NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except

in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2022 IL App (3d) 210199-U

Order filed May 18, 2022

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2022 

K.S. KRISHNAMOORTHI, )

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

 ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

JOSEPH CHEN, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 10th Judicial Circuit, 

Peoria County, Illinois

Appeal No. 3-21-0199 

Circuit No. 20-L-160 

Honorable 

Michael D. Risinger,

Judge, Presiding 

____________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Hauptman and Lytton concurred in the judgment.

____________________________________________________________________________ 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Trial court did not err when it dismissed plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a 

claim.

¶ 2 Plaintiff K.S. Krishnamoorthi brought a two-count complaint against defendant Joseph 

Chen, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and tortious interference with an 

expectancy. The trial court dismissed the case on Chen’s motion. Krishnamoorthi appealed. We 

affirm.
2 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Plaintiff K.S. Krishnamoorthi and defendant Joseph Chen are both professors in the 

Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering at Bradley University. Krishnamoorthi 

had taught in the department for more than 39 years, specializing in engineering statistics, and 

planned to retire in May 2020. He was then 79 years old and in poor health, suffering from diabetes, 

hypertension and a peptic ulcer. Chen was the department chair. In 2017, Krishnamoorthi ran 

against Chen for the chairperson position and authored a “manifesto” critical of Chen. In 2018, 

Krishnamoorthi informed the associate dean of the college that Chen had allowed an unqualified 

graduate student to enroll in one of Krishnamoorthi’s classes. In June 2018, Chen assigned 

Krishnamoorthi to teach a new graduate level course in facilities planning in the upcoming spring 

semester.

¶ 5 Krishnamoorthi attempted to decline the teaching assignment, claiming ill health and lack 

of expertise in the area of facilities planning. He asked Chen to reconsider but Chen declined to 

release Krishnamoorthi from the teaching duties. Krishnamoorthi then appealed to the dean of the 

engineering school, who denied the appeal because the department chair was responsible for 

teaching assignments. Krishnamoorthi asked the dean to reconsider, offering that one of his 

colleagues had agreed to switch teaching assignments with Krishnamoorthi. The dean denied the 

new request.

¶ 6 Krishnamoorthi began experiencing physical and emotional problems, including sleep 

disturbances, stomach pain related to his ulcer, elevated blood pressure and a preoccupation with 

his new assignment. His symptoms continued to worsen and he was hospitalized in October 2018 

for high blood pressure. He was further diagnosed with blood clots in his lungs, stress to his heart 

and an aortic aneurism. Krishnamoorthi informed both Chen and the dean of his medical status.
3 

¶ 7 Also in October 2018, Krishnamoorthi filed a grievance with the faculty grievance 

committee, which recommended Chen withdraw the teaching assignment. He did not withdraw it 

and Krishnamoorthi took medical leave for the spring semester. He returned from leave with 

instructions from his doctor that his workload minimize stressors. Krishnamoorthi requested a fulltime teaching load that did not include the facilities planning course. When Chen refused, 

Krishnamoorthi went on half-time medical leave but was still required to teach facilities planning. 

After the dean intervened, Chen excused Krishnamoorthi from teaching the course but would not 

assign him a course in his area of expertise.

¶ 8 Krishnamoorthi filed a two-count complaint, alleging intentional infliction of emotional 

distress and tortious interference with an employment expectancy. Chen moved to dismiss per 

section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2020)). The trial court 

granted the motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Krishnamoorthi timely appealed.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Krishnamoorthi argues that the trial court improperly dismissed his complaint. He 

maintains he adequately pleaded extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to sustain his claim

for intentional infliction of emotional distress and that he sufficiently alleged tortious interference 

with his employment expectancy.

¶ 11 A section 2-615 motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Id. In 

the complaint, the plaintiff is not required to prove his case but must allege facts sufficient to 

sustain each element of the cause of action. Griffin v. Bruner, 341 Ill. App. 3d 321, 324 (2003). In 

deciding a 2-615 motion to dismiss, the court considers whether, taking all well-pleaded facts as 

true and construing them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the allegations are sufficient to 

state a cause of action on which relief may be granted. Doe-3 v. McLean County Unit District No. 
4 

5 Board of Directors, 2012 IL 112479, ¶ 16. This court reviews the dismissal of a complaint 

de novo. Id. ¶ 15.

¶ 12 We first address the complaint’s intentional infliction of emotional distress count. 

Krishnamoorthi characterizes the circumstances at issue as more than a mere work dispute and 

contends that Chen’s behavior was outrageous, and his allegations were sufficient to sustain the 

intentional infliction of emotional distress count. He asserts that Chen held a position of power 

over him and the ability to damage his interests. Krishnamoorthi further questions whether Chen’s 

assignment of the facilities planning course was a legitimate business objective and whether Chen 

had a retaliatory motive in assigning the course. Finally, Krishnamoorthi claims that his age and 

ill health made him particularly vulnerable to emotional distress.

¶ 13 To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the complaint must 

allege that (1) defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) defendant intended to cause 

severe emotional distress or knew there was a high probability his conduct would lead to severe 

emotional distress; and (3) defendant’s conduct did cause severe emotional distress. McGrath v. 

Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78, 86 (1988). Whether a defendant’s conduct is extreme and outrageous is 

judged objectively based on the particular facts and circumstances of the case. Id. at 90. Outrageous 

conduct involves more than “ ‘mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or 

other trivialities.’ ” Id. at 86 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, comment d at 73 

(1965)). When the conduct arises in an employment context, the court looks at whether it involves 

an abuse of power or authority and whether the conduct furthers a legitimate business objective. 

Id. at 88.

¶ 14 Krishnamoorthi’s complaint alleges that Chen assigned him to teach a class outside of his 

area of expertise in retaliation for actions Krishnamoorthi took challenging Chen and that Chen 
5 

refused to reconsider the decision despite knowing its adverse effect on Krishnamoorthi’s mental, 

emotional and physical well-being. The complaint states that Chen was aware Krishnamoorthi was 

nearly 80 years old and planning to retire but still assigned him to teach the facilities planning 

course. Krishnamoorthi alleged such conduct violated the university handbook in that it did not 

further the school’s objective to provide a quality education; that Chen persisted in maintaining 

the course assignment despite Krishnamoorthi’s stress resulting from the assignment; that 

Krishnamoorthi had a “life threatening medical condition” that would be aggravated by stress; and 

that Chen was aware of Krishnamoorthi’s health issues; and that Krishnamoorthi suffered severe 

physical and emotional distress as a result of Chen’s conduct.

¶ 15 These allegations are insufficient to sustain a cause of action for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress. Chen used his position of authority to further the legitimate objective of 

assigning courses to professors. When Krishnamoorthi challenged the assignment, Chen did not 

engage in coercive tactics or threaten Krishnamoorthi. There are no allegations of unprofessional 

conduct by Chen, only conduct that Krishnamoorthi disliked. Chen’s knowledge of 

Krishnamoorthi’s physical and emotional distress does not save Krishnamoorthi’s claim. While it 

is undisputed Krishnamoorthi suffered emotional distress, the allegations do not support that any 

action by Chen was outrageous such that it could have resulted in severe emotional distress. Public 

Finance Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill. 2d 85, 94 (1976) (even when defendant is aware of plaintiff’s 

particular susceptibility, “major outrage *** is still essential to the tort”). Krishnamoorthi was 79 

years old when this saga began, in ill health, and facing retirement. We find the trial court properly 

dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional distress count for failure to state a claim.

¶ 16 We next address whether the trial court erred when it dismissed the tortious interference 

count. Krishnamoorthi maintains that he pleaded facts adequate to sustain his cause of action. He 
6 

argues that Chen’s conduct forced him to work part time and deprived him of income. He asserts 

he reasonably expected to continue teaching courses in his area of expertise and Chen’s conduct 

interfered with his expectation.

¶ 17 To sustain a cause of action for tortious interference with an employment relationship, the 

plaintiff must establish (1) a reasonable expectation of continued employment; (2) defendant’s 

knowledge of the plaintiff’s expectancy; (3) defendant’s intentional and unjustified interference 

caused the employment to be terminated; and (4) damages. Harrison v. Addington, 2011 IL App 

(3d) 100810, ¶ 52.

¶ 18 As to the first element, Krishnamoorthi had a reasonable expectation of continued 

employment. He had been employed as a professor for nearly 40 years and reasonably anticipated 

that his tenure would continue, albeit it in light of his projected retirement. However, in the 

complaint, Krishnamoorthi alleged that he had a reasonable expectation that he would continue 

teaching courses “which he was qualified to teach and were consistent with his plan of professional 

development.” It was not a reasonable expectation that he would only be assigned coursework he 

enjoyed and wanted to teach.

¶ 19 The second element is Chen’s knowledge of Krishnamoorthi’s expectancy. The complaint 

does not allege that Chen knew Krishnamoorthi wanted to teach only specific courses in his 

particular field. It alleges only that Chen knew Krishnamoorthi was not qualified to teach the 

facilities planning course based on Krishnamoorthi’s own assessment of his abilities and 

preferences. As alleged in the complaint, Chen was responsible for faculty teaching assignments. 

He was not required to satisfy each professor’s preferences as to the assignments. The facilities 

management course Chen assigned Krishnamoorthi was within the college of engineering program 

with which Krishnamoorthi was affiliated. Krishnamoorthi had taught a course in facilities 
7 

management, albeit 30 years prior. Chen’s assignment of the course to Krishnamoorthi did not 

alter his expectancy of employment. Krishnamoorthi maintained his professorship and voluntarily 

opted to reduce his workload.

¶ 20 Krishnamoorthi cannot satisfy the third element, that Chen interfered in such a manner as 

to cause Bradley to terminate Krishnamoorthi’s employment. Significantly, Krishnamoorthi was 

not terminated from his employment. Bradley did not reduce his workload or his work hours. 

Krishnamoorthi voluntarily took medical leave and requested a part-time course load. The 

complaint does not allege Chen’s conduct interfered with his employment with Bradley. Simmons 

v. Campion, 2013 IL App (3d) 120562, ¶ 32 (“A complaint must contain specific factual 

allegations to support a reasonable inference that a defendant’s conduct was unjustified”). 

Although the complaint alleges that Chen’s conduct caused Krishnamoorthi to seek a reduced 

workload, Krishnamoorthi fails to allege Chen caused a breach of his employment expectancy. 

Krishnamoorthi could have continued teaching full time but he would have had to teach the 

facilities planning course, which he refused to do.

¶ 21 Krishnamoorthi’s allegations also fail on the fourth element, damages. Although he 

voluntarily took medical leave and reduced his course load to part time, he retained his 

professorship and continued to teach classes. He remained employed by Bradley. There was no 

tortious interference in his employment relationship. We find this count was properly dismissed

for failure to state a cause of action. 

¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed. 

¶ 24 Affirmed.