United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

June 1995 ARMY NATIONAL

GUARD

Combat Brigades’

Ability to Be Ready 

for War in 90 Days 

Is Uncertain

GAO/NSIAD-95-91

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-260005 

June 2, 1995

The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman

Chairman

The Honorable Norman Sisisky

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Readiness

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Robert K. Dornan

Chairman

The Honorable Owen B. Pickett

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Personnel

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

This reports reviews the war-fighting readiness of Army National Guard combat brigades and

their ability to deploy to any regional conflict within 90 days of mobilization. It contains

recommendations to the Secretary of the Army.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen of the House Committee on National

Security; Senate Committee on Armed Services; House and Senate Committees on

Appropriations; and Subcommittee on Readiness, Senate Committee on Armed Services. We are

also sending copies to the Secretaries of Defense and the Army and will make copies available

to others on request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this

report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues
Executive Summary

Purpose The war-fighting readiness of Army National Guard combat brigades may

be more critical today than ever before. Changing defense needs due to the

end of the Cold War and budgetary constraints have increased reliance on

Guard combat brigades and on their ability to deploy within 90 days of

mobilization to any number of regional conflicts. However, deficiencies

revealed during the brigades’ mobilization for the Persian Gulf War raised

questions about the training strategies used and the time required to be

ready to deploy. Accordingly, the Chairmen and Ranking Minority

Members of the Subcommittee on Military Readiness and the

Subcommittee on Military Personnel, House Committee on National

Security asked GAO to determine whether (1) the Bold Shift training

strategy has enabled combat brigades to meet peacetime training goals,

(2) the advisers assigned to the brigades are working effectively to

improve training readiness, and (3) prospects of having the brigades ready

for war within 90 days are likely.

Background In 1990, the President authorized the mobilization of three National Guard

combat brigades for the Persian Gulf War. These three brigades were

participants in a war-planning concept, called “roundout” or “roundup,” in

which certain high-priority National Guard brigades had a preplanned

wartime role as integral parts of active Army units. At that time, the

brigades estimated that they would need 28 to 42 days of postmobilization

training to be ready to deploy. However, the two brigades that completed

training needed 91 and 106 days, and the Army estimated they would have

required an additional 24 days of posttraining activities before

deployment. None of the Guard brigades deployed to the Gulf; they

remained in a training status until the war was over.

In 1991 the Army adopted a new training strategy—called Bold Shift—that

refocused peacetime training goals on proficiency at the platoon level and

below, rather than up through the brigade level, for mission-essential tasks

and gunnery. The strategy also included efforts to improve individual job

and leader training and implemented a congressionally mandated program

that assigned active Army advisers to the brigades. In 1993, the

Department of Defense (DOD) announced the concept of “enhanced

brigades,” which eliminated the roundout and roundup roles of the

brigades. Under this concept, 15 National Guard combat

brigades—including 7 former roundout/up brigades—are designated to

augment and reinforce active duty units in the event that the active units

cannot adequately respond to two major and nearly simultaneous regional

conflicts. GAO’s findings are based on the training proficiency of the seven

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Executive Summary

former roundout/up brigades, which should have been the best trained

because of their higher priority for resources.

Results in Brief For the most part, none of the seven former roundout/up brigades came

close to achieving the training proficiency sought by the Bold Shift

strategy during 1992 through 1994, the first 3 years the new strategy was

tested. The brigades were unable to recruit and retain enough personnel to

meet staffing goals, and many personnel were not sufficiently trained in

their individual job and leadership skills. Even if the brigades had made

improvements in individual training, their 23-percent personnel loss rate

would quickly obliterate such gains. Collective training was also

problematic. In 1993, combat platoons had mastered an average of just

one-seventh of their mission-essential tasks, compared with a goal of

100 percent, and less than one-third of the battalions met gunnery goals.

Although gunnery scores improved for four brigades in 1994, the brigades

reported no marked improvement in the other key areas. Causes of the

brigades’ training problems in many instances date back at least to the

Gulf War, and solutions are likely to be difficult and long term.

Adjustments to the strategy are underway, but it will be years before their

effectiveness has been proven.

The new adviser program’s efforts to improve training readiness have been

limited by factors such as (1) an ambiguous definition of the advisers’ role;

(2) poor communication between the active Army, advisers, brigades, and

other National Guard officials, causing confusion and disagreement over

training goals; and (3) difficult working relationships. The relationship

between the active Army and the state-run Guard is characterized by an

“us and them” environment that, if not improved, could undermine

prospects for significant improvement in the brigades’ ability to conduct

successful combat operations.

It is highly uncertain whether the Guard’s mechanized infantry and armor

brigades can be ready to deploy 90 days after mobilization. Initial models

estimated that the brigades would need between 68 and 110 days before

being ready to deploy. However, these estimates assumed that the

brigades’ peacetime training proficiency would improve to levels near

those envisioned by Bold Shift, thus shortening postmobilization training.

One model, which included the possibility that the strategy’s goals would

not be met, estimated that as many as 154 days could be required to

prepare the brigades to deploy. An Army contractor is developing a new

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Executive Summary

model, which estimates that two or three of the better trained brigades

could be ready to deploy in 102 days.

Principal Findings

Brigades Have Not Met

Peacetime Training Goals

During 1993 the brigades achieved fully trained status in about 14 percent

of platoon-level mission-essential tasks. Four of the brigades’ 13 battalions

(31 percent) met the tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle crew gunnery

standards, and another three came within 4 percentage points of the goal.

Although three of the seven brigades met the Army’s goal of having

85 percent of the reserve soldiers fully trained, they fell far short of

achieving leader training goals. An average of about 70 percent of the

officers and 58 percent of the noncommissioned officers had completed

the professional military education courses needed to lead and train

soldiers, compared with a goal of 100 percent. The brigades were staffed at

an average of 94 percent of their authorized personnel levels, compared

with a goal of 125 percent. The brigades reported that 12 of 18 battalions

(67 percent) met crew gunnery standards in 1994, but proficiency in the

other goals was generally about the same as in 1993.

Even though brigade officials said that many problems interfered with

their training proficiency, officials in six of the seven brigades pointed to

confusion over which of the hundreds of mission-essential tasks and

subtasks soldiers should train for during peacetime as one major cause of

the problems. For example, during 1993, Army evaluators noted that about

21 percent of the combat companies tried to train for too many tasks or

tasks that were less important to combat operations than others. Army

doctrine recognizes that the units cannot train for all possible wartime

tasks and requires commanders to select only those tasks that are critical

to their mission.

The Army revised the Bold Shift strategy and goals in January 1995.

Brigade task lists, which previously listed between 6 and 19 tasks, were

reduced to 3—attack, defend, and movement to contact—and the

definition of platoon proficiency was changed from fully trained in all

critical tasks to fully or partially trained in at least 70 percent of the critical

tasks. A minimum annual training attendance of at least 75 percent is now

required before a unit can be evaluated at the fully or partially trained

level. The revisions also included a mandate for a balanced program of

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Executive Summary

gunnery and critical task training. Soldier and leader training continue to

be emphasized, but school attendance during annual training is restricted

as a last resort for soldiers who must qualify for promotion.

Adviser Program Is

Hampered by Numerous

Problems

Chief among the many problems that have hampered active Army advisers’

efforts to improve the brigades’ training readiness is the advisers’ unclear

role. Army guidance is ambiguous regarding whether the advisers should

identify and resolve training problems or only assist with training. As a

result, some advisers aggressively identified training problems and sought

corrective action, whereas others focused more on training processes,

such as planning. When advisers did attempt to correct training problems,

not all Guard units were responsive to their suggestions. Since Army

National Guard units are commanded by their respective state governors

until federalized by presidential order, they are not obliged to adopt

advisers’ suggestions. According to some active Army officials, the

advisers’ effectiveness is driven primarily by the quality of their working

relationship with the brigades.

Poor communication was another major impediment to the effectiveness

of the adviser program, causing considerable confusion over Bold Shift’s

goals. Officials in four of the seven brigades and one-half the active Army

adviser teams GAO visited said that they either did not know Bold Shift’s

peacetime training goals or were uncertain about them. According to

brigade officials, Bold Shift’s goals were communicated only in broad,

general terms, such as proficiency at the platoon level.

Once officials were made aware of the goals, many believed some were

too high to achieve—particularly the fully trained goal for platoons—and

some officials did not attempt to train to the goals. Brigade officials also

believed the fully trained goal for platoons held them to a higher standard

than the active Army. Officials in several active Army divisions confirmed

that, in some cases, their objective was to reach only a partially trained

status.

Officials in both the active Army and National Guard, including officials

from five of the seven brigades, cited the need for more unified, better

coordinated working relationships. During the Gulf War, some Guard

personnel believed the Army used a double standard of readiness to keep

Guard units from deploying to Iraq. The “us and them” environment has

continued, with some Guard officials stating that the active Army does not

understand the unique difficulties faced by their personnel, often expects

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Executive Summary

too much, and excludes them from decision-making. Active Army officials

said that Guard personnel often do not understand Army training doctrine

and need to be more objective in assessments of their training proficiency.

Prospects for the Brigades

to Be Ready to Deploy

90 Days After Mobilization

Are Uncertain

Mechanized infantry and armor brigades face some of the most complex

training tasks in the Army. Postmobilization models for these brigades

developed by the Director of Army Training, Army Inspector General, and

Rand Corporation in 1991 and 1992 estimated the brigades would need 

93 to 98, 68 to 110, and 96 to 154 days, respectively, before being ready to

deploy. (GAO found no models for the Guard’s light infantry brigades.)

However, the more optimistic estimates by the Director of Army Training

and Army Inspector General were based on the assumption that Army

initiatives would be successful in improving the peacetime training

proficiency of the brigades to levels near those envisioned by Bold Shift,

thus shortening postmobilization training. The Rand model’s 154-day

estimate is based on the assumption that the strategy’s goals would not be

met.

The Army is studying a new postmobilization model being developed by

Rand. The model, expected to be completed by the summer of 1995,

estimates that two or three of the better trained brigades, at their current

levels of proficiency, could be trained and ready to deploy in 102 days. The

new model shortens the training time predicted by earlier models partly by

assuming that training will be conducted at one site large enough to

handle brigade-level exercises against an opposing force. Earlier models

had assumed the brigades would perform some training at one site and

then move to a second, larger site for brigade-level exercises. The model

also assumes that 5,000 advisers, 2,800 Army trainers, and opposing forces

for the brigades would be available to provide the training needed. (Only

2,000 advisers had been assigned as of September 1994; the remaining

3,000 are scheduled to be assigned by September 1997.) However, it is not

clear whether a sufficient number of trainers and opposing force

personnel and large-scale training sites would be available to ensure that

all 15 brigades can be readied to deploy quickly.1

Recommendations GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Army, in consultation with

National Guard leaders, (1) reassess the brigades’ premobilization training

goals to ensure that they are consistent with readiness requirements and

achievable within available training time and resources; (2) reassess the

1

DOD’s goal for the deployability of all 15 brigades is classified.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Executive Summary

role of active Army advisers assigned to the brigades, clearly stipulate

whether advisers are to identify and resolve training problems or only

assist with training; and (3) establish and document an Army plan for

preparing the brigades to be ready to deploy to war. Other GAO

recommendations to the Secretary of the Army appear in chapters 3 and 4.

Agency Comments DOD generally agreed with GAO’s findings and recommendations and said

that it had already begun actions to implement them (see app. I).

Nevertheless, DOD said that GAO had based some of its conclusions on

changing standards and emerging data and that it was too early in the

implementation of post-Desert Storm initiatives to evaluate improvement

in the Guard brigades’ readiness.

Since the brigades have not yet had a full year to train under DOD’s latest

revision to the training strategy for the brigades, GAO agrees that it is

uncertain whether the revisions will be more effective than earlier

approaches. However, this situation does not diminish the importance of

correcting deficiencies identified by GAO, many of which are management

problems that are not likely to be corrected by a change in strategy. Other

problems are long-standing and will be more difficult to solve. GAO

disagrees that its conclusions are based on emerging data. This report

covers Bold Shift data from the strategy’s inception in 1991 to 1994, the

most recent year for which data exists.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

10

Gulf War Call-Up Reveals Combat Brigade Deficiencies 11

Bold Shift Strategy Refocused Training Efforts 12

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 13

Chapter 2 

Brigades Have Not

Met Peacetime

Training Goals

15

Brigades Were Trained in Few Mission-Essential Tasks 15

Few Units Met Gunnery Standards 20

Most Units Did Not Meet Goals for Soldier and Leader Training 22

Personnel Recruiting Goals Were Not Met 26

Conclusions 28

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 29

Chapter 3 

Adviser Program Is

Hampered by

Numerous Problems

30

Adviser Program Was Mandated by Congress 30

Role of Advisers Has Not Been Clearly Defined 31

Brigades and Advisers Were Confused Over Training Goals 33

Relationship Between Active Army and Guard Is Strained 34

Enhanced Brigade Concept Confuses Potential Impact of Other

Initiatives

35

Conclusions 37

Recommendations 37

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 38

Chapter 4 

Prospects for

Achieving the 90-Day

Deployment Goal Are

Uncertain

40

Models Predict That Brigades Need Over 90 Days to Prepare to

Deploy

40

Brigade Estimates Were Subjective and Unrealistically Low 46

Conclusions 48

Recommendations 48

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 49

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 52

Appendix II: National Guard Brigades Included in Our Review 62

Appendix III: Key Reports on National Guard Training 63

Appendix IV: Major Contributors to This Report 65

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Contents

Tables Table 4.1: Director of Army Training, Army Inspector General,

and Rand Estimates of the Number of Days Required for

Postmobilization Training

42

Table 4.2: Comparison of New Rand Postmobilization Model With

Previous Models

44

Figures Figure 2.1: Unit Proficiency Achieved on Mission-Essential Tasks 17

Figure 2.2: Battalion Proficiency in Bradley and Tank Gunnery 21

Figure 2.3: Soldier Proficiency in Assigned Jobs 23

Figure 2.4: Percent of Leaders That Had Completed Professional

Education Courses

25

Figure 2.5: Brigade Personnel Strength 27

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

METL Mission Essential Task List

RTD Resident Training Detachment

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Over the past 20 years, changing defense needs and budgetary pressures

have led to an increased reliance on the Army National Guard and other

reserve forces to defend the nation. In the early 1970s, the Department of

Defense (DOD), faced with the end of the Vietnam War and budgetary

pressures to reduce active duty personnel and other costs, introduced the

Total Force Policy, which mandated the integration of active and reserve

personnel into one homogenous fighting force. The policy placed

maximum reliance on the Army National Guard when they could meet

wartime deployment schedules. Army National Guard units are

commanded by their respective state governors until federalized by

presidential order. Guard members have only about 39 days each year to

dedicate to training, although many devote considerably more time.

However, administrative and other nontraining matters can use a

considerable portion of the 39-day schedule.

In 1990, the end of the Cold War prompted a second major policy change.

The focus of the nation’s defense strategy shifted from deterrence of

global war with the Soviet Union to the projection of forces quickly to

major regional conflicts, such as aggressions against the Persian Gulf

region. The strategy now includes operations other than war, such as the

Somalia relief effort and counterdrug operations. This change in security

strategy and continuing budgetary pressures prompted DOD to develop a

plan that would reduce the Army by 25 percent by fiscal year 1995.

The role of the National Guard combat brigades has also been changing.1

Since the early 1970s, some National Guard brigades were expected to

deploy shortly after active Army units. These brigades, known as

“roundout” or “roundup” brigades, had a predetermined wartime affiliation

with active Army divisions, providing the last of three required brigades to

round out the division or an extra brigade to round up the division. These

brigades received higher priority for resources than other Guard brigades.

In 1992, the Army Chief of Staff testified that the brigades were expected

to be ready to deploy 60 to 90 days after call-up. In the early 1990s, 7 of the

44 Guard brigades were in roundout/up roles. (The seven brigades are

listed in app. II).

In 1993, DOD introduced the concept of “enhanced brigades,” which

eliminated the Guard’s roundout role. Under this concept, 15 Guard

combat brigades—including the 7 former roundout/up brigades—would be

responsible for reinforcing and augmenting active Army units if the active

1

Several platoons form a company. Two or more companies make up a battalion. Three or more

battalions comprise a brigade.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Chapter 1 

Introduction

units could not handle two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts, as set

forth in the Secretary of Defense’s Bottom-Up Review. The 15 brigades

include mechanized infantry, armor, armored cavalry, and light infantry

units.

These changes have resulted in continuing debate between Congress and

DOD over the size and role of active and reserve forces. In 1991, the

planned total force included 12 active duty divisions and 8 National Guard

divisions. However, Congress was concerned that the Army was not

assigning a large enough role to the reserves. Congress approved the

Army’s plans for reductions in the active force but did not approve all of

the reductions in the reserves. The 1993 Bottom-Up Review called for 

10 active duty divisions and the 15 enhanced brigades, the equivalent of

5 divisions. However, in May 1994 the House Armed Services Committee

recommended that the force be reconfigured to eight fully manned active

divisions and four roundout divisions that would be staffed by both active

and Guard units. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 1995 calls for a reevaluation of force structure, including increased

reliance on the reserves and an evaluation of an Army configured as 

12 active duty divisions, a number of which would be rounded out with

National Guard combat units.

Gulf War Call-Up

Reveals Combat

Brigade Deficiencies

Training and other related problems revealed during the activation of

three National Guard roundout brigades for the Persian Gulf War—the

first large scale call-up of reserve forces in more than 20 years—raised

questions about the training strategies used and the time needed to be

ready to deploy to areas of conflict.

The brigade commanders estimated that the three units would need 28 to

42 days of postmobilization training to prepare for mission-essential tasks.

However, the two brigades that completed training needed 91 and 106

days, and the Army estimated that the third brigade would have needed

135 days. The Army also estimated that an additional 24 days of

posttraining activities would have been needed before the brigades could

have deployed. None of the brigades deployed to the Gulf; they remained

in a training status until the war was over.

Reports issued by us and others found that the roundout brigades suffered

from many complex and interrelated problems. These problems resulted

in (1) the brigades being unable to achieve peacetime unit proficiency in

critical wartime tasks, gunnery skills, individual soldier and leader skills,

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Chapter 1 

Introduction

and desired personnel staffing levels and (2) increased postmobilization

training time. (See app. III for a list of key reports.)

The brigades’ problems prompted us, the Army, and Congress to

recommend improvements in training and readiness and new initiatives to

implement them. For example, the Army Chief of Staff launched studies to

identify the Army’s training support and structure needs for the 21st

century and fully accredit and integrate active Army and reserve schools

providing individual training to soldiers and leaders. The National Guard

implemented Project Standard Bearer to give priority for resources to the

roundout/up brigades to help ensure that they would be ready to meet

Army requirements when needed. In addition, Congress passed legislation

that identified 18 different reforms designed to improve National Guard

readiness, including the assignment of 5,000 active Army advisers to

reserve units.

Bold Shift Strategy

Refocused Training

Efforts

In September 1991, the Army adopted a new training strategy—called Bold

Shift—to respond to the recommendations and implement the adviser

program and other key initiatives. The strategy’s goals were to improve the

reserve’s peacetime training readiness, thereby shortening the amount of

postmobilization training time needed to prepare the units to be ready to

deploy, and the relationships between reserve and active Army units. The

strategy included initiatives in seven primary areas: the restructuring and

realignment of active and reserve units for the new defense environment,

readiness assessments and exercises, unit training, soldier training, leader

training, the involvement of affiliated active Army units in training, and the

assignment of active Army advisers to the reserves. The Bold Shift

initiatives extensively changed the way in which the Guard’s brigades

trained by

• refocusing training on proficiency at the platoon level and below in

individual skills, gunnery, and mission-essential tasks, instead of

proficiency at platoon, company, battalion, and brigade levels, and

emphasizing proficiency for a given task before moving on to the next one

rather than focusing on a large number of tasks;

• emphasizing the importance of individual soldier and leader training and

providing priority for such courses to personnel in the Bold Shift program;

• authorizing, along with ongoing National Guard efforts, certain units to

recruit over 100 percent of their wartime personnel requirements;2

 and

2

The former roundout/up units were authorized to recruit up to 125 percent.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Chapter 1 

Introduction

• increasing active Army and National Guard integration and training

support by assigning active Army advisers to reserve units and

implementing other initiatives.

The Army began testing the Bold Shift strategy on the seven former

roundout/up brigades and other reserve units during fiscal year 1992.

According to the Director of the Bold Shift task force, however, it may

take 5 to 10 years before the impact of the strategy is clearly known.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

We reviewed the training results of the seven enhanced brigades that were

former roundout/up brigades to determine whether (1) the Bold Shift

training strategy has enabled combat brigades to meet peacetime training

goals, (2) the advisers assigned to the brigades were working effectively to

improve training readiness, and (3) prospects of having the brigades ready

for war within 90 days are likely. At the time we selected the seven

brigades for review, they comprised all of the Army’s roundout/up

brigades. Because of their higher priority for resources, these brigades

should have been the best trained. Support units, such as artillery, military

police, and engineering units, were not included in our work. Despite

mobilization problems, many support units deployed on time and served

effectively during the Gulf War.

Our work at the seven brigades covered five of the seven primary Bold

Shift initiatives. We obtained data on the brigades’ progress in meeting five

key Bold Shift training goals in the areas of soldier, leader, and unit

training and discussed the results with brigade officials and active Army

advisers. These five training goals were platoons fully trained in

mission-essential tasks; tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle crews trained in

gunnery; 85 percent of soldiers fully qualified for their assigned jobs;

leaders fully trained in command, control, and coordination; and

personnel strength at 125 percent of required wartime levels.

To understand the brigades’ training policies and approaches, the training

involvement of the affiliated active Army units, and the adviser program,

we visited all seven brigades and held discussions with brigade

commanders and other officials, adviser program team chiefs and

personnel collocated with the brigades, and representatives from three

affiliated active Army divisions. Adviser personnel attached to these teams

represented about 15 percent of all advisers assigned to the program in

fiscal year 1994. We conducted detailed case studies at four of the seven

brigades, reviewing records and holding discussions with brigade

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Chapter 1 

Introduction

personnel down to the company level. We selected the four brigades, along

with Army and National Guard officials, so that the various brigade

types—light infantry, mechanized infantry, and armor—and various

geographical areas would be represented in our study. We relied

extensively on Army data for 1992 and collected data directly from the

brigades for 1993 and 1994. However, 1994 data was limited to areas in

which the brigades reported marked progress. We did not verify the

accuracy of the Army’s data.

To assess estimates of the amount of time the brigades would need to be

ready for war, we compared estimates by the mechanized infantry and

armor brigades with models prepared by the Director of Army Training,

Army Inspector General, and Rand Corporation. We discussed the

estimates with officials from each organization and three of the active

Army sponsor divisions associated with the brigades. We found no models

estimating the time needed for light infantry brigades to be ready for war.

We also met with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense,

Washington, D.C.; State Area Reserve Commands in Georgia, Idaho, and

South Carolina; the National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia; the U.S.

Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; and the U.S. Army

Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia.

We conducted our review from August 1993 to December 1994 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. DOD

provided written comments on a draft of this report. These comments are

discussed and evaluated in chapters 2 through 4 and are reprinted in

appendix I.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Chapter 2 

Brigades Have Not Met Peacetime Training

Goals

For the most part, none of the seven former roundout/up brigades came

close to meeting the Bold Shift training goals in 1992 through 1994. In

1993, the combat platoons were able to achieve fully trained status in an

average of about 14 percent of their mission-essential tasks, compared

with a goal of 100 percent. Tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle crews in less

than one-third of the battalions were able to meet gunnery goals. Although

three of the brigades met the goal of having 85 percent of soldiers fully

qualified in their assigned jobs, they fell far short of achieving leader

training goals. About 70 percent of the officers and 58 percent of the

noncommissioned officers had completed the military education courses

needed to lead and train their soldiers, compared with a goal of

100 percent. The brigades were staffed at an average of 94 percent of their

authorized personnel strength levels, compared with a goal of 125 percent.

Even if the brigades were able to meet professional education and staffing

goals, their 23-percent personnel loss rate could quickly obliterate such

gains. Gunnery scores improved in 1994, but the brigades told us that they

did not make marked improvement in the other key areas.

Many training problems faced by the brigades were identified at least as

far back as the Gulf War, and their solutions are likely to be difficult and

long term. The Army revised the Bold Shift strategy and goals in

January 1995 and has been studying additional training approaches.

However, it will be years before the effectiveness of the revisions is

known.

Brigades Were

Trained in Few

Mission-Essential

Tasks

Army doctrine states that peacetime training is to be focused on the

requirements of a unit’s wartime mission. It also recognizes that units do

not have sufficient time to train for all of the hundreds of potential

wartime tasks that may be associated with that mission, such as

maneuvering tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles to attack and defend,

and preparing for nuclear attack. Accordingly, due to limited training time,

unit commanders must identify and train only those combat tasks that are

essential to their wartime mission. The Mission Essential Task List (METL)

is the formal listing of those tasks. Unit commanders plan, execute, and

assess training based on the tasks included on brigade-, battalion-, and

company-level METLs and the supporting tasks identified for platoons and

lower levels. If commanders determine that their unit cannot execute all

the tasks on the unit’s METL to standard, they must request an adjustment

to their mission.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Chapter 2 

Brigades Have Not Met Peacetime Training

Goals

One of Bold Shift’s peacetime training goals is for platoons to be fully

trained in all tasks supporting the company-level METL.

1

 Army data for 1992

and 1993 show that the brigades did not meet this goal in either year.

Brigade officials said that they were also unable to meet the goal in 1994.

As shown in figure 2.1, only about 14 percent of platoon tasks were rated

as fully trained by unit commanders or active duty observers in 1993.

About 25 percent of the tasks were untrained, and about 61 percent were

partially trained. Figure 2.1 also illustrates that the percent of tasks rated

as fully trained generally decreases at succeedingly higher company,

battalion, and brigade levels. This outcome should be expected in a

strategy that focuses training at the platoon level and below.

1

The Army uses a system of different letters to assess training proficiency in METL tasks. An

evaluation of T, or trained, means that the unit can successfully perform the tasks to the Army

standard. P, or needs practice, evaluations mean that the unit can perform the task with some

shortcomings that are not severe enough to require complete retraining. U, or untrained, evaluations

mean that the unit cannot perform the task to the Army standard. Throughout this report, P ratings are

referred to as “partially trained” to more clearly differentiate this rating from T, or fully trained,

ratings.

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Figure 2.1: Unit Proficiency Achieved

on Mission-Essential Tasks Percent of tasks

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Platoon

Company

Battalion

Brigade

Average proficiency

Untrained

Partially trained

Fully trained

Note: Our analysis of mission-essential task proficiency included only combat elements at

company level and below; support elements were not included. Data for companies and platoons

is from 1993. Data for battalions and brigades is for 1993 and 1994.

METL task evaluations are not precisely defined and contain a measure of

subjectivity. For example, according to Army officials, partially trained

can mean that the unit can perform the task to 99 percent of standard or

1 percent of standard. We identified this problem in 1991 and

recommended that the Army develop more definitive criteria for assessing

unit proficiency.2

2

Army Training: Evaluations of Units’ Proficiency Are Not Always Reliable (GAO/NSIAD-91-72, Feb. 15,

1991).

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Numerous Problems

Hamper Achieving METL

Proficiency

Brigade officials told us that many problems interfere with achieving METL

proficiency. For example, time for collective training on METL tasks is often

overshadowed by time needed for administrative and other nontraining

requirements and attendance at individual training courses. Several

brigades told us that they focused primarily on gunnery during the 1993

annual training period and devoted little time to training on METL tasks.

METL training is further hampered by shortages of suitable local training

areas, new equipment training, and organizational changes.

In six of the seven brigades, officials ranging from brigade to company

commanders told us that a key problem was confusion over which of the

hundreds of tasks and subtasks should be selected for training. The

confusion was due to such factors as the lack of clear guidance from the

active Army and Guard officials’ inexperience. This problem undercut the

efficient use of already scarce training time, as some units were training

on tasks that were less important to combat proficiency and leaving more

important tasks untrained.

During 1993, Army evaluations of the brigades’ annual training found that

about 21 percent of the combat companies, excluding those undergoing

new equipment training, suffered from such METL-related problems. For

example, an Army evaluator found that one company’s task list included

battalion- and brigade-level tasks, such as logistical planning and refueling

on the move, which should not be a part of a company METL. The evaluator

suggested that the company closely examine its platoon task list as well.

The platoons were training for tasks, such as performing resupply

operations and crossing chemically contaminated areas, but tasks that

supported the company METL better, such as assaulting an enemy position

and defending, were not trained.

Some of the METL-related problems date back to before the Gulf War. For

example, in 1989 we reported that reserve commanders were not properly

developing METLs either because they lacked experience or guidance from

higher headquarters was vague.3

 Also, some units were using

comprehensive lists of combat tasks contained in Army training manuals

rather than identifying only the essential tasks related to their wartime

missions. About 2 years later, the Army Inspector General’s review of the

Gulf War mobilization concluded that the brigades could not meet training

3

Army Training: Management Initiatives Needed to Enhance Reservists’ Training (GAO/NSIAD-89-140,

June 30, 1989).

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standards in all the required tasks because they were trying to accomplish

too much in the time allotted.4

Bold Shift Adjusted in 1995 In April 1994, the Department of the Army’s Enhanced Brigade Task Force

proposed several adjustments to the Bold Shift training strategy and

recommended that the adjustments be tested in two or three of the

brigades over a 3-year period. One proposal was to reduce the number of

brigade-level tasks from the 6 to 19 tasks listed on the METLs we reviewed

to 3: movement to contact, attack, and defend. According to Army

officials, these three tasks comprise about 85 percent of the critical

combat tasks that brigades and lower echelons must train. The remaining

tasks are primarily those associated with specialized missions, which

could be trained after mobilization, if needed. Under the task force’s

proposal, yearly training in the test brigades would focus on one of the

three tasks so that training for all three would be completed in 3 years.

According to Army officials, the training for each of the tasks would

overlap and reinforce the other, so skills would be sustained over time,

even though only one task would be trained each year.

A National Guard working group is developing the supporting tasks down

through the platoon level for the three brigade tasks. As of January 1995,

the group had identified a preliminary list of 39 critical tasks for

mechanized infantry platoons and 38 for armor platoons. Work was still in

process for the light infantry units. In contrast, during 1993 the number of

tasks in the units we reviewed ranged from 6 to 37 in mechanized infantry

platoons and 8 to 101 in the armor platoons. Several of the brigades we

reviewed were already developing their own standardized METLs. Brigade

officials said that standardized METLs helped eliminate confusion and

wasted training time and created savings in the administrative time

required to prepare METLs.

We compared the preliminary list of critical tasks identified by the

working group with the 1993 assessment results for the brigades’ armor

and mechanized infantry platoons and found that they were only slightly

more proficient in the critical tasks than the full universe of tasks

assessed. For example, about 17 percent of the armor and mechanized

infantry critical tasks were rated as fully trained compared with an

average of 14 percent of all tasks. About 22 percent of the critical tasks

were rated untrained compared with 25 percent of all tasks on the platoon

4

Special Assessment: National Guard Brigades’ Mobilization, Department of the Army Inspector

General, June 1991.

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lists. Sixty-one percent of the tasks in both categories were rated as

partially trained.

The Army announced revisions to the Bold Shift strategy and goals on

January 30, 1995. The revisions included focusing unit METLs on the

missions of attack, defend, and movement to contact and defining platoon

proficiency as at least 70 percent of the critical tasks rated as fully or

partially trained. A minimum annual training attendance of at least

75 percent is now required before a unit can be evaluated at the fully or

partially trained level. Basic principles were retained, such as focusing

collective training at the small unit level and emphasizing achieving

proficiency on a given task before progressing to higher level training.

Few Units Met

Gunnery Standards

A second Bold Shift goal was to qualify between 60 and 66 percent of

Bradley Fighting Vehicle crews, depending on the vehicle model, at the

gunnery table VIII level.5

 Tank battalions were expected to qualify

75 percent of their assigned crews. According to the Bold Shift Director,

the goal was initially 100 percent, but Bold Shift officials lowered this goal

once they realized that a high degree of personnel turnover made the goal

difficult to meet. In 1992 only three of the brigades attempted to qualify at

the table VIII level, with 37 percent of assigned crews qualifying. In 1993, 

4 of 13 battalions met the Bold Shift strategy’s gunnery goal, and three

other battalions came within 4 percentage points of the goals, as shown in

figure 2.2. All six brigades with Bradley vehicles or tanks attempted to

qualify at least some units, with about 64 percent of the total assigned

crews qualifying.

5

The Army structures 12 gunnery tables to develop and test proficiency in a progressive manner. For

example, table I requires individual crews to engage stationary targets with a stationary tank or

fighting vehicle. Table VIII requires individual crews to demonstrate proficiency against single,

multiple, and simultaneous targets while the crews are stationary and moving.

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Figure 2.2: Battalion Proficiency in Bradley and Tank Gunnery

Percent of crews qualified

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

43

49

57

94

56

10

65

85

93

74

67

86

64

Bradley battalions Tank battalions

Battalions meeting Army standards

Battalions not meeting Army standards

Army standard for Bradley battalions

Army standard for tank battalions

Note: Our analysis excludes five battalions in new equipment training and one light infantry

brigade that has neither tanks nor Bradley vehicles.

The brigades faced a number of difficulties in seeking to meet the goal. For

example, in 1993 units were able to assemble only about 79 percent of

their assigned crews for firing qualification. According to brigade officials,

many of the personnel were excused to take individual training courses in

their assigned jobs. Army policy gives individual training priority over

collective training. Consequently, in 1993 about 71 percent of the brigade

personnel in our four case study units attended annual training, at which

attempts to qualify in gunnery often take place. Also, personnel turnover,

which includes personnel leaving the unit and changing jobs within a unit,

makes it difficult to have stable crews who have worked together long

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enough to develop a high level of proficiency. Finally, brigade officials said

that a shortage of suitable local training areas was a key factor inhibiting

their proficiency in gunnery. Some brigades must travel to training areas

150 miles away or more for weekend training.

Officials in four brigades told us that gunnery results had improved in

1994, raising the total to 12 of 18 battalions qualifying at the table VIII

level. However, this improvement may have been at the expense of combat

maneuver skills, as some brigades have had difficulty balancing gunnery

and METL training. The Army’s Enhanced Brigade Task Force found that

the brigades were spending most of their time on gunnery training and

little time on practicing combat maneuvers with tanks and Bradley

vehicles. Similarly, three of the brigades with improved 1994 gunnery

scores told us that their heavy focus on gunnery left little time for

maneuver training. Another brigade focused so heavily on METL training

during 1994 that its crews did not even attempt to qualify at the table VIII

level. As part of its recommendations for adjustments to the Bold Shift

strategy, the task force suggested that the brigades balance training in

gunnery with the maneuver tasks on unit METLs. The Army’s January 1995

revisions to Bold Shift adopted the task force’s recommendation.

Most Units Did Not

Meet Goals for Soldier

and Leader Training

Soldier and leader training are critical to successful unit training in METL

tasks, gunnery, and other areas. Soldiers must be trained in their assigned

jobs, such as infantryman or master gunner, before units can function well

collectively. Leaders, in turn, must also be trained so that they may train

their soldiers and be tactically proficient on the battlefield.

The Army’s goal is to have 85 percent of reserve unit soldiers, excluding

those who have not completed basic and advanced individual training,

fully trained in their assigned job.6

 Even though it does not specify a

percentage goal, the Bold Shift strategy’s goal was to raise the percentage

of brigade soldiers fully trained for their assigned jobs to about the same

level as active Army soldiers. In 1992, we reported that about 90 to

97 percent of the soldiers in the active Army units that replaced the Guard

combat brigades during the Gulf War mobilization were fully trained in

their assigned jobs compared with about 75 to 85 percent in the Guard

6

Although this standard was established in 1988, it has never been formalized into regulation. Thus,

many of the brigades did not maintain historical data on the number of soldiers in or awaiting training,

which is necessary to calculate the qualification rate. Consequently, officials had to estimate the

number of soldiers in training for one brigade.

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brigades.7 Program officials agreed that the Army’s overall goal of

85 percent was an appropriate substitute to use in our analysis.

As shown in figure 2.3, three brigades met the goal in 1993, and one other

was within 3 percentage points of meeting the goal. On average, 79 percent

of each brigade’s soldiers were fully qualified for their jobs. If the soldiers

who had not completed basic or advanced individual training were

included in the calculation, the average qualified rate would drop to about

74 percent.

Figure 2.3: Soldier Proficiency in

Assigned Jobs Percent trained

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1234567 Average

Brigade

74

90 90

56

82

76

93

79

Army goal for Reserves

According to Bold Shift officials, the goal for leader training was for all

commissioned and noncommissioned officers to complete the training

courses needed to lead their soldiers. Army National Guard commissioned

officer leader training includes the Officer Basic Course, the Officer

Advanced Course, and courses given at the Combined Arms and Service

Staff School and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. The

basic course prepares newly commissioned lieutenants for their first

7

Army Training: Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard Roundout Brigades

(GAO/NSIAD-93-4, Nov. 4, 1992).

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command and is required for promotion to first lieutenant. The advanced

course prepares captains to command at the company level. The

Combined Arms and Service Staff School trains majors to function as staff

officers at battalion levels and above. The Command and General Staff

College prepares lieutenant colonels to function as staff officers and field

grade commanders.8

Noncommissioned officers have primary responsibility for teaching

soldiers subjects ranging from basic survival skills to specific job skills.

Therefore, they also need to complete a series of leadership courses. The

Primary Leadership Development Course is required for promotion to

sergeant, the Basic Non-commissioned Officer Course for promotion to

staff sergeant, the Advanced Non-commissioned Officer Course for

promotion to sergeant first class, and the Sergeants Major Course for

promotion to sergeant major.

As shown in figure 2.4, no brigade met the Army’s leader training goal. On

average, about 70 percent of commissioned officers and 58 percent of

noncommissioned officers in each brigade had completed these required

courses by 1993.9

 Noncommissioned officer completion rates were

relatively low for all four required courses. Commissioned officer

completion rates were particularly low for the course given at the

Combined Arms and Service Staff School: an average of only about

11 percent of the majors in the brigades had completed the course.

Brigade officials believed this low rate was due to the fact that the course

did not become a requirement for promotion to major until October 1994.

8

The latter three were not required in 1993 before promotion to the rank indicated. However, National

Guard Bureau officials told us that each rank should have had the course indicated to perform their

duties effectively, and completion of 50 percent of the Command and General Staff College courses is

required for promotion to lieutenant colonel. Beginning in October 1994, captains were required to

have the Combined Arms and Service Staff School course before promotion to major.

9

These figures include data from one brigade as of August 1994.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
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Figure 2.4: Percent of Leaders That

Had Completed Professional

Education Courses

Percent

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Average

Brigade

84

54

83

75

60

64 63

51

64

51

76

57

68

52

70

58

Commissioned officers

Non-commissioned officers

Bold Shift goal

Note: Brigade 1 figures exclude support units.

Brigade officials consistently rated soldier and leader training as major

problems affecting overall training proficiency. Soldier and leader courses

are often difficult to complete due to their length, which may conflict with

home life; inadequate funding to attend the courses; and too few course

openings. Attendance at individual training courses also competes with

collective training for the scarce training time available, since the

individual courses are often attended during the 2-week annual training

period.

Soldier and leader training have been major problems for the Guard

brigades since at least the Gulf War. The Army Inspector General’s report

on the Gulf War mobilization concluded that, of all the weaknesses

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identified in the brigades, leadership problems—particularly in the

noncommissioned officer and field grade officer ranks—were the most

debilitating. According to the report, these leaders could not make routine

operations happen routinely because they lacked the necessary leadership

training and peacetime opportunities to practice.

One brigade reported marked progress in both soldier and leader training

during 1994, but the remaining brigades reported proficiency levels about

the same as in 1993. The Enhanced Brigade Task Force recommended that

the Army authorize funding of additional paid days for brigade personnel

to allow extended annual training periods and more leader training. The

January 1995 revisions to Bold Shift continued to emphasize soldier and

leader training, but school attendance during annual training is now

restricted as a last resort for soldiers who must qualify for promotion. No

numerical goals were specified.

Personnel Recruiting

Goals Were Not Met

Brigade officials told us that one major solution to the individual and

leader training problem was to allow the brigades to recruit over

100 percent of their authorized personnel strength. This action was

expected to help the brigades compensate for personnel problems, such as

low soldier qualification levels and turnover. The extra personnel could fill

in when soldiers or leaders were away at training courses. In 1993, the

brigades were authorized to recruit up to 125 percent of their authorized

strength. However, as shown in figure 2.5, staffing averaged about

94 percent, and only two brigades were staffed at levels higher than

100 percent.

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Figure 2.5: Brigade Personnel Strength

Percent

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Average

Brigade

93

23

113

19

102

17

89

38

85

19

82

25

91

15

94

23

Staffing rate (assigned/authorized)

Loss rate (losses/assigned)

Bold Shift staffing goal

To exacerbate the staffing problem, the number of personnel leaving the

brigades in 1993 averaged about 23 percent, ranging from about 15 to

38 percent. Such losses not only make personnel staffing a never-ending

problem, but they can also make gains in individual training quickly

disappear and further lengthen the time required to be ready to deploy.

According to National Guard Bureau data, turnover is highest among the

soldiers below the sergeant level.

Brigade officials told us that efforts to increase personnel strength are

often affected by problems such as inadequate recruiting and retention

bonuses and demographic changes. Moving units to respond to shifting

populations may improve the recruiting base but slows training in the near

term. One brigade reported raising its personnel strength from 85 percent

in 1993 to 92 percent in 1994, but the remaining brigades reported strength

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levels about the same or lower than in 1993. One unit that had been able to

increase its strength to about 102 percent reported a drop-off to the

mid-90-percent level. According to brigade officials, this decline was due

to (1) economic downsizing in the area; (2) a perception among employers

that a strong military was no longer needed, which resulted in their

increased reluctance to allow employees time off to train; and

(3) overworking Guard personnel to compensate for the high personnel

loss rate.

The Army Inspector General’s report on the Gulf War mobilization also

found that personnel strength and turnover problems, which were due to

inadequate recruiting and retention incentives, were major impediments to

rapid training of the brigades. Because personnel strength was too low in

the brigades that had been mobilized, personnel from other units had to be

brought in to fill critical vacancies. The personnel problems lengthened

the training time needed to prepare the brigades to deploy.

The Enhanced Brigade Task Force recommended that the brigades

continue to be authorized to recruit over 100 percent of their authorized

strength, possibly at 105 to 108 percent. According to one brigade official,

recruiting high levels of personnel is expensive, particularly at levels as

high as 125 percent. The task force also recommended that the brigades’

personnel priority group be raised to authorize recruiting and retention

bonuses. Guard officials told us that they had been funding such bonuses,

in certain cases, on their own for some time. However, they were forced to

suspend them in the spring of 1994 due to funding shortages. The new

Bold Shift training strategy does not address specific goals for personnel

strength, but the current National Guard program authorizes the brigades

to recruit to approximately 104 to 108 percent of their authorized strength

in certain positions.

Conclusions We believe the Army’s decision to focus platoon training on three METL

tasks is a step in the right direction, since it may help to reduce the

amount of postmobilization training time the brigades will need to be

ready to deploy. However, due to this and other recent strategy changes, it

will not be known until nearly the end of the decade whether the brigades’

peacetime training proficiency can be markedly improved. Solutions to

problems in areas such as soldier and leader training and personnel

recruiting and retention appear difficult and long term.

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The recent changes to Bold Shift attempt to balance competing and

interrelated problems in peacetime training in maneuver and gunnery,

individual training, and personnel staffing with the goal of having the

brigades ready to deploy 90 days after mobilization. The changes appear

reasonable, but they are unproven. For example, reducing authorized

personnel levels while mandating an increase in attendance at annual

training could increase problems in individual training and personnel

retention, as soldiers face the choice of reducing their time at home by

attending military training courses or being less competitive for

promotion. In addition, the changes are susceptible to other influences,

such as funding shortages, which could upset the balance that is sought.

Chapters 3 and 4 discuss additional issues and recommendations that the

Secretary of the Army should consider along with the recent adjustments

to the Bold Shift strategy.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

A draft of this report contained a recommendation that the Chief of Staff

of the Army identify and focus training on the combat tasks considered

critical to fulfilling the enhanced brigades’ missions. In view of the Army’s

recent modification to the brigades’ training strategy that will focus

training on three critical missions, we have deleted the recommendation

from this report. Also, we have revised this report to reflect other revisions

to the strategy and premobilization goals.

In commenting on platoon proficiency in METL tasks, DOD said that its

analysis of figure 2.1 showed a combined 74-percent fully and partially

trained level, and it concluded that this level would be a successful

outcome under the new goals. However, we believe that indiscriminately

combining partially trained tasks with fully trained tasks could lead to an

overly optimistic view of training proficiency. As pointed out earlier, a

partially trained rating could indicate proficiency ranging from 1 to

99 percent of a task.

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Problems

The new adviser program’s efforts to improve training readiness have been

limited by factors such as an ambiguous definition of the advisers’ role;

poor communication between the active Army, advisers, brigades, and

Guard leadership, which caused confusion and disagreement over Bold

Shift’s goals; and difficult working relationships. The role of active Army

advisers in the state-run brigade operations has not been clearly defined

by the Army. Consequently, some advisers were focused less on

identifying and resolving training problems and more on assisting in

planning and other training processes. Since advisers have no formal

authority, their effectiveness is determined primarily by the quality of their

personal relationships with the brigades. In many instances, advisers were

not effective in resolving some major training problems, such as confusion

over mission-essential task priorities.

Poor communication was another major impediment to the effectiveness

of the adviser program, causing considerable confusion over Bold Shift’s

goals. Many advisers and brigade officials said that they either did not

know Bold Shift’s goals or were uncertain about them. Once they were

made aware of the goals, many brigade and active Army officials, including

the advisers, believed that some goals were unrealistically high and could

not be achieved. As a result of the confusion and disagreement, some

brigades did not attempt to train to the proficiency level sought by the

strategy.

The Bold Shift program was begun in an environment of strained

organizational relationships between the active Army and Guard. This

problem has existed since at least the Gulf War, when some Guard

personnel believed a double standard of readiness was used to keep Guard

units from deploying to the Gulf. The resulting “us and them” environment

provided fertile ground for the confusion and disagreement over the

advisers’ role and the Bold Shift strategy’s goals. The potential

effectiveness of other initiatives begun in the early 1990s to better

integrate the active Army and Guard and strengthen training support and

oversight of Guard operations is unclear due to the changes brought about

by the enhanced brigade concept.

Adviser Program Was

Mandated by

Congress

To improve integration between the active Army and Guard, Congress

mandated in 1991 that the active Army assign 2,000 full- time advisers to

high-priority Guard and reserve units beginning in 1992.1

 This program was

intended to increase substantially the number of active advisers to the

1

Public Law 102-190, section 414, December 5, 1991.

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reserves, improve readiness, and provide a basis for determining the most

effective mix of reserve and active personnel in administering and training

reserve units. Army personnel assigned to the program have no formal

authority over the reserves. Congress amended the legislation in 1992 to

provide an additional 3,000 advisers after September 1994.2

About 700 of the first group of 2,000 advisers are in Resident Training

Detachments (RTD), which are dedicated to and collocated with specific

reserve units. About 300 RTDs are located at the Guard combat brigades.

These RTDs generally report to active Army divisions assigned training

associations with the enhanced brigades. Most of the remaining 1,300

advisers are organized regionally and provide general training assistance

and assessments of the operational readiness of Guard and reserve units

located in their region.

During 1993 and 1994, the RTD teams had a total of 45 to 49 advisers

serving each brigade. These teams are generally structured with one

major, four captains, one warrant officer, and two sergeants to service the

four to five companies in each battalion. The RTD teams are physically

collocated at battalion armories, and they periodically make visits to the

companies in the surrounding cities and towns. The Army’s original plan

was to locate about 70 advisers at each brigade, including about 20

sergeants at the company level. However, the company-level advisers were

never assigned. According to an Army adviser program official, the Army

concluded that clustering a larger number of advisers at the battalion level

was more conducive to team cohesion and command and control than

having small groups of advisers dispersed throughout each state.

Role of Advisers Has

Not Been Clearly

Defined

A number of the advisers expressed uncertainty over their role, that is,

whether they are to advise or support. The legislation establishing the

program termed the active Army personnel assigned “advisers,” and the

1992 Army Memorandum of Instruction on the program stated that the RTD

staff would focus on assessing training (identifying and resolving

problems) as well as assisting in training. However, a 1993 Army

assessment stated that the program was set up specifically as a training

support, not an adviser, program. According to the assessment, the

advisers’ duties centered around training, training support, and training

management. The assessment also stated that the personnel assigned

provided advice when appropriate, even though they were not intended to

be advisors in the historic and usual sense.

2

Public Law 102-484, section 1132, October 23, 1992.

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As a result of the ambiguous guidance, some RTD advisers attempted to

evaluate and correct problems, whereas others focused more on assisting

in training processes, such as planning. According to active Army and RTD

personnel, the advisers’ effectiveness is determined primarily by the

quality of their personal relationships with the brigades. For example, RTD

advisers in several brigades identified problems, including (1) inadequate

METLs; (2) improper rifle sighting standards; and (3) weaknesses in training

objectives, plans, and exercises. The advisers subsequently attempted to

initiate corrective actions. Guard units were responsive to the advisers’

suggestions in some cases, in others they were not. In one case, RTD

advisers repeatedly made suggestions in writing for nearly 1 year for

improvements in a unit’s METL, but that unit did not respond.

Other RTD advisers said that their active Army division told them not to

become involved in assessing or evaluating training readiness. As a result,

the advisers focused more on training processes than training results. For

example, these advisers told us they had helped prepare the training plans

for the brigade but had not seen the training assessment reports from

annual training. The advisers also said that, despite their good personal

relationships with many officials throughout the brigade, Guard personnel

were very sensitive to any criticism. For example, one of the adviser’s

suggestions for improvement was picked up by the active Army division to

whom the RTDs report, and the division aggressively called on the brigade

for corrective action. However, that instance set off a long period of bad

feelings between the brigade and the advisers because the brigade

believed the advisers had publicly criticized them.

Symbolic of the problems faced by some advisers, RTD advisers at one

location were housed in trailers outside the armories, separate from the

Guard personnel inside the armories. RTD personnel said that they had

initially shared armory space with the Guard, but the state area reserve

command believed it did not have adequate space to collocate them. RTD

advisers told us that the physical separation from the daily conversation of

the brigade made it much harder to identify problems and reinforced a

separation between the brigade and the advisers. All other brigades we

visited were able to collocate the adviser and Guard personnel.

In another brigade, RTD and Guard personnel enjoyed a particularly good

relationship. In fact, unlike the other brigades, Guard personnel were

allowed to provide formal written input to the RTD performance ratings,

which is normally provided only by active Army personnel. Also, RTD

personnel had been used to temporarily fill brigade positions, such as

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executive officer. However, the RTD personnel had been so busy with their

other duties that they had not focused on correcting METL problems. When

we brought this situation to their attention, the advisers acknowledged

that they needed to focus more on improving the unit’s METL.

National Guard and active Army officials had varying opinions about the

proper role for the advisers. Some active Army officials believed the RTD

advisers could not be effective without some formal assessment,

supervisory, or other clear line of authority over Guard operations. Army

officials also told us, however, that the relationship was not strong enough

between the Army and Guard to allow the RTDs to assess or evaluate the

Guard units they live with, and the relationship would worsen if they did.

Alternatively, Army officials told us that the active divisions affiliated with

the brigades, or the regionally organized adviser teams, should perform

assessments of the brigades, with the RTD advisers’ role limited to training

support functions only.

Some Guard officials stated that they valued the advice provided by the

advisers and could accept that they had some assessment authority.

However, other Guard officials stated that they did not need advice from

active Army officers. Some brigade officials called for more RTD sergeants

with technical expertise in gunnery, supply, and maintenance. Guard

officials valued the up-to-date technical expertise and hands-on support

provided by the sergeants. However, since the Army abandoned its

original plan to locate about 20 RTD sergeants at the company level, the

current organization provides five commissioned officers but only two

sergeants and one warrant officer to provide such technical advice to the

four or five combat companies in each battalion.

Brigades and Advisers

Were Confused Over

Training Goals

Officials in four of the seven brigades, as well as three of the six active

Army adviser teams, told us they either did not know the Bold Shift

strategy’s peacetime training goals or were uncertain about them.3

 Most of

the confusion centered on the goal for platoon proficiency. For example,

even though three brigade commanders understood the goal for platoon

proficiency was that tasks needed to be fully trained, several commanders

believed that platoon tasks needed to be only partially trained. Brigade

and Army officials stated that the strategy’s goals were communicated

only in broad, general terms through a series of briefings from the Army to

the National Guard Bureau and the brigades. A more specific

3

One brigade was not assigned a team of advisers because it was considered for dissolution as part of

the reduction of the military.

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interpretation of the goals—such as platoons fully trained on all tasks that

support the company’s METL—were not documented in training guidance

or other documents provided to the brigades.4

When we reiterated the goals described by Bold Shift officials, many

brigade, as well as advisers and other active Army officials, believed that

some were too high to achieve during peacetime. These officials were

particularly concerned with the platoon proficiency goal. According to

these officials, this goal holds brigades to a higher standard than active

Army units. Officials from several active Army divisions acknowledged

that their goal was to train some tasks to the fully trained level and others

to the partially trained level. The Director of the Bold Shift strategy

acknowledged that there was, and still is, a great deal of disagreement

over the goals.

As a result of the confusion and disagreement, brigade training goals were

sometimes focused at lower levels of proficiency than the Bold Shift

strategy’s goals. For example, several brigade commanders told us that

they generally planned platoon training on METL tasks to reach only the

partially trained level and avoid an untrained status in the tasks. Another

commander told us that they could probably never get all their leaders

fully trained because of high personnel losses and turnover. Even though

some brigades did not know the goals, our analysis of 1993 data showed

no marked difference in the training proficiency levels of those brigades

and the brigades who knew the goals.

Relationship Between

Active Army and

Guard Is Strained

Advisers and other officials in both the active Army and Guard, including

officials from five of the seven enhanced brigades we reviewed, cited the

need for more unified, better integrated working relationships.

Working relationships between the active Army and Guard chains of

command have been strained since at least the Gulf War mobilization. For

example, a Congressional Research Service report on the mobilization

found that considerable bitterness and recrimination existed over the

Army’s decision not to deploy the Guard brigades that were mobilized for

the war.5

 According to the report, active Army brigades with the same

4

We identified the specific goals by interviewing the Bold Shift Director and staff and Guard officials.

We also traced the goals through a Bold Shift test directive, dated May 1992, and versions of U.S.

Forces Command Regulation 220-3, dated July 1993 (draft) through April 1994. This regulation

provides guidance to active Army units for assessing reserve unit training.

5

The Army’s Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War, Congressional Research Service,

October 1991.

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resource and training status ratings as the three Guard brigades were

allowed to deploy immediately, but the Guard units were required to

undergo several months of postmobilization training. Some Guard officials

believed the brigades were subjected to a double standard and that this

was the reason for the brigades’ lengthy postmobilization training period

rather than any real readiness problems.

On the other hand, however, the Army Inspector General’s report on the

Gulf War mobilization found that the resource and training status ratings

for the brigades overstated their actual level of training readiness. For

example, most METL tasks were rated as fully or partially trained, but many

units could not demonstrate proficiency in basic skills, such as sighting

the weapons on their tanks.

During our review, National Guard and active Army officials repeatedly

referred to the continuing “us and them” environment. For example, one

brigade commander told us that, although he had good personal

relationships with his active Army counterparts, he believed the Army’s

decision to eliminate the roundout/up role for the Guard was actually

motivated to keep the Guard out of any combat role and thus preserve

funding for the active Army. Other Guard officials told us that the active

Army did not understand the unique difficulties faced by their personnel,

often expected too much, and excluded them from decision-making.

Active Army officials told us that Guard personnel did not understand

Army training doctrine and needed to learn to be more objective in

assessments of their training proficiency. According to these officials, the

Guard cannot be as ready as active Army units because it has only 39 days

of annual training compared with about 240 days for active units.

Enhanced Brigade

Concept Confuses

Potential Impact of

Other Initiatives

The Army and Congress also introduced other initiatives in the early 1990s

to better integrate the active Army and Guard and strengthen training

support and oversight of Guard operations. However, the potential

effectiveness of these initiatives is unclear primarily due to the changes

brought about by the enhanced brigade concept. For example, at the time

the initiatives were introduced, a wartime tie existed between the former

roundout/up brigades and their active Army sponsor divisions. However,

the enhanced brigade concept has severed this relationship.

One initiative was the attempt under Bold Shift to increase the training

support provided by the active Army divisions with whom the brigades

held a predetermined wartime affiliation. For example, Bold Shift

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attempted to ensure that these active Army sponsor divisions were located

near the brigades. Instead of just observing and assessing the brigades’

conduct of their own training, Bold Shift made the sponsor divisions

responsible for helping support the training of the brigades by setting up

firing ranges and exercises and providing other direct assistance.

Some Guard officials raised concerns that severing the predetermined

wartime ties with sponsor divisions under the enhanced brigade concept

was a step backward from this Bold Shift initiative. This wartime

interdependence provided a measure of shared accountability between the

Guard brigades, active Army sponsor units, and advisers who reported to

the sponsor units.

Although the brigades are continuing peacetime training associations with

active Army sponsor units, brigade officials were concerned that the

sponsors have no incentive to provide strong training support, since the

brigades no longer round out or round up the divisions during wartime.

According to several of the brigades, active Army support for such things

as setting up firing ranges during annual training has already been

reduced. Army officials told us that the Guard brigades would lose some of

the routine support previously provided by the active Army sponsors.

However, the sponsors will continue to provide support during annual

training, although some support roles will now be taken over by the

advisers. The enhanced brigade concept also lowered the priority of four

of the seven former roundout/up brigades for resources, since that priority

was linked to that of their active Army wartime sponsors.

Another initiative was to increase sponsor unit oversight of the brigades,

under Congress’ Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of

1992. According to this legislation, the associated active Army sponsor

units became responsible in 1993 for agreeing or disagreeing with

recommended promotions above the level of first lieutenant in the

brigades. By 1995 the sponsor divisions were expected to be responsible

for approving training programs, reviewing readiness reports, assessing

resource requirements, and validating the compatibility of the Guard unit

with active Army forces. According to officials at active Army sponsor

units, the legislation formalizes informal reviews of training plans and

readiness reports that some active units have been conducting for years as

part of their sponsor role.

The weakening of incentives for shared accountability and the factors that

influenced some advisers to avoid aggressive evaluation of brigade

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problems could also hamper aggressive oversight by the sponsor units. For

example, the Army Inspector General’s report on the mobilization for the

Gulf War found that sponsor units for the brigades were not challenging

brigade Unit Status Reports that overstated their level of training

readiness. According to sponsor unit officials, some units do take a critical

look at the reports, but the criteria for assessing training readiness is so

subjective that it is difficult to challenge inflated reports. Other units

stated that they do not challenge the reports, even if they do appear

inflated. Instead, they pass their own estimate up through channels along

with the brigade’s estimate. (See ch. 4 for more detail on this subject.)

Conclusions Any significant improvement in the proficiency levels of National Guard

combat brigades are not likely to be attained without a marked

improvement in the relationship between the active Army and the Guard.

The “us and them” environment must change if Guard combat brigades are

to meet the expectations set out for them in the national defense strategy.

We believe that at least two critical elements are needed to achieve a

smoother relationship between the active Army and the Guard. The first

element is clear and reasonable peacetime training goals, which are fully

supportive of military needs, accepted by all participants, and adequately

communicated to all parties. Without goals that are mutually acceptable

and effectively communicated, confusion over program direction will

linger and foster continuing disagreement and misunderstanding of

training readiness. The second element is a mutually acceptable role for

advisers in Guard brigade operations that balances the right of National

Guard command prerogative with the need to identify and correct training

problems. In this regard, we do not believe the effectiveness of the adviser

program should be determined primarily by an individual adviser’s ability

to succeed in interpersonal relations.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of the Army, in consultation with

National Guard leaders, direct the Chief of Staff of the Army to

• reassess premobilization training goals for the enhanced brigades to

ensure that they are consistent with readiness requirements and

achievable within available training time and resources;

• document the training goals in guidance provided to the brigades;

• reassess the role of advisers assigned to the enhanced brigades, clearly

stipulate whether advisers are to identify and resolve training problems or

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only assist with training, ensure that advisers have the authority necessary

to carry out their role, and document the advisers’ role in memorandums

of understanding with each state; and

• test additional steps to improve the integration of advisers assigned to the

enhanced brigades by, for example, (1) providing the advisers with formal

authority to review and agree or disagree with unit training plans and

readiness reports, (2) including National Guard commanders as

intermediate raters for all RTD advisers, (3) increasing enhanced brigade

personnel authorizations to allow RTD active duty officers to augment key

brigade positions such as executive officers and training and operations

officers, and (4) restructuring or increasing the size of adviser teams

assigned to the brigades to provide for additional master gunners or other

noncommissioned technical experts.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD agreed with our first three recommendations. It said that the Army

planned to (1) establish the minimum essential premobilization training

objectives that the brigades must meet in the areas of gunnery, platoon

maneuver proficiency, and command and staff training; (2) document the

goals in regulations; and (3) prepare detailed guidance that should

eliminate confusion about the role of advisers.

DOD did not agree with our recommendation to test additional steps to

improve the integration of advisers assigned to the enhanced brigades. It

stated that it believed the recommendation would subvert the chain of

command and place advisers in an untenable position. DOD explained that

our report implied that state command of the Guard units removed the

obligation to accept adviser recommendations, oversimplifying the fact

that Guard units must meet Army standards in all activities to retain

federal recognition. DOD further stated that advisers could not

simultaneously play the role of adviser and evaluator.

We agree that the brigades must meet Army standards and that the brigade

commander is ultimately responsible for resolving problems. However, the

issue addressed in our report pertains to the question of what role advisers

should play to ensure a proper balance between the Guard’s command

prerogative and the prompt identification and correction of training

readiness problems.

We believe that advisers can simultaneously advise and evaluate the

brigades without subverting the chain of command. Advisers are uniquely

qualified to evaluate unit training and readiness by virtue of their daily

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presence at the brigades. This role would also be consistent with the

responsibility of the active Army unit associated with the brigades for

approving training programs and reviewing readiness reports, since the

advisers report to these active Army units.

The feasibility of active duty personnel assisting as well as evaluating

reserve units has been demonstrated by the Marine Corps’

Inspector-Instructor program. The mission of Inspector-Instructor

personnel is not only to assist units in maintaining a continuous state of

readiness but also to supervise and inspect the units. In this regard, Marine

Inspector-Instructors have formal responsibility for monitoring and

evaluating unit training and other readiness aspects. Although there are

significant differences between the Marine Reserves and the Army

National Guard, the former Chairman of the Subcommittee on Military

Forces and Personnel, House of Representatives, testified in 1993 that he

intended for the Army advisers to be used similar to the Marine

Inspector-Instructors.6

6

Hearings on the Link Between Force Structure and Manpower Requirements, Subcommittee on

Military Forces and Personnel, House Armed Services Committee, Report 103-5, March 1993, pp. 48

and 188.

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
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Deployment Goal Are Uncertain

It is highly uncertain whether the National Guard combat brigades can be

ready to deploy 90 days after mobilization. Initial postmobilization models

estimated that the brigades would need between 68 and 110 days before

being ready to deploy. These estimates, however, assumed that the

brigades’ peacetime training proficiency would improve to levels near

those envisioned by Bold Shift, thus shortening postmobilization training.

One model, which included the possibility that the strategy’s goals would

not be met, estimated that as many as 154 days could be required to

prepare the brigades to deploy.

An Army contractor is developing a new postmobilization model, which

estimates that two to three brigades could be ready to deploy in 102 days.

However, the Army has not endorsed the model, and there are a number of

unanswered questions about the availability of the resources needed to

mobilize all 15 enhanced brigades quickly. Although some brigades have

reported that they could be ready to deploy in less than one-half the time

predicted in the models, these reports omit key steps in the

postmobilization training process.

Models Predict That

Brigades Need Over

90 Days to Prepare to

Deploy

Postmobilization models for mechanized infantry and armor brigades

developed by the Director of Army Training, Army Inspector General, and

Rand Corporation in 1991 and 1992 estimated that the brigades would

need 93 to 98, 68 to 110, and 96 to 154 days, respectively, before being

ready to deploy. However, the more optimistic estimates by the Director of

Army Training and Army Inspector General were based on the assumption

that the brigades would reach a higher level of proficiency during

peacetime training than has been realized. The new postmobilization

model shortens the training time predicted by earlier models, in part, by

assuming that training would be conducted at one site large enough to

handle brigade-level exercises against an opposing force instead of some

training being performed at one site and then a second, larger site for

brigade-level exercises. The Army has not stated whether it endorses these

models or believes other plans for preparing the brigades are needed.

Initial Models Estimate 

68 to 154 Days

In February 1992, the Army Chief of Staff testified before the House

Committee on Armed Services that the Army could not have the Guard

brigades ready to deploy with less than 60 to 90 days of postmobilization

preparation time. The Chief of Staff attributed this to the brigades’

difficulty in reaching a high enough level of peacetime training proficiency,

in only 39 days of training, to be able to lower the postmobilization time

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requirements. In 1993, the Secretary of Defense’s Bottom-Up Review

reiterated that the goal for the enhanced brigades was to have them ready

to deploy in 90 days.

In 1991 and 1992, the Director of Army Training, Army Inspector General,

and Rand Corporation, under contract to the Army, all produced models

analyzing the training and other actions needed to prepare the mechanized

infantry and armor brigades to be ready to deploy to a war zone.1

 (We

found no models estimating the time needed for light infantry brigades to

be ready to deploy.) The models generally included three basic steps:

mobilization, collective training on combat skills, and training recovery

and preparation to deploy. The particular content of each step may vary

based on the particular needs of the mission, an analysis of enemy

capabilities, the type of terrain, and the time available. The range of tasks

and time required to train for them may also vary based on the level of

proficiency sought and the premobilization training proficiency achieved.

The first step, mobilization, included such actions as assembling the

troops, moving them to the mobilization or collective training stations, and

preparing them to move overseas. Units would perform administrative and

personnel processing at the mobilization and collective training sites.

Soldiers would receive individual refresher training in common combat

skills, such as map reading and weapons qualification, as well as their

particular job duties. Wills and family care plans and other preparations

for overseas movement would be completed, and personnel from other

units would be assigned to fill any vacancies.

The second step, collective training, included a progression of training on

the unit skills needed from the lowest to highest echelon. Two basic

phases are involved in this step. First, individual tank and Bradley Fighting

Vehicle crews, and the platoons they form when combined, would need to

ready themselves to function as part of a larger group and correct any

maintenance problems with their tanks and Bradleys. Since some crews

may have new personnel, they might need to practice on simulators before

moving to the gunnery ranges. The crews would then proceed through the

sequence of gunnery tables up through platoon-level proficiency at 

table XII.

Second, the unit would move up to company-, battalion-, and brigade-level

operations. Bradley and armor platoons would be integrated into company

1

90/365 Day Post Mobilization Training, Director of Army Training, April 1992. Special Assessment of

the Mobilization of Army National Guard Combat Brigades, Army Inspector General, June 1991.

Post-Mobilization Training of Army Reserve Component Combat Units, Rand Corporation, 1992.

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teams to practice mission-essential tasks, such as attacking and defending.

Multiple company teams would then come together to practice operations

under a battalion task force headquarters. The battalion task forces might

also come together to form a complete brigade and practice offensive and

defensive battles against an opposing force. Because of the space

requirements for such a large-scale action, the brigade would generally

have to relocate from its collective training site to one of the few sites set

up to handle brigade operations, such as the National Training Center at

Fort Irwin, California.

The third step, recovery and preparation to deploy, occurs after training is

completed and the unit is back at its mobilization station. In this step, the

unit would conduct maintenance on its equipment after its use in training

and prepare to load the equipment for overseas shipment to the war zone.

The three models established new postmobilization training time estimates

based on the innovations in training set forth by the Bold Shift strategy. As

shown in table 4.1, the Director of Army Training and Army Inspector

General estimates ranged as high as 8 and 20 days, respectively, over the

goal of 90 days. However, the Rand Corporation estimated that as much as

154 days could be required to prepare the brigades to deploy. The

estimates all assumed that large numbers of active Army personnel would

be available to help the brigades conduct the training.

Table 4.1: Director of Army Training,

Army Inspector General, and Rand

Estimates of the Number of Days

Required for Postmobilization Training

Figures in days

Activity

Director of

Army Training

Army

Inspector

General

Rand

Corporation

Mobilization 7 7-12 11-15

Collective training 86-91 54-84 78-125a

Recovery and preparation to deploy 0 7-14 7-14

Total 93-98 68-110 96-154

aRand’s baseline estimate was 79 to 128 days. However, the estimate assumed that collective

training, including a brigade-level exercise, would be conducted at one site without having to

move to the National Training Center. The time required to move a brigade and its equipment to

and from the Training Center was estimated by Rand to add between 17 and 26 days. We added

these days to Rand’s base estimate for comparison with the other models.

The different estimates were a result of differences in the models’

assumptions and approaches. For example, unlike the other estimates, the

Director of Army Training model did not set aside a specific block of time

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for recovery activities, generally estimated at 7 to 14 days. According to

members of the team that developed the estimate, they believed enough

flexibility was built into the overall schedule to allow the brigades to

complete training, clean up their equipment, and move directly from the

collective training site to the port of deployment.

The main reason for the differences, however, was that the Director of

Army Training and Army Inspector General assumed that the brigades

would generally meet the Bold Shift strategy’s peacetime training goals,

thereby shortening postmobilization training time. For example, both

estimates assumed that brigade staffing would be about 110 percent of

authorized strength, which would help the brigades to mobilize with fully

trained leaders and about 85 percent of their soldiers fully trained in their

duty specialties. However, as discussed in chapter 2, in 1993 the brigades

averaged about 94 percent of authorized strength, and only about

70 percent of their officers and 58 percent of their noncommissioned

officers were fully trained. The Director of Army Training and Inspector

General estimates also assumed that platoons would achieve

premobilization proficiency in METL tasks and that 70 to 100 percent of the

tank and Bradley crews would be qualified at the gunnery table VIII level.

However, in 1993 the platoons were fully trained in only about 14 percent

of their METL tasks, and about 64 percent of the crews met table VIII

standards.

The Rand Corporation included estimates for a range of outcomes

resulting from the implementation of the Bold Shift strategy, including the

possibility that the strategy’s goals would not be met. This assumption

increased the Rand estimate for collective training by 34 to 41 days over

the Director of Army Training and Army Inspector General estimates.

Under Rand’s scenario, the units that had difficulty meeting the goals

would suffer high personnel turnover. Attendance at annual collective

training would be lowered by attendance at individual training courses,

and most annual training would be devoted to gunnery. This would leave

little time for maneuver training in METL tasks. Squad and platoon skills

would be difficult to sustain because of the focus on gunnery, limited time

for weekend training, and difficulties in gaining access to local training

areas. Company-level training would require more time because the

platoons needed more training time and repeat training.

New Model Predicts 102

Days

The Rand Corporation is currently developing a new postmobilization

training model for the Army, which is expected to be completed during the

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summer of 1995. As of January 1995, the new model was predicting that

the better enhanced brigades—for example, those who had qualified most

of their crews at the gunnery table VIII level and had 75 percent of their

soldiers trained in assigned jobs—could be ready to deploy about 102 days

after mobilization. Army officials told us they were studying the model and

various options for implementing it. However, there are a number of

unresolved questions about the availability of the personnel, training

facilities, and other resources needed to ensure that all 15 enhanced

brigades can be trained and ready to deploy quickly.

The current version of the model is based on the same three steps as

earlier models: mobilization, collective training, and recovery and

preparation to deploy. As shown in table 4.2, the times allotted for

mobilization and recovery are similar to the earlier models.

Table 4.2: Comparison of New Rand

Postmobilization Model With Previous

Models

Figures in days

Activity

Director of

Army

Training

model

Army

Inspector

General

model

Previous

Rand model

New Rand

model

Mobilization 7 7-12 11-15 12

Collective training 86-91 54-84 78-125 80

Recovery and preparation to

deploy 0 7-14 7-14 10

Total 93-98 68-110 96-154 102

The largest difference between the former and current Rand models was

in collective training. The 1992 Rand model estimated that as much as 125

days could be required in this step, whereas the new model included only

80 days. Both models include the progression from crew and platoon

proficiency to company teams, battalion task forces, and brigade-level

exercises against an opposing force. However, the new model cuts as

much as 26 days off the time by starting collective training at a site large

enough to handle brigade-level exercises without moving to a second site.

Under the earlier models, one scenario was for the units to conduct

collective training through company and battalion levels at one training

site and then move to the National Training Center or another site large

enough to handle brigade-level exercises. However, the time for moving

the equipment and soldiers to and from the new site was estimated at

between 17 and 26 days.

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Army officials told us that postmobilization training would also be

shortened by improved planning for pre- and postmobilization training.

According to these officials, Bold Shift provided clearer and better focused

peacetime training expectations than the brigades had at the time of the

Gulf War. In addition, the new postmobilization model is developing a plan

that matches the brigades with the personnel, training facilities, and other

resources needed to ensure efficient postmobilization training.

Army officials told us they were studying options to train two to three

brigades at a time. However, under the model, training three brigades at a

time could require about 300 days to prepare the seven armor and

mechanized infantry brigades. It is not clear how much more time would

be required to prepare the remaining eight light infantry and armored

cavalry brigades. Options to shorten the time to prepare all 15 brigades for

deployment appear limited. For example, according to Army officials,

increasing the number of brigades in each training group to five and

starting the second group’s training before the first was finished would

require about 10 sites suitable for brigade-level exercises, 6,800 trainers,

3,000 National Guard assist personnel, and 10 brigades to provide

opposing forces.

It is also not clear how the Army will provide the large numbers of

personnel and training sites needed to quickly prepare all 15 enhanced

brigades to perform their wartime role. For example, during the Gulf War,

nearly 9,000 active Army personnel were committed to help train the three

Guard brigades that were mobilized. These Army personnel performed

such functions as running gunnery ranges, helping with training exercises,

and evaluating training proficiency, which freed the Guard brigades to

focus on training. Active Army personnel also provided the opposing

forces needed for brigade force-on-force exercises.

According to Army and Rand officials, the new model assumes that the

5,000 advisers plus an additional 2,800 active Army trainers from other

programs would be available to provide the training needed. Under the

model, each brigade would require about 1,000 support personnel: 680

active Army trainers and 300 National Guard personnel to assist them, as

well as another 3,000 personnel to form the opposing force brigade.

However, only 2,000 advisers had been assigned as of September 1994,

with the remaining 3,000 scheduled to be assigned by September 1997.

In addition, Army officials told us that there are currently only two trained

opposing forces in the United States and one in Germany. The officials

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believed that National Guard personnel could be trained to perform as

opposing forces in 1 to 2 years. According to the officials, a total of seven

training sites are being considered to provide the space needed for

brigade-level exercises. However, at least one of these sites has

environmental constraints that could limit its use.

Brigade Estimates

Were Subjective and

Unrealistically Low

In recent years, all the brigades have reported that they could meet the

90-day deployment goal. Brigade estimates of collective training time

reported in Unit Status Reports were, in some cases, less than half the 86

to 91 days estimated in the Director of Army Training model.2

According to brigade officials, postmobilization collective training

estimates were based on current levels of proficiency in individual

training, METL tasks, gunnery, and personnel staffing. However, the

estimates did not assume that the brigades needed to meet the Bold Shift

peacetime training goals to meet the 90-day postmobilization goal. The

estimates also excluded brigade-level exercises against an opposing force

at the National Training Center or other site with sufficient space for such

exercises. These exercises, according to the Army Inspector General,

could add as much as 38 days to training time. For example, one brigade

reported that it could achieve full proficiency with only 60 days of

postmobilization training, even though it had been reorganized, had two

battalions in new equipment training that were unable to qualify in

gunnery, and had not conducted a consolidated annual training period

with all its units at the same site for 3 years. Another brigade estimated it

would need only 37 days of training.

According to officials from active Army sponsor units, the brigades can be

trained in less than 90 days by omitting such activities as brigade-level

force-on-force exercises. However, these actions would increase the risk

of a higher number of casualties. Similar comments were made by others

during the Gulf War mobilization. For example, according to a

Congressional Research Service report on the roundout brigades

mobilization, one active Army division commander stated that Guard

combat brigades could deploy and fight immediately but with enormously

high risk and at the cost of many casualties. This commander believed that

it would take about 120 days to get his Guard brigade fully trained.

2

The Army requires commanders to complete Unit Status Reports, which assess the status of their

personnel, equipment, and training in terms of five overall “C-levels.” C-1, for example, indicates that

the unit possesses the resources and training to undertake its full wartime mission. C-5 indicates that

the unit is not prepared to undertake its wartime mission.

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Chapter 4 

Prospects for Achieving the 90-Day

Deployment Goal Are Uncertain

The Army has neither endorsed the deployment models nor included them

in regulations and procedures guiding brigade estimates of

postmobilization requirements.3

 The Army also has no objective training

performance measurement system to analyze peacetime training

proficiency and link it to the number of postmobilization training days

required for the brigades to be ready to deploy. According to brigade

officials, the estimates in Unit Status Reports are subjective assessments

of the time needed to train. Army guidance currently requires the brigades

to estimate the training days required to achieve full proficiency in METL

tasks based on subjective considerations of peacetime training

proficiency, the status of personnel and equipment, the adequacy of

nearby training areas, and the mission.

Army guidance does not provide commanders with specific information to

help guide their estimates of the number of training days the brigades

would need. This information consists of (1) objective measures of

peacetime training proficiency, such as the Bold Shift goals; (2) the

general training steps, such as brigade-level force-on-force exercises,

which should comprise postmobilization training; or (3) objective

definitions of the relationship between various levels of peacetime training

proficiency and postmobilization training requirements. The Army also has

no system to provide centralized information on the status of training

relative to the Bold Shift goals. For example, we had to query each brigade

individually down to the company level to obtain information on

proficiency in METL tasks and leader training.

Brigade and active Army officials told us that, under the current system,

the brigades feel pressured to keep postmobilization training time

estimates at 42 days or less because of that estimate’s perceived linkage

with the brigades’ ability to perform their wartime mission. Army guidance

equates the estimated days with the unit’s training status, or “T-level.”

Estimates over 42 days are T-level 4. According to brigade officials, the

T-level is equated with the unit’s overall status relative to the training and

resources needed to perform its wartime mission, or “C-level.” For

example, T-level 4 is equated to C-level 4, which indicates that the unit

needs additional resources or training to undertake its wartime mission.

3

These models could be included in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting, July 1993, and the

U.S. Army Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Chapter 4 

Prospects for Achieving the 90-Day

Deployment Goal Are Uncertain

Difficulties with the subjective nature of the C-level rating system have

been reported by the Army Inspector General and us for years.4

 For

example, 2 years before it reported inflated C-level ratings during the Gulf

War mobilization, the Inspector General reported that guidance on the

translation of required training days into C-levels might be too vague and

that unit commanders had been first deciding what C-level their units

should be and then looking up the associated number of training days and

reporting that number. According to the Inspector General, the reports

were clearly labeled as status reports, but unit commanders had perceived

them as readiness reports. The reports were sent through active Army

channels, but the commanders making the estimates were rarely

challenged to show what and how they would train during the estimated

days. As a result, C-levels did not reflect the true training proficiency levels

in the units.

Conclusions Given the current level of proficiency in the Bold Shift goals, the brigades

would have difficulty meeting the Army’s 90-day goal if mobilized today

under existing modeling approaches. Also, the ability to meet this goal in

the future rests largely on the success of untested adjustments to the

training strategy and the availability of substantially greater resources than

exist today.

Existing models make various assumptions regarding postmobilization

training requirements and the supporting resources that will be necessary,

such as trainers and training sites. However, the Army has not stated

whether it endorses these models or believes other plans for preparing the

brigades are needed. A credible estimate of the postmobilization days

needed to prepare Guard brigades to deploy rests largely on answers to

these questions. A more objective system for brigade commanders to

assess peacetime training proficiency and postmobilization training times

may help prevent unrealistic deployment estimates and higher

expectations of training proficiency than may be warranted.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of the Army, in consultation with

National Guard leaders, direct the Chief of Staff of the Army to

• establish and document an Army plan for preparing the enhanced brigades

to be ready to deploy to war that (1) is based on realistic assessments of

4

Special Inspection Report: Readiness Reporting Systems, Department of the Army Inspector General,

July 1989, and Army Training: Evaluations of Units’ Proficiency Are Not Always Reliable

(GAO/NSIAD-91-72, Feb. 15, 1991).

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Chapter 4 

Prospects for Achieving the 90-Day

Deployment Goal Are Uncertain

peacetime training proficiency and the resources available to support

postmobilization training and (2) stipulates the training steps involved,

including when brigade-level training against an opposing force is not

required;

• estimate the timing of the brigades’ availability for war based on the

Army’s plan; and

• establish a training performance measurement system to provide

(1) objective measures of the enhanced brigade’s peacetime training

proficiency, (2) centralized oversight information about the status of

training relative to those measures, and (3) criteria for commanders to

follow when estimating postmobilization training time requirements.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD agreed with our recommendations. It said that (1) ongoing

improvements to the Army’s premobilization training strategy, such as

developing an alternate gunnery strategy, would provide the foundation

needed for improved postmobilization planning and (2) ongoing

improvements to the Army’s training readiness reporting system would

identify critical training events and resources, establish objective training

proficiency measures, and enable commanders to correlate training

readiness to predeployment time constraints. DOD also said that it

expected these and other planned initiatives to be in place by fiscal year

1999 and that the brigades were expected to be ready to deploy within 

90 days at that time. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan will provide

specific deployment timelines.

Nevertheless, DOD said that our conclusion regarding prospects for the

brigades’ ability to deploy in 90 days was based on studies that did not

completely reflect a thorough analysis of lessons learned from the Gulf

War mobilizations or enhancements now being applied to the brigades.

DOD further noted that our report did not include a 1992 study by the

Institute for Defense Analysis, which indicated that units could reduce

postmobilization training time 20 to 40 percent by better use of simulation

technology.5

 The studies that we used were the most detailed analyses of

postmobilization training requirements made and were based on extensive

analysis of the Gulf War mobilization. The Army Inspector General’s study,

for example, was specifically chartered to assess the mobilization of the

Guard brigades. Moreover, the Institute for Defense Analysis used the

Inspector General’s study and Rand’s 1992 study as the baseline for its

analysis.

5

Alternative Approaches to Organizing Training and Assessing Army and Marine Corps Units, Institute

for Defense Analysis, November 1992.

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Chapter 4 

Prospects for Achieving the 90-Day

Deployment Goal Are Uncertain

We did not include a discussion of the Institute’s findings because,

according to the report, it represented only an initial effort to define new

conceptual possibilities to improve brigade readiness. The report cautions

that its 20- to 40-percent savings estimate should be taken only as

demonstrating great promise rather than documenting proven potential.

Also, DOD said that during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Guard’s

48th Brigade was certified as fully trained 91 days after its mobilization,

despite the absence of preexisting postmobilization plans. We believe that

citing this statistic is misleading. Although the brigade did complete

mobilization and collective training in 91 days, it was not ready for

deployment at that time. For example, the brigade and its equipment were

still at the National Training Center; therefore, the brigade would have

needed time to perform equipment maintenance and ready itself for

deployment. Rand’s current model estimates this time, generally referred

to as recovery time, at 10 days.

As previously discussed, nearly 9,000 active Army personnel were used to

help train the three Guard brigades that were mobilized. It is not clear how

the Army will provide the required numbers of personnel and the training

sites needed to quickly prepare the brigades for deployment. DOD said it

recognized that these factors limited the number of combat units that

could train simultaneously.

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 3-5 and

15-29.

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 3, 5-6, and

30-38.

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 3, 6, and

40-49.

Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See p. 29.

Now on pp. 6 and 37.

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 7 and 37.

Now on pp. 7 and 37-38.

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 7 and 38.

Now on pp. 7 and 48-49.

Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 7 and 49.

Now on pp. 7 and 49.

Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Appendix II 

National Guard Brigades Included in Our

Review

27th Infantry Brigade (Light), Syracuse, New York1

48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), Macon, Georgia1

81st Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), Seattle, Washington

116th Cavalry Brigade, Boise, Idaho1

155th Armor Brigade, Tupelo, Mississippi1

218th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), Newberry, South Carolina

256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), Lafayette, Louisiana

1

These are our case study brigades.

Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Appendix III 

Key Reports on National Guard Training

Report of the Enhanced Brigade Task Force, Department of the Army,

April 1994.

Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Secretary of Defense, October 1993.

Reserve Forces: Aspects of the Army’s Equipping Strategy Hamper

Reserve Readiness (GAO/NSIAD-93-11, Feb. 18, 1993).

Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces:

Final Report to the Secretary of Defense, Rand Corporation, 1992.

History of Reserve Component Mobilization: Operation Desert

Shield/Storm August 1990-July 1991, Second U.S. Army, 1992.

Post-Mobilization Training of Army Reserve Component Combat Units,

Rand Corporation, 1992.

Army Force Structure: Future Reserve Roles Shaped by New Strategy,

Base Force Mandates, and Gulf War (GAO/NSIAD-93-80, Dec. 15, 1992).

Army Training: Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard

Roundout Brigades (GAO/NSIAD-93-4, Nov. 4, 1992).

Structuring U.S. Forces After the Cold War: Costs and Effects of Increased

Reliance on the Reserves, Congressional Budget Office, September 1992.

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Department of

Defense, April 1992.

90/365 Day Post Mobilization Training, Director of Army Training,

April 1992.

Operation Desert Storm: Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active

and Reserve Support Forces (GAO/NSIAD-92-67, Mar. 10, 1992).

Mobilization of the Reserve Components for Operations Desert Shield and

Desert Storm, Center for Army Lessons Learned, U.S. Army Combined

Arms Command, February 1992.

Manning Full-Time Positions in Support of the Selected Reserve, Rand

Corporation, 1991.

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Appendix III 

Key Reports on National Guard Training

Measuring Military Readiness and Sustainability, Rand Corporation, 1991.

Special Assessment of Operation Desert Shield/Storm Mobilization,

Department of the Army Inspector General, December 1991.

The Army’s Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War, Congressional

Research Service, October 1991.

National Guard: Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat

Brigades for Gulf War (GAO/NSIAD-91-263, Sept. 24, 1991).

Army Reserve Forces: Applying Features of Other Countries’ Reserves

Could Provide Benefits (GAO/NSIAD-91-239, Aug. 30, 1991).

After Action Report: Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm,

Army National Guard, June 1991.

Special Assessment: National Guard Brigades’ Mobilization, Department of

the Army Inspector General, June 1991.

Persian Gulf War: U.S. Reserve Callup and Reliance on the Reserves,

Congressional Research Service, March 1991.

Special Assessment of Training Execution, Department of the Army

Inspector General, February 1991.

Army Training: Evaluations of Units’ Proficiency Are Not Always Reliable

(GAO/NSIAD-91-72, Feb. 15, 1991).

Special Inspection Report: Readiness Reporting Systems, Department of

the Army Inspector General, July 1989.

Army Training: Management Initiatives Needed to Enhance Reservists

Training (GAO/NSIAD-89-140, June 30, 1989).

Page 64 GAO/NSIAD-95-91 Army National Guard
Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Charles J. Bonanno, Assistant Director

Karen S. Blum, Communications Analyst

Atlanta Regional

Office

John W. Nelson, Evaluator-in-Charge

Harry F. Jobes, Site Senior

Maria Storts, Evaluator

Gerald L. Winterlin, Evaluator

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