*DEFENSE REFORM*

##### TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I:  INTRODUCTION1

CHAPTER II:  Savings through streamlining7

chapter III:  adopting best business practices9

chapter IV:  quality of life23

chapter V:  financial management31

chapter VI:  competition38

chapter Vii:  savings through eliminating unneeded      infrastructure43

chapter viii:  transforming acquisition and logistics48

chapter ix:  the defense management council66

chapter x:  the challenge of change management in DOD69

****

# I.INTRODUCTION

Since 1997, the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) has sought to change the way the Department of Defense (DoD) does business. Just as private industry changed its ways to be competitive, DoD is working to bring competitive and best commercial practices into the business of defense. The Department is trying to take advantage of lessons learned in private industry in its efforts to lay out a sensible road map for improving efficiency and reducing costs. The DRI has two principal purposes: 

1. Increase Departmental efficiencies and apply resultant savings to the modernization of America’s fighting forces, and

2. Present a commercially friendly interface to DoD’s contractors and suppliers to make it faster and cheaper to compete for the Department’s business.

*DoD has labored under support systems and business practices that are at least a generation out of step with modern corporate America. DoD support systems and practices that were once state-of-the-art are now antiquated compared with the systems and practices in place in the corporate world, while other systems were developed in their own defense-unique culture and have never corresponded with the best business practices of the private sector. This cannot and will not continue.*

**William S. Cohen

Secretary of Defense 

The underlying principles for Defense Reform are to focus the enterprise on a unifying vision, commit the leadership to change, focus on core competencies, streamline organizations for agility, invest in people, exploit information technology, and break down barriers between organizations.

The DRI Report released in 1997 identified four pillars, or major areas, of Defense Reform: **Reengineer** – adopt best practices, **Consolidate** – reorganize, **Compete** – apply market mechanisms, and **Eliminate** – reduce excess support structures. These four pillars were expanded in 1999 and are now structured around the Department’s business processes: 

1. Adopting Best Business Practices;

2. Quality of Life;

3. Financial Management;

4. Competition;

5. Savings Through Eliminating Unneeded Infrastructure; and

6. Transforming Acquisition and Logistics.

As some initiatives reach their end state and other, new initiatives begin, the structure of the DRI has evolved over time. However, the purpose and underlying principles have remained the same, providing a consistent point on the horizon toward which the DoD leadership can steer, as they move on the road to reform.

Only two formal organizations were created to support the Defense Reform Initiative: the Defense Management Council and the Defense Reform Initiatives Office. The *Defense Management Council (DMC)*was established in winter 1998 as the “Board of Directors” to oversee the continued reengineering of the Department of Defense. The DMC ensures that reform initiatives directed by the Secretary of Defense are carried out, recommends reforms to the Secretary, and reviews the Defense Agencies’ performance contracts. The DMC is a first: an attempt to create a Board of Directors of the senior military and civilian leadership of the Department to provide direction on a range of critical reform and reform-related issues. The Deputy Secretary of Defense chairs the DMC, and membership includes senior decision makers from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the uniformed Services (see chapter IX, The Defense Management Council, for the list of members).

The *Defense Reform Initiatives (DRI) Office* was established in May 1998 to provide executive leadership to all levels of DoD management to facilitate, coordinate, and introduce reform initiatives complementary to other ongoing reforms, within and outside the Department. The Defense Reform Office operates with a small staff of eight and reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. It is their responsibility to monitor this monumental effort and keep it moving toward its ultimate destination.

To date, the Department has issued a total of 17 Management Reform Memoranda (MRMs) and 54 Defense Reform Initiative Directives (DRIDs), covering a wide range of issues for changing the way it does business. Actions on 95 percent of these are complete. Many of the early Directives dealt with downsizing in OSD. These downsizing efforts are now complete. Many of the open Directives deal with process changes that are currently underway.

The MRMs and DRIDs generally assigned responsibility for the reform effort to someone in a key leadership role in the Office of the Secretary of Defense or a Defense Agency. Some of these leaders act as “process owners” for DoD core processes such as acquisition management, financial management, human resources management, information management, installation management, and logistics management. Other leaders head organizations that play a key role within that process. Many of the initiatives impact more than one core process. Quite often, in these cases, the MRM or DRID assigns shared responsibility or coordination requirements. In all cases, the initiatives focus on changing a DoD process in some way, whether it is introducing, changing, or eliminating steps; harnessing IT; restructuring the responsible organization; or impacting the people who work the process through training, job redesign, or reduction.

Report Format

This transition report is written at the macro, or “big picture,” level. It attempts to provide a top-level road map for incoming DoD decision makers to use during fiscal year (FY) 2001 to evaluate overall Defense Reform progress and aid in decision making and resource allocation. This report offers a candid assessment of the relative successes and challenges of Defense Reform. As such, it should be a useful decision-making tool with respect to continuing, halting, or changing/altering initiatives. This report does not provide a detailed analysis of every initiative, but focuses on key reform areas. 

The report is structured into two principal areas within each chapter: “Successes” and “Challenges.” When suggestions and recommendations can be offered with respect to a given Success or Challenge, they are provided as “Near-Term Priorities” (where action is recommended within the first 90 days of the new Administration) or characterized as “Future Focus” (where immediate attention is not warranted). When a Defense Reform Initiative is termed successful, that does not mean that it is exempt from near-term attention or future monitoring. There are numerous successful initiatives for which recommendations are made to further improve results or, perhaps, to change the methodology for measuring results.

A table is included on the next page that provides the reader with the overall “health” of the many initiatives contained herein. Table I-1 breaks out the initiatives by “Successes” or “Challenges” and indicates whether progress is “On-Track,” “Off-Track,” or “Completed.” Next, the table provides a recommendation either to continue or to reevaluate the initiative. Finally, opportunities for improvement are highlighted as “Near-Term Priorities” or “Future Focus.” Some initiatives will have multiple check marks in the status box. The number of check marks indicates the number of recommendations that are contained within the initiative.

# Table I-1:  Status of Initiatives and Opportunities for Improvement

##### II.SAVINGS THROUGH STREAMLINING 

There are two primary goals under this Defense Reform element:

· Create a flatter, more streamlined headquarters throughout DoD

· Create a single organization in DoD to carry out programs designed to address proliferation and to counter threats posed by weapons of mass destruction

***SUCCESSES***

**Streamlined Headquarters (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

DoD’s goal is to reduce staffing at major DoD Headquarters’ elements by more than 35,000 personnel, with the majority of these staff reductions (27,000) coming from the Headquarters of the Defense Agencies. The Secretary directed that OSD staff be cut by one-third by the end of FY 1999. This reduction is already completed. The Joint Staff will be reduced by 29 percent by FY 2003. Defense Agencies are moving forward with reductions of 21 percent by FY 2001. This goal was adjusted in the FY 1999 Budget. Field Activities will exceed their required 36 percent reduction. Table II-1 below depicts the reduction goals by organization, with the number of people reduced by September 2000:

**Table II-1**

**DoD Staff Reductions**

The Defense Reform Initiative also mandates staff cuts for the Headquarters of Military Departments and Major Commands. PRIVATE "TYPE=PICT;ALT=Projected Reductions"By 2003, the Headquarters staffs of the Military Departments and Major Commands will be reduced 10 percent from FY 1998 levels. Taken together with previous reductions begun in the early 1990s, the Headquarters Components of the Military Departments and the Combatant Commands will reduce their Headquarters staffs by a total of 29 percent and 22 percent, respectively. 

The 1997 Defense Reform Initiative Report noted that more than 550 boards, commissions, and working groups existed throughout the Department. While perhaps individually advantageous at the time of their creation, the aggregate effect of so many committees and boards involving so many employees resulted in too many hours not spent on core missions and functions. The Defense Reform Initiative immediately eliminated 22 boards and committees.  In addition, the Defense Reform Initiative called for a 25 percent decrease in the total number of committees remaining. We’ve exceeded this goal by reducing the number of committees to 338 . . . nearly a *40 percent*reduction!

The Defense Reform Initiative includes efforts to realign the Department of Defense to meet more effectively the evolving threats to the United States—threats quite different from those of the past. Among those of greatest concern are threats posed by the production, proliferation, and use of weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) was created on October 1, 1998, by consolidating the On-Site Inspection Agency, the Defense Special Weapons Agency, the Defense Technology Security Administration, and some missions and responsibilities of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs. DTRA is now the cornerstone of the DoD’s efforts to confront and control weapons of mass destruction. 

##### III.ADOPTING BEST BUSINESS PRACTICES

The strength of the U.S. economy lies in the flexibility of the commercial sector—in its ability to reorganize, restructure, and innovate. DoD is adopting the tools, processes, and techniques used by leading private-sector companies to manage the way it does business. The Department recognizes the advantages of adapting the best of private-sector business practices to its business transformation strategy and is applying these best business practices across the spectrum of core DoD processes: acquisition/procurement, logistics, finance, human resources, and information management. By using best commercial practices, DoD reduces the costs of performing these core business processes and will use the resulting funds to modernize its forces.

Use of information technology to reduce cycle times and costs and to improve the fidelity of the data used to operate and manage is a prominent best commercial practice being applied within the Department. Information technology is not only improving the core processes to which it is applied, but it is also improving the interface among those core processes. The Department is working to adapt the same revolutionary business and management practices made possible through electronic-enabled technology solutions (E-Business/E-Commerce) that have helped the commercial sector gain a competitive edge in a rapidly changing global marketplace. 

Finally, the use of performance indicators and metrics allows DoD managers to operate at reduced cost while providing their internal DoD customers better service in a more timely manner. This will result in a greater level of integration of the “business” and “operational” sides of DoD than has been previously achieved. Adoption of best business practices is a key element to the achievement of a “Revolution in Business Affairs” at DoD.

***SUCCESSES***

**Paperless Contracting (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

The goal is to achieve a paperless contracting process from requirements generation to contract closeout by January 1, 2003. Management Reform Memorandum #2, “Moving to a Paper-Free Contracting Process*,*” was issued on May 21, 1997. In that Memorandum, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) was requested to develop a plan to move to a totally paper-free contract writing, administration, finance, and auditing process by January 1, 2000. Subsequently, Defense Reform Initiative Directive (DRID) #46, “Paperless Contracting,” formalized and focused the various efforts related to paperless contracting under the DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO). DRID #46 also established an organizational structure (overarching and working integrated product teams) to manage the effort. Currently, the performance measures used to gauge progress toward the paperless goal are output measures related to six activities in the overall contracting process: contract requirements, solicitations, awards/modifications, receipts/acceptances, invoices/payments, and contract closeouts. The performance measures are based on the percentage of electronic transactions by category. The target for FY 2000 was 90 percent paperless transactions in each of the six identified categories. This target date was subsequently extended to FY 2003.

###### Table III-1

###### Electronic Transactions by Category

(In Percentages)

###### Goal: Achieve 90 percent electronic contracting and payment transactions by FY 2003.

*Source:*Paperless Contracting Program Office

***FUTURE FOCUS***

*Develop Outcome Measures.*While the current measures clearly support the stated goal of a paperless acquisition process, the outcome of this initiative is not captured. There are no outcome measures showing the impact of going “paperless” on the affected processes (such as procurement, logistics, or finance). The focus is on the implementation of a change to the process, not on the result of the process change. The relationship between this initiative and the Electronic Commerce initiative is very close, and the two overlap. It is recommended that the owner of core processes impacted by this initiative should establish performance metrics that measure outcomes.

*Wide Area Work Flow Receipts and Acceptance (WAWF-RA).*WAWF-RA is not scheduled to complete deployment until January 2003. As such, WAWF-RA is the initiative with the longest completion date for achieving the paperless goal of 90 percent. Although WAWF-RA development continues to proceed without bottlenecks, WAWF-RA rollout has been delayed to align with the deployment of the DoD Common Access Card that is scheduled to be completed in October 2002. The Common Access Card, in addition to allowing physical access to secure areas, will permit entry into the Department’s computer networks and will serve as the authentication token for DoD’s computerized public key infrastructure. The WAWF-RA prototype involves benchmarking commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products and various file formats (i.e., PDF, HTML, and XFDL) and is now available for production. If WAWF-RA is not successful, then a paperless work-around for acceptance processing into the Defense Finance and Accounting Services (DFAS) payment system will be required. A corollary effort to enhance the Receipts and Acceptance process is tied to recommendations that came from the DD250 Reengineering Report. Many communities of interest need to participate in WAWF-RA to make it successful, and the coordination of these diverse communities is an ongoing challenge.

*Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).*As noted later in this chapter under “Safeguarding Electronic Data,” PKI technology, including a digital signature capability, has important implications for all paperless initiatives. Widespread industry user participation is dependent on affordable and interoperable PKI technology (e.g., contractors with commercial certificates submitting/accessing electronic proposals).

**Simplifying Payments with the Government Purchase Card (STATUS: Completed)**

This initiative seeks to simplify the purchasing and payment process for DoD goods and services costing less than $2,500 per transaction. (Transactions costing less that $2,500 are known as “micropurchases.”) The goal was to decentralize use of the Purchase Card throughout DoD and make it the primary vehicle for buying 90 percent of the goods and services costing $2,500 or less by FY 2000. Under the management of the Purchase Card Joint Program Management Office, DoD has achieved this goal, and Table III-2 below charts the Department’s increasing annual use of the Purchase Card. 

The Purchase Card Program has dramatically improved the DoD acquisition process for small-dollar micropurchases. DoD purchasing costs have been significantly reduced, and improved process efficiencies have been achieved. DoD has also seen increased savings through reduced interest penalties associated with overdue vendor payments and increased prompt payment rebates. Since 1994, DoD has reduced the number of micropurchases processed via traditional means by 90 percent and has realized cost savings in excess of $740 million on approximately 38 million Purchase Card transactions.

**Table III-2**

**Annual Micropurchase Card Use**

(In Percentages)

*Goal:*90 percent of goods and services costing $2,500 or less will be bought using the Purchase Card by FY 2000.

*Source:*Purchase Card PMO

**Simplifying Customer Support, Ordering, and Payment with the Prime Vendor (PV) Program (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

This initiative seeks to lower total ownership costs through reduction of government inventories, processes, and workforce used to maintain, repair, and operate (MRO) facilities at DoD installations. MRO Prime Vendors supply repair and maintenance parts through commercial, best-practice contracts that leverage DoD buying power to supply these parts quickly and at discounted commercial prices. The goal of the MRO Prime Vendor initiative is to simplify customer support, ordering, and payment and should result in less government infrastructure needed to perform the MRO function at installations. This, in turn, will reduce funding requirements for these activities, lowering DoD total ownership costs. DRID #45, “Prime Vendor Contracting Program for Facility Maintenance Supplies,” made the Defense Logistics Agency/Defense Supply Center – Philadelphia the initiative’s Executive Agent.

Prime Vendor is a concept of support whereby a single commercial distributor/supplier serves as the major provider of products to various federal customers within a geographical region. Prime Vendor enables the military to take advantage of the commercial vendors’ distribution systems. The program began in order to reduce the Defense Logistics Agency’s warehouses, which were stocked with millions of dollars worth of materiel. Expansive inventories require expensive storage, handling, and second destination charges. The overall purpose of the program is to streamline supply chain management, using best commercial practices and leading-edge information technology, to improve customer support. 

The Prime Vendor Initiative relies on annual MRO sales data to reflect progress under the program. Table III-3 below reflects the annual growth in MRO PV sales.

**Table III-3**

**Annual MRO PV Sales**

(In $ Millions)

*Source:*Defense Supply Center Philadelphia (DSCP)

***FUTURE FOCUS***

More specific measures are needed to track actual impacts of MRO PV. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) should continue measuring internal performance of the MRO Prime Vendor contractors to ensure best commercial performance in materiel availability, delivery dates met, and quality standards, as a means of encouraging Service participation. It is recommended that the Services provide specific data for their respective MRO inventories [MRO inventory size, full-time equivalent (FTE) labor costs, and MRO-related process costs] to DLA. DLA may then analyze reductions in Service MRO costs to measure progress toward the desired outcome of reduced Service infrastructure costs related to MRO. 

Defense Agency Performance Contracts (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)

Defense Reform Initiative Directive #23, “Defense Agency Performance Contracts,” dated January 26, 1998, provided guidance for the establishment of annual performance contracts between designated Defense Agencies, Field Activities, and Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. DRID #23 recognized that “the Department must manage its resources better than it has in the past, and learning to manage by performance objectives is a necessary step in doing so.” Because these Agencies and Activities are involved in all of the DoD core processes, the impact of this particular initiative is significant across the Department. A Defense Agency Task Force was created to assist the Deputy Secretary in establishing and reviewing performance contracts, and the Defense Management Council (see chapter IX of this report) was to provide executive leadership.

Ten DoD organizations are required to develop annual performance contracts outlining performance requirements and new initiatives agreed to by the organization, its customers, the Defense Management Council, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. During January 1998, four organizations completed one-year performance contracts that covered FY 1999. These organizations, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, the Defense Contract Audit Agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Defense Health Program, worked closely with their customers and the OSD staff to identify critical management metrics for use in the contracts. These organizations have achieved two important things by using performance contracts: First, the level of communications between the organizations and their customers has improved dramatically. Second, these organizations had to carefully articulate what their business areas are, who their customers are, and assign resources to each business area. 

During FY 2000, significantly improved performance contracts were developed for a total of seven organizations, using lessons learned from the FY 1999 process. For FY 2001 and beyond, all 10 of the organizations required to develop performance contracts will submit them to the Defense Management Council for approval. These contracts will coincide with long-range planning documents submitted by each organization in May of every year and will be a linking tool between those long-term plans and the annual budget submission. The latest performance contracts include reengineering actions necessary to improve business processes and are multiyear instruments covering FYs 2000 through 2005.

**Electronic Business Strategic Plan (STATUS: On-Target, Continue)**

The 1997 Defense Reform Initiative Report announced a “full commitment to electronic business operations that will result in tangible savings, change DoD’s business culture, and force managers to think differently and act more efficiently.” In May 1998, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established a Joint Electronic Commerce Program to accelerate the use of business practices and associated information technologies. A Program Office was established to manage the Joint Electronic Commerce Program, and its efforts are described as a separate “Success” below. In addition to establishing the Joint Electronic Commerce Program, the Deputy Secretary assigned Department-wide policy and oversight responsibilities for the program to the Department’s Chief Information Officer. DoD released its Electronic Business (EB) Strategic Plan in May 1999, which identifies the goals, objectives, and strategies that DoD will pursue over the next 10 years to achieve an electronic business operations environment.

The Strategic Plan broadened the scope of electronic commerce to include all of DoD’s business processes, not just the buying and selling activities traditionally associated with electronic commerce. The plan included 41 strategies aimed at achieving broad goals such as improving productivity and promoting cultural changes in the Department. The goals are to be achieved through actions such as establishing training programs, partnering with industry, and basing new electronic commerce applications on commercial standards and practices. In addition, the plan embodies the principles of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 in that it establishes strategic goals for the Department, points out the need for the Military Services and Defense Agencies to link their strategic goals and objectives to the Department’s, and encourages the use of outcome-oriented performance measures to track progress. An Electronic Business Board of Directors was established in September 2000 to help guide implementation of the Strategic Plan.

**Joint Electronic Commerce Program Office (STATUS: On-Track, Reevaluate)**

Defense Reform Initiative Directive #43, “Defense-Wide Electronic Commerce,” established the Joint Electronic Commerce Program Office (JECPO) and made it responsible for the strategic implementation of electronic commerce (EC) policy in support of the Principal Staff Activities and Components. The JECPO was designated as the DoD Executive Agent to support, facilitate, and accelerate the application of electronic business practices and associated information technologies to improve DoD processes and  support weapons and combat support systems throughout their life cycles. The JECPO allows DoD to centralize EC policy recommendations, planning, and coordination and ensures consistent implementation based on open standards for interoperability. The JECPO Electronic Business/Electronic Commerce (EB/EC) Strategic Plan, dated May 1999, outlined three broad goals:

1. Achieve global flexibility, increased productivity, and a dynamic working environment through the application of EB/EC;

2. Achieve efficient and effective responses to changing environments by the rapid introduction of business process improvements or reengineering and the exploitation of EB/EC technologies; and

3. Through guidance and attaining necessary skills for implementation of EB/EC, achieve cultural changes and shift from current business practices.

Performance measures used by the JECPO are mostly process-oriented (input, activity, or output) measures. One project in particular, “Central Contractor Registration,” has shown considerable improvement in reducing contractor registration cycle time, as reflected in Table III-4 below: 

**Table III-4**

**Centralized Contractor Registration (CCR) Cycle Time and Number of Users**

*Goal*: Expand the use of electronic commerce between DoD and its suppliers by reducing contractor registration cycle time.

*Source*: JECPO

***NEAR-TERM PRIORITIES***

*Reevaluate the Mission and Organizational Placement of the JECPO.*DoD may have difficulty effectively implementing its EB/EC goals because of the way that its joint program office has been set up. The office receives its funding and personnel through two Defense Agencies: the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA); consequently, it must report through these Agencies’ chains of command to the DoD CIO. This organizational ambiguity has created day-to-day management issues and impeded the JECPO’s effectiveness. In addition, the joint office’s affiliation with the two Defense Agencies has raised doubts about the office’s independence and its long-term viability. It is recommended that the JECPO’s mission be reevaluated, and then the proper organizational alignment may be instituted. If the JECPO’s mission is to concentrate on DoD-wide electronically enabled business processes, the JECPO could report to a newly created Electronic Business “Czar” (suggested later in this chapter) or report directly to the DoD CIO. If the mission of the JECPO is to be oriented toward logistics issues, then it could report to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Under either scenario, the JECPO would no longer report to a Defense Agency, but report directly to a Principal Staff Activity within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the JECPO naming convention should be reevaluated concurrent with the JECPO mission.

***FUTURE FOCUS***

**“**Outcome” measures such as reduction of process costs or process cycle time should be established for DoD core processes. This responsibility should not fall on the JECPO, but on the core process owner. In addition, the DoD process owners who utilize JECPO-related services should establish measures that gauge the impact of those services on their processes. For example, if a capability such as electronic data access eliminates the requirement to reproduce and distribute contract documents, there is a measurable potential cost impact on the procurement process. Also, the JECPO should complete its efforts to measure the goals/objectives in its Strategic Plan.

**Simplifying and Saving with Electronic Malls (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

The DoD Electronic Mall (E-Mall) provides users with a simple means to order commercially available items on-line without having to place repetitive small purchases. The Government Purchase Cardholder places an electronic delivery order against an existing long-term contract. The buyer receives the benefit of the volume discounts related to the long-term contract, and no paperwork is required. The E-Mall provides a single location for buyers to order items from different catalogs. Similar to a new retail business, the primary focus of DoD E-Mall has been to establish itself in the marketplace. Since its inception in 1998, E-Mall management has concentrated on expanding the number of items offered/catalogs available and the number of customers using the site.

The following performance measures currently in use by the DoD E-Mall represent the achievement of the project’s near-term focus of establishing itself in the marketplace:

· Registered Users (Orderers)

· Number of Catalogs

· Number of Items

· Sales

***FUTURE FOCUS***

*Customer Focus.*If the DoD E-Mall is to become the primary source for DoD users to acquire commercially available items, it must have the loyalty of that customer base. Currently, there are no customer (user)-focused measures, such as customer satisfaction with the product delivered or ease of use of the site. The Director, JECPO should establish customer-oriented performance measures. In addition, the current process metrics do not measure the impact of this initiative on the DoD procurement or logistics processes. The procurement and logistics process owners should assess the cost and cycle-time impact of the DoD E-Mall on their processes and continue to measure this impact in conjunction with the other Defense Reform Initiatives that affect their processes.

*Single DoD E-Mall.*In addition to the DoD E-Mall effort, each of the Military Services and many of the Defense Agencies have developed their own E-Malls independently. The result is redundant capability that lacks interoperability. Therefore, DoD is not in compliance with the FY 1999 Defense Authorization Act mandating a single, integrated DoD E-Mall. The Defense Reform Office and the Change Management Center have formed two rapid improvement teams with Components, with the objective to achieve a single E-Mall by summer 2001.

**End-to-End Procurement Process (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

In this initiative, DoD is adopting a best practice from private industry of using information technology to improve its procurement process while reengineering business processes. This initiative recognizes the importance of developing and agreeing to business processes, business rules, and overarching architecture to achieve the paperless acquisition vision of the future. DRID #47, “End-to-End Procurement Process,” pulls together in a single initiative other related electronic business initiatives that were previously issued separately, such as DRID #32, “Paperless Contracting Closeout”; DRID #33, “Paperless DD250”; and elements of DRID #2, “Moving to a Paper-Free Contracting Process.” The Department realized that it would not receive maximum benefits from these process improvements until an end-to-end procurement process for the future acquisition environment was defined and implemented as the basis for a shared data environment.

One of the primary benefits of this initiative is its positive impact on another process— financial management. The end-to-end procurement process will have single points of data entry and single sources of data to confront problems such as unmatched disbursements and contract overpayments.

A two-phased approach has been established for this initiative: The first phase calls for the development of an end-to-end process model, which has been completed. The second phase, process implementation, will fall under the oversight responsibility of the Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) responsible for those end-to-end processes. An Executive Steering Group has been chartered to review the progress of this initiative. The DoD CIO will be responsible for the integration of process reengineering activities and maintaining the overall end-to-end process model. The end-to-end procurement process model is expected to be fully functional by March 2004.

***NEAR-TERM PRIORITIES***

*Establish Business Rules for the DFAS Corporate Database.*The financial management component for the end-to-end procurement process is the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Corporate Database. The DFAS Corporate Database (DCD) is the sole interface among procurement, accounting, and disbursing systems. It holds the official accounting records and performs the primary edits and validations for contracts, contract modifications, and contract receipts (delivery information). The business rules associated with DCD have not been agreed to by the Services. Failure to finalize the DCD business rules may jeopardize the deployment of the end-to-end procurement system and will negatively impact the retirement of a key legacy system, the Mechanization of Contract Administration Services (MOCAS) system (see “Contract Conversion” below). It is recommended that the Procurement Executive Steering Group approve the final business rules soon in order to establish the system baseline and allow for the final configuration of the end-to-end model.

*Reevaluate the Standard Procurement System.*The Standard Procurement System (SPS) is a modified COTS software system that provides the future capability of receiving paperless contract requirements into the procurement process and of producing paperless solicitations. Paperless contract requirements will be accomplished through both replicating existing procurement legacy system point-to-point interfaces and interfacing to alternative paperless requirements generating systems. 

SPS also provides a capability for paperless solicitation data to be loaded onto Web sites and be accessible by industry for viewing. The capability for industry to respond via the World Wide Web and import data back to SPS is under review, and that review should continue. It appears that SPS works as intended for purchases under the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (i.e., purchases under $100,000); however, the development of contract “clause logic” for large-dollar major weapon systems has been hampered by the complexity of matching the correct contract clause to the appropriate contract type. SPS should be reexamined as a paperless solution for the procurement of large and/or complex acquisitions. When SPS was originally procured, its operating concept was based on a client/server platform. With the advent of more advanced Internet-based electronic business solutions available today, there is the possibility of improving SPS functionality at reduced life-cycle costs.

***CHALLENGES***

**Contract Conversion (STATUS: Off-Track, Continue)**

The MOCAS system, a critical contract management/contract payment legacy system, is scheduled for retirement in September 2002 as part of an effort to modernize and standardize contract payment and achieve elimination of unmatched disbursements and negative unliquidated obligations. The MOCAS system’s timely retirement is contingent upon the successful transfer or closure of approximately 300,000 contracts from MOCAS into the DCD, a component of the planned Defense Procurement and Payment System. Delays in implementing the new business rules associated with the DCD will result in approximately 25,000 contractual instruments per month being entered into MOCAS, a system that has historically produced problems with payments, unmatched disbursements, and contract closeout. The later that DCD becomes operational, the more difficult it becomes to transfer contracts from legacy systems, because there is less time available to reconcile payment and disbursement data between the legacy and new systems. The Executive Steering Group for the End-to-End Procurement System must ensure that the business rules are finalized quickly to avoid additional contract documents from being input into legacy systems and causing further payment problems. 

DoD Electronic Business Implementation Plan (STATUS: Off-Track, Reevaluate)

DoD has ceased efforts to develop an implementation plan for the Electronic Business (EB) Strategic Plan primarily because the Chief Information Officer and the JECPO are unable to reach agreement with the Military Services and Defense Agencies on the scope and content of an overarching implementation plan. Without the plan, DoD has no assurance that the Military Services and Defense Agencies will continue with their individual EB projects in a manner consistent with the goals and objectives of the Electronic Business Strategic Plan. After the Strategic Plan was issued in May 1999, the joint program office prepared two draft implementation plans that the Military Services and Defense Agencies reviewed. Military Service officials were not satisfied with the drafts, primarily because they believed that the draft plans were narrowly focused on the joint program office’s responsibilities and projects. In their view, the draft plans did not

1. Describe how the 41 strategies in DoD’s Strategic Plan would be implemented;

2. Identify who would be responsible for implementing the strategies;

3. Describe how progress would be assessed; or 

4. Address the amounts and sources of funding that would be needed.

These concerns persisted among the Services, and in a February 2000 Electronic Business/Electronic Commerce Panel meeting, the participants decided to abandon efforts to develop a DoD-wide plan. Instead, the joint program office, the Military Services, and three of the larger Defense Agencies issued separate plans.

***NEAR-TERM PRIORITIES***

*Develop an EB Implementation Plan.*Without a DoD-wide EB Implementation Plan, DoD has no assurance that the Military Services and Defense Agencies will proceed with their individual electronic commerce programs in a manner that is consistent with the goals and objectives of the Strategic Plan. The Electronic Business Board of Directors could be the top-level oversight organization that ensures that an implementation plan is developed and approved. Without the active participation of the DoD senior leadership, the Services and Defense Agencies will continue to implement their own EB initiatives, which may be incongruent with the objectives of an overarching plan. The Services should be provided the necessary funds to implement systems that are integrated with the DoD plan. Unless and until the requisite financial resources are made available, the Services will not be incentivized to be full participants.

*Consider Creating an Electronic Business Czar for DoD.*Responsibility for current EB/EC initiatives within DoD is diffuse, and there is a lack of accountability for many of the ongoing efforts. Many Fortune 500 companies are creating new positions within their organizations in which responsibility and accountability for EB is centralized and from which coherent and consistent plans/policies are promulgated. In some companies, the position is known as the Chief Technology Officer; in others, it may be the Vice President for Electronic Business. Regardless of title, the position is being created to centrally fund, coordinate, direct, control, and manage the diverse and growing number of electronic business opportunities/initiatives from a corporate, or global, perspective. DoD should strongly consider creating a similar position, in which accountability and responsibility are fixed in a top-level executive. This person would be responsible for the significant number of business process reengineering efforts that cut across multiple functional and organizational boundaries to achieve the desired outcomes (e.g., increased efficiency, more effectiveness, and reduced costs) of a fully integrated, electronic-enabled organization. DoD should move away from focusing on electronic output measures such as the number of transactions and move toward more electronic business-to-business (B2B) applications, an area of substantial growth in the private sector. The E-Business Czar position would need to be at least at the DoD Assistant Secretary level to be effective and should be given budget authority to successfully manage the myriad of EB/EC initiatives. As envisioned, the position would be responsible for development of the DoD Electronic Business Strategic Plan and the DoD electronic commerce architecture. [The CIO would support (i.e., be the “enabler” of) the IT requirements for the various initiatives.]

**Electronic Commerce Architecture (STATUS: Off-Track, Reevaluate)**

An electronic commerce/electronic business architecture (i.e., an information systems blueprint) is necessary to integrate processes and information systems across the Military Services and Defense Agencies. Without an architecture, the Department runs the risk of having the Services and Defense Agencies develop and implement initiatives that are redundant, do not readily share information, and do not maximize the Department’s investments in information technology. In general, architecture development begins by analyzing the functional requirements of each business area—such as acquisition, financial management, and logistics—and identifying improved business processes and underlying systems that will be used to satisfy the requirements. Next, the analysis identifies the information that must be shared among the modernized processes and systems to ensure that they can readily exchange this information. In total, DoD estimates that the number of business areas that need to be analyzed range from 8 to 21. To date, one business area, procurement, has identified architecture requirements of the future “to-be” system (see “End-to-End Procurement System” in this chapter for further discussion). The Joint Electronic Commerce Program Office has been given the responsibility to develop the DoD EC architecture; however, DoD Components have not fully embraced the architecture development approach being promoted by the JECPO.

***NEAR-TERM PRIORITIES***

*Implement DoD Global Information Grid (GIG).*  Interoperability is the cornerstone to realizing the goals of the Revolution in Military Affairs, the Revolution in Business Affairs and Joint Vision 2010.  The recently agreed to definition of the Global Information Grid (GIG) is a critical element in realizing those goals.  With the establishment of a GIG definition the need now exists to expeditiously push its implementation.  As an enterprise, the DoD must be unified in the application of that definition.

Appropriate representation of DoD an industry stakeholders to initiate a dialogue leading to a practical understanding and application of the GIG definition is needed, in particular.  Understanding what is meant by “GIG interface criteria,” and how the GIG definition applies to embedded information technology must be discussed and understood by all stakeholders in relation to the preference and emphasis on performance-based acquisition.  The DoD should also develop a rapid implementation plan that includes a dissemination of this information to the acquisition community and establish meaningful metrics to ensure the implementation of the GIG definition is furthering the goal of interoperability.  It is essentail that key stakeholders representing a broad spectrum view of the acquisition process such as engineering, program management, acquisition and the warfighter community understand and participate.

*Consider Realigning the Chief Information Officer (CIO) Position.*In keeping with industry best business practices, most large companies have the CIO reporting directly to the Chief Executive Officer. The current DoD organizational structure makes the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) the Chief Information Officer.  Although the present organizational alignment makes sense from a functional perspective [i.e., the role/mission of the CIO is in consonance with the overall responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I)], it is at least one level too low to be fully effective. If the CIO were an Under Secretary with OSD, the CIO would have undiluted authority over all information management issues and be more visible in DoD. The CIO’s role is to provide the infrastructure for IT network management. The CIO should be responsible for developing a robust and scalable technical architecture based on communities of interest and should enforce the standards for each community of interest. As part of these responsibilities, the DoD CIO should have budgetary authority and oversight of all infrastructure issues and be responsible for the end-to-end architecture, including configuration management. The Clinger/Cohen Act envisioned the CIO being the responsible official for IT capital planning and capital investment decisions. Within DoD, these functions have been the purview of the DoD Comptroller. As information technology continues to play an increasing role in all DoD operations from both the warfighter and functional-owner perspective and as information technology development cycles continue to shorten, the role of the CIO becomes increasingly important in ensuring that U.S. forces maintain information superiority.

**Safeguarding Electronic Data (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

The Department’s EB/EC goals cannot be fully achieved unless it improves its ability to safeguard and verify the authenticity of electronic data and transactions. DoD has initiated many initiatives to improve security over its information, and one effort—the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)—is seen as critical, because it will offer important safeguards.

The Public Key Infrastructure program is essential to improving security because it will allow DoD to ensure that

1. The data contained in electronic transactions and messages have not been tampered with;

2. Systems users can confirm who is on the other end of an electronic transaction;

3. The parties involved in a transaction cannot later deny that they participated in the transaction; and 

4. The transaction or message data cannot be accessed and read without proper authorization.

The PKI program should achieve these objectives by giving DoD personnel digital signature and encryption capabilities. These capabilities are needed to implement paperless contracting, which cannot be truly paperless until contracts can be signed digitally and those signatures can be verified, stored, and recreated for the life span of the documents, which can be up to 30 years for weapon system acquisitions.

The PKI program is a very difficult challenge for the Department. Although the technology supporting the planned public key infrastructure is being piloted by many federal agencies, including DoD, it is still not mature. Technical issues, including problems with scalability, interoperability, and ease of use, have not been fully resolved. Moreover, for the infrastructure to work properly, DoD will have to confirm the identity of each user, mass distribute the so-called tokens that will carry the mathematical keys, make sure that personnel’s computer workstations have the necessary hardware to accept the tokens, and ensure that DoD software and systems can accept and process the hardware on the tokens.

It is not clear when the digital signature and encryption capabilities will be fully in place. The Deputy Secretary of Defense originally called for completing this task by October 1, 2001, and for more secure versions of these capabilities to be phased in beginning in January 2002; however, DoD is revising these timetables because new requirements are expected to create delays.

##### IV.QUALITY OF LIFE

DoD employees and military personnel make up the most important single resource in the defense of the United States. Quality of life for DoD personnel is a priority for several reasons: It’s easier to *attract* well-trained personnel if we can offer a good work environment. It’s also easier to *retain* employees under those conditions. But most important, our personnel *deserve*a high quality of life. Many of our reform initiatives, therefore, are intended to increase the level of job support and assistance, so we can offer the highest quality of life to our most valuable resource.

***SUCCESSES***

**Improved Military Pay and Retirement Benefits (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

Over the past several years, DoD has sought to significantly improve military pay and retirement benefits so that we adequately compensate the dedicated service of our men and women in uniform through a three-pronged approach: First, the Department sought annual pay increases above the Employment Cost Index (ECI), a measure of private-sector wage increases. Second, the Department wanted to reform the military retirement system for members who entered the military after August 1986, to the previous system, based on 50 percent of basic pay at 20 years of service. The third prong was to correct military pay tables so that performance would be rewarded over longevity. DoD was successful in all three areas, as Congress passed legislation authorizing and appropriating the necessary funds.

The FY 2000 Defense Authorization Act included a three-part package of significant pay increases and retirement improvements. Beginning January 1, 2000, we increased pay across the board by 4.8 percent. In FYs 2001 through 2005, the military pay increase will be set one-half percent above the average of private-sector raises, as measured by the ECI. Targeted pay raises of up to an additional 5.5 percent occurred on July 1, 2000. These targeted raises were aimed at midcareer officers and enlisted personnel, impacting almost 75 percent of all Service members. This pay raise was in addition to the January 2000 raise and was intended to permanently adjust pay tables so that rewards for performance (promotions) outweighed rewards for longevity. This change ensured that every promotion was worth more in terms of absolute dollars; however, it still provided meaningful length-of-service raises reward performance better; compensate people for their skills, education, and experience; and encourage them to continue their military service. We restored the retirement plan providing 50 percent of basic pay at 20 years of service to all who entered the service since August 1986. Also, they will have the option instead to choose a $30,000 cash bonus at 15 years of service and a retirement of 40 percent of basic pay at 20 years of service.

**Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

Another goal of the quality-of-life (QOL) initiative is to decrease the average percentage of out-of-pocket housing costs for military members who reside off base. In FY 1999, a military member’s out-of-pocket housing costs were 20 percent. To eliminate these out-of-pocket housing expenses, DoD will provide Service members with more than $3 billion in BAH over the next five years so that by the end of FY 2005, there will be no (0 percent) out-of-pocket housing expenses. As a result, Service members will realize an immediate impact from higher allowances.  These allowances will increase the quality and availability of existing off-base housing options. 

By law, BAH was supposed to be calculated with a typical Service member living off base paying 15 percent of expenses out of pocket. However, because of budget shortfalls over the years, affected Service members report paying an average of 18.8 percent, while military members living on base continue to have no out-of-pocket expenses. Congress helped the Department achieve its goal by eliminating the 15 percent statute and then authorized and funded BAH in FY 2001 so that the percentage of out-of-pocket expenses would initially decline from 19 percent to approximately 15 percent. Continued Congressional and Administration support is required for more than $3 billion in BAH to achieve the zero out-of-pocket expenses goal by FY 2005.

**Family Programs (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

Recent QOL improvements in family programs include the following:

· Overall, DoD has increased per capita investment in commissaries, schools, recreation facilities, family centers, child care, family advocacy, transition assistance, relocation services, and others from approximately $1,500 per Service member in FY 1990 to approximately $2,100 in FY 2000 (based on constant 1990 dollars).

· DoD has started full-day kindergarten and reduced pupil-teacher ratios in the early grades within DoD-dependent schools. In addition, the number of school psychologists and guidance counselors has been increased.

· The Department has also made an investment in technology for DoD schools. Their average of one Pentium-class computer for every 4.8 students is well above the national average.

· More than 95 percent of DoD child development centers are nationally accredited, compared with 8 percent of the civilian child care centers in the United States. In May 2000, the National Women’s Law Center pointed to the military child care system as a nationwide model.

· DoD has added more than $200 million for the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) program and for improving physical fitness centers. Since 1995, funding for these programs has increased by 19 percent.

**Household Goods Transportation (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

The Department of Defense is working hard to improve the way in which we contract for the movement of household goods and related services. Our goal is to provide world-class service for the movement of the most precious possessions of all DoD personnel. We move approximately 650,000 military and civilian families every year—more than any U.S. corporation—at a cost of nearly $1.2 billion. We are actively pursuing initiatives that will reengineer the personal property shipping process. This will incorporate best industry practices, which simplify the moving process and improve service. These initiatives are grounded in a common principle: that military families deserve the same quality of moving services enjoyed by the private sector. DoD initiatives include:

1. Selection of vendors based on “best value,” rather than lowest cost (Service Member-Arranged Move);

2. Commercial-sourcing the entire household goods shipment process to a commercial relocation company (Full Service Move Project);

3. Improved Do-It-Yourself Program to increase the monetary allowance for participants from 80 to 95 percent of what the government would have paid to accomplish the move (institutionalized in February 1998); and 

4. The use of Purchase Cards to ensure prompt and easy payment.

Through these initiatives, we save critical taxpayer dollars and provide the best possible service to our members. We are also working with the moving industry and members of Congress to seek their support for our efforts.

The Service Member-Arranged Move (SAM) is an initiative to streamline and simplify the current system for transportation of household goods (HHG). SAM is a Navy pilot for streamlining and simplifying member-arranged movement of household goods. 

Prior to SAM, Navy members had basically two HHG movement options: the government-arranged move and the do-it-yourself (DITY) move. The government-arranged moves allow minimal involvement in the management of the move; carriers are assigned business based on a rotating list. A DITY move is just what the name implies: the Navy members move their household goods and are reimbursed for the cost. SAM provides a third “option” for the service member. The goal of SAM is to offer a set of choices that will fit the member’s specific needs; give the member more control over the move process; provide a better-quality move; and reduce damage, loss, and claims. An empowering element of the SAM program is that it allows for a member’s participation in the selection of the carrier. The Personal Property Office will provide Navy members with a list of participating carriers and documentation of their past performance relative to on-time pickup, on-time delivery, damage, loss, claims, and overall customer satisfaction. Carrier performance under SAM is measured by customer surveys completed at the end of each move. Under SAM, the member will decide which carrier best meets his or her needs. SAM promotes competition among carriers to improve quality and to reduce damage, loss, and claims. The carrier industry welcomes the use of commercial practices, and guaranteed prompt payment via the government Visa card eliminates burdensome government regulations. 

The Full Service Move Project****(FSMP) is designed to streamline and simplify the movement of household goods. It provides the Service members with numerous QOL benefits that make moving easier, including point-to-point move management, personal move coordination, on-time delivery guarantee, binding cost estimate, quality control over carriers’ performance, direct claims processing, and a full-replacement-value protection for lost or damaged items. They also include optional move management services such as home finding for buyers and renters and home selling. Government benefits include administrative, claim, and overhead cost reductions. With the FSMP, the move manager is the member’s single point of contact that integrates the member’s relocation from origin counseling to destination delivery and throughout the claims process. The DoD has partnered with three independent firms to ensure a quality process. Dun and Bradstreet will screen move managers and transportation providers for financial and performance risk. The Gallup Organization will survey test participants on the quality of their move; results will determine whether transportation providers receive future DoD business. The U.S. Bank’s Powertrack systems will be used to electronically pay move managers and transportation providers within three days of notification of delivery. The FSMP will be a best-value acquisition with full and open competition. Presently, the National Capital region, Georgia, and North Dakota are being used as test sites. Estimated annual volume is 45,000 shipments. DoD awarded seven Move Manager contracts on August 25, 2000 and 189 Transportation Provider service agreements on September 8, 2000.  Two Full Service Move pilot programs were started in January 2001 and the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is scheduled to evaluate progress for DoD-wide implementation in 2002/2003.

***FUTURE FOCUS***

In moving to a best-value service to promote customer service levels, DoD’s actual total move costs may show a resulting increase, especially if all costs are not captured (including indirect cost). Emphasis should be placed on capturing overall program costs, including the amount of time that a Service member spends involved in the household goods movement process and the reduction in costs associated with reduced damage predicted under the pilots. U.S. Transportation Command’s evaluation is ongoing for the SAM and FSMP pilots and will evaluate which HHG initiatives promote best practices and best value to DoD.

***CHALLENGES***

**Permanent Change of Station (PCS) (STATUS: Off-Track, Continue)**

This initiative seeks to improve PCS moves for Military Service members. The Department of Defense has more than 2 million active military and civilian employees located throughout the world. The current process to relocate DoD personnel, their families, and their property is complex and time-consuming and involves a minimum of 10 major functional areas. In 1999, DoD moved almost 650,000 military members, civilian employees, and their families. Annually, the direct costs were more than $3 billion, with a loss of more than 30,000 man-years of productivity . . . not to mention the adverse effect on morale, retention, and readiness. Because of these adverse impacts, DoD is taking significant steps to change the relocation travel process. First, we are working on simplifying relocation entitlements and formulas. Working with the Congress to update federal laws and streamline DoD regulations so that they’re easy to understand will also help reduce complexity. Next, we will reengineer the relocation process. During reengineering, we’ll develop methods to facilitate automated computations, as well as improve quality of life and customer satisfaction. After reengineering, we intend to implement an improved relocation system using standard business and reengineering methodologies to eliminate redundancy, automate manual processes, and maximize the use of electronic commerce. These initiatives will help to reduce the workload and out-of-pocket expenses imposed on the moving family. They’ll also facilitate communications between the losing and gaining commands within the Department. Ultimately, DoD’s goal is to implement a modernized relocation system. Using streamlined processes and up-to-date technology, we hope to field a vastly improved system for moving Departmental personnel to meet mission requirements.

***FUTURE FOCUS***

To date, efforts have been focused on the development of a Web-based solution to solve PCS problems, with little progress being made toward simplifications of entitlement policies or lump sum payments. Web-based solutions have been put on hold while DoD, under the direction of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy, works on forming a cross-functional, multi-Service team.  This team will develop a new and innovative approach to reengineer the PCS process and policy by taking full advantage of commercial best practices.

**Temporary Duty Travel (STATUS: Off-Track, Reevaluate)**

Temporary duty travel for the Department of Defense has never been easy. The current process is paper-based, not customer-focused. DoD’s new Defense Travel System (DTS) uses information technologies to authorize travel arrangements, as well as to compute travel claims—and does it all in an electronic environment from the convenience of a desktop computer. The goal is to significantly reengineer today’s travel process (from 40 to 21 steps). No longer will a traveler have to obtain paper copies of orders from one location (presently a multistep process); go to the Commercial Travel Office to arrange for transportation, lodging, and rental car; and then file a paper-copy travel voucher upon completion of the trip. These functions will be accomplished seamlessly from the workstation via computer. In addition, the traveler will request permission to travel and obtain approval from his or her designated authorizing official via electronic means. By streamlining the travel management function, DTS is expected to provide direct cost savings of $100 million a year when fully implemented and a total of $481 million over an eight-year period. Travelers will also save *time*: pilot site programs showed that DTS reduced average payment time from more than 11 days to less than 6, cut in half the number of steps for processing travel, and reduced travel management process time by two-thirds. 

Initial deployment of DTS was slated to begin no later than January 2001 to meet the Hotel/Motel Fire Safety Act, which requires that government travelers use a travel management system by January 1, 2001. DTS has been under development for five years, however, and has yet to achieve initial operational capability (IOC). Delays have been primarily due to difficulties associated with establishing a DoD-wide solution to the information systems security challenges related to electronic data interchange between a central travel system and the thousands of implementation sites. As a result of the long development cycle, DTS technology is lagging behind current technology and is based on a client/server vice a Web-based approach. 

DTS began “real-time” operational assessment testing with actual travelers in October 2000 at Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri, after successful laboratory testing at Fort Huachucha, Arizona. IOC is scheduled for early 2001 in one of 19 areas in the United States, and the DTS project management office has developed an ambitious schedule that will enable full deployment of the system by December 2003. By 2004, we estimate that well over 3 million travelers will be able to take advantage of the Defense Travel System. The next steps in the Department’s efforts to reengineer travel will focus on relocation and Reserve Component travel.

***FUTURE FOCUS***

Because of the delay in the DTS deployment, coupled with the requirement of government travelers to use a travel management system by January 1, 2001, several DoD Components have either developed their own travel management system or had private contractors develop systems for them. Furthermore, within all of the federal government, there are several systems already being used by federal travelers. None of the DoD or federal government systems do all that DTS promises to accomplish, but each system is meeting the needs of its customers and is frequently using Web-based technology that is ahead of DTS. Also, DTS is dependent upon a digital signature for vouchers that require Public Key Infrastructure and Common Access Card technologies that are not due to be fully implemented until 2003. Thus once IOC is achieved with DTS, a study needs to be conducted that determines whether DTS meets the desired goals or whether DoD should instead use another, more simple, already proven, and possibly more cost-effective system.

**Improve Military Housing (STATUS: Off-Track, Continue)**

A top Department of Defense priority—and among the most important aspects of our Service members’ lives—is the quality of their housing. About a third of our personnel live in DoD-owned housing, much of it in need of revitalization or replacement. DoD owns about 300,000 housing units. Approximately 200,000 units are old and in need of extensive repair. However, using traditional military construction practices and funding, it would take *30 years* and about *$16 billion dollars* to improve them to an acceptable condition. In January 2000, Secretary Cohen announced a major three-prong initiative to improve military housing, which includes the following components: 

1. Increase housing allowances to eliminate the out-of-pocket costs being paid by Service members for off-base housing in the United States.

2. Increase reliance on the private sector through privatization.

3. Maintain military construction. 

The first prong has been previously discussed under the BAH section, but the second and third prongs are designed to further strengthen ongoing efforts to eliminate DoD’s inadequate on-base family housing by FY 2010 through the increased use of privatization, as well as traditional military construction. The DoD’s Military Housing Privatization Initiative, which was signed into law in 1996, provides powerful tools to help acquire, operate, and maintain DoD’s housing. These tools help DoD decrease expenses and eliminate traditional costs by fundamentally revising the way that we fund and build housing. 

Through privatization, it is estimated that the backlog can be worked off in 10 years. Under the program, private companies build or refurbish and then manage family housing units. DoD will generally invest up to 25 percent of the cost of a project, and contractors borrow the rest from financial institutions. At the end of FY 2000, 8,444 units have been privatized: 1,000 units in FY 1998, 2,700 in FY 1999, and 4,744 in FY 2000. We’re working on privatizing several thousand units this fiscal year. Larger allowances increase the income available to private-sector developers, improving the quantity and quality of privatized housing. The Department will continue to review and encourage housing privatization projects by each Service. 

The combination of increased allowances and expanded use of privatization will allow for more efficient use of current family housing construction funding, the third prong of Secretary Cohen’s initiative. Increased availability of quality private-sector options will relieve some pressure for on-base housing; reduce the need to maintain older, high-cost units; and better allow resources to be devoted to improving and maintaining needed on-base housing. Using all three prongs of Secretary Cohen’s housing initiative together will go far in improving the availability and quality of living for our Service members, which will help us attract and retain top-quality personnel. 

***FUTURE FOCUS***

This initiative is considered a “Challenge” because the privatization program got off to a slow start and thus initial goals were not achieved. The program’s slow start can be attributed to its complexity and newness, because DoD had to work with the parties (installation commanders and private industry contractors) to prove the Services’ long-term commitment to housing privatization. In addition, both parties needed time to be convinced that these new financing techniques would actually work. It is anticipated that the long-term outcome of this initiative will be a huge success. In addition to improving the Service members’ quality of life, significant cost savings are anticipated because military construction (MILCON) expenses are approximately five times the amount of the DoD privatization investment. The goal is to eliminate substandard housing by 2010, but to achieve this goal will require a significant increase in the current pace of privatization, as well as a significant improvement in Service commitment to the additional MILCON funding required to address other substandard housing. 

V.FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

The Department’s goal is to streamline and redesign DoD financial processes and organizations in order to make them optimally effective and cost-efficient. These reforms also seek to ensure that financial management fulfills the needs of its leaders, satisfies statutory requirements, minimizes the potential for fraud, and provides superior customer service. The two major process owners that support and are responsible for the financial management defense reforms are the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS).

As part of the efforts to overhaul financial operations and systems, the Department is eliminating redundancy in, and reducing the cost of, accounting and finance activities. By standardizing systems, consolidating operating locations, and implementing more modern technologies, DFAS has significantly reduced the cost of finance and accounting operations, while improving the quality of services. DFAS has consolidated 330 Defense accounting offices into 26 locations, standardized financial systems (for civilian pay, military pay, retiree pay, and annuity pay) and debt management, and reengineered business practices.

Regarding financial business practices reform, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is committed to obtaining an “unqualified audit opinion” for the government’s financial statements. Within DoD, the Secretary of Defense designated the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to oversee the efforts to improve the manner in which financial information is captured and reported in all the systems—not just financial systems. Taking measures to correct systemic deficiencies is a Departmentwide management challenge. To accomplish this objective, initiatives to improve the accuracy, timeliness, and usefulness of financial information are being developed. To achieve favorable audit opinions, a number of steps are being taken to modify acquisition, logistics, medical, and personnel processes. These steps allow a focus on the functionality needed to adequately capture and report new information. To that end, the Department has developed a strategic long-term “concept of operations” for financial management to meet the goal of obtaining an “unqualified” audit opinion by the end of FY 2003.

***SUCCESSES***

**Consolidate and Improve Financial Management Operations (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

The goal was to consolidate more than 330 Service finance and accounting locations into 26 locations by FY 2000 and to make them more effective and efficient. This consolidation was achieved in FY 1998, two years ahead of schedule. The success of these consolidations has allowed DFAS to reorganize and shift from a geographical focus to a “business line” focus, similar to what many leading global corporations have done. The DFAS reorganization along the three business lines of Accounting, Personnel Pay, and Commercial Pay Services has helped DoD improve its business practices.

***NEAR-TERM PRIORITIES***

Although the Services’ finance and accounting locations were consolidated by the end of FY 1998 (two years ahead of schedule), further opportunities for continued consolidation should be sought to optimize efficiency and effectiveness. The Services continue to employ approximately 20,000 finance and accounting (F/A) personnel, exclusive of budgeting personnel, and this number is nearly equal to the total number of personnel engaged in similar activities within DFAS. The reason for the Services’ continued large presence of F/A personnel is that “exceptions” to the consolidation initiative were granted to the Services for many F/A activities. It is recommended that the Services review the exception agreements to see whether they remain valid. The DoD Comptroller should then review the Services’ findings, and where a disagreement exists with regard to the continued validity of an exception, the case should be forwarded to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for a decision. The objective is to further reduce redundant F/A positions in the Services.

***FUTURE FOCUS***

*Reorganization.*This recommendation pertains to the manner in which the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Financial Management) is organized. The Department should consider reorganizing the Under Secretary’s Office so that the Comptroller and the Chief Financial Officer are separate functions, not the same person. There are two distinct functions under the Under Secretary’s purview: budgeting and financial management. Consideration should be given to making the Comptroller (political appointee) responsible for budgeting and programming, and the Chief Financial Officer (career civil servant) responsible for accounting policy and financial operations. This recommendation is expected to result in the overall increased effectiveness of the Office of the Under Secretary.

*Performance-Based Organization.*The Administration should also consider studying the creation of a quasi-governmental organization or a federal corporation to perform the DFAS mission, like Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae. At a minimum, DFAS would be a performance-based organization similar to the Office of Student Financial Assistance Programs (the Federal Government’s first performance-based organization) within the Department of Education. All of this would require legislation, but offers great managerial flexibility. 

**Reduce the Number of Financial Systems (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

The intent of this goal is to leverage technology and change processes to improve performance and reduce cost by reducing the number of finance and accounting systems.

DoD has made significant progress in reducing the number of accounting and finance systems deployed by the Services and Agencies. In 1991 (baseline year), DoD had 324 finance and accounting systems. By 1997, the number had been reduced to 156, and at the end of FY 2000, the number of accounting and finance systems in operation had been further reduced to 76, a reduction of 77 percent from 1991. DoD’s goal is to shrink the number of systems to a total of 38 by the end of FY 2005.

The Department’s approach for improving financial management is to move toward an integrated financial management system that comprises primarily substantially compliant finance, accounting, and critical feeder systems. The strategy for achieving integrated financial management systems includes eliminating unnecessary systems and consolidating others—the Department’s goal is to eliminate outdated, noncompliant systems. Accounting and finance systems are compliant when they substantially meet Federal Financial Management System requirements, adhere to applicable federal accounting standards, and use the U.S. Standard General Ledger at the transaction level. By standardizing financial management systems, DoD will also be able to decrease the time that it takes to get reports back to the customers. This, in turn, will lead to the improvement of timely and accurate financial management decisions.

**Reconciling Disbursements (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

As part of the efforts to overhaul financial operations and systems and reduce the amount of problem disbursements, the Department is eliminating redundancy in, and reducing the cost of, accounting and finance activities. The goal is to reduce problem disbursements from $34.3 billion (1993 baseline) to $2.0 billion by the end of FY 2000. At the end of FY 1999 (latest data), DoD had reduced problem disbursements to $5.5 billion—an 84 percent improvement in reconciling disbursements with official accounting records from FY 1993.  This improves cash flow for vendors and reduces late payments.  Also, elimination of problem disbursements will not only improve the accuracy of the Department’s financial records but also significantly reduce the amount of overhead resources devoted to “cleanup” of existing out-of-balance contractual instruments. In addition, elimination of problem disbursements should significantly shrink the backlog of physically complete contracts that require additional funds in order to be closed out.

**Reduce Characters in Lines of Accounting (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

In March 2000, the Defense Management Council tasked the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense [OUSD (Comptroller)] to simplify the lines of accounting for contractual transactions under $2,500. Presently, many lines of accounting are in excess of 200 characters and must be input manually into contract-writing and contract-administration systems. As a result, the opportunity for error is increased with every additional character that must be input. Errors are often undetected until an invoice is submitted and an unmatched disbursement results from discrepancies in the various accounting and payment systems, or when the contract cannot be closed out because the accounting information cannot be reconciled. Initially, the acquisition and financial management communities indicated that they could not decrease the number of accounting characters because of extraneous information requirements imposed by the Services. However, the OUSD (Comptroller) proposed a “technical work-around” using a standard fiscal code (SFC) to reduce the number of characters in each line of accounting. DFAS is now in the process of developing SFCs for use in the DFAS Corporate Database (the future migration system) that will bridge both financial and nonfinancial feeder systems. Although the DFAS Corporate Database is not expected to be operational until September 2001, results of initial testing using revised SFCs have been favorable.

***CHALLENGES***

**Reengineer DoD Business Practices (STATUS: Off-Track, Continue)**

The overall goal is to make DoD financial business practices straightforward, more efficient, and more effective in order to meet stakeholder, customer, and staff requirements. One key element of this transformation process is to develop a future Defense Procurement and Payment System that achieves a paperless environment. To meet this goal, the Department must take advantage of improvements in information technology and harness the power of Web-enabled technologies in developing electronic solutions. DFAS is promoting the paperless exchange of financial information through a variety of initiatives such as electronic document management (EDM). In addition, World Wide Web applications are enabling on-line, real-time access to documents needed to perform bill-paying and accounting operations.

Overall, the Department’s efforts to reengineer existing business processes related to financial management have been lagging. The Department has successfully developed a future financial management system architecture that reengineers many of today’s funding, accounting, and payment processes to form the Defense Procurement and Payment System. However, many of the business rules associated with the reengineered to-be systems have not been agreed to by the Services. Developing a future DoD-wide paperless system that addresses the myriad of DoD and Service requirements is a daunting task, particularly given the wide range of contractual actions that must be included in any new system, ranging from small purchases priced under $100,000 to major weapon system procurements costing billions of dollars. In some cases, financial rules must be based on commercial practices, and in others, payment rules must follow government-unique financing and auditing provisions.

***NEAR-TERM PRIORITIES***

The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 mandates that processes be reengineered in advance of implementing automated systems. Within the Department business processes for purchases under $2,500 (micropurchases) have not been reengineered and this could result in the automation of inefficient processes. The Department should reexamine the current business practice of keeping track of every transaction used with a government credit card for purchases below $2,500. If the Department wishes to drive a behavioral change, it must be willing to use risk management techniques and answer the question, “What is the value-added of keeping track of each purchase under $2,500?” Significant savings may be achieved by implementing one or both of the following actions for micropurchases:

1. Let the Defense Finance and Accounting Service directly post the Services’ obligations; and/or

2. Go to a non-transaction-based accounting methodology.

· Have random samples populate accounting data using analytical methods to produce summary reports.

· Use sampling techniques to develop object class/budget quality data.

**Produce Auditable Financial Statements (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

The goal is for the Department to receive an “unqualified” audit opinion on its financial statements for FY 2003. An unqualified, or clean, audit opinion is the best opinion that may be provided by an auditor and, when given, means that the financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position, results of operations, and cash flows of the entity in conformance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), through the Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service, is responsible for compliance with this goal.

Almost all of the Department’s accounting systems were designed to ensure that funds appropriated by the Congress were obligated and spent for the purposes expressly authorized. The financial systems perform these tracking functions quite well, ensuring, for example, that monies appropriated for research and development or procurement are obligated in the time period authorized by law and only for the intended purpose. However, most of the accounting systems in use by DoD were not designed to meet GAAP and did not incorporate features such as accrual accounting that are prevalent outside the government.

The single largest reason for DoD’s present inability to furnish an unqualified audit statement stems from its reliance on a large number of antiquated and, in many cases, nonfinancial “feeder” systems that do not integrate well with the Department’s financial management systems. It is estimated that less than half of the information needed for sound financial management originates in systems under the control of the Department’s financial management community. The remainder comes from feeder systems—primarily from logistics, acquisition, personnel, and medical systems. 

Approximately 70 of these feeder systems provide critical financial data to DFAS to satisfy disbursement, accounting, and financial reporting purposes. These automated feeder systems are used by the Services and Defense Agencies to operate and maintain inventories, supplies, equipment, war reserve materiel, and human resources. These systems are vital to military commanders’ knowing that they have the correct assets to fulfill their missions. Although the Comptroller community does not manage these systems, they provide critical financial data such as the cost of assets used, lost, or consumed during operations. While it may be assumed that federal financial management requirements pertain only to financial reporting, the truth is that such financial management requirements also pertain to the visibility and control of most physical assets.

The following primary issues are associated with correcting deficiencies in DoD feeder systems: 

1. General lack of expertise in the feeder systems community in defining and interpreting applicable federal financial management systems requirements;

2. Implementation of “transaction-driven” general ledger requirements;

3. Providing summarized data for like financial transactions versus feeding detailed data for each individual transaction; and,

4. Handling deficiencies in mixed systems in which DFAS controls financial functions and the Military Services or Defense Agencies control nonfinancial functions.

***NEAR-TERM PRIORITIES***

The critical challenge is for the Services to develop real, funded strategies for updating/fixing their old feeder systems. Service feeder systems provide approximately 80 percent of all finance and accounting information to DFAS, and most of these feeder systems are outmoded and not interoperable. As part of the FY 2003 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process, the Services and Defense Agencies should be directed to submit corrective action plans, with detailed resource requirements, to remedy the shortcomings associated with their current feeder systems. Also, the Department should consider having feeder systems added to the list of priorities for the Defense Management Council to review. Consideration should be given to having someone outside the financial management community with a strong program management focus steer this project to completion. If the Department seeks an integrated end-to-end supply chain management solution, feeder systems would come under the purview of the E-Business Czar discussed in chapter III.

***FUTURE FOCUS***

The Department has developed a comprehensive blueprint for remedying its shortcomings: the Financial Management Improvement Plan (FMIP). In October 1998, DoD submitted to the Congress its first biennial FMIP, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1998. Since then, the Department has voluntarily updated and submitted annual revisions. The Plan includes the Department’s concept of operations, which addresses both financial systems and nonfinancial feeder systems. The projected timeline for having new or improved systems in place is September 30, 2003. In the short term, the Department is attempting to develop interim solutions to support a more favorable audit opinion prior to 2003. DoD has hired Certified Public Accounting (CPA) firms to assist in the valuation of property and in the development of new procedures on accountability. These actions are being accomplished in partnership with the Office of Management and Budget, the General Accounting Office, and the DoD Office of the Inspector General.

While the target date for completing the FMIP is almost three years away, the Department faces daunting challenges for achieving the end state. Existing business/financial processes must be reengineered to take advantage of the new, automated systems and allow for a seamless transition. However, prior to business process reengineering, the financial management community must work closely with the audit community to develop detailed policy guidance to assist the Services/Agencies in identifying and reporting additional information not previously required. Many of the 70 critical feeder systems are mixed systems that are jointly owned by DFAS and the other Services/Agencies. Care must be taken to ensure that both parties understand their separate and joint responsibilities for migration systems so that accuracy and accountability are maintained. Moreover, given the large number of workers who input data into existing feeder systems, workforce education and training will need to be conducted on the migration systems to allow for job redesign and to provide cultural acceptance of the adapted environment. The goal should be not only to receive an unqualified audit opinion but also to improve the quality of the financial information to enable better decision making by DoD officials.

##### VI.COMPETITION

Competition is the driving force in the American economy. It forces organizations to improve quality, reduce costs, and focus on customers’ needs. Continuously spurred by these forces, American firms are now global leaders in innovation, cost performance, and technological development. Competition offers these same benefits to DoD and plays a critical role in our reform effort. Our bases and forces require support in a number of service areas. Buildings must be maintained, equipment must be repaired, and checks must be written. Uniformed personnel or civilian government workers now perform many of these activities. Often there is no reason why this work cannot be performed by the private sector. In such cases, following the example of America’s leading firms, DoD benefits greatly by introducing the dynamic forces of competition into the procurement of support activities.

Competition between the public and private sectors is not new. We have conducted such competitions in the past, typically saving at least 20 percent of the contract cost as a result. Many states and local communities have also begun using competition to take advantage of its benefits. They too have found that competition improves services and lowers cost. As the growing body of experience demonstrates, competition leads both the public and private sectors to find new ways to improve service and lower cost.

We do not seek to replace government workers with private-sector contractors. Our DoD civilian employees are dedicated, skilled, and hardworking. We fully expect—and our own experience has shown—that the government sector will win a significant portion of these competitions. But when it does, it will be because it provides the best service at the best price. The Department benefits, as does the American taxpayer and our fighting forces.

To ensure that competitions between the public and private sectors occur on a level playing field, the government has established a formal process, outlined in OMB Circular A-76 and its revised Supplement. The Supplement sets forth detailed, “how-to” procedures for conducting cost comparisons to determine whether commercial activities should be performed in-house or by the private sector. The process mandates competition between the government organization currently doing the work and the private sector. As part of the process, the public-sector organization is able to reform into a “most efficient organization” to compete. In order to win a competition, a private-sector bid must be at least 10 percent lower than the public-sector bid.

*Competitive Sourcing remains a major pillar of the Defense Reform Initiative and the Department’s business strategy. We must continue to demonstrate that significant cost savings and performance enhancements may be obtained through a commitment to a fair but aggressive implementation of this program.*

Jacques S. Gansler

Under Secretary of Defense 

                                                            (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)

The Strategic Sourcing Program, embraced by the Department in 1999, is a broader approach to maximizing effectiveness, efficiencies, and savings in DoD. The approach cuts across all functions and organizations, permitting Components to take a complete look at how they do business and to achieve savings proactively in all their functions, rather than focus only on commercial activities. The goal of the Strategic Sourcing Program is to determine whether processes can be eliminated, improved, or streamlined and should not be interpreted as avoidance or replacement of A-76. The value of a Strategic Sourcing approach is that an assessment of every function or organization is made, regardless of whether the function or activity is commercial, commercial exempt from competition, or inherently governmental. Some of the Strategic Sourcing techniques include elimination of obsolete practices, consolidation of functions, reengineering of processes, restructuring of organizations, activity-based costing (ABC), and adoption of best business practices. 

***SUCCESSES***

**Number of Positions Competed (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

In 1997, DoD announced a goal to compete 150,000 positions between FYs 1997 and 2003 under the Competitive Sourcing or A-76 process. In 1999, DoD embraced Strategic Sourcing and established a goal to compete 244,000 positions between FYs 1997 and 2005. Today, we are on track to meet our goals and have more than 125,000 positions in one phase or another of Competitive or Strategic Sourcing. We anticipate saving $11.7 billion from FYs 1997 to 2005 through this combined process.

***CHALLENGES***

**A-76 Process (STATUS: Off-Track, Reevaluate)**

The A-76 process is lengthy and onerous. While much progress has been made to streamline and smooth the process, there remains much resistance to undertaking these studies without top-down emphasis. The peak rate of Competitive Sourcing studies (36,000) was achieved primarily because the Defense Reform Initiative mandated a significant surge in planned studies. The resultant projected savings became a wedge that the Services struggled to achieve. This struggle intensified as they determined that fewer A-76 studies could be completed than originally projected. During the FY 2002–2007 Program Review, suggestions to require increased out-year study targets were opposed by the Services and not supported by the Defense Resources Board.

Federal employee unions who see Competitive Sourcing as a downsizing effort resist this program. The private sector strongly supports increased studies, and the interaction of the two creates high Congressional interest. In addition, OMB supports very aggressive targets to achieve a more efficient, cost-effective government.  History shows, however, that without mandatory program goals, the number of studies quickly reduce. Current projections for A-76 studies drop from a peak of about 36,000 positions in FY 1999 to 4,000 in FY 2007.

### 

Strategic Sourcing shows significant promise in rationalizing an overall cost-efficiency strategy by functional areas, rather than by full-time equivalent (FTE) positions. Currently pursued by the Navy Department, the Army and the Air Force are starting to look into Strategic Sourcing as well. It is too soon to tell, however, what the ultimate impact of the Strategic Sourcing Program will be on the Department. 

For Competitive Sourcing, we recommend that the new Administration establish a reasonable target for out-year studies that is not arbitrary, but relies upon solid inventory data that cannot be easily manipulated. While it would be logical to establish this target based on the number of commercial positions, the inventory process is still being refined. Coding of positions as “commercial” remains inconsistent across the Components because of inherent subjectivity. An alternate approach is to establish the target relative to the total civilian population plus military performing commercial functions. The Department is required to collect and report this information annually by the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act. Finally, targets could be derived based on prior-year execution rates, although such targets would likely be opposed on the grounds that no commercial functions remained to be studied. 

A more radical or comprehensive approach would be to rethink how we go about efficiency improvements, focusing more on whole functional or business areas, rather than upon “non–inherently governmental” positions. So, for example, functional areas requiring large technological or capital infusions or significant skill set changes (possibly information technology functions) could be prioritized Departmentwide for review, using a variety of mechanisms, including A-76 competitions, Strategic Sourcing, or wholesale policy decisions to get government entirely out of certain business areas. Other functional areas that historically and verifiably have shown the most cost savings through competition (possibly base operating services) could also be prioritized. Out-year goals could be set without dictating specific competition targets or assigning budget wedges. Centralized management and expertise could be improved, with a focus on broad functional areas, rather than upon site-specific activities. Management/union partnerships could also be enhanced, with a focus upon functional area efficiency and future skill-set requirements.

**VII.SAVING THROUGH ELIMINATING UNNEEDED INFRASTRUCTURE**

For the Department of Defense, post–Cold War budget realities include a steady-state, no-growth fiscal environment that has seen force reductions outstrip infrastructure reductions. Recognizing this imbalance, Congress authorized four previous Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) rounds, which will account for a cumulative $14 billion in savings by the end of implementation in 2001. If DoD is to achieve similar impact savings in the near term, additional BRAC rounds will have to be authorized by Congress and executed. Eliminating unneeded infrastructure represents the greatest potential for dollar savings in the out-years. The initiatives in this chapter include key aspects for correctly sizing the fixed installations’ portion of the Defense budget. In addition to BRAC, DoD is pursuing other initiatives that focus on more efficiently streamlining fixed installations’ costs, including management of off-base leases, demolition of excess facilities/structures, privatization of military housing and base utility systems, and reduction in energy consumption.

***SUCCESSES***

**Demolition and Disposal of Excess and Obsolete Defense Facilities (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

The Services demolished and disposed of 44.9 million square feet from FY1998-2000.  After completing three years of a six-year initiative, the Department of Defense is 5.5 million square feet ahead of its plan and has achieved 56% of its long-term goal (80.1 million square feet disposed by the end of FY2003).  

**Table VII-1**

### Cumulative Square Feet Demolished Planned versus Completed

(In Millions)

The Marine Corps, after demolishing 665 buildings, has exceeded the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) goal of 2.1 million square feet, but plans, as do most of the other Services, to continue to identify and demolish obsolete facilities in the future.  

The Department has expended $473 million dollars to achieve the cumulative FY1998-2000 result ​– an average of $10.53 per square foot demolished.  The cost per square foot goal at the three-year mark is $11.36 – meaning results so far are about 7 percent under target cost.  The lower cost is primarily for three reasons:

· lower cost projects in the early years (e.g. more vacant, easy-to-demolish buildings),

· use of technology (such as the Air Force’s “building grinder”), and 

· higher than anticipated salvage prices.

However, costs will continue to rise as the easier demolition candidates are removed from the inventory.  Future demolition projects, such as wastewater treatment plants and electrical power stations, are constructed with more concrete and masonry, thus costing more to demolish.  The increase is also caused, in part, by costs of consolidation since some of the current demolition candidates are not vacant.

Also, in addition to buildings (square footage), the Services are demolishing selected non-building facilities (non-square footage) from the inventory.  FY 2000 examples include fuel tanks and engine test pads.  These projects are funded within the demolition expenditures but are in addition to the DRI square feet targets.  At present the costs for these non-buildings are included in the overall reported costs for buildings.

Through FY 2000, DoD has avoided approximately $95 million in operations and maintenance costs due to the demolition investment in FYs 1998 and 1999.  In FY 2000 and continuing each year thereafter, DoD will avoid approximately $90 million in costs due to these demolition efforts, and future demolitions will increase this figure.  Consistent with DRI, the Services will retain any savings for use in other high priority programs.

***FUTURE FOCUS***

The current metric of counting the square footage of demolished facilities is an output measure and conforms to the original goal. Because of varying costs, varying structures, and varying use of structures DoD-wide, utility costs are not tracked on a per structure basis. However, estimated dollar savings for maintenance costs, based on the estimated standard cost of $2 per square foot, can still be monitored to calculate the benefit of this initiative and produce an “outcome”-oriented metric. At $2 per square foot, projected cumulative maintenance savings from disposal could reach $160 million recurring annual savings from disposal through FY 2003.

**Energy Management – Reduce Energy Consumption (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

By Presidential order, the Department must decrease its consumption of electricity, water, and natural gas. The President’s goal: to reduce energy consumption per square foot in our buildings and facilities by 30 percent *below* 1985 levels by 2005 and by 35 percent *below* 1985 levels by 2010.

Under Executive Order (E.O.) 13123, energy consumption is measured as an aggregate ratio of British thermal units (Btus) per gross square foot. The 1985 baseline was 135 thousand Btus per gross square foot. The Department is currently on track to achieve both the 30 percent and 35 percent reductions by 2005 and 2010 of 94.5 thousand Btus and 87.7 thousand Btus, respectively. These reductions are being accomplished by upgrading existing buildings with energy-efficient systems and using new, sustainable design techniques to increase the energy efficiency of new construction. 

**Base Realignment and Closure (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

This is the number one defense reform priority. The Defense Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process was enacted by Congress to achieve cost savings in facility infrastructure created by post–Cold War military personnel reductions. A bipartisan, independent commission convened over closure rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 and depoliticized the base closure process as much as possible. Their recommendations had to be approved or disapproved in total by both the President and Congress. The implementation of the four BRAC rounds will conclude in September 2001, with cumulative one-time savings projected to total $14 billion at that time. Annual recurring savings from the BRAC rounds are projected to be $5.7 billion per year. Savings associated with BRAC closures are typically operations and maintenance costs that are not borne by DoD once a base has been closed. The focus of the present DRI is to have two additional BRAC rounds authorized for 2003 and 2005.

***NEAR-TERM PRIORITIES***

Although the Department would like to pursue another round of BRAC in 2003, Congressional authorization would have to occur in calendar year 2001 to adequately plan for this event. The existing metrics for BRAC include the impact on enterprise objectives, currently captured in “Net Savings after Implementation.” This metric is a good indicator of BRAC’s impact on the DoD operating budget and is an appropriate measure of achievement for this initiative. Specific infrastructure reduction targets for the next two rounds would make target achievement easier to determine. Additional output metrics used for BRAC include (1) reduction in excess acres, (2) recurring savings, (3) reductions in plant replacement value, and (4) percentage of major bases closed. Each BRAC closure round is implemented over a six-year period. Both costs and savings are generated during that implementation period, the difference being net implementation savings (or loss). 

Adoption of new, additional metrics for this initiative could provide more detailed outcome metrics with which to assess BRAC successes over the past 12 years and in the future. For example, incorporating cumulative implementation period costs and implementation period savings is an effective way to measure the cumulative implementation net savings (or loss), which can be used with annual recurring savings to more fully display the return on investment of the BRAC process to the taxpayer as a direct result of BRAC rounds. 

***CHALLENGES***

**Energy Management – Privatize DoD Utility Systems (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

DRID #49, “Privatizing Utility Systems, “ directed the Military Departments to award privatization contracts for all eligible utility systems by the end of FY 2003. The DRID also set forth the criteria for exempting systems from the privatization program, for using competitive procedures, and for conducting the economic analyses. The actual number of privatized DoD utility systems is the existing metric identified in the DRIDs. Currently, 312 systems are privately owned and operated; 2,300 systems are being considered for privatization. 

The new DoD policy stated that DoD would be an energy consumer, rather than an energy producer, including the operation and maintenance of systems where possible. The specific goals for implementation of privatization were changed to reflect the complexities of the process. The deregulation of utility systems nationwide has served to complicate, rather than facilitate, privatization efforts because of the interface of state regulatory agencies and their influence over local and regional provider options. In addition, organizational coordination of privatization is proving to be unclear and slow. Varying interpretations of what constitutes a separate utility system among Service Field Components have frustrated attempts to establish an effective baseline for use in a scorecard. In one example of this issue, the Army believed that some of its utilities in Europe were currently privatized because of the wording of the DRID and the difficulty in defining its utilities. As a result, incorrect numbers were reported.

***FUTURE FOCUS***

Utility privatization is complex, time-consuming, and expensive. It requires analyzing state and local laws governing utilities and evaluating offers received from interested utility companies. Efforts should continue to refine the baseline established that sets the number of utility systems to be privatized, as well as the baseline for the total cost of operating utility systems in the preprivatization environment. The comparison of these two baseline figures would allow for assessment of impact of DoD operations after implementation. Establishing clear-cut privatization guidance will also facilitate a more seamless transfer of utility management to privatization.

##### VIII.TRANSFORMING ACQUISTION AND LOGISTICS

*The Department of Defense is engaged in a Revolution in Business Affairs. A significant part of the Revolution is a more efficient and effective acquisition and logistics environment that will deliver high performance weapon systems and support to our warfighters in less time, and at lower total cost of ownership. The end result will be a military force that not only meets the needs of today, but has superior capability over the next decade.*

                     Jacques S. Gansler 

                                   Under Secretary of Defense

                                                                         (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)

*Logistics transformation must be rapid. The goals and objectives of the Logistics Strategic Plan must urgently become today’s capability instead of tomorrow’s vision. We must drive down our costs (e.g., pipeline, maintenance, and logistics footprint costs) as we leverage emerging technology to increase the visibility, accuracy, and speed of logistics operations without compromising our effectiveness. World-class warfighting logistics is our challenge, and we must work together to provide it.*

Dr. John J. Hamre

Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Revolution in Business Affairs at DoD has been underway since 1993 and should continue to be among the highest priorities of the Department’s civilian and military leadership. Within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, primary focus has been on the following three top-level goals:

· Field high-quality defense products quickly; support them responsively,

· Lower the total ownership cost of defense products, and

· Reduce the overhead cost of the acquisition and logistics infrastructure.

Acquisition and logistics are inextricable functions in supporting the warfighters with equipment, supplies, and all other resources that enable our forces to perform their roles throughout the spectrum of mission taskings. Acquisition and logistics processes bring major weapon systems and support equipment into DoD inventories. The logistics process that provides operational support (fuel food, spare parts, finished goods, and other supplies) and maintenance, repair, and overhaul activities are well known. However, the absolutely essential requirement to integrate the logistics role into the acquisition process as soon as the decision is made to start a program is not universally applied, accepted, or understood. 

Even though acquisition and logistics are responsible for a large amount of DoD and private-sector process costs, physical inventories, and the extensive infrastructure needed to acquire and maintain nearly 1,400 DoD weapons systems throughout their life cycles, in today’s era of technological advancement, the U.S. Government, at large, and DoD, in particular, are no longer the driving forces behind the development of most new technology. Technology development is now led by the commercial world, where research and development have increased steadily at a rate of about 5 percent per year for more than 20 years, while U.S. Government spending on research and development has dropped some 2.5 percent per year during the same period. It is clear that this trend will not be reversed, and DoD must improve its ability to take advantage of the commercial marketplace. The result of technology advantages in the commercial sector has been marked by a new era of customer satisfaction and improved performance at lower cost.

A series of acquisition and logistics initiatives have been promulgated over the past decade. Major, comprehensive efforts [such as the establishment of the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform) in 1993], set in motion a series of legislative, process, and workforce improvements. These positive enhancements to the acquisition system culminated in some reduction of the acquisition and logistics costs associated with bringing military materiel into service, improved cycle time, and improved logistics support throughout the weapon system’s life cycle. New legislation (such as the Federal Acquisition Reform Act and the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act) supported reduced government oversight while, in many cases, authorizing best commercial practices to transform the way government acquires and sustains its military capabilities.

Transformation of defense logistics is moving at a slower pace than planned because of institutional resistance, outdated systems, and bureaucratic delays; DoD’s equipment is aging, and most of it cannot be replaced in the near future. Consequently, DoD’s operations and maintenance (O&M) costs will continue to escalate, resulting in reduced readiness at increasing costs. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has stated that unless we reverse the trend quickly and deliberately, DoD will face what he described as a “death spiral”—a situation where reduced readiness requires DoD to divert budget authority from equipment modernization to daily O&M. The results of this death spiral are further delays in modernization, reduced readiness from aging and overused equipment, and increased O&M costs.

The impact of current and future change on a shrinking DoD acquisition and logistics workforce will require near-term workforce professional development efforts and “change management” programs. The objective is to train and motivate the retained workforce, while attracting new recruits. The 21st century acquisition and logistics worker must be able to exploit the new rules and tools that he or she has been given.

Some acquisition and logistics reform efforts are achieving the desired outcomes. The implemented initiatives are delivering newer technology into warfighter hands more rapidly and affordably and, once it is in service, providing support for the required levels of military performance at the lowest levels of total ownership costs. However, the slow pace of implementing the necessary changes has acted as a “drag” on the overall effort to transform the way the Department conducts business, particularly in the logistics arena. Even within the Successes highlighted below, there are a number of recommended near-term and future actions that can be taken to further improve the core area under discussion.

**ACQUISITION INITIATIVES**

***SUCCESSES***

**New Approach to Systems Acquisition (Rewrite of DoD Directive 5000.1) (STATUS: Completed)**

A new DoD systems acquisition process was unveiled in October 2000, by issuance of a completely revamped DoD Directive 5000.1, “The Defense Acquisition System,” and its sister publication, DoD Instruction 5000.2, “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System.” These two companion directives were rewritten to substantially simplify, improve, and provide flexibility in the way the Department manages its acquisition programs. The key objectives of the new guidance are to deliver advanced technology to warfighters faster; reduce total ownership costs; and provide a more flexible acquisition process focused on interoperability, supportability, and affordability. The revised guidance was necessary because the existing acquisition process took too long, cost too much, and was incompatible with modern technology cycles. 

The new acquisition system for the 21st century divides the total process into four major activity phases: Concept and Technology Development, System Development and Demonstration, Production and Deployment, and Operations and Support. Under this new model, technology development is separated from system development. This approach allows new technology opportunities to be introduced along multiple process paths. For example, advanced technology could be introduced at the beginning of each of the first three major phases (or within phases), depending on the relative maturity and risk of the technology application. In the Production and Deployment phase, “Low Rate Initial Production” (LRIP) of a weapon system is now viewed as a more important Departmental commitment than “Full Rate Production.” 

Reducing total ownership costs is a major goal of the new acquisition system. One goal is to deploy new systems earlier, thereby eliminating costly support for older systems. Full funding for systems is now required as a program enters the System Development phase to avoid the budgetary pitfall of having “too many systems chase too few dollars.” Moreover, the new DoD Directive 5000.1 states a preference for using COTS products and standards. Given the advances in information technology, there are increased opportunities for computer simulation and modeling. Also, there is the recognition that software must be mature before deployment and that software development may not follow the same acquisition model as hardware development. DoD is now emphasizing evolutionary (or “spiral”) software development and is requiring the use of the software maturity matrix to reduce risk and shorten product development cycles.

**Performance-Based Service Acquisition (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

As the nation’s “services” sector of the economy grows, so does DoD’s acquisition of nonpersonal services. The Department’s nonpersonal service acquisitions are increasingly large and complex. Statements of work (SOWs) for the acquisition of services are becoming “performance”-based: that is, they describe the expected outcome, rather than how to do the work. Performance-Based Service Acquisition (PBSA) strategies adapt best commercial practices and maximize performance, innovation, and competition. Performance work statements and their associated standards of quantity, quality, timeliness, and quality assurance are all vital components of PBSA. A May 1998 OMB study estimated that performance-based contracting for services (1) saved the government an average of 15 percent over contracts that lacked performance work statements and (2) increased customer satisfaction.

In April 2000, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics issued a new DoD policy that (1) directed the use of performance-based acquisition strategies whenever possible, (2) directed that 50 percent of Service acquisitions are to be performance-based by the year 2005, (3) required the Military Departments and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to develop implementation plans to increase the use of PBSA, and (4) required the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to provide PBSA training to their respective workforces within the next 12 months. Subsequently, the Services and DLA have all issued implementation plans to achieve the goals. Moreover, under the guidance of the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform), the National Contract Management Association and the National Association of Purchasing Managers jointly developed a computer-based on-line PBSA training course. The course is self-directed, and students may register individually or as teams. The course also features facilitation on-site to teams needing to engage in “action learning” through the DoD Change Management Center. In addition, a *PBSA Guidebook* is also being developed for on-line use, which will include examples of SOWs, measurable performance standards, and performance plans.

**Civil/Military Integration (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

Although “Civil/Military Integration” has been a cornerstone of acquisition and logistics reform efforts, results are mixed at best. DoD should increasingly rely on an integrated civil-military industrial base in lieu of a defense-unique industrial base. In fact, today’s modern business entities are part of an industry trend: transitioning to a global commercial industrial base. To ensure a successful transition, the Department has significantly reduced the use of detailed military specifications and standards in favor of far greater use of commercial performance standards. This has led to reduced costs and enabled access to a wider array of technologies and solutions. The Single Process Initiative (SPI), which was launched as a means of eliminating duplicative processes and introducing appropriate, commercial-like processes at defense manufacturing facilities, has enabled the conversion of more than 200 facilities to ISO 9000 standards (replacing DoD’s traditional and unique quality standards) and allowed the rationalization of numerous manufacturing processes. For example, circuit boards for the F-22 are being produced on a commercial—rather than a military—line where DoD can capitalize on advanced commercial technology while taking advantage of a large production run. By taking advantage of these dual-use manufacturing facilities, the Department achieves economies of scale, resulting in cost savings typically between 30 and 50 percent. The SPI has resulted in savings and cost avoidance of more than $500 million from 1996 through 1999.

***NEAR-TERM PRIORITIES***

*Enhance Access to and Use of Commercial Markets, Technologies, and Best Practices.*DoD is struggling to keep pace with, and access, new, leading-edge technologies. The Department has begun the transformation to greater reliance on commercial practices through a host of improvements cited elsewhere in this report, such as Virtual Prime Vendor, Electronic Malls, Single Process Initiatives, and Strategic Supplier Alliances, but there are more actions that should be taken now:

1. Promote performance requirements or conversion to performance requirements during reprocurement of systems, subsystems, components, spares, and services beyond the initial production contract and to include postproduction support;

2. Eliminate regulatory and cultural barriers to supplier partnerships to avoid impeding industry’s adoption of rapidly evolving supply chain management practices;

a. Establish a common vision (e.g., a *DoD Handbook for DoD/Industry Supply Chain Partnerships*); engage in collaborative forums with the Joint Staff/Military Departments/industry.

b. Promote Strategic Supplier Alliances, where appropriate.

3. Encourage commercial performance incentives and greater reliance on past performance information in source selection decisions;

4. Revise intellectual property rules, and develop guidance for the workforce;

5. Continue policy refinement and training associated with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 12, Acquisition of Commercial Items.

a. Promote performance-based (milestone) payments as the preferred method of contract financing.

b. Promote performance-based acquisition strategies (e.g., integrating information technology to ensure that the finest products and services are available to the warfighter).

*Reform Government Property Management*. During the past year, DoD has been the principal architect in rewriting government property policy to make it easier for companies to do business with the Department of Defense and not have to subscribe to a bureaucratic government property “approval” process when it is not warranted. It should be a near-term priority of the incoming Administration to ensure that these revised property rules are finalized and published in the *Federal Register*. The global objectives of the revised property policy are fourfold:

1. Government data will be the primary source for property information;

2. Reporting will be minimized;

3. Limit the amount of government property provided, and take title to less property; and

4. Adopt commercial practices.

The new policy will ensure that providing and taking title to government property is a business decision that offers program managers increased flexibility. For example, where the contractor is the original equipment manufacturer (OEM), the contractor will be able to buy back tooling, thereby eliminating property from the government property record. The contract will become the principal source of record keeping. Property will only enter the government inventory via a contract line item number (CLIN), which will give program managers the authority and responsibility for managing all tangible assets. Finally, oversight of a contractor’s property system will be based on risk, rather than a prescribed requirement.

*Expand Military Specification and Standard Reform.* The initial military specification and standard reform policy (i.e., Single Process Initiative) was limited to new acquisitions. It should be expanded to include legacy systems, which will improve reliability, maintainability, and sustainability through continuous technology refreshment. By extending military specification (MILSPEC) reform to legacy systems, the Department will be able to also reform logistics during all phases of a program’s life cycle. 

*Use Commercial Packaging Techniques in Lieu of Government Packaging Requirements*. The Department is currently conducting a pilot program to test the application of commercial packaging on military requirements. Major third-party logistics (3PL) providers such as FedEx and UPS, to name but two companies, routinely use commercial, state-of-the-art packaging and containers to ship high-value and critical items for private industry end users. This is an area where explosive growth in the private sector, coupled with the emphasis on customer satisfaction, has redefined packaging techniques.

*Develop an Institutional Approach to Exploit the Commercial Business Environment.* DoD has effectively used the Change Management Center in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform) to form Rapid Improvement Teams to reengineer complex government processes into proposed future-state target areas, with implementation plans and measurable performance goals that are actionable within 60–90 days. Continued senior leadership commitment and resource investment in the change management infrastructure for continuous improvement will provide DoD with the ability to capture, package, and reuse best commercial practices and lessons learned. (For a more extensive discussion on institutionalizing “Change,” see chapter X of this report, “The Challenge of Change Management in DoD.”)

**Shaping the Civilian Acquisition Workforce of the Future (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

By 2005, half of the current civilian acquisition, technology, and logistics workforce will be eligible for retirement. The retirement-eligible population of acquisition workers over the next five years is 152,000 members. In October 2000, the Department of Defense’s Acquisition 2005 Task Force issued its report, “Shaping the Civilian Acquisition Workforce of the Future,” which was prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) and the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness). The report provides recommendations for the orderly transition of the aging civilian acquisition workforce to meet the national security requirements of the 21st century. To manage and reshape the civilian acquisition workforce for the future will require leadership commitment, a significant investment of resources in compensation and development programs, new authorities, and, most important, a change in the traditional way that DoD manages its people. To make this transition successful, DoD must employ innovative approaches to recruiting, developing, and retaining its future workforce. 

***NEAR-TERM PRIORITIES***

*Implement the Acquisition 2005 Task Force Recommendations*. The Task Force developed 31 recommendations for implementation in three categories: What We Can Do Immediately, What We Should Start in the Near Term, and What We Need Legislative Authority To Do. Moreover, initiatives to implement these new approaches must begin in early 2001 if DoD is to complete the transition of the acquisition workforce within three to five years. Therefore, all the Task Force’s recommendations should be considered as Near-Term Priorities.  

Additionally, immediate attention should be paid to achieve the following desired results:

· A clear representation of the future workforce critical to accomplishing the organization’s strategy;

· A comprehensive plan of action that will ensure the appropriate workforce will be available when needed;

· A convincing rationale for acquiring new authority and resources to implement needed changes in human resource policies and programs; and

· A robust estimate of future needs to support career development programs.

*Change the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Curriculum*. The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) is changing its curriculum and training delivery methods to ensure that the future acquisition workforce has the right skills and tools to effectively operate in the 21st century. DAU is moving to a case-based training environment, with increased emphasis on distance learning and job-specific targeted training. Case-based training formats will be utilized to prepare students for real-life challenges and dilemmas that they will encounter on the job. An example of this is DAU’s major revision of the Program Management curriculum. Distance learning and Web-based training will be applied where appropriate to lower costs and increase training opportunities. Currently, the introductory-level acquisition course is offered via distance learning. Two new courses are being designed and developed in a Web-based training format: Program Managers’ Tools Course and Intermediate Systems Acquisition Course. DAU is working to provide the acquisition workforce with more training to improve critical thinking skills, field performance support, and greater “throughput” to meet the expected increased needs of a transitioning workforce caused by expected retirements.

***FUTURE FOCUS***

*Aging Acquisition and Logistics Workforce.*This “human capital” issue looms as possibly the largest single challenge facing the DoD acquisition and logistics communities. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has referred to the situation as “a crisis that can dramatically affect our nation’s ability to provide warfighters with modern weapon systems needed to defend our national interests.” After 11 consecutive years of downsizing, the Department faces serious imbalances in the skills and experience of a highly talented and specialized civilian workforce. 

In the private sector, the source of value creation for an enterprise has shifted dramatically from tangible assets to intangible assets. In the service and “knowledge” economy of today, approximately 85 percent of a firm’s market value is based on intangible assets, of which a worker’s skills, competencies, knowledge, leadership, and innovation are principal components. Although the public sector does not have a comparable benchmark to measure “market value,” there is a parallel with the private sector in that creating value is heavily dependent on human capital and how it is applied. As DoD moves toward a performance-based business environment that closely mirrors best commercial practices, it will be faced with the daunting task of attracting and recruiting knowledge workers in sufficient quantities to replace retiring acquisition workers. There is a very real possibility that DoD’s hypothetical market value could seriously decline commensurate with the loss of its highly skilled and aging workforce. Moreover, the acquisition community’s continued ability to provide warfighters with systems needed to win the nation’s military conflicts is at stake. The DoD acquisition, technology, and logistics “Workforce and Career Management Task Force” has been established to put the tools in place to address the recruiting, training, and retention issues that will surface with the expected “brain drain” between now and 2005. (Their recommendations were listed previously in this chapter.)

*Acquisition and Logistics Workforce (Recruitment, Retention, Training, and Career Management).*Although the acquisition and logistics workforces face comparable challenges, the logistics community lags behind the acquisition community in workforce development. The DoD Acquisition 2005 Task Force identified significant actions to drive necessary workforce changes. A similar study for the logistics workforce is recommended.

The Department should also consider adopting select personnel policies prevalent in industry; principal among them are “portability” of employer-sponsored savings/retirement plans. With the advent of 401(k)-type investments, the Department should seek authority through the Office of Personnel Management, or via legislation, to make Thrift Savings Plan benefits of federal employees portable to the private sector. Concurrently, the Department should seek authority to permit new hires into the federal workforce already possessing 401(k) plans to “roll over” their private-sector savings into the Thrift Savings Plan. These measures would foster an environment that would be conducive to attracting into the federal workforce skilled journeymen from the private sector to help mitigate the deleterious effects of the expected hemorrhage of retirement-eligible federal workers during the next five years. In addition, a fresh flow of private-sector “human capital” into the federal workforce will bring new ideas and methods and act as a catalyst in achieving civil/military integration.

**CHALLENGES**

**Reduce Acquisition Cycle Time/Minimize Cost Growth (STATUS: Off-Track, Continue)**

Under the Revolution in Business Affairs, the Department has established high-level metrics to measure its overall performance in fielding high-quality defense products quickly and in lowering the total ownership cost of defense products. A key objective is to reduce by 25 percent the average acquisition systems cycle time (measured from program start to initial operating capability) for all major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) that started since FY 1992. The overall goal is to achieve a cumulative average cycle time of 99 months for all MDAPs started since 1992. As reflected in Table VIII-1 below, DoD has made progress on this objective, reducing MDAP cycle time for post–FY 1992 starts from 132 months to 99 months at the end of FY 2000; however, the target for FY 2000 was missed slightly: the goal was to reduce MDAP cycle time to less than 99 months.

**Table VIII-1**

**Major Defense Acquisition Cycle Time**

(In Months)

*Metric Description:*Represents the cumulative average of acquisition cycle times (a combination of projected and actual times achieved) as reported in September Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) submitted by the Services.

Another key performance parameter was to minimize cost growth in MDAPs to no greater than 1 percent annually. As indicated in Table VIII-2 below, DoD’s average annual MDAP cost growth has been –0. 3 percent, 3.1 percent, and 2.9 percent from FY 1998 through FY 2000, respectively. Although progress was made during FY 2000, the Department fell short of its goal to reduce cost growth to less than 1 percent. 

**Table VIII-2**

**Major Defense Acquisition Program Cost Growth**

(In Percentages)

*Metric Description:*Cost growth is the difference between MDAP program costs in the current-year budget and the budget for the previous year, divided by the program costs for the previous year.

The causes of cost growth are numerous, but three main cost drivers are believed to offer the best explanation:

· The Department reduced or deferred purchases of aircraft and other equipment. Because fewer of these systems were purchased per year than previously planned, their unit costs were increased.

· Contractors or acquisition managers revised cost estimates for programs upward.

· Design changes or the incorporation of new technologies boosted costs above originally estimated amounts.

**LOGISTICS INITIATIVES**

***SUCCESSES***

**Strategic Plan (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

Historically, the Military Services have managed their own logistics systems to meet their individual needs, with the Defense Logistics Agency providing common support. To place greater top-level Defense Department emphasis on the critical role of logistics, the Office of Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) changed its title within the past two years to that of the Office of Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). Logistics has always been a key component of the acquisition and technology mission, but the change in title did send the message that logistics would play a more prominent role and receive greater visibility at the highest levels of the Department in the future. 

Although logistics reform is relatively new compared with acquisition reform, progress has been achieved within the past 18 months, and the Department has developed an overarching Logistics Strategic Plan in August 1999 that provides vision and a set of objectives for meeting the logistics challenges of the 21st century. 

**DoD Logistics Strategic Plan Objectives**

· *Objective #1: Optimize Support to the Warfighter.* The Components will determine their existing aggregate mission-capable (MC) rates and establish appropriate goals for higher aggregate MC rates within specified times. Initiatives discussed under this strategy will address establishing and tracking MC rates or alternative measures that describe the operational capability of a weapon system or a unit and the higher aggregation of those measures.  

*Measure:*****Attain the specified percentage of Level “A” weapon systems meeting their targeted mission-capable (MC) rates through FY 2006. Develop a documented baseline of applicable Military Service MC rates by the end of FY 2001. Establish target MC rates for the end of FY 2006, and track progress in attaining these targets (i.e., the percentage of increased/decreased MC rates) annually, beginning at the end of FY 2001. The Military Services will develop the capability for quantifying the actual and target MC rates based on individual weapon systems, weapon system categories, or Service composite, as appropriate, to provide meaningful performance information. The Defense Logistics Agency will develop the capability for reporting its customer wait time (CWT) baseline and annual progress toward the DLA FY 2006 CWT target by Service or consistent with the Services’ weapon system categories. Each Component will report its composite progress against its target(s) annually, beginning at the end of FY 2001.

· *Objective #2: Improve Strategic Mobility to Meet Warfighter Requirements.* To improve support to the warfighter, increase cargo airlift, sealift surge, and afloat pre-position capacity to meet DoD guidance; also, infrastructure and mobility process improvements.

*Measure 1:*****By the end of FY 2006, achieve a cargo airlift capacity and sealift surge and afloat pre-position capacity to meet the validated requirements in the current Mobility Requirements Study.

*Measure 2:*****Develop a measurement plan and goals for mobility infrastructure and mobility process improvements by the end of FY 2001. Achieve those goals by the end of FY 2006.

· *Objective #3: Implement Customer Wait Time (CWT) as the DoD Logistics Metric.* CWT is the elapsed time from issuance of a customer order to satisfaction of that order. This objective will establish CWT as the key DoD performance metric and will require refining the definition of CWT, developing appropriate measures, and implementing them.

*Measure 1:*****Develop the process for definition and measurement of customer wait time (CWT) by the end of FY 2001.

*Measure 2:*****Fully implement CWT measurement for 100 percent of all selected segments by the end of FY 2006.

· *Objective #4: Fully Implement Total Asset Visibility across DoD.* Asset visibility is the ability of users to view information on the identity and status of all DoD materiel and, in some cases, complete a business transaction using that information. DoD materiel assets to be included are in storage (wholesale and retail), in process (maintenance and procurement), and in transit.

*Measure:*****Determine user/business methods, asset information requirements, and associated measures by the end of FY 2000; implement 100 percent of requirements by the end of FY 2006.

· *Objective #5: Reengineer/Modernize Applicable Logistics Processes/Systems.*As DoD updates and replaces its legacy logistics business systems with modern, Defense Information Infrastructure/Common Operating Environment-compliant systems, measuring and reporting of progress are essential. The Components will develop logistics process and system modernization plans by the end of FY 2001 and increase the proportion of modern Logistics business systems according to those plans by the end of FY 2006.

*Measure:*****Develop Component logistics processes/systems modernization plans by the end of FY 2001, and increase the proportion of modernized logistics business systems according to those plans by the end of FY 2006. The Military Services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the U.S. Transportation Command will develop the capability for quantifying the percentage of logistics and related ADP systems modernized, using implementation status as of the end of FY 1999 as a baseline. For each major system undergoing modernization, track annual progress against an FY 2006 target percentage. Each Component will report its composite progress against its target annually, beginning at the end of FY 2001.

· *Objective #6: Minimize Logistics Costs While Meeting Warfighter Requirements.* Reduce the cost of logistics support for selected weapon systems by FY 2006. Logistics support includes elements such as maintenance, supply, distribution, transportation, and combat logistics.

*Measure:*****For selected fielded weapon systems, reduce the logistics support cost per weapon system per year compared with the FY 1997 baseline as follows: 7 percent by FY 2000; 10 percent by FY 2001; and a stretch target of 20 percent by the end of FY 2005.

***FUTURE FOCUS***

The DoD Logistics Strategic Plan objectives, and their measures, represent and ongoing area of focus.  Many of the measures call for initial reporting or plans in FY 2001, with completion out in FY 2006.  Future focus will be on the achievement of these objectives, with continued examination of the applicability of these goals.

**Logistics Value to the Warfighter (STATUS: On-Track, Continue)**

There are three primary outcomes to increased logistics value to the warfighter: increased readiness, increased performance through reduced logistics processes cycle times, and reduced process and infrastructure costs. The following three initiatives have been developed to attain these outcomes:

· Reduce logistics response time, 

· Increase total asset visibility, and

· Reduce supply inventories.

During the past three years, DoD achieved some notable improvements in its logistics performance, meeting the goals for all three initiatives in FY 1999. The first goal was to reduce the wholesale system logistics response time, which would reduce (1) peacetime retail inventory levels, and thus costs, and (2) wartime deployment requirements, reducing logistics burdens on strategic transportation assets. Logistics response time (LRT), the primary DoD metric, is the elapsed time from customer requisition to receipt of materiel ordered from the DoD wholesale system. As Table VIII-3 indicates, the DoD aggregate LRT FY 2000 goal of 18 days was reached.

Table VIII-3

# Wholesale Logistics Response Time 

# (In Days)

*Metric Description:*The number of days from customer order to delivery at 

end-customer location.

The second goal was to increase military readiness and sustainability through the redistribution of materiel assets from any source in DoD. This is accomplished through increased total asset visibility (TAV). The TAV measure provides a good performance indicator of process responsiveness and support to the warfighter. The FY 2000 goal of 90 percent was met.

# Table VIII-4

# Total Asset Visibility 

# (In Percentages)

*Metric Description:*The percentage of total DoD materiel asset inventories that are visible and accessible to all Integrated Materiel Managers (IMMs).

The final goal was to reduce infrastructure costs by reducing secondary item inventories**.**Secondary item inventory (SII) is the value of the supply system inventory of repair parts and finished goods, measured in constant FY 1995 dollars. Although the FY 2000 goal was attained, definitional changes will include more inventories in the future calculations, resulting in a reassessment of this measure as a suitable metric.

VIII-5

### Supply Inventory Value 

### (In $ Billions)

*Metric Description:*The adjusted acquisition value of DoD’s secondary item inventories.

***CHALLENGES*****

**Transforming Logistics (STATUS: Off-Track, Continue)**

The Department spends nearly $78 billion annually on logistics and wants to transform its mass logistics system into a highly agile, reliable system that delivers logistics on demand. The Deputy Secretary of Defense issued Defense Reform Initiative Directive #54, “Logistics Transformation Plans,” on March 23, 2000. The purpose of the Directive is to require the Military Components, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to submit annual logistics transformation plans. The intent is to document how these organizations plan to reach the goals and objectives laid out in the DoD Logistics Strategic Plan. 

In the summer of 2000, the Military Components, DLA, and USTRANSCOM submitted their annual transformation plans as requested by the Deputy Secretary; however, the individual plans showed programs that were underfunded, not cohesive, lacked specific performance metrics and milestones, and had no clear relationship to DoD strategic objectives. The Services and Agencies have approximately 30 logistics transformation pilot projects that, when viewed individually, demonstrate cost savings or novel logistical improvement; however, when viewed collectively against the Department’s six overarching objectives (stated previously), they lacked cohesion. 

***NEAR-TERM PRIORITIES***

Improve the FY 2003 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) by

· Defining quantitative end-state descriptions, metrics, and baselines consistent with the emerging logistics operations architecture;

· Refining input format, clearly emphasizing end-state description, specific performance measures, key initiatives, milestones, and resources;

· Integrating requirements into FY 2003 Defense Planning Guidance in conjunction with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation); and

· Conducting annual reviews to determine compliance and to make adjustments to the POM, as necessary.

***FUTURE FOCUS***

DoD will increasingly rely on logistics, whether provided organically or by contractor, to keep weapon systems technologically current and DoD facilities operating efficiently. Therefore, it is essential that all elements of the logistics community, including our private-sector partners, put greater emphasis on fully implementing the spirit and intent of the DoD Logistics Strategic Plan through each Component’s activities, programs, and initiatives. Accordingly, the Department should expect the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to incorporate the Plan objectives into their planning, programming, and budgeting process on a priority basis. We should also expect each Component to track performance and make meeting performance metrics a key responsibility of each logistics manager.

The focus of logistics must be on “meeting the warfighters’ needs,” not on “DoD’s infrastructure.” This shift provides the warfighter with improved performance and readiness. Ultimately, speed and dependability are what the warfighter requires, and DoD’s logistics systems must meet those needs.

##### IX.THE DEFENSE MANAGEMENT COUNCIL

The Defense Management Council (DMC) was created to oversee the continued reengineering of the Department and to ensure that reform initiatives directed by the Secretary of Defense are carried out within the Department. The DMC also recommends to the Secretary of Defense major reforms still needed and reviews the Defense Agencies’ performance contracts. The DMC was established by a Defense Reform Initiative Directive in December 1997, and the DMC’s mission, organization, and functions were spelled out in DoD Directive 5160.69, issued concurrently. 

The DMC is a first: the creation of a “Board of Directors” of the senior military and civilian leadership of the Department to provide direction on a range of critical reform and reform-related issues. 

**Organization and Membership**

Chair –Deputy Secretary of Defense

Members–Under Secretaries of Defense for:

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

Policy

Comptroller

Personnel and Readiness

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Counsel

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,  Communications, and Intelligence

Under Secretary of the Army

Under Secretary of the Navy

Under Secretary of the Air Force

Vice Chief of Staff of the Army

Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force

Vice Chief of Naval Operations

Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps

Director, Administration and Management

Director, Defense Reform

*Coordinating Group.* This is the staff arm of the Council. The Coordinating Group reviews and prepares issues for DMC attention and resolution. The Coordinating Group comprises primary and alternate members representing their respective DMC principals. The Executive Directors for the group are the Director of Defense Reform and the Director, Program, Analysis, and Evaluation. Among other duties, the Executive Directors help decide which issues to bring to the DMC and regularly attend its meetings. The Coordinating Group usually meets as necessary to address ongoing DRI activities and resolve problems as they arise. It provides advice and assistance to the DMC, drafts policy statements for the DMC’s review and approval, provides a forum for the Military Services and Defense Agencies to discuss concerns with policy statements, and helps teams prepare presentations for DMC meetings.

**Functions**

The principal functions of the DMC are to

1. Advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to Defense Reform, the efficient organization and management of the Department, and other matters as the Secretary may direct;

2. Negotiate performance goals and measurements with the heads of the Defense Agencies and monitor their performance against agreed-upon goals;

3. Identify initiatives to improve DoD business practices and monitor progress of the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and other DoD organizations toward their accomplishment;

4. Identify opportunities to achieve improved efficiency and effectiveness in DoD operations by opening them to competition with the private sector, consistent with OMB Circular No. A-76, and monitor the progress of the competitive evaluation process for these initiatives;

5. Identify opportunities for the consolidation of management activities of the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and other DoD organizations; and

6. Consult with business leaders and the academic community to seek innovative methods to resolve management problems, reengineer business practices, and streamline operations.

The DMC has been active in the top-level management of the Department and has approved nine performance contracts of Defense Agencies for FY 2001.

***CHALLENGES***

**DMC Charter and Authority (STATUS: On-Target, Continue)**

DoD Directive 5160.69, the authority that created the DMC, contained a sunset provision of December 31, 2000.

***NEAR-TERM PRIORITIES***

A new DoD Directive should be issued to continue the existence of the DMC. The Defense Management Council is an important element of the Department’s overall management strategy for implementing reform. The executives on this Council are at a high enough level to speak for their organizations and to impact how reform is implemented, either within their home organizations or across the Department. This level of representation not only provides credibility for the issues that the DMC works but also, by involving uniformed members of the Department, demonstrates that the reach of its decisions extends all the way to the individual soldier, sailor, airman, and marine serving throughout the world.

While the Defense Management Council played an effective role over the past several years, opportunities exist to build on its success, if desired. The role and effectiveness of the DMC could be enhanced if efforts were made to

· Focus the Council’s attention on the key reform initiatives that, if addressed in an integrated fashion, could produce the greatest results;

· Strengthen the Council’s decision-making role, authority, and accountability; and

· Provide the Council with current and accurate information on the status of key reform initiatives so it can better gauge progress and identify and address implementation problems. 

##### X.THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE MANAGEMENT IN DoD 

##### The Challenge

Managing change is a major challenge to many large, multinational organizations today. Jim Schiro, CEO of PricewaterhouseCoopers, wrote in a recently published book entitled *Memos to the President – Management Advice from the Nation’s Top CEOs*, “We operate in a global, knowledge-based economy, and no company can long maintain its competitive edge unless it is willing to continually transform and reconfigure itself to meet new marketplace demands.” The challenge to the Department of Defense is no different. DoD and commercial organizations are extremely large, with many, varied operations spread all across the globe. Their organizational structures are extremely complex, with numerous interfaces among various business processes at multiple levels. In order to cope with management issues, multiple solutions to a particular element may be developed within the same organization, indicating the lack of a common corporate focus, coordinated planning, and integrated execution of change initiatives. 

However, as leaders of today’s global giants recognize, change has become the one constant in business. To become or remain competitive in the global marketplace, successful senior executives are attacking the change management challenge with proven, rigorously applied methods. Those who don’t do this become part of the roughly two-thirds of senior executives that fail, or fall short of expectations, in their organizational change efforts to downsize, restructure, or reengineer. 

The secret to successful change initiatives is strong executive leadership, clear communications, a sharp customer focus, employee empowerment, and commitment to quality. When these practices are linked to change initiatives, successful implementation and sustainment over time normally follow.

###### The Approach

Organizational change occurs at two levels:

· **Transformational** – impacts the entire organization and has sustainability through clarity of vision, development of strategy, leadership alignment with both vision and strategy, and commitment throughout the organization

· **Transactional** – impacts specific organizational entities—people, processes, technology, and structure—and contributes to the operational change desired, but in and of itself will not create lasting or sustainable change within an organization

Both transformational and transactional change will deliver results. However, when an organization focuses solely on transactional elements, the outcomes are not as quick or as sustainable as when they are paralleled with transformational change elements.

The Defense Reform Initiatives are primarily focused at the transformational level. The future challenge of business process reform in DoD is how to bridge the gap from the transformational level to the transactional level in order to maximize the outcome of initiatives. If one were to assess the difficulty of change in Defense Reform, he or she would most likely learn the following: 

· **Organizational Scope** – The change is going to impact the entire DoD organization.

· **Change Complexity** – There is a relatively high level of complexity/uncertainty that requires some external expertise.

· **Cultural Challenge** – The change challenges certain aspects of the current culture and, in some cases, requires a radically different culture to succeed; therefore, it represents a significant cultural barrier.

The following actions are suggested to overcome this high level of difficulty:

**Organizational Scope** – As the scope of the change increases, specific change tasks such as communications and implementation planning become far more demanding. As stated by Edward A. Blechschmidt, CEO of Gentiva Health Services, in *Memos to the President*, “A large organization cannot continue indefinitely without adopting a unifying strategy and mission if it is to remain competitive.” The organizational structure for Defense Reform at the OSD level, with its Defense Management Council and Defense Reform Office, is the right approach. This type of structure must be applied down through the Services and Major Commands to ensure consistency in planning and implementation, as well as effective downward and upward communication.

**Change Complexity** – As the complexity of the change increases, the level of innovation required will also increase. Organizations will need to create an environment where employees are encouraged to change their current ways of thinking and begin thinking “out of the box.” The challenge is to create an environment in which midlevel managers understand their limits within the statutory/regulatory framework, but are encouraged to be innovative. Restructuring laws, directives, and regulations to ensure that their content is limited to addressing only “must do” activities is one solution. A prime example of DoD efforts in this regard is the restructuring of the DoD Directive 5000.1 pertaining to acquisition. 

Midlevel managers must also be given the capability to innovate. This capability may come through additional education and training. Once again, in the acquisition area, DoD has made a concerted effort to increase acquisition education and training, raising the level of professionalism in the workforce and creating the confidence that supports the growth of innovation. Probably the most prevalent area where midlevel managers are being innovative in addressing efforts to reduce costs and cycle times is in the application of technology. Eric Kuhn, CEO of Varsity Group, wrote, “Brick-and-mortar companies are fast learning that more and more consumers desire the same types of products, delivered via new technology. Likewise, the services of the federal government will have to be made available through methods that provide increased ease of use and speed.” However, caution must be exercised to ensure unity of effort, thus preventing dramatically different solutions for the same issue within several parts of the organization. The delicate balance between centralized management and decentralized execution must be maintained.

Organizations may consider bringing in outside experts to lower the level of uncertainty associated with the change. However, when the leadership makes a decision to bring in a specialist, they must realize that these additional players will need to “sell” their solutions to those inside the organization. The rest of the organization will also need to acquire the skills and knowledge brought in by the outside specialist. This is particularly true in the case of implementing information technology solutions.

Within DoD, the use of “outside” experts is being addressed in several ways. The Department uses outside consultants to assist on many programs and projects. But DoD has also established its own internal consulting structure. The Department’s Change Management Center (CMC) was established to accelerate critical reform activities in the acquisition and logistics functional areas within the Defense supply chain management process. The CMC uses a “rapid improvement” approach by bringing together the diverse team members of this process, including DoD and industry. Then, in a structured, focused manner, the group is driven to rapidly develop, implement, and measure new and innovative business practices while overcoming obstacles to that reform effort. Mr. Kuhn also wrote, “As a business that must respond to technologies moving at light speed, it is important that our business does not operate on a model that requires changes on a global scale at a glacial pace. By coordinating smaller, faster efforts, we are able to make the changes most necessary first while moving toward larger objectives.” The CMC approach is very consistent with Mr. Kuhn’s Varsity Group model.

**Cultural Challenge** – A change effort represents a significant cultural challenge if the individuals within an organization are likely to claim that “this is not the way we have done things before.” Much of the change resulting from the DRI fits this category. In order to be successful in realizing the desired outcome of the change initiative, DoD must depend on changing the attitudes and behaviors of its employees toward customers and colleagues. Employee attitudes and behaviors are the observable components of an organization’s culture; therefore, the only way to change a culture is to change an organization’s behaviors.

The behavior changes begin with the leadership in OSD and should be cascaded down throughout the Services/Agencies and their commands. While it is critical for this to occur initially at the most visible senior levels, a new culture only becomes imbedded in an organization when both the leaders and the employees behave in a consistent fashion on a daily basis. 

The creation of a compelling change vision is a critical first step in overcoming the cultural challenge. DoD efforts to communicate the vision of defense reform, as outlined in the vision for the Revolution in Business Affairs, have been considerable, including information distribution through the World Wide Web and through satellite broadcasts. These communications efforts should continue. 

The application of change leadership as a “change lever” is another critical step. Leaders in a change effort are responsible for setting the initial direction of the change, monitoring the progress of the change effort, and accomplishing the desired end results of the change. The members of the Defense Management Council are well positioned to be the core of the change leadership. The Council exhibits a significant span of influence and control within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Services, as well as within the functional business areas of DoD. The active involvement of the DMC members in change management activities within their Services and functional areas will provide the thrust needed to overcome the cultural challenge and move Defense Reform from the transformational to the transactional level. Their efforts to build commitment of leaders within their organizations will eventually result in the commitment of those at the transactional level. Unfortunately, the level of commitment to change leadership is personality-driven and varies among individuals. The successful “flowdown” of reform efforts into the Services must be actively supported from both sides of the matrix: through the organization structure and through functional business lines. 

Success requires a consistent level of change management activity that is planned, organized, monitored, and controlled outside the DMC environment. For those employees unaware of the change, change leaders within the organization should communicate with them, informing them of the change and what it will bring. For those that are unable to change, change leaders should provide the training and tools needed by those employees to perform their duties as indicated by the change. And for those who are unwilling to change, the change leaders should apply the appropriate motivation to change their behavior and gain their support. 

If implementation efforts are successful, subtle changes in people’s behaviors will be noticed, enthusiasm for the change will be exhibited, and evidence of a consistent understanding of the leadership’s message will be present. To sustain the change at this point, application of change levers such as performance measures and reward systems will reinforce the new, changed behaviors within the organization—resulting in institutionalization of the changes.

###### Closing

There has been a substantial investment in reforming the Department of Defense over the past eight years. The breadth of the reforms has increased over time to the point that the Defense Reform Initiative now includes all the major business processes in DoD. It is headed in the right direction, and any incoming Administration would be wise to embrace the effort, because it gives them a good start and will produce results sooner. There is still work to be done to drive Defense Reform down from the transformational level to the transactional level throughout the DoD organization structure, deep into all the Services and Defense Agencies. The DoD workforce is certainly aware of the Defense Reform Initiative, even if it has not yet impacted how they all perform their day-to-day functions. The continued support of the DRI is imperative, otherwise leadership—any leadership—will lose all credibility with the DoD workforce. If that happens, the Defense Reform Initiative will join the long list of other reform efforts started, but never quite finished, and future change will be more difficult. 

Projection for A-76 Positions Studied

�PAGE \# "'Page: '#'�'"  ��Shouldn’t this be “82”? (rounded off from .82263)

�PAGE \# "'Page: '#'�'"  ��To be consistent with later tables, I have deleted all “%” signs from this table. It is obvious to the reader that these are percentages from the title.

�PAGE \# "'Page: '#'�'"  ��Should this word be changed to “two”?

�PAGE \# "'Page: '#'�'"  ��OK to add?

�PAGE \# "'Page: '#'�'"  ��Should this word be changed to “formed”?

�PAGE \# "'Page: '#'�'"  ��I recommend using a different word here, such as “parts” or “elements” (to avoid confusion with DoD Components).

�PAGE \# "'Page: '#'�'"  ��Not clear to reader what the antecedent of this pronoun is. Can you rewrite sentence to clarify?

�PAGE \# "'Page: '#'�'"  �� Where did this section come from? It has nothing to do with our office. [Note that this is not a comment from the copyeditor.]

�PAGE \# "'Page: '#'�'"  ��I recommend substituting “implemented” or “accomplished” here.

�PAGE \# "'Page: '#'�'"  ��See my comments on these statements in previous paragraph. Also, does this information have to be restated so close to the other two times that it is given? I recommend eliminating at least one instance of the three.

�PAGE \# "'Page: '#'�'"  ��Is this correct as it stands?

�PAGE \# "'Page: '#'�'"  ��Would “separate” be better here?

�PAGE \# "'Page: '#'�'"  ��Would “by” be better here?

65

# _1043487825.ppt

# _1043488076.xls

# _1043487802.ppt