Strategic Deployment of FARC’s strategy, just across the mountains from Bogotá. This was especially 

dangerous because FARC insisted that outside of the DMZ there be no ceasefire. In other 

words, the government was ceding a secure platform to FARC from which it could launch 

military operations toward its strategic objective. In addition, the southeastern side of the 

DMZ bordered with the Yari Plains.53 This was considered a strategic drug trafficking area 

for FARC; thus, the government had given FARC a military-free area that was perfect 

for concentrating and projecting force toward its strategic objective. The military’s fears 

would prove to be completely valid. 

On November 1, days before the DMZ was inaugurated, FARC launched a demonstration of strength offensive, attacking Mitu, capital of the department of Vaupes. Mitu 

was no more than a small town, but it was a department capital nonetheless. Located in 

extreme southeastern Colombia, it was surrounded by a drug trafficking zone. More importantly, the air force couldn’t reach it without refueling, and there was no intermediate 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 83

base available. Initially the attack went well for FARC; it was able to take the town fairly 

quickly, subduing the police garrison and taking 61 captive. What it didn’t count on was 

that 28 hours later the first rescue forces landed and began advancing on Mitu. Some quick 

negotiations with the Brazilian military had acquired a temporary intermediate landing 

strip just across the border.54 The military was able to send a large rescue force supported 

by close air support. While FARC drew the advanced units into a kill zone, killing 24, it 

could not resist the following waves, and soon the town was recovered. 

This proved to be the beginning of a series of setbacks, the most important of which 

occurred in July 1999. The FARC was able to solve its logistics problems by cutting a deal 

with representatives of Peru’s corrupt intelligence chief, Vladimir Montesinos, to purchase 

60,000 Soviet-designed weapons from Jordan, most manufactured in East Germany. More 

than 10,000 of the weapons were parachuted into the jungles of Guainía and were collected 

by the 16th Front and shipped to the DMZ. Here, amassed FARC forces were refitted and retrained. They attacked from the DMZ north toward Bogotá, initially massacring 36 soldiers 

at Gutierrez, Cundinamarca. They also attacked in Casanare, Huila, Meta, Caquetá, and 

Putumayo. In Meta at Puerto Lleras and Puerto Rico, FARC had taken the towns to attract 

government reinforcements. The plan was to draw them into huge ambush zones and shoot 

down the helicopters filled with troops. The military detected the maneuver and landed several kilometers outside the kill zones, rolling up the ambushes from the flank, and forcing 

the guerrillas to withdraw in the open. This made them vulnerable to aviation, and approximately 200 were killed—the largest number of guerrillas killed during any single battle of 

the war. In addition, in Casanare FARC took Hato Corozal. As the FARC withdrew from 

the town, the Colombian air force caught a large column in the open and inflicted several 

dozen casualties. For the first time, the government had something to celebrate.

Meanwhile, the government attempted to negotiate peace with FARC in the DMZ. 

When President Pastrana showed up to install the negotiating table on January 7, 1999, 

Manuel Marulanda refused to appear, alleging a paramilitary plot to assassinate him.55 He 

left President Pastrana to sit by himself next to an empty chair. The empty chair became 

symbolic of the whole process. Initially the DMZ was supposed to last only 90 days, but 

the government repeatedly prolonged it, trying to salvage the peace process. However, 

with things not going on in the battlefield the way that FARC wanted them to, its negotiating position became weaker. It suspended the talks, claiming that the government wasn’t 

doing enough against the paramilitaries. In response, the government carried out several 

measures, including putting Vice President Gustavo Bell at the head of an anti-paramilitary 

task force and dismissing several hundred officers, including three generals suspected of 

supporting paramilitary activity. FARC suspended the talks, because it didn’t agree with an 

international verification committee, and in this way successively, demurring every time 

the two sides seemed close to an agreement.

FARC continued to attempt to improve its military position. It launched several additional multi-objective offensives throughout 1999 and 2000. All of them saw significant 

forces concentrate and attack from the refuge of the DMZ. In November 1999 it attacked 

targets in Cundinamarca, Tolima, Arauca, and Huila y Norte de Santander, with its main 

attack at Puerto Inirida. During December, its main effort was toward blocking the Bogotá-Villavicencio highway. The only success was against a remote marine base in Chocó 

known as Juarado. In January, February, and March, it launched renewed multi-pronged 

offensives in the general direction of Bogotá, along the Bogotá-Villavicencio Highway. 
84 Security and Defense Studies Review

Finally, it launched an offensive in Tolima and Huila. This offensive, one of the largest, 

was designed like the July 1999 offensive to draw in the helicopter reaction forces in an 

ambush. The problem for FARC was that it kept on repeating the same tactics, so while 

the combat was intense, the army adapted and became increasingly successful at defeating 

FARC attacks.

In the midst of this offensive, FARC held a plenum of the high command in March 

2000. It congratulated itself on the qualitative leap it had made in terms of combat experience and skill. In addition, it noted that almost all of the mobility corridors necessary for 

the action of the mobile companies were ready in each one of the blocs, facilitating its 

military action. It noted that it had solved its weapons problem. However, it was short on 

recruits, cadre, and money. The plenum considered the results of the talks to be positive. 

Its importance lay “in the accomplishment of the Strategic Plan and its role in opening up 

new spaces for struggle for the blocs and fronts across national territory.”56 It toyed with 

the idea of a ceasefire with the government, but only if it allowed them to locate its forces 

closer to the major cities and achieve its goal of belligerent status.57

Politically, FARC developed three courses of action. First, in the areas where it was 

active it would ensure the election of candidates favorable to them and block the campaigns of unfavorable or “paramilitary” candidates. Second, it would continue to foment 

the building of the clandestine party. It formally gave it a name, “Clandestine Communist 

Party of Colombia,” known by the acronym PCCC, and developed statutes for it. Finally, 

it announced the creation of a front movement known as the Bolivarian Movement. The 

Bolivarian movement was to be composed of the PCCC and all those who sympathized 

with the FARC but who were not necessarily part of the organization or the party.58 This 

movement was officially inaugurated with great fanfare in the DMZ on April 29, 2000.

A topic that would have important future consequences was the development of a 

more serious international front. The Colombian government-sponsored tour of Europe 

by the negotiating team had been meant to expose FARC to the world to convince them of 

the futility of revolution and instead expose them to the possibilities that the world had to 

offer. The first step was a meeting with members of the regional Communist parties. FARC 

would pay for them to come to Colombia. The idea was to revitalize the continental revolutionary movement and broaden space for FARC.59

As FARC failed to gain traction with its mobile warfare offensives, it turned increasingly to terrorism. On September 18, a member of FARC kidnapped a plane and forced it 

to land in the DMZ. FARC claimed that this was a rogue action but refused to turn over 

the perpetrator. In addition, FARC began carrying out a number of attacks with ramplas. 

In October 2000, FARC declared an armed transportation blockade on the department of 

Putumayo in protest of Plan Colombia. When food and fuel began to run out, the military 

carried out three separate successful operations to penetrate the blockade and escort commercial convoys through to the people. The blockade finally collapsed in December. The 

same month, FARC intercepted the vehicle of Congressman Diego Turbay Cote and assassinated him, his mother, and five others. 

In 2001 the FARC announced that it would unilaterally release several hundred enlisted soldiers it had taken prisoner. This marked a shift in the kidnapping strategy. Where 

previously it had tried to pressure the government for a prisoner exchange by taking large 

numbers of troops, now it would try to pressure an exchange through the taking of “political” hostages—members of elite families and societies. The numbers of FARC actions 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 85

increased—terrorist actions such as the kidnapping of Alan Jara, ex-governor of Meta, 

and the kidnapping and murder of ex-culture minister Consuelo Araujo. The international 

connections of FARC became evident when three members of the IRA were captured in 

Bogotá. Eventually legal technicalities secured their release. How the IRA advisers fit into 

FARC plans became clear when shortly after, FARC released 360 enlisted members of the 

armed forces and the police who had been captured between 1997 and 2000. At one of the 

release ceremonies presided over by Mono Jojoy in June 2001, he told them that he would 

see them in the cities, alluding to an attempt to intensify urban terrorist operations.60 Some 

of the most notable in 2001 were the attack on the La Picota National Penitentiary, freeing 

98 inmates, and the kidnapping of 15 people from an apartment building in Neiva, Huila. 

The problem was that most of those attacks had been launched from the sanctuary 

of the DMZ. The military was ordered to tighten the controls over the entrances and exits 

from the zone. This caused FARC to suspend peace talks. Meanwhile, FARC launched a final mobile warfare campaign. In June 2001, a column of about 500 guerrillas left the DMZ 

and made their way to Coreguaje, Putumayo, where it overran an under-strength army 

company that was setting up a training base. Thirty soldiers were killed.61 This attack was 

shocking because an attack of this magnitude had not occurred for some time. In early August the same column, reinforced by an additional 800-plus guerrillas, marched east from 

the DMZ towards Vichada. In February 2001 the military had carried out Operation Gato 

Negro to retake the area controlled by FARC’s 16th Front, its main logistics group. This 

operation revealed the deep connection of FARC with drug trafficking, when the military 

captured Fernandinho Beira Mar, the major Brazilian drug trafficker who traded weapons 

for drugs with FARC. FARC’s campaign was intent on recapturing this terrain for the organization. However, FARC showed little imagination and employed the same maneuver and 

combat tactics from previous years. When the military detected the column, it launched a 

counter operation known as “7 de Agosto” that in the course of several intensive clashes, 

decimated, decapitated, and disorganized the column.62 Its mobile warfare tactics defeated, 

FARC definitively returned to guerrilla warfare and terrorism. 

In January 2002 FARC held an extraordinary plenum, during which it confirmed its 

peace talk’s objective as part of the strategic plan to “take power by using the dialogue 

for the proposal and implementation of mechanisms to facilitate that goal.”63 To force this 

issue, it ordered its forces to carry out sustained operations against business and the infrastructure of the oligarchy. This was to include the big city electrical grid. It ordered the 

attack of army bases and police stations with bombs disguised in all kinds of implements: 

bicycles, produce, bags, garbage, gunny sacks, milk cans, and so forth. It was to infiltrate 

elements into the cities, but be careful to avoid civilian casualties.64 Soon after, FARC began carrying out its directives. However, contrary to the directive, many civilians were injured. Frustrated by the intransigent attitudes of FARC in the negotiations and the continual 

acts of terrorism, the public hardened its attitude toward FARC to unprecedented levels. 

Finally in February 2002, a FARC commando hijacked a small commercial plane, diverted it to a road near the DMZ, and kidnapped some of the passengers, including Senator 

Jorge Eduardo Gechem. This proved to be the breaking point, and the military was ordered 

to recover the DMZ on February 21 after giving FARC a 48-hour warning. Operation 

Thanatos, later called TH, was met with harassment and mines. FARC chose to withdraw 

in the face of this overwhelming force and retreat back into the jungles. During the lull 

between the President’s announcement and the beginning of military operations, presiden-
86 Security and Defense Studies Review

tial candidate Ingrid Betancur was kidnapped as she attempted to make solidarity with the 

people of the former DMZ and accompany them during their time of danger. She naively 

believed that because she had held discussions with FARC, she would not be kidnapped. 

FARC’s response to the termination of the peace process was twofold. On the one 

hand, it was to make governance difficult, if not impossible. It notified mayors, councilmen, and aldermen not to exercise their offices or face kidnapping and death.65 The other 

response was increased terrorism in the urban areas. It gave orders in particular to carry 

out a campaign against the roads and infrastructure connecting Bogotá to the rest of the 

country.66 In addition, a variety of types of bombs were set off, damaging infrastructure and 

killing some people. Operations to kidnap high-level hostages increased. In April 2002, a 

commando of the Teofilo Forero column made a daring incursion into Cali and kidnapped 

12 department legislators. It also kidnapped Governor of Antioquia Guillermo Gaviria and 

former Defense Minister Gilberto Echeverri. 

Finally, it tried to influence the outcome of the presidential 2001–2002 elections. 

Recognizing the danger of candidate Alvaro Uribe, FARC attempted to assassinate him 

with a bomb in Barranquilla in April 2002. The bomb failed, and Uribe was elected in a 

rare first-round victory with 56 percent of the vote. 

2002–2010

FARC greeted President Uribe at his inauguration with terror. It attempted to launch approximately 180 much-improved ramplas from two different locations at the inauguration 

ceremony and the military academy. Fortunately, the weapons misfired, and only around 

20 bombs were launched. Instead of killing or injuring Uribe or his guests, they missed and 

killed a number of poor homeless people. However, FARC was now on the defensive. Although the time was past due for a Ninth Conference, the situation was such that the FARC 

high command could not even move safely enough around the country to hold a plenum. 

Instead, Manuel Marulanda sent a letter stating what FARC should do to confront Uribe. 

Marulanda tried to analyze why FARC was suffering so many setbacks: “What is happening at the fronts that they are hitting us with such frequency, which allows the enemy to say 

that it is invincible, that causes panic to those that are thinking about joining, as well as is 

bad for the masses and the rapid growth of all the fronts?”67 He admitted that perhaps it had 

lost much of the masses and that it needed to change its behavior. He chided his commanders about having forgotten the basic fundamentals of irregular warfare. He scolded them for 

not understanding the strategic plan, for having underestimated the enemy, and for having 

gone soft. However, he essentially dismissed Uribe’s new policies, viewing the growth of 

the armed forces as nothing new or overly difficult to handle. 

The response had to be to show the “warmongers” that to attain peace by fighting 

without negotiating was a mistake. It had to systematically strike at the enemy with everything it had in the cities and fields and on the roads. This would be largely done with small 

units employing guerrilla warfare, and when conditions were right an occasional mobile 

warfare operation, but carried out quickly to avoid an aviation response. He also directed 

them to continue their policy of controlling local politics by blocking the operation of local 

government and by killing or kidnapping mayors and councilmen who dared do business 

against FARC’s will.68 As Mono Jojoy put it in a subsequent document: “Increase carrying out the order against the institutions. Whoever doesn’t resign, give him lead (pistola), 

but do something so they believe us.”69 Subsequently Mono Jojoy issued an operational 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 87

plan based on Marulanda’s guidance. FARC was to completely cease mobile operations 

unless expressly authorized. It was to avoid casualties and losses. To do this, it was to use 

mines and explosives massively. Additionally, each front was to form groups of snipers that 

would attrit the army by killing one soldier a day. However, FARC leadership failed to understand the fundamental difference between the Uribe strategy and previous government 

operations. The new strategy was not just an increase of troops or an increase of operations, 

but a fundamentally different way of thinking about security. Instead of focusing only on 

combating the enemy, it focused on protecting the population and, by providing security, 

mobilizing political support. It was known as the Democratic Security Policy. While FARC 

did change its mode of operations and occasionally scored minor tactical successes, strategically it lost ground. It viewed troop increases as being aimed at physical elimination 

of the insurgents, not on occupation of terrain and prevention of violence. In many cases, 

FARC even ceded ground without a fight, thinking that it would be able to return as it had 

before. Instead, it found itself increasingly isolated both physically and politically from the 

people and less able to move from one place to another without danger. 

In February 2003 it tried a different tack, bombing a high society social club, El 

Nogal. The bomb killed 36 people and wounded more than 200. This act was meant to terrorize affluent Colombians and distance them from government policies—as Mono Jojoy 

said, “So the rich feel the bombs in their own houses.”70 Instead, the bombing galvanized 

them and consolidated their support for Uribe’s policy against FARC. To make things 

worse, FARC kidnapped three American contractors, adding them to their other high-value 

political hostages. The events of September 11, 2001, were already changing the way the 

United States viewed FARC. However, Plan Colombia was a counterdrug plan, and it was 

only with some reluctance that Plan Colombia aid was allowed to be used against FARC. 

With the kidnapping of the three Americans, all of the restrictions were removed. Combating FARC became a top priority within United States counterdrug aid to Colombia. Without political support and with the United States firmly against them, and unable to respond 

adequately to the Democratic Security Policy, FARC was increasingly swept from around 

the major cities and populated centers of the country. 

However, FARC’s ability to project strategic force remained essentially intact. With 

base areas in the southern and eastern jungles, FARC could recover. The next objective 

of the Colombian military was to destroy this capability. The plan was to reverse FARC’s 

strategic plan, destroy FARC’s ability to project force into Bogotá by clearing the high 

plain on the border between Meta and Cundinamarca and then following the Eastern Cordillera down into the strategic base area of FARC. This was executed in two phases. The 

first, known as Operation Libertad I, began in May 2003. By October, Aurelio Buendia, 

the FARC area commander, was cornered and killed. In its own after-action review, FARC 

revealed what had happened. Because of the many previous operations, FARC thought 

it would be just like before. The army would come in, patrol for a while, and then leave. 

FARC left behind a covering force and withdrew to more remote camps. However, this 

time the military didn’t leave and didn’t stop patrolling, leaving FARC no choice but to 

fight or withdraw. All of the state worked together—army, police, fiscalia, and others. It 

patrolled in groups no more than 8–10 minutes apart.71 FARC tried to break up into small 

groups and fight back with mines, ambushes, and harassment to attrit the enemy. However, 

it was FARC that suffered. One by one, the small groups were annihilated or deserted. In 

the end the army was able to keep FARC separated from the population either by arresting 
88 Security and Defense Studies Review

known militias and collaborators or by co-opting them. Overall, 70 percent of the FARC 

forces were lost, as well as most of its equipment. Those that were not lost were forced to 

displace, escaping from the area of operations in civilian clothes after burying their weapons.72

In March 2004, the second phase of the offensive was launched, this time against 

the FARC base area in the borders of Meta and Caquetá known as “the Secretariat.”73 This 

operation was named Operation JM after Jorge Mora, the former Colombian Army Chief 

of Staff, and carried out by a special task force known as Task Force Omega. Although 

the armed forces tried to keep it secret, FARC was not totally in the dark as there were too 

many people involved to guarantee secrecy, and the military began carrying out a number 

of preparatory operations to secure the jumping off points for the offensive. FARC was 

confident that the Colombian military could not sustain operations for a prolonged period 

of time in this part of the country. It developed what it called “Resistance Operation Urias 

Rondon.” The plan called for FARC to wear down and attrit the advancing government 

forces through snipers, mortar fire, and mine fields. The intent was to draw them into kill 

zones where heavy casualties could be inflicted. For the latter, Mono Jojoy organized more 

than two dozen companies to maneuver for such an eventuality. The guerrillas were ordered not to stand and fight unless conditions were extremely favorable. Initially the military did have problems with disease, particularly leishmaniasis,74 but over time it adapted. 

FARC, however, suffered heavy attrition. After the first six months it held a commander’s 

conference in which it admitted that it had lost over 500 guerrillas between those dead, 

captured, or deserted, as well as a large amount of materiel.75 FARCs responded through 

continual attempts to carry out urban terrorism and to draw the military into kill zones. 

While generally unsuccessful in the JTF Omega area, FARC was able to mass and overrun 

some isolated platoons in Antioquia and Putumayo. However, these were minor tactical 

gains. As the military increasingly occupied the strategic base area of FARC and went after 

intermediate base areas in the regions, maneuver and communications between the various 

components became dangerous and precarious. This set up the conditions for the military 

to successfully attack so called high-value targets. The military had created special forces 

for this task in 2003, but it was not until 2005 that these forces began to experience success, 

first against mid-level leadership and eventually against increasingly important leadership. 

The military’s capability was greatly enhanced when the Colombian Air Force acquired a 

precision bombing system for their Tucano close support aircraft. On September 1, 2007, 

Negro Acacia, head of the FARC’s most important logistics front, the 16th, was killed by 

precision bombing. In October, Martín Caballero, an important leader in the Caribbean 

Bloc was killed. Over time other similarly important mid-level commanders were killed 

or captured. 

FARC’s geographical center of gravity also shifted. Where it had been centered in 

Caquetá and Western Meta, it now shifted further southwest to Putumayo, Nariño, Cauca, 

and Chocó along the Pacific coast. This area is partly mountainous and contiguous to a 

maze of rivers, inlets, mangrove swamps, and jungle. It is also sparsely populated, which 

has made it extremely difficult to control. It allowed FARC to export drugs and import 

weapons with little fear of interference by authorities. Other FARC concentrations continued to exist in the Sierra of La Macarena, Catatumbo, and Arauca. 

In the interim, FARC held its Ninth Conference. Unlike previous conferences, this 

one was virtual, due to the impossibility of all of the delegates travelling safely to a sin-
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 89

gle meeting place. Internet connections and satellite uplinks made the meeting possible. 

Manuel Marulanda wrote that “finances were the motor for the accomplishment of all 

of the plans.”76 FARC needed a reserve of $230 million. To do this it needed to rebuild 

its economic structures over the next four years. Marulanda acknowledged that despite 

substantial attempts to turn plans into reality, FARC had fallen short, and that therefore 

the revolution would take longer. He acknowledged indirectly that it had been severely 

affected by President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy because, as Marulanda noted, it 

would take four years of work for the organization to recover its pre–Plan Patriota levels. 

It admitted that the new tactics of the mobile brigades operating in a large number of small 

patrols had caused them a lot of damage, because the small patrols were very hard to locate 

and predict, unlike the mobile brigades, which had operated in concentrated formations. In 

particular, Operation JM had done them damage. The guerrillas couldn’t replace its casualties, physically it was getting worn down, food and medicine were increasingly scarce, 

and every day maneuver space was increasingly reduced, making it more probable that the 

government could carry out a significant strike against them on unfavorable terrain. Marulanda had no new answers except for the same tired speech about remembering the good 

old days, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism.77

Politically, Marulanda wrote that FARC needed to work hard on strengthening the 

Bolivarian Movement over the next four years. It needed to mobilize all of the opposition 

to President Uribe. It needed to develop relations at the highest levels with countries such 

as Venezuela, Vietnam, North Korea, China, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and other countries on 

their borders, in particular Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador.78

On March 1, 2008, the Colombian armed forces and police bombed a camp just 

across the border with Ecuador killing Raúl Reyes, a member of the FARC Secretariat. 

This was the first time the military was able to deliberately kill a member of this leadership 

body. In quick succession, a bodyguard killed Iván Rios after he began to threaten members of his entourage when his unit began to experience severe pressure from advancing 

army troops. Shortly thereafter, Manuel Marulanda died of a heart attack at the age of 77. 

Although some began to predict the imminent collapse or fragmentation of FARC, this did 

not happen. Within days all three members were replaced. Alfonso Cano became the new 

head of the Secretariat. The degree of weakness of FARC owing to its loss of leadership 

became evident, however, when intelligence units were able to infiltrate FARC communications and carry out “Operation Jaque,” a spectacular rescue operation. Soldiers impersonating members of an NGO ordered that the political prisoners be turned over to them 

to be transported to a different location, closer to Alfonso Cano. Among them were Ingrid 

Betancur and all three Americans.79

When the Colombian special forces recovered Raúl Reyes’s body, it also recovered 

several computers, hard drives, and thumb drives containing a treasure trove of documents 

revealing strategic plans and relationships. While it had long been known that FARC had 

developed relationships with foreign governments and terrorist organizations, the depth 

and breadth of these relationships had been underestimated. In the Eighth Conference, 

FARC had ordered the creation of an international commission. In the March 2000 plenum 

the importance of international work had been reemphasized. Raúl Reyes’s computers revealed the degree to which FARC had accomplished this directive. Essentially it revealed 

three levels of international relationships: foreign governments, foreign political parties/

individuals, and foreign terrorist organizations. Particularly damaging were the relation-
90 Security and Defense Studies Review

ships it revealed between the Venezuelan Chávez government and the Ecuadorean Correa 

government. FARC had donated up to $100,000 to Correa’s electoral campaign, and had 

campaigned for him along the northern border. Several emails on Reyes’s computers indicated that Correa maintained a relationship through his minister of internal security, Gustavo Larrea. Larrea was requesting FARC’s assistance to maintain security on Ecuador’s 

Colombian border. In addition it was keeping FARC informed of official U.S. government 

activity and promised to shut down the counternarcotics base at Manta. In general, it offered FARC diplomatic and political support, including recognition as a belligerent. Correa, however, was careful to keep FARC at arm’s length. 

Hugo Chávez was not as careful. He was grateful to FARC for having provided him 

100 million pesos during his time in jail in the 1990s after his coup attempt against Carlos 

Andrés Pérez. He proposed meeting with Marulanda and a delegation from the Secretariat, 

adding that all of the guarantees and security would be provided by the Venezuelan military. He was willing to work for recognition of FARC belligerence and to lead an effort to 

press for another peace process, together with several regional countries as well as some 

European nations. Finally, Venezuela offered FARC material aid. Most significantly, the 

Venezuelans offered to give FARC crude oil that it could sell on the international market—about $300 million worth. If the oil was sold on the international market and FARC 

received the proceeds directly, there would be no traceable link to Venezuela. It is no coincidence that this amount coincided nearly exactly with the strategic reserve identified by 

Manuel Marulanda in the Ninth Conference. Venezuela donated some weapons to FARC 

from its own arsenals, specifically anti-tank rockets, and finally offered to help FARC 

purchase weapons from Russia by camouflaging their shipments in the large purchases of 

weapons being made by Venezuela.80 

In 2010 Colombia presented significant evidence to the OAS general assembly, demonstrating that there was significant FARC presence in Venezuela that was known, tolerated, and even encouraged by the Venezuelan government. As Colombia became more effective at recovering terrain from the guerrillas, this foreign sanctuary became increasingly 

important. 

At the political party level, since 2004, FARC had promoted the creation of the Bolivarian Continental Coordinator (Coordinadora Continental Bolivariana). This was composed of several radical leftist parties and groups from all over Latin America. There were 

representatives of several Communist parties and Communist youth organizations from 

Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Venezuela, El Salvador, Mexican radical student groups, 

Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, the MRTA 

from Peru, and radical Mapuches from Chile. It also included representatives from what 

it called the “international brigades” from Spain, France, Italy, and Denmark. Its major 

function seems to have been to develop solidarity and foment propaganda activity against 

the government. Some members traveled to Colombia to attend student forums and workshops. Much of their work was done among university student groups. They carried out 

campaigns against US counternarcotics policy and the presence of US military personnel 

in the region.81 However, several of these organizations dispatched their members to Colombia to receive guerrilla training for up to two months. In early 2008, the Ecuadoreans 

allowed FARC to hold a conference among the members, which included a march in front 

of the US Embassy.82 Some of the individuals were considered trusted agents of FARC and 

were entrusted with money in places such as Costa Rica, Spain, and Italy. 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 91

The third level of relationship was with other regional terrorist organizations. As 

mentioned, FARC had a relationship with the Peruvian MRTA and with Venezuelan guerrilla groups, both historical and those created under the Chávez government. It enjoyed a 

relationship with the Spanish ETA and, bizarrely, the Paraguayan EPP. FARC sent advisers to Paraguay to help the EPP carry out kidnappings, for which it was paid a percentage 

of the ransom money. In addition, EPP members travelled to Colombia to attend FARC 

training schools. The efforts FARC made to develop an international network now meant 

that FARC enjoyed a strategic depth guaranteeing its survival in some form, even if it was 

completely defeated inside Colombia. 

In August 2008, Alfonso Cano produced a document that became known as “Renacer 

Revolucionario de Masas” (Revolutionary Masses Rebirth). While some called this a new 

strategy, in fact the document confirmed that FARC continued to implement the existing 

strategy. The main shift was that it called for the organization to return to basics. Where 

Marulanda had advocated a return to guerrilla warfare as a temporary tactical measure, 

Cano insisted that the organization return to guerrilla warfare as a strategic phase. The 

document acknowledged that FARC had suffered greatly under Democratic Security and 

from Plan Patriota, losing physical space to the enemy. The organization was to emphasize a combination of special operations snipers and mines to limit government mobility. 

The latter were particularly important, acknowledged as the only weapon that “stopped 

and intimidated” government forces.83 Finally, FARC was to swiftly acquire man portable 

anti-aircraft missiles, or MANPADS. FARC was to immediately go back on the offensive, 

carrying out attacks to “save the prestige of the organization,” and it was to again attempt 

to take the war to the cities.84

Politically, Cano acknowledged that the organization had “misused our social resources and lost social-political space.”85 FARC was to emphasize the growth of the Bolivarian Movement, PCCC, and the militias. In particular Cano called on the organization 

to strengthen this effort in the urban areas and among the more educated segments, high 

school graduates and university students. Above all, he called for the organization to work 

with Senator Piedad Cordoba to create a legal political organization called “the People’s 

Party” that would develop an alliance with the Bolivarian Movement. He asked that Ms. 

Córdoba be shown a copy of Plan Renacer and that her advice be solicited.86 Finally, the 

important role of Venezuela was made clear when it was suggested that the Plan be revealed to Chávez and his representative Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, presumably for consulting and advice.87

The impact of Cano’s plan was soon evident. FARC began operating in subtly different ways. Rather than using uniformed guerrillas, it began operating increasingly through 

militias in civilian clothing in urban settings. Mines, bombs, and hit squads became the 

most common tactics. While FARC appeared to get weaker, after the 2010 election of Juan 

Manuel Santos, it began conducting a series of offensive actions to show that it was still 

a viable force. It carried out numerous attacks, particularly against rural police patrols, 

producing a number of casualties. 

This was part of a campaign under Plan Renacer known to FARC as the Raul Reyes 

Campaign. Under this campaign, the main objective was to create a feeling of doubt within 

the population about the success of Democratic Security. It was to carry out several simultaneous small-scale attacks that would produce 50–60 government deaths. Not the whole 

organization was to be involved, however. Thirty columns or companies were to keep 
92 Security and Defense Studies Review

government forces distracted while the rest of the organization rebuilt its forces. Another 

important shift was that the military leadership of the campaign was to be carried out by the 

leader of Southern Bloc and Secretariat member, Joaquín Gómez, instead of Eastern Bloc 

Secretariat member, Mono Jojoy. Eastern Bloc was to provide logistical support, a reversal 

of roles since 1998, when it had become the military fulcrum of the organization. Finally, 

as part of the campaign, Secretariat member Iván Márquez, head of Caribbean Bloc, was 

to take over the efforts previously led by Raúl Reyes and develop a concerted international 

propaganda campaign. He was to be assigned an organization of roughly 130 people to 

carry out work in 50 countries, 35 of which were identified in the document.88

In September 2010, the Colombian Air Force and Special Operations carried out Operation Sodoma, which resulted in the killing of FARC secretariat member, Jorge Briceño 

Suarez, or Mono Jojoy. This was a huge blow politically because Jojoy had been FARC’s 

primary military commander since 1996. Jojoy’s death certainly signaled an end to an era. 

However, as previously mentioned, the military fulcrum had passed to Southern Bloc, so 

Jojoy’s death did not disrupt FARC’s military plans. Furthermore, FARC was mentally 

prepared for the attack; the discipline and organization of FARC was made evident when in 

the aftermath of the operation no deserters emerged from those who had been with Jojoy in 

the Sierra de la Macarena. Furthermore, the FARC units in the area withdrew from the area 

of operations in good order, taking with them all their heavy and vital equipment. This was 

not the attitude of a defeated force. While FARC was certainly beat up, it was not defeated, 

and the war goes on. 

FARC is a remarkable insurgency. First, it has kept together an armed irregular organization with a single-minded purpose for more than 50 years through a series of ups and 

downs. For 30 of those 50 years, it has systematically worked toward the fulfillment of a 

concrete strategy. Despite the ebbs and flows of society, politics, and the battlefield, it has 

never lost sight of that strategy or made the mistake of attempting to force the environment 

to fit into the model—which would have jeopardized the existence of the organization—

versus adapting to the environment to advance the strategy. This constant adaptation has 

caused analysts and reporters to frequently report changes in FARC strategy, when in fact 

what it observed was an adjustment of tactics that the leadership had judged to be temporally better suited—in accordance to the environment—to accomplish the strategy. If one 

understands the basic concept, found in the writings on prolonged war of Mao Tse-tung 

and Truong Chinh, these adjustments or shifts are not random or wild, but very logical and 

predictable and based on assessments of the strategic correlation of forces. 

This adherence to strategy over such a prolonged period requires a remarkably structured and disciplined organization, something that makes FARC different from just about 

any other insurgency in Latin America. While FARC has leaders, the individuals are less 

important than the structure and methodology, a characteristic that guarantees FARC’s survival over a prolonged time. Strategic direction is provided to a decentralized organization 

through the conferences and plenums. The decisions are made by consensus, ensuring a 

great deal of harmony at the highest levels, as well as preventing exaggerated protagonism

or the emergence of any one personality at the top, which would make the organization 

dependent on the fate of that individual. There is always built-in redundancy and deliberate 

dispersion so that if several leaders are killed, the organization can still carry on. Furthermore, each of these redundant leaders has designated replacements so that when individuals disappear, they are immediately replaced, and business goes on as usual. FARC has 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 93

been designed to survive as an organization. 

FARC often comes across as inefficient, insensitive, ponderous, and bureaucratic, 

but it is very consistent and never given to wild behavioral swings. FARC almost always 

experiments with a concept on a limited scale for several years before implementing the 

concept on an organization-wide scale. Compliance is assured through a system of central 

oversight, periodic reporting, and self-analysis, which guarantees that every element of 

FARC stays on program. Discipline for deviance is harsh and swift. The myth of rogue 

units or elements has been used to avoid taking responsibility for unpopular acts, but there 

are no rogue FARC units. When they do exist, they are dealt with immediately. The combination of these elements—consensus, redundancy, strategy, communication, oversight, 

self-evaluation, and discipline—gives the organization coherence. 

Not even the recent succession of significant defeats has been able to break the cohesion of the organization and its stubborn adherence to its strategy. While Alfonso Cano has 

implemented significant changes with his new directive, the purpose is not to change direction, but to recover what was lost. Theoretically, there is no time limit to this effort, and so 

the organization soldiers on into the indefinite future. This means that FARC, despite its 

reversal of fortunes, will continue to be a security headache for the Colombian government 

for some time to come.

Despite its strengths, FARC also has some significant weaknesses. FARC’s failures 

lie in two interrelated areas: first, an inability to “see the trees for the forest,” and second, 

a confusion of methods with its strategic goal. The deliberate flipping of an old American 

cliché illustrates that while FARC has developed an extraordinary far-sighted and disciplined adherence to its strategy, which guarantees its survival; this has also infused the 

organization with a degree of rigidity that makes it incapable of flexibly responding to 

short-term situations that have strategic impact. It has forgotten that strategic victories are 

an accumulation of tactical successes, and as a result is often its own worst enemy, particularly where tactical political victories are concerned. An outstanding example of this 

is the case of the son of a captured policeman who was diagnosed with terminal leukemia. 

The public and the press clamored for FARC to release the man to be with his son on humanitarian grounds. The FARC refused. It is not clear why it refused, but it was unable to 

respond because it didn’t fit into the strategic plans and guidelines that had been developed. 

It was unable to deal with this situation that was outside the norm. The boy died without 

seeing his father, and, to make matters worse, FARC killed the father when he attempted to 

escape captivity after hearing of his son’s death.89 Objectively, the FARC had little to lose 

by releasing the policeman, and it would have reaped enormous political benefits, making 

it seem humanitarian. Instead, FARC came across as cold, callous, and indifferent to the 

suffering of the people--not the people’s champion it claimed to be. There are hundreds, 

if not thousands, of similar cases, where FARC has seemed blind to opportunities to make 

symbolic concessions and achieve tactical political victories in pursuit of its strategic political goal. In this way, FARC seems to be out of step and out of touch with the population 

of Colombia. 

This political estrangement is probably connected to FARC’s second great failure, 

the confusion of methods with strategic ends. The FARC’s strategic goal is to take political 

power. Its method is violent insurgency because it claims that a peaceful transition to socialism through democracy is not possible in Colombia. In the past it has also declared that 

if there was a different way to compete in the political arena it would participate in normal 
94 Security and Defense Studies Review

politics. However, FARC suffers from a sort of organizational psychosis that prevents it 

from truly broadening its forms of struggle. All of its efforts are focused almost exclusively 

on the armed struggle, with efforts in other arenas poor at best. The stated purpose for 

armed struggle is to create or open maneuver space or freedom of action in the political 

arena—to allow the organization to take political power. FARC has turned this concept 

on its head, where its political efforts are directed toward supporting and promoting the 

armed struggle. This is due to the mostly negative experience of FARC in the political 

arena. FARC’s experience has given it no reason to believe that it would survive, much less 

prosper, without arms. The communist militias that morphed into FARC were born in the 

midst of La Violencia between 1948 and 1964. The militias were formed because for over a 

dozen years political militias claiming affiliation with the traditional parties spread through 

the countryside massacring those who did not share their politics. Most of the guerrilla 

leaders who eventually demobilized from this period were assassinated, and their political 

impact dissipated. This included not only the traditional party militias of La Violencia that 

demobilized in the 1950s and 1960s, but also the Marxist guerrillas that demobilized in the 

late 1980s and early 1990s. In the late 1980s, drug traffickers and paramilitaries unleashed 

a war of terror against FARC’s legal political party, the UP, and so forth. Maintaining its 

armed component is a nonnegotiable element of FARC’s approach. 

However, FARC has failed in two respects: first, to perceive how its own actions 

provoked violence against them, and second, to distinguish the differences between its 

adversaries. In the first instance, FARC has often carried out policies that have provoked a 

violent reaction against its most vulnerable elements. While this does not justify this violence, it explains it. For example, FARC’s decision to steal drugs from the cartels in the late 

1980s, and then its failure to restore the situation, provoked a war between the drug cartels 

and FARC. The cartels unleashed the violence against the element of FARC that was most 

vulnerable, the UP, which also destroyed FARC’s vital mass base. And yet, FARC did little 

to protect the UP. It would seem that the consequences to its political wing of going to war 

with the drug cartels should have been evident and was totally preventable. The fact that 

it went ahead without warning the political organization or taking any countermeasures 

indicates that something was amiss. It was almost as if FARC didn’t appreciate the strategic role that the UP could play. It is perhaps significant that Jacobo Arenas, the brain trust 

behind the UP, died around this time. Nobody else seemed to appreciate the true potential 

of the political party. 

Furthermore, when the murders of the UP began, FARC considered the killings to be 

part of a grand conspiracy between government, paramilitaries, and drug cartels to destroy 

the organization: the legal government through negotiations and demobilization, and clandestine dirty war through the cartels and paramilitaries, of course, backed by the United 

States. While it is true that there were individuals who had feet in two or more of the Colombian entities, in fact the strategies were different. The government was actually trying 

to create the conditions for a peaceful settlement of Colombia’s social conflicts. It was 

sincere, even if weak, and penetrated by elements of the drug traffickers and paramilitaries 

who were also the state’s enemies. FARC was unable to distinguish this or take advantage 

of it to play the government against the others to create more space for its legal political 

activity. 

This was due in large part to how FARC conceived of the role of the political organization. Rather than the armed struggle opening space for the political struggle, FARC 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 95

organized its political structures to advance and support the military struggle, thus confusing ends with means. When the UP was unwilling or unable to advance the armed struggle, 

FARC abandoned it, leaving it to its fate. FARC took advantage of the discontent over the 

assassination of UP cadre to recruit new guerrillas into the armed structures and replaced 

the UP with clandestine political structures linked to the militias. These political structures’ main task was to create space at the local level and provide support to the advance 

of the armed struggle, not the reverse. This has been FARC’s fatal flaw, and has resulted 

in FARC’s inability to make significant inroads into Colombia’s political scene. This flaw 

combined with its organizational virtue and enormous resources from drug trafficking and 

other illegal economies has created an organization that has the ability to survive almost 

indefinitely, but never win.

Notes

1

 Daniel Pecaut, Las FARC: Una Guerrilla Sin Fin o Sin Fines (Bogotá: Editorial Norma, 

2008), p. 90.

2

 Ejército Nacional de Colombia, Evolución de las FARC 1964–2005, 2005.

3

 FARC-EP, Conclusiones de la Septima Conferencia, May 1982.

4

 Ibid.

5

 Ibid. 

6

 Ibid. There are several slightly different versions of this document, all with the same title, 

that have been captured. Not all of them contain the financial conclusions. The problem is 

that FARC produces at least three versions of its conference conclusions: one for public 

consumption, one for internal consumption at low levels, and then another version for use 

of the front leadershi p. In addition, there are secret versions of the document or parts of 

the document that are only circulated among the High Command or even the Secretariat. 

7

 Op. cit., May 1982.

8

 Ibid.

9

 FARC-EP, Informe Central al Pleno Ampliado del Estado Mayor Central de las FARCEP, October 1983.

10 The eight-year plan was kept secret and not documented until the May 1989 plenum, but 

it is referred to often in plenums between 1982 and 1989, and it is very clear from these 

references that the original was outlined in the Seventh Conference. 

11 FARC-EP, Variantes del Planteamiento Estratégico de la Séptima Conferencia, Pleno 

del Estado Mayor, May 1989.

12 See Russell Stendall, Rescue the Captors (Bogotá: Ransom Press International, 1986).

13 Government of Colombia, Acuerdos de la Uribe, May 28, 1982.

14 Steven Dudley, Walking Ghosts (New York: Routledge, 2004), p.59.

15 Armando Solis (Jacobo Arenas), Opiniones en Torno a las Tesis del 14 Congreso, n.d.
96 Security and Defense Studies Review

16 Ibid. and Jacobo Arenas, El Poder Formal y el Poder Real, n.d.

17 FARC-EP, Informe Central al Pleno Ampliado del Estado Mayor Central de las FARCEP, October 1983.

18 Ibid.

19 Jacobo Arenas, La Tregua: Problemas de la Guerra y la Paz, n.d.

20 FARC-EP, Conclusiones del Pleno Ampliado del Estado Mayor Central de las FARC-EP, 

January 1985.

21 Op. cit. 

22 FARC-EP, Informe Central al Pleno del Estado Mayor de las FARC-EP, February 1987.

23 FARC-EP, Pleno Ampliado del Estado Mayor de las FARC-EP, December 1987.

24 The CGSB was a loose alliance between the various Marxist guerrilla groups to work 

together towards socialist revolution by coordinating their military operations to produce a 

more strategic effect. It was inspired by the example of the amalgamation of the five groups 

in El Salvador known as the FMLN. While each organization retained its independence, 

the hope was that through working together and developing trust in each other it would 

eventually flourish into a full alliance. In 1986 it was composed of the M-19, ELN, EPL, 

FARC, PRT, and Quintin Lame.

25 FARC-EP, Conclusiones del Pleno Ampliado del Estado Mayor de las FARC-EP, December 1987.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 FARC-EP, Plan Militar de Despegue y Empate con el de 8 Años, December 1987.

30 FARC-EP, Conclusiones Generales del Pleno del Estado Mayor de las FARC, May 1989.

31 Ibid.

32 Where the UP was an open, legal political organization, solidarity unions were clandestine political support groups existing in relatively small groups. 

33 Op. cit.

34 Interview with Carlos Plotter, March 2005.

35 For example, see, “Las FARC en las Goteras de Bogotá,” El Tiempo, February 6, 1991.

36 “Último Parte de Guerra de 1991, El Tiempo, February 9, 1992.

37 “Regresa de México Comisión Negociadora,” El Tiempo, March 22, 1992.

38 FARC-EP, Informe de la Octava Conferencia de las FARC-EP Comandante Jacobo Arenas Estamos Cumpliendo, April 1993.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid. 

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 97

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 The difference was that blocs contained more than five fronts and the Joint Commands 

less than five. It was foreseen that the Joint Commands would become blocs, so many 

sources refer to FARC’s seven blocs rather than parsing out the Joint Commands from the 

blocs. This is not incorrect.

46 Op. cit.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 FARC-EP, Pleno del Estado Mayor Central, November 1997.

50 Ibid.

51 The rampla was a crude homemade mortar originally designed by the Irish Republican 

Army (IRA) made from natural gas tanks. FARC made contact with IRA representatives in 

Cuba, who sent advisers to Colombia, where they taught FARC how to make and use them.

52 Edgard Tellez, Oscar Montes, and Jorge Lesmes, Diario Íntimo de un Fracaso: Historia 

no Contada del Proceso de Paz con las FARC (Bogotá: Editorial Planeta, 2002), p. 51.

53 Ibid., pp. 49-50.

54 “Así Registro El Tiempo la Toma de Mitu, Vaupes (3 de Noviembre de 1998),” El Tiempo, March 16, 2010.

55 Op. cit., pp. 98-103.

56 FARC-EP, Pleno del Estado Mayor Central: “Con Bolívar, por la paz y la soberanía 

nacional,” March 2000.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Mono Jojoy said: “La Guerrilla va para las ciudades. Alla nos pillamos” (The Guerrillas 

are going to the cities. We’ll run into you there.). See “FARC anuncia Guerra Urbana,” El 

Tiempo, June 25, 2001.

61 “30 Militares Muertos en Ataque de las FARC,” El Tiempo, June 23, 2001.

62 See Claudia Rocio Vásquez, “Retirada Guerrillera Hacia el Caguan,” El Tiempo, August 

22, 2001; see also “Accoraladas las FARC en Mapiripán,” El Tiempo, August 24, 2001.

63 Secretariado del Estado Mayor Central FARC-EP, Pleno Extraordinario, January 2002.

64 Ibid.

65 Manuel Marulanda, Ponencia para el Desarrollo de la Novena Conferencia Nacional 

Guerrillera, 2007.

66 Directive from Jorge to Aurelio dated February 4, 2002.

67 Manuel Marulanda, Circular del Comandante Manuel, 2002.

68 Ibid.
98 Security and Defense Studies Review

69 Directive from Jorge Suárez Briceño to Marco Aurelio Buendia, Hugo, Geovanny, Pablo, and Javier, July 17, 2002.

70 Ibid.

71 FARC-EP, Informe para Balance de los Frentes Policarpa Salvatierra y 42 del Bloque 

Oriental de las FARC-EP, March 15, 2004.

72 Ibid.

73 An area comprising a rough box in between the Sierra de la Macarena in the northwest to 

San Jose del Guaviare in the northeast, to the Serrania de Chiribiquete in the southeast to 

Peñas Coloradas in the southwest.

74 “Plan Patriota y la Leishmaniasis,” El Tiempo, November 2, 2004.

75 Interview with FTC, 14th Front, deserted in January 2006.

76 Manuel Marulanda, Ponencia para el Desarrollo de la Novena Conferencia Nacional 

Guerrillera, 2007.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 The most thorough account of this operation is found in Juan Carlos Torres, Operacion 

Jaque: La Verdadera Historia (Bogotá: Planeta, 2008).

80 Captured Raul Reyes documents released by the Colombian government in April 2008.

81 José Gregorio Pérez, Raul Reyes, El Canciller de la Montaña (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial 

Norma, 2008), pp. 185-250.

82 Captured Raul Reyes documents released by the Colombian government in April 2008.

83 Alfonso Cano, Plan Renacer Revolucionario de las Masas, August 16, 2008.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid. Due to this and other significant evidence from the Raul Reyes’s computers, Senator 

Piedad Cordoba lost her public office and was barred from holding political office for 18 

years. See “Piedad Cordoba fue Destituida por Nexos con las FARC,” El Tiempo, September 28, 2010. 

87 Op. cit. 

88 FARC, Campaña Raul Reyes, February 1, 2010. The countries identified were Algeria, 

Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Chile, China, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Germany, Lebanon, France, Italy, Libya, Mexico, Nicaragua, 

North Korea, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Suriname, Ukraine, the United States, Venezuela, and Vietnam

89 “El Cabo Pérez Estaba Desesperado,” El Tiempo, April 9, 2002.
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 99

A Participação Sul-Americana nas Operações de Paz da 

ONU: Algumas Considerações 

Sérgio Luiz Cruz Aguilar

RESUMO

As operações de paz são respostas pragmáticas da comunidade internacional a 

uma situação de ameaça ou comprometimento à paz e segurança internacionais. 

Apesar da Carta da Organização as Nações Unidas (ONU) não fazer uma 

referência explícita às operações de paz elas estão amparadas nos capítulos VI, 

VII e VIII do referido tratado. A Organização utiliza, ainda, como base teórica 

para o tratamento do tema, principalmente, os documentos Uma Agenda para 

Paz e seu Suplemento que foram apresentados pelo então Secretário-Geral 

Boutros Boutros-Ghali em 1992 e 1995, respectivamente. Desde 1947, mais de 

um milhão de militares, policiais e civis serviram nas 67 missões de manutenção 

de paz realizadas. Os países sul-americanos, em especial o Brasil, a Argentina e 

o Uruguai, têm marcado significante presença nessas operações. Esse trabalho 

apresenta um balanço descritivo da participação dos países da América do Sul 

em operações de manutenção da paz das Nações Unidas e os dispositivos legais 

que regem sua participação. Concluindo, apresenta algumas considerações sobre 

a experiência acumulada pelos países da região, conduzindo o raciocínio para a 

importância da participação conjunta nessas operações.

Introdução

A ONU iniciou suas operações de paz em 1947, ao instalar a Comissão Especial das Nações Unidas para os Bálcãs, que operou na Grécia até 1951. Desde então, foram desenvolvidas 67 missões de manutenção de paz, incluindo missões políticas e de construção da 

paz conduzidas pelo Departamento de Operações de Paz da ONU (DPKO). 

As operações desenvolvidas pela Organização foram divididas em dois períodos. Entre 1948 e 1988, a Guerra Fria determinou características próprias ao relacionamento dos 

Estados no âmbito dos organismos internacionais com conseqüentes reflexos à efetivação e 

condução das operações de paz. Nesse período, foram denominadas como “clássicas”, nas 

quais predominou a manutenção da paz limitada a obter e manter acordos de cessar fogo e 

a separação das forças envolvidas nos conflitos. No segundo período, de meados de 1988 

aos dias atuais, as mudanças no sistema internacional marcadas pelo fim da Guerra Fria, 

permitiram o aumento das missões chamadas de “multidisciplinares” ou de “segunda geração.” As operações passaram a envolver não só tarefas de cunho militar.1

 Houve, portanto, 

uma ampliação considerável das atividades que abarcaram a proteção do envio de ajuda 

humanitária, desminagens, atenção a vítimas e refugiados, reestruturação ou estruturação 

das instituições políticas, judiciárias, financeiras, etc, supervisão de eleições, reconstrução 

da infra-estrutura, fiscalização da observância dos direitos humanos, dentre várias outras 

atividades.2

Na década de 1990, os documentos Uma Agenda para Paz e seu Suplemento, apre-
100 Security and Defense Studies Review

sentados pelo então Secretário-Geral desta organização, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, apresentaram um marco conceitual para o tratamento das operações de paz. A partir de então, 

passou-se a trabalhar com os diferentes tipos de operações. A diplomacia preventiva (preventive diplomacy) englobam medidas que previnem o surgimento de litígios entre as partes, incluindo o desdobramento preventivo de tropas (preventive deployment). A Promoção 

da Paz (peacemaking) objetiva levar as partes hostis a um acordo por meio de mecanismos 

pacíficos. A Manutenção da Paz (peacekeeping) indica a presença da ONU no campo, com 

o desdobramento de tropas com o consentimento das partes interessadas. Essas operações 

se situam no marco do Capítulo VI da Carta da ONU. A Imposição da Paz (peace enforcement) envolve o uso de meios coercitivos aprovados pelo Conselho de Segurança, a fim 

de garantir que a restauração da paz e da segurança seja efetivada em localidades onde há 

ameaças e violações à paz. Se dá de acordo com o Capítulo VII da Carta da ONU. A Consolidação ou Construção da Paz (peacebuilding) visa a desenvolver uma série de ações, nos 

mais diversos campos, de modo a prevenir futuros atos de violência e estabelecer as bases 

para uma paz duradoura. É interessante salientar que, na maior parte das vezes, há uma 

inter-relação entre algumas dessas categorias.3

Do total de operações de manutenção da paz conduzidas pela ONU, 13 foram iniciadas entre 1948 e o início de 1988, as demais 54 missões foram iniciadas a partir de 

maio de 1988. Em dezembro de 2010, 98 311 militares armados, policiais e observadores 

militares de 115 países estavam servindo em 16 missões de paz.4 Nesses esforços, os países 

sul-americanos, em especial o Brasil, a Argentina e o Uruguai, têm marcado significante 

presença. 

O final do século passado foi particularmente importante para a América do Sul, pois 

permitiu que alguns contenciosos fossem definitivamente resolvidos, diminuindo as possibilidades do uso da força por meio das forças armadas nacionais. O retorno à democracia e 

o maior controle civil das forças armadas também colaboraram para o desenvolvimento de 

uma série de medidas de confiança mútua (MCM) e o aumento das relações de cooperação 

militar.

Em conseqüência, praticamente em todos os países foram estabelecidas políticas de 

defesa nacional que definiram o amparo legal do uso das forças armadas. Paralelamente ou 

em decorrência dessas políticas, uma séria de diplomas legais foram aprovados, os quais 

estabelecem, com clareza e exatidão, quais as missões dessas forças e os mecanismos para 

a sua utilização. Sejam nas políticas de defesa, sejam em outros dispositivos legais que 

disciplinam o emprego de forças militares, quase a totalidade dos países sul-americanos 

apresenta como objetivo da defesa nacional, a participação em operações de paz dos organismos internacionais.

O presente trabalho apresenta um balanço descritivo da participação dos países da 

América do Sul em operações de paz das Nações Unidas, bem como dos dispositivos legais desses países que regem sua participação e da concepção dos países do subcontinente 

sobre essas operações. Concluindo, apresenta algumas consideraçõs sobre a experiência 

acumulada pelos países da região, conduzindo o raciocínio para a importância da participação conjunta nessas operações, que se dá por meio de entendimentos bilaterais para o 

desenvolvimento de medidas de confiança mútua na região.

 

Argentina

A Argentina iniciou sua participação nas operações de paz em 1958, na operação da ONU 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 101

no Oriente Médio (UNOGIL). Até 2010, mais de 20 mil militares haviam sido desdobrados 

em 32 missões da ONU.

O Livro Branco de Defesa de 2001, estabeleceu como missão complementar das forças armadas argentinas, a participação em operações de paz e/ou coalizões multinacionais 

sob mandato de organismos internacionais. O mesmo documento determinou que a decisão 

de integrar tais forças deve ser política e condicionada a fatores como: a existência de uma 

ameaça real à paz e à segurança internacionais; os objetivos propostos para a missão devem 

ser claros e devem responder a um instrumento jurídico internacional; e, as partes em conflito devem aceitar a presença da missão ou, apesar da não-aceitação, a intervenção deve 

ser imperativa para preservar a paz e a estabilidade da região. Dessa forma, é permitida a 

participação de forças argentinas em qualquer tipo de operação, inclusive a de imposição 

da paz, como ocorreu quando da participação do país na Guerra do Golfo, em 1991.

A Lei 25 880 sobre Ingresso e Saída de Tropas fixa os procedimentos do Poder Executivo para solicitar ao Congresso Nacional a autorização para a saída de forças do território, assim como prazos, detalhes que devem constar do pedido e exceções ao mesmo. O 

Decreto 727/2006 que regulamentou a Lei n. 23.554 apresentou em seu preâmbulo que o 

encargo básico do sistema de defesa deve integrar-se com os compromissos assumidos pela 

Argentina para o desenvolvimento das operações realizadas no quadro da ONU. O Decreto 

1116/96 sobre planejamento militar conjunto define que a participação das Forças Armadas 

no quadro das Nações Unidas é elemento essencial de sua política exterior, mas que não 

deverá afetar as capacidades do instrumento militar para cumprir sua missão principal.

A Lei 24948 sobre reestruturação das Forças Armadas, no seu artigo 5, determina que 

nos cálculos estratégicos, organização, equipamento, doutrina e adestramento será dada 

prioridade “al accionar conjunto y a la integración operativa de las fuerzas, así como con 

las fuerzas de seguridad en sus funciones de apoyo y con fuerzas del ámbito regional y las 

de los países que integren contingentes de paz por mandato de las Naciones Unidas.” A 

exemplo dos demais países da região, o artigo 24 da mesma Lei, que define os programas 

da função de defesa, não inclui os recursos necessários para as missões de paz que devem 

ser determinados e destinados para cada missão em especial mediante aprovação do congresso. 

Em decorrência do aumento da participação argentina, em 1995, foi criado o Centro de Treinamento Conjunto para Operações de Paz (CAECOPAZ), com o objetivo de 

ministrar cursos teórico-práticos de preparação de militares e civis para essas operações, 

inclusive com participação de estrangeiros. O Conselho Acadêmico do CAECOPAZ tem 

a presença do Diretor de Organismos Internacionais do Ministério de Relações Exteriores 

argentino. Isso atesta outra realidade presente nos países sul-americanos atualmente que é 

a estreita ligação entre as áreas de defesa e de relações exteriores.

Bolívia

Na Bolívia a Lei Orgânica das Forças Armadas da Nação estabeleceu os princípios da 

segurança e defesa e as missões das forças armadas. O artigo 22 (letra j), determinou que 

o Ministério da Defesa deve coordenar com o Ministério das Relações Exteriores a participação do país em tratados, de acordo com as normas internacionais. O Livro Branco 

de Defesa de 2004 apresentou como uma das finalidades das forças armadas cooperar para 

a manutenção da paz e da segurança internacional e como um aspecto da efetivação da 

política de defesa a contribuição para a manutenção da paz mundial.
102 Security and Defense Studies Review

O país não tinha um histórico de participação em operações de paz. Em maio de 1997, 

o governo celebrou um Memorando de Entendimento com a ONU colocando à disposição 

da organização efetivos militares para essas missões. A partir daí, passou a preparar um 

contingente de 540 militares, baseados no batalhão de Santa Cruz de La Sierra, chamado 

de Agrupamento Tático Bolívia.5 Em 3 de maio de 1999, os primeiros 70 militares foram 

deslocados para a Missão de Observação da ONU em Angola e observadores militares 

foram enviados para missões no Kosovo, Kuwait, Timor Leste e Nicarágua. Atualmente o 

país tem militares desdobrados em cinco missões.

Brasil

No âmbito da Liga das Nações, o Brasil teve uma importante participação na questão de 

Letícia, enviando um oficial para integrar a comissão da Liga que supervisionou, entre 

1933 e 1934, a retirada de tropas irregulares peruanas daquela cidade. Também mediou o 

acordo entre o Peru e a Colômbia, assinado em maio de 1934, quando Letícia foi devolvida 

à Colômbia. No âmbito da ONU, iniciou sua participação em 1948, ao enviar dois militares 

para a Comissão Especial das Nações Unidas para os Bálcãs (UNSCOB), que operou na 

Grécia de 1947 a 1951. Desde então, o país participou de 33 missões de paz sob a égide 

da ONU, com observadores militares, policiais, peritos eleitorais e especialistas em saúde.

A presença de grandes efetivos armados aconteceu na UNEF I, com um batalhão 

de infantaria, totalizando vinte contingentes entre 1957 a 1967, perfazendo um total de 

6 300 homens que atuaram no Oriente Médio, tendo sido o único país sul-americano a 

permanecer durante toda a UNEF I. Em Moçambique, uma Companhia de Infantaria Páraquedista foi desdobrada em julho de 1994 com 170 militares. Em Angola, na UNAVEM III, 

o Brasil, além de observadores militares e policiais, enviou um Batalhão de Infantaria (800 

homens), uma Companhia de Engenharia (200 homens), dois Postos de Saúde Avançados 

(40 homens) e cerca de 40 militares para compor o Estado-Maior da força militar da ONU. 

O contingente brasileiro permaneceu naquele país de agosto de 1995 a julho de 1997 e com 

os revezamentos realizados, totalizou um efetivo de 4 174 militares e 48 policiais empregados. Em 1999, enviou um Pelotão de Polícia do Exército com 50 homens e um oficial superior comandante do contingente brasileiro para integrar a força da ONU que interveio no 

Timor Leste (INTERFET), permanecendo nas missões seguintes que foram estabelecidas 

naquele país. Em 2004, o Brasil enviou um Batalhão com 1200 homens para a recém instalada missão da ONU no Haiti, assumindo, inclusive, o comando do componente militar.6

 

O embasamento jurídico para participação em operações de paz tem seu início na 

Constituição Federal de 1988. A Política de Defesa Nacional de 2005 estabeleceu como 

objetivos da defesa a contribuição para a manutenção da paz e da segurança internacionais, 

a projeção do país no concerto das nações e sua maior inserção em processos decisórios 

internacionais. Para isso, uma das orientações estratégicas determinou que o país intensificasse sua participação em ações humanitárias e em missões de paz sob a égide de organismos multilaterais. Uma das diretrizes estratégicas que a política listas, apresenta que o 

país deve dispor de capacidade de projeção de poder, visando à eventual participação em 

operações estabelecidas ou autorizadas pelo Conselho de Segurança da ONU.

A Lei Complementar n. 97, de 9 de junho de 1999, que estabeleceu normas gerais 

para a organização, preparo e emprego das Forças Armadas, definiu ser de responsabilidade do Presidente da República a participação de tropas em operações de paz. Já a saída 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 103

de tropas armadas do país depende de autorização do legislativo de acordo com a Lei n. 

2953, de 17 de novembro de 1956. O Decreto no 3080 de 10 de junho de 1999, que estabeleceu a Estrutura Regimental do Ministério da Defesa, determina como sendo daquele 

Ministério a responsabilidade pelo planejamento e o acompanhamento dessas forças. 

O aumento da participação em missões de paz resultou na criação, em 2001, da Divisão de Missão de Paz do Comando de Operações Terrestres (COTER) e do Centro de 

Preparação e Avaliação para Missões de Paz do Exército Brasileiro (CEPAEB), com a 

missão de orientar o preparo dos militares brasileiros. Em 2005 foi criado pelo Exército 

o Centro de Instrução de Operações de Paz (CIOPaz) que, em junho de 2010, passou a 

denominar-se Centro Conjunto de Operações de Paz do Brasil (CCOPAB), sendo encarregado da preparação de militares e civis brasileiros e de nações amigas a serem enviados 

em missões de paz.7

Tabela 1: Efetivo Atual de Militares e Policiais Brasileiros em Missões de Manutenção de Paz8

MISSÃO PERITOS CONTINGENTES POLICIAIS TOTAL

MINUSTAH ---- 2.187 03 2.190

UNFICYP --- 01 ---- 01

UNFIL ---- 01 ---- 01

UNMIN 06 --- ---- 06

UNMIS 20 02 02 24

UNMIT 03 ---- 20 23

MINURSO 11 ---- ----- 11

UNOCI 04 03 ----- 07

MARMINCA 07 ----- ----- 07

MARMINAS 07 (sendo 5 no Peru-Equador 2 na Colombia) 07

TOTAL 58 2.194 25 2.277

Chile

O Chile iniciou sua participação em missões de paz ao integrar a Comissão Militar Neutra 

do Chaco Boreal que, entre 1935 e 1939, supervisionou os acordos ao término da Guerra do 

Chaco, entre Bolívia e Paraguai. Posteriormente, em 1967, esteve presente na Supervisão 

da Trégua da ONU no Oriente Médio (UNTSO) e, em 1969, integrou a missão de observadores da OEA no conflito El Salvador-Honduras. A partir daí, teve pouca participação 

centrada em observadores militares, oficiais de ligação ou especialistas, como nas missões 

da ONU na Índia-Paquistão, Líbano, Oriente Médio, El Salvador, Bósnia Herzegovina, 

Kosovo, Guatemala, Iraque, Timor Leste, Equador-Peru, e na operação de desminagem da 

OEA na Nicarágua. O próprio regime militar chileno não considerava esse tipo de missão 

adequada aos interesses das forças armadas. 

A partir da década de 1990, o país passou a integrar forças de paz com tropas armadas, mas a participação era restrita a operações de manutenção de paz com o consentimento 

das partes em conflito como no Camboja, fronteira Iraque-Kuwait, Iraque e Timor.

Em decorrência do aumento da presença das forças armadas do país nesse tipo de 

operação foi criado, em 2002, o Centro de Treinamento Conjunto para Operações de Paz 

(CECOPAC), subordinado ao Ministério da Defesa e destinado ao treinamento de milita-
104 Security and Defense Studies Review

res e civis, nacionais e estrangeiros. A idéia chilena de conjunto implica na utilização do 

Centro por todas as instituições envolvidas com as missões. Da mesma forma, há a idéia 

de participação combinada com forças de outros países, o que se materializou no Chipre, 

quando integrou o batalhão argentino com um pelotão e ao fazer parte da EUFOR, força 

da União Européia na antiga Iugoslávia, quando integrou uma força britânica com fração 

de igual valor.9 

Os diplomas legais que enquadram a participação do país nas operações de paz são 

a Constituição Política da República de 1980, em seus artigos 24 e 32, o Livro Branco de 

Defesa de 2002, no seu capítulo III e a Lei N° 19.067 que rege a participação do pessoal das 

Forças Armadas e de Segurança Pública nas referidas operações e determina a necessidade 

de aprovação do legislativo para a saída de tropas do território nacional. Os Ministérios da 

Defesa e de Relações Exteriores avaliam cada petição e a decisão final é do Presidente. A 

saída de tropas do país deve ser autorizada pelo Senado. Um grupo de análise permanente 

foi criado no Ministério da Defesa para proporcionar assessoria especializada no processo 

decisório, estudando cada caso e sugerindo pela participação ou não do país. O Ministério 

da Defesa tem a responsabilidade de coordenar as operações, incluindo a preparação e o 

treinamento das forças cuja organização é encargo da instituição que fornece os meios. 

Em 1999, foi promulgado o Decreto Supremo n. 68 dando amparo à participação em 

operações próximas ao Capítulo VII, ou seja, de imposição da paz “tales como la interrupción total o parcial de las relaciones económicas y de las comunicaciones ferroviarias, 

marítimas, aéreas, postales, telegráficas, radioeléctricas, ruptura de relaciones diplomáticas, demostraciones, bloqueos y otras operaciones ejecutadas por Fuerzas Aéreas, Navales 

o Terrestres a que se refiere la Carta de las Naciones Unidas.”10

Colômbia

Tanto a Política de Defesa e de Segurança Democrática, de 16 de junho de 2003, como a 

Política para a Consolidação da Segurança Democrática de 2007, priorizam o emprego das 

Forças Armadas no combate ao narcotráfico e ao terrorismo. Por essa razão, para o país, o 

foco da cooperação internacional em termos de segurança está ligado às ações conjuntas 

para a realização de operações coordenadas para o controle de armas, explosivos, narcóticos e pessoas, o intercâmbio de inteligência e de informação financeira e o controle das 

fronteiras. Em nenhum momento a Política apresenta a questão da participação do país em 

missões de paz, nem como uma missão complementar das Forças Armadas. O país tem 

um histórico de participação em apenas cinco operações da ONU e atualmente mantêm 33 

policiais na missão no Haiti. 

Equador

O Equador participou do Grupo de Observação da ONU no Líbano (UNOGIL) em 1958, e 

atualmente mantém observadores militares na Libéria, Costa do Marfim e Sudão. Na MINUSTAH o país desdobrou um efetivo de 67 engenheiros militares. Partindo das concepções de defesa nacional previstas na Constituição, em 2006 o Ministério da Defesa editou 

seu Livro Branco de Defesa. O capítulo IV apresentou entre os objetivos estratégicos a 

contribuição com a comunidade internacional para a manutenção da paz e da segurança no 

marco da ONU. Dos objetivos da defesa resultaram as tarefas e ações das Forças Armadas, 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 105

dentre elas, participar em operações de manutenção da paz e ajuda humanitária, além de 

cumprir os convênios e tratados internacionais dos quais o país é signatário, respeitando 

as capacidades e as prioridades estratégicas nacionais. Os delineamentos estratégicos da 

política de defesa determinam a responsabilidade do poder executivo em aprovar a participação equatoriana assim como dos Ministérios de Relações Exteriores e da Defesa em 

analisar e recomendar a participação de elementos e meios militares neste tipo de ação de 

cooperação internacional, que é caracterizada como tarefa adicional das Forças Armadas. 

Em novembro de 2003 foi criada a Unidade Escola de Missões de Paz (UEMPE) para realizar a coordenação administrativa da participação do país nessas operações.

Paraguai 

A Política de Defesa do país está expressa na Lei 1337 De Defesa Nacional e de Segurança 

Interna, promulgada em 14 de abril de 1999. A Lei permite, em seu artigo 33, a prestação 

de ajuda militar a outros países em decorrência de tratados celebrados e aprovados pelo 

Congresso. Da mesma forma, permite a formação de pactos, alianças e outros procedimentos ou instituições de defesa coletiva de natureza sub-regional até a global (art. 34). Já o 

artigo 35 é explícito ao permitir a participação dos meios militares nas operações de paz 

das organizações internacionais que o país seja membro. Tal possibilidade é regida pela 

Constituição Federal, artigo 143, que trata dos princípios que pautam as relações externas 

do Paraguai, dentre eles, a solidariedade e a cooperação internacional e a proteção dos 

direitos humanos. 

O país mantém o Centro de Treinamento Conjunto para Operações de Paz (CECOPAZ), responsável pela formação e aperfeiçoamento do pessoal empregado nessas 

missões através de cursos para observadores militares e tropas a serem desdobradas. 

Peru

O Peru iniciou sua participação na Missão de Observadores da ONU no Líbano (UNOGIL) 

em junho de 1958. Após um longo período ausente, retomou a participação em 1973 na 

Força de Emergência da ONU no Oriente Médio (UNEF II) com um batalhão. A partir daí 

esteve presente com observadores militares no Irã-Iraque (1988 a 1989), Namíbia (1989), 

Sahara Ocidental (1991 a 1992), Serra Leoa e Congo (2000) e Eritréia/Etiópia (2001). Atualmente participa das missões no Haiti, Etiópia/Eritréia, Costa do Marfim, Congo, Chipre, 

Libéria e Sudão. 

O Livro Branco de Defesa apresentou como objetivo do Estado garantir a plena operatividade das Forças Armadas orientadas para a dissuasão, defesa e prevenção de conflitos, 

assim como a manutenção da paz, como política de defesa que contribui para a paz mundial, hemisférica e regional. Assinalou que as políticas de Estado e aquelas estabelecidas 

no Acordo Nacional promovem a participação das Forças Armadas nas operações de paz 

convocadas pela ONU e que a participação do Peru constitui um dos objetivos da política 

externa e é interesse nacional. Em 11 de novembro de 2003, foi assinado um Memorando 

de Entendimento com as Nações Unidas, confirmando a vontade política de participar nas 

missões de paz que não impliquem no uso da força coercitiva.11

O Comando Conjunto das Forças Armadas delega a responsabilidade de executar 

os programas de instrução e treinamento dos efetivos às instituições militares. Foi esta-
106 Security and Defense Studies Review

belecido um Sistema de Operações de Manutenção de Paz (SOMPAZ) e criado o Comitê 

Multisetorial de Operação de Paz com o objetivo de aumentar a participação das Forças 

Armadas nas missões da ONU.12

Uruguai

Iniciou sua participação em missões de paz em 1935 ao designar quatro militares para 

acompanhar a Comissão Militar formada para auxiliar no processo de paz entre a Bolívia 

e o Paraguai, decorrente da Guerra do Chaco. Pela ONU, em 1952, enviou observadores 

militares para a fronteira entre a Índia e o Paquistão (UNMOGIP). Após longo período 

ausente dessas operações, em 1976, participou com dois militares da missão da OEA em 

Honduras e El Salvador e, em 1982, da operação da ONU na península do Sinai. Foi a partir do final da década de 1980 que, seguindo a tendência regional, passou a se mostrar mais 

atuante. No total, o Uruguai esteve presente em 31 operações da ONU. 

A participação do país se dá sob o amparo legal da Constituição através do princípio 

da solução pacífica de controvérsias. A Lei Marco de Defesa Nacional apresentou, em seu 

artigo 21, que as missões no exterior desenvolvidas pelas forças armadas deverão cumprir 

fins defensivos, humanitários, de estabilização ou de manutenção e preservação da paz, e 

no artigo 22, que a participação em missões de paz deve atender a promoção dos interesses 

nacionais no âmbito internacional, a prática de medidas de confiança mútua e a promoção 

de relações de cooperação entre os diferentes atores da comunidade internacional. É prerrogativa do Presidente da República, atuando com o Conselho de Ministros, decidir sobre 

a participação do país, cabendo ao Poder Legislativo aprovar a saída de força armada do 

país de acordo com o artigo 85, inciso 11 da Constituição Nacional. A Missão Permanente 

do Uruguai na ONU retransmite os convites da organização para a chancelaria uruguaia e 

acompanha o desenrolar das operações. O MRE estabelece os contatos internos e levanta 

dados sobre a área em questão. O Ministério de Economia e Finanças decide sobre os recursos necessários e o Ministério da Defesa Nacional avalia e determina os contingentes 

disponíveis.

O Exército criou o Centro Coordenador de Operações de Paz (CECOMAPA) subordinado ao Chefe do Estado Maior do Exército que, desde 1982, foi responsável por reunir 

as informações necessárias para o processo decisório, além de capacitar pessoal e difundir 

planos e diretrizes.

O Decreto 560/994, de 21 de dezembro de 1994, criou o Sistema Nacional de Apoio 

às Operações de Manutenção de Paz (SINOMAPA), ligado ao Ministério da Defesa, sob 

direção do Chefe do Estado Maior do Exército e integrada por diversos ministérios e órgãos 

civis e militares com as missões de coordenar os esforços dos organismos do Estado, assessorar os ministérios correspondentes, planejar e avaliar as participações, avaliar convênios 

e acordos, informar sobre recursos, necessidades e limitações e auxiliar no planejamento 

do desdobramento rápido. Em 1999, foi criada a Escola de Operações de Paz do Exército 

(EOPE) que passou a realizar vários cursos de preparação para militares nacionais e estrangeiros.13

O país, tradicionalmente desdobra suas tropas em missões de manutenção da paz. 

No entanto, em julho de 2003, quando a ONU dotou a Missão no Congo de um mandato 

impositivo, regido pelo capítulo VII de sua Carta, o governo uruguaio decidiu manter as 

tropas na operação. A decisão gerou um debate político no país uma vez que não havia 

sido solicitada uma nova autorização do legislativo para manutenção das forças sob uma 
107

Tabela 2: Participação dos Países Sul-Americanos nas Missões de Paz da ONUa

Missão Argentina Bolívia Brasil Chile Colômbia Equador Guiana Paraguai Peru Uruguai Venezuela

UNEF I X X

UNEF II X

UNOGIL X X X X

UNIMOG X X X

UNIKOM X X X X

UNPREDEP X X

UNSPG X

UNTAES X X

UNSF X

UNMOT X

UNIPOM X X X

UNTAET X X X X X

UNTAC X X X X

UNAMIC X X

UNMISET X X

UNMIBH X X

UNMOP X X

ONUCA X X X X X

DOMREP X X X X

ONUSAL X X X X X X X

MINUGUA X X X X X

UNMIH X X X

UNTMIH X

MIPONUH X

UNAVEM I X X

UNAVEM II X X X

UNAVEM III X X

MONUA X X X X

ONUC X X

UNOMIL X X

UNPROFOR X X

ONUMOZ X X X X X

UNTAG X X

UNAMIR X X X X

UNOMUR X

UNOMSIL X X

MINURSO X X X

UNAMSIL X X

UNMEE X X X

MONUC X X X X X

UNMIL X X X X X X X

UNOCI X X X X X X X

ONUB X X X X

UNTSO X X X

UNOMIG X

UNFICYP X X X X X X X

UNMOGIP X X

MINUSTAH X X X X X X X X X

UNMIT X X

UNMIK X X X X

UNMIS X X X X X X

UNOTIL X

UNAMA X

UNMINb X X X

MINURCAT X X

MONUSCO X X X

TOTAL 32 17 33 12 05 09 04 10 13 31 07

a Dados obtidos no DPKO/ONU e em Ministérios da Defesa de diversos países, atualizados até dezembro de 

2010. O Suriname se fez presente na UNMIH.

b UNAMA E UNMIN são missões políticas estabelecidas em 2007 e conduzidas pelo DPKO. Foram inseridas na 

tabela por contarem com participação de países sul-americanos.
108 Security and Defense Studies Review

operação de imposição da paz.

Venezuela

A Lei Orgânica de Segurança da Nação, de 2002, em seu artigo 19, que trata da política 

exterior, apresenta que a projeção da república ante a comunidade internacional está baseada fundamentalmente na autodeterminação, solidaridade e cooperação entre os povos. A 

Lei Orgânica da Força Armada Nacional, sancionada pelo legislativo em 6 de setembro 

de 2005, apresenta, em seu artigo 3, como umas das funções da Força Armada Nacional, 

“formar parte de misiones de paz constituidas dentro del marco de las disposiciones de la 

Carta de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas, previa decisión del Jefe del Estado y la 

aprobación de la Asamblea Nacional”. O artigo 5, que trata da tradição das forças armadas, 

afirma que a Venezuela “cooperará con las organizaciones mundiales en sus esfuerzos para 

el mantenimiento de la paz.”

Em 1957, a Venezuela participou com dois oficiais do Comitê de Assessores Militares para supervisar o cessar fogo entre Honduras e Nicarágua. Entre setembro de 1965 

e março de 1966, 12 oficiais participaram da Missão de Observação da ONU na Índia e 

Paquistão. O diplomata José Antonio Moyobre foi o representante pessoal do Secretario 

Geral da ONU na operação de paz na República Dominicana em 1965. Posteriormente, 

veio a participar do Grupo de Assistência da Transição para a Namíbia (ONTAG) com 

doze observadores militares. Em 1991, a Venezuela enviou sete observadores militares 

para a Missão de Observação da ONU no Iraque-Kuwait (UNICOM) e 15 oficiais para a 

Missão da ONU para o Referendo no Sahara Ocidental (MINURSO). A maior participação 

do país se deu na América Central, na década de 1990, na ONUCA e na ONUSAL com um 

batalhão de infantaria.

Considerações sobre a Participação Sul-Americana

Argentina, Brasil e Uruguai são os países sul-americanos com maior tradição de participação em operações de paz. Chile, Paraguai, Peru e Equador incrementaram suas presenças a 

partir da década de 1990 e demonstram a intenção de permanecerem mais atuantes nesses 

empreendimentos. A Colômbia esteve presente nas missões clássicas, mas, em decorrência 

do grave problema de segurança interna teve uma tímida presença nas últimas décadas. 

A Venezuela não participa de nenhuma operação atualmente, uma vez que suas políticas 

externas e de defesa não priorizam as missões de paz. 

Todos os países sul-americanos têm dispositivos legais que embasam suas presenças 

em operações de paz e, na maioria deles, a participação é considerada como uma missão 

complementar ou subsidiária das forças armadas. 

A decisão de integrar forças de paz é governamental, é vontade política, motivada por 

diversas razões que vão desde a ajuda humanitária, desprovida de qualquer outra intenção, 

até a utilização dessas missões como forma de aumentar sua inserção no meio internacional. Pode ocorrer, também, por interesses particulares em relação às organizações, como no 

caso do pleito do Brasil por um assento permanente no Conselho de Segurança da ONU, 

por necessidade de utilizar as operações para adestramento de tropas nacionais, ou ainda, 

em decorrência de cumprimento de obrigações geradas por tratados, como no caso do 

Grupo Garante em relação ao conflito Equador-Peru. 

Afinidades com o país ou países em conflito também são importantes fatores que 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 109

pesam na decisão, como nos caso do Brasil em Angola, Moçambique e Timor Leste em 

decorrência da língua portuguesa e do passado comum de colônias portuguesas. Pode-se 

entender, ainda, que haja um interesse brasileiro de projetar poder no âmbito da Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP). 

Há, ainda, a questão da solidariedade com países da região. A Venezuela só enviou 

tropa armada para operações na América Central e a presença dos países sul-americanos 

na MINUSTAH foi justificada, principalmente, por se tratar de um problema de segurança 

hemisférica. 

As chamadas parcerias estratégicas também são fatores que pesam na decisão. A 

Argentina participou da operação de imposição da paz no Golfo Pérsico, em 1991, num 

momento em que sua política exterior privilegiava as relações com os EUA, diferente da 

postura dos demais países sul-americanos naquela ocasião. O Chile negociava um tratado 

de livre comércio com os EUA quando decidiu participar da Força Multinacional Provisória no Haiti liderada pelos norte-americanos, em março de 2004, com um efetivo de 

331 militares do Exército. 

Sendo os membros do CS os reais responsáveis pelo reconhecimento que determinados conflitos colocam em risco a paz e a segurança internacional e pelo estabelecimento 

de uma operação de paz, a presença como membro do CS atua como fator de pressão para 

que o país integre operações de paz sobre a qual participou das decisões e ajudou a aprovar.

Um possível aumento de prestígio, de projeção do país no sistema internacional ou 

a busca da liderança regional, como no exemplo do Brasil no Haiti comandando a operação militar, podem balizar uma maior ou menor presença nessas missões. Por exemplo, a 

política de defesa brasileira estabeleceu diretriz estratégica nesse sentido, de aumentar a 

participação em “processos internacionais relevantes de tomada de decisão, aprimorando e 

aumentando a capacidade de negociação” do país.

Assim, a decisão tem relação com a política externa do país. O Chile, depois da 

redemocratização, priorizou a re-inserção internacional seguido da ênfase na economia e 

no regionalismo aberto. Tendo atingido o objetivo inicial na área econômica, conseguindo 

estabelecer 14 tratados de livre comércio com 47 países, o país pôde modificar o foco central para um papel de mais destaque nas organizações internacionais e na manutenção da 

paz, materializadas pela presença no Haiti e pela campanha que elegeu José Insulza como 

Secretário Geral da OEA.14 A volta dos governos civis permitiu que a própria diplomacia 

dos países sul-americanos se tornasse mais pró-ativa nas organizações internacionais. 

A decisão tem relação também com a política interna do Estado. O Chile, por exemplo, manteve-se isolado politicamente do sistema internacional durante o regime militar. 

O retorno da democracia permitiu que os governos seguintes assumissem papel de maior 

destaque no sistema. O governo militar brasileiro se manteve distante do Conselho de 

Segurança da ONU por vinte anos, como opção, face às constantes pressões que sofria em 

relação às violações dos direitos humanos no país.

No geral, os países com maior tradição em participação nessas operações acompanharam a tendência mundial, intensificando a presença, não apenas em número de missões, 

mas também em relação ao efetivo empregado, a partir do final da década de 1980, coincidindo com o início das operações de segunda geração. Logicamente, o aumento da 

presença tem relação com o próprio aumento das missões estabelecidas na década de 1990.

A diminuição ou quase ausência da possibilidade de conflitos interestatais com a resolução pacífica da maior parte dos problemas de limites na América do Sul tornou-se um 
110 Security and Defense Studies Review

argumento poderoso por meio do qual as organizações internacionais direcionam esforços 

pela maior contribuição dos países da região. Tornou-se, também, um argumento utilizado 

pelos próprios militares para justificarem uma maior participação de suas forças, tanto em 

cumprimento de uma das missões legais previstas para as forças armadas, como pela possibilidade de manter parte de seus efetivos adestrados em condições que dificilmente manteriam no interior do próprio país, ou ainda a possibilidade de renovação do equipamento 

por meio das aquisições necessárias e do reembolso da ONU pelo desgaste do material 

empregado. 

Há ainda a questão dos vencimentos. Para os militares de países onde os salários se 

encontram defasados, o fato de integrar uma operação de paz significa um aporte financeiro, pois, normalmente, os valores pagos quando em missão oficial no exterior superam 

os vencimentos pagos no país. 

 O aumento da presença de forças sul-americanas nas missões de paz determinou 

a criação de uma série de organismos específicos destinados ao planejamento, preparação de efetivos, apoio logístico, acompanhamento, desmobilização, avaliação, pesquisa 

de doutrina, etc. São exemplos os centros de treinamento na Argentina (CAECOPAZ), 

no Chile (CECOPAC) e no Brasil (CCOPAB), dentre outros, além de diversas seções em 

departamentos das instituições militares e de defesa voltados para as operações de paz. 

Nos centros de treinamento já se estabeleceu uma tradição de intercâmbio de instrutores e 

alunos entre os países do sub-continente. 

Uma preocupação que apareceu com a redemocratização no subcontinente foi a de 

embasar legalmente as participações em missões de paz. Diversos dispositivos são encontrados em leis ou nas políticas de defesa dos países da região e servem, também, para 

justificar perante o público interno, a maior ou menor presença nas operações.

Com relação ao tipo de operação, há diferenças nas posturas de alguns países sulamericanos. Pode-se dizer que para a Argentina independe se as operações são de manutenção ou de imposição da paz. Caso as avaliações indiquem que a presença do país é 

importante para seus interesses, será decidida pela participação, como aconteceu em 1991, 

ao integrar a força de coalizão que invadiu o Kuwait. O Chile, através de seus dispositivos 

legais, permite a participação nas operações de peace-enforcement. 

No caso brasileiro, não há impedimento legal para a participação em operações de 

imposição da paz, mas há uma tendência de se fazer presente apenas nas missões de manutenção da paz. No entanto, o Brasil participou com tropa armada da INTERFET, desdobrada no Timor Leste, em setembro de 1999, considerada uma força de imposição da 

paz pela característica do mandato que permitia o uso da força para manter a segurança o 

que gerou alguns debates sobre uma possível mudança de atitude do governo brasileiro. 

Nesse caso é interessante destacar três pontos. Primeiro, que o desdobramento da força só 

foi realizado após entendimentos da ONU com os governos de Portugal e, principalmente, 

da Indonésia, então detentora de facto daquele território. Segundo que, por suas características, uma mesma missão pode ser lida de maneira diferente por governos e acadêmicos, 

algumas inclusive sendo referenciadas como estando sob o marco do “capítulo VI e meio” 

da Carta da ONU. Terceiro que, não havendo impedimento em elação ao tipo de missão, 

essa dissonância cognitiva é mais importante para o governo e seu ministério de relações 

exteriores que para as próprias os militares que executarão a missão e pautarão sua conduta 

por conta das regras de engajamento estabelecidas pela ONU para a operação. 

Mas, independente do tipo de mandato que se estabeleça, nota-se um consenso entre 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 111

os países da região em só participar de operações sob o estrito critério da legalidade outorgado pela aprovação das mesmas nos organismos internacionais. Ou seja, missões que 

respondam a um instrumento jurídico referendado pela sociedade internacional.

Outra característica importante é que, dentre os critérios de avaliação que os países 

sul-americanos utilizam para balizar a decisão política, avultam de importância o fato do 

conflito realmente ameaçar a paz e a segurança internacionais e a clareza dos objetivos e 

mandatos. Além disso, são avessos a arranjos pré-estabelecidos, preferindo decidir caso a 

caso, em quais missões, e, como participar, num exercício de decisão soberana de acordo 

com seus interesses. 

Há uma tendência em privilegiar ou até priorizar a América Latina. Assim, casos que 

afetem a segurança de países da região, em que seja necessária a ativação de uma missão 

de manutenção da paz, provavelmente, contarão com a participação de boa parte dos países 

do continente. Na operação da ONU no Haiti, dos 11.984 militares e policiais pertencentes 

a 57 países que a compõem, 5.385 pertencem a nove países sul-americanos, o que corresponde a 45% do efetivo total da missão.15 

Os países justificam, também, a presença nas missões de paz pelo fator cooperação, o 

que contribui para a geração de confiança. Cooperação e confiança devem contribuir para 

a estabilidade de regiões em conflito e, conseqüentemente, para a paz e a segurança. Por 

essa razão, é normal encontrar uma priorização da presença em missões relacionadas com 

a segurança sub-regional e regional sobre as de caráter global. 

Essa tendência pode auxiliar a própria OEA a ser mais pró-ativa em suas atribuições 

de preservar a paz e a segurança no continente, uma vez que, provavelmente haverá uma 

maior predisposição dos seus membros em se envolver nos problemas de segurança de 

países americanos.

No caso da crise no Haiti, aconteceram várias reuniões entre os governos do Brasil, Chile, Argentina e Uruguai, que levaram à decisão de obter maior peso na operação, 

dando uma forma de concertação sub-regional ao esforço para resolver um problema num 

país do continente. Posteriormente, os governos desses quatro países estabeleceram um 

foro de discussões, materializado em reuniões realizadas com a presença de diplomatas 

e funcionários dos respectivos ministérios da defesa, com o objetivo de coordenar suas 

atividades no Haiti.16

O alto grau de entendimento alcançado pelos países sul-americanos, especialmente 

os do Cone Sul, resultou em alguns acordos bilaterais, através de memorandos de entendimentos, que definiram a presença conjunta de militares em contingentes de paz. Em 1995, 

Brasil e Argentina firmaram acordo que permitiu a participação de dois militares brasileiros 

no contingente argentino em Chipre. Em contra-partida, militares argentinos fizeram parte 

das tropas brasileiras em Angola e no Timor Leste. Ainda em Chipre, militares do Chile, 

Peru, Bolívia e Paraguai integraram o Batalhão Argentino. Na MINUSTAH, militares paraguaios e bolivianos atuaram com o contingente brasileiro e militares equatorianos integraram a companhia de engenharia chilena.17

Na realidade, a ONU não estimula e tem colocado dificuldades para a implementação 

de tal cooperação, pois pode haver problemas de comando e controle que, logicamente, 

serão resolvidos pelos próprios contingentes, mas que podem prejudicar o andamento da 

operação em algumas situações. 

O Brasil incentiva tal procedimento, argumentando que a presença conjunta de militares em contingentes de paz ajuda a atrair novos troop-contributing countries para as 
112 Security and Defense Studies Review

operações de paz. Utiliza como exemplo o caso da Bolívia que, através de um acordo 

bilateral, participou do Estado Maior da tropa brasileira com dois oficiais. Posteriormente, 

isso permitiu o desdobramento de uma companhia boliviana com 218 homens sob sua 

própria “bandeira”. O argumento de atrair novos contribuintes não deixa de ser um forte 

e importante perante a ONU que, por vezes, tem dificuldade de compor o efetivo de suas 

operações. 

Da mesma forma, Equador e Chile assinaram, em 17 de outubro de 2004, um memorando de entendimentos pelo qual o Equador se comprometeu a participar da companhia 

de engenharia chilena que opera no Haiti, com um efetivo de 66 engenheiros, mais os equipamentos necessários. A partir desse entendimento, o Equador preparou uma companhia 

própria que foi desdobrada naquela operação. 

Na prática, a ONU toma conhecimento do acordo bilateral para reconhecer a presença de militares de outro país num determinado contingente até mesmo para fins de amparo 

em caso de acidentes. 

Em junho de 2005, os chefes dos Estados Maiores de Defesa da Argentina e do Chile 

concordaram sobre a criação de uma força combinada para operações de paz. Em agosto 

daquele ano, foi assinado um Protocolo de Entendimento que resultou, em 27 de dezembro 

seguinte, na assinatura da Ata do Acordo Bilateral entre os Ministérios de Defesa para a 

Criação de uma Força de Paz Combinada.18

Os países sul-americanos marcaram presença em 56 operações de paz desenvolvidas 

pelas Nações Unidas e das 16 operações atualmente em curso, 12 contam com a presença 

dos países do sub-continente. A experiência acumulada pelas forças armadas e policiais, 

o intercâmbio de conhecimento e de pessoal, os exercícios conjuntos direcionados para 

esse tipo de operação realizados pelos exércitos, especialmente os do Cone Sul, e as iniciativas de coordenação entre governos são importantes para a consecução e o sucesso 

das iniciativas voltadas para a resolução de conflitos. São importantes, sobretudo, para o 

fomento da confiança mútua com reflexos na manutenção da paz e da segurança regional. 

Tabela 3: Participação Atual dos Países Sul-Americanos nas Missões de Paza

MISSÃO TIPO Argentina Bolívia Chile Colômbia Equador Paraguai Peru Uruguai

MINUSTAH POLICIAIS 21 15 33 04

TROPA 715 207 501 67 131 371 1130

MINURSO EXPERTS 03 05 01

UNMIT POLICIAIS 03

UNFICYP TROPA 263 15 14

EXPERTS 02 02 02 02

UNMIL POLICIAIS 12 01

TROPA 01 01 01 02

EXPERTS 03 02 07 03 02

UNOCI POLICIAIS 03 03

TROPA 02

UNMIS EXPERTS 15 07 06 11

POLICIAIS 04

UNTSO EXPERTS 03 03

UNAMA EXPERTS 01

UNMIN EXPERTS 06 02

UNMOGIP EXPERTS 02 02

MONUSCO EXPERTS 10 10 07 46

TROPA 1258

TOTAL 1024 238 536 33 79 184 396 2453 a Preparada com base em dados do DPKO/ONU, atualizada em 31 de dezembro de 2010.
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 113

Notas

1

 Ver Fontoura, Paulo R. C. Tarrisse da. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz 

das Nações Unidas. Brasília, Instituto Rio Branco/FUNAG,1999, p. 100.

2

 Alguns autores apresentam três gerações das operações de paz. As de primeira geração 

tratavam dos conflitos durante a Guerra Fria que eram em sua maioria interestatais e tinham funções de monitoramento das fronteiras e o estabelecimento de zonas-tampão após 

acordos de cessar-fogo. As de segunda geração aconteceram no período pós-Guerra Fria e 

trataram principalmente de conflitos intraestatais e com características multidimensionais, 

apresentando três vias de atuação, a promoção da paz (peacemaking), manutenção da paz 

(peacekeeping) e construção da paz (peacebuilding). As de terceira geração envolvem principalmente o uso da força para o cumprimento de suas atividades no âmbito da imposição 

da paz (peace enforcement). Ver Doyle, Michael W. Sambanis, Nicholas. Making War and 

building peace: United Nations peace operations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 

2006.

3

 ONU. A/47/277 – S/24111, An Agenda for Peace. United Nations General Assembly, 17 

June 1992. Disponível em http://www.un.org/docs/SG/agpeace.html. Acesso em 10 jul. 

2001. ONU. A/50/60 – S/1995/1, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace. United Nations 

General Assembly, 3 January 1995. Disponível em http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.

html. Acesso em 10 jul. 2001.

4

 ONU. UN Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet. Nova Iorque, Janeiro de 2011. 

5

 Richter, Daen Carol Dick. La experiencia boliviana en las Operaciones de Mantenimiento 

de Paz. Exposição no Club de Graduados Argentinos del Centro de Estudios Hemisféricos 

de Defensa. Buenos Aire, 2-5 de abril de 2001. Disponível em http://www.pdgs.org.ar/

chds/ponencias/richter-3-e.htm. Acesso em 25 de abril de 2007.

6

 Para um balanço completo da participação brasileira ver Aguilar, Sergio (Org). Brasil em 

Missões de Paz. São Paulo: Usina do Livro, 2005. O efetivo do contingente no Haiti foi 

aumentado em 2010 para 2190 militares e policiais. 

7

 Ministério da Defesa. Portaria no 952-MD de 15 de junho de 2010. Alterou a denominação 

de Centro de Instrução de Operações de Paz (CIOpPaz) para Centro Conjunto de Operações de Paz do Brasil (CCOPAB). A mudança colocou o Centro vinculado diretamente 

ao Ministério da Defesa, apesar de permanecer subordinado ao Exército Brasileiro, com 

a idéia de que nele se concentrasse o apoiar a preparação de militares, policiais e civis 

brasileiros e de nações amigas para missões de paz e desminagem humanitária. Essa função está sendo assumia paulatinamente. No segundo semestre de 2011, o Centro recebeu 

pela primeira vez, o Comandante do Grupamento Operativo, seu Estado-Maior e os comandantes de companhia e pelotão do Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais da Marinha. No entanto, 

o exercício final de preparação dessa tropa continuava a cargo da Força de Fuzileiros da 

Esquadra.

8

 Fonte: Estado Maior do Exército. 5a Sub-Chefia e ONU/DPKO. Atualizado em dezembro 

de 2010. 

9

 A tropa do Chile na EUFOR foi desdobrada em outubro de 2003. Brondi, Marcelo Péndola. Chile y las operaciones de paz: de la participación individual a Haiti. Fuerzas Armadas 

y Sociedad, a. 19, n. 1. Santiago, 2005, p. 73-84.
114 Security and Defense Studies Review

10 Chile. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. Subsecretaria de Guerra. Decreto Supremo n. 68 

de 14 oct. 1999. Diário Oficial n.36510 de 10 nov. 1999.

11 Peru. Ministério de Defensa. Libro Blanco de Defensa, p. 113.

12 Peru. Comando Conjunto das Forças Armadas. Disponível em http://www.ccffaa.mil.pe/

cecopaz/ misiones.htm. Acesso em 20 mar. 2007.

13 Zurbriggen, Cristina. Política exterior, defensa y las operaciones de paz:¿una estrategia 

coherente? El caso de Uruguay. Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad, a. 19, n. 1. Santiago, 2005, 

p. 85-109. 

14 Walker, Ignácio. Palestra do Ministro de Relações Exteriores no Seminário de Política 

Externa. FLACSO. Santiago do Chile, 23 jun. 2005.

15 Cálculo feito com base no documento UN Mission’s Contributions by Country. Disponível em http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2010/missioncountry.zip. 

Acesso em 02 fev. 2011.

16 Posteriormente, Equador, Guatemala e Peru aderiram ao foro. O envolvimento regional 

é uma tendência. Casos semelhantes aconteceram recentemente na África com a presença 

maciça de tropas do ECOWAS na Libéria, de países da Oceania durante a crise no Timor 

Leste em 2006 e da União Africana em Darfur. 

17 A iniciativa não é inédita. Em 1998, os ministros de defesa dos países nórdicos decidiram 

aumentar a cooperação entre eles em relação às operações de paz estabelecendo formalmente o Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) que 

possibilitou a participação de unidades militares multinacionais inicialmente constituída 

por tropas desses países e, posteriormente, em parceria com outros países não nórdicos. 

É um instrumento de coordenação que não substitui o processo de decisão nacional dos 

países integrantes.

18 PINO, Gonzalo García. Palestra do Subsecretário de Guerra do Ministério de Defesa do 

Chile. IV Conferência de Segurança Internacional do Forte Copacabana. Rio de Janeiro, 

15 nov. 2007.
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 115

Referências Bibliográficas

Aguilar, Sergio (Org). Brasil em Missões de Paz. São Paulo: Usina do Livro, 

2005.

Argentina

Cámara de Diputados. Ley 24948-Ley de reestructuración de las Fuerzas Armadas. Buenos 

Aires, 18 de fevereiro de 1998.

—–. Congreso de la Nación. Ley n. 25880 Ley Marco sobre el Ingreso y Egreso de Tropas. 

Buenos Aires, 31 de março de 2004. 

—–. Decreto 1116 Directiva para la Realización del Planeamiento Militar Conjunto. Buenos 

Aires, 2 de outubro de 1996.

—–. Decreto 727/2006 - Princípios Básicos. Competencia del Consejo de Defensa Nacional. 

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Buenos Aires, 13 de junho de 2006.

—–. Ministério da Defesa. Libro Blanco de Defensa. Buenos Aires, 2001.

Bolívia 

Ley Orgánica de las Fuerzas Armadas de la Nación. La Paz, 18 de dezembro de 1992.

_____. Libro Blanco de Defensa de Bolivia. La Paz: Instituto Geográfico Militar, 2004.

Brazil 

Decreto no 3080. Aprova a Estrutura Regimental e o Quadro Demonstrativo Dos Cargos 

em Comissão do Grupo-direção e Assessoramento Superiores - das do Ministerio da 

Defesa, e da Outras Providencias. Brasília, 10 de junho de 1999.

—–. Decreto n. 5484 Política de Defesa Nacional. Brasília, 30 de junho de 2005. 

—–. Lei Complementar n. 97. Dispõe sobre as normas gerais para a organização, o preparo 

e o emprego das Forças Armadas. Brasília, 9 de junho de 1999. 

—–. Lei n. 2953. Fixa normas para remessa de tropas brasileiras para o exterior. Rio de 

Janeiro, 17 de novembro de 1956. 

Brondi, Marcelo Péndola. “Chile y las operaciones de paz: de la participación individual a 

Haiti”. Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad, a. 19, n. 1. Santiago, 2005, p. 73-84.

Chile

Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. Subsecretaria de Guerra. Decreto Supremo n. 68 de 14 

oct. 1999. Diário Oficial n.36510 de 10 nov. 1999.

Colômbia

Ministerio de Defensa. Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática. Bogotá, 13 jun. 

2003. 

Doyle, Michael W. Sambanis, Nicholas. Making War and building peace: United Nations peace operations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006

Equador

Ministério de Defensa Nacional. Libro Blanco de la Defensa Nacional. Quito, 2006.
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Fontoura, Paulo R. C. Tarrisse da. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz das 

Nações Unidas. Brasília, Instituto Rio Branco/FUNAG,1999, p. 100.

La Nación. Preparan misiones de paz conjuntas. Buenos Aires, 29 dez. 2005. 

ONU. A/47/277 – S/24111. An Agenda for Peace. United Nations General Assembly, 17 

June 1992. Disponível em http://www.un.org/docs/SG/agpeace.html.

—–. A/50/60 – S/1995/1. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace. United Nations General 

Assembly, 3 January 1995. Disponível em http://www.un.org/Docs/ SG/agsupp.

html.

—–. DPKO. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko. 

Paraguai

Informe Nacional sobre la Implementación del Programa de Acción 2001 de las Naciones 

Unidas para Prevenir, Combatir y Eliminar el Tráfico Ilícito de Armas Pequeñas y Ligeras en Todos sus Aspectos del período 2001 – 2005. Assunção, 2006.

—–. Senado Federal. Ley 1337 – De Defensa Nacional y de Seguridade Interna. Assunção, 

14 de abril de 1999. 

Peru

Comando Conjunto das Forças Armadas. Disponível em http://www.ccffaa.mil.pe/ cecopaz/ misiones.htm.

Richter, Daen Carol Dick. La experiencia boliviana en las Operaciones de Mantenimiento 

de Paz. Exposição no Club de Graduados Argentinos del Centro de Estudios Hemisféricos de Defensa. Buenos Aire, 2-5 de abril de 2001. 

Uruguai

 Lei n. 18650. Ley Marco de Defensa Nacional. Diário Oficial n. 27931, de 08 de março 

de 2010.

Venezuela

 Ley Orgánica de Seguridad de la Nación. Gaceta Oficial n. 37.594. Caracas, 18 de diciembre de 2002. 

—–. Ministério da Defesa. Ley Orgánica de la Fuerza Armada Nacional. Asamblea Nacional Expediente N° 234. Caracas, 6 de setembro de 2005.

Walker, Ignácio. Palestra do Ministro de Relações Exteriores. Seminário de Política Externa. FLACSO. Santiago do Chile, 23 jun. 2005.

Zurbriggen, Cristina. “Política exterior, defensa y las operaciones de paz:¿una estrategia 

coherente? El caso de Uruguay”. Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad, a. 19, n. 1. Santiago, 

2005, p. 85-109. 
Strategic and Security Issues

2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 119

Liderazgo Estratégico en Defensa

Jaime García Covarrubias

RESUMEN

El tema del liderazgo estratégico ha tenido un desarrollo espectacular en el mundo 

de la dirección empresarial, donde se ha publicado mucha literatura tendiente 

a explicar sus alcances, formas de operación y su relación con la planificación 

estratégica y el proceso de toma de decisiones. Toda esta información, que 

aseguraría el éxito de una empresa, ha sido una referencia sumamente útil para el 

ámbito de la defensa y seguridad, aun cuando todo lo escrito no es exactamente 

aplicable en el escenario estratégico en que nosotros actuamos. En efecto, las 

especificidades del cargo político, de las FFAA y del tipo de conflicto al que 

se aboca este sector, hacen que sea necesaria una redefinición de cuáles son los 

aspectos esenciales de un liderazgo estratégico en el ámbito que nos preocupa.

“La mejor manera para llegar a ser un buen tomador de decisiones, es mediante 

el aprendizaje que se obtiene al estar presente cuando otros las toman.” 

—Dwight D. Eisenhower

Introducción

Cuando se habla de liderazgo, lo primero que aparece en nuestra mente, es la figura del 

líder encarnada en un hombre o mujer que es capaz de encabezar la dirección de personas 

en pos de obtener determinados objetivos en forma eficiente y eficaz. Ese líder que nos 

estamos imaginando también posee un conjunto de cualidades personales que lo hacen normalmente muy singular y que son atributos de suma importancia en el comandante militar. 

De allí que relacionemos el liderazgo con la carrera de las armas ya que se considera a éste, 

incluso, como algo inherente a la carrera militar. Con el político ocurre algo similar ya 

que el liderazgo debe ser, sin ninguna duda, un atributo de quien aspira a ostentar cargos 

de dirección nacional. 

En este artículo, aun cuando también me refiero al liderazgo individual, mi foco 

principal está orientado a la estructura que dirige la defensa y seguridad en el país. Desde 

este punto de vista liderazgo estratégico, conformaría un “sistema” tendiente a articular 

la toma de decisiones desde el más alto escalón político hasta el comandante militar. Para 

este artículo, he recogido los aspectos que yo considero esenciales, algunos ya publicados 

por otros autores, con la intención de aprovechar todo ese conocimiento en la propuesta 

que estoy haciendo aunque en general estos autores tienen una interpretación algo diferente 
120 Security and Defense Studies Review

ya que no identifican al liderazgo estratégico como sistema. Esta es, entender el liderazgo 

estratégico como un “sistema de liderazgo” que va más allá del liderazgo individual de un 

jefe de estado o ministro de defensa o de la suma de liderazgos individuales. Lo anterior, 

debido a que la dinámica política en los tiempos actuales exige la integración, coordinación 

y convergencia de los liderazgos. Asimismo, las orgánicas propias de la burocracia moderna requieren que la toma de decisiones sea conocida, coherente, integrada y muy racional. 

No es mi deseo complicar este artículo con aspectos de cibernética, sino recordar que 

sistema es un conjunto organizado de elementos que interactúan entre sí o son interdependientes, formando un todo complejo, identificable y distinto. A su vez, por elementos de un 

sistema se entienden no solo sus componentes físicos sino las funciones que estos realizan. 

A su vez alguna parte del sistema puede ser considerado un subsistema si los elementos 

mantienen una relación entre sí que los hace también un conjunto identificable y distinto. 

Yo diría que trabajando con estas simples categorías ya podemos comenzar a entender a 

este “sistema de liderazgo” que estamos proponiendo.

Mi idea está basada en la experiencia de varios años de ejercicio de la carrera militar tanto en academias, estado mayor, tropas como también ministerio de defensa y en la 

observación e investigación de este problema en la región. Por lo tanto, mis opiniones son 

personales y no comprometen el pensamiento del país, universidad y el centro en el que 

cumplo mis funciones profesionales.

La Interacción entre Democracia, Estrategia y Liderazgo

El primer punto que nos tenemos que plantear, es porque algunos seres humanos mandan 

o dirigen a otros. En tal sentido, la explicación la encontramos en la historia misma al 

observar que siempre hubo hombres que mandaron a otros. Es asimismo, Max Weber 

quien nos explica la dominación como la probabilidad de encontrar obediencia en un grupo 

determinado para mandatos específicos. Es la capacidad de ejercer poder o influjo sobre 

otros hombres. Para Weber, va desde la habituación inconsciente hasta lo que son puramente racionales, como los con arreglos a fines. La voluntad de obediencia, o sea el interés 

de obedecer es esencial en toda relación autentica de autoridad. Aquí es donde Weber nos 

encamina al concepto de autoridad que es la dominación legítima. Esta es voluntaria ya 

que es una creencia que en el caso de las democracias es la autoridad racional legal o un 

conjunto de preceptos por sobre los grupos de dominio. En la teoría del pensador alemán, 

vemos que los tipos de dominación que el tipifica, han evolucionado desde la carismática 

o las más primaria, en la que se sigue la santidad, heroísmo o ejemplo de una persona, 

pasando por la tradicional, que sería en la afirmación en la tradiciones o en las familias 

herederas de líderes carismáticos y culminando en la forma moderna que descansa en la 

creencia de la legalidad de la autoridad racional legal.1

En esta apretada síntesis observamos la evolución de la legitimidad, en la cual se 

basa la democracia y muy particularmente su forma moderna. No es posible entender a la 

democracia si es que carece de legitimidad e instituciones. En efecto son las instituciones 

las que en definitiva plasman la autoridad racional legal ya que las formas legales deben 

ser encarnadas en instituciones. Las democracias más estables son precisamente las que 

poseen instituciones sólidas y estables tales como las que conforman los tres poderes y los 

partidos políticos. En este contexto, se inscribe el liderazgo, ya que debe estructurarse en 

un adecuado escenario institucional ya que no puede y no debe basarse en representaciones 

individuales que están por sobre las instituciones y más aun que pareciera que les molesta 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 121

la estructura jurídica. En nuestra región observamos frecuentemente este tipo de líderes 

que si no estuvieran en democracia serian “insignes” dictadores ya que hacen uso del populismo y la arbitrariedad, siendo con frecuencia la reelección su gran aspiración. 

Como sabemos la estrategia nace con la política y la democracia, y por tanto evoluciona con ella. La historia nos enseña, que en Grecia, la estrategia era la forma en que 

se dirigía en términos políticos y militares la guerra. La diferencia estribaba que quienes 

ejercían la política eran seleccionados por sorteos en cambio quien (o quienes) dirigían la 

estrategia (llamados strategoi) era elegido por sus virtudes. Este último dato histórico es 

muy relevante porque insinúa que los griegos pensaban que la política podía estar en manos de cualquier ciudadano en cambio la estrategia solamente entre los ciudadanos que tuvieran capacidades para ello. Además este cargo era por lejos el más prestigioso del estado, 

lo que se observa desde inicios del Siglo V a.c. y podía ser reelegido interminablemente. 

En Roma, al contrario, estos cargos estaban restringidos a solo un año. Es importante tener 

en cuenta que en Grecia no existía división de poderes, como lo posee la democracia y en 

el mismo sentido los ejércitos no eran permanentes, sino que las milicias se organizaban 

para la guerra, salvo la armada que era permanente. En cambio, en Roma, había una mayor 

tendencia al profesionalismo militar. Los jefes militares griegos eran civiles de alta graduación. O más bien, ostentaban esta doble condición tanto civil como militar. Sin embargo, 

ya en el siglo IV a.c. comienza a observarse una separación entre el liderazgo político y el 

militar.2

La estrategia del siglo XX, conocida hoy como “estrategia total”, es propia de la sociedad moderna y por consecuencia de la democracia en la cual existe una integración de 

las actividades del estado las que funcionan dentro de un sistema de check and balance, a 

diferencia de la Grecia clásica. En tal sentido, la estrategia moderna exige un tratamiento 

distinto y acorde con los códigos del modelo político, en este caso el democrático, que es 

donde está inserta. El concepto de “estrategia total” fue creado por el General André Beaufre (1902-1975) y estrenado en su libro “Introducción a la Estrategia”, donde el general 

francés, señala que la estrategia está en un ámbito más amplio que el puramente militar 

y la redefine como “el arte de hacer que la fuerza concurra para alcanzar las metas de la 

política.”3

Es relevante la postura de Beaufre, quien a través de su propuesta se hace cargo de la 

ampliación del fenómeno bélico al considerarlo, como ya no eminentemente militar, sino 

que una circunstancia donde concurren todos desde tiempo de paz. Hoy, con el tipo de 

guerra que hemos conocido, ya nadie duda de esta particular interpenetración, o yo diría 

fusión, entre política y estrategia y tiempo de guerra y de paz. Precisamente el Almirante 

Michael G. Mullen, en un artículo sobre comunicación estratégica, advierte que, en la actualidad, la distinción entre los clásicos niveles de la guerra, está desdibujada o borrosa. El 

General David W. Barno lo explica muy bien en un artículo en la Revista Prism, cuando 

muestra el triángulo de los niveles de la guerra (Político-Estratégico y Táctico), en un 

conflicto convencional, donde en la base ancha esta la táctica, que es el escenario donde se 

desarrollan las acciones más importantes para alcanzar los objetivos políticos, cuyo sitio 

está en la cúspide del triángulo y es de menor dimensión. A su vez, Barno contrapone el 

triángulo correspondiente al conflicto actual, invirtiéndole, quedando entonces la táctica 

representada en su base, pero con menor dimensión y el nivel político en la parte superior 

como la parte ancha o sea la base invertida del triangulo. Barno explica, que las acciones 

más importantes en la guerra del terrorismo se dan el ámbito político-estratégico, y en el 
122 Security and Defense Studies Review

táctico solo acciones muy localizadas, que buscan el impacto estratégico y político.4 El 

planteamiento de Beaufre criticado en algún momento, hoy es de amplia comprensión y 

aceptación. 

Para mayor claridad me parece que el hecho de cambiar la denominación, niveles de 

la guerra, por ámbitos; lleva a que se visualice más claramente la interpenetración natural 

entre política, estrategia y táctica, ya que como hemos visto, la genealogía de la política y 

estrategia nos indica que son como hermanos siameses.

Los autores Richard Hughes, Robert Ginett, y Gordon Curphy, en su magnífico libro sobre Liderazgo, marcan una diferencia entre líder y liderazgo. Para ellos, liderazgo 

es la resultante de la acción del líder, en una situación determinada y ante un grupo de 

liderandos.5 Esto significa que el liderazgo no es acción sola del líder y que un líder en 

determinada situación o ante un determinado tipo de personas a conducir puede fracasar. 

En tal sentido, se me viene a la memoria el caso del General George S. Patton, notable 

comandante durante la IIGM pero que muy probablemente de no adaptarse a la situación y 

normas jurídicas del conflicto actual terminaría fracasando y siendo removido. 

FIGURA 1

L I D E R A Z G O

Source: Hughes, Ginnett and Curphy

Para ellos, el liderazgo no es una simple posición sino que es un proceso y en éste 

intervienen diferentes agentes. Concluyen que esta es ciencia y arte así como razón y emoción. Otro aspecto interesante es cuando los autores distinguen entre líder y gerente (o 

administrador). Al líder se le vincula con toma de riesgos, dinamismo, creatividad, cambio 

y visión en cambio el gerente es vinculado a eficiencia, plan, procedimiento, regulaciones, 

control y consistencia.6

Muy relevante resultan los valores para el líder, ya que son éstos los que diferencian a un Dalai Lama, Martin Luther King o un Gandhi, de un Hitler o un Stalin. Esto 

es que el propósito de su ejercicio e inspiración valórica, marcan la diferencia entre la 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 123

gestión de uno y otro. El líder intentara alinear a los liderandos en sus valores, creencias, 

motivaciones y expectaciones. El ideal es que estos valores también sean conjugados por 

los seguidores, ya que de lo contrario, se dificultará la interacción líder con situación.

Definición, Contenidos y Alcances

Los especialistas coinciden, en que el peor enemigo del Liderazgo Estratégico, serán las 

circunstancias que rodean al mundo actual y que se resumen en la gran Volatilidad, Incertidumbre, Complejidad y Ambigüedad. Todas ellas perjudican notablemente las definiciones 

en defensa. Los problemas aparecen, desaparecen o convergen en un clima, donde si algo 

falta es la certeza, y la multiplicidad de factores tienden a hacer que la situación más simple se vuelva compleja. La ambigüedad, por su lado, tiene un impacto muy negativo en el 

sector defensa, por cuanto en el metalenguaje moderno los hechos van tomando verdaderos 

“nombres de fantasía”, lo que dificulta enormemente la definición de tareas y de misiones 

para las FFAA. Imagínese, amable lector, si no será perjudicial en este ámbito el lenguaje 

ambiguo, cuando precisamente los planes de las FFAA, deben ser claros, precisos y concisos. Será entonces un adecuado sistema de liderazgo estratégico integrado, coherente y 

muy coordinado, quien tendrá que dar cuenta de todas estas dificultades que dificultan el 

escenario de la defensa.

En esta escala de liderazgo, que conformará el sistema, seguramente se combinarán 

líderes y administradores, lo que es parte de la realidad y es más bien positivo, por cuanto 

el administrador complementa muy bien al líder clásico. La experiencia nos dice, que los 

liderazgos fuertes normalmente son desprolijos en los ámbitos en que los administradores 

son fuertes. Por ello, yo diría que para una autoridad racional legal moderna es más cómodo un administrador que un líder clásico. Obviamente, estas categorías no son extremas 

y normalmente encontraremos en todos los individuos una mezcla entre administrador y 

líder ya que la primera característica se obtiene por educación y la segunda es más un 

atributo. Por esta razón no nos complicaremos con mayores disquisiciones entre estas dos 

tipologías.

Entenderemos por Liderazgo Estratégico al “sistema” de liderazgo que involucra al 

Jefe de Estado, Ministro de Defensa y Mandos Militares, y que se orienta a la conducción 

y administración del sector Defensa. Comprende el Entorno y horizonte estratégico debiendo tener en consideración que le afectara la volatilidad, incertidumbre, complejidad y 

ambigüedad de los escenarios actuales. La comunicación estratégica será la herramienta 

que le servirá para comunicar e influir. 

El ideal es que el sector defensa y la política exterior sean “hermanos siameses” y 

estén absolutamente actuando de consuno. Esto es que el ideal es que este ‘sistema” de 

liderazgo abarque los dos campos. De no ser este el caso, al menos deberá existir una muy 

buena coordinación entre el sector defensa y la política exterior del país. 

Este sistema de liderazgo, se organiza para resolver lo que estoy llamando contenidos 

del liderazgo estratégico. Esto corresponde a cuatro actividades cardinales, cuales son: 

Definición del Modelo Político Estratégico, Planeamiento y Dirección (estratégica y administrativa), Ejecución y finalmente Comunicación Estratégica. La primera tarea y pilar 

de todo lo que vendrá después, será la determinación del modelo político-estratégico a 

asumir. Por ejemplo, en los últimos años en la región latinoamericana, ha sido la disuasión 

convencional la modalidad preferida. 

Sin embargo, el papel que juegan hoy los organismos internacionales en el control de 
124 Security and Defense Studies Review

los conflictos, va restando las posibilidades de ejercer algún tipo de disuasión a países de 

bajo o incluso mediano poder nacional. La precitada elección de la modalidad, será posterior a la jerarquización de misiones que todo gobierno debe realizar para el sector defensa. 

Estas misiones están ordenadas en misiones tradicionales (normalmente hipótesis vecinales), no tradicionales (Lucha contra las llamadas nuevas amenazas), compromisos internacionales (operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz y otros) y rol en el desarrollo nacional o 

apoyo social a la comunidad. Es imposible para un país, asumir estas cuatro tareas con el 

mismo énfasis, por lo que se deberá fijar un orden de prioridad para determinar los presupuestos. Una vez que se tiene la definición del modelo político-estratégico se comienza la 

planificación la que tendrá que hacerse de acuerdo con la experiencia de cada país. 

Esta planificación tendrá que abordar las definiciones estratégicas acorde con la modalidad elegida y todo lo que tiene que ver con la conducción administrativa del sector. La 

planificación corresponderá a los usos de cada país pero deberá tener en cuenta que deberá 

ser flexible, dinámica y realista manejando distintas alternativas y coordinaciones. El plan 

en cada uno de los ámbitos (llamados antes niveles) debe ser muy prolijo ya que será éste 

el que en definitiva facilite la identificación de los ámbitos de la conducción, tales como 

político, estratégico, operacional y táctico. Asimismo, el plan debe dar cuenta de las actividades de paz (administración del sector) como las etapas de crisis, conflicto y guerra si es 

del caso. Ya con las actividades planificadas, comienza la acción de dirigir y administrar 

el sector. Esta fase obliga al manejo de la contingencia política la que normalmente afecta 

a las actividades planeadas. Ahora, si los hechos contingentes que se producen fueron previstos en el plan, quiere decir que éste último es magistral. 

Finalmente, deberá ejecutarse la comunicación estratégica que consiste en el apoyo 

mediático o comunicacional a la toma de decisiones del sector.7 Los requisitos fundamentales deben ser:

• Los mensajes deben ser integrados por los distintos sectores con proyección hacia el 

exterior del país;

• Comunicada por una autoridad pertinente con oportunidad y absolutamente ajustada 

a los hechos;

• Reflejar valores de la sociedad;

• No debiera ser empleada como un instrumento para la lucha política interna.

Uno de los aspectos más relevantes sobre la comunicación estratégica, es si estará 

orientada a informar, influir o persuadir. El “deber ser” es orientar la comunicación estratégica a informar lo mas objetivamente posible, desestimando influir o persuadir. Sin 

embargo, esa será una definición propia de cada estado acorde con sus intereses, valores 

ciudadanos y necesidades estratégicas.

En tanto, la mayor dificultad en la comunicación estratégica de defensa, es que para 

las FFAA la noticia termina cuando aparece el comunicado oficial. No obstante, para los 

periodistas cuando aparece el comunicado, la noticia recién comienza. Esa desavenencia 

genera frecuentemente la incomunicación entre estos dos sectores esenciales para el vinculo comunicacional.

Los integrantes de la cadena del sistema de liderazgo, para una mejor toma de decisiones, deberán tener conocimiento compartido sobre el entorno estratégico y el horizonte 

estratégico. La diferencia entre ellos es que mientras el primero da cuenta del corto plazo 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 125

el segundo se orientara al largo plazo. El entorno estratégico se compone de Asuntos de 

Seguridad Nacional, el Escenario Internacional, el Ambiente Militar, la Política Contingente y los Aspectos Económicos. Los Asuntos de Seguridad Nacional, se refieren al conocimiento, manejo y dominio de todo lo que tenga que ver con la seguridad global del país, 

esto es la definición de las amenazas y problemas que afectan a la seguridad del estado. 

En esta parte, se debe tener un conocimiento muy exacto del potencial estratégico del país. 

Complementario a lo anterior, está el conocimiento del Escenario Internacional, sus cambios y como están influyendo en la situación interna. El Ambiente Militar es la información 

que se debe tener acerca de los usos, costumbres y códigos de las FFAA así como su actual 

situación, necesidades y aspiraciones. 

La Política Contingente será de particular relevancia, ya que no es posible dirigir o 

administrar la defensa haciendo caso omiso de la coyuntura política. La defensa es problema de todos y como tal debe tender a involucrar a todos los sectores políticos en el tema, 

para lo cual el dialogo con todos los sectores partidistas resulta fundamental. El Ministro 

de Defensa tendrá que concurrir a las comisiones de defensa en el parlamento y para ello se 

requiere que este tenga “espaldas políticas” para poder soportar las críticas y tensiones. En 

tal sentido, siempre un ministro político será más adecuado que un militar en el cargo. Por 

su parte, los aspectos económicos son de vital importancia ya que esto, en lenguaje simple, 

equivale a colocarle precio al plan. Siempre los recursos terminarán siendo menores que 

los que se necesitan realmente.

A su vez, el Horizonte Estratégico que es la proyección del entorno en el tiempo, 

está integrado por el Desafío Político Estratégico, las Amenazas Potenciales, la Proyección 

Presupuestaria, la Evolución de los preceptos legales tanto nacionales como internacionales e Integraciones, ciclo político electoral y otros que pudieren considerarse oportuno 

considerar. Todos estos aspectos hablan por sí solos. Lo importante es tener presente que 

todos ellos hay que observarlos en perspectiva y con visión prospectiva. Por ejemplo, el 

ciclo político electoral significa tener claridad en el tiempo que se gobernara. 

El Coronel (USAF) Michael Guillot, estructura en forma diferente lo precedente.8 El 

coloca las decisiones estratégicas en el medio de cuatro cuadros que son el Ambiente de 

Seguridad Nacional, el Ambiente Nacional, el Entorno internacional y el Entorno Militar. 

Dentro de cada uno de ellos fija otros agentes (que se indican en la Figura 2).

Para desempeñarse en el sistema de liderazgo estratégico, es fundamental conocer

FIGURA 2

 Gráfico de Michael Guillot.
126 Security and Defense Studies Review

los ámbitos de la conducción, o como se le llama en EE.UU., los niveles de la guerra. Más 

allá de los nombres, estos ámbitos representan los espacios donde se desarrolla el liderazgo 

estratégico, constituyéndose en espacios abstractos, pero que en algunos aspectos tienen 

una innegable tangibilidad. Estos espacios no se conocen por el simple estudio, sino que 

también hay que tener una dosis de ubicación abstracta. Hay autoridades políticas que 

nunca entienden el ámbito en que están. Estos ámbitos, dimensiones o niveles de la guerra, 

permiten apreciar, analizar, planificar, resolver, dirigir, coordinar y supervisar. Se inicia con 

el nivel político en la cúspide siguiendo del estratégico. Entre ambos existe una interpenetración que se denomina ámbito político estratégico. 

En ese espacio se inserta la política de defensa y ocurren un sinnúmero de actividades 

de la mayor importancia y que normalmente en nuestros países no están planificadas. La 

coyuntura política, por ejemplo, impacta muy fuertemente. Hay que tener conciencia de 

que esta interpenetración tiene una dimensión más política en la medida de que se acerca 

hacia lo político y más propia del sector defensa cuando se acerca a la dimensión estratégica. En el medio esta el ámbito estratégico (sector defensa), que articula los objetivos 

políticos con la ejecución táctica. Hay que tener presente que el ámbito estratégico permea 

a hacia lo político y hacia lo táctico. Esto es que se hace estrategia hacia arriba y hacia 

abajo hasta llegar a lo táctico. A ese ámbito intermedio entre estratégico y táctico en algunos países se le llama operativo u operacional.

Otro conocimiento que no puede obviarse en el liderazgo estratégico, es lo relativo a 

política defensa. Cuando se publicaron los libros blancos en la región, hubo cierta confusión 

porque aparecieron distintas interpretaciones de que era la política de defensa. En el caso 

de Chile, el libro jamás fue de política de defensa ya que su titulo era Libro de la Defensa 

Nacional. Lo mismo sucedió en Argentina y en otros países. Sin embargo, en el lenguaje 

colectivo se les mencionaba como los libros de política de defensa. Para otros, la política de 

defensa eran todo el conjunto de leyes que permitían administrar la defensa. Por lo que no 

requería ser explícita. Estaba allí desde siempre. Con la política militar sucedió un hecho 

algo más dramático, ya que esta se desvaneció y no se volvió a hablar de ella. Lo concreto 

es que el liderazgo estratégico debe definir el criterio nacional que se tendrá respecto a estos 

conceptos y estar todos muy conectados en la convicción frente a estas. En tal sentido, hay 

que acordar que en el tema de la política de defensa hay que tener consenso en lo siguiente:

Es una Política Pública, pero “especial,” ya que requiere de ciertos grados de reserva que 

no es una exigencia para otras políticas públicas, como por ejemplo salud que debe ser 

conocida por todos.

• Considerar que es necesario trabajar los consensos políticos ya que ellos determinaran 

que se pueda alcanzar los quórums.

• Debe ser una Política de Estado. La única forma de elevar una política pública a política de estado es elevar los quórums de reforma. De manera que se requiera amplios 

consensos para su reforma. Sin embargo, habrá que tener cuidado con esto ya que no 

se trata tampoco de convertir una política de defensa en una estatua de sal y que pierda 

toda flexibilidad.

• La Política de Defensa debe interpretar los escenarios estratégicos correctamente, con 

el objeto de que ayude a definir un modelo estratégico adecuado y realista, que tenga 

en el diseño de fuerza un instrumento racional y eficiente.9

• La Política de Defensa y la Política exterior deben actuar de consuno.
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 127

• La Política de Defensa es global. La parte militar de la Política de Defensa se define 

como Política Militar.

Los Circuitos del Liderazgo Estratégico

Le he llamado “circuitos” de liderazgo, a los canales de relacionamiento que deberán usar 

las autoridades que conforman este sistema. De no existir un circuito que asegure la transmisión continua de información, coordinación y órdenes, no podrá construirse un sistema 

de liderazgo. Para que esto ocurra, deberá delinearse un procedimiento de canalización del 

relacionamiento que asegure la continuidad del circuito, ajustado al conducto regular, que 

todos conozcan, que sea permanente y que este por sobre los personalismos y caprichos 

de autoridad.

Como lo señaláramos anteriormente lo ideal, y a lo que hay que tender, es que la 

política de defensa y la política exterior conforme una sola unidad. En ese caso, el sistema 

de liderazgo deberá proveer, no solo los circuitos verticales, sino que también, deberá desarrollar los circuitos horizontales para poder enlazar dos instituciones que están en el 

mismo nivel pero que normalmente les corresponde actuar en distintos momentos. Esto 

es la política exterior que acciona en primer lugar y la defensa a continuación. Lamentablemente, en la región no se ha desarrollado esta unión y convergencia entre la política y 

gestión de exterior y defensa.10

Como lo hemos dicho en la cadena del sistema de liderazgo están el Presidente, que 

por razones obvias estará en un nivel en que su función primordial es dictar los grandes criterios, orientaciones y hacer las correcciones. Su estilo personal tendrá mucha repercusión 

en el sistema. Sin embargo, la experiencia dice que en general, los primeros mandatarios 

se terminan sometiendo a la burocracia que maneja el sistema, ya que la gran cantidad de 

materias que tienen que analizar y resolver no les permite evadirse del sistema. Inmediatamente, bajo el Presidente se encuentra el Ministro de Defensa (se incluye viceministerio), 

quien deberá estar en la cadena de mando para mejor el funcionamiento del sistema.11 Reitero que en lo personal lo prefiero civil y político. En mi opinión, esto último no impide que 

podría ser un militar en retiro pero que tenga reconocimiento en la clase política. 

Mención especial merece el liderazgo del ministro ya que tendrá gran relevancia 

debido a que es quien encarna el sector defensa, pivoteando entre lo político y estratégicooperativo. Habrá distintos estilos. Por ejemplo, podemos ejemplarizar a un Ministro Nelson Jobim de Brasil que se coloca uniforme militar, opuestamente el Ministro Andres Allamand en Chile, busca resaltar su liderazgo civil, al insistir el uso de ropa civil en ejercicios 

militares, a diferencia de los anteriores ministros que si los usaron.12 Similar ocurre cuando 

se elije un liderazgo que marque un símbolo de género. En el caso español, la Ministra 

de Defensa Carmen Chacón, no por mera casualidad apareció en su primera revista a las 

tropas con varios meses de embarazo. Esa fue una fuerte imagen y símbolo de liderazgo 

basado en el género. En suma, la actitud simbólica del ministro marcará mucho la relación 

político militar y por ende también en la forma de ejercer su autoridad. Respecto de los 

asesores del ministro de defensa, es conveniente formar dos equipos. Uno, destinado a asesorar sobre la coyuntura, y el otro equipo destinado a los estudios y temas de largo plazo, 

ojala ambos equipos bajo la misma dirección para que no se interrumpa la vinculación 

de las materias. Abajo del ministro, como sabemos, estarán los jefes de estado de mayor, 

comandantes militares o comandantes en jefe según sea el nombre que se les otorgue. Estas autoridades tendrán como responsabilidad pivotear hacia arriba con el límite inferior 
128 Security and Defense Studies Review

del ámbito estratégico que algunos denominan “estratégico militar” y hacia abajo con lo 

táctico. 

Un tema crucial para mantener la fluidez del liderazgo estratégico, son las buenas relaciones que debieran existir entre ministro de defensa y mandos militares. Es muy deseable 

que tengan una muy buena relación con el ministro de defensa, y que en ningún momento, 

a este último, se le niegue u oculte información, ya que en el sector defensa normalmente, 

toda la información va desde abajo hacia arriba. Esto ocurre, porque las FFAA tienen, en 

general, los mejores y más consolidados servicios de inteligencia en los países. Estos son 

desarrollados desde hace muchos años y con gente que tiene permanencia en la función, 

amén de que los que sirven en esos organismos participan en cursos en distintos momentos 

de su carrera, lo que les significa un buen nivel de preparación. Se suma a ellos la experiencia que se traspasan a través del tiempo. Por esta razón, los ministros están en una situación 

de desmedro informativo y lo normal, es que sea el mando militar, quien tenga mejor información que el ministro y sea él quien se la provea a la autoridad ministerial. Por esta razón, 

es que una relación basada en la confianza y credibilidad entre ministro y mando militar es 

fundamental. De todas maneras, el ejecutivo tiene las herramientas constitucionales para 

resolver una eventual desconfianza con algún mando militar, pero esto es excepcional. La 

experiencia nos dice que, incluso, ministros que asumieron con una predisposición muy 

negativa hacia las FFAA, terminan finalmente apoyándose en estas últimas.

Los circuitos serán básicamente, el canal principal o de los titulares, canal de viceministros, canal terciario y el canal de asesores. El canal principal, que es el más común y 

conocido, se plasma en la relación directa y vertical que va desde el Presidente, Ministro 

y mandos militares. Esta relación es normal y casi a diario entre los mandos militares y el 

ministro. El presidente en forma personal entrará intermitente en el circuito, pero su concepto y orientaciones se estarán comunicando mediante el ministro. Luego viene el canal 

de viceministros, que deberá funcionar regularmente y que integra a un nivel inmediatamente inferior al de ministros y jefes de estado o comandantes en jefes. Posteriormente, estará el canal terciario que integra al nivel inmediatamente inferior a los viceministros y que 

estará compuesto por un tercer nivel de dirección, y finalmente vendrá el canal de asesores 

que lo constituyen desde los asesores del nivel presidencial, ministerial y militar. De esta 

forma, los temas serán tratados en diferentes instancias con diferentes grados de profundidad y ópticas. Los comités o reuniones integradas con los diferentes niveles de jerarquía, 

no son tan útiles como esta instancia. No obstante, se pueden mantener dosificadamente. 

Con el tipo que se propone, creo que se mejora la asesoría, el tratamiento de las materias, 

la información y los temas son diseccionados en detalle. Por cierto, que estos circuitos que 

se proponen no son rígidos y pueden tener variaciones ya que deben ser estructurados dependiendo de cada realidad y de las orgánicas propias del país. Empero, la idea es que las 

materias se traten como quien va “pelando una cebolla.”

Habrán problemas, a mi juicio, que dificultan el circuito del liderazgo y estos son 

el factor confianza, el factor político-ideológico y el ensimismamiento militar. El factor 

confianza ha sido intensamente tratado en la temática de las relaciones políticos-militares, 

y se refiere básicamente a las divisiones que se producen entre políticos y militares, o bien 

solamente entre políticos por razones de luchas internas. El factor político es una división 

que tiene un carácter más ideológico y es bastante común que un ministro emplee como 

asesores a personal de confianza política y se refugie en ellos, aislándose del resto de la 

estructura formal. El ensimismamiento militar se produce cuando los miembros de las 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 129

instituciones armadas se aíslan de la estructura política y se retrotraen en la institución 

respectiva. Todos estos factores son negativos y hay que evitarlos de todas formas.

De vital importancia para el liderazgo estratégico, será la exigencia de consolidar un 

buen proceso de las coordinaciones y conexiones horizontales con otros ministerios. Este 

tipo de coordinaciones deberán cautelarse y evaluar si es que éstas están funcionando correctamente. Sin lugar a duda las mejores coordinaciones en un gobierno se dan cuando se 

comparten objetivos y propósitos por lo que es muy importante poner toda la inteligencia 

y voluntad en esta línea.

Formación del Liderazgo Estratégico

Una de las tareas que tiene particular trascendencia, es la formación de líderes para el sector y esa responsabilidad recae en los institutos de altos estudios de la defensa de los países, 

quienes tendrán la responsabilidad de dictar programas formativos en esta función. Como 

hemos visto, el liderazgo tiene dos facetas. Por un lado, es un atributo y por otro una serie 

de conocimientos técnicos que se pueden aprender, para que el liderazgo tenga un efecto 

mayor. Existen, además, medidas de coordinación y de formas de relación para establecer 

el sistema, que es necesario conocer. 

Es sin duda Clausewitz quien nos ilumina sobre un aspecto muy importante cual es el 

atributo para desempeñarse en el ámbito estratégico y poder ejercer un acertado liderazgo. 

Cuando el prusiano se refiere al arte de la guerra relaciona arte con juicio señalando que allí 

donde se traza la línea que divide lo que es producto del conocimiento comienza el juicio, 

es decir el arte. En consecuencia, hay personas que tendrán esta condición “artística” con 

la estrategia y habrá otros que no la tienen. Sin embargo, el conocimiento teórico les será 

útil a ambos. Respecto a esta condición innata o arte, no olvidemos a los ya mencionados 

“strategoi” griegos, que eran elegidos y no sorteados. Este atributo especial seria el “juicio 

estratégico” del que nos habla Clausewitz. 

Hay otra idea del autor de De la Guerra, que converge con la formación del juicio 

estratégico, y este es, el “coup d’oeil”, que no es otra cosa que “una inteligencia que aun en 

medio de la obscuridad más intensa, no deje de tener algunos vestigios de luz interior que 

conduzcan a la verdad”. Agregando, el notable pensador militar, que ese “coup d’oeil”, requiere del valor y determinación para seguir esa intuición o ese dictado de la inteligencia.14

Por ello, podemos afirmar que quien tiene el “coup de d’oeil” pero no la determinación (los 

franceses le llaman courage ‘desprit) es un proyecto de líder o un “líder esterilizado”. En 

suma, un ministro de defensa debe tener innato o poseer juicio estratégico y determinación, 

y además conocer el entorno estratégico que lo rodea y prever el horizonte estratégico que 

tendrá a futuro. (Ver Figura 3.) 

El Coronel Guillot, ya citado, describe la anatomía del líder estratégico. Esto significa, que para convertirse en un líder estratégico, se deberá recorrer un camino formativo, 

que va conciliando aprendizaje en el aula, experiencia de campo, e incluso, reflexión y 

lectura. En síntesis, Guillot parte valorando una base de valores y normas éticas que constituyen los cimientos. Esta base valórica es de la máxima trascendencia, porque a partir 

de ellos se diferencia un líder que tienda al bien y otro que tienda al mal. En este punto se 

diferencia, por ejemplo, un Stalin de un Gandhi. Aquí podemos hacer otro paralelo, por 

ejemplo, entre Konrad Adenauer y Fidel Castro. Mientras uno, recobró y desarrolló una 

nación, otro la retrasó. Mientras el primero entronizó las libertades y la democracia; el 

segundo, la suspendió. Mientras el primero reintegró a su país al concierto internacional, el 
130 Security and Defense Studies Review

otro lo aisló. Mientras el primero se retiró cuando lo consideró conveniente, el otro morirá 

ejerciendo cuotas de poder.

FIGURA 3

Luego de esta base valórica imprescindible, para el autor, se va adquiriendo experiencia y educación continua. Adicionalmente, vendrá el ejercicio de funciones de comando. A 

continuación vendrá la etapa de desarrollar destrezas de “reflexión estratégica”, que van en 

apoyo de un líder estratégico. Esto sería el trabajo de estado mayor en cuarteles generales 

para finalmente convertirse en líder estratégico previo mostrar su idoneidad.14

Resulta de particular importancia, identificar a los líderes desde jóvenes; tanto para la 

política, como para las FFAA. Las cualidades centrales o cardinales de un líder, en términos personales, serán en primer lugar, y como lo decía el Mariscal Louis Hubert Lyautey, 

como requisito para un comandante militar, es la alegría. Quien lidera con una sonrisa y 

con alegría genuina es alguien que expresa confianza en sí mismo, tranquilidad, felicidad 

de cumplir una tarea en la que cree. Otra cualidad, es la fortaleza o determinación ya descrita por Clausewitz, ya que sin ella no se puede pensar en dirigir. Hay otra cualidad muy 

relevante cual es la transparencia, virtud esencial ya que el subalterno siempre captará 

las emociones del que manda, quien no podrá ocultarlas todo el tiempo. Por ello, en los 

ámbitos militares se dice que se puede engañar a los jefes, pero jamás a los subordinados. 

Hay otra cualidad que va de la mano con la alegría ya citada y que es el entusiasmo. Lo 

menciono como una calidad especial, porque no basta con ser alegre o de tener un “alegre 

pesimismo”, se trata de tener entusiasmo de verdad, el que viene naturalmente de las capacidades que el mismo líder se reconoce. En estrecha relación con este último, encontramos la seguridad en sí mismo, que significa estar seguro cuando imparte la orden y no 

contradecirse. Sin embargo, debe tener flexibilidad para cambiar de decisión si la situación 

lo amerita, por ello el equilibrio emocional para advertir las situaciones es de particular 

trascendencia. Recordemos el cuadro que citamos entre líder, situación y liderandos. Esa 

triple interacción es fundamental. La seguridad en sí mismo requiere creer en sus propios 

proyectos y hacer suyo el proyecto que está liderando. Sobre el conocimiento, también 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 131

Clausewitz, le dedica estudio, ya que no se puede ejercer liderazgo, sin tener conocimiento 

de las materias que le compete. Esto puede suceder en el sector defensa, ya que no todos 

los ministros de defensa civiles tendrán conocimientos previos sobre defensa. 

Sin embargo, ellos deben rápidamente estudiar los temas de su ámbito y prescindir 

de perder tiempo en materias muy técnicas que corresponden al manejo de las propias instituciones armadas. No obstante, para elegir un ministro, aunque no tenga conocimiento, 

debería tener juicio estratégico y determinación. Eso es fundamental. Otra cualidad relevante, es la capacidad del líder para escuchar a la gente y darse cuenta cuáles son las diferentes sensibilidades existentes. Hay un aspecto que podría ser discutible, cual es estar apto 

física y mentalmente. No hay duda de que mentalmente si, pero lo físico es relativo a la 

capacidad mental y de proyección que tenga el líder político. Por ejemplo, el ex presidente 

Joaquín Antonio Balaguer de la República Dominicana, ejerció liderazgo político estando 

completamente ciego y frecuentemente decía “no estoy aquí para enhebrar agujas”. Sin 

embargo, el militar por imperativo de su función debe estar apto físicamente. Un general 

obeso da una primera impresión bastante negativa, ya que proyecta la imagen de estar 

inhabilitado para las tareas propias de su profesión. Finalmente, hay una condición que es 

muy difícil de explicar pero en el mundo de los seres humanos donde hay espacios donde la 

razón no lo explica es todo, resulta muy valorado. Esto es, estar en posesión de una buena 

suerte. Para mí, esta condición no es azar sino que la vinculo con cuidar los detalles. Hay 

una simple historia que ejemplifica esto. Se dice que Oliverio Cromwell una noche que 

llovía intensamente les requirió a sus tropas. “Cuiden que no se moje la pólvora esta noche, 

para que tengamos suerte mañana.”

Las fallas de un líder son las opuestas a las capacidades que vimos en el párrafo anterior. Para mi modo de ver, la más grave es la vanidad. Esta es particularmente grave ya que 

a través, o movido por ella, se pueden cometer todos los errores posibles. No en vano fue el 

colofón final de esa notable película llamada El abogado diablo, cuando el actor Al Pacino, 

que interpreta al demonio encarnado en un ser humano, al observar a un joven abogado con 

arrestos de vanidad, sentencia: “La vanidad... mi pecado favorito”. Otras fallas son, el personalismo y la poca inclinación a trabajar en equipos. Siempre el equipo será mejor que la 

individualidad. Asimismo, la ambición desmedida que acarrea que todos los proyectos por 

importantes que sean se subordinen al interés personal. También, la inflexibilidad y rigidez 

en la toma de decisiones son otras debilidades que merman el liderazgo. Por último, la 

ignorancia en las materias que se deben conocer y la visión corta respecto a los escenarios 

son absolutamente indeseables.

Para elaborar un programa de enseñanza de liderazgo orientado al ámbito estratégico, he elaborado este cuadro que permite colocar en consideración tres momentos para 

expresar óptimamente las capacidades del liderazgo estratégico. El primero se refiere a lo 

innato, el atributo deseable o la base del juicio estratégico como requisito básico para ser 

seleccionado. En segundo término lo que se requiere recibir en un programa educativo de 

liderazgo y en tercer término lo que se espera del líder en el sistema estratégico o sea los 

objetivos del curso. (Ver Figura 4.)
132 Security and Defense Studies Review

FIGURA 4

ATRIBUTO DESARROLLAR ACCIÓN

Poseer valores y conocimientos 

generales

Mirada prospectiva Construir futuro

Visión o Juicio Estratégico Conocer los conceptos sobre 

Estrategia

Diseñar “la” estrategia y accionar, basándose en esta

Sensible a la historia Conocer el Marco de Referencia Conciliar tradición y futuro

Mente abierta a complejidades 

de los procesos

Estudiar el escenario general y 

específico

Accionar teniendo en cuenta las 

coyunturas políticas

Liderazgo efectivo o determinaciónConceptos teóricos y Prepararse 

para el liderazgo

Capaz de resolver bien, contando con apoyo y adhesiones

Prudencia Sociología de las organizaciones

Conocer la cultura organizacional

Representar la organización

Capaz de contextualizar Percibir las grandes tendencias en 

el mundo

Accionar basado en las situación Nacional e Internacional

La explicación a este gráfico es la siguiente:

• El primer atributo, o sea lo que se debe poseer para ser un líder apropiado, esto es 

valores positivos tendientes al bien. Esta es la base fundamental y a partir de ello se 

pueden entregar conocimientos de prospectiva y pensamiento crítico que le permitan 

en su gestión construir futuro. La selección del futuro líder debe hacerse no solamente 

porque demuestra condiciones para dirigir sino que tan importante como eso, es que 

sea buena persona.

• Lo innato es la capacidad de poseer buen juicio estratégico, esto es que logra distinguir 

lo importante de lo secundario. Ya con ello, se trata de impartirle los conocimientos de 

que es la estrategia, como se hace una estrategia y a moverse en los ámbitos de la política y estrategia. Esto significa estudiar ciencia política también. Se espera que a futuro 

el líder sea capaz de diseñar estrategias y basarse en estas para actuar.

• Ser sensible a la historia. Este es una base deseable ya que permite entender las épocas. 

Por ello, la sociología clásica se apoya en la historia. En el curso conocer los paradigmas donde se enmarcan los cambios sociales y la evolución de las sociedades. El objetivo es que pueda conciliar tradición con futuro. En este punto replico una frase del 

General Eric Shinseki (ex Jefe de Estado Mayor del Ejército de EEUU): “El principal 

deber de un General es saber administrar transiciones” Yo amplio la frase que para al 

político también. 

• Mente abierta capaz de entender las complejidades de la vida humana. O sea, ser 

inteligente. La estrategia es para gente inteligente y esto lo decían los griegos cinco 

siglos antes de Jesucristo. Esto permite estudiar y reflexionar en mejor manera acerca 

de de los escenarios generales y específicos siendo el objetivo siempre accionar conciliando la factibilidad de lo propuesto con la coyuntura. Esto significa un grado de 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 133

pragmatismo correcto.

• Como lo exige Clausewitz, tener determinación o liderazgo efectivo. Con ello dotarlo en el curso de todos los temas modernos respecto a liderazgo, teniendo como 

objetivo, mejores tomas de decisiones y además que sean apoyadas por quienes las 

reciben.

• La virtud de la prudencia será base para una mejor interpretación de la organización, 

conociendo la cultura organizacional y así quedar en condiciones de asumir la representatividad organizacional que se espera del líder. 

• Con innata capacidad de contextualizar. Dotarlo del conocimiento sobre las grandes 

tendencias internacionales. El objetivo será que su accionar siempre tome en consideración estas variables.

Palabras Finales

Al entregar esta articulo al conocimiento y escrutinio de los lectores, quisiera reafirmar 

algunas ideas. La primera idea es que la estrategia, como herramienta que fija una carta de 

navegación a los países, resulta fundamental para los estados y no hay razón para renunciar 

a ésta por el solo hecho de ser un país pequeño. La estrategia es un rumbo, es claridad de 

objetivos, es forma de lograrlos y es uso racional de los instrumentos. No es necesario ser 

una potencial mundial para tener una estrategia. 

La segunda idea, es la necesidad de establecer la dirección o conducción estratégica 

como un sistema de liderazgo en que todas las partes tengan participación y que obedezca 

a la lógica de la autoridad racional legal propia de la democracia. Este liderazgo debe 

enhebrar desde la gestión del presidente a través de la cadena jerárquica del ministerio de 

defensa y hacia las fuerzas. La gran tarea futura es consolidar una vinculación más funcional y expedita entre los ministerios de defensa y relaciones exteriores. Los próximos libros 

de defensa deberían cubrir ambos ministerios.

La tercera idea es que la comunicación estratégica debe ser preparada y permanente. 

No es posible desarrollar un liderazgo de este carácter si no se posee el control de la comunicación estratégica. Este control no es solamente “que decir” sino “que” y “cuando” 

decirlo. Sin perder de vista que una misma noticia puede ser positiva si es oportuna y muy 

negativa si es tardía. 

Al cierre, quiero traer a colación una frase muy acertada del General Martin Dempsey 

(US Army), quien era Comandante del Comando de Entrenamiento y Doctrina cuando expresa: “El líder debe ser capaz de influir en la conducta de las organizaciones.” Esto último 

significa que deberá saber en qué momento colocar los ritmos y énfasis de su gestion.

Notas

1

 Ver en Weber, Max, Economía y Sociedad, (Berkeley, CA): University of California 

Press, 1978. 

2

 Se recomienda de Finley, M.I., Politics in the Ancient World, (Cambridge, UK): Cambridge University Press, 1993.

3

 Beaufre, Andre, Introducción a la Estrategia, Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 
134 Security and Defense Studies Review

páginas 28 y sigtes.

4

 Ver Admiral Michael Mullen, “Strategic communication: getting back to basics” Joint 

Force Quarterly, issue 55, 4th Quarter 2009, y David Barno, Military Adaptation in Complex Operations, NDU Journal Prism, Vol I, Num 1, 12/2009.

5

 Hughes, R., Ginett, R., y Curphy, G., Leadershi, (Los Angeles) Times Mirror Higher 

education Group, 2 Ed, 1996.

6

 Ibidem pag 74-75.

7

 Se recomienda Porter, Michael, en The Competitive Advantage of the Nations, (New 

York, NY), The Free Press, 1990, y Sánchez Benítez Sergio en “La Comunicación Estratégica como Política Publica,” en Documento de Opinión Vol. 21; no. 011.

8

 Guillot, Michael, “Liderazgo Estratégico,” Air & Space Power Journal, Trimestre, 2004.

9

 Garcia Covarrubias, Jaime, Documento de trabajo, Ceppro, Asuncion (Paraguay) 1999. 

Documentos de clases en Estrategia y Política de Defensa (CHDS) 2003. 

10 En EEUU se marca una diferencia entre Disuasion y Deterrence. La primera es cuando 

la política exterior actúa en primer lugar y la segunda es cuando las capacidades militares 

relevan a la política exterior. 

11 Hay países en la región como Paraguay y Nicaragua donde el ministro no está en la cadena de mando.

12 Esto fue destacado por la prensa con motivo de una visita inspectiva del Ministro Andrés 

Allamand. 

13 Clausewitz, Karl, De la Guerra. Ver cap III. “El Genio de la Guerra.”

14 Guillot, op. cit., pp 8-10.
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 135

Sangre Joven?

Understanding the New Wave of Armed Groups 

in Latin America

W. Alejandro Sánchez

ABSTRACT

Latin America continues to be a breeding ground for violent groups, as exemplified 

by the rise of drug cartels in Mexico and narcoterrorist organizations such as the 

Colombian FARC and the Peruvian Shining Path. A question that has not yet been 

properly addressed, however, is whether there is the possibility that ideologically 

oriented violent groups, like the Paraguayan EPP or the Mexican EPR, will 

rise again. This article provides a general review of the security situation in the 

region, focusing on violent armed groups and discussing to what extent they may 

have a political ideology.

The Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo (Paraguayan People’s Army, or EPP), not to mention 

some of its most aggressive operations, has become increasingly well known in recent 

months, following a string of relatively high-profile kidnappings in the landlocked South 

American country of Paraguay. Though incidents regarding armed EPP members and declarations of the organization’s mission continue to gain media coverage, it is necessary 

to put the EPP in the proper regional security context. Indeed, the existence of the EPP 

presents a fascinating case, as it is arguably one of the few ideologically oriented insurgent 

groups to appear in Latin America since the end of the Cold War. Other such organizations 

include the Mexican Ejército Popular Revolucionario (Popular Revolutionary Army, or 

EPR) and, also arguably, the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista National 

Liberation Army, or EZLN). 

One goal of this article is to provide a general overview on the current status of different violent groups in Latin America, commonly labeled “terrorist.” Besides the aforementioned groups, three violent movements, remnants from the Cold War, continue to operate: 

the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, or SL); the Colombian Fuerzas Armadas 

Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC); and 

the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN). 

The second goal is to highlight the problems of defining an ideologically oriented 

violent group, as the six aforementioned groups are commonly labeled. To what degree do 

these armed movements remain faithful to the ideological roots they have publicly claimed 

to adamantly support? Furthermore, given the fact that several of these groups are criticized today for their ties to drug trafficking, can any credibility be given to the new wave 

of insurgent movements? In addition, should narco-insurgent groups like the FARC and 

Shining Path, as well as possibly the EPP, be placed in a different category from drug trafficking organizations, like the Mexican cartels, or international criminal gangs in Central 

America, like Mara Salvatrucha, since the former claim to have a political ideology/goals? 

Latin America continues to be considered a breeding ground for violent organizations 

to take root, just as they did 40 years ago (more or less, depending on the country), when 
136 Security and Defense Studies Review

the region began a period of ideologically oriented violence. Poverty, indifferent political 

leaders, corruption, and various other factors were major catalysts that brought about the 

rise of ideologically oriented organizations. Unfortunately, such factors continue to exist. 

Thus, the question regarding the future of internal security in Latin America, when considering the rise of violent groups like Paraguayan EPP, becomes, “Are ideologically minded 

insurgent groups making a comeback?” 

The Problem of Defining Violent Groups

One of the initial issues we face is defining what qualifies a violent movement as “terrorist,” particularly when referring to the organizations that are currently operating in Latin 

America. In his April 2009 article entitled “Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism: Beyond 

Orthodox Terrorism Theory: A Critical Research Agenda,” in Global Society, Jason Franks 

combines the ideas of different scholars by stating that “terrorism is thus defined (relative 

to the legitimacy of state governance) as an illegal and illegitimate act or as a specific 

method of political violence against the state, such as hijacking or bombing or as acts of 

violence against civilians protected by the state.” Franks goes on to argue that, in some 

circles, the study of terrorism has become preoccupied with explaining what actually constitutes terrorism, how it functions, and how to counter it, failing to examine why it actually occurs. Finally, Franks says, “the intention of the terrorists (according to orthodox 

terrorism theory) is to undermine the security of the population by demonstrating that the 

state is unable to provide adequate protection and therefore force the population to turn to 

alternative sources such as the instigators of the terrorist violence to provide security and 

alternative governance.”

The transition from “criminal” to “terrorist” organization highlights another important issue when it comes to actually labeling such groups. Names like “guerrillas,” “subversives,” “rebels,” and “insurgents,” have also been used by the Latin American politicians, 

specialists, and the general media over the years to define groups like Shining Path, the 

FARC, and ELN, among others. It is only now, when the remaining historical aforementioned groups have become involved in drug trafficking, that the label “narcoterrorist”

seems to be more commonly used. Is there a difference between a group that is a “rebel” or 

“insurgent” versus one that is a “terrorist”? Or are these all just similar adjectives? A key 

part of defining terrorism seems to be that terrorists will carry out attacks against civilians 

as part of their overall strategy. Meanwhile, the term “insurgent” is defined as “a person 

fighting against a government or invading force; a rebel or revolutionary.” The word has 

its origins in French from the verb insurgere, which means to arise (in-into, toward; surgere–to rise). Meanwhile, Hughes defines insurgency as “an internal conflict waged by an 

armed group using a combination of means—including guerrilla warfare, terrorism, civil 

disobedience, and political agitation—to secede from a state, to overthrow its government, 

or to resist foreign occupation.” Does this mean that if a violent group does not engage in 

terror tactics (namely, attacking civilians), but does attack state installations and military 

forces, it is then not classified as a terrorist group? Is this the key difference between insurgencies and terrorist groups? 

How to Label Whom?

The Mexican EZLN generally does not fit the definition of a terrorist organization, since it 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 137

has not engaged in an indiscriminate murder of nonhostile targets, nor does it have as a goal 

to overthrow the Mexican government. Furthermore, the group is fairly popular among the 

Mexican population (though probably not at the level it enjoyed in the 1990s), because it 

is an indigenous group that stands up to the central government. This article will not deal 

with how popularity among the masses affects how an insurgent group is defined, though it 

is a topic that should be kept in mind for further studies. Another Mexican group, the EPR, 

has staged explosions against oil and gas facilities, but it has not specifically targeted civilians. When it comes to the Paraguayan EPP, the terms usually associated with them are of 

subversivos or criminals. Meanwhile, the Colombian FARC and ELN are usually referred 

to as “guerrilla” or “insurgent” groups rather than terrorists. Finally, members of Shining 

Path were originally referred to as criminals, and later as terrorists. At no time did the Peruvian government or security forces appear to have considered labeling Shining Path (or 

the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru, or Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement 

[MRTA], the other Peruvian terrorist group that operated in the 1980s and most of the 

1990s) as an “insurgent” or “rebel” group. Rather, the terminology used to describe these 

organizations morphed from “criminal” to “terrorist organizations,” which, from Lima’s 

point of view, meant that it afforded no legitimacy to either group.

In addition, there is the case of former Colombian paramilitaries: It has been recently reported that these former paramilitary gangs carried out more attacks than either the 

FARC or ELN in 2010. In addition, they control up to 50 percent of drug trafficking in the 

country. Such gangs include the Rastrojos, with 1,849 members, the Urabenos (1,292), and 

the Erpac (Colombian Popular Anti-Communist Army, with 690 members). Besides drug 

trafficking, such groups also carry out criminal actions such as extortion and kidnapping 

for ransom. Nevertheless, such groups continue to be labeled “paramilitary” since their 

members appear to be mostly former members of the AUC (the paramilitary Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) or, at worst, criminals. Does the fact that they have not carried 

out attacks against the Colombian military (if anything the two are suspected of mutual 

cooperation against the FARC) mean that it would be incorrect to label them “terrorists,” 

even though they are involved in drug trafficking and have carried out attacks against the 

civilian population?

At the time of this writing, there are interesting ongoing developments in the U.S. 

government vis-à-vis Mexican drug cartels. Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas) has introduced legislation in the U.S. Congress that would designate several Mexican drug cartels 

as foreign terrorist organizations, including Los Zetas, La Familia Michoacana, and the 

Arellano Feliz Organization. A major reason for McCaul’s initiative is that if these cartels 

are officially labeled “terrorist,” then their members can receive up to 15 additional years 

of prison time if they are captured and convicted while in the United States. The American 

politician has explained that while these cartels are not driven by an ideology as other terrorist groups are, they are “using similar tactics to gain political and economic influence,” 

relying on “kidnappings, political assassinations, attacks on civilian and military targets, 

taking over cities, and even putting up checkpoints in order to control territory and institutions.” Nevertheless, a relabeling of what constitutes a “terrorist” organization in order 

to impose harsher prison terms does have implications. Senator John Cornyn (R- Texas) 

argues, “cartels are in it for one thing—money.... to me, we need to be clear about what is 

happening in Mexico. We have got to be careful about the label because sometimes those 

labels can create misleading impressions.” Therefore, if the Zetas are eventually labeled 
138 Security and Defense Studies Review

“terrorists” by Washington, will the Mara Salvatruchas soon follow? What is the detriment to theoretically combining the Zetas, the Maras, and the FARC in the same “bag” of 

violent organizations? With the creation of the term “narcoterrorism,” it would appear that 

the definition of terrorism is a living entity that has to continue to evolve with ongoing 

developments.

In order to avoid some of the issues regarding what constitutes terrorism, I will mostly use the term “insurgent groups” to label the EPP, EZLN, and the EPR, as well as the 

ELN, FARC, and Shining Path. The decision for this is that the term “terrorist” cannot 

be applied equally to all the aforementioned organizations. In addition, using terms like 

“terrorist,” “narcoterrorist”, and “insurgent” as synonyms does not appear to be accurate, 

even though other analysts tend to do this. Key differences, at least at the theoretical level, 

appear to exist between them. Due to time and space constraints, not to mention that this 

isn’t one of the goals of this piece, I will not go into an in-depth analysis of the differences 

between the previously mentioned terms used for violent organizations in Latin America. 

Nevertheless, it is understood that other scholars, government officials, and members of security forces that have encountered such groups—not to mention sympathizers or victims 

(or families thereof)—may describe them very differently, most likely in harsher terms.

The Remaining Guard of the Original Terror Groups 

Three violent organizations dating to Cold War–era times have continued to operate in 

spite of massive military operations against them. All of them have continued, at least publicly, to espouse their leftist ideology while mutating into organizations that traffic drugs 

to finance their existence. It is therefore debatable how loyal these organizations remain to 

the goals that originally brought about their creation.

Sendero Luminoso—SL (Peru). Sendero Luminoso is known for committing violent acts 

in public. For example, in 1980, in what is regarded as the unofficial start of the war, senderistas burned ballot boxes in the town of Chuschi, in the Ayacucho region. Despite the 

capture of the group’s leader, Abimael Guzmán, and major Peruvian military offensives, 

Sendero continued to operate. Upon his 1992 capture and subsequent interrogations and 

meetings with Vladimiro Montesinos, the intelligence czar of dictator Alberto Fujimori, 

Guzmán signed an agreement in which he ordered Sendero to lay down its weapons and 

cease fighting. Nevertheless, a faction of Sendero has refused to recognize the agreement, 

dubbing itself Proseguir (Onwards) and continuing the armed struggle against Peru’s security forces. For some time, Sendero’s major leader was Oscar Ramírez Durand, “camarada

Feliciano.” 

The group’s current leaders are “camarada Artemio” and “camarada Alipio,” among 

others. Proseguir’s area of operations is limited to the VRAE area (Apurimac and Ene 

River’s Valley) in Peru’s Amazon. However, they have managed to keep Peruvian military 

operatives from capturing or eliminating them. In September 2009, senderistas shot down 

an Mi-17 helicopter in the Sinaycocha area around the VRAE, killing three Peruvian Air 

Force personnel. The attack was carried out by troops led by Sendero’s Victor Quispe Palomino (“camarada Jose”). 

Sendero’s current strength is thought to be around 200 troops. The remaining forces 

have aligned themselves with drug groups, or have begun producing illicit substances (particularly cocaine) on their own, as a way of financing their new operations. Sendero, in its 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 139

new form, is labeled a “narcoterrorist” organization. Arrests and interviews of major Shining Path members in the last couple of years seem confirm this allegation. For example, in 

a late 2010 interview, a captured Edgar Mejia Asencia, “camarada Izula,” explained that 

Shining Path produces at least five tons of cocaine a year in order to survive, at a rate of 

roughly 800 kilograms every two months. The captured insurgent said that, according to 

his personal knowledge, Shining Path has been involved in the drug trade since 2004. Nevertheless, Shining Path occasionally carries out attacks in order to make statements that it 

still is fighting an ideological war against the state. In early May 2011, a civilian was found 

dead in a small town in the Andean region of Huanuco. He had been tied up and shot in the 

head, execution style. In addition, two large pieces of paper were found on the body that 

portrayed the images of the hammer and sickle, as well as a message that said, “This is how 

snitches die, criminals that take the name of the party [Shining Path].”

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—FARC (Colombia). The FARC is the 

bigger of the two guerrilla groups that remain in Colombia and, arguably, the deadliest. In 

February 2009, reports emerged that the FARC had killed at least 17 members of the indigenous tribe Awa in the state of Nario, including two minors. Human Rights Watch said 

in a statement that the FARC’s actions show “its utter disregard for the lives of civilians 

and refusal to respect the most basic tenets of humanitarian law.” The FARC admitted to 

executing eight indigenous people by stating that, “given their responsibility in the deaths 

of several guerrillas and their undeniable acts of participation in this conflict, they were 

executed.” Another nonmilitary target was Luis Francisco Cuellar, a provincial governor 

of Caquetá (south of Colombia), who was kidnapped and killed by FARC insurgents in 

January 2010. According to the FARC, he was guilty of corruption and paramilitary ties. 

More recently, in September 2010, FARC rebels used gas canisters stuffed with explosives 

to attack a police station. Eight Colombian police officers were killed as a result of the 

explosions in their offices in San Miguel, in the country’s southern region of Putumayo. 

However, the group was dealt a heavy blow in September 2010 when one of its major leaders, Víctor Julio Suárez Rojas, known as “Mono Jojoy,” was killed. 

Like Shining Path, the FARC employs occasional declarations in order to try to give 

its actions and existence some justification. In September 2010, the Colombian insurgent 

group released a press release in which it justified its action to “injustice, displacement and 

exile, hoarding land and riches, drug gangs and paramilitary co-governing, impunity, corruption, extreme poverty, lack of guarantees to participate politically through peaceful and 

democratic means” in the country. Even more, the FARC argued that its governing body, 

the National Secretariat, has “always deplored violence and instead have advocated and 

proposed dialogue and peace.”

Ejército de Liberación Nacional—ELN (Colombia). In the Manifiesto De Simacota by 

the ELN July of 1965, the movement explains the reasons for their struggle and the goals 

they hold for Colombia. According to the manifesto, the ELN wants to seize power for the 

clases populares (popular classes) and install a democratic government that can free the 

country from “international monopolies and the oligarquía criolla (criollo is a term used 

to denote light-skinned Latinos). The manifesto also states the desire for an agrarian revolution that would redistribute the land justly to those who work the land. The manifesto 

goes on to describe additional goals that the ELN seeks for Colombia, including a national 
140 Security and Defense Studies Review

health plan and education reform, among others. In a December 2010 communiqué, the 

ELN stated its plan to empower people to construct el poder popular (people’s power). The 

ELN insists on unity for the struggle toward building socialism in Colombia, as well as the 

desire to work toward peace in Latin America to “multiply the Latin American dream of 

Bolívar, Martí, and Ché [Guevara] and many other heroes and revolutionaries who offered 

their life for the people.” With regard to drug trafficking, the ELN has been steadfast in 

declaring that it is not involved in such. In fact, in a December 2009 statement, ELN Commander “Antonio García” denied any such allegation.

The group is the smaller of the two remaining guerrilla movements in Colombia, 

though its size has not made it any less deadly in recent years. It is currently composed of 

approximately 4,000 to 4,500 troops. Some recent ELN operations include such violent 

acts as assassinations. In December of 2008, five civilians were killed when they were fired 

upon in their vehicles. “We accuse ELN members of this murder, since one of the dead was 

a former member of this group...and we are investigating to find out the true motives of this 

massacre,” said Luis Ortiz, police commander from Arauca province. 

However, as of mid-2011, the ELN appeared to be on the losing side of the war 

against the government, with numerous desertions plaguing the group (18 surrendered in 

December 2008 alone). There have also been attempts at ELN-Bogotá peace talks (the government was represented by High Commissioner for Peace Luis Carlos Restrepo), dating 

back to 2005, sometimes with Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez as a mediator, but they 

have made little or no progress. 

Nevertheless, it should be stated that despite the lack of troop numbers, the ELN has 

not shied away from attacking the Colombian army, as exemplified by a June 2009 ambush 

in Bolivar province, where two soldiers were killed and five were injured. Likewise, the 

Colombian police force is a normal target of the insurgents. In December 2008, police officers in Arauca province were ambushed with a remote-controlled bomb and gunfire from 

suspected ELN troops. Eight police officers were killed in the attack. 

The New Wave?

A small number of new insurgent organizations have appeared since the early- to mid1990s. While not as destructive as the Central American wars in the 1980s, or Shining Path 

or the FARC at the height of their power, these groups have carried out a number of significant operations against their local governments, targeting government officials, security 

forces, and infrastructure. 

Ejército Popular Paraguayo—EPP (Paraguay). The Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo (Paraguayan People’s Army) is beginning to become a household name. For the moment, it 

has focused its operations on kidnapping wealthy Paraguayans and demanding ransom for 

their return. One of the latest victims was Fidel Zavala, who was held captive for 94 days 

and finally freed on January 17, 2010. Unfortunately, as the history of guerrilla movements 

seems to show, there is ample room for “growth” when it comes to their potential activities.

For the moment, the EPP presents itself as an obscure guerrilla movement. According to Jane’s Defense, its origins date to 1992, when a group of trainee priests, who had 

been expelled from a Catholic seminary for their radical political views, established the 

Movimiento Monseñor Romero with the aim of plotting a socialist revolution. For the Paraguayan daily ABC, the EPP is a group composed of criminals accused of murdering police 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 141

officials and attacking police and military outposts. According to the news service, the EPP 

was created in 2005, after the murder of Cecilia Cubas, the daughter of a former Paraguayan president. Meanwhile, the EPP argues that it is a group made up of peasant communities 

armed to fight. It denies Asuncion’s accusations that it is a group of criminals or has any 

affiliation with criminal organizations like the Colombian FARC. 

Carmen Villalba, a self-declared spokeswoman of the EPP, has stated that the group’s 

support comes from “el pueblo paraguayo, del sector popular, de gente que eternamente 

fue burlada, discriminada, pisoteada” (“the Paraguayan people, the people who eternally 

feel that they have been ridiculed, discriminated against and stepped on”). According to reports, the EPP is influenced by “Ché” Guevara and Regis Debray, as well as national heroes 

such as Mariscal Francisco Solano López. Other reports, particularly media declarations by 

former hostage Fidel Zavala, point out that the EPP also looks up to Cuba’s Fidel Castro, 

Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, and Karl Marx. 

 Even though the EPP seems to follow Marxist-Leninist ideology, prominent individuals such as Luis Casabianca, leader of the Paraguayan Communist Party, have condemned 

the Zavala kidnapping. The Paraguayan has stated that the EPP “no es revolucionario, sino 

terrorista” (“is not revolutionary, rather, terrorist”). It is interesting that Casabianca, who in 

the 1960s was part of the guerrilla group called the Frente Unido de Liberación Nacional

(Fulna), today stands apart from the EPP.

Discussions will continue to assess whether the EPP is a criminal band or a real guerrilla group with a concrete political ideology born out of the extreme poverty for which 

Paraguay is known. If it proves to be the latter, the EPP would represent a fascinating 

case, as it would arguably be the first ideologically oriented guerrilla movement that has 

emerged in the region since the end of the Cold War. On September 21, 2010, President 

Lugo allegedly received a threatening letter from the EPP, calling him a “walking cadaver” 

and calling Minister of the Interior Rafael Filizzola and his wife, Congresswoman Desire 

Masi, “oligarch bullies” and “money wasters.” Such terminology has reminded specialists 

of statements made by groups like Shining Path and the FARC during their heyday in the 

1980s.

The future of the EPP will depend on how President Fernando Lugo, a former Roman 

Catholic bishop, chooses to act. Will the president allow for a military offensive, including 

search-and-destroy missions, against the EPP should its activities continue? Will Lugo’s 

religious background affect his decisions? Apparently not. In January 2010, six peasant 

leaders were detained by the country’s security forces and accused of being EPP members 

and involved in the 2008 Luis Alberto Lindstrom kidnapping, despite claims from human 

rights activists that there was no concrete evidence against them. Then, in late April 2010, 

the Paraguayan leader ordered the deployment of 3,300 troops of the Paraguayan army, 

navy, and air force, as well as 300 police officers, to the northern provinces of Concepción, San Pedro, Amambay, Presidente Hayes, and Alto Paraguay to crack down on the 

insurgents. Political opposition groups, as well as civil society organizations, have since 

condemned these events. However, such military operations against the EPP have yet to 

disband the insurgent group.

Ejército Popular Revolucionario—EPR (Mexico). In June 1994, two years prior to their 

first public appearance, the EPR originated as a popular revolutionary army through a 

communiqué. The EPR described itself as representing the interests of the poor, as well 
142 Security and Defense Studies Review

as working under one strategy to confront and destroy the power of the bourgeoisie. According to the statement, the EPR declared itself a revolutionary organization because it 

chooses to serve the interests and the historical goals of the proletariat. In the declaration, 

the EPR also ordered the “defeat of every imperialistic interventionist attempt” as part 

of its fundamental goals in order to obtain what the EPR refers to as the main historical 

objectives of the proletariat. These objectives include: seizing political power in Mexico, 

constructing socialism, and establishing a so-called dictatorship of the proletariat. The EPR 

is defined as Marxist-Leninist and advocates a Socialist uprising. As of January 24, 2011, a 

new statement by the EPR denies being an extreme leftist group and claims that the social, 

political, and economic inequalities in the country are the driving forces for their professed 

struggle. 

The group officially announced its existence on June 28, 1996, at the one-year anniversary memorial of the Aguas Blancas Massacre, in Aguas Blancas, Guerrero. The group 

has carried out a relatively low number of military operations, but this does not make them 

any less lethal. In the summer of 1996, the EPR conducted several attacks against Mexican 

soldiers and police, killing or wounding several, including some civilians. In late August 

1996, a coordinated multi-state attack hit army, police, and government targets in Oaxaca, 

Guerrero, Puebla, and the Federal District, killing 18 and wounding more than two dozen 

people. Guerrilla forces also blocked roads in Chiapas to distribute pamphlets, and they 

seized a radio station in Tabasco.

In November 2006, Joel Ortega, the Federal District’s Secretary of Public Security, 

said the 2004 beating and burning to death of two federal police officers by a mob of residents in the Tláhuac district may have been planned by the EPR. He also said he would not 

rule out the possibility that the EPR was involved in other major unsolved crimes, including a bank heist in early October 2006. The thieves made off with an estimated 231 million 

pesos after boring a hole into a Banamex branch in the small town of Tecamachalco.

But it was between the months of July and September of 2007 that EPR carried out its 

most ambitious attacks to date. During this time, the guerrilla group claimed responsibility 

for several blasts on PEMEX oil facilities. In September of that year, explosions occurred 

in oil facilities in both Veracruz and Tlaxcala. Although state oil firm Petroleos Mexicanos

said the attacks did not result in any casualties, some 2,000 businesses in 10 states went 

without power at a cost of about $100 million per day. In May 2010, the EPR was accused of being involved in the kidnapping of a prominent Mexican political figure, Diego 

Fernández de Ceballos, a friend of Mexican President Felipe Calderón and former leader 

of Mexico’s National Action Party. The EPR repeatedly denied any involvement, and de 

Ceballos was freed in December 2010 following the payment of a ransom by his family 

(estimated at around $20 million).

Though the international media has largely focused its attention on the Mexican cartels—the EPR remains an interesting organization that has proven successful in carrying 

out attacks, though only sporadically. 

Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional—EZLN (Mexico). In the Declaration of the 

Lacandon Jungle of 1993, which the EZLN refers to as their declaration of war, the organization included the defeat of the Mexican Federation’s army as one of their goals. The 

EZLN expressed the desire—allowing the newly liberated population to elect freely and 

democratically their own authorities. In the declaration, the EZLN demands the termina-
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 143

tion of the looting of natural riches found in the areas controlled by the organization. The 

insurgent group goes on to ask the Mexican people for support in the struggle for work, 

land, education, justice, democracy, and respect for native rights, among other things. The 

EZLN, a barely armed indigenous guerrilla group, staged their armed uprising in the state 

of Oaxaca in January 1994. Their leader is known as Sub Comandante Marcos (bringing 

about the myth that there was a “commander,” a leader above Marcos) who currently continues to govern a group of villages in the southern state of Chiapas.

The goal of the Marxist-Leninist group is to bring autonomous control to the indigenous people of Chiapas, though not necessarily to overthrow the Mexican government. In 

a June 2005 communiqué and Sixth Declaration of the Lacandona Jungle, the EZLN stated 

its decision to listen to the Mexican populace, deciding to cease fire and no longer engage 

in attacks against the Mexican military or other opposing military movements. Despite 

choosing a pacifist means toward its struggle, the EZLN maintains, in that same statement, 

its obligation to the struggle. It also poses its desire for a new constitution that recognizes 

the “rights and liberties of the people and defends the weak in front of the mighty.” 

The government has carried out a two-pronged approach of crackdown operations 

and negotiations to deal with Marcos and the EZLN. One of the bloodiest examples of 

operations against the EZLN was the December 1997 massacre, in which 45 members of 

the Tzotzil indigenous community were murdered. Mexican paramilitaries are accused of 

having carried out the attack, though accounts differ as to whether the government and/or 

military knew about or authorized the operation. Reported operations by the EZLN have 

been fairly low key in recent years. In September 2010, the Mexican daily Cuarto Poder

reported that EZLN members blocked the Panamerican highway (in the Comitán-San Cristobal area). An indigenous protester said that the move was to protest the deployment of 

paramilitary troops to the region and accused the troops of torture. Even though the EZLN 

has lost momentum when it comes to being in the national spotlight, it remains a powerhouse within Oaxaca, with Marcos still free.

Other Groups. Finally, there are a number of armed groups that have either made statements or carried out some operations, but not enough is known of them to understand their 

ideology, origins, membership, and goals. In early 2009, a new rebel group appeared in 

northern Mexico, calling itself the Movimiento Armado del Norte (Armed Movement of 

the North) and railing against ”the aggressions of foreign capital” and “the abuse and injustices of the current government,” according to February 2009 article in The Dallas Morning News. Nevertheless, aside from a couple of communiqués, the group has been silent 

and has not yet been attributed with any major operations, much less a reported political 

ideology. Another shadow Mexican group is called the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 

del Pueblo (People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces). Other groups elsewhere in the region 

include the Frente Bolivariano de Liberación (Bolivarian Liberation Front), the Ejercito 

del Pueblo en Armas (Army of the People in Arms), and Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da

Capital (First Command of the Capital). The website Centro de Documentación de los 

Movimientos Armados (Armed Movements Documentation Centre) is known for its publication of declarations and communiqués by Latin American armed movements. However, 

some groups are fairly unknown and it remains unclear as to whether they have carried 

out any attacks or if their cadres are simply made up of a few radical individuals, but not 

necessarily violent. Another argument is that some of these groups are simply facades for 
144 Security and Defense Studies Review

criminal organizations that are trying to use political rhetoric in order to justify their illegal 

operations.

Inter-insurgent Cooperation? 

A final point has to do with support between these insurgent organizations. Discussing the 

ties between terrorist groups or speculating on state support for terrorist organizations is 

difficult, in part because citing reliable examples is complicated. Does a common ideology 

and situation (i.e., being an insurgent movement fighting a government) create some common bond among insurgent organizations like the EPR, EPP, EZLN, FARC, ELN, and SL? 

How much support can one organization provide to another? Could they lend weaponry, 

financial supports, or troops (as advisors, for example)? In a hypothetical scenario, would 

an ideologically driven organization such as the EPP prefer to form an alliance with an 

ideologically similar organization like the FARC, instead of a money-oriented drug cartel? 

Or does ideology not matter at all? There are some examples that help give an idea of the 

complexity in trying to understand the relationships between these insurgent movements 

or lack thereof. For example, the EZLN’s famous leader, Sub Comandante Marcos, has 

denied any connection to the EPR, although the EPR has stated their support for the mostly 

anarchist Zapatistas. Another example comes from the Peruvian media, which has reported 

for years how FARC troops cross the Putumayo River (the border between Colombia and 

Peru) to meet with Shining Path leaders. Regarding these two insurgent groups, a common 

interest to create an alliance is probably not because of their shared political ideology, but 

instead to strengthen their ties and control cocaine production and trade. 

Additionally, Venezuela’s outspoken President Hugo Chávez has been accused on 

occasion of supporting both the FARC (by allegedly providing them with AT4 anti-tank 

weapons) and the EPR. The Coordinadora Continental Bolivariana (CCB), an entity created by Chávez to support nations and organizations with ideologies similar to that of the 

Venezuelan leader—including the FARC—has been accused of trying to expand outside of 

Colombia’s border by opening “offices” in other countries. Likewise, Bogotá officials have 

accused the FARC of becoming close with a non-hemispheric terrorist group, the Spanish 

ETA. In 2008, then–Colombian Vice President Francisco Santos was quoted as saying, 

“The FARC’s contacts with ETA and drug traffickers exporting cocaine to Europe are not 

new, and when they are secure in Colombia, they try to do harm overseas.” A retired Colombian general, who was interviewed by the author, confirmed reports by different media 

outlets about possible links between the FARC and Paraguay’s EPP. There have also been 

accusations that the EPP and Mexican EPR may have received training in Venezuela.

With regard to Mexico, not much has been written about any possible ties, if they exist at all, between the drug cartels and movements like the EPR and EZLN. For example, 

the Sinaloa cartel is expanding its influence in the Mexican state of Oaxaca where the 

EZLN operates. So far, it is unclear what actions, if any, the Zapatistas have taken regarding the presence of this criminal organization in its area of influence. 

Questions to Ask in Order to Understand the Ideological Framework of Violent 

Groups in the 21st Century 

In July 2008, a FARC statement reiterated, “We’ll never be the ones—never, a thousand 

times never—to lay down our weapons,” thus reaffirming their commitment to continue 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 145

the fight “for communist ideals and against imperialism.” Such statements bring up a number of questions:

• What is so attractive about leftist ideologies that militant organizations still turn to 

them for inspiration?

• How “loyal” are these groups to their political ideologies? 

• Does the fact that the new groups arose in poor states like Paraguay signal a backlash 

against democracy/capitalism? 

When looking at the FARC, ELN, and Shining Path, it is important to consider the 

extent to which they have remained loyal to their decades-old ideological origins. While 

the FARC and ELN still label themselves as communists and claim to battle capitalist oligarchs, resorting to drug trafficking and the targeting of non-armed civilians seems to have 

dissolved their credibility with the civilian population. In Shining Path, the faction that 

still resorts to violence has separated itself from the “old guard,” which dates back to the 

group’s founder, Abimael Guzmán. The violent faction, under the leadership of Artemio, 

argues that it continues the social struggle, while both the government in Lima and the military continue to label it as a “narcoterrorist” organization, thus denying it any legitimacy.

Regarding the EPR, EPP, and EZLN, it is too early to determine their loyalty to their 

ideological origins. This is especially true of the EPR and EPP, because their existence has 

been relatively brief and their operations very limited. It is difficult to fully understand 

how far these organizations are willing to go; for example, whether or not they will target 

civilians. When it comes to the EZLN, the group has been largely concerned with avoiding targeting civilians, though rumors exist that the group is resorting to extortion in order 

to maintain their status in Chiapas. In their Declaración de la Selva Lacandona 1993, the 

EZLN chose to deny in advance any association of their “just” cause to narco-trafficking 

or of narco-guerilla activity. The EZLN claimed that their struggle is a standard bearer of 

equality and justice. In Ética y Política, Subcomandante Marcos, the EZLN leader, made 

his first statement in more than two years by openly criticizing the Mexican government’s 

war against drugs. The letter, released on February 14, 2011, states that from the beginning 

of the government’s war against drugs, it was already lost and had no justification in “destroying the social fabric in almost every national territory.” The EZLN’s open critique of 

the Mexican government’s war against drugs, as well as narco-trafficking, sheds a light on 

the ideological stance of the EZLN—or the very least the image it seeks to portray. 

From the little that is known of their ideology, EPP, EZLN, and EPR do, however, 

have some general points of comparison. The three groups are all Marxist-Leninist and 

were formed in particularly poor regions of their respective states. More importantly, the 

three combine Marxist-Leninist ideas with local national heroes and events. It is not a goal 

of this article to discuss how Latin American groups, past and present, combine local heroes and traditions with their overall political ideology, though this is also a topic worthy 

of greater research. 

Latin America: Still a Breeding Ground for Insurgency/Violence?

Unfortunately, much like the genesis of the terrorist/insurgent organizations in the 1950s 

to 1970s, there are a great deal of factors today that still promote the creation and growth 

of such groups. Latin America holds the dubious distinction of traditionally serving as a 
146 Security and Defense Studies Review

breeding ground for left-wing terrorism, dating back to the 1960s, and participating in the 

proxy wars of this era, due to various domestic issues relating to the Cold War. Much has 

already been written about the roots of terrorism, so there is little need to go into greater 

detail on this topic. Of course, the usual culprits include: poverty, dictator-style governments, indifference of leaders toward the needs of the population (particularly the lower 

classes), rampant corruption, lack of proportional representation, and lack of development 

such as jobs and infrastructure. 

In their 2010 report in Latin American Politics and Society, Feldmann and Perala argue that, “nongovernmental terrorism tends to surface cyclically and to be more prevalent 

in countries that have long-established nonstate organizations with a history of engaging in 

terrorist activities.” Flaherty explains how such radical groups appeal to the youth, stating 

that, “the appeal of such groups to poor, uneducated youth for whom there are few, if any, 

alternatives is obvious. However, the seeming enigma of relatively well-educated terrorists 

can also be partly explained on the basis of a similar developmental trajectory.” One popular author on the psychology of terrorists, McCauley, describes how difficult it is for people 

to believe that the violence committed by terrorists is possible unless it is explained by psychopathy: “People want to believe that terrorists are psychologically ill, that their theatrical 

violence falls far outside the realm of normalcy.” Other experts hint at reasons—such as 

that terrorists are motivated by hate and frustration. Andrea Korn Maikovich argues that 

“becoming a terrorist is a graduated process; it happens not all at once, but over time, as the 

inhibiting forces of cognitive dissonance are reduced within the individual contemplating 

terrorism.” Maikovich delves deeper and tries to dissect the members of terrorist groups, 

explaining that as members of violent groups move up the ranks, they begin to become 

more secretive and distant from their families. This is an important factor in determining 

who will remain in the group and who will abandon it before they become the perpetrators 

of violence themselves. One factor to mention about Maikovich’s analysis is that it focuses 

heavily on Muslim terrorist organizations, as well as, occasionally, European groups or 

incidents in the United States. There is no mention of Latin American insurgent groups, or 

how political ideology influences their creation and membership. 

For its part, the U.S National Intelligence Council predicts that by 2020 “in parts 

of Latin America particularly, the failure of elites to adapt to the evolving demands of 

free markets and democracy probably will fuel a revival in populism and drive indigenous movements, which so far have sought change through democratic means, to consider 

more drastic means for seeking what they consider their ‘fair share’ of political power and 

wealth.” The study, called Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence 

Council’s 2020 Project, was based on interviews of several experts on regions across the 

world, focusing on trying to predict future security issues that could potentially affect U.S 

interests. 

Experts who have written about the future of security in Latin America tend to highlight the “ethnic edge.” The executive summary of a June 2004 conference entitled Latin 

America 2020: Discussing Long-Term Scenarios gives the scenario that “the emergence 

of politically organized indigenous groups may also entail a risk to regional security.” 

Meanwhile, Sarah Radcliffe, of the University of Cambridge, explains that “in the antiterror geographies of fear, commentators perceive a clear tie between armed groups and 

activist ethnic groups, identifying a homology between Islamic fundamentalism and Latin 

American ethnics. This imagined geography pits the ‘axis of evil’—including certain Latin 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 147

American states—against the U.S.-centered coalition.” Countries with large indigenous 

groups, like those in the Andes and Central America, are usually assumed to be sources 

for potential instability, since regional governments there are generally perceived as weak 

and corrupt. The election of Evo Morales, an Aymara Indian, to the presidency of Bolivia, 

along with his ongoing semi-nationalistic initiatives, seems to be a warning sign of what 

could possibly be expected in the future. With that being said, Alejandro Toledo, who was 

the first ethnic Indian to become head of state in Peru, remained quite Washington-friendly 

in his policies (diplomatic and trade related) and could hardly be described as a source of 

regional security concern, unlike how Morales or Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez tend to be 

categorized. 

Unsurprisingly, the possibility of ethnic unrest is tied to politics, as well as if economic decisions carried out by the powers-that-be positively affect the lower classes of 

a country. Radcliff explains that “large numbers of Indians remain impoverished under 

neoliberalism, trapped by segregated labor markets, limited product outlets, insecure land 

tenure, and weak social welfare.” It is understandable that ethnic groups in Latin America 

are perceived as potential sources of unrest. After all, in most countries, it is the indigenous 

people who are usually both the majority of the population and have the worst economic 

status. 

Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the rise of these ethnic groups is almost 

placed in an ideological vacuum. These groups are generally labeled “populist,” using 

modern day examples like Bolivia and Venezuela for precedents. Does populist inevitably 

refer to having a Socialist/Communist influence in nature? What links can be made of 

such uprisings, ongoing or potential, with the terrorist groups of the 1980s and the newly 

formed organizations (like the EPP and EPR) that we see today? Does the Paraguayan EPP 

represent such a group, while perhaps not a fully ethnic (little is known about the ethnic 

composition of their members) populist group? 

Conclusions

Gregory Weeks concludes his 2003 article in Human Rights Review by stating that, “for 

over a decade, military forces across the region have been attempting to redefine their roles 

in the absence of a Communist threat. The fight against terrorism can easily be regarded 

as a way to protect national sovereignty from insidious foreign elements that have taken 

root domestically, while also fostering closer ties to the United States.” The extent to which 

external powers are physically supporting (read financing and/or arming) groups like the 

EPP, EPR, and EZLN is unclear. It is currently “in vogue” to accuse Venezuela’s Hugo 

Chávez of such support; however, such arguments remain debatable. Even if groups like 

the EPR and EPP contain no foreign element, such organizations could potentially rise to 

become significant security threats, particularly for militarily weak countries like Paraguay 

or for countries that are common breeding grounds for violence like Mexico, which already has its hands full with the drug cartels. The internal security role for Latin American 

militaries may be far from over, especially because the current socioeconomic panorama 

of the region, just as it was 30 and 50 years ago, remains ripe for new blood in the form of 

insurgent groups to rise.

Does this mean that insurgent groups with a political ideology could make a return? 

The rise of the Mexican drug cartels, the Mara gangs, and the evolution of the FARC and 

Shining Path into narcoterrorists in the past decade and a half seemingly supported the idea 
148 Security and Defense Studies Review

that ideological armed groups were a relic of the Cold War. However, the EPP may provide 

a counter factual to such notions, proving that populist ideologies could, indeed, make a 

comeback. Nevertheless, the obvious problem is trying to figure out just how faithful these 

new groups, and the remnant organizations from the Cold War, remain to their stated political beliefs. One thing is clear—all of these armed groups have carried out attacks, not 

just against their respective governments and security forces, but also directly on civilians 

(either via kidnappings, car bombs, or straightforward murder). In fact, Latin American 

insurgent groups have historically attacked civilians just as much as they have targeted security forces, perhaps creating an even greater need to closely monitor these developments 

in the near future. 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 149

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2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 155

La Legítima Defensa en Perspectiva

Vicente Torrijos

RESUMEN

Este documento analiza la evolución de la institución de la legítima defensa y 

su relación con la prohibición del uso de la fuerza. Estudia el camino hacia la 

consolidación del concepto clásico de legítima defensa, sus elementos y sus 

requisitos. Posteriormente, presenta tres posiciones acerca de la evolución de 

esta institución jurídica hacia un esquema anticipatorio, desde la posición de 

los Estados y los instrumentos del derecho internacional. Finalmente, muestra 

el camino por recorrer para el establecimiento y consolidación de la noción de la 

legítima defensa preventiva. 

La legítima defensa se ha constituido como una de las instituciones más estables e importantes del derecho internacional y asi como una de las bases de la comunidad internacional 

moderna.

Su fundamentación histórica se remonta a la misma esencia del Estado Nación, la 

consolidación de la noción de comunidad internacional, y el largo camino hacia la proscripción del uso de la fuerza.

Desde los mismos inicios del Estado Nacional, con la Paz de Westfalia y paralelamente con los principios fundantes de Soberanía y no injerencia que se mantienen hasta 

hoy, los lideres de las naciones, los políticos, ejércitos, los doctrinantes del derecho internacional y los Estados mismos se han preguntado sobre la pertinencia, legalidad y la 

posibilidad de la guerra y el uso de la fuerza entre Estados a la luz de la territorialidad y la 

soberanía. 

Antes de los grandes acuerdos del Siglo XX la guerra era un atributo mas del Estado, 

noción que apoyada en las doctrinas del derecho natural, circunscribía todo acto bélico 

en el ius ad bellum del Estado. Fue una amplísima potestad solo sometida a su libertad y 

soberanía, que era difícilmente reprochable y no desataba consecuencias de ilegitimidad 

para el Estado. Más adelante, como nos lo recuerda la doctrina del derecho internacional,1

importantes autores como Hugo Grocio empezaron a teorizar acerca de las guerras justas e 

injustas, abriendo el sendero hacia la proscripción excepcionada de la fuerza.2

El uso de la fuerza era un derecho ilimitado, propio del Estado, utilizable en tiempos 

de paz para desactivar amenazas o como detonante de una guerra que el Estado consideraba necesaria o inevitable.

A medida que se va relativizando el Jus ad Bellum de los Estados, que en su versión 

más amplia, era un derecho ilimitado y potestativo a hacer la guerra, se va volviendo más 

relevante y necesario un concepto que indique las oportunidades donde el uso de la fuerza 

sea legitimo. Para el advenimiento de tal concepto, que se asemejará a la muy antigua 

causal de exclusión de responsabilidad de la clásica doctrina penal3

 predicable sobre los 

individuos, fue necesario que se cristalizara el acuerdo sobre la proscripción del uso de la 

fuerza que el sistema de Naciones Unidas hoy representa. 
156 Security and Defense Studies Review

La historia del derecho internacional demuestra que solo fue tras los horrores de la 

Primera Guerra Mundial que se empezaron a consolidar prohibiciones claras del uso de 

la fuerza que admitían pocas excepciones, materializadas en foros como la Sociedad de 

Naciones e instrumentos como el Pacto Briand-Kellogg. Este último contiene una de las 

más claras prohibiciones generales de la guerra y el uso de la fuerza consignada en tratado 

multilateral alguno.4

Con posterioridad, y tras el segundo descarnado conflicto mundial, simultáneo al 

nacimiento de la nueva base de la sociedad internacional—las Naciones Unidas—se prohibió de forma patente el uso de la fuerza en el Artículo 2 de la Carta de la Organización, 

como medio necesario para la consecución del Artículo 1 (mantenimiento de la paz), junto 

con el reconocimiento de la soberanía, la buena fe y la necesidad de otros mecanismos para 

resolver disputas internacionales:

Artículo 2

Para la realización de los Propósitos consignados en el Artículo 1, la Organización 

y sus Miembros procederán de acuerdo con los siguientes Principios:

1. La Organización está basada en el principio de la igualdad soberana de todos 

sus Miembros.

2. Los Miembros de la Organización, a fin de asegurarse los derechos y 

beneficios inherentes a su condición de tales, cumplirán de buena fe las 

obligaciones contraídas por ellos de conformidad con esta Carta.

3. Los Miembros de la Organización arreglarán sus controversias internacionales 

por medios pacíficos de tal manera que no se pongan en peligro ni la paz y la 

seguridad internacional ni la justicia.

4. Los Miembros de la Organización, en sus relaciones internacionales, se 

abstendrán de recurrir a la amenaza o al uso de la fuerza contra la integridad 

territorial o la independencia política de cualquier Estado, o en cualquier 

otra forma incompatible con los Propósitos de las Naciones Unidas.

Acompañando tal prohibición de la guerra y el uso de la fuerza, la amenaza y su uso 

en contra de la integralidad territorial e independencia de los Estados, en consonancia con 

los principios de soberanía y no injerencia y además suscrita a los propósitos de las Naciones Unidas, la Carta también fue pionera en definir claramente el tema en cuestión, el 

contenido de la legítima defensa, en su Artículo 51: 

Artículo 51: Ninguna disposición de esta carta menoscabará el derecho inmanente 

de legítima defensa, individual o colectiva, en caso de ataque armado contra un 

miembro de Naciones Unidas, hasta tanto que el Consejo de Seguridad haya tomado 

las medidas necesarias para mantener la paz y la seguridad internacionales. Las 

medidas tomadas por los miembros en ejercicio del derecho de legítima defensa 

serán comunicadas inmediatamente al Consejo de Seguridad, y no afectarán en 

manera alguna la autoridad y responsabilidad del consejo conforme a la presente 

carta para ejercer en cualquier momento la acción que estime necesaria con el fin 

de mantener o restablecer la paz y la seguridad internacionales.”
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 157

Si bien este artículo consagra la legítima defensa como un derecho de los Estados, 

un instrumento de seguridad del Estado pero a su vez propio de los esquemas de Seguridad 

Colectiva y vincula su ejercicio a la participación del Consejo de Seguridad, fue la práctica 

de los Estados, la costumbre, las fuentes del derecho y los casos que a lo largo de los siglos 

XVIII y XIX le dieron contenido jurídico al concepto en su acepción internacional. Ese 

contenido mismo es el objeto de las evoluciones y las discusiones en torno a las nociones 

de legítima defensa preventiva o ampliada que estudiaremos más adelante.

La legítima defensa en su estado más puro y restrictivo implica el cumplimiento de 

un grupo específico de requisitos que se consideran parte del derecho internacional consuetudinario y que se han mantenido como parte de la institución jurídica incluso después de 

la creación del artículo 51. Entre ellos se encuentra la certeza e inminencia del ataque, la 

imposibilidad de utilizar otros medios para disuadir o evitar la amenaza, y la proporcionalidad entre el uso de la fuerza y la amenaza misma. Igualmente, se predicaba sobre riesgos 

que pusieran en peligro la integridad territorial del Estado, su soberanía, existencia, sus 

ciudadanos y bienes.5

La no observancia de estos requisitos para las interpretaciones más clásicas, implica 

la ilegalidad de la medida e implica que el Estado incurre en responsabilidad internacional. 

Ya no es cobijado, por ejemplo, por la causal de exclusión de responsabilidad internacional 

“legítima defensa” consagrada en el proyecto de responsabilidad del Estado por el hecho 

internacionalmente ilícito.6

A partir de la Carta de Naciones Unidas, se han tenido por requisitos: la existencia 

de un ataque armado inminente (entendido como una operación militar regular o irregular 

enemiga), la necesidad del uso de la fuerza ante la ineficacia de otras medidas, la proporcionalidad entre la fuerza empleada y la fuerza amenazante a desactivar—escenario en el 

cual todo exceso desata la responsabilidad internacional en razón de la diferencia o exceso 

que se instaura como ilegal. Incluye también la inmediatez—que suscitará discusiones 

más adelante y que hace referencia a la relación temporal entre el derecho a defenderse, y 

la amenaza o ataque, especialmente ligada no a una noción de igualdad en el tiempo, sino 

de prontitud entendida como la vigencia que tendrá toda operación mientras la amenaza 

persista o como acción después de un ataque para desactivar su fuente o prevenir ataques 

futuros o complementarios (tal y como se predicó en un principio de la invasión a Afganistán tras los ataques del 11 de septiembre). 

Finalmente, la Carta impuso a la legítima defensa las cargas de subsidiaridad y provisionalidad, pues esta no debe ser la medida definitiva, sino por el contrario, una medida 

provisional y previa a la entrada del Consejo de Seguridad al control y solución de la 

situación.7

De las consideraciones anteriormente realizadas, es posible concluir que del Artículo 

51 se puede extraer la existencia, legalidad y vigencia de la legítima defensa preventiva 

(si es entendida como aquella que se da ante un ataque inminente y cierto pero no efectuado 

aún) y la legítima defensa colectiva, elementos fundamentales de las posteriores evoluciones del concepto. Luego veremos cómo existen versiones todavía más amplias de la 

legítima defensa que son el centro del debate en torno a la evolución del concepto.

Los hechos del 11-S y la evolución hacia la legítima defensa ampliada: tres posiciones

El acuerdo alrededor del alcance de la legítima defensa no presentó mayores sobresaltos 
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desde su cristalización en los instrumentos de las Naciones Unidas, y los debates que se 

suscitaron alrededor de algunos casos históricos como el bloqueo a Cuba durante la crisis de los misiles se resolvieron alrededor de interpretaciones más o menos estrictas del 

Artículo 51 y de los elementos consuetudinarios de la legítima defensa, especialmente la 

proporcionalidad y la inmediatez.

Pero desde 2001, se ha desatado el debate crucial acerca de los nuevos alcances 

del concepto y la correcta manera de interpretar sus requisitos y restricciones. Esto tiene 

que ver con los ataques a las torres gemelas en la ciudad de Nueva York, la posición del 

gobierno norteamericano, la invasión a Afganistán y la operación “Libertad Duradera,” la 

actitud de algunos miembros del Consejo de Seguridad sumada a la posterior ofensiva en 

Irak, incluido el advenimiento y consolidación de las nuevas amenazas del terrorismo internacional y los retos en seguridad del mundo globalizado, más la proliferación de armas 

nucleares.8

El nuevo estado de cosas respecto a la seguridad mundial, los esfuerzos de la seguridad colectiva, las amenazas irregulares,9

 la necesaria extraterritorialidad de los riesgos que 

implica la globalización junto con los usos que hace de ella el terrorismo10 y la inminencia 

de una disputa entre el terrorismo y los poderes Estatales, han impulsado a los poderes 

políticos de gran cantidad de países miembros de Naciones Unidas en América y Europa 

a tomar decisiones que ponen sobre la mesa de debate la forma de entender los elementos 

propios de la legítima defensa, especialmente en lo que respecta a la inmediatez, la proporcionalidad y la necesidad.

De una mirada al espectro de las variadas consideraciones políticas y doctrinales 

alrededor de la evolución de la legítima defensa, es posible extraer tres grandes posiciones:

La primera de ellas es la posición de interpretación restrictiva, casi literal, del Artículo 51 y de los requisitos de la legítima defensa, que considera como ineludible el requisito 

que impone una interpretación estricta del texto en cuanto a la necesidad actual, efectiva, 

palpable, de un ataque armado para poder efectuar una defensa legítima. Para los partidarios de la legítima defensa clásica, un ataque preventivo invocando la legítima defensa 

en ausencia de un ataque real constituye un acto violatorio de la soberanía del otro Estado 

y compromete la responsabilidad internacional.

Esta doctrina soporta su posición en el riesgo que implica una interpretación amplia del artículo, que podría llevar a la generalización de ataques entre Estados basados 

en meras sensaciones de inseguridad o rumores de ataque. Para tal doctrina, también es 

necesaria la existencia de evidencia absolutamente cierta y convincente de que el ataque 

al que se quiere responder será repetido, pues en caso de no haberlas, se configura, por el 

contrario, una represalia por fuera de toda licitud.11

Para esta posición, ampliar la interpretación a casos en que no existe un ataque inminente, es violar la Carta misma e, igualmente, implica pasar por alto el requisito de necesidad de la medida, que se constituye como uno de los elementos esenciales de la institución 

y busca que antes del uso de la fuerza se opte por otros medios para disuadir la amenaza.

Otra de las consideraciones en que se basa esta posición consiste en anotar que cuando no se observan los requisitos del Artículo 51, no solo se olvidan los requisitos de la 

legítima defensa, sino también sus fines autorizados, circunstancia que puede llevar a que 

la institución sea desviada para propósitos distintos de la efectiva y necesaria protección de 

la integridad territorial, existencia del Estado, sus ciudadanos y bienes.12

Una segunda tendencia, más moderada en cuanto a condenar la posibilidad de todo 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 159

ataque que se manifieste como preventivo, se sitúa entre los que consideran que los ataques 

preventivos ante amenazas no inminentes no constituyen una manifestación ampliada de la 

legítima defensa,13 pero no por ello tienen que ser automáticamente ilegales, pues pueden 

circunscribirse dentro del capítulo VII de la carta de las Naciones Unidas.

En concreto, esta doctrina circunscribe lo que algunos llaman legítima defensa ampliada y legítima defensa preventiva, en una institución del sistema internacional, distinta 

y ajena al régimen de la legítima defensa: la llamada acción preventiva.

A esta tendencia se suman aquellos que consideran que las manifestaciones actuales 

de este tipo de ataques preventivos anidan también en la poca efectividad del Consejo de 

Seguridad para aplicar, regular y dirigir tal institución jurídica.14

De tal modo, la existencia de una institución jurídica que permita la acción preventiva fuera de la legítima defensa es muy discutida e, incluso, existen quienes la justifican 

alrededor de una ausencia expresa de prohibición.15

Para tal doctrina, la diferencia entre legítima defensa y acción preventiva está en el 

grado de certeza de la amenaza: en la acción preventiva, el grado de certeza e inminencia 

de la amenaza o el ataque es mucho menor que en la legítima defensa. Incluso puede estar 

justificado simplemente por un requerido contexto de enemistad o tensión bélica entre dos 

Estados.

Partícipes de esta posición consideran que en virtud del mismo Artículo 39 y del 

Capítulo VII de la Carta de Naciones Unidas, ante probables amenazas a la paz, quebrantos a la misma, y actos de agresión (que no solo implican una amenaza de ataque armado 

inminente, como solicita el Artículo 51) es posible, en ausencia de inminencia absoluta de 

un ataque, realizar acciones bélicas preventivas contra un Estado enemigo del que se sabe 

que tiene planes futuros de poner en jaque la seguridad nacional o internacional. (Lo que 

involucra también en esta doctrina a los esquemas de Seguridad Colectiva.)

Dentro de esta tendencia que hoy mantiene rasgos de vigencia frente a la tercera 

posición que estudiaremos posteriormente, existen quienes interpretan que la Carta de las 

Naciones Unidas prohíbe el ataque o acción preventiva pues prevalece la prohibición del 

uso de la fuerza y su excepción de la legítima defensa. No obstante, para los impulsores 

de esta posición, la práctica actual de los Estados ha forjado un espacio para permitirla 

ante la presencia de amenazas irregulares provenientes del terrorismo internacional y la 

proliferación nuclear.

La presente posición no solo se aparta en mucho de los linderos de la legítima defensa, sino que también puede considerarse como una externalidad frente a la pretensión de 

los esquemas de seguridad colectiva universal, pues en el centro de su justificación está la 

guerra entre dos Estados que permite, dentro de un ambiente bélico, acciones preventivas 

ante amenazas no inminentes16 pero de alguna manera esperadas por el intercambio de 

hostilidades. 

Siendo este un modelo que opera dentro de los linderos de tensiones entre dos o más 

Estados, sólo faculta a poner en conocimiento del caso al Consejo de Seguridad para que 

sea él y no el Estado quien tome las medidas preventivas. Asimismo, en alguna medida 

desconoce la existencia de la posibilidad de efectuar legítimas defensas preventivas por 

fuera de escenarios como aquellos, por lo que ante una sospecha de amenaza, pero fuera de 

los linderos de la acción preventiva.17

Finalmente, la tercera posición respecto a la evolución de la institución de la legítima defensa es aquella que propende por la legalidad y necesidad de la consolidación de 
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una visión ampliada de la legítima defensa clásica, que sea adecuada para responder a las 

amenazas del mundo después del 9-11. O sea, de un mundo globalizado con amenazas 

irregulares, asimétricas, híbridas y desbalanceadas, ante las cuales, en razón del riesgo 

mayor que significan, el Estado no puede esperar su consolidación, inminencia o ejecución.

La legítima defensa ampliada, preventiva y anticipatoria: en busca de un consenso 

mundial

Como anticipábamos, los llamados peligros de un mundo globalizado no son más que 

amenazas para las ventajas y oportunidades de bienestar que la misma globalización representa, así que teniendo como punto de inflexión el 9-11 y el auge, durante los años siguientes, de la lucha mundial contra el terrorismo y el narcoterrorismo. Todo ello sumado al debate en torno a la legalidad de las acciones de Estados Unidos y sus aliados en Afganistán 

e Irak teniendo como referentes las restricciones clásicas de la institución. Ha sido la ONU 

la que en búsqueda de un consenso mundial y en razón de mantener al Consejo de Seguridad y a la Carta misma al frente de estas discusiones, la que ha promovido la cristalización 

del concepto de la legítima defensa preventiva a través de su adecuación a las necesidades 

actuales del sistema internacional. 

Ante movimientos que promovían activamente la modificación de la Carta de Naciones Unidas, y que estuvieron en auge en el periodo 2003-2004 precisamente como respuesta a las presuntas diferencias entre lo que la Carta reflejaba y las acciones de Estados 

Unidos en su respuesta a los ataques en su territorio, la ONU, de la mano de Kofi Annan, 

desarrolló los documentos considerados como inspiradores de la doctrina de la defensa 

preventiva entendida como una acción propia de Naciones Unidas. Esto fue enfrentado a la 

doctrina Bush, que siempre justificó su legalidad basada en la unilateralidad.

El primero de estos documentos es el reporte, “Un mundo más seguro: la responsabilidad que compartimos. Informe del Grupo de alto nivel sobre las amenazas, los desafíos 

y el cambio,”18 considerado como precursor en asimilar el cambio de las condiciones de 

seguridad mundiales y promovedor de un nuevo consenso ante amenazas distintas a las que 

el mundo vivía durante la época de la redacción de la Carta de Naciones Unidas. 

Las amenazas que identifica el grupo de alto nivel son transnacionales y transfronterizas, irregulares y no tradicionales que, como el terrorismo, la pobreza generalizada y la 

proliferación de armamento nuclear, radiológico, biológico y químico, retan la existencia 

y la estabilidad de los Estados. Requieren, por tanto, del acuerdo en fines y métodos de un 

renovado esquema de seguridad colectiva.

El documento reconoce el crecimiento de conflictos y actores internos que ponen en 

peligro la seguridad mundial, auge que contrasta con la reducción de los conflictos tradicionales Estado-Estado. 

De tal modo, el documento no sólo identifica la necesidad de esquemas de legítima 

defensa preventiva sino que adiciona la necesidad de intervención preventiva en los ámbitos de mantenimiento de la paz y asistencia humanitaria en el contexto de esas mismas 

amenazas, brindándole coherencia al sistema de Naciones Unidas.

La propuesta, que busca ser llevada a consenso internacional, parte de que la dimensión restrictiva del Artículo 51 cede ante el derecho de los Estados de defenderse ante la 

inminencia de las amenazas que atentan contra su existencia, condición que sumada a la 

gravedad de los riesgos actuales debe permitirles actuar anticipadamente contra amenazas 

que en el evento de ser desatadas, pueden dar lugar a consecuencias irreparables. Estas 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 161

consecuencias, en todo caso, pueden evitarse gracias a acciones previas:

¿Puede un Estado aducir en esas circunstancias, sin recurrir al Consejo de 

Seguridad, el derecho de actuar anticipadamente en legítima defensa no sólo para 

evitar una amenaza inminente o próxima sino también para prevenir una amenaza 

que no sea inminente ni próxima? Quienes responden en la afirmativa aducen 

que el daño que puede dimanar de algunas amenazas (terroristas con un arma 

nuclear, por ejemplo) es tan grande que simplemente no se puede correr el riesgo 

de esperar hasta que la amenaza sea inminente y que ese daño puede ser menor 

(evitar un intercambio nuclear o la precipitación radiactiva como consecuencia de 

la destrucción de un reactor) si se actúa antes.19

Entonces, ante la tendencia generalizada entre los Estados más influyentes del sistema internacional a considerar la legítima defensa preventiva y anticipatoria como práctica 

necesaria para hacer frente a las nuevas amenazas, la ONU prefirió darle legitimidad al 

concepto dentro del sistema y vincularlo a su sistema de seguridad colectiva liderado por 

el Consejo de Seguridad.

Tal decisión resultaba en ese momento preferible a que los Estados se apropiaran de 

la medida y la utilizaran indiscriminadamente, sin consenso y de forma unilateral, circunstancia que podría implicar mayores desbalances en el sistema y enfrentar a los Estados 

en cuanto a la adecuación de la medida. Esta estrategia se reflejaba claramente en el documento: 

190. La respuesta en pocas palabras es que si existen buenos argumentos para 

una acción militar preventiva y buenas pruebas que los corroboren hay que 

presentarlos al Consejo de Seguridad, que puede autorizar esa acción si decide 

hacerlo. Si el Consejo de Seguridad decide no hacerlo, por definición habrá 

tiempo para estudiar otras estrategias, entre ellas la persuasión, la negociación, la 

disuasión y la contención, antes de volver a la opción militar.

191. A quienes esa respuesta suscita impaciencia hay que decirles que, en 

un mundo lleno de amenazas que se consideran posibles, el riesgo para el 

orden mundial y para la norma de la no intervención en que sigue basándose 

simplemente es demasiado grande como para aceptar la legitimidad de la acción 

preventiva unilateral, en contraposición a la aprobada colectivamente. Dejar que 

uno lo haga es dejar que lo hagan todos.”

Esta declaración de aceptación de la nueva vertiente, basada en que podía ser 

perfectamente viable dentro del sistema de seguridad colectiva de Naciones 

Unidas, encontró su complemento en otro documento que analizaba la relación 

del sistema internacional, la seguridad, los derechos humanos y el desarrollo en 

el nuevo milenio. Incluye así un estudio de cómo lograr los grandes retos de 

la humanidad y la paz en un mundo bajo la amenaza terrorista: “Un concepto 

más amplio de la libertad: desarrollo, seguridad y derechos humanos para todos. 

Informe del Secretario General.20

Tal documento reconoció que además del consenso alrededor de la legítima defensa 

preventiva, se deben desarrollar todos los elementos de la institución jurídica, incluida la 

diferencia entre amenaza inminente y latente. Eso significa que la legítima defensa anticipada y preventiva debe ser parte de la institución jurídica reconocida y sólo ser una especie 
162 Security and Defense Studies Review

distinta a ella en lo que a la temporalidad de la acción defensiva y la inminencia del ataque 

respecta. No apartarla de la legítima defensa clásica significa, pues, construirla sobre las 

bases de legalidad que fundamentan a su predecesora, profundizando también en la subsidiariedad y provisionalidad para garantizar la participación legítimadora del Consejo de 

Seguridad:

126. La tarea no consiste en encontrar alternativas al Consejo de Seguridad 

como fuente de autoridad, sino en lograr que el Consejo funcione mejor. Cuando 

considere si ha de autorizar o aprobar el uso de la fuerza militar, los miembros del 

Consejo deben llegar a un acuerdo sobre cómo sopesar la gravedad de la amenaza; 

cuál es el propósito de la acción militar propuesta; las probabilidades de que 

otros medios distintos del uso de la fuerza permitan neutralizar la amenaza; si la 

opción militar es proporcional a la amenaza en cuestión y si hay una posibilidad 

razonable de éxito.21

Naturalmente, el alcance del debate no solo termina en las previsiones de estos dos 

documentos. Adicionalmente, desde la ejecución efectiva de la doctrina Bush, la operación 

“Libertad Duradera” y las complejidades respecto a la legitimación de la guerra en Afganistán e Irak, el mundo ha tenido diversas oportunidades para debatir los alcances de la 

legítima defensa ampliada y preventiva.

Un ejemplo ya paradigmático de cómo el concepto de la legítima defensa ampliada 

va haciendo carrera y suscita debate en escenarios regionales, es sin duda, el ataque de Colombia contra un campamento guerrillero de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, FARC, 

en territorio ecuatoriano.

Este caso, más allá de sus particularidades políticas, fue una demostración de cómo 

se va forjando una doctrina acerca de la posibilidad de ataques preventivos o anticipados en otros territorios contra amenazas no estatales provenientes de grupos terroristas. 

Ataques que se emprenden invocando la legítima defensa (en una variante no clásica sino 

ampliada), sin mediar un ataque inminente de un Estado enemigo.

Aquel bombardeo, que tuvo lugar en el año 2008, evidenció cómo, a pesar de existir 

Estados a favor y Estados en contra de su legalidad, la institución jurídica se puede considerar como existente y utilizada. Así que fue invocada por Colombia y apoyada por Estados Unidos. Y aunque recibió condenas de países como Ecuador y Venezuela, así como 

críticas de la secretaria general de la OEA, fue el argumento que permitió su ejecución y 

justificación.

Estudios más actuales comentan que el uso de la legítima defensa ampliada no se 

limita a los escenarios ya mencionados, sino que desde un nivel político y con posterioridad a los documentos de 2004-2005 anteriormente citados, el concepto ha sido aplicado en 

varios casos. Incluyen las intervenciones del ejército francés en Costa de Marfil (Operación 

Licorne) incluso en compañía de misiones de mantenimiento de paz de Naciones Unidas; 

acciones defensivas de Israel en el conflicto con Palestina, incluidos los bombardeos a Siria, y desde la propia Unión Europea en operativos en diferentes territorios contra células 

terroristas, especialmente los desplegados por el Reino Unido en 2007-2008.22

Tal aplicación relativamente reiterada demuestra que la legítima defensa ampliada 

es una vía de acción que empieza a manifestarse como opción para un grupo creciente de 

Estados, que la consideran posible y legal y así esperan hacerla valer ante la comunidad 

internacional. 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 163

Conclusión: el futuro de la legítima defensa

No hay duda de que la legítima defensa ampliada constituye un tema sensible en relación 

con la prohibición del uso de la fuerza y los principios de soberanía y no injerencia. Hemos 

visto como ha evolucionado desde una permisión del uso de la fuerza, a una prohibición 

absoluta, para luego pasar a una prohibición general con excepciones claras que a medida 

que cambian las circunstancias del sistema internacional exigen cuidadosa adecuación. 

Las Naciones Unidas han optado por una solución en alguna medida salomónica que 

contempla las exigencias del mundo moderno y las urgencias de los Estados, pero que también se guarda de no legitimar una nueva tendencia y luego dejarla a la deriva.

Es así como hoy es una realidad que dentro del sistema de Naciones Unidas, esta 

interpretación amplia de la legítima defensa sea posible y defendible, pero solo bajo el 

concurso del Consejo de Seguridad. Se podría concluir que un ejercicio de defensa anticipada que se dé bajo el concurso del Consejo de Seguridad, con su autorización y posterior 

supervisión, será totalmente legal, o lo será cuando sin mediar una autorización expresa, se 

ciña a lo que el Consejo de Seguridad anteriormente manifieste como legítimo.

Por el contrario, si la acción es absolutamente unilateral y ni siquiera fundada suficientemente en un nivel de probabilidad aceptable, constituirá un desbordamiento de la 

legítima defensa desembocando en un hecho ilícito del Estado y comprometiendo su responsabilidad. 

Simultáneamente, se impone la necesidad de trabajar en la definición clara de los elementos a proteger y las amenazas que pueden ser objeto de despliegues preventivos, para 

evitar que la flexibilidad de los Estados en su interpretación particular mine la credibilidad 

de la institución y la desvíe de las amenazas desde las que Naciones Unidas la justificó.

La práctica diaria de la política multilateral en el seno del Consejo de Seguridad, 

donde se presentan acalorados debates entre potencias y alianzas de países emergentes, 

demuestra que el gran reto para la legítima defensa ampliada. Tal y como se plantea hoy 

será, precisamente, que una vez reconocida como institución viable, manejable y legítima, 

obtenga el consenso necesario por parte de todos los miembros del Consejo de forma expedita en casos apremiantes. 

De no ser así, se generalizará en la práctica internacional que los Estados la justifiquen 

y la apliquen de forma unilateral como parte de su política exterior,23 dejando de lado las 

estructuras multilaterales y privilegiando su uso como un derecho propio del Estado.

Otro reto que enfrentará la legítima defensa ampliada, será, sin duda, el de lograr 

asentarse como práctica Estatal aceptada por las Cortes Internacionales, como la Corte Internacional de Justicia, que a lo largo de su historia se ha a pronunciado en múltiples casos 

relativos a la legítima defensa, como el caso de las actividades militares y paramilitares 

en Nicaragua y contra Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. Estados Unidos) o la Opinión Consultiva 

Licitud de la amenaza o del empleo de armas nucleares del 8 de julio de 1996. En estos

ya ha dejado entrever altas exigencias respecto a los elementos constitutivos de la legítima 

defensa en su vertiente clásica, sin que todavía haya tenido la oportunidad real de decidir 

sobre un caso de legítima defensa ampliada tal como la estamos percibiendo hoy.

En ese ámbito, es importante la relación entre la institución jurídica y la práctica 

estatal, dado que aunque ésta ya se encuentre relativamente consagrada en el sistema de 

Naciones Unidas como aceptable por los documentos anteriormente citados, aún no es de 

total aceptación en los sistemas de integración regional, tal como lo demuestra la posición 

de la OEA en el caso Colombo-Ecuatoriano. 
164 Security and Defense Studies Review

Solo a medida que la doctrina encuentre más adeptos o, de alguna manera, logre 

superar debates críticos, puede abrirse camino como costumbre y hacer parte del derecho 

internacional consuetudinario, lo que le daría un sustento mayor en la práctica, adicional a 

su consagración en las resoluciones mencionadas. 

En el futuro, el camino para quienes pretenden hacerla valer como derecho del Estado, será sin duda el de consagrarla en instrumentos internacionales e integrarla como parte 

de las Cartas de los sistemas de integración regional, incluyendo sus objetivos esenciales.

En otros términos, el impulso actual de la legítima defensa ampliada está directamente relacionado con el consenso mundial contra el terrorismo y las nuevas amenazas. 

De la capacidad que tengan sus promotores para ampliar estos esfuerzos dependerá en gran 

medida la imposición o no de la doctrina. Con la reducción de los conflictos entre Estados 

y el incremento de las amenazas irregulares, híbridas, simultáneas-y-múltiples, la legítima 

defensa ampliada se perfila cada vez más como una herramienta para combatir a los grupos 

armados ilegales y a las amenazas externas en escenarios donde los Estados que las albergan no pueden o no quieren actuar. 

Esta circunstancia implica que la legalidad de la medida esta íntimamente relacionada con el rechazo a estos grupos y al terrorismo. Por el contrario, un uso arbitrario, permisivo e innecesario de la institución jurídica puede deslegitimarla y afectar el rechazo hacia 

aquellos fenómenos en los que ella misma se funda. Es decir, el terrorismo y las amenazas 

nucleares e irregulares, fenómenos que, sin duda, han venido moldeado y reconfigurando 

los principios de no injerencia e integridad territorial en temas de seguridad.

Notas

1

 Mathias Forteau, Droit international public (Lextenso Éditions, 2009).

2

 Peter Haggenmacher, Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983), pp. 597-613.

3

 Diego Manuel Luzón Peña, Aspectos esenciales de la legítima defensa (Editorial B de f, 

2006).

4

 Emmanuel Guerisoli, Evolución del concepto de Legítima Defensa, Centro Argentino de 

Estudios Internacionales Programa Derecho Internacional, pp. 1-28.

5

 C. Waldock, “The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International 

Law,” RCADI 82 (1952), pp. 450-519.

6

 Naciones Unidas Asamblea General UN-AG, “Proyecto de Responsabilidad del Estado 

por el hecho internacionalmente ilícito,” Anexo del 12 de Diciembre de 2001 a la resolución UN A/56/83, 2001, pp.1-15. Documento Electrónico.

7

 Emmanuel Guerisoli, Evolución del Concepto de Legítima Defensa, Centro Argentino de 

Estudios, Internacionales Programa Derecho Internacional, pp. 1-28.

8

 C. Gutiérrez Espada, “Los atentados del 11 de septiembre, la operación ‘libertad duradera’ y el derecho a la legítima defensa,” en REDI 53 (2002), pp. 247-271.
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 165

9

 Mary Kaldor, Las nuevas guerras: la violencia organizada en la era global (Barcelona: 

Tusquets Editores, 2001), pp.1-242.

10 M. Bothe, “Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force,” European Journal of International Law, 2003.

11 Manuel Pérez Gonzáles, “Acción preventiva y legítima defensa en derecho internacional: Algunas consideraciones jurídicas,” en Ricardo Méndez-Silva, Derecho y seguridad 

internacional (México: UNAM, 2005), pp.59-64.

12 Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff, 1991).

13 Mary Ellen O’Connell, “The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense,” American Society of 

International Law, Task Force on Terrorism Essay, August 2002.

14 A. Arend, “International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force,” The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 2: (2003), pp.93-103. 

15 Manuel Pérez Gonzáles, “Acción preventiva y legítima defensa en derecho internacional: Algunas consideraciones jurídicas” en Ricardo Méndez-Silva, Derecho y seguridad 

internacional (México: UNAM, 2005), pp.59-64.

16 Franck, Thomas M., Recourse to Force State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks 

(Cambridge University Press, 2002).

17 Héctor Gros Espiell,, “La pretendida legítima defensa preventiva y la guerra en Irak,” 

en Anuario Mexicano de derecho internacional 4, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 

México, 2004, p.190.

18 A/59/565.

19 Ibid.

20 “Un concepto más amplio de la libertad: Desarrollo, seguridad y derechos humanos para 

todos,” S.G. ONU, Kofi Annan, 21 Mar 2005.

21 Ibid. (V. pp. 36, ACÁP. 122 - Uso de la Fuerza), 21 Mar 2005.

22 Abdul Ghafur Hamid “The Legality of Anticipatory Self-Defence in the 21st Century 

World Order: A Re-appraisal,” Netherlands International Law Review 54, no. 3 (2007), 

441-490, and Amos N. Guiora. “Anticipatory Self-Defence and International Law: A ReEvaluation,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 2008. 

23 Louis Henkin, “Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy,” Right v. Might: International Law 

and the Use of Force (NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1989).
166 Security and Defense Studies Review

Bibliografía

Arend, A. “International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force.” The Washington 

Quarterly 26, no. 2 (2003): 93-103.

Bothe, M. “Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force.” European Journal of International Law, 2003.

Forteau, Mathias. Droit international public. Lextenso Éditions, 2009.

Franck, Thomas M. Recourse to Force State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks. 

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Guiora, Amos N. “Anticipatory Self-Defence and International Law: A Re-Evaluation.” 

Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 2008.

Gros Espiell, Héctor. “La pretendida legítima defensa preventiva y la guerra en Irak.” En 

Anuario Mexicano de derecho internacional 4. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 

México, 2004, 190.

Guerisoli, Emmanuel. Evolución del concepto de legítima defensa. Centro Argentino de 

Estudios Internacionales Programa Derecho Internacional, 1-28.

Gutiérrez Espada, C. “Los atentados del 11 de septiembre, la operación ‘libertad duradera’ 

y el derecho a la legítima defensa.” En REDI 53 (2001): 247-271.

Haggenmacher Peter, Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1983: 597-613.

Hamid, Abdul Ghafur, “The Legality of Anticipatory Self-Defence in the 21st Century 

World Order: A Re-appraisal.” Netherlands International Law Review 54, no. 3 

(2007): 441-190.

Henkin, Louis. “Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy.” Might v. Right: International Law and 

the Use of Force. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1989.

Kaldor, Mary. “Las nuevas guerras: la violencia organizada en la era global.” Tusquets 

Editores, 2001: 1-242.

Luzón Peña, Diego Manuel. Aspectos esenciales de la legítima defensa. Editorial B de f, 

2006.

Naciones Unidas Asamblea General UN-AG. “Proyecto de responsabilidad del estado por 

el hecho internacionalmente ilícito.” Anexo del 12 de Diciembre de 2001 a la resolución UN A/56/8, 2001: 1-15. Documento electrónico.

O’Connell, Mary Ellen “The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense.” American Society of International Law, Task Force on Terrorism Essay, August 2002.

Pérez Gonzáles, Manuel. “Acción preventiva y legítima defensa en derecho internacional: 

Algunas consideraciones jurídicas.” En Ricardo Méndez-Silva, Derecho y seguridad 

internacional. México: UNAM, 2005: 59-64.

Schachter, Oscar. International Law in Theory and Practice. Martinus Nijhoff, 

1991.

“Un concepto más amplio de la libertad: Desarrollo, seguridad y derechos humanos para 

todos,” S.G. ONU, Kofi Annan, 21 Mar 2005.

Waldock, C. “The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International 

Law.” RCADI 82 (1952):450 -519.
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 167

La Utilización de las Fuerzas Militares en un 

Ambiente Criminal y no de Guerra: Desafíos del Siglo XXI

Juan Carlos Gómez

RESUMEN

La utilización de las Fuerzas Militares en la lucha contra todas las amenazas 

criminales que afectan las democracias es viable y necesaria, pero lo importante 

es saber cuándo y cómo se puede utilizar la fuerza como primera opción para 

no incurrir en un acto ilegitimo e ilegal. Este articulo desarrolla la aserción 

por primeramente reconocer los términos “Derechos Humanos” y la “Ley de 

Humanitario Internacional” y como se puede aplicar y refrenar las acciones de las 

Fuerzas Armadas dentro del territorio de un país. Además, reconoce el peligro del 

tipo de guerra no tradicional actualmente ocurriendo contra las populaciones de 

unos países, y como deben reevaluar la misión de la policía y las fuerzas militares 

y adaptarla a las nuevas ambientes operativas. Finalmente, este articulo afronta 

las preguntas desalentadoras de cómo completar estas nuevas misiones con éxito 

dentro de parámetros legales, y como responder a las alegaciones y ataques del 

“enemigo” que pueden tomar el formo de tácticos políticas y judiciales. 

“No puedo cambiar la dirección del viento, pero si ajustar las velas para llegar a 

mi destino.”

—James Dean

Introducción

La utilización de las Fuerzas Militares en la lucha contra todas las amenazas criminales 

que afectan las democracias es viable y necesaria, pero lo importante es saber cuándo y 

cómo se puede utilizar la fuerza como primera opción para no incurrir en un acto ilegitimo 

e ilegal. Estas nuevas amenazas a las que se ven enfrentados los gobiernos por concepto 

de la globalización están dadas como dice Moises Naim por el control al tráfico de drogas, armas, ideas, personas y dinero. “...Estos mercados ilegales están dominados por 

redes ágiles, multinacionales y con muchos recursos, potenciadas por la globalización. Los 

gobiernos seguirán perdiendo estas guerras si no son capaces de crear y adoptar nuevas 

estrategias para hacer frente a estos nuevos desafíos que configuran el mundo tanto como 

lo hicieron en el pasado las guerras entre Estados...”1

Existe la necesidad de entender la transformación de la amenaza, ver cómo las posiciones ideológicas han cambiado pragmáticamente hacia los intereses económicos y hoy 

los grupos armados de supuestas ideologías políticas contrarias (extrema izquierda y derecha) hasta se unen y conforman alianzas siniestras,2

 retando a los estados en materia de 

seguridad e incluso poniendo en riesgo la estabilidad democrática y la estructura de las 

instituciones.

Frente al nuevo panorama, las Fuerzas Militares se deben adaptar y actuar de manera 
168 Security and Defense Studies Review

decidida y efectiva en la neutralización de los fenómenos criminales y terroristas que están 

en la mayoría de los casos lejos de las teorías de guerra convencional e incluso de la guerra 

de guerrillas. Ya no resulta viable adaptar a la realidad criminal las viejas teorías de la 

guerra, si no que por el contrario se deben crear y aplicar nuevas teorías y conceptos que 

enseñen y expliquen la actuación de las Fuerzas Militares en medio de la población y no 

en los campos de batalla tradicionales de los siglos XIX y XX con trincheras y enemigos. 

Por ese entonces se distinguían y regían por los valores propios de las guerras Industriales 

y/o la guerra de guerrillas en zonas aisladas de centros poblados o donde la muerte de no 

combatientes se entendía y aceptaba como una consecuencia más de la guerra.3

Las normas que permiten la actuación de los estados y su Fuerza Pública4 (Fuerzas 

Militares y Policía Nacional) para enfrentar y neutralizar cualquier amenaza que requiera 

el uso de la fuerza están dadas dentro del marco jurídico de los derechos humanos (DH) y 

el derecho internacional humanitario (DIH). 

Marco legal de uso de la fuerza

El marco de DH es conocido como “derecho de máximos” porque se entiende como la 

norma que exige de los gobiernos y sus funcionarios los mayores niveles de cuidado y 

protección con relación a los ciudadanos a quienes está llamado a proteger. Este marco 

de actuación es en el cual de manera doctrinaria y estructural se mueven las policías. Es 

viable a través de estas normas enfrentar las realidades criminales y a la vez proteger los 

individuos, dejando en manos de la rama judicial las acciones penales a que haya lugar con 

base en los delitos cometidos y el ordenamiento legal existente.

Por su parte el DIH es conocido como “derecho de mínimos” porque se entiende que 

fue concebido para permitir el uso de la fuerza y tratar de recuperar la paz en el marco de 

un conflicto armado internacional o no internacional, tratando de generar el menor daño 

posible sobre las personas y bienes que no hacen parte de los objetivos militares. En los 

últimos sesenta años esta norma ha evolucionado y hoy dentro de una concepción pragmática, e independiente de la aceptación política o no de un conflicto, se aplica, previo 

el análisis de unas realidades objetivas como son: el nivel de organización de los grupos 

armados y el nivel de intensidad de la violencia que desplieguen.5

 Esta realidad jurídica es 

la que ha permitido la realización de operaciones ofensivas legales y legitimas de las Fuerzas Militares de Colombia en contra de los grupos armados ilegales que actúan en el país.6

Problema de aplicación de la fuerza en el marco de DH o DIH

De manera infortunada la clara diferencia teórica entre el derecho de máximos (DH) y 

el derecho de mínimos (DIH), se vuelve gris al momento de aplicar la fuerza frente a las 

nuevas amenazas que enfrentan los gobiernos con su Fuerza Pública. Los grupos armados 

ilegales, los criminales organizados y los no organizados, se mueven sigilosos y cobardes 

entre las dos esferas jurídicas; prefiriendo obviamente camuflarse y actuar en medio de la 

población en donde la aplicación de la fuerza para su neutralización se hace más difícil.

Cada error que la Fuerza Pública cometa en el empleo de la fuerza en contra de las 

nuevas amenazas que como se ha dicho se mueven en medio de la población, su nuevo 

campo de batalla, afecta de manera inmediata la credibilidad en las instituciones, generando efectos jurídicos en contra de los funcionarios y afectando a su credibilidad.

Cuando las características objetivas de aplicación del DIH se den en la posible neu-
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 169

tralización de la amenaza, ésta resulta útil y eficaz, para ello el planeamiento y ejecución 

de operaciones de la Fuerza Pública en ese marco es absolutamente lícito y ha demostrado 

ser efectivo. Lo importante eso sí, es entender que la fuerza se puede aplicar de manera 

ofensiva y letal, solo contra objetivos militares y en los casos no prohibidos de manera 

expresa por la ley.

Guerra en medio de la población

Es obvio que la amenaza que representan los narcotraficantes y todos los actores armados 

que se mueven detrás de este negocio ilícito son generalmente incapaces de sostener una 

confrontación armada contra las fuerzas regulares de los Estados. Por esta razón han convertido a la población en su centro de gravedad. Hoy, los grupos armados y criminales se 

mueven, actúan, utilizan y se benefician de la población; el campo de batalla y el área de 

operaciones, es precisamente en medio de la población.7

Nadie duda de la perversidad de los actores criminales, no tienen la aceptación entre 

la gran mayoría de la población y por el contrario los desprecian, pero eso no implica que 

el ciudadano tolere o acepte restringir, ceder o anular sus derechos al Gobierno y su Fuerza 

Pública para que los proteja. Por el contrario, cada error o acto percibido como ilegal o ilegitimo cometido por un funcionario público menoscaba la confianza de la gente. La suma 

de cuestionamientos y actos ilícitos en contra de los llamados a proteger independientemente de la vileza de los malos puede terminar por volcar la opinión pública en su contra.

Quienes de alguna manera llevan la peor parte en este nuevo ambiente operacional 

de confrontación en medio de la población son las Fuerzas Militares, pues están siendo 

utilizadas de manera cada vez más recurrente por los gobiernos para atender situaciones 

criminales que en condiciones normales deberían enfrentarse exclusivamente por fuerzas 

policíales. Las Fuerzas Militares deben rediseñar su doctrina para enfrentar las nuevas 

amenazas; en la guerra de hoy no hay victoria, ni capitulación de los vencidos. El uso de 

la fuerza no resuelve el problema; solo contribuye positiva o negativamente en la determinación de un resultado. A los criminales e integrantes de los grupos armados ilegales les 

interesa erosionar la voluntad de la población, generar caos y así hacer interminables los 

conflictos.

Hoy, lo que está en juego es la voluntad de la gente. Los Estados deben desarticular 

los grupos armados ilegales y criminales para derrotarlos sometiéndolos a la justicia, sin 

aniquilarlos.8

 Se debe buscar por todos los medios lícitos y legítimos la cooperación de la 

población para dominar la amenaza. Nunca se debe confundir a la población con el adversario y los criminales, si se comente el error de tratar por parte de la Fuerza Pública a la 

población como enemigo, terminará de manera efectiva convirtiéndose en enemigo. 

Se deben generar estrategias para cooptar la población a favor del Estado, acabando 

con la complicidad y neutralidad que favorece a quienes actúan al margen de la ley, y 

remplazarla por una conducta y acción imparcial y de cooperación con la autoridad institucional de la nación. Es decir se debe estimular la delación del delito y quitarle a los grupos 

armados y criminales las estructuras de apoyo que surgen de la población. La seguridad es 

y debe ser una responsabilidad de todos en la sociedad y no solo del Gobierno y la Fuerza 

Pública.

Las guerras que se libran en medio de la población permean y pueden corroer todas 

las instituciones de la sociedad incluida la familia. Por ello, el Gobierno y la Fuerza Pública 

deben tener presencia permanente en las poblaciones y lugares donde normalmente la ha 
170 Security and Defense Studies Review

tenido, o ha logrado retomar control. De lo contrario, está dejando la iniciativa estratégica en cabeza de los grupos armados y la criminalidad que no desaprovecharan cualquier 

descuido para tomar o recuperar control, con o sin el beneplácito de la sociedad en que se 

instala.

La manera en que actúan hoy los grupos armados ilegales y los criminales hace que 

no siempre en su confrontación el uso de la fuerza sea la mejor opción. Si el Gobierno y 

la Fuerza Pública por el afán de neutralizar la amenaza que representan cometen el error 

de irse en contra de la gente termina actuando a nombre del criminal cooperando con su 

causa y con la estrategia de los delincuentes que busca la deslegitimación del Estado y las 

instituciones democráticas. 

Un integrante del estado mayor de la organización terrorista IRA (Ejército Revolucionario Irlandés) decía en 1972 “...el mejor sargento reclutador que tuvimos fue el Ejército 

Británico...” La razón fue sin duda la cantidad de desafueros e irregularidades cometidas 

por los integrantes del Ejército de ese país, en la búsqueda de neutralizar a la IRA. Es obvio 

que esta no es una estrategia nueva de aquellos que actúan en la ilegalidad, por lo tanto 

resulta clave entender que los errores en el enfrentamiento a los grupos armados ilegales 

y criminales puede terminar engrosando el número de sus integrantes, deslegitimando el 

Gobierno, y la Fuerza Pública. Por lo tanto, incrementa las investigaciones penales y disciplinarias en contra de los funcionarios involucrados en irregularidades.

Nuevas misiones a los militares

Colombia no es el único país del hemisferio occidental que utiliza las Fuerzas Militares 

dentro de sus fronteras en temas diferentes a los de defensa. El presidente Mauricio Funes 

de El Salvador tan pronto asumió la presidencia en el 2009 dispuso la participación de los 

militares en la lucha contra la Mara Salvatrucha9 y aun hoy lo hacen de manera activa.10

En Brasil, las Fuerzas Militares contribuyen en la lucha que la Policía libra contra bandas 

criminales y narcotraficantes en las Favelas.11 Ni que decir de México, cuyo Presiente Felipe Calderón en 2006 declaró “la guerra en contra del narco” en donde la participación de 

la Marina y el Ejército es permanente y cada día se comprometen más.12 Al igual que los 

anteriores: Guatemala, Paraguay y Perú han recurrido a las Fuerzas Militares para atender 

problemas relacionados con la seguridad dentro de sus fronteras.

Adaptabilidad al nuevo ambiente operacional 

Como se dijo anteriormente, lo ideal sería que la Policía atendiera de manera exclusiva 

los temas de seguridad en los países y la región. Infortunadamente la capacidad criminal y 

económica proveniente de la financiación con dineros del narcotráfico hace que los grupos 

armados ilegales y la delincuencia organizada superen en algunos casos la posibilidad de 

acción y reacción de las fuerzas de policía. Cuando esto sucede, es absolutamente legítimo 

que los gobernantes y la sociedad recurran a sus fuerzas militares para mantener el estado 

de derecho y minimizar la amenaza. Es por esta razón, que la adaptación al nuevo ambiente 

operacional en medio de la población no admite espera. O las Fuerzas Militares se adaptan 

y contribuyen de manera efectiva y eficaz en la neutralización de las nuevas amenazas o los 

gobiernos y la sociedad no encontrarán argumentos para justificar y mantener los grandes 

presupuestos que demandan su existencia.

En Colombia el marco de acción del DIH es cada vez más restrictivo. El contundente 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 171

éxito del Gobierno especialmente en los últimos ocho años ha hecho que muchas de las 

estructuras armadas ilegales que operaban en el país desaparezcan y las que subsisten, han 

perdido la capacidad de realizar acciones sostenidas y con los niveles de violencia que 

las convierten en objetivos militares legítimos. De eso precisamente se trata la Política de 

Defensa y Seguridad Democrática—acabar con la amenaza terrorista y criminal para hacer 

tránsito al desarrollo comunitario y de prosperidad en un ambiente de seguridad donde 

impere la ley ojalá sin necesidad de recurrir al uso de la fuerza por parte del Estado. Para 

la fecha, los grupos armados ilegales y los criminales que representan las nuevas amenazas 

tienen poco que perder en términos de control territorial, si sienten presión del Gobierno y 

de la Fuerza Pública únicamente se desplazan generando lo que se conoce como “el efecto 

globo.”13

En aquellos lugares de Colombia en donde aun delinque la guerrilla de las FARC es 

viable, útil, legal y legítimo, el uso de las herramientas legales otorgadas por el DIH para 

neutralizarla, es decir, las operaciones ofensivas en contra de objetivos militares pueden seguir siendo la primera opción. Pero cuando se trata de acciones en medio de la población en 

donde la posibilidad de generar daños es más grande que el mal que se busca resolver, definitivamente el marco de actuación que debe regir es el de DH y la aplicación de la fuerza 

debe ser la última opción y solo debería utilizarse en legítima defensa propia o de terceros. 

Las nuevas amenazas criminales no son susceptibles de negociación política, deben 

ser enfrentadas con todo el rigor de la ley, y sus integrantes capturados y sometidos a la 

justicia. No cabe dar estatus político y de negociación a organizaciones e individuos que 

no tienen ningún tipo de ideario político o causa noble desde el punto de vista social. Se 

mueven exclusivamente por interés económico pero de manera obvia siempre ven en la 

negociación política la posibilidad de obtener beneficios y eternizar la confrontación. Por 

esta razón, buscan la intermediación de iglesias, líderes políticos, sociales e incluso organizaciones internacionales. Los grupos criminales subsisten en medio de la población y la 

utilizan. 

¿Cómo se pueden utilizar las Fuerzas Militares en un ambiente ajeno a su naturaleza 

como es la lucha contra el crimen, actuar bajo el marco normativo, tener éxito y mantener su bien más preciado—la legitimidad?

Lo primero y fundamental es conocer el tipo de amenaza que se está enfrentando. Tener un 

observatorio que permita de manera objetiva y real conocer el tipo de organizaciones y de 

delitos que se enfrentan, para poder así planear la mejor estrategia y el curso de acción en 

cada circunstancia. 

La complejidad jurídica y el ambiente garantista de las democracias occidentales 

exige de los gobiernos y su Fuerza Pública pulcritud y precisión quirúrgica en el desarrollo operacional. La participación de los abogados militares (AJO)14 con conocimiento y 

experiencia operacional ha demostrado ser eficaz en el caso colombiano. Los Comandantes deben contar en sus estados mayores con abogados que los asesoren en el proceso de 

planeación operacional, así como al momento de la ejecución y evaluación de las mismas. 

Se deben emplear reglas claras para determinar el uso de la fuerza a aplicar dependiendo del tipo de operación en que se actúa. En el caso de las Fuerzas Militares Colombianas 

se han establecido dos tipos de tarjetas que llevan las tropas a cada una de las operaciones 

identificadas por colores azul y rojo. En el caso de la tarjeta azul, el marco de acción es el 

propio de acciones policiales, es decir de DH y la fuerza se utiliza como última opción y 
172 Security and Defense Studies Review

solo en legítima defensa o de terceros. Por su parte, la tarjeta roja se utiliza en operaciones 

planeadas en el marco del DIH contra objetivos militares, en donde el uso de la fuerza se 

puede ejercer ofensivamente y si la necesidad militar lo exige de manera letal.15

Se debe trabajar de manera coordinada con la Policía Judicial, Fiscalía y en general 

todo el aparato de justicia. Cada acción en medio de la población debe estar acompañada 

por la rama judicial, para que a través de ella se establezcan las acciones penales a que haya 

lugar. Sin duda el papel de la inteligencia y los procedimientos ajustados a derecho resultan 

indispensables en la judicialización cuando se opera en un ambiente de DH.

Los errores y los posibles hechos delictuales por parte de los funcionarios públicos 

son inevitables en el ambiente operacional actual. Lo importante es siempre atender e investigar todas y cada una de las denuncias que se presenten en contra de los miembros que 

integran la Fuerza Pública. 

La verdad debe ser la premisa en toda acción, ya que los errores pueden ser perdonados cuando los mismos se cometen de buena fe, se admiten y se responde por ellos, pero la 

mentira resulta imperdonable y la afectación a la legitimidad es inminente.16

Cuando un individuo que hace parte de la Fuerza Pública incurre en una conducta 

que transgrede de manera abiertamente dolosa el código penal y las normas disciplinarias, 

se le deben ofrecer las garantías que otorgan la Constitución y la Ley para su defensa pero 

su conducta se debe apartar del ámbito institucional. La lealtad institucional debe estar por 

encima de la individual, no se puede afectar la credibilidad y legitimidad de la institución 

por tratar de defender una conducta individual cuestionable. Ejemplos de este tipo se han 

visto, cuando se captura en flagrancia individuos de la Fuerza Pública que se han valido 

de su investidura para delinquir o actuar de manera irregular. Las violaciones a los DH se 

materializan cuando funcionarios públicos cometen delitos y los mismos no se separan 

del ámbito institucional, lo cual trae consecuencias políticas, legales y económicas para la 

nación. 

Los niveles Estratégico, Operacional y Táctico que se han conocido tradicionalmente 

en el análisis de las guerras cada vez están más cerca el uno del otro. La globalización, los 

avances tecnológicos, las redes sociales, entre otros, hacen que lo que pasa en el área de 

operaciones sea esta en zona rural o urbana, se conozca casi de manera inmediata en cualquier latitud de la tierra. Hoy, situaciones tácticas pueden y generalmente tienen efectos 

a nivel estratégico, lo que hace que se pueda de manera real ganar todas y cada una de las 

acciones en el terreno, pero sin embargo generar una percepción negativa al más alto nivel 

de la opinión pública. 

La percepción que una situación particular genere en la sociedad, es determinante 

en los resultados finales de cualquier confrontación. Los Comandantes a nivel estratégico 

y operacional deben estar en permanente contacto y controlar las unidades a nivel táctico 

y tener la capacidad de reaccionar, adaptarse y tomar decisiones a medida que se den los 

acontecimientos en el terreno.

¿Cómo enfrentar las acciones políticas y jurídicas del adversario?

Una de las preocupaciones más grande que asalta a quienes integran la Fuerza Pública 

son los riesgos legales por sus acciones en contra de las nuevas amenazas en un ambiente 

totalmente garantista. Las investigaciones penales y disciplinarias con razón, amedrantan y 

en ocasiones frenan la voluntad de lucha de militares y policías. Igualmente es cierto, que 

denunciar penalmente funcionarios públicos y demandar administrativamente al Estado es 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 173

rentable política y económicamente. 

Son muchos y variados los intereses detrás de los daños y de los posibles errores 

cometidos por funcionarios de Estado. Esta situación de manera irónica favorece a los ilegales, pues mina la credibilidad del Estado frente a los ciudadanos, pero no por cierta esta 

realidad se puede satanizar a quienes de manera legal se lucran y benefician políticamente 

por errores o fallas de la Administración. La única posibilidad de acción frente a quienes 

atacan jurídica y políticamente al Estado y sus funcionarios es la denuncia ante las autoridades judiciales cuando los mismos violen la ley penal.

Dar la cara, decir la verdad y demostrar con argumentos sostenibles a nivel legal 

como se da cada una de los hechos objeto de denuncia, es la mejor y única manera de salir 

bien librados en el evento donde se cuestiona una acción de la Fuerza Pública. Por su parte, 

la peor estrategia de defensa es no dar la cara, decir mentiras, verdades a medias, o dejar 

que medios de comunicación y terceros especulen frente a lo que fue o no fue. 

Salir a defender los intereses de la Fuerza Pública alegando guerra política, jurídica 

o judicial, sin dar argumentos que expliquen a la opinión como se dieron los hechos, es 

casi igual que tomar un arma y darse un tiro en el pie. Es herir de manera profunda la legitimidad. 

Nada afecta tanto la credibilidad y el buen nombre de la Fuerza Pública, como el 

hecho de refutar una denuncia, simplemente alegando sin fundamentos de validación una 

estrategia de desprestigio del enemigo para afectar el buen nombre de la institución. Ojo! 

No con esto se quiere decir que no existan falsas denuncia, (claro que las hay!) y no han 

de ser pocas. Lo que se pretende plantear es, que si se acusa a la Fuerza Pública de manera 

falsa, es responsabilidad y obligación de los afectados convencer a la opinión y a la justicia 

que dicha aseveración carece de veracidad. No hacerlo y defenderse alegando guerra política o jurídica, es tanto como aceptar la responsabilidad de la Fuerza Pública en los hechos 

y permitir que la opinión pública, sin la información completa y veraz, saque conclusiones 

que normalmente afectan el buen nombre de la institución.

Es absolutamente posible que en situaciones de confrontación donde se hace uso de 

la fuerza se afecten o mueran personas inocentes, se dañen o destruyan bienes civiles y 

en general haya fallas en el servicio prestado por el Estado. Es por esta razón que existen 

figuras jurídicas a nivel administrativo como son la responsabilidad sin falta por riesgo 

excepcional o el daño especial,17 que adicional al concepto de falla del servicio permiten 

a quienes resulten afectados por un hecho en donde intervino la Fuerza Pública accedan a 

compensación económica por el daño sufrido.

La Conciliación Prejudicial o Judicial18 para resarcir los daños generados por el Estado a través de sus funcionarios es un excelente mecanismo que de manera rápida atiende 

las víctimas de situaciones inesperadas y no deseadas. Adicionalmente, desestimula a 

quienes pretenden obtener beneficios políticos y económicos en contra de la institucionalidad y cuando se demuestra la buena fe en la acción por parte de los funcionarios de estado, 

los puede exonerar de responsabilidad penal, disciplinaria y administrativa. 

Reflexión final

Los Gobiernos tienen en las Fuerzas Militares un instrumento válido y eficaz en la lucha contra las nuevas realidades que afectan la seguridad y quebrantan la estabilidad 

democrática de las instituciones del Estado. Resulta fundamental eso sí, revisar la doctrina 
174 Security and Defense Studies Review

y adaptar la Fuerza Militar a las nuevas amenazas. De lo contrario se puede terminar haciendo mayor daño que el que se pretende evitar o detener.

Los DH son la base de las normas que sustentan el accionar del Gobierno y su Fuerza 

Pública en la lucha contra las nuevas amenazas y eso implica un uso de la fuerza limitado 

y restringido en su confrontación. Si las Fuerzas Militares son requeridas por los gobiernos 

para enfrentar realidades criminales, deben adaptarse al fenómeno que enfrentan sin perder 

su naturaleza y actuar en el ámbito que por excelencia y desde su creación ha pertenecido 

a la Policía.

Por su parte, el DIH es un instrumento jurídico amplio idóneo que permite a los 

comandantes el uso de la fuerza de manera ofensiva dentro de unos parámetros objetivos 

como son el nivel de organización de los grupos armados y el nivel de intensidad de la 

violencia que despliegan. Si estos parámetros se dan y existen las condiciones jurídicas 

dentro de los Estados, como de hecho ocurre en Colombia, además de la férrea voluntad 

política para confrontar a los grupos armados, la neutralización a través de esta normativa 

es practicable y eficaz.

En el siglo XXI, las sociedades democráticas se sienten a gusto con sus libertades y 

cada día son más las voces exigiendo a los gobiernos sus derechos y garantías conquistadas, que a pesar de la existencia de la criminalidad no están dispuestas a ceder. Son muchos 

los beneficios que ha obtenido la humanidad a partir del reconocimiento y el ejercicio de 

autoridad a nivel universal (Naciones Unidas/ONU) y regional (Organización de Estados 

Americanos/OEA) en materia de respeto de la dignidad del individuo y sus derechos. Estas 

realidades implican un reto grande para las instituciones encargadas de la seguridad y la 

defensa, que deben cumplir la misión y ser efectivos en contra de las nuevas amenazas en 

un marco legal garantista, que no tolera y denuncia los excesos.

El intangible de la legitimidad es y seguirá siendo el mayor capital y baluarte del 

Gobierno y la Fuerza Pública, el cual no se puede ignorar ni mucho menos sacrificar en 

el enfrentamiento a los grupos armados ilegales y las nuevas amenazas. El privilegio de 

gobernar y de tener el monopolio en el uso de las armas a nombre de la sociedad obliga a 

quienes ejercen esta facultad a realizarlo de forma legal y con apego a los más altos valores 

éticos y morales. 

Ni los gobiernos ni la Fuerza Pública pueden cambiar la dirección de los vientos 

en materia legal y de derechos fundamentales y garantías, pero si pueden y deben ajustar 

sus velas y sus procedimientos para cumplir los ideales democráticos, brindar seguridad 

y defensa dentro de un marco que les permita mantener la credibilidad y legitimidad de la 

población que justifica su existencia.
Cooperation and Controversy

2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 177

The Honduran Coup of 2009: Application of the 

Inter-American Democratic Charter

Kevin Newmeyer

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the Honduran Coup of 2009 as a case study of the 

application of the Organization of American States Inter-American Democratic 

Charter. The Charter, unanimously approved by the Organization in September 

2001, consolidated and built upon earlier OAS efforts to support and defend 

democracy in the hemisphere. The study highlights the steps taken by the OAS 

and its member states and examines the difficulties multilateral organizations 

have in trying to effect democratic changes inside of a state. While the OAS 

took the severest actions permitted by the accord, the coup was not reversed. The 

sanctions remained in place nearly two years afterwards.

The events in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, in late June 2009 challenged the Organization of 

American States (OAS) and its ability to ensure democratic governance in accordance 

with the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC). The Charter and its commitment 

to democratic governance and constitutional succession came face to face with a classic 

military coup (Colburn & Trejos, 2010, p. 11; Hernandez, 2010). Coups in the Americas 

were thought to be a thing of the past with only the 2002 coup attempt in Venezuela occurring since 1996 (Colburn & Trejos, 2010; McCoy, 2006). When the Honduran military 

placed President Zelaya on a plane in the middle of the night on June 28, 2009, it put in 

motion a series of events that led the Organization of American States to invoke the IADC 

that continues to the present day. This paper will look at the invocation of the Charter and 

its effectiveness, or lack thereof, as a study in international governance and the ability of 

international actors to respond to challenges in domestic crises that challenge representative democracy. It will assess the tools invoked under the Charter and their effectiveness in 

achieving an outcome. It will also look at the variables involved in Honduras and how they 

affected the actions of the principle international actors in the crisis and their effects on the 

underlying democratic principles challenged by the coup.

Background

President Manuel Zelaya won the 2005 election as the leader of one of the two centerright parties that dominated Honduran politics for many years (Thale, 2009; Vargas Llosa, 

2009). In 2007, he announced he had become socialist and strengthened ties with Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and the Chávez-led Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America 

(ALBA) (Thale, 2009; Vargas Llosa, 2009). Due to leave office in January 2010 at the end 

of his term according to the Honduran Constitution, Zelaya initiated a call for a public 

referendum on changing the Constitution that many thought would allow him to run again 

(MSNBC News Service, 2009; Thale, 2009; Vargas Llosa, 2009). Several ALBA leaders 

including Chávez and Morales used the constitutional convention process to establish new 

constitutions that allowed them to continue with multiple terms in office (Colburn & Tre-
178 Security and Defense Studies Review

jos, 2010; Vargas Llosa, 2009). Ortega in Nicaragua used a packed Supreme Court to gain a 

favorable ruling to allow him to run for a consecutive term (Bremer, 2009). The Honduran 

Constitution of 1982 contained specific prohibitions on succession, and even calling for a 

change to the constitution to allow for succession was a violation (Sanchez, 2009; Vargas 

Llosa, 2009). Article 239 of the Honduran Constitution of 1982 states “No citizen who has 

already served as head of the Executive Branch can be President or Vice-President. Whoever violates this law or proposes its reform, as well as those that support such violation 

directly or indirectly, will immediately cease in their functions and will be unable to hold 

any public office for a period of 10 years” (Sanchez, 2009, pp.1-2).

On June 26, Zelaya ordered government employees to participate in the referendum on the coming Sunday, June 28 (Sanchez, 2009). Zelaya never specifically discussed 

the nature of the constitutional reform he was seeking (Thale, 2009). He did nonetheless 

frighten the oligarchies and power brokers in Honduras, and he lost the support of his 

party (Thale, 2009). His calls for the referendum and related actions involving the ballots 

triggered the Honduran Supreme Court to issue several rulings stopping the referendum 

and directing Zelaya to follow the Constitution (Sanchez, 2009; Vargas Llosa, 2009). This 

resulted in a situation where a consensus of the other branches of government and power 

in Honduras believed that Zelaya was abusing his power as president and violating the 

Constitution (Hernandez citing a cable from U.S. Ambassador Llorens, 2010). This set in 

motion the classic Honduran military response to a president they disagreed with, a plane 

trip to Costa Rica in the middle of the night (Hernandez, 2010; MSNBC News Service, 

2009; Thale, 2009).

The coup was immediately denounced internationally (Hernandez, 2010; MSNBC, 

2009). The Permanent Council of the Organization of American States issued a resolution 

(CP/Res. 953) on June 28, 2010, that condemned the coup and convened an extraordinary 

session of the organization’s General Assembly (OAS, 2009a). On June 30, 2010, the General Assembly issued Resolution AG/RES. 1 (XXXVII-E/09), invoking the Inter-American 

Democratic Charter Article 20 (OAS, 2009b).

The Organization of American States and the Inter-American Democratic Charter

The Organization of American States is the oldest regional organization in the world. It 

currently has 35 member states including Cuba in a suspended status (OAS, 2011). With its 

foundational Charter signed in 1948, it adopted the principle that member states should be 

representational democracies (Fabry, 2009, p. 110). Over the intervening years the member 

states adopted additional resolutions and declarations in support of democracy efforts and 

rejection of nondemocratic forms of governance. The Santiago Commitment adopted by 

General Assembly Resolution AG/Res. 1080 in 1991 declared representative democracy as 

the only legitimate form of government in the hemisphere (Fabry, 2009, p. 110). Adopted 

the same day as the attacks of 9/11, the Inter-American Democratic Charter represented the 

culmination of the defense of democracy process in the Organization of American States 

(Fabry, 2009, p. 110). The Charter reinforces the Santiago Commitment to representative 

democracy as the only legitimate form of government for the Western Hemisphere (Fabry, 

2009, p.108). Constitutional succession following the end of a term is the recognized and 

accepted way to transfer power (Colburn & Trejos, 2010, p.11). While not immune to 

charges that the commitment to democracy was held hostage to realpolitik during the Cold 

War (Levitt, 2006), the Organization has shown a steady tendency to support the develop-
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 179

ment of democracy within the region.

The April 2001 Summit of the Americas directed the OAS foreign ministers (the 

highest body within the OAS system) to draft the IADC to consolidate and strengthen the 

Organization’s active efforts in defense of democracy and eliminate emerging forms of 

authoritarianism in the region (Levitt, 2006, p. 95; Fabry, 2009, p. 111).

Article 21 requires the suspension of a member state following an interruption of 

the democratic order (Levitt, 2006, p.96; OAS, 2001). The coup in Honduras triggered 

the consultations required by IADC Article 20 and the suspension required by Article 21. 

While debate occurred on whether it was a coup or not (Hernández, 2010; Sánchez, 2009; 

Vargas Llosa, 2009), the consensus of international opinion in the OAS and United Nations 

labeled it a coup (MSNBC News Service, 2009).

Over the following days and weeks, various factions within the Americas took actions to attempt to reverse the coup. The Hondurans installed the head of the Congress, Roberto Michelette, as the interim president. Zelaya, from his exile, vowed to return. He was 

supported by Chávez and his ALBA supporters. Their efforts even included using Chávez’s 

presidential plane to fly Zelaya and others back to Tegucigalpa where the Honduran military thwarted efforts to land by blocking the runway with military vehicles (Wilkenson & 

Rendros, 2009). Eventually Zelaya was smuggled across the land border from Nicaragua 

and took refuge inside the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa (Walter & Cancel, 2009). 

After his efforts to be reinstated failed, he eventually went into exile in the Dominican 

Republic following the swearing in of President Lobo in January 2010 (Ellingwood & 

Rendros, 2010). Honduras was restored to full membership at the OAS General Assembly 

in June, 2011 (OAS, 2011).

Policy Issue

The fundamental policy issue involved was the extra-constitutional alteration of power that 

was properly classified as a coup. This presented the Inter-American community with a 

clear violation of the IADC and initiated a series of actions by international organizations, 

nation states, and organs of each.

The consensus trend of OAS and United Nations governance is that coups are a violation of democratic order. In the case of the OAS, this requires the Organization and its 

member states to undertake efforts to restore democratic legitimacy. Articles 19, 20, and 21 

of the Inter-American Democratic Charter specify the actions to be taken.

Article 19 states that an unconstitutional interruption or alteration of the democratic 

order or constitutional regime within a member state presents an insurmountable barrier to 

participation within the Organization (OAS, 2001, Art. 19). This is the article that forced 

the OAS to suspend Honduras once the action was declared a coup.

Article 20 allows for the Secretary General or any member state to call for the Organization’s daily governing body, the Permanent Council, to convene and initiate diplomatic 

efforts to resolve the crisis (OAS, 2001, Art. 20). Included among the options for the Permanent Council was the ability to convene an emergency session of the General Assembly 

to consider the matter. This is in effect an escalation of diplomatic initiatives and pressure.

Article 21 grants the General Assembly the power to suspend the member state immediately from all activities of the OAS (OAS, 2001, Art. 21). It in fact requires the General Assembly to suspend if it determines there is a violation of democratic order (OAS, 

2001, Art. 21; Levitt, 2006, p. 96). The suspension required a 2/3 vote. This is significant in 
180 Security and Defense Studies Review

the case of Honduras and in light of the general pattern of operations of the OAS. Normally 

the Organization operates and votes on a consensus model that tends to lead to accommodative responses to issues (Levitt, p. 97-98).

On June 28, 2009, the OAS reacted to the overnight removal and deportation of 

Zelaya by convening a special meeting of the Permanent Council at the request of the 

Secretary General in accordance with Article 20 of the IADC (OAS, 2009a). That meeting 

unanimously adopted Resolution CP/953 (1700/09), which condemned the coup de état, 

the ouster of Zelaya, and the alteration of the democratic order in Honduras; it also called 

a special session of the General Assembly for June 30, 2009 (OAS, 2009a).

The June 30th session of the General Assembly continued actions in accordance with 

the IADC. It confirmed the actions of the Permanent Council in condemning the coup and 

unconstitutional disruption of democratic order, ordered the safe return and restoration of 

Zelaya, declared that no government arising from the coup would be recognized by the 

Organization, and tasked the Secretary General and others to attempt diplomatic initiatives to resolve the crisis (OAS, 2009b). The resolution also established a 72-hour window 

before invoking Article 21 of the IADC and the required suspension of Honduras. The 

deadline passed and Honduras was suspended by the General Assembly on July 4, 2009 

(OAS, 2009c).

Over the next several months, various diplomatic efforts occurred without achieving 

the restoration of Zelaya. The United States suspended millions in non-humanitarian aid to 

Honduras on September 3, 2009 (Kellerhals, 2009). In late October, the powers in Honduras agreed to the Tegucigalpa–San José Accord negotiated by Oscar Arias without allowing 

the restoration of Zelaya. The accord led to the acceptance of the interim unity government 

by others within the region, the provision for the scheduled general election in November 

2009 followed by the winner taking office in January 2010, and the establishment of a 

truth commission to investigate the events surrounding the removal of Zelaya (Honduras 

News, 2009). Essentially, the Honduran leadership waited out the international community 

(Colburn & Trejos, 2010, p. 15).

President Lobo won the election and was sworn in as President in January 2010. The 

truth commission began its investigation in May 2010 and continues its work. Following 

Lobo’s inauguration, bilateral U.S. and European Union aid resumed; but the OAS still has 

not lifted its Article 21 sanctions (UPI, 2010).

Policy Outcome

Even though the OAS sanctions remained in place in 2011, Honduras effectively outlasted 

the pressure. The IADC failed to prevent or reverse the actions taken by forces within 

Honduras. Zelaya never regained the presidency and continued to be in exile. The truth 

commission created in the San Jose accord continues its investigation. The results may provide closure. On February 17, 2011, the Honduran Congress approved a referendum that, if 

approved, will significantly alter the constitution (Latinnews Daily, 2011). Included among 

the reforms are alterations to Article 239 to allow for presidential reelection (Latinews 

Daily, 2011).

The limited ability of a regional organization to change events inside of a member 

country is not new. Levitt (2006) argued that domestic politics in the member states determined the action the states took under the umbrella of multilateral institutions. He also 

pointed to the lack of authoritative definitions of democratic governance and what con-
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 181

stituted a basis for intervention (2006, pp. 95-97). McCoy noted that when confronted by 

mass protests combined with murky legislative or military action to remove a president, 

the international community will grudgingly accept the fait accompli and focus on the follow on transition and return to constitutional order (2009, p. 771). This is clearly the line 

of action the United States followed with Honduras. Fabry (2009, p.108-109) pointed to 

the weakness of international law and organizations in determining internal constitutionality. Stich and Miller (2008) in their discussion of policy networks stated that the basic 

social structures and rules limited the actions of the coalitions involved, consistent with 

Fabry for international actors. In this case the Hondurans (Sánchez, 2009; Vargas Llosa, 

2009) argued that the actions taken were legal and just in accordance with the Honduran 

Constitution, whereas the OAS clearly rejected this assertion. Given the difficulty of the 

international community in a case as clear as Honduras in 2009, the more subtle challenges 

to democratic governance posed by some members of the ALBA alliance clearly challenge 

the OAS and the Inter-American Democratic Charter (Colburn & Trejos, 2010; Fabry, 

2009; Levitt, 2006; McCoy, 2006). 

The competing coalitions within the OAS kept Honduras in suspension. U.S. efforts 

to lift the Article 21 restrictions remain stymied, with Brazil and Argentina leading the resistance (Quinn, 2010). The OAS Secretary General Insulza (2010) cited the success of the 

coup and the de facto government in holding on until the ascension of Lobo; and although 

recognizing the reluctance of some sectors, he called for normalization with Honduras in 

his opening address to the 2010 General Assembly. Again this reflects the friction of competing policy networks (Stich & Miller, 2006) and the limited set of tools available to international policy makers and the structural limitations on using them (The Johns Hopkins 

Center for Civil Society Studies, 2003).

Democratic Principles Involved

The coup and its aftermath presented a number of challenges to democratic governance. 

First and foremost, the interruption of the constitutional order without due process violated 

the fundamental requirement of consent of the governed. The removal by force, in lieu of 

an arrest and trial for Zelaya if he had in fact violated the Honduran Constitution and his 

duties as President, violated the rule of law.

The unequal distribution of wealth and power in Honduras contributed to the problems. Zelaya played the neopopulist card (McCoy, 2006; Thale, 2010), which challenged 

the oligarchs. Latin America in general suffers from great disparity in wealth and chronically weak rule of law (Colburn & Trejos), allowing elites to act as they please with great 

impunity. The success of the coup continued the discrediting of democratic institutions in 

the region and highlighted the weaknesses of the international institutions to effect change 

(Colburn & Trejos, 2010, p. 12; Insulza, 2010; Levitt, 2006). 

Another area of concern in the Honduras coup centered on allegations of human 

rights violations (Insulza, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2011). Grandin (2009) cited Amnesty International reports of police beatings of protestors and mass detentions of Zelaya 

supporters, especially following Zelaya’s return to the country. The Truth Commission has 

been charged with investigating this issue but no prosecutions have occurred to date. These 

allegations should continue to receive international attention. 
182 Security and Defense Studies Review

Relationships and Network Interactions

The Honduras Coup of 2009 and its aftermath involved the interactions between numerous 

actors and policy networks inside and outside of the country. Internal interactions included 

the president and the other constitutional organs of Honduran government; the president 

with his citizenry; and the president with the country’s nongovernment power centers. On 

the international level there are multiple bi-lateral and multi-lateral interactions to consider.

On the national level, the following network/variables are significant in the coup and 

its aftermath:

1. The interactions between the Constitutional Authorities in Honduras: President Zelaya, the Congress, and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found Zelaya to be violating the Constitution in his push for the referendum, and congress launched an investigation prior to the coup (Latin American Newsletters, 2010, p. 2). Congress accepted 

the purported resignation of Zelaya following his arrest and removal to Costa Rica and 

voted Micheletti, the constitutional successor, as the interim president.

2. Zelaya and the military. Prior to the coup, Zelaya ordered the dismissal of the head of 

the armed forces in reaction to the military, executing the orders of the Supreme Court 

to seize the referendum ballots (Latin American Newsletters, 2010, p. 2). An army 

unit seized Zelaya from his home in the early hours of June 28 and flew him to Costa 

Rica (Latin America Newsletters, 2010; Hernández. 2010; Thale, 2009). This action 

was key to the issue being labeled a coup and invoking the IADC (Latin America 

Newsletters, 2010, p.3). It was a poor choice in response to a real threat to democracy 

(Colburn & Trejos, 2010, p. 11; Vargas Llosa, 2009). Had an arrest occurred and judicial processes been observed, the international response could have been significantly 

different.

3. Zelaya and the oligarchs. As Vargas Llosa (2009) commented, Zelaya came from the 

oligarchy and changed midterm. As he took more steps down the ALBA playbook on 

retaining power, tension increased and the business and political elites in the country 

opposed Zelaya.

4. Zelaya and the public. Leveraging the inequities in Honduran society, Zelaya appealed 

to the leftist elements within the country. The protests and counterprotests following 

his removal indicate the appeal he had with some segments of the population (Walter 

& Cancel, 2009).

On the international level a multitude of policy networks became involved with Zelaya and the coup. Bilateral and multilateral interactions occurred and were intimately 

involved in the immediate and long-term results of the crisis.

1. Honduras and the OAS. As the multilateral organization most closely related with the 

crisis, the OAS faced significant challenges with the build up to and the aftermath of 

the coup. The OAS did invoke the Inter-American Democratic Charter and for the 

first time suspended a member state for violating the IADC. This remains a significant 

policy decision. The crisis also showed the limited power of a regional organization 

to produce desired outcomes in a member state opposed to the international solution 

(Levitt, 2006). The continued suspension of Honduras after the election of Lobo reflected the rivalries within the OAS itself.
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 183

2. ALBA and the OAS. ALBA led the calls for OAS action on Honduras (Latin American Newsletters, 2010; MSNBC News Service, 2009). Chávez was able to seize the 

initiative in the public opinion arena. 

3. Zelaya and ALBA. Following the coup, ALBA provided a platform and tools to 

exploit the public relations game for Zelaya. The aborted flight to Tegucigalpa on 

Chávez’s plane (Wilkenson & Rendros, 2009) and the eventual smuggling of Zelaya 

into Honduras (Walter & Cancel, 2009) were victories for ALBA in keeping the outside pressure on Honduras.

4. ALBA and the United States. Chávez formed his alliance as a counter to Washington 

and its liberal economic policies. Relations between the two have been poor for many 

years. The U.S. response to the 2002 Venezuelan coup provided fuel to Chávez and an 

indication of potential future reactions when a regime disinclined to U.S. interests is 

pushed aside (Fabry, 2009; Levitt, 2006; McCoy, 2006).

5. U.S. and Honduras. The United States followed the OAS line in the initial response to 

the crisis. Although U.S. law required the suspension of aid with the coup, the issue 

was “studied” for a few days (Thale, 2009) with aid formerly suspended in September 

2009 (Kellerhals, 2009). While Zelaya may not have been a U.S. favorite, public declarations by the administration conformed to the coup characterization (Hernández, 

2010; MSNBC News Service, 2009; Thale, 2009). The U.S. led efforts to normalize 

relations with Honduras following the inauguration of Lobo and the implementation of 

San Jose-Tegucigalpa Accord (Quinn, 2010; UPI, 2010).

6. U.S. and the OAS. In the globalized, post–Cold War, post–financial crisis world of 

2009 and beyond, the United States does not have its historic leverage (Levitt, 2006, 

p. 113; McCoy, 2006, p. 772). Rising regional powers such as Brazil pushed back and 

delayed normalization (Insulza, 2010). The multilateral structure of the Organization 

frustrated the United States (Kuleta, 2011).

Insights

Perhaps the most telling insight from the coup is that coups can still occur. While Latin 

American history is riddled with military coups dating almost to the independence from 

Spain (Galeano, 1997), McCoy (2006) noted the marked decrease since 1990 with the last 

coup before Honduras being Venezuela in 2002. 

The coup also pointed out the continued weakness of the international organizations 

in resolving democracy issues and overt threats to democracy. The system remains constrained by the traditions of classical national sovereignty and a tradition of nonintervention in internal affairs (Levitt, 2006). All the reviews are not bad, however. The OAS took 

a decisive stance in this coup and implemented the tools available. This was the first time 

that the OAS suspended a member state for violation of the Inter-American Democratic 

Charter. The weakness lies in the limited tools available. The IADC depends on the willingness of the member state to take action and its receptiveness to diplomatic good offices.

The external implementation of democracy remains difficult, if not impossible. Democracy is a complex, interrelated set of beliefs and practices for domestic governments 

in how they respond and interact with their citizenry (Fabry, 2009, p. 108). International 

organizations such as the OAS or United Nations are not designed to resolve governance 

conflicts within individual countries (Fabry, 2009, p. 108). This is the case even in such 

a classic challenge to the democratic order as the 2009 coup in Honduras. The system is 
184 Security and Defense Studies Review

even less capable to respond in situations where the tools and trappings of democratic governance are used to support and strengthen authoritarianism such as in Venezuela, Bolivia, 

and Ecuador (Colburn & Trejos, 2010). In each of those countries, democratically elected 

leaders have used what Colburn and Trejos (2010) called “constitutional subterfuge” to 

drastically alter property rights, freedom of speech, and governmental separation of powers. Apart from efforts in Nicaragua in 2005, when internal factions aligned to attempt 

implementation of constitutional changes to limit the power of the sitting president, the 

OAS did not invoke the Inter-American Democratic Charter for an internal governance 

issue (McCoy, 2006, p. 766). 

Another insight draws from the increased role of other regional actors in the hemisphere. The US role as the dominant economic and political power in the OAS traditionally was mitigated by the smaller powers such as Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. Brazil 

assumed a significant role in the Honduran crisis when Zelaya took refuge in the nation’s 

Tegucigalpa mission (Heine, 2009). The recent regional trend of increasing subregional integration and formation of new multilateral institutions offers additional areas for research. 

SICA, the Central America Integration System, moved to reinstate Honduras in July 2010 

(Americas Society, 2010). The readmission by its neighbors is significant. Brazil, as the 

emerging global power in the region, remains key to full reintegration of Honduras within 

the OAS system. 

The unanimity of the rejection of the coup was significant. Although the United 

States was likely not very fond of Zelaya and his swing toward ALBA, it did condemn the 

coup immediately. This was not the case with the 2002 coup in Venezuela (Levitt, 2006, pp. 

110-113). One challenge to action in the OAS has been the tradition of consensus. While 

it has not been used thus far in the Honduras case, Article 23 of the IADC only requires a 

2/3 majority to lift sanctions (OAS, 2001). Recently, the OAS passed nonunanimous resolutions on the Nicaragua–Costa Rica border dispute (OAS, 2010). A move away from the 

consensus model may allow for greater action, especially on internal threats to democratic 

governance.

Given the nature and structure of the OAS, an area for further research would be 

evaluating its ability and likely response in the event of an Egypt or Tunisia-like movement in Cuba or one of the more authoritarian states. At present Cuba has very limited 

Internet access, and the government highly restricts its use (Miroff, 2011). If communications technology were to spread on the island, it would make for interesting times. Given 

Cuba’s suspended status with the OAS and its strong support from Chávez and his ALBA 

allies, there is little likelihood of direct intervention in a consensus manner. It would likely 

produce highly charged debates and calls for action. For an organization with spreading 

democracy as one of its missions, it will most likely have to take some concrete steps to 

support a broad-based citizen initiative. Rising food prices provide another potential trigger for widespread unrest. Several countries in the hemisphere are at risk of food riots 

(Larkin, 2011).

Summary

The Honduras Coup of 2009 brought a direct implementation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. The organization took immediate action but was unable to restore Zelaya to 

office. This situation reiterated the difficulty that international institutions have in resolving 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 185

internal crises of democracy. The current tool set at the disposal of regional organizations 

like the OAS is insufficient to force democratic change on an unwilling member state. The 

common tools of economic leverage (aid cutoff, suspension of project, trade embargos, 

etc.) would, in fact, probably hurt the poorest elements in the society, who are not even 

likely to have been involved in the threat to democracy (Fabry, 2009, p.130). The events 

of the Arab Spring of 2011 in North Africa and elsewhere offer potential for regional organizations to support citizen-driven efforts for greater democracy. It will be interesting to 

see if they rise to the challenge. 
186 Security and Defense Studies Review

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2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 189

 Constitutional Coups? 

Military Interventions in Latin America

Howard J. Wiarda and Hilary Collins*

ABSTRACT

Americans are so committed to elections and democracy as the only legitimate 

path to political power that it is sometimes hard to conceive of politics by other 

means. Moreover U.S. policy-makers tend to believe that elections occupy 

a higher realm of moral authority, and hope that, with democracy-assistance 

programs, Latin America and other developing areas will “move beyond” 

revolutions, coup d’états, general strikes, and other non-electoral routes to power. 

But as the Silvert quote below indicates, non-electoral paths may still be pursued 

especially in crisis circumstances; furthermore, these extra-electoral means may 

enjoy both legitimacy and constitutional mandate. In this article we test these 

propositions as they apply in Latin America. 

“Military coups are a regular, recurrent, normal part of the Latin American 

political process.” 

—Kalman H. Silvert†

Democracy Policy in Latin America

At least since President Ronald Reagan, the US has been pursuing a pro-democracy foreign 

policy. His administration created the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and 

its subsidiary organizations, the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National 

Democratic Institute (NDI). He then used these organizations to influence the creation of 

a moderate, centrist, elected, middle way in Central America; to help support democratic 

movements in Eastern Europe; and to help delegitimize the non-democratic regime in the 

Soviet Union. Every president since then, with variation, has followed the Reagan agenda 

of seeking to advance democracy; by this time we have democracy/human rights offices in 

the State Department, Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency; and such international 

organizations as the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS) 

have adopted democracy charters and/or democracy offices. Still, with all of Reagan’s efforts to promote democracy both domestically and abroad, there exists the possibility of 

military intervention in many countries in the Hemisphere. 

The opinions expressed in the Security and Defense Studies Review do not necessarily reflect those of the Center 

for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the National Defense University, or the U.S. Department of Defense.

*

An earlier version of this paper was published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, 

Washington, DC, 2011). 

† Kalman H. Silvert, The Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin America, New Orleans, LA, Hauser 

Press, 1961.
190 Security and Defense Studies Review

In the course of pursuing his democracy-promotion agenda, Reagan discovered a 

number of advantages, which helps explain why his successors have followed and expanded the policy and why it has wide bipartisan support. First, it gives moral purpose to US 

foreign policy and reinforces the longtime American belief that the United States is a “beacon on a hill,” and a “light to the world”; no one would dare to disagree with that. Second, 

it serves as a way to unite the often-feuding departments and agencies—State Department, 

Defense Department, CIA, and now FBI and Homeland Security Department—behind the 

policy, to overcome what in the academic literature is called the “bureaucratic politics” 

of foreign policy decision-making. Third, Reagan discovered that democracy promotion 

is good domestic politics; he found that otherwise opposing religious and human rights 

groups, the media, and the other party in Congress would support his policies if they were 

stated in pro-democracy terms. Finally, Reagan discovered that democracy promotion was 

good policy in Central America, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union, leading generally 

to moderate, centrist, middle-of-the-road governments that are easier for the US to deal 

with than either right-wing authoritarians or Marxist regimes. Moral purpose and good 

policy were thus combined. 

Then, when the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia, for a time, as well as Eastern 

Europe, adopted democracy, the agenda seemed vindicated. In his famous book, The End 

of History,

1

 Francis Fukuyama argued that democracy was the terminus of the Hegelian 

dialectic;other political scientists proclaimed that democracy was “the only game in town.” 

The funds for NED were vastly increased and one prominent neoconservative predicted 

that in a short time “all the world would be democratic.” With regard to Latin America, 

the mantra became that all countries, except Cuba, were democratic. Within foreign affairs 

agencies like the State Department, the Agency for International Development, and others, 

the consensus on the democracy agenda was so strong that no other alternatives or possibilities were considered. The few doubters—Samuel Huntington (The Clash of Civilizations),2

 Peter Berger (Many Globalizations), 3 and other scholars who suggested democracy 

was incomplete or partial—were either dismissed or ignored. 

Now, the wheel has turned once again. First, the United States itself is not doing so 

well economically and there is less eagerness in the Third World to emulate the US model. 

Second, China is doing spectacularly well; the Asian model of strong state direction and 

close coordination between the public and private sectors is widely popular. Third, twenty 

years’ experience has shown that some so-called democracies continue to utilize repressive 

practices; additionally, fourth, that democracy by itself does not, as Latin American citizens 

expected, automatically produce social and economic improvement. And fifth, in quite a 

number of countries (Belarus, Russia, Venezuela, and Honduras) there have been reversals 

of democracy or the use of the “democracy” label to disguise undemocratic practices. 

This article focuses on one aspect of this issue, namely the constitutional role of the 

armed forces in Latin America.4

 The dilemma, as exemplified by the coup d’état that ousted 

President Zelaya in Honduras in 2009, is that while the US and the OAS push the democracy agenda, the Honduran and other Latin American constitutions say something different. Because Americans strongly believe in civilian control over the military—and that any 

armed forces meddling in the political order represents a usurpation—it is hard to conceive 

that other norms, even constitutional ones, may prevail in other countries. 

In Latin America, while one constitutional article may proclaim that the armed forces 

are “non-political, non-deliberative, and totally subservient to civilian authority,” another 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 191

will say they have a special responsibility, even an “obligation,” to intervene under certain 

circumstances: if the country is attacked, if internal order is upset, or if the political system 

is gridlocked. Those latter provisions are open invitations for the armed forces to involve 

themselves, legally and constitutionally, in the political process. That is essentially what 

happened in Honduras. Apparently ignoring or unaware of these provisions, the United 

States condemned the coup from the beginning and maintained that posture throughout 

the dispute, but eventually, bowing to reality, opted to support a process under which new 

elections were held and, thus, “constitutionality” was maintained. Others, notably Brazil 

and the OAS, still do not comprehend, or are hostile to, this special and constitutional role 

for the armed forces. 

It is useful, therefore, to look at this issue systematically. We examined carefully the 

constitutions of all the Latin American countries, highlighting passages that deal with the 

armed forces, police, or national security.5 Our goal was to see in which countries the socalled “poder moderador” (moderating power) of the armed force still applies and what the 

precise language is for each country. Our working hypothesis was that the Latin American 

constitutions elevate the armed forces into almost a fourth branch of government, with 

special obligations and responsibilities. Further, that these requirements oblige the armed 

forces to play a political role even if they are reluctant to do so. And finally, that these constitutional provisions and the “organic law” of the armed forces may be at odds both with 

the US democracy-promotion efforts and with international laws as manifested in such 

instruments as the OAS’s Charter of Democracy. In short, if national law and custom are in 

conflict with international conventions and policies, something has to give. 

Findings 

Our findings are divided into three categories. Each Latin American country is different, 

and their constitutions are different, which means we have to carefully distinguish among 

countries. 

Countries with No Official Armed Forces

Three countries have no official or regular armed forces. These are: Costa Rica, Haiti, and 

Panama. In the Costa Rican case the armed forces were abolished by President José (Pepé) 

Figueres following the brief 1948 civil war because Figueres was anti-military, the armed 

forces had been on the wrong (losing) side in the civil war, he wanted to save money, and 

he wished to prevent the possibility of a future coup d’état against himself. The armed 

forces were replaced by a national police force. In the Haitian case, the armed forces were 

abolished in the hope that abolition would prevent future coups and set Haiti on the path 

to development and democracy. The pressure to abolish the Haitian armed forces came 

mainly from the international community, and chiefly from the United States, in the hope 

that without a military organization, outside forces would not have to be sent in so often. 

As in Costa Rica, the armed forces were replaced by a small police force.

Panama has never had armed forces because the United States, occupying the Canal 

Zone, did not want trouble or competition from the Panamanians. Instead, Panama has a 

National Guard which functions de facto as a national police or armed force. 

Just because these countries have police forces and guardias, and not armed forces, 

does not necessarily mean their police are not also politicized. The Costa Rican police are 
192 Security and Defense Studies Review

tough and very well-trained; there has not been a coup in decades, but that has not prevented the police, even in a solidly democratic context, from sometimes putting pressure 

on the government, getting involved (to a limited extent) in drug deals and other illegal 

acts, and operating at times outside of their legal mandate. The Haitian police have been 

generally poorly trained, poorly paid, often inept and corrupt; they were largely ineffective 

following the 2010 earthquake, and they remain a dangerous force in Haitian politics. The 

Panamanian Guardia is highly politicized and, at one time, constituted the route to power 

for Panamanian generals, the most notorious being Manuel Noriega, later arrested in a US 

intervention. 

Countries Whose Armed Forces Have No or Extremely Limited Constitutional Role

A second category is those countries that have armed forces with a limited constitutional 

role. Democratic institutions may be sufficiently resilient that there is no need for armed 

forces to maintain internal order, or the role of the armed forces is spelled out in organic 

laws which are a step below constitutional provisions, or they are seeking to convey a 

negative message to their armed forces because of past “sins”—i.e., long years of military 

dictatorship. The message is: don’t intervene again because it would have no constitutional 

legitimacy. The countries that fall into this category tend to be developed and institutionalized. The only country that fully fits this category (no mention in the constitution) is Argentina, although Chile, Cuba, Mexico, and Uruguay come close to this norm. 

• Argentina: The Argentine Constitution of 1853, last reformed in 1994, contains no 

mention of the military instrument. 

• Chile: The Chilean Constitution of 1980, last reformed in 2010, says the armed forces 

are “obedient, non-deliberative, professional, and disciplined; their only constitutional 

roles are to “defend the motherland and safeguard the political order during elections.” 

This latter role could, conceivably, draw the Chilean armed force into politics (who 

would decide when the “public order” needed defending, by what means, and for how 

long?), but in the Chilean case, that seems highly unlikely. However, it was only in 

2010, two decades after the return to democracy, that Chile removed from its constitution the last vestiges that gave special privileges to the armed forces. 

• Cuba: The Cuban Constitution of 1976, last amended in 1992, says the Revolutionary 

Armed Forces “and other armed organizations” (presumably militias and vigilante 

groups) have the right to vote and be elected like any other Cuban citizen. No other 

mention is made of the armed forces in the constitution. But “all citizens” in Cuba 

have the obligation to defend the motherland and the “Revolution,” and to struggle 

against colonialism, racism, and imperialism. The obligation to defend the Revolution 

could drag the Cuban armed forces into politics, and most observers agree that in any 

post-Castro transition the armed forces will play a major role. 

• Mexico: The Mexican Constitution of 1917, last amended in 2007, says that members 

of the military cannot be elected as congressional deputies unless they resign ninety 

days prior to the election; it also says “in times of peace, no military authority may 

perform any function other than those that are directly connected with military discipline.” Other than these provisions, the Mexican armed forces have no constitutional 

role and, since the 1940s, have largely stayed out of politics. They operate as an interest group and a bureaucratic actor not unlike the United States armed forces but their 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 193

recent involvement, complementing and sometimes supplementing the police in the 

war against crime and drugs, may lead to their greater participation. 

• Uruguay: The Uruguayan armed forces are governed by the Constitution of 1967 as 

last amended in 2004. It says that members of the military are regulated by special 

laws. Members of the armed forces cannot have positions in the government, form part 

of commissions or political parties, subscribe to any party manifestoes, run for office, 

or authorize use of their names and execute any other private or political act except 

voting. The armed forces have no deliberate or political roles. 

It seems unlikely in any of these countries that the armed forces will intervene overtly 

in politics anytime soon. Of course in none of these cases can that possibility be ruled out 

entirely now and forever; of the five countries mentioned, the ones that might be susceptible to military intervention, depending on circumstances, are Argentina and Cuba. 

Countries with Armed Forces Featured Prominently in their Constitutions and Whose Constitutional Roles Includes the Maintenance of Internal Order

This is by far the largest grouping in our classification. Twelve countries fall into this category. In these countries, the armed forces are featured prominently in their constitutions 

and expansive political roles are spelled out. These constitutions almost invite the armed 

forces to be active politically. Under certain circumstances they not only have the right but 

the duty and obligation to become involved in the political process. And that can easily 

lead, as suggested in the title of this article, to the phenomenon of a constitutional coup as 

happened in Honduras in 2009. 

It is easy to overlook these constitutional provisions. Americans tend to assume that 

neighboring democracies subordinate their armed forces to civilian authority since that is 

the case in the United States. In the American view, any action by the military in politics 

must be unconstitutional and a usurpation of authority. 

Not so in some Latin American states. In those nations, the corporate and autonomous role of the armed forces, called the “fuero militar,” has a long legal and constitutional 

history.6

 So much so that the armed forces are almost a fourth branch of government. Under 

certain circumstances, they may be obliged to involve themselves in politics. Depending 

on your politics, you may wish to condemn such military action but you may be on very 

shaky ground if you call it “unconstitutional.” 

The logic, which goes back to Latin America’s founding fathers, such as Simón 

Bolívar, is quite different from that of America’s founding fathers. When James Madison and Thomas Jefferson observed the American society, they found an already semideveloped country, with roads and thriving commerce, a vibrant middle class, an already 

thick civil society, a trading and entrepreneurial culture, a basically literate population with 

home-grown local and state institutions, a vibrant, energetic, and progressive society. In 

contrast, when Bolívar and his contemporaries looked around at their surroundings in the 

early nineteenth century, they found in South America a vast continent with no roads, no 

infrastructure, no civil society, no institutions, no development or modernity, no economy, 

vast illiteracy, and no middle class. How can one build a nation on such a weak basis, they 

asked? The answer, in large part built on the genius of Bolívar, was: 1) a powerful presidency (another subject for examination in itself), and 2) a military with authority, if necessary, and under certain conditions, to intervene and thus stabilize the system. 
194 Security and Defense Studies Review

Let us look at the individual country cases in this category:

• Bolivia: The Bolivian Constitution of 2008 says that armed forces shall not carry out 

any political activity; they are also to be obedient, non-deliberative, and subject to the 

law (Sections 2 and 5). But that same constitution defines the mission of the armed 

forces as maintaining and defending national independence, national honor and sovereignty, and the security and stability of the state. It also “participates in the development of the country, and guarantees the stability of the legally-established government.” Those latter responsibilities are very vague and general: who or what decides 

if the national honor has been violated, what if it is the congress or president who 

does so, what does “participate in the development of the country” mean, and so on. 

These provisions are open-ended that they provide almost an open invitation for the 

armed forces to be involved in the political process, as has happened numerous times 

in Bolivian history. 

• Brazil: The Brazilian Constitution of 1988, modified in 2010, says the “Armed Forces 

are a national, permanent, and non-political institution, organized on the basis of hierarchy and discipline.” But then it says (Section 142) that the mission of the armed forces is to “defend the Motherland and guarantee constitutional powers, as well as law 

and order.” Brazil was famous for advancing in its constitutions the idea of the armed 

forces as a “moderating power,” a fourth branch of government that would moderate 

between the parties or the other branches of government if they were paralyzed, gridlocked, or broke down, and one can see vestige of this idea in Section 142. Does “defending the Motherland” mean against internal (labor strikes, peasant land seizures) 

as well as external foes, what does guaranteeing the constitutional powers or law and 

order mean, what if it is the president who violates these provisions, would he then be 

overthrown? Although no coups are likely in Brazil, these days the constitutional basis 

for the armed forces to act in extreme circumstances remains. 

• Colombia: The Colombian constitution of 1991, last amended in 2009, has articles 

championing peace, democracy, human rights, and international law. With regard to 

the armed forces, it says their mission is to “defend the sovereignty, independence, 

and integrity of the nation’s territory as well as constitutional order.” But what if 

the constitutional order is upset by guerrillas, drug gangs, or private militias? Do the 

armed forces then have a right or even an obligation to step in? The constitutional legitimization for such actions is there. Again, it is not likely to happen, but the rationale 

is certainly present. 

• Cuba: There is no constitutional role for the Revolutionary Armed Forces, but they 

defend the nation and now most state enterprises, so may they be expected to play a 

pivotal role in the coming transition.

• Dominican Republic: The language of the Dominican Constitution of 2010 says that 

the armed forces are “essentially obedient to the civil power, not affiliated with any 

political party, and are not entitled to deliberate under any circumstances.” Their mission is to “defend the independence and sovereignty of the nation, the Constitution, 

and the institutions of the Republic.” They are empowered to “intervene” in programs 

of social and economic development, to mitigate disasters, and assist the police in 

maintaining public order. But one would want to know what, exactly, does “essentially” mean, how they would defend the Constitution and the country’s institutions (and 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 195

which ones?), and how could they intervene in the social and economic development 

without “deliberating”? 

• Ecuador: The Ecuadoran Constitution of 2008, specifies that the armed forces shall 

be obedient, non-deliberative, and under strict control. However, it also says their 

mission is to protect citizens’ human rights, liberties, and guarantees. Now suppose it 

is the president and his government who are the ones violating these rights, liberties, 

and guarantees. Who decides: the president, the military, the Supreme Court? The 

constitution is silent. Once again it is the ambiguity involved, as well as the special 

obligations placed on the military to settle these crucial issues, that invite intervention. 

• El Salvador: The Salvadoran Constitution of 1983, last amended in 2003, has the nowfamiliar language: the armed forces are “obedient, professional, apolitical, and nondeliberative.” They defend the sovereignty of the state and the integrity of its national 

territory. But then it says “the legislative, executive, and judicial branches may use the 

armed forces to enforce any resolution adopted within their respective jurisdictions.” 

Which branch has priority; what if executive and legislative are under the control of 

two different parties (“divided government”), whom must the armed forces obey; how 

much “enforcement” may be used? Again, ambiguity invites confusion, conflict, and 

possibly military intervention. 

• Guatemala: In the Guatemalan Constitution of 1985, reformed in 1993, the Army is 

said to be “unique and indivisible, essentially professional, apolitical, obedient, and 

non-deliberative.” This same language appears almost word for word in other constitutions. “Unique and indivisible” is unusual language, however; one wonders what it 

means. The mission of the armed forces is to maintain independence, sovereignty, the 

honor of Guatemala, internal and external peace, etc. If the military is “indivisible,” 

what would happen to those politicians who seek to promote their own corps of loyal 

officers? Does defending the “honor” of Guatemala mean against external or domestic 

foes? Does maintaining “internal” peace include beating up student or labor demonstrators or torturing leftists? In Guatemala, there is a certain history here. 

• Honduras: Honduras and its Constitution (1982) were an important test case in 2009; 

and the US, the OAS, and most of the “international community” failed the test of understanding and operating within Latin American constitutional parameters. The Honduran Constitution says the armed forces are “permanent, apolitical, essentially professional, obedient, and non-deliberative.” But then it says “members of the military 

are not obliged to carry out illegal orders or those which involve committing a crime,” 

which was precisely the issue when President José Manuel Zelaya ordered the military 

to carry out an illegal referendum which he had engineered to amend the constitution 

to provide for an unconstitutional second term for himself. The mission of the armed 

forces is the familiar one of defending the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the 

republic, but then the constitution adds to that “the order and respect of the Constitution the principle of free vote, and the rotation of the Presidents of the Republic”—all 

of which it could be argued Zelaya had violated (emphasis added).

The White House, the US Secretary of State, the Secretary General of the OAS and 

many of its members, and the international community, either in ignorance of what the 

Honduras Constitution said on these matters, hung up with guilt over their timid reaction 
196 Security and Defense Studies Review

in the 1980s Central American conflicts, or not wishing to see a precedent set (a coup) that 

might be repeated in their own countries, condemned the Honduran military and imposed 

sanctions on the country. However, a neutral report from the authoritative and balanced 

Law Division of the Library of Congress7 correctly indicated this was not an illegal act but 

a constitutional coup (and therefore maybe not a coup at all) except for the possibly unconstitutional act of expelling Zelaya from the country without a trial, and said even that was 

arguable. Eventually the United States, while maintaining official opposition to the coup, 

supported a process that led, after new elections, to the restoration of democracy. 

• Nicaragua: The Nicaraguan Constitution of 1986 (the Sandinista Constitution, 

amended in 2007) is unusual because it is the constitution of a revolutionary regime. 

The Constitution as amended says the armed forces are professional, not affiliated to 

any political party, obedient, and non-deliberative; but major efforts had been undertaken by the Sandinistas to politicize the military and ensure its loyalty by making it 

an appendage of the Party. The new Constitution says the armed forces are strictly 

subject to the Constitution and cannot perform political activities—all this meant to 

depoliticize the armed forces by a more conservative post-Sandinista government. But 

now that the Sandinistas are back in power, the struggle over the politicization of the 

armed forces is on again, and Nicaragua could once more, conceivably, descend into 

violence, revolution, civil war, and military intervention, however unlikely for the 

moment. 

• Paraguay: The Paraguayan Constitution of 1992 states that the armed forces are a 

“professional, non-deliberative, and obedient institution, subordinated to the power of 

the state and to the provisions of the Constitution.” But that same article (173) says the 

mission of the military is to safeguard territorial integrity and “defend the legitimately 

constituted authority.” The document does not specify who decides if the constituted 

authority is legitimate or not, when it needs defending, from whom or what, and with 

what kind of force. There is sufficient ambiguity here to justify various actions by the 

Paraguayan military, reflecting earlier times in the country’s history.

• Peru: The Peruvian Constitution of 1993, last amended in 2009, specifies that the 

armed forces are non-deliberative and are subordinated to the constitutional power. 

Other articles impose greater restrictions: members of the military cannot run for political office, cannot establish unions or go on strike, and cannot engage in political 

activity. It says the mission of the armed forces is to guarantee the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the state and to “take control of internal order in a 

state of emergency.” The possibility in this order and other constitutions of declaring a 

“state of emergency,” a “state of siege,” and, in time of crisis, giving the armed forces 

emergency powers opens up an entirely broader range of military power. 

• Venezuela: The Venezuelan Constitution of 1999 is slightly different from some of 

the others discussed here because it is a product of the revolutionary regime of Hugo 

Chávez. Nevertheless the language used, for the most part, is strikingly familiar. It 

says that the armed forces are an “essentially professional institution, with no political 

affiliation, organized by the state, at the exclusive service of the nation.” It continues 

that the military is “founded on discipline, obedience, and subordination.” It then goes 

on to say, classically, that the primary mission of the armed forces is to guarantee the 

independence and sovereignty of the nation. 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 197

But the Constitution also requires that the military maintain internal order (a frequent rationale for military intervention) and, unusual in Latin America, be actively engaged in national development. What does that last phrase mean? Who decides? What if 

the armed forces determine that the Chávez regime is disruptive of internal order (which 

has been the case at times) or is not providing for national development (also arguable)? 

To prevent any possibility of a military coup against himself—i.e., a repeat of the abortive 

2002 attempt—Chávez, like almost all Latin American presidents, has himself unconstitutionally intervened in the military chain of command, used political criteria to determine 

armed forces promotions, and thus secured an officer corps personally loyal to himself. But 

those actions also violate the Constitution; would they constitute sufficient grounds for the 

armed forces to move against Chávez? Often when the military moves against a president, 

it is because the president has first intervened in the military.

Conclusion

Echoing the Silvert quote with which we began, coups are a regular, recurrent, almost 

normal part of the Latin American political process. One can hope that they have gone 

away, but they likely have not, and the international community has to deal with this fact 

realistically. 

Coups may take unconstitutional directions but may have a considerable degree of 

constitutional legitimacy. They tend to occur when the normal civilian political system has 

broken down, is in crisis, is paralyzed, or when internal order is threatened. They also tend 

to occur in the least developed countries, lacking strong institutions or strong civil society; 

when these institutions have failed, the armed forces are often called upon, and have a 

constitutional obligation, to step in and fill the vacuum. They are not necessarily usurping 

power, but most often fulfilling their constitutional responsibilities. 

Three countries of Latin America (Costa Rica, Haiti, and Panama) have no regular 

armed forces; nevertheless their police forces or guardias may play a political role. In five 

countries of Latin America (Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, and Uruguay) the armed 

forces are either not mentioned in their constitutions or have a limited constitutional role. 

But in twelve Latin American countries (60%), the armed forces do have a constitutional 

role, usually revolving around the maintenance of internal order, the exercise of emerging 

power, or the resolution of a crisis if the political system is deadlocked. 

The more developed and institutionalized a Latin American country is (Chile, Costa 

Rica, and Uruguay), the less likely will it be for the armed forces to intervene in the political system. The problem therefore is not so much military intervention as it is underdevelopment and weak institutions as in the other countries discussed. There is an inherent 

conflict—as in Honduras in 2009—between the US calls for democracy in Latin America, 

usually in pristine forms, and Latin American constitutions that provide for armed forces 

intervention under certain circumstances. Either US policy will have to be adjusted or 12 

of the 20 Latin American constitutions will have to be rewritten. There is a similar inherent 

conflict between the OAS’ “Charter of Democracy,” which imposes sanctions on governments that come to power after a military intervention, and the constitutions of the twelve 

countries that provide for military intervention. It is, as in Honduras, certain to be repeated 

elsewhere, a classic and unresolved conflict between international law and national constitutional law. Again, to address this issue, either the OAS charter would have to be revised 

or the 12 Latin American constitutions would have to be rewritten. Neither is likely in the 
198 Security and Defense Studies Review

short run. Therefore, disputes over the constitutional role of the armed forces are likely to 

continue. 

Notes

1

 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York, NY: Avon Books 

Inc., 1992).

2

 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order

(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 

3

 Peter L. Berger and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity 

in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

4

 Some classic related studies include Brian Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in Spanish America (Pittsburg, PA: The University of Pittsburg Press, 

1993); and David Mares, Civil and Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional 

Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview 

Press, 1998). 

5 See Georgetown University, Political Database of the Americas: Constitutions and Comparative Constitutional Study, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/constudies.html; 

and Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina, A Comparative Atlas of Defense in 

Latin America and Caribbean: 2010 Edition (Buenos Aires, Argentina: RESDAL, 2010).

6

 Loveman, Constitution; see also the writings of historians Lyle McAlister, John J. Johnson, Edwin Lieuwen, and John Lynch.

7

 “Honduras: Constitutional Law Issues,” Report for Congress, Directorate of Legal Research LL File No. 2009-002965, Law Division, Library of Congress (Washington DC, 

August 2009).
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 199

Cultura Política y Fuerzas Armadas en Venezuela*

Hernán Castillo

RESUMEN

En Venezuela, el tema de las relaciones entre civiles y militares ha sido 

tradicionalmente muy polémico. El origen de la controversia es complejo, pero 

básicamente se trata del problema histórico relacionado con la significación 

política que los militares han jugado en la conformación del Estado y el lugar que 

deben ocupar en la sociedad venezolana. Pero, en lo fundamental, el liderazgo 

político civil venezolano no tuvo, ni ha tenido hasta ahora, la capacidad, el interés, 

la voluntad y claridad política, consistencia conceptual y convicción doctrinaria, 

e incluso hasta la necesidad de implementar un conjunto de mecanismos y 

técnicas para ejercer un efectivo control civil sobre el histórico potencial 

pretoriano de los militares venezolanos. De tal manera que, se puede afirmar que 

en materia de relaciones civiles y militares venezolanas, luego del fracaso del 

pretorianismo gobernante del dictador Marcos Pérez Jiménez, no hemos tenido 

un real y verdadero control civil sobre los militares. Al contrario, lo que hemos 

tenido es un entendimiento, acuerdo, fusión, alianza y simbiosis militar-civil y 

político-militar; no escrita, pero sí operante y efectiva. Después de varios siglos 

de barbarie, atraso e incivilización puede que el siglo XXI sea para Venezuela el 

siglo de la derrota definitiva del virus del pretorianismo y la supremacía final de 

la sociedad civil venezolana sobre los militares y sus instituciones armadas.

Introducción

En el caso de los estudios académicos venezolanos sobre las relaciones civiles y militares 

tenemos una cierta diversidad de aproximaciones y enfoques, tanto de autores nacionales 

(Irwin 2003: 149-224) como extranjeros (Castillo 2003: 73-104) No obstante, los estudios 

especializados en esta temática son relativamente recientes y escasos, sobre todo si tomamos en consideración el volumen de estudios que en esta materia encontramos en el resto 

de los países del continente latinoamericano, especialmente los países del Cono Sur.

Hay algunas razones que podrían explicar por qué el sector académico venezolano, 

con muy pocas excepciones, no tuvo entre sus prioridades la investigación rigurosa del 

tema de las relaciones civiles y militares, el pensamiento estratégico, y el estudio de los 

problemas de seguridad y defensa del Estado. Esencialmente, se trata del lugar común, que 

la democracia venezolana, aún con sus problemas, se consideraba estable políticamente, 

con suficientes recursos naturales y financieros, en donde los alzamientos militares de la 

última parte del siglo XX estuvieron condenados al fracaso. De esta manera, Venezuela, 

Las opiniones aquí expresadas reflejan exclusivamente el punto de vista del autor, y no representan los puntos de 

vista de las instituciones que organizaron, patrocinaron y participaron en este evento.

*Este trabajo fue seleccionado como parte de una convocatoria para remitir propuestas de investigación, y fue 

presentado durante la VII Conferencia Sub-Regional llevada a cabo en Santiago de Chile, Julio 19-22. La conferencia fue organizada por el Centro de Estudios Hemisféricos de Defensa, con el patrocinio del Ministerio de 

la Defensa Nacional de Chile y el apoyo de la Academia Nacional de Estudios Estratégicos y Políticos de Chile. 
200 Security and Defense Studies Review

sus problemas estratégicos, su democracia, el estudio de las relaciones civiles y militares 

en particular no llegó a despertar mayor interés entre los investigadores de las ciencias 

sociales. 

En general, el sector académico no tuvo entre sus prioridades la investigación y estudio de la situación de las relaciones civiles y militares venezolanas mientras no se desarrolló su crisis. Es a partir del conjunto de reformas y medidas que intentó implementar el 

segundo gobierno de Carlos Andrés Pérez (1989-1993), especialmente a partir de la crisis 

de febrero de 1989 (Guardia 2005: 103),1 y los alzamientos militares del 4 de febrero y 27 de 

noviembre de 1992(Guardia: 2005: 109)2

 cuando surgió un renovado interés que posteriormente ha cobrado fuerza por su impacto sobre el futuro de la democracia venezolana. Pero, 

por otra parte, también el estudio de las relaciones civiles y militares y las Fuerzas Armadas, 

realizado por los noveles investigadores venezolanos, desde una perspectiva interdisciplinaria, está comenzando a salir del ostracismo en que se encontraba (Castillo 2001).

En las aproximaciones de los militares venezolanos en su relación con la sociedad y 

el Estado ha prevalecido hasta ahora, en las investigaciones hechas por reconocidos académicos nacionales, fundamentalmente el enfoque que proporciona el pensamiento estratégico y la seguridad y defensa como una política pública (Romero 1980). Estos estudios 

tienen mucho valor y constituyen un avance en relación con el proceso de civilidad que 

hay que sostener y perfeccionar en el tiempo a fin de continuar avanzando hacia un verdadero y efectivo control civil de las fuerzas militares en Venezuela. Sobre todo, estos 

trabajos, son importantes para una sociedad en la cual el abordaje de los diferentes temas 

se consideraban tabú y en cierta forma eran percibidos como peligrosos, reservados al sector militar principalmente, en donde el investigador académico corría ciertos riesgos, se 

requería coraje y valentía personal para publicar investigaciones en este campo, incluso 

por más académicas y teóricas que fuesen ya que toda la información, absolutamente toda 

la información, era legalmente considerada secreta (Rey 1981: 14-16).

La problemática de las relaciones civiles y militares en sociedades democráticas institucionalmente subdesarrolladas como es el caso bastante generalizado de Latinoamérica, 

entre ellas Venezuela, adquiere connotaciones realmente dramáticas, en donde entre otros 

problemas institucionales, el lugar que tienen que ocupar los militares en la sociedad y 

el papel que deben jugar en el Estado pareciera histórica y políticamente no estar total y 

absolutamente claros. Así expone Brian Loveman en uno de los estudios más completos 

sobre la evolución histórica del rol político de la institución armada en las sociedades 

latinoamericanas, estudio que va desde la Colonia hasta finales del siglo XX. Desafortunadamente este trabajo no estudia en detalle el caso de nuestro país.

Para la situación venezolana el origen del pretorianismo, o en otras palabras, el secular problema institucional de la abusiva intervención en política de los militares y sus 

orígenes doctrinarios en el siglo XX, comienzan según lo planteado por Tomás Straka de 

la siguiente manera:

El pretorianismo parte de la convicción de que es el ejército el que debe llevar la 

patria a la grandeza. No sólo y más humildemente como López se esforzó en aclarar: 

dotándola de la paz necesaria para que florezcan las industrias y defendiendo sus leyes e 

instituciones, sino haciéndolas florecer directamente, dictaminándole, incluso, las leyes. 

Poniendo orden, su orden, allá donde el resto de la sociedad, evidentemente, no pudo. 

Tomando (¿usurpando?) sus funciones, pues. Pero no militarizando la sociedad, como en 

Japón desde la guerra con China hasta Hiroshima, donde a todos hubo de metérsele en 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 201

algún uniforme; sino teledirigiendo desde los cuarteles lo que el resto de los paisanos 

hacemos. Al inventársele al ejército moderno la tradición que lo empalma con los Padres 

de la Patria se le estaba dando una carga ideológica que escapaba, largamente, de las sanas intenciones (insistimos: nada indica lo contrario) que siempre tuvo López Contreras 

(Straka 2003: 38-39).

Es decir, se puede afirmar que el pretorianismo en nuestro país tiene sus orígenes 

históricos más remotos en la exaltación de la tradición acerca del papel que jugó el ejército 

en las luchas por la independencia y en la conformación del Estado Nacional. Ahora bien, 

Gene Bigler, quien fue de los iniciadores extranjeros de los estudios académicos sobre 

nuestras relaciones civiles y militares, plantea la aparición y consolidación de nuevos patrones de las relaciones civiles y militares luego de derrocada la dictadura perezjimenista, 

básicamente centrados en dos aspectos: por un lado el proceso de profesionalización militar; y por el otro, el sistema sociopolítico en el cual se desenvolvió el estamento militar. 

Además, Bigler establece cinco factores básicos que proporcionaron las bases para la institucionalización del control civil sobre los militares luego de 1958, estos son: 

• La cultura antimilitarista de la población civil; 

• La profunda división de la institución; 

• La cohesión de las elites y el prestigio del liderazgo civil en contraposición al fracaso 

de los militares al frente del Estado; 

• Este grupo de elementos coaligados terminaron por imponer la visión del Estado y la 

sociedad establecida en el Pacto de Punto Fijo, luego consagrada en la Constitución de 

1961 que sacaba del juego político a la opción pretoriana; 

• Por último la amenaza que significó la revolución cubana, por el apoyo a la subversión comunista terminó por establecer las bases para lograr la lealtad al experimento 

democrático recién iniciado y a la Constitución de 1961, y sobre todo reorientar el papel que debían jugar en el Estado (Bigler 1981: 85-142 y 1982: 175-196). 

Finalmente, Bigler advierte sobre cuatro áreas de tensión y conflictivo que se le planteaban a las relaciones civiles y militares venezolanas, de la siguiente forma:

1. El tema fronterizo, en el cual los efectivos militares tuvieron poder de veto. 

2. El muy escaso escrutinio, supervisión y contraloría por parte de las instituciones civiles y la opinión pública, en los temas y problemas asociados con la seguridad y defensa 

y el funcionamiento de la institución militar en su conjunto. 

3. La restauración del ejercicio de los derechos políticos de los militares. 

4. La situación socioeconómica.

Las características de las relaciones civiles y militares que le asigna Bigler a la democracia venezolana fueron factores y circunstancias que permitieron mantener dentro 

del sistema democrático y los mecanismos institucionales a las Fuerzas Armadas, pero eso 

no significa necesariamente la real y efectiva existencia de control civil. Un verdadero, 

efectivo e institucional control civil sobre los militares y sus instituciones no ha existido 

nunca en la historia de Venezuela. Afirmar que durante la democracia ha existido este tipo 

de control es una ingenuidad política. 

Ahora bien, si en Venezuela no existió ni ha existido control civil sobre los militares, 
202 Security and Defense Studies Review

entonces, qué fue lo que permitió que las Fuerzas Armadas se mantuvieran e incluso respaldaran el proyecto político democrático.

En primer lugar, los factores que según Bigler proporcionaron las bases para la institucionalización del control civil sobre los militares luego de 1958 son los rasgos más sobresalientes y constituyen la argumentación central del discurso oficioso para tratar de explicar 

la fortaleza de la actuación institucional de los militares en la democracia y la presencia de 

un pretendido control. Pero no constituyen el ejercicio de un efectivo control civil sobre la 

institución militar, tal como tratare de mostrar. 

En segundo lugar, hay que aceptar que durante los años de violencia subversiva castrocomunista de la década de los años 60 que vivió Venezuela, ese conjunto de factores 

contribuyó a mantener la situación del país bajo control y se logró la incorporación de 

los militares venezolanos al nuevo sistema político. Pero lo que queremos mostrar es que 

la conjugación de esos factores, por el hecho de haber tenido logros importantes y evitar 

que la situación se desbordara además de haber logrado el apoyo de los militares para la 

implantación del modelo democrático, no significó necesariamente la presencia política e 

institucional de un efectivo control civil sobre los militares. 

En su análisis, Bigler omite el factor crucial para que cualquier Estado democrático 

desarrollado alcance la implementación institucional y política de un efectivo control civil 

como lo constituye la erradicación de la intervención abusiva de los militares en política. 

En otras palabras, la eliminación del pretorianismo del sistema político en cualquiera de 

sus formas y manifestaciones. Es más, a partir de la participación exitosa de los militares en 

la lucha contra la insurgencia armada en los años 60 en apoyo manifiesto a la democracia 

venezolana, la intervención política de los militares se mantuvo dentro del sistema.

Recordemos, la condición imprescindible para la existencia del control civil en la 

democracia es el sometimiento del pretorianismo; es decir, la supremacía de la sociedad 

civil sobre sus militares. Y en Venezuela, hasta ahora, no se ha logrado. El problema radica 

esencialmente en que el pretorianismo mantiene su potencialidad en la precariedad institucional, la debilidad de las organizaciones no gubernamentales de la sociedad civil, el 

sobredimensionamiento de la institución militar y, la baja o mediana cultura política. Esto 

sobre todo en relación con el papel que deben jugar los militares en el Estado y el lugar que 

deben ocupar en la sociedad (Finer 1969: 221);3

 elementos a los que muy pocos estudiosos 

del tema hacen referencia, entre ellos Bigler.

Llegados a este punto conviene reiterar que el grupo de factores que establece Bigler 

no necesariamente indican y establecen las condiciones suficientes para el ejercicio de un 

efectivo control civil sobre la institución castrense por las siguientes razones: 

1. La tecnificación de muchas actividades militares, proceso que rigurosa y estrictamente no se puede llamar profesionalización militar, sino más bien de orientación 

profesional, la cual estuvo aparejada de una intensificación de las amenazas, al mismo 

tiempo que se incrementaron los privilegios, las inmunidades y el poder político de 

los militares, lo cual iba en desmedro del profesionalismo para transformarlos en pretorianos. 

2. El sector pretoriano de las Fuerzas Armadas venezolanas, luego del enorme fracaso de 

la dictadura militar 1948-1958 estuvo un franco retroceso, lo cual reforzó la emergencia y fortalecimiento del sector de orientación profesional. No obstante, pretorianos 

y “profesionales” se vieron en la forzosa situación de tener que respaldar el proyecto 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 203

democrático que recién se iniciaba en los años 60 y enfrentar la amenaza común que 

significó la subversión comunista. Aunque a nivel estrictamente teórico, el hecho de 

que en la Venezuela post 1958 absolutamente todos los alzamientos y rebeliones militares fracasaron, puede indicar, entre otras cosas, que quienes se alzaron en armas 

contra la democracia no calibraron correctamente las circunstancias por las cuales 

pasaba el país, ni tampoco los altísimos costos políticos del fracaso de sus intentonas, 

tal como efectivamente ocurrió. Tuvieron que pasar alrededor de treinta años que van 

de 1962, desde el “porteñazo”, hasta 1989 para que nuevamente se presentaran ciertas 

condiciones socioeconómicas en el sistema político que propiciaron los nuevos alzamientos militares en febrero y noviembre de 1992.

3. La existencia de un sentimiento antimilitarista en la sociedad venezolana, entre otras 

cosas por el fracaso de los militares en la dirección del Estado; y por el papel tiránico 

y represivo que tradicionalmente han jugado los uniformados en armas política y técnicamente, no significa, ni implica control civil, aunque ese sentimiento antimilitarista 

puede actuar como una barrera cultural ante pretensiones golpistas. 

4. A pesar del alto grado de cohesión y prestigio del liderazgo civil, en torno al proyecto 

político democrático, éste no tuvo la visión de asignarle importantes facultades de 

control civil a las instituciones políticas, entre ellas al parlamento, para ejercer un 

efectivo control sobre los militares, y consagrar estas técnicas en la Constitución y en 

las leyes. Sino muy al contrario, los incorporó a la estructura de poder político (Castillo 1998).

5. En definitiva, el acatamiento de la Constitución Nacional por parte de los militares no 

implica, necesariamente, la existencia de un efectivo control civil sobre la institución 

castrense y su real subordinación al poder civil. En ese sentido, la Constitución de 1961 

prácticamente no tenía mayores ni específicas facultades de control sobre los militares 

y, sin embargo, fue acatada y defendida por ellos. No obstante, se puede respetar la 

Constitución y las leyes por muchas razones que no obligatoriamente están asociadas 

al desempeño del profesionalismo militar. Entre otras razones la Constitución puede 

ser defendida por oportunismo político de los militares pretorianos. 

En definitiva, Bigler acorde con esa tendencia de buena parte de las investigaciones 

politológicas norteamericanas sobre Venezuela, no toma en consideración, y en cierta forma desestima las fuerzas profundas de la historia como, por ejemplo, la herencia cultural 

pretoriana de los militares venezolanos que se enraíza a comienzos del siglo XX. En pocas 

palabras, la realidad y la historia de las relaciones civiles y militares en nuestro país es más 

complicada y pareciera que tiene factores importantes que hay que sacar a la luz.

En Venezuela, el funcionamiento político del papel que debían jugar los militares 

en la democracia implícita en el Pacto de Punto Fijo y la Constitución de 1961 se limitó a 

establecer que el sistema de control civil se basaría centralmente, por una parte en la figura 

del Presidente de la República; y, por otro, en el mantenimiento de una profunda división 

administrativa entre las fuerzas militares. Pero, al mismo tiempo permitió un exagerado 

grado de autonomía y una abusiva intervención en política.

En este contexto, el conjunto de las instituciones del sistema político llamadas naturalmente a ejercer un efectivo control civil, entre ellas el parlamento, se ven neutralizadas 

y principalmente circunscritas a actividades simbólicas como la autorización de algunos 

ascensos militares. En ese aspecto, en el caso de la Constitución Bolivariana de 1999 la 
204 Security and Defense Studies Review

situación se agrava ya que todos los ascensos militares dependen solo de la autorización 

presidencial.

En consecuencia, la amenaza pretoriana para la democracia y la sociedad, con sus 

avances y repliegues, ha estado presente históricamente lo que ha impedido la consolidación definitiva de un control civil institucional sobre los militares. A pesar de existir 

fuertes indicios de un antimilitarismo en la sociedad, la tendencia pretoriana no ha logrado 

erradicarse por completo de la cultura política y la ideología militar. Incluso, lo más grave, 

el pretorianismo en la Venezuela democrática se ha incubado, desarrollado y consolidado, 

entre otras cosas, por la propia permisividad, tolerancia, desconocimiento teórico y conceptual, y desprecio del sector político dirigente, de la capacidad y poder destructivo que 

pueden llegar a alcanzar.

En definitiva, control civil significa esencialmente la supremacía de la sociedad civil 

sobre la institución militar; es decir, la erradicación de la abusiva intervención de los militares en política.

Sobre el poder de los militares en la sociedad venezolana y particularmente sobre su 

intervención política en el Estado, Irwin sostiene que en el siglo XX se produjo un fenómeno histórico que llama, indistintamente, contubernio, fusión, entente, acuerdo no escrito, simbiosis, entendimiento militar-civil (en ese orden), control civil parcial negociado, 

mediatizado y condicionado, entre los civiles y la institución castrense. 

El sector militar, indirecta o directamente, ejerce primacía o predominio dentro de 

este entendimiento mutuo. Éste se expresa políticamente, por lo que es también una relación político-militar, donde un militar, o un grupo de militares, o la institución castrense, 

logran una ventajosa y hasta dominante relación de poder para con el sector civil de la 

sociedad. El resultado de esta simbiosis militar-civil y político-militar es el fracaso por 

consolidar un auténtico control civil en la realidad venezolana del siglo XX. El reto del 

siglo XXI es, pues, procurar consolidar el control civil en Venezuela. Sostenemos que la 

tendencia histórica apunta hacia un fortalecimiento, en el mediano y largo plazo, del profesionalismo militar y una cada vez más reducida influencia política de este sector en la 

realidad política venezolana del siglo XXI (Irwin 2000: 10).

Pero, fundamentalmente, surge una comunidad de intereses entre el gobierno de los 

partidos políticos reformistas y los militares al enfrentarse a un enemigo común: la guerrilla de orientación marxista leninista apoyada logísticamente desde Cuba gobernada por 

Fidel Castro. Esta situación reafirma la influencia estadounidense, refuerza la tendencia 

de orientación profesional entre la oficialidad venezolana y contribuye a neutralizar el 

protagonismo político a la oficialidad pretoriana. Partidos políticos y Fuerzas Armadas 

redefinen sus áreas de influencia y competencia, durante 1958-1962. La secular simbiosis 

de poder entre militares y civiles entra en una nueva fase de reacomodo, mas no desaparece. La tradicional política militar encuentra nuevas formas de expresarse, deja de lado 

su condición visiblemente protagónica, pero se mantiene como un factor clave de poder 

(Irwin 2000: 98-99). 

Es decir, se produce una especie de “alianza entre iguales”, pero control civil no hay, 

y mucho menos subordinación al sector civil. Se produce un reacomodo que, por la reciprocidad del sector civil, por la victoria militar en la lucha contra la subversión, y luego 

por la lealtad militar hacia el sistema democrático, gradualmente se fue estableciendo y 

consagrando una serie de privilegios institucionales por parte de la institución castrense: 

autonomías, inmunidades, discrecionalidad y áreas de influencia y control administrativo 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 205

y burocrático monopólicos. 

Ahora bien, el sector político luego de los difíciles años de resistencia y una dura 

lucha clandestina de los partidos políticos contra la dictadura perezjimenista (1948-1958) 

estuvo especialmente representado en Acción Democrática (AD) y COPEI (Partido Social 

Cristiano de Venezuela), y también en URD (Unión Republicana Democrática). Estas organizaciones emergieron como las principales protagonistas e instituciones políticas civiles 

del sistema democrático que recién, y con amenazas muy importantes, se iniciaba en la 

Venezuela de aquellos años. El Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV), aunque tuvo una 

importante participación en el derrocamiento de la dictadura, al igual que AD, fue excluido 

del Pacto de Punto Fijo por razones inherentes a su filosofía política que es enemiga de la 

democracia y partidaria de “la dictadura del proletariado.”

Una vez que los militares fueron derribados del poder en 1958, el Pacto de Punto 

Fijo y la Constitución de 1961, más una renta petrolera significativa que se encargaría de 

institucionalizar, por cuarenta años, un sistema político bipartidista suficientemente fuerte 

y representativo que impidió la consagración final de la intervención militar abierta en el 

sistema político durante esos cuarenta años que van desde 1958 hasta 1998 con el triunfo 

electoral del teniente coronel Hugo Chávez y la entrada en vigencia de la Constitución 

Bolivariana de 1999. Sin embargo, a pesar de la institucionalización de un sistema político 

bipartidista muy fuerte y representativo, durante esos cuarenta años, jamás hubo un verdadero y efectivo control civil de la sociedad y del sistema político sobre los militares 

venezolanos.

No obstante, en el sector civil dirigente, especialmente en AD, había plena conciencia 

del papel político que los militares habían jugado en la historia venezolana, y no sólo gravitaba sobre ellos el enorme peso de lo que significó la clandestinidad, las persecuciones, 

prisiones, torturas, muertes, exilio, y todo tipo de sacrificios durante la dictadura derrocada, 

sino también la experiencia del trienio 1945-1948, que los inhibió de aplicar amplias y 

fuertes medidas de control civil sobre los militares venezolanos. A lo cual hay que agregar 

una cierta concepción maniqueísta de la política, donde la clase política dirigente pensaba 

que la situación militar la podían manipular a su antojo. Es bastante común aquella expresión que se le atribuye a parte de la dirigencia política de aquellos años que sostenía que 

para mantener en tranquilidad a los militares y evitar alzamientos había que construirles 

casas, clubes militares, y de vez en cuando dejarlos pasar un contrabandito de aguardiente. 

Esta expresión contiene una carga despreciativa hacia los militares, además de significar un 

error grave en relación con el manejo y control de la institución militar.

Una vez derrocada la dictadura, la dirigencia política implementó una serie de medidas orientadas a someter a los militares, pero no a controlarlos. Pero también, en vez de 

intensificar y profundizar aún más la aplicación de técnicas y mecanismos efectivos de 

control civil, empezó a concederle una serie de privilegios y prerrogativas que iban en desmedro del control civil para, de esa manera, comenzar muy gradualmente a recuperar sus 

niveles de influencia y poder político. En efecto, en la nueva experiencia democrática que 

se iniciaba en el país los militares ya no ejercerían directa y abiertamente el poder político 

como cuando lo hicieron durante los años de la dictadura, sino a través del chantaje al sector civil. Esto tal como veremos más adelante cuando analicemos el “segundo orden de 

cultura política” del modelo teórico sobre las relaciones civiles y militares de S.E. Finer. 

Pero lo más grave es que, el nuevo sistema político le asignó a la institución militar el papel 

de árbitros de la democracia, en el sentido expuesto por Amos Perlmutter (Irwin 2003: 18-
206 Security and Defense Studies Review

19) y Eric Nordlinger (Irwin 2003: 40 y 151).

La lucha antisubversiva por la supervivencia de la democracia creó una serie de 

vínculos entre los militares de orientación profesional y los pretorianos, ante la amenaza 

común. Pero, también, creo una serie de intereses, vínculos, complicidades, alianzas, etc. 

entre los militares en su conjunto, pretorianos y los de orientación profesional, con la dirigencia política de AD y COPEI quienes gobernaron al país. 

La estructura militar recibe privilegios económicos y de status como recompensa 

inmediata en su labor de defender con las armas el sistema democrático, estos serán celosamente resguardados y hasta ampliados por los miembros de la institución armada criolla 

(Irwin 2000: 17). 

Este conjunto de privilegios, que sigue recibiendo el sector militar con miras a lograr 

un efectivo control civil sobre la institución militar y el fortalecimiento de la sociedad civil 

venezolana en el siglo XXI, son los que hay que desmontar, sin llegar a lesionar el papel y 

la función estrictamente profesional e institucional de los uniformados de verde. 

Es clave “civilizar” al Ministerio de la Defensa, en el sentido siguiente; no se trata 

sólo de nombrar al ministro civil, sino también el resto de la estructura administrativa y 

burocrática de la seguridad y defensa. La Constitución de 1961 aunque permitía la designación de un civil jamás fue nombrado uno que no fuera militar. Paradójicamente, la 

titularidad de un civil al frente de la seguridad y defensa del Estado permite despolitizar a 

los altos mandos militares y concentrarlos en funciones técnicas asociadas directamente a 

la aplicación de la violencia en sus respectivos campos profesionales. Es a partir de entrada 

en vigencia de la Constitución Bolivariana de 1999 cuando tenemos a José Vicente Rangel 

como ministro de la defensa civil.

En efecto, en las democracias donde funciona el control civil, no necesariamente los 

comandantes de las fuerzas tienen que ser militares. Igualmente la Contraloría General de 

la institución armada debe ser objeto de algún tipo de supervisión de una institución política, especialmente todo aquello relacionado con esa fuente tradicional de corrupción como 

son las compras y adquisiciones de equipos, armas y sistemas técnicos. En ese aspecto el 

parlamento debe tener injerencia en lo relacionado con la discusión sobre la conveniencia 

estratégica o no de comprar determinados equipos y marcas de sistemas de armas.

En general, el parlamento debe tener amplias y específicas facultades legales de control presupuestario en materia de seguridad y defensa que vayan mucho más allá de las 

estrictamente simbólicas y formales, a fin de controlar los gastos e inversiones militares.

La administración presupuestaria y financiera militar venezolana es un coto cerrado 

inescrutable donde nadie prácticamente tiene acceso. Todo tipo de gasto asociado con la 

seguridad y defensa es considerado secreto, sólo el Presidente de la República, como Comandante en Jefe tiene acceso a las partidas de gastos secretos de Estado. En materia de 

los procedimientos y mecanismos de control presupuestario de los gastos de defensa por 

parte de las autoridades públicas civiles venezolanas son prácticamente inexistentes. La 

vigilancia sobre la forma como se administra el presupuesto de defensa tiene sólo sistemas 

de control interno que escapan al escrutinio público. 

Otra prebenda que los militares venezolanos fueron gradualmente consolidando, producto de la confrontación durante los años de la Guerra Fría, fue clasificar como secreto 

de Estado o militar cualquier tipo de información relacionada con la seguridad y defensa, 

incluso por más banal que fuese. La legislación venezolana, en ese aspecto, ha estado 

atrasada, mucho más en estos tiempos de desarrollo de Internet y de las comunicaciones en 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 207

general, y ha traído como consecuencia, entre otras cosas, que los estudios sobre relaciones 

civiles y militares; pensamiento estratégico; y la seguridad y defensa; fuese casi de la exclusividad del sector militar. La formación de expertos y especialistas civiles en estos campos, al igual que la conformación de grupos y equipos interdisciplinarios para el estudio del 

pensamiento, planificación, investigación e incluso docencia con participación académica 

civil, resulta extremadamente difícil. Estas actividades, con muy pocas excepciones, han 

estado reservadas casi exclusivamente a los institutos de formación militar.

Esta privilegiada situación ha alcanzado tales extremos que en la toma de decisiones 

en áreas como fronteras y límites internacionales pareciera que existe una especie de poder 

de veto militar en decisiones del Estado. Y no sólo eso sino que amenazan con invadir y 

monopolizar otros campos de investigación y estudios como el terrorismo, el narcotráfico, 

la narcoguerrilla, entre otros. 

Por otra parte, los militares se habían reservado una serie de posiciones de dirección 

en la administración pública muy importantes, sobre todo en Relaciones Exteriores y en 

el Ministerio de Infraestructura y Comunicaciones. Pero, esta situación hizo metástasis 

y llegó al paroxismo luego de entrada en vigencia de la Constitución de 1999, con el 

gobierno de Chávez, en donde prácticamente se ha “militarizado” toda la administración 

pública central y descentralizada, y los principales cargos los ocupan oficiales de distintas 

condiciones y jerarquías.

Durante los años de la lucha subversiva en Venezuela la dirigencia se esmeró en 

complacer y mejorar las condiciones socioeconómicas de los militares, al fin y al cabo 

eran ellos quienes estaban exponiendo sus vidas en defensa de la sociedad y el sistema 

político. A la vez gradualmente esos logros fueron convirtiéndolos en un sector realmente 

privilegiado en relación a las condiciones socioeconómicas que tenía el resto de los sectores profesionales de la sociedad (Irwin 2000: 149-150). Así, por ejemplo, actualmente con 

la Constitución Bolivariana los militares están fuera del sistema nacional de la seguridad 

social que rige para todos los empleados de la administración pública.

Por otra parte la autonomía en materia del funcionamiento de los servicios de inteligencia ha sido absoluta y totalmente discrecional durante los gobiernos democráticos. Independientemente, de cada gobierno los servicios de inteligencia e información militar han 

estado fuera de control, auditoria, profesionalismo y supervisión civil. No hay legislación 

que controle y limite su funcionamiento y actividades. Todas las fuerzas y componentes 

militares tienen sus Direcciones de Inteligencia, que actúan a sus anchas. Estos servicios 

operan y tienen actividades que alcanzan campos que pueden invadir cualquier ámbito de 

la vida pública, e incluso el privado de personas y empresas. Así tenemos los escándalos 

sobre excesos y abusos que, en oportunidades, han trascendido a los medios de comunicación social y a la opinión pública. Esta irregularidad se comenzó a formar como parte 

de las exigencias de la lucha contra la subversión durante los gobiernos presididos por 

Rómulo Betancourt y Raúl Leoni y no fue corregida oportunamente.

Otra área de privilegios del sector es la aplicación de la justicia militar a delitos de 

naturaleza civil cometidos por oficiales. Sin embargo, a los civiles, usualmente por razones 

políticas, se les aplica el código de justicia militar. En cambio, cuando por ejemplo los 

militares cometen delitos asociados con corrupción administrativa se les aplica el código 

de justicia militar, cuando en realidad no es estrictamente un delito de este tipo.

Finalmente, un aspecto importante para la formación profesional y de valores 

democráticos entre los militares es la supervisión y control de los objetivos y la admin-
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istración de los contenidos curriculares de sus institutos educativos a todos los niveles, 

puesto que tradicionalmente ha estado fuera de todo tipo de control y vigilancia de las 

autoridades educativas civiles nacionales. 

El pretorianismo venezolano tiene sus orígenes en el mantenimiento en las escuelas 

de formación militar y en la educación cultural venezolana en general de un conjunto de 

mitos, como por ejemplo, entre otros, aquel mito que tiene que ver con el establecimiento 

de relaciones artificiales entre el papel jugado por las fuerzas armadas en la defensa de la 

integridad territorial y la soberanía nacional, y la preservación de la democracia, con las luchas de Simón Bolívar en su época, cuando en realidad, rigurosamente, esas situaciones no 

tienen ningún vínculo, el ejército que creó Gómez y las fuerzas armadas que le sucedieron 

no tienen nada que ver con el ejército del Libertador (Irwin 1999: 31-50).

Con la presidencia de Hugo Chávez la situación ha llegado a tales extremos que a los 

militares venezolanos se les impuso el saludo, de los militares cubanos, de “Patria, Socialismo o Muerte.” Y la Ley Orgánica de las Fuerzas Armadas Nacionales (LOFAN) ha sido 

objeto de reformas en cuatro oportunidades, en donde, entre otros cambios importantes, 

se le agregó el calificativo de Bolivariana, quedando ahora como FANB, Fuerza Armada 

Nacional Bolivariana. Todas estas modificaciones se han producido sin mayores debates 

por parte de las instituciones y la sociedad civil venezolana sobre su significación, impacto 

y alcance y una enorme falta de claridad y grandes dificultades para obtener información, 

que no sea estrictamente la que sale publicada en las Gacetas Oficiales. No obstante, de 

lo poco que ha salido a la luz pública, en documentos oficiales se plantean cambios en la 

estructura administrativa, contenidos y orientación doctrinaria e ideológica de la educación 

militar venezolana. 

En el contexto del Plan Integral de la Educación Militar (PIEM) y el Primer Plan 

Socialista de Desarrollo Simón Bolívar 2007-2013, el pensamiento y acción de los precursores y héroes de la independencia, Simón Bolívar, Simón Rodríguez, y Ezequiel Zamora 

pasan a ser el fundamento de la educación militar venezolana, con objetivos programáticos 

como el antiimperialismo, el anticapitalismo, el anticolonialismo y el socialismo. Sin embargo la propuesta de que la educación militar pase a ser el eje transversal de la educación 

básica y secundaria, administrada por la Milicia Bolivariana, presentó un rechazo nacional 

por parte de la opinión pública, Organizaciones No Gubernamentales (ONGs), medios de 

comunicación social, sectores especializados, grupos de presión, gremios profesionales, 

y asociaciones de padres y representantes, de tal magnitud que pareciera que, por el momento, la idea fue pospuesta e incluso cancelada definitivamente.

De tal manera que resulta prácticamente insostenible, tal como lo plantea Irwin la tesis del discurso oficioso sobre las relaciones civiles y militares venezolanas de la existencia 

de un efectivo control civil y subordinación de los militares venezolanos al poder político 

de los siglos XX y XXI (Irwin 2000). 

Ahora bien, si en Venezuela no hemos tenido control civil; ¿qué hemos tenido? Teóricamente, buena parte de la respuesta a esta interrogante la encontramos en lo que S.E. 

Finer (1962) llama el “segundo orden de cultura política.” En este orden, los civiles pueden 

gobernar otorgándoles a los militares total autonomía e inmunidad institucional. Es decir, 

la legitimidad de las autoridades civiles es importante y refractaria a los militares. 

Los aspectos cruciales del funcionamiento del “segundo orden de cultura política” 

son el “blackmail” y el contubernio, la rivalidad, la intimidación, la amenaza de no-cooperación, e incluso las amenazas de violencia contra las autoridades civiles, como formas de 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 209

intervención de los militares. Con relación al significado de “blackmail” es una palabra inglesa que ideológicamente se traduce como chantaje. No obstante, la versión española del 

modelo teórico de (Finer 1969: 221), la traduce literalmente como extorsión. Sin embargo, 

consideramos que la traducción ideológica como chantaje es más adecuado, a nuestros 

propósitos, ya que esa acción, no necesariamente implica el uso de la fuerza física. Más 

bien está asociada con amenazas o presión psicológica para lograr algún tipo de dividendo 

o privilegio. 

En cambio, la extorsión política va más allá de la presión o amenaza psicológica; 

implica el uso de la fuerza, no para obtener ventajas, dividendos o prerrogativas, sino para 

la usurpación. En efecto, el chantaje político es más sutil, la extorsión es más directa y 

agresiva. Entonces, el chantaje político se ajusta más para explicar la característica principal de las relaciones civiles y militares venezolanas. Sobre todo es para explicar cómo es 

que sin la existencia de control civil en el sistema político y la democracia venezolana; los 

militares enmarcaron su actuación histórica y política en los parámetros legales y constitucionales.

Por otra parte, tenemos que S.E. Finer denomina como maduro al “primer orden de 

cultura política”, pues la legitimidad de las autoridades civiles es de capital importancia e 

inaccesible a los militares. Y el modo de intervención militar en política es a través de la 

influencia en los canales institucionales del sistema.

Así, la ausencia y debilidad de mecanismos constitucionales de influencia militar 

en el sistema político no permite ubicar la actuación de los militares venezolanos en el 

primer orden de cultura política del modelo de S.E. Finer. Esto puesto que los mecanismos 

de influencia para la intervención de los militares en política estaban y siguen, ahora aún 

más que nunca, centralizados absolutamente en la figura del Presidente de la República. En 

consecuencia, luego del primer alzamiento de Castro León se produjo en Venezuela una 

gran variedad de alzamientos militares, de todo tipo, que intentaban la intervención en la 

política y el control del Estado. Estos alzamientos, aunque no siempre expresaron una representación y legitimidad institucional, siempre manifestaron una fuerte vocación violenta 

contra las autoridades civiles legítimamente establecidas, por el voto popular.

Retomando la línea argumental de S.E. Finer encontramos que el “tercer nivel de cultura política” se corresponde con un orden de cultura política bajo. Así, aunque la legitimidad es relativamente importante, sin embargo es fluida; lo cual significa que la legitimidad 

política no es decisiva para este tercer nivel de cultura política. La forma de intervención 

de los militares, en este tercer nivel de cultura política, se expresa a través de su negativa a 

defender a las autoridades civiles contra la violencia. Incluso, pueden presentarse amenazas propias del segundo nivel de cultura política de no cooperar, pero también se pueden 

presentar acciones de violencia directa. En este nivel, la intervención política puede alcanzar el desplazamiento del gabinete civil. 

El cuarto nivel es de mínima cultura política, en donde la legitimidad no tiene ninguna importancia y la forma de intervención es la violencia y la suplantación del régimen 

civil. Esta es la forma más brutal de intervención militar en política. 

La subordinación y la sujeción militar al control civil exigen de profesionalismo 

militar, pero también exige compartir los valores y la visión acerca del futuro y la cultura 

política democrática de la sociedad. Y no sólo eso, sino más aún, que ese grupo de valores 

y esa visión del futuro pasen a formar parte integral de las convicciones y creencias de la 

institución militar y de los militares individualmente.
210 Security and Defense Studies Review

De esta manera, la autonomía del sector militar venezolano, alcanzó una mayor significación política para el sistema político, que fue mucho más allá del alcance planteado 

en el propio Pacto de Punto Fijo. Es decir, el acuerdo tácito entre el sector civil, representado por las cúpulas de los partidos AD, COPEI y URD, entre otros, y los militares, consistió en darle una total y absoluta autonomía a la institución militar, en donde los civiles 

no tuvieron una importante injerencia, ni en asuntos de la más baja importancia hasta cuestiones vitales para la supervivencia de la misma sociedad. En efecto, la autonomía total de 

los militares en un ambiente político donde las instituciones y los mecanismos de control 

civil son débiles o inexistentes, presenta mortales inconvenientes para la supervivencia del 

sistema democrático. Esto puesto que esa autonomía termina separando a los militares de 

los valores generales y la visión del futuro de la sociedad. Pero lo más importante, simultáneamente, el sector civil pierde todo el control sobre los militares y sus instituciones.

Uno de los mecanismos más característicos de la separación de la sociedad civil y 

los militares, pero potencialmente muy peligrosos en países con bajos niveles de cultura 

política e institucionalmente frágiles y débiles como es el caso de Venezuela, es cuando 

los militares, individual o colectivamente, comienzan a formularse teorías sobre su papel 

en el desarrollo del país. Especialmente las teorías referidas a la seguridad y defensa del 

Estado orientadas a justificar su intervención en la política y la búsqueda del poder del 

Estado. La Constitución Bolivariana de 1999, en el Artículo 328, en relación a las misiones militares, tiene uno de los virus políticos de mayor potencial destructivo, cuando 

textualmente consagra: “La Fuerza Armada constituye una institución...organizada por el 

Estado para garantizar la independencia y soberanía de la Nación y asegurar la integridad 

del espacio geográfico, mediante la defensa militar, la cooperación en el mantenimiento del 

orden público y la participación activa en el desarrollo nacional.” En este sentido apunta 

la formulación de Richard Kohn, cuando señala que los militares son para la defensa de la 

sociedad y el Estado, no para hacer definiciones teóricas, políticas, económicas o de cualquier otro tipo en la sociedad a la cual pertenecen (Kohn 1997). A la institución castrense 

en las sociedades democráticas les corresponde la implementación operativa de la defensa 

militar. Las definiciones políticas y estratégicas le corresponden al sector civil. 

Cuando los militares comienzan a intervenir estas áreas con sus interpretaciones se 

inicia el germen del desconocimiento de la subordinación y sujeción militar al control civil. 

Estas teorías sobre el desarrollo nacional usualmente van complementadas con interpretaciones interesadas de la historia. El ejemplo de la interpretación que hace Hugo Chávez, 

como militar, del papel jugado por Simón Bolívar, en la historia venezolana constituye un 

extraordinario ejemplo de hacia donde pueden conducir a un país esas caprichosas interpretaciones históricas de los militares.

En síntesis, el problema de la politización de los militares, y el pretorianismo en general, se origina durante su proceso de formación y educación. En ese momento cuando se 

comienzan a elaborar teorías que separan y establecen diferencias entre categorías, como 

el cumplimiento de las responsabilidades, el deber moral, la obediencia y lealtad hacia la 

nación, la institución castrense, el gobierno, la Constitución Nacional, el Ejecutivo, y el 

pueblo, entre otros, se comienzan a crear las condiciones favorables para que se desarrolle 

y manifieste el pretorianismo. Es decir, en ese momento se está sembrando en la mentalidad militar el virus de la insubordinación, el desconocimiento de la autoridad, y la falta de 

sujeción al control civil; que posteriormente se podría expresar en la búsqueda del poder 

político a través de la posesión y uso ilegitimo de las armas del Estado, y eventual violencia 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 211

en contra de la sociedad civil. Así pues, la pérdida de cohesión ideológica al igual que la 

expansión de sus responsabilidades mas allá de su campo natural, conduce a los militares 

a su división y desintegración, pero también amenaza propia la existencia de la sociedad 

civil democrática.

Ahora bien, para Samuel Huntington la sociedad tiene dos formas básicas de asegurar el control civil. A través del control subjetivo, por medio de medidas constitucionales, institucionales, e incluso mecanismos de superación social, y el control objetivo 

sobre los militares que se logra por medio del profesionalismo militar. Además propone 

el profesionalismo militar como garantía contra la politización (Huntington 1957). Sin 

embargo, en América Latina y en general para las sociedades con bajos niveles de cultura 

política y debilidad institucional y política como la situación venezolana, el problema de 

la intervención de los militares en política parece que trasciende los parámetros teóricos 

del profesionalismo militar planteado por Huntington. Este es uno de los puntos centrales 

de la polémica entre Huntington y Finer. No obstante, el esquema huntingtoniano de control civil sobre los militares pareciera funcionar más adecuadamente para las sociedades 

democráticas del mundo industrializado y no para el conjunto de sociedades subdesarrolladas institucionalmente. “Lo que justamente diferencia a las democracias políticamente 

maduras de las democracias limitadas es precisamente el control que la sociedad civil 

ejerce sobre sus militares. Esta es una de las características, probablemente la más importante, entre las democracias modernas y desarrolladas con el resto de las democracias del 

mundo civilizado” (Castillo 2003: 104). 

La evidencia histórica, para esta parte del mundo, pareciera estar del lado de la tesis 

de Finer, en el sentido de que en ciertas circunstancias, que dependen principalmente del 

nivel de cultura política de la sociedad, los “profesionales militares” pueden ser sujetos de 

intervención política. Sobre todo, cuando comienzan a plantear ciertas teorías que, muy 

subliminal y a veces abiertamente, establecen diferencias y se divorcian de los objetivos 

e intereses de la nación, la Constitución y el gobierno. Igualmente, cuando hacen ciertas 

interpretaciones interesadas de la política y la economía sobre el papel que han jugado en la 

historia. Teorías que conducen finalmente, a veces de una forma sutil, al desconocimiento 

de los controles y la subordinación militar ante la supremacía civil. 

Según la tesis de Huntington, no se puede afirmar absoluta y universalmente que el 

profesionalismo militar sea la variable clave para asegurar el control civil ya que no está 

demostrado históricamente para todos los casos. Además, el profesionalismo no parece ser 

en definitiva la garantía para impedir, limitar o incluso eliminar la politización de las fuerzas y sus distintas formas de manifestación pretoriana. Se pueden encontrar situaciones en 

donde se presenten distintos niveles de profesionalización con diversos tipos de intervención militar en política, que pueden ir desde muy alto profesionalismo y politización hasta 

niveles muy bajos en las dos variables mencionadas.

Pero, en cualquier caso, cualquier forma que tomen las relaciones entre profesionalismo militar y politización atenta y va en detrimento de la institucionalidad y en contra 

del control civil. En América Latina la situación de países como Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, 

Chile, Perú, e incluso Venezuela últimamente, entre otros, es ilustrativa, sin mencionar 

numerosos casos en otras partes del mundo subdesarrollado. Así pues, tal como lo sostiene 

Finer, resulta insuficiente, para estas latitudes, explicar el control civil principalmente en 

términos de profesionalismo militar.

En vista del poder y las características de la actuación política de los militares vene-
212 Security and Defense Studies Review

zolanos y la ausencia de un efectivo control civil, rigurosamente no se puede afirmar que 

las Fuerzas Armadas venezolanas han alcanzado altos niveles de profesionalismo ni tampoco hemos tenido control civil. Ahora bien, si no hemos tenido un efectivo control civil y, 

sin embargo, los militares se han mantenido dentro del marco legal y constitucional hasta 

el punto, incluso, en que todos los alzamientos militares venezolanos después de 1958 han 

sido derrotados con los mismos recursos de la propias Fuerzas Armadas, entonces ¿qué 

tipo de militares hemos tenido en Venezuela? En relación a la situación venezolana, los 

parámetros teóricos de Perlmutter, a pesar de que él no examina en detalle nuestra situación, parecen ofrecer argumentos para intentar la siguiente explicación: Una vez que el 

pretorianismo fracasa en el gobierno militar entre 1948-1958, hemos tenido a unos militares pretorianos en estado latente o potencial; y un ejército árbitro (Perlmutter 1977). 

Es decir, la dirigencia política civil permitió la existencia de unas condiciones propicias 

para que el pretorianismo latente se desarrollara, tal como efectivamente ocurrió luego 

del triunfo electoral de Chávez. O sea, compartimos el planteamiento teórico de Irwin, 

el cual sostiene que luego de 1958 la dirigencia política civil venezolana pretendía saber 

sobre relaciones civiles y militares y control civil, cuando en realidad lo ignoraba y fue 

incapaz de manejar esa problemática. “El acuerdo de mutuo interés, no escrito, entre la 

alta dirigencia de AD y COPEI y los altos mandos castrenses, suponían estar en capacidad 

de controlar favorablemente el siempre presente potencial político protagónico del sector 

castrense criollo” (Irwin 2003a: 203). 

Recordemos que Perlmutter considera a los ejércitos como el principal instrumento 

de poder pretoriano y los clasifica de árbitros y gobernantes, así tendríamos entonces que 

nuestra institución castrense se ha comportado políticamente durante la democracia como 

un ejército pretoriano tipo árbitro. Es decir se perciben, a si mismo, como no preparados para ejercer la conducción política del Estado directamente, mientras que los ejércitos 

pretorianos tipo gobernantes en cambio si se perciben a si mismo como preparados para 

ejercer la conducción política del Estado.

Ahora bien, si se sigue el modelo teórico de Eric Nordlinger (1977) hemos tenido en 

Venezuela un ejército pretoriano tipo moderador. Es decir, aquellos que: “Constituyen un 

poderoso grupo de presión que ejerce un poder de veto sobre las autoridades civiles pero 

sin pretender ellos tomar directamente el poder político. Se caracterizan por ser conservadores, defensores del status quo, los civiles gobiernan pero el gobierno es supervisado por 

los militares” (Irwin 2003: 40).

Pero, en lo fundamental, el liderazgo político civil venezolano no tuvo, ni ha tenido 

hasta ahora, la capacidad, el interés, la voluntad y claridad política, consistencia conceptual 

y convicción doctrinaria, e incluso hasta la necesidad de implementar un conjunto de mecanismos y técnicas para ejercer un efectivo control civil sobre el histórico potencial pretoriano de los militares venezolanos. De tal manera que, se puede afirmar que en materia de 

relaciones civiles y militares venezolanas, luego del fracaso del pretorianismo gobernante 

del dictador Marcos Pérez Jiménez, no hemos tenido un real y verdadero control civil sobre los militares. Al contrario, lo que hemos tenido es un entendimiento, acuerdo, fusión, 

alianza y simbiosis militar-civil y político-militar; no escrita, pero sí operante y efectiva. 

Después de varios siglos de barbarie, atraso e incivilización puede que el siglo XXI sea 

para Venezuela el siglo de la derrota definitiva del virus del pretorianismo y la supremacía 

final de la sociedad civil venezolana sobre los militares y sus instituciones armadas.
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 213

Notas

1 En febrero de 1989 se produjo el “Caracazo” o “Sacudón”. A raíz del alza de los pasajes 

en el transporte colectivo entre el 27 y 28 de ese mes estallaron en las principales ciudades 

de Venezuela una serie de protestas populares: hubo saqueos y destrozos en distintas zonas 

comerciales, gran cantidad de muertos, heridos y desaparecidos que fueron enterrados en 

fosas comunes y hasta la fecha no se conoce el número exacta de las cifras. Estos hechos 

provocaron una situación de anomia y anarquía, pues la violencia se convirtió en el mecanismo de expresión popular, lo cual ameritó la suspensión de las garantías constitucionales 

y la militarización del país, hecho que no ocurría en Venezuela desde los años sesenta. 

2

 Los argumentos que ambos grupos golpistas manejaron fueron: la pérdida de credibilidad 

del sistema de partidos, el malestar social causado por las medidas económicas adoptadas 

durante el período 1989-1992, la corrupción tanto en el sector público como en el privado, 

la injusticia, la inseguridad y la pérdida del poder adquisitivo de las clases medias, que 

repercutió en la baja de los niveles de vida y que habían trascendido también a la Fuerza 

Armada. De esta forma, emergieron grupos ideológicos del sector castrense que se aliaron 

a civiles para plantearse una salida por la vía del “cuartelazo”, utilizando métodos que se 

creían superados como forma de hacer la política en Venezuela. 

3

 En este contexto, nos referimos a baja o mediana cultura política al concepto de S.E. Finer 

en su modelo teórico sobre las relaciones civiles y militares según el cual, en estos ordenes 

de cultura política, los civiles pueden gobernar dándole a los militares total autonomía e 

inmunidad institucional. Es decir, la legitimidad de las autoridades civiles es importante 

pero fluida o refractaria a los militares.
214 Security and Defense Studies Review

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2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 217

El Control Civil de las Fuerzas Armadas en el Ecuador 

¿Intento Fallido?*

Luis Hernández

RESUMEN

El Ecuador ha sido uno de los últimos países en la región en tener como ministro 

de la defensa a un civil. Tradicionalmente esta tarea ha sido entregada a militares 

retirados. El tema militar fue y sigue siendo un área poco apetecida para ser 

aprendida por la sociedad civil y académica. El mismo Presidente Correa ha 

aceptado conocer muy poco sobre temas de seguridad, a tal punto que en una de 

sus intervenciones semanales en los medios de comunicación ha ofrecido leer y 

aprender más sobre el tema.

Sin embargo de conocer poco del tema—como él lo admite—durante su 

gobierno se designó por primera vez en más de 35 años a un ministro civil para la 

defensa. Hasta el momento en su gobierno dos ministras han sido mujeres—una 

de las cuales murió en un accidente de un helicóptero militar. El actual ministro es 

un ex periodista que, a través de su columna en uno de los periódicos de alcance 

nacional era un crítico—para algunos a veces injusto—de las actividades de las 

FF.AA.

Introducción

Desde el 2006 en que tomó el poder el presidente Rafael Correa, los cambios en las Fuerzas 

Armadas (FF.AA.) han estado dirigidos a dos áreas específicas: quitarles a las FF.AA. su 

condición de garantes del orden democrático, y ejercer el control civil de las mismas. Para 

el efecto se aprobaron varias leyes que han permitido que esto se efectivice.

La rebelión policial del 30 de septiembre del 2010 (30-S), originó una profunda crisis 

en la Policía Nacional, y por ende en la Seguridad Nacional. Las percepciones de confianza hacia la Policía Nacional cambiaron, particularmente de parte del Correa, quien fue 

objeto de vejámenes por policías en la mañana del 30-S y más tarde “rescatado” por un 

contingente de las FF.AA. de un hospital policial. El desenlace determinó cambios en el 

Ministerio del Interior y la designación de un militar retirado como Ministro de Seguridad 

Interna y Externa, desplazando a un civil. Este hecho para ciertos analistas es visto como 

un regreso al pasado en que los temas militares los tratan solo los militares.

Acciones recientes por parte del gobierno del presidente Correa han estado orientadas 

Las opiniones aquí expresadas reflejan exclusivamente el punto de vista del autor, y no representan los puntos de 

vista de las instituciones que organizaron, patrocinaron y participaron en este evento.

*Este trabajo fue seleccionado como parte de una convocatoria para remitir propuestas de investigación, y fue 

presentado durante la VII Conferencia Sub-Regional llevada a cabo en Santiago de Chile, Julio 19-22. La conferencia fue organizada por el Centro de Estudios Hemisféricos de Defensa, con el patrocinio del Ministerio de 

la Defensa Nacional de Chile y el apoyo de la Academia Nacional de Estudios Estratégicos y Políticos de Chile. 
218 Security and Defense Studies Review

a disminuir la participación de la policía en actividades de orden interno y a aumentar la 

participación de la FF.AA. en tareas policiales.

Los militares a los asuntos militares

La Constitución aprobada luego del gobierno militar (1972-1979), dejó tareas a ser cumplidas por las FF.AA. dentro de los organismos del estado. Estas fueron desarrolladas gracias 

a la participación a través de delegados en los directorios de varias empresas nacionales. La 

participación de los delegados de las FF.AA era con voz y voto, lo cual contradecía con el 

carácter de no deliberantes establecido en las Constituciones que regían desde 1979. Eran 

común escuchar que las FF. AA. se retiraron del gobierno, pero no del poder.

La Constitución de 1998 dejó normas claras para que los militares se concentren más 

en sus actividades específicas, de tal manera que ya se estableció que las empresas militares 

se dediquen exclusivamente a aspectos relacionados con la defensa nacional. Esto no se 

cumplió, ya que ningún gobierno tuvo la voluntad política, ni el apoyo para que esto sea 

una realidad, por lo que las FF.AA. continuaron en actividades económicas, tales como 

cultivo de flores, agricultura, piscícola, bancaria, acciones en hoteles, entre otras, más la 

participación en los directorios de ciertas empresas del estado. 

En lo referente al rol de las FF.AA. dentro de la convivencia en un estado democrático, tanto la Constitución de 1979 como la de 1998 le dieron a las FF.AA. la misión de ser 

garantes de la institucionalidad interpretada por muchos analistas como guardianes de la 

democracia. Bajo estos argumentos se produjeron, por ejemplo, intervenciones en la vida 

política del Ecuador, siendo el más trascendental el golpe de estado del año 2000 ejecutado 

por un grupo de oficiales. Liderados por el coronel Lucio Gutiérrez y apoyados por el sector indígena, contó más tarde con la venia del mando militar. Como consecuencia de este 

golpe fue derrocado el presidente Jamil Mahuad. Sin embargo, las FF.AA. no tomaron el 

poder, sino que facilitaron la sucesión presidencial a través del vicepresidente Gustavo 

Noboa.

El proyecto de la “Revolución Ciudadana” que lidera el presidente Correa inauguró 

en el 2008, una nueva Constitución, la misma que en los temas de seguridad trae cambios 

significativos en relación a las pasadas constituciones. Tanto las FF.AA. como la Policía 

Nacional pasan a ser “de garantes del orden jurídico”1

 a “Instituciones de protección de 

los derechos, libertades y garantías de los ciudadanos.”2 Otro cambio importante es el de 

asignar a las FF.AA. únicamente la defensa de la soberanía y la integridad territorial y a 

la Policía Nacional la protección de seguridad interna. En las Constituciones anteriores la 

Policía Nacional se subordinaba a las FF.AA. a través del Comando Conjunto en misiones 

de orden interno, cuando se declaraba el estado de emergencia, para poder de esa forma 

enfrentar de mejor manera situaciones de conflictividad social que puedan llevar a una 

grave conmoción interna. 

En lo relacionado a las actividades económicas la nueva constitución casi mantiene el 

mismo articulado, tanto para las FF.AA. como para la Policía Nacional, al determinar que: 

“solo podrán participar en actividades económicas relacionadas con la defensa nacional, 

y podrán aportar su contingente para apoyar el desarrollo nacional, de acuerdo a la ley.”3

Sin embargo, que el articulado de las Constituciones tanto actual como anterior es 

parecido en lo relacionado a las actividades económicas que pueden realizar los organismos de seguridad, Correa toma acciones que le permiten profundizar el control civil de las 

FF.AA. y la Policía Nacional. Es así que para el efecto a través de la Asamblea Nacional—
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 219

donde tiene mayoría—aprueba dos leyes determinantes para esto, la Ley Orgánica de Empresas Públicas y la Ley de Educación Superior, por medio de las cuales asume el control 

de los directorios de las empresas militares y policiales y procede a eliminar las empresas 

que no tienen relación con el tema de seguridad.

La Ley Orgánica de Empresas Públicas, aprobada por el gobierno del Correa y publicada en el Registro Oficial del 16 de Octubre el 2009, dispone la creación del Comité de 

Industria de la Defensa con la siguiente misión:4

El Comité de Industria de la Defensa Nacional, en base a elementos objetivos y 

parámetros definidos, recomendará en un plazo no mayor de 180 días al gobierno 

nacional, mantener o no el control o administración de dichas empresas. Con el 

referido informe y dentro del plazo de noventa días las empresas que queden 

bajo control de las Fuerzas Armadas adecuarán su naturaleza jurídica al marco 

de la presente Ley. En las que se decida que las Fuerzas Armadas no continúen 

participando se iniciarán los procesos de desinversión, sin menoscabo de aquellos 

que a la fecha de expedición de la presente Ley se encuentren ejecutando. 

La creación de este comité es nueva en la estructura organizacional de la defensa y 

permite que los diferentes gobiernos lo manejen de acuerdo a sus proyectos políticos ya 

que la mayoría de sus integrantes son designados por el presidente de la república.

La Ley Orgánica de Empresas Públicas da fiel cumplimiento a lo establecido en el 

Art. 162 de la Constitución aprobada en referéndum por el pueblo ecuatoriano en el año 

2008.

La puesta en práctica de esta ley ha determinado que actividades económicas que 

desarrollaban las FF.AA. y que no se referían a la defensa nacional sean abandonadas. El 

Diario Hoy el 1 de noviembre del 2008, pública en un titular: “Las FF.AA. sacan a la venta 

sus empresas militares,” en el desarrollo del mismo, da fé de la puesta en venta por ejemplo 

del 44 por ciento de las acciones que las FF.AA. tenían en el Hotel Marriott de Quito.

El control civil sobre las empresas militares que se dediquen a actividades de la defensa nacional, también se acentúa con esta ley, ya que determina que los directorios de estas empresas estén conformados con mayoría de miembros civiles, a pesar que se mantiene 

la integración del directorio con miembros militares como son el Jefe del Comando Conjunto y el Comandante de Fuerza—dependiendo de la rama de las FF.AA. a que pertenezca 

la empresa. Es decir cualquier decisión sobre el futuro de la industria militar está bajo el 

control civil ya que ellos tienen mayoría en los directorios.

Igual tratamiento es dado a las empresas que maneja la Policía Nacional, con lo 

cual dos instituciones de la seguridad del Ecuador, que tradicionalmente habían tenido 

autonomía para manejar sus empresas, con motivo de la entrada en vigencia de la Ley 

Orgánica de Empresas Públicas pierden esa autonomía y sus empresas pasan al control 

civil a través de los respectivos gobiernos.

En lo referente a la educación superior en la FF.AA., a las instituciones de educación 

superior se les unificó dando cumplimiento a lo establecido en la Ley de Educación Superior. Esto permitirá que bajo el control del Ministerio de Defensa se desarrolle la nueva 

Universidad de las FF.AA. 

Los debates para la aprobación de estas dos leyes en sectores de la oposición, en especial, no fueron vistos como un avance en el control civil de los organismos de seguridad 

del estado, sino más bien como una forma de aumentar el poder del ejecutivo.
220 Security and Defense Studies Review

En los sectores de seguridad en cambio, la percepción que se manejó es que las empresas militares se debilitarían, los directorios se politizarían y por ende los recursos a los 

que tenía acceso las FF.AA. por el rendimiento de sus empresas se afectaría. De acuerdo 

a declaraciones al Diario Hoy el 1 de noviembre del 2008, el comandante del ejército, 

Ernesto González, sostenía que los ingresos por la administración de las empresas significaban 12 millones de dólares al año.

Romper una larga tradición de autonomía si bien no trajo expresiones públicas en 

contra, de parte de miembros de las FF.AA. y Policía en servicio pasivo, el sentimiento en 

muchos de ex militares era que se debilitaba la defensa nacional.

El Proyecto de la “Revolución Ciudadana” 5 había fijado en la Constitución del 2008 

claras competencias, tanto para la Policía como para las FF.AA., a tal punto que se estableció claramente que para utilizar a las FF.AA. en misiones de orden interno será necesario 

decretar el estado de excepción.6 Al haber establecido que la policía tendrá como misión 

“atender la seguridad ciudadana,”7 y las FF.AA. “la defensa de la soberanía y la integridad 

territoria,“ las leyes consecuentes estaban dirigidas a normar de forma más específica lo 

establecido en la Constitución y así sucedió.

Hasta antes de septiembre del 2010, tres leyes recogían y normaban lo establecido 

en la Constitución del 2008. Estas son: La Ley de Empresas Públicas, la Ley de Seguridad 

Pública y la Ley referida al Código Orgánico de la Función Judicial. En todas ellas se introdujeron artículos por los cuales se restaba autonomía y a la vez se aumentaba el control 

civil de las FF.AA. y Policía.

Así tenemos por ejemplo que el Código Orgánico de la Función Judicial derogó leyes 

que permitieron tanto a las FF.AA. como a la Policía gozar de una gran autonomía en la 

administración de justicia en sus instituciones y que en algunos casos provenían de hace 

varias décadas. Estas leyes fueron: Ley de la Función Judicial de la Policía Nacional de 

1960, Ley Orgánica del Servicio de Justicia de las FF.AA. de 1961, el Código de Procesamiento Penal de la Policía Nacional de 1960 y el Código de Procesamiento Penal de las 

FF.AA. de 1961.

Igualmente se bajó el nivel de fuero al de Corte de Justicia Provincial al Jefe del 

Comando Conjunto, Comandantes de Fuerza y Policía Nacional.8

 Antes tenían fuero del 

más alto organismo de justicia que era la Corte Suprema de Justicia, hoy Corte Superior 

de Justicia.

La Ley de Seguridad Publica y del Estado en cambio reformó los organismos de 

inteligencia, sacándoles de la tutela militar y creando la Secretaria Nacional de Inteligencia. Fue establecido además que para ser secretario “no podrá ser miembro activo de las 

FF.AA. o de la Policía Nacional,” 9 todo esto con el claro propósito de establecer un control 

civil de los organismos de inteligencia a nivel del estado. Estas decisiones fueran tomadas 

en vista de las críticas a la acción de la Inteligencia Militar con motivo de la infiltración 

de las FF.AA. colombianas el mes de marzo del 2008 en el sector ecuatoriano de Angostura—área fronteriza con Colombia—para destruir un campamento de las FARC en el que 

se encontraba Raúl Reyes un alto miembro del Secretariado de las FARC. Según altos 

funcionarios del gobierno del Correa, se ocultó “más de 20 días información al Presidente”. 

Según declaraciones de Miguel Carvajal, ministro coordinador de seguridad del gobierno, 

dadas al Diario El Universo el 4 de julio del 2010.

Igualmente a través de esta Ley se conforma el Consejo de Seguridad Pública y del 

Estado en sustitución del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional. El actual Consejo reduce la 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 221

participación de los organismos de seguridad a únicamente dos miembros, el Jefe del Comando Conjunto y el Comandante de la Policía Nacional, cuando antes eran además miembros los comandantes de fuerza.

La participación de miembros de la FF.AA. y Policía en ámbitos ajenos a su función 

se norma también por medio de esta ley. Es así como el Art. 44 establece que: “En concordancia con su naturaleza no podrán participar en directorios, comisiones, comités, consejos 

consultivos y en general organismos colegiados de instituciones, empresas públicas y organismos de regulación y control, a excepción de las entidades de seguridad social de las 

fuerzas armadas y la policía nacional, y de aquella empresas relacionadas directamente con 

la seguridad interna y externa.” 

Es esta posiblemente una de la normas más claras dirigidas a terminar uno de los 

legados que más duraron en la vida democrática de Ecuador después de los gobiernos 

militares, y que fue el de mantener empresas ajenas a su misión y al mismo tiempo integrar 

directorios de instituciones nacionales lejanos a su tarea de la defensa nacional, tales como 

en el área de petróleos, electricidad, teléfonos etc. Sin embargo, quedó a discreción del 

gobierno utilizar a las FF.AA. o a sus miembros en tareas ajenas a su misión fundamental 

mediante la declaración de estado de emergencia de un determinado sector de la actividad 

pública. Así al sector petrolero se entregó a la marina para que maneje de Petroecuador 

durante más de un año a partir de enero del 2008. 

En el caso de la Policía Nacional el control del tránsito a nivel nacional y su organización había sido uno de las tareas más apetecidas por esta institución. La Ley de Tránsito aprobada en el año 2008 entregó el manejo y el control del tránsito en gran medida a 

los gobiernos locales. Este fue también un cambio significativo en el proceso de “ordenar” 

las tareas de la Policía por parte del gobierno.

También dentro del proceso de entregar el control interno y la seguridad ciudadana 

a la Policía Nacional, se modificó la Ley que ordenaba el control y registro de armas por 

parte de las FF.AA. y se entregó esta responsabilidad a la Policía Nacional.

La revuelta policial del 30 de septiembre y las consecuencias en las tareas constitucionales de las FF.AA. y la Policía Nacional 

El Art. 158 de la Constitución del Ecuador establece que: “la protección interna y el mantenimiento del orden público son funciones privativas del Estado y responsabilidad de la 

Policía Nacional.” Igualmente el Art. 163 establece que la Policía Nacional es una institución del estado de “carácter civil.”

Los artículos arriba mencionados originaron procesos de reforma dentro de la Policía 

Nacional, tales como la entrega paulatina del control y administración del tránsito a los 

gobiernos locales, junto a procesos de depuración dentro de las filas policiales.

Una decisión que no solamente involucró a la Policía, sino también a las FF.AA., 

fue el establecimiento de una Comisión de la Verdad para investigar las violaciones a los 

derechos humanos por parte de los organismos de seguridad en los gobiernos anteriores. 

Al parecer estas decisiones no eran vistas de buena manera por algunos miembros de la 

policía. Sin embargo, se estaban cumpliendo en un ejercicio claro de obediencia al control 

civil y a sus dictámenes. Pero, cuando el ejecutivo, mediante el veto, aprobó cambios en la 

Ley de Servidores Públicos que alteraban la forma de recibir recompensas económicas por 

el tiempo de servicio y la promoción tanto de las FF.AA. como de la Policía Nacional, esta 

última escogió la vía de rebelión para demostrar su malestar. No faltaron también protestas 
222 Security and Defense Studies Review

aisladas de personal de la Fuerza Aérea que motivaron el cierre temporal del aeropuerto de 

Quito la mañana del 30-S.

La rebelión de la Policía el 30 de septiembre del 2010 creó una gran incertidumbre 

en el liderazgo político en el Ecuador, fue algo totalmente inesperado para un gobierno que 

con razón sostiene que ha dedicado grandes recursos para el fortalecimiento de la policía. 

Fue tan inesperado que el propio presidente pensó que con su sola presencia podía sofocar 

la rebelión, presencia que no ayudó y que más bien agravó los sucesos, al punto que el 

presidente permaneció retenido en un hospital policial hasta la noche.

La rebelión de una institución armada y no deliberante fue un duro golpe para el gobierno del Correa, que había emprendido reformas profundas para lograr el control civil de 

los órganos de seguridad y evitar justamente lo que sucedió el 30-S. Memorias ya pasadas 

de rebeliones armadas parecía que eran cosa del pasado; sin embargo, el 30-S las revivió 

a tal punto que fue necesario escuchar la intervención en cadena nacional del Jefe de las 

FF.AA. llamando al orden a los elementos en rebeldía y comprometiendo su apoyo a la 

democracia.

El pronunciamiento fue visto nuevamente por sectores de la opinión pública como 

una vuelta al viejo molde. Grave conmoción interna—como es el caso de una rebelión 

policial—y finalmente el pronunciamiento de las FF.AA. inclinando la balanza en el caso 

del 30-S en apoyo al Correa. Cabe anotar que el ministro de defensa estuvo muy activo en 

apagar focos de rebelión en las FF.AA., pero no fue su pronunciamiento el que se escucho, 

sino, el del Jefe del Comando Conjunto, sin duda por pedido del propio ministro. 

Transcurridos casi seis meses del 30-S, parecería ser que el gobierno acelera la reforma policial y la profundiza. Tal es así, que en las recientes reformas a la Ley de Transito 

aleja más a la Policía Nacional de esta actividad, considerada por muchos como “el bocado 

del león’’ en cuanto a recursos y poder. La reforma contempla la eliminación de la Dirección Nacional de Transito y Seguridad que es parte de la Policía y es sustituida por una 

nueva organización que estará bajo control totalmente civil.

Está también en proceso de debate la creación de una Policía de Investigaciones al 

mando de un civil y totalmente aparte de la Policía Nacional que actualmente la maneja.

Todos estos cambios no estaban en el tapete antes del 30-S y si lo estaban iban a requerir una mayor participación de la sociedad y de la propia policía. El 30-S los precipitó 

y los aceleró, y han sido implementados, unos mediante ley y otros por Decreto Presidencial, como aquel de inicios de febrero del 2010 por el cual se le quita a la Policía Nacional 

su facultad para administrar recursos financieros y realizar adquisiciones. Esta tarea pasa 

ahora al Ministerio del Interior en similitud a lo que ocurre en las FF.AA. donde no tiene la 

autonomía con la que gozaba la Policía Nacional para administrar sus recursos. El Ministerio de Defensa es quien maneja la parte administrativa y financiera de las FF.AA.

En una entrevista radial un general retirado de la policía alertó sobre el hecho que la 

policía pierda misiones y que tras de ello estaban instituciones que querían asumirlas. Al 

ser preguntado por el periodista cuales instituciones: respondió que las FF.AA.

¿Desean las FF.AA. ejercer funciones que antes tenía la policía? Parecería ser que no, 

y así lo evidencia las nuevas leyes por las cuales se crean instituciones netamente civiles 

para que manejen las tareas que antes las hacia la policía y que la distraían de su función 

fundamental que es la de la Seguridad Ciudadana y que se ha convertido en una de las 

mayores preocupaciones del Correa, a tal punto que convocó a un referéndum en el mes de 

mayo que le permita reformas a la Constitución para mejorar los niveles de seguridad en 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 223

el país. Los resultados del referéndum apoyan las iniciativas del gobierno para reformar la 

justicia y emprender acciones que permitan mejorar el nivel de seguridad de la sociedad.

Parecería ser que el gobierno de Correa discernió adecuadamente el escenario luego 

de los sucesos del 30-S y concluyó que ante la crisis policial y sus consecuencias para la 

seguridad, las FF.AA. se convertían en un factor fundamental para aliviar la crisis y llenar 

el vacío dejado por una Policía desmoralizada y bajo restructuración. 

Mediante la declaración del estado de emergencia pudo utilizar a las FF.AA. para 

tareas de control de la delincuencia en todo el país. Sin embargo, a pesar que se cumplieron 

los plazos de la emergencia—la Ley de Seguridad Ciudadana y del Estado establece que 

solo con un Decreto de Emergencia las FF.AA. pueden ser empleadas en tareas de seguridad ciudadana—siguió utilizándolas hasta el presente, valiéndose del dictamen de un juez 

que argumentó el derecho de los ciudadanos a tener seguridad. El propio asesor jurídico 

de la presidencia, Dr. Alexis Mera, ha sostenido en este asunto que la “seguridad interna 

es responsabilidad de la policía pero no exclusiva”. Lo más conveniente sería establecer 

plazos para la actuación de las FF.AA. en las calles, lo cual permitirá también que la Policía 

se fortalezca dentro de un plazo adecuado y pase por si sola a cumplir su tarea fundamental 

que es la seguridad ciudadana.

Al momento se discuten en la Asamblea Nacional reformas propuestas por el presidente a la Ley de Seguridad Ciudadana y del Estado que fue aprobada en julio del 2009. El 

tema más polémico es el que se refiere a la participación en tareas de Seguridad Ciudadana 

por parte de las FF.AA., sin necesidad de establecer la emergencia, sino únicamente por 

Decreto Ejecutivo. Esta misma propuesta ya fue negada por la Asamblea Nacional cuando 

se debatía la ley. El escenario como consecuencia de la crisis policial y de seguridad podría 

flexibilizar las posiciones sobre el tema por parte de los asambleístas y facilitar su aprobación, pero a las luces de muchos analistas esto sería inconstitucional y lo que es peor 

distraería a las FF.AA. de su tarea fundamental y retardaría la recuperación de la Policía 

Nacional a niveles que les permita cumplir su misión con toda su capacidad. 

Parecería ser que el gobierno nacional ha decido echar mano de las FF.AA. en aspectos de índole interno relacionados con la conflictividad social y que antes del 30 de septiembre hubieran sido dados un tratamiento mayormente policial. Así tenemos que una vez 

declarado el estado de emergencia en la provincia de Esmeraldas se procedió a desalojar 

a mineros ilegales de sus campamentos en el mes de mayo del presente año con la subsecuente destrucción de sus herramientas de trabajo en algunos casos (retroexcavadoras), 

en una acción que ha merecido criticas por supuestos abusos del poder y violación a los 

derechos de las personas, a tal punto que el juez que autorizó la destrucción fue suspendido 

por el Presidente de la Judicatura. ¿Es esta una nuestra de desconfianza en la Policía Nacional? El ministro de Defensa Javier Ponce al ser abordado por la prensa y consultado sobre 

la posible creación de una unidad de policía militar para la seguridad ciudadana responde: 

“Es la creación de un grupo especializado dentro de las Fuerzas Armadas en el marco de 

la seguridad ciudadana. Se va a trabajar en la forma de relacionarse con la ciudadanía y el 

tipo de armamento que portaran.” Abordado por el periodista en el sentido de que si esto 

significa desconfianza hacia la policía, responde: “No. Los roles de las FF.AA. en Ecuador 

y en muchos países están modificándose, hay problemas agudos de inseguridad y los efectivos pueden colaborar. No desconfiamos de la Policía no se trata de prescindir de ella.”10

Es posible que sin los sucesos del 30 de septiembre del 2010, sea decir la posible creación de una unidad de policía militar para el control de la delincuencia, no hubiera estado 
224 Security and Defense Studies Review

en el tapete. Esto más aun cuando en la Ley de Seguridad Pública y del Estado propuesta 

y aprobada por el gobierno del Correa en el 2008 se establece en el Art. 11 que la Policía 

Nacional es la responsable de “lograr la seguridad ciudadana.”

La credibilidad de las FF.AA. se mantiene alta. Según una encuesta publicada por 

la revista Vistazo el 1 de Julio del 20011, su nivel de aceptación es del 69 por ciento, a 

diferencia de la Policía que tiene según la misma encuesta un nivel de desconfianza del 76 

por ciento. Esta aceptación de las FF.AA. en la sociedad puede estar animando al gobierno 

para seguir utilizándolas en tareas policiales por un tiempo que no sea el prudente. Más 

aún cuando es necesario que la Policía Nacional en el menor tiempo posible recupere la 

confianza del gobierno y la sociedad a niveles que faciliten su trabajo que es fundamental 

para la seguridad ciudadana. 

Ante los hechos del 30 de septiembre, ciertas tareas que se dieron a la policía nacional en base a lo propuesto por el gobierno del Correa en las nuevas leyes y la reciente 

constitución se han entregado a las FF.AA. Por citar un ejemplo: el control y registro de 

armas siempre estuvo bajo responsabilidad de las FF.AA. Sin embargo, a partir del año 

2009, pasó a ser tarea de la Policía Nacional. El mes de junio del 2011 Correa mediante 

decreto ejecutivo devolvió esa tarea a las FF.AA. ¿Consecuencias del 30 de septiembre? 

De acuerdo a un reporte que publica el Diario El Comercio11 la Policía desde que asumió 

la tarea de registrar las armas en posesión de la población civil, logró hacerlo solo en un 

20 por ciento, lo cual sería posiblemente una de las razones para quitarle esta tarea. Lo que 

queda por preguntarse es si un Decreto Ejecutivo puede cambiar lo dispuesto en una Ley 

que es de mayor jerarquía.

El “retorno de los militares” a dirigir los reformados organismos de inteligencia se 

produce con la designación de un Almirante en servicio pasivo al frente de la Secretaria 

Nacional de Inteligencia luego de los sucesos del 30-S. ¿Es esto como resultado de fallas 

en los organismos de inteligencia para detectar las inconformidades en la Policía Nacional 

que desembocaron en la rebelión policial del 30 de septiembre del 2010? Es posible, considerando que estos se producen a los pocos días de la rebelión.

La sociedad frente a los cambios para profundizar el control civil de los organismos 

de seguridad 

Sin duda, es el gobierno del Correa el que más cambios ha introducido en la Legislación 

Ecuatoriana para lograr un mayor control civil de las FF.AA. y de la Policía Nacional y 

reducir su autonomía, lo cual puede ser saludable para la democracia y para la institucionalización de un adecuado y permanente control civil de las FF.AA. y por ende para su 

fortalecimiento. Esto porque tareas ajenas a sus misiones las distraen de su función fundamental y la sociedad se ve perjudicada en su seguridad. Estos cambios han sido asimilados 

por los miembros de estas instituciones como consecuencia de su conducta de obedientes 

y no deliberantes. Una excepción —y muy grande—fue la insubordinación policial del 30 

de septiembre. 

En una sociedad como la ecuatoriana con una cultura democrática todavía por fortalecerse, con pasados cercanos de inestabilidad política—desde 1996 al 2006 hubo 7 presidentes—el tema militar y su control civil no ha sido una de las prioridades de la agenda 

política de los gobiernos. No son muchos los expertos en el mundo académico ecuatoriano 

que han buscado profundizar su conocimiento en el tema de seguridad, tal es así que en 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 225

el actual gobierno al decidir poner a la cabeza del ministerio de defensa a civiles, los escogidos tenían poca o ninguna formación en temas de seguridad. Sin embargo, al llegar a 

instituciones cerradas —como son las FF.AA. de todo país—encontraron apertura y rápido 

involucramiento de los militares en las nuevas políticas que se impartían por parte de la 

autoridad civil. Un caso particular es por ejemplo, lo que sucede con el actual ministro de 

defensa, Javier Ponce, un antiguo critico de las FF.AA. quien se adentro en el tema militar, 

lo entendió y ha facilitado en gran medida los cambios que la Constitución y nuevas leyes 

demandaron para el área militar.

Los actores políticos, especialmente los de la legislatura, debatieron democráticamente los cambios introducidos por el gobierno, y en algunos casos los apoyaron, pero la 

cultura política dominante impidió que se los vea como un tema de estado y necesario para 

la democracia y se dio más un tratamiento como tema de gobierno. Es posible que haya 

sido el resultado del casi dialogo nulo que existe entre el gobierno y la oposición.

En un escenario de exagerada polarización política que vive el Ecuador en el momento, acentuado por una débil cultura política que demanda hacer una oposición, muchas 

veces ciega hacia quien está en el poder, no se ha destacado en forma extensa, ni en la 

opinión pública, ni en el medio académico, los cambios en algunos casos sustanciales 

que se han producido en los últimos dos años en el área de seguridad. Un cambio que ha 

tenido repercusiones inmediatas ha sido el de convertir al Servicio Militar en voluntario 

de acuerdo a lo que establece el Artículo 161 de la nueva constitución. La población lo ha 

apoyado y las FF.AA. han adecuado su organización a este nuevo ordenamiento.

Conclusiones 

El gobierno del Presidente Correa es él que más ha avanzado en cuanto a control civil de 

las fuerzas de seguridad se refiere. El manejo de las FF.AA. y los cambios introducidos por 

parte de una administración civil con ningún antecedente militar durante todo su gobierno 

demuestra este hecho. 

Temas aparentemente sensitivos para la cultura militar ecuatoriana fueron abordados, 

tales como el voto militar y la eliminación del servicio militar que paso a ser voluntario.

La designación de civiles al mando del ministerio de defensa y la determinación del 

Presidente Correa para mantener esa línea es una muestra de continuar profundizando el 

control civil de las FF.AA.

La participación de las FF.AA. y la Policía Nacional en actividades a apoyo al “desarrollo nacional,” también fue abordada por el gobierno de Correa y se legisló con nuevas 

leyes siguiendo lo establecido por la Constitución del 2008. Así se redujeron las empresas 

militares y policiales a aquellas relacionadas únicamente con su misión específica ya sea la 

defensa nacional o la seguridad ciudadana.

La infiltración del ejército colombiano al sector de Angustura para atacar un campamento de las FARC, que se encontraba en territorio ecuatoriano, motivo suspicacias y recelos sobre la autonomía de los organismos de inteligencia y su dependencia de las FF.AA. 

al habe—según el gobierno—ocultado información sobre el ataque. La consecuente Ley 

de Seguridad Pública y del Estado expresamente impide que un militar en servicio activo 

dirija la Secretaria Nacional de Inteligencia, lo cual induce a creer que existía desconfianza 

en el nivel política sobre el manejo de la inteligencia.

La designación de un civil como jefe de la Secretaria de Inteligencia, en el corto 
226 Security and Defense Studies Review

plazo, no dio los frutos que el gobierno ansiaba, más aun cuando los hechos del 30-S, 

detectaron las deficiencias del sistema que obligaron al gobierno a designar un almirante 

retirado como jefe de la secretaria. 

La concepción inicial por parte del gobierno de manejar las políticas y temas de seguridad con poca participación de las FF.AA. parece haber sufrido un cambio a raíz de la 

rebelión del 30-S. El relevo del ministro de ascendencia civil de seguridad interna y externa 

Miguel Carvajal (ministerio creado en este gobierno), por el almirante Homero Arellano (r) 

evidencia una mayor participación del “know how” militar en las políticas de seguridad y 

en la organización y desempeño de las instituciones de seguridad. 

El gobierno del Correa está empeñado en darles a las FF.AA. una mayor participación 

en la seguridad interna y ciudadana. No está claro si esto es una política temporal hasta 

lograr una adecuada reorganización de la Policía Nacional o si desea mantenerlo. De ser 

así, serían necesarias reformas a la Constitución.

Los cambios realizados por Correa en el tema militar han cambiado poco en la forma 

en que la sociedad percibe a las FF.AA. El apoyo al sistema democrático el 30-S puede 

haber dejado la sensación que todavía las FF.AA. pueden tener un papel dirimente cuando 

las fuerzas políticas no llegan a acuerdos y de por medio esta una alta conflictividad social 

como ocurrió el 30-S.

Un efectivo control civil de las FF.AA. está aumentando el conocimiento de las mismas desde el escenario político y académico, lo cual, facilitara para que se profundice la 

democracia al mejorar la relación civil- militar, esperando que los actores políticos resuelvan la conflictividad social sin la intervención a veces política de las FF.AA., obligada por 

la circunstancias.

Notas

1

 Constitución Política del Ecuador, 2008.

2

 Constitución Política del Ecuador, 2008.

3

 Ley Orgánica de Empresas Pública.

4 Transitoria Tercera de la Ley Orgánica de Empresas Públicas.

5

 Nombre con el que califica a su proyecto político el presidente Correa.

6

 Art.158, Constitución de la República del Ecuador, 2008.

7

 Art.163, Constitución de la República del Ecuador, 2008.

8

 Art.208 del Código Orgánico de la Función Judicial, 2008. 

9 Art.13 de la Ley de Seguridad Pública y del Estado, 2008.

10 El Universo, 19 junio del 2011, pag. 4.

11 Diario El Comercio 28 de junio del 2011, pag. 1 Sección Seguridad.
Book Reviews

2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 229

Book Review: Terrorist Financing and Resourcing

By Jodi Vittori

Reviewed by Matthew Finger

Center for Hemispheric and Defense Studies Research Intern

In her new book, Terrorist Financing and Resourcing, Jodi Vittori seeks to explain how 

terrorists obtain the financing and resourcing they need and how they use these financial resources to conduct terrorist campaigns. Designed to serve as a primer on terrorist funding, 

Terrorist Financing presents the complex issues involved in how terrorists pay for violence 

in an accessible and engaging way. Beginning with the basic concepts, Vittori defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 

targets by individuals or subnational groups, usually intended to influence an audience.” 

She moves on to discuss the importance of terrorist group autonomy and capacity and how 

these affect the way terrorist get their resources. 

One of the book’s greatest strengths is the cogent presentation of a typology of the 

different kinds of terrorist groups. “On the basis of the strategy used to acquire, move and 

store their resources,” Vittori writes, “terrorist organizations can be grouped into seven 

categories: lone wolf, state sponsored, franchise, bundled support, state sponsoring, shell 

state, and transnational corporation.”

Vittori uses this typology throughout the book to discuss the various ways in which 

terrorist organizations use their resources, as well as how they function generally. The first 

four chapters lay out these types of groups, their needs, and how they fulfill those needs, 

and also provide a brief history of terrorist financing. The author clearly relays the foundational knowledge she will build upon in the more detailed chapters later in the book. She 

also raises some major points about terrorism today, such as a rise in concern regarding 

“lone wolf” groups, the importance of the hawala money exchange system, and the large 

variety of funding available to terrorists. 

In chapter five, Vittori explains one of the most critical factors for the success of terrorist organizations: the ability to create formal funding and leadership structures and to 

adapt those structures to new threats. Likening major terrorist groups to multinational corporations, she discusses Al Qaeda’s five principles for protecting its resourcing institutions 

and its struggle to control its “brand name,” the taxes the Tamil Tigers enacted on their 

diaspora population in Europe, and the organizational structure of HAMAS. 

This leads to Vittori’s main argument—and the big take away from the book: terrorist groups acting like multinational corporations may evolve to resemble “transnational 

corporations” (TNCs). TNCs have no home country, are able to relocate and redistribute 

personnel, resources, and money wherever it is needed and safest, and operate globally. 

These TNCs, though not yet a reality, present a latent peril and a new step in the evolution 

of transnational security threats.

Half of the book is dedicated to the above-mentioned typology, using case studies 

for the illustration of each type. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), HAMAS, 

Al Qaeda, eco-terrorists, the Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and the Provisional Irish Republican 
230 Security and Defense Studies Review

Army (PIRA) serve as her main subjects, and these groups alongside others mentioned 

throughout the book provide both an excellent introduction for the newly interested as well 

as a worthwhile review for longtime researchers. 

Another major strength of the book is its overall presentation. Until now, finding a 

good textbook-like resource on terrorist financing has been difficult. Given the illicit nature 

of the subject, the present literature on terrorist financing is limited. A few authors have 

written on it—Douglas Farah, Bruce Hoffman, and Loretta Napoleoni come to mind—but 

overall, terrorist financing is still a burgeoning field of study. Vittori synthesizes this complex subject into an accessible text outlining both the major and the more nuanced issues 

of terrorist financing to provide a comprehensive reference. 

Given that this field is limited, Vittori relies heavily on the major works; the reader 

is asked to trust these sources for the sake of creating a well-organized reference. But the 

sources Vittori cites have been tested before, and should be considered reliable and accurate (to the degree one can be accurate when discussing terrorist financing). Ultimately, 

while her reliance on a limited series of key sources may seem to be a weakness, it is not a 

major flaw, as the objective of the book is to collect the major sources for easy consumption.

Overall, the book achieves its objective of creating a primer on a complex issue. Vittori skillfully outlines the pressing issues of terrorism, generally, and terrorist financing, 

specifically. 

More about Terrorist Financing and Resourcing

Publisher: Palgrave (January 31, 2011) 

Language: English 

ISBN: 9780230111882

240 pages
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 231

Book Review: Hugo Chávez

By Cristina Marcano and Alberto Barrera Tyszka

Reviewed by Joanna Gillia

Center for Hemispheric and Defense Studies Research Intern

In their definitive biography of Hugo Chávez, Cristina Marcano and Alberto Barrera Tyszka 

succeed in presenting an objective account of Chávez’s journey from a small plains town in 

western Venezuela to Miraflores, the presidential palace in Caracas. The authors illuminate 

numerous trends that have emerged during his 12 years in office in a neutral tone, without 

aggrandizing or demonizing one of the most polarizing leaders in Latin America. 

The first section of the book methodically details Chávez’s upbringing in Sabaneta, 

Barinas, Venezuela. Through interviews with Chávez’s family and friends, Marcano and 

Tyszka provide a comprehensive overview of Chávez’s early circumstances, including 

family dynamics, financial situation, and education. Though at times tedious, this historical 

account provides a necessary basis for the reader to understand the evolution of Chávez 

from a virtually unknown peasant to a military officer, the leader of an unsuccessful coup, 

and, eventually, a democratically elected president. To their credit, the authors avoid the 

temptation to psychoanalyze Chávez based on his upbringing, leaving the reader to postulate how and to what degree Chávez’s earliest experiences have impacted his perceptions 

of politics, governmental authority, and power. 

The true value of this book, however, is realized in the sections describing Chávez’s 

failed coup in 1992, his astounding victory at the polls in 1998, and the subsequent changes he made to the Venezuelan constitution and the executive, legislative, and judiciary 

branches of government. The authors also emphasize particular trends that have emerged 

during Chávez’s 12 years in power, some of which diverge very little from those observed 

elsewhere in Latin America, and others that are patently unique to Venezuela and its colorful leader.

With regard to trends endemic in Latin America as a whole, the authors highlight 

how Venezuela has been captivated by a charismatic leader, had its democratic institutions 

eroded, and has seen its civilian sector subjugated, if not crushed, by Chávez’s obsession 

with the military. Similarly, the authors introduce and elucidate trends that seem to be more 

a product of Chávez’s own idiosyncrasies than of the historical or regional context. These 

trends include Chávez’s willingness to challenge the status quo, especially great powers 

such as the United States, no matter the cost. They highlight Chávez’s profound character 

transformation from a private man of humble means, to a man obsessed with the limelight 

and retaining absolute power.

Ultimately, Marcano and Tyszka have provided their readers with an impressively 

fair and balanced account of Hugo Chávez’s early life, struggle for power, and rise to the 

presidency. Specifically, the authors manage to do what few writers have been able to do—

provide an objective account of how Chávez, for better or worse, has reshaped the political 

and economic structure of an entire country. Moreover, the text, in spite of being published 

in 2004—with the addition of an epilogue in 2006—remains relevant and informative, es-
232 Security and Defense Studies Review

pecially given the recent revelation that Hugo Chávez is battling cancer. Indeed, Marcano 

and Tyzska’s biography, which sheds light on Chávez’s leadership, decision-making, and 

reasoning styles, may well provide political actors with important insight into the fate of 

the Venezuelan polity if its enigmatic leader, Hugo Chávez, dies while in office.

More about Hugo Chávez

Publisher: Random House (August 14, 2007) 

Language: English 

ISBN: 978-067945666-7

352 pages
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 233

Book Review: Latin America’s Cold War

By Hal Brands

Reviewed by Patricia Kehoe

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies Research Assistant

Hal Brands, who joined the faculty at Duke University’s Sanford School of Public Policy 

after receiving his Ph.D. from Yale University, brought his background in Cold War history 

to an innovative new task in identifying the patterns and variations among Latin American 

countries’ experiences during the Cold War and what role the United States and Soviet 

Union played in shaping them. Brands’ second book, Latin America’s Cold War was developed from a prize-winning dissertation and provides a new interpretation of the impact of 

the convergence of longstanding regional issues and the additional ideological polarization 

of the Cold War environment. 

The author argues that the machinations of the two world superpowers and Sovietproxy Cuba did not alone create the crises throughout Latin America during the Cold War, 

but that longstanding domestic and regional problems had already rendered the hemisphere 

ripe for turbulence. This series of overlapping local and international problems is broken 

down into: the “built-in instability” of long-term conflict over political and economic arrangements in virtually every country in the region, animosity due to U.S. hegemony in the 

hemisphere, the ideological East/West conflict becoming ingrained in the local politics of 

many countries, as well as the emergence of the Third World (Tercermundismo), and the 

fallout of decolonization.

The second part of Brands’ thesis states that the established theories on the impact 

that the Cold War had on Latin American history deserve serious revision. In the fifteen 

years leading up to the publication of Latin America’s Cold War, national archives of many 

Latin American countries and the former Soviet Union have become more accessible and 

organized than ever before, and much of the valuable information contained in those archives challenges traditional assumptions about regional history. 

His strongest criticism is leveled against the notion that Latin American states had 

little agency in the ideological battles that ravaged the region from the 1950s through the 

1980s. Brands addresses some of the major examples of American and Soviet influence in 

the hemisphere, but also refutes the theory that phenomena like National Security Doctrine 

and anticommunism were engineered solely and entirely by U.S. leaders. He argues that 

while U.S. military aid provided funding for anti-insurgent state terror campaigns, many 

governments already had the incentives to oppose communist infiltration in their countries. 

His case flows both chronologically and thematically from the early 1950s and the 

game-changing Castroist Revolution of 1959, through the crises and coups in the Southern 

Cone during the 1960s and 1970s, and the rampant violence on both sides of Central American insurgencies during the 1980s. Rather than tackle every country in the hemisphere, 

Brands focused his research on such landmark case studies as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 

Cuba, Guatemala, Nicaragua, as well as several others. Brands’ explanation for the failure 

of both Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress and Ché Guevara’s foco theory were their “one-
234 Security and Defense Studies Review

size-fits-all approach” to the region; in his own attempt to understand Latin America’s social and political climate, he gives nearly equal attention to the similarities and distinctions 

between the historical backgrounds of each country in his study. 

 Brands acknowledges the changing international environment during the 1970s outside of the powder keg-like Western Hemisphere, including the shifting focus of the United 

States to the conflict in Vietnam and the institution of détente between the two superpowers. By this time, Brands argues, Latin America was already locked into a “larger cycle 

of radicalism and reaction” with the very real threat of urban guerrillas and insurgencies 

provoking a blanket obliteration of dissenters by right-wing militarized governments. 

Outside of military conflict, the economic and social change occurring during the 

Cold War is astounding. Economists from all over the world developed modernization 

theories, development and dependency theories, corporatism and statism theories, and new 

economic models, which were put to the test in Latin American countries desperate for 

reform of often longstanding semi-feudal economic systems. Import-substitution industrialization gave way to neoliberalism during the “maelstrom” of military crises in Latin 

America, but a lack of viable trade partners either inside or outside the region made the 

effects of rampant market liberalization insufficient to propel the region into the global 

economy quickly or easily enough. 

Brands argues, “the fact that the system did not work was evident in any number of 

trends: the rise of coca cultivation and narcotics production, the influx of illegal immigrants to the United States, the Zapatista revolt, and the rise of [Hugo] Chávez and his ilk.” 

While the economic and political impact of the Cold War is not sufficient to explain these 

trends in totality, Brands opens the door to future studies into the relationship between the 

global themes of communism and anti-Americanism and local conflict and development 

during the Cold War.

Latin America’s Cold War is an important addition to the body of work already published on both mid-twentieth century Latin America and the Cold War in general, because 

of Brands’ challenges to the traditional assumptions of Latin American agency and the 

reality on the ground of U.S., Soviet, and Cuban influence (or lack thereof) in the region 

during the Cold War. 

More about Latin America’s Cold War

Publisher: Harvard University Press (September 30, 2010)

Language: English

ISBN-10: 0674055284

408 pages
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 235

Book Review: The Future of Power

By Joseph S. Nye Jr.

Reviewed by Celina B. Realuyo

Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs, 

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies

The Future of Power by Joseph Nye provides a compelling analysis of the significant political, economic, cultural, technological, and informational power shifts under way that 

challenge nation states in the 21st century. Although the three aspects of relational power 

(commanding change, controlling agendas, and establishing preferences) have existed for 

centuries, what is new is the number of actors involved and the democratization of access 

to information and the instruments available to impact events in a globalized world. Given 

this new environment, with power transitions among states and the diffusion of power 

from states to non-state actors, Nye advocates the need to use “smart power” to influence 

counterparts and shape desirable outcomes in the future. 

Nye dedicates the first part of his book to the traditional types of power and considers power as the ability to affect others, regarding something, by some means, to reach 

a preferred outcome, elaborating on the findings of a 2007 CSIS Commission on Smart 

Power: A Smarter, More Secure America that he co-chaired with Richard Armitage. Nye 

acknowledges that population, territory, natural resources, economic strength, and military 

might remain relevant but emphasizes the increasing importance of soft power. Soft power 

includes a country’s or organization’s culture, political values, and foreign policies that 

can attract or persuade counterparts through public diplomacy. Nye, known as the architect of “soft power,” provides a “hard" to "soft" power spectrum (from left to right), with 

behavioral options that range from coerce, threat, sanction, pay, frame, and persuade, to 

attract. In this new security environment, Nye believes that one must design “smart power” 

strategies that employ a combination of policies, instruments of national power, and behaviors along this spectrum for the best results. Looking at the war in Iraq, the United States 

possessed unparalleled military capabilities in the face of Saddam Hussein’s regime and 

won the initial battle with shock and awe; however, the conflict became a protracted and 

irregular war against non-state actors (a tenacious insurgency and Al Qaeda in Iraq) that 

demonstrated the limits of hard power in a complex operations and cost the United States 

significant blood, treasure, and legitimacy. 

The book aptly, but briefly, characterizes the new global environment as one with 

significant power shifts among nation states with the “rise of the rest” (like the BRICs–

Brazil, Russia, India, China), the phrase coined by Fareed Zakaria. The BRICs have been 

the beneficiaries of globalization, with unprecedented rates of economic growth compared 

with the United States and Europe. Nye recognizes China as a game changer in terms of its 

economic and military might and global influence but does not count the United States out. 

China’s significant internal challenges, which include demographic pressures, rapid industrialization, urbanization, inequality, and lack of political liberties, are formidable ones to 

surmount, however. Nye rejects declarations of late that America is in decline; he reminds 
236 Security and Defense Studies Review

readers that the United States has gone through various cycles of pessimism, such as the 

fear of a Japanese takeover in the 1980s. Nye is perhaps overly optimistic that the United 

States, with its strong democratic institutions, educational system, innovative economy, 

and influential culture, will remain a leading power in the 21st century if “smart power” is 

consciously exercised. 

Perhaps the most interesting part of the book addresses the significant diffusion of 

power from state to non-state actors as a result of the information revolution and cyberspace. In the past, nation states enjoyed a monopoly in the use, control, and management 

of information. This is no longer the case because the Internet has democratized communication and access to information. This development has lowered the barriers to entry for 

good and bad non-state actors to promote their respective agendas, from multinationals to 

humanitarian organizations and from terrorist groups to criminal networks. The Internet 

and social media served as key enablers for political movements such as those under way 

in the Arab Spring. Nye argues that cyberspace provides numerous opportunities and risks 

at the same time. Regarding the downside of cyberspace, nation states, organizations, and 

individuals must be increasingly concerned with cybercrime, espionage, cyberwar, and 

cyberterrorism, with limited governance structures and countermeasures to address these 

risks. While the book explains the challenging domain of cyberspace, it does not offer any 

novel approaches for policymakers to address these threats. 

In this new world order, Nye recommends the following five questions for national 

security policymakers in the 21st century:

1. What are the preferred goals and outcomes?

2. What resources are available and in which contexts?

3. What are the positions or preferences of our targeted audience?

4. Which forms of power behavior (hard, soft, smart) are likely to succeed?

5. What is the probability of success? 

The “smart power” framework is useful to shape and influence rather than impose 

outcomes, but falls short of providing result-oriented prescriptions for policymakers as the 

U.S. determines its international engagement with the changing Middle East, the rise of 

China, an aspiring nuclear Iran, and the global economic recession. Although the hard-tosoft-power spectrum may not be really new, Nye explains the dynamic power shifts in a 

globalized world in such a coherent and practical fashion that The Future of Power is destined to become a must read for current and aspiring international relations professionals.

More about The Future of Power

Publisher: Public Affairs (February 1, 2011) 

Language: English 

ISBN-10: 1586488910

320 pages
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 237

Book Review: Mañana Forever: Mexico and the Mexicans

By Jorge G. Castañeda

Reviewed by Richard W. Taylor

Executive Liaison from CHDS to the United States Northern Command

In an October 1939 radio address, Winston Churchill famously said of Russia: “I cannot 

forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma; 

but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.” Today, more than 70 

years later, we could replace the word Russia with Mexico and arrive at an equal sentiment. 

The vast majority of Americans know Mexico from an occasional visit to a beach resort 

town, a walk across the border to do some light shopping, or short-sighted newscasts about 

illegal immigration or criminal trafficking. Few know anything more than what they glean 

from inaccurate stereotypical descriptions. For those who recognize the potential of incorporating Mexico into the global debate, there are few better places to start than Mañana 

Forever, Mexico and the Mexicans, by Jorge G. Castañeda. 

I have often posed a hypothetical future to my colleagues in the Department of Defense in an attempt to lead them to an understanding of how deep cultural roots can go: 

Suppose China invaded the United States and, over time, subjugated the entire population 

under an iron hand. How long would it take for Americans to become culturally Chinese? 

In one hundred years would we forget all it is that makes Americans unique as Americans? 

Probably not. Two hundred years? Five hundred? I submit that even after five hundred 

years we would retain significant characteristics Americans exhibit today. 

The Aztecs were conquered and subjugated by Spain less than five hundred years ago. 

I submit that they are not yet Spanish—that they are, in fact, Aztec. It would therefore be 

wise to dig deep into their history to get a grasp of who the Aztecs were as a people. In fact, 

as Castañeda notes, Mexicans may not actually be Aztecs so much as the people whom the 

Aztecs conquered less than two hundred years before the 1521 felling of Tenochtitlán by 

the Spaniards. History makes us who we are, and the history of Mexico predates that of the 

United States by centuries, a point Castañeda makes clear in Mañana Forever. In that sense 

when dealing with Mexico, U.S. politicians, diplomats, military operators, businesspeople, 

etc., should take into account the origins of present-day Mexicans. After living in Mexico 

and working daily to understand the Mexican people for more than ten years, one thing is 

obvious to me: Americans have very little understanding, from a cultural perspective, of 

whom they are dealing with when they work to build bridges with their closest neighbors. 

Jorge Castañeda joins others before him whose approach to this subject should be required reading for everyone who wishes to better understand Mexicans. While D.H. Lawrence, in Mornings in Mexico and The Plumed Serpent, and Alan Riding, in Distant Neighbors: A Portrait of the Mexicans, left us important works to assist in bridging this cultural 

gap, they did so by writing from a non-Mexican, non-native perspective. In 1950 Octavio 

Paz collected nine essays into what might be considered to be one of the most important 
238 Security and Defense Studies Review

works ever to explain Mexico and the Mexican from the perspective of a native citizen: 

The Labyrinth of Solitude. Miguel León-Portilla went farther back in The Broken Spears: 

The Aztec Account of the Conquest of Mexico. His treatise is vital to help understand Aztecs 

and their genesis as present-day Mexicans. Jorge Castañeda continues the great tradition of 

those giants by presenting a Mexican view from the 21st century viewpoint. His perspective 

is unique, however, because it is from the viewpoint of a person who, while Mexican, is 

able to see his own country as an outsider. Though as the son of a diplomat, he spent many 

formative years in the midst of other cultures, after embracing his country, he served as 

foreign minister (under President Vicente Fox) and spent a lifetime of service to his nation 

as a university professor and public figure. 

For the student of Mexican culture, Mañana Forever is an important work. To those 

who recognize the emergence of Mexico from the Third to the First World (at least economically), it is clear that Mexico has found a permanent place on the world stage. The 

Department of Defense and the entire Executive Branch has recognized this, as evidenced 

by the 2011 release of a National Strategy on Transnational Organized Crime with Mexico as a central focus. Sadly, however, since the enactment of the North American Free 

Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the mid 1990s, the United States has largely viewed Mexico 

through two lenses: the lens of illegal immigration and the lens of violence as perpetrated 

by Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs). Early in the administration of President 

George W. Bush, it appeared the United States would come closer than ever to a partnership relationship with Mexico. President Bush’s first international visit was to strengthen 

ties with his close friend then Mexican President Vicente Fox. Unfortunately, one key casualty of the 9/11 terrorist attacks was a refocus of national priorities in which Mexico lost 

out in the battle for competing attention. Jorge Castañeda reminds us that Mexico, despite 

its overt problems, is a force to be reckoned with.

A thorough understanding of Mexico is key to moving forward. Castañeda presents 

an exceptional analysis of a Mexican ethos of ingrained individualism that has led to an 

aversion to competition on any range of the spectrum from team sports to acting on the 

world stage as a nation. He professes that Mexico has an middle class which emerged 

largely without recognition, but is nonetheless changing the society as a whole. His words 

on the Mexican preoccupation with ritual, process, and form over substance speak volumes 

about why U.S. government agencies can become frustrated in their dealings with their 

neighbors across the southern border. Some would say that democracy “emerged” in Mexico when Father Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla shouted a call for independence from a church 

in Dolores Hidalgo in 1810. (Hidalgo is arguably Mexico’s first patriot given that nearly 

100 percent of Mexicans can correctly name him while Castañeda cites only 29 percent of 

Mexicans—and I would guess 0 percent of Americans—can name the first Mexican president.) This “El Grito” began an 11-year revolution that ostensibly opened up the country 

to democracy. Mañana Forever speaks to this Mexican experiment with democracy and 

the difficulty of inculcating its tenets into culture—a lesson the United States could benefit 

from as it works to spread democracy around the world. 

Castañeda states that Mañana Forever was “...meant to provide readers with a roadmap for Mexico, where it comes from, where it is going today, and where it might find itself in the future.” The treatise closely ties Mexico’s difficulties rising to the level of a First 

World actor with its inextricable links to culture and history that may be holding it back. 

For U.S. players to assist Mexico, or at least to work with Mexico in its future as a Western 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 239

Hemispheric and world partner, they must understand Mexico from the perspective of that 

culture and history which, despite being so close geographically to the United States, is so 

foreign in every other sense. 

More about Mañana Forever: Mexico and the Mexicans

Pages: 293

Year: 2011

Language: English

ISBN-10: 0375404244 

ISBN-13: 978-0375404245

Contratapa

2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 243

Contratapa

(Contratapa offers the abstracts found 

in this volume in a second language)

EE.UU. – Latinoamericano Relaciones Episódicas 

(U.S.-Latin American Episodic Relationships)

Amb. (ret.) Cresencio Arcos

RESUMEN

Cualquier persona que intenta de tratar con el estado actual de las relaciones de la seguridad entre los EE.UU y Latinoamérica encontrará la adivinanza existencial: ¿tienen los 

EE.UU un interés estratégico definido en la región y es una prioridad? Otro desafío es la 

dificultad en explicar la política estadounidense y sus trasfondos históricos. Es necesario 

que resumir primeramente las relaciones casi ‘confusas’ en su contexto histórico. 

La Seguridad y Cooperación: Cambios Geopolíticos y Tendencias 

Estratégicas en América del Sur

(Security and Cooperation: Geopolitical Changes and Strategic Tendencies 

in South America)

María Luisa Parraguez Kobek

RESUMEN

Este trabajo de investigación pretende dar respuesta a las preocupaciones regionales y los 

desafíos planteados en la Declaración de Santa Cruz de la Sierra, como resultado de la 

IX Conferencia de Ministros de Defensa de las Américas (CMDA) en Bolivia 2010. En 

particular, se enfoca en reconocer la importancia de la cooperación en defensa y seguridad 

en la región, particularmente el avance en la implementación de medidas de fomento de 

la confianza y seguridad recientemente aprobadas en el Consejo de Defensa Suramericano 

(CDS) de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR).
244 Security and Defense Studies Review

Los EE.UU. y China en Latinoamérica: 

La Cooperación y la Competición 

(The United States and China in Latin America: Cooperation and Competition)

R. Evan Ellis

RESUMEN

La presencia ampliada de la República del Pueblo de China (PRC) en Latinoamérica ha 

llamado la atención de más que una generación de líderes políticos, empresarios y estudiantes en la región, y además sus homólogos en los EE.UU., acostumbrados de una posición 

dominante y relativamente exclusiva en la política y economía de las Américas. Se puede 

entender la expansión de China en Latinoamérica en términos de la búsqueda de unos legítimos objetivos de seguridad nacional, como la diversificación del mercado y la búsqueda 

de fuentes seguros de la oferta. Al mismo tiempo, a pesar de una dimensión inherente de 

competición comercial y política entre el PRC y los EE.UU. en la región, los EE.UU. quieren identificar vías para la colaboración con China en Latinoamérica para el beneficio de 

todos lados, y en el interés de prevenir la evolución de la competición entre los EE.UU y 

China en la región en un nuevo conflicto del estilo de la Guerra Fría. Sin embargo, la expansión de los intereses del PRC en la región y el imperativo de defenderlos en el contexto 

del ambiente fluyente de la política y la economía de Latinoamérica van a crear numerosas 

oportunidades para malentendidos. Si se podría superar estos riesgos, hay mas intereses 

que suficiente en común entre los EE.UU. y China en la región para una asociación beneficial a todos para forjar nuevas relaciones constructivas con la región.

La Perspicacia Política y Ansiedad Geopolítica en Surinam

(Political Acumen and Geopolitical Anxiety in Suriname)

Ivelaw Griffith

RESUMEN

Bouterse resurgimiento tiene implicaciones tanto locales como extranjeros. Internamente, 

se ha generado esperanzas sobre la unidad política y una mejor calidad de vida, entre 

muchas otras cosas. Externamente, se ha planteado preocupaciones geopolíticas debido 

a su rica historia y el perfil poco envídiale: dos veces fabricante de golpe de Estado y 

gobernante autoritario (1980-1987; 1990-1991), el único líder mundial con la dudosa distinción de una prisión de 11 anos condenado por traficando drogas, dictada in abstenía 

por un tribunal Holandés, con la extradición ejecutadas por Surinam y Holanda carecen 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 245

de los tratados de extradición reciproca, y el demandado (junto con otros) en un estudio 

nacional para ordenar el asesinato de 15 opositores políticos en 1982. Por tanto, más que 

cualquier otra nación del Caribe, excepto Haití (y unos pocos de América Latina) que se 

celebraron elecciones en la última década, los resultados electorales de Surinam se sitúan 

en un momento historio digno de mención. Esta coyuntura ha fascinantes aspectos internos 

y externos, lo que refleja, en términos teóricos, Políticos y Adaptación y Intermestic-nexus 

entre la dinámica nacional e internacional. Con el fin de apreciar algunas de las dinámicas 

de adaptación y que es importante examinar las cuestiones contestación algunas de las 

inquietudes que han surgido debido a los resultados de la impugnación.

La Evolución y Implementación de la Estrategia de las FARC: Los 

Entendimientos de sus documentos internos 

(The Evolution and Implementation of FARC Strategy: 

Insights from Its Internal Documents)

David Spencer

RESUMEN

FARC es una insurgencia notable. En primer lugar, se ha mantenido junto a una organización armada irregular con un solo propósito por más de 50 anos a través de una serie 

de subidas y bajadas. Treinta de los cincuenta años ha trabajado sistemáticamente en el 

cumplimiento de una estrategia concreta. A pesar de los flujos y reflujos de la sociedad, 

la política y el campo de batalla, nunca ha perdió la vista en esa estrategia y ha caído en 

el error de intentar forzar el medio ambiente para avanzar en la estrategia. Esta constante 

adaptación ha hecho que los analistas y los periodistas a informar con frecuencia los cambios en la estrategia de las FARC, cuando en realidad lo que han observado fue un ajuste 

de las tácticas que la dirección ha juzgado a ser temporal más adecuado de acuerdo con el 

medio ambiente para llevar a cabo la estrategia. Si uno entiende el concepto básico, que se 

encuentra en los escritos sobre la guerra prolongada de Mao Tse Tung y Truon Chinh, estos 

ajustes o los cambios no son aleatorios o salvajes, pero muy lógico y predecible basado en 

la evaluación de la correlación estratégica de fuerzas.
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South American Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations: 

Some Considerations

(A Particição Sul-Americana Nas Operações de Paz da ONU: 

Algumas Considerações)

Sérgio Luis Cruz Aguilar

ABSTRACT

The United Nations peacekeeping operations began in 1947 with the establishment of the 

UN Special Commission for the Balkans (UNSCOB). Since then, more than a million 

soldiers, policemen and civilians were provided by member states to serve in 67 peacekeeping missions. Of this total, 13 were performed between 1948 and early 1988, and the 

remaining 54 missions were launched from May 1988. In these efforts, the South American 

countries, especially Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, have marked a significant presence. 

The paper presents a descriptive assessment of the South American countries’ participation 

in UN peacekeeping operations and the legal provisions of those countries that govern their 

participation. It also considers how the accumulated experience of these countries would 

make it important that they participate jointly in such operations.

Strategic Leadership in Defense

(Liderazgo Estratégico en Defensa)

Jaime García Covarrubias

ABSTRACT

Whether you are leading a small or large country, the importance of implementing a system 

of strategic leadership in governance is the same. The components of an effective system of 

strategic leadership are: the definition of a strategic political model, planning and direction 

(both strategic and administrative), execution, and strategic communication. The article describes examples and explanations on how to carry out these components to greatest effect. 

Strategic leadership occurs at all levels of government and in the military, from a country’s 

president down to lower-level leaders, and good strategic leaders exploit the channels of 

communication among different levels. Ultimately, the best strategic leader “should be 

able to influence the conduct of the organizations” under his or her command through understanding and proper exploitation of the components of a system of strategic leadership.
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 247

Sangre Joven: Entender la Nueva Oleada de Grupos Armados en 

Latinoamérica

(Sangre Joven: Understanding the new wave of Armed Groups in Latin America)

W. Alejandro Sánchez

RESUMEN

Latinoamérica sigue siendo un terreno fértil para los grupos violentos, como ejemplificado 

por la subida de los carteles de drogas en México, y las organizaciones narcoterroristas 

como la FARC de Colombia y el Sendero Luminoso de Perú. Sin embargo, una pregunta 

que no ha sido contestado bien es si hay la posibilidad que los violentos grupos orientada 

ideológicamente subirían otra vez, como el EPP paraguayo o el EPR mexicano. Este artículo proviene una resumen general de la situación de seguridad en la región, enfocando en 

los grupos armados violentos y tratando de hasta qué punto tengan una ideología política. 

Legitimate Defense in Perspective

(La Legítima Defensa en Perspectiva)

Vicente Torrijos

ABSTRACT

This document analyzes the evolution of the institution of self-defense and its relation to 

the prohibition of the use of force. The text studies the historic way toward the consolidation of the classical concept of self-defense, its features, and requirements. The document 

presents three positions about the evolution of this legal institution on its way into a preventive scheme, viewed from the position of states and the instruments of international 

law and shows the path for the establishment and consolidation of the notion of preventive 

self-defense. 
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The Use of the Armed Forces in a Non-War Criminal Environment:

Challenges of the 21st Century 

(La Utilización de las Fuerzas Militares 

en un aabiente criminal y no de Guerra: Desafíos del Siglo XXI)

Juan Carlos Gómez

ABSTRACT

It is necessary to utilize the Armed Forces in the fight against criminal organizations, which 

present a sizeable threat to national security in the 21st century. It is also equally important to understand how and when these forces can be used for this type of threat without 

committing illegal or unconstitutional actions. The armed forces must analyze the transformation of internal criminal and terrorist threats, and adapt in order to be able to neutralize these hazards that stray far outside of any traditional theories on conventional war. 

This article fleshes out this assertion by first acknowledging the terms “human rights” and 

“international humanitarian law” and how they can be applied to and restrain actions of 

the Armed Forces within a country's territory. It also recognizes the perils of this nontraditional type of war that is being waged amongst the populations of countries, and how 

because of this police and military forces must reevaluate current missions and adapt to 

new operational environments. Lastly, this article confronts the daunting questions of how 

to complete these new missions successfully within legal parameters, and how to respond 

to allegations and attacks from the “enemy” that may take the form of political and judicial 

tactics. 

El Golpe de Estado Hondureño de 2009: Applicacíon de la Carta 

Democrática Interamericana 

(The Honduran Coup of 2009 : Application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter)

Kevin Newmeyer

RESUMEN

Este trabajo examina el golpe de estado Hondureño de 2009 como un estudio de la aplicación de la Carta Democrática Interamericana de la Organización de Estados Americanos. 

La carta, aprobado unánimemente por la Organización en Septiembre 2001, consolidó y 

construyó de esfuerzos previos de la OEA para apoyar y defender la democracia en el 

hemisferio. Este trabajo destaca los pasos ya tomado por la OEA y sus miembros y examina las dificultades que enfrenten las organizaciones multilaterales en tratar de afectar 
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 249

los cambios democráticos dentro de un estado. Mientras que la OEA tomaba las acciones 

más severas permitidas en el acuerdo, no ha revocado el golpe de estado. Mantenían las 

sanciones casi dos años después del golpe de estado. 

Los Golpes de Estado Constitucionales: La Intervención Militar en 

Latinoamérica

(Constitutional Coups: Military Intervention in Latin America)

Howard J. Wiarda and Hilary Collins

RESUMEN

Los estadounidenses los dedican tanto a las elecciones y la democracia como la única vía 

legitima hacia el poder político, que algunas veces es difícil imaginar la política por otra 

manera. Además diseñadores de política estadounidenses tienden de creer que las elecciones ocupan un mundo más alto de autoridad moral, y esperan que, con los programas de 

asistencia para la democracia, Latinoamérica y otras áreas en desarrollo vayan a avanzar 

más allá de las revoluciones, los golpes de estado, las huelgas, y otras rutas a poder no 

electorales. Estas maneras extra-electorales podrían disfrutar ambos la legitimidad y el 

mandato constitucional. En este trabajo, ponemos a prueba estos propuestos como aplican 

en Latinoamérica. 

Political Culture and the Armed Forces in Venezuela

(Política y Fuerzas Armadas en Venezuela)

Hernán Castillo

ABSTRACT

In Venezuela, the topic of civil-military relations has traditionally been very controversial. 

The origin of that controversy is complex, but basically boils down the problem that has 

plagued Venezuela for most of its history: the significant political role the military has 

played in the formation of the state and the place it occupies within Venezuelan society. 

However, more fundamentally, the civil leadership in Venezuela has not, even in the present day, had the capacity, interest, will, and political clarity to implement the necessary 

mechanisms and techniques to exercise effective civil control of the historically Praetorian 

tendency of the military. Since the Marcos Pérez Jiménez failure of Praetorian governance, 

Venezuelans have not had real and true control over the military. On the contrary, what 
250 Security and Defense Studies Review

they have is an understanding, fusion, alliance and symbiosis, civil-military and politicalmilitary; it is unwritten, but is certainly effective and operating within the country. Following centuries of barbarism, backwardness, and incivility, perhaps the 21st century can be for 

Venezuela the century when the virus of Praetorian tendencies is defeated, resulting in the 

supremacy of the Venezuelan civil society over the military and the armed forces. 

Civilian Control of the Armed Forces in Ecuador: A Failed Attempt?

(El Control Civil de las Fuerzas Armadas en el Ecuador. ¿Intento Fallido?)

Luis Hernández

ABSTRACT

Ecuador has been one of the last countries in the region to have a civilian Minister of Defense. Traditionally, this job has been handed to retired military officers. The military’s role 

was and continues to be an area little understood by the greater civil society and academia. 

Even current President Correa has accepted he knows very little about security matters, 

though he expressed an interest in reading and learning more about the subject during a 

national media press conference. 

Nevertheless, Correa designated the first civilian Minister of Defense in more 

than 35 years. Up until that time, his two ministers had been women—one who died in a 

military helicopter accident. The current minister is an ex-journalist who was an outspoken 

critic of the activities of the armed forces in his nationally syndicated column before taking 

the position.
2011 Fall-Winter Issue / Volume 12 251

Contributors

Sérgio Luiz Cruz Aguilar is a Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the Universidade Estadual Paulista in São Paolo, Brazil.

Cresencio Arcos, Political Advisor to the Director of the Center for Hemispheric Defense 

Studies, is a former Assistant Secretary and Director of International Affairs at the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security (2003–2006), a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board at the White House (1999–2003), and the former U.S. Ambassador to Honduras.

Hernán Castillo participated in the CHDS Chile Sub-Regional Conference in July 2011, 

representing the Universidad Simón Bolívar in Venezuela.

Hilary Collins served as a research intern at the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies (CSIS) from January-May 2011.

R. Evan Ellis is an Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies and the author of China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores.

Matthew Finger was a Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies Fall 2011 academic intern.

Jaime García is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Center for Hemispheric 

Defense Studies.

Joanna Gillia Covarrubias was a Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies Summer 2011 

academic intern.

Juan Carlos Gómez, a lawyer and a Colombian Air Force Colonel with 26 years of service, was the Director of the Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Office in 

the Colombian Ministry of Defense.

Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith is Provost and Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs of York 

College, The City University of New York.

Luis Hernández is an independent political-military analyst and a former member of Ecuador’s Constituent Assembly. 

Patricia Kehoe is a Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies student hire from Georgetown University and serves as assistant to Dr. Howard J. Wiarda.

María Luisa Parraguez Kobek is the Associate Director for Academics at the Technological University of Monterrey, Mexico. 
252 Security and Defense Studies Review

Kevin Newmeyer, an Assistant Professor of National Seurity Affairs at the Center for 

Hemispheric Defense Studies and a former officer in the U.S. Navy, was detailed to the 

Organization of American States following the attacks on September 11, 2001, to establish 

the Secretariat for the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE).

Celina Realuyo is an Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Center for 

Hemispheric Defense Studies and an adjunct professor at Georgetown and George Washington universities.

W. Alejandro Sánchez is a Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs 

(COHA) where he focuses on geopolitics and security issues. 

David Spencer, a former Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies Assistant Professor of 

National Security Affairs, serves as Colombia Country Director in the United States Office 

of the Secretary of Defense.

Richard W. Taylor serves as the Executive Liaison from CHDS to the United States 

Northern Command. He is a retired career US Air Force Officer and a former Air Attaché 

to Mexico.

Vicente Torrijos, former President of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies alumni 

association in Colombia, is a Professor of Political Science and International Relations at 

the Universidad del Rosario, as well as an advisor on strategic issues for the High Command of the Colombian Armed Forces. 

Howard J. Wiarda is Advisor to the Director, Professor of National Security Policy, and 

Associate Director for Research and Publication at CHDS. He is also the Dean Rusk Professor of International Relations at the University of Georgia, Senior Associate at CSIS, 

and Senior Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

254 Security and Defense Studies Review