United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

September 1995 COMBAT

IDENTIFICATION

SYSTEMS

Changes Needed in

Management Plans and

Structure

GAO/NSIAD-95-153

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-260443 

September 14, 1995

Congressional Committees

The military services are pursuing a number of solutions that should help

reduce the occurrence of friendly fire incidents. One class of systems

being pursued under Army and Navy led efforts are cooperative

identification of friend or foe (IFF) question and answer (Q&A) systems.

Because the services are approaching major decision points in the

acquisition process for these systems, we reviewed their management

plans and structures for cooperative IFF Q&A systems development and

integration. We conducted this review under our basic legislative

responsibilities and are addressing this report to you because we believe it

will be of interest to your committees.

Results in Brief The Army and the Navy have been pursuing cooperative IFF Q&A systems to

help combat the problem of fratricide without having developed a

cohesive management plan and structure. These systems could cost more

than $4 billion. Currently, responsibility for the development of these

systems is divided between the Army and the Navy. The two services have

been pursuing systems based on different technologies without fully

considering how and at what cost those systems will be integrated. For

example, the Navy has developed a cost and operational effectiveness

analysis (COEA) for air-to-air and ground-to-air systems, while the Army is

just beginning to develop a COEA that will help determine what

ground-to-ground and air-to-ground system(s) to pursue. The development

of separate COEAs risks the development and procurement of systems that

cannot be integrated, or at least cost effectively integrated, and may result

in having to field two or more cooperative IFF Q&A systems on the same

equipment. Moreover, it should be noted that a cooperative IFF Q&A system

only enables the identification of friends having compatible and operating

cooperative IFF Q&A systems.

In our prior report1

 on combat identification, we noted that the Army

planned to begin production of its near-term millimeter wave cooperative

identification system without an analysis of whether the system could be

integrated into the mid- and long-term solution(s). At that time, we

recommended that the Army not begin production of the near-term system

until it had determined that the system could be integrated into the mid1

Minimizing Friendly Fire: The Army Should Consider Long-Term Solution in Its Procurement Decision

on Near-Term Needs (GAO/NSIAD-94-19, October 22, 1993).

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and long-term solution(s). The Department of Defense (DOD) agreed that

the integration of the near-term battlefield combat identification system

into the long-term approach is an important consideration in deciding on

the production of the near-term system. However, we recently learned that

the Army plans to acquire more near-term systems than needed for a

demonstration that is to be the basis for the near-term system production

decision without the analysis recommended in our prior report. The Army

plans to acquire an additional 115 near-term systems at a cost of about

$23.4 million. Army officials informed us that only 45 of the additional 

115 systems are required for them to accomplish their goals for that

demonstration.

DOD and the Army are concerned about the affordability and

cost-effectiveness of the near-term system, and it may never be fully

fielded for these reasons. The Army’s plan to acquire more near-term

systems than necessary to reach a production decision and without a

determination of whether the near-term system can be cost effectively

integrated into the mid- and long-term solution(s) or whether they will be

affordable for large-scale fielding risks wasting millions of dollars on a

system that may never be procured.

Background The friendly fire casualties and equipment losses suffered during

Operation Desert Storm reilluminated an old problem, fratricide, and

underscored the need for more effective means of identifying friendly and

hostile forces, and neutrals and noncombatants on the battlefield (i.e.,

combat identification). Studies and incidents subsequent to Operation

Desert Storm, such as the friendly forces shootdown of two Blackhawk

helicopters over Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort, have reiterated

the need for improved combat identification.

Combat identification has been defined as “the means to positively identify

friendly, hostile and neutral platforms in order to reduce fratricide due to

mis-identification and to maximize the effective use of weapon systems.”

The services are pursuing a number of solutions2

 to provide combat

identification. They believe the solution will involve a “system of systems,”

one component of which will be cooperative IFF Q&A systems.

2

The services are pursuing both materiel and nonmateriel solutions to help prevent fratricide. The

materiel solutions include cooperative and noncooperative target identification systems of various

types and systems to provide knowledge of the location of friendly, enemy, and neutral forces. The

nonmateriel solutions include changes in training, tactics, techniques, and procedures. The services’

cooperative IFF Q&A development efforts are, thus, a small part of a larger effort to combat the

problem of fratricide.

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In March 1992, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved a

mission need statement for combat identification. That mission need

statement requires positive, timely, and reliable identification of hostiles,

friendlies, and neutrals; classification of foes by platform, class/type, and

nationality; interoperability between services;3

 and interoperability with

minimum civil air traffic control system requirements.4

 It states that the

primary constraint is affordability.

A cooperative IFF Q&A identification is accomplished when a

shooter/observer queries a target and the target answers with a reply

identifying itself as a friend. A Defense Acquisition Board review

conducted on August 14, 1992, and subsequent approval from the Under

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, gave (1) the Army the lead in

battlefield combat identification (BCI) efforts, including cooperative

systems for ground-to-ground and air-to-ground identification, and (2) the

Navy the lead for air-to-air and ground-to-air cooperative identification

systems. The Navy was charged with coordinating these efforts. Figures 1

and 2 depict the current breakdown of responsibility for cooperative IFF

Q&A systems development.

3

Interoperability with allies is not a requirement but is desired.

4

The United States and Europe are moving to adopt a new civil air traffic control signal, Mode S. The

services’ current Mark XII IFF systems do not have Mode S capability. Since military aircraft must

operate in civilian controlled airspace, the military will have to adopt some Mode S capability or face

restricted airspace in peace time.

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B-260443 

Figure 1: Army Area of Responsibility for Cooperative IFF Q&A Development

Query

Query

Answer

Answer

Ground-to-Ground

Air-to-Ground

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
B-260443 

Figure 2: Navy Area of Responsibility for Cooperative IFF Q&A Development

Query

Query

Answer

Answer

Ground-to-Air

Air-to-Air

Army’s Efforts To enhance force warfighting capability and minimize fratricide in the

future, the Army has been pursuing a BCI5

 program to improve situational

awareness and provide immediate, positive target identification. In 1991,

the Army started implementing a five-phased program to develop and field

battlefield identification techniques through fiscal year 2000. The Army is

actively into the third phase6

 of the program, the near-term phase, whose

objective is to integrate a battlefield combat identification system (BCIS)

into selected ground vehicles and helicopters. A millimeter wave

5

The Army determined that the term “combat identification” would encompass all antifratricide

measures and would address situational awareness and immediate, positive combat target

identification capabilities. Situational awareness is knowledge of the tactical environment, that is,

knowledge of where friendly, enemy, and neutral forces are located. Combat identification is a subset

of and complement to situational awareness. Each can enhance the effectiveness of the other, and

both contribute to avoiding fratricide and improving combat effectiveness.

6

The first two phases of the Army’s BCI program were (1) quick fix and (2) quick-fix plus. The quick-fix

phase included the development and production of various infrared identification systems. The

quick-fix plus phase includes the development and production of positive navigation systems and the

integration of global positioning systems to enhance situational awareness as well as further

developments in thermal identification systems.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
B-260443 

cooperative IFF Q&A system was selected for BCIS as the near-term

technology.

The near-term cooperative IFF Q&A system is currently in engineering and

manufacturing development (EMD). The Army is acquiring 45 EMD models

and is planning to acquire another 115 in fiscal year 1996 to be

demonstrated during the fiscal year 1997 digitized brigade experiment

known as Task Force XXI. The Army currently estimates the cost of

providing the near-term BCIS to 6,400 selected platforms of Force 

Package I7

 at between $250 million and $300 million. The ultimate cost of

BCIS would be substantially higher if all Army divisions were to be

equipped.

The Army is just beginning the mid- and long-term phases of its BCI efforts

with the development of a COEA to identify affordable and promising

alternatives. The objectives of the mid- and long-term phases are to

integrate situational awareness and target identification and to have an

automated correlation and display of situational awareness and target

identification information. The mid- and long-term cooperative IFF Q&A

system may be different than the near-term technology.

Navy’s Efforts As the lead for cooperative aircraft identification development, the Navy

has been working on its Cooperative Aircraft Identification (CAI) effort to

address deficiencies in the currently used aircraft identification system,

Mark XII. The CAI effort is to provide a system to replace or upgrade the

Mark XII system for use in air-to-air and ground-to-air identification. Navy

officials have estimated that a Mark XII follow-on system could cost more

than $3.5 billion.

In addition to providing reliable, secure identification of friends, any Mark

XII follow-on system will have to ensure future civil aviation air traffic

control compatibility. Mode S is a civil aviation air traffic control

capability started by the United States and now planned for international

use. Eurocontrol, the European aviation authority, has mandated Mode S

usage by January 1, 1999. Mark XII transponders, however, do not

currently incorporate Mode S. Without this capability, U.S. military aircraft

may face delays in the use of civil airspace or may even be excluded from

certain regions during peacetime.

7

Force Package I contains 5-1/3 divisions. The Army currently has a total of 12 active divisions. There

are an additional eight National Guard divisions. Current plans are for the Army to reduce to 10 active

and 5 National Guard divisions by fiscal year 1999.

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In June 1994, the Naval Research Laboratory completed and published a

draft COEA for the CAI effort. That COEA was not approved because some

Navy officials believe it did not consider subsequently proposed

alternatives that should be considered. Additionally, the Navy provided

only about half of the funding required for fiscal years 1996 and 1997 to

accomplish a 1997 scheduled decision on whether to move the CAI effort

forward to the next phase of the acquisition process—demonstration and

validation.

Cohesive Management

Plan and Structure

Needed

The services’ current management plan and structure for cooperative IFF

Q&A systems, which reflect the division of responsibility between the Army

and the Navy, lack needed cohesiveness. While the Army and the Navy

have worked to coordinate their efforts, the separation of responsibility

between the two services may result in the selection of suboptimal

solutions, unnecessary program delays, and the acquisition of systems that

may not be interoperable across the services.

The services defined the management structure for their efforts to combat

fratricide in a December 1992 memorandum of agreement on combat

identification. In its capacity as lead for the services’ cooperative IFF Q&A

systems development, the Navy led the development of the management

section of DOD’s September 1993 Joint Master Plan for Cooperative Aircraft

and Battlefield Combat Identification. The plan provides a management

approach that is intended to coordinate cooperative identification

requirements development and management mechanisms to ensure

development, procurement, and integration of interoperable surface and

air identification systems.

As shown in figure 3, the management structure identified in the plan uses

the organizations defined in the services’ memorandum of agreement on

combat identification.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
B-260443 

Figure 3: Current Cooperative IFF Q&A Development Management Structure

USD(A)


[C3I SC/ASD (C3I)]

Joint Requirements


Oversight Council

Navy SAE

SAE Council

Army SAE GOSC-CID

JCIDO

Joint SAG


(Army, Navy, AF, USMC)

Acquisition Requirements Development

PEO


NAVAIR


AIR-01

PEO


IEW

Services


&


CINCs

(Navy)


PM CAI

(Army)


PM-CI

CAI/BCI’s Management

Key:


ASD- Assistant Secretary of Defense


BCI- Battlefield Combat Identification


CAI- Cooperative Aircraft Identification


C3I- Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence


CINC- Commander-in-Chief


GOSC-CID- General Officers' Steering 


 Committee for Combat Identification


IEW- Intelligence & Electronic Warfare


JCIDO- Joint Combat Identification Office


NAVAIR- Naval Air Systems Command

PEO- Program Executive Officer


PM- Program Manager


PM-CI- Project Manager-Combat Identification


SAE- Service Acquisition Executive


SAG- Senior Advisory Group


USD(A)- Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition)

Source: DOD.

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The principal coordinating bodies identified in the plan are the General

Officers’ Steering Committee for Combat Identification, the Joint Combat

Identification Office, the Service Acquisition Executive Council, and the

Senior Advisory Group. The General Officers’ Steering Committee for

Combat Identification provides senior level review and coordination of all

Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps combat identification

requirements, development and procurement efforts, product

improvements, and related technologies. The Joint Combat Identification

Office provides action officer level coordination and functions as the

primary information center for all combat identification issues, programs,

requirements, and technologies. The Senior Acquisition Executive Council

was established to provide the highest level of service coordination, while

the Senior Advisory Group is to provide program manager level

coordination.

Suboptimal Solutions,

Delays, and

Interoperability Risked

The separation of responsibility for the development of cooperative IFF

Q&A systems between the Army and the Navy is not conducive to looking

for and finding common technological solutions. For example, a DOD

official informed us that a North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally has

demonstrated a laser interrogation and D-band8

 response system for

ground-to-ground identification. Since the Mark XII system operates in the

D-band,9

 the adoption of a D-band ground-to-ground system, if feasible,

could be a cost-effective solution providing interoperability among the

services. The Army, however, has not considered that D-band system or

one like it for ground-to-ground identification.

Even absent the identification of a common technology, the current

management plan and structure have allowed the services to pursue

systems without fully considering how and if those systems can cost

effectively be made interoperable. For example, the Navy’s COEA could not

fully consider the equipment that would be needed to unify the Army’s

mid- and long-term approach with the Navy’s CAI system because that

approach has not been defined. Since a Mark XII follow-on wave form has

not been identified for CAI, the Army will have similar difficulties.

While the Army and the Navy have worked to coordinate their efforts, the

current management structure and plan perpetuate the stovepipe

development of cooperative IFF Q&A systems. In commenting on an earlier

8

D-band comprises the radio frequency range of 1 to 2 gigahertz.

9

Specifically, the Mark XII system queries at a frequency of 1.03 gigahertz and answers at a frequency

of 1.09 gigahertz.

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draft of the management plan, the Under Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition stated “. . . I am concerned that the ‘stovepipe’ management

scheme shown . . . will not enable possible equipment interoperability and

commonality to be realized between aircraft and battlefield systems.” A

Navy official informed us that the plan’s developers added the Senior

Acquisition Executive Council and Joint Senior Advisory Group to the

plan’s organizational chart to address this criticism. However, these

organizations were already defined in the draft plan because they were

included in the services’ memorandum of agreement on combat

identification. Furthermore, the delays in developing a new air-to-air and

ground-to-air cooperative IFF Q&A system combined with the recent Army

start of its mid- and long-term efforts provide an opportunity to address

the Under Secretary’s concerns through joint management of the Army’s

and Navy’s efforts.

The current management structure also risks unnecessary delays in the

development and fielding of a set of systems planned to help prevent

future fratricide by allowing the services to prioritize their efforts

differently. For example, while DOD has made development of combat

identification systems a high priority, the Navy, through its funding

process, did not make CAI a high priority. Given the high priority DOD

places on combat identification, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence

(ASD/C3I) proposed an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) funding line

for the CAI effort to (1) pursue the planned course of development or

(2) alternatively use an advanced concepts and technology demonstration

(ACTD)10 to accelerate it.

OSD decided not to proceed with the Program Objective Memorandum

proposed strategy. Instead, OSD adopted the position that the existing 

Mark XII system satisfies the services’ current air-to-air and ground-to-air

cooperative IFF Q&A system requirements. Its current strategy is an

evolutionary upgrade of Mark XII equipment to provide improved

reliability and maintainability and greater upgradeability, while over the

next couple of years defining, under a continued Navy-led effort, in

coordination with our allies, what a Mark XII follow-on wave form might

look like. The upgradeability of the new Mark XII system would allow for

the addition of Mode S capability and implementation of the Mark XII

10In general, an ACTD is to demonstrate “novel” yet relatively mature technologies through the

placement of prototype equipment with an active military unit(s) of one or more of the services. The

prototypes are evaluated by the service(s) during operation level exercises. The ACTD evaluation is

then to be used in deciding whether to procure the technology.

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B-260443 

follow-on wave form, should the services later decide that the current

wave form no longer satisfies their requirements.

If the Program Objective Memorandum proposal had been adopted, it

would have alleviated any risk of delay in Mark XII efforts due to low

prioritization. However, it would not have corrected the stovepipe nature

of the management structure and plan.

Even given OSD funding of the Mark XII effort, the continued division of

development under the current management plan and structure would

allow the Army’s and the Navy’s efforts to continue unsynchronized. The

Navy’s initial time lead in development resulted in the Navy and Army

programs being unsynchronized. The current delays in defining a Mark XII

follow-on wave form, however, provides an opportunity for a jointly

managed effort. The original Navy time lead is what led to (1) the Navy’s

uncertainty about likely mid- and long-term ground identification systems

and (2) the Navy’s inability to consider in its COEA the equipment necessary

to obtain interoperability with those ground identification systems.

Schedule changes in separate efforts could again result in difficulties

obtaining full consideration of interoperability issues. Separate service

efforts risk delays in the development and fielding of cooperative IFF Q&A

systems due to time and resource expenditures to obtain “after-the-fact”

interoperability, if required. Additionally, a dual management structure

means dual funding of dual efforts when a single management structure

and funding source could provide efficiencies resulting in not only

monetary savings but also faster development and earlier fieldings.

Proposed Funding Action

Is Step in Right Direction

The ASD/C3I proposal that an OSD program line be created and funded to

ensure cooperative aircraft IFF continuity also provided for the

demonstration and validation or an ACTD of an armor identification

capability using the upgraded aircraft IFF signal format. The ASD/C3I

proposal noted that a COEA on alternatives to the Mark XII system,

“. . . has been completed, and alternatives for improving the system and applying it to

armor identification were to be considered at a CAI Milestone I review originally planned for

the fall of 1993. However, the Services do not place a high priority on upgrading the Mark

XII or on defining and demonstrating an integrated aircraft/armor identification system,

and they have yet to schedule the review.”

We believe ASD/C3I’s proposed action was a step in the right direction and

that a single funding line for both the Navy’s CAI effort and the Army’s BCI

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program would help ensure coordinated aircraft and ground cooperative

IFF Q&A systems development. While ASD/C3I’s proposed action would have

alleviated some of the unnecessary risk currently associated with the

services’ management structure and plan, it would not have corrected the

stovepipe nature of that structure and plan. We believe, therefore, that, in

addition to having a single funding line, those efforts should be managed

under a structure similar to that recommended by DOD’s Acquisition

Reform Process Action Team11 in its recent report12 on reengineering the

acquisition process.

The Process Action Team recommended that a trial management structure

be tested on selected programs for which either a joint requirement exists

or there is a need for substantial integration among the components.

Specifically, the team recommended that the Principal Deputy Under

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) be designated as a

Joint Acquisition Executive and be delegated oversight, review, and

budgeting/programming responsibility for those selected programs. The

team noted that

“the creation of a Joint Acquisition Executive permits the DOD to directly address the

long-standing problems encountered by joint programs. Issues of agreement on

requirements, dictated marriages and shifting priorities are avoided by having the programs

placed under a purple-suited decision maker who has fiscal resource management

authority. No single Component will be able to optimize system performance at the

expense of other users . . . .”

The team stated that the advantages of such a management structure

included reduction of program redundancy, promotion of commonality

across the services, and stabilization of funding by removing funds from

the vagaries of each service’s priorities. We believe that the adoption of

the proposed management structure outlined by the team could help

ensure the development of a cost-effective, integrated combat

identification solution(s) while maintaining appropriate OSD oversight.

Joint COEA Needed The Army’s and the Navy’s development of separate COEAs for their

respective BCI and CAI efforts risks the selection and development of

systems that may not represent the most cost and operationally effective

solution(s). The division of responsibility for cooperative IFF Q&A systems

11The Secretary of Defense chartered this team to develop “. . . a comprehensive plan to reengineer the

oversight review process for systems acquisition, in both the Components and OSD, to make it more

effective and efficient, while maintaining an appropriate level of oversight.”

12Reengineering the Acquisition Oversight and Review Process, Vol. 2, Implementation Plan, a report

by the DOD Acquisition Reform Process Action Team, Dec. 9, 1994.

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development between the Army and the Navy raises interoperability

issues. Ground and air platforms that represent threats to each other and

that are provided cooperative IFF Q&A systems based on different

technologies will either have to field dual systems or systems that have

been made interoperable or will remain at risk of fratricide from each

other. COEAs that do not fully consider the desirability of interoperability,

the way to obtain it, and its cost risk suboptimal solutions.

In providing guidance on COEAs, DOD Instruction 5000.2 notes that

“individual systems generally cannot be evaluated in isolation.” It goes on

to state that “. . . the analysis must consider all relevant systems and the

synergisms, such as interoperability, and potential difficulties they

collectively represent on the battlefield.” The development of separate

COEAs for IFF Q&A systems has not allowed and may not allow proper

consideration of the interoperability issue and thus risks the selection of a

suboptimal solution(s). A DOD official expressed concern about this risk

when commenting on the plan to perform separate COEAs for the BCI and

CAI efforts during the first meeting of the Combat Identification COEA

Oversight Group that OSD established to periodically review the two COEA

efforts. Additionally, Naval Research Laboratory officials who conducted

the CAI COEA stated that because the Army’s selected near-term technology

differed so dramatically from their expectations, the BCIS initially

envisioned in their CAI COEA was made irrelevant by the Army selection.

Without an approved Mark XII follow-on wave form identified, the Army

will face the same difficulty addressing interoperability in its currently

started BCI COEA effort. The performance of a joint COEA now, giving due

consideration to the interoperability issue, will help assure the selection

and development of the most cost and operationally effective solution(s).

The recent delays in the Navy’s efforts combined with the Army’s recent

start of its mid- and long-term BCI COEA provide an opportunity to develop a

joint COEA for combat identification. A DOD official stated that an

agreement with the allies on a Mark XII follow-on wave form should be

accomplished within 2 years. The current Army schedule calls for the midand long-term COEA to be completed in fiscal year 1997, which provides

time for a joint COEA effort to consider the new wave form being discussed

with U.S. allies, expand the Navy’s COEA to consider subsequently

proposed solutions, and merge the work with the Army’s COEA efforts. A

joint COEA would ensure that DOD and the services have a joint analysis that

will help to select systems representing the most cost and operationally

effective integrated solution.

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Army Acquisition of

Additional Systems

Risks Wasting Millions

of Dollars

The Army continues to invest in its near-term millimeter wave cooperative

system when there is no discernible indication whether this system can or

should be integrated into mid- and long-term solution(s). Without a

completed COEA for BCI, there is no way to tell whether the near-term

system should be or will be a part of the mid- and long-term solution(s).

Furthermore, the Army may never choose to make large scale fieldings of

the near-term system due to affordability.

In our prior report on combat identification, we noted that the Army

planned to begin procuring the near-term millimeter wave cooperative

identification system without an analysis of whether the near-term system

could be integrated into the mid- and long-term solution(s). At that time,

we recommended that the Army not begin procurement of the systems

until it had determined whether the near-term systems could be integrated

into the mid- and long-term solution(s). DOD agreed that the integration of

the near-term BCIS into the long-term approach is an important

consideration in deciding on the production of the near-term system.

Nevertheless, the Army now plans to acquire more near-term systems than

are necessary to reach a production decision without the analysis we

suggested.

Our current evaluation showed that the Army plans to use $5 million in

fiscal year 1995 funds and has requested about $18.4 million of fiscal year

1996 funds to acquire 115 additional near-term systems beyond the 45 in its

current EMD contract. The Army intends to use these units, in combination

with 25 refurbished EMD units, in the testing of the digitized battlefield

concept. However, the Army did not develop a specific analysis to support

the need to demonstrate 140 BCISs during the digitized brigade experiment.

Rather, Army officials stated that the goal of the near-term BCIS

demonstration was to sell individual soldiers on the system and provide

higher level Army officials with an understanding of its operational

effectiveness. They noted that the more soldiers supporting the acquisition

of the system the better. This formed the basis for their “the more, the

better” rationale. Given funding and time constraints, 115 systems are all

“the more” that can be acquired. The Army has already awarded a contract

option to obtain 45 of the additional 115 systems and expects to award a

second option at a cost of about $15.2 million for the remaining systems in

July 1995. When questioned about the impact of limiting the demonstration

to 70 systems (i.e., those already on hand or on contract), Army program

officials stated that they could accomplish their goals for the

demonstration with 70 systems.

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There are concerns within DOD and the Army over the affordability and

cost-effectiveness of the near-term system, and it may never be fielded for

these reasons. The selection of a cooperative technology to pursue in the

mid- and long-term will be determined in part by the Army’s mid- and

long-term COEA, an effort that has just started. Until a mid- and long-term

cooperative technology is selected, the continued acquisition of the

near-term system risks wasting millions of dollars on a system that may

not be able to be integrated into the mid- and long-term solution(s).

Furthermore, acquiring more systems to demonstrate during the Task

Force XXI exercise than is necessary to accomplish the goals of that

demonstration also risks millions of dollars.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) create a single OSD

funding line for the Army’s BCI and Navy’s CAI efforts, (2) direct the

Secretaries of the Army and the Navy to develop and institute a cohesive

management structure and plan in line with the Process Action Team’s

recommendation, and (3) direct the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy

to develop a joint COEA for their BCI and CAI efforts giving due consideration

to the problem and costs of obtaining systems’ interoperability.

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of

the Army to (1) use the 70 near-term systems on hand or currently under

contract for the Task Force XXI digitized brigade experiment and (2) not

acquire more near-term systems than necessary until the Army determines

the near-term technology is affordable and will be fielded and whether, if

determined desirable, it can be integrated into the mid- and long-term

combat identification and aircraft solution(s).

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed that the requirements

for aircraft and battlefield identification should not be addressed in

isolation. It stated that this was one of the reasons they formed a Combat

Identification Task Force in October 1994. DOD stated that the task force

was created to consider the overall architectural framework for combat

identification and within that architecture, the techniques and

programmatic plans for battlefield identification and for the Mark XII

identification system. DOD also stated that management actions are being

taken that reflect the results of the task force, and that address the

concerns described in our report. Specifically, DOD stated that a joint COEA

on battlefield identification is being organized, and technology

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
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demonstrations that will be an important element of the evaluation will be

guided and partially funded by OSD.

DOD did not agree that Army’s plan to acquire 140 near-term systems for

the Task Force XXI digitized brigade experiment risked wasting millions

of dollars. In discussing Army officials’ comments made to us that they

could accomplish their goals for the experiment with 70 near-term

systems, DOD stated that the adequacy of 70 systems was judged in the

context of a contingency plan, should 140 systems not be available. It also

stated that the acquisition of more units would result not only in more

operational experience and more data but also in a greater capability left

with the forces. DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the

Army be directed to not acquire more near-term systems prior to a

determination that the near-term system is affordable and will be fielded

and whether it can be integrated into the mid- and long-term solution(s).

DOD noted that although the integration of the near-term system into the

long-term solution is an important consideration, it may be prudent to

produce the near-term system even if it is not part of the long-term

architecture and noted that it was concerned that, without a near-term

system, U.S. forces may face a period of 10 years or more with no

substantial improvement in their ability to identify combat vehicles.

While DOD, in forming its Combat Identification Task Force, may have been

motivated by many of the same concerns expressed in our report, it does

not appear that the task force’s final product will address the issues

identified in our report. Specifically, based on briefings we have received

on the task force’s efforts, the task force’s final product will not

(1) address needed management changes to provide cohesiveness in the

services’ cooperative identification development efforts; (2) dictate a joint,

single COEA for those efforts; and (3) address the Army’s plan to acquire

more near-term systems than are required for the Army to reach a

production decision. Furthermore, while the task force has developed an

overall architectural framework for combat identification, it does not

appear to provide the management structure and plans needed to assure a

cohesive effort to obtain the goals of that architecture. The architecture

provides direction to the services. However, in the past, DOD has provided

direction to the services that was subsequently ignored. For example, as

we noted earlier, while DOD has placed a high priority on combat

identification efforts, the Navy did not place a high priority on its CAI effort

and underfunded it.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
B-260443 

Regarding the Army’s plan to acquire more near-term systems than are

necessary to accomplish the Army’s goals for the Task Force XXI

experiment, the DOD’s comment indicates that 70 systems are adequate for

conducting the experiment if 140 systems are not available. Since the

Army has not yet made a procurement decision for the near-term BCIS, the

expenditure of $15.2 million to acquire 70 systems beyond the 70

necessary to accomplish the goals for the demonstration risks millions of

dollars on a system that may never be fielded. If the Army can accomplish

its goals for the demonstration with 70 systems, as Army officials have

repeatedly informed us, then only 70 systems are needed. Furthermore,

the Army did not produce and does not have an analysis to support a

requirement to demonstrate 140 BCIS units. There is no debating that more

units will provide more operational experience and data. This, however,

should not be the basis for acquiring more systems than are needed to

accomplish the goals of the demonstration. DOD’s comment stating that it

might be prudent to produce the near-term system even if it is not a part of

the long-term architecture is not debated, and our recommendation would

not prevent the Army from fielding any system for 10 years. We simply

believe it would be prudent for the Army to make its production decision

for the near-term system taking into consideration its decision for its midand long-term solution(s). Such a determination should be possible once

the BCI COEA is completed. Since that COEA is currently scheduled to be

completed in fiscal year 1997 and the BCIS production decision is currently

scheduled to occur in late fiscal year 1997 or early fiscal year 1998, our

recommendation would not delay the fielding of the near-term system.

DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix I, along with

our evaluation.

Scope and

Methodology

During this review, we interviewed officials and reviewed documents in

Washington, D.C., at the offices of the ASD/C3I; the DOD Joint Combat

Identification Office; the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,

Development, and Acquisition; the U.S. Navy, Air Traffic Control and

Landing Systems Office; the U.S. Navy, Office of the Director of Navy

Space Systems Division; the Naval Research Laboratory; and the Defense

Intelligence Agency. We also reviewed documentation issued from the

offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology,

the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the Congressional Research

Service, and the Office of Technology Assessment. We visited, received,

and analyzed information from the U.S. Army Communications and

Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; the U.S. Army

Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia; the U.S. Army

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
B-260443 

Armor Center and School, Fort Knox, Kentucky; the U.S. Army Aviation

Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama; and the Headquarters of the U.S. Marines

Corps’ Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia.

In addition, we visited and received briefings on the Air Force’s Combat

Identification Integration Management Team from Air Force personnel at

the Directorate of Special Projects, Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom

Air Force Base, Massachusetts. We also visited and received briefings on

the OSD sponsored Joint Air Defense Operation/Joint Engagement Zone

exercises from service personnel at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

We conducted this review from August 1994 to July 1995 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional

committees; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and the

Secretaries of Defense, the Army, and the Navy. We will also make copies

available to other interested parties upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were William L.

Wright, Bruce H. Thomas, and Peris Cassorla.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Systems Development

 and Production Issues

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
B-260443 

List of Committees

The Honorable Strom Thurmond, Chairman

The Honorable Sam Nunn, Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens, Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr., Chairman

The Honorable Sam Nunn, Ranking Minority Member

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

Committee on Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence, Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums, Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young, Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha, Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Robert K. Dornan, Chairman

The Honorable Owen B. Pickett, Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Personnel

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 3.

See comments 1 and 4.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 7, p. 10,

and pp. 11-12.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comments 1 and 5.

See comment 6.

See comment 7.

See comment 8.

See comment 9.

See comment 10.

See comment 11.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 12-13.

See comment 12.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 14-15.

See comment 13.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 14.

Now on p. 15.

See comment 15.

See comment 7.

Now on p. 15.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 16.

See comment 9.

See comment 7.

See comment 17.

Now on p. 15.

See comment 12.

Now on p. 15.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comments 13, 14,

and 18.

Now on p. 15.

See comments 13, 14,

and 18.

See comment 19.

See comment 20.

See comment 21.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

letter dated July 6, 1995.

GAO Comments 1. We appreciate that DOD shares our concern that the requirements for

aircraft and battlefield identification should not be addressed in isolation.

While this was one of the reasons the Combat Identification Task Force

was formed, and we believe the task force’s efforts were a step in the right

direction, we do not believe the task force adequately addressed our

concerns regarding the cohesiveness of the structures and plans created to

manage the services’ aircraft and battlefield cooperative identification

efforts.

2. The management actions discussed represent a continuation of the

stovepipe management of the ground and air identification efforts

discussed in our report. The Army-led development of a cost and

operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) for battlefield identification

separate from the Navy-led similar analyses planned to help define what a

new air identification wave form might look like perpetuates the stovepipe

development scheme identified in our report.

3. As explained in our report, we focussed our evaluation on the services’

cooperative identification of friend or foe (IFF) question and answer (Q&A)

system efforts because the services are approaching major decision points

in the acquisition process for those systems. To address DOD’s concern, we

have added information to the body of our report indicating that the

services’ cooperative IFF Q&A system development efforts are a part of a

much broader array of efforts that should help minimize friendly fire

incidents.

4. At the time our draft report was written, we were aware of the task

force’s efforts. We determined that while those efforts may have been

motivated by many of the same concerns expressed in our report, it did

not appear that the task force was going to address the issues related to

our findings. Based on more recent briefings on the task force’s outcome,

it still does not appear that those issues were addressed. Specifically,

based on the information we have received in briefings on the task force’s

efforts, the task force’s final product will not (1) address needed

management changes to provide needed cohesiveness in the services’

cooperative identification development efforts; (2) dictate a joint, single

COEA for those efforts; and (3) address the Army’s plan to acquire more

near-term systems than are needed to reach a production decision.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

5. While the task force has developed an overall architectural framework

for combat identification, it does not appear to provide the management

structure needed to assure a cohesive effort to attain the architecture’s

goals. The architecture provides direction to the services. However, in the

past, DOD has provided direction that was subsequently ignored. For

example, as noted in our report, while DOD has placed a high priority on

combat identification efforts, the Navy did not place a high priority on the

Cooperative Aircraft Identification (CAI) effort and underfunded it.

6. The management and funding arrangements being established do not

adequately address our concerns. The joint advanced concepts technology

demonstration and advanced technology demonstrations planned are to

demonstrate candidate battlefield identification systems, that is,

ground-to-ground and air-to-ground solutions. The planned

demonstrations are to focus on battlefield identification solutions, not on

battlefield and aircraft identification solutions and their interoperability.

Furthermore, the planned demonstrations will not address the underlying

management structure’s division of responsibility between the Navy and

the Army and the risks that are associated with that division. The

continued use of the current management plan and structure with its

division of responsibility between the Army and the Navy still risks the

selection of suboptimal solutions, unnecessary program delays, and the

acquisition of systems that may not be interoperable across the services.

7. The Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) role as the top level

manager of these demonstrations and the funding of these demonstrations

under an OSD line do not adequately address our concerns regarding the

cohesiveness of the Army’s and the Navy’s efforts and the need for truly

joint management. Under the current DOD plan, that is, the joint

demonstrations, the Army and the Navy will continue to manage and fund

separate developmental efforts for their respective areas of responsibility.

Continued use of separate funding lines for those efforts will continue to

pose interoperability risks and risks to the timely accomplishment of the

most cost and operationally effective solutions.

8. While the evolutionary nature of the upgrade process and the reliance

on commercial technology may or may not make centralized funding

desirable, the DOD’s adopted strategy includes working with U.S. allies to

define what a new wave form might look like. The services’ new wave

form definition efforts will be a joint effort under a Navy lead, just as the

Navy’s original CAI effort was. We maintain our position that funding the

services’ new aircraft wave form definition and ground identification

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

efforts under a single funding line would help ensure coordinated aircraft

and ground cooperative IFF Q&A systems’ development.

9. As we indicated in our report, while the Army and the Navy have

worked to coordinate their efforts, the current management structure and

plan perpetuate the stovepipe development of cooperative IFF Q&A systems.

As noted in our report, in commenting on an earlier draft of the

management plan for the cooperative IFF Q&A development efforts, the

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition stated “. . . I am concerned that

the ’stovepipe’ management scheme shown . . . will not enable possible

equipment interoperability and commonality to be realized between

aircraft and battlefield systems.” The General Officers’ Steering Committee

on Combat Identification, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and

the Joint Combat Identification Office were all defined in the draft and

final management plans. Despite these coordinating bodies, we agree with

the Under Secretary’s assessment and believe the current management

structure continues to perpetuate that stovepipe management scheme.

10. We have added information on the role of the General Officers’

Steering Committee on Combat Identification to our report.

11. A prioritized list of identification initiatives with service funding

commitments did not prevent the Navy from placing a lower priority on its

CAI effort than DOD placed. As we note in our report, while DOD has made

development of combat identification systems a high priority, the Navy,

through its funding process did not make the CAI effort a high priority.

Again, a single OSD funding line for both the Navy’s new wave form and the

Army’s battlefield combat identification system (BCIS) efforts would help

ensure coordinated aircraft and ground cooperative IFF Q&A systems

development efforts and appropriate funding given DOD’s prioritization of

those efforts.

12. While DOD’s adopted Mark XII upgrade strategy has superseded the

Navy-led COEA, the continued research and development of air and ground

systems without performing a joint COEA still risks the selection and

development of systems that may not represent the most cost and

operationally effective solutions. DOD’s adopted strategy for upgrading the

Mark XII includes working with U.S. allies to define what a follow-on 

Mark XII wave form might look like. In providing oral comments on a draft

of this report, agency officials indicated that the new wave form air

identification effort would include cost and operational effectiveness type

analyses. Those analyses should be done as a part of a joint aircraft and

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

ground identification COEA to ensure that the most cost and operationally

effective ground and air solutions are selected giving due consideration to

the interoperability issue.

We recognize that commonality between air and ground identification

systems may or may not be attainable or desirable from a cost and

operational effectiveness standpoint. In fact, a joint COEA may support the

use of different technologies for air and ground systems. The performance

of a joint COEA, however, will not only help ensure the consideration of

technological commonality between air and ground solutions but also the

cost and operational effectiveness of solutions to provide interoperability

between differing air and ground solutions. Because the Navy-led joint

service new wave form air identification effort is to develop cost and

operational effectiveness type analyses and the Army-led joint service

ground identification effort is developing a formal COEA, it appears that

minimal adjustment would be required to combine the two efforts to

obtain a joint COEA ensuring due consideration of the interoperability

issue. In addition, the final product of a joint COEA would present a

service-wide, unified vision of the air and ground solution(s) to be pursued

and the means, if determined attainable and desirable, by which air and

ground interoperability will be obtained.

13. DOD’s comment indicates that 70 systems are adequate for conducting

the demonstration if 140 systems are not available. Since the Army has yet

to determine whether it will procure the near-term BCIS, the expenditure of

$15.2 million to acquire 70 systems beyond the 70 systems necessary to

accomplish the goals for the demonstration risks millions of dollars on a

system that may never be fielded.

14. At issue here is not whether the demonstration of more systems will

have value, but rather the value of what is gained against the cost and the

risk that the Army may never procure and field the BCIS. The Army did not

produce and does not have an analysis to support a requirement to

demonstrate 140 BCIS units. If the Army can accomplish its goals for the

demonstration with 70 systems, as Army officials have repeatedly

informed us, then only 70 systems are needed. There is no debating that

more units will provide more operational experience and data. This,

however, should not be the basis for acquiring more systems than are

needed to accomplish the goals of the demonstration.

Army correspondence obtained during our evaluation states that this

demonstration “. . . is going to be the decision making exercise to decide

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

whether to purchase . . . .” Clearly, a procurement decision is yet to be

made. If the Army subsequently decides against procuring the BCIS, what

value do the additional 70 systems then have and what is the value of the

greater capability left with the forces. As we noted in our prior report on

the Army’s combat identification efforts, vehicle deployments in Operation

Desert Storm included 2,300 M1A1 Abrams tanks, 2,200 Bradley Fighting

Vehicles, 20,000 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, over 4,400

Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks, over 29,000 Tactical Wheeled

Vehicles, and several thousand other wheeled vehicles. We do not believe,

in view of the number of vehicles fielded, that the additional capability

that would be left with the forces by the acquisition of 140 systems versus

70 systems is great enough to warrant the expenditure of an additional

$15.2 million before a production decision is made.

15. DOD misinterpreted our recommendation. In line with Finding A, as

reported by DOD, we believe the Army battlefield combat identification

(BCI) and the Navy new wave form efforts should be managed under a

single OSD funding line. We have rephrased our recommendation to clarify

its scope.

16. We believe that it would be more accurate to state that the Under

Secretary’s memorandum overruled the Process Action Team’s

recommendation. Regardless, the Under Secretary’s memorandum still

allows for joint program management and oversight. DOD’s response to the

team’s recommendation recognizes that the current joint program

management structure has problems but fails to offer solutions and merely

creates another panel to consider the issue. We believe that the team’s

recommendation should be tested, as it recommended. We believe a joint

Army combat identification and a Navy new wave form aircraft

identification effort would be an excellent candidate for testing the team’s

recommendation.

17. The coordination among the services of the DOD’s adopted Mark XII

strategy does not alleviate the stovepipe nature of the management

structure represented in the continued division of the air and ground

cooperative IFF Q&A systems development efforts between the Army and

the Navy.

18. DOD’s response to our recommendation is at odds with its response to

Finding C and to comments made by Army officials. In response to our

recommendation, DOD states that 70 systems are inadequate to meet the

equipment needs of the planned demonstrations. In response to Finding C,

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

DOD states that 70 systems were adequate if 140 systems were not

available. Furthermore, Army program officials stated that they could

accomplish their goals for the Task Force XXI demonstration with 70

systems. It is further evident from Army correspondence obtained during

our evaluation that the Army’s goals for the demonstration can be

accomplished with fewer than 140 systems. In that correspondence, an

Army official states

“Believe it is imperative that during Force XXI we not only evaluate how well BCIS works

but the total impact BCIS has on the way we operate. Platforms are currently prioritized to

give us the ability to look at this total impact even if we don’t get the entire 140 systems we

are currently planning for.”

19. We have clarified our recommendation in view of DOD’s comments. We

believe that the acquisition of near-term systems should be limited to the

minimum quantity required to complete any testing needed to make a

production decision. Furthermore, the Army should not be allowed to

acquire more near-term systems than that limit until a COEA based

determination has been made that the near-term system, if deemed

desirable, can be integrated, that is, made interoperable, with the mid- and

long-term combat identification and aircraft solutions.

20. We recognize that commonality between air and ground identification

systems may or may not be attainable or desirable from a cost and

operational effectiveness standpoint, just as interoperability of differing

air and ground systems may not be determined attainable or desirable.

Nothing in our report dictates commonality. It does, however, argue that a

joint COEA should be completed to assess this issue before moving forward.

21. As we pointed out in our response to DOD in our prior report, our

recommendation will not prevent the Army’s acquisition of the near-term

system and will not require the Army to wait until long-term systems are

fielded. As stated in our prior report, we believe it would be prudent for

the Army to make its production decision for the near-term system taking

into consideration its decision for its mid- and long-term solution(s). Such

a determination should be possible once the BCI COEA is completed. Since

that COEA is currently scheduled to be completed in fiscal year 1997 and

the BCIS production decision is not scheduled to occur until late fiscal 

year 1997 or early fiscal year 1998, our recommendation would not delay

the fielding of the near-term system. Our current recommendation extends

the recommendation in our prior report to include a determination on

interoperability with the new air identification wave form being defined.

(707055) Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-95-153 Combat Identification Systems
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