PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

KANSAS JUDICIAL WATCH; HONORABLE CHARLES M. HART; ROBB RUMSEY, Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v. MIKE L. STOUT, in his official capacity as a Member of the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications; JENNIFER L. JONES, in her official capacity as a Member of the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications; NANCY ANSTAETT, in her official capacity as a Member of the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications; J. PATRICK BRAZIL, in his official capacity as a Member of the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications; THEODORE B. ICE, in his official capacity as a Member of the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications.; CHRISTINA PANNBACKER; WILLIAM B. SWEARER, in his official capacity as a Member of the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications; CAROLYN No. 09-3356 FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 9, 2011
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 TILLOTSON, in her official capacity as a Member of the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications; ROBERT FLEMING; BRUCE BUCHANAN; MARY DAVIDSON COHEN; ROBERT A. CREIGHTON, in his official capacity as a Member of the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications; DAVID J. KING, in his official capacity as a Member of the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications; LAWRENCE E. SHEPPARD, in his official capacity as a Member of the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications; EDWARD G. COLLISTER, JR., in his official capacity as Commission Examiner for the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications; STANTON A. HAZLETT, in his official capacity as Disciplinary Administrator; FRANK D. DIEHL, in his official capacity as Deputy Disciplinary Administrator; ALEXANDER M. WALCZAK, in his official capacity as Deputy Disciplinary Administrator; JANITH A. DAVIS, in her official capacity as Depu ty Disciplinary Administrator; GAYLE B. LARKIN, in her official capacity as Admissions Attorney, Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court3 for the District of Kansas (D.C. No. 5:06-CV-04056-JAR-KGS)

Josiah S. Neeley, Bopp, Cole son & Bostrom, Terre Haute, Indiana (Jeffrey P. Gallant, James Bopp, Jr., and Anita Y. Woudenberg, Bopp, Coleson & Bost rom, Terre Haute, Indiana; and Austin K. Vincent, Tope ka, Kansas, with him on the briefs) for Plaintiffs-Appellants. George T. Patton, Jr., Bose McKinney & Evans LL P, Indianapolis, Indiana (Marisol Sanchez, Bose McKinney & Ev ans LLP, Indianapolis, Indian a; and Stephen O. Phillips, Office of the Attorney Genera l of the State of Kansas, T opeka, Kansas, on the brief) for Defendants-Appellees.

Before KELLY , EBEL , and HOLMES , Circuit Judges.

EBEL , Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Kansas Judicial Re view (“KJR”), the Honorable Charles M. Hart, and Robb Rumsey appeal from the district court’s order denying their motion for attorney’s fees. This case requires us to decide whether Appellants qualify as “prevailing parties” entitled to attorney’s fees unde r 42 U.S.C. § 1988 where they secured a preliminary injunction that a fforded some of the relief s ought in the complaint, the district court granted the injunction after find ing that Appellants were substantially likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, and the actions of third parties mooted the case before this Court had the op portunity to determ ine the validity of the preliminary injunction on appeal. Exercising jurisdiction un der 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we hold that the4 preliminary injunction conferre d prevailing-party status on Ap pellants. Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment of th e district court and REMA ND for further proceedings. I. BACKGROUND Our two prior opinions in this case di scuss the relevant factual background in some detail, and we recite only those facts ne cessary to resolve the instant appeal. See Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout (Stout IV ), 562 F.3d 1240, 1244–45 ( 10th Cir. 2009); Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout (Stout II ), 519 F.3d 1107, 1111–14 (1 0th Cir. 2008). Kansas provides for the popular election of judges in almost half of its judicial districts. In 1995, the Kansas Supreme Court adopted the Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct (the “Code”) to govern the behavior of judges and candi dates for state judicial office. See Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 601A (1995). Until March 1, 2009, th e Code prohibited judicial candidates from making certain kinds of pledges and commitm ents and from personally soliciting support for their campaigns. Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) stated that judicial candidates “should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office ot her than the faithful an d impartial performance of the duties of the office” (“Pledges Claus e”). (Aplt. App., vo l. I at 23.) Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) prohibited judicial candidates from “mak[ing] statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the cour t” (“Commits Clause”). (Id. ) Canon 5C(2) provided that “a candidate shall not personally . . . solic it publicly stated support” (“Solicitation Clause”). (Id. at 24.)5 In May 2006, KJR, Hart, and Rumsey sued the individual members of the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications (the “Commission”) 1 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the constitutionality of these canons. Appellants claimed that the Pledges, Commits, and Solicitation clauses violated the First and Four teenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution by infringing on their ri ghts of free speech and association. Specifically, KJR, a nonpartisan political act ion committee that educates citizens about judicial candidates, alleged that it wished to collect and publish responses to a “2006 Judicial Candidate Questionnaire” (the “Que stionnaire”) before the primary election on August 1, 2006. But candidates would not re spond to the questions, which were designed to elicit their views on a variety of political a nd legal issues, for fear of being disciplined under the Pledges and Commits clauses. Hart , an incumbent distri ct judge up for reelection in 2008, asserted that he desired to go door-to-door to seek signatures on a nomination petition, but he feared discipline under the Solicitation Clause. And Rumsey, a candidate for district judge in the 2006 election, alleged th at he wanted to express his views to the public by answering the Questionnair e but was afraid to do so because of the canons. Appellants sought a declaration that the canons were uncons titutional, as well as preliminary and permanent in junctive relief prohibiting enforcement of the canons. On the same day that they filed their complaint, KJR, Hart, and Rumsey also moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the Commission from initiating

1 The Commission is responsible for inves tigating allegations of Code violations and recommending disciplinary action when necessary.6 disciplinary proceedings under the canons ag ainst judicial candidates who responded to the Questionnaire. After a hearing, the di strict court issued a written order granting preliminary relief. See Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout (Stout I ), 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Kan. 2006). In a thoughtful and comprehens ive opinion, the district court determined that Appellants satisfied each of the four requirements for a preliminary injunction. 2 Id. at 1225–39. The court first concluded that Appellants were substantially likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. Id. at 1225–38, 1240. It analyzed the canons in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White , 536 U.S. 765 (2002), and found each of the Pledges, Commits, and Solicitation Clauses unconstitutional on its face a nd as applied. Stout I , 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1233–34 (Pledges and Commits clauses), 1237–38 (Solicitation Clause); see also id. at 1240 (“This Court follows the Supreme C ourt’s opinion in White and finds certain Kans as judicial canons unconstitutional.”). After a painstaking ex amination of the merits prong of the

2 In order to secure a preliminary injunc tion, the moving party must establish the following elements: (1) a substantial likeli hood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will result if the injunc tion does not issue; (3) the thre atened injury to the movant outweighs any damage the inj unction may cause the opposing party; and (4) issuance of the injunction would not be adverse to the pu blic interest. Schrier v. Univ. of Co. , 427 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2 005). If, however, the movant can demonstrate that the latter three elements weigh heavily in its favor, “t he test is modified, and the [movant] may meet the requirement for showing success on the merits by showing that questions going to the merits are so serious, substantial, diffi cult, and doubtful as to make the issue ripe for litigation and deserving of more delib erate investigation.” Davis v. Mineta , 302 F.3d 1104, 1111 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court in this case did not apply the “modified” test. For reas ons that will be explained below, that fact is critical to our determination th at Appellants are “prevailing parties.”7 preliminary-injunction standard, the court succ inctly concluded that Appellants satisfied the other three elements. See id. at 1239 (finding that (1) the chilling effect of the canons on the exercise of Appellants’ First Amendm ent rights constituted irreparable injury, (2) the injury to Appellants outweighed any harm to the Commission, and (3) the injunction would serve the public’s interest in re ceiving speech and lear ning about judicial candidates). Accordingly, the district c ourt enjoined the Commi ssion from enforcing the canons against any judicial candidate. Id. at 1241. The Commission appealed the grant of the preliminary injunctio n to this Court on August 11, 2006. Because the appeal “presented . . . several novel and unsettled questions of state law, the re solution of which could substan tially alter our determination of the federal constitutional issues at stak e,” we certified five questions regarding interpretation of the can ons to the Kansas Supreme Court. Stout II , 519 F.3d at 1122. In December 2008, that court answ ered our questions and also indicated that it had been presented with, but not yet considered, propos ed revisions to the Code. Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout (Stout III ), 196 P.3d 1162, 1171–79 (Kan. 2008). Approximately one month later, the Kansas Supreme Court amende d the Code by adopting Rule 601B, which took effect on March 1, 2009. See Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 601B (2 009) (superseding Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 601A (1995)). Rule 601B “completely eliminate[d] the challenged portion of the Solicitation Clause” and “materially narrow[ed ] the language and sc ope of the Pledges and the Commits Clauses.” Stout IV , 562 F.3d at 1245. Co nsequently, this Court8 vacated the preliminary injunction, dismi ssed the Commission’s appeal as moot, and remanded the case to the district court for dismissal. Id. at 1249. After the district court dismissed the ca se, KJR, Hart, and Rumsey filed a motion seeking attorney’s fees. They argued that they qualified as “prevailing parties” entitled to a fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 becaus e the preliminary in junction constituted a “judicially enforceable judgment that materially alter[ed] the legal relationship between the parties.” (Aplt. App., vol . III at 426–27.) On November 19, 2009, the district court denied the motion, reasoning, in pertinent part, as follows: The primary relief sought by plainti ffs was declaratory relief. While plaintiffs succeeded in preserving the status quo—no disciplinary action for answering the questionnaire and for soliciting publicly-stated support— they did not succeed in ob taining relief on the merits. Plaintiffs did not merely seek an injunction that allows them to answer and distribute the questionnaire and solicit publicly-sta ted support in the 2006 primary election. They sought declarations th at the judicial canons at issue were unconstitutional both on th eir face and as applied to the questionnaire and petitions, in 2006 and beyo nd. Under these circum stances, the Court does not find that the legal relationship between the parties was materially altered by the preliminary injunction. (Id. at 629.) Appellants now seek review of the distri ct court’s ruling that the preliminary injunction did not make them “prevaili ng parties” for purposes of § 1988. II. DISCUSSION In 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), Congress crea ted an exception to the “American Rule” that each party ordinarily must pay its own a ttorney’s fees. Secti on 1988(b) provides that in civil-rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “the court, in its discretion, may9 allow the prevailing party, other than the United Stat es, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Whet her a litigant qualifies as a “prevailing party” under a fee-shifting statute such as § 1988 is a question of law that we review de novo.
See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Engida , 611 F.3d 1209, 1214–15 (10th Cir. 2010); AlMaleki v. Holder , 558 F.3d 1200, 1204 (10th Cir. 2009). A. Meaning of “Prevailing Party” in th e Context of Preliminary Injunctions The Supreme Court set forth the general standard governing the prevailing-party determination in Texas State Teachers Ass’ n v. Garland Independent School District (TSTA ), 489 U.S. 782 (1989). Ther e, the Court stated that “[t]he touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration of the lega l relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute.” Id. at 792–93. The Court explained that a material alterati on in the parties’ lega l relationship occurs when “the plaintiff has succeeded on any si gnificant issue in litigation which achieved some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Id. at 791–92 (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted). This standard re quires that “‘a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim befo re he can be said to prevail.’” Id. at 792 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms , 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987)). This Court has twice addressed whethe r a plaintiff who secured a preliminary injunction could satisfy the standard set forth in TSTA . In Dahlem v. Board of Education , 901 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1990), Scott Dahlem, a high-school senior, desired to participate in intersc holastic gymnastics. Id. at 1510. But Dahlem’s school only had a10 girls’ gymnastics team, and the state high-sc hool activities associa tion did not allow boys to join girls’ athl etics teams. Id. Dahlem filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that this situation amounted to unconstitutional gender discrimi nation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. After an initial hearing, the distri ct court granted Da hlem a preliminary injunction that allowed him to participat e in interscholastic gymnastics during the pendency of the case. Id. The defendants appealed the district court’s interlocutory ruling to this Court, but while the appeal was pending, the gymnastics season ended. Id. This rendered the case moot because Dahlem was scheduled to graduate before the beginning of the next season. Id. After the district court vacated the injunction and dismissed the case per our instructions, Dahlem filed a motion for a ttorney’s fees, which the district court denied. Id. On appeal, we considered whether the preliminary inju nction rendered Dahlem a “prevailing party” even though the injunction was vacated on mootness grounds before the defendants could challenge its validity in this Court. Id. at 1511. We began by stating that “[f]or the purpose of deciding whether a plaintiff is a prevailing party, a preliminary injunction is considered a decision on the merits so long as it represents an unambiguous indication of probable success on the merits, and not merely a maintenance of the status quo.” Id. (internal alteration and quotatio n marks omitted). The injunction at issue there met that standard because th e district court’s order granting preliminary relief explicitly stated that there was a substantial likelihood that Dahlem would ultimately prevail on his claim. Id. We next observed that TSTA requires a plaintiff to11 receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he may be deemed a “prevailing party,” but that nothing in TSTA or any other Supreme Court case precludes a plaintiff from obtaining that relief by some means other than a final judgment. See id. at 1512. Thus, we adopted the rule that “a party which achieves the objective of its suit by means of an injunction issued by the distri ct court [after an unambiguous finding of probable success on the merits] is a prevailing party in that court, notwithstanding the fact that the case becomes moot, through no acquiescence by the defendant, while the order is on appeal.” Id. (footnote omitted). Under th at rule, Dahlem qualified for prevailing-party status because the preliminary injunction afforded him all of the relief he sought in bringing suit: [Dahlem] brought suit so that he could participate in interscholastic gymnastics during his senior year. Becau se of the district court’s preliminary injunction, he did so participate. No s ubsequent judicial proceedings could have given him any more relief on his claim. It cannot be sugge sted that Dahlem’s foray into the legal system was anything but completely successful. Id. at 1513. We reached a different conclusion in Biodiversity Conserva tion Alliance v. Stem , 519 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2008). In that case, the U.S. Forest Service authorized a sale of timber in the Cement Region of the Black H ills National Forest (the “Cement Project”). Id. at 1227–28. The Biodiversity Conser vation Alliance (“BCA”) filed a complaint alleging that the Forest Service’s actions in planning and developi ng the Cement Project violated various environmenta l statutes and the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”).12 Id. at 1228. BCA also moved for a prelimin ary injunction to stop the imminent timber sale. Id. In ruling on BCA’s motion, the district court found that BCA would suffer irreparable injury as a result of permanent sp ecies loss if the sale went forward. Id. Further, because “the equities tipped heavily towards [BCA],” the district court required only that BCA raise substantial questions on th e merits rather than prove a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Id. (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted). The court concluded that BCA satisfied the “substantial questions” standard and granted the preliminary injunc tion “to maintain the status quo antebellum” until the court could make a final ruling. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). During the pendency of the litigation, a forest fire destroyed approximately ten percent of the timber in the Cement Region that the Forest Service had planned to sell. Id. Consequently, the Forest Service withdrew the Cement Project, and the district court dismissed the case as moot. Id. BCA then moved for attorney ’s fees, relying in part on the preliminary injunction. Id. The district court granted the motion, and the Forest Service appealed. Id. at 1229. On appeal, we cited TSTA and explained that “[a] pr eliminary injunction that does not provide a plaintiff with re lief on the merits of her claim cannot serve as the basis for prevailing party status.” Id. at 1232. Applying that rule, we held that the preliminary injunction obtained by BCA was insufficient to make BCA a “prevailing party” because the injunction did not provide any of the relief that BCA so ught in its complaint. Id.13 BCA sought a determination that the Cement Pr oject violated envir onmental statutes and the APA, but the district court’s order gr anting preliminary relief did not “address[] whether the Cement Project was arbitrary and capricious.” Id. Instead, the court granted the injunction largely because the bala nce of equities favored BCA. Id. Therefore, in obtaining the preliminary injunction, BCA won nothing more than “the right to have the status quo preserved, so that had [BCA] prevailed on the me rits, its victor y would have meaning.” Id. In dicta in Biodiversity , we questioned whether Dahlem remains good law after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Buckhann on Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources , 532 U.S. 598 (2001), and Sole v. Wyner , 551 U.S. 74 (2007). Biodiversity , 519 F.3d at 1232. We d eclined to resolve that issue, however, because the validity of Dahlem was irrelevant to our conclusion that BCA failed to obtain relief on the merits a nd thus could not me et the “stringent” prevailing-party standard of TSTA . See id. at 1232. Having carefully analyzed Buckhannon and Sole , we now hold that Dahlem survives those decisions. The plaintiff in Buckhannon sought to recover attorney’s fees under the “‘catalyst theory,’ which posits that a plai ntiff is a ‘prevailing party’ if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought a bout a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct.” 532 U.S. at 601. But the Supreme Court explicitly re jected that theory as inconsistent with its prior cases recognizing that a “prevailing party” must obtain so me form of judicial relief, such as a judgment on the merits or court-ordered consent decree. Id. at 604–06. The14 Court explained that “[a] defendant’s volunta ry change in conduc t, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the la wsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.” Id. at 605. Buckhannon thus stands for the proposition that there must be a judicially sanctioned alteration in the legal relationship between the parties before a plainti ff can be deemed a “prevailing party.” 3
In Dahlem , we held that the plaintiff attained prevailing-party status on the basis of a preliminary injunction. Buckhannon does not undermine that conclusion. A preliminary injunction is a form of court-orde red relief. Thus, “[a] preliminary injunction issued by a judge carries a ll the ‘judicial imprimatur’ ne cessary to satisfy Buckhannon .” Watson v. Cnty. of Riverside , 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9 th Cir. 2002); see also People Against Police Violence v. City of Pittsburg , 520 F.3d 226, 233 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We need not determine in this ca se the outer limits of the requisite ‘judicial imprimatur.’ Whatever those may be, preliminary injuncti ons are certainly within them.” (citation omitted)). We do not mean to suggest, of co urse, that every preliminary injunction will necessarily render the recipient a “prevailing party.” As we have already explained, “to

3 Although the Supreme Court in Buckhannon interpreted the term “prevailing party” under the fee-shifting provisions of th e Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12205, the Court recognized that “prevailing pa rty” is a term of art that Congress has used to mean the same thing in numerous statutes. See Buckhannon , 532 U.S. at 602–03 & n.4. Accordingly, Buckhannon ’s “judicial imprimatur” requirement applies to the prevailing-party analysis under § 1988. See Bell v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs , 451 F.3d 1097, 1102 (10th Cir. 2006 ) (applying Buckhannon ’s definition of “prevailing party” in a § 1988 case).15 be a prevailing party on the basis of a pr eliminary injunction re quires ‘relief on the merits.’” Lorillard Tobacco Co. , 611 F.3d at 1217 (quoting Biodiversity , 519 F.3d at 1232). We hold only that Buckhannon ’s “judicial imprimatur” requirement does not make preliminary injunctions categorically insu fficient to create prevailing-party status. In Sole , the Supreme Court addressed the ques tion whether “a plaintiff who gains a preliminary injunction after an abbrevia ted hearing, but is denied a permanent injunction after a dispositive ad judication on the merits, qualif[i es] as a ‘prevailing party’ within the compass of § 1988(b).” 551 U.S. at 77. The Court answered that question in the negative, reasoning that whatever “fleet ing success” a plainti ff may achieve when a court grants preliminary injunctive relief is negated if the court ultimately rules against the plaintiff on the merits. Id. at 83–86. Thus, the Court held that “[p]revailing party status . . . does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case.” Id. at 83. Significantly, however, the Cour t explicitly declined to cons ider the issue involved in both Dahlem and Biodiversity :

We express no view on whether, in the absence of a final decision on the merits of a claim fo r permanent injunctive re lief, success in gaining a preliminary injunction may sometimes wa rrant an award of counsel fees. We decide only that a plaintiff who gains a preliminary injunction does not qualify for an award of counsel fees under § 1988(b) if the merits of the case are ultimately decided against her. Id. at 86; see also Biodiversity , 519 F.3d at 1231 (“Unlik e the injunction in Sole , the preliminary injunction here was not undone by a fi nal decision on the merits. It is thus in16 the area explicitly left open by Sole .” (citation omitted)); id. at 1232 (“Sole explicitly declined to decide th e question in [Dahlem ] . . . .”). Consequently, Sole , like Buckhannon , leaves our holding in Dahlem undisturbed. Given that both Dahlem and Biodiversity stand as controlling precedent in this circuit, we must consider bo th cases when deciding whether a plaintiff who has secured a preliminary injunction qua lifies as a “prevailing party” eligib le for an award of attorney’s fees under § 1988. Those cas es, along with the relevant Supreme Court precedent, establish two overarching principles: First, and most fundamental, in order for a preliminary injunction to serve as the basis for prevailing-party status, the injuncti on must provide at least some relief on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim(s). A prelim inary injunction provides relief on the merits when it (a) affords relief sought in the pl aintiff’s complaint and (b) represents an unambiguous indication of probable success on the merits. By contrast, a preliminary injunction does not provide relie f on the merits if the district court does not undertake a serious examination of the plaintiff’s likeli hood of success on the merits but nonetheless grants the preliminary injunction to preser ve the status quo because the balance of equities favors the plaintiff. Second, if a preliminary injunction satisfi es the relief-on-the-merits requirement, the plaintiff qualifies as a “prevailing party” even if events outside the control of the plaintiff moot the case. If, however, th e preliminary injunction is undone by a17 subsequent adverse decision on the merits, th e plaintiff’s transient success in obtaining the injunction does not render th e plaintiff a “prevailing party.” These principles must cons titute the beginning point (a nd, perhaps in many cases, also the ending point) of the prevailing-party inquiry when a plaintiff relies on a preliminary injunction as the basis for an award of attorney’s fees. B. The Preliminary Injunction Obta ined by KJR, Hart, and Rumsey In light of the principles set forth above, we have no tr ouble concluding that KJR, Hart, and Rumsey are “prevailin g parties” in this case. First, the district court’s preliminary injunction provided relief on the merits of Appellants’ claims. Regarding the first prong of the relief-on-the-merits requirement, the preliminary injunction afforded Appellants relief that they spec ifically requested in their complaint. Appellants sought two basic types of relief in th eir complaint: (1) a declaration that the Pledges, Commits, a nd Solicitation clauses were unconstitutional; and (2) preliminary and permanent injunctions that would prohibit the Commission from enforcing the canons against judicial candida tes who responded to KJR’s questionnaire. The preliminary injunction issued by the distri ct court provided the second form of relief as long as it was in effect. That is, the pr eliminary injunction prohibited enforcement of the challenged canons and allo wed Appellants to e ngage in their spe ech activities without fear of a disciplinary action duri ng the pendency of the case. Furthermore, the district court was clea r about Appellants’ u ltimate likelihood of success on the merits. After ca refully analyzing the Pledges, Commits, and Solicitation18 clauses under the First Amendm ent, the court expressly c oncluded that those clauses were unconstitutional and that Appellants we re substantially likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to the clauses. Stout I , 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (“The Court finds that plaintiffs are substantially likely to succeed on the mer its of their claims concerning the pledges . . . , commits, and so licitation clauses under Republican Party of Minnesota v. White .”); id. (“This Court follows the Supreme Court’s opinion in White and finds certain Kansas judi cial canons unconstitutional. ”). We find it difficult to imagine a more “unambiguous indication of probable success on the merits.” Dahlem , 901 F.2d at 1511 (internal quotation marks omitted). To borrow the words of the D.C. Circuit, “this is not a case in which a pr eliminary injunction was based less on the trial court’s view of the merits than on a perc eived hardship to the plaintiff. Rather, [Appellants] secured a prelimin ary injunction in this case la rgely because their likelihood of success on the merits was never seriously in doubt.” Select Milk Producers, Inc. v. Johanns , 400 F.3d 939, 948 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Second, this Court dissolv ed the preliminary injunction only after the Kansas Supreme Court amended the challenged canons and rendered Appellants’ claims against the Commission moot. Significantly, no cour t ever ruled against Appellants on the merits. Accordingly, the pre liminary injunction was sufficien t to confer prevailing-party status on Appellants, “notwithstanding the fact that the case bec[a] me[] moot, through no acquiescence by the [Commission], while the order [was] on appeal.” Dahlem , 901 F.2d19 at 1512; see also, e.g. , Dupuy v. Samuels , 423 F.3d 714, 723 & n.4 (7th Cir. 2005); Select Milk Producers , 400 F.3d at 947–48; Watson , 300 F.3d at 1096. The district court determined that Appe llants were not “prevailing parties” because they never obtained the “primary relief sought .” Specifically, the court reasoned that “[t]he primary relief sought by plaintiffs was declaratory relie f. . . . Plaintiffs did not merely seek an injunction . . . . They sought declarations that the judicial canons at issue were unconstitutional . . . . Under these circ umstances, the Court does not find that the legal relationship between the parties wa s materially altered by the preliminary injunction.” (Aplt. App., vol. III at 629.) We cannot agree with the dist rict court’s analysis, as it conflicts with the Supreme Court’s directives in TSTA . In that case, the Court made clear that the prevailing-party determination does not turn on whether the pl aintiff has prevailed on the “central issue” or obtained the “primary relief sought.” 4 89 U.S. at 790–92. “[T]he search for the ‘central’ and ‘tangential’ issues in the laws uit, or for the ‘prima ry,’ as opposed to the ‘secondary,’ relief sought, much like the search for the golden fleece, distracts the district court from the primary purposes behind § 1988 and is essentially unhelpful in defining the term ‘prevailing party.’” Id. at 791. Instead, the criti cal inquiry is whether “the plaintiff has succeeded on any significant issue in litigation which achieved some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Id. at 791–92 (emphases added) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also McQueary v. Conway , 614 F.3d 591, 603 (6th Cir. 2010) (“A plaintiff crosses the th reshold to ‘prevailing party’ status by20 succeeding on a single claim, even if he loses on several others and even if that limited success does not grant him the ‘primary relief’ he sought.”). Where, as in this case, that standard has been met, “the degree of the plaintiff’s overall success goes to the reasonableness of the award . . . , not to the availability of a fee award vel non .” TSTA , 489 U.S. at 793; see also McQueary , 614 F.3d at 603 (“The significance of the relief obtained goes only to the amount of fees.”). In its brief, the Commission raises one grou nd for affirmance that was not relied on by the district court. Specifically, the Commission cont ends that the preliminary injunction cannot serve as the basis for prev ailing-party status because it was ultimately vacated, leaving Appellants with out an enforceable judgment. This argument ignores our holding in Dahlem and the critical distinction betwee n preliminary inj unctions vacated on mootness grounds and preliminary injunctions vacated as a result of an adverse decision on the merits. 4 Appellants secured a preliminary in junction that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties by providing relief on the merits of Appellants’

4 The First Circuit recently expl ained the distinction as follows: Reversal on the merits deprives a pl aintiff of “prevailing party” status because it repudiates the favorable change in the parties’ legal relationship effectuated by the district court’s judg ment and holds that the plaintiff was never legally entitled to such relief. In contrast, in the mootness context, a “prevailing party” is a party who mana ged to obtain a favorable, material alteration in the legal relations hip between the parties prior to the intervening act of mootness. Diffenderfer v. Gomez-Colon , 587 F.3d 445, 45 3 (1st Cir. 2009).21 claims. This injunction continued in effect until the Kansas Supreme Court took actions that mooted the case. Neither this Court no r the district court ev er issued an order undermining the district court’s assessment of the merits of Appellants’ claims or Appellants’ legal entitlement to relief. Acco rdingly, the fact that the preliminary injunction was vacated does not deprive Appellants of their st atus as “prevailing parties.” III. CONCLUSION KJR, Hart, and Rumsey obtained a prelim inary injunction that provided some of the relief sought in the comp laint, represented an unambi guous indication of probable success on the merits, and was disso lved only after the actions of third parties mooted the case. Under these circumstance s, we hold that Appellants ar e “prevailing parties” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 19 88. Therefore, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings.