*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
ANNA IZABELA PALOSZ, COADMINISTRATOR

(ESTATE OF BARTLOMIEJ F. PALOSZ), ET AL.

v. TOWN OF GREENWICH ET AL.

(AC 40315)

Bright, Moll and Sullivan, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs, coadministrators of the estate of the decedent, sought to

recover damages from the defendants, the town of Greenwich and its

board of education, for the wrongful death of the decedent, who committed suicide after being subjected to severe and continual bullying from

his classmates while he was enrolled in the town’s public school system.

During that time, the board was mandated by statute ([Rev. to 2011]

§ 10-222d [as amended by Public Acts 2011, No. 11-232, § 1]) to develop

and implement a policy to address the issue of bullying in the public

school system. In compliance with the statute, the board adopted a

policy that, inter alia, required the board to appoint administrators and

specialists, who were responsible for the development and implementation of the policy, and provided detailed procedures for employees and

specialists to follow if they had knowledge of a bullying incident or if

a bullying incident had been reported. In their complaint, the plaintiffs

alleged that, despite being aware that the decedent was being subjected

to unremitting bullying, the board’s administrators, supervisory personnel and other school employees failed to comply with the mandatory

provisions of the policy in numerous ways, that, in failing to do so, they

engaged in gross, reckless, wilful and wanton misconduct, which was

a substantial factor in causing the decedent’s suicide, and that the board

was liable for the decedent’s wrongful death and related damages. The

board filed a motion to strike the complaint on the ground that it was

entitled to sovereign immunity because it was acting as an agent of the

state when it allegedly failed to carry out its state mandated duties

under § 10-222d. The trial court denied the motion strike concluding,

inter alia, that the board was not entitled to sovereign immunity because

it was acting on behalf of the town, not the state, when it allegedly

failed to comply with the policy. On the board’s appeal to this court,

held that the board could not prevail on its claim that the trial court

improperly concluded that it was not entitled to sovereign immunity

from the plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim; the board was acting as an

agent of the town, not the state, when its employees allegedly failed to

comply with the terms of the policy that it had adopted in accordance

with § 10-222d, as the state action mandated by that statute begins and

ends with the development, implementation, submission and assessment

of the policy, and the claim that the board was entitled to sovereign

immunity was untenable in light of the qualified immunity specifically

provided to a local board of education pursuant to a related statute

(§ 10-222l) for actions taken by the board in connection with a policy

developed and implemented pursuant to § 10-222d, as that qualified

statutory immunity is irreconcilable with the complete protection from

suit afforded by sovereign immunity, and there would have been no

need for the legislature to create limited statutory immunity for local

boards of education of those boards already were protected by sovereign immunity.

Argued May 25—officially released August 14, 2018

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for the wrongful death of

the plaintiffs’ decedent as a result of, inter alia, the

defendants’ alleged gross misconduct, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the court, Jacobs, J., denied the defendants’

motion to strike, and the defendant Board of Education
of the Town of Greenwich appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Brett R. Leland, pro hac vice, with whom were Harold

J. Friedman, pro hac vice, and Fernando F. De Arango,

for the appellant (defendant Board of Education of the

Town of Greenwich).

David S. Golub, with whom were Jennifer Goldstein

and, on the brief, Jonathan M. Levine, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Opinion

BRIGHT, J. In this wrongful death action, the defendant, Board of Education of the Town of Greenwich,1

appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying

its motion to strike2

the first count of the operative

complaint filed by the plaintiffs, Anna Izabela Palosz

and Franciszek Palosz, coadministrators of the estate

of Bartlomiej F. Palosz (decedent), which stems from

the decedent’s tragic suicide. On appeal, the defendant

claims that the court improperly concluded, as a matter

of law, that it is not entitled to sovereign immunity

from the plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim, in which the

plaintiffs allege, in part, that the defendant’s employees

failed to comply with the antibullying policy that the

defendant developed and implemented pursuant to

General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 10-222d, as amended

by Public Acts 2011, No. 11-232, § 1.3 We affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

In count one of the operative amended complaint4

(complaint), the plaintiffs allege the following relevant

facts. The defendant serves as the agent of the town

of Greenwich to maintain control of all of the public

schools in Greenwich, which include Western Middle

School and Greenwich High School. On August 27, 2013,

after being subjected to unremitting bullying for several

years in the Greenwich public school system, the decedent died by suicide on the first day of his sophomore

year at Greenwich High School. At the time of his death,

the decedent was fifteen years old and had been a

student enrolled in the Greenwich public school system

for seven years.

Throughout those years, the defendant was mandated

by § 10-222d to develop and implement a safe school

climate plan to address the existence of bullying in the

Greenwich public school system. In compliance with

this statutory mandate, the defendant adopted the

‘‘Whole Student Development Policy’’ (policy) in April,

2009, which later was strengthened in July, 2012. The

policy requires that the defendant appoint administrators and specialists who are responsible for the development and implementation of the policy. The policy

further mandates an employee who has knowledge of

a bullying incident to notify, by an oral report, the specialist or another school administrator within one

school day and to file a written report not later than

two school days after such verbal notification. Upon

receipt of a report, the policy requires the specialist to

investigate, or to supervise the investigation of, the

bullying incident. If the acts of bullying are verified, the

policy requires the specialist or designee to develop a

student safety plan to protect against further bullying,

to notify the parents of the students involved not later

than forty-eight hours following the completion of the

investigation, and to invite the parents to a meeting to

discuss the measures being taken to intervene. If there
are repeated instances of bullying against a single individual, the policy requires the development of a specific

written intervention plan. Moreover, the policy mandates that any students who engage in bullying behavior

be subject to school discipline. In addition to the written

policy provisions, the defendant has oral policies and

procedures that require school employees to intervene

to protect students from being bullied repeatedly.

During the time in which the policy was effective,

the decedent was subjected to severe and continual

verbal and physical bullying by his fellow classmates.

Greenwich school employees, including supervisory

employees, were ‘‘long aware’’ that the decedent was

being subjected to such bullying. Despite being aware

of said bullying, the defendant’s administrators, and

supervisory personnel, and other school employees5 did

not comply with the mandatory provisions of the policy

in that they failed to: report the repeated instances of

bullying to the specialist or other school administrator

orally and/or in writing within the required timeframes;

investigate the repeated incidents of bullying; notify the

parents of the findings of any such investigation; meet

with the parents to communicate appropriate remedial

measures being taken by the school to ensure the decedent’s safety and to prevent further acts of bullying;

develop a student safety support plan in response to

all verified acts of bullying with safety measures to

protect against further acts of bullying; develop a specific written intervention plan to address the repeated

instances of bullying; direct appropriate discipline to

the student or students who bullied the decedent; and

properly oversee and implement the provisions of the

policies and procedures.

The plaintiffs further allege that the defendant and its

administrators, supervisory personnel, and other school

employees, in failing to comply with the policy requirements, engaged in ‘‘gross, reckless, wilful or wanton

misconduct,’’ which was a substantial factor in causing

the decedent’s death by suicide. On the basis of the

foregoing, the plaintiffs allege that the defendant is liable, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557n,6

for the

wrongful death of the decedent and for the related

damages caused by the defendant and its administrators, supervisory personnel, and other school

employees.

On July 6, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to strike

the complaint.7 The defendant argued, in relevant part,

that it is entitled to sovereign immunity because it was

acting as an agent of the state when it allegedly ‘‘failed

to carry out its state mandated duties under the antibullying statute . . . § 10-222d et seq.’’ Following a hearing, the court issued a memorandum of decision, dated

March 21, 2017, denying the defendant’s motion to

strike. The court held that the defendant is not entitled

to sovereign immunity because it was acting on behalf
of the municipality, as opposed to the state, when it

failed to comply with the policy. The court also held

that there is no sovereign immunity protection for the

defendant and its employees when their actions or omissions constitute gross, reckless, wilful, or wanton misconduct because the qualified immunity provided to

them by General Statutes § 10-222l

8

specifically limits

sovereign immunity in that regard. This appeal

followed.

We begin by setting forth the standard of review

and legal principles that govern our resolution of this

appeal. Notwithstanding the fact that the issue of sovereign immunity was presented to the court by way of a

motion to strike, as opposed to a motion to dismiss,9

‘‘[s]overeign immunity relates to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction over a case, and therefore presents a

question of law over which we exercise de novo review.

. . . In so doing, we must decide whether [the court’s]

conclusions are legally and logically correct and find

support in the facts that appear in the record.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Columbia Air Services, Inc.

v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 349, 977 A.2d

636 (2009).

In Connecticut, ‘‘[w]e have long recognized the common-law principle that the state cannot be sued without

its consent. . . . The doctrine of sovereign immunity

protects the state, not only from ultimate liability for

alleged wrongs, but also from being required to litigate

whether it is so liable.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Henderson v. State, 151 Conn. App. 246, 256, 95

A.3d 1 (2014). ‘‘The protection afforded by this doctrine

has been extended to agents of the state acting in its

behalf. . . . Town boards of education, although they

are agents of the state responsible for education in the

towns, are also agents of the towns and subject to

the laws governing municipalities.’’ (Citations omitted.)

Cahill v. Board of Education, 187 Conn. 94, 101, 444

A.2d 907 (1982). ‘‘[O]ur jurisprudence has created a

dichotomy in which local boards of education are

agents of the state for some purposes and agents of the

municipality for others. . . . To determine whether the

doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to a local school

board, we look to whether the action would operate to

control or interfere with the activities of the state

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 112, 708

A.2d 937 (1998), overruled on other grounds by Haynes

v. Middletown, 314 Conn. 303, 323, 101 A.3d 249 (2014);

see also Cahill v. Board of Education, supra, 101–102

(local school board not entitled to sovereign immunity

from claim of breach of employment contract because

such action would not operate to control state’s activities or subject it to liability).

Consistent with the foregoing, our Supreme Court

specifically has held that ‘‘[a] local board of education
acts as an agent of the state when it performs those

duties delegated to it by the state. . . . A board of

education acts as an agent of its respective municipality when it performs those functions originally

entrusted by the state to the municipality that the

municipality has subsequently delegated to the board of

education . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Education

v. New Haven, 237 Conn. 169, 181, 676 A.2d 375 (1996).

For example, a local board of education acts as an agent

of the state when it furnishes an education for the public

pursuant to General Statutes § 10-220. See Cheshire v.

McKenney, 182 Conn. 253, 257–58, 438 A.2d 88 (1980).

Conversely, a local board of education acts as an agent

of the municipality when it maintains control over the

public schools within the municipality’s limits pursuant

to General Statutes § 10-240. Id., 258; see Purzycki v.

Fairfield, supra, 244 Conn. 103–105, 112 (local board

of education not entitled to sovereign immunity from

claim that child tripped in hallway notwithstanding existence of related ‘‘policies, rules and regulations promulgated by school officials’’ because ‘‘duty to supervise

students is performed for the benefit of the municipality’’).

On appeal, the defendant maintains that § 10-222d

deputizes local boards of education as agents of the

state to carry out and effect the state’s public policy,

imposes specific duties upon the local boards of education, and subjects them to ongoing state oversight and

control. Thus, the defendant argues that it was acting

as an agent of the state when it failed to comply with

the policy adopted pursuant to § 10-222d.10 The defendant also contends that the qualified statutory immunity

specifically provided by § 10-222l does not waive sovereign immunity.11 We are not persuaded.

Section 10-222d (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Each

local and regional board of education shall develop and

implement a safe school climate plan to address the

existence of bullying in its schools. . . .’’ Subsection

(b) mandates that each plan ‘‘shall’’ contain certain

particularized requirements, each of which is designated in subdivisions (1) through (17). These requirements, generally, enable the reporting of instances of

bullying, mandate school officials to forward and investigate these reports to a specialist, who would then

notify the parents of the students, and direct the adoption of a comprehensive prevention and intervention

strategy. Section 10-222d (c) provides in relevant part:

‘‘[E]ach local and regional board of education shall

approve the safe school climate plan developed pursuant to this section and submit such plan to the Department of Education . . . .’’ Section 10-222d (d) compels

each board of education to require each school in the

district to complete and submit an assessment of its

policy to the Department of Education pursuant to General Statutes § 10-222h.
The plaintiffs do not dispute that a local board of

education acts as an agent of the state when it develops

and implements a policy, submits the policy to the

Department of Education, or mandates that each school

submit an assessment to the Department of Education,

pursuant to the requirements of § 10-222d. The plaintiffs

do not claim that the defendant failed to comply with

any of these requirements. In fact, the plaintiffs specifically allege that the defendant complied with the development and implementation mandates of § 10-222d.12

Instead, the gravamen of the plaintiffs’ complaint is

their allegation that the wrongful death of the decedent

was caused by the defendant because its employees

failed to comply with the terms of the policy that it had

developed and implemented pursuant to § 10-222d. The

narrow issue presented, therefore, is whether the defendant was acting as an agent of the state when its employees allegedly failed to comply with the terms of the

policy that the defendant adopted in accordance with

§ 10-222d. We conclude that it was not.

The state action mandated by § 10-222d begins and

ends with the development, implementation, submission, and assessment of the policy. Holding the defendant liable for its employees’ alleged tortious conduct

in failing to execute properly the terms of the policy it

developed and implemented, however, does not operate

to control or interfere with the activities of the state.

Rather, the defendant acts as an agent of the municipality when it enforces and complies with the policy pursuant to its general powers of control over public schools,

which is explicitly delegated to a local board of education through the municipality pursuant to § 10-240. Section 10-240 provides: ‘‘Each town shall through its board

of education maintain the control of all the public

schools within its limits and for this purpose shall be

a school district and shall have all the powers and duties

of school districts, except so far as such powers and

duties are inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter.’’ It is pursuant to this broad mandate of control,

and not through § 10-222d, that a board of education

polices the behavior of its students and, accordingly,

enforces and complies with the policy. When the delegations of §§ 10-222d and 10-240 are read together, it

becomes apparent that the mandate of § 10-222d does

not go so far as to encroach upon the general powers

of control delegated to the towns by § 10-240. Therefore,

we conclude that the defendant was acting as an agent

of the municipality, and not the state, when its employees allegedly failed to comply with the policy it had

adopted.

Additionally, the defendant’s position that it is entitled to sovereign immunity is undercut by the qualified

statutory immunity specifically provided by § 10-222l

to a local board of education for actions taken in connection with a policy developed and implemented pur-
suant to § 10-222d. In particular, § 10-222l (c) provides

in relevant part: ‘‘No claim for damages shall be made

against a local or regional board of education that implements the safe school climate plan, described in Section

10-222d, and reports, investigates and responds to bullying . . . if such local or regional board of education

was acting in good faith in the discharge of its duties.

The immunity provided in this subsection does not

apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, reckless,

wilful or wanton misconduct.’’ Section 10-222l was

adopted in 2011, nine years after § 10-222d was first

enacted.

The qualified statutory immunity provided by § 10-

222l is irreconcilable with the complete protection from

suit afforded by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and

contradictory to the presumption of legislative uniformity. As outlined previously in this opinion, ‘‘[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity protects the state, not only

from ultimate liability for alleged wrongs, but also from

being required to litigate whether it is so liable.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Henderson v. State,

supra, 151 Conn. App. 256. Moreover, ‘‘[i]t is axiomatic

that the legislature is presumed to be aware of the

common law when it enacts statutes. . . . [T]he legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious

and consistent body of law . . . [and] to be aware of

prior judicial decisions involving common-law rules

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Pacific Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Champion Steel, LLC,

323 Conn. 254, 265, 146 A.3d 975 (2016). ‘‘Furthermore,

[w]e presume that laws are enacted in view of existing

statutes . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Southington v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 254 Conn.

348, 357, 757 A.2d 549 (2000). Accordingly, we presume

that the legislature enacted § 10-222l with the knowledge of the long-standing doctrine of sovereign immunity and of § 10-222d.

On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that there

would have been no need for the legislature to create

a limited statutory immunity for local boards of education if those boards already were protected by sovereign

immunity. This is particularly true given that § 10-222l

was adopted in 2011, nine years after § 10-222d was first

enacted, and after a number of conflicting decisions

had been rendered in the Superior Court.13 Had the

legislature agreed with those cases that held that sovereign immunity barred claims like the one presented in

this case, § 10-222l would have been unnecessary. It

makes more sense that the legislature concluded

instead that § 10-222l was necessary because local

boards of education are not protected by sovereign

immunity when their employees fail to comply with an

antibullying policy.

Put another way, if, as the defendant contends, a

board of education has sovereign immunity from suit
predicated on its noncompliance with the policy mandated to be adopted by § 10-222d, then the provision

of qualified statutory immunity, by virtue of § 10-222l,

for the same noncompliance, would be superfluous.

Likewise, it would be illogical to conclude that a board

of education is entitled to sovereign immunity from the

claims posited in the present case when § 10-222l makes

it clear that a board of education may be subject to

tortious liability in certain prescribed circumstances.

Consequently, the defendant’s claim that it is entitled to

sovereign immunity is untenable in light of the qualified

statutory immunity provided by § 10-222l.

14

In sum, we conclude that the defendant is not entitled

to sovereign immunity from the plaintiffs’ wrongful

death claim, in which the plaintiffs allege, in part, that

the defendant’s employees failed to comply with the

antibullying policy. Accordingly, the court properly

denied the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiffs’

complaint.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The town of Greenwich is also a defendant in this action, but it is not

a party to this appeal. Accordingly, we refer to the Board of Education of

the Town of Greenwich as the defendant.

2 Although the denial of a motion to strike is interlocutory and, thus,

generally not a final judgment for purposes of appeal; White v. White, 42

Conn. App. 747, 749, 680 A.2d 1368 (1996); the denial of a motion filed on

the basis of a colorable claim of sovereign immunity is an immediately

appealable final judgment. Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 167, 749 A.2d 1147

(2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn.

301, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). On June 23, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion to

dismiss this appeal on the ground that there is no ‘‘colorable basis’’ for the

defendant’s sovereign immunity claim, which was denied by this court on

September 7, 2017.

3 General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 10-222d (b), as amended by Public Acts

2011, No. 11-232, § 1, provided in relevant part: ‘‘Each local and regional

board of education shall develop and implement a safe school climate plan

to address the existence of bullying in its schools. . . .’’ The alleged tortious

conduct of the defendant’s employees began prior to 2011, and continued

after 2011, and the plaintiffs’ claims do not involve the specific requirements

of that statute. Accordingly, all references to § 10-222d in this opinion are

to the 2011 revision, as amended by No. 11-232 of the 2011 Public Acts.

4 The plaintiffs filed their original complaint on August 17, 2015. On May

6, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in two counts, both of

which sound in wrongful death. Count one is addressed to the defendant;

count two is addressed to the town of Greenwich. On May 25, 2016, the

plaintiffs filed an amendment to the amended complaint, which revised two

paragraphs in each count. Accordingly, the operative complaint is the May

6, 2016 amended complaint, as partially revised by the May 25, 2016

amendment.

5 Although they do not utilize the talismanic phrasing, the plaintiffs’ allegations are framed in vicarious liability against the defendant for the actions

of its employees.

6 General Statutes § 52-557n (a) (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Except as

otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable

for damages to person or property caused by: (A) The negligent acts or

omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent

thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties . . . .’’

7 The defendant and the town of Greenwich filed a joint motion to strike

on four grounds. In the first ground, which is at issue in the present appeal,

the defendant argued that it is entitled to sovereign immunity. The second,

third, and fourth grounds, which contested the legal sufficiency of the complaint based upon §§ 52-557 and 10-222d, are not at issue on appeal.

8 Even though it is ultimately immaterial, the court relied upon § 10-222l
(a), instead of § 10-222l (c). The import of both subsections is congruent,

however; subsection (a) applies to claims made against school employees,

and subsection (c) applies to claims made against a board of education. In

light of the fact that this action is brought against a board of education, we

rely on § 10-222l (c), which provides in relevant part: ‘‘No claim for damages

shall be made against a local or regional board of education that implements

the safe school climate plan, described in Section 10-222d, and reports,

investigates and responds to bullying . . . if such local or regional board

of education was acting in good faith in the discharge of its duties. The

immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions

constituting gross, reckless, wilful or wanton misconduct.’’

9 See Bruno v. Travelers Cos., 172 Conn. App. 717, 723 n.6, 161 A.3d

630 (2017) (explaining distinction between motion to strike and motion to

dismiss); see also Lane v. Cashman, 179 Conn. App. 394, 423, 180 A.3d 13

(2018) (when issue raised by motion to strike concerns trial court’s subject

matter jurisdiction, we view and review court’s ruling on motion as one

made in connection with motion to dismiss).

10 The decisions of the Superior Court are split as to whether a local board

of education is entitled to sovereign immunity when it acts, or fails to act,

in connection with the prevention of bullying in public schools. The defendant relies upon the following cases to support its position that it is entitled

to sovereign immunity: Wells v. Stoval, Superior Court, judicial district of

New Haven, Docket No. CV-10-5032978-S (June 25, 2013) (sovereign immunity protects local board of education for its failure to notify parents of

bullied student, pursuant to § 10-222d, because that statute imposes state

mandated activities); Roach v. First Student Transportation, LLC, Superior

Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-10-6007924-S (August

18, 2010) (50 Conn. L. Rptr. 517) (in determining whether § 10-222d imposes

duty of care upon school bus operator, court held that local board of education acts as agent of state when creating antibullying policy pursuant to

§ 10-222d and that ‘‘legislative intent was . . . not to impose punishment

on the board, or its agents, for the violation of that policy’’); Antalik v.

Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket

No. CV-07-5001762-S (August 13, 2008) (46 Conn. L. Rptr. 179) (sovereign

immunity protects local board of education because it was acting pursuant

to state mandated activity when it failed to implement and follow antibullying

policy adopted pursuant to § 10-222d); Santoro v. Hamden, Superior Court,

judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-04-0488583-S (August 18,

2006) (sovereign immunity protects local board of education because it

acted as an agent of state when it failed to provide ‘‘equal educational

opportunities’’ through its failure to prevent bullying in public schools,

and § 10-222d does not waive sovereign immunity or create private cause

of action).

Conversely, the plaintiffs rely upon the following cases to bolster their

argument that the defendant is not entitled to sovereign immunity: Lopez

v. Bridgeport, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV15-6051932-S (June 27, 2016) (62 Conn. L. Rptr. 593) (sovereign immunity

does not protect local board of education because it acts on behalf of

municipality when it provides a ‘‘safe school setting’’ pursuant to § 10-220);

Rajeh v. Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven,

Docket No. CV-14-6049904-S (June 7, 2016) (62 Conn. L. Rptr. 512) (sovereign

immunity does not protect local board of education because it acts as

agent of the municipality, not the state, when it fails to prevent bullying);

Hernandez v. Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV-09-5010484-S (June 7, 2013) (56 Conn. L. Rptr.

311) (sovereign immunity does not protect local board of education for its

failure to comply with antibullying policy because § 10-222d does not control

or interfere with state and ‘‘[m]aintaining a safe school is done for the

benefit of the municipality, not the state’’); Straiton v. Board of Education,

Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV-10-6003255-S

(March 13, 2012) (sovereign immunity does not protect local board of education for its failure to prevent bullying because it acts as agent of municipality

when it supervises and maintains control of premises for protection of

students); Esposito v. Bethany, Superior Court, judicial district of New

Haven, Docket No. CV-06-5002923-S (February 14, 2007) (43 Conn. L. Rptr.

7) (sovereign immunity does not protect local board of education for its

failure to prevent bullying because duty to supervise students is performed

for benefit of municipality).

11 The defendant contends that the qualified statutory immunity provided

by § 10-222l does not waive sovereign immunity. The defendant’s argument
misconstrues the plaintiffs’ reliance on § 10-222l. The plaintiffs do not claim

that § 10-222l waives sovereign immunity; instead, they argue that the existence of the limited statutory immunity in § 10-222l confirms that there is

no sovereign immunity for the failure to execute properly or to comply with

a plan developed and implemented pursuant to § 10-222d. For the reasons

discussed later in this opinion, we agree with the plaintiffs.

12 To the extent that the defendant endeavors to characterize the plaintiffs’

allegations as claiming that it directly violated the provisions of § 10-222d,

we disagree. Construing the plaintiff’s complaint broadly and realistically,

as we must; see Byrne v. Avery Center for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C.,

314 Conn. 433, 462, 102 A.3d 32 (2014); their complaint clearly alleges a

violation of the policy, not the statute.

13 With one exception, all of the Superior Court decisions relied on by the

defendant were decided prior to the enactment of § 10-222l; see footnote

10 of this opinion; the only decision cited by the defendant that was decided

after 2011; Wells v. Stoval, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-10-5032978-

S; makes no mention of § 10-222l.

14 The defendant attempts to reconcile the language of § 10-222l with its

claim of sovereign immunity by arguing that § 10-222l is intended to limit

what claims a plaintiff can pursue if the Claims Commissioner waives sovereign immunity. Of course, that is not what the statute says. In fact, the

statute makes no reference to the Claims Commissioner at all. We will not

torture the plain wording of a statute to impart a meaning not expressed

by its unambiguous language. See State v. Smith, 148 Conn. App. 684,

700–701, 86 A.3d 498 (2014), aff’d, 317 Conn. 338, 118 A.3d 49 (2015).