COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bumgardner, Humphreys and Clements 

Argued at Salem, Virginia and by teleconference 

JERROD SHERRELL JACKSON, A/K/A 

 JEROME JACKSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0628-02-3 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS 

 JUNE 17, 2003 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG 

William W. Sweeney, Judge Designate 

 Andrew W. Childress, Assistant Public 

Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Paul C. Galanides, Assistant Attorney General 

(Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Jerrod Sherrell Jackson was convicted in a bench trial of 

assault and battery against a law enforcement officer, in 

violation of Code § 18.2-57(C), possession of cocaine with intent 

to distribute, in violation of Code § 18.2-248, and possession of 

marijuana, in violation of Code § 18.2-250.1.1 On appeal, Jackson 

contends the trial court erred (1) in denying his motion to 

suppress the evidence offered against him that was obtained by the 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

1

 Jackson was also convicted of assuming another name, in 

violation of Code § 18.2-504.1. He does not challenge this 

conviction on appeal. 
police in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and (2) in 

finding the evidence sufficient to prove he intended to distribute 

the cocaine in his possession. Finding no error, we affirm the 

convictions. 

 As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this 

case and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential 

value, this opinion recites only those facts and incidents of the 

proceedings as are necessary to the parties' understanding of the 

disposition of this appeal. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Under familiar principles of appellate review, we view the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly deducible from 

that evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

the party that prevailed below. See Dowden v. Commonwealth, 260 

Va. 459, 461, 536 S.E.2d 437, 438 (2000); Weathers v. 

Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 652, 656, 529 S.E.2d 847, 849 (2000). 

 So viewed, the evidence presented in this case establishes 

that, at approximately 11:50 p.m. on April 26, 2001, Lynchburg 

City Police Officer Tom Childress received a "LYN-COM" police 

dispatch alerting him to a report from Greenfield Security 

regarding the location of a man for whom there was an 

outstanding capias. LYN-COM confirmed that a capias for failure 

to appear at a criminal proceeding was outstanding for the 

person named by Greenfield Security. Childress testified he 

could not remember the name of the wanted man, but the 

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description he received from dispatch was of a black male, with 

a stocky build, wearing dark clothes and a black stocking cap, 

who had left the area served by Greenfield Security in the 

backseat of a green Allied taxi, identified as cab number 

eleven. According to dispatch, the taxi was "headed toward the 

area of 2202 Memorial Avenue." 

 Responding to the area where the taxi was reportedly 

headed, Officer Childress proceeded in his marked police car up 

Stuart Street toward the intersection of Memorial Avenue and 

Stuart Street. As he approached the intersection, Childress 

observed a green Allied taxi sitting under a streetlight at the 

intersection, approximately three houses away from 2202 Memorial 

Avenue. He saw two people in the taxi, the driver and a black 

male in the backseat. When the officer's headlights illuminated 

the taxi's interior, Childress saw that the passenger had a 

stocky build and was wearing dark clothing and a black stocking 

cap. Childress saw the passenger look in the direction of 2202 

Memorial Avenue, where two marked police cars were parked, and 

then look directly at Childress. At that point, the taxi 

proceeded down Stuart Street past Childress's vehicle and away 

from 2202 Memorial Avenue. The driver of the taxi, who was 

called as a witness for Jackson, testified that the taxi was 

Allied cab number eleven. 

 Officer Childress turned his vehicle around and followed 

the taxi. After going approximately three blocks, the taxi 

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pulled into the parking lot of the Family Dollar store. 

Childress pulled his vehicle into the lot and parked behind the 

taxi. A second police officer pulled his vehicle into the 

parking lot and parked beside the taxi. 

 Officer Childress got out of his vehicle, approached the 

taxi, and informed the driver that he was checking information 

that there was an outstanding warrant for the passenger and that 

he would need to ascertain the passenger's identity. Childress 

then approached the passenger, later identified as Jackson, 

informed him of the report he had received from LYN-COM, and 

asked him if he had any identification. Jackson told Childress 

he did not have any identification on him. The officer then 

asked Jackson to get out of the taxi, and Jackson complied. 

When asked for his name and date of birth, Jackson told the 

officer his name was Jerome Saunders and his date of birth was 

February 26, 1972. Childress then asked Jackson his age, and 

Jackson responded that he was twenty-six years old. Immediately 

recognizing that Jackson's stated age was inconsistent with the 

year of his birth, Childress informed Jackson that, while not 

under arrest, he was no longer free to leave and would be 

handcuffed until the police could verify his identity. 

 However, when the other officer present attempted to 

handcuff him, Jackson spun loose, punched Officer Childress in 

the face, and attempted to flee. Jackson was subsequently 

subdued, placed under arrest for assaulting Childress, and 

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searched incident to that arrest. On his person, the officers 

found $140 in twenty-dollar bills, a bag containing 8.3 grams of 

a green leafy material later determined to be marijuana, and a 

second bag containing 1.871 grams of a white substance later 

determined to be cocaine. No smoking device was found on his 

person. 

 Later, at the magistrate's office with Jackson, Officer 

Childress learned that Jackson was not the person identified by 

Greenfield Security and dispatch as having an outstanding 

capias. 

 At trial, Investigator Davidson was qualified as an expert 

in narcotics trafficking. He testified that the cocaine found 

on Jackson's person was packaged in a way typically used for 

distribution, was "almost ten times" the amount of cocaine a 

typical user of cocaine would possess, and had a "street value" 

of approximately $250. Davidson also testified that a user 

would typically have a pipe or papers to smoke the cocaine. He 

added that cocaine was typically sold in twenty-dollar "rock 

increments" and that those who purchased cocaine typically used 

twenty-dollar bills to pay for it. 

 Jackson testified he used cocaine but was not a dealer. He 

further testified he had "so much" cocaine on him that night 

because he had just won $290 in the lottery and had used some of 

his winnings to buy cocaine and marijuana for his personal use. 

He did not have anything on him with which to smoke the drugs, 

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he testified, because the police "pulled [him] over" before he 

had the chance to get any "papers." 

II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS 

 Jackson contends the police lacked a reasonable suspicion 

that he was wanted on an outstanding capias. He claims his 

actions and the informant's vague and general description did 

not provide Officer Childress with sufficient information to 

justify the investigatory detention. Therefore, Jackson argues, 

his initial detention was unlawful and all evidence resulting 

from that unlawful seizure was obtained in violation of his 

Fourth Amendment rights and should have been suppressed. Thus, 

Jackson concludes, the trial court erred in not suppressing the 

evidence offered against him.2

 The Commonwealth concedes that Jackson was effectively 

seized when he was informed that the police intended to compare 

his identity to that of a particular person for whom a capias 

had been confirmed. The Commonwealth contends, however, that 

the information provided to Officer Childress by dispatch and 

his observations of Jackson's actions after receiving that 

information clearly justified a brief investigatory detention to 

check Jackson's identity. Jackson's further detention, the 

Commonwealth continues, was also justified when he gave the 

 2

 At oral argument, Jackson waived the other 

suppression-related arguments included in his appellate brief. 

Accordingly, we do not address those arguments here. 

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police obviously false information regarding his age and date of 

birth. Thus, the Commonwealth concludes, the investigatory 

stop, Jackson's ensuing arrest, and the seizure of the marijuana 

and cocaine were proper. We agree with the Commonwealth. 

 When a motion to suppress is reviewed on appeal, we examine 

the records of both the suppression hearing and the trial to 

determine whether the evidence was lawfully seized. DePriest v. 

Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 577, 583, 359 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1987). 

"In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, 

'[t]he burden is upon [the defendant] to show that the ruling, 

when the evidence is considered most favorably to the 

Commonwealth, constituted reversible error.'" McGee v. 

Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) 

(en banc) (alterations in original) (quoting Fore v. 

Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1980)). 

"'Ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause 

to make a warrantless search' involve questions of both law and 

fact and are reviewed de novo on appeal." Id. (quoting Ornelas 

v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1991)). However, "we are 

bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact unless 

'plainly wrong' or without evidence to support them and we give 

due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident 

judges and local law enforcement officers." Id. at 198, 487 

S.E.2d at 261 (citing Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699). 

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 Under well-established Fourth Amendment principles, "[t]he 

police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative 

purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by 

articulable facts that criminal activity 'may be afoot.'" 

United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). An investigatory stop under Terry

"is a lawful stop designed to permit an officer with reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity to quickly confirm or dispel that 

suspicion." Davis v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 533, 539, 546 

S.E.2d 252, 255 (2001) (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 

119, 126 (2000)). "Actual proof that criminal activity is afoot 

is not necessary; the record need only show that it may be 

afoot." Harmon v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 440, 444, 425 

S.E.2d 77, 79 (1992). However, the justification for the 

investigatory stop "must be based on something more than the 

officer's 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch."'" 

Ramey v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 624, 629, 547 S.E.2d 519, 522 

(2001) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). 

 In determining whether a police officer had a reasonable 

suspicion justifying an investigatory stop, "the courts must 

consider 'the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.'" 

Hoye v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 132, 135, 442 S.E.2d 404, 406 

(1994) (quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8). We are further 

mindful, in making that determination, that the police officer 

may "view the circumstances confronting him in light of his 

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training and experience, and he may consider any suspicious 

conduct of the suspected person." James v. Commonwealth, 22 

Va. App. 740, 745, 473 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1996). 

 Here, the record establishes that Officer Childress 

received a report from dispatch that there was an outstanding 

capias for a man who was the backseat passenger in a green 

Allied taxi, identified as cab number eleven, heading for "the 

area of 2202 Memorial Avenue." The man was described as a black 

male, with a stocky build, wearing dark clothes and a black 

stocking cap. Upon arriving, shortly after receiving the 

dispatch, in the vicinity of 2202 Memorial Avenue, Childress 

observed Jackson, a stocky black male, wearing dark clothes and 

a black stocking cap in the backseat of a green Allied taxi, 

identified as cab number eleven, located approximately three 

houses away from 2202 Memorial Avenue. Childress saw Jackson 

look in the direction of 2202 Memorial Avenue, where marked 

police vehicles were parked. The officer then saw Jackson look 

back at him. At that point, the taxi drove away from the 

location. 

 Based on the totality of these circumstances, we conclude 

that Officer Childress had a reasonable, articulable suspicion 

that Jackson was the man who was wanted on the outstanding 

capias. Not only did Jackson's physical characteristics and 

clothing match the description provided by dispatch, Childress 

observed Jackson in the vicinity of the address provided by 

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dispatch in the backseat of a taxi matching the description 

provided by dispatch. Childress's suspicion that Jackson was 

the wanted man was further buttressed by Jackson's observable 

interest in the indicated address and his leaving the area 

immediately upon noticing Childress's approach. 

 Officer Childress's initial detention of Jackson was 

therefore reasonable to allow the officer to confirm or dispel 

his suspicion by checking Jackson's identity. Accordingly, that 

brief investigatory detention was not in violation of Jackson's 

Fourth Amendment rights. 

 Thereafter, when Jackson gave the officer obviously false 

identifying information, Officer Childress was justified in 

detaining him further while attempting to obtain additional 

information. Once Jackson struck Childress in the face, the 

officer had probable cause to arrest Jackson. Incident to that 

arrest, the officers could properly conduct the search that 

resulted in the discovery of the marijuana and cocaine on 

Jackson's person. Hence, the trial court did not err in denying 

Jackson's motion to suppress. 

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

 Jackson next contends the evidence was insufficient to 

prove he intended to distribute the cocaine in his possession. 

We disagree. 

 When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on 

appeal, we review the evidence "in the light most favorable to 

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the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences 

fairly deducible therefrom." Bright v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 

248, 250, 356 S.E.2d 443, 444 (1987). "In doing so, we must 

discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the 

Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence 

favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may 

be drawn therefrom." Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 

349, 494 S.E.2d 859, 866 (1998). We are further mindful that 

the "credibility of a witness, the weight accorded the 

testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are 

matters solely for the fact finder's determination." Crawley v. 

Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 372, 375, 512 S.E.2d 169, 170 (1999). 

We will not disturb the conviction unless it is plainly wrong or 

unsupported by the evidence. Sutphin v. Commonwealth, 1 

Va. App. 241, 243, 337 S.E.2d 897, 898 (1985). 

 "Where an offense consists of an act combined with a 

particular intent, proof of the intent is essential to the 

conviction." Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 524, 371 

S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988). "Because direct proof of intent [to 

distribute drugs] is often impossible, it must be shown by 

circumstantial evidence." Id. "Circumstantial evidence is as 

competent and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, 

provided it is sufficiently convincing to exclude every 

reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt." Coleman v. 

Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d 864, 876 (1983). 

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"However, the Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable 

hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence, not those 

that spring from the imagination of the defendant." Hamilton v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993). 

"Whether an alternate hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a 

question of fact and, therefore, is binding on appeal unless 

plainly wrong." Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 12-13, 

492 S.E.2d 826, 832 (1997). 

 Factors that may indicate the defendant intended to 

distribute the illegal drugs in his possession include the 

"[p]ossession of a quantity [of drugs] greater than that 

ordinarily possessed for one's personal use," Iglesias v. 

Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 93, 110, 372 S.E.2d 170, 180 (1988) (en 

banc), "[t]he method of packaging of the controlled substance," 

Servis, 6 Va. App. at 524, 371 S.E.2d at 165, the quantity and 

denomination of the cash possessed, see Welshman v. 

Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 20, 37, 502 S.E.2d 122, 130 (1998), 

and "the absence of any paraphernalia suggestive of personal 

use," id.

 Here, the record contains ample evidence that Jackson 

intended to distribute the cocaine in his possession. Jackson 

possessed 1.871 grams of cocaine, consisting of three separate 

rocks in three separate bags. He also had $140 in twenty-dollar 

bills on his person. In addition, he had no smoking device on 

his person. The Commonwealth's narcotics expert, Investigator 

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Davidson, testified that the typical cocaine user purchased 

cocaine in twenty-dollar "rock increments" and paid with 

twenty-dollar bills. Davidson further testified that the 

cocaine found on Jackson's person had a "street value" of 

approximately $250 and was packaged in a manner typically used 

for distribution. It was also, according to Davidson, nearly 

ten times the amount of cocaine a typical user of cocaine would 

possess. Davidson also testified that a mere user would 

typically have a pipe or papers on him to smoke the cocaine. 

 Although Jackson testified at trial that he had just won 

the lottery, had purchased the cocaine in his possession for 

personal use, and had not had the chance before being detained 

by the police to procure papers with which to smoke the cocaine, 

the trial court was entitled, in assessing Jackson's credibility 

and determining the weight to accord his testimony, to conclude 

that he had given false testimony regarding his intended use of 

the cocaine and that he had done so to conceal his guilt. See

Christian v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 704, 716, 536 S.E.2d 477, 

483 (2000) (en banc); Welch v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 518, 

525, 425 S.E.2d 101, 106 (1992). 

 We conclude, therefore, that the evidence presented by the 

Commonwealth was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

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that Jackson possessed the cocaine with the requisite intent to 

distribute it. 

 Accordingly we affirm Jackson's convictions. 

Affirmed.

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