[Cite as State v. Nichols, 2020-Ohio-5157.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 19AP-612 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 18CR-2024)

Angela M. Nichols, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellee. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on November 3, 2020 

 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. 

Gilbert, for appellant. Argued: Seth L. Gilbert. 

On brief: Yeura Venters, Public Defender, and George M. 

Schumann, for appellee. Argued: George M. Schumann. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

KLATT, J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, State of Ohio, appeals from the September 11, 2019 entry 

of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting, in part, the motion to suppress of 

defendant-appellee, Angela M. Nichols. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and 

remand for further proceedings. 

{¶ 2} By indictment filed April 27, 2018, the state charged Nichols with one count 

of tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2931.12, a third-degree felony, and one 

count of abuse of a corpse in violation of R.C. 2927.01, a fifth-degree felony.1

 

1 The indictment charged Nichols' husband, Andrew, with the same crimes. 
No. 19AP-612 2 

{¶ 3} Subsequently, on February 7, 2019, Nichols filed a motion to suppress 

statements she made to detectives during an interview at the Franklin County Sheriff's 

office on April 16, 2018. Nichols argued that the interview was a "custodial interrogation" 

and that the statements were elicited without proper advisement of her constitutional rights 

pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). (Feb. 7, 2019 Mot. to Suppress at 2, 

6.) The state opposed the motion, arguing that Nichols was not in custody at the time of 

the interview; thus, no Miranda warnings were required. The trial court set the matter for 

a hearing. 

{¶ 4} At the suppression hearing on June 27, 2019, the state provided the following 

evidence. On April 16, 2018, Franklin County Sheriff Deputy James Dishong was instructed 

by the detective bureau to contact Nichols and her husband, Andrew, at the Days Inn on 

Stringtown Road to see if either or both of them would be willing to come to the sheriff's 

office for an interview. Dishong did not know if Nichols was considered to be a potential 

suspect or a witness. Dishong drove a marked police cruiser to the hotel. Upon arrival at 

Nichols' room, he covered the door's peep hole with his hand and knocked. When Nichols 

answered the door, Dishong explained that detectives would like to speak to her. Dishong 

was wearing a uniform; his service weapon was visible but holstered. According to Dishong, 

Nichols seemed a little surprised by his presence, as if she did not understand what was 

happening. Nichols told Dishong that Andrew was not present, as he had gone to buy 

cigarettes. Another deputy left to search for him. 

{¶ 5} Dishong, referring to himself as "the Uber driver," told Nichols he would give 

her a ride to the sheriff's office, but she did not have to go with him. (June 27, 2019 Tr. at 

7.) According to Dishong, Nichols "was free to go, free to run away, free to close the door 

in my face, whatever she wanted to do." Id. at 21. When Nichols expressed concern about 

leaving her dog alone at the hotel for an extended period of time, Dishong explained that a 

hotel employee had assured another deputy that the dog could stay in the room. 

{¶ 6} Dishong testified that he explicitly told Nichols that she was not under arrest; 

as such, he did not handcuff or otherwise restrain her and did not advise her of her Miranda 

rights. He denied Nichols' request to smoke a cigarette before leaving the hotel but 

permitted her to take her purse with her. Dishong and Nichols engaged in small talk during 

the drive from the hotel to the sheriff's office, which took eight or nine minutes. Upon 
No. 19AP-612 3 

arrival, Dishong and Nichols entered through the Sallyport. Dishong escorted Nichols to 

an interview room in the detective bureau. 

{¶ 7} Franklin County Sheriff Detectives Jason Evans and Andrew Harper 

interviewed Nichols in conjunction with an investigation involving discovery of an 

unidentified dead body in the basement of a Harrisburg home where Nichols and Andrew 

had recently lived with Andrew's mother. Evans testified that prior to the interview, he did 

not consider Nichols to be a "suspect"; rather, she was "just a witness." Id. at 33. 

{¶ 8} At the outset of the interview,2 Evans and Harper introduced themselves as 

detectives and thanked Nichols "for coming down and chatting with us." Id. at 37; State's 

Ex. M-1. When asked about her living arrangements, Nichols confirmed that she and 

Andrew had been staying with Andrew's mother in Harrisburg for a few weeks until the 

landlord asked them to leave because of their dog. 

{¶ 9} Evans soon averred, "[s]o obviously you are here for a reason." Id. at 38; 

State's Ex. M-1. Nichols responded, "[y]eah, and I have no idea." Id.; State's Ex. M-1. Evans 

then said, "we will kind of fill you in, but * * * I really want you to be honest with us * * * 

and come clean with us, okay?" Id.; State's Ex. M-1. Nichols agreed to do so. 

{¶ 10} The detectives then questioned Nichols about telephone communications she 

had with Andrew's mother earlier in the evening. Nichols acknowledged that her motherin-law initially asked her, "[w]hy am I in a sheriff's vehicle"? Id. at 38; State's Ex. M-1. In 

a subsequent call, her mother-in-law stated, "[i]t's a crime scene. They're taping off the 

house." Id. at 39; State's Ex. M-1. Nichols told her mother-in-law that she did not know 

why law enforcement was at the house. Nichols apprised Andrew of the conversations; he 

stated that he would return his mother's call and then left the hotel. He did not return prior 

to Nichols' departure with Dishong. 

{¶ 11} The detectives then asked Nichols about her relationship with Andrew. She 

averred that the 2 had been married for 5 years and have a 15-month old child. She further 

averred that Andrew had been a patient at a psychiatric facility in February 2019 and had 

been arrested for assault in October 2018. 

 

2 The interview was videotaped. The parties stipulated to a redacted version of the videotape, which was 

submitted as State's Ex. M-1 and played at the motion hearing. The redactions involve only gaps in time

where the detectives exited and reentered the interview room. Audio from the interview was transcribed 

and is included in the transcript of the motion hearing. 
No. 19AP-612 4 

{¶ 12} At this point in the interview, Evans left the room to take a phone call from 

his sergeant. Harper remained with Nichols and continued to question her about Andrew. 

When Evans returned, at the 7 minute, 48 second mark of the interview (hereinafter 

"7:48"), he told Nichols he had just been informed that a neighbor who lives behind the 

Harrisburg home told sheriff's deputies that Nichols had asked to borrow carpet cleaner. 

Nichols responded that she had used her own carpet cleaner to clean up a mess made by 

the dog. 

{¶ 13} Evans immediately advised Nichols that the interview was being recorded. 

He then averred, "[y]ou got about 50 years of law enforcement sitting in front of you. This 

is not our first case. * * * I no doubt think that you are fully aware of what's in that basement 

and what took place in that basement." Id. at 46; State's Ex. M-1. He informed Nichols that 

there was a dead body in the basement of the Harrisburg home and urged her to "start 

thinking about who you are trying to protect here." Id.; State's Ex. M-1. When Nichols 

averred that she "had no idea" about the dead body, Evans stated, "Andrew is not here right 

now for us to talk to, but you are. * * * Accidents happen. * * * You were in the house as 

well. If you made a mistake, this is the time for us to know that up front. * * * Don't sit here 

and lie to me. * * * People make mistakes. * * * We know what took place. We know what 

happened. I need you to tell us what happened." Id. at 46-47; State's Ex. M-1. At the 

hearing on the motion to suppress, Evans acknowledged that after he returned to the 

interview room, he lied to Nichols about knowing what had happened to the woman in the 

basement. He characterized his fabrication as an "interview tactic" often used by police. 

Id. at 48. 

{¶ 14} Nichols insisted that she did not know what had happened; Evans responded, 

"[w]ell, I think you do." Id. at 47; State's Ex. M-1. Both detectives then told Nichols that 

they knew Andrew was abusing drugs and that he had a bad temper. Evans further stated, 

"[n]ow, am I going to sit here and accuse you or Andrew of being homicidal maniacs? No, 

I'm not, and I don't think you are. I think you're good people who made a mistake and 

attempted to clean up the mess. * * * I've already told you, this isn't our first homicide." Id. 

at 49; State's Ex. M-1. 

{¶ 15} When Nichols began discussing the carpet cleaner, Evans averred "[w]e're 

beyond that. All right? Don't lie to me. * * * If you made a mistake, that's what we need to 
No. 19AP-612 5 

know. If Andrew made a mistake that's what we need to know. * * * Look at me. Tell me 

what happened in the basement." Id. at 49-50; State's Ex. M-1. 

{¶ 16} Nichols told the detectives she had arrived at the Harrisburg home three 

weeks earlier following her release from a drug rehabilitation facility in California. Andrew 

immediately told her that a girl had "OD'd" in the basement and that her body was still 

there. Id. at 50-51; State's Ex. M-1. He further stated that the girl had injected herself with 

cocaine, resulting in a fatal seizure. Because he feared arrest for drug possession, he 

disposed of the needle the girl used and did not call 911. Nichols urged Andrew to call 911; 

however, neither she nor Andrew did so. 

{¶ 17} After questioning Nichols about Andrew's current whereabouts and the 

couple's past and present drug use, Evans announced he was going to leave the interview 

room to make phone calls. Nichols asked if she was going to be arrested. Evans responded, 

"I can't say that for sure. * * * You being forthcoming with us and being honest, it goes a 

long way." Id. at 59; State's Ex. M-1. Both Evans and Harper left the room; Nichols 

remained alone in the room and, with Evans' permission, smoked a cigarette. 

{¶ 18} When the detectives returned, Evans asked Nichols what she knew about the 

deceased woman. Evans said "listen, you've already came clean, so to speak, and been more 

than informative and been very helpful to us, to our investigation. And with that being said, 

there is no reason to shut down on me now." Id. at 61; State's Ex. M-1. Nichols averred that 

she did not know the woman, as Andrew had met her in the psychiatric facility. Evans then 

questioned Nichols about her drug supplier; Nichols provided a name and cell phone 

number. 

{¶ 19} The detectives again returned to the topic of the deceased woman. Both 

expressed incredulity at Nichols' statement that she had never gone into the basement to 

examine the woman's body. They also questioned her about her knowledge of Andrew's 

clean-up efforts in the basement. To that end, Harper averred, "[y]ou have got to think 

about this. Now, we're going to fingerprint that plastic, we're going to swab it. * * * [Y]our 

fingerprints, your DNA is not going to be on that bagged body anywhere? Id. at 68; State's 

Ex. M-1. When Nichols responded, "I was never in the basement," Harper asked, "[i]t's not 

going to be on the floor around it where you kneeled down to help him tape her up or 

anything? * * * So if you were anywhere near that body, we are going to know it, and that's 
No. 19AP-612 6 

where you have been great with us. But continue to be great and let us know. * * * [A]nd 

believe it or not, tape is an awesome thing to collect evidence. So did you help him wrap 

her up?" Id. at 68-69; State's Ex. M-1. Nichols responded, "[y]eah." Id. at 69; State's Ex. 

M-1. 

{¶ 20} Evans then said, "we know this stuff" and warned Nichols not to "lie" to him. 

Id. at 69; State's Ex. M-1. Harper urged Nichols to "look out" for herself and "be honest 

with everything." Id.; State's Ex. M-1. In response to questions about her return to 

Harrisburg from California, Nichols reiterated what Andrew told her about the body in the 

basement. Nichols said she and Andrew eventually went down to the basement because 

they "were afraid [the body] would start smelling." Id. at 71; State's Ex. M-1. 

{¶ 21} Harper then told Nichols to be "completely honest" and "walk us through 

what you guys did." Id. Nichols averred, "I feel like I need a lawyer. I'm scared." Id. 

Without any acknowledgment of Nichols' statement, Evans asked her to provide more 

details about what had happened. He also told Nichols that Andrew was in custody and 

would tell the police what had occurred. 

{¶ 22} Evans next stated, "I understand that you assisted him in wrapping the body 

or placing it in a bag." Id. at 72. Nichols agreed and thereafter provided details of their 

actions. Specifically, Nichols averred that while wearing gloves, they taped together six 

plastic trash bags, placed the woman's fully clothed body on top of the trash bags, and ducttaped around it. Following additional questioning about her drug use with Andrew, the 

detectives left the room. 

{¶ 23} Upon their return, the detectives told Nichols they had spoken with Andrew 

that morning and now had to "nail down some details with you." Id. at 75; State's Ex. M-1. 

Evans clarified that Nichols was not being accused of administering the lethal dose of drugs 

to the woman or even being present when the woman did so. Thereafter, Harper averred, 

"I've got to get through this with you real quick, okay" and advised Nichols of her Miranda 

rights. Id. at 76; State's Ex. M-1. Nichols indicated that she understood her rights. 

{¶ 24} Thereafter, in response to the detectives' further questioning, Nichols 

repeated, albeit in slightly greater detail, the information she had already disclosed 

regarding her discussion with Andrew about the circumstances of the woman's death and 
No. 19AP-612 7 

her participation in wrapping the body and cleaning the area around it. Subsequently, the 

detectives swabbed Nichols' mouth for DNA and ended the interview. 

{¶ 25} In addition to State's Ex. M-1, the state submitted State's Ex. M-2, a 

constitutional rights form used by the sheriff's office in advising an accused of his or her 

Miranda rights. At the hearing, Evans acknowledged that Nichols did not sign the form. 

He explained that pursuant to standard sheriff's office protocol, Nichols was not given the 

opportunity to do so because she had orally waived her rights during the recorded 

interview. 

{¶ 26} On cross-examination, Evans conceded that at no time during Nichols' 

interview did he tell her that the interview was voluntary, that she was free to leave, or that 

she did not have to speak with him. He further acknowledged that Nichols was seated at a 

table at the back of the interview room and that he and Harper sat facing her on either side 

of the table; he was seated between Nichols and the door. In addition, he admitted that 

Nichols was not permitted to leave the room to smoke. Review of State's Ex. M-1 bears out 

these details. Evans testified that the seating arrangement was to accommodate the video 

camera. He conceded that Nichols "probably" was "under the impression that she had to 

stay in the room" during the interview. Id. at 134. 

{¶ 27} In response to defense counsel's intimation that Evans considered Nichols to 

be a suspect from the outset of the interview based upon his knowledge that a dead body 

had been discovered in the basement of the home where Nichols was staying, Evans averred 

that he "thought of her as nothing more than a witness until the time we Mirandized her." 

Id. at 106. During further cross-examination, however, Evans acknowledged that many of 

the questions posed to Nichols prior to advisement of her Miranda rights were designed to, 

and did, elicit incriminating responses from her. He also acknowledged that the questions 

posed after the Miranda advisement elicited only "more detail" about the topics already 

covered prior to the advisement. Id. at 132. He further testified that at the conclusion of 

the interview and after discussion with other law enforcement personnel, it was determined 

there was probable cause to take Nichols into custody; she was thereafter taken directly to 

jail. 

{¶ 28} Nichols testified that she was in bed when the police knocked on her hotel 

room door. She stepped outside and was told she "needed to go down and speak to a 
No. 19AP-612 8 

detective downtown." Id. at 146. She felt she did not have a choice in the matter. A deputy 

accompanied her into the room to retrieve her sneakers. She was not provided the 

opportunity to make arrangements for the care of her dog. Dishong granted her permission 

to smoke before he "hurried" her into his police cruiser. Id. at 148. 

{¶ 29} Upon arrival at the sheriff's office, she was escorted into an interview room; 

the door was closed behind her. She believed she would have been handcuffed and "taken 

in anyway" had she refused to go into the room. Id. at 150. She did not feel as if she could 

leave the room without asking permission to do so or that she had a choice about answering 

the detectives' questions. She was not asked if she wanted to talk to the detectives and was 

not told that she was not required to speak to them. She further testified that she did not 

have a means of returning to the hotel. 

{¶ 30} Nichols conceded on cross-examination that the detectives were "nice" to her 

and did not shout at her. Id. at 155. She further acknowledged that they repeatedly told 

her they wanted to help her and encouraged her to "look out" for herself." Id. 

{¶ 31} Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court accepted additional briefing 

from the parties on the issues raised at the hearing. In her briefing, Nichols argued that the 

entire interview was a custodial interrogation and that all of her statements—both before 

and after the Miranda warnings—should be suppressed. Nichols further maintained that 

even if the interview began as a voluntary interview, it became custodial once Evans 

returned to the interview room at the 7:48 mark as, at that point, the nature of the 

questioning changed. In contrast, the state argued that no Miranda warnings were 

required because Nichols was never in custody and, even though unnecessary, the Miranda 

warnings given were effective. 

{¶ 32} At the August 13, 2019 hearing addressing the parties' additional briefing, 

the court issued an oral ruling granting Nichols' motion to suppress in part. The court, 

noting that it had reviewed State's Ex. M-1, suppressed all of Nichols' statements made after 

the 7:48 mark in the interview. The court reasoned that, prior to that point, "there was no 

indication and no interviewing of her culpability and/or knowledge of the event." (Aug. 13, 

2019 Tr. at 165.) The court further determined after the 7:48 mark, "the detectives directly 

confronted Ms. Nichols about her knowledge and participation in the location of the body 

and the ultimate bundling of the body, and the detectives failed to provide Ms. Nichols with 
No. 19AP-612 9 

the appropriate and proper Miranda warnings." Id. at 165-66. The court noted that Nichols 

was in a "closed interview room, and it was a clear inquiry into her without the reading of 

the Miranda warnings." Id. at 166. The court further averred that any subsequent 

advisement of her Miranda rights "does not render the admission of the statements." Id. 

at 166. 

{¶ 33} The trial court journalized its oral ruling in an entry filed September 11, 2019 

wherein the court stated: 

Upon reviewing the videotape and the post-hearing 

memorandums [sic] the Court found [at the August 13, 2019 

hearing] that at 7:48 of the videotaped interview with Angela 

Nichols, the detectives began to inquire into Ms. Nichol's [sic] 

knowledge of the event. However, prior to that time there was 

no indication and no interviewing of her culpability and or 

[sic] knowledge of the event. Therefore; [sic] the first 7:48 

seconds [sic] will be admitted. The court also found that from 

7:48 to the remainder of the videotaped interview, the 

detectives conducted a custodial interrogation of the 

Defendant without first advising the Defendant of her 

Constitutional Miranda Rights. The Detectives directly 

confronted Ms. Nichols about her knowledge and 

participation in the location of the body in a closed interview 

room until the Defendant's inculpatory statements were 

solicited. Therefore, the Court will suppress the remainder of 

the video. 

 

(Sept. 11, 2019 Entry at 2.) 

{¶ 34} The state timely appeals pursuant to Crim.R. 12(K) and R.C. 2945.67(A) and 

sets forth one assignment of error for our review: 

The trial court committed reversible error in suppressing 

statements. 

{¶ 35} In its single assignment of error, the state argues that the trial court erred in 

concluding that statements made by Nichols after the 7:48 mark in the interview were the 

result of custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. The state concedes that the 

detectives' interview of Nichols was an interrogation. The relevant issue, therefore, is 

whether Nichols was in custody at the time she was interrogated. The state maintains that 

Nichols was never in custody; Nichols contends she was in custody from the time she was 

first contacted by Dishong at the hotel. 
No. 19AP-612 10 

{¶ 36} "Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law 

and fact." State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. "When considering 

a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the 

best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses." Id., 

citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366 (1992). "Consequently, an appellate court must 

accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible 

evidence." Id., citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). "Accepting these facts as 

true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the 

conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard." Id., 

citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 (4th Dist.1997). Therefore, an 

appellate court grants deference to the trial court's findings of fact but conducts a de novo 

review of whether the trial court applied the appropriate legal standard to those facts. State 

v. Soto, 9th Dist. No. 16CA011024, 2017-Ohio-4348, ¶ 5, citing State v. Booth, 151 Ohio 

App,3d 635, 2003-Ohio-829, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.). 

{¶ 37} The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the 

states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides persons 

with a privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Wilcox, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-972, 2006-

Ohio-6777, ¶ 43. The privilege against self-incrimination is also guaranteed by Section 10, 

Article 1 of the Ohio Constitution, which provides that "[n]o person shall be compelled, in 

any criminal case, to be a witness against himself." Id. To protect this right, a criminal 

defendant subject to custodial interrogation by law enforcement must be informed of his or 

her constitutional rights to remain silent and to have defense counsel. Miranda, 384 U.S. 

at 478-79. 

{¶ 38} The Miranda court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated 

by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise 

deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444. "A person is 

considered in custody for purposes of Miranda when he is placed under formal arrest or 

his freedom of action is restrained to a degree associated with a formal arrest." State v. 

Simpson, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-757, 2002-Ohio-3717, ¶ 33, citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 

U.S. 420, 434 (1984). "In determining whether a person's freedom of movement was so 

restrained, what is examined is not the subjective views of the person or of the authorities 
No. 19AP-612 11 

but the 'objective circumstances' of the questioning." State v. Tullis, 2d Dist. No. 2012-CA59, 2013-Ohio-3051, ¶ 9, citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994). The test 

is "whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a 'reasonable person would have 

believed that he was not free to leave.' " State v. Gumm, 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 429 (1995), 

quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion). 

{¶ 39} In State v. Simms, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1063, 2012-Ohio-2321, this court 

noted the decision of the Second District Court of Appeals in State v. Estepp, 2d Dist. No. 

16279 (Nov. 26, 1997), which set forth several factors to consider in assessing how an 

objectively reasonable person would have understood and interpreted the interrogation. 

Simms at ¶ 55. Those factors include: (1) the location of the interrogation, i.e., whether the 

defendant was comfortable and in a place a person would normally feel free to leave; 

(2) whether the defendant was a suspect at the time the interrogation began; (3) whether 

the defendant's freedom to leave was restricted in any way; (4) whether the defendant was 

handcuffed or informed he or she was under arrest; (5) whether the defendant was 

threatened during the interrogation; (6) whether the defendant was physically intimidated 

during the interrogation; (7) whether the police verbally dominated the interrogation; 

(8) the defendant's purpose for being at the place where the interrogation occurred; 

(9) whether neutral parties were present at any point during the interrogation; and 

(10) whether the police took any action to overpower, trick, or coerce the defendant into 

making a statement. Id., citing Estepp. Other appellate districts have applied the Estepp 

factors in determining the issue of custody. See State v. Carter, 3d Dist. No. 1-10-01, 2010-

Ohio-5189, ¶ 23; State v. Jones, 5th Dist. No. 13 COA 012, 2014-Ohio-1716, ¶ 31-40; State 

v. Benson, 11th Dist. No. 2018-A-0054, 2019-Ohio-3234, ¶ 40-49; State v. Tate, 7th Dist. 

No. 07 MA 130, 2008-Ohio-3245, ¶ 46-68. 

{¶ 40} In addition to the factors set forth in Estepp, Ohio courts have also 

considered: (1) the duration of the interrogation; (2) whether the defendant was released 

or arrested at the conclusion of the interrogation; (3) whether the door to the interrogation 

room was closed or open, locked or unlocked; (4) whether the defendant requested to leave 

the interrogation room; (5) whether law enforcement told the defendant he or she was free 

to leave or gave the impression he or she was not free to leave; (6) the positioning of the 

defendant and law enforcement in the interrogation room; (7) the circumstances under 
No. 19AP-612 12 

which the defendant appeared at the interrogation (voluntarily or involuntarily); and 

(8) whether the defendant was transported to the police station by a police officer. See State 

v. Brantley, 9th Dist. No. 27466, 2016-Ohio-4680, ¶ 53, 60-62; State v. Tullis, 2d Dist. No. 

2012-CA-59, 2013-Ohio-3051, ¶ 10; State v. Gomez, 12th Dist. No. CA2017-03-035, 2017-

Ohio-8681, ¶ 21; State v. Smith, 12th Dist. No. CA2006-08-030, ¶ 12 (Jan. 20, 2009). In 

addition, an officer's statements concerning the nature of the investigation or his or her 

beliefs regarding the culpability of the defendant are also relevant in assessing whether the 

defendant was in custody when such statements would have affected how a reasonable 

person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave. State v. 

Greeno, 3d Dist. No. 13-02-46, 2003-Ohio-3687, ¶ 17, citing Stansbury v. California, 511 

U.S. 318, 324-25 (1994); State v. Robinson, 6th Dist. No. L-06-1182, 2008-Ohio-3498, 

¶ 271. 

{¶ 41} When the record contains evidence of the foregoing factors, the factors must 

be examined to determine " 'whether, under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable 

person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' " Soto, 9th Dist. No. 16CA011024,

2017-Ohio-4348, at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Dunn, 9th Dist. No. 04CA008549, 2005-Ohio1270, ¶ 24. 

{¶ 42} In neither its oral ruling nor its written entry did the trial court specifically 

find at what point Nichols was in custody. Although a reasonable interpretation of the trial 

court's written statement that "from 7:48 to the remainder of the videotaped interview, the 

detectives conducted a custodial interrogation of the Defendant" suggests that the court 

found that Nichols was not in custody prior to the 7:48 mark in the interview, the trial court 

did not expressly so state. Furthermore, the court's statement is ambiguous as to whether 

the reference to "custodial interrogation" related to interrogation, custody, or both. 

{¶ 43} Further, in both its oral ruling and written entry, the trial court made only 

two factual findings in support of its decision to suppress the statements Nichols made after 

the 7:48 mark in the interview–that the detectives "directly confronted Ms. Nichols about 

her knowledge and participation in the location of the body"–and that the interview was 

conducted in a "closed interview room." (Aug. 13, 2019 Tr. at 165-66; Sept. 11, 2019 Entry 

at 1-2.) However, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, which included the 

videotaped interview, the testimony provided by the state's witnesses, Dishong and Evans, 
No. 19AP-612 13 

and the testimony offered by Nichols, includes numerous additional facts relevant to an 

assessment of how an objectively reasonable person in Nichols' position would have 

understood and interpreted her circumstances. 

{¶ 44} Further, the trial court's findings of fact contained no analysis or discussion 

of the testimony provided by Dishong, Evans, or Nichols. Although the trial acknowledged 

in its entry that Dishong and Evans testified on behalf of the state, the court averred that 

"[t]he Defendant called no witnesses." (Entry at 1.) This statement is contrary to the 

record. 

{¶ 45} Whether a defendant has been subjected to custodial interrogation for 

purposes of the Fifth Amendment and Miranda is a fact-intensive inquiry. State v. 

Martucci, 9th Dist. No. 28888, 2018-Ohio-3471, ¶ 10, citing State v. Lerch, 9th Dist. No. 

26684, 2013-Ohio-5305, ¶ 8; Benson, 11th Dist. No. 2018-A-0054, 2019-Ohio-3234, at 

¶ 38. As noted, in reviewing a trial court's suppression ruling, we must accept the trial 

court's factual findings if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Burnside, 

100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, at ¶ 8. "However, a trial court's findings of fact are 

deemed incomplete when they fail to include pertinent facts that were presented during the 

hearing and which are necessary to conduct the legal analysis." Soto, 9th Dist. No. 

16CA011024, 2017-Ohio-4348, ¶ 10, citing State v. Trivett, 9th Dist. No. 15CA0041-M, 

2016-Ohio-8204, ¶ 7-8. In addition, "the findings of fact are incomplete when the trial 

court fails to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and resolves questions of fact." Id., citing 

State v. Martin, 9th Dist. No. 24812, 2009-Ohio-6948, ¶ 14. A reviewing court "has a 

limited standard of review as to the facts and is not permitted to fill-in gaps." Id. at ¶ 10. 

The absence of adequate factual findings impedes a reviewing court's ability to determine 

the extent to which the facts in the record were considered by the trial court. Martucci at 

¶ 9, quoting State v. Purefoy, 9th Dist. No. 27992, 2017-Ohio-79, ¶ 18. In such an instance, 

a reviewing court must reverse a trial court's suppression ruling and remand the matter for 

the trial court to make factual findings in the first instance. Id., citing Purefoy; Soto at ¶ 17-

18. 

{¶ 46} In the present case, because the trial court has failed to adequately set forth 

its findings of fact, including an evaluation of the credibility of all witness who testified at 

the suppression hearing, this court cannot properly apply the Burnside directive that we 
No. 19AP-612 14 

determine, without deference to the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal 

standard. "[B]ecause [the trial court's findings of fact] are incomplete, we cannot conclude 

that [its] findings of facts as a whole are supported by competent, credible evidence." 

Trivett, 9th Dist. No. 15CA0041-M, 2016-Ohio-8204, at ¶ 7. Consequently, we must 

conclude that the trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress upon the analysis set 

forth in its September 11, 2019 entry. Accordingly, the state's sole assignment of error is 

sustained, and the matter is remanded to the trial court to make adequate factual findings, 

including credibility determinations, and address the motion to suppress based upon those 

findings in the first instance. 

{¶ 47} Having sustained the state's sole assignment of error, we hereby reverse the 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas and remand this matter to the 

trial court for further proceedings in accordance with law and consistent with this decision. 

Judgment reversed; cause remanded.

BEATTY BLUNT and NELSON, JJ., concur.