United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Committee on

National Security, House of

Representatives

May 1995 NAVAL SURFACE

FIRE SUPPORT

Navy’s Near-Term Plan

Is Not Based on

Sufficient Analysis

GAO/NSIAD-95-160

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-261397 

May 19, 1995

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman, Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you requested, we evaluated the Navy’s program to upgrade guns on

surface ships to determine whether the Navy has chosen the most

cost-effective system for improving its ability to provide naval surface fire

support (NSFS).

Background Since the end of the Cold War, the Navy has emphasized a strategy of

littoral warfare. As part of this strategy, the Navy and the Marine Corps

have been developing operational concepts for amphibious warfare, which

rely heavily on the ability to launch and support amphibious assaults from

ships up to 25 nautical miles from the enemy’s shore.1

 According to the

Navy and the Marine Corps, to successfully conduct amphibious

operations, the Marine Corps requires all-weather fire support. If artillery

and other ground-based fire support assets are not available, Marine Corps

ground forces will need long-range fire support from Navy surface ships or

from attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.

Currently, the Navy operates the 5-inch, 54-caliber gun on cruisers and

destroyers, which can fire unguided projectiles a maximum range of about

13 nautical miles. According to the Navy and the Marine Corps, this short

range combined with threats to surface ships from mines and antiship

missiles currently preclude the Navy from adequately supporting Marine

Corps amphibious operations or engaging other long-range targets.

The Congress has been interested in the Navy’s plans for NSFS since 1991.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993

required (1) the Secretary of the Navy to provide a report to the Congress

outlining NSFS requirements and survey alternative technologies and other

options that could meet these requirements; (2) the Secretary of Defense,

through the Institute for Defense Analysis, to provide a study of naval

ship-to-shore fire support requirements and cost-effective alternatives; and

(3) the Navy to conduct a cost and operational effectiveness analysis

(COEA) based on the requirements and technologies identified in the first

1

A nautical mile is equal to about 1.85 kilometers.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-95-160 Naval Surface Fire Support
B-261397 

report. In the conference report to the National Defense Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 1995, the Congress required the Secretary of the Navy to

submit a report on the Navy’s NSFS plan. At the time of this review, this

report has not been submitted to the Congress.

Results in Brief The Navy’s decision to upgrade existing 5-inch, 54-caliber guns and

develop a 5-inch precision-guided munition, at an estimated research and

development cost of $246 million, was made without sufficient analysis. As

a result, the Navy is unable to show that this decision will meet NSFS

requirements or provide the most cost-effective solution.

The Navy’s COEA for NSFS determined that a 155-millimeter, 60-caliber gun

with an advanced propellant and precision-guided munitions in

combination with the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile was the most

cost-effective system to meet NSFS requirements by fiscal year 2003. On the

basis of the COEA’s results, the Navy initially proposed a $360 million

research and development program to (1) develop 155-millimeter,

60-caliber guns; (2) develop a 155-millimeter precision-guided munition

with the Army; and (3) research advanced propellants. The Navy also

proposed providing limited upgrades to existing 5-inch guns until

155-millimeter, 60-caliber guns became operational. However, the Navy

subsequently determined that this comprehensive plan was not affordable

and decided to limit the program to upgrading existing 5-inch guns and

developing 5-inch precision-guided munitions. A chronology of major

events surrounding the NSFS program appears in appendix I.

COEA Determined

That 155-Millimeter

Gun Was the Most

Cost-Effective System

In February 1993, the Center for Naval Analyses began the COEA. It

evaluated the performance of 10 existing and candidate 5- and 8-inch and

155-millimeter gun systems with different propellants, flight

classifications, and warhead types against target sets for three scenarios,

two of which represented major regional conflicts. The third scenario

represented a noncombatant evacuation operation. The Navy also

evaluated seven missile concepts against these scenarios because it found

that none of the gun systems could handle all of the target sets. The

scenarios and target sets were developed along with the Marine Corps and

validated by the COEA’s oversight board.2

2

Co-Chairs of the oversight board were the Director, Expeditionary Warfare Division, Office of the

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments)—a Marine

Corps official; and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and

Acquisition (Ship Programs).

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-160 Naval Surface Fire Support
B-261397 

The COEA identified eight gun systems that, when combined with missiles,

were capable of attacking at least 95 percent of the targets in the major

regional conflict scenarios at the lowest total estimated cost. Five of these

systems were 155-millimeter variants, and three were 8-inch variants with

different propellants and calibers. The COEA concluded that a

155-millimeter, 60-caliber gun system with an advanced propellant and

precision-guided munitions in combination with the Tomahawk missile

was the most cost-effective NSFS option.3

According to the Navy, the only 5-inch gun candidate that was able to

compete with other gun systems modeled in the COEA was a 5-inch,

70-caliber Magnum gun. This gun does not exist and would have to be

developed. The COEA found that, for both major regional conflict scenarios,

fewer 155-millimeter munitions and long-range missiles would be needed

to hit a majority of the target sets than 5-inch, 70-caliber munitions and

missiles. For example, the Navy could hit 99 percent of the targets in one

scenario with 1,316 fewer 155-millimeter projectiles, and 34 fewer

long-range missiles at a wartime cost of about $69 million less than with a

combination of 5-inch, 70-caliber projectiles and missiles.4

 Also, the COEA

stated that, if the NSFS program became fiscally constrained, development

of a 5-inch, 70-caliber gun might save money in the near term, making it an

attractive option because of lower research and development costs, but

(1) wartime costs would be considerably higher than with larger guns and

(2) a 5-inch, 70-caliber gun would not adequately cover the targets.

The Navy subsequently developed the NSFS program based on the results of

the COEA. In March 1994, the Navy proposed (1) developing a new

155-millimeter, 60-caliber gun; (2) developing, along with the Army, a new

155-millimeter precision-guided munition; and (3) researching different

propellants, including electro-thermal-chemical and liquid propellants. The

Navy planned to field these new systems by fiscal year 2003. The Navy also

proposed providing limited upgrades to existing 5-inch guns to achieve

greater ranges until the 155-millimeter gun became available and planned

to conduct concept demonstrations of various missiles.

According to the Navy, the NSFS program had the potential for joint

development of various propellants and commonality with Army

3

The COEA was signed out for distribution by the oversight board in December 1994. However,

according to the Navy, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition

had not signed or released it to the Congress.

4

According to the COEA, wartime costs refer to costs to replace missile and gun projectile stocks to

prewar levels.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-160 Naval Surface Fire Support
B-261397 

155-millimeter munitions. To fund this overall program, the Navy included

$360 million for research and development in its proposed Future Years

Defense Program for fiscal years 1996-2001 and expected to field the

155-millimeter gun in fiscal year 2003 on new-production DDG-51

destroyers or on a follow-on surface ship, known as SC-21.

The Navy

Restructured Its

Program for

Affordability Reasons

Funding shortfalls in the Navy’s fiscal year 1996 program objective

memorandum led to a decision by the Navy to cut its NSFS program in

August 1994 to help pay for programs that the Marine Corps considered

vital to its amphibious capabilities. These programs included the V-22

medium-lift aircraft and the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle.

According to program officials, to stay within the reduced funding level,

the Navy canceled plans to develop the 155-millimeter, 60-caliber gun and

the 155-millimeter precision-guided munition and scaled back efforts to

develop advanced propellants for 155-millimeter munitions. The Navy said

it would consider this option as a long-term NSFS solution as it develops its

new surface combatant ship, the SC-21. In the interim, the Navy has

decided to upgrade its existing 5-inch, 54-caliber guns and develop a 5-inch

precision-guided munition. According to program officials, the Navy made

this decision primarily because it believed that modifying existing guns

would be the quickest way to gain better gun capability at the least cost.

In December 1994, the Chief of Naval Operations approved the Navy’s

revised NSFS plan, and in January 1995, directed the Naval Sea Systems

Command to (1) initiate upgrades to the 5-inch, 54-caliber gun to deliver

precision-guided munitions; (2) develop a 5-inch precision-guided

munition with an initial operational capability before fiscal year 2001; and

(3) scale back liquid propellant gun technology efforts. In addition, the

Chief of Naval Operations directed that no funds be used to develop the

155-millimeter gun.

According to the Navy, it will need about $246 million in research and

development funds between fiscal years 1996 and 2001 for the revised NSFS

program. About $165 million will be required to develop the

precision-guided munition, $56 million to upgrade the 5-inch gun, and

$25 million will be needed for research and development on NSFS-related

command and control systems. The Navy included $160.2 million in its

Future Years Defense Program for fiscal years 1996-2001 for research and

development of the 5-inch gun and precision-guided munition, including

$12 million for fiscal year 1996. As a result, the Navy’s research and

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-160 Naval Surface Fire Support
B-261397 

development program is underfunded by about $86 million. Navy officials

told us that funds would be added to the program in fiscal year 1997.

Marine Corps Defined

Gun Range

Requirements After

the Navy Restructured

the Program

In November 1994, 3 months after the Navy proposed the 5-inch, 54-caliber

gun solution, the Marine Corps established a range requirement for NSFS

that is less than the range requirements assumed in the COEA. Although the

COEA does not specify a range requirement, the COEA assumed that a

majority of the NSFS targets in the major regional conflict scenarios were

located within 75 nautical miles of the fire support ship. This requirement

was consistent with the findings of the July 1992 Navy NSFS requirements

study and the June 1993 Institute for Defense Analysis study, which found

that 75 nautical miles was the maximum required range to support the

Marine Corps’ operational concepts.

Although range estimates for an upgraded 5-inch, 54-caliber gun vary, all

estimates are less than 75 nautical miles. The June 1993 Institute for

Defense Analysis study estimated that an advanced 5-inch gun projectile

with rocket-assisted propulsion could achieve a range between 

45 and 65 nautical miles.

Navy officials told the Chief of Naval Operations that an upgraded 5-inch

gun could achieve ranges between 45 and 70 nautical miles depending on

the scope of the upgrade and the type of propellant used in the

precision-guided munition. According to the Navy, to achieve a 70 nautical

mile range, electro-thermal-chemical propellants may be needed, but these

propellants have not yet been developed.

In November 1994, the Marine Corps established a requirement for NSFS in

terms of range, volume of fire, and lethality. Although it participated in

developing the original 75 nautical mile range target assumption used in

the COEA, the Marine Corps decided that the minimum range requirement

for NSFS should be 41.3 nautical miles and that the maximum range should

be 63.1 nautical miles. The Marine Corps based these ranges on its intent

to use NSFS during the initial stages of an amphibious operation until

artillery is ashore.

Because its 155-millimeter towed artillery would be unavailable during the

initial stages of an amphibious operation, the Marine Corps concluded that

NSFS, at a minimum, must provide the same range, lethality, and accuracy

as current artillery systems. The minimum 41.3 nautical mile range

consists of the 25 nautical mile ship-to-shore distance plus a 16.3 nautical

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-160 Naval Surface Fire Support
B-261397 

mile (30 kilometers) distance representing the maximum range of existing

Marine Corps 155-millimeter artillery with rocket-assisted projectiles. To

derive the maximum range of 63.1 nautical miles, the Marine Corps used

the accepted minimum range for threat artillery articulated in the Army

Field Artillery COEA of 21.8 nautical miles (40 kilometers) and added this

range to the minimum range of 41.3 nautical miles.

The Marine Corps’ intent to use NSFS during the initial stages of

amphibious landing operations was outlined in the NSFS mission needs

statement, which was signed by the Navy in May 1992. According to the

statement, NSFS also involves suppressing and destroying hostile antiship

weapons and air defense systems, delaying and disrupting enemy

movements, and reinforcing defending forces.

Marine Corps and Navy requirements officials also told us that the Marine

Corps revised the 75 nautical mile range requirement because it was not

logical, specifically defined, or formally agreed to by the Navy or the

Marine Corps. We found this surprising because Navy and Marine Corps

officials were involved in developing the target sets used in the COEA’s

scenarios. The scenarios and target sets were also approved by officials

from both services serving on the COEA’s oversight board.

The fact that the Navy and the Marine Corps established the new range

requirement after the Navy completed work on the COEA and restructured

the program raises questions about the validity of NSFS range requirements.

The Marine Corps did not assess the impact of its new requirement on the

target sets originally developed for the COEA or conduct any further

analysis to validate these ranges. Therefore, the importance to the NSFS

mission of targets located between 63 and 75 nautical miles from the ship

is not clear.

Supplemental Navy

Analysis Appears to

Be Limited

According to defense acquisition management policies and procedures, a

COEA is intended to assist decisionmakers in choosing the best system

alternative for the money invested and not to justify decisions that have

already been made. The Navy did not perform a supplemental analysis to

its original COEA before it decided to restructure the NSFS program.

The Navy is currently conducting a supplemental analysis to evaluate

near-term alternatives for NSFS. According to the Navy, this analysis will

reflect the new Marine Corps’ maximum range requirement of 

63.1 nautical miles and be limited only to 5-inch gun options. The Navy has

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-160 Naval Surface Fire Support
B-261397 

asked the Center for Naval Analyses to complete this analysis by

May 1995.

It is not clear whether a supplemental analysis that considered all gun

options—5 and 8 inch and 155 millimeter—against the Marine Corps’ new

distance requirements would support the Navy’s decision to upgrade the

5-inch gun because (1) larger guns firing advanced projectiles with more

payload can attack more targets than smaller, 5-inch guns and (2) the

original COEA found that the rankings of the eight most cost-effective

systems were not sensitive to range. The original COEA assessed the

effectiveness of the eight most cost-effective systems when the

ship-to-shore distance was reduced from 25 to 5 nautical miles and found

that the cost-effectiveness rankings of the systems remained basically the

same. Even at shorter ranges, the 155-millimeter, 60-caliber gun and

Tomahawk missile combination remained the most cost-effective NSFS

option.

Matter for

Congressional

Consideration

The Congress may wish to consider not authorizing or appropriating fiscal

year 1996 funds for NSFS until the Navy has (1) determined and validated

NSFS requirements and (2) conducted a comprehensive supplemental

analysis to the COEA that includes all available gun and missile alternatives.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

The Department of Defense (DOD) did not concur with either the thrust of

this report or the matter for congressional consideration (see app. II). DOD

took issue with three major issues in the report: the Marine Corps’ range

requirement, the Navy’s long-term plans for the 155-millimeter gun, and

our suggestion that the Navy is revising the COEA to justify decisions it had

already made.

DOD noted that the report incorrectly alludes to a Marine Corps initial NSFS

requirement of 75 nautical miles. DOD said that the minimum 41.3 and

maximum 63.1 nautical mile ranges established by the Marine Corps in

November 1994 was the first explicit statement of the requirement based

on a practical analysis of war-fighting scenarios.

We do not agree with DOD’s position. Although the COEA did not include a

specific range requirement, a majority of the targets in the major regional

conflict scenarios modeled by the COEA were located within 75 nautical

miles of the fire support ship. The 75 nautical mile range was consistent

with the findings of the July 1992 Navy NSFS requirements study and the

June 1993 Institute for Defense Analysis study, which found that

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-160 Naval Surface Fire Support
B-261397 

75 nautical miles was the maximum required range to support the Marine

Corps’ operational concepts. Further, the Navy did not conduct an analysis

to validate the relationship between the target set used in developing the

COEA and the Marine Corps’ new maximum range requirement of 63.1

nautical miles. Also, it should be noted that the original COEA found that

the rankings of the eight most cost-effective systems were not sensitive to

range. The original COEA assessed the effectiveness of the eight most

cost-effective systems when the ship-to-shore distance was reduced from

25 to 5 nautical miles and found that the cost-effectiveness rankings of the

systems remained basically the same. Even at shorter ranges, the

155-millimeter, 60-caliber gun and Tomahawk missile combination

remained the most cost-effective NSFS option.

DOD said that plans to develop the 155-millimeter gun and precision-guided

projectile, as recommended in the COEA, have not been canceled and that

this system remains a viable option for inclusion on the SC-21. This differs

sharply from what Navy officials told us during the audit. Moreover, no

funds have been budgeted for this program in the Future Years Defense

Program for fiscal years 1996-2001. Also, in his December 1994 decision to

focus on the 5-inch gun upgrade program, the Chief of Naval Operations

directed that no funds be used to develop the 155-millimeter gun.

DOD said that the Navy was not revising its COEA but was conducting a

supplemental analysis to the original NSFS COEA.

5 DOD noted that the

purpose of the supplemental analysis was to determine the best near-term

NSFS improvements to meet the range requirements established by the

Marine Corps in November 1994. However, we note the Navy requested

the Center for Naval Analyses to perform the supplemental analysis

2 months after its decision to proceed with the restructured program.

Because the Navy has restricted the supplemental analysis to only 5-inch

gun solutions, rather than all potential gun solutions, we believe that the

supplemental analysis may not determine the most cost-effective,

near-term NSFS program. Our recent discussions with officials from the

Center for Naval Analyses who are conducting the supplemental analysis

has reinforced this view. According to these officials, the 5-inch

precision-guided munition development program is a high-risk endeavor

that requires concurrent development of a number of new technologies.

One risk associated with concurrency is that fielding of the munition may

be delayed beyond the year 2001. According to the Center for Naval

5

In a draft of this report, we referred to the supplemental analysis as a revised COEA; as a result of

DOD’s comments, we changed this language and incorporated other technical comments where

appropriate.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-160 Naval Surface Fire Support
B-261397 

Analyses, another risk is that the 5-inch munition may not be able to meet

the Marine Corps’ maximum range requirement.

DOD also disagreed with the matter for congressional consideration. DOD

noted that its near-term program was consistent with the 1993 Institute for

Defense Analysis study, which recommended developing advanced

projectiles compatible with existing 5-inch, 54-caliber guns for the near

term and that sufficient analysis has been conducted for the Navy to

proceed with its program. DOD also stated that removal of fiscal year 1996

funding would slow the achievement of both near- and long-term

objectives. From the outset, the Navy intended to use the COEA to

determine the best program for NSFS. We continue to believe the Navy has

not conducted sufficient analysis to support its near-term program.

Scope and

Methodology

To obtain information on NSFS requirements and the Navy’s plans, we

interviewed officials and reviewed documents from the Office of the

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements,

and Assessments and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for

Research, Development, and Acquisition, Washington, D.C. We also

interviewed officials and reviewed documents at the Marine Corps Combat

Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; and the Naval Sea Systems

Command, Crystal City, Virginia. We reviewed the Navy and the Office of

the Secretary of Defense NSFS studies mandated by the Congress in the

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 and

discussed them with Navy officials and representatives of the Institute for

Defense Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia.

The Navy did not provide us with a copy of the COEA, but we reviewed the

COEA’s summary report dated March 31, 1994, which contained its major

findings and conclusions. We discussed the COEA with officials of the

Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. We conducted our review

between July 1993 and March 1995 in accordance with generally accepted

government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this letter to the Secretaries of Defense and the

Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. We will also make copies

available to others on request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are Richard Price,

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-160 Naval Surface Fire Support
B-261397 

Assistant Director; Anton Blieberger, Evaluator-in-Charge; and Robert

Goldberg, Senior Evaluator.

Sincerely yours,

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-160 Naval Surface Fire Support
Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-160 Naval Surface Fire Support
Appendix I 

Chronology of Major Events

December 1991 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993

mandates the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to assess

naval surface fire support (NSFS) needs and the Navy to conduct a formal

cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA).

May 1992 The Navy signs the NSFS mission needs statement.

July 1992 The Navy issues its first congressionally mandated report on NSFS

requirements.

February 1993 The Navy begins the COEA.

June 1993 The Institute for Defense Analysis completes its assessment of NSFS.

March 1994 The Navy completes its work on the COEA and, on the basis of its results,

proposes an NSFS program and funding in its Future Years Defense

Program for fiscal years 1996-2001.

August 1994 The Navy restructures the NSFS program in light of funding shortfalls and

cancels 155-millimeter, 60-caliber gun development.

November 1994 The Marine Corps identifies NSFS range requirements.

December 1994 The COEA is signed out for distribution by the Co-Chairs of COEA oversight

board, but is not released to the Congress. The Navy proposes a revised

NSFS program to the Chief of Naval Operations and obtains approval.

January 1995 The Chief of Naval Operations formally approves the NSFS range

requirement and issues formal program guidance directing the Navy to

pursue upgrades to 5-inch guns and development of a precision-guided

munition.

March 1995 The Navy asks the Center for Naval Analyses to provide a supplemental

analysis to its original COEA that reflects the Marine Corps’ new range

requirements by May 1995.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-160 Naval Surface Fire Support
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-160 Naval Surface Fire Support
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-160 Naval Surface Fire Support
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-160 Naval Surface Fire Support
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

(701069) Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-160 Naval Surface Fire Support
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the

following address, accompanied by a check or money order

made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when

necessary. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a

single address are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 6015

Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015

or visit:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 

or by using fax number (301) 258-4066, or TDD (301) 413-0006.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any

list from the past 30 days, please call (301) 258-4097 using a

touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on

how to obtain these lists.

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Mail

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. G100