# United States Court of Appeals
**For the Eighth Circuit**

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No. 13-1214

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Lisa Carol Dockins

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau

____________ Submitted: November 6, 2013 Filed: November 14, 2013 [Unpublished]

____________ Before LOKEN, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Lisa Dockins appeals the 46-month prison sentence that the district court 1 imposed following her guilty plea to a drug-conspiracy offense. Her counsel has

1 The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.moved to withdraw, and has filed a brief under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Dockins has not filed a pro se s upplemental brief. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Counsel raises several sentencing argum ents: (1) the sentence is unreasonable and excessive, (2) the court abused its discre tion when it considered information in the presentence report (PSR) about Dockins’s dr ug use in imposing her sentence, (3) the court abused its discretion in failing to c onclude that Dockins was the least culpable member of the conspiracy, (4) a p retrial services officer made false or misleading

statement s at sentencing, and (5) the government impermissibly made statements at sentencing that were taken from Dockins’ s confidential pre-plea proffer meeting.

We reject a ll of the foregoing arguments, and conclude that the sentence was

not unreasonable. See United States v. Feemster , 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (standard of review). Specifi cally, the court did not plainly err in its determination of the level of Dockins’s culpability, see United States v. Molnar , 590 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2010) (plain error review for error to which party did not object); in accepting as true the PSR’s descri ption of Dockins’s drug use, to which she did not object, see United States v. Douglas , 646 F.3d 1134, 1137 (8th Cir. 2011); or in considering the information about he r drug use in choosing how to sentence Dockins, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). We also conclude that the sentence, a
downward variance from the calculated Guid elines range, was not substantively
unreasonable. See United States v. Lazarski , 560 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir. 2009) (it was nearly inconceivable that court abused di scretion in not varyi ng downward further). Finally, the court was entitled to accept the stat ements of the pretrial services officer,

see U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a); and at sentencing, Dockins did not alert the court that any

statement by the government breached a proffer ag reement, nor does she identify on appeal which statements were at issue. In these circumstances, we find no error.

-2-Counsel also raises a second set of arguments, namely, that (1) the court erred in accepting Dockins’s guilty plea, (2) th e officers who searched Dockins’s home
tricked her into cooperating, (3) the search warrant was invalid, (4) certain
information was not admissi ble in establishing her guilt, and (5) counsel should not
have waived the filing of pretrial motions, and should have filed a motion to suppress. However, Dockins pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement in which she agreed

to waive--with the exception of sentencing issues--all rights to appeal all nonjurisdictional issues including, but not li mited to, any issues relating to pretrial motions, hearings, and discovery and any issues relating to the negotiation, taking or acceptance of the guilty plea or the factual basis for the plea. We enforce the appeal
waiver as to these arguments, which fall within the scope of the waiver, because the
record reflects that Dockins understood and voluntarily accepted the terms of the plea
agreement, including the appeal waiver, and no miscarriag e of justice would result
from enforcing the waiver. S ee United States v. Andis

, 333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

Finally, having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio

, 488
U.S. 75, 80 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Therefore, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm.

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