### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d onBr ie fs A ugus t 15
, 200 7

ROG ER T. JOHNS ON v. WA YN E BR AN DON , WA RD EN

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Hickman County No. 06-5040C Je ff

ery S. Bivins, Ju dge

No . M 20 07 -0 01 82 -C CA -R 3- HC

The pe titioner, Roge r T

. J o h n s o n , appea ls from the trial cour t’s denial of his petition for ha beas corpus r elief f

rom his convictions for fir st deg ree murder a nd second de g ree murder. Be cause we find that the petit ioner has failed to alleg e a cog nizable claim for habea s corpus r elief, w e af firm the denial of the petition.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he cour t, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

Roge r T. Johnson, Only , Tenne ssee, Pro Se.

Robert E. Cooper, J r., Att orney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; and Cameron L . Hyder, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

F AC TS

This court set out the relevant factual backg round i n its opinion aff irming the dismiss al of the petitioner’s f

irst habea s corpus pe tition:

On Dec e mbe r 7 , 1 99 4, Pe tit ion e r e nte re d guil ty ple a s to on e c ount o f f

ir st deg ree murder a

nd one count of second deg ree murder in e x chang e for a sente nce of life followed by a thi rty

y ear sentenc e as a

Rang e I offe nder. The trial court amended the judg ment on Dec ember 8, 1 9 9 4 to refle ct a se ntence of twenty -five year s andT he rec o rd d o es no t refl ec t the re aso n for this ch an ge

. T he am en d m en t d i d no t m o d i f y t he p eti t i o ne r’ s relea se 1

e ligib ili ty i n a n y m a te ria l wa y. T h e o rig ina l ju d g m e n t o f thirty yea rs a s a R a n g e I o ff e n d e r w ith 3 0 % re le a se e ligib ili ty woul d h ave r es ul t ed i n r el eas e el i gi bi l i t y af t er ni ne y ear s

. T he amended j udgment of t wen t y
- f i ve y ear s , ei gh t mo nt hs as a R an ge II o f

f en d er w i t h 3 5 % relea se e l i gib i l i t y result s i n re l ea se e l i gib i l i t y af t er 8 .98 years.

-2- eig ht months on t he sec ond deg ree murder count to be serve d as a Rang e I Ioffe nder. 1 On J une 18, 2002, P etitioner filed, pr o s e , a petition f or writ of habea s corpus r elief, alleg ing that his plea barg ain ag ree ment was brea ched by the trial cour

t's a mendment of the judg ment. Petitioner alleg ed that the br eac h of the plea b ar gain ag ree ment rende red his convic tion void.

By order enter ed J uly 18, 2002, the trial cour t denied Petitioner' s application fo r h ab ea s co rp u s re l i ef

. T h e t ri al co ur t f

o u n d t h a t P et i t i o n er

h adfa i l edt o al l ege g rounds for r elief c og nizable in a state habea s corpus action. The c ourt ruled that at most, P etitioner' s claim of a br eac hed plea ag ree ment would rende r the c onvictions voidable, rather than void. Petitioner filed a motion to rehe ar in the t rial court, which was de nied by

order dated Oc tober 17, 2002.

Rog e r T . J oh ns on v. State , No. M2 00 2- 02 90 2- CCA -R 3- CO , 200 4 WL 44 39 71 , at *1 (T e nn . Cr im. App. Mar. 5, 2004) , perm. to appe al denied ( Tenn. June 21, 2004).

Under the Tenne ssee Criminal SentencingReform Ac t of 1989 (“the 1989 Act”) , the petitioner wa s classified a s a Rang e I offe nder, f or whom the statutorily

authorized pena lty

for second de g ree murder, a

Class A felony , is fifteen to twe nty -five year s. Howeve r, as pa rt of the plea ag ree ment, the petitioner a g ree d to plead “out of the ra ng e” a nd acc ept a thirty -y ear

sentenc e on the second de g ree murder c ount. I d.

Acc ording to his present petition for ha beas c orpus re lief, the pe titioner filed a second ha beas corpus pe tition i n Marc h 2006. T h e t ri al court dism issed this second petition, and it appea rs no appea l was take n from that dismissal. I n J uly 2006, the petitioner filed his thi rd and pr esent pe tition fo r h a be a s c or pu s r e lie f, a lle g ing :
(1) “ The Criminal Court of Da v id s o n Co u nty at Nashville, e x cee ded their jurisdiction and author ity

while enter ing judg ments of convictions ag ainst t h e petitioner. The sentenc e for

second de g ree murder is i l l ega l beca use . . . the Criminal Sentencing Re f o r m A c t d id n ot p ro vid e fo r c ou

pli ngdif fe re nt i nc arc e ratio n a

nd re le a se e lig ibi lity rang es, . . .”

(2) “ The Criminal Court of Davidson County

. . . y et, [ once ag ain] on Dec ember 8, 1994, exceede d their authority by amendingthe judg ments it had previously enter ed.

. . . T h e am e n d e d j u d g m e n t r e f l e c t s an e n h an c e d s e n t e n c e f r o m R an g e I t o R an g e II, wh ic h is no t th e jud g me nt o f c on vic tio ns the pe tit ion e r a g re e d to waive his constitutional rights to.”Sec t i o n 40

- 3 5

- 1 0 5 de f i nes t he t erm “ st and ard o f f end er” a s used i n t he T enness ee C ri m i nal Sentenci ng R ef o rm 2

A c t o f 1 9 8 9 , an d se c tio n 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 2 e sta b lishe s the se n te n c ing ra n g e s fo r d iff e re n t o ff e n d e rs a n d felo n y c la sse s.

-3- (3) “ [T] he petitioner[’s] pleas of guilt are even mor e tainted [now] than ever be fore
, and .

. . a tr ia l c o u rt h a s n o a u th o r it y to ta k e a p r e v io u s ly e xc e p te d [s ic ] p lea to a sp e c if ic a g re e me nt, [se c re tly

ame nd it], a pp lyingwh a te ve r p un ish me nt t he y wa nt t o impose without filing a notice
, wi t h o u t a sentenc ing he aring , without givingthe defe ndant the opportunity or option to withdraw his pleas, a nd without testing for voluntariness. The pe tit i o n er [’s] pleas of guilt can not [si c] be knowing ly and voluntarily

enter ed to judg ments of convictions that has ‘ no waiver .’”

(4 ) “ [T]he ame nd e d ju dg me nt .

. . is a n ille g a l sen te nc e

. 25 .8 y e ars is n ot a va ila ble under the 1989 Act. T.C.A. § 40-35-211 provides for year s or months, not y ear s and months. Theref

ore, 25.8 year s for a

felony is an illeg al sentenc e.”

The State filed a motion to dismiss for f ailure to pre sent a c og nizable claim for ha beas c orpus re lief, which the tria l court g rante d. This appea l followed.

AN AL YSI S
As we have set out, in his first petition for habe as cor pus relief , the petitioner a lleg ed that the trial court’ s amendment of his judgme nt for second degr ee murder amounted to a bre ach of his plea ag ree ment, rende ring his c onviction void. Roge r T. J ohnson, 2004 WL 443971, at * 1

. He n ow challeng es the same conviction on a somewhat differ ent basis, arguing that his ple a ag ree ment was

never enfor cea ble bec ause it v io la

te d Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tions 40-35-105 and 40-35- 112, parts of the 1989 Act dea ling with off ender classification and sentenc ing r ang es, and that, as w e 2 understand, the court c ould not amend the first judgme nt without a hear ing. H e conte nds that the 1989 Act “did not provide for c oupling diff ere nt incarc eration and re l ease elig ibilit y rang es.” O n
a pp e a l, t he pe tit ion e r a lso c la ims that th e tr ial c ourt e rr e d b y no t a llo wi nghim

su ff ic ie nt t ime to oppose the State’s motion to dismis s his petition and violated his rig ht to due proce ss by allowing the State to file a response to his orig inal petition afte r i t had been amended. He further asser ts, on appea l, that it was improper for the trial court to dismiss his petition wit hout appointing c ounsel and conductingan evid en t i ar y h ea ring . The State c ounters that the pe titioner has not prese nted a cog nizable claim for ha

beas c orpus re lief, so summary dismiss al of the pe tition was appropriate.

I t is we ll- e sta

bli sh e d in Te nn e sse e that th e re me dy pr ov ide d b y

a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s is limit ed in scope and may only be invoked whe re the judgme nt is void or the petitioner’s ter m of imp ri so nme nt ha s expir e d. State v. Ritc hie , 20 S.W.3 d 624 , 630 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; State v. Da ve np or t, 980 S.W .2d 407, 409 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). “ A judg ment is void only when it appe ars upon the fa c e of the jud g me nt o r t

he re c or d o f t

he pr oc e e din g s u

po n w hic h th e judgm ent is render e d th a t a convictingcourt wa s without jurisdi ction or authority to sentence a def endant, or that a def endant’ s sentenc e of imprisonment or other restra int has expi red.” Hoover v. State, 215 S

. W

. 3d 776, 778 (Tenn. 2007) (citation omitted). The judg ment of a c ourt of g ener al jurisdiction is conclusive and-4-

presumed to be valid, and such a judgme nt can only

be impeac hed if the record a ffirmatively shows that the re nderingcourt was wi t h o u t persona l or subject matter jurisdiction. Arche r v. State, 851 S

. W

. 2 d 1 5 7 , 1 6 2 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 3 )

. T o o b t a i nh a b e a s c o r p u s r e l i e f
, t h e p e t i t i o n e r

mu s ts h o wb y a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of th e e vid e nc e tha

t hi s se nte nc e is v oid

and no t me re ly

vo ida ble . Se e Da

ve np or t, 980 S.W .2d at 409. Consequently , a petitioner c annot collater ally attack a fac ially valid judgme nt of the trial c ourt in a petition for ha beas c orpus re lief. Arc her, 851 S.W.2d at 162.

Th e pe tit ion e r n owc on te nd s, a s we have se t out, that his sente nc e is i lle g a l be c a us e it i s in direc t co n t ravention of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tions 40-35-105(a) (1) a nd 40-35-112( a)( 1) (2 00 6) . “ A s e nte nc e imp os e d in dir e c t c on tr ave nti on

of a statut e is v oid

and ill e g a l and

su bje c t to attack in a

habea s corpus p ro ce ed i n g. ” Hoove r, 215 S.W.3d at 778 (citations omit ted). F irst, the petitioner asser

ts that his ag ree ment to ple ad “out of the rang e” was binding upon the trial cour t. He argues that he “ ag ree d to plea [sic] g uilty to L ife plus 30 y ear s at 30% Rang e I with other cha

rg es beingdismiss ed w h i ch i s a T enn. R . Crim. P. 11(E)(1)(C) ty pe of a g ree ment . . . causingit to be bin din g up on

the c ourt .” Simu lta

ne ousl y , he c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt ha d n o ju

ri sd ic tio n to impose a sentenc e outside of the r ang e pre scribed by the 1989 Act.

The petitioner’s argument in this re g ard is inher ently contra dictory

and ig nores de cisions of the United States and Te nnessee Sup re m e C o u rts. As an initial matter, plea ag ree ments are not bin d i n g o n t rial cour

ts, and we c an disce rn no statement to the c ontrary in Tennesse e Rule of Criminal Procedu re 1 1 . See also Santobello v. Ne w York, 404 U .S. 257, 262 (1971); State v. Willi ams, 85 1 S. W.2 d 8 28 , 8 30 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ). Mo re ov e r, the pe tit ion e r ha s wa ive d th is argument by

failing to raise it in his amended pe tition. S ee T enn. R. App. P. 36(a) ; State v. Al va ra do , 9 61 S.W. 2d

13 6, 15 3 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ) ( “ Or din ari ly , is su e s r a ise d f or the fi rs t ti me on appea l are waived.” ). Simil arly , there is no merit to the petitioner’s cla im that t h e t ri al cour t lacke d jurisdiction to im pose the barg ained- for sentence

. Our supreme court held i n Hoover that an offe nder who pleads guilty may be sente nced t o a ter

m outside the rang e, as longas the sente nce imposed is within t he over all punishment rang e for the par ticular cl as s o f o ffense. Hoove r, 215 S.W. 3d a t 77 9. Th e fa c ts o f H oo ve r a re str iki ng ly

sim ila r t o th e c a se a t ba

r. Th e de fe nd ant i n Ho ov e r p le d guil ty to seco nd deg re e mur de r a nd a c c e pte d a s p art

of the ple a a g re e me nt a

c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a s a R an g e I , s t an d ar d o f f e n d e r an d a s e n t e n c e o f th i rty
- f i v e y e ar s w ith re le a se elig ibilit y afte r 100%. I d. at 777. He subsequently attacke d his conviction with a petition for habe as corpus r elief, a lleg ing that his sentence w as illeg al bec ause it excee ded the twe nty -five- y ear maxi mum permitted under the 1989 Act for Rang e I offe nders convicted of Class A felonies. I d. at 777-78. The Tennesse e Supreme Court held that “[a] plea-bar g ained se ntence may leg ally exceed the maxi mum a

vailable in the offe nder Rang e so long as the sentenc e does not e x cee d the maxim um punishment authorized for the plea offe nse.” I d. at 780.

Ho ov e r c on tr ols our a

na ly sis of thi s is su e . T he pe tit ion e r’ s se nte nc e is n ot v oid be c a us e it

e x c e e d e d t h e s t a tu t o r

y m a x i m u m f

o r h i s o f f e n d e r c l a s s i f

i c a t i o n

. H i s s e n t e n c e w a s b e l o w th e s i x tyy ear maxi mum punishm ent authorized for Class A felonies, so it is not f acia lly illega l. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 112(c) (2006). Ac cording ly , we c on clude that the pe titioner does not state a cog nizable gr ound for ha

beas c orpus re lief on this issue.-5-

Th e pe tit ion e r n e xt ar g ue s th a t he is e nti tle d to re lie f b e c a us e the tr ia l court a llo we d th e State to file a re sponse to his origina l habea s corpus petition a fter he had filed an amende d petition. The petitioner alleg es that such c onduct violates his constitutio n al ri gh t to due proce ss but cites no authority in support of this proposition; thus, he has wa ived this argument. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 1 0( b) (“ I ssu e s w hic h a re no t su pp or te d b y argume nt, c itatio n to a

uth or iti es, or

a pp ro pr iate ref ere nces to the r ecor d will be treated as wa ived in this court.”). Fu rt h er m o re , even if this iss ue
wer e prope rly

befor e thi s court, the pe titioner makes no alleg ation that this due proce ss violation rende rs his judgme nts of convict i on void. There fore , this claim is not a cog nizable gr ound for habea s corpus re lief.

The pe ti ti o n e r

n e xt c la im s th a t t

h e tr ia l c o urt e r

r e d b y n o t p r o v id in g h im

w it ha sufficie nt op po rt un ity to op po se the State ’s mot ion to d ism iss his pe tit ion . T he re c or d in dic a te s th a t th e State filed its motion to dismiss on September 7, 2006. The trial cour t gr anted the motion on September 12, 2006. The pe titioner claims that languag e in Tennesse e Rule of Civil Procedure 12.01, “[t] he plaintiff shall serve a re ply to a cou n t er cl aim in the answe r within 30 day s after service of the

answe r,” guara

ntees him a rig ht to submit a r esponse to the State’ s motion before it is ruled upon by the c ourt . T he pe tit ion e r c ite s n o a uth or ity in su pp or

t of his c on str

uc tio n o f t

his ru le of

c ivi l proce dure, a

nd this alleg ed g round for relief does not posit that the p etitioner’s judg ments of conviction ar e void. I t is not a cog nizable claim for ha beas c orpus re lief.

T h e petiti oner a

rgued in his amende d petition that the trial court’s amendment of the jud g me nts dir e c tly c on tr ave ne d T e nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -2 11 (2 00 6) , d e a lin g wi th the impositi on of sentenc es. He claimed that “ 25.8 y ear s [25 y ear s, 8 months] is not available unde r the 1989 Act. T.C.A. § 40-35-211 provides for y ear s or m onths, not y ear s and months. There fore
, 25 .8 y e ars fo r a

fe lony is a n il le g a l se nte nc e .” Ag a in, ho we ve r, the pe tit ion e r h a s n ot s up po rt e d th is

c la im w ithargume nt i n h is a pp e a l and ha s thu s wa ive d thi s iss ue

. Ev e n we re we to re a c h the me ri ts of this issue, we could not conc lude that this asser t i o n const itutes a cog nizable claim for ha beas corpus r elief. We c an dis cer n no rea son why the l eg islature would require that the l eng th of a f elony sentenc e be e x presse d in either months or y ear s, but not both. The petitioner offe rs us no rea son why the leg islature would intend such a n unorthodox , formalistic construc tion.

Finally , the petitioner a

rgues that the trial c ourt err ed by summarily dismiss ing his petiti on without appointing counse l or holding a n evidentiar

y hear ing. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 29-21-109 ( 2006) provides: “ I f, fr om the showing of the petiti oner, the plaintiff would not be entitled to a ny re lie f, the wr it [of ha

be a s c or pu s] may be re fu se d, the re a so ns fo r s uc h r e fu sa l be ingbr ie fl y endorse d upon the petition, or appende d there to.” Our supr eme c ourt has held that “ when a habea s corpus petition f

ails to e stablish that a judgme nt is void, a trial court may dismiss the petition without a hea ring .” Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 260 (Tenn. 2007) (citations omi tted). An indig ent petitioner does not have a constit utional rig ht to counsel in a habeas corpus proce edingunless the trial court de termines that counse l is “nec essar y ” under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-14- 204. Summers, 212 S.W .3d at 261. Appointment of counse l is not necessar y mere ly beca use a petition states a cog nizable claim for ha beas c orpus re lief. I d.-6-

The amended pe tition asserted that the pe titioner’s sentenc e was i l l ega l beca use (1) the

seco n d d egr ee mur der se ntence exceede d the maxim um for a Ra ng e I offe nder; (2) the trial cour t

e x c e e d e d i t s a

u t h o r i t y b y am e n d i n g t h e j u d g m e n t f r o m th i rty ye ar s a s a R an g e I o f f e n d e r t o tw e n tyfive y ear s, eig ht months as a Rang e I Ioffe nder; and (3) a sentenc e including a term of both y ear s and

months is i mpe rm iss ibl e un de r T e nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d sec tio n 40- 35 -2 11

. No ne of the se c la ims

are meritorious. There fore
, summary dismiss al of the petit ion was appr opriate, a s we will explain.

Pr e vio us po rt ion s o f t

his opin io n hav e con sid e re d a nd re je c te d th e fi rs t and

thi rd of the se
c la ims . A s f

or the se c on d cla im, a jud g me nt be c ome s fin a l thir ty da y s a ft e r e ntr

y , a ft e r whic h ti me the trial cour

t ge nera lly

may not amend it. State v. Moore, 814 S.W .2d 381, 382 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); see T enn. R. App. P. 4(a) , (c) (2007). The rec ord re flec ts that the trial court amended the jud g me nt w ith in o ne we e k o f t he e ntr y of the or ig ina l. Th e re fo re , the tr ia l c ourt ha d jur isd ic tio n to make the amendment. Fur ther, any potential err or i n the amendment proce ss did not prejudice the pe tit ion e r. As no te d e arl ie r, the ame ndme nt d id n ot m a te ri a lly c ha ng e the pe ti tio ne r’ s r e le a se elig ibilit y ; any

err or was there fore harmless. See Tenn. R. A pp. P. 36( b) (2007) (“A final judg ment from w h ic hr e li e f

is av a il a b le an d o th e r w is e a p p r o p r iate s h a ll n o t b e s e t a s id e un le s s , c o n s id ering the whole r ecor d, err or involving a substantial r ight more probably than not affe cted the judg ment

or wo uld re su lt in pr e

jud ic e to t

he jud ic ia l pr oc e ss. ” ). Th e pe tit ion e r d id n ot p re se nt a c og niza ble

c la im f or ha be a s c or pu s re lie f in his pe tit ion
, and the tr ia l c ourt wa s w ith in i ts a uth or ity to d ism iss the petition without appointing counse l or conduc ting a hear ing.

CO NC LU SION

After our re view, we aff

irm the trial court’s dismiss al of the pe tition for habea s corpus re lief.

___________________________________ AL AN E. GL ENN, JUDGE