*

After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. Fed. R.

App. P. 34(a)(2).

 

 United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 7, 2007*

Decided February 8, 2007

Before

Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 06-3284

MELVIN GRIGSBY,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

B.A. BLEDSOE,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Southern

District of Illinois

No. 03-832-GPM

G. Patrick Murphy,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Melvin Grigsby petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241

to compel the Bureau of Prisons to credit his federal term with the time he spent in

state custody before his federal sentencing. The district court concluded that

federal law prohibits giving Grigsby credit for this period and denied his petition. 

We agree and affirm the judgment. 

On March 28, 1993, state authorities in California took Grigsby into custody

on a robbery charge. He was convicted in state court, and on August 13, 1993, he

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 06-3284 Page 2

was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. About a month later, federal

authorities executed a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum and took custody of

Grigsby to answer an indictment charging him with committing a federal drug

offense prior to entering state custody. He was convicted of conspiracy to possess

with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and on August 19, 1994, he was sentenced to

200 months’ imprisonment to run concurrently with his undischarged California

sentence. Grigsby was then returned to a California facility, where he remained

until he was paroled to federal officials to complete the remainder of his federal

sentence. 

 

After exhausting his administrative remedies, Grigsby filed his § 2241

petition claiming that he should have received credit against his federal sentence

for the period between his arrest by California authorities on March 28, 1993, and

his sentencing in federal court on August 19, 1994. The magistrate judge assigned

to review Grigsby’s petition recommended that the district court deny it. As to the

period before Grigsby’s state sentencing (March 28, 1993, to August 12, 1993), the

magistrate judge reasoned that the petition was moot because the BOP already had

credited this time against Grigsby’s federal sentence. As to the period between

Grigsby’s state sentencing and his federal sentencing (August 13, 1993, to August

19, 1994), the magistrate judge reasoned that 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), which governs

the award of federal credit for periods of prior incarceration, prohibited crediting

this period against Grigsby’s federal sentence because the California Department of

Corrections already had credited the time against his state sentence. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3585(b). The magistrate judge further concluded that BOP Program Statement

5880.28(2)(c), which allows credit for time spent in “nonfederal presentence

custody” in certain instances where the federal and state sentences run

concurrently, did not provide an alternate basis for awarding the credit Grigsby

sought. See Program Statement 5880.28(2)(c), Sentence Computation Manual of

1984.

The magistrate judge notified Grigsby that he had just ten days to file any

objections to the proposed resolution of his § 2241 petition. The notice warned that

failure to object would result in a waiver of the right to appeal. Within ten days,

Grigsby filed a single page entitled “Objections,” which reads in full:

Petitioner respectfully objects to the magistrate judge, Report

and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law.

If petitioner is allowed to file additional papers will the court

please inform petitioner of the time limit for doing so. 
No. 06-3284 Page 3

Afterward the district court adopted in full the magistrate judge’s proposed

resolution. Citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), which provides that any

party disagreeing with a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation on a

dispositive motion must file “specific, written objections,” the district court

concluded that it need not undertake de novo review in this case because Grigsby’s

submission was so general. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Nonetheless, the court noted

that it “fully agree[d]” with the magistrate judge’s “findings, analysis, and

conclusions.” The court then dismissed Grigsby’s petition and later denied his

motion for reconsideration. 

On appeal Grigsby presses his contention that his petition should have been

granted to the extent that it seeks credit against his federal sentence for the period

between his California sentencing on August 13, 1993, and his federal sentencing

on August 19, 1994. Before reaching that argument, however, we must address the

government’s argument that Grigsby failed to comply with Rule 72(b) and thus

waived the right to challenge the dismissal of his § 2241 petition. A party who fails

to abide by that rule waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions. 

See United States v. Hall, 462 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 2006). The government

argues that Grigsby’s submission fails to fulfill Rule 72(b)’s mandate that a party

file “specific” objections. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

We have interpreted “specific” as used in Rule 72(b) to require only that a

party “specify each issue for which review is sought and not the factual or legal

basis for the objection.” Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 741 

(7th Cir. 1999). The magistrate judge addressed only the facts and law relating to

whether Grigsby was entitled to presentence credit. Since this question is the only

question presented by Grigsby’s § 2241 petition, and given that Grigsby was

proceeding pro se, we conclude that his timely objection was sufficient under Rule

72(b) to preserve his challenge on appeal. See United States v. Sawaf, 74 F.3d 119,

122 (6th Cir. 1996) (pro se litigants’ letter stating only that “[w]e object to the report

and recommendation” satisfied Rule 72(b) given the limited nature of the legal

question presented), cited with approval in Johnson, 170 F.3d at 741.

We therefore take up the merits. Our review is de novo. Glaus v. Anderson,

408 F.3d 382, 386 (7th Cir. 2005). Grigsby acknowledges § 3585(b), which prohibits

the BOP from giving credit for prior custody that already has “been credited against

another sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). Grigsby further admits that California

authorities already credited the disputed time period against his state sentence. 

But relying on Program Statement 5880.28(2)(c) and our decision in Kayfez v.

Gaselle, 993 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1993), Grigsby insists that the same period should

be credited against his federal sentence because that sentence was ordered to run

concurrently with his California sentence. Grigsby is mistaken. 
No. 06-3284 Page 4

Program Statement 5880.28(2)(c) provides that if a prisoner’s federal and

state sentences are concurrent, and the federal sentence is to run longer than the

state sentence (not counting any credits), “[p]rior custody credits shall be given for

any time spent in non-federal presentence custody that begins on or after the date

of the federal offense up to the date that the fist sentence begins to run, federal or

non-federal.” Program Statement 5880.28(2)(c). The BOP refers to these credits as

“Willis time credits.” See Willis v. United States, 438 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1971). 

We recognized in Kayfez v. Gaselle, 993 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1993), that by

sanctioning Willis time credits the BOP often permits what amounts to a form of

“double counting,” despite the language in § 3585(b). See Kayfez, 993 F.2d at 1290. 

In Kayfez, the BOP had refused to credit against the petitioner’s federal sentence

the time he spent in state custody before receiving his first sentence (federal in that

case) because that time already had been credited to his concurrent state sentence. 

Id. at 1289. The BOP insisted that, because his state sentence was longer than his

federal sentence, the period he sought credit for did not qualify as “Willis time.” Id.

at 1290. We concluded, however, that because the petitioner had been in

presentence custody for 416 days, and his state sentence was longer than his federal

sentence by only 358 days, he needed a 58-day credit to his federal sentence in order

to receive the full benefit of the 416-day credit he technically had received. Id. 

But Grigsby’s reliance on that line of reasoning is misplaced: the time for

which he seeks credit is not “Willis time” because it was not time spent in nonfederal presentence custody. See Program Statement 5880.28(2)(c). (The BOP

already credited that period—March 28, 1993 to August 12, 1993—to his sentence.) 

The disputed period—August 13, 1993 to August 19, 1994—all arose after Grigsby’s

state sentencing, and since he obtained credit for this period from the state, he is

not entitled to the same benefit from the BOP merely because his subsequent

federal sentence was ordered to run concurrently. See Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257,

273 n.13 (3d Cir. 2000) (concluding that reasoning in “Willis/Kayfez line of cases”

does not extend to permit federal credit for time served after concurrent state

sentence was imposed). By its plain language, § 3585(b) prohibits such a credit. 

See 18 U.S.C § 3585(b); United States v. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000)

(“[Section] 3585(b) forbids the BOP from giving credit for presentence custody when

that credit has been applied against another sentence.”). 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the dismissal of Grigsby’s petition for a writ of

habeas corpus.