THE AWAKENING:

THE ZAPATISTA REVOLT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

FOR CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF MEXICO

Stephen J. Wager

Department of History

U.S. Military Academy

and

Donald E. Schulz

Strategic Studies Institute

U.S. Army War College

December 30, 1994
ii

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed directly to the authors by calling commercial (717)

245-4123 or DSN 242-4123.

*******

The authors wish to thank Drs. Roderic Camp, Edward

Williams, Gabriel Marcella, Steven Metz, and Earl Tilford, and

Colonels William Allen and William Doll for their incisive

comments on earlier drafts of this work. Needless to say, any

errors of omission or commission are entirely the authors'

responsibility.
iii

FOREWORD

On January 1, 1994, an obscure guerrilla group calling

itself the Zapatista National Liberation Army attacked and

captured four cities and a number of towns in Chiapas, Mexico's

southernmost state. The violence shocked the Mexican government

and military, as well as the public, and ushered in a

multifaceted political crisis that over the course of the next

several months brought into question not only the prospects for

democracy and economic development, but also for continued

political stability. In this study. Drs. Stephen Wager and Donald

Schulz examine the causes, nature and implications of the

Zapatista uprising, emphasizing in particular its impact on

Mexican civil-military relations. They argue that, together with

the onset of democratization, the Chiapas rebellion has strained

these relations and led to a certain mutual distancing between

the Mexican army and government. Interestingly enough, however,

they argue that this may actually be a good thing since it means

that the military is becoming a more politically neutral

institution and will likely be more open to the idea of an

opposition electoral victory than in the past.

Of more immediate importance, Wager and Schulz note that

there has been little progress toward resolving the rebellion,

and that as long as this is so fighting could very well break out

anew, with disastrous results. They therefore urge the incoming

Zedillo administration to move quickly to "bring the Zapatistas

in from the cold" by co-opting them and their supporters both

economically and politically. This means fulfilling not only the

socioeconomic promises that have been made by the government, but

reforming state and local political power structures to assure

the rule of law and the access of those who have been shut out of

the system. They further argue that the process of national

political reform should be broadened and deepened, since without

democratization on the national level any other gains that might

be made would probably be ephemeral.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this

report as a contribution to understanding events in this

important country.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN

Colonel, U.S. Army

Acting Director

Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEPHEN J. WAGER is an Associate

Professor of History at the U.S. Military Academy. He has a Ph.D.

from Stanford University where he did his dissertation on the

Mexican military. His articles have appeared in the Journal of

Borderlands Studies and Hemisphere, and as chapters in Sergio

Aguayo Quezada and Bruce Bagley's En Busca de la Seguridad

Perdida and David Ronfeldt's The Modern Mexican Military: A

Reassessment. He is also the author of an SSI Special Report on

The Mexican Military Approaches the 21st Century: Coping with a

New World Order.

DONALD E. SCHULZ is an Associate Professor of National

Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College. He is the coauthor of The United States, Honduras

and the Crisis in Central America and coeditor of Revolution and

Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean; Cuba and

the Future; Political Participation in Communist Systems; and,

Mexico Faces the 21st Century (forthcoming). His articles have

appeared in Foreign Policy, Orbis, the Journal of Inter-American

Studies and World Affairs, and Small Wars and Insurgencies, as

well as such media outlets as Newsweek, The Washington Post, The

Miami Herald, and the Christian Science Monitor.
v

SUMMARY

This study examines the origins and nature of the Zapatista

rebellion in Chiapas, the response of the Mexican government and

military, and the implications for civil-military relations and

the future of Mexico. It places the armed forces' reaction within

the context of the institution's resonse to the country's

accelerated transition to democracy and analyzes the implications

of that democratization for the army. The main findings are as

follows:

On the Zapatista Revolt.

• The Zapatista rebellion is not primarily a "military"

problem. Rather, it is the product of a convergence of economic,

social and political problems that exist not only in Chiapas but

in much of rural Mexico.

• Unlike most traditional guerrilla movements, the Zapatista

National Liberation Army (EZLN) did not seek to destroy the state

or take power itself, but rather to force a democratic opening.

In this, it has been at least partially successful. Indeed, the

Zapatistas may have done more to accelerate the process of

Mexican democratization than the previous 5 years of dramatic

economic reform under the Salinas administration.

• Nevertheless, since the breakdown of peace talks last

spring, there has been little progress in terms of defusing a

potentially explosive situation. The Zapatistas have assumed an

uncompromising stance with regard to the issue of democratic

reform. At the same time, they remain very weak militarily. They

are largely surrounded by the much stronger Mexican army (with

Guatemala being their only escape route), and any attempt to

resume their offensive would likely prove suicidal. This has led

to a classic standoff. Neither side wants to resume the fighting,

yet their negotiating positions remain incompatible. And so

unable to move forward and unwilling to surrender, the rebels

risk being indefinitely consigned to limbo.

• This is dangerous, for as long as the deadlock continues,

violence could break out anew; thus, the need to bring the rebels

in from the cold. One of the priority tasks of the Zedillo

administration should be to explore ways to co-opt the Zapatistas

and their supporters, both economically and politically. That

means fulfilling the promises that have been made to alleviate

the poverty and desperation that drove so many people to support

the guerrillas. It also means reforming state and local power

structures to assure the rule of law and the access of those who

have been shut out of the system in the past. Nor are these

requirements limited to Chiapas. Many other areas of rural Mexico

suffer comparable problems which, if neglected, may lead to

social explosions.
vi

• It is also imperative that the process of national

political reform be deepened and consolidated, for without

democratization other gains will likely prove ephemeral.

On Democratization and Civil-Military Relations.

• Due to a massive intelligence failure, the Zapatista

uprising caught the Salinas administration by surprise. The

Mexican military had ample warning of the guerrilla presence, but

government officials had other concerns (most notably, NAFTA) and

tended to ignore or downplay the evidence that trouble was

brewing. Subsequently, civil-military relations were strained

when army leaders perceived that they were being used as

scapegoats for the government's failure.

• The acceleration of democratization has also strained

civil-military relations, resulting in a certain amount of mutual

distancing between the army and the governent. With the opening

of Mexican society to more pluralistic influences, there has been

much greater criticism of previously sancrosanct subjects (e.g.,

the president and the military). The army has increasingly become

a target of criticism with regard to corruption and human rights

abuses and President Salinas has not always been willing to

defend it. Thus, the military has become more aggressive in its

own defense, especially through the use of public relations. At

the same time, the army has distanced itself somewhat from the

government and the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). It

is becoming a more politically neutral institution, and appears

to be much more open to the idea of an opposition electoral

victory than in the past.

• In spite of Chiapas, the mission of the Mexican army will

not change drastically in the foreseeable future. While

improvements will be made in its counterinsurgency capabilities,

the military will gradually return to its traditional missions of

narcotics interdiction and civic action, with the latter being

the mission of preference.

• The authors recommend the introduction of mandatory human

rights training at all levels of the military.
1

THE AWAKENING:

THE ZAPATISTA REVOLT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

FOR CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF MEXICO

The Zapatistas Ignite a Powder Keg.

The 1994 New Year's celebration in Mexico started with a

bang. A mere hour into the year, the Zapatista National

Liberation Army (EZLN) assaulted and captured four cities in the

Los Altos region of Mexico's southernmost state, Chiapas. The

Ejército Zapatista de Liberación shocked the Mexican people and

most of the world with its rebellion. Although Mexican political

and military leaders adamantly denied that they were caught off

guard, they were in fact totally surprised by the magnitude of

the assault.

As events unfolded during that first week in January, the

reasons behind the seizure of San Cristóbal de las Casas, Las

Margaritas, Altamirano and Ocosingo became apparent. The

Zapatistas called for a nationwide movement for "jobs, land,

housing, food, health, independence, freedom, democracy, justice

and peace." Unlike many traditional guerrilla movements, the EZLN

did not seek to destroy the state, but rather sought to shift

"the balance of forces in favor of popular and democratic

movements, thereby isolating and ultimately defeating

anti-democratic tendencies within the ruling Partido

Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the state and the rest of

society."1 Whether or not the Zapatistas will be able to

accomplish their goal of making government more accountable to

the people and establishing fair representation for all Mexicans

remains to be seen. However, almost a year after the initial

uprising, the movement has prompted some visible changes,

including some positive ones, within the government and its

supporting institutions. In fact, the Zapatistas may have done

more to accelerate democratization than the previous 5 years of

dramatic economic reform engineered by President Carlos Salinas

de Gortari.

As the Mexican government responded to the crisis, one point

became clear: the rebellion was not a "military problem."

Instead, it can most properly be viewed as a concatenation of the

many endemic economic, political and social problems prevalent

not only in Chiapas but in most of rural Mexico. Nonetheless, the

actions of the EZLN have affected the Mexican army in a number of

respects. The army's involvement in restoring order in Chiapas

has in some ways changed the long-standing civil-military

equation in Mexico. To fully understand this change, one must

examine the military's response to the conflict in light of other

recent problems confronting the armed forces. This study will

look at that reaction within the context of the institution's

response to the nation's accelerated transition to democracy. We

will also analyze the implications of this increasingly rapid

democratization for the Mexican army.
2

The Roots of the Conflict.

What all Mexico understood when it awoke last New

Year's Day . . . was that the Mexican revolution had

finally arrived in Chiapas.2

The contrasts are both striking and sobering. Whereas in

Mexico as a whole only 29 percent of the populace lives in rural

areas, in Chiapas the figure is 60 percent. While the Mexican

illiteracy rate is 13 percent, for chiapanecos it is 31 percent.3

A third of the households in Chiapas are without electricity,

41.6 percent are without drinking water, and 58.8 percent lack

drainage. (The figures for all of Mexico are 12.5 percent, 20.6

percent and 36.4 percent, respectively.4) Moreover, when one

looks at the data for Ocosingo, Altamirano and Las Margaritas–

three of the cities captured by the Zapatistas–the contrasts tend

to be even greater. In Altamirano, fully 75 percent of the

households lack electricity, and the figures for Ocosingo and Las

Margaritas are almost as large. In Las Margaritas, 72.7 percent

are without drinking water.5 And the farther one moves out into

the countryside, the fewer such amenities are to be found.

Yet, Chiapas is a rich land. The region contains fertile

farmlands, pastures and forests, and an abundance of petroleum.

It is a major source of the nation's coffee, as well as

three-fifths of its electricity.6 The problem is that the wealth

is maldistributed. The gap between rich and poor is probably as

great as anywhere in the hemisphere. According to the available

statistics, a little over a hundred people–just .16 percent of

all coffee farmers–control 12 percent of the coffee lands.

Similarly, some 6,000 families hold over 3 million hectares of

cattle land–the equivalent to almost half the territory of all of

the state's rural landholdings.7

These elites have access to the best land and infrastructure

and most of the credit. Over the years, they have acquired their

properties by both fair means and foul. This system dates all the

way back to Spanish colonial days, when many of their ancestors

received grants of land, labor and tribute from the Crown. Since

that time, the members of this "Chiapas Family" have been able to

dominate the local power structures and assure that their

interests would be protected. In alliance with PRI caciques or

local political bosses, they have been able to manipulate the

legal system by bribing officials and securing delays and

exemptions for themselves while assuring that the letter of the

law would be applied to those without money or influence. Many of

their estates were created illegally, through the violent seizure

of ejidos or state-owned farms, and maintained by the use of

private armies and the complicity of local judges, sheriffs and

military commanders.8 A sign which as recently as 1971 hung in

the Ocosingo Lions Club said it all: "In the Law of the Jungle it

is willed that Indians and blackbirds must be killed."9
3

Though the rebellion caught the government by surprise, it

had been slowly brewing for years. In the two-and-a-half decades

prior to the uprising, a wide variety of groups had been active

in promoting peasant organizational activities. As early as the

late 1960s, Catholic priests and catechists, inspired by

Liberation Theology, had begun to engage in politically oriented

pastoral work, especially in the Diocese of San Cristóbal de las

Casas. During the 1970s, other organizations (among them, the

Proletarian Line, People United, the Socialist Workers Party, and

the Independent Organization of Agricultural Workers and

Peasants-Mexican Communist Party) also became involved in

grassroots efforts. Beginning in 1979, moreover, a broad-based

revolt of the state's primary and secondary school teachers led

to the formation of a "democratic teachers' movement," which

embraced the campesinos' cause and became an interlocutor with

the state government on their behalf.

By then, major socioeconomic, ecological and demographic

changes had begun to aggravate the already-precarious existence

of the peasants. The oil boom of the late 1970s had triggered a

cycle of social polarization, which was subsequently accelerated

by the debt crisis of the early 1980s. After the boom ended, many

highlanders who had left their homelands for more lucrative

opportunities in nearby oil fields returned, bringing with them

capital and new technology. They proceeded to introduce modern

farming methods, including fertilizers and herbicides, which

allowed more intensive and extensive cultivation of the land.

Unfortunately, these changes had destructive side effects.

Ecologically, they led to a dramatic increase in soil erosion and

a loss of fertility which sapped the land's ability to sustain

the human population. Socially and economically, they

increasingly polarized communities as the new entrepreneurs

expanded their wealth, often at the expense of those at the

bottom of the socioeconomic pyramid. As peasants were

increasingly pushed off the land by more powerful agro-export

farmers and cattle ranchers, many drifted to urban areas or the

agricultural frontiers in the Lacandona lowland.10

Social tensions were further aggravated by rapid population

growth (the rate in Chiapas is 4.5 percent, which means that the

population doubles about every 16 years)11 and the arrival of

some 100,000 Guatemalans, most of whom were fleeing bloody

counterinsurgency operations in their own country. Furthermore,

after August 1982 Mexico entered into a period of financial

crisis and economic stagnation unprecedented since the Great

Depression. Over the next half-dozen years, unemployment and

inflation soared, while real wages and the per capita Gross

National Product plummeted. In response to the crisis, the de la

Madrid administration (1982-88) adopted a neoliberal economic

strategy. Government spending was slashed, and the bureaucracy

reduced. As usual with such programs, the poor and the middle

class suffered the most.
4

In short, a combination of factors had produced a milieu

that was ripe for alienation and political organization.

Grass-roots intellectuals, religious catechists, Marxist

organizers and other proponents of change (including even federal

development agencies such as the National Indigenous Institute)

helped raise the political consciousness of Chiapas' peasants and

Indians, encouraging them to organize to defend their interests.

The upshot was a proliferation of campesino groups, the most

important being the Union of Ejido Unions (UU), the Independent

Central of Agricultural Workers and Peasants (CIOAC), and the

Emiliano Zapata Peasant Organization (OCEZ).12 As campesino

militance increased and calls for agrarian reform and political

change intensified, so did violence. When peasants began seizing

land, the ranchers unleashed their paramilitary squads. Campesino

leaders were killed, and entire villages threatened and in some

cases burned to the ground. Local authorities, as usual, sided

with the cattlemen.13

Under the Salinas administration (1988-94), the situation

deteriorated further. A collapse of coffee prices devastated

local producers, causing both productivity and total output to

fall by about 35 percent between 1989 and 1993. On average, small

growers suffered a 65-70 percent drop in income. Many were forced

to abandon production.14

Meanwhile, the administration was accelerating and extending

the economic policies of its predecessor. In 1991-92, Article 27

of the Mexican constitution was revised and a new Agrarian Law

passed. These measures formally ended the government's moribund

land distribution program. Ejido members15 now acquired the right

to sell their lands. At the same time, however, they had to

confront the difficult challenges of reduced agricultural

subsidies, the privatization of state enterprises, and

liberalized trade policies. When import licenses were removed,

many peasants found themselves unable to sell their crops because

of the sudden influx of cheaper grains from the United States.

While corn and beans continued to be subsidized, under the North

American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) all tariffs and import

quotas were to be gradually phased out. In combination with the

ejido reform, these measures raised the prospect that

landlessness and rural inequalities might soon grow much worse,

as millions of campesinos, unable to compete with foreign

imports, were forced off the land. The resulting insecurity and

confusion fueled discontent throughout rural Mexico, providing

the Zapatistas with a base of popular support on which to launch

their rebellion.

Not even Solidaridad (Solidarity), President Salinas'

much-lauded social development program, could do much to

ameliorate these fears and realities. During Salinas' first 5

years in office, federal spending in Chiapas increased more than

tenfold. Solidarity funding grew 130 percent in 1989-90, 50

percent in 1990-91, 20 percent in 1991-92, and a further 1

percent in 1992-93.16 But much of this money ended up in the
5

pockets of local caciques. In the meantime, these same

authorities resisted by all means available the efforts of poor

Indians and campesinos to pursue their interests within the

existing system. Symptomatic of the problem was that some 30

percent of Mexico's unresolved land petitions came from

Chiapas.17

Salinas was the most modern of Mexican presidents. Yet, in

spite of his pledges of reform and democratization, in Chiapas he

chose to work with the existing retrograde power structure.

Indeed, he depended on these elements–and on others like them

throughout rural areas of the country–for his own political

fortune. In the 1988 presidential election, this system had

delivered between 85-90 percent of Chiapas' vote, one of the

highest percentages of any state. In the 1991 federal elections,

the PRI had won 100 percent of the vote in 50 municipalities,

many of them in precisely those areas most affected by the

insurrection.18

In short, the first 5 years of Salinas' term brought few

substantive changes in the state's governance. The new "reform"

governor, Patrocinio González Garrido, was himself from an

important Chiapan family and had landholdings well in excess of

constitutional limitations. Not surprisingly, he continued the

repressive practices of his predecessor. Electoral fraud

continued unabated. By 1990-91, social conflicts were sharply on

the rise. As land invasions and protest movements proliferated,

the authorities cracked down. So harsh was the repression that

the Bishop of San Cristóbal de las Casas, Samuel Ruiz García, set

up a diocesan human rights center to document the abuses.

In October 1992, moreover, an extraordinary demonstration

took place in San Cristóbal. During a celebration commemorating

500 years of popular resistance, thousands of peasants took to

the streets, toppling and smashing the statue of conquistador

Diego de Mazariegos, a symbol of white domination. For some, this

catharsis of collective anger was an important psychological

turning point, crystallizing "what many already felt: that armed

struggle was the only path to achieve Indian demands."19

Knowing the Enemy.

One of the principal tenets of a sound military operation is

to know your enemy. However, on January 1, 1994, top-level

Mexican government officials were forced to scramble to identify

the Zapatista insurgents. Ironically, the enemy provided some

immediate assistance. Subcomandante Marcos burst onto the

national scene with the now famous "Declaration of the Lacandona

Jungle" that appeared in most Mexico City newspapers on January

2nd. The proclamation declared war on the Mexican army, called

for the non-recognition of the Mexican president, and demanded

the establishment of a transitional government. The masked EZLN

commander gained immediate notoriety as well as hero status in
6

the eyes of many Mexicans, including many marginalized peasants

and members of the middle class throughout the country. Marcos

projected the image of a Robin Hood defending the rights of the

downtrodden against an unjust and repressive government. His

physical appearance added to his aura. Although a black ski mask

remained a permanent part of his uniform, one could detect his

handsome features, captivating green eyes, and light complexion.

Over the course of the next few months, he became a celebrity.

Marcos dolls became the latest craze in Mexico City, and many

women treated him like a matinee idol.20

The identity of Marcos still remains unknown,21 as do many

other details about these rebels who call themselves Zapatistas,

in honor of the famous Mexican revolutionary, Emiliano Zapata,

who gave his life for the cause of agrarian reform. Recent

Mexican army estimates suggest that the EZLN has about 1,500

well-armed fighters with several thousand others poorly armed and

trained.22 The Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional was born

in the Lacandona jungle in 1983. According to some of its

leaders, the group has been recruiting and training there and in

small indigenous communities in the central part of Chiapas since

its inception. Most accounts indicate that the EZLN is comprised

of indigenous irregulars, commanded by a trained and disciplined

cadre of mestizo and caucasian extraction.23 These are "not the

most backward, or even the poorest, campesinos of Chiapas...but,

rather, the innovators: adventurous frontiersmen and women who

were convinced that they could make a new world."24 Many of the

leaders appear to be city folk, an impression that is reinforced

by the fact that Marcos speaks four languages. Rumors abound

about their backgrounds. There have been reports that the cadre

is composed of individuals who remain from the insurgency of the

1970s and of Mexicans who fought alongside the Central American

guerrillas. The movement lacks strong ideological foundations and

military resources, though it may be the beneficiary of funding

by undisclosed outside sources.25

The deepest roots of the EZLN may in fact extend as far back

as 1974. In October of that year, the city of San Cristóbal de

las Casas hosted an Indigenous Congress in honor of the 500th

anniversary of the birth of Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, Spain's

staunchest defender of Indian rights. The convention provided a

major impetus to peasant efforts to organize. This mobilization,

supported in part by Liberation Theologians from the Catholic

Church, led to the development of the three major campesino

umbrella organizations mentioned earlier (UU, CIOAC, and OCEZ),

which in turn started an organized struggle for rights to Indian

lands and against repression. From that base, the Zapatista cadre

had a ready source of individuals who could be easily

recruited.26

There is little hard information on the structure of the

EZLN. Marcos has emphasized on a number of occasions that he is

not the leader of the movement but is subordinate to a

Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committee that makes the
7

major decisions after polling the organization's membership. It

is believed that there is a national directorate above the

clandestine committee, but little about the structure has been

confirmed. Reports have circulated that the EZLN hierarchy has

maintained a liaison with the Partido Revolucionario Clandestino

Unión del Pueblo (PROCUP), a longtime umbrella organization for

subversive political and guerrilla groups. Mexican army sources

released a schematic of the EZLN's organization, which shows

clandestine committees for each of the major indigenous groups in

the region and has the EZLN subordinate to those committees.

According to this information, there are also local militias and

popular assemblies at the community level. In short, the

organization is more a political-military body than a purely

military one. Some captured documents indicate that the military

wing of the EZLN is organized along lines similar to those of the

Mexican army, especially with regard to unit and rank

designations and military regulations.27

The EZLN conducted training at both special camps and within

the local communities. In some cases, whole villages

participated, the women preparing food while the recruits trained

and the older population tended to daily chores. The Zapatistas

set up bases in isolated areas marked by rugged terrain.

Low-level thefts and kidnappings were employed as a means of

obtaining money to buy weapons.28

After more than 10 years of preparation, the EZLN was ready

to take a major step. Because it was not well-armed (many Indian

recruits only carried wooden sticks or machetes), Marcos realized

that surprise would be critical to any success the movement might

hope to achieve. Employing that principle of war, along with

sound discipline and small-unit tactics, the Zapatistas launched

their attack at San Cristóbal de las Casas, a picturesque

colonial city with an international flavor. In addition to a

Catholic Church strongly supportive of indigenous demands, many

Protestant groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were

in the city. This would help the movement gain extensive national

and international attention, which was obviously one of Marcos'

major aims. During the first week of January, the NGOs played a

key role in disseminating information about the uprising.29

At first, Marcos declared freedom for all as the movement's

goal. Though he soon moved to articulate his objectives more

precisely, there remained some confusion as to whether the

group's ideology was socialist. While the Declaration of the

Lacandona Jungle stated that the Zapatistas were fighting for

that cause, Marcos did not demand a socialist government but

merely a transitional one. In the second EZLN communique on

January 1, 1994, the rebels made 10 demands. The first five

(jobs, land, housing, food and health) were socioeconomic in

nature, while the second five (independence, freedom, democracy,

justice, and peace) were distinctly political. These demands

would serve as a basis for negotiation after the government's

unilateral cease-fire was declared on January 12th. As the
8

political phase of the conflict progressed, it became more

apparent that the rebels were trying to force the regime to

negotiate a democratic opening rather than take power

themselves.30 Had their uprising produced a chain reaction in

other states, perhaps this goal might have been modified to allow

them to compete for power at the national level. But with their

severely limited resources, such a course of action was simply

not viable.

The Government's Response.

The government responded to the events in Chiapas with great

uncertainty. The Salinas administration was caught completely

off-guard. Official sources initially tried to downplay the

situation and deflect criticism by declaring the rebellion to be

the work of external influences trying to destabilize Mexico. The

government blamed Central American guerrillas, the drug cartels

and, as a last resort, the Catholic Church. Even when the causes

of the crisis became apparent, the official media attempted to

suppress the news. However, word spread rapidly via telephone,

computer traffic, and the NGO network, and government radio and

television stations had no alternative but to report it.31

Patrocinio González Garrido, the interior minister and

former governor of Chiapas, initially dismissed as insignificant

accounts of armed groups in the four towns that were eventually

captured. The rebels held San Cristóbal de las Casas for over 24

hours before abandoning it and moving ten kilometers southeast to

attack the garrison of the 31st Military Zone in Rancho Nuevo.

With that provocation, the army asked for and received

authorization to counterattack. By midday on January 6th,

military forces had dislodged the rebels from all towns and

villages that they had previously occupied, forcing most of the

guerrillas to flee into the Lacandona jungle. Nevertheless, the

garrison at Rancho Nuevo was subjected to intermittent attacks

and sniper fire until January 12th.32

The conflict had two phases. The first was a military phase

that virtually concluded on January 12th, when President Salinas

declared a unilateral cease-fire. By that time, the army's

presence in the region had swelled from approximately 2,000

soldiers to over 14,000, more than enough to cordon off the

Zapatistas' stronghold in the Lacandona jungle. Under those

circumstances, the EZLN probably welcomed the cease-fire and

therefore agreed to respect it. At that point, the second or

political phase began, and has been ongoing ever since. On

January 10th, President Salinas fired his interior minister,

Patrocinio González, because of his ineptitude and his ties to

the long-standing repression in Chiapas, and replaced him with

Jorge Carpizo MacGregor, the attorney general and former

president of the National Commission on Human Rights (CNDH). He

followed that move 2 days later by appointing Manuel Camacho

Solís, the foreign minister and former presidential contender, as
9

his principal peace negotiator. On January 19th, Elmar Setzer,

the governor of Chiapas, resigned. The next day, Congress passed

an amnesty decree, clearing the way for meaningful peace

negotiations.33

By mid-January, the army had received considerable criticism

for its slow response to the outbreak of hostilities. Media

reports had described it as too ill-prepared and poorly equipped

to carry out a successful jungle campaign. Needless to say,

military leaders privately fumed over these allegations. Many

felt the political leaders had taken away their prerogative to

complete their operations.34 In actuality, unfavorable

international attention was pushing the government towards a

cease-fire. On January 4th, a photo of five cadavers near the

marketplace in Ocosingo hit the national and international wires.

The dead men had their hands tied behind their backs and had been

shot in the head, execution-style. Accompanying stories placed

the blame on Mexican soldiers. After this, the government could

no longer withstand the pressure. Accordingly, it sought the most

expeditious way to end the fighting.35

Although the military served as an initial scapegoat for the

rebellion, it soon became evident that Mexican political leaders

had blundered by underestimating the size of the threat and by

ignoring a series of warning signs. Among the latter was a public

statement by an opposition congressman that the army and Interior

Ministry had information about an armed movement in Chiapas. In

March 1993, the bodies of two junior officers had been found

hacked to pieces and buried in a shallow pit outside an Indian

village in the Los Altos region. The heinous nature of this crime

should have served as a warning that serious problems existed.

Army and police forces reportedly ransacked two villages and

tortured some of the inhabitants in search of the guilty parties.

This incident was followed in May by a firefight between Mexican

soldiers and a group of armed men outside Ocosingo. For months

thereafter, rumors abounded of guerrillas roaming the

countryside. A colonel from the 31st Military Zone reported that

his unit had been conducting reconnaissance missions throughout

the area in search of insurgent training camps.36 A Jesuit priest

declared that insurgents had been active for the past 8 years. As

late as October, residents reported seeing soldiers in numerous

communities around Ocosingo and hearing gunfire at night.

Nevertheless, there was a steady stream of denials on the part of

government officials.37

As events unfolded in January 1994, it became evident that

the government had been following a specific agenda in attempting

to cover up the guerilla presence. It needed to put on its best

face for the impending vote by the U.S. Congress on the North

American Free Trade Agreement. NAFTA was the key piece in

Salinas' revolutionary economic reforms, and Mexico could not

risk its defeat by drawing attention to potentially destabilizing

developments in Chiapas. According to one political insider, a

representative of the Centro de Investigación y Seguridad
10

Nacional (CISN), which is a combination Federal Bureau of

Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency, had visited

Chiapas on three separate occasions in May 1993 in response to

the trouble reported there. This source added that the

intelligence failure was attributable to the government rather

than the army. The latter had been reporting on these activities

and recognized the potential for an uprising, but government

officials believed that the focos were small and could be easily

controlled. These developments were kept secret so as not to

prejudice the vote on NAFTA or the presidential campaign of Luis

Donaldo Colosio, the assumption being that corrective action

could wait until after the August 1994 presidential election.38

The above suggests not so much the inadequacy of the

government's response to the rebellion as it does a gross failure

on the part of its intelligence apparatus. It should come as no

surprise that military leaders were disgruntled. They felt that

blame had been unjustly placed on their own shoulders.

The Mexican Military Takes the Offensive.

From a military perspective, the Chiapas uprising was unique

because, unlike any time in the recent past, the army found

itself in the eye of a political hurricane. One U.S. official in

Chiapas during the first days of the rebellion reported that its

leaders had been privately voicing displeasure at the ineffective

and poorly planned political strategy that they were being asked

to carry out. On one occasion, General Miguel Angel Godínez

Bravo, commander of the 31st Military Zone and of all army forces

in Chiapas, invited reporters to his headquarters at Rancho Nuevo

for an interview. The general told them that the best course of

action would be to go on the offensive and wipe out the

Zapatistas. The next day he suggested that he had been misquoted

and that he supported wholeheartedly the government's strategy of

a negotiated settlement. There were also other indications of

discontent. Army leaders reportedly were annoyed at the new peace

commissioner, Camacho Solís, when he called for a cease-fire and

asked the military to withdraw its forces from certain

communities and take up positions outside towns and villages.

Moreover, though the army had traditionally been the principal

administrator of humanitarian aid, during the Chiapas conflict

the government was pressured into replacing it with the Red Cross

and assorted NGOs.39

Not since 1968 had the armed forces been subjected to such

harsh public criticism as during the first few months of 1994.

For that reason, Chiapas represents a kind of watershed. Prior to

the Salinas administration, the military had always been looked

upon as an intocable or untouchable. The golden rule for

journalists and writers had always been that everything was

subject to criticism except the president, the army and the

Virgen de Guadalupe. On those few occasions when the military was

the subject of criticism, the president had always spoken out in
11

defense of the institution. But the Salinas sexenio (6-year term)

witnessed the end of the army's mythical status.

The increasingly "irregular relationship" between the

military and the president seems ironic in light of the first few

months of Salinas' term. Back then, with the legitimacy of his

electoral victory still very much in question, army leaders had

organized a parade on inauguration day as a sign of support for

the new president. Shortly thereafter, Salinas had called on the

military to apprehend a corrupt and well-armed labor leader. He

later asked for the army's help in tracking down the nation's

leading drug trafficker (which it did). Those actions were

followed by preemptive measures to prevent a violent strike at a

copper mine in northern Mexico. Nonetheless, after relying on the

army to get off to a solid start, Salinas fell

uncharacteristically silent in its defense towards the end of his

term.40

The flood of recent criticism began in 1989. Numerous

reports circulated throughout Mexico and the United States

implicating former Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) General Juan

Arévalo Gardoqui in high-level narcotics trafficking. At the

time, President Salinas had remained silent and offered no

disclaimers. Then, in November 1991, soldiers killed seven

federal narcotics agents at a remote landing strip in Veracruz.

Instead of allowing an in-house investigation, the president

ordered the National Commission on Human Rights to look into the

crime, and as a result five officers were imprisoned. In

September 1992, the Ministry of Public Education distributed

textbooks to public schools which described soldiers as having

fired upon innocent students during the 1968 Student Movement.

When army leaders took exception, the textbooks were recalled,

but Salinas never publicly disavowed their content.41

By 1993, the public attacks had accelerated. It seemed that

the army had fallen victim to the democratization process. In

April, its deteriorating relations with the Catholic bishop in

Chiapas received considerable publicity, and most reports sided

with Bishop Ruiz. (The latter had irked General Godínez by trying

to stop the army's searches of Indian villages. In addition,

Godínez had been accused of collaborating with former Governor

González Garrido to expel or jail two priests.) Some implied a

military role in the assassination of Cardinal Juan Jesús Posadas

Ocampo by drug traffickers in Guadalajara that May. Others used

the incident to criticize what they perceived to be the army's

ineffectiveness in the national anti-narcotics campaign.42 With

the 25th anniversary of the October 1968 student deaths at

Tlatelolco, moreover, many groups lobbied for the release of

classified documents related to that affair. For the army, this

was a case of opening old wounds. A Comisión de la Verdad (Truth

Commission), comprised of prominent citizens and intellectuals,

many of whom had been university students in 1968, was set up to

investigate the events at Tlatelolco. When the final report was

presented in December, the army found itself again having to
12

defend itself from accusations of complicity in the killings.43

Finally, the case of General José Francisco Gallardo

Rodríguez has proved nettlesome. Gallardo has been imprisoned

since November 1993, ostensibly for defaming the military's

reputation. The general had committed the sin of publishing an

article in a small Mexico City magazine stating that the army had

frequently violated the rights of its soldiers and officers, and

he suggested creating an ombudsman to rectify some of these

problems. This case has captured the attention of both Mexican

and U.S. human rights groups, which have been pressuring the army

for Gallardo's release. While official sources insist the case is

more complex, army leaders have been made to appear as the guilty

party.44

The Chiapas uprising added more fuel to the fire. The army

has had a much more difficult time in fending off accusations

from human rights organizations than it had in forcing the

Zapatistas back into the Lacandona jungle. Since the beginning of

hostilities, it has been subjected to a barrage of criticism. The

picture of the five dead bodies in Ocosingo opened the

floodgates.45 In the face of these accusations, the SECDEF,

General Antonio Riviello Bazán, has remained steadfast in his

defense of the army. In March, for instance, he reported that 40

of 46 complaints delivered by the National Commission of Human

Rights had been investigated, and there was no evidence of

wrongdoing. General Godínez in Chiapas has also emphatically

denied that any of his troops were guilty of human rights

violations.46

The army has not been without its defenders. The director of

the principal human rights center in Chiapas (Centro de Derechos

Humanos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas) stated that while some

soldiers may have engaged in abuses, there exists no systematic

pattern of violations.47 Speaking for a group of nonpartisan

legislators, a Mexican senator declared that the military had

responded admirably to a difficult challenge in Chiapas, and that

the institution's behavior with respect to human rights had been

beyond reproach.48 A group of almost 500 grateful citizens from

the now famous town of Ocosingo demonstrated in favor of the army

and denounced human rights organizations said to be unjustly

tarnishing the military's reputation.49

Despite the support from outside sources, President Salinas

chose not to dispute many of these accusations. After the first

few weeks of the conflict, General Riviello recognized that the

army could no longer depend on the president to defend it.

Instead, the military would have to begin defending itself. The

SECDEF took the first step in establishing a new public relations

modus operandi in a speech commemorating the anniversary of the

Loyalty March of February 9, 1913. Fed up with seeing

Subcomandante Marcos and the Zapatistas glorified by the press,

the SECDEF spoke aggressively in defense of the army. He

proclaimed that the military had not digressed from its best
13

traditions of loyalty to the president and the Constitution, or

to its mission of guaranteeing internal order. He said that

Mexican soldiers had been the victims of violent aggression by

the EZLN, and added that the army stood firmly behind the

government's efforts at peace and reconciliation. He followed

that speech with another on Army Day (February 19) in which he

reiterated the institution's commitments and described it as "an

army in search of peace."50

General Riviello clearly understands the new rules of the

game that are being established in countries making the

transition to democracy. He promptly appointed a public relations

expert to deal with the press and set out to form new alliances.

The SECDEF set up meetings with journalists and academicians who

had been critical of the army and made overtures to establish a

more open dialogue. Nevertheless, these efforts have not stopped

the criticism. Perhaps the press views the military as a target

that had long been off-limits and senses a public interest in

learning as much as possible about it. In February, army sources

had to refute unsubstantiated allegations that the leadership was

attempting to obtain U.S. military aid in order to escalate the

conflict in Chiapas. A few months later, it was reported that the

army had obtained at least two dozen armored riot-control

vehicles in anticipation of increased violence. The most recent

uproar concerns overtures made to the United States to buy AH-1

Cobra attack helicopters. Some journalists implied that there

would soon be a step-up of repression.51 (In turn, a high-ranking

officer explained the riot-control vehicles and attack

helicopters as part of the army's ongoing modernization program.

With regard to the former, he remarked that water was a lot safer

than rifles. As for the latter, he seemed surprised that the

request for only three helicopters would create such a

reaction.52 In the end, the request for the Cobras was denied.)

Looking back over the present administration, army leaders

acknowledge that the traditional political-military situation has

begun to change significantly. While the army continues to adhere

to its most sacred traditions–loyalty to the president and the

Constitution and unwavering defense of the nation's sovereignty–

the traditional perception of the institution by the Mexican

people has probably changed forever. Public relations reforms are

just the beginning. Greater changes lie ahead. The challenge of

adapting to an increasingly democratic society will be a

difficult one.

Chiapas and the Future of the Mexican Military.

After examining events in Mexico during the first 9 months

of 1994, the prescient observer might ask whether the Mexican

military is at a crossroads. In fact, there are indicators that

it may undergo significant changes in the not- too-distant

future. Some analysts anticipate substantive alterations in its

mission and structure.53 At this point, political leaders are
14

beholden to the military for its response to the Zapatista

threat. At the same time, accusations of army human rights abuses

have helped to take some of the pressure off already overburdened

political leaders who have been trying to rectify their flawed

strategies.

Political leaders will most likely try to compensate the

military with increased salaries (which have remained at

uncharacteristically low levels during the Salinas years) and new

equipment. The latter has already been evident with the reports

on the U.S. attack helicopters. A new military zone has been

established in the state of Tabasco, and some new battalions have

been added to the army's inventory.54

Some analysts have suggested that the military may soon

begin a second professionalization process to shore up some of

its deficiencies. On an operational level, the army will move to

improve its counterinsurgency and jungle operations. Another area

that begs for improvement is human rights instruction. If nothing

else, Chiapas proved that the army no longer possesses immunity

from criticism. Political leaders, including the president, have

become increasingly involved with trying to deflect media attacks

and no longer possess the credibility or influence to defend the

military. The army has been introduced rather rudely to the

long-neglected field of public relations. One means of reducing

unfavorable press is to pay closer attention to human rights. The

first step should consist of mandatory human rights training at

all levels. The military has transitioned, perhaps somewhat

reluctantly, into a new and highly competitive environment, and

its leaders now find themselves scurrying to defend its

interests. They must expeditiously formulate a strategy to

function effectively in this transitional period. If they fail to

do so, the army could be seriously weakened. The recent

improvements in public relations suggest that the leadership now

understands the need for change.55

There are also strong indications that the relationship

between the PRI and the military may undergo substantive

alteration. The "irregular relationship" during the Salinas

administration points to a distancing by the military from the

PRI. Uncontrollable events brought on by accelerated

democratization seem to be forcing military leaders into a more

neutral corner with respect to politics. In the past, the

Constitution has served as justification for the army's unique

relationship with the PRI. Since the president was head of both

the legitimate government and the PRI, the military invariably

favored the latter. Given the traditionally weak opposition, this

relationship was seldom questioned. The past decade, however,

witnessed the growth of more viable opposition parties, and this

has led the SECDEF to declare, on more than one occasion, that

the army would remain at the margin of the presidential

succession and would uphold the results of the August 1994

election. In addition, he denied his partiality for the PRI

candidate.56
15

At the same time, military leaders have probably questioned

the allegiance of the president and the PRI to the armed forces.

Here one has to understand how a Mexican army officer thinks. The

institution's ideology stresses six core concepts: revolutionary

heritage, loyalty, discipline, patriotism, nationalism, and

apoliticism. These values comprise a creed by which the Mexican

officer lives.57 Since the 1920s, the army has maintained

steadfast loyalty to the president and the institutions of

government. Yet, the president's "silence" at numerous times

during this sexenio has raised doubts about the system's loyalty

to the armed forces. As a result, the army has become less

willing to bail the government out of problems emanating from

failed and heavily criticized economic, political, and social

policies.58

Since the 1968 student movement, the military has been

extremely reluctant to engage in repressive actions against the

Mexican people. Army leaders learned their lesson the hard way at

Tlatelolco. Many of the junior officers who took up arms against

the students on that occasion now serve in the upper echelons of

the armed forces. The conflict in Chiapas once again forced the

military to take up arms against the people, and one of the

casualties was its reputation. Army leaders can dismiss their

current dilemma as unavoidable, but they do not want to be forced

into similar situations in the future. In recent months, there

has been a fair share of private expressions of dissatisfaction

over government policies. The military has grown increasingly

disenchanted with having to clean up after politicians' mistakes.

Consequently, one anticipates that its leaders may become more

assertive on national security issues that have a direct impact

on their institution.59

There is no easy solution for Mexico's military leaders. But

in a truly democratic system, the army will no longer be able to

take sides. Some of its leaders have begun to understand this,

and they seem to fear the opposition less than in the past.

Despite the winds of change, however, there are indicators

that suggest a high degree of continuity for the military.

Alterations in its structure and budget may prove temporary once

the Chiapas conflict is resolved. In this era of downsizing, it

would be difficult for Mexico, which has traditionally had one of

the poorest armed forces in Latin America, to justify a major

military build-up. Improvements will be made in counterinsurgency

capabilities, but the mission of the army will not change

drastically. Rather, it will gradually return to narcotics

interdiction and civic action on a full-time basis, with the

latter being the preferred mission.

In the not-too-distant future, Chiapas may be viewed as a

brief distraction from the army's well-established traditional

missions. In 1980, then Secretary of National Defense, General

Félix Galván López, became the first military leader in years to
16

speak out on national security, which he defined as "the

maintenance of social, economic and political equilibrium

guaranteed by the armed forces."60 That has become the accepted

army definition of national security, and it clearly suggests

that military force is not a solution to national problems. The

Mexican approach has been and will continue to be negotiation,

thereby obviating the need for a large and totally modern armed

forces. In their present state, those forces could not be

seriously challenged by any internal opposition group.

As in most military institutions, leadership in the Mexican

army is a function of hierarchy. Since the 1950s, the position of

SECDEF has been filled by men well into their sixties. After more

than 40 years in the military, these leaders have put aside

aspirations for political power. They have become totally

consumed with ensuring that their organization adheres strictly

to its proud traditions of loyalty to the institutions of

government and service to the Mexican people. Only in that way

can each SECDEF hope that his legacy will be favorably judged. In

addition, most SECDEFs view their position as the achievement of

a life-long dream and would never consider ruining their good

fortune by becoming embroiled in political struggles. This system

of military succession has become well-entrenched. At present,

there is no move to modify it by bringing in younger military

leaders who might seek an active role in political

decisionmaking.

Because the present sexenio is drawing to a close, it is

difficult to speculate about the future. As with the political

system itself, the military experiences a major internal

transformation every 6 years. The direction in which it moves

will depend principally on its new leader. As one insider

remarked, "the military has many arms and many legs but only one

head." At this writing, the PRI candidate, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce

de Leon, has just been elected president. Relations between the

military and Zedillo will likely be a bit tense during the early

months of his administration. Mexico's new leader will have to

mend some fences, for his past actions have not endeared him to

the armed forces. Zedillo was the minister of education who

authorized publication of the textbooks that accused the military

of repressing the student movement in 1968. Early in his career,

he worked for the army's bank, and after leaving that position,

he made some untoward and imprudent remarks about the military's

efficiency.

All this suggests there will be changes in civil-military

relations in Mexico. How the new president and SECDEF proceed at

the outset of the administration will go a long way towards

determining whether the relationship only needs a minor tune-up

or whether a major overhaul is in order. At this point, it seems

likely that Zedillo will work quickly to win back the support of

the armed forces, since the military remains one of the crucial

pillars upon which the entire system rests.
17

War or Peace?

And what of the Zapatistas? In the months prior to the

August elections, they had repeatedly warned that a PRI victory,

if fraudulent, would lead to a resumption of hostilities. The

EZLN had retained its weapons during the cease-fire. Moreover,

Subcomandante Marcos claimed to have been contacted by "armed

groups in the four corners of the country." There were reports of

guerrilla activity in Guerrero, Oaxaca, Jalisco, Nayarit,

Durango, Veracruz, Puebla, Hidalgo, Michoacán, and Chihuahua.61

The image being cultivated was that of a peasant army ready to

resume the offensive not only in Chiapas but throughout rural

Mexico.

At the same time, Zapatista leaders gave few indications

that they were willing to temper their militance or abandon their

more extreme and unrealistic demands. When the government offered

sweeping socioeconomic concessions (including land

redistribution, aid to impoverished farmers, the creation of new

industries, job-retraining programs, schools and roads) designed

to ameliorate the hardships and inequities of Chiapan society,

the terms were rejected. Nothing less than fundamental political

reform on a national level would do. The rebels renewed their

call for Salinas' resignation and the formation of a transitional

government to organize "democratic and free elections." In

addition, they demanded an end to central government control over

indigenous communities and a renegotiation of NAFTA.62

Not even Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the major presidential

candidate most supportive of the rebels' demands, seemed pure

enough to merit their support. In May, Cárdenas had journeyed to

Chiapas in search of favorable publicity, hoping to bask in the

glow of Subcomandante Marcos' charisma. Instead, he was publicly

humiliated. Marcos accused Cárdenas' party of pursuing the same

economic policies and undemocratic practices as the PRI. The

candidate was subjected to a series of staged harangues by

guerrilla commanders. In the end, the photo opportunity turned

into a nightmare, undermining the campaign (which was already

shaky) of the very contender most likely to come to terms with

the rebels.

Since March 1994, there has been a growing sense of

unreality and irrelevance about the Zapatistas. With the March

assassination of the PRI presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo

Colosio, the selection of his successor, Ernesto Zedillo, and the

relaunching of the election campaign, public attention was

increasingly diverted from Chiapas. Whereas during the first

months of the crisis, Marcos' communiqués had been front-page

headlines, by spring they were largely being consigned to the

back pages of Mexican newspapers. Meanwhile, the government moved

to undermine the rebels' popular support through massive social

spending. In less than 6 months, over $220 million was poured

into the state's social development and infrastructure projects,

a 44 percent increase over what had been budgeted. By far the
18

largest recipients were San Cristóbal, Altamirano, Ocosingo, and

Las Margaritas. By now, too, the military's treatment of the

Indians had improved, and the latter were becoming more vocal

about the hardships and abuses (especially forced recruitment) of

guerrilla rule. For their part, the Zapatistas seemed

increasingly divorced from those whom they purported to

represent. After May, they virtually dropped their socioeconomic

demands, calling instead on Mexican "civil society" to rise up

and demand national political reform.63

The culmination of this shift was the convocation of a

"National Democratic Convention" in Chiapas in early August. The

gathering, part of which was held in Marcos' jungle hideout, was

attended by several thousand representatives from a broad

spectrum of left-wing groups. Proclaiming the PRI "the common

enemy of us all," the delegates called for a nationwide campaign

of civil disobedience to push the ruling party from power.

On election day, however, the voters cast their ballots

overwhelmingly for Zedillo and the PRI. Though the process was

not free from irregularities, the magnitude of the victory was

such as to leave little doubt as to who had won. The Mexican

people might be unhappy with the PRI's long record of

authoritarianism, corruption and violence–or for that matter with

the weak state of the economy–but they were unwilling to risk

more instability and violence by turning power over to the

opposition. The events of the preceding 8 months had left deep

insecurities in the national psyche. Mexicans were not yet ready

to make such a transition.64

The election results left the Zapatistas in a difficult

position. Obviously, the Mexican people did not reject the

existing system and did not support the kind of violence that the

EZLN represented, even when they were sympathetic to many of its

proclaimed objectives. (Significantly, the presidential candidate

favored by most of the delegates to the "National Democratic

Convention"–Cárdenas–had finished a poor third. Moreover, in

Chiapas the PRI gubernatorial candidate had handily defeated the

candidate favored by the Zapatistas. Subsequently, the EZLN

refused to recognize the validity of that election and threatened

to resume fighting if the governor-elect assumed office.) For the

moment, at least, the PRI had snatched the cloak of legitimacy

away from the rebels, and it was by no means clear that they

could recapture it.

The critical question that remains unanswered is whether the

Zapatistas will carry out their threats to resume fighting.

Certainly, it would be difficult–if not impossible–for them to

regain the moral high ground they had held the previous January.

(Even many of their supporters have balked at the leadership's

militant challenge to the gubernatorial election results.) Nor

would they any longer have the strategic advantage of surprise.

Indeed, over the preceding months the Mexican army, with some

20,000 troops in Chiapas,65 had carefully surrounded the
19

Zapatista forces in the Lacandona jungle, leaving the Guatemalan

border as the only possible escape route. Given the limited

resources of the guerrillas, a resumption of their offensive

would likely prove suicidal.

As for the threat of "other Chiapases" in states like

Veracruz and Guerrero, where there have been reports of guerrilla

activity, one can only speculate. Most of these accounts are

sketchy. The numbers and viability of these groups remain very

much in doubt. Where they exist at all–and some of them are

probably nothing more than rumor–they appear to be small, based

on local land disputes, and lacking a national political

agenda.66

And so we are left with a classic Mexican standoff. Thus

far, at least, the military has been willing to play a waiting

game and avoid subjecting itself to more accusations of human

rights violations. It continues to stand behind the government's

negotiation strategy and seems unlikely to attack the Zapatistas

unless provoked. The latter have also exhibited caution.

Notwithstanding some of their rhetoric, they clearly understand

that they are in a very weak position militarily; thus, their

shift away from a military strategy to a political strategy based

on public relations and popular mobilization.

The problem, however, is that the strategy does not seem to

be going anywhere. The rebels are increasingly isolated and

trapped. Unable to move forward and unwilling to surrender, they

risk being indefinitely consigned to limbo. Still, as long as the

deadlock continues, the potential for violence remains. There is

a streak of martyrdom in the Latin American political culture

that could very well be activated by prolonged frustration.

Moreover, the army and the guerrillas are not the only

potentially explosive elements in the equation. Since January,

traditional local elites have seen their properties and power

threatened as never before. They are angry, afraid and prone to

violence. Many are not above taking the law into their own hands

to recapture stolen cattle or occupied properties. Some may even

be tempted to provoke a resumption of all-out war in the hope

that the army may help them retrieve their losses.

Thus, the need to defuse the conflict by bringing the rebels

in from the cold. One of the priority tasks of the Zedillo

administration should be to explore ways to coopt the Zapatistas

and their supporters, both economically and politically. On the

one hand, that means fulfilling the promises that have been made

to alleviate the poverty and desperation that drove so many

chiapanecos to support the guerrillas. On the other, it means

reforming state and local power structures to assure the rule of

law and the access of those who have been shut out of the system.

Nor are these requirements limited to Chiapas, for there are many

other areas of rural Mexico with comparable problems which, if

neglected, may lead to social explosions.
20

Finally, it is imperative that the process of national

political reform be deepened and consolidated. On this point–even

if not on all of their specific demands–the Zapatistas are quite

right. Without democratization, other gains will likely prove

ephemeral, since what can be so easily given can also be taken

away. Here, then, may be the rebels' ultimate contribution: that

at a critical moment in Mexican history they forced reform on a

reluctant president and an even more reluctant political system.

On the other side of the ledger, the Mexican army has done its

part to keep the system afloat and restore an environment of

stability and security. But whether these developments will be

enduring or merely a passing illusion remains to be seen. On that

issue rests the future of Mexico.

ENDNOTES

1. Neil Harvey, "Rebellion in Chiapas: Rural Reforms,

Campesino Radicalism, and the Limits to Salinismo," in

Transformation of Rural Mexico, Number 5, La Jolla, CA: Center

for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego,

1994, pp. 1-2.

2. Alma Guillermoprieto, "Zapata's Heirs," The New Yorker, May 16, 1994, p. 52.

3. Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e

Informática (INEGI), Anuario Estadístico de los Estados Unidos

Mexicanos, Aguascalientes: INEGI, 1991.

4. INEGI, XI Censo General de Problación y Vivienda, 1990, Aguascalientes: INEGI, 1992.

<%-2>5. Consejo Nacional de Problación, cited in <MI>La

Jornada<D>, January 3, 1994.<%0>

6. Thomas Benjamin, A Rich Land, a Poor People: Politics and

Society in Modern Chiapas, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico

Press, 1989, p. xiii; and Andrew Reding, "Chiapas is Mexico: The

Imperative of Political Reform," World Policy Journal, Vol. 11,

No. 1, Spring 1994, pp. 12-13.

7. Luis Hernández Navarro, "The New Mayan War," NACLA Report

on the Americas, Vol. 27, No. 5, March/April 1994, p. 6.

8. On politics and society in Chiapas, see especially

Benjamin, A Rich Land; and Robert Wasserstrom, Class and Society

in Central Chiapas, Berkeley: University of California Press,

1983.

9. Hernández Navarro, "The New Mayan War," pp. 6-7.

10. Peter Rosset and Shea Cunningham, "Understanding

Chiapas," Food First Action Alert, Institute for Food and

Development Policy, Spring 1994, pp. 2, 4.
21

11. Reding, "Chiapas is Mexico," p. 16.

12. For details, see Neil Harvey, "Peasant Strategies and

Corporatism in Chiapas," in Popular Movements and Political

Change in Mexico, Joe Foweraker and Ann Craig, eds., Boulder:

Lynne Rienner, 1990, pp. 183-198.

13. Reding, "Chiapas is Mexico," pp. 13-14; Guillermoprieto,

p. 55.

14. Harvey, "Rebellion in Chiapas," p. 11; Luis Hernández,

"The New Mayan War," p. 9.

15. Ejidos are groups of 20 or more peasants who were given

usufruct rights to state-owned lands during the agrarian reform.

Until 1992, their right to sell, lease or rent these properties

had been severely restricted.

16. Human Rights Watch/Americas, Mexico, The New Year's

Rebellion: Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law During

the Armed Revolt in Chiapas, Vol. 6, No. 3, March 1, 1994, p. 5;

Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Quinto Informe de Gobierno, Annex,

1993.

17. Luis Hernández Navarro, "The Chiapas Uprising," in

Transformation of Rural Mexico, p. 44.

18. Human Rights Watch/Americas, Mexico, The New Year's

Rebellion, p. 5; Reding, "Chiapas is Mexico," p. 17.

19. Hernández, "The New Mayan War," p. 8.

20. Raúl Benítez Manaut, "El Desafío de las Guerrillas,"

Nueva Sociedad, No. 130, March-April 1994, pp. 24-26; Arturo Cano

and Daniel Moreno, "La Guerrilla que No Existía," Enfoque, January 9, 1994, pp. 18-20; "La Guerrilla Zapatista, una Mezcla

de Ambición y Mesianismo" and "La Realidad que Nadie Quería Ver:

la Guerrilla," Epoca, January 10, 1994, pp. 8-15.

21. Mexican intelligence services believe he is an

anthropologist and former Catholic lay worker in his late 30s or

early 40s. Andrés Oppenheimer, "Mexico Rebel Leader: I Am a Poet,

Not a Politician," The Miami Herald, July 28, 1994.

22. Oppenheimer, "Mexico Rebel Leader."

23. Instituto Mexicano de Estudios Políticos A.C., Política

Mexicana, January 7, 1994, pp. 1-8 (hereafter cited as IMEP); Tod

Robberson, "Mexican Army Short of Funds and Combat Experience,"

The Washington Post, January 19, 1994; Moreno, "La Guerrilla,"

pp. 18-20; and "La Guerrilla Zapatista," Epoca, pp. 8-9.

24. Guillermoprieto, "Zapata's Heirs," p. 54.
22

25. Ricardo Alemán, "Abandona Ocosingo y Altamirano El

Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional," La Jornada, January

5, 1994; Octavio Paz, "El Nudo de Chiapas," in Ibid.; and IMEP,

Política Mexicana, January 7, 1994, pp. 5-8.

26. See Hernández Navarro, "The Chiapas Uprising," pp.

44-48.

27. Untitled document, dated January 8, 1994, prepared by

the Mexican Interior Ministry, pp. 15-18. See also Raymundo Riva

Palacio, "Guerrillas en México," El Financiero, February 4, 1994;

Miguel Angel Ortega, "Características de Partido en los Organos

de Dirección de la Guerrilla," El Financiero, February 28, 1994;

and Miguel Pérez, "Tiene EZLN Reglamento Militar," Reforma, March

2, 1994.

28. Untitled Interior Ministry Document, January 8, 1994,

pp. 18-23.

29. Benítez Manaut, "El Desafío," pp. 26-27; "La Guerrilla

Zapatista," Epoca, pp. 8-9; Hernández Navarro, pp. 47-48; and

interview with U.S. Embassy official, March 1994.

30. Raymundo Riva Palacio, "La Apuesta del EZLN," El

Financiero, January 26, 1994; Sergio Aguayo Quezada, "Contener la

Intolerancia," La Jornada, February 23, 1994; Miguel Angel

Ortega, "Obligar a una Apertura Democrática, no Tomar el Poder,

el Objectivo de la Estrategia Militar del EZLN," El Financiero, February 28, 1994; and Benítez Manaut, "El Desafío," pp. 27-28.

31. Interview with U.S. Embassy official, March 1994.

32. "Los Hechos Paso a Paso," Epoca, January 10, 1994, pp.

18-19 provides a concise sequence of events. See also Secretaría

de la Defensa Nacional, "Chiapas: Mentiras e Infamias en Contra

del Ejército y Fuerza Aérea Mexicanos," May 1994, pp. 5-10.

33. Benítez Manaut, "El Desafío," pp. 28-30; and IMEP,

Política Mexicana, January 14, 1994, pp. 1-3.

34. March 1994 interview with Mexican government official

who had talked to army officers in Chiapas in January.

35. "La Realidad que Nadie Quería Ver," Epoca, pp. 15-16.

36. Armando Guzmán and Rodrigo Vera, "Militares y Sacerdotes

Se Enfrentan por el Caso de los Dos Oficiales Asesinados e

Incinerados en Chiapas," Proceso, April 12, 1993, pp. 6-9;

Guillermo Correa, "Infantería, Tanquetas, Helicópteros y

Paracaidistas, en los Combates de Ocosingo," Proceso, June 7,

1993, pp. 18-21; "La Guerrilla," Enfoque, p. 19; "La Guerrilla

Zapatista" and "La Realidad," Epoca, pp. 8-13; and Guillermo

Correa, Salvador Corro and Julio César López, "Ominoso Ambiente
23

en Chiapas: Llega Más Tropa, Estrecha el Ejército su Cerco en

Torno del EZLN, los Ganaderos Se Arman," Proceso, February 14,

1994, pp. 22-26.

37. Julio César López and Rodrigo Vera, "Hay Noticias de

Gente Armada en Chiapas, pero no de la Iglesia," Proceso,

September 20, 1993, pp. 27-29; Raymundo Riva Palacio, "Entremés

Dominical," El Financiero, January 23, 1994; Dolia Estévez,

"Profundiza Chiapas Transformaciones Económicas y Políticas:

Washington," El Financiero, February 3, 1994; "La Guerrilla,"

Enfoque, p. 19; and "La Guerrilla Zapatista" and "La Realidad,"

Epoca, pp. 8-9, 13-14.

38. Interview with Mexican official having close ties to

CISN, March 1994; Interview with high-ranking Mexican military

officer, March 1994; and Raymundo Riva Palacio, "Entremés

Dominical," El Financiero, January 23, 1994.

39. Interview with U.S. Embassy official, March 1994; Elena

Gallegos and Emilio Lomas, "Se Integrarán en Guarniciones de

Plaza las Tropas en Chiapas," La Jornada, January 21, 1994;

Raymundo Riva Palacio, "Entremés Dominical," El Financiero, January 23, 1994; and Rodrigo Vera, "Al Tono Negociador del

Gobierno Civil, El General Godínez Sobrepone La Agresividad: `Ni

Son Ejército Ni Son Zapatistas...Son Unos Delincuentes,'"

Proceso, February 14, 1994, p. 19.

40. Carlos Ramírez, "Archivo Político," El Financiero, February 13, 1994; and Stephen J. Wager, "The Mexican Military

Approaches the 21st Century: Coping with a New World Order,"

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College, February 21, 1994, pp. 13-16.

41. Wager, "The Mexican Military," p. 16; Ramirez, "Archivo

Político."

42. Armando Guzmán and Rodrigo Vera, "Militares y Sacerdotes

Se Enfrentan por el Caso de los Dos Oficiales Asesinados e

Incinerados en Chiapas," Proceso, April 12, 1993, pp. 6-9;

Alberto Aguirre, Felipe Cobián and Guillermo Correa, "Los

Asesinos Forcejearon con el Cardenal y su Chofer antes de

Acribillarlos," Proceso, May 31, 1993, pp. 6-13; Carlos Puig,

"Ante la Incapacidad Policiaca, Salinas Adoptó como Suya

Estrategia de Reagan: Militarizar la Lucha Antinarco," Proceso, July 5, 1993, pp. 17-21; and Rodrigo Vera, "Acusa el Clero al

Ejército, Adultera Documentos y Se Divide ante las Marchas,"

Proceso, July 5, 1993, pp. 26-28.

43. Roberto Zamarripa, "Censura Gobernación Declaraciones de

Patrocinio; Luego Rectifica y Vuelve a Censurar," Proceso, October 1993; "Informe de la Comisión de la Verdad 68," La

Jornada, December 17, 1993; Alberto Aguirre and Ignacio Ramírez,

"El General Rivello Aceptó que en el 68 el Ejército Fue Utilizado

Mas Allá de Sus Atribuciones," Proceso, December 27, 1993, pp.
24

12-14; Manuel Robles and Rodrigo Vera, "Ocurrencias,

Contradicciones y Mentiras, los Recursos del Gobierno para Cerrar

Archivos del 68," Proceso, January 3, 1994, pp. 6-9; and Sergio

Aguayo Quezada, "Los Misterios del 68," La Jornada, December 29,

1993.

44. Roberto Zamarripa, "Autoritarismo, Impunidad y Ejercicio

Irracional del Poder dentro del Ejército, Ponen en Riesgo la

Seguridad Nacional," Proceso, December 13, 1993, pp. 20-24;

Octavio Rodríguez Araujo, "El Caso Gallardo," La Jornada,

December 23, 1993; Anthony DePalma, "A Mexican General, in

Prison, Says the Army Flouts Rights," The New York Times,

December 23, 1993; Roberto Zamarripa, "El Ejército No Tolera que

Se Atente Contra Su Decoro; la Meta de Gallardo, un Golpe de

Estado," Proceso, December 27, 1993, pp. 6-11; and Andrew Reding,

"Hold Mexican Military Accountable for Human Rights Abuses,"

Christian Science Monitor, July 20, 1994.

45. See for example, "Abusos del Ejército Mexicano:

Coalición de Grupos Canadienses," El Financiero, January 19,

1994; Oscar Hinojosa and Rodulfo Reyes, "Persisten los Informes

Sobre Civiles Detenidos por Militares," El Financiero, January

20, 1994; Oscar Hinojosa, "Ante la CIDH de la OEA, Informe Sobre

Presuntas Transgresiones del Ejército Mexicano en Chiapas," El

Financiero, February 11, 1994; "Serios Abusos Cometieron Tropas

del Ejército Mexicano en Chiapas," El Financiero, February 23,

1994; and María De Alva, "Denuncian Violaciones a Derechos

Humanos," Reforma, March 17, 1994.

46. Juan Manuel Venegas, "Godínez: Apoya el Ejército una

Solución Negociada y Política," La Jornada, January 28, 1994 and

Amparo Trejo, "Responde Ejército a CNDH," Reforma, March 9, 1994.

47. Sergio Aguayo Quezada, "Comprender a los Militares," La

Jornada, February 16, 1994.

48. Rodolfo Rojas-Zea, "No Cayó el Ejército en Provocación,

Como Quería el 'Grupo Armado'," El Financiero, February 23, 1994;

and Jesús Aranda and Oscar Camacho, "Las ONG, Injustas con el

Ejército: Riviello en Reunión con Legisladores," La Jornada, February 23, 1994.

49. José Reveles, "Manifestación en Apoyo al Ejército y al

Gobierno en Ocosingo," El Financiero, January 15, 1994. See also

Federico Arreola, "Y los Derechos del Ejército," Reforma, January

20, 1994, for an opinion, not uncommon among middle-class

Mexicans, that it was the EZLN that attacked the military, and

that the latter protected unarmed citizens from the rebels.

50. "México Cree en la Lealtad, la Práctica y la Reconoce

Como Valor: Riviello Bazán," La Jornada, February 10, 1994;

Carlos Ramírez, "Archivo Político," El Financiero, February 13,

1994; Carlos Ramírez, "Indicador Político," El Financiero, February 18, 1994; and Amparo Trejo and Julieta Medina, "Somos un
25

Ejército para Lograr la Paz," Reforma, February 20, 1994. One

incident, in particular, angered military leaders. On February

21, Subcomandante Marcos had his picture taken with Peace

Commissioner Camacho Solís, with each man holding one end of the

Mexican flag. Army leaders consider the flag sacred and resented

the sight of the Zapatista leader posing as a patriot. See Ciro

Gómez Leyva, "Molestó a Militares el Episodio de la Bandera

Nacional," El Financiero, February 23, 1994.

51. Scott Morrison, "Come the Crackdown," Mexico Insight,

May 29, 1994; Andrés Oppenheimer, "Mexico Wants U.S. Attack

Copters," The Miami Herald (International Edition), June 11,

1994.

52. Interview, July 1994.

53. Tod Robberson, "Mexican Army Short of Funds and Combat

Experience," The Washington Post, January 19, 1994; Carlos Puig,

"El Ejército Se La Va a Comprar Exigiendo Mayor Participación

Política: Roderic Camp," Proceso, February 14, 1994, pp. 8-9; and

Andrés Oppenheimer, "Mexico Wants U.S. Attack Copters."

54. Interview with Mexican army officer, March 1994; and

Rodulfo Reyes, "Redobla el Ejército el Patrullaje en Tabasco," El

Financiero, April 26, 1994.

55. Most of these ideas were developed as a result of

discussions with two Mexican academics during a visit to Mexican

City in March 1994.

56. Carlos Ramírez, "Indicador Político," El Financiero, February 18, 1994.

57. See Chapter 3 of Stephen J. Wager, "The Mexican Army,

1940-1982: The Country Comes First" (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford

University, 1992) for a detailed analysis.

58. Carlos Puig, "El Ejército," pp. 8-9.

59. Ibid.; and interview with Mexican national security

analyst, March 1994.

60. Wager, "The Mexican Military," p. 3.

61. See, e.g., Andrés Oppenheimer, "Mexico Rebel Leader: I'm

a Poet, not a Politician," The Miami Herald, July 28, 1994;

Andrew Reding, "For Mexico's Rulers, Reform Is Risky. . .," The

Washington Post, August 7, 1994.

62. Tim Golden, "Rebels in Mexico Spurn Peace Plan from

Government," The New York Times, June 13, 1994; and Tod

Robberson, "Zapatista Rebels Reject Mexico's Peace Program," The

Washington Post, June 13, 1994.
26

63. See the Second Lacandona Jungle Declaration, in Foreign

Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Latin America, June

14, 1994, pp. 21-25; Tod Robberson, "Mexico Takes the Initiative

from Rebels," The Washington Post, July 6, 1994.

64. There were, of course, other issues involved in the 1994

election campaign. For a detailed discussion, see Donald E.

Schulz and Edward J. Williams, eds., Mexico Faces the 21st

Century, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, forthcoming, chapter one.

65. According to official figures; Anthony DePalma, "Rebels

Say Mexican Army Is Breaking Terms of Truce," The New York Times,

September 18, 1994.

66. Oppenheimer, "Mexico Rebel Leader."
27

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat<R>Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Acting Director

Colonel William W. Allen

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Authors

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Wager

Dr. Donald E. Schulz

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Mrs. Deloris A. Hutchinson

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Design

Mr. James E. Kistler