Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 169 / Friday, September 1, 2023 / Notices 60513 

that allows users to view the Contact 

Officials currently on file for the 

employer. Users will be able to edit and 

delete existing Contact Officials, as well 

as add new Contact Officials. The screen 

to edit and add Contact Officials collects 

essentially the same information as the 

approved paper Form G–117a. The 

internet version provides for the 

required notices and certifications, 

contains help messages to ensure users 

provide valid contact information, and 

prevents users from deleting Contact 

Officials without first providing a 

replacement. 

Completion is voluntary. One 

response is requested from each 

respondent. 

Previous Requests for Comments: The 

RRB has already published the initial 

60-day notice (88 FR 41994 on June 28, 

2023) required by 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2). 

That request elicited no comments. 

Information Collection Request (ICR) 

Title: Designation of Contact Officials. 

OMB Control Number: 3220–0200. 

Form(s) submitted: G–117A & G–117A 

(internet). 

Type of request: Revision of a 

currently approved collection. 

Affected public: Private sector; 

businesses or other for profits. 

Abstract: The Railroad Retirement 

Board (RRB) requests that railroad 

employers designate employees to act as 

liaison with the RRB on a variety of 

Railroad Retirement Act and Railroad 

Unemployment Insurance Act matters. 

Changes proposed: The RRB proposes 

to change the Form G–117a (Paper) by 

adding updated language in section 12, 

Signature line. The language proposed 

is, ‘‘The above officials of this employer 

are authorized to serve in the capacities 

indicated and to act as trusted referees 

for the RRB in accordance with the 

National Institute of Standards and 

Technology (NIST) Special Publication 

800–63A guidelines for online reporting 

access.’’ The RRB proposes no changes 

to Form G–117a (internet). 

The burden estimate for the ICR is as 

follows: 

Form No. Annual 

responses 

Time 

(minutes) 

Burden 

(hours) 

G–117A ........................................................................................................................................ 25 15 6 

G–117a (Internet) ........................................................................................................................ 200 5 17 

Total ...................................................................................................................................... 225 ........................ 23 

Additional Information or Comments: 

Copies of the forms and supporting 

documents can be obtained from 

Kennisha Money at (312) 469–2591 or 

Kennisha.Money@rrb.gov. Comments 

regarding the information collection 

should be addressed to Brian Foster, 

Railroad Retirement Board, 844 North 

Rush Street, Chicago, Illinois 60611– 

1275 or Brian.Foster@rrb.gov. 

Written comments and 

recommendations for the proposed 

information collection should be sent 

within 30 days of publication of this 

notice to www.reginfo.gov/public/do/ 

PRAMain. Find this particular 

information collection by selecting 

‘‘Currently under 30-day Review—Open 

for Public Comments’’ or by using the 

search function. 

Brian Foster, 

Clearance Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2023–18980 Filed 8–31–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7905–01–P 

OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND 

TECHNOLOGY POLICY 

Request for Information; Potential 

Changes to the Policies for Oversight 

of Dual Use Research of Concern 

(DURC) and the Potential Pandemic 

Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3CO) 

Policy Framework 

AGENCY: Office of Science and 

Technology Policy (OSTP). 

ACTION: Notice of request for 

information. 

SUMMARY: Life sciences research is vital 

for improving health outcomes and 

protecting the Nation from infectious 

disease threats, but a small subset of this 

research could potentially pose risk of 

accidents or misuse that could harm 

human health. It is important to 

regularly evaluate and update biosafety 

and biosecurity oversight policies to 

keep pace with new technological 

developments and the evolving risk 

landscape. The Office of Science and 

Technology Policy (OSTP) invites 

comments on potential changes to the 

Policies for Federal and Institutional 

Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use 

Research of Concern (DURC) and 

Recommended Policy Guidance for 

Departmental Development of Review 

Mechanisms for Potential Pandemic 

Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3CO). 

These policies establish frameworks for 

review and oversight requirements for 

certain categories of life sciences 

research, namely research with certain 

pathogens and toxins, including at 

institutions that accept Federal funding 

for such research. These requirements 

are intended to complement activities 

under existing Federal regulations or 

guidelines such as the Federal Select 

Agent Program. OSTP requests 

comments on how potential changes to 

these research oversight policies could 

mitigate risks associated with DURC and 

research with enhanced potential 

pandemic pathogens (ePPP) while 

minimizing undue burden on 

institutions. The public input provided 

through this Request for Information 

(RFI) will inform policy evaluations and 

issuance of a revised policy (Revised 

Policy). 

DATES: Responses are due by 11:59 p.m. 

Eastern Time on October 16, 2023. 

Submissions received after the deadline 

may not be taken into consideration. 

ADDRESSES: Comments must be 

submitted via the Federal eRulemaking 

Portal at regulations.gov. However, if 

you require an accommodation or 

cannot otherwise submit your 

comments via regulations.gov, please 

use the email or phone number listed 

under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT. OSTP will not accept 

comments by fax or by email. To ensure 

that OSTP does not receive duplicate 

copies, please submit your comments 

only once. Additionally, please include 

the Docket ID (EOP–2023–0001) at the 

top of your comments. 

Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

www.regulations.gov to submit your 

comments electronically. Information 

on how to use Regulations.gov, 

including instructions for accessing 

agency documents, submitting 

comments, and viewing the docket, is 

available on the site under ‘‘FAQ’’ 

(https://www.regulations.gov/faq). 

Privacy Note: OSTP’s policy is to 

make all comments received from 

members of the public available for 

public viewing in their entirety on the 

Federal eRulemaking Portal at 

www.regulations.gov. Therefore, 

commenters should be careful to 

include in their comments only 

information that they wish to make 

publicly available. OSTP requests that 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1
60514 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 169 / Friday, September 1, 2023 / Notices 

1Examples include: Select Agents and Toxins 

Regulations (42 CFR part 73, 9 CFR part 121, and 

7 CFR part 331); National Institutes of Health 

Guidelines on Research Involving Recombinant and 

Synthetic Nucleic Acids; (https://osp.od.nih.gov/ 

wp-content/uploads/NIH_Guidelines.pdf); Biosafety 

in Microbiological & Biomedical Laboratories 

(BMBL) 6th Edition (https://www.cdc.gov/labs/ 

BMBL.html); Additional U.S. Laws, Regulations and 

Guidelines (https://www.phe.gov/s3/law/Pages/ 

default.aspx). 

2United States Government Policy for Oversight 

of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern 

(https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/uspolicy-durc-032812.pdf); United States Government 

Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences 

Dual Use Research of Concern (https://

www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/durcpolicy.pdf). 

3Recommended Policy Guidance for 

Departmental Development of Review Mechanisms 

for Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and 

Oversight (P3CO) (https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/ 

Documents/P3CO-FinalGuidanceStatement.pdf). 

4Proposed Biosecurity Oversight Framework for 

the Future of Science (nih.gov); https://

osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/ 

NSABB-Final-Report-Proposed-BiosecurityOversight-Framework-for-the-Future-of-Science.pdf. 

5National Biodefense Strategy and 

Implementation Plan: https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 

wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-BiodefenseStrategy-and-Implementation-Plan-Final.pdf. 

no proprietary information, copyrighted 

information, or personally identifiable 

information be submitted in response to 

this RFI. 

Instructions: Response to this RFI is 

voluntary. Each individual or 

organization is requested to submit only 

one response. Commenters can respond 

to one or multiple questions. 

Submissions are suggested to not exceed 

the equivalent of ten (10) pages in 12 

point or larger font. Submissions should 

clearly indicate which questions are 

being addressed. Responses should 

include the name(s) of the person(s) or 

organization(s) filing the response. 

Responses containing references, 

studies, research, and other empirical 

data that are not widely published 

should include copies of or electronic 

links to the referenced materials. 

Responses containing profanity, 

vulgarity, threats, or other inappropriate 

language or content will not be 

considered. 

Please note that the U.S. Government 

will not pay for response preparation, or 

for the use of any information contained 

in the response. A response to this RFI 

will not be viewed as a binding 

commitment to develop or pursue the 

project or ideas discussed. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Direct questions to Asad Ramzanali, 

research-oversight-policy@ostp.eop.gov, 

or 202–456–4444. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Life 

sciences research is essential to the 

scientific advances that underpin 

improvements in the health and safety 

of the public, agricultural crops, and 

other plants, animals, and the 

environment. While life sciences 

research provides enormous benefits to 

society, there can be risks associated 

with certain subsets of work, typically 

related to biosafety and biosecurity, that 

can and should be mitigated. The 

United States has existing, 

complementary statutes, regulations, 

policies, and guidelines that address 

these potential biosafety and biosecurity 

risks, particularly those associated with 

research oversight and management.1

Together these existing regulatory 

authorities and guidelines provide a 

foundation to ensure that scientific 

research and innovation is safe and 

secure. 

Scientists, institutions, and the USG 

have gained valuable insight over the 

past decade from implementing research 

oversight policies such as the policies 

for oversight of DURC2 and the P3CO 

Policy Framework.3 During this time, 

advances in science and technology 

have occurred that present realized and 

potential future benefits. However, these 

advances also present potential risks of 

misuse. The National Science Advisory 

Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), a 

Federal advisory committee that 

addresses issues related to biosecurity 

and dual use research, provided 

recommendations in a March 2023 

report 4 to inform United States 

Government (USG) policy evaluations 

and the development of a more 

comprehensive and integrated 

framework for the oversight of research 

with pathogens and toxins that may 

pose significant biosafety or biosecurity 

risks. Since the release of this report, 

OSTP has been working with Federal 

departments and agencies to review, 

harmonize, and revise these policies in 

accordance with USG goals of 

promoting safe and secure biological 

practices and strengthening responsible 

conduct for biological research as 

outlined in the 2022 National 

Biodefense Strategy and Implementation 

Plan.5

The policy review and revision 

process has three broad goals: 

1. Assess whether and how to merge 

the existing Federal DURC, Institutional 

DURC, and P3CO policies into a 

harmonized policy that addresses 

oversight for research with pathogens 

and toxins. 

2. Consider revising the scope of the 

Federal DURC, Institutional DURC, and 

P3CO policies to include a broader set 

of pathogens and toxins, including—but 

not limited to—biological select agents 

and toxins (BSAT) that impact humans 

or have the potential to impact humans. 

3. Examine ways to strengthen 

effective implementation of oversight 

for life sciences research on pathogens 

and toxins throughout the research 

lifecycle. 

The USG acknowledges that effective 

oversight helps maintain public trust in 

the life sciences research enterprise by 

demonstrating that the scientific 

community recognizes the implications 

of research conducted and is acting 

responsibly to protect public welfare 

and preserve national security. 

Scope: OSTP invites comment from 

any interested stakeholders. In 

particular, OSTP is interested in input 

from research institutions, including 

both domestic and international entities, 

currently subject to the PC3O Policy or 

the DURC policies or that may be 

subject to the revised scope of a 

potential policy update, researchers 

within those institutions, scientific and 

professional organizations, and 

organizations representing diverse 

interests across the U.S. research 

ecosystem. 

Information Requested: Respondents 

may provide information for one or 

more of the topics included below. 

Respondents are asked to note the 

corresponding number/s to which 

responses pertain. 

1. The NSABB recommended that 

USG develop an integrated approach to 

oversight of research that raises 

significant biosafety and biosecurity 

concerns, including ePPP research and 

DURC (Recommendation 1). By merging 

the existing Federal DURC, Institutional 

DURC, and P3CO policies into a 

harmonized policy, a merged policy 

could potentially adopt the institutional 

applicability outlined in the 

Institutional DURC policy framework, 

making the following entities subject to 

a Revised Policy: 

• U.S. Government departments and 

agencies that fund, sponsor, or conduct 

life sciences research. 

• Institutions within the United 

States or its territories that both: 

D Receive U.S. Government funds to 

conduct or sponsor life sciences 

research; and, 

D Conduct or sponsor research that is 

within the revised scope, regardless of 

the source of the funding for the specific 

project. 

• Institutions outside of the United 

States that receive U.S. Government 

funds to conduct or sponsor research 

that falls under the scope. 

(a) What are the anticipated benefits 

and challenges of applying a Revised 

Policy, inclusive of both DURC and 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1
Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 169 / Friday, September 1, 2023 / Notices 60515 

6United States Government Policy for Oversight 

of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern 

(https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/uspolicy-durc-032812.pdf); United States Government 

Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences 

Dual Use Research of Concern (https://

www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/durcpolicy.pdf). 

7Select Agents and Toxins Regulations (42 CFR 

part 73, 9 CFR part 121, and 7 CFR part 331). 

8Risk groups as defined in ‘‘NIH Guidelines for 

Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic 

Nucleic Acid Molecules’’ (https://osp.od.nih.gov/ 

wp-content/uploads/2019_NIH_Guidelines.htm). 

9Recommended Policy Guidance for 

Departmental Development of Review Mechanisms 

for Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and 

Oversight (P3CO) (https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/ 

Documents/P3CO-FinalGuidanceStatement.pdf). 

10Public Health Preparedness: HHS Could 

Improve Oversight of Research Involving Enhanced 

Potential Pandemic Pathogens. (GAO–23–105455). 

ePPP research, to the scope of entities 

outlined above? 

(b) What are the anticipated benefits 

and challenges of investigators and 

institutions having primary 

responsibility for identification of both 

DURC and ePPP research? 

(c) What types of resources or tools 

would be useful for researchers and 

institutions to determine if their 

research falls into a revised policy scope 

that is risk-based rather than list-based, 

and adequately conduct risk 

assessments to identify DURC and ePPP 

research? 

2. Currently, the scope of the DURC 

policies is research that uses one or 

more of 15 listed agents or toxins and 

that produces, or is anticipated to 

produce, any of seven listed 

experimental effects. The NSABB 

recommended that the scope of research 

requiring review for potential DURC 

should include research that directly 

involves any human, animal, or plant 

pathogen, toxin, or agent that is 

reasonably anticipated to result in one 

or more of the seven experimental 

effects outlined in the DURC policy 6

(Recommendation 10.1). 

a. Considering the diversity of 

federally-funded research settings and 

portfolios, how would adoption of 

NSABB’s Recommendation 10.1 affect 

policy implementation and research 

programs at the institutional level? 

b. Rather than including any pathogen 

within the scope of DURC review, one 

possible modification of 

Recommendation 10.1 would be to 

include DURC experiments that utilize: 

i. HHS and Overlap Biological Select 

Agent and Toxins (BSAT) List 7 and/or 

ii. Pathogen risk group (RG) 

classification of 3 or 4 8 and/or 

iii. Any pathogen where the conduct 

of work (e.g., one of the DURC 

experimental categories) would require 

biosafety level 3 or 4 containment. 

Would a modification of 

Recommendation 10.1, in line with the 

outlined scope of pathogens above, be 

useful for policy implementation? What 

specific benefits, challenges, and/or 

gaps are anticipated by this revised 

scope? 

c. Are there other risk-based 

approaches that would expand the 

scope beyond the current list of 15 

agents and toxins provided in the DURC 

policy that would facilitate the 

identification of research that poses 

significant risks by investigators and 

institutions while not resulting in 

undue burdens? 

d. Given the possible revised scope of 

research requiring review for potential 

DURC, what modifications, if any, to the 

current DURC policy list of 7 

experimental effects should be 

considered for a Revised Policy that 

captures appropriate research without 

hampering research progress? 

e. What resources or tools would be 

valuable to assist with implementation 

of a DURC policy with a scope that is 

revised to include more than the current 

list of 15 agents and toxins? 

3. A PPP is currently defined in the 

P3CO policy framework 9 as: ‘‘a 

pathogen that satisfies both of the 

following: 1. It is likely highly 

transmissible and likely capable of wide 

and uncontrollable spread in human 

populations; and 2. It is likely highly 

virulent and likely to cause significant 

morbidity and/or mortality in humans.’’ 

The NSABB recommended that the 

definition of PPP be modified to: (1) 

Likely moderately or highly 

transmissible and likely capable of wide 

and uncontrollable spread in human 

populations; and/or (2) Likely 

moderately or highly virulent and likely 

to cause significant morbidity and/or 

mortality in humans; and, in addition 

(3) Likely to pose a severe threat to 

public health, the capacity of public 

health systems to function, or national 

security’’ (Recommendation 2). 

(a) How would the change in the 

definition of PPP affect the overall scope 

of a Revised Policy and its subsequent 

implementation? 

(b) One possible modification to the 

NSABB PPP definition is to specify a 

respiratory route of transmission within 

clause (1). Would that definition of PPP 

be an appropriate scope to mitigate risks 

and enhance effective implementation? 

(c) Do you have additional 

suggestions to modify the PPP definition 

to mitigate the most significant risks not 

currently addressed and enhance 

effective implementation, while limiting 

negative or unintended consequences 

and burden on researchers, institutions, 

and the Federal government? 

(d) Are there characteristics related to 

human pathology, pathogen 

characteristics, or other features that 

would be helpful to clarify the intent of 

‘‘moderately virulent’’? Are there 

characteristics related to human 

pathology that would be helpful to 

clarify the intent of ‘‘moderately 

transmissible’’? 

4. A Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) report from January 

2023 10 recommended that the 

Department of Health and Human 

Services funding agencies should 

develop and document a standard to 

define ‘‘reasonably anticipated’’ to 

ensure consistency in identifying 

research that falls within scope of a 

Revised Policy. One possible definition 

of ‘‘reasonably anticipated’’ is: 

‘‘ ‘Reasonably anticipated’ describes 

an assessment of an outcome that an 

individual with scientific expertise 

relevant to the research in question 

would expect this outcome to occur 

with a non-trivial likelihood. It does not 

require high confidence that the 

outcome will definitely occur and 

excludes experiments in which an 

expert would anticipate the outcome to 

be technically possible, but highly 

unlikely.’’ 

(a) Does this definition of ‘‘reasonably 

anticipated’’ provide additional clarity 

to ensure greater consistency in 

identifying research that falls within 

scope of the Revised Policy? What 

modifications to this definition (if any) 

would be most helpful? 

5. NSABB recommends the removal of 

blanket exclusions for research activities 

associated with surveillance and 

vaccine development or production for 

research with ePPPs (Recommendation 

3). 

(a) Should exemptions for certain 

activities be included in a Revised 

Policy? 

(b) What are the benefits and 

drawbacks of including exemptions for 

domestic and international pandemic 

preparedness, biosafety, biosecurity, 

and global health security? 

(c) If exemptions are included, how 

could they be bounded to maximize 

safety and security and minimize 

negative impact on domestic and global 

public health including outbreak and 

pandemic preparedness and response? 

For example, would vaccine research 

and development activities be 

unjustifiably impeded if the current 

P3CO policy framework exemption for 

‘‘Activities associated with developing 

and producing vaccines, such as 

generation of high growth strains’’ was 

either removed completely or modified 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1
60516 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 169 / Friday, September 1, 2023 / Notices 

1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). 

2 17 CFR 240.19b–4. 

3See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 96979 

(February 24, 2023), 88 FR 13182. 

4 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2). 

5See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 97261, 

88 FR 22509 (April 13, 2023). 

6Amendment No. 1 is available at: https://

www.sec.gov/comments/sr-ise-2023-08/ 

srise202308.htm. 

7See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 97626, 

88 FR 37110 (June 6, 2023). 

8 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2). 

9See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 

10 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2). 

11 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(57). 

1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). 

2 17 CFR 240.19b–4. 

to ‘‘Research on PPPs directly associated 

with testing and/or producing vaccines, 

such as generation of high growth 

strains’’? 

6. NSABB recommends that 

continued assessment of the risks and 

benefits associated with advances and 

applications of bioinformatics, 

modeling, and other in silico 

experimental approaches and research 

involving genes from or encoding 

pathogens, toxins, or other agents must 

inform future evaluations of the scope of 

research oversight policies to help 

ensure that associated risks are 

appropriately identified and managed. 

(Recommendation 10.2). This type of 

research is not currently included in the 

DURC and ePPP oversight policies. 

(a) Is there a subset of such in silico 

research that should require risk 

assessment and review in a Revised 

Policy, and if so, how should this 

research be defined so that the Policy 

captures the appropriate research 

without hampering activities with 

limited biosecurity risks? 

(b) One possible way to define this 

category of in silico research within a 

Revised Policy would be to include 

experiments that are reasonably 

anticipated to: 

‘‘(i) Develop in silico models that 

directly enable the predictive design of 

an enhanced potential pandemic 

pathogen or novel pathogen or toxin 

covered under a Revised Policy that 

could be constructed via genomic 

editing or de novo synthesis; and/or 

(ii) Develop a dataset(s) connecting 

nucleic acid or amino acid sequences 

with experimentally-determined 

pathogenic functions in a manner 

sufficient to enable the development of 

in silico models described in (i).’’ 

If a new category of research, similar 

to the examples provided above, were to 

require risk assessment and review in a 

Revised Policy, what would be the 

benefits and challenges with 

implementation? 

Dated: August 28, 2023. 

Stacy Murphy, 

Deputy Chief Operations Officer/Security 

Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2023–18906 Filed 8–31–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3270–F1–P 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

[Release No. 34–98233; File No. SR–ISE– 

2023–08] 

Self-Regulatory Organizations; Nasdaq 

ISE, LLC; Notice of Designation of a 

Longer Period for Commission Action 

on Proceedings To Determine Whether 

To Approve or Disapprove a Proposed 

Rule Change, as Modified by 

Amendment No. 1, To Make Permanent 

Certain P.M.-Settled Pilots 

August 28, 2023. 

On February 23, 2023, Nasdaq ISE 

LLC (‘‘ISE’’ or ‘‘Exchange’’) filed with 

the Securities and Exchange 

Commission (‘‘Commission’’), pursuant 

to section 19(b)(1) of the Securities 

Exchange Act of 1934 (‘‘Act’’) 1 and Rule 

19b–4 thereunder,2 a proposed rule 

change to make permanent the pilot 

program to permit the listing and 

trading of options based on 1⁄5 the value 

of the Nasdaq-100 Index and the 

Exchange’s nonstandard expirations 

pilot program. The proposed rule 

change was published for comment in 

the Federal Register on March 2, 2023.3

On April 7, 2023, pursuant to section 

19(b)(2) of the Act,4 the Commission 

designated a longer period within which 

to approve the proposed rule change, 

disapprove the proposed rule change, or 

institute proceedings to determine 

whether to disapprove the proposed 

rule change.5 On May 11, 2023, the 

Exchange filed Amendment No. 1 to the 

proposed rule change (‘‘Amendment No. 

1’’).6 On May 31, 2023, the Commission 

instituted proceedings to determine 

whether to approve or disapprove the 

proposed rule change and published 

Amendment No. 1 for notice and 

comment.7

Section 19(b)(2) of the Exchange Act 8

provides that, after initiating 

proceedings, the Commission shall issue 

an order approving or disapproving the 

proposed rule change not later than 180 

days after the date of publication of 

notice of filing of the proposed rule 

change. The Commission may extend 

the period for issuing an order 

approving or disapproving the proposed 

rule change, however, by not more than 

60 days if the Commission determines 

that a longer period is appropriate and 

publishes reasons for such 

determination. The proposed rule 

change was published for notice and 

comment in the Federal Register on 

March 2, 2023.9 The 180th day after 

publication of the proposed rule change 

is August 29, 2023. The Commission is 

extending the time period for approving 

or disapproving the proposed rule 

change for an additional 60 days. 

The Commission finds it appropriate 

to designate a longer period within 

which to issue an order approving or 

disapproving the proposed rule change 

so that it has sufficient time to consider 

the proposed rule change and the issues 

raised therein. Accordingly, the 

Commission, pursuant to section 

19(b)(2) of the Exchange Act,10

designates October 28, 2023, as the date 

by which the Commission shall either 

approve or disapprove the proposed 

rule change (File No. SR–ISE–2023–08). 

For the Commission, by the Division 

of Trading and Markets, pursuant to 

delegated authority.11

Sherry R. Haywood, 

Assistant Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2023–18898 Filed 8–31–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8011–01–P 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

[Release No. 34–98231; File No. SR– 

CboeBZX–2023–062] 

Self-Regulatory Organizations; Cboe 

BZX Exchange, Inc.; Notice of Filing of 

a Proposed Rule Change To Amend 

the Initial Period After Commencement 

of Trading of a Series of ETF Shares 

on the Exchange as It Relates to the 

Holders of Record and/or Beneficial 

Holders, as Provided in Exchange Rule 

14.11(l) 

August 28, 2023. 

Pursuant to section 19(b)(1) of the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 

‘‘Act’’),1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2

notice is hereby given that on August 

14, 2023, Cboe BZX Exchange, Inc. (the 

‘‘Exchange’’ or ‘‘BZX’’) filed with the 

Securities and Exchange Commission 

(the ‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule 

change as described in Items I, II, and 

III below, which Items have been 

prepared by the Exchange. The 

Commission is publishing this notice to 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1