[Cite as Short v. Rhodes, 2021-Ohio-1845.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

WOOD COUNTY 

Tonya Short Court of Appeals No. WD-20-066 

 

 Appellee Trial Court No. 2014-DR-0120 

v. 

Mark J. Rhodes DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: May 28, 2021 

* * * * * 

 Stephen M. Szuch and Patricia Hayden Kurt, for appellant. 

* * * * * 

PIETRYKOWSKI, J. 

{¶ 1} Appellant, Mark Rhodes, appeals the judgment of the Wood County Court 

of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, denying his motions for a reallocation of 

parental rights and responsibilities and to modify child support. Appellee, Tonya Short, 

has not filed a brief in response. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

I. Facts and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} On January 22, 2015, the parties entered into a consent judgment entry of 

divorce. In the consent entry, appellee was designated the residential parent and legal 
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custodian of the two minor children, L.R. (born in 2007), and E.R. (born in 2010). 

Appellant was granted parenting time with the children for three evenings each week, as 

well as Friday overnight, and alternating weekends. Appellant was also ordered to pay 

$1,600 per month in child support. 

A. History of Post-Divorce Litigation

{¶ 3} On July 18, 2016, appellant reopened the case by filing a motion to show 

cause, and for a reallocation of parental rights and responsibilities. In his motion, 

appellant alleged that appellee had begun a new job which made the previous parenting 

schedule impractical. Appellant also alleged that appellee had unilaterally curtailed his 

parenting time with the children. Appellee responded by also seeking certain 

modifications to the parenting schedule. 

{¶ 4} The hearing on appellant’s motions was vacated and rescheduled several 

times, and was ultimately held on June 9 and August 17, 2017. During the intervening 

period, the parties filed additional motions including motions to show cause, to relocate 

the children, and to prevent the children from being dis-enrolled from a particular school, 

among others. 

{¶ 5} Following the hearing, the magistrate found that appellee unilaterally 

deprived appellant of parenting time on numerous occasions. Appellee also unilaterally 

withdrew the children from the private school they had been attending, and enrolled them 

in public school. Records from the private school show that the children were tardy 

approximately 25 days, and absent 7 days over the course of the 2015-2016 school year, 

all of which occurred while appellee was responsible for the children. Around April 
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2017, the guardian ad litem recommended that the parties try a “week-on/week-off” 

schedule with a midweek overnight visit. Following the end of the 2016-2017 school 

year, appellee unilaterally suspended the midweek overnight visits. At the hearing, 

appellee stated that she could not remember exercising midweek overnight visits after the 

parties started the “week-on/week-off” schedule, which the magistrate found not credible 

since the parties had exercised midweek visits for approximately five weeks in April and 

May 2017. 

{¶ 6} The magistrate also found that appellee had filed for a domestic violence 

civil protection order against appellant, and included the children as desired protected 

persons. Appellee’s petition listed several dates on which appellant was at her house, but 

the magistrate found that appellant had legitimate reasons involving his parenting time 

for being there, noting that appellant could have handled some of the times better to avoid 

upsetting appellee. In addition, the magistrate found that appellee had contacted 

appellant’s pastor to make disparaging remarks about appellant. The magistrate also 

found that after a referral to children’s services about appellee’s boyfriend, appellee 

decided to have a police escort attend all exchanges of the minor children, which she 

claimed was necessary to protect her safety, and was not a retaliatory action. Finally, the 

magistrate found that both parties had made inappropriate comments to the children about 

the pending case. 

{¶ 7} In light of her findings, the magistrate ordered that there was no change of 

circumstances to cause the court to modify the residential parent status. However, the 

magistrate ordered that the parenting time should be modified so that the parties alternate 
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weeks of parenting time with the children, with exchanges to occur on Fridays at 5:15 

p.m. The magistrate further ordered that the parties shall encourage frequent phone 

contact with the other parent, and to allow video-call access at least two times per week. 

As to child support, the magistrate ordered that appellant shall be responsible to pay the 

sum of $600 per month. On January 5, 2018, the trial court denied the parties’ respective 

objections, and affirmed and adopted the magistrate’s decision.

{¶ 8} On June 15, 2018, appellee reopened the case, seeking to modify the parties’ 

parenting times surrounding the Wood County Fair and other holidays. Additionally, 

appellee alleged that appellant was not complying with the requirement of video-calls 

two times per week, and that appellant was not allowing the children to wear and use 

their phone watches to freely contact appellee. Furthermore, appellee alleged that 

appellant was making “nasty remarks” when the children wanted to contact appellee, and 

that appellant yelled at the children, thereby intimidating the children into not wanting to 

call appellee. Appellee subsequently supplemented her motion five times with additional 

complaints regarding appellant’s availability to be home when the children return from 

school, appellant’s inability or unwillingness to hire a babysitter, and appellant’s move to 

within a block from appellee’s home and his desire to send the children to appellee’s 

house after school which would require appellee to expend her own funds to hire a 

babysitter. 

{¶ 9} Appellant responded to appellee’s motions by filing a motion to reallocate 

the parental rights and responsibilities, as well as subsequent motions to show cause. In 

his motions, appellant alleged that appellee’s behavior has become increasingly erratic, 
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and that she has attempted to alienate the children from him and has failed to properly 

care for the children by not providing adequate meals. Appellant also alleged that 

appellee signed the children up for extracurricular activities without first consulting him 

in violation of the most recent court order, that she denies the children access to their 

phones to contact appellant, and that she refuses to allow L.R. to ride the bus from school 

to appellant’s home and interferes with his parenting time by picking L.R. up from 

school. Furthermore, appellant alleged that appellee confiscated electronic devices that 

appellant had purchased for the children and refused to return them to appellant. Finally, 

appellant alleged that appellee was not paying her share of the medical expenses. 

{¶ 10} Following a February 6, 2019 hearing on this round of motions, the 

magistrate found that although there was still tension between the parties, the relationship 

“seem[ed] to have improved somewhat,” and the children were doing relatively well. 

Based upon the guardian ad litem report and her in-camera discussions with the children, 

the magistrate found that the “week-on/week-off” schedule was too long, and since the 

parties were now living on the same street, it would be easier for the children to travel 

between the two homes. Additionally, the magistrate found that appellant has 

undermined appellee’s decisions to the children, has not been respectful towards 

appellee’s feelings, and has exhibited a desire to not allow the children to see appellee 

during his parenting time. The magistrate also found, on the other hand, that appellee has 

at times evidenced interference and a lack of cooperation. The magistrate exhorted the 

parties to work together to resolve issues and act in the best interests of the children. 
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{¶ 11} In light of her findings, the magistrate ordered that appellee continue as the 

residential parent, and that the parenting time should be divided based on a “2-2-3” 

schedule. The magistrate further ordered that appellant pay $509.66 per month in child 

support. Both parties objected to the magistrate’s decision, and on May 10, 2019, the 

trial court denied their objections and affirmed and adopted the magistrate’s decision. 

B. Current Post-Divorce Litigation

{¶ 12} Three weeks later, on May 31, 2019, appellee reopened the case by filing a 

motion to show cause in which she alleged that appellant has been withholding the 

children from her in violation of the terms of the parenting schedule. 

{¶ 13} On June 19, 2019, appellant responded by filing a motion for reallocation 

of parental rights and responsibilities and other relief. In his motion, appellant alleged 

that there has been a change of circumstances in that the children have on numerous 

occasions refused to visit with appellee. Appellant further alleged that while he has 

encouraged both children to respect and visit with appellee, he is reluctant to force the 

children to go with appellee given appellee’s history of making domestic violence 

allegations and her litigious nature. 

{¶ 14} The matter came to be heard before the magistrate on September 23, and 

October 23, 2019. 

{¶ 15} At the hearing, appellee testified regarding the timeline of events. Appellee 

testified that March 18, 2019, was the last time that she had seen E.R. being herself, i.e., 

smiling, hugging, interacting, and telling appellee that she loves her. Appellee described 

that since that date, E.R. has had a flat affect, does not show emotion, and does not want 
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to look at appellee. Appellee explained that a short time before, appellant had moved 

into the neighborhood, approximately 600 feet from appellee’s house. Appellee testified 

that she was concerned that the children would ride their bikes or scooters in front of her 

house and not even look at her house, and if appellee was outside the children would not 

interact with her. Thinking that this behavior was not healthy for the children, appellee 

decided to move two miles away. It was during the process of putting the house up for 

sale and moving that E.R.’s behavior changed. Appellee did not move until May 2019. 

{¶ 16} On March 29, 2019, E.R. became upset at appellee and ran away to 

appellant’s house. Appellee testified that E.R. was upset that she had to pick up her room 

and pack, and that they could not have a bonfire that night. Appellee stated that appellant 

held E.R. at his house for one and one-half hours. Eventually, with the help of the 

Bowling Green Police Department, E.R. returned to appellee’s house and things settled 

down. 

{¶ 17} The next day, March 30, 2019, appellee took the children to Columbus, 

Ohio, where appellee met a friend at the hotel bar/restaurant while the children remained 

in the hotel room. Appellee testified that the friend was known to the children, and had a 

child that had gone through some similar issues as E.R. Appellee stated that the children 

had a great time in Columbus, and expressed that they did not want the weekend to end. 

{¶ 18} Appellee testified that at the next scheduled exchange, appellant held the 

kids from her, so that she did not see them for five days. Then, during the period of April 

4 through April 11, 2019, appellant arranged for E.R. to be driven in a car to the bus stop 

in front of appellee’s house, where E.R. remained in the car until the moment that the bus 
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arrived. Appellee testified that she believed this was done so that she could not go out 

and say hello or good morning to E.R. Several videos of these incidents were recorded 

by appellee and played at the hearing. 

{¶ 19} On April 8, 2019, appellee picked up the children for her parenting time at 

the baseball field during L.R.’s practice. Appellee recorded the exchange. Although the 

audio in the recording is hard to hear, appellee testified that when she asked E.R. to get 

L.R.’s belongings from appellant’s truck, appellant commented to E.R. that “your mom 

just wants [L.R.]’s stuff so he doesn’t have to come back to me and say goodbye.” 

Further, when appellee told E.R. that it was time to leave, appellant stated to E.R. that 

“your mom just wants you to go so that she can take you away from me.” Appellee then 

left with E.R. to find E.R.’s missing smart watch while L.R. was still at baseball practice. 

The watch was at an address near appellant’s house, but appellee did not realize it was 

the house immediately next door to appellant’s house. When they could not find the 

watch, E.R. stated that maybe it was in appellant’s house, and so she went in to look for 

it. But once E.R. went into the house she shut the blinds and closed the door and refused 

to come out. E.R. then called appellant. After 15 or 20 minutes, appellee messaged 

appellant that E.R. was in his house, and that she was going to return to the baseball field 

to pick up L.R. and then come back to get E.R. for her parenting time. When appellee 

came back to the house, E.R. came out to the car twice and asked if they were going to 

watch a movie that night. When appellee said no, that it was a school night and it was 

too late, E.R. returned to appellant’s house. The third time that E.R. came out, she took 
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her belongings from appellee’s vehicle and went back into appellant’s house and did not 

come back out. Appellee took L.R. and had her parenting time with just him. 

{¶ 20} On April 12, 2019, a similar scenario occurred where E.R. came to the car 

but ultimately refused to go with appellee, and so appellee had her parenting time with 

just L.R. Appellee testified that the next morning, April 13, 2019, the children had an 

appointment with a counselor, but appellant did not bring E.R. to the appointment. 

{¶ 21} On April 17, 2019, L.R. notified appellee that they would not be coming 

for her parenting time that night. Appellee testified that L.R. told her that appellant was 

putting pressure on him, and making it difficult for him. 

{¶ 22} On April 22, 2019, the exchange was to take place at the baseball fields. 

Appellee testified that all of the cars were in a line, and that her car was several cars in 

front of appellant’s truck. Appellee observed E.R. sneak up to her car and put her hand 

on the door handle, but then back away to appellant’s truck. On the third time, E.R. 

opened the door to appellee’s car, and told appellee that she was not coming. Appellee 

again had her parenting time with just L.R. 

{¶ 23} On April 24, 2019, while it was still during appellee’s scheduled parenting 

time, the school called appellee and told her that E.R. was sick with a fever and needed to 

go home. Appellee went to the school to pick up E.R. When appellee arrived, E.R. 

refused to go with her, despite encouragement to do so from her principal, teacher, and 

two guidance counselors. Ultimately, the school contacted appellant and he came to get 

E.R. While they were waiting, E.R. calmed down and had a good conversation with 

appellee. At the end of the conversation, they hugged, and expressed love for each other. 
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{¶ 24} On April 26, 2019, appellee arrived for the exchange. E.R. came out to the 

car, and as she had done previously, asked if they were going to a movie. When appellee 

responded that they were not, E.R. said that she was not going to go with appellee, and 

went back into appellant’s house. 

{¶ 25} The next morning, April 27, 2019, E.R. went with appellee from the 

baseball field and had breakfast with appellee and L.R. E.R. then went home with 

appellee. At home, E.R. was looking for something that appellee had already packed to 

move, and appellee told her that they would find it once they moved to the new house. 

E.R. then wanted to jump on the trampoline, and appellee informed her that she would 

jump with her after she finished mowing the grass. While appellee was mowing, E.R. 

came outside and asked her if she could ride her bike over to appellant’s house. Appellee 

asked E.R. if she was going to go and not come back, to which E.R. replied “No.” 

Appellee then told E.R. to go over for 15 minutes, and they hugged and E.R. left. E.R. 

did not return to appellee’s house. The next day, E.R. returned to gather her things, but 

did not stay for the rest of appellee’s parenting time even though she was being 

encouraged to do so by appellee and L.R. 

{¶ 26} On May 1, 2019, appellee did not have any parenting time with E.R., and 

E.R. did not even come out to speak with her. The same thing happened on May 6 and 

May 10, 2019. 

{¶ 27} On May 13, 2019, appellant picked up L.R. from appellee’s house. Shortly 

thereafter, L.R. ran back to appellee’s house upset and crying. L.R. told appellee that he 

had said to appellant that he was excited about picking out a room at appellee’s new 
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house, to which appellant allegedly responded “if you’re that happy about moving away 

from me, go back to your mom’s, I don’t want you here.” Appellee consoled L.R. over 

dinner, and after he was calm, returned him to appellant. 

{¶ 28} Appellee testified that she did not have any parenting time with E.R. on 

May 15, May 24, May 29, June 3, and June 7, 2019. 

{¶ 29} On June 9, 2019, E.R. text messaged appellee while appellee was at church. 

E.R. stated that she wanted to go with appellee to go shopping for Father’s Day and to 

pick out her things for an upcoming 4-H camp. Appellee messaged back that she already 

had plans to visit her parents in Defiance, Ohio, and that she wished that E.R. would join 

her. Appellee told E.R. that she was unable to take her shopping and drop her back off at 

appellant’s house. Appellee messaged E.R. to tell her that she loved her and missed her. 

But the next day, E.R. stated that she never received the message. 

{¶ 30} On June 12, 2019, appellee again had parenting time with L.R., but not 

E.R. 

{¶ 31} On June 22, 2019, appellee had parenting time with L.R. Two days earlier, 

appellant demanded to have both kids on June 22 so that they could attend a cousin’s 

birthday party. Appellee noted that L.R. had a 4-H obligation earlier in the afternoon, 

then was playing with the neighborhood kids, and later they were going to have a cookout 

and bonfire. Because of this, appellee told appellant that L.R. would not be able to go to 

the cousin’s birthday party. Nevertheless, appellant arrived at appellee’s house and 

yelled for L.R. to come. Appellant also sent E.R. to persuade L.R. to come, and both of 

them attempted to make L.R. feel guilty for not going. 
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{¶ 32} On June 26, 2019, appellee arrived at 4-H for “rabbit ID day” with her 

boyfriend. Appellee’s parenting time with the children began at 6:00. The boyfriend 

videotaped an interaction where appellee was helping E.R. fill out the paperwork for her 

rabbit, during which appellant approached and told them to hurry up. Appellee testified 

that appellant had already approached two or three times before that, despite court orders 

to not approach each other in public. After the rabbit was checked in, E.R. informed 

appellee that she was not going with appellee for appellee’s parenting time. 

{¶ 33} Appellee continued to not have parenting time with E.R. through July 12, 

2019. Appellee testified that during that time, appellant did not encourage or assist E.R. 

in completing the tasks necessary to show her rabbit at the county fair. Instead, appellee 

received notification that E.R. was not going to do her rabbit project. 

{¶ 34} On July 12, 2019, the counselor had arranged a dinner for E.R., L.R., and 

appellee during appellee’s parenting time. Appellee initially expressed doubt that she 

would be available for the dinner given the various 4-H and baseball commitments, but 

ultimately decided to leave work early so that she could carve out 45 minutes for dinner. 

Appellee testified that appellant was 15 minutes late bringing E.R. to the dinner, despite 

knowing that they were on a tight schedule. As soon as appellee walked out of the 

restaurant after dinner, appellant was sitting there on the bench and left with E.R. 

Appellee testified that she was not given time to say goodbye to E.R., or hug or kiss her. 

{¶ 35} According to appellee, after the dinner on July 12, 2019, appellant did not 

allow appellee to have her next parenting time with the children beginning July 15, 2019. 

Appellee testified that appellant informed her that the children did not want to go with 
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her. The children did not even come out to appellee’s car to say hello. Later, appellee 

learned that appellant had taken the children with him to his sister’s house for that week. 

{¶ 36} Appellee also described difficulties surrounding the county fair schedule. 

Appellee testified that appellant did not abide by the court order regarding the fair and 

deprived her of two and one-half days of parenting time. In addition, appellee testified 

that appellant was yelling and attempted to engage in a confrontation with her boyfriend 

during one of the exchanges at the fairgrounds. 

{¶ 37} On August 7, 2019, the parties went back to court, and at the hearing it was 

decided that exchanges would take place at the library going forward. Appellee’s 

understanding was that there was to be a 10 minute delay between the person dropping 

the children off, and the person picking the children up. 

{¶ 38} The first exchange at the library took place on August 9, 2019. Appellee 

testified that E.R. was “stand-offish,” and that she did not want to interact with appellee. 

Appellee tried to encourage her to pick out a book for an upcoming vacation that E.R. 

had been excited about only a few days earlier, but E.R. ignored her. E.R. then told 

appellee that she was not going with her for appellee’s parenting time. In refusing to go, 

E.R. stated that she did not have to listen to the counselor or the guardian ad litem. The 

guardian ad litem, who was present to supervise the exchange, tried to encourage E.R. to 

go with appellee, but E.R. ran and locked herself in the bathroom. Eventually, the 

guardian ad litem contacted appellant to pick up E.R. 

{¶ 39} Appellee testified that she had a vacation planned for August 13 through 

August 19, 2019. Appellee stated that the court orders allowed for a week of vacation if 
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they were going out of town, and that the other parent was to get an itinerary for the trip. 

Appellee testified that she told appellant that she was going to allow the children to 

decide whether they wanted to go to Toledo or Findlay for ice cream on the night of 

August 13, 2019, and when they decided she would let appellant know. Appellant 

refused to allow the children to go with appellee. 

{¶ 40} On August 14, 2019, appellee celebrated her birthday. Appellee testified 

that the court orders provided that appellee would have the children from 5:00 – 9:00 

p.m. on her birthday. Appellee waited at the library for 15 or 30 minutes, messaged 

appellant, and then went home. After about an hour, appellee checked her messages and 

saw that appellant had replied, “I’m sorry, I forgot it was your birthday.” Appellee 

responded and asked if he was not going to give her the kids for her parenting time, her 

vacation, or her birthday, why has he not even allowed the kids to call her. A few 

minutes later, appellee received a phone call from L.R., who said that they were at the 

library and wanted to know where appellee was. When appellee arrived at the library, 

she found out that the children had been waiting for one and one-half hours. During the 

time with the children at the library, appellee had a conversation with E.R. about going 

on vacation, and how she wanted E.R. to come with her. L.R. also tried to convince E.R. 

to come on vacation. After the 45-minute conversation, appellee felt like E.R. was just 

being manipulative, and so she became more direct with E.R. and told her that she could 

walk politely and respectfully to the car, or appellee could take her by the hand and walk 

her to the car, and if E.R. threw a temper tantrum and fell to the ground and flailed she 

would only embarrass herself. Appellee testified that E.R. agreed to come to the car. 
15.

After they were outside, E.R. returned to the front of the library to get a paper that she 

had been coloring. Appellee testified that appellant must have honked his horn or flashed 

his lights to signal to E.R. because she then refused to come, and bolted across the road to 

appellant’s truck. Appellant refused to return E.R. Ultimately, appellee went on vacation 

with L.R. 

{¶ 41} On August 26, 2019, the exchange for appellee’s parenting time was 

scheduled to occur at the same time as L.R.’s soccer practice. Appellee told appellant 

that since he did not want to do the exchange before the soccer practice, she would be at 

the library to pick up the children at 8:00 after practice. Appellant refused to bring the 

children to the library, but instead had L.R. call appellee from the soccer field to ask her 

where she was. L.R. was frustrated that appellee would not pick him up at the soccer 

field. Appellee did not have parenting time with the children that night. The next 

morning, appellee met L.R. at the bus stop, and explained to him that she wanted to do 

the exchange at the library—as had been agreed in court—because at least then she could 

see E.R. for 10 or 15 minutes, whereas if the exchange was at the soccer field, she would 

not have gotten to spend any time with E.R. Appellee then asked L.R. if he wanted to 

come for the rest of appellee’s parenting time, and he said no, “dad won’t do it.” 

Appellee did not have any of her parenting time with the children on August 26 and 27, 

2019. 

{¶ 42} On August 30, 2019, appellee met at the library to pick up the children for 

an extended Labor Day weekend. After 15 minutes of speaking with E.R. and L.R., 
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appellee told E.R. that it was time to leave. E.R. responded that she was not going and 

ran out of the library, across the road, and directly to appellant’s vehicle. 

{¶ 43} On September 9, 2019, appellant again refused to meet appellee at the 

library either before or after soccer practice. Appellant informed appellee that if she did 

not show up at the soccer field then she was forfeiting her parenting time with the 

children. 

{¶ 44} On September 13, 2019, appellant was late for the exchange at the library. 

When appellant arrived, E.R. left his vehicle, walked into the entrance to the library, and 

yelled down the hall that she was not coming. E.R. then got back into appellant’s truck 

and they left. Appellee had her parenting time with L.R. A similar scenario unfolded on 

September 18, 2019. 

{¶ 45} Finally, appellee testified as a general matter that appellant did not 

consistently bring the children to counseling appointments in that they missed four out of 

six visits, that he did not cooperate with her on getting information from the children’s 

school, and that he does not work with her to enforce consistent discipline of the children. 

{¶ 46} Appellant testified next. Appellant testified that appellee contacted the 

Bowling Green Police Department to oversee the exchanges in March 2019, and that the 

police presence upset the children. Regarding the March 29, 2019 incident where E.R. 

ran away from appellee’s house, appellant testified that appellee was yelling and 

screaming at E.R. and raised her hand with her phone in it as if she was going to strike 

E.R., which scared E.R. and caused her to run. Appellant testified multiple times that 

E.R. is afraid of appellee. 
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{¶ 47} Appellant also testified generally that he speaks with E.R. all the time 

trying to convince her to go with appellee, and trying to explain to her that she is missing 

out on making memories with her mother. Appellant further described an incident in 

April where he messaged appellee and offered a suggestion on a time that appellee could 

speak with E.R. during one of L.R.’s baseball games. However, appellee did not get the 

message in time because she does not get phone notifications. Appellant testified that he 

and L.R. both try to convince E.R. to go with appellee, but that their efforts upset E.R. 

Appellant explained that he does not want to force E.R. to go because appellee has tried 

to convince the children that he is a monster or an evil-person, and he feels that if he 

forced E.R. to go he would be playing into appellee’s description of him. In addition, 

appellant is concerned that if he physically forced E.R. to go with appellee, that he would 

be accused of child abuse. 

{¶ 48} Appellant testified that he believed it was in E.R.’s best interest to spend 

time with appellee, and that he has never disparaged appellee to the children. Appellant 

testified that he has never told the children that they cannot interact with appellee at 

practices or games, and in fact has encouraged E.R. to go over and say hello to appellee. 

Appellant also encourages the children to call appellee during his parenting time. 

{¶ 49} Appellant next testified that appellee does not attend all of the children’s 

baseball and soccer practices. He stated that the children have remarked that appellee 

“has no interest in what we do.” Appellant, on the other hand, attends all of their 

practices, even those that occur during appellee’s parenting time. Appellant testified that 

frequently appellee will have a coach or another parent transport L.R. to and from games, 
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despite the fact that appellant is present and able to transport L.R. Appellant explained 

that L.R. is embarrassed by this, and to appellant it is an example of appellee not wanting 

to spend time with her children. Appellant also testified regarding the times that appellee 

has left the children alone, highlighting the night in the Columbus hotel room and a time 

when L.R. was left at the fairgrounds. 

{¶ 50} As to appointments with the counselor, appellant testified that the children 

have missed three appointments. On two of those occasions, appellant only found out 

about the appointment on the day of the appointment. On the third occasion, the 

appointment was the same day as when E.R. was sent home from school for being sick. 

Other than those, appellant testified that the children have been seeing the counselor 

every two weeks for a total of approximately nine appointments.

{¶ 51} On the subject of the exchanges at the library, appellant testified that on 

August 14, 2019, he took the kids to the library shortly before 6:00, not remembering that 

it was appellee’s birthday and that he should have delivered the children at 5:00. 

Appellant dropped off the children and then went home. Over an hour later, he received 

a call from L.R. that appellee was not there to pick them up. Appellant then had L.R. 

contact appellee. Appellant testified that after that night, he informed the children that he 

would not leave until he knew that they were going with appellee. He denied, however, 

that he ever told or signaled E.R. to come back to his truck. 

{¶ 52} Appellant next testified regarding his interaction with the guardian ad 

litem. Appellant stated that although the guardian ad litem has been on the case for a 

long time, he has not spent much time in the last two rounds of litigation. Appellant 
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testified that the guardian has only observed him with the children one time, which was at 

the August 9, 2019 exchange at the library, and that the guardian has never observed the 

children at appellant’s house. Appellant also testified that the guardian did not interview 

L.R. before filing his report. Appellant noted that the children wrote letters to the 

guardian because they wanted to talk to him but he did not have the time. Appellant 

explained that the children do not feel like their voices are being heard. 

{¶ 53} Finally, appellant testified that he believes there has been a change in 

circumstances in that once he moved into his new house, appellee told the children that it 

was not healthy or safe to live in that neighborhood and she decided to move again. 

Appellant also noted that appellee constantly has boyfriends around. Appellant feels that 

it is in E.R.’s best interest to stay with him and work on spending time with appellee. 

Appellant testified that E.R. feels safe at his house, but does not feel safe with appellee, 

and although L.R. is comfortable going back and forth, appellant testified that he thought 

it would be best for the children to remain together. Appellant testified that he is willing 

to co-parent with appellee, but it is difficult when she is constantly telling the children 

that he is abusive and threatening. 

{¶ 54} The matter was then continued to October 23, 2019, for the rest of the 

hearing. Appellant testified that during the intervening time, L.R. had a scooter accident 

on a Saturday during appellant’s parenting time, which resulted in L.R. chipping his front 

teeth. Appellant took L.R. to an emergency after-hours dentist visit, at which the dentist 

decided that it would be best to wait until Monday to try to do a permanent repair. On 

Monday morning, the dentist was unable to repair the teeth because L.R. would not let 
20.

the dentist numb his mouth. The dentist recommended a pediatric dentist that could see 

L.R. that afternoon. At 10:00 a.m., appellee messaged appellant that appellant was to 

remain quiet, not approach her, and was to remain in the waiting room during the 

pediatric dentist appointment. If appellant did not agree to those conditions by noon, then 

appellee would cancel the appointment. Appellant testified that appellee ultimately 

cancelled the appointment, and L.R.’s teeth were not fixed until Wednesday. 

{¶ 55} Appellant testified that as a result of the cancellation, L.R. experienced 

embarrassment at school as a result of his chipped teeth, he could not participate in a 

band performance because playing the trumpet put too much pressure on the front of his 

teeth and mouth, and he missed a field trip on Wednesday because he had to go to the 

rescheduled dentist appointment. 

{¶ 56} Appellant testified that since the dental ordeal on October 5, 2019, L.R. has 

refused to go with appellee for her parenting time. Appellant explained that L.R. viewed 

the situation as appellee putting herself before him and his needs of getting his teeth 

fixed. 

{¶ 57} Appellant also testified that on October 14, 2019, appellee contacted him to 

take the children’s pets because they are taking up space in her garage, and if he did not, 

then she would give the pets away. Appellant felt the threat to give the pets away was 

mental abuse and an attack on the children’s emotions. 

{¶ 58} Appellant next testified that appellee did not show up for the exchange at 

the library on October 21, 2019. 
21.

{¶ 59} Appellant then described several bills and expenses for the children that he 

alleged appellee has not paid. 

{¶ 60} Finally, appellant testified that the children are not currently in counseling, 

but that he believes that they should be in counseling. However, appellant stated that he 

is not allowed to make appointments for them. 

{¶ 61} The only other witness to testify at the hearing was the guardian ad litem. 

The guardian concluded that it was in the children’s best interests to maintain the current 

arrangement with appellee as the residential parent and both parents splitting parenting 

time on the “2-2-3” schedule. 

{¶ 62} The guardian spoke about E.R.’s issues with visiting appellee, and 

commented that based upon his interactions with her, he does not perceive that E.R. is 

afraid of appellee or is unsafe with her. The guardian noted that during the first library 

exchange, E.R. was sitting with appellee and talking and interacting with her in a positive 

manner. It was only when it came time to leave that E.R.’s mood changed and she 

became “stone-faced” and said that she did not want to go with appellee. The guardian 

believed that the issue with E.R. could have been more easily resolved at the beginning, 

but because it has been going on for months, it presented a much more difficult 

challenge. The guardian explained that he believed appellant could have been firmer 

with E.R. in the beginning, and could have worked with appellee and E.R. to restore 

E.R.’s relationship with appellee. 

{¶ 63} The guardian also testified that the children hear a lot of negative 

information from appellant and appellee about the other parent, including information 
22.

about the other parent’s compliance or non-compliance with court orders. The guardian 

explained that one of the concerns of the counselor was that the children felt a need to 

protect appellant emotionally because they disclosed to the counselor that appellant 

would cry when they leave. The guardian further noted that it was a significant problem 

when appellee explained to the children that she was moving away from appellant 

because he made her feel unsafe. 

{¶ 64} As to the letters sent to him by the children, the guardian expressed 

skepticism that the letters were written free of influence because they contained phrasing 

that he would not normally expect from children, such as “I want so and so to have 

custody so they can sign me up for activities.” 

{¶ 65} Based upon his interactions with the family, the guardian recommended 

that both parents need to engage in individual counseling and family counseling. He 

recommended that each parent should say something positive about the other parent to 

the children at least once a day. Lastly, the guardian recommended a parenting 

coordinator given the parents’ history of being unable to work together to parent the 

children. 

{¶ 66} Following the hearing, the magistrate determined that there had not been a 

change in circumstances to warrant a change in the residential parent. The magistrate 

ordered that the children shall resume their counseling and that the counselor shall 

implement a schedule to normalize the mother-child relationships, with the goal of 

resuming the full parenting schedule in three months. The magistrate further ordered that 

each parent shall make a positive statement about the other parent each day that the 
23.

children are with him or her, and ensure that the children have a picture of the other 

parent in his or her room. 

{¶ 67} Appellant objected to the magistrate’s decision. On August 31, 2020, the 

trial court overruled appellant’s objections and approved and adopted the magistrate’s 

decision. 

II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 68} Appellant has timely appealed the trial court’s August 31, 2020 judgment, 

and now asserts five assignments of error for our review: 

1. The trial court abused its discretion when it neglected to find a 

change of circumstances to warrant a change in the residential parent from 

[appellee] to [appellant]. 

2. The trial court abused its discretion when it neglected to find a 

change of circumstances before issuing numerous orders that modified the 

then-existing orders relating to the parties’ two minor children, to wit: 

[L.R.] and [E.R.]. 

3. The trial court abused its discretion when it accepted and relied 

upon a Guardian ad Litem Report and Recommendation although the

Guardian failed to carry out numerous responsibilities set forth in Ohio 

Sup. R. 48(D). 

4. The trial court abused its discretion when it neglected to modify 

the existing child support orders although there had been a clear and 

substantial change of circumstances. At the time of the trial, Appellant was 
24.

acting as the children’s primary caretaker and was paying for all of the 

children’s ongoing expenses in addition to the full child support order to 

Appellee. 

5. The trial court abused its discretion when it adopted a 

Magistrate’s Decision that contained numerous Findings of Fact that were 

unsupported by the evidence on the record. Many of the facts relied upon 

by the magistrate were not presented at the trial. 

III. Analysis

{¶ 69} For ease of discussion, we will address appellant’s assignments of error out 

of order. In his third and fifth assignments of error, appellant challenges the evidentiary 

and factual underpinnings supporting the trial court’s conclusion that there was not a 

change in circumstances to warrant a change in the residential parent. In his first 

assignment of error, appellant challenges the trial court’s conclusion itself. In his second 

assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in modifying the parental 

rights and responsibilities without finding a change of circumstances. Finally, in his 

fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to modify 

the child support order. 

A. Guardian Ad Litem 

{¶ 70} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred 

when it considered the guardian ad litem’s report because the guardian failed to comply 
25.

with his responsibilities under Ohio Sup. R. 48, et seq.1 Specifically, appellant argues 

that the guardian failed: to promptly notify the court as required by Sup. R. 48.03(A)(5) 

that his conclusion was in conflict with the children’s wishes; to maintain independence, 

objectivity, and fairness as required by Sup. R. 48.03(A)(2); to meet, interview, and 

observe the children as required by Sup. R. 48.03(D); and to file a report no less than 

seven days before the hearing as required by Sup. R. 48.06(C)(1). 

{¶ 71} “Appellate courts will not reverse trial court decisions to admit a guardian 

ad litem’s testimony and recommendation unless the trial court abused its discretion.” In 

re T.C., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1106, 2015-Ohio-3665, ¶ 20, citing Corey v. Corey, 2d 

Dist. Greene No. 2013-CA-73, 2014-Ohio-3258, ¶ 9. An abuse of discretion connotes 

that the trial court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. 

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

{¶ 72} Sup. R. 48, et seq., provides “good guidelines for the conduct of a guardian 

ad litem in meeting his or her responsibilities in representing the best interest of a child in 

order to provide the court with relevant information and an informed recommendation.” 

In re M.S., 2015-Ohio-1847, 34 N.E.3d 420, ¶ 45 (8th Dist.), quoting In re C.O., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga Nos. 99334, 99335, 2013-Ohio-5239, ¶ 14. However, the rules of 

superintendence are only general guidelines, and “do not create substantive rights in 

individuals or procedural law.” Id., quoting In re C.O. at ¶ 14. “As such, it has generally 

 

1

 Appellant references Ohio Sup. R. 48(D), but subsequent to the filing of his brief, Sup. 

R. 48(D) has been amended and renumbered by the Ohio Supreme Court. We will refer 

to the appropriate sections as renumbered. 
26.

been held that a guardian ad litem’s failure to comply with Sup.R. 48 is not, in and of 

itself, grounds for reversal of a custody determination.” Id.

{¶ 73} In Nolan v. Nolan, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 11CA3444, 2012-Ohio-3736, ¶ 26, 

the Fourth District held that the trial court abused its discretion in considering the 

guardian ad litem’s report and recommendation where the guardian ad litem “fell so far 

below the minimum standards.” In that case, the guardian ad litem failed to interview the 

mother’s boyfriend—with whom the child would be living—failed to investigate the 

relevant details of the boyfriend’s life, did not interview the child’s half-sister, did not 

visit the residences of either parent, did not interview the child’s school personnel or 

medical-health providers despite the child being diagnosed with ADHD and having 

behavioral issues, and did not meet with the child in a one-on-one setting. Id. at ¶ 25. 

{¶ 74} Here, in contrast, the guardian ad litem was familiar with the family from 

his years of service as a guardian, spoke with the children’s counselor, spoke with 

personnel at E.R.’s school, spoke with L.R., observed E.R. with appellant and appellee 

during an exchange at the library, had a walking interview with E.R. in an attempt to 

divert her attention so that he would get more organic responses from her, observed her 

with appellant in the waiting room of his office, and received letters from the children 

discussing their wishes. Therefore, we find the present case to be distinguishable from 

Nolan, and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the report 

and recommendation from the guardian ad litem. See In re T.C. at ¶ 23 (trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in considering guardian ad litem’s testimony where the guardian 
27.

testified at length as to the extent of her investigation and was subject to crossexamination by all parties). 

{¶ 75} Accordingly, appellant’s third assignment of error is not well-taken. 

B. Magistrate’s Factual Findings 

{¶ 76} In his fifth assignment of error, appellant challenges several of the 

magistrate’s factual conclusions, which were adopted by the trial court, as not being 

supported by the evidence. 

{¶ 77} First, appellant challenges the magistrate’s findings that: 

5. Father moved into Mother’s neighborhood sometime in May of 

2019. 

6. Father is aware that Mother is uncomfortable around him, 

however he did not take that into consideration prior to moving around the 

corner from Mother. He refuses to acknowledge that Mother is 

uncomfortable around him because he does not feel that he has done 

anything to make her fear him. It is not clear if this is a control issue or a 

lack of empathy. He testified that he moved because he wanted the 

children to be able to go back and forth between the houses so that the 

parents could co-parent. Although that would be an ideal situation, and it 

sounds wonderful, it does not reflect the reality of the current situation. 

{¶ 78} Appellant argues that the magistrate’s findings were factually incorrect as 

the testimony revealed that he moved into his new home in February 2019, not May 

2019. Further, he argues that the timing of the move is important because the close 
28.

proximity of the parties was taken into consideration at a hearing on March 7, 2019, and 

because the subsequent events of E.R. running away and the children becoming upset at 

mother occurred because of appellee’s comments that the neighborhood was no longer 

safe. 

{¶ 79} We agree with appellant that the magistrate’s finding that he moved into 

the neighborhood in May 2019 was factually incorrect. However, we do not find any 

prejudicial effect from this error, because although the magistrate may have been 

confused on the specific dates, the magistrate recognized the events and consequences in 

an appropriate timeline. Rather than ignore appellee’s conduct and its impact on her 

relationship with the children, the magistrate later found, 

23. Mother has done some things that have caused or contributed to 

the children’s turmoil: 

a. She made statements that it was unsafe and unhealthy when 

Father moved into the neighborhood. The children resented her for these 

comments. 

b. As a result of Father’s move, Mother decided that she had to 

move again, so she wasn’t so close to Father. This move upset the children. 

Therefore, we find the magistrate’s error in the date that appellant moved into the 

neighborhood to be of no practical consequence. 

{¶ 80} Second, appellant challenges the magistrate’s findings that: 

7. There is no evidence that the children are unsafe at either parent’s 

home. On one occasion, [L.R.] left Father’s home and did not want to 
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return. Mother handled it very well. She made sure that Father was aware 

of [L.R.]’s location, she talked things through with [L.R.] and then had 

[L.R.] return to Father’s home. 

8. On the other hand, [E.R.] left Mother’s home on April 22, 2019, 

went to Father’s home and never returned. There is no indication that 

Father communicated with Mother or encouraged [E.R.] to return to 

Mother’s. Father claims he doesn’t want to force [E.R.] to go where she 

does not feel safe. Knowing that she would be safe at Mother’s, he needs 

to reassure her that she will be safe, calm her down and send her back. 

9. [E.R.] has left Mother’s home when Mother has corrected her

about inappropriate behavior. Instead of trying to learn the cause of the 

interrupted parenting time and reinforcing the importance of good behavior, 

Father reinforced [E.R.]’s avoidance and poor behavior of running away 

and this can lead to manipulative behavior. As a parent, there are many 

occasions when it is necessary to “force” something on a child such as 

medicine or going to school. It is not a negative. 

{¶ 81} Appellant disagrees with the magistrate’s finding that appellee’s home is 

not unsafe. Appellant points to the fact that E.R. was allowed to run away twice, and the 

fact that appellee left E.R. unsupervised at appellant’s home on one occasion as evidence 

of clear safety risks. Furthermore, appellant argues that forcing the children to visit with 

appellee against their will, and when they have stated that they do not feel safe with 

appellee, perpetuates the ongoing risk to the children’s health. Appellant notes that E.R. 
30.

stated in her letter to the guardian ad litem that appellee “gets very angry and yells too 

much.” 

{¶ 82} In addition, appellant argues that there is no evidence that he reinforced 

E.R’s behavior in running away, and identifies that he was not home on either occasion 

that she ran away. Furthermore, appellant testified about his efforts to encourage the 

children to visit and communicate with appellee. Lastly, appellant highlights that he does 

not “force” E.R. to visit with appellee because E.R. does not feel safe at appellee’s house, 

and because appellee has previously accused him of domestic violence and child abuse 

and he believes that if he forced E.R. to visit, he would face similar allegations. 

{¶ 83} Upon review, we find that the magistrate’s findings are supported by the 

evidence. Although running away from home obviously is concerning, there is no 

evidence that either child has been abused, neglected, or harmed at either home. To that 

end, the magistrate has implicitly concluded that to the extent that E.R. is afraid of 

appellee, that fear is irrational. Assuming that E.R. accurately reported that appellee 

raised her hand one time as if to strike E.R., there is no evidence that E.R. was ever 

actually struck. Appellant had an opportunity when he discussed the incident with E.R. 

to calm her and reassure her that she was safe with appellee, but appellant did not do so 

as evidenced by the fact that E.R. has since consistently refused to visit with appellee, 

claiming that she is afraid of her. Notably, the guardian ad litem testified that he does not 

believe that E.R. is afraid of appellee or is unsafe with her. Thus, E.R.’s persistent 

refusal to visit with appellee following a relatively minor incident supports the 
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magistrate’s conclusion that appellant is reinforcing E.R.’s avoidance of appellee and her 

poor behavior of running away. 

{¶ 84} Appellant next challenges the magistrate’s findings that: 

12. Since picking up on Father’s cues, [E.R] has now, on her own, 

adopted the attitude of not wanting to see Mother. Following are some 

examples: 

a. She has gone to Mother’s car on several occasions and told her 

that she was not going with Mother. At times this was because Mother told 

her it was too late to watch a movie or do something else. 

b. On March 29, 2019, [E.R.] ran away from Mother’s home. She 

was upset because she wanted to call Father. [E.R] stated Mother was 

yelling at her. 

c. On April 24, 2019, Mother had planned to pick up [E.R.] at 

lunchtime to take her to lunch and then pick up [L.R.] from school, as they 

both had a counseling appointment at 4:30 pm. The school called Mother 

around 9:15 am and stated [E.R.] had a temperature of 101.8 and needed to 

be picked up from school. Mother went to the school to pick up [E.R.]. 

When she arrived, [E.R.] said hello and asked why she was there. [E.R.] 

stated that it was her dad’s time. Mother told [E.R.], “No, it is not your 

dad’s time,” and asked her to get her things so they could go home. [E.R.] 

stated, “No, dad is to come and get me.” [E.R.] stated that she needed to go 

to her classroom, as there was something she had forgotten. She went to 
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the classroom and called her dad. [E.R.] then began crying and

hyperventilating, stating that she did not want to go with Mother. Both 

[E.R.]’s teacher and principal attempted to intervene and get [E.R.] to go 

with her mother. After nearly an hour, [E.R.] calmed down but still would 

not leave with Mother. Then, Father was called to come to get her. After 

leaving, Mother sent a message to Father on Our Family Wizard informing 

him of the counseling appointment that day, but [E.R.] was not brought to 

the counseling appointment. 

d. On April 27, 2019, [E.R.] ran away from Mother’s home to 

Father’s home. Earlier that day, [E.R.] went to breakfast with [L.R.] and 

Mother. At breakfast [E.R] went under the table and sat on the floor to let 

[L.R.] out of the booth. Mother talked to [E.R.] about making good choices 

and reminded her that she is very aware that sitting on the floor under the 

table is not a good choice. When [L.R.] returned, [E.R.] stood up at the 

corner of the table, not allowing [L.R.] enough room to get back to his seat. 

[L.R.] asked [E.R.] two times to move, however, [E.R.] remained obstinate 

and did not move her foot. [L.R.] tripped over [E.R.]’s foot getting back 

into the booth. Mother then stated to [E.R.] if she continues this behavior 

and continues to not make good choices, she will get a consequence. [E.R.] 

did not like to hear that and stated she did not know her foot was in the 

way. When they returned home around 11:00 am, Mother felt she had to 

mow the lawn before it rained. Mother told [E.R.] she would jump on the 
33.

trampoline with her after mowing. [E.R.] then asked where her slime kit 

was located, however it had been packed and Mother was unsure of its 

location. [E.R.] became upset, went upstairs, came down a few minutes 

later and asked to ride her bike to her dad’s house to say hi. Mother asked 

[E.R.] if she was going to go to her dad’s to not return and she said no she 

was only going to say hi. Mother had [E.R.] wear a Gizmo watch so that 

she would be able to call her. Mother asked [E.R.] to come back in 15 

minutes and [E.R.] told her she would return at 12:05 pm. [E.R.] gave 

Mother a kiss and told her she loved her. [E.R.] did not return to Mother’s 

home. 

e. On August 9, 2019, the Guardian Ad Litem met the parties at the

library. [E.R.] stated she was not going with Mother for her parenting time. 

[E.R.] stated that she did not have to listen to the Guardian Ad Litem or Ms. 

Kroniser. The Guardian Ad Litem eventually called Father to come back 

and pick up [E.R.] from the library after she locked herself in the bathroom. 

{¶ 85} In his appellate brief, appellant takes issue with some minor discrepancies 

between the record and the magistrate’s findings. For example, appellant argues that 

certain direct quotes do not exist in the record, nor does the record reflect that E.R. called 

appellant while she was sick at school. We find these discrepancies to be trivial. 

Moreover, our review of the record leads us to conclude that the salient points of the 

magistrate’s findings are, in fact, supported by the record. 
34.

{¶ 86} More significantly, appellant argues that it is not fair to conclude that E.R. 

adopted an attitude of not wanting to visit appellee because she was “picking up on 

Father’s clues.” As alluded to above, this is not an unreasonable conclusion to reach. 

E.R. initially ran away from appellee’s home on March 29, 2019, because she was upset 

that appellee was moving, and because she reportedly feared that appellee was going to 

strike her. Despite that, E.R. went with appellee the next day to Columbus, and had a 

good time. However, the record reflects that at the very next exchange, appellant denied 

appellee parenting time with the children. This appears to be a consistent pattern with 

appellant as the record shows that he denies appellee parenting time immediately after 

she is able to spend time with E.R. For example, in addition to the exchange following 

the trip to Columbus, appellant denied appellee her next parenting time after E.R. spent 

time with appellee on April 27, 2019, before she ran away, and after appellee’s dinner 

with E.R. on July 12, 2019. 

{¶ 87} Relatedly, the record shows that appellant has communicated to the 

children that he does not want them to leave him to go visit with appellee. At the April 8, 

2019 exchange, appellant reportedly told E.R., “your mom just wants you to go so that 

she can take you away from me.” On April 17, 2019, when L.R. informed appellee that 

they were not coming for her parenting time, L.R. allegedly stated that appellant was 

putting pressure on him and making it difficult on him. The children have also reported 

to their counselor that appellant cries when it is time for them to leave. 

{¶ 88} Furthermore, appellant testified repeatedly that E.R. is afraid of appellee, 

but the guardian ad litem does not believe that to be the case. Upon review, the record in 
35.

this case is replete with examples that suggest there may be a different motivation other 

than fear to explain why E.R. does not want to go with appellee for her parenting time. 

Early on, after the first running away incident, E.R. refused to go with appellee after 

learning that appellee was not going to let her watch movies. The second running away 

incident came after appellee told E.R. that she was not going to look for something that 

had been packed away, and that she would only jump on the trampoline with E.R. after 

she finished mowing the grass. Since then, E.R. has had multiple interactions with 

appellee whether at dinner, 4-H, or the library that have been positive until the moment 

that it is time to leave to go with appellee. 

{¶ 89} We recognize that we are not counselors or medical professionals, and we 

do not attempt to diagnose E.R.’s motivation for not visiting appellee. We merely 

highlight these incidents to demonstrate that there is support for the magistrate’s 

conclusion that appellant is influencing E.R.—whether intentionally or unintentionally—

to maintain in her decision not to visit appellee. Thus, we do not find the magistrate’s 

conclusion that E.R. is picking up on appellant’s clues to be unsupported by the record. 

{¶ 90} Finally, appellant contests the magistrate’s findings that: 

16. Father did not explain why Mother was not called after [the 

scooter accident where L.R. chipped his teeth] when he was working and 

Mother was at home. Instead, [L.R.] was with the babysitter since it was 

Father’s parenting time. When one parent is available in this type of 

situation, that parent should be with the child. Instead, Father refuses to 
36.

give up his parenting time to Mother, even when he is not available and it 

would be best for the child. 

17. On Monday, October 7, 2019, Father contacted the dentist’s

office at approximately 7:45 am. The office said that [L.R.] could be seen 

at 8:30 am, so Father took the children to the dentist’s office to have [L.R.] 

seen. Father did not notify Mother, he testified that he was rushed to get to 

the office. Mother, who had also called the office in the morning, learned 

of the appointment and was also present for [L.R.]’s visit. 

18. Because the pediatric dentist was not able to give [L.R.] nitrous 

oxide, a second appointment to fix [L.R.]’s teeth was scheduled for 3:00 

pm later that same day (10/7/19) at another office. 

19. Prior to the 3:00 pm dentist appointment on October 7, 2019, 

Mother sent Father a message via Our Family Wizard insisting that he 

conduct himself a certain way at the 3:00 pm appointment (e.g. “stay in the 

lobby,” “stay quiet and not approach me,” and stay out of the room where 

[L.R.] will be treated). Mother stated that, if Father did not confirm by 

noon that he would comply with these rules, she would cancel the 3:00 pm 

appointment to fix [L.R.]’s teeth. Father viewed these as demands from 

Mother that he did not have to follow, but Mother testified that these were 

the doctor’s rules. 

 
37.

20. Ultimately Mother did cancel the appointment. 

21. [L.R.] was not able to participate in his band concert on Tuesday 

October 8, 2019 and he had to miss a field trip on Wednesday. Father let 

[L.R.] know that Mother cancelled the appointment so now the children and 

Father are all blaming Mother. 

22. Father kept [E.R.] out of school on Monday to take her to the 

dentist with [L.R.]. He testified that he did that because he did not know 

how long it would take and whether he would be available to pick [E.R.] up 

from school. There was no reason for [E.R.] to miss school; this is an 

example of his lack of acknowledgment that the children have two parents 

who can work together to accommodate both children. 

{¶ 91} Appellant argues that the magistrate’s decision was wrong in two respects. 

First, appellant argues that the magistrate erroneously found that he did not explain why 

he did not contact appellee after the scooter accident. Appellant stated that L.R. required 

immediate medical attention, and appellant was able to make that appointment. He then 

notified appellee of the incident later that night. The magistrate’s point, however, was 

that in that situation it may have made more sense for appellee to respond to the injury 

because appellant was at work. The fact that appellant did not have appellee contacted 

was just an example of his unwillingness to truly co-parent the child. 

{¶ 92} Second, appellant contests the magistrate’s finding that “Mother testified 

that these were the doctor’s rules.” Appellant argues that appellee’s assertion that the 

dentist’s office created those rules lacked all credibility. However, the magistrate’s 
38.

finding was factually correct. Notably, the magistrate did not make a finding whether or 

not the rules were created by the dentist’s office, but instead recounted what each party 

said. 

{¶ 93} Appellant further criticized the magistrate for not reprimanding appellee for 

cancelling the dentist appointment. The extent to which the magistrate specifically 

considered appellee’s cancellation of the dentist appointment is unclear, but it suffices to 

say that the magistrate recognized that “Mother has done some things that have caused or 

contributed to the children’s turmoil,” and “There are numerous examples of both parties 

contributing to the conflict affecting the children.” Thus, as with the above findings, the 

trial court’s findings regarding the chipped-teeth incident are supported by the record. 

{¶ 94} Accordingly, appellant’s fifth assignment of error is not well-taken. 

C. Change of Circumstances 

{¶ 95} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred 

when it found that there was not a change of circumstances to warrant a change in the 

residential parent. 

R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) provides, 

The court shall not modify a prior decree allocating parental rights 

and responsibilities for the care of children unless it finds, based on facts 

that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at 

the time of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances 

of the child, the child’s residential parent, or either of the parents subject to 

a shared parenting decree, and that the modification is necessary to serve 
39.

the best interest of the child. In applying these standards, the court shall 

retain the residential parent designated by the prior decree or the prior 

shared parenting decree, unless a modification is in the best interest of the 

child and one of the following applies: 

* * * 

(iii) The harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is 

outweighed by the advantages of the change of environment to the child. 

{¶ 96} “In determining whether a ‘change’ has occurred, we are mindful that 

custody issues are some of the most difficult and agonizing decisions a trial judge must 

make. Therefore, a trial judge must have wide latitude in considering all the evidence 

before him or her * * * and such a decision must not be reversed absent an abuse of 

discretion.” Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997). “The 

reason for this standard of review is that the trial judge has the best opportunity to view 

the demeanor, attitude, and credibility of each witness, something that does not translate 

well on the written page.” Id. “This is even more crucial in a child custody case, where 

there may be much evident in the parties’ demeanor and attitude that does not translate to 

the record well.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 419. 

{¶ 97} In support of his assignment of error, appellant argues that there has been a 

clear change of circumstances, as evidenced by the fact that E.R. stopped visiting with 

appellee in April 2019, and L.R. stopped visiting with appellee in October 2019. 

Appellant claims that the trial court ignored the new reality that he is effectively the sole 

caretaker for the children. In addition, appellant argues that the trial court failed to 
40.

consider that the children no longer wish to visit with appellee, that E.R. has run away 

from appellee’s house on multiple occasions, that appellee has left the children 

unattended, that appellee failed to follow through on dental care for L.R., and that 

appellee told the children that she moved because she was afraid of appellant and he 

made their neighborhood unsafe. 

{¶ 98} Upon our review, it is clear that the circumstances have changed in light of 

the fact that E.R. has not been visiting appellee since April 2019, and L.R. has not been 

visiting since October 2019. However, a change in circumstances is only a threshold 

determination, and the trial court should not modify the parental rights and 

responsibilities unless such a modification is in the children’s best interests, and should 

not change the residential parent unless the harm caused by a change of environment is 

outweighed by the benefits from a change of environment. R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a). Here, 

although the trial court did not artfully word its decision in finding that there “has not 

been a change of circumstances to warrant a change in the residential parent,” (emphasis 

added), we think it is clear that the trial court’s decision was based on the best interests of 

the children and the potential harm to the children. Indeed, the trial court emphasized the 

harm to the children in its comments that “[appellee] and [appellant] are irresponsibly 

damaging their children during this war,” that “a Parenting Coordinator is necessary to 

try and curb the sophomoric actions of both [appellee] and [appellant],” that “the parents 

don’t even appear to marginally recognize the damage they are doing by showing the 

children how not to parent. [Appellant] in particular is letting [E.R.] run the show by 
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failing to enforce [appellee’s] parenting time,” and that “[appellant] is undermining 

counseling. The passive/aggressive actions are more fitting of a teenager, not a parent.” 

{¶ 99} As to the best interests of the children, appellant argues that the trial court 

did not conduct an analysis of the relevant factors under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), which 

provides: 

In determining the best interest of a child pursuant to this section, 

whether on an original decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities 

for the care of children or a modification of a decree allocating those rights 

and responsibilities, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, 

but not limited to: 

(a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care; 

(b) * * * [T]he wishes and concerns of the child, as expressed to the 

court; 

(c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s 

parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the 

child’s best interest; 

(d) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and 

community; 

(e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the 

situation; 

(f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved 

parenting time rights or visitation and companionship rights; 
42.

(g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support 

payments, including all arrearages, that are required of that parent pursuant 

to a child support order under which that parent is an obligor;

* * * 

(i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to a 

shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied the other 

parent’s right to parenting time in accordance with an order of the court. 

{¶ 100} Here, while the magistrate’s decision does not expressly list the R.C. 

3109.04(F)(1) factors, the decision itself demonstrates that consideration was given to 

each one. The magistrate’s decision, as adopted by the trial court, contains nearly 12 

pages of detailed findings touching on each of the relevant factors. Thus, we disagree 

with appellant’s assertion that the trial court did not conduct a best interest analysis. 

{¶ 101} In sum, the trial court found that there was not a change in circumstances 

warranting a change in the residential parent. Giving due deference to the trial court, and 

upon consideration of the evidence, including evidence which suggests that the children’s 

desire to stop visiting appellee is at the least partly influenced by appellant’s own conduct 

and that it would not be in the children’s best interests to change the residential parent, 

we cannot say that the trial court’s decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. 

{¶ 102} Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is not well-taken. 

 
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D. Change in Terms 

{¶ 103} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court 

erred by modifying the existing parenting orders without finding a change of 

circumstances. 

{¶ 104} Appellant does not specify how the previous order was modified, but our 

comparison of the orders shows that in the August 31, 2020 judgment the trial court 

maintained appellee as the residential parent, and continued the parenting time schedule 

that had been previously ordered in the May 10, 2019 judgment entry. The trial court, 

however, did modify the May 10, 2019 judgment entry by eliminating the requirement 

that mother’s vacation time does not have to occur out of town, and by requiring the 

itinerary to be provided no later than 12 hours before the start of the trip. Additionally, 

the trial court modified the May 10, 2019 judgment entry by requiring that exchanges 

take place at the library as opposed to curbside. 

{¶ 105} Aside from those modifications, the trial court imposed additional 

requirements upon the parties that were not contained in the May 10, 2019 judgment 

entry. For example, the trial court ordered that the parties resume the children’s 

counseling, and that both parents are to participate in counseling as recommended by the 

children’s counselor. The court ordered that the counselor shall establish a schedule to 

normalize the mother-child relationship with the goal of resuming the court-ordered 

parenting time as soon as possible and within three months. The court appointed a 

parenting coordinator, and ordered the parties to participate in communication counseling 

as recommended by the parenting coordinator. The court ordered that if a parent has the 
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children for three straight days, that parent must email the other parent describing at least 

one recent activity or saying something positive about each child. The court ordered the 

parties to ensure that the children have a picture of the other parent in their rooms. The 

court ordered that each parent make a positive statement about the other parent each day 

that the children are with him or her. Finally, the court ordered each parent to 

acknowledge his or her actions that have contributed to the current situation and work 

with the children to overcome the resistance. 

{¶ 106} The question we are presented with is whether the modifications and 

additional requirements imposed by the court in its August 31, 2020 judgment entry 

constitute a modification of “a prior decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities 

for the care of children.” R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a).2

 We hold that they do not. 

{¶ 107} In Fisher v. Hasenjager, 116 Ohio St.3d 53, 2007-Ohio-5589, 876 N.E.2d 

546, ¶ 22, 26, the Ohio Supreme Court noted, 

“Parental rights and responsibilities” is not defined in the statute. 

However, a majority of this court commented that the General Assembly 

changed the terms “custody and control” to “parental rights and

responsibilities” when it amended R.C. 3109.04 in 1991. Braatz v. Braatz

(1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 40, 43, 706 N.E.2d 1218. “‘“Custody” resides in the 

party or parties who have the right to ultimate legal and physical control of 

a child.’” Id. at 44, 706 N.E.2d 1218, quoting In re Gibson (1991), 61 Ohio 

 

2

 There is no shared parenting decree in this case, so modification of the terms of a shared 

parenting plan under R.C. 3109.04(E)(2) is inapplicable. 
45.

St.3d 168, 171 573 N.E.2d 1074. Therefore, parental rights and

responsibilities reside in the party or parties who have the right to the 

ultimate legal and physical control of a child. 

* * * 

In summary, R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) expressly provides for the 

modification of parental rights and responsibilities in a decree. An 

allocation of parental rights and responsibilities is a designation of the 

residential parent and legal custodian. Therefore, R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) 

controls when a court modifies an order designating the residential parent 

and legal custodian. 

{¶ 108} From the language in Fisher, we hold that a trial court does not modify an 

order allocating parental rights and responsibilities when it makes minor changes to the 

terms of a parent’s vacation time or imposes additional conditions such as counseling or 

saying nice things about the other parent. Because those minor modifications and 

conditions do not change the residential parent designation or even alter the parenting 

time between the parties, we hold that the trial court was not required to first find a 

change of circumstances under R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a). Truly, if a “party requesting a 

change in visitation rights need make no showing that there has been a change in 

circumstances in order for the court to modify those rights,” Kelley v. Kelley, 6th Dist. 

Wood No. WD-19-073, 2020-Ohio-1535, ¶ 34, quoting Braatz v. Braatz, 85 Ohio St.3d 

40, 706 N.E.2d 1218 (1999), paragraph two of the syllabus, it follows that a change of 

circumstances likewise would not be required where the trial court imposes minor 
46.

conditions such as counseling. This is particularly so in light of the purpose of R.C. 

3109.04(E)(1)(a), which is to “spare children from a constant tug of war between their 

parents who would file a motion for change of custody each time the parent out of 

custody thought he or she could provide the children a ‘better’ environment. The statute 

is an attempt to provide some stability to the custodial status of the children, even though 

the parent out of custody may be able to prove that he or she can provide a better 

environment.” Davis, 77 Ohio St.3d at 418, 674 N.E.2d 1159, quoting Wyss v. Wyss, 3 

Ohio App.3d 412, 416, 445 N.E.2d 1153 (10th Dist.1982). 

{¶ 109} Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error is not well-taken. 

E. Child Support 

{¶ 110} In his fourth and final assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial 

court erred when it failed to modify his child support obligation. 

{¶ 111} R.C. 3119.79(C) provides, 

If the court determines that the amount of child support required to 

be paid under the child support order should be changed due to a substantial 

change of circumstances that was not contemplated at the time of the 

issuance of the original child support order or the last modification of the 

child support order, the court shall modify the amount of child support 

required to be paid under the child support order to comply with the 

schedule and the applicable worksheet, unless the court determines that 

those amounts calculated pursuant to the basic child support schedule and 

pursuant to the applicable worksheet would be unjust or inappropriate and 
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therefore not in the best interest of the child and enters in the journal the 

figure, determination, and findings specified in section 3119.22 of the 

Revised Code. 

“It is well established that a trial court’s decision regarding child support 

obligations falls within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed 

absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.” Pauly v. Pauly, 80 Ohio St.3d 386, 

390, 686 N.E.2d 1108 (1997); Funkhouser v. Funkhouser, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-18-

039, 2019-Ohio-733, ¶ 31 (“We review a trial court’s child support modification 

order for an abuse of discretion.”). 

{¶ 112} Appellant argues that the trial court’s decision not to modify the child 

support orders was unreasonable and arbitrary where there was a change of circumstances 

resulting in appellant being the primary caregiver for E.R. beginning in April 2019, and 

for L.R. beginning in October 2019. As the primary caregiver, appellant states that he 

has incurred all of the children’s expenses. He concludes that it is unjust and inequitable 

for him to also be required to pay child support to appellee. 

{¶ 113} In this instance, we disagree. Although appellant claims a change of 

circumstances, the trial court did not find the changed circumstances to be desirable. 

Instead, the trial court entered orders that it hoped would resolve the issues between 

appellee and the children, and that would restore the original distribution of parenting 

time. In light of the trial court’s goal of equal parenting time, and its efforts toward 

achieving that goal within three months, we hold that it was not an abuse of discretion for 

 
48.

the trial court to maintain the current child support order, particularly where the trial 

court considered that appellant is at least partially responsible for the children refusing to 

visit appellee. 

{¶ 114} Accordingly, appellant’s fourth assignment of error is not well-taken. 

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 115} For the foregoing reasons, we find that substantial justice has been done 

the party complaining, and the judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, 

Domestic Relations Division, is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this 

appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. 

Judgment affirmed. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Thomas J. Osowik, J. 

 _______________________________ 

Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE 

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.