[Cite as State v. Knowles , 2012-Ohio-2543.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CHAMPAIGN COUNTY STATE OF OHIO : : Appellate Case No. 2011-CA-17 Plaintiff-Appellee : : Trial Court Ca se No. 2007-CR-205 v. : : EURON W. KNOWLES : (Criminal Appeal from : ( Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant : :

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 8th of June, 2012.

. . . . . . . . . . . NICK A. SELVAGGIO, Champaign County Pros ecutor’s Office, 200 North Main Street, Urbana, Ohio 43078 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee EURON W. KNOWLES, #579-273, Chillicothe Corr ectional Institution, Post Office Box 5500, Chillicothe, Ohio 45601 Defendant-Appellant, pro se

. . . . . . . . . . . . . FAIN, J. I. Introduction {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Euron Knowles appeals, pro se , from an order overruling his motion for reclassification of his sex offender status. K nowles contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to apply the proper classification scheme. 2

 {¶ 2} We conclude that th e trial court erred by ove rruling Knowles’s motion. A retroactive classification of a sex offe nder under the Adam Walsh Act is void. State v. Eads , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24696, 2011-Ohio-6307, ¶ 24. A trial court has inherent authority to vacate (or, in this case, to correct) a void judgment. Patton v. Diemer , 35 Ohio St.3d 68, 518 N.E.2d 941 (1988), fourth paragra ph of syllabus. Accordingly, the order of the trial court from which this appeal is taken is Reversed, and this cause is Remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

II. Course of Proceedings {¶ 3} In August 2007, Knowles was indicted for one count of Rape and seven counts of Gross Sexual Impositi on, based on offenses alleged to have occurred between 2002 and 2004. Knowles pled guilty to three counts of Gross Sexual Imposition in April 2008, and the remaining charges were dismissed. In J une 2008, Knowles was sentenced to two years in prison on each count, with the terms to be serv ed consecutively, for a total of six years imprisonment. The trial court also classified Knowles as a Tier II Sex Offender pursuant to S.B. 10, also known as the Adam Walsh Act. There is no indication in the record that Knowles directly appealed fro m the conviction and sentence. {¶ 4} In May 2011, Knowles filed a motion for reclassification in the trial court, contending that his conduct and indictment occurred prior to the enactment of S.B. 10, and that under recent Ohio Supreme Court cases and ot her authority, application of S.B. 10 to his situation was unconstitutional. The State file d a memorandum in response, arguing that severance or reclassification di d not apply to Knowles, because his conviction occurred after 3

 S.B. 10 became effective in January 2008. In J une 2011, the trial court adopted the reasoning of the State, and denied the motion for reclassification. The trial court also relied on our decision in State v. Williams , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22574, 2010-Ohio-3537, which had upheld S.B. 10 on various cons titutional claims. Knowles a ppeals from the order overruling his motion for reclassification.

III. Did the Trial Court Err in Overru ling the Motion for Reclassification? {¶ 5} Knowles’s sole assignment of error is as follows: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION FOR [SIC] FAILING TO APPLY THE PROPER CLASSIFICATION SCHEME. {¶ 6} Under this assignment of error, Know les contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for reclassi fication. Knowles relies on authority cited in his motion and on State v. Williams , 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, which held that “2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, as applied to defenda nts who committed sex offenses prior to its enactment , violates Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, which prohibits the General Assembly from passing retroactive laws.” Id . at syllabus. In Williams , the Supreme Court of Ohio specifically noted that: The General Assembly has th e authority, indeed the obligation, to protect the public from sex offenders. It may not, however, consis tent with the Ohio Constitution, “impose[ ] new or additional burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities as to a past transaction.” If the registration requirements of S.B. 10 are imposed on Williams, the General Assembly has imposed new or additional burdens , duties, obligations, or liabilitie s as to a past transaction. 4

 We conclude that S.B. 10, as applied to Williams and any other sex offender who committed an offense prior to the enactment of S.B. 10, violates Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, which prohibits the General Assembly from enactin g retroactive laws. [Citation omitted.] Id. at ¶ 22. {¶ 7} The defendant in Williams had committed his sexually-oriented offenses before the effective date of S.B. 10. He had also been designated a Tier II se x offender by the trial court after the effective date of S.B. 10. Williams , 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108 Id. at ¶ 1-2. From a factual perspective, this is the same thing that happened to Knowles. Unlike Knowles, however, the defendant in Williams filed a direct appeal a nd raised issues about the constitutionality of S.B. 10 as applied to defendants who had committed offenses before the effective date of the act. Id. at ¶ 4. Therefore, the pro cedural postures of the two cases are not the same. {¶ 8} In the case before us, the State contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Knowles’s motion for reclassi fication. The State did not make this argument in the trial court, and this was not the basis of the deci sion overruling the motion for reclassification. In particular, the trial court fo cused on our prior decision in State v. Williams , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22574, 2010-Ohio-3537, which had rejected various constitutional challenges to S.B. 10. Id. at ¶ 15. Due to the intervening Supreme Court decision in Williams , which could impact individuals in Knowle s’s position, the State now argues that the trial court properly rejected the motion for reclassification as an untimely motion for post-conviction re lief under R.C. 2953.21. 1

1 Our Williams decision had nothing to do with the decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Ohio; the two defendants merely happen to have the same last name. 5

 {¶ 9} In State v. Eads , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24696, 2011-Ohio-6307, ¶ 24, we held that a retroactive cla ssification under the Adam Walsh Act to an offender who committed his offense before the effective date of the Ac t was not merely voidable, but void. That case involved a conviction for failure to notify the sh eriff of the offender’s change of address. Because we found that the offender’s sex offende r classification was void, even though he had never challenged that classification by a direct appeal, we re versed his conviction. {¶ 10} Here, Knowles is not raising the voidne ss of his classification under the Adam Walsh Act collaterally, as a challenge to his c onviction for having failed to comply with his reporting and registration requirements, but directly, in a motion to reclassify him under the sex offender registration law preceding the enactment of the Adam Walsh Act. In our view, that is not a material distinction. It woul d seem unreasonable to hold that Knowles cannot now effect a change in his sex o ffender classification, even though, under State v. Eads, supra, he can obtain the reversal of any subseque nt conviction for viol ating the requirements applicable to his classifica tion under the Adam Walsh Act. {¶ 11} Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a trial court has the inherent power to vacate a void judgment. Patton v. Diemer , 35 Ohio St.3d 68, 518 N.E.2d 941 (1988), fourth paragraph of sy llabus. We recognized a trial court’s inherent authority to vacate a void judgment in State v. Caldwell , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24333, 2012-Ohio-1091, ¶ 9. But in that case, we di stinguished between the defendant’s sex offender classification , which was void because of retroactivity, and his conviction for violating sex offender reporting a nd registration requirements, wh ich was merely voidable, not void. 6

 {¶ 12} Here, Knowles is not challenging hi s conviction for viol ating reporting and registration requirements; he is seeking a recognition by the trial court that his purported classification under the Adam Walsh Act is void, which the trial court ha s inherent authority to do, independently of the provision in R.C. 2953.21 for petitions for post-conviction relief. In recognizing the voidness of Knowles’s classification under th e Adam Walsh Act, the trial court may substitute the correct classifica tion under the sex offende r classification law preceding enactment of the Adam Walsh Act. {¶ 13} Knowles’s sole assignment of error is sustained.

IV. Conclusion {¶ 14} Knowles’s sole assignme nt of error having been sustained, the order from which this appeal is taken is Reversed, and th is cause is Remanded for further proceedings.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . DONOVAN and HALL, JJ., concur. Copies mailed to: Nick A. Selvaggio Euron W. Knowles Hon. Roger B. Wilson