NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________ No. 21

- 2886

________________ EMILIO ROMERO,

Appellant

v.
TOWNSHIP OF TOBYHANNA; CHIEF OF POLICE CHRIS WAGNER; DETECTIVE LUCAS BRAY; DETECTIVE MARK WEBB; BOROUGH OF MOUNT POCONO; TOWNSHIP OF COOLBAUGH; TOWNSHIP OF TUNKHANNOCK; TOWNSHIP OF BARRETT; TOWNSHIP OF PARADISE; ADA MICHAEL RACKACZEWSKI

________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D. C. No. 3

- 19

- cv

- 01038) District Judge: Honorable Joseph F. Saporito , Jr.

________________ Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34 .1(a)

on October 20, 2022

Before: GREENAWAY, JR. , MAT E Y and ROTH , Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : March 3 1 , 2023 )

________________ OPINION *

________________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full C ourt and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

RO TH , Circuit Judge

Emilio Romero brought a civil rights action, arising from his arrest on rape and
related charges. The defendants moved for summary judgment
, which was granted by the

District Court. Romero appealed. He contends on appeal that the District Court improperly
granted summary judgment and that it abused its discretion by striking his statement s o f

fact s and deeming the d efendants ’ statements of fact s admitted

. For the reasons below, we

will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

I.

Romero was arrested and charged with rape and other offenses after a sexual
encounter with his wife, which he recorded on his cellphone. 1 Police recovered various
graphic videos that Romero produced of his wife without her knowledge
, using hidden
recording devices. Romero was tried by a jury in state cou rt and acquitted on the sex

offenses but convicted on related charges

. 2 He was sentenced to serve five to twelve years
in prison followed by three years ’ probation

. Romero subsequently brought federal civil rights claims against law enforcement

official s and municipal entities, primarily under 42 U.S.C. § § 1983 and 1981, a s well as

1 Because we write primarily for the parties, we only discuss the facts and proceedings to the extent necessary to resolve t his case

. 2 The other charges included criminal use of a communication facility, possession of the instrument of a crime with intent to employ it criminally, possession of a cont rolled substance, interception of communications, possession of a device for intercepting communications, invasion of privacy, and tampering with evidence.3

several state

- law tort claims

. Defendants moved for summary judgment

. 3 Romero,
however, failed to file responsive statement s of facts pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)

and M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. Nor did he file timely briefs
, respon ding to d efen d ants’ motions
to have their statements of facts deemed admitted for the purposes of summary judgment
, despite the court’s explicit instructions and multiple extensions of time to do so

. As a

result , the court ordered Romero’s statement s of fact s stricken from the record and

d efendants’ statements of fact s admitted for the purposes of summary judgment

.
The District Court then granted summary judgment in favor of the d efendants. That
evening
, Romero filed two motions to vacate the District Court’s order striking his

statement s of facts and deeming d efendants’ statements admitted. Romero cited no rule or
other legal basis for t h e motion s. T he District Court construed the m to be motions to
reconsider under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) because they were filed after entry of final judgment

.
The court denied them.

Romero appeals both the District Court ’s order, striking his statement s of facts and
deeming the d efendants’ statements admitted, and the grant of summary judgment.

II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 2 8 U.S. C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the D istr ict C ourt’s application and

3 Defendants sorted themselves into two separately represented groups in respon se to Romero’s complaint in the District Court and on appeal : The Township defendants and the County defendants. For the purposes of this opinion, we refer to all d efendants collectively.4

interpretation of its local rules for abuse of discretion

. 4 We review orders, granting
summary judgment
, de novo. 5

First, w e find no abuse of discretion in the District Court ’s order to strike Romero’s

statement s of facts and to deem d efendants’ statements admitted. “[L]ocal rules play a
‘vital role in the district courts’ efforts to manage themselves and their dockets,” and
“facilitate the implementation of court policy

. . .. ” 6 For this reason , it is both f itting and
“beyond question that the District Court has the authority to strike filings that fail to comply

with its local rules

. ” 7 Local Rule 56.1 makes plain that “[t] he papers opposing a motion
for summary judgment shall include a separate, short and concise statement of the material
facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the [moving party’s] statement.” 8

The R ule further requires such statements to “include references to the parts of the record
that support the statements.” 9 As we have previously observed, “ the Rule ‘is essential to
the Court’s resolution of a summary judgment motion ’ due to its role in ‘organizing the
evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating precisely how each side
proposed to prove a disputed fact with admissible evidence.’” 10

4 Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc. , 909 F.3d 604 , 613 (3d Cir. 2018)

. 5 Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC , 861 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2017)

. 6 Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Rev. , 922 F.2d 168 , 174 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Smith v. Oelenschlager
, 845 F.2d 1182, 1184 (3d Cir. 1988) ). 7 Weitzner , 909 F.3d at 614

. 8 M . D . Pa. L.R. 56.1. 9 Id. 10 Weitzner , 909 F.3d at 613 (quoting Kramer v. Peerless Indem. Ins. Co. , No. 3 : CV

- 08

- 2096, 2010 WL 11553711, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2010) ).5

Here, the District Court was well within its discretion in strik ing Romero ’s untimely

r esponses to the d efendants’ statements of material facts

. The responses failed to include
required references to the recor d

. Also, Romero failed to file a brief in opposition to the

d efendants’ motions, as explicitly directed both by Local Rule 7.6 and the court’s own

o rder

. 11 We note that the court granted Romero multiple extensions of time to comply with
these requirements, including one sua sponte extension entered three weeks after the
expiration of Romero’s time to respond. A ccordingly, we conclude that the District Court
properly struck Romero’s statement s of facts

.
We also conclude that the District Court’s Sept. 15, 2021 Order
, denying Romero’s

motions to reconsider , was proper. 12 W e discern no error (and Romero indicates none) in
the court’s construction of his filings as motions to reconsider under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
On appeal, Romero presents no factual or legal basis for his claim that the District Court
abused its discretion in denying these motions. Instead, he appears to assert that the District

11 See Md. Pa. L.R. 7. 6 (“ Any party opposing any motion

. . . shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14) days after service of the movant ’ s brief

. . . . Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion. ”); Feb. 4, 2021 , Minute Order ECF No. 93. ( “ [O]pposition briefs to Docs. 84, 86 and 88 due within 14 days of date of Order or motions shall be deemed unopposed.”). 12 See Or der (Sept. 15, 2021), ECF No. 106. We generally review a denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, and we review the District Court ’ s underlying legal determinations de novo and factual determinations for clear error

. Howard Hess Dental Labs., Inc. v. Dentsply Int ’ l, Inc. , 602 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2010 ) ( citing Max ’ s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 , 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining “t he purpose of a motion for reconsideration .

. . is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence ” and noting a court may alter or amend a judgment if the moving party demonstrates “ (1) a n intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court granted the motion for summary judgment; [and/] or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice. ’”).6

Court’s denial constituted an abuse of discretion simply because he filed his motion to
vacate within the filing deadlines contemplated by Local Rules 7.1 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 59

. Such a position is facially meritless. Romero ’s claim that the District Court’s denial will
result in manifest injustice is not supported by any factual basis or legal authority, and we

find none in the record.
Finally, both the record and relevant case law support the District Court’s grant of
summary judgment. On appeal, Romero raises four challenges, each rel iant on th e underlying premise that the District Court improperly found there was probable cause for
his arrest and prosecution. Reviewing the District Court’s determination de novo, w e agree

with the District Court that “it is clear from the record on summary judgment that, on June
22, 2017, authorities had probable cause to initiate the criminal proceedings against

Romero.” 13 Even the facts set forth in Romero’s own appellate brief would support such
a result, including the graphic, detailed witness statement provided by his wife to the
investigating detective shortly after the sexual encounter that precipitated his arrest , and
the corroborating evidence police found in Romero’s home upon execution of a duly

- issued

search warrant

. 14 Romero’s remaining contentions are without merit.

F or the foregoing reason s , we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

13 Op. 28

– 31. 14 See Wilson v. Russo , 212 F.3d 781 , 790 (3d Cir. 2000) ( W ithout “[i]ndependent exculpatory evidence or substantial evidence of the witness’s own unreliability that is known by the arresting officers” to outweigh it, “a positiv e identification by a victim witness, without more, would usually be sufficient to establish probable cause.” ); Sharrar v. Felsing , 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997) (“When a police officer has received a reliable identification by a victim of his or her at tacker, the police have probable cause to arrest.”)

.