P.1 

OAR Box 1818 

Prepped by Ollie Stewart 

Document Number: 

54) ll-D-26 

Docket Number: 

A-87-11 

Printed 11/6/2008 3:12:45 PM Sheet 54 of 79 
p 2 

II c'i—H

 ! • 

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY MILLER 

DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION 

* BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

tf" COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 

ON OZONE ISSUES 'U^"'LU 

un Uiunt .JiUiJ ENVIRONMENTAL HROTECTION 

<-.v,,. . • •-••-• •• AGENCY 

-•'--- ^d^K;..- . April 27,J987:%^ . " •.• • 

""•'"' ••> • v:-!t*p5»- • AUG rai98?^ - CENTRAL DOCKET 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to appear 

before you today to discuss the motor vehicle safety aspects of the 

Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) plans with respect to controlling 

the vapors produced by gasoline refueling. Hi th me at the witness table 

from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) are Barry 

Felrice, Associate Administrator for Rulemaking, and Erika Jones, Chief 

Counsel. Frits Wybenga, from the Coast Guard's Office of Marine Safety, 

Security and Environmental Protection, and -

from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), are also with us, as 

requested in your letters of invitation. 

The EPA is currently considering the issuance of a proposal to reduce the 

atmospheric ozone produced by gasoline refueling vapors by capturing 

these vapors with recovery systems on board new gasoline-powered 

passenger cars, light trucks and heavy-duty vehicles. Section 202(a)(6) 

of the Clean Air Act requires the EPA Administrator to consult with the 

Secretary of Transportation on the motor vehicle safety consequences of 

these systems.. HI thin DOT, responsibility for that function has been 

assigned to NHTSA, consistent with our motor vehicle safety 
P.3 

a* 

2 

responsibilities under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act 

of 1966, and FHWA, consistent with 

NHTSA's consultations with EPA on this matter began in October 1985. 

Among the factors which we believe need to be considered are the extent 

to which such systems will increase the risk of vehicle fires (both crash 

and non-crash), and the safety consequences of such fires; the cost and 

complexity of the technical solutions to be developed in response to the 

potential safety problems; the amount of time needed in the past for 

technical development of similar levels of complexity; and the 

development and testing done to date. 

We have recently received an EPA draft proposal with respect to onboard 

recovery systems, together with an EPA draft technical report on the 

safety implications of such systems. Our assessment of the draft 

proposal 1s that the safety of onboard recovery systems would depend upon 

which design and hardware alternatives are selected by the vehicle 

manufacturers. As a practical matter, the major safety implications of 

such systems on post-crash vehicle fires would be evaluated principally 

in the context of the vehicle manufacturers' self-certification tests for 

compliance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 301, fjjfil . 

System Integrity. We currently consider the performance tests of 

Standard 301 adequate to assure a reasonable level of post-crash fire 

safety 1n the motor vehicles to which the standard applies, those with a 

gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less, and 

school buses over 10,000 pounds (GVWR).. * 
P.4 

However, compliance with the standard Is not the only measure of the 

safety of such systems. The Federal motor vehicle safety standards are 

minimum standards; they do not and indeed cannot protect motor vehicle 

occupants against all conceivable hazards. Standard 301, for example, 

seeks to assure fire safety in several serious crash configurations, but 

it does not.assess safeguards against non-crash fires. Under the Vehicle 

Safety Act, a manufacturer must not only comply with all applicable 

safety standards, it must also remedy any safety-related 

defects—including those not related to aspects of performance covered by 

our safety standards. For example, an increased risk of fire caused by 

installation of new devices in the fuel system or by location of certain 

components of the fuel system could result in a defect determination, 

even if the fuel system complies with our safety standard for fuel system 

integrity. Responsible manufacturers, therefore, seek to design and test 

their vehicles to prevent potential safety defects, as well as to ensure 

compliance with NHTSA safety standards. 

Should EPA decide to require onboard vapor recovery systems, 1t appears 

that technological breakthroughs are probably not necessary to prevent 

any degradation of current levels of post-crash vehicle fire safety. 

However, our current assessments lead us to stress that adequate 

leadtimes must be provided so that the manufacturers can test for 

potential safety consequences and incorporate the safeguards necessary to 

reduce any such hazards associated with the emissions compliance strategy 

they select. 
P.5 

* 

4 

NHTSA's Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) data indicates that of the 

43,795 motor vehicle fatalities 1n 1985, approximately 1,500 (3.4t) were 

occupants of crashed vehicles in which fires occurred. Approximately 

1,40.0 vehicles covering every vehicle type were involved in these fatal 

crashes. Based on NHTSA's 1983 evaluation of FMVSS 301, we project that 

about 4,000 serious injuries and another 4,000 moderate to minor injuries 

were associated with these fire-involved fatal crashes. We have no 

information on the location or origin of these fires. 

NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation is currently investigating 13 

separate vehicle fire cases. Our experience in f1re-1nvolved defects 

investigations compels us to underscore the critical importance of 

providing the manufacturers with adequate leadtime to develop and test 

the added complexities of onboard recovery systems. For example, earlier 

this month, after having received over 150 reports of fuel expulsions and 

three reports of fires involving Ford Econoline E-350s, which are 

converted to ambulances, NHTSA asked both Ford and the final stage body 

manufacturers to voluntarily recall these vehicles. Ford and the 

ambulance manufacturers have announced a joint service campaign and are 

currently making "modification kits" for 1983 to 1987 Econoline E-350 

ambulances that should be ready for Installation by May 15. At the same 

time, NHTSA is still considering whether this campaign should be 

conducted 1n accordance with federal regulations. 

We believe that Ford's problem with "these converted E-350s 1s very much 

related to the generic problem of an Increase in the probability of risk 

whenever complexity 1s added to a given system. Much of the problem with 
P.6 

•* 

5 

these vehicles can be traced to high under-vehicle temperatures resulting 

from exhaust' system air pumps and closed-tank vent systems which were 

added in the past few years to meet federal emission requirements. The 

problem is further aggravated by the high vapor pressures of some 

currently available gasolines and modifications to the gasoline tank vent 

system undertaken by the ambulance body manufacturers. In short, the 

added complexity of onboard vapor recovery systems could negatively 

impact the safety of existing emissions control systems unless the 

manufacturers have adequate leadtime to design and test measures to 

safely accomodate such systems. NHTSA cannot make specific predictions 

about the safety consequences of EPA's draft proposal until the vehicle 

manufacturers select the design and hardware alternatives for such 

systems. 

We also note that, for the next several years, the automobile 

manufacturers will be directing a major portion of their safety resources 

(including staff, funds and physical facilities) to the development of 

occupant protection systems that meet the requirements of our vehicle 

safety standard on automatic crash protection, Safety Standard No. 208. 

Many companies have told us that their safety engineering resources are 

strained due to the need to tool-up for automatic restraint systems, and 

that their crash test facilities are operating at or near capacity. 

Accordingly, we believe it is essential that EPA's leadtime estimates to 

ensure the safety of onboard vapor recovery systems fully consider the 

other demands and constraints on the manufacturers due to the development 

of automatic restraint systems. 
P.7 

6 

In addition to regulating motor vehicle safety, NHTSA is responsible for 

setting automotive fuel economy standards for passenger cars and light 

trucks under Title V "of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings 

Act. Onboard vapor recovery systems could have some fuel economy 

implications, although we are uncertain at this time what these effects 

might be. The process of storing refueling vapors for later burning in 

the engine could result in an energy benefit. However, the added weight 

of vapor recovery systems could penalize fuel economy. The Issue of 

whether the weight penalty, would exceed the energy benefit of recovered 

vapors cannot be resolved without reference to specific hardware. The 

net effects of onboard vapor recovery systems, like other EPA 

requirements, would be taken into account 1n setting fuel economy 

standards, under section 502(e)(3) of the Act. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to sum up by reiterating that 

§202(a)(6) of the Clean Air Act requires EPA to make a determination of 

the feasibility and desirability of requiring new motor vehicles to 

utilize onboard vapor recovery systems. If EPA finds that 1t is feasible 

and desirable to employ onboard technology, the statute directs the 

agency, after consultation with DOT with respect to motor vehicle safety, 

to Issue standards requiring the use of such technology. Accordingly, 

NHTSA's role 1s limited to consulting on the motor vehicle safety aspects 

of onboard vapor recovery systems. We have neither the statutory 

authority nor the technical expertise to make recommendations or 

otherwise comment on various emissions control technologies. However, we 

are confident that EPA will take our views into account, along with 

Information from other sources, in developing any proposals or decisions 
P.8 

fi 

with regard to.onboard vapor recovery systems. 

As requested in your March 10 and April 7 letters to Secretary Dole, I 

have attached to this statement the detailed answers to the questions you 

addressed to NHTSA, the Coast Guard's discussion of the status of the 

National Research Council's study of maritime hydrocarbon vapor control 

systems, and FHWA's statement regarding highway sanctions under the Clean 

Air Act. 

This concludes my statement. I will be glad to try to answer the 

questions directed to NHTSA that you may have. Mr. Wybenga will try to 

answer any questions concerning marine vessel vapor recovery and 

will try to answer the questions directed to FHWA.