### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON JA N U A RY 21, 200 4 S es sio n
WAY NE JERR OLD S v. ROB ERT D. KELL EY and w ife, MITS Y K ELLEY v. EDDI E K. WH IT LOW , TRUSTEE FOR THE H ARDIN COUNTY BANK

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Hardin Coun ty No. 5920 C. Cr eed Mc Ginley, Judge, Sitting b y Interc hange

No. W2003-00739-C OA-R3-C V - F iled April 30, 2004

Th is c a s e s inv o lv e s an a c ti o n f o r d e c la r a to r y ju d g me n t r e g ar d in g an e a s e me n t f o r th e b e n e f

it of a landlocked pa

rce l. The lower

court found that an easement does e x ist and that the owner s of the servient pa

rce l are not entitled to monetary damag es. On appeal, the ow ners of the servie nt parc el maintain that the lower

court de monstrated bias in its comm en t s from the be nch and, f urther, that it erre d i n failing to awar d damag es. F or the following rea sons, we af firm the ruling of the trial
c ourt

.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed

A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u rt, in w h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined.

Ke n Se a ton , Se lme r, TN , f or Ap pe lla nts
Dennis W. Pl unk, Savannah, TN, for A ppellee

OP IN ION

F acts and P roce dural Hi story

I n 1998, Way

ne Jerrolds (“Jerrolds”) acquir ed a ten ac re tra ct in Har din County , Tenne ssee that adjoined a public r oad known a s Bur ks L ane. J err olds subsequently sold a five- acr e portion of the land to J ames Ye rby

(“Y erby”). Y erby ’s five a cre parc el containe d all th e l an d t hat abutted Burk s L ane, leaving J err olds with a five ac re pa rce l isolated from any

public road. Ing ress a

nd
e g re ss f ro m th e Jer

ro lds pa rc e l w a s a c hie ve d b y

us e of a dr ive wa

y tha t r an f ro m B ur ks L ane a c ro ss the Yer by parc el. I n May 1999, J err olds convey ed by deed his five acr e par cel to Ricky DeShazier, who then re convey ed the pa rce l back to J err olds on Marc h 18, 2000. Then, on Septembe r 15, 2000,O n t wo oc casi o ns, t he C hancello r c o n c e d e d t hat “ a si m i l ar com m ent m i ght have b een m ad e i n t he 1
ent i re context of t he C o urt ’ s rul i ngs” and t hat “ I mi ght have used wo rds of sim il ar i m p o rt i n t he co nt ext of t he ent i re
ru ling .”
-2- Yer by convey ed his five a cre trac t, which fronte d the public roa d, to the Def endants, Rober

t and Mitsy Kelley (“the Kelley s”).

None of the dee ds in any

of the a bove conve y ance s mentioned the drivew ay that crosse d the trac t with road a cce ss for the be nefit of the isolate d parc el. The K elley s, upon purcha se of the tr act fronting Bur

ks L ane, e re ct ed fenc ing that obstructed Jerrolds’ use of the drivew ay . J err olds then filed a dec laratory

judgme nt action in Har din County Chance ry Court, seeking a dec laration that an
ease ment acr oss the Kelley s’ land ex isted for the be nefit of Jerrolds’ prope rty . The Ke lley s answer ed that no su c h e a se me nt e xiste d in the c hai n of t itl e . T he y

fu rt he r a rgue d th a t, i f t

he c ourt we re to
cre ate suc h an ea sement, they should be entitled to damag es for the deva luation of their land. A non-jury

trial was he ld before the Chance llor on November 21, 2002. At the conc lusion of this hear ing, the Chance llor told the parties t he subst ance of hi s intended ruling . He f ound that the a c c e ss r oa d at is su e wa s i n ex ist e nc e a t th e tim e the Ke lle y s p ur c ha se d th e ir pr op e rt y , th a t it s e xiste nc e wa s o pe n a

nd ob vio us , a

nd tha t the fa ilure to lis t it in the c ha in of tit le wa s me re ly a re su lt of mutual mistake and inadve rtenc e on the pa rt of J err olds a

nd Yer by . The Chanc ellor fur

ther stated that he would not awa

rd dama g es to the Ke lley s, beca use they did not adduce sufficie nt evidence on the matter. After this hea ring , the Kelley s filed a Rule 59 motion, seekingthe lower court’s permission to present a dditional ex pert testimony reg ardingthe devaluation of t heir property

. The Chance llor denied this motion and enter ed its de cre e on J anuar y 27, 2003. I n its de cre e, the lower court simply memorialized the s ubstance of t he oral ruling g iven at the c onclusion of the Nove mber 21, 2002 hear ing.

The Ke lley s then appe aled the tr ial court’s r uling. There was no transcr ipt of the trial, so the K e l l e ys p r e p ar e d

a p r o p o s e d S t a t e m e n to f

E v i d e n c e

. In o n e o f

t h e i r i s s u e s o n a

p p e a l , t h e K e l l e ys alleg ed that the Chanc ellor’s rulingwas the r esult of bi as. They soug ht to include in the Statement of Evidenc e a statement purportedly made by the Chance llor during the cour se of his ruling at the conclusion of the November 21, 2002 hear ing. T he re levant stateme nt rea ds as follows: “I have alway s detested these situations where pe ople choose to posse ss the proper ty they own in suc h a wa

y so as to ref

use to g ive their ne ighbor a rig ht to cross their proper ty in c ases suc h as this.” The lowe r court he ld a post-trial hearing , which wa s transcr ibed, on the propose d Statement of Evidenc e. At this hearing , the Chance llor conce ded that he had likely made a statement, in the context of a long and deta iled ruling , that was simil ar to the one alleg ed in the proposed Statement of Evidence

. The

1 Chance llor was veheme nt, how ever , that his c omment w as not indicative of any persona l prejudice or animosi ty , stating that “[I ] m ight have dete sted [Mr. Kelley ’s] actions, but I do not detest him as a per son.” Counsel for the Kelley s ag ree d, stating that “[I ] certainly d i d n ’t take it that way and I don’t think Mr. Kelley took it that way .” After the hear ing, the Chance llor approve d a Statement of Evidence without mention of the purportedly biased c omment.-3-

On appe al, the Ke lley s ask this Court to reverse the Chance llor’s ruling and remand for a new trial on the issue of damag es. The K elley s premise their appea l on two g rounds. Fir st, as mentioned above, the y

alleg e that the Chancellor’s decision was af fec ted by his bias ag ainst landowner s who seek to r esist the imposit ion of an ease ment. The Kelley s also maintain that the Chance llor’s ruling denying da

mag es wa s contrar

y to the pre p o n d er an ce of evide nce. T hey alleg e that Mr. Ke lley te sti fi e d th a t th e e a se me nt d e c re a se d th e va lue of his land by $5 ,0 00 and

that th e Jer

ro lds fa ile d to prese nt any

evidenc e to re but this amount. The trial court re fused to include this testimony in the Statement of Evidenc e. At the p o s t -t ri al h ear ing, the Chance llor stated that he r emember ed Mr. Ke lle y g ivi nga c le arl y un re a so na

ble fi g ur e , s uc h a s $ 50 ,0 00 , r a the r t ha n the a lle g e d $ 5, 00 0 amou nt. The Ke lley s maintain that the Chance llor err ed in exc l u d i n g this testim ony from the Statement of Evidence and that the testimony provides a suf

ficient ba sis for an a

war d of dama g es.
Issues

Th e Ke lle y s r a ise tw o is su e s o n a pp e a l:

I

. Whether the Chanc ellor’s statements and conduct demonstrate bia s, thereby pr ov idi ngsu ff

ic ie nt g ro un ds fo r a

ne w tri a l.

I I

. Whether the Chanc ellor er red in findingthat the Kelley s fai l ed t o produce
su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt an a wa rd of mon e tary dama g e s.

Stand ard of Review

This case was tried by

the lower

court sitting without a jur y
. Consequently , our re view of the tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t is de novo up on

the re c or d, wi th a

pr e su mpt ion

of c or re c tne ss u nle ss the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s oth e rw ise

. Te nn

. R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Kendrick v . Shoemak e , 90 S.W .3d 56 6, 56 9 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) . With r e sp e c t to the low e r c ourt ’s c on c lus ion s o f l aw, our r e vie w i s de novo , with no presumption of corr ectne ss. Kendrick, 90 S.W .3d at 569.

The Cond uct of the Trial Court

The Ke lley s maintain that the C hance llor made a statement at trial that de monstrated a bia s ag ainst landowner s who resist the imposition of an ease ment for the be nefit of a n ei ghbor. The Cha nc e llo r, ho we ve r, did no t inc lud e the a lle g e d co mme nt in the State me nt o f E vid e nc e . We wi ll, there fore , first addre ss the lower c ourt’s ruling excluding the state ment at issue. As a ge nera l rule, the trial court’s decision reg arding a st atement of evidenc e is conc lusive. Ten n. R. App. P. 2 4( e ); Parker v . Parker , No. 01A01-9504- CH-00138, 1996 WL 557816, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 1996). In Ha ll v . H all , 772 S.W .2d 432 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989), w e discussed thi s is su e in s ome de ta il:-4-

Any question as to the accura cy of a transcr ipt or st atement of the evidenc e is to be submitt ed to and se ttled by the Trial Court, whose de termination is conclusive a bsent extra o rd i n ar y

circ umstances. Te nn. R. App. P. 24(c), (e ). The only resour ces of

a trial judg e for

resolving such questions ar e (1) the memory of the trial judg e, (2) memoranda

of the trial judg e, and ( 3) an ev identiary hear ing to e stablish what evi den c e wa s p re se nte d d ur ingthe tr ia l. T he thi rd

re so ur c e is s e ldo m us e d, bu t, i f used, an d the evidenc e at suc h hear ing is pre serve d on appea l, the appellate court might find some support ther ein for r evision of the evide ntiary rec ord.

Id . at 435. The issue in the pr ese n t case , then, is whether the evidenc e pre sented at the post-trial hear ing, w hich was tra

nscribed, suppor

ts revision of the e videntiary rec ord. Having r eviewe d the rele vant authority , we f

ind that it does. W e conside red a simil ar situation in Parker , in wh ich the trial judg e wa s acc used of making a st atement that mig ht demonstrate bias. I n that case , we f

ound: At the post-trial hea

ring in the prese nt case , the trial judg e esse ntially conce ded that he had ma de re marks si m i l ar to those in dispute, ex cluding the par enthetica l [co mme nta

ry a dd e d b y Wif e ]. In li g ht of th is , we hold t hat th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in excluding the state ment from the State m ent of Evidence. How ever , the trial cour t proper ly excluded the par enthetica l portion of Wife’s proposed s ta te me nt t h a t of fer ed Wif e ’s int e rp re ta tio n o f t

he imp or t of the tr ia l ju dg e ’s re mark s.
Parker , 1996 WL 557816, at *4. I n the instant case , the Chance llor likewise admitted that he ma de simil ar c omments to those included in the Kelley ’s proposed Stateme nt of Eviden ce

. He se emed
conce rned, how ever , about t he possi ble misperce ption that he detested Mr . Kelley as a pe rson rather than s im p ly d e te s ti n g th e c o n c e p t o f

c o n f li c t b e tw e e nn e ig hb o r s o v e r th e u s e o f

th e ir la n d

. T he langua g e pr op os e d b y

the Ke lle y s in

the ir re vis e d St a te me nt o f E vi dence , h ow e ve r, is c are fu l to
make thi s dist inc tio n. As the Cha nc e llo r him se lf a dmi tte d that the pr op os e d sta te me nt i s si mil a r t o the re marks he ma de duringhis ruling, it was err or to exclude the statement f rom the Statement of Evidence

. Havingresolved the evidentiar y aspec t of this matter, we nowtur n t o t h e s u bstance of the judicial bias issue. As an initial matter, we rec og nize the core principle that “ all litigants have a rig ht to have their

case s hear d by

fair a n d impartial judg es.” Kin ar d v . Ki na rd , 986 S.W .2d 220, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). I n order to preser v e t h e p u b lic’s conf idence in judicial neutrality , judge s must not onl y

be impartial in fac t, but must a lso be perc eived to be impar tial. Id . Acc ording ly , even wh e n a tr ia l ju dg e fe e ls that he or sh e c an h e ar a c a se fa ir ly

and imp art ia lly , th e jud g e sh ou ld r e c us e himself or her self in a pr o ce eding “in which the judg e’s impar tiality might re asonably

be qu e sti on e d. ” Te nn . Su p. Ct

. R. 10 , Ca no n 3 (E )( 1) ; Kin ar

d , 986 S.W .2d at 228. The de cision of whether rec usal is w arr anted must be made, initially , by the trial judge

. Kin ar d , 986, S.W .2d at 228. This decision is discretionar y , unless the basis for r ecusa l is mandated by the Tenne ssee Constitution or by statute. Id

. See Tenn. Const. art. 6, § 11; Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-2-101 ( 2000). The judg e, howeve r, must attempt to ma k e an obje ctive dete rmination by asking “what a re asonable ,-5-

disinterested pe rson knowing all the re levant fa cts would th i n kabout his or her impartiality .” Kin ar d , 986 S.W .2d at 228.

Part ie s, ho we ve r, may

los e the ri g ht to ch a lle ng e a jud g e ’s imp art ia lity if the y do no t ti me ly file re cusal motions soon after they become awa re of the fa cts g iving r ise to the motion. Id

. Se e als o Eldridge v. Eldridge , No. W 2000-00730-COA- R3-CV, 2002 WL 1838145, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Au g 8 , 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g W

ilson v. W ilson , 9 87 S.W. 2d

55 5, 56 2 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 99 8) ). Th is C ourt wi ll not allow parties to g ain proc edura l a dvantag e by silently prese rving a prejudicia l event as a n “ac ein-the-hole” to be used in the e vent of a n adver se dec ision. Kin ar d , 98 6 S. W.2 d at 22 8; Eldridge , 2002 WL 1838145, at *3. I n the p re s en t ca se, the Ke lley s failed to question the Chanc ellor’s imp art ia lity

by fi lin g a mot ion

to r e c us e in t

his ma tte r. I ns te a d, the y

ra ise d th e iss ue fo r t

he fi rs t ti me on appea l. We note that the statement purpor tedly showing bias was utter ed duringthe trial cour t’s
rec itation of its ruling at t he conclusion of t he trial. We must also note, however , that the trial cour t waited some thre e months to issue a written dec ree and, fur ther, that the K elley s filed a Rule 59 motion in the i nterim. The Kelley s had the opportunity to raise the issue of re cusal duringthis ti me, and they declined to do so. As we he ld in Eldridge , “ [t]his c omp e ls the c on c lus ion tha t [th e Ke lle y s] ‘p ur po se ly de c ide d to us e the imp art ia lity iss ue a s [th e ir ] ac e -i n- the -h ole in t he e ve nt t hat [th e y ] los t the [ trial] on the merits.’” Eldridge , 2 0 0 2 W L 1 8 3 8 1 4 5 , at * 3 (c i t i n g Davis v. D ep’t of Employm ent Sec. , 23 S.W

. 3 d

3 0 4 , 3 1 3 ( T e n n

. Ct

. A p p

. 1 9 9 9 ) )

. Co n s e qu e n tl y , w e h o ld th a t “ an y

ar g u me nt
c on c e rn ingthe [Cha

nc e llo r’ s] alle g e d bia s or impr op ri e ty in thi s c a se is w a ive d a nd mus t ne c e ssa

ri ly be viewe d with skepticism.” Id

. Al tho ug h th e Ke lle y ’s iss ue re g ard ingthe a lle g e d b ia s o f t he Cha nc e llo r i s w a ive d, we wi ll briefly addre ss the merits of their claim in or der to pr eser ve the public’s confide nce in j u d i cial neutra lity

. Id . The Ke lley s maintain that the follo wing statement demonstrates the Chance llor’s bias: “I have a lway s detested these s ituations wher e people choose to possess the property they own in such a wa

y so as t o re fu s e t o gi v e t heir ne ighbor a rig ht to cross their prope rty in case s such as this.” We cannot ag ree that this demonstrates bias. We have held:

Bia s and pre

judice ar e only

improper whe n they

are persona l. A fee ling of ill will or, con ver se ly , f

a vo ri tis m to wa

rd s o ne of

the pa rt ie s to a su it a re wh a t c on sti tut e disqualify ing bia s or pre

judice . . . . Despite ear lier fictions to the contra ry , it is now
un de rs too d t hat j ud g e s are no t w ith ou t op ini on s w he n th e y he ar a nd de c ide c a se s. J udg es do have values, whic h cannot be m agi ca l ly shed whe n they

take the be nch.

Ma y es v . Le mo nte , 1 2 2 S

. W

. 3 d 1 4 2 , 1 4 6 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Caudill v. Foley , 21 S.W .3d 203, 214 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)) . L ikewise, in W ilson v. W ilson , 987 S.W .2d 555 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), we found that “[m] ost trial judge s, we suspec t, have strongfee lings ab o u t ce rt ai n ty pes of behavior or conduc t. When the judge perc eives t h at o n e party or the other

has eng ag ed in that conduct, the pa

rty should not be surprised that he /she has incur red the judge ’s wrath.” Id . at 56 2. We find this li ne of r easoningto be instructive in t he present case. The Chancellor’ s comment, as draf ted by the Kelley s in the ir proposed Statement of Evidence , does not demonstrate any persona l animosity or ill will t owar d the Kelley s as i ndividuals. I nstead, the state ment mere ly indicates that-6-

the Chance llor has strong fee lings a bout a ce rtain ty

pe of c onduct, namely , the re fusal of a landowner to allow his neig hbor ac cess ove r his land

. Acc ording ly , the Kelley s’ alleg ation of judicial bias would ultimately

fail on its merits, absent wa iver of the issue.

Da m ag e s R e sult ing fro m th e Eas e m e nt

I n th e ir fi na l issu e on a

pp e a l, the Ke lle y s ma int a in t hat th e low e r c ourt

e rr e d in re fu sin g to g rant them moneta

ry damag es. Withi n this iss ue, the p ri mary source of conte ntion concer ns the testimony g iven by Mr. Kelley at t rial. Ther e is no dispute that the only evidenc e pre sented by

either party on the issue of damag es was the t estimony of Mr. Kelley

. The Chancellor and the Kelley s do, howeve r, disag ree as to the dollar amount given by Mr. Kelley at trial. I n their propose d Statement of Ev ide nc e , th e Ke lle y s ma int a ine d th a t Mr . K e lle y te sti fi e d th a t th e e a se me nt de va lue d h is l a nd in the amount of $5,000. At the post-trial hear ing, the trial court disag ree d with this st atement of the testimony . I nstead, the Chanc ellor re m em b er ed Mr. Kelley g iving the “ astronomical f igur e” of $50,000, which the lowe r cour t felt to be cle arly

unrea sonable. Ac co rd ingly , the lower court excluded from the Statement of Evidence the estimate of $5,000 purportedly g iven by Mr. Kelley
a t tr ia l.

As w e s tate d

e ar li e r , an y

is s u e r e g ar d in g th e a c c ur a c y o f a s tate me n t o f

e v id e n c e is to be
se ttl e d b y the tr ia l c ourt , w ho se de te rm inatio n is c on c lus ive a bs e nt e xtra or din ary

c ir c ums tanc e s. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 2 4( c ), (e ); Ha ll v . H all , 772 S.W .2d 432, 435 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). The r esourc es of a tria l judge for resolving these i ssues are (1) the memory of the trial judg e, (2) memoranda of the trial judg e, and ( 3) an e videntiary hear ing to e stabl i s h what evide nce w as pre sented a t trial. Ha ll , 772 S.W .2d at 435. I f the trial c ourt conduc ts an evidentiar y hear ing t h at i s transcr ibed, as it was here , then this Court can re view the tra nscript of the proceeding , wher e it might find some support for r evision of t he evidentiary rec ord. Id . Havingrevie wed the tr anscr ipt of the post-trial proc eeding in the prese nt case , we do not find ther e to be any “exceptional circ umstances” that would war rant revision of the e videntiary rec ord approved by the t rial court. This appear s to be a ty pical situation wh e re the tr ia l judg e and on e of the pa rt ie s d if fe r i n th e ir

re c oll e c tio n o f e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at tr ia l. Under such circ umstances, t h e d et er m ination of the trial cour t is conclusive and will not be disturbed. We note that our holding o n t h i s m att er disposes of the Kelley s’ ar g ument that they are entitled to da

mag es. The question of the amount of damag es to be a llowed is an issue of f act, a nd the dec ision of the trial judg e, si tting without a jury , enjoy s a pre sumption of corre ctness on appe al unless the evidenc e pre ponderates otherwise

. Ar ms tro ng v . H ic k ma n Co un ty

Hi gh way De pt. , 743 S.W .2d 189, 195 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). As ther e is no evidenc e whatsoever in the r ecor d reg arding the amount of damag es, we cannot sa y that the trial cour

t erre d in its determination.-7- Conclusion

For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the trial court is affirme d. Costs of this appea l
are taxed to the Appellants, Robert D. Ke lley and Mitsy

Kelley , and their sur ety , for whic h execution
m ay i s s u e i f

n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ AL AN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE