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81–246 PDF 2002

S. HRG. 107–612

DEFENDING AMERICA’S TRANSPORTATION

INFRASTRUCTURE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND DRUGS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 16, 2001

Serial No. J–107–44

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

JON KYL, Arizona 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Majority Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

SHARON PROST, Minority Chief Counsel 

MAKAN DELRAHIM, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND DRUGS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

GEORGE ELLARD, Majority Chief Counsel 

RITA LARI, Minority Chief Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., a U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware ............. 1

Grassley, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa ..................... 4

Schumer, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of New York ............ 6

WITNESSES 

Beatty, Jeffrey K., President and Chief Executive Officer, Total Security 

Services International, Marietta, Georgia ......................................................... 19

Brown, Donald E., Professor and Chair, Department of Systems Engineering, 

University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia ............................................... 17

Chrestman, Tony, President, Ruan Transport, Des Moines, Iowa ...................... 22

Jenkins, Brian M., Senior Advisor to the President, RAND Corporation, Santa 

Monica, California ................................................................................................ 14

Parker, Hon. Mike, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works), Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. ................................................................. 10

(1)

DEFENDING AMERICA’S TRANSPORTATION 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2001

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND DRUGS, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:37 a.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., 

chairman of the subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Biden, Schumer, and Grassley. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

Chairman BIDEN. The hearing will come to order. I thank the 

witnesses for their patience and for their willingness to be here. 

Welcome to this morning’s hearing on Defending America’s 

Transportation Infrastructure. As you know, only the initial part of 

this hearing will be open to the public. I want to explain straight 

up front the reason for this for the press. 

There is no classified information, there is no information that 

I am aware of that any witness is about to tell us about any imminent attack. They are not in a position to know that, even if there 

were. I don’t want you to think the closing of this hearing has anything to do with the idea that we know something is about to happen and we have decided that we have to keep that quiet, because 

some press have raised that question. It has nothing to do with 

that. 

What it has to do with is there is going to be an open statement, 

a public statement made by each of the witnesses, but we want to 

get into some detail about the vulnerabilities of the system. And although it is probable that the full-blown terrorist organization or 

organizations would understand what those vulnerabilities are and 

would not learn much by anything we said publicly, what we are 

concerned about is the prospect of copycat folks and screwballs out 

there who have not thought of some of these vulnerabilities. 

I realize it is a delicate balance here. I have been a Senator now 

for 29 years. Other then the 10 years of being on the Intelligence 

Committee, I don’t recall closing many hearings at all, but I don’t 

want to make this a bigger deal than it is in terms of why it is 

being closed. 

The second reason that we have decided to close it, speaking for 

myself, is that I think we are doing a pretty good job unintentionVerDate Feb 1 2002 14:37 Aug 14, 2002 Jkt 081246 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\HEARINGS\81246.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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ally of scaring the living devil out of the American people about 

things that could happen. 

Our job is to determine what could happen; our job is to look at 

the worst-case scenario. Many of those worst-case scenarios are 

highly, highly, highly improbable. Not a subject for this hearing 

today is the issue of, for example, anthrax out of airplanes, and so 

on. 

The way we talk about it, most Delawareans think that all anybody would have to do is get a hold of a crop duster and fill it up 

with anthrax, like grass seed, and spread it over a large population 

and tens of thousands of people are going to be affected. Putting 

anthrax in aerosol form is incredibly difficult. They wouldn’t be 

sending it in the mail if they were able to do it otherwise. 

It is the same way with smallpox. The prospect of an individual 

terrorist getting access to smallpox and infecting tens of thousands 

of people is highly unlikely. Is it a worst-case? Yes. Is it possible? 

Yes, but it is about as possible as your being struck by lightning 

twice in the same day. 

Again, I think it is important that we not inadvertently, in doing 

our job, which we have to do, unnecessarily alarm the American 

people. I am going to say something that my staff will be very 

upset that I say, but I believe very firmly that my granddaughters 

are going to write about this in their school reports as an episode 

in American history, not as a fundamental shift in American history. 

So I just want to sort of keep this on the straight and narrow, 

be level-headed about it and put it in perspective. But I do want 

to be able to ask each of the witnesses, who collectively have a 

great deal of experience dealing with these issues, some of the 

worst-case possibilities. 

Maybe it is appropriate in the sense that it need not be classified 

and it is appropriate in the sense that Americans would have a 

right to know it. There is nothing in particular that we are aware 

of that is about to happen anywhere, but it just seems to me unnecessary to do that now. We may decide after the hearing to declassify the whole hearing—not declassify, but take it all public 

based on what we have learned. 

So as I said, only the initial portion of the hearing will be open 

to the public. Pursuant to Senate rules, we will close the hearing 

after some initial testimony to allow the expert witnesses to speak 

freely to the subcommittee regarding potential threats to the transportation infrastructure. 

It has now been over a month since the tragic events of September 11, and during that time we have heard many speeches memorializing the losses of that day. There is nothing more that I can 

say, and I suspect Senator Grassley can say, to speak to the profound loss that those thousands now of family members dealing 

with the loss that occurred on the 11th are undergoing. 

Many of us know from personal experience when you get that 

phone call it is like your chest turns into a black hole and you are 

being sucked inside it. And there is not much any of us can do, except to express our sympathies and guarantee our support, not just 

support but our long-term support and commitment to those families. 

3

What we can do and what we have been doing in the Senate and 

the House, and the White House as well, is to work as hard as we 

can to prevent future terrorist attacks and if, in fact, God forbid, 

they occurred, to diminish the damage they can do. 

We have recently passed bills to make life harder for those who 

commit terrorist acts. We have passed the antiterrorism bill that 

will help law enforcement suck the oxygen out of the air that these 

sons-of-guns breathe. We have passed a law to make air travel 

safer, and I am sure we will continue to improve on that so that 

our own airlines will not again be turned into weapons against the 

American people. 

Now, we need to focus on the other areas of potential vulnerability. In so doing, we need to think ahead of the terrorists, think 

of the next step and not just the last attack. The horse is out of 

the barn when it comes to the airlines. We are backfilling now to 

prevent it from happening, but we will hopefully get ahead of the 

curve here before the horse gets out of the barn on some other 

means of surface transportation. We need to stop it before it happens, if at all possible. 

We need to think of the ways terrorists can attack. Before September 11, few people thought someone would use a commercial 

airliner as a missile aimed at our buildings. But in light of the 

events of September 11, much attention has been paid in the last 

month to the need for enhanced security and criminal penalties in 

our Nation’s aviation system. But as was noted in a recent New 

York Times editorial, ‘‘airports and airplanes are like Fort Knox 

when compared to other forms of transport.’’ These hearings will focus on the extent to which security 

vulnerabilities exist in non-aviation transportation. That is because 

today we need to anticipate the threat that may come not just in 

the belly of a plane, but in the hold of a ship or in the dark of a 

tunnel or the span of a bridge. 

Each day, tens of thousands of companies move tons of cargo, 

much of it hazardous, over the Nation’s railroads, waterways and 

highways. Countless additional tons of cargo arrive daily in U.S. 

ports of entry. More importantly, millions of Americans use surface 

transportation to reach their workplaces, visit their loved ones, and 

return to their homes. 

Our modes of surface and sub-surface transportation may not be 

keeping up with the security advances that we are seeing in the 

air. For example, it has recently been reported that 98 percent of 

all cargo containers enter U.S. ports without any inspection. As one 

commentator has noted, ‘‘We are now experiencing the dark side of 

a transport system in which efficiency has trumped public security.’’

As I recently noted on the floor of the United States Senate, 

when an Amtrak Metroliner train and an Amtrak AmFleet train 

are in a tunnel at the same time—and this is often the case—there 

are more people in that confined space than five full 747 aircraft. 

I am not an expert on these issues and I am not prepared to 

measure the extent of the problem for myself, and without responsible inquiry I don’t think it is possible. That is why I am glad to 

welcome our panel of experts today to educate us, and I will be 

happy to close this hearing to the public at the appropriate time 

4

so that our witnesses may feel free to speak about any concern they 

have. 

I hope today’s hearing will be a constructive step toward the goal 

of shoring up our defenses against terrorism in all realms of our 

transportation infrastructure. In the wake of September 11, we 

need to reevaluate our rules of prevention because the rules of engagement have changed. 

Now, I would like to turn to Senator Grassley, the ranking member of the subcommittee, and thank him for working so hard in 

putting this together. 

I look forward to hearing all the witnesses at the appropriate 

time. I see my friend from New York has come in and we will give 

him the opportunity to make an opening statement, as well. 

What I will do at the appropriate time, which I will warn you 

about ahead of time, is I am going to read a little about your backgrounds, more than we usually do, so people can understand who 

we have before us. 

Senator Grassley? 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF IOWA 

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, Mr. Chairman, in holding this hearing 

you show your concern about the safety and the economic vitality 

of our ground transportation system. Our waterways, highways, 

rail systems, pipelines and more, are critical to the economy and 

must be protected from terrorist attack. 

Americans must be able to continue to travel by car, truck, train, 

whether for business or leisure, and do it without fear. We have to 

increase the confidence of the American traveling public in the 

safety and integrity of our transportation system. By doing that, I 

think we show the terrorists that they are not going to break the 

spirit of America, as they try to put psychological trauma upon our 

people. 

I welcome Mr. Tony Chrestman, President of Ruan Industries, of 

Des Moines, Iowa. Ruan is one of America’s largest trucking companies. Mr. Chrestman has more than 30 years’ experience in logistics and transportation services. He is active in the American 

Trucking Association and Council on Logistics Management, and 

we look forward to his advice. 

I would also join the chairman in welcoming Mike Parker, the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works. The Corps is 

heavily involved in maintaining river transportation infrastructure. 

Of course, the importance of that infrastructure is underscored, I 

think, by the appearance here this morning of the Assistant Secretary. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, I have focused a great deal of my 

time on the need for smaller airports, because that is how Iowa is 

served. This mode of transportation is important not only to our 

economy, but also to the people of Iowa and elsewhere who need 

to travel. I realize that today’s hearing will not focus upon aviation, 

but I bring this to your attention in hopes that maybe sometime 

we can do something in that area as well. 

The hearing today is about the backbone of the transportation 

system, an extensive interrelated network of public and private 

5

roads, railroads, transit routes, waterways, terminals, ports, and 

pipelines. It is a system that supported more than 2.7 trillion vehicle miles in the year 1999, with a total tonnage miles of 3.1 trillion. 

Together, these modes of transportation, without even considering 

airlines, make up more than 65 percent of the value of U.S. international merchandise trade. 

Grain is Iowa’s biggest commodity, and it is primarily transported by train and river barge. Iowa is the bread basket not just 

for the United States, but for the world. To hit our means of transporting grain would be to keep food from the hungry of the world 

and to devastate our own economy. 

As to trucking, more than 80 percent of the value and more than 

74 percent of the weight of all goods originating in Iowa are transported by truck. Over 64 percent of shipping originating in Iowa is 

transported to other States. These forms of transportation are important to my State, but also the rest of the country. 

Air is not the only method of travel for the general public, obviously. In fact, in the aftermath of September 11, those Americans 

who usually travel by air at least had the option of traveling by 

car, train or bus. 

So, Mr. Chairman, much is at stake. If we can’t ensure the safety 

of our transportation system, we will have an equally difficult time 

sustaining the economic vitality of these industries for our economy, as well as instilling confidence in the traveling public. 

We need to be focusing, then, on ways in which we can address 

the issue of security for the trucking industry. I am sure we will 

hear many recommendations here today, but I would want to suggest looking at the trucking industry’s ability to access background 

checks and licensing requirements for operators of their vehicles, 

tighter security and scanning methods at the borders, and the safety concerns of the communities and workers of this transportation 

network. 

Although I am confident that the various trucking industries will 

rapidly take the necessary measures to ensure that operator licensing requirements are rigorously developed and followed, I am concerned about the coordination among the States in sharing this information. 

At this time, Ruan Industries, of Des Moines, has no way of accessing a Federal criminal database to check on the backgrounds 

of potential employees. Mr. Chrestman’s employees have to rely on 

other time-consuming and often unverifiable methods that usually 

differ from State to State. So I hope that could change. 

The other problems have to do with border and port security, especially with regard to inspecting shipments. As I understand it, 

less than 5 percent of the entries at borders and less than 1 percent of the entries at ports are randomly inspected. Consequently, 

these statistics do not generate a great deal of confidence that our 

borders are secure. 

I am also concerned with the safety of our locks, dams and 

bridges. My State is flanked on both sides by the Missouri, on the 

west, and the Mississippi on the east, which have extensive systems of barge transport. This system carries grain from Iowa to export on the lower Mississippi. It also transports salt, fertilizer, petroleum products, cement and other bulk commodities up river to 

6

Iowa. There are also numerous bridges, obviously, over the rivers 

that are critical to train and truck transportation. It is not unlikely 

that terrorists would target them in an effort to disrupt transportation systems. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, one of the lessons of the tragic events of 

Oklahoma City and the events of September 11 is that terrorists 

find their weapons of mass destruction once they are here. They 

rarely bring them with them. The tools that the hijackers used in 

New York and elsewhere were box cutters and other crude instruments, but their weapons of mass destruction were our jets. The 

point is their weapons of mass destruction are all around our country, in trucks, in cargo trailers, in rail cars, in ports and pipelines, 

and even recreation boats. 

What is more, as the September 11 terrorist act showed, it had 

a devastating effect on the general confidence of the public, particularly in traveling, whether for business or leisure. Air transportation came to a grinding halt. The only thing that allowed Americans to keep moving were our highways, waterways and railroads. 

That is why this hearing is so important, and I thank you for holding it. 

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you. 

Senator Schumer? 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

Senator SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to 

thank you for holding this hearing on the critical issue of security 

of our transportation infrastructure. 

Unfortunately, we have learned a lot after September 11 and one 

of the things we have learned is terrorists look for the weak pressure points in our society and then they strike. Unfortunately, 

many aspects of our transportation system are those weak pressure 

points. We have lived in a free and open society, thank God, for all 

these hundreds of years, and the transportation system reflects it. 

But because people agglomerate at the transportation system, because, by definition, there is movement and they have to move 

things to do what they want to do—move bad things, explosives or 

whatever—it is really important that we examine our transportation infrastructure because it is one of the places where terrorists 

will focus their attention. So nothing could be more timely than 

holding this hearing and I thank you for it. 

We are each focusing on areas that affect our States, although 

we want to look at the whole Nation. Senator Grassley talked 

about truck and barge and the things that are needed in Iowa. I 

would like to focus a little bit on rail transportation because of its 

importance to both the Nation and to New York. 

I first want to say, Mr. Chairman, your leadership on rail transportation, and on Amtrak in particular, is just exemplary, and I 

think all of us who believe in rail transportation, its necessity and 

the need to make it safe and secure, just thank you for everything 

that you have done. 

The aftermath of the attack on September 11 has made one simple fact clear, and that is that our Nation’s rail system is essential 

and has to be made secure. Last month, when our airports were 

7

shut down, it was rail that provided one of the only means of travel 

available in many parts of the country. Amtrak added trains and 

provided transportation to New York City for relief workers and 

military personnel and public officials. They honored plane tickets 

for stranded travelers. 

Amtrak proved its worth, as more and more Americans relied on 

its service during this crisis. In the week following the September 

11 tragedy, rail ridership increased 17 percent nationally, and Amtrak had to add 30 percent more seating capacity on the Northeast 

corridor. 

What we have learned in this brave new world in which we live 

is that all our transportation systems are interdependent and we 

need them all. You cannot simply say let’s make one secure in the 

preeminent part of the system. We have to work on all of them, 

whether that be air, rail, road, or water or ship. 

The Senate has already passed legislation, I am glad to say, addressing airline security. The next item of business must be legislation on the pressing issue of rail security. We need both, and we 

need them now. That is why I am glad—and I know Senator Biden 

has joined me in this in playing his leadership and spearhead 

role—that Senator Hollings and Senator McCain introduced yesterday a bill that was modeled on the amendment that we had worked 

on to the airline security bill. 

The Hollings bill will fill critical gaps in our system of security for rails by providing $1.7 billion to provide new security equipment, training and personnel to our railway system. Included in 

this package would be something of great concern in New York, 

and that is the tunnels under the Hudson River. That is also of 

great concern in Maryland and in Washington, D.C. 

We have, coming out of Penn Station, for instance, tunnels that 

go on for more than a mile, sometimes as much as two. They don’t 

have good ventilation systems. They don’t have good egress if, God 

forbid, something were to happen. Before September 11, nobody 

paid much attention to that, but now we are, and I think that is 

extremely important and I am glad that we are looking at that 

issue. 

In addition to pressing for this legislation, I have asked Secretary of Transportation Mineta to conduct a comprehensive study 

of the Nation’s rail security and report back in two months regarding the status of current Amtrak safety standards and procedures; 

the most urgently needed upgrade throughout our rail system, 

freight as well as passenger; the ability of our rail, Amtrak and 

others, to respond and operate in the face of another terrorist attack; and the methods of implementation and execution of new security and safety measures. 

The information that we will receive from this study, coupled 

with additional funds for railroad safety from the Hollings bill, will 

allow us to put in place security measures designed to provide the 

maximum security possible. 

Let me say as somebody who takes the rails—and I know my colleagues would agree with me because I know they have taken 

them, or I certainly know Senator Biden has—we are more secure 

today than we were before September 11. If you go ride the trains, 

just as when you ride the planes, you will see much more security 

8

personnel. But it is being done in an ad hoc way, in light of the 

crisis, and we need a permanent regimen. 

We may need to look at inspection of baggage and metal detectors and things like that, which we do at airports. I am hopeful 

that between the legislation that Senator Biden, myself and a number of our colleagues have been working on, embodied in the Hollings bill, as well as the study from Secretary Mineta, we will get 

quick answers and then move without delay to implement them. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you very much. 

I am going to introduce the background of each of the witnesses 

all at once and then I am going to start with you, Mike, and we 

will work our way down. 

Mike Parker is the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil 

Works. Since 1996, he has been the owner and president of GFG 

Farms Incorporated and Wells Resources Incorporated, companies 

with timber and farming and leasing operations. 

In 1999, he was involved in something he would like to forget, 

the closest race I think that ever existed in Mississippi history for 

governor. 

Is that right, Congressman? 

Mr. PARKER. It was close. 

Chairman BIDEN. It was close; I mean, it was a heck of a race. 

In 1989, he was elected to the 4th District of Mississippi and 

served in the House for 10 years. He is a graduate of William 

Carey College, in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, with a B.A. degree in 

1970, and in 1985 he was awarded an honorary doctorate in humanities from William Carey College. He has a lot of experience 

and background here. 

Mr. Brian Jenkins is one of the country’s leading authorities on 

terrorism and sophisticated crime. He has been quoted in the 

media almost daily since September 11. He is a senior adviser to 

the president of the RAND Corporation, and serves as an adviser 

to both government and industry. 

A former deputy chairman of Kroll Associates, a prominent international investigative and consulting firm, Mr. Jenkins is also currently involved with the Mineta International Institute for Surface 

Transportation Policy Studies. 

Previously, from 1972 to 1989, he was chairman of the RAND political science department. In 2000, he oversaw a year-long RAND 

study of security vulnerabilities in the California rail, tunnel, waterway, highway and pipeline infrastructure carried out for the 

California Office of Emergency Services. This report was embargoed on September 11 by Governor Davis in light of the attacks. 

Mr. Jenkins served from 1996 to 1997 as a member of the White 

House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, and he is the 

author of ‘‘A Hundred Wars: International Terrorism, a New Mode 

of Conflict,’’ and ‘‘Terrorism and Personal Protection.’’

A former captain in the Green Berets, he served in the Dominican Republic during the American intervention, and later in Vietnam from 1966 to 1970. He is a widely respected and often-quoted 

analyst with over 25 years of experience. He comes highly recommended by a number of people who have testified before this 

9

committee and the Congressional Research Service Transportation 

Security Section. 

Also, we have Professor Donald E. Brown. He is Professor and 

Chair of the Department of Systems Engineering at the University 

of Virginia. He is a nationally regarded expert in qualifying security threats to surface transportation structures. 

As such, he served as a consultant for the National Security Administration on intelligence and threat analysis, and he has also 

recently served on the National Academy of Sciences panel which 

produced one of the definitive analytical studies on security 

vulnerabilities in the Nation’s transportation system, entitled ‘‘Improving Surface Transportation Security.’’ Dr. Brown has also produced several studies on the asymmetric 

threat posed to transportation infrastructure by terrorists; that is, 

the ability of a small cell of dedicated radicals to inflict significant 

blows against unprotected U.S. transportation targets, rather than 

against the overwhelming superiority of U.S. military forces. 

Prior to joining the University of Virginia, Dr. Brown served for 

9 years as an officer in the United States Army, reaching the rank 

of captain, including more than 3 years as a military intelligence 

officer in Berlin in the late 1970s. He has also served as a visiting 

fellow at the National Institute of Justice’s Crime Mapping Research Center, and has been a co-principal investigator in over 50 

research contracts with Federal, State and private organizations. 

He has published more than 80 papers. 

Dr. Brown is a graduate of the United States Military Academy 

at West Point, and received his master’s in engineering and operations research from the University of California at Berkeley and 

a Ph.D. in operations engineering from the University of Michigan 

at Ann Arbor. 

Welcome, Doctor. Thank you for being here. 

Jeffrey Beatty looks too mild-mannered to fit this description. 

Jeffrey K. Beatty is a former U.S. Delta Force counterterrorism 

unit officer, a special agent for the FBI, and an operations officer 

for the CIA. He is currently president and CEO of Total Security 

Services International, in Marietta, Georgia. 

I might point out, to the best of my knowledge, no other individual has served in all three of the most elite counterterrorism 

units in the United States military. Mr. Beatty has appeared as a 

commentator on CNN on terrorism and transportation infrastructure since September 11, and maybe before, but I have noticed him 

since the 11th. 

From 1981 to 1983, Mr. Beatty served as a Delta Force assault 

troop commander, where he led a unit on several deployments and 

was commended for saving lives. Subsequently, he became operations officer for the entire Delta Force. 

From 1983 to 1985, Mr. Beatty served as a special adviser to the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation Hostage Rescue Team, with an 

emphasis on security for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic. He also 

flew surveillance missions for the Bureau, including a mission involving the capturing of a Top 10 fugitive. 

From 1985 to 1992, he worked at the Central Intelligence Agency 

on Europe and the Middle East. In addition to traditional intelligence operations, he developed counterterrorism training proVerDate Feb 1 2002 14:37 Aug 14, 2002 Jkt 081246 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\HEARINGS\81246.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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grams for Allied troops. He also mounted several successful intelligence and security operations, including thwarting a terrorist attack. 

In 1992, Mr. Beatty founded Total Security Services International, a security consulting firm serving corporate and government clients. TSSI has managed large security projects, including 

the security upgrade program for Fairfax County, Virginia. The 

reason for that, I might add, was because of the trial of the gentlemen who shot two people at the CIA headquarters in 1993. 

Mr. Beatty specializes in the high-threat portion of the security 

spectrum and has experience in three Olympics—Los Angeles, Barcelona and Atlanta—not as a participant but as a consultant. It 

would be kind of nice to be a participant, too, wouldn’t it? 

He has also done work on terrorism prevention with regard to 

the Big Dig highway excavation project in Boston. He also developed antiterrorism procedures and training materials for Amtrak 

and the Washington, D.C., Metro system. In addition, he has studied the vulnerabilities of Boston and New York City’s tunnels, and 

has been a speaker at the Department of Transportation’s Conference on Land Transportation issues. Mr. Beatty and TSSI have 

most recently been hired by the Boston MBTA to beef up subway 

security. 

TSSI warned officials at the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta 

that their security procedures would leave crowds open to package 

bomb attacks, a prediction that soon came true. In 1999, Mr. 

Beatty conducted an exercise in Boston preparing for armed terrorists seizing a subway train and a bomb detonating in the train station. In 1998, he went on record as stating that terrorists were 

aiming for an attack leading to 5,000 or more casualties by the end 

of 2001, a prediction unfortunately that has come true. 

Tony Chrestman currently serves as the president of Ruan 

Transportation Corporation, a business unit of Ruan Transportation Management Systems. Mr. Chrestman has more than 30 

years’ experience in logistics and transportation services. Joining 

Ruan in 1999, he was vice president of transportation services with 

Ryder Integrated Logistics, and he is active in the American Trucking Association and the Council for Logistics Management. Mr. 

Chrestman attended Mississippi State University, and he is extremely welcome as well. 

Having said that, gentlemen, why don’t we proceed with your 

public statements, if you will. If any of my colleagues want to ask 

a question on the record here in the public portion, we can do that 

and then we will go to the closed hearing. 

Mike, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF MIKE PARKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

THE ARMY (CIVIL WORKS), DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. PARKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. For the last three weeks, I have had the privilege of serving 

as Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works. I appreciate 

the opportunity to speak to you today, and also thank you for the 

opportunity to provide information on Army Corps of Engineers acVerDate Feb 1 2002 14:37 Aug 14, 2002 Jkt 081246 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\HEARINGS\81246.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
11

tivities to address the infrastructure security issues resulting from 

the events of September 11, 2001. 

First, allow me to say how proud I am to be associated with the 

Corps of Engineers, its record, and the manner in which it has 

begun to move out to protect the large part of America’s infrastructure that is our responsibility. I want to assure you that the Corps 

will prove itself worthy of the trust which that responsibility conveys. 

Within two hours of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade 

Center, Corps employees were at Ground Zero lending assistance. 

Thousands of New York City residents were evacuated on Corps 

civil works vessels from Lower Manhattan in excess of 2,000. We 

provide expert structural assessments, emergency power to get the 

stock market up and running, and provided technical assistance for 

the removal of what will likely exceed one million tons of debris. 

Within hours of the attack on the Pentagon, Corps structural engineers were on-site providing expert advice. We are presently conducting a comprehensive force protection analysis to make the rebuilt Pentagon safer from terrorist intervention in the future, and 

we continue to support local and military leaders with every asset 

the Corps can muster. 

In conjunction with its military construction mission, the Corps 

has developed in-depth antiterrorism force protection expertise. 

The Corps serves as the Department of Defense lead for public 

works under national and departmental plans. The Corps’ laboratories and technology transfer centers were instrumental in the development of the DoD antiterrorism/force protection standards now 

used by all of the military services in military construction, major 

repair and other programs. 

These standards and the underlying technologies are being widely used by the State Department in their embassy program. For example, we have world-class antiterrorism force protection engineers 

at our Protective Design and Electronic Security Centers who are 

supported by the best available research assets within the Engineer Research and Development Centers six-laboratory network. 

Expertise available there to the Corps and others includes, 

among other things, survivability and protective structures, 

sustainment engineering, battle space environment, military and 

civil infrastructure, and environmental quality. We have hundreds 

of employees trained by these engineers, along with experience 

born of work on the Khobar Towers, Murrah Federal Building, 

World Trade Center, the Pentagon and other sites, some wellknown and others not so well-known. The Corps centers and labs 

are supported by the some of the leading antiterrorism/force protection engineering and construction firms through effective contracting vehicles. 

We are in the process of leveraging the expertise gained in the 

Corp’s military mission areas to protect the Corps’ critical water resources infrastructure from terrorist activities. Fortunately, we are 

not starting from scratch. Over the past few years, the Corps has 

been working diligently with other agencies, including the Bureau 

of Reclamation, the Department of Energy, the Tennessee Valley 

Authority, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation to develop a comprehensive security asVerDate Feb 1 2002 14:37 Aug 14, 2002 Jkt 081246 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\HEARINGS\81246.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
12

sessment process to identify risks to critical facilities, such as locks, 

dams and hydropower facilities. As the security assessments are 

completed, we will apply the Corps’ and others’ antiterrorism/force 

protection expertise to critical sites to mitigate security risks uncovered. 

Today, temporary protection measures are in place, including restricted public access, increased stand-off distances to critical structures, increased patrol activities, additional contract guard support, 

increased coordination with local law enforcement, and establishment of early-warning telephone procedures. 

A civil works infrastructure management team has been established at headquarters and in the field, and the Corps has begun 

the task of assessing the need for more specific, effective protective 

measures. The centerpiece of this effort is the risk assessment and 

protection of dams methodology, called RAM–D, developed by the 

Interagency Forum on Infrastructure Protection from the efforts 

mentioned earlier. I have with me a copy of the training material 

and workbooks that teams will be using over the next several 

months to complete this comprehensive civil works security assessment. 

By using this Risk Assessment Methodology for Dams, security 

risks to dams and other Corps infrastructure can be assessed 

quickly in a structured, systematic manner, even though the structures to be assessed have been built at different times to meet a 

specific set of criteria and sited in unique environments. 

The Corps of Engineers has already put in place a plan to conduct these assessments on our critical dams and other infrastructure, and to cooperate with other agencies on still more dams. We 

will also cooperate on other types of structures as requested. The 

lack of standardizing tools may make for a slower process, but the 

assessment should be no less accurate. 

We are also actively involved with the Nation’s leading engineering and construction industry associations, professional societies, 

and standards-writing organizations to improve the security and 

survivability of public and private buildings throughout the country. 

Your letter of invitation asked that I testify on the structural 

vulnerabilities of our Nation’s surface transportation to terrorist attacks. I must tell you that America’s water resources, including our 

waterborne transportation infrastructure, locks and dams, are at 

risk to terrorism. 

Risk is everywhere and impossible to eliminate entirely. However, there are many forms of risk and many ways to minimize and 

manage it. The Corps of Engineers has already begun the process 

of protecting the resources entrusted to it and the people who work 

and visit there. We have coordinated with the U.S. Coast Guard, 

the American Waterways Operators, and other members of the marine transportation industry to address the risk and challenges before us in ensuring the safe and efficient movement of hazardous 

cargoes on our inland rivers and waterways, while maintaining a 

high level of diligence and concern for the possibility of a terrorist 

act. I am proud of the Corps and confident in its ability to achieve 

and maintain the results demanded by the American people and 

their representatives in this august body. 

13

The President, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Secretary of the 

Army White and I are committed to providing the leadership and 

resources for the Army Corps of Engineers to carrying out its vital 

military and civil works missions in these difficult times. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement and I will be 

pleased to address any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Parker follows:]

STATEMENT OF MIKE PARKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (CIVIL WORKS), 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE: 

INTRODUCTION 

I am Mike Parker, for the last three weeks, the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

for Civil Works. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today. 

Thank you for the opportunity to provide information on the Army Corps of Engineers activities to address the infrastructure security issues resulting from the 

events of September 11, 2001. First, allow me to say how proud I am to be associated with the Corps of Engineers, its record, and the manner in which it has begun 

to move out to protect the large part of America’s water infrastructure that is our 

responsibility. I want to assure you that the Corps will prove itself worthy of the 

trust which that responsibility conveys. 

Within two hours of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, Corps employees were at ground zero lending assistance. Thousands of New York City residents were evacuated on Corps civil works vessels from lower Manhattan. We provided expert structural assessments, emergency power to get the stock market up 

and running and providing technical assistance for the removal of what will likely 

exceed 1 million tons of debris. Within hours of the attack on the Pentagon, Corps 

structural engineers were on site providing expert advice. We are presently conducting a comprehensive force protection analysis to make the rebuilt Pentagon 

safer from terrorist intervention in the future. We continue to support local and 

military leaders with every asset the Corps can muster. 

In conjunction with its military construction mission, the Corps has developed indepth anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) expertise. The Corps serves as the Department of Defense (DoD) lead for Public Works under national and departmental 

plans. The Corps laboratories and technology transfer centers were instrumental in 

the development of the DoD AT/FP standards now used by all the military services 

in the Military Construction, major repair and other programs. These standards and 

the underlying technologies are being widely used by the State Department in their 

embassy program. 

For example, we have world-class AT/FP applications engineers at our Protective 

Design and Electronic Security Centers who are supported by the best available research assets within the Engineer Research and Development Centers six laboratory 

network. Expertise available there (to the Corps and others) includes, among other 

things: Survivability and Protective Structures, Sustainment Engineering, 

Battlespace Environment, Military and Civil Infrastructure, and Environmental 

Quality. We have hundreds of employees trained by these engineers, along with experience born of work on the Khobar Towers, Murrah Federal Building, World 

Trade Center, the Pentagon, and other sites—some well-known and others not-sowell-known. The Corps Centers and labs are supported by some of the leading AT/

FP engineering and construction firms through effective contracting vehicles. 

We are in the process of leveraging the expertise gained in the Corps military 

mission areas to protect the Corps critical water resources infrastructure from terrorist activities. Fortunately, we are not starting from scratch. Over the past few 

years the Corps has been working diligently with other agencies, including Bureau 

of Reclamation, Department of Energy, Tennessee Valley Authority, Environmental 

Protection Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to develop a comprehensive security assessment process to identify risks to critical facilities such as locks, 

dams and hydropower facilities. As the security assessments are completed we will 

apply the Corps (and others) AT/FP expertise to critical sites to mitigate security 

risks uncovered. 

Today, temporary protection measures are in place, including restricted public access, increased standoff distances to critical structures, increased patrol activities, 

additional contract guard support, increased coordination with local law enforcement, and establishment of early warning telephone procedures. 

14

A civil works infrastructure management team has been established at headquarters and in the field, and the Corps has begun the task of assessing the need 

for more specific, effective protective measures. The centerpiece of this effort is the 

risk assessment and protection of dams methodology called RAM-D developed by the 

Interagency Forum on Infrastructure Protection from the efforts mentioned earlier. 

I have with me a copy of the training material and workbooks that teams will be 

using over the next several months to complete this comprehensive civil works security assessment. 

By using this Risk Assessment Methodology for Dams, security risks to dams and 

other Corps infrastructure can be assessed quickly, in a structured, systematic manner, even though the structures to be assessed have been built at different times 

to meet specific set of criteria and sited in unique environments. The Corps of Engineers has already put in place a plan to conduct these assessments on our critical 

dams and other infrastructure, and to cooperate with other agencies on still more 

dams. We will also cooperate on other types of structures, as requested. The lack 

of standardizing tools may make for a slower process, but the assessment should 

be no less accurate. 

We are also actively involved with the Nation’s leading engineering and construction industry associations, professional societies and standards writing organizations 

to improve the security and survivability of public and private buildings throughout 

the country. 

You letter of invitation asked that I testify on the structural vulnerabilities of our 

Nation’s surface transportation to terrorist attacks. I must tell you that America’s water resources, including our waterborne transportation infrastructure (locks and 

dams), are at risk to terrorism. Risk is everywhere, and impossible to eliminate, entirely. However, there are many forms of risk, many ways to minimize and manage 

it. The Corps of Engineers has already begun the process of protecting the resources 

entrusted to it, and the people who work and visit there. We have coordinated with 

the U.S. Coast Guard, the American Waterways Operators, and other members of 

the marine transportation industry to address the risks and challenges before us in 

ensuring the safe and efficient movement of hazardous cargos on our inland rivers 

and waterways, while maintaining a high level of diligence and concern for the possibility of a terrorist act. I am proud of the Corps and confident of its ability to 

achieve and maintain the results demanded by the American people and their representatives in this august body. 

CONCLUSION 

The President, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Secretary of the Army White and 

I are committed to providing the leadership and resources for the Army Corps of 

Engineers to carrying out its vital military and civil works missions in these difficult times. Mr. Chairman that concludes my statement and I would be pleased to 

address any questions that you or the committee may have.

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you very much, Congressman. 

Mr. Jenkins? 

STATEMENT OF BRIAN M. JENKINS, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE 

PRESIDENT, RAND CORPORATION, SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA 

Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank 

you very much for giving me the opportunity to make a few remarks. 

Let me take a cue from your opening comments, Mr. Chairman. 

We must be realistic in our acceptance of risk. We know that terrorists can attack anything, anywhere, any time. We cannot protect 

everything, everywhere, all the time. 

Trying to imagine all the potential scenarios that exploit the infinite vulnerabilities in our society is not particularly helpful in allocating security resources. Terrorists are always going to find some 

vulnerability to exploit. Security to a certain extent is always going 

to be reactive. 

This obliges us to make choices based upon the likelihood that 

terrorists will attack a certain target and the consequences of that 

15

attack were to succeed. Fortunately, terrorists have shown some 

clear preferences, although the fact that they haven’t done something in the past certainly is no guarantee that they will not do it 

in the future. 

We know, for example, that commercial aviation has been a preferred terrorist target for decades. Security at airports has been 

augmented since September 11, but in my view not enough. Aviation security still requires a complete overhaul. 

But for those determined to kill in quantity and willing to kill 

indiscriminately, which is a trend we have seen in terrorism over 

the last decade, public surface transportation is an ideal target. 

Precisely because it is public and used by millions of people daily, 

there is necessarily little security, with none of the obvious checkpoints like those at airports. Concentrations of people in contained 

environments are especially vulnerable to conventional explosives 

and, as we have seen in Tokyo, to unconventional weapons as well. 

The threat here is real. We are not talking about hypothetical 

scenarios. We have seen terrorist attacks in the subways of Paris 

and London’s Underground, Tokyo’s subways, Moscow’s Metro and 

Tel Aviv’s buses. In the United States, we have seen the deliberate 

derailment of an Amtrak passenger train. We have seen a thwarted 

plot to carry out suicide bombings on New York subways. 

Terrorists see public transportation as a killing field. Now, it 

may not be so dramatic in the shadow of more than 5,000 deaths 

on September 11, but the statistics nonetheless are impressive. 

Thirty-seven percent of all terrorist attacks on surface transportation have involved fatalities. That is significant when we realize 

that the average for terrorist attacks in general is about 20 percent. So when they go after public transportation, twice as many 

of these attacks result in fatalities. 

Indeed, two-thirds of the attacks have clearly been intended to 

kill, versus 37 percent for terrorist attacks overall. So they are 

twice as likely to be trying to kill people. Twenty-three percent of 

the attacks with fatalities involve 10 or more deaths. Attacks on 

public transportation, of course, also cause great disruption and 

alarm, which are the traditional goals of terrorism. 

Security on surface transportation fortunately can be significantly improved without disrupting operations or even spending 

vast sums of money. Potential casualties can be reduced both 

through the design of stations and vehicles and through effective 

and rapid response. 

Disruptions resulting from unnecessary shutdowns can be minimized with technology and procedures that permit prompt assessment, accurate diagnosis, and rapid, well-rehearsed responses. Crisis management is a critical component of this security. 

We can apply the best practices learned from those systems that 

have dealt with higher levels of threat. Fortunately, in this country 

thus far we have seen only a small number of incidents. But other 

countries—France, the United Kingdom, Japan—have dealt with 

terrorist campaigns on their public transportation systems and we 

can learn from their lessons. This has been the focus of ongoing research by the Mineta Transportation Institute, and I have provided 

members of the committee with advance copies of an executive 

overview of this ongoing research. 

16

One final thought. Much of our country’s critical infrastructure—

dams, water systems, ports, transportation systems—is protected 

by private security guards, and I think we often overlook the role 

played by private security in this country. We spend over $100 billion a year on private security in this country. The industry currently employs more than 2 million persons. That is close to the 

strength of the United States armed forces at the height of the 

Cold War. 

We can, of course, on a temporary basis, augment security at 

critical facilities with police and National Guard, but that is not a 

permanent solution. I think we should explore ways in which we 

can better ensure high-level performance among private sector 

guards, not just in airports, and ways in which we can more effectively utilize this second line of defense in crisis situations. This 

could be achieved through the certification of those companies involved in protecting designated components of the Nation’s critical 

infrastructure and improved professional training. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]

STATEMENT OF BRIAN MICHEL JENKINS, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT, RAND 

CORPORATION, SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA

Terrorists can attack anything, anywhere, any time, while we cannot protect everything, everywhere, all the time. Trying to imagine all of the potential terrorist 

scenarios that exploit the infinite vulnerabilities in our society is not particularly 

helpful in allocating security resources. We can easily overwhelm security planners 

with plausible threats. Terrorists will always find vulnerabilities to exploit. To a certain extent, security will always be reactive. 

This obliges us to make choices based upon the likelihood that terrorists will attack a certain target, and the consequences of that attack were it to succeed. Our 

ability to protect certain categories of targets is also a factor. Terrorists seeking to 

cause heavy casualties, can always set off bombs in public places that are by their 

very nature difficult to protect. We must be realistic in our acceptance of risk. 

Fortunately, terrorists have shown clear preferences. However, the fact that terrorists have not done something in the past is no guarantee that they might not 

try it in the future. Our security goal lies somewhere between ensuring adequate 

protection at facilities that have been attacked by terrorists in the past and attempting to eliminate every conceivable vulnerability to future attack. 

The September 11 attack humbles any analyst attempting to forecast what terrorists might do in the future. While a growing percentage of attacks are clearly intended to kill (as opposed to purely symbolic violence, sabotage, or hostage-taking), 

of more than 10,000 international terrorist incidents in the past three decades, prior 

to September 11 only 14 resulted in 100 or more fatalities. The September 11 attack 

was unprecedented in the annals of terrorism, (although I strongly suspect that the 

terrorists had hoped for a far greater number of casualties). The attack did conform 

to the view offered years ago that tomorrow’s terrorist might not be the high-tech 

adversary envisioned by many, but rather a more bloody-minded version of previous 

low-tech terrorists. 

Commercial aviation has been a preferred terrorist target for decades. Security at 

airports has been augmented since September 11 but not enough. In my view, aviation security requires a complete overhaul. 

But our focus today is surface transportation. For those determined to kill in 

quantity and willing to kill indiscriminately, public surface transportation is an 

ideal target. Precisely because it is public and used by millions of people daily, there 

is little security, with no obvious checkpoints like those at airports. Concentrations 

of people in contained environments are especially vulnerable to conventional explosives and unconventional weapons. 

The threat is real. We have seen terrorist bombing campaigns against the subways of Paris, London’s Underground and railways, Tokyo’s subway, Moscow’s 

Metro, and Tel Aviv’s buses. In the United States, we have seen the deliberate derailment of a passenger train, chemical attack scares on metro-rail systems, and a 

thwarted plot to carry out suicide bombings on New York’s subways. 

17

Terrorists see public transportation as a killing field: 37 percent of attacks on surface transportation have involved fatalities compared to 20 percent for all terrorist 

incidents, and two-thirds of the attacks clearly have been intended to kill (versus 

37 percent for terrorist attacks overall); 23 percent of the attacks on surface transportation with fatalities involve 10 or more deaths. Attacks on public transportation, 

the circulatory systems of our cities, also cause great disruption and alarm, which 

are the traditional goals of terrorism. 

Security of surface transportation can be significantly improved without disrupting operations or spending vast sums of money. Potential casualties can be reduced both through the design of stations and vehicles and through effective and 

rapid response. 

Disruptions resulting from unnecessary shutdowns can be minimized with technologies and procedures that permit prompt assessment, accurate diagnosis, and 

rapid, well-rehearsed responses. Crisis management is a critical component of security. 

We can apply the ‘‘best practices’’ learned from those systems that have dealt with 

higher levels of threat. This has been the focus of on-going research by the Mineta 

Transportation Institute. (I have provided committee members with advanced copies 

of the executive overview of this project, which catalogues many of the security 

measures.) 

Terrorists have carried out fewer attacks in the maritime environment, although 

they have sabotaged ships and port facilities, especially oil and gas facilities, and 

the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, indicates that this area of operations is not outside 

the terrorists’ field of vision. 

Other components of the critical physical infrastructure including power generation and distribution, oil and natural gas facilities, and water systems must also be 

considered as potential targets. The transport of hazardous materials is another 

area of concern. Power grids and pipelines have been the targets of sabotage in 

guerrilla wars. In the realm of terrorism, however, fewer than two percent of all terrorist attacks can be categorized as traditional sabotage as opposed to purely symbolic attacks and attacks intended to kill, which together account for 82 percent. 

One final thought: Much of the country’s critical infrastructure is protected by private security guards. This industry currently employs more than 2 million persons, 

close to the strength of the United States armed forces at the height of the Cold 

War. We can, on a temporary basis, augment security at critical facilities with police 

and the National Guard. It is not, however, a permanent solution. We should explore ways in which we can better ensure high level performance among private sector guards, and in crisis situations effectively utilize this second line of defense. This 

could be achieved through the certification of those companies involved in protecting 

designated components of the nation’s critical infrastructure and improved professional training.

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you very much. 

Professor Brown? 

STATEMENT OF DONALD E. BROWN, PROFESSOR AND CHAIR, 

DEPARTMENT OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, UNIVERSITY OF 

VIRGINIA, CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Biden, Senator 

Grassley and Senator Schumer. Thank you very much for offering 

me the opportunity to discuss the issues surrounding surface transportation security. 

As each of you have already noted, surface transportation is critical to our Nation’s economy, defense, and quality of life. Few 

Americans spend even one day without enjoying the benefits of our 

open and easily accessed surface transportation system. However, 

there can be little question that currently the surface transportation infrastructure is threatened by the potential of terrorist attack, but we can take steps to address these threats. 

That our surface transportation infrastructure is threatened can 

be seen by a simple three-step analysis: what are the threats, what 

are the vulnerabilities, and what are the impacts? 

18

First, what are the threats? The events of September 11 clearly 

showed that global terrorist groups provide significant threats to 

facilities in the United States. Their willingness to use civilians, including even 4-year-old children and their mothers, as human 

bombs provides chilling evidence of both their lack of morality and 

the seriousness of their intention as they pursue their objectives. 

However, we should not lose sight of the fact that many of the terrorist groups, including those spawned within this country, have 

also targeted the U.S. infrastructure. 

Second, what are the vulnerabilities? While I will not discuss 

specific vulnerabilities in this forum, we need only look at the 

record of accidents, natural disasters and past terrorist incidents 

both here and abroad to recognize that vulnerabilities exist within 

the surface transportation infrastructure. Further, if you talk with 

the people traveling and working in this infrastructure, you gain 

a sense of the perceived vulnerabilities. We need to recognize and 

address these vulnerabilities to ensure the continued growth and 

the use of surface transportation. 

Finally, what are the potential impacts of attacks on the surface 

transportation infrastructure? Again, specifics are best discussed in 

a closed forum, but an objective assessment shows that the inherent decentralized, redundant and distributed nature of much of the 

surface transportation infrastructure makes it robust to many 

forms of attack. Nonetheless, without going into details at this 

time, attacks on this infrastructure can cause both significant loss 

of life and severe economic consequences. 

Given threats, vulnerabilities and impacts, what steps can we 

take to improve security on surface transportation? The answer to 

this question lies in our past record of success in the face of other 

threats. 

We have made great progress in reducing the threats from disease, environmental hazards, natural disasters and accidents. 

Clearly, there is more work that needs to be done in each of these 

areas, but it is difficult to argue that we are not measurably better 

off today than we were 50 years ago. These successes derive from 

government actions that provide safer environments in each area. 

Additionally, many of these successes derive from one of America’s greatest strengths: its research and development community. 

Forged in World II and institutionalized in the post-war years, this 

alliance of industry, government and universities provides the capability for addressing national needs that are second to none. As 

we face this newest threat to our transportation infrastructure, this 

community can be mobilized to help address the needs for greater 

security in the face of multiple threats. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown follows:]

DONALD E. BROWN, PROFESSOR AND CHAIR, DEPARTMENT OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA

Good morning Chairman Biden and Senator Grassley and thank you for offering 

me the opportunity to discuss the issues surrounding surface transportation security. Surface transportation is critical to our Nation’s economy, defense, and quality 

of life. Few Americans spend even one day without enjoying the benefits of our open 

and easily accessed surface transportation systems. However, there can be little 

question that currently the surface transportation infrastructure is threatened by 

the potential of terrorist attacks, but we can take steps to address the threats. 

19

That our surface transportation infrastructure is threatened can be seen by a simple three-step analysis: what are the threats, what are the vulnerabilities, and what 

are the impacts? First, what are the threats? Events of September 11 clearly showed 

that global terrorist groups provide significant threats to facilities in the U.S. Their 

willingness to use civilians, including four year old children and their mothers, as 

human bombs provides chilling evidence of both their lack of morality and the seriousness of their intention as their pursue their objectives. However, we should not 

lose sight of the fact that many other terrorist groups, including those spawned 

within this country have also targeted the U.S. infrastructure. 

Second, what are the vulnerabilities? While I will not discuss specific 

vulnerabilities in this forum, we need only look at the record of accidents, natural 

disasters, and past terrorist incidents, both here and abroad, to recognize that 

vulnerabilities exist within the surface transportation infrastructure. Further, if you 

talk with people traveling and working in this infrastructure you gain a sense of 

the perceived vulnerabilities. We need to recognize and address these vulnerabilities 

to ensure the continued growth and use of surface transportation. 

Finally, what are the potential impacts of attacks on surface transportation? 

Again the specifics are best discussed in closed forum. On the positive side, an objective assessment shows that the inherent decentralized, redundant, and distributed 

nature of much of the surface transportation infrastructure makes it robust to many 

forms of attack. Nonetheless, without going into details at this time, attacks on this 

infrastructure can cause both significant loss of life and severe economic consequences. 

Given these threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts what steps can we take to improve security in surface transportation? The answer to this question lies in our 

past record of success in the face of other threats. We have made great progress in 

reducing the threats from disease, environmental hazards, natural disasters, and accidents. Clearly there is more work needed in each of these areas, but it is difficult 

to argue that we not measurably better off today than we were 50 years ago. These 

successes derive from government actions that provide safer environments in each 

area. Additionally, many of these successes derive from one of America’s greatest 

strengths: its research and development community. Forged in World War II and 

institutionalized in the post war years this alliance of industry, universities, and 

government provides the capabilities for addressing national needs that are second 

to none. As we face this newest threat to our transportation infrastructure, this 

community. Forged in World War II and institutionalized in the post war years this 

alliance of industry, universities, and government provides the capabilities for addressing national needs that are second to none. As we face this newest threat to 

our transportation infrastructure, this community can be mobilized to help address 

the needs for greater security in the face of multiple threats.

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Beatty? 

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY K. BEATTY, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, TOTAL SECURITY SERVICES INTERNATIONAL, MARIETTA, GEORGIA 

Mr. BEATTY. Mr. Chairman, Senators and distinguished guests of 

the Senate, my name is Jeff Beatty, President of Total Security 

Services International, a company that specializes in advising 

transportation systems on preventing terrorism. Thank you for the 

opportunity to be with you today and to share some observations 

and suggestions that might help improve our Nation’s security in 

the transportation sector, specifically in surface and rail transportation. In this open session, I intend to make some very brief general comments, and I will save the details of specific vulnerabilities 

and remedies for the closed session. 

It is the threat that dictates the level of security necessary for 

the transportation sector. We must build our security based on the 

threat’s capability, not on some interpretation of intention. Intentions can change overnight and we can’t change our defenses that 

fast. 

20

The current threat consists of 1 to 50 persons who either directly 

or indirectly can launch a pre-planned attack or attacks that are 

capable of causing mass casualties, destruction of property and severe economic impact, using everything from mechanical weapons 

to firearms to weapons of mass destruction. 

The terrorists have, in fact, at their disposal over 50 different 

types of weapons and special techniques. These attacks may be 

pressed home by persons planning to die in the attack. The attacks 

may have multiple stages, use multiple weapons, and may take 

place at multiple locations. 

Based on that threat, I believe that there is an immediate need 

to conduct an incremental threat exposure and response analysis 

for all places where people transit and travel nationwide. This is 

being undertaken and done by some organizations now, but this 

analysis is not an end in itself. It must be functional and fast. 

This analysis would look beyond the threat of the day, to cover 

over 50 different types of weapons and special techniques. The Federal Government can provide the guidance and some of the tools 

to do this task to the tens of thousands of State and local law enforcement professionals who have a contribution to make in the 

transportation sector. When the locals do the work, you will be improving their capabilities in the war against terrorism. They are a 

hugely untapped resource in this war and we need to get them 

more involved. 

In the meanwhile, I urge you to continue to deploy more security 

than may seem necessary in the transportation sector, especially on 

tunnels, and then adjust as results of the threat exposure and response analysis becomes available. 

In the closed session, I will discuss a form of security that is not 

purely defensive and reactive, but rather is an active defense. 

There are training and equipment requirements that are near-term 

and need to be prioritized as a result of September 11. Much good 

work was underway already. It will need your support and will 

need to become accelerated. There are other technologies that 

frankly have not yet been considered in this sector and they can 

save a significant number of lives in the event of an incident. I 

hope you will support their early adoption, also. 

Public trust is key to the public continuing to use the transportation system. To this end, we must keep the public informed. 

Right now, threat information is shared with the transit companies 

and airlines, but not with passengers. The position that government knows best really does not apply. We learned that on September 11. 

We must consider requiring transportation providers to post on 

a Web page or at some other location the same threat information 

the Government gives those providers, providers such as the MTA 

in New York, WMATA in D.C., the CTA in Chicago, the MBTA in 

Boston, and Delta Airlines in Atlanta. Let the citizens use the 

transportation system under the concept of informed consent. 

There may be some initial reduction in travel, but soon travelers 

will realize for themselves the credibility of the threat information 

posted in this manner and put it into proper perspective. They will 

make informed choices about traveling and the Government will 

21

have demonstrated its openness and fulfilled its responsibility to 

the citizens. 

In conclusion, I must tell you that I am impressed and encouraged by the work our Government is now doing against terrorism. 

Now is the time to be bold and decisive. There is no doubt in my 

mind that we will prevail in this struggle, but what does prevail 

mean? 

This war on terrorism is not like World War II or Desert Storm 

where victory means peace. It is more like the war on crime. You 

can make great progress in the war on crime, but after your 

progress some lower level of crime will still exist. So it is with the 

war on terrorism. We will make great progress, but we must put 

in place the tools to ensure that terror in the future, even in its 

most virulent form, is only an occasional occurrence, with minimum casualties and minimum disruption to our way of life. 

The work of this committee on protecting our transportation sector will go a long way to achieve that success for the American people. I wish you good luck in your mission, and thank you for the 

opportunity to address you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Beatty follows:]

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY K. BEATTY, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, 

TOTAL SECURITY SERVICES INTERNATIONAL, MARIETTA, GEORGIA

Mr. Chairman, Senators, and distinguished guests of the Senate. My name is Jeff 

Beatty and I am President of Total Security Services International, a company that 

specializes in advising transportation systems on preventing terrorism. Thank you 

for the opportunity to be with you today to share some observations and suggestions 

that might help improve our nation’s security in the transportation sector and specifically in surface and rail transportation. In this open session, I intend to make 

some general comments, and I will save the details of specific vulnerabilities and 

remedies I have identified for the closed session. 

The threat dictates the level of security necessary for the transportation sector. 

We must build our security based on the threat’s capability, not on some interpretation of intention. Intentions can change overnight, we can’t change our defenses that 

fast. 

My company, TSSI, utilizes specialized analysis to evaluate terrorist threats to 

public events and transportation systems. Using that analysis, TSSI was able to 

predict a major attack on the United States by the end of 2001 in which the terrorist goal was to create at least 5,000 casualties. We also predicted the breach of 

security at the Atlanta Olympics. TSSI predicted that Atlanta would suffer a successful package bomb attack after the 5‘’’ day and estimated that there would be 

120 casualties. In actuality, there were 112 casualties. TSSI’s assessment of the current threat is detailed but can be summarized as follows: 

The current threat consists of 1-50 persons who either directly or indirectly can 

launch a preplanned attack or attacks that are capable of causing mass casualties, 

great destruction of property and severe economic impact using everything from mechanical weapons to firearms to weapons of mass destruction. The terrorists have 

at their disposal over 50 different types of weapons and special techniques. These 

attacks may be pressed home by persons planning to die in the attack. They attacks 

may have multiple stages, use multiple weapons and may take place at multiple locations. 

Based on that threat, I believe there is an immediate need to conduct Incremental 

Threat, Exposure and Response Analysis for all places where people transit and 

travel nationwide. This is being done by some organizations now. This analysis 

would look beyond the ‘‘Threat of the Day’’ to over 50 different types of weapons 

and special techniques. The Federal Government can provide the guidance and some 

of the tools to do this task, to the tens of thousands of the State and Local Law 

Enforcement professionals who have a contribution to make in the transportation 

sector. When the locals do this work, you will be improving their capabilities in the 

war against terrorism. They are a hugely untapped resource in this war; we need 

to get them more involved. In the meanwhile, I urge you to continue to deploy more 

22

security than seems needed in the transportation sector, especially on tunnels, and 

adjust as results of the Threat Exposure and Response analysis become available. 

There are training and equipment requirements that are near term and need to 

be prioritized, as a result of September 11. Much good work was underway already. 

It will need your support and become accelerated. There are other technologies that 

frankly have not yet been considered in this sector that can save significant numbers of lives in the event of an incident. I hope you will support their early adoption. 

Public trust is key to the public continuing to use the transportation system. To 

this end we must keep the public informed. Right now, threat information is shared 

with the transit companies and airlines, and not with passengers. The position that 

‘‘government knows best’’ does not apply. We learned that on September 11. We 

must consider requiring transportation providers to post on a web page the same 

threat information the government gives those providers such as the MTA in NY, 

WMATA in D.C., the CTA in Chicago, the MBTA in Boston and Delta Airlines in 

Atlanta. Let the citizens use the transportation system under the concept of informed consent. There may be some initial reduction in travel, but soon travelers 

will realize for themselves the credibility of threat information posted in this manner. They will make informed choices about traveling and the government will have 

demonstrated its openness and fulfilled its responsibility to the citizens. 

In conclusion, I must tell you I am impressed and encouraged by the work our 

government is now doing against terrorism. There is no doubt in my mind that we 

will prevail in this struggle. But what does prevail mean? This war on terrorism 

is not like World War II or Desert Storm, where victory meant peace. It is more 

like the war on crime. You can make great progress in the war on crime, but after 

your progress, some lower level of crime will still exist. So it is with the war on 

terrorism. We will make great progress. But we must put in place the tools to ensure that terror in the future, even in its most virulent form, is only an occasional 

occurrence, with minimum casualties and minimum disruption to our way of life. 

The work of this Committee on protecting our transportation sector will go a long 

way to achieve that success for the American people. I wish you good luck in your 

mission and thank you for the opportunity to address you. 

I will save the details of specific transportation vulnerabilities and suggested remedies for the closed session. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Beatty. 

Mr. Chrestman? 

STATEMENT OF TONY CHRESTMAN, PRESIDENT, RUAN 

TRANSPORT, DES MOINES, IOWA 

Mr. CHRESTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Grassley, 

members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to 

present Ruan’s perspective on transportation infrastructure security. 

As a highly diversified transportation company, Ruan is in a 

unique position to address the many security issues currently facing the trucking industry. We are a Des Moines, Iowa-based company with operations throughout the infrastructure. Ruan provides 

for-hire trucking services for a full range of commodities, including 

hazardous materials. Our operations also include dedicated truck 

fleets, logistic services, truck leasing, contract maintenance services, and truck and trailer rentals. 

I want to add that Ruan worked closely with the American 

Trucking Association in preparation for this hearing to make certain that we are able to present the subcommittee with the broadest possible picture of the many challenges the trucking industry 

has had to deal with in the wake of the tragedies that occurred on 

September 11. 

Mr. Chairman, the trucking industry has been working to combat cargo theft and address other security concerns for many decades. As a result of the work that we have done in cooperation with 

various Federal, State and local government agencies, the industry 

23

has made great strides toward ensuring that the cargo and the 

equipment we are responsible for does not fall into the wrong 

hands. 

However, recent events have caused many carriers, including 

Ruan, to reevaluate the adequacy of our safety measures. We have 

certainly made positive changes over the past few weeks, and believe we are using all of the tools at our disposal. However, there 

are several measures that Congress can adopt which would help 

Ruan and other trucking companies to both curtail security threats 

within the trucking industry and help mitigate the impacts of a 

transportation system disruption resulting from a terrorist act. 

Specifically, Congress should take steps to mitigate the impacts 

of a terrorist attack on the highway system: one, facilitate trucking 

companies’ ability to run criminal background checks on employees; 

two, give the enforcement community more and better tools to combat cargo theft; three, direct additional resources toward land border infrastructure to facilitate more efficient trade flows; and, last, 

improve oversight of the commercial driver’s license program. 

I will go into more detail now. As we have witnessed, a disruption to one part of the transportation system can have ripple effects 

that impact the entire system from coast to coast. We also discovered that a severe disruption to the transportation system will generate negative impacts throughout the economy. 

The best way to deal with these disruptions is to build some redundancy into the transportation system. This means ensuring 

that if one bridge or one tunnel goes down, there is enough redundancy in the highway network to ensure the continued flow of commerce. This also means prioritizing Federal investments to make 

certain that the highways that are not critical to our military and 

our economy are adequately funded. 

Of course, it is better to avoid these problems in the first place. 

Motor carriers have various tools at our disposal to ensure that 

trucks and their cargo do not fall into the wrong hands and are not 

used in a terrorist act. We are ready and willing to do more, but 

we need Congress’ help to get there. 

Ruan supports recent proposals by the American Trucking Association to authorize motor carrier access to national crime information databases, thus allowing motor carriers to conduct nationwide 

criminal background checks on current or prospective employees. 

Congress has authorized such access to other industries with employees who have a demonstrated impact on public security or are 

in a position of public trust—banking, credit unions, child care providers, nuclear facility operators, home health care agencies, and 

airport operators. 

While the trucking industry has dealt with cargo theft for many 

decades, hijacked trucks and trailers are no longer simple economic 

losses. They now present a national security threat. Even before 

September 11, ATA proposed cargo theft legislation that would increase the penalties and fines for cargo theft, and require uniform 

reporting on cargo theft and provide increased funding to local, 

State and Federal multi-jurisdictional task forces that have proven 

effective in combatting cargo theft. 

Mr. Chairman, it will come as no surprise that the most vulnerable part of the highway system during times of a national security 

24

crisis is at our border crossings with Canada and Mexico. After the 

terrorist attacks, the Nation’s land borders were put on a Level I 

alert, resulting in extreme border crossing delays and hampering 

the delivery of parts and equipment. 

The Level I alert at our borders continues today. As globalization 

of manufacturing continues to expand, the need for consistently efficient border operations will grow. While we recognize and support 

strong security measures, we also believe that greater investments 

in technology and physical and human infrastructure at the borders will help to alleviate future problems. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, there has been great concern over 

the fact that suspected terrorists were able to obtain commercial 

drivers’ licenses with HAZMAT endorsements. This should be a 

wake-up call to all of us. While we believe the CDL program is very 

effective, it clearly has shown deficiencies particularly with regard 

to CDL testers and examiners. More Federal personnel should be 

dedicated to program evaluation and oversight, and Congress 

should consider directing additional resources to States to improve 

their own oversight processes. 

Finally, we urge Congress to reject any legislation that would 

curtail the use of Social Security numbers as personal identifiers 

on national drivers’ licenses. While there are legitimate concerns 

with Social Security numbers related to identity theft, the inability 

of carriers and States to track drivers due to the loss of Social Security numbers as a personal identifier would compromise both security and highway safety. 

This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I have provided 

much more detail on these recommendations in my written statement. I thank you once more for the opportunity and I am pleased 

to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Chrestman follows:]

STATEMENT OF TONY CHRESTMAN, PRESIDENT, RUAN TRANSPORT, DES MOINES, IOWA

I. INTRODUCTION

Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of this Subcommittee. My name is 

Tony Chrestman, and I am the President of Ruan Transport, the trucking arm of 

Ruan Transportation Management Systems (hereafter referred to as Ruan) based in 

Des Moines, Iowa. I sincerely appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony today 

to this Subcommittee, which I have prepared in conjunction with the trucking industry’s leading trade group, the American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA). 

Ruan is a full service ground transportation company that operates more than 200 

service centers throughout the United States. The range of trucking-related services 

Ruan provides include: common for-hire trucking of all types of commodities including bulk transportation of hazardous materials (hazmat); dedicated truck fleets for 

specific customers; logistics services including complete supply-chain management; 

full-service truck equipment leasing; contract truck maintenance services; and truck 

and trailer rentals. 

Mr. Chairman, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, Ruan and the entire U.S. 

trucking industry have worked diligently to support President Bush’s goals of keeping our country and our economy moving forward. I am very proud of the effort of 

Ruan’s employees throughout the country, and the entire trucking industry’s efforts, 

to keep America moving. In doing so, we at Ruan, along with most companies in 

the industry, have tightened operating security measures. Below, I will provide 

some examples of these increased measures. 

Trucking is a critical component of the United States’ economic strength, with 9 

billion tons of freight transported by inter-city and local trucks, representing 68% 

of the total domestic tonnage shipped. The trucking industry generates revenues of 

$606 billion annually, equaling almost 5% of our Gross Domestic Product, and a figVerDate Feb 1 2002 14:37 Aug 14, 2002 Jkt 081246 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\81246.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
25

ure that represents nearly 87% of all revenues generated by our nation’s freight 

transportation industry. Our nation’s transportation infrastructure, in particular the 

highway system, provides the opportunity for the trucking industry to play such a 

large and important role in the U.S. economy. Preservation of and improvement to 

the existing infrastructure will help to ensure a strong and vibrant economy both 

now and in the future. 

As in all businesses and all sectors of our country’s economy, the horrific attacks 

have heightened security concerns in the trucking industry, and even more so after 

it was recently reported by the FBI that some suspected terrorists had obtained 

commercial driver’s licenses (CDLs) to operate large trucks. It appears that motor 

carriers involved in transporting hazardous materials (hazmat) may have been, or 

may be, targeted for hijackings or theft for use in potential acts of terrorism. In fact, 

just late last week the FBI issued a warning that it is very possible that a new terrorist attack on U.S. soil very likely could involve truck bombs. Obviously, this is 

a major concern to Ruan and the entire trucking industry. I commend you for holding this hearing today to identify ways to address these very real threats which may 

be aimed at our transportation infrastructure. 

In this testimony, I will communicate the trucking industry’s longstanding involvement in transportation security issues, and provide examples of increased security measures the industry has taken since September 11. I will also provide some 

background information on the transportation of hazmat, since much of the trucking-related concern stems from the fact that suspected terrorists recently obtained 

commercial driver’s licenses (CDLs) to transport hazmat by truck. I will also recommend several potential legislative actions that that would improve our infrastructure, and that would assist Ruan, and hundreds of thousands of other trucking companies, enhance driver, vehicle and cargo security in the industry. 

II. THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY’S INVOLVEMENT IN TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND

RELATED ISSUES

SECURITY

Ruan and its fellow ATA members have long been actively involved in providing 

safe and secure transportation of goods on behalf of customers and their consumers. 

Since 1982, ATA has maintained a Council of members, like Ruan, dedicated to advancing security and loss prevention issues. The name of this organization has undergone numerous changes since its inception, and today is known as the Safety & 

Loss Prevention Management Council (Safety Council). The Safety Council has numerous committees, but two in particular focus on security issues—the Security 

Committee and the Claims and Loss Prevention Committee. These Committees have 

addressed many trucking security issues, including driver and vehicle security, 

cargo security, and facility security. The Committees consist of security directors, 

many of whom are former law enforcement personnel, from a broad array of America’s leading motor carriers. The Committees publish guidelines and educational materials to assist motor carriers enhance the security of their operations. 

INCREASED SECURITY MEASURES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11

Ruan and other trucking companies throughout the trucking industry took a number of measures to increase the security of operations immediately following the attacks. Some carriers have re-evaluated their overall security procedures for pick-up 

and delivery, for their service locations, terminals and loading-dock facilities, for dispatch operations to vehicles in cities and on the road. In addition to requesting personnel to be extremely alert and to report any suspicious activity to law enforcement 

personnel, other examples of actions taken include:

• Initiating new background checks through systems available to motor 

carriers; 

• Designating specific drivers for specific types of loads (particularly 

hazmat loads) and studying the specific routes to be used; 

• Instructing drivers not to stop or render assistance except in the case of 

a clear emergency, and alerting drivers of possible ploys to obtain vehicles 

for hijacking purposes; 

• Emphasizing to all trucking company employees, not only drivers, to stay 

alert and remain aware of their surroundings at all times, especially when 

transporting hazmat; 

• Advising drivers transporting hazmat to, whenever possible, avoid highly 

populated areas, and use alternate routes if feasible to avoid such areas. 

• Verifying seal integrity at each and every stop. Notifying central dispatch 

immediately if the seal is compromised. 

26

1Department Wide Program Evaluation of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Programs, 

Executive Summary, U. S. Department of Transportation, March 2000, p. v. 

• Advising drivers to notify supervisors/managers of any suspicious shipments, and if deemed necessary, to contact local police or law enforcement 

authorities to request inspection of shipment under safe practices.

These are just a few of the measures that Ruan and many other trucking companies around the country took to enhance their operational security. Now, I will turn 

to some additional information concerning the transportation of hazmat, since much 

of the security concern involving the trucking industry stems for suspected terrorists 

obtaining licenses to operate hazmat trucks. 

III. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION

Transportation of hazmat is highly regulated by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). In addition to the requirements in the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs), the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) contain certain rules for transportation of hazardous materials. For instance, drivers of trucks 

requiring hazmat warning placards need a CDL with a hazmat endorsement. If, the 

hazmat is transported in a tank truck, then the driver also needs a tank endorsement on the CDL to show proficiency in its operation. To obtain these endorsements, 

drivers must pass additional exams administered by the state licensing agency. The 

HMRs also require ‘‘hazmat employees,’’ including drivers, to receive periodic training in hazmat awareness and safety and in any specific function that the employee 

performs. Also, the FMCSRs specifically deal with driving and parking of trucks 

that contain certain hazmat, and highway routing requirements for both Highway 

Route Controlled Quantities (HRCQ of Radioactive Materials (RAM) and non-HRCQ 

RAM. 

Hazardous materials are an integral part of American life and are used in the 

manufacture of everything from automobiles to soap. They include ordinary household items such as bleach and fingernail polish remover, swimming pool chemicals, 

and lawn and garden fertilizers and insecticides. Welding supplies, paint and varnishes, and gasoline are commonplace. Radiopharmaceuticals are included, as are 

very highly regulated chemicals such as chlorine gas for water purification, sulfur 

trioxide for the making of soap products, and, of course, radioactive spent nuclear 

fuels. 

Hazmat is transported in many forms of conveyance ranging from ocean-going supertankers to handyman vans. By highway, hazmat is transported in tank trucks, 

on flatbeds, and inside van-type trailers. These materials are packaged in drums, 

boxes, bags, portable tanks, cargo tanks, and in a variety of other ways. These packages are clearly marked and labeled, and the transport vehicles display product 

markings and hazard class placards in order to warn emergency responders of their 

contents. Drivers carry shipping papers and emergency response information that 

clearly identifies the hazmat on board their vehicle and provides emergency responders with immediate response information. 

Annually in the U.S., there are at least 300 million hazmat shipments totaling 

approximately 3.2 billion tons.1 The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Office of 

Hazardous Materials Safety estimates the number of hazmat shipments in the U.S. 

at more than 800,000 per day—94% of these shipments are carried by truck. Approximately 500,000 daily shipments involve chemical and allied products; about 

300,000 involve petroleum products; and at least 10,000 other shipments involve 

waste hazmat, medical wastes and various other hazardous materials. Shipments 

are defined as equivalent to deliveries, and in most instances may be distinguished 

from the number of movements, trip segments, or other measures. The estimated 

number of movements associated with these shipments exceeds 1.2 million per day. 

As previously mentioned, all hazmat is highly regulated; however, certain materials demand an even higher level of oversight. For instance, high-level nuclear 

wastes from power plants are closely monitored by several federal agencies, including the Department of Energy (DOE) and DOT. Transportation of radioactive materials is highly regulated, and trucking companies involved in its movement are prescreened and approved by DOE. And, each truck is inspected prior to transporting 

a specific shipment of nuclear waste. In fact, the trucking industry played an integral role in the development of the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance’s Level VI 

enhanced radioactive transporter inspection criteria, which specifically is designed 

to afford a high level of driver, vehicle, and load scrutiny prior to the truck leaving 

the shipper’s facility. 

Type and condition of the transportation infrastructure affect hazmat risks. For 

example, two-lane rural roads typically have much higher accident rates than diVerDate Feb 1 2002 14:37 Aug 14, 2002 Jkt 081246 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\81246.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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2 Hazardous Materials Shipments, Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, Research and Special 

Programs Administration, October 1998, p. 10

vided, multi-lane interstate highways. And similarly, interstate highway segments 

with narrow shoulders and damaged pavement are generally more risky than interstate segments without these problems. One way of dealing with infrastructure concerns is through highway routing of hazmat. Motor carrier and state requirements 

for the transportation of HRCQ RAM are very detailed in the FMCSRs, while the 

DOT gives more flexibility to the states on their non-HRCQ routing provisions. 

Another step that a number of states have taken to ensure the safety of their citizens, is to implement hazmat and/or hazardous waste transportation permit and 

registration programs. These programs primarily are designed to monitor the movement of hazmat into, out of, and through their jurisdictions. They also are designed 

to fund hazmat incident emergency response training and to allow states to closely 

scrutinize trucking companies involved in the transportation of hazmat through audits of the applicants. In addition, approximately 37,000 trucking companies are 

registered in the DOT’s Hazardous Materials Registration Program that provides 

funds for grants distributed to states and Indian tribes through the Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness Grants Program. 

Hopefully, with this as background, it is plain to see that the transportation of 

hazmat is highly regulated, as it should be. These controls have resulted in a very 

safe and secure system. Additionally, the Subcommittee may be interested to know 

that, according to DOT, the 800,000 daily shipments in transportation are generally 

safer and more secure today than the 500,000 daily shipments were when they 

moved in transportation during the 1980s.2 However, these shipments can be made 

even safer and more secure in the future by expanding and improving our highway 

infrastructure, and through the adoption of the additional proposals outlined below. 

IV. LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES TO INCREASE SECURITY IN TRUCKING

Mr. Chairman, this hearing is both timely and necessary. We need to re-examine 

the security of our nation’s infrastructure, and we should take the reasonably available steps to ensure the infrastructure will be there to allow companies like mine 

to deliver goods to America’s consumers and manufacturers in a timely, efficient 

manner. I would now like to suggest some specific legislative actions that would 

help ensure America’s motor carriers’ ability to continue to supply America’s eco- nomic engine. 

INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS

While much attention has appropriately been directed toward aviation security, 

if additional terrorist attacks occur in the U.S., the surface transportation system 

is a more likely target, based on past history. Fifty-eight percent of terrorist attacks 

worldwide are directed at transportation systems. Of these attacks, the surface 

transportation system is targeted 92 percent of the time. Undoubtedly, it is an enormous challenge to safeguard 3.8 million miles of highway, nearly 600,000 highway 

bridges, and some 400 highway tunnels throughout the U.S. However, steps can be 

taken to protect the most vulnerable of these assets, such as tunnels and major 

bridges. Ruan and the trucking industry support reasonable measures to protect 

these assets. It must be recognized, however, that any disruptions to truck travel, 

whether as a result of a terrorist attack or restrictions placed on truck travel to prevent such attacks, have economic consequences that will ultimately spread throughout the national economy. Furthermore, because of the military’s heavy reliance on 

truck transportation, any interruption to our industry also affects the military’s ability to move troops and equipment. As the interdependence of the transportation 

system grows, and as more manufacturers adopt time-definite delivery strategies, 

the potential impacts of surface transportation system disruptions will increase. 

We believe that long-term measures should be taken to mitigate these potential 

impacts. As we have learned from natural disasters, the key to minimizing transportation disruptions is system redundancy. In the wake of a major earthquake that 

shut down several major highways, San Francisco residents were able to adjust 

their travel patterns relatively quickly due to the availability of other modes of 

transportation and an extensive highway system. On the other side of the coin, the 

closure of Route 93 over the Hoover Dam to trucks in the wake of the September 

11 attacks has forced truckers in the Las Vegas area to take long detours. The closest crossing point to the Hoover Dam is nearly 70 miles away. This is an example 

of a lack of redundancy in the highway system, which is repeated throughout the 

nation. Fortunately, an alternative crossing near the Hoover Dam is being planned, 

but completion is not expected for several more years. Where alternate routes to 

28

vulnerable bridges and tunnels are being considered, or are under construction, the 

trucking industry recommends that these projects be accelerated through additional 

funding and the expedited approval of environmental reviews. 

In addition, Congress should reassess the continuing trend toward a federal transportation program that fails to prioritize spending on the National Highway System 

(NHS). The NHS, which includes the Interstate Highway System and other principal highways, carries 75 percent of the nation’s truck traffic. It serves 53 land borders and 242 military installations. Despite the obvious commercial and military importance of the NHS, one-third of the system is in poor or mediocre condition, and 

one-quarter of NHS bridges are deficient. Furthermore, the lack of system capacity 

expansion over the past three decades has led to severe congestion on a large part 

of this system. The NHS is the backbone of the commercial and military transportation infrastructure, and its many deficiencies will compound any system interruptions that occur as the result of a terrorist attack. The trucking industry recommends that Congress should direct additional funds to the NHS and other highways of national significance. 

CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS

While trucking companies do not possess any authority over our nation’s highways, there are certain actions motor carriers can take to play a role in safeguarding the roads, bridges and tunnels essential to our doing our job. One measure 

to help prevent evildoers from using trucks to purposely harm transportation infrastructure is to conduct criminal background checks. We at Ruan currently review 

each driver’s employment history, and we attempt to conduct criminal background 

checks on drivers. However, our ability to conduct the criminal background checks 

is limited to a slow, costly and cumbersome county-by-county search. All in the industry agree that a nationwide check under the present scheme is simply not feasible. While Ruan and its fellow ATA members did not envision the evil wrought 

on September 11 when the ATA Board of Directors in 1999 directed the ATA staff 

to pursue cargo theft deterrence legislation that would enable motor carriers to obtain criminal background information on all current and prospective employees, 

such legislation would be an effective step in addressing the threats we now know 

await—both to our people and our transportation infrastructure. 

The possibility of a truck being used as a weapon of mass destruction, while unthinkable before, is now a reality. Numerous other industries with employees who 

have a demonstrated impact on public security or are in a position of public trust 

have been authorized by statute to access national crime information databases to 

search criminal history records corresponding to fingerprints or other identification 

information. The list includes federally chartered banks and credit unions through 

the American Bankers Association, child care providers, nuclear facility operators, 

nursing facilities, home health care agencies, and airports. Motor carriers are a glaring omission. 

A scenario in which a truck driver or motor carrier warehouseman could wreak 

a similar level of destruction to a major freight corridor as the September 11 perpetrators wrought through air transport means is no longer hard to imagine. Yet, 

although ATA has sought authorization from Congress to allow motor carriers to 

conduct criminal background checks of employees and potential employees, the 

trucking industry remains without this basic tool. Ruan fully supports ATA’s efforts 

on behalf of the trucking industry, and I know that ATA stands willing to work with 

this Congress to enact legislation that would enable motor carriers to access national crime information databases to conduct nationwide criminal background 

checks. I truly hope that this Subcommittee and the full Committee will enact such 

legislation and thus allow motor carriers to assist with the security of our nation. 

Moreover, the recent events have highlighted the need to enhance communications between the various federal databases. Ruan supports federal efforts to enhance interoperability and communications between various federal criminal history 

and immigration databases, which would assist in screening out potential threats. 

There is some consideration being given in the Congress to have state licensing 

agencies check criminal history and other relevant databases prior to issuing CDLs 

to truck drivers. Ruan and its fellow members of ATA would support such requirements provided motor carriers still had the opportunity to conduct criminal background checks at the time of employment. 

CARGO THEFT

I would like to now discuss another issue that falls within the full Committee’s 

jurisdiction—cargo theft. Hijacked trucks and trailers are no longer simply economic 

losses; now, they may be direct threats to our security. What was once an issue of 

29

great importance to the trucking industry before September 11 should now be an 

issue of concern for this Subcommittee. 

It is no secret that cargo theft losses in our country have a severe economic impact on the trucking industry, the shipping public, businesses of all sizes and on 

consumers. The losses being suffered by our industry from pilferage, theft and hijackings continue to be substantial, with figures ranging from $10 billion to $12 billion annually. Therefore, for a number of years the trucking industry has looked for 

various means to reduce and control the losses caused by such illegal acts. Ruan 

has implemented many security measures to combat cargo theft, but without some 

fundamental changes in the law, these measures cannot be fully successful. 

The lax penalties associated with, and insufficient resources devoted to, cargo 

theft have made it increasingly appealing to criminal elements as a source of funding. Further, some of the goods carried on behalf of America’s producers and manufacturers may be diverted for sinister purposes. Therefore, Ruan respectfully requests that this Congress enact much-needed cargo theft deterrence legislation, as 

proposed by ATA. In addition to allowing motor carriers to conduct criminal background checks, ATA’s legislative proposal would: 1) increase the criminal penalties 

and fines for cargo theft; 2) require uniform statistical reporting on cargo theft; and 

3) provide increased funding local, state, and federal multi-jurisdictional task forces 

that have proven effective in combating cargo theft. Further, in view of the possible 

threat posed to the public by stolen commercial motor vehicles, any cargo theft legislation should establish a mechanism within DOT to allow for immediate, aroundthe-clock reporting of the theft. DOT should establish a toll-free hotline to receive 

reports from motor carriers of commercial vehicle thefts and then disseminate that 

information to federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel nationwide on a 

timely basis. Today, no such mechanism exists. 

Now, I would like to turn your attention to two other specific areas in which the 

trucking industry plays crucial roles: international cargo movements, and commercial driver’s licenses. 

BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE FOR INTERNATIONAL CARGO MOVEMENTS

As the members of this Subcommittee are probably aware, on September 11, ports 

of entry at our international land borders were put on Level 1 alert, resulting in 

extreme border crossing delays on, and severely hampering delivery of, parts and 

equipment for just-in-time deliveries at manufacturing operations. Ruan and its fellow members of ATA would also ask the Subcommittee to look at technologies under 

development that can facilitate enforcement efforts while at the same time expedite 

the movement of cargo across our borders. One such system being designed presently by U.S. Customs is the International Trade Data System (ITDS). The ITDS 

concept is simple: Traders and carriers submit commercially based, standard electronic data records through a single federal gateway for the import or export of 

goods. As a single information gateway, ITDS distributes these records to the affected federal trade agencies, such as U.S. Customs, INS, and the DOT, for their 

selectivity and risk assessment. 

I would urge the subcommittee to look at infrastructure needs of our ports of 

entry, in conjunction with other Senate Committees and Subcommittees with oversight of border agencies, to establish appropriate levels of human resources in addition to investments in technology infrastructure, such as the ITDS. Both Canada 

and Mexico, our largest and second largest trading partners respectively, play a critical role in our economic wellbeing through our economic interdependence. We cannot overlook the critical link that motor carriers play in the success of our increasing trade flows within North America. Therefore, we must continue to find solutions 

that will continue to allow us to move the legal commodity flows among our three 

nations, while at the same time improve our security relationships between the 

trade community and law enforcement agencies at our borders. 

COMMERCIAL DRIVER’S LICENSE ISSUES

With the full support of the trucking industry, the U.S. Congress, DOT and the 

states have been instrumental in establishing a generally successful CDL program. 

However, the fact that suspected terrorists have illegally obtained CDLs with hazardous materials endorsements should be a wake up call for all of us. 

While the federal and state governments have done a good job putting the regulations, programs, and information systems in place to administer the program, the 

level of effort to actively monitor and oversee the personnel charged with administering the program has not been sufficient. The suspected terrorists illegally obtaining CDLs, and the number of recent CDL related scandals in several states, is 

evidence that more oversight is needed, particularly as it relates to CDL testers and 

30

examiners. More federal personnel should be dedicated to program evaluation and 

oversight, possibly including dedicated federal CDL program personnel in each 

state. The states licensing agencies should also consider increasing their program 

oversight staffs, to work in greater cooperation with federal CDL oversight personnel. Congress should consider authorizing additional DOT positions for this function, and should also consider establishing a dedicated (and state matching) CDL 

grant program to provide additional financial assistance to states for greater program oversight. 

An additional and more specific security-related issue concerning the CDL program is the collection and use of a driver’s Social Security Number (SSN) by state 

licensing agencies. As part of the federally-required and state administered CDL 

program, state licensing agencies are required by DOT to collect SSNs on the CDL 

application. And, many states use the driver’s SSN as the driver’s state license 

number on the CDL document. The SSN is one of several ways that states uniquely 

identify truck drivers, which is an important aspect of the CDL program. With identity theft apparently playing a role in the recent attacks, the industry, the states 

and the federal government must consider ways to safeguard and even enhance personal identification methods. Clearly, however, we should not make it more difficult 

for the industry and the states to track the identities of truck drivers—which is 

what would occur if recently sponsored legislation on SSNs was passed by the Congress. Ruan knows that ATA stands ready to work with DOT and the Congress to 

enhance truck driver identifiers, and calls upon Members of Congress to reject legislation that would do away with SSNs as personal identifiers on driver licenses. 

V. CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, Ruan and its fellow ATA members understand we are entrusted 

with the secure transportation of goods that keep America moving forward. Law enforcement has frequently been a strong ally in the industry’s longstanding efforts 

to ensure the security of cargo, on America’s highways and across our international 

borders. We look forward to continued cooperation with those authorities charged 

with securing our nation against future terrorist threats. I know that ATA understands the role trucking must play to ensure our national security in this newly 

changed landscape. Ruan and the trucking industry ask that Congress consider the 

proposals discussed above which will allow the trucking industry to better fulfill its 

role to safely and securely transport our nation’s freight.

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you very much. 

I would like to thank each of the witnesses for their opening 

statements. 

As I mentioned at the outset, we are now going to go into a 

closed session. Such an act requires a motion, a second, and a recorded vote, with a majority of the members of the subcommittee 

voting in favor. The reason for my motion is that the testimony we 

will be hearing will disclose matters necessary to be kept secret in 

the interest of national defense or confidential conduct of the foreign relations of the United States, as set forth in Rule XXVI, section (b((5)(1). 

I therefore move that we go into closed session. Is there a second? 

Senator GRASSLEY. I second it. 

Chairman BIDEN. Obviously, we are all in favor, since there are 

only two of us here, and the clerk will record the aye votes of Senator Biden and Senator Grassley. 

I am told we need a roll call of the full subcommittee. Proxies 

are appropriate. The clerk will call the roll. 

The CLERK. Mr. Kohl? 

Chairman BIDEN. Aye, by proxy. 

The CLERK. Mrs. Feinstein? 

Chairman BIDEN. Aye, by proxy. 

The CLERK. Mr. Durbin? 

Chairman BIDEN. Aye, by proxy. 

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The CLERK. Ms. Cantwell? 

Chairman BIDEN. Aye, by proxy. 

The CLERK. Mr. Grassley? 

Senator GRASSLEY. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hatch? 

Senator GRASSLEY. We don’t have a proxy. 

The CLERK. Mr. Sessions? 

Senator GRASSLEY. Aye, by proxy. 

The CLERK. Mr. Brownback? 

Senator GRASSLEY. Aye, by proxy. 

The CLERK. Mr. McConnell? 

Senator GRASSLEY. Aye, by proxy. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman BIDEN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, the votes are 9 yeas, no nays, and 

one pass. 

Chairman BIDEN. We are now in closed session. I ask the staff, 

is everyone in here associated with the witnesses? If not, would the 

staff clear the room? 

[Whereupon, at 11:38, the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene immediately in closed session.]

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