### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 609 -CR NO. 03-07-00612- CR
Ex pa r te Jo e Sam ue l G r iffit h

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 390TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NOS. D-1-D C-07 -9040 52 & D-1 -DC -07-90 4071 HO NORAB LE FRED A. MO ORE, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
J oe Samuel Griff

ith’s tr ial for two counts of burg lary ended in a mistrial a fter the jury
wa s una ble to r e a c h a ve rd ic t. Gr if fi th su bs e qu e ntl y a

pp lie d fo r a wr it of

ha be a s c or pu s se e kin g to preve nt a re trial on the g round that fur ther prose cution would constitute d o uble jeopar dy
. See U. S. Co ns t. a

me nd . V ; T e x. Con st. art
. I , § 14
. Th e tr ia l c ourt de nie d Gr if fi th’ s a pp lic a tio n, and

thi s appea l followed. In a sing le issue, Griff ith a sserts that double-jeopa rdy protec tions forbid retria l of his case a fter the trial court e rrone ously denied his motions for an instructed verdict due to the fa ct that the State had f

ailed to prove an ele ment of the c harg ed off ense. We a ffirm the order of the trial court de ny ing ha

beas c orpus re lief.
BACK GR OUND Griff ith was indicte d

f o r tw o c ounts of burg lary

of a ha bitation and the ca se proc eede d to a jury t r i a l
. I ni t s c a s e i nc h i e f , t h e S t a t e p r e s e n t e d

e v i d e n c e t h a to nM ar c h 2 8 , 2 0 0 6 , G r i f fi th broke into the home of

his estrang ed wife , Marie Ca se, and, onc e discove red, a ssaulted Case a nd herTh e vic tim s and the inv e sti g a tin g of

fi c e rs te sti fi e d th a t G ri ff

ithbr ok e int o th e ho us e jus t 1 be fo re mid

nig ht; he wa s d

re sse d a ll i n b la c k a

nd wa s w e ari nga

ma sk and g lov e s. During the s ix -month period in which she had been t he sol e occupant of the house, all of 2 Gr if fi th’ s p os se ssi on s h a d b e e n r e mov e d f ro m insid e the ho me and

Ms. Ca se ha d c ha

ng e d th e loc ks
. Griff ith did not have key s to the new locks, nor had he ever enter ed the house without Ms. C ase’ s knowledg e and e x press pe rmission. See A llen v. United States , 164 U.S. 492 (1896). 3 2 male compa

nion. Th e ma in d isp ute d is su e a t tr ia l w a s w he the r G ri ff ithow ne d o r h a d a ri g ht t o 1 occupy the house, ther eby

making his entry

lawful. See Tex. P en al Code Ann. § 30.02(a )(1) (West 2003) (per son commits offense of burg lary if he ente rs habitation without effe ctive conse nt of ow ne r) ; Ex parte Cavazos , 203 S.W .3d 333, 337 (Tex. Crim. Ap p . 2 0 0 6) (“ the g rava men of a burg lary is the entry

without the eff

ective consent of the owner and with the requisite mental state ”). Both sides off

ere d testimony reg arding whether the hous e was owned solely by Ms. Case or whether Griff ith had reta ined an owne rship interest in the house, despite the fac t that he had not occ upied the proper ty since Ms. Case initiated divorc e proc eeding s in September of 2005. 2 At the c los e of th e S tat e’s e vid e nc e and a g a in w he n b oth

sid e s h a d r e ste d, Gr if

fi th moved fo r an instructed verdic t on the g rounds of leg al and f actua l insufficienc y , arguing that the S t a t e h a d f a i l e d t o p r o v e b e yo n d

a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b tt h a tG r i f

f i t h w a s n o tan o w n e r o f

t h e p r o p e rt y. The trial c ourt denied his motions, and th e j u ry retire d for de liberations. Over two day s of deliberations, during whic h it submi tted four notes to the court and wa s rea d an Allen char g e, the 3 jury indicated that it was de adlocke d. Griff ith moved for a mistrial, which the trial court de clar ed on Aug ust 10, 2007. The ca se wa s reindicted, c harging the orig inal burg lary

counts as we ll as
a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult and a tte mpt e d mu

rd e r. Gr if fi th fi le d an a

pp lic a tio n f

or wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s to pr e ve nt t he State fr om p ro se c uti ng him on the ne w i nd ic tme nt, arguin g tha t to do so wo uld

vio la teM o r e o v e r , w h e nt h e m i s t r i a l i s b a s e d o n “ m an i f

e s tn e c e s s i t y, ” r e t r i a l w i l l n o tb e j e o p a r dy- 4 barr ed. O r e

g o n v . Ke nnedy , 45 6 U.S. 667 , 6 72 (1 98 2) ; State v. Torres , 805 S.W .2d 418, 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The S upreme Court has l ong held t hat a mistrial resulting f rom a hungjury f a l l s w i t h i nt h e “ m an i f

e s tn e c e s s i t y” e x c e p t i o nt o t h e p r o h i b i t i o na g a i n s td o u b l e j e o p a r dy. Loga n v. Un i t ed

States , 1 44 U. S. 2 63 , 2 97 -9 8 ( 18 92 ); United States v. Pe rez , 22 U.S. 579, 580 (18 24). As a matter of policy , this ex ception is intended to per mit the St ate to complete a prosec ution ag ainst an alleg ed violator whe re “ unfore seea ble circ umstances that a

rise duringa trial [m ake] its completion impos sible, such as the f ai l u re o f a jury

to ag ree on a ver dict.” Richardson v. United States , 4 6 8 U. S
. 3 1 7 , 3 2 4 (1 9 8 4 ) ( qu o t i n g W ade v. H unter , 3 3 6 U. S . 684, 688-89 (1949) ). 3 his right to be f

ree from double jeopardy
. After a hearing , the t rial court denied his application, and this appeal followe d.
STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW I n revie wing the trial court’s decision to g rant or de ny habea s corpus re lief, we view the fa c ts “ in t

he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to t he tr ia l ju dg e ’s ru lin g and sh ou ld u ph old it a bs e nt an a bu se of di scre tion.” Ex parte W heele r , 20 3 S.W. 3d 31 7, 32 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ). We a ff or d th e same amount of def

ere nce to the tr ial court’ s application of the la w to the fa cts if the re solution of the
u l t i m ate questions turns on an evaluation of c redibility and deme anor. See E

x parte Pe terson , 11 7 S. W.3 d 8 04 , 8 19 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ) ( pe r c ur iam) . I f the res ol ut ion of the ult imate questions turns on an application of leg al standar ds, we re view the de termination de novo. Id.
DI SCU SSIO N Griff i t h ar gu es that, beca

use jeopa rdy had alr eady

attache d when the jur

y was impaneled a

nd sworn in his first trial, se e Cri st v . B re tz , 437 U.S. 28, 29 (1978), a second tria l for the same of

fense would place him in double jeopardy . He a ptly rec og nizes that in most si tuations wher e, as he re, it is the defendant who reque sts a mi strial, a sec ond trial does not rise to the leve l of d o u b l e j e o p ar dy. See O regon v. Kenne dy , 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982) (“ A def endant’ s motion for a 44

mistrial constitu t es ‘a

deliberate elec tion on his part to forg o his valued rig ht to have his g uilt or i n n o ce n ce d et er m i n ed b ef o re t h e fi rs t t ri er o f f

ac t
. ’” (q u o t i n g Un ite d S

tat es v . S c ott , 437 U.S. 82, 93 (1978))
. He maintains, howeve r, t hat he is entitled to relief beca use t he State fa iled to provide “e ven a scintilla of evide nce” that Griff ith was not an owne r of the h o use, and thus to allow fur ther pr os e c uti on

wo uld g ive the State “ a

se c on d atte mpt ” to p ro ve its c a se in v iol a tio n o f th e do ub le jeopar dy clause
. I n support of this c laim, G riffith cites to c ases holding that afte r an appell at e c o urt
re vers es a g uil ty

ve rd ic t be c a

us e of ins uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e , s ub se qu e nt r e tr ia l f or the same offe nse is constituti onally barr ed. See B urks v. United States , 4 37 U. S. 1 (1 97 8) ; Gree ne v. M assey , 43 7 U .S. 19 (1 97 8) ; se e als o S te ph e ns v . S

tat e , 8 0 6 S. W. 2 d

8 1 2 ( T e x. Cr im
. A p p . 1 9 9 0 ) ( h o lding double jeopar dy clause also bars subsequent retria l of lesser- included off ense) . He maintains that these c ases stand f

or the princ iple that “if ther e wa s not sufficie nt evidence during the first trial for a jury to rende r a ve rdict of guilty , a sec ond trial should be bar red” by the double jeopa

rdy clause
. I n Burks , the c a se pr inc ipa lly re lie d up on by Gr if fi th, the de fe nd a

nt ra ise d an in sanit

y defe nse but was f

ound g uilty ; reve rsing , the appel l ate court deter mined that the state ha d not produce d sufficie nt evidenc e to rebut his claim of insanity , but then rema nded the c ause to a llow the trial court to hea

r additional evidenc e and deter mine if the g overnme nt could car ry its burden on that iss ue . 4 37 U. S. at 4. F ind ingtha t su c h r e mand

wa s c on sti tut ion a lly ba

rr e d, the Sup re me Court

he ld that wher e a c onviction is set aside due to insuff iciency of the evidenc e, rathe r than for tr ial err or, the double jeopa

rdy clause specific ally

“for bids a second tr ial for the pu rp o s e o f affording theGree ne , decide d the sam e d ay , appli ed the standa rd announc ed in Burks and he ld t hat a 5 per c uriam opinion of the state supr eme c ourt dec iding that the e vidence from the f irst trial was leg ally ins ufficie nt “compelled the conclusion that Gre ene’ s second tria l violated the Double Jeopardy

Clause.” Gree ne v. M

assey , 437 U.S. 19, 25 (1978). 5 pr os e c uti on

ano the r oppo rt un ity

to s up ply

e vid e nc e wh ic h it

fa ile d to mus te r i n th e fi rs t proce eding .” Id. at 9.

5 Since Bu rk

s and Gree ne , “it has bee n established that an a ppellate r ever sal on the basis of insufficient evidenc e operates as the functional equivalent of an acquittal, a n d t h us te rm inate s je op ard

y . O nc e je op ard

y te rm inate s in an ac qu itt a l, the Do ub le Jeop ard y Cla us e pr ote c ts
a g a in s t a s e c o n d p r o s e c u ti o n f o r th e ‘ s a me ’ o f

f e nse.” Gran ge r v . S

tat e , 850 S.W .2d 513, 525 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g B r o w n v . Oh io , 4 3 2 U. S
. 161 (1977)) . Griff ith asserts that the
rea soning of Bu rk

s and Gree ne must apply in this case be cause , in his view, the evidenc e adduc ed at his first trial was leg ally and fa ctually

insufficient. In essenc e, he a sks this C ourt to weig h the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence that the State produc ed in the first trial—a lthough ther e has not y et bee n a fina l determination of guilt by the trier of

fac t—and hold that the evidenc e was i n s u ff i ci en t as a matter of law. As a g e ne ra l r

ule , “ e ve n und e r t

he g uis e of

do ub le je op ard

y , chal len g e s to the suffic iency

of the e vidence are not properly revie wed in a h ab ea s co rpus proc eeding .” Mi tc he ll v . S

tat e , 963 S.W .2d 532, 539 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996), aff’d 97 7 S.W. 2d 57 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ); se e als o Ex parte Grigsby , 137 S.W .3d 673, 674 (Tex. Crim. Ap p . 2 0 0 4 ); Ex pa rte Coleman , 59 9 S.W. 2d 30 5, 30 7 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 78 ); Ex parte Se pulveda , 358 S.W .2d 630, 630 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 62 ); Ex pa rteW ing fie ld , 282 S.W .2d 219, 220 (T ex . Crim. App. 1955).6

Be cause the denia l of habe as cor pus relief permits an interloc utory appea l, appellate c ourts are
car eful to ensur e that a pr etrial wr it is not misused to secure pretria l appellate revie w of matter s that should not be put befor e appellate courts at t he pre trial stag e. Ex pa rteSm ith , 178 S.W .3d 797, 801 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ). Re g ard le ss o f w he the r G ri ff ith ’s c la im is cog niza

ble on ha be a s c or pu s, howeve r, we find that it has been inva lidated by decisions from our

highe r cour

ts. I n Richardson v. Un i t ed Stat es , 4 68 U. S. 3 17 (1 98 4) , th e Sup re me Court dir e c tly confr onted the ar g ument Griff ith advance s. L ike Gr i ffith, the petitioner in Richardson was tried befor e a jury and twice moved for a judgme nt of ac quittal on the gr ound that the prosec ution had not introduced sufficient evidence to pr ove his g uilt. Id. at 318. His motions were de nied, and a mistrial
was decla red afte r the jury was unable to r eac h a verdic t. Id. at 3 1 8 -1 9
. C i t i n g Burks , the petitioner argued that he w as entitled to interlocutory revie w of his c laim that a second trial was ba rre d by the double jeopar dy clause beca use t he gover

nment had failed to introduce leg ally sufficie nt evidence at the first trial. Id. at 320.

The R ic h a rdson court disag ree d, emphasizing that its “dec ision in Burks did not
e xten d b e y on d th e pr oc e dura l se tti ngin w hic h it aro se ” and rej ect ingpe tit ion e r’ s a rgume nt. Str e ssi ngthe pr oc e dura l di ssi mil ari tie s b e tw e e n the tw o c a se s, the Cou rt e xpla ine d th a t Burks “ a ro se out of an a ppellate f inding of insufficie ncy

of evide nce to c onvict following a jury verdic t of g uilty ,” while in Richardson’s tria l, the jury was unable to a g ree on a verdic t, resulting in a mistrial. Id. at 32 4. Th is d ist inc tio n w a s c ri tic a l be c a us e a pp e llate r eversa l du e to i ns uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e is tantamount to an ac quittal, see Burk s , 437 U.S. at 18, while “a trial court’ s decla ration of a

mistrial following a hungjury

is not an eve nt that terminates the or igina l jeopardy to which petitioner wa sI n his reply brief, G riffith attempts to distinguish Richardson by alleg ing that his challeng es 6 w e n t to th e le g a l s u f

f ic ie n c y o f th e e v id e n c e , while Richardson dealt only with the petitioner’s claims of fa ctual suff

iciency
. Griff

ith’s char acte rization of Richardson is errone ous in this reg ard, since the pe titioner had in fac t soug ht “interloc utory revie w of his claim t hat a se cond trial is bar red by the Double Je opardy Clause beca use the Gove rnment fa iled to introduce l eg ally sufficie nt evidenc e to g o to the j ury at t he first trial.” Richardson , 46 8 U .S. at 320 (sec ond emphasis adde d). 7 subjected.” Richardson , 4 68 U. S. at 326. “Where , as here , there has bee n only a mistrial resulting from a hungjury , Burks simply does not r equire that an appe llate cour t rule on the suff

iciency of the evidenc e bec ause r etrial mig ht be bar red by the Do ub le J

e op ar dy Cla us e .” Id. at 323. Dec laring that Richardson’s position was incompatible with its established ca se law
conce rning ev en t s t h at will terminate jeopa rdy , see Logan v. U

nited States , 144 U.S. 263, 297-98 (1 89 2) ; United States v. Pe rez , 2 2 U. S
. 5 7 9 , 5 8 0 (1 8 2 4 ), t h e C o u rt p u tt h e m at t er t o re s t , s t at i n g: [W ]e reaf firm the proposition that a trial court’s declaration of a mistrial following a hungjury

is not an event that terminates the or igina l jeopardy to which petitioner was subjec ted. The G overnme nt, like the defe ndant, is entitled to resolution of the c a se by verd ict f

ro m th e jur

y , a nd je op ard y do e s n ot t e rm inate wh e n th e jur y is discharg ed beca

use it is unable to ag ree . Regardless of the sufficiency of the evide nce at petitioner’s first

trial , h e ha d n o v a lid

do ub le je op ard

y c la im t o p re ve nt h is r e tr ia l.
Id. at 326 (e mphasis added)
. 6

Th e Court

the n atte mpt e d to fo re c los e su c h c la ims fr om b e inga sse rt ed in futur e c a se s:
I t follows logica lly

from our holding today

that claims of double jeopa rdy such as petitioner’s a

re no long er “colora

ble” double jeopar dy claims which may be appe aled be fo re fi na l ju dg me nt.
. . . Si nc e no se t of fa c ts wi ll su pp or t the a sse rt ion of

a c la im of do ub le j e o p ar dy l i k e p e t i t i o n e r ’ s i n t h e f u tu r e , t h e r e i s n o p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a defe ndant’s double jeopa rdy rig hts will be violated by a new trial . . . .
Richardson , 468 U.S. at 326 n.6.8 We t hink th a t Richardson is disposi tive of Grif fith’s issue, and fur

ther note the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’s unqua lified adoption of the “ core proposition of j eo p ar dy law”
announce d in Richardson that “ a tr ia l c ourt ’s de c laratio n of mis tr ia l fo llo wi nga hungjur y is no t an
e ve nt t hat terminates the original jeopardy to which petitioner wa s subjected.” Ex parte M cAfee , 761 S.W .2d 771, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (emphase s in origina l).

I n McAfe e , the cour

t set forth that the pr otections ag ainst double jeopar dy enshrined in the Fifth Ame ndment of the U.S. Constitut ion and Article I , § 14 of the Te x as Constitut ion
bar the Gover

nment and the State, respe ctively , from subjec ting a ny person f or the same off ense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. Thus an acc used must suffer jeopar dy befor e he c an suff

er double jeopar dy . The Double J eopar dy Clauses do not me an th a t e ve ry

tim e a de fe nd ant i s p ut t o tr ia l be fo re a c omp e te nt t

ri buna l he is entitled to go f

ree if the trial fa ils to end in a final judg ment. Absent a f inal jud g me nt, he re ma ins un de r t he ini tia l je op ardy . T he re fo re , a re tr ia l f or the same of fe ns e is n ot double j e o p ar dy.
Id. at 772-72 (inter

nal citations omitted) (empha ses in orig inal). I t is clear that in this case , wher e ther e has be en no fina l judgment, Gr iffith has not y et suffe red je opardy

such that fur

ther prose cution would subject him to double jeopar dy . Moreove r, absent a final judg ment of convic tion, we dec line his request to assess the s ufficie ncy of the e vidence fr om t he fi rs t tr ia l on

the ba sis that Richardson preve nts such review. Gr iffith, having failed to point us to any authority mandating that an appellate court ha s the authority to reviewthe suffic iency of the evidenc e ra ised in a trial that resulted in a hung jury on pretria l writ of habe as cor pus, and having failed to distinguish binding authority holding to the contrary , has not shown err or i n the trial cour t’s denial of his applica

tion. Accor dingly , we o v er ru le his issue and af firm the judg ment of the tr ia l c ourt
.9 CO NC LU SION F ind ingno e rr or

in t he tr ia l c ourt ’s de nia l of

Gr if fi th’ s a pp lic a tio n f

or ha be a s c or pu s,
we a ffirm the or der.

__________________________________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: Jul y

16, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh