UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-4247

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CARROL LEE OWENS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, 

at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, District Judge. (1:08-cr-00025-MR-DLH-1)

Submitted: November 29, 2018 Decided: December 3, 2018

Before DUNCAN and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Randolph M. Lee, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, 

Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Carroll Lee Owens appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his term of 

supervised release and imposing a 27-month sentence of imprisonment. On appeal, 

counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting 

that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether the district court 

erred by allowing hearsay testimony at the supervised release hearing. Owens has filed a 

pro se brief and an amended brief. The Government has declined to file a response brief.

“We review a district court’s evidentiary ruling in a revocation hearing for abuse 

of discretion.” United States v. Ferguson, 752 F.3d 613, 616 (4th Cir. 2014). Prior to 

admitting hearsay evidence, a district court “is to balance the person’s interest in the 

constitutionally guaranteed right to confrontation against the government’s good cause 

for denying it,” United States v. Doswell, 670 F.3d 526, 530 (4th Cir. 2012), and failure 

to do so is an abuse of discretion, id. at 531; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C). 

However, an “error [that] had no substantial and injurious effect or influence on the 

outcome,” is harmless, Ferguson, 752 F.3d at 618 (internal quotation marks omitted).

At the revocation hearing the Government presented testimony of two police 

officers who attempted to pull over the driver of a stolen car. Owens sought to cast doubt 

on his identification as the driver. The first officer related statements made by a female 

passenger in the vehicle and by Owens’ mother that enabled the officer to identify Owens 

as the driver. Owens objected to these statements on hearsay grounds. The district court 

overruled his objection but failed to conduct the balancing test required by Doswell. In 

reaching its factual findings, however, the court did not consider the statements, but 
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rather the officers’ actions resulting from the statements. The court thoroughly 

summarized the evidence, which included Owens’ statement to the officer after his arrest, 

which established that Owens committed the charged violations of supervised release. 

We therefore conclude that the court’s failure to conduct Rule 32.1’s balancing test was 

harmless, see Ferguson, 752 F.3d at 618.

The issues raised in Owens’ pro se supplemental brief and amended brief are 

without merit. The district court did not lack jurisdiction to revoke Owens’ supervision, 

because the probation officer signed the petition for a warrant under penalty of perjury 

and the information in the petition established probable cause for issuance of a warrant. 

Any error in Owens’ receipt of police reports four hours prior to the hearing was 

harmless because Owens told the court he was prepared for the hearing and used the 

reports to cross-examine the officers. Owens’ predicate state offense was a Class B 

violation of his supervision, as it was punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. 

See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17(c), (d) (2017). Finally, Owens’ claim that his 

identification was based on an improperly suggestive mug shot fails because the court did 

not consider this identification evidence.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record and have found no 

meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we deny Owens’ motions to strike counsel’s 

Anders brief and to proceed pro se*

, grant his motion to amend his pro se supplemental 

 * Owens has no constitutional right to self-representation on appeal. Martinez v. Court of 

Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000).
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brief, and affirm the judgment of the district court. This court requires that counsel 

inform Owens, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States 

for further review. If Owens requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that 

such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was 

served on Owens. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument 

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED