COURT OF APPEAL S OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judg es Elder, Bray and Senior Judge Baker Argued at Rich mond, Virginia

PAULUS THENDOLL OWENS MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1060-98-2 JUDGE RICHAR D S. BRAY MAY 4, 1999 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF HENRICO COUNTY George F. Ti dey, Judge William T. Linka (Boa twright & Li nka, on brief), for appellant. H. Elizabeth Sh affer, Assist ant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. Paulus Thendoll Ow ens (defendant) was convicted by the trial court for operat ing a motor vehi cle after being adjudged an habitual offender, a vi olation of Code § 46.2 -357(B). On appeal, defendant chal lenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove actual notice of the adjudication. We disagree and affirm his conviction. The parties ar e fully conversa nt with the re cord, and this memorandum opinion re cites only those fa cts necess ary to a disposition of the appeal.“On appeal, ‘we re view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Comm onwealth, granti ng to it al l reasonable inferences fairly dedu cible theref rom.’” Archer v. Commonwealth , 26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 83 1 (1997) (citat ion omitted). The credibility of the witnesses, the weig ht accorded testimony, and the inferenc es to be drawn from proven facts are ma tters to be determined by th e fact finder. See Long v. Co mmonwealth , 8 Va. App. 194, 199, 379 S. E.2d 473, 476 (1989). The ju dgment of the trial court will not be set aside unless plainly wrong or without support in the evidence. See Code § 8.01-680. On October 1, 1997 , State Troope r J.L. Bradford observed defendant speedi ng and “pulled [him] ov er.” When Bradford inquired “about his license,” defendant initially acknowledged “that he doesn’t [sic ] have his license,” but denied that his privileges were “suspended.” De fendant then “cha nged his mind” and confessed th at he “was suspen ded,” adding that he “didn’t know he was a habitual offe nder.” Follow ing further inve stigation by Bradford, defe ndant was arrested for driving whil e intoxicated and after having been de clared an habi tual offender , the instant offense. At trial, the Co mmonwealth introduc ed a certified DMV “Transcript of [defenda nt’s] Driver History, ” which refl ected an habitual offender adju dication by th e Richmond Gene ral District Court on September 3, 1996, together with the attend ant show cause and final orders. The adjudication order recited that defendant

- 2 -had failed to appear at the hear ing, despite pers onal service of the show cause order on May 2, 1996. The documentary evidence further establis hed that an “appea l [was] noted” of the order, but “not perfected,” and a “copy [of the order had been ] mailed to [defendant]” on October 3, 1996. Neve rtheless, re lying upon Reed v. Commonwealth , 15 Va. App. 467, 424 S. E.2d 718 (1992), defendant contends that such evid ence failed to establ ish actual notice of the adjudicati on, a proof indisp ensable to the in stant conviction. Code § 46.2-357(B) punishes “any person found to be an habitual offender . . ., who is thereafter convicted of driving a motor vehicle . . . wh ile the revoca tion determin ation is in effect.” Howe ver, “Code § 46.2-3 55 . . . requires that the person receive actual noti ce of having been declared an ha bitual offender and directed not to drive before he ca n be convicted and imprisoned for driving after having been de clared an habitual offender.” Reed , 15 Va. App. at 471, 424 S.E.2d at 72 0-21. Thus, the Commonwealth must prove actual notice of an habitual offender adjudication to support a conv iction for viol ation of Code § 46.2-357. See id. at 471-72, 424 S. E.2d at 720-21. Here, the record clearly reflec ts that an ap peal was noted from the adjudication order. “An ap peal [from a ge neral district court judgment] ma y be noted by a party or by the attorney for such party.” Rule 7A:13; see also Code § 16.1-106. “In the absence of clear eviden ce to the cont rary, courts may presume that public officers have pr operly discharged thei r official duties.”

- 3 -Robertson v. Commonwealth , 12 Va. App. 854, 856-57, 40 6 S.E.2d 417, 418 (1991) (citations om itted). “The attorney-client relationship presumes that attorney and cl ient, as servant and master, will communic ate about all th e important st ages of the client’s . . . trial.” Hunter v. Commonwealth , 15 Va. App. 717, 722, 427 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1993); see also Code § 8.01-314. Guided by these principl es, the record establishes that an appe al of the order was proper ly noted by defendant or his attorney in compliance with the Rules of Cour t, a circumstance sufficient to prove that defendant was actually cogniz ant of its import, directly or thro ugh counsel. Accordingly, we af firm the conviction. Affirmed.

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