No. 90-532 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1991 

MARIE JOHNSTON, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

-vsAMERICAN RELIABLE INSURANCE COMPANY, 

ROBERT FRANCHUK, DONNA FRANCHUK, 

and JANEVA J. GALAYDA, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Missoula, 

The Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Terry G. Sehestedt, Attorney at Law, Missoula, 

Montana 

For Respondents: 

Kim L. Ritter; Milodragovich, Dale & Dye, Missoula, 

Montana (American Reliable Insurance) 

Darla J. Keck; Datsopoulos, MacDonald & Lind, 

Missoula, Montana (Galayda) 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: March 14, 1991 

Decided: April 30, 1991 

Clerk 
Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Plaintiff brought this action in the District Court of 

Missoula County alleging conversion and breach of contract. The 

District Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and 

plaintiff appeals. We remand this cause to the District Court with 

instructions to enter the grounds for granting summary judgment in 

favor of both defendants. 

Appellant has presented the following issues for review on 

appeal : 

1) Whether the District Court erred in failing to make 

findings in connection with its orders granting summary judgment 

to defendants. 

2) Whether the District Court erred in denying plaintiff's 

motion for partial summary judgment. 

On May 3, 1988, appellant Marie Johnston entered into a 

written contract for the purchase of a mobile home from defendants 

Robert and Donna Franchuk. The home was located on a rental lot 

owned by Janeva J. Galayda. On June 22, 1988, Johnston purchased 

a "Deluxe Mobile Homeowners" insurance policy from respondent 

American Reliable Insurance Company (Reliable). The insurance 

policy, by its terms, covered Johnston's mobile home and its 

contents. 

On May 6, 1988, shortly after Johnston signed the Franchuksl 

purchase contract, Johnston paid Galayda the $110 monthly lot rent 

and moved into the home. There was testimony that Johnston owned 
and kept dogs at her home in violation of Galaydals ''no dogt1 

policy. Galayda testified that Johnston refused to remove the dogs 

from the property and that, on May 24, 1988, Galayda sent Johnston 

a Notice of Default and to Quit based on Johnston's dogs. The 

Notice of Default gave Johnston fourteen days to leave. Johnston 

refused to leave and, on June 16, 1988, Galayda filed suit with the 

Missoula County Justice Court requesting damages and immediate 

possession of the premises. The Process was served, but Johnston 

failed to respond and, on July 11, 1988, the Justice Court entered 

a Default Judgment in favor of Galayda which provided Galayda with 

possession of the lot. 

The District Court also issued a Writ of Assistance on July 

11, 1988, ordering that the Missoula County Sheriff physically 

remove Johnston from the premises. The Missoula County Sheriff 

served the Writ on Johnston who then vacated the premises, but left 

the mobile home on the lot. Galayda alleges, in her affidavit, 

that Johnston abandoned the mobile home. Based on this alleged 

abandonment, Galayda served Johnston with a Notice of Abandonment 

dated August 17, 1988, informing her that if the abandoned mobile 

home was not removed from the premises in fifteen days, it would 

be stored at Johnston's expense. Galayda sent a copy of this 

Notice to the Franchuks since they had a legal interest in the 

property. 

On September 2, 1988, Franchuks removed the mobile home. 

Johnston subsequently filed a claim for theft with Reliable, but 

Reliable refused to cover her claim. Thereafter, on April 18, 
1989, Johnston filed a complaint for damages with the District 

Court against Reliable for breach of the insurance contract, and 

against Galayda and the Franchuks for wrongful conversion. 

Subsequently, defendants Franchuks filed for and were granted a 

discharge in bankruptcy and have since not participated in the case 

due to a bankruptcy stay. The District Court granted Reliable 

summary judgment on June 19, 1990 and granted Galayda summary 

judgment on June 21, 1990. Thereafter, Johnston filed a motion 

requesting the court make certain findings and amend its summary 

judgment. This motion was deemed denied by the lapse of fortyfive days without action by the District Court. Plaintiff appeals 

from the orders granting summary judgment and from the denial of 

her post-judgment motion. 

The first issue is whether the District Court erred in failing 

to specify the grounds for summary judgment. The District Court 

summarily adjudicated this cause in favor of Galayda and Reliable 

but failed to specify the grounds or rationale for the rulings. 

In pertinent part Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P., requires: 

However, any order of the court granting a motion under 

Rules 12 or 56 [summary judgment rule] which is 

appealable to an appellate court shall specify the 

grounds therefor with sufficient particularity as to 

apprise the parties and the appellate court of the 

rationale underlying the ruling and this may be done in 

the body of the order or in an attached opinion. 

In a similar manner, this Court has stated that district courts 

should state the reasons for granting summary judgment. Stepanek 

v. Kober construction (1981), 191 Mont. 430, 431, 625 P.2d 51, 52. 

The District Court did not specify the grounds for either of the 
summary judgment rulings with sufficient particularity to apprise 

the parties and the appellate court of the rationale underlying the 

rulings. We therefore remand this cause to the District Court with 

instructions to specify the grounds for the rulings with sufficient 

particularity so as to apprise the parties and this Court of the 

rationale underlying its rulings. 

This cause is hereby remanded to the District Court with the 

foregoing instructions to enter reasons in support of summary 

adjudication. 

We concur: 

Chief Justice 
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage, specially concurring: 

I concur in the majority opinion which requires the District 

Court to enter in the record its reasons for granting summary 

judgment. The case is properly remanded for such purpose. In 

reviewing this case upon remand, it is my suggestion that the 

District Court look at the record with relation to the Justice 

Court proceeding instituted by Janeva J. Galayda against the 

appellant and the July 11, 1988, affidavit submitted by Galayda in 

obtaining a default judgment, apparently for rent. 

In part, I make this suggestion for the reason that in the 

record before us, there is a complaint in Justice Court dated June 

16, 1988, wherein Galayda sued Johnson for the reason "that 

defendant owed back rent from July 1, 1988, in the amount of $110 

plus late fee in the amount of $10 . . .I1 This complaint was dated 

June 16, 1988. It is somewhat difficult to understand how back 

rent could be owed from July 1, 1988, when the complaint was filed 

June 16, 1988. In addition, in the deposition of Galayda at page 

36, it is indicated that Galayda received a money order postmarked July 4, 1988, covering June and July rent in the amount of 

$220. Galayda stated that the money order did not include the "$10 

late feel1 which was part of her rental agreements. When Galayda 

was asked if Johnston had ever signed a rental agreement, Galayda 

responded, "No, she did not." 

This case undoubtedly is frustrating to the parties and to the 

court. However, in reviewing the grant of summary judgment and in 

6 
the interest of justice, I recommend a thorough review of the 

record.