Filed 7/11/13 Jorge T. v. Super. Ct. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JORGE T., Petitioner,

v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF STANISLAUS COUNTY, Respondent;

STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY SERVICES AGENCY, Real Party in Interest. F067153 (Super. Ct. Nos. 516366, 516367 & 516368)

O P I N I O N

THE COURT  ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for ex traordinary writ review. Ann Q. Ameral, Judge. Dependency Advocates of Stanislaus County a nd Nadine Salim, for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. John P. Doering, County Counsel, and Robin Gozzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
-ooOoo-

 Before Wiseman, Acting P. J., Levy, J., and Gomes, J.2 Petitioner, Jorge T. (father), filed an ex traordinary writ petition (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) regarding his minor children S. T., age seven; Kaitlyn T., age five; and Jacob T., age one. Father se eks relief from the juvenile cour t’s order issued at the sixmonth review hearing terminating his reunifi cation services and setting a Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26 1 hearing for September 9, 20 13. We deny the petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND On July 18, 2012, a sec tion 300 dependency petition (petition) was filed in which the following was alleged: On July 16, 20 12, police went to the home of Brandy D. (mother) in response to a 911 call placed by one of mother’s neighbors. Upon arriving at mother’s home, police found the body of St ephanie T. (Stephanie), which was in the initial stages of decomposition. 2 The house “was dirty with animal feces, cats, garbage and the smell of urine throughout the house.” Mother told police th e following: She had been ill “during the weekend,” and “after he r period of convalescence,” she awoke and found Stephanie dead. The previous night mother and a friend had used methamphetamine. Mother “was under the im pression” her two olde st daughters, ages six and four, were taking care of Stephanie and Jaco b, age six months. The detention report, filed July 18, 2012, states that in May 2012, father was arrested for “conspiracy to commit a crime” a nd for illegally entering the United States in violation of federal immigration la w, and deported to Mexico. On July 19, 2012, the court ordere d the children detained and set a jurisdiction/disposition hearing for August 15, 2012. On that date , the court appointed counsel to represent father, who was not pres ent in court, and continued the hearing.

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 Although it was not specifically alleged in the petition, it is not disputed that Stephanie was mother’s daughter. The au topsy report indicates Stephanie was a little over two weeks shy of her third birthday at the time of her death.3 After several more continuances, the hearing, for which father was not present, was held on October 22, 2012, at which time the court found the allegations of the petition true, found father to be the presumed father of the children, ordered reunification services granted to father and denied to mother, and adopted and approved a case plan. Following a contested six-mont h review hearing on April 9, 2013, the court, after finding that reasonable reunification servi ces were offered to father, terminated
reunification services to father and set a s ection 366.26 hearing for September 9, 2013. The filing of the instant writ petition followed. Neither party requested oral argument.
DISCUSSION Father contends the juvenile court e rred in finding that reasonable reunification services had been provided. We disagree. Legal Background “When a finding that reunification services were adequate is ch allenged on appeal, we review it for substantial evidence. [Citation.] ‘“In juvenile cases, as in other areas of the law, the power of an appellate court aske d to assess the suffici ency of the evidence begins and ends with a dete rmination as to whether or not there is any substantial evidence, whether or not contradicted, which will support the conclusion of the trier of fact.”’ [Citation.]” ( In re Alvin R . (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971 ( Alvin R. ).) “We must resolve all conflicts in support of the determination, and indulge in all legitimate inferences to uphold the court’s order. Additionally, we ma y not substitute our
deductions for those of the trier of fact.” ( Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) “A finding that reasonable reunification services have been provided must be made upon clear and convincing evidence. [Citation.] ‘When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challe nged on appeal, even where the standard of proof in the trial court is clear and conv incing evidence, the reviewing court must4 determine if there is any substantial eviden ce--that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value--to support the conc lusion of the trier of fact. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” ( Alvin R ., supra , 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 971.)
“‘The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal worl d, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.’” ( Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598-599.) “Services will be found reasonable if the Depa rtment has ‘identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offe red services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during th e course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult ....’” ( Alvin R. , supra , 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 972-973.) Th e effort must be made “in spite of the difficulties of doing so or the prospects of success.” ( In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.) “The adequacy of a reunificati on plan and of the department’s efforts are judged accord ing to the circumstances of each case.” ( In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1362 ( Ronell A. ).) In assessing the reasonableness of reunification services, the juvenile court evaluates not only th e agency’s efforts to assist the parent in accessing the services, but also the parent’s e fforts to avail himself or herself of the services. ( Ronell A. , supra , 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1365.) Additional Background At the outset we seek to clarify what is not at issue. Father does not challenge the content of the case plan and he implicitly con cedes he did not comply with the case plan. Indeed, he states, “complian ce became impossible ....” Fath er’s argument is that the Stanislaus County Community Services Ag ency (agency) did not provide reasonable services because the ag ency failed to make reasonable e fforts to maintain contact with father and, as a result, failed to assist hi m in complying with th e services plan. The agency, he asserts, “ref used to [make efforts to contact father] in a manne r calculated to5 actually reach him even though they had information that thei r efforts were not successful through no fault of the father.” To address father’s contentions, we must first summarize the evidence regarding attempts of the agency and fath er to make contact with each other. We find it useful to separate the contacts and attempted contacts into three periods: (1) July 17, 2012, 3 to September 20, during which time there were both attempted and successful contacts; (2) post-September 20 to Fe bruary 26, during which time there were numerous attempts by the agency but no contacts; and (3) February 27, when father cont acted the agency for the first time since Sept ember, through April. July 17 to September 20 During the period of July 17 to Septembe r 20, there were repeated attempts by the agency and father to contact each other. The detention report filed July 18 states that on July 17, Social Worker (SW) Petra Orozco-Sandoval called what the agency believed to be a possible local telephone nu mber for father and spoke to father’s sister-in-law who explained that she and her husband had not seen father for over one year and believed he had been deported to Mexico. 4 On July 19, Or ozco-Sandoval informed SW Cynthia Hujdic by e-mail of the following: She had ju st spoken to father in Mexico, and he was
“aware about what has ha ppened and would like to have the children taken to Mexico.” He left a telephone number in Mexico. He said he had last seen his children on May 15.
Orozco-Sandoval told fa ther “to wait for a call from a soci al worker for more information on background checks , etc[.] ....”

3 All further references to dates of ev ents in July, August, September, October, November and December are to dates in 2012. All further refere nces to events in January, February, March and Ap ril are to dates in 2013.
4 The record indicates father’s brothe r and sister-in-law lived in Merced.6 The jurisdiction/disposition report prepar ed and filed August 10 details further contacts and attempted contacts in July and Au gust. Father left two different telephone
numbers on Orozco-Sandoval’s voice mail. On July 24, Or ozco-Sandoval called both numbers. One was busy and when she called the other one there was no answer and no message-leaving capability. On July 26, father attempted to reach Orozco-Sandoval, who
was out of the office. On August 3, an international call “was received.” It was “believed to be from [father],” but due to “low volume” the message could not be heard. “However, a phone number was identified on the voice over internet protocol ....” On August 8, SW Maria Pasillas called father “at a number he had used in the past,” and left a voice mail message. On August 9, Karla Self, identifying he rself as an agency “family finding researcher,” sent an e-mail to the Mexi can consulate in Sacramento (consulate) requesting assistance in locating father. The August 10 report stated there had been no response as of August 10. On August 10, according to an e-mail from Pasillas to Hujdic, Pasillas received an e-mail from father, in which father “reporte d to have found (no name) a place to take [domestic violence] classes,” and that he “h as an appointment w ith a psychologist ....” 5 He provided an e-mail address: cepavi@c ol.gob. The e-mail contained what is designated by a handwritten nota tion as the “newest ph #,” followed by another number which is identical except fo r two transposed digits.

5 The case plan requires, inter alia, th at father “attend and complete a 52-week domestic violence class as approved of by th e social worker,” “a ttend general counseling in a program as approved of by the social worker,” and “attend and complete a parenting education program as approved of by the soci al worker.” However, although this email suggests appellant was aware of what the ca se plan, once adopted, would contain, as indicated earlier, the case plan was not adopt ed and approved until more than two months after this contact, on October 22.7 An “Addendum Report” prepared by Hujd ic and filed August 24 (August 24 report) shows an address for father—C.P . 28047, 1546 Colonia las Torres, Colima,
Mexico 6 —and what appears to be yet anothe r international telephone number. An “ADDENDUM REPORT” pr epared by Hujdic and filed October 17 and her activity log detail the following events in September: On September 10, father telephoned and le ft a voice mail message with his “new” telephone number. It was the same number he left on August 14. Pasillas called the number twice; each time “the phone sounded busy.” On September 13, Orozco-Sa ndoval received a call from father, in which he left the same telephone number he left on Sept ember 10. An e-mail from Orozco-Sandoval to Hujdic, a copy of which is contained in th e record, states father told Orozco-Sandoval that “he has started taking one of the classes that were ordered for him” and “asked if someone can call him as soon as possible.” On September 20, father “returned a call to Swkr Pasillas.” During what appears to be an extended conversation, he told her he “did not receive th e packet [the agency]
mailed him ....” Pasillas “recited” to father th e address the agency ha d for him, but father “couldn’t even say that the [address] ... recite d to him was not the right one.” Father did say “the nearest city to his town is Colima, Colima Mexico.” Father said he was taking “dv classes” from an entity called Cepavi, but “he could not give [Pasillas]” the location or telephone number of Cepavi. Pasillas “remi nded” father that the agency needed this information in order to “verify that he is taking his classes, what the curriculum is, etc.”

6 As best we can determine, the record does not reveal from wh at source the agency obtained this address.8 Pasillas told father to “get in touch w/DIF,” 7 and that the agency had e-mailed DIF “asking for their assistance” but had not received a reply. Pasillas asked father to “get back” to the agency and advise of his a ddress, an “alternate” telephone number, and “other info as to where he is taking classe s, what type, a [tele phone number and address],
etc.” Post-September 20 to February 26 In an October 1 log entry, SW Hujdic stated the following: Karla Self had attempted “monthly contacts” wi th the consulate, but had r eceived no response. Hujdic telephoned the consulate and left a voice mail message. In an October 1 log entry, SW Hujdic stated she sent an e-mail to the consulate in which she requested information regarding father, and she was attempting personal
contact with the consulate because Self “has sent requests each of the last couple of months with no response from consulate ....” She stated that father lives in “Colima Colima Mexico” and she asked for “help as we would need [father] to complete a case plan that has many service componen ts.” She asked, “Which DEF [ sic ] office would I contact and how would I go about doing so ... [?]” On October 11, Hujdic sent an e-mail to the consulate in which she stated the following: The agency was “atte mpting to work with a DIF lo cal to the father”; father “lives in Colima, Colima Mexico”; the ag ency had made “numerous” unsuccessful attempts “to reach a consulate member”; and th e agency was “still at a loss as to who to
contact at which DIF office.” On October 22, following the jurisdicti on/disposition hearing, the clerk of the juvenile court mailed to father a notice advi sing him, “You must make meaningful efforts

7 “ DIF is the acronym for Desarrollo Integral de la Familia, a Mexican social services agency dealing w ith family matters.” ( In re E.M. (2012) 204 Ca l.App.4th 467, 472, fn. 3.)9 to comply with th e Reunification Plan, a copy of which is served herewith, prior to the next review hearing.” The notice was mailed to the same address in Colima, Mexico set forth in the August 24 repor t prepared by Hujdic. In a status review report filed February 25 (February 25 re port), SW Shahbazian stated the following regardi ng the agency’s attempts to contact father from October through January: On October 25 she and Hujdic mailed “a letter, case plan to [father] in Mexico.” On November 28, Shahbazian “e-mailed, faxed and mailed a request to the Mexican Consulate requesting assistance ... in locating the father and providing appropriate services to him in Mexico.” November 29, SW Victor Pena “attempte d contact with [father] by calling him at several phone numbers the agency had obtained previously.” On November 30, Shahbazian “mailed [fath er] a letter with hi s case plan both written in Spanish.” Also on November 30, a “Family Reunification Clerk” faxed a letter
to the consulate and called the cons ulate and “left a message.” On December 10, the same clerk sent a fax to the consulate and called the consulate, “again leaving voice message s requesting a return call ....” On December 13, Shahbazian “mailed a lette r and case plan in Spanish to [father]
in Mexico.” On December 17, Pena “attemp ted to contact [father] in Mexico by calling him at several phone numbers that the agency had obtained previously.” On December 20, Shahbazian “attempted to contact th e Mexican Consulate ... by mail, fax and e-mail.” On January 23, Shahbazian “mailed [father ] a letter with his case plan written in Spanish.”10 On January 25, Pena “attempted to reach [father] by phone by calling him at the numbers that the agency had obtained previously.” On January 29 the family reunification cl erk again “faxed and called the Mexican Consulate regarding assistance in this matter.” On January 31, Shahbazian, after rece iving a voice mail message from the consulate, returning the call a nd speaking with someone at th e consulate, sent an e-mail that included the “contact information” the ag ency had for father, what information the agency had that “could assist the consulate in locating [father],” and “the case plan to assist in finding appropriate servic es for [father] in Mexico.” At the six-month review hearing, Pena testified that beginning around the end of November, “approximately every m onth” he “sent” to father “a translated copy of the case plan in addition to a letter ....” 8 When asked to what addr ess he sent the letters to father, he responded that his March 27 log note indicated an address—“C.P. 28047 1546 Colonia Las Torres Colima, Co lima, Mexico 523125955841’’—but he was “not sure if that’s the same address that [h e] used for the letter ....” On February 10, father sent an e-mail to the consulate in which he stated, “I received your message” and that he would be contacting his attorney regarding what he (father) “need[ed] to do for the reuni fication with [his] children.” On February 11 the consul ate responded to father by e-mail, stating “we will be working together with the Dele gation of SRE in Colima in rega rds to the reunification of your children.” Attached to an “Addendum Report” prep ared by Shahbazian and filed March 5 (March 5 report) is a fax to Shahbazian , dated February 22, from the “Consul of Protection and Legal Affairs” (Consul of Protection) at the consulate, that provides a

8 All references to testimony are to testim ony taken at the six-m onth review hearing.11 mailing address, telephone number and e-ma il address for father, and states, “our
coworkers in Colima info rmed us that through state DIF [f ather] is starting some services soon (parenting classes, counseling addr essing ... abandonment and his children’s
emotional needs and substance abuse assessmen t.)” The address provided is “Republica de Honduras #1546[,] Col. La s Torres[,] Colima, Colima, Me xico 28047[.]” The March 5 report also states that SW Pena, apparent ly on February 22, “sen t an email to [father] and attempted phone contact.” Pena testified that in the February 22 e-mail, he asked father to provide information including the names of all adults living with him, the name of his employer, and the telephone numbers and addresses of “[ w]ho [father] was using for drug treatment, parenting classes, domestic violence pr ograms, and ... drug te sting and NA or AA
assistance.” On February 25, father sent an e-mail to “Attorney German,” in which father asked for “any type of information regardin g where I need to go for the therapy’s [ sic ].” Father also stated he was “thinking of vi siting your office” on th e upcoming Wednesday, “which is my day off work.” On February 26 and 27, according to the March 5 report, Shahbazian “contacted [the Consul of Protection] ... requesting follow up in formation including contact information for the local DIF,” but as of March 5 she had “not received any further contact from [the Consul of Protec tion] regarding ... [father].” February 27 through April The March 5 report further states that on February 27, father “responded to Social Worker Pena by e-mail sent from his iPhone.” An interpreter testifie d that in that e-mail father provided the name a nd address of his employer—a car wash—and the names of the persons living with him, and stated he had not “started ... classes” because he was12 “waiting for ... State Department ... of Rep ublic of Mexico to refer [him] to the organization that will help [him].” On March 8, the consulate official sent an e-mail to Shahbazian stating he had “sent a request to our agency in Colima in order to get the information of the DIF office who’s going to handle this case ....” Pena further testified to the following: On March 27 he “emailed [father] his case plan” and sent father a “letter explaining, again, what the case plan was and the importance for him to contact [the agency ]” and providing the agency’s “contact information”; he “also ema iled [father] on [March] 28th”; and on March 29, Pena “attempted to contact [father]” by telephone. On April 4, Pena received a voice mail message from father, “asking about his case” a nd providing a telephone number to return
the call. Pena “called that number back th ree times and was unsuccessful in reaching [father].”
Problem in Communicatin g with the Consulate On February 21, SW Shahba zian e-mailed an official at the consulate and stated she had e-mailed the consulate two weeks pr eviously and had not heard back; she was “really bothered ... that [she] didn’t get [the official’s] e-mails or the e-mail from [the official’s] supervisor”; and wo ndered if those e-mails “were possibly filtered as spam[.]” Other agency staff log entries and e-mails i ndicate that thereafter an agency “Information Systems” worker conducted an investigatio n, determined consulate e-mails were not reaching the agency due to a “firewall” setting, and “res olved [the] issue” on March 6. Shahbazian’s Testimony Shahbazian, called as a witn ess by father, testified to the following: She became aware that the address in Mexico the agen cy had for father wa s not correct when, beginning “[p]robably in December or January,” th e letters sent to father at that address were returned as undeliverable. Nevertheless, letters to father were sent to him at that13 address until the agency obta ined a new address for him because until that time, the
address to which the letters were sent wa s the only one the agen cy had for father. 9 Shahbazian had spoken to another soci al worker “who [h ad] had cases that
involved DIF before ....” Shah bazian had been “‘attempting to work with the local DIF’” but she and the agency had b een unable to learn “who th e local DIF is ....” She was advised by a co-worker to contact DIF “via the Consulate.” When asked, “wouldn’t it have made sense to try to contact DIF direc tly,” she responded: “That’s not what I was instructed to do as our procedure.” Even though she had been se nding letters to father at a Colima address, she did not “try to Google the DIF in Colima” because, she testified, “I don’t know that he is in Colima for sure, because we have n’t had contact from him.”
When asked if she would have called th e “local DIF” if she had a telephone number to call, she resp onded: “Once I knew where he wa s living, then I would -- and I had a phone number for the local DIF, and I was told that he was -- I mean, I guess. I don’t know. I was waiting for information from the Consulate at the last point, so ...[.]” When asked if prior to the consulate pr oviding her with contact information for
father she had “sent letters to the Consulate asking for assistance in locating the father,” she responded: “I sent letters, I phone called, I faxed, and I e-mailed the Consulate every
month.” Father’s Offer of Proof Father made, and all counsel accepted, an o ffer of proof that if called to testify, he would testify to the following: “the first lin e of his address is Re publica ... De Hondorus [ sic ]”; he “started contacting External Relations , an Agency in Mexico , [in] November of

9 As indicated earlier, the record shows th e agency obtained a different address in February after father contacted the consulate.14 2012”; “he contacted his local DIF on his ow n”; “he ... contacted the Mexican Consulate on his own”; “He was waiting ... [for] the Mexi can Consulate to respond to him so DIF would accept his case,” and “two months after that, the Consulate told him to go to DIF”; one month after that “he was accepted and st arted classes”; he “is doing,” and he “has done,” four “combined parentin g and domestic violence cla sses”; and “he did not contact the Agency ... because he thought the Mexican Agency was supposed to do that.” Analysis As indicated earlier, father contends the agency did not provide reasonable
reunification services because th e agency failed to make reas onable efforts to contact him and, as a result, failed to assist him in complying with the case plan. We disagree.
The record contains evidence of the fo llowing: The agency began attempting to contact father immediately after Stephanie’s death, and after some unsuccessful attempts, contact was made on September 20, when fath er and SW Pasillas s poke by telephone. However, during that conversa tion, father was unable to pr ovide the agency with his address, and when Pasillas recited the addre ss the agency had for hi m, father could not
confirm it was his. The best father could do was state that he was living near the city of
Colima in Mexico. Pasillas dire cted father to “get back” to the agency and provide his address and an alternate telephone number. Father contacted the consulate on February 10, but he did not contact the agency again until February 27, more than five mont hs after Pasillas directed him to do so and provide his contact information. In that pe riod when the agency was getting no help from father in establishing contact , the agency made numerous, re gular attempts to find father by attempting to contact the consulate through various means, mailing father material at the only address the agency had for him and placing telephone calls to various numbers the agency ha d for father.15 As indicated above, when evaluating the reasonableness of reunification services, we consider not only the agency ’s efforts to assist father in obtaining services, but also father’s efforts to avail himself of services. ( Ronell A. , supra , 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1365.) Here, the juvenile court reas onably could have c oncluded that for a critical five-month period, father’s efforts were nonexistent. Father’s offer of proof does not establish otherwise. The court was not compelled to be lieve that father believed some unspecified “Mexican agency” 10 was going to provide the Stanislaus County agency with the
information Pasillas asked father to provide. We note that fath er’s offer of proof does not
indicate on what basis father formed this be lief. Moreover, the offer of proof suggests that the first Mexican agency he contacted was External Relations and that he did not contact that agency until Novemb er. Thus, his offer of proof contains no support for the claim that he thought someone else would cont act the agency in Stan islaus County on his behalf during the period from September 20 to the unspecified date in November when, according to father, he cont acted External Relations. On this record, given the ev idence of the agency’s effo rts to contact father and father’s failure for a five-month period to contact the agency, we conclude that the juvenile court could reasonably find that it had been proved by cl ear and convincing evidence that the agency had “made reasonable efforts” ( Alvin R. , supra , 108 Cal.App.4th at pp. 972-973) to contact fa ther and assist him in co mplying with the case plan. Father challenges the adequacy of the agency’s efforts to contact him. He asserts that in his September 20 telephone conversati on with SW Pasillas, in asking father to confirm the address the agency had for him, recited both th e address and the telephone number in Mexico that the agency believed was his. The agency was remiss, father

10 Father’s offer of proof referred to three entities that could be described as agencies: The Consulate, External Relations, a nd DIF. It is not cl ear which of these is “the Mexican agency” referred to in his offer of proof.16 suggests, because the inclusio n of the telephone number c onfused him and was the reason
he did not confirm the address was his. The record does not support the claim that Pasillas inco rrectly recited father’s address to him. Father asserts that Hujd ic’s August 24 report incorrectly indicates father’s address by including in the notation of the address a numerical sequence which is actually a telephone number, and he suggests that this is wh at Pasillas recited to him. However, assuming the August 24 report wa s the source of Pasillas’s information regarding father’s address, that report, a lthough it contains both the address and the numerical sequence, does so under the heading “ Address/Phone .” This does not suggest, much less comp el the conclusion, that Pasillas incorrectly included a telephone
number in the address she asked father to confirm. Moreover, an d more fundamentally,
even an incorrect recitation of an address could not be exp ected to prevent father from providing his correct address, if he kne w it, nor prevent him from conveying that information to the ag ency at some point in the five months that followed. Father also finds it “remarkably telling” that SW Shahbazian tes tified that even if
she had a number for the local DIF in Colima she does not know if she would have called it. He argues, “There can be no reason fo r this other than the Agency did not wish [father] to reunify.” We disagree. Shahbazian’s testimon y on this point does not compel the conclusion that the agency de liberately, or would have de liberately, sabotaged its own efforts to find father and assist him in comp lying with his case plan . From the evidence of the agency’s many attempts to contact father, the court reasonably could have concluded the agency did not act in bad faith as father claims. Father also criticizes the ag ency’s efforts to make cont act with him on three other bases. First, implying that had the agency be en able to make contact with the local DIF office in the city of Colima, the agency would have discovered his address, he criticizes17 the agency’s efforts to locate a DIF office in Colima, asse rting the agency was remiss in failing to contact other DIF offices with which it had worked in the past and in failing to utilize an internet search engine. He ch allenges Shahbazian’s explanation that notwithstanding that the agen cy’s only address for father was in Colima, she did not “‘Google’” DIF in Colima because she did not know whether father actually lived there. Second, father argues that the agency’s efforts to find him by contacting the
consulate were unreasonable b ecause the agency “d id nothing to chan ge its ways” when it received no reply from the consul ate “after months of effort.” He attributes the delay in the agency’s failure to obtain information from the cons ulate, in large part, to a firewall setting in the agen cy’s own communications system which prevented e-mails from the consulate from reaching the agency. Finally, referring to the evid ence in an e-mail on August 10 that he provided the agency with an e-mail a ddress—cepavi@col.gob—and that on September 20 he told Pasillas he was taking a domestic violence class at “Cepavi, ” father notes there is no evidence the agency ever sent an e-mail to the address given.
These matters do not establish that the court erred in terminating reunification services. The court reasonably could have concluded that a lthough in an ideal world the agency could have made more and/or better e fforts to make contact, its efforts here were
reasonable under the circumstances. The factors cited by father militate in favor of the opposite conclusion, but, as indicated earlie r, “we may look only at whether there is any evidence, contradicted or unco ntradicted, which supports the trial court’s determination” and “[w]e must resolve all conflicts in support of the determination.” ( Elijah R. v. Superior Court , supra , 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 969.) As also indicated earlier, there was ample evidence that the agency worked long and hard to try to contact father, and that father, though instructed to get back to the agency with contact information, did not do so18 for five months. On this record, we conclu de substantial evidence supports the court’s
determination.
DISPOSITION The petition for extraordinary wr it is denied. This opinion is final forthwith as to
this court.