SECURITY COOPERATION WITH CHINA:

ANALYSIS AND A PROPOSAL

Thomas L. Wilborn

November 25, 1994
ii

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.

Government. This report is approved for public release; distribution

is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may be

conveyed directly to the author by calling commercial (717) 245-4064

or DSN 242-4064. Copies of this report may be obtained from the

Publications and Production Office by calling commercial (717) 245-

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All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are loaded on

the Strategic Studies Institute Homepage for electronic dissemination.

 SSI's Homepage address is: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/.

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The author is indebted to Lt. Col. Bernard C.W. Chang, USAF; LTC

(P) John F. Corbet, Jr., USA; LTC William T. Johnsen, USA; COL James

S. McCallum, USA, Ret.; COL Edward G. O'Dowd, USA; and LTC Larry M.

Wortzel, USA, who reviewed an earlier draft of this study, for their

useful suggestions and criticisms. In addition to the individuals

mentioned in the endnotes, he benefitted greatly from discussions with

Dr. Eden Y. Woon of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

for International Security Affairs. The author is, of course, solely

responsible for all errors and faulty judgments. He also is indebted

to the Institute of National Security Studies of the U.S. Air Force

Academy for support of field research in Hong Kong.
iii

FOREWORD

Relations between the United States and China reached their

lowest point in almost 20 years when President Bush imposed sanctions

on Beijing after the People's Liberation Army (PLA) indiscriminately

fired at unarmed demonstrators and their supporters at Tiananmen

Square on June 4, 1989. In the intervening years, some U.S. contacts,

particularly trade, quickly attained or exceeded their pre-Tiananmen

level. However, until recently, the U.S Government resisted

reestablishing formal security links.

In this study, Dr. Wilborn examines U.S.-China security

cooperation before Tiananmen, the strategic context in which it took

place, and the strategic environment of U.S.-China relations at the

present time. He then concludes that the reasons which justified the

program of security cooperation with China during the cold war are

irrelevant today.

Security cooperation and military-to-military relations with

China are highly desirable in the strategic environment of the 1990s.

China is a major regional power which inevitably will affect U.S.

security interests, and the PLA is an extremely important institution

within that nation. Additionally, as a member of the U.N. Security

Council and one of the five acknowledged nuclear powers, China's

actions can influence a wide range of U.S. global interests. In the

future, China is likely to be even more powerful and its actions more

significant for the United States.

Structurally, renewed U.S.-China security cooperation can be

modeled on the program of the 1980s. However, the purpose of the high

level visits, functional exchanges, and technological cooperation will

no longer be to strengthen a strategic alliance against a common

enemy, as it was before, but to contribute to stability in an

important region of the world and to achieve U.S. global objectives.

This study fulfills a requirement in SSI's research program for

1994, Strategic Challenge During Changing Times. The Institute is

grateful for a grant from the Institute of National Security Studies

of the U.S. Air Force Academy, which partially supported Dr. Wilborn's

field research, and offers this monograph as a contribution to the

ongoing dialogue on U.S. strategy in Asia and the Pacific.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN

Colonel, U.S. Army

Acting Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

THOMAS L. WILBORN, a Research Professor of National Security Affairs,

is an Asian specialist with the Strategic Studies Institute of the

U.S. Army War College. His recent publications include Japan's

Self-Defense Forces: What Dangers to Northeast Asia?; Stability,

Security Structures, and U.S. Policy for East Asia and the Pacific;

Roles for the Army in a Peacetime Engagement Strategy for the Pacific;

and How Northeast Asians View Their Security, Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994, 1993, 1992, and 1991,

respectively; and "Arms Control and R.O.K. Relations with the

D.P.R.K.," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Winter 1990. He is

also author or coauthor of several other studies and articles related

to Asian security, nuclear doctrine, and NATO. Before joining the

Institute in 1975, Dr. Wilborn taught international relations and

political science at James Madison University and Central Missouri

University, and served on a University of Kentucky educational

assistance group working at the Institut Teknologi Bandung, Bandung,

Indonesia. He received the Ph.D. degree in political science from the

University of Kentucky.
v

SUMMARY

Suspended for 5 years after the Tiananmen Square massacre, the

United States and China have renewed the security cooperation

relationship initiated in 1983.

From 1971, when National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger

visited Beijing to affect rapprochement with China, until 1983,

security cooperation between the two nations was sporadic and limited,

even though their common opposition to the Soviet Union was the basis

of the relationship. However, by 1983, adventurist moves by the Soviet

Union, including the invasion of Afghanistan, coupled with an

understanding between Washington and Beijing concerning U.S. relations

with Taiwan, had set the conditions for a more extensive and

systematic program.

U.S.-China policy called for "three pillars" of security

cooperation: high level visits, functional exchanges, and sales of

defensive weapons and weapons technology. In fact, frequent high level

visits involved the key defense and military figures of each nation.

However, functional exchanges, organized by individual services

and only begun in 1985, were limited and engaged relatively few

mid-level officers from both sides. The initiative for these exchanges

appears to have come from the United States. By 1988, the People's

Liberation Army (PLA) had begun to withdraw from the functional

exchange program between its ground forces and the U.S. Army.

The last "pillar," arms sales, turned out to be limited, also.

The PLA sought only a few systems, although it discussed a broad array

of weapons and equipment with U.S. Government and defense industry

representatives. The PLA entered into four Foreign Military Sales

Agreements and several commercial contracts involving relatively small

purchases when compared to other U.S. customers, including Taiwan.

President George Bush suspended all aspects of security cooperation in

June 1989.

Had the events of Tiananmen Square not abruptly interrupted the

U.S.-China security cooperation program, significant alterations would

probably have begun to occur anyway. The profound changes which have

transformed the international system and brought an end to the cold

war were already in progress in 1989. U.S.-Soviet relations were no

longer confrontational and, more importantly, President Mikhail

Gorbachev had conceded virtually all Chinese preconditions to

Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Washington and Beijing are renewing

security cooperation at a time when the trends which were unfolding in

1989 have already resulted in a new decentralized international

system. The cold war and one of the protagonists have disappeared.

Thus, the strategic rationale which justified U.S.-China security

cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s is no longer valid.

But the United States and China are key factors respectively in

each other's foreign and security policy calculations. As a major East

Asian power, China's behavior inevitably affects regional stability,

and also influences U.S. global interests. Security cooperation,

supplementing other aspects of binational relations, increases the

ability of the United States to influence and be better informed about
vi

China and the PLA. It is also important for the United States to

improve its contacts with China's military because as an institution

the PLA performs critical political and economic roles within China.

Structurally, renewed U.S.-China security cooperation can be

modeled on the program of the 1980s. However, the purpose of the high

level visits, functional exchanges, and technological cooperation will

no longer be to strengthen a strategic alliance against a common

enemy, but instead to contribute to stability in an important region

of the world and to the attainment of U.S. global objectives.

Three other important characteristics should be included in

renewed U.S. security cooperation with China. These are:

• Policy direction centralized in OSD;

• Relatively slow, deliberate pace; and

• Transfer of only defensive weapons which cannot be used against

Chinese civilians or seen to endanger regional power balances.
1

SECURITY COOPERATION WITH CHINA:

ANALYSIS AND A PROPOSAL

INTRODUCTION

After a hiatus of almost 5 years, the United States and the

People's Republic of China (PRC) have resumed security cooperation and

military-to-military relations. Exchanges of high level visits are

taking place again, and students from the U.S. Air War College and the

National Defense University are visiting Beijing. The U.S. Pacific

Command (USPACOM) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) have

reestablished military-to-military contacts. And Washington and

Beijing have agreed to establish a binational commission on defense

conversion, through which the United States will help the PLA adapt

some of its systems, beginning with air traffic control, for civilian

uses.1

Despite ideological differences and historical animosity, the

United States and China initially established a program of security

cooperation at the height of the cold war as an expression of a common

strategic interest in restraining the Soviet Union. By the late 1980s,

the two governments were regularly exchanging high level visits of

defense and military officials and military delegations were probing

common functional problems. The United States had also approved a few

weapons sales to the People's Liberation Army (PLA). But on June 4,

1989, before CNN cameras, PLA units fired indiscriminately into

demonstrators in Tiananmen Square and their supporters in Beijing,

killing at least 700 and wounding thousands.2

 As a result, President

George Bush suspended all U.S. contacts with the Chinese military and

imposed commercial sanctions on China. His administration did not

resume military-to-military relations with the PLA.

Security cooperation between the United States and China in the

1990s and beyond obviously is no longer required as a means to contain

Soviet expansion. The Soviet Union's principal successor, Russia, is

not an enemy (although perhaps a potential longer-term adversary) of

either nation. The strategic justification for resuming this

relationship spawned in the cold war is now based on a different set

of factors and priorities.

The purpose of the following analysis is to propose the outline

of a new U.S.-PRC security cooperation program, based on the political

and strategic context of the 1990s. It begins with a summary of

previous security cooperation between the two nations, in order to

find hints of the more--and less--effective ways to engage China in

military-to-military relations, and simply to provide an account of

the earlier relationship. That is followed by an analysis of the

current environment of U.S.-China relations, focusing on how the

behavior of China, and specifically the PLA, may impinge on U.S.

security interests and identifying potential risks and benefits of

security cooperation with China. Then the author provides his

suggestions for U.S.-PRC security cooperation. The final section is a

restatement of the major conclusions of the analysis.

SECURITY COOPERATION BEFORE 1989

Virtual enemies for two decades after the Chinese Communist Party
2

assumed control of China in 1949, the secret diplomacy of Henry

Kissinger and Zhou Enlai in 1971 and President Nixon's extensively

reported visit to Beijing in 1972 transformed relations between China

and the United States. But outstanding disputes, in particular U.S.

recognition of the Republic of China government in Taiwan and the war

in Vietnam, prevented establishing full diplomatic relations,

including formal security cooperation or regular military-to-military

contacts. Indeed, as late as 1980 there were many officers in the U.S.

armed services who still viewed the PRC as the enemy who had caused

tens of thousands of casualties among American forces during the

Korean war, and there were probably PLA officers with similar views of

the United States.3

Nixon and Carter Administrations.

In the period between Nixon's visit and the normalization of

U.S.-China relations in 1979, the United States and China supported

each other diplomatically against the Soviet Union, and took similar

positions with respect to ASEAN and, after 1975, Vietnam. But security

cooperation was extremely limited.4

 Washington reportedly shared

intelligence on the Soviets with Beijing from Kissinger's first visit

onward, often through the Chinese mission to the United Nations.5 These

intelligence briefings became increasingly frequent in the year before

normalization, and included a special NATO briefing for Mao and Zhou.6

The developing U.S.-China trade did not include weapons systems or

military equipment, but the Ford administration did authorize the sale

of American-produced sophisticated computers to Beijing. In 1978,

Washington withdrew its opposition to weapons sales to China by

Western European nations, even though no sales of military equipment

or weapons by American companies were permitted.

Upon de jure recognition of each other in 1979, more extensive

contacts in all aspects of relations, including security cooperation,

were possible. Deng Xiaoping, back in China after his memorable 1979

tour of the United States, told a group of visiting U.S. Senators that

China would be interested in exchanging port calls, purchasing U.S.

arms, and having American monitoring facilities on Chinese soil to

verify Soviet compliance with arms control agreements. Nonetheless,

the only military contact in 1979 was the visit of a U.S. National

Defense University (NDU) delegation to Beijing and several other

cities. Planned before normalization, the group was "unofficially"

hosted by the PLA. NDU hosted a PLA group the next year.7 A delegation

from the Corps of Engineers visited China in early 1980, consulting

with its hosts on flood control and similar topics, but not military

affairs.8

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 profoundly changed the

environment of Sino-American relations, and in the following year,

when Secretary of Defense Harold Brown visited Beijing, he discussed

the sale of nonlethal military equipment and the formation of a

military relationship with China. The Brown visit resulted in

agreement for a wider range of military-to-military activities and a

U.S. commitment to sell dual-purpose technology and nonlethal

equipment--but not weapons systems. According to newspaper reports,

the United States and China also agreed to covertly establish two

facilities to monitor Soviet missile tests, which at least partially

compensated for similar facilities lost when Moslem fundamentalists
3

took control of the government of Iran the previous year.9

While military sales issues were not satisfactorily resolved in

this period--China wanted to be able to purchase U.S. equipment on the

same basis as other friendly, nonallied nations--the broader strategic

relationship between the United States and China seemed to improve

significantly. The policies of both nations with regard to a number of

questions, including Cambodia, Afghanistan, and American military

presence in the Pacific and East Asia, approached congruence. There

were also limited military-to-military exchanges. A PLA educational

delegation visited the United States in the fall of 1980.

Reciprocating the visit, a U.S. group representing the various war

colleges and several other service schools went to China in 1981.10 And

in the economic and cultural arenas, contacts grew increasingly more

frequent and varied.

Reagan Administration.

The Reagan administration, after a 2-year hiatus, further

expanded security cooperation with Beijing to reinforce and strengthen

the strategic alignment of the United States and China against the

Soviet Union.11 The period from 1981 until August 1983 was spent in

extensive negotiations, resulting in a Sino-U.S. Joint Communique.12

Through it, Washington surrendered some of its independence in

fulfilling U.S. obligations to the security of Taiwan under the Taiwan

Relations Act, even though Reagan and some of his supporters clearly

felt a personal and ideological commitment to the Nationalist regime.13

For its part, Beijing, while it would not renounce the use of force

against Taiwan, did state that its policy was to reunify the

Motherland peacefully, and accepted without approval that the United

States would continue to contribute to the security of Taiwan.

The new program of security cooperation, announced in the summer

of 1983 by Secretary of Defense Weinberger in Beijing, consisted of

"three pillars": comprehensive high level visits, functional

exchanges which allowed the PLA and U.S. armed forces to explore

common problems and interests, and the sale of U.S. defensive weapons,

military equipment, and technology to China.14 While Beijing

participated in the activities of all three dimensions, Washington

initiated the program and was its principal champion.

High Level Visits. Virtually all of the top leadership of the

U.S. Department of Defense and services made trips to China. Casper

Weinberger, in Beijing when the program started in 1983, went again in

1986, and his successor, Frank C. Carlucci, visited in 1988. The

Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy also visited, and the Secretary

of the Army sent a personal representative.15 On the military side,

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all of the service

chiefs travelled to China between 1985 and 1989.16

The traffic from Beijing to Washington was also impressive. It

included a Minister of Defense, Vice Chairman of the Central Military

Commission, Chief of the General Staff, Deputy Chief of the General

Staff, PLA Air Force and Navy Commanders, the Air Force Political

Commissar, and PLA Equipment Department Head. At least as far as

participation is concerned, the high level visit portion of U.S.-China

security cooperation must be considered a success for as long as it
4

lasted.

Functional Exchanges. The second pillar of U.S.-China security

cooperation, functional exchanges, was implemented on the American

side by the individual services, each of which approached the

requirements differently. The Army delegated responsibility to the

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) which established with the PLA

General Staff a binational annual meeting on training, to alternate

between the United States and China.17 Always funded generously and

given strong command support on the U.S. side, two Chinese delegations

visited the United States, and two U.S. delegations visited China.

Delegations consisted of 9 or 10 people, headed by a one or two star

general or equivalent.18 The visitors were always given a broad

exposure to the host's training facilities, and also the opportunity

to see many parts of the host's country.19 

There were never very many people on either side involved in this

program, although those few on each side with responsibilities for

planning and liaison developed effective working relations. In the

opinion of U.S. participants, professional and personal relationships

at the working level were uniformly forthright and open--even warm.

Both U.S. and Chinese participants in the exchanges appeared to

consider their experiences professionally valuable. TRADOC had

proposed, but the PLA had not accepted, more comprehensive functional

exchanges and educational exchanges in 1988 and 1989.

The Air Force and the Navy had less structured functional

exchanges. The Air Force hosted PLA Air Force (PLAAF) exchanges on

training and maintenance, each of which the PLAAF reciprocated.20 Like

the Army exchanges, the participants appeared to value the experiences

and supported extension of the exchanges. The U.S. Air Force and the

PLAAF were considering exchanges on storage and restoration and other

activities, including educational exchanges, when the United States

suspended all programs because of Tiananmen. According to one of the

closest observers to these activities, the PLAAF--or at least

influential members of the PLAAF leadership--wanted to emulate

selected USAF doctrine and practice, and did in fact adopt some

changes based on the USAF model.21 In addition to the functional

exchanges, the Air Force sent their prized aerial demonstration team,

the Thunderbirds, to Beijing in 1987.

For the Navy, three port calls, two by U.S. ships to Qingdao

(1986) and Shanghai (1989), and one by PLA Navy (PLAN) ships to Pearl

Harbor (1989), constituted the functional exchange pillar of

U.S.-China security cooperation. In addition to being high-level

protocol events--Commander, Pacific Fleet, and Commander, Seventh

Fleet, led the visits to Qingdao and Shanghai respectively--the port

calls also involved discussions about navy systems and procedures.

Because the PLAN had expressed interest in gas turbine technology and

the HH2 Foxtrot Seasprite helicopter, those systems were included in

the 1986 three-ship visit to Qingdao. There were also meeting and

passing exercises in conjunction with all three port calls.22

Arms Sales and Technology Transfers. The third pillar, arms sales

and technology transfers, produced considerable publicity but little

actual activity.23 The PRC received Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

customer status in 1984, but it sought only a few projects. The PLA
5

also bought very little through regular commercial channels. Table 1

shows the totals for arms sale agreements and actual deliveries from

1977 through 1992. By way of comparison, U.S. military sales to Taiwan

exceeded sales to China in agreements and actual deliveries each year

from 1977 through 1992. Total deliveries to China for the entire

period were exceeded by deliveries to Taiwan in each single year

during that period. In terms of volume of items or costs, arms sales

to China never reached the level of a major military sales program.

Extensive discussions about arms sales and technology transfers

did take place between the two governments and between the PLA and

U.S. manufacturers. With limited resources and some appreciation that

there were limits to what the PLA could absorb, Chinese

representatives engaged more in window shopping than in buying.

Whereas U.S. vendors offered large volumes of end items for sale,

Chinese (when they were interested at all) sought only a few items and

technology. Whether China's purpose was more to gain information about

American weapons systems than to buy materiel, as has been suggested,

is unclear, but undoubtedly PLA specialists did learn much about U.S.

technology, as well as the lore of defense acquisition and the

intricacies of foreign military sales in the United States.24

The Reagan administration limited its offers to four groups of

weapons systems, all considered defensive: anti-tank missiles,

artillery and artillery defense, air defense, and anti-submarine

warfare. As it turned out, the PLA made purchases only in the last

three categories.25

The largest single program was an FMS $550 million agreement

involving upgrading avionics on 50 Chinese F-8 interceptor aircraft,

called the "Peace Pearl" project. The primary contractor was the

Grumman Corporation. Grumman's urgency to obtain the contract and the

PLA's obsession with secrecy combined to prevent the contractor from

knowing that the cockpit of each of the 50 aircraft was unique,

requiring individual adjustments which increased the costs

significantly. Grumman accordingly demanded cost overruns, to the

dismay of the PLA. The other three FMS programs were much smaller.

They were:

• A $22 million large scale ammunition program (LCAMP), in which

Hamilton/Bulova modernized fuse and detonator facilities for China.26

• A $62 million project for four counter-battery radars. Hughes

Corporation was the American contractor, and training of PLA personnel

was conducted at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

• An $8 million sale of four Honeywell anti-submarine torpedoes.

The largest commercial sale, a $140 million agreement, involved

the purchase of 24 UH-60A Blackhawk helicopters, produced by the

Sikorsky Corporation. There was also an agreement with Grumman to

upgrade another fighter, the F-7M, for export, and some smaller sales.

Of the FMS agreements, only the LCAMP project was close to

completion on June 4, 1989, when President Bush suspended all aspects

of security cooperation with China. Two of the four radars from Hughes

had been delivered, but none of the Honeywell torpedoes. Production
6
7

had not begun on the Peace Pearl program, and the cost overruns had

soured relations with Grumman in any case, leading the PRC to

terminate the project in 1990 even though several F-8 aircraft were

being held by Grumman at its New York factory.27 The sale of Blackhawks

was the only significant commercial sale completed. Some 3 years after

Tiananmen, China finally received all of the undelivered items which

it had purchased, as well as F-8s being held by the Grumman

Corporation.28

Intelligence Cooperation. There was apparently another dimension

of U.S.-China security cooperation (a fourth pillar, so to speak) in

the intelligence sharing and combined intelligence activities which

dated back to 1972 and 1980, respectively. In addition to the

facilities established to monitor Soviet missile tests in 1980, some

five primary seismic research stations were placed in several Chinese

provinces between 1980 and 1984.29 According to a detailed report

leaked to The Washington Post, these activities were not affected by

the U.S. response to Tiananmen Square.30 Never acknowledged officially

by either government, it is unclear if these operations are still

maintained.

Status of the Relationship, 1988-89.

There is evidence that the pace of U.S.-China security

cooperation might have waned even if the Tiananmen incidents had not

taken place. In 1988, the PLA not only would not expand functional

exchanges with the U.S. Army, but it desired to suspend the annual

training dialogue for an unspecified time.31 Had all programs not been

suspended, the PLA might have relented and agreed to a somewhat

modified program for the future. But there clearly were reasons for

the Chinese to withdraw from, or at least slow down, security

cooperation with the United States.

On the pragmatic level, the costs in money and resources and the

requirements for reciprocity may have imposed greater burdens than the

PLA was willing to continue. While the costs of entertaining a

visiting delegation in China were less than in the United States, they

were still considerable, and the PLA budget was constrained. There was

a particular strain on the relatively small group of personnel who

were proficient in English. Moreover, the U.S. Army and Air Force were

discussing a number of longer term educational and training exchanges

which would be more expensive, and also would provide opportunities

for a deeper understanding of the host's operations. The PLA claimed

that it did not have living accommodations and quality of life

facilities which would be expected as a minimum by U.S. servicemen.

Rather than having to confront the possible embarrassment of

providing--or being unable to provide--reciprocity, the PLA leadership

may have decided to restrain and reduce the exchange programs to keep

them well within the capacities of the PLA. On the other hand, the PLA

leadership simply may not have wanted an educational exchange with the

United States if it provided U.S. officers the opportunity to become

familiar with the inner workings of the PLA, and exposed Chinese

officers to the relatively open intellectual environment of U.S.

military institutions. In any case, the ad hoc approach of the Air

Force, which allowed the PLAAF to more easily reject specific

proposals, may have been more compatible to the wishes of the PLA

leadership than the more structured and durable arrangements which had
8

been fostered by the Army.

Strategically, the Chinese leadership must have considered that

the initial rationale for Sino-American entente had all but evaporated

in the wake of Gorbachev's "new thinking" and the rapidly emerging

rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union. Rather than posing a

threat to China's vital interests, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev

had, by the spring of 1989, conceded all requirements which Deng had

made prerequisites to normalizing relations. Moreover, there were

possibly interesting prospects for security cooperation again with the

Soviet Union.

From the U.S. perspective, detente had similarly undermined the

logic of continuing to advance security cooperation with China,

although in 1988 and 1989 most civilian and military security

officials in Washington still considered the Soviet Union the global

adversary of the United States. U.S. officials were also bothered by

China's pattern of arms sales, especially the sale of Silkworm

missiles to Iran and of a CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic missile

to Saudi Arabia. Beijing considered that complaints about China's

relatively modest arms sales program on the part of the second largest

weapons merchant in the world were inappropriate, at the very least.32

CURRENT ENVIRONMENT FOR U.S.-CHINA SECURITY COOPERATION

Few if any observers in Beijing or Washington predicted in 1989

the revolutionary events of the next several years which have so

drastically transformed the international system. Not only has the

bipolar world of the cold war ended, but one of its protagonists, the

Soviet Union, no longer exists, and its successor states, including

Russia, are in disarray. The principal reason for both nations to

engage in security cooperation with each other disappeared with the

dismemberment of the Soviet Union, if not sooner. If there are

strategic reasons for China and the United States to regularize

security relations with each other, they can no longer be based on

mutual fear of a common enemy posing a clear and present threat.33 But

they can be found in the needs of each nation to influence the

behavior of the other in order to attain its objectives in the region.

China's Influence on U.S. East Asia Policy.

PRC's Global and Regional Capabilities. For the United States,

China today is an important actor in both the international and

regional environments. While it is in no sense a superpower, it has

significant global capacities which can influence the success of U.S.

policies, and it has the potential to wield even greater influence in

the future. It is a member of the U.N. Security Council with a veto,

and can therefore frustrate or, at the least, strongly influence any

U.S. policy which requires a Security Council decision. As a selfproclaimed "Third World" state, increasingly successful in an economic

and military sense, it has the ability to influence other Third World

governments, either in support of or in opposition to U.S. global

interests. Because it is one of the five acknowledged nuclear powers,

China is central to restraining the spread of nuclear weapons and

weapons technology. Lastly, it is an important exporter of arms which

sells relatively sophisticated missiles to customers that the United

States considers dangerous, including Iran, Syria, and Libya.34
9

Regionally, China's ability to influence events and affect U.S.

interests is probably more significant. East Asia is the most dynamic

region in the world economically, accounting for ever increasing

volumes of U.S. trade, and offering increasing opportunities for U.S.

investments. Moreover, it is a region particularly vulnerable to

instability caused by the emergence of historic rivalries and disputes

partially restrained during the cold war by the strictures of the

bipolar system.35 Unlike Europe, there are no tested region-wide

institutions like NATO and CSCE which show promise for mediating among

disputants or providing channels for peaceful change. The behavior of

the region's largest state with the largest armed forces and the

fastest growing economy obviously will influence regional stability

and U.S. regional interests. In addition, China is one of the few

nations remaining in the world with the capability, as diminished as

it may be, of influencing Kim Jong Il's regime in North Korea, or the

State Law and Order Restoration Council in Burma, both governments

with which the United States has limited influence.

As many observers are increasingly pointing out, the PRC is also

a potential regional problem.36 As its economy provides greater

resources to pursue international objectives, China cannot be expected

to support all aspects of the status quo. Motivated by a strong

nationalism which transcends other ideological boundaries, Chinese

leaders will want to reclaim the international status they believe

that their nation has been denied since the age of imperialism, and

they should be expected to want the capabilities to act as a major

power.37 The increases in China's formal defense budgets since

Tiananmen, the obsessive secrecy surrounding actual expenditures and

capabilities of the military, the adoption of a new doctrine which

openly incorporates power projection in the national military

strategy, and the recent modernization of its navy and air force raise

the possibility and fear, especially in Taiwan and Southeast Asia, of

assertive intentions.

Moreover, numerous contentious issues could serve as the catalyst

for regional conflict. Almost all of the actual and nascent

territorial disputes in East Asia involve China. These include China

with India on the south, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on the west, Russia

and Mongolia on the north; and Japan, Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines,

and Vietnam on the east.38 And for the United States, there is the

always sensitive and potentially dangerous question of the status of

Taiwan.

Potential Impact of Chinese Domestic Problems. A serious

political crisis within China could be destabilizing for the entire

region. Groups contending for power might seize on border issues, or

even the return of Taiwan to the control of the PRC, as rallying cries

to solidify domestic support. Even if domestic politics did not

directly extend into the international arena, weak, less effective

governance from Beijing and conflict among the provinces in the

context of a succession struggle will have repercussions throughout

East Asia.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is about to enter one of the

most critical periods of its history, at least as serious as the

previous crises associated with the Cultural Revolution, the death of
10

Mao, or Tiananmen Square. Paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, who still

sets the broad outlines of Chinese policy even though he holds no

official position in the Party or government, turned 90 years of age

in 1994. His passing will intensify the succession struggle already

under way, and inevitably introduce a period of greater instability

and uncertainty. Moreover, this will also represent a generational

change of enormous significance, for the next leader of the CCP and

the PRC will not come from the revolutionary generation who survived

the Long March and the civil war, and who with Mao established the

People's Republic. Instead, he and his coterie will be members of the

nomenklatura; technocrats and bureaucrats rather than revolutionary

fighters. No matter how effective or wise, the new leader will be

denied the source of legitimacy which all previous leaders enjoyed

merely because they had participated in the great struggle for

liberation. More than any of his predecessors, his ability to remain

in power will depend on success in modernizing the economy and raising

the standard of living of the population. He will not be able to rely

on past glories.

China also faces serious challenges unrelated to succession. The

nation is being battered by centrifugal forces emanating from the

reforms which shifted much regulation of the economy to market forces

rather than formal economic controls.39 The most prosperous areas, most

notably Guangdong, which includes Guangzhou (Canton) and several

special economic zones (the fastest growing entities in the Chinese

economy), resist Beijing's efforts to restrain export-driven economic

growth in the interest of curbing inflation or achieving economic

balance. A great deal of power over the economy has already devolved

to provinces, cities, firms, and sometimes even foreign investors.

Some political control has become decentralized also, and if economic

decentralization is not reversed, the authority of the central

government as compared to local power centers will almost surely

become weaker.

Economic inequality is a growing problem. The material well-being

of most Chinese clearly is improving, but for some much more rapidly

than for others. Many peasants appear to be left out, and believe that

they are left out, of the general prosperity which has produced

double-digit growth rates for the economy as a whole. The income gaps

between city and countryside and between coastal areas and hinterland

are getting larger, as urban and coastal rates of growth far outstrip

those in the rest of China.40

"Market socialism" not only has led to rapid economic growth and

noticeable inequality by eliminating many of the mechanisms of a

centrally planned economy, it has also undermined the ideology of

Communism, and thus a basis for the Party's legitimacy. Corruption,

not absent before the Deng reforms but certainly relatively limited,

has become pervasive, obvious, and widely resented.41 The most

prominent grievance expressed by the demonstrators at Tiananmen Square

related to corruption, and not the absence of democracy. Violent

crime, gambling, and prostitution, repressed in the days of monolithic

Party control, are now serious and escalating problems in the special

economic zones and the rapidly developing cities.42

United States as a Factor in China's Security Calculus.
11

Chinese perceptions of the strategic significance of the United

States cannot be mirror images of U.S. perceptions of the strategic

significance of China. Each nation affects and is affected by the

other in the context of different interests and capabilities and each

represents a domestic political system which is almost the polar

opposite of the other on the spectrum of democratic-authoritarian

politics. But there are also similarities. As China can influence the

ability of the United States to attain some of its objectives, so can

the United States be either a facilitator or obstruction to China's

achievement of its global and regional objectives, for the United

States is the world's only superpower, it possesses the strongest

military capability, and it is the major customer of China's dynamic

export sector. The United States also annoys and frustrates China's

leaders because it supports the activities of dissidents, publicly

rebukes certain domestic social and political practices, and tries to

dictate policy relative to intellectual property rights and other

trade-related procedures.

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, especially the recent authorization

for Taiwan to purchase 150 F-16s, and the imposition of sanctions

because of Chinese trading practices are more than annoying--these

actions touch on Beijing's fundamental security interests. In fact, a

number of Chinese strategists and security analysts identify the

United States as the primary enemy in the post-cold war era.43 In any

case, the United States is a major force in East Asian regional

affairs and a major factor in China's economic development. Whether

they like it or not--and clearly many of them do not--China's leaders

must deal with the United States.

Potential Benefits of Security Cooperation.

The greater the variety of contacts in a bilateral relationship,

especially when they include activities which are very important to

both nations, the greater the points of access, and thus the greater

the number of opportunities for each participant to gain information

about the other and influence the behavior of the other. Therefore,

engaging in security cooperation, including military-to-military

relations, should be beneficial to both nations. First of all, it can

complement economic, political, and cultural exchanges already in

place, and thus give the bilateral association the appearance of a

normal and comprehensive relationship. Security cooperation will not

overcome disputes in the areas of human rights and trade, but it

should contribute to greater balance and flexibility in U.S.-China

relations.

Contacts between the U.S. and Chinese armed forces as part of the

total network of bilateral connections are especially important for

the United States because of the domestic political and economic roles

of the PLA. It is highly unlikely that the PLA will dominate Chinese

politics in the foreseeable future--"The Party controls the gun" is a

regular theme of propaganda toward the military, and civilian control

in the form of the CCP over the military has rarely been in question

in the PRC.44 But CCP leaders, including Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and

many other important figures in the history of the PRC were also

leaders of the PLA. Moreover, some members of the PLA always serve on

the major organs of the Party, although this formal influence of the

PLA within the Party has varied over the years. More significantly,
12

the all-important personal links connecting the highest Party

leadership and the PLA leadership have remained vital: PLA opinion

is, and always has been, heard with sympathy at the highest levels of

decisionmaking in China.

The PLA is also an extremely important actor in the Chinese

economy. Encouraged to expand their existing relatively modest

business activity in the early 1990s to supplement relatively meager

appropriations, many PLA units, from the General Logistics Department

to battalions in the field, developed a great variety of commercial

interests, ranging from munitions to consumer products to traditional

small-scale agricultural enterprises. They produce goods for export

and for the domestic market. Reliable data are not available, but it

is estimated that the PLA earned 30 billion yuan in 1992, or as much

as the official defense budget.45 In spite of criticism from outside

and inside the military, the value of the PLA's commercial concerns

has continued to grow, at least as fast as the economy as a whole.46

Moreover, especially in times of crisis for the regime, as during

the later stages of the cultural revolution and the demonstrations at

Tiananmen Square, the PLA as an institution historically has played

critical roles in preserving the system. The Communist Party of China

is now at another critical period, with the survival of the regime

possibly at risk. U.S.-China military-to-military relations may give

the United States a better ability to anticipate the actions the PLA

may take, and therefore also anticipate likely developments within the

PRC. Possibly--but certainly not necessarily--in the mid and long

terms it may be able to influence PLA decisions, and possibly even the

political decisions of senior members of the PLA in their roles as

leaders of the CCP.

Risks of Extensive Security Cooperation.

There are probably no political or military risks to the United

States in modest security cooperation and military-to-military

cooperation with China. But some types of security cooperation, or

identification with the PLA which appears to be uncritical, do imply

some dangers.47

Popular dissatisfaction with the current regime also applies to

the PLA. It has not escaped the pervasive corruption in China. Indeed,

some observers believe that parts of the PLA are among the most

corrupt elements of the system.48 Beyond that, many in the population

still hold the PLA responsible for the massacre at Tiananmen Square.

Therefore, too close an identification with the PLA carries the risk

of appearing to favor unpopular groups least likely to support the

kind of government the United States would want to see created. This

identification could also undermine the credibility of U.S. positions

on human rights and democracy with other governments. In the event

that there were a fundamental shift in government in Beijing, an

unlikely development in the near term, too close an identification

with the most repressive institution of the present regime would

complicate U.S. access to new ruling groups, which probably would not

include PLA leaders now influential in Beijing.

A danger also exists that security cooperation with China could

have adverse affects on U.S. relations with other nations in the East
13

Asia--especially China's most proximate neighbors. They favor normal

relations between the United States and China, which they hope will

help to deter China from destabilizing behavior.49 But they would all

object strongly if the United States provided assistance which

strengthened the PLA's power projection capability.

There are also risks to the PRC in an extensive security

cooperation relationship. Military-to-military relations would provide

a new channel (in addition to trade, sports, educational exchanges,

manipulation of international media, etc.) through which the United

States might, from the Chinese perspective, attempt to subvert Chinese

socialism through a campaign of peaceful evolution, a threat to PRC

values which was heralded in the Chinese press in 1990 and still

receives some attention.50 The extent to which the PRC leadership is

willing to allow large numbers of PLA officers, especially younger

ones, to interact with U.S. counterparts will be a good indication of

either the former's confidence in their own position or faith in the

loyalty and political training of the latter. Fairly active security

cooperation can take place, as it did during U.S.-China security

cooperation in the 1980s, without involving large numbers of people at

any given time, however, so that this risk to the PRC leadership need

not necessarily inhibit a renewed relationship. But any U.S. activity

which was perceived as an effort to propagate the values of "bourgeois

liberalism" would be strenuously resisted. Moreover, some PRC and PLA

officials, acculturated to value secrecy in military affairs for its

own sake, see risks in any exchange of information with a foreign

government, particularly one with the capability to frustrate PLA

plans and actions.

Parameters of U.S.-China Security Relations.

Security cooperation and military-to-military relations with

China will not fit the typical pattern of U.S. security cooperation.

Unlike most partners with the United States, China is not an ally or

even a "friendly" state, as it might have been designated in the 1980s

because of the strategic alliance against the Soviet Union. It is

worth repeating that, in addition to some common international and

global objectives which do justify collaboration, the policies of the

United States and China diverge on a number of significant issues.

They include the status of Taiwan, human rights, and a whole series of

trade questions. Moreover, China is a party to disputes, although not

actual conflict, with several nations which definitely are either

allies or friends of the United States. And while Chinese communism

has evolved so as to accept many features of a market economy,

ideological differences between the present regime in Beijing and any

possible government in Washington are fundamental. Nonetheless, even

with such a complex relationship, China has been willing to resolve

problems with the United States through dialogue and compromise.

Conflict and the threat of conflict have not been a part of U.S.-China

relations since 1971.

The nature of the relationship with China means that the

principal themes of U.S. military-to-military programs with other

major regional states are inapplicable. The United States does not

necessarily want to strengthen the military capability of China, which

could threaten allies and friends in the region and disturb existing

military balances. Interoperability should not be of primary concern
14

because, except in certain types of operations other than war (e.g.,

humanitarian relief, anti-piracy operations, or perhaps U.N.-sponsored

peacekeeping), military units of the United States and China are

unlikely to serve together. Fighting side-by-side in medium to high

intensity conflict is particularly difficult to imagine now or in the

foreseeable future. Security assistance programs may have some role in

future U.S.-China security cooperation, but China is unlikely to

become either a major customer of U.S. armaments or military

technology.

In addition to the political/strategic environment, cultural

differences between the United States and China inhibit free exchanges

of information and the development of understanding. This was true

during the 1980s, when the anti-Soviet strategic alignment propelled

personnel on each side to extend good will to those on the other.

Today, without that strategic rationale and the existence of

disagreements on a range of issues, cultural and ideological

differences and stereotypes derived from them could become more

obstinate barriers.

Professional military values and interests should compensate for

some of the differences between the two societies, but the divergence

between Chinese and American military ethos is also significant,

especially in the case of ground forces. PLA ground forces are much

less oriented toward technological approaches to warfare and more

prone to accept political as well as military roles for the armed

forces than other branches. They also appear to be more enmeshed in

commercial activities, rarely considered acceptable within the U.S.

military, than do the PLAAF and PLAN. In addition to these cultural

factors, as in 1988-89, the PLA may not want to endorse a rapid pace

to security cooperation with the United States because of a shortage

of resources. Its overall budget may be larger than during the 1980s,

but it does not necessarily have more funds for security cooperation.

Moreover, the most limiting resources may be trained, reliable English

speaking personnel rather than money. (Budget and personnel restraints

may restrict U.S. contributions to military-to-military relations with

China in the future much more than was the case in the 1980s.)

While more extensive security cooperation and

military-to-military relations with China can advance U.S. interests,

they should be designed by American personnel familiar with China and

the PLA, with cultural differences in mind. Even in the 1980s, the PLA

appeared to prefer a slower, less structured approach than the

American services, especially the Army. The PLA also was more hesitant

than U.S. services to share information about its capabilities and

organization. At least in the foreseeable future, the United States

should agree to a relatively slow, cautious program which conforms to

Chinese as well as American expectations. This warning may be

especially necessary for U.S. military administrators of the program.

Their culture places a premium, usually very appropriate and

beneficial, on "can do": accomplishing the mission--in this case

expanding security cooperation with the PLA--whatever the obstacles.51

But in this instance, the obstacles should not necessarily be defeated

or overrun.

SUGGESTIONS FOR A SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAM WITH CHINA
15

A security cooperation program with the PRC should include the

basic components of the program of the 1980s--high level visits,

functional exchange, and technological cooperation. However, given

current and expected strategic relationships between the two nations,

the content and priority attached to the program will differ from that

of the earlier decade. Initial dialogues can seek out arenas in which

common objectives provide the basis for more extended higher level

discussions and military-to-military contacts.

The execution of U.S.-China security cooperation necessarily

involves many segments of the defense community, all of which must

have authority to carry out their missions. Nevertheless, in order to

insure that all activities conform to U.S. policy, the overall

coordination and direction should be centralized in the Office of the

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD/P), in close consultation

with the Department of State. Ideally, China specialists will be

available to direct all aspects of the program, or at least advise

those who do.

In the discussions associated with high level visits, the United

States should focus on areas in which U.S.-China cooperation may

advance global and regional stability, as opposed to the former

priority of strengthening their strategic alignment to deter the

Soviet Union. Such issues would include arms and weapons technology

transfers (including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction),

drug trafficking, peaceful settlement of disputes, stability on the

Korean peninsula, and confidence-building measures to reduce the

secrecy surrounding PLA budgets and plans. Beijing and Washington will

not agree or find compromises on all of these items, or other issues

(e.g., Taiwan and the forward presence of U.S. forces in the region)

which the former may not want to introduce during high level

discussions. But even when agreement is not possible, exchanges of

positions enhance understanding. And frequent dialogues can, at least

in principle, lead to changes of policy. Hopefully, both governments

will not publicly exaggerate disagreements. Confrontation for its own

sake between China and the United States will not improve regional

stability.

Functional exchanges offer the most promising prospects for

establishing enduring military-to-military relationships. They can

provide a means for the development of personal and institutional

networks which can foster understanding and evolve into informal

structures for cooperation and collaboration. Functional exchanges

also can create opportunities for each side to gain new information

about the other, and points of access for each side to influence the

other. However, at least in the immediate future, functional exchanges

are not likely to involve many people on either side in reoccurring

contacts. Thus, personal and institutional networks are likely to

evolve slowly, only providing significant benefits of mutual

understanding and informal collaboration in the mid and long term.

Longer assignments and/or reassignments of service personnel involved

in these programs might facilitate the development of such networks.

During the first period of U.S.-China security cooperation, individual

services administered functional exchanges and they presumably will

also be the primary agents for functional exchanges in the future.

However, at least one activity, the proposed binational commission on

defense conversion, will be directly sponsored by the Office of the
16

Secretary of Defense.52 There may be opportunities for other

binational commissions, perhaps examining demobilization, in the

future.

Individual services will also share responsibility for functional

exchanges with the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), which has been one

of the first participants in the resumption of U.S.-China security

relations. USPACOM not only has military-to-military programs in which

the PLA can (and does) participate, but it may be in the best position

to advise the USD/P from a joint perspective on the plans and

activities of the individual services.

To stimulate mutual understanding, the major objective of

U.S.-China functional exchanges in the post-cold war era, U.S.

services should emphasize conferences on military history, strategy,

and doctrine. They should also respond to requests from the PLA,

which, especially in the case of the PLAAF and the PLAN, may be

heavily oriented towards technology and more beneficial to Chinese

than U.S. participants. U.S. negotiators and coordinators should

insist that each exchange be at least potentially beneficial to the

military organizations in each nation, however, or be balanced by

another exchange that is. Each side in the relationship will always be

entitled to a quid pro quo.

A prudent approach will not press for exchanges in areas where

the Chinese do not seem to desire them. Where reciprocity may be a

special problem for the PLA, U.S. administrators could suggest special

arrangements by which the PLA could avoid direct reciprocity without

embarrassment if they believed the program would be particularly

valuable for the United States.

While there were a number of exchanges of delegations considering

education and training, there were no educational exchanges in the

earlier period of security cooperation. Both the Army and the Air

Force suggested educational exchanges, without positive responses

from the PLA leadership. It is possible that the latter considered

that the military education systems of the two countries were so

different that reciprocal exchanges would be unworkable. PLA leaders

may not have wanted to allow American students in Chinese military

schools, especially at staff college and war college levels, for fear

of breaches of security. Or perhaps the Chinese were unwilling to

expose their officers to bourgeois liberalism in U.S. military

schools. Most Western observers believe that this last reason was the

most salient. In any case, given the Chinese lack of enthusiasm in the

past, initiatives for educational exchange probably should come from

the PLA.

There probably cannot be a successful program of security

cooperation with China unless the PLA is allowed to purchase armaments

and military equipment from U.S. weapons producers. Beijing would view

denial as an affront, tantamount to naming China an outlaw state.

However, for reasons of both domestic and international politics, an

arms transfer program for China must be limited. As in the program of

the Reagan and Bush administrations, when the political atmosphere was

much more favorable than now, Washington should offer only clearly

defensive systems which would not directly contribute to a force

projection capability. Moveover, the United States should not
17

authorize the PLA to buy weapons which it might use against Chinese

citizens: under no circumstances may a future Tiananmen Square

massacre involve American weapons or equipment. Within those

constraints, even though opposition may be expected in Congress and

segments of the public, China should be allowed to purchase from U.S.

weapons manufacturers, and, if it wants it, enjoy Foreign Military

Sales status.

Beijing, which only purchased a few U.S. weapons systems in the

1980s, is unlikely to become a major customer of U.S. defense industry

in the future for at least four reasons. First, the suspension of all

arms related programs after June 4, 1989, was unpleasant and extremely

disruptive for the Chinese. From their perspective, American companies

cannot be considered reliable when, in spite of binding legal

contracts, the flow of supplies and technology can be interrupted by

what they consider unjustified political decisions by the U.S.

Government. Second, while the resources available to the PLA are

greater than formerly, their funds for weapons and equipment

acquisition, especially from foreign sources, are limited. They are

unlikely to spend much money on imported weapons from all sources, and

they will necessarily look for bargains. Third, the best prices for

high technology items which cannot be produced in China are likely to

be offered by the Russians, who also impose less red-tape than the

United States. And fourth, Russian equipment is more compatible with

existing Chinese weapons systems, most of which are based on Soviet

designs, than U.S. equipment. Any requests from the PLA, except

perhaps for spare parts for U.S. equipment already in its inventory,

are unlikely to come soon, and they are likely to be very selective.

On the other hand, Chinese enterprises (not necessarily, but

possibly, owned by the PLA) may seek a variety of dual-use items, such

as advanced computers and information technology, alleging that they

will be used within civilian sectors of their economy although they

could also have military applications. Neither the Bush nor Clinton

administration has been unduly restrictive in dealing with such

requests, often very profitable to U.S. vendors. As in the past, they

may be treated more as commercial, as opposed to security,

transactions.

In addition to these programs there will be other dimensions to

U.S.-China security cooperation, probably including intelligence

sharing and cooperative intelligence activities. USPACOM 's

military-to-military programs can include PLA participants--PLA

representatives have already attended a Pacific Armies Management

Seminar sponsored by U.S. Army Pacific--if Beijing is interested. Air

War College and NDU programs which send groups of students abroad as a

part of their educational experience, as well as CAPSTONE participants

on worldwide orientation tours, should continue to include China on

their itineraries as long as they are welcome.53

SOME CONCLUSIONS

Assuming Washington designs and executes its participation

sensibly, renewed U.S. security cooperation with China, including

routine military-to-military contacts, supports stability in East

Asia, the overarching U.S. regional security objective, and increases

the opportunities to solicit Beijing's support in achieving some
18

global objectives as well. To assure that U.S. objectives guide all

activities, policy formulation should be centralized in the Office of

the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. However, the program, which

should be framed primarily to increase mutual understanding rather

than achieve operational cooperation, is unlikely to produce immediate

or dramatic results.

The renewal of U.S.security cooperation with China, potentially

the most influential nation in the region, strengthens stability in

East Asia by supplementing other dimensions of Sino-American

relations, thereby increasing U.S. involvement with China and--perhaps

more significantly--enhancing the perception that the United States is

fully engaged with the PRC. East Asian leaders view Sino-American

consultations and dialogue, particularly when they explicitly involve

security affairs, as one of the factors which could restrain China's

behavior, were the need to arise. These leaders make decisions for

their own nations partly on the basis of this perception. If security

cooperation results in more transparency in China's defense system, an

objective which the United States should pursue, the result would be

even greater predictability and stability in East Asia.

In reality (as distinguished from the realm of perceptions),

renewed security cooperation has not significantly enhanced U.S.

influence in Beijing thus far, and probably will not do so in the near

future. But it probably can expand the opportunities for American

officials to explain U.S. positions on nonproliferation, global

environmental concerns, illegal narcotics traffic, terrorism, and

other global issues, including some which may not have direct security

implications. The United States will also have more frequent

opportunities to persuade China to expand its recognition of human

rights. In addition, PLA officers participating in

military-to-military activities should be able to observe, and

hopefully appreciate, U.S. counterparts functioning in accordance with

Western human rights standards.

U.S.-China military-to-military relations should be kept at a

level sufficient to keep an inter-military dialogue going but modest

enough not to strain the capacity of either side. In offering weapons

and military technology to the PLA, Washington must always consider

regional military balances and the attitudes of other East Asian

governments. Moreover, it must avoid selling the PLA weapons which

might be used against its own population.

Notes:

1. Steve Mufson, "U.S. to Help China Shift Arms Output to Civil

Use," The Washington Post, October 18, 1994, p. 28.

2. The exact number of casualties is unclear. The official report

listed over 200 dead, mostly military and security personnel, and

3,000 injured civilians and 6,000 injured military and security

personnel. Chinese Red Cross officials initially reported 2,600 dead,

but later denied the figure. Western newsmen estimated several

thousand dead based on leaks from Chinese security personnel and

checks of some Beijing hospitals. Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia

1990 Yearbook, Hong Kong, 1990, p. 110, estimates at least 700.
19

3. I heard many such comments from senior officers during an

earlier examination of U.S.-China security in 1980-81.

4. The discussion of security cooperation, and the lack thereof,

between 1971 and 1979 is based on Harry Harding, A Fragile

Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972, Washington: 

The Brookings Institution, 1992, pp. 88-90; and George Lardner, Jr.

and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Intelligence Ties Endure Despite U.S.-China

Strain: `Investment is Substantial, Longstanding,'" The Washington

Post, June 25, 1989, pp. A1, A24.

5. Harding, p. 88, claims that data from satellite photography

and intercept were provided the Chinese. See also Jim Mann, "U.S.,

China Coordinated Policy During Cold War," Los Angeles Times, June 

13, 1994, p. 1.

6. Ibid., p. 90.

7. Telephone interview on May 16, 1994, with Dr. Thomas Robinson,

who as professor of Chinese studies at the National War College at the

time, planned and organized the trip.

8. Interview with Colonel (retired) Douglas Lovejoy, June 10,

1994. Colonel Lovejoy was the China specialist in the

Politico-Military Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for

Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, from 1979 until 1982.

9. Lardner and Smith, cited in Harding, p. 92.

10. Lovejoy interview. The U.S. delegation was headed by the

Deputy Commander of Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

11. Part of the explanation for the strained relations between

China and the United States in 1981 was that candidate Reagan had made

a series of pro-Taiwanese statements during the presidential campaign

of 1980.

12. Reciprocal visits of delegations from advanced military

educational institutions may have been the only military-to-military

relations activities during the first 2 years of the Reagan

administration.

13. The communique provides that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would

"not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level

of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of

diplomatic relations between the two countries," and that the United

States intended "to reduce gradually its sale of arms to Taiwan."

14. Secretary of State Schultz had proposed the Weinberger visit

in February, but Beijing would not extend the invitation until issues

relating to Chinese textile exports and Huguang Railway bonds were

resolved. Harding, pp. 142-143.

15. General Maxwell Thurman, who at the time was Commander of the

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The visit occurred

in 1988, when two of the four AN/TPQ-37 radars which China had

purchased from Hughes had been delivered. During the visit, PLA crews
20

which had trained at Fort Sill as part of the FMS procurement

demonstrated the equipment.

16. A new Chief of Staff of the Army was planning a visit at the

time of the Tiananmen incident.

17. The information about U.S. Army functional exchanges is based

primarily on a telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel Kevin M.

Rice, USA, a Foreign Area Officer (FAO) specialist on China, who was

the TRADOC action officer for the program until May 1988; Lieutenant

Colonel (Retired) Ronald G.S. Tom, a former China FAO, who was the

China specialist in the Political-Military Division of the Army Staff

from 1985 until 1988; and Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Jay Allen, also

a former China FAO, who succeeded Colonel Rice in 1988 and served as

the China specialist on the Army Staff until his retirement in 1994.

Rice and Tom attended the first two meetings.

18. The PLA had abolished its rank structure; U.S. Army China

specialists estimated rank on the basis of current and previous

positions.

19. During a sight-seeing excursion at a large shopping mall in

Atlanta in 1985, an American escort for the Chinese delegation

happened to notice former President and Mrs. Carter riding on an

escalator. They agreed to meet and be photographed with the Chinese.

Colonel Rice thinks that the Chinese never believed that the encounter

was a coincidence, although it fact it was.

20. The description of the Air Force programs was obtained

primarily from Lieutenant Colonel Bernard C.W. Chang, USAF, who was

utilized as an interpreter during the functional exchanges of the

1980s.

21. Lieutenant Colonel Chang.

22. Information on the Navy functional exchange was provided by

Mr. Ted Tacket, Deputy Director for International Programs, U.S. Navy,

and Commander Michael Matacz, political-military officer for China at

Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet. Commander Matacz

participated in both U.S. Navy port calls.

23. The arms sales and technology transfer programs with China

are discussed in Harding, pp. 164-168; Eden Y. Woon, "Chinese Arms

Sales and U.S.-China Military Relations," Asian Survey, Volume XXIV,

Number 6, June 1989, pp. 601-618; Kerry B. Dumbaugh and Richard F.

Grimmet, "Arms Sales to China: The Limits to U.S.-China Military

Cooperation," The Washington Quarterly, Volume 9, Number 3, Summer

1986, pp. 89-102; and Larry M. Wortzel, "United States Export Control

Policies and the Modernization of China's Armed Forces," in China's

Military Modernization: International Implications, ed. by Larry M.

Wortzel, Contributions in Military Studies, Number 72, New York: 

Greenwood Press, 1988, pp. 159-192.

24. Harding, p. 164.

25. Ibid., p. 167, indicates that there was an FMS agreement to

coproduce TOW anti-tank missiles in China. I could find no evidence
21

that such an agreement was signed, however.

26. Bulova bought out Hamilton during the program.

27. Interview with Colonel R. Mark Bean, USAF, a former Air

Attache in Beijing.

28. See U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, Country Point

Paper, SUBJECT: China, 3 March 1993. The agreement between the United

States and China which allowed shipment of the undelivered materiel

was signed December 16, 1993.

29. Harding, p. 166.

30. George Lardner, Jr. and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Intelligence Ties

Endure Despite U.S.-China Strain: `Investment is Substantial,

Longstanding,'" The Washington Post, June 25, 1989, p. A1.

31. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Jay Allen, USA,

who succeeded Lieutenant Colonel Rice as TRADOC project officer for

U.S.-China functional exchanges in 1988.

32. Woon argues that U.S. attitudes toward security cooperation

with China had become largely a function of the latter's arms transfer

policy by 1989, and that it would likely dominate security relations

with China in the future. See especially pp. 614-618.

33. However, at least one Chinese has suggested that Russia will

be a long-term threat to both nations which justifies continuous

security cooperation. Richard C. Barnard and Barbara Opall, "U.S.,

China Resume Ties: High-Level Visits by Military May Spur Sanction

Removal," Defense News, July 11-17, 1994, p. 1.

34. Compared to the United States, Russia, and Western European

countries, the volume of China's arms trade is modest, however. See R.

Bates Gill, The Challenge of Chinese Arms Proliferation: U.S. Policy

for the 1990s, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,

U.S. Army War College, August 31, 1993, pp. 1-12.

35. While it is true that East Asian politics were not

subordinated to cold war considerations as much as in Europe, the

bipolar structure nonetheless had a restraining impact on most powers.

For a insightful presentation of this view, see Richard K. Betts,

"Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States

after the Cold War," International Security, Volume 18, Number 3,

Winter 1993/94, pp. 34-77.

36. For example, see David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong: China's

Challenge to Asian Security," Security, Volume 36, Number 2, Summer

1994, pp. 43-59; Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Builds Its Military

Machine, Making Some Neighbors Nervous," The New York Times, January

11, 1993, p. A1; and William Branigin, "As China Builds Arsenal and

Bases, Asians Wary of `Rogue in the Region'," The Washington Post,

March 31, 1993, p. A21.

37. Larry M. Wortzel,"China Pursues Traditional Great-Power

Status," Orbis, Volume 38, Number 2, Spring 1994, pp. 157-176.
22

38. The remaining territorial dispute with Russia concerns the

boundary along the Amur River. Japan and China both claim sovereignty

to barren islets north of Taiwan named Senkakku in Japanese and

Diaoyutai in Chinese. Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam are

in dispute with China, and to some degree with each other, over the

Spratly Islands. Vietnam and China also dispute sovereignty over the

Paracel Islands.

39. This discussion is primarily based on George Segal, "China

Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy," Adelphi Paper 287, March 1994.

40. Segal, p. 15. Lincoln Kaye, "Haves and Have-Nots," Far

Eastern Economic Review, September 2, 1993, p. 46, speculates that the

ratio of urban to rural income, which was 1.7:1 in 1985 after 7 years

of Deng's agricultural reforms, was probably 4:1 in 1993. Official

statistics place the ratio at 2.3:1.

41. Ibid., pp. 26-27.

42. During the author's discussions with observers of Chinese

politics in Hong Kong in March 1994, there was virtually unanimous

agreement that the Communist Party of China is facing a serious crisis

of legitimacy, and that the current leadership is unusually insecure.

43. Shambaugh, p. 49.

44. It is an article of faith of the CCP that the PLA is a

servant of the Party. Since the Tiananmen massacres this has been the

dominant theme of major military publications.

45. See Tai Ming Cheung, "Serve the People," Far Eastern Economic

Review, October 14, 1993, pp 64-66; and Segal, p. 26.

46. "Hostile Takeover: China Reigns in PLA Businesses," Far

Eastern Economic Review, February 17, 1994, p. 5. The number of

concerns operated by the PLA, and the size of the revenue they

generate, are matters of conjecture, even to the leaders of the PLA.

Cheung, "Serve the People."

47. An American observer in Hong Kong, who does not want to be

identified, warned against relations between the PLA and the American

military which appeared to be "intimate."

48. Consensus of a group of Hong Kong specialists on China and

the PLA in February 1994. Many of the generalizations concerning the

PLA were derived from discussions in Hong Kong with a number of

observers, often in animated conversations and discussions in which it

was difficult to determine who was responsible for a given comment.

49. A strategy of ASEAN, which Beijing is resisting, appears to

be to enmesh China in a network of regional and bilateral

relationships. See Nayan Chanda, "Divide and Rule," Far Eastern

Economic Review, August 11, 1994, p. 18.

50. Harry Harding, "`On the Four Great Relationships:' The
23

Prospects for China," Survival, Volume 36, Number 2, Summer 1994, pp.

22-42, states that the mainstream press has not emphasized "peaceful

evolution" since 1992. However, Shambaugh, p. 50, suggests that the

concept still resonates among security specialists.

51. Several observers of U.S.-China security cooperation from

within the American military, who spoke under nonattribution rules,

commented on the inability of the administrators of the U.S. program

to be patient and proceed at the pace desired by the Chinese.

52. This will be the first instance of security cooperation with

China, except for arms sales, in which participants will be recruited

from the private sector.

53. CAPSTONE is an orientation/training program for new flag

officers and flag officer-designates administered by NDU.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Acting Director

Colonel William W. Allen

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Thomas L. Wilborn

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Mrs. Shirley E. Martin

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mr. Daniel B. Barnett

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler