Tactical Nuclear Weapons: 

Debunking the Mythology 

John T. Cappello, Gwendolyn M. Hall, 

and Stephen P. Lambert 

INSS Occasional Paper 46 

August 2002 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
ii
iii

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of 

the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. The 

paper is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

******* 

ABOUT THE AUTHORS: 

John T. Cappello, Major, USAF, is Assistant Director of 

Operations/Chief Long Range Planning, 28th Operational Support 

Squadron, 28 BW, Ellsworth Air Force Base, SD, and a B-1 instructor 

pilot. He is a 1986 Graduate from the US Air Force Academy, and he 

holds a MA in Political Science from Wichita State University with a 

focus in Russian studies and Latin America. He was a member of the 

Political Science Department at USAFA from 1995-1998. Three 

previous studies were published by INSS: A Post-Cold War Nuclear 

Strategy Model (Occasional Paper 20, July 1998—that paper was 

awarded the Major General Robert E. Linhard Outstanding INSS 

Researcher Award); “US Counter-proliferation Strategy for a New 

Century” (in Searching for National Security in an NBC World, 

INSS July 2000); and “Triad 2025: The Evolution of a New 

Strategic Force Posture” (in Nuclear Deterrence and Defense: 

Strategic Considerations, February 2001; a version was also 

published under that same title in National Security Studies 

Quarterly, Spring 2001). 

Gwendolyn M. Hall, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, is currently the 

Commander of the Dean of Faculty Squadron Section and a Sequential 

Tour Officer at the Air Force Academy, where she is also a Professor 

of Political Science. She is former Chair of the International Security 

Studies Section (ISSS) of the International Studies Association (ISA). 

She is a member of the ISA Governing Council, and a member of the 

Executive Board of Women in International Security (WIIS). Colonel 

Hall is on the Board of Directors of the Colorado School of 

Professional Psychology, and a Fellow of the Inter-University Seminar 

on Armed Forces and Society. She received a Master of Public Policy, 

and a PhD in Policy Studies from the University of Maryland at 

College Park. Three previous studies were published by INSS: A PostCold War Nuclear Strategy Model (Occasional Paper 20, July 1998—

that paper was awarded the Major General Robert E. Linhard 

Outstanding INSS Researcher Award); “US Counter-proliferation 

Strategy for a New Century” (in Searching for National Security in 

an NBC World, INSS July 2000); and “Triad 2025: The Evolution 

of a New Strategic Force Posture” (in Nuclear Deterrence and 
iv

Defense: Strategic Considerations, February 2001; a version was 

also published under that same title in National Security Studies 

Quarterly, Spring 2001). Colonel Hall is coeditor of Milestones in 

Strategic Arms Control 1945-2000: United States Air Force Roles 

and Outcomes (AU Press, 2002 forthcoming). 

Stephen P. Lambert, Major, USAF, is currently serving as a Special 

Air Missions Pilot with the 99th Airlift Squadron at Andrews AFB, MD. 

Previously an assistant professor and course director in Military 

Strategic Studies at the Air Force Academy, he has also flown the KC135RTR and KC-10 aircraft. Major Lambert was a distinguished 

graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School, (Monterey, 1996) with an 

MA in National Security Affairs (Russian and West European Area 

Studies). He has previously served on the Air Staff (XONP) as a 

summer intern to Gen. Gamble and also participated in numerous staff 

groups with the National Security Policy Division of Sandia National 

Laboratories. INSS published his earlier study Russia’s Crumbling 

Tactical Nuclear Weapons Complex: An Opportunity for Arms Control

(with David A. Miller, Occasional Paper 12, April 1997). Three 

previous studies were also published by INSS: A Post-Cold War 

Nuclear Strategy Model (Occasional Paper 20, July 1998—that paper 

was awarded the Major General Robert E. Linhard Outstanding INSS 

Researcher Award); “US Counter-proliferation Strategy for a New 

Century” (in Searching for National Security in an NBC World, 

INSS July 2000); and “Triad 2025: The Evolution of a New 

Strategic Force Posture” (in Nuclear Deterrence and Defense: 

Strategic Considerations, February 2001; a version was also 

published under that same title in National Security Studies 

Quarterly, Spring 2001).

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: inss@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss
v

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

Introduction: The Definition Problem and Tactical 

 Nuclear Weapons 1 

 What is a Tactical Nuclear Weapon? 1 

 Taking a Step Back: Hiroshima and Nagasaki 3 

 The Limitations of Arms Control 4 

 The New Deterrence Requirements 6 

The Historical Context of Tactical Nuclear Weapons 8 

 Nuclear Weapons and the Transatlantic Link 8 

Tactical Nuclear Weapons and the Triad 10 

 Unilateral Initiatives and the New Environment 10 

Concerns about Russian Nuclear Weapon Security 12 

 The Nature of the Russian Problem 12 

 Recent Developments and Proliferation Concerns 13 

The Future: Taking “Tactical” Out of the Discussion 15 

 Finding #1 16 

 Finding #2 18 

 Finding #3 21 

 Finding #4 23 

Notes 26 
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vii

FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this forty-sixth volume in the 

Occasional Paper series of the United States Air Force Institute for 

National Security Studies (INSS). This paper is a capstone 

document on two levels. First, it is a linked follow-on to Steve 

Lambert’s (with Dave Miller) Russia’s Crumbling Tactical Nuclear 

Weapons Complex: An Opportunity for Arms Control (INSS 

Occasional Paper 12, April 1997). That paper was derived from 

their Naval Postgraduate School thesis, and it was selected for the 

award of the INSS Linhard Outstanding Researcher Award. 

Second, this current paper also caps a remarkable series of closely 

related research by the team of John Cappello, Gwen Hall, and 

Steve Lambert. They previously wrote A Post-Cold War Nuclear 

Strategy Model (INSS Occasional Paper 20, July 1998—also a 

Linhard Award winner); “US Counter-proliferation Strategy for a 

New Century” (in Searching for National Security in an NBC 

World, INSS July 2000); and “Triad 2025: The Evolution of a New 

Strategic Force Posture” (in Nuclear Deterrence and Defense: 

Strategic Considerations, February 2001; a version was also 

published under that same title in National Security Studies 

Quarterly, Spring 2001). This paper brings both tracks full circle 

back to “tactical” nuclear weapons. While this topic is addressed in 

much more exhausting detail in Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. 

Klingenberger, eds. Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: 

Obstacles and Opportunities (INSS, July 2001), this paper offers a 

concise summary of many of the difficult issues presented in 

addressing this category of weapons within nuclear policy and 

posture, and particularly within the arms control arena. Its four 

direct findings are worthy of full consideration and debate as we 

rethink the place and role of tactical nuclear weapons. 

About the Institute

INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy 

Division, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, 

Headquarters US Air Force (HQ USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the 

Faculty, USAF Academy. Our other sponsors include the Secretary 

of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency; the Air Staff’s Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI) and the Air Force's 39th and 

23rd Information Operations Squadrons; the Army Environmental 

Policy Institute; and the Air Force Long-Range Plans Directorate 
viii

(XPXP). The research leading to the papers in this volume was 

sponsored by OSD/NA, DTRA, and XONP. The mission of the 

Institute is “to promote national security research for the 

Department of Defense within the military academic community, 

and to support national security education.” Its research focuses on 

the areas of greatest interest to our organizational sponsors: arms 

control and strategic security; counterproliferation, force protection, 

and homeland security; air and space issues and planning; 

information operations and information warfare; and regional and 

emerging national security issues. 

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for 

defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, 

selects researchers from within the military academic community, 

and administers sponsored research. It also hosts conferences and 

workshops and facilitates the dissemination of information to a wide 

range of private and government organizations. INSS provides 

valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of our sponsors. 

We appreciate your continued interest in INSS and our research 

products. 

JAMES M. SMITH 

 Director 
ix

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS: 

DEBUNKING THE MYTHOLOGY 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

This paper closes out a series of projects already completed by 

the authors to review nuclear weapons and deterrence strategy in the 

post-Cold War world. Previous research addressed the overall 

numbers of nuclear forces, deterring chemical and biological 

threats, and incorporating national and missile defenses. In this 

project, the authors acknowledge the special psychological 

properties of nuclear weapons (regardless of yield and range) and 

the fact that detonation of any nuclear weapon, to include a tactical 

nuclear weapon, would be a “strategic” event. The paper reviews 

the many concerns attached to tactical nuclear systems over time, to 

include recent concerns about security surrounding the Russian 

stockpile. Given all these issues, the authors propose that tactical 

nuclear forces be seen in the context of current and future security 

needs, and that the US not limit its own security needs because of 

problems with the Russian arsenal. 

A recommendation to integrate all nuclear weapons into the US 

nuclear framework is made to enhance deterrence and provide a 

credible response to a variety of threats to US interests, and to 

continue the critical trans-Atlantic link between the US and NATO. 

This accepts both the military and political value of nuclear 

weapons without distinguishing between them because of yield, 

range, target effect, delivery vehicles, or deployment location. This 

is especially important in an environment of declining numbers of 

strategic nuclear systems and the incorporation of missile defenses. 

Recent events have demonstrated the difficulty of formal arms 

control agreements aimed at strategic systems and circumstances of 

the past and the need to address future threats and situations. 

Further, the Bush administration’s reaction to the ABM Treaty, 

particularly the rationale provided, suggests that bilateral arms 

control initiatives will not be as successful in the future as they were 

during the Cold War. 

The paper concludes with four findings recommending that US 

nuclear strategy evolve to include all nuclear systems so they are 

part of a comprehensive nuclear posture. The first finding 

acknowledges the lack of Russian incentive to engage in traditional 

arms control negotiations in any nuclear weapons category other 

than those in the strategic arena. This is primarily due to 
x

weaknesses in Russian conventional forces. Second, even if the 

Russians were motivated to do so, it is not in the interest of the US 

or its allies to become entangled in further agreements on systems 

not previously captured in other treaties. This is the view of the 

current administration. Third, because of the first two findings it is 

clear that for the future, other engagements aside from traditional 

arms control measures, should be the solution for dealing with the 

Russian “problem.” And finally, though historically tactical nuclear 

systems have not been discussed when talking about the US nuclear 

arsenal, the US can enhance deterrence by integrating all US nuclear 

weapons into a comprehensive nuclear posture. 
Tactical Nuclear Weapons: 

Debunking the Mythology 

“one cannot fashion a credible deterrent out of an 

incredible action.”1

INTRODUCTION: THE DEFINITION PROBLEM 

AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

What is a Tactical Nuclear Weapon? 

The very question brings forth a conundrum of difficult and 

challenging issues--directly related to security strategy, doctrine, 

and arms control. A brief survey of respected and knowledgeable 

experts in the field of nuclear and defense policy reveals the depth 

and breadth of the definitional problem. According to some of 

these academics and officials, a “tactical” nuclear weapon is 

• a nuclear weapon used on the battlefield2

• any nuclear weapon not limited or captured by 

SALT and START counting rules3

• any nuclear weapon delivered by shorter 

range systems4

• a nuclear weapon used in a regional 

contingency or deployed to strengthen 

deterrence in a regional contingency—

essentially weapons deployed overseas to meet 

a step in the escalation ladder5

• all nuclear weapons not limited by the START 

negotiations6

• a nuclear weapon with operational military 

war-fighting capabilities7

• a weapon that can be used with strategic 

effect, and has relatively long range and 

identical or similar capabilities [to strategic 

weapons]8
2

The typical array of potential characteristics tends to include range, 

yield, target effect, delivery vehicle, deployment location, or a 

definition based on an exclusion from other classes or weapons 

types. In addition, numerous labels associated with these types of 

nuclear weapons have proliferated throughout the literature. 

According to one recent analysis, besides the term “tactical,” these 

systems have also been described as non-strategic nuclear forces 

(NSNF), intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), shorter-range or 

short-range, battlefield, theater, or sub-strategic nuclear weapons.9

 

With regard to the word “tactical,” it seems that two meanings have 

developed in the course of the nuclear age. One the one hand, 

“tactical” relates to range—its origins are in the theories articulated 

by the inter-war strategic airpower thinkers—this being the 

predominant viewpoint used during the Cold War to distinguish 

between “tactical” and “strategic” systems.10 The second meaning 

of “tactical” seems to relate to function, the manner in which the 

employment of such a weapon affects the course of events on the 

battlefield—this being the classical understanding of the term 

“tactical.”11 

However, can a nuclear weapon even be considered in a 

“tactical” or theater-level sense, especially given the immense 

political and strategic pressures that would inevitably follow the 

detonation of such a weapon? During the Cold War, “tactical” or 

sub-strategic nuclear weapons were developed and produced by 

both sides in mass quantities, and included air-delivered gravity 

bombs. That the latter, in particular, should be labeled as a 

“tactical” weapon is somewhat dubious. A nuclear gravity bomb 

that is delivered from a bomber or fighter-bomber platform from 

thousands of miles away (with limited warning) is more of an 
3

offensive, deep-strike, strategic system than a “tactical” weapon. In 

many ways, the entire class of “tactical” nuclear weapons runs into 

a doctrinal malaise. In a real sense, it is the effect—both militarily 

on the target, and politically on the system—that should define the 

class of weapon or employment. Many would argue that a nuclear 

detonation is a strategic event, politically and militarily, regardless 

of the yield or the delivery means. 

Taking A Step Back: Hiroshima and Nagasaki

In order to fully exploit this argument, it would be helpful to 

take a step back and briefly review the only historical example of an 

actual nuclear use during wartime. More often than not, the 

discussion relating to “tactical” nuclear weapons tends to be 

ensnared in the day-to-day technical debates regarding arms control, 

deterrence strategy, or targeting policy. Decision makers, 

academics, and military planners alike loose sight of the immense 

capabilities of the weapons they are theorizing about. After all, 

both atomic weapons dropped on Japan during World War II were 

below 20 kilotons in their explosive power. Most today would 

consider that a relatively low-yield “tactical” weapon. 

On the sixth of August, 1945, the Enola Gay, an American B29 bomber, flew over the city of Hiroshima and dropped a lone 

bomb named Little Boy. 

[The explosion] created a fireball 18,000 feet in diameter. 

Near the center, people became nothing; within nine 

seconds, 100,000 people were killed or fatally injured. 

Two hours later, drops of black rain the size of marbles 

began to fall on the city. . . . Shadows of Hiroshima’s 

citizens were burned onto sidewalks and on the sides of 

buildings. Patterns of victim’s clothes were burned into 

their skin. . . . On the twelfth day after Hiroshima was 

bombed . . . the survivors’ wounds began to open. On the 

fourteenth day, hair began to fall from their heads. Skin 
4

came off in patches; there was vomiting, diarrhea, bleeding 

from gums, and nausea. 12

Significantly, in one spectacular instant, all key functions of 

municipal agencies, all means of defense, relief, medical care, 

police protection, and firefighting, were destroyed or thrown into 

confusion.13 Because of the immense disorder surrounding the city 

after the bombing, it is impossible to know exactly how many 

people were directly effected, but most moderate estimates conclude 

that around 130,000 people died within three months of the 

explosion.14 As Thomas Schelling concluded in Arms and 

Influence, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were “weapons of terror and 

shock. They hurt, and promised more hurt, and that was their 

purpose. The few ‘small’ weapons we had were undoubtedly of 

some direct military value, but their enormous advantage was in 

pure violence.”15 These weapons were, as Schelling noted, “in the 

tradition of Sheridan against the Comanches and Sherman in 

Georgia.”16 The point is that even a so-called “tactical” 20 kiloton 

nuclear weapon is capable of dramatic shock and destruction—and 

the efficacy of deterrence relies on signaling that message. 

The Limitations of Arms Control

It is unfortunate that the dynamic of arms control—and its 

requirement to categorize and sometimes artificially label weapons 

in order to simply allow counting their numbers—has removed an 

awareness of the immense destructive fire power of each “tactical” 

nuclear weapon. While battlefield effects may vary based on the 

yields of various nuclear weapons, it is not tautological to state that 

a “nuclear weapon remains a nuclear weapon.” To attempt to 

classify the extremely large number of “tactical” weapons not 

limited by previous arms control arrangements leads to several 
5

negative consequences. First, it reduces the discussion to a fruitless 

effort to categorize warheads or weapons that have thus far 

presented no productive way of being classified—due in large part 

to their great diversity, quantity, and the secrecy with which they 

are held. Second, it fundamentally ignores the strategic effect and

political consequences that the future employment of any nuclear 

weapon will invariably have. Third, it reduces the overarching 

impact of nuclear deterrence by implying that the category of 

nuclear weapons artificially dubbed as “tactical” are somehow more 

“usable” or “less destructive” than other nuclear weapons. While a 

20 kiloton yield may be mathematically smaller than a one megaton 

yield, the destructive firepower of the smaller nuclear weapon 

remains so far above the conventional threshold that it still retains a 

dramatic qualitative and quantitative difference in physical damage 

and human casualty potential. Fourth, it ignores, and possibly 

diminishes, the fundamental psychological element of nuclear 

weapons—that part of the nuclear equation that promises to inflict 

unimaginable terror, shock, and destruction on the enemy. 

Future discussions regarding national security, deterrence 

strategy, targeting policy, employment doctrine, or arms control 

should instead simply refer to nuclear weapons and non-nuclear 

weapons. As Ambassador Robert Joseph has aptly stated, “we must 

not make this more difficult than it is. Not every element of this 

complex security environment is complex. In fact, some things are 

clear. This is the case with TNF, where old arms control notions—

perhaps jazzed-up somewhat—represent nothing more than a 

problem masquerading as a solution.”17 According to Dr. Keith 

Payne at the National Institute for Public Policy, the clear-cut 

distinction between nuclear vis-à-vis non-nuclear weapons 
6

underscores their value to deterrence in the mind of national 

political leaders: The difference between the two is stark and 

definitive and thereby serves to enhance nuclear impact throughout 

the deterrence spectrum. It avoids a graying of deterrence, and 

simplifies or sharpens the deterrence discussion.18

The New Deterrence Requirements

The United States should be prepared to engage and move 

forward in this area. This paper closes out a series of projects 

completed by the authors directly engaging nuclear weapons and 

deterrence strategy in the post-Cold War world. By means of a 

brief review, our previous work has concluded that while the 

concept of deterrence is not in danger, it will not require the same 

number of weapons or even the same weapons mix that was deemed 

necessary during the Cold War. In fact, deterrence must continue to 

evolve, as traditional deterrence by punishment may not be credible 

nor militarily effective against the many Tier II threats armed with 

chemical or biological weapons capabilities. Concern about these 

threats has been heightened since the September 11, 2001 terrorist 

attacks on the US. 

In order to address these Tier II threats, defenses will need to 

become an integral part of a new approach to deterrence and its 

required force posture.19 Defenses can indeed be vitally synergistic 

within a comprehensive deterrence and counter-proliferation 

strategy. Our most recent work suggested a New Logic with which 

to proceed in today’s multi-polar security environment.20 It put 

forth an intellectual framework, and created a new mix of offensive 

nuclear and defensive forces which effectively suppress the 

capabilities of Tier II states with smaller NBC forces, while 

preserving robust deterrence vis-à-vis the primary Tier I states, the 
7

Russian Federation and China. It called for an evolution of 

deterrence strategy away from mutual vulnerability toward 

protection and assurance. This last project concluded that, over 

time, the New Logic might begin to de-escalate the historical search 

for security based on higher numbers of nuclear weapons. These 

results from prior research led us toward this new effort, an attempt 

to integrate all nuclear weapons into the framework in order to 

enhance deterrence and to provide a credible response to a variety 

of threats to US interests. An adversary has to believe that you 

could and would use a particular nuclear response. This is the 

essence of deterrence. Therefore, you need a range of credible 

responses to engage a variety of threats. 

Looking at “tactical” nuclear forces in the context of former

security needs and circumstances does not allow for a thorough or 

even useful examination of these weapon systems. Current and 

future security needs should be the guide to how all nuclear 

weapons are considered within US national security policy. While 

there is a legitimate concern about the Russian tactical nuclear 

arsenal, leading arms control enthusiasts to focus on these weapons, 

the US should not limit its own security needs because Russia has a 

problem with its arsenal. To do so could result in the US losing its 

military flexibility and its political-military link to its European 

allies. As Dr. David Kay, the former UNSCOM inspector in Iraq 

has stated, “do not treat the hemorrhaging of the old Soviet 

stockpile of weapons and technology as an arms control issue. It is 

essential that . . . [we] clearly lay before the Russians the choice we 

face. Unless Russia itself brings order and control over its 

storehouse of weapons of mass destruction, the US and others will 

have no choice but to undertake greater defensive measure to 
8

protect themselves against the certainty that these weapons will fall 

into the hands of dangerous states and groups.”21

This paper examines the historical context in which “tactical” 

nuclear weapons have been considered, including the transatlantic 

linkage to NATO, their place within the US nuclear arsenal, and 

recent unilateral initiatives by the US and Russia. It then briefly 

reviews Russia’s stockpile management issues, to include recent 

transparency regimes and bilateral cooperation attempts. The paper 

concludes with four findings that ultimately recommend that US 

nuclear strategy evolve to include all nuclear systems. Accordingly, 

all US nuclear weapons should become part of a comprehensive 

nuclear posture.*

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 

OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

Nuclear Weapons and the Transatlantic Link

Much has been written about “tactical” nuclear weapons, both 

positive and negative, since they became part of the US-NATO 

relationship. In 1953, the US offered NATO small yield and shortrange tactical nuclear weapons as a means to provide firepower with 

less manpower.22 Support for these weapons, though expressed in 

public less frequently than in the past, continues through today. US 

nuclear weapons deployed in Europe have been cited for their 

benefits in sustaining the transatlantic link between the US and its 

NATO allies, as an obvious deterrent to weapons of mass 

 

*

 This paper is constrained, by historical necessity, to use a variety of 

names (tactical, non-strategic, TNF, NSNF, etc.) to refer to these 

weapons. Though less than desirable, this definitional confusion 

persists through the current context. As previously mentioned, one of 

the findings by the authors is to recommend a change in terminology 

simply to nuclear and non-nuclear weapons.
9

destruction held by an adversary, and as a possible deterrent to 

aggression by Tier II states.23

As Jeffrey Larson states in a recently published comprehensive 

review of non-strategic nuclear weapons and the problems 

associated with them, these weapons were an integral part of 

NATO’s triad of conventional forces, tactical nuclear weapons in 

theater, and US, British, and French strategic systems.24 That 

book’s authors note what most accept as gospel: these non-strategic 

weapons are part of the transatlantic link to the US. The US now 

has an arsenal of about 1,300 gravity bombs delivered by tactical 

aircraft, and about 320 nuclear Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles 

(TLAM-N) delivered by submarine.25 According to the Natural 

Resources Defense Council, 150 tactical nuclear weapons are 

deployed at 10 bases in seven European nations.26

Though some believe that there is little military rationale for 

these weapons, they continue to play an important symbolic and 

political role.27 “A survey by the Atlantic Council of the United 

States in the mid-1990s observed that the overwhelming consensus 

among political leaders and strategic thinkers in Europe was that it 

is premature to address major changes in future nuclear force 

postures.”28 From this one can conclude that at least in this public 

context, there is no interest among the European allies to reduce or 

eliminate US non-strategic nuclear weapons. The 1999 NATO New 

Strategic Concept states that “The fundamental purpose of the 

nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and 

prevent coercion of any kind of war. They will continue to fulfill an 

essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of the aggressor 

about the nature of the Allies’ response to military aggression.”29 

Furthermore, the Concept states that European sub-strategic nuclear 
10

forces “provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, 

reinforcing the transatlantic link.”30 

Tactical Nuclear Weapons and the Triad 

Historically, tactical nuclear weapons have not been discussed 

when talking about the US nuclear arsenal, the US Triad does not 

incorporate non-strategic nuclear forces, and only some are 

integrated into the SIOP. Traditionally, non-strategic nuclear 

weapons were distinguished in terms of yield and range. One 

reason for the many categories and classifications of nuclear 

weapons was the need to count those weapons so as to arrive at 

some perceived level of parity that gave the US and the Soviet 

Union/Russia a feeling of stability. Though, in the past, they had 

much smaller yields than strategic weapons, “considerable overlap 

currently exists in the yields of strategic and non-strategic nuclear 

weapons.”31 As Andrea Gabbitas notes, US non-strategic nuclear 

weapons have yields as high as 170 kilotons and Russia has yields 

up to one megaton.32 Regardless of yield, nuclear weapons have a 

psychological property not found in other weapon systems. And 

because of their “special nature” the authors of this study agree with 

Linton Brooks’ assertion that “by any rational definition, all nuclear 

weapons are strategic.”33 

Unilateral Initiatives and the New Environment

Some argue that tactical nuclear weapons are more trouble than 

they are worth; thus, they are suitable candidates for arms control 

initiatives leading to drastic reductions or elimination. In June 

1991, President Bush ordered the military to unilaterally cut its 

arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons, though some still remain 

in Europe. All nuclear weapons, including TLAM-Ns, were 

removed from surface ships and stored ashore, though they can still 
11

be deployed on submarines.34 Between 1991 and 1993 US tactical 

nuclear weapons were reduced by 85 percent, and related weapons 

storage sites were reduced by more than 80 percent.35

In 1997 Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed that 

tactical nuclear weapons would be included in the strategic arms 

limitations talks.36 This did not happen. Tactical nuclear weapons 

are said to have lost prominence in Air Force planning, and plans to 

use them may expire when the F-15, F-16, and F-117 are retired 

from service (there are no plans to integrate them aboard the F22).37 The Army is out of the tactical nuclear weapons business, 

and the Navy’s tactical nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles are not 

carried aboard Navy vessels. The B-61 nuclear gravity bomb is 

presently the only “tactical” nuclear weapon deployed by DoD.38 

As a result, some policy makers are concerned about the US 

being at a possible strategic disadvantage if there are deep 

reductions in strategic arsenals and the Russians maintain their 

numerical advantage in non-strategic nuclear weapons. Also, there 

has been concern in some quarters that Russia might withdraw from 

Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces arms control 

agreements as well as the START II treaty as the US abrogates the 

ABM Treaty.39 In December 2001 President Bush announced that 

the US would withdraw from this treaty. It is unclear how the 

recent cooperation between the US and Russia in combating 

terrorism might lessen these concerns. 

There seems to be an implicit assumption among some in the 

policy community that since the US reduced its non-strategic 

arsenal—and the Russians have many more of these weapons than 

the US—there is an automatic requirement for binding negotiations 

to reduce the Russian arsenal, especially given Russia’s apparent 
12

problems in securing it. The same people tend to believe that arms 

control measures can fix these “problems.” Condolezza Rice’s 

recent comments about arms control’s usefulness in making 

strategic nuclear weapons cuts are relevant to this discussion about 

tactical nuclear systems. Dr. Rice said that the Bush administration 

believes that “the old arms control agreements in which you match 

warhead for warhead, system for system, ignoring geography, 

ignoring history, ignoring threats around you, was the old way of 

thinking about this.”40

CONCERNS ABOUT RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

SECURITY

The Nature of the Russian Problem 

The US has been actively engaged in attempts to help the 

Russians secure their nuclear weapons arsenal. These efforts 

include: helping to ensure reliable command and control; 

decreasing the vulnerability to theft of nuclear stockpiles; enhancing 

the safety of nuclear facilities and weapons grade material; 

improving verification procedures; and curbing the diffusion of 

nuclear-related technologies and equipment.41 A bipartisan panel 

report to the Secretary of Energy concludes that uncontrolled 

nuclear weapons material in the former Soviet Union is “the most 

urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today.”42

Previous work by the authors has analyzed the nature of 

Russian woes in this area, to include (1) physical and technical 

security challenges, (2) operational doctrine including predelegation and de-escalation, (3) nuclear dependency in the face of 

conventional force degradation, (4) considerable shortcomings in 

stockpile consolidation and stewardship efforts, and (5) challenges 

with demoralized personnel and resultant internal security 
13

problems.43 Assuming that either Russia and/or the United States 

were to engage on this issue, there remain tremendous potential 

difficulties including (1) initial declarations and accuracy in original 

base-line warhead numbers, (2) the detection of non-declared 

warheads and the presence of intrusive monitoring regimes, and (3) 

the verified elimination of warheads that have been previously 

declared. Additionally, what are the ramifications of actually 

counting warheads and which ones will be accountable and/or 

considered operational and which ones will be considered “on 

reserve?” 

The Nunn-Lugar program, formally known as the Cooperative 

Threat Reduction Act, was passed in January 1991. Through it and 

similar efforts, the US spends about $700 million per year to help 

secure the Russian arsenal. In January 2001, the Baker-Cutler task 

force recommended that the US spend up to $30 billion over the 

next eight to ten years to improve Russian nuclear stockpile 

security.44 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is reviewing the 

CTR program and its benefits. He indicated that, “We would not 

want the US investment in the CTR program to become the means 

by which Russia frees up resources to finance its military 

modernization programs.”45 

Recent Deployment and Proliferation Concerns

There were reports in January 2001 that in June of the previous 

year Russia moved tactical nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad, a 

military base in Eastern Europe, possibly in response to NATO 

expansion and to compensate for Russia’s crumbling conventional 

military forces.46 Nevertheless, a Russian Foreign Ministry 

spokesman automatically disputed such reports saying that none of 

the Baltic Fleet’s forces located in Kaliningrad “has ever had any 
14

tactical nuclear weapons.”47 Concerns about Russian placement of 

non-strategic nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad continue to motivate 

arms control enthusiasts to find ways to reduce the Russian 

stockpile, if not eliminate it entirely. And there are concerns about 

Russian initiatives to develop new “pin point” tactical nuclear 

weapons to compensate for its conventional forces’ shortcomings.48 

The recent terrorist attacks on US soil have raised considerable 

attention and discussion about whether or not terrorists have been 

successful in obtaining Russian nuclear material and weapons. It 

was recently reported in the Wall Street Journal that a Russian 

three-star general told reporters that terrorists had attempted to 

penetrate Russia’s nuclear weapons facilities.49 The chief of the 

Russian Defense Ministry said there were two attempts by terrorists 

to penetrate Russian nuclear storage facilities.50 And it is thought 

that the Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network has tried to buy 

nuclear material stolen from the former Soviet states.51 

Notwithstanding these concerns, a singular focus on problems 

with the Russian arsenal detracts from a more proper focus on US 

security interests and what these interests require in terms of 

maintaining a credible deterrence posture. For example, there have 

been suggestions that the US alter its deployment posture by 

centralizing its non-strategic nuclear forces in a limited number of 

storage sites, with the Russians doing the same. One motivation for 

this proposal is concern about Russian control over its nuclear 

warheads.52 But, this centralized approach would limit US 

flexibility to both deter and retaliate if necessary.53 Furthermore, 

the so-called cantonement of warheads dramatically increases their 

vulnerability, making them susceptible to sabotage and preemption. 
15

Though wanting to influence the Russian non-strategic arsenal 

and its policies about its use are desirable goals, especially in 

attempting to create a more secure environment for what many 

consider to be a troublesome weapons category, the US should first 

consider its own security needs. The US should posture those needs 

in the most advantageous way—militarily, to engage emerging 

threats and politically, to enhance its alliance relationships. 

THE FUTURE: TAKING “TACTICAL” OUT OF THE 

DISCUSSION 

Much of the definitional malaise involving so-called tactical 

nuclear weapons resulted from the Cold War requirement to either 

(1) purposefully exclude these systems from arms control regimes 

or (2) ultimately include them in some type of arms control agenda 

in the future. Therefore, any future progress in dealing with these 

weapons must be disconnected from previous Cold War arms 

control logic. Arms control no longer holds the promise that it was 

once thought to have in this arena. Indeed, traditional arms control 

has only a limited ability to capture this highly diverse and multidimensional class of weaponry. Instead of an approach based on 

arms control, the authors of this paper advance the following 

findings: 

► There is little incentive for the Russians to engage in 

traditional arms control in nuclear weaponry outside of 

previous strategic protocols. 

► It is not in the interest of the United States or its allies 

to entangle themselves in further agreements that affect 

nuclear weapons not previous captured in other 

treaties. 
16

► The prescription for the future involves seeking 

engagement through other means aside from traditional 

arms control venues. 

► The US should enhance deterrence by integrating all 

nuclear weapons into a comprehensive nuclear posture. 

Finding #1: There is little incentive for the Russians to 

engage in traditional arms control in nuclear weaponry outside 

of previous strategic protocols. The Russians have little incentive 

to meet the United States at the arms control table in this area. In a 

recent study, Dr. David Yost explains four primary reasons why the 

Russians are unlikely to agree to engage in discussions regarding 

reductions in tactical nuclear weapons, much less codify them in a 

formalized agreement. “The first is Russia’s conventional military 

weakness. This weakness is largely a function of the country’s 

economic problems, which are unlikely to be overcome for many 

years.”54 According to Yost, the second reason involves NATO’s 

conventional military superiority. “While Russian analysts include 

China and other potential non-Western adversaries in their 

assessment of NSNF requirements, in Russian eyes the Atlantic 

alliance’s military posture currently towers above all other security 

threats.”55 Alexei Arbatov, the vice chairman of the defense 

committee of the Duma, stated the following in a July 2000 paper: 

During the next 10 years, in addition to holding superiority 

in Europe of approximately 2:1, or even 3:1, NATO will 

also possess a substantial nuclear superiority. . . . 

However, due to the failures of Russian military reform 

from 1992-1997 and chronic underfunding of Russian 

defense from 1998-1999 (in constant prices, during these 3 

years, the military budget has fallen by 50 per cent), 

qualitative factors (training, combat readiness, command 

and control, troop morale, and technical sophistication of 

weapons and equipment, etc.) are presently even more 
17

favorable to NATO than pure numerical ratios might 

indicate.56

Thirdly, Russia justifies its nuclear forces by looking beyond 

NATO’s capabilities to its perceived intentions. NATO’s 

operations in Kosovo and the former Yugoslavia significantly 

impacted the perceptions of Russian defense officials and military 

planners. The Russian defense minister, Igor Sergeyev, indicated 

that 

The fullest and most graphic significance of these threats to 

Russia’s national security manifested itself in the course of 

NATO’s expansion to the East and their aggression against 

Yugoslavia. . . . From a military-political point of view, 

this war signified, in essence, the beginning of a new era of 

not just military, but also general history. An era of the 

open, military-force dictate of the US in relation to other 

countries, to include its allies.57

Finally, according to Yost, the “fourth reason for a low level of 

interest in NSNF arms control is that Russian military doctrine and 

policy assign several important functions to Russia’s nuclear 

weapons and to NSNF in particular.”58 These functions are: 

1. To deter external aggression. 

2. To serve as an “equalizer” or “counterbalance” to the conventional force superiority 

of potential adversaries. 

3. To help maintain the “combat stability” of 

forces engaged in an operation. 

4. To make possible the “de-escalation” of 

conventional conflicts. 

5. To make it possible for Russia to conduct 

limited nuclear strikes in a regional (or theater) 

war while avoiding an escalation to 

intercontinental nuclear operations or any 

other geographical extension of the conflict. 
18

6. To inhibit the intervention of outside powers 

(such as the United States or NATO) in 

regional conflicts involving Russia. 

7. To substitute for advanced, long-range, nonnuclear precision strike systems that, Russian 

authorities hold, “have begun to approach the 

role of nuclear weapons” in their significance. 

8. To constitute assets for the high command to 

change the correlation of forces in specific 

theaters or sectors of military operations. 

9. To compensate, at least to some extent, for 

reductions in Russia’s strategic nuclear forces.

59

In a general sense, the Russians tend to view “tactical” 

nuclear systems as weapons that have operational or 

military utility, i.e. war fighting value. They tend to view 

strategic systems as weapons that are used for political 

effects, i.e. the prevention of war and deterrence. 

Therefore, for the foreseeable future, and with no changes 

to the current economic forecast in Russia, there seems to 

be little likelihood for a Russian willingness to engage on 

this issue. 

Finding #2: It is not in the interest of the United States or 

its allies to entangle itself in further agreements that affect 

nuclear weapons not previous captured in other treaties. The 

potential outcomes of any formalized regime with the Russians 

could prove to be quite costly to the United States and its allies. 

First, any future negotiation involving tactical nuclear weapons 

would invariably allow the Russians to build legitimacy to their 50 

plus year claim to pressure the United States to remove its nuclear 

weapons from NATO Europe. Russian political maneuvering in 

this area may very well undercut NATO’s strategic posture, and 
19

generate pressure to withdraw the remaining weapons deployed in 

Europe. 

Second, initiating TNF arms control would likely further 

undercut domestic support for maintaining current US capabilities 

in this area.60 It is also likely to constrain the present force 

structure, and limit future requirements for these types of weapons. 

One strategic concern is the debate about deterring Tier II states 

with weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological 

weapons, and more recently radiological weapons). Even before the 

Gulf War, former Assistant Secretary of Defense Harold Smith 

identified the B-61 nuclear bomb as “a weapon of choice against the 

Libyan chemical weapons program.”61 Maynard Glitman notes that 

the NATO Alliance Strategic Concept acknowledges the usefulness 

of NATO’s conventional and nuclear forces as a deterrent to the use 

of NBC weapons and prevents their proliferation.62 More recently, 

terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001 and the anthrax scares 

soon thereafter raised this concern to new heights. 

Dr. C. Paul Robinson, the director of Sandia National 

Laboratories, favors the US developing a new class of nuclear 

weapons that would deter small aggressors. Stephen Younger, the 

new head of DoD’s Threat Reduction Agency, has recommended 

smaller nuclear weapons as part of a “fundamental rethinking of the 

role of nuclear weapons.”63 These weapons would be small, lowyield, satellite-guided, extremely accurate, and able to kill a state’s 

leadership and military without killing a lot of civilians.64 This type 

of weapon would be used for destroying deeply buried bunkers. 

Advocates of this weapon say it will also allow the US to reduce its 

current stockpile of more powerful warheads.65 There is some 

belief that a “new” nuclear weapon could lead to stockpile 
20

reductions by permitting one to retire the “city-busters” in the 

current stockpile, and yield cost savings.66

With appropriate planning and training dual capable 

systems could target much of the strategically relevant 

world. Thus the number and mix of dual-capable systems 

and theater nuclear forces the US and opponents maintain 

is likely to affect US “strategic” nuclear requirements. US 

strategic weapons requirements could, for example, 

decrease if the US possessed robust theater capabilities, just 

as Russia’s robust theater forces almost certainly ease its 

strategic force requirements.67

Younger notes that while some precision-guided long-range 

conventional weapons might be able to take on some roles currently 

assigned to nuclear weapons, road mobile missiles carrying 

weapons of mass destruction may still require a nuclear weapon for 

assured destruction.68 This would apply to other hard targets as 

well (e.g., missile silos, command and control). In addition, a lowyield nuclear weapon might be “more useful against lesser powers 

that may not be deterred by large nuclear weapons that cause 

massive collateral damage,” so their “increased probability of use 

would provide a greater deterrent.”69 Though some argue that 

deploying a weapon of this type indicates a move towards a warfighting doctrine, others believe it would enhance deterrence 

because high-yield weapons are considered to be self-deterring in 

some cases.

70

Third, implementing an arms control regime in this sphere is, 

according to some, a prescription for paralysis. According to 

Ambassador Robert Joseph, “given the inherent monitoring and 

verification limitations that would be associated with theater 

[nuclear] forces—from production to destruction—the outcome 

would not lead to high confidence in compliance.”71 Dr. David 

Kay, the former chief UNSCOM’s inspector in Iraq, explains that in 
21

a TNF regime, “you would need to have very high fidelity in 

verification, which is going to be very, very tough.” The obstacles 

to be confronted would include, but not be limited to, verification, 

command and control, diversity of weapon types and ranges, and 

the complexities inherent in dealing with dual-capable delivery 

systems. In addition, any TNF agreement would have to be global 

to be efficacious, thereby involving Russia, France, Great Britain, 

China, India, and Pakistan. It is unlikely that most, if not all, of 

these countries would be willing participants. 

As Ambassador Joseph has pointed out, “it may well be that the 

greatest potential problems associated with theater nuclear forces 

are those that could result from pursuing TNF arms control, 

especially if pursued as an end in itself.”72 

Finding #3: The prescription for the future involves seeking 

engagement through other means aside from traditional arms 

control venues. Recent scholarship recognizes the search for 

solutions outside the boundaries of traditional arms control. “With 

the Cold War over and enthusiasm waning for negotiating new, 

formal arms control agreements involving complex monitoring and 

verification regimes, legally binding controls aimed specifically at 

NSNF do not seem to be technically or politically practical.”73 

Instead, the United States should (1) focus its efforts on establishing 

a cooperative environment that incorporates, to the greatest extent 

possible, multi-lateral transparency measures, while also (2) placing 

a premium on rigorous intelligence gathering. 

There are numerous avenues for transparency measures. They 

include previously established programs such as the Cooperative 

Threat Reduction (CTR) program. Other promising approaches 

include nuclear warhead transparency regimes that might involve 
22

stockpile stewardship, infrastructure, dismantlement, and fissile 

materials disposition monitoring exchanges. While these programs 

may not produce concretely measurable results or tangible 

verification regimes, they do encourage and promote some sense of 

international understanding and cooperation. Their utility 

ultimately rests, according to Dr. Yost, in their ability (1) to 

reassure Western publics in the place of, or as a substitute for, 

normal arms control; (2) to act as a contact builder with the Russian 

nuclear weapons community, and a direct financial support to 

Russian WMD experts, thereby moderating their need to seek 

employment in other less desirable places; (3) to represent official 

engagement between Russia the United States in the public eye; and 

(4) due to the financial aspects of the programs, they have a 

definitive attraction for the Russians.74 

This type of engagement will require the United States to 

remain vigilant and to continually assess the situation through 

various intelligence gathering and analysis efforts. To lend some 

focus to the problem at hand, the United States should concentrate 

on the most threatening weapons types. To try to control the entire 

spectrum is both unrealistic and unnecessary. Which weapons 

frustrate the United States’ ability to meet its national objectives 

and its commitments to allies? The weapons that fit this description 

tend to include the air-delivered and submarine-launched categories. 

These nuclear warheads are mated to delivery systems that have the 

ability to reach out over strategic distances, not only directly 

holding US sovereignty at risk, but also US allies, and US forces 

engaged in military operations throughout the world. Ironically, 

these weapons and delivery systems also seem to be the ones the 

Russians are remanufacturing, upgrading, and modernizing. 
23

According to Dr. Nikolai Sokov, a Russian defense analyst, Russian 

warhead remanufacturing is concentrated on the following delivery 

systems: new medium bomber research and development, T-22M 

Backfire upgrades, air- and sea-based short and long-range cruise 

missile development, and the Iskander, a new tactical ballistic 

missile.75 Due to the nature of these types of weapons, they are also 

likely to be forward-deployed during times of increased tension. 

According to Dr. Kay, who was intimately involved in searching for 

Iraqi WMD concealment and dispersal methods, there are several 

classic signals that aid in tracking forward deployment of these 

types of weapons: 

• the physical signature of the actual weapon 

(neutrons emitted by the warhead) 

• temporary storage facilities 

• specialized security forces 

• classic logistical configurations for special 

weapons support 

• SIGINT associated with nuclear security forces 

• training and operational patterns 

• specialized unit characteristics that are designated 

as WMD capable76

By placing a premium on intelligence gathering and analysis, by 

concentrating on deployment patterns, and by using all National 

Technical Methods (NTMs) available to gain information and 

access about an adversary’s WMD programs, the United States can 

add credibility to overt confidence building and negotiated 

transparency programs like the Nunn-Lugar program. 

Finding #4: The US should enhance deterrence by 

integrating all nuclear weapons into a comprehensive nuclear 

posture. The New Logic77 of deterrence requires a set of enhanced 
24

capabilities and strategies. No longer does the US have the 

convenience of carefully plotting a bilateral deterrence relationship 

with a well-studied and reasonably predictable adversary. The 

realities of the new global environment demand multi-dimensional 

deterrence that is postured against primary Tier I threats as well as a 

multitude of potential Tier II adversaries. More than ever, as Gen. 

Eugene Habiger, the former CINC of USSTRATCOM indicated, 

“deterrence is a package of capabilities, encompassing not just 

numbers or weapons, but an assured retaliatory capability provided 

by a diversified, dispersed, and survivable force with positive 

command and control and effective intelligence and warning 

systems.”78 Nuclear weapons serve to signal the “determination to 

maintain the military capability and willingness to ensure global 

stability and to frustrate, with speed and decisiveness, those who 

would attempt to overturn that stability.”79 But the threat of nuclear 

weapons must be made real and credible to ensure that deterrence is 

robust. The psychological element of nuclear deterrence must be 

preserved. Jonathan Shell correctly emphasized that “A central 

lesson of deterrence theory is that the psychological effects of 

nuclear arms are as important as the physical ones.” 

Whether in the Cold War or post-Cold War period, the first 

step in understanding deterrence is to recognize that it is a 

psychological function. Confident claims that any 

particular strategic nuclear balance is “stable,” or that any 

particular adjustment to that balance will be “stabilizing” or 

“destabilizing” should be viewed with great skepticism 

because deterrence, properly understood, involves much 

more than comparing relative force capabilities. It involves 

essential questions about decision making factors that 

typically are ignored in Cold War style “stability 

analyses.”80
25

Two inextricably linked components—credibility and capability—

amplify the psychological nature of deterrence. Both need to be 

robustly preserved to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction 

against the United States and its allies. 

But how does this relate to those weapons traditionally labeled 

as “tactical” nuclear weapons and why is this discussion relevant? 

Because these weapons have political and military value when the 

US is forced to deter multi-dimensional Tier II threats. A full range 

of nuclear options, when combined with defensive systems, make 

multi-dimensional deterrence robust and credible. The capability to 

respond with a variety of nuclear systems complicates planning in 

the mind of the adversary and ultimately ensures that Tier II-type 

challengers continue to face the risk of nuclear retaliation by the 

United States. Instead of presenting a deterrence strategy that 

postures the Triad for national survival situations and then muddles 

through the broader range of multi-dimensional WMD threats by 

obliquely referring to “other nuclear weapons,” the US should field 

a comprehensive deterrence strategy and parallel force posture 

incorporating all nuclear weapons without distinction between 

“tactical” and “strategic” options or systems. The Triad should no 

longer just represent “strategic” nuclear systems. Instead, the US 

should field a robust package of nuclear systems—to be postured 

and deployed across the spectrum of Tier I and II deterrence 

requirements, as necessary for national security. As previously 

outlined in this paper, the Cold War vintage distinction between 

“tactical” and “strategic” may, in the long term, have the unintended 

consequence of actually weakening deterrence. Diminishing the 

impact of nuclear weapons by labeling them as “tactical” and not 

incorporating them as part of the comprehensive nuclear force 
26

posture may very well undermine their fundamental psychological 

value. Ultimately nuclear weapons are about their inherent 

potential for rapid and dramatic destruction, shock, and death—

regardless of whether they yield one megaton or 20 kilotons. 

Distinguishing between “strategic” or “tactical” in that sense is 

more or less academic. As Schelling wrote, their enormous value is 

in the pure violence that they signal. 

NOTES 

 

1

 Comment by Robert McNamara, in David M. Kunsman and Douglas 

B. Lawson, A Primer on US Strategic Nuclear Policy, SAND2001-

0053 (Albuquerque, New Mexico: Sandia National Laboratories, 

January 2001), 44. 

2

 Dr. David Kay, Interview with the authors, Science Applications 

International Corporation, Washington D.C., May 15, 2001. 

3

 Dr. Keith Payne, Interview with the Authors, National Institute for 

Public Policy, Washington D.C., May 22, 2001. 

4

 Dr. John Reichart, Interview with the Authors, National Defense 

University, Washington D.C., May 23, 2001. 

5

 Dr. Lewis Dunn, Interview with the Authors, Science Applications 

International Corporation, Washington D.C., May 15, 2001. 

6

 Dr. George Look, Interview with the Authors, Office of Strategy and 

Threat Reduction/Threat Reduction Policy, Pentagon, Washington 

D.C., May 10, 2001. 

7

 Dr. Nikolai Sokov, Interview with the Authors, Monterey Institute for 

International Studies, Monterey, CA, May 1, 2001. 

8

 Testimony by Admiral Richard Mies, Commander-in-Chief, US 

Strategic Command, Hearing of the Senate Armed Service Committee 

on US Strategic Nuclear Force Requirements, Washington D.C., 23 

May 2000. 

9

 Harald Mueller and Annette Schaper, “Definitions, Types, Missions, 

Risks and Options for Control: A European Perspective,” in Tactical 

Nuclear Weapons: Options for Control (Geneva: United Nations 

Institute for Disarmament Research, December 2000), 32-35. 

10 Ibid. 

11 Ibid. 
27

 

12 Lester R. Kurtz, The Nuclear Cage: A Sociology of the Arms Race

(New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988), 21-23. 

13 Ibid. 

14 Ibid. 

15 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale 

University Press, 1966), 17. 

16 Ibid. 

17 Robert Joseph, “Nuclear Weapons and Regional Deterrence,” in 

Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, editors, Controlling NonStrategic Nuclear Weapons, Obstacles and Opportunities, (USAF 

Academy, CO: Institute for National Security Studies, June 2001), 94. 

18 Dr. Keith Payne, Interview with the Authors. 

19 See John Cappello, Gwendolyn Hall and Stephen Lambert, “Triad 

2025: The Evolution of a New Strategic Force Posture,” National 

Security Studies Quarterly VII:2 (Spring 2001): 1-29. 

20 Ibid. 

21 Dr. David Kay, Interview with the authors. 

22 Robert Kromer, New Weapons and NATO (New York: Greenwood 

Press, 1987), 41. 

23 Nikolai Sokov, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons Elimination: Next Step 

for Arms Control,” The Nonproliferation Review (Winter 1997): 20. 

24 Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, 6. 

25 Ibid., 7. 

26 Inside the Air Force, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons Losing Prominence 

in Air Force Planning,” September 8, 2000, 1, http://ebird.dtic.mil/

Sep2000/s20000908tactical.htm. 

27 Linton Brooks, “Diplomatic Solutions to the “Problem” of NonStrategic Weapons,” in Larsen and Klingenberger, op. cit., 204. 

28 Stanley R. Sloan, “NATO Nuclear Strategy Beyond the Cold War,” 

in Larsen and Klingenberger, op. cit., 54. 

29 NATO’s Strategic Concept, 1999, Concept #62, in Larsen and 

Klingenberger, op. cit., appendices, 344. 

30 Ibid., Concept #64, 345. 

31 Andrea Gabbitas, “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Problems of 

Definition,” in Larsen and Klingenberger, op. cit., 31. 
28

 

32 Ibid., 28. 

33 Linton Brooks, op. cit., 210, (note 2). 

34 Linton Brooks, op. cit., 211 (note 11). 

35 Kenneth H. Bacon, ASD PA, DoD News Briefing, October 20, 1999. 

36 Ibid. 

37 Ibid. 

38 Ibid. 

39 Lewis A. Dunn and Victor Alessi, “Arms Control by Other Means,” 

Survival 42:4 (Winter 2000-2001): 140 (note 3). 

40 Michael R. Gordon and David E. Sanger, “Bush Will Offer Nuclear 

Cuts to Sway Russia,” New York Times, November 2, 2001, 

http://ebird.dtic.mil/Nov2001/e20011102offer.htm. 

41 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, “A US Policy for Russia,” Foreign Policy 

Research Institute, April 25, 2001. 

42 John M. Donnelly and George Lobsenz, “Rumsfeld Wants Review of 

Threat-Reduction Spending,” Defense Week, January 16, 2001, 3, 

http://ebird.dtic.mil/Jan2001/e20010116rumsfeld.htm. 

43 See Gwendolyn M. Hall, John T. Cappello, and Stephen P. Lambert, 

A Post-Cold War Nuclear Strategy Model, INSS Occasional Paper 20 

(USAF Academy, CO: Institute for National Security Studies, July 

1998), 41; Stephen P. Lambert and David A. Miller, Russia’s 

Crumbling Tactical Nuclear Weapons Complex: An Opportunity for 

Arms Control, INSS Occasional Paper 12 (USAF Academy, CO: 

Institute for National Security Studies, April 1997), 12-15.

44 Walter Pincus, “Panel Urges $30 Billion to Secure Russian Nuclear 

Arms,” Washington Post, January 11, 2001, 21, http://ebird.dtic.mil/

Jan2001/e20010111urges.htm. 

45 John M. Donnelly and George Lobsenz, “Rumsfeld Wants Review of 

Threat-Reduction Spending,” Defense Week, January 16, 2001, 3. 

46 Bill Gertz, “Russia Transfers Nuclear Arms to Baltics,” Washington 

Times, January 2, 2001, 1; Walter Pincus, “Russia Moving Warheads,” 

Washington Post, January 4, 2001, 16; The Associated Press, “A 

Russian Base in the Baltics is Reported to Have Nuclear Arms,” 

January 4, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/04/world/

04MILI.html; Nikolai Sokov, “The Tactical Nuclear Weapons 

Controversy,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 31, 2001, 

http://ebird.dtic.mil/Jan2001/ s20010131tactical.htm; Barry James, 
29

 

“Nuclear Arms in a Russian Enclave?” International Herald Tribune, 

February 16, 2001, 1, http://ebird.dtic.mil/Feb2001/

e20010216nuclear.htm. 

47 Patrick E. Tyler, “Putin Dismisses US Reports that Russia Shipped 

Nuclear Weapons for Baltic Fleet,” The New York Times on the Web, 

January 7, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/07/world/

07PUTI.html. 

48 Robert Joseph, “Nuclear Weapons and Regional Deterrence,” Larsen 

and Klingenberger, op. cit., 91. Also see Dunn and Alessi, op. cit., 140 

(note 3). 

49 Pavel Felgenhauer, “Do The Terrorists Have Nukes,” Wall Street 

Journal, November 8, 2001, http://ebird.dtic.mil/

Nov2001e20011108nukes.htm. 

50 Ibid. 

51 Sonya Yee, “Nuclear Experts Warn of Threat From ‘Dirty Bombs,’” 

Christian Science Monitor, November 5, 2001, http://ebird.dtic.mil/

Nov2001/s20011106nuclear.htm. 

52 Dunn and Alessi, op. cit., 135. 

53 Ibid., 136. 

54 David S. Yost, “Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces,” Draft of 

Paper, an earlier version of which was published as a chapter in Larsen 

and Klingenberger, op. cit., 3. 

55 Ibid. 

56 Alexei Arbatov cited in Yost, 3-4. 

57 Igor Sergeyev cited in Yost, 4. 

58 Ibid. 

59 Yost, 5-9. 

60 Robert Joseph, “Nuclear Weapons and Regional Deterrence,” in 

Larsen and Klingenberger, op. cit, 93-94. 

61 Nikolai Sokov, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons Elimination: Next Step 

for Arms Control,” The Nonproliferation Review (Winter 1997): 21. 

62 Maynard W. Glitman, “US Sub-strategic Nuclear Forces and 

NATO,” Larsen and Klingenber, op. cit., 71. 

63 Ibid. 
30

 

64 John J. Lumpkin, “Mini-nukes Proposed as Deterrent to Small 

Aggressors,” Alburquerque Journal, March 28, 2001, 7, 

http://ebird.dtic.mil/Apr2001/s20010402mini.htm. 

65 The Washington Post, “US considers low-yield nuclear weapon,” The 

Gazette, April 16, 2001, A3. 

66 William B. Scott, “Will National Security Reviewers Propose a New 

Nuke?” Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 20, 2001, 66, 

http://ebird.dtic.mil/Aug2001/s20010821nuke.htm. 

67 National Institute for Public Policy, Rationale and Requirements for 

U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control, January 2001, 9. 

68 Stephen M. Younger, “Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First 

Century,” LAUR-OO-2850, June 27, 2000. 

69 “US Rethink Could Spawn ‘Mini-Nukes,’” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 

May 23, 2001, http://ebird.dtic.mil/May2001/s20010523rethink.htm. 

70 Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll, Jr., USN (Ret), “A New US Nuclear 

Weapon?” The Defense Monitor, Vol XXIX, No. 7, 2000, 

http://www.cdi.org/dm/2000/issue7/new-nuclear.html. 

71 Robert Joseph, “Nuclear Weapons and Regional Deterrence,” in 

Larsen and Klingenberger, op. cit, 93-94. 

72 Ibid. 

73 Robert H. Gromoll and Dunbar Lockwood, “Non-Strategic Nuclear 

Weapons: Defining Objectives,” in Larsen and Klingenberger, op. cit, 

81. 

74 Dr. David Yost, Interview with the Authors, Naval Postgraduate 

School, Monterey, CA, May 1, 2001 

75 Dr. Nikolai Sokov, Interview with the Authors. 

76 Dr. David Kay, Interview with the authors. 

77 For reference, please see John Cappello, Gwendolyn Hall and 

Stephen Lambert, “Triad 2025: The Evolution of a New Strategic 

Force Posture.” 

78 US Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Statement of General 

Eugene E. Habiger, March 13, 1997, p.4 (mimeo), in Payne, op. cit., 

79. 

79 Dr. David Kay, Interview with the Authors. 
31

 

80 Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New 

Direction (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 

2001), 30. 
32