SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1899-15T1

IN THE MATTER OF TAKIA JOHNSON,

CAMDEN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS.

_________________________________

Submitted May 2, 2017 – Decided May 15, 2017

Before Judges Ostrer and Vernoia. 

On appeal from the Civil Service Commission,

Docket No. 2015-3106.

William B. Hildebrand, attorney for appellant 

Takia Johnson.

Christopher A. Orlando, County Counsel,

attorney for respondent Camden County 

Department of Corrections (Howard L. Goldberg,

First Assistant County Counsel, and Antonieta 

Paiva Rinaldi, Assistant County Counsel, on 

the brief).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,

attorney for respondent New Jersey Civil 

Service Commission (Pamela N. Ullman, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the statement in lieu of 

brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant Takia Johnson appeals the Civil Service 

Commission's (Commission) final agency decision finding the Camden 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
2 A-1899-15T1

County Department of Corrections (CCDC)1 properly removed 

appellant from her position as a county corrections officer for 

insubordination, conduct unbecoming a public employee, neglect of 

duty, and other sufficient cause including violations of CCDC's 

rules and regulations. We reject appellant's argument that the 

sanction of removal was excessive, and affirm.

I.

CCDC hired appellant as a county corrections officer in 2003. 

During the course of an investigation of officer Michael Jacob's 

possession of cell phones in the Camden County jail, the CCDC's 

internal affairs unit discovered numerous text messages exchanged 

between Jacob and appellant while appellant was on-duty.

Appellant was interviewed and acknowledged bringing her 

cellphone into the jail and using it to send messages, make phone 

calls, and send pictures to Jacob while she was on duty. She 

admitted possessing and using her cellphone while on duty with

prisoners at the hospital. In addition, she explained she took a

photograph with her phone of another officer's naked buttocks 

without his knowledge while they were on duty at the hospital, and 

sent the photograph to Jacob. She also admitted knowing it was a 

violation of CCDC's policy to bring a cellphone into the jail and

 

1 The CCDC is also occasionally referred to in the record as the 

Camden County Correctional Facility.
3 A-1899-15T1

to the hospital while on duty, and that doing so constituted a 

breach of security. 

On January 26, 2015, CCDC issued a preliminary notice of 

disciplinary action for removal, charging appellant with: 

insubordination, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(2); conduct unbecoming a 

public employee, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6); neglect of duty,

N.J.S.A. 4A:2-2.3(a)(7); other sufficient cause, N.J.S.A. 4A:2-

2.3(a)(12); and violations of various CCDC policies and rules. 

Following a departmental hearing, the CCDC removed appellant 

effective June 29, 2015. 

Appellant appealed, and the Commission referred the matter 

to the Office of Administrative Law. A hearing was conducted before

an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who issued an initial written 

decision sustaining each of the charges and CCDC's decision to 

remove appellant. Appellant filed exceptions to the ALJ's 

decision. On December 18, 2015, the Commission issued its final 

decision adopting the findings and conclusions of the ALJ and 

determining CCDC's removal of appellant was justified. This appeal 

followed.

On appeal, appellant argues:

Point I

REMOVAL IS TOO HARSH A PENALTY FOR A CELL PHONE 

VIOLATION.
4 A-1899-15T1

II.

Our role in reviewing the Commission's decision is limited. 

In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). "[A] 'strong 

presumption of reasonableness attaches to [an agency decision].'"

In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div.) (quoting In 

re Vey, 272 N.J. Super. 199, 205 (App. Div. 1993), aff'd, 135 N.J.

306 (1994)), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 85 (2001). We "may not 

substitute [our] own judgment for the agency's, even though [we] 

might have reached a different result." Stallworth, supra, 208 

N.J. at 194 (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007)). 

"This is particularly true when the issue under review is directed 

to the agency's special 'expertise and superior knowledge of a 

particular field.'" Id. at 195 (quoting In re Herrmann, 192 N.J.

19, 28 (2007)). 

Our deference to agency decisions "applies to the review of 

disciplinary sanctions as well." Herrmann, supra, 192 N.J. at 28. 

"In light of the deference owed to such determinations, when 

reviewing administrative sanctions, 'the test . . . is "whether 

such punishment is so disproportionate to the offense, in light 

of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of 

fairness."'" Id. at 28-29 (alteration in original) (quoting In re 

Polk, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982)). "The threshold of 'shocking' the 
5 A-1899-15T1

court's sense of fairness is a difficult one, not met whenever the 

court would have reached a different result." Id. at 29.

"In order to reverse an agency's judgment, [we] must find the 

agency's decision to be 'arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,

or [] not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record 

as a whole.'" Stallworth, supra, 208 N.J. at 194 (second alteration 

in original) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571,

579-80 (1980)). To determine whether an agency action is arbitrary,

capricious, or unreasonable, we must examine

(1) whether the agency's action violates 

express or implied legislative policies, that 

is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether 

the record contains substantial evidence to 

support the findings on which the agency based 

its action; and (3) whether in applying the 

legislative policies to the facts, the agency 

clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that 

could not reasonably have been made on a 

showing of the relevant factors.

[Ibid. (quoting Carter, supra, 191 N.J. at 

482-83).]

The findings of fact made by an administrative agency are binding 

on appeal if they are supported by "sufficient credible evidence."

In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656-57 (1999). We are not however 

bound by the agency's legal conclusions, which we review de novo. 

A.B. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 407 N.J. Super.

330, 340 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 210 (2009).
6 A-1899-15T1

Applying these principles, we are satisfied there is no basis 

to reverse the Commission's decision sustaining appellant's 

removal. She contends that removal is excessive because the CCDC 

and Commission failed to employ principles of progressive 

discipline. She argues this was her first offense for improper use 

of a cell phone and that, although what she did was wrong, it was 

not sufficiently egregious to warrant her removal.

The concept of progressive discipline has been employed in 

two ways: "(1) to 'ratchet-up' or 'support imposition of a more 

severe penalty for a public employee who engages in habitual 

misconduct'; and (2)'to mitigate the penalty' for an employee who

has a record largely unblemished by significant disciplinary 

infractions." Stallworth, supra, 208 N.J. at 196 (quoting 

Herrmann, supra, 192 N.J. at 30-33). Progressive discipline is 

not, however, "'a fixed and immutable rule to be followed without 

question,' because 'some disciplinary infractions are so serious 

that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished 

record.'" Ibid. (quoting Carter, supra, 191 N.J. at 484). For 

example, "progressive discipline has been bypassed when an 

employee engages in severe misconduct, especially when the 

employee's position involves public safety and the misconduct 

causes a risk of harm to persons or property." Herrmann, supra,

192 N.J. at 33.
7 A-1899-15T1

Here, appellant engaged in an ongoing, knowing, and 

intentional violation of the CCDC's rules while on duty, which,

as the ALJ recognized, "compromised the security and functioning 

of the correctional facility, [and] jeopardized the safety of 

fellow staff members." While on duty, she also photographed a 

partially naked fellow officer without his knowledge and sent the 

photograph to Jacob. Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion in 

the Commission's conclusion that the egregiousness of appellant's 

conduct alone warranted her removal. Ibid.

Moreover, the record shows appellant received formal 

discipline seventeen times for offenses including neglect of duty,

abuse of position, conduct unbecoming a public employee, and 

insubordination. She received two verbal reprimands, three 

reprimands, five "day fine(s)," and eight separate suspensions of 

between two and ninety days. Thus, the Commission's reliance on 

appellant's history of habitual misconduct is consistent with 

notion of progressive discipline, Stallworth, supra, 208 N.J. at 

196, and its decision sustaining her removal is not an abuse of 

discretion.

Affirmed.