2014 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-10-2014

USA v. Lamar Staten

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-4015

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 12-4015

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

LAMAR STATEN,

 Appellant

No. 12-4035

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

EMMANUEL DURAN, a/k/a Manny, a/k/a Manny Yunk

Emmanuel Duran,

 Appellant

No. 12-4096

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JOHN BOWIE, a/k/a HEADS

John Bowie,

 Appellant
2

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(No. 10-cr-00605-001/002/003)

District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis 

____________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 24, 2014

Before: FUENTES, GREENBERG, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: June 10, 2014)

____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

____________

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.

Emmanuel Duran, John Bowie, and Lamar Staten appeal their convictions for 

conspiracy, robbery, and firearms offenses.1For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

This case arises from a crime spree that took place on the evening of March 24, 

2010 and extended into the following day. During this period, Duran, Bowie, Staten, 

Jacklyn Smith,2and two unidentified confederates robbed Smith‟s ex-boyfriend, Brandon 

Coleman, who they believed was a drug dealer. In furtherance of their plan to obtain 

drugs and drug proceeds, the conspirators beat and tortured Coleman and his cousin, 

 

1 Duran, Bowie, and Staten filed separate appeals (respectively, Nos. 12-4034, 12-4096, 

and 12-4015), but we will address them together because they involve the same 

underlying facts and the same jury trial. 

2

Smith was originally named in this criminal action, but pled guilty on October 6, 2010. 

She later testified at the defendants‟ trial as a cooperating co-defendant. 
3

invaded two homes at gunpoint, and engaged in a shootout while attempting to rob a third 

home. Five days later, Duran and Staten robbed a deli to obtain money to pay for a

lawyer for Smith, who had been identified by the authorities by this point. 

Duran was arrested in May 2010, and Bowie and Staten were arrested in June 

2010. Bowie made two statements to the police following his arrest. Immediately after 

his arrest on June 10, 2010, Bowie waived his Miranda rights and admitted to possessing 

a Glock 27 handgun. Then, on June 23, 2010, while Bowie was still in custody, his uncle 

informed the police that Bowie wished to speak with them again. As a result, FBI Special 

Agent William Brooks and Philadelphia Police Detective Joseph Murray went to the 

Southwest Detective Division to interview Bowie. The officers advised Bowie of his 

Miranda rights, at which point he told them that he wanted to speak with his lawyer. 

Questioning immediately ended, and Bowie called his lawyer‟s office. When the phone 

call concluded, Bowie informed the officers that his lawyer was not in the office, but that 

another lawyer had advised him to wait for his attorney‟s arrival at the detective division. 

Bowie then spoke to his grandmother, who also beseeched him not to make a statement 

without his lawyer.

Following these phone calls, Bowie, on his own volition, informed the officers 

that he wanted to make a statement without waiting for his lawyer. The officers once 

more advised Bowie of his Miranda rights, and he waived those rights. Bowie then 

admitted to participating in the kidnapping and beating of Coleman and the three home 

invasions. The officers reminded Bowie of his Miranda rights multiple times and advised 

him that he could stop talking at any time. Each time, Bowie responded that he wanted to 
4

continue. After Bowie finished giving his statement, he reviewed and signed each page of 

the statement.

Ultimately, Duran, Bowie, and Staten were charged with conspiracy to commit

Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); five counts of Hobbs Act 

robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); five counts of using and carrying a firearm 

during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Not 

every defendant was charged in each count.

After filing numerous pretrial motions, which the District Court denied, Duran, 

Bowie, and Staten proceeded to trial, and the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts 

against them. The defendants subsequently filed post-trial motions under Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure 29, 33, and 34. The District Court denied these motions, and they 

appealed.3

II.

A.

The defendants contend that the government did not sufficiently establish 

interference with interstate commerce to uphold a prosecution under the Hobbs Act.4The 

crux of their argument is that, because Coleman was not dealing drugs by the time of 

 

3 We have jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

4

In determining whether a jury verdict rests on legally sufficient evidence, we “must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and will sustain the 

verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
5

their robbery spree, the robberies targeted private individuals, rather than businesses 

engaged in interstate commerce. The defendants raised this argument to the District Court 

in their Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. The District Court rejected the 

defendants‟ argument, explaining that any interference with or effect on interstate 

commerce, whether slight or potential, is sufficient to uphold a Hobbs Act prosecution. 

Bowie App. 33 (citing United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 372 (3d Cir. 2012)). The 

District Court correctly noted that a Hobbs Act violation can be established “even if „the 

ends of the conspiracy were from the very inception of the agreement objectively 

unattainable,‟ so long as the agreed-upon acts „would have affected commerce,‟ if 

successfully completed.” Id. (quoting United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 591-92 (3d 

Cir. 1982)). Moreover, the District Court explained that “the robbery of a drug dealer 

whose product originates outside Pennsylvania has a direct nexus to interstate commerce” 

for Hobbs Act purposes. Id. (quoting United States v. Walker, 657 F.3d 160, 182 (3d Cir. 

2011)). Ultimately, the court concluded that there was a sufficient basis for a Hobbs Act 

prosecution because: the defendants committed three home invasions with the intent to 

obtain drugs and drug proceeds, and expert testimony indicated that cocaine and 

marijuana, the drugs that the defendants thought Coleman sold, are grown and harvested 

outside of Pennsylvania and brought into the state for sale. For substantially the same 

reasons set forth by the District Court, we hold that the government sufficiently

established interference with interstate commerce. 

B.
6

Additionally, the defendants argue that the District Court improperly joined the 

counts relating to the deli robbery and the counts relating to the previous robberies, and 

they claim that the District Court abused its discretion in denying their motion to sever 

these counts.

5

In particular, the defendants assert that the deli robbery was a distinct 

criminal episode that was not connected to the previous robberies. Bowie also asserts that 

the counts relating to the deli robbery should not have been joined because he did not 

participate in that robbery, and, at the very least, the counts should have been severed 

because they were prejudicial to him. 

We agree with the District Court that “[d]espite defendants‟ arguments to the 

contrary, the Han‟s Deli counts were properly joined under Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 8(b) because of the strong relationship between the events of March 24-25, 

2010, and the robbery of the deli on March 30, 2010.” Duran App. 34-35. Therefore, we 

conclude that joinder was proper under Rule 8(b). Furthermore, we affirm the District 

Court‟s denial of severance because the defendants have failed to demonstrate substantial 

prejudice. 

C.

Bowie also asserts that he was unfairly prejudiced by a variance between the 

single conspiracy charged in the indictment and the evidence produced at trial, which, he 

 

5 We review de novo whether counts were properly joined. United States v. Irizarry, 341 

F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2003). We review a district court‟s denial of severance for abuse 

of discretion. United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 369 (3d Cir. 2001). “Significantly, 

even if the district court abused its discretion in denying the severance motion, the 

defendant must pinpoint clear and substantial prejudice resulting in an unfair trial.” 

United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 340 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).
7

claims, demonstrated multiple conspiracies.

6

To determine whether there was a single 

conspiracy, we examine: (1) whether the conspirators had a common goal; (2) whether 

the agreement contemplated bringing about a continuous result that would not continue 

without the ongoing cooperation of the conspirators; and (3) the extent to which the 

participants overlapped. United States v. Lee, 359 F.3d 194, 207 (3d Cir. 2004).

Despite Bowie‟s argument to the contrary, the March 24-25 robberies and the 

subsequent deli robbery were part of a single conspiracy. As the District Court correctly 

pointed out, the criminal objectives of both the March 24-25 robberies and the deli 

robbery “remained the same. A substantial overlap in participants is present . . . . The 

events are separated only by a few days. Thus, the home invasions and deli robbery are 

but separate parts of a larger whole, with all crimes committed in furtherance of a single 

agreement.” Bowie App. 32. Having reviewed the record and the parties‟ arguments, we 

conclude that the jury‟s finding of a single conspiracy was supported by sufficient 

evidence and that there was no variance between the conspiracy alleged in the indictment 

and the trial evidence.

D.

Bowie next argues that the statement he made on June 23, 2010 should have been 

suppressed.

7 Where a suspect invokes his right to an attorney, questioning must cease 

 

6 We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government to determine 

whether a reasonable jury could have found the existence of a single conspiracy. United 

States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 1989).

7

“This Court reviews the District Court‟s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as 

to the underlying factual findings and exercises plenary review of the District Court‟s 
8

until an attorney is present. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966). Police may 

engage in “further interrogation” of a suspect who has invoked his Miranda rights only if 

the following conditions are met: (1) “the suspect must initiate the conversation with the 

authorities,” and (2) “after the suspect initiates the conversation, the waiver of the right to 

counsel and the right to silence must be knowing and voluntary.” United States v. 

Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1084 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 

1039, 1045-46 (1983)). 

The District Court held an evidentiary hearing on Bowie‟s motion to suppress and 

found that Bowie, following his phone calls to his lawyer‟s office and his grandmother, 

was “adamant that he wanted to speak” to law enforcement and “did not want to wait”

until his lawyer arrived. Bowie App. 36. Based on this and other factual findings, the 

District Court determined that Bowie willingly initiated contact with the law enforcement 

officers after invoking his right to have an attorney present and that he knowingly and 

voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Accordingly, the District Court denied Bowie‟s 

motion to suppress. This Court, in a related proceeding concerning the same statement, 

held that the District Court properly denied Bowie‟s motion to suppress. See United 

States v. Duran, 2014 WL 1378220, at *6 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2014). For substantially the 

same reasons set forth in our previous ruling, we affirm the District Court‟s denial of the

motion to suppress. 

E. 

 

application of the law to those facts.” United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 

2002).
9

Finally, Duran and Bowie challenge the sufficiency of the indictment.8They argue 

that the indictment is missing essential elements and that the judgment should be arrested, 

and the charges dismissed, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 34(a). In 

particular, Duran and Bowie claim that the indictment does not sufficiently allege 

violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) because it does not contain the 

words, “in furtherance of any such crime,” see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), or “in furtherance of a 

plan or a purpose,” see 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).

An indictment is sufficient if it “(1) contains the elements of the offense intended 

to be charged, (2) sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to 

meet, and (3) allows the defendant to show with accuracy to what extent he may plead a 

former acquittal or conviction in the event of a subsequent prosecution.” United States v. 

Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 595 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In this case, the indictment closely parallels the relevant statutory language and 

contains the necessary elements of the charged offenses. For example, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1951(a) provides that: “[w]hoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects 

commerce . . . by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or 

threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose 

to do anything in violation of this section shall be [punished].” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) 

(emphasis added). The indictment alleges that the defendants “attempted to obstruct, 

 

8

This Court exercises plenary review over a challenge to the sufficiency of an 

indictment. United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2002). We uphold an 

indictment “unless it is so defective that it does not, by any reasonable construction, 

charge an offense.” United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 324 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).
10

delay, and affect commerce and the movement of articles and commodities in commerce, 

by robbery.” See, e.g., Joint App. 60. As the District Court correctly explained in its posttrial opinion, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) is phrased in the disjunctive. Because the indictment 

sufficiently alleges all of the acts necessary to constitute a violation of the first prong of 

18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), the indictment is not defective.9

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

 

9

Like 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is phrased in the disjunctive. For similar 

reasons, the defendants‟ challenge as to this statutory provision fails.