[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-15270

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-00502-KD-M

VINCENT WHITE,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOHN MCLAIN,

Defendant-Appellant,

JOHNNY THORNTON, SR., et al.,

Defendants.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

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(April 19, 2016)

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, JORDAN, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit 

Judges.

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PER CURIAM:

Vincent White sued several members of the Mobile County Sherriff’s Office

after they burst into his home without legal justification. The deputies, who had 

mistaken White’s house for the one specified in a warrant, all asserted qualified 

immunity as a defense to White’s claim that they had violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights. The district court held that qualified immunity insulated all but 

one of them from that claim. The only officer denied immunity was Deputy John 

McLain, the man responsible for confirming that the deputies had the right house. 

He appeals the district court’s order denying him qualified immunity, asserting that 

he made reasonable efforts to confirm that the house identified in the warrant was, 

in fact, the one he had been told was part of a drug dealing operation. We reverse 

the district court’s order denying him qualified immunity because his conduct did 

not violate “clearly established” law when it occurred.

The district court accurately characterized the facts drawn from the evidence 

construed in the light most favorable to White:

In October 2012, [McLain] received information from a 

confidential informant that an individual was involved in the 

distribution of marijuana and that the individual was storing drugs at 

his girlfriend’s residence located at 1817 Toulmin Avenue, Mobile, 

Alabama. McLain and the confidential informant drove past the 

residence and the informant pointed out the house to McLain. Three 

months later, McLain received corroboration from a different 

confidential informant. Both informants told McLain that the house 

in question was the second house on the left after turning from St. 

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Stephens Road. A month later, the second informant again told 

McLain about the drug activity at 1817 Toulmin Avenue.

On February 5, 2013, McLain traveled to Toulmin Avenue 

[again]. However, rather than entering from St. Stephens Road, he 

turned onto Toulmin Avenue from Carleton Street, which resulted in 

him approaching the house from the opposite direction he would have 

if he had entered from St. Stephens Road. When approaching from 

St. Stephens Road, the first house on the left i[s] situated further back 

from the street than the other houses on Toulmin Avenue. McLain 

approached what he “believed to be the second house” and took a 

photograph of it. The house he took a photograph of was 1819 

Toulmin Avenue. White’s house, 1819 Toulmin Avenue, is the third 

house on the left when approaching from St. Stephens Road and the 

target house, 1817 Toulmin Avenue, is the second house on the left.

Before taking the photograph, as McLain approached 1817 

Toulmin Avenue, he noticed people who he thought appeared to be 

engaged in drug activity, standing in front of what McLain thought 

was 1817 Toulmin Avenue. “So not to expose [himself] as a narcotics 

officer,” McLain “pulled off the side of the road” and took a 

photograph of White’s home, which he “believed to be” 1817 

Toulmin Avenue. Though not visible in the photograph McLain took, 

White’s numerical street address (1819) is posted at eye level to the 

left of his front door.

In the darkness of the early morning hours of February 6, 2013, 

McLain travelled to Toulmin Avenue to check out information from 

an informant. [The] informant had told McLain that a “certain vehicle 

dropped off some drugs” and “[McLain] was trying to determin[e] if 

that vehicle was at the location.” Neither 1817 nor 1819 Toulmin 

Avenue had any residential lights turned on when McLain passed. 

Looking straight at 1817 Toulmin Avenue, its driveway is on the right 

side of the house. From the same vantage point, 1819 Toulmin 

Avenue is to the right side of 1817 Toulmin Avenue. McLain 

observed the vehicle he had been looking for, and it was parked “back 

behind the house.”

As a result of the information McLain obtained from the 

informants and the details uncovered during investigation, he obtained 

a search warrant for 1817 Toulmin Avenue. However, in the search 

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warrant application, he attached a picture of 1819 Toulmin Avenue 

rather than 1817 Toulmin Avenue. Additionally, McLain’s written 

description of the place to be search[ed] described the façade of 1819 

rather than 1817 Toulmin Avenue.

Later that morning, McLain briefed members of the Mobile 

County Sheriff’s Office Narcotics and Vice Unit about the upcoming 

search of 1817 Toulmin Avenue. Defendant Deputies Johnny 

Thornton, Sr., John Cassidy, Allen O’Shea, Greg O’Shea, Jeffrey 

Sullivan, and Clinton Law were present at the briefing. During this 

meeting, McLain showed the deputies a photograph of White’s house, 

which was 1819 Toulmin Avenue and told them that this was the 

house where the search warrant was to be executed.

After the briefing, the Defendants travelled in several vehicles 

to Toulmin Avenue. When the deputies arrived at 1819 Toulmin 

Avenue, several of them attached a truck’s winch hook to the burglar 

bars on the front door. Other deputies arranged themselves outside 

the home. McLain gave the “go” signal and deputies pulled the 

burglar bars from the front door. Deputy John Cassidy forced entry 

into the home using a ram. Defendant Deputy Clinton Law entered 

the home first, holding a riot shield. McLain, Greg O’Shea, Johnny 

Thornton, and Captain Razzie Smith followed Law into the home.

Prior to the Defendants’ entry, White was home preparing to 

attend a doctor’s appointment. As the Defendants entered his home, 

White was moving from his bedroom into the hallway. Law detained 

White, kicking his legs apart and placing him in handcuffs. Law also 

forced White to get down on the floor of the bathroom. Law used his 

hands to push White onto the floor while yelling for White to get 

down.

Within minutes the Defendants realized their error. Captain 

Razzie Smith brought White up from the floor and removed the 

handcuffs from his wrists. Smith apologized to White and explained 

that there had been a mix-up and that White’s home had been entered 

in error.

In January 2013, the month before the search, White underwent 

abdominal surgery. On February 6, 2013, White had a pre-scheduled 

appointment with his doctor several hours after the search. His doctor 

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checked his incision, which was not leaking at that time. Several 

hours later, White went to the emergency room at Mobile Infirmary, 

complaining of pain and experiencing leakage from his surgical 

incision. He was admitted and treated at the hospital. He seeks 

damages including but not limited to medical expenses, and 

compensation for the physical and emotional injuries he suffered as 

[a] result of the events of February 6, 2013.

White v. McLain, No. 14-502-KD-M, 2015 WL 7196412, at *1–3 (S.D. Ala. 

Nov. 16, 2015) (citations omitted).

Relying heavily on our decision in Hartsfield v. Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950 (11th 

Cir. 1995), the district court denied McLain qualified immunity. It concluded that, 

although McLain’s was “undoubtedly an honest mistake,” his “actions in this case 

were simply not consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the 

place intended to be searched.” White, 2015 WL 7196412 at *7 (quotation marks 

omitted). We review de novo a district court’s denial of qualified immunity. Perez 

v. Suszcynski, 809 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2016).

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials performing 

discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages 

insofar as their [official] conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982). A government 

official seeking qualified immunity “must prove that he was acting within the 

scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred,” 

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Hartsfield, 50 F.3d at 953, and White does not dispute that McLain was. “[I]f the 

official meets that burden, the plaintiff must prove that the official’s conduct 

violated clearly established law.” Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1281 

(11th Cir. 1998). A law is “clearly established” only when preexisting law gave 

government officials “fair warning” that their conduct was unconstitutional. Hope 

v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2516 (2002).

Because then-existing law did not fairly warn McLain that his conduct

leading up to the search violated federal law in the circumstances,” he is entitled to 

qualified immunity here. None of our precedents holds — or logically compels the 

conclusion — that an officer’s well-intentioned attempts to ascertain and identify 

the property described in a warrant are not reasonable simply because they lead to 

an error, or because more accurate means of ascertaining the property’s identity 

were available. That might be the better rule, but it is not a rule that was clearly 

established in this circuit when the events giving rise to this lawsuit happened.

White relies on our Hartsfield decision, but it does not clearly establish what 

White needs to defeat McLain’s defense of qualified immunity. In that case, a 

confidential informant took Deputy Sheriff Mike Newton to a residence at 5108 

Middlebrooks Drive, where the informant purchased marijuana from an occupant. 

Based on those events, Newton obtained a search warrant for 5108 Middlebrooks 

Drive. The next day, however, when he returned with other law enforcement 

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officers to execute the warrant, he mistakenly led the team to the residence at 5128 

Middlebrooks Drive. The officers forcibly entered that home with guns drawn. 

Only several minutes later — after the residence’s innocent occupant had a gun 

pointed at her head and a police dog had sniffed around her home — did the 

officers realize their error. When Newton asserted qualified immunity, the district 

court denied his motion. We affirmed the denial, reasoning that:

[a]lthough we recognize the need to allow some latitude for honest 

mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult 

process of making arrests and executing search warrants, . . . 

Newton’s actions in this case were simply not consistent with a 

reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place intended to be 

searched, as dictated by [Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 107 S. 

Ct. 1013 (1987)].”

Hartsfield, 50 F.3d at 955. As we explained elsewhere in the opinion:

Newton had been to the proper residence the day before the 

search and had procured the search warrant based upon his own 

observations supervising a drug buy at 5108 Middlebrooks. Although 

Newton had the warrant in his possession, he did not check to make 

sure that he was leading the other officers to the correct address, let 

alone perform any precautionary measures such as those performed by 

the officers in Garrison. As it is uncontroverted that the numbers on 

the houses are clearly marked, and that the raid took place during 

daylight hours, simply checking the warrant would have avoided the 

mistaken entry. Moreover, evidence before the court showed that the 

houses were located on different parts of the street, separated by at 

least one other residence, and that their appearance were 

distinguishable.

Because Newton did nothing to make sure that he was leading 

the other officers to the correct residence, we conclude that the district 

court erred in holding that he was protected by qualified immunity.

Id.

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There are obvious differences between that case and this one. In Hartsfield, 

“Newton did nothing to make sure that he was leading the other officers to the 

correct address.” Id. (emphasis added); see also id. (characterizing the law 

enforcement conduct at issue as “searching the wrong residence when [Newton] 

had done nothing to make sure he was searching the house described in the 

warrant”). McLain, by contrast, did attempt to ascertain and verify that he had the 

right house. He revisited the block where the house sits, took a photograph of what 

he perceived to be the second house on the left coming off of St. Stephens Road 

(the description one of the confidential informants had given of the house to be 

searched), and verified that a car associated with the trafficking appeared to be

parked behind the house he had identified. His attempts were ineffectual, but he 

made them, which is more than Newton did. The Hartsfield Court, after all, 

repeatedly noted and expressly rested its holding on the fact that “Newton did 

nothing.” We cannot say that the Hartsfield decision put law enforcement 

personnel on notice (that is, gave them fair warning) that an officer who attempts 

to ascertain and verify the identity of the place to be searched violates the Fourth 

Amendment if he fails to do everything possible to ensure that he is not mistaken.

The portion of the district court’s order denying qualified immunity to 

Deputy McLain is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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