[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-12425

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 4:17-cr-10024-JEM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

DAVAUS L. MCCOWN, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

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No. 18-12495

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-20628-DLG-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

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versus

DAVAUS LEANARD MCCOWN, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

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Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(February 25, 2019)

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, GRANT, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

In this consolidated appeal, Davaus McCown appeals his 2017 convictions 

for drug trafficking and firearm offenses, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 

922(g)(1), and 924(c)(1)(A)(i). McCown also appeals the district court’s 

revocation of his supervised release in an unrelated 2010 case. No reversible error 

has been shown; we affirm.

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I.

McCown challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress 

evidence -- including physical evidence and inculpatory statements -- obtained 

during a 3 August 2017 search of McCown’s apartment. McCown contends that 

the information in the search warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause 

that evidence of criminal activity would be found in his apartment. McCown also 

contends that the information in the search warrant affidavit was stale when the 

warrant issued.

We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence as a 

mixed question of law and fact; we review fact findings for clear error and the 

application of law to the facts de novo. United States v. Jiminez, 224 F.3d 1243, 

1247 (11th Cir. 2000). We construe all facts “in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party below.” United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 

2000).

“Probable cause to support a search warrant exists when the totality of the 

circumstances allows the conclusion that there is a fair probability that contraband 

or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” United States v. 

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Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1310 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). A search 

warrant affidavit need not allege that unlawful activity occurred at the place to be 

searched; the affidavit need only establish a nexus between the place and the 

criminal activity. Id.; United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 

2002). 

“[T]he duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 

substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 

U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983) (quotation and alteration omitted). We afford “great 

deference” to the lower court judge’s determination about probable cause. United 

States v. Gonzalez, 940 F.2d 1413, 1419 (11th Cir. 1991). We also “give due 

weight to inferences drawn from [the factual findings] by resident judges and local 

law enforcement officers.” Jimenez, 224 F.3d at 1248. 

The search warrant affidavit in this case alleged these facts. Using a 

confidential informant (“CI”), officers conducted two controlled drug buys from 

McCown on 10 July and 14 July 2017. On 10 July, officers saw McCown leave 

his apartment immediately before meeting with the CI. The CI gave McCown $50 

in exchange for a baggy containing crack cocaine. McCown then returned directly 

to his apartment. On 14 July, McCown met again with the CI “in the vicinity of 

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his apartment” and gave the CI a baggy containing crack cocaine in exchange for 

$50. 

This information -- viewed in the light most favorable to the government --

was sufficient to establish a fair probability that contraband or evidence of drug 

trafficking would be found inside McCown’s apartment. The affidavit established 

that McCown left his apartment with drugs on his person, sold those drugs at a 

location near his apartment, and returned to his apartment with the proceeds from 

the sale of the drugs. That the affidavit established a connection between 

McCown’s apartment and the criminal activity is enough. See Kapordelis, 569 

F.3d at 1310. The affidavit need not establish that unlawful activity itself occurred 

inside McCown’s apartment. See id. About staleness, “the information supporting 

the government’s application for a warrant must show that probable cause exists at 

the time the warrant issues.” United States v. Lopez, 649 F.3d 1222, 1246 (11th 

Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). No “arbitrary time limitation” exists for purposes 

of determining whether supporting information is “stale.” United States v. Harris, 

20 F.3d 445, 450 (11th Cir. 1994). Instead, we consider the particular facts of each

case, including (1) the amount of time that elapsed between the date the 

information was obtained and the date the warrant issued, (2) whether the 

suspected crime is ongoing, (3) the “habits of the accused,” (4) the “character of 

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the items sought,” and (5) the “nature and function of the premises to be searched.” 

Id. 

Here, the information alleged in the affidavit was sufficient to show that 

McCown was engaged in an ongoing pattern of selling drugs within close 

proximity to his apartment. The allegations also support a conclusion that the 

items sought by the search warrant -- drugs and evidence of drug-trafficking 

activity -- would likely be found in McCown’s apartment. Based on the 

circumstances of this case, we are unpersuaded that the 18-day period between the 

second controlled drug buy and the filing of the search warrant application 

rendered the information in the affidavit impermissibly stale for purposes of 

applying for a search warrant. Cf. United States v. Green, 40 F.3d 1167, 1173 

(11th Cir. 1994) (concluding that information about a drug sale one month before 

officers applied for a search warrant was not stale); United States v. Domme, 753 

F.2d 950, 955 (11th Cir. 1985) (“When criminal activity is protracted and 

continuous, it is more likely that the passage of time will not dissipate probable 

cause.”). 

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The district court committed no error in denying McCown’s motion to 

suppress; we affirm McCown’s convictions.

1

 

II.

McCown also challenges the revocation of his supervised release in his 2010 

case. McCown says that his 2017 judgment of conviction served as the sole basis 

for the district court’s determination that he violated the terms of his supervised 

release in the 2010 case.2

 McCown contends that -- because his 2017 judgment 

should be vacated (based on suppression error) -- no factual basis exists to 

establish a violation of his supervised release and, thus, the revocation of his 

supervised release in the 2010 case must be vacated. 

We have concluded, however, that the district court committed no error in 

denying McCown’s motion to suppress. We affirm McCown’s 2017 convictions; 

the 2017 judgment relied upon during McCown’s revocation proceedings remains 

 

1 Because we conclude that the search warrant affidavit established sufficiently probable cause, 

we need not address the district court’s alternative ruling based on the “good-faith” exception to 

the exclusionary rule. 

2 McCown raises no challenge to the sufficiency of the 2017 judgment as evidence that he 

violated the terms of his supervised release. 

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valid. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s revocation of McCown’s 

supervised release in the 2010 case.

AFFIRMED.

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