### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs O ct obe r 26, 200 4
MIC HAE L D WAY NE CA RTE R v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for K nox Coun ty No. 77242 Richard Baumgar tner, Judge

No. E2004-00502-CC A-R3- P C - F iled Janu ary 24, 2005

The pe titioner, Mic h ael Dw ayne Carte r, pled g uiltyin May of 2002 to two counts of for g ery , one c ou nt o f f e lon y the ft , tw o c ou nts of

mis demean or the ft , o ne c ou nt o f m isd e me a no r e va din g arr e st and one c ount of burg lary of a ve hicle in ex chang e for an ef fec tive sentenc e of six y ear s and ac ce p t an ce i n t o a “ Dr u g C o u rt ” p ro gra m
. T h e t ri al co u rt s et a s en t en ci n g d at e. P ri o r t o s en t en ci n g, the petitioner wa s char g ed with seve ral other offe nses. I n October

of 2002, the pe titioner appea red for se ntencing on the pre vious guilty pleas a nd enter ed g uil t y p l ea s on four a dditional counts of fo rg e ry . B y

a g re e me nt, the pe tit ion e r’ s se nte nc e s o n th e su bs e qu e nt o ff e ns e s w e re c on sid e re d w ith the prior of

fense s, resulting in an ef

fec tive t en -y ea r s en t encefor a ll of the cha rg ed off enses. The petitioner subseque ntly

fi l ed a pe tition for post-conviction relief alleg ing ine ffe ctive assistanc e of counsel. The trial court denied the petition. For the following rea sons, we af firm the judg ment of the trial court.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Tr ial Co ur t i s A ffirm e d.
J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opi nion of the c ourt, in which A L AN E. G L EN N a n d J. C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.
J . L iddell Kirk, Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Michae l Dwayne Carte r. Paul G. S ummers, Att orney Gene ral & R eporte r; Br ent C

. Cherry , Assistant Attorney Gene ral; and Randall E. Nichols, District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.-2- OP IN ION
Fa ctual B ackg round

I n M a y of 20 02 , th e pe tit ion e r p le d g uil ty to two c ou nts of fo rg e ry , one c ou nt o f f e lon y the ft , two counts of misdemea nor theft, one count of misdemeanor eva ding a rre st, and one c ount of burg lary of a ve hicle, arising from sever al differ ent incidents. The terms of the ag ree ment resulted in three c onsecutive two- y ear sent en ces, for a total e ffe ctive sente nce of six y ear s. The petitioner wa s p e rm itt e d to app ly

fo r p ro bat io n and wa s a c c e pte d in to a “ Dr ug Cou rt ” ha lf

way ho us e . A s a re su lt, t h e p e t i t i o n e r w a s r e l e a s e d f r o m c u s t o d y u p o n a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e p l e a
. T h e tr i a l c o u rtse t a date f or sentenc ing in Julyof 2002.
Fr om the rec ord, it appea rs that th e p et i t i o n er stay ed at the ha lfway house for

a couple of w e e k s a n d t h e n l e f

tt h e f a c i l i t y. W h e n t h e p e t i t i o n e r d i d n o tap p e ar

a tt h e s e n t e n c i n g h e ar i n g i n J u l y, the trial court issued a capias for his arr est. Howeve r, t he petiti oner had alre ady been a pprehe nded on an indictment and on a n information cha rg ing him with four a dditional counts of forg ery
. I n October

of 2002 , the petitioner a ppear ed bef

ore the trial court f

or sentenc ing on the previous g uilty pleas and to e nter g uilty pleas on the four additional counts of forg ery
. T h e plea ag ree ment specifie d that the s entenc es on the new forg ery offe nses wer e to be c onsidered w ith the prior g uiltypleas a nd that the petitioner would withdra w his application for probation. At that time, the petitioner pled g uiltyto an indictment char g ing him with one c ount of fo rg e ry , a Cla ss Efe lon y , a ndon a n inf orma tio n ch arg ing him wi th thr e e c ou nts of fo rg e ry , a

Cla ss E felony . The plea

ag ree ment specifie d that the sentenc e for the plea on the indictment would be two y ear s and the sente nce for the plea on the i nformation would be two y ear s on eac h count of for g ery to r un c on c ur re ntl y to e a c h o the r. Th e pe tit ion e r a g re e d that the se nte nc e s on the ne w c ha rg e s w ou ld run conse cutive to ea ch other and conse cutive to the previously imposed six -y ear eff ective se ntence , for a total effe ctive sente nce of ten y ear s. The trial c ourt summarized the proce eding s for the pe titioner at t h e conclusion of the ple a he ari ng a s f

oll ow s: THE COURT: [Y] ou’ve g ot two case s here for disposition today , and y ou’ve ha d three prior ca ses, which y ou’ve a lrea dy pled. Those are 74764, 73148, 74944. You g ot two-y ear sentenc es i n eac h of t hose, conse cutive, for a total ef fec tive sentenc e of six y e ars in tho se thr e e c a se s. Yo u’ re wi thdra wi ng y ou r a pp lic a tio n f

or pr ob a tio n in those, and y ou’re g oing to se rve those se ntence s. And then the cases y ou have here , one of them is an indi ctment, one of them is an informatio n
. They both char g e for g ery . There ’s a sing le count in the-3-

I ndictment 7 4 9 88, class E fe lony forg ery with a one- to-two-y ear rang e of punishment. That’s g oing to - y ou’re g oing to g et the maxim um two-y ear sentenc e in that. A ndthe n inthe I nf orma tio n 7 58 40 the re are thr e e c la ss Efe lon y fo rg e ri e s. You’re g oing to g et two-y ear sentenc es in ea ch of t h o s e. T hose three to run c on c ur re ntl y wi th e a c h o the r b ut c on se c uti ve to the i nd ic te d c a se , a ndtho se are a ll consec utive to the other thre e ca ses for a total eff ective se ntence of ten y ear s to serve as a r ang e I

standard of

fende r. Your total c onvictions, f our of them today , plus the three befor e, mea n y ou have se ven total class E felony convictions on y our re cord. I s th a t y ou r u nd e rs ta nd ing of the a g re e me nt?
PETI TI ONER: Yes, y our Honor. THE COURT: And y ou understand this is a sentence to serve , so I ’m g oing to se nd y ou on to the Tenne ssee Depa rtment of Corre ctions. They ’ll determine w hen y ou’re a c tua lly e lig ibl e fo r r e le a se . Y ou un de rs ta ndthat?
PETI TI ONER: Yes. At the conclusion of the plea a nd sentenc ing he aring , the trial court addre ssed the petitioner along with severa l other def endants who w ere being sentenc ed at t h at same time. The f ollowing colloquy occur red: THE COURT: Now, those of y ou who I ’m g oin g t o s en t en ce, if y ou don’t like the way I tell y ou y ou’ve g ot to serve y our senten ce , y ou can a ppeal that be cause I ’ve made that de cision. What y ou can’ t a ppeal is y our convic tion, because y ou’ve a g ree d to that, o r t h e n u m b er of y ear s that y ou’ve a g ree d to take, bec ause a g ain, y ou’ve ag ree d to that. The only thing y ou could appeal is the decision that I make, not so me thi ng y ou ’v e a g re e d to . E ve ry bo dy un de rs ta ndthat? (De fendants responded in the a ffirmative.)
THE C OU RT: Has any

body forc ed y ou or threatened y ou or pre ssured y ou in any w a y? (De fendants responded in the ne g ative.)
THE C O U RT : H a v e y o u r la w y e r s e xp lain e da ll y o u r o p ti o n s to y o u a n d e xp lained t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h t h e D i s tr i c tA t t o r n e y? (De fendants responded in the a ffirmative.) THE COURT: And y ou’ve thoug ht this over, and this is a fre e, voluntary

decision. I s th a t r ig ht?-4-

(De fendants responded in the a ffirmative.)
THE COURT: Every

body satisfied with their lawy er? (De fendants responded in the a ffirmative.)
TH E CO UR T: An y thi ng y ou do n’ t un de rs ta nd ; a nythi ng y ou want t o ask me abo ut? (De fendants responded in the ne g ative. )
The trial court acc epted the petitioner’s plea and sentenc ed him to an ef fe ct i v e ten-y ear sentenc e in the Te nnessee Depa rtment of Corre ction pursuant to the plea ag ree ment.
I n May of 2003, the pe titioner filed a pr o se “Petition for Relief from Conviction or Sentence .” I n the petit ion, he allege d that his “[c] onviction was base d on [an] unlawfully induced g uiltyplea or

g uiltyplea involuntarily enter ed without unde rstanding the nature and conse quence s of the plea ,” that the c onviction was “ba sed on t h e u s e o f coe rce d confe ssion,” and that he w as denied the e ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. Counsel was appointed to re prese nt the petitioner in the post-conviction proce eding and an a me nd e d p e tit ionwa s f

ile d a lle g ing that th e “ le g a l ba sis fo r this c la im i s th e de nia l of du e pr oc e ss a nde ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l. S pe c if

ic a lly , th e pe tit ion e r a lle g e d th a t: [T] rial counse l was ineff

ective in that trial counsel assure d petitioner that petitioner wo uldbe pla c e d inthe B oo t Ca mp p ro g ram. B a se d u po n c ou ns e l’ s r e pr e se ntatio ns , petitioner believe d that he would be admitted to the Boot Camp prog ram a nd reduc e his a c tua l ti me of

inc arc e ratio n. Th is u nd e rstandin g wa s a su bs ta nti a l f

a c tor in petitioner’s de cision to withdraw his pending application for probation and to a cce pt the plea a g ree ment in the new c ases. Petitioner ha s not been ad m i t t ed to the Boot Camp prog ram. The p et i t i oner a lso raised a claim that his counsel failed to discuss the weaknesses in the State’s evidenc e and “plausible counter -off ers which may have resulted in a more favor able total effe ctive sentenc e.” H e assert ed t h at h i s counsel “a ppear ed to be unwilling to ag g ressively seek a more favor able outcome .”
Post-Convi ction Hea ring
The trial c ourt held a hearing on the post-conviction petition wher e the tria l court hea rd testimonyfrom the pe titioner and trial counse l. The pe titioner testifie d t hat he took the of fer beca use he “ was told by

counsel that the . . . DA , a ndthe jud g e wa s [si c ] g oin g to r e c omm e ndbo ot camp, that [ I ] wo uld g e t boot c a mp. Th a t is-5-

wh y I too k th e 10 y e ars wi tho ut g oin g to t ri a l.” Th e pe tit ion e r t e stifi ed th a t he “ ha d tr us t” in h is attorney that he would g et boot camp. He did not remember trial counsel e x plaining to him t hat t h er e we re o t h er options or the possibili ty of g oing to tria l. The petitioner a lso denied that trial counsel told him he was r ece iving t h e m ax i mum sentence for the f org ery char g es. The pe titioner admitted that he discovere d afte r the acc eptanc e of the plea that he wa s too old for boot camp, but that he would not have enter ed the plea if he kne w he wa s too old for boot camp.
On cr oss- e xami n ation, the pe titioner admitted that after the first plea

hearing, he was re lease d pending sentenc ing to live at the halfway house and attend a Dr

ug Court pr og ram. He admitted that he lef t the halfway

house af ter a few wee ks, did not report for sentenc ing and d i d not report f or a prese ntence investigation.
Th e pe tit ion e r a lso a dmi tte d th a t he sh ou ld h a ve sa id s ome thi ng to the jud g e abo ut b oo t c a mp at the plea

hearing. H e admitted that the trial court asked i f “any body promised . . . [hi m] anything or coe rce d . . . [hi m] ” and he responde d “no.” T he petitioner also admitted that there was nothing on the g uiltyplea pa

perw ork re fer encing boot camp.
Tria l c ou ns e l f

or the pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th a t he dis c us se d the po ssi bil ity of bo ot c a mp w ith the petitioner at one time, but that he did not tell him i t was part of t he ag ree ment. He testified that he told the petitioner he did not know if he wa s elig ible for boot camp “bec ause of . . . [hi s] age .” Tria l c ou ns e l di d n ot r e me mbe r d isc us sin g bo ot camp with the pe tit ion e r a g a in. Tria l c ou ns e l a lso state d tha t whe n boo t ca mp is part of a ple a a g re e me nt, he make s su re that bo ot c a mp i s sp e c if ic a lly ref ere nced in the ple a ag ree ment.
At the c o n c lu s io n o f th e h e ar in g , th e tria l c o u r t d e n ie d th e p e ti ti o n
. T h e p e ti ti o n er f iled a timely notice of a

ppeal.
Post-Convi ction Standard of Re view
T h e post-conviction court’s finding s of fa ct ar e conc lusive on appea l unless the evidenc e preponde rate s otherwise. See State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999) . During our re view of the issue raised, we w ill afford those f indings of f

act the w eig ht of a jury verdic t, and this Court is b ou n d b y t h e c o u r t ’ s f i n d i n g s u n l e s s t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d p r e p o n d e r a t e s a g a i n s ttho se finding s. See He nley

v. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997) ; Alley v. State, 958 S.W .2d 138, 14 7 ( Te nn . Crim . App . 199 7) . Thi s Court may no t re we ig h or re -e va luate the e vid e nc e , n or su bs titute its infe renc es for those draw n by the post-conviction court. See State v. Honey cutt, 54 S.W .3d 762, 766 (Tenn

. 2 0 0 1 )

. H o w e v e r , th e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n c o u r t’ s c o n c lu s io n s o f la w ar e r e v ie w e d u n d er a purely de novo standa

rd with no presumption of cor rec tness. See F ields v. State, 40 S.W .3d 4 5 0, 458 (Tenn. 2001) . Further, “ question s o f cr ed i bilityof the witnesse s, the weig ht and value of the evidenc e, and r esolution of conflicts in t h e ev i d ence ar e matter s entrusted to the trial judg e as the trier of fac t.” State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). Thus, the post-conviction court’s c re dib ili ty

de te rm inatio ns are c on c lus ive on app e a l un le ss the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t th e m.-6- An a ly sis On appe al, the petitioner sugg ests that his attorney “led . . . [hi m] to mist akenly believe that bo ot c a mp w a s p art

of his a g re e me nt .” He c on te nd s th a t he su ff e re d p re jud ic e in that “ he wo uld ha ve re je c te d th e ple a

of fe r andins ist e d o n g oin g to t ri a l ha d h e un de rs too d tha t he co uld no t ge t in to the boot camp pr og ram.” The State c ounters that the post-conviction court “weig hed and me asure d the cr edibilityof the witnesse s and ac cre dite d t h e testimony of . . . [trial counsel] over that of the petitioner” and that the petit ioner failed to show that trial counse l’s perf ormanc e wa s deficie nt in any way
. The pe titioner arg ues that he w as denie d eff ective assistance of counsel. When a pe titioner seeks post-c onviction relief on the basis of ineffe ctive assistance of counsel, the pe titioner bear s the burden of showing that (a) the servic es re ndere d by trial counsel we re de ficient a nd (b) that the defic ient perf

ormanc e wa s prejudicial. See Powers v. State, 942 S.W .2d 551, 558 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). I n order

to demonstrate de ficient pe rformance , the petitioner must show that the ser vices rende red or

the advice g iven was be low “the r ang e of c ompetence demande d of attorne y s in criminal case s.” B axter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). I n order to demonstrate pr ejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a rea sonabl e p ro b ability

that, but for counse l’s defic ient perf ormanc e, the r esult of the proce eding would have be en diffe rent. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). “B eca use a petitioner must establish both prongs of the test to prevail on a claim of inef

fec tive assistance of counse l, failure to pr ove either defic ient perf

ormanc e or r esulting prejudice provides a suf

ficient ba sis to deny

relief on the claim.” H enley , 960 S.W .2d at 580.
As no te d a

bo ve, th is C ou rt

wi ll a ff or d th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ’s fa c tua l f ind ing s a presumption of cor

rec tness, rende ring them co n clusive on appe al unless the re cord pr eponder ates ag ainst the court’ s findings. See id. at 578. Howeve r, our supreme court has “de termined that issues of def icient per formanc e by

counsel a nd possible prejudice to the defe nse ar e mix ed questions of law and fa ct . . .; t h u s , [appellate] review of [t hese issues] is de novo” with no pre sumption of c or re c tne ss. B urns , 6 S.W. 3d a t 46 1. F urthe rm or e , o n c la ims of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l, the petitioner is not entitled to the benef it of hindsight. See Adkins v. State, 911 S.W .2d 334, 347 (Tenn. 1994)

. On appeal, t he petitioner c omplains that his trial counsel was inef fec tive beca

use he f ailed to inform him that he would not ge t boot camp as a part of his plea

ag ree ment. He c laims that trial counsel’s a ssuranc es of boot camp were the only rea son he ag ree d to acc ept the g uiltyplea.
Th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt de te rm ine d th a t: [F]i rst of all, I

don’t believethat y ou wer e promised boot camp. Second of a ll, I don’t believe that there was no discussion about the potential for a differ ent re solution of the case or y our rig ht to go to trial, be cause I revi ewe d that rig ht with y ou my self, and as poi nted out by the prosec utor here today , y ou wer e-7-

asked if the re w as an y thing e lse offe red to y ou. You wer e aske d if y ou had any questions. I n eac h case y ou indicated that y ou did not have any questions and nothing e lse had be en off

ere d to y ou, and I believe if y ou thought that y ou wer e g oing to be able to g o to boot camp that y ou would have r aised that at this t ime.
I do n’ t f indthat th e re ’s su bs ta nc e to y ou r a lle g a tio n th a t . . . [tria l c ou ns e l] was inef fec tive, and sec o n d o f all, y ou’ve of fer ed no evide nce that y ou wer e prej udiced in any

way . The fa ct of the matter is y ou wer e looking at a long er sentenc e than y ou g ot, and y ou ag ree d to take the se ntence that y ou did take.
So I do n’ t f inda ny me ri t to y ou r c la im o f i ne ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l, which, of c ourse, y ou would have had to establish by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e.
I n order for the petitioner t o prevail here in, he must show, by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e, that his attorney

failed to prope rly advise him of the possible conse quence s of his plea a nd that trial c ou ns e l’ s f

a ilu re to d o s o r e su lte d inpr e jud ic e
. On c e a g uil ty

ple a ha s b e e n e nte re d, e ff

e c tiv e ne ss of c ou ns e l is re le va nt o nly

to the e xten t th a t it a ff

e c ts the vo lun tari ne ss of the ple a
. I n th is r e sp e c t, such cla ims o f i neff

ective a ssistance ne cessa rily implicate the princ iple that g uiltypleas be vo lu n t ar i l y

a n d i n t e l l i g e n t l y

m a d e
. S e e H i l l v
. L o c kh ar t , 4 7 4 U

. S

. 5 2 , 5 6 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ( c i t i n g N o r th Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 ( 1970)). As state d above, in or der to succ essfully challeng e the eff ectivene ss of counsel, the pe titioner must demonstrate that counsel’s repr esentation f ell below the ra n ge of compe tence demande d of attorne y s in criminal case s. See B axter, 523 S.W .2d at 936. Under Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, the petit ioner must establish: (1) deficient repre sentation; and (2) prejudice resulting from the defic iency

. Howeve r, in the context of a g uilty plea, to sat i s fy t he second pr ong of Strickland, the petitioner must show that “ther e is a re asonable probability that, but for c ounsel’s er

rors, he would n o t h av e p l eade d g uiltyand would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; see also Walton v

. S t ate, 966 S.W .2d 54, 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) . The re c or d do e s no t pr e po nd e rate a g a ins t the fi nd ing that tr ia l c ou ns e l w a s e ff e c tiv e . Impl ic it i n th e po stconviction court’s finding s and conc lusions was that the court a ccr edited the testimony o f t rial counsel rather than that of the petitioner. As state d previou s l y , cr edibi litydeterminations are entrusted to the tria l court. Odom, 928 S.W .2d at 23. The post-conviction court ac cepte d as true the testimonyof trial counse l conce rning the circ umstances of the plea and the conve rsations leading up to that decision, including the fa ct that t rial counsel did not promise t hat t he petiti oner w ould rec eive boot camp in lieu of incar cer ation. Further, the petitioner has failed to e stablish that he suff ere d any prejudi ce as a re sult of trial counsel’s r epre sentation. We conclude that the re cord doe s not pr e po nd e rate a g a ins t th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s.-8- Conclusion
For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the judg ment of the post-c onviction court.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE