-1 -

UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C OU RT D IS T R IC T O F C O LU M B IA

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- - : J OHN DO E, : : CASE NO. 1:08-CV-1902 Plaintiff, : : v. : OPI NI ON & ORDER : [R esolving Doc. Nos. 11 , 12, 14 , 15] DONAL D RUMSFEL D, e t al

. , : : De fe nd ants
. : :

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- - J AMES S. GW I

N, UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT J UDGE: In this challeng e to the conditions of and pr ocedur es used in deta ining a n Americ an citizen at a United States military compound in Iraq, Plaintiff John Doe sues forme r De fen se Secr etar y Donald Rumsfeld, other high- ranking United States g overnme nt of ficials, and se vera l unidentified United States offic ials and ag ents. He a lleg es multiple constituti onal violations in his seizure and detention. [ Doc. 4
. ] Def endant Rumsfeld moves to dismiss Doe’s complaint for failure to state a c laim. [ D o c . 11
. ] The g ov er n m en t m o v es t o dismiss for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction and for f

ailure to state a claim; it also moves for a more de finite statement as to Doe ’s rig ht to travel cla im. [ Doc. 14 .] For the re a so ns that f

oll ow , th e Court GR

ANTS IN P ART and DENIES IN PAR T th e D e fe nd a nts ’
mo tio ns to d ism iss . In a dd iti on , th e Court DE NI ES the g ov e rnme nt’ s mo tio n f or a mor e de fi nit e state me nt. I. Bac kgr oundCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-2 - For the purposes of

the pendingmotions t o dismiss , the Court acc epts as true the following fa c tua l a lle g a tio ns ma de in P la int if f John D oe ’s c omp la int : In D e c e mbe r 2 00 4, Do e , a n A me ri c an c iti zen

and Un ite d St a te s A rmy

ve te ra n, tr ave le d to Iraq a s a civilian employ ee of an Amer ican- owned de fense contra cting firm. Doe we nt to work as an Ar abic tra

nslator and wa s detailed to a United States Marin e Corps Human Exploitation Team operating in the United States milit ary bases along the Iraq- Sy ria border
. The Human Exploi tation Team, a Marine Corps intelligenc e unit, g ather ed and de veloped military intelligenc e throug h local Ir a q i c ontacts. [ Doc. 4 at 12 .] Doe’s assig ned team comprised Doe , two serg eants, a nd one lieutenant. The Team operated in Iraq’ s Anbar Province, a hig hly volatile reg ion along the weste rn border of Iraq. [Id. ] Duri nghis te nure in I

ra q, Do e wo rk e d w iththe Human E xploi tatio n T e am to e sta bli sh contac t with I raqi Sheikh Abd Al-Sattar Abu Risha. [ Do c . 4 a t 2 .] Doe maintains that, a s the Human Ex ploitation Team’s translator and a s the fi rs t Am er ican to open dir ect talks with Al-Sattar , he
serve d as the main point of contact for all communications betwee n the Sheikh and the Te am. Doe also contends that throug h a series of hi g hly secr etive meetings with Al-Sattar, the Sheikh pledge d to support the United States and ultimatel y b ec am e “one of Americ a’s staunc hest allies” by providing the United S tates m ilitary with information t o help control insurg encie s in Anbar. [ Doc. 4 at 2, 13
. ] On Octobe r 20, 2005, Doe was tra nsported to “Camp Kor ean Vi l l age,” a Ma rine Corps support base, to pre pare for his sche duled Novembe r 5, 2005 depa rture f rom Iraq to the United States fo r an n u al leave . [ Doc. 4 at 14 .] W hen Doe arr ived at Camp Kore an Villag e, a N avy Criminal Investig ative Servic e (N CI S) ag ent questioned him abou t h i s wo rk with the Human ExploitationCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

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-3 - Te am. I n r e sp on se to the NC I S a g e nt’ s q ue sti on s, Do e say s h e pr ov ide d a g e ne ra l de sc ri pti on

of his work with the Te am. On or about November 4, 2005, Doe was transporte d to A l A sad, a milit ary airba se in Anbar and Doe ’s sche duled point of departure from I raq. Soon afte r hi s arr ival at Al Asad, Doe was take n to an interrog ation room wher e thre e NCI S ag ents and one o t h er of ficial que stioned him for approximately

four hour s. [ Doc. 4 at 14-15 .] The agen t s d en ied Doe’ s reque sts to have a repr esentative from his milit ary company

or the Huma

n Ex ploitation Team presen t d uringthe interrog ation. They

also d en i ed his reque sts for an a ttorney . Doe sa

y s he re fused to answ er qu e sti on s, c iti nga

c on c e rn fo r t he c on fi de nti a lity

of se ns iti ve inf

or matio n h e ha d le arn e d d

ur inghis work on the Te am. The a g ents sear ched a nd confiscated Doe’ s lugg ag e. The y also handc uffe d and blindfolded Doe, and, he sa y s, kicked him repe atedly

in the back. O ne ag ent threatened to shoot Doe if he tried to e scape . [ Doc. 4 at 15
. ] Doe wa s then transporte d to the airport at Al Asad, whe re he was h el i co p t er ed to a point
a pp ro ximate ly

thi rt y min ute s awa y and d e p os ite d into t

he c us tod y of the Un ite d St a te s Ma

ri ne Cor ps . The Mar ines strip-sea

rche d Doe a

nd place d him in complete isolation in a small cell. After seventy -two hours of solitary confin em en t , Doe sa

y s he wa s flown, blindfolded and hooded, to C am p Cropper, a United States milit ary

fac ility near Ba g hdad International Airport dedicated to holding “ high- value” detainee s. [ Doc. 4 at 16
. ] Gover nment officia ls detained Doe in a military jail at C am p C ropper for more than nine months. During the first three m o n t hs of his detention, Doe w as held incommunica do in solit ary confine ment. On infre quent occ asions, Doe wa s briefly allowed outdoors f

or s h o rt p er i o ds after mid night.Case No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-4 - When prison officials took Doe out of isolation, they moved him into a cell housing
su sp e c te d A l Q a e da

and Ar a b Soc ia lis t B a ’a

th P art y me mbe rs ho sti le to t

he Un ite d St a te s. Pr ior

to moving Doe, t he officials publicized Doe’ s aff iliation with the Depa

rtment of De fense and his work fo r t he Human E xploi tatio n T e am, t he re by e nc oura g ing the Al Qa e da and B a ’a th P art y de ta ine e s to phy sically

attack D oe. L ater , prison g uards moved Doe into a c ell with seven suspec ted Al Qae da members, encoura g ing additional attacks. Doe say s he li ved in constant fe ar f or his life. [ Do c . 4 a t 18-19
. ] Doe f

urther a lleg es that the Camp Cropper p ri s o n gu ards tortured him using “psycholog ically -dis ru p t i v e tac tics desig ned to induce c ompliance.” [ Do c . 4 a t 8 .] Among other things, Doe say s they

exposed him t o extreme cold and c ontinuous artificial lig ht, blindfolded and hooded him, woke him by bang ing on a

door or slamminga window whe never they observe d Doe tr yingto s le e p, and

bla ste d h e avy

me ta l or c ountr y mus ic int o h is c e ll at wh a t Doe c a lls “ int ole ra bly loud volumes.” [ Doc. 4 at 8, 17 .] One g uard r epeatedly choked D oe. [ Doc. 4 at 18
. ] Gover nment officia ls also repe atedly interrog ated Doe, though they never permitted Doe the assistance of counse l or any other re prese ntative. Doe sa y s he consistently

denied a ny wrong doing and re sponded truthfully

to the quest i oning but his interr og ators continued to thre aten him and
acc use him of lying. [ Doc. 4 at 19
. ] DuringDoe’ s detention at Camp Cropper, g overnme nt officials he ld two Detainee Status B oa rd he ari ng s to eva luate wh e the r D oe sh ou ld k e e p h is p re lim ina ry de signatio n a s a

“ se c ur ity internee ” or instea d be desig nated a n “innoce nt civilian” or an “enemy combatant.” [ Doc. 4 at 19- 2 0 .] A l et t er fr om the Detaine e Status Boa rd President infor

med Doe that his first status hearing would be held on or

afte r Nove mber 30, 2005. Prior to this first hear ing, the Boa rd told Doe that heCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-5 - did no t ha ve the ri g ht t o a

n atto rn e y

and c ou ld o nly

pr e se nt w itn e sse s a

nd e vid e nc e “ re a so na

bly available ” to him at Camp Cropper. [ Id. ] Do e c la ims that the D e ta ine e Status B oa rd de nie d h is reque sts for a Judge Advocate Gene ral’s Corps attorney o r to ca ll his Human Ex ploitation Team members a s witnesses. The Status Boa

rd held Doe’s first hear ing on or about Dece mber 22, 2005. [ Id. ] Duri ngthi s sh or t he ari ng , D oe wa s n ot p e rm itt e d to vie w e vid e nc e a g a ins t him , to he ar te sti mony a g a ins t hi m, or to cross- examine witnesses. After the hea ring , the B oard ultimately deeme d Doe a

threat to the Multi-National For ces in Iraq a nd authorized his continued detention. [ Doc. 4 at 20-21
. ] In J uly 2006 and af

ter de taining D oe for

more than a

n additional six months, the Detainee Status Boar d held a se cond hea ringreg ardingDoe’ s status a s an enemy combatant, se curity

internee , or civilian. The Boa

rd once a g ain denied D oe an a ttorney and stopped him from pre senting evidenc e not “re asonably available ” to him at C amp C ropper . Doe was not permitted to prese nt evidence from his mil itary

company or the Huma

n Ex ploitation Team wi t h wh i ch he had w orked. This sec ond hear ing la sted much long er than the first, and Doe f ace d more e x tensive questioning about his work with Al-Sattar. In addition, Doe wa s quest i o ned about his treatment at Camp Cropper a nd about what he mig ht do if relea sed fr om the camp. [ Doc. 4 at 22
. ] The ne x t month, on or about Aug ust 10 , 2 0 0 6 , Doe was transporte d, shackle d and blindfolded, to Ba g hdad Internatio n a l A irport, wher e off icials g ave him a ne w United States passport and put him on a military fli gh t t o J ordan. [ Doc. 4 at 25 .] Doe ultim ately returne d to the United States. Doe ha s never

been f ormally char g ed with a c rime. He claims that his pe rsonal proper ty has not been returned to him and that he has been placed on a “bla cklist” that preve nts America n milit aryCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

U nd er

1/ Fe der al R u l e of C i v i l Pr oce du r e 25( d) , t he s ucc es s or t o an of f i cer s ued i n h i s of

f i ci al ca paci t y wh o has l ef t of f i ce af t er comm enc ement of

t he s ui t i s au t om at i cal l y s ubs t i t ut ed as t he proper part y . D oe ori gi nal l y s ued f ormer D ep art m ent of H o m el and Se curi t y Se cret ary M i chael C hert o f f , FB I D i rect o r R o b ert S. M uel l er I II , f o rme r Cust o m s and B o rder P rotect i o n C o m m i ss i o ner W
. R al p h B asham , and f o rme r A ss i st ant Se cret ary o f U ni t ed Stat es I m m i grat i o n and -6 - c on tr a c tin g fi rm s f

ro m hi ri nghim . D oe a lso a lle g e s that he h a s b e e n p ut o n a te rr or ist “ watc h” lis t, leadingUnited States Customs officers to interr og ate him and se arc h his be longing s when he returns fr om i nte rn a tio na l tr ave l. On Novembe r 3, 2008, Doe filed the instant suit, ch al l en gi ng the conditions of and proce dures use d during his confine ment, his placeme nt on various blacklists, and the f ailure to re turn his seized property
. Doe brings this ac tion ag ainst Donald Rumsfeld, forme r Secr etar y of the United States Depa

rtment of De fense , in h i s individual capac ity , alleg ing substantive a nd proce dural due pr oc e ss v iol ati on s, as we ll a s d e nia l of a c c e ss t o c ourt s a

nd c ouns e l. D oe argue s th a t Rumsf e ld persona lly

approve d the use of torturous interrog ation techniques on a case -by -ca se basis and that Rum sf e ld m a int a ine d c on tr ol o ve r t he re le a se or con ti nue d d e te nti on of Un ite d St a te s d e ta ine e s. [ Doc. 4 at 40 .] Ul tim a te ly , Do e say s, Rum sf e ld a uth or ize d th e po lic ie s a

nd a c tio ns that r e su lte d in violations of Doe’s substantive a nd proce dural due p ro ce s s rig hts, as well as the de nial of Doe ’s
ac ce s s t o co urts to challeng e his detention. [ Doc. 4 at 36
. ] D o e a s k s th i s C o urtt o h o l d R u m s f e ld persona lly

liable by allowing a money

damag es re medy

under Bi v e ns v . Six Un k

no wn N am e d A ge nts of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971) , f or the se a lle g e d c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio ns . Doe a lso sues Defe ndants J anet Na politano , S ecretar

y of the United States De partment of Homeland Sec urity , Robert S. Mueller I I I , Direc tor of the F eder al B urea u of Invest i gat i o n , Alan Be rsin, Customs and B order Protection Commi ssioner, and J ohn Morton, Assistant Secreta ry of the United States I mmigration a nd Customs Enforc ement, in the ir officia l c apac ities, to secur e the r eturn of the pr op e rt

y se ize d u po n h is d e te nti on

and fo r a lle g e d v iol a tio ns of

his ri g ht t o tr ave l. 1/Case No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

C u sto m s E n fo rc e m e n t Ju lie S . M ye rs . See [ D o c . 4
. ]

D o e’s cl aim s aga i nst t he unid en t i f i ed o f f i ce rs are no t ch all en ge d b y t he D efen d an t s wh o no w m o ve t o d i sm i ss 2/ D oe’ s comp l ai nt
. T he C our t ’ s di s po s i t i on of D oe’ s r i gh t t o t r ave l cl ai m as ag ai ns t t he named gove r nment of f i ci al s , does n o t affe c t t h a t cla im a s a g a ins t t h e un id e n tif ie d o ff ic e rs . A l t ho ugh D ef

end ant R um sf

el d m o ves, for sum m ary jud gm ent , in t he al t ernat i ve t o hi s m o t i o n t o dis m i ss , t he 3/ C o u rt d e c line s to c o n v e rt h is m o tio n to o n e fo r su m m a ry ju d g m e n t a n d c o n stru e s it so le ly as a m o tio n to d ism iss D o e ’s c o m p la int. -7 - F ina lly , D oe br ing s c la ims a g a ins t un ide nti fi e d offi c e rs or a g e nts of

the Un ite d St a te s, alleg ing: ( 1) fa lse arr est, (2) unla wful dete ntion and conditions of confinem en t , (3) torturous a nd
un lawf ul int e rr og a tio n, (4 ) d e nia l of the ri g ht t o c ouns e l and

the ri g ht t o c on fr on t a dv e rs e wi tne sse s, (5) de nial of the rig ht to present witnesses and to have exculpatory evidenc e disclosed, ( 6) denia l of
a c c e s s t o c o urt s an d

t o p e t i t i o n , ( 7 ) b l a c k l i s t i n g , an d ( 8 ) c o n s p i r a c y. 2/ The De fenda

nts now seek dismissal of Doe’ s claims under Rule 12( b )( 1 ) and 12(b)(6) f or lack of subject matter jurisdiction a nd for failure to state claims upon which r elief c an be grante d. 3/ [ Doc. 11 ; Doc. 14 .] The gove rnment also separ ately moves for a more definite statement. [Doc. 15.] II. Legal Stand ard Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 8 provides the gene ral standa rd of plea ding a

nd only require s that a complaint “c ontain . . . a short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleade r is entitled to relief.” F e d
. R. Ci v . P. 8 ( a)( 2)
. Rul e 8 d oe s n ot r e qu ir e “ de ta ile d f a c tua l a lle g a tio ns , b ut i t demands more than an unadorne d, the-de fenda nt-unlawfully -har

med-me a ccusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (i nte rn a l qu otatio ns omi tte d) . In d e c idi nga mot ion to d ism iss under Rule 12( b)(6) , “a court should a ssume the[] vera city ” of “ well-plea ded fa ctual alleg ations,” and construe rea sonable inferenc es drawn from those fac tual alleg ations in the plaintiff’s f avor. Id. at 1950 ; see also District of Columbia Retirement Bd. v . United States , 657 F. Supp. 428, 431 (D.D.C. 1987)
. Co urts n e e d n o t, h o w e v e r , a c c e p t a p la inti f f ’ s le g a l c o n c lu s io n s a s tr

u e . T h u s , “ [t ]oCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

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-8 - surv ive a mot ion to dis mis s, a c omp la int mus t conta in suf fi c ie nt fa c tua l matte r, a c c e pte d a s tr ue , to ‘state a claim for r elief that is plausible on its fac e.’” Iqbal , 129 S. Ct . 1937 at 1949 (q u o t i n g Be ll At lan tic v . Two mb ly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) ). Th e pla us ibi lity re qu ir e me nt i s n ot a

“ pr ob a bil ity require ment,” but re quires “mor e than a sheer possibili ty that the defendant ha s acte d unlawfully .” Id. Although motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jur isdiction under Rule 12(b)( 1) ar e sim ila r i n many re sp e c ts to tho se un de r Rul e 12 (b )( 6) , a 12 (b )( 1) mot ion pr e se nts a dis tin c t thre sh old challeng e. Such motions “will be succe s s fu l o nly if the plaintiff[] fail[s] to car ry [hi s] burden of showing by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that the Court ha s the statutory and constitutional power to adj u dicate the claims.” In re I raq and Afghanistan Detainees Litig. , 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 93 (D.D.C. 2007) (c i t i n g Makarov a v. United States , 2 0 1 F
. 3 d 1 1 0 , 1 1 3 ( 2 d

Ci r . 2 0 00) ), a

ff’d Mo ha mm e d v . R um sfe ld , --- F.3d -

--- , 2011 WL2462851 (D.C. Cir. J une 21, 2011) . In evaluating whether the plaintiff has car

ried this burde n, courts may consider matters beyond the pleading s, but must sti ll review the complaint liberall y and ac cept a ll reasona

ble infer ence s favor able to the plaintiff. See Davis v. U

nited States , 569 F. Supp. 2d 91, 94 (D.D .C. 2008)
. Additionally , a district cour t may require a more definite stateme nt, on a def endant’ s motion
un de r R ule 12 (e ), wh e re a

ple a din g is “ so va g ue or ambi g uo us that the [de fe nd ant] c ann ot r e a so na bly prepa re a re s p o n s e.” Fe d. R. Civ. P . 12(e) . “Rule 12(e ) provides de fenda nts with a remedy

for inadequate complaints that fail to meet the mini m u m pleadingstandard se t forth in Rule 8(a) .” Mc Qu ee n v. W

oodstream Corp. , 244 F.R.D. 26, 34 (D .D.C. 2007)
. H o w e v e r , s u c h mo ti o ns are g ener ally disfavore d. Rahman v. J

ohanns , 501 F. Supp. 2d 8, 19 (D.D .C. 2007)
. “Given the liberal nature of the fe dera l pleadingrequire ments, courts are reluctant t o compel a more de finite statementCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-9 - . . . [for] fea

r t hat s uch action will become a substitute for discove ry .” Potts v

. Howard Univ. , 269 F.R.D. 40, 42 (D .D.C. 2010)
.

III. Cause of

Act ion u nder the De tainee Tre atm ent Ac t Doe first argues that the Deta inee Tr eatment Ac t of 2005 (“D TA”) , 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd e t seq . , g ive s him eithe r an e xpre ss or imp lie d pri vate ri g ht of a c tio n to c ha lle ng e the c on dit ion s o f h is
n i n e- m onth detention at Camp Cropper. [ Doc. 4 at 27 ; Doc. 33 at 10-11
. ] H o w e v e r , b ecause the langua g e of

the Ac t is sil e nt a s to a

pr ivate ri g ht o f a c tio n f

or c it iz ens , and

be c a us e c ourt s mu st ref rain fr om inferr ing statutory cause s of ac tion in the absence of clea r st atutory

intent, Doe ca

nnot bringhis claims under the D TA. Doe relies on the l anguag e of the DTA, whic h procla ims that “[n] o individual in the custody or under the phy sical control of

the United States g overnme nt
. . . shall be subject to cr uel, inhuman, or degradingtreatment or punishment.” 42 U.S.C
. § 2 0 0 0dd(a) . T he Ac t f ur the r d e fi ne s “ c ru e l, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” to include ac ts prohibited by the Fif th, Eighth, a

nd Four teenth Amendme nts. Id. Th is langua g e , ho we ve r, c on ta ins no e xpre ss pr ov isi on fo r a pr ivate
cause of ac tion that would permit plaintiffs like Doe to sue under the DTA. Detainee s Lit ig. , 479 F. Supp. 2d at 107 n.23
. Nor may the Court, without an express statutory rig ht of ac tion, imp l y a p ri vate c ause of action under the Act. Rather, it is for Cong ress to cr eate private r ights of a ction to enforc e fe dera l statutes. Alexande r v. Sandoval , 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (fe dera l courts may not r aise up a
cause of ac tion to enforce statutory law whe re the statute itself has not c reated one). Thoug h Doe
c on te nd s th a t th e Ac t’ s r e fe re nc e to “ c ivi l act ion ” and “ c ivi l . . . li a

bil ity or dama g e s” e vin c e s a statutory intent to create a pr ivate re medy , this argum ent runs counte r to the re st of the Act’ sCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

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-1 0- languag e. See id. at 286 (“ Th e jud ic ia l ta sk is t o inte rp re t th e statut e Con g re ss h a s p a sse d to deter mine whether it display s an intent to cre ate not just a private r ight but also a private r emedy .”). Suc h r e fe re nc e s, to t

he e xtent th e y

e ve n c on te mpl a te pr ivate civ il act ion s, pe rt a in o nly to s uit s involving the “ detention and i n terrog ation of aliens,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd-1(a) , and do not ra ise a
cause of ac tion for ci t i z en d etainees. Acc ording ly , beca use there is insufficient indication that Congr ess intended to c re at e a pr ivate rig ht of ac tion for citizens to enforc e the DT A, the Court declines to infer such a cause of action and g rants De fenda nt Rumsfeld’s motion t o dismiss to the extent Doe’s claims re st on alleg ed violations of the DTA
. IV. Biv e ns Re m e dy Doe ne x t urg es this Court t o rec og nize a private r ight of action under Bi v e ns v . S

ix Un k no wn Nam e d A ge nts fo r m on e y dama g e s b a se d o n th e c on sti tut ion a l viol a tio ns a lle g e d in hi s c omp la int
. 403 U.S. 388
. In Bivens , th e Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Court

e sta bli sh e d th a t w he re fe de ra l of fi c ia ls v iol a te a constitutional rig ht, victims of that violation have a private ca use of a ction for m o n ey

damag es ag ainst the offic ials in fede ral court, even if no statute expli citly cre ates such a

cause of ac tion. Id. at 396
. T h e Bivens Co urt a llo we d a su it a g a ins t f

e de ra l na rc oti c s a g e nts ba se d o n a lle g e d F ourt h Amendment violations, finding that the pl aintiff’s cause of action could be implied directly from the fac e o f th e Co n s ti tuti o n . T h e Co urt h e ld th a t, a s a un iv e r s a l p r e mi s e , “ ‘ w h e r e f e d e r a ll y protec ted rig hts have be en invade d . . . courts will be aler t to adjust their re medies so as to g rant the ne cessa ry relief .’” Id. at 392 (q u o t i n g Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) ); c f. Bush v. Lucas , 462 U.S. 367, 374 (1983) (f

ind ingtha t 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ’s g ener al jurisdictional gr ant to decide case s arisingunder the Constitut ion not only g rants fe dera l courts the au t h o ri ty to decide whether

a constitutionalCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-1 1- vio latio n o c c ur

re d, “ but als o the a

uth or ity to ch oo se amon g ava ila ble jud ic ia l re me die s in or de r t o
v i n d i ca t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ri gh t s . ” ( ci t i n g Hood , 327 U.S. at 684 )). The Supreme Court has since
rec og nized that, in addition t o compensating victims, a funda mental purpose of Bivens is to deter individual officer s from committing c onstitut ional violations. See Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko , 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001) (c i t i n g FDIC v. M eye r , 510 U.S. 471 (1994) )
. In allowing for a

d a ma g es re medy

direc tly under the Constit ution, the Bivens Court noted that the case befor e it “ involve[d] no specia l f actor s counseling hesitation in the absenc e of a ffirmative action by Congr ess.” Bivens , 403 U.S. at 396 . In W ilkie v. Robbins , the Sup re me Court c lari fi e d th is and held that a re medy

under Bivens “is not an automatic e ntitlement.” 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007)
. Rather, the W

ilk ieCo urt sa id , c o urts mu s t f o ll o wa tw o - s te p p r o c e s s in

d e c id in g w h e th e r

to r e c o g n iz e
a Bivens reme dy . First, they must determine “whether any alternative, exis ting pr ocess f or protec ting the intere st” exist s. Id. (c i t i n g Bu sh , 462 U.S. at 378 ); see Bivens , 403 U.S. at 397 (re cog nizi ng that implied remedies unde r the Con s t i t u t i on may be unnec essar

y upon “explicit congr essional deleg ation” that cla ims “must ins tead be remitted to another reme dy , equally

eff ective in the vie w of Cong ress.” ). Second, c ourts must independe ntly deter mine whether

“any specia l fac tors” counse l judicial hesitation. W

ilk ie , 551 U.S. at 550 (q u o t i n g Bu sh , 462 U.S. at 378 ). I f alter native re medies
or specia l f

actor s counseling hesitation are prese nt, a damag es reme dy may not be i m p l i ed u nder Bi v e ns . Rumsfeld argues that allowingmonetary damag es in thi s case would constitute a “r adica l extension of Bivens .” [ Doc. 11 at 16 (c i t i n g D e ta in e es Li tig. , 4 7 9 F. S upp. 2d at 103-107)
. ] Specifica lly , Rumsfeld say s that rec og nizi ng a Bi ve ns action her e would ig nore se vera l special fac tors counselinghesitation that are rooted in instituti onal compete nce a nd prac tical nationalCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

In Car ls on , t h e S u p re m e C o u rt fo u n d tha t “[a ] fe d e ra l i n m a te se rv ing a p riso n se n te n c e c a n e m p lo y Bi ve ns

4/ to se e k d a m a g e s re su lti n g fro m m istre a tm e n t b y p riso n o ff ic ia ls. It w o u ld b e o d d if a fed e ra l d e ta ine e no t ch a rg e d w ith or convi ct ed of

an y of f ens e c oul d not bri ng an an al ogous cl ai m. ” A ra r v . A sh c ro ft , 585 F. 3d 559, 605 ( 2d Ci r . 2009) (S a c k , J.d isse n ting ) (in te rn a l cita tio n o m itt e d ). -1 2- secur ity conce rns. [ D o c . 1 1 at 15-26 .] Beca use, howe ver, this Court conclude s that no remedy outside of Bi v e ns exis ts for plaintiffs like Doe and that no specia l f actor s counsel judicial hesitation, the Court finds that Doe may maintain a fe dera l cause of ac tion ag ainst Rumsfeld under Bivens
. A. Availability of a Bive ns Cause of Action R u m s fe l d fi rs tar gu es th atth i s C o urt s h o u l d re fu s e t o re co gnize a B iv e ns re me dy he re be c a us e the Sup re me Court

dis fa vo rs Bivens actions and ha s cau t i o n ed aga inst allowing them in new contexts. [ Doc. 11 at 16
. ] T o b e s ur e , in

th e y e ar s s in ce B i vens , the Supreme Court ha s infreque ntly permitted such imp lie d r ig hts of

a c tio n. Pos t- Bivens , the Supreme Court only twice c onsidered a

nd approve d of
mon e y dama g e s a g a ins t f

e de ra l of fi c e rs : f or vio latio ns of

the F if th A me nd ment’s Du e Pr oc e ss Clause, Davis v. Passman , 442 U.S. 228 (1979) , and the Eig hth Amendment’s Cruel a nd Unusual Punishm ent Clause, Carlson v. G reen , 446 U.S. 14 (1980)
. See also 4/ United States v. Stanley , 483 U.S. 669, 678 (1987) (r e c og nizi ng that the Sup re me Court ha s “ he ld t

hat a c tio ns fo r d ama g e s c ou ld be bro u gh t d i rectly

under the Due Proc ess Clause of the Fifth Ame ndment, and under the Eig ht Amendment’s pr oscription ag ainst crue l and u nusual punishment . . . .” (interna l citations and quotations omit ted)). But the Court ha s neither ove rruled Bivens no r e xplic itl y prec lude d a dd iti on a l Bivens
reme dies. Instead, whe re the Supreme Court has de clined to r ec o gnize a cause of ac tion under Bivens , that decision has a lway s relied upon the pr es en ce o f al t ernative reme dies for the alleg ed constitutional viol ation or spec ial fac tors counselingjudicial hesitation. S e e, e . g. , Schweike r v.Case No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-1 3- Chili cky , 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (ac knowledg ing a reluc tance to ext end Bivens , but ultim ately finding
a Bivens reme dy

unavailable beca

use of compre hensive Social Sec urity administrative re medies); Bu sh , 462 U.S. 367 (

Bivens reme dy for First Amendment violation prec luded by elabor ate statutory
re me dia l sy ste m) ; Chappell v. W allace , 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (unique military disciplinary

structure
make s Bivens claim for r ace discrimination ina p t). Thoug h the instant suit may prese nt a new se t of fa cts, as almost all ca ses do, it is ult imately the pre sence or abse nce of alter native re medies or specia l fac tors that deter

mines the ava ilability

of a Bivens reme dy
. See Arar v . A sh c ro ft , 585 F.3d 559, 572 (2d Cir. 2009) (“ On c e we have ide nti fi e d th e c on te xt as ‘n e w, ’ w e mus t de c ide wh e the r t o
rec og nize a Bivens reme dy in that environment of fac t and law” based on Bivens ’ two-pa rt inquiry .). The Supreme Court has neve r held other wise. B. Alternative Re medies Rumsfeld does not argue that re medies outside of B iv e ns damag es exist for Doe’s a lleg ed constitutional inj uries

. [ Doc. 11 at 25 (“ Con g re ss ha s not e na c te d a re me dy that a pp lie s to the fa c ts of this case .”).] Nor doe s the Court find any
. See, e .g. , su pra Section I I I (findingno cause of ac tion for Doe under the DTA). F o r p l aint iffs in Doe’ s shoes, there fore , as in Bivens , “it is damag es or nothing.” Bivens , 403 U.S. at 410 ( H ar l an , J. , c o n c ur r i n g ); see also Carlson , 446 U.S. at 18-19 ( Bivens claims may

not lie “when de fenda

nts show that Cong ress has provided an alter native re medy which it expli citly

decla red to be a su bs titute for rec overy direc tly under the Constit ution and viewed as equa lly eff ective.” (citations o mi tt e d ) ( e mp h asis in orig inal)); Passman , 442 U.S. at 242 (plaintiffs wi tho ut e f

f e c t i v e m e an s o th e r th an th e j u d i c i ar y t o e n f o r c e c o n s t i tu t i o n a l r i g h t s mu s t b e a b l e to invoke the cour

ts’ jurisdiction). C. S pe c ial Fa c tor sCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-1 4- Havingfound no alter

native re lief for Doe’ s alleg ed constitutional injuries, the Court turns to Bivens ’s se c on d p ro ng : whe the r any “ sp e c ia l fa c tor s” c ouns e l hes itatio n in re c og nizi nga

c a us e of ac tion here unde r Bivens
. Special fa ctors counse ling he sitation “relate not to the me rits of the par ticular re medy , but to the question of who should dec ide whethe r such a reme dy should be provided.” Sanchez-E s pinoza v. Re agan , 770 F.2d 202, 208 ( D.C. Cir. 1985) (q u o t i n g Bu sh , 462 U.S. at 380 ). “ Ac c or din g to t his pr inc ipl e , c ourt s sh ou ld avo id c re a tin g a ne w, no ns tatut or y re me dy wh e n do ing so wo uld be ‘p la inl y inconsistent’ with authority constitutionally rese rved for t he political bra nches.” Detainee

s Lit ig. , 479 F. Supp. 2d at 103 (q u o t i n g Cha pp e ll , 462 U.S. at 304 ). Even a bsent a textual commitm ent of authority of discre tion t o t h e political bra nches, “ there never

theless might be rea sons that favor allowing Congr ess, rather t h an t h e j u d i ciar y , to prescr ibe the scope of re lief ava ilable . . . .” Id. (c i t i n g Bu sh , 462 U.S. at 380 ). F or example, wh ere an issue invokes policy considerations that inv olv e “ a

ho st o f c on sid e ratio ns that mu st b e we ig he d and a pp ra ise d, ” re so lut ion of

that is su e “ is
more a ppropriate ly

for those who write the laws, rather than f or those who inter

pret them.” United States v. Gilman , 347 U.S. 507, 512-13 (1954)
. Rum sf e ld c on te nd s th a t tw o im

po rt ant sp e c ia l f

a c tor s c ouns e l he sit a tio n in of fe ri ngre lie f i n this c ase. First, he argues that allowinga Bivens re me dy he re wo uld

imp ro pe rl y

le a d th e Court

to
re vie w w art ime matte rs and fo re ig n a ff

a ir s c on sti tut ion a lly c omm itt e d to the Pr e sid e nt a nd to Con g re ss. Se c on d, Rum sf e ld i de nti fi e s p ra c tic al in stitut ion a l c omp e te nc e and natio na l de fe ns e
conce rns that he say s further caution ag ainst a Bivens reme dy
. Yet, in larg e part beca use t he judicial protec tion of individual li berties is appr opriate he re, where allowing a B iv ens reme dy does not require a g ener al expansion of judicial authority into core war -making power s, the C ourt finds thatCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-1 5- no sp e c ia l f

a c tor s p re c lud e Do e ’s Bivens claim. 1. Separation of Powers In h is s e pa

ratio n- of -p ow e rs argume nt, Rum sf e ld c on te nd s th a t th is C ourt sh ou ld d e c lin e to inf e r a c a us e of a c tio n in this ca se be c a

us e the Con sti tut ion re se rv e s aut ho ri ty ov e r m ili tary

a ff a ir s, fore ign policy , and national secur ity matters to the coor dinate bra nches. [ Doc. 11 at 17
. ] S p e c i f i c a l l y, Rum sf e ld s ay s th a t c ou rt s shou ld r e fr a in f ro m “ jud ic ia l r e e xami natio n o f w art ime jud g me nts
a ll egedl y made ” duri nga “ fo re ig n mi lit ary

e ng a g e me nt t

hat Co ng re ss a

uth or ize d th e Pr e sid e nt t o prosec ute.” [ Doc. 11 at 20
. ] I t is ax iomatic that the Constitut ion commits di scre tion in mi litary and for eig n aff airs to the leg islative and executive bra nches. U.S. Const. Art. I , § 8 (C ong ress ha s power to pr ovide for
c omm on de fe ns e , d e c lare wa

r a nd su pp or t arm e d f or c e s) ; Id. at Art I I , § 2 (President is Commander in Chief of the a

rmed for ces) . Indeed, the “Constituti on rec o gn i z es t hat cor e strate g ic matters of
wa rm akin g be lon g in t

he ha nd s o f t ho se wh o a

re be st p os iti on e d a

nd mos t po lit ic a lly

a c c ounta ble for makingthem.” Ha md i v . R um sfe ld , 542 U.S. 507, 531 (2004) (plurality opinion). Courts thus g ener ally defe r to Congr ess or military authorities when suc h core strateg ic war making power s and
conce rns over

the ac tual prosec ution of war a re involved. Id. at 535
. Avoiding the “risk of a ssuming a r ole that is a lmost alwa y s best suited for Cong ress,” [ Doc. 11 at 17 ], however, doe s not recommend that courts be e ntirely power less to reviewleg islative or executive ac tion during a

time of war . Rather, “a state of wa r is not a blank che ck for

the President when it comes to the r ights of the Nation’s citizens.” Hamdi , 542 U.S. at 536 (c i t i n g Y oungstown Sheet &Tube Co. v. Sawyer , 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) ). “Whateve r powe r t h e Un i t ed S tates Con sti tut ion

e nv is io ns fo r t

he Exe c uti ve in i ts e xch ang e s w ithoth e r n a tio ns or wi th e ne myCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-1 6- org anizations in t imes of conf lict, it mos t assuredly

en visions a role for

all three branc hes whe n individual liber

ties are at stake.” Id. Acc ording ly , even in times of wa r, “the war

power [gra nted to the coordinate bra

nches] does not remove constitutional li mitations safeguardingessential liberties” that the judiciary has a r ole in protec ting. Ho meBl dg . &Loa n A ss’n v . B lai

sd e ll , 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) ; see also United States v. Robe l , 389 U.S. 258, 263-64 (1967) (“[T]he phrase ‘ war power ’ ca nnot be invoked as a talismanic incantation to suppor t a ny exercise of congressional powe r wh ic h c an b e br ou g ht w ith in i ts a mbi t.” ); Ex pa rteQu iri n , 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942) (n oti ng“ the duty which re sts on the courts, in time of war as we ll as in tim e of pe ace , to p re s erve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty ”). Th is n oti on

is p art ic ula

rl y tr ue w here , as he re , a

pla int if f’ s a lle g a tio ns do no t ne c e ssa ri ly implicate the “c ore strateg ic matters of war making ” that ca ll m o re f

orce fully for de fer ence to the political branc hes. Thoug h Rumsfeld claims that allowing a Bivens reme dy would require the Court to intr u d e into a c e n tr a l w arti me d e c is io n to d e ta in an d inte r r o g a te a p e r s o n “ a

p p r e h e n d e d

on the field of battle on suspicion of aidinginsurg ents,” [ Doc. 11 at 20 ], Doe ’s complaint pleads that Doe was de tained on his way

out of Iraq, ne ar the end of his tour a nd at the poi n t o f h i s depar ture for annual lea

ve. [ Doc. 4 at 14 .] Doe alleg es that he ha d alre ady left t he field of battl e—not that he wa s de ta ine d to re mov e him

fr om a c tiv e pa

rt ic ipatio n in

ho sti lit ie s. Pr e sumpt ive ly , D oe wo uld have los t any ability to offer low-leve l aid to insurge nts if he had be en per m i t t ed to leave I

raq. See Padilla v. Y oo , 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1027-28 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (findingno core strateg ic war making power implicated wher e “[t]here is no alleg ation that [t he plaintiff] was eng ag ed in ar med conf lict with the United States at the time of his ca pture or that he was de tained as ‘a simpl e war m easur e’ to prevent h i mfr o mac t i v el y

s erv i n g th e e n em y . ” ( ci t i n g Hamdi , 5 4 2 U. S
. at 518 )). More over, a s to Doe’sCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-1 7- proce dural due proce ss challeng e, the Supre me Court has alre ady evince d a willingne ss to review (t hough pe rh a

ps to a lim ite d d e g re e ) t

he pr oc e dure s a ff

or de d d e ta ine e s in

c ha lle ng e s to the ir detention status. See ge nerally Hamdi , 542 U.S. 507
. In concludingthat judicial protec tion of individual li berties is appr opriate he re , t h is Court is i nf or me d b y the re a so nin g of

tw o r e c e nt c a se s th a t c on sid e re d, and a llo we d, Am e ri c an c iti zen s’ Bivens challeng es to the conditions of and proce dures use d in their milit ary detention. In Padilla v. Y oo , the Northe rn District of Califor nia allowed a Bivens claim by an Amer ican c itiz en cha lleng ing th e c o er ci v e i n t erro gat i o nt ec h n i qu es u s e d d uri n g h i s d et en t i o ni na S o u thC ar o l i n a m i l i t ary b ri g. 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005
. After weig hing se paration-of-powe rs and f oreig n relations concer

ns simil ar to those that Rumsfeld ra i s es her e, the Padilla court found no spe cial fa ctors pre cluding a Bivens claim. Id. at 1027-30 . Simi larly , in Va nc e v . R um sfe ld , 694 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. I ll. 2010) , the Norther n District of I llinois allowed two Americ an citizens to make a Bivens claim ag ainst former De fe n s e S e c r e t ar

y R u m s f e l d
. O n th e b a s i s o f a l l e g a t i o n s s i m i l ar t o th o s e m a d e i n th i s c a s e (a lso challeng ing de tention conditions at Ca mp Cr o p p e r) a

n d a g a inst arguments of the same specia l fac tors as Rumsfeld now ra ises, the Vance court found that no specia l fac tors fore closed a cause of ac tion under Bivens
. Id. at 972-75
. But see Le bron v . R um sfe ld , 764 F. Supp. 2d 7 8 7 (D
. S
. C
. 2011) (f ind ing sp eci al fa c tor s p re c lud e d a c iti zen ’s Bivens action ag ainst Rumsfeld due to separ ation of power s and pra ctical c oncer ns). Th a t the Sup re me Court ha s fou nd sp e c ia l f

a c tor s p re se nt i n r e a dil y -d ist inguis ha ble c la ims ba se d o n in

jur ie s in c ide nt t o mi lit ary se rv ic e do e s n ot ( a s Rumsf e ld wo uld have it) de mand that th is Co urt f in d s p e c ia l f

a c to r s p r e s e n t h e r e. I n C h a p p el l v. W allace , the Supreme Court he ld that the “spec ial relationship of the soldier to his superiors ” and the “unique struc ture of the milit aryCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-1 8- establishment” we re spe cial fa ctors barr ing a Bivens re me dy fo r m ili tary

pe rs onne l c la ims a g a ins t superior of

fice rs. 462 U.S. at 300 (citations omitted). The Court then e x tended Cha pp e ll beyond the milit ary superior- subordinate relationship to deny , in United St ates v. Stanley , a Bivens reme dy for “ in ju r ie s th a t ‘ ar is e o u t o f o r ar e in th e c o ur s e o f a c ti v it y in c id e n t to [m il it ar

y ] s e r v ic e .’” 483 U.S. at 684 (q u o t i n g Feres v. United S t a tes , 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) ). In both case s, the Court tur ne d to “ the un iqu e dis c ipl ina ry str uc tur e of the Mil ita

ry Es ta bli sh me nt a

nd Con g re ss’ a c tiv ity

in the field [of military aff

airs]” to f ind that spe cial fac tors rec ommended ag ainst a Bivens reme dy
. Id
. at 683 (q u o t i n g Cha

pp e ll , 462 U.S. at 304 ); but see id. at 681-82 (d e c lin ingto a do pt r ule that w ou ld p re clude Bivens a c t i o n s b y s e r vic e me n e nti re ly , a

nd re je c tin g c ha

ra c te ri zat ion

that “ a ll m a tte rs wi thi n
c on g re ssi on a l po wer are e xemp t f ro m Bivens .”). This c ase, how ever , does not prese nt such
c on c e rn s. Rum sf e ld’ s se pa rate wa rn ingthat al low ingDo e ’s c la ims to p ro c e e d w ou ld u na c c e pta bly inj e c t Bivens into foreig n aff airs is e qually unavailing
. Rumsfeld analog izes to Sa nc he z-Es pin oz a v. Re agan and In re I

raq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigat ion to sugg est that a Bivens re me dy is simil arly barr ed under

the pre sent ci rc u m stance s. I n both case s, the courts de termined that the specia l needs of f

oreig n aff

airs bar red a damag es re m ed y “ag ainst mili tary and for eig n policy officia ls for alleg edly

unconstitutional treatm ent of for eig n subjects ca using injury

abroa d.” Sa nc he z-Es pin oz a , 770 F.2d at 209 ; see Detainee s Lit ig. , 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 . The Sa nc he z-Es pin oz a
co urt co n cl u d edth at“t h e d an ger o f f o re i gnci t i z en s ’ u s i n g th e c o urt s . . . t o o b s tru ctt h e f o re i gn policy of our g overnme nt is sufficie ntly acute that we must leave to Congre ss the judge ment whether a dama g e re medy

should ex ist.” 770 F.2d at 209

. In Detainee s Lit igation , th e cou rt lik e wi se
c a uti on e d a g a ins t a llo wi ng“ high- ra nk ingmil ita

ry of fic ia ls [to be ] ha le d into o ur ow n c ourt s toCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

R um sf

el d ’ s argum ent that t he Sup rem e C o urt ’ s d eci si o n i n 5/ M un af v. G er en , 553 U
. S. 674 ( 2008) , ex t ends s uch f o rei gn po l i cy- b ased “s p eci al f act o rs ” co nsi d erat i o ns t o A m eri can ci t i zen p l ai nt i f f s f ai l s. I n M unaf

, t he C our t f

ound t hat p ro v id ing ha b e a s re lief to two A m e ric a n c iti z e n s d e ta ine d in Ira q w o u ld re su lt in “u n w a rr a n te d ju d ic ia l i n tru sio n ” into the E x e c u tive ’s au tho rity o v e r w a rm a k ing a n d inte rn a tio n a l re la tio n s. I d. a t 700
. H o w ev er, as R um sf eld ad m i t s, s i gn i f i can t t o t he M unaf

Co ur t wer e t he f

orei gn p ol i cy i mp l i cat i ons o f i nt er f er i ng wi t h Ir aq’ s aut hor i t y “t o puni s h of f ens es aga i ns t i t s l aws com mi t t ed wi t hi n i t s border s . ” I d. a t 697- 98 ( i n t er n al qu ot at i on s omi t t ed)
. Ap ar t f r om t he s eve r al f

act ual d istinc tio n s b e tw e e n tha t ca se a n d this o n e , M unaf ’ s reas oni ng evi nce d conce r n over i nt er f er enc e wi t h a f

orei gn cr i mi nal syste m tha t ar e no t p re se n t he re . M unaf di d no t gut t h e i mpor t an ce of c i t i ze n s h i p t o de t er mi n i n g t h e s cope of c o n stitutio n a l p ro te c tio n a n d the a v a ilab ili ty o f ju d ic ia l re m e d y. -1 9- defe nd ag ainst our ene mies’ leg al cha lleng es . . . .” 479 F. Supp. 2d at 105
. B ut D oe is a

Un ite d St a te s c iti zen

and thi s c a se do e s n ot i nv olv e fo re ig n c iti zen pla int if fs
. The fe ar of allowing enemy aliens to e ng ag e domestic courts in continuing hostilities is not prese nt here . Doe’s Am er i ca n citizenship t hus cuts strong ly in favor of

aff ordinghim constitut ional pr ote c tio ns a

br oa d a nd a llo wi ngjud ic ia l r e me dy fo r t he c on sti tutio na l vi olatio ns he a lle g e s. See 5/ id. at 95 (d en yi n g Bivens reme dy in larg e pa rt b eca

use nonre sident alien plaintiffs ar e not entitled to c on sti tut ion a l pr ote c tio ns in t he fi rs t pl a c e ); see also Vance , 6 9 4 F. Supp. 2d at 974 (“[T]he exis tence of [America

n] citi zenship has gone a longway for rece nt courts asked to assess the scope
o f c o n s t i tu t i o n al p ro t ec t i o no v er s ea s . ” ( ci t i n g Hamdi , 542 U.S. at 532 , and Pa dil la , 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1020 )). Doe’ s complaint does not ask this Court to assume the authority to make or ma

nag e wa r, or to allow foreig n citizens acc ess t o courts to obstruct foreig n policy
. Nor does it require this Court to intrude upon the political branc hes’ a uthority over military

service . Instead, the c omplaint alleg es

“ c on sti tut ion a l tr e sp a ss o n a de ta ined i ndivi du a l c iti zen ’s lib e rt ie s w he re the de te nti on wa s n ot a
nece ssary remova l f

rom th e b attlefield,” Pa dil la , 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1028 , and ca lls upon judi cial expert is e in

s a f e g u ar d in g th e c it iz e n ’ s in d iv id u a l l ib e rti e s an d

e n f o r c in g a lr e a dy - e s ta

b li shed proce dural rig hts. See Hamdi , 542 U.S. 507
. 2. Practica l ConcernsCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-2 0- In addition, Rumsfeld predicts that adve rs e “r ea l world conse quence s” will stem from
a ll owing a Bivens reme dy here , namely , that (1) the thr eat of liability would impede military decision-making ; (2) that allowinga Bivens action will forc e disclosure of sensitive information,
re qu ir e dis tr a c tin g dis c ov e ry , a nd wi ll d ang e ro us ly

requi re re mov ingso ldi e rs fr om t he fi e ld t o provide testimony ; and (3) that Doe’s proposed cause of action would “e mbroil the judiciaryin warrelated dec isions” that are complicated to a djudicate. [ Doc. 11 at 22-23 .] T he se c on c e rn s are larg e ly
un fo un de d a

nd do no t su pp or t f ind ingsp e c ia l f

a c tor s p re c lud ingDo e ’s Bivens action. First, althoug h rec og nizi ng a Bivens reme dy would cer

tainly prese nt t h e t h re at of money d ama g e s f

o r c o n s ti tuti o n a l v io lati o n s b y mi li ta r y o f f ic e r s , a c e n tr a l p ur

pose of Bivens is j us t th a t: to raise the c ost of unconstitutional behavior. Malesko , 534 U.S. at 70 . As such, Bivens actions pe rm it j u d i c i a l e n f

o r c e m e n t o f p r e e xi s t i n g l i m i t a t i o n s o n un c o n s t i tu t i o n a l c o n d u c t p r e c i s e ly

to disincentiviz e such c onduct. In addition, courts re g ularly handle se nsitiv e i nformation. The state sec rets doctr ine, for insta n c e , n o t o n ly

a ll o w s th e g o v e r

n me n t t o w it

h h o ld c o n f id e n ti a l m a te r ia l r e late d

to n a tional
secur ity , El lsb e rg

v . M itchell , 709 F.2d 51, 57 ( D.C. Cir. 1983) (s tate se c re ts p ri vil e g e e xten ds to
natio na l de fe ns e c a

pa bil iti e s, int e lli g e nc e -g a the ri ngme tho d s , a n d d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s) , b ut m ay

a lso require dismiss al, W

ilson v. Libby , 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 94 n.7 (D.D .C. 2007) , aff’d W ilson v. Libby , 535 F.3d 697 ( D.C. Cir. 2008) ( W ilson II ). See W ilson II , 535 F.3d at 720-21 (Rog ers, J. concurr ing i np artan d

d i s s en t i n g i np art ) ( re

j ec t i n g B iv ens -rel ated c on c e rn ov e r j ud ic ia l in tr

us ion int o int e lli g e nc e inf

or matio n a s pr e c lud e d b y

ava ila bil ity of state se c re ts p ri vil e g e ); se e als o Arar , 585 F.3d at 605, 608-09 (Sack, J ., dissenting) (same)
. To categ orica lly prec lude plaintiffs fr om bring ing
a Bivens action, at this e arly stag e of litigation and whe re se nsitive national secur ity information mayCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-2 1- be prote cted b y t u rn i n g to the state sec rets doctr ine, would re quire a premature c onstitut ional deter mination. Finally , national sec urity or over seas de tention issues are not e ntirely unfamiliar to the judiciary . Deter

minations such as t hose presented in this case , though pote ntially complicated, a

re within a court’s c ompetence , as they involve discerning a nd prese rvingthe line betwe en constitutional and un const itutional conduct. See, e .g. , Hamdi , 542 U.S. 507 (adjudicating the constitutional boundaries of Ex ecutive discretion over the proce ss due habea s petitioners detaine d
a t G ua nta namo) ; Ste rli ng

v . Co ns tan tin , 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932) (“ What ar e the a llo wa ble lim its of military

discretion, and whether or not they have be en over stepped in a pa rticular c ase, a

re judicia l questions.”). Bivens itself—as we ll as the S u preme Court’s subsequent dec isions in Carlson and Passman al l o wi n g Bivens reme dies for F ifth Amendment and Eig hth Am endment vio latio ns —r e qu ir e d d e lic a te lin e -d ra wi ng in are a s invo lvi nglarg e ly su bje c tiv e de te rm inatio ns . Bivens , 403 U.S. 388 (allowingdamag es re medy for F ourth Amendme n t violations based on
warr antl e ss a

rr e st a nd se arc h a nd us e of unre a so na

ble fo rc e ); Arar , 585 F.3d at 603 (Sack, J., d i s s en t i n g) ( d es cr i b i n g Carlson and Passman as al l o wi n g Bivens reme dies in are as within the Ex ecutive’ s expertise or re quiring subjective de cisionmaking ). Findingthat no specia l fac tors prec lude a Bivens reme dy for Doe’ s al l ege dconst itutional claims, and because there are no alternative reme dies ava ilable for the due proc ess violations of which Doe complains, the Court conc ludes that Doe ma y asser t a ca use of a ction under Bivens
. V. Qualif ied Im m uni ty Rums f e ld n e xt c o n te n d s th a t e v e n if D o e c o u ld ma inta in a Bive ns a c tio n a g a ins t hi m, Rumsfeld is e ntitled to qualified immunity on Doe’ s due proc ess and a cce ss to courts claims. [ Doc.Case No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-2 2- 11 .] The do ct ri ne of qua lified immunit y g ener ally

shields “g overnme nt officials pe rfor ming dis c re tio na

ry fu nc tio ns . . . fr om lia

bil ity fo r c ivi l da

ma g e s in so fa

r a s th e ir c on du c t do e s n ot v iol a te clea rly established statutory

o r co nstitut ional rig hts of which a r easona ble per son would have known.” Ha rlo w v . F

itz ge ra ld , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (198 2) . The doc trine provides immunity from suit a nd serve s “to avoid ‘subject[ing] g overnme nt of ficials either to the costs of trial o r t o the burdens of

broad- rea ching discovery ’ wher e the leg al norms the officia ls a re alleg ed to have violated
w e r e n o t c le ar ly

e s ta b li s h e d a t t h e time.” Mi tch ell v . F

or sy th , 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (quoting Harlow , 457 U.S. at 817-18 ). B eca use qualified immunity

is an aff irmativ e d efe nse, the initial “burde n of plea ding it re sts with the defenda nt.” Crawf

ord-El v. Britton , 523 U.S. 574, 587 (1998) (q u o t i n g Gomez v . Toledo , 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) )
. In deter mining whe ther a

defe ndant is entitled to qualified im munity , the C ourt must employ
a tw o- pa rt ana ly sis
. Th e Court mus t det e rm ine wh e the r: (1 ) wh ile vie wi ng the fa c ts i n th e lig ht m os t favor able to the plaintiff, a violation of a constitutional rig ht occur red; a nd (2) the c onstitut ional rig ht at issue was c lear ly

established at the tim e o f t he def endant’ s conduct. Sa uc ie r v . Ka tz , 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) , overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) . Thus, even if the C ourt deter mines that “a constituti onal right would have be en violated on the fa c ts a lle g e d, ” a

de fe nd ant m ay

sti ll b e immun e fr om s uit

un le ss h e “ kn e w, or

[wa s] unre a so na

ble in not knowing , that [hi s] behavior violated the Constituti on.” Ha rri s v . D .C. , 932 F.2d 10, 13 ( D.C. Cir. 1991) . Where, howe ver, the plaintiff’s well-plea ded fac tual alleg ations, taken as true, showthe violation of a cle arly -established c onstitut ional rig ht, a def endant ’s m o t i on to dismi ss on gr ounds of qualified immunity

must be denied. See Iqbal , 129 S. Ct. 1937 at 1949 ; se e ge ne ra lly CrawfordE l , 523 U.S. at 588 (p la int if f m us t sh owc on sti tut ion a l vi olatio n) ; Davis v. Sc herer , 468 U.S. 183,Case No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-2 3- 197 (1984) (plaintiff must show that constitutional rights we re c lear ly established). C o urt s h av e d i s cr et i o n t o d ec i d e wh i ch o f th e two i n qu i ri es s h o u l d b e a d dre s s edfi rs t , t h o u gh if a c ourt finds a c onstitut ional righ t n o t clea rly established, it need not de cide the of ten more difficult question whethe r a c o n s t i t u tional rig ht was violated. Pearson , 129 S. Ct . at 818 . B oth inquiries, howeve r, re quire c ontext -spec ific ana ly sis. Saucier , 533 U.S. at 201
.

A. Cau sa tio n: Ru ms

fe ld’ s P e rso na l I

nv olv e me nt B e c a us e lia bil ity un de r D oe ’s Bivens claims is limited to those who ar e “pe rsonally involved in the illega l conduct,” Simpkins v. D.C. Gov’t , 108 F.3d 366, 369 ( D.C. Cir. 1997) , th e Court mus t first addre ss the is s u e of Rumsfeld’s per sonal participation in the constitut ional violations Doe alleg es. Rumsfeld ar g ues that bec ause D oe’s c omplaint fails to plead suffic ient fac ts supporting Rums f e ld ’ s inv o lv e me n t in th e a ll e g e d c o n s ti tuti o n a l v io lati o n s , D o e c an n o t ma inta in a B i ve ns action. [ Doc. 11 at 29 .] At this ear ly stag e of this litigation and befor e any discovery

has take n place , the Court finds Doe sufficiently pleads Rumsfeld’s pe rsonal involvement in the alleg ed substantive du e pr oc e ss v iol a tio n, but ha s no t do ne so a s to Do e ’s a lle g e d p ro c e dura l du e pr oc e ss o r a c c e ss t o
c ourt s c la ims
. Bivens liability

may not be imposed on the basis of respondeat superior
. Iqbal , 1 29 S. Ct
. at 1949 . H ow e ve r, wh e n a de fe nd ant i s sa id t o h ave c ra ft e d th e po lic ie s f or or a uth or ize d f

a c ia lly
un c on sti tut io nal ac tio n, he do e s n ot a vo id r e sp on sib ili ty

fo r t he fo re se e a

ble c on se qu e nc e s o f h is conduct. Barham v. Ram sey , 434 F.3d 565, 578 ( D. C
. Cir. 2006) (super visor can be liable for subordinate’ s misconduct if he knows of, facilitates, approve s, or wil lingly turns a blind ey e to the
c on du c t) ; see also Pa dil la , 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34 (alleg ations that g overnme nt lawy er’ s leg al
me mor and a

“ set in mo ti on a

se ri e s o f e ve nts ” re su lti ngin p la int if f’ s d e te nti on

we re su ff

ic ie nt t oCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-2 4- impose Bivens liability). As to his substantive due proce ss claim, Doe makes sever al alleg ations that Rumsfeld cra fted the po lic ie s for and a

uth or ize d the de te nti on c on dit ion s and int e rr og a tio n te c hn iqu e s u se d at Camp Cr op pe r. Do e ’s c omp la int a lle g e s th a t on De c e mbe r 2 , 2 00 2, Rum sf e ld p e rs on a lly

a pp ro ve d a lis t of torturous interr og ation techniques f or use on detainee s at Guantana mo. These techniques, D oe
s ay s , i n cl u d edp ro l o n gedi n t erro gat i o n , i s o l at i o n , an d s en s o ry d eprivation. [ Doc. 4 a

t 32
. ] Doe alleg es that Rumsfeld later r escinde d his authoriza t i o n o f t hose tec hniques, only to “authorize the Commander of the United States Southern Command to use them if war rante d and approve d by

Mr. Rumsfeld in indivi dual ca ses.” [ Doc. 4 at 33
. ] Th ou g h D oe wa s n e ve r d e ta ine d at Gua nta namo, he a lle g e s that in

Au g us t 20 03 , Rumsf

e ld sent Major Gene ral Geof

fre y Miller to I

raq to “ g itmo-iz e” Camp Cropper. Part of that proce ss, Doe say s, called f

or Major G ener al Miller to revie w t he United States milit ary prison sy stem in I raq a nd to make re commendations on how t o better gather actionable intellig ence from deta inees. [Doc. 4 at 34 .] Doe alleg es that, at Miller’s sug g estion, Rumsfeld direc ted and approve d the Commander of the Coalition J oint Task For ce- 7 in I raq, L ieutenant Ge nera l Ricard o Sanchez, to sign a memorandum “ author izi ng the use of 29 inter rog ation techniques, which included yelling, loud music, light control a

nd sensory

deprivation.” [ Id. ] Even after San ch ez l ater modified the
me mor and

um, Do e say s ma

nip ulatio n o f l ig hti ng , he a tin g , foo d, sh e lte r, and c lot hin g c on tin

ue d to be used a s authorized interrog ation techniques. [Id. ] Do e a lle g e s th a t aro un d th e same tim e , Rumsf e ld had con ven ed a

“ Wor kin g Gr ou

p” to
e va luate his int e rr og a tio n poli c ie s. Do e ma int a ins that a s a re su lt o f t

he wo rk ingg ro up , Rumsf e ld
a pp ro ve d a set of new int e rr og a tio n te c hn iqu e s in c lud ing , amon g oth e rs , is olatio n f or up to t hir tyCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

D o e ad d s, as f urt her s up p o rt t hat R um sf el d knew o f

de t a ine e a b u ses i n Ir aq , t hat C o l i n P o well

— t hen t he 6/ Se cr et ar y of

D ef en s e— con f

i r med t h at t h r ou g h ou t 2003, Rums f el d w as awa r e of

re por t s pu bl i s h ed by t h e Red Cr os s on ab us i ve det ent i on condi t i ons i n I r aq. A ccor di ng t o D oe, P owel l s t at ed t hat he and R ums f el d k ept P resid en t B ush “re g u la rly a p p rise d ” o f t h e se re p o rts. [ D oc. 4 a t 35
. ] T he C o urt n o te s t hat t hese al l egat i o ns are not, on t hei r own, suf f i ci ent t o supp o rt D o e’ s cl ai m t hat R um sf el d aut ho ri zed t he ab usi ve co nd i t i o ns, o r was d el i b erat el y i nd i f f erent t o t he a lleg e d d u e p ro c e ss v io la tio n s a t C a m p C ro p p e r. See Far m er v . Br ennan , 511 U
. S. 825, 847 ( 1994) ( h ol di n g pr i s on o f f i ci al s l i ab l e f

o r del i b erat e i nd i f

f erence und er E i ght h A m end m ent o nl y i f t hey kno w o f s ub st ant i al ri sk o f

s eri o us harm and d i sr egard t hat ri sk “by f ai l i ng t o t ake reasonab l e m easure t o ab at e i t ”). R ums f el d cont es t s t hat an y p o rti o n of t he Fi el d M anu al i s cl as s i f i ed, an d ar gu es t hat t he manua l r emai ned 7/ u n m o d ifi e d b e tw e e n 1 9 9 2 a n d S e p te m b e r 2 0 0 6 . [ D oc. 11 a t 31 .] B e c a u se , f o r th e p u rp o se s o f a m o tio n to d ism iss, c o u rts m u st g e n e ra lly a c c e p t a s tru e a p la intiff ’s fa c tua l alle g a tio n s, I qbal , 129 S. Ct
. a t 1949 , t h e C o u rt fi n d s this e sse n tially e v id e n tiar y d isp u te m o re a p p ro p ria te fo r su m m a ry j u d g m e n t o r tria l. -2 5- day s, dietary

manipulation, an d s l eep de privation. [ Doc. 4 at 33 .] D oe a lle g e s th a t Rumsf e ld approve d these tec hniques ag ainst the b ac k d rop of his knowledg e about de tainee a buses in I raq. 6/ [ Id. ] And, ac cordingto the complaint, on Dec ember 30, 2005, Rumsfeld modified the military ’s Field Manual by

addingten classifie d pag es authorizing de tention and interrog ation techniques of the sort used on Doe . Doe sa y s this version of the manua l w as in ope ration during his de tention at Camp Cropper a

nd was not re place d until S eptember 2006. [

7/ Doc. 4 at 36
. ] Ag ainst these alleg ations, Rumsfeld posits that it is purely speculation that someone like the Secre tary of De fense signe d off on the s pecif ic interrog ation techniques a nd conditions of detention imposed on Doe. [ D o c . 1 1 a t 3 1 -32
. ] Although it may be unlikely

that Rumsfeld evaluated the detention conditions of ea ch deta inee in deta il, it i s not impl ausible that he a u t h orized the use of int e rr og a tio n te c hn iqu e s on the de ta ine e po pu latio n a t Camp Cr op pe r, or e ve n on sp e c if ic de ta ine e s. Th ou g h D oe mus t e ve ntu a lly su pp or t hi s f a c tua l a lle g a tio ns wi th e vid e nc e , a mot ion to d ism iss simply c a l l s u p o n th e C o urt t o e v a l u a t e w h e th e r a p l a i n t i f f h a s a l l e g e d w i th s p e c i f i c i ty fa c ts supporting a pl ausible cla im. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct . at 1949 (c i t i n g Twom bly , 550 U.S. at 556-57 ). Th is is a notice plea ding r equire ment that acknow ledg es, par ticularly in case s such as this one, the ofte nCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-2 6- limit ed information available to plaintiffs at the time of complaint. At t h i s s t ag e of litig ation, the Court does not evaluate the proba bility of Doe ’s succ ess. See id. At thi s e arl y sta g e of pr oc e e din g s in

thi s ca se , D oe ’s a lle g a tio ns su ff ic ie ntl y su pp or t hi s c la im that Ru m sfeld wa s involved in the substantive due proc ess violations related to the c onditions of confine ment and interr og ation at Camp Cropper. H e has a lleg ed wi t h adequate spec ificity that Rumsfeld knew of, or dere d, and appr oved the a lleg ed constitutionally defic ient interrog ation
me tho ds and de te nti on c on dit ion s e mpl oy e d in Ira q. Do e ha s the re by ide nti fi e d “ e no ug h f

a c t to ra ise
a re asonable expectation that discovery will reve al evidenc e” of Rumsfeld’s persona l involvement in the alleg ed torturous tre atment. Twom bly , 550 U.S. at 545 ; see Vance , 694 F. Supp. 2d at 963-64 (dee ming s u f f ic ient almost identical alleg ations that Rumsfeld cre ated a policy expressly authorizing constitutionally

invalid interrog ation and dete ntion measures)
. Ho we ve r, re g ard ingDo e ’s pr oc e dura l due pr oc e ss cl a im, Do e ha s n ot p le a de d a de qu a te fa c ts to s up po rt

tha t Rumsf e ld p e rs on a lly

a uth ori z ed o r w a s d e lib e rate ly ind if fe re nt t o th e ina de qu a te pr oc e dure s use d in the de ta ine e status he ari ng s at Cam p Cro pp e r. Ac c or din g to D oe ’s c omp la int , Rumsfeld was aw are that the process aff orded detainee s in I raq f

ell below constitutionally -mandated levels. [ Doc. 4 at 39, 43 .] Yet in support of this contention, Doe of fer s only the fa ct of a

Marc h 6, 2006 Amnesty

International repor

t ref ere ncing the s ecur ity

internment sy stem’s defic ient proce dural protec tions. [ Doc. 4 at 37 .] Doe also alleg es that Rumsfeld had final say over the continued dete ntion
or re lease of deta inees, [ Doc. 4 at 40 ], but does not alleg e that this authority extended to the status
c la ssi fi c a tio n p ro c e dure s le a din g to a ny c on tin ue d d e te nti on

or re le a se de c isi on s. Moreove r, Doe ’s complaint mere ly proff ers that Rumsfeld c ould have re fo rm ed detention proce dures but did not undertake such r efor m. [ Doc. 4 at 39 .] Such vague alleg ations of Rumsfeld’sCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-2 7- persona l involvement are insufficient to support a Bivens claim aga i n s t Ru msfeld for a lleg ed proce dural due proce ss violations. Nor ha s Doe a dequat el y

alleg ed Rumsfeld’s pe rsonal involvement in the alleg ed denia l of Do e ’s a c c e ss t o c ourt s. Simi lar to Doe ’s pr oc e dura l due pr oc e ss cl a im, the a lle g a tio n th a t Rumsf e ld controlled the de cision to relea se deta inees doe s not sugg est that Rumsfeld was personally involved in d e nying de ta ine e s ac c e ss to c ourt s to pe tit ion fo r h a be a s r e lie f o r c ha lle ng e the c on dit ion s o f t he ir detention. B eca

use Doe otherwise c omplains only g ener ally (and c onclus orily) that Rumsfeld’s policies prohibited detaine d citizens from acc essing courts, [ D o c . 4 a t 30, 47 ] , and that Rumsf

e ld
c on tin ue d s uc h p oli c ie s e ve n a ft e r t he S up rem e Co urt “ wa

rn e d” him

a g a ins t th e m in

its Hamdi v. Rumsfeld decision, [ Doc. 4 at 30 ], he c ann ot m a int a in h is d e nia l- of -a c c e ss c la im. The Court thus finds Doe ’s alleg ations of Rumsfeld’s per sonal involvement in the detention
and int e rr og a tio n p ra c tic e s at Camp C ro pp e r s uf fic ie ntl y su pp or t a su bs tanti ve du e pr oc e ss c la im. Be cause , howeve r, Doe offe rs no fa ctual alleg ations sugg esting Rumsfeld’s persona l involvement in d e n yi n g c o n s t i tu t i o n a l l y - m an d a t e d p r o c e d ur a l p r o t e c t i o n s a t d e t a i n e e s t a tu s h e ar i n g s , or in denying D oe ac cess to courts, the Court g rants Rumsfeld’s mot ion to dismiss Doe’ s proce dural due pr oc e ss a nd de nia l- of -a c c e ss c la ims
.

B. Su bs tan tiv e Du e Pr oc ess Rum sf e ld i ns ist s th a t he is e nti tle d t o qu a lif ie d immun ity

fr om Bivens liability

on Doe’ s alleg ations of Fifth Amendment subst antive due proce ss violations. S pecif ically , Rumsfeld argues that Doe cannot assert a subst antive due proce ss rig ht to be fre e fr om cer tain interrog ation techniques
and c on dit ion s of c on fi ne me nt imp os e d in the sp e c if ic c on te xt o f a Un ite d State s de te nti on fa c ili ty in I raq. [ Doc. 11 at 47-55 .] Rumsf e ld a dd s th a t, i n a

ny c a se , D oe ’s a sse rt e d s ub sta nti ve du e pr oc e ssCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

B eca us e D oe was det ai ned i n f eder al cus t od y , hi s cons t i t ut i onal prot ect i on ag ai ns t mi s t r eat ment ar i s es un der 8/ the D u e P ro c e ss C la u se o f th e F ift h A m e n d m e n t, b u t th e se p ro te c tio n s a re s u b sta n tially s im ilar to th o se a d e ta ine e in sta te cu s t ody r ec ei v es u n der t h e D u e Proc es s C l au s e of t h e Fou r t ee n t h Amen dmen t
. I n a ddi t i on , “ t h e du e pr oce s s r i g h t s of a [ pret r i al det ai nee ] ar e a t l eas t as gr eat as t he E i gh t h A mendm ent prot ect i ons av ai l abl e t o a conv i ct ed pri s oner . ” C ou nt y o f S a c ra m e n to v . L e w is , 523 U
. S. 833, 849- 50 ( 1998) (quo t i ng Ci t y of R ev er e v. M as s . G en. H os p. , 463 U
. S. 239, 244 ( 1983) )
. -2 8- rig hts were not clear ly established at the time Doe w as held at Camp Cropper. [ Doc. 33 at 45-47
. ] Th e Co urt f

in d s , h o w e v e r , th a t D o e h a d a c o n s ti tuti o n a l r igh t t o b e f r e e f r o m c o n d u c t a nd conditions of confine ment that shock the c onscienc e, that such right was clea rly established at the tim e of Rum sf e ld' s c on du c t, a

nd that D oe ha s p le a de d f

a c tua l a lle g a tio ns su ff

ic ie nt t o sup po rt

a c la im that Rumsfeld' s conduct violated this clea rly -established rig ht. Accor dingly , Rumsfeld’s qualified immun ity de fe ns e to D oe ’s su

bs tanti ve du e pr oc e ss c la im f a ils
. 1. Constit utional Violation Th e Sup re me Court

ha s lo nghe ld t

hat c e rt a in E xec uti ve or governm e nt c on du c t ma y so “shock[] t he consc ience ,” off endingbasic notions of hum an dignity and a civiliz ed sy stem of justice, that it violates the Due Process Clause. Ro c hin v . Ca lif or nia , 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952) . T o th is end, cer tain phy sical abuse or “interr og ation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique char ac t eristi cs of a

particula r suspec t,” ca

n violate the Due Process Clause unde r the “ shocks the conscie nce” standard. Miller v. Fe nton , 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985) ; see also Palko v. Connec ticut , 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937) (noting that under the Due Process Clause, “ there would rema in the need to give protec tion ag ainst tortur e, p hy sical or menta l.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Benton v. M

aryland , 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) ; cf
. Brown v. Mississippi , 29 7 U. S
. 278, 285-86 (1936) (holding that confe ssions coerc ed throug h means off ensive to fundamental p ri n ci ples of justice ca nnot support a conviction). 8/ Her e, Doe alleg es, inte r a lia , that he wa s detained in co m m u n i ca do and ofte n in solit aryCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-2 9- c on fi ne me nt. He a lso say s h e wa s e xpos e d to e x tr eme and pr olo ng e d c old

and c on tin uo us lig ht, blindfolded and hoode d, subjected to slee p alteration and deprivation through e x posure to lig ht or blasting music, de nied some food and w ater , and phy sically assaulted. [ Doc. 4 at 8, 17-19
. ] Al th o u gh Rumsfeld argues that seve ral of the various pra ctices a lleg ed do n o t individually shock the conscie nce, [ Doc. 11 at 51 ] , D o e ’ s c l a i md o e s n o tr e s to na l l e g a t i o n s o f an y o n e c o n d i t i o nh e s ays is s ingula rl y e g re g iou s. Ins te a d, Do e say s se ve ra l “ ps y c ho log ic a lly -d isr up tiv e ta c tic s d e signe d to induce c ompliance” wer e used on him throug hout his detention at Camp Cropper. [ Do c . 4 a t 8
. ] Thus, the Court considers the cumulative impact o f the conduc t alleg ed to deter mine whether

the
co n d i t i ons of Doe’ s confineme nt could support a substantive due pr ocess c laim. See R h o d es v . Chapman , 452 U.S. 337, 362-63 (1981) (eva luating E ighth Ame ndment challeng e to conditions of
c on fi ne me nt b y

loo kin g to t

he tot a lity of the c ir c ums tanc e s and c umu lativ e e ff e c t of c on dit ion s) ; see also Vance , 694 F. Supp. 2d at 966-69 (findingdetainee s’ cumulative a lleg ations of similar d etention and interr og ation techniques suf ficient to sug g est torturous conditi ons of confinement in violation of the Due Process Clause)
. Doe contends that Rumsfeld’s conscie nce- shockingconduct wa s undertake n with an intent to injure, or, alter

natively , with deliberate indiffer ence to the harms ca used by such conduc t. [ Doc. 4 at 41-42 .] The Court finds that, under e ither theory of liability , Doe ha s stated a substantive due proce ss claim based on c onditions of co n fi n em ent and interrog ation methods that shock the conscie nce. F ir st, a s to an a lle g e d inte nt to injure , the Sup re me Court ha s hel d th a t c on du c t “ int e nd e d to inj ur e in s ome wa

y un jus tif ia ble by any g ov e rnme nt int e re st is the so rt of a c tio n most lik e ly to r ise to the conscie nce- shockinglevel.” Cou nty of S ac ra me nto v . Le wis , 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998)
. DoeCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-3 0- alleg es that Rumsfeld’s ac tions were a imed to injure, and such allegations are supporte d by the ver y nature of the alleg ed conduct, which sugg ests that Rumsfeld cra fted the policie s for or or dere d the use of de tention and interrog ation techniques at Camp Cropper with the intent to inflict phy sical or psy cholog ical har

m. See, e .g. , Vance , 694 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (conc luding that a lleg ations of
su bs tanti a lly sim ila

r “ tor tur ou s tr e a tme nt me tho ds may manif e st a n in e xtri c a

ble a im t o in

jur e tho se subject to their use.” ). Rumsfeld’s argument that the military was “ pursuing leg itimate g overnme nt interests, eve n if in an alleg edly

unauthorized manner ,” [ Doc. 11 at 54 ], d o es not nece ssarily justify the interrog ation techniques a nd conditions alleg edly imposed on Doe with intent to harm. See Nor ris
v . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 737 F.2d 1148, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (c h ar ac t er i z i n g Rochin as standing for “ the limited principle that g overnme nt action, eve n if taken pur suant to leg itimate objectives such as evide nce g ather ing, ma y not proce ed via means that shock the c onscienc e.” ( quotation and
a lte ratio n omitte d) ); cf. Be ll v . W olf ish , 441 U.S. 520, 538-39 (1979) (findingthat a condition of pretria l detention rea sonably related to a leg itimate gove rnment objec tive does not direc tly amount to p un ishme nt a

bs e nt a sh ow ingof

int e nt t o p un ish

but st ill c ann ot b e e xcess iv e in re latio n to its alt erna tiv e purp os e ); id. at 539 ( “ Re tr ib u ti o nan d d e te r r e n c e ar e n o t l e g it im a te n o np u n itive g overnme ntal objectives.” ). The mere asser tion that a g overnme nt inter est in g ather ing intellig ence mot ivate d it s a c tio ns do e s n ot n e c e ssa ri ly vo id a n o the rw ise pr op e rl y ple a de d c on sti tut ion a l c la im. Sa c ra me nto , 523 U.S. at 840 (finding a substantive due proce ss violation wher e office r’s ac t i ons

“ w e r e ana

b u s e o f e x e c u t i v e p o w e r

s o c l e ar l y unjustif

ied by any leg itimate objective of la w
e nf or c e me nt” (e mph a sis a dd e d) ); see also W as h. Te ac he rs’

Un ion v . B d. of E

du c . o f th e Di st. of Colum bia , 109 F.3d 774, 781 ( D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[S] ubstantive due proc ess pre vents g overnme ntalCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

T h e D i st ri ct of C o l um b i a C i rcui t has hel d t hat i n de t erm i ni ng whet her governm ent co nd uct ri ses t o t he

9/ co nsci ence- shocking l evel , co urt s co nsi d er: t he nee d f

or t he appl i cat i on of

f orce , t he r el at i ons hi p bet ween t he nee d a nd t he amo un t of f orce t hat w a s u se d , t h e e x te n t o f i n ju ry in fli c te d , an d w h e the r fo rc e w a s a p p li e d i n a go o d faith e ff o rt to ma i n t a i n or r e s t or e di s c i pl i n e or ma l i c i ou s l y a n d s a di s t i c a l l y f or t h e v e r y pu r po s e of

c a u s i n g h a r m. F r at er na l O r der of

P ol i ce v. G at es , 602 F. Su pp. 2d 104, 109 ( D
. D
. C. 2009) (quo t i ng No rris v . D istrict o f C o lu m b ia , 737 F. 2d 1148, 1150 ( D
. C. Ci r . 1984) ). T hese f act o rs d o l i t t l e t o res o l ve D o e’ s cl ai m at t hi s st age o f l i t i gat i o n, part i cul ar l y wh er e D oe’ s comp l ai nt cont ai ns no i ndi cat i on of an y gove r nment ne ed f or t he appl i cat i on of

f orce . -3 1- power from beingused for

purposes of oppr ession, or abuse of gover nment power that shocks the
c on sc ie nc e , o r a c tio n th a t is le g a lly ir ratio na l [ in that] it is not suf fi c ie ntl y ke y e d to any

le g iti mate
s t at e i n t er es t s . ” ( qu o t i n g Comm. of United States Citi zens Living in Ni car. v. Re agan , 859 F.2d 929, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (interna l quotations and citations omitt ed) ( second a lteration in orig inal)). At the ver

y least, w h et h er evidence ultimately supports Doe’s c laim that the alleg ed interr og ation te c hn iqu e s and

c on dit ion s o f his c on fi ne me nt we re un jus tif ie d by any le g iti mate g ov e rnme nt i nte re st and we re so e x treme a s to shoc k the conscie nce is a question addre ssed to a stag e of litig ation when the Court can pr operly

consider suc h evidenc e. 9/ Second and alter

natively , as to Doe’ s theory of Rumsfeld’s alleg ed “de liberate indiffer ence ” to Doe’s substantive due proce ss r ights, the Supreme Court ha s held that to maintain a constitutional due proc ess claims for

deliberate indiffer ence , plaintiffs must show “someth i n g more than neg li gen ce b u t less than intentional conduct.” Sa c ra me nto , 523 U.S. at 849 (interna l quotations omi tte d)
. In p art

to d ist inguis h “ de lib e ra

te ind if fe re nc e ” c la ims fr om m or e wi de ly ava ila ble lia bil ity under c ommon tort law, this lower “deliber ate indiffe renc e” sta ndard is appr opriate only

in limi ted circ umstances whe re a

n officia l’s d el i berate indiffer ence may rea ch the “ point of the conscie nce shocking .” Sa c ra me nto , 523 U.S. at 849 . Such circ umstances a re pr esent whe re the g overnme nt “has a heig htened oblig ation toward the individual,” such as when it has taken a person into custodyCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-3 2- and has thus assumed a

corr espondingduty

of “r esponsibility

for his safe ty and g ener al well-be ing.” Bute ra v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 235 F.3d 637, 651- 52 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (q u o t i n g Sa c ra me nto , 523 U.S. at 851 ). Thoug h Doe say s that Rumsfeld may be held liable f or deliber ate indiffe renc e bec ause he had “ample oppor

tunity t o co n s i d er ( and re consider) the conse quence s of his actions,” [ Doc. 29 at 47 (c i t i n g Sa c ra me nto , 523 U.S. at 854 )], “ [t]he op po rt un ity fo r de lib e ra

tio n a lon e is no t su ff

ic ie nt t o apply the lower

[deliberate indiffe ren ce ] t hreshold to substantive due pr ocess c laims.” Frate rn al O rd e r o f P o li c e D e

p t. o f C o rr . La b o r

Co m m . v . W

illiams , 375 F.3d 1141, 1146 ( D.C. Cir. 2006)
. On its ow n , t h e m er e opportunity to deliberate or re consider doe s not present the “ limit ed
c ir c ums tanc e s” ne c e ssa

ry to s up po rt

fi nd ing c on sc ie nc e -s ho c kin g de lib e rate ind if fe re nc e . Do e a lso alleg es, h o weve r, that he suf fer ed the mistreatment while he wa s detained a nd interrog ated in the g overnme nt’s phy sical custody . The fa ct of that c ustody , wher e Doe say s the g overnme nt exercised complete c ontrol over his liberty , can sufficie ntly prese nt the “spec ial circ umstances” under which a g overnme nt official’ s “deliber ate indiffere nce . . . can be t ruly shocking .” Bu te ra , 235 F.3d at 652 (quotations omitted). Moreove r, this c ase does not call for de liberate indiffer ence liability based on g overnme nt
a c ti o nta k e nq u ic k ly to r e s to r e o r d e r

o r s e c ur it y , f o r w h ic hc o urts h av e ty

p ic a ll y d e c li n e d to r e c o g n iz e conscie nce- shocking conduct. See Sa c ra me nto , 523 U.S. at 852-533 (deliber ate indiffe renc e inappropriate in ci rc u m s t ances like a prison riot or police chase , wher e an of fice r must make decisions “in haste ” to re store and ma intain lawful orde r). I t does not appea r fr om Doe’s c omplaint that the detention or inter rog ation techniques use d on him were implemented to quell violence or restore order within Camp Cropper. And t houg h Rumsfeld say s he face d weig hty obligations whenCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-3 3- prosec uting t h e war in Iraq, he has not prese nted (a nd the Court at this stage cannot c onsider)
e vid e nc e be y on d h is o wn

c on te nti on s o f c omp e tin g c on sid e ratio ns that be ar o n h is a lle g e d c on du c t. See [ Doc. 11 at 49 (d e sc ri bin g mil ita ry ’s “ dif fi c ult , d ang e ro us , a

nd de a dly” ta sk s to su

pp re ss ins ur g e nc y , tr a in I ra qi fo rc e s, a ssi st in I ra q’ s r e c on str uc tio n, and

g a the r i nte lli g e nc e ); Doc. 33 at 41
. ] Fr om the fac e of the complaint, it is not appar ent that Rumsfeld fac ed a choice betwee n competing obligations. Cf. Benzman v . W hitman , 523 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2008) (d ism iss ingde lib e rate indiffer ence claim bec ause a lleg ati o n s i n plaintiff’s complaint show de fenda nt fac ed compe ting
c on sid e ratio ns ). At

thi s st a g e of

lit ig ati on , an d g ive n D oe ’s a lle g a tio ns that Rumsf e ld c are fu lly evaluated his detenti o n an dinterrog ation policies rathe r than makingsplit-second dec isions, see Sa c ra me nto , 523 U.S. at 853 (noting that deliberate i ndiffer ence liability is most appropriate whe re officia ls have the c han ce for re peate d ref lection or whe re “ extended opportunities to do better ar e teamed with pr otrac ted failure even to c are ”), the Court f inds that D oe has adequately al l eg ed Rum sf e ld’ s d e lib e rate ind if

fe re nc e to h is s ub sta

nti ve du e pr oc e ss r ig ht. Do e ’s a lle g a tio ns a de qu a te ly state his subst anti ve du e pr oc e ss c la im e ve n w he n v ie we d in the c on te xt of

lif e a t Camp C ro pp e r. Rum sf eld reas on s th a t, a g a ins t th e da ng e ro us and

vo latil e conditions in I raq, Doe’ s conditions of confine ment cannot fairly be said to shock the consc ience
. [ Doc. 11 at 50-51 .] B ut D oe ba se s h is c la im n ot o n a ny ro ug h o r d ang e ro us c on dit ion s inhe re nt t o l i fe i n I ra q , but rather

on actions take n ag ainst him that he say s amounted to phy sical and ps y c ho log ic a l abu se . Th ou g h co nd uc t that shoc ks the c on sc ie nc e in o ne c on te xt may no t do so in another , see Sa c ra me nto , 523 U. S
. at 850 ; Nor ris , 737 F.2d at 1152 , the Court finds that Doe’ s cumulative alleg ations of mistreatment are sufficie nt at this stag e to state a plausible substantive due proce ss claim based on his dete ntion at Camp Cropper.Case No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

T he C o urt no t es D o e’s ob je cti o n that R um sf eld d i d no t ad d ress thi s p ro ng o f his q ua l i f

i ed i m m un i t y de f

en se 10/ i n a n y de t a i l i n i t s i n i t i a l mo t i on t o di s mi s s , of f e r i n g a r g u me n t on l y u po n h i s r e pl y . [ D oc . 29 a t 49
. ] T h e r e ma y be s om e aut hor i t y f

or r ej ect i ng t hi s ar gu ment as wai ved

. See A. J. M cNul t y & Co. v. Sec ’

y of Labor , 2 8 3 F .3 d 3 2 8 , 3 3 8 (D .C . C ir. 2002) (ci t i ng M cB r i de v. M er r ell D ow and P ha r m s . , I nc. , 800 F. 2d 1208, 1211 ( D
. C. Ci r . 1986) ( “ C ons i deri ng an argum ent ad vanced f

o r t he f i rs t t i m e i n a repl y bri ef
. . . ent ai l s t he ri sk o f

an i m p rovident o r i l l

- ad vi sed op i ni o n o n t he le g a l is s u e s te n d e re d .” (in te rn a l cita tio n s o m itt e d )) ). H o w e v e r, b e c a u se the C o u rt fi n d s in a n y c a se tha t R u m sfe ld ’s qual i f i ed i mm un i t y def

ens e f ai l s un der ei t her prong of t he S a u cier t est , and be cause D o e hi m sel f ad d res ses t hi s p rong i n hi s op po s i t i on t o Rumsf el d’ s mo t i on, t he C our t cons i ders and r ej ect s R ums f el d’ s ar gu ment t hat t he al l ege dl y vi ol at ed c o n stitutio n a l righ ts w e re no t cle a rly e sta b lishe d
. -3 4- Ac c or din g ly , thr ou g h fa c tua l a lle g a tio ns su g g e sti ngRum sf e ld’ s inte nt t o in

jur e or de lib e rate ind if fe re nc e to t

he c on dit ion s o f D oe ’s c on fi ne me nt, Do e ha s a de qu a te ly ple a de d a vio latio n of

his substantive due proc ess rig ht by alleg ing c onduct that shocks the c onscienc e. 2. Clearly Established In addition to consideringwhether Doe’ s al l ega tions could show the violation of a
c on sti tut ion a l ri g ht, thi s Court mus t de te rm ine wh e the r that c on sti tut ion a l ri g ht was “cl e arl y established” at the time and in the contex t of the c omplained-of c onduct. Saucier , 533 U.S. at 201- 0 2
. Rumsfeld argues t hat at the time and plac e of D oe’s de tention, the scope of Doe’ s substantive due proc ess rig hts were far from settled a

nd, acc ording ly , that a re asonable officia l in Rum sfeld’s position would not have known the alleg ed misconduct to violate the Constitution. 10/ I t has long been held that United States citizens are e ntitled to constit utional protections eve n when a broad. Re id v . Co v e rt , 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (re jecting“the idea that when the United States acts a g ainst citiz ens abr oad it can do so fre e of the Bill of R ights” and finding established the conce pt th a t “ th e s h ie ld

w h ic hth e B il l o f

Rig hts and oth e r

p arts o f th e Co n s ti tuti o np r o v id e to p r o te c t [ a citizen’s] life and liber

ty should not be stripped awa y just because he happe ns to be in another land.”) . I t was also cl ea rl y established by

the time of Rumsfeld’s alleg ed conduc t that pretrial detainee s enjoy

fundame ntal constitutional rights. See, e .g. , W olf ish , 441 U.S. at 545 (“[P] retria l detainee s, who have not be en convic ted of a ny crimes, r etain at le as t those constitutional rights thatCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-3 5- we have held are enjoy ed by convicted prisoners.” (emphasis added)). The ac tions alleg ed in Doe’ s
c omp la int , if

tr ue , w ou ld b e un c on sti tut ion a l if take n a g a ins t a c iti zen de ta ine d in

the Un ite d St a te s; that Doe’ s detention took pla ce abroa d does not itself rende r his constitutional right to be f ree from such conduc t unsettled. Ag a ins t th i s b a c k dr o p o f g e n e r a l i z e d

r i g h t s , D o e ’ s s u

b s t an t i v e d

u e p r o c e s s r i g h t s mu st additionally

be cle arly

established “in light of the spec ific conte x t of the ca se.” Saucier , 533 U.S. at 201
. As indicated, Doe say s that he wa s seized away from the battlefield and while he was prepa ring to le ave Iraq, presumptively for the United States. [ Doc. 4 at 14 .] Rumsfeld contends that be c a us e no c ourt a t the tim e ha d he ld that a c iti zen e njo y s “ any constitutional rights whe n detained by Americ an military

forc es on a fore ign battlefield pending an initi al status deter mination,” [ Doc. 33 at 45 (empha sis in original)], Doe’ s constit u t i o nal rig hts at Camp Cropper c annot have been clea rly established. Cert ai n ly , this Court m ust evaluate whether the alleg edly

violated constitutional right wa s
c le arl y e sta bli sh e d in

a c on te xt spe c if

ic e no ug h to be me anin g fu l to the pr e se nt a na ly sis and

to
war rant holdinga re asonable fede ral off icial liable for

violating the r ight. But the Court ne ed not
re qu ir e pr e vio us de c laratio ns that th e c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht e xiste d in ide nti c a l f

a c tua l c ir c ums tanc e s. Hope v . Pelzer , 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) ( n o t i n g th a t“ o f f i c i a l s c ans t i l l b e o nn o t i c e t h a tt he ir
c on du c t vi olate s e sta

bli sh e d la w e ve n in no ve l f a c tua l c ir c ums tanc e s” ); s e e, e.g. , United States v. Lanier , 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) (“The re ha s never been a . . . case ac cusi ng welfa

re of ficials of
se lli ngfo ste r c hil dr e n into s lave ry ; it do e s n ot f

oll owthat if

su c h a c a se aro se , the of

fi c ia ls w ou ld be immune from damag es.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Where pr eexisti ng law would dictate to a rea sonable off icial that his conduct is unconstitutional, even if pr ior ca se law ha sCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

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-3 6- not expl icitly

addre s s edi d en t i ca l ci rc u m s t an ce s , th e u n co n s t i tu t i o n al i ty o f t h atco n d

u ct m ay be found clea rly established. Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (“The contours of the rig ht must be sufficiently clea

r that a re asonable officia l would understand that what he is doing violate s that rig ht. This is not to say that an official action is protec ted by qualified im munity unless the ver y action in question has previously been he ld unlawful, but it is to s ay that in the light of pr e-e x isting law the un lawf

uln e ss mus t be a

pp are nt. ” (c itatio ns om it ted )) ; se e als o J oh ns on v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 528 F.3d 969, 976 ( D.C. Cir. 2008) (same)
. Al tho ug h th e fact ual se tti ngof Do e ’s de te nti on

may no t ha ve re pli c a te d th e c on te xts addre ssed by

prior ca se-law , the Court finds no convincingrea son that United States citizens in I raq should or must lose previously -dec lare d substantive due proc ess protec tio n s duringprolong ed detention in a conflict zone a broad. Dra

wing from the f

actua l alleg ations in Doe’s c omplaint, there is l itt le that r e nd e rs Camp C ro pp e r s o d ist inc t f ro m othe r co nte xts tha t th e e xtent of c on sti tut ion a lly permissible treatment of detaine es and c onditions of confinement c ould not be clea r there. The stakes in holding de tainees at Camp Cropper may have be en hi gh , but one purpose of the constitutional li mitations on i nterrog ation techniques a nd conditions of con fi n em ent (e ven domestically

) is to strike a bala

nce betwee n g overnme nt objectives a nd individual rights eve n when the stakes a

re hig h. In light of law decla ring unconstitutional c onduct or conditions of confine ment that shock the c onscienc e, as well as clearly established law r ecognizi ng constitutional protections ag ainst cer

tain g overnme nt action for United States citiz ens abr oad, the Court finds that Doe ha s set fo rt h f a c ts that if

tr ue c ou ld s ho w the vio latio n o f a c le arl y e sta bli sh e d c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht. The outcome of this analy sis is not altere d by the D.C. Circuit’s rec ent findi ng that was it not clea rly established in 2004 (a

bout the time of Doe’ s detention) whether the Fifth Ame ndment appliesCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-3 7- “to aliens held in I raq a

nd Afg hanistan.” Mohamme d , 2011 WL2462851, at *4
. De sp ite dic ta in the Mohamme d court’s opinion that “no c ourt has held any constitutional rig ht a pplies” in Iraq a

nd Afg hanistan, id. , Mohamme d ’s a n al y sis was confine d to the protec tions afforde d aliens by the extraterritorial r eac h of the Constituti on. On the contr ary , it has long be en held that United States citizens enjoy

constitutional protections whether at home or a b ro ad. “Clearly , a plaintiff’ s citizenship often g oes a longway in determiningthe scope of ava ilable constitutional protections.” Vance , 694 F. Supp. 2d at 969
. The Court thus finds, under the circ umstances alleg ed, that a rea sonable fede ral o ff i cial would have understood conscience -shockingphy sical and psycholog ical mistreatment—including temperature, slee p, food, and lig ht manipulation—of a United States citizen detainee to violate the de ta ine e ’s c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o s ub sta nti ve du e pr oc e ss. Ac c or din g ly , Rumsf e ld i s n ot e nti tle d to qu a lif ie d immun ity

fr om D oe ’s su

bs tanti ve du e pr oc e ss c la im. C. Pro c e du ra l D uePr oc ess Rum sf e ld a lso mov e s to dis mis s, on g ro un ds of qu a lif ie d immun ity , th e c la im that Rumsf e ld violated Doe’ s Fifth Amendment proce dural due proce ss rig hts by approvingprac tices and policie s th atp re v en t edDo e f

ro mch al l en gi n g h i s “e n em y co mb at an t ” o r “s ec uri ty i n t ern ee ” s t at u s th ro u gh fair pr ocedur es. [ Doc. 4 at 43
. ] Doe e ssential l y

makes two proc edura l due proc ess ar g uments. First, Doe alleg es that the pr oc e ss a ff

or de d h im at hi s tw o de ta ine e status he ari ng s f a ile d to me e t th e c on sti tut ion a l mi nim ums established by

the Supreme Cour t’s decision in Ha md i v . R um sfe ld
. 542 U.S. 507 (holding that proce dural due proce ss require s citiz en deta inee be g iven notice of and opportunity

to contest the fac tual basis for his dete ntion before a neutr al adjudicator). Specif ically , Doe say s he wa s deniedCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-3 8- notice of the fac tual basis for his desig nation, the opportunity to challeng e that basis bef ore a neutra l decision-make r, and a cce ss to evidence and witnesses. [ Do c. 4 at 4 3 -44 .] S econd, D oe make s an equal pr otection ar g ument: Doe say s the m ilitary denied him the rig orous due pr ocess pr otections it otherwise af

forde d Americ an milita ry personne l who wer e alleg ed to have committed simi lar misconduct. [ Doc. 4 at 22 .] To thi s end, Doe contends that proc edura l rig hts under the Unif orm Code of Military

J ustic e we re rout inely

made available to Amer ican soldiers in B ag hdad and that no leg itimate gove rnmental intere st justifies withholdi ng those same r ights fr om civilians like Doe. [ Doc. 4 at 28-29
. ] Be cause , as pre viously

discussed, Doe has not alleg ed suff icient fa cts to support Rumsfeld’s pe rs on a l i nv o l v e m e nt

i n t h e s e a lle g e d c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio ns , b oth of Do e ’s pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss claims fail. Wit hout a dequate alleg ations of Rumsfeld’s involvement in the complained- of violations, Doe ca

nnot maintain a claim ag ainst Rumsfeld.

D. Ac c ess to Co ur ts F ina lly , Rumsf

e ld m ov e s to dis mis s D oe’s las t cla im, wh ic h a sse rt s a de nia l of a c c e ss t o courts. See Lewis v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996) (p ri so ne rs have a c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht o f a c c e ss to courts). Doe alleg es that the policies a uthorized by

Rumsfeld preve nted Do e fr om challeng ing the basis for a

nd enjoining the conditions of his detention in court. [ Doc. 4 at 30 .] D oe pr e mis e s h is
acc ess to court c laim on two gr ounds. First, he a lleg es a de nial of the rig h t to petition for habea s corpus. [ Doc. 4 at 47 .] S econd, D oe alleg es a se parate, bac kwar ds-looking “ rig ht of ac cess to a c ourt to enjoin the torture that wa s inflicted upon him.” [ Doc. 29 at 67
. ] Be cause Doe has not sufficie ntly pleade d that Rumsfeld was pe rsonally involved in cra fting policies that preve nted detaine es’ a cce ss to courts or wa s deliberately indiffer ent to the def

icientCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-3 9- enfor ceme nt of policies providingacc ess to courts, [ Doc. 4 at 47 ], Doe cannot ove rcome Rumsfeld’s qu a lif ie d immun ity

de fe ns e to t

his de nia l- of

-a c c e ss c la im. Moreove r, Doe’s alleg ations of a de nial of ac cess to enjoin the c onditions of his detention ultimately fail, as Doe’ s reque sted relief under this claim mer ely duplicates the r elief soug ht under his su bs tanti ve du e pr oc e ss cl a im. To ple a d the vio latio n of a co ns tit uti on a l r ig ht t o a c c e ss t o c ourt s,
a pla int if f mus t alle g e : (1) the los s o f “ a no nf ri vo lou s, argua

ble un de rl yingc la im” ; ( 2) “ of fi c ia l a c ts frustrating the litigation” of that claim; and (3) “a r emedy that could not be obtained on a n exis ting claim.” Chr istop he r v . H

arbu ry , 536 U.S. 403, 415-21 (2002) ; Broudy v. M ather , 460 F.3d 106, 118- 20 (D.C. C i r. 2 006) . These r equire ments ensure that plaintiffs ca nnot simpl y

tack on a denial-of

acc ess charac terization in order to liti g ate f rivolous or duplicative c laims. Ha rb ur y , 536 U.S. at 415
. The Supreme Court has held that b ec au s e denia l-of-a cce ss claims must seek “re lief unobtainable in other

suits, the remedy

soug ht must i tself be identifie d to hedg e ag ainst the risk that
an ac cess c laim be tried a ll the way throug h, only

to find that the court can awa rd no reme dy that the plaintiff could not have be en aw arde d on a pre sently exis ting c laim.” 536 U.S. at 416 . I n pleading
an ac cess c laim, a plaintiff must theref ore “ descr ibe any

reme dy available under the acc ess claim and prese ntly unique to it.” Id. at 417-18
. Do e ’s de nia l- of

-a c c e ss c la im e xplic itl y

ide nti fi e s and

se e ks on ly

mon e t a r y dama g e s and

fe e s,
re lie f o the rw ise ava ila

ble un de r h is s ub sta

nti ve du e pr oc e ss Bivens claim. Doe c laims that, but for the de nia l of

his a c c e ss t o c ourt s, “ he c ou ld h ave c ha lle ng e d [hi s] to rt ur ou s mistr e a tme nt” a t Camp Cropper. [ Doc. 4 at 48 .] As re l i ef , Doe de mands damag es, costs and f ees, a nd “any and all other relief to which he may

appea r entitled.” [ Doc. 4 at 49 .] Beca use Doe has no t d es cr i b ed to any
me anin g fu l de g re e re lie f d ist inc t f ro m th a t so ug ht u

nd e r his pr e se nt su

bs tanti ve du e pr oc e ss c la im,Case No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-4 0- he c ann ot m a int a in a se pa rate a c c e ss to c ourt s c la im pr e mis e d on a c ha lle ng e to t he c on dit ion s o f h is confine ment. Th e Court

thu s g ra nts Rum sf

e ld’ s mo tio n to dis mis s D oe ’s c la im that he wa s d e nie d a c c e ss to courts to bringa habe as petition and to cha lleng e the c onditions of his detention. VI. Seized P roperty Doe ne x t bring s two claims ag ainst Defe ndants Napolitano, Muelle r, Be rsin, and Morton,
a c t i n g i n th e i r o f

f i c i a l c a p a c i t i e s an d

un d e r c o l o r o f l aw . D o e s e e k s th e r e tur no f p r o p e rty h e s ays the g overnme nt unconstituti onally seized; he also complains that the g ove r nme nt h a s denied his rig ht to international trave l. [ Doc. 4 at 64-66
. ] Withre g ard

to D oe ’s re tur

n o f s e ize d p ro pe rt

y c la im, the g ov e rnme nt m ov e s to dis mis s th is claim both for lac k of s u b j ect matter

jurisdiction, under Rule 12(b)( 1), and f or fa ilure to state a
c la im, un de r R

ule 12 (b )( 6) . T he g ov e rnme nt say s Doe f a ils to s ho w that hi s c la im d oe s n ot f a ll under a n exception to the A dminist rative Proc edure Act’s wa iver of sove reig n immunit y and in any
case does not cha lleng e a f inal, judicially

revie wable, a g ency

action. [ Doc. 14
. ] The Court notes that althoug h the United States moves to dismiss D o e’ s claim in part on jurisdictional g rounds under Rule 12(b)( 1), the Administrative Proce dure A ct (“ APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. , “is not a jurisdiction-confe rring statute.” Oryszak v . Sullivan , 576 F.3d 522, 524 ( D.C. Cir. 2009) (q u o t i n g Tru de au v . F .T. C. , 456 F.3d 178, 183 ( D.C. Cir. 2006) ). Th e Court ha s su bje c tmatter jurisdiction over this cla im under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (gra nti ng “ or ig ina l jur isd ic tio n of a ll c ivi l
a c tio ns ari sin g un de r t

he Con stitut ion , la

ws , o r t re a tie s o f t

he Un ite d St a te s” ), wh ic h “ c on fe r[s ] jurisdiction on feder al cour ts to revie w ag ency

action.” Id. at 524-25 (q u o t i n g Cal ifa no v . S an de rs , 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977) ) ( ci t i n g Chr y sle r Co rp . v . B ro wn , 441 U.S. 281, 317 n.47 (1979) and Ass’nCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

D oe does n ot pu r por t t o ba s e h i s c l ai m on any c o nst i t u t i on al or s t at u t or y a u t h or i t y r equ i r i n g t h e r et u r n of

11/ sei zed pro p ert y unde r t he ci rcum sta n c e s p res ent here. M o reove r, D o e ap p rop ri at el y charact eri zes hi s cl ai m as o ne ch al l en g i n g a n a g en cy a ct i on , r at h er t h an a n a g en cy ’ s f ai l u r e t o ac t
. Acc or di n g l y , t h e g ov er n men t ’ s ar g u men t t h at D oe i s l i m i t ed t o ch all en ging a n a ge nc y’ s f ail ure t o t ak e a n a cti o n that t he ag en cy i s r equi r ed to tak e , [ D o c. 3 4 a t 18 ], is m isp la c e d
. See Nort on v. S. U t ah Wi l der nes s A l l i an ce , 542 U
. S. 55, 63 ( 2004) ( “ [ T ] h e on l y a g en cy a ct i on t h at c an be c o m p e lled un d e r th e A P A is ac tio n leg a lly r equi r ed .” ); i d. a t 64 (n o ting tha t a p la intiff m u st “a sse rt tha t an a g e n c y f ai l ed t o t ake a d i scr et e agency act i o n t hat i t i s requir ed t o t ake. ” (emp hasi s ad d ed ))
. -4 1- of N at’ l A dv e rti

se rs v . F .T. C. , 617 F.2d 611, 61 9 (D
. C
. C i r. 1979) ) (a lteration in orig inal). Acc ording ly , a plaintiff whose challeng e fa ils to m eet or co m ply with the APA’s judicial re view provisio n s, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701

– 706 , h a s si mpl y fa ile d to state a

c la im; the Court

ha s n ot l os t ju r isdic tion. See id. at 525 (that the APA is not jurisdictional “applies with equa l force ” to the APA ’s pr ov isi on e xclu din g re vie w of “ a g e nc y a c tio n c omm itt e d to a g e nc y dis c re tio n b y

law” a s to its provision l imiti ng judicial revie w to “fina l ag ency action,” be cause both “limit[ ] t he ca use of action provide d by the APA.”) . The Court thus considers the g overnme nt’s motion to di smiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
. In g e n er al , th e j u d i ci al re v i ew p ro v i s i o n s o f t h e A P A w ai v e t h e U n i t edS t at es ’ s o v er ei gn immun ity fo r non -m on e tary su its c ha lle ng ing a fi na l fe de ra l ag e nc y a c tio n o r a

n a g e nc y ’s fa ilure to take leg ally -re quired ag ency action. As a threshold matter, the APA provides that “[a]ge ncy action
ma de re vie wa

ble by statut e and

fi na l a g e nc y

a c tio n f or wh ic h th e re is n o oth e r a de qu a te re me dy in
a co u rt are subject to judicial revie w.” 5 U.S.C. § 704
. H e r e , b e c a u s e D o e c h a ll e n g e s ana g e n cy action—the g overnme nt’s denial of his re quest for the return of his property

—direc tly

under the A P A , h i s c l a i mf

a l l s un d e r th e A P A ’ s s e c o n d

( “ n o o th e r

a d e qu a t e r e m e dy” ) c a t e g o r y. 11/ The APA de fines “ag ency action” expansively to include “the whole or a part of an ag ency rule, orde r, license , sanction, re lief, or the equivalent or denia l thereof .” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) . At the same ti me, t he APA permits challeng es only to “ag ency

action” that is “final.” “ The Supreme CourtCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-4 2- has explained that to be ‘f in al,’ an ag ency

action must ‘mark the consummation of the ag ency ’s decisi o n ma

k in g p r o c e s s , an d

mu s t e it

h e r d e te r mi n e r igh ts o r

o b li g a ti o n s o r

o c c a s io nle g al conseque nces.’ ” Friends of The Earth, Bluewater Netw o rk Di v. v. United States Dept. of the Interior , 478 F. Supp. 2d 11, 23 (D.D .C. 2007) (q u o t i n g Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA , 540 U.S. 461, 482 (2004) ). In oth e r wo rd s, the a g e nc y ’s de c isi on -m akin g pr oc e ss m us t c ulm inate in the c ha lle ng e d a g e nc y a c tio n and that c ha lle ng e d a c tio n mus t have “ an a c tua l or i mmed iate ly threatened e ffe ct.” Lujan v. Nat’l W ildlif e Fe d’n , 497 U.S. 871, 894 (1990)
. The g overnme nt corre ctly points out t hat Doe has not sufficiently pleade d that he cha lleng ed a discre te, final a g ency

action, as r equire d to bring suit under the APA. [ Doc. 14 at 15-17 .] Doe’s complaint say s that Doe pe titioned the United States Army for the r eturn of c erta in property taken fr o m h i m d

ur i n g h i s ar

r e s t an d d e t e n t i o n a t C amp C r o p p e r , th a t th e U n i t e d S t a t e s re fu se d th is p et ition, and that, as a re sult, Doe has not bee n able to ac cess the se ized property . [ D o c . 4 at 66
. ] Th ro ug h the s e f

a c tu a l a l l e g a t i o n s , D o e h a s s u f f i c i e n t l y i d e n t i f i e d a d i s c r e t e a g e n c y

a c t i o nan d

i ts actua l effe ct, but he has not plea ded any fac tual alleg ations that would support even a n infere nce that the g ov e rnme nt’ s re fu sa l wa s a “f ina l ag e nc y a c tio n” or the outc ome of any de c isi on makin g pr oc e ss. Doe of fer s only his own leg al conc lusion that “[t] he United States’ rulingon this matter constitutes final ag ency

action under

the Administrative Proce dure A ct . . . .” [ Doc. 4 at 66 .] W ithout any
a c c omp anyingfa c tua l a lle g a tio ns —d e sc ri bin g , f or e xamp le , in

wh a t f or m D oe ma de his pe tit ion

to th e A r my , if D o e r e p e a te d ly p e ti ti o n e d th e g o v e r n me n t, o r th e d e ta il s o f th e U n it e d St a te s’ or the Arm y ’ s r e s p o n s e t o s u c hp e t i t i o n
—th i s c o n c l u s o r

y a s s e r t i o na l o n e i s i n s u f

f i c i e n tt o s t a t e a

c la im challeng ing “ final ag ency action” unde r the APA. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct . 19 3 7 at 1949 ; cf. Vancev. Ru ms fe ld , N o . 0 6

- CV

- 6 9 6 4 , 2 0 0 9 WL 2 2 5 2 2 5 8 , a t * 5 (N
. D
. I ll
. Ju ly 2 9 , 2 0 0 9) (f

i n d ing f actua lCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

T he U ni t ed Stat es say s o nl y t hat t he so- cal l ed “ m i l i t ary aut ho ri t y excep t i o n” b ars revi ew o f D o e’ s cl ai m . I t 12/ d o e s n o t ar g u e tha t a n y o the r ex c e p tio n to the A P A ’s ge n e ra l wa ive r o f so v e re ign im m u n ity a p p lies. See , e . g. , 5 U .S .C
. § 70 1(a) (precl ud i ng judi ci al revi ew und er t he A P A o f “agency act i o n [t hat ] i s co m m i t t ed t o agency d i scr et i o n by l aw.”)
.

T ho ugh D o e d o es not co nt est t hat t he m i l i t ary aut ho ri t y excep t i o n wo ul d l i kel y preclude chall enges t o t he 13/ sei zure of hi s p rop ert y , D o e al so cl ari f i es t hat hi s chal l enge i s no t t o t he i ni t i al sei zure o f hi s p rop ert y , b ut rat her t o t he “U n ited S ta te s’ d e c isio n no t t o r e tur n [ the p ro p e rty] w h e n a sk e d to d o so ” ye a rs a fter it s se iz u re . [ D oc. 20 a t 14
. ] T he C o urt notes t hat i t i s uncl ear f rom t he reco rd where D o e’ s p rop ert y was hel d , a nd und er wha t a ut ho ri t y , a t t he t i m e t he g ov er n men t a l l eg edl y r ef u s ed t o r et u r n i t , s u g g es t i n g t h at D oe’ s c h al l en g e t o t h e r et en t i on of h i s pr oper t y w ou l d n ot be c a te g o ric a lly p re c lud e d b y the m ili ta ry a u tho rity ex c e p tio n . T h e go v e rn m e n t’s ar g u m e n t t h a t p ro p e rty re te n tio n c a n n o t b e d isting u ish e d fro m p ro p e rty se iz u re , [ D o c . 3 4 a t 5 ] , woul d hav e t he C our t dra w a cat egor i cal l i ne, un s uppo r t ed by l egi s l at i ve hi s t ory or cont r ol l i ng cas e l aw, t o avoi d what sh o u ld b e a c a se -sp e c ifi c inq u iry. See R osner v. Uni t ed St at es , N o . 0 1 -C V -1 8 5 9 , 2 0 0 2 W L 3 1 9 5 4 4 5 3 , a t *3 (S .D . F la
. N ov . 26, 2002) (f

i nd i ng t hat “ [d]i scovery o n [t he m i l i t ary aut ho ri t y excep t i o n’ s ap p l i cab i l i t y ] i s cri t i cal be cause of t he f act
- i nt ensi ve nat ure of

t hi s i nq ui ry necess ary t o pe rmit t he C o urt t o de t erm i ne i f i t has juri sdi ct i o n ove r t he no n- m o net ary c la im s.” ); I

d. ( not i ng a l ack of

l egi s l at i ve hi s t ory an d cas e l aw on t he mi l i t ar y au t hor i t y ex cept i on)
. T he C our t not es t hat t here ma y be s o m e scenari o s i n whi ch t he f ai l ure to r e turn p rop ert y i s co ncep t ual l y and f unct i o nal l y dis t i nct f

rom t he ori gi nal deci s i on t o s ei ze i t
. K eepi ng i n mi nd t he mi l i t ar y aut hor i t y ex cept i on’ s l i mi t ed pur po s e of i ns ul at i ng onl y war fun c tio n s o r w a rtim e d e c isio n s fro m ju d ic ia l re v ie w , t h is d istinc tio n c o u ld b e im p o rta n t. -4 3- a l l e g a t i o n s th a tA r

m y r e f u s e d t o r e tur ns e i z e d p r o p e rty and that the Depar t m ent of J ustice stated “that the g overnme nt does not intend to return a ny of their pr operty” a suf

ficient c halleng e to “f

inal ag ency action”)
. The g overnme nt also argues that the “ milit ary authorit y ex ce ption” to the APA’s judicial
re vie w p ro vis ion s b ars Do e ’s c la im. [ 12/ Doc. 14 at 12-14 .] The APA excludes from its provisions judicial revie w of a

ny “military authority exercised in the field in time or war or in occupied te rritory . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)( G)
. This exception applies to “m i l i t ar y co m mands made in c ombat zones or in prepa

ration for , or in the af

t er math of, battle.” Doe v . Sullivan , 938 F.2d 1370, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1991) . Be cause , irrespe ctive of the milit ary authority except i o n ’s ap plication to Doe’s claim, this Court finds that Doe has not a dequate ly pleade d that he challeng es a final ag ency action, the Court does not dec ide this issue. 13/ Acc ording ly , the Court g rants the g overnme nt’s motion t o d i s m i ss Doe’s r eturn of se ized pr op e rt y fo r f a ilure to s tate a

c la im und e r t

he APA
. Ho we ve r, the Court pe rm its Do e to a me nd hisCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-4 4- complaint t o as s er t fac tual alleg ations supporting a rea sonable infe renc e that the g overnme nt’s ref usal to return his pr operty was a “f inal ag ency

action,” if

such alleg ations may

be plea ded in g ood faith. VII. Right to Travel In addition, the g overnme nt asks the Court to order a more definite statement of Doe ’s rig ht to travel claim. Doe alleg es that the g overnme nt “denied a nd unfairly

burdene d [Doe’s] ex erc ise of his right of

international tra

vel in violation of his constitut i onal rig hts.” [ Doc. 4 at 64 .] I n support of that cla im, Doe say s that he has be en plac ed on a te rror ist watch list, wh i ch ca u s es hi m to be detained a

nd sear ched ever

y time he returns to the United States fr om international trave l. [ Doc. 4 at 25 .] Doe adds that his requests to be r emoved f rom the watch list have bee n denied. [ Do c . 4 a t 2 6
. ] Th e g ov e rnme nt c on te nd s that the se a lle g a tio ns are so va g ue that it can no t r eas on a bly respond to Doe ’s rig ht to travel cla im. [ Doc. 14 ; Doc. 34 .] According ly , the g overnme nt argues, the Court should require Doe to identify the jurisdictional basis for his cla im, the particular provisions of the Con sti tut ion he a lle g e s we re vio late d, and the pr e c ise natur e of the inj un c tiv e re lie f h e se e ks
. [ Doc. 14 at 18
. ] Be cause , howeve r, Doe ’s complaint meet s t h e l i bera l pleadingrequire ments of Rule 8, g rantingthe g overnme nt’s mot i o n wo u l d amount to requiringsomething more particula r than “ a short and plain stateme nt” of the pla inti ff’s claim. Fe d. R. Civ. P . 8(a) . Rule 8 require s only that
a pla int if f p le a d f a c ts sup po rt ing his c la im; it doe s not de mand that he expl ic itl y name the le g a l ba sis for this claim. Id. ; Kri e

ge r v . F ad e ly , 211 F.3d 134, 136 ( D.C. Cir. 2000)
. Do e ’s fa ilure to spe c if

y the ve hic le , jur isd ic tio na l or oth e rw ise , for his ri g ht to tra ve l c la imCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

T he gover nment makes much of D oe’ s s t at ement t hat he s eek s r emedy f or v i ol at i ons of

hi s righ t t o t r ave l 14/

“ onl y un der t he C ons t i t ut i on. ” [ D oc. 4 a t 65 .] T h e y a rg u e that t hi s p recl ud es D o e f rom bri ngi ng t hi s cl ai m unde r t he A P A
. W hi l e t hi s ar gu ment i s ce r t ai nl y appropri at e f or a mo t i on t o di s mi s s or f or s ummary j udgment , i t do es not r ender D o e ’s co m p la int im p e rm issib ly va g u e . -4 5- does not make this claim unansw era ble. The g overnme nt does not challeng e Doe’s contention that the Court may

exercise jurisdiction over this claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . Moreove r, for plaintiffs “suff eringleg al wrongbeca

use of age n cy

action,” the APA permits “re lief other tha n money d am a g e s ” a g a i n s tth e U n i t e d S t a t e s , o r a g a i n s t g o v e r

n m e n t o f f i c e r s a c t i n g i nth e i r

o f f i c i a l c a p a c i ty. 5 U.S.C. § 702 ; 5 U. S .C . § 70 6(2 )(B)
. H e r e , D o e a ll e g e s th a t g o v e r n me n t o f f ic e r s , a c ting under color of la

w, violated his constitutional rights. He also seeks injunctiv e re lief to preve nt further constitutional viol ations and identifies an ag ency action—the de nial of his petitions to be removed from the watch list—related to these violations. [ Doc. 4 at 25-26, 64-65 .] Havingpleade d this factual basis, Doe’ s failure to cite to the APA is not fatal to his claim. 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fe dera l Practice and Proce dure § 1206 (3d ed. 2004) (A“ dis tr ict court may su sta in jurisdiction when an e x amination of the e ntire complaint reve als a proper basis for assuming subje ct matter jurisdiction other than one that has been improperly asser ted by the pl eade r . . . .”). A lthough, as the g overnme nt argues, Doe ultimately “bears t h e b u rd en of proving that the g overnme nt as unequivoca lly

waived its i mmunity ” under the APA, Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States , 341 F.3d 571, 575 ( D.C. Cir. 2003) , that burden is not appr opriately imposed under Rule 12(e ). 14/ For the same r easons, Doe ’s claim is not impermissibly vague for failing to name a pa rticular provision of the Constit ution he claims was violated. The g overnme nt doe s not disp u t e t h at the fac tual all ega t i o n s i n Doe’ s complaint support one or more constitutional claims, and they do not
move to dismiss Doe’ s alleg ations for failure to state a claim. Instead, the g overnme nt would have Doe specify the exact constitutional basis for his rig ht to travel cla im. [ Doc. 34 at 21 .] Ye t si mpl yCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-4 6- beca use Doe ’s fa ctual alleg ations could support one or more constitutional c laims does not rende r it “so vague or a

mbiguous” that the g overnme nt cannot re asonably respond. Finally , the g overnme nt’s contention that Doe must spec ify the t y pe of injunctive relief

he
se e ks is w ith out su

pp or t. T he g ov e rnme nt a

rgue s th a t k n o w i n g “ m o r e pr e c ise ly

wh a t pl a int if

f w ants ” is nece ssary

in its assessment of applicable defe nses. [ Doc. 14 at 22 .] Although Rule 8 c alls for “ a demand f or t he re lief soug ht,” it does not require a plaintiff to desc ribe the nature of his de sired re lief in g reat detail. Fe d. R. Civ. P . 8(a) (3) . Doe spe cified in his complaint that he “ seeks a n injunction to preve nt further

infring ement of his liberties.” [ Doc. 4 at 65 .] This sta t ement is sufficie nt under Rule 8. Should t he gover

nment desire more for its own edification, Doe has noted in re sponse to the g overnme nt’s motion that he seeks “to preve nt f urther unr easona

ble and unc onstitut ional detention duringinternational tra

vel.” [ Doc. 20 at 24 .] The gove rnment’s a rgument that even this statement i s t o o v ague, [ Doc. 34 at 22 ], is s im p ly an un w ar

r an te d a tt e mp t to n ar

r o w th e s c o p e of Doe ’s
c o mp l a i n tp r e m a tur e l y. Acc ording ly , the Court denies the g overnme nt’s motion for a more definite stateme nt. VIII. Conclusion F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th e Court DE NI ES Rumsfeld’s motion to di smiss Doe’s
su bs tanti ve du e p r o c e s s c l a i m. T he Court G RA NT S Def endant Rumsfeld’s motion to dismis s Doe’s proce dural due proce ss and ac cess to cour ts claims. The Court fur

ther G RA NT S the g overnme nt’s motion to dismiss Doe’ s return of s eiz ed proper ty claim; the Court permits Doe lea ve to amend his c omplaint if he c an plea d, in good f aith, fa c tua l a lle g a tio ns su

pp or tin g a re a so na ble inf e re nce th at the g ov e rnme nt’ s r e fu sa l to re tur n h is pr op e rt y wa s a “ fina l a g e nc y

a c tio n. ” F ina lly , th e Court DE NI ES the g overnme nt’s motion for aCase No. 1:08-CV- 1902

G w i n , J.

-4 7- mor e de fi nit e state me nt o f D oe ’s ri g ht t o tr ave l c la im. I T I S SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 2, 2011 s/ James S. Gwin J A M E S S
. G W IN UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT J UDGE