Lords of the Silk Route: 

Violent Non-State Actors in Central 

Asia

Troy S. Thomas and Stephen D. Kiser 

INSS Occasional Paper 43 

May 2002 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
ii
iii

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department 

of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US 

Government. The paper is approved for public release; distribution 

is unlimited. 

******* 

ABOUT THE AUTHORS: 

Major Troy Thomas is an intelligence officer currently serving as 

an instructor of political science at the United States Air Force 

Academy. Maj Thomas has participated in Operations SOUTHERN 

WATCH and VIGILANT WARRIOR in Southwest Asia. He also 

served in the Pacific Theater with 7th Air Force, Osan Air Base, 

Republic of Korea. His operational experience was interrupted for 

tours of duty on the Air Staff and in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, Pentagon. He received a Masters Degree in International 

Relations from the University of Texas, Austin, and a Masters in 

Organizational Management from George Washington University, 

Washington, DC. 

Major Steve Kiser is an intelligence officer currently completing 

studies toward a Doctorate in Public Policy at the RAND Graduate 

School. He previously was assigned to the faculty at the United 

States Air Force Academy in the Department of Political Science. 

He is a graduate of the Air Force Academy and holds a Master’s 

Degree from the University of Hawaii at Manoa. His operational 

assignments have included Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, Osan 

Air Base, Republic of Korea, and the Joint Intelligence Center 

Pacific in Hawaii. He is the author of INSS Occasional Paper #35, 

Water: The Hydraulic Parameter of Conflict in the Middle East and 

North Africa, September 2000. 

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: INSS@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss
iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

A Violent System 1 

 Objectives 1 

 System of Violence 4 

 Silk Route Nexus 9 

Roots of Violence 11 

 Deep Roots 11 

 Resource Scarcity 13 

 Demographic Pressures 22 

 Organized Crime and Corruption 28 

 Socio-Economic Deprivation 35 

 Closing Shots 41 

Transformation to Violence 42 

 Engines of Change 43 

 Failures of Governance 45 

 Identity Cleavages 47 

 Identity Mobilization 67 

 Reinforcing Actions 70 

 Closing Shots 71 

Violent Non-State Actors 72 

 Nonconforming Threats 72 

 Warlords 76 

 Transnational Criminal Organizations 80 

 Militant Religious Movements 85 

 Ethno-Political Groups 95 

 Eco-Warriors 106 

 Closing Shots 110 

Violent Future 111 

 Prospects 114 

 Policy 117 

Notes 120 
v
vi

FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this forty-third volume in the 

Occasional Paper series of the United States Air Force Institute for 

National Security Studies (INSS). This paper, while it reports the 

results of research undertaken across the year prior to the events of 

September 11 and their aftermath, presents an analysis that is both 

timely and relevant given those events. This important paper 

represents the kind of original thinking that this Institute was 

designed in the hope of fostering. The two authors—each of whom 

is individually the winner of a previous INSS outstanding research 

award—develop and test a systematic, targeted, and useful 

methodology for examining the non-state political violence and its 

practitioner that the United States now faces. Their analysis also is 

grounded in Central Asia, a new but increasingly important region 

to United States military interest and presence. The paper stands 

well on either of those legs—a systematic methodology for violent 

non-state actors or a detailed and security oriented examination of 

an emerging critical region. Taken together, the two legs mark it as 

a singularly significant work, one well worthy of serious study. 

About the Institute

INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy 

Division, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, 

Headquarters US Air Force (HQ USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the 

Faculty, USAF Academy. Our other sponsors include the Secretary 

of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency; the Air Staff’s Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI) and the Air Force's 39th and 

23rd Information Operations Squadrons; the Army Environmental 

Policy Institute; and the Air Force Long-Range Plans Directorate 

(XPXP). The research leading to the papers in this volume was 

sponsored by OSD/NA, DTRA, and XONP. The mission of the 

Institute is “to promote national security research for the 

Department of Defense within the military academic community, 

and to support national security education.” Its research focuses on 

the areas of greatest interest to our organizational sponsors: arms 

control and strategic security; counterproliferation, force protection, 

and homeland security; air and space issues and planning; 

information operations and information warfare; and regional and 

emerging national security issues. 

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for 

defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, 
vii

selects researchers from within the military academic community, 

and administers sponsored research. It also hosts conferences and 

workshops and facilitates the dissemination of information to a wide 

range of private and government organizations. INSS provides 

valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of our sponsors. 

We appreciate your continued interest in INSS and our research 

products. 

JAMES M. SMITH 

 Director 
viii

LORDS OF THE SILK ROUTE: VIOLENT NON-STATE 

ACTORS IN CENTRAL ASIA 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

In Central Asia, as in much of the developing world, the 

warlord is returning triumphant while the state withers in its 

arbitrary, post-colonial borders. Transnational dynamics at the subnational level are interacting to create regional incubators for 

violent non-state actors (VNSAs). Some VNSAs already pose a 

real, direct challenge to state sovereignty and regional security. The 

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, for example, employs terrorist 

and guerrilla tactics to seek the ouster of Uzbekistan’s President, 

Islam Karimov. As VNSAs gain greater access to resources and 

transnational networks, they increasingly pose a threat to 

neighboring states and the security of non-regional powers. The 

ancient Silk Route, which once brought Chinese treasures to Europe 

and the Middle East, is thriving again. The caravans of the 21st

Century, however, are moving a loathsome cargo at the core of 

transnational security issues facing the international community. 

It is the contention of this paper that the new warlords of the 

developing world pose a pressing security challenge for which 

regional governments and western powers, including the United 

States (US), are not adequately prepared. The post-heroic 

objectives and asymmetric methods embraced by VNSAs shatter the 

assumptions of the “Clausewitzian Trinity” on which the modern 

nation-state roots its conception of conflict. The new VNSAs are 

already challenging our understanding of how traditional constructs 

of deterrence, coercion and warfighting apply. Developing viable 

policies and responses to these threats demands a rigorous 

examination of the linkages between the spawning of VNSAs and 

transnational security issues at the sub-national level. We further 

assert that non-traditional security issues, such as resource scarcity 

and demographics pressures, are gaining relevance as explanatory 

factors in the transformation from passive individual deprivation to 

violent collective action. 

Our approach to understanding the new face of violent 

collective action adds value by deviating from the reliance on the 

state as the primary unit of analysis. The standard approach, 

particularly in Central Asia, is to focus on state failure and the 

important role played by other states in supporting the struggling 

regime or furthering its decay. While we do not discount the value 

of state-centered approaches, we are convinced they must be 
ix

complemented by an examination of the dynamics working at the 

sub-national level with the non-state actor as the primary unit of 

analysis. To this end, our principal objective is to introduce an open 

systems analytical framework that provides explanatory, and 

possibly predicative, insight to the system of relationships and the 

cycle of violence at work in Central Asia. Although this framework 

is in its initial offering, we contend that its further development will 

yield benefits for comparative study in other regions of the world. 

Our second objective is to offer insight to the roots of violence most 

likely to create the environment in which VNSAs emerge and 

prosper. We also take on the objective of engendering an 

appreciation for the range of potential VNSAs organizational types 

and the forms of collective violence employed to increase their 

power. Our final objective is to explain the linkages between roots 

of violence and VNSAs, focusing on reinforcing behaviors as well 

as failures in state governance and identity mobilization as key 

transformational engines. 
LORDS OF THE SILK ROUTE: 

VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS IN CENTRAL ASIA 

A VIOLENT SYSTEM 

Samarkand Dispatch: The aged helicopter rose unexpectedly 

from behind a barren, tanned ridge, catching the two French 

archeologists and their guides off guard. Armed, grizzled men, 

unadorned by any insignia, emerged from the groaning bird. The 

Uzbek guides were forced on board to the prodding of AK-47s. 

Within minutes, the archeologists were left staring in bewilderment 

as the helicopter flew low to the east over the Fan Mountains, 

disappearing into the rugged terrain of western Tajikistan. Rumor 

of the incident and its unconfirmed details spread quickly. Although 

the Uzbekistan government refused to acknowledge the armed 

abduction, roads in the east, particularly in and out of the Ferghana 

Valley, were suddenly closed to overland tourist travel. On the 

street, the brazen display of military force was seen as evidence of 

the impending renewal of guerrilla operations by Islamic militants. 

To the foreign observer, and most certainly to the archeologists, the 

incident hinted at the growing capacity of violent non-state actors 

to act with impunity in the hinterlands of a nation-state.*

Objectives 

In Central Asia, as in much of the developing world, the 

warlord is returning triumphant while the state withers in its 

arbitrary, post-colonial borders. Transnational dynamics at the subnational level are interacting to create regional incubators for 

violent non-state actors (VNSAs). Some VNSAs already pose a 

real, direct challenge to state sovereignty and regional security. The 

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), for example, employs 

terrorist and guerrilla tactics to seek the ouster of Uzbekistan’s 

 

*

 Editor's note: This and other vignettes in this paper are observations 

and accounts gathered by the authors from their travel in support of the 

research for this paper. They are included in this otherwise more 

traditional scholarly format to underscore points made by the authors. 
2

President, Islam Karimov. As VNSAs gain greater access to 

resources and transnational networks, they increasingly pose a 

threat to neighboring states and the security of non-regional 

powers—they have global reach. The ancient Silk Route, which 

once brought Chinese treasures to Europe and the Middle East, is 

thriving again. The caravans of the 21st Century, however, are 

moving a loathsome cargo at the core of prominent transnational 

security issues facing the international community. 

It is our contention that the new warlords of the developing 

world pose a pressing security challenge for which regional 

governments and western powers, including the United States, are 

not adequately prepared. As a subset of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) growing at a rate of 3-5 

percent annually, VNSAs are proliferating and gaining strength 

while the sovereignty of the nation-state is being transformed by the 

systemic effects of integration and disintegration.1

 The number of 

states has increased dramatically since the 1950s, from around 60 to 

over 190, due in part to deterioration in legitimacy combined with 

increasing demands for self-determination. We are also witnessing 

a dramatic increase in brutal civil conflicts and heinous acts of 

terrorism. Since the end of the Cold War period in 1989, 107 civil 

wars have erupted, each involving multiple VNSAs, as compared to 

only seven interstate conflicts.2

 

The post-heroic objectives and asymmetric methods embraced 

by VNSAs also shatter the assumptions of the “Clausewitzian 

Trinity” on which the modern nation-state roots its conception of 

conflict.3

 That is, VNSAs are not states organizing pubicsupported, mass violence to achieve political ends. The new 

VNSAs are already challenging our understanding of how 
3

traditional constructs of deterrence, coercion, and warfighting 

apply. Developing viable policies and responses to these threats 

demands a rigorous examination of the linkages between the 

spawning of VNSAs and transnational security issues at the subnational level. We further assert that non-traditional security issues, 

such as resource scarcity and demographics pressures, are gaining 

relevance as explanatory factors in the transformation from passive 

individual deprivation to violent collective action. 

In an effort to understand this contemporary face of violent 

collective action, we begin by introducing an analytical framework 

that provides explanatory, and possibly predicative insight to the 

system of relationships that produce VNSAs. Although this 

framework is in its initial offering, we contend that its further 

development will yield benefits for comparative study in other 

regions of the world. As part of our specific application to Central 

Asia, we will regularly intertwine descriptive stories based on our 

three-week journey across the region in an effort blend a sense of 

place with our analysis. It is our hope that this color commentary 

will elucidate the narrative we are trying to construct; a story of 

how a hopeful individual engaged in the routine activities of life can 

be transformed in to a drug runner and terrorist. 

Our second objective is to offer insight to the roots of violence 

most likely to create the environment in which VNSAs emerge and 

prosper. We also take on the objective of engendering an 

appreciation for the range of potential VNSA organizational types 

and the forms of collective violence employed to increase their 

power. Our final objective is to explain the linkages between roots 

of violence and VNSAs, focusing on reinforcing behaviors as well 

as failures in state governance and identity mobilization as key 
4

transformational engines. Our approach adds further value by 

deviating from the reliance on the state as the primary unit of 

analysis. The standard approach, particularly in Central Asia, is to 

focus on state failure and the important role played by other states 

in supporting the struggling regime or furthering its decay. While 

we do not discount the value of state-centered approaches, we are 

convinced they must be complemented by an examination of the 

dynamics working at the sub-national level with the non-state actor 

as the primary unit of analysis. 

System of Violence 

Our approach is founded in a systems perspective, which 

enables an understanding of VNSAs within the context of a 

structured environment, consisting of multiple sub-systems 

interacting to make up the whole system. As argued by Kenneth 

Waltz, some part of our understanding of system outputs and actor 

behaviors is found within the structure of the system itself.4

 The 

structure explains the “arrangement, or the ordering, of the parts of 

the system.”5

 As shown in Figure 1, our system’s structure includes 

roots of violence (inputs), transformations, VNSAs (outputs), and 

environmental factors. These system elements interact in a highly 

dynamic, causative manner to spawn the VNSAs of the developing 

world. This framework effectively captures the disparate factors 

that are too often examined in isolation, and draws needed attention 

to the salient relationships that enable the cycle of violent collective 

action to thrive. 

As an open system, our framework allows for environmental 

factors, which is particularly important given the transnational 

character of many VNSAs. It allows us to consider the influence of 

such international dynamics as globalization and the role of external 
5 

Failures of Governance

Identity Cleavage

& Mobilization

SOURCES TRANSFORMATIONS ACTOR

Resource Scarcity

Demographic

Pressures

Socio-economic

Deprivation

Organized Crime

& Corruption

Religious Mov

Ethnopolitical

G

Warlords w/ M

Crime Networ

Eco-warriors

Tribes /Clans

City-States

Ideological Gr

Reinforcing Actions

VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTOR SUB-SYSTEM

Environment

Globalization

External Influences

Figure 1: Open System Model 
6

powers. Globalization can undermine state sovereignty by 

contributing to the commercialization of VNSA behaviors and 

objectives. External powers also play an important role as 

evidenced by the abundant research on Russian and Chinese policy 

toward Central Asia. These dominant players as well as 

Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and many western states, 

including the United States, have a significant impact on the system. 

Rather than treating environmental factors separately, we weave 

them into our analysis. 

A brief accounting of one particularly infamous warlord serves 

nicely to set up the following overview of the framework’s core 

elements. Standing among heavily laden fruit trees with the murky 

waters of the Syr Darya flowing nearby, it was difficult for us to 

envision the fierce fighting that occurred in November 1998 

between Tajik government forces and the private army of a 

renegade Uzbek warlord. Taking advantage of a puzzle-work of 

borders that delineate the Ferghana Valley, Colonel Makhmud 

Khudoiberdiyev led nine hundred armed militia in a raid into 

Tajikistan from Uzbekistan, seizing security installations in the 

northern town of Khujand. As many as 200 were killed and 500 

injured, including innocent civilians, in the two weeks of fighting.6

 

Colonel Khudoiberdiyev recruited locally from a growing pool of 

disaffected young men, gained training and weapons from the 

Taliban in Afghanistan, and took advantage of Dushanbe’s inability 

to secure its northern region. 

Roots of Violence. While there are many dynamic forces 

impacting the system, the roots of violence proffered in the next 

section have explanatory power regarding the formation of an atrisk population, ripe for mobilization along existing identity 
7

cleavages. They are transnational forces at the sub-national level 

with a direct impact on the individual. As with the unemployed, 

dispossessed young men in Colonel Khudoiberdiyev’s private army, 

it is the individual who must be mobilized to become a member of a 

collectivity and embrace violent action. Roots of violence are 

highly interrelated and a greater stress in each has a synergistic 

effect on the whole. In regions where the synergistic effect is most 

acute, the system is highly likely to undergo a transformation 

resulting in the rise of VNSAs. Central Asia proves its worth as a 

case study given the prevalence of the most salient roots of 

violence. The unemployed youth of Khojand are certainly affected 

by tensions to include resource scarcity, demographic pressures, 

crime and corruption and socio-economic deprivation that 

undermine any embryonic loyalty to their assigned states. 

Transformations. A transformation must occur before the 

Khojand youth become members of a VNSA like Khudoiberdiyev’s 

private army. The relational aspect of our system of violence is 

tackled in the paper's third section. The conversion from individual 

passivity to collective activity is difficult to explain and harder to 

predict. Moreover, current research focuses almost solely on state 

failure as the primary catalyst. Although we agree that a weakened 

state is a key intervening variable, we assert that identity 

mobilization is an equally viable explanatory factor. We also 

amend the traditional view of state failure in terms of a weakened 

capacity to include failure due to extreme coercive action. This 

approach integrates contemporary insights on the state failure with 

early research on revolutionary and insurgent movements to achieve 

an understanding of the transformational process. Once Colonel 

Khudoiberdiyev’s private army emerges from the primal soup of a 
8

weak state and identity mobilization, it is likely to engage in 

reinforcing actions that perpetuate and possibly expand the systemic 

cycle of violence. Together, a weakened state, identity cleavages 

and mobilization, and reinforcing actions undermine the prospects 

for a decline in collective violence and the emergence of a stable, 

prosperous system. 

Violent Non-State Actors. Our inquiry continues in the fourth 

section with the output of our system—the VNSA. The VNSA is 

the focus of our analysis principally because it does the shooting, 

plants the bomb, and conducts the guerilla assault. Even if we are 

not successful in understanding the sources of tension and 

transformations leading to its birth, we are obligated by the reality 

of the threat to appreciate the range of potential non-state actors and 

the preferred forms of violent action. This analysis is of particular 

value given the narrow range of non-state actors typically 

considered. 

Central Asia provides fertile soil for investigating the range of 

potential VNSAs. Our research reveals at least nine primary 

collectivities, although many variations are certain to exist: militant 

religious movements, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), 

ethno-political groups, private militias, tribes or clans, city-states 

(regionalism), eco-warriors, and ideological political parties. Future 

analysts may be wise to consider adding multi-national corporations 

with robust security forces as potential VNSAs. For example, the 

security forces at the various Microsoft offices in Costa Rica dwarf 

that nation’s own security forces, and the impressive security 

presence of the Daewoo industrial site in the Ferghana Valley is 

significant enough to affect the power calculus in the region. Our 

list reflects the groups of primary focus in international security 
9

studies and others that have been the subject of neglect. Although 

all non-state actors are not currently mobilized for organized 

violence in Central Asia, all exist with at least a latent potential for 

mobilization. 

Silk Route Nexus 

Our framework and its application to Central Asia should prove 

meaningful for a wide variety of stakeholders, ranging from the 

NGO leader seeking to leverage developmental assistance to the Air 

Force intelligence officer charged with targeting emerging threats. 

Moreover, this research should be valuable to those focusing on 

Central Asia regardless of whether they are involved in furthering 

diplomatic relationships, planning military operations, or studying 

the rich array of socio-economic issues confronting the not-sonewly independent states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Indeed, research and regional travel 

convinced us of Central Asia’s value as fertile soil for an 

examination of VNSAs. 

The conventional focus on the state has led to a treatment of the 

region in a monolithic manner due to the structural legacies of the 

Soviet era and the persistence of communist bosses in leadership 

positions. While these similarities and others do exist from one 

state to the next, Central Asia must also be appreciated for its 

diversity, particularly in terms of identity cleavages. These 

cleavages, such a tribal affiliations, undermine state efforts to grow 

nationalism and serve as schisms that render borders less 

meaningful. Focusing on Central Asia as a region, or a sub-system 

within a global system, allows us to investigate actors and issues 

that transcend the artificial boundaries imposed by Soviet dictator 

Josef Stalin. Central Asia also proves its metal for the application 
10 
11

of our framework because every core transnational security issue is 

at play to varying degrees across the region. As our research 

reveals, the hub of the ancient Silk Route is now the nexus for a 

potentially volatile cocktail of actors and issues. 

ROOTS OF VIOLENCE 

Ashgabat Dispatch: A weary father joins a gathering crowd 

on the street corner, anticipating the collapse of a run-down 

apartment block. Anxious neighbors peer from windows as the steel 

chain cuts down the side of the adjoining building; a drab gray 

Soviet structure like their own. The father knows his building is 

next to fall in the remodeling plan for Ashgabat. As the capital of 

Turkmenistan continues its transition from Soviet outpost to turgid 

capital, the families of the inner city are being forcibly relocated to 

a sprawling periphery of equally squalid apartments or to outlying 

villages. In his new community he can expect acute levels of 

unemployment and derelict health care. If he can find work at all, 

maybe loading camels at the Tolkuchka Sunday Bazaar, a portion of 

his income will undoubtedly be needed to bribe his children’s 

teachers for passing marks. Shortages of bread, which led to armed 

revolt in recent years, will undoubtedly add to his frustration. 

Deep Roots 

A passivity formed by several generations of authoritarian rule 

is likely to characterize this Turkmen father’s response to difficult 

circumstances. Submission is unlikely, however, to reflect the 

attitude of all Turkmen, particularly those of a younger generation 

whose expectations are high for a country that the enigmatic leader 

of Turkmenistan, Turkmenabashi, hails as the “new Kuwait.” For 

the young Turkmen and their similarly positioned peers along the 

Silk Route, these frustrations are undermining any embryonic sense 

of citizenship. Pressures at the sub-national level are creating atrisk populations in which dispossessed individuals are rendered ripe 

for mobilization into violent identity-based groups. These roots of 

violence are not unique to Central Asia or the post-Cold War 

period, nor are they the only sources of conflict in the system. That 
12

said, we assert they are the most likely to create populations at risk 

to manipulation by the re-emergent ideologies of hate, religion, and 

greed. The Islamic militants of Osama bin Laden’s Al Queda 

network and the armed men of the Yohmud clan in Turkmenistan 

represent the new Marxists and Maoists of the early 21st century. 

The landscape of contemporary organized violence has as much 

to do with the “tremendous stresses on human communities” as it 

does with geographically defined power struggles.7

 From among 

the varied sources of human insecurity, our analysis focuses on four 

specific stresses that we contend are most likely to make individuals 

susceptible to transformation into a VNSA: resource scarcity, 

demographic pressures, socio-economic deprivation, and organized 

crime and corruption. Each underlying dynamic serves to place 

significant stress on the individual, civil society, and state. 

Importantly, these roots are unlikely to be sole causal factors in 

creating an at-risk population. Rather, it is their mutually 

reinforcing interaction that is key. There is no magic threshold for 

collective violence; however, severe stresses in any one area may be 

sufficient to engender a sense of individual hopelessness. Grave 

stresses across the board are a strong indicator of impending 

violence by non-state actors. The transformation from despair to 

anger expressed through collective violence is also a function of 

state response (coercion or impotence) as well the resources and 

leadership of the mobilizing VNSA. 

The roots of violence are the inputs to our open systems 

framework. Rather than focusing on these stresses as sources of 

inter-state conflict or civil war as is in current research, we adapt 

them to an explanation of identity-based mobilization and 

ultimately, the warlord’s triumph. A more effective response to the 
13

VNSA threat can be crafted only when an understanding of the 

underlying causes examined here is linked to a study of 

transformational engines, which is tackled in the next section. 

Moreover, we zero in on the threats VNSAs pose to external actors 

such as the US or UN, the authority of state, the security of 

communities, and the activities of other non-state actors. While 

many of the VNSAs under our microscope do appear to have a will 

to power, it is clear many armed non-state groups are focused on 

protecting turf, controlling networks of illicit trade, or accumulating 

wealth. For these VNSAs, the overthrow of the state is a secondary 

or even tertiary objective. Transnational criminal organizations, 

such as the caviar mafia in the Caspian basin, are quite content to 

exist beyond the control or even with the acquiescence of the state. 

Resource Scarcity 

Trying to rinse the salty glaze off our arms and face with what 

could be best described as brackish water, the specter of the dried 

Aral Sea was reaching as far west as Bukhara. Having washed 

down a dinner of sashlik (globs of fat thinly marbled with meat, 

roasted on a metal kabob) with equally salty tea, our own bodies 

were becoming testaments to the ill effects of low-quality water. 

Water, the most basic resource needed by all living creatures, is not 

plentiful in most of Central Asia; clean, potable water is in even 

shorter supply. A water crisis could create a backdrop that 

augments VNSA incubation; indeed, resource scarcities in general 

could weaken the fabric of both state and society, creating 

conditions more amenable to VNSA development. 

The intersection of resource scarcity and the rise of non-state 

actors is a relatively new line of inquiry. The notion that 

environmental degradation or resource deprivation could have an 
14

impact on security issues, while having its roots as early as the 

1960s, left the fringe of studies in the late 1970s. Lester Brown of 

the World Watch Institute wrote extensively on an expanding notion 

of national security to include resource scarcity.8

 Since then, 

political scientists, sociologists, environmentalists, and even 

prominent politicians have reflected their belief that resource 

scarcity and environmental degradation (which often go hand-inhand) have a place in security issues. 

A significant contributor to this body of literature is Thomas 

Homer-Dixon. His research suggests a variety of environmental 

issues, prominently resource scarcity, can impact social order and 

state stability. Through careful modeling and empirical 

observation, Homer-Dixon argues that resource scarcity can lead to 

conflict through three main routes, each with a unique type of 

conflict: (1) decreasing supplies of physically controllable resources 

can provoke interstate “simple scarcity” conflicts; (2) large 

population movements caused by environmental stress can 

precipitate “group-identity” conflicts, specifically ethnic clashes; 

and (3) severe environmental scarcity can increase economic 

deprivation and disrupt key social institutions, precipitating 

“deprivation” conflicts, such as civil strife and insurgency.9

 While 

all are applicable to Central Asia, the last two are the most relevant 

to our line of inquiry. 

It is important to provide a working definition of “resource 

scarcity.” Drawing again on Homer-Dixon, resource scarcity can 

come from three different sources: (1) a decline in the quality and/or 

quantity of renewable or (especially) non-renewable resources, 

which can provoke resource scarcity conflict between states; (2) 

population growth, which reduces the per capita availability of 
15

resources; and (3) unequal resource distribution among a given 

population.10 As before, Central Asia reflects all three components 

of resource scarcity, but the last facet of resource scarcity is 

especially germane to a discussion of Central Asia, as it influences 

nearly all of the resulting system outputs—VNSAs. 

The chain of events from resource scarcity to conflict is fairly 

clear. Homer-Dixon admits that resource scarcity is certainly not the 

sole incubator of conflict; we extend this contention to the creation 

of VNSAs. Empirics indicate, however, that Central Asia’s varied 

and worsening environmental scarcities interact with the structure 

and operation of the various states in the region to trigger processes 

that heighten ethnic, communal, and class-based rivalries. This 

combination of forces encourages resource capture, the 

marginalization of the poor, rising economic hardship, and a 

progressive weakening of the state. These processes, in turn, 

culminate in increased group-identity and deprivation conflicts. 

All three dynamics of resource scarcity are at play in Central 

Asia. The supply of many basic resources (especially water and 

arable land) have always been historically low; resource scarcity is 

also affected by demand, as populations are growing rapidly and per 

capita resource use and wasteful state use is increasing; and 

structural shortages, where corruption leads to disproportionate 

resource allocation among elites at the expense of the larger 

population. An exhaustive treatment of resource scarcity in Central 

Asia would include much more than water and arable land—the 

corollary resources (particularly food and forest resources) are in 

demand as well. However, water and arable land are more than 

adequate to demonstrate how resource scarcity can contribute to the 

mobilization of individuals and incubation of VNSAs. 
16

Water Woes. Water is the leading resource issue in Central 

Asia. In a word, Central Asia faces a crisis in water. The Aral Sea 

is drying up, and may be gone completely by 2012. Only a third of 

the Aral’s surface area remains.11 The two major rivers feeding the 

Aral, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, long ago ceased reaching the 

sea, which is now actually two smaller “lakes.” The drying of the 

Aral Sea has increased the salinity of water in all of western Central 

Asia, and the extensive residual salt is often whipped by the winds, 

coating everything in its path. A severe drought, which some 

meteorologists contend will be a permanent feature due to loss of 

the Aral, has gripped the region for a second year. Further, 

exceptionally poor water infrastructures lose at least as much water 

as is transported—evidenced by the hundreds of miles of lush 

weeds that grow along all major canals and irrigation systems. 

Other water aggravations include lavish, yet wasteful uses of water 

for politically pretentious purposes. For example, Ashgabat boasts 

both the largest water fountain in the world and has incredible 

displays of various “water architectures” throughout the city. 

President Saparmurat Niyazov also declared his intention to create 

the “Turkmenbashi Sea” just north of Ashgabat—in the middle of 

the vast Kizilkum Desert—by diverting more water from the 

already hyper-exploited Amu Darya, via the Karakum Canal. 

Historically, as with so many resources during Soviet times, 

water was commonly controlled by the state. As exclusive state 

property, it was also a free good.12 Water use and allocation were 

based on the "Fundamentals of Water Legislation of the USSR and 

the Union Republics" of 1970. This central, nation-wide guidance 

also crafted the water codes for the individual Soviet Republics.13 

This background is important in two distinct ways. First, as all 
17

water utilization and allocation was decided by Moscow, there is no 

tradition at all in Central Asia for regional water-sharing agreements 

between the five governments. Second, as with any free resource, 

water was wasted. In the early days of the Soviet Union, with a low 

industrial rate and a small population, water utilization could be less 

than optimal with minimal impact. With populations that are at 

least doubled since the 1960s and water resources becoming 

increasingly scarce in much of Central Asia, squandering is no 

longer a viable option. This well-documented sub-regional scarcity, 

so thoroughly studied in academia, is juxtaposed by the nearly 

universal Central Asian practice of slinging bowls of water on one’s 

driveway or sidewalk in the morning and in the evening, the many 

ostentatious fountains in major cities, and the hundreds of miles of 

leaky, weed-infested canals bringing water to the desert. 

Another important factor when discussing water resource 

scarcity in Central Asia is the vast water disparities in the region. 

While Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are largely steppe 

or desert, mountainous Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have ample water 

supply. Indeed, the headwaters of the two most important water 

sources in the region, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, originate 

in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan respectively. The Amu Darya then 

flows through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan where it simply dries 

up before reaching the Aral Sea. The Syr Darya, on the other hand, 

flows through all the Central Asia Republics except Tajikistan, 

crossing political borders several times, and at least in the case of 

Uzbekistan, enters, leaves, and re-enters further to the west. 

Two things are important regarding this complex hydrogeography. First, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan control the headwaters 

of these rivers, and therefore technically, control the flow of the 
18

waters. Thus, either country is at least theoretically capable of 

building enough dams or reservoirs to significantly reduce (or for 

short periods of time, actually stop) the flow of the rivers to the 

downstream riparians. These downstream riparians are militarily 

and economically (with the possible exception of Turkmenistan) 

more powerful than the upstream riparians. Most analysts who 

study international river basins agree with this arrangement—a 

stronger downstream riparian dependent on water from a weaker 

upstream riparian is the most unstable and conflict-prone type of 

basin. 

Second, multiple border crossings by both these rivers 

complicate regional water sharing agreements. In issues of both 

quantity of water taken and quality of water leaving the country, 

each country always demands more and higher quality water from 

its upstream neighbor. Another very significant issue is water 

utilization. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan typically use their water for 

hydroelectric power production. Thus, they tend to fill their 

reservoirs during the summer and release water during the winter 

when more power is needed. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and 

Kazakhstan, on the other hand, need that water released during the 

summer for irrigation purposes. Thus, the timing of water release 

from the upstream riparians creates a considerable amount of 

tension as well. 

The potential for this to create an interstate resource scarcity 

conflict is substantial. Tension between states regarding water is 

already palpable. This became obvious when the owner of the flat 

we rented in Ferghana explained why the bathtub was full of water 

(for emergencies after 7:00 pm, when the water was cut off) and 

instructed us to try to avoid using the facilities during the night. 
19

Kyrgyzstan had cut the water flow of the Syr Darya to eastern 

Uzbekistan. The Uzbek government, in response, stopped 

electricity flows from power plants in the Ferghana Valley.14 

Additionally, Kyrgyzstan filled the Toktogul Reservoir with waters 

from the Naryn River, which is fed from snowmelt in the far-off 

Central Tian Shan Range. This reservoir, lying in the western-most 

quarter of Kyrgyzstan, is very vulnerable to either an Uzbek or 

Kazakh military intrusion; several guides, officials, and individuals 

expressed fear that if the water situation got worse, Uzbekistan 

could be the most likely next owner of Toktogul. Several other 

scenarios exist; for example, the depletion of Lake Balkash waters 

in Kazakhstan will be accelerated by China’s recent decision to 

divert two rivers that feed into the lake in order to expand irrigation 

in the Xinjiang province.15 Certainly this decision will complicate 

Kazakh-Sino relations in the future. 

Research regarding non-state conflict over water is far less 

substantial, but this too is an area where conflict can occur. As 

Stefan Klotzki stated in 1994, “Ethnic minorities could use 

ecological problems as a vehicle for imposing their interests against 

the titular nation, as has happened in the disintegration of the Soviet 

Union in many different regions.”16 Based on persistent resource 

scarcities, the most likely form of non-state conflict in the near term 

is “deprivation conflict,” where substate actors will fight one 

another for water due to low supply and/or unequal or unfair 

distribution of water. As one possible case, a survey of the entire 

Aral Sea basin in 1994 identified a total of 32 major irrigation 

systems—23 on the Amu Darya and nine on the Syr Darya. The 

most ethnically contentious irrigation systems were found in 

Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.17 Some of these irrigation 
20

systems lie in ethnically diverse (and torn) areas such as the 

irrigation systems in the Ferghana valley. Other irrigation systems 

straddle political borders—like the system used by the Uzbek 

minority in Dashoguz, Turkmenistan and the semi-autonomous 

Karakalpaks in western Uzbekistan. Others go through areas 

previously torn by civil strife; the Vakhsh/Pyandsh system is split 

between Gorno-Badakhshan and Kurgan Tyube, two bitter regional 

rivals in Tajikistan’s civil war. 

It is also important to understand water (and to a lesser extent 

land) is already established as a flashpoint. For example, the UN 

reported that in 1989, tensions over access to water resulted in a 

violent conflict where several people were killed and injured in the 

village of Samarkandik, a Tajik enclave within western Kyrgyzstan. 

The following year, the Ferghana Valley city of Osh, Kyrgyzstan, 

witnessed a much larger conflict over allocation of scarce land 

resources. The warring parties fell along ethnic lines—Uzbeks 

fighting Kyrgyz, where at least 300 people (possibly up to 1,000) 

were killed, and well over 1,000 wounded. Additionally, more than 

5,000 crimes were reported, including the destruction of homes, 

robbery and rapes. A potential water conflict simmering on the 

horizon may spring from decisions to drastically cut water flow to 

the downstream riparians in July, 2000. This caused Kazakhstan to 

lose possibly up to twenty percent of its cotton crop last year.18

Three different catalysts could cause water shortages to further 

mobilize various groups to turn violent to advance their goals. First 

is a continued supply crunch. Central Asia is already consuming far 

more water than is being naturally replenished. As Peter Gleick 

calculated, per capita water availability in 2000 is estimated at 700 

m

3

, significantly down from the estimated 7500 m3 in 1950 and the 
21

2000 m3

 in 1980.19 By comparison, US citizens enjoy 

approximately 4000 m3

 of available water per capita; 1000 m3 of 

water per capita is considered necessary to maintain an adequate 

standard of living in a moderately developed country. As the per 

capita water availability continues to shrink (data is not available 

for 2001, but will surely be less than 700 m3

 due to the severe 

drought in the region), localities will be the first to resort to violence 

for two reasons. First, certain localities are already in critical water 

shortages, and any further reduction in water supply may push such 

localities over the edge. One such region is Karakalpakstan, which 

is located in western Uzbekistan near the Aral Sea. Second, while 

states may negotiate prior to resorting to force to secure adequate 

water for their populations, individuals and small groups will 

mobilize and resort to violence much sooner. Groups that are 

already formed along some other identity cleavage will be 

especially prone to violence. 

A second possible catalyst for environmental conflict is the 

further erosion, or possible collapse, of the agricultural sector, 

especially in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. With yields already 

30% below peak production during the Soviet days (largely due to 

drought and a precipitous drop in water and soil quality), resulting 

in increasingly fewer rural jobs, the monoculture of cotton 

consumes an enormous amount of the scarce water resources 

throughout the region. Driving throughout Uzbekistan and 

Turkmenistan, the authors saw thousands of acres of salt-encrusted 

earth where cotton fields used to be. The farmers of the region have 

had to resort to “washing” their fields prior to planting cotton—

actually flooding the fields, then bringing huge vacuums to suck 

away the then salty water—in order to make the soil marginally 
22

useful. Should this already teetering sector of the economy cease 

delivering what economic security it now provides, rural farmers 

(which have already demonstrated a penchant for violence while in 

duress) could choose conflict to express their frustrations. 

Figure 2: Central Asian Ecological Migrants (Since 1988) 

A third environmental catalyst that could lead to conflict is a 

massive flight from rural to urban areas due to continued drought, 

which we explore further under demographic pressures. Already, 

access to the capital cities in all Central Asia republics is tightly 

controlled, and the ruling elite would no doubt unfavorably view 

any massive refugee movement to urban areas. Indeed, many 

young unemployed people moving to urban areas report having to 

pay police in order to simply be in the cities—let alone the bribes 

which would be necessary in order to find employment.20 Some 

level of ecologically-induced population movement is already 

evident. As shown in Figure 2, some reports suggest that as many 

of 270,000 migrants resulted from ecological disaster.21 

Demographic Pressures 

The forced displacement of central Ashgabat residents in our 

opening example is one instance among many in Central Asia of 

how demographic pressure can be a root of violence. Although 

there is little evidence to support demographic pressures as a 

singular cause of armed conflict, there is a growing appreciation for 

its contributory role. Demographic stresses can accentuate 

Aral Sea to Kazakhstan 30,000 

Aral Sea to CIS at large 13,000 

Aral Sea to Uzbekistan 50,000+ 

Semipalatinsk w/in Kazakhstan 45,000 

Semipalatinsk to CIS at large 116,000 

Kyrgyzstan w/in Kyrgyzstan 17,000 
23

underdevelopment, crime, and resource scarcity. An understanding 

of demographic pressures provides insight to the future of urban 

violence, the power play of dispossessed youth and the weakening 

of the state. 

Population Ambush. Our analysis considers population as more 

than a static measure of national power.22 Rather, demographic 

pressures are a function of both composition and dynamics.23 

Composition refers to the characteristics of a given population, 

including size, age distribution, and religious/ethnic-makeup. 

Population dynamics entail changes in population composition over 

time. Moreover, demographic pressures are most often assessed as 

a source of conflict between states. For our analysis, composition 

and changes in populations that brew non-state violence are more 

important. In this context, the two most salient dynamics are 

fertility and migration patterns. The compositional factors 

associated with negative demographic pressures are “youth bulges” 

and urban density. It is the reinforcing relationships between 

dynamics and composition that create the conditions for individual 

deprivation and eventual mobilization into identity-based groups. 

Figure 3: Central Asian Demographics 

Figure 3 Population Popuation 

Growth

Fertility 

(births 

per 

woman)

Infant 

Mortality 

(per 1000)

Net 

Migration 

(per 1000) 

Uzbekistan 25,155,064 1.60% 3.06 71.92 -2.06 

Turkmenistan 4,603,244 1.85% 3.58 73.25 -1.04 

Tajikistan 6,518,681 2.12% 4.29 116.09 -3.49 

Kazakhstan 16,731,303 0.03% 2.07 59.17 -6.43 

Kyrgyzstan 4,753,003 1.44% 3.19 76.5 -2.66 

 

CIA World Factbook 2001 
24

Persistent fertility rates above the replacement value of children 

per family can expand the population beyond the capacity of 

governance. When high fertility rates are combined with declining 

death rates, the result is a population explosion that will persist until 

the demographic transition is completed by a corresponding decline 

in fertility. This population explosion has been forestalled in 

Central Asia due primarily to acute underdevelopment and 

migration. As the data in Figure 3 make clear, infant mortality rates 

are high by western standards (6.76 in US) and net migration values 

are negative. 

Despite these negative trends, the high fertility rates throughout 

the region and strong growth rates are creating destabilizing 

demographic pressures. In particular, a rapidly increasing youthful 

population is demanding the education, employment, and health 

care promised at independence. According to 2000 data collected 

by the US Census Bureau, a substantial percentage of each 

country’s population is below the age of 30: Uzbekistan-65.3%, 

Turkmenistan-66%, Tajikistan-69.4%, Kazakhstan-51.4%, and 

Kyrgyzstan-63%.24 Leaders in Dushanbe, Tashkent, Bishkek, 

Ashgabat, and Astana have proven incapable of satisfying 

expectations they initially raised. Along the so-called “Broadway” 

of Tashkent, young men in their late teens and twenties gather in 

pool halls and on street-corners. They market in cigarettes, cheap 

wine, and prostitution. To the careful observer, evidence of drug 

and alcohol addiction marks their faces and arms. Thousands of 

similar broken young men litter the streets of Central Asia, each a 

candidate for mobilization into a criminal gang or militant religious 

movement. 
25

The population growth trends in Central Asia are also certain to 

reduce the per capita availability of resources, exacerbating water 

and land depletion.25 As argued in our analysis of resource scarcity, 

dramatic demographic shifts are resulting from ecological decay. 

According to conservative estimates, over 250,000 people had 

already moved out of ecological disaster areas within five years of 

independence.26 These shifts not only transfer stresses from rural to 

urban areas, but also serve as catalysts for group-identity conflicts.27 

Drought in eastern Uzbekistan stemming from the depletion of 

water has already driven thousands to urban centers, particularly 

Tashkent, adding to a significant pool of unemployed youth. 

Migration Strains. In addition to ecological decay, substantial 

demographic shifts can also result from acute underdevelopment, 

political change, and conflict. Migratory pressures include refugees 

and migrants. Refugees tend to move because they are pushed out, 

often as a function of government policy or the effects of war.28 

Migrants tend to move as a result of both push and pull factors. In 

Central Asia, the push of resource scarcity in one region is often 

accompanied by the false hope for economic opportunity in another. 

Whether being pushed or pulled, the numbers for Central Asia are 

staggering. Over 4.2 million people have moved within, from, or to 

the region since the collapse of the Soviet Union.29

The remarkable negative migration rates for each country 

reflect the out-migration of Russians, Germans, and others that are 

suffering from the collapse of the Soviet system. In Kyrgyzstan 

alone, over 450,000 people left the country between 1990 and 2001, 

including 62% of all Russians.30 Over 560,000 Germans, out of 1.1 

million, have the left the region for Germany since 1992, which 

represents a significant loss in professional talent.31 For the 
26

thousands of doctors, teachers, and engineers who have not been 

able to emigrate, life in the newly independent states is a struggle to 

learn new skills as drivers and janitors. The Russians in particular 

are new to the minority role, and their dissatisfaction with the new 

system of preferences and patronages is palatable. 

Migration result from and contributes to conflict. Fighting in 

the Ferghana Valley between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks 

(Turkish minority group) during 1989 left 100 dead and forced the 

Soviet army to evacuate nearly 74,000 Meskhetians. Two to five 

hundred people died just a year later as a result of inter-ethnic 

fighting between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Osh and nearby Uzgen. 

The numbers displaced are not known; however, persistent violence 

in the Ferghana Valley continues to push individuals out and to the 

capital cities. In 1994 alone, over 116,000 Kyrgyz moved from the 

southern rural areas around Osh to the more industrialized north, 

especially Bishkek.32 Further north, Kazakhstan hosts an estimated 

10,000 Chechen refugees from the war in Chechnya. The most 

dramatic migratory shifts resulted from the devastating civil war in 

Tajikistan, which witnessed the displacement of over 700,000 

people, including 60,000 who fled to the war-torn Afghanistan.33 

While many returned home by the mid-1990s, thousands still 

remain in surrounding countries. According to the UNHCR’s MidYear Report 2000, approximately 10,500 remain in Kyrgyzstan, 

14,000 Tajik refugees of Turkmen ethnic origin remain in 

Turkmenistan, 6,000 are in Kazakhstan, and as many as 30,000 may 

be in Uzbekistan.34 

The migratory pressures outlined here pose four broad security 

threats: 1) opposition to the home regime; 2) political risk to the 

host country; 3) perceived threat to cultural identity; and 4) social or 
27

economic burden.35 Each of these is at play in Central Asia to 

varying degrees. For example, Afghan refugees are sources of 

external support for the Northern Alliance. Russians are now 

perceived as threats to cultural identity, particularly in 

Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Tajiks refugees add to the already 

Tajik character of Samarkand and Bukhara, undermining 

government efforts to establish these ancient Silk Route cities as 

loci for Uzbek nationalism. Most importantly, all migrants and 

refugees are posing very real social and economic burdens. 

Although the hard data is not available, there are anecdotal reports 

suggesting the need for further inquiry into the contribution of 

migrants and refugees to criminality, dependency, and 

delinquency.36 The economic burden is more direct. Migrants and 

refugees compete for scare jobs, inadequate health care, and 

insufficient housing. 

Compelling Demographics. The demographic pressures in 

Central Asia are gaining momentum. The out-migration of the 

1990s that kept a lid on rapid population growth has nearly stopped. 

The impact of high fertility rates is just being realized as an 

expanding “youth bulge” seeks jobs and services that are actually 

declining. The stresses of population growth are compounded by 

the perceived and real threats from migrants and refugees. Even if 

many refugees can be returned to their home countries, they are 

likely to be greeted by equally distressing socio-economic 

deprivation. As weakened regimes thrash about to provide basic 

services, more and more young men and women are looking to nonstate groups to provide access to food and housing. To the teenager 

of Ashgabat’s peripheral slums and the 28-year-old man loitering in 
28

a Tashkent pool hall, the consistent monthly salary of a criminal 

network is increasingly appealing. 

Organized Crime and Corruption

A train of donkeys loaded with heroin is intercepted along the 

Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border. A struggling schoolteacher in 

Karakol, Kyrgyzstan accepts a bribe from impoverished parents for 

a passing grade. Several hundred automatic rifles are smuggled by 

Uighar separatists across the border from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang 

province, China. Traditionally considered a domestic rule of law 

problem, endemic organized crime and corruption have emerged as 

transnational roots of violence in the developing world. According 

to Former Director of Central Intelligence, James R. Woolsey, 

Drug trafficking, links between drug traffickers 

and terrorists, smuggling of illegal aliens, massive 

financial and bank fraud, arms smuggling, 

potential involvement in the theft and sale of 

nuclear material, political intimidation, and 

corruption all constitute a poisonous brew—a 

mixture potentially as deadly as what we faced 

during the cold war.37

The problem is endemic in Central Asia, permeating from the 

governmental elite to the rural peasant. The roots are fed by the 

rapid expansion of illicit transnational economic activity, 

particularly in the global commodities of drugs, small arms, and 

persons. Underdevelopment, demographic pressures, and resource 

scarcity foster and result from this destructive duo. Although 

distinct concepts, the interaction of crime and corruption is a 

harbinger of a decline in regime legitimacy and the rise of collective 

violence. 

Organized Crime. Crime shifts from a domestic law-and-order 

problem to legitimate security threat when it becomes organized and 
29

transnational. As defined by Interpol, organized crime involves 

“any group having a corporate structure whose primary objective is 

to obtain money through illegal activities, often surviving on fear 

and corruption.”38 This definition rightfully embraces the core 

profit motive, the role of violence and the key link to corruption. 

Along the Silk Route, organized crime prospers both outside state 

authority and in cooperation with it. 

In addition to the massive drug trade discussed below, Central 

Asia experiences robust transnational crime in oil, caviar, metals, 

humans, and weapons.39 The most naked form of crime is the black 

market in oil. Illegal vendors ply their trade along the roadsides of 

the now paved Silk Routes, offering used plastic water bottles full 

of dusty petrol. According to Kyrgyzstan’s Interior Ministry, over 

155 tons of oil products were smuggled into the country during 

1997 and 1998 alone.40 Possibly the most insidious organized 

criminal activity is the vigorous sex trade.41 Essentially a form of 

modern slavery, human trafficking trends indicate at least 700,000 

and possibly 2 million women and children are illegally smuggled 

across international borders every year.42 Figures for Central Asia 

are shaky; however, the International Organization for Migration in 

collaboration with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe (OSCE) report more than 4,000 Kyrgyz women and 

children were involved in the sex trade during 1999. Other 

estimates suggest as many as 50,000 to 70,000 in the last few years 

alone.43

Central Asia is also home to a robust illegal arms trade. 

According to Jane’s Intelligence Group, an estimated 30 million 

firearms are circulating throughout the Commonwealth of 

Independent States.44 In 1998, an Iranian “humanitarian” aid train 
30

bound for the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan was intercepted in 

Osh. Its seventeen cars held 700 tons of weapons, including antitank mines, grenades, machine gun ammunition, 122mm artillery 

shells, and rocket launchers.45 In 1999, forty MiG fighter aircraft 

were “illegally” smuggled from Kazakhstan through the Czech 

Republic to North Korea. Officially unresolved, it is quite likely 

well-placed officials were instrumental to the sale, particularly 

given the mysterious murder of the head of state arms exports 

shortly thereafter. Non-proliferation efforts are high on the agendas 

of the US State Department, the OSCE, and other intergovernmental 

organizations. Russian troops of the 201st Motorized Infantry 

Division patrol the Tajik-Afghan border in a vain effort to stem the 

flow between the two weapons-saturated countries. 

The transfer of conventional arms is destabilizing enough; 

however, we are eminently concerned about the potential for the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As the threat 

of nuclear proliferation from the Semey (Semipalatinsk), 

Kazakhstan, test site recedes, the threat of biological proliferation is 

advancing. Once a remote island in the center of the Aral Sea, 

Ostrov Vozrozhdeniya is increasingly accessible by land as the Aral 

Sea shrinks. This modest island shared by Uzbekistan and 

Kazakhstan was home to a sophisticated Soviet biological weapons 

program until 1992 with laboratories for creating persistent, 

weaponized variants of anthrax, plague, Q-fever, and other deadly 

toxins. Giant steel canisters of anthrax spores and and other 

unknown agents were placed underground during the Cold War, but 

their status—both in regards to safety and security—is unclear. The 

Russians are not forthcoming, but according to experts at the 

Monterrey Institute for International Studies, the US sampled viable 
31

spores in recent years.46 Absent the introduction of security 

controls, it is increasingly probable these forgotten toxins will draw 

the attention of regional VNSAs like the IMU, possibly in collusion 

with the remnants of Osama bin Laden’s Al Queda network. 

Corruption Corrupts. Corruption shares the profit motive with 

crime, but is more narrowly focused on abuse of entrusted power 

for private gain.47 Corruption is not limited to public offices, but 

includes abuse in the private sector. Bribery serves as the main 

tool; however, corruption also entails theft, fraud, embezzlement, 

patronage, and nepotism.48 In traditional state-level analysis, focus 

is on political corruption, such as election manipulation and the 

effects on regime legitimacy. Equally important is administrative 

corruption, which has both an individual and systemic impact. 

Administrative corruption involves illegal private gain for doing 

what is “ordinarily required by law” (according-to-rule) or what is 

prohibited by law (against-the-rule).49 

Political and administrative corruption is ubiquitous in Central 

Asia. Extensive anti-corruption laws and strong official rhetoric are 

at odds with the realities of daily life. The Transparency 

International 2001 Corruption Perceptions Index, for example, 

assesses “the degree of corruption as seen by business people, 

academics and risk analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) 

and 0 (highly corrupt).”50 Of 91 countries surveyed, Uzbekistan 

and Kazakhstan tie at 71st with a rating of 2.7.51 The World Bank 

estimates one-third of small business annual profits in Uzbekistan 

go to protection money and bribes.52 Turkmenistan would likely 

bottom out with a score of 0 if polling were allowed. Anecdotal 

evidence of embezzlement is pervasive, and graft is an aspect of 

customary transactions—even prisoners must pay bribes to receive 
32

basic necessities.53 Kyrgyzstan is reflective of the region in that 

meager earnings—civil servants earn approximately $10-40 per 

month—encourage supplementing one’s income through bribes. 

On our first day in Bishkek, we experienced a typical shakedown by 

plain-clothed men posing as police officers. As reported to us by 

numerous Peace Corps volunteers, the educational system is being 

subverted through routine bribery of teachers.54 The examples are 

bountiful. 

Dark Dynamics. In addition to the synergistic effect of the 

other roots of violence, there are several key environmental factors 

at work. Organized crime and the associated corruption represent 

the dark dynamic of globalization. According to prominent scholar 

Phil Williams, increased economic interdependence of nation-states, 

“permeability of national boundaries, and the globalization of 

international financial networks have facilitated the emergence of 

what is, in effect, a single global market for both licit and illicit 

commodities.”55 

Central Asian borders are notoriously porous. The popularity 

of the so-called “Northern Route” from the poppy fields of 

Afghanistan is the direct result of Soviet disintegration and the 

closing of the Iranian border. Rugged terrain, insufficient border 

guards and official corruption contribute to the region’s newly 

acquired reputation as the primary route for caravans of drugs, guns, 

and girls to China, Russia, and on to Europe. The growth of global 

financial networks has made it increasingly easy to launder money. 

A globalized informal economy has emerged beyond the control of 

the state. On the streets of Urgench in western Uzbekistan and 

Ashgabat, the wide divergence in official and black-market 

exchange rates for dollars provides direct insight to the advantages 
33

for crime and corruption of commercial liberalization. The problem 

is compounded in Central Asia where weak state institutions and an 

underdeveloped civil society persists.56 

Poppy Problems. The interplay between crime and corruption 

and the importance of environmental factors is most evident in the 

burgeoning Central Asian drug trade. Narcotics are quite likely the 

only true global commodities, generating an estimated $500 billion 

a year in revenues for criminal sponsors.57 Rarely are these funds 

used for new libraries. Rather, they make possible the proliferation 

of weapons used by VNSAs. Silk Route opium, heroin, and 

cannabis trafficking are at the center of a global drug addition. 

Figure 4: Drug Seizures 

According to the United Nations, 80% of all heroin consumed in 

Western Europe originates in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and 50% of 

these drugs (120 tons of heroin per year) arrive via Central Asia.58 

These estimates are supported by the most recent data on drug 

seizures as shown in Figure 4, which probably represent only a 

small percentage of total flow through. Afghan and Tajik dealers 

move narcotics through Dushanbe and northward through the 

increasingly popular Batken route across the mountains between the 

Batken oblast of Tajikistan and the Osh oblast of Kyrgyzstan.59 

Although Osh has developed a reputation as the Bogotá of Asia, 

Drug Seizures 

(all drugs in kg) 

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 

(9 mo.) 

Kazakhstan 10,400 12,975 31,521 13,368 23,000 20,062 

Kyrgyzstan 1,255 2,118 2,428 1,774 3,555 5,370 

Tajikistan 1,750 3,565 4,533 2,951 2,000 7,128 

Turkmenistan n/a 14,109 41,216 24,157 39,555 2,200 

Uzbekistan 3,017 7,822 3,308 3,206 2,500 n/a 

Combined data from UN Office for Drug Control and Crime 

Prevention 
34

new routes are opening, including seven known routes from 

Tajikistan into Uzbekistan and at least two more from 

Turkmenistan.60 

South Asia production is supplemented by rapidly expanding 

cultivation in Central Asia. The official cultivation of opium on the 

high slopes around Lake Issy-Kul in Kyrgyzstan ended in 1974; 

however, drug production continues with the addition of cannabis. 

Kyrgyz officials indicate one-third of the population is in the 

business.61 Fifty grams of marijuana can be bought in any lakeside 

village for a mere $3-4. Poppy cultivation also occurs near 

Samarkand and Surkhandaria in Uzbekistan, in the Penjikent Valley 

of Tajikistan and the Mary and Lebap regions of Turkmenistan. 

Kazakh officials estimate that over 15,000 acres of land are covered 

by wildly growing poppy, cannabis, and ephedra.62 State authorities 

are aggressive in their interdiction and eradication efforts in large 

part due to the connection between drug trafficking, organized 

crime, and militant religious movements. 

Taking a Toll. Organized Crime and corruption take a toll. 

Drug addiction alone erodes the social fabric, contributing to 

increases in crime, the spread of disease, especially HIV/AIDs and 

lost productivity. The World Bank points to losses in government 

revenue, reductions in foreign direct investment, barriers to small 

entrepreneurs, and environmental degradation.63 Moreover, the 

cancer spreads throughout government, undermining public trust. 

Systemic crime and corruption can lead common citizens to 

cynically conclude that it is futile to work through official channels. 

When ordinary citizens turn to illegal activity for basic needs, or 

even survival, they quickly become easy recruits for predatory 

gangs offering a return on illicit activities that dwarfs the average 
35

regional salary of $10-15 a month. Invariably, the emerging 

transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) rival the state’s power, 

contributing to its weakness and failing legitimacy. 

Socio-economic Deprivation 

A young girl, maybe eight or nine, in a tattered yellow dress 

pushes single cigarettes by briskly circling the plastic tables of an 

outdoor café in Almaty. An elderly man in the traditional black and 

white Uzbek skull cap offers a gaze at the moon through his 

antiquated telescope for a mere five cents. A mother worn beyond 

her years squats behind a cardboard box table, waiting with a 

seasoned patience for an equally destitute resident of Turkmenabat 

to buy a handful of sunflower seeds. Standards of living vary across 

Central Asia, from rural to urban and from one state to another; 

however, a common thread of daily struggle exists for all but the 

small percentage of government and criminal elite. The disparity 

between Kyrgyz families living in yurts, or huts, in high Tian Shan 

alpine valleys and Kazakh officials residing in the thick woods 

above Almaty is striking. The widening gap between rich and poor 

draws our attention to the socio-economic roots of violence. 

Building on the intellectual tradition of economic sources for 

internal rebellion, our analysis incorporates a broader understanding 

of degenerative human development as a contributor to the 

emergence of VNSAs. 

Rethinking Developmental Conflict. This current wave of 

internal violence bears similarity to the spate of civil conflict in the 

Third World during the period of decolonization. During the Cold 

War, our understanding of this trend was rooted in the development 

process itself. Essentially, the shedding of the colonial yoke leads 

to rising expectations that ill-equipped governments are not able to 
36

satisfy. In his seminal work Why Men Rebel, Ted Gurr refers to this 

as relative deprivation; “the perceived discrepancy between value 

expectations and value capabilities.”64 The resulting frustration 

turns to aggression as individuals realize they are being denied the 

basic necessities they deserve. The evidence of the period also 

seemed to suggest that instability is most likely during periods of 

rapid development.65 

This Cold War thinking warrants reconsideration since many 

contemporary conflicts are occurring where the developmental 

process is stagnating, or even deteriorating. Individuals are aware 

of their deprivation and turning to collective violence earlier. 

Donald Snow suggests two contributory factors that are consistent 

with our assertions regarding the impact of globalization and the 

rise of post-heroic motivations. First, developmental activity in 

which resources are unfairly allocated is no longer a necessary 

trigger for rebellion.66 Essentially, the global media has brought 

disparity to the doorstep of even the most rural of peasants. Second, 

the ideological justification for traditional insurgencies waned.67 

Very few Marxist and Maoist VNSAs exist, and those that do, such 

as the Khmer Rouge, are not on the ascendancy. Criminal intent, 

ethnic hatred, and religious fervor have replaced traditional 

ideology. These motivations are not always focused on shaping or 

controlling the developmental process and, therefore, can emerge in 

societies that are moribund or degenerating. 

The concept of development has also transformed beyond a 

strict consideration of hard economic indicators. Perceived relative 

deprivation is not just a function of gross national product, but of a 

broader range of individual values to include expectations for 

education, health care, sanitation, food, shelter, and even dignity. In 
37

order to measure a state’s ability to provide these basic human 

needs, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 

established the Human Development Index (HDI).68 The HDI seeks 

to capture as many aspects of human development as possible in 

one index. HDI scores on a 0 to 1 scale (.5 is low development) and 

rankings against 157 other countries (data is not available for 29) 

place the Central Asian states in the medium development range: 

Kazakhstan .742 / 75, Kyrgyzstan .707 / 92, Tajikistan .660 / 103, 

Turkmenistan .730 / 83, and Uzbekistan .698 / 99.69 Given the 

absence of previous HDI scores on all but Uzbekistan, it is difficult 

to determine whether the situation is improving or deteriorating. 

For this, we must go behind the aggregate numbers. 

Derelict Development. Central Asia is experiencing postponed 

decolonization. Independence in 1991 was supposed to bring 

freedom and prosperity. Although holdover communist bosses 

knew the loss of Soviet funding would be devastating, they 

nonetheless generated high expectations in an effort to remain in 

power. They are failing. Across the region, the general population 

is experiencing persistent socio-economic deprivation. A wide 

range of indicators is commonly available to get a sense of the 

situation. These measures of human well-being tend to focus in 

three broad areas: poverty, education, and health. Central Asia is 

problematic due to the distinct absence of key indicators as revealed 

by a survey of statistical resources, including the UNDP, World 

Bank, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Figure 5 captures 

relevant and available indicators as a first step toward understanding 

the situation. Perspective is provided by comparison with US 

indicators. Combining this limited data set with expert observations 
38 

Figure 5: Poverty, Education, and Health Data 

POVERTY EDUCATION HEALTH 

Sources: CIA, World Bank, UNDP 

% Below Poverty Line(2001, CIA)

% Unemployment (2001, CIA)

GDP Per CapitaPPP US$ (2001, CIA)

Gross Enrollment (1999, UNDP)70

Adult Literacy (1999, UNDP)

Physicians per 1,000 (1999, World Bank)

Uzbekistan NA 10.00% $2,400 76.00% 88.50% 2.8 Turkmenistan 58.00% NA $4,300 81.00% 98.00% 3.6 (1990) Tajikistan 80.00% 5.70% $1,140 67% 99.10% 2 Kazakhstan 35.00% 13.70% $5,000 77.00% 99.00% 4.3 Kyrgyzstan 51.00% 6.00% $2,700 68.00% 97.00% 3 United States 12.70% 4.00% $36,200 95.00% 100.00% 2.7 
39

strengthens our contention that the governments of Central Asia are 

failing to adequately meet the basic needs of citizens. 

As articulated by the World Bank Group, poverty is hunger, 

homelessness, sickness, illiteracy, and powerlessness; it is living 

day to day with no hope for the future.71 A person is considered 

poor if their consumption or income level falls below some 

minimum level necessary to meet basic needs. This minimum level, 

known as the “poverty line,” varies—each country uses values 

appropriate to its level of development and social norms.72 To gain 

a sense of poverty on a global scale, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 

is used to account for the relative purchasing power of currencies 

across countries. Applying this understanding to Central Asia, we 

note the high percentage living below poverty lines that are 

artificially high to begin with. Although Uzbekistan is not 

available, unemployment and PPP indicators suggest a value around 

50%. PPP values indicate average citizens survive on $3.20 a day 

in Tajikistan to $13.70 a day in Kazakhstan. Given that most 

professionals earn less than $50 a month, we contend that these PPP 

values are inflated, most likely due to the super-sized incomes of 

high-level governmental and business elites. In the Uzbek Ferghana 

Valley, for example, monthly incomes average $10 as compared to 

$15 in the rest of the country.73 On the Tajik side of the border, 

incomes average under $8 per month. 

Just as PPP values are brought in to question by street-level 

inquiry, so too are unemployment rates. Official employment rates 

in the region do not reflect under-employment, which probably 

exceeds 40% across the region. The grandmother selling sunflower 

seeds for two cents a cup on the streets of Khiva is technically 

employed even though she may make a $1 in a week if lucky. 
40

Unemployment rates are also considerably higher in rural areas. 

According to Dr. Fiona Hill of the Brookings Institute, as many as 

95% of male high school graduates are unable to find jobs.74 The 

potential for unemployment to contribute to social tension is 

compounded by disproportionately high rates for those under thirty, 

the failure of the state to provide promised unemployment 

payments, and uneven distribution of jobs across ethnic groups.75 

Poverty is difficult to overcome when the education system is 

also impoverished. Gross enrollment and literacy indicators do not 

do justice to the deficiencies in regional educational systems. State 

funding has been on a precipitous decline since the early 1980s. As 

one example, the Ferghana Valley Working Group, a scholarly 

investigative team sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, 

reports that the non-wage element of the education budget has fallen 

by an estimated 70% in real terms, “resulting in shortages of 

textbooks and teaching materials and inadequate maintenance of 

school buildings.”76 Our own discussions with students and Peace 

Corps teachers confirm this grim analysis. Teachers are forced to 

take bribes to supplement meager earnings, which are often in 

arrears, and classes take place in rooms with crumbling walls, dirt 

floors and no plumbing. Teachers in Tajikistan earn $12 per month 

with bribes increasing for higher grades or more prestigious 

programs like the Medical University in Dushanbe.77 In 

Turkmenistan, budget cuts led to the elimination of an entire grade, 

ostensibly to be replaced by a year learning vocational skills as an 

apprentice. This is a fiction since there are no apprenticeships 

outside of the drug and sex trade. With funds so limited, the state is 

precluded from delivering educational programs in multiple 

languages, which has developed as an additional source of tension 
41

among nationalities. Any optimism for near-term improvement 

springs from the growing role of foreign investment, IGOs, and 

NGOs. The Peace Corps, in particular, has an impressive and 

highly regarded presence in Kyrgyzstan. The American University 

in Bishkek also offers a strong, diverse program that is supplying 

Kyrgyzstan with a new intellectual class that is not dominated by 

governmental elite. 

Fading Hopes. Leaning across the massive oak bar of The Pub 

in Bishkek, Lena sighs deeply and explains, “I study to become a 

nurse, but I may not find work. Many of the hospitals have closed 

and patients have no money. Even if I am a lucky one, I can make 

more in a week behind the bar than in a month as a nurse.” The 

optimism of 1991 is waning. A complex combination of corruption 

and incompetence as well as the structural legacies of a defunct 

communist system undermine most prospects for progress. The 

situation, however, has yet to descend to such a desperate level that 

socio-economic deprivation can generate violence on its own. 

Moreover, grass roots organizations, such as the makhallas in 

Uzbekistan, have taken the place of the state to ensure families have 

sufficient food and water. Unless current regimes weed out 

corruption and embrace difficult reforms, such as the privatization 

of collective farms, the region is unlikely to turn the corner. Until 

then, the ranks of the unemployed and uneducated youth will grow 

along with disillusionment and even anger. Will the young girl in 

the tattered yellow dress still be selling cigarettes in five years, or 

will she have moved on to a more lucrative heroin trade? 

Closing Shots 

Violence grows where desperation lingers. At the individual 

level, the majority of peoples in Central Asia struggle to survive, 
42

growing increasingly dissatisfied with their existing leadership. 

That said, over seventy years of Soviet domination and ten years of 

indigenous authoritarianism have engendered a political and social 

passivity that restrains collective violence. In comparison to the 

paranoia of the Soviet era, even the authoritarian rule of 

Turkmenbashi can be sold as “freedom.” Moreover, the economic 

retardation caused by Soviet planning still serves as a source of 

blame to deflect criticism from present failings. Nonetheless, 

individual attitudes are slowly sliding toward a resentment that 

cannot be pacified through state coercion or pleas for patience. 

With the state failing, non-state identity groups are gaining 

prominence as a socio-economic provider. Even NGOs like 

Counter-Part Consortium, funded in part by the US Agency for 

International Development, bypass state bureaucracies to work 

directly with these non-state actors in an effort to provide basic 

health and educational services. Identity cleavages are deepened as 

identity groups vie for scare resources, jobs, and services. For the 

most part, this competition has been peaceful; however, incidents of 

non-state violence have precedent and are likely to grow in 

frequency as the roots of violence become more acute. Standing 

next to the Turkmen father, watching solemnly as another Ashgabat 

apartment building crumbled, we sensed not only resignation, but a 

simmering rage. 

TRANSFORMATION TO VIOLENCE 

Bukhara Dispatch: The glass beer bottle skids across a 

crowded dance floor and shatters against a table. Shouting drowns 

out the blaring Uzbek dance music, as two men, probably in their 

early twenties, exchange punches under the shifting colored lights 

and flashing disco ball. A second bottle cracks, drawing everyone’s 

attention to the escalating fight. Swinging wildly, clearly in a 

drugged frenzy, one of the men slashes the other across the chest. 

Blood flows. Patrons retreat to their tables. It takes the police 
43

several minutes to reach this disco on the roof of the Old Bukhara 

Hotel, which is a popular hangout for local students. After the men 

have been detained, an inquiry reveals the underlying catalysts. 

According to several patrons, the men recently graduated from the 

local university. They are unemployed, addicted to heroin, and part 

of a growing number of local street gangs. This is not the first fight 

here, and it is unlikely to be the last. As we side step the 

bloodstained floor for a view of Bukhara’s night, the towering 

minaret of the central madraseh is a stark reminder that this ancient 

town was once the world’s center of Islamic scholarship and 

birthplace of the mystical Sufi faith. 

Engines of Change 

Violent collective action on a widespread scale is rarely the 

spontaneous outgrowth of the roots of violence. The roots create 

the conditions and shape individuals to be ripe for mobilization. 

The aggressive Bukharan youth is most likely the product of these 

conditions; however, his response if most likely limited to disco 

brawls or even the occasional street gang violence. For 

mobilization into a VNSA to actually occur, there must be 

transformational process. Our open systems framework provides 

visual insight to the key relational dynamics. First, the state must 

fail him. As the legitimate governing authority, the state is the 

recipient of his expectations for education, employment, and 

security. This failure can take the form of incapacity to provide 

basic serves or effectively allocate resources and/or it can manifest 

as an excessively coercive response. Second, there must exist 

identity cleavages to redirect and absorb his searching loyalties. 

Finally, there must be some sort of catalyst to mobilize an identity 

group, possibly transforming it into a full-fledged VNSA. 

These three engines of change are fueled by environmental 

factors. Globalization improves access to resources and information 

as discussed earlier, which frustrates state efforts to control 
44

activities within the confines of their territory. Globalization is 

often the primary vehicle for external support, as it provides the 

modern conveniences of wire-transfers of money, cellular phone 

communications, internet connectivity, and the like; however, more 

traditional activities, such as simple cross-border smuggling, remain 

popular in the region. Other environmental factors, such as external 

players (both states and diasporas), can exercise a high degree of 

influence, providing strategic direction, financial resources, 

training, and safe haven for mobilizing identity groups. The IMU, 

for example, routinely retreats to Afghanistan for training before 

launching new attacks in the Ferghana Valley and Tashkent. The 

Uighar Diaspora, principally in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 

Afghanistan, smuggles weapons into the Xinjiang Province of 

Western China in an effort to create an independent Eastern 

Turkestan. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are known to provide direct 

support to the IMU and other Wahabi groups, while Iran has a stake 

in the protection of Shi’a communities throughout the region. 

The transformational process is not linear. The actions of 

VNSAs can have reinforcing effects, perpetuating the cycle of 

violence. While it is true that some VNSAs do act with the intent of 

improving their communities or for some perceived public good, the 

groups we are focused on generally pursue narrow, post-heroic 

objectives. That is, they seek to increase their wealth, gain control 

over important, often illegal, networks, or to exert power over 

another group. To this end, they benefit by the deepening of the 

roots of violence, which in turn increases their recruiting pool. 

These VNSAs also thrive on the margins of state authority and civil 

society influence. By reinforcing the cycle of violence, they gain 

greater autonomy of action. State coercion may constrain their 
45

growth in the short-term, but over the long run it serves to 

legitimize the warlord’s violent response. 

Failures of Governance 

The state, at least theoretically, is the grand arbiter of conflict of 

all types within its borders—it sets up and administrates the rules by 

which everyone plays. A fully sovereign state controls all matters 

of governance, administrative control, and most importantly, holds 

ultimate and monopolistic command and control of the means of 

coercion, both of its citizens within its borders and entities outside 

its borders.78 With such power come certain responsibilities, and 

more importantly, expectations and desires on the part of the 

citizenry. Citizens desire safety and security, a relatively equal 

application of justice, and a generally legitimate distribution of 

goods and resources. When a government or state consistently fails 

to deliver such conditions, either because it is incapable of doing so 

or because it made the conscious choice to not do so, the sectors of 

its populace affected by such a failure begin to view the state as less 

and less legitimate—and thus the first step in the failure of 

governance is taken. 

Should such a deprived sector of the populace begin to act on 

its disaffections, three general options exist for the state: (1) have 

political structures in place wherein groups can make grievances, 

and some sort of attempt at redress can take place; (2) the state 

decides to simply ignore the disaffected portion of the population, 

and do nothing; or (3) the state can turn to its tools of coercion in an 

attempt to silence, stifle or even destroy that sector of the populace. 

If states have redress structures that the disaffected portion of 

the populace perceives as legitimate, VNSA mobilization is difficult 

at best. In other words, if the accommodative capacity of the state 
46

is sufficient to absorb or co-opt disaffected portions of the 

population, then the state will maintain enough legitimacy to avoid 

potential VNSA mobilization. This accommodative capacity can be 

a measure of access to government structures, inclusion of members 

of most important groups and organizations within the state’s 

borders, and the flexibility of the state bureaucracy to adequately 

respond to necessary minor changes. 

Should a state simply do nothing, however, VNSA mobilization 

is possible, although not necessarily immediate. A state that ignores 

a disaffected portion of the population typically does so for two 

possible reasons: (1) it has an incapacity to act, or (2) it chooses not 

to act, as redressing the grievances of the disaffected group could 

cause (at least in the state’s calculus) an even greater disaffection 

among other sectors of the population, or more likely, among elites 

in the state. Inaction due to either reason still does not void the fact 

that state apathy is much less a mass motivator than wide-spread 

coercion. For VNSA mobilization to be possible in the face of state 

apathy, severe problems, extended lack of attention, or several 

instances of obvious punitive state apathy (i.e. a natural disaster 

affecting a specific sector of the population that the state refuses to 

respond to) before significant VNSA mobilization will become 

possible. As such, a state with even a mediocre accommodative 

capacity that simply does nothing in the face of a disaffected 

population will not have to face significant or widespread VNSA 

mobilization. 

It is when the state makes the third choice that disaffected 

groups have the greatest potential for VNSA mobilization. A state 

will make this choice for a variety of reasons—the challenge posed 

by the disaffected population is above an acceptable threshold (as 
47

deemed by the state), the existing order is in danger, elites feel 

threatened, or the state has such a low accommodative capacity little 

disagreement is allowed. Whatever the reason, however, the civil 

society of that given state is fractured—sectors of that civil society 

obviously view the state system, which decides the distribution of 

goods, resources, safety, security, justice, etc. as illegitimate. As 

such, the state can no longer count on the fabric of shared values or 

consensus to hold the state together; the basis of state authority in 

such situations then shifts to the unstable solution of state 

coercion.79

Failure of governance begins when populations (either in whole 

or in substantial parts) perceive their state no longer adequately 

functions. Failure of governance exists depending on how the state 

responds to that loss of legitimacy. If a state continues to be unable 

to meet its population’s expectations beyond that population’s 

tolerance threshold, or if a state resorts to significant coercion of its 

population, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for VNSA 

mobilization exists. Thus, it is possible to move to the second 

dynamic of our transformational model. 

Identity Cleavages 

With failures in governance resulting in a loss of regime 

legitimacy and undermining the notion of “citizenry,” identity 

cleavages are serving to absorb the wandering loyalties of a 

disaffected citizenry. These identity cleavages are the nucleus 

around which VNSA recruit members and develop group cohesion. 

Some of the most complicated identity issues in the world are found 

in Central Asia. While much literature regarding identity conflict is 

based exclusively on ethnicity, this is only part of the Central Asia 
48

Republics’ identity puzzle. Other pieces include economic, 

regional, and religious identities. 

Before an examination of each of these major identity cleavages 

begins, the authors wish to point out this effort does not subscribe to 

the primordialist approach to identity, even when discussing ethnic 

identity. The primoridalist approach essentially states sociological 

groupings exist in a society based on natural differences—physical, 

biological, and racial—which then become the criteria for social 

judgment and differentiation. Such an approach inevitably leads 

one to conclude that conflict is essentially a return to primitivism, 

and nothing can be done.80 While the definition of “ethnic group” 

the authors use includes the phrase “biologically self-propagating,” 

identity (even ethnic identities) is much more than physical and 

biological differences. This caveat will be discussed further in the 

“Identity Mobilization” section. 

Ethnic Identity Cleavages: According to Frederick Barth, a 

scholar on social organizations and interaction, an "ethnic group" 

designates a people that is predominantly biologically selfpropagating, that holds a common set of fundamental values, that 

constitutes a field of interaction and communication, and that has a 

membership that identifies itself, and is identified by others, as 

constituting a category that can be distinguished from other 

categories of the same order. 81 Importantly, the continued 

existence of these groups is dependent upon the establishment and 

maintenance of social, cultural, religious, and sometimes 

geographic boundaries by which they define themselves and are 

defined as distinct by others. 

Under the autocratic rule of the Soviet system, ethnic groups 

were suppressed in favor of creating the Soviet Man. While some 
49

expressions of nationalism or ethnicity were allowed, they were the 

rare exception rather than the proverbial rule. Consequently, the 

desire to propagate one’s own ethnic group, thereby creating the 

necessary boundaries to do so, was rare. This has changed 

significantly. In the post-Soviet vacuum, ethnic groups are 

emerging—and thus asserting or reasserting the norms and values 

that define them. How and to what extent these norms and values 

are exerted have a critical impact on the mobilization of populations 

and the creation of VNSAs. 

The ethnic portion of identity in Central Asia contains at least 

five parts. While this fragmented background of identity certainly 

provides the individual many allegiances outside the state from 

which to choose, these same cross-cutting cleavages can complicate 

identity-based mobilization. Competing identities may frustrate the 

efforts of other identity groups. 

The Citizen: The first aspect of identity in Central Asia is 

nation-state citizenship. Efforts are underway by the various 

governments to formally codify state boundaries and solidify 

notions of citizenship. This attempt cuts across the grain of Central 

Asia culture and history, and the act of “creating” (or re-creating, 

depending on one’s view) the state and citizenship is by definition 

creating tension and unease. 

A bit of history is necessary here. According to Dr. Igor 

Torbakov, a Russian historian, the ideas of an ethnic identity, 

statehood, citizenship or nationality were largely alien to the 

peoples of Central Asia. Indeed, as late as 1927, Vasiliy Barthold, 

Moscow’s leading specialist in Oriental affairs, stated "The settled 

peoples of Central Asia regard themselves first as Muslims and then 

as inhabitants of any given town or region; ethnic concepts having 
50

virtually no significance in their eyes."82 It was only under the 

Soviet program of "national delimitation" (natsional’noe

razmezhevaniye) that occurred in 1924-1925, where swaths of 

formerly undemarcated Asian territory were turned into Soviet 

Socialist Republics and given titular names, that the political 

creations now known Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, 

Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan came into being. However, these 

“creations” did little to create eponymous identities, as Soviet 

policies were strictly from Moscow and (as stated earlier) ethnic 

expressions were largely suppressed.83

In the wake of the Soviet collapse, the Communist Party leaders 

who inherited their respective Soviet Socialist Republic 

immediately faced the task of nation building. This task was 

approached in a variety of ways—demarcating boundaries (in 

Uzbekistan’s case, unilaterally), relaying historiographies, 

establishing national heroes, political elites attempting to be the 

most important in the region, and competing for once-shared 

resources, etc. This process of getting individuals living within the 

boundaries of these new political creatures to swear their loyalty to 

them has proved difficult. For example, some governments are 

requiring their citizens to identify ethnicity on passports—“citizens” 

understand that if their ethnicity does not match their citizenship, 

they will be discriminated against. Thus, most minorities are now 

forced to administratively deny their ethnic identity. These nationbuilding efforts have created certain external instabilities as well. 

Once dormant border disputes are now serious points of contention 

between governments, resources are now weapons (as was 

illustrated in the “Resource Scarcity” section), and national leaders 
51

consistently fight for the spotlight on the international scene instead 

of focusing on greater regional cooperation. 

These policies are having an overall detrimental effect. Any 

attempt to create an “us” necessarily creates a “them.” Again, to 

quote Torbakov, “efforts by both countries to forge distinct 

identities in the post-Soviet era are a source of considerable friction 

between peoples who have co-existed relatively peacefully in the 

same region for centuries.”84 These efforts, coupled with the 

emergence of other boundaries, will significantly contribute to the 

emergence of VNSAs. 

The Nation: A second, but closely related identity 

cleavage, is the “nation” half of nation-state. As opposed to the 

period before Russian colonization and Soviet annexation, 

awareness of national identity is now an established social practice 

in the region. As is often the legacy in recently de-colonized areas, 

the newly independent populace embraces ethnicity as a significant 

and legitimate category of assessment—a phenomenon the HutuTutsi rivalry in Rwanda and Burundi illustrates horrifyingly well. 

To the authors’ untrained eye, only the largest of ethnic differences 

could be discerned; the locals, however, could go so far as to 

identify the city or village of origin for a casual passer-by. 

Discrimination, especially in the militaries of these countries, is 

now rampant; individuals who do not speak the ethnic language of 

their country are often singled out for harassment and punishment.85 

The codification of the nation-state mix is illustrated by examining 

an Uzbek passport—clearly, the holder of an Uzbek passport is an 

Uzbek citizen, but “nationality” is an additional required identifier 

on the passport. For a group of peoples where Muslim identity 

traditionally masked ethnic differences, such an awareness of 
52

ethnicity coupled with a very adolescent but active desire and 

ability to use ethnicity to meet various political purposes can be 

dangerous. 

Perhaps more ominous is the increasing trend of 

“nationalizing,” or the attempt to make the nation and state 

coterminous. Kazakhstan provides an excellent example of 

“nationalizing” policies, which aim to promote the Kazakhs, while 

assimilating, marginalizing, or expelling non-dominant ethnic 

groups. For example, although nearly everyone in Kazakhstan 

speaks Russian, the “official language,” the “state language” is 

Kazakh. While the difference between these two terms is vague and 

uncertain, other laws have more concrete effects—stipulating 

phasing-in of exclusive use of Kazakh for state employees, for 

example. Linguists and sociologists alike point out that even 25% 

of ethnic Kazakhs speak Russian as their first language; only those 

communities that resisted Russification during Soviet times are still 

using Kazakh as their first language.86 Using such preferences has 

the effect of staffing the government bureaucracy almost entirely of 

ethnically aware Kazakhs. While many other such laws and 

programs exist which structurally favor Kazakhs over non-Kazakhs 

(especially Russians), this example makes the point—laws are 

creating new winners and losers in Kazakhstan, and individuals are 

placed in each category based on their ethnicity. 

The effects of Kazakhstan’s nationalizing programs are visible. 

A clear indicator of early mobilization among Russians is their 

massive out-migration, with estimates showing that from 1989-1999 

over 1.5 million Russians, or 25% of the Russian population of 

Kazakhstan, left the country permanently. Many of the remaining 

Russians moved to the highly Russified areas of Kazakhstan—in the 
53

north and east, close to the Russian border. A second visible effect 

is the emergence of largely Russian groups and political movements 

in northern Kazakhstan that actually have secessionist goals. While 

these groups are small (so far), their influence may be limited more 

by state actions (such as media restrictions, constraints on their 

ability to meet and organization) and a lack of support from Russia 

than as a reflection of low resonance among the population.87 

While such measures may be effective in keeping Russian 

irredentism capped in the short term, they will only add to 

mobilization effects over the long term. 

Such nationalizing actions are observable from each of the five 

Central Asian Republics. Saparmurat Niyazov, the president of 

Turkmenistan, proclaimed himself leader of all Turkmen and 

declared the 21st Century to be the Golden Age of the Turkmen. 

Other slogans, splashed over everything (to include buildings, 

airliners, and mountainsides) proclaim “Halk! Watan! 

Turkmenbashi!” loosely translated as “The People! The Land! The 

Leader of all Turkmen!” Such popular pronouncements definitely 

promote Turkmen nationalism; however, one could not fault nonTurkman citizens for feeling uneasy going into the new Golden 

Century. Even the Tajiks, with perhaps the most difficult job of 

creating a state, are attempting to build their nation around the old 

Saminid dynasty. 

These two aspects of identity cleavages become all the more 

difficult given Josef Stalin’s population mixing programs of the 

1920s. Stalin removed all Koreans on the Russian and Korean 

border and relocated them in the Ferghana Valley and central 

Uzbekistan. Moreover, Stalin gerrymandered the political 

boundaries of the Ferghana Valley so it would be divided between 
54

Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan—all in an effort to divide 

the Muslim population there. Large numbers of Russians, and to a 

lesser degree Ukrainians, and Belorussians were sent to the new 

Soviet Socialist Republics to help the natives conform to the 

requirements of socialism. Later in Soviet history, many of the 

German and Japanese soldiers captured in World War II were 

relocated to Central Asia, and their descendents still live there. The 

resulting mixture of ethnicities is startling, and it certainly makes a 

walk around the various bazaars in the region exceptionally 

interesting. In the Fergana Valley city of Osh, Kyrgyzstan, there 

are at least 83 nationalities.88

The Region: The third dimension of ethnic identity is the 

meta-state or supra-state identity. This is an affinity to those that 

have broad, generally similar histories, share a religion, and/or 

come from a similar linguistic family. The region is divided (both 

by population, and increasingly geographically, as the various 

groups settle into more homogenous “sub-communities” and 

diasporas) into those who come from a Muslim cultural heritage and 

those who do not, and those who are Turkic and those who are not. 

A Muslim cultural heritage, for example, would group Uzbeks and 

Tajiks together, but separate Russian, Ukrainians, and German 

individuals. A Turkic meta-identity, for example, would focus on 

shared linguistic roots, grouping Uzbeks and Turkmen, but 

marginalizing Kazakhs, Koreans, Ukrainians, and Russians.89

The Tribe and Clan: A fourth ethnic identity cleavage in 

Central Asia is the clan or tribal identity. Within Turkmenistan, for 

example, there are five tribes, but three dominant ones: the Tekke in 

the center, the Ersary on the eastern Afghan border, and the Yomud 

in the west.90 While President Niyazov has gone to great lengths to 
55

erase tribal identity, it still exists—Turkmen will only marry within 

their own tribe, and will also typically hire within their own tribe.91

Only three generations ago, these tribes were distinct separate 

social, political and economic entities often in conflict with one 

another; only since becoming a Soviet Socialist Republic were these 

tribes tied together by the uncomfortable cord of a state boundary. 

Kazakhstan provides another excellent example of the sub-national 

identity; these once nomadic people categorize themselves by zhuz

or ordas (tribal confederations), and then through ru and taipa

(clans and tribes). These identities continued through the Soviet 

era, and they retain some level of importance after independence.92

The Civilization: A fifth cleavage is Huntington’s classical 

civilization fault lines. If our system of conflict is truly open, actors 

who are not physically in Central Asia but have influence there 

must be considered. Central Asia is the intersection of several 

civilization fault lines—one between the Muslim and Sinic 

civilizations, along the Muslim and Slavic/Orthodox civilizations, 

and one along the European/Muslim civilizations. The proximity of 

the Muslim/Buddhist fault line must also be mentioned. China and 

Russia both have political, economic, and security interests in the 

area. India has an additional indirect interest in the area due to its 

conflict with Islamic militants over Jammu and Kashmir, in addition 

to its continuing struggle with Pakistan. 

Economic Identity Cleavages: The emergence of economic 

elites since the collapse of communism created another class of 

identity—economic elites. While corruption and the Communist 

Party system in the former Soviet Union obviously thwarted the 

Marxist notion of equality, the disparity between rich and poor 

witnessed in the region is orders of magnitude greater than anything 
56

seen in the USSR—and the difference continues to grow. Given the 

recent “decolonized” status of the Central Asian Republics, the 

identity of economic elite and the poor are of great importance. As 

Martha Brill Olcott asserts, 

The prospects of social and political instability are 

also more pronounced. Decolonization has always 

provided enormous economic opportunities for the 

new political winners, but the totality of the 

economic transformation is something quite new, 

and in the post-Soviet states the losers—be they 

the masses or among the political elite—have little 

or no economic assets to fall back on, because 

private property was virtually non-existent under 

the Soviet system.93

The emergence and solidification of such economic strata can 

certainly make populations more vulnerable to exploitation. As 

Drs. Fiona Hill and John Shoeberlein recently testified at the Open 

Society Institute in New York, poverty is a—perhaps the—critical 

ingredient in the increasing violent tension in Central Asia.94 

According to The Central Asia Project, another program sponsored 

by the Open Society Institute, stratification of economic elites can 

create instability as well. In the post-independence chaos, wealth 

accumulated in a very select group of hands.95 The emergence of 

such a small group of prosperous elite left the majority of Central 

Asians below the poverty line. While this level of poverty grinds 

the population down, certain elites continue to gain wealth—a 

recipe for at least widespread resentment, or possibly widespread 

violence. The International Crisis Group concludes: 

there is a sharply growing disparity between the 

narrow elite, which benefits appreciably from 

privatization and other market reforms, and the 

larger part of the population, which is being driven 

towards economic desperation. Even more 

worrying, there are significant sub-regions and 
57

localities in [Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 

Kyrgyzstan] where the situation is so 

[economically] dire for the vast majority of the 

population that patience is beginning to evaporate 

and unrest to grow sharply. While most Central 

Asians have been steadfastly passive in the face of 

post-Soviet upheaval, indications are increasing in 

some localities that a breaking point is near. If it is 

reached, spontaneous uprising or organized 

underground political activity, increasing 

militancy, and a readiness to seek the overthrow of 

current regimes can all be anticipated. The most 

dangerous social force is a desperate population 

that has little to lose.96

Another potential avenue for violence springs from economic 

identities in the form of the loss of the middle class. Examples from 

other states suggest that a small middle class in such skewed wealth 

distributions typically does not survive—a trend that unfortunately 

is being confirmed throughout Central Asia. The erosion of the 

middle class makes that particular caste prey for radical groups; in 

our case, VNSAs. As Alisher Ilkhamov, a 2000 IREX fellow at 

Harvard University stated, “the IMU not only appeals to the 

impoverished peasants of the Ferghana Valley, but also to a 

significant number of Uzbekistan’s’ shrinking middle class.”97

Regionalist Identity Cleavages: The third class of identity in 

Central Asia is regionalism. Central Asians do not have a long 

tradition of loyalty to a state. Loyalty, if anything, is to the 

extended family and locality. Outside ethnic identities, this 

tradition of “locality” or “regionalism” is strong force. Any 

discussion of regionalism must begin with the fractured “state” of 

Tajikistan. While identity cleavages played a large part, regional 

issues were the main driver in the bitter civil war. The northern 

faction based largely in Khojand (formerly Leninabad), the 
58

Kulyabis from the southern province, radical Islamic militants (with 

influence from neighboring Afghanistan) from Kurgan-Tyube and 

the Garm Valley, and the Parmiris from the Gorno-Badakhshan all 

fought a protracted war which left at least sixty thousand dead. 

Despite power-sharing agreements, problems remain. 

While Tajikistan may be marginally stronger than just after 

independence, its “statehood” can be considered de facto in nature. 

Little federal government control extends beyond the edges of 

Dushanbe. The IMU operates freely in the country, the 

international drug trade is well established (especially in the west), 

and Tajikistan has shown little ability to control its own borders. 

Furthermore, despite the 1997 General Peace Agreement that called 

for the disarming and disbanding of the United Tajik Opposition, 

the United Nations estimates approximately 2,400 armed (and 

unemployed) Islamic militants remain in their Karategin and 

Tavildara Valley strongholds.98 Indeed, a 2001 Human Rights 

Watch report on Tajikistan reported a great deal of regional and 

clan-based violence occurring, inferring most of it was due to the 

parliamentary elections on February 27th, 2000 that were labeled 

“fraudulent” by both Human Rights Watch and the OSCE 

observers.99 Tajikistan descending into another region-based civil 

war, or more likely, continue to slide closer and closer to simply 

being a state in name only (similar to Somalia in the 1990s), is not 

an unreasonable prediction. 

The regionalism extends to the Ferghana Valley, where 

gerrymandering has divided the Valley among Uzbekistan, 

Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, leaving small autonomous enclaves to 

dot the extreme western tip of Kyrgyzstan. Tajikistan administers 

Vorukh, while Uzbekistan administers Sokh and Shakhimardan, all 
59

completely surrounded by sovereign Kyrgyz territory. With a scant 

few miles of Kyrgyz territory separating these areas from their 

contiguous mother country, identity cleavages could easily invite 

armed intervention by any of these countries to secure territory. 

Kyrgyzstan, once the darling of the West due to President 

Akaev’s initial verbal commitments to freedom and economic 

reform, is a state in slow deterioration as well. Bishkek is nearly at 

the mercy of its more powerful surrounding neighbors, primarily 

Uzbekistan and China. Uzbekistan especially has used its military 

to set the border between itself and Bishkek, to the detriment of 

many Kyrgyz villagers in the south—an area witnessing a great deal 

of violence in 1990. This, coupled with an increase in organized 

crime and the drug trade, suggests Kyrgyzstan could also fall into 

de facto statehood, where regional warlords rule at their whim. 

Uzbekistan, arguably the strongest of all the Central Asian 

states, faces its own problems. Two of the most beautiful cities in 

the country, Samarkand and Bukhara, host over 700,000 Tajiks and 

were historically considered part of Tajik territory; indeed, as late as 

1989, Dushanbe was attempting to convince Soviet leadership to 

return these two areas.100 Furthermore, conversations with 

“ordinary citizens” in these two cities clearly leave one with the 

notion they identify themselves more with their city (or perhaps, in 

their mind, their khanate) than they do with the state of Uzbekistan. 

Other regional cleavages in Uzbekistan exist as well. The 

further west and away from Tashkent one travels, the further this 

sub-state identity grows. The western end of the country takes this 

trend to its logical conclusion: the Republic of Karakalpakstan, the 

largest “province” in Uzbekistan, received a semi-autonomous 

status in December 1991. The Karakalpaks have their own separate 
60

constitution, their own separate political structures, and have a 

distinct language and culture separate from the rest of Uzbekistan. 

While separatist rumblings are not yet loud, they do exist. 

Kazakhstan is also facing regionalist threats that coincide with 

ethnic tensions. Russia has accepted the notion of Kazakh 

sovereignty much more quickly and completely than most observers 

anticipated; however, many Russian nationalists still call for a 

Russian absorption of the Kazakh steppe, and the dwindling 

Russian population still largely dominates the vast border between 

Kazakhstan and Russia. For the time being, Russia seems to be 

content with maintaining a near monopoly over transporting 

Almaty’s vast gas and oil wealth. Should Russian politics change, 

or if the Kazakh state continues to erode, the secessionist intentions 

of these Russians could lead to Russia absorbing its Diaspora in the 

southern near abroad, thus fracturing the state and leading to other 

possible secessionist movements in the eastern extremes. 

The contest between loyalty to traditional regions versus the 

loyalty to the adolescent state will come soon. All five Central 

Asian Republics will face power transitions soon. This transition 

will take place over a population that not only has older citizens 

who may have a closer affinity to their respective region, but also 

the younger generations who have reached political maturity since 

independence, but are frustrated by the political and economic 

stagnation endemic to all the Republics. Against this backdrop, 

continued statehood is anything but guaranteed. Martha Brill Olcott 

argues that unlike five years ago when each of the five Central 

Asian Republics were exploring ways to properly exercise their 

sovereignty, now all are exploring ways to maintain their 

sovereignty.101 We do not intend to suggest the Central Asian 
61

Republics will split apart along regional lines, creating multiple 

states where five exist now; further “Balkanization” of this former 

Soviet-controlled area is unlikely. A more likely scenario is that 

these states will maintain limited sovereignty, while in reality they 

will erode into geographic areas controlled by local warlords with 

little, if any, central government control.102

Religious Identity Cleavages: The Muslim community, or 

umma, of Central Asia emerged after seventy-four years of 

totalitarian administration to find itself part of nationalist struggles 

for independence. With the Islamic awakening came regional and 

Western anxieties over the possibility of a fundamentalist revolution 

based on an Iranian model. The umma also became a target and 

object of concern for varied foreign powers seeking to establish 

influence. Although the revolution did not materialize, external 

efforts to shape the umma persist. Despite renewed international 

interest in Central Asia, current examinations have failed to 

sufficiently delineate the cleavages of the Muslim community. 

Islam has been integral in defining the culture, political 

behavior and economic interaction of Central Asians since the Arab 

invasion in the seventh century. Hence, its resurgence is neither 

surprising, nor unintelligible. The current revival has its roots in 

glasnost, peristroika, and the collapse of the Soviet empire, and it 

takes place in a community of over 50 million Muslims. Sunni 

Muslims of the Hanafi school, or madraseh, are an overwhelming 

majority (70%), although approximately 1.5 million Sunni's follow 

the Shafi'i madraseh. Other religious groupings include Sufis, 

Twelver (Ja'farite), Shi'ites, Ismailis, and Bahais. Despite diversity, 

the umma has remained relatively homogenous. Although Sunni 

and Shi'a Muslims are historically ambivalent, this traditional 
62

enmity was dampened in the region due to shared resistance to 

Russian and Soviet rule. Indeed, both Sunni and Shi'a delegations 

to the 1905 Third Congress of Muslims in Russia declared Ja'farite 

Shi'ism as a fifth legal school, equivalent to the Hanafi, Maliki, 

Hanbali, and Shafi'i madrasehs.103

Alternative Islamic Cleavages: Although cleavages in 

Islam are often examined as a function of dominant sect, branch or 

school, the umma's fissures in Central Asia can better be understood 

on four levels. The first is at the grassroots level, which can be 

examined in degrees of "religiosity;" a term corresponding to the 

observance of Islamic traditions.104 Covertly organized communities 

and Sufi brotherhoods also functioned at this sub-national level. 

The Islamic establishments of the ex-Soviet regime and current 

authoritarian regimes operate on another level. Political-religious 

movements can be considered on a fourth level and are the focus of 

more detailed analysis in our section on VNSAs. 

Despite bans on unofficial religious activity, Islam received 

widespread allegiance at the grassroots level during the Soviet 

period. This, so-called "Parallel" Islam remains active today. 

Expressed in terms of religiosity, this unorganized activity can be 

readily observed as a function of life-cycle rituals. Various studies 

have revealed the extensive observance of religious rites to include 

circumcision, religious burials, marriage, and the payment of the 

bride price, or kalym. Other commonly practiced rituals include 

observing Ramadan (the month of fasting), Bairam (the feast of 

sacrifice), and Mawlud (communal prayers celebrating the date of 

Mohammad's birth).105 Moreover, many take to wearing religious 

symbols, painting Quranic verses on their automobiles, and giving 

their children distinctly Islamic names. One of the most extensive 
63

and overt practices is the pilgrimage to various holy places, of 

which there are many. Bukhara and Samarkand in particular were 

centers for Islamic learning over a several century period. 

Parallel Islam revolves around loosely organized communities, 

which follow an unofficial mullah or highly structured Sufi 

brotherhoods called tariqas (the path leading to God). Sufi 

brotherhoods date back to the eleventh century and exert substantial 

influence over public opinion. Two tariqas are the most prevalent; 

the Naqshbandi, originating in Bukhara, and the Qadiri, founded in 

Baghdad. They advocate both the spiritual advancement of 

individual Muslims and the establishment of Allah's rule on earth 

through the umma. One might consider, however, that the mystical 

and personal nature of Sufism is less conducive to political activity 

than other sects such as Shi'ism. 

Only Sunni and Shi'a Islam were officially recognized by the 

Soviet Union and only to the extent that they submitted to state 

control. This trend has continued under current regimes. The state 

appoints the overall spiritual head, the Mufti of Tashkent for 

example, as well as imams and mullah at prominent mosques and 

madrasehs. Official Islam is tasked with regulating religious 

activity, operating official mosques, supervising religious 

publications, and directing the educational institutions in a manner 

consistent with governmental policies. To many, these co-opted 

religious leaders are illegitimate because their loyalty is to the state. 

A more recent phenomenon has been the emergence of politicalreligious movements. Although many consider these new 

"revolutionaries" to be the inheritors of the Basmachi opposition in 

the 1920s, they represent a unique reaction to contemporary 

conditions. The politisation of Islam also reflects a symbiosis 
64

between nationalism and religion. These movements form the 

nucleus of Islam's role in the current situation.106 The dynamic 

composition of the Central Asian umma contributes to its tenacity. 

Official Islam, which allowed for limited expression, is 

supplemented by other modes of activity. Parallel Islam provides 

the basis for popular action in the event the current regime and 

Official Islam prove insufficient in meeting the umma's religious 

demands. 

Politicizing Islam: Islam is directly involved in the 

unfolding political process, which serves to deepen the four 

cleavages. At independence, Islam quickly became inextricably 

linked with the nationalist movements. Prominent scholar, Ahmed 

Rashid, makes the point that Islam has become a convenient symbol 

"which allows local nationalists to distance themselves from Slavic 

culture and aspirations."107 Unfortunately, it is also intertwined 

with inter-ethnic conflict. Many of the communist leaders in power 

prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union, with the lone exception of 

Kyrgyzstan, retain prominent government positions. According to 

some experts, Islam may be the only force strong enough to 

overcome the continued monopolization of power by these exSoviets. 

External powers also seek to influence the relationship between 

the umma and the state. Turkey, capitalizing on shared linguistic 

traits with all Central Asians except Tajiks, offers a secular model 

with a market economy. Its efforts are directed at the current 

leaders, the new middle class, and the indigenous intelligentsia. 

Iran continues to export its revolutionary ideology, although its 

influence is primarily directed at Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and 

Tajikistan. Iranian influence is more prominent in Tajikistan since 
65

both speak a version of Persian, or farsi, and because there are 

approximately 100,000 Ismailis living in the Badakhshan region.108 

Like that from Iran, Saudi Arabian influence is directed at 

grassroots activity and a growing Wahabi movement (examined in 

the VNSA analysis later in this paper). The Wahabi movement is 

currently the most potent in the region, and the source of a highly 

conservative theology embraced by religious VNSAs. There have 

also been strong linkages between this movement, centered in the 

Ferghana Valley, and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The rivalry 

between Pakistan and India has overflowed into the region, with 

both seeking extensive trade linkages. 

The political-religious movements can be classified according 

to their objectives. The first, often termed "fundamentalist," seeks 

the establishment of an Islamic republic based on Islamic law, or 

shari'a. Generally speaking, these movements are led by the 

previously non-registered mullahs and the Islamic Renaissance 

Party (IRP). The second, coined "secularists," advocate the 

establishment of a secular state, but with Islam playing some major, 

but non-political role. The remnants of Official Islam tend to prefer 

this option, as do numerous unregistered clerics and some moderate 

ex-communist leaders. A third political grouping seeks to prevent 

any official role for Islam in government and in society. Its 

advocates are primarily the reactionary ex-communists and 

remaining European and Russian settlers. There has also been 

widespread speculation over pan-Islam and pan-Turkic ideologies. 

Given the widespread ethnic diversity and conflict, accentuated by 

state-specific nationalism, any pan-movement is destined to failure. 

This typology suggests that the political process can be seen as a 
66

struggle for power between the fundamentalists, secularists, and the 

current regime. 

Summary: If one could draw a multi-dimensional map, which 

juxtaposed political, ethnic, national, religious, sub-national, and 

civilization demarcations simultaneously, the resulting jumble 

would illustrate how fractured this part of the world truly is. For 

example, the eastern part of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and the 

Xinjiang province of China (political entities) are populated by the 

Uighars (a Turkic nationality), which (according to Huntington) 

straddles the fault line between the Sinic and Muslim civilizations, 

contains several subnationalities, but is a subset of the meta-state 

Muslim/Turkic identity. Intermingled in this largely Uigharpopulated area are Russians, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Germans, 

Tartars, and Belorussians, in addition to the Kyrgyz and Kazakhs. 

For China, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan to be able to convince all 

those different identities at all levels to stay faithful subjects of the 

state would be a difficult task indeed. 

Indeed, a thorough examination of all the competing identity 

cleavages in Central Asia makes the political borders drawn in the 

area seem insignificant. While some effort is underway to formally 

demarcate them, the borders in Central Asia are best described by 

Alexi Maleshenko as “virtual in the sense that they are less a matter 

of physical demarcation and more a function of what people in the 

region think them to be.”109 The multiple “other” borders rarely 

coincide with administrative borders; governments typically will 

focus much of their energy defending such administrative borders, 

while non-state actors often see such borders are mere 

inconveniences. Such multi-dimension identities coupled with 

multi-dimension borders, with various groups holding differing 
67

levels of importance to differing demarcations, certainly creates 

conditions conducive to conflict between non-state actors. 

Identity Mobilization

Should a state be perceived as illegitimate by a given sector of 

society, and should an identity cleavage (or cleavages) exist which 

coincides with (and therefore reinforces) that disaffected sector of 

society, then the third dynamic of the transformational process 

applies. This portion of the model seeks to explain how such 

disaffected, reinforced groups decide to mobilize, especially 

resorting to violent means to achieve their ends. The authors 

wholeheartedly agree with the minority (although growing) voice in 

the social sciences when dealing with ethnic violence, and apply the 

same logic to identity violence writ-large: large-scale violence is 

not a phenomenon that spontaneously ignites in the bosoms of 

thousands of individuals simultaneously, thus resulting in group 

action. Rather, a specific and careful set of conditions (two 

ingredients which are already analyzed) must exist before any group 

can be mobilized. The ingredients necessary for this third stage of 

the transformation model include an “identity entrepreneur,” which 

must “create” or “reinforce” the identity that now stands opposed to 

the state, necessary resources for such a mobilization must be 

available, and some element of organization must exist for the 

mobilization to be successful. 

An “identity entrepreneur” is simply an individual, typically a 

charismatic voice that appeals to the emotional (rather than 

rational), who finds it desirable to create or reinforce group 

identities. 110 This can be done by highlighting (or in many 

instances embellishing or even creating) injustices to the identity 

group, myth-creation about the significance of the group in other 
68

times or places, and bringing the borders between the “us” (those in 

the identity group) and “them” (those outside the identity group, 

most typically the “enemy”) into sharper focus. Most identity 

entrepreneurs are not associated with a state, as was the case with 

Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia; most are associated with a non-state 

organization, with the state or another identity group. Abdullah 

Ocalan of the Kurdish Worker’s Party, a Kurdish identity group 

violently fighting the Turkish state, is an excellent example. Other 

variations of the identity entrepreneur exist: Vladimir Zhirinovksy 

is a Russian identity entrepreneur who attempted to use the Russian 

state to assume power, but failed; Osama bin Laden is an identity 

entrepreneur for radical Islam, with the enemy being the West. 

This “creation” aspect of identity mobilization stands in stark 

contrast to the primordialist approach to identity conflict. As 

mentioned earlier, the authors do not subscribe to this primitivist 

notion of conflict—groups fight simply because they are from 

different “tribes” or “clans.” While fighting often does fall along 

identity fissures, such competitive demarcations are coincidental to 

other, deeper reasons for conflict as well as falling victim to identity 

entrepreneurs exploitation of ethnic differences for their own selfish 

reasons. In other words, the transformation of identity groups to 

VNSA requires much more than the simple fact that identity groups 

exist; mythical historiographies, exaggerated claims, or embellished 

injustices appealing to emotion are all tasks the identity 

entrepreneur must successfully complete before an identity group 

will move to action. 

Resources and organization must also be available for identity 

mobilization. Without these two elements, even the most 

determined identity entrepreneur will be unable to get his or her 
69

message out to the intended audience, provide the necessary 

incentives to the appropriate individuals, or even be taken seriously. 

Additionally, once a small-scale group is mobilized, more resources 

and greater organization are necessary to expand the group, begin 

working towards the group’s goals, and importantly, achieve at least 

some small short-term goals.111

Another important element in identity mobilization is foreign 

influence, especially that of another state. A state may be interested 

in creating and mobilizing an identity group in a potential adversary 

state for a variety of reasons. A state’s intelligence service could 

search for and train an appropriate identity entrepreneur, provide 

plenty of resources (and where possible, organization), and then use 

the now-mobilized identity group for its own purposes. 

Applying this framework to Central Asia, several “identity 

entrepreneur opportunities” exist. The most obvious identity 

entrepreneur is the military leader of the IMU, Juma Namangani. A 

charismatic individual with a military background who had backing 

from the Al Qaeda network in Afghanistan, Namangani had all the 

necessary ingredients to make the IMU a full-fledged VNSA. In 

addition to the IMU, groups that are susceptible to mobilization 

once an identity entrepreneur emerges include (but are not limited 

to) the Uighars, the Karakalpaks, the Russians in Kazakhstan, the 

Pamiris, any of the Turkmen tribes after Niyazov’s death, devout 

(not radical) Muslims, farmers threatened by drought, and 

disaffected military units. As state power in each of these republics 

erodes for a variety of reasons, the emergence of identity 

entrepreneurs becomes more likely, as the probability of success 

against such a weakened state increases. 
70

Reinforcing Actions 

Among the aspects of our open systems framework, reinforcing 

actions are probably the most difficult to understand without direct 

access to VNSA leaders. Essentially, we are proposing that the 

VNSAs behave in a manner that sustains, and even expands, the 

cycle of collective violence. Warlords recognize they can only exist 

in the context of a weak state. Druglords understand they can only 

increase their profits if the government fails to intervene or is a 

corrupt element in the system. Leaders of militant religious 

movements recognize the value of a corrupt, incapacitated state to 

the furtherance of their efforts to bring down a regime. Identity 

entrepreneurs of armed ethno-political groups are aware that they 

will be less successful in mobilizing based on socio-economic 

disparities if the state can successfully reconcile differences. Each 

group has a vested interest in expanding their recruiting pool and 

undermining state efforts to govern effectively. Because VNSAs 

are rarely focused on the public good, or the betterment of all 

society, they do not necessarily work to pull up the roots of 

violence. Since their foot soldiers come from the ranks of the 

impoverished and dispossessed, they do not have a stake in seeing 

this pool shrink. 

VNSAs may not establish specific objectives with regard to 

sustaining the system; however, the nature of their activities does 

deepen the roots of violence whether they intend it or not. VNSAs 

almost always raise funds through illegal means. In Central Asia, 

the primary revenue generating activities are illegal marketing in 

drugs, guns, and people. Drugs abuse is on the rise in Central Asia, 

and guns are flooding the landscape. Both derail productive 

engagement in civil society and engender greater violence. 
71

Collective violence has its own reinforcing effects. It now only 

creates a climate of fear, but it often forces the state, particularly 

authoritarian regimes, to divert limited resources to law 

enforcement and counter-insurgency/terrorism. In our analysis of 

VNSA types, we present evidence of these behaviors, which are at 

odds with the legitimate, non-violent efforts of NGOs to improve 

human development in Central Asia. 

Closing Shots

The transformational engines in Central Asia are strong. This 

paper earlier introduced the incubation of an at-risk population, 

ready to divert loyalties from the state. The Republics are having 

limited success in their nationalist projects. Statues of Amir Timur 

in Tashkent and Manas in Bishkek have replaced Soviet party 

officials, but have not proved sufficient in binding the citizen to the 

state. The state’s challenge is compounded by the varied, deep 

identity cleavages that stand ready to absorb loyalty. In one respect, 

competing cleavages can undermine cohesion around one specific 

identity. This does not appear to be an obstacle to mobilization in 

Central Asia where most VNSAs are built on multiple, reinforcing 

identities. Family, clan, region, religion, and socio-economic status 

act in a reinforcing manner that binds individuals to the respective 

VSNA. The Republics are losing ground in their effort to co-opt 

any of these groupings; indeed, they are hastening the process 

through failures in governance. Decreasing legitimacy and capacity 

are being replaced by coercion, which form the ultimate recipe for 

alienating a citizenry. For their part, VNSAs are capitalizing on 

globalization, external support, and illegal activities to increase their 

resource access. Identity entrepreneurs seem sufficiently plentiful 

to take advantage of the resources, although they are under constant 
72

threat of harassment and imprisonment. Based on the 

transformational process underway, the Bukhara bar brawler is 

probably already along the path to identity mobilization. Today he 

is fighting under disco lights; tomorrow he may be committing 

violent acts as part of an Afghan drug network. 

VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS 

Ferghana Dispatch: The scarred, muscular Uzbek soldier 

breaks free of the ropes binding him. Ruthlessly, he snaps the neck 

of a dozing guard. An axe through the skull fells a second oblivious 

guard, sporting an ample beard, loose robes and curved dagger. 

Stumbling through the rugged Pamir Mountains in the coal 

darkness of night, our beleaguered soldier discovers the bivouac of 

his fatigued unit. A tearing young woman dressed in a flowing 

white gown rushes to his arms, thankful he has returned from the 

dead . . . from the camps of the Islamic militants. As the morning 

sun breaks, the valiant Uzbek soldiers return to the fight while 

images of lost comrades float across the horizon. 

Nonconforming Threats 

According to our host, the music video described here is among 

the most popular in Uzbekistan. It is a government production 

intended to sustain popular support for an on-going conflict with the 

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Fighting during 1999 and 

2000 in the Pamirs and Ferghana Valley resulted in the deaths of 

approximately twenty-seven Uzbek and fifty-five Kyrgyz soldiers. 

Operating from mountain bases in Tajikistan, the IMU engages in 

terrorist and guerrilla tactics in a self-proclaimed effort to establish 

an Islamic state. Ostensibly motivated by faith, the IMU is also 

reported to finance operations with funds from the Taliban in 

Afghanistan, narco-trafficking, small arms proliferation, and human 

trade. The IMU epitomizes the character and activities of a VNSA 

at the nucleus of regional and transnational security concerns. 
73

VNSAs are a distinct form of non-state actor. VNSAs are 

organizations with an “enduring membership and specifiable 

authority relationships.”112 Social movements, one-time 

demonstrations, and even revolutions do not fit within the context of 

our non-state actor definition. Rather, the “leaderless public” 

emerges out of “the separate but convergent actions of many 

individuals who do not share organizational membership.”113 In 

addition to the organizational criteria, VNSAs employ collective 

violence. Collective violence is really an extension of collective 

action, which is coordinated action by the members of the group in 

pursuit of common ends.114 Contemporary collective violence, 

however, reflects a disturbing divergence from the dominant 

orientation of the 1970s and 1980s. Many non-state actors now 

employ violence, or the use of physical force, for reasons other than 

a power struggle with the state. 

In its purist form, the VNSA is sovereignty free. Although 

theoretically subject to state authority, non-state actors are routinely 

able to act with autonomy “to preserve their integrity and move 

toward their goals.”115 The absence of government control can 

result from state incapacity as well as complicity. This freedom of 

action has increased dramatically with the onset of globalization. 

The proliferation of non-state actors not only contributes to the 

erosion of state competency, but also allows VNSAs to interact 

directly with external states or sympathetic diasporas, which serve 

as sources of information and financial support.116 As one example, 

the IMU is able to routinely move guerrillas, monies, and 

information across the borders of Afghanistan, Tajikistan, 

Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. It has even been asserted by some 

experts that Osama bin Laden provided direct guidance as well as 
74

assistance to the IMU. The weaker the state, the more likely 

warlords leading sovereignty-free groups will fill the vacuum of 

authority. 

VNSAs pose a beguiling threat, particularly from the western 

perspective, because their approach to collective violence rejects 

Carl Philipp Gotlieb von Clausewitz’s concept of Trinitarian war. 

Trinitarian war is “organized mass violence” waged by the state for 

political ends.117 The instrument of the state is the army; organized, 

uniformed, and subordinate to the political leadership. The third 

element is the populace, which must be mobilized to participate and 

support the war. Trinitarian war is based on the Napoleonic model 

and remains the guiding construct for modern warfare. 

VNSAs do not engage in “modern” warfare. They are not 

strictly post-modern or pre-modern, but rather reflect characteristics 

that precede the birth of the nation-state in 1648 while embracing 

elements of 20th Century total wars. VNSAs are certainly not states, 

nor do they mobilize the populace to serve in organized, 

hierarchical armies.118 Warlords mobilize various sized groups of 

volunteer militants and/or reimbursed mercenaries, who regularly 

operate in loose guerilla bands and networked cells. Like the 

members of the IMU, they do not wear uniforms or unit insignia. 

Most importantly, they do not always employ force to achieve a 

political end. While many VNSAs like the IMU do seek change in 

the political system, many employ violence for post-heroic reasons. 

Collective violence is often a means to eradicate a feared or hated 

people (ethnic cleansing), perpetuate criminal activities, protect 

one’s turf, or perpetuate chaos in the system. In the most extreme 

cases, a VNSA may see violence as end itself. 
75

The forms of collective violence and associated tactics are 

equally vital to our understanding of the threat. VNSAs most often 

engage in conspiracy violence—highly organized violence with 

limited participation on a small scale.119 Conspiracy violence can 

grow into internal wars as participation becomes more widespread 

and objectives expand to include overthrowing the regime, 

dissolving the state, or eradicating opposition.120 In terms of tactics, 

VNSAs trend toward the asymmetric, including violent crime, 

guerrilla operations, terrorism, and in some rare case, cyber warfare. 

These tactics differ principally in scope and objectives. Violent 

crime is typically directed toward individuals for material gain even 

though it can be highly organized with multiple targets. Specific 

acts include shooting, stabbing, kidnapping, beating, and other 

short-term acts that generally do not have second- and third-order 

consequences.

121 While guerrilla and terrorist operations share 

several similarities, guerrilla tactics generally mean a larger group 

of armed individuals “who operate as a military unit, attack enemy 

military forces, and seize and hold territory, while also exercising 

some form of sovereignty or control over a defined geographical 

areas and its population” (even if only temporarily).122 In contrast 

to crime and guerrilla operations, terrorism is designed to have 

second- and third-order consequences, not the least of which is a 

dramatic psychological impact on a mass audience beyond the 

immediate target. For our purposes, terrorism is “the deliberate 

creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of 

violence in the pursuit of political change.”123 As evidenced by the 

devastation of 11 September 2001, terrorism can reflect the most 

heinous designs of man. 
76

Warlords 

Warlords have emerged from a long hibernation to resume a 

prominent role in today’s conflict zones. They thrive in the 

hinterlands of terminally ill states and beyond the control of civil 

society. The private armies they wield are predators, surviving 

through plunder, corruption, and crime. Warlords are a significant 

and often underestimated actor in the international system. They 

are VNSAs without redeeming social value, championing nothing 

beyond the accumulation of localized power and wealth for their 

own group. Warlords are certain to emerge where the roots of 

violence run deep, such as in Tajikistan, and the transformational 

engines are strong. 

In our opening section we drew attention to Colonel 

Khudoiberidyev, the warlord who briefly seized the Tajik town of 

Khojand in 1998. The Colonel is indicative of most warlords, 

which are defined as leaders of armed groups that control territory 

locally, and at the same time act “financially and politically in the 

international system without interference by state(s) in which he is 

based.”124 Warlords and their private armies are mature gangs with 

memberships ranging from a hundred to several thousand. They are 

also distinct from insurgents. Where the insurgent draws support 

from the local population, the warlord preys on the population. 

Although the warlord recruits from the community, he does not 

ultimately depend on its popular support for any political end 

game.

125

Charming Thugs: The warlord combines charisma with 

cunning opportunism—the consummate identity entrepreneur. 

Through membership in his private army, he is able to offer a sense 

of belonging. He is able to exploit existing identity cleavages, most 
77

often capitalizing on socio-economic disparities along ethnic and/or 

regional lines. The warlord almost always has some form of 

professional military or at least extensive paramilitary experience. 

Most importantly, he has access to resources. 

Colonel Khudoiberidyev, for example, built his army along 

loose kinship lines. During 1991 and 1992, the Captain 

Khudoiberidyev was in charge of recruiting soldiers for the Soviet 

army from his base in the town of Qurghonteppa in southern 

Tajikistan. From this position of influence, he was able to offer 

highly coveted officer positions for a price and to other Lakai tribal 

members. For elite seeking to avoid conscription, this 

entrepreneurial warlord readily accepted bribes for exemptions.126 

By the end of Tajikistan’s first civil war in late 1996, 

Khudoiberdiyev’s First Brigade of the Presidential Guard was one 

of the most effective combat units in the Tajik army due in part to 

its illegal activities. Dissatisfied with their compensation, the First 

Brigade picked a fight with Tajik 11th Brigade for control of the 

central market in Qurghonteppa. Although the 11th Brigade was 

whipped in a short street-to-street fight, Khudoiberdiyev’s newly 

named Rapid Reaction Force was not satisfied. They rebelled in 

January-February 1996, moving on the capital Dushanbe.127 

Another unit of the Presidential Guard was up to the fight. Backed 

by street thugs armed by the government with AK-47s during a rally 

at the soccer stadium, the Presidential Guard sent Khudoiberidyev 

and his irregulars fleeing into Uzbekistan. The Uzbeks share a 

loose kinship with the Lakais, and thus, Khudoiberdiyev has used 

Uzbek territory to launch operations. 

Warlordism: Warlords with private armies tend to exhibit 

several traits. Like the army of Colonel Khudoiberidyev, they tend 
78

to be highly fluid, moving in and out of government as a function of 

shifting alliances, power struggles, and most importantly, greed. 

Participation in government is not likely to result from government 

spending on equipment, salaries, training, etc. Rather, warlords 

pursue tactical alliances based on control over some type of 

economic activity that will generate revenue. In the most lucrative 

of situations, warlords are given control over casinos, drug routes, 

or industries. This type of activity is not only common in 

Tajikistan. Commanders of Turkmen military branches are 

reportedly charged with building hotels to generate their own 

revenues. When government cooptation is not sufficiently 

profitable, warlords turn to overt criminal behaviors like plundering. 

As an organized and relatively capable military unit, local policy, or 

civilians are not likely to offer much resistance. 

Additional characteristics of private armies ensure their 

elusiveness as a potential adversary. They rarely wear uniforms or 

display rank, making it difficult to distinguish them from civilians. 

Their size is not standardized, rendering any self-imposed unit 

designation useless as a means of assessing their personnel and 

equipment numbers. This ambiguity extends to the rank structure. 

Non-commissioned officers are an extreme rarity. Rather, there is 

usually a single officer over an indistinguishable band of irregulars. 

The officers are often chosen based on clan structures rather than 

merit. Among the Tajik forces that compromise part of the 

Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, one unit of approximately 300 

men is led by a 15-year-old boy—the youngest commander in the 

Afghan civil war. Mohammed Aqa Humayun Khadim took 

command of his unit upon the death of his father, an ethnic Uzbek 

chieftain of Bolak Kushlaq. Rising every morning at 0500 to pray, 
79

Humayun issues orders to soldiers well beyond him in age and 

experience. As the soldiers move out to man the six tanks and truckmounted BM-21 rocket launcher under his command, Humayun is 

quoted as saying, “they were my father's soldiers and now they 

belong to me.”128

Tactically, the First Brigade demonstrated greater combat 

capabilities then most private armies—yet, even it was defeated by 

a rag-tag Tajik army. Based on research conducted by John 

Mackinlay in sub-Saharan Africa, most of these VNSAs do not have 

the attitude, structure, or effectiveness of professional military 

units.129 Instead, they are “organized around the magnetism of their 

leaders” and rely on “their frightening behavior and appearance.”130 

They rely on conspiracy violence to prey on communities, 

collecting taxes by generating fears for lost limbs, slain family 

members or destroyed property. The ultimate asymmetric warrior, 

these private armies rarely engage government forces or other 

warlords in open battle, although the most successful private armies 

are “capable of absorbing defeat in one district and executing 

revenge at another venue.”131 Warlords rely principally on violent 

crime, guerrilla operations, and even terrorism to secure their 

power. 

Alive and Killing: Warlordism continues to reign in Tajikistan 

despite the peace accords that brought the United Tajikistan 

Opposition (UTO) in to government. As recently as June 2001, the 

Tajik Ministry of Interior initiated an operation to wipe out private 

armies in Eastern Tajikistan. The specific target was Rakhmon 

Sanginov; know locally as the Rakhmon Hitler. After the civil war, 

Rakhmon promised to retire to a farmer’s life. Apparently, milking 

cows did not suit him. Rakhmon is accused of kidnapping five 
80

police officer and two Interior Ministry servicemen, and possibly 

being associated with the 11 April 2001 assassination of the Deputy 

Minister of Interior.132 In actuality, the Minister could have been 

the target of several VNSA operating in Eastern Tajikistan, 

including splinter groups from the Ministry of Emergency 

Situations or the Movement for the Islamic Revival of Tajikistan 

(MIRT).133 Despite the efforts of the Council for National 

Reconciliation (CNR), warlords are organized and violently active 

in Tajikistan. Significantly, their range of movement includes the 

Ferghana Valley and Northern Afghanistan, where they often joined 

in fighting against the Taliban. One should not be deluded into 

thinking that warlords are not present elsewhere in the region—they 

exist! For now, they remain co-opted by the government. 

Deepening roots of violence and stronger transformational engines, 

however, will likely cause Yomud warlords in Turkmenistan, orda 

warlords in Kazakhstan, or city-state warlords in Khiva, Uzbekistan, 

to break with the government. 

Transnational Criminal Organizations 

The VNSAs of Central Asia are with few exceptions involved 

in some form of organized crime. It is not surprising that territory 

controlled by the IMU includes primary drug routes. Kyrgyz and 

Uzbek officials assert that the IMU controls 70% of the regional 

drug trade as a part of the Osama bin Laden network.134 Like 

warlords, crime bosses and drug kingpins seek autonomy of action 

from the state and pursue goals with no social benefit. They exploit 

the roots of violence and failures in governance to develop 

membership and perpetuate illegal activities. Conspiracy violence 

is used for protecting and expanding their networks. Even though 

many warlords engage in organized crime, and crime bosses employ 
81

private armies, there are important organizational and tactical 

differences. Distinctions are a consequence of globalization and the 

transnational character of organized crime. Along the Silk Route, 

TCOs are gaining ground at the expense of, or sometimes in 

cooperation with, the state. Their product line is also expanding, 

including such diverse commodities as drugs, oil, caviar, weapons, 

humans, and quite possibly, bio-toxins. 

Corporate Cunning: TCOs are transnational groups with a 

corporate structure whose “primary objective is to obtain money 

through illegal activities, often surviving on fear and corruption.”135 

Like MNCs, TCOs operate in several states simultaneously. Unlike 

MNCs, they do so illegally. In this regard, Phil Williams suggests 

they are “transnational organizations par excellence” since they 

operate outside the existing structures of authority 

and power in world politics and have developed 

sophisticated strategies for circumventing law 

enforcement in individual states and in the global 

community of states.136

The dark dynamics of globalization are contributing to the rapid 

proliferations of TCOs. According to the UNESCO, the Kazakh 

Security Committee recently identified over 125 organized crime 

groups in Central Asia.137 Thirty of these groups, and possibly 

another 90+ identified by Kyrgyzstan, are directly tied to the drug 

trade. The IMU, warlords of Tajikistan, clans in Turkmenistan, and 

families in southern Kyrgyzstan are key players. The rise of 

transnational economic activity has made it significantly easier to 

disguise illicit sales, launder money, transfer product, and 

communicate with strategic allies.138 This dynamic has also 

resulted in the emergence of several global commodities—the most 

destructive and lucrative of which are narcotics. 
82

Criminal groups do start out as TCOs, but develop into 

sophisticated transnational players. The evolutionary process can 

be understood in three phases. In the first, predatory stage, 

localized gangs use violence to control turf.139 These gangs gain 

recognition from other power brokers, including legitimate 

authorities as well as influential VNSAs. For example, gangs in the 

Batken oblast of southern Kyrgyzstan probably controlled localized 

heroin distribution networks, drawing the attention of more 

dominate actors like the IMU or possibly, corrupt Uzbek and 

Kyrgyz governmental security forces. A parasitical relationship 

develops in which the more powerful state and VNSAs manipulate 

the gangs to their own purposes. Over time, a symbiotic relationship 

forms with “the host itself dependent on the parasite” for 

sustainment.140 In the Osh and Batken oblasts as well as tribal areas 

of Turkmenistan, major Russian and Afghan narco-traffickers need 

local markets to not only move product across frontiers, but to 

develop local clientele. 

Successful TCOs take advantage of their environment, applying 

their adaptive and innovative organizational networks to a 

relationship with the global marketplace. Essentially, TCOs link 

regions where failures in governance can be effectively exploited 

with regions where income levels can sustain consumption.141 

Failures in governance create political and economic space for the 

development of shadow political and economic sub-systems.142

Importantly, TCOs have a stake in the perpetuation and expansion 

of this space. A fluid, networked organizational structure allows the 

TCO to respond quickly to local conditions while avoiding any 

concentration of resources or capability. The distributed quality of 
83

TCO networks makes them particularly difficult to assess, monitor, 

and attack. 

The TCO is also distinguished from localized warlords and ecowarriors by its use of strategic alliances with other criminals as a 

means of increasing profit and reducing risk.143 There is little doubt 

that narco-traffickers in Central Asia are tied in to the Russian mafia 

and the Chinese Triads. Others point to the role of Iranian drug 

lords, such as Hajj Bhulam Baloch; however, the Iranian 

government has essentially shutdown this route. Of note, Iran is 

responsible for more than 80% of the global seizures of opium due 

to an extensive interdiction effort that involves concrete dam 

barriers, observations posts, 30,000 law enforcement personnel, and 

the death penalty for narcotics possession.144

Like warlords, crime bosses and drug lords capitalize on the 

roots of violence for recruitment. While not necessarily charismatic 

leaders, they do offer membership in a group that is often defined 

along family, clan, or ethnic lines. Most importantly, they offer 

steady income. The IMU reportedly offers new militants up to $100 

a day. Commanders can receive up to $500!145 When compared to 

$1-3 per day for most rural people, the risk of being arrested is 

worth taking. Even though traffickers get 90% of the “value-added” 

for heroin in a producer country, farmers still get a 6% cut, 

processors 2%, and traders 2%.146 Bottom line—crime pays very 

well. In terms of specific membership, reports indicate 65.3% of 

the region’s drug traffickers are Tajik citizens, 10.8% are Russian 

citizens, 9.2% are Kyrgyz citizens, and 8.2% are Turkmen 

citizens.147 Looking behind the numbers, it is interesting to note the 

growing role of women in narco-trafficking. Based on drug arrests, 

women in Kazakhstan have increased their participation from 
84

approximately 3% in 1996 to 12.2%.148 This figure is up to 35% for 

Tajikistan.149 According to Olcott and Udalova, women accept less 

pay, are more protective of their sources, and generally receive 

more lenient sentences.150

Criminal Aggression: TCOs are the masters of conspiracy 

violence, applying lethal force in a highly organized, selective and 

compartmented manner. Although we chose not to interview drug 

lords, there is widespread street knowledge of the murders, 

kidnappings, and gunfights associated with organized crime. There 

has been a string of high-profile kidnappings in the so-called “Osh 

Knot” of the Ferghana Valley, including Japanese and American 

tourists. When one combines criminal intent with the political and 

religious motivations of hybrid VNSAs like the IMU, collective 

violence can take the form of terrorism and guerrilla attacks. 

Proficiency in the use of violence is enhanced by the prominent role 

of experienced fighters from the wars in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. 

Drawing again on the pioneering work of Phil Williams, there 

are three general types of violence associated with TCOs. Although 

he focuses on narco-trafficking, our research suggests equally valid 

application to networks associated with other illegal commodities. 

First, there is violence to protect profits and turf.151 Rarely is this 

violence between criminal groups. Indeed, Professor Anara 

Tabyshalieva of the Institute for Regional Studies in Kyrgyzstan 

describes the drug mafia as a “model of inter-ethnic cooperation.”152 

Rather, violence is with government security forces. IMU raids into 

the Ferghana Valley of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1999 and 

2000 are regarded by many experts to have been primarily for the 

purpose of protecting drug routes. This type of conflict has also 

been limited through cooptation of border guards. It is widely 
85

accepted that the Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division along the 

Tajikistan border and other Russian border troops are in on the 

trade. Among the more damaging reports are accusations that 

Russian military aircraft are used to move drugs from Tajikistan to 

airports outside Moscow.153 

The additional two types of violence involve drug addicts 

committing crimes to support their habit and users perpetrating 

violence while under the influence of mind-altering substances.154

There is strong evidence that drug-related crimes are climbing 

steadily upward, catching the West and Russia.155 As isolated 

behaviors, these acts of violence do not contribute to our 

understanding of VNSAs; however, we consider growing drug use 

by VNSA members to be both likely and dangerous. Even with 

religious prohibitions, addiction is on the rise, especially among the 

dispossessed youth that are ripened by the roots of violence.156 For 

relief organizations and military operators alike, countering the 

threats posed by civilian-clothed, networked irregulars that are 

simultaneously high will be a significant challenge. We must be 

prepared to engage thugs on drugs. 

Militant Religious Movements 

The call to prayer resonates throughout the bazaar in Andijan, a 

leafy provincial capital in the Ferghana Valley. A diverse array of 

men stream through the market stalls and pile out of Daewoo minivans. Some wear heavy beards and flowing robes while others are 

clean-shaven and sport western attire. The former take greater risks 

since the Uzbekistan security services are known to monitor this 

mosque and keep records of men that “appear” to have connections 

to militant religious movements like the IMU. The main Friday 

mosque, or Juma Mosque, quickly overflows, leaving many to 
86

unroll their prayer rugs on the surrounding streets. The strong 

showing is not surprising given the Ferghana Valley’s reputation as 

a center of Islamist activity. Compared to other Friday mosques we 

have visited along the Silk Route, Ferghana mosques are certainly 

the busiest, but we also notice the even larger crowds in the market 

that are seemingly oblivious to the rhythmic call to prayer. 

Militant religious movements have received increasing global 

attention as a result of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on 

the World Trade Center and Pentagon. This attention has zeroed in 

on Central Asia where the phenomenon is far from new. Although 

many faiths are present in the region, nearly all past and present 

religious VNSA have claimed some connection to Islam. Contrary 

to the expectations of many western alarmists in the early 1990s, the 

region has not witnessed a widespread militant Islamist resurgence. 

Rather, only a few militant Islamist movements are organized, 

active, and willing to use collective violence to achieve their 

objectives. Limited numbers; however, have not prevented these 

VNSAs from exploiting a growing at-risk population, and 

capitalizing on external support from other militant movements like 

the Taliban and Osama bin Laden’s Al Queda network. Moreover, 

there is mounting concern that state coercion as well as overt 

cooperation with the hated west is having a blowback effect. 

Islamic Nationalism: Religious VNSAs must be distinguished 

from non-violent, politically active religious movements. In 

addition to avoiding misguided generalizations, these groups 

warrant our consideration because the potential exists for currently 

peaceful movements to resort to violence in response to excessive 

state coercion or other failures in governance. Political religious 

movements in the region are entirely Islamic. Current Islamic 
87

nationalists have their roots in the Soviet era when unregistered 

mullahs led underground communities of believers (known as the 

umma). Great risks were taken to operate illegal mosques, open 

religious schools (madrasehs), and perform life-cycle rituals.157 

Their activities tended to revolve around holy places, which 

provided a forum for the religious leaders, or mullahs, to address the 

umma outside of “official” mosques controlled by the Soviet state. 

By some estimates, there were over 1,800 clandestine mosques in 

1987 as compared to 365 official ones.158 

Independence brought an overt attempt by the clandestine 

Muslim community to integrate Islam with the emerging political 

system. For these emergent groups, Islam is an all-encompassing 

faith that cannot be divorced from the political, social, and 

economic life of the state. Among the several Islamic republican 

parties that emerged, the most organized and active is the Islamic 

Revival (or Renaissance) Party (IRP), which ultimately fractured in 

to state-specific parties throughout Central Asia and the Caucuses. 

The general goals of the IRP include: 

- Explain to the people the real meaning of the 

holy Koran and hadith (traditions of the prophet) 

and call the people to live and act according to the 

Koran and hadith.

- Fight national and racial discrimination, 

impudence, crime, alcoholism, and all other things 

forbidden by Islamic law (shari’a) through 

understanding and appeal. 

- Educate young people in the principles of Islam 

and create instruction and training centers and 

madrasehs for this purpose. 

- Ensure the rights of all Muslims are exercised 

according to the Koran. 

- Strengthen Islamic brotherhood, develop 

religious relations with the Muslim world, and 
88

seek a relationship of equal rights with 

representatives of other religions. 

- Cooperate with other democratic parties and state 

organizations in all fields. 

- Create philanthropic funds that will support 

anyone in need of help. 

- Strengthen the family according to the principles 

of Islam and ensure the rights of women and 

children. 

- Ensure the principles of Islamic economy and 

regain economic purity. 

- Solve the problems of the people according to the 

holy Koran and hadith.

159

Notably, these goals do not call for the establishment of an Islamic 

state. That said, achieving these objectives is only feasible in the 

context of an Islamic republic. The IRP also avoids calls for 

immediate violent action.160 Thus, the Uzbek IRP works out of its 

Ferghana Valley strongholds, like Andijan, to train new clerics and 

renew adherence to Islam among the population. As articulated by 

Imam Abdul Ahmad in Namagan, “first Ferghana, then Uzbekistan 

and then the whole Central Asia will become an Islamic state.”161

The IRP and other Islamic nationalist parties face significant 

obstacles to their long-term goals. Most importantly, the 

authoritarian regimes of the region have banned all Islamic political 

parties, resulting in thousands of Uzbeks crossing the border to the 

Kyrgyz side of the Ferghana Valley. The lone exception is 

Tajikstan where the IRP holds a role in government as a result of 

the peace accords. Second, government security services actively 

monitor suspected Islamists, accusing IRP members of being 

terrorists. Whether the label is warranted is a matter of some 

controversy. It is widely known that law enforcement officials 

consider a beard to be a sign of Islamic opposition, sufficiently 
89

telling of one’s political views to warrant listing, harassment, and 

even arrest. According to several estimates, hundreds of activists 

have been jailed, and at least six have disappeared.162 The first to 

go was Abdullo Utaev, the leader of the IRP in Uzbekistan. He was 

abducted in 1992 during the first year of independence and remains 

missing.163 

In addition to state coercion, the IRP faces challenges from 

militant groups who accuse IRP leaders of cooperating with the 

government and of being co-opted by the official, state-controlled 

Islamic institutions. A fourth obstacle is the general political 

passivity of the region’s Muslims, which is reinforced by a personal 

faith tradition. Finally, new strategic alliances between the US and 

Central Asia Republics in the fight against terrorism do not suggest 

that the US will be applying pressure for political liberalization any 

time soon. Given these trends and the persistent sources of tension 

outlined previously, we expect there to be increasing defections and 

fissures with the Islamic nationalist movement. 

Militant Islam: Islamic VNSAs benefit from the continued 

failings of the moderate Islamic nationalists. They too have their 

contemporary roots in the Soviet period. The Basmachis, for 

example, resisted the early years of Soviet rule in the 1920s and 

1930s. With some 20,000 fighters spread across the region, local 

mullahs led guerilla operations against an ultimately more powerful 

Soviet Red Army. Today’s militant Islamists share characteristics 

with extreme militant religious movements around the world.164 

Richard Shultz and William Olson summarize these characteristics 

in their 1994 work, Ethnic and Religious Conflict: Emerging Threat 

to US Security: 

- Militant religious political movements tend to 

view existing government authority as corrupt and 
90

illegitimate because they do not uphold religious 

values. 

- They attack the inability of government to 

address the roots of violence. 

- They are universalists, seeing their views as part 

of an inheritance for all believers, which orient 

them toward transstate activities and disregard for 

national boundaries. 

- They are exclusionists, relegating all conflicting 

opinions to the margins or excluding them all 

together. 

- They are willing to use coercion to achieve their 

true ends—compromise is unacceptable.165

In Central Asia, these qualities are primarily associated with a 

“purist” religious movement known locally as Wahabism.166 

Originating in the harsh deserts of Najd, Saudi Arabia, Wahabism 

arrived in Central Asia around 1912 by way of India and 

Afghanistan. Espousing a strict, puritanical version of Islam, 

Wahabis are unwilling to entertain the theologies of the other four 

main Sunni schools of thought: Hanafi (the school of most Central 

Asian Muslims), Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali.167 The Wahabi 

movement does have a doctrinal connection with the Hanbali 

School, which also emphasizes the Koran and hadith as the 

definitive sources of Islamic law. Such a rigorous interpretation 

leaves little room for cooperation with the state, official Islamic 

institutions, or other faiths. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration 

to declare that there is an evangelical war being waged between 

Christian missionaries and Wahabi mullahs on the streets of 

Bishkek. 

Wahabi intolerance is compounded by a jihad culture that 

embraces a strict interpretation of the so-called verse of the sword, 

which translates "when the forbidden months are past, then fight 
91

and slay the Pagans wherever ye find them" (IX, 5).168 Wahabis 

believe this verse commands Muslims to attack disbelief until it is 

eradicated from the earth.169 Placed in context, as proffered by the 

Islamic scholar, Mohammad Ali, the verse takes on a different 

meaning. Indeed, one finds that it is directed against those that 

initiate an attack on Muslims, and the idolatrous tribes that broke 

treaties with Muslims (IX: 13, VIII: 56).170 A broader 

interpretation, based on Shaybani's The Islamic Law of Nations, 

suggests jihad to be a struggle both to improve and expand Islam, 

but not necessarily through violent means.171 The Wahabi reject 

these more “liberal interpretations.” The Wahabis are ready to fight 

to see the Islamic Caliphate restored on earth. As articulated by a 

leading Wahabi mullah, “the IRP wants to be in parliament. We 

have not desire to be in parliament. We want a revolution.”172

Wahabis are also willing to die for their cause. Indeed, one the first 

martyrs of Islam in the modern era was Bahauddin Vaissov, a 

Wahabi teacher in Ferghana who was imprisoned in 1950 where he 

later died.173 

The movement spreads at the grass roots level, fueled by 

charismatic leadership and external support. Mullah Abdul Kehi 

and Abdulwali Qari are especially well known for their persuasive 

sermons in footholds throughout the Ferghana Valley, particularly 

in Namangan and Ferghana, Uzbekistan, and Osh and Jalalabad, 

Kyrgyzstan. But fiery rhetoric is rarely sufficient. The Wahabi 

provide social services the state fails to deliver. They build schools 

and mosques. In Namangan, a multi-story Islamic education 

complex was built in the mid-1990s, rumored to have cost over 

$127,000. Islamic centers have also been built in Osh, Jalalabad, 

Andijan, and Margilan.174 Rather than bribing for books and marks, 
92

students are given books, literature for their parents, and free 

lunches. In return, they proselytize with the mullahs in local 

villages on the weekend, and when older, they might join a 

VNSA.175

External support is key to the Wahabi success. The Saudi 

Arabian Wahabi movement, known as Ahl e-Sunnah, is the 

principal benefactor. Within two years of independence, Ahl eSunnah had set up offices in Margilan, and funneled over $1.3 

million of Saudi money in to new construction and social services. 

The flow has not subsided. Other important benefactors have been 

the Taliban, Osama bin Laden, and the Jamaat-i-Islami out of 

Pakistan. In the face of government crackdowns on mosques and 

schools, prospective students often travel to Afghanistan and 

Pakistan for education. They have been sponsored by the Taliban, 

with bin Laden backing, and ultimately recruited for their jihad

against corrupt Arab regimes and the West. 

The IMU, also known as the Harakatul Islamiyyah, is the most 

organized and violently active of the Wahabi groups. It earned 

worldwide notoriety and a fourth place ranking on the State 

Departments Foreign Terrorist Organizations List in September 

2000 after the kidnapping of four US mountain climbers. The 

IMU’s political leader is Takhir Yuldash and its military 

commander is Juma Namangani. Namangani brings a warlord’s 

character to the movement. His military background includes 

service as a Soviet paratrooper in Afghanistan and commander of 

approximately of 1,000 irregulars during the Tajik civil war. With 

the end of the war, he capitalized on the thousands of now 

unemployed former fighters and the resource backing of the Wahabi 

movement to expand IMU operations. 
93

Recruiting is heaviest in the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan. The 

region is desperately poor and packed with mercenaries, ready to 

accept the regular wages that come with joining the jihad. Islam is 

certainly not the motivating factor in their service. Among IMU 

members are also Tajiks, Uzbeks, Chechens, Uighars, and Afghans, 

many of whom are seasoned veterans from the civil wars in 

Afghanistan and Tajikistan. The link to Afghanistan remains 

strong. Namangani and his fighters receive sanctuary and training 

at Afghan camps. Although discussed here as a militant religious 

movement, the IMU is also assessed as participating in narcotics 

and weapons trafficking. 

Tactically, the IMU embraces the full range of collective 

violence. In addition to the high profile kidnapping in 2000, the 

IMU raised $3 million off the kidnapping of four Japanese 

geologists in 1999 and $50,000 for three Kyrgyz district officials. 

Assassinations and bombings are also on the menu. The Uzbek 

government holds the IMU responsible for a series of Tashkent 

bombings in 1997, which missed their target, Islam Karimov, but 

left 16 dead and 128 wounded.176 Additional assassination attempts 

on Karimov as well as bombings in 1997 and 1999 resulted in a 

government crackdown that continues today. 

Namangani also commands guerrilla and conventional forces, 

which have conducted a series of cross-border raids from Tajikistan 

in recent years. In 1999, approximately 800 IMU guerrillas 

launched an unsuccessful attack near Batken with the intent of 

establishing a permanent base from which to launch assaults on 

Uzbekistan.177 A smaller force of approximately 100 guerrillas tried 

again in August 2000, attacking Kyrgyz security forces and seizing 

several villages in Uzbekistan (27 soldiers killed). The latter 
94

become the subject of the popular video showing an Uzbek soldier 

battling for his freedom from an IMU camp. A third round of 

attacks was expected in 2001, particularly when Yuldash announced 

during a BBC interview on 3 Aug that several thousand IMU 

fighters had established a base in Batken.178 Yuldash certainly 

exaggerates, and no attack has materialized. IMU fighters have 

probably retreated to their training base in Afghanistan, which is 

just a few miles from the Uzbek border.179 Given the IMUs 

dependence on the Taliban regime, the US victory is likely to set 

back future small-unit operations. 

Raging Religion? Militant religious movements in Central Asia 

are isolated geographically and without widespread support across 

the region. Nationalist Islam is more dominant on the political 

landscape, but is also constrained by institutional and cultural 

obstacles to generating enthusiasm for its agenda. That said, 

Islamic VNSAs do have a solid foothold in the Ferghana Valley and 

are able to move with relative ease across the border between 

Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Persistent socio-economic deprivation, 

resource scarcity, and demographic pressures are certain to expand 

the recruiting pool. State coercion, charismatic identity 

entrepreneurs, and resource access are strong transformational 

engines. There is also emerging anecdotal evidence that US 

counter-terrorism operations are creating a popular backlash, 

fueling the Wahabi jihad. The defeat of the Taliban regime and 

eradication of the Al Queda network, however, are likely to deal a 

significant blow to the IMU in particular, which is heavily 

dependent on these relationships for financial backing, training and 

safe haven. Even with such a defeat, Islamic VNSAs are expected 
95

to persevere; although we assess it as highly unlikely they will ever 

witness the new Caliphate. 

Ethno-Political Groups 

The ethnic component of warlords, TCOs, and religious 

movements is important, but not the defining characteristic. 

Therefore, we must consider the potential rise of violent ethnopolitical groups pursuing ethnic-based agendas. Five major ethnic 

identity cleavages exist in Central Asia, all of which create at least 

some tension with the notion of citizenship. This incongruence 

between the borders of the republics and the perceived dimensions 

of the ethnic homelands can produce territorial conflicts, especially 

when they are exacerbated by economic, demographic, and 

ecological stress. 

Ethno-political groups transform into VNSAs relatively slowly 

and only with other supporting inputs. The more reinforcing 

identity cleavages that exist, coupled with reduced efficacy of the 

state, the higher the probability such actors will emerge. A 

continuum of ethno-political VNSAs may follow during their 

incubation period is as follows: (1) become ethnically aware, (2) 

become ethnically organized, (3) develop goals which primarily or 

exclusively help one’s own ethnic organization, and (4) using 

violent means to achieve ethnically-based goals. 

By ethnically aware, we assert that individuals are conscious of 

their ethnic identity—they are keenly aware of ethnic differences. 

Most Central Asian peoples were not ethnically aware prior to 

Russian colonization. Soviet disintegration, coupled with nationbuilding programs by the five Central Asian Republics at 

independence, ensure nearly all peoples are now aware of their 

ethnicity. Ethnic organization is a significant step toward 
96

mobilization for two main reasons. First, creating organization 

requires a motivated (charismatic) individual or group of 

individuals to lay the groundwork for the organization—not a small 

task. Second, an individual joining an organization is making the 

leap from acting in self-interest to acting in the interest of a group. 

Ethnic organization in Central Asia is definitely surging. To 

begin, the number of political parties, non-governmental groups and 

informal (and often illegal) groups based on ethnic lines is large and 

growing. Indeed, the number of NGOs registered with the Ministry 

of Justice in Kyrgyzstan stood at 3,000 at the end of 2000; while the 

majority of these NGOs work in the social sector (largely 

addressing poverty, unemployment, women’s issues, etc.) a 

significant number work ethnic issues. It is important to note that 

some of these NGOs exist in an effort to improve inter-ethnic 

relations, not simply to advance the cause of a single ethnic 

group.

180 Paradoxically, all five Central Asian Republics recently 

cracked down on almost all political actors (the press, political 

parties, and NGOs); thus, the likelihood of such ethno-political 

actors going underground (and thus defining the state as an enemy 

rather than a political framework which facilitates their 

development) is growing as well.181 Actions likely to encourage the 

creation of additional ethnic organizations include nationalizing 

policies, perceived favoritism of certain ethnic groups or clans, or 

economic disparities along ethnic divides. In a rather humorous 

book on security issues, President Islam Karimov repeatedly makes 

the (inaccurate) boastful claim that all ethnic minority rights are 

respected in Uzbekistan. Indeed, Karimov continues, 

“consolidation processes based on ethno-cultural grounds are 

actively underway among other nationalities that live on the 
97

territory of Uzbekistan.”182 What President Karimov does not 

understand is that “ethnic consolidation” is simply sowing the seeds 

for future ethnic mobilization. 

Some ethnic organizations have reached the third stage on the 

continuum—defining their goals exclusively for their own ethnic 

group, even if it comes at the expense of other organizations. A 

handful of groups are at the extreme end of the spectrum, using 

violence to accomplish their goals. While some of these groups 

form in an ad hoc manner (such as Uzbek farmers in Osh resorting 

to violence over perceived favoritism for their Kyrgyz peers), others 

exist for the primary purpose of advocating violence to pursue 

ethnic goals. 

The most important fact resulting from an application of this 

model to Central Asia is that only a paltry handful of ethnic 

organizations are moving down the spectrum. The vast majority of 

ethnic groups are gaining momentum in their upward march 

towards ethnic-goal setting and violence. The primary reason 

Turkmen Clans are not moving up the spectrum is President 

Niyazov’s exceptionally heavy-handed tactics in repressing any 

political or organizational expression other than adoration for his 

own regime. This stalled movement is temporary—once the aging 

and unhealthy Niyazov passes on, such clan-based identity will 

likely come back with a vengeance, especially if the lesser clans 

believe that the dominant Tekke clan was unfairly privileged or 

were repressive to other clans under Turkmenbashi’s rule. 

Central Asia provides plenty of grist for ethno-political VNSA 

incubation. We selected two prominent examples that highlight the 

process by which a group climbs the ethnic motivation spectrum, 
98 

Figure 6: Application of the Ethnic Motivation Spectrum to Central Asia Ethnic AwarenessÆ Ethnic OrganizationÆ Ethnic Goal-SettingÆ Ethnic Violence 

All ethnic groups Tajiks in Bukhara  and SamarkandÆ

 Kyrgyz UzbeksÆ

 Kazakh Russians Æ

 Turkmen Clans  Uighars Æ Afghani Tajiks Æ

 Badakhshan Æ

 (Pamiris in Tajikistan)  Karakalpakstan  (Karakalpaks in Uzbekistan) 
99

and moves to the cusp of becoming a VNSA—Uighars and 

Karakalpaks. 

Uigharstan—Worth Fighting For: The recent history of the 

Uighar (and the Uighar Diaspora in Central Asia) begins with 

China’s absorption of Eastern Turkestan (a infant state created 

during World War II) in the late 1940s. Fleeing the communist 

government, tens of thousands of Turkic-speaking Uighars fled west 

from China, which had expanded the Xinjiang province to include 

Eastern Turkestan. As a result, every Central Asian Republic, in 

addition to India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, has a noteworthy 

Uighar population; Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have a significant 

Uighar presence.183 The resulting diasporas kept their ethnic and 

cultural identity during Soviet times. With the collapse of the 

Soviet Union came the concurrent irredentist desire to regain a 

Uighar homeland. China quickly established diplomatic ties with 

the Central Asian Republics, however, leaving the Uighar nation 

divided by the complicated and (still) unsettled borders of the 

region. 

The Uighars, much like their Muslim brothers to the west, 

identified themselves along religious lines prior to the Chinese 

arrival. Just as Russian colonization introduced national identity to 

many of the Central Asian peoples, Chinese occupation and 

subjugation made the Uighars ethnically aware as well. Thus, for 

the Uighars, the first step toward becoming a VNSA was taken 

nearly 50 years ago. Under strict communist rule by both the Soviet 

Union and the People’s Republic of China, organization for the 

Uighar community was difficult. However, soon after the collapse 

of the Soviet Union, several Uighar-based organizations sprang 

forth, reflecting the desire of at least a portion of the Uighar 
100

population to have their own country. The Chinese partially 

placated this desire for independence by establishing the Xinjiang 

Uighar Autonomous Region (XUAR).184 Thus, the next two steps 

up the ethnic motivation spectrum can reasonably be estimated as 

the early 1990s. 

As is the case with nearly all ethno-political actors, the decision 

to turn to violence is not ethnically or identity-based alone. Other 

inputs, to include resource scarcity, demographics, 

underdevelopment, and coercion all come into the Uighar calculus. 

Indeed, under the appropriate leadership and political structure, 

allowing an ethnic group to organize and pursue ethnic goals—

within the confines of the state—can serve to placate that group. 

Given oppressive leadership, concurrent with resource scarcity, 

underdevelopment, etc., allowing an ethnic organization to move up 

the spectrum in such a manner only empowers that group to pursue 

violence once the state framework serves as a frustration rather than 

a augmenting structure. It is with this bifurcation in mind that we 

proceed with the Uighar example. 

Chinese President Jiang Zemin announced his “Go West” 

policy in 1996, largely to develop the desolate western portions of 

China. As a result, tens of millions of ethnically Han Chinese are 

expected to move to XUAR in the next two decades. This massive 

demographic shift has created significant resentment with the 

Uighar population; the Chinese are quickly changing the cultural 

trappings of the area (not the least of which is consuming massive 

amounts of pork—an insult to that Muslim population).185 

Although Uighar separatists have waged a campaign of sporadic 

violence since the late 1980s (which is, ironically, when a great deal 

of inter-ethnic violence in the rest of Central Asia erupted), the level 
101

of violence increased with the increasing number of Chinese.186 

This violence has included planting bombs, killing Chinese police 

and soldiers, robbing banks, etc. Furthermore, anti-Chinese rioting 

in the region’s capital of Urumqi, Kashgar, and Yining left some 

Chinese dead.187 Following one particular 1997 riot in Yining that 

left at least 10 dead, and a bomb attack in Beijing the same year, 

China cracked down on the Uighars and began passing a series of 

bilateral understandings with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in an 

attempt to get those governments to do the same.188 More recently 

in early 2001, Uighar separatists conducted yet another bombing 

campaign. The response from the Chinese government was swift 

and harsh—in the resulting wave of arrests, called Operation Strike 

Hard, over 200 Uighars were sentenced to death and many more 

were handed lengthy prison sentences.189 

How the violent relationship between the Uighars in XUAR and 

the Chinese government affects Uighar mobilization in Central Asia 

is clear—the structural coercion extends to those governments as 

well. Uighar separatists and Kazakh authorities in Almaty waged a 

tit-for-tat battle in September of 2000.190 Kyrgyz authorities 

branded the Uighars as Muslim extremists and actively tried to link 

them to the Khizb-ut-Takhrir, an active Islamic organization. 

Further, most avenues of Uighar protests against any government, 

including the Chinese and Kyrgyz, are closed.191 Thus, the state is 

now viewed as an obstacle toward Uighar expression rather than an 

empowering avenue—a promise for continued, perhaps increased 

violence. 

As a result, several Uighar organizations exist in the Central 

Asian Republics, some of them devoted to the violent creation of a 

Uigharstan. These groups include, but are not limited to, the Uighar 
102

Ozatlik Tashlakhty (bases in Kazakhstan, fighting for an 

independent Uighar enclave in Xinjiang), the United National 

Revolutionary Front of Turkestan, the Organization for the 

Liberation of Uigharstan, and the International Committee for the 

Liberation of Turkestan and Yana Ayat. Although the focus of these 

groups’ violence is primarily China, this past year illustrates that 

Central Asian governments are considered legitimate targets for 

attempting to interfere with the groups’ efforts. 

Some Central Asian authorities believe any independent 

homeland for the Uighars will negatively affect them as well. 

According to a representative of the Kazakhstan Foreign Ministry, 

"It should be remembered that the aim of the Uighur separatists is to 

create an independent Uighur state, not only on the territory of 

Sintszyan-Ugursk [Xinjiang] but also in parts of Kazakhstan."192 At 

this point, the political boundaries between China and Central Asia 

become pointless for all sides—Uighar separatists attack both 

Central Asian and Chinese targets, Central Asian regimes fear 

increased Uighar influence both in their own homelands as well as 

China, and China convinced the Central Asian states to adopt 

oppressive measures against their Uighar populations. 

The future for the Uighars and the Uighar movement is cloudy. 

While the majority of Uighars are not violent, both Central Asian 

and Chinese authorities are fearful of outside Islamic influences 

radicalizing the Uighar population. For example, in 1997 the 

French newspaper al-Watan al-‘Arabic erroneously reported that 

Osama bin Laden had intentions of moving to Xinjiang to start a 

jihad against Chinese rule there.193 This greatly worried Chinese 

leaders, who were concerned about conditions in Afghanistan due to 

the flow of drugs and other illegal goods from there.194 Given 
103

current military operations in the area, these fears are sure to 

resurrect. This last point should not be lost. One of the more 

influential sources of VNSA incubation may be outside actors. 

With China being a primary example of an outside actor towards the 

Uighars, the US presence in Central Asia may indeed trigger an 

effort to mobilize the Uighars against the US and their host 

governments. While this is speculation, the possibility should be 

taken seriously. 

Karakalpakstan—Primed to Erupt: Karakalpakstan, literally 

meaning the “land of the black hats,” is an autonomous region at the 

extreme western end of Uzbekistan, bordering on the Aral Sea and 

the Amu and Syr Darya Rivers. The Karakalpaks history in the 

region goes back at least to the 16th Century. Having always been at 

least autonomous, the Karakalpaks fought against the Mongols, the 

Khiva and Kazakh Khanates, and later the Russian encroachment. 

The Karakalpak history becomes complicated after the Soviet 

Revolution. In 1924, the region was awarded autonomous status 

under the administration of Kazakhstan. In 1930 it became a part of 

the Russian Federation and on March 20, 1932, it was reformed as 

the Karakalpak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. On 

December 5, 1932, Karakalpakstan became a part of the Uzbek 

Republic, a status that remained until the break-up of the Soviet 

Union. In December 14, 1991 the Karakalpak Republic was 

announced as an autonomous republic in Uzbekistan.195 With this 

status came its own Constitution, parliament, capital, and other 

structures associated with government. Given this long tradition of 

independence and some level autonomy under the Soviets, the 

Karakalpaks have a level of ethnic awareness. 
104

The most striking thing about Karakalpakstan is not its political 

status, but the wretched conditions in which that region exists. It is 

home of one of the greatest environmental catastrophes in the 

world—the dying of Aral Sea. Fishing villages, which fifty years 

ago rested on the lapping shores of the Aral, now lie over 100 miles 

away from the poisoned water. Vast dry flats are suggestive of 

former placid waters—now replaced with barren soil mixed with 

harsh chemicals and salt, constantly whipped by the wind, sending 

noxious dust clouds for hundreds of miles. The only place where 

many of the Aral Sea fish (which once sustained the Karakalpaks) 

now exist is in the Karakalpak museum in Nukus. 

The health catastrophe is as bad as the environmental collapse. 

Anemia among women is nearly universal. Most Karakalpaks show 

signs of malnutrition. Children below the age of 15, who make up 

40% of the population, show signs of scurvy and liver and kidney 

problems. Infant mortality in some areas is 50 per 1,000. Birth 

defects, which match the startling figure, are five times the rate in 

Europe. The list of depressing statistics could continue, but the 

point is made—the Karakalpaks are an exceptionally unhealthy 

population.196

It is not a leap to suggest the Karakalpak’s health woes are 

linked to the environmental ruin in their homeland. Indeed, a 

comparative analysis with other population groups in the region 

with similar dietary and living habits shows that those populations 

in the Aral Sea region suffer greater health problems than those 

further away (such as Turkmen or Uzbeks from the eastern half of 

the country).197 A temporal analysis, comparing what few statistics 

on the health of the Karakalpak population earlier this century with 

that populations’ current health, suggests the same thing—this 
105

population began getting sick approximately two decades ago, as 

the Soviet agricultural practices of the region were beginning take a 

toll on the environment. 

Given the ethnic awareness and organization, the poverty, 

resource shortages, and other conditions conducive to VNSA 

incubation, why are the Karakalpaks still peaceful? According to 

Thomas Szayna, a RAND Corporation expert on Central Asia, the 

answer contains many dimensions.198 First, the problems facing the 

Karakalpaks are similar to the problems facing all Uzbeks—only far 

more severe. With an extensive drought hammering western 

Uzbekistan (due to some weather patterns but also largely because 

the Amu and Syr Darya Rivers are fully exploited before they reach 

western Uzbekistan) new disparities are likely to emerge. With a 

shortage of potable water, many are drinking from poor sources of 

water, creating a surge in infectious diseases. As of 2001, 

approximately 48,000 are without their main source of income, as 

crops have withered. No rice was harvested in Karakalpakstan at all 

in 2000. With up to ninety percent of Karakalpak’s agriculture 

destroyed last year, and a similar percentage facing destruction this 

year, the Karakalpaks may be at the breaking point. 199 

A second reason Karakalpakstan is still reasonably stable is that 

no charismatic leader has emerged willing to directly challenge 

Tashkent. Two events could change that. The first is a continuing 

rise in Karakalpak identity awareness. Although Karakalpak ethnic 

awareness can be traced back several decades (possibly centuries), 

it is not exceptionally deep. With less than 40% of 

Karakalpakstan’s population actually being Karakalpak (Uzbeks 

outnumber the Karakalpaks), a penetrating and uniform ethnic 

awareness is difficult to accomplish. With more and more Uzbeks 
106

moving east due to the drought and health problems, these 

population dynamics may change. 

The second potential “trigger event” is the Uzbek state being 

fully occupied with other challenges to its authority, probably 

taking the form of a surge in IMU activity. Such an even could 

force the central government to pull the limited resources directed 

to the Karakalpak region into other areas such as defense. Should 

that occur, the Karakalpaks may begin adopting a victim mindset, 

creating a growing list of grievances against the central government. 

Additionally, the central government may be perceived as too 

occupied with other challenges than to worry about its far western 

province. Such a window of opportunity may be what Karakalpak 

nationalists are waiting for. 

The Karakalpak issue must be described as latent, but it should 

not be dismissed. If some kind of stasis or slight improvement is 

achieved, the likelihood of the Karakalpaks breeding a VNSA in the 

near future is unlikely. Should any of several triggering events 

develop—VNSA uprisings elsewhere, conditions getting 

comparatively worse, or a charismatic leader emerging—this 

dormant issue has the foundation to incubate violent groups with the 

goal of independence from Uzbekistan.

Eco-Warriors 

There is no tradition in Central Asia of violent environmental 

organizations such as the Earth Liberation Front or Earth First! 

Indeed, although environmental degradation in the region is 

pervasive and substantial, no concomitant environmental 

consciousness, such as that compared to western societies, yet 

exists. A moment that solidified this perception came when the 

authors handed out sticks of gum to some small Turkmen 
107

children—perhaps 3 years old—on a private bus between Mary and 

Ashgabat. After unwrapping the gum, without thought or prodding 

from their parents, the young children tossed the wrappers out the 

half-open window, as naturally as if it was what they were taught to 

do from the moment they were cognizant of the concept of disposal. 

Having thus caveated the discussion, the possibility of future 

VNSAs emerging from the environmental turmoil is real. Since 

independence, environmental awareness is on the rise for a variety 

of reasons. Educated individuals (particularly university professors) 

are beginning to speak out on the issue. The large increase in 

NGOs working in Central Asia has increased both local and world 

awareness of the catastrophes in the region. With the exception of 

Turkmenistan, “home-grown” NGOs, many of them based on 

environmental awareness, have sprung up since 1994. Websites, 

newsletters, conferences, and grassroots projects all mark the arrival 

of this new voice of civil society. 

Supporting the assessment that an eco-warrior VNSA could 

emerge is the Nevada-Semey Movement. Founded in 1989 by 

Olzhas Suleymenov, a Kazakh poet and politician, the Movement’s 

original goal was to stop nuclear testing at the Polygon, located in 

northeastern Kazakhstan, and the largest such testing facility in the 

world. After two particularly massive tests that created huge shock 

waves and a radioactive plume over much of northern Kazakhstan, 

Suleymenov organized a grassroots campaign that collected over 

one million Kazakh signatures demanding an end to the testing. 

Eight months later, the Kazakhstan Communist Party called for 

closure of the Polygon, and no additional tests occurred. After 

Kazakh independence in 1991, the Polygon was permanently 

closed.200 Such a massive demonstration of discontent with 
108

government policies empirically suggests that Central Asians will 

take action based on environmental concerns. 

This history, coupled with the rapidly expanding awareness of 

environmental issues, provides grounds for VNSA creation in two 

ways. First, eco-warriors may actually develop indigenously—

albeit for resource scarcity issues, rather than for the aim of simply 

protecting the environment. For example in 1992 and 1993, due to 

the severe water shortages, Uzbeks and Turkmen communities near 

Dashoguz sent raiding parties across the common Amu Darya in 

order to destroy the other community’s pumping stations and 

canals.201 How soon such similar activity will re-occur due to the 

present drought is unknown. A more troubling question is how long 

until organized groups, who would not directly benefit from such 

destructive activity, begin using violence to oppose government or 

social group activity based on their own singular environmental 

concerns. 

A second incubation route for environmentally-based VNSAs 

involves external factors such as outside actors, possibly diasporas, 

attempting to influence events. An example of such a potential 

VNSA is an organization calling itself Eastern Turkestan. This 

organization claims that a large swath of western China, roughly 

encompassing the Xinjiang province and parts of Tibet, were 

illegally invaded by the Chinese Army, and is now illegally 

occupied. Its goals include secession from China and creation of an 

independent Eastern Turkestan. This organization began beating 

the environmental drum in 1993 in response to Chinese nuclear 

testing at Lop Nur. Its on-line newsletter reported a large protest at 

the Chinese embassy in Almaty, Kazakhstan, was in response for 

support of the victims in Eastern Turkestan.202 Perhaps more 
109

ominously, the World Tibet Network described in detail the 

ecological disaster and the health impacts on the citizens of Eastern 

Turkestan due to Chinese testing at Lop Nur. The press release 

ended with the following suggestive statement: “The peaceful 

demonstrations of the peoples of Eastern Turkestan living at home 

and abroad demanding the closure of the nuclear 

testing site have so far achieved no results.” (emphasis added)203 

The point here is that a group with political aspirations may turn to 

environmental issues to find resonance within its local populace, its 

Diasporas, and possible sympathetic environmental organizations 

outside the region. 

In a similar vein, it is also possible Western militant 

environmental and/or anti-globalization groups could infiltrate the 

region and organize violent attacks or protests against various 

symbols of environmental abuse. While unlikely, perusing many 

websites published by these groups results in stories such as the US 

government secretly developing a killer fungus in state laboratories 

in Uzbekistan in an attempt to destroy the poppy fields in the 

region.204 As these groups of protesters have illustrated a 

remarkable mobility and global presence, it is possible such groups 

could organize violent activities even in the tightly controlled 

republics of Central Asia. The US military seems to be taking the 

potential of emerging eco-warriors/terrorists seriously as well. US 

Central Command, in cooperation with the Woodrow Wilson 

Center’s Environmental Change and Security Project, listed 

environmental security issues to be watched in Central Asia. The 

emergence of eco-terrorists was one of the seven items listed.205
110

Closing Shots 

Several common threads emerge from our VNSA analysis. 

First, membership principally consists of young people drawn from 

the at-risk population. As the roots of violence become more acute, 

the ranks of ripe recruits will grow and loyalties will increasingly 

shift away from the state. And initial recruitment in most VNSA is 

along clan and tribal lines, which seem to persist over time. 

Second, collective violence is most prevalent among those groups 

that are the target of government crackdowns and/or exist on the 

hinterlands of state control. A related, necessary transformation 

ingredient is the presence of identity entrepreneurs and 

organizational access to resources. Infamous yet skilled men like 

Khudoiberidyev or Namangani lead the most successful groups. 

Access to financial resources, principally through illegal activities, 

is the glue that binds. Religion or shared ethnicity may be an 

important aspect of group identity and objectives, but money keeps 

mercenaries and drug traffickers coming back. Sugar daddies, like 

Saudi Arabia or bin Laden, are also essential to sustained levels of 

activity. 

Third, regional VNSAs break the Trinitarian mold. They 

operate on the margins of the political system and do always seek 

political goals. Militant religious movements do seek the creation 

of an Islamic republic, and Karakalpaks may pursue selfdetermination. On the other hand, regional governments will likely 

argue with some degree of credibility that religion and ethnicity 

may be convenient facades for less noble objectives. Warlords and 

TCOs are the real predators, pursuing wealth and localized power 

often for its own sake. All of these groups take advantage of 
111

globalization, capitalizing on global commodity markets and the 

easy anonymity of international money and information transfers. 

Fourth, the asymmetric application of violence reigns. Violent 

crime, terrorism, guerrilla operations, and even conventional attacks 

are all employed, often simultaneously. Robust weapons 

smuggling, fed mostly by monies from the illegal trade in drugs, 

enables VNSAs to pose a real, immediate challenge to the thin 

conventional forces of regional states. To date, force application 

has been concentrated in the Ferghana Valley and Tajikistan; 

however, the threat of violence is spreading like a cancer. It is not 

uncommon to hear residents as far north as Almaty, Kazakhstan, 

express concerns about the Wahabis of Afghanistan. 

The full-range of VNSA types and tactics have the potential to 

emerge in Central Asia. In many cases, such as the IMU, the nonstate actor is engaged in violent activity and warrants the label. In 

other cases like the Uighars of Kyrgyzstan, an organization exists 

and is actively pursuing its goals, but has yet to embrace the use of 

physical force. Some non-state actors, including the Tajiks of 

Samarkand and the residents of Khiva, already assign loyalty to a 

non-state identity, but city-state groups have yet to organize. In 

addition to recognizing the spectrum of identity-based awareness 

and activity, our analysis appreciates the overlap of VNSA tactics 

and types. The IMU, for example, is a militant religious movement 

engaged in transnational criminal activity that relies on violent 

crime, guerrilla operations, and terrorism to further its agenda. As 

in the popular Uzbek video, the morning sun breaks along the Silk 

Route, wakening us to a potential host of nonconforming threats. 

VIOLENT FUTURE 

Almaty Dispatch: Muscular, snow-capped peaks of the 

Zailiysky Alatau Range frame the former capital of Kazakhstan. 
112

Thick green blankets of trees shroud the wide boulevards and mask 

the graying Soviet architecture. As day turns to night, streets 

darken and a new breed of citizen emerges. In a rougher version of 

American Graffiti, teenagers with bottles of vodka in hand recline 

on old Chevys under the only street lamp. Shouting precedes a 

scuffle that urges us to quicken the pace. Turning the corner, 

several too-young women huddle outside an old apartment building 

while a gray-haired, slovenly man limps back and forth between 

bars seeking customers for their flesh. Nearing the hotel, a police 

car stops abruptly in our path. Almaty is different than Bishkek, 

Kyrgyzstan, where we experienced shakedowns by local thugs 

posing as cops in broad daylight. In Almaty, real police wait until 

darkness descends before engaging in extortion. With wallets and 

passports secure, we enter the lobby for our last night along the Silk 

Route. 

At the most fundamental level, we have been telling a story; 

creating a credible narrative that links the desperation of individuals 

like the teenagers and prostitutes of Almaty with the prosperity of 

violent groups. To this end, we premier an open systems analytical 

framework that provides explanatory and possibly predicative 

insight to the relationships most likely to foster an environment in 

which ripe populations are mobilized into VNSAs. We contend that 

the most salient underlying causes are at the sub-state level: 

resource scarcity, demographic pressures, socio-economic 

deprivation, and organized crime and corruption. Rather than 

applying these roots of violence to conflict between states, we adapt 

them for explanatory purposes to understanding collective violence 

by non-state actors. They are sub-national and often transnational 

forces impacting individuals in a manner that leads to increasing 

cynicism, desperation, and even anger. 

But this is only the beginning of our story. The dispossessed 

along the Silk Route will remain isolated in their anger until they 

are mobilized. The transformation is a function of state failure and 

identity mobilization. The state fails them when it is unable to 
113

provide very basic services like education and employment. The 

state also fails when it responds to their hostility with excessive 

coercive force. Should the state prove capable of meeting 

fundamental needs, we expect the prospects for VNSA formation to 

diminish significantly. 

State failure is still insufficient without existing identity 

cleavages. That is, there must be some pre-existent identity groups 

to absorb the wandering loyalty and respond to the needs of the 

individual. These cleavages are generally quite shallow until 

exacerbated by a charismatic leader, or identity entrepreneur, who 

also has the resources to establish and sustain an organization. This 

approach rejects primordial views of identity espoused by global 

chaos theorists, which see identity cleavages as the underlying 

source of conflict. Rather, we embrace an ascriptive view of 

identity, which asserts that it is more often the tool of nationalists. 

It tends to characterize the violence when a charismatic leader 

successfully changes minor differences into major ones.206 State 

failure and identity mobilization are thus the engines of change that 

spawn VNSAs. 

The persistence of conflicts involving groups like Al-Queda, 

Abu Sayyaf, and Somalia warlords suggests the need to understand 

VNSAs and appreciate their sophistication. Their organizational 

structure, recruiting strategies, financial methods, and 

unconventional operations are at odds with the Western approach to 

conflict. As a result, basic socio-political constructs like war, 

coercion, and deterrence must be reevaluated. As the current war 

on terrorism unfolds, we are learning that war does not only involve 

nation-states employing lethal force to achieve political ends. The 

battlefield is once again an arena for a range of political entities, 
114

including VNSAs, that may be fighting for post-heroic, apolitical 

reasons. 

As mentioned in the introduction, our framework is in its initial 

offering. Future research by the authors and others should examine 

among other issues the internal relationships between the roots of 

violence, the specific nature of reinforcing actions, the impact of 

globalization on VNSA character and activities, and the short- and 

long-term implications of state coercion. Moreover, the predicative 

aspects of the framework can only be enhanced through the 

development of specific thresholds, or criteria, for the 

transformation of an at-risk population. With these long-term 

projects in mind, we close with prospects for future violence in 

Central Asia and policy considerations. 

Prospects 

Multiple significant trends intersect in Central Asia—

decolonization (from Soviet rule), religious revival, drug 

trafficking, weapons trading, globalization, and a general decline of 

state power all have a considerable imprint in the five Republics. 

Some of these trends are not new—drugs and weapons traveled the 

Silk Route hundreds of years ago. Other trends have no parallel in 

history, such as the way societies are being transformed through the 

forces of globalization. Furthermore, the introduction of US forces 

and the recently heightened cooperation between the Central Asian 

Republics and the US are both historic firsts. Unlike other parts of 

the world, which either benefit from these trends or at least can 

contain their ill effects, the Central Asia Republics are facing an 

increasingly difficult struggle to maintain their territorial 

sovereignty, stability, and indeed, even long-term existence. Do the 

political structures in Central Asia have the wherewithal to 
115

accommodate and coopt substate actors in the region? Our 

preliminary analysis with this nascent model suggests that in the 

short term, it is possible; however, the medium-term and long-term 

prognoses are not nearly as optimistic. 

In the short term, many potential VNSAs will be stymied by the 

twin actions of increased US aid to the various governments in the 

region and decreased support from abroad. For example, US and 

Northern Alliance successes in Afghanistan probably decimated the 

IMU; indeed, even as this paper was being edited, media reports 

suggest Juma Namangani was killed from wounds received in the 

battle for Mazar-i-Sharif.207 The collapse of the Taliban and 

weakening of the Al Qaeda network will certainly reduce training, 

resources, and inspiration to potential radical Islamic VNSAs 

throughout Central Asia, thus making their incubation less likely. 

Furthermore, world opinion, now solidly against terrorist groups of 

any sort, will act as a general damper for the sorts of activities that 

would incubate VNSAs, and states are more likely to provide 

necessary resources to deal with any potential uprisings.208 

The resulting dampening effects will give states the opportunity 

and time to increase their accommodation capacity or actually deal 

with root problems that have caused many substate actors to take 

the first steps towards becoming full-fledged VNSAs. The history 

of these states, however, suggests that instead of doing so, they will 

divert these resources towards strengthening their coercive 

capabilities, which in the short term will prevent VNSA incubation. 

Over the medium to long term, governments supporting the US 

effort in Afghanistan should expect to be targeted by those 

sympathetic to the Taliban and Al Qaeda’s cause. Disaffected 

groups opposed to Western influence will be easily mobilized 
116

against those supportive governments simply because of such 

cooperation. Former President Anwar Sadat provides a chilling 

example—he was assassinated for making peace with Israel. Will 

Uzbek President Islam Karimov share a similar fate at the hands of 

a surviving IMU cell five years from now? While we hesitate to 

make an assessment of future IMU military capabilities in this time 

of fluid military activities, we are confident the desire to conduct 

such an operation will persist. 

A variety of other factors becomes important when making 5-

10 year assessments. Population increases, water shortages, 

continued economic decay, deaths of elites (which is likely in the 

case of Turkmenistan’s president), and the resulting succession 

struggles all factor into VNSA mobilization. Of these previous 

factors, we view succession issues resulting from the deaths of the 

Republic’s presidents as the greatest possible trigger for an 

accelerated transformational process. None of the five Central 

Asian Republics has a well-developed system in place to provide 

for leadership succession or transfer of power; what laws that have 

been passed have all already been broken by the current presidents 

in order to maintain power. Leadership transition in these 

Republics will not just be a transfer of political power; it will be a 

transfer of economic power, due as much to corruption as it is to the 

secondary wealth effects of having political power. As such, the 

struggle for power will be quite bitter with potential VNSAs as 

players in the struggle. TCOs, for example, will have an obvious 

stake in who is president in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Ethnic 

groups will be especially wary of who will be the next president in 

Tajikistan. 
117

As our framework suggests, the structural problems will not by 

themselves cause a VNSA to emerge; rather, such conditions simply 

set the state for the possibility. Once potential identity 

entrepreneurs emerge, VNSA incubation becomes more likely. 

Who these identity entrepreneurs will be or where they will come 

from is an issue of great importance when applying this model to 

Central Asia. 

Policy 

Our framework also provides policy direction, with economic 

development as a central issue. Economic development in Central 

Asia obviously is important—with VNSAs (especially smuggling 

and organized crime organizations) offering employment to 

disaffected youth who have no other income alternatives, it is 

imperative that economic alternatives be created. With a “youth 

bulge” just approaching employment age, hundreds of thousands of 

jobs are needed. Policy should be focused on programs that 

encourage job growth, equality of economic opportunity, and a 

merit-based economy vice cronyism or nepotism. 

Along these lines, the obvious bright spot for Central Asia is oil 

and natural gas exploration and exploitation. This can be a doubleedged sword, as the case of oil exploration and development in 

Nigeria suggests. Due to the government of Nigeria’s neglect and 

certain policy failures on the part of the oil MNCs in the region, 

Nigeria’s population lives on approximately a dollar a day, despite 

the several hundreds of billions of dollars of oil extracted.209 

Regardless of who is to blame for Nigeria’s economic state, the 

economic disparity that exists despite the oil exploitation has given 

rise to all levels of conflict—from petty theft to sabotaging 

pipelines and refineries, and to guerilla operations in the case of the 
118

Ogoni tribe. Such a situation—conflict between MNCs and local 

citizens—can not be allowed to develop in Central Asia; given that 

the political environment there is so conducive to violence, poverty 

in the face of billions of dollars of oil wealth will certainly be a 

rallying cry VNSAs can use to mobilize frustrated citizens. MNCs 

engaged in oil exploration together with the Central Asian 

governments must ensure development across the population—jobs 

must be provided, schools and roads must be built, the environment 

can not be destroyed, and the individual must not perceive to be a 

victim of foreign corporations, lest these be the seeds a VNSA later 

can harvest. 

Some precedent exists in Central Asia to suggest that economic 

development placates potentially restless groups. While the authors 

were unable to confirm this through independent sources, interviews 

with businesspersons in Uzbekistan reveal that the Republic of 

Korea built automobile plants in the Ferghana Valley to prevent the 

Korean diaspora there from returning to Korea—a policy that thus 

far seems successful. The point is this—citizens in the Central 

Asian Republics will be less prone to resort to extreme actions if 

they have legitimate economic opportunities. While in the case of 

the Korean diaspora, extreme action would be a mass exodus to the 

Republic of Korea, extreme action for young Muslims in Tajikistan 

might include taking up arms against the government—again. 

Education is an essential aspect of economic development. 

More specifically, the state must offer educational options other 

than mudrassahs. Educational opportunities in Central Asia are 

few. Many of the students with whom we spoke had some level of 

education abroad. However, the poignant issue here is that there are 

few educational opportunities available to young Central Asian 
119

citizens. Indeed, education seems to be in decline in the region, as 

illustrated by Turkmenbashi’s decision to reduce the number of 

mandatory years of education for Turkmen children.210 As another 

example, Islam Karimov recently stated the number of Uzbek 

college students studying in Turkey needed to be reduced and that 

Turkish colleges in Uzbekistan needed to be closed.211

Political reform is also essential. The number of outlets 

through which individuals can voice discontent must also be 

increased, while simultaneously increasing the number of access 

points to the government. As with providing economic alternatives 

to poor citizens, policies which aim at providing political 

alternatives to violence weaken the ability of VNSAs to recruit. 

Policies should encourage the continued growth of NGOs in Central 

Asia, while pushing for top-heavy central governments to allow 

legitimate local levels of government to grow both in size and 

responsibility/authority. Central Asian governments must realize 

such moves will make their governments much more pliable, and 

therefore much more survivable. 

Complementing political reform must be efforts to 

professionalize government bureaucracies. As repeatedly 

mentioned in this paper, each of the presidents of these Republics is 

simply the former Communist party chief prior to the break-up of 

the Soviet Union. There exists no tradition in democratic values, 

respect for human rights, the political necessity of an economic 

middle class, or a government responsive to its citizens. Islam 

Karimov’s recent decision to make himself “president for life,” 

coupled with Turkmenbashi’s similar decision last year, only points 

out how ossified and unresponsive these governments are 
120

becoming. A government that continues to feed its citizenry’s 

disillusionment will eventually become vulnerable. 

Reforms must also come in the law enforcement, judicial, and 

banking sectors. Citizens must believe their governments are 

essentially fair in economic and judicial realms—without citizens 

believing in those core functions, trust in government will not 

development. Without such trust, warlords will continue to triumph 

along the Silk Route. 

NOTES 

 

1

 NGO growth data from Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, 

World Politics: Trend and Transformation (Boston, MA: Bedford/St 

Martins, 2001), 174. 

2

 Ibid., 435. 

3

 Martin van Creveld provides a compelling examination of the 

Clausewitzian Trinity and its implications for our understanding of total 

war in The Transformation of War (New York, NY: The Free Press, 

1991), 35- 42. 

4

 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York, NY: 

McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1979), 73. 

5

 Ibid., 81. 

6

 Recounted in Ferghana Valley Working Group of the Center for 

Preventive Action, Sam Nunn, Barnett Rubin, and Nancy Lubin,

Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart 

of Central Asia (New York, NY: Century Foundation Press, 1999), 49-

51. 

7

 Michael T. Klare, “Redefining Security: The New Global Schisms,” 

Current History (November 1996): 353, highlights several of the 

leading “stresses” on human security. 8

 Lester R. Brown. “Redefining National Security.” Worldwatch Paper 

14 (Washington: Worldwatch Institute, October 1977), 37. 9

 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcity and Violent 

Conflict,” Scientific American (February 1993). 10 Ibid. 

11 “Water Shortage in Central Asia and Re-Routing of Siberian Rivers 

to Central Asia.” The Times of Central Asia, June 14, 2001, 1 12 G.E. Hollis, “The Falling Levels of the Caspian and Aral Seas,” The 

Geographical Journal 144, part 1 (1978): 77. 13 Dante A. Caponera, Principles of Water Law and Administration. 

National and International (Rotterdam: Brookfield, 1992), 85. 
121

 

14 Gregory Gleason, “Mixing Oil and Water: Central Asia’s Emerging 

Energy Market,” 27 August 2001, http://www.eurasianet.org/ 

departments/business/articles/eav082701.shtml. 15 BBC, as reported by the Central Asia/Caucuses Analyst, 

http://209.58.150.225/cacianalyst/August_2/newsbitesaug2.htm. As of 

14 September 2001. 

16 Stefan Klotzli, “The Water and Soil Crisis in Central Asia—A 

Source for Future Conflicts?” ENCOP Occasional Paper No. 11. Center 

for Security Policy and Conflict Research/ Swiss Peace Foundation. 

Zurich/Berne, May 1994. http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/fsk/encop/11/en11-

con.htm. 17 P. Raskin, E. Hansen, Z. Zhu, and M. Iwra, “Simulation of Water 

Supply and Demand in the Aral Sea Region,” Water International 17 

(1992): 56. 

18 Bea Hogan, “Decreased Water Flow Threatens Cotton Crop, Peace in 

Region, August 2, 2000, Eurasianet.org. http://www.eurasianet.org/ 

epartments/environment/articles/eav080200.shtml. 19 Peter Gleick, ed. Water in Crisis: A Guide to the World Fresh Water 

Resources (New York: Oxford, 1993), 127. 20 International Crisis Group, “Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia’s 

Localised Poverty and Social Unrest.” 

21 United Nations High Commission for Refugees, “The State of the 

World’s Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda,” 1997. http://www. 

unhcr.ch/refworld/pub/state/97/box1_2.htm. As of 14 September 2001. 22 This evolving view of demography and national security is explained 

by Brian Nichiporuk in The Security Dynamics of Demographic 

Factors (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 5-7. 23The available data is defined in terms of the nation-state. Given our 

focus on non-state actors, many of which are transnational, this data 

provides only partial insight to the dynamics working at the subnational level. Ibid., 3. 

24 From the International Population Database of the US Census Bureau 

at http://www.census.gov./. 25 The relationship between population growth and resource availability 

is examined in our section on Resource Scarcity and is based on 

research by Thomas-Homer Dixon. Among other articles, consider 

“Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict,” International Security

19:1 (Summer 1994): 5-40. 

26 “Displacement in the Commonwealth of Independent States,” UN 

High Commission on Refugees, 1996. http://www.unhcr.ch./pubs/ 

cis96/cis9603.htm. 27 Ibid., 19. 

28 Internally displaced persons are included in our concept of refugees. 29 “Displacement,” 1. 
122

 

30 Field Report, “New Splash of Migration of the Kyrgyz Population.” 

Analyst (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University, 4 

Jul 2001). http://www.cacianalyst.org/). 31 “Displacement,” 1. 

32 Ibid. 

33 Ibid. 

34 UNHCR, “Mid Year Report 2000.” http://www.unhcr.ch/. 35 Myron Weiner outlines these threats to include a fifth, refugees as 

potential hostages, in “Security, Stability and International Migration,” 

International Security 17:3 (Winter 1992/1993): 106-120. 36 Ibid., 115. 

37 Statement appears on the website of the Global Organized Crime 

Project for Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

www.csis.org/goc/. 38 Fenton Bresler, Interpol (London: Penguin, 1992). www.css.org. 

Referenced in Tara Kartha, “Organised Crime and the Illegal Market in 

Weapons in Southern Asia,” Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of 

the IDSA XXIV:2 (May 2000). www.cc.columbia.edu/sec. 39 With the exception of the drug trade, reliable statistics for 

transnational criminal activities are not available. The United Nations 

is pursuing the development of such a database through its Crime 

Prevention Program at www.undcp.org/organized_crime.html. 40 Tamara Makarenko, “Patterns of Crime in the Caspian Basin,” 

Jane’s Intelligence Review 13:4 (April 1, 2001). LEXIS-NEXIS 

database. 

41 The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 

defines sex trafficking as the inducement of a commercial sex act by 

“force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform 

such act has not attained 18 years of age.” US Department of State, 

Trafficking in Persons Report 2001, 2. 42 Amy O’Neill Richard, “International Trafficking in Women to the 

United States: A Contemporary Manifestation of Slavery and 

Organized Crime,” DCI Exceptionally Intelligence Program: An 

Intelligence Monograph (Center for the Study of Intelligence, April 

2000), 3. 

43 Field Report by Faniya Mussayeva, South Kazakhstan State 

University, for The Analyst, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns 

Hopkins University, 18 Jul 2001. www.cacianalyst.org. 44 Chris Smith. “Light Weapons Proliferation: A Global Survey,” Janes 

Intelligence Review 11:7 (July 1, 1999). Lexis-Nexis. 45 Martha Brill Olcott and Natalia Udalova, “Drug Trafficking on the 

Great Silk Road: The Security Environment in Central Asia,” Working 

Paper for the Russian and Eurasian Program, Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace (March 2000, No. 11), 23. 
123

 

46 For excellent audio report on the biological threat originating from 

Ostrov Vozrozhdeniya, listen to the National Public Radio report by 

Aileen Garres, All Things Considered, 27 Sep 2001 at www.npr.org/ 

ramfiles/atc/20010927.atc.05.ram. 47 As put forth by the World Bank’s General Counsel, Ibrahim Shihata, 

“in all cases, a position of trust is being exploited to realize private 

gains beyond what the position holder is entitled to.” The World Bank 

Group, “Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World 

Bank.” www.worldbank.org/html/extder/corruptn. 48 Ibid. 

49From “Chapter 1: The Challenge of Renovation,” in the TI Source 

Book 2000, Transparency International. www.transparency.org/ 

sourcebook/01.html. 

50 2001 Corruption Perceptions Index at www.transparency.org/ 

documents/cpi/2001/cpi2001.html#cpi. 51 Restrictions of polling prohibited polling in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan 

and Turkmenistan. 

52 Freedom House, “Uzbekistan,” Nations in Transit 2001. 

www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm. 53 Freedom House, “Turkmenistan.” Ibid. 

54 Interviews with Peace Corps volunteers in Bishkek and Karakol, 

Kyrgyzstan, 19 and 20 June 2001. 

55 Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Organizations and 

International Security,” Survival 36:1 (Spring 1994). Appears in In 

Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, 316. 56 This view is not only intuitive, but supported by research of the US 

Agency for International Development in the USAID Handbook for 

Fighting Corruption, 1998, 7. www.usaid.gov/democracy/ 

anticorruption/ resources.html

57 Williams, “Transnational,” 320. 

58 Data is from the United National International Drug Control Program 

and is provided in Olcott and Udalova, “Drug Trafficking,” 4. 

59 Ibid., 12. 

60 Ibid., 12. 

61 Ibid., 10. 

62 Ibid., 10. 

63 The World Bank Group, “Helping Countries Combat Corruption: 

The Role of the World Bank.” www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/ 

corruptn/cor02.htm. 64 Tedd Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 1970), 36 

65 Charles Tilly effectively outlines and critiques the dominant theories 

during the Cold War in From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: 

Random House, 1978), 12-51. 
124

 

66 Donald M. Snow, Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New 

Internal Conflicts (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 55. 67 Ibid. 

68 The Human Development Report for 2001 can be found at 

www.undp.org/hdr2001. 69 Ibid. 

70 The 1999 gross enrollment ratios (combined primary, secondary and 

tertiary gross enrollment) are preliminary estimates from UN 

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations based on the 1998 

revision of population estimates and projections. Gross enrollment 

ratios are calculated by dividing the number of children reenrolled in 

each level of schooling by the number of children in the age group 

corresponding to that level. They are affected by the age and sexspecific population estimates published by the UN and by the timing 

and methods of surveys by administrative registries, of population 

census and of national education surveys. 

71 World Bank Group, “Understanding Poverty” at 

www.worldbank.org/poverty/mission/up1.htm. 72 World Bank Group, “Measuring Poverty” at 

www.worldbank.org/poverty/mission/up2.htm

73 Ferghana Valley Working Group, Calming the Ferghana Valley, 62. 74 Remarks by Dr Fiona Hill during an Open Forum by the Open 

Society Institute on June 11, 2001. Recap of forum available at 

www.eurasianet.org. 75 Ferghana Valley Working Group, Calming the Ferghana Valley, 66. 76 Ibid., 73. 

77 Field Report by Konstantin Parshin, “The Cost of Education in 

Tajikistan,” Analyst (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins 

University, 14 February 2001). http://www.cacianalyst.org/. 78 Thomas S. Szayna, ed. Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict: 

Application of a Process Model (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 

33. 

79 Snow, Uncivil Wars, 35. 80 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global 

Era (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 113. 81 Frederick Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social 

Organization of Culture Difference, (Boston: Little, Brown, Sept 

1969), 10-11, 14. 

82 As quoted by Igor Torbakov, “Tajik-Uzbek Relations: Divergent 

National Historiographies Threaten To Aggravate Tensions,” 12 June 

2001. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/culture/articles/ 

eav061201.shtml. 83 Ibid. 

84 Ibid. 
125

 

85 Jennifer Balfour, “Many Families Fear for Sons’ Safety in Uzbek 

Military,” 15 Jun 2001. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/ 

articles/eav061501.shtml. 86 William Fierman, “Language and Identity in Kazakhstan: 

Formulations in Policy Documents 1987-1997,” Communist and PostCommunist Studies 31:2 (1998): 171-186. 87 Olga Oliker, Thomas Szayna, Sergej Mahnovski, “Potential Sources 

of Conflict in the Caspian Region,” RAND Arroyo Center, March 

2001, 65. 

88 United Nations High Commission for Refugees, “Displacement 

within the Commonwealth of Independent States,” May, 1996. 

http://www.unhcr.ch/pubs/cis96/cis9603.htm. 89 Oliker, “Potential Sources,” 56 

90 The Dorling Kindersley World Reference Atlas (London: Dorling 

Kindersley, 1994), 550. 

91 Interview, Otajon, Tour guide, June 2001. 

92 Edward Schatz, “The Politics of Multiple Identities: Lineage and 

Ethnicity in Kazakhstan,” Europe-Asia Studies (2000): 489-506. 93 Martha Brill Olcott, “Central Asia’s Security Issues,” Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace. Paper presented April 10, 2001 

for the Spring 2001 meetings of the Schlesinger Working Group on 

Strategic Surprises, an initiative of the Institute for the Study of 

Diplomacy of Georgetown University, 3. 

94 Erin Finnerty, “Poverty a Crucial Element Leading to Tension and 

Violence in Central Asia—Experts,” 12 June 2001. 

http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/recaps/articles/eav061201.shtml

As of 16 Sept 2001.

95 Alec Applebaum, “Post-Soviet Experience Shows There Are No 

Easy Economic Solutions for Caucusus, Central Asia,” 20 August 

2001. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/ 

eav082001.shtml. As of 16 September 2001. 96 Ibid., 3 

97 Ibid. 

98 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 

Integrated Regional Information Network. http://www.reliefweb.int/ 

IRIN/asia/countrystories/tajikistan/20010130.phtml. As of 15 Sept 

2001. See also Environment, Development and Conflict, “Issues and 

Cases: Livelihoods Mitigating Conflict in Tajikistan.” http://www. 

padrigu.gu.se/EDCNews/Research/TajikistanLivelihoods.html As of 

16 September 2001. 

99 Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights Development: Tajikistan.” 

http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/europe/tajikistan.html. As of 16 September 

2001. 

100 Lonely Planet, Central Asia 2nd Edition (Melbourne, Australia: 

Lonely Planet Publication, April 2000), 429. 
126

 

101 Martha Olcutt, “Revisiting the Twelve Myths of Central Asia.” 

Paper prepared under the auspices of the UN Development Program. 

Presented at the Open Society Institute for Kazakhstan, Almaty, March 

2001. Available on-line at http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/ 

wp23.asp . 102 Olcott, 5. 103 Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims of the 

Soviet Empire (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), 14. 104 Alexandre Bennigsen, “Islam in Retrospect,” Central Asian Survey

8 (1989): 89-91. 

105 William Fierman, Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation

(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 193. 

106 Troy Thomas provides a thorough examination of the Central Asia 

umma at the time of independence in “The Central Asian Umma: 

Composition and Prospect,” 4 May 1992. Available from the author. 

107 Ahmed Rashid, “Clout of the Clergy,” Far Eastern Economic 

Review, 9 Janurary 1992, 18 108 Anthony Hyman, “Suddenly, everyone’s interested,” The Middle 

East, February 1992, 14 109 Alexi Mashenko, Martha Brill Olcott, eds., Multidimensional 

Borders of Asia (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 

2000). Summary available on-line at http://pubs.carnegie.ru/english/ 

books/default.asp?n=ethnicity. 110 Barbara Ballis Lal, “Identity Entrepreneurs: Do We Want Them? 

Do We Need Them?” Unpublished manuscript. As used by Szayna, 

45 

111 Szayna, 48-50. 112 Ibid., 132. 113 James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of 

Change and Continuity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

1990), 125. 

114 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: 

Random House, 1978), 55. See also Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). 115 Our definition of non-state actors draws heavily on Rosenau’s 

concept of a “sub-group.” See Turbulence, 133 116 Rosenau argues that globalization has made it increasingly difficult 

for the state to solve society’s problems, contributing to the rise of subgroups to manage socio-economic, and even political issues. Ibid., 131. 

117 Peter Paret, “Clausewitz” in Makers of Modern Strategy: from 

Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 1986), 198-207. 

118 Martin van Crevald offers a comprehensive explanation of nontrinitarian war in The Transformation of War (New York: The Free 

Press, 1991), 49-57. 
127

 

119 Adapted from Why Men Rebel, 11. 120 Not included in our forms of violence typology is turmoil, which is 

“relatively spontaneous, unorganized political violence with substantial 

popular participation, including violent political strikes, riots, political 

clashes and localized rebellions.” Ibid., 11. 

121 These distinctions are fleshed out in greater detail by Bruce 

Hoffman in Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 

1998), 41-44. 

122 Ibid., 41. 123 Ibid., 43. Donald J. Hanle also provides a useful discussion of 

terrorism as a form of war in Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare

(Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989), 105-119. 

124 John Mackinlay, “Defining Warlords.” Published in Monograph 46, 

Building Stability in Africa: Challenges for the New Millennium,

February 2000. Available at www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/

No46/Defining.html. p. 1. 125 Mackinlay goes on to assert that the warlord is a “wholly negative 

phenomenon. There is, so far, no mitigating Robin Hood tendency 

which might show him to be a redresser of global inequality,” 9. 

126 For a complete accounting of Colonel Khudoiberdiyev’s story, see 

“The Gray Area of Private Armies” in Strategic Assessment of Central 

Eurasia by Charles Fairbanks, C. Richard Nelson, S. Frederick Starr 

and Kenneth Weisbrode (The Atlantic Council. Central Asia-Caucasus 

Institute, SAIS, January 2001), 48-49. 

127 Ibid., 49. 128 Tim Judah, “Afghan Boy Takes on Taliban,” IWPR's Reporting 

Central Asia, No. 78, 25 October 2001. 129 Mackinlay, “Defining Warlords,” 7. 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid. 132 Alexi Igushev, “Hostage-taking and Unrest in Eastern Tajikistan,” 

Field Reports, Analyst (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins 

University, 4 Jul 2001). http://www.cacianalyst.org/. 133 Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 

“Tajikistan: Is Peace at Hand?” Briefing Paper (Central Asia-Caucasus 

Institute, Johns Hopkins University). www.sais-jhu.edu/caci/

Publications/Tajikistan.htm. 134 Remarks by the Kyrgyzstan Ambassador to the US, Bakyt 

Abdrisaev on 15 March 2000 as part of a forum on “Drugs: A Threat 

to Central Asian Security,” sponsored by the Central Asia-Caucasus 

Institute, Johns Hopkins University. 

135 Fenton Bresler, Interpol (London: Penguin, 1992). www.css.org. 

Referenced in Tara Kartha, “Organized Crime and the Illegal Market in 

Weapons in Southern Asia,” Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of 

the IDSA XXIV:2 (May 2000). www.cc.columbia.edu/sec. 
128

 

136 Williams, “Transnational Criminal Organizations,” 321. 137 Olcott and Udalova, “Drug Trafficking,” 18. 138 See Williams for a more complete discussion, 316-320. 139 Adapted from Kartha, “Organized Crime.” 140 Ibid. 141 Phil Williams adapts the idea of “zones of peace” and “zones of 

turbulence” to this relationship, 336. 

142 Ibid., 331. 143 A useful examination of strategic alliances, particularly for narcotraffickers can be found in “Terrorism, Crime and Weapons 

Proliferation” by Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi in their text 

International Relations and World Politics: Security, Economy and 

Identity (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997), 173-178. 144 Olcott and Udalova, “Drug Trafficking,” 8. 145 Tamara Makarenko, “Terrorism and religion mask drug trafficking 

in Central Asia,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 12:11 (1 November 2000). 

LEXIS-NEXIS Database. 

146 Olcott and Udalova, “Drug Trafficking,” 13. 147 Ibid., 12. 148 Ibid., 18. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid. 151 Williams, “Transnational Criminal Organizations,” 329. 152 Ferghana Valley Working Group, Calming the Ferghana Valley, 72 153 Reported by Olcott and Udalova, “Drug Trafficking,” 18. 154 Williams, “Transnational Criminal Organizations,” 329. 155 In 1998, Kyrgyzstan reported 3,295 drug-related crimes and 

Kazakhstan 18,479 drug-related crimes (702 and 1,193 crimes per 

million people respectively) as compared to about 1,261 per million in 

Russia for 1997. Olcott and Udalova, “Drug Trafficking,” 17. 156 Rates are roughly equivalent to the US and higher than Europe. 

Kazakhstan has the highest rate with 12.3 addicts per thousand in 1998. 

Ibid., 15. 

157 For a solid analysis of the role of Islam in political life during the 

early 1990s, see “The Central Asian Umma: Composition and 

Prospects” by the author, Troy Thomas. Available on request. 158 Bennigsen, “Islam in Retrospect,” 101. 159 Mehrdad Haghayeghi, Islam and Politics in Central Asia (New 

York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 89-90. 

160 The exception is the IRP of Tajikistan, which moved in and out of 

government and conflict during Tajikistan’s civil wars. For a complete 

description of the IRP’s role, see Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of 

Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism (Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford 

University Press, 1994), 159-186. 
129

 

161 Poonam Mann, “Fighting Terrorism: India and Central Asia,” 

Strategic Analysis XXVI:11 (February 2001). Available on line at 

wwwc.columbia.edu. 162 Ferghana Valley Working Group, Calming the Ferghana Valley, 

102. 

163 Ibid. 164 We use the worlds violent, militant, extreme and radical 

interchangeably to represent the willing use of force to coerce and 

attack those that do not share their outlook and agenda. The term 

“Islamist” refers to Muslims who embrace a political program for the 

state. 

165 Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and William J. Olson, Ethnic and Religious 

Conflict: Emerging Threat to US Security (Washington, DC: National 

Strategy Information Center, 1994). Overviewed Charles W. Kegley, 

Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trends and 

Transformation (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2001), 220. 166 This term is also used derogatively by governmental officials and 

others that consider the Wahabis a threat to stability. 

167See also Haghayeghi, Islam and Politics, 95. 168 Abdullah Yusuf Ali, trans. The Meaning of the Glorious Qur'an

(London: Nadim and Co, 1976), 248. 

169Maulana M. Ali, The Religion of Islam (Lahore, Pakistan: The 

Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha'at Islam, 1983), 540. 

170Ibid., 540-541. 171Mian R.A. Khan, Islamic Jurisprudence (Lahore, Pakistan: Sh. 

Mohammad Ashraf, 1978), 199. 

172 Quoted in Haghayeghi, Islam and Politics, 95 173 Rashid, The Resurgence, 92. 174 Haghayeghi, Islam and Politics, 94. 175 Rashid, The Resurgence, 78. 176 Poonam Mann, “Fighting,” 8. 177 Kenneth Katzman, “Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State 

Sponsors, 2001” (CRS Report for Congress, Library of Congress, 10 

September 2001), 16. 

178 Reported by Sultan Jumagulov and Kubat Otorbaev for the Institute 

for War and Peace Reporting in “Kyrgyz IMU Fears Mount,” 3 August 

2001. Available at www.iwpr.net. 179 Poonam Mann, “Fighting,” 8. 180 “Kyrgyzstan at Ten: Trouble in the ‘Island of Democracy,’” ICG 

Asia Report No. 22, 28 August 2001. http://www.crisisweb.org. 181 Ibid., 1-2. See also Sergei Duyanov, “Kazakh NGOs Squeezed 

Out,” 15 September 2000. 
130

 

182 Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First 

Century: Threats to Security, Conditions of Stability and Guarantees 

for Progress (1997), 70. 183 Igor Grebenshchikov, “Kyrgyz Exploit Uighar Minority,” 27 April 

2001. http://www.iwpr.net/archive/rca/rca_200104_49_5_eng.txt 184 Mark Burles, Chinese Policy Toward Russia and the Central Asian 

Republics (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 8-9. 185 Ruth Ingram, “Uighars Defy Beijing,” 19 July 2001. 

http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca/rca_200107_61_4_eng.txt 186 Dimitry Balburov, “China’s Wild West,” World Press Review,

August 1997. As quoted by Burles, 1999. 

187 Anthony Davis, “Xinjiang Learns to Live with Resurgent Islam,” 

Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 1996. 188 “A Bomb in Beijing,” The Economist, 15 March 1997, 37-38. See 

also “Xinjiang Conference on Separatism, Religious Activities,” 

Xinjian Ribao, Urumqi, 7 May 1996, 74. Appearing in Foreign 

Broadcast Information Service—China, 22 May 1996. 

189 Ingram. 190 Aidar Kaliev, “Almaty Fears Uighar Militants,” 10 November 2000. 

http://www.iwpr.net/archive/rca/rca_200011_29_2_eng.txt 191 Grebenshchikov. 192 Ingram. 193 Burles, 18. 194 Ibid. 195 “History of Karakalpakstan” Karakalpakstan Online. 

http://karakalpakstan.freenet.uz/English/English%20HC/English%20Hi

story.htm. 196Sascha Gabzion, ed., Sustainable Water for Karakalpakstan, WECF, 

Utrecht, November 1998. Author: Dr. Oral Ataniyazova. Full report 

available from: WECF, PO Box 12111, NL-3501 AC Utrecht, The 

Netherlands, e-mail: wecf@antenna.nl. Selected statistics available at 

http://karakalpakstan.freenet.uz/English/English%20HE/English%20He

alth%20Problems.htm. 197 Ibid. 198 Thomas Sazyna, Interview, 27 September 2001. 199 Vladimiar Davlatov, “Drought Devastates Region,” 22 September 

2000. http://www.iwpr.net/archive/rca/rca_200009_22_1_eng.txt 200 Lonely Planet, “Kazakhstan,” Central Asia, 1999, 173-4. 201 Adrian Hyde-Price, “Eurasia,” Resource Politics, Freshwater and 

Regional Relations (Philadelphia: Buckingham Publishers, 1993), 166. 

As referenced by Klotzli, “The Water and Soil Crisis in Central Asia,” 

previously cited. 

202 Eastern Turkestan Information Bulletin 3:5 (October 1993) 

http://www.caccp.org/et/etib3_5.html. 
131

 

203 World Tibet Network News, 8 October 1994. http://www.tibet.ca/

wtnarchive/1994/10/8_1.html. 204 “Are We Having Fungus Yet?” Earth Island Journal, Fall 1998. 

http://www.earthisland.org/eijournal/fall98/departments/ecoMole.html. 205 Woodrow Wilson Center, “Current Events Archive.” 

http://ecsp.si.edu/archive/central_command.htm. 206 For an excellent application of the ascriptive approach, see Michael 

Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War in the Modern Conscience

(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1997). 

207 “Northern Alliance Captures Konduz,” CNN On-Line. Alessio 

Vinci, Satinder Bindra. http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/

asiapcf/central/11/26/ret.afghan.konduz.0332/index.html. As of 27 

November 2001. 

208 “New US Aid for Central Asia, Russia,” Los Angeles Times, 7 

October 2001. Available on-line at http://www.latimes.com/

business/la-000080003oct07.column?coll=la-headlines-business. As of 

27 November 2001. 

209 “Nigeria’s Oil Wealth Shuns the Needy,” British Broadcasting 

Corporation, 28 Dec 2001. Available On-line at http://news.bbc.co.uk/

hi/english/business/newsid_1732000/1732196.stm. As of 27 January 

2002. 

210 Interview, USDAT, June 2000. 211 Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan news summaries. Available on-line at 

http://uzland.narod.ru/2000/10_21.htm, As of 27 January 2002. 
132