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80–848 PDF 2002

S. HRG. 107–575

DIRTY BOMBS AND BASEMENT NUKES: THE

TERRORIST NUCLEAR THREAT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 6, 2002

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

BARBARA BOXER, California

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

BILL NELSON, Florida

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

BILL FRIST, Tennessee

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

EDWIN K. HALL, Staff Director

PATRICIA A. MCNERNEY, Republican Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared statement . 5

Cobb, Dr. Donald D., Associate Laboratory Director for Threat Reduction,

Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM .......................................... 11

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 14

Helms, Hon. Jesse, U.S. Senator from North Carolina, prepared statement ..... 6

Kelly, Dr. Henry C., President, Federation of American Scientist, Washington,

DC .......................................................................................................................... 30

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 37

Koonin, Dr. Steven E., Provost, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena,

CA .......................................................................................................................... 15

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 19

Meserve, Dr. Richard A., Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 8

Vantine, Dr. Harry C., Division Leader, Counter-terrorism and Incident Response, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA ................. 48

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 53

(III)

(1)

DIRTY BOMBS AND BASEMENT NUKES: THE

TERRORIST NUCLEAR THREAT

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 6, 2002

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room SD–

419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

(chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Biden and Nelson.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order. Good

morning, gentlemen. Thank you so much for being here. Let me explain, I have already explained to three of our five witnesses today

the scheduling dilemma, and I want to explain to the public and

the press that is here our circumstances. We have a number of

things going on today, not the least of which is, Senator Helms and

I, along with our counterparts in the House, have been asked to

meet with the President at 10:30, and the President is fulfilling his

commitment of briefing us on some detail on foreign policy matters.

As you know, there is a little bit of, as they say, a dust-up in

the press as to whether we are being informed. We are being informed, and part of that is meeting with the President today, but

as we all know, President’s schedules are busier than Senators’

schedules, which is fully understandable, and we were unaware of

this meeting until yesterday.

In addition to that, Senator Lugar and Senator Hagel, both are

keenly interested in this subject and are involved in a hearing, and

Senator Lugar will not be able to be here until this afternoon. As

ranking member of Agriculture he is deeply involved in that matter, and there is some real sort of dilemmas on the floor of the Senate right now that are, as they say, seizing the body in a way that

has made this an uncertain start. This hearing was supposed to

start at 10 a.m. We moved it up to 9:30 in order to get in, to accommodate, or to accommodate us.

Two of our witnesses, Dr. Meserve and Dr. Cobb, are unable to

be here this afternoon. There is no reason why they should have

been able to. They were told this was going to be in the morning

in the first place, and Dr. Koonin, the Provost at California Institute of Technology in Pasadena is here. He was kind enough to be

here this morning, and indicated he would be here this afternoon,

and we will hear from Drs. Kelly, who is the president of the Federation of American Scientists, and Dr. Vantine, who is division

leader of the Counter-terrorism and Incident Response at Lawrence

2

Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California, this afternoon.

I should state to the press that we had a closed hearing yesterday in S–407, a secure room, because quite frankly we are sort of— improvising is the wrong word, but deciding as we go that fine line

between the public’s right to know and need to know, and us not

providing, as one person said, a cookbook for some screwball who,

seeing this televised on national television, would be able to—or

would think he or she would be able to cause some havoc.

I personally—and I have consulted with my colleagues, particularly Senator Lugar, on this—have little doubt that the terrorists

we are most concerned about have knowledge of what we spoke

about yesterday, but it still is a close call. I instructed the witnesses—that is the wrong word. I have suggested to the witnesses,

I have instructed no one, that if any question that I ask this morning or this afternoon they believe would border on releasing information, although may be in the public domain but not so easy to

access, that they think would be detrimental if broadcast, they

should just indicate they would rather discuss that in a closed session.

Now, the second point I would make is, Senator Helms is unable

to be here this morning. He is at the White House now, if I am not

mistaken, I think on another matter unrelated to this, but hopefully will be here this afternoon.

I have a prepared statement that I am going to enter in the

record to save time. I will just suggest the following, that I have

long believed and felt, and on three occasions attempted to raise

the concern, and I would suggest some degree of alarm, about the

possibility of terrorists, and we have learned very clearly that terrorists are fully prepared, some to give their lives, in an effort to

undertake their terrorist activity. That being the case, it raises the

ante when we are talking about potentially more dangerous avenues of attack.

In particular, it means our assumption about radiological and

nuclear weapons in the hands of al-Qaeda and other fanatic groups

must be revisited and revised, and that we had thought that extremely radioactive sources were self-protecting in that they were

difficult to handle, and people would be unwilling to handle them.

We had thought that no terrorist would use them because his own

death was guaranteed by exposure, from the radiation emitted.

We now know that is not true. Today there is a new reality.

Today there is a new reality. Today we know that radiological and

nuclear attacks in the United States are not only possible, but

there are enough screwballs out there who are willing to risk their

lives or give their lives in order to use them or other potential

weapons against the United States. Today, we know such attacks

would be terribly devastating.

We have come to realize that there are those who would literally

die to use them. If a dirty bomb were to be detonated in the center

of Washington, or if a highly radioactive can of powder were

emptied from a rooftop, it could kill dozens. It would not be the catastrophic event that many think, but it would have a catastrophic

psychological impact on the Nation and, even worse, it would contaminate a city that would probably result in evacuations and great

3

difficulty in convincing the American public that it could be reinhabited, even though the increased cause or risk of cancer and/

or other negative health effects would be relatively minimal.

The economic impact that could result from such an attack could

be devastating. We all know what the economic impact was when

the World Trade Towers came down, beyond the impact of the loss

of the towers, as well as the loss of the personnel and the businesses that were contained in the towers. It went beyond that, and

quite frankly, I have tried, along with others on at least three occasions in the last year to raise the alarm bell about this.

I must be straightforward with you. This is not what the scientists are here to discuss, but I want to straightforwardly state

what my purpose is as chairman of this committee in trying to

highlight this danger again, and this will not be the last hearing

I will have on this. I am going to do this until the policymakers

in the Congress and in the White House and in every unit of government begin to make a decision about priorities in this country.

One of the things we have to look at as policymakers is what is

the most likely devastation that could be rained upon the United

States if we are willing, and I am not opposed to it in principle,

if we are willing to commit to spend $100 billion—depending upon

whether we have a layered national missile defense system or a

single system that is limited, we are talking about spending, committing over the next 10 years somewhere between $100 billion to

$1 trillion on national missile defense.

And I would love to have a national missile defense that was redundant, but the Pentagon, as well as many others, believe that is

the least likely threat we face, is from an ICBM hurtling across the

skies, crashing into the United States of America. It is a real

threat. It is a possibility, but it is not the most likely possibility,

and I would argue, and have argued for a long time, that even before the so-called Baker-Cutler report was issued, that the single

most urgent threat we face is the access potential terrorists have

to fissile material, and knowledge and access to scientific capability

that resides in what I refer to as the candy store of all candy stores

for terrorists, and that is Russia.

The good news is, Russia wants to cooperate. Russia needs help.

Russia wants to inventory and wants us to help account for and destroy, or at least secure nuclear weapons and fissile material. The

Baker report indicated that it was the most urgent national threat

we faced, and that it would cost $30 billion over the next 5 to 8

years to begin to corral it, so I just want us to be facing head on

and look realistically into the eye of the threat and make some realistic decisions based on priorities and limited resources after we

have heard all the evidence, the point being, we have to wonder if

terrorists could take advantage of a situation—for example, the

curie conventional measure of a radioactive source, a tenth of a

curie can kill people within a few weeks. A single curie is a very

strong source and, if left unshielded in an office, could kill the inhabitants in days.

A cesium source found in North Carolina in a steel mill was only

2 curies in strength, but far more intense sources of radiation have

turned up in some strange places lately. Last December, in the

former Soviet Republic of Georgia, three hunters gathering fireVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:30 Jul 24, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 80848 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
4

wood stumbled upon two abandoned canisters, incredibly lethal

material, which the canister contained 40,000 curies of material.

By the way, all three hunters were critically injured, but since they

did not break open the canisters, there was no environmental contamination.

Let me just say, even though a team from the Government of

Georgia and the International Atomic Energy Agency recovered the

containers, several more Soviet sources are unaccounted for. It is

certainly not comforting to think the former Soviet Union made

hundreds of similar devices.

These hearings are intended to let us know exactly what is out

there and how close the threat of terrorists getting their hands on

such material really is. We need to know what is possible, and how

readily terrorists could make a dirty bomb. We also need to consider how terrorists might turn uranium or plutonium into a true

nuclear explosive.

We need to know how, with or without explosive devices, nuclear

materials might be dispersed and dispensed, and the kind of damage that could be done. We need to know what has to be done to

ensure that the threat remains exactly that, a threat and nothing

more. We once thought it would be virtually impossible for anyone

to have the money, the means, the motive to build its own nuclear

explosive device and the will to use it, but just last month, according to press reports, our Special Forces found pamphlets and

manuals on nuclear weapons in al-Qaeda safe houses.

We learned of al-Qaeda’s dealing on the black market for nuclear

materials. Whether they have been successful is doubtful, but Time

Magazine this week reported an alleged plot to bring a nuclear device to New York. September 11 vividly shows us the kind of hatred we face, the kind of people who, were they to get their hands

on such weapons, would have no hesitation to kill Americans.

We have a new perspective, in many ways a more realistic perspective. We see the clear and present danger. We understand the

threats that exist. We also understand that we must address these

threats. Before we can be successful in protecting against them, we

have to have a complete understanding of them. We have to know

exactly what the terrorists can do with nuclear materials, from the

simplest application to the most sophisticated, and there are important steps we can take to stop them, from improving nuclear security in the former Soviet Union to thinking carefully about our response here at home, to combating the threat of nuclear terrorism,

and make it much less destructive if it were to occur.

Are there international conventions and codes of conduct which

could restrict access to fissile material? Can the IAEA help? How

can we allocate resources to combat radiological or nuclear terrorist

attack? What priority should this have in the larger context of defending the United States, as compared, for example, to other defensive systems or buildings? What is required to protect against

radioactive and nuclear terrorism, as compared to protecting

against biological agents or chemical weapons in the hands of rogue

states?

The bottom line, the choice would be made based upon what we

know and what we think is most likely.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

5

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

I have long believed and felt—and have attempted to raise the alarm—about the

risk of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. September 11 introduced the

possibility of terrorists prepared to give their lives in undertaking their activities.

The ante is raised by that; we now face potentially more dangerous avenues of attack, such as the use of radiological weapons.

We had thought that extremely radioactive sources were ‘‘self-protecting.’’ We had

thought that no terrorist would use them because his own death was guaranteed

by exposure to the radiation they emit.

We now know that’s not true. Today there’s a new reality. Today we know that

radiological and nuclear attacks on the United States are not only possible, but

there are enough screwballs out there willing to risk or even give their lives to use

them against the United States.

We know such attacks would be terribly devastating. And today we realize that

there are those who would literally die to use them.

If a dirty bomb were to be detonated in the center of Washington, or if a can of

highly radioactive powder were emptied from a rooftop, it could kill dozens—it

would not be the catastrophic event that many might think it would be, but it would

have a catastrophic psychological effect on the United States. Even worse, it would

so contaminate part of the city that we’d have to evacuate and perhaps demolish

a number of buildings. The economic impact could be devastating.

One of the things we have to look at as policy makers is what is the most likely

devastation that could be rained on the United States. Should we spend up to a

hundred billion dollars to a quarter trillion dollars for a national missile defense

system while the Pentagon, as well as many others, believes the least likely threat

we face is from an ICBM missile? It is a real threat, it is a possibility, but it is

not the most likely possibility.

I have argued for a long time that the single most urgent threat we face is the

access that potential terrorists have to fissile material and knowledge and scientific

capability that resides in what I refer to as the candy store for terrorists, and that

is Russia.

The good news is Russia wants to cooperate, it wants to inventory and wants us

to help account for and secure nuclear weapons and fissile material. I just want us

to look realistically at the threat and to make some realistic decisions based on priorities and limited resources after we have heard all the evidence.

The curie is the conventional measure of the intensity of a radioactive source. A

tenth of a curie can kill people in a few weeks; a single curie is a very strong source,

and if left unshielded in an office could kill the inhabitants in days. The cesium

source found recently in some scrap metal in a North Carolina steel mill was only

two curies in strength. But far more intense sources of radiation have turned up

in some strange places recently.

Last December, in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia, three hunters gathering

firewood stumbled onto two abandoned canisters of an incredibly lethal material.

Each of those canisters contained 40,000 curies of material.

By the way, all three hunters were critically injured, but, since they didn’t break

open the containers, there was no environmental contamination.

Let me just say, even though a team from the government of Georgia and the

International Atomic Energy Agency recovered the containers, several more formerSoviet sources are apparently unaccounted for.

It is certainly not comforting to think that the former Soviet Union made hundreds of similar devices.

These hearings are intended to let us know what exactly is out there and how

close the threat of terrorists getting their hands on such materials really is.

We need to know what’s possible, how readily terrorists could make a dirty bomb.

We also need to consider how terrorists might turn uranium or plutonium into a

true nuclear explosive.

We need to know how, with or without explosive devices, nuclear materials might

be dispersed and the kind of damage that could do.

We need to know what has to be done to ensure that the threat remains exactly

that—a threat—and nothing more.

We once thought it would be virtually impossible for anyone to have the money,

the means, and the motive to build his own nuclear explosive device, and the will

to use it. But just last month, according to press reports, our Special Forces found

pamphlets and manuals on nuclear weapons in al-Qaeda safe houses.

We’ve learned of al-Qaeda’s dealings on the black market for nuclear materials.

Whether they’ve been successful is doubtful, but Time Magazine, this week, reported an alleged plot to bring a nuclear device into New York.

6

September 11 vividly showed us the kind of hatred we face, the kind of people

who—were they to get their hands on such weapons—would have no hesitation to

kill Americans.

We have a new perspective—in many ways, a more realistic perspective.

We see the clear and present danger and we understand the threats that exist.

We also understand that we must address these threats. Before we can successfully

protect against them, we have to have a complete understanding of them. We have

to know exactly what a terrorists can do with nuclear materials, from the simplest

application to the most sophisticated.

There are important steps we can take to stop them—from improving nuclear security in the former Soviet Union to thinking carefully about our response here at

home—to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism or make it less destructive if it

were to occur. Some questions to consider:

Are there international conventions and codes of conduct which could restrict access to fissile materials? Can the IAEA help? How should we allocate resources to

combat a radiological or nuclear terrorist attack? What priority should this have in

the larger context of defending the United States—as compared, for example, to

other defensive systems we’re building?

What is required to protect against radioactive and nuclear terrorism, as compared to protecting against biological agents, or chemical weapons, in the hands of

rogue states or terrorists? The bottom line: What choices should we be making

based on what we know and what is most likely?

Our first witness is Dr. Richard A. Meserve, Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission. He’s a man with an unusual background: a Ph.D. in applied physics

from Stanford University, and a J.D. from Harvard Law School. Chairman Meserve

has focused on an enormous range of issues that arise at the intersection of law

with science and technology, including environmental law, nuclear licensing, and

nuclear non-proliferation.

Then we will hear from Dr. Donald D. Cobb, Associate Laboratory Director for

Threat Reduction at Los Alamos National Laboratory. In his thirty-year career, Dr.

Cobb has managed major programs in arms control, the detection of nuclear explosions, and the developments of safeguard systems.

Later, we will speak with Dr. Steven E. Koonin, who is a specialist in theoretical

nuclear physics, Provost of the California Institute of Technology and chair of

JASON, the group of top scientists who have advised the government on issues including nuclear weapons, arms control, and intelligence for almost four decades. In

1999 he was the recipient of the Department of Energy’s prestigious E.O. Lawrence

award.

He has studied possible radiological and nuclear terrorist devices, and, not surprisingly, found their potential extraordinarily alarming.

The Federation of American Scientists has long been an important voice to educate the nation about nuclear issues. We are pleased to have its president, Dr.

Henry Kelly, here to discuss the recent FAS study of the effects of a dirty radiological bomb. Dr. Kelly spent over seven years as Assistant Director for Technology

in the White House’s Office of Science and Technology.

And finally, we will hear from Dr. Harry Vantine, Division Leader of the

Counterterrorism and Incident Response Division at Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory.

[The prepared statement of Senator Helms follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JESSE HELMS

RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICES: THREAT AND RESPONSE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for scheduling this hearing today.

As we have all learned so tragically, terrorist organizations present a very real

threat to America and are capable of the most vicious and barbaric acts.

The increasing capabilities of terrorist groups and the malevolent intentions of

those nations that support them combine to threaten us in ways not previously

imagined.

Because these threats are only limited by a terrorist’s ingenuity and capabilities,

we must defend the American people against all potential threats.

Today we will hear testimony on Radiological Dispersal Devices, one of those

threats known to only a few, but which could cause harm to many. These ‘‘dirty

bombs,’’ as they are more commonly known, combine conventional explosives with

radioactive material.

7

These devices are often simple to build—if you have the necessary materials—but

will likely produce more fear and terror in a civilian population than actual damage.

That is why the potential threat must not be exaggerated.

To begin, the radioactive material needed to build these bombs is difficult to acquire, and even more difficult to handle or transport.

Additionally, in contradiction to published news reports, these devices are not

likely to kill thousands of people, or to leave large swaths of land uninhabitable for

decades.

Rather, scenarios envisioned by the intelligence community indicate that more

people would be harmed by the bomb blast than from the radiation itself, which

would most likely be less than what the average person receives in a year from the

sun.

But while the physical destructive power of a radiological dispersal device may

be very limited, its psychological impact on our economy and sense of security could

be enormous.

In light of this potential catastrophe, the administration is sensibly advancing efforts to secure our borders, tighten our customs procedures, and strengthen export

control laws. The administration is also bolstering multilateral export control regimes and the national initiatives abroad that support them.

Another integral aspect of our defense against this threat is our set of programs

that account for and secure Russian nuclear material and prevent their potential

theft or illicit transfer.

Such programs are undermined, however, when Moscow squanders U.S. assistance, fails to tighten its own export control and border security procedures, and continues its dangerous nuclear cooperation with Iran.

That is why my ‘‘debt for non-proliferation’’ legislation, which passed unanimously

through this Committee last year, conditioned any debt relief for Russia on Moscow

ending its illicit relationship with Tehran.

Russian nuclear proliferation to Iran is a clear threat to the United States, and

its interests and allies in the Persian Gulf region, and must be stopped.

How the United States prepares to deal with the consequences of an attack employing a nuclear weapon or radiological device is an essential government responsibility; however, I would much prefer first to prevent and defend against the clear

threat—Russian proliferation to Iran—rather than deal with the terrible consequences that could follow.

This is why, given Russia’s equally nefarious proliferation of missile technology

to Iran, I applaud the President’s decision to withdraw from the outdated ABM

Treaty and to build robust missile defenses.

In short, when it comes to America’s security, we must be prepared to deal with

threats.

I am grateful to our witnesses for being here today, and look forward to their testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Our first witnesses this morning are going to

be—and I am going to have to go a little out of order here, since

we changed it—Dr. Donald D. Cobb, associate laboratory director

for Threat Reduction at Los Alamos National Laboratory. In his 30-

year career, Dr. Cobb has managed major programs and arms control, the detonation of nuclear explosions, and the development of

safeguard systems.

We also are going to hear this morning from Dr. Richard A.

Meserve, Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC].

He is a man with an unusual background, a Ph.D. in applied physics from Stanford University, a J.D. from Harvard Law School.

Chairman Meserve has focused on the enormous range of issues

that arise at the intersection of law and science and technology, including environmental law and nuclear licensing and nuclear nonproliferation.

We are also going to hear, time permitting—and he has been

wonderful in accommodating us—Dr. Steven E. Koonin, who is a

specialist in theoretical nuclear physics, the Provost at California

Institute of Technology, in care of JASON, a group of top scientists

8

who have advised our Government on issues including nuclear

weapons, arms control and intelligence for almost four decades.

In 1999, he was the recipient of the Department of Energy’s prestigious E.O. Lawrence Award. He has studied possible radiological

and nuclear terrorist devices and, not surprisingly, found the potential extremely alarming.

We also will hear later from Drs. Kelly, representing the Federation of American Scientists, and also from—I apologize for skipping

around, but we have changed the order here. We are going to hear

from Dr. Harry Vantine, division leader of the Counter-terrorism

and Incident Response Division at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory.

Gentlemen, do you have a suggested way in which it is most orderly to proceed this morning? Should you begin, Dr. Meserve?

Dr. MESERVE. I would be happy to.

The CHAIRMAN. If you would proceed, and I thank you again for

accommodating our hectic schedule.

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD A. MESERVE, CHAIRMAN,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. MESERVE. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to have the opportunity to meet with you today to discuss a very important subject. As you indicated, I am the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Most of our attention, or a large part of our attention since September 11, as you will appreciate, has been focused on nuclear power plants and the hazards that might be associated with a terrorist attack on such a facility. The NRC also regulates radioactive materials, and they also have not lacked attention

since the September 11 events.

What I would like to do this morning is to briefly cover three

subjects. First, our assessment of radiological dispersion devices,

which I will come back and define in a moment. Second, I would

like to discuss some of the NRC actions to deal with the threats

associated with such devices, and then finally I would like to briefly discuss materials associated with nuclear weapons themselves.

Let me first describe what I mean by a radiological dispersion device. This is a terminology that is used to describe any device that

would serve to disperse radioactive material in a public area. For

example, one might imagine that one could take some conventional

explosive and to combine it with radioactive material and use the

explosive as the vehicle to disperse the radioactive material in a

public area. This, of course, has to be sharply distinguished from

a nuclear weapon, which itself relies upon the nuclear material to

cause the propulsive force. A nuclear weapon, of course, as you all

know, would have devastating effects. This is in contrast with a radiological dispersion device. Our evaluation, consistent with the

statement you made at the beginning, Mr. Chairman, is that such

devices are really not very effective as a means for causing fatalities. We have looked at a range of scenarios in which they might

be used, and they could cause, certainly could cause death, but we

are talking deaths on the order of tens of people in most scenarios,

rather than hundreds or thousands, or tens of thousands.

The reason for this is that the very large sources, some of which

are in use to irradiate the mail that you are receiving, tend to be

self-protecting in the sense that these very large sources would be

9

very difficult to handle without elaborate equipment. An individual

has to be shielded in order to avoid health effects.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you explain what you mean by shielded, doctor?

Dr. MESERVE. By shielded we mean some material, for example,

lead, which serves to attenuate or stop the radiation that is emitted from the device. If there is shielding between you and the device, then you do not get the radiation exposure.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it appropriate for those who are listening to

think in terms of a shield like when you go in and have an x ray,

and you have that big leaded apron put on you, that it prevents

the radiation from penetrating that, and only goes to the area

where it is intended?

Dr. MESERVE. That is exactly right. That is exactly what I mean.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. MESERVE. These devices, very large sources, tend to be selfprotecting, in that someone handling such a device, without handling them in an appropriate way, could get a lethal dose of radiation very quickly, in a matter of a few minutes or so, and would

rapidly become very disorganized and unable to function, and

would die soon.

The second reason why these sources tend not to have large

health effects is that the dispersal of the radioactive material tends

to reduce the risk, in that intensity of the source is reduced by

spreading it over a larger area. Of course, if you have an explosive

event, people are aware that something has happened, and they

can be evacuated from the area, so you do not have an extended

duration of exposure. The intensity of the radiation times the time

in which you are exposed is what determines the risk.

So we do not see that radiological dispersion devices themselves,

because of their radiological properties, have very significant

health risk associated with them and, of course, that is the reason

why no country of which I am aware includes such devices in its

armories. Although there are countries that have contemplated biological or chemical or nuclear weapons, radiological dispersion devices are not included, and that is because they are not very effective as weapons.

This is not to deny the fact that they could have a very severe

psychological effect, and that there is a fear of radiation, a fear of

health effects. Of course the terrorists’ greatest weapon is fear, and

I think that one of the beneficial things that I hope will come out

of this hearing is a process of educating the American public, as a

part of our self-defense, that such devices are likely to have limited

direct health effects.

Of course, a second consequence, as you noted in your opening

statement, is the problem that these devices could spread contamination over an area that might not result in serious health consequences, but would have to be cleaned up. There would be the

effect of people’s concerns about that area in the future and cleanup costs would be expensive. The deflection of people from their

normal activities until the area has been cleaned up is going to create costs. So I do not mean to minimize consequences of such an

event, although the health effects are not particularly significant.

10

In light of the consequences, however, it is important that we have

tight regulatory controls on these materials.

Let me say that nuclear materials are in widespread use in our

economy, and the uses range from radiopharmaceuticals, to the radiography of welds in construction sites, to instruments that are

commonly used in production processes in plants to measure the

flow of materials, the level of materials in tanks and the like. Many

of these materials that are in common use would not be attractive

for a radiological dispersion device in any event, because they could

only be available in small quantities and have a very short halflife.

Most radiopharmaceuticals, for example, have only a short halflife, so they would not be particularly useful for terrorist purposes.

But nonetheless there are some of these materials that are of concern.

The NRC before September 11 had a comprehensive set of licensing requirements to ensure that radioactive materials are used,

stored, and transported in a safe fashion. The focus of the regulatory requirements was on safe use. September 11 has awakened

us to the concerns about possible malevolent use of these materials

in a way that we had perhaps not appreciated as fully as we might

have. The actions we have taken since then include the issuance

of a series of advisories to our licensees.

Let me say many of these materials are regulated by the states,

and so we work cooperatively with the states in this area. We

issued advisories to our licensees and the states have issued parallel advisories to their licensees to basically bring these materials

under tighter controls. This is not the forum in which to go into

the details of all of these requirements, but they basically involve

increased attention to unusual activities that might be associated

with these materials, tighter security controls, increased protection

of the materials, making sure, if there are unusual activities, that

there are reports to the police and to us about these events so they

could be evaluated for intelligence purposes, and increased scrutiny

of who is purchasing materials.

We are also undertaking a comprehensive examination of our

regulatory system. We work in this area with the Office of Homeland Security, the FBI, the Department of Energy and the Department of Transportation, Customs Service, and with the states, as

I have indicated. All of us have some piece of this puzzle, and we

are working this issue. As a result of the comprehensive review I

expect there will be some tightened, more permanent regulatory

changes that we will be making.

I would like to close by saying just a few words about special nuclear material. These are the materials that are the essential ingredients in building a nuclear weapon. As I have indicated, such

weapons should be sharply distinguished from radiological dispersion devices because of the consequences that would be associated

with their use. An essential ingredient in a nuclear weapon is special nuclear material—that is, highly enriched uranium or plutonium.

We have extensive safeguards in this country on such material,

and have had for 50 years, in recognition of its importance. Such

materials are very heavily guarded at all times, with extensive

11

monitoring devices and other aids to assure that this material does

not escape from control.

As you indicated in your opening statement, the crucial issue

with regard to these materials is the possibility they might be diverted from a foreign source. There are huge quantities of such material in Russia under limited control. There have been extensive

programs that have been undertaken by the Department of Energy

in particular to try to bring these materials under control, but

there is still a lot of work that will have to be undertaken.

I share your view that this is an important challenge in which

the United States should be engaged in order to assure the protection of such materials at the source, because if they were to be lost

from their source, they would be very hard to detect. I think this

is a national priority to build on the programs, that incidentally

have had bipartisan support over the years, to assure that these

materials are safeguarded adequately.

That concludes my statement. I would be very happy to respond

to questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, doctor. I think what we should do is

hear from all the witnesses, if we could, and Dr. Cobb, we welcome

you, and again thank you not only for this morning, but for yesterday. My colleagues and I found your briefing thorough and interesting and chilling, and somewhat hopeful.

STATEMENT OF DR. DONALD D. COBB, ASSOCIATE LABORATORY DIRECTOR FOR THREAT REDUCTION, LOS ALAMOS

NATIONAL LABORATORY, LOS ALAMOS, NM

Dr. COBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to discuss

this important topic of potential terrorist attacks not only using radiological dispersal devices, but the entire spectrum of potential

nuclear terrorism threats that we face. You mentioned, as the Associate Director for Threat Reduction, I have been working some of

these issues for 30 years. I have a written statement that I have

submitted. I would like to just make a few points.

The CHAIRMAN. Your entire statement will be placed in the

record.

Dr. COBB. Thank you, sir.

Briefly, let me start by saying—and I think you pointed this out

in your opening remarks—that we cannot just focus on part of the

problem. It is not just radiological dispersal devices. The entire

spectrum, from that perhaps being the low end of terrorism, to now

concerns about nuclear ability to acquire the materials and create

a nuclear explosive device. I think we need to consider all of these

in the context of the concerns we have today.

Let me just say for the past 30 years we have been looking for

evidence of not only countries acquiring nuclear materials, but

other groups that might be supported to acquire those, so it is not

a new thing we are worried about the threat, but since September

11, clearly it has brought home the desire to create and inflict the

maximum amount of damage by the terrorists to our country, so I

think that did change on September 11, as has changed our viewpoint.

The CHAIRMAN. And if I might interject, I do not know if this is

true, but I think since the Wall came down and the Soviet Union

12

broke up, we have a very different view of, at least in my recollection, dealing with this subject for years and years, particularly on

the strategic doctrine side of the equation was that we did not

worry very much about the lack of control of this material in weapons by the former Soviet Union. We, as a matter of fact, ascribed

to them a capability and a security apparatus that was tighter

than it really was, but after the wall came down and the Soviet

Union broke up, I would suggest that put a slightly new slant on

our concern.

Dr. COBB. That is exactly right, sir, and in fact as you know,

prior to the fall of the former Soviet Union, the KGB and tight security enforcement in Russia and control of the people were the

methods to control these, and it made us less concerned, but since

that time, of course, opening up the Soviet Union has made a difference, and let me say some more words about that as we go

through, because I think that is an essential point.

One of the principles in relating to nuclear materials and the nuclear threat that goes back to Manhattan Project, and I think Dr.

Meserve mentioned this, is to control the materials, keep the

sources of these materials out of the hands of the bad guys.

The CHAIRMAN. For the public, would you explain the materials

you are referring to?

Dr. COBB. The materials are nuclear materials that are source

materials that could be used, for example, in nuclear weapons. For

nuclear weapons it is enriched uranium and plutonium, and so for

50 years the focus has been to keep the use of those types of nuclear materials rigidly controlled so that they do not get diverted

and get distributed. I think we can extend some of that principle

to radiological materials, and I think Dr. Meserve talked about a

change in emphasis toward helping to control the materials.

Let me talk to you about a couple of the programs that I think

are important that we can draw on, because I think some of the

things that we have done over the last 10 years since the fall of

the Soviet Union can apply here. One of them is, and again the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration

has been working the materials protection, control, and accounting,

and what that is basically is to work with colleagues in Russia at

sites, and there are over 100 of them, to try to secure the nuclear

materials that they have, the materials that are weapons-usable

materials, and that is what we call kind of the first line of defense,

securing the materials in place where they are so they cannot get

out.

Once they get out, they are much more difficult to find and track,

so that is one. If you worry about, and you do, if you worry about

the materials that could be smuggled across borders, at transit

points, overseas, out of Russia, maybe through intermediaries in

Europe and other countries, then getting into the United States,

you need border protection, so securing—and let me say today we

do not have the security at the borders we would like to have, but

the ability to develop detection capabilities to look for nuclear materials.

If I talk about weapons-usable materials—let me be clear, if I am

talking about enriched uranium or plutonium, those are very challenging things to detect at those points, so that is a focus for us

13

to develop that capability, and has been. If you think about these

radiological materials, particularly if you are talking about large

sources of the type that you mentioned in your opening statement

that might be used overseas, those also generate a lot of radiation

that is detectable by the sensors, and so in some sense for free we

get some capability if we just deploy the systems we are talking

about today at these borders and choke points, looking for all of the

materials, including radiological, so that is a second one.

A third one that I would cite is, we have international agreements. We have the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA],

which has the safeguards program. We have a Nuclear Suppliers

Group, which looks at export controls. What that means is that we

actually share information with over 30 other countries about nuclear-related exports, technologies, materials, whatever it might be.

It seems to me reasonable to just kind of expand that even on an

informal basis to share information about radiological materials as

well as nuclear weapons-related technologies and materials.

So there are a number of things that are already available, kind

of institutionalized, that we can draw on to extend to the radiological problem, and I personally believe that we should, and I

would say for the National Nuclear Security Administration

[NNSA], the Department of Energy, they are talking—you mentioned the Russians are being cooperative. Well, I know the people

in DOE are talking to their Russian counterparts about extending

some of these programs.

Let me go on to say that there is a difference, though, between

the radiological sources, the sources of mass disruption, as people

have called them, versus nuclear weapons-capable materials, and I

think Dr. Meserve did a good job of talking about them. They are

distributed widely. There is a problem that the materials that

could be radiological sources could be susceptible to theft or diversion, even locally in the United States, be closer at hand so there

is a possibility that they could be stolen. Clearly, that is a licensing

and control issue that needs work, and Dr. Meserve I think addressed that very well.

Let me talk about one point that is related to what happens,

what are we going to do about it if something does occur? Clearly,

the state and local first responders, the state and local agencies are

going to be faced with this, and so today the Federal Government,

the Department of Energy, we are working with state and local responders, we are doing exercises and training, and I think we need

to do more of those kinds of activities.

If the worst does occur, it is a nuclear emergency support team,

the Federal-level Department of Energy people that will be the

Federal help in response to such an activity to actually understand

what the extent of the damage is, what kind of responses would be

most effective to preserve human life, protect the health of the public, and protect the environment.

The nuclear emergency support team is mostly configured with

people from the national laboratories who are experts in radiation

and detection, and all of these various technologies, and they are

volunteers, and I just wanted to say we are very proud of them,

because these people, they give up nights, weekends, they are

called out at any time of the day or night. They go off on short noVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:30 Jul 24, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 80848 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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tice to help with this, and so we are proud of that capability, but

it needs to be expanded. It needs to be extended in terms of its capabilities to support the state and local authorities, particularly in

consequence management.

What I mean by that, if there is a radiological dispersal, how do

we deal with the cleanup problem? How do we protect the environment and the public? That is still a challenge, still something we

need to work on with more training, more technology.

The final point that I want to make, our military is the best in

the world, because we have our entire Nation’s science and tech

base supporting it. We need to apply that same kind of process for

science and technology support to homeland security. I think we

are starting in that direction. Since September 11 we are doing

more, but that is the direction we need to do. We need better technology. We need better engagement of the science and technology

providers to address these problems.

So again, thank you for inviting me.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cobb follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. DONALD D. COBB, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR THREAT

REDUCTION, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

Thank you Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Senate Committee

on Foreign Relations for inviting me here today to discuss the very important problem of potential terrorist attacks using radiological dispersal devices (RDDs), socalled ‘‘dirty bombs.’’ I am Don Cobb, Associate Director for Threat Reduction at Los Alamos National

Laboratory. I am responsible for all programs at Los Alamos directed at reducing

threats posed by weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, biological. I personally have more than 30 years experience working to reduce these threats.

Let me begin by saying that one needs to consider the RDD threat in the broader

context of threats posed by nuclear terrorism and, in turn, in the even broader context of all types of potential terrorism against the United States and our allies. The

events of September 11 show clearly that terrorists want to inflict as much damage

as possible on our institutions and thereby strike at our core values.

The spectrum of nuclear terrorist threats—starting with RDDs at the low end of

the spectrum of violence and moving up through improvised nuclear explosives or

stolen nuclear weapons is a fearsome challenge. We must consider these together

in the context of the terrorist’s intention to inflict maximum damage.

Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that will protect us from these threats.

Rather we must have a systematic approach that provides us with defense in depth.

The good news is that a systematic approach is possible against the spectrum of nuclear terrorist threats, but it will take much hard work and continued investments

to achieve. And of course there is ultimately no foolproof system against all possible

threats. But the beginnings of such a system against the most pernicious threats

is starting to emerge after a decade of effort starting with the Nunn-Lugar program.

Allow me to illustrate what I mean by a few examples. We have been working

with the Russians for several years now to secure nuclear weapons and materials

through the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting Program. Experts generally believe that the nuclear weapons

in Russia are more secure than the nuclear materials. In any case there are hundreds of tons more weapons-usable materials scattered at sites across the former Soviet Union not in weapons than there are materials in weapons. Of course we can’t

ignore the security of the weapons, but the materials are perhaps the greater danger. The Baker-Cutler report calls this, ‘‘the most urgent unmet national security

threat to the United States.’’

It seems logical to ask, can we extend the MPC&A program to cover radiological

sources as well as weapon-usable materials? It is these sources that are least well

protected, and have a special concern for RDDs. The answer appears to be yes. At

least the NNSA officials responsible for the MPC&A program are working with their

Russian counterparts to move in this direction.

Another NNSA program, called the Second Line of Defense (MPC&A being the

first line), is working to establish detection systems at borders and transit points

in Russia and the former Soviet countries to detect smuggled nuclear material.

15

While the focus is on weapon-usable materials, these same systems with some modest modifications would also be effective against smuggled radiological sources, since

the radiation signatures from such sources is generally much stronger than from

uranium and plutonium.

There are some major differences however. Nuclear weapons and weapon-usable

materials tend to be focused in military applications under tight government oversight. There are international agreements and arrangements governing the authorized export and use of such materials. Radiological sources are more wide spread

and have fewer controls. For example, there is not an export control regime for such

sources comparable to the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group for weapon-usable materials. It

seems logical to use and extend these existing arrangements to at least the notification of intent to export large radiological sources.

What is in effect the third line of defense consists of efforts to detect and intercept

smuggled nuclear materials at U.S. borders and entry points. Most U.S. customs

agents and emergency response teams in large cities have hand-held radiation sensors that can detect large radiological sources generally more easily than weaponusable materials. But better technology is needed to detect and intercept nuclear

materials, including radiological sources, concealed in luggage, packages, or shipping containers.

Perhaps the biggest difference between nuclear weapons and weapon-usable materials and radiological sources is the possibility of a terrorist obtaining radiological

sources ‘‘at hand’’, rather than having to smuggle them into the United States. In

the U.S., nuclear weapons and weapon-usable nuclear materials are under extremely tight security. Radiological sources, on the other hand, are more susceptible

to theft or diversion, possibly by insiders.

If the worst occurs, whether it is a terrorist attack involving an improvised nuclear explosive device using weapon material or an RDD using radiological material,

it will be up to the emergency response forces to deal with the consequences. In the

U.S. the NNSA’s Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) is the group that would

be called upon in case of a nuclear-related terrorist attack. NEST actually consists

of multiple capabilities ranging from searching for a nuclear device to protection of

people and the environment from radiological harm whether the cause is accidental

or deliberate. The men and women of NEST largely consist of volunteer experts

from the national labs. We’re proud of them.

But more capability is needed considering the urgency of the threat post-September 11. We need more practice and training against realistic terrorist scenarios

including RDDs. Clean up and wide-area radiological decontamination represent a

huge challenge. We need to make investments in related science and technology

now. We also need to upgrade our existing forensics and attribution capabilities

against a heightened threat of nuclear terrorism.

The Defense Science Board studies of 1997 and 2000 made similar recommendations regarding state-sponsored or trans-national nuclear terrorism. Since September 11 some of these recommendations have begun to be implemented. But the

pace remains slow and the scope of the effort is not yet broad enough to cover the

spectrum of nuclear threats, including RDDs. This work needs to be expanded and

accelerated now.

Finally I would like to point out that implementing these response measures just

in the U.S. is not enough. We need to work to make sure that other countries have

them as well, and Russia should be at the top of the list. The ability to locate and

recover stolen nuclear materials, including weapon-usable or radiological sources,

before they get out of the country should be a top priority. Notification that such

a theft has occurred should also be a first priority. A Russia ‘‘NEST program’’ would

be in our mutual interest. We should work to add this to the current list of successful cooperative programs, while we examine all of these programs from the perspective of their ability to counter the RDD threat.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Actually, Dr. Koonin, maybe in light

of the fact that you are fortunately here, and I may call on you

again if I may, but maybe you should go forward with your presentation as well.

STATEMENT OF DR. STEVEN E. KOONIN, PROVOST,

CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, PASADENA, CA

Dr. KOONIN. Mr. Chairman, my name is Steven E. Koonin, and

today I want to discuss with you the threat of radiological terVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:30 Jul 24, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 80848 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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rorism. Before I do so, however, I would like to place my remarks

in a broader context. The events of last fall have induced all of us

to pay greater attention to the safety and defense of the civilian

population in this country. Unfortunately, this is a very difficult

problem, because the number of targets that a terrorist might go

after is virtually unlimited, and the resources that we have available to defend them are finite. We are going to have to be making

hard choices about what, and what not, to protect, and about what

to protect against.

Of course, not all threats are equal. The variables include the direct and indirect consequences of an attack, the likelihood of an attack, the vulnerability of the target, intelligence and warnings that

we may have about the capabilities and intentions of an attacker,

and the availability of plausible countermeasures.

I applaud the initiative of you and this committee in defining

and addressing these very important issues. In that context, I want

to call your attention to one type of terrorist attack that I believe

is a very serious threat, the deliberate dispersal of radioactive materials. These materials might be the weapons-grade materials that

Dr. Meserve and Dr. Cobb have talked about—the uranium and

plutonium that make up a nuclear weapon—or they might be ordinary radioactive sources, cobalt, cesium, iridium, and so on, that

find many uses in society.

The methods of dispersal could be explosive. We could be talking

about the fallout from a successful or fizzled nuclear device, or they

could be conventional, the so-called dirty bomb, in which conventional explosives are laced with radioactive material, or the dispersal could be covert, in which the radioactive material is contained in particles, aerosols, or perhaps in contaminated materials

such as food.

The intent of the terrorists may be severalfold. They might be intent on inducing casualties, perhaps immediately as the result of

radiation sickness, or longer term, as the result of cancers that

might be induced by radiation exposure. But more likely they are

going to be after the psychosocial reactions that are associated with

radiation. These are certainly likely to be far more widespread and

significant than immediate or long-term casualties.

In any case, a large-scale release of radioactive material could

well entail significant costs, both directly in terms of cleanup expenses, and indirectly in terms of the economic disruption it induces.

What I am going to describe for you in the next few minutes are

the potential threat, as I see it, and some of the possible steps that

could be taken to reduce it. You have already discussed my credentials. I think I will just skip over that, other than to say that I

have been involved in national security matters for more than 15

years. My expertise is in nuclear physics, and more recently I have

been involved in counterterrorism studies, both biological and

chemical, as well as thinking about nuclear-related matters.

It is true that radioactive materials find many uses in society,

and so are quite common. They are indispensable for certain medical diagnostics and therapies. Perhaps less well-known is that intense radioactive sources are used to sterilize food and medical instruments. Sources are also used in industrial radiography: to

17

image equipment, and also, as Dr. Meserve mentioned, in the logging of oil wells. In addition, far less potent amounts of radioactivity are present in smoke detectors, antistatic devices, and exit

signs. Many of these sources are harmless, and have no potential

for terrorist misuse. There is also, of course, a significant amount

of radioactivity contained in the spent fuel of the cooling ponds of

the nuclear reactors that are about in our country.

I have some images here that illustrate, for example, a radiography, a bone scan that was taken using a technetium source, and

one can see in the pictures the infected area in this particular patient. Also shown in the upper right is an antistatic brush with a

polonium source that is used in darkrooms, and in the lower right

is one of the cooling ponds around a reactor.

Even small amounts of radioactive material can be very disruptive. The sources of concern of long-lived isotopes range from 1

curie up to thousands of curies. If one were to take just 3 curies

of an appropriate isotope, which is an amount that is a fraction of

a gram, and disperse that over a square mile—— The CHAIRMAN. Would you give me an idea what that is? Is that

as big as the head of a needle, or this pen?

Dr. KOONIN. A gram is about a thirtieth of an ounce, so it is perhaps the size of a ball on a ballpoint pen or something like that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. KOONIN. That amount of material would have to be diluted,

of course. If it were spread over a square mile, that would make

the area uninhabitable, according to the maximum dose currently

recommended for the general population.

It is important to note, however, that the health effects of such

contamination would be minimal. For every 100,000 people exposed

to that level of radiation, four lifetime cancers would be induced,

which would take place on top of the 20,000 cancers already expected to arise from other causes.

The CHAIRMAN. It is important that that gets straightened out.

Without exposure to this 1 curie you just referenced, 20,000 people

out of 100,000 today, without any additional exposure, are likely to

get cancer. This would increase that by four?

Dr. KOONIN. That is correct, four out of 20,000.

The CHAIRMAN. So that is what you mean by the health effects

would not be—it would be consequential for those four people, but

it is not consequential in broad terms.

Dr. KOONIN. Of course. Of course, higher levels of contamination

would——

The CHAIRMAN. The higher level of contamination, I understand

your point. I just wanted to make sure everybody gets this.

Dr. KOONIN. However, the psychosocial effects of such contamination would be maximal, as we know from Three Mile Island,

Chernobyl, and other incidents. Radiation taps into a very deep

fear and concern that people have. There are tens of thousands of

significant sources of this size in the United States, and many

more abroad. Here is a picture of one, to just give you a sense of

the size. This is a 150-curie source that is used in industrial applications, and it weighs 53 pounds. All of that weight is shielding.

It is a compact 6 inches by 6 inches by 15 inches.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is a device legally used?

18

Dr. KOONIN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. By shielding, you mean the lead that keeps this

radioactive material from emanating from anywhere, other than

when it is aimed and used for its purpose?

Dr. KOONIN. When the source is exposed, there is a mechanism

in the box for exposing the source and, of course covering it up

again.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. KOONIN. In my view, radiological terrorism is a very plausible threat. Here are some facts that summarize the situation for

me. Gram-for-gram, radioactive material can be as disruptive as

weaponized anthrax, not necessarily as dangerous, but as disruptive. Furthermore, this material circulates broadly through society.

We produce it. It can be purchased with appropriate licenses, at

low levels without a license. We ship it, we store it, we have mechanisms for disposing of it, and so on. So it is out there.

Moreover, the expertise for handling it is widely known and

readily acquired. In fact, you can take radiation safety courses from

any number of commercial or nonprofit providers that teach you

how to handle radioactive material safely.

As Dr. Meserve emphasized, the safety and security of radioactive material depends upon the good faith and good sense of licensed end users. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission does the licensing. Inspections of the sources onsite are sporadic, in my understanding. This system was developed at a time when we were

facing a cooperative or nonhostile environment. The situation post

9/11 has changed significantly. This array of facts does not leave

me with a great deal of comfort.

To make the threat a little more tangible, it is interesting to outline what a radiological attack might look like. You can imagine

that a several-curie source was stolen, and that the source is dispersed covertly one night throughout the business district of a

major city. There is then an anonymous tip the next morning, and

officials detect widespread contamination at roughly three times

the natural background level, which is well above the legal limit

protecting the general population. They find this contamination

over some 100 blocks of the business district. The area would be

evacuated immediately and sealed off, and we could expect that

hundreds of thousands of people would be showing up at hospitals

demanding to be screened for contamination.

There would be, at this level of exposure, no fatalities from the

radiation at all. However, the decontamination would take months.

It is possible that buildings could not be economically decontaminated, and so dozens of them would have to be razed. In any event,

there would be billions of dollars of economic damage.

In thinking through this sort of scenario, it is interesting that

dose limits play a major role. Currently, there is a very low legal

dose limit that properly protects the general public in ordinary circumstances, but in some ways this dose limit works against us in

this situation. It makes it possible to do great damage, both psychosocial and economic, with very small amounts of contamination.

Further, the question of ‘‘how clean, at what cost, and when?’’

will inevitably have to be answered after any release. Given the

19

discomfort that is evident in many public discussions of radiation,

this is going to be a very difficult discussion.

So what should be done? Let me offer a few high-level suggestions. One is to encourage alternative sources of radiation that can

be turned off. There are accelerators, electrically driven neutron

generators under development, and other devices that can substitute for radioactive materials in some circumstances, and there

are regulatory, economic, and technological ways in which one

might encourage those substitutions.

Second, as has already been mentioned, it is very important that

we strengthen controls on radioactive materials. Some infrastructure is already in place domestically in terms of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and internationally in terms of the IAEA.

It is also very important for us to establish pathways that allow

the retrieval, storage, and disposal of unwanted material. Currently, users have a very difficult time disposing of radioactive material.

I believe it is also important that we think about tracking personnel with radiation expertise. These people would provide a pool

of expertise in the event of a response, and a database of people

who understand how to handle radiation may help provide indicators of terrorist preparations.

Going further, we can think about the widespread deployment of

radiation monitoring for the transport of large sources. Points of

entry, choke points, luggage, and mail are all streams of material

that should be routinely scanned for radiation sources.

It is also possible to think about distributed sensor arrays. The

technology to detect radiation is well-known, unlike that for biological or chemical agents. It is robust, relatively inexpensive, and one

could well imagine deploying sensors more broadly throughout society than we do currently. Whatever sensor systems are put into

place, it is very important that they be significantly tested and

‘‘red-teamed’’ if they are to continue to be effective.

It is also, finally, important to educate and prepare the first responders and the public for the possibility of a radiological event.

Again, this will likely not be simple, given the difficulty we have

in talking about radiation.

Let me, then, summarize. The dispersal of radioactive materials

is, in my opinion, a plausible and significant threat. However, it is

overwhelmingly likely that the effects of a terrorist attack using radioactive materials will be psychosocial and economic, not entailing

a large number of deaths or illnesses, and there are steps that can

be taken to prevent such acts.

The first line of defense, as has already been mentioned, is the

control of radioactive materials.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Koonin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. STEVEN E. KOONIN, PROVOST, CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE

OF TECHNOLOGY

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. My name is Steven E. Koonin and

today I want to discuss with you the threat of radiological terrorism.

Before I do so, however, I’d like to place my remarks in a broader context. The

events of last fall have induced us all to give greater attention to the safety and

defense of the civilian population. Unfortunately, this is a very difficult problem. BeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:30 Jul 24, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 80848 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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cause the number of targets is virtually unlimited and the resources available to

protect them are necessarily finite, hard choices have to be made about what, and

what not, to protect, as well as what to protect against.

Of course, not all threats are equal. In allocating defensive resources, the factors

to consider include the direct and indirect consequences of a successful attack, the

likelihood of an attack, the vulnerability of the target, intelligence and warnings of

potential attacks, and the availability of effective defense measures. I applaud the

initiative of this Committee in defining and addressing these very important issues.

In that context, I want to call to your attention one type of terrorist attack that

I believe to be a very serious threat: the deliberate dispersal of radioactive materials. These materials might be the weapons-grade metals used in nuclear weapons

or the more common materials contained in radiation sources. The dispersal can be

accomplished either through an explosive release (a nuclear device producing ‘‘fallout’’ or a conventional explosive that has been laced with nuclear material) or

through a covert, and perhaps gradual, release of particulates, aerosols, or contaminated materials such as food. While the intent of the perpetrators might be to induce immediate or long-term casualties, far more widespread will be the intense

psychosocial reactions associated with radiation. In any case, a large-scale release

of radioactive material could well entail significant costs through both direct cleanup expenses and the economic disruption induced. My goal here is to describe for

you the potential threat that I see and offer some possible steps that could be taken

to reduce it.

My scientific credentials for this task are as follows. I am Professor of Theoretical

Physics at the California Institute of Technology, as well as that institute’s Provost.

For more than 30 years, the focus of my teaching and research has been in nuclear

physics and I am the author of some 200 referred scientific publications in that

field. I have also served as the Chair of the Division of Nuclear Physics of the American Physical Society. Beyond my academic credentials, I have been involved in National Security matters for more than 15 years. I currently chair the JASON group

of academic scientists and engineers, which has a 40-year record of unbiased technical advice to the government on national security matters. I have also served on

both the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board and the Navy’s CNO Executive Panel,

and also chair the University of California’s committee overseeing the national security aspects of the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories.

More specifically related to counter-terrorism, I led a DARPA-chartered JASON

study of Civilian Biodefense issues in 1999, and served this Fall on Defense Science

Board panel looking broadly at terrorism vulnerabilities. While my testimony is informed by these experiences, particularly discussions with my JASON colleagues,

the words and opinions expressed are my own.

Radioactive materials are common in society. Their importance in medical diagnostic and therapeutic procedures is well-known. Less well known, but equally important, is the use of intense radioactive sources to sterilize food and medical instruments and to image industrial equipment (including the logging of oil wells). Far

less potent amounts of radioactive materials are used in smoke detectors, anti-static

devices, and self-illuminating exit signs. Many of these sources are harmless and

have no potential for terrorist misuse. There is also a very large amount of radioactivity contained in the spent fuel in the cooling ponds at nuclear power reactors.

Sources ranging from a few to thousands of curies could be employed for terrorist

purposes. If just three curies (a fraction of a gram) of an appropriate isotope were

spread over a square mile, the area would be uninhabitable according to the recommended exposure limits protecting the general population. While direct health effects would be minimal (for each 100,000 people exposed, some 4 cancer deaths

would eventually be added to the 20,000 lifetime cancers that would have occurred

otherwise) the psychosocial effects would be enormous.

I believe that radiological terrorism is a plausible threat. Gram for gram, radioactive material can be at least as disruptive as weaponized anthrax. Further, the

material circulates broadly through society. There are tens of thousands of significant, long-lived sources in the U.S. and many more abroad; they are produced, purchased, stored, and transported through ordinary channels. The expertise to handle

them is widespread and/or readily acquired (radiation safety courses are offered regularly; you can sign up on the web), And the safety and security of these materials

relies on the good faith and good sense of the end-users, who are licensed by the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This array of facts does not leave me with a great

deal of comfort.

One scenario of how a terrorist attack using radioactive material might play out

is as follows. A several-curie source of a long-lived isotope is stolen and covertly released one evening throughout the business district of a major city. Acting on an

anonymous tip the next morning, officials verify widespread contamination over a

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100 block area at roughly three times the natural background level, well above the

legal exposure limit protecting the general population. That area is immediately

evacuated and sealed off as hundreds of thousands of people rush to hospitals demanding to be screened. Businesses in the area are shutdown during the many

months of decontamination that follow; dozens of buildings are razed. Economic

damage runs into the billions of dollars, but there are no direct fatalities.

Most important in thinking through the situation are the widespread fear of radiation and the low legal dose limits protecting the general population. These latter

make the terrorists’ task easier in at least two respects. First, even very low levels

of contamination, comparable to the natural background level in many locales, will

be very disruptive. Second, in decontaminating any site, the question of ‘‘How clean,

at what cost, and in what time?’’ will eventually have to be answered; that will not

be easy.

There are several kinds of measures that can be taken to prevent terrorist attacks

using radioactive materials, or at least make them more difficult to carry out.

Through various economic, regulatory, and technological mechanisms, one can encourage migration of legitimate users from radioactive sources to radiation sources

that can be turned off, such as accelerators and electrically-driven neutron generators. However, this will not be possible for all applications. Strengthened controls

on radioactive materials are therefore an important step; fortunately, some of the

infrastructure is already in place through the NRC and the IAEA. Also important

would be the establishment of pathways to retrieve, store, and dispose of unwanted

radioactive materials. The tracking of personnel with radiation expertise also seems

a good idea, as this would provide both a registry of trained responders in the event

of an incident, as well as be of assistance in detecting terrorist preparations.

Widespread radiation monitoring to detect large sources as they are moved about

would be very useful. One would start with ports of entry, transportation

chokepoints, rail, plane, and ship cargo, and mail. Going further, it is not difficult

to imagine widely deployed radiation detectors (‘‘one on every lamp post’’). In contrast to detectors for biological and chemical agents, the monitoring technology is

well-established, the power and maintenance requirements are likely to be minimal,

and the specificity and robustness will be high. Whatever the character and extent

of radiation monitoring, it will be important to significantly test and ‘‘red-team’’ the

system.

Before an incident occurs, it is important to educate the first responders and the

public as to the nature of this threat, the probable consequences an incident (i.e.,

few casualties, maximal disruption), and how they can be managed. This will likely

not be simple given the unease evident in many public discussions of radiation.

In summary, I believe that the deliberate dispersal of radioactive materials is a

significant and plausible threat. However, it is very likely that the predominant effects will not be casualties, but rather psychosocial consequences and economic disruption. Fortunately, there are a number of steps that can be taken to reduce the

likelihood and impact of such an attack, beginning with the strengthening of controls on radioactive materials.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I have a number of questions, and with your permission I may ask that we not overburden

you, that we may be able to submit some questions in writing to

you if that is appropriate. That is, if you agree.

Let me begin with you, Dr. Cobb, and you have all made—and

it is important, I guess, I continue to make the distinction between

a radiological device dispensing radioactive material in one form or

another, and an improvised nuclear device. People talk about a

bomb. The way it is thought about in the popular culture in the

last couple of months is that there is a conventional explosive, radioactive material around that, the bomb goes off, the curies are

dispersed throughout an area, depending upon how much radioactive material there is. There is a relationship between the intensity, the amount of the radiation that someone is exposed to and

the duration of the radiation, is that correct?

Dr. COBB. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And there is a second device, and the second device is an actual nuclear explosion, where you have weapons-grade

22

material, plutonium-enriched uranium, and either through a gun

mechanism or some other mechanism they are at high speed

pushed together, they cause a reaction, that reaction is explosive,

that reaction has three features to it. One, there is a big blast, depending on the size of that weapon, a single kiloton or megaton— I mean, it depends upon the size, and that relates to the amount

of material, correct?

Dr. COBB. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And it has three effects. One, there is a blast.

For example, we discussed yesterday if the similar amount of energy—we will have this testimony this afternoon. If a similar

amount of energy that was released when the World Trade Towers

came down as a consequence of the explosion that took place because of the jet fuel, if a similar amount were to take place with

a nuclear device, instead of that building taking sometime to come

down, it would be down in a matter of——

Dr. COBB. Virtually instantaneously. We are talking about 140

tons of high explosive equivalent being released in one moment.

The CHAIRMAN. So it would come down immediately?

Dr. COBB. Very quickly.

The CHAIRMAN. A second effect is, there is actual radiation released.

Dr. COBB. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is in relatively high doses, in high doses

that if people are in that area they have ill effects, and the third

is fire. There is a high intensity heat, and so you have buildings

burning. You have fire, in layman’s terms, is that correct?

Dr. COBB. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, there is a phrase that—I thought I knew

a fair amount about this, all the years doing arms control issues

and the like. I had not until recently heard the abbreviation. All

of the national security kinds of issues all have acronyms, and I

had not heard of, I think you referred to it as an improvised nuclear device, an IND. Is that what you refer to it as?

Dr. COBB. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. So people are going to begin to hear about IND’s,

improvised nuclear devices.

Now, Dr. Harold Agnew, the former director of Los Alamos Laboratory said, ‘‘for those who say that building a nuclear weapon is

easy, they are very wrong, but those who say that building a crude

device is very difficult are even more wrong.’’ Now, I am quoting

him. Recent reports about a possible 10 kiloton nuclear weapon

being smuggled into Manhattan last fall thankfully proved to be

false, but I do not think anyone would suggest we should be complacent. As President Bush reportedly declared, nuclear terrorism

in fact is the most serious danger to the U.S. national security

today, and so what I would like to discuss for just a moment, what

are the primary barriers facing an outfit like al-Qaeda, or other

terrorist groups in seeking to acquire or construct an improvised

nuclear device?

Dr. COBB. The answer is clearly controlling the nuclear weaponcapable materials, the highly enriched uranium and plutonium.

These are very specialized materials. Generally, because they are

specialized materials, they are under government control.

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We mentioned earlier in the discussion that certainly in Russia,

Russia pops up to the top of the list because there is hundreds of

tons of these materials at various sites, and it is a good thing that

over the past 10 years we could work with the Russians to help increase the security, because they are concerned about these issues

as well, but the first and last answer to that question always comes

around to controlling materials.

Once the materials get out, the nuclear weapons-capable materials, the ability to fashion, construct, even the intention to do so

in some strange way, you might say, somebody could be lucky if

they have the materials. If their intention is to make it go off, they

might be able to do it. That is the concern. So it is controlling the

materials, keeping them out of the wrong hands.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when we talk about materials, I am not

going to go into it in open session, but yesterday we actually,

though one of your colleagues, know that you folks at the laboratories have been ahead of the game here in that you have been concerned about this possibility for sometime, and that you have actually constructed devices to see how difficult or how hard it would

be to determine, to be able to make an informed judgment of how

difficult it would be for an informed or uninformed terrorist to

build a device, and that would make this nuclear reaction take

place, and there are various concerns.

One is the wholesale purchase of a device, and we went through

yesterday in closed session the kinds of devices that would theoretically be on the top of the wish list for a terrorist out there trying

to purchase such a device, and they genuinely relate to how compact, and the size.

You cannot buy an SS–18 and pack it in your bag and take it

over to the United States, or even know how to fire it. An SS–18

is one of the big Soviet missiles with considerable throw weight,

multiple warheads independently targeted, et cetera. But there are

devices, nuclear devices that weaponize, nuclear devices that are

smaller.

The second thing we were told is that there is the concern about

being able to construct a device that could cause this nuclear reaction, and therefore the devastation that would follow, and the

somewhat good news that I took away from that was that such a

device within the realm of possibility ends up being a fairly heavy

device. It is not something you can pack in a suitcase. It is not

something you can disperse out of the back of a moving vehicle. It

is not something that you can carry onto a plane, et cetera.

But nonetheless, there is literature out there that is available to

anyone with—and I told you yesterday I had a friend who used to

say he was not the brightest candle on the table. He passed away,

but he had a lot of common sense. He said, Joe, you have to know

how to know. There are folks out there who know how to know,

and how to get an open source material, if not literal diagrams,

cookbooks for how to actually—and it is difficult, but cookbooks on

how to build the device that would cause the nuclear reaction to

take place with relatively small amounts. The larger the amounts

get, the more complicated this all gets.

Now, what I am leading to is this. I would like you to, if you can,

speak to how difficult it is not to get the material, that is, the enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:30 Jul 24, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 80848 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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riched uranium, or the plutonium, the weapons-grade material that

causes this nuclear chain reaction, but how difficult is it to get the

material that would be required to construct, without describing it,

construct the thing that would make it go boom, the apparatus in

which this material is placed to cause the chain reaction, and I am

trying to be articulate without being specific, and I am probably

doing neither.

Dr. COBB. In terms of the discussion here, I would say there is

a lot of information. Some of it is incorrect, some of it is just speculation, but there is a lot of information that is out that is available

that might lead a terrorist group to think they could do something

whether they could or not, and the key to stopping them, again I

would go back to say is, the materials that are most difficult for

them to get would be, at least from their perception I believe would

be, the hardest thing for them to do would be to get the nuclear

materials themselves, and so that is always still back to the focus

that I said earlier.

The other thing I might mention, you were talking about a spectrum of potential threats, and I am glad you raised that again because if we have to face these kinds of threats then we need to be

prepared for a whole spectrum of possibilities, and I mentioned the

nuclear support team earlier. Our folks, some of the thinking we

are doing is not because we know that these are the specific

threats we are going to face tomorrow. It is just that the possibility

may occur, so we have got to be prepared, so a lot of this is about

just thinking and preparing in advance.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I want to make that clear as well. I have

received, and I will continue to urge all of my colleagues in the

Senate to receive, a detailed briefing from the intelligence community as to what we know has occurred or has not occurred, and

what we know or believe is being sought and what is not being

sought, but it is no longer—I remember when I was first on the Intelligence Committee there was clear evidence that two individuals

in other parts of the world had attempted to negotiate purchasing

nuclear weapons. It was then a very classified idea.

Since September 11 it has been discussed openly that there is a

knowledge that there is a serious desired to purchase wholesale—

the easiest way to do this is buy the finished product, not have to

find the raw material and then construct from that raw material

a device that would make it functional, causing the damage.

Now, the other question I have for you is, just again without getting into classified information, it is clear—those of us who have

worked in this area from the layman but policymaker side of the

equation know that there are a number of nuclear scientists who

are unemployed in the former Soviet Union. There are a number

of people who, given the material, given the fissile material, it

would not be beyond their capability to construct a very, as the

phrase used by Dr. Agnew, a very crude device, a crude nuclear device.

What kind of background does one have to have, and this may

be beyond your scope here, but what kind of background, if any of

you could speak to this, would one have to have in order to, given

access to the material, be able to construct a device that could do

significant damage, a nuclear device.

25

Dr. COBB. Clearly, this is the so-called brain drain problem, and

what you are focusing on is the numbers of people who have direct

knowledge of nuclear weapons and their construction and their design in the former Soviet Union.

Now, through these cooperative programs with the Russian Federation, we meet some of our colleagues, and I can just say that

the people that we talk to are patriots in their own country. We

do not see that this brain drain is an epidemic of people leaving

to go serve some other country.

Having said that, it is a concern. Clearly, one person with this

kind of information and knowledge can change the speculation

from a maybe and a wish to something that is more scientifically

or engineeringly certain, so it is a concern.

The CHAIRMAN. To summarize my questions to you, and I will

ask two more questions and yield to my colleague from Florida, and

ask him to chair this because I will have to go to meet the President at 11.

There are really sort of three elements, and this is Joe Biden

speaking now. I am not trying to paraphrase you, but just so I understand it and can communicate this accurately to my mother—

I have a very bright mother, but she always says to me when I try

to explain what I think is a relatively complicated concept, she will

look at me and say, Joey, speak English, so I want to make sure

that I am able to, quote, speak English, as my mother would say,

because I think it is important.

My colleagues and I understand what it is we are facing in order

to work with scientists and serious people like you to do all we can

to diminish the prospect of any of this occurring. The first is, you

need, for a nuclear device, not radiological, you need the raw material, which is enriched uranium, plutonium, there are other possibilities but those are primarily the ones, so-called fissile materials,

and that is very difficult to get a hold of, although our concern relates primarily—is it correct, Dr. Meserve, we are fairly confident

here in the United States that access to that material—nothing is

impossible, I guess. Fort Knox could be held up, too, but it is like

Fort Knox. We are talking about a great degree of difficulty, and

requiring incredible sabotage or espionage for there to be a release

of that material in a way that would go undetected, is that correct?

Dr. MESERVE. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. So therefore we look at sources, and there are,

the estimates I have—and I do not want to guess at it again, because my memory may not be correct, but there are more than several tons of this material in the Soviet Union, is that correct?

Dr. MESERVE. That is correct. The precise number may be classified, but there are more than hundreds of tons.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is enough to make, if we were dedicated to do it and had it available, thousands of nuclear weapons,

correct?

Dr. MESERVE. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, we do know that the Russians very badly

want to protect that material, but in light of their economic and political circumstances, they are not nearly as equipped to do that as

we are in the United States, and they have been working with us

26

on threat reduction possibilities. This all goes to priorities for us,

and what we fund and how we fund it.

So first thing is, protect the source. The most open source, the

most likely source, the most vulnerable source, although not porous, is the former Soviet Union, Russia in particular. Is that a fair

statement?

Dr. MESERVE. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you think that, Dr. Cobb, as well?

Dr. COBB. I would agree.

The CHAIRMAN. Now then, the second feat that has to be overcome beyond getting the material is having the engineering capability, building the box, building the thing, building the device that

causes the nuclear reaction to take place, even if you have the material, correct?

Dr. COBB. Plausibly, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That relates to engineering know-how, some of

which is available in the open literature. Some is correct, some is

incorrect, some is accurate, some is inaccurate, and our concern relates to the degree of sophistication and knowledge and background, nuclear and engineering background of the individual who

is tasked to do that, so Joe Biden would have great difficulty doing

that.

As a history and political science major, and a lawyer I would

have great difficulty doing that, but someone with real scientific

background and knowledge, and particularly if they had worked in

the nuclear arena, might not have as much difficulty, correct?

Dr. COBB. That is fair.

The CHAIRMAN. And the material that would be needed to construct such a device, those materials are available on the open

market because they are used for other things as well, correct,

most of them?

Dr. COBB. To a certain extent.

The CHAIRMAN. And then the third thing to be concerned, so we

have to look at either if there are materials that could be used in

such a device, we have to deal with controlling those materials to

the extent we can if they are not enriched uranium or plutonium,

that is the canister, the thing that causes this reaction to take

place, and there is more vulnerability there, because many of those

elements are used for legitimate purposes.

And the last piece, then, is that the degree to which our intelligence services are able to detect and to interface with other intelligence communities to try to get ahead of the curve here to determine who may be engaged in such activity, and we are working on

that to determine whether we beef up our intelligence capacity and

our intelligence capability, but there is one piece that I am not

fully—I am not fully cognizant of all those pieces, but I am not as

certain about, and that is the ability to detect the material, the

fissile material that produces the release of nuclear energy, and

that is the plutonium or enriched uranium.

Now, if I try to smuggle across a border or into a building a radiological material, a material that is not adequately shielded, we

have devices now, do we not, that are in the conventional market

that could detect me walking into a building with radiological material in a briefcase, a suitcase, unless it was fully shielded, and

27

then the more material I have, the more shielding is required, the

heavier it is, so there are other ways to look for this material, other

than just merely detecting, is that correct, Dr. Meserve?

Dr. MESERVE. That is correct. There is some intricacy here having to do with the type of material, but basically, for many of the

materials of concern here, not highly enriched uranium or plutonium, there are detection devices one could have at ports of entry,

or going into buildings, or at airports, or what-have-you, to be able

to detect them.

The CHAIRMAN. We discussed yesterday in one nonclassified portion of this, if someone were to smuggle in radiological material in

a canister, a so-called dirty bomb in a canister—excuse me, a cargo

container that theoretically we are able to detect one of two things,

either based on the shipment we can detect mass that is designed

to shield the radiological material, which would give us a headsup to take a look at it, or actually detect, have a little geiger

counter go off and say, there is radiological material in this big old

cargo container, and theoretically that is possible to attach to the

crane that picks this device up off a ship and puts it on the back

of a tractor trailer, or have a device where you go through just like

a metal detector, where the canister or vehicle goes through a

metal detector, in effect, and gives you some reading as either the

density of the material that is there, and/or the radiological reading, is that correct?

Dr. MESERVE. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I know it is much more complicated and

more detailed than this, but I am trying to get at the second issue

that Dr. Cobb raised yesterday that I think is very important that

we focus on, at least that we focus on, and that is that I think the

average person would think it would be easier to detect fissile material, plutonium, uranium being transported than it would be to

detect a radiological material because of the consequences.

People think the greater the consequence, the danger, I think instinctively they think, well, the easier it would be able to detect it.

In fact, that is not true, is it? In fact, it is very difficult for us to

be able to detect, whether or not in a suitcase, in an aircraft, on

a train, on a plane, in a cargo ship there is enriched uranium or

plutonium, is that correct?

Dr. COBB. Well, let me comment. I think we have been working

for years—I think Dr. Koonin pointed out that radiation sensors,

devices to do detection, the physical principles are pretty well understood, and we have worked on these for a long time, and we focused on actually the weapons-usable materials, uranium and plutonium, so I guess I would only quibble with the comment that it

may be difficult, but there are approaches that have been developed over the years to do the detection.

And without going into a lot of details about different kinds of

radiological sources and the radiation they emit, in some sense you

do get almost for free, because you have been working the uranium

problems and plutonium problems, some capability to detect these

other types of materials.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason I mentioned that, and I will cease

with this, is that again, in terms of priority for policymakers, and

we are talking about taking limited dollars to deal with threats

28

that are posed, if we could, if we could develop on a larger scale,

and with more precision, detection devices that would expose the

presence of nuclear-capable material, that is enriched uranium,

plutonium, et cetera, that that is something we physically would be

able to improve on and do, but it comes down to a question of, we

have not done it extensively yet. I imagine it is fairly costly.

For example, when we talk about borders, one of the questions

that my friend from Florida and I talk about privately is, he represents the State of Florida. There are millions upon millions, over

the period of time, of cargo containers on ships that come into his

state, and so should we be looking at ports of embarkation where

this material, where things leave—whether it is Le Havre, or

whether it is London, whether it is Vladivostok, wherever, a cargo

container is placed on a ship. Should we begin—and I am not asking you the question unless you want to answer it, should we begin

to negotiate trade agreements with other countries saying, we want

to be able to inspect on the dock, at the port of embarkation, materials that are being sent to us?

I mean, there is a lot we have to think about. That is the only

point I am trying to get to, but it is within the realm of scientific

possibility and capability to be able to enhance the prospect of detecting the transfer of this weapons-grade material, is it not?

Dr. COBB. I think it is consistent with the thought that you need

as much layers in your protection as you can afford and you can

put in place.

Dr. MESERVE. Senator, if I might add a thought, however, I think

the consequences, if this material were to come into the United

States and were to be exploited by a terrorist, are so severe that

you would need to look at the whole range of options to be able to

deal with it.

Probably the single most effective thing that we could do is to try

to control these materials at the source, because of the difficulty in

detection. We have long borders and there is the possibility that

something could get through. Control at the source is the one place

where we really could assure ourselves of great progress. I think

that ought to remain the place where our attention is primarily focused, not to discourage these other things as well as backup, part

of a defense in depth.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I have never before, and I am not deliberately now standing up a President of the United States—it is almost 11—but there are other colleagues there, and I am sure he

will not miss me, and I hope they will allow me to enter this meeting late, but let me conclude with one comment, or one question

and one comment.

Dr. Koonin, your presentation has been extremely helpful, and I

truly appreciate the fact that you have emphasized, as all of you

have, that the life-threatening consequences of the easiest—if I

may, the easiest radiological terrorist activities that they could undertake are de minimis, but part of this is, I am of the view that

educating the public as to the nature of the threat and the consequences of the action enhance our ability significantly to deal

with it.

I said to you gentlemen yesterday, and this is pure conjecture on

my part, and I will probably get 10,000 letters disagreeing with me,

29

but God forbid we have another anthrax letter, of weapons-grade

anthrax, or something approaching that. I have a feeling the American public will adjust to it and move through it with a greater degree of confidence than we did before, because we know more, and

we know that at the end of the day, as devastating as it was, there

were a half dozen or so people who lost their lives, incredibly bad.

That was terrible, but it is not what I think some people envisioned, that I would go home during this period and people would

say to me, am I going to open up my mail and will my whole family

die, and will the neighborhood be taken down, et cetera, and so I

think there is a sense of proportion that is being established here.

It is an awful reality we have to deal with. It is a shame we have

to be educated about this at all, so I appreciate, doctor, you putting

this in a context, but my question is, it is clear that handling radioactive material, you can learn how to do it, but it is still a difficult

process, the larger the amounts and the greater the danger one is

exposed to.

What about the handling of plutonium and enriched uranium?

How difficult is it to physically handle, assuming you got access to

it?

Dr. KOONIN. If you want to do it safely, it is very difficult, and

we have facilities at the national laboratories that are very secure,

expensive, safe, in order to do just that. However, if you are willing

to die for what you are doing, then it would be quite easy to deal

with large amounts of highly enriched uranium [HEU], or plutonium.

Radiological materials could induce death within minutes to

hours, but again you do not need a very strong source in order to

cause a lot of trouble.

The CHAIRMAN. The last thing I would like to do is thank the

panel and ask your indulgence that if we desire to have you back

at another time, whether you would be willing to consider giving

us the benefit of your wisdom, and possibly in a slightly different

context for an additional hearing. Would you be willing to do that?

Dr. MESERVE. Of course.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I have to be presiding at 11.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry I did not give you a chance to ask

questions. I thought you were able to stay.

Senator NELSON. I understand you are going to recess this until

2:30.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I am going to recess the hearing until this

afternoon. I started my day at 5 a.m. as my father underwent a

minor operation this morning at 6 a.m., so we are going to recess

until 2:30. I realize Drs. Meserve and Cobb are unable to return

this afternoon. Are you able, Dr. Koonin, to be available at 2:30?

Dr. KOONIN. I am, indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. We will resume at 2:30 with Dr. Kelly, Dr.

Koonin, and Dr. Vantine, and I appreciate your indulgence, gentlemen. Thanks for the accommodation. I appreciate it a whole lot.

We are in recess until 2:30.

[Whereupon, at 10:55 a.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., the same day.]

30

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 p.m. in room SD–

419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

(chairman of the committee), presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will reconvene. It seems all I’m

doing today is apologizing to witnesses, and I do apologize. You’re

all incredibly busy and important men, and what you have to say

is of great consequence to us, and I do apologize.

We had—as the Senator from Florida probably told you, we had

President Mubarak here, and we had a little followup with the

President a moment ago. There’s a judge the President is interested in. At any rate—it is hard to say, ‘‘I’ve got witnesses waiting’’—but, unfortunately I’m not able to help them. But, having

said that, why don’t we begin?

And let me invite Dr. Kelly, if you would be willing to make your

statement. And, by the way, we owe something beyond the glass

of water we’re giving Dr. Koonin. He was here this morning, and

he is here this afternoon, and he has been kept waiting in the

meantime.

Dr. Kelly, I introduced you, in your absence this morning, by

pointing out that you are here to discuss a recent FAS study on the

effects of dirty radiological bombs. And I understand you’re going

to show us some specifics of how such a device may affect American

cities. And you’ve spent over 7 years as Director of Technology in

the White House Office of Science and Technology, and you’ve

worked at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment,

where you were an Assistant Director of what is now known as the

National Renewable Energy Laboratory.

So, doctor, why don’t you begin, and then we will go to Dr.

Vantine, who gave us a great presentation yesterday, as well, and

I will introduce him at that time. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. HENRY C. KELLY, PRESIDENT,

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. KELLY. Thank you very much, and I certainly appreciate the

committee’s attempt to try to understand this very difficult subject

and bring what we think is a very critical problem to the public’s

attention. I would like to begin by thanking two of my colleagues

here, two physicists, Mike Levi and Robert Nelson, who have

worked with FAS to do the analysis.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for being here, gentlemen.

Dr. KELLY. So what I’m going to do here is concentrate on the

impact of radiological attacks using comparatively small amounts

of radioactive material. And I guess I have three main points I

want to make here. First is that the threat of an attack using these

radiological materials——

The CHAIRMAN. For years and years in the Senate, I served either as chairman or ranking member with Senator Thurmond, and

he had the best explanation. He said, ‘‘You’ve got to speak into the

machine.’’ With all our great technology, you will notice that this

hearing room has a terribly inadequate PA system, and poor Bertie

has to work with it all the time. But you have to speak right into

the machine, as Senator Thurmond would say.

31

Dr. KELLY. I remember reading a candidate in New York City

spoke to 20,000 people in 1960, and I always wondered—without

any amplification. So those were the days when lung-power counted.

The CHAIRMAN. He was obviously desperate.

Dr. KELLY. Well, what I want to do is make three points. The

first is that the danger presented by radiological attack is very real

and credible. Anything of significant size is not going to be trivial

to undertake, but it’s certainly not beyond the capacity of a sophisticated organization.

A second point is that any attack that makes any reasonable

sense is not going to kill a large number of people. If that is your

aim, this is not the appropriate tool, nor will it even injure a large

number of people, so that it will be a comparatively small number

of people that will be getting radiation sickness from this kind of

attack. The main danger is contaminating significant areas with

material that would require very expensive cleanup and could be

extremely disruptive and could, without proper emergency response, create considerable panic. And, of course, you could deny

economic use of large areas.

Now, one of the things that needs to be put on the table to put

this in perspective, what you did this morning, is that this needs

to be clearly distinguished from a nuclear weapon. This doesn’t create an explosion. A nuclear weapon would be killing tens, hundreds

of thousands of people, and it is an order of magnitude different.

And so that this issue needs to be kept in perspective.

And I guess my third point is that—the good news in all of this

is that, while this is a new class of threats that we need to take

seriously, there are a number of very constructive things that we

can do to vastly reduce the threat. This is a problem which, compared to a lot of the other things we’re facing, is fairly solvable.

Now, let me just quickly go through why we think this is a problem. And the problem is basically that we are using radioactive materials in many parts of our economy—and this, again, was discussed this morning—but they’re extremely valuable in application—from making food safe, to medical facilities, to finding oil,

smoke detectors, many other things we count on for our economy.

So they are distributed in quite large numbers around the United

States and around the world.

Now, in the past, our main concern about nuclear materials has

been, in the first instance: Is there enough material to make a nuclear weapon? And we have, certainly in the United States and in

most parts of the world, made very sure that we have control of

any amount of radioactive material that could be used to make a

weapon. And——

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a high degree of confidence in that

statement, doctor?

Dr. KELLY. I certainly have it in the United States. You discussed the problem of controlling it in the former Soviet Union, and

I think it is a real problem, but in the United States, our Department of Energy and the national labs have done, I think, a spectacular job of maintaining control over this material. So that means

that there are smaller amounts of material and radioactive samples

that are used—that cannot be used to make a nuclear weapon.

32

1This reference is to slides of maps being displayed by Dr. Kelly during his testimony. The

maps are part of his prepared statement that begins on page 37.

And, in the past, of course, our main concern about this stuff has

been making sure that the workers who are handling it were well

protected, that it wasn’t lost or stolen or led to public health dangers of one kind or another. There was concern about theft, but

mainly because it had the economic value. Somebody would steal

it for—often by accident, using it for scrap metal, but there was

never any thought of malicious intent, other than an honorable

thief looking for a quick buck.

The notion that someone would steal this material for malicious

intent and actually try to turn it into a radiological weapon has

created a whole new class of threats, and that is what has put this

issue on the table on what to do about that.

What we have done is some very simple calculations just to show

the danger presented by many of the classes of materials that are

out there. What we have done is use a computer program that is

used to help emergency-response teams understand what areas

might be contaminated.

So I’m just going to take two examples. One is a very small piece

of cesium, roughly the size of the piece of cesium that was found

in North Carolina a couple of weeks ago that had accidentally

found its way into a steel mill. And let’s see if I can get the technology to work for me. We’re assuming you simply blow this material up at the foot of Capitol Hill. And what happens is, if—— The CHAIRMAN. How much material are we talking about now in

this slide? 1

Dr. KELLY. Well, it’s 2 curies, the size of the material that was

found in North Carolina. And we’ve assumed that it’s broken up

into tiny particles and settles around Capitol Hill. And I have—

we’ve calculated three circles here. The inner circle, the smaller

one, you have one chance in a hundred of getting cancer in that

area. Now, that’s roughly the risk that is taken already by a nuclear worker, radiation workers. So over their lifetime, they get

roughly the same exposure. So at least for that class of people, we

would, you know, have been willing to take that risk. The middle

ring is one chance in a thousand of getting cancer. And the outer

ring is one chance in ten thousand.

Now, this assumes that you are—to get this cancer risk, you

have to be there for—you have to live there for 40 years to get that

level of risk.

The CHAIRMAN. So it’s not merely that if you’re intially exposed

to this—let’s say you’re walking down the mall—that looks like the

mall or the ellipse.

Dr. KELLY. Yes, I think——

The CHAIRMAN. What you have there?

Dr. KELLY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You’re walking down the mall, and this thing

would go off. If you’re in the first small circle, and you are immediately evacuated from that area, is your risk still one in a hundred?

Dr. KELLY. Oh, no. You would have to—your risk would be—the

risk of—if you just walked out of here, your risk would be almost

33

non-existent. The only people likely to be hurt in this are likely to

be hurt either by the weapon itself, the explosion—— The CHAIRMAN. The actual explosion, right.

Dr. KELLY [continuing]. Or if there’s panic—— The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. KELLY [continuing]. Which is something you want to be worried about. So the reason for showing these contours, however, is

that the areas that are exposed—— The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Dr. KELLY [continuing]. Have to be cleaned up.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Dr. KELLY. And one of the problems in the outer ring is the EPA

threshold that was actually discussed earlier. It’s the Superfund

threshold, one in ten thousand. Now, one thing you have to understand about that level is that it’s an extremely low level or risk.

It’s about—we’re saying you have one chance in twenty of dying of

cancer, in any event, and this makes it—increases it by this one

in ten thousand. So this is—you’re also exposed to a background

level of radiation all the time. No amount is good for you, but we

get it from cosmic rays, we get it from radon from the soil. You

know every—you’re rolling the dice every time one of these radioactive rays goes through your body. And so the more times you roll

the dice, the higher your probability is. But this increases the risk

only about—by a factor of one-twentieth above background.

Nonetheless, it is the level that EPA sets as the area which they

recommend decontamination. And one of the dilemmas you face is

that this stuff is pretty hard to decontaminate. In the case of cesium, it binds to asphalt and concrete. It can get into the air-conditioning system. And if anything like—if it had gotten into the Hart

Office Building, you couldn’t, for example, just pump chlorine into

it and kill this stuff. I mean, it is very hard to get out and, in many

cases, you probably would have to demolish the buildings or reconsider whether this threshold really makes sense, because this is

a——

The CHAIRMAN. Reconsider the one in ten thousand standard?

Dr. KELLY. Yes. I mean, you’d be faced with that decision

about—— The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. KELLY. Now, the second example I have is taking a comparatively large source of cobalt of the sort that is used in devices

around the country, and detonating it at the tip of Manhattan.

Now, here you see the rings are—these are the same three rings

here, so you’re basically—— The CHAIRMAN. Rings are elliptically shaped because that represents wind—the direction of the wind, or whatever, just

arbitrarily——

Dr. KELLY. Yes; we just picked—low wind, but the wind just happened to be blowing to the northeast. Now, one of the things that

I should emphasize is that all of these calculations—if you read the

manual for the first-responder calculation, they say that the—there

are huge errors associated with these calculations, because it depends on the tails of the wind and where the buildings are located

and all sorts of other assumptions. So this is not an absolute

forecast——

34

The CHAIRMAN. Gotcha.

Dr. KELLY [continuing]. But it’s a reasonable scenario of what

could happen. And again, you can see that you have, in this case,

quite significant areas that are affected, including some agricultural areas you’d have to worry about. And the other point here,

though, is that anybody who tries to actually handle this kind of

material would have to be quite a sophisticated person, because

just holding this—if you held or were close to one of these for even

a few minutes, you’d get a fatal dose of radiation and be incapacitated within an hour. So this is not a simple task to do.

I want to just give you another point of comparison. We tried to

use the Russian standard at Chernobyl as a point of comparison,

and given the contamination levels that would have come from this

cobalt explosion that I was just describing, the inner ring is the

area that the Russians closed permanently as a result of the

Chernobyl accident. So this is just to give you an indicator of

the——

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the tip of Manhattan island we’re looking

at?

Dr. KELLY. Yes, it’s detonated right down at the tip.

The CHAIRMAN. OK.

Dr. KELLY. And, of course, this is a slightly different wind pattern that we’ve got——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. KELLY [continuing]. And it just goes up——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. KELLY. It’s just to give you a sense of scale. But the point

of this is—and again, you—the level of risks at the far end of this

are high, but if you walk out of this thing, even in this case, very

few people are going to be killed through direct effects. There are

always freak events where you’d have a hot spot and some could

get a high dosage, but this is not going to be—if people are safely

evacuated, you’re not going to be killing significant numbers of people.

So the question at the end, then, is if this is quite a serious

threat and a credible threat, as you said in your opening remarks,

one of the things we all need to face up to here after September

11, is to take a very hardheaded look at the real risks faced by the

United States and find out whether our resources are being aligned

with where the real risks are and where we can do some good. This

is clearly an area where we can do some good and where at least

we believe the risks are quite high.

And we have three classes of recommendations, which largely follow the statements that have already been made. There seems to

be an amazing consensus here on how to proceed. First of all, you

want to reduce opportunity for the terrorists or any malefactors to

get hold of this material to begin with. Second, you’d like to have

very early warning to detect any illicit movement of this. And,

third, you want to minimize casualties and panic that would result

if such an event actually occurred.

And let me give a few specific things that I think would qualify

in each one of those areas. I think we really do congratulate Dr.

Meserve and the activities of the NRC to face up to this new class

of challenge for his materials. But we plainly need to take a fresh

35

look at the procedures under which people obtain high levels of radioactive materials, the safety and security procedures, and tracking these materials throughout their lifetime.

Another thing we need to do is to beef up our intelligence, both

through domestic police work and through close cooperation internationally, in making sure that we keep close track of both the

legal and illegal movements of this material. And I should hasten

to say that virtually every problem we’re facing here in the United

States is being faced in Europe and most parts of the world, so it

really makes sense to approach almost all of these problems

through international collaborations and perhaps even cost sharing

where it’s appropriate.

One place where this might be particularly appropriate is looking

for technical alternatives to radiation. Right now we use radioactive materials to sterilize food and to do logging and other things,

because it’s the cheapest way to do it. Now, what will happen if you

start applying rigorous security to some of those facilities, the price

of doing it that way might go up. And one thing that is likely to

happen is that it will stimulate technology that is not high risk

that could do the same job, maybe at a slightly higher price. And

we think that it’s probably appropriate for the laboratories and

other organizations to actually engage actively in research and

search for alternatives, particularly for these higher-level sources of

radioactive material.

One specific problem that people have had is that there’s a lot

of—is getting rid of radioactive material when it’s no longer being

used. And there are—it’s a terrible problem, but if you’ve got a

sample in a laboratory or in a company that’s gone bankrupt or

just is going to some other line of work, what do you do with this

stuff? In most cases, the Department of Energy is the only organization allowed to come and pick the stuff up and move it to a safe

site.

And there’s a program in DOE called the Offsite Source Recovery

Project, which we think has been chronically underfunded. These

are guys who just go out in trucks, locate these sources, pick them

up and take them to a safe place. And it seems, to us, silly to have

people who don’t want this material forced to keep it because this

program is underfunded.

The second thing I mentioned was early detection, and there are

a lot of—there’s a need to put radiation detectors in many different

pinch points, ports, bridges, tunnels, and other areas, and also a

need to develop improved detectors. And there are a lot of things

that can be done and are being done at the labs and other places

to increase our ability to detect movement of all kinds. A lot of

them are sophisticated systems where the more different detectors

you network together, the better able you are to get patterns and

eliminate false alarms. And we would strongly support increasing

research and testing as well as deploying things we already know

how to do.

And then, finally, in the event that you actually do have an incident, there are—the first thing you need to do it to make sure that

people who respond to the emergency are able to control panic and

are able to treat any people who have real symptoms. Emergency

response training is key. One very important thing is that this—

36

an attack of this sort would generate a lot of panic. There was a

case in Brazil where a large amount of cesium was released inadvertently in a neighborhood, and huge numbers of people in the

town showed up at the emergency rooms. Some of them had radiation-sickness symptoms. They were nauseous and had physical

symptoms. But only fewer than 10 percent of them actually had

anything approaching dangerous levels of exposure. It was purely

psychosomatic stress. And if the emergency responders aren’t prepared to deal with this kind of problem and do instant triage, you

could have chaos at the health facility.

We have some concern that, while a lot of money is being directed into first-responder training, that there is a real need to

take a tight, controlled approach to this rather than simply spread

it out to all the states and hope for the best.

The CHAIRMAN. Tight control of the training?

Dr. KELLY. Yes. Things like quality control over the materials.

There’s a lot of people who are still training with obsolete information. And, as you know, we are learning, rapidly, new things about

the nature of these threats and how to respond and trying to update everybody’s field manual in the realtime is not a very practical

thing to do. Fortunately, the Internet and other tools like this

should make it easier to do that. You’d also like to have some kind

of peer review or quality control for the materials which are being

sent out to these people. And again, advanced information-based

training systems seem to cry out for this.

The Defense Department and the labs have started to work in

this area, but we sense that there is a real need to get some infrastructure here to make sure that good material is easy to find and

distributed quickly out to the very large number of people who

need it. There are 2.7 million nurses and over a million police and

fire alone, let alone emergency responders.

So in the end, we’re concluding that this is a very serious security problem from radiological attack, from sources that are spread

throughout the economy. One of the things I haven’t talked about

is nuclear reactor fuel rods. Of course, these have many times more

nuclear radioactive material in these rods than anything that I’ve

been talking about. But also trying to acquire and move and manipulate these is also many times more difficult. So I haven’t formally considered that here. But the good news, of course, is that

with some prompt and very practical things, we can hugely reduce

the risk of these kinds of attacks.

I have to conclude by saying that in the long run, there’s no way

we can reduce this risk to zero. And one of the things we plainly

need to do is to try to find a way to build a world where the kind

of people who would even contemplate this kind of attack aren’t

being bred and trained. But I really do thank the committee for engaging this. I think it’s very timely, and I look forward to being

able to work with you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kelly follows:]

37

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. HENRY C. KELLY, PRESIDENT, FEDERATION OF

AMERICAN SCIENTISTS

INTRODUCTION

Surely there is no more unsettling task than considering how to defend our nation

against individuals and groups seeking to advance their aims by killing and injuring

innocent people. But recent events make it necessary to take almost-inconceivably

evil acts seriously. We are all grateful for the Committee’s uncompromising review

of these threats and its search for responses needed to protect our nation. Thank

you for the opportunity to support these efforts.

My remarks today will review the dangers presented by radiological attacks, situations where nuclear materials that could be released, without using a nuclear explosive device, for the malicious propose of killing or injuring American citizens and

destroying property. Our analysis of this threat has reached three principle conclusions:

1. Radiological attacks constitute a credible threat. Radioactive materials that

could be used for such attacks are stored in thousands of facilities around the

U.S., many of which may not be adequately protected against theft by determined terrorists. Some of this material could be easily dispersed in urban areas

by using conventional explosives or by other methods.

2. While radiological attacks would result in some deaths, they would not result in the hundreds of thousands of fatalities that could be caused by a crude

nuclear weapon. Attacks could contaminate large urban areas with radiation

levels that exceed EPA health and toxic material guidelines.

3. Materials that could easily be lost or stolen from U.S. research institutions

and commercial sites could contaminate tens of city blocks at a level that would

require prompt evacuation and create terror in large communities even if radiation casualties were low. Areas as large as tens of square miles could be contaminated at levels that exceed recommended civilian exposure limits. Since

there are often no effective ways to decontaminate buildings that have been exposed at these levels, demolition may be the only practical solution. If such an

event were to take place in a city like New York, it would result in losses of

potentially trillions of dollars.

The analysis I will summarize here was conductd by Michael Levi, Director of the

Strategic Security Program at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), and by

Dr. Robert Nelson of Princeton University and FAS.

BACKGROUND

Materials are radioactive if their atomic nuclei (or centers) spontaneously disintegrate (or decay) with high-energy fragments of this disintegration flying off into the

environment. Several kinds of particles can so be emitted, and are collectively referred to as radiation. Some materials decay quickly, making them sources of intense radiation, but their rapid decay rate means that they do not stay radioactive

for long periods of time. Other materials serve as a weaker source of radiation because they decay slowly. Slow rates of decay mean, however, that a source may remain dangerous for very long periods. Half of the atoms in a sample of cobalt-60

will, for example, disintegrate over a five year period, but it takes 430 years for half

of the atoms in a sample of americium-241 to decay.

The radiation produced by radioactive materials provides a low-cost way to disinfect food, sterilize medical equipment, treat certain kinds of cancer, find oil, build

sensitive smoke detectors, and provide other critical services in our economy. Radioactive materials are also widely used in university, corporate, and government research laboratories. As a result, significant amounts of radioactive materials are

stored in laboratories, food irradiation plants, oil drilling facilities, medical centers,

and many other sites.

A. Commercial Uses

Radioactive sources that emit intense gamma-rays, such as cobalt-60 and cesium137, are useful in killing bacteria and cancer cells. Gamma-rays, like X-rays, can

penetrate clothing, skin, and other materials, but they are more energetic and destructive. When these rays reach targeted cells, they cause lethal chemical changes

inside the cell.

Plutonium and americium also serve commercial and research purposes. When

plutonium or americium decay, they throw off a very large particle called an alpha

particle. Hence, they are referred to as alpha emitters. Plutonium, which is used in

nuclear weapons, also has non-military functions. During the 1960s and 1970s the

federal government encouraged the use of plutonium in university facilities studying

38

nuclear engineering and nuclear physics. Americium is used in smoke detectors and

in devices that find oil sources. These devices are lowered deep into oil wells and

are used to detect fossil fuel deposits by measuring hydrogen content as they descend.

B. Present Security

With the exception of nuclear power reactors, commercial facilities do not have

the types or volumes of materials usable for making nuclear weapons. Security concerns have focused on preventing thefts or accidents that could expose employees

and the general public to harmful levels of radiation. A thief might, for example,

take the material for its commercial value as a radioactive source, or it may be discarded as scrap by accident or as a result of neglect. This system works reasonably

well when the owners have a vested interest in protecting commercially valuable

material. However, once the materials are no longer needed and costs of appropriate

disposal are high, security measures become lax, and the likelihood of abandonment

or theft increases.

Concern about the intentional release of radioactive materials changes the situation in fundamental ways. We must wrestle with the possibility that sophisticated

terrorist groups may be interested in obtaining the material and with the enormous

danger to society that such thefts might present.

Significant quantities of radioactive material have been lost or stolen from U.S.

facilities during the past few years and thefts of foreign sources have led to fatalities. In the U.S., sources have been found abandoned in scrap yards, vehicles, and

residential buildings. In September, 1987, scavengers broke into an abandoned cancer clinic in Goiania, Brazil and stole a medical device containing large amounts of

radioactive cesium. An estimated 250 people were exposed to the source, eight developed radiation sickness, and four died.

In almost all cases, the loss of radioactive materials has resulted from an accident

or from a thief interested only in economic gain. In 1995, however, Chechen rebels

placed a shielded container holding the Cesium-137 core of a cancer treatment device in a Moscow park, and then tipped off Russian reporters of its location. The

only reported death from terrorist use of a radioactive material occurred when a

Russian mafia group hid a radioactive source below the office chair of a businessman, killing him after a few days of exposure.

Enhanced security measures at commercial sites that use dangerous amounts of

radioactive material are likely to increase the cost of using radioactive materials

and may possibly stimulate development and use of alternative technologies for

some applications.

C. Health Risks

Gamma rays pose two types of health risks. Intense sources of gamma rays can

cause immediate tissue damage, and lead to acute radiation poisoning. Fatalities

can result from very high doses. Long-term exposure to low levels of gamma rays

can also be harmful because it can cause genetic mutations leading to cancer. Triggering cancer is largely a matter of chance: the more radiation you’re exposed to,

the more often the dice are rolled. The risk is never zero since we are all constantly

being bombarded by large amounts of gamma radiation produced by cosmic rays,

which reach us from distant stars. We are also exposed to trace amounts of radioactivity in the soil, in building materials, and other parts of our environment. Any increase in exposure increases the risk of cancer.

Alpha particles emitted by plutonium, americium and other elements also pose

health risks. Although these particles cannot penetrate clothing or skin, they are

harmful if emitted by inhaled materials. If plutonium is in the environment in particles small enough to be inhaled, contaminated particles can lodge in the lung for

extended periods. Inside the lung, the alpha particles produced by plutonium can

damage lung tissue and lead to long-term cancers.

CASE STUDIES

We have chosen three specific cases to illustrate the range of impacts that could

be created by malicious use of comparatively small radioactive sources: the amount

of cesium that was discovered recently abandoned in North Carolina, the amount

of cobalt commonly found in a single rod in a food irradiation facility, and the

amount of americium typically found in oil well logging systems. The impact would

be much greater if the radiological device in question released the enormous

amounts of radioactive material found in a single nuclear reactor fuel rod, but it

would be quite difficult and dangerous for anyone to attempt to obtain and ship

such a rod without death or detection. The Committee will undoubtedly agree that

39

1See figures 1 through 5 at end of statement.

the danger presented by modest radiological sources that are comparatively easy to

obtain is significant as well.

Impact of the release of radioactive material in a populated area will vary depending on a number of factors, many of which are not predictable. Consequences depend

on the amount of material released, the nature of the material, the details of the

device that distributes the material, the direction and speed of the wind, other

weather conditions, the size of the particles released (which affects their ability to

be carried by the wind and to be inhaled), and the location and size of buildings

near the release site. Uncertainties inherent in the complex models used in predicting the effects of a radiological weapon mean that it is only possible to make

crude estimates of impacts; the estimated damage we show might be too high by

a factor often, or underestimated by the same factor. The following examples are

then fairly accurate illustrations, rather than precise predictions.

In all three cases we have assumed that the material is released on a calm day

(wind speed of one mile per hour). We assume that the material is distributed by

an explosion that causes a mist of fine particles to spread downwind in a cloud. The

blast itself, of course, may result in direct injuries, but these have not been calculated. People will be exposed to radiation in several ways.

• First, they will be exposed to material in the dust inhaled during the initial

passage of the radiation cloud, if they have not been able to escape the area

before the dust cloud arrives. We assume that about 20% of the material is in

particles small enough to be inhaled. If this material is plutonium or americium

(or other alpha emitters), the material will stay in the body and lead to long

term exposure.

• Second, anyone living in the affected area will be exposed to material deposited

from the dust that settles from the cloud. If the material contains cesium (or

other gamma emitters) they will be continuously exposed to radiation from this

dust, since the gamma rays penetrate clothing and skin. If the material contains plutonium (or other alpha emitters), dust that is pulled off the ground and

into the air by wind, automobile movement, or other actions will continue to be

inhaled, adding to exposure.

• In a rural area, people would also be exposed to radiation from contaminated

food and water sources.

The EPA has a series of recommendations for addressing radioactive contamination that would likely guide official response to a radiological attack. Immediately

after the attack, authorities would evacuate people from areas contaminated to levels exceeding these guidelines. People who received more than twenty-five times the

threshold dose for evacuation would have to be taken in for medical supervision.

In the long term, the cancer hazard from the remaining radioactive contamination

would have to be addressed. Typically, if decontamination could not reduce the danger of cancer death to about one-in-ten-thousand, the EPA would recommend the

contaminated area be eventually abandoned. Decontaminating an urban area presents a variety of challenges. Several materials that might be used in a radiological

attack can chemically bind to concrete and asphalt, while other materials would become physically lodged in crevices on the surface of buildings, sidewalks and streets.

Options for decontamination would range from sandblasting to demolition, with the

latter likely being the only feasible option. Some radiological materials will also become firmly attached to soil in city parks, with the only disposal method being large

scale removal of contaminated dirt. In short, there is a high risk that the area contaminated by a radiological attack would have to be deserted.

We now consider the specific attack scenarios. The first two provide examples of

attacks using gamma emitters, while the last example uses an alpha emitter. In

each case, we have calculated the expected size of the contaminated area, along with

other zones of dangerously high contamination. The figures in the Appendix 1 provide a guide to understanding the impact of the attacks.

EXAMPLE 1—CESIUM (GAMMA EMITTER)—FIGURE 1

Two weeks ago, a lost medical gauge containing Cesium was discovered in North

Carolina. Imagine that the Cesium in this device was exploded in Washington, DC

in a bomb using ten pounds of TNT. The initial passing of the radioactive cloud

would be relatively harmless, and no one would have to evacuate immediately. But

what area would be contaminated? Residents of an area of about five city blocks,

if they remained, would have a one-in-a-thousand chance of getting cancer. A swath

about one mile long covering an area of forty city blocks would exceed EPA contamiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:30 Jul 24, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 80848 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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nation limits, with remaining residents having a one-in-ten thousand chance of getting cancer. If decontamination were not possible, these areas would have to be

abandoned for decades. If the device was detonated at the National Gallery of Art,

the contaminated area might include the Capitol, Supreme Court, and Library of

Congress, as seen in figure one.

EXAMPLE 2—COBALT (GAMMA EMITTER)—FIGURES 2 AND 3

Now imagine if a single piece of radioactive cobalt from a food irradiation plant

was dispersed by an explosion at the lower tip of Manhattan. Typically, each of

these cobalt ‘‘pencils’’ is about one inch in diameter and one foot long, with hundreds

of such pieces often being found in the same facility. Admittedly, acquisition of such

material is less likely than in the previous scenario, but we still consider the results, depicted in figure two. Again, no immediate evacuation would be necessary,

but in this case, an area of approximately one-thousand square kilometers, extending over three states, would be contaminated. Over an area of about three hundred

typical city blocks, there would be a one-in-ten risk of death from cancer for residents living in the contaminated area for forty years. The entire borough of Manhattan would be so contaminated that anyone living there would have a one-in-a-hundred chance of dying from cancer caused by the residual radiation. It would be decades before the city was inhabitable again, and demolition might be necessary.

For comparison, consider the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, in which a Soviet nuclear

power plant went through a meltdown. Radiation was spread over a vast area, and

the region surrounding the plant was permanently closed. In our current example,

the area contaminated to the same level of radiation as that region would cover

much of Manhattan, as shown in figure three. Furthermore, near Chernobyl, a larger area has been subject to periodic controls on human use such as restrictions on

food, clothing, and time spent outdoors. In the current example, the equivalent area

extends fifteen miles.

To summarize the first two examples, materials like cesium, cobalt, iridium, and

strontium (gamma emitters) would all produce similar results. No immediate evacuation or medical attention would be necessary, but long-term contamination would

render large urban areas useless, resulting in severe economic and personal hardship.

EXAMPLE 3—AMERICIUM (GAMMA EMITTER)—FIGURES 4 AND 5

A device that spread materials like americium and plutonium would present an

entirely different set of risks. Consider a typical americium source used in oil well

surveying. If this were blown up with one pound of TNT, people in a region roughly

ten times the area of the initial bomb blast would require medical supervision and

monitoring, as depicted in figure four. An area 30 times the size of the first area

(a swath one kilometer long and covering twenty city blocks) would have to be evacuated within half an hour. After the initial passage of the cloud, most of the radioactive materials would settle to the ground. Of these materials, some would be

forced back up into the air and inhaled, thus posing a long-term health hazard, as

illustrated by figure five. A ten-block area contaminated in this way would have a

cancer death probability of one-in-a-thousand. A region two kilometers long and covering sixty city blocks would be contaminated in excess of EPA safety guidelines.

If the buildings in this area had to be demolished and rebuilt, the cost would exceed

fifty billion dollars.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A number of practical steps can be taken that would greatly reduce the risks presented by radiological weapons. Our recommendations fall into three categories: (1)

Reduce opportunities for terrorists to obtain dangerous radioactive materials, (2) Install early warning systems to detect illicit movement of radioactive materials, and

(3) Minimize casualties and panic from any attack that does occur. Since the U.S.

is not alone in its concern about radiological attack, and since we clearly benefit by

limiting access to dangerous materials anywhere in the world, many of the measures recommended should be undertaken as international collaborations.

(1) Reduce access to radioactive materials

Radioactive materials facilitate valuable economic, research and health care technologies. Measures needed to improve the security of facilities holding dangerous

amounts of these materials will increase costs. In some cases, it may be worthwhile

to pay a higher price for increased security. In other instances, however, the development of alternative technologies may be the more economically viable option. Specific security steps include the following:

41

• Fully fund material recovery and storage programs. Hundreds of plutonium, americium, and other radioactive sources are stored in dangerously large quantities in university laboratories and other facilities. When these materials are

actively used and considered a valuable economic asset, they are likely to be

well protected. But in all too many cases they are not used frequently, resulting

in the risk that attention to their security will diminish over time. At the same

time, it is difficult for the custodians of these materials to dispose of them since

in many cases only the DOE is authorized to recover and transport them to permanent disposal sites. The DOE Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP), which

is responsible for undertaking this task, has successfully secured over threethousand sources and has moved them to a safe location. Unfortunately, the inadequate funding of this program serves as a serious impediment to further

source recovery efforts. Funding for OSRP has been repeatedly cut in the

FY2001 and 2002 budgets and the presidential FY2003 budget proposal, significantly delaying the recovery process. In the cases of FY01 and FY02, the 25%

and 35% cuts were justified as money being tansferred to higher priorities; the

FY03 would cut funding by an additional 26%. This program should be given

the needed attention and firm goals should be set for identifying, transporting,

and safeguarding all unneeded radioactive materials. • Review licensing and security requirements and inspection procedures for all

dangerous amounts of radioactive material. HHS, DOE, NRC and other affected

agencies should be provided with sufficient funding to ensure that physical protection measures are adequate and that inspections are conducted on a regular

basis. A thorough reevaluation of security regulations should be conducted to

ensure that protective measures apply to amounts of radioactive material that

pose a homeland security threat, not just those that present a threat of accidental exposure. • Fund research aimed at finding alternatives to radioactive materials. While radioactive sources provide an inexpensive way to serve functions such as food

sterilization, smoke detection, and oil well logging, there are sometimes other,

though possibly more expensive, ways to perform the same functions. A research program aimed at developing inexpensive substitutes for radioactive materials in these applications should be created and provided with adequate funding.

(2) Early Detection

• Expanded use of radiation detection systems. Systems capable of detecting dangerous amounts of radiation are comparatively inexpensive and unobtrusive.

Many have already been installed in critical locations around Washington, DC,

at border points and throughout the U.S. The Office of Homeland Security

should act promptly to identify all areas where such sensors should be installed,

ensure that information from these sensors is continuously assessed, and ensure

adequate maintenance and testing. High priority should be given to key points

in the transportation system, such as airports, harbors, rail stations, tunnels,

highways. Routine checks of scrap metal yards and land fill sites would also

protect against illegal or accidental disposal of dangerous materials.

• Fund research to improve detectors. Low-cost networking and low-cost sensors

should be able to provide wide coverage of critical urban areas at a comparatively modest cost. A program should be put in place to find ways of improving

upon existing detection technologies as well as improving plans for deployment

of these systems and for responding to alarms.

(3) Effective Disaster response

An effective response to a radiological attack requires a system capable of quickly

gauging the extent of the damage, identifying appropriate responders, developing a

coherent response plan, and getting the necessary personnel and equipment to the

site rapidly. The immediate goal must be to identify the victims that require prompt

medical attention (likely to be a small number) and to ensure that all other unauthorized personnel leave the affected area quickly, without panic, and without

spreading the radioactive material. All of this requires extensive training.

• Training for hospital personnel and first responders. First responders and hospital personnel need to understand how to protect themselves and affected citizens in the event of a radiological attack and be able to rapidly determine if

individuals have been exposed to radiation.

There is great danger that panic in the event of a radiological attack on a

large city could lead to significant casualties and severely stress the medical

system. Panic can also cause confusion for medical personnel. The experience

of a radiological accident in Brazil suggests that a large number of people will

42

present themselves to medical personnel with real symptoms of radiation sickness—including nausea and dizziness—even if only a small fraction of these

people have actually been exposed to radiation. Medical personnel need careful

training to distinguish those needing help from those with psychosomatic symptoms. While generous funding has been made available for training first responders and medical personnel, the program appears in need of a clear management strategy. Dozens of federal and state organizations are involved, and

it is not clear how materials will be certified or accredited. Internet-based tools

for delivering the training will almost certainly be necessary to ensure that

large numbers of people throughout the U.S. get involved. In the U.S., there are

over 2.7 million nurses and over a million police and firefighters who will require training, not to mention the medics in the U.S. armed services. However,

there appears to be no coherent program for developing or using new tools to

deliver needed services, and to ensure that training and resource materials are

continuously upgraded and delivered securely.

• Decontamination Technology. Significant research into cleanup of radiologically

contaminated cities has been conducted in the past, primarily in addressing the

possibility of nuclear war. Such programs should be revisited with an eye to the

specific requirements of cleaning up after a radiological attack. As demonstrated

above, the ability to decontaminate large urban areas might mean the difference

from being able to continue inhabiting a city and having to abandon it.

CONCLUSION

The events of September 11 have created a need to very carefully assess our defense needs and ensure that the resources we spend for security are aligned with

the most pressing security threats. The analysis summarized here shows that the

threat of malicious radiological attack in the U.S. is quite real, quite serious, and

deserves a vigorous response. Fortunately, there are a number of comparatively inexpensive measures that can and should be taken because they can greatly reduce

the likelihood of such an attack. The U.S. has indicated its willingness to spend

hundreds of billions of dollars to combat threats that are, in our view, far less likely

to occur. This includes funding defensive measures that are far less likely to succeed

than the measures that we propose in this testimony. The comparatively modest investments to reduce the danger of radiological attack surely deserve priority support.

In the end, however, we must face the brutal reality that no technological remedies can provide complete confidence that we are safe from radiological attack. Determined, malicious groups might still find a way to use radiological weapons or

other means when their only goal is killing innocent people, and if they have no

regard for their own lives. In the long run our greatest hope must lie in building

a prosperous, free world where the conditions that breed such monsters have vanished from the earth.

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The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Dr. Kelly. After Dr. Vantine

speaks, I have some questions I’d like to pursue with you, as well

as Dr. Koonin, on this.

But, doctor, welcome. I indicated this morning, when I opened

the hearing, that we had had a very good briefing, in a secure setting. And some of what each you had to say we felt was not prudent to repeat here or was classified and could not be repeated in

this setting. And at any time in your presentation, any question

that I ask—which is unusual for us to do, but important—that I

know what I don’t know, and therefore I know you know more than

I know—and therefore if you conclude, classified or otherwise, that

it is better not to respond to the question in open session, all you

have to do is indicate that. I’d appreciate it, and we’ll pursue it in

closed session.

You all have acknowledged and been willing to come back for the

larger session I want to set up for my colleagues, the entire Senate,

and the first briefing, more detailed and classified briefing we received. And so we’ll have an opportunity to pursue that. But I leave

you to your own judgment, and I thank you again for the briefing

yesterday, and I’m sure we’ll benefit from the testimony today.

STATEMENT OF DR. HARRY C. VANTINE, DIVISION LEADER,

COUNTER-TERRORISM AND INCIDENT RESPONSE, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY, LIVERMORE,

CA

Dr. VANTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the remarks. And

thank you for the opportunity to talk before you this afternoon.

By way of introduction, I’m Harry Vantine. I lead the program

at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Counter-terrorism and Incident Response. I’ve been a member of the Emergency Response Program at Livermore for 20 years, so I have quite

a bit of experience in these fields.

As you mentioned, yesterday, in closed session, we talked about

the threat to homeland security posed by terrorist use of improvised nuclear devices and radiological dispersal devices. What I’d

like to do today is to talk about means by which we can go forward

and protect the United States against the terrorist threat. And to

that end, I’ve prepared some written testimony. I ask that that be

submitted into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record.

Dr. VANTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What I’d like to do is

start out by giving a little bit of background about the current

emergency-response program in the United States.

As you know, there are over 40 agencies involved in emergency

response and counter-terrorism in the United States, and they all

play a role. And the essential progress that we’ll make in this country is the progress we’ll make by those agencies working together

cooperating and coordinating.

One thing that strikes me, though, is that whenever a matter of

nuclear expertise comes up, those questions get referred to the Department of Energy. The requests come from many agencies. They

can come from the FBI. They can come from State, Transportation.

But the Department of Energy is the repository of nuclear knowledge.

49

We have a program at Energy, the NEST program, emergencyresponse program, and we try to respond to all requests for information. And to the extent that we can, we do.

Now, the program, as has been talked about this morning, is a

volunteer program. We have limited resources. And so when requests come in, we have to prioritize those requests. And the way

that we prioritize the requests is by looking at the threat to life

that the particular area might pose. For instance, we look at the

improvised nuclear device and the biological weapon as those terrorist devices that can cause the greatest loss of life. And so we

prioritize—give those the highest priority. There’s been a lot of discussion at today’s hearing about——

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, I want to make something clear.

Dr. VANTINE. Sure.

The CHAIRMAN. I’d like you to clarify it, because I think it’s an

important point that most people don’t know. When you’re contacted by the FBI, when you’re contacted by any of these 39 other

government agencies, about the content of the prospect of the particular circumstance that has occurred, that is not included in your

yearly budget at the laboratory. That is work done, as you said, on

a volunteer basis. Is that correct?

Dr. VANTINE. That’s correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Which I think is probably the most astounding

and stupid thing that I have heard us do of late, that we do not—

knowing that the one place where the expertise resides, we don’t

provide you—I know you’re not here asking for resources, but that

we don’t provide you the resources so this need not be a volunteer

effort. Or am I missing something on that?

Dr. VANTINE. Mr. Chairman, let me explain the rationale. The

rationale is that we have major programs at the laboratories looking at nuclear matters. We have the National Nuclear Stockpile

Program. We have many experts——

The CHAIRMAN. Which I hope we can keep going, by the way.

Dr. VANTINE [continuing]. In many fields. Thank you. We have

experts in many fields in nuclear weapon design, detection,

diagnostics, engineering. Those people, many of those people, have

volunteered, in the case of a national crisis, to respond. And so

when a request comes in, they do respond. So that’s the rationale.

With the heightened concern about terrorist use of nuclear materials since September 11, it may be time to revisit that. In the past,

that has worked, though.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. VANTINE. Now, improvised nuclear devices, as I said, and biological weapons are at the top of our list. What I’d like to do is

spend a few minutes talking about what an improvised nuclear device is and what a radiological dispersal device is.

An improvised nuclear device, as its name implies, is a nuclear

device. It produces nuclear yield, and the yield has catastrophic effects. And we talked about some of those effects yesterday. Those

effects are generally well known. They’re in the open literature.

And I think the public has a keen awareness of the catastrophic

effects of nuclear weapons.

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If you consider what would have happened if the World Trade

Center terrorist attacks had been a nuclear attack, the effects

would have been much more catastrophic than they were.

The CHAIRMAN. Of the same proportions as it relates to the release of energy. Make the comparison for me.

Dr. VANTINE. That’s right. There has been an estimation of the

effects of the two airplanes crashing into the World Trade Center,

that they carried the chemical equivalent of a kiloton of energy.

Now, normally we don’t express chemical energy in kilotons, because chemical energy is released over a longer time than the blast

from a high explosive. But in terms of raw energy, those airliners

carried the chemical equivalent of about a kiloton of energy.

If that kiloton had been a nuclear device, the effects would have

been immediate and much longer-range. The loss of life would have

been at least two orders of magnitude—a hundred times larger,

maybe more, so that it would have been much more catastrophic.

It just emphasizes, punctuates the point, that nuclear weapons are

much more deadly than their chemical equivalents.

The other thing that I would point out is that dealing with the

aftermath of an improvised nuclear device would really be horrific.

The rescue workers who tried to go back to ground zero would see

radiation levels that were just enormous. In certain parts near

ground zero, radiation workers just would not be able to reenter.

The radiation levels would be too high. Further away from ground

zero, there would have to be evacuation because of fallout. So there

would be a long-term consequence, a long-term evacuation needed,

and clean up. And, of course, clean up would produce enormous

quantities of radioactive material that would have to be disposed

of, and that would be no mean feat.

So that, in a nutshell, is why we’re really concerned about improvised nuclear devices. The effects are tremendous, and loss of life

is just enormous.

Now, if a terrorist decides not to pursue the idea of building a

nuclear device and, instead, tries to build what has been called a

radiological dispersal device, or a dirty bomb, they would try to get

radioactive material, as has been described by both Dr. Koonin and

Dr. Kelly. This requires the acquisition of radiological material and

some kind of a dispersal mechanism. And radioactive materials are

used around the world for a variety of purposes—medical, industrial, and research. And standards for handling the material are in

place, and the United States has high standards.

But if you read stories in the world press—some of those have

been referred to today—controls around the world—those stories in

the press suggest that current controls are just maybe not adequate for protecting some of this radiological material.

The effects of radiological dispersal devices vary fairly widely,

and they are measured in terms of contamination area, which

we’ve talked about this morning, health effects, and economic consequences. The health effects appear to be small. The economic consequences can be very large. The psychological effects can be very

large. These things are hard to quantify, and we certainly need to

guard against radiological dispersal devices.

Now, you know, it’s interesting. I mean, there are things that we

can do. And in the paper that I’m submitting, I’m suggesting some

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of those. One of the things that you’d like to do, of course, to guard

against both improvised nuclear devices and radiological dispersal

devices is you’d like to protect the material. And so if you can protect the material, keep the terrorists from getting it, that’s your

first measure of protection.

At the next level, you’d like to have some indications and warning. If somebody was planning something, you’d like to see it. You’d

like to get some indications of that. One of the advantages that we

have is that we understand, if somebody is trying to build an improvised nuclear device, what they have to do, what kinds of materials they need. There are certain signatures and indicators, and

we can look for those, and we do look for those.

Going on, search and interdiction is an important area. There are

two major areas I’d like to talk about in trying to improve our

search and interdiction capability. One is a technology area. We

should try to build better detectors. We have ideas for better detectors, detectors that are longer-range, detectors that are smarter,

detectors that use computers to try to take the man out of the loop,

to interpret the signals coming from the detectors. So better detectors is the first part of the equation.

The second part of the equation is to try to integrate those detectors into some kind of a system. The technology fails if we’re just

throwing this technology over a wall without anybody to catch it.

What we really need to do is integrate these detectors into systems.

And so I’m going to propose two ideas for systems here. There are

probably others. These two have to do with protecting the borders

and protecting the cities.

The idea of protecting the borders, a system that might help to

do that is a system that looks at cargo containers coming into the

United States. You could put detectors at the cargo sites and try

to find these materials before they find their way into the country.

The idea of protecting cities is to look internal to the borders, to

look at cities, to put out distributed sensor network systems, networks of sensors that sense the motion of materials and identify

the transport and then are hooked into an infrastructure system

that allows us to interdict those shipments. So those are ideas in

the area of search.

The next area I’d like to talk about a little bit is consequence

management. We tend not to think about the consequences of an

improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device, because it’s not a very pleasant thing to think about. And at that

point, there’s a feeling of hopelessness. The event has occurred,

you’ve been unsuccessful in stopping it. But we really have to think

about that. We have to think about what we do, how we protect

the public.

We need to educate the public. We have to understand what stories we would tell the public about what’s happened. We can’t start

looking at the problem when it happens. We really have to look at

the problem before it happens. And so we need to do that. The public needs to be educated. There have to be emergency response

plans in place. There have to be decontamination procedures exercised and embedded.

And then the final area I think we need to work on is what I’ll

call forensics analysis or attribution. Here we are, 3 months after

52

the anthrax events, still don’t know who the perpetrator was, still

looking for that. That’s really not an acceptable position to be in.

We need to develop forensic methods to look at the forensic evidence whenever somebody uses a weapon of mass destruction, to go

back and understand who did it. And those forensic methods need

to be quick, and they need to be precise. And so that’s something

that we really need to do.

Traditional forensics labs don’t handle radiological materials.

They don’t handle chemical weapons. They don’t handle biological

weapons. They handle fingerprints, DNA, that sort of thing.

The DOE laboratories have started forensics work looking at

weapons of mass destruction. I think that’s work that needs to be

supported. And we’re doing a lot in that area, and I think there’s

more to be done. I think there’s more that we could do.

So let me kind of wrap up and make some points about where

we are with improvised nuclear devices and radiological dispersal

devices. In my opinion, the use of an improvised nuclear device is

a low-probability event, but it is a high-consequence event. And, for

that reason, it’s a high-risk event, and it’s something we need to

prepare for.

We’ve talked about use of radiological dispersal devices. They’re

dirty bombs. Those are higher-probability events, because the material is more readily available, but they are certainly lower-consequence events.

As September 11 has shown us, we don’t know where the terrorists are going to strike. We don’t know how they’re going to strike.

We need to be prepared for all of these events, and we need to be

thinking about vulnerabilities in our infrastructure.

I think the most important message that I would try to give

today is that there is no silver bullet in dealing with weapons of

mass destruction. We really need a layered approach. We need to

look at many different systems to counter the terrorist threat. Coordination among the many different agencies is vital. And I have

seen a real improvement, I would say, in the coordination among

different agencies, since September 11. We are working together,

the different agencies. I think we could do more in the future. I

think planned exercises and drills is a way to do more.

As has been mentioned many times today, the key to protecting

the country against weapons of mass destruction, against INDs, is

to protect the materials. And I think no effort should be spared in

trying to protect materials, particularly the strategic nuclear materials, out of which an improvised device could be made. We need

to look for signatures that people or groups are trying to obtain

weapons of mass destruction and try to get some early indications

and warning.

And, finally, let me say that I think this area of emergency response is one where we’re going to have to make a sustained investment in science and technology to win the war on terrorism.

There are too many places that a terrorist can strike. They have

too many opportunities to rely on traditional law-enforcement

methods. I think technology is going to have to play a part, and I

think we’re going to have to look for advanced technologies to protect us.

53

In closing, I’d like to say that we’ve been aware of this problem

of weapons of mass destruction for a number of years. The NEST

team goes back 30 years. We’ve been involved in this program for

a long time. We are aware of it. We’re committing resources to it.

And we’ve done a lot. And I think since September 11, we’ve done

a whole lot. I think we could do more. I think we need to do more

in the future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Vantine follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HARRY C. VANTINE, PH.D., PROGRAM LEADER FOR

COUNTER-TERRORISM AND INCIDENT RESPONSE, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL

LABORATORY

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to

appear before you today. I lead the program in Counterterrorism and Incident Response at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). However, the opinions that I present today represent my views and not necessarily those of the Laboratory or the National Nuclear Security Administration. Yesterday, in closed session, I discussed the threat to homeland security posed by terrorist use of improvised nuclear devices or radiological dispersal devices. Today I would like to focus

on what we can do to protect the U.S. against terrorist acquisition and use of nuclear WMD.

Let me start by briefly defining improvised nuclear devices (INDs) and radiological dispersal devices (RDDs).

IMPROVISED NUCLEAR DEVICES

An IND, as its name implies, is a nuclear explosive device. It produces nuclear

yield, and this nuclear yield has catastrophic effects. An IND is the ultimate terrorist weapon and terrorist groups are actively attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. Detonation of an IND could dwarf the devastation of the September 11 attack

on the World Trade Center.

Dealing with the aftermath of an IND would be horrific. Rescue efforts and cleanup would be hazardous and difficult. Workers would have to wear full protection

suits and self-contained breathing apparatus. Because of the residual radioactivity,

in certain locations they could only work short times before acquiring their ‘‘lifetime’’ dose. As with the Chernobyl event, some rescue workers might well expose

themselves to lethal doses of radiation, adding to the casualty toll. Enormous volumes of contaminated debris would have to be removed and disposed of.

RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICES

If a terrorist group decides not to pursue an actual nuclear device, it might well

turn to RDDs or ‘‘dirty bombs’’ as they are often called. RDDs spread radioactivity

but they do not generate nuclear yield, The fabrication of an RDD requires radioactive material and a dispersal mechanism. Radioactive materials are used all over

the world for medical, industrial, and research applications. Standards for safe handling and accountability of radioactive material vary around the world. Stories in

the press suggest inadequate controls on radiological materials in parts of the world.

The effects of an RDD vary widely, and are measured in terms of contamination

area, health effects to the exposed population, and economic consequences. Even a

negligible, but measurable, exposure would exploit the general public’s fear of things

radioactive and have significant psychological consequences. The greatest impact of

a small release would probably be economic, associated with cleanup and restoration

of the contaminated area.

MULTILAYERED DEFENSE AGAINST INDS AND RDDS

So, what can we do to protect the U.S. against terrorist acquisition and use of

INDs and RDDs? As with every other aspect of the terrorism problem, there is no

silver bullet. A layered strategy is required, addressing the various stages on this

threat.

Weapons and Material Protection

Since acquiring the nuclear materials is a prerequisite to the fabrication of an

IND or RDD, first and foremost we must protect nuclear weapons and special nuclear material. Extensive safeguards are in place in this country to protect weaponsVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:30 Jul 24, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6621 80848 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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usable nuclear materials; Security at weapon storage sites is rigorous. The NNSA’s

Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program is making essential

enhancements to the security of nuclear materials at dozens of sites across Russia.

Switching to commercial radiological and nuclear facilities, two threats need to be

considered. One is the theft of materials by terrorists and the other is attack on a

facility to disperse radiological or nuclear materials. Facilities may include reactors,

waste and storage areas. A high-level risk assessment should be performed of U.S.

and relevant foreign radiological and nuclear facilities to provide an integrated national view of vulnerabilities. This high-level assessment and analysis of proposed

controls would supplement and update current assessments. It would include additional research and development needed for protection. This summary assessment

and corresponding recommended measures should be distributed to appropriate

agencies/facilities for implementation.

The September 11 terrorists clearly demonstrated considerable technical innovation, excellent operational security, and extensive financial backing. We should

therefore conduct enhanced threat assessments that include some threats beyond

the current design basis threat. These outside-the-box threats should be analyzed

for high-risk or strategic potential targets, based upon likelihood and consequence.

The results would be used to guide intelligence gathering and enhance protection

of sites and facilities.

Indications and Warning

As always, accurate and timely intelligence is critical. The September 11 attacks

demonstrated the extraordinary difficulty of this task, particularly when faced with

a diffuse organization that practices excellent operational security. We must be alert

to signatures of terrorist IND activities. Significant indicators may be available but

difficult to identify either because they are embedded in massive quantities of background information or because it is difficult to share analysis results between different user communities. Improvements in data mining/extraction techniques will

offer important advances in the out-years. The utilization of existing national laboratory resources could significantly enhance in the near term the identification of

terrorist intentions. Terrorists formulate their own attack plans and strike where

and how they choose. However, with nuclear weapons and INDs there are limits involving design, materials and fabrication that must be met in order to produce a

nuclear yield. This is the realm of the national design labs and we are able to identify some early indications of a terrorist group attempting to go nuclear.

The NNSA’s Nuclear Assessment Program provides a national capability to expeditiously assess the credibility of nuclear threats. Decision makers at the FBI, in

concert with their counterparts at the NNSA and NRC, use these assessments together with other information to determine the appropriate response. Since the program began in 1977, we have assessed the credibility of more than 75 nuclear extortion threats, 30 nuclear reactor threats, 20 nonnuclear extortion threats, and nearly

1000 cases involving the attempted illicit sale of alleged nuclear materials. Since

September 11 alone, this program has evaluated 13 nuclear extortion threats, 1 nuclear reactor threat, 24 nuclear smuggling cases, and 23 nonthreat incidents.

Search and Interdiction

We need to be able to detect and intercept INDs and RDDs before they reach their

target, preferably before they enter the U.S. This element alone requires layers

within layers. The DOE Second Line of Defense (SLD) program is assisting Russia’s

State Customs Committee in detecting and intercepting illicit traffic in nuclear materials, equipment, and technology across the 35,000 miles of Russia’s borders. Information from this and similar efforts should be used to enhance existing nuclear

smuggling databases, providing linkages among prior scams, materials, regions and

intermediaries.

Protection at U.S. borders or ports of entry should be enhanced. Maritime shipping is a particular concern, with nearly six million cargo containers entering the

U.S. each year. Technology can play an important role here, with improved detectors

at border crossings, and ‘‘smart’’ transportainers with built-in nuclear, chemical, and

bioagent detectors. The Labs are exploring improvements in port security including

building a test bed for cargo container technology.

While the problem of complete protection for large metropolitan areas remains difficult, it is possible to install correlated sensor networks around key facilities and

approach routes. Prototype systems have been studied, developed and shown to

work. These prototypes will help lay the ground-work for development of effective

approaches for more complex deployment. Multiple organizations are/will be engaged in these types of efforts; communication regarding these activities will be essential.

55

Crisis Response

Should we fail to intercept a terrorist IND or RDD, the next layer of defense is

crisis response. We must locate the device and render it safe. Established U.S. capabilities exist, most notably the Nuclear Emergency Search Team or NEST. NEST

capabilities include search and identification of nuclear materials, diagnostics and

assessment of suspected nuclear devices, technical operations in support of rendersafe procedures, and packaging for transport to final disposition. NEST personnel

are drawn from the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, and NEST personnel and equipment are ready to deploy worldwide at all times.

In the current threat environment the NEST program takes on a more critical

role. Funding for research and development needs to keep pace with the changing

threat environment. Also, additional personnel will need to be recruited and trained.

Consequence Management

In the event of a domestic nuclear event, consequence management assets would

be deployed. The NNSA has an established capability for predicting the transport

and dispersion of materials released into the atmosphere, including radionuclides.

Most important here is knowledge about the probable transport and distribution of

prompt effects (blast, thermal, radiation) and delayed effects (fallout). The Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) is a national emergency response service

for real-time assessment of incidents involving nuclear, chemical, biological, or natural hazardous material. Since it was established in 1979, ARAC has responded to

more than 70 alerts, accidents, and disasters (including Cosmos 954, Three Mile Island, and Chernobyl) and supported hundreds of emergency response exercises.

Emergency managers use ARAC plots to develop the best response strategy for

minimizing hazards to life or health and property damage in affected regions.

Efficient emergency response will require a capability for promptly predicting the

dose to the population as a function of location relative to ground zero and time

after the explosion. Such a capability is also essential for rescue teams and others

who must enter the contaminated area. ARAC’s dose-factor database contains dose

conversion factors for internal and external exposure to all radionuclides. ARAC results include plots of material deposited on the ground, instantaneous and time-integrated doses, or air concentrations at selected levels above the ground. Contours are

overlaid on maps with features proportional to scale, from buildings to streets to cities to countries.

Decontamination procedures, including a framework for assuring public confidence in the adequacy of cleanup, need to be exercised and vetted. Incident site

monitoring capabilities may require enhancement.

A mechanism to ensure that decision-makers are familiar with the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan should be developed and implemented; a protection guide for the public needs to be developed because written guidance addressing

a terrorist event is negligible. Plans are needed to prepare for a large-scale incident

requiring long-term deployments of personnel (potentially at multiple locations) and

significant laboratory analytical capabilities.

Attribution

The final layer of defense against terrorist use of INDs and RDDs against the

U.S. is the threat of retaliation. Effective retaliation requires accurate attribution

of the device—its nuclear materials and device design as well as the perpetrators

and their suppliers, intermediaries, and sponsors. A key technical component is forensic analysis of post-detonation debris. The NNSA laboratories, in coordination

with a DOD sponsor, are working to enhance the timeliness of the current attribution capability.

A related need is the development of a comprehensive forensic-type database of

nuclear materials worldwide.

CONCLUSIONS

Terrorist acquisition and use of an IND against the U.S. is a low-probability, but

high-consequence threat. The use of an RDD is a higher probability, but lower consequence event. As September 11 so chillingly demonstrated, today’s terrorists are

technically innovative and resourceful, financially well supported, actively attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and intent on causing mass casualties

and wide-scale devastation.

Let me note that important elements of a layered defense against the threat of

terrorist INDs and RDDs are already in place. Coordination among the many agencies involved in Homeland Security is improving and continues to be vital. However,

with such a complex problem, more needs to be done.

56

We must protect the key materials for fabricating an IND—full-up weapons,

weapon pits, plutonium, and enriched uranium—both in the U.S., in Russia, and in

the rest of the world.

We must watch for signatures of individuals or groups attempting to obtain materials or components of INDs.

Last, but most important, we must make a sustained investment in the science

and technology needed to win the war on terrorism. Pulling resources from other

important programs is ‘‘robbing Peter to pay Paul’’ and is not a effective long-term

strategy. Programs in nonproliferation, proliferation detection, counterterrorism,

and homeland security are closely linked and must not be selected ‘‘either/or’’ or conducted in isolation from each other.

In closing, let me assure you that we at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

have long been concerned about the terrorist nuclear threat. We have built on our

historical nuclear weapons mission and developed unique expertise, capabilities, and

technologies to meet these emerging threats. LLNL is already providing critical elements of the nation’s defense against nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorism,

many of which were called into action post-September 11. We are committed to

using our worldclass scientific and technological resources—people, equipment, and

facilities—to meet the nation’s national security needs today and in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, doctor. Let be begin with

you, and then I want to talk a little more about nuclear devices,

improvised nuclear devices, and then go back to radiological devices

and dispersal means.

As I said yesterday, you showed us a much more detailed outline

as well as graphic material. And I don’t want to trespass on anything that is classified, but I think it would be useful for the record

to know whether or not in your counter-terrorism and incident-response efforts over the last many years, have you and your colleagues at Livermore—have you attempted to go through the process of constructing, doing the engineering that would be required

for—you obviously know how to make nuclear weapons, but, I

mean, have you gone through the engineering requirements, minimal requirements, that would be needed in order to be able to have

a reasonable probability that if a terrorist had plutonium or enriched uranium, what is the most crudest, most workable weapon

they could construct? I’m not asking you to describe it to me, but

have you all looked into that to try to figure out what we should

be looking for?

Dr. VANTINE. Senator, we have looked at that, in a sense. We periodically do exercises and drills in the emergency response programs. And so for those drills, on occasion, we will ask our designers to build what they consider an improvised nuclear device. Now,

there’s a problem, because these are often experts in the field, and

so they don’t think like a terrorist.

The impediment to doing this in a more rigorous way is that you

don’t want to take people who are untrained in the business to ask

them to do this, because, in some sense, you’d be educating them

to the problem. So you have to approach it very carefully.

I think it’s a good point that you bring up, that, in fact, if you

want to look for surprises, if you want to look for innovative ideas,

you probably should, in a systematic way, ask people who are not

trained in the area to do this.

The CHAIRMAN. And the second point that—you state what has

been repeated by others, including your former colleague, Dr.

Agnew, at Los Alamos, that—and I’m paraphrasing him, but

quoting you—‘‘low probability, high consequence.’’ And what I was

trying to get at this morning, because I think it’s important that

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policymakers know and that the American people know so we can

have a rational debate in allocation of resources as to what our priorities are in which we seek to deal with first, what threat—the

threat assessment is the phrase that is used in your business, as

well as over at the Pentagon—and for us to make some rational

judgments on what our priorities should be.

And as I understand it, there are, in terms of an improvised nuclear devise, the, hopefully, most difficult part of the process is

gaining access to the material that goes boom, gaining access to the

enriched uranium or plutonium or fissile material that would cause

a chain reaction—a nuclear explosion, correct?

Dr. VANTINE. That’s certainly true, Senator. If you can’t get access to the materials, there’s no further progress.

The CHAIRMAN. Alright. Now—— Dr. VANTINE. They need that.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. The reason I raise this is that there

has been a good deal of discussion about the existence of the safeguard capabilities that exist in the United States relative to that

kind of material. In my private briefings, in classified briefings,

and in this open discussion, there is, at least in my assessment— I don’t suggest I’ve surveyed every person who has any knowledge,

but there is a fairly broad assessment that is in sync that says that

we are pretty darn confident about our ability to safeguard our— meaning U.S.—weapons-grade material. But there is—and I’m not

going to ask you to comment in any detail—but there is a diminished—in some cases, significantly diminished—confidence in the

ability of other nations that possess weapons-grade material to

guard that weapons-grade material from access to someone unauthorized.

Now, one of the things that—and I’m trying to make this not

only—I’ve been doing this a long time; I think I understand it—but

I’m trying to recall the dilemma I had in understanding the process

when I was first exposed—no pun intended—first exposed to this

subject. And that is the first thing I wondered about was how—in

what form can this material be acquired or stolen? For example,

does a terrorist, assuming they had access to enriched uranium or

plutonium in Russia—they gained access to a not-sufficiently

guarded—now, I want to make it clear, I am not suggesting, and

no one has suggested to me that the Russian Government has anything other than the highest interest in making sure no one has

access to this material, so I’m not implying when I say Russia is

the ‘‘candy store’’ that the Russian Government in any way has

been part of, is considering, has any desire that anyone have access

to this material other than the Russian Government and RussianGovernment personnel.

I know that sounds like stating the obvious, but there’s an old

expression from a friend of mine, ‘‘Assumption is the mother of all

screw ups.’’ I don’t want to make any assumptions here, because

they can be dangerous.

But having said that, assuming that a person with a mal-intent—whether an individual or an organization, whether it’s alQaeda or an organization that has yet to be spawned—gained access to the—not a constructed weapon, not a weapon, period, but

to enriched uranium or plutonium. How do they gain access? Do

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they have to have an expertise? It’s not like walking in and saying—if I’m a terrorist and I’m part of an international network and

I buy off someone in Russia and they sell me a small nuclear device, I can put it in the back of a truck, I can put it—depending

on how big it is, I can put it in another container, I can transport

it, and I can do it without any danger other than I may get shot

transporting it, but it won’t be because, by my touching it, by my

putting it in the truck, I am going to be contaminated.

What about the actual raw material—and it’s not raw, because

it’s been—it’s acted upon. But what about plutonium? How does

that occur? Is that a difficult thing, even if you have access, to take

it from its source and transport it to whatever destination you desire for purpose of making an improvised nuclear device?

Dr. VANTINE. Senator, let me answer that by way of relating

some of the findings of the DOE’s Nuclear Smuggling Program. The

Department has a program to look at smuggled sources, if you will,

smuggling. And what they find is that there are a significant number of what I’ll call ‘‘scams’’ on the market. So there’s a lot of misinformation out there. There’s a lot of uncertainty about, ‘‘Whether

this is nuclear material,’’ by people who really aren’t educated as

to what they have or what they think they have or are trying to

make a fast buck for something they don’t have. So there’s a lot

of misinformation out there.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that’s good.

Dr. VANTINE. That is good. But I’m not sure that addresses your

question, but it shows that, indeed, there is some difficulty on people’s part understanding what they have and how important it is,

how vital the material they have might be.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess what I’m trying to get at is this. If someone were to steal, purchase, acquire radiological substance. That is,

what you showed Dr. Koonin, that—I forget how many pounds it

was——

Dr. KOONIN. Fifty pounds.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. A 50-pound device used for a legitimate commercial purpose—were it not shielded, it may admit, depending on what you are acquiring, a lethal dose of radiation, rendering you too ill, and eventually die, to be able to fulfill your mission if you had to do an engineering feat to construct something to

put it in to make it do something that would be dangerous to society. Is the transport of plutonium as difficult if you are in contact

with it? Need it be shielded?

Dr. VANTINE. I don’t want to go too far with this, Senator,

but——

The CHAIRMAN. OK.

Dr. VANTINE [continuing]. But let me say that with proper precautions, shielding and distance from the source, these materials

can be handled. How easy or hard it is, I’d rather not get into that.

The CHAIRMAN. And the reason I ask is, it seems to me—and one

of the things we, in the closed session, I’m going to ask my colleagues to listen to you at another time—I mean all 99 of my colleagues at some forum or another—is to try to get a sense of

whether or not the low probability is a low probability throughout

the process. It’s a low probability you’re going to get to the point

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where someone is going to make available to you this material,

even in the former Soviet Union, hopefully. Second—— Today’s my day for Presidents. Excuse me. It’s the President of

another country. I apologize. I lost my train of thought.

There is the process of acquiring the material. There is the process of transporting the material. And then is there a requirement

that the material would have to be put in a different form than acquired in order to make it applicable or be able to be used in a device that would be designed, engineered to make it explode, to

cause a nuclear chain reaction?

Dr. VANTINE. Mr. Chairman, I understand the question, and I’d

be glad to respond to that in a closed session.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. Now, I think I’m right at the end of my

string of what we can talk about in an open session. I recall what

the other thing I wanted to ask you is.

Are you able to discuss this at all in an open session? What are

the signatures and indicators of the presence of or the attempt or

the circumstances that makes the lights go on that would make

government officials say, ‘‘This group, based on this signature,

based on’’—as I understand what you mean by signature and indicators—‘‘is a group that appears to be pursuing an effort to build,

acquire, and/or construct an improvised nuclear weapon?’’ If I can make an analogy, I have some considerable experience

in the drug field for doing this for so many years. There are certain

precursor chemicals that are obvious if they’re present what the individuals involved in the drug business are about. And it relates

to whether or not they’re making methamphetamine or cocaine or

heroine. Is that what you mean by signature? What do you mean

by ‘‘signature’’ and ‘‘indicators’’?

Dr. VANTINE. Normally when I talk about signatures, I mean

precisely what you just mentioned, Senator. When somebody is trying to produce biological or chemical weapons in particular, there

will be chemicals given off in the production process that perhaps

we can look for.

In the nuclear business, there is some of that to some degree, so

that when somebody is trying to work with materials that might

go into a warhead, they might have to deal with certain materials,

and we can look for indicators that they are working with those

materials.

In a general sense, let me say that, in working with nuclear—

trying to develop either a radiological or a nuclear warhead, you

look for people, you look for information, and you look for equipment. So you can look for the kind of people that maybe are working on this. You can look at people with various degrees—in the

case of nuclear, nuclear engineering—look for the kind of sources

they might use, look at resources from the Internet, resources from

the library that they might collect. So you look for the people. You

look for the knowledge. I touched on that. People who are interested in—you know, in the case of the World Trade Center, flying

airplanes, but not know how to land them. So you look for pieces

of intelligence that tells you somebody’s out there looking—seeking

information about how to build something.

And then you look for the technologies, if somebody is buying

equipment that could be used in the construction of nuclear deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:30 Jul 24, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 80848 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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vices. This morning we talked a little bit about radiation detectors.

If people are buying who don’t seem to have a reason—a normal

reason to buy that—so you can put all this together. I think these

are all signatures, in a broad sense.

The CHAIRMAN. Without naming them, are there certain metals—if you were aware that I was purchasing certain metals or certain devices that would be categorized as elements of my engineering process to construct a device, not the material, are there certain obvious telltale signs that would raise a red flag if you knew

that so and so went to such and such a supplier and purchase x

amount of a particular metal or a particular anything else, are

there those kinds of things that are—are there basic elements that

are required to construct a device that are essential?

Dr. VANTINE. There’s no one path here. There’s no one solution

that we look at. There are multiple paths forward. So there’s not

just one indicator, for instance.

Coming at it from the other direction, a lot of materials are what

I’ll call ‘‘dual use,’’ so they have a legitimate use besides the use

of trying to make INDs. So there’s no smoking gun in that sense.

But I think it’s the preponderance of evidence, it’s collecting a

number of indicators, trying to put the—make composite case out

of this and then understanding what somebody is trying to do.

That’s how we—— The CHAIRMAN. I guess what I’m trying to say is—— Dr. VANTINE. It’s a difficult problem.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. If you knew that the XYZ Club to

Promote Peace and Humanity was buying dual-use items without

any reason to believe that they would have a legitimate use for

them, that would be—that’s an indicator, I assume.

Dr. KOONIN. One dual-use, maybe. Two dual-use items, you get

very worried. Three dual-use items, you’re very worried.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what can we do, the U.S. Government, to

raise the barriers or raise the stakes that make it more difficult for

terrorists to obtain these improvised nuclear devices or basement

nukes or whatever the phrase you hear bouncing around. The term

of art you all use is ‘‘improvised nuclear device.’’ But what are

some of the things that we can do? If we first prevent them from

acquiring plutonium-enriched uranium, is the game over?

Dr. VANTINE. Let me just second the first point you made. I think

the United States has the most serious program to protect strategic

nuclear materials, and I think it’s in our interest to encourage the

rest of the world to have the same standards that we have.

I think once they get—if somebody is known to have materials,

I think we ought to try to recover those materials. The game is certainly not over at that point. I think there’s a long, rocky road

ahead. But at that point, it becomes much more speculation as to

where they’ll go, and you’ll find many strong opinions. There are

many detours you can take along the way. There are many wrong

turns you can make. There is no guarantee of success at that point.

But there is a very heightened state of concern at that point, when

somebody has the materials.

The CHAIRMAN. If they have the material. Because as I said—I

quoted Agnew this morning, and I’ll quote him again, ‘‘For those

who say building a nuclear weapon is easy, they are very wrong,

61

but those who say building a crude device is very difficult, they are

more wrong.’’ Would you agree with that statement?

Dr. VANTINE. I won’t comment on that statement, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Alright, OK. I think you’re really with the CIA.

I don’t think—or, if not, maybe you’re with the Department of Information at the State Department. I’m not sure which, but one

thing I do know is you’re a first-rate scientist, and I told you I

would abide by your concerns of what you stated in open session,

and I will.

But in terms of priorities, though, is there agreement that, in a

sense, first things first, the single most significant thing we could

do to even make the probability of a device being able to be purchased lower than it is at this moment is increase the safeguards

surrounding the actual—that weapons-grade material that is in existence.

Dr. VANTINE. Absolutely correct, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Good. Well, and have you had a chance, doctor— are you familiar with the Baker-Cutler report?

Dr. VANTINE. Unfortunately, I’m not familiar with that report,

no.

The CHAIRMAN. Alright. Well, I’m going to—because I know you

have really very little else to do, you’re not a busy man—I’m going

to send you a copy of the report. And maybe over the next month

or so, if I ask you for your response, in open or closed session, as

to some of its recommendations, because neither Mr. Baker—Senator Baker—Mr. Ambassador, now, Baker or Mr. Cutler, who are

very schooled and aware of matters relating to what used to be

called ‘‘strategic doctrine,’’ and now we’re talking about its—the application of very cruder versions of weaponry in the hands of individuals and not nation states, but they don’t have your background

on the science side of it, so I’d be interested to see what you

thought.

But the safeguarding of the world’s fissile material is not the

only defense, but it seems to me, from what I’ve heard today, it

may be the best defense. We get the—no pun intended—the biggest

bang for the buck if we were able to make it even more difficult.

The degree to which we raise that bar, in terms of accessing that

material, the degree to which, it seems, increase the lower, even

than it is now, the probability of such a weapon being able to be

constructed.

Let me move, if I may—my one other question is—apparently—

and I don’t remember this, but I’m told that Dr. Oppenheimer was

asked what resources would be needed to intercept a smuggled

atomic bomb. And at the dawn of the nuclear age, he told the Congress the best tool for finding a smuggled atomic bomb was a

screwdriver—and that was to open every crate and open every

package.

Which leads me to, really, my next—not line, but my next area

of questioning, and that is that—and we just touched on it briefly,

and I’d appreciate the three of you giving me your best judgment.

You indicated, Dr. Vantine, that in order to deal with this, you look

at the source, the signature, detection, mitigation, management,

and attribution. And not probably in that order. With regard to detection, there has been discussion this morning, and there will be

62

more discussion about the detection capability presently exists commercially, detection capability that exists, at least in the literature,

and detection capability that is on the horizon. And everyone has

said we should spend more time and energy and resources in attempting to better that capability.

Now, can you—any of you or all of you—explain, in layman’s

terms for me—the difference in the degree of difficulty, if there is

any, in detecting a radiological weapon and detecting a nuclear

weapon, even though it is an improvised nuclear weapon or device.

Could you talk to me about that?

Dr. VANTINE. Yes, let me begin with that, maybe. Let’s talk

about radiological weapons first. By their nature, these radiological

weapons are meant to scare people by emitting radiation. So

they’re fairly ‘‘hot’’ in that sense. In a radiation sense, they’re very

hot. And particularly before they’re dispersed, if there’s an explosive or something, they can be extremely hot. And in that sense,

they can be detected.

Someone walking down a street—that’s one peg point, if you will.

People with radiation treatment for medical—people who have

medical isotope treatments, generally they can be seen very easily

by these detectors. Those sources are very strong in the sense of

the kind of detectors that we have. So we can see those.

We do have sensors for looking for nuclear weapons. And, yes, we

can see those. They’re somewhat harder to see than the radiological

weapons.

So there is real potential here to be able to detect these weapons.

And we do have prototype detectors that are even better. We have

prototype detectors that are very effective at removing background

radiation. There’s background radiation all around us, but if you

can knock down some of that, you can see things much more clearly. So that’s a path forward that I think we’re almost ready to take.

We’re almost ready to bring it out of the box.

The other big advantage here, particularly for low-cost detectors,

is trying to put some computer software on and trying to include

some interpretive software so that when they take their signals, on

the spot, they can look and compare what they’re seeing to known

data bases and relay the message back to someone that—some control point that, ‘‘This is what I’m seeing.’’ So those things have real

promise in the future.

So I think we’re sitting at the dawn, maybe, of a new era. Maybe

that’s too strong a word, but I think we’re sitting at the breakout

of new detector technology. So I think it’s pretty exciting. We have

lots of people working that at the, I’ll call, development level—R&D

level.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Dr. Koonin.

Dr. KOONIN. Mr. Chairman, I’m not quite as confident as Dr.

Vantine is about the detectability of radiological sources. I won’t go

into the details of steps one might take to minimize their detectability, but I would note that we routinely ship radiological sources

through ordinary public transportation channels without setting off

detectors.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Kelly.

Dr. KELLY. Well, I must say the one thing I think we all agree

on is the fact that our detection systems are good, but they could

63

be a lot better, and that there are many technologies out there that

could be tuned to the variety of different materials that will be

moving through the economy. And a lot of these materials we’re

talking about for potential radiological weapons have fairly unique

signatures. I think we need to work on that.

Plainly, the highest priority is finding smart systems that are

able to bring lots of different sources together. But the more information you’ve got, the more your computer system can filter out

spurious signals from real ones. And I’m sure we all would say that

this needs to be a very high-priority research project in the laboratories and elsewhere.

Dr. KOONIN. One last point. As we put surveillance systems of

all sorts, and we’ve seen this with the airport security systems, it’s

very important that they be constantly tested and ‘‘red-teamed’’ to

be effective. Someone must probe the system and someone must be

actively trying to defeat the system to make sure we understand

its capabilities and limitations.

The CHAIRMAN. We have, as a Nation, supported IAEA programs

to provide confidential technical advice to countries that may have

nuclear security problems. The IAEA also helps bring radioactive

sources under control, as it did in two very dangerous sources in

the former Soviet Republic of Georgia earlier this year. How useful

are the IAEA programs to help countries improve their nuclear materials security?

Dr. KOONIN. I think they’re an excellent place to start. But

again, as we’ve been talking, in this country the change in atmosphere and context of the control of sources shifting from safe-use

to perhaps tighter security is something that the IAEA may also

want to consider changing its posture on. But it’s a very good start.

The CHAIRMAN. Anyone else? Should we support efforts to expand those programs so that we can better address security of radioactive sources? I mean, is that something any of you have any

background or expertise in?

I mean, a lot of these things are complicated. As we expand

methods to deal with this, we end up with more intrusive practices,

and sometimes they are counterproductive, arguably. But is there

any instinct you all have about how to proceed, whether we should

be looking at that? Or should we be going to a—no pun intended—

a different source to get that advice or information?

Dr. KOONIN. There’s one international aspect that strikes me

here as perhaps worth bringing out. Because of our concerns about

security and our economic capacity to do so, we might encourage

the shift away from sources to accelerators or neutron generators,

and that would be our judgment of the economic tradeoff, versus

security. Other countries which might not have as robust an economic situation or might not have the same security situations,

might see the balance in a different way. And so it may be very

difficult to impose uniform standards of control across all countries.

Dr. VANTINE. I might comment, Senator, that one of the things

that I recommended was that in certain areas of our infrastructure

we do risk assessments. And I think this issue of shipping practices

internationally is an area that we might want to do a risk assessment, to look at the problem, find out if there are particular

vulnerabilities, and, once having identified those vulnerabilities,

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trying to close them. I think those type of systems studies, in the

context of the current threat, need to be done and they should be

high priority.

The CHAIRMAN. I couldn’t agree with you more, and what I’m

about to say, I want the record to show, is not a criticism of the

new Homeland Defense Office, nor is it a criticism of Governor

Ridge. I think he has an incredible job to undertake, and he is

going to find so many bureaucratic roadblocks in his way that it’s

going to be awhile to sort this out, but it’s a good place to start.

I am—and I’m not asking for a comment—I am operating under

the assumption, because I do not know at this point—I’m operating

under the assumption that that very approach is being considered

and organized and plotted by this new agency of the government,

because it goes back to my central point and, quite frankly, my primary reason for engaging you gentlemen in the first place, and

that was that—is that I am—again, as a bit player in the policy

process here, I am incredibly—for me, the place that I start and

drives my professional staff crazy, is I want that risk assessment.

I want that analysis, because I’m being asked to—and occasionally

proposing—to spend the taxpayer dollars for purposes protecting

them.

And the one great thing about this job—and taking a quote out

of context from former Judge Bork is, ‘‘This is an intellectual feast.’’ This is the most wonderful job in the world to have if you have intellectual curiosity. You can have at your disposal the best minds

in the world. Three of them are sitting at this table, and I get to

ask them anything I want to ask them, and I get to hopefully learn

something.

But I think there’s been precious too little—in this administration, the last administration—precious too little emphasis on risk

assessment, risk analysis, and comparative analysis of the priority

that should attract our attention relative to the threat and the risk.

And that’s one of the reasons for this hearing. And there will be

more.

Let me ask you, one of the things that you all have spoken about

as it relates to all of the questions that have been raised is this

notion of mitigation. Once an episode, an event, has occurred,

whether it be an improvised nuclear device or a radiological disbursal device—and you’ve pointed out that we’re talking about a

standard that exists now, which I believe is one in ten thousand.

Is that right? The EPA?

Dr. KELLY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And how, in God’s name, do you decontaminate

the exterior, let alone the interior, of a building that is—as you

pointed out, doctor, the cesium attaches to asphalt, attaches to

granite, concrete, I assume glass—maybe not, I don’t know—to just

anything, any substance. How would—how is that done? And don’t

say ‘‘with great difficulty.’’ Please.

Dr. KELLY. Well, I guess in some of the—there has been considerable experience, of course, after Chernobyl, and particularly the

Scandinavian countries that have been downwind have invested

very heavily in trying to find ways to mitigate. And it is really, unfortunately, a largely unsolved problem. You can make the matter—one thing they did discover is you can make things worse if

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you don’t do it right. You can trade a lot of contaminated water

that can go under the ground, not something you want to do.

I think that there’s a—this is a place which I think—well, you

say ‘‘with great difficulty’’—unfortunately, the way, often, these

sites often are decontaminated is by scooping up the dirt and ripping down the buildings. And one would hope that there’s a better

way. And it strikes me that this is an area where, again, we need

to do some fairly careful thinking about what the alternatives are

to us.

Of course, there are also procedural things we need to do to figure out how we can make sure we get people out of these places

in an efficient way. But, plainly, our highest priority is to—— The CHAIRMAN. Well, if I can—again, I’m just trying to get my

arms around this so it’s understandable. Assume, for the moment,

that we could roll the tape back to September 10, not September

11, and the terrorists set off a 1,000-curie radiation device in lower

Manhattan. How would you compare the number of buildings that

we’d have to raise compared to what happened, if that’s a fair— it may not be a fair question, and there may not be a precise answer. But we’d be taking down a heck of a lot more than the World

Trade Towers, wouldn’t we, or would we?

Dr. KELLY. Yes, we’re talking—— Dr. VANTINE. Oh, yes.

Dr. KOONIN. A thousand curies, we’d be looking at—30 square

miles is probably a good fraction in Manhattan if it were disbursed

efficiently.

Dr. KELLY. And Manhattan has roughly $2 trillion worth of real

estate.

The CHAIRMAN. Say again?

Dr. KELLY. There’s roughly $2 trillion worth of real estate—— The CHAIRMAN. Two trillion dollars worth of real estate. Well, I

suspect that’s the first time we would visit seriously of whether or

not the standard——

Dr. KELLY. Indeed, we——

The CHAIRMAN. No, I’m not being facetious. Obviously one in ten

thousand is something that is the standard that we would be—— Dr. KOONIN. Mr. Chairman, I wonder, as we think about preparations for this sort of thing, what we can do in advance, I wonder

whether some amount of education of the public about the different

standards, how they are set, the differences between recommended

dose, legally allowed dose, seriously—health hazards associated

with doses—might be something that would be worth talking about

in public forums more—— The CHAIRMAN. Well, quite frankly, that’s the very reason—one

of the reasons I wanted to have this hearing, because, as I said earlier this morning, obviously anthrax is a dangerous substance, but

before our most recent and, God willing, our only, but not likely,

experience with anthrax disbursal, there was a sense that it may

have a lethality far beyond what it did. And there was a significant

period, and still a question now, of whether or not the lethality of

what was released in the envelope that was released in the building adjacent to here, actually connected to this building, was even

more dangerous than it was—than had occurred, but because of

mitigation at the time, it didn’t do as much damage.

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But, having said that, I don’t think there is the same response

out there now. I went home immediately after the first anthrax

event, and literally I found reasonable people, understandably in

my constituency, close to panic about what was underway. We had

great discussions about the issue of the disbursal anthrax through

crop-dusting aircraft and the ability to wipe out whole cities and

so on. And then we got to the issue of—which I would argue is a

little more analogous because of difficulty of acquiring—to smallpox

virus and its disbursal and means of disbursal through a self-infected human being, et cetera.

But we began to gather some sense of proportion here. And when

you had a case of the bubonic plague in India—in two different cities in India about—I think it was about 10 years ago—there was,

in one area—in one of the cities where the political—meaning the

governmental apparatus—had sufficient information. They greatly

diminished the panic, greatly diminished the damage done, greatly

diminished the consequences, compared to the city where there was

little information made available to the public.

And so I operate on the premise here that your suggestion—or

your question should be turned into a suggestion, that I think we

should be doing that. And I would ask, not for you necessarily to

respond now, whether any of you or all of you would be willing to

submit for the record how one would best approach doing that,

from a public policy position, from the position of sitting behind

this bench. What should we be doing? Because I think that it is

the—I mean, the greatest tool terrorists have is terror. It is inflicting this sense of helplessness upon a society and in many cases designed and if not handled, literally being able to break governmental entities and breed chaos.

So I would very much be interested, doctor, in any suggestions

you have, because I think the discussions should be undertaken in

light of the fact that it is a—it is, in a sense, the opposite geometry

of—political geometry of a nuclear device, which is a low probability and high damage. This is a higher probability and lower-end

life-threatening damage that can occur. And to the extent that we

educate people, I think we will be doing the country a service.

Rather than keep you all beyond what I have, beyond trespassing

on your time, as I’ve done so far today, is there any comment any

of you would like to make in closing here or any suggestions you

would have for me or the Congress in how we should think about

proceeding as we explore what is obviously a problem, obviously a

concern?

Dr. VANTINE. Senator, let me just wind up things by reiterating

something I started with, and that is that I think as we look at

weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, biological, the

whole panoply of weapons of mass destruction—we always have to

come back to—the worse scenario is loss of life. And I think that

needs to be put at the top of the list. We need to be concerned with

those scenarios where people lose their life.

And I would just close by reminding people that in the Chernobyl

incident, which is about the worst radiological release I can think

of—maybe there are worse ones, but it’s pretty bad—5 percent of

the core up in the air, carbon core reactor burning for several days

dispersing materials—you look at that accident—30 people died—

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they were all radiation workers—as a result of that accident. A

hundred and forty people had radiation sickness—again, all radiation workers.

That kind of an event, in terms of loss of life, pales compared to

World Trade Center, Oklahoma City, Khobar Towers, Embassy

bombings. So I think we need to keep our eye on all of this, but

the thing I’m most concerned about is those incidents that cause

loss of life.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen?

Dr. KOONIN. I would think, after what we have heard today and

in our discussions in the closed session yesterday, you or your colleagues might want to take a hard look at the improvements in

safety and security of radioactive sources that might be made in

this country.

Dr. KELLY. I would say that the theme that you outlined, which

is to try to understand what the risks are facing the country and

what the probabilities are and what the consequences are, is something that is seriously needed. And I think what we’ve done here

is to implicitly rank some of these threats.

At the end of the day, radiological weapons are far from the most

serious kind of attack that we could have, but it’s a very plausible

threat, and it’s a place where a reasonable investment and a good

plan could accomplish a lot.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason why I think people are looking at

the—some of us are focusing on the radiological attack. And, Dr.

Vantine, I have had a preoccupation with your major concern that

absolutely has bored the living hell out of my colleagues for the last

6 years. And I began to wonder—the reason I was so impressed

with your testimony is I said, ‘‘My God, there’s someone else thinking about this,’’ because I’ve gotten nowhere in trying to raise the

consciousness of the prospect, even the raw prospect, of an improvised nuclear device, notwithstanding its great degree of difficulty.

And so I understand, and I agree with your, sort of, calibration of

the damage and the risk and what we should look at first.

But just as we are looking at cyber-terrorism, we’re looking at it

for—the two things terrorists seem to be interested in in this country are disrupting our financial and economic systems and, on the

other hand, inflicting a significant loss of life as a consequence of

terrorist activities. They seem to—there’s some evidence to think

that those who think about doing us harm are no longer

unidimensional, are no longer looking just for, you know, the big

bang, although that is the thing that gives them the greatest joy

and seems to be the thing they are pursuing with the greatest earnestness.

But the economic impact of a radiological weapon, particularly in

the absence of considerable more public education, is one that can

have catastrophic consequences for us not resulting in a loss of life

directly, but—and I’m not comparing the two in terms of their consequence except to say that the second-tier concern is nonetheless

a monumental concern.

But I look forward, if you’re willing to doing two things, making

your individual and collective knowledge available to my colleagues, as a whole, and, second, to—asking for your willingness to

continue to give us advice, in closed session as well as open session,

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on how we should proceed, because this is one area that is, in a

sense—should be above my pay grade, but, unfortunately, it’s not.

It should be above the President’s pay grade, but it’s not. We have

to rely on, and we should rely on, the acumen that you all possess

in order to tell us, guide us, in how to proceed.

So again, I thank you very much. I apologize for the confusion

of the day and appreciate your forbearance. And with that, the

hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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