Filed 8/29/24 P. v. Shojaei CA4/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MOHAMMADREZA SHOJAEI,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 G062293

 (Super. Ct. No. 18HF1163)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, 

Richard M. King, Judge. Affirmed.

Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette 

C. Cavalier and Maxine Hart, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
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Defendant Mohammadreza Shojaei was convicted of animal 

cruelty for maliciously injuring his roommate’s dog, Max. At trial, defendant 

testified he loved Max and injured him only by accident. However, an animal 

services officer testified the circumstances surrounding the incident were 

inconsistent with defendant’s version of events. Defendant contends the 

officer was not qualified to render an opinion on that issue, but we find no 

abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to the contrary. Accordingly, 

we affirm the judgment. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Max was a 16-pound Chihuahua/Shih Tzu mix. His owner shared 

an apartment with defendant and usually tended to his needs. However, on 

May 26, 2018, she was out of town, and defendant was responsible for looking 

after Max. 

That day, at around 3:00 p.m., defendant called 911 in a panic 

and reported Max was paralyzed and dying on the floor. Asked what 

happened, defendant said, “He bite me. I shake my hand. He hit the wall.” 

Defendant requested assistance, so the police were dispatched to his Irvine 

apartment.

One of the officers who arrived there was Animal Services Officer 

Madison Morris. She found Max lying on his side in the hallway next to the 

kitchen. Although Max was conscious, he could not lift his head or move his 

body, and he had defecated on himself. Defendant, who was anxious and 

emotional, told Morris that Max bit his hand in the bathroom. He said that in 

reaction to the bite, he pulled his hand back and shook his arm to get Max off 

him, and that is when Max hit the wall. 

Defendant also said he bled from the bite, but when Morris 

looked in the bathroom, she did not see any blood. In fact, when defendant 
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showed her his hand, she did not see any sign of injury until defendant 

directed her to the precise spot where Max had bitten him. In the area 

around his right thumb, defendant had some superficial “tooth scrapes” and 

“puncture/skin breaks.” But, according to Morris, the wounds were minor and 

nonpenetrating; they did not require irrigation, antibiotics, or stitches. Yet, 

when the police photographed the wounds, defendant was very fidgety and 

had to have his hand held still. 

Morris took Max to a veterinary hospital, where he was 

diagnosed with a fractured neck and a compressed spinal cord. His treating 

doctor believed the injuries were caused by head-on blunt force trauma. He

surmised there was a chance that Max could walk again if he had major 

surgery, but his owner decided to put him down. A necropsy confirmed Max 

had suffered serious neck trauma. The performing pathologist opined his 

injuries resulted from the type of severe and sudden impact that commonly 

occurs in car accidents. 

At trial, defendant testified he grew up in Iran and had a hard 

time expressing himself in English sometimes. On the day in question, he 

wanted to take Max for a walk, but when he got his leash, Max went under 

the kitchen table. Defendant tried to coax him out by showing him the remote 

control associated with his collar. However, Max nipped at the remote and 

ran into the bathroom. Defendant followed, finding Max behind the door. 

When he bent down to pet him, Max bit his thumb and took most of the 

appendage in his mouth. Seeing blood in Max’s mouth, defendant became 

very frightened because he is hemophobic. He started shaking his arm side to 

side in order to free his thumb, and as he was doing so, Max hit the wall and 

slumped to the floor. Asked if Max left the ground before impact, defendant 

said no. 
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After washing his hands in the kitchen and attending to his 

wounds, defendant returned to the bathroom and discovered Max was still 

not moving. He used a mat to transport Max into the hallway area. Then he 

pricked his paw with a pin to see if he could feel any pain. When Max did not 

respond, he called 911 and requested emergency assistance. According to 

defendant, the entire ordeal was an accident; he loved Max very much and 

never intended to hurt him.

Morris had a different take on the situation, based on what she 

saw at the scene. At trial, she testified that during her time as an animal 

services officer for the Irvine Police Department, she responded to 

approximately 200 calls involving dog bites.1Some of those calls were for 

serious, penetrating bites. However, Morris described defendant’s injuries as 

minor scraping wounds. She did not believe they were consistent with 

defendant’s claim about how Max was injured. 

In rendering that opinion, Morris took issue with defendant’s 

testimony that Max never left the ground before hitting the wall. Based on 

the severity of Max’s injuries, Morris was convinced that he must have been 

lifted off the ground prior to impact. However, she said that could not have 

occurred while defendant was shaking his arm because Max did not bite him 

deep enough to allow the dog to latch onto his thumb in the first place. 

Therefore, defendant’s story about how Max was injured did not add up to 

her.

To counter Morris’ testimony, the defense called Dr. Kimberly 

Carvalho-Faucher, a specialist in veterinary forensics. She testified it is 

1 Morris worked as an animal services officer for two-and-a-half 

years before becoming a regular patrol officer. She is currently a deputy with 

the Orange County Sheriff’s Department. 
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impossible to quantify the amount of force required to break a small dog’s 

neck because there are too many variables involved. However, if the dog’s 

neck were compressed at a certain angle where the spinal process is at its 

highest point, it would take less force than usually required to cause 

significant injury. Dr. Carvalho-Faucher also testified there was nothing in 

Max’s necropsy’s report indicating that he had brain damage, which is 

commonly seen in severe trauma cases.

In the end, the jury convicted defendant of malicious animal 

cruelty under Penal Code section 597, subdivision (a). After reducing the 

conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code section 17, 

subdivision (b), the trial court sentenced defendant to one year of formal 

probation on the condition that he serve 90 days in jail. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues the trial court erred in allowing Morris to 

testify about the plausibility of his testimony as to how Max was injured 

because that issue was outside the scope of her expertise. In so arguing, 

defendant claims Morris testified that Max was injured by him “picking Max 

up off the ground and slamming him into a wall.”

Our response is threefold. First, Morris did not actually say that 

in her testimony. Second, Morris was qualified to offer an opinion on the 

plausibility of defendant’s version of events. And third, even if she was not, 

the error in allowing her to do so was both invited and harmless. 

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

We begin with an overview of how Morris’ testimony unfolded. 

On direct examination, she testified that she responded to over 400 calls of 

animal abuse during her career as an animal services officer. Roughly half of 
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those calls involved dog bites, ranging from serious “mauling” bites, which 

result from the dog sinking his teeth into the victim’s skin, to minor “tooth 

scrapes,” which are caused when the victim’s hand briefly comes in contact 

with the dog’s teeth. Most of the injuries she observed on defendant were of 

the latter variety; “very superficial or light cut[s] caused by a tooth.”

Defendant also had a couple of “single point,” “puncture/skin break” wounds, 

but they were not penetrating or serious. 

Given Morris’ experience handling dog bite cases, the prosecutor 

wanted to ask her if defendant’s injuries were consistent with his testimony 

about how Max was injured. Recall, defendant had testified that after Max 

bit his thumb, he shook his arm back and forth to get Max off him, implying 

that Max had latched onto his thumb with his teeth. And during the shaking, 

Max hit the wall without ever having left the ground. The prosecutor wanted 

to ask Morris if defendant’s injuries were such that Max could have actually 

latched onto his thumb in the first place.

Defense counsel objected on the basis Morris was not qualified to 

render an opinion on that topic. However, during voir dire, Morris testified

that she had personally observed injuries that resulted from dogs latching 

onto a victim’s hand with his teeth. Therefore, even though Morris admitted 

she had no formal medical training on latching injuries and had not read any 

research papers about them, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to go 

forward with his questioning. Back in front of the jury, the following 

exchange occurred between him and Morris:

“Q. Was the bite mark that you observed on the defendant 

consistent with how he told you he received that bite mark?

“A. No.
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“Q. Based solely on what you observed . . ., what about that bite 

mark is inconsistent?

“A. The depth.

“Q. And what do you mean by ‘depth’?

“A. That [the bite] is not a sufficient depth to lift a dog [of Max’s] 

size.”

On cross-examination, Morris conceded she had no personal 

knowledge as to whether Max was actually lifted off the ground, and the 

pattern of the scrape marks on defendant’s hand was generally consistent 

with his claim about shaking his arm. But when defense counsel asked if that 

meant defendant’s injuries were consistent with his claim about how Max 

was injured, Morris answered no. Instead of leaving that answer alone, 

defense counsel proceeded to ask Morris why she felt that way. Morris said 

that if defendant shook his arm to extract Max from his thumb while Max 

was on the ground, it would not have created enough force to break his neck 

when he hit the wall. Therefore, the only way for Max to have sustained such 

a serious injury was if he had been “lifted airborne off the ground.”

When defense counsel objected to that answer on foundational 

grounds, the trial judge met with the attorneys outside the presence of the 

jury to discuss the issue. Defense counsel argued Morris did not have 

sufficient knowledge of the type of force required to break a dog’s neck to 

opine on how Max was injured. However, the judge overruled the objection 

and allowed Morris’s answer to stand. In so doing, the judge told defense 

counsel that she only had herself to blame for the answer because she asked 

Morris an open-ended question. Nevertheless, the judge said he would allow 

her free rein to question Morris about the foundation for her opinions.
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When cross-examination resumed, defense counsel asked Morris 

about her training and experience on the amount of force required to break a 

dog’s neck. While admitting she had no formal training on that issue, Morris 

said she had investigated and reviewed cases where dogs had suffered broken 

necks from car accidents, being stepped on, and running into sliding glass 

doors. In such cases, it was her responsibility to determine whether the dog’s 

injuries were caused by accident or abuse. To make that determination, she 

would talk to witnesses, watch any available surveillance footage, and review 

the veterinarian records to get an understanding of how the injury incurred. 

Morris conceded, though, she did not know: 1) the amount of force 

or momentum needed to break a dog’s neck; 2) the amount of force, 

momentum or speed defendant generated by shaking his arm after Max bit 

him; 3) how far defendant’s arm was extended from his body at that time; 4) 

how long Max was latched on to defendant’s thumb; 5) how Max hit the wall; 

or 6) what his neck flexion was at impact. Morris also admitted that, 

although defendant demonstrated to her how he shook his arm following the 

bite, he did not reenact the biting incident for her in terms of where he was 

standing when Max hit the wall or the angle at which the impact occurred. 

II.

ANALYSIS

Defendant does not challenge Morris’ qualifications to testify as 

an expert on dog bites. However, he contends she had no business testifying 

about how Max’s injuries occurred. More particularly, defendant complains 

that Morris was improperly allowed to testify that he “must have picked up 

Max and thrown him into a wall.” But Morris never testified that defendant

picked up Max or that he threw Max against the wall. Rather, she simply 
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opined that Max’s injuries were inconsistent with defendant’s claim that Max 

never left the ground prior to hitting the wall.

Moreover, defense counsel was the one who elicited Morris’

testimony on that topic. As explained in People v. Bell (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 

153, the invited error doctrine precludes a defendant from mounting an 

appellate challenge to testimony that was elicited from his own attorney. (Id. 

at p. 193; accord, People v. Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 620.) 

Defendant contends Bell was wrongly decided, but our Supreme Court has 

ruled similarly in many cases. (See, e.g., People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 

208, 237; People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1138–1139; People v. 

Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 72; People v. Simmons (1946) 28 Cal.2d 699, 722.) 

We are not at liberty to depart from those decisions. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc.

v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)

Even if the issue were properly before us, we do not believe the 

trial court erred in allowing Morris to testify about the plausibility of 

defendant’s version of events. A witness is sufficiently qualified to testify as 

an expert if she has sufficient skill or expertise in the field such that her 

testimony would likely assist the jury in its search for the truth. (Evid. Code, 

§ 801, subd. (a); People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 766, abrogated on 

other grounds in People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 390, fn. 2.) “The 

qualification of expert witnesses, including foundational requirements, rests 

in the sound discretion of the trial court.” (People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 

1133, 1175.) An abuse of discretion will only be found if the evidence shows 

the witness clearly lacked qualification as an expert. (People v. Farnam

(2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 162.) 

Defendant argues Morris’ testimony about Max’s injuries was 

outside the scope of her expertise. (See generally People v. Pearson (2013) 56 
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Cal.4th 393, 445–446 [an expert’s qualifications must relate to the particular 

subject on which she testifies]; People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 852 

[same], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 

771, 836.) In that regard, defendant claims Morris lacked the formal 

education and training required to opine about the degree of force needed to 

break a dog’s neck and whether Max’s injuries could have resulted from how 

he described the incident.

However, a witness’s expertise “is not subject to rigid 

classification according to formal education or certification.” (People v. Ojeda

(1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 404, 408.) Rather, expertise may be established by 

showing the witness “‘has the requisite knowledge of, or was familiar with, or 

was involved in, a sufficient number of transactions involving the subject 

matter of the opinion.’” (ABM Industries Overtime Cases (2017) 19 

Cal.App.5th 277, 294.) In other words, personal experience with the subject 

matter of the expert opinion will suffice.

Morris testified that during her time as an animal services

officer, she responded to and reviewed cases in which dogs had suffered 

broken necks in a variety of situations. Her job was to examine the 

circumstances involved to determine whether the injury was an accident, or it 

resulted from abuse or neglect. That assessment required Morris to examine 

the nature of the dog’s injuries in light of any other available evidence, such 

as witness statements about how the incident occurred, which is precisely 

what she did in this case. As such, she was qualified to testify about the 

significance of Max’s injuries, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in allowing her testimony on that subject to stand.

Furthermore, any error in allowing Morris to testify about Max’s 

injuries was mitigated because defense counsel cross-examined her rigorously 
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about the foundation for her opinions, and the jury was instructed to consider 

that foundation in assessing the value of her testimony. (CALCRIM No. 332.) 

The jury was also instructed that it could disregard Morris’ opinions

altogether if they were unbelievable, unreasonable, unsupported by the 

evidence, or refuted by another, more qualified, expert. (Ibid.) Thus, it is 

unlikely the jury blindly accepted Morris’ testimony without critically 

examining the basis for her opinions. 

In considering the issue of prejudice, it also important to keep in 

mind that the doctor who treated Max at the emergency hospital and the 

doctor who performed his necropsy both opined that Max’s injuries were 

likely caused by high-impact blunt force trauma. So, even without Morris’

testimony, defendant would have had a hard time convincing the jury he 

injured Max by accident. 

For all these reasons, it is not reasonably probable defendant

would have obtained a more favorable result at trial absent Morris’s 

testimony regarding the cause of Max’s injuries. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 

Cal.2d 818, 836.) Therefore, there is no basis to disturb the jury’s verdict. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

SANCHEZ, J.