United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Congress and the

Chairman, Defense Base Closure and

Realignment Commission

April 1995 MILITARY BASES

Analysis of DOD’s 1995

Process and

Recommendations for

Closure and

Realignment

GAO/NSIAD-95-133

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-261024 

April 14, 1995

To the President of the Senate and the

Speaker of the House of Representatives

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon

Chairman, Defense Base Closure and

 Realignment Commission

The Secretary of Defense announced his 1995 recommendations for base closures and

realignments to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission on February 28, 1995.

This report responds to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-510),

as amended, which requires that we provide the Congress and the Commission, by no later than

April 15, 1995, a report on the recommendations and selection process. We have identified

issues for consideration by the Commission as it completes its review of the Secretary of

Defense’s recommendations. Given that this is the last of three biennial reviews authorized

under the 1990 act, we are also including matters for consideration by the Congress regarding

the potential need for continuing legislation to authorize further commission reviews and

authorize changes, as needed, to prior decisions.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen, Senate Committee on Appropriations,

Subcommittee on Defense; Senate Committee on Armed Services; House Committee on

Appropriations, Subcommittee on National Security; House Committee on National Security;

the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Directors of the

Defense Logistics Agency and the Defense Investigative Service. We will make copies available

to others on request.

This report was prepared under the direction of David R. Warren, Director, Defense

Management and NASA Issues, who may be reached on (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have

any questions. Other major contributors are listed in appendix VI.

Charles A. Bowsher

Comptroller General

of the United States
Executive Summary

Purpose On February 28, 1995, the Secretary of Defense recommended closures,

realignments, and other actions affecting 146 domestic military

installations. Of that number, 33 were described as closures of major

installations, and 26 as major realignments; an additional 27 were changes

to prior base closing round decisions. The Secretary projects that the

recommendations, when fully implemented, will yield $1.8 billion in

annual recurring savings. As required by the Defense Base Closure and

Realignment Act of 1990, as amended, this report presents GAO’s analysis

of the Secretary’s recommendations and the selection process used by the

various defense components.

Background Closing unneeded military facilities is not easy, partly because of public

concern about the effects on communities and their economies and

concerns about the impartiality of the decision-making process. To

overcome impediments to base closures, Congress enacted legislation in

1988 (P.L. 100-526) that facilitated a successful round of base closures.

Because of that success, Congress enacted the 1990 Defense Base Closure

and Realignment Act (Title XXIX, P.L. 101-510), which authorized base

closure rounds in 1991, 1993, and 1995. The 1990 legislation outlined a

process to close and realign military installations, including the

establishment of an independent, bipartisan commission to review the

Secretary of Defense’s closure recommendations. Base realignment and

closure (BRAC) rounds in 1988, 1991, and 1993 resulted in decisions to fully

or partially close 70 major domestic bases and to close, realign, or

otherwise downsize hundreds of other bases, installations, and activities.

DOD estimates that when fully implemented, these actions will produce

savings of $4 billion per year.

The current BRAC round retained basically the same requirements and

procedures as those in 1993. It included the requirement to use certified

data, that is, information that was accurate and complete to the best of the

originator’s knowledge and belief. This requirement was designed to

overcome concerns about the consistency and reliability of data used in

the process. For the 1995 round, DOD emphasized the exploration of

opportunities for cross-service use of common support assets. It therefore

established cross-service review groups to provide the services with

alternatives for realignments and closures in the areas of depot

maintenance, laboratories, test and evaluation facilities, undergraduate

pilot training, and medical treatment facilities.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Executive Summary

As before, the Secretary’s recommendations were to be based on selection

criteria established by DOD and on a 6-year force structure plan. As

indicated in table 1, DOD established eight selection criteria; they have

remained unchanged since 1991.

Table 1: DOD Criteria for Selecting

Bases for Closure or Realignment Category Criteria

Military value (priority

consideration is to be given

to the four military value

criteria)

1. Current and future mission requirements and the

impact on operational readiness of DOD’s total force.

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and

associated airspace at both the existing and potential

receiving locations.

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization,

and future total force requirements at both the existing

and potential receiving locations.

4. Cost and manpower implications.

Return on investment 5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings,

including the number of years, beginning with the date of

completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings

to exceed the costs.

Impact 6. The economic impact on communities.

7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving

communities’ infrastructures to support forces, missions,

and personnel.

8. The environmental impact.

Results in Brief Although the Department of Defense (DOD) has in recent years undergone

substantial downsizing in funding, personnel, and force structure,

commensurate infrastructure reductions have not been achieved. Despite

some progress in reducing excess infrastructure, it is generally recognized

that much excess capacity will likely remain after the 1995 BRAC round.

This view is supported by the military components’ and cross-service

groups’ analyses, which showed far greater excess capacity than will be

eliminated by the Secretary’s recommendations. Currently, DOD projects

that its fiscal year 1996 budget represents, in real terms, a 39-percent

reduction to its fiscal year 1985 peak of recent times. By way of

comparison, its 1995 BRAC recommendations would produce cumulative

BRAC reductions of 21 percent in inventory of major domestic bases since

1988.

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Executive Summary

DOD’s 1995 BRAC process was generally sound and well documented and

should result in substantial savings. However, the recommendations and

selection process were not without problems and, in some cases, raise

questions about the reasonableness of specific recommendations. At the

same time, GAO also noted that improvements were made to the process

from prior rounds, including more precise categorization of bases and

activities; this resulted in more accurate comparisons between like

facilities and functions and in better analytical capabilities.

GAO raises a number of issues it believes need attention by the Congress

and the Commission in considering DOD’s recommendations:

• DOD’s attempt at reducing excess capacity by suggesting cross-service

opportunities to the services facilitated some important results. However,

agreements for consolidating similar work done by two or more of the

services were limited, and opportunities to achieve additional reductions

in excess capacity and infrastructure were missed. In particular, this was

the case at depot maintenance activities and laboratory facilities.

• Although the services have improved their processes with each succeeding

BRAC round, some process problems continued to be identified. In

particular, the Air Force’s process remained largely subjective and not

well documented; also, it was influenced by preliminary estimates of base

closure costs that changed when more focused analyses were made. For

these and other reasons, GAO questions a number of the Air Force’s

recommendations. To a less extent, some of the services’ decisions

affecting specific closures and realignments also raise questions. For

example, the Secretary of the Navy did not consistly apply DOD’s criteria

when he excluded certain facilities from closure for economic impact

reasons. Because the legislation authorizing BRAC expires this year, some

process will be needed to handle changes and problems that arise during

implementation of this and earlier rounds.

Principal Findings

BRAC Savings Are

Expected to Be

Substantial, but Estimates

Are Preliminary

GAO estimates that the 20-year net present value of savings from DOD’s

recommendations will be $17.3 billion, with annual recurring savings of

almost $1.8 billion. GAO notes that these estimates are not based on budget

quality data and are subject to some uncertainties inherent in the process.

However, GAO believes the savings will still be substantial. At the same

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Executive Summary

time, it should be noted that environmental restoration was not a factor in

the DOD base closure decision-making process, and such restoration can

represent a significant cost following a base closure.

DOD and its components improved their cost and savings estimates for

BRAC 1995 recommendations. In developing cost estimates, they took steps

to develop more current and reliable sources of information and placed

greater reliance, where practicable, on standardized data. Some

components sought to minimize the costs of base closures by avoiding

unnecessary military construction. For example, the Navy proposed a

number of changes to prior BRAC decisions that will further reduce

infrastructure and avoid some previously planned closure costs.

GAO has identified a number of instances where projected savings from

base closures and realignments may fluctuate or be uncertain for a variety

of reasons. They include uncertainties over future locations of activities

that must move from installations being closed or realigned and errors in

standard cost factors used in the services’ analyses. Additionally, some

projected savings involve salaries for military personnel associated with

BRAC reductions. It is not clear that such positions are always eliminated

from the force structure. GAO completed a number of sensitivity tests to

assess the potential impact of these various factors on projected costs and

savings and found that they had a rather limited impact.

It should be noted that shortly after the Secretary of Defense announced

his list of proposed closures and realignments, most DOD components

began undertaking more rigorous assessments of expected costs of

implementing the recommendations as a basis for developing budget

quality data. Such efforts are currently underway primarily in the Army

and Air Force, and to less extent in the Navy.

Service Recommendations

Will Reduce Infrastructure,

but With Little Gain in

Cross-Servicing

The BRAC 1995 process reduced some infrastructure in common support

areas such as hospitals and pilot training facilities. However, the lack of

progress in consolidating similar work done by two or more of the

services limited the extent of infrastructure reductions that could have

been achieved.

DOD tried to strengthen the 1995 BRAC process by establishing cross-service

groups to provide the services with proposals for consolidating similar

work in the areas of depot maintenance, laboratories, test and evaluation

facilities, undergraduate pilot training, and medical treatment facilities.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Executive Summary

However, in the laboratories and test and evaluation areas, the

cross-service groups were narrowly focused, and their initial proposals

represented minor workload shifts that offered little or no opportunity for

a complete base closure or cost-effective realignment. While the depot

maintenance group identified excess capacity of 40.1 million direct labor

hours, the services’ recommendations would eliminate only half that

amount. DOD received the services’ recommendations too late in the

process for meaningful give-and-take discussions to achieve greater

consolidations. More time for such interactions and stronger DOD

leadership will be required should there be future BRAC rounds.

DOD Components’

Processes Were Sound,

With Some Exceptions

While GAO found the components’ processes for making their

recommendations were generally sound and well supported, it did have

some concerns. This was particularly the case as it related to the Air

Force. Regarding the Air Force, key aspects of its process remained

largely subjective and not well documented. Documentation of the Air

Force’s process was too limited for GAO to fully substantiate the extent of

Air Force deliberations and analyses.

However, GAO determined that the initial analytical phases of the Air Force

process were significantly influenced by preliminary estimates of base

closure costs. For example, some bases were removed from initial

consideration based on these estimates. Also, in some instances, closure

costs appeared to materially affect how the bases were valued. For

example, Rome Laboratory, in Rome, New York, was ranked high for

retention purposes largely because of projected high closure costs. When

the Air Force later looked at the laboratory at the suggestion of a

cross-service group, it found that the closing costs were much lower.

Consequently, the Air Force recommended closure of the laboratory.

Without the cross-service group’s suggestion, the Air Force might have

missed this opportunity to reduce excess capacity and produce savings.

The Air Force’s more numerous recommendations on Guard and Reserve

activities were developed outside its process for grouping or tiering bases

for retention purposes, and were based largely on cost-effectiveness.

Regarding the Navy, the Secretary of the Navy’s actions excluded four

activities in California from consideration for closure because of concerns

over the loss of civilian positions. For the activities in California, he based

his decision on the cumulative economic impact of closures from all three

BRAC rounds. But the economic impact of the four California activities, as

defined by Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) criteria, is less for

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Executive Summary

individual localities than that for similar activities recommended for

closure either by the Navy or by other DOD components. However, OSD did

not take exception to this inconsistency.

Regarding the Army, it did not fully adhere to its regular process for

installations in assessing military value when recommending minor and

leased facilities for closure. In selecting 15 minor sites for closure, the

Army based its decision on the judgment of its major commands that the

sites were excess and of low military value. In considering leased facilities,

the Army relied on its stationing strategy and its guidance to reduce leases

but did not assess the facilities separately as it did for other installations.

The decisions were arrived at through some departure from the process

used for installations.

Some Service

Recommendations Raise

Issues That Should Be

Considered by the BRAC

Commission

GAO generally agrees with the Secretary’s recommendations. However, it

has specific unresolved questions about a number of Air Force

recommendations and to much less extent the other components’

recommendations. The following are some examples.

Even though the Air Force recognized that it had excess capacity at its five

maintenance depots and was considering closing two, it opted late in the

process to realign the workload rather than close any depots. However,

the Air Force based its decision on preliminary data from incomplete

internal studies on the potential for consolidating and realigning workload

and reducing personnel levels at the depots. Some of these studies were

completed after DOD’s BRAC report was published and do not fully support

the BRAC-recommended consolidations. These recommended

consolidations appear to expand the workload at some depots that are in

the process of downsizing. Thus, the Air Force’s recommendation may not

be cost-effective and does not solve the problem of excess depot capacity.

The Air Force also proposed the realignment of Kirtland Air Force Base,

New Mexico, because it rated low relative to the other five bases in the

same category. Again, closure costs appeared to heavily influence this

base’s rating. However, in the military value criterion most important to

this group of bases, mission requirements, Kirtland rated among the

highest of the six bases. Kirtland’s realignment would reduce the Air

Force’s operational overhead, including support previously provided to the

Department of Energy (DOE) and its Sandia National Laboratory located on

Kirtland. However, the Air Force’s savings could mean an increase in base

operational support costs borne by DOE. As GAO has recommended in the

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Executive Summary

past, it believes DOD should consider the impact of significant

government-wide costs in making its recommendations.

The Army’s proposed realignment of the Letterkenny Army Depot has

generated some concerns not only about the completeness of closure cost

data but also about the extent to which the current BRAC recommendation

represents a change from a 1993 BRAC decision. BRAC 1993 produced a

decision to consolidate all tactical missile maintenance at one

location—Letterkenny. The Army’s 1995 BRAC recommendation would split

up some of the work by transferring the missile guidance system workload

to Tobyhanna Army Depot while preserving the tactical missile

disassembly and storage at Letterkenny. Maintenance on the associated

ground support equipment, such as trucks and trailers, would be done at

Anniston Army Depot. There are differences of opinion concerning the

impact that separating these functions would have on the concept of

consolidated maintenance.

GAO also noted that the services considered closing a number of bases, but

ultimately rejected them for operational and cost considerations.

Future BRAC Legislation

May Be Needed to Reduce

Remaining Excess

Activities

According to DOD, its major domestic bases will be reduced by 21 percent

after implementation of all BRAC recommendations from the current and

prior rounds; however, DOD fell short of meeting the goal it established for

BRAC 1995. To bring DOD’s base infrastructure in line with the reductions in

force structure, DOD’s goal for the 1995 round was to reduce the overall

DOD plant replacement value by at least 15 percent—an amount at least

equal to the three previous base closure rounds. However, DOD’s 1995

recommended list of base closures and realignments is projected to reduce

the infrastructure by only 7 percent.

The Secretary of Defense recently stated that excess infrastructure will

remain after BRAC 1995, and he suggested the need for additional BRAC

rounds in 3 to 4 years, after DOD has absorbed the effects of recommended

closures and realignments. However, the current authority for the BRAC

Commission expires with the 1995 round. Should the Congress seek

further reductions, some process will be needed. The current BRAC

process, while not without certain weaknesses, has proven to be effective

in reducing Defense infrastructure. Also, without new BRAC legislation,

there is no process to approve modifications of BRAC decisions if

implementation problems arise. BRAC Commissions in 1991 and 1993 ruled

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Executive Summary

on changes to prior BRAC round decisions, and GAO sees nothing to indicate

that changes may not occur in the future.

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

GAO suggests that as the Congress considers the need for future defense

infrastructure reductions, it consider a process similar to that authorized

in the 1990 BRAC legislation. In the meantime, it should also consider

legislation to provide a process for reviewing and approving changes to

prior BRAC decisions, should DOD components face difficulties in

implementation.

Recommendations GAO is making recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense and the Air

Force to strengthen DOD’s process should there be future BRAC rounds. It is

also making recommendations to the Base Closure and Realignment

Commission for its consideration.

Agency Comments GAO did not request written comments from the Department of Defense.

However, GAO informally discussed its findings, conclusions, and

recommendations with DOD officials and included their comments where

appropriate.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

18

Previous Base Closure and Realignment Efforts 18

The 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Round 20

Key Steps in DOD Components’ Decision-Making 22

Military Judgment, Including Operational and Policy

Considerations, Affects Ultimate Closure and Realignment

Decisions

28

Bases Recommended for Closure and Realignment in BRAC 1995 28

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 28

Chapter 2 

BRAC 1995 Savings

Are Expected to Be

Substantial, Although

Somewhat Imprecise

for Now

31

Cost of Base Realignment Actions Model 31

Substantial Savings Are Expected, Despite Some Errors and

Uncertainties

32

Comparability of COBRA Data and Implementing Budget

Estimates

34

BRAC 1995 Used a Different Discount Rate Approach to

Calculate Long-Term Savings

35

A Short-Term View of Savings Without Using a Discount Rate 37

Environmental Cleanup Costs Are Not Considered in Making

Closure Decisions

38

Conclusions and Recommendation 39

Chapter 3 

OSD Attempted to

Play a Stronger Role

in BRAC 1995, With

Limited Success in

Cross-Servicing

40

OSD Established Oversight and Cross-Service Groups 40

Services’ Recommendations Will Reduce Some Infrastructure,

but Few Workloads Will Be Cross-Serviced

42

Conclusions and Recommendations 50

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Contents

Chapter 4 

The Air Force’s

Process Made It

Difficult to Easily

Track Resulting

Recommendations

51

Although Some Improvement Has Been Made, Concerns About

the Process Remain

51

Identifying Closure and Realignment Candidates 54

Some Air Force BRAC 1995 Recommendations Raise Questions 58

Impact of Cross-Service Group Alternatives on Air Force

Decisions

63

Cost Was an Important Factor in Air Force Decisions 64

Cost and Operational Factors Eliminated Some Candidates From

Consideration

66

Need to Reassess Closure of Newark AFB Aerospace Guidance

and Metrology Center

69

Conclusions and Recommendations 70

Chapter 5 

The Army’s Process

and

Recommendations

Were Generally

Sound, With Cost

Considerations

Eliminating Some

Potential Closures

and Realignments

72

Few Changes Were Made to the Army’s Sound Process 72

Identifying Closure and Realignment Candidates 74

Army’s 1995 BRAC Recommendations Were Largely Well

Supported

75

Open Issues That Should Be Addressed by the BRAC Commission 77

Impact of Cross-Service Group Alternatives on Army Decisions 79

Cost as a Factor in Army Decisions 79

Costs and Other Factors Eliminated Some Closure Candidates 81

Conclusions and Recommendations 86

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Chapter 6 

The Navy’s Process

and

Recommendations

Were Sound, With

Costs, Economic

Impact, and Other

Factors Eliminating

Some Potential

Recommendations

87

The Navy’s Process Was Strengthened 87

Identifying Closure and Realignment Candidates 89

The Navy’s 1995 BRAC Recommendations Were Generally Sound 93

Impact of Cross-Service Group Alternatives on Navy Decisions 98

Cost as a Factor in Navy Decisions 99

Costs, Economic Impact, and Other Factors Eliminated Some

Candidates for Closure or Realignment

105

Recommendations 109

Chapter 7 

DLA Based Its BRAC

Recommendations on

Sound Military and

Business Analyses

110

DLA’s 1995 Process Was Much Improved Over Its 1993 Process 110

Identifying Closure and Realignment Candidates 113

DLA’s 1995 BRAC Recommendations Were Based on Multiple

Analyses

115

Cost as a Factor in DLA Decisions 121

Conclusions 122

Chapter 8 

Defense Investigative

Service Requested a

Change to Prior BRAC

Decision Affecting Its

Location

123

DIS Recommendation Is Supported by Its Analysis 123

Chapter 9 

Future Directions

125

Conclusions and Matters for Congressional Consideration 126

Appendixes Appendix I: Office of the Secretary of Defense Base Realignment

and Closure Definitions

128

Appendix II: The Joint Cross-Service Groups’ Analytical Process 130

Appendix III: Cost of Base Realignment Actions Model (COBRA) 135

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Contents

Appendix IV: Bases Affected by the Secretary of Defense’s

February 28, 1995, Base Closure and Realignment

Recommendations

138

Appendix V: Economic Impact Assessments 144

Appendix VI: Major Contributors to This Report 152

Tables Table 1: DOD Criteria for Selecting Bases for Closure or

Realignment

3

Table 1.1: DOD Criteria for Selecting Bases for Closure or

Realignment

22

Table 2.1: Impact of Various Discount Rates on BRAC 1995 Net

Present Values

37

Table 2.2: Projected 6-year Costs and Savings From BRAC 1995 38

Table 3.1: Amount of Excess Capacity Identified by Each

Cross-Service Group

42

Table 4.1: Air Force Basing Categories and Subcategories 56

Table 4.2: Air Force Bases Studied and Considered Excess 57

Table 4.3: Air Force BRAC Recommendations By Category 58

Table 4.4: Recommended Changes to Prior BRAC Decisions 63

Table 4.5: Estimated Costs and Savings Resulting From Air Force

Recommendations

65

Table 4.6: Summary of Estimated Costs and Savings for Air Force

Bases Not Recommended for Closure or Realignment

67

Table 5.1: Army’s BRAC Installations, by Category, and Potential

Candidates for Closure

74

Table 5.2: Army BRAC Recommendations by Installation

Category

76

Table 5.3: Estimated Costs and Savings Resulting From Army

BRAC Recommendations

80

Table 5.4: Estimated Costs and Savings for Selected Army

Installations Excluded From Consideration

82

Table 6.1: The Navy’s BRAC Subcategories 90

Table 6.2: The Navy’s 1995 BRAC Recommendations, by

Subcategory

94

Table 6.3: Estimated Costs and Savings Resulting From Navy

Recommendations for Closure

101

Table 6.4: Estimated Costs and Savings from Navy

Recommendations for Realignment

103

Table 6.5: Estimated Costs and Savings from Navy-Recommended

Reconsiderations of Prior BRAC Decisions

104

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Table 6.6: Estimated Costs and Savings From Selected Navy

Scenarios Eliminated from Consideration

105

Table 7.1: Categories and Subcategories of DLA Activities 114

Table 7.2: DLA’s 1995 BRAC Recommendations, by Category 115

Table 7.3: Estimated Costs and Savings Resulting From DLA

BRAC Recommendations

122

Table II.1: Chairpersons of the Five Functional Joint

Cross-Service Groups

130

Table II.2: Categories for Analysis and Locations Selected by the

Cross-Service Groups

131

Table II.3: Amount of Excess Capacity and Methodology Used by

Each Cross-Service Group

132

Table II.4: Examples of Policy Constraints Employed by the

Cross-Service Groups

133

Table II.5: Alternatives the Cross-Service Groups Sent to the

Services

134

Table III.1: Some COBRA Improvements Affecting BRAC 1995 136

Table IV.1: Major Bases Recommended for Closure 138

Table IV.2: Major Bases Recommended for Realignment 139

Table IV.3: Smaller Bases and Activities Recommended for

Closure, Realignment, Disestablishment, or Relocation

140

Table IV.4: Changes to Previously Approved BRAC

Recommendations

143

Abbreviations

AAA Army Audit Agency

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile

AFAA Air Force Audit Agency

AFB Air Force Base

AFEWES Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator

AFMC Air Force Materiel Command

AFRES Air Force Reserve

AGMC Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center

AGS Air Guard Station

ALC Air Logistics Center

AMSA Area Maintenance Support Activity

ARB Air Reserve Base

ARS Air Reserve Station

ASO Aviation Supply Office

ATCOM Aviation Troop Command

BEA Bureau of Economic Analysis

BLS Bureau of Labor Statistics

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
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BOS Base Operating Support

BRAC Base Realignment and Closure

BSAT Base Structure Analysis Team

BSEC Base Structure Evaluation Group

C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and

Intelligence

CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation

and Liabilities Act

CHAMPUS Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed

Services

COBRA Cost of Base Realignment Actions

DCMC Defense Contract Management Command

DCMD Defense Contract Management District

DCSC Defense Construction Supply Center

DDCO Defense Depot Columbus, Ohio

DDMT Defense Depot Memphis, Tennessee

DDOU Defense Depot Ogden, Utah

DDRV Defense Depot Richmond, Virginia

DFSC Defense Fuel Supply Center

DGSC Defense General Supply Center

DIS Defense Investigative Service

DISC Defense Industrial Supply Center

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DLSC Defense Logistics Services Center

DOD Department of Defense

DOD IG Department of Defense, Inspector General

DOE Department of Energy

DOSO DLA’s Operations Support Office

DPSC Defense Personnel Support Center

DRMS Defense Reutilization And Marketing Service

DSDC DLA Systems Design Center

EFA NW Engineering Field Activity Northwest

EIG Engineering Installation Group

FISC Fleet and Industrial Supply Center

GSA General Services Administration

IAP International Airport

IG Inspector General

IC&AD Investigations Control and Automation Directorate

ICP Inventory Control Point

ISSC Information Systems Software Command

IUSS Integrated Undersea Surveillance System

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
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JPAT Joint Process Action Team

LANTIRN Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared System

(Night)

LMI Logistics Management Institute

MCAS Marine Corps Air Station

MSA Metropolitan Statistical Area

NADEP Naval Aviation Depot

NAESU Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit

NAF Naval Air Facility

NAS Naval Air Station

NATSF Naval Air Technical Services Facility

NAVFAC Naval Facility

NAVMASSO Naval Management Systems Support Office

NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command

NAWC Naval Air Warfare Center

NBDL Naval Biodynamics Laboratory

NCCOSC Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance Center

NHRC Naval Health Research Center

NISE Naval In-Service Engineering

NISMC Naval Information Systems Management Center

NMRI Naval Medical Research Institute

NPRDC Navy Personnel Research and Development Center

NPS Nuclear Power School

NPV Net Present Value

NRC Naval Reserve Center

NRD Naval Recruiting District

NRL Naval Research Laboratory

NSWC Naval Surface Warfare Center

NSY Naval Shipyard

NTC Naval Training Center

NTTC Naval Technical Training Center

NUWC Naval Undersea Warfare Center

NWAD Naval Warfare Assessment Division

OEA Office of Economic Adjustment

OMB Office of Management and Budget

ONR Office of Naval Research

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PWC Public Works Center

R&D Research and Development

RDT&E Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

REDCAP Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Contents

REDCOM Readiness Command

ROI Return on Investment

SAILS Strategic Analysis of Integrated Logistics Systems

SDIV Southern Division

SIMA Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity

SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan

SPAWAR Space and Naval War Systems Command

SRF Ship Repair Facility

SSN Attack Submarine, Nuclear-Powered

SUPSHIP Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair

UPT Undergraduate Pilot Training

WDIV Engineering Field Activity West

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Chapter 1 

Introduction

In recent years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has seen substantial

reductions in its funding, personnel, and force structure, and to less extent

in its facilities infrastructure. DOD’s attempts to close and realign military

bases represent an opportunity to ensure that scarce defense resources

are devoted to the most pressing operations and investments rather than

to maintenance of unneeded property, facilities, and overhead.

On February 28, 1995, the Secretary of Defense announced

recommendations for closures, realignments, and other actions affecting

146 domestic military installations. Of that number, the Secretary

described 33 as being closures of major installations and 26 as major

realignments; 27 were requested changes to prior BRAC round decisions.

The recommendations were submitted to the Defense Base Closure and

Realignment Commission, which will consider them as it develops its list

of proposed closures and realignments for the President and the Congress.

This year’s efforts will mark the fourth round of major base closures since

1988.

Previous Base Closure

and Realignment

Efforts

Historically, closing unneeded facilities has not been easy, partially

because of the public’s concerns about the effects of closures on

communities and their economies and about the impartiality of the

decision-making process. Additionally, 1970s legislation requiring

congressional notification of proposed closures and preparation of

economic, environmental, and strategic consequence reports greatly

impeded base closure efforts. Legislation enacted in 1988 (P.L.

100-526) facilitated a successful round of base closure decision-making. It

outlined a special process for considering base realignment and closure

(BRAC) actions, authorized a special commission to review proposed

closures and realignments, and provided relief from certain statutory

provisions that hindered the base closure process.

In 1990, acting without use of special enabling legislation, the Secretary of

Defense found it difficult to initiate, and could not complete, additional

base realignment and closure actions. Concerned about the Secretary’s

proposals in January 1990, the Congress passed the Defense Base Closure

and Realignment Act of 1990 (Title XXIX, P.L. 101-510), which halted any

major closures unless DOD followed the new act’s requirements. The act

created the independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment

Commission; it also outlined procedures, roles, and time lines for the

President, the Congress, DOD, us, and the Commission to follow. It required

that all bases be compared equally against (1) selection criteria to be

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
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Introduction

developed by DOD and (2) DOD’s current force structure plan. The

legislation mandated rounds of BRAC reviews in 1991, 1993, and 1995.1

For the 1991 and 1993 rounds under the 1990 legislation, the services and

defense agencies submitted their candidates for closure and realignment

to the Secretary of Defense for his review. After reviewing these

candidates, the Secretary submitted his recommendations to the BRAC

Commission for its review. The BRAC Commission, which could add,

delete, or modify the Secretary’s recommendations, then submitted its

recommendations to the President for his consideration. The President

could either accept or reject the Commission’s recommendations in their

entirety; if he rejected them, the Commission could give the President a

revised list of recommendations. If the President accepted the

Commission’s recommendations, he forwarded the list to the Congress,

and the list became final unless the Congress enacted a joint resolution

disapproving it in its entirety.

By DOD’s count, base closure rounds in 1988, 1991, and 1993 produced

decisions to fully or partially close 70 major domestic bases and close,

realign, or otherwise downsize scores of other bases, installations, and

activities.2

 The number of bases recommended for closure or realignment

in a given BRAC round is often difficult to tabulate precisely because

closure decisions are not necessarily complete closures and closures vary

in size. The term base closure often conjures up the image of a larger

facility being closed than may actually be the case. Military installations

are rather diversified and can include a base, camp, post, station, yard,

center, home port, or leased facility. Further, more than one mission or

function may be housed on a given installation. For example, in 1993, the

Navy closed the Norfolk Naval Aviation Depot, one of its six aircraft

maintenance facilities. The Norfolk depot was located on the Norfolk Navy

Base, which includes the Norfolk Navy Station, Supply Center, and Air

Station.

An individual DOD base closure and realignment recommendation may

actually affect a variety of activities and functions without fully closing an

installation. Full closures, to the extent they occur, may involve relatively

1

For each BRAC round, this legislation mandated that we analyze the Secretary’s selection process and

recommendations, and submit a report to the Congress and the BRAC Commission. Depending on the

BRAC round, these reports must be completed within 30 or 45 days after the Secretary of Defense

makes public the proposed realignments and closures. For information on the 1991 and 1993 rounds,

see: Military Bases: Observations on the Analyses Supporting Proposed Closures and Realignments

(GAO/NSIAD-91-224, May 15, 1991) and Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s Recommendations and

Selection Process for Closures and Realignments (GAO/NSIAD-93-173, Apr. 15, 1993).

2

See appendix I for definitions pertaining to DOD’s base realignment and closure actions.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Chapter 1 

Introduction

small facilities, rather than the stereotypically large military base. Thus,

this report refers generically to a variety of sized facilities, installations,

and activities as base closures.

DOD is still completing the base closures and realignments approved in

1988, 1991, and 1993. By law, DOD must currently initiate closure or

realignment actions no later than 2 years after the President submits his

list to the Congress and must complete implementation within 6 years. As

of January 1995, DOD data shows that 51 percent of the 70 major closing

actions of the prior three rounds had been completed. Bases selected for

closure in BRAC 1995 must be closed by 2001.

DOD calculated that BRAC rounds in 1988, 1991, and 1993 resulted in

decisions to close 14 percent of its major domestic bases, representing a

15-percent reduction in plant replacement value.3 DOD data shows that

reductions in military and civilian personnel levels during this time period

have been much steeper and are slated to reach 32 percent within the next

several years. Similarly, DOD states that its budget request for fiscal year

1996 is, in real terms, 39 percent below fiscal year 1985, the peak year for

inflation-adjusted budget authority in recent times. Firm correlations

between these data sets are problematic. Nevertheless, differences in the

extent of reductions among these categories have been used to suggest the

need for significant additional infrastructure reductions in BRAC 1995.

The 1995 Base

Realignment and

Closure Round

The 1995 BRAC round was subject to the same legislatively mandated

requirements and procedures enacted in 1990, and subsequently amended,

that governed BRAC rounds in 1991 and 1993. However, for the 1995 round,

DOD also required that its components explore opportunities for the

cross-service use of common support assets. Thus, the Office of the

Secretary of Defense (OSD) organized cross-service review groups to

propose alternatives for the components to consider in the following five

functional areas: (1) maintenance depots, (2) laboratories, (3) test and

evaluation facilities, (4) undergraduate pilot training, and (5) medical

treatment facilities.

On January 7, 1994, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued policy

guidance for the 1995 BRAC round. He stipulated that his goal was to

further reduce the overall DOD domestic base structure by a minimum of

15 percent of DOD-wide plant replacement value.

3

Plant replacement value is DOD’s estimate of what it would cost to replace all the buildings,

pavements, and utilities at its bases using today’s building standards.

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Actions Taken to Help

Ensure the Integrity of the

Process

Several requirements of the BRAC process are designed to contribute to its

fairness and integrity, including the following:

• Closure and realignment decisions must be based upon selection criteria

and a current force structure plan (fiscal years 1996 to 2001) developed by

the Secretary of Defense.

• All installations must be considered equally for possible closure or

realignment.

• All components must use specific models for assessing (1) the cost and

savings associated with BRAC actions and (2) the potential economic

impact on communities affected by those actions. We have identified

shortcomings in these models in prior BRAC rounds and have seen

improvements made in each round to enhance their effectiveness.

• Decisions to close defense facilities with authorization for at least 300

civilians must be made under the BRAC process. Decisions to realign

defense facilities authorized at least 300 civilian that involve a reduction of

more than 1,000 civilians, or 50 percent or more of the civilians authorized,

also must undergo the BRAC process. DOD components retain the option of

including facilities/activities that fall below the threshold.

• Information used in the BRAC decision-making process must be certified;

that is, the information is accurate and complete to the best of the

originator’s knowledge and belief. This requirement was designed to

overcome concerns about the consistency and reliability of data used in

the process.

• DOD components must develop and implement internal control plans

identifying how they intend to conduct their BRAC process, foster accurate

data collection and analyses, and document decisions.

• Service audit agencies and DOD Inspector General (IG) personnel must be

extensively involved in auditing the process to better ensure the accuracy

of data used in decision-making and enhance the overall integrity of the

process.

Selection Criteria DOD has used the same eight selection criteria in BRAC 1995 as it did in the

prior two rounds (see table 1.1).

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Table 1.1: DOD Criteria for Selecting

Bases for Closure or Realignment Category Criteria

Military value (priority

consideration is to be given

to the four military value

criteria)

1. Current and future mission requirements and the

impact on operational readiness of DOD’s total force.

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and

associated airspace at both the existing and potential

receiving locations.

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization,

and future total force requirements at both the existing

and potential receiving locations.

4. Cost and manpower implications.

Return on investment 5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings,

including the number of years, beginning with the date of

completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings

to exceed the costs.

Impact 6. The economic impact on communities.

7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving

communities’ infrastructures to support forces, missions,

and personnel.

8. The environmental impact.

Force Structure Plan Decisions under each of the last three BRAC rounds have been predicated

on the most current force structure plan. The force structure plan for

fiscal years 1995 through 2001 governs BRAC 1995. The planned force

structure includes 10 active Army divisions, 11 Navy aircraft carriers, and

936 active Air Force fighter aircraft. This contrasts with the force structure

in effect for BRAC 1993, which included 12 active Army divisions, 13 Navy

aircraft carriers, and 1,098 fighter aircraft.

Key Steps in DOD

Components’

Decision-Making

Each of the DOD components participating in BRAC 1995—including the Air

Force, Army, Navy, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and Defense

Investigative Service (DIS)—had its own unique organization and process

for identifying candidate bases or activities for closure and realignment.

Yet, in varying degrees, each component incorporated similar key steps.

Establishing Base Closure

Review Organizations

Each DOD component participating in BRAC 1995 was responsible for

completing a review and giving the Secretary of Defense its candidates for

base closure and realignment. To accomplish this objective, each

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
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Introduction

component established an internal organization for conducting the

reviews. The Air Force, Navy, and DLA had executive-level review groups,

with senior civilian and military personnel overseeing the BRAC process.

Each organization also formed working groups functioning under its

executive review group. Decisions on candidate bases to be forwarded to

the Secretary of Defense were made by the respective service secretaries

and agency heads.

The Army’s principal organization for conducting its base closure review

was a working group that functioned under the direction of a brigadier

general. Periodic briefings were provided, as needed, to the senior Army

leadership, including the Vice Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff, and Secretary

of the Army. DIS had an executive group composed of senior agency

officials who directed the functions of working groups under them.4

Categorizing Bases and

Activities

Each DOD component grouped its bases, installations, or activities with like

missions, capabilities, or attributes into categories and, where appropriate,

subcategories. The Army and Air Force tended to establish categories

according to the type of installations and bases. The Navy and DLA

categories were more oriented to functional activities. Specifically, the

services and DLA grouped their installations and bases as follows:

• The Army had 15 categories of facilities, the major ones being combat

maneuver installations, major training areas, command and

control/administrative support, training schools, and ammunition storage

facilities.

• The Navy placed all its activities into one of five categories: operational

support, industrial support, technical centers/laboratories,

educational/training, and personnel support/other. Within these categories

were 27 subcategories. The largest category, operational support, had 12

subcategories, which included operational air stations, reserve air stations,

and naval bases. The industrial support category included subcategories

such as shipyards and aviation depots. Within these subcategories were

individual Navy and Marine Corps installations and activities subject to

review for closure or realignment.

• The Air Force had seven base categories encompassing operations —small

and large aircraft and missile bases; technical training and education

facilities; undergraduate flying training; other/administrative; space

4

DIS’ interest in BRAC 1995 was limited to seeking a change to a 1988 BRAC Commission action that

realigned Fort Holabird, Maryland, leaving DIS as the fort’s primary tenant. During BRAC 1995, DIS

sought relocation from Fort Holabird and construction of an office building at Fort Meade, Maryland.

Accordingly, DIS had a rather abbreviated BRAC program and review process.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
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Introduction

operations; industrial/depot test facilities and laboratories; and Guard and

Reserve facilities.

• DLA had four functional categories: command and control, distribution

depots, inventory control points, and service/support activities.

Distribution depots represented the largest category, which was

subdivided into stand-alone depots and specialized depots collocated with

non-DLA maintenance depots of individual services. Compared with the

services, which normally own or otherwise control their bases, DLA is

almost always a tenant on another component’s facility.

Data Gathering and

Analysis to Identify Excess

Capacity and Establish

Military Values for

Activities/Bases

Initial steps in BRAC 1995 evaluations were to (1) determine whether

bases/facilities in categories/subcategories had excess capacity for future

requirements and (2) assess bases and facilities against the military value

selection criteria. These were important steps toward identifying

bases/facilities/activities for further study as potential candidates for

closure or realignment.

Data used to make these initial determinations of capacity and military

value (and satisfy data requirements for other review criteria) were

obtained by the DOD components through questionnaires, or data calls, that

went out to their activities, facilities, and installations. This quantifiable

data was unique to each category about facilities, missions, operations,

and personnel. Individuals that provided this data had to certify that it was

accurate and complete.

A starting point for assessing excess capacity was examining changes in

future years’ force structure. Beyond that, how excess capacity was

evaluated varied by and within component, depending on the type of

activity. The Navy, for example, used personnel throughput as a capacity

indicator for its training air stations; for operational air stations, capacity

was measured by the number of air squadrons that could be housed in

terms of hangar and required support space. Likewise, capacity for Air

Force bases with aircraft missions was evaluated in terms of the maximum

number of mission aircraft that could be parked at the bases.

The Army relied upon measures besides quantifiable data to assess excess

capacity. Guidance and insights on potential excess capacity were derived

from a study entitled “The Army Stationing Strategy.” This study, produced

by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans at the outset of the

1995 BRAC review process, served as a frame of reference, or operational

blueprint, for the Army’s BRAC review process. Drawing on input from

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Chapter 1 

Introduction

senior leaders in the Army, this study provided operational insights and

military judgments regarding each category of Army base/facility,

including possible operational requirements and opportunities to reduce

infrastructure. For example, the study cited the need to maintain the

capability to station 10 division equivalents plus 2 armored cavalry

regiments in the United States—the equivalent of 32 maneuver brigades.

This requirement was predicated on the Army’s force structure remaining

as it is now and included contingency planning for stationing all Army

forces in the United States. The study estimated that the Army could now

house 29 brigades in the United States without any new construction; with

military construction, it could increase its capacity to station 38 brigades.

This stationing strategy formed the basis for military value assessments

and was used to identify a list of installations to be studied closer for

closure or realignment.

Key measures of capacity for DLA were the amount of physical space and

throughput capacity available and used. Although it depended on data

calls for information about storage capacity, DLA’s BRAC review also used as

a frame of reference “concepts of operation” for each of its organizational

categories to guide decision-making. Examples of concepts of operations

were increased emphasis on modern means to eliminate old, excess items;

less reliance on item stockage in government depots; and greater reliance

on industry delivery systems for direct delivery to military customers.

Each component developed a unique analytical approach to using DOD’s

military value criteria to analyze, rank, or tier facilities within its

categories. Data call responses were keyed to the selection criteria. Data

calls were designed to permit comparisons among installations and

activities. The components assigned values to particular data call items

based on their importance to the individual elements of military value.

Subsequently, ranked or tiered installations and activities were used as a

frame of reference by most components in selecting specific installations

and activities for further assessment in terms of potential closing or

realignment action. Thus, the ranking or tiering of installations was viewed

more as the beginning of the deliberative process, rather than the end of it.

Identifying Potential

Realignment and Closure

Candidates and Analyzing

Scenarios

After DOD components identified candidates for further study, they

examined the feasibility of various realignment and closure scenarios. For

a component with primarily one function/activity/mission at a given base

or facility, scenarios focused on options for eliminating or relocating that

single function or mission. The potential for closing these bases was more

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Introduction

apparent. Components with BRAC categories more aligned to functions

than to bases could make decisions affecting several functions on a given

installation before their cumulative effect provided the potential for a base

closure or major realignment.

Most components relied on their staffs’ technical expertise and

professional judgment in identifying various alternative scenarios. For

example, because several of DLA’s activities were collocated with service

activities or closely tied to service operations, DLA coordinated with the

services in developing its scenarios. DLA considered several factors, such

as the services’ force structure changes, base closure or realignment plans,

and projected workload estimates.

The Navy was the only service to use a computer program to configure

requirements to existing capacity in each of its basing categories as a

starting point for deliberation on closure/realignment scenarios. The

program was designed to find a set of activities in a subcategory that

achieved a reduction of excess capacity to varying degrees. The Navy also

had the unique goal of maintaining an average military value at least as

high as that calculated for all activities in a subcategory. Thus, it was

possible to recommend some bases with higher military value for closure

while leaving others open.

The services’ identification of scenarios was complemented by alternatives

given to them for their consideration by cross-service working groups.

Appendix II provides a more complete description of the cross-service

working groups’ analytical processes.

Gauging Potential Costs

and Savings for Various

Scenarios

Important aspects of the scenarios to evaluate were the costs, savings, and

payback periods associated with them. Each component assessed costs

using the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model. This model has

been used in each of the BRAC rounds, and improvements were made after

each successive round to overcome identified limitations. Appendix III

summarizes improvements that have been made to the COBRA model.

Determining Community,

Environmental, and

Economic Impacts

Although OSD policy guidance specifies that priority consideration be given

to military value, economic, community, and environmental impact issues

were also factors in the process. For installations that would inherit

additional missions, functions, or personnel as a result of BRAC actions, the

component assessed the impact on surrounding communities’

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Chapter 1 

Introduction

infrastructures, including housing, public utilities, transportation, and

recreational facilities.

Under OSD policy guidance, environmental restoration costs were not

considered in base closing decisions, since DOD is obligated to restore

contaminated sites on military bases regardless of whether they are

closed. Yet consideration was given to the impact of BRAC actions on such

environmental issues as threatened or endangered species, wetlands, flood

plains, water supplies, and air quality. Air quality issues played a larger

role in BRAC 1995 than they did in previous BRAC rounds because

implementing regulations for the Clean Air Act of 1990 were developed

after BRAC 1993. As a result, the components, particularly the Air Force,

took a harder look at air quality issues in evaluating their bases in BRAC

1995.

With succeeding BRAC rounds and the cumulative effect of closures and

realignments on particular regions, the issue of economic impact on

communities has grown in importance. The economic impact was

calculated by measuring the direct and indirect effects on employment in

the communities affected by a closure or realignment. DOD components

calculated the economic impact of each of their recommendations and the

cumulative impact of recommendations from this and prior BRAC rounds

on individual areas of the United States. Such assessments could, although

they did not in the past, provide the basis for the components to consider

alternative closures and realignments. Once OSD had compiled BRAC

recommendations from all of its components, it likewise made a collective

assessment of economic impact. This provided the basis for determining

whether final adjustments in proposed realignments and closures were

needed before the Secretary submitted his recommendations to the BRAC

Commission. Appendix V provides a more complete description of how

economic impact was assessed and the changes made to improve this

assessment for BRAC 1995. Despite initial expectations that economic

impact assessments would play a larger role in BRAC for 1995 than it had in

prior rounds, this did not turn out to be the case, with the exception of

actions by the Secretary of the Navy to exclude some bases from closure

consideration due to the cumulative effects of prior BRAC rounds (see 

ch. 6).

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Chapter 1 

Introduction

Military Judgment,

Including Operational

and Policy

Considerations,

Affects Ultimate

Closure and

Realignment

Decisions

Although each DOD component goes through a phased and largely

quantified process in evaluating its facilities and installations, final closure

and realignment decisions are often influenced by military judgments,

operational and policy imperatives, and other factors. These are important

parts of the BRAC process. Such factors may include a service’s decision to

maintain certain capabilities on both the east and west coasts, or to

maintain a facility having relatively low military value because of its

strategic location and importance.

Military judgment and other policy factors are applied at various points

throughout the evaluation process to eliminate facilities and installations

from further consideration for closure or realignment. To some extent

they may also be applied by a service secretary before forwarding

candidates to the Secretary of Defense. Likewise, OSD, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, and the war-fighting Commanders-in-Chief also review proposed

base closures and realignments, applying their military judgment as a final

check on proposed recommendations.

Bases Recommended

for Closure and

Realignment in BRAC

1995

After reviewing a consolidated list of recommendations for closures and

realignments from the services and Defense agencies, and without making

any changes, the Secretary of Defense publicly announced his list of

recommendations on February 28, 1995. The Secretary recommended

closures, realignments, and other actions affecting 146 domestic military

installations. Of that number, the Secretary described 33 as being closures

of major installations and 26 as major realignments, and 27 involve

requests to change (redirect) prior BRAC decisions (see app. IV).

DOD projects that its 1995 BRAC recommendations, if approved, will

produce a 6-year net savings of $4.0 billion, with annual recurring savings

of $1.8 billion after implementing actions are completed.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended,

requires that we provide to the BRAC Commission and the Congress a

detailed analysis of the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations and

selection process. Accordingly, from March 8, 1994, to February 28, 1995,

we monitored the process as it was being implemented by DOD

components. We analyzed the Secretary’s recommendations and further

analyzed the process between March 1 and April 10, 1995.

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Introduction

DOD and its components granted us varying degrees of access. For

example, DLA allowed us to monitor all phases of its decision-making

process, including all executive-level sessions at which BRAC issues were

being discussed and decisions made. At the other extreme, the Air Force

gave us very limited direct access to its process until after the Secretary of

Defense announced her recommendations on February 28, 1995. This

limited our ability to fully assess the Air Force’s process.

We did our work at OSD, the military services’ and defense agencies’

headquarters and field locations, and various military commands and

installations. We interviewed and obtained pertinent documentation from

officials at these locations. At OSD, we obtained information about policy

guidance provided to DOD components and OSD’s oversight role in the base

closure and realignment process. We also interviewed and obtained

pertinent documentation from officials involved in the cross-service

working groups.

For each of the services, DLA, and DIS, we reviewed documentation and

interviewed officials to determine whether their decision-making

processes complied with legislative requirements and OSD guidance and

employed sound methodologies and techniques. We broadly examined

categories of bases and individual decisions within those categories to

determine whether recommended closures and realignments logically

flowed from available documentation and decision-making processes. For

major recommendations, we tracked the recommendation in detail

through the decision-making process to test the decision logic,

consistency, reasonableness, and correlation with military value

assessments and other decision criteria. We applied the same approach to

examine alternatives suggested to the services by the five functional

cross-service groups.

If the services used special cost or analytical models, we reviewed them to

understand how they fit into the analytical process and examined

technical documentation to ensure that these tools were appropriate for

their use. We also independently examined the outputs of these models,

particularly COBRA. Any errors we detected, such as in cost data, were

immediately referred to DOD components for their consideration. In most

instances, service audit agencies and the DOD IG made more in-depth

assessments of these models and verified data entries and output

pertaining to these models; they also referred errors to the components on

a real-time basis to ensure needed corrections were made. In most

situations, we reviewed and assessed the results of the audit agencies’

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Introduction

work; in selected instances, we observed the work of the audit agencies in

making their assessments.

Each of the DOD components used its respective audit agency to provide

real-time audit coverage of data collection and analyses processes to

ensure that the data used were adequately documented and accurately

incorporated in the process. Therefore, we maintained a liaison with these

groups to facilitate our monitoring efforts and in selected instances

observed their verification of data.

We performed our work in accordance with generally accepted

government auditing standards. We did not request written comments

from DOD, but we informally discussed our findings, conclusions, and

recommendations with DOD officials and included their comments where

appropriate.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Chapter 2 

BRAC 1995 Savings Are Expected to Be

Substantial, Although Somewhat Imprecise

for Now

Although projected annual recurring savings from DOD’s BRAC 1995

recommendations are substantial, various sensitivity tests we completed

indicated they could be overstated by 2 percent, and implementation costs

could be understated by 4 percent. At the same time, the cost and savings

data remain somewhat imprecise pending development of budget quality

data for implementation of the recommendations.

The COBRA model is used by DOD components to estimate the costs and

savings of base closures and realignments. Improvements have been made

to the model after each BRAC round; however, it remains more of a

comparative tool rather than a precise indicator of budget costs and

savings. DOD has employed a different, but appropriate, discount rate

approach for BRAC 1995 than was used in earlier BRAC rounds to project the

net present value (NPV) of long-term savings. Recent changes in the actual

discount rate for this approach, and DOD’s reaction to that change, have

created some confusion regarding the extent of long-term savings.

Cost of Base

Realignment Actions

Model

The COBRA model estimates the costs and savings associated with a

proposed base closure and realignment action, using data that are readily

available to DOD without extensive field studies. COBRA incorporates data

pertaining to three major costs: the current cost of operations, the cost of

operations after the closure or realignment, and the cost of implementing

the realignment or closure action. Using these costs, COBRA calculates the

number of years it takes to generate enough savings to offset the cost of

the closure or realignment. Stated another way, it determines how long it

takes for the closure or realignment action to be paid for.

COBRA computes the NPV of the BRAC action over a 20-year period, as well as

one-time costs, 6-year costs and savings, and annual recurring costs and

savings. COBRA data depict costs as accurately as possible; however, when

uncertainty exists, COBRA inputs have tended to overestimate costs and

underestimate savings as a conservative safeguard to guide

decision-making.1

 While COBRA does not produce budget-quality data, it

does aggregate relevant cost data to provide a consistent comparison

between realignment and closure options.

1

Environmental cleanup costs, which by OSD policy direction are not included in COBRA calculations.

These costs are not a part of base-closing decisions, since they are expected to occur whether a base

closes or not.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Chapter 2 

BRAC 1995 Savings Are Expected to Be

Substantial, Although Somewhat Imprecise

for Now

Substantial Savings

Are Expected, Despite

Some Errors and

Uncertainties

In several instances, variances may exist in cost and savings estimates for

BRAC 1995 recommendations. In other instances, cost and savings

estimates remain uncertain. However, assuming the Commission approves

all recommendations as presented, our analysis indicates that these

variances would not significantly alter the substantial savings expected

from the BRAC recommendations.

A DOD IG review completed and made public after DOD’s BRAC report,

including COBRA summaries, showed that several of OSD’s standard cost

factors supplied for the components’ use either were not well supported or

were outdated. These standard factors related to civilian personnel and

housing costs. As a result of using these faulty standard factors, one-time

costs were understated by $101 million, and in at least two instances,

one-time costs increased enough to extend the return on investment (ROI)

an additional year. However, our analysis also indicated the use of faulty

factors caused a reduction in net present value only by approximately

$68 million.

Questions have been raised about the accuracy of OSD’s standard factors

regarding (1) the willingness of civilian employees to relocate if their

positions are moved to a new base and (2) the percentage of civilian

personnel who would receive other government jobs as a result of the

Priority Placement Program.

OSD’s standard factor of 6 percent of civilian personnel that would be

unwilling to move was based on a 1991 study of one air base. Because of

concern that the percentage could be much higher, we completed a

sensitivity analysis, assuming that more than two-thirds of affected civilian

personnel would be unwilling to move. Our analysis showed a net result of

less than a 1-percent change in one-time costs. Increased costs associated

with separation of persons unwilling to move was largely offset by

decreased costs associated with moving personnel.

The standard factor of 60 percent placement of civilian personnel through

the Priority Placement Program (used in all of DOD’s COBRAs) was

challenged by the DOD IG and subsequently revised by OSD to 50 percent

based on historical data. In spite of the reduction, concern remained that

the percentage could be much lower. To test the impact of this factor on

overall cost, we reran the COBRAs using a 20-percent placement rate. The

result was a slight increase (2 percent) in one-time costs, due to a rise in

severance pay that was mitigated by a decrease in moving costs.

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COBRA uses authorized personnel positions for analysis; however, we found

that the actual number of civilian personnel at a base may be less. To

determine the impact of this difference, we completed a sensitivity

analysis, assuming that the actual civilian personnel levels were 98 percent

of what was authorized (an approximation based on differences in recent

fiscal years). The results indicated that one-time costs decreased by

$17 million, with a 6-year net increase in savings of $27.7 million. This

appeared to be caused by (1) reduced moving costs because fewer

positions were being realigned and (2) greater overhead savings.

DOD’s BRAC policy guidance stipulates that personnel reductions associated

with force structure reductions are not to be included in BRAC savings.

Other military personnel reductions occurring at bases slated for closure

or realignment may be counted as savings to the extent that they represent

reductions in salary costs. While such reductions are taken, they may not

always result in reductions in authorized end strength. The Navy and the

Air Force indicate that they reduce their end strengths to match military

personnel reductions resulting from BRAC; the Army, which is claiming

savings from such reductions in BRAC 1995, indicates that it does not

expect to take commensurate reductions in end strength. We calculate

that approximately $41 million of the Army’s annual recurring BRAC savings

is related to such personnel reductions. Since these personnel will be

reassigned elsewhere rather than taken out of the force structure, they do

not represent dollar savings that can be readily allocated outside the

personnel accounts.

We also found that DOD components were not always able to identify

where activities from closing or realigning bases would relocate.

Therefore, to fully capture costs and savings, a generic “base X” was used.2

 Collectively, the services and DLA included base X in 32 (22 percent) of

their BRAC 1995 recommendations, accounting for 12 percent of all

personnel realignments and 3 percent of costs. Further, in 15 of these 32

recommendations, more than half of the personnel realignments were to

base X. Because base X represents an average cost option, or in the case of

the Navy and Air Force a higher than average cost option, the difference

between the COBRA cost estimate and the eventual implementation cost

could be more or less for these recommendations. The components with

the greatest number of base-X recommendations were the Army and DLA.

Army and DLA officials indicated that prior BRAC experience has shown that

2

For anticipated relocations of less than 50 miles, a generic “base Y” was used. Relocations to base Y,

as for actual relocations less than 50 miles, do not include personnel moving costs.

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costs associated with such moves have been similar or less than initially

projected.

The net result of various sensitivity tests we completed showed that DOD’s

projected $1.8 billion annual recurring savings from BRAC 1995

recommendations could be overstated by $31 million, or 2 percent, and the

cost to implement the recommendations could be understated by

$160 million, or 4 percent. This represents a relatively limited diminution

in projected cost savings.

It should be noted, however, that most DOD components undertake more

rigorous assessments of expected costs very quickly after the Secretary of

Defense announces his list of proposed closures and realignments, as they

begin to more fully consider how to implement the recommendations and

develop budget quality data for doing so. Such efforts are currently

underway, primarily in the Army and Air Force, and to a lesser extent in

the Navy. A more current estimate of projected costs and savings should

be available before the Commission completes its work and issues its

report to the President.

Comparability of

COBRA Data and

Implementing Budget

Estimates

Various concerns have been voiced about the comparability of prior BRAC

COBRA data and subsequent budget estimates prepared to implement BRAC

decisions, and the same concerns pertain to the 1995 BRAC round. It is

important to note that COBRA is only a starting point for preparing BRAC

implementation budgets, and there are important differences in how cost

data is developed for COBRA and for subsequent budget submissions. Thus,

no services or defense agencies routinely compare COBRA estimates with

implementing budgets. At the same time, the services and defense

agencies do not update their initial estimates of BRAC savings once

implementing budgets are completed.

Differences between COBRA estimates and the BRAC budget exist for myriad

reasons, including the following:

• COBRA estimates, particularly those based on standard cost factors, are

averages. Not surprisingly, those averages must be refined for budget

purposes.

• COBRA costs are expressed in constant-year dollars; budgets are expressed

in then-year (inflated) dollars.

• COBRA costs can be understated if a closing base has several tenant

organizations that must be relocated. Understatement has occurred in the

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past where decisions had not been finalized when the COBRA costs were

estimated.

• Environmental restoration costs are not included in COBRA, but these costs

are included in the BRAC implementation budgets.

• COBRA data capture costs and savings pertinent to a given installation, even

if multiple tenants are involved; BRAC implementation budgets represent

only a single component’s costs.

• Homeowners Assistance Program costs are included in COBRA but

excluded from BRAC implementation budgets.

While COBRA and budget data are not routinely compared across the board,

some ad hoc assessments have shown that budgeted costs related to COBRA

cost factors were less than originally projected by COBRA or even initial

budget estimates. For example, the Army has found over time that actual

BRAC-related personnel costs were less than initially forecast. Also, the DOD

IG has done a series of audits comparing most recent budget requests for

BRAC construction with the COBRA estimates for 38 affected bases. It found

that the budget requests, on average, were 7.79 percent ($170.5 million)

less than original estimates.

To the extent that implementation costs are less than those projected by

COBRA, BRAC savings can obviously be greater than initially projected.

However, as indicated previously, DOD and its components do not routinely

update their initial savings estimates. In another review, we are examining

the extent to which actual cost savings vary from initial estimates of prior

BRAC closures and realignments.

BRAC 1995 Used a

Different Discount

Rate Approach to

Calculate Long-Term

Savings

All BRAC 1995 COBRA costs and savings are projected over a 20-year period

and are adjusted, or discounted, to fiscal year 1996 dollars. COBRA uses a

discount rate to calculate the present value of net savings over the 20-year

period. Discounting reflects the time value of money by transforming gains

and losses from different time periods to a common unit of measurement.

The discount rate is also used as a factor in determining the number of

years before the government realizes a return on its ROI, that is, the point

at which savings begin to exceed costs associated with the closure or

realignment action.

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-94, “Guidelines and

Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs,” provides

guidance on the discount rates to be used in evaluating federal programs

whose benefits and costs are distributed over time. In prior BRAC rounds,

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the discount rate approach used was one that OMB said approximated the

rate of return on private capital. According to OMB, that approach is

appropriate for analyzing public investments and regulatory programs that

provide costs and savings to the general public, such as building a dam.

Because the benefits of such programs occur in the private sector, the

government’s ROI is comparable to the rate of return expected in the

private sector. The discount rates for this approach as used in BRAC 1991

and 1993 were 10 percent and 7 percent, respectively, for 20-year

programs. Had this approach been used in BRAC 1995, the applicable

discount rate would have remained at 7 percent.

OSD opted to use a different discount rate approach for BRAC 1995. After

consulting with OMB, OSD elected to use a discount approach tied to the

U.S. Treasury’s borrowing rate.3

 That approach is considered appropriate

for analyzing programs where a given objective is to be achieved at the

least cost. An example of a program for which the use of this discount

approach is applicable is an investment in an energy-efficient building

system that reduces federal operating costs. At the time most BRAC 1995

COBRA analyses were done, the discount rate for this approach was

2.75 percent for 20-year programs—this rate was used by the services in

completing their COBRA analyses.4

 However, on February 7, 1995, OMB

completed its annual reassessment of the rate and changed it to

4.85 percent.5 OSD did not revise its COBRA assessments to reflect this

higher rate.

Although OMB officials approved of DOD’s shift in the discount rate

methodology for BRAC 1995, they acknowledge that economists have

reached no consensus on a single conceptual approach for such analyses.

It should be noted, however, that the use of a discount rate tied to the

Treasury’s borrowing rate is consistent with our approach in evaluating

benefits and costs of public policies over time. Thus, we believe DOD’s use

of this approach is appropriate for BRAC.

What is the practical impact of changing discount rate approaches on

expected BRAC costs and savings? In general, for base closures with closing

3

OMB first authorized government agencies to use this discount rate in October 1992. This rate is

updated each year with the President’s budget submission.

4

In subsequent chapters dealing with individual DOD components’ recommendations and other bases

they considered for closure, we also used the 2.75-percent rate to show NPV, since that rate was used

in their decision-making.

5

In its report to the Commission, OSD inadvertently summarized its BRAC 1995 cost data using a

discount rate of 4.2 percent rather than 4.85 percent. It used the 2.75-percent rate for reporting specific

recommendations.

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costs concentrated in the early years and savings occurring later, the lower

the discount rate, the greater the net present value of savings and the

shorter the time period before net savings begin to accrue. To more

precisely determine the impact of different discount rates on expected

BRAC net present value savings, we reran the COBRA model for BRAC 1995

recommendations using 7 percent, 4.85 percent, 4.2 percent, and

2.75 percent discount rates (see table 2.1).

Table 2.1: Impact of Various Discount

Rates on BRAC 1995 Net Present

Values

Fiscal year 1996 dollars in millions

DOD component

2.75-percent

discount

4.2-percent

discount

4.85-percent

discount

7-percent

discount

Army $8,184.2 $6,945.2 $6,463.9 $5,134.1

Navy 8,528.0 7,457.0 7,039.2 5,878.4

Air Force 3,656.1 3,056.7 2,824.6 2,186.4

DLA 1,276.7 1,077.7 1,000.6 788.4

DIS 4.2 3.4 3.1 2.2

Total $21,649.2 $18,540.1 $17,331.4 $13,989.6

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

In recalculating COBRA estimates, we also sought to determine when the

DOD components would receive a return on their investments, using a

2.75-percent and a 4.85-percent discount rate. In most cases, we found no

appreciable difference, although in several instances (11 percent) the ROI

years increased by 1 year to 2 years under the higher discount rate.

A Short-Term View of

Savings Without Using

a Discount Rate

Another perspective on expected savings from BRAC 1995 base closures,

realignments, and redirects, without including the impact of a discount

rate, is seen in the costs and savings expected during the 6-year

implementation period and in the projected recurring annual savings after

the 6-year implementation period. Table 2.2 summarizes those projected

costs and savings.

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Table 2.2: Projected 6-Year Costs and

Savings From BRAC 1995 Fiscal year 1996 dollars in millions

DOD component 6-year costs 6-year savings

6-year net

savings

Recurring

annual net

savingsa

Army $1,594.2 $2,796.0 $1,201.8 $725.1

Navy 1,729.5 4,501.8 2,772.3 605.3

Air Force 1,392.7 1,505.3 112.6 363.3

DLA 464.2 577.2 113.0 119.6

DIS 12.8 12.3 (.5) .5

Total $5,193.4 $9,392.7 $4,199.3 $1,813.8

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

aRecurring annual net savings begin after BRAC recommendations have been implemented.

Environmental

Cleanup Costs Are

Not Considered in

Making Closure

Decisions

Environmental restoration was not a factor in the DOD base closure

decision-making process; however, it can represent a significant cost

following a base closure. The Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980 (P.L. 96-510) and the

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (P.L.

99-499) require the Department to restore contaminated sites on military

bases, whether the bases are closing or not. Environmental cleanup costs,

however, are likely to have a significant budgetary impact since pressure

for rapid conversion and reutilization of closed bases will not allow these

costs to be spread over many years.

For the 123 bases affected by the 1988, 1991, and 1993 closure actions, the

estimated cleanup costs contained in the 1995 BRAC budget justification

document will be about $4 billion. For the 33 major bases proposed for

closure by BRAC 1995, the estimated cleanup costs contained in the

Defense Environmental Cleanup Program Annual Report to Congress for

Fiscal Year 1994 (Mar. 31, 1995) are about $2 billion.6 For the cleanup of

minor bases, for which DOD provided data, the cost estimate was

$147.3 million.

The cost estimates are only preliminary ones because (1) detailed

environmental surveys for BRAC 1995 bases have not been done to reflect

shorter time frames to accomplish restoration and expedite the transfer of

property following a base closure, (2) CERCLA cleanup studies have not

been done, (3) the amount and types of contaminants to be cleaned up are

6

DOD has not completed the cost estimate for the accelerated cleanup of the BRAC 1995 bases.

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unknown, (4) changes in requirements are being issued often, and

(5) technology improvements could decrease costs. As shown in our

report entitled Military Bases: Environmental Impact at Closing

Installations (GAO/NSIAD-95-70, Feb. 23, 1995), past cleanup cost estimates

have proven to be low. For the 84 bases included in earlier BRAC rounds,

where additional information was supplied in April 1994, the cost to clean

up these bases rose to $5.4 billion, or over $1.6 billion more than the total

estimate for these same bases in the fiscal year 1995 budget request.

It is too early to assess what impact environmental cleanup will have on

the timely disposal of properties, since most of them have not closed.

Conclusions and

Recommendation

Projected savings from BRAC 1995 recommendations are expected to be

substantial, despite some potential areas of overstatement. At the same

time, COBRA estimates included in the Secretary of Defense’s report to the

Commission are recognized as somewhat imprecise. Currently, some DOD

components are working to obtain more complete cost data. Accordingly,

we recommend that the Commission consider obtaining updated cost and

savings data to the extent it is available and include this data in summary

form in its report for the recommendations it forwards to the President for

his consideration.

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Cross-Servicing

OSD took actions to improve its oversight of the BRAC 1995 process. It also

sought to encourage the consolidation of workloads across the services

and thereby reduce DOD-wide capacity for performing five common

support functions. Based on the services’ recommendations, some

reductions in excess capacity would be achieved within the services, but

the services’ recommendations for closures and realignments would move

very little work from one service’s facilities to another’s. OSD’s efforts to

encourage the services to share assets, consolidate workloads, and reduce

capacity in the five functions were limited because of reliance on service

decision-making and consensus; insufficient time; and, in some cases, a

narrow analytical approach.

OSD Established

Oversight and

Cross-Service Groups

In prior BRAC rounds, OSD involvement was generally limited to issuing

guidance and reviewing the services’ recommendations just before the

Secretary forwarded them to the Commission. For BRAC 1995, OSD

continued its policy guidance role but also established a senior-level

review group to oversee the entire BRAC process and a steering group to

support it. These two groups brought key senior OSD officials into the BRAC

process for the first time in a substantive way. The review group was

chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the secretaries or under

secretaries of the services, chairpersons of the cross-service groups, and

others were members. The group met six times between January 1994 and

February 1995.

The review group was authorized to review BRAC 1995 policies,

procedures, and excess capacity analyses; establish closure or realignment

alternatives, numerical excess capacity analyses, and reduction targets for

DOD components; review BRAC 1995 work products of the DOD components

and cross-service groups; and make recommendations to the Secretary of

Defense regarding cross-service trade-offs and asset-sharing opportunities.

The BRAC 1995 steering group assisted the review group. It was chaired by

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security; the team

leaders of each joint cross-service group, service representatives, and

others were members. The steering group met 10 times between January

and August 1994.

Between January and November 1994, the periodic meetings of the review

and steering groups helped focus the attention of senior DOD officials on

the potential for cross-servicing and facilitated the cross-service groups’

process. In November and December 1994, each cross-service group sent

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one or more sets of alternatives (proposals for closures, realignments, and

workload consolidations) to the services for their consideration in making

their final recommendations. After this point, the review group met one

more time to endorse, without changes, the services’ recommendations to

the Secretary of Defense.

We did not attend the review, steering, and cross-service groups’ meetings.

However, we reviewed the minutes of their meetings and interviewed OSD

and service officials who led and worked with each of the groups, DOD IG

officials who attended the meetings of each group, and service audit

officials who verified the data submitted to the groups. We observed

service auditors verifing data collected at several activities and DOD IG

auditors verifing data consolidation, analyses, and calculations for each of

the cross-service groups. We assured ourselves that data discrepancies

were identified and corrected. In March and April 1995, we analyzed how

the cross-service groups calculated excess capacity and developed the

proposals they sent to the services. We also evaluated the services’

response to the cross-service groups and their recommendations for

closures and realignments.

The Timing of the

Cross-Service Process

Limited Its Impact on OSD

and Service Decisions

The cross-service group process began in January 1994. In March and

April 1994, the cross-service groups sent their data calls to the services,

after the services had sent their own data calls to the field activities. In

July and August 1994, the steering group approved the plans the groups

proposed for analyzing the data they had requested. The groups identified

amounts of excess capacity, but except for depot maintenance, they did

not set capacity reduction goals, as originally envisioned. In late 1994, the

groups sent their proposals to the services that were responsible for

considering the cross-service alternatives in their service decisions.

Subsequently, OSD received the services’ recommendations too late in the

process for meaningful give-and-take discussions to achieve greater

consolidations. Had the cross-service groups started earlier, they might

have had more fully developed proposals and greater influence on the

services’ and the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations for closures

and realignments.

DOD officials told us that, ideally, the groups should have decided how they

would use the information they requested before asking the questions.

This would have avoided needless work on the part of the responding

activities. Also, this would have given the groups more time at the end of

the process to formulate their proposals to the services. In addition, if OSD

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had established capacity reduction goals for each function early in the

process, the services might have more carefully considered the

interservicing opportunities that the groups identified.

As it was, despite the efforts of the review and steering groups, milestones

slipped repeatedly throughout the process. When the groups sent their

proposals to the services in late 1994, the services were already

completing their analyses of their own installations. Consequently, little

time remained for the review group to work with the services on

additional opportunities for cross-service trade-offs and asset-sharing.

Services’

Recommendations

Will Reduce Some

Infrastructure, but

Few Workloads Will

Be Cross-Serviced

In prior BRAC rounds, each service’s base closure and realignment process

and recommendations focused almost exclusively on its activities. They

did not consider the potential for consolidating work across service lines.

Recognizing this potential, the Secretary of Defense designated five

common support functions as areas of special attention in BRAC 1995 and

established joint cross-service groups to deal with them. The functions

were depot maintenance, test and evaluation, laboratories, medical

treatment facilities, and undergraduate pilot training. Appendix II

discusses the structure of and analytical process used by these groups.

Among other things, the groups computed the capacity of each site

performing a specific function. Then they compared the cumulative

capacity of all sites with the workload projected for a given year to

determine the amount of excess capacity in each area. Table 3.1 shows

how much excess capacity each group identified.

Table 3.1: Amount of Excess Capacity

Identified by Each Cross-Service

Group

Cross-service group Amount of excess capacity

Depot maintenance 40.1 million direct labor hours (equal to 24,830 work

yearsa)

Test and evaluation 495,000 test hours

Laboratories 9,800 work years

Medical treatment facilities 1 medical center is excess, and 2 medical centers and 13

hospitals should be realigned.

Undergraduate pilot training 33 percent of available airfield operations for fixed-wing

aircraft and 108 percent of available ramp space for

rotary-wing aircraft

aDirect labor hours as a measure of capacity represents the amount of workload a facility can

accommodate with all work stations manned, on a single shift, 5-day, 40-hour week.

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Early in the process, DOD officials debated the role of the cross-service

groups. The Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, advocated a strong role

for these groups and recommended that the services be required to

incorporate the groups’ alternatives in their final recommendations. Other

officials believed the services had to retain the final say on closures and

realignments to meet their Title 10 responsibilities.1

 The latter view

prevailed. This key decision meant that cross-service groups were

subordinate to the services. In other words, the services retained the

power to make the final recommendations for closures and realignments

of their activities.

The cross-service groups’ perspective on the activities they studied

differed from that of the services. They looked only at functions performed

at two or more sites, or by two or more services, and those with the

potential for being consolidated. In most cases, these functions

represented only a portion of what was done at a specific site.

Furthermore, the activity was usually only part of a base or installation.

The services had the broader perspective of the entire base and its future

needs. In addition, the cross-service groups did not calculate the ROI of the

closures, realignments, and workload consolidations they proposed to the

services. Using these factors, the services determined whether the groups’

proposals were feasible and cost-effective. Finally, the groups’ proposals

were not definitive; four of the groups proposed two or more sets of

alternatives. In effect, the groups said that given the magnitude of excess

capacity, the services could close or realign one facility or another; the

remaining sites could handle the workload, and would meet the objective

of eliminating capacity with either choice.

In some cases, despite their different analytical approaches, both the

services’ and cross-service groups’ analyses supported closure or

realignment of the same activity. However, in most cases, the services’

final recommendations were based on their own analyses, not those of the

cross-service groups. Moreover, virtually all of the services’

recommendations resulted in moving workloads to like facilities within

the same service, as compared with the cross-service groups’ proposals,

which generally involved moving some workloads to other services’

facilities. In most cases in which the services analyzed the ROI of the

alternatives developed by the cross-service groups, they did so with some

1

Under Title 10, DOD activities are required to “maintain a logistics capability . . . to ensure a ready and

controlled source of technical competence and resources necessary to ensure effective and timely

response to a mobilization, national defense contingency situations, and other emergency

requirements.” (10 U.S.C. 2464(a). The Secretary of Defense shall identify those logistical activities that

are necessary to maintain the logistics capability described in paragraph (a). (U.S.C. 2464 (a)(2).

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variation of what the groups’ recommended. Generally, the variation

moved more work to that service’s own facilities than the alternatives

presented by the cross-service groups.

As discussed below, the services’ recommendations for closures and

realignments eliminate some of the excess capacity in the area covered by

the cross-service groups, but much of it will remain.

Depot Maintenance The cross-service group for depot maintenance analyzed the capacity of 24

facilities to maintain and repair 57 commodities, such as aircraft engines

and landing gear. The group identified 40.1 million direct labor hours of

excess capacity. It provided two sets of alternatives to the services, each

of which would close up to eight depots. The two sets of alternatives

would have consolidated 12 or 13 workloads at single sites, and various

other workloads at two or more locations.

Although some differences existed between which depots were included

in each set of alternatives, the capacities of the eight depots and various

workload transfers suggested for closure in the group’s first alternative

amounted to 30.5 million direct labor hours. The second alternative would

have eliminated between 34.5 million and 36.8 million direct labor hours.

In comparison, the services’ BRAC 1995 recommendations for depot

closures and realignments will reduce excess capacity by about 20 million

direct labor hours. The services recommended (1) realigning Letterkenny

Army Depot, Pennsylvania; and the Naval Undersea Warfare Center,

Keyport, Washington; and (2) closing Red River Army Depot, Texas; Long

Beach Naval Shipyard, California; and the Naval Surface Warfare Center,

Louisville, Kentucky. These recommendations paralleled cross-service

group alternatives but were fewer in number. The Air Force recommended

downsizing its five air logistics centers in lieu of closing San Antonio and

Sacramento Air Logistics Centers, as suggested by the group.2

 The group

also suggested closing the Naval Aviation Depot, Jacksonville, Florida, and

an additional shipyard—either Portsmouth, New Hampshire, or Pearl

Harbor, Hawaii. The Navy did not concur with these suggestions due to

strategic and operational considerations.

Even if the services’ recommendations are accepted by the BRAC

Commission, the excess capacity remaining will be equivalent to about

four average-sized depots (5 million direct labor hours), on the basis of the

2

The Air Force reported that downsizing these depots will eliminate 9 million of the 20 million direct

labor hours the cross-service group estimated would be reduced by BRAC 1995. As discussed in

chapter 4, we have concerns about the Air Force’s plans for downsizing these depots.

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cross-service group’s approach to calculating excess capacity. Much of

this excess will be in Air Force and Navy aviation repair capability.

Had the services designated a joint depot or consolidated more workloads

through interservicing, one or more additional depots might have been

closed. On May 4, 1994, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the

Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force to consider establishing a joint

fixed-wing aviation depot. However, the cross-service group decided that a

joint depot should be designated from among those remaining after BRAC

1995 and did not suggest establishing one in the alternatives it sent to the

services.

Test and Evaluation and

Laboratories

The cross-service groups for test and evaluation and laboratories had little

impact on the services’ recommendations. The groups identified large

amounts of excess capacity, much of which will remain after BRAC 1995.

DOD officials identified a number of problems that constrained the groups’

efforts. These included the following:

• Test and evaluation and laboratory functions were split between the two

cross-service groups, thereby creating artificial barriers around the

functions and facilities that each could consider.

• The groups chose analytical frameworks that broke work down into such

small pieces that some of the sets of alternatives they suggested to the

services proposed numerous transfers of small workloads from one

facility to another. The services did not find most of these options feasible

or cost-effective.

The cross-service group for test and evaluation analyzed the capacity of 23

activities that supported test and evaluation of air vehicles, electronic

combat, and armaments/weapons and identified about 495,000 test hours

of excess capacity.3

 However, the group did not set capacity reduction

goals.

The group provided two sets of alternatives to the services. The first set of

alternatives, developed by the group as a whole, suggested numerous

transfers of small workloads from one facility to another. The second set

of alternatives, which was controversial, proposed larger realignments of

work and, in the view of the chairpersons, had the greatest potential for

reducing excess capacity. Among other things, these alternatives proposed

3

This excess capacity existed at many installations in air vehicles, electronic combat, and

armament/weapons functions and in 18 test facility categories, including open air ranges, integration

laboratories, and measurement facilities.

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consolidating the air vehicle test and evaluation missions of the Naval Air

Warfare Center, Patuxent River, Maryland, primarily at Edwards AFB,

California, or vice versa, and consolidating the electronic combat test and

evaluation missions of Eglin AFB primarily at the Naval Air Warfare Center,

China Lake, California, or vice versa. The chairpersons said the services

did not sufficiently analyze this set of alternatives and that opportunities

for consolidations, cross-servicing, and infrastructure reductions were

being missed.

While the Navy and the Air Force recommended some reductions and

consolidations of test and evaluation activities, each service’s

recommendations were based on its own analysis. The services’ analysis

involved little transfer of workloads to other services’ facilities, and were

largely unrelated to the work of the cross-service group. The Navy and the

Air Force were unable to agree on the assumptions to be used in COBRA

scenarios. The Army did not recommend closing or realigning any test and

evaluation facilities proposed by the cross-service group. Despite the lack

of time at the end of the process and the need to further refine their

proposals for major realignments, the chairpersons of the cross-service

group said they were reasonable and should be carefully analyzed by the

services.

The cross-service group for laboratories analyzed the capacity and

functions of the 29 common support functions it identified as having

potential for consolidation, collocation, and cross-servicing. The group

estimated that about 9,800 work years of excess capacity were within

these 29 common support functions. On initial analysis, the group found

its approach yielded piecemeal results that usually considered workload

packages that fell below the BRAC threshold of 300 authorized civilians. At

this point, the group recognized that a broader approach was needed to

identify opportunities to eliminate infrastructure through cross-servicing.

In late September 1994, the group identified alternatives where it thought

the services could benefit from cross-servicing. The chairperson directed

the group to focus data collection and analysis on the following

alternatives:

• Consolidate most command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligence (C4

I) acquisition and research and development (R&D) at Fort

Monmouth, New Jersey.

• Consolidate air launched weapons research, development, test and

evaluation at Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake.

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• Consolidate explosives at the Armament Research Development

Engineering Center, Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, and the Naval Air

Warfare Center, China Lake.

• Consolidate propellants at the Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake.

The Navy eliminated a significant number of laboratory installations. In a

more expansive recommendation, it moved its C4

I activities to San Diego

rather than Fort Monmouth. The Air Force elected to realign these

functions within its own infrastructure, with a contingent moving to Fort

Monmouth. The Army proposed closing one laboratory, realigning its

functions internally, and chose not to move its propellant work to China

Lake. Subsequently, the cross-service group concluded that if the BRAC

Commission accepted the services’ recommendations as submitted, about

4,300 work years of excess capacity would still remain.

Medical Treatment

Facilities

Of the 14 medical centers and 86 hospitals it analyzed,4 the group

suggested closing 1 medical center and realigning 2 medical centers and 13

hospitals. The group did not set an overall capacity reduction goal for BRAC

1995. The services recommended closing one medical center and two

hospitals, and realigning two hospitals to clinics. The two closing hospitals

are on bases that will be closed. At the time it made its suggestions, the

cross-service group did not know which bases the services would

recommend for closure.

For various operational reasons, the services said some of the group’s

suggestions were not feasible. The Air Force did not calculate the ROI for

the cross-service group’s suggestions. However, both the Air Force and the

Navy said they were downsizing some facilities outside of the BRAC

process. Because in many cases a small number of jobs are involved, a

hospital can be reduced to a clinic, and clinics can be eliminated outside

of the BRAC process. Both services expressed concern that downsizing

hospitals to clinics as BRAC actions would limit future flexibility in that

congressional action would be required if plans needed to be revised.

DOD’s health care system’s primary mission is to maintain the health of

1.7 million active-duty service personnel and to be prepared to deliver

health care during times of war. As we have reported, a crucial task facing

the Congress and DOD as they plan for the future of the military health

4

Medical centers provide patient care and have at least two graduate medical education programs.

Hospitals provide inpatient and outpatient care, and clinics provide only outpatient care.

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services system is to agree on the size and structure of the medical force

needed to meet wartime requirements.5

A recent DOD study has challenged the Cold War assumption that all

medical personnel employed during peacetime are needed for wartime. Its

conclusion that wartime medical requirements are much lower than the

medical system programmed for fiscal year 1999 raises the question of

whether U.S. military medical forces should be reduced to only those

needed for wartime. Thus, as we have reported, several key variables that

greatly affect the wartime demand for medical care are still in debate. And,

while the cross-service group’s analysis and other studies indicate that

some excess capacity in medical facilities will remain after BRAC 1995, it is

unclear that there is consensus on wartime requirements and therefore on

how much excess capacity exists DOD-wide. In addition, because DOD is

still obligated to meet the health care demands of nonactive-duty

beneficiaries,6

 downsizing decisions must also be made on the

cost-effectiveness of maintaining a military medical capacity larger than

that needed for wartime purposes.

Undergraduate Pilot

Training

The cross-service group measured capacity for undergraduate pilot

training for fixed-wing aircraft by number of airfield operations at 12

installations, and ramp space availability for rotary-wing aircraft at 2

installations. For fixed-wing aircraft, the group identified excess capacity

of 33 percent. For rotary-wing aircraft, the ramp space capacity was more

than twice the amount needed. The group provided three sets of

alternatives for the services to consider. The first, which aimed to reduce

capacity and minimize the movement of functions to new sites, proposed

closing Naval Air Station (NAS), Meridian, Mississippi; NAS, Whiting Field,

Florida; and Reese AFB, Texas. Fixed-wing training was to be moved at the

services’ discretion, while rotary-wing training was to move from NAS,

Whiting Field to Fort Rucker. The second alternative assumed

redistribution of excess airfield operations capacity and added the closure

of Vance AFB, Oklahoma, to the first alternative. The third alternative

added the closure of NAS, Corpus Christi, to alternative two and transferred

its outlying field and air-space capacity to NAS Kingsville.

5

See Wartime Medical Care: Aligning Sound Requirements With New Combat Care Approaches Is Key

to Restructuring Force (GAO/T/NSIAD-95-129, Mar. 30, 1995).

6

See Defense Health Care: Issues and Challenges Confronting Military Medicine (GAO/HEHS-95-104,

Mar. 22, 1995).

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The Air Force recommended closing Reese AFB, and the Navy

recommended closing Meridian and realigning Corpus Christi from a naval

air station to a naval air facility (NAF). The group estimated that the Air

Force and Navy recommendations would reduce excess capacity for

fixed-wing pilot training to about 8 percent. Capacity for rotary-wing

training would remain at more than twice the ramp space needed.

The Air Force disagreed with the cross-service group’s second and third

alternatives, which included closing Vance AFB. It viewed these

alternatives as unacceptable because they both exceeded 100 percent of

capacity when planned capacity requirements were considered. The Air

Force concluded that for the foreseeable future, it was necessary to

account for the uncertainty of such factors as the turmoil of multiple base

closings and the fielding of new aircraft, including the Air Force’s T-1, the

Navy’s T-45, and both services’ joint pilot training system.

The Navy rejected the group’s proposal to move its helicopter training

from Whiting to Fort Rucker because its cost analysis indicated high

closure costs with a 15-year ROI. The proposal, as interpreted by the Navy,

would simply have collocated the Army and Navy helicopter training at

Fort Rucker, not consolidated the training—a concept the Navy continues

to oppose.

The Navy retained Corpus Christi as a NAF in order to provide additional

airfield capacity. This additional capacity will enable the Navy to locate all

of its strike training at NAS Kingsville, Texas; to accept mine warfare

helicopter assets in support of the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence at

Naval Station, Ingleside, California; and to move additional aviation assets

to the NAF as operational considerations dictate. Because the cross-service

group made no recommendations that affected the Army, no Army

analysis was required.

A key policy decision for undergraduate pilot training consolidations and

potential base closings was the Secretary of Defense’s April 15, 1993,

directive to the services to consolidate initial training on fixed-wing

aircraft and to transition to a common primary training aircraft. The

Secretary also directed the Army and the Navy to study alternatives for

consolidating Army, Navy, and Marine Corps initial training on helicopters

at Fort Rucker and to develop detailed proposals for implementation

within 90 days.

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The Navy and the Air Force agreed to a joint primary aircraft training

system for fixed-wing aircraft and began planning for the joint training

aircraft acquisition, syllabus development, and common training

philosophies. The cross-service group’s proposals and the services’

recommendations factored in the requirements for the new joint training

system. However, the Navy has not agreed to consolidate helicopter

training at Fort Rucker because it considers its training requirements

unique. A firm decision to consolidate helicopter training would be needed

to facilitate further reductions in the infrastructure for undergraduate pilot

training.

Conclusions and

Recommendations

Some reductions in excess capacity were achieved within each service in

support areas. However, OSD’s efforts to encourage the services to share

assets, consolidate workloads, and reduce capacity in five functional areas

met with limited success because of reliance on service decision-making

and consensus; insufficient time; and, in some cases, a narrow analytical

approach. More time for interactions between the services and with OSD,

and stronger DOD leadership will be required to ensure progress in the

future.

Because the services did not completely analyze the set of alternatives

developed by the chairpersons of the cross-service group for test and

evaluation, the BRAC Commission may wish to have the services complete

detailed analyses, including cost analyses, for its consideration.

If there is another BRAC round, we recommend that the Secretary of

Defense

• begin the cross-service process 1 year before the services’ BRAC process,

and for each common support function studied, incorporate specific

capacity reduction goals in OSD’s initial BRAC guidance and

• prior to the BRAC round, identify and make the policy decisions necessary

in each area to merge service functions that would result in further

reductions in infrastructure.

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The Air Force recommended closures, disestablishments,1 and

realignments of 23 installations, including 7 air reserve bases. It also

proposed reconsideration of seven prior BRAC decisions. The Air Force

considered the alternatives suggested by the cross-service groups and

incorporated five of them in its recommendations.

While some improvements in the process were made, certain aspects of

the Air Force’s evaluation process remained largely subjective. Initial

analytical phases of the Air Force’s process were influenced by

preliminary estimates of base closure costs. In some instances, these

closure costs appeared to materially affect how the bases were valued and

thus what bases were first considered for closure and realignment.

Restricted access to the Air Force’s process as it was unfolding, the

subjective nature of the decision process, and limited documentation in

some areas affected our ability to fully assess the analyses behind some

decisions, particularly those decisions excluding bases from closure or

realignment. These and other factors caused us to question a number of

the Air Force’s recommendations.

Air Force excess capacity analyses suggested the potential for a greater

number of closures and realignments than was recommended. The Air

Force did not propose closure of any active-duty operational aircraft

bases, although its capacity analyses showed a potential to close eight.

Factors limiting Air Force closures and realignments included operational,

environmental, and closure cost considerations.

Although Some

Improvement Has

Been Made, Concerns

About the Process

Remain

As in previous BRAC rounds, the Secretary of the Air Force established a

group of senior Air Force military and civilian personnel—the Base

Closure Executive Group—to administer BRAC 1995. The Executive Group

was assisted by the Air Staff Base Closure Working Group. Minutes of the

Executive Group’s meetings indicated extensive interaction with, and

direction from, the Secretary, for example, in setting capacity reduction

goals or in selecting bases to evaluate for closure. However, when the

Secretary met with members of the Executive Group and others to discuss

specific closure options, the meetings were not considered official

Executive Group meetings, and details of these meetings were not

documented.

An important part of the Air Force process was evaluating its bases against

DOD’s selection criteria. The Air Force weighed all eight criteria

1

According to OSD’s BRAC definitions, bases are closed and activities are disestablished.

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simultaneously, emphasizing the first five criteria, to place its bases in

three tiers, suggesting high (tier 1) to low (tier 3) value for retention

purposes.2

In prior BRAC rounds, the Air Force used a subjective color-coded scale to

assign a value to individual criteria and their subelements and used

subjective judgments to tier its bases.3

 The lowest-tiered bases provided

the starting point for considering bases for possible closure and

realignment. We reported in 1993 that the Air Force’s rating and tiering

approach, including limited documentation, made it difficult to track and

verify the decision-making process.4

 The Air Force did improve its rating

process for BRAC 1995 by establishing a numerical approach to determine

the scores for five of DOD’s eight selection criteria that had not been

quantified in BRAC 1993 (the first three and last two). However, these

values were ultimately translated once again to color codes. The color

codes were still used to represent individual subelement scores and to

aggregate the subsequent scores for each of the five criteria. Cost to close,

ROI, and economic impact information, the three remaining selection

criteria, were given numerical values.

A cumulative rating, either color-coded or numerical, was not calculated

for each base, unlike the other DOD components. Instead, the Executive

Group’s members subjectively weighed the five criteria rated by color

codes and the three criteria with numerical values, with emphasis on the

military value and cost criteria, and voted by secret ballot on a base’s

score. A 3-point scale was used, with a base’s score ranging from high to

low. With 13 members voting, an individual base could receive a maximum

score of 39 points. Natural break points were used to place bases in one of

the three tiers. Bases placed in the lowest, or third, tier provided the

starting point for considering bases for potential closure or realignment.

Prior to voting, a co-chairman of the Executive Group summarized for the

members which of the eight selection criteria were most important. For

the Air Force’s small aircraft and large aircraft subcategories, depots, and

product centers and laboratories, the co-chairman emphasized giving the

greatest weight to the first criterion dealing with mission requirements and

2

The Air Force, unlike the other services, did not establish a distinct military value for its bases.

3

A “green” rating meant that for a particular attribute, a base was desirable for retention; “red” meant

less desirable; and a “yellow” rating fell between the two. Each color could also have a plus or minus

designation. In prior rounds, after scoring the bases or individual subelements, the Air Force gave each

base an overall color rating for six of the eight DOD selection criteria.

4

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s Recommendations and Selection Process for Closures and

Realignments (GAO/NSIAD-93-173, Apr. 15, 1993).

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then to the fourth and fifth criteria dealing with cost and savings estimates

associated with closing the bases. The minutes do not provide information

about how the members actually weighed the eight criteria when voting.

Concerns About Aspects of

the Air Force’s Process

As in past rounds, the process was not sufficiently documented to

substantiate the extent of deliberations and analyses leading to decisions

to close or realign individual bases. This was especially problematic for

bases where deliberations occurred and decisions were made that bases

could not be closed or realigned. In these cases, we relied on oral

discussions to gain insight into the rationale behind some decisions.

Although Air Force Audit Agency (AFAA) personnel were permitted access

to portions of the Air Force’s process from the beginning, they too were

not given access to all the documentation for the final recommendations

until they were made public. Therefore, they are still working to complete

their final reviews.5

Second, closure costs played a major role in the Air Force’s

decision-making from the beginning of its process. Unlike previous BRAC

rounds, the 1995 BRAC process appeared more influenced by options that

would have smaller closure costs and quicker savings. The closure costs

used in the tiering process were preliminary, based on the premise that

installations would be closed and, with few exceptions, all personnel,

equipment, and functions would move to other locations. However, in a

number of instances, we found these initial estimates were significantly

higher than might be the case later, when more definitive assessments

were made.

The preliminary cost estimate could vary significantly from actual costs

for full or partial closures or realignments. We are concerned that this

approach could have affected the extent to which bases with high closing

costs or long payback periods were seriously examined for closure or

realignment. However, the nature of the Air Force process and its

associated documentation did not provide the basis to conclusively

determine whether this was the case.

5

AFAA oversaw and reviewed each phase of the process. It (1) reviewed and reported on the Air

Force’s internal control program, (2) reviewed the data collection process through statistical sampling

of the color-coded criteria, (3) reviewed cross-service data collection, and (4) performed a limited

review of the economic and cost data. During its reviews, AFAA provided at least 17 interim

memorandums to the Air Force to disclose discrepancies to ensure timely corrective action. At the

time of our report, it was completing its reviews and reports for each segment. AFAA estimates the

reports will be completed between late April and June 1995.

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In one instance, our analysis showed that Rome Laboratory, New York,

was placed in the top tier rather than a lower tier, where it more likely

would have been placed had closure costs not been emphasized. An Air

Force Working Group official stated that the high preliminary closure cost

($134 million) and long payback period (over 100 years) were reasons for

this placement. Later in the process, the Air Force took a closer look at

Rome Laboratory based on a cross-service group suggestion to close the

laboratory. The Air Force found that the costs were much lower

($52 million) and the payback period was much shorter (4 years) after

calculating more precise closing cost data for this specific

recommendation. Without the cross-service group suggestion, the Air

Force might not have seriously considered this recommendation and

might have missed an opportunity to reduce this excess capacity and

produce savings.

In another instance, we found that a second-tier base (Offutt AFB,

Nebraska) had lower color-coded scores in the first three criteria than a

third-tier base (Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota). While not precisely stated in

the Air Force documentation, the tiering decision may have resulted from

significant differences in closure costs. Ellsworth’s closure costs were

estimated to be $41 million, while Offutt’s were projected to be

$515 million. However, Air Force documentation does not provide the

rationale for the base’s relative standing. In this case, the relative standing

apparently would not have affected any decisions, since no bases were

selected for closure in this basing category.

Identifying Closure

and Realignment

Candidates

To begin the process for selecting bases for closure, the Air Force

identified all bases (active and reserve components) in the United States

that had at least 300 authorized civilian positions. The Air Force identified

99 bases (72 active and 27 reserve) that for the most part met this criterion

and grouped them into 7 categories, with a total of 13 subcategories.6

 The

Air Force also looked at Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve bases

that did not meet the base closure threshold of 300 civilian positions.

The Executive Group sent a detailed data call to the 99 bases to gather

information for a comparative analysis. It also developed preliminary

closure cost estimates for each base using the COBRA model.

6

Three bases—Onizuka in California, Vance in Oklahoma, and Arnold in Tennessee—had less than the

300 authorized civilian positions but were included because of their missions.

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The Secretary of the Air Force excluded 15 installations from the analysis

process because they were either essential to the Air Force’s mission or

located in geographical areas that were strategically important. For

example, McChord AFB, Washington, was excluded because it is the

primary deployment base for the Army’s I Corps and supports the rapid

deployment of Army troops to the Pacific theater. Based on the Executive

Group’s analysis, the Secretary eliminated two categories and one

subcategory that encompass nine additional bases because in its judgment,

no significant excess capacity existed. We found no reason to question the

basis for these decisions.

Capacity Analysis To identify excess capacity, the Executive Group compared each of the 99

bases’ projected force structure requirement with its total capacity and

future mission requirements. For example, for bases with an aircraft

mission, the Executive Group compared the maximum number of mission

aircraft that could be parked at the base with the base’s projected

requirement. Table 4.1 displays the Air Force’s categories and

subcategories along with the number of bases initially considered; the

number of bases excluded due to mission essentiality or insufficient

capacity; and the number of bases that were selected as candidates for

further study, that is, evaluated against DOD’s eight selection criteria.

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Table 4.1: Air Force Basing Categories and Subcategories

Reason bases were eliminated from

detailed study

Category/subcategory Total bases

Mission/

geography

No excess

capacity

Bases left for

detailed study

Operations

 Missiles

 Large aircraft

 Small aircraft

4

19a

15

1

4

4

0

0

0

3

15

11

Undergraduate flying training 5 0 0 5

Industrial/technical support

 Depots

 Product centers and labs

 Test and evaluation

5

6

3

0

0

2

0

0

0

5

6

1

 Education and training

 Technical training

 Education

4

2

0

2

4

0

0

0

Space

 Space supportb

 Satellite control

3

2

2

0

1

0

0

2

Other/administrative 4 0 4 0

Air Reserve componentc

 Air National Guard

 Air Force Reserve

13

14

0

0

0

0

13

14

Total 99 15 9 75

aThree additional large aircraft bases were considered in the missile bases subcategory.

bThe entire space support subcategory was eliminated because the Air Force found no excess

capacity. Two of its bases, Patrick AFB, FL, and Vandenburg AFB, CA, were eliminated because

of mission considerations.

cAir reserve component bases were generally not compared against each other. Instead, they

were reviewed separately for potential cost-effective relocations to other bases.

As a result of the capacity analysis, the Executive Group, in consultation

with the Secretary, identified the maximum targeted number of base

closures that could be achieved within each subcategory. Table 4.2 shows,

by subcategory, the number of bases studied and the number of bases that

the Air Force considered excess to requirements. This excess became the

Air Force’s base reduction goal.

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Table 4.2: Air Force Bases Studied and

Considered Excess

Category/subcategory

Number of bases

studied

Reduction goal

(excess bases)

Operations

Missiles

Large aircraft

Small aircraft

3

15

11

1

4

3

Undergraduate flying training 5 1

Industrial/technical support

Depots

Product centers and laboratories

Test and evaluation

5

6

1

2

3

0

Education and training

Technical training

Education

0

0

0

0

Space

Space support

Satellite control

0

2

0

1

Other/administrative 0 0

Air Reserve component

Air National Guard

Air Force Reserve

13

14

3

5

Total 75 23

The Executive Group indicated that it was unlikely the Air Force could

achieve reduction goals due to its constrained ability to provide parking

space and facilities for aircraft. That information would be developed

during later analyses when actual realignments of force structure were

considered.

After considering the preliminary closing costs, capacity analyses,

operational factors such as the type of aircraft supported and the impact

on air quality standards, and air encroachment potential at receiving

bases,7

 the Secretary of the Air Force directed the Executive Group to

assess how the missions of third-tier bases might be allocated to other

bases. An analysis of third-tier bases was completed, and if none were

considered candidates for closure or realignment, the Secretary then

directed that bases in the other tiers also be considered. During these

7

Environmental impact is the eighth DOD selection criterion. However, because of its perceived

importance, the Air Force also considered air quality within criteria two, which concerns the

availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated air space. An Air Force Working Group

official told us that beside being a factor in deciding whether to keep open or close a base, it was also

a factor in excluding bases. For example, Beale and McGuire were eliminated from consideration as

receivers of other bases’ missions, because adding a new type or additional aircraft could increase the

air pollution (measured in tons) beyond the allowed limits.

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analyses, more detailed COBRA estimates were developed for various

scenarios.

Some Air Force BRAC

1995

Recommendations

Raise Questions

The Air Force recommendations addressed the targeted active component

excess capacity primarily through realignments and the targeted reserve

component excess capacity through closures. The Air Force

recommended 23 closures, realignments, and disestablishments, and 7

changes to prior BRAC decisions. Three of the closures and the two

disestablishments affect active duty facilities; no operational aircraft bases

are recommended for closure. Table 4.3 shows the bases the Secretary of

the Air Force recommended for closure/disestablishment and realignment

by category/subcategory.

Table 4.3: Air Force BRAC Recommendations by Category

Category

Number

recommended Closure or disestablishment Realignment

Large aircraft/missile 2 0 Grand Forks AFB

Malmstrom AFB

Small aircraft 0 0 0

Satellite control 1 0 Onizuka AFB

Depots 5 0 Hill AFB

Kelly AFB

McClellan AFB

Robbins AFB

Tinker AFB

Product centers and laboratories 3 Brooks AFB

Rome Laboratory

Kirtland AFB

Test and evaluation 4 AFEWES

REDCAP

Eglin AFB

Hill AFB

Undergraduate flying training 1 Reese AFB 0

Air Force Reserve 2 Bergstrom ARB

Greater Pittsburgh

IAP ARB

0

Air National Guard 5 Moffett Federal Airfield AGS

Ontario IAP AGS

Roslyn AGS

Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport

AGS

North Highlands AGS

0

Total 23 12 11

While we have some concerns about the Air Force’s process, we found no

information that would lead us to question 15 of the 23 decisions. Seven of

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the 15 decisions involved cost-effective closures of air reserve component

bases, which will reduce excess capacity. Our review of the other eight

showed that the decisions were based on bases and activities having

relatively lower scores from the eight selection criteria, excess capacity,

and low projected workloads. However, we do have unresolved questions

about the basis for the remaining eight recommendations.

Reese AFB Closure The Air Force recommended closing Reese AFB, Texas, because it rated

last relative to the other four bases in the undergraduate flying training

category when measured against the eight DOD selection criteria. However,

community concerns arose over the issues of potential errors in the Air

Force’s scoring of selection criterion 1 (mission requirements) and its

reliance on data gathered under the cross-service group process to make

this assessment.

The Air Force’s initial review of the community concerns indicated that

while there were data errors, they did not significantly alter the relative

scoring of the bases for criterion 1 and would not have changed the

recommendation. The Air Force was finalizing its response to these issues

when we completed our fieldwork. Accordingly, we did not have time to

fully assess the situation.

Grand Forks AFB

Realignment

The Joint Chiefs of Staff review of this recommendation found that the

realignment of Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota, was problematic because

of questions about its potential impact on future antiballistic missile (ABM)

system deployment rights under terms of the ABM treaty. Thus, the Air

Force’s BRAC recommendation was adjusted to specify that the missile unit

at Grand Forks AFB would inactivate unless, prior to December 1996, the

Secretary of Defense determined that the need to retain ballistic missile

defense options would preclude this action. The Secretary of the Air Force

recommended that if such a determination was made, that the Minot AFB

missile group be deactivated. After receiving the Secretary of Defense’s

recommendations, the BRAC Commission, on March 7, 1995, added Minot

AFB to the realignment list to reflect its potential for realignment.

Kirtland AFB Realignment According to the Air Force, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, was recommended

for realignment because it rated low relative to the other five bases in the

product center and laboratory subcategory, considering all eight selection

criteria. Our analysis of the eight criteria does not support the Air Force’s

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reasoning. In addition, other issues need to be addressed: (1) certain costs

to operate existing facilities may be transferred to DOE; (2) the realignment

of Kirtland AFB will not reduce excess capacity in the product center and

laboratory subcategory, since the Phillips Laboratory at Kirtland will not

close or move; and (3) the Air Force may not have considered other issues

regarding those facilities that are scheduled to remain at Kirtland.

Our analysis shows that Kirtland’s first military value criterion was among

the highest of the six bases rated in the subcategory. From our analysis of

the remaining seven criteria, it appears that closure cost considerations

(criterion 4 and 5 in the Air Force process, involving NPV and ROI years)

made Kirtland an attractive realignment candidate.

Kirtland’s realignment would reduce the Air Force’s operational overhead,

including support previously provided to DOE and its Sandia National

Laboratory located on Kirtland. However, the Air Force’s savings could

mean an increase in operational support costs borne by DOE. Thus, while

DOD might reap some savings, the government would see much less

savings. We did not have time to fully assess the magnitude and validity of

costs that would be shifted to DOE; however, DOE estimates they would

exceed $30 million per year in addition to one-time costs of over

$60 million.

In previous BRAC rounds, we expressed concern that some DOD BRAC

decisions excluded costs that may be incurred by other federal agencies as

a result of its actions, and we recommended that DOD at least disclose such

costs. DOD did not concur with our recommendation and in this BRAC round

did not identify those costs.

The Air Force will reduce overall infrastructure but not laboratory

capacity with this recommendation. The Air Force’s Phillips Laboratory at

Kirtland will remain in place. Finally, there are questions about whether

the Air Force gave adequate consideration to security and operational

issues regarding weapons storage facilities at Kirtland. To all appearances,

the Air Force did not thoroughly consider all the factors associated with

leaving this activity at Kirtland.

Five Depot Realignments Citing the high costs of closure, the Air Force recommended that none of

its five maintenance depots be closed, but instead that each be realigned.

The Air Force based the realignments, which included the consolidation of

14 commodity groups, on studies that were incomplete and ongoing

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outside the BRAC process. Thus, we question the validity of the Air Force’s

resulting depot realignment recommendations.

The studies—considered to be a regular depot workload planning

evaluation and conducted independent of the BRAC process—were initiated

by the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) in July 1994. The purpose of

the studies was to evaluate the feasibility of realigning 24

commodity/process workloads. The depot maintenance workloads for

almost all weapon systems and some functional processes are currently

consolidated at specific air logistics centers. For example, depot

maintenance for the F-16 aircraft and for landing gear for all Air Force

aircraft is consolidated at the Ogden Center, Hill AFB, Utah. The Command

expected that further realignments, if approved, would occur along with

other realignments as a result of the BRAC review. However, Command

officials said that even though the studies were incomplete, they were

asked to provide their data for use in formulating the Air Force’s BRAC

depot consolidation recommendation.

The workload consolidation studies are expected to be completed and

reviewed by the Command and the air logistics centers by mid-April 1995.

Command officials stated that once the review process is complete, they

can present a coordinated position on recommended commodity or

workload consolidations. Given that data from their incomplete studies

were used to help make BRAC recommendations, these officials believe that

they should have the opportunity to suggest revisions to them.

The findings and recommendations of the current versions of the

Command’s studies do not fully support the realignments and

consolidations recommended in DOD’s February 1995 BRAC report. For

example, the Command’s study team report recommends no consolidation

of the plating function.8

 However, for the BRAC recommendation, the Air

Force recommended this function be eliminated at one of the five depots

and at the same time designated the depot as a consolidation center for

hydraulics—a function dependent on plating capability. The March 10,

1995, AFMC commodity study on plating recommended no plating

consolidation, noting that other consolidation study teams assumed that

plating is available at each depot. Likewise, the March 1, 1995,

consolidation study for the instrument and display workload

recommended consolidating this workload at two sites versus the three

sites called for in the BRAC report. Also, the report on advanced

8

Plating is a metal finishing process that restores dimensions and improves properties, such as

corrosion resistance, hardness, and surface smoothness to a part so that it can perform its designed

functions.

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composites, plastics, and metal bonding recommended workload

consolidation at two sites instead of the one site recommended in the BRAC

report.

In addition to inconsistencies between the preliminary Command studies

and the BRAC recommendations, we noted that the studies did not cover

two areas critical to making a meaningful assessment of the

cost-effectiveness of proposed consolidations. Command officials affirmed

that the workload consolidation reports do not address (1) the potential

impact of workload consolidation on the rates charged by the air logistics

centers for their services and (2) the extent to which residual workload

capability would have to be retained at each depot subject to workload

transfers to other depots. However, the officials said that the Command is

studying both of these issues and plans to report on them as part of the

workload consolidation study. These data appear to be essential for

making a meaningful assessment of the cost-effectiveness of the proposed

consolidations.

We also noted that workload shifts resulting from realignments proposed

by the Air Force would move workload to depots that appear to be

downsizing apart from BRAC. For example, one depot, Sacramento Air

Logistics Center, California, is losing almost all its unique airframe

workload as a result of force structure downsizing. As workload declines

and commensurate personnel positions are reduced, it would become less

costly in the future to close this facility. However, if the Air Force

continues to spread workload among all five depots, it will continue to be

costly to close any of these activities in the future.

Changes to 1991 and 1993

Base Closure Commission

Recommendations

The Air Force recommended seven changes to recommendations for the

closure and realignment of five bases in 1991 and 1993. These changes

were made because of either force structure changes or Air Force

evaluations that redirected missions and functions. The Air Force believes

they will result in about $20.6 million recurring annual savings. Table 4.4

shows the recommended changes to 1991 and 1993 BRAC Commission

recommendations.

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Table 4.4: Recommended Changes to Prior BRAC Decisions

Base Recommended change Justification

Griffiss AFB Inactivate the 485th Engineering Installation Group

(EIG) and transfer its functions elsewhere.

Renovation of originally planned receiver site too

costly.

Griffiss AFB Close the airfield at Griffiss AFB and use the Fort

Drum airfield for mobility, contingency, and training

support to the 10th Infantry (Light) Division.

Operation of airfield at Griffiss AFB far exceeds

earlier estimated costs.

Homestead AFB Relocate 301st Rescue Squadron (AFRES) to Patrick

AFB, FL, instead of reconstructing its facilities at

Homestead AFB.

The relocation will enable the 301st to provide

primary support to space shuttle missions more

efficiently and cost-effectively with less disruption to

the unit and mission.

Homestead AFB Relocate 726th Air Control Squadron to Mountain

Home AFB, ID.

Original receiving base, Shaw AFB, SC, does not

have adequate radar coverage of training airspace.

Lowry AFB Inactivate Det. 1, Space Systems Support Group;

some personnel and equipment will relocate to

Peterson AFB, CO.

Consolidate software support at Peterson AFB with

resulting elimination of personnel positions and cost

savings.

MacDill AFB Retain MacDill airfield as part of MacDill AFB. Deputy Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the

JCS have validated airfield requirements of the two

unified commands at MacDill AFB.

Williams AFB Retain Armstrong Laboratory Aircrew Training

Research Facility at its present location as a

stand-alone activity.

Facilities at Orlando, FL, are not available at the

estimated cost and Navy actions in 1993 BRAC

reduced pilot resources necessary for the facility’s

work.

Impact of

Cross-Service Group

Alternatives on Air

Force Decisions

As part of its process, the Air Force assessed alternatives offered by the

five functional cross-service groups. The Air Force collected data on

behalf of and under the direction of the joint cross-service groups. From

the responses to the data calls, the cross-service groups conducted

functional analyses of the bases within each subcategory for criterion 1

and developed ratings for them. The Air Force then developed a criterion 1

grade for each base from this data. The final Air Force recommendations

incorporated five of the cross-service groups’ alternatives. The Air Force

considered and analyzed the following cross-service alternatives:

• Test and Evaluation. The Air Force incorporated two of the five

alternatives related to test and evaluation facilities in its

recommendations—the disestablishment of the Air Force Electronic

Warfare Evaluation Simulator (AFEWES) Activity at Fort Worth, Texas, and

the Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor (REDCAP) Activity at

Buffalo, New York. The two activities were not part of the Air Force

process because they did not meet DOD’s threshold of 300 authorized

civilian positions. The Air Force rejected the other three alternatives,

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which included moving Air Force functions to other services, because it

did not consider the moves cost-effective or operationally beneficial.

• Product Centers and Laboratories. The Air Force incorporated parts of 2

of 11 recommended alternatives related to laboratories—the closure of

Rome Laboratory and relocation of its functions to Hanscom AFB,

Massachusetts, and Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey. It rejected the rest, citing

cost and operational considerations.

• Undergraduate Pilot Training. The Air Force incorporated one of three

alternatives related to undergraduate pilot training—the closure of Reese

AFB, Texas. This alternative supported the Air Force’s own analysis. The

other two alternatives were to close a second Air Force pilot training base.

The Air Force concluded that too much capacity would be reduced if two

pilot training bases were closed.

• Medical Treatment Facilities. The Air Force rejected all eight alternatives

for medical treatment facilities. The Air Force said that four of the

alternatives would affect readiness or have service-specific mission

implications. The other alternatives were rejected because the Air Force

either thought they required a more extensive evaluation of availability of

other resources or wanted to keep open options to size the medical asset

to fit future requirements.

• Maintenance Depots. The Air Force considered the two proposed

alternatives to close two maintenance depots because they supported its

own analysis, which placed both bases in the bottom tier. The two

depots—Kelly AFB, Texas, and McClellan AFB, California—became the

initial focus for possible closure, and, until early February 1995, the Air

Force was analyzing this option. However, the Air Force concluded that

one-time costs to close one or both depots would be significant

($653 million for Kelly and $514 million for McClellan and over $1 billion

for both). According to a Working Group official, recommending closure

of one or both depots would have precluded recommending other actions.

This official also said that, although not a factor in the Air Force’s analysis,

the Air Staff knew that considerable additional costs would be incurred for

environmental cleanup if any depots were closed. On February 3, 1995, the

Secretary directed the Executive Group to concentrate on other

alternatives, such as consolidations and downsizing. This new direction

led to a recommendation to consolidate 14 commodity groups, realign

workloads within the 5 depots, and downsize personnel.

Cost Was an

Important Factor in

Air Force Decisions

As indicated earlier, closure costs were an important factor in the Air

Force’s decision-making process. The closure and realignment of AFBs

selected for the most part had relatively small implementation costs and

provided immediate or near-term savings. According to a Working Group

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official, the planning target to spend on implementing all

recommendations was $1 billion. Table 4.5 summarizes costs and savings

data for the bases recommended for closure and realignment.

Table 4.5: Estimated Costs and Savings Resulting From Air Force Recommendations

Fiscal year 1996 dollars in millions

Installation

One-time

costsa

6-year net

savingsb

Recurring

annual

savingsc ROId years 20-year NPVe

Grand Forks AFB $11.9 $111.8 $35.2 Immediate $447.0

Malmstrom AFB 17.4 5.2 5.1 4 54.3

Onizuka AFB 124.2 (125.7) 30.3 8 181.6

Five Air Logistics Centers 183.0 138.6 89.0 2 991.2

Brooks AFB 185.5 (138.7) 27.4 7 142.1

Kirtland AFB 277.5 (158.8) 62.0 3 464.5

Rome Laboratory 52.8 (15.1) 11.5 4 98.4

AFEWES 5.8 (2.6) 0.8 7 5.8

Eglin AFB 2.2 6.3 2.6 1 31.4

REDCAP 1.7 1.9 0.9 1 11.0

Utah Test and Training Range, Hill AFB 3.2 62.4 12.4 Immediate 179.9

Reese AFB 37.3 51.9 21.5 2 256.8

Bergstrom ARB 13.3 93.4 20.9 Immediate 291.4

Greater Pittsburgh ARS 22.3 36.3 13.1 2 161.1

Moffett Federal Airfield AGS 15.2 4.4 4.8 4 50.1

North Highlands AGS 1.3 (0.5) 0.2 8 1.5

Ontario IAP AGS 0.8 (0.3) 0.1 8 0.9

Roslyn AGS 2.4 0.7 0.7 4 7.6

Springfield-Beckley Municipal Air Port AGS 23.4 (5.6) 4.2 6 35.1

485th Engineering Installation Group, Griffiss

AFB 0.5 26.8 2.9 Immediate 53.6

Airfield Support for Army, Griffiss AFB 51.3 (12.9) 12.7 5 110.8

301st Air Rescue Squadron, Homestead AFB 4.6 1.5 1.5 4 15.4

726th Air Control Squadron, Homestead AFB 7.4 2.3 0.2 Immediate 4.6

Det.1, Space Support Group, Lowry AFB 1.7 10.9 3.0 1 39.0

Williams AFB 0.0 18.4 0.3 Immediate 21.0

Total $1,046.7 $112.6 $363.3 $3,656.1

(Table notes on next page)

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Note: Totals may not compare to those in DOD’s report due to rounding.

aThis represents unique one-time costs to implement the recommendation.

bThis represents net savings within the 6-year implementation period.

cProjected recurring annual savings after the 6-year period.

dReturn on investment (ROI) years means the number of years after completion of the

implementing action until savings begin to exceed the costs associated with the implementing

action. “Immediate” means upon completion of the implementing action.

eNet present value (NPV) is net savings after closure costs, measured over 20 years and

discounted at the rate of 2.75 percent.

AFAA did a limited review of COBRA cost and savings data associated with its

service’s recommendations. AFAA audited a sample of the higher cost

elements calculated by COBRA for the Air Force’s preliminary and more

detailed closing cost analyses and determined that data entered into the

COBRA model could be traced to an appropriate source. They did not verify

that all inputs to COBRA were certified. Since the public announcement of

the BRAC recommendations, the Air Force has sent teams of personnel,

including AFAA representatives, to affected bases to develop more

comprehensive data regarding expected costs and savings.

Cost and Operational

Factors Eliminated

Some Candidates

From Consideration

Several bases (see table 4.6) were screened for possible closure but not

selected because of operational considerations, environmental issues, and

closure costs.

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Table 4.6: Summary of Estimated Costs and Savings for Air Force Bases Not Recommended for Closure or Realignment

Fiscal year 1996 dollars in millions

Installation One-time costsa

6-year net

savingsb

Recurring

annual

savingsc ROI years 20-year NPV

Beale AFB $199.0 $62.6 $52.6 3 $566.9

Ellsworth AFB 40.7 247.7 63.4 1 849.1

Scott AFB 239.6 11.2 53.6 5 528.3

Cannon AFB 72.9 118.8 40.2 2 501.8

Holloman AFB 257.2 36.7 65.1 4 663.2

Moody AFB 97.5 85.6 36.9 2 438.4

Kelly AFB 652.8 (558.7) 70.4 10 179.5

McClellan AFB 513.7 (366.1) 95.8 5 607.0

Hanscom AFB 421.3 (370.2) 50.5 9 158.0

Los Angeles AFB 449.7 (375.8) 49.5 10 142.0

Total $2,944.4 ($1,108.2) $578.0 $4,634.2

Note: Totals may not compare to those in DOD’s report due to rounding.

aThis represents unique one-time costs to implement the recommendation.

bThis represents net savings within the 6-year implementation period.

cProjected recurring annual savings after the 6-year period.

As part of our analysis of the recommendations, we obtained information

about the reasons that potential candidates were not selected for closure

or realignment. Some information came from the Executive Group’s

minutes, while other information came from extensive discussions with

Air Force Working Group officials.

Operational Aircraft and

Missile Bases

The Air Force did not recommend closing any operational-type (large and

small aircraft/missile) bases, even though its analysis indicated a potential

excess of eight of these bases. In rating and tiering the bases, the Air Force

placed only six bases in the lowest, or third, tier. Although these bases, as

well as some from the second tier, were extensively reviewed as closure

candidates, the Secretary of the Air Force did not recommend any for

closure for operational and cost reasons.

Large Aircraft and Missile

Bases

Three large aircraft bases—Ellsworth AFB (which bases the B-1 bomber),

Grand Forks AFB, and Scott AFB, Illinois—were rated in the bottom tier and

were considered for closure. In discussions between the Air Force

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Secretary and the Executive Group regarding Ellsworth, concerns were

raised about overloading Dyess AFB, Texas, the other B-1 bomber base.

Other concerns were the placement of all B-1 assets at a single location

and provisions in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that preclude

collocation of nonnuclear-capable aircraft (the B-1) with nuclear-capable

aircraft (the B-52). The Secretary and the Executive Group were also

concerned about the high one-time costs ($250 million) to close Scott and

the disruption of the U.S. Transportation Command’s activities at the base.

For Grand Forks, a Working Group official said that the Executive Group’s

analyses and discussions with the Secretary centered on finding a base

that could receive Grand Forks’ 48 KC-135 aircraft as a single package.

Consideration was given to moving the aircraft to McGuire AFB, New

Jersey, but air quality issues there precluded the action. Also, Grand Forks

is a prime location for single integrated operational plan (SIOP) purposes.

After discussing the bases in the bottom tier, the Secretary looked at

candidate bases from the middle tier, giving primary attention to Minot

AFB; Beale AFB, California; and Malmstrom AFB. According to a Working

Group official, Minot AFB could have been closed; however, the Air Force

does not intend to decrease its B-52 inventory, as planned, and a suitable

receiver base could not be found. For example, moving Minot’s B-52

aircraft to other bases like Beale raised air quality environmental

concerns, as well as concerns over the high cost ($183 million) to move

the mission. Beale AFB was cited as a potential base to receive a special

operations wing returning from overseas. The Executive Group minutes

point out that closing Beale and moving its U-2 aircraft would create

problems of overloading aircraft and encroachment problems at the

potential receiving base (Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona). The Working

Group official also said that the importance of the Minuteman Missile

Field at Malmstrom AFB precluded it from being a closure candidate. The

Secretary also discussed the other second tier bases (Offutt AFB and

McGuire AFB) but eliminated them from further consideration because of

their missions. The Secretary did recommend the realignment of Grand

Forks and Malmstrom AFBs.

Small Aircraft Bases Three small aircraft bases were rated in the bottom tier—Cannon AFB,

New Mexico; Holloman AFB, New Mexico; and Moody AFB, Georgia.

According to Executive Group minutes, potential receiving bases (Hill AFB,

Utah; Nellis AFB, Nevada; and Shaw AFB, South Carolina) have operational

constraints affecting their ability to accommodate aircraft and meet range

and training requirements. According to the minutes, Cannon and

Holloman had airspace and range capabilities that would be difficult to

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replace if both closed. Holloman, according to a Working Group official,

had the unique mission of maintaining the F-117 aircraft and had the

airspace and training ranges needed to support that aircraft; therefore, it

could not be considered a candidate for closure. Also, relocating its

aircraft to other locations (Nellis and Shaw) would overload their base

facilities. Moreover, according to a Working Group official and Executive

Group minutes, moving aircraft from Moody AFB to other locations would

cause air congestion problems and overloading of facilities at the

prospective receiving bases (Hill and Shaw AFBs). Finally, the four active

F-16C LANTIRN-equipped squadrons at Moody AFB would require a receiving

base to be able to support the aircraft’s specialized equipment.

After discussing the bases in the bottom tier, the Secretary looked to the

middle tier bases for closure options, but basically the same operational

impacts and concerns surfaced. From these analyses, the Secretary

concluded that no small aircraft bases could be closed.

Product Center and Laboratory

Bases

Two bases were discussed as candidates but not selected—Los Angeles

AFB, California, and Hanscom AFB. According to a Working Group official,

the bases were not recommended for closure or realignment because they

are collocated with Federally Funded Research and Development Centers

(Aerospace Corporation and MITRE Corporation). Closing either base

would be costly because its respective corporation would also have to be

moved. Furthermore, the Air Force did not want to lose its relationship

with the high-technology industry close to those bases.

Need to Reassess

Closure of Newark

AFB Aerospace

Guidance and

Metrology Center

In our December 9, 1994, report entitled Aerospace Guidance and

Metrology Center: Cost Growth and Other Factors Affect Closure and

Privatization (GAO/NSIAD-95-60), we noted that the justification for closing

Newark AFB/Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center (AGMC) is not clear

for several reasons. Among other things, one-time closure costs had

doubled and may still be underestimated. As a result, the payback period

has increased to at least 17 years and as much as over 100

years—depending on the assumptions used. Moreover, projected costs of

conducting post-privatization operations could exceed the cost of current

Air Force operations and reduce or eliminate projected savings. This

report also pointed out other closure and privatization problems that

created uncertainty about the feasibility of the Air Force’s planned action.

Although DOD generally concurred with our report, the Department

responded on March 8, 1995, that there was currently not enough data to

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conclude that privatizing the Center’s workload in place is not a feasible

and cost-effective alternative. DOD noted that the Air Force strategy is to

continue moving toward privatization while concurrently reassessing

organic alternatives, such as moving all the AGMC workloads to other Air

Force and interservice depots. DOD also noted the Air Force has engaged a

contractor to provide an independent cost assessment of alternative

approaches to privatization-in-place and an independent certification of

the privatization source selection board methodology/conclusions.

However, our review of the contractor’s recent assessment of the costs of

privatizing the Center’s workload and of moving the workload to other

organic depots indicates that the costs of both of these options may be

much higher than continuing the operation of the Center as a government

facility.

Conclusions and

Recommendations

The Air Force is recommending the closure/disestablishment or

realignment of 23 installations, including 7 reserve bases, plus 7 changes to

prior BRAC decisions. Only five of the closures and disestablishments affect

active-duty facilities; no operational bases are recommended for closure.

The Air Force’s recommendations to realign rather than close any

maintenance depots did not appear to be well thought out or adequately

supported. They do not fully address the problem of significant excess

capacity in the depot system, and it is not clear that the realignments will

achieve indicated savings. Moreover, they also appear to be adding work

to depots that are being downsized outside the BRAC process.

The realignment of Kirtland AFB is estimated to save the Air Force money,

but a significant amount of these savings would be offset by added costs to

DOE. Also, questions arise concerning whether the Air Force gave adequate

consideration to security and operational issues at Kirtland before

reaching its realignment decision. Additionally, as the Commission is

aware, the realignment of the Grand Forks AFB depends on a DOD decision

to retain ballistic missile defense options. Likewise, community concerns

regarding the Reese AFB closure were not fully resolved at the time we

completed our work. These issues will need to be addressed by the

Commission before a final decision is reached.

The Air Force gave great weight to preliminary closing costs before rating

its bases, which influenced the relative rating of bases. The impact of

closure costs on BRAC decisions cannot be fully assessed, but their greater

impact may have been on eliminating bases from closure consideration.

Documentation of the Air Force’s process was too limited for us to

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substantiate the extent of its deliberations and analyses; this made it

difficult to verify what had actually transpired.

Recommendations to the

Secretary of the Air Force

If the Congress should mandate future BRAC rounds and DOD retains its

eight selection criteria, we recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force

more fully document all analyses and decisions, including cost data.

Recommendations to the

Commission

Given the uncertainty associated with the Air Force’s recommendation

regarding its depots, we recommend that the BRAC Commission, at a

minimum, require more complete plans for eliminating excess capacity

and infrastructure from the Air Force before approving the

recommendation. Also, we recommend that the Commission closely

examine expected cost savings and operational impacts associated with

the Kirtland AFB realignment. Additionally, we recommend that the

Commission have DOD identify those closures and realignments that have

costs and savings implications that affect other federal agencies.

Further, in light of the available evidence indicating that closure of AGMC

may not be cost-effective, we recommend that the Commission consider

requiring that DOD report to the Commission on the comparative

cost-effectiveness of both options under consideration,

privatization-in-place or the transfer of workload to other DOD depots,

versus the current cost of performing AGMC operations.

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The Army’s Process and Recommendations

Were Generally Sound, With Cost

Considerations Eliminating Some Potential

Closures and Realignments

The Army is recommending the closure and realignment of 44

installations, including 3 leases of facilities, and 15 minor sites. These

recommendations incorporate several alternatives provided by

cross-service groups. The Army’s process for evaluating and

recommending installations for closure or realignment was generally

sound and well documented. However, we are highlighting some

recommendations for the Commission’s attention because of a variance in

how they were assessed compared to others or because of other open

issues.

Implementation costs were a significant factor in the Army’s

decision-making, but only after military value analyses had identified

candidate installations for study. At the same time, some candidate

installations/facilities ranked relatively low in military value and had the

potential for long-term savings, but they were excluded from closure or

realignment consideration because of closing costs and other

considerations.

Few Changes Were

Made to the Army’s

Sound Process

The Army completed its BRAC 1995 review using basically the same process

it had used in prior rounds. Only a few changes were made to the process

for BRAC 1995, including (1) the basing categories for some facilities to

provide a different grouping for a better assessment of relative military

value and (2) a more direct and clear link between the Army’s data calls

and DOD’s four military value selection criteria. The Army’s process for

evaluating and recommending installations for closure and realignment

generally complied with legislation and OSD policy guidance, was well

documented, was supported by generally accurate data, and appeared

reasonable.1

 Although explainable, there was some variance in the Army’s

application of its process for two groups of installations and facilities.

In keeping with a suggestion from the 1993 BRAC Commission’s report, the

Army also established a separate review category for leased facilities. All

leases (including groups of leases in the same headquarters and same

geographical area) costing more than $200 thousand per year were

identified as study candidates. However, the Army’s military value analysis

for leased facilities was not done in the same way as it was for

installations. To assess the military value, an installation assessment was

1

The Army Audit Agency (AAA) provided comprehensive review and oversight of each segment of the

process, to include reviewing the primary data sources and analytical approaches; this included

checking COBRA entries against source documents. In all cases where discrepancies were found,

corrections were made. None of the discrepancies, however, were considered material or affected any

of the recommended closures or realignments.

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coupled with the operational requirements in the stationing strategy. In

contrast, the stationing strategy alone provided the basis for the military

value of leased facilities. One tenet of the stationing strategy was to

minimize the use of leased facilities. The Army did not prepare installation

assessments for leased facilities because it believed that they do not have

the same measurable attributes and characteristics as installations and

were not competing against each other for retention purposes.

The Army also included within its BRAC process a review of minor sites,

many of which contained less than 100 acres and had few, if any, tenants

or employees. These sites were identified by the major commands as being

excess to their needs and of low military value. These sites were added

during the latter stages of the Army’s BRAC process and also underwent a

different review from the normal military value assessment completed

under the Army’s BRAC process. Once identified as excess to the Army’s

needs and of low military value by the major commands, the Army’s BRAC

group evaluated the impact of closing each site on operations and the ROI.

We monitored all aspects of the decision process from the beginning. We

had access to and reviewed key documents, discussing aspects with key

officials, and observed the process as it occurred. We also sat in on

selected meetings and were able to verify that the Army was following its

established policies and procedures. As a result, we were able to track the

analysis of each installation through the process. The Army gave priority

consideration to military value criteria, as required, and its

decision-making appeared logical, consistent, and fair. Some installations

were not selected for closure, based on closing costs and/or operational

considerations, even though they ranked relatively low in military value

compared with other installations in the respective installation categories.

An important part of the Army’s process, as in prior BRAC rounds, was

periodic consultation with senior military and civilian Army officials.

These key Army officials were involved in each phase of the process.

Deliberative minutes were kept for each of the meetings with the key

officials. These minutes documented key decisions made during the

process relative to the Army’s installations. The end result was the closure

and realignment recommendations made by the Secretary of the Army to

the Secretary of Defense.

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Identifying Closure

and Realignment

Candidates

The Army initially identified 112 installations/facilities (including the 15

leases of facilities), which it placed in 14 categories for initial screening in

BRAC 1995. The Army later added 20 minor sites for closure or realignment

consideration as a separate category. Selected installations/facilities were

eliminated from further consideration at various points in the process due

to their strategic importance or continuing operational need. For example,

Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was excluded from further study; it has a high

military value because it is the home of the 82nd Airborne Division and is

located near Pope AFB.

By the time the Army completed its military value assessments, it had

reduced the number of candidates for further consideration to 45

installations and 15 leases of facilities. At this point, the Army selected

candidates that were relatively low in military value and that the Army’s

stationing strategy indicated could be excess. The documentation for this

part of the process clearly supported the Army’s conclusions concerning

the candidates selected. Table 5.1 shows the installation categories and the

number of installations and candidates in each category.

Table 5.1: Army’s BRAC Installations,

by Category, and Potential Candidates

for Closure Installation category

Number of

installations

Closure

candidates

Maneuver areas 11 4

Major training areas 10 8

Command and control/administrative support 15 11

Training schools 14 5

Professional schools 4 0

Ammunition production 8 0

Ammunition storage 8 5

Commodity 9 3

Ports 3 2

Depots 4 2

Proving grounds 4 1

Medical centers 3 1

Industrial facilities 4 3

Subtotal 97 45

Leased facilities 15 15

Total 112 60

Table 5.1 does not include the 20 minor sites, which were not originally

aligned with any of the BRAC installation categories. Also, the Army did not

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identify candidates in the professional schools and ammunition

production categories because it believed that these categories had no

excess capacity. These conclusions were supported by the stationing

strategy, which said that none of the schools/installations in these

categories should be closed.

Once the candidates were selected and approved by the Secretary of the

Army and the Army Chief of Staff, alternatives or action scenarios were

identified and examined for their viability to facilitate implementing

potential closures or realignments. The scenarios were derived from

several sources such as force structure decisions, the Army’s stationing

strategy, and major Army command recommendations.

For each scenario, the Army analyzed (1) affordability, (2) economic

impact, (3) environmental impact, (4) community impact, and (5) the

ability to complete closure or realignment within 6 years as required.

Army’s 1995 BRAC

Recommendations

Were Largely Well

Supported

The Army recommended 44 closures and realignments (26 installations, 3

leases of facilities, and 15 minor sites) to the Secretary of Defense. From

our analysis of available documentation, we concluded that the candidates

recommended for closure or realignment were generally among those

ranking lowest in military value in their respective categories. However,

the Commission may want to more closely examine three of the Army’s

recommendations. One involves the recommended closure of an Army

base previously rejected in two prior BRAC rounds. The other two involve

realignments. One realignment involves a change in a prior BRAC decision

involving the consolidation of missile maintenance functions at a single

location. The other realignment, while appearing sound, is caught up in

debate over the accuracy of some data. Table 5.2 shows the installations

recommended for closure or realignment by installation category.

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Table 5.2: Army BRAC

Recommendations by Installation

Category

Installation category

Number

recommended for

closure and

realignment

Installations

recommended for

closure or realignment

Maneuver areas 0 None

Major training areas 6 Fort Chaffee

Fort Dix

Fort Greely

Fort Hunter Liggett

Fort Indiantown Gap

Fort Pickett

Command and

control/administrative

support

8 Fort Buchanan

Fort Hamilton

Kelly Support Center

Fort Meade

Price Support Center

Fort Ritchie

Fort Totten

Selfridge

Training schools 2 Fort Lee

Fort McClellan

Professional schools 0 None

Ammunition production 0 None

Ammunition storage 3 Savanna Depot

Seneca Depot

Sierra Depot

Commodity 0 None

Ports 1 Bayonne

Depots 2 Letterkenny

Red River

Proving grounds 1 Dugway

Medical centers 1 Fitzsimons

Industrial facilities 2 Stratford Plant

Detroit Tank Plant

Leased facilities 3 Aviation and Troop

 Command

Army Concepts Analysis

 Agency

Army Information Systems

 Software Command

Minor sites 15 See app. IV, table 3.

Recommended Change to a

Previous BRAC Decision

The Army recommended one change to a 1991 BRAC Commission

recommendation regarding “Tri-Service Project Reliance.” This change

would cancel the relocation of environmental and occupational toxicology

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research from Fort Detrick, Maryland to Wright-Patterson AFB. The Army

now recommends relocating the health advisories environmental fate

research and military criteria research functions of the Environmental

Quality Research Branch to the Army Environmental Hygiene Agency,

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and keeping the remaining functions

at Fort Detrick. The Army has determined that implementing the 1991

recommendation gives it no operational advantage. In addition, the Army

found that significant new construction will be avoided because Aberdeen

Proving Grounds has facilities available. We found no basis to question the

Army’s assumptions.

Open Issues That

Should Be Addressed

by the BRAC

Commission

In our examination of the Army’s recommendations, a question was raised

about Fort McClellan being proposed for closure in BRAC 1995 after

previously having been rejected for closure by the BRAC Commission. Also,

some questions were raised concerning the accuracy of some data used in

the military value analysis for ammunition storage installations. In

addition, concerns were expressed regarding the recommendation to

realign Letterkenny Army Depot. These issues are summarized below.

Fort McClellan Of the Army’s closure recommendations, only one involves an installation

the BRAC Commission previously rejected for closure—Fort McClellan.

Unlike its prior recommendations, the Army’s BRAC 1995 recommendation

would relocate the Chemical Defense Training Facility along with the

Chemical School to Fort Leonard Wood. In BRAC 1993, the Army planned to

keep the training facility at Fort McClellan but move the Chemical School

to Fort Leonard Wood. The 1993 BRAC Commission had questioned the

wisdom of separating the training facility from the Chemical School.

The report of the 1993 BRAC Commission states that if the Secretary of

Defense wanted to move the Chemical School and the training facility in

the future, the Army should obtain the required permits and certification

for the new site before the 1995 BRAC process. However, the Army did not

officially begin this process until it was certain that Fort McClellan would

be recommended for closure. According to the Secretary of the Army,

obtaining the required permits before Fort McClellan was recommended

for closure would have been premature and also would have created

unnecessary apprehension among personnel at the base. The Secretary

also stated that if the permits and certifications cannot be obtained, Fort

McClellan will not be closed.

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Ammunition Storage

Installations

Community concerns about the development of military value for

ammunition storage installations centered around the accuracy of some of

the information used to score all of the installations. Specifically, data in

two of the attributes were questioned—ammunition storage and total

buildable acres. For example, buildable acres at one facility increased by

over 300 percent between BRAC rounds in 1993 and 1995. Our follow-up and

that of the Army’s seem to support the existence of some data

inaccuracies; however, the correct information has not yet been

ascertained. Army officials have informed us that they will determine what

is correct and make the necessary adjustments. Using available data, we

performed a sensitivity analysis (using the lower buildable acre figure

from BRAC 1993) to determine the impact of changes and did not notice any

change in the installation rankings. The Commission may want to ensure

that the corrected data has been obtained and assessed prior to making a

final decision on this recommendation.

Letterkenny Army Depot Concerns regarding the recommendation to realign Letterkenny Army

Depot, Pennsylvania, centered around the completeness of closure cost

data and the extent that the current BRAC recommendation represents a

change from the 1993 BRAC decision to consolidate all tactical missile

maintenance at one location. Concerns have been expressed that costs

associated with the proposed realignment of the tactical missile

maintenance mission from Letterkenny to Tobyhanna Army Depot,

Pennsylvania, are understated and could be much greater than initially

indicated. We found that some one-time moving and site preparation costs

were not included but currently appear to be relatively small, between

$3 million to $5 million. Assuming no significant additional costs are

identified, the inclusion of the $3 million to $5 million in the COBRA would

have no impact on the current ROI.

Concerns also have been expressed that the 1995 recommendation

represents some departure from the plan for consolidating tactical missile

maintenance at one site. The 1995 recommendation would split up some of

the work by transferring the missile guidance system workload to

Tobyhanna while preserving the tactical missile disassembly and storage

at Letterkenny. Maintenance on the associated ground support equipment,

such as trucks and trailers, would be done at Anniston Army Depot,

Alabama. There are differences of opinion concerning the impact of

separating these functions on the concept of consolidated maintenance.

The Commission may want to examine this issue further.

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Impact of

Cross-Service Group

Alternatives on Army

Decisions

In addition to completing affordability and other analyses of its study

candidates, the Army assessed various alternatives suggested by the five

functional cross-service groups. The Army analyzed only those

cross-service group alternatives in which the Army was the “losing”

military department, that is, an Army activity/function would be shifted to

another service. In analyzing its cross-service group alternatives by

functional category, the Army concluded the following:

• Test and Evaluation. Each alternative represented minor workload shifts

and offered no opportunity for a base closure or realignment. It therefore

rejected the alternatives.

• Laboratories. Each alternative represented minor workload shifts and

offered no opportunity for a base closure or realignment. It therefore

rejected the alternatives.

• Undergraduate Pilot Training. No alternatives were presented where the

Army was the losing department. Therefore, no Army analysis was done.

• Medical Treatment Facilities. The Army accepted three of the six

alternatives proposed by the cross-service group, including closure of

Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center and the realignments of Kenner (Fort

Lee) and Kimbrough (Fort Meade) Army hospitals to clinics. The Army

modified the alternative to realign Noble Army Hospital (Fort McClellan)

and recommended closure instead, since the Army is recommending the

closure of Fort McClellan. The Army cited operational considerations in

not accepting the remaining two alternatives.

• Maintenance Depots. The cross-service group recommended the

realignment of 17 work packages that required Army analysis as the losing

service,2

 and 2 closures. The Army accepted 3 work packages, modified 6

others, and rejected 8 due to either cost or operational reasons. The

Army’s own recommendations to close Letterkenny and Red River depots

coincided with alternatives of the cross-service group.

Cost as a Factor in

Army Decisions

Army installations/facilities selected for closure or realignment generally

had relatively small one-time closing costs and provided almost immediate

savings after completing the closure. In fact, the estimated cost of closure

or realignment was one of the factors that limited the size of the Army’s

recommendation list. For those facilities/installations selected for further

study but not recommended for closure or realignment, the reasons most

frequently cited by the Army were cost and operational requirements.

2

A work package contains the proposed transfer of a defined body of work.

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To execute its 1995 BRAC actions, the Army was guided in its decisions by a

$729-million budget for the 6-year implementation period. The Army

exceeded the planning budget by approximately $400 million, for a total

cost of $1.1 billion. Although costs were a factor in the decision-making

process, we found no evidence, based on our review of the documentation

and our exposure to the process, that the study group withheld any

potential recommendations from the Secretary of the Army because of

costs. The Army had no minimum financial criteria for closing or

realigning an installation. Each was considered on its own merits.

Nevertheless, a ROI during the 6-year period was viewed as favorable. In

fact, recommended actions for each of the candidates were briefed to the

Secretary of the Army for his approval or disapproval. Table 5.3

summarizes estimated costs and savings resulting from Army BRAC

recommendations.

Table 5.3: Estimated Costs and Savings Resulting From Army BRAC Recommendations

Fiscal year 1996 dollars in millions

Installation One-time costsa

6-year net

savingsb

Recurring

annual

savingsc ROI years 20-year NPV

Chaffee $9.6 $39.4 $13.5 1 $168.2

Dix 19.4 112.2 38.3 1 477.9

Greely 22.7 43.0 19.0 1 224.8

Hunter Liggett 6.5 11.7 5.5 1 64.4

Indiantown 12.7 66.6 22.5 1 281.5

Pickett 25.5 41.1 20.7 Immediate 240.6

Buchanan 74.4 (49.6) 9.6 7 45.4

Hamilton 2.1 3.2 7.2 Immediate 74.0

Kelly 35.7 (21.9) 5.0 6 27.5

Fort Lee 2.1 15.5 3.7 1 50.5

Fort Meade 1.6 16.4 3.5 1 49.5

Price 3.6 35.5 8.5 Immediate 116.3

Ritchie 92.8 82.9 65.1 1 712.1

Totten 3.7 0.1 1.7 1 16.8

Selfridge 5.3 47.3 9.8 Immediate 139.7

McClellan 259.1 (122.0) 44.8 6 315.9

Savanna 37.8 (12.2) 12.7 2 111.9

Seneca 14.9 34.0 21.5 Immediate 241.9

Sierra 14.1 54.5 28.8 Immediate 333.0

Bayonne 44.1 (7.6) 10.1 5 90.1

(continued)

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Fiscal year 1996 dollars in millions

Installation One-time costsa

6-year net

savingsb

Recurring

annual

savingsc ROI years 20-year NPV

Letterkenny 50.3 206.6 77.8 Immediate 952.2

Red River 59.6 313.1 123.5 Immediate 1,497.3

Dugway 25.4 61.0 25.6 1 306.7

Fitzsimons 102.9 179.1 83.6 Immediate 983.2

Stratford 2.1 23.9 5.9 Immediate 79.7

Detroit Tank Plant 1.4 7.9 3.1 Immediate 38.2

Subtotal $929.4 $1,181.7 $671.0 $7,639.3

Minor installations 15.6 12.6 6.6 72.5

Leases 155.2 5.7 47.6 468.2

Redirect 0.3 4.5 0.0 Immediate 4.1

Total $1,100.5 $1,204.5 $725.2 $8,184.1

Note: Totals may not compare to those in DOD’s report due to rounding and other adjustments to

correct minor errors.

aThis represents unique one-time costs to implement the recommendation.

bThis represents net savings within the 6-year implementation period.

cProjected recurring annual savings after the 6-year period.

Costs and Other

Factors Eliminated

Some Closure

Candidates

Senior Army leadership exercised operational, financial, military, and

other judgments in making ultimate decisions not to recommend some

installations for closure. The Secretary of the Army eliminated some

candidates having (1) sizable cost savings but significant up-front closing

costs, (2) relatively low military value, and/or (3) operational value

considerations precluding their closure. Table 5.4 summarizes cost and

savings information for selected Army installation/facilities studied but not

recommended for closure or realignment.

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Table 5.4: Estimated Costs and Savings for Selected Army Installations Excluded From Consideration

Fiscal year 1996 dollars in millions

Installation One-time costsa

6-year net

savingsb

Recurring

annual

savingsc ROI years 20-year NPV

Drum $405.3 $(127.2) $121.3 4 $1,070.6

Riley 690.2 (413.4) 110.8 7 688.4

Richardson 392.8 (266.4) 56.3 8 300.4

Wainwright 390.8 (280.9) 48.5 10 213.1

A.P. Hill 5.0 45.5 14.1 Immediate 180.1

McCoy 119.5 206.9 95.4 1 1,121.6

Gillem 65.1 (16.1) 15.0 5 129.3

Meade 653.9 (499.2) 64.2 12 149.9

Monroe 93.9 (24.4) 23.8 2 208.3

Eustis/Story 480.9 (322.8) 48.4 11 152.7

Lee 716.9 (606.9) 32.1 35 (273.3)

Leonard Wood 623.9 (348.8) 82.6 8 462.9

Presidio of Monterey 429.3 (392.3) 13.5 86 (246.2)

Pueblo 17.0 2.6 29.1 Immediate 290.3

Umatilla 10.0 2.9 19.0 Immediate 190.1

Cold Laboratory 52.9 (41.4) 4.1 18 (0.5)

Natick 160.4 (77.1) 26.6 7 185.3

Picatinny 314.3 (156.3) 48.0 8 317.2

Oakland 34.6 25.2 16.1 2 179.9

Lima 3.0 20.4 6.2 Immediate 79.7

Total $5,659.7 ($3,269.7) $875.1 $5,399.8

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

aThis represents unique one-time costs to implement the recommendation.

bThis represents net savings within the 6-year implementation period.

cProjected recurring annual savings after the 6-year period.

As part of our analysis of the recommendations, the following are brief

summaries of the reasons that potential candidates were not selected for

closure or realignment.

Maneuver Areas Forts Drum, New York, and Riley, Kansas. The Army considered these two

installations because of their relatively low military value as maneuver

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installations and the Army’s desire to do a broader assessment of this

category. While estimated savings from closing these installations were

significant, so were the associated closing costs. Citing the overall

importance of maneuver installations to station and train ground forces

and to support the stationing strategy, along with the high costs associated

with closure, the Army decided that Forts Drum and Riley should remain

open. 

Forts Richardson and Wainwright, Alaska. The Army’s stationing strategy

seems to suggest that only one base is needed in Alaska to support one

maneuver brigade and support forces. Initial Army studies show that

keeping Fort Wainwright open was the better choice and that Fort

Richardson would therefore be the best candidate for closure. The

strategy stated that as the maneuver division is reduced to a maneuver

brigade, the installation can be structured to meet the specific needs of the

brigade and supporting forces. Each can support one light brigade without

additional military construction. However, the Army later decided that due

to strategic requirements in the Pacific and high closure costs, Fort

Richardson would remain open.

Major Training Areas Forts AP Hill, Virginia, and McCoy, Wisconsin. The Army’s stationing

strategy emphasized the need to reduce the number of major training

areas and focused primarily on reserve component training support. As a

result, Forts AP Hill and McCoy were chosen as candidates for further

study. The Army decided that their closure was operationally infeasible

due to the training requirements of the reserve components. It should be

noted that six major training installations are being recommended for

closure or realignment.

Command and

Control/Administrative

Support Installations

Fort Gillem, Georgia. Because of its low military value, Fort Gillem was

selected as a candidate for closure. The Army concluded that Fort Gillem

must remain open because of the operational support it provides to Fort

McPherson, Georgia, and the high closure costs. The 1993 BRAC

Commission considered Fort Gillem as a potential addition to DOD’s list but

ultimately concluded it should remain open.

Fort Meade, Maryland. Because of Fort Meade’s large non-DOD population

and its low operational value to the Army, its study for closure was

suggested by the stationing strategy. Due to the high costs associated with

closure and its importance to the National Capital Region, its close

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proximity to Washington, D.C., and the number of tenants, the Army

decided to keep it open. However, the Army recommended realigning Fort

Meade by downsizing its hospital to a clinic.

Fort Monroe, Virginia. In BRAC 1993, the Secretary of the Army deleted Fort

Monroe from closure consideration, citing operational reasons. However,

other information suggested that high environmental clean-up costs played

a part in this decision. The environmental concerns did not conform with

DOD policy guidance, which states that environmental restoration costs are

to be expected whether a base closes or not; therefore, they are not a basis

for closure decisions.3

 The 1993 BRAC Commission added Fort Monroe to

its list of candidates but did not direct its closure. The Commission did ask

the Army to investigate the extent of unexploded ordnance at Fort

Monroe. The Army completed the requested study and found that

unexploded ordnance posed a minimal risk to the public health and

environment if identified sites were left undisturbed. The Army estimated

the cost to safely remove all hazards to a 10-foot depth at about

$22 million.

In BRAC 1995, the Army’s stationing strategy emphasized that the Training

and Doctrine Command headquarters (currently located at Fort Monroe)

should be stationed in the joint environment of the Tidewater, Virginia,

region to allow immediate access to doctrine development agencies of

other services and joint-service organizations in the region. However, Fort

Monroe ranked relatively low in military value and was still recommended

for further study. The Army did study closing Fort Monroe and moving the

majority of its tenants to Fort Eustis. This scenario provided the basis for

savings estimates shown in table 5.4. Ultimately, the Army concluded that

Fort Monroe was well suited and well situated to meet its mission and that

military judgment indicated that Fort Monroe should remain open.

Training Schools Forts Eustis/Story, Virginia; Lee, Virginia; Leonard Wood, Missouri; and the

Presidio of Monterey, California. Fort Eustis/Story, Fort Lee, and the

Presidio of Monterey were rated relatively low in military value for

training schools. Accordingly, they were selected for further study.

However, citing the high cost of closure, the Army decided to keep them

open. Additionally, the Army studied Fort Leonard Wood because it also

was examining the closure of Fort McClellan and relocation of its schools

to Fort Leonard Wood. It should be noted that under the recommendations

3

See our report, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s Recommendations and Selection Process for

Closures and Realignments (GAO/NSIAD-93-173, Apr. 15, 1993).

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finally adopted, Fort Leonard Wood became a receiving installation. Also,

the Army recommended realigning Fort Lee by downsizing its hospital to a

clinic.

Ammunition Storage Pueblo, Colorado, and Umatilla, Oregon, Depot Activities. Because of their

low military value, each of these depot activities was selected for further

study. However, because their missions involve demilitarizing chemical

agents, the Army would be unable to close either of them before the

deadline of the 1995 Commission, which is 2001. Therefore, the Army

discontinued its study of these installations.

Commodity Installations Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory, New Hampshire.

Because this laboratory ranked relatively low in the Army’s military value

assessment, it was selected for further study. The only reason cited by the

Army for not closing this installation was the high closing costs.

Natick Research, Development, and Engineering Center, Massachusetts.

Natick’s research focuses on the soldier and soldier support systems.

Because of its relatively low military value, the Army reviewed the

operational and financial impact of transferring Natick and associated

research activities and elected to discontinue further study of

closure/realignment options. Natick ultimately gained functions related to

soldier systems relocating from the Aviation and Troop Command in St.

Louis, Missouri.

Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey. Picatinny’s mission is to conduct and

manage the research, development, and engineering for assigned

armaments and ammunition systems. Picatinny scored high in the

installation assessment, but it ranked low in military value. According to

the Army, its facilities are older and require substantial funds for

renovation or replacement. In addition, it is a single-purpose installation

that cannot support integrated life-cycle functions. The closure of

Picatinny was found to be costly.

Ports Oakland Army Base, California. Oakland is an Army-owned terminal

facility that supports Alaska, Hawaii, and the Pacific and Far East theaters

of operation. It provides secure water terminal facilities for the rapid

movement of forces into theaters of operation around the world during

conflicts or fast-breaking contingencies. Because Oakland’s primary

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capabilities can be duplicated by commercial activities, it was selected as

a candidate for study. After a review of available West Coast port

activities, the Army decided that operational risks precluded the closure of

Oakland. However, the Army did not elaborate on what these risks were. It

only stated that the availability of West Coast commercial port facilities

was insufficient to meet contingency demands.

Industrial Facilities Lima Army Tank Plant, Ohio. Because of its low military value, Lima was

selected for further study. Since the Army is recommending the closure of

the Detroit Tank Plant, it decided that the Lima plant should remain as the

only operating tank plant.

Conclusions and

Recommendations

The Army’s process and recommendations were generally sound, although

some recommendations on leases of facilities and minor sites involved

some variance in the process. Although there was some logic in the Army’s

rationale for these variances, we recommend that the Commission further

assess these actions and make a determination, under its legislative

authority, whether these variances represent substantial deviation from

the selection criteria.

Also, some questions remain about the accuracy of some data used in

assessing Army ammunition depots. Therefore, we recommend that the

Commission ensure that the Army’s ammunition depot recommendations

are based upon accurate and consistent information and that corrected

data would not materially affect military value assessments and final

recommendations.

Further, the proposed realignment of Letterkenny Army Depot involves a

change to a prior BRAC decision to consolidate tactical missile maintenance

at a single location. Some questions exist about the impact of the

realignment on the concept of consolidated maintenance. The Commission

may want to examine this issue further.

Finally, the Commission will want to ensure that the Army has met all

permit requirements related to the closure of Fort McClellan.

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The Navy is recommending the closure or realignment of 62 activities,

including 2 leases and 18 changes to previous BRAC decisions. Its

recommendations reflect 20 of the alternatives suggested by the

cross-service groups. Eliminating excess capacity while maintaining or

improving the average military value of Navy activities was the principal

goal. The Navy believes that keeping any remaining excess capacity is

prudent because of the uncertainty of future force structure levels.

Operational, strategic, cost, and civilian job loss concerns were factors in

excluding some candidates from closure or realignment consideration.

The process employed by the Navy to arrive at these decisions appeared

generally sound and well documented. However, we have identified issues

associated with several recommendations that warrant additional

attention by the Commission.

The Navy’s Process

Was Strengthened

The Navy conducted a generally thorough and well-documented

evaluation of its basing requirements in developing its 1995

recommendations. The Navy conducted its 1995 base closure review in

essentially the same manner as it did in 1993. The Secretary of the Navy

established a group of senior military officers and civilian executives, the

Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC), to conduct the process and

another group, the Base Structure Analysis Team (BSAT), to assist BSEC.

The Navy made several improvements to its process for 1995. One

improvement was that BSAT staff consisted of officers with a greater

variety of operational experience than the staff in previous rounds. For

example, BSAT had an “industrial” team that included staff with substantial

aircraft depot and shipyard practical experience. Its technical

centers/laboratories team included the previous director of a major Navy

test and evaluation center. Most of the 1993 staff had facilities and civil

engineering backgrounds and relied on various functional commands for

technical expertise. Although this same expertise was available and used

in 1993, the Navy believes having staff with operational and technical

experience on site generally enhanced the process. On the basis of our

observations of the Navy’s process as it was being conducted, we agree.

Another improvement in the Navy’s process was that BSEC developed

alternative scenarios for review. The development of alternative scenarios

was a change from the 1993 process, when generally only one scenario

was developed for each recommendation. In 1993, a scenario producing

the greatest elimination of excess capacity in a subcategory was

developed, and if the ROI was acceptable, that scenario generally became

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BSEC’s recommendation. In 1995, BSEC developed alternatives that reduced

excess capacity by varying degrees and additional alternatives based on

increases and decreases in requirements. The additional alternatives

provided a form of sensitivity analysis important for areas such as

ordnance activities and shipyards, in which BSEC was uncertain about the

level of future workload requirements. From the various alternatives, BSEC

selected specific scenarios and collected cost and savings data from

activities affected by the scenarios. The results of cost and savings

analyses were the basis of final BSEC deliberations in making closure and

realignment recommendations.

An important part of the Navy’s process, as in all prior BRAC rounds, was

periodic consultation with the Navy’s most senior military leaders,

including the Commanders of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and Marine

Forces, Atlantic and Pacific. In responding to closure and realignment

scenarios forwarded from BSEC, these officers were encouraged to suggest

alternative receiving sites for consideration.1 BSEC also held periodic

consultations with the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the

Marine Corps, and senior civilian officials in the Department of the Navy.

Policy imperatives that reflected current and future Navy priorities were

presented to BSEC as guidance for use throughout the BRAC process. Such

imperatives ensured that a capability deemed vital to the Navy would not

be harmed by the process. For example, one policy imperative was that

the Navy must be able to drydock large deck and complex Navy ships,

refuel/defuel nuclear-powered ships, and dispose of nuclear ship reactor

compartments. Such a concern was important for the Navy as a whole, as

it was in previous BRAC rounds.

The final stage in the Navy’s process was a review of BSEC

recommendations by the Secretary of the Navy. During this review, the

Secretary made a decision to eliminate several BSEC recommendations due

to concerns over the cumulative job losses2

 in California. In the case of

each of these activities, other activities in other states were recommended

for closure or realignment that had the same or greater economic impact

at the local level. In making his decision, the Secretary of the Navy

expressed concern about the statewide impact. BSEC had previously

removed an activity in Guam from consideration due to economic impact

concerns. In no case was another activity recommended for closure or

1

Receiving sites are Navy activities that absorb remaining equipment and personnel from closing

activities.

2

Cumulative job losses include those estimated to result from all the proposed 1995 Navy actions.

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realignment as a substitute for an activity removed for economic impact

reasons.

The Naval Audit Service reviewed the Navy’s 1995 process to ensure that

the data and processes used in developing Navy recommendations were

complete and accurate. The Audit Service’s involvement included

validation of data being submitted by field activities, compliance with the

certification requirements throughout the chain of command, and

accuracy of the analytical process. We observed Navy auditors conducting

their review at numerous field activities during their data validation phase

and during the BSEC analytical phase. The auditors we observed were

aggressive in obtaining support for data submitted through the various

chains of command. They also checked final COBRA data entries against

certified source documents. The Naval Audit Service report, issued to the

Secretary of the Navy on February 28, 1995, concluded that the data used

in the process was reasonably accurate and complete and that the analysis

was conducted accurately.3

 We have no basis to dispute the conclusions of

the Naval Audit Service. Further, we believe the Naval Audit Service’s

effort enhanced the Navy’s process.

Identifying Closure

and Realignment

Candidates

The Navy’s 1995 base closure review included all activities, regardless of

size. Although only 140 of over 800 Navy activities reviewed met the Base

Closure and Realignment Act’s personnel threshold, BSEC believed that its

review should include all activities. BSEC viewed the Navy’s infrastructure

as “complementary and mutually supportive”; that is, all Navy activities

existed to support each other as a whole, regardless of their size. BSEC

placed all Navy activities in 5 categories and 27 functional subcategories.4

The Navy’s analytical process took place at the subcategory level. Table

6.1 displays the Navy’s 27 subcategories, the number of activities in each

subcategory, and the activities that had excess capacity.

3

The Navy’s Implementation of the 1995 Base Closure and Realignment Process (Naval Audit Service

026-95, Feb. 28, 1995).

4

These categories were operational support, industrial support, technical centers/laboratories,

education/training, and personnel support/other.

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Table 6.1: The Navy’s BRAC

Subcategories

Subcategory

Number of

activities

assessed

in 1995

Activities

with excess

capacity

Naval bases 15 X

Marine Corps bases 3

Operational air stations 20 X

Reserve air stations 6 X

Reserve activities 286 X

Training air stations 5 X

Training/education 29 X

Naval aviation depots 3 X

Naval shipyards 6 X

Ordnance activities 11 X

Marine Corps logistics bases 2 X

Inventory control points 2 X

Shore intermediate maintenance activities 14 X

Fleet and industrial supply centers 9 X

Public works centers 8 X

Construction battalion centers 2

Naval security group activities 4

Integrated undersea surveillance system

facilities 2 X

Naval computer and telecommunications

stations 17

Naval meteorology and oceanography

centers 6

Medical activities 142 X

Dental activities 104

Military Sealift Command activities 2

Technical centers/labs 65 X

Administrative activities 33 X

Engineering field divisions & activities 9 X

Supervisors of shipbuilding 13 X

Total 818a

aThe Navy review started with a list of 830 activities. However, when activities were placed in

subcategories, BSAT determined that 12 minor activities had been closed or were closing outside

of BRAC.

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Capacity and Military Value

Analyses Were the

Beginning Point for the

Navy’s Deliberative

Process

Capacity analysis for each subcategory consisted of estimating the

maximum available capacity and comparing it to the requirements

projected in the future force structure plan. As in 1993, BSAT developed

different measures of capacity, or measures of throughput, for each

subcategory. For some subcategories, such as training air stations, the

throughput indicator was the number of students that could be trained in a

year. Throughput capacity indicators for other subcategories included

direct labor hours, staff years, and spatial measures (e.g., length or width).

For example, the capacity indicator for operational air stations was the

“squadron module.” Air station capacity was thus characterized as the

number of air squadrons and their necessary support requirements that

could be housed in terms of two hangar types, based on existing Navy

facilities standards. In some cases, BSAT refined the indicators used in

1993. In fact, for operational air stations, BSAT developed the squadron

module as a less complicated way of characterizing the space available to

house air squadrons.

BSEC began its military value analysis by reviewing the matrices of

questions, by subcategory, used in 1993. It then revised the matrices by

adding new categories of questions and removing or modifying others.

BSEC was concerned with keeping questions similar to those used in 1993

but updating them to reflect changes in the Navy’s infrastructure, force

structure, and operational outlook. We and the Naval Audit Service found

instances where there were differences in answers to the same questions

between the 1993 and 1995 matrices for a specific activity. However, we

generally found that these differences were due mostly to differing

circumstances between the two time periods or in the methodology

required for developing answers. For example, during a review of the 1993

and 1995 shipyard military value matrices, we found that the Naval

Shipyard (NSY) Long Beach, California, received credit in 1993 for

conducting overhauls on submarine rescue ships and salvage ships but did

not receive credit in 1995. Like many of the differences we found, this was

due to the change in circumstances between the two time periods; in this

case, Long Beach is no longer scheduled to perform work on those types

of ships.

Whether such differences were errors or attributable to the reasons cited,

our analysis showed that they would not change the relative shipyard

military value ranking. Also, corrections to the relative military value

scores were made throughout the process in response to errors identified

by the Naval Audit Service.

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The Navy used its military value analysis and the results of its capacity

analysis as inputs to its configuration analysis to help identify the optimum

approach to reducing excess infrastructure. The average military value of

activities in a subcategory was more important in the Navy’s process than

the relative military value score of any one activity. The Navy’s goal was to

maintain the average military value of the remaining activities in each

subcategory after it had identified closure and realignment

recommendations.

Configuration Analysis

Used for Developing

Alternatives

As the starting point for the derivation of alternatives aimed at reducing

excess capacity, the Navy used a computer-based model to compare

existing capacity with future requirements and arrive at solutions for each

subcategory that would eliminate excess capacity to the maximum extent

practicable. This process was known as configuration analysis. Rules were

applied to the model for each subcategory for solutions to be reasonable,

though rules were kept to a minimum so as not to artificially distort the

results of the model. One such rule for all subcategories was that the

average military value of any solution must be at least as high as the

average for the existing activities in each subcategory. An example of a

rule applied to the naval shipyard subcategory was that nuclear workload

must be accomplished at nuclear-capable shipyards. This reflects the

realities of the workload distribution to naval shipyards. For naval bases,

one rule was that the current force level distribution between the Atlantic

and Pacific fleets would be maintained. This prevented the model from

placing ships on either coast in a manner that was inconsistent with

operational or strategic realities.

The configuration model was programmed to derive the three best

alternatives for each subcategory. Each alternative successively reduced

less excess capacity. For most subcategories, sensitivity analyses were

also performed, whereby future requirements were increased by

10 percent and then decreased by 10 and 20 percent. This enabled BSEC to

evaluate the effect of such changes on possible configuration alternatives.

BSEC generally chose several alternatives from the results of configuration

analysis as scenarios to conduct cost and savings analyses. Cost and

savings data for each scenario was then obtained from the affected

activities and certified by the providers throughout the chain of command.

BSEC then used this data in the COBRA model to evaluate relative cost and

savings of scenarios.

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After arriving at a set of scenarios that it was prepared to recommend to

the Secretary of the Navy, BSEC conducted analyses on the impact of the

proposed actions on the affected economic areas, the ability of the

receiving sites’ communities to absorb an increase in Department of the

Navy personnel, and the environmental considerations of closing or

realigning those bases. Upon reviewing the results of the impact analyses,

BSEC, through its own deliberations and consultations with senior military

and civilian executive officials, arrived at the recommendations provided

to the Secretary of the Navy.

The Navy’s 1995

BRAC

Recommendations

Were Generally Sound

The Navy is recommending 62 closure or realignment actions. Several

actions affect large activities, such as a shipyard and a training air station.

The Navy’s recommendations logically flowed from its analytical process;

however, one technical center facility located at an activity recommended

for closure, the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) White Oak,

Maryland, may be required by DOD in the future. The majority of closure

and realignment actions are in the technical centers subcategory. In

addition, 11 reserve activities are being recommended for closure. Four of

the 12 subcategories (operational air stations, naval shipyards, training air

stations, and technical centers/laboratories) accounted for 34 of the 62

Navy recommendations. The recommendations in these subcategories

include about 60 percent of the total one-time costs and over 80 percent of

the total job losses associated with the Navy’s recommendations. Table 6.2

summarizes the number of the Navy’s closure and realignment

recommendations by subcategory.

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Table 6.2: The Navy’s 1995 BRAC

Recommendations, by Subcategory

Subcategory

Closure and

realignment

recommendations

Redirects of

previous BRAC

recommendations

Naval bases 1 0

Operational air stations 2 6

Reserve air stations 1 1

Reserve activities 11 0

Training air stations 2 0

Training/education 1 3

Naval aviation depots 0 1

Naval shipyards 2 1

Fleet and industrial supply centers 2 0

Technical centers/laboratories 20 1

Administration activities 1 5

Supervisors of shipbuilding 1 0

Total 44 18

Operational Air Stations In the operational air station subcategory, the configuration analysis

indicated that excess capacity equivalent to several activities could be

eliminated. As a result, several closure scenarios for cost and savings

analyses were developed. The recommended closure of NAF Adak, Alaska,

resulted from these analyses. However, substantial excess capacity

remained in the subcategory. BSEC then reassessed 1993 BRAC decisions so

it could better use existing air station capacity, rather than attempt to

close additional air stations. BSEC determined that such a solution was

feasible and would save construction money budgeted for the move of

aircraft based on BRAC 1993 decisions.

The changes to the 1993 BRAC decisions included moving F/A-18 squadrons

from NAS Cecil Field, Florida, to NAS Oceana, Virginia, rather than NAS

Cherry Point, North Carolina, and moving all F-14s to NAS Oceana rather

than locating some at NAS Lemoore, California. In assessing the costs and

savings of these changes, the Navy used the COBRA model, but only in

considering costs and savings items that would be different from the 1993

cost and savings analysis. For example, some military construction would

be required at Oceana and Jacksonville, Florida, as a result of the changes

made in 1995, and these costs were included. Budgeted military

construction projects that would no longer be required were counted as a

savings. We verified the amount of the savings. We also reviewed

additional costs and savings items in the 1995 COBRA analysis and believe

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that they are generally reasonable and represent what would, in fact, be

different from the items in the 1993 analysis. For the air stations

subcategory as a whole, the Navy made recommendations to close or

reduce operations at several activities, such as NAF Adak and NAS Key

West, Florida.

Training Air Stations The capacity analysis for the training air stations subcategory indicated

that future requirements for the various training paths, such as primary

pilot and advanced helicopter training, was from 19 to 42 percent below

peak historic levels. The Navy’s best configuration analysis indicated that

with even a 10- or 20-percent increase in requirements, NAS Meridian,

Mississippi, should close. The Navy evaluated several scenarios involving

the projected closure of NAS Meridian; NAS Corpus Christi, Texas; and NAS

Whiting Field, Florida, which was recommended by the undergraduate

pilot training (UPT) cross-service group. The scenario that included the

closure of Whiting was rejected due to high costs and protracted ROI

period. BSEC determined that the best solution was the closure of Meridian

and the realignment of Corpus Christi as a NAF, which was what the Navy

recommended.

The Secretary of the Navy queried BSEC about the possibility of NAS

Meridian and Columbus AFB, Mississippi, being used as a joint fixed-wing

training activity due to their proximity, airspace, outlying fields, and

bombing range. Thus, in making its recommendation to close NAS Meridian

and acknowledging that the air station is not needed for Navy UPT, the

Navy suggested the potential for Meridian NAS and Columbus AFB being

linked as a joint UPT base.

Naval Shipyards As was the case for the naval shipyard subcategory in 1993, the Navy was

primarily concerned with satisfying future nuclear workload requirements.

Nonnuclear work could be performed at any shipyard, whereas nuclear

work could be performed only at nuclear-capable shipyards. The

configuration analysis produced several scenarios, all of which indicated

that at least one naval shipyard, Long Beach, California, should be closed.

Other scenarios also pointed to the closure of Ship Repair Facility (SRF)

Guam or Portsmouth, New Hampshire, or both. BSEC determined that

Portsmouth should not be closed because of uncertainties in the future of

the SSN-21 program and the nature of the evolving submarine threat. If the

SSN-21 program is terminated or if there is a need for an increase in total

submarine force structure levels that could not be met through new

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construction, the Navy would likely decide to lengthen the service life of

existing SSN-688 submarines. This would involve refueling those

submarines whose reactor cores are nearing the end of their design lives

rather than retiring them. Thus, workload requirements for refueling

SSN-688s would increase. The Portsmouth shipyard is the sole site for most

SSN-688 work. The Chief of Naval Operations consulted with BSEC and

concurred with these conclusions.

In 1993, the Navy did not recommend Long Beach for closure, despite

demonstrated excess capacity, because of concerns about losing the

capability to drydock aircraft carriers on the West Coast. The Navy’s 1995

analysis indicated that Long Beach was not needed to satisfy the Navy’s

future requirements. In deliberating the possible closure of Long Beach,

BSEC and senior naval officers and civilian officials did not believe it was

necessary to retain the large drydock capability at Long Beach to support

the fleet. Therefore, along with the SRF Guam, NSY Long Beach was

recommended for closure. The Navy also recommended the closure of the

two large surge drydocks at Philadelphia—a change from the 1991 BRAC

decision—for the same reason.

Questions have been raised about the risk involved in the loss of organic

shipyard depot capability on the West Coast if Long Beach is closed. These

questions center around the viability of private shipyards in performing

work now done at Long Beach as well as the loss of the large drydock. The

Navy does not share this concern and points out that much of the work

scheduled for Long Beach will be moved to the private sector and thus

help these private yards.

BSEC sought to reduce the substantial excess capacity remaining in the

shipyard subcategory by transferring depot-related work from two

technical centers. Those two centers were then recommended for closure

or realignment because the remaining technical work could be transferred

to other technical centers.

Technical Centers During the 1995 process, the Navy was concerned that excess capacity in

technical centers/laboratories subcategory had not been reduced in BRAC

1993 to the same degree as in other subcategories. The Navy also wanted

to further enhance the multispectrum nature of the technical centers,

which encompass research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E).

The configuration analysis for this subcategory involved complicated

assessments of the existing capabilities and requirements for 29 functional

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categories, such as undersea and surface ships platforms, across four

phases of work: RDT&E, acquisition, lifetime support, and general. This

analysis involved satisfying future requirements by transferring specific

functions from various categories, such as undersea and surface ship

platforms, to only those activities that performed the same function.

However, functional workload could be transferred to an activity that does

different life-cycle phase work; for example, undersea and surface ship

platform lifetime support work could be moved to an activity with

undersea and surface ship platform acquisition work.

The Navy analyzed cost and savings projections for 43 scenarios in the

technical centers/laboratories subcategory and recommended 21 closure

or realignment actions. As indicated earlier, capacity reductions were also

realized through the transfer of depot work from technical centers to

industrial activities. Depot work from NSWC Louisville, Kentucky, and the

Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) Keyport, Washington, was

transferred to existing shipyards. Depot work from the Naval Air Warfare

Center (NAWC) Lakehurst, New Jersey, and support work from the Naval

Aviation Engineering Service Unit (NAESU) Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and

Naval Air Technical Services Facility (NATSF) Philadelphia, were

transferred to existing naval aviation depots (NADEPs).

The Secretary of Defense’s recommendations include the complete closure

of NSWC White Oak. However, in testimony before the BRAC Commission on

March 1, 1995, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that the

White Oak activity houses a hypervelocity wind tunnel that serves military

research and development needs and is used by other agencies, such as

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The Chairman stated

that the wind tunnel probably should be retained. The Navy maintains that

the wind tunnel is excess to its needs and has no plans to retain the

facility. Should a DOD component or other government agency determine

that it needs the wind tunnel, that agency would have to obtain the wind

tunnel facility from the Navy.

The Navy removed several technical centers from consideration for

various reasons after COBRA analysis. BSEC determined that AEGIS

Moorestown, New Jersey, and AEGIS Wallops, Virginia, performed work

that was both dissimilar and required in each case. BSEC’s concern about

the possible loss of the organic explosives capability at NSWC Indian Head,

Maryland, prompted it to remove that activity from consideration. As

discussed later, the Naval Warfare Assessment Division (NWAD) Corona,

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California, was removed from consideration in response to the Secretary

of the Navy’s concern about eliminating further civilian jobs in California.

Impact of

Cross-Service Group

Alternatives on Navy

Decisions

As part of its process, the Navy assessed alternatives offered by the five

functional cross-service groups. The Navy developed separate closure or

realignment scenarios based on the cross-service group alternatives or

incorporated alternatives into existing Navy scenarios. The Navy then

issued cost-related data calls to its activities in those cases in which a joint

scenario indicated that a Navy function would be shifted to another

service. The Navy also obtained data in these cases from the affected

activities of other services. The Navy’s final recommendations include 20

that reflect portions of cross-service group alternatives. In analyzing the

cross-service group alternatives, the Navy concluded the following:

• Test and Evaluation. The Navy’s analyses included all alternatives

provided by the test and evaluation and laboratories cross-service groups.

The detailed approach utilized by the cross-service groups in this area

focused on specific functions, whereas the Navy focused its review on

functions in broader categories. In addition, the nature of Navy technical

centers is multispectrum and includes both test and evaluation and

laboratory (R&D) functions. Thus, there was not a one-for-one correlation

with Navy technical center scenarios. Of the alternatives offered by the

cross-service groups, many were already being considered under the

Navy’s process. Much more Navy technical capacity was reduced by the

Navy’s recommendations than was suggested within the cross-service

group reports.

• Laboratories. See Test and Evaluation.

• Undergraduate Pilot Training. The Navy’s recommendations incorporated

parts of two of the three joint alternatives forwarded by the UPT

cross-service group. BSEC rejected a third alternative that would have

closed NAS Whiting Field because of high one-time costs and a long ROI

period.

• Medical Treatment Facilities. Naval hospitals are true “followers” in that

their presence is closely tied to the presence of other Navy and Marine

Corps units in their area. The cross-service group for medical treatment

facilities and graduate medical education recommended no closures of

naval hospitals and the realignment of only two (Corpus Christi and

Beaufort, South Carolina) into clinics. Both hospitals suggested by the

cross-service group were in areas with a large active duty presence, so

BSEC determined it was imprudent to lower the military medical presence.

Since no operational bases with tenant hospitals were recommended for

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closure, no hospitals were recommended for closure or realignment by the

Navy.

• Depot Maintenance. BSEC analyzed four scenarios arising from this

cross-service group, including one that examined application of a

developing regional maintenance concept, which would align several

depot and intermediate maintenance activities under a single regional

management structure. The Navy said that the results of its COBRA analysis

demonstrated that none of the scenarios resulted in a consolidation or

interservicing distribution of workload that was more cost-effective than

the Navy’s best scenario, which was adopted as its final recommendation.

In response to the cross-service group’s proposed closure of NADEP

Jacksonville, the results of the Navy’s scenario that contemplated creation

of a Regional Maintenance Activity, Southeast, suggest that some

operational and economic efficiencies could be achieved. However, the

Navy concluded that prudent military judgment dictated that the

application of the regional maintenance concept to NADEP Jacksonville,

with its restructuring of the principal industrial activity in this area’s fleet

concentration, was premature. It concluded that such a concept could be

executed outside the BRAC framework in the future.

Alternatives issued by the cross-service group also suggested closure or

realignment of segments of functional workload by commodities from

each of the five naval shipyards to other DOD depot maintenance activities.

The Navy concluded that none of the scenarios resulted in a consolidation

or interservicing distribution of workload that was more cost-effective

than the Navy scenarios under evaluation. The cross-service group

alternatives suggesting the movement of industrial workload from NUWC

Keyport; NSWC Crane, Indiana; and NSWC Louisville to other naval activities

were incorporated into existing Navy scenarios, consistent with the Navy’s

intent to move industrial work out of technical centers.

Cost as a Factor in

Navy Decisions

The Navy used the COBRA algorithms as a tool to ensure that

recommendations for closure and realignment actions were cost-effective.

The Navy did not use COBRA as a means of finding the lowest cost

alternative, but the analysis of several alternatives permitted the Navy to

find ways to reduce excess capacity for less cost and satisfy operational

requirements. In considering various cost and savings scenarios, the Navy

was concerned with the up-front costs associated with closures and

realignments and the length of time required to obtain a ROI. The Navy’s

process for developing cost data for closures has led to some controversy

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over the reasonableness of cost estimates pertaining to several technical

center recommendations.

The Navy’s process was unique in that it obtained input on cost and

savings data from activities identified as potential closure or realignment

candidates. This has contributed to concerns about the accuracy of such

data. As described earlier, BSEC obtained cost and savings data from

affected activities by issuing scenario data calls through the chain of

command to closing activities. The major claimant for these activities,

such as the fleet commander for an air station, was responsible for

coordinating data collection from all other affected activities in that

scenario.

Although the cost and savings data was certified through the chain of

command, in several instances involving technical centers, the

reasonableness of cost and savings estimates was questioned by BSEC. This

final review resulted in some substantial changes to original estimates by

BSEC, which ultimately certified the data. We reviewed the changes made

to several scenarios, including NSWC Louisville, NAWC Indianapolis, and

NAWC Lakehurst. Some costs were disallowed by BSEC because they were

already included in the COBRA algorithms. Some were disallowed because

they were environmental cleanup-related costs, which are not included in

BRAC analyses. Other disallowed costs involved more difficult judgments

and decisions, for example, military construction requirements,

productivity, and “disruption” loss. Although time constraints prevented us

from completing a full review of more than a few recommendations, we

found no basis to question the BSEC decisions we examined. Nevertheless,

we believe the Commission should more thoroughly examine the basis for

the cost exclusions associated with scenarios in the technical centers

subcategory.

The estimated up-front costs of the Navy’s closure and realignment

recommendations are the lowest of any round of base closures for the

Navy. The Navy has also estimated the longest period for ROI as being only

4 years, and most actions experience an immediate ROI. Table 6.3 displays

the costs and ROI for Navy activities recommended for closure.

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Table 6.3: Estimated Costs and Savings Resulting From Navy Recommendations for Closure

Fiscal year 1996 dollars in millions

Activity One-time costsa

6-year net

savingsb

Recurring

annual

savingsc ROI years 20-year NPV

NAF Adak $9.4 $108.0 $26.0 Immediate $354.8

NSY Long Beach 74.5 725.6 130.6 Immediate 1948.6

SRF Guam 8.4 171.9 37.8 Immediate 529.0

NAWC Indianapolis 77.6 7.8 39.2 1 392.1

NSWC Louisville 103.9 (39.4) 28.6 3 243.7

NSWC White Oak 2.9 28.7 6.0 Immediate 85.9

NAS South Weymouth 17.3 50.8 27.4 1 315.2

NAS Meridian

NTTC Meridian 83.4 158.8 33.4 Immediate 471.2

NAS Alameda

NAS Corpus Christi

NAWC Lakehurst 96.9 (5.0) 37.2 3 358.7

NAWC Warminster

NCCOSC Warminster 8.4 33.1 7.6 Immediate 104.6

NISE San Diego 1.8 19.3 4.3 Immediate 60.0

NHRC San Diego 6.2 (2.0) 1.4 4 11.4

NPRDC San Diego 7.9 (4.3) 1.9 4 14.9

SUPSHIP Long Beach 0.3 0.8 0.3 1 3.3

NUWC New London 23.4 14.3 8.1 3 91.2

NRL Orlando 8.4 3.7 2.8 3 30.1

FISC Guam 18.4 14.3 31.1 Immediate 437.3

NBDL New Orleans 0.6 14.1 2.9 Immediate 41.8

NMRI Bethesda 3.7 19.0 9.5 1 111.0

NSWC Annapolis 25.0 36.7 14.5 1 175.1

NAESU Philadelphia 2.5 5.9 2.5 1 29.5

NATSF Philadelphia 5.7 1.5 2.2 3 22.7

NAWC Oreland 0.1 0d 0e 3 0.2

FISC Charleston 2.3 2.3 0.9 2 10.8

NISE Norfolk 4.6 0.1 2.1 3 20.4

NAVMASSO Chesapeake 2.2 9.0 2.7 1 34.9

NRC Huntsville 0.1 2.6 0.5 Immediate 7.2

NRC Stockton 0 2.0 0.4 Immediate 5.4

NRC Santa Ana 0 3.0 0.5 Immediate 8.1

NRC Pomona 0 1.9 0.3 Immediate 5.1

(continued)

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Fiscal year 1996 dollars in millions

Activity One-time costsa

6-year net

savingsb

Recurring

annual

savingsc ROI years 20-year NPV

NRC Cadillac 0 1.8 0.3 Immediate 5.0

NRC Staten Island 0 4.5 0.6 Immediate 9.8

NRC Laredo 0 1.4 0.3 Immediate 3.8

NRC Sheboygan 0 1.5 0.3 Immediate 4.1

NRC Olathe 0.2 3.9 0.7 Immediate 10.9

REDCOM New Orleans 0.6 6.0 1.9 Immediate 23.8

REDCOM Charleston 0.5 14.4 2.7 Immediate 39.9

Total $597.2 $1,418.0 $469.5 $6,021.5

Note: Totals may not compare to those in DOD’s report due to rounding.

aThis represents unique one-time costs to implement the recommendation.

bThis represents net savings within the 6-year implementation period.

cProjected recurring annual savings after the 6-year period.

dThe 6-year net savings for NAWC Oreland is $33,000.

eThe annual savings after implementation period for NAWC Oreland is $15,000.

As indicated in table 6.3, for some scenarios, the Navy analyzed cost,

savings, and ROI data for several activities together. The nature of these

scenarios did not lend itself to a separate cost and savings analysis. For

example, since units, equipment, and people would be moving from NAS

Meridian and NAS Alameda, California (a redirect of a BRAC 1993 decision)

to NAF Corpus Christi (a realignment), and units, equipment, and people

would be moving from Corpus Christi to Pensacola, Florida, the entire

group of moves was considered together. In addition, since the closure of

NAS Meridian depended on the closure of the Naval Technical Training

Center (NTTC) Meridian and the movement of its functions to several

activities, the latter was also part of the overall cost and savings analysis.

Table 6.4 displays the cost and savings information for activities the Navy

has recommended for realignment. (The realignment of NAS Corpus Christi

was included in table 6.3 as part of the NAS Meridian scenario.)

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Table 6.4: Estimated Costs and Savings From Navy Recommendations for Realignment

Fiscal year 1996 dollars in millions

Activity One-time costsa

6-year net

savingsb

Recurring

annual

savingsc ROI years 20-year NPV

NAS Key West $0.4 $8.2 $1.8 Immediate $25.5

Naval activities, Guam 93.1 66.2 42.5 1 474.3

NUWC Keyport 2.1 9.8 2.1 1 29.7

NISMC Arlington 0.1 0.3 0.1 2 1.7

Total $95.7 $84.5 $46.5 $531.2

Note: Totals may not compare to those in DOD’s report due to rounding.

aThis represents unique one-time costs to implement the recommendation.

bThis represents net savings within the 6-year implementation period.

cProjected recurring annual savings after the 6-year period.

Table 6.5 displays cost and savings information for activities associated

with redirects of previous BRAC decisions by the Navy. (The redirect of the

NAS Alameda decision is included in table 6.3 as part of the NAS

Meridian/NAF Corpus Christi scenario.)

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Table 6.5: Estimated Costs and Savings From Navy-Recommended Reconsiderations of Prior BRAC Decisions

Fiscal year 1996 dollars in millions

Activity One-time costsa

6-year net

savingsb

Recurring

annual

savingsc ROI years 20-year NPV

MCAS El Toro $90.2 $293.0 $6.9 Immediate $346.8

MCAS Tustin

NRD San Diego 0.3 0.1 0.0 1 0.1

NTC San Diego 0.6 20.0 0.1 Immediate 20.7

NTC Orlando 5.2 4.8 0.0 Immediate 5.0

NAS Cecil Field 66.6 335.1 11.5 Immediate 437.8

NADEP Pensacola 1.5 2.4 0.2 Immediate 3.8

NPS Orlando 148.0 19.5 5.3 1 71.1

NAS Agana 43.7 213.8 21.7 Immediate 418.0

NAS Barbers Point 0 17.6 0.1 Immediate 18.4

NAF Detroit 0 9.4 0 Immediate 9.3

NSY Norfolk—Philadelphia 0 51.9 8.8 Immediate 134.7

NAVSEA Arlington 159.7 47.6 9.4 Immediate 144.0

ONR Arlingtond

SPAWAR Arlington 24.0 120.0 25.3 Immediate 360.0

Naval Recruit Command, Washington, D.C. 6.5 1.1 0 Immediate 1.2

Naval Security Group, Washington, D.C. 0 0e 0 Immediate 0e

Total $546.3 $1,126.3 $89.4 $1,945.2

Note: Totals may not compare to those in DOD’s report due to rounding.

aThis represents unique one-time costs to implement the recommendation.

bThis represents net savings within the 6-year implementation period.

cProjected recurring annual savings after the 6-year period.

dThe Navy reevaluated its BRAC 1993 decision, which would have involved about $9.4 million in

one-time costs and a 10-year time to realize a payback. Thus, no new COBRA was run.

eThe 6-year net savings and the 20-year net present value are both $4,000.

In some scenarios, such as MCAS Tustin and MCAS El Toro, California, the

Navy analyzed the cost, savings, and ROI for several activities together.

This was due to the interdependence of moves associated with these

scenarios.

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Costs, Economic

Impact, and Other

Factors Eliminated

Some Candidates for

Closure or

Realignment

The Navy eliminated activities from closure or realignment consideration

as part of its process. If no excess capacity was found in a subcategory, no

further analysis was performed on that subcategory. Additionally,

concerns of an operational nature, based on military judgment, caused

BSEC to eliminate some activities from consideration. Once BSEC developed

closure and realignment scenarios, the results of costs and savings and

economic impact analyses were used to eliminate individual activities

from consideration. The Secretary of the Navy eliminated some activities

from consideration due to concerns about cumulative job losses. Table 6.6

shows the cost and savings information for activities in the subcategories

the Navy identified as having excess capacity but did not recommend for

closure or realignment. The table also includes information on the

activities eliminated from consideration by the Secretary of the Navy

because of concern about the magnitude of job losses in California.

Table 6.6: Estimated Costs and Savings From Selected Navy Scenarios Eliminated From Consideration

Fiscal year 1996 dollars in millions

Activity One-time costsa

6-year net

savingsb

Recurring

annual

savingsc ROI years 20-year NPV

ASO Philadelphia $68.7 ($26.4) $12.0 6 $91.4

NAVFAC Whidbey Island 27.5 (19.4) 4.6 7 27.0

SDIV Charleston 30.6 1.0 7.1 5 69.1

EFA NW Bangor 6.9 (8.1) 0.5 24 (2.4)

NAVHOSP Corpus Christi 2.7 5.1 1.4 Immediate 18.5

NAVHOSP Beaufort 1.0 (1.9) (0.8) Never (9.5)

WDIV San Brunod 5.5 5.8 4.8 1 51.9

NWAD Coronad 76.0 (31.7) 21.3 3 178.3

SUPSHIP San Franciscod 0.4 1.6 0.5 1 6.8

FISC Oaklandd 25.3 47.3 18.9 Immediate 228.6

aThis represents unique one-time costs to implement the recommendation.

bThis represents net savings within the 6-year implementation period.

cProjected recurring annual savings after the 6-year period.

dThese activities were eliminated from consideration by the Secretary of the Navy.

Capacity and Operational

Concerns and Cost and

Savings Analysis

The Navy’s capacity analyses revealed that seven subcategories did not

have sufficient excess capacity to warrant closure or realignment

consideration. Those subcategories were Marine Corps bases,

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Potential Recommendations

construction battalion centers, naval security group activities, naval

computer and telecommunications stations, naval meteorology and

oceanography centers, dental activities, and Military Sealift Command

activities.

In the Marine Corps bases subcategory, for example, some degree of

excess capacity was indicated among the five capacity measures:

maintenance space, covered storage space, barracks, messing, and

administrative space. However, BSEC determined that the distribution of

the relative excess capacity did not allow reductions in any combination of

these categories to the extent that one of the Marine Corps bases could be

closed. The capacity analysis for Military Sealift Command activities

indicated that ongoing reorganization within the Command matched the

changing force structure; subsequently, there was little excess capacity to

eliminate. In the dental activities subcategory, BSEC determined there to be

a 21-percent deficiency in dental workload, after a comparison of existing

capacity to future requirements. Thus, this subcategory was also

eliminated from further consideration.

The elimination of the 7 subcategories that did not have sufficient excess

capacity left 20 subcategories, which BSEC analyzed to develop

recommendations. BSEC did not make recommendations in 8 of the 20

subcategories: ordnance activities, Marine Corps logistics bases, inventory

control points (ICP), shore intermediate maintenance activities, public

works centers, Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) facilities,

medical activities, and engineering field divisions and activities.

Recommendations were not made in these eight subcategories for various

reasons. In the ordnance activities subcategory, BSEC was concerned about

uncertainties in future weapon storage and wartime surge requirements.

BSEC also did not recommend closing either of the two Marine Corps

logistics bases because the distribution of capacity at existing activities

would not permit future requirements to be met if one of the activities

were closed.

Of the Navy’s two ICPs, the Aviation Supply Office (ASO), Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania, was identified as a suitable candidate for closure. However,

the results of the cost and savings analysis associated with this scenario

were unsatisfactory to BSEC in that the up-front costs were considered too

large and the ROI time was considered too long. In addition, current efforts

by the Naval Supply Systems Command in streamlining management

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structures precluded significant personnel savings from a potential 1995

action.

BSEC identified excess capacity in its shore intermediate maintenance

activity (SIMA) subcategory. BSEC determined SIMAs to be “follower”

activities, since they are closely tied to the presence of other Navy units in

their area or their host activity. Since none of these hosts were included in

the Navy’s final recommendations, no SIMAs were recommended for

closure or realignment. BSEC determined that public works centers (PWC)

were also essentially follower activities. Thus, should the customers they

support leave, they themselves would become excess. Since BSEC

approved the closure or realignment of several activities on Guam (the

ship repair facility, fleet and industrial support center, and piers), many

public works center customers would be leaving the area. Concerned

about civilian job losses on Guam that would result from the PWC’s closure,

BSEC determined that a sufficient number of customers would remain to

justify leaving the center open.

BSEC determined through its capacity analysis that it was feasible for only

one of the two IUSS facilities (Whidbey Island, Washington, and Dam Neck,

Virginia) to perform all necessary functions in the subcategory. Since the

naval facility (NAVFAC) at Whidbey Island had a lower military value than

the facility at Dam Neck, BSEC assessed a scenario identifying NAVFAC

Whidbey Island for closure. However, BSEC subsequently determined that

the projected costs and savings associated with such a recommendation

did not justify the loss of operational flexibility to fleet commanders of

having a facility on each coast.

Even though excess capacity was also found in the medical activities

subcategory, BSEC determined these to be follower activities. The

cross-service group provided the Navy with an alternative to realign two

naval hospitals (Beaufort and Corpus Christi) into clinics. However, since

no activity with a tenant hospital in any subcategory was recommended

for closure by the Navy, no hospitals were included in final

recommendations.

Excess capacity was identified in the engineering field divisions and

activities subcategory, although BSEC recognized that these activities were

closely tied to Navy presence in a region. Southern Division, Charleston,

South Carolina, and Engineering Field Activity Northwest (EFA NW),

Bangor, Washington, were eliminated from consideration for closure

because the scenarios did not offer a favorable payback.

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In several instances, the Navy eliminated closure and realignment options

due to the results of COBRA analysis. For example, the closure of NSWC

Crane was dropped due to high one-time costs and no return on

investment resulting from two alternatives and high one-time costs relative

to the 20-year NPV for a third alternative. The decision not to recommend

ASO Philadelphia for closure was also partially due to the high one-time

costs and long payback period. The decision not to close the IUSS activity

at NAVFAC Whidbey Island was due to BSEC’s decision that the high one-time

costs and limited savings did not justify the loss of operational flexibility.

The realignment of the naval hospital at Beaufort to a medical clinic was

not pursued because the COBRA analysis indicated that the resulting

increase in CHAMPUS costs would result in the scenario never achieving a

ROI.

Economic Impact

Concerns

Five activities were eliminated from consideration due to concern about

cumulative job losses. The Secretary of the Navy removed four activities in

California from consideration because of concerns about total cumulative

direct job losses in the state. BSEC removed PWC Guam because of concerns

about civilian job losses that would result from that closure. The

Engineering Field Activity West (WDIV), San Bruno; NWAD Corona;

Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP) San

Francisco; and the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) Oakland were

eliminated from consideration for closure by the Secretary of the Navy

based on his concerns about cumulative civilian job losses in California.

The Navy’s decisions on these five activities raise several questions. Navy

officials stated that the Secretary of the Navy made his decisions based on

cumulative civilian job losses statewide rather than on economic impact as

a percentage of an economic area’s employment population. OSD guidance

stipulates that economic impact is to be assessed at the economic area

level (metropolitan statistical area or county) and that priority

consideration should be given to the military value criteria. However, as in

previous BRAC rounds, OSD has no other guidance on how the services are

to consider economic impact in their deliberative process.

The cumulative job losses in California are greater than the comparable

job loss in any other state. However, the individual economic impact of

each of the four California activities, as defined by OSD criteria, is less than

the impacts estimated for other activities in other states recommended for

closure. For example, the closure of NWAD Corona would have meant a

total loss of 3,055 jobs, but the closure of NAS Meridian will result in an

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Potential Recommendations

estimated loss of 3,324 jobs. Yet NAS Meridian remained in the Navy’s final

recommendations for closure. The total losses in California before the

removal of the four activities was estimated to be 19,994 jobs, roughly a

0.1-percent decrease in statewide employment, whereas the estimated

total losses for Mississippi are estimated to be 3,249 jobs, roughly a

0.3-percent decrease in statewide employment. Because the BRAC law (P.L.

101-510, as amended) states that all bases must be considered equally, the

Commission may wish to more closely examine the Navy’s decisions

regarding the consideration of job losses in California.

Recommendations We recommend that the Defense Base Closure and Realignment

Commission

• explore the need for a DOD component or some other government agency

to obtain the wind tunnel facility at NSWC White Oak from the Navy in

order to operate it in support of its mission;

• thoroughly examine the basis for exclusions to the cost and savings data

associated with closure and realignment scenarios such as NSWC Louisville,

NAWC Indianapolis, and NAWC Lakehurst in the technical centers

subcategory; and

• examine, from an equity standpoint, the Navy’s exclusion of activities from

closure and realignment consideration due to concerns over job losses.

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DLA Based Its BRAC Recommendations on

Sound Military and Business Analyses

The decision-making process that DLA employed to arrive at its BRAC

recommendations was well documented and flowed logically from the

data presented. DLA recommended nine activities for closure,

disestablishment, or realignment, including a proposed change to a 1993

BRAC decision. DLA was not directly affected by the cross-service groups’

recommendations.

DLA made significant improvements for its 1995 BRAC process. The

installation analysis and the commercially accepted Strategic Analysis of

Integrated Logistics Systems (SAILS) model provided additional insight in

the decision-making process. Although DLA eliminated a sizable amount of

excess capacity with the closure and disestablishment of four depots, it

could reduce additional infrastructure in the future. However, such

reductions are largely dependent on DLA and the services further reducing

their inventories.

DLA’s 1995 Process

Was Much Improved

Over Its 1993 Process

DLA first participated in the BRAC process in 1993. BRAC 1993 was

problematic because questions arose about how decisions were made and

how accurate the cost and savings estimates were. We found that DLA’s

BRAC 1995 process for evaluating and recommending activities for closure

and realignment was well documented and that the data used was

generally accurate. DLA consistently followed the requirements of the

applicable BRAC law, force structure plan, DLA’s concepts of operations,1

DOD selection criteria, and OSD policy guidance to ensure that all activities

reviewed were evaluated fairly and equitably.

We found that DLA took significant actions to strengthen its process for

BRAC 1995. Improvements were made in nearly every phase of DLA’s BRAC

review process to ensure its integrity for BRAC 1995. DLA

• refined its BRAC decision rules for scenario evaluation,

• used an off-line spreadsheet approach to calculate more reliable cost and

savings estimates associated with nonlabor base operating support (BOS)

and communications costs,

• used independent assessments of its facilities’ conditions,

• standardized procedures for calculating and reporting storage space

capacity and utilization,

1

DLA developed concepts of operations for its business areas. These concepts summarize the current

position and future direction of DLA missions and activities in relation to the changes noted in the

DOD force structure plan.

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• incorporated a detailed analysis for evaluating its host activity

installations,2

• adopted a commercially accepted optimization model to determine the

relative operating costs of the DLA distribution depots, and

• involved the DOD IG in the data verification and validation phases of the

BRAC process.

As in BRAC 1993, DLA established decision rules to assist in evaluating

closure or realignment scenarios. In BRAC 1995, DLA refined these rules and

placed more emphasis on adhering to them. Under the new rules, DLA was

to make decisions that

• minimized infrastructure costs,

• made closing installations a top priority,

• eliminated duplicate activities and functions,

• maximized the use of shared overhead,

• optimized the use of remaining DLA space, and

• moved DLA activities from leased space to DOD-owned installations.

The decision rules determined whether a scenario was abandoned,

refined, or retained for further analysis.

One of the most significant of all improvements made to DLA’s 1995 BRAC

process was DLA’s approach to estimating costs and savings associated

with BOS and communications. In BRAC 1993, we reported that DLA’s savings

were overstated because DLA did not adequately consider differences

between base operating costs, such as nonlabor BOS and communications,

when dissimilar operations were combined.3

 For BRAC 1995, DLA calculated

the impact of the nonlabor BOS and communication costs and savings

outside of the COBRA model; these costs were then entered into the COBRA

model. DLA’s method of carrying the losing site’s BOS and communications

costs and savings to the receiving site was more realistic and reflective of

DLA’s operations.

In 1993, DLA did not have a consistent basis for gathering data on the

condition of its buildings and facilities. Between BRAC 1993 and 1995, DLA

commissioned the Navy PWC to perform long-range maintenance planning

for its facilities. This data was provided to activity commanders for

2

At six installations, DLA is the primary tenant and hosts other DOD and non-DOD federal tenant

activities.

3

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s Recommendations and Selection Process for Closures and

Realignments (GAO/NSIAD-93-173, Apr. 15, 1993).

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verification and certification under BRAC 1995. Also, during this time the

DLA Operations Support Office (DOSO) developed similar data on the

condition of DLA’s administrative space. This data also was given to DLA

activities to check and certify for use in the BRAC process. We found that

by using PWC and DOSO data, consistency was gained in analyzing DLA

facilities.

As in BRAC 1993, DLA required its distribution depots to use data from their

Storage Space Utilization Report (805 Report) to calculate storage

capacity and utilization rates for BRAC 1995. However, in an audit

completed before BRAC 1995 data calls went out, the DOD IG found that

these reports inconsistently reported and documented storage space

capacity and utilization. On the basis of this audit, DLA provided guidance

that standardized procedures for calculating and reporting storage space

capacity.4

In BRAC 1993, DLA only assessed the military value of its activities and did

not consider or analyze the military value of its installations where it was

the host and other DOD and non-DOD activities were tenants. For BRAC 1995,

DLA not only evaluated its activities on these installations but also analyzed

the military value of these installations.5

 We believe the installation

analysis provided a broader basis for considering the closure of an

installation as a whole.

For BRAC 1995, DLA used SAILS, a commercially available optimization

model, to help make closure and realignment decisions regarding its

stand-alone distribution depots.6

 The model helped DLA identify which

depots could be closed while minimizing transportation and infrastructure

costs. Information such as the type of commodities, workload capacity,

transportation rates, and supplier and customer geographic locations for

all of DLA’s distribution depots was loaded into SAILS. The model

considered various configurations of closing one or two stand-alone

depots based on this information.

DLA did not rely solely on the SAILS model results to decide which depots to

close; these results were considered along with the military value and

4

According to a DOD IG official, in its validation of data call questionnaire responses, no discrepancies

in the storage space data were reported by the activities.

5

DLA’s six host installations are located in Columbus, Ohio; New Cumberland, Pennsylvania;

Richmond, Virginia; Tracy/Sharpe, California; Ogden, Utah; and Memphis, Tennessee.

6

Stand-alone depots distribute a wide range of material to customers in many locations. These depots

are not located with a military service maintenance function.

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COBRA analyses. We believe that the SAILS model was a valuable tool in

assessing the operating costs of its stand-alone depots, because it helped

DLA identify the most cost-effective solution.

In BRAC 1993, DLA’s data was validated by DLA’s Office of Internal Review

and augmented by field auditors. Audit coverage was strengthened in BRAC

1995 with the addition of the DOD IG to oversee the audit effort. In order to

maintain independence and objectivity in the 1995 BRAC process, we

recommended, and DLA agreed, that DLA field auditors should review the

data collection process of activities that were not in the same category as

their own activity. This differed from the approach taken in BRAC 1993.

The DOD IG was responsible for verifying the accuracy and completeness of

the certified field data, determining the adequacy of the supporting

documentation, and evaluating DLA’s analyses. DOD IG audit teams visited

sites to verify that field activity data was collected in accordance with

DLA’s data collection plan and recommended corrective action where

necessary. We accompanied the DOD IG on some visits and facilitated its

reviews by ensuring that they were validating the most current data

requested by DLA. We also independently validated some data and found

the data was generally well documented and supported. For locations we

did not visit, we selectively reviewed the DOD IG’s workpapers.

Data used in the 1995 process was reviewed and favorably reported on by

the DOD IG audit teams. The majority of errors found were due to lack of

supporting documentation; all errors that were essential to DLA’s analyses

were subsequently corrected by the activities.

Identifying Closure

and Realignment

Candidates

DLA selected candidates to close, realign, or disestablish by first grouping

its 39 activities into four categories and five subcategories (as shown in

table 7.1). DLA then analyzed the capacity and military value of all activities

within their respective categories.

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Table 7.1: Categories and

Subcategories of DLA Activities

Category Subcategory

Number of

activities

Command and control Defense contract management districts 4

Defense distribution regions 2

Defense reutilization and marketing

operations 2

Inventory control points 5

Distribution depots Stand-alone depots 6

Collocated depots 17

Service/support 3

Total 39

Capacity Analysis An excess capacity analysis was done for activities in each BRAC category

and subcategory. The intent of this analysis was to determine the usage of

physical space and compare it with anticipated future requirements.

Future requirements were based on (1) force structure projections,

(2) military service basing and operational changes, and (3) DLA’s

initiatives for improving operational efficiencies and effectiveness.

Activities that had significant amounts of excess capacity were considered

as potential receiver sites in realignment recommendations.

In all categories except the distribution depots, excess capacity was based

on the (1) total current existing administrative space, less any special use

space, and (2) number of additional personnel that could be

accommodated in that space. The excess capacity analysis for DLA’s

distribution depots was evaluated differently because of their distribution

mission. For these depots, excess capacity was measured in terms of

(1) workload capacity—the depot’s ability to handle the in and out

processing of material—and (2) physical storage space capacity—the

depot’s ability to store material in support of active issue, slow-moving,

and war reserve material.

Military Value Analysis DLA analyzed military value to determine the relative ranking of each

activity with respect to other activities in the same category or

subcategory. Military value rankings did not, by themselves, provide the

basis for closure and realignment decisions. Military value was used in

conjunction with DLA’s concepts of operations, decision rules, other

analyses (e.g., installation analysis and SAILS model results), and military

judgment to make realignment and closure recommendations.

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DLA Based Its BRAC Recommendations on

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DLA’s 1995 BRAC

Recommendations

Were Based on

Multiple Analyses

DLA recommended nine activities for closure, realignment, or

disestablishment. In one of these recommendations, DLA sought to change

or redirect a 1993 BRAC decision. These recommendations were the

culmination of extensive deliberations by DLA’s Executive Group.7

 We

observed these sessions firsthand and witnessed extensive deliberations

about each activity and the factors and analytical tools that were used in

the decision-making process.

For the nine targeted activities, DLA examined whether these decisions

would have adverse economic, community infrastructure, and

environmental impacts. It found that the impacts would be negligible.

Table 7.2 shows DLA’s 1995 BRAC recommendations by category.

Table 7.2: DLA’s 1995 BRAC Recommendations, by Category

DLA category

Number of

activities

Activities

studied

Number of activities

recommended for

closure, realignment,

or disestablishment

Names of activities

recommended for closure,

realignment, or

disestablishment

Command and control 8 All 3 Defense Contract Management

 District South

Defense Contract Management

 District Westa

Management Command

International

Inventory control pointsb 5 All 1 Defense Industrial Supply Centerc

Distribution depotsb 23 All 5 Defense Depot Columbus

Defense Depot Ogden

Defense Depot Memphis

Defense Depot Letterkenny

Defense Depot Red River

Service/support activities 3 All None

aThis is a redirect of a 1993 BRAC decision.

bThe installation analysis aided in the decision-making process for selecting recommendations in

these categories.

cThis decision requires the disestablishment of the Defense Industrial Supply Center and the

realignment of the workload of the Defense Construction Supply Center, the Defense General

Supply Center, and the Defense Personnel Support Center.

7

DLA’s Executive Group consisted of senior-level civilian and military executives from DLA’s business

and staff areas. The Executive Group was chaired by the Principal Deputy Director of DLA.

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Command and Control For each subcategory of activities in the command and control category,

DLA sought to determine (1) the need for those oversight capabilities;

(2) the optimum location for performing the activities’ missions; and (3) in

the case of the Defense Contract Management Districts (DCMD), the ability

of a one-, two-, or three-regional structure to provide the most manageable

level of risk.

DLA’s closure and realignment recommendations in this category primarily

affected DCMDs. Facilities in the other subcategories were left intact due to

their assessed high military value and importance to providing

management oversight.

DCMD South, located in Marietta, Georgia, was recommended for

disestablishment for three reasons: (1) it had the lowest military value,

(2) it had a lower concentration of workload and administration offices to

oversee than the Northeast District, and (3) COBRA results indicated that

closing it was the most cost-effective decision of the two-district scenario

options. DLA decided that although the scenario that reconfigured the three

districts into one large district had the greatest ROI, the span of control

overseeing 90 subordinate offices throughout the United States was not

feasible.

The recommendation regarding DCMD West, located in El Segundo,

California, was a redirect of a 1993 BRAC decision. The BRAC 1993 decision

called for the movement of this district from leased space to DOD-owned

property in Long Beach, California. The 1995 BRAC decision expanded this

earlier decision by incorporating the purchase of a building by the Navy on

behalf of DLA in the Long Beach area. DLA recommended this redirect

action because (1) the Navy had not successfully negotiated a land

exchange with the Port Authority/City of Long Beach and (2) the Long

Beach Naval Shipyard, which was another option for DLA, was placed on

the Navy’s BRAC 1995 list for closure.

Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) International, located in

Dayton, Ohio, was not compared with the other contract management

districts because its workload was not comparable to the DCMDs. On the

basis of the results of DLA’s analysis and military judgment, DLA

recommended the merger of DCMC International with its headquarters

organization in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. Because DCMC

International could be located anywhere, DLA had the opportunity to take

advantage of the location’s proximity to the State Department and to the

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DLA Based Its BRAC Recommendations on

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international support infrastructure in Washington, D.C., and the

surrounding area.

Inventory Control Points DLA operates five ICPs: (1) the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC),

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; (2) the Defense Industrial Supply Center

(DISC), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; (3) the Defense General Supply Center

(DGSC), Richmond, Virginia; (4) the Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC),

Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and (5) the Defense Construction Supply Center

(DCSC), Columbus, Ohio.

Each ICP is responsible for acquiring and managing an inventory of supply

items. DFSC manages fuel-related items, while the other four manage

differing mixes of weapon system, troop support, and general support

items. The number of troop and general support items managed by the ICPs

is relatively small, although they have high demand patterns. DLA manages

nearly five times as many weapon system items as troop and general

support items combined.

All activities were evaluated in terms of their military value. However,

because DFSC and DPSC are one-of-a-kind activities, DLA evaluated them

separately. On the basis of the results of the military value analyses on

both of these activities, DLA decided that they should not be disestablished

because of their unique missions. Therefore, in the case of DPSC, DLA

evaluated DPSC as a receiver of similar workloads managed by the other

ICPs.

DGSC, DISC, and DCSC were hardware centers and were evaluated as a group

in terms of military value. Of the three, DISC received the lowest military

value score. However, DLA did not consider the results of the ICP military

value analysis sufficient by itself to reveal any obvious closure candidates.

On the basis of DLA’s ICP supply management concept of operations, DLA

considered four scenarios that analyzed the types of items each ICP

managed and the way they are managed. DLA determined that maintaining

one troop and general support ICP was feasible, considering the small

number and the commercial nature of the items. Holding the single troop

and general support ICP constant, DLA varied the scenarios between having

one and two weapon system ICPs.

Although one weapon system ICP and one troop and general support ICP

had the greatest ROI, DLA considered the risk of having a single weapon

system ICP as too great because (1) the large number of weapon system

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DLA Based Its BRAC Recommendations on

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items posed a management challenge and (2) the ICP could adversely affect

the national defense if it failed to properly manage critical weapon system

items. Therefore, DLA decided that two weapon system ICPs posed an

acceptable level of risk to the agency. From our perspective in observing

DLA’s process, we found that this became a consensus decision within the

Executive Group following considerable internal discussions weighing the

various options.

DLA’s recommendation to disestablish DISC and realign DCSC and DGSC was

influenced primarily by the ICP supply management concept of operations,

which stated that synergy could be gained by combining commodities with

similar management requirements. Other considerations affecting the

decision to retain DCSC and DGSC included (1) DLA’s decision rule that

emphasized maximizing the use of shared overhead (i.e., taking advantage

of the depots collocated with these two ICPs), (2) the installation analysis

indicating that it was more beneficial to keep DCSC and DGSC because of

their relatively high military value rankings, and (3) the considerable

expansion capabilities of DCSC and DGSC.

DLA recommended consolidating the troop and general support items at

DPSC because (1) DPSC is almost exclusively a troop support ICP, and no

other ICP manages these items; (2) the percentage of general support items

at the other ICPs is minimal; and (3) the consolidation would reduce the

potential management responsibilities between the ICPs. Weapon system

items were realigned between DGSC and DCSC.

By disestablishing DISC and delaying the implementation (until 1999) of a

1993 BRAC recommendation to relocate DPSC to the Navy’s Aviation Supply

Office compound in Philadelphia, DLA avoided a substantial cost. It did so

by backfilling the space already occupied by DISC and substantially

reducing the amount of conversion of existing warehouse space.

Distribution Depots DLA operates 17 collocated and 6 stand-alone distribution depots.

Collocated depots are located with a service maintenance depot or major

fleet support point, which is usually the distribution depot’s principal

customer. Stand-alone depots are not located with a maintenance function

but distribute a wide range of material to customers in many locations.

Of the five BRAC recommendations in this category, three involved

stand-alone depots (Columbus, Ogden, and Memphis) and two are

collocated with military service facilities (Letterkenny, Pennsylvania, and

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DLA Based Its BRAC Recommendations on

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Red River, Texas). Decisions regarding the distribution depots were based

on various types of analyses; a single analysis, in itself, did not drive DLA’s

realignment, closure, or disestablishment recommendations. Separate

military value analyses were performed for the collocated and stand-alone

depots.

Collocated Depots Military value for the collocated depots was influenced by their capacities

and the strategic advantage of being located with a military service

maintenance customer. DLA evaluated 17 collocated depots. However, the

ultimate decision to realign or close any of these activities was influenced

by whether the depots’ primary military service customer was closed or

realigned. DLA considered various closure and realignment scenarios for its

collocated depots, based on discussions with each military service’s BRAC

office regarding the maintenance depots each was considering for BRAC

action. As a result of service decisions, DLA recommended its depots at

Letterkenny and Red River for disestablishment.

Stand-Alone Depots To assess the military value of the stand-alone depots, DLA measured the

full range of support they provide to customers worldwide. DLA’s

recommendations were influenced by current and future capacity

requirements, military value analysis, installation analysis, and the SAILS

model. On the basis of the results of these analyses, DLA recommended

that two stand-alone depots be closed and one realigned.

Although Defense Depot Columbus, Ohio (DDCO), ranked last in military

value in the stand-alone category, the separate installation analysis ranked

Columbus highest. This was a determining factor in DLA’s decision to

recommend Columbus for realignment and not closure. Other

considerations included (1) the decision to keep the ICP open that was

collocated with the Columbus depot and (2) DLA’s concept of operations

that cited the need for storage space for slow-moving and war reserve

material.

Considered but not recommended for closure or realignment was Defense

Depot Richmond, Virginia (DDRV). Its relatively low military value in the

depot analysis suggested that it was a prime candidate for closure or

realignment. However, the key factors that prevented its closure or

realignment included (1) the Richmond installation’s third-place ranking in

the installation analysis, (2) the Navy PWC’s assessment that the depot’s

facilities were the best maintained in DLA, (3) the SAILS model’s favoring

this depot’s location on the East Coast, and (4) DLA’s decision to keep the

collocated Richmond ICP open.

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DLA Based Its BRAC Recommendations on

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Defense Depot Memphis, Tennessee (DDMT), and Defense Depot Ogden,

Utah (DDOU), tied for third place in the stand-alone depot military value

analysis. Both depots had the lowest rankings in the installation analysis,

and the SAILS model showed that closing these two depots resulted in the

lowest operating costs for the remaining depot structure. According to

DLA, the capacities of the other depots remaining in the system could make

up for the loss of the production and physical space of these two depots.

By closing these two depots, DLA can eliminate excess and close entire

installations. Closing DDCO and DDRV would not have produced installation

closures.

Historically, we have reported that government storage capacity far

exceeds storage requirements.8 DLA officials agree with us on this issue.

DLA’s recommendations to close DDOU and DDMT, in addition to

disestablishing two collocated depots, are based on anticipated declining

inventory requirements.9

 Such reductions, if they fail to occur, could cause

DLA to fall short in storage capacity. To guard against such an occurrence,

DLA negotiated with the Air Force and the Navy for use of space on their

bases (where DLA already has a presence) should it be needed. Conversely,

if DLA and the services further reduce their inventories, additional

infrastructure reductions could be possible.

Service/Support Activities The following service/support activities were evaluated in DLA’s BRAC

selection process: (1) the Defense Logistics Services Center (DLSC) located

in Battle Creek, Michigan; (2) the Defense Reutilization and Marketing

Service (DRMS) also located in Battle Creek, Michigan; and, (3) the DLA

Systems Design Center (DSDC) headquartered in Columbus, Ohio, with 12

operational sites geographically dispersed throughout the United States.

These activities were evaluated independently because they do not have

peer organizations within DLA and are unique in terms of their nature,

mission, and function. On the basis of its analysis, DLA decided not to

recommend these three activities for closure or realignment.

DLA considered two different realignment alternatives that moved DLSC

from General Services Administration leased space in Battle Creek, to

DOD-owned property. Military value analysis indicated that both

8

Defense Inventory: DOD Actions Needed to Ensure Benefits From Supply Depot Consolidation

Efforts (GAO/NSIAD-92-136, May 29, 1992).

9

The decline in inventory requirements is based on DLA initiatives that DLA believes will allow it to

provide supply support without holding costly inventories, drawing down troops, and disposing of

obsolete material. DLA worked with the services to determine the amount of inventory that could be

reduced.

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DLA Based Its BRAC Recommendations on

Sound Military and Business Analyses

realignment scenarios were feasible, although COBRA results showed that

both produced relatively small savings. However, since DLSC’s workload

could be performed anywhere and officials could find no clear reason why

the activity should be realigned, DLA decided to maintain the status quo.

DLA considered two different realignment scenarios that moved DRMS from

GSA-leased space in Battle Creek, Michigan, to DOD-owned property.

Military value analysis and COBRA results were similar to those for DLSC.

Moreover, DLA determined that it did not make sense to move DLSC or DRMS

if a decision was not made to move both activities.

DLA considered two scenarios that involved realigning all or some of DSDC’s

12 satellite locations scattered throughout the United States. DLA decided

that because these scenarios involved the movement of fewer than the

BRAC threshold of 300 authorized civilian personnel and COBRA results

showed modest savings, it would not make any changes unless a host

activity was being closed. Thus, on the basis of other DLA BRAC

recommendations, the three satellite sites that were tenants at the Defense

Depot Memphis, Defense Depot Ogden, and Defense Depot Letterkenny

were identified for realignment to other locations. A total of 140 DSDC

employees are to be relocated.

Cost as a Factor in

DLA Decisions

DLA considered the cost associated with its BRAC recommendations, but

this did not appear to be a significant factor in determining its

recommendations. Table 7.3 displays the costs, savings, and ROI for the

nine activities DLA recommended for closure, realignment, or

disestablishment.

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DLA Based Its BRAC Recommendations on

Sound Military and Business Analyses

Table 7.3: Estimated Costs and Savings Resulting From DLA BRAC Recommendations

Fiscal year 1996 dollars in millions

Activity One-time costsa

6-year net

savingsb

Recurring

annual

savingsc ROI years 20-year NPV

Defense Contract Management District South $3.8 $17.9 $6.1 1 $75.8

Defense Contract Management Command

International 3.1 8.7 3.1 1 38.7

Defense Contract Management District West 10.3 10.9 4.2 Immediate 51.2

Defense Industrial Supply Center 16.9 59.3 18.4 Immediate 236.5

Defense Distribution Depot Columbus 7.9 51.2 11.6 Immediate 161.0

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis 85.7 14.8 23.8 3 244.3

Defense Distribution Depot Ogden 110.8 (27.8) 21.3 4 180.9

Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny 44.9 (21.2) 12.4 3 102.1

Defense Distribution Depot Red River 58.9 (.8) 18.9 2 186.1

Total $342.3 $113.0 $119.8 $1,276.6

Note: Totals may not compare to those in DOD’s report due to rounding.

aThis represents unique one-time costs to implement the recommendation.

bThis represents net saving within the 6-year implementation period.

cProjected recurring annual savings after the 6-year period.

Conclusions The decision-making process that DLA employed to arrive at its 1995 BRAC

recommendations was well documented and flowed logically from the

data presented. Although DLA eliminated a sizable amount of excess

capacity with the closure and disestablishment of four depots, it could

reduce additional infrastructure in the future. However, such reductions

are largely dependent on DLA and the services further reducing their

inventories.

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Chapter 8 

Defense Investigative Service Requested a

Change to Prior BRAC Decision Affecting Its

Location

DIS has recommended that its Investigations Control and Automation

Directorate (IC&AD) function be moved from Fort Holabird, Maryland, to a

newly constructed facility at Fort Meade, Maryland. This move would

reverse a 1988 BRAC Commission decision that permitted DIS to remain

while other DOD entities moved from Fort Holabird. A BRAC team at DIS

analyzed the proposed move and assessed its cost and savings and

economic impacts.

DIS Recommendation

Is Supported by Its

Analysis

DIS currently has a building hosting 458 civilian employees on what

remains of Fort Holabird. Fort Holabird was partially closed by the 1988

Commission, which, at DIS’s request permitted it to remain. DIS will soon be

the base’s only tenant. The building occupied by IC&AD is old and needs

refurbishment. The Corps of Engineers surveyed the building and

documented many of its problems. Identified hazards include lead-based

paint and asbestos, both of which would pose significant health hazards

should renovations begin while employees remain in the building.

DIS formed a BRAC working group and an executive group to assess the

need to move the Investigations Directorate to a new site. The DOD IG

reviewed the working group’s draft internal control plan, which was then

approved by the DIS BRAC Executive Group. Through a military value

analysis, the Executive Group determined that the Directorate could not

perform its mission in a substandard facility.

The Working Group considered the future DIS personnel and workload

requirements in its assessment of the size of any new site and the

necessity of a new building. DIS queried the military services at

installations in the Baltimore/Washington area about the possibility of

moving IC&AD into existing space on those installations. The services

indicated that no existing buildings would meet DIS requirements. The DIS

Working Group then conducted cost and savings analyses on three

options: (1) renovation of the existing building, (2) movement of the

Directorate into leased space, and (3) construction of a new building on

Fort Meade.

The first option (renovation) would cost about $9.2 million and would not

produce a ROI for more than 100 years. The second option (lease) would

produce annual lease costs of about $1.3 million and a return on

investment in 14 years. The third option (construction of a new building)

would cost an estimated $9.4 million and produce a ROI in 5 years. The

construction option was determined to be the best from a military value

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Chapter 8 

Defense Investigative Service Requested a

Change to Prior BRAC Decision Affecting Its

Location

standpoint, as the Directorate’s function would remain in the

Baltimore/Washington area with little or no disruption in the work

performed.

The Executive Group approved the recommendation to move the IC&AD

function to a newly constructed building at Fort Meade. The results of a

COBRA analysis showed the 6-year net cost to be $.48 million; the annual

savings in the years after implementation to be $.49 million; a ROI to be

realized in 5 years; and the 20-year NPV to be $4.23 million. Most of the

savings would result from avoidance of the costs associated with the

support services agreement between the Army and DIS for the Fort

Holabird building. Since the construction and move would take place

within the same economic area, the economic impact analysis indicated no

impact associated with the recommendation.

The analyses performed by DIS were well documented. The results of its

analyses support its subsequent recommendation. In addition, the DOD IG

observed all stages of the DIS BRAC process, including its assessment of the

DIS internal control and analysis plans. The DOD IG also reviewed the data

used by DIS in its military value, cost and savings, and economic impact

analyses.

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Chapter 9 

Future Directions

The 1995 BRAC is the last round of base closure reviews authorized under

the 1990 legislation. Since excess infrastructure will likely remain even if

all current BRAC recommendations are adopted, future BRAC rounds may be

needed. If a policy decision is made to continue BRAC rounds, legislative

authority, similar to the 1990 BRAC legislation may be necessary to mitigate

prior impediments to base closures.

The current and prior BRAC round recommendations, once implemented,

will reduce DOD’s inventory of major domestic bases by 21 percent. On the

other hand, DOD states that its budget request for fiscal year 1996, in real

terms, is 39 percent below fiscal year 1985. While such data are not

directly comparable, they suggest the need for greater reductions in

defense infrastructure and various base categories show that excess

infrastructure is expected to remain.

In fact, the Secretary of Defense recently acknowledged that excess

infrastructure would remain after the 1995 BRAC. He has suggested the

need for additional BRAC rounds in 3 to 4 years, after DOD components have

had a chance to absorb closures and realignments under this and prior

rounds. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in March 1, 1995,

testimony before the BRAC Commission, said that excess capacity would

remain after the 1995 BRAC. He cited the need for future base closure

authority and said that opportunities remain regarding cross-servicing,

particularly in the area of joint-use bases and training facilities. He also

noted that the Commission on Roles and Missions was expected to

recommend measures to enhance efficiency and interoperability. He

indicated that implementing those recommendations could require a

process similar to BRAC.

Our examination of DOD’s BRAC process, as well as other work underway

examining infrastructure, also suggests that costly excess infrastructure

could remain after the 1995 BRAC. We also agree that opportunities remain

for significant consolidations that will not only enhance joint operations

but also reduce additional infrastructure in the process.

Our work in examining the 1995 BRAC recommendations, particularly in

identifying those not proposed by defense components, suggests that a

number of installations with relatively low military value were not

proposed for closure because of the significant up-front closure costs,

despite projecting savings in the long term. Therefore, the success of

future BRAC rounds may be even more contingent on the willingness of DOD

to make these up-front investments.

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Chapter 9 

Future Directions

The current BRAC process may have certain weaknesses, but it has proven

to be an effective mechanism for reducing defense infrastructure. BRAC

Commission deliberations in 1993 and 1995 have included changes to prior

BRAC round decisions, and future changes are likely. Since DOD cannot

unilaterally change a BRAC Commission decision, and the authority for the

BRAC Commission soon expires, no process will exist to authorize changes

to prior decisions.

Conclusions and

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

Excess infrastructure is expected to remain after the 1995 BRAC process is

completed, even if all of DOD’s recommendations are approved. This could

indicate the need for future BRAC rounds. We suggest that as the Congress

considers the need for future defense infrastructure reductions, it consider

a process similar to that authorized in the 1990 BRAC legislation. In the

meantime, the Congress may wish to consider legislation to provide a

process for reviewing and approving changes to prior BRAC round

decisions that may encounter difficulties in implementation.

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Appendix I 

Office of the Secretary of Defense Base

Realignment and Closure Definitions

The following definitions were provided by OSD to the Department of

Defense components for use in the 1995 base closure and realignment

process. The definitions remain unchanged from the 1993 process, and are

presented as stated by OSD.

Close All missions of the base will cease or be relocated. All personnel (military,

civilian, and contractor) will either be eliminated or relocated. The entire

base will be excessed and the property disposed. Note: A caretaker

workforce is possible to bridge between closure (missions ceasing or

relocating) and property disposal which are separate actions under Public

Law 101-510.

Close, Except The vast majority of the missions will cease or be relocated. Over

95 percent of the military, civilian, and contractor personnel will either be

eliminated or relocated. All but a small portion of the base will be

excessed and the property disposed. The small portion retained will often

be facilities in an enclave for use by the reserve component. Generally,

active component management of the base will cease. Outlying, unmanned

ranges or training areas retained for reserve component use do not count

against the “small portion retained.” Again, closure (missions ceasing or

relocating) and property disposal are separate actions under Public Law

101-510.

Realign Some missions of the base will cease or be relocated, but others will

remain. The active component will still be host of the remaining portion of

the base. Only a portion of the base will be excessed and the property

disposed, with realignment (missions ceasing or relocating) and property

disposal being separate actions under Public Law 101-510. In cases where

the base is both gaining and losing missions, the base is being realigned if

it will experience a net reduction of DOD civilian personnel. In such

situations, it is possible that no property will be excessed.

Relocate The term used to describe the movement of missions, units or activities

from a closing or realigning base to another base. Units do not realign

from a closing or a realigning base to another base, they relocate.

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Appendix I 

Office of the Secretary of Defense Base

Realignment and Closure Definitions

Receiving Base A base which receives missions, units or activities relocating from a

closing or realigning base. In cases where the base is both gaining and

losing missions, the base is a receiving base if it will experience a net

increase of DOD civilian personnel.

Mothball, Layaway Terms used when retention of facilities and real estate at a closing or

realigning base are necessary to meet the mobilization or contingency

needs of Defense. Bases or portions of bases “mothballed” will not be

excessed and disposed. It is possible they could be leased for interim

economic uses.

Inactivate,

Disestablish

Terms used to describe planned actions which directly affect missions,

units or activities. Fighter wings are inactivated, bases are closed.

Page 129 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Appendix II 

The Joint Cross-Service Groups’ Analytical

Process

Each cross-service group was composed of an executive group and one or

more working groups. Senior OSD officials served as the chairpersons of

each executive group. Representatives from each service and other DOD

officials were members. Decisions were made at the executive level, after

receiving input from the working groups. The cross-service groups

reported to the OSD steering and review groups, which provided oversight

and guidance (see ch. 3). Table II.1 lists the titles of the chairpersons of

each cross-service group.

Table II.1: Chairpersons of the Five

Functional Joint Cross-Service Groups Cross-service group Chairperson

Depot maintenance Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics

Test and evaluation Director, Test, Systems Engineering, and Evaluation

Director, Operational Test and Evaluation

Laboratories Director, Defense Research and Engineering

Medical treatment facilities Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs

Undergraduate pilot training Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness

The working groups were composed of technical experts from each of the

services and OSD. They drafted the cross-service groups’ data calls and

analyses plans, calculated the amount of excess capacity, ranked all the

activities under consideration, and prepared sets of alternative workload

transfers, closures, and realignments for consideration by the services. In

general, the executive groups approved products prepared by their

working groups.

The Cross-Service

Group Process

OSD defined the cross-service process in a BRAC 1995 policy and procedures

memorandum, dated January 7, 1994; an internal control plan for

managing cross-service opportunities, dated April 13, 1994; and policy

memorandum number two on the analysis process, dated November 23,

1994. The following is a description of the cross-service process in the

order that the steps were taken. Some steps were taken by the

cross-service groups; others were accomplished by the services. To ensure

accuracy, the DOD IG audited and reported on the cross-service groups’

data analyses, and the service audit agencies audited the data provided by

the services.

Data Collection Each cross-service group defined the functions that were candidates for

cross-service consolidation in the areas with which they dealt and the sites

that performed these functions. Unlike the services, which focused on

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Appendix II 

The Joint Cross-Service Groups’ Analytical

Process

bases or installations, the cross-service groups focused on functions that

were performed in two or more locations or by two or more services or

facilities with similar capabilities. Table II.2 shows the categories that each

group selected for analysis and the number of locations.

Table II.2: Categories for Analysis and

Locations Selected by the

Cross-Service Groups

Cross-service group Analysis categories Locations

Depot maintenance 57 commodities, such as

aircraft engines and landing

gear

24 depots

Test and evaluation Air vehicles, electronic

combat, and

armaments/weapons

23 activitiesa

Laboratories 29 functions, such as

avionics for fixed-wing air

vehicles

81 laboratories

Medical treatment facilities Number of operating beds 14 medical centers

86 hospitals

Undergraduate pilot training Undergraduate flying

training in 10 functional

groupings

12 installations for

fixed-wing aircraft, 2

installations for rotary-wing

aircraft

aUnlike the other cross-service groups, the test and evaluation group did not develop a list of

activity locations to be included in its study. Instead, the group charged the military services with

determining which of their facilities should be included. Twenty-three activities were included in

its final analysis.

Like the services, the cross-service groups developed data calls to obtain

information for their BRAC analyses. The cross-service groups submitted

their data calls to the services for distribution through regular BRAC

channels to the targeted activities in each service. Activities responded

following the same procedures they used in responding to the service data

calls. The services and their audit agencies monitored the data collection

phase.

Capacity Analysis Using data obtained in their data calls, the cross-service groups computed

the capacity of each site performing a specific function. Then they

compared the capacity with the projected workload to determine the

amount of excess capacity in each of the functional areas. The amount of

excess capacity depended on how much work was planned and the

measure of capacity employed. Table II.3 shows how much excess

capacity each group identified and how each measured capacity.

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Appendix II 

The Joint Cross-Service Groups’ Analytical

Process

Table II.3: Amount of Excess Capacity

and Methodology Used by Each

Cross-Service Group Cross-service group Amount of excess capacity

Methodology for measuring

excess capacity

Depot maintenance 40.1 million direct labor hours

(equal to 24,830 work years).

Fiscal year 1999 capacity

minus the core-funded work

loada for fiscal year 1999.

Test and evaluation 495,000 test hours. Peak annual work load

between fiscal year 1986 and

1993 minus projected work

load of .72 times the average

work load in fiscal years 1992

and 1993.

Laboratories 9,800 work years. Peak work years between

fiscal year 1986 and 1993,

minus the 1997 requirement,

minus 20 percent.

Medical treatment

facilities

1 medical center is excess,

and 2 medical centers and 13

hospitals should be realigned.

Acute care occupancy rate in

fiscal year 1994 for each

facility compared to the active

duty and family population it

serves within a 40-mile area

projected to 1998-99.

Undergraduate pilot

training

33 percent of available airfield

operations for fixed-wing

aircraft and 108 percent of

available ramp space for

rotary-wing aircraft.

The number of airfield

operations for fixed-wing and

ramp space availability for

rotary-wing aircraft needed to

train the number of students

required annually.

aThe logistics capability maintained for national defense by DOD activities (including personnel,

equipment, and facilities) to ensure the availability of a ready and controlled source of technical

competence and resources to provide an effective and timely response to a mobilization, national

defense contingency situations, and other emergency requirements.

The cross-service groups’ data calls, like those used by the services, were

also keyed to obtaining information related to the first four BRAC criteria

dealing with military value. The services used these same criteria in

completing the military value analyses of installations and facilities in their

basing categories. The cross-service groups used these criteria to assign a

functional value to each activity. Functional values represented the value

of performing each function at each site in comparison with all sites in a

given category.

Military Value Analysis The services computed the military value for each of their own activities

and provided this ranking to the cross-service groups. The services used

their own procedures to assign military value, and each was required to

present the results on a scale of one (least valuable) to three (most

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Appendix II 

The Joint Cross-Service Groups’ Analytical

Process

valuable). The Air Force ranked its activities in three tiers in lieu of

military value.

Configuration Analysis Combining the functional values developed by the cross-service groups

and the military values provided by the services, a linear program called

the optimization model was used to derive sets of alternatives for each

cross-service group. Other inputs to the model included total capacity,

capacity reduction goals, and the policy constraints defined by each group

and approved by the steering group. Table II.4 shows some of the policy

constraints employed by each cross-service group.

Table II.4: Examples of Policy

Constraints Employed by the

Cross-Service Groups

Cross-service group Policy constraint

Depot maintenance The Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force will each

retain at least one depot to perform essential

maintenance.

Test and evaluation DOD will retain irreplaceable air, land, and sea space that

will provide at least one sea range and land range and at

least one of each type of topography and climatology.

Laboratories None.

Medical treatment facilities Facilities will remain open if they are in an 

underserved primary care area, acute care beds in the

community are insufficient, or less than two accredited

acute care facilities are available.

Undergraduate pilot training There will be no helicopter training at sites with less than

two auxiliary fields.

The model identified options for moving workloads based on the criteria

the groups wanted to optimize. The model could provide suggested

workload transfers that would (1) minimize the number of sites,

(2) minimize the amount of excess capacity, (3) maximize the average

military value of all sites, or (4) maximize the average functional value of

all sites. A group could also direct variations that would, for example,

eliminate as much excess capacity as possible while maintaining an

average functional value at least as high as the original set of sites.

The cross-service groups evaluated the feasibility of the various sets of

alternatives for closures, realignments, and workload transfers. Then the

chairpersons provided what they considered to be the best sets of options

to the services for their consideration. Table II.5 summarizes the

alternatives that the groups submitted to the services.

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Appendix II 

The Joint Cross-Service Groups’ Analytical

Process

Table II.5: Alternatives the

Cross-Service Groups Sent to the

Services

Cross-service group Summary of alternatives

Depot maintenance Two options with some variations—both would close eight

depots, consolidate about 13 work loads at single sites

and others at two or more sites.

Test and evaluation Core alternatives: realign work load among five core

activities, which are part of the major range and test

facility base. Non-core alternatives: realign work load from

11 activities to core activities.

Laboratories Consolidate broad functional areas of work at major sites.

Transfer 72 functional life cycle work load.

Medical treatment facilities Close 1 medical center;

realign 2 medical centers and 13 hospitals.

Undergraduate pilot training Three options—close undergraduate pilot training at

three, four, or five installations.

Air Force, Army, and Navy responses to each cross-service group’s

proposals are summarized in chapters 4, 5, and 6, respectively.

Page 134 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Appendix III 

Cost of Base Realignment Actions Model

(COBRA)

The COBRA model uses a set of formulas, or algorithms, that rely on three

types of data elements in its calculations: base-specific data,

scenario-specific data, and standardized data. Base-specific data is applied

to all closure and realignment scenarios involving a given base. Examples

of base-specific data include base operating and family housing costs.

Scenario-specific data changes for each BRAC action and includes the

number of personnel positions to be eliminated or relocated and the

amount of required military construction. Standardized data elements—or

standard factors—are common to a class of bases and are applicable for

all scenarios that involve those bases. Some standard factors apply only to

one DOD component or a subset of a component’s bases, while others are

applicable to all bases DOD-wide. Average salaries and moving costs are

examples of standard factors used in the COBRA model.

Improvements to

Model Have Been

Made

The COBRA model has been used in the base closure process since 1988,

and in the intervening years it has been considerably revised to deal with

problems we and others identified after each BRAC round. Perhaps the

most significant change was conversion of the original LOTUS spreadsheet

version to PASCAL programming language prior to BRAC 1991. This change

prevented the model’s algorithms from being altered by anyone other than

the model’s programmers and better ensured consistent application of the

model. Another major revision allowed the user to enter costs and savings

unique to a specific base or scenario without deactivating the model’s

algorithms.

Refinements to the model are initiated and controlled by a COBRA Joint

Process Action Team (JPAT). The JPAT is comprised of representatives from

user organizations, including OSD.

Some of the more significant enhancements that affected COBRA’s ability in

BRAC 1995 to overcome weaknesses reported by us and others in BRAC 1993

are shown in table III.1.

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Appendix III 

Cost of Base Realignment Actions Model

(COBRA)

Table III.1: Some COBRA

Improvements Affecting BRAC 1995 BRAC 1993 shortcoming BRAC 1995 improvement

COBRA algorithms not independently

verified.

Key COBRA algorithms verified by Army

Audit Agency.

Inconsistency in cost data for certain factors. Greater emphasis on standardized cost

factors.

Unable to summarize cost and saving data

for multiple scenarios.

Cost and savings data for multiple

scenarios can be aggregated.

ROI year is understated by 1 year in an

output report.

Calculation of ROI year has been

corrected.

Inconsistent treatment of recurring costs

and savings.

All recurring costs and savings are

half-year in the year of the BRAC action,

except base operating support costs,

which are full-year and unique costs

entered by the user.

Time phasing of administrative planning and

support costs is evenly distributed.

Administrative planning and support costs

are phased according to the movement

and elimination of personnel.

Additional base operating support

personnel required at gaining bases are not

identified.

Model considers the impact of more base

operating support personnel.

Overhead savings for non-DOD salaried

personnel are not considered.

Overhead savings for non-DOD personnel

are considered.

Two of the more significant actions affecting BRAC 1995 are the validation

of the COBRA model and a greater emphasis on using standardized cost

factors.

Errors discovered in COBRA formulas during prior BRAC rounds, although

corrected, indicated a need for COBRA’s algorithms and programming to be

validated. Thus, in 1994, the Army Audit Agency agreed to examine

whether the COBRA model accurately calculated cost and savings estimates.

The audit agency tested four of the model’s algorithms against several of

the Army’s BRAC 1993 recommendations.1

 The Army Audit Agency

concluded that the COBRA model correctly calculated the cost and savings

estimates.

In earlier BRAC rounds, the DOD components frequently differed in the

values they assigned to COBRA standard factors. Thus, in an effort to

minimize differences in BRAC 1995 the JPAT agreed on common values for

36 standard factors, more than four times as many as in BRAC 1993.

1

Tests were run on four of the model’s algorithms: (1) military construction costs, (2) miscellaneous

recurring costs, (3) civilian salary savings, and (4) base operating support savings. These areas

represented 54 percent of the costs and 81 percent of the savings associated with the Army’s BRAC

1993 recommendations.

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Appendix III 

Cost of Base Realignment Actions Model

(COBRA)

Standardized factors introduced in BRAC 1995 included two large

areas—personnel and relocation costs. The remaining standard factors

were developed independently by the DOD components to account for

differences deemed too large to standardize, such as factors for

construction, the percentage of officers and enlisted personnel who are

married, and permanent change of station costs.

Page 137 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Appendix IV 

Bases Affected by the Secretary of Defense’s

February 28, 1995, Base Closure and

Realignment Recommendations

This appendix shows, by military service and DOD agency, the bases and

activities that would be affected by the Secretary of Defense’s

recommendations. Table IV.1 shows the major bases that were

recommended for closure; table IV.2 shows the major bases that were

affected by realignment recommendations; table IV.3 lists the smaller

bases and activities that were affected by closures, realignments, and

other actions; and table IV.4 lists the changes to previously approved BRAC

recommendations.

Table IV.1: Major Bases Recommended

for Closure Service/agency Base/installation/activity

Army Fort McClellan, Alabama

Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, Colorado

Price Support Center, Illinois

Savanna Army Depot Activity, Illinois

Fort Ritchie, Maryland

Selfridge Army Garrison, Michigan

Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, New Jersey

Seneca Army Depot, New York

Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania

Red River Army Depot, Texas

Fort Pickett, Virginia

Navy Naval Air Facility, Adak, Alaska

Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, California

Ship Repair Facility, Guam

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division,

 Indianapolis, Indiana

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division Detachment,

 Louisville, Kentucky

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division Detachment,

 White Oak, Maryland

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, Massachusetts

Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division,

 Lakehurst, New Jersey

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division,

 Warminster, Pennsylvania

Air Force North Highlands Air Guard Station, California

Ontario IAP Air Guard Station, California

Rome Laboratory, Rome, New York

Roslyn Air Guard Station, New York

Springfield-Beckley MAP, Air Guard Station, Ohio

Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station, Pennsylvania

Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, Texas

Brooks Air Force Base, Texas

Reese Air Force Base, Texas

Defense Logistics

Agency

Defense Distribution Depot, Memphis, Tennessee

Defense Distribution Depot, Ogden, Utah

Page 138 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Appendix IV 

Bases Affected by the Secretary of Defense’s

February 28, 1995, Base Closure and

Realignment Recommendations

Table IV.2: Major Bases Recommended

for Realignment Service/agency Base/installation/activity

Army Fort Greely, Alaska

Fort Hunter Liggett, California

Sierra Army Depot, California

Fort Meade, Maryland

Detroit Arsenal, Michigan

Fort Dix, New Jersey

Fort Hamilton, New York

Charles E. Kelly Support Center, Pennsylvania

Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania

Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico

Dugway Proving Ground, Utah

Fort Lee, Virginia

Navy Naval Air Station, Key West, Florida

Naval Activities, Guam

Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas

Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport,

Washington

Air Force McClellan Air Force Base, California

Onizuka Air Station, California

Eglin Air Force Base, Florida

Robins Air Force Base, Georgia

Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana

Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico

Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota

Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma

Kelly Air Force Base, Texas

Hill Air Force Base, Utah

Page 139 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Appendix IV 

Bases Affected by the Secretary of Defense’s

February 28, 1995, Base Closure and

Realignment Recommendations

Table IV.3: Smaller Bases and

Activities Recommended for Closure,

Realignment, Disestablishment, or

Relocation

Service Base/installation/activity

Army Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, California

East Fort Baker, California

Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, California

Stratford Army Engine Plant, Connecticut

Big Coppett Key, Florida

Concepts Analysis Agency, Marylanda

Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore, Maryland

Hingham Cohasset, Massachusetts

Sudbury Training Annex, Massachusetts

Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM), Missouria

Fort Missoula, Montana

Camp Kilmer, New Jersey

Caven Point Reserve Center, New Jersey

Camp Pedricktown, New Jersey

Bellmore Logistics Activity, New York

Fort Totten, New York

Recreation Center #2, Fayettville, North Carolina

Information Systems Software Command (ISSC), Virginiaa

Camp Bonneville, Washington

Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support

Activity (AMSA), West Virginia

(continued)

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Appendix IV 

Bases Affected by the Secretary of Defense’s

February 28, 1995, Base Closure and

Realignment Recommendations

Service Base/installation/activity

Navy Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance

 Center, In-Service Engineering, West Coast

 Division, San Diego, California

Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, California

Naval Personnel Research and Development Center,

 San Diego, California

Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair,

 USN, Long Beach, California

Naval Undersea Warfare Center-Newport Division,

 New London Detachment, New London, Connecticut

Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound

 Reference Detachment, Orlando, Florida

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Guam

Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, New Orleans, Louisiana

Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, Maryland

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division

 Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland

Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, Mississippi

Naval Aviation Engineering Support Unit,

 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Naval Air Technical Services Facility, 

 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division,

 Open Water Test Facility, Oreland, Pennsylvania

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center,

 RDT&E Division Detachment, Warminster, Pennsylvania

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Charleston, South Carolina

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance

 Center, In-Service Engineering East Coast

 Detachment, Norfolk, Virginia

Naval Information Systems Management Center,

 Arlington, Virginia

Naval Management Systems Support Office,

 Chesapeake, Virginia

Naval Reserve Centers at:

 Huntsville, Alabama

 Stockton, California

 Santa Ana, Irvine, California

 Pomona, California

 Cadillac, Michigan

 Staten Island, New York

 Laredo, Texas

 Sheboygan, Wisconsin

Naval Air Reserve Center, Olathe, Kansas

Naval Reserve Readiness Commands

 New Orleans, Louisiana (Region 10)

 Charleston, South Carolina (Region 7)

Air Force Moffett Federal Airfield AGS, California

Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer

Processor Activity, Buffalo, New York

Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation 

Simulator Activity, Fort Worth, Texas

(continued)

Page 141 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Appendix IV 

Bases Affected by the Secretary of Defense’s

February 28, 1995, Base Closure and

Realignment Recommendations

Service Base/installation/activity

Defense Logistics

Agency

Defense Contract Management District South, 

 Marietta, Georgia

Defense Contract Management Command

 International, Dayton, Ohio

Defense Distribution Depot, Columbus, Ohio

Defense Distribution Depot, Letterkenny,

 Pennsylvania

Defense Industrial Supply Center,

 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Defense Distribution Depot, Red River, Texas

Defense Investigative

Service

Investigations Control and Automation Directorate,

 Fort Holabird, Maryland

aThis is a leased facility.

Page 142 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Appendix IV 

Bases Affected by the Secretary of Defense’s

February 28, 1995, Base Closure and

Realignment Recommendations

Table IV.4: Changes to Previously

Approved BRAC Recommendations Service/agency Base/installation/activity

Army Army Bio-Medical Research Laboratory, Fort

 Detrick, Maryland

Navy Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California

Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, California

Naval Air Station, Alameda, California

Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, California

Naval Training Center, San Diego, California

Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, Florida

Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, Florida

Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center,

 Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida

Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida

Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam

Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii

Naval Air Facility, Detroit, Michigan

Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment,

 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia

Office of Naval Research, Arlington, Virginia

Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command,

 Arlington, Virginia

Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, D.C.

Naval Security Group Command Detachment

 Potomac, Washington, D.C.

Air Force Williams AFB, Arizona

Lowry AFB, Colorado

Homestead AFB, Florida (301st Rescue Squadron)

Homestead AFB, Florida (726th Air Control Squadron)

MacDill AFB, Florida

Griffiss AFB, New York (Airfield Support for

 10th Infantry (Light) Division)

Griffiss AFB, New York (485th Engineering 

 Installation Group)

Defense Logistics

Agency

Defense Contract Management District West,

 El Segundo, California

Page 143 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Appendix V 

Economic Impact Assessments

The economic impact on affected communities has been one of DOD’s eight

criteria for making base closure and realignment decisions in the current

and two previous BRAC rounds. DOD’s sensitivity to this issue has increased

with each succeeding round, as the cumulative impact of base

realignments and closures has increased. This has caused DOD to

strengthen its process for assessing potential economic impact. DOD also

placed greater emphasis on aggregating the impacts of tentative closure

decisions across the services for the 1995 round, as well as assessing the

cumulative impact of the current and prior BRAC rounds. Though not a

precise predictor of outcome, the methodology employed by OSD is

considered a reasonable use of existing tools of economic impact analysis.

Economic Impact

Analysis Has

Improved Over the

BRAC Rounds

The services and defense agencies have been required to assess the

economic impact of their recommendations for potential closure or

realignment in each of the recent BRAC rounds. Economic impact

assessments are intended to define the impact BRAC recommendations

could have on the affected community’s economy in terms of total

potential job change (direct and indirect). The assessments estimate

impact in absolute terms and as a percentage of employment in the

economic area. An affected economic area is generally defined as a

metropolitan statistical area (MSA) or non-MSA county(s), unless there is

evidence calling for some other definition.

Once the services and Defense agencies completed their economic impact

assessments, they were reported to OSD along with the BRAC

recommendations. OSD then considered economic impact from a DOD-wide

perspective. The extent to which either OSD or the services and Defense

agencies used the results of their analyses has varied in each BRAC round.

1991 Round In the 1991 BRAC process OSD guidance required the services to consider

the economic impact of proposed BRAC actions and report their impact

calculations, but it did not specify how this assessment was to be used in

the process. As a result, the services differed in the methods they

employed and the extent to which they examined economic impact.

However, economic impact was not a major factor for any of the services

in their decision-making processes in the 1991 round.

A separate assessment was done by OSD, using the Office of Economic

Adjustment (OEA) to calculate the full impacts of actions proposed by all

DOD components. The OEA methodology was derived with assistance from

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Appendix V 

Economic Impact Assessments

the Logistics Management Institute (LMI), which was retained for this

purpose. The methodology appeared sound, but we noted in our 1991

report that the definition of economic areas in some cases could have

overstated the potential impact. For example, if a county was identified as

the economic area of a given base and that county was rural, the impact

may have been overstated if the base drew employees from several

counties. Having completed an assessment of economic impact, OSD did

not use it to make any changes to the services’ proposed closures. The

cumulative impacts of the proposed 1991 actions were not considered

significant because of the limited number of BRAC actions up to that time.

1993 Round In 1993 OSD guidance to DOD components included how economic impact

analyses were to be conducted but, again, did not specify how such impact

was to be considered in the overall decision-making process. The DOD

components were mandated by OSD to use the approach developed by OEA

to calculate the direct and indirect employment impacts of a potential

closure or realignment. Impacts were to be expressed in terms of job

changes as a percentage of area employment. The issue of cumulative

impact became more important, because of the increased numbers of

recommendations. When OSD considered the estimated impact of all

proposed actions in 1993, they established a standard against which to

evaluate economic impact. Information from DOD components was

compiled into a master spreadsheet that calculated the cumulative effect

on an economic area of 1988, 1991, and recommended 1993 actions across

all services and DOD agencies. A job loss of 5 percent or greater in an area

with 500,000 or more jobs was determined by OSD to constitute the

standard for unacceptable economic impact.

OSD subsequently used economic impact to cancel proposed closure

actions affecting Sacramento, California, without explicitly addressing the

implications for military value. Alternative candidates were not proposed,

largely because DOD’s consideration of cumulative economic impact came

too late in the 1993 process, which made it difficult to assess alternative

closure and realignment scenarios.

In our 1993 report we expressed concern about the subjective method OSD

used to derive its threshold for determining unacceptable economic

impact and the basis for not considering those areas whose impact fell

close to that threshold. Further, there was no evidence to support OSD’s

assumption that economic recovery would be more difficult in a larger

metropolitan area than in a smaller one. In reviewing DOD’s proposed

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Appendix V 

Economic Impact Assessments

closures and realignments, the BRAC Commission also expressed concern

about how the economic impact criterion had been applied. Thus, the BRAC

Commission recommended to DOD that, in future, they state clearly that

cumulative economic impact alone would be insufficient cause for

removing a base from consideration without adequate military value

justification.

1995 Round On January 7, 1994, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established the Joint

Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact. This group was the vehicle

through which the methodology for calculating economic impact was

derived. The group was also responsible for the analysis of DOD component

recommendations in order to evaluate cumulative impacts. The issue of

cumulative economic impact was important once again. The cross-service

group was chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Installations and included members from the military departments and

OEA.

The cross-service group worked to refine the process of estimating

economic impact. Its principal function was developing and refining its

approach and ensuring that it would be standard across all DOD

components. Representation by all services on the cross-service group

greatly facilitated this.

As was the case in 1993, DOD retained LMI to provide technical assistance in

developing a methodology and a computer database for use in calculating

impacts by the DOD components and the cross-service group. The

cross-service group defined the geographic areas they would use in the

analysis process—in this case “economic areas.” If an installation was part

of an MSA, as defined by OMB, then the MSA was the economic area for

analysis purposes. The 1993 BRAC Commission recommended that DOD

clarify and standardize its geographic areas of measurement. In response,

DOD established a set of rules for assigning installations to economic areas

for BRAC 1995. For example, several MSAs were not appropriate for BRAC

purposes in that they did not reflect the locations where those affected by

BRAC actions live and work. Input from the BRAC offices of the military

services on the geographic location of the military and civilian personnel

associated with particular bases helped further define economic areas.

The database program developed by the cross-service group and LMI was

constructed using the most recent information available from official U.S.

government sources, such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics and from the

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Appendix V 

Economic Impact Assessments

DOD components. The resulting database was much larger than that used in

1993, providing a more comprehensive set of basic economic data more

closely associated with each individual economic area. The military

services provided basic information to the cross-service group for input to

the economic impact program. This input included such information as

installation functions, base personnel numbers, and base identification

codes. Each base or installation was linked in the database to background

and employment information as well as economic indicators necessary to

review economic impact.

The impact of a potential 1995 BRAC action, or actions, on an area is

measured in terms of direct and indirect job changes estimated for 1994

through 2001, expressed in absolute terms and as a percentage of the total

number of jobs in an economic area. Direct job changes are the estimated

net addition or loss of jobs for military personnel, DOD civilian employees,

and on-base contractors that work in support of the installation’s military

missions. Such changes are directly associated with base closures and

realignments. Indirect job changes are the estimated net addition or loss of

jobs in each affected economic area that could potentially occur as a

result of the estimated direct job changes. The cross-service group and LMI

developed multipliers as a means of gauging the effect of direct job

changes on surrounding communities. For example, in one area, each

civilian DOD job may be estimated to create or support 1.5 jobs in that area.

The numbers are different for each economic area. Such multipliers

essentially represent the expected purchasing level in the local economy

of military personnel, military trainees, and civilian DOD employees. When

multiplied by the number of people moving out of an economic area due to

a proposed closure, the resulting figure represents an estimated decrease

in the number of jobs in that area.

For purposes of deriving employment multipliers, DOD installations were

placed into two groups: (1) facilities performing specialized functions and

(2) all others. Military personnel, military trainees, and civilian DOD

personnel were assigned multipliers according to their expected level of

purchases in the local community. Multipliers for specialized installations

were higher than other installations due to the generally higher-skilled and

higher-paying positions associated with them. Specialized installations

were further classified as depots, research and development facilities, or

ammunition production facilities. Multipliers for the specialized functions

were based on the local economic activity patterns of industries that

perform similar functions. Multipliers also vary according to the size of the

local economy, with larger economic areas having larger multipliers. This

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Appendix V 

Economic Impact Assessments

is because, in small areas, a higher proportion of goods are imported into

the area. Using a statistical technique, the cross-service group developed

their multipliers based on actual Department of Commerce multipliers for

53 communities. The estimated values for the sample multipliers were

then adjusted upward so that the resulting multipliers would reduce the

likelihood that the process would underestimate the potential employment

effects of BRAC.

The cross-service group asked the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA),

Department of Commerce, to provide an independent review of its BRAC

1995 multiplier methodology. The BEA indicated that the cross-service

group methodology was sound and “consistent with good regional

economic impact estimation practices.” They also recognized that

economic impact calculated using the cross-service group multipliers

would be overstated.

Assessing economic impact in 1995 involved estimating the impact of each

recommendation on an economic area, the impact of all other BRAC 1995

recommendations on the same area, and the impact of previous BRAC

actions on that economic area. In this round, the military services were

also to include in their estimates of 1995 impacts the impacts of all

previous BRAC actions, including those of other DOD components. In

keeping with the recommendations of the 1993 BRAC Commission, OSD

stressed that the existence of economic impact on an area due to actions

in prior BRAC rounds or multiple 1995 recommendations would not, by

itself, cause a recommendation to be changed. Priority was to be placed,

once again, on military value in making decisions or reexamining

recommendations. OSD also stated that it would not establish threshold

values.

The impact of realized closures resulting from previous BRAC rounds was

based on consideration of historic economic data. These included changes

in unemployment rates and per capita personal income for each economic

area from 1984 through 1993. Historic economic data were obtained by the

cross-service group from the BEA and the Bureau of Labor Statistics and

were included in the database. These economic indicators provided an

indication of the current economic condition of each given area and recent

trends in that condition and were presumed to reflect the effects of

previous BRAC actions on local areas. When considered with potential job

changes from proposed 1995 actions, they were the principal means by

which the cumulative impact of proposed and past BRAC actions was

considered. Thus, an area containing bases closed in 1989 and 1992 and a

Page 148 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Appendix V 

Economic Impact Assessments

base recommended for closure in 1995 could be assessed through its 1984

through 1993 unemployment rates, change in employment levels, and

change in per capita personal income in order to put any estimated 1994

through 2001 employment impacts into perspective.

Once constructed, the database program was given to the services and DOD

agencies for their review. Each of the services and DOD agencies reviewed

the program and discussed any necessary changes with the cross-service

group. This process produced refinements in the program, which was

employed by every component in the BRAC process.

Economic Impact

Methodology Has

Limitations but Seems

Reasonable for BRAC

Purposes

As was the case in previous BRAC rounds, there are many types of models

and computer-assisted tools in use by the private sector and the

government that could be used to estimate the economic impact of base

closures to some degree. The methodology used by DOD in BRAC 1995 does

have some limitations in that it does not fully account for all impacts.

However, these limitations appear to be more than offset by other factors

that would overstate impact. One limitation in the program’s data for BRAC

1995 was that current data was not available on changes in military

employment levels after 1992. The data used represented the most recent

official U.S. government information available. Data for 1993 and 1994 was

still being compiled and analyzed during the BRAC 1995 DOD deliberative

process and was therefore unavailable. DOD was concerned about

abandoning its principle of relying on authoritative data by attempting to

project changes in employment data for the hundreds of economic areas

involved in BRAC 1995.

Additionally, the database does not develop economic multipliers

individually for each economic area. Using the BEA’s multiplier

development technique for the large number of economic areas involved

in the BRAC process would have been time-consuming and expensive. As

discussed earlier, DOD arrived at its multipliers by adjusting current

estimates upward. This essentially increased the multipliers for all

economic areas and resulted in overstatement of impacts from BRAC

actions.

The DOD database also does not consider factors that might offset local

impacts, such as the potential reemployment of separated employees in

other local area businesses, or possible civilian reuse of closed facilities.

Thus, DOD’s database is not the most accurate tool for predicting the

economic picture of areas that might experience a closure or realignment.

Page 149 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Appendix V 

Economic Impact Assessments

A more accurate tool would be much more complicated, employing more

community-specific information. While such a tool might be more

accurate, the DOD methodology’s relative simplicity and tendency to

overstate the employment impact on local areas seems reasonable for BRAC

purposes in terms of ensuring that the most severe potential impact is

considered. Also important to DOD’s estimation of economic impact is that

the use of the database applies a consistent analysis to all proposed

actions.

OSD’s methodology for assessing economic impact was reviewed by an

independent panel of six government, academic, and private sector

economic experts in May 1994 and was found to be sound. The panel

agreed that the use of direct and indirect job change was a reasonable way

to characterize the impact of proposed closures or realignments and that

DOD’s planned use of historic data would adequately capture the impacts of

previous BRAC actions. The reviewers noted that the methodology did not

account for any of the ameliorating factors local areas would experience,

such as land reutilization or reemployment associated with any economic

expansion occurring in the area. The reviewers concluded that since job

change multipliers were adjusted upward to avoid understating

employment impacts, the results of the analyses proposed by DOD would

represent a “worst-case” estimate of economic impact. It is important to

note that the impact analysis done for BRAC is not a method for precisely

predicting the economic events of areas that may experience a closure or

realignment. It considered only the effects of current BRAC actions in the

context of an areas historical economic condition, rather than taking into

consideration any mitigating factors.

In addition to the independent review discussed above, the DOD IG

performed an audit of a sample of the computer program’s data elements

in order to validate the multipliers and historic data in the program. This

audit revealed a small number of instances of data inaccuracy, none of

which affected subsequent economic impact calculations. It also revealed

an initial lack of documentation for the sources of certain important data

elements, such as unemployment figures. However, these issues were

satisfactorily resolved by the DOD IG, the cross-service group, and LMI.

Page 150 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Appendix V 

Economic Impact Assessments

DOD Components and

OSD Conducted

Economic Impact

Analyses

As the military services began to develop their closure/realignment

scenarios, they used the database program to compute the economic

impact of their component-unique scenarios. We found little

documentation indicating that DOD components eliminated potential

closure or realignment candidates from consideration for economic

impact reasons. The only exceptions appeared to be in the Navy, where

the Secretary of the Navy expressed his intent to minimize other closures

in California if he recommended the closure of the Long Beach NSY. This

prompted the Navy BSEC to keep several activities open that they were

prepared to recommend for closure (see ch. 3). The Navy also decided to

keep PWC Guam open, in part due to economic impact considerations.

Nevertheless, the BSEC believed sufficient customers will remain on Guam

to justify keeping the PWC open.

Once the services and DOD agencies submitted their recommendations to

the OSD, the cross-service group on economic impact collected and merged

the economic impact data files of each service and agency. The

cross-service group then calculated updated values for cumulative

economic impact to account for multiple BRAC 1995 actions from different

DOD components in the same economic areas. The chairman of the

cross-service group sent a memorandum to the services and defense

agencies requesting that they review their recommendations for those

installations located in areas with multiple BRAC 1995 actions. The services

and defense agencies reviewed their recommendations in light of the

updated cumulative economic impact values and the other seven criteria.

None decided to change its recommendations. In examining the

cumulative impact data, OSD also determined that no changes were

required in the components’ recommended closures and realignments.

Page 151 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Barry W. Holman, Project Director

Claude T. Adrien

Marian Harvey Bennett

David F. Combs

Raymond C. Cooksey

Julia C. Denman

Raymond H. Denmark

Stephen G. Desart

Joseph W. Kirschbaum

Andrew G. Marek

Charles W. Perdue

Kevin B. Perkins

William E. Petrick

Robert R. Poetta

Marjorie L. Pratt

Nancy L. Ragsdale

Marc J. Schwartz

Jacqueline E. Snead

Jacob W. Sprouse, Jr.

Celia J. Thomas

Atlanta Regional

Office

John M. Ortiz

Bobby R. Worrell

Cincinnati Regional

Office

Frank Lawson

Dallas Regional Office Larry J. Junek

Enemencio S. Sanchez

Cleofas Zapata, Jr.

Los Angeles Regional

Office

Thaddeus S. Rytel

San Francisco

Regional Office

Floyd J. Adkins

John P. Kennedy

Page 152 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to This Report

Health and Human

Services Division

Stephen P. Backhus

Timothy E. Hall

(709059) Page 153 GAO/NSIAD-95-133 Military Bases
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