U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1

99–118 ★ (STAR PRINT) 

" SENATE ! 107TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

TREATY DOC. 

2002

107–8

THE MOSCOW TREATY

MESSAGE

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TRANSMITTING

THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS, SIGNED AT MOSCOW ON MAY 24, 2002

JUNE 20, 2002.—Treaty was read the first time, and together with the 

accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate 


E:\Seals\Congress.#13
(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

THE WHITE HOUSE, June 20, 2002. 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to 

ratification, the Treaty Between the United States of America and 

the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, signed 

at Moscow on May 24, 2002 (the ‘‘Moscow Treaty’’). 

The Moscow Treaty represents an important element of the new 

strategic relationship between the United States and Russia. It will 

take our two nations along a stable, predictable path to substantial 

reductions in our deployed strategic nuclear warhead arsenals by 

December 31, 2012. When these reductions are completed, each 

country will be at the lowest level of deployed strategic nuclear 

warheads in decades. This will benefit the peoples of both the 

United States and Russia and contribute to a more secure world. 

The Moscow Treaty codifies my determination to break through 

the long impasse in further nuclear weapons reductions caused by 

the inability to finalize agreements through traditional arms control efforts. In the decade following the collapse of the Soviet 

Union, both countries’ strategic nuclear arsenals remained far larger than needed, even as the United States and Russia moved toward a more cooperative relationship. On May 1, 2001, I called for 

a new framework for our strategic relationship with Russia, including further cuts in nuclear weapons to reflect the reality that the 

Cold War is over. On November 13, 2001, I announced the United 

States plan for such cuts—to reduce our operationally deployed 

strategic nuclear warheads to a level of between 1700 and 2200 

over the next decade. I announced these planned reductions following a careful study within the Department of Defense. That 

study, the Nuclear Posture Review, concluded that these force levels were sufficient to maintain the security of the United States. 

In reaching this decision, I recognized that it would be preferable 

for the United States to make such reductions on a reciprocal basis 

with Russia, but that the United States would be prepared to proceed unilaterally. 

My Russian counterpart, President Putin, responded immediately 

and made clear that he shared these goals. President Putin and I 

agreed that our nations’ respective reductions should be recorded 

in a legally binding document that would outlast both of our presidencies and provide predictability over the longer term. The result 

is a Treaty that was agreed without protracted negotiations. This 

Treaty fully meets the goals I set out for these reductions. 

It is important for there to be sufficient openness so that the 

United States and Russia can each be confident that the other is 

fulfilling its reductions commitment. The Parties will use the comVerDate Jun 13 2002 23:04 Jul 18, 2002 Jkt 099118 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 7633 Sfmt 7633 E:\HR\OC\TD008.107 pfrm17 PsN: TD008
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prehensive verification regime of the Treaty on the Reduction and 

Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the ‘‘START Treaty’’) to 

provide the foundation for confidence, transparency, and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions. In our Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship between the United 

States and Russia, President Putin and I also decided to establish 

a Consultative Group for Strategic Security to be chaired by Foreign and Defense Ministers. This body will be the principal mechanism through which the United States and Russia strengthen mutual confidence, expand transparency, share information and plans, 

and discuss strategic issues of mutual interest. 

The Moscow Treaty is emblematic of our new, cooperative relationship with Russia, but it is neither the primary basis for this relationship nor its main component. The United States and Russia 

are partners in dealing with the threat of terrorism and resolving 

regional conflicts. There is growing economic interaction between 

the business communities of our two countries and ever-increasing 

people-to-people and cultural contacts and exchanges. The U.S. 

military has put Cold War practices behind it, and now plans, 

sizes, and sustains its forces in recognition that Russia is not an 

enemy, Russia is a friend. Military-to-military and intelligence exchanges are well established and growing. 

The Moscow Treaty reflects this new relationship with Russia. 

Under it, each Party retains the flexibility to determine for itself 

the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, and 

how reductions are made. This flexibility allows each Party to determine how best to respond to future security challenges. 

There is no longer the need to narrowly regulate every step we 

each take, as did Cold War treaties founded on mutual suspicion 

and an adversarial relationship. 

In sum, the Moscow Treaty is clearly in the best interests of the 

United States and represents an important contribution to U.S. national security and strategic stability. I therefore urge the Senate 

to give prompt and favorable consideration to the Treaty, and to 

advise and consent to its ratification.

GEORGE W. BUSH. 

(V)

LETTER OF SUBMITTAL 

THE SECRETARY OF STATE, 

Washington. 

The PRESIDENT, The White House. 

MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 

Strategic Offensive Reductions (the Moscow Treaty), signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002. 

INTRODUCTION

The Moscow Treaty marks a new era in the relationship between 

the United States and Russia. This short, legally binding document 

codifies in a flexible manner both countries’ commitment to make 

deep strategic offensive reductions. It facilitates the transition from 

strategic rivalry to a genuine strategic partnership based on the 

principles of mutual security, trust, openness, cooperation and predictability. The Moscow Treaty is one important element of a new 

strategic framework, which involves a broad array of cooperative 

efforts in political, economic and security areas. 

BACKGROUND

The Moscow Treaty codifies the deep reductions that you announced during the November 2001 Washington/Crawford Summit 

and President Putin announced at that time and a month later. It 

reflects the shared desire to conclude a legally binding document 

that would outlast both of your presidencies and to provide openness and predictability over the longer term in this important area 

of the U.S.-Russian relationship. The transition to a relationship 

based on mutual trust and cooperation enabled us to conclude an 

agreement in months, not years. At the same time, the Treaty affords flexibility to each Party to meet unforeseen future contingencies, while avoiding unnecessary restrictions on either Party’s 

forces or activities. 

REDUCTION REQUIREMENTS

The United States and Russia both intend to carry out strategic 

offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with 

their national security requirements and alliance obligations, and 

reflecting the new nature of their strategic relations. The Treaty 

requires the United States and Russia to reduce and limit their 

strategic nuclear warheads to 1700–2200 each by December 31, 

2012, a reduction of nearly two-thirds below current levels. The 

United States intends to implement the Treaty by reducing its 

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operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1700–2200 

through removal of warheads from missiles in their launchers and 

from heavy bomber bases, and by removing some missiles, launchers, and bombers from operational service. 

For purposes of this Treaty, the United States considers operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to be reentry vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in their launchers, reentry vehicles on submarine-launched ballistic missiles 

(SLBMs) in their launchers onboard submarines, and nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage 

areas of heavy bomber bases. In addition, a small number of spare 

strategic nuclear warheads (including spare ICBM warheads) are 

located at heavy bomber bases. The United States does not consider these spares to be operationally deployed strategic nuclear 

warheads. In the context of this Treaty, it is clear that only ‘‘nuclear’’ reentry vehicles, as well as nuclear armaments, are subject 

to the 1700–2200 limit. 

RELATIONSHIP TO START

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) continues in force 

unchanged by this Treaty. In accordance with its own terms, 

START will remain in force until December 5, 2009, unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement or extended. 

START’s comprehensive verification regime will provide the foundation for confidence, transparency and predictability in further 

strategic offensive reductions. As noted in the May 24 Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship, other supplementary 

measures, including transparency measures, may be agreed in the 

future. 

BILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION COMMISSION

The Treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission 

(BIC), a diplomatic consultative forum that will meet at least twice 

a year to discuss issues related to implementation of the Treaty. 

The BIC will be separate and distinct from the Consultative Group 

for Strategic Security, established by the Joint Declaration of May 

24, which will be chaired by Foreign and Defense Ministers with 

the participation of other senior officials. 

ENTRY INTO FORCE; DURATION; RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL

The Treaty will enter into force on the date of the exchange of 

instruments of ratification. It is to remain in force until December 

31, 2012, and may be extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement. 

The Treaty also provides that each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw from the Treaty upon three 

months’ written notice to the other Party. 

STATUS OF START II TREATY

The START II Treaty, which was signed in 1993, and to which 

the Senate gave its advice and consent in 1996, never entered into 

force because Russia placed unacceptable conditions on its own 

ratification of START II. Russia’s explicit linkage of START II to 

VII

preservation of the ABM Treaty and entry into force of several 

agreements, signed in 1997, which related to ABM Treaty succession and ABM/TMD demarcation, made it impossible for START II 

to enter into force. With signature of the Moscow Treaty, the 

United States and Russia have now taken a decisive step beyond 

START II. 

CONCLUSION

Accompanying this report is an article-by-article analysis of the 

Treaty. By deeply reducing operationally deployed strategic nuclear 

warheads while preserving each Party’s flexibility to meet unforeseen future contingencies, the Moscow Treaty will enhance the national security of the United States. I strongly recommend its 

transmission to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification at 

the earliest possible date. 

Respectfully submitted, 

COLIN L. POWELL. 

Enclosures: As stated. 

(1)


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