[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10742

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

HENRY MARTIN STEIGER, 

a.k.a. Henry Matthew Steiger,

a.k.a. H M Steiger, 

a.k.a. Robert Woods, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

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D.C. Docket No. 3:17-cr-00043-RV-2

____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge, and 

COOGLER,* District Judge.

COOGLER, District Judge:

We sua sponte vacate our previous opinion and substitute 

the following.

***

This case returns to this panel on remand from the en banc

Court with instructions to consider the Appellant’s additional arguments that we were not able to review in the first instance. See 

United States v. Steiger, 99 F.4th 1316, 1327 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc). 

After careful consideration, we conclude that the Appellant, Henry 

Martin Steiger, has not demonstrated that the district court erred 

in imposing a sentence of 20 years of imprisonment following the 

revocation of his probation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3565. Accordingly, we affirm Steiger’s sentence. 

I. BACKGROUND

We described the factual and procedural history of this case 

in our prior panel opinion, United States v. Steiger, 83 F.4th 932, 934–

36 (11th Cir. 2023), vacated, 86 F.4th 1337 (11th Cir. 2023), and 

* Honorable L. Scott Coogler, United States District Judge for the Northern 

District of Alabama, sitting by designation.

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remanded en banc, 99 F.4th 1316 (11th Cir. 2024). To summarize, Steiger pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire 

fraud and three counts of wire fraud, and the district court sentenced him to three years of probation. Two months into his probation sentence, Steiger murdered the mother of his infant child 

on the child’s first birthday. After he was convicted of second-degree murder in Florida state court, the district court held a hearing 

to revoke Steiger’s probation and to resentence him on the federal 

conspiracy and wire fraud offenses. At the revocation hearing, the 

district court heard evidence that Steiger strangled his victim to 

death while she was holding his infant daughter and then stowed

the victim’s body in a 55-gallon barrel. Law enforcement discovered 

her decomposing body six months later. Steiger’s business associate 

told law enforcement that Steiger planned the murder and that he 

helped Steiger move the barrel into a trailer and dispose of the 

woman’s iPad and iPod. Steiger admitted to hiding the body and 

lying to law enforcement when questioned about the woman’s disappearance initially, but he maintained that he did not commit 

murder. He claimed that the woman died by suicide and that he, 

fearful that he would lose custody of his daughter, attempted to 

“cover [his] tracks more like a guilty person.” 

The district court found that Steiger violated the terms of 

his probation and revoked it. The government argued that the Sentencing Guidelines range of 12 to 18 months’ imprisonment

grossly understated the egregiousness of Steiger’s conduct while 

on federal probation and emphasized that the district court could 

sentence Steiger to the statutory maximum sentence of 20 years' 

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imprisonment on each of the four counts for a total of 80 years’ 

imprisonment. Steiger requested that he be sentenced to time 

served in light of his lifetime imprisonment sentence in the state 

case. The district court imposed a sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment on each count to run concurrently with each other and with 

the life sentence imposed by the Florida court in the second-degree 

murder case. When the district court asked whether Steiger had 

any objections to the sentence imposed, Steiger answered no. 

Steiger appealed, arguing that the district court’s sentence is 

procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We construed one of 

his procedural unreasonableness arguments to be that the district 

court failed to give a specific reason for imposing an upward variance to the statutory maximum sentence, thereby violating 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2), which requires the district court to “state in 

open court . . . the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence” 

when that sentence is outside the guidelines range. See Steiger, 83 

F.4th at 937. Because this Court’s precedents required automatic 

reversal for any § 3553(c) error, we were forced to reverse and remand to the district court for an explanation of why it chose 20 

years. See id. at 938 (citing United States v. Parks, 823 F.3d 990, 997

(11th Cir. 2016)). This was so even though Steiger did not object to 

the district court’s failure to explain its reasons and even though we 

thought it obvious that the district court varied upward due to the 

horrific crime Steiger committed while on probation. See id. 

Chief Judge Pryor wrote separately, concurring in this

panel’s application of this Court’s precedents but urging this Court 

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to rehear this appeal en banc to reconsider United States v. Parks because that case “requires a ‘per se rule of reversal for [section] 

3553(c)(2) errors’ even when the defendant never objected to the 

explanation of his sentence in the district court.” Steiger, 83 F.4th at 

938 (Pryor, C.J., concurring) (quoting Parks, 823 F.3d at 996–97). 

The Court reheard this appeal en banc and held that when a 

defendant does not object to a district court’s failure to explain its 

sentence in violation of § 3553(c), plain error review applies on appeal, not automatic reversal, thereby overruling Parks and other 

precedents to the extent they conflicted with the Court’s en banc 

holding. Steiger, 99 F.4th at 1324. The en banc Court further held 

that the district court did not commit plain error in failing to explain the upward variance because its reasons were clear by examining the record of the revocation proceeding. Id. at 1327. The en 

banc Court then remanded the case to this panel to consider Steiger’s additional arguments.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, this 

Court conducts a two-step inquiry. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 

51 (2007). First, the Court considers whether the sentence is procedurally reasonable, and if it is, the Court examines whether it is 

substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances. Id. This Court reviews the reasonableness of a sentence 

“under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. at 41. But if

a defendant fails to object at sentencing to the procedural reasonableness of the sentence imposed by the district court, this Court 

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reviews for plain error. United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 

1307 (11th Cir. 2014). Thus, in order to prevail on appeal, a defendant must establish “(1) that the district court erred; (2) that the error 

was ‘plain’; and (3) that the error ‘affect[ed his] substantial rights.’” 

Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 734 (1993)). If 

all three conditions are met, we then decide whether the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. When a defendant requested a specific sentence shorter than the one ultimately imposed, we review that sentence’s substantive reasonableness for abuse of discretion. HolguinHernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766–67 (2020).

III. DISCUSSION

First, Steiger argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court did not properly consider the 

guidelines range of 12 to 18 months of imprisonment or the 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. He also contends that the court should 

have addressed his request for a time served sentence. Our review 

is for plain error because Steiger did not object below. See Vandergrift, 754 F.3d at 1307.

A district court commits a “significant procedural error” in 

imposing a sentence if it fails to calculate the guidelines range, calculates the range incorrectly, or fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. However, “the district court is not required 

to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the 

§ 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors.” United 

States v. Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918, 936 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation 

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omitted). Rather, it is “sufficient that the district court considers the 

defendant’s arguments at sentencing and states that it has taken the 

§ 3553(a) factors into account.” Id. Similarly for the guidelines 

range, all that is required is that “there be some indication that the 

district court was aware of and considered the Guidelines, which 

requires the court to consider the sentencing range established under the Guidelines.” United States v. Campbell, 473 F.3d 1345, 1349 

(11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Here, the district judge stated that he had “fully considered 

all of the factors set out in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a), as well as the applicable guidelines and policy statements from the United States Sentencing Commission and the decisions of the courts about sentencing under these circumstances.” 

The district judge also stated that he had carefully considered the 

issues presented in the underlying case, the evidence presented at 

the revocation hearing, and the statements Steiger made in his defense. The evidence presented at the revocation hearing obviously 

concerned “the nature and circumstances of the offense”—one of 

the § 3553(a) factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). And although the 

district judge did not specifically reiterate that the guidelines range 

was 12 to 18 months’ imprisonment, both parties referred to the 

range in their arguments at the hearing. Although Steiger requested that he be sentenced to time served, the government argued that the guidelines sentence was inadequate considering the

seriousness of Steiger’s probation violation. Thus, it is clear from 

the record and the district judge’s own statements that he was 

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aware of and considered the guidelines range. This case is thus unlike Campbell, where this Court was unable to review a sentence 

imposed upon revocation of supervised release because “the district court never explicitly mentioned Campbell’s advisory Guidelines range during the revocation hearing” and in fact “never said 

the word ‘Guidelines’ during the entire hearing.” 473 F.3d at 1349.

Nor was the district judge required to explain why he rejected Steiger’s request for a time served sentence. “[T]he sentencing judge need only set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court 

that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned 

basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” 

Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109, 113 (2018) (2018) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). “Just how much of an explanation” is required “depends . . . upon the circumstances of the 

particular case.” Id. at 116. Sometimes it is enough “that the judge 

simply relied upon the record, while making clear that he or she 

has considered the parties’ arguments and taken account of the 

§ 3553(a) factors, among others.” Id. In sum, Steiger has not 

demonstrated plain error with regard to the procedural reasonableness of the sentence. 

Next, Steiger argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We review for abuse of discretion. Holguin-Hernandez, 140 

S. Ct. at 766–67. 

This Court “consider[s] whether a sentence is substantively 

unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances and in light 

of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Johnson, 803 F.3d 

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610, 618 (11th Cir. 2015). “Although there is no proportionality principle in sentencing, a major variance does require a more significant 

justification than a minor one—the requirement is that the justification be ‘sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.’” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1196 (11th Cir. 2010) (en 

banc) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). But “[e]ven as to a substantial 

variance, [this Court] will not reverse a sentence unless [it is] left 

with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors 

by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable 

sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Johnson, 803 F.3d at 618–

19 (quotation omitted).

Here, the district judge addressed the § 3553(a) factors and 

specifically mentioned that he had considered the evidence presented at the revocation hearing, which would have included the 

nature and circumstances of the murder. Steiger murdered the 

mother of his child on the child’s first birthday and dumped her 

inside a barrel where her decomposing body remained for months 

in the heat. Steiger planned the murder beforehand and carried it 

out in the presence of his one-year-old child. Steiger lied when 

questioned by law enforcement. His actions a mere two months 

into his probation sentence obviously convinced the district judge

that he deserved a much greater penalty than the guidelines suggested, and the upward departure itself is reasonable. The district 

court imposed a lighter sentence than the statutory maximum of 

20 years per count, which would have resulted in a total of 80 years’ 

imprisonment. Steiger has not demonstrated that the district court 

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abused its discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) factors and imposing 

an above-guidelines sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Steiger’s sentence. 

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