* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4.

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-50624 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee

v. RODOLFO LOPEZ-GONZALEZ, also known as Rudolfo Lopez Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:07-CR-128-ALL
Before WIENER, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Rodolfo Lopez-Gonzalez appeals hissentencefollowi ng conviction for being found illegally in the United States following a prior deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b). The government moved for summary affirmance, arguing that all of Lopez-Gonzalez’s arguments are foreclosed by our precedent or Supreme Court precedent. We agree with the government, and grant summary affirmance. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D April 17, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 07-50624

2 Lopez-Gonzalez argues that his sentence was unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) and United Statesv. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), because defendants in other districts receive sentences belowthe Guidelines’ range as a result offast-track departures. According to Lopez-Gonzalez, the district court should have taken into consideration the fact that the jurisdiction in which he
was sentenced did not provide for fast-track departures, and reduced his sentence to draw it in line with those jurisdictions that do offer fast-track options. Lopez-Gonzalez’s argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent. See United States v. Aguirre-Villa, 460 F.3d 681, 683 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3053 (2007), (holding that a district court’s refusal tofactor in the sentencing disparity caused by early disposition programs does not render a sentence unreasonable under Booker); see also United State s v. Gomez-Herrera, No. 07- 10153, )) F.3d )) , 2008 WL 886091 (5th Cir. April 3, 2008), (reaffirming Aguirre-Villa and holding that Kimbrough v. United States, 128S. Ct. 558 (2007) did not impact our decision in Aguirre-Villa). Lopez-Gonzalez argues that the district court erred by considering two of his convictions as separate offenses, when they should have been counted as a singleoffense in calculating hiscriminal history. Lopez -Gonzales was convicted of a robbery charge in 1997 and sentenced to probation. He was convicted and sentenced for aggravated battery in 2002, which violated his probation. LopezGonzales received his 2002 sentence and had has 1997 probation revoked in a consolidated sentence. Lopez-Gonzalez contends that the robbery and battery offenseswere related because they had been consolidated for sentencing. LopezGonzalez does not dispute that the sentences were imposed for factually distinct offenses, with separate arrests. When sentences for factually distinct offenses
are imposed “on the same day and/or in the same proceeding,” those offenses are not considered related under the sentencing guidelines manual § 4A1.2. U nited States v. Huskey, 137 F.3d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 1998). Further, it was the revocation of parole related to the 1997 offense, not the offense itself, that wasNo. 07-50624

3 consolidated with the 2002 offense for sentencing. The district court did not err in determining that Lopez-Gonzalez’sconvi ctions were unrelated for the purpose of calculating his criminal history. In light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Lopez-Gonzalez challenges the constitutionality of § 1326(b)’s treatment of prior felony and aggravated felony convictions as sentencing factors rather than elements of the offense that must be found by a jury. This argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1995). U nited States v. Pineda-Arrellano, 492 F.3d 624, 625 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 2008WL 59441 (Jan. 7, 2008) (No. 07-6202). Given the foregoing, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and its alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED as moot. The district court’s sentence is AFFIRMED.