United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

September 1995 WEAPONS OF MASS

DESTRUCTION

DOD Reporting on

Cooperative Threat

Reduction Assistance

Can Be Improved

GAO/NSIAD-95-191

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-259294 

September 29, 1995

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Sam Nunn

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

As called for in section 1203 of the National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 1995, we reviewed the Department of Defense’s (DOD) report

accounting for Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program assistance

provided to the former Soviet Union (FSU) to determine whether DOD had

• made progress in auditing and examining CTR aid,

• listed its planned audit and examination activities to be carried out during

fiscal year 1995,

• included a list describing the current location and condition of

CTR-provided assistance, and

• provided a basis for determining whether the assistance was being used

for the purposes intended.

Background Since 1991, Congress has authorized DOD to help the FSU republics

(1) destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction

(including strategic nuclear delivery vehicles); (2) transport, store, and

safeguard such weapons in connection with their destruction; and

(3) prevent the proliferation of such weapons. DOD manages the various

CTR projects aimed at assisting Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and

Ukraine—the four republics that inherited the FSU’s weapons of mass

destruction.1

 Congress authorized $1.25 billion for the CTR program

1

Beginning in fiscal year 1996, DOD will transfer management and oversight responsibilities of nine

CTR projects to other executive branch agencies. Specifically, those projects designed to improve

nuclear material protection, control, and accountability will be transferred to the Department of

Energy. The Department of State will assume responsibility for the International Science and

Technology Center and, in conjunction with the Department of Commerce, will manage the projects

for improving export controls.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-95-191 Weapons of Mass Destruction
B-259294 

through fiscal year 1995, and DOD plans to request $735 million for fiscal

years 1996 and 1997.

Section 1203 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

1995 required that DOD (1) provide a report accounting for CTR assistance

no later than January 5, 1995, (2) list CTR assistance provided before the

date of the report, (3) describe the current location and condition of the

assistance, (4) determine whether the assistance has been used for its

intended purpose, and (5) describe activities to be carried out during fiscal

year 1995 for auditing and examining CTR-provided assistance.

Although the act required that DOD issue a report only for 1995, Congress is

now considering legislation requiring DOD to provide an annual report

accounting for CTR aid.2

 In October 1994, we reported that DOD had not yet

begun implementing an audit and examination process for the CTR

program,3 but in June 1995 we were able to report that DOD had made some

initial progress toward auditing and examining CTR aid.4

Results in Brief DOD made some progress in the CTR program’s first year of audit and

examination activities. DOD has worked to resolve recipient nations’

concerns over audit and examination implementing procedures;

conducted five audits at sites in three countries as of July 1995, which

indicated that the CTR-provided assistance at these sites was accounted for

and was being used for the purposes intended; and planned an audit every

month of other CTR-provided assistance through the end of fiscal year

1995. However, in reviewing DOD’s report to Congress, we found the

following shortcomings:

• The report does not fully present all of DOD’s audit and examination

activities for fiscal year 1995, as required, and does not describe how DOD

plans such activities.

• The report does not describe the condition of the assistance, as required,

and contains outdated and inaccurate listings of CTR assistance deliveries.

While the report is dated January 5, 1995, it was not issued until May 31,

1995. Moreover, the list of CTR deliveries that the report includes is dated

2

Section 1107 of H.R. 1530 as passed by the House of Representatives in June 1995.

3

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet Union (GAO/NSIAD-95-7,

Oct. 6, 1994).

4

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet Union—An Update

(GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 9, 1995).

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-191 Weapons of Mass Destruction
B-259294 

February 2, 1995. After that date and through May 1995, DOD delivered CTR

aid worth over $38 million.

• The limited number of projects DOD reviewed raises questions about the

basis for DOD’s programwide determination that CTR assistance—with one

classified exception—has been accounted for and used for its intended

purpose. According to DOD’s report, this determination was based on

information on 9 of the 23 projects for which CTR-provided assistance was

being used. Of these nine projects, only three had actually been audited.

Other sources of information for the projects included random

observations by U.S. technical teams, recipient-provided data, and national

technical means.

DOD Has Made

Progress in Auditing

and Evaluating CTR

Aid

DOD has made progress in auditing and evaluating CTR aid and is addressing

recipient concerns regarding the implementation of its audit and

evaluation rights. Agreements with each of the four recipient nations give

the United States the right to examine the use of any CTR-provided

material, training, or other services and to inspect any related records or

documents. DOD has the right to audit and examine each CTR project upon

30 days advance notice.5

 In commenting on our draft report, DOD noted

that discussions are continuing with both the Russians and the Ukrainians

to ensure the smooth conduct of CTR audits and examinations. While

acknowledging the fundamental right of DOD to conduct audits, Russia and

Ukraine have recently recommended that additional arrangements be

agreed upon with DOD.

Personnel from DOD’s On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), along with relevant

DOD technical and policy experts, will conduct the audits and examinations

for most CTR projects. The DOD Under Secretary for International Security

Policy, the Defense Nuclear Agency, and CTR program managers are to

review the results of the audits.

Audit and Examination

Plan

DOD’s report also refers to a DOD CTR audit and examination plan prepared

in mid-1994. This plan outlines the process and support requirements for a

planned audit of armored blankets in Russia. Devised as a template for

conducting future audits, the plan establishes the composition and

operation of audit and examination teams and details the administrative

procedures for implementing the examinations.

5

Implementing agreements with Russia specify that CTR projects can be audited up to three times each

calendar year.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-191 Weapons of Mass Destruction
B-259294 

Although the plan sets specific criteria for an audit of the armored

blankets, it does not establish overall evaluation criteria for all audits and

examinations. The plan states that DOD shall establish criteria for each

audit of CTR-provided assistance. DOD did not prepare written audit plans

establishing criteria for the audits and examinations conducted in Belarus,

Russia, and Ukraine. DOD indicated that a primary goal of the audit and

examination process was to determine if the assistance was being used for

the purposes intended and that it was unrealistic to devise a written plan

for each audit. DOD program officials told us that DOD policy officials had

given them oral guidance regarding the criteria for these examinations.

DOD explained that in preparing for each audit and examination, criteria

developed among the CTR program office, technical representatives, and

OSIA are discussed during team preparation and briefings. However, there

is no record of what specific criteria were to be used.

Furthermore, the plan stipulates that DOD shall establish criteria for

judging whether or not assistance has been used exclusively for its

intended purpose. According to a DOD official, the standard of exclusive

use refers to the language in various CTR implementing agreements, which

state that the assistance provided is to be used only for its intended

purpose. While the plan cites specific criteria and indicators for

determining whether the armored blankets have been used (for example,

worn spots, folds, and rips), the criteria and indicators do not appear

sufficient to support a determination of exclusive use of the blankets or

other CTR-provided assistance. DOD officials also told us that the oral

criteria provided for conducting the audits and examinations described

below, as well as future audits, were not directed toward establishing

exclusive use of the CTR-provided assistance.

Russia After a 10-month delay, DOD officials audited CTR-provided assistance in

May 1995. DOD had planned to conduct its first CTR audit and examination

in Russia in July 1994. However, after DOD notified Russia of its intended

audit and examination, the Russians raised questions over U.S.

implementation procedures. In March 1995, DOD officials met with the

Russians to clarify how DOD would conduct the audits and examinations

and provided assurances that the audits differed from arms control

verification measures. DOD then scheduled and conducted the May audit of

CTR-provided railcar conversion kits, which are designed to enhance the

safety and security of transporting nuclear weapons and material. During

this audit, DOD officials observed 8 modified railcars and 32 uninstalled

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-191 Weapons of Mass Destruction
B-259294 

kits, inventoried a sample of items, and reviewed documents accounting

for all 115 kits delivered.

In the interim, the Defense Contract Audit Agency conducted a financial

audit of the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow in

March 1995. This audit concluded that the Center’s financial reports

accurately reflected its financial condition.

Ukraine Although Ukraine also objected to DOD’s proposed audit and examination

implementing procedures, DOD officials met with Ukrainian officials in

May 1995 to address their concerns. In June 1995, DOD officials audited

(1) the government-to-government communications link used to transmit

notification data under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty

and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and (2) initial support

assistance used to help deactivate and return nuclear warheads to Russia.

The audit included an examination of fuel usage and accountability, issues

of concern to DOD in 1994. The audit team concluded that the assistance

was accounted for and that it was used for the purposes intended.

Belarus DOD conducted its first CTR audit and examination in Belarus in

January 1995. DOD audit and examination team members examined the

continuous communication link equipment designed to relay notification

data, as required under the INF treaty and START, and found that all

equipment was accounted for.

Report Does Not

Include All Planned

Audit Activities

DOD’s report refers to three planned audits and examinations for the

remainder of fiscal year 1995—two in Ukraine and one in Kazakhstan.

However, at the time the report was issued, DOD officials had planned and

budgeted for more audits through the end of fiscal year 1995 and even

through the end of fiscal year 1996. Their plan includes several more

audits and examinations than are mentioned in the report for the

remainder of fiscal year 1995, including audits of training centers in

Belarus and communications link equipment in Kazakhstan, and

considerably more audits before the end of fiscal year 1996. The projected

schedule details what projects are to be audited, when the audits will

occur, and estimates how much the audits will cost. DOD officials stated

that the schedule could be modified to accommodate additional audits, if

warranted.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-191 Weapons of Mass Destruction
B-259294 

Report Lacks

Information on

Equipment Condition

and Current

Deliveries

While DOD’s report states where CTR-provided equipment is to be used, it

does not provide information, as required, on the condition of

CTR-provided equipment and contains an outdated and inaccurate listing of

CTR assistance deliveries. Information on the condition of CTR-funded

hardware could be important because equipment maintenance is provided

as part of CTR assistance. For example, if the cranes used for

dismantlement efforts in Russia and Ukraine are not maintained, they will

not function properly. DOD officials acknowledged that the report lacks the

required condition information but provided no explanation. In

commenting on a draft of this report, DOD indicated that equipment

condition would be addressed in the future by each audit and examination

team.

The CTR delivery information in the report is dated February 2, 1995,

although the report was not issued until May 1995. DOD officials told us

that internal delays prevented the timely release of the report. However,

between February and May 1995, DOD delivered CTR aid worth over

$38 million. This aid represents nearly half the dollar value of all CTR

assistance delivered through May 31, 1995. Further, the report does not

include all items that were delivered by February 2, 1995. Among the

deliveries omitted were items that DOD alluded to elsewhere in the report.

For example, DOD cites the audit and examination of the continuous

communications link in Belarus and the railcar modification kits in Russia

as examples of how it accounts for CTR-provided assistance. This

equipment, however, does not appear on DOD’s list of CTR assistance

deliveries.

Program officials told us that they had more recent and informative data

available to them than when the report was provided to Congress on 

May 31. CTR officials maintain and update a database that includes current

and more detailed information than is in the report, including the dollar

value of the CTR equipment being provided. According to DOD officials, a

conscious policy decision was made not to update the report before its

release on May 31. However, the report was modified somewhat to include

the three audits and examinations conducted between January 5, 1995, the

date on the report, and May 31, 1995, when the report was issued.

Appendixes I through IV contain a list of CTR assistance deliveries through

June 8, 1995, to Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-191 Weapons of Mass Destruction
B-259294 

End-Use

Determination Based

on Limited Evidence

DOD determined and reported that it is reasonably confident that CTR

assistance is being properly accounted for and used for the purposes

intended, with one exception.6

 According to its report, DOD believes that it

has confirmed the delivery and appropriate use of a significant portion of

assistance through two audits and examinations of delivered assistance,

one financial audit, observations by U.S. technical teams, and classified

sources.7

 However, we question how DOD could determine that assistance

had been accounted for and used for its intended purpose given the

limited information in its report.

As of May 31, 1995, when DOD provided its report to Congress, DOD had

delivered equipment for 23 CTR projects in the FSU. By that date, it had

completed only two audits and examinations of CTR-provided

assistance—a mid-January 1995 audit of the continuous communications

link equipment in Belarus and a May 1995 audit of railcar conversion kits

in Russia. Also, a financial audit of the International Science and

Technology Center in Russia was completed in March 1995. None of these

audits had been completed by January 5, 1995, the report’s due date.

In its report, DOD also cites as a basis for its determination the

observations of U.S. technical teams charged with defining project

requirements, delivering equipment, providing services, and monitoring

contractors’ performance. Although DOD notes several examples of

technical team observations, the report says that such random

observations are not a systematic means of accounting for CTR aid. In

addition, although the DOD report provides a variety of information

sources, it cites fewer than half of the 23 projects for which CTR-provided

assistance was being used and does not connect the source with the

assistance.

Recommendations The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 required that

DOD issue a report in 1995. If Congress decides to require the Secretary of

Defense to submit similar reports in the future, we recommend that the

Secretary of Defense take steps to ensure that such reports (1) contain

current and complete data on CTR assistance deliveries, including the

current condition of the equipment provided; (2) integrate available

sources of information on CTR assistance to show what assistance is

accounted for and is used for its intended purpose; (3) link this

6

Details of this one incident are classified.

7

DOD notes that it has also used data gathered from FSU official sources and national technical means.

This data is classified and cannot be discussed in this report.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-191 Weapons of Mass Destruction
B-259294 

information to its overall determination as of a specific date; and (4) detail

planned audit and examination activities for the year ahead.

Agency Comments In commenting on our draft report, DOD agreed with our recommendation

and provided technical corrections, which we have incorporated where

appropriate. DOD’s comments are presented in appendix V.

Scope and

Methodology

To respond to our legislative mandate, we reviewed DOD’s audit and

examination report to Congress, DOD’s audit and examination plan for the

CTR program, and reports detailing the results of actual audits and

examinations. We also reviewed other documents and met with officials

from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Nuclear Agency,

OSIA, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency. DOD’s report contains classified

information concerning national technical means. We cannot assess or

validate such data and did not include it in this report.

We conducted our review between October 1994 and June 1995 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and other

interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available

to others upon request.

Please contact me on (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any

questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are

listed in appendix VI.

Joseph E. Kelley

Director-in-Charge

International Affairs Issues

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-191 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-191 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Cooperative Threat

Reduction Equipment

Deliveries to Belarus

Through June 8, 1995

12

Appendix II 

CTR Equipment

Deliveries to

Kazakhstan Through

June 8, 1995

13

Appendix III 

CTR Equipment

Deliveries to Russia

Through June 8, 1995

14

Appendix IV 

CTR Equipment

Deliveries to Ukraine

Through June 8, 1995

16

Appendix V 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

17

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-191 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Contents

Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to

This Report

20

Abbreviations

CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction

DOD Department of Defense

FSU former Soviet Union

INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty

OSIA On-Site Inspection Agency

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-191 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix I 

Cooperative Threat Reduction Equipment

Deliveries to Belarus Through June 8, 1995

Project Location Item Value Date

Continuous

communications link

Minsk Computer equipment $15,000 July 1, 1993

Minsk Computer equipment 133,050 May 10, 1995

Defense conversion Minsk Retraining center 186,000 Dec. 1, 1993

Minsk Auto training center 140,000 June 1, 1994

Minsk Woodworking

equipment

6,827 Oct. 27, 1994

Minsk English language

center

39,693 Oct. 31, 1994

Minsk Woodworking

equipment

44,850 Mar. 27, 1995

Minsk Woodworking

equipment

14,360 May 30, 1995

Emergency response Minsk Protective clothing

and equipment

516,000 June 1, 1993

Minsk Mobile lab, tractor,

and radios

250,000 Apr. 6, 1995

Environmental

restoration

Postavy Chemical and field

sample equipment

2,600,000 Mar. 1, 1995

Export control Minsk Software licensing 924,000 Mar. 30, 1995

Minsk Computer network 974,750 May 10, 1995

Total $5,844,530

Source: Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Office.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-191 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix II 

CTR Equipment Deliveries to Kazakhstan

Through June 8, 1995

Project Location Item Value Date

Continuous 

communications

link

Almaty Computer

equipment

$179,000 June 1, 1994

Almaty Communications

equipment

133,050 May 2, 1995

Material control

and 

accountability

Almaty Overhead

projectors and

laptops

Not available June 5, 1995

Total $312,050

Source: CTR Program Office.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-191 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix III 

CTR Equipment Deliveries to Russia

Through June 8, 1995

Project Location Item Value Date

Armored blankets Not available Armored blankets $2,590,000 July 1, 1992

Emergency

response

Not available Miscellaneous

equipment

2,958,000 Jan. 1, 1993

Not available Miscellaneous

equipment

7,955,000 Oct. 1, 1993

Moscow Radiography

system, liquid

abrasive cutter,

and computer

equipment

1,975,000 Apr. 12, 1995

Fissile material

containers

Not available Prototype

containers

50,000 Apr. 1, 1993

Mytishohi Fissile material

containers

16,000 Oct. 1, 1994

Material controls

and accountability

Mayak Monitoring and

detecting

equipment

102,594 Jan. 13, 1995

Moscow Computer

equipment

25,523 Jan. 13, 1995

Railcar

enhancement

Not available Railcar

conversion kits

19,700,000 Oct. 1, 1993

SOAEa (bombers) Engels Dump trucks, 

tractors, trailers,

and

miscellaneous

equipment

1,636,000 Sept. 1, 1994

Engels Crane 11,000 Jan. 17, 1995

SOAEa (ICBMs)b Yedrova Bulldozer,

plasma cutter,

and

miscellaneous

equipment

583,572 July 1, 1994

Sechuga Bulldozer,

plasma cutter,

and

miscellaneous

equipment

588,460 July 1, 1994

Pibanshur Bulldozer,

plasma cutter,

and

miscellaneous

equipment

588,460 July 1, 1994

Uzhur Bulldozer,

plasma cutter,

and

miscellaneous

equipment

583,572 Aug. 1, 1994

(continued)

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-191 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix III 

CTR Equipment Deliveries to Russia

Through June 8, 1995

Project Location Item Value Date

Yedrovo Crane 389,904 Apr. 11, 1995

Uzhur Crane 389,904 Apr. 13, 1995

Sechuga Crane 389,904 Apr. 13, 1995

Pibanshur Crane 389,904 Apr. 13, 1995

SOAEa

(liquid propellant

disposition)

Nizhegorod Crane 961,750 Mar. 15, 1995

Turinskaya Railcars 628,510 Mar. 15, 1995

Gorohovetz Intermodal

containers

3,035,492 Apr. 9, 1995

Tambov Railcars 961,750 Apr. 15, 1995

Moshkovo Railcars 677,050 Apr. 15, 1995

Nizhegorod Intermodal

containers

1,599,609 Apr. 19, 1995

Mulyanko Railcars 384,700 May 15, 1995

Vanino Railcars 384,700 May 15, 1995

SOAEa

(submarines)

Bolshol Kamen Plasma cutters

and welding

equipment

165,883 Aug. 1, 1994

Murmansk Plasma cutters

and welding

equipment

82,916 Aug. 1, 1994

Severodvinsk Plasma cutters

and welding

equipment

248,749 Aug. 1, 1994

Bolshol Kamen Cable shredders 773,000 Sept. 1, 1994

Murmansk Cable shredders 773,000 Sept. 1, 1994

Severodvinsk Cable shredders 773,000 Sept. 1, 1994

Bolshol Kamen Crane 326,216 Mar. 6, 1995

Murmansk Crane 326,616 Mar. 10, 1995

Severodvinsk Crane 326,216 Mar. 6, 1995

Bolshol Karmen Excavator with

shears

1,873,255 Apr. 21, 1995

Storage facility Mayak Bulldozers and

excavators

4,149,210 May 31, 1995

Total $59,374,419

aStrategic Offensive Arms Elimination.

bIntercontinental Ballistic Missile.

Source: CTR Program Office.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-191 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix IV 

CTR Equipment Deliveries to Ukraine

Through June 8, 1995

Project Location Item Value Date

Continuous communication link Kiev Communication

equipment

$133,050 May 6, 1995

Emergency response Khmel ’Nitskiy Emergency access

tools

25,006 Oct. 1, 1994

Export control Kiev Starter computer

network

110,000 June 1, 1995

Kiev Xerox copiers 3,254 June 8, 1995

Material control and accountability Kiev Computer equipment 82,000 Jan. 28, 1995

Academy of

Science

Superscanner metal

detectors

Not available Apr. 1, 1995

SNAEa (emergency response equipment) Khmel ’Nitskiy Emergency access

tools

25,006 Oct. 1, 1994

Khmel ’Nitskiy Mobile cranes 2,278,360 May 2, 1995

Pervomaysk Mobile cranes 2,278,360 May 2, 1995

SNAEa (fuel disposition) Pervomaysk Fuel containers 1,582,414 May 4, 1995

SNAEa (neutralization facility) Kiev Vehicles, cranes, and

miscellaneous

equipment

2,499,756 Mar. 1, 1994

Kiev Copiers 22,185 Aug. 1, 1994

Kiev Computer equipment 206,044 Oct. 1, 1994

Dneprope- trovsk Plasma cutters and

miscellaneous

equipment

5,534 Oct. 1, 1994

Kiev Computer supplies 3,484 Oct. 1, 1994

Dneprope-trovsk Miscellaneous

equipment

204,171 Mar. 16, 1995

Dneprope-trovsk Tractor trailer 69,497 Mar. 29, 1995

Dneprope-trovsk Fuel containers 301,218 May 4, 1995

SNAEa (silo elimination) Pervomaysk Miscellaneous

equipment

37,963 Oct. 1, 1994

Pervomaysk Saws, drills, jacks,

and air compressor

29,150 Oct. 1, 1994

Uman Bulldozers, dump

trucks, and tractor

trailers

3,327,433 Mar. 30, 1995

Total $13,223,885

aStrategic Nuclear Arms Elimination.

Source: CTR Program Office.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-191 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-191 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See p. 3.

See p. 2.

See p. 5.

See p. 5.

See p. 5.

See p. 5.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-191 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See p. 5.

See p. 4.

See p. 4.

See p. 6.

See p. 7.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-191 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

F. James Shafer

Blake L. Ainsworth

Muriel J. Forster

Jo Ann T. Geoghan

Beth A. Hoffman León

Pierre R. Toureille

(711106) Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-191 Weapons of Mass Destruction
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