****The Defense Information Debate:The American Militaryat the Dawn of the 21st Century**
**Compiled by****Dr. Stephen Biddle****Strategic Studies Institute**
The U.S. Army War College and the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced InternationalStudies cosponsored a conference in Washington, DC, on October 5, 2001, to examine options fortransforming the U.S. military. Among the 225 registered attendees were representatives from themilitary, the executive branch, and the Congress, as well as defense experts from privateindustry, think tanks, and academia. 
The conference centered on three panels. The first considered the strategic context fortransformation, the second concerned force structure and technology alternatives, and the thirdexamined organizational implications. This brief summary highlights the salient points raised inthese panel discussions. 
A central theme throughout the meeting concerned the scale and nature of needed change. Allagreed that change was necessary, but change is always necessary, even in much less dynamictechnological and geopolitical environments than today s. Stasis is thus a straw man. There wassubstantial disagreement, however, over how much and what kind of change are required. 
In particular, advocates of sweeping change focused on three areas where they felt incrementaladaptation is insufficient: the need for a new American foreign policy framework; the need for aforce structure more oriented on the revolution in military affairs (RMA); and the need for majorreform in the U.S. military command structure. Moderates, by contrast, voiced concern thatproposals for sweeping change could abandon traditional concepts and capabilities that remainessential. 
**Sweeping Change: Imperialism and America First.**
Some see recent American foreign policy as an unsustainable compromise between mutuallyexclusive alternatives. We have been engaged abroad, they argue, but only enough to breed enmitywithout being sufficiently committed to secure our interests. This yields opposite proposals forsweeping change: a case for an  imperialist  foreign policy that embraces a more interventionistrole, and a case for an  America first  policy that disengages from overseas commitments andfocuses U.S. security policy on homeland defense. 
The imperialist brief sees important benefits to American primacy, both for America and forothers. Imperialists argue that open markets, for example, are facilitated by a dominant powerwho has the ability and the will to compel states to reduce their trade barriers. Internationaldisputes are more likely to be resolved peacefully when one state enjoys a preponderance of powerand is willing to use it on behalf of conflict resolution. The more peaceful, more prosperousworld that results is in everyone s interest, reducing the dangers of al Qaeda-style terrorism bycreating order in place of the failed societies and local anarchies that create and harborterrorists. 
Of course, not every potential hegemon is benign: a Nazi or Communist empire would have hadhorrific consequences, and both were appropriately resisted. The British Empire, by contrast, wasa broadly beneficial hegemony, many imperialists argue, and a liberal American Empire would be,too. It matters who the hegemon is, and America could enjoy a legitimacy that others have not. 
An imperial foreign policy would imply a very different military with four main components. Wewould require powerful deep strike forces capable of  emphatic dominance  over any combination ofcompetitors, imperialists argue. Second, we would need expeditionary ground forces able to deployquickly to punish norm-breakers but without a need for sustained, large-scale combat actions; acombination of the Marine Corps and cross-service special forces would be ideal. Third, we wouldneed constabulary forces to keep the peace abroad and maintain order where this exists; this rolewould be best suited to a radically restructured Army. Finally, domestic law enforcement withReserve component military augmentation would protect the American homeland against terrorism. 
By contrast, the case for  America First  holds that the costs and benefits of an assertiveU.S. foreign policy have been transformed by the September 11 attacks. Whereas engagement ispreferable, other things being equal, they argue that the benefits are now outweighed by thecosts of becoming a target for groups like al Qaeda. Asserting U.S. power, moreover, isunnecessary for prosperity: mutual economic incentives are sufficient to provide for trade andaccess to oil or other raw materials. Local conflicts may escalate without our involvement, butit is better to cope with escalation by defending our borders than by intervening in farawaylands: a strong homeland defense backed up by a sole superpower s resources will deter partieswith no real need to challenge us, and, by staying out of others  disputes, we reduce theirmotives for involving us. 
An  America First  policy would likewise imply a very different military from today s. Itspredominant focus would be homeland security, with a heavy emphasis on frontier defense, missiledefense, airspace control, and terminal security for key infrastructure and CONUS economicassets. Nonmilitary security agencies would see a major increase in relative importance andfunding, with the FBI, CIA, INS, and Customs Service all rising in priority as keycounterterrorist resources, and with major efforts in consequence management by a wide range ofcivilian and military organizations. The Coast Guard would be radically expanded. American forceswould be withdrawn from most overseas bases. Increased emphasis on assets with intercontinentalreach (such as B2 bombers and carrier battle groups) would compensate for the rejection offorward basing and provide deterrent power to dissuade foreign actors from drawing America intolocal disputes. The Army would transition to a role focused on territorial defense on Americansoil, and restructure accordingly. The Marine Corps, with no expeditionary mission to perform,could be disbanded or drastically reduced. 
**Sweeping Change: An RMA Force Structure.**
Many see U.S. force structure as lagging behind the technological and geopolitical imperativesof the RMA. The United States now enjoys a geopolitical  strategic pause  in which we face nopeer competitor, they argue; we should exploit this breathing space to discover and implementradically new forces and doctrines for taking advantage of information age technology. The sheerinefficiency of experimentation means that we cannot both transform and remain ready to fightmultiple major wars in the meantime, hence today s absence of a peer competitor offers anirreplaceable opportunity to put major resources into transformation before facing a real threat.The danger of complacency is the real threat of today: without a clear and present need, we couldfail to take the dramatic steps needed and get caught flat-footed when a new superpowereventually arises. 
For RMA advocates, this implies a need for heavier investment in science and technologyprograms, and rapid development of new weapon systems such as arsenal ships and  Streetfighter littoral warfare surface combatants; space-based radars; very long range, stealthy unmannedaeriel vehicles for both surveillance and strike missions; and stealthy transport aircraft(especially for special forces insertion). New combat formations and doctrines for using suchsystems need to be designed and extensively tested in rigorous wargames and field maneuvers, theyargue. Sunset systems like carrier battle groups and heavy tanks need to be reduced, and back-ward-looking weapon programs like the Joint Strike Fighter, the DD-21, or the Crusader need to becancelled or radically curtailed. U.S. force structure needs to be overhauled, with majorreductions in close combat forces and short-range aircraft, a major shift toward increasedreliance on very long range deep precision strike systems, a much more bomber-centric attackforce, and a major increase in special operations forces for waging the coming war of shadowsagainst terrorism. 
**Sweeping Change: Command Structure Reform.
Closely related to the argument for an RMA force structure is the case for major commandstructure reform. Some argue that major organizational change is overdue. It has been 54 yearssince the National Security Act of 1947 established the government s overall organization fordefense decisionmaking; the military has been organized around divisions, carrier battle groups,and fighter wings for longer than that. Given the scale of technical and geopolitical changesince then, we surely need to revisit these choices. 
Among the specific options for such reform might be the development of a National SecurityCouncil-like organization for the new Homeland Defense Agency, wherein a powerful HomelandDefense Adviser and staff acted both as policy coordinators but also as the President s advocatesin shaping the agendas of the component Cabinet departments. The interagency process could alsobe overhauled to facilitate jointness and improved coordination across departments. Within themilitary, a global counterterrorism commander-in-chief (CINC) could be established tocounterbalance regional parochialism in the current structure and facilitate cross-regionaloperations in the war on terrorism. A Space Command or Information Warfare Corps could beestablished to lend greater coherence to efforts in these critical domains. The currentdivision/wing/battle group structure could be replaced by flatter, less-hierarchical alternativesto speed decisionmaking and information flow. The Army in particular could be reorganized toplace less of its essential support activities in unwieldy division or corps size units, perhapsby establishing self-contained brigade size units capable of independent deployment andoperation. 
**Moderate Change: Retaining What Works.**
Others argue that sweeping change is unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. Withrespect to strategy and foreign policy, for example, some argue that the chief problem beforeSeptember 11 was that traditional internationalist *realpolitik,* was ignored, not that itsomehow failed or represented an unsustainable compromise. We repeatedly failed to retaliate whenterrorists killed Americans, as in Somalia and Yemen, and we backed down by withdrawing Americanmilitary assets when we received subsequent threats of terrorist action against U.S. forcesoverseas. Defense reformers scorned peacekeeping, nation-building, and development assistance,yet a serious effort at using American economic power or diplomatic clout to promote a lesschaotic post-Soviet Afghanistan might have denied Osama bin Laden his base of operations. Chronicunderinvestment in defense stretched our forces too thinly to respond as forcefully astraditional *realpolitik* would have suggested; combined with a lack of will to use ourpower where necessary, this emboldened opponents to believe we were paper tigers who could bebullied into withdrawal. If so, the solution is not to adopt a radical vision of imperial orisolationist foreign policy, but simply to exercise the normal tools of great power statecraft ina more sustained, forceful way. 
Similarly, some argue that calls for radical force restructuring undervalue traditional forcesand overlook important shortcomings in new technology. Calls to retire Army close combat forcestructure in favor of special forces or constabulary units, it is held, err in assuming that wewill never again need to fight a major theater war. The war on terrorism may indeed be winnablewithout large-scale land forces--but it also may not. If early, small-scale uses of force fail,we will face powerful pressures to escalate. Among the most powerful escalatory threats at ourdisposal is the ability to topple regimes who sponsor terrorism by invading and taking politicalcontrol of their territory. Against regimes like the Taliban s or Saddam Hussein s, this is theultimate sanction. And this sanction requires large-scale close combat forces: air power alonecannot topple a regime that takes appropriate countermeasures by hiding its forces and its keyleaders. 
Calls to restructure away from close combat and toward heavier reliance on long-rangeprecision strike, some argue, fail to recognize the incentive this gives our enemies to adapt.Deep strike systems work best against massed targets in the open. They are much less effectiveagainst dispersed opponents in forests, mountains, cities, or towns. Such  complex terrain offers cover, creates background clutter, and greatly reduces the sensor performance on which allelse depends in deep-strike warfare. As our deep strike capabilities grow, our opponents thusface a growing incentive to avoid massed formations in the open and emphasize dispersed opera-tions in cover, where close combat forces offer the only effective means of reaching them. Arestructured U.S. military with more effective deep strike technology, larger deep strike forces,and smaller close combat forces would give our enemies a double incentive to disperse into cover:not only would massed operations in the open be more costly against such a restructured U.S.force, but dispersed operations in cover would be less so, given the U.S. reductions in closecombat capability. If anything, the optimal U.S. response to improving deep strike technology isto shift toward greater emphasis on close combat, not less, given our opponents  incentives forresponding to this technology. We certainly should not be creating opportunities for them viaself-inflicted vulnerabilities in close combat capability. 
Others argue that many of technology s benefits can be had with modest deployments rather thanwholesale re-equipment. In this view, modest numbers of stealthy aircraft, for example, could beused to destroy air defenses, opening the doors for larger fleets of cheaper, nonstealthy systemsto operate with impunity. Moderate nuclear missile defense (NMD) programs could defend againstsmall rogue-state missile inventories without threatening Russian retaliatory capabilities,providing much of the benefit of NMD without the geostrategic costs of a new arms race or Russiandiplomatic alienation. 
Organizationally, too, some argue that proposals for sweeping change should be approached withcaution. Reorganization has unintended, as well as intended, consequences. The Goldwater-Nicholsreforms, for example, created regional CINCs who have subsequently become so powerful as toovershadow the U.S. ambassadors in their regions, becoming almost viceroys and exertinginordinate influence over U.S. foreign policy by virtue of the institutional capacity grantedthem by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. None of this was anticipated by the Act s authors orsupporters. In light of this, some hold caution is warranted in evaluating major reorganizationswhose downstream consequences cannot be completely anticipated. 
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The views expressed in this conference brief are those of the author and do not necessarilyreflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense,or the U.S. Government. This conference brief is cleared for public release; distribution isunlimited.
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