United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

04-1196 

INDEPENDENT INK, INC., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS, INC. and TRIDENT, INC., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

 

Edward F. O’Connor, Levin & O’Connor, of Laguna Beach, California, argued for 

plaintiff-appellant. 

Jordan A. Sigale, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, of Chicago, Illinois, 

argued for defendants-appellees. With him on the brief was Laura A. Wytsma, of Los 

Angeles, California. 

Appealed from: United States District Court for the Central District of California 

Judge Cormac J. Carney 
 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

04-1196 

INDEPENDENT INK, INC., 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS, INC. and TRIDENT, INC., 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

 ___________________________ 

 DECIDED: January 25, 2005 

 ___________________________ 

Before CLEVENGER, DYK, and PROST, Circuit Judges. 

DYK, Circuit Judge. 

 Independent Ink, Inc. (“Independent”) appeals from the judgment of the United 

States District Court for the Central District of California in this patent tying antitrust 

action. The district court granted summary judgment on plaintiff Independent’s 

Sherman Act section 1 claim because Independent had failed to produce any evidence 

of market power over the tying product. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Trident, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 

1155 (C.D. Cal. 2002). We hold that a rebuttable presumption of market power arises 

from the possession of a patent over a tying product. Because no rebuttal evidence 

was submitted by the patent holder, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on the 

Sherman Act section 1 claim and remand for further proceedings. As to Independent’s 

Sherman Act section 2 claim, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment. 
BACKGROUND 

Defendant Trident, Inc. (“Trident”) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of defendant 

Illinois Tool Works, Inc. (“ITW”). Trident is a manufacturer of printheads and holds a 

patent over its printhead technology. See U.S. Patent No. 5,343,226 (“the ’226 patent”). 

Printer manufacturers (the “OEMs”) use Trident’s printhead technology to manufacture 

printers. The end users of the printers are usually product manufacturers, who use the 

printers to place bar codes on cartons.

As disclosed by the ’226 patent, ink jet devices for printing bar codes consume a 

large quantity of ink. The small cartridges typical in other ink jet devices are impractical 

for such applications. But the use of a large supply of ink poses problems for 

transferring the ink from the container to the printhead. Specifically, one must be able 

to apply pressure in one direction, forcing ink towards the printhead, without sucking the 

ink back when that pressure is released. As reflected in the prior art and discussed by 

the ’226 patent, there have been essentially three methods by which this could be done. 

First, there have been valves that allow release of the pressure without affecting the 

flow of ink. However, such valves must be sensitive to back pressure while being 

strong enough to seal the ink, and are difficult to reliably design. Second, there have 

been devices that pressurize the air space above the ink reservoir. But any increase in 

pressure in the ink container “will continue to force ink out . . . even after the pressure is 

removed. . . . [P]uncturing a hole in the container in the air space above the ink . . . to 

relieve pressure within the container . . . makes removal of partially filled containers 

messy.” Id. col. 1, ll. 51-60. Third, there have been devices using a peristaltic pump. 

However, such devices are usually complex and expensive. The ’226 patent discloses 

04-1196 2 
an ink jet device and supply system using a hand actuated peristaltic pump. The use of 

hand pumping overcomes the usual complexity and expense of such devices.

Trident also manufactures ink for use with its patented printheads. Trident’s 

standard form licensing agreement allowing the OEMs to use its patented product 

requires “OEMs to purchase their ink for Trident-based systems exclusively from 

Trident.” (Br. of Appellees at 8.) Specifically, the licensing agreement grants the right 

to “manufacture, use and sell . . . ink jet printing devices supplied by Trident” only “when 

used in combination with ink and ink supply systems supplied by Trident.” (J.A. at 275.) 

There is now no claim that the ink is protected by any of Trident’s patents.1

 We thus

have an explicit tying agreement conditioning the sale of a patented product (the 

printhead covered by the ’226 patent (and possibly other patents as well)) on the sale of 

an unpatented one (the ink). 

Independent is a competing manufacturer of ink. It manufactures ink usable in 

Trident’s printheads. Independent filed suit in the United States District Court for the 

Central District of California on August 14, 1998, initially seeking a declaratory judgment 

of non-infringement and invalidity against Trident’s patents. Independent subsequently 

amended its complaint to allege that Trident was engaged in illegal tying and 

monopolization in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et 

seq. Both parties moved for summary judgment as to the section 1 claim, and Trident 

moved for summary judgment as to the section 2 claim. The district court granted 

summary judgment in favor of Trident on both claims. 

 1 Although Trident initially claimed patent rights over the ink used in its 

printheads and sued Independent for infringement, that infringement claim was 

dismissed with prejudice. 

04-1196 3 
The district court held that for patent tying to constitute a violation of the antitrust 

laws, the plaintiff must affirmatively prove market power. Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 

1162. The district court, in a footnote, dismissed several Supreme Court cases holding 

to the contrary as “vintage.” Id. at 1165 n.10. Addressing the Supreme Court’s more 

recent decision in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 

(1984), it declined to follow the rule announced by the majority in that case that “the sale 

or lease of a patented item on condition that the buyer make all his purchases of a 

separate tied product from the patentee is unlawful." Instead, relying on the concurring 

opinion in Jefferson Parish, the dissent from a denial of certiorari by two members of the 

Jefferson Parish majority,2 and academic criticisms of the presumption of market power, 

the district court dismissed the majority opinion of Jefferson Parish as dictum that 

should not be followed. Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1164-65. The district court found 

that Independent submitted no affirmative evidence defining the relevant market nor 

proving Trident’s power within it, and therefore could not prevail in either antitrust claim. 

Id. at 1173-77. 

The parties settled all their remaining claims, which were accordingly dismissed 

with prejudice, and final judgment was entered. This appeal followed. Because the 

complaint originally contained a claim for declaratory judgment of invalidity and noninfringement of the ’226 patent, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 

 2 Data Gen. Corp. v. Digidyne Corp., 473 U.S. 908, 908 (1985) (White, J., 

04-1196 4 
DISCUSSION 

I 

The first issue before us is whether Federal Circuit or Ninth Circuit law governs 

the legality of patent tying under the Sherman Act, an issue which may arise both in the 

context of affirmative claims (as here) and in the context of a patent misuse defense. 

We have previously held that where an affirmative antitrust claim or antitrust misuse 

defense is based on “procuring or enforcing a patent,” the central antitrust question is a 

matter governed by Federal Circuit law. Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 

141 F.3d 1059, 1067-68 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc in relevant part). We conclude that 

the antitrust consequences of patent tying likewise is a question governed by our law.3

 

However, as stated in Nobelpharma, “we will continue to apply the law of the 

appropriate regional circuit to issues involving other elements of antitrust law,” such as 

defining the relevant market and determining as a factual matter whether power exists 

within that market. Id. at 1068. 

II 

We now address the Sherman Act section 1 claim. This case first requires us to 

determine whether patent tying is illegal per se (or presumptively illegal) under the 

Sherman Act,4

 or whether the plaintiff is obliged to prove as part of its affirmative case 

that the patent confers market power in the relevant market for the tying product. 

 

joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 

3 We note that tying as a defense in patent cases is governed by statute. 

35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2000). 

4 Independent expressly states in its brief that its position before this court is 

that Trident’s contracts violate the Sherman Act. (Br. of Appellant at 9.) Therefore, we 

do not consider whether there are any violations of Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 

(2000). 

04-1196 5 
This case comes to us with a long history of Supreme Court consideration of the 

legality of tying arrangements. Earlier Supreme Court cases dealing with tying 

agreements were extremely hostile to them, whether the case involved intellectual 

property or other tying products. The first case that found tying to violate section 1 of 

the Sherman Act was a patent tying case. Int’l Salt Co. v United States, 332 U.S. 392 

(1947).5 In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949), the Court 

commented that “[t]ying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression 

of competition.” In Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the 

Court held again that: 

Tying arrangements . . . flout the Sherman Act’s policy that competition 

rule the marts of trade. . . . By conditioning his sale of one commodity on 

the purchase of another, a seller coerces the abdication of buyers’ 

independent judgment as to the “tied” product’s merits and insulates it 

from the competitive stresses of the open market. 

Id. at 10 (quoting Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 

(1953)). The Court held that Northern Pacific’s conditioning the lease of its land to 

shipping commodities on its railway lines violated the Sherman Act, because Northern 

Pacific’s landholdings gave it “sufficient economic power to impose an appreciable 

restraint on free competition in the tied product.” Id. at 11. 

Later Supreme Court cases reflected divergent treatment, depending on whether 

statutory intellectual property was involved. Those cases not involving patents or 

copyrights refined the test, holding that tying was only unlawful if the defendant had 

 5 Prior to this, the Court had found tying, including patent tying, to violate 

section 3 of the Clayton Act in an action to enjoin the enforcement of patent tying 

agreements. United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922). It had 

also found patent tying to be a defense in a patent infringement action. Motion Picture 

Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 

04-1196 6 
“market power” in the market for the tying product. As articulated in United States Steel 

Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) (“Fortner II”), this 

requirement of “market power” necessitated an inquiry into “whether the seller has the 

power, within the market for the tying product, to raise prices or to require purchasers to 

accept burdensome terms that could not be exacted in a completely competitive 

market.” The requirement of demonstrating sufficient market power to raise prices was 

notably more onerous than the Northern Pacific requirement that there be some power 

to “appreciably restrain free competition.”6

The Supreme Court further explained the requirement for market power in the 

1984 Jefferson Parish decision, which involved an agreement requiring patients of a 

hospital to use a particular anesthesiology firm. The Court stated that “certain tying 

arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition.” 466 U.S. at 9. But the 

“unacceptable risk of stifling competition” arises, and consequent liability attaches, only 

if there is anticompetitive “forcing.” As explained by the Court: 

[T]he essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the 

seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer 

into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, 

or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms. When 

such “forcing” is present, competition on the merits in the market for the 

tied item is restrained and the Sherman Act is violated. 

 6

 Under the Northern Pacific test, market power could be inferred from 

having “unique economic advantages” of some kind. Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United 

States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 505 (1969) (“Fortner I”). In contrast, Fortner II

requires the ability to actually raise prices in a relevant market. Since Jefferson Parish

found a 30% market share inadequate, lower courts in subsequent cases have 

generally refrained from condemning tying arrangements where the defendant had less 

than a 30% market share. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law 

of Competition and Its Practice § 10.3, at 397 & n.19 (2d ed 1999) (collecting cases). 

04-1196 7 
Id. at 12. The requirement of proving “forcing” or “market power” in cases not involving 

intellectual property necessitates a definition of the market in which such power is 

alleged to exist and showing an “actual adverse effect on competition.” Id. at 29-31. 

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the requirement of market power in such cases in 

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992), where it 

held that tying “violates § 1 of the Sherman Act if the seller has ‘appreciable economic 

power’ in the tying product market and if the arrangement affects a substantial volume 

of commerce in the tied market.” 

The Court’s treatment of tying cases when the tying product is patented or 

copyrighted, however, has been more consistent. In the 1947 International Salt case, 

the defendant held patents over “machines for utilization of salt products.” 332 U.S. at 

394. It leased these machines on the condition that the lessee purchase from the 

defendant “all unpatented salt and salt tablets consumed in the leased machines.” Id. 

The Supreme Court held that this arrangement violated the Sherman Act, holding that 

“the patents confer no right to restrain use of, or trade in, unpatented salt.” Id. at 395-

96. The Court found that by tying the lease of machines to the purchase of salt, and 

“contracting to close this market for salt against competition, [the defendant] engaged in 

a restraint of trade for which its patents afford no immunity from the antitrust laws.” Id.

at 396. The Court made no inquiry of the defendant’s market power, finding that “the 

admitted facts left no genuine issue. . . . [T]he tendency of the [patent tying] 

arrangement to accomplishment of monopoly seems obvious.” Id.

 In United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962), relying on International Salt, 

the Court made clear that, where the tying product is patented or copyrighted, market 

04-1196 8 
power may be presumed rather than proven. Loew’s involved the tying of less popular 

films to popular copyrighted films by movie distributors in their licenses to television 

stations. The Court stated that in tying cases not involving intellectual property the 

“standard of illegality is that the seller must have sufficient economic power with respect 

to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied 

product.” Id. at 45. However, “[t]he requisite economic power is presumed when the 

tying product is patented or copyrighted.” Id. The Loew’s Court confirmed that patent 

tying is a distinct doctrine when it noted defendants’ argument “that their behavior is not 

to be judged by the principle of the patent cases . . . , but by the general principles 

which govern the validity of tying arrangements of nonpatented products.” Id. at 48. 

The Loew’s Court also stated that it needed not inquire into whether the distributors had 

market power. “[T]he mere presence of competing substitutes for the tying product . . . 

is insufficient to destroy the legal, and indeed the economic, distinctiveness of the 

copyrighted product.” Id. at 49. 

The subsequent Supreme Court cases that have required proof of market power 

in tying cases not involving intellectual property have consistently reaffirmed the 

holdings of International Salt and Loew’s that no proof of market power is necessary in 

patent or copyright tying cases. The Fortner II Court in 1977 expressly restated the 

presumption of market power in cases of patent tying, stating that “the statutory grant of 

a patent monopoly in [International Salt] . . . represented tying products . . . sufficiently 

unique to give rise to a presumption of economic power. 429 U.S. at 619. Likewise, the 

Jefferson Parish Court in 1984 stated that “if the Government has granted the seller a 

04-1196 9 
patent or similar monopoly over a product, it is fair to presume that the inability to buy 

the product elsewhere gives the seller market power.” 466 U.S. at 16. 

In sum, the Supreme Court cases in this area squarely establish that patent and 

copyright tying, unlike other tying cases, do not require an affirmative demonstration of 

market power. Rather, International Salt and Loew’s make clear that the necessary 

market power to establish a section 1 violation is presumed. The continued validity of 

International Salt and Loew’s as binding authority, and the distinction between patent 

tying and other tying cases that was articulated in Loew’s, have been consistently 

reaffirmed by the Court ever since.7

III 

Defendants attempt to distinguish International Salt and Loew’s on the ground 

that they were cases brought by the United States. Specifically, they argue that 

International Salt and Loew’s apply only to government cases because prior to Walker 

Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), 

private parties could not bring antitrust tying suits. This is simply incorrect. See, e.g., 

Switzer Bros., Inc. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 861 

(1962) (private party patent tying case in 1961, four years before Walker Process). 

Moreover, we can see no persuasive reason to make such a distinction between 

 7 It is noteworthy that Congress has declined to require a showing of market 

power for affirmative patent tying claims as opposed to patent misuse defenses based 

on patent tying. Proof of actual market power is required to establish a patent misuse 

defense based on patent tying. Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, § 201, 102 

Stat. 4674, 4676 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2000)). The version of Public Law 

No. 100-703 that originally emerged from the Senate contained language also 

abrogating the presumption of market power in antitrust patent tying cases. See 134 

Cong. Rec. 30,688-89 (1988). This language was removed in a House amendment and 

04-1196 10 
government and private party plaintiffs. There is no indication whatsoever in either 

International Salt or Loew’s that the Court considered it important that it was the United 

States bringing suit. We further note that the manifest purpose of the statute 

authorizing private party actions, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000), is to encourage the 

enforcement of the antitrust laws. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 

U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969). We conclude that defendants’ attempt to distinguish 

International Salt and Loew’s as involving suits brought by the United States is without 

merit. 

IV 

The defendants argue alternatively that International Salt and Loew’s are no 

longer good law. They offer three theories in support of this contention. First, they point 

to Walker Process, where the Court stated in a patent antitrust case that it was 

“reluctant to extend [per se illegality] on the bare pleadings and absent examination of 

market effect and economic consequences.” 382 U.S. at 178. But Walker Process was 

a section 2 case asserting claims of monopolization, not a section 1 claim for tying. 

Moreover, the gravamen of Walker Process was the inappropriate obtaining of the 

patent, id. at 174, not the extension of that patent beyond its terms to an unpatented 

article through a tying arrangement, see Int’l Salt, 332 U.S. at 395-96. We conclude 

that Walker Process does not articulate a rule applicable to patent tying cases.8

The defendants next point to Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Jefferson Parish, 

which was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell and then-Justice (now Chief 

 

does not appear in the statute, see 134 Cong. Rec. 32,295 (1988), making clear that 

Congress was not attempting to change existing law in this respect. 

04-1196 11 
Justice) Rehnquist, stating that it is a “common misconception . . . that a patent or 

copyright . . . suffices to demonstrate market power.” 466 U.S. at 37 n.7 (O’Connor, J., 

concurring). Defendants argue that the 1984 Jefferson Parish concurrence, coupled 

with a dissent in the following year joined by two members of the Jefferson Parish

majority,9 imply that a then-majority of the Court indicated that International Salt and 

Loew’s were no longer good law. The district court relied on this reasoning. Indep. Ink, 

210 F. Supp. 2d at 1164-65. It is not persuasive. Justice White’s opinion in Data 

General, joined by Justice Blackmun, did not expressly contradict International Salt, 

Loew’s, Jefferson Parish, or opine that a showing of market power was required in 

patent and copyright tying cases. Justice White noted that the court of appeals “viewed 

[a] copyright . . . as creating a presumption of market power, and seemingly concluded 

that forcing power is sufficiently established to demonstrate per se antitrust liability if 

some buyers find the tying product unique and desirable.” Data Gen., 473 U.S. at 909. 

The only conclusion Justice White drew was that the case raised “several substantial 

questions of antitrust law and policy, including . . . what effect should be given to the 

existence of a copyright or other legal monopoly in determining market power.” Id. This 

hardly amounts to a repudiation of the presumption of market power. More importantly, 

the district court’s practice of “nose-counting,” as one sister circuit has called it, Felton v. 

Sec’y, United States Dep't of Educ., 739 F.2d 48, 72 n.25 (2d Cir. 1984), is “a pastime in 

which we do not commonly engage.” United States v. Curcio, 712 F.2d 1532, 1542 (2d 

Cir. 1983). 

 8 Many of this court’s decisions upon which defendants rely are also Walker 

Process cases. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 

04-1196 12 
The defendants finally point to the numerous academic articles criticizing the 

Supreme Court cases relying on a presumption of market power in patent and copyright 

cases.10 We recognize that the Supreme Court precedent in this area has been subject 

to heavy criticism. See, e.g., Phillip E. Areeda, Einer Elhauge and Herbert Hovenkamp, 

10 Antitrust Law ¶ 1737c (2d ed. 2004); Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy § 10.3 

(“[M]ost patents confer absolutely no market power on their owners. . . . The economic 

case for ‘presuming’ sufficient market power . . . simply because the tying product is 

patented . . . is very weak.”); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 197-98 (2d ed. 2001) 

(“[M]ost patents confer too little monopoly power to be a proper object of antitrust 

concern. Some patents confer no monopoly power at all.”). Defendants point out that, 

based on a student note critical of the doctrine, the Sixth Circuit has been persuaded to 

hold that: “Loew’s [was] overbroad and . . . we reject any absolute presumption of 

market power for copyright or patented product . . . such a presumption is not 

warranted merely by existence of a copyright or patent.” A.I. Root Co. v. 

Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1986).11 The defendants also 

point out that two Seventh Circuit decisions, USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 

F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982), and Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665 

 9 Data Gen., 473 U.S at 908 (White, J., joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting 

from denial of certiorari). 

10 The defendants also point out that the Department of Justice and the 

Federal Trade Commission have resolved, as a matter of their prosecutorial discretion, 

not to presume that a patent or copyright confers market power. U.S. Dep’t of Justice 

and Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property

§ 5.3 (1995). This of course does not affect the validity of the Supreme Court’s 

decisions in International Salt and Loew’s. 11 The Sixth Circuit stated that its decision was “based on the cogent reasoning in 

Note, The Presumption of Economic Power for Patented and Copyrighted Products in 

Tying Arrangements, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1140 (1985).” A.I. Root, 806 F.2d at 676. 

04-1196 13 
(7th Cir. 1985), in dictum have suggested that proof of market power may be required in 

patent and copyright tying cases. 

The fundamental error in all of defendants’ arguments is that they ignore the fact 

that it is the duty of a court of appeals to follow the precedents of the Supreme Court 

until the Court itself chooses to expressly overrule them. This message has been 

conveyed repeatedly by the Court. The Court’s “decisions remain binding precedent 

until [it] see[s] fit to reconsider them, regardless of whether subsequent cases have 

raised doubts about their continuing vitality.” Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252-

53 (1998). “If a precedent of th[e] Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to 

rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should 

follow the case which directly controls, leaving to th[e] Court the prerogative of 

overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 

490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). Even where a Supreme Court precedent contains many 

“infirmities” and rests upon “wobbly, moth-eaten foundations,” it remains the “Court's 

prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.” State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 

20 (1997). None of the authorities that defendants present, whether it be the language 

of Walker Process, the concurrence in Jefferson Parish, or the dissent from denial of 

certiorari in Data General, constituted an express overruling of International Salt or 

Loew’s. We conclude that the Supreme Court has held that there is a presumption of 

market power in patent tying cases, and we are obliged to follow the Supreme Court’s 

direction in this respect. The time may have come to abandon the doctrine, but it is up 

to the Congress or the Supreme Court to make this judgment. 

04-1196 14 
V 

We must therefore address the scope of the rule announced by the Supreme 

Court’s patent and copyright tying cases. Independent submits that under International 

Salt and its progeny, patent tying is per se illegal in every case and market power is 

irrebuttably presumed. In this area, unfortunately, there is no Supreme Court case 

directly addressing the issue, and we are required to ascertain the rule from dictum. 

Loew’s expressly stated that “[t]here may be rare circumstances in which the doctrine 

we have enunciated under § 1 of the Sherman Act prohibiting tying arrangements 

involving patented or copyrighted tying products is inapplicable.” 371 U.S. at 49-50. 

Jefferson Parish confirmed that International Salt created only a presumption of market 

power: “[I]f the Government has granted the seller a patent or similar monopoly over a 

product, it is fair to presume that the inability to buy the product elsewhere gives the 

seller market power.” 466 U.S. at 16 (emphasis added). It would stretch the language 

of “fair to presume” beyond the breaking point to say that such a presumption is 

irrebuttable. We are obliged to follow such clearly articulated Supreme Court dicta. Ins. 

Co. of the West v. United States, 243 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Stone 

Container Corp. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1345, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 

Other circuits have similarly interpreted the Supreme Court’s patent and 

copyright tying cases to create a rebuttable presumption of market power. See, e.g., 

Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1344 (9th Cir. 1984) (Copyright 

“created a presumption of economic power sufficient to render the tying arrangement 

illegal per se. The burden to rebut the presumption shifted to defendant.”); Susser v. 

Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 521 (2d Cir. 1964) (“[W]here the tying product is patented, 

04-1196 15 
the patentee should be permitted to show that in the entire factual setting . . . the patent 

does not create the market power requisite to illegality of the tying clause. . . . [A] 

patent is prima facie evidence of market control.” (internal citations omitted)); but see

MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1276-79 (11th Cir. 1999) 

(appearing to assume that presumption is not rebuttable). 

Thus, a patent presumptively defines the relevant market as the nationwide 

market for the patented product itself, and creates a presumption of power within this 

market. Once the plaintiff establishes a patent tying agreement, it is the defendant’s 

burden to rebut the presumption of market power and consequent illegality that arises 

from patent tying. 

VI 

The district court found that, even if there was a presumption of market power in 

patent tying cases, any presumption of market power was rebutted in this case because 

it is undisputed that consumers could place bar-coded labels on their 

products before other competitors manufactured bar-coding printers, and 

Plaintiff does not establish that the various labeling systems are not proper 

substitutes for Defendants’ printhead system or dispute Defendants’ 

arguments that they are. Moreover . . . at least two other competitors . . . 

have designed printheads that can print bar codes on kraft paper. The 

fact that [two competitors] have done so indicates that any barriers to 

entry, such as R & D and manufacturing costs, are not so great as to 

prevent competitors from entering the market. 

Indep. Ink., 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1167. The defendants argue that the district court was 

correct because there is testimony here by the president of an OEM that consumers use 

labels as substitutes for Trident’s printhead technology, (J.A. at 983), and it is 

undisputed that two competitors offer competing printheads. 

04-1196 16 
However, “[t]he mere presence of competing substitutes for the tying product . . . 

is insufficient to destroy the legal, and indeed the economic, distinctiveness of the 

[patented] product.” Digidyne, 734 F.2d at 1345 (quoting Loew’s, 371 U.S. at 49). 

Rather, the definition of a market requires careful consideration of both the product and 

geographic markets. Bhan v. NME Hosp., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1991). 

The presumption can only be rebutted by expert testimony or other credible economic 

evidence of the cross-elasticity of demand, the area of effective competition, or other 

evidence of lack of market power. See Tanaka v. Univ. of So. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 

1063 (9th Cir. 2001); Forro Precision, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 673 F.2d 1045, 

1052 (9th Cir. 1982). On the present record there is not sufficient evidence to rebut the 

presumption of market power resulting from the patent itself, or to create a genuine 

issue of material fact on the issue. 

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the 

Sherman Act section 1 claim.12 Because plaintiff’s summary judgment motion appeared 

to rest entirely on a theory that the presumption of market power is irrebuttable, we 

remand to the district court to permit defendants an opportunity to supplement the 

summary judgment record with evidence that may rebut the presumption. Should the 

defendants on remand fail to present sufficient relevant evidence to create a genuine 

 12 In the district court the defendants argued that summary judgment should 

also be denied because plaintiff failed to show two separate products and that the tying 

agreement affected a not insubstantial amount of commerce in the tied product. Indep. 

Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1162 n.7. Despite these arguments, the district court noted that 

“both parties seem to agree that market power will be the dispositive element in this 

case.” Id. Defendants have not renewed these arguments on appeal, and we treat 

them as abandoned. 

04-1196 17 
issue of material fact as to whether the presumption has been rebutted, partial summary 

judgment on liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act should be granted.13

VII 

We turn next to the section 2 claim. The presumption of illegality in patent tying 

arises in section 1 cases. Neither International Salt nor Loew’s dealt with section 2 of 

the Sherman Act. See Int’l Salt, 332 U.S. at 393 & n.1; Loew’s, 371 U.S. at 39 & n.1. 

To establish a monopolization claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act, there must be 

monopoly power in the relevant market and the willful acquisition or maintenance of that 

power. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 124 S. 

Ct. 872, 878-79 (2004). To establish an attempted monopolization claim, plaintiff must 

demonstrate that the defendant had specific intent to monopolize a relevant market and 

a “dangerous probability of success.” Spectrum Sports Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 

455 (1993). It follows that in section 2 cases a definition of the relevant market and 

consideration of the defendant’s power within that market are required. Id. at 455-56; 

Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177-78. 

In this case, the alleged monopolization is over the tied product, the ink, not the 

tying product, the printhead technology. The patent tying cases do not create any 

presumption that market power over the tying product confers the degree of market 

power over the tied product necessary to establish a monopolization or attempted 

monopolization claim. See Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 619. In section 2 cases, the plaintiff 

bears the burden of defining the market and proving defendant’s power in that market. 

 13 On remand, should the plaintiff prevail on liability, the district court should 

then assess damages. The district court then should also determine the scope of the 

04-1196 18 
See Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 455-56. As the district court found, plaintiff makes 

only the conclusory allegation of a geographic market without supporting economic 

evidence. Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. Such conclusory statements are not 

sufficient to define a relevant market. Morgan, Strand, Wheeler & Biggs v. Radiology, 

Ltd., 924 F.2d 1484, 1490 (9th Cir. 1991). Therefore, there is no genuine issue of 

material fact as to the section 2 claim and summary judgment was properly granted. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment as to the Sherman Act section 2 claim. We reverse the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment as to the Sherman Act section 1 claim and remand for further 

proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 

AFFRIMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED

COSTS 

 No costs. 

 

tying agreement as the parties dispute whether end users as well as OEMs are bound 

by the tying agreement. 

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