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-- UNSCOM reports that it supervised the destruction of 48 Scud-type missiles, 10 mobile launchers,
30 chemical and 18 conventional warheads, and related equipment.

-- UNSCOM has verified Iraq's unilateral destruction of only 83 Scud-type missiles and nine mobile
launchers. Iraq has tried to account for the remainder by claiming the missiles were destroyed by
having fired in the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars, or used in static tests or for training.

Unmonitored unilateral destruction and discrepancies in Iraqi accounting suggest that Baghdad could
still have a small force of Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of warheads and
launchers. UNSCOM believes it has accounted for all but two of the original 819 Scud missiles
imported from the former Soviet Union. Iraq has not adequately explained the disposition of important
missile components that it could not produce on its own and may have removed before destruction.
There are still many gaps on the scope of Iraq's indigenous missile programs:

-- Iraq may have pieced together a small inventory of missiles by integrating guidance and control
systems it concealed with indigenously produced parts.

-- Iraq admitted producing Scud engines, airframes, and warheads before the war, but UNSCOM has
not verified claims that it destroyed all of these components.

-- Baghdad probably continues to receive some parts through clandestine procurement networks. In
1995, Jordan interdicted missile-guidance equipment (gyroscopes) bound for Iraq. Baghdad admitted
under UNSCOM questioning that it received a similar shipment earlier in 1995.

-- In November 1995, Iraq turned over a previously undeclared SS-21 short-range ballistic missile
launcher it acquired from Yemen before the Gulf war, illustrating Iraq's ability to conceal major
elements of missile systems from UNSCOM inspectors.

Baghdad has not given up its plans to build larger, longer-range missiles. UNSCOM has uncovered
numerous Iraqi design drawings, including multistage systems and clustered engine designs, that
theoretically could reach Western Europe. Inspectors have uncovered evidence that Iraq has
continued missile research since the imposition of sanctions. If sanctions were lifted, Iraq could
probably acquire enough material to resume full-scale production of Scud-type missiles, perhaps
within one year.

-- Iraq's Al-Samoud and Ababil-100 missile programs -- within the U.N.-allowed 150-km range limit --
serve to maintain production expertise within the constraints of sanctions. Iraq has apparently flight-
tested the Al-Samoud -- which UNSCOM describes as a scaled down Scud -- successfully. Iraq
probably will begin converting these programs into long-range production as soon as sanctions are
lifted.

-- Iraq continues to expand a missile production facility at Ibn Al Haytham -- currently used to support
its authorized missile programs. Two new fabrication buildings at the facility are spacious enough to
house the construction of large ballistic missiles.

-- Baghdad's claim that the buildings at Ibn al Haytham are intended to be computer and
administrative facilities is inconsistent with the facility's inherent size and capacity.

Nuclear Weapons

Iraq had a comprehensive nuclear weapons development program before the Gulf war that was
focused on building an implosion-type weapon. The program was linked to a ballistic missile project
that was the intended delivery system. After Husayn Kamil's defection in 1995, Iraq retreated from its
longtime claim that its nuclear program was intended only to conduct research:

-- Iraq admitted experimenting with seven uranium enrichment techniques and was most actively
pursuing electromagnetic isotope separation, gas centrifuge, and gas diffusion.

-- Baghdad planned to build a nuclear device in 1991 by using IAEA-safeguarded highly enriched
uranium from its Soviet-supplied reactors.

UNSCOM and IAEA inspections have hindered Iraq's nuclear program, but Baghdad's interest in

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Appendix B

Iraqi Chemical Warfare Program

CW Agent Stockpiles
CW Agent Chemical Agents Potential CW Agents Based on Comments

Declared by Lraq Unaccounted Precursors
Vx at least 4 metre tons DOU metric tors Iraq denied producing VX until Husayn Kamil’s
G Agents (Sarni 10010 150 metre tens 200 meine toms and bulk agents,
Mustard S00 10 P(X) metric tons 200 metric toms Figures include ooth weaponized and bulk agents.

CW Delivery Systems

Delivery System, Estimated Numbers Comments
Before the Gulf War Unaccounted For*
Missile Warhends 7510 100 45 0 UNSCOM superyined the destruction of 30 warheads.
Al Husayn (mocified Scud By
Rockets 100,04) 5,000 10 25.04 LINSCOM supervised the dectruction of nearly 40,000
g rockets, artillery. w
serial bombs) 28,000 of which were tilled
Actial Bombs 16,000, 2.000
Anillery Shelly 30.000 15,008
Avriat Spray Tass unknown unknown

“These estimates are very rough. They are derived fram repons pew
vided hy UNSCOM to the Security Council and to UNSCOM plenary
mectings. Gaps im [ragi disclosures strongly suggest thar Baghdad is
cancew ing chemical rranitions and precursors. [rag may alse tetaiey a
smiall stockpile of filled munitions. Baghdad has the capa
ickly resume CW production at Aaown dual-use facia
produce legitimate tems, suc Is and pesticides
SCOM has supervised the dest different types
CW precursors (1,800,000 Titers of Lguid

“AL of these munitions could be used to deliver CW or BW agents
numbers tor missile warhead
erally destruyed after having fi
all war, UNSCOM has been unable to verify the
these warheads

struction of

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Traqi Use of Chemical Weapons

Date Area Used Type Approximate Target
Casualties

August 1983 Hajj Umran Mustard fewer than 100

Oct November 1983 Panjwin 3,000

Febr arch 1984 Majnoon Island 2,500

Mar Al Basrah

March 1985 Hawizah Marsh

February 1986 Al Faw 8,000 to 10,000

December 1986 Umm ar Rasas reportedly in the thousands

April 1987 Al Basrah Mustard/Tabun 5,00

October 1987 Sumar/Mehran Mustard/nerve 3,000

March 1988 Halabjah Mustard/ne reportedly in the hundreds Iranians/Kurds
Iran also used chemicals at Halabjah that may have cauased some of the

casualties.

While precise information is lacking, human rights

received plau Kurdish villa
chemical attacks
frames—with ks as late as October 1988-—in areas close to both

ne Iranian and Turkish borders.

UNSCOM supervised the destruction of more than 40,000 CW munitions (28,000 filled and 12,000
empty), 480,000 liters of CW agents, 1,800,000 liters of chemical precursors, and eight different types
of delivery systems -- including ballistic missile warheads -- in the past six years. Following Husayn
Kamil's defection, Iraq disclosed that it:

-- Produced larger amounts of the nerve agent VX/7 than it previously admitted. Iraq acknowledged,
despite previous claims that it only conducted research, that it had conducted pilot production of
about 4 tons of VX from 1988 to 1990.

-- Researched in-flight mixing of binary CW weapons before the Gulf war -- an advance in the
development of a CW capability that extends the shelf life of chemical agents.

-- Perfected techniques for the large-scale production of a VX precursor that is well suited to long-
term storage.

UNSCOM believes Iraq continues to conceal a small stockpile of CW agents, munitions, and
production equipment. Baghdad has not supplied adequate evidence to support its claims that it
destroyed all of its CW agents and munitions. The destruction of as much as 200 metric tons of
chemical precursors, 70 Scud warheads, and tens of thousands of smaller unfilled munitions has not
been verified.

-- Baghdad retains the expertise to quickly resume CW production. In the absence of UNSCOM
inspectors, Iraq could restart limited mustard agent production with a few weeks, full-scale production
of sarin within a few months, and pre-Gulf war production levels -- including-VX -- within two or three
years.

-- Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt two facilities it once used to produce chemical agents and has
the capability to shift smaller civilian facilities to CW production.

Ballistic Missiles

Iraq had an active missile force before the Gulf war that included 819 operational Scud B missiles
(300-km range) purchased from the Soviet Union, an advanced program to extend the Scud's range
and modify its warhead (e.g., the Al-Husayn with a 650-km range and the Al Abbas with a 950-km
range), and an extensive effort to reverse-engineer and indigenously produce complete Scud
missiles. Iraq also had programs to indigenously produce long-range missiles (e.g., the Condor) that
never entered the production phase:

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acquiring or developing nuclear weapons has not diminished:

-- Iraq retains a large cadre of nuclear engineers, scientists, and technicians who are the foundation
of its nuclear program. We have concerns that scientists may be pursuing theoretical nuclear
research that would reduce the time required to produce a weapon should Iraq acquire sufficient
fissile material.

-- Iraq continues to withhold significant information about enrichment techniques, foreign
procurement, weapons design, and the role of Iraq's security and intelligence services in obtaining
external assistance and coordinating postwar concealment. Iraq continues to withhold documentation
on the technical achievements of its nuclear program, experimentation data, and accounting.

-- Baghdad has not fully explained the interaction between its nuclear program and its ballistic missile
program.

The Husayn Kamil Connection

Husayn Kamil Hasan al-Majid, Saddam's son-in-law, was the pre-eminent military industries official
and a fundamental player in Iraq's efforts to procure weapons of mass destruction before his
defection to Jordan in August 1995. A strict and capable manager, Kamil took charge of Iraq's efforts
to develop its WMD program around 1987. As the head of the Ministry of Industry and Military
Industrialization until 1990, he oversaw Iraq's nuclear weapons research, continued Iraq's
development of biological and chemical weapons, and supervised the successful development of the
Al-Husayn missile -- an indigenous modification of the Scud. During this time, it is possible that Kamil
directed Iraq's testing of its chemical and biological weapons on Iranian prisoners of war.

-- After the Gulf war, Kamil -- first from his position as Minister of Defense and then as the director of
the Ministry of Industry and Minerals and the Organization of Military Industrialization -- led Iraq's
efforts to conceal its WMD program from international inspectors.

-- Husayn Kamil's influence over the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program did not end with his
defection in 1995. For instance, he is largely responsible for using Saddam's security services -- of
which he was a member in the early 1980s -- to hide proscribed materials and documents from the
United Nations.

Despite Kamil's influence, the Iraqi WMD program did not die with his defection and subsequent
murder, as Iraq claims it did. Qusay Husayn -- Saddam's second son -- has assumed many of the
responsibilities for concealing the proscribed programs. In addition, many of the leading scientists in
Iraq's WMD programs during Husayn Kamil's tenure are still associated with the regime:

-- Lt. Gen. Amir Hamud Sadi -- who serves officially as a presidential adviser and is a leading official
in Iraqi relations with UNSCOM -- was one of the principal engineers in the WMD program and
essentially served as Husayn Kamil's deputy. With a doctorate in chemical engineering, Sadi has
dedicated his entire career to conventional and non-conventional weapons development. In 1987,
Sadi received rare public praise from Saddam for his role in the development of the Al-Husayn
missile.

-- Humam Abd al-Khaliq Abd al-Ghafur -- currently Minister of Culture and Information -- is Iraq's
leading nuclear official and the former head of its nuclear program. Abd al-Ghafur also was a close
associate of Husayn Kamil, and he occasionally serves as an interlocutor with the IAEA, leading an
Iraqi delegation to the IAEA annual conference in October 1997.

-- Jafar Dia Jafar is perhaps Iraq's foremost nuclear scientist and served as Abd al-Ghafur's deputy in
the Iraqi Atomic Energy Organization. Jafar now officially serves as a presidential adviser, but his
position -- unlike that of Sadi -- appears to be largely nominal.

-- Dr. Rihab Taha is the leading official in charge of Iraq's biological weapons program. She has
overseen Iraqi efforts to develop anthrax and botulinum toxin and directed testing on animal subjects.
Taha is also politically well-connected -- she is married to the Minister of Oil, Amir Rashid Ubaydi,
who helps direct Iraqi relations with UNSCOM.

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Appendix C

Iraqi Ballistic Missile Program

Soviet-Supplied Scud Missiles 819
(includes Iraqi modifications of the

Scud: the Al-Husayn with a range of 650 km

and the Al-Abbas with a range of 950 km)

Iragi-Produced Scud Missiles Unknown,

UNSCOM accepts Iragi accounting for all but two of the original
819 Scud missiles acquired from the Soviet Union. Iraq has not
explained the disposition of major components that it may have
stripped from operational missiles before their destruction, and some
Iraqi claims—such as the use of 14 Scuds in ATBM tests—are not
believable. Gaps in Iraqi declarations and Baghdad’s failure to fully
account for indigenous missile programs strongly suggest that [rag
retains a small missile force

Iraq denied producing a completed Scud missile, but it produced/pro-
cured and tested all major subcomponents

Iragi-Produced Scud Warheads 120

Iragi-Produced Scud Airframes

Iragi-Produced Scud Engines 80

Soviel-Supplied Missile Launchers W

Iraq claims all 120 were used or destroyed. UNSCOM supervised the
destruction of 15. Recent UNSCOM inspections found additional
CW/BW warheads beyond those currently admitted.

Irag claims testing two indigenous airframes in 1990. It is unlikely
that Iraq produced only two Scud airframes.

Iraq's claim that it melted 63 engines following acceptance tests—
$3 of which failed quality controls—are unverifiable and not
believable. UNSCOM is holding this as an open issue.

UNSCOM doubts Iraq’s claim that it unilaterally destroyed five
launchers. The Soviet Union may have sold more than the declared
U1 launchers.

Traqi-Produced Missile Launchers 8

Iraq has the capability to produce additional launchers.

February 13, 1998
(End text)

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Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

U.S. Government White Paper, released February 13, 1998

Overview

The Gulf War damaged Saddam Hussein's biological, chemical, ballistic missile, and nuclear
weapons programs, collectively referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The U.N. Special
Commission (UNSCOM) was established by the Security Council and accepted by Iraq following the
war to eliminate and verify the destruction of Iraq's biological, chemical, and ballistic missile
programs. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assumed responsibility for dismantling
Iraq's nuclear program. Further, the United Nations established sanctions to prevent the purchase of
equipment and materials needed to reconstitute Baghdad's WMD programs and inspections to find
remaining elements of these programs and deter further research or production related to WMD.

On the basis of the last seven years’ experience, the world's experts conclude that enough production
components and data remain hidden and enough expertise has been retained or developed to enable
Iraq to resume development and production of WMD. They believe Iraq maintains a small force of
Scud-type missiles, a small stockpile of chemical and biological munitions, and the capability to
quickly resurrect biological and chemical weapons production.

This conclusion is borne out by gaps and inconsistencies in Iraq's WMD declarations, Iraq's continued
obstruction of UNSCOM inspections and monitoring activities, Saddam's efforts to increase the
number of "sensitive" locations exempt from inspection, and Saddam's efforts to end inspections
entirely. Collectively, the evidence strongly suggests that Baghdad has hidden remnants of its WMD
programs and is making every effort to preserve them. Baghdad has also enhanced indigenous
capabilities and infrastructure to design and produce WMD. Saddam's strategy in dealing with
UNSCOM is unchanged: he is actively trying to retain what remains of his WMD programs while
wearing down the will of the Security Council to maintain sanctions.

UNSCOM and IAEA inspections and monitoring activities have severely curtailed Iraq's WMD
programs, but even a small residual force of operational missiles armed with biological or chemical
warheads would pose a serious threat to neighboring countries and US military forces in the region.
lraq has demonstrated its capability to employ other delivery systems. Saddam has used such
weapons for tactical military purposes against Iran, and to suppress rebellious segments of his
population in Kurdish-held areas.

Assessment of Cooperation With UNSCOM and the IAEA

Baghdad has a long history of obstructing UNSCOM inspections and has taken an increasingly hard
line since March 1996 when the United Nations began inspecting security facilities suspected of

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Appendix A

Traqi Biological Warfare Program

BW Agent Production Amounts*

BW Agent (Organism) Declared Concentrated — Declared Total Comments
Amounts Amounts
Anthrax 8,500 liters 85,000 liters UNSCOM estimates production amounts were actually
(Bacillus anthracis) (2,245 gallons) (22,457 gallons) three to four times more than the declared amounts, but
is unable to confirm. a
Botulinum toxin 19,400 liters 380,000 liters UNSCOM estimates production amounts were actually
(Clostridium botulinum) (10x and 20x concentrated) (100,396 gallons) two times more than the declared amounts, but is unable
: (5,125 gallons) - to confirm.
Gas Gangrene 340 liters 3,400 liters Production amounts could be higher, but UNSCOM is
(Clostridium perfringens) (90 gallons) (900 gallons) unable to confirm.
Afiatoxin NA 2.200 liters Production amounts and time frame of production
(Aspergillus flavus and (581 gallons) claimed by Irag do not correlate.
Aspergillus parasiticus)
Ricin NA 10 Liters Production amounts could be higher, but UNSCOM is
(Castor Bean plant) (2.7 gallons) unable to confirm,
BW-Filled and Deployed Delivery Systems
Delivery System Anthrax Botulinum Toxin Affatoxin Comments
“Missile warheads 5 16 UNSCOM cannot confirm the unilateral
Al-Husayn (moditied Scud B) destruction of these 25 warheads due to
conflicting accounts provided by Iraq,
R-400 aerial bombs sO 100 7 Trag claimed unilateral destruction of
157 bombs, but UNSCOM is unable to
confirm this number. UNSCOM has
found the remains of at least 23,
Aircraft aerosol spray tanks 4 Iraq claims to have produced four, but
F-1 Mirage modified fuel drop tank may have manufactured others.
BW Agent Growth Media"
Media ‘Quantity Imported Unaceounted For Amounts
BW Agent Growth Media 37,000 kg 3,500 kg
(68,200 Ibs) (7,700 Ibs)

"Tonal refers to amount of material obtained from the production
process, while concentrated refers to the amount of concentrated
agent obtained after final filtration/porification. The concentrated

number is the amount used to fill munitions.

"Media refers to the substance used to provide nutrients for the

growth and multiplication of micro-organisms.

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concealing WMD-related documents and material. UNSCOM is targeting these facilities because Iraq
admitted after Husayn Kamil -- Saddam's son-in-law and former head of Iraqi military industries --
defected in August 1995 that security organizations were involved in concealing material from the
United Nations:

-- Resolution 687 demanded that Iraq provide declarations on all aspects of its WMD programs 15
days after the Security Council enacted the resolution in 1991. Nearly seven years later, gaps and
inconsistencies remain in each of Iraq's WMD declarations covering chemical, biological, nuclear, and
missile programs.

-- Baghdad has modified each declaration several times to accommodate data uncovered by
UNSCOM of the IAEA and provides new information only when confronted with direct evidence. For
example, Baghdad revised its nuclear declaration to the IAEA four times within 14 months of its initial
submission in April 1991 and has formally submitted six different biological warfare declarations to
date, each of which UNSCOM has rejected.

Baghdad has sought to constrain UNSCOM from inspecting numerous facilities since March 1996,
mostly by declaring the sites "sensitive" and the inspections a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. Iraq has
applied the term "sensitive" to a variety of facilities -- on one occasion security officials declared a
road sensitive. Most consistently, Iraq has sought to limit U.N. access to Special Republican Guard
garrisons that are responsible for executing the highest priorities of Saddam's inner circle:

-- Iraq is trying to keep the whole WMD story out of reach. UNSCOM and the IAEA have detected
Iraqi officials removing documents and material from buildings, and even burning documents to
prevent them from being evaluated. Inspectors have routinely found high-interest facilities cleaned out
after their entry was delayed for several hours.

-- Baghdad is interested in debilitating UNSCOM's ability to monitor elements it has declared. Iraq
disabled monitoring cameras and hid production equipment after expelling US inspectors from the
country in November 1997.

-- Iraqi officials have interfered with inspection operations. Iraqi escort have endangered U.N.
helicopter flights supporting inspections by harassing the pilot and grabbing the flight controls.
Security guards have harassed inspectors on the ground.

Baghdad has tried to generate a public impression of cooperation while working hard to conceal
essential information on the scope and capabilities of its WMD programs. It has allowed UNSCOM to
monitor dormant WMD production facilities and has provided incomplete documentary evidence to
support its claims. For example, Iraq dramatically disclosed nearly 700,000 pages of WMD-related
documents following Husayn Kamil's defection. Sparse relevant information was buried within a
massive volume of extraneous data all of which was intended to create the appearance of candor and
to overwhelm UNSCOM's analytic resources:

-- For example, Iraq released detailed records of how many ball-point pens it ordered in the late
1980s, but it has not provided records of how it procured biological precursors or supported claims
that it destroyed missile warheads capable of delivering biological and chemical agents.

-- UNSCOM and the IAEA have examined much of the documentary material and concluded that,
despite advertisements to the contrary, Iraq did not release its most important WMD-related
documents.

Biological Weapons

No concrete information on the scope of Iraq's biological warfare program was available until August
1995, when Iraq disclosed, after Husayn Kamil's defection, the existence of an offensive biological
warfare (BW) capability. Iraqi officials admitted that they had produced the BW agents anthrax/1
(8,500 liters), botulinum toxin/2 (19,000 liters), and aflatoxin/3 (2,200 liters) after years of claiming that
they had conducted only defensive research. Baghdad also admitted preparing BW-filled munitions --
including 25 Scud missile warheads (five - anthrax, 16 - botulinum toxin, four - aflatoxin), aerial bombs
(157), and aerial dispensers -- during the Gulf war, although it did not use them. Iraq acknowledged
researching the use of 155mm artillery shells, artillery rockets, a MiG-21 drone, and aerosol
generators to deliver BW agents:

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-- UNSCOM has destroyed a range of BW production equipment, seed stocks, and growth media
claimed by Iraq for use in its BW programs.

-- UNSCOM believes Iraq has greatly understated its production of biological agents, and could be
holding back such agents which are easily concealed.

Iraq resisted dismantling the Al Hakam BW production facility for nearly one year after disclosing in
1995 that it manufactured more than 500,000 liters of BW agents at the facility between 1989 and
1990. UNSCOM finally pressed Iraq to destroy Al Hakam in the summer of 1996:

-- Baghdad claimed that Al Hakam was a legitimate civilian facility designed to produce single-cell
proteins and biopesticides.

-- Al Hakam's remote location (55 km southwest of Baghdad) and the security involved in its
construction suggest that Al Hakam was intended to be a BW production facility from the outset.

Baghdad has provided no hard evidence to support claims that it destroyed all of its BW agents and
munitions in 1991. UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler stated that Iraq's most recent BW declaration,
submitted in September 1997, "failed to give a remotely credible account of Iraq's biological weapons
program:"

-- In late 1995, Iraq acknowledged weapons testing on Ricin, but did not provide details on the
amount produced. In early 1997, two years later, UNSCOM discovered documents that showed Iraq
had produced the biological agent Ricin.

-- Iraq has the expertise to quickly resume a small-scale BW program at known facilities that currently
produce legitimate items such as vaccines and other pharmaceuticals. Without effective U.N.
monitoring, Baghdad could probably begin production within a few days. For example, Iraq can
convert production of biopesticides to anthrax simply by changing seed material.

Chemical Weapons

Iraq had an advanced chemical warfare (CW) capability that it used extensively against Iran and
against its own Kurdish population during the 1980s. Iraqi forces delivered chemical agents (including
Mustard 5 agent and the nerve agents Sarin and Tabun/6) in aerial bombs, aerial spray dispensers,
120-mm rockets, and several types of artillery both for tactical military purposes and to terrorize
rebellious segments of the population. Iraq maintained large stockpiles of chemical munitions and had
a major production capacity.

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