1

Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS
N O . P D - 0202- 08 THE S TA TE OF TE X AS

v. M I L T O N D W A Y N E G O B E R T , A ppel l ee ON APP ELLEE ’ S PET I TI ON FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW

FROM THE THI RD C OU RT OF APPE ALS

TRAVI S CO UNTY P RI CE , J. , de l i ve r e d t he opi ni on o f t he C our t i n w hi c h M E YE RS , W OMACK , J O H N S ON , K EASLER , H ERVEY , H OL C OM B and COC HRA N , J J ., jo in e d . K ELL ER , P .J ., c o n c u r r e d in th e r e s u lt . O P I N I O N D uri ng a cust od i al i nter rogat i on , ri gh t aft er hi s M i r anda r i ght s w er e r ead t o hi m , t he 1 appel l ee made a s t at ement t hat ref ere n ce d hi s r i ght t o a “l aw y er . ” The pol i ce de t ect i ves cont i nued t he i nt er r ogat i on w i t hout pr ovi di ng couns el

. W e gr ant ed t he appe l l ee’ s pet i t i on for di s cr et i onar yr evi ew i n or dert o det er m i ne w het her t he cont i nued i nt er r ogat i on, r es ul t i ngGober t — 2

2 Go be rt v . S

tate , 228 S.W .2d 221, 223 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007) ( Go be rt I ); Go be rt v . S

tate , 244 S.W .3d 861, 863 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008) ( Gobert II ). i n a conf essio n , vi ol at ed t he appe l l ee’ s Fi ft h A m endment r i ght t o t he pr es ence of couns el dur i ng cus t odi al i nt er r ogat i on. W e hol d t hati tdi d.

F ACT S AND P ROCE DURAL P OS TU RE T he A ust i n C ou rtof A pp eal s r eci t ed the fact s as fol l ow s: T he r el evantfac t s ar e not in d ispu te
. G ober t , w ho w as s us pect ed of co m m it ti n g th e m u rde r fo r w h ich h e n o w stan d s ind ict ed , w as a rrested fo r a par ol e vi ol at i on and for t he as s aul t of a w om an named C hr i s t i ne orC hr i s t i na. Fol l ow i ng hi s ar r es t , G ober t w as ques t i oned byA us t i n det ect i ves B ur gh and Scanl on. B ur gh began t he i nt er vi ew byadvi s i ng G ober t of hi s cons t i t ut i onal a n d s ta tu to ry rig h ts
. S e e M ir a n d a v . A r iz o n a , 3 8 4 U .S . 4 3 6 , 4 7 9 , 8 6 S .C t. 1602, 16 L

. E d. 2nd, 694 ( 1966) ; T ex C ode C r i m . Pr oc. A nn. A r t
. 38. 22, §§ 2, 3 (W e st 2 0 0 5 ). A sk e d if h e u n d e rsto o d h is rig h ts, G o b e rt re p lied th a t h e d id a n d t h e n s a i d , “ I d o n ’ t wan t t o g i v e u p a n y r i g h t , t h o u g h , i f I d o n’ t got no l aw y er . ” Scanl on i m m edi at el yas ked, “Y ou don’ t w antt o t al k?” T he ques t i on w as r epea t ed byB ur gh, “Y ou don’ t w antt o t al k t o us ?” G ober t ans w er ed, “I m e a n , I’ll talk to y ’a ll. I m e a n , I k n o w , y o u k n o w , w h a t sh e h a d sa id a b o u t it , y o u k n o w . I’ll sp e a k w ith y ’a ll, b u t (in a u d ib le) , m a n . I m e a n , I’ ll sp e a k w ith y ’ al l , y ou know

. ” Scanl on t hen s ai d, “O kay , s i gni ng t hi s – s i gni ng t hi s i s not g iv in g u p y o u r rig h t. S ig n in g th is is a c k n o w le d g in g th a t th is w a s re a d to y o u .” H e th e n a d d e d , “ O k a y ? Y o u r c h o ice to talk to u s is d if f e re n t. T h is – a ll t h is is , is a c k n o w le d g in g th a t yo u w e re w a rn e d .” B u rg h th e n b e g a n to q u e s ti o n G o b e rt re g a rd in g h is re latio n sh ip w ith C hr i s t i na. A ft era n um berof ques t i ons w er e as ked and a ns w er ed, Scanl on i nt er r upt ed t o as k, “I w ant t o cl ear s om et hi ng up, t hough, beca us e ea r l i ery ou s ai d y ou don’ t w antt o gi ve up y our r i ght t o a l aw y er . I w anty ou – I w anty ou – I w ant t o cl ear up t he fact t hat y ou w ant t o t al k t o us about t hi s . O kay ? Y ou under s t and w hatI ’ m s ay i ng?” G ober t ans w er ed, “Y eah. ” Scanl on cont i nued,
“ I wan t t o c l e a r i t u p . I me a n , t h a t ’ s

– t h a t ’ s wha t y o u wan t t o do, r i g h t ?” G o b ert ag ain a n sw ere d , “Y ea h

. ” T h e i nt errog ati o n co n ti n u ed fo r sev era l ho u rs and ul t i m at el yr es ul t ed i n appel l antconfe s s i ng t o t he m ur der of M ei K er nena C ot t on. 2Gober t — 3

3 Go be rt I , su pra . 4 T EX . R. A PP . P. 50. 5 Gobert II

, su pra . 6 T EX . R. A PP . P. 66.3(c). T he t r i al cour t r ul ed t hatt he appe l l ee’s st at ement cons t i t ut ed an une qui vocal i nvocat i on of hi s F ift h A m endment r i ght t o couns el dur i ng anyens ui ng i nt er r ogat i on, and t her efor e s uppr es s ed t he appe l lee’s confe s s i on. U pon t he St at e’ s i nt er l ocut or yappea l , t he

co u rt o f ap peal s atfi r s t aff i r m ed t he t r i al cour t ’ s j udgm entaft erconduct i ng a de novo

re v iew

. T h e S tate f

iled a m o tio n f

o r re h e a rin g , w h ich th e c o u rt o f a p p e a ls d e n ied . T h e S tate 3
t hen fi l ed a p eti ti on for di s cr et i onar yr evi ew . Pur s uantt o R ul e 50 of t he Texas R ul es of A ppel l at e Pr ocedur e, t he cour t o f appe al s w i t hdr ew i t s or i gi nal opi ni on and s ubs t i t ut ed a

m odi fi ed one. T hi s ti m e the cour t of appe al s hel d t hatt he appe l l ee’ s s t at ement w as not 4

u n e q u iv o c a l, an d th a t th e d e tec tiv e s th e re f o re d id n o t v io late h is F if th A m e n d m e n t rig h t to

couns el bycont i nui ng t o ques t i on hi m . W e gr ant ed t he appe l l ee’ s s ubs equentpet i t i on for 5 di s cr et i onar yr evi ew i n or dert o exami ne t hi s r evi s ed hol di ng. 6 FACTUAL DI S PUTE? Dur i n g the pr e- t r i al s uppr es s i on hear i ngs , t he St at e i nt r oduced t hr ee D V D s cont ai ni ng an audi o/ vi s ual r ecor di ng of t he appe l l ee’ s i nt er r ogat i on, pl us a t r ans cr i pt i on i t had pr epar ed. T he purpor t ed i nvocat i on of couns el w as t r ans cr i bed exac t l yas t he cour t of appe al s r epor t edGober t — 4

7 State’s Motion for Rehea ring , at 5. it, v iz : “I d o n ’t w an t to g ive u p an yri g h t, tho u g h , if I do n ’t g o t no law y er.” T h e tri al co u rt

w at ched t he D V D r ecor di ngs and r evi ew ed t he t r ans cr i pt
. I n r ul i ng t hat t he conf es s i on w as i nadmi s s i bl e, t he t r i al cour t obs er ved: “I j us t don’ t fi nd any t hi ng t hati s unequi vocal about t he s t at ement ‘ I ’ m not goi ng t o w ai ve anyr i ght s i f I don’ t got no l aw y er . ’ I m ean, I t hi nk t hat t hat ’ s as unequi vocal as I can i m agi ne a s t at ement bei ng. ” Lat er , t he t r i al cour t obs er ved: Y o u k n o w , the re is a lo t o f th in g s th a t [ th e a p p e llee ] sa y s o n th e tap e th a t I coul dn’ t under s t an d an d t hathe t al ks s o l ow and mum bl es and t hats or t of t h i n g . B u t o n e i s v e r y c l e a r . W h e n h e g e t s p a r t i c u l a r l y t o t h i s p o i n t , h e s a ys out l oud and pr et t yl oudl y , he s ay s , ‘ I don’ t w ant t o gi ve up anyr i ght t hough, i f I don’ t got no l aw y er . ’ H e t el l s – t hat i s t he l oudes t t hi ng he s ay s t hr oughout t h e i n t e r v i e w. I n i t s br i ef on di r ectappea l , i t i s t hi s s t at em en t, take n from i t s ow n t r ans cr i pt of t he in ter ro g a tio n , tha t th e S tate a rg u e s w a s eq u iv o c a l. T h e c o u rt o f a p p e a ls o rig in a llyf

o u n d th is fact t o b e un dis pu t ed— as, i nd eed, att hat poi nt, i t w as. In i ts m o ti o n fo r reh ea ri n g fo ll o w ing the co u rt o f a p p ea ls’ s init ial o p inion , h o w ev er, t he St at e t ook i s s ue w i t h t he cont entof t he appe l l ee’ s s t at ement for t he fi r s t t i m e. “Li s t eni ng

c lo se lyto th e v id e o tap e ,” th e S tate a ss e rte d , “ re v e a ls th a t p a rts o f th is c o m m e n t ar e c lo se to b e in g in a u d ib le.” W h e n th e c o u rt o f a p p e a ls d e n ie d th e m o tio n f o r re h e a rin g , the S tate 7

ar gued i n i t s pet i t i on for di s cr et i onar y r evi ew t hat t he best t r ans cr i pt i on t hat can be m ade of the ac tual w o rds sp o k en b y the a p p ell ee at t h is cri ti ca l j u n cture in the rec o rdin g is: “I d o n ’tGober t — 5

8 State’s Petition for Discre tionary Review, at 2. 9 Id . T he de fe ns e su g g e ste d n o s pe c if ic corr ect ion s, ho we ve r, and ne ith e r d id t

he State e nd or se thene e d to c or

re c t it s o wn

tr ans c ripti on

duri ng pr oc e e din g s in th e tria l c ourt , mu c h le ss d id it e ve r suggest that

its own p art ic ula

r t ra ns c ripti on of thestate me nt a

t is su e wa s, in a

ny re sp e c t, ina c c ur ate . F or

thefi rs t ti me in i ts PD R, the State argue d: “ It is di ff ic ult to d isc e rn

pa rt s o f t his ‘invocation,’ but it is clea r that the tra

nscript does not paint the c omplete picture . Acc ordingto the State’s [new] understandingof the video, [the appe llee] said ‘ these rights,’ rathe r than ‘a ny right.’ Second, the State doe s not understand [the appellee ] as saying the phrase ‘if I don’t g ot.’ He might have sa id ‘bef

ore I g ot,’ or poss ibly something else, but most likely not ‘if Idon’t g ot . . .’” Id . at 2-3. 10 Id . at 3. 11 Gobert II , su pra , at 863. w ant t o g i ve u p those r i gh t s, t ho ug h, __ _ _ __ __ _ _ __ go t n o law y er. ” T he S t at e al so 8 poi nt ed t o t he fact t hat t he defens e had comm ent ed dur i ng t he s uppr es s i on pr ocee di ngs t hat

“ so m e c o rre c tio n s” to th e tra n s c rip t m ig h t b e w a rra n ted , an d , fo r th e f irst tim e , the S tate agr eed. T he St at e ar gued t hat t he cour t of appea l s had er r ed t o r el y s ol el y on the w r i t t en

9
t r a n s c r i p t i n i d e n t i f

y i n g t h e r e l e v a n t f

a c t s , e s p e c i a l l y i n v i e w o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e DVD

r ecor di ngs w er e al s o i n evi dence w hi ch, i n t he St at e’ s es t i m at i on, demons tr at e “t hat t he [ a p p e llee ’s] sta tem e n t w a s m u m b led , u n in tellig ib le, an d a m b ig u o u s.” In iss u in g its R u le 10 5 0 o p in io n , h o w e v e r, t h e c o u rt o f a p p e a ls p e rs is te d in d e s c ri b in g th e f a c ts a s “ u n d is p u te d .” 11 T h e S tat e a lso a rgu ed it s n ew interpre tat ion o f t h e fa cts d u ri n g o ral argu m en t bef o re t hi s C our t
. W e decl i ne, how ever , t o adopti t
. Fi r s t , up unt i l t he t i m e t he St at e fi l ed i t s m ot i on for r ehea r i ng i n t he cour t of appeal s , bot h par t i es as s um ed t hatt he appe l l ant ’ s s t at ement had b e e n a s t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s h a s d e s c r i b e d i t
. T h e S t a t e c h a l l e n g e d t h e a c c u r a c yo f i t s o wnGober t — 6

12 Ro c he llev . S

tate , 7 91 S.W. 2d

12 1, 12 4- 25 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 ). B e c a us e theState did n o t p r e v a ilin

th e tria l c o urt, it

c ann o t t ak e advanta g e o f o ur r e c e ntl y ann o un c e d

r u leth at “ [a ]n appellee ’s fa ilure to make a particula r argument [on appea l] is a fac tor that may be conside red when this Court decides whethe r to exercise its discr etion to grant [di scre tionary] review, but it does not bar this Court from grantingrevie w to addre ss the issue if the Court, in its discretion, dec ides that revie w is warr anted.” Vo los e n v . S tate , 227 S.W .3d 77, 80 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). See also Rhode s v . S tate , 240 S.W .3d 882, 887, n.9 (Tex. Crim. App

. 2 0 0 7 ) (“ th e party who loses at the tria l level who then complains a

bout a dec ision o f th e co urt o f appe als must address both the holdingand re a so nin g o f th e c o urt o f a p p e a l s , b ut th e p arty wh o w i n s at th e tr i a l l e v e l wh o c o mp l a i n s abo ut a decision of the c ourt of appe als nee d only addre ss the holding of

the cour t of appe als.”). T he re a so nin gof

thec ourt of a pp e a ls i n thi s c a se wa s ba se d up on an und e rs tand ingof thea pp lic a blefa c ts that was, i n d eed, undisputed. The State, as a ppellant, should not be hea rd now to cha lleng e that re a so nin gba se d u

po n a ne w, un ilate ra l un de rs tand ingof thea pp lic a blefa c ts that w a s n ot t ime ly pr e se nte d to , a

nd ne ve r c on sid e re d b y

(n or re qu ir e d to be c on sid e re d b y ), thec ourt

of a pp e a ls. 13 Th e State c ite s Car

mo uc hev . S

tate , 10 S

. W
. 3 d 323, 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), for the pr op os iti on

that app e llate de fe re nc e wa s in a pp ro priate be c a

us e a ud io/vid e o e vid e nc e ind isp uta bly belied testimony

that was the only

evidenc e in the re cord that supported a particula r findingof historical fa ct made by

the trial cour

t. But the DVD in this case does not indisputably ref ute the trial c ourt ’s fi nd ingthat what th e a pp e lla nt s a id w a s, ind e e d, wh at th e State ’s own tr ans c ript s ho we d it to be

. Un de r the se c ir c ums tanc e s, it is a pp ro priate that we de fe r to the tria l c ourt ’s prima ry fact

findingfunction. Mo nta ne z v . S tate , 195 S.W .3d 101, 108-09 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006). t r ans cr i pt onl yaft eri t l os t t he ar gum ent bas ed on t hatver s i on of t he appe l l ant ’ s s t at ement on

or i gi nal s ubm i s s i on. T he cour t of appe al s i s not r equi r ed t o ent er t ai n a new ar gum entfr om an appell ant (her e, t he Stat e) for t he fi rs t t i m e on reheari ng , and w hen i t refuses t o ex erci se i t s di s cr et i on t o do s o, i t r ender s no d ec isi o n o n t hatnew ar gum entt hati s avai l abl e for di s cr et i onar yr evi ew . Second, t he t r i al j udge vi ew ed t he D V D w i t h t he St at e’ s t r ans cr i pt 12 i n hand, and he f

ound t hatt he appe l l ee di d i n fac t actual l ydecl ar e, “I don’ t w antt o gi ve up

a n yrig h t th o u g h , if I d o n ’t g o t n o law y e r.” T h e re c o rd su p p o rts th a t co n c lu sio n , ev e n a s it

m i ght al s o s uppor t a d iffe ren t c oncl us i on. T her efor e, w e w i l l not s econd- gues s t he t r i al

cou rt ’s deter m i nati on of the fact s, especi al l yat t his st age o f t he p roceedings. 13Gober t — 7

14 Mc Ne il v . W isc on sin , 501 U.S. 171 (1991). 15 Miranda v. Arizona , su

pra , at 479. 16 Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). 17 E.g. , Di nk

ins v . S tate , 894 S.W .2d 330, 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (“ the meremention of the word ‘attorne y ’ or ‘lawyer’ without more , does not a utomatically

invoke the right to counsel.”). 18 Davis v. U

nited States , 512 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1994).

THE LA W U nli ke t he Sixt h A m end m ent ri gh t t o coun sel , w hich i s off ense-s pecifi c, t h e F if

th A m endment r i ght t o have a n at t or neypr es entdur i ng po li ce int er r ogat i on appl i es t o any offe ns e aboutw hi ch t he pol i ce mi ght w i s h t o ques t i on a s us pect
. A m ong t he r i ght s about 14

w hi ch t he pol i ce m us t advi s e a s us pect w hom t hey have ar r es t ed i s t he ri ght t o have c ouns el p re se n t d u rin g a n yp o lice -in iti a ted in te r r o g a tio n . O n c e th e su sp e c t h a s in v o k e d h is F if th 15 A m endment r i ght t o couns el , pol i ce i nt er r ogat i on m us t cea s e unt i l couns el has been pr ovi ded

or t he s us pecthi m s el f r ei ni t i at es a di al ogue. 16 N ot ever ym ent i on of a l aw y er w i l l s uffi ce, of cour s e, t o i nvoke t he Fi ft h A m endment

r i ght t o t he pr es ence of couns el dur i ng ques t i oni ng. A n ambi guous or equi vocal s t at ement 17

w ith re sp e c t to c o u n se l d o e s n o t ev e n re q u ire o f f ice rs to se e k c lar if

ica tio n , m u c h les s h a lt t hei r i nt er r ogat i on. W het hert he ment i on of a l aw y ercons t i t ut es a cl eari nvocat i on of t he 18 ri g h t to co u ns el w i l l depend upon t he s t at ement i t s el f and t he t ot al i t yof t he s ur r oundi ngGober t — 8

19 Id . at 459. 20 Id . at 458-59. 21 See S mith v . I lli no is , 469 U.S. 91, 100 (1984) (“ under the clea r log ical for ce of

settled pr e c e de nt, an a c c us e d’ s po stre qu est re sp on se s to fu

rther inte rrog atio n ma

y no t beus e d to c a st retrospe ctive doubt on the cla rity of the initial reque st itself.”). 22 Con ne c tic ut v . B arre tt , 479 U.S. 523, 529 (1987). 23 Gobert II , su pra , at 864. c ir c u m s ta n c e s . T h e te s t is a n o b je c tiv e o n e , v iz : th e su sp e c t “ m u st artic u late h is d e sire to 19 have couns el pr es ent s uffi ci ent l y cl ear l y t hat a r eas onabl e pol i ce offi ceri n t he ci r cumst ance s

w oul d under s t and t he s t at ement t o be a r eques t for an at t or ney . ” W e l ook t o t he t ot al i t yof 20 ci r cumst ance s t o det er m i ne w h etheranys t at ement r efe r enci ng couns el w as r eal l ya cl ear i nvocat i on of t he Fi ft h A m endment r i ght ; w e do notl oo k to t he tot al i t yof the ci rcum st ances, h o w e v e r , t o d e t e r m i n e i n r e t r o s p e c t w h e t h e r t h e s u s p e c t r e a l l y m eant i t w hen he unequi vocal l yi nvoked hi s r i ght t o couns el

. Fi nal l y , w hen a s us pectm akes a cl ear , but 21 l i m i t ed, i nvocat i on of t he r i ght t o couns el , t he pol i ce m us t honor t he l i m i t s t hatar e t her eby pl ace d upon t he i nt er r ogat i on, but t heym ayques t i on t hei r su sp ec t o ut s i de t he pr es ence of

c o u n se l to th e e x ten t th a t h is c lea rlye x p re ss e d lim itatio n s p e rm it. 22

APP LI CATI ON OF THE LAW TO TH E FACTS T he cour t of appe al s bel i eved t hat“i t i s cl eart hat[t he appe l l ee’ s ] s t at ement i s not an unequi vocal r eques t for couns el

. ” W e agr ee t hatthe appel l ee di d not m ake a di r ectand 23Gober t — 9

24 Common experience counsels that, in the contex t of this particular dialogue with the police, the appe llee’s use of the double n egative should be disreg arde d. We rea sonably construe the appellee ’s phra se, “if I

don’t g ot no lawyer,”to be func tionally equivalent to the phrase in standard Eng lish, “ if I don’t have a lawyer,” or “unless I have a lawyer.”In context, itis clear enough (and wo uld have be e n c le ar t o th e int e rrog atin g of fi c e rs ) that the a

pp e lle e me ant that he did no t de sir e to “g ive up any right” in the absenc e of the lawyer the police had just informe d him he was e ntitled to. s t r ai ghtfo rw ard req u est for a l aw y er . B ut t hatdoes not nece s s ar i l ym ean t hathe di d not adequa t el ycomm uni cat e hi s des i r e t o deal w i t h hi s pol i ce i nt er r ogat or s onl yt hr ough, or at lea st in th e p re se n c e o f

, co u n s e l. H e re , w e th in k th e a p p e llee m a d e th a t d e sire a b u n d a n tly clea r. Im m ediat el yfoll ow i ng t he ad m i nis t rat i on of h i s M i r anda r i ght s , u p o n bei ng as ked

w het her he under s t ood t hem, t he appe l l ee une qui vocal l ys t at ed t hathe di d not w antt o “gi ve

u p a n y r i g h t ” i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a l a wy e r . Un d e r t h e c i r c u ms t a n c e s , we ma y s a f e l ya s s u me 24 he meant “any ” of t he r i ght s t hat had j us t been r ead t o hi m , and t hatt he l aw y erhe r efe r r ed t o w as t he couns el t o w hi ch t he off i cer s had j us t i nfor m ed hi m he w as l egal l yent i t l ed. A m ong t he r i ght s t he appe l l ee ha d j us t been i nfor m ed of, and w hi ch he di d not w i s h t o “gi ve

u p ” i n the ab sen ce o f co u n sel, w as th e righ t t o sil en ce . W e the ref o re c o n stru e the ap p ell ee ’s p h ra s e to b e a n in d ir e c t e x p re s s io n o f a p o s s ib le w illin g n e s s to w a iv e , in ter a lia , h is rig h t to

s i lenc e, b ut onl yon t he unqual i fi ed condi t i on t hathe fi r s t be af for ded hi s r i ght t o have

c o u n se l p re se n t. J us t beca us e a s t at ement i s condi t i onal does not m ean i t i s equi vocal , ambi guous , or ot her w i s e uncl ear . T he onl y asp ect of t he appe l l ee’ s s t at ement t hatw as t ent at i ve w asGober t — 10

25 It is telling that Offic er Scanlon did in fac t r ecognize that the appellee had re quested to dea l wi th t he po lic e on ly

throu gh c ouns e l ( “ Iwa

nt t o c le ar s ome thi ngup , thou gh, be c a us e e arl ie r you

sa id you don’t want to g ive up your right to a lawyer” ), but that rathe r than attempt to verify any invocation of that

right, he proc eede d direc tly to persuadethe appe llee to g ive up his right to sil ence (“I want you – Iwant you – Iwant to clea r up the fa ct that you want to talk to us about this”). 26 479 U.S. 523. 27 Id . at 525-26. w hether he w ou l d in fact be w i l l i ng t o “g i ve u p” an yof h i s M i r anda r i ght s . W hat w as abs ol ut el ycr y s t al cl earabouthi s s t at ement w as t hathe di d notdesire to do s o ( or t o be p re ss u re d b y t h e p o li c e to d o so ) in th e a b se n c e o f c o u n se l. Itw a s m o re th a n su f f icie n t to

a ler t th e in te r r o g a tin g o f f ice rs th a t if

t heydes i r ed t o s peak w i t h t he appe l l ee f ur t her , i n an at t empt t o per s uade hi m t o w ai ve anyof t he ot herrig h ts th a t M i r anda confe r s upon hi m , t hen t hey m us t fi r s t aff

or d hi m t he r i ght t o have c ouns el pr es entdur i ng t hatat t empt
. B efor e t hey 25

c o u ld tak e a d v a n tag e o f th e a p p e llee ’s a p p a re n t a m e n a b ili ty to talk , an d th e re b yf o re g o h is

c o n stitu tio n a l rig h t to sta n d m u te, t h e in te rro g a tin g o f f ice rs w e re o b lig e d to a b id e b yh is cl ear l ys t at ed condi t i on. T hi s cas e i s i nver s el yanal ogous t o C o n n e c ticu t v. B a rr e tt . T h e re th e su sp e c t cle a rly 26 i ndi cat ed t o t he pol i ce t hat he w as w i l l i ng t o t al k t o t hem, but j us t as unequi vocal l yr efus ed t o g i v e t h e m a wr i t t e n s t a t e me n t wi t h o u t c o u n s e l b e i n g p r e s e n t
. Th e Co n n e c t i c u t S u p r e me 27 C ou rtcon st rued his refusal broadly as an i nv ocati on of t he r i gh t t o co un sel for al l pu rposes,Gober t — 11

28 Id . at 526-27. 29 Id . at 529-30. 30 Id

. i ncl udi ng or al i nt er r ogat i on. T he U ni t ed S t at es Supr eme C our t r ever s ed, hol di ng t hatt he 28

s us pect had cl ear l ycomm uni cat ed onl ya l i m i t ed des i r e for couns el , and t hatt he i nt er r ogat i ng offi cer s had honor ed t hatl i m i t at i on. T he C our t r emar ked: “To concl ude t h at r es pondent 29 i nvoked hi s r i ght t o couns el f or al l pur pos es r equi r es not a br oad i nt erpr et at i on of an

a m b ig u o u s s ta te m e n t, b u t a d is re g a rd o f th e o rd in a ry m e a n in g o f re s p o n d e n t’ s s ta te m e n t.” 30 Si m i l a r l y , t o c o n s t r u e t h e a p p e l l e e ’ s s t a t e me n t h e r e a s e q u i v o c a l wi t h r e s p e c t t o t he i nvocat i on of hi s r i ght t o counse l is to ignor e t he mani fes t cl ar i t yof hi s condi t i on, as expr es s ed byt he or di nar ym eani ng of hi s w or ds

. For w hi l e t he appe l l ee i ni t i al l yexpr es s ed

w hatt he pol i ce mi ght r eas onabl y have t aken t o be a t ent at i ve w i l l i ngnes s t o w ai ve hi s r i ght to s ile n c e a n d t a l k to th e m (“ I d o n ’t w a n t to g iv e u p a n yri g h t, th o u g h , if

. . . ”) , anys uch

w il li n g n ess w as f

o rt h ri g h tl yp red icated u p o n the f ir m an d u n q u ali fied co n d it ion (“.

. . I do n ’t got no l aw y er ”) t hat t hey fi r s t pr ovi de hi m t he as s i s t ance of t he at t or neyt o w hi ch t heyhad just t o ld h im the F ift h A m en d m e n t e n ti tl ed h im

. In f ail ing to h o n o r t h e a p p ell ee ’s unambi guous and unqual i fi ed condi ti o n , an d i ns t ead c ont i nui ng t o i nt er r ogat e hi m i n an

e f f o rt to p e rsu a d e h im to talk to th e m , the o f f ice rs v io late d h is rig h t to c o u n se l. T he cour t of appe al s w ent on t o obs er ve t hat“i m m edi at el yaft erm aki ng t he s t at ementGober t — 12

31 Gobert II , su pra , at 865. 32 Sm ith v . I lli no is , su pra , at 100. i n ques t i on, [t he appe l l ee] t ol d t he pol i ce t hr ee t i m es t hat he w as w i l l i ng t o t al k t o t he pol i ce, i ndi cat i ng t hathe w as w i l l i ng t o pr ocee d w i t hout havi ng t he as s i s t ance of counse l

. ” Such 31 p o st-re q u e st s tate m e n ts, h o w e v e r, “m a yn o t b e u se d to c a st retro sp e c tiv e d o u b t o n th e c lar ity of t he i ni t i al r eques t i t s el f. ” B eca us e w e have concl uded t hatt he appe l l ee’ s condi t i on t hat 32

co u n sel b e p rese n t bef

o re h e w o u ld talk to the p o li ce w as un eq u ivo ca l, w e disco u n t t h e c o u rt of appeal s ’ s obs er vat i on as i m m at er i al t o t he ana l y s i s . O nce a s us pecthas cl ear l yi nvoked hi s r i ght t o couns el , no s ubs equent excha nge w i t h t he pol i ce ( unl es s t he s us pecthas i ni t i at ed i t hi m s el f) can s er ve t o under m i ne t he cl ar i t yof t he i nvocat i on. CO NC L US I ON W e r ever s e t he j udgm entof t he cour t of appe als an d rei ns t at e t he or derof t he t r i al

cour t gr ant i ng t he appel l ee’ s m ot i on t o s uppr es s . T he caus e i s r emanded t o t he t r i al cour t for fur t herpr ocee di ngs cons i s t entw i t h t hi s opi ni on.

D el i ver ed: J anuar y28, 2009 P ub l i sh