SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

79 

KA 10-01061 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, PERADOTTO, CARNI, AND MARTOCHE, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN TOLLIVER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (ROBERT L. KEMP OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

JOHN TOLLIVER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE.

FRANK A. SEDITA, III, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (MATTHEW B. POWERS OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Penny

M. Wolfgang, J.), rendered May 4, 2010. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon a jury verdict, of murder in the second degree and

criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him

upon a jury verdict of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25

[1]) and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§

265.03 [3]). We reject the contention of defendant in his main and

pro se supplemental briefs that he was denied a fair trial based on

the use of his nicknames “Crim” and “Criminal” in the indictment. 

Supreme Court properly instructed the jury that the indictment

contained “simply . . . accusation[s]” and “was not in any way

evidence” of those accusations (see People v Johnson, 253 AD2d 702,

703-704, lv denied 92 NY2d 1031, 1034). In addition, inasmuch as

several of the People’s witnesses knew defendant only by his

nicknames, it was permissible for the People to elicit testimony

regarding those nicknames at trial for identification purposes (see

People v Hoffler, 41 AD3d 891, 892, lv denied 9 NY3d 962, 963; People

v Caver, 302 AD2d 604, lv denied 99 NY2d 652, 653). Indeed, the court

instructed the jury that the evidence concerning defendant’s nicknames

was “competent for one particular purpose only: [e]stablishing the

identity of the [d]efendant.” Defendant’s further contention in his

main and pro se supplemental briefs that the prosecutor’s use of the

nicknames during summation constituted misconduct is not preserved for

our review (see Caver, 302 AD2d 604). In any event, any error with

respect to the prosecutor’s use of the nicknames is harmless inasmuch
-2- 79 

KA 10-01061 

as the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming and there was no

significant probability that defendant would have been acquitted but

for the alleged error, especially in light of the court’s instruction

to the jury (see id.; see generally People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230,

241-242). We reject defendant’s contention in his main and pro se

supplemental briefs that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to

object to comments made by the prosecutor during summation (see People

v Lyon, 77 AD3d 1338, 1339, lv denied 15 NY3d 954). 

Defendant’s challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence

corroborating the testimony of his accomplice, raised in his main and

pro se supplemental briefs, is unpreserved for our review because he

did not raise the issue of accomplice corroboration in his general

motion for a trial order of dismissal (see People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10,

19). In any event, defendant’s challenge is without merit (see

generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). We reject defendant’s

contention in his main brief that he was denied effective assistance

of counsel based on the failure of defense counsel to move for a trial

order of dismissal on that ground (see generally People v Baldi, 54

NY2d 137, 147). “Defendant has not shown that [such a] motion, if

made, would have been successful and thus has failed to establish that

defense counsel was ineffective in failing to make such a motion”

(People v Borcyk, 60 AD3d 1489, 1490, lv denied 12 NY3d 923). Viewing

the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the

jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349), we accord great

deference to the jury’s resolution of credibility issues and conclude

that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see

generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495).

By failing to object to the court’s ultimate Sandoval ruling,

defendant failed to preserve for our review his further contention in

his main brief that the ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion (see

People v Brown, 39 AD3d 1207, lv denied 9 NY3d 921; People v Alston,

27 AD3d 1141, lv denied 6 NY3d 892). In any event, the court’s

Sandoval ruling did not constitute a “ ‘clear abuse of discretion’ ”

warranting reversal (People v Nichols, 302 AD2d 953, 953, lv denied 99

NY2d 657; see People v Reid, 34 AD3d 1273, lv denied 8 NY3d 884). The

prior convictions in question were relevant to the credibility of

defendant (see People v Marquez, 22 AD3d 388, 391, lv denied 6 NY3d

778). Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.

Entered: March 16, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court