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volumes go to press. 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No.12-FM-1386

ANTWANYE ERIC FORD, APPELLANT,

V.

RITA CASTILLO, APPELLEE. 

Appeal from Order of the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia

(DRB-3227-03)

(Hon. Danya A. Dayson, Trial Judge)

(Argued September 25, 2013 Decided September 4, 2014)

Johnny M. Riddick for appellant.

Rita Castillo, pro se. 

Before GLICKMAN and BECKWITH, Associate Judges, and NEBEKER, Senior 

Judge.

BECKWITH, Associate Judge: Appellant Antwanye Eric Ford contends that 

the trial court erred in calculating his adjusted gross income (AGI) under the D.C. 

Child Support Guideline, D.C. Code § 16-916.01 (2012 Repl.),1by not subtracting

certain expenses that he must pay under a separation agreement that had been 

 

1

 All subsequent statutory references are also to D.C. Code (2012 Repl.).
2

“incorporated and merged” with the parties‟ divorce decree. We agree that the trial 

court should have subtracted those expenses in calculating his AGI. We therefore 

reverse and remand for a recalculation of Mr. Ford‟s child support obligation.

I. Background

Mr. Ford and appellee Rita Castillo married on October 4, 1997, and 

divorced, in an uncontested divorce, on January 20, 2004. The parties have one 

child together, born on March 6, 1998. As part of the divorce, the parties, both 

acting pro se, drafted a separation agreement providing for custody, access, 

education, and support. It stipulated that Mr. Ford would have the child for the 

first half of the week and Ms. Castillo would have the child for the second half of 

the week. Mr. Ford would bear the entire cost of the child‟s private school tuition, 

which, after financial aid and other grants, totaled $8,650 per school year. Mr. 

Ford would pay for the child‟s health insurance; each parent would pay one half of 

the child‟s unreimbursed medical costs, school aftercare, and airfare to the 

Dominican Republic (for twice-annual visits with Ms. Castillo‟s family); and each 

would contribute $125 quarterly for clothing and $125 annually for Christmas 

gifts. Mr. Ford earned approximately $50,000 per year at the time of the 

agreement, and Ms. Castillo earned approximately $47,000. This separation 

agreement was “incorporated and merged” with the Judgment of Absolute Divorce 
3

issued by the trial court on January 20, 2004.

In April 2011, the parties agreed that the child would reside with Ms. 

Castillo during the school year. The following month, Ms. Castillo filed a petition 

seeking child support under the D.C. Child Support Guideline. Both parties‟

incomes had increased substantially since 2004. At the time of Ms. Castillo‟s

petition, Mr. Ford was earning $237,920 per year and Ms. Castillo was earning 

$90,000 per year. Ms. Castillo alleged in her petition that the new custody 

arrangement and Mr. Ford‟s increased earnings warranted a modification in child 

support under D.C. Code § 46-204 (a). 

In a series of hearings, the parties disputed whether Mr. Ford‟s obligations 

under the Judgment of Absolute Divorce should figure into the monthly support 

calculation. The cost of private school tuition, in part because of Mr. Ford‟s 

greater earnings, had increased to $22,151 per year. The trial court told the parties 

on April 4, 2012, that it would not credit Mr. Ford‟s expenses for tuition, nor his 

other required expenses, in calculating his AGI because they were “a discrete 

obligation separate and apart from child support.” In a May 30, 2012, written 

order, the court stated that “[Mr. Ford‟s] obligation to pay tuition exists 

independently of his obligation to pay child support.” And in a July 9, 2012,

written order, the trial court reiterated that Mr. Ford‟s expenses in paying the 
4

child‟s “private school tuition, his annual travel to the Dominican Republic, one 

half of his extraordinary unreimbursed medical expenses, one half of other school 

costs, and maintenance of his medical insurance . . . do[] not receive a credit in the 

child support Guideline calculation.” 

The court gave three reasons for not crediting these expenses. First, “tuition 

is listed as a separate obligation in the agreement, which although not dispositive, 

is a factor subject to consideration.” The court noted that a chart in the “Child 

Support” section of the agreement “explicitly addressed „other school costs,‟

thereby indicating that the parties chose to distinguish tuition payments as separate 

from their overarching child support obligations.” Second, “the tuition provision 

lists both an amount of tuition and names a specific school . . . implying that this 

was not only a financial term but one related to legal custody.” Third, “the 

language of [the] Divorce Decree notes that parties have „settled matters relating to 

child support and custody, visitation, medical and health insurance for the child, 

education, and other matters.‟ By distinguishing child support from education, the 

Court treated tuition separately from child support, and the parties did not object or 

file any pleading to amend the judgment” (emphasis added by the trial court). 

Having decided not to subtract these expenses from Mr. Ford‟s gross 

income, the court calculated his monthly obligation under the Guidelines to be
5

$1,446. Because Mr. Ford‟s and Ms. Castillo‟s combined AGI exceeded $240,000 

per year, the Guideline projection did not “presumptively” apply and the court had 

discretion to impose a greater (although not a lesser) amount. D.C. Code § 16-

916.01 (h). In this case, the court found the minimum amount “fair and just.” The 

court also ordered Mr. Ford to pay Ms. Castillo $14,460 in retroactive support for 

the ten months that Ms. Castillo‟s petition had been pending. Mr. Ford appealed.

II. Analysis

“A trial court has a considerable measure of discretion in determining the 

appropriate amount of alimony and child support,” and “that determination will not 

be disturbed on appeal unless the court clearly abused its discretion.” Araya v. 

Keleta, 65 A.3d 40, 48 (D.C. 2013) (quotation marks and citations omitted). We 

review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. See Wilkins v. Ferguson, 928 

A.2d 655, 667 (D.C. 2007). In interpreting statutes, we begin with the provision‟s

plain language and also consider “„its placement and purpose in the statutory 

scheme.‟” Tippett v. Daly, 10 A.3d 1123, 1126 (D.C. 2010) (en banc) (quoting 

Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995)).

Mr. Ford argues that the trial court erred in treating the child-related 

obligations he assumed under the divorce decree as “discrete obligation[s] separate 

and apart from child support” and declining to credit them when calculating his 
6

AGI (and based on his AGI, his minimum monthly child support payment).

2

 We 

conclude that in calculating Mr. Ford‟s AGI, the trial court should have counted 

the tuition payment and Mr. Ford‟s other child-related obligations as “prior child 

support orders” and deducted them from Mr. Ford‟s gross income.3

The Guideline directs courts to “[r]efer to Worksheet B in Appendix III to 

calculate child support in cases involving shared physical custody.”4 D.C. Code 

§ 16-916.01 (x). That worksheet follows the instructions set forth in D.C. Code § 

16-916.01 (q): To reach a parent‟s AGI, it takes each parent‟s gross income and 

adds or subtracts alimony, subtracts “prior child support orders,” and adjusts for 

additional children living in the home. A parent‟s monthly obligation is then 

 

2

 At oral argument, Mr. Ford clarified that he does not seek to modify the 

obligations—including paying the child‟s tuition—that he assumed in the 

separation agreement. 

3

 We reject Mr. Ford‟s contention that the trial court erred in modifying the 

parties‟ child support arrangement at all. The court first found a “substantial and 

material change,” D.C. Code § 46-204 (a), in the child‟s needs because the child 

was spending significantly more time with the mother. It also found a “substantial 

and material change” in Mr. Ford‟s ability to pay based on Mr. Ford‟s increase in 

income. It noted that while private school tuition had also increased, tuition 

nevertheless occupied a lesser percentage of his income. These facts suffice to 

demonstrate a substantial and material change warranting a modification in Mr. 

Ford‟s child support obligation.

4

 The trial court used a “shared physical custody” arrangement when 

running the Guideline in this case and estimated that Mr. Ford cared for the child 

35% of the time. See D.C. Code § 16-916.01 (q)(1).
7

computed from that AGI. Worksheet B cites D.C. Code § 16-916.01 (d)(4) when 

directing that “prior child support orders” be deducted from gross income. That 

statute provides that “[a] support order that is being paid by either parent shall be 

deducted from the parent‟s gross income before the child support obligation is 

computed.” The term “support order” is defined in two statutes as follows:

“Support order” means a judgment, decree, or order, 

whether temporary, final, or subject to modification, 

issued by a court or an administrative agency of 

competent jurisdiction, for the support and maintenance 

of a child, including a child who has attained the age of 

majority under the law of the issuing state, or a child and 

the parent with whom the child is living, which provides 

for monetary support, health care, arrearages, or 

reimbursement and which may include related costs and 

fees, interest and penalties, income withholding, 

attorneys‟ fees, and other relief.

D.C. Code § 16-901 (8); § 46-201 (2). 

In this case, the terms of the separation agreement drafted by Mr. Ford and 

Ms. Castillo became “issued by a court” within the meaning of D.C. Code § 16-

901 (8) when they were incorporated into the divorce decree in 2004. “The 

purpose of incorporating the terms of a separation agreement into a separation or 

dissolution decree is to make them the terms of the decree.” LINDEY AND PARLEY 

ON SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS (Matthew Bender) 

§ 83.30 (2d ed. 2013). See also Brown v. Dyer, 489 A.2d 1081, 1083 (D.C. 1985) 

(granting the Superior Court‟s Family Division jurisdiction over an action to 
8

recover payment promised in an incorporated-but-not-merged agreement).5

Further, Mr. Ford‟s obligations to pay tuition and health insurance, as well 

as his other obligations, shared with Ms. Castillo, to pay for the child‟s clothing, 

Christmas gifts, after-school programs, unreimbursed medical costs, and travel to 

the Dominican Republic, were “for the support and maintenance of a child” within 

the meaning of D.C. Code § 16-901 (8).6 The statute‟s broad conception of the 

“the support and maintenance of a child” includes “monetary support, health care, 

arrearages, or reimbursement” and “related costs and fees.” Our case law has also 

 

5

 Separation agreements that are not only “incorporated” but also “merged” 

into a court order are, of course, also “issued by a court” within the meaning of 

D.C. Code § 16-901 (8). See Mazza v. Hollis, 947 A.2d 1177, 1179 (D.C. 2008) 

(explaining that the parties‟ merged agreement had been “adopted by the court as 

its own determination of the proper disposition” (quoting Hamel v. Hamel, 539 

A.2d 195, 199 (D.C. 1988))); Duffy v. Duffy, 881 A.2d 630, 639 (D.C. 2005) 

(“Where a settlement agreement is merged into the trial court‟s order . . . the 

binding force of the amount of child support is not based on the contractual 

obligation arising from an agreement between the parties, but on the authority of 

the court‟s order.”). Because this case does not involve a court‟s authority to 

modify a separation agreement, we have no need to explore any distinction 

between incorporated-and-merged agreements and incorporated-but-not-merged 

agreements. See Mazza, 947 A.2d at 1180 (discussing the conflict between the 

standard for modifying unmerged agreements in Cooper v. Cooper, 472 A.2d 878, 

880 (D.C. 1984), and the standard later enunciated in D.C. Code § 16-916.01 (t)).

6

 Ms. Castillo‟s child-related expenses under the separation agreement—for 

example, the obligation to pay her portion of the child‟s clothing, Christmas gifts, 

after-school programs, and unreimbursed medical costs—are also court-ordered 

expenses “for the support and maintenance of a child” and would be deducted from 

her gross income in calculating her AGI for Guideline purposes.
9

embraced an expansive understanding of child support. In Brown v. Dyer, 489 

A.2d 1081, a woman sued her ex-husband after he refused to pay for their child‟s 

private school tuition, which he had agreed to pay in a property settlement 

agreement incorporated into their divorce decree. We construed the suit “as an 

action for child support” and found the ex-husband “obligated to pay.” Id. at 1083. 

In Carr v. Haynes, 374 A.2d 868 (D.C. 1977), a woman sought to compel her exhusband to contribute to their child‟s private school tuition paid during their 

separation. We deemed her action “clearly one for child support” because the exhusband “had recognized the need of the children to attend a private school and 

had agreed they should attend.” Id. at 870.7

We conclude that the separation agreement‟s child-related provisions qualify 

as “support orders” under D.C. Code § 16-901 (8) and that Mr. Ford‟s reasonable 

expenses in furtherance of those obligations “shall be deducted from the parent‟s 

gross income before the child support obligation is computed.” D.C. Code § 16-

916.01 (d)(4). This result honors the plain meaning of the statute and obviates 

scrutiny of pro se agreements for clues about whether the parties themselves 

considered any particular obligations to be “child support.” It also comports with 

 

7

 In Carr v. Haynes, deeming the tuition payment “child support” was 

necessary to our holding because had we not done so, according to the opinion, we 

could not have awarded attorneys‟ fees to the ex-wife. Carr, 374 A.2d at 870.
10

the statutory scheme underlying D.C. Code § 16-916.01 (q) and Worksheet B in 

Appendix III. See Cass v. District of Columbia, 829 A.2d 480, 482 (D.C. 2003) 

(urging “an interpretation that makes sense of the statute as a whole”). That 

scheme directs courts to deduct certain expenses from parents‟ gross income and to 

calculate monthly obligations only from the remainder. It conceives of alimony, 

“prior child support orders,” and adjustments for other children living in the home

as spoken for—that is, as previously reserved carve-outs.

Because Mr. Ford and Ms. Castillo together earn more than $240,000, the 

Guideline projection is not presumptive and the trial court may impose an amount

greater than the amount yielded by the Guideline. D.C. Code § 16-916.01 (h). 

Under the same provision, the court may not impose an amount less than the 

Guideline‟s projection. The trial court in this case imposed what it computed to be

the exact minimum. As the trial court erred in not counting Mr. Ford‟s expenses 

for tuition and other obligations as “support orders” in calculating his AGI, we 

reverse the court‟s judgment and remand to allow the court to consider imposing, 

at its discretion, a lesser monthly child support payment down to the new 

minimum.8

 

8

 The new minimum is not very different from the old minimum. If the trial 

court inputs $24,000—what Mr. Ford claims as the cost of his court-ordered 

obligations—into line 1(b) of Appendix III‟s Worksheet B in D.C. Code § 16-

(continued...)
11

So ordered.

 

(...continued)

916.01, which is currently line 1(c) on the shared custody framework of the online 

Guideline calculator (http://csgc.oag.dc.gov/application/main/intro.aspx), then

even without considering any court-ordered child-related expenses claimed by Ms. 

Castillo, the Guideline yields a monthly obligation of $1,363—$83 less than the 

original $1,446 order. This estimate uses the trial court‟s other inputs, including 

that Mr. Ford has a child at home (other than the child in this case) whom he has a 

legal duty to support.