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S. HRG. 107–620

TRANSIT SAFETY IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND TRANSPORTATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

THE EXAMINATION OF CERTAIN INITIATIVES TO ENSURE THE SAFETY

OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSIT SYSTEM IN THE WAKE OF THE RECENT TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE WORLD TRADE CENTER AND THE

PENTAGON

OCTOBER 4, 2001

Printed for the use of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

(

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota

JACK REED, Rhode Island

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York

EVAN BAYH, Indiana

ZELL MILLER, Georgia

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware

DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan

JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

PHIL GRAMM, Texas

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania

JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

MIKE CRAPO, Idaho

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada

STEVEN B. HARRIS, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

WAYNE A. ABERNATHY, Republican Staff Director

JONATHAN MILLER, Professional Staff Member

JOSEPH R. KOLINSKI, Chief Clerk and Computer Systems Administrator

GEORGE E. WHITTLE, Editor

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND TRANSPORTATION

JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado, Ranking Member

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware

DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan

JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

KARA M. STEIN, Legal Counsel

JOHN CARSON, Republican Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2001

Page

Opening statement of Senator Reed ...................................................................... 1

Opening statements, comments, or prepared statements of:

Senator Allard ................................................................................................... 2

Senator Sarbanes .............................................................................................. 20

Senator Stabenow ............................................................................................. 30

Senator Corzine ................................................................................................ 30

WITNESSES

Jennifer L. Dorn, Administrator, Federal Transit Administration

U.S. Department of Transportation .................................................................... 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 31

Response to written questions of:

Senator Sarbanes ...................................................................................... 56

Senator Corzine ......................................................................................... 57

William W. Millar, President, American Public Transportation Association ..... 11

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 33

Response to written questions of:

Senator Reed .............................................................................................. 59

Senator Allard ........................................................................................... 60

Robert A. Molofsky, General Counsel, Amalgamated Transit Union .................. 14

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 41

Richard A. White, General Manager, Washington Metropolitan Area

Transit Authority ................................................................................................. 16

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 54

(III)

(1)

TRANSIT SAFETY IN THE WAKE

OF SEPTEMBER 11

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2001

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met at 2:35 p.m., in room SD–538 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed (Chairman of the

Subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator REED. Let me call this Subcommittee hearing to order.

Good afternoon. I want to welcome all of you to today’s hearing

on transit safety. The safety of our Nation’s transit systems has always been a priority. But the events of September 11 have made

it clear that we need to do even more to ensure the safety of transit

riders and operators.

I would caution everyone that the intent of today’s hearing is not

to raise new fears in the minds of Americans. It only seems prudent, however, to ask our witnesses and my colleagues to focus not

on the ultimate worst-case scenarios or what a specific system’s response plans are, because to do so could unwittingly aid the very

people we are seeking to thwart.

We also know from yesterday’s Greyhound Bus incident that our

transportation system faces lethal threats from apparent nonterrorists as well. And it is important to note that while rail systems face

a significant threat, our Nation’s bus systems merit increased

attention also.

I believe this hearing should provide an opportunity to hear from

transit experts on what the threats actually are, what they plan to

do in response to them, what lessons they have learned from the

tragedies of September 11, and what the Federal Government can

do to help ensure that we have the safest transit system possible.

The hallmark of our Nation’s transit system has long been its

safety record, particularly in comparison to other modes of travel.

Moreover, in the wake of the horrific events of September 11, transit systems in New York and Washington played an essential role

in safely moving thousands of people from the affected areas. We

owe a great debt of gratitude for those efforts to hard-working men

and women in these transit organizations who helped their fellow

Americans in a time of grave danger.

What is also clear from September 11 is that we have a new level

of threat facing the open society we have cherished since our NaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:37 Aug 23, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 81324.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4
2

tion’s founding. It is encumbent upon all of us to find new ways to

reduce this threat. That effort starts first and foremost by not retreating from our daily routines and practices, whether it is riding

the subway or going to a football game, because if we allow ourselves to be frozen with fear, the terrorists will have achieved one

of their goals.

Rather we should do all that we can to address the threat. That

task lies first and foremost with our law enforcement and intelligence agencies, which have the expertise and the authority to

stop terrorists before they act. Success by these agencies is the best

way to preserve the integrity and safety of our transportation system. However, at the same time, we have a responsibility to make

sure that if this front-line defense fails, our transit operators are

prepared and ready to respond. Helping them achieve that goal is

what today’s hearing is all about.

And I am glad to report that transit agencies from around the

country, such as the Boston MBTA, which is working on high-tech

biological weapons security systems with MIT, and the Federal

Government, all of these systems are taking concrete and rapid

steps to meet this new threat.

This hearing is the start of a longer process—to develop new, enhanced security provisions for the reauthorization of TEA–21,

which our Subcommittee will begin considering next year. As part

of that effort, I want to make sure that the Federal Transit Authority, FTA, has the resources it needs from the recently passed $40

billion supplemental to help systems with new capital and operating concerns. The FTA and transit are indeed part of the President’s new Homeland Defense effort, and we will want to maximize

coordination between law enforcement and transportation officials.

Today, we will hear from two panels of witnesses. The first panel

will consist of Ms. Jennifer Dorn, the new Administrator of the

Federal Transit Administration. For our second panel, we will hear

from three witnesses who have hands-on experience with the

events of September 11 at the Pentagon, and they can address the

steps that transit systems have been taking to improve safety.

We will be asking all of our witnesses to discuss: First, the existence and nature of any threats to transit. Second, efforts underway

to address those threats. Third, lessons learned from the experience of September 11. And fourth, suggestions for improving transit safety.

Before we hear from Administrator Dorn, I would like to recognize my colleague and friend, the Ranking Member, Senator Allard

of Colorado.

Senator Allard.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Senator Reed.

I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on transit safety in response to the September 11 terrorist attack in Washington, DC and New York City. It is crucial at this

time to acknowledge and prepare for the fact that our Nation’s

skies are not the only possible conduits of terrorist aggression.

I would agree with your comments, Mr. Chairman, that we do

not want to unnecessarily raise any alarm in the country. But we

3

need to systematically and thoroughly review what is happening as

far as trying to be prepared for a possible terrorist attack in all of

our transportation systems. I think it needs to start here in the

Committee. So, again, I commend you.

Indeed, some experts believe that, as aviation targets become

more difficult to exploit, mass transit targets such as buses and

trains may become a more attractive venue for terrorist activities.

We are here today to ensure that this does not happen.

While all sectors of society are vulnerable to terrorism, some consider public transportation particularly susceptible, as rail and bus

systems are highly visible and carry large numbers of people in

concentrated spaces along predictable routes and schedules. Also,

in their objective to move large numbers of people quick and conveniently, transit systems are easily accessed by the public and

therefore, there is difficulty in ensuring their security.

Since 1998, all rail transit systems, though not bus systems,

have been required by the Federal Government to prepare and implement a system security program plan. Based on FTA’s guidelines, these plans focus on agency-wide activities to provide a secure environment for transit customers and employees, including

the prevention and mitigation of terrorist activity.

Our witnesses are here today to discuss potential terrorist

threats to our Nation’s transit systems, their efforts, current and

planned, to address those threats, and how their thinking about

transit safety may have changed in the wake of last month’s terrorist attacks. Certainly, the attacks refocus everyone on the importance of emergency preparedness. However, being prepared for

an emergency involves consideration of far more than just terrorism. In preparing a good, comprehensive plan, an agency will

also be well-equipped to deal with natural disasters, medical problems, power failures, and the like. Although we hope that these

events never occur, we must be prepared for that possibility.

I would like to thank all of our witnesses for being here today.

I look forward to hearing from all of you. Furthermore, I would like

to recognize all the transit officials and employees who quickly and

efficiently helped to evacuate large numbers of people out of congested areas under the difficult circumstances following the attacks

on September 11. Our thanks go out to all these dedicated transit

employees.

Again, I would like to thank my colleague for holding this hearing, and I look forward to working with him on this matter.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Senator Allard.

I would now like to recognize our first witness, Ms. Jennifer

Dorn, the FTA’s Administrator, who is appearing before the Subcommittee for the first time. Jennifer has served with distinction

in previous Administrations in senior positions at the Departments

of Transportation and Labor.

Welcome, Ms. Dorn, and we look forward to your testimony.

4

STATEMENT OF JENNIFER L. DORN

ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Ms. DORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Allard. The

Federal Transit Administration appreciates the opportunity to talk

with you about these important matters.

I recently had the opportunity to meet with transit leaders in

New York City to discuss their public transportation needs and

emergency operations. Like the fire, police, and emergency medical

teams, transit employees have shown both heroism and incredible

resilience as they responded to and helped the city recover from the

terrorism of September 11. It is really astounding to realize that

thanks to the emergency response plans, clear-thinking, and quick

action of transit employees, no one—no one—riding the PATH or

the New York City subway lines that morning was injured. As you

know, literally thousands of lives were saved.

I have just returned from the American Public Transportation

Association annual conference in Philadelphia. The fact that the

conference was held as planned reflects the sense of responsibility

of the Nation’s transit leaders and it gave all of us in the transit

community an important opportunity to have a number of significant and intense discussions about safety and security.

I certainly share Secretary Mineta’s strong commitment that the

Department has no higher priority than keeping our communities

safe and moving, and the Department is taking responsible and aggressive action to do just that. Within minutes of the first plane

crash on September 11, the Department of Transportation’s Crisis

Management Center went into action and it continues to provide

precise, current, multimodal information about the Nation’s transportation system directly to the Secretary and, as he sees fit, to the

White House.

In order to respond to the new level of security threats, within

days, Secretary Mineta also created the National Infrastructure

Security Committee—NISC—within the Department of Transportation. The mission of the NISC is to execute preemptive, preventative, protective, and recovery efforts for critical elements of the U.S.

national transportation system. FTA is working with NISC, the

States, transit agencies, and other Federal agencies to identify

high-value, high-consequence transportation operations and structures, as well as their current protection strategies, and any gaps

which may exist.

As we consider a variety of measures to improve security in our

Nation’s transportation systems, it is very important that we keep

in mind two fundamental points.

First, that our actions must carefully balance three important interests. One—and not in any particular order—the need for security. Two, the need for personal mobility. And three, the need to

maintain economic vitality.

I believe that the second most important fundamental point to

keep in mind is that the Nation’s public transportation system is

geographically dispersed within communities, they are diverse in

their delivery mechanisms, and most of all, designed to meet the

unique features and needs of the areas they serve. Thus, it is very

difficult and somewhat unproductive to focus a cookie-cutter apVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:37 Aug 23, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 81324.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4
5

proach on a problem as significant as this without taking into account the unique attributes of particular systems.

With those points in mind, let me briefly describe the steps that

FTA is taking to enhance the security of the Nation’s public transportation systems.

First, we are stepping up our ongoing efforts to help transit

agencies evaluate the threats and vulnerabilities to their systems.

This way, they can appropriately refine or develop security and

emergency response plans, particularly in light of the new terrorist

reality. Some systems are 100 years old. They were designed with

19th Century crimes in mind. Others are brand new, designed with

security in mind and incorporating the latest security technology.

No two systems are alike.

Second, we plan at the Department of Transportation to provide

assistance to transit agencies as they refine their emergency response plans in light of their system assessments and the heightened terrorist threats. These plans serve as blueprints for action in

the wake of an attack and articulate who will take the specific

steps necessary for emergency response.

FTA also will continue to work with local transit agencies to conduct full-scale emergency drills to test their plans and equipment.

In my visits with New York and Washington transit officials, they

emphasize how important it was that they had conducted regular

emergency drills—not just fire drills—to keep skills sharp, update

response plans, and build personal relationships with counterparts

in the police, fire, emergency and health response systems. Although regular drills are routinely recommended by security experts in FTA and in transit systems throughout the country, there

is nothing like hearing advice from people who have lived it—literally lived it.

And finally, we will offer additional security training and workshops throughout the country. Nothing is more important than

training and awareness. We have heard from our colleagues in

Washington and New York and that means employees and riders.

We intend to expand our free security and emergency response

training to incorporate new security strategies and tactics and to

give more local transit employees the opportunity to attend emergency response training. It is imperative that we have a transit

workforce that understands security issues and is fully prepared to

respond, should an emergency occur.

In addition to these broader plans, many of which are already

underway and have been for some time, next week, FTA will be

mailing to every transit agency nationwide, a security toolbox that

will include resource guidelines, planning tools, training opportunities and sample public awareness publications, all at one place, for

the ready access of transit leaders throughout the country who are

paying renewed attention to a renewed threat. We believe these

materials will be of assistance to agencies as they continue to enhance their efforts for security awareness and emergency response

capabilities.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Madam Administrator, for

your very fine testimony. Let me ask a few questions before I turn

to my colleague.

6

As you know, Congress recently passed, and the President

signed, the emergency supplemental appropriations bill totaling

$40 billion in response to the September 11 tragedy. Transportation security is specifically identified as eligible for that money.

Has the FTA requested funds for that bill for improved safety and,

if not, why not?

Ms. DORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are as we speak, working directly with the National Infrastructure Security Committee,

that I mentioned, and certainly, that effort is focused on identifying

priority needs within transportation. There is no question that

transportation security will be addressed. It is a work in progress.

I have every confidence that the Administration and the Department will set appropriate priorities so that we can enhance the security across the Nation.

Senator REED. From your review today, and also your discussions

with local transit leaders, is it your impression that they will require additional resources?

Ms. DORN. I think it is very dependent on local issues. Certainly,

as the New Jersey Commissioner of the Department of Transportation said to me and to many others at the Philadelphia conference, there is no way to plan for what happened, the magnitude

is so huge. However, it is imperative that every agency take a holistic, systematic look at this issue. And all transit agencies are

sorting out the priority needs. There is never enough to be completely secure. As I have said in other matters, you cannot wring

all of the risk out of people moving. But I am confident that, together, we will be able to sort through the priorities that will really

make a difference.

Senator REED. One of the lead agencies, or the premier agency,

for response to a crisis here in the United States is FEMA. It has

the lead role in most cases and it is also charged with developing

a comprehensive national emergency management system. Does

FTA work on a daily regular basis with FEMA?

Ms. DORN. Absolutely, through both the Crisis Management Center and in our work with the National Infrastructure Security Committee, in general, on a day-to-day basis in the New York area.

They are partners in emergency response and how the necessary

funds will be delivered.

Senator REED. Now as you work through the issues, the demands

for increased resources, are you also reviewing potential changes in

the law that would give you and local transit agencies more appropriate powers? And if so, can you share some of those thoughts

with us today? Again, we are preparing ultimately next year for

the reauthorization of TEA–21.

Ms. DORN. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. The events of September 11

require that everything be put on the table. With our industry

counterparts, our partners in the labor community, passenger

groups, and with the Federal agencies, we are looking at everything that will make security more effective.

We have to be very cautious, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, that well-intentioned, aggressive actions do not have ramifications that we did not anticipate. This is a complicated matter.

7

I also think that a cooperative approach where indirect pressure

and direct pressure from a variety of sources, combined with model

programs, may well be the solution.

However, we cannot, and should not prescribe that every mode

or every type of transportation should have a specific mandate for

the type of security. The review will show that it is more complicated than that and we will need to have as dynamic and relatively complex a system as we do. But everything is on the table.

Senator REED. We give much more specific direction to the rail

systems than we do to the bus systems, it is my understanding.

There has been a proposal by the ATU to require that bus systems

meet the same general guidelines with respect to their operations,

the security procedures, and also a certain percentage of resources

devoted to security. Would you be in favor of imposing those same

types of directions on bus systems as well as rail?

Ms. DORN. Mr. Chairman, at this point in time, I do not believe

that it is clear that those additional mandates would be of benefit.

That is not to say they would not be on the table. But I believe that

we can thoroughly address the needs at this point in time through

the voluntary security assessments which FTA offers, combined

with the model bus safety program that is now in its final stages.

I am eager to work with our partners in Labor to ensure that the

model bus safety program helps meet the needs that they have

identified. I believe that it is appropriate to utilize that avenue

first. I know that there is a strong commitment on the part of

APTA and the bus industry to really take a firm grasp of the importance of this. So, I believe that we should try that at this point.

Senator REED. In line with my previous questions, FTA’s Office

of Safety and Security develops guidelines, best practices, provides

training, generally performs safety analysis reviews and audits. Do

you believe that your Office of Safety and Security needs more authority, legislative authority, to be more effective?

Ms. DORN. At this point, I could not say that we do. I do not

mean to be repetitive, but in light of the situation, everything must

be on the table.

I feel comfortable, particularly with the heightened awareness

and the responsiveness of industry groups, and the best practices

that are available, and the technical assistance that we provide, we

are doing as good a job as we can in the existing environment.

Senator REED. One final question before I turn it over to Senator

Allard.

In 1997, FTA instituted a voluntary security audit program for

any system at no cost. I wonder how many systems, and if you do

not have this knowledge, it is certainly appropriate to provide it

later, have taken advantage of this audit program? Have there

been an increased number of requests after September 11? And are

there any indications from these audits of what is a consistent

weakness across the board in these transit systems?

Ms. DORN. In partial answer to your question, Mr. Chairman and

I would prefer to be more specific in the record, if I might, we have

over the last three fiscal years conducted 53 voluntary audits, and

they range from the smaller transit agencies to the larger transit

agencies. We have completed about 18 or 19 each year. I am not

8

aware, although our Security Director, Harry Saporta, may know

if we have had any requests since September 11.

But I am confident that once we make agencies aware of this

service, they may take advantage of it. And as you and I discussed

earlier, agencies, particularly the larger ones, are taking their own

initiative and hiring security firms to help them assess the most

important issues that they need to address in terms of emergency

preparedness, security, and safety.

Senator REED. Thank you very much.

Senator Allard.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

FTA’s Office of Safety and Security, the way I understand its

function, you guide local transit authorities in their preparation of

the systems security program plans. And in addition to that, if

there is a request for an audit, then, on a volunteer basis, you provide help in that audit. Beyond that, what sort of oversight, what

sort of function do you carry on with the transit agencies to help

assure security?

Ms. DORN. It actually depends on the mode. But in all cases, if

we get a call for help, we try to accommodate. And if we cannot,

we have contractors who have the expertise so they can help.

We have over 200 safety and security courses offered by the

Transportation Safety Institute. I believe about one-third of those

have a heavy component in security. We are increasing the number

of training workshops within our 2002 budget, so that we can offer

a number of workshops to the smaller agencies on a regional basis.

And in addition to that, of course, our partners in the State, if

it is a light rail, a heavy rail, or a people mover, the State has then

the oversight authority for ensuring that a safety and security plan

is in place for that type of system.

Senator ALLARD. Do you interact with those States?

Ms. DORN. Yes, we do.

Senator ALLARD. And you are working together on these plans

and whatnot?

Ms. DORN. We do. And every 3 years, we do a State review to

ensure that the State oversight program is up to the level that we

think is important.

Now does that mean that we are completely comfortable and believe that we are doing everything the way we could? No. Even

those issues are on the table. How can we qualitatively make a difference in those reviews?

Senator ALLARD. Now, you mentioned that you handle calls for

help from local transit agencies. Do you get a lot of calls? Or do

you get a few calls? Or a moderate number? Could you give us

some feel as to how often they request help?

Ms. DORN. It depends on the size of the agency. And many of

those calls would go to our regional offices, where they are more

of the day-to-day partners in technical assistance. There is definitely a strong attention across the agencies for security and safety.

Senator ALLARD. So most of the calls you have gotten have to do

mainly with maintenance and day-to-day operations. You are not

getting calls on helping with security issues.

Ms. DORN. Not at this point. However, I would mention that, just

as an anecdotal example, at APTA’s conference they had some

9

1,700 folks at a special session for anyone who wanted to hear from

the New York and Washington folks about lessons learned and how

they could incorporate and enhance their security. There were 400

to 500 people in that audience. For 2 hours, you could have heard

a pin drop and notes were taken. There is a heightened awareness

about the security piece.

Does that mean we have done enough? No. We have to work together. We have a new normalcy, as Secretary Mineta would say.

Senator ALLARD. Now, please describe for us the functions of and

coordination between the Department of Transportation’s Office of

Intelligence and Security and FTA’s Office of Safety and Security,

as they relate to helping the transit agencies prepare for and perhaps respond to terrorist threats or attacks, if that should happen.

Ms. DORN. Right. Well, there are two ways that we work on a

regular basis with OIS, as you have mentioned. One had been in

place prior to September 11, and that is through the Crisis Command Center. Every mode is represented, and for the period of

time since September 11, it was on a 24/7 basis. Every mode is at

the table, connected with the Nation’s transportation systems. And

OIS is there as well. So they are talking constantly.

In addition to that, OIS is on the executive committee of the Secretary’s group that I mentioned, the National Infrastructure Security Committee, as is FTA. And so, that is focused on the kinds of

problems out there, the gaps, and how we can fill them in the high

priority areas.

Senator ALLARD. I have never heard of an agency or somebody

representing an agency come here and say that they do not have

enough resources. And perhaps the following question is a foolish

question, but I am going to ask it anyhow. Does FTA’s Office of

Safety and Security have the staff and resources it needs to effectively help State and local transit agencies prepare and respond to

possible terrorist attacks?

Ms. DORN. I am confident, Senator Allard, that as we work

through this issue with the Office of Management and Budget and

the Secretary, we will have the necessary resources to do the job

that is required.

Senator ALLARD. I appreciate that response. As you know, the

President recently announced the formation of the Office of Homeland Security. Do you have any idea what FTA’s role might be as

it relates to this new office, and what role the office will have in

transportation? I have not gotten any of those details. I do not

know whether the Chairman has or not. But we would like to hear

what your perception is as you interact with the Office of Homeland Security.

Ms. DORN. It is my understanding that the White House is moving aggressively to outline the specific authorities and the office

structure. There is no question that the mission is clear, as I have

heard and understood it from Secretary Mineta, and that is to coordinate the Executive Branch’s efforts to detect, prepare for, respond, and recover from acts of global terrorism.

Senator ALLARD. But you do not have the details yet.

Ms. DORN. No, I do not.

Senator ALLARD. Okay.

10

Ms. DORN. But I have every confidence that FTA, through the

Department of Transportation, will have a seat at that table. It will

not work if it is not that way, and I am confident that Governor

Ridge and the President would thoroughly understand that. That

is the purpose of creating it. I am pleased that it has been created.

Senator ALLARD. We have some privately owned transportation

systems out there. What role does the Federal Government have in

antiterrorism measures with these transportation systems?

Ms. DORN. As I understand it, it is the bully pulpit, primarily,

because the hook is usually Federal grant money.

Senator ALLARD. Okay.

Ms. DORN. So that is the primary authority. Plus the good citizen

motivation.

Senator ALLARD. Do you reach out to them or do you kind of ask

them to reach out to you on a regular basis?

Ms. DORN. Well, since I have had this position, I have reached

out proactively. That piece of the industry will be, and should be,

a growing part of the Nation’s public transportation system. We

need them. We need their counsel. We need their advice. We need

their good business practices.

Senator ALLARD. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is expired and I

know you are anxious to get to the next panel.

Thank you.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Senator Allard, for your

excellent questions.

Madam Administrator, thank you for your testimony. You are

very articulate.

Ms. DORN. Thank you very much.

Senator REED. Very well thought-through. We are eager to know

of the results of your deliberations, particularly if it would result

in requesting supplemental funds. We would like to be an aid to

you in getting the resources that you and local transit authorities

need, to make sure they are secure and protective of the public.

Ms. DORN. We at the Department of Transportation are eager to

work with this Committee in that regard. And I am confident I will

be calling you.

Senator REED. Thank you very much.

Now let me call the second panel to the table.

[Pause.]

I would like to introduce the witnesses on our second panel.

First, Mr. William Millar has been President of the American Public Transportation Association since November 1996, after 24 years

in transit operations at the Port Authority of Allegheny County,

Pittsburgh, and elsewhere. Bill has long been a national leader in

transit policy. We thank you for joining us today.

Mr. MILLAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator REED. Mr. Robert A. Molofsky is the General Counsel of

the Amalgamated Transit Union, which represents 175,000 employees in public mass transit, intercity bus, school bus, para-transit,

and van service operations in some 46 States and throughout the

provinces of Canada. Bob has been involved in the ATU’s legal, regulatory, and governmental affairs since 1981.

Thank you, Bob, for joining us.

11

And finally, Mr. Richard A. White is the General Manager of the

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, the regional operator of rapid transit and bus services in the Greater Washington

National Capital Metropolitan Area, and the fourth largest mass

transit system in the United States. Mr. White has 25 years of

transit experience, including several high-level positions with San

Francisco’s Bay Area Rapid Transit district, among others. Mr.

White is joined by Chief Barry McDevitt of the WMATA’s police

force. And we have a mutual friend, Chief. That is Beverly Scott,

who is the head of RIPTA in Rhode Island, and she is very proud

of what you and all of your colleagues were able to accomplish, and

with your fellow colleagues in New York City.

I thank you all for joining us.

Before we begin, I would just point out that your written testimony will be made part of the record. There is no need to read it,

but we will allow you 7 minutes.

Mr. Millar, please begin.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM W. MILLAR, PRESIDENT

AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION

Mr. MILLAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon. I want

to thank you for this opportunity to testify and appear before you.

And I want to say thank you to Senator Allard and to all the other

Members of Congress—how quickly you have responded to the

needs of the Nation after the horrific events of September 11. We

do believe that there is additional information we could provide to

you and to the Committee, particularly if there is an opportunity,

perhaps, for executive session or private sessions on this.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that the Federal investment that has

been made in the past several years in public transportation has

been paying off in lots of different ways. And one of those ways is

improved safety and security, which I will discuss in a moment.

That investment has allowed public transportation usage to grow

dramatically in this country, up some 21 percent over the last several years, and it has enabled our members to upgrade their systems, improve the safety and security of their systems in a variety

of ways, from upgrading rolling stock to buying security equipment

to building new systems with the latest design characteristics that

are necessary for the best of safety to be included.

And we think this investment paid enormous dividends on September 11, when public transportation operators in both the New

York City area and the Washington, DC area helped safely evacuate citizens from the center city. Indeed, while the attention is focused on those cities, all across America, evacuations were underway that day. Transit systems were part of the emergency response, as they served to carry stranded travelers from the Nation’s airports and as they moved emergency workers around, and

the story goes on and on.

We believe that the response of the transit industry to the September 11 events shows quite clearly that, just as our interstate

highway system when it was begun by President Eisenhower, was

a national defense interstate highway system, we think in this new

war on terrorism, public transit agencies are certainly part of the

national defense component of this. We are extremely proud of the

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way our members throughout the country, and particularly in the

New York and Washington area, responded.

Mr. Chairman, as Administrator Dorn said, through perhaps fortuitous scheduling, the last few days, much of our industry, much

of the leadership of our industry has been in Philadelphia for a

long ago scheduled annual meeting of our assocation.

Over 2,300 transit leaders from around the country were present

and, needless to say, the agenda we had on September 10 was altered dramatically for the meeting that began on September 29.

We were most pleased that Secretary Norman Mineta was able

to come to Philadelphia just 4 days ago to be our keynote speaker.

He emphasized the importance of public transportation to our Nation and the critical importance of continuing to focus on safety and

security needs.

While he said many memorable things in that speech, there were

some words that stuck out particularly for me. He said: ‘‘Preparation equals performance.’’

And I want to assure you that we in the public transit industry

are taking that message to heart. For nearly 20 years, through the

American Public Transportation Association’s System Safety Program, and our related Safety Management Audit Programs, APTA

has been working with and encouraging its members to plan and

prepare for safety and security.

A good, safe, and secure system does not, as they say, happen by

accident, and the Secretary’s words—preparation equals performance—were borne out on September 11.

I can report to you that nearly all of the Nation’s 18 commuter

rail systems participate in our audit program, that all of the Nation’s rail transit systems in the country participate either in our

program, or in a program of their own State, and those State programs follow guidelines that are based on our system safety plans.

In the last year and a half, we have developed a similar program

for the Nation’s bus systems, which is being implemented now. And

we are seeing, as you would well imagine, quite a large increase

in inquiries about joining that program since September 11.

APTA handles that program through a staff of in-house auditors

who are well trained, and it is advised by committees inside our

association. We include members of FTA’s security office, as well

as DOT’s Office of Intelligence and Security, in our meetings and

as part of our committee.

We share and trade information and we make sure that we are

each aware of what the other is doing. We make sure that our programs can be coordinated as much as they can be, so that they can

be effective.

Our safety and security plan program certainly proved its worth

on September 11. Both the operators in New York and Washington

have been long-standing members of those programs. They had

plans. They practiced their plans. And they responded well when

they were called upon.

As a trade association representing both public-sector operators,

which has been the focus of much of my testimony so far, but also

the private-sector industry that supports our public operators, we

work on a whole variety of activities, and let me outline some of

13

those for you very briefly. I would be, obviously, happy to go into

more detail during questions and answers.

First, as soon as the terrible events became clear on September

11, we immediately offered our help to the FTA and to the Federal

Railroad Administration. Within a few days, we were able to supply them with a list of capital needs, operating needs, and research

and development needs that would be critical to improving the

safety and security of our systems. We have, as part of our testimony, supplied that list to the Committee for your consideration.

We think that considerable investment will need to be made, and

not anticipating your questions, but having heard the questions to

Administrator Dorn, we do believe that additional investment is

going to be made, and we are working with our members now to

see if we can get a handle on the order of magnitude that might

be appropriate there.

At our recently concluded annual meeting, we did have a very

special forum that the Administrator spoke of on Tuesday afternoon, where the leaders from New York and Washington told us of

their experience and how they responded.

Four key themes emerged—you need to plan, you need to prepare, you need to practice, and you need to partner. It was clear

in all those cases that those systems did that, it paid off, and I am

sure my colleague, Mr. White, say more about that later.

We as a trade association are sharing critical information of best

practices among our members. The reality of it is, this has been an

issue higher on some members priority list than it has been for

others. But now, it is number one on everybody’s list and we want

to make sure that we learn from our experience.

Later this month, we are sponsoring with the Mineta Institute

from San Jose State University in California, and the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials and DOT’s

Research and Special Projects Administration, a special invitationonly conference here in Washington, DC, where we will bring the

leaders of the surface transportation industry together to talk

through these issues and hear the results of research that was

completed last summer on terrorism in transportation and how to

respond to it. We are also having discussions with the International Union of Public Transport based in Brussels. Regrettably,

much of the rest of the world has had far worse experience up until

September 11 than us, and we do believe that we have much to

learn from other countries and other cities here.

And finally, we continue to work with DOT in making sure that

safety and security remain paramount issues. We are very pleased

with the Administrator’s quick actions to develop a rapid response

toolbox, including an offer to our association to have material

placed in there.

We are very pleased with her response to assist in making audits

available. And there are many other examples where we are working together. I will look forward to your questions and expanding

on these points.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Millar.

We will hear from Robert Molofsky, General Counsel of the

Amalgamated Transit Union.

14

STATEMENT OF ROBERT F. MOLOFSKY

GENERAL COUNSEL, AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION

Mr. MOLOFSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am appearing on

behalf of our International President James La Sala to discuss the

ATU’s views and concerns about the safety issues facing the transit

industry, as well as to offer recommendations for making transit

systems safer and addressing the heightened concerns in the wake

of the September 11 terrorist attacks.

This is certainly a difficult time for those in the transportation

industry, and indeed, for all Americans. It has now been 23 days

since this Nation witnessed the horror of the events on September

11. Since then, President Bush, his Administration and Congress

have shown remarkable bipartisanship in their efforts to implement new counter-terrorism measures. The airlines, along with the

assistance of the Federal Government, have adopted stringent new

security measures to better protect America’s air travelers. And

transit systems throughout the country, with the full support and

assistance of the ATU, have begun to reexamine existing security

procedures and emergency preparedness plans in the hopes of preventing further tragedies.

Today, too, we meet just one day after a most tragic incident on

Greyhound. We are indeed grateful that our driver survived. And

I take this moment to again offer and extend, on behalf of the ATU,

our prayers and thoughts to those passengers, their families, and

friends who were hurt or killed in that accident. And yet, that incident underscores the kind of preparations, plans, and programs

that we are here today to talk about in the transit industry.

We are grateful at the same time for the swift actions undertaken by Secretary Mineta, Deputy Under Secretary Underwood,

the FBI, and State officials immediately investigating that accident

and communicating the outcome of that investigation immediately,

not only to Greyhound, but also to the unions and others in the

media and the public concerned about what that event may or may

not have been. We think that important and rapid investigation

and communication response helped defuse what might have been

a more difficult situation and allowed the company, with our support, to reopen its operations several hours after the shutdown.

Yet, despite all of the extraordinary measures taken in transit

and in the airlines, we know that no one is immune from future

attacks. This is not new to the ATU or the transit industry who

for years have faced startling statistics and real-life events as I just

described that have put this industry on guard for the very real potential of terrorists or quasi-terrorist attacks.

According to the DOT’s Office of Intelligence and Security, attacks against transportation and transportation infrastructures accounted for 42 percent of all international terrorist attacks. And 34

percent of violent attacks against transportation target rail and bus

systems. Mass transportation systems in the United States have

figured prominently in many of these acts of terrorism and extreme

violence, and our testimony summarizes those major incidents.

Our testimony, too, highlights the less severe forms of violence

against operators of bus transportation vehicles who have also

been, as happened yesterday, the victims of assaults and attacks

while in their vehicles. While the severity of those incidents may

15

pale in comparison to the recent tragedies in New York and Washington, these assaults are nonetheless a serious safety threat to

transit personnel, passengers, and to the rest of the traveling public who share the roads with our mass transportation vehicles.

The ATU has been committed for years to addressing the threat

of these attacks. Among our many efforts in this campaign, we

have worked and have urged the FTA and Members of Congress

to require security measures and mass transit safety programs, to

increase penalties for persons who assault transit operators, and to

provide funding for the National Transit Institute, enabling it to

provide important safety research and training programs to transit

workers. Over the last two sessions of Congress, we have also supported and urged passage of the Preparedness Against Terrorism

Act, currently H.R. 525. This bill, now pending, seeks to improve

coordination of Federal efforts with regard to preparedness against

terrorist attacks in the United States.

The bill would require an assessment of the risk of such attacks

against transportation, energy, and other infrastructure facilities,

as well as an evaluation of available technologies and practices to

determine the best means of protecting such facilities from attacks.

We take note of the testimony earlier of Administrator Dorn in

referencing Secretary Mineta’s new committee that is now undergoing a current review and study that parallels some of the issues

raised by that bill and hope that the transportation labor community will be asked to participate in that ongoing effort.

We want to take the opportunity to ask this Committee to consider the bill now pending in the House and support it or seek to

have it included in any comprehensive transit security legislation

that may come out of these hearings in the future.

While I have painted a rather grim picture of the security

threats facing the industry, I would be remiss if I did not point out

that the transit industry is one of the safest forms of transportation. Even in the face of the tragic events of September 11, public

transportation systems in New York and Washington responded

quickly, reliably, and efficiently in evacuating people away from

areas affected and delivering them safely to their destinations.

Today, as I sit side by side with Mr. White of WMATA, it is clear

that the comprehensive planning, preparation, and practices, as

Mr. Millar mentioned, involving not only the security personnel,

but also the transit workers, on that system, as in New York, were

the key to the ability of those two systems to respond as they did

to those unexpected events. They made heroes of our members and

they made good examples of what this country should look forward

to having happen and take place in every system throughout the

United States.

With that said, there are several specific legislative and regulatory fixes that must be taken to better ensure the safety of our

transit systems. This is not a time just for best practices or model

safety plans. We make the following six recommendations for improving transit safety and security which are amplified in detail in

our testimony.

First and foremost, the safety and security requirements which

apply to fixed-rail guideway systems should be extended to cover

bus transit systems. There is currently no Federal requirement

16

that bus systems prepare or implement security plans to protect

and prepare bus operators and passengers in emergency situations.

This makes no sense.

Second, Federal law should be amended to require all transit systems in urban areas to spend a minimum percentage of their formula grant monies on security measures without exception. While

Federal law currently requires that at least 1 percent of such

grants be spent on security, it allows an exception where the grant

recipient has decided that the expenditures for security projects are

not necessary. At a minimum, that decision should be left up to the

Secretary of Transportation.

Third, Congress must appropriate sufficient funds to allow transit agencies to adopt and implement needed security improvements.

Funding is necessary and needed not only for equipment and planning, but also for training of the workers who are on the front lines

of our Nation’s systems to ensure that they are properly aware and

informed as to the steps to be taken in sudden emergencies.

Fourth, the FTA should develop a national transit terrorism

threat warning system similar to the system developed by the FAA

to warn all operating systems that an attack may be imminent.

Fifth, Congress should Federalize penalties for violent assaults

on transit operators. Despite the important public service they provide and the accompanying risks they face on the job every day,

transit operators receive very little protection under Federal and

State laws, unlike airline pilots or flight attendants.

Sixth, the FTA must further improve its transit crime reporting

system so that the true extent of the threat can be assessed.

We believe that by considering these and other measures, including the program outlined by Administrator Dorn and by my copanelists, that if the proper funding is provided to ensure that all of

the systems—the bus and rail systems—can develop and implement the kinds of plans that we know will work, that our systems

will remain safe and become safer and that the personnel that are

on the front lines and operating those systems will be well prepared to respond to sudden attacks.

Thank you, and I will be happy to later answer questions.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Molofsky.

We have been joined by the Chairman of the full Committee,

Senator Sarbanes, and at the conclusion of Mr. White’s testimony,

I will ask him for his comments.

Mr. White, again, thank you and your colleagues for wonderful

service to this community and the Nation on September 11. And

please proceed.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD A. WHITE, GENERAL MANAGER

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY

Mr. WHITE. Thank you.

Good afternoon, Chairman Reed, Senator Allard, and Committee

Chairman Sarbanes. Thank you for asking me to testify on the important subject of transit safety in the wake of September 11.

The events of September 11 have affected all aspects of national

life. Daily and routine events like business trips, vacation travel,

and commuting have been changed forever. Although WMATA handled its mission well on that tragic day, we now face altered expecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:37 Aug 23, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 81324.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4
17

tations, especially from our Federal customer base. Safety and security are of concern for each of the 1.1 million daily trips on the

system, and it is our obligation to continue to ensure that Metrorail

and Metrobus operations provide our customers safe passage, so

the important work of the National Capital Region can continue.

Before responding to your questions regarding safety, I would

like to also acknowledge the extraordinary efforts of our New York

and New Jersey colleagues. They were heroes in their communities.

As did Administrator Dorn earlier this week, I also attended the

annual meeting of the American Public Transportation Association

and heard firsthand some of the courageous and brave acts performed by transit employees, acts which literally saved thousands

of lives that otherwise would have been lost in the subway tunnels

that ran underneath the World Trade Center complex.

In those and other systems across the Nation, America’s transit

system customers were safeguarded on that sad day. And Mr.

Chairman, and Members of the Committee, I believe that WMATA

and transit systems across the country will play an even greater

role in our national defense and national security in the months

and years ahead.

On September 11, when WMATA was needed most, and in the

midst of regional chaos, Metrorail and Metrobus were ready, and

delivered for the National Capital Region. We operated the equivalent of back-to-back rush hours, virtually without incident, after

the Federal Government and other regional employers sent hundreds of thousands of workers home around mid-morning. We were

operating the entire day. We did what we do best—we moved large

numbers of people safely and efficiently.

Throughout the day, the WMATA workforce performed extraordinarily, and, I might add the vast majority of our represented employees are represented by the Amalgamated Transit Union. Not

once did an employee put their own individual concerns ahead of

their sense of duty to the customers. The transit police, the bus

and rail operators, the station personnel, the customer service representatives—everyone—demonstrated their dedication to our mission of moving people safely and securely.

Further, we never lost communications throughout the day. We

established our internal operations command center and maintained contact with local, State, and Federal authorities. We communicated with our riders through in-system messages, our phone

system, and over the Internet through the website.

WMATA, blessedly, suffered no property damage, no loss of life,

and no injury to any of our employees, or to any of our customers

on that terrible day. I would be happy to give you additional details

on the actions of that day, but I would now like to address the important safety questions raised in your invitation letter.

The most significant issue facing WMATA is adapting to the

post-September 11 reality that our freedom of mobility has been

challenged. Security is paramount in the minds of our riders.

WMATA is considered one of the safest transit systems in the

country, but we are always reviewing ways to meet the obligation

of providing greater security for the riders of the region’s public

transportation.

18

Currently, we have been doing the following, and, have been

doing the following for quite some time.

We do conduct annual counter-terrorism training for our police.

We conduct suspicious package and explosive device training, not

only for our police, but for our operations personnel as well. We

provide bomb containment trash cans. We participate in numerous

interagency related training drills. We have 1,400 cameras monitoring the rail system. We participate in the testing of emergency

technology. And we have assigned protective equipment to our police and rail operations personnel.

We are partnering with the scientific community and the Federal

Government through the Departments of Transportation, Energy,

and Justice, under the guidance of several national laboratories in

an ongoing program for chemical and biological protection. For security reasons I cannot discuss the details of this program, but

chemical sensors have been installed in a portion of our rail system

and are being tested in the system as a part of an effort to protect

our customers, first-line emergency responders, and employees. The

intent is to share the results of the program with the transit industry in this country and around the world.

In addition, WMATA has identified a number of enhancements

to current security. Since you have asked the question about investment, we have a preliminary list of approximately $20 million

for a series of security enhancements, including allowing us to provide the recording of security-related incidents. The 1,400 cameras

that I mentioned do not have recording capabilities. We believe

that we can enhance our security efforts by providing recorders to

those cameras. Also, to provide intrusion monitoring capability,

adding that same kind of technology at our rail yards and bus

garages will help limit access in secure facilities to authorized personnel only.

We are currently completing a comprehensive review of procedures, facilities, and other security enhancements. We believe that

other security options could be desirable, such as security cameras

on our buses, a global positioning vehicle location system for our

buses, and additional sensors throughout the system. The review is

an effort to identify all other potential security needs and their associated costs. Of course, this would be in addition to the $20 million that I previously mentioned.

Completing this review and implementing additional security enhancements should go a long way toward reassuring our riders that

public transit continues to be safe in the post-September 11 world.

Since September 11, we have done other things, such as providing a higher level of presence of the Metro police. We put them

in bright orange-colored vests, together with our operations personnel, so that they are more visible to our customers. We are

engaged in continued dialogue with our customers related to the

security, asking them to be additional eyes and ears for us. We are

doing additional risk assessments, and we have inplemented some

new security measures in our headquarters.

What we learned on that day was that it is critical that there are

reliable and redundant communication systems in place and that

there is an open exchange of information with other local and Federal agencies. There does need to be a regional evacuation plan deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:37 Aug 23, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 81324.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4
19

veloped for this metropolitan area in cooperation with local, State

and Federal agencies. Such a plan is now in development on an expedited basis.

Further, there needs to be regular and ongoing communication

with our riders. We found the value of our website where we had

double the number of web hits and user sessions on that day and

also handled double the number of calls into our call center.

More broadly speaking, to improve safety, I believe that all transit properties should do the following:

Make sure that you do have good emergency plans. Make sure

that you have a high level of employee training and awareness.

There is no substitute for drill, drill, drill. Make sure that you have

a high level of interagency coordination with appropriate police,

fire and emergency rescue personnel. Know your partners, but,

more importantly, have roles and responsibilities well defined and

understood before an incident takes place. Make sure the communications systems, both internal and external, are adequate and in

good working order.

To improve transit safety, echoing what we have already heard

from Administrator Dorn and others, the Federal Government

should consider the following:

Have FTA conduct a security readiness assessment of all transit

systems, or certainly the largest transit systems. Have FTA provide

technical assistance to systems in preparing good safety and security plans and in conducting training and drills. Have FTA be the

facilitator of information through the exchange of national and

international best practices through linkage with the Department

of Transportation’s Office of Intelligence and Security and the new

Office of Homeland Security. Exploring and making best use of

technology. Ensuring that the various Federal agencies with regulatory responsibility do coordinate their activities with the transit

industry. Coordinating intelligence-sharing through partnering efforts with the FBI and other key Federal agencies. I would put an

underscore on that particular item. Supporting necessary long- and

short-term investments in order to provide enhanced security and

expanded system capacity.

There was much talk of transit’s ability to shape the nature of

the first major transportation bill of the 21st Century, at the APTA

annual conference this week.

In closing, I would like to propose that now is the time for the

Nation to consider certain transit properties as a part of the national defense system, and to contemplate their value and needs as

the evacuation method of choice, and possible necessity, during specific emergency situations. Every mode of transportation is important during emergencies, but transit has experienced the highest

growth rate of any of the transportation modes over the last 5

years. It is able to move people more quickly and efficiently than

congested roads and highways can. The Nation needs to view our

transit systems in a national defense context in order to properly

recognize the new reality.

Thank you for holding a hearing on this important subject. I look

forward to answering your questions.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. White.

20

Now, I want to call upon full Committee Chairman Sarbanes for

his comments.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL S. SARBANES

Senator SARBANES. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize for not being here earlier and, unfortunately, I am going

to have to leave because of the press of other business. But I first

of all want to underscore my appreciation to you for calling what

I think is a very important and timely hearing.

Our Nation, of course, has experienced a daunting national tragedy. It is very difficult to find words to convey the devastation that

occurred on September 11. It is now 3 weeks after that day and I

am gratified to see that, while we continue to mourn those who are

lost, we are proceeding ahead with the business of the country.

This hearing reflects that.

We obviously need to focus since more and more Americans are

relying on public transportation for their daily mobility needs. It is

my understanding that the ridership is up now to a peak year

since, when, 1946 or something?

Mr. MILLAR. In the last 40 years, it is the highest ridership at

the current time since about 1960, 1961.

Senator SARBANES. That is right. So it is very clear that transit

must be a vital component of any city for transit plans to begin

with, and certainly, any emergency plans.

Today’s hearing will focus on the security of the systems themselves, but we need to keep in mind the crucial role that a reliable

public transportation network can play in responding to the demands of the traveling public.

Now, obviously, public transportation faces unique challenges in

the safety and security area. Almost by definition, transit must be

accessible to all who wish to use it. It runs on identified routes and

at published times, it has to use an extensive network of roads and

rails, spanning a wide geographic area. So, we have to do some

very careful thinking about how we address the safety and security

problems.

The United States has actually been largely spared from transitrelated terrorism, some of which rail and bus attacks have occurred

in other countries. I know that Mr. Molofsky, in his testimony, had

a list of incidents. But compared to what has been experienced in

European countries, it is a fairly short list, and some of it seems

directly attributable to individuals of a deranged nature of one sort

and another. Not that that makes it much better, but at least it

is not perceived as part of some coordinated scheme.

Transit systems have taken steps to mitigate the risks, minimize

the damages. Their efforts of course cover a wide range of things—

improved technology, increased coordination among agencies,

heightened awareness and training for transit personnel.

Mr. Chairman, I was very struck by this panel in terms of how

specific and focused the recommendations of each of the three people at the table were in terms of what could be done. By happenstance, of course, the American Public Transportation Association

just held their annual conference in Philadelphia and was able to

focus in particular on this issue. But each of our witnesses at the

table has really laid out a very detailed agenda of what can be

21

done and what needs to be done. And your holding this hearing

will help to underscore that. It helps us also to provide an agenda

to the Federal Transit Administration and to the Department of

Transportation on how we may move forward.

There is tremendous expertise not only at the table, but also reflected by their colleagues across the country. And obviously, they

are in a position to speak in a very knowledgeable way about

things that can be done. So, I am hopeful, with your prodding and

that of others here in the Congress, we can take some of these recommendations and move them very quickly into an action agenda.

Now, we will not be dealing with the reauthorization of transit.

I mean, we are still in the authorization cycle, so that remains

ahead of us. But there are obviously matters we can do in the short

run. In the long run, we need to do a lot. We were already beginning to focus on that. I know of the Chairman and the Ranking

Member’s strong commitment to transit. And I very much look forward to helping carry through with that. But Senator Reed and

Senator Allard, I think this is a very, very timely hearing and I appreciate your initiative in holding this hearing.

Thank you very much.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Chairman Sarbanes.

Let me address a question to Mr. Millar. There is a differential

between the way the Federal Government treats rail systems and

bus systems in terms of the security policy and safety policy. Do

you think there should be the same rules applied to bus systems,

as well as rail systems?

Mr. MILLAR. Bus systems and rail systems are different. The

technology is different, the operating environments are different.

So, I do not believe that a single approach makes sense.

Where we are is that, historically, rail systems carried much

larger numbers of people, and often had enclosed, fixed facilities

and were viewed as more likely targets.

What we have learned in the last 3 weeks as we focused on the

overall issues, and certainly, as my colleague, Mr. Molofsky, has

pointed out, we certainly need to do a better job across the board,

not just where the risk is the greatest.

Senator REED. I just want to be clear. Because they are different

in many ways, you cannot apply the same rules.

Mr. MILLAR. Right.

Senator REED. But there are guidelines that the Federal Government promulgates, as I understand, for rail systems and they do

not do that for buses. Would it be appropriate to have certain

guidelines for bus systems that the Federal Government promulgates?

Mr. MILLAR. I was with you until ‘‘Federal Government promulgates.’’

Senator REED. Okay.

Mr. MILLAR. We as an industry have put together guidelines for

our bus operators, regardless of size.

Senator REED. Right.

Mr. MILLAR. We are believers in voluntary compliance with those

guidelines and working with our members to do it. Administrator

Dorn said it best, though—no matter what our positions have been,

everything has to be on the table. And we would anticipate working

22

with the Congress and the Administration on appropriate guidelines in that area.

Senator REED. The issue, and you suggested in your response, is

what is voluntary and what is mandatory?

Mr. MILLAR. Yes.

Senator REED. And I hope that issue is on the table.

Mr. MILLAR. Yes, sir.

Senator REED. In that regard, before I turn to Mr. White and ask

him to comment on this line of questioning, ask you to what extent

do those bus systems meet what you would say is good practice out

there? Is it 80 percent of them? 20 percent of them?

Mr. MILLAR. The largest bus systems in the country, the ones

that probably carry 75 or 80 percent of the bus passengers in the

Nation, are all members of our bus safety program and all practice

the same kind of activities that served us so well by the rail systems on September 11. For the smaller systems, by and large, it

is a new issue to them. But if I can judge what I heard from my

members in the last few days, a very important issue for them.

Senator REED. The other issue, just to put it on the table, is not

just the guidelines. It is also requiring funds to be spent on safety

and security measures. Mr. Molofsky was quite specific to these

issues. So let me turn to Mr. White. Would you comment on these

issues?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We are an operator of both a

heavy rail system and a large bus system. I would agree with the

characterization of Mr. Millar as to, first, the differences between

a rail system and a bus system and, second, the differences between a large bus system and a small bus system.

We already voluntarily comply. We already have system safety

program plans for bus as well as rail and security plans for a bus,

as well as rail. We have already taken that step. We have also

signed up for the APTA bus review program, which is a very new

program. We are one of the first properties to sign up. As a matter

of fact, APTA is going to be conducting that audit within the next

week or two.

We believe in being very proactive. We make sure that our bus

system has the appropriate protections built into it. I agree that we

need to move forward on a voluntary basis and maybe begin to differentiate a little bit between the larger systems and the smaller

systems.

Senator REED. Thank you.

Mr. Molofsky, do you have a comment? I do not want to presume

to know your answer, although it was pretty obvious.

Mr. MOLOFSKY. I appreciate you asking those questions.

It is unclear to us what exactly the field is in terms of those systems that are complying and exactly what they are complying with,

even voluntarily.

Certainly, there are a number of the large systems that are probably exemplary. We do not think it is uniform even for those who

have some plans in place.

Also, we would note that, as we set forth in our testimony and

in correspondence to the FTA, the model bus plan, the model transit bus safety program that has been developed and circulated

without our input, is pretty light on security issues and was preVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:37 Aug 23, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 81324.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4
23

pared without any input from the transportation labor force. So, I

just want to underscore that.

We are prepared to work with our industry counterparts in the

FTA to ensure that there are acceptable guidelines that meet the

new security issues that we all face. But without a mandate, and

the funds to go along with it, given the public interest and the public policy to maximize safety and security among all of our Nation’s

systems, we would fall short of what we owe the public and the ridership that we serve.

Senator REED. Mr. Millar.

Mr. MILLAR. May I comment further on that, Mr. Chairman?

Senator Reed. Yes, absolutely, sir.

Mr. MILLAR. Certainly, the Committee is going to want to look

into the issue of what should the Federal Government pay for.

Some things will be very obvious. I am sure there is no disagreement on major, multiyear, capital items or things like security

cameras and the like. But how about the men and women to be on

the other end of those security cameras?

One of the things the public expects is to see police in the stations ready and visible. That not only improves security, but also

improves the sense of security. Right now, those are not costs that

the Federal Government covers. So we certainly would support

funding earmarked specifically for safety and security. However,

we would recommend to you, that it may be more broadly defined

than it is in current law.

Senator REED. Let me ask another question which goes to the

oversight that the FTA performs for the Office of Safety and Security. They are responsible for developing at the Federal level these

best practices, guidelines, and performing audits at the request of

local transit agencies. I wonder—Mr. Millar, Mr. Molofsky, and Mr.

White—what has been your experience with the Office of Safety

and Security? Do they need additional legislative authority, additional resources, different emphasis?

Mr. Millar.

Mr. MILLAR. We have been pleased in the last couple of years

that Safety and Security has gotten a great deal more attention.

They have added additional staff. We would support additional

staffing for those offices. We do believe that would be appropriate

and necessary. I do not know that we have a specific recommendation at this point. We may be able to provide that later. But we

do believe they need more resources, yes, sir.

Senator REED. Mr. Molofsky.

Mr. MOLOFSKY. I would agree. I would add that it is one thing

to have a good plan. It is another thing for all of the people who

work on the transit system to know what that plan is and be

trained to implement it. And to that extent, more resources are

needed both within the FTA’s Office of Safety and Security and

through FTA generally, to enable these systems to provide the appropriate training to make sure that the workforce is prepared to

respond.

Senator REED. Thank you.

Mr. White I must say, I am a user of your system. When you own

a 1991 Ford Escort, you find yourself using the system, sometimes

unexpectedly.

24

[Laughter.]

It is a wonderful system. But would you comment now?

Mr. WHITE. Mr. Chairman, I hope we are at least as reliable, if

not more reliable, than your 1991 Ford Escort.

Senator REED. Well, you are more reliable.

[Laughter.]

Mr. WHITE. I know that the Administrator said that they are

evaluating the issue of personnel and manpower with the Secretary

and the Office of Management and Budget. Ultimately, they would

need to be the best judge of their needs. Certainly, it is a program

that has grown quite large over the years with a very limited

amount, if any, of additional personnel.

There seems to be a dependency on third-party consultants to

provide the technical support to the Federal Transit Administration with its many oversight responsibilities. Given the increasing

importance which we all must attach to the safety and security

issue, I certainly would not be surprised if it were their conclusion

that additional manpower was required.

Although one can benefit from independent help, you do need to

have a fair amount of expertise on you own staff. I would hope that

the FTA can satisfy themselves that they have an adequate

amount of expertise.

Senator REED. Let me turn it over to Senator Allard.

Senator Allard.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Millar, in your testimony, you talked about providing some

audit services to your membership. We heard from the previous

panel that they also provide audit services. Do we have a duplication of effort here?

Mr. MILLAR. I do not believe we do. The APTA program goes

back to the mid-1980’s. Much of what the Federal Transit Administration does, to my knowledge, is based on the guidelines that have

been developed in the industry.

As I testified, representatives of FTA, as well as the DOT Office

of Intelligence and Security, sit on our committees to make sure

that we are coordinating properly. There are certainly transit systems that are not members of my association, but do receive Federal aid. And, quite properly, the FTA needs to assist in meeting

their needs as well. So, I do not believe there is duplication.

Senator ALLARD. Let me understand this. There are people that

are in mass transit that are not members of your association. You

believe them to use the services provided by the FTA.

Mr. MILLAR. Yes, sir.

Senator ALLARD. Now your members, do they generally use your

audit services and then supplement them with the FTA? Or do

they just say, well, what you provide is adequate enough, we do not

need to use the FTA’s.

Mr. MILLAR. You have to talk in classes of our members. The

commuter rail members use our services. The rapid transit and

light rail members use either our services or Congressionally mandated State services that are based on ours. The bus services, I

would think, generally speaking, would either use ours or the FTA.

But I really do not know that they overlap between the two. I

would be glad to get that information for you, sir.

25

Senator ALLARD. It would be helpful.

Mr. MILLAR. Sure.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you. Also, could you give us some estimate as to how many transit agencies have—we were just talking

about safety plans in place. Of those who have safety plans in

place, how many of them do you think are considering the possibility of terrorist attacks?

Mr. MILLAR. All the commuter rail systems have some form of

safety plans. There is one brand new one that is in the process of

putting theirs together now. All of the rail systems in the country

have safety plans. To my knowledge, there are 26 of the major bus

systems that are members of APTA and use our guidelines. I do

not know how many bus systems that are not in our program may

have their own safety plans underway. I do not believe we have

that information.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you.

Mr. Millar and Mr. White, you must balance a lot of interests

when you are putting together your safety plans. Your members

not only operate mass transit systems, but also bus lines.

Mr. White, you alluded that you not only operate a large mass

transit system, but also a lot of buses separately. And when it

comes to terrorist attacks and safety plans and whatnot, do you

find it difficult in establishing priorities between those two areas

of service, or do you find that you can pretty well put together adequate safety plans, including consideration of possible terrorist attacks with both of those types of services that you provide?

Mr. WHITE. I guess Mr. Millar is looking at me, so, Senator Allard, I guess that is my cue to go first.

Senator ALLARD. You go first and he will wrap it up.

Mr. WHITE. Since my arrival at WMATA in August 1996, I have

been on record, and stated before my arrival, that safety was my

top priority. Coming into WMATA, it was clear that there were a

number of issues that required attention. As I entered the authority, we were coming off of a very unfortunate incident where one

of our rail operators lost their life.

Safety has had my utmost attention, and it is the highest priority of the authority for both bus and rail. I would admit that

there are probably more things that still need to be done for both

bus and rail. The bus system is much larger and deserves to get

all the attention that it requires. I appointed a chief safety officer

immediately upon my arrival and made that department a direct

report to me. I might have been the first General Manager in the

country to do that. A number of transit systems have followed since

then. We have built that department up from about 7 or 8 people

to about 25 people in just a couple of years.

Our police department—and I believe we have done an outstanding job that has been recognized. In a recent audit conducted

by the General Accounting Office which looked at a number of our

programs, including safety and security, their quote, which I think

said it all, was an assessment by both FTA and APTA that we

were, ‘‘very good in both safety and security.’’

We have done a number of things that are leading the industry

in terms of best practices. We are not resting on our laurels. More

26

needs to be done. Quite frankly, much of it does require resources

to accomplish.

Senator ALLARD. Mr. Millar, for your membership?

Mr. MILLAR. Yes. The transit systems around the country are

controlled either as parts of city or county departments, usually, or

as separate authorities with local citizens or local elected officials

on the board. The budget battle is always there. I would not kid

you, but based on what I have heard since September 11, everyone

is understanding the need to rejuggle their budget priorities.

However, I anticipate that they will run into the stark reality,

as I indicated in my earlier answer, in taking many of the steps

to improve security. It is going to require very difficult choices between the amount of extra security one puts in place, which are

generally operating costs, versus, let us say, the number of bus

route miles that one operates, or the bus vehicle miles.

That will be a topic of conversation throughout the country, and

I would encourage that as this Committee looks at this whole security issue, that we be realistic about the funding that is going to

be necessary. We cannot kid the American public: To have good,

safe, secure systems costs money.

Senator ALLARD. Where I see us struggling, if we look at Mr.

Molofsky’s figures there, most of the instances we see reported on

there are actually on buses. But, then, you could have one incident

on a train that could be more catastrophic than 25 incidents on a

bus. And that is one of the things, Mr. Chairman, that we will have

to struggle with and this Congress will probably have to struggle

with.

Now, the country has more than 500 transit agencies running

the gamut of really large, sophisticated agencies, like the one here

in Washington, and then there are those that have smaller agencies, like the one I have in my hometown of Loveland, Colorado— Valentine capital, I might add. Do such desperate systems have

very different emergency needs? And do smaller systems also have

adequate access to technical and financial assistance, in your view,

Mr. Millar?

Mr. MILLAR. In my view, there is certainly a difference in scale

that results in a difference in need. But safety and security must

be dealt with in every size property.

Americans tended to think that smaller communities in rural

areas and perhaps places away from the largest cities were the

safer place. Unfortunately, the history of our country in the last

few years is terror can strike anywhere. So, we are working with

the FTA and looking at regional meetings that might be easier for

smaller members to get to. We have also recently amended our bus

program to allow for joint bus audits of smaller communities. We

tested that in the State of Illinois among small properties and it

worked very well. We need to rethink where and when things can

happen and who needs to know.

Senator ALLARD. I want to follow up on the smaller systems, like

my hometown. They are relying pretty much, from what I can tell,

on their local police departments and maybe the sheriff’s department in some instances, to provide the safety requirements to at

least be a participant if there is a terrorist act or some kind of

event that occurs on those systems. In your view, do you believe

27

local law enforcement is prepared to respond to these situations?

And would you comment a little bit about how much coordination

and planning is happening right now between these smaller transit

systems and local law enforcement?

Mr. MILLAR. I am certainly no expert on the capability of law enforcement in smaller communities. I can tell you, as a General

Manager, as I was for many years in a larger community, that it

is only in recent years that law enforcement in my experience has

begun to come to grips with terrorism. And of course, that is because we have all learned a lot more there. So, I would anticipate

that there would be more need to train law enforcement officers,

particularly in smaller communities, who may not have had to face

this before.

I would think that we need to look to partnerships. For example,

one of the things that we used to do when I was in Pittsburgh was

do joint exercises with the surrounding transit agencies. They were

very small, we were very large, so that we could share our expertise and knowledge. As Mr. White testified, and I alluded to, having the relationships established with local police, local fire, and

local emergency workers, long before there is a need, becomes key

and becomes critical, and that is true whether you are talking

about the largest systems or the tiniest systems.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Senator Allard.

Let me follow up quickly with just a few questions.

Mr. Millar, you may not have these numbers, but if you could get

them to us, we would appreciate it. Generally what on average

does a transit system spend on security, if you look across the Nation? And then, if you could help us, is it adequate?

Mr. MILLAR. I really do not know, but we will be glad to get that

for you, sir.

Senator REED. Thank you. And also, if you could help give us

your perspective as to what might be an adequate level. I know it

might change system by system, but give us an idea.

Mr. MILLAR. Yes, sir.

Senator REED. Mr. Millar, you suggested, and Mr. White and Mr.

Molofsky, that there might be some comments you would like to

make informally. We will arrange, subject to our procedures, for an

opportunity to get your informal feedback, which you might be able

to share some details we cannot share now.

Mr. Molofsky, you also indicated that one of the key elements is

training of transit operators, the whole workforce. Is there any system in particular that you would point out as being a model of

that, an exemplar of that system?

Mr. MOLOFSKY. I am sitting next to one.

[Laughter.]

Senator REED. Good.

Mr. MOLOFSKY. WMATA is a good example. I just want to add

another note on that.

Senator REED. Please.

Mr. MOLOFSKY. We know that Lamar, Colorado is not Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. And we know that systems of different sizes

are going to require different kinds of plans and programs requiring more or less amounts of money.

28

The point I want to emphasize is this. Just as the local police in

Manchester, Tennessee, responded very effectively to the Greyhound incident, we believe that local law enforcement can respond

to incidents as they occur. We have the highest regard for the police force in this country.

However, at the same time, what we are stressing is the need for

a set of standards, of requirements for the transit systems, both

large and small, to convey to their workforce to have in place the

kinds of security systems that make sense for that community. We

are not saying that Pittsburgh’s system should be applied to the

smaller towns in other parts of the country. But as we speak and

as we sit here, the bus systems and bus drivers, which are highly

exposed on the Nation’s roads, are not working for systems that are

required to have appropriate programs in place. And that is where

we are pledging today to work with the industry and the FTA to

identify what those kinds of programs should be and look for the

resources to make sure that they can provide them.

Thank you.

Senator REED. Thank you.

Finally, Mr. White, you alluded to one of the key elements in

your ability to respond so effectively, was redundant communications. And I am just wondering, Mr. Millar, Mr. Molofsky, Mr.

White, is that a problem in other systems? Obviously, it was not

a problem in Washington, thank goodness.

Mr. Millar.

Mr. MILLAR. Everything we have heard from our members is that

that is essential because cell phones might work one place, radios

another, land lines another. Ten minutes from now, what worked

10 minutes ago does not work, but something else has come back

on-line. So, yes, redundant communications are essential.

Senator REED. And I presume that is another resource challenge

in terms of getting that in every system, from Lamar, Colorado, to

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Mr. Molofsky.

Mr. MOLOFSKY. It is not just communication between the driver

and the transit authority and the enforcement agencies. It is communication that allows the transit agencies themselves, the GPS

and other systems, to track the equipment that is on the street.

This is important for Greyhound, as we have learned and had reinforced yesterday, and it is equally important for our transit systems. And Mr. White emphasized it and we think it is an important program that should be supported around the country.

Senator REED. Mr. White, a comment or anything else that you

might want to add at this juncture?

Mr. WHITE. Mr. Chairman, I would go back again to stressing

the importance of interagency coordination. You have heard a number of us speak to that and, clearly, the Administrator has spoken

to that. To emphasize the point, make sure that everybody has

practiced well so that when you show up on the scene, people are

not fumbling all over one another trying to find out who has jurisdiction on the scene.

That is absolutely critical, and only comes from training and coordination, actually, inter-personal relationship. You need to know

29

these people because they are going to be your best friends. It is

going to be a mutual-aid society, and that is essential.

Another issue—you have to understand the nature of the world

that we live in here in Washington, DC—we have found, of course,

to be of tremendous assistance to us, is the sharing of intelligence

information. That is absolutely critical. Although one can never

guarantee that you can prevent something from happening, the

best place to start is on the front end, to know that you should be

on the look-out for something, rather than on the back end, trying

to respond to something that happened. So that is very important.

Senator REED. Well, thank you, Mr. White, Mr. Molofsky, and

Mr. Millar, for your excellent testimony. The good news, I believe,

is that we are aware of the very serious threat to the security of

the public as they try to move about this country. With that knowledge, I hope that we can go forward and do more to ensure their

security and safety. But it is a very difficult and daunting task, as

suggested by you gentlemen and Ms. Dorn.

And Senator Allard and I obviously pledge our best efforts to

work with everyone to ensure you have the resources and the direction to go forward and to ensure that we do all we can to prevent

any type of possible incident on our transit systems throughout the

United States.

Senator Allard.

Senator ALLARD. Mr. Chairman, just to kind of bring this to a

close here. It is obvious that there has already been a considerable

amount done and thought put in by the industry. I want to congratulate you.

But after September 11, things have changed. Certainly it is appropriate for us to review carefully the new situation that now exists in this country. I am pleased with the comments from the

Chairman. We will carefully review what was said here and carefully review as far as your industry is concerned and see what

there is that we can do to be helpful in this effort to make our transit systems safer.

Thank you.

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Allard.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

[Prepared statements, response to written questions, and additional material supplied for the record follow:]

30

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEBBIE STABENOW

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad you have called this hearing and I appreciate our witnesses coming before the Subcommittee today.

September 11 will certainly be remembered as a day that changed our Nation forever. As we continue to grieve the lives lost in this horrendous attack, this Congress

also has come together to tackle the serious security and anti-terrorism issues that

must be addressed, in order for our Nation’s business to go on.

One of the issues foremost on our minds is addressing the public’s safety. Whether

it is on our Nation’s airplanes, trains, and buses, in our offices and Federal buildings, or even in our football and baseball stadiums, this attack has made us all feel

vulnerable. We must remember that terrorism is only victorious when it makes us

fear and question the way we conduct our daily lives. Our daily commute to work,

weekly trips to the grocery store, weekend football games—all of these things must

go on, if we are to defeat this insidious threat. That is why it is paramount that

we reassure Americans of the continued safety of our Nation’s public transportation

system.

Millions of Americans rely on our Nation’s buses, subways, and commuter trains

every day to travel to their homes, schools, and jobs. While the U.S. transit systems

have fortunately not been the focus of terrorism, buses, trains, and subways have

long been targets of terrible attacks in such countries as Israel, France, and Japan.

Many of our public transportation systems have responded to the growing threat

of terrorism, and have added additional training and security programs to protect

passengers, employees, and facilities from the devastating consequences of a terrorist act. In the wake of this terrible tragedy, we need to expand and support these

efforts to protect the public’s safety.

Mr. Chairman, I also would like to commend both the Washington Metropolitan

Area Transit Authority (WMATA) and the New York City transit authorities for responding quickly and effectively to the September 11 attacks.

After the Pentagon was struck by the hijacked airliner, WMATA closed the Pentagon Metrorail Station and delivered engineers to assess the structural damage.

The system also provided buses to help transport those injured at the Pentagon to

area hospitals, and provided several Metrobuses to assist DC Metropolitan Police in

moving personnel to several locations throughout the District.

Both Washington and New York transit systems also helped passengers safely return to their homes and their loved ones within hours of the attack. Even in the

wake of these horrible attacks, the Washington and New York City transit employees kept these regions moving, safely, and efficiently.

I know the witnesses before us today have an impressive breadth of experience

on this topic, and I look forward to hearing their ideas and insight for helping maintain the safety of our Nation’s public transit systems.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

—————

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JON S. CORZINE

Chairman Reed, thank you for calling this hearing of the Subcommittee on Housing and Transportation to discuss the safety of our transit systems. This is a critical

question for this Subcommittee to consider in the aftermath of the horrific attack

on our Nation on September 11 and I look forward to hearing the testimony of Federal Transit Administrator Dorn and the other witnesses.

Mr. Chairman, we saw what a vital role our mass transit system can play in the

events that unfolded on September 11 when, in both Washington and New York,

trains and buses helped ease the crush of the thousands of people leaving their offices at the same time, trying to get home to their loved ones. I can tell the Committee that, in the aftermath of this attack, mass transit ridership into New York

City remains at high levels.

We have to make sure that mass transit will be able to continue to play such a

vital role. That cannot happen unless people know that the trains, buses, and ferries

they are riding are safe.

That is why I am glad to hear from the witnesses today and I look forward to

considering how the Federal Government can help to keep our Nation’s mass transit

systems safe and secure. But I want to point out that any look at the security needs

of mass transit must eventually consider the need for increased rail construction.

Mr. Chairman, one of the many lessons we learned from this tragedy in my home

State is how much of a strain a terrorist attack can put on a mass transit network.

While I am proud to say that the State agencies that coordinate transit between

New York and New Jersey—New Jersey Transit and the Port Authority of New

31

York and New Jersey—met the challenge, it is clear that this overloaded infrastructure needs to provide more options to get people off the road.

Mr. Chairman, we need to ensure that there are enough rail lines to support cities

like Washington and New York both during normal times as well as in emergencies.

That is why I am supporting major rail projects for the New York metropolitan area

such as building a rail tunnel under the Hudson River from New York into New

Jersey. Such a project is necessary to help the metropolitan area meet this new demand and I will be working to secure funding for it in the future.

Only by increasing the availability of mass transit, as well as increasing security

on buses, trains, and ferries, can we say that we have a safe and secure transit system.

—————

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JENNIFER L. DORN

ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

OCTOBER 4, 2001

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. Good afternoon. Thank you for

the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Federal Transit Administration regarding

the security of our Nation’s transit systems.

Every year, America’s public transportation systems carry more than 9 billion

passengers and employ nearly 400,000 people. It is estimated that our public transportation infrastructure—subways, light rail, buses, ferries, and commuter railroad

services—is valued at hundreds of billions of dollars. Ensuring the security of the

Americans who depend upon this infrastructure, as well as the security of these important assets, has always been an important duty of every transit agency, but the

events of September 11 have proven to all of us this responsibility must receive even

more attention and resources in order to keep our communities safe and moving.

I want to express my personal gratitude to our transit colleagues in New York

and Washington DC, who had emergency response plans in place and the courageous leadership to take action when the unimaginable happened. We have all been

riveted by stories in the press about the heroes of September 11. I have one more

I would like to share.

At 8:52 a.m. on September 11, minutes after the first hijacked jet plowed into One

World Trade Center, a Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) train master gave lifesaving instructions to conductors and operators.

A train from Newark, carrying about 1,000 passengers, had just pulled into the

station below the World Trade Center. The train master told the crew to keep everyone on the train, board everyone in the station, and immediately depart for the

Exchange Place stop in Jersey City. Public transportation employees immediately

evacuated passengers who mistakenly left the train.

A train from Hoboken carrying another 1,000 people was just behind the Newark

train. The train master told that crew to keep the doors closed at the Trade Center

and head immediately to Jersey City.

The train master then told another train in Jersey City to discharge all passengers and head back to the World Trade Center to evacuate remaining travelers

and transit personnel. That train departed with its precious cargo at 9:10 a.m., 40

minutes before the first building collapsed.

That train master, Richie Moran, and PATH’s emergency response plan, saved

thousands of lives. As we watched the death toll climb in New York, it is astounding

to realize that no one riding the PATH or New York City subway lines that morning

was injured.

At the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, similarly quick action occurred. Within minutes of the Pentagon crash, all Metrorail trains were ordered into

tunnels, where they would be safe from any further air attacks. Twelve minutes

later, with the skies clear, Metro was up and running safely—once again.

The State Department reports that in 1991, 20 percent of all violent attacks

worldwide were against transportation targets; by 1998, 40 percent involved transportation targets, with a growing number directed at bus and rail systems. The

recent attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon using hijacked airliners

reminds us all that we must respond to a new terrorist reality—terrorism that is

well-financed, well-organized, and ruthless. The credible threat of increasing terrorism directed toward our Nation’s transit systems requires that we take immediate prudent action to prevent, prepare for, and respond to violence—the nature

and magnitude of which was once unimaginable.

32

Today, I would like to share with you the immediate steps that FTA is taking to

help keep our communities safe and moving, and to discuss some of the issues that

we believe should be considered as the President and Congress examine the broader

implications of the new terrorist environment.

I want to talk with you about the work we have underway to help our community

public transportation agencies cope with this threat. There are 5 components to our

security initiative: assessment, planning, technology, testing, and training.

First, assessment. Enhancing transit security must begin with an in-depth, professional assessment of the threats to and vulnerabilities of each transit system.

This is not a ‘‘one size fits all’’ undertaking; every transit system has different components—tunnels, bridges, open rights-of-way—and different intersections with

other means of transportation—connecting with airports, train stations, highways.

Some of our transit systems are 100 years old and coping with design features that

could never have anticipated even the criminal, let alone the terrorist, threats of

today. Other systems are brand-new, built using security-minded design concepts

and state-of-the-art technology.

In order to ensure an integrated, intermodal response to security concerns, Secretary Mineta has created the National Infrastructure Security Committee (NISC).

The NISC’s mission is to executive preemptive, preventive, protective, and recovery

efforts for critical elements of the U.S. national transportation system. FTA is working with NISC, the States, and transit agencies to identify high value/high consequence transit operations, as well as their current protection strategies. An initial

list has already been developed. We will be working with NISC and other Federal

entities involved in such efforts to coordinate strategy and minimize duplication of

effort. FTA will also be working with NISC to develop national standards for a prudent level of protection for categories of critical assets. We will work with our counterparts within DOT and in other agencies to identify and close the gaps in security.

The second component of FTA’s security initiative is planning. Effective response

to an act of terrorism requires instantaneous and sound decisionmaking in a volatile, high-pressure environment. Although our largest transit operations already

have emergency response plans, small- and medium-sized transit agencies are not

always well-prepared, and even our largest agencies need to reexamine their plans

in light of today’s potential threats. FTA plans to provide hands-on assistance to

transit agencies as they develop and refine their emergency response plans in light

of their security assessment findings and heightened terrorist threats. These plans

serve as blueprints for action in the wake of an attack. They articulate the steps

to take in order to notify authorities of the incident, evacuate passengers, protect

personnel and equipment, activate a unified command and communications system

among transit, police, fire, and emergency medical units, and restore the system to

normal. In the wake of a terrorist attack or even a natural disaster, we cannot afford to lose precious moments simply trying to figure out what to do; plans must

be in place.

The third component of our security initiative involves technology and capital

equipment investments. FTA is evaluating the need for purchasing equipment and

technology to enhance security and emergency preparedness. These acquisitions

may range from personal protective equipment for train operators and station managers, to surveillance equipment for stations and facilities, to readying the latest

chemical and explosive detection systems for deployment in transit systems.

The fourth component involves testing. When I visited with the New York transit

officials in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attack, I asked them what advice they might share with other transit agencies based on their own experience.

Their advice? In addition to having an emergency response plan in place, they recommend that every transit agency conduct regular emergency drills—not just fire

drills—to keep skills sharp, update response plans, and build personal relationships

with counterparts in the police, fire, and emergency medical response organizations.

Although regular tests and drills are routinely recommended by security experts in

FTA and elsewhere, there is nothing like hearing advice from people who have lived

it. As a result, FTA plans to work with local transit agencies to conduct full-scale

emergency drills to test their plans and equipment.

Finally, we will be offering additional security training and workshops. We intend

to expand our free security and emergency response training to incorporate new

security strategies and tactics, and to give more local transit employees the opportunity to attend emergency response training. It is imperative that we have a transit workforce that understands security issues and is fully prepared to respond

should an emergency occur.

In an effort to assist transit operators around the country as they reevaluate potential security threats, their emergency response plans, employee training needs,

and ways to both reassure and work with the public to reduce security risks, FTA

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will soon be mailing a Security Toolkit to 600 transit agencies throughout the country. The toolkit will include resource guides, planning tools, training opportunities,

and sample public awareness publications.

FTA is fundamentally a grant-making agency. We manage $8 billion in grants for

programs ranging from the purchase of buses to the construction of new subway systems. We also provide training and technical assistance to local transit agencies. We

are neither an operational agency, nor a traditional regulatory agency.

One of the greatest challenges that we all face is ensuring that the safety and

security of our transit systems remains a high priority in years to come. The sustainability of whatever requirements, programs, and funding we put in place today

must be considered as we move forward—particularly in light of the other costs that

loom on the horizon. Although a number of brand new systems are being built

throughout the Nation, we also have many aging systems that need rehabilitation

and redesign. And figuring out a way to accomplish all that needs to be done will

be a challenge for every level of government.

Let me close by, again, thanking the Committee for initiating this dialogue. I am

eager to work with you to keep our communities safe and moving.

Thank you.

—————

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM W. MILLAR

PRESIDENT, AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION

OCTOBER 4, 2001

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to testify on the security and safety

of public transportation systems. We commend Congress for its quick response to

the horrific terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.

About APTA

The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) is a nonprofit international association of over 1,400 public and private member organizations including transit systems and commuter rail operators; planning, design, construction, and

finance firms; product and service providers; academic institutions; transit associations and State departments of transportation. APTA members serve the public

interest by providing safe, efficient, and economical transit services and products.

Over 90 percent of persons using public transportation in the United States and

Canada are served by APTA member systems.

Overview

Mr. Chairman, the APTA thanks you, and the Committee on Banking, Housing,

and Urban Affairs, for crafting the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century

(TEA–21), which has so effectively improved the industry’s ability to meet demands

for capital investment and service. The legislation has significantly improved our industry’s ability to meet the growing demand for service in urban, suburban, and

rural communities throughout America.

The good news is that TEA–21’s increases in Federal investment and the predictability of those funds has paid off. Public transportation ridership is up 21 percent

over the past 5 years, to the highest levels in 40 years. The Federal investments

in TEA–21 and earlier legislation enabled the transit industry to develop new transit services, and to upgrade and modernize older transit infrastructure. This investment paid enormous dividends on September 11, when public transportation in New

York City and in Washington, DC helped safely evacuate citizens from center cities.

Indeed, this same story was true around the country, as transit systems quickly and

efficiently evacuated people from closed airports and downtown areas. Mr. Chairman, we remember that the interstate highway program was begun by President

Eisenhower as a national defense interstate highway program. We can now certainly recognize that public transportation too has a significant national defense

component, and we are extremely proud of our transit systems in New York, Washington, DC, and around the country, and how they responded so successfully to the

horrific events of September 11.

Post-September 11 Activities

Mr. Chairman, APTA was honored and pleased that Transportation Secretary

Norm Mineta came to Philadelphia Monday morning to deliver the keynote address

to our Annual Meeting where over 2,000 transit professionals gathered. He emphasized the importance of public transportation, and the critical importance of a

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continuing focus on safety and security. In particular, he said ‘‘preparation equals

performance,’’ and I want to assure you that we are taking that message to heart.

Specifically, let me respond to the Subcommittee’s questions regarding what steps

APTA is taking to assist its members in improving safety, and what would be useful

to transit systems in that regard.

• On September 19, 2001, we wrote to the Federal Transit Administration (FTA)

offering our full support and cooperation as the FTA and DOT develop programs

and priorities in response to the tragic events of September 11. In that letter,

which is included as an attachment to this testimony, we provided an initial list

of critical needs for transit-related safety and security functions. These include

capital items, operational items, and research and development needs in the industry. Needless to say, considerable investment is needed to begin to make these

items available throughout our industry.

• At APTA’s Annual Meeting in Philadelphia, we added a special forum on the

events of September 11, and how our transit systems responded so effectively to

it. Officials from New York, Washington, DC, and other key cities discussed what

they did in responding to the attacks and how they successfully evacuated citizens

safely from center cities. Sharing critical information and best practices among

our membership is one of the strongest resources we can provide as an association. We will be sharing these ‘‘lessons learned’’ with our membership and the

Federal Transit Administration.

• Together with the Mineta Institute in San Jose, California, the American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials, and DOT’s Research and Special

Projects Administration, APTA will partner in a special invitation-only conference

in Washington, DC in late October to focus on a Mineta Institute study on terrorism and how to respond to it. This is the beginning of a comprehensive industry effort to discuss security issues on an ongoing basis at meetings, seminars,

and conferences around the country.

• Discussions are underway with the International Union of Public Transport

(UITP) to coordinate efforts among transit systems worldwide to address safety

and security issues.

• Finally, we will continue to work closely with the DOT and FTA in making certain that safety and security remain paramount issues in our industry and that

programs being developed by the DOT reflect industry needs and operations. We

understand that FTA hopes to make financial and technical assistance available

to transit systems around the country to assess their state of readiness to meet

security threats. We strongly urge that this initiative be properly funded. Moreover, FTA Administrator Jennifer Dorn also spoke at our Annual Meeting on

Monday, and stated that FTA would be sending a ‘‘rapid response’’ toolbox to

every transit system in the country, and we look forward to collaborating with the

FTA in that effort.

Let me now outline for you some of the things we, as the association for the public

transportation industry, do to promote safety and security in public transportation,

and explain how these plans and programs address significant issues.

Safety and Security Plans

We are proud as an association to have established the industry standard for

transit system safety program plans, which include security and emergency response elements. In October 1986, APTA initiated activities to develop a safety management program for the public transportation industry. A pilot program of highlevel, formal safety audits were scheduled at six volunteer transit systems over an

18 month period. Upon completion of the pilot program, APTA’s staff

gathered information from the auditors and participants in the pilot audits, and produced a report, which recommended a course of action on safety accreditation. The

APTA Manual for the Development of Transit System Safety Program Plans was

a result of these recommendations.

The Manual serves several purposes. It establishes a recommended format for

System Safety Program Plans (SSPP). The SSPP is developed by each transit system; it identifies all safety-related responsibilities, and assigns these responsibilities

to proper areas within the organization. A transit system maintains oversight of its

safety status and program to ensure all responsibilities are being carried out and

coordinated. This process is known as System Safety. A transit system establishes

a SSPP in a formal written document. It implements the SSPP by policy directives

from the chief executive officer.

The APTA Manual assists transit systems with established System Safety Program Plans in the development and definition of their safety programs. It also provides tangible evidence to the public and governmental oversight agencies that the

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transit industry possesses the means and expertise to develop sound, effective,

proactive safety programs designed to reduce accident potential and increase the efficiency of transit operations.

A key element of the SSPP is security. Each transit system’s safety program

should provide a proactive, prevention-oriented approach to security. This element

emphasizes the importance of identifying potential threats and areas of vulnerability, developing approaches that will minimize those threats and vulnerabilities,

and demonstrating a clear and proactive approach to security.

Emergency Response Planning is also a primary component of any safety program. As such, it must be given constant attention. A typical process for the component includes an approved, coordinated schedule for all the emergency response

elements. Meetings with outside agencies, emergency drills, and revision and distribution of Emergency Response Procedures are activities that are then scheduled

on a periodic basis with necessary approvals and checks for completion built in. The

safety unit of the transit organization is generally responsible for coordination of

these types of emergency response functions. As part of the regular reports to general management issued by the safety unit, status reports on emergency response

activities are included. These reports then provide an audit trail for both internal

and external audits.

APTA Safety Management Audit Programs

Once having created a system safety program, the industry next turned to ways

to make sure that systems were implemented in a comprehensive and voluntary

way. As a result, the Safety Management Audit Program was created to equip transit systems with industry-created formats for developing a System Safety Program

Plan (SSPP) and to provide formal evaluations on how well those System Safety

Program Plans have been implemented. APTA has a Director of Safety and Security

and a staff of auditors who carry out this work. The audit and program participation

is completely voluntary and is supported by dues paid by industry participants. The

audits are completed every 3 years. There are three different programs: the Rail

Safety Audit Program, the Commuter Rail Safety Management Program, and most

recently the Bus Safety Management Program.

So successful has APTA’s SSPP and audit program been that the APTA system

program plan format and elements within the Rail Safety Audit Program (including

security) are officially recognized by the Federal Transit Administration in its Rail

Safety Oversight regulation at 49 CFR Part 659 as a way of meeting the regulatory

requirements for System Safety Program Plans for fixed guideway systems. The

audit includes an extensive review of all safety-related functions of the organization,

and provides a mechanism for continual improvement for system safety. However,

since each system is unique, the plan must allow for differences unique to each system.

All but one of the Nation’s 18 commuter rail systems participate in APTA’s audit

program, and we are in discussions with that remaining system. Moreover, all rail

transit systems in the country participate either in the APTA Rail Audit Program

or in State programs that follow the guidelines for system safety established by

APTA. A similar program for the Nation’s bus systems is being implemented by

APTA. This voluntary program for bus operations similarly includes elements specific to security and emergency preparedness.

The APTA System Safety Program Plan format and elements within the Commuter Rail Safety Management Program (including security) are recognized by the

Federal Railroad Administration as a way of meeting the guidelines for System

Safety Program Plans for commuter rail systems. Each audit addresses policies,

processes, and procedures set out in the transit agency’s safety plan and includes

a review of supporting documentation, interviews with agency personnel, and a variety of operational field observations.

Under our Safety Management Audit Programs, each transit operation receives

the benefit of an independent evaluation of its safety management processes by a

team of experienced safety personnel. This evaluation plays a critical role in optimizing safety practices at each system.

This evaluation assists each system’s ability to demonstrate its diligence for safety

and the ability of our industry to maintain self-regulation.

Other APTA Safety Initiatives

APTA has a Standing Committee on Public Safety that has a forum for industry

personnel involved in policing and security functions to share information, experiences, and resources. This very active committee has subcommittees on Operations;

Outreach; Professional Development and Strategic Planning. The committee also

conducts a number of workshops and seminars on transit security in conjunction

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ing organizations including the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the

International Railway Police, and the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives.

APTA has developed a Safety & Security on-line ‘‘list-serve’’ resource that enables

its members to request information and pose questions to industry peers on matters

pertaining to safety and security issues.

APTA and its members have been instrumental in assisting the development and

delivery of programs on transit system security as provided through the Transportation Safety Institute. Transit system personnel from numerous agencies continue

to benefit from attending these training programs.

APTA and its members have also assisted in the development and delivery of the

Land Transportation Anti-Terrorism Training Program that was a joint effort of the

Department of Transportation’s Office of Intelligence and Security, and the Federal

Law Enforcement Training Center. Many transit system personnel are benefiting

from their participation in this program.

Standard Setting

APTA is engaged in a broad-based standard-setting exercise in a number of significant areas, and clearly, standards play a key role in safety and security.

In 1996, APTA’s commuter rail members voluntarily undertook an effort with $2

million of their own funds to create Passenger Rail Equipment Safety Standards

(PRESS). Our commuter rail members are regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), which participated in the development of these standards.

These standards are reviewed in an ongoing effort and are updated as necessary.

As part of the PRESS program, the FRA, APTA, and the commuter railroads recently collaborated on a series of 10 courses to prepare railroad employees to meet

new industry-wide training requirements.

With the success of the commuter rail effort, APTA has turned to a similar initiative for transit rail equipment. Some 27 APTA rail members will be contributing

over $3 million to develop a range of vehicle design and operational standards over

the next 3 years.

In addition, APTA has just been awarded a $400,000 grant by the FTA to help

establish interface standards in the transit industry for Intelligent Transportation

System applications.

All of these standard-setting exercises help the industry bring a special focus to

standardized products and services. These are activities that clearly help support

safety and security goals.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, these are just some of the issues that we think can help improve

safety and security of transit services. We again thank you and the Subcommittee

for your commitment to investing in the Nation’s transportation infrastructure and

look forward to working with you on safety and security issues and on the reauthorization of TEA–21.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. MOLOFSKY

GENERAL COUNSEL, AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION

OCTOBER 4, 2001

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my name is Robert Molofsky and

I am the General Counsel of the Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL–CIO, CLC, the

largest labor union representing transit employees in the United States and Canada. It is my pleasure to appear here on behalf of our International President James

La Sala to discuss the ATU’s views and concerns about the safety issues facing the

transit industry, as well as to offer recommendations for making our transit systems

safer and addressing the heightened concerns in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.

As the representative of over 175,000 employees in the transit industry, maintaining and operating bus, light rail, ferry, over-the-road bus, school bus, and paratransit vehicles throughout North America, the ATU views the safety and security

of these transit systems to be of utmost importance. As such, we are extremely

grateful for this Committee’s decision to hold this hearing today and for inviting the

ATU to participate on this panel.

This is certainly a difficult time for those in the transportation industry, and indeed, for all Americans. It has now been 23 days since this Nation witnessed the

horror of the events on September 11. Since then, President Bush, his Administration and this Congress have shown remarkable bipartisanship in their efforts to implement new counter-terrorism measures. The airlines, along with the assistance of

the Federal Government, have adopted stringent new security measures to better

protect America’s air travelers. And transit systems throughout the country, with

the full support and assistance of the ATU, have begun to reexamine existing security procedures and emergency preparedness plans, in the hopes of preventing further tragedy.

Despite all of these extraordinary measures being taken, we know that no one is

immune from future attacks. Just this week, Bush Administration officials announced that there will likely be more terrorist strikes in the United States, possibly including chemical and biological warfare.

This is not news to the ATU or the transit industry, who for years have faced

startling statistics and real life events that have put the industry on guard for the

very real potential of terrorist or quasi-terrorist attacks.

According to the most recent records of the U.S. Department of Transportation’s

Office of Intelligence and Security, in 1998, attacks against transportation and

transportation infrastructures accounted for 42 percent of all international terrorist

attacks reported by the U.S. State Department. The Transportation Research Board

found that 34 percent of the violent acts against transportation target rail and

buses.

The devastating effects of such attacks against mass transportation have been

seen throughout the world. Ongoing bombing campaigns directed at the Paris Metro

have targeted trains, passenger terminals, and other rail facilities, resulting in hundreds of casualties. In 1995, between 5,000 and 6,000 people were exposed to sarin

gas in the Tokyo subway system, resulting in 12 deaths and marking the first time

chemical or biological weapons have been deployed on a large scale by terrorists.

And in Israel and Britain, buses have too often been the unfortunate targets of terrorist bombings.

Mass transit systems in the United States have also figured prominently in many

of these acts of terrorism and extreme violence. In a survey of transit agencies conducted in 1997, over 90 percent of the agencies surveyed said they had experienced

bomb threats, more than 50 percent with hate crimes, and almost 30 percent with

hijackings and multiple victim shootings. In responding to terrorist events, almost

60 percent of the transit agencies surveyed felt that they were not well prepared

to deal with these kinds of activities. ATTACHMENT ONE summarizes some of the

most violent attacks against mass transportation in the United States, beginning as

far back as 1927, when two bombs exploded in two New York City subway stations,

and as recently as May 2001, when a city bus in Los Angeles was hijacked by an

armed gunman and crashed into a minivan, killing the minivan driver and injuring

seven others.

Fortunately, these types of terrorist and quasi-terrorist incidents are rare. However, less severe forms of violence against the operators of public transportation vehicles are much more common. These frequent occurrences have plagued the transit

industry in the United States for far too long. ATTACHMENT TWO summarizes some

of the assaults against mass transit operators and vehicles that have occurred since

last December, including the armed hijacking of a bus in Council Bluffs, Nebraska,

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the stabbing of a SEPTA bus driver in Delaware County, Pennsylvania, the brutal

beating of another SEPTA driver in Philadelphia less than 2 months later, and the

recent shooting aboard a Greyhound bus at a midtown Manhattan terminal that

wounded four passengers.

While the severity of these events may pale in comparison to the recent tragedies

in New York and Washington, DC, these assaults are nonetheless a serious safety

threat to transit personnel, passengers and to the rest of the traveling public who

share the roads with our mass transportation vehicles. We saw the potential devastation that can result from such assaults in 1998, when a deranged passenger onboard a Seattle Metro bus shot and killed bus operator and ATU Local 587 member

Mark McLaughlin, causing the bus to careen off a bridge and resulting in the death

of one passenger and injuring 32 others.

Because public transportation brings masses of people together and is highly visible and familiar, it is an attractive target for crime. Transit operators, in particular,

are often the victim of such crimes as they are forced to deal on a daily basis with

passengers who become angry over bus fares, delays, crowded vehicles, and for various other reasons. Clearly, such crimes result not only in harm to the operator but

also seriously impair the ability of that operator to safely transport passengers.

In response to the prevalence of such violent incidents, the Amalgamted Tranist

Union has for years been steadfastly committed to addressing the threat of terrorist

attacks against mass transportation and the growing rates of violence and assaults

against transit workers and vehicles. In addition to raising awareness of the issue

among our membership, the ATU has worked along with the transit industry to implement additional safety and security procedures in the workplace to protect our

members. We have worked with and urged the Federal Transit Administration to

include additional security measures in its model transit safety programs. And we

have worked with Members of Congress to urge passage of legislation making assault against a transit operator a Federal crime, the same protection extended to

airline pilots and flight attendants. Significantly, since 1998 with the passage of

TEA–21, Congress, at our urging, has provided increased funding to the National

Transit Institute, enabling it to provide important safety research and training programs to transit workers.

Over the last two sessions of Congress, we have also supported and urged passage

of the Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act, currently H.R. 525, originally

sponsored by Congresswoman Tillie Fowler and presently sponsored by Congressman Wayne Gilchrest. This bill, which was unanimously approved by the Economic

Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management Subcommittee and is

now pending before the full Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, seeks to

improve coordination of Federal efforts with regard to preparedness against terrorist

attacks in the United States. As part of the development of the Domestic Terrorism

Preparedness Plan required by this bill, an assessment will be required of the risk

of terrorist and quasi-terrorist attacks against transportation, energy, and other

infrastructure facilities, including passengers, personnel, and other individuals occupying such facilities. In addition, the bill requires an evaluation of available technologies and practices to determine the best means of protecting such facilities and

persons from terrorist and quasi-terrorist attacks.

I want to take this opportunity to ask the Members of this Committee to urge

their colleagues on the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, as well

as the entire House of Representatives, to expeditiously pass this long overdue legislation or incorporate its provisions into other comprehensive security legislation

under consideration. And, if this bill appears before this body, I ask that you and

your Senate colleagues do the same.

While I have painted a rather grim picture of the security threats facing the transit industry, I would be remiss if I did not point out that the transit industry is

one of the safest forms of transportation. In fact, according to the National Safety

Council, riding a bus is 91 times safer than traveling by car and taking the train

is 15 times safer than a car. One of the primary reasons for this unequaled safety

record is the fact that the professional operators of transit vehicles are highly

trained to drive defensively and anticipate potential safety problems.

Even in the face of the tragic events of September 11, public transportation systems in New York and Washington, DC responded quickly, reliably, and efficiently

in evacuating people away from the affected areas and delivering them safely to

their homes, churches, and other chosen destinations. We at the ATU could not be

more proud of our members in these cities who stayed calm in the midst of this national tragedy and bravely performed the same important public service that they

provide on a daily basis.

In addition to the commitment to employee and passenger safety demonstrated

by New York City Transit and the Washington Metro Area Transportation AuthorVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:37 Aug 23, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 81324.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4
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1Synthesis of Transit Practice 27—Emergency Preparedness for Transit Terrorism, Transportation Research Board (1997); Worldwide Terrorist and Violent Criminal Attacks Against Transportation—1998, U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Intelligence and Security; Transit

Security Handbook, Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (1998).

ity, Federal laws and regulations requiring rail fixed guideway systems to have in

place emergency management plans, were, in part, responsible for the successful

way in which these transit agencies were able to handle the September 11 crisis.

But this does not mean that we are prepared to face what may come next. If the

tragic events that unfolded before our eyes 23 days ago taught us anything, it is

that we cannot rely on traditional notions of safety and security to protect us from

those who are determined to terrorize America.

There must be a thorough reassessment of the threat posed to transportation facilities—mass transit in particular. We can no longer rely on these outdated studies

from 1997 and 1998 1 to tell us what needs to be done to make America’s transit

systems safe and secure. We urge this Committee and Congress to mandate such

a study—either through the passage of H.R. 525, which I discussed earlier, or

through new legislation specifically addressing the needs of mass transit.

With that said, there are several specific legislative and regulatory fixes that

must be taken now to better ensure the safety of our transit systems. This is not

a time for Best Practices or Model Safety Plans! There must be defined legislative

and regulatory requirements with respect to the equipment, technology, training,

and personnel needed to prepare, prevent, and respond to any future attacks or

threats. ATTACHMENT THREE is a summary of the current Federal laws and regulations relating to transit security. We recommend that these laws and regulations be

improved in the following six ways:

First, and foremost, the safety and security requirements which apply to rail fixed

guideway systems should be extended to cover bus transit systems. There is currently

no Federal requirement that bus transit systems prepare or implement security

plans to protect and prepare bus operators and passengers in emergency situations.

This is absurd given that 23 percent of violent acts against all modes of transportation occur on transit buses—almost 5,000 incidents alone in 1999, according to the

FTA statistics.

Earlier this year, the ATU recommended just that action to the FTA, who, along

with the transit industry and without any request for input by the affected labor

community, is in the process of developing a Model Transit Bus Safety Program. AT- TACHMENT FOUR is a copy of our recommendations to the Agency. As the ATU pointed out, the Draft Report most recently released by the Agency on April 20, 2001,

is seriously lacking much needed security measures. In fact, the proposal put forth

by the agency includes security measures only as a voluntary element of any transit

bus safety plan.

While, the ATU acknowledges that transit bus systems vary greatly in services

offered, size and resources, and thereby face different security threats, it is our contention that some basic security measures must be taken by all transit providers

to ensure the safety and well being of both the operators of the vehicles, as well

as the passengers.

All transit operators should be trained on how to handle potential incidents, including instructions on how to defuse situations involving angry or belligerent riders

and how to identify and minimize potentially dangerous situations. Drivers should

be given detailed protocols to be followed when a violent situation erupts, such as

who to call first for backup, when to stop the bus, when to refuse service to a passenger, when other passengers should be evacuated from the vehicle, etc. . . . This

training should be required as a basic element of any safety and security program.

In addition, all systems should, at a minimum, have a formal agreement with

local law enforcement concerning coordination with transit personnel when security

breaches occur. These agreements may be as basic or complex as necessitated by

the individual transit bus system, considering whether the system has its own police

force or security personnel.

Other security measures, including technological and design strategies such as

lighting, cameras, panic buttons, alarms, and automated ticketing, should be incorporated as appropriate in every new or enhanced safety and security program. In

implementing such strategies transit service providers should be required to consult

with representatives of their employees to insure that the specific security concerns

of both passengers and workers are identified and addressed.

Second, Federal law should be amended to require all transit systems in urban

areas to spend a minimum percentage of their formula grant monies on security

measures, without exception. While Federal law currently requires that at least 1

percent of such grants be spent on security measures, it allows an exception where

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the grant recipient ‘‘has decided that the expenditure for security projects is not necessary.’’ At a minimum, this decision should be left up to the Secretary of Transportation, not the individual transit agencies.

Third, Congress must appropriate sufficient funds to allow transit agencies to

adopt and implement needed security improvements. Clearly, the above requirements

mean nothing without the funds necessary to carry out the mandates. Resources

must be made available for equipment needs, including the development of devices

to detect the presence of chemical or biological weapons, as well as personnel and

training needs. Specifically, we call upon Congress to increase funding to the FTAsponsored National Transit Institute for expanded transit employee safety and security training. In addition, Congress should consider a supplemental appropriation to

address the immediate needs of our urban systems to quickly upgrade their security

systems. We are prepared to work with this Committee, Congress, DOT, and industry representatives to identify the level of emergency funding needed to satisfy these

goals.

Fourth, the FTA should develop a National Transit Terrorism Threat Warning

System, similar to the system developed by the Federal Aviation Administration to

warn all operating systems that an attack may be imminent. The FAA system was

critical in responding to the September 11 hijackings, allowing the Agency to immediately ground all flights and possibly averting further tragedy. Such a system operating in coordination with the appropriate Federal, State, and local law enforcement

agencies would ensure the issuance of timely and accurate information required to

put potentially targeted systems on high alert.

Fifth, Congress should Federalize penalties for violent assaults on transit operators. Despite the important public service they provide and the accompanying risks

they face on the job everyday, transit operators receive very little protection under

Federal and State laws. While a person who assaults an airline pilot or a flight attendant is subject to Federal penalties, the same deterrent is not applied to those

who attack the bus and rail operators who transport us daily to work, home, shopping, medical facilities, and other destinations. Likewise, most State laws treat such

attacks only as simple misdemeanor assaults.

And finally, the FTA must further improve its transit crime reporting systems so

that the true extent of the threat can be assessed. While transit agencies are required

to report crime statistics along with other information required by the FTA, many

transit agencies, even those with police divisions, do not appear to have the capacity

to produce reliable crime counts. This is primarily due to the absence of interagency

exchange mechanisms to supply reports of transit crimes, which transit agencies

simply never receive.

The ATU is committed to working with this Committee, Congress, the Administration, and the transit industry to see that these and other necessary steps are

taken to improve the safety and security of this Nation’s transit systems, personnel,

and passengers. While we certainly hope that none of these plans or warning systems that we have recommended here today are ever tested, we must nonetheless

take all necessary actions now to enable our transportation system to prevent, prepare, and respond in the event that we are faced with another terrorist or quasiterrorist attack.

Thank you again for inviting the ATU to participate on this panel here today. We

cannot stress enough how important it is to include the input of the labor community in this discussion. It is our members who are on the front lines of this battle

and it is our members who know best what dangers they face everyday on the job.

We look forward to working with all of you in the months and years to come to address the important issues raised here today.

We would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD A. WHITE

GENERAL MANAGER, WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY

OCTOBER 4, 2001

Chairman Reed and Members of the Subcommittee, good afternoon, and thank

you for asking me to testify on the important subject of Transit Safety in the Wake

of September 11. I am Richard White, and I am proud to serve as General Manager

of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) here in the National Capital Region.

The events of September 11 have affected all aspects of national life. Daily and

routine events like business trips, vacation travel, and commuting have been

changed forever. Although WMATA handled its mission well on that tragic day, we

now face altered expectations, especially from our Federal customer base. Safety

and security are of concern for each of the 1.1 million daily trips on the system, and

it is our obligation to continue to ensure that Metrorail and Metrobus operations

provide our customers safe passage, so the important work of the National Capital

Region can continue.

Before responding to your questions regarding safety, I would like to acknowledge

the extraordinary efforts of our New York and New Jersey colleagues. They were

heroes in their communities. Earlier this week I attended the annual meeting of the

American Public Transportation Association (APTA) and heard firsthand some of

the courageous and brave acts performed by transit employees, acts which saved

thousands of lives that otherwise would have been lost in the subway tunnels that

ran underneath the World Trade Center complex. In those and other systems across

the Nation, America’s transit customers were safeguarded on that sad day. And, Mr.

Chairman and Members of the Committee, I believe that WMATA and transit systems across the country will play an even greater role in our national defense and

national security in the months and years ahead.

On September 11, when WMATA was needed most, and amid regional chaos, Metrorail and Metrobus were ready, and delivered for the National Capital Region. We

operated the equivalent of back-to-back rush hours virtually without incident, after

the Federal Government and other regional employers sent hundreds of thousands

of workers home around mid-morning. We were operating the entire day. We did

what we do best. We moved large numbers of people safely and efficiently.

Throughout the day, the WMATA workforce performed extraordinarily. Not once

did an employee put their own individual concerns ahead of their sense of duty to

the customers. The transit police, the bus and rail operators, the station personnel,

the customer service representatives—everyone—demonstrated their dedication to

our mission of moving people safely and securely.

Further, we never lost communications throughout the day. We established and

maintained contact with local, State, and Federal authorities, and we communicated

with our riders through in-system messages, our phone system and over the Internet through the website.

WMATA, blessedly, suffered no property damage, no loss of life, and no injury to

any of its employees nor to any of our customers on that terrible day.

I would be happy to provide the specific details of our actions that day, but now

I would like to address the safety questions raised in your invitation letter.

The most significant issue facing WMATA is adapting to the post-September 11

reality that our freedom of mobility has been challenged. Security is paramount in

the minds of our riders. WMATA is considered one of the safest transit systems in

the country, but we are always reviewing ways to meet the obligation of providing

greater security for the riders of the region’s public transportation. Currently,

WMATA does annual counter-terrorism training for police and operations personnel,

does explosive device training, provides bomb containment trash cans, participates

in numerous interagency disaster-related drills, has 1,400 cameras monitoring the

rail system and participates in the testing of emergency technology. WMATA is

partnering with the scientific community and the Federal Government in an ongoing program for chemical and biological protection. For security reasons I cannot

discuss the details of this program, but chemical sensors have been installed and

are being tested in the system as part of the effort to protect customers, first-line

emergency responders and employees. The intent is to share the results of the program with the transit industry in this country and around the world.

In addition, the WMATA has identified a number of enhancements to current security. These enhancements, at a projected cost of approximately $20 million, will

allow the recording of security-related incidents, will enhance the intrusion-monitoring capability in Metrorail, will add technology at rail yards and bus garages and

will limit access to secure facilities to authorized persons only. We are currently

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completing a comprehensive review of procedures, facilities, and security enhancements, such as cameras on buses, global positioning systems for buses, and sensor

systems, in an effort to identify all other potential security needs and their associated costs. Completing this review and implementing additional security enhancements should go a long way toward assuring our riders that public transit continues

to be safe in the post-September 11 world.

Since September 11 we have taken a number of actions to demonstrate to riders

that we are prepared and are providing security. Our Metro Transit Police have assumed a higher level of recognition within the system, along with operations personnel wearing orange vests. The Metro Transit Police are providing the highest

possible level of presence through the use of overtime. On Thursday, September 20,

a ‘‘Dear Fellow Rider’’ letter was distributed to customers to engage them in our

security efforts and to ask them to help to be our eyes and ears. We are reemphasizing security vigilance to all personnel and completing instruction as needed. We

are conducting an updated risk assessment of facilities, and we have introduced new

security measures in our headquarters building. Finally, we are actively engaged in

a dialogue with others around the country and the world seeking best practices. Our

objective is to be prepared and to reassure riders in the region that their freedom

of mobility has not been compromised.

What we learned on that day was that it is critical that there are reliable and

redundant communication systems and that there is an open exchange of information with other local and Federal agencies. There needs to be a regional evacuation

plan developed in cooperation with local, State, and Federal agencies. Such a plan

is now in development on an expedited basis in the National Capital Region.

Further, there needs to be regular and ongoing communication with riders. For

example, we learned the value of our website, which had double the usual number

of hits that day—over 23,000. Also, our telephone call center handled over 13,000

calls, almost twice the daily volume.

To improve safety, I believe all transit properties should do the following:

• Make sure they have good emergency plans. The Federal Transit Administration

(FTA) requires two plans—a system safety plan and a system security plan. Every

agency needs to have them and they need to be thorough. • Make sure they have a high level of employee training and awareness. And, then,

drill, drill, drill. • Make sure they have a high level of interagency coordination with the appropriate

police, fire, and emergency rescue personnel. Know your partners, and have roles

and responsibilities well defined and understood before an incident takes place. • Make sure communication systems—both internal and external—are adequate

and in good working order.

To improve transit safety, I believe the Federal Government should consider the

following:

• Having the FTA conduct a security readiness assessment of all transit systems. • Having the FTA provide technical assistance to systems in preparing good safety

and security plans and in conducting training and drills. • Having the FTA be a facilitator of information through the exchange of national

and international best practices and through linkage with the Department of

Transportation’s Intelligence and Security Office and the new Office of Homeland

Security. • Exploring and making the best use of technology. • Ensuring that various Federal agencies with regulatory responsibility coordinate

their activities with the transit industry. • Coordinating intelligence sharing. • Supporting necessary long- and short-term investments in order to provide enhanced security and expanded system capacity.

There was much talk of transit’s ability to shape the nature of the first major

transportation bill of the 21st Century, at the APTA annual conference this week.

In closing, I would like to propose that now is the time for the Nation to consider

certain transit properties as part of the national defense system, and to contemplate

their value and needs as the evacuation method of choice, and possibly necessity,

during specific emergency situations. Every mode of transportation is important

during emergencies, but transit has experienced the highest growth rate of any of

the transportation modes over the past 5 years. It is able to move people much more

quickly and efficiently than congested roads and highways can. The Nation needs

to view our transit systems in this national defense context in order to properly recognize the new reality.

Thank you for holding a hearing on this important subject. I look forward to answering your questions.

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RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR SARBANES

FROM JENNIFER L. DORN

Federal law requires that transit grant recipients spend at least

1 percent of their formula money on transit security projects, such

as ‘‘increased lighting . . .increased camera surveillance . . .[or]

an emergency telephone line to contact law enforcement or security

personnel.’’ (49 U.S.C. 5307(d)(1)(J)). The law also gives the grant

recipient the option to certify to FTA that the required security expenditure is unnecessary.

Q.1. What steps does the FTA take to ensure that transit agencies

are making adequate investments in system security? How many

systems have certified that this expenditure is unnecessary? Does

the FTA review transit agencies’ security plans before accepting

the certification?

A.1. Every grantee receiving formula funds under 49 U.S.C. 5307

is required to certify that 1 percent of those funds is spent for security or that such expenditures are unnecessary. Although the FTA

tracking system currently does not distinguish between transit systems that certify that the funds are unnecessary and those that expend the 1 percent, it is being modified to do so in the near future.

FTA verifies that a grantee is in compliance with its annual certifications as part of the triennial review process by examining

each transit agency’s security expenditures. Of the approximately

150 triennial reviews conducted in fiscal year 2001, FTA determined that three transit systems were not in compliance with their

certification and were required to take immediate corrective action.

Section 5330 of Title 49, U.S.C., requires, among other things,

that a State establish a safety program plan for each fixed guideway mass transportation system in the State. Pursuant to FTA’s

implementing regulation, each rail transit system must develop

and implement a System Security Program Plan that is reviewed

and approved by a State safety oversight agency. The State oversight agency submits an Annual Certification and Report to FTA

in which it certifies the security oversight activities it performed

during the year. Grantees receiving Section 5307 formula funds

that do not have fixed guideway mass transportation are not statutorily required to develop a security plan.

Q.2. TEA–21 also allows FTA to make grants to transit agencies

for the purpose of crime prevention and security (49 U.S.C. 5321).

How many grants have been made pursuant to this section, and for

what purposes? Under what criteria does FTA review these grant

applications?

A.2. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 5321, funds for capital grants from

amounts made available under 49 U.S.C. 5338 may be used for

crime prevention and security. Thus, Section 5321 does not create

a separate program, but makes crime prevention and security an

eligible expense for FTA capital assistance. It is rarely possible to

describe a project as serving crime prevention/security purposes exclusively. For example, automatic vehicle locating (AVL) systems

are typically installed to improve transit operation efficiency, but

have the added benefit of improving transit security. Similarly,

radio systems permit the exchange of information in the event of

equipment malfunction or other operational problems, and also perVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:37 Aug 23, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 81324.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4
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mit the reporting of emergencies and security incidents. Consequently, programs for improving or upgrading security are normally incorporated in a grantee’s application for funds, which must

meet the applicable eligibility criteria under the FTA’s capital assistance programs.

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR CORZINE

FROM JENNIFER L. DORN

Q.1. The Administration is establishing an Office of Homeland Security, What role will this office play in guaranteeing the safety of

our mass transit system?

A.1. The Office of Homeland Security will coordinate the Executive

Branch’s efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, and

recover from acts of global or domestic terrorism within the United

States. The Federal Transit Administration (FTA), through the Department of Transportation (DOT), will assist the Office of Homeland Security in developing and implementing homeland security

activities and policies that will help to ensure the safety of the Nation’s mass transit systems.

Q.2. What steps are the Federal Transit Administration and the

Department of Transportation taking to ensure bus safety? Do you

consider these measures adequate and, if not, what more do you

think needs to be done?

A.2. Over the past several months, FTA has been developing a

Model Transit Bus Safety Program in close coordination with the

transit bus industry, including the Amalgamated Transit Union

(ATU), Community Transportation Association of America (CTAA),

American Public Transportation Association (APTA), and American

Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials

(AASHTO). The Program attempts to create a uniform and consistent transit bus safety program for the transit industry by offering core safety elements that every transit bus provider should

have as part of a minimum safety program. FTA, ATU, CTAA,

APTA, and AASHTO are in agreement these core elements include:

• Security • Employee Selection and Training • Vehicle Maintenance • Drug and Alcohol Abuse Programs • Safety Data Acquisition and Analysis

The Model Transit Bus Safety Program will discuss what measures should be undertaken by transit agencies in each of these core

areas. Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, measures included elements that help prevent crimes against transit personnel

and property. Now, the program also includes elements that help

thwart sabotage and terrorist attacks against transit agencies,

their employees, and the riding public. FTA will develop guidance

documents that will discuss how each measure, including security

measures, should be implemented by transit agencies. These guidance documents will be developed with the collective assistance of

transit labor unions and transit industry representatives. In view

of the events of September 11, development of the security guidance document will be expedited.

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The FTA has received a commitment from the transit industry

to promote and monitor the Model Transit Bus Safety Program. Accordingly, FTA believes there is adequate support from the transit

industry to implement the model program without additional regulation. FTA will monitor implementation of the program and, in

particular, progress made in the area of transit security.

Q.3. New Jersey Transit is facing additional ongoing costs related

to the tragedy on September 11 at the World Trade Center. For example, New Jersey Transit has initiated a ferry service from Liberty State Park to lower Manhattan for its bus riders who can no

longer travel through the Holland Tunnel. There is no additional

fee to riders for this service, but there is a substantial cost to New

Jersey Transit. In addition, New Jersey Transit is honoring Port

Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) fare passes on its Hudson Bergen

Light Rail; again, without any cost to the rider but at a cost to New

Jersey Transit.

What efforts are the Administration considering to reimburse

these and other ongoing costs that New Jersey has incurred as a

result of the tragedy on September 11? Would the Administration

consider declaring New Jersey a disaster area, like New York, in

order for it to be eligible for reimbursement for these costs?

A.3. The Administration has proposed that $4.9 billion of the $40

billion Congress recently made available in the 2001 Emergency

Supplemental Appropriations Act be appropriated to the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Disaster Relief Fund to

support relief efforts in New Jersey, New York, and Virginia in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. If appropriated, the

funds will be used to rebuild damaged transit facilities and other

critical public infrastructure, remove debris from the World Trade

site, and help individual victims. The FTA has been informed that

FEMA has authority under its Public Assistance Program to fund

the capital and operating expenses incurred by State, local governments, and certain private nonprofit organizations associated with

the provision of emergency transportation required as a result of

a Presidentially declared disaster or emergency, FEMA has informed FTA that increased expenses incurred by a New Jersey

public ferry operator or its contractor due to emergency transportation needs directly related to the September 11 disaster would be

eligible under that program. The FTA strongly supports the Administration’s position that funds be made available for relief efforts in response to September 11. We will continue to work with

FEMA to identify funds that should be allocated to mass transit

needs, including the provision of emergency transportation.

Q.4. Does the Administration support efforts to provide Amtrak with almost $1 billion for tunnel and life safety upgrades, as proposed by Senator Biden and by several other Senators? Does the

Administration consider the condition of these tunnels—which lie

along the Northeast corridor in New York, Washington, and Baltimore—to be a matter of transit safety, given the fact that the tunnels are shared by other transit systems?

A.4. Amtrak, an intercity railroad, owns the tunnels that lie along

the Northeast corridor in New York, Baltimore, and Washington.

The Federal Railroad Administration has regulatory responsibility

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for ensuring the safety of these tunnels. The Railroad Advancement

and Infrastructure Law for the 21st Century, S. 1530, was introduced on October 11, 2001, by Senators Hollings, Biden, Breaux,

Cleland, Schumer, Kerry, Rockefeller, Carper, Jeffords, and Durbin. The bill, among other things, authorizes funding for Amtrak

safety, security, and infrastructure needs and includes $998 million

for tunnel improvements on the Northeast corridor. On October 15,

the Rail Security Act of 2001, S. 1550, was introduced by Senator

Hollings. This bill contains the identical provisions for tunnel improvements as S. 1530. The Administration supports the concept of

strengthening and improving the safety of America’s rail system,

such as recognizing that funds would only become available if provided through the appropriations process. The Administration opposes the inclusion of nonsecurity/life safety-related infrastructure

projects, or amendments that would repeal the regimen of fiscal

discipline imposed by the current statutory requirements for Amtrak self-sufficiency, barring the establishment of an alternative

that imposes similar discipline. Given Amtrak’s severe financial

difficulties, the establishment of such an alternative would be more

appropriately fashioned through dialogue between the Administration and Congress in the context of an early reauthorization of

intercity passenger rail programs.

Q.5. One concern in New Jersey is the need for additional rail cars

and buses to deal with the crush of extra capacity as a result of

the tragedy on September 11. Do you support providing additional

funding to transit systems like New Jersey’s that are experiencing

these severe capacity problems so that they may buy the additional

rail cars and buses they need?

A.5. As indicated in response to question 3 above, FEMA has authority under its Public Assistance Program to fund the capital and

operating expenses incurred by State, local governments, and certain private nonprofit organizations associated with the provision

of emergency transportation required as a result of a Presidentially

declared disaster or emergency. It is FTA’s understanding that the

costs of additional rail cars and buses to address emergency transportation needs directly related to the September 11 disaster would

be eligible under FEMA’s Public Assistance Program. The FTA will

work with FEMA and New Jersey Transit officials should New Jersey Transit apply to FEMA for such funding.

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION OF SENATOR REED

FROM WILLIAM W. MILLAR

Q.1 Generally, what on average does a transit system spend on security? And also, if you could help give us your perspective as to

what might be an adequate level.

A.1. It is important to note that the Federal transit law (49 USC

5307(d)(1)(J)(i)) provides that at least 1 percent of the amount that

an FTA grantee receives each fiscal year under the formula program must be allocated to security projects. In the event that the

FTA grantee determines that such expenditure is not necessary, a

request for exemption must be submitted to the Secretary of Transportation.

Beyond this Federal requirement, transit agencies provide for

system security and policing in various ways. Some transit agenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:37 Aug 23, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 81324.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4
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cies maintain dedicated transit police forces, some contract for policing services with local police jurisdictions and some contract for

security services through private companies or maintain a mix of

dedicated and contracted services. Smaller transit systems will

typically establish a working demand-response community relationship with their local police jurisdictions.

In terms of quantifying capital funding expenditures for transit

security, there is no comprehensive source of information that provides that information. Such expenditures and projects often are

part of broader activities that can have a direct impact on security

but are not considered ‘‘security’’ projects. An example would be the

upgrading of radio communications. It should also be noted that

transit agencies engage in security-related infrastructure funding

campaigns that can vary widely from year to year depending upon

the stages of infrastructure life-cycles and prior existence of security features.

In short, a definitive response to the question of security funding

requirements for transit systems is difficult to determine as individual agency needs vary widely according to system configuration,

service interface and complexity, demographics, system age, and regional disparities in funding availability.

Specifically in response to your question, however, APTA recently

conducted a quick general survey of its members that included

questions on security initiatives and funding levels. From this survey it appears that operating budgets for security and policing

range between 2 percent to 5 percent of transit agency total operating budgets, but note the qualifying points we state above.

With respect to what might be an adequate level of funding for

transit security funding needs that have arisen due to terrorist activities, enclosed is a general list of recommended requirements

with estimated funding needs we recently compiled.

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION OF SENATOR ALLARD

FROM WILLIAM W. MILLAR

Q.1. Mr. Millar, in your testimony, you talked about providing

some audit services to your membership. We heard from the previous panel that they also provide audit services. Do we have a duplication of effort here?

A.1. The previous panel noted that security-related audit services

are available through the FTA upon the request of transit agencies.

It is our understanding that the one-time audit services provided

by the FTA relate specifically to security.

In contrast, the audit services provided by APTA are one component of our comprehensive APTA Rail, Commuter Rail, and Bus

Operations Safety Management Programs. The APTA audits are

conducted once every 3 years and address overall safety programs,

policies, and procedures as they relate to prescribed elements of a

transit System Safety Program Plan. Security and emergency preparedness are two of twenty-four elements prescribed in such

plans. In our view, there is no duplication of effort between the audits of FTA and APTA. Indeed, the respective audits are complementary and provide transit agencies with an enhanced level of

assessment of their security initiatives.

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