United States General Accounting Office

GAO Briefing Report to Congressional

Committees

February 1995 PEACE OPERATIONS

Information on U.S.

and U.N. Activities

GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-260417 

February 13, 1995

Congressional Committees

This report provides information drawn from the work we have done on

peace operations at the request of various Committees and individual

Members of Congress. It covers (1) the cost and funding of peace

operations, (2) the effectiveness of United Nations (U.N.) operations,

(3) U.S. policy and efforts to strengthen U.N. capabilities, and (4) the

impact of peace operations on the U.S. military. On February 3, 1995, we

briefed staff from multiple Committees on these issues.

In reviewing issues concerning U.N. and U.S. peace operations over the

past several years, we have done extensive work in the United States and

at various peace operation locales, including Bosnia, Cambodia, and

Northern Iraq. We spoke with U.N. officials at these operations and with

representatives of the warring parties. We have also discussed peace

operations extensively with officials throughout the U.S. government,

including the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State, the

United Nations, private organizations, and U.S. military units that have

participated in peace operations. Finally, we have reviewed U.S.

government, U.N, and private organization reports and documents

concerning peace operations. A list of issued GAO products related to

peace operations is at the back of this report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and

State and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also

be made available to others upon request.

The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix I. If you or

your staff have any questions about this report, please call Richard Davis,

Director, National Security Analysis Issues, on (202) 512-3504 regarding

DOD aspects of peace operations and Joseph Kelley, Director-in-Charge,

International Affairs Issues, on (202) 512-4128 regarding the Department of

State and U.N. aspects.

Henry L. Hinton, Jr.

Assistant Comptroller General

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
B-260417 

List of Committees

The Honorable Jesse Helms

Chairman

The Honorable Claiborne Pell

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Sam Nunn

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Pete V. Domenici

Chairman

The Honorable J. James Exon

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on the Budget

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Benjamin Gilman

Chairman

The Honorable Lee Hamilton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
B-260417 

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable John R. Kasich

Chairman

The Honorable Martin Olav Sabo

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on the Budget

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Contents

Letter 1

Briefing Section I 

Background

6

Types of Operations 6

U.S. Policy Framework 8

U.N.-Led Operations 10

Non U.N.-Led Operations 12

Briefing Section II 

Cost and Funding

14

What Kind of Costs Are Involved? 14

Who Incurs Costs? 16

How Are Peace Operations Funded? 18

U.N. Pays Some U.S. Costs 20

Briefing Section III 

Effectiveness of U.N.

Operations

22

Findings 22

Findings 24

Briefing Section IV 

U.S. Policy and

Response

26

PDD-25 26

U.S. Actions to Strengthen U.N. Capacity 28

U.N. Reform Efforts 30

Briefing Section V 

U.S. Military

Participation

32

Participating U. S. Forces 32

Impact on U.S. Forces 34

Impact on Regional Conflicts 36

Appendix I 

Major Contributors to

This Report

38

Related GAO Products 40

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Contents

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

MRC major regional conflict

MFO Multinational Force Observers

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force

UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

Types of Operations

• Peace operations 

Preventive deployment

Peacekeeping

Peace enforcement 

• Humanitarian operations

Execution of operations

• U.N.-led

• Non-U.N.-led but U.N.-authorized 

• Independent of U.N.

Peace operations use military assets to help maintain or restore

international peace. Peace operations cover three types of

actions—preventive deployment, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.

Preventive deployment is defined as the use of military assets to prevent

conflict from breaking out. An example of preventive deployment is

Operation Able Sentry, where U.S. troops are stationed in Macedonia to

deter fighting from spreading into that country from the former

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

Yugoslavia. Peacekeeping is a military operation designed to monitor and

facilitate implementation of a cease-fire or other similar agreement.

Peacekeeping is undertaken with the consent of all major parties to the

dispute. Both preventive deployment and peacekeeping are authorized

under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, which specifies peaceful means to

resolve disputes.

Peace enforcement is the use of military force or the threat of force to

compel countries to comply with international sanctions designed to

maintain or restore peace and order. Peace enforcement, such as the

operation in Somalia, is authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,

which specifies forceful action to deal with international crises.

Humanitarian operations involve the use of military assets to relieve

human misery and suffering. Humanitarian operations, such as DOD’s

Operation Support Hope in Rwanda, do not attempt to directly resolve

disputes or support a peace settlement.

These operations can be U.N.-led, that is, planned, paid for, and

implemented by the United Nations. They can also be authorized by the

U.N. Security Council and thus U.N.-sanctioned, but without U.N.

participation, such as the U.S.-led coalition in Haiti. Or they may be

completely independent of U.N. sanction or participation, such as the

Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

U.S. Policy Framework

• U.N. Participation Act of 1945, 

as amended

• Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 

FY 1994 and 1995

• PDD-25

• National Security Revitalization 

Act/Peace Powers Act (Proposed) 

Two acts of Congress and Presidential Decision Directive 25

(PDD-25) provide a basis for U.S. participation in U.N. peace operations.

The U.N. Participation Act of 1945, as amended, states that a maximum of

1,000 U.S. armed forces personnel can be detailed to the United Nations in

noncombat roles to help peacefully resolve disputes. The act also

authorizes the President to negotiate agreements with the Security

Council, subject to the approval of Congress, to provide armed forces to

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

the United Nations acting under Chapter VII to maintain international

peace and security.

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995

limits appropriations for the U.S.-assessed contribution for U.N.

peacekeeping to 25 percent of the operations’ costs, as of fiscal year 1996.1

 It further requires the President to consult with Congress each month on

the status of U.N. peacekeeping operations, provide quarterly and annual

reports on peacekeeping, and notify Congress 15 days prior to providing

assistance to the United Nations for peacekeeping.

PDD-25, issued by the President in May 1994, sets U.S. policy regarding

U.S. participation in peace operations. It sets forth factors the United

States will consider before deciding to participate in peace operations and

states that U.S. troops will not be placed under U.N. command, but may be

placed under U.N. operational control for a prescribed operation.

On January 4, 1995, the National Security Revitalization Act (HR7) was

introduced in the House of Representatives, and the Peace Powers Act

(S5) was introduced in the Senate of the United States. This legislation, if

enacted, would build on the existing policy framework. It would clarify

certain reporting requirements, require the President to certify that placing

U.S. troops under the command or operational control of a U.N.

commander is necessary to protect U.S. security interests, and provide a

credit against the U.S. peacekeeping assessment for certain DOD

expenditures in support of U.N. Security Council resolutions.

1

Currently the U.S. peacekeeping assessment is 31.7 percent of peacekeeping costs, but the United

States pays 30.4 percent, reflecting an informal agreement.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

GAO U.N.-Led Operations

 Missions

Peacekeeping 13

Enforcement 4 

 

U.N. peacekeeping troops 64,000

Range of troops 17 to 40,000

 

 

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

As of February 1995, there were 17 active U.N.-led peace operations.

Thirteen were peacekeeping operations and four authorized the use of

force. A total of 64,000 U.N. troops, police, and military observers were

assigned to these 17 missions. Seventeen of these personnel were

deployed to the U.N. Observer Mission in Tajikistan, and 40,000 were

deployed to the U.N. Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

GAO Non-U.N.-Led Operations

 Missions U.S. participation

U.N. authorized 1O Angola, Bosnia, 

 Cambodia, Haiti, 

 N. Iraq, Rwanda,

 Southwest Asia, Somalia

Independent of 

U.N. 3 MFO (Sinai)

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

At the end of 1994, there were 13 non-U.N.-led peace operations. Ten

operations were undertaken in support of U.N. Security Council

resolutions; of those, the United States participated in eight. The two

operations the United States did not participate in were the South

Ossetia-Georgia Force and the CIS Collective Force in Tajikistan, both in

the former Soviet Union. Three operations were independent of the United

Nations—the Multinational Force Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, the

Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring

Group, and the Moldova Force. The United States participates only in the

MFO.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Cost and Funding

What Kind of Costs Are Involved?

• Incremental 

DOD reports only incremental costs

• Total

Two broad cost categories are associated with peace

operations—incremental and total. DOD reports the incremental costs of its

participation in peace operations. As defined by the Omnibus Budget

Reconciliation Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508) for use during Operation Desert

Shield/Storm, incremental costs are those costs that would not have been

incurred except for the operation. DOD is still using this definition.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Cost and Funding

We have reported that when considering the cost of operations it should

be recognized that DOD’s financial systems cannot reliably determine costs.

The services do not have the systems in place to capture actual

incremental costs. Only the total obligations are captured by the

accounting systems. The services use various management information

systems to identify incremental obligations and to estimate costs.

Obligational data are generated by individual military units that report

them up the chain of command. In our work on several operations, a

limited review of obligations documents showed that these actions were

directly related to the operation.

Total costs are difficult to quantify because many assumptions have to be

made concerning the allocation of costs. For example, the Marine Corps

brought equipment to Somalia valued at almost $100 million. This

equipment was purchased over a period of years and has a long useful life.

To determine total costs DOD would have to decide how much of the value

of that equipment to charge against the operation.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Cost and Funding

Who Incurs Costs?

• DOD—logistics, transportation, 

troops

• State Department—U.N. 

peacekeeping assessments,

refugee assistance

• USAID—humanitarian aid

• Other agencies

DOD, the Department of State, the Agency for International Development,

and a host of other agencies—including the Departments of Agriculture,

Commerce, Health and Human Services, Justice, Transportation, and the

Treasury—have participated to some extent in peace operations.

Of these agencies, DOD has the most incremental costs for peace

operations. For fiscal year 1994, it reported incremental costs of $1.9

billion. The most costly operations were those in Somalia ($528 million),

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Cost and Funding

Haiti ($371 million), and in and around Iraq ($425 million). For fiscal year

1995, DOD estimates that it will incur incremental costs of $2.6 billion for

all contingency operations, including operations in Haiti ($592 million), in

and around Iraq ($579 million), and Bosnia ($312 million). Our preliminary

estimate is that peace operations-related incremental costs are about

$2.1 billion of that amount. The remainder, which we have not

characterized as a peace operation, is associated with Operation Vigilant

Warrior, the U.S. response to Iraqi troop movements near the Kuwait

border. DOD incurs incremental costs to transport troops, equipment, and

supplies and to sustain the military forces in the field, among other things.

The Department of State has the next highest amount for peace

operations. The bulk of State’s costs are for the U.S. share of U.N.

peacekeeping assessments. In fiscal year 1994, the State Department paid

$1.1 billion towards the U.S. assessed contribution for peacekeeping. State

also incurs costs for additional voluntary peace operation contributions

and for refugee programs.

The Agency for International Development’s costs for humanitarian aid

exceed $100 million. Other agencies’ costs range from several hundred

thousand to several million dollars, some of which are reimbursed by DOD

or State. At the request of the House Budget Committee, we are developing

data on estimated fiscal year 1995 costs for all U.S. agencies participating

in peace operations.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Cost and Funding

How Are Peace Operations Funded?

• State, AID, Agriculture use annual 

appropriations

• DOD uses different funding 

mechanisms

• Emergency supplemental 

appropriations sometimes provided

Most agencies budget for and receive annual appropriations to fund their

participation in peace operations. Each year, the Congress appropriates

funds for the State Department for the anticipated U.S. share of

assessments for U.N. peace operations, for U.S. voluntary contributions

for U.N. operations, and for refugee programs. The Congress has also at

times provided emergency supplemental appropriations for the State

Department to cover unanticipated U.N. peacekeeping assessments. The

U.S. Agency for International Development receives annual appropriations

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Cost and Funding

for humanitarian aid, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture receives

annual appropriations for food programs, as authorized by P.L. 480.

DOD does not budget for the cost of military operations or contingencies. It

budgets to be ready to conduct such operations. When the services have to

conduct these operations, the planned budget execution cycle is

necessarily disrupted. DOD must then absorb the costs of these operations

within its existing appropriation or seek supplemental appropriations.

DOD has funded operations in different ways. In fiscal year 1993, to pay for

the cost of operations in Somalia, DOD asked for and received a

supplemental that reprogrammed $750 million from other areas within its

budget but provided no new funds. In fiscal year 1994, DOD received two

emergency supplementals: one for $1.2 billion in February 1994 and one

for $299 million in September 1994. These supplementals covered most of

DOD’s incremental costs for peace operations; the remainder of the costs

were absorbed within its existing appropriations. DOD recently requested a

$2.6 billion emergency supplemental to cover estimated costs for fiscal

year 1995.

The way peace operations are funded has important implications. If the

funds come from existing appropriations, spending plans are disrupted

because funding for other planned activities has to be reduced. Additional

resources received through supplemental legislation would not have this

same impact, but such legislation could be subject to the discretionary

spending limits of the Budget Enforcement Act unless designated as

emergency funding. If emergency supplemental legislation appropriates

additional resources to fund an operation, the budget deficit will increase,

since emergency appropriations cause an increase in the spending caps

established by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 for that fiscal year. If

additional resources are appropriated but not marked as emergency, they

would be subject to the discretionary spending limits in the Budget

Enforcement Act, which could mean that the amount of budget authority

available for other discretionary spending could be reduced.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Cost and Funding

U.N. Pays Some U.S. Costs

• DOD supplies goods and services

at U.N. request; U.N. pays DOD

• U.N. reimburses DOD for troops 

and equipment only if under U.N.

command

For peace operations, the United Nations needs to fill planned and

unexpected requirements for equipment and services. To do this, the

United Nations uses Letters of Assist, specific agreements that define a

requirement, the delivery and payment terms, and other necessary

information. DOD has provided the United Nations such items as armored

personnel carriers, maps, and transport services through these agreements

and has been reimbursed for this support. U.S. support provided through

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section II 

Cost and Funding

these agreements is authorized by section 607 of the Foreign Assistance

Act.

In return for participating in specific U.N.-led peace operations, the United

Nations reimburses member nations for the costs they incur when fielding

troops and equipment. The United Nations uses a fixed rate of payment for

all troops serving in U.N.-led operations. These rates are $988 per person

per month for regular infantry, $1,279 per person per month for specialists,

and an additional $70 per person per month for wear and tear on personal

clothing, gear, and weapon. The United Nations also reimburses member

nations for the value of the equipment participating troops are requested

to bring with them to the operation.

The United States will not be reimbursed for the deployment of troops and

equipment to an operation that is not U.N.-led. For example, during the

U.N. operation in Somalia, DOD provided 2,900 logistics troops to the U.N.

force. DOD also had about 1,100 troops under U.S. command in Somalia as

a quick reaction force to assist U.N. troops. The United Nations

reimbursed DOD for the 2,900 logistics troops and their equipment, but not

for the 1,100 combat troops in the quick reaction force.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section III 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

Findings

• Limited effectiveness in

Complex missions

Peace enforcement

• Structural limits 

Leadership

Command and control

Deployment/personnel

The United Nations has had limited effectiveness carrying out complex

missions such as the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and

operations that entail the use of force, such as the U.N. Protection Force

(UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and U.N. Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM).2

 In

Cambodia, for example, UNTAC held a successful election, but national

reconciliation was fragile because the force did not disarm the

2

Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness of U.N. Operations in Bosnia (April 13, 1994, NSIAD

94-156BR); U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions (December 29, 1993,

NSIAD 93-15)

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section III 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

combatants, ensure human rights were respected, or ensure that the

government acted impartially. In Bosnia, U.N. operations fell short of

carrying out many objectives. Aid convoys were delayed and obstructed

on a daily basis. In the safe areas, human rights were violated and many

civilians were killed.

These operations took place in hostile environments. However, several

weaknesses of the United Nations limit its ability to effectively undertake

such large and ambitious operations. These include weaknesses in

leadership, command and control, and logistics. In Bosnia, for example,

weaknesses in overall leadership and coordination hindered consistent

assertive action to deliver aid and protect Bosnians. The operation lacked

central authority to set policies and integrate humanitarian objectives with

supporting military activities. All three operations illustrate the limits in

U.N. command and coordination. There was limited coordination of

military and civilian activities in UNTAC, partly due to fragmentation in

planning. UNTAC’s large multinational force carried out orders

inconsistently. In UNOSOM II, command and control sometimes broke down

during operations and troop contingents carried out actions independently

of U.N. command. In Bosnia, command and control problems prevented

UNPROFOR from deploying troop contingents to areas where assistance was

desperately needed.

The United Nations is ill-equipped to plan, logistically support, and deploy

personnel to large missions. For example, operational plans for UNTAC

were not fully prepared before deployment, supplies and equipment

arrived long after deployment, and military and civilian peacekeepers were

late in deploying for both UNTAC and UNOSOM II.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section III 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

Findings

• More effective at

Observation/monitoring

Facilitating elections

Coordinating multinational action

• Enabling factors

Limited scope

Standardized approach

The United Nations has effectively observed and monitored peace

processes, supervised elections, and authorized multilateral action. U.N.

operations monitor cease-fires in such locations as the Arab-Israeli border

following the war of 1948; Cyprus; and Liberia. And U.N. military

observers work unarmed in the former Yugoslavia and Liberia. In

Cambodia, UNTAC conducted over 1,000 investigations of cease-fire

violations. The United Nations has also supervised elections in Angola,

Cambodia, and Mozambique. In Cambodia, the U.N. electoral unit

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section III 

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

organized a nationwide voter education campaign, registered nearly

5 million Cambodians, and supervised a staff of over 50,000 during the

election. The U.N. Security Council also authorizes multinational actions

to address international disputes. Multinational coalitions for Somalia,

Haiti, and Desert Storm in Iraq were authorized by the U.N. Security

Council.

Several factors enable the United Nations to carry out these actions. First,

the actions are limited in scope. Observation and monitoring, for example,

involves reporting on the situation through on-the-ground visual

inspection. Some observer missions have used as few as 17 personnel.

Elections are usually one component of a larger operation, and the

objective is clear—hold the election. Standard approaches are also used in

conducting these actions. The primary action of over 15 U.N. peace

operations has been the observation and monitoring of cease-fires, dating

back to the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in 1948. Elections are

supported by the electoral unit, which specializes in planning elections.

For Cambodia, the electoral unit wrote a plan for developing electoral

laws, registering voters, and administering the election. The plan,

completed 18 months prior to the election, provided the blueprint used for

the election.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section IV 

U.S. Policy and Response

PDD-25

• Sets factors considered for U.S. 

approval and participation

• Provides for shared responsibility

• Strengthens U.N. capacity

PDD-25 provides policy guidance for U.S. support of and involvement in

peace operations. This guidance outlines factors to be considered by the

United States before deciding to participate or support a new U.N. peace

operation or renewing long-standing peace operations. Under the policy,

the United States participates in peace operations that are in the national

interest. Other factors to be considered include whether missions have

clear objectives, adequate financing, and an end date for involvement of

U.S. troops. As part of our ongoing review of the effectiveness of peace

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section IV 

U.S. Policy and Response

operations, we are focusing on the impact of PDD-25. Before the President

approved the directive in May 1994, elements of it were considered in

deciding to participate in earlier peace operations. But the first full

implementation of PDD-25 was in Rwanda. Our evaluation of the decision

to participate in Rwanda indicated that the U.S. agencies closely

scrutinized operations against the factors outlined in PDD-25 before

committing to support the mission.

In addition to providing guidance, the directive calls for strengthening the

U.N. capacity to manage peace missions. Our past reports on Somalia and

Cambodia, for example, have detailed deficiencies in logistics,

deployment, and staffing that need to be corrected.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section IV 

U.S. Policy and Response

U.S. Action to Strengthen U.N. 

Capacity

• DOD planners detailed 

• Logistics staff provided 

• Interagency task forces established

PDD-25 recommends steps to improve the capabilities of the U.N.

Department of Peacekeeping Operations and thus provide for effective

and efficient peace operations. U.S. agencies have assisted in making these

improvements. For example, DOD has detailed military officers, sealift and

airlift planners, and budget experts to U.N. headquarters to improve

planning and preparation for new and ongoing operations. The Joint Staff

sponsored a logistics working group comprised of 10 U.S. military logistics

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section IV 

U.S. Policy and Response

experts who produced a manual of recommendations for further

enhancement of logistics operations at the United Nations.

In May 1994, DOD commissioned the Defense Information Systems to study

the communication and information needs of the U.N. Department of

Peacekeeping Operations. The study recommends the establishment of a

modern communications architecture that will allow the United Nations to

save money on communications costs, to capture data—financial, military

or other—at any point from the field to the headquarters, and to integrate

its communication with systems used by the United States and other

nations that contribute to peacekeeping operations.

In addition to the support provided in the areas above, U.S. interagency

working groups have been closely monitoring and developing strategies to

improve ongoing U.N. operations.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section IV 

U.S. Policy and Response

U.N. Reform Efforts

• Security Council involvement 

enhanced

• Planning division strengthened

• New logistics base planned

• Situtation center operational

• Intelligence architecture set up

The United Nations has instituted or is implementing a number of reforms.

Many of these reforms were a direct result of U.S efforts to strengthen the

U.N. capacity to manage peace operations. For example, as a result of

PDD-25, the U.N. Security Council is more closely reviewing its decisions to

enter into international crises and has adopted many of the same PDD-25

factors for consideration before making a decision.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section IV 

U.S. Policy and Response

The United Nations has also begun strengthening its planning capability.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations created a separate planning

unit, now headed by a Major General from a member state, and obtained

additional staff. The planning unit prepares plans for individual missions,

civilian police, and demining and intends to provide peacekeeping training.

Our ongoing work will report on the results of the planning unit.

The U.N. reforms include the establishment of a new logistics center to be

established in Brindisi, Italy, where materials and equipment left over from

previous peace missions, such as those in El Salvador and Cambodia, will

be refurbished and reused. Also, in March 1994, a 24-hour Situation Center

was created. During a visit, we noted that the center quickly provides

up-to-date information on troop locations and bottlenecks in the delivery

of humanitarian assistance. However, compared to similar DOD activities,

preciseness was lacking in some areas.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section V 

U.S. Military Participation

Participating U.S. Forces

• Tactical and airlift aircraft

• Carrier and amphibious forces

• Infantry/mechanized infantry

• Military police

• Special operations forces,

logistics, and C3I

U.S. military forces have participated in peace operations for almost 50

years, with limited numbers of personnel. However, as the number, size,

and scope of peace operations have increased in the past several years, the

nature and extent of U.S. participation have changed markedly. Recently,

the United States has used much larger numbers of combat and support

forces to respond to events in a number of locations.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section V 

U.S. Military Participation

U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps tactical aircraft have provided a

variety of capabilities to peace operations, such as suppression of enemy

air defenses, close air support, air-to-ground weapons delivery,

surveillance, reconnaissance, and command and control. Forces providing

such capabilities have participated in operations such as Deny Flight

(Bosnia), Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq), and Southern Watch (Southern

Iraq). Air Force C-130 and C-141 airlift aircraft have delivered

humanitarian relief for operations such as Provide Promise (Bosnia) and

Support Hope (Rwanda).

Navy Carrier Battle Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units/Amphibious

Ready Groups are the naval units of choice for peace operations. They

include an array of multipurpose, forward-deployed forces, including

aircraft carriers and supporting airwings, surface combatants, amphibious

ships, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft. Naval forces have

supported peace and humanitarian operations off the coast of Somalia, the

former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Haiti, and Cuba.

Forces from the Army’s 10th Mountain Division, 25th Infantry Division,

24th Mechanized Infantry Division, 3rd Infantry Division, and 1st Armored

Division have participated in peace operations such as Restore and

Continue Hope (Somalia), Able Sentry (Macedonia), and Uphold

Democracy (Haiti).

Peace operations tend to rely heavily on support forces. Military police,

special operations, logistics, and command, control, and communications

forces from all the services have provided unique capabilities for peace

operations. Few other nations have this range of capabilities, and these

U.S. forces have been used extensively in most peace operations in which

the United States has participated.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section V 

U.S. Military Participation

Impact on U.S. Forces

• Strain on certain support forces 

and specialized capabilities

• Increased operational tempo and 

consecutive deployments

• Reduced combat training time

• Increased reliance on reserves

Peace operations have stressed certain key military capabilities, few of

which are in the active component. These include (1) certain Army

support forces, such as quartermaster, transportation, engineering, and

special operations units, and (2) Air Force specialized aircraft, such as the

EC-130E Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center, the E-3

Airborne Warning and Control System, and the F-4G Wild Weasel, which is

used for lethal suppression of enemy radars. These forces are being used

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section V 

U.S. Military Participation

in an increasing number of peace operations, most of which have required

a sustained presence.

Peace operations have provided U.S. military forces with valuable

experience, for example, in joint and coalition operations. For some units,

these operations provide excellent training in the same missions they

would perform in a war. However, the increased number of these

operations and their extended nature have resulted in (1) an increased

number of days spent away from home bases exceeding recommended

standards; (2) consecutive deployments; (3) missed training; (4) increased

maintenance on systems and equipment; and (5) cannibalization of

aircraft.

Because of the increasing number of peace operations, aircrews

associated with certain specialized aircraft are exceeding the 120-day

maximum time on temporary duty recommended by the Air Force’s Air

Combat Command. For example, personnel assigned to the only F-4G

squadron in the active component averaged approximately 145 days on

temporary duty in 1994, and some individuals exceeded 180 days.

The extent to which a unit’s combat capabilities are affected by

participating in peace operations depends on several factors, including the

length of participation and the mission performed. According to Air Force

and Navy officials, aircrews can lose proficiency in some combat skills

through prolonged participation in peace operations because the missions

may not require the entire breadth of combat capabilities. Skills not

practiced could include, for example, night and low-level flight operations,

night intercept maneuvers, and other air combat maneuvers.

To cope with the increased tempo of operations, the military has relied on

and most likely will continue to rely on reserve forces, primarily

volunteers. In some cases, reserves have been needed to meet mission

requirements that active forces were unable to fulfill. In other cases,

reserve volunteers have provided operational relief to active forces that

had been continuously participating in these operations.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section V 

U.S. Military Participation

Impact on Regional Conflicts

• U.S. participation could impede 

timely response to regional 

conflicts

• Certain forces designated for

peace operations would be needed 

in a regional conflict

• Disengagement and redeploymnet 

could be difficult

Extended participation in multiple and/or large-scale peace operations

could impact the ability of some forces to respond in a timely manner to

major regional conflicts (MRC). This is because certain active component

support units and specialized Air Force aircraft used for these operations

would also be needed initially in an MRC. Contrary to the DOD bottom-up

review’s assumption, it could be difficult to quickly disengage these assets

from a peace operation and redeploy them to an MRC.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Briefing Section V 

U.S. Military Participation

First, some of the forces needed in the early days of an MRC, such as port

handlers, air and sea movement control personnel, and petroleum

handlers, would also be needed to facilitate a redeployment from the

peace operation. During the Somalia peace operation, for example, the

Army used 100 percent of some of the contingency forces that would be

needed in the first 30 days of an MRC. Had an MRC begun then, immediate

access to reserve component forces would have been necessary. The Army

recognizes this challenge and is addressing the issue as part of the ongoing

Total Army Analysis 2003.

Second, airlift assets would have to pick up personnel and equipment from

the peace operation. Redeployment of ground personnel and equipment

from a peace operation could be difficult because the already limited

number of airlift assets flying from the United States to the MRC would

have to be provided to pick up personnel and equipment from the peace

operation.

Finally, some of the forces would need training, supplies, and equipment

before deploying to an MRC. For example, once 10th Mountain Division

personnel returned from Somalia, it took approximately 3 to 6 months to

bring some units’ skills back to a level acceptable for combat operations,

according to Division officials. The extensive use of certain equipment,

combined with the effects of harsh environments in certain peace

operations, has required that the equipment undergo extensive

maintenance before it can be used again. Also, equipment and supplies

off-loaded from prepositioned ships for use in a peace operation, as was

the case in Somalia, would not be immediately available for use in an MRC.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Appendix I 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division

Ann Borseth

Joseph C. Brown

Elizabeth Guran

Zina Jones

Julio A. Luna

Tet Miyabara

Joseph F. Murray

Lisa M. Quinn

Nancy Ragsdale

Leroy Richardson

Steven H. Sternlieb

Office of General

Counsel

Raymond J. Wyrsch

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
Related GAO Products

United Nations: How Assessed Contributions for Peacekeeping Operations

Are Calculated (GAO/NSIAD-94-206, Aug. 1, 1994). Contact: Tet Miyabara

(512-8974).

Peace Operations: Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Somalia

(GAO/NSIAD-94-175, June 9, 1994). Contact: Steve Sternlieb (512-4534).

DOD Budget: Analysis of Options for Funding Contingency Operations

(GAO/NSIAD-94-152BR, Apr. 26, 1994). Contact: Steve Sternlieb (512-4534).

Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness of U.N. Operations in Bosnia

(GAO/NSIAD-94-156BR, Apr. 13, 1994). Contact: Tet Miyabara (512-8974).

Peace Operations: Cost of DOD Operations in Somalia (GAO/NSIAD-94-88,

Mar. 4, 1994). Contact: Steve Sternlieb (512-4534).

U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions

(GAO/NSIAD-94-9, Dec. 19, 1993). Contact: Tet Miyabara (512-8974).

Haiti: Costs of U.S. Programs and Activities Since the 1991 Military Coup

(GAO/NSIAD-93-252FS, Aug. 6, 1993). Contact: Dave Martin (512-8979).

U.N. Peacekeeping: Observations on Mandates and Operational Capability

(GAO/T-NSIAD-93-15, June 9, 1993). Contact: Tet Miyabara (512-8974).

Serbia-Montenegro: Implementation of U.N. Economic Sanctions

(GAO/NSIAD-93-174, Apr. 22, 1993). Contact: Dave Martin (512-8979).

United Nations: U.S. Participation in Peacekeeping Operations

(GAO/NSIAD-92-247, Sept. 9, 1992). Contact: Lee Richardson (512-5493).

(701063) Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR Peace Operations
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