1 The substance of the lender-liability action is not directly relevant to the disposition of this

appeal. For a detailed account of that suit, see Latham v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 896 F.2d 979,

980-82 (5th Cir.1990).

2 On July 10, 1990, the banks purchased the debtor's claims against them at a judicial auction.

On July 19, 1990, the bankruptcy court approved the transaction. On July 25, 1990, the banks

and the debtor agreed to a joint stipulation of dismissal. United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 92-4754

Summary Calendar.

James A. LATHAM, Plaintiff,

Marian E. Latham, Movant-Appellant,

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

April 13, 1993.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before GARWOOD, JONES and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Movant-appellant Marian E. Latham (Latham) is a would-be intervenor in a suit instituted by

her husband against defendants-appellees. Because the suit had already been settled by the parties

and dismissed with prejudice, the distric t court rejected Latham's attempted intervention. Due

allegedly to the failure of her counsel to receive notice of the entry of the court's order, Latham failed

to make a timely appeal. She thus moved to have the district court set aside its order or to extend

the appeals period. It is from the denial of these two motions that Latham now appeals. We affirm.

Facts and Proceedings Below

The suit that underlies this appeal is a lender-liability action commenced in 1987 by appellant's

husband, James A. Latham (the debtor). 1 Following a compromise and settlement agreement

executed between the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy and appellees Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and First

Security Bank of Utah, N.A. (the banks), 2 the district court on July 30, 1990, ordered the dismissal3 A similar claim was advanced by the debtor in our earlier decision in this case, but we did not

reach it. See Latham, supra, 896 F.2d at 985 ("We need not consider Latham's argument that if

his personal claims were barred, his wife would still be able to press half of them because they are

community property under Louisiana law.").

4 Latham had thirty days to appeal the court's December 26, 1991, order. See Fed.R.App.P.

4(a)(1). Because January 25, 1992, was a Saturday, Latham had until Monday, January 27, 1992,

to file her notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court. See Fed.R.App.P. 26(a). of the suit with prejudice.

On August 14, 1990, Latham, who was not a party to original litigation, filed two motions

in the district court, one seeking leave to intervene or be substituted as a party in the suit and another

couched as a "motion to set aside order of dismissal." The theory of both motions was that Latham's

intervention in the litigation was necessary because the cause of action asserted in the lender liabilit y

suit, and dismissed in the court's July 30 order, was community property

. 3 Reasoning that Latham's

community property could properly be sold or compromi sed by t he trustee with the bankruptcy

court's approval, and that Latham had expressly renounced her right to concur in the sale or

encumbrance of her community assets, the court denied her motion to set aside the July 30, 1990,

dismissal order. The court also denied Latham's motion to intervene on the ground it was too late

to intervene once judgment had been rendered. These motions were denied on December 20, 1991,

and the court's order was docketed on December 26, 1991.

Latham's counsel claims that the denial order was mailed to the wrong address and thus was

not received by him until January 24, 1992, just three days before the time for filing a notice of appeal

of that order would expire. 4 In reaction, Latham, on February 21, 1992, filed two more motions: a

"motion to extend time for filing of appeal" and a second "motion to set aside order of dismissal."

The district court denied both motions on June 18, 1992, and Latham thereafter t imely appealed that

order to thi s Court.

Discussion

At the outset, we emphasize that the only matters before this Court are Latham's two motions

of February 21 an d t he dist rict court's denial of them. Latham brought no timely appeal from the

December 26, 1991, denial of her August 14, 1990, motions.5 The current versions of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) and Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 77(d) took effect on December 1, 1991, prior to the court's denial of Latham's

August 14 motions and prior to the date on which Latham's counsel claims to have received

notice of the order. We deem both rules to be binding in this case. See In re Jones, 970 F.2d 36,

38 (5th Cir.1992). I. The Motion to Extend the Time for Filing an Appeal

Latham argues that, because her counsel did no t receive notice of the district court's

December 26, 1991, order until just before the expiration of time to file notice of appeal therefrom,

it was error for the district court to deny her request, brought under Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure 4(a), to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. We disagree. It is true that the clerk

of the court is required to serve no t ice o f t he entry of an order or judgment by mail to the parties

immediately upon its entry. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 77(d). Nevertheless, Rule 77(d) also provides:

"Lack of notice of the entry by the clerk does not affect the time to appeal o r relieve or

authorize the court to relieve a party for failure to appeal within the time allowed, except as permitted in Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure." Fed.R.Civ.P. 77(d).

Thus, Rule 77(d) clearly states that a party must make a t imely appeal whether or not he recei ves

notice of the entry of an order. Implicit in this rule is the notion that parties have a duty to inquire

pe riodically into the status of their litigation. S ee, e.g., Jones v. Estelle, 693 F.2d 547, 549 (5th

Cir.1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1072, 103 S.Ct. 1528, 75 L.Ed.2d 950 (1983). As

the text of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 77(d) indicates, the only exception to its rule is Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(a).

Two provisions of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(a) are potentially applicable in

circumstances such as these. The first, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6), as amended

effective December 1, 1991, was specifically designed to deal with cases of late notice. It provides:

"The district court, if it finds (a) that a party entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment or

order did not receive such notice from the clerk or any party within 21 days of its entry and

(b) that no party would be prejudiced, may, upon motion filed within 180 days of entry of the

judgment or order or within 7 days of receipt of such notice, whichever is earlier, reopen the

time for appeal for a period of 14 days from the date of entry of the order reopening the time

for appeal." 5 Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(6).

Rule 4(a)(6) thus allows a court to extend the filing period for a party that receives notice of an order

more than three weeks (but less than six months) after its entry. Assuming that Latham, as she6 Rule 4(a)(5)'s allowance for extensions in cases of "good cause" (as distinguished from its

"excusable neglect" standard) applies only to requests made before the expiration of the thirty-day

appeals period. See Allied Steel v. City of Abilene, 909 F.2d 139, 143 & n. 3 (5th Cir.1990) (per

curiam) (citing the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 4(a)(5)). claims, did not receive notice of the court's order until January 24, 1992, she could have sought an

extension under Rule 4(a)(6) on that date. However, that Rule requires a party to seek an extension

"within 7 days of receipt of such notice." Latham did not seek any ext ensio n until February 21,

1992—almost a month after receiving notice. Therefore, Latham is not entitled to relief under

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6).

Latham's only oth er po t ential avenue of relief under Rule 4(a) is Rule 4(a)(5), which

provides:

"The district court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time

for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the

time prescribed by this Rule 4(a)." Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5).

We note init ially that Latham's application for an extension was w it hin the time permitted by Rule

4(a)(5). As noted, s ee supra note 4, the deadline f o r filing an appeal of the court's December 26,

1991, order was January 27, 1992. Thirty days fro m t hat t ime would be February 26, 1992.

Latham's motion was filed on February 21, 1992. Therefore, her application for an extension, while

not within the appeals period itself, was within thirty days after its exp iration. It thus becam e

necessary for the district court to determine whether Latham had demonstrated that her failure to file

a timely appeal was due to excusable neglect. 6 Latham, of course, offers as justification her failure

to receive prompt notice of entry of the court's order. The district court rejected this argument. We

have said both that the excusable neglect standard is a strict one and that a district court's decision

to grant or deny relief under Rule 4(a)(5) is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. S ee, e.g., Allied

Steel v. City of Abilene, 909 F.2d 139, 142-43 (5th Cir.1990) (per curiam).

We now hold that no such abuse was committed. There is some dispute over whose fault it

was that the notice was sent to the wrong address; however, we see no need to resolve it. A

sufficient reason for denying Latham's request was offered by the district court: her counsel received

the order within the time for filing an appeal yet wa it ed almost a month before requesting anextension. A related sufficient reason, we think, is that Latham failed to avail herself of Rule 4(a)(6).

That rule was designed to handle cases just such as this one. Yet, as we have seen, Latham waited

too long to seek relief under that provision. This fact is fatal to her claim of excusable neglect under

Rule 4(a)(5). We cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion to deny Latham relief under the

general provisions of Rule 4(a)(5) where but for her own delay she could have sought an extension

under Rule 4(a)(6).

In sum, we are unable to conclude that the district court erred in denying Latham's motion to

extend the time for filing an appeal.

II. The Motion to Set Aside the Court's Order

We now consider Latham's other February 21, 1992, motion, which was styled as a "motion

to s et aside order of dismissal." This February 21 motion, which attacked the court's denial of

Latham's August 14, 1990, motions, is obviously a Rule 60(b) motion for relief f rom an order

(indeed, Latham cited Rule 60(b) in support of that motion). S ee Harcon Barge Co. v. D & G Boat

Rentals, Inc., 784 F.2d 665, 669 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct. 398, 93

L.Ed.2d 351 (1986).

We review the denial of Latham's February 21, 19 92, Rule 60(b) motion only for abuse of

discretion. Although the grounds offered in support of that motion are rather murky, one can find

in the motion three arguments in favor of setting aside the district court's December 26, 1991, order

(which, again, denied Latham's August 14, 1990, motions). First, she reiterates the arguments that

she made in su p port of her August 14, 1990, attack on the dismissal of the lender-liability suit.

Second, she cites her failure to receive notice of the court's December 26 order. Third, she complains

t hat she failed to receive the banks' oppositions to her August 14 motions. We will address t hese

arguments seriatim.

A.

In large part, Latham's February 21, 1992, R ule 60(b) motion is an attempt to revive her

August 14, 1990, motion. Indeed, the first five paragraphs of the February 21 motion repeat verbatim

the five paragraphs that constituted the entirety of the August 14 motion. Latham's brief before this7 We have recognized that this rule may yield "in truly extraordinary cases," O'Neil, 709 F.2d at

373, but this is not such a case. Court also restates much of the argument made in support of her August 14 motions.

We begin our analysis with the principle, recognized time and again in our case law, that a

Rule 60(b) motion may not be used as a substitute for a t imely appeal. S ee, e.g., Williams v. New

Orleans Public Service, Inc., 728 F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir.1984); U nited States v. O'Neil, 709 F.2d

361, 372 (5th Cir.1983); C hick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 699 F.2d 693, 695 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 464 U.S. 826, 104 S.Ct. 98, 78 L.Ed.2d 103 (1983); S ilas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 586

F.2d 382, 386 (5th Cir.1978); E dw ards v. Joyner, 566 F.2d 960, 961 (5th Cir.1978) (per curiam).

As we said on one occasion, "Rule 60(b) simply may not be used as an end run to effect an appeal

outside the specified time limit s, o t herwise those limit s become essentially meaningless." P ryor v.

U.S. Postal Service, 769 F.2d 281, 288 (5th Cir.1985). 7 Thus, we have frequently upheld district

court decisions denying Rule 60(b) motions where it appeared that Rule 60(b) was being used as a

substitute for a timely appeal. S ee, e.g., United States v. O'Neil, supra. This is part icularly

appropriate in a case such as this one where a Rule 60(b) motion is itself an attack on the denial of

a prior post-judgment motion that asserted virtually identical grounds for relief, and where, as here,

it is filed after the time for giving notice of appeal from the order denying the earlier motion. See

Pryor, 769 F.2d at 288. Obviously, if on February 21, 1992, Latham had attempted to bring a direct

appeal from the December 26, 1991, denial of her August 14, 1990, motion, such an appeal clearly

would have been out of time, and this Court would now have no jurisdiction to consider the appeal.

In effect, b y filing a Rule 60(b) motion following the prior denial of an earlier virtually identical

post-tri al mot i on, Latham is using the second motion, which is under Rule 60(b), as an attempt to

resurrect the then expired period in which to appeal the denial of the first motion. This procedural

ploy cannot be allowed to succeed.

When confronted with an analogous situation in Burnside v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 519 F.2d

1127 (5th Cir.1975) (per curiam), this Court stated:

"The time for notice of appeal on plaint iff's init ial Rule 60(b) motion having run, the filing of

another such motion alleging substantially similar grounds for relief does not provide plaint iff8 The district court stated that Latham's August 14, 1990, motion to set aside was too late to be

considered a Rule 59 motion, and hence had to be considered as one under Rule 60(b), although

the court denied it on grounds equally applicable to both rules. Latham does not challenge the

district court's determination that her referenced August 14, 1990, motion was filed beyond the

ten-day period permitted for Rule 59 motions. The district court's July 30, 1990, order was filed

on that date; the docket sheet does not clearly indicate when it was docketed, although notice of

entry was not mailed until July 31, 1990. If the order was not entered on the docket until July 31,

then the August 14 motion was timely for purposes of Rule 59. Even if that were the case,

however, Latham would still be trying to challenge, by her February 21, 1992, Rule 60(b) motion,

the denial of her earlier post-judgment motion, raising the same grounds in both motions instead

of timely appealing the denial of the first. This is using Rule 60(b) for what an appeal should do;

and it is doing so after time for notice of appeal has run and without adequate excuse. Moreover,

a Rule 60(b) motion does not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. Cf. Eleby (Rule 59

motion directed to denial of Rule 60(b) relief does delay time for appealing the denial of Rule

60(b) motion). with a second opportunity for appellate review." Id. at 1128 (citation omitted).

See also Ellis v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 720 (5th Cir.1973) (successive Rule 59 motions); R atcliff v.

State of Texas, 714 F.2d 24 (5th Cir.1983) (Rule 60(b) motion to attack denial of earlier post-trial

motion). See also Eleby v. American Medical Systems, 795 F.2d 411 (5th Cir.1986). Cf. Hines v.

Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 341 F.2d 229, 231 (2d Cir.1965) ("If plaint iff's [second R ule 60(b)

motion] contained only arguments which were made or could have been made on the prior motion,

an appeal from the denial of such a motion would not lie, as the second motion would then truly be

classified as a reargument.").

This is not t o say t hat a party may never mount a Rule 60(b) attack upon the denial of a

previous post-tri al motion. However, at least absent truly extraordinary circumstances, not present

here, the basis for the second motion must be something other than that offered in the first. 8

B.

The second argument advanced by Latham in support of her Rule 60(b) motion is the same

one offered in support of her motion to extend the filing period, namely, her failure to receive notice

of the entry of the court's order. The law is clear, however, that Rule 60(b) affords no relief under

such circumstances. In W ilson v. Atwood Group, 725 F.2d 255 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed,

468 U.S. 1222, 105 S.Ct. 17, 82 L.Ed.2d 912 (1984), this Court refused to grant Rule 60(b) relief

to a party that had failed to receive notice of the entry of a judgment in time to file an appeal. Relying

heavily on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 77(d)'s instruction that lack of notice does not halt the9 Citing the 1991 amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 77(d) and Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6), this Court in In re Jones, 970 F.2d 36, 39 (5th Cir.1992), stated that

"[t]he continuing viability of Wilson ... is now subject to question." It is unclear to us what is

meant by that statement. Perhaps it was intended to be read in context with the statement that

amended Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(6) does not require the district court to grant relief even if its

requirements are met, id. at 39, and to suggest that though relief was not always required in such

instances we would normally expect it to be granted. Or perhaps Jones meant that there will be

less room for Wilson to operate with the 1991 amendments to Rule 77 and 4(a)(6). We will not

construe Jones to do what it could not, and did not purport to do, namely overrule the en banc

Wilson decision. The final sentence of Rule 77(d), which states that lack of notice does not

excuse an untimely appeal, was un changed by the 1991 amendment. The advent of Rule 4(a)(6),

if anything, cuts against the idea that Wilson is no longer good law in areas where new Rule (4)(6)

does not give relief because that new Rule now provides a safety valve for whatever harshness

inheres in Wilson 's strict interpretation of Rule 77(d). running of the filing period, we held that "to be relieved from the effect of judgment, a party must

show more than mere reliance on the clerk to give notice of a judgment." I d. at 258. The clear

purpose of W

ilson was to cease the practice of "extending the time for appeal by vacating an d

re-entering judgments in order to accommodate a party that has not recei ved act ual notice of the

entry of judgment." P ryor, supra, 769 F.2d at 287. Despite the fact that W ilson arose amidst what

the Court described as "unique circumstances," 725 F.2d at 258, subsequent cases have read Wilson

as establishing a clear rule: "failure to receive notice does not justify granting of 60(b) relief to extend

[the] time for appeal." I n re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, 852 F.2d 842, 844 (5th

Cir.1988) (per curiam). 9 Even the dissenters in W ilson agreed with the proposition that "Rule 77(d)

makes one exception to Rule 60(b)(6)'s grant of equitable power—the reason cannot be the clerk's

failure to notify." W

ilson, 725 F.2d at 258 (Clark, C.J., dissentin g). Followi ng W ilson, we have

consistently rejected the use of Rule 60(b) to provide relief for parties complaining of lack of notice.

See, e.g., Prior Products, Inc. v. Southwest Wheel-NCL Co., 805 F.2d 543, 545 (5th Cir.1986) (per

curiam); Alamo Chem. Transp. Co. v. M/V Overseas Valdes, 726 F.2d 1073, 1074 (5th Cir.1984);

Cf. United States v. Aw alt, 728 F.2d 704, 705 (5t h Cir.1984) (per curiam) (applying W ilson to a

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 35 motion to correct a sentence).

To be sure, W

ilson did state that its rule would not reach a party whose counsel "had not

relied on the clerk to give notice of the entry of judgment but had been diligent in attempting either

to delay its entry or to inquire about the status of the case." W ilson, 725 F.2d at 258. Thus, we didnot apply Wilson in Tubbs v. Campbell, 731 F.2d 1214, 1215-16 (5th Cir.1984) (per curiam), where

the clerk's office misled appellant into th inking that no judgment had been entered, or P rudentialBache Securities, Inc. v. Fitch, 966 F.2d 981, 985-86 (5th Cir.1992), where the clerk's office misled

appellants into thinking that an order had been entered (and th us caused them to fi l e a prem ature

appeal). But there is nothing in the record to indicate that Latham's co unsel made any effort to

inquire int o t he st at us of her August 14, 1990, motion, even though that motion had been filed

seventeen months prior to the time that Latham learned of its denial. Because Latham has failed to

"show more than mere reliance on the clerk to give notice," Wilson, 725 F.2d at 258, her motion must

be denied.

C.

Latham's final argument in support of her February 21, 1992, Rule 60(b) motion is that the

banks mailed their oppositions to her August 14, 1990, m oti ons to the wrong address. Latham 's

counsel had supplied his correct address in the August 14 motions. The banks, however, mailed their

oppositions to the address listed for Latham's counsel in the Louisiana Legal Directory, which touts

itself as the official directory of the Louisiana State Bar Association. Latham argues that, if she had

received the banks' oppositions, as Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 5(a) requires, she would have

been able to file a reply brief. Nevertheless, we cannot agree with Latham that this error warrants

the vaca t io n of the district court's December 26 order. The court reasoned that, notwithstanding

Latham's failure to file a reply brief, its order "was, in all respects, correct as to fact and law." We

need not investigate the merits of that claim to conclude that it was within the court's discretion to

deny Latham's motion. Latham does not explain, either in her memorandum in support of her Rule

60(b) motion or in her brief before this Court, what she could have said in a reply brief to state her

case more convincingly than did her original motion and supporting memoranda.

Conclusion

The district court's denial of Latham's February 21, 1992, motions is

AFFIRMED.