United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 19-2199

___________________________

Bryce Masters

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

City of Independence, Missouri; Tom Dailey; Bryce Blackmore

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants

Timothy Runnels

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

TASER International, Inc.; Patrick Smith

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants

 ___________________________

No. 19-2242

___________________________

 Bryce Masters

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

City of Independence, Missouri; Tom Dailey; Bryce Blackmore

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants
Timothy Runnels

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee

TASER International, Inc.; Patrick Smith

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants

 ____________

Appeals from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

 ____________

 Submitted: November 19, 2020

Filed: May 27, 2021

____________

Before COLLOTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

____________

KELLY, Circuit Judge.

Bryce Masters brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging that Independence, Missouri police officer Timothy Runnels used excessive

force against him during a traffic stop.1 A jury found in favor of Masters and awarded

him compensatory and punitive damages. Runnels appeals, arguing that the district

court erred in denying (1) his motion for judgment as a matter of law based on

qualified immunity and (2) his motion for a new trial based on the admission of

testimony by two of Masters’s expert witnesses. Masters cross-appeals, arguing that

the district court erred in granting Runnels’s request for a remittitur of a punitive

1Masters sued other defendants in addition to Runnels, all of whom were

dismissed from the case over the course of the proceedings. Only the claims against

Runnels are at issue on appeal.

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damages award. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm in part and

reverse in part.

I.

In the afternoon of September 14, 2014, Bryce Masters, then a 17-year-old high

school senior, was driving his car on a residential street in Independence, Missouri.2

Timothy Runnels, a police officer with seven years’ experience in law enforcement,

was on patrol in the area. He ran a license plate check on Masters’s car, which

revealed an outstanding warrant apparently associated with the plate.3 Runnels then

initiated a traffic stop. 

After both cars stopped on the side of the road, Runnels approached Masters’s

front passenger-side window and asked Masters to roll it down. Although the

window was fully operable, Masters did not roll it down completely. Runnels then

walked around to the opposite side of the car, opened the front driver-side door, and

ordered that Masters get out of the car. Masters refused, asking, “For what?” and

whether he was under arrest. Runnels told Masters he was under arrest, but he did not

explain the reason. During the encounter, Runnels never told Masters why he had

2These facts are based on the parties’ joint stipulation of facts, two video

recordings of the incident (from the onboard dash camera of Runnels’s police car and

the camera on Masters’s cell phone), and evidence introduced at trial. We consider

the evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict, giving [Masters] the benefit

of all reasonable inferences.” Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. N. Am. Mortg. Co.,

381 F.3d 811, 818 (8th Cir. 2004).

3The outstanding warrant was erroneously associated with Masters’s license

plate through a clerical error. The warrant was actually associated with a different

license plate registered to an unrelated 39-year-old woman who had failed to appear

in traffic court. 

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been pulled over, and he never asked for Masters’s driver’s license, vehicle

registration, or proof of insurance.

Runnels drew his model X26 Taser,4 which was in probe mode, and asked, “Do

you really wanna get Tased right here in the middle of your car?” Masters resisted

by leaning back onto the passenger-side front seat, saying, “I haven’t done anything

officer.” Runnels re-holstered his Taser then attempted to physically remove Masters

from the car by pulling on his shirt and legs. Masters temporarily succeeded in

resisting Runnels by pulling away from him, but at no point during the encounter did

Masters attempt to hit or kick Runnels nor did he verbally threaten him. After several

4According to the parties’ stipulation, an X26 Taser is classified as a “less

lethal” weapon used by law enforcement that may be operated in two modes: “probe

mode” and “drive stun mode.” In probe mode, two barbed darts shoot from the

cartridge at the front of the weapon when a user pulls its trigger. If both darts make

adequate contact with a target, an electrical circuit is completed and the X26

discharges short, rapid pulses of electrical current that radiate between the darts,

causing muscle contractions intended to temporarily and safely incapacitate that

person. The length of the electric shock varies depending on how the X26 is used. 

If the user fires the X26 and immediately releases the trigger, the target will be

shocked in a five-second “cycle.” The user can cut that cycle short by engaging the

X26’s safety before the five seconds elapse. The user can also initiate a new fivesecond cycle by pulling the trigger again after the first cycle ends. Alternatively, the

user can continuously shock the target for consecutive five-second cycles by holding

down the trigger. Before the encounter with Masters, Runnels received training on

how to use the Taser to reduce the risk of inducing cardiac arrest. Specifically, he

was trained to avoid (1) targeting an individual’s chest with a Taser and (2)

prolonging Taser discharges. Additionally, Runnels knew that he could stop the

Taser from discharging continuously by engaging the safety or releasing the trigger. 

The X26 user can also operate the Taser in drive stun mode by removing the

cartridge from the front of the weapon. Doing so exposes two electrodes, which

become energized when the user pulls the trigger and cause a painful burning

sensation when applied to a target. Drive stun mode is solely intended to coerce an

individual into compliance through the application of pain.

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seconds, Runnels again drew his Taser and pointed it at Masters. He said, “All right,

fine, f*** it. Just get out. Out, out right now,” and he pulled the trigger.

One Taser probe lodged in Masters’s chest while the other lodged in his

abdomen, and the Taser began to shock Masters. Masters was nevertheless able to

move, get out of the car, and lie face-down on the asphalt, where he fell unconscious. 

Runnels knelt down, released the trigger, and handcuffed Masters’s hands behind his

back. Runnels kept the Taser trigger engaged from the time he initially fired the

Taser until he knelt down to handcuff Masters. The parties agree that the continuous

Taser discharge lasted at least 20 seconds, the equivalent of four cycles of the Taser. 

During the Taser discharge, Masters complied with all of Runnels’s commands until

he fell unconscious. 

After handcuffing him, Runnels lifted Masters, who was still unconscious, by

his arms and dragged him several feet around the rear of the car to a driveway on the

edge of the road. Runnels dropped Masters face-first onto the concrete, fracturing

four teeth and causing abrasions to Masters’s forehead as well as a laceration on his

chin. In addition, the Taser discharge had disrupted Masters’s heart beat, causing

Masters to suffer a convulsion due to a lack of oxygenated blood flowing to his brain

34 seconds after Runnels fired the Taser. One minute and 41 seconds later, Masters

fell into cardiac arrest. Emergency medical responders were able to resuscitate

Masters, but he suffered hypoxia and anoxic brain injury as a result of his cardiac

arrest.

 Runnels was subsequently terminated from the Independence Police

Department because of this incident and, after an FBI investigation, was indicted on

two counts of deprivation of rights under color of law (one for the prolonged use of

the Taser and one for dropping Masters to the ground) and two counts of obstruction

of justice. On September 11, 2015, Runnels pleaded guilty to the deprivation of

rights count related to the drop, the remaining counts were dismissed, and he was

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sentenced to 48 months’ imprisonment. Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States

v. Runnels, No. 15-cr-00106-DW, at Doc. 44 (W.D. Mo. June 1, 2016).

On September 26, 2016, Masters sued Runnels under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

violating his civil rights. As relevant to this appeal, Masters initially claimed that

Runnels violated his Fourth Amendment right against the use of excessive force by

(1) firing a Taser into Masters’s chest, (2) prolonging the Taser discharge (the

prolonged Taser claim), and (3) picking Masters up after he was rendered unresponsive and dropping him face-first onto concrete (the drop claim). 

At the close of discovery, Runnels moved for summary judgment, arguing he

was entitled to qualified immunity on Masters’s two Taser-related claims. The

district court denied the motion. Before trial, Runnels moved to exclude the expert

testimony of, among others, Michael Dreiling, a vocational rehabilitation expert, and

Dr. Karen Tabak, an economics expert. After a Daubert hearing on November 27,

2018, the district court denied Runnels’s motion.

On December 10, 2018, a five-day jury trial commenced. At the close of

Masters’s evidence, Runnels moved for judgment as a matter of law, again arguing

that he was entitled to qualified immunity for Masters’s first two claims. The district

court denied the motion. Runnels renewed the motion at the close of all evidence,

and the district court again denied it.

On December 13, Masters submitted only the second and third claims—the

prolonged Taser claim and the drop claim—to the jury. On December 14, the jury

found in favor of Masters on both claims, awarding Masters $5,000,0005 in

compensatory damages for the prolonged Taser claim and $50,000 in compensatory

5The district court later reduced the compensatory damages award for the

prolonged Taser claim to $2,900,000 to account for two payments that resulted in a

$2,100,000 credit against the initial $5,000,000 award. 

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damages for the drop claim. The jury also awarded punitive damages on both

claims—$500,000 for the prolonged Taser claim and $1,000,000 for the drop claim.

Runnels filed three post-trial motions. First, he renewed his motion for

judgment as a matter of law on the prolonged Taser claim on the ground of qualified

immunity. Second, he filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the district court

erred by, among other things, admitting the expert testimony of Dreiling and Dr.

Tabak. Third, he filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment by remittitur, arguing

that the jury’s $1,000,000 punitive damages award for the drop claim was grossly

excessive. On May 7, 2019, the district court denied Runnels’s motions for judgment

as a matter of law and a new trial but granted his motion for remittitur, decreasing the

punitive damages award for the drop claim to $236,500.6 This appeal and crossappeal followed. 

II.

First, Runnels appeals the denial of his post-verdict motion for judgment as a

matter of law, arguing that he is entitled to qualified immunity for Masters’s

prolonged Taser claim. We review a district court’s denial of judgment as a matter

of law on the basis of qualified immunity de novo, using the same standards as the

district court. See Luckert v. Dodge Cnty., 684 F.3d 808, 816 (8th Cir. 2012). “A

motion for judgment as a matter of law is proper only if ‘a reasonable jury would not

6As part of its order, the district court credited $2,700 against the compensatory

damages award for the drop claim to account for the restitution payment Runnels

made in connection with his conviction based on the same conduct. This reduced the

amount of compensatory damages Masters would receive on the drop claim to

$47,300. When the district court granted remittitur, it did so by reducing the punitive

damages award to a 5:1 ratio, using $47,300 as the amount of the compensatory

damages award. Neither party asserts error in the district court’s decision to rely on

the reduced amount of compensatory damages to calculate the reduced punitive

damages award. 

-7-
have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for [Masters].’” Id. at 817 (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)). Our review is “highly deferential to the jury verdict,” id., and

we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Masters “without making

credibility assessments or weighing the evidence,” Dean v. Cnty. of Gage, 807 F.3d

931, 936 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Phillips v. Collings, 256 F.3d 843, 847 (8th Cir.

2001)). 

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability in a § 1983

action unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or

statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known.” De Boise v. Taser

Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Brown v. City of Golden

Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 495 (8th Cir. 2009)). “Qualified immunity gives government

officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all

but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Blazek v. City

of Iowa City, 761 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S.

3, 6 (2013) (per curiam)). We conduct a two-part inquiry to determine whether

qualified immunity protects a government official from liability: “(1) whether the

facts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional or statutory right,

and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s

alleged misconduct.” Brown, 574 F.3d at 496. 

We start with whether the evidence makes out a constitutional violation,

specifically whether Runnels’s prolonged use of the Taser amounted to an excessive

use of force. To answer this question, we look to “whether the amount of force used

was objectively reasonable under the particular circumstances.” Shekleton v.

Eichenberger, 677 F.3d 361, 366 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Johnson v. Carroll, 658

F.3d 819, 824 (8th Cir. 2011)). “We evaluate the reasonableness of an officer’s use

of force ‘from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with

the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’” Brown, 574 F.3d at 496 (quoting Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). Looking to the totality of the circumstances, we consider

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(1) “the severity of the crime at issue,” (2) “the immediate threat the suspect poses to

the safety of the officer or others,” and (3) “whether the suspect is actively resisting

or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Shekleton, 677 F.3d at 366 (quoting Smith

v. Kan. City, Mo. Police Dep’t, 586 F.3d 576, 581 (8th Cir. 2009)). “Force is least

justified against nonviolent misdemeanants who do not flee or actively resist arrest

and pose little or no threat to the security of the officers or the public.” Id. (internal

quotation omitted).

Although we give some consideration to the circumstances in which Runnels

initially discharged the Taser, Master’s excessive force claim focuses solely on

Runnels’s prolonged use of his Taser, or the last 15 seconds of its deployment.7 See

Jackson v. Stair, 944 F.3d 704, 712 (8th Cir. 2019) (finding error where the district

court did not analyze the second discharge of a Taser, which nearly instantaneously

followed the initial discharge without warning, as a separate use of force); cf. Smith

v. Conway Cnty., 759 F.3d 853, 860–61 (8th Cir. 2014) (analyzing under the Eighth

Amendment the constitutionality of the second tasing of a non-violent, no longer

aggressive inmate attempting to comply with prison guards’ orders separately from

the initial discharge of a Taser).

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, Runnels’s

prolonged use of his Taser was not an objectively reasonable use of force. Masters’s

conduct leading up to the tasing “did not amount to a severe or violent crime.” 

Brown, 574 F.3d at 496. And although Masters initially resisted Runnels’s attempts

7At trial, the court gave the gave the following instruction to the jury: “If you

find that defendant Timothy Runnels had a reasonable belief that plaintiff Bryce

Masters was actively resisting arrest as the taser was discharged, that plaintiff was

failing to comply, or defendant Runnels continued the taser discharge unintentionally,

your verdict must be in favor of defendant Timothy Runnels.” As Runnels conceded

at oral argument, by rendering its verdict in favor of Masters, the jury found that

Runnels did not have a reasonable belief that Masters was actively resisting arrest

during the last 15 seconds of the continuous 20-second Taser discharge. 

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to remove him from the car, he did not physically hit or verbally threaten Runnels. 

Masters, who was 17 years old at the time, “posed at most a minimal safety threat”

to Runnels. Id. at 497. Moreover, any slight safety threat he might have posed

dissipated during the last 15 seconds of the continual tasing when he was not resisting

but in fact was complying with Runnels’s commands, getting out of his car, and

laying down on the pavement. In sum, Masters “was an unarmed suspected

misdemeanant, who [was] not resist[ing] arrest, did not threaten [Runnels], did not

attempt to run from him, and did not behave aggressively towards him.” Shekleton,

677 F.3d at 366. A reasonable officer would not have continued to tase Masters

under these circumstances. See Goodwin v. City of Painesville, 781 F.3d 314,

324–25 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding a Fourth Amendment violation where police officers

continuously tased the plaintiff in probe mode for 21 seconds, during which he “was

convulsing uncontrollably and had ceased all resistance”); Jones v. Las Vegas Metro.

Police Dep’t, 873 F.3d 1123, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding a triable issue of fact

as to whether police officers violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights where

they continued to tase him while he lay “on the ground after his body ‘locked up’ as

a result of repeated taser shocks”); Glasscox v. City of Argo, 903 F.3d 1207, 1214

(11th Cir. 2018) (“Even if the arrestee’s resistance justified deployment of a taser

initially, if he has stopped resisting during this time period, further taser deployments

are excessive.” (cleaned up)). “[E]ven previously-resisting suspects have a

constitutional right to be free of a gratuitous application of a Taser once they have

stopped all resistance.” Goodwin, 781 F.3d at 324.

Runnels nevertheless argues that this was a “tense and rapidly evolving”

encounter. In his view, it was reasonable to continue discharging the Taser, even

while Masters was compliant, until Masters was fully subdued. It is true that the

reasonableness of an officer’s use of force must take into account that “police officers

are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a

particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. “Even so, a reasonable officer is not

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permitted to ignore changing circumstances.” Neal v. Ficcadenti, 895 F.3d 576, 581

(8th Cir. 2018). The undisputed evidence shows that Masters stopped resisting arrest

soon after Runnels initially discharged his Taser. A reasonable officer would have

taken into account those changed circumstances to determine whether continued or

additional use of the Taser was warranted. Runnels did not do so, and the record

supports Masters’s claim that Runnels used excessive force when prolonging the use

of the Taser. 

Second, we consider whether the right to be free from an excessive, prolonged

use of a Taser was clearly established as of September 14, 2014, when the traffic stop

occurred. See Shekleton, 677 F.3d at 366 (“When determining whether an action was

a clearly established constitutional violation, we look to the state of the law at the

time of the incident.”). “For a right to be clearly established, ‘existing law must have

placed the constitutionality of the officer’s conduct beyond debate.’” Bell v.

Neukirch, 979 F.3d 594, 606 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby,

138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018)). The law must have been clear enough at the time of the

officer’s conduct “that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the

particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” Id. at 606–07 (quoting Wesby, 138 S. Ct.

at 590). “The relevant, dispositive inquiry is whether it would be clear to a

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” 

Brown, 574 F.3d at 499 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)).

In September 2014, it was clearly established that prolonging the use of a Taser

against a suspect who was complying with a police officer’s commands constituted

an excessive use of force. See Jackson, 944 F.3d at 713. In Jackson, we held that it

was clearly established as of 2013 that tasing an individual—who had fallen to the

ground after being initially tased for five seconds—a second time without warning

or time to affirmatively comply with the officer’s commands was excessive force. 

See id. at 711–13. This was the case even though Jackson was initially tased for

actively threatening a police officer by “rais[ing] his right fist toward the officer’s

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head.” Id. at 708. Thus, by 2013, our case law had sufficiently established that tasing

a “non-threatening, non-fleeing, non-resisting” misdemeanant was excessive,

regardless of his or her earlier conduct that precipitated the initial use of force. See

id. at 713 (citing Brown, 574 F.3d at 496–97; then citing Shannon v. Koehler, 616

F.3d 855, 862–63 (8th Cir. 2010); and then citing Montoya v. City of Flandreau, 669

F.3d 867, 871–72 (8th Cir. 2012)). Even though Jackson actively resisted arrest, we

held that it would have been sufficiently clear to a reasonable officer that tasing him

a second time while he was incapacitated from the first Taser discharge violated his

constitutional right to be free from excessive force.

Runnels argues this case is distinguishable because the officer in Jackson

“delivered a second taser application while the suspect was prone on the ground

under the effects of the taser, clearly no longer resisting arrest.” Yet that is

effectively what happened here—Runnels continued to deploy his Taser after Masters

was clearly no longer resisting arrest. Runnels also asserts there is “no bright line”

on how long an officer may tase a suspect. But there is: An officer may not continue

to tase a person who is no longer resisting, threatening, or fleeing. That is so whether

the tasing comes in the form of multiple, separate deployments or, as in this case, a

single, continuous deployment that lasts for an extended period of time. By

September 2014, “when the tasing[] of [Masters] occurred, there was sufficient case

law to establish that a misdemeanor suspect in [Masters’s] position at the time of the

[prolonged] tasing—non-threatening, non-fleeing, non-resisting—had a clearly

established right to be free from excessive force,” Jackson, 944 F.3d at 713, and that

prolonged tasing of such a suspect was excessive. 

The district court did not err in denying Runnels’s motion for judgment as a

matter of law on Masters’s prolonged Taser claim.

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III.

Runnels next appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial on

the grounds that the testimony of Dreiling, Masters’s vocational rehabilitation expert,

and Dr. Tabak, Masters’s economics expert, should have been excluded. We review

the district court’s decision regarding the admissibility of expert witness testimony

for an abuse of discretion. See In re Wholesale Grocery Prods. Antitrust Litig., 946

F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir. 2019). We will not reverse the district court’s determination

on the admissibility of expert testimony “[a]bsent a clear and prejudicial abuse of

discretion.” In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 586 F.3d 547, 565 (8th Cir. 2009); see

also Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 (“Unless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or

excluding evidence . . . is ground for granting a new trial . . . .”). 

Trial judges serve a “gatekeeping” function and have “considerable leeway”

in admitting or excluding evidence, including expert testimony. Kumho Tire Co. v.

Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 

[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or

otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to

determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts

or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and

methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and

methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. We have recognized that the “cases are legion that . . . call for the

liberal admission of expert testimony,” Johnson v. Mead Johnson & Co., 754 F.3d

557, 562 (8th Cir. 2014), and “[c]ourts should resolve doubts regarding the usefulness

of an expert’s testimony in favor of admissibility,” Marmo v. Tyson Fresh Meats,

Inc., 457 F.3d 748, 758 (8th Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, “[e]xpert testimony is

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inadmissible if it is speculative, unsupported by sufficient facts, or contrary to the

facts of the case.” Wholesale Grocery, 946 F.3d at 1001.

Runnels asserts that Dreiling’s vocational rehabilitation expert testimony was

inadmissible because it was not supported by sufficient medical facts or data. “A

vocational rehabilitationist assesses the extent of an individual’s disability, evaluates

how the disability affects the individual’s employment opportunities, and assists the

individual’s re-entry into the labor market.” Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734,

740 (3d Cir. 2000). Because vocational rehabilitationists generally are not

physicians, they are not competent to diagnose a person’s medical condition or to

opine on their physical or psychological impairments. See Nguyen v. Chater, 100

F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996). They may, however, rely on medical records,

reports, and testimony about a person’s medical condition, combined with other

materials and their knowledge and experience about the labor market, to opine on the

effect the medical condition may have on that person’s vocational outlook. See id.

In reaching his expert opinion, Dreiling relied upon medical records from the

time Masters was initially treated for his injuries, neuropsychological testing

performed by Dr. Terrie Price, an independent interview with Masters about his

perspective on his injuries, Masters’s educational records and employment history,

and Dreiling’s own education, training, and experience as a vocational rehabilitation

consultant. Based on the information contained in these materials, he opined that, due

to Masters’s anoxic brain injury and related behavioral and cognitive difficulties

caused by the tasing, Masters would likely be unable to successfully complete college

or obtain a job that could adequately accommodate his physical and emotional needs. 

Because of this, Dreiling further reasoned that Masters has a diminished future

earning capacity compared to his estimated earning capacity before the tasing.

Runnels nevertheless argues that such an opinion is speculative and unsupported by facts because none of Masters’s medical experts directly testified that

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Masters’s brain injury “would impact him vocationally in any way, shape, form, or

fashion.” By his reading, the medical records and reports did not establish that

Masters could not complete college or perform certain work-related tasks, would have

a shortened work life, or would need any special or particular accommodations for

work. Instead, he continues, experts like Dr. Price testified that Masters was of above

average intelligence and could enroll in and complete college with certain accommodations. 

Based on our review of the record, we disagree; there was sufficient undisputed

evidence in the record to permit Dreiling to reach an independent vocational

rehabilitationist opinion that Masters will have a diminished earning capacity going

forward because of his medical, behavioral, and cognitive injuries. Although Dr.

Price, when asked on cross-examination, said that she did not believe Masters was

wholly incapable of attending college, she expressly conditioned that view by noting

that Masters’s cognitive and behavioral difficulties would “be limiting in his pursuit

of goals.” Namely, she identified that Masters’s cognitive ability (e.g., executive

functioning, processing speed, memory, complex reasoning) and behavior (e.g.,

frustration tolerance, attention span) were negatively affected by his anoxic brain

injury and would require accommodations if Masters chose to pursue college. For

example, in 2014, soon after the tasing, she observed that Masters reported slower

thinking, headaches, visual problems, forgetfulness, mood swings, judgment issues,

and trouble sleeping. And in 2015, when she reassessed Masters, she observed a

worsening of some symptoms, including that he exhibited severe depression and

anxiety.

Separately, during an interview with Dreiling as part of his vocational

rehabilitation assessment, Masters confirmed that he had been dealing with ongoing

difficulties since his anoxic brain injury relating to loss of short-term memory,

difficulty multi-tasking, fatigue, anxiety, depression, and irritability. Moreover,

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Masters explained that he felt incapable of pursuing college-level coursework

because of his injuries and related cognitive and behavioral challenges. 

Based on all of the above, as well as his experience working with people

exhibiting similar challenges, Dreiling concluded that Masters will “have a lot of

difficulty with pursuing a college education and being successful and using that

education and training in the labor market.” Rather than offering an unfounded

medical opinion diagnosing Masters’s symptoms, Dreiling relied upon medical

reports and his own observations to conclude that Masters’s cognitive and behavioral

challenges would make attending college or obtaining and maintaining employment

more difficult. Such an opinion falls within Dreiling’s experience and expertise as

a vocational rehabilitationist and was not contrary to the medical evidence. To the

extent Runnels disagreed with the underlying medical opinions about the scope of

Masters’s injuries and related difficulties, he was free to challenge them through

cross-examination at trial, which he did. See Hose v. Chi. Nw. Transp. Co., 70 F.3d

968, 974 (8th Cir. 1995) (“As a general rule, the factual basis of an expert opinion

goes to the credibility of the testimony, not the admissibility, and it is up to the

opposing party to examine the factual basis for the opinion in cross-examination.”

(quoting Loudermill v. Dow Chem. Co., 863 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1988))). The

district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Dreiling’s expert testimony.

Runnels also argues that the expert testimony of Dr. Tabak, an economist who

opined on the present-day value of Masters’s diminished future earning capacity, was

inadmissible solely because it relied on Dreiling’s vocational rehabilitation expert

opinion. Because we conclude that Dreiling’s expert opinion was properly admitted

into evidence, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to admit

Dr. Tabak’s expert testimony. 

-16-
IV.

Masters cross-appeals, asserting the district court erred in granting a remittitur

of the jury’s punitive damages award on the drop claim from $1,000,000 to $236,500. 

Punitive damages are imposed to further legitimate interests in “punishing unlawful

conduct and deterring its repetition.” BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,

568 (1996). An award of punitive damages that is “grossly excessive” in relation to

those interests, however, “enter[s] the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.; see also State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003) (noting that grossly excessive

punitive damages contravene “[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our

constitutional jurisprudence . . . that a person receive fair notice not only of the

conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty

that a State may impose” (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 574 (Breyer, J., concurring))). 

We review the constitutionality of an award of punitive damages de novo, Ondrisek

v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1028 (8th Cir. 2012), and we also review the proportionality determination de novo, Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 953 (8th Cir. 2010)

(citing Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 435 (2001)).

To determine whether a punitive damages award is grossly excessive, we

consider three guideposts: “(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s

misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the

plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive

damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in

comparable cases.” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).

Reprehensibility is the “most important indicium of the reasonableness of a

punitive damages award.” Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 394 F.3d

594, 602 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419). To assess the

reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, we consider whether:

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[1] the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; [2] the

tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the

health or safety of others; [3] the target of the conduct had financial

vulnerability;8 [4] the conduct involved repeated actions or was an

isolated incident; and [5] the harm was the result of intentional malice,

trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.

Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419). 

Looking to these factors, we agree with the district court that Runnels’s actions

dropping an unconscious Masters face-first onto concrete were reprehensible. The

drop fractured several of Masters’s teeth and injured his face and chin, exhibiting at

the very least an indifference to Masters’s health and safety—especially given his

vulnerability at that moment. Indeed, Runnels could have just as easily lowered the

then-unconscious Masters to the ground or placed him in the grass mere steps away. 

And although the drop was an isolated incident, it reflected a callousness to Masters’s

well-being that supports the conclusion that Runnels was acting with intentional

malice. Such a reprehensible act may justify a large punitive damages award.

Next, we consider the ratio between the punitive and compensatory damages

awarded, keeping in mind that “[p]unitive damages must bear a reasonable

relationship to compensatory damages.” Quigley, 598 F.3d at 954 (cleaned up). The

Supreme Court has “consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is

marked by a simple mathematical formula,” Gore, 517 U.S. at 582, although it has

also suggested that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and

compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process,” Campbell,

538 U.S. at 425. A higher ratio may comport with due process where “a particularly

egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages,” Gore, 517

8Because the harm caused to Masters was physical not economic, the third

factor is inapplicable. See Lee ex rel. Lee v. Borders, 764 F.3d 966, 975 n.4 (8th Cir.

2014).

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U.S. at 582; see also Bryant v. Jeffrey Sand Co., 919 F.3d 520, 528 (8th Cir. 2019)

(“Punitive damages may withstand constitutional scrutiny when only nominal or a

small amount of compensatory damages have been assigned, even though the ratio

between the two will necessarily be large.” (quoting JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters

Bank, NA, 539 F.3d 862, 876 (8th Cir. 2008))), or “the injury is hard to detect or the

monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine,” Gore,

517 U.S. at 582. On the other hand, a lesser ratio may be appropriate “[w]hen

compensatory damages are substantial.” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425; see id. at 426

(noting compensatory damages “already contain [some] punitive element”).

Here, the jury’s compensatory damages award of $47,300 is not a nominal

amount, see, e.g., Quigley, 598 F.3d at 955 ($13,685 not a nominal amount); Wallace

v. DTG Operations, Inc., 563 F.3d 357, 362 (8th Cir. 2009) ($30,000 not a nominal

amount), and this is not a case where “the injury was hard to detect” or to put an

economic value on. Contra Bryant, 919 F.3d at 528–29 (affirming 250,000:1 punitive

damages ratio where jury awarded $1 in nominal damages); Haynes v. Stephenson,

588 F.3d 1152, 1158–59 (8th Cir. 2009) (affirming 2,500:1 punitive damages ratio

where jury awarded $1 in nominal damages). Indeed, the jury heard evidence

regarding the medical and dental costs to treat the damage to Masters’s face and teeth

as a result of the drop. 

Finally, we compare the punitive damages award to the civil and criminal

penalties available for comparable misconduct. See Quigley, 598 F.3d at 955. 

Masters directs us to the crime Runnels pleaded guilty to, deprivation of rights under

color of law, 18 U.S.C. § 242, which carries a fine of up to $250,000, see id.

§§ 3559(a)(3), 3571(b)(3). This amount gives us some impression of Congress’s

views on the seriousness of Runnels’s misconduct, but it is less useful to determine

the constitutional limits of the punitive damages award. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at

428 (“When used to determine the dollar amount of [a punitive damages] award, . . .

[a] criminal penalty has less utility [than a civil penalty].”). 

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Ultimately, we conclude that the district court correctly found the jury’s initial

punitive damages award was disproportionate, but we disagree that the reduced award

of $236,500 “sufficiently reflects the reprehensibility of [Runnels’s] conduct.” 

Quigley, 598 F.3d at 955. “[E]xemplary damages imposed on a defendant should

reflect ‘the enormity of his offense,’” Gore, 517 U.S. at 575 (quoting Day v.

Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371 (1852)). An appropriate ratio of punitive damages to

compensatory damages on the drop claim must take into account the gravity of

Runnels’s misconduct, as recognized by the jury, while remaining consistent with due

process in light of the amount of the compensatory damages award. The task is not

easy, but looking to Supreme Court cases on the issue as well as those from our own

circuit for guidance, we conclude that a ratio of 9:1 “comports with due process,

while achieving the statutory and regulatory goals of retribution and deterrence.” 

Quigley, 598 F.3d at 956; see Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425.

V.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s judgment in all

regards, except that the punitive damages award is reversed and remanded to the

district court for entry of a judgment imposing $425,700 in punitive damages for the

drop claim.

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, concurring.

In my view, Jackson v. Stair, 944 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2019), was wrongly

decided and should not be extended. See Jackson v. Stair, 953 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir.

2020) (opinion dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The case presented by

Masters, however, is stronger than the claim in Jackson. Unlike Jackson, where a

reasonable officer could have believed that the offender’s “momentary post-tasered

position on the ground” did not “justify considering it as a clearly punctuated interim

of compliance” that made further use of a taser unreasonable, 944 F.3d at 714

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(Wollman, J., dissenting), Masters was compliant for the last fifteen seconds of the

disputed tasing and lying face-down on the pavement for most of that time. No

reasonable officer could have believed that Masters was resisting during that period,

or that continued application of a taser was reasonable under the circumstances, so

the district court properly denied qualified immunity.

_________________________

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