* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### AUG 17 2004 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

DOUGLAS WEST,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. DIANNE KOLAR, Law Library Supervisor; FELIX KELLY, Investigation officer; T JONES, Sergeant disciplinary hearing officer; REGINALD HINES, Warden; KIMBERLY OWENS, Records; MELINDA GUILFOYLE, Designee; RONALD WARD, Director DOC State of Oklahoma,

Defendants-Appellees. No. 03-6265 (D.C. No. 02-CV-1451-M) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before HENRY , MURPHY , and TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination-2-

of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Douglas West, an inmate of the State of Oklahoma pr oceeding pro se, brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S .C. § 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on three of the claims in his complaint. It dismissed his remaining claims because it found that West had not exhausted his administrative remedies as to those claims. Wh ile we agree with the district court that West did not exhaust all of the claims p resented in his § 1983 complaint, a different disposition is required. Th e district court should have either dismissed the entire complaint to permit Wes t to exhaust his administrative remedies or, in the alternative, have given West th e opportunity to dismiss his unexhausted claims and to proceed solely on those h e had exhausted. For this reason, we vacate the district court’s order and re mand. West’s complaint contains nine claims for relief. The magistrate judge assigned to this case concluded that West failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pertaining to Counts One, Two, Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine, and recommended that these counts therefore be dismisse d without prejudice. He further recommended that summary judgment be grante d to the defendants on the exhausted claims, Counts Three, Four, and Five. Th e district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation.-3-

1. West’s challenge to exhaustion West challenges the district court’s disposition of his complaint, contending that all of his claims have been exhausted. We rev iew de novo the issue of whether West exhausted his administrative remedies. Jernigan v. Stuchell , 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002). The pertinent st atutory provision provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to priso n conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a priso ner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrati ve remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a). The Oklahoma Department of Corrections provides a multi-step inmate grievance procedure. See R. doc. 22, ex. A. Having reviewed the record in this case, we agree with the district court that West fa iled to complete this grievance procedure as to the claims raised in Counts One, Tw o, Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine of his § 1983 complaint. The district court concluded that no such exhaustio n problem existed as to Counts Three, Four, and Five of West’s complaint. These counts relate to a disciplinary procedure instituted against West for lying to staff about having a court deadline and needing additional library time. The grievance policy provides that “[m]isconduct reports received through the dep artment disciplinary procedures may not be appealed through the grievanc e process,” but are instead-4-

appealed through the misconduct appeals process. Id. at 2 (Grievance Policy, Part II(b)(1)). The record reflects that West completedthe misconduct appeals process as it relates to Counts Three, Four, and Five. West contends, however, that he also raised the rem aining six counts in his § 1983 complaint during the course of the misconduc t appeals process. The “Offender’s Misconduct Appeal Form” reflects that h e did present the essence of Counts One, Two, and at least a portion of Count Se ven as part of his misconduct appeal. See R. doc. 23, Att. K. These counts, however, concerned much broader issues than those involved in the misconduct procee dings. Count One charged a deprivation of meaningful access to the courts by d enial of law library access. Count Two asserted West’s right to assist other inm ates with their legal work. The first portion of Count Seven asserted a denial of law library access. These counts should have been exhausted through the griev ance procedure rather than as part of the misconduct appeal, and they therefore r emain unexhausted for purposes of § 1997e(a). The remainder of Count Se ven (pertaining to space in the library, the ability to check out law library b ooks, and the posted law library hours) and the claims raised in Counts Eight and Ni ne were not even raised in the misconduct appeal and therefore also remain unexhau sted.-5-

2. Proper disposition of the complaint West’s complaint is a “mixed” complaint, containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. We recently determined, analog izing to the rule for habeas corpus cases established in Rose v. Lundy , 455 U.S. 509 (1982), that where an inmate files a “mixed” § 1983 complaint, “the distr ict court must ordinarily dismiss the entire action without prejudice” to permit the inmate to exhaust his unexhausted claims. Ross v. County of Bernalillo , 365 F.3d 1181, 1190 (10th Cir. 2004). It also follows from the adaptation of the rule in Rose v. Lundy that the district court may permit an inmate who has filed amixed complaint in a § 1983 complaint to dismiss voluntarily his unexhausted cl aims and to proceed only on those he has exhausted. See Rose , 455 U.S. at 510. For these reasons, we must vacate the district court’s order, to the extent itgranted summary judgment on West’s Counts Three, Four, and Five, and remand foreither complete dismissal for failure to exhaust or to give West an opportuni ty to voluntarily dismiss his unexhausted claims.-6-

The judgment of the district court is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance withthis order and judgment.

Entered for the Court

Michael R. Murphy Circuit Judge