ASSAD AND THE PEACE PROCESS:

THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF LEBANON

Stephen C. Pelletiere

February 1, 1995
ii

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed directly to the author by calling commercial (717)

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iii

FOREWORD

The world is waiting for peace in the Middle East. At

present the possibility of a settlement is delayed by differences

between Israel and Syria. The two are far apart on how to solve

one of the thornier problems of the negotiations--the eventual

status of the Golan Heights.

That Syria's President Assad and Israel's Prime Minister

Rabin should find themselves in disagreement is not unusual--

Israel and Syria have been enemies for years. But that Assad

should be able to hold out against Israeli power is quite

extraordinary.

Assad has played an extremely astute game of diplomatic

intrigue against the Israelis, with successes far beyond anything

one might have imagined. This study shows how the Syrian was able

to improve his originally weak position in the peace talks by

exploiting crisis conditions in Lebanon.

Assad's major weapon against the Israelis has been the

guerrilla group Hizbollah. The author claims that the fact that a

small group of guerrillas could have such an enormous impact in

this international drama reveals changed power relations in the

strategic Middle East.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this

analysis as a contribution to the debate on the peace process and

on this important region.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN

Colonel, U.S. Army

Acting Director

Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE received his Ph.D. in Middle East politics

from the University of California, Berkeley. In the early 1960s

he served in the Middle East as a foreign correspondent during

which time he was based in Beirut. Dr. Pelletiere returned to the

Lebanese capital in 1970, for a stay at Shemlan, the Arabic

language school of the British government. In 1975, when the

Lebanese civil war erupted, Dr. Pelletiere was in Cairo, Egypt,

conducting research on a Fulbright Fellowship. He interviewed

refugees fleeing Lebanon to Egypt, including many United Nations

professionals. Dr. Pelletiere has taught at the University of

California, Berkeley; at Ripon College, in Wisconsin; and at

Union College, Schenectady, NY. From 1982 until 1987 he was an

intelligence officer in Washington monitoring the Iran-Iraq War.

He came to the Strategic Studies Institute in 1988, and became a

full professor in 1992. He has written two books on the Middle

East: The Kurds--An Unstable Element in the Gulf, and the Iran

War--Chaos in a Vacuum. He is currently working on a book on the

war in Kuwait.
v

SUMMARY

This study considers the remarkable performance of Syria's

President Hafez al Assad, who took what apparently was a bankrupt

negotiating stance in the Arab-Israeli peace talks and turned it

into a position of strength.

What enabled Assad to make this extraordinary turnaround was

a correct analysis of power relations in the Middle East. In

particular Assad seems to have been among the first Middle East

politicians to recognize the potential of groups like Hizbollah,

which has for over a decade now been carrying on a fierce

guerrilla war against Israel in southern Lebanon. The study

examines why Israeli society is vulnerable to the Hizbollahis,

and how this vulnerability has played into Assad's hands.

The study also considers the arguments of those who oppose

making concessions to Assad, because, they claim, his position at

home is so weak that he would be unable to deliver on any deal

that he might make.

The study concludes with a look at the anarchic conditions

in Lebanon and ponders whether the radical forces set loose there

can ever again be brought under control.
1

ASSAD AND THE PEACE PROCESS:

THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF LEBANON

Introduction.

Syrian President Hafez Assad has established himself as the

virtual arbiter of the peace process; whether the process

succeeds or fails to a large extent depends on him. Given the

difficulties that Assad confronted when the talks first began 4

years ago, it is extraordinary that he has been able to maneuver

himself into this position.

This study attempts to show how he did it, and, in the

process, clarify the realities of power in the Middle East.

According to the author, with the coming of groups like Hizbollah

the Middle East power balance has changed, and U.S. policymakers

need to appreciate this fact if they are not to be overwhelmed by

the new situation that has come into being.

At the start of the peace process Israel appeared to be

holding all of the cards, and thus saw itself under no compulsion

to make accommodations to its enemies. With the collapse of the

Soviet Union, Israel's main antagonist, Syria, was bereft of

international support; it could not look to Moscow to bolster its

weak position.

Along with that, Syria could not hope to coerce the Israelis

by holding out the threat of resumed hostilities. After Egypt had

concluded a separate peace with the Jewish state, Syria's ability

to make war was severely compromised.

Given this situation (Syria's loss of Soviet patronage and

its inability to play the war card), the peace process appeared,

from the Israelis' standpoint, to be a win-win situation.

However it has not evolved that way. It is now apparent that

it is Tel Aviv, not Damascus, that is most anxious for a

settlement; the Israeli government is the one that is importuning

the United States to move the talks along.1

 Assad has held back,

refusing to cooperate unless and until he can obtain his minimum

requirement. Assad wants the Golan Heights back (after Damascus

lost it to Israel in 1967).
2

Israel's leaders are loath to hand it over--at least all at

once. They have hinted that they might be willing to return it

incrementally (the Israeli Defense Force [IDF] could make staged

withdrawals from the Heights over a period of, say, 3-8 years).

That, for Assad, is not good enough; he wants an almost immediate

withdrawal of the Israeli forces. The maximum waiting period that

he is willing to entertain is 1 year. Assad's position is that

Syrian sovereignty must be reestablished over the Heights by the

close of 1995. Where did Assad get the idea that he could hold

out like this?

The study will argue that Syria's grip on Lebanon is what

gives Assad leverage over the Israelis. Lebanon, the arena from

which numerous guerrilla groups operate, is crucial to Israel's

hopes of making peace with its neighbors.2 One of these groups,

Hizbollah, has proved extraordinarily effective. The Hizbollahis

seem able to embarrass the IDF, sometimes with seeming impunity.

Assad has used this group--along with others--to put pressure on

Tel Aviv, and induce it to bargain on a more or less equal basis

at the peace table.

The study starts with a look at Lebanon's unique political

environment, since this provided Assad the opening to dominate

Lebanon's political life, and subsequently to turn the situation

there to his uses.

Lebanon and the Peace Process.

Lebanon is governed by a system called confessionalism,

under which all of the major religious sects in the country share

in its rule.3 Each sect puts forward a representative for one of

Lebanon's top political posts, and that individual uses his

office to dispense privileges to his co-religionists.

Today, in Lebanon, power is shared among the sects on a more

or less equal basis.4

 However, as originally conceived,

confessionalism favored the politically dominant Christian

community. The other sects--the Druze, the Sunni and the Shia

Muslims--were involved in decisions affecting the national

welfare; however, in the end, the Christians determined the

actual decision making. This unique situation, where one group

(the Christians), came to dominate was established by the French.

They did this as part of the peace settlement after World War I.
3

The French and British devised the so-called system of mandates

at the San Remo conference, one of several international fora

called to work out the peace settlement after the Great War. At

San Remo, the Allies decided that communities previously

controlled by the Ottoman Empire would be reconstituted as socalled mandate territories. Supposedly, the Europeans would tutor

the territories, preparing them for self-rule. In fact, to all

intents they became the Europeans' possessions.

In the case of Lebanon, the French wanted a Christian entity

that would offset the power of the predominant Muslim

communities, and so they detached a Christian enclave from

greater Syria and made it into a separate state. The Syrians

objected to this; however the French, who had been given the

mandate for Syria, compelled their submission, and so the

arrangement was allowed to stand.

Then, in World War II, Vichy France sided with the Axis

powers, and as a result the United States and Britain stripped

the French of their mandate over not only Lebanon but Syria as

well. Lebanon became independent, but the Lebanese, among

themselves, arranged matters so that the same system of rule was

preserved; that is, Lebanon remained a Christian-dominated

state.5

 And this arrangement was codified by making it a law that

the president of the country would always be Christian;

specifically he had to come from the so-called Maronite

community.6 Also, because they remained the most numerous group

in Lebanon after World War II, the Christians got the most seats

in Parliament.

Years passed and the system never lapsed, even though most

of the points on which it was premised had changed. The most

important shift was in the area of demographics--the Christians

ceased to be the most numerous group; the Muslims, and in

particular the Shia Muslims, overtook them, but rather than

tinker with the system--much less drastically change it--the

Lebanese stopped taking a census count.7

 They maintained the

fiction that the old numerical superiority of the Christians was

still in force. Therefore, the Christians were entitled to run

the country.

One might ask why the Lebanese clung to this artificial

political construct? The answer would appear to be that under it
4

the economy did well; indeed, the Lebanese economy, pre-1970s,

was a wonder. For a country so tiny, Lebanon was rich, certainly

richer than the countries surrounding it. Syria, Israel, Jordan--

none were in a league with it. The Lebanese miracle, as it was

called, was based largely on this fact of Christian dominance.

Because of this, Western businessmen made their headquarters

there, and also--and this is most important--they did their

banking there. In addition, Lebanon benefited from a steady flow

of remittances from Lebanese living overseas. (Another great

source of income was the Persian Gulf. We will be discussing this

in more detail below.)

As long as money flowed into Lebanon, and as long as

everyone was more or less taken care of--that is, had a job and

was reasonably secure--the system, even though inequitable

politically, survived. However, problems became manifest as far

back as 1948 with the arrival in Lebanon of Palestinian refugees

of the first Arab-Israeli War. Some 100,000 Palestinians came to

Lebanon because they had nowhere else to go. With nothing but a

few possessions they had been able to salvage from the wreck of

that war, these people were destitute. The Lebanese did not

welcome the Palestinians; rather they exploited them shamefully.

The Lebanese used the Palestinians as a source of cheap labor,

and this persisted until the fateful period of the 1970s.

In 1970, clashes between the Palestinians living in Jordan

and the government there produced a new exodus. Another 100,000

fled into Lebanon, and this lot was entirely different from the

first, the 1948 cohort.8

 The Palestinian refugees in 1970

considered themselves fighters. In Jordan they had functioned as

guerrillas and they were determined to carry on their fight

against Israel from their new home in exile.

The newly arrived Palestinians settled in the south of

Lebanon, just over the Israeli border since from there they could

conduct fedayeen raids against the Israeli nahals (paramilitary

settlements) in Galilee. Ordinarily, cross-border raiding of this

kind would be interdicted by the country's rulers. But in

Lebanon's case, there was no adequate military to perform such

interdiction, and so the raiding went unchecked.9

To be sure, the raids were not very effective. Still, they

brought fierce retaliation from the Israelis. The latter bombed
5

and strafed the Palestinian camps in southern Lebanon and, in the

process, inevitably some local communities were hit.10 The

communities comprised mainly Shias, the poorest and most backward

politically of all the sects.11 These people were unhappy with

having the Palestinians in their midst, especially after the

Israeli retaliatory raids commenced, but there was not a great

deal that they could do about it. The Palestinians remained a

force in the south and--being an enterprising people--gradually

took over more and more of the country. They did not seek power

within the Lebanese system (for the reason that they hoped one

day to return to their homes in the Israeli-controlled

territories). However, they created a mini-state in Lebanon. They

had their own hospitals, clinics and businesses; they set up

schools and established welfare schemes, all to benefit

themselves; native Lebanese had no share in this. In this sense

the phenomenal growth of the Palestinian community was

parasitical. The Palestinians poached on resources of the

Lebanese, but did not contribute much, if anything, to the

overall society.

The Christians, more than any, despised the Palestinians,

and were outspoken in their contempt. They, alone among the

Lebanese communities, were not awed by the self-proclaimed

fedayeen fighters. (For a diagram of the various religious

enclaves within Lebanon, see Figure 1.) The other groups, the

Sunni Muslims, the Druze, and even the Shias--all were mindful of

the special political role the Palestinians played; that is, they

embodied the Arabs' grievance against Israel; they were the

vanguard of the Arab struggle against the Jewish state. The

Christians, however, did not think of themselves as Arabs; rather

they believed themselves to be the descendants of the ancient
6
7

Phoenicians. This was somewhat far fetched; still, the Christians

believed it.12 We can see, therefore, why the special character of

the Palestinians as the vanguard fighters of the Arabs would be

lost on the Christians.

Ultimately, the Christians and the Palestinians came into

conflict, and with that the fragile Lebanese system fell apart.

Assad was able to exploit this crisis to aggrandize his power

position in the area.

Birth of a Movement.

Beginning from roughly the 1960s, various leftist groups in

Lebanon had tried to mobilize the population against the

country's ruling elite. These efforts consistently were

frustrated. The power of the feudal lords was too great; moreover

(as we have already indicated) the feudalists' control was

bolstered by Lebanon's economy. As long as the economy thrived,

the feudalists could ignore calls for reform, much less

revolution.

By the 1970s, however, more and more Lebanese had begun to

find themselves in strained circumstances. The have/have-not gap

had grown, with the Christian and Sunni communities doing well to

quite well, and the rest--particularly the Shias--doing not well

at all.

At this point the head of the Druze community, Kamal

Jumblat, took charge of the anti-establishment agitation.

Jumblat, a strange figure (by Middle East lights), was something

of a mystic and a genuine reformer; however, he was also a

traditional Lebanese warlord.13 He commanded the Druze, a

community renowned for its fighting prowess. As things then stood

in Lebanon, the Druze were probably the only sect that could

stand up to the Christians militarily. With the Druze leading the

newly formed leftist coalition (called, by Jumblat, the National

Movement), the Christians found themselves facing a serious

challenge.

The aim of Jumblat and the leftists was to destroy the

confessional basis on which Lebanese politics was run,

substituting for it a form of proportional representation, and

also to bring the country into the orbit of the Soviet Union.
8

This last objective may seem surprising, but in fact it made

sense. Since the Christians boasted of their strong ties to the

West, it was natural that the enemies of the Christians should

seek to ally themselves with the Soviet Union.

The move to bring Lebanon into the camp of the Soviets was

something that the leftists originated without, it appears, any

encouragement from Moscow. Indeed, it could be argued that the

Russians wanted no part of this since--were the move to have

succeeded--it would have disrupted the regional power balance and

might have provoked a superpower confrontation. (This is an

important point which we will develop more fully later.)

Under normal conditions, a power realignment of this scope

would probably not have been likely. However, with the

Palestinian presence in Lebanon, it became a possibility. The

Palestinians in many ways were natural allies of the National

Movement forces. Like the latter, they looked to Moscow for

support, and, also like them, they saw themselves as underdogs, a

people who had been victimized by the system. Starting in the

mid-1970s, Jumblat maneuvered to bring the Palestinian/leftist

alliance into being.

The Palestinian Factor.

In 1975, fighting broke out between the Palestinians and the

Christians. It started in Beirut and, in a matter of days, spread

throughout Lebanon, drawing in the National Movement forces. With

that the civil war was on.14

Originally Syria opposed the war, for much the same reasons

that had influenced the Soviets. It foresaw that this could

escalate, drawing in the superpowers. Assad argued that neither

Israel nor the United States would stand for a "red republic of

Lebanon." Once it appeared that such an entity might come into

being, Israel (if not the United States) would certainly oppose

it.

Nonetheless, within a comparatively short time it did appear

that this would happen. The National Movement forces, backed by

the Palestinians, pushed the Christians into a trap, surrounding

the Phalange militia of the Maronites in the town of Zahle.15 (See

Figure 2.) The Christians held out, thanks in part to the
9

Israelis, who had for some time been supplying them by sea.

Meanwhile Assad summoned one leftist leader after another to

Damascus to insist that the seige be lifted.16 He remonstrated

that Israel could not be restrained, and indeed the Israelis had

begun to threaten intervention on the Christian side. Assad

wanted this "foolishness" stopped. However, Jumblat was adamant

that the Christians must be curbed for good and all.

At this point, the Christian President of Lebanon Suleiman

Franjiyah appealed to the Arab League for succor, and the League

responded positively.17 Assad's contribution to a League-sponsored

operation was to send 30,000 Syrian troops to force the leftists

to lift the seige of Zahle.
10
11

Several well-respected and well-informed authors--most

notably Patrick Seale--maintain that the United States was

involved in this decision; that then Secretary of State Henry

Kissinger not only approved Syria's action but induced the

Israelis not to oppose it.18

Israeli backing for a Syrian thrust into Lebanon would not

appear, on the face of it, to be credible. Tel Aviv and Damascus

both competed for influence over Lebanon, each claiming it as its

sphere of interest. A Syrian invasion, under such circumstances,

would not enhance Israel's power position. As it turned out,

however, the intervention suited the Israelis very well; it

divided the Arab Rejectionist Front. The Front was a coalition of

Arab forces actively carrying on the fight against Israel.19

Syria, by challenging the National Movement, split this grouping-

-from Israel's standpoint a highly desirable development.

Syria took considerable abuse from the other Arab states for

its action. Initially, to be sure, the Arab League had supported

the Syrian intervention, assuming that the mere appearance of the

Syrian army in Lebanon would cause the leftists to stand down.

When this did not happen, and when the leftists commenced to

fight the Syrians, Assad ordered his military to crush their

resistance. At one point the Syrian army stood by and let the

resuscitated Christian forces massacre some 3,000 Palestinians in

their camps.20

The Arab League further was upset because--after the leftist

challenge had been beaten--the Syrians stayed on in Lebanon; they

did not withdraw. To be sure, a large expedition like this could

not be shut off just like that. The Syrians could not relieve the

beleaguered Christians, and then immediately turn around and

depart the country; they had to guard against a flareup of the

fighting. Still, months after the seige had been lifted, the

Syrians were still there, and, not only the Arab League members

were upset, but the Israelis as well.

As part of the deal that Kissinger originally had brokered,

Syria accepted Israeli-imposed limitations on its activities

inside Lebanon.21 For one thing Syrian forces south of the BeirutDamascus road could not exceed one brigade (see Figure 2), and,

furthermore, Syria was prevented from setting up missile
12

batteries inside the country. This arrangement, called the Red

Line Agreement, kept the peace initially, but then broke down.

The Christians Grow Impatient.

As time passed, the Christians grew impatient over Syria's

continued Lebanon stay. The Maronite militiamen of the Phalange

pleaded with Israel's then prime minister Itzhak Rabin to help

them oust the Syrians (and the Palestinians). Rabin temporized,

unwilling to become involved militarily. At the same time, he did

extend various forms of aid to the Phalange. He enhanced its

military strength by supplying it with arms, and also undertook

to have Phalange youth receive military training from the IDF.22

Then, in 1977 the Israelis did an about face and commenced

planning for an intervention. This was the year that Menahim

Begin, the head of Israel's Likud Party, took over as Israel's

prime minister. Likud, unlike Israel's Labor Party, was

expansionist. Its leaders dreamed of extending Israel's borders,

ostensibly to make the country more secure.23 To be sure, after

1973 those borders had been shrinking, since Israel's setback in

the fourth Arab-Israeli war. As part of a peace settlement with

Egypt, Israel had agreed to surrender the Sinai Peninsula. In

return, however, it compelled Egypt's President Anwar Sadat to

sign a separate peace. As a result of this action, relations

between Egypt and Syria--partners in the 1973 war--became

strained. The Syrians felt themselves bereft, because without

Egypt they could not hope to stand up to Israel militarily; the

balance of power in the Middle East had swung back to Israel,

whose power position was now virtually unassailable.

After this, Assad had to rethink his options. Thus when the

Palestinians and Lebanese leftists began to battle the Christians

again, he backed them. This vascilation may seem odd, but in the

Middle East it is commonplace. Ideology is not as strong a factor

as some make it out to be. In fact, a point we will make in the

study is that Assad consistently has respected the balance of

power, and sought where possible to maintain it. Where he has

moved militarily, it has generally been for reasons of state.

Not so in the case of Israel under Likud. In 1978 and again

in 1982 Menahim Begin actively sought to disrupt the power

balance by invading neighboring Lebanon. Indeed one could argue

that having failed to impose his authority over Lebanon in the
13

first attempt, Begin deliberately created the conditions for a

second invasion in 1982.

In its first, 1978, incursion into Lebanon, Israel committed

30,000 troops and displaced more than 200,000 Lebanese who fled

in a mass exodus to Beirut. It also seized territory as far north

as the Litani River (see Figure 2). Although Begin claimed to be

acting with cause, Washington opposed the invasion, and, as a

consequence, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance--at the behest of

then President Jimmy Carter--pressured Tel Aviv to pull back.24

Afterward Carter supported emplacement of United Nations forces

in the south. Nonetheless, Israel did not completely pull out of

the country, but kept troops in a narrow strip along the border,

thus creating its own security zone.

This zone reflected Begin's policy; the Israeli prime

minister never gave up an asset. He had invaded Lebanon, and was

bound to have something to show for it. Thus, despite the

displeasure of the United States, Begin kept the extreme southern

portion of the country. This action, however, ultimately proved

Israel's undoing, because it alienated the Lebanese Shia

community.

Until this point the Shias had kept out of the National

Movement, even though one would have expected them to join since

they were arguably the most oppressed community in Lebanon. At

the same time, however, (as pointed out above) they were hostile

towards the Palestinians, whom they could not forgive for turning

their homeland into a battleground by making it a staging area

for raids on Israel. The Shias would have nothing to do with a

coalition of which the Palestinians were a part.

Nonetheless, after the Israelis invaded in 1978 things began

to change, and it was activities of the IDF that soured the Shias

on the Israelis. The IDF began cooperating with local Christian

communities in the south, effectively by-passing the Shias.25

Since the latter were by far the most numerous group in the area,

this slight was resented. The Shias believed that Israel would

turn over control of their area to their Christian rivals. Having

just seen the Palestinians driven off, they were dismayed by this

new development. Subsequently, several important Israeli

politicians have looked back on Israel's treatment of the Shias

and pronounced it a major error.26 At the time, however, the
14

backward, desperately poor Shia population was not seen as a

threat to the Jewish state, or even a factor worth considering.

So, despite the community's protests, the Shias were ignored.

That the Shias potentially were harmful to Israeli interests

ought to have been apparent. The community had undergone a

profound change (since the 1970s). Elements of it had begun

mobilizing militarily and had created a militia. To be sure the

appearance of militia was not unusual, not in Lebanon in those

days when every sect had its own fighting force. The Shias,

however, had for years refrained from forming such a group. That

they had now done so ought to have alerted the Israelis to

trouble ahead, since the community's outstanding grievance was

the loss of their southern territory to the IDF.

The newly formed militia of the Shias was called Amal, an

acronym for Afwaj al Muqawama al Lubnaniya (Lebanese Resistence

Detachments), and it was not long before it was locked in combat

with both the IDF and a newly created Israeli surrogate force,

the South Lebanon Army (SLA). This unit, comprising mainly

Christians, was the Israelis' gendarme in the southern region,

which Tel Aviv now had taken to calling its "security zone."

Thus, it appeared to the Shias that the Israelis were moving to

permanently annex their homeland, and this is what triggered the

hostilities between the two forces. Once Amal and the Israelis

clashed there was then nothing to prevent the Shias from joining

the Lebanese leftists, which increased the strength of the latter

significantly. Still, the Israelis do not seem to have recognized

the danger of the situation that they were getting into.

The Onslaught of Terror.

Just as many Israeli leaders failed to perceive the dangers

evolving in Lebanon, so, too, were the Christians blinded. They

continued their agitation for Israel to invade, and, when the

latter procrastinated, the Christians, in effect, forced the

issue. In 1981, the Phalange leader, Bashir Gemayl, apparently

thought himself strong enough to challenge Assad. He ordered the

construction of a highway across the mountains from the

Maronites' stronghold outside of Beirut to Zahle in the Beka'a

Valley (See Figure 2).27 This road, had it been completed, would

have enabled Bashir to dominate the Beirut-Damascus road, the

main corridor through which Syrian troops must pass to enter
15

Lebanon. Hence, Bashir's road-construction activity was a

flagrant provocation. With this in mind, on April 25, 1981, Assad

sent helicopter gunships loaded with troops to clear the

Phalangists off the ridge line where the road was being built. On

April 28 he repeated this operation, and the Israelis shot the

helicopters down.28 The Israelis maintained that--under the Red

Line Agreement--Syria was not allowed to provide air cover for

its troops. Syria counter-argued that the helicopters were

ferrying, not providing air cover for the units. An angry Assad

reacted by bringing missile batteries inside Lebanon, which, of

course, was a clear violation of the Kissinger- brokered deal.

Not long after this, the Israelis, in response to a

terrorist incident, sent their forces back into Lebanon, and this

time they went all the way to Beirut.29 They did not, however,

enter the Lebanese capital, because, were they to have done so,

they would then have had to confront the leftists and Syrians in

the narrow streets of the city. This almost certainly would have

meant large numbers of casualties, which the Israelis were not

prepared to accept. That Israel could not complete its invasion

of Lebanon by conquering Beirut was unfortunate for its

interests. Effectively, it stalemated the whole invasion

operation, and eventually the United States was brought to

intervene with American troops. The Israeli forces then withdrew.

President Ronald Reagan brokered a "solution" whereby the

Palestinians agreed to leave Lebanon once and for all. Lebanon's

Parliament, which recently had elected Bashir Gemayl president,

then signed an accord with Israel that amounted to a separate

peace. It appeared that the Israelis had won the day, an

extraordinary sequel to their success at Camp David. Syria looked

to have lost in its closely contested struggle with the Jewish

state.

However, in rapid succession a series of events occurred

that were completely to reverse the situation. There were several

vicious bombings, in which not only Israelis but Americans were

targeted. The greatest loss of life was at the U.S. Marine Corps

barracks in Beirut where 241 U.S. servicemen died. In another

explosion 67 Israeli troops perished in the city of Tyre. As a

consequence of this latter bombing a great hue arose in Israel to

bring the IDF home. Israelis were increasingly unhappy over

"Begin's war," as they called it. The casualties were too high.
16

Along with that, Israel's reputation was tarnished by the affair.

Images of the IDF using phosphorous and cluster bombs against

Lebanon's civilian population took their toll on the nightly

television news.

Then Bashir himself was blown up, and the leftist coalition

launched a full-scale assault on the Christian-dominated Lebanese

army. With that Amin Gemayl, Bashir's brother--who had taken over

the presidency--went to Damascus where he tore up the accord so

recently signed with Begin. In the short space of a few weeks the

situation was completely reversed. Now it appeared that Assad,

not Begin, was the winner. How did this happen?

The Force of the Shias.

The group that carried out the terrible bombings was a

relative newcomer to the Lebanese area, Hizbollah (the Party of

God). Hizbollah was drawn from the Shia community; it was not,

however, an arm of Amal. This was a totally new organization, one

that had been formed by the Iranians.

In 1982, a band of Iranian Revolutionary Guards arrived in

Lebanon from Tehran. They undertook to mobilize the Shia

community. They provided arms training and weapons, and

additionally they delivered extensive social services.

Eventually, the Iranians took the cadres that they had trained

and formed them into a new organization, Hizbollah.

The Iranians had just engineered a successful religious

revolt at home, the first genuine revolution in the Middle East

since the Algerian insurrection in 1962. As a part of this

revolution, elements of the Iranian community committed

themselves to undertake a worldwide jihad in behalf of Islam.

This revolution motivated the Iranians to invade Iraq in 1982,

and it was also behind their decision to intervene in Lebanon.

At the time, Iran's intrusion into Lebanon was viewed as an

extraordinary event. What motivated the Iranians to do so puzzled

many. Even today, opinion widely differs over this. If one puts

to one side Iran's motives however, and concentrates only on

results, the move was significant. For one thing, it unleashed

terrible forces previously pent up within the Lebanese Shia

community, among them a penchant for martyrdom, which has always
17

been a feature of Shia Islam, the sect of which the Iranians,

like the Hizbollahis, are a part.

The insidious nature of the martyrdom tactic is that it is

practically unbeatable. In all of the worst bombings, the victims

were helpless to defend themselves. Shias simply forced

themselves into areas where American or Israelis were massed, and

then detonated bombs, either strapped to their persons, or loaded

on trucks which the suicide bombers drove.30

Faced with an enemy that would resort to such abhorrent

tactics, the Americans and then the Israelis retreated. The

Israelis moved first, pulling the IDF back to their security zone

in the south. Soon afterward, the Americans departed; U.S.

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger withdrew them entirely

from the theater.

One could say, then, that what had turned the tide in

Lebanon was terror. At least it seemed that way from Assad's

perspective. He drew three fateful lessons from what had

occurred.

The Lessons Learned.

The first lesson that Assad absorbed involved the Israelis.

He saw that they were reluctant to take casualties. This was

revealed when they refused to go into West Beirut. Rather than

fight the leftists house-to-house in the back streets and alley

ways of that sprawling metropolis, Israel stood off and, in

effect, called on the United States to broker a solution. It

repeated this pattern of retreat after the bombing of IDF

headquarters in Tyre. Over a period of years the IDF surrendered

practically all of its conquests in Lebanon, except for the

narrow security zone.

The Israelis' performance convinced Assad that their muchvaunted military might was limited. The IDF depended on its

technological edge; once that edge was lost it became vulnerable.

To be sure, the Israelis are prepared to sacrifice in an imposed

war, such as in 1973, but "Begin's war" was not perceived in this

light. To much of the Israeli public, the invasion was an

undisguised power grab, of which they wanted no part. When the

casualties began to mount, the public demanded a withdrawal.
18

Assad's second lesson involved the United States. Washington

suffered losses similar to that of Israel, and it, too, pulled

out. Lebanon was not of vital interest and so Washington was

indisposed to sacrifice in its behalf. This revelation shocked

the Christians (indeed all the Lebanese), who had assumed the

opposite to be true. The Lebanese had always assumed their

country was a bastion of the West. Indeed, in 1958, the United

States had sent Marines to defend Lebanon from communist

takeover, and after that the people of Lebanon had prided

themselves on being special allies of Washington.31

When Washington pulled up stakes and withdrew over the

horizon, the rightists in the country were appalled. The

implications of the move were quite sobering. In fact, it meant

that Lebanon ceased to be an autonomous country. As pointed out

earlier, Lebanon had no adequate military of its own. The central

government had no means of imposing its will throughout the

country. The only effective instrument for keeping order

therefore was the Syrian army. Assad had not withdrawn his

forces, which were settled down throughout the country; indeed,

the Syrians were treating Lebanon as if it were a province of

theirs. This was a situation that affronted many Lebanese,

particularly the Christians, but were the Syrians to leave--what

then? Would not the land be torn with anarchy?

The final lesson was in many ways the most disturbing. The

appearance of Hizbollah upset all of the familiar understandings

that previously had prevailed in this part of the world. For one

thing, it had always been the case that dissidents survived by

allying themselves with powerful patrons. Hizbollah did not do

that. To be sure, it was allied to Iran, and secondarily to

Syria. But Iran, in the 1980s, was not viewed as particularly

powerful, and, this being the case, one had to wonder, why were

the Hizbollahis willing to make common cause with it?

Assad seems to have appreciated the appeal of Iran, and its

revolution, for the founding members of the Hizbollah movement.

Clearly, the attraction was ideological--Khomeini's message spoke

to the fervent young Muslims. Later in the study we will discuss

this more. Here it is sufficient to note that for Assad, the

Hizbollahis were potentially useful. Their violent ways in

particular appealed to him.
19

Here was a group which--if its ideologues were to be

believed--was ready for anything. Motivated by deep contempt for

the world as it existed, the Hizbollahis were set to sweep away

the whole edifice of power.32 To them, existing power arrangements

and the blocs that supported them were anathema, fit only to be

destroyed. In this respect, the radicals seemed uncontrollable.

Left to themselves, there seemed no limit to the destruction that

they would wreak.

Assad looked at the Hizbollahis in contrast to the Israelis.

The latter were great conservers of life--at least the lives of

their own soldiers. The IDF was certainly not profligate in this

regard; if it could, it would conserve the life of every single

Israeli soldier. The Hizbollahis, on the other hand, craved

martyrdom, and would willingly sacrifice themselves, if only to

confound their enemies.33

To Assad, this must have seemed a perfect setup. Pit the

Hizbollahis against the IDF. The guerrillas, by their willingness

to employ suicidal tactics, might prove a match for the IDF,

which preferred to stand off and bombard the enemy with aircraft

and long-range artillery.34 Given the IDF's technological

superiority, this type of warfare was ideal for it. At the same

time, however, in war it is impossible to avoid small unit

actions, and here the Hizbollahis came into their own.

As long as Israel held south Lebanon, the IDF was compelled

to patrol the area, the terrain of which favors guerrilla

operations. Cut with arroyo-like formations, southern Lebanon

affords excellent cover for ambush parties. They can lay

concealed in trenches no more than a few feet deep, and then,

leaping out, fire at passing patrols.

To be sure, such operations took their toll on the

guerrillas, armed as they were with rocket propelled grenades

(RPG), the range of which is only 150 meters. They had to attack

at close quarters which meant they rarely could escape, and

Israeli helicopter gunships would hunt them down. Despite initial

high losses, however, the Shias continued to press home their

assault, displaying considerable courage.

Starting about 1989, we witness Assad turning increasingly
20

to the Hizbollahis, having apparently determined that they were

the perfect foil to use against the IDF.

The Changed Situation in Lebanon.

After the explosion at the U.S. Marine Corps barracks and

America's pullout, the situation in Lebanon fundamentally

changed. The Christians practically laid down their arms. As

stated above, the American departure disillusioned them. It was

not merely that they had lost a potential military ally;

something much more disturbing had occurred.

Prior to the outbreak of the civil war, Lebanon was the

banking center of the Middle East. As the war escalated,

depositors transferred their wealth out of the country. The most

serious defection was that of the Gulf monarchs, who now sought

the security of the financial centers of New York and London.

Without the monarchs' financial contributions the Lebanese

banking system could not survive.35

If Lebanon were to regain its erstwhile status (as the

Middle East's banker), it had to coax back that Gulf money. Had

America maintained its support of Lebanon, this probably could

have been accomplished. But, with the Americans gone, virtually

no hope existed of recouping Beirut's preeminent position. As a

consequence, the Christians, who had been foremost in directing

the country's finances, now began to emigrate, the pattern of

Lebanese life for centuries. In despair of making their fortunes

at home, the Christians sought new lives for themselves overseas.

Of course, the Palestinians, too, had departed--the one

great plus for the Israelis. The fedayeen fighters had been

forced to leave by the deal brokered between them and the Reagan

administration. Some Palestinians remained, to be sure, the far

leftist groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine (PFLP). However, these became virtual puppets of the

Syrians. Indeed, all of the diehard Palestinian fighters who

remained behind in Lebanon were compelled by the Syrians to

relocate their headquarters to Damascus, where they came directly

under Assad's control.36

The Lebanese government, too, became a victim of Assad's

takeover since it no longer controlled much of anything.
21

Practically every important action it took had to be cleared with

Assad; in that respect Lebanon's president became a kind of

factotum running between Beirut and Damascus. This almost total

subservience of the Lebanese to the Syrians was to have great

significance once the peace talks between the Israelis and Arabs

commenced in 1990. It meant, in effect, that Assad controlled the

Lebanese delegation, which could take no independent position,

but had to constantly defer to the Syrian president.

At this stage (in 1989), Assad probably did not foresee the

opportunities that were open to him. If he congratulated himself

at all, it was probably on having faced down the Israelis. The

fact that he could actually capitalize on his victory, to

aggrandize himself even further, almost certainly was not

apparent at this stage. The realization of how well off he was

did not come until the next year.

The Standoff.

In 1989, Syria and Israel confronted each other in Lebanon

like a couple of schoolboys standing inside a circle, each

demanding that the other quit the circle, or face being ejected.

Neither would make the first move, and so the confrontation

simply dragged on.

Israel was adamant that it would not withdraw from the south

of Lebanon until Syrian forces had pulled out of the north. Assad

maintained that, inasmuch as his forces originally had been

invited into Lebanon by the Lebanese government, they were there

by right. It was Israel that had invaded the country, and

therefore it must be the first to depart.

There is no telling how long this situation might have

continued, with Lebanon effectively partitioned into separate

spheres of interest, one Israeli-controlled, the other under the

domination of Damascus.37 In 1990, however, the United States

announced that it intended to open peace talks between the

Israelis and their Arab neighbors, and this proved the catalyst

to move towards a resolution of the impasse.

Assad knew, going into the peace talks, that his position

was weak. His army was so far inferior to that of Israel that he

could not hope to take on the latter militarily. Further, he
22

lacked friends in the international arena, after the Soviet Union

had fallen. He therefore had no way of pressuring his enemies to

bargain with him in earnest.

At the outset of the talks, Israel adopted the stance that

it had no need to achieve a peace with its Arab neighbors. It

held all the territory that it wanted.38 With these holdings it

felt secure. Why should it bargain with the Arabs? It had peace--

or, if it did not, it had security, the next best thing. Israel

therefore determined that it would make no concessions. If there

were to be concessions, they must come from the Arab side.

As events have subsequently shown, this was in practically

all cases a solid strategy. It certainly has paid off with

respect to the Palestinians. Yasir Arafat, leader of the

Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), has had to make

significant concessions to the Israelis just to get them to sit

down with him.39 Jordan's King Hussein has effectively made peace

with Israel, on the latter's terms. Only Syria is continuing to

hold out, and here, it would appear, Israel's strategy has broken

down.

Playing the Lebanon Card.

Prior to the start of the peace talks, Assad had been

assisting the Hizbollahis to carry on a low-level guerrilla war

in the south of Lebanon, in cooperation with Iran. The latter

resupplied its clients with arms and provisions, flown to

Damascus in regularly scheduled runs and off loaded to the

Hizbollahis, who then transhipped them south through the Beka'a

Valley.40

The war in the south never developed into much, because the

Hizbollahis for a considerable time lacked the expertise to

accomplish anything. Although brave certainly, their courage,

against a superior force like the IDF, did not go very far. For a

long time the Hizbollahis did not constitute anything more than a

minor irritant to the IDF.

Starting in early 1993, however, the picture began to

change. The operations of the Hizbollahis increased in intensity

as the guerrillas displayed more and more proficiency.41 Along

with that, they had been supplied with some extremely
23

sophisticated weapons, like the Russian-made AT-3 (Sagger) wire

guided missile, with a range of between 500 and 3000 meters. With

these, they overcame the handicap they had suffered previously;

when armed only with RPGs, they had been forced to initiate

actions under almost suicidal conditions.

As the war in the south escalated, the Israelis suffered two

concerns. First, their surrogate force, the SLA, was losing

heart; there had been significant defections to the side of

Hizbollah. Indeed, in one incident a whole SLA unit went over to

the Hizbollahis, and afterward several of the defectors appeared

on Beirut television to explain why they had abandoned the

Israeli cause.42 Along with that, IDF soldiers were being lost in

unacceptable numbers.

Therefore, in spring 1993, the Rabin government decided to

check the rapidly deteriorating situation. It determined to

attack Lebanon. However, this would not be a ground invasion, in

the manner of past such attacks. The IDF would rather bombard the

south and target it with air strikes, the idea being to create

chaos in the southern region,43 thus to bring the Beirut

government to the point of collapse. To spare their client, the

Syrians would then have to agree to call off Hizbollah.

The Israelis named this exercise Operation Accountability,

because to them it was Assad who should be held accountable for

the guerrillas. In this latest flareup of guerrilla violence he

was particularly suspect because of certain events that had

occurred outside Lebanon in connection with the peace conference.

Coping with Breakdown in the Talks.

In spring 1993, the U.S.-sponsored talks had practically

broken down.44 In the Arabs' eyes, the Israelis were stonewalling.

Indeed, the Arabs despaired of going on with the talks; the

Israelis were so unyielding. It was either walk out, the Arabs

felt, or give in to Tel Aviv's demands.45

Rather than walk away from the talks, Assad apparently

determined to show Israel there was a price for behaving in this

fashion. By stepping up the guerrilla war--and killing a

significant number of IDF soldiers--Assad was, in effect,

offering a quid pro quo. Israel could expect to suffer more such
24

costly guerrilla actions, unless it agreed to be more forthcoming

towards the Arab side.

 This being the case, Rabin decided to respond in kind. By

by-passing the guerrillas and seeking to destabilize the Lebanese

government, he was saying to Assad--we hold you responsible for

this situation, and you must correct it or we will create such

pandemonium in Lebanon that the country you claim as your client

will fall apart.46

The shelling of southern Lebanon continued for a week, and

did in fact cause considerable suffering among the Shias.

However, when the shelling stopped, and the few IDF infantry

units that had been deployed inside Lebanon were withdrawn, the

Hizbollahis returned to the south, and within a matter of weeks

had resumed their operations. Indeed, in August 1993 the

guerrillas ambushed an Israeli patrol, killing nine IDF soldiers,

the largest loss of Israelis in a single engagement since 1982.47

After this Rabin did nothing. Indeed he accepted the fact

that Syria could keep up the war in the south while the peace

talks went on.48 This was a most unexpected development. One would

have thought that Israel would have withdrawn from the talks

immediately. If, as the Israelis had been maintaining, they did

not need a formal peace with their neighbors, why then were they

going on with the negotiations? Indeed, Israel not only did not

pull out of the talks, it tried to pressure Damascus-- through

the United States--to come to an agreement. Secretary of State

Christopher's repeated shuttles between Damascus and Tel Aviv and

the subsequent meetings between President Clinton and Assad were

all at the behest of the Israelis, to try to break the deadlock.49

In other words, it now appeared that the situation had

reversed itself. Assad was holding out in the talks while the

Israelis had become the petitioners. How had this developed?

Involving the Gulf States.

Only recently has it become apparent how much Israel needs

peace, for the reason that only with peace can Israel's economic

situation be improved. This became clear with the convening of

the Casablanca Conference in Morocco in November.50 Israel sent a

huge delegation to this conference, which lobbied for the
25

creation of a regional bank. This bank--the money for which would

largely be subscribed by the Gulf states--would fund projects to

develop the whole Middle East region, Israel included.51

Although the United States supported Israel's push for the

creation of such an agency, the plan foundered (for the time

being, at least) on the reluctance of the Gulf states to commit

the necessary funds. The monarchs pleaded that the time was not

ripe, since there was still war in the region.52

The only war in the area is the one between the Hizbollahis

and the IDF in southern Lebanon (that and the escalating conflict

carried on by Hamas inside the occupied territories).53 Since

backing from Assad allows that fight to continue, he, therefore,

is the key to ending the conflict. There can be no real peace in

the area (that is, one in which the Arabs accept Israel's de jure

existence), without the Syrian president's cooperation. If Assad

gets a settlement on the Golan, it seems certain Israel will get

one in Lebanon, after which things will return to calm.54

Effectively, then, Assad has succeeded in equalizing the

contest between himself and the Israelis at the negotiating

table. He has something that Israel wants--an end to the fighting

which would then open the area to development by the regional

bank. The banking scheme to be sure is visionary, but it could be

realized if the Gulf monarchs' concerns were addressed. This

being the case, the Israelis are motivated to make concessions to

Assad, to get on to the phase of economic development.

As with all complex situations, however, it rarely happens

that there is a neat solution. Just so in this instance. There is

an outstanding objection to making peace on Assad's terms.

Skeptics within the Israeli establishment claim that Assad is so

insecure at home, he could not deliver on a peace deal, were one

to be made with him.

The Question of Syrian Stability.

Syria is not a rich country, nor has it ever been, at least

in modern times. While it has oil, it is heavy oil which is not

in demand for export. Syria can, however, provide for its own

fuel needs.55
26

The major drawback to Syria's development is the country's

economic system. Patterned after that of communist Eastern

European governments, Syria's system is among the most controlled

in the Middle East, if not the world. Every aspect of the economy

is subject to government oversight (except for agriculture). The

public sector is heavily bureaucratized, and looks into every

detail of the economy's operation.56

Politically, too, the society is overcontrolled. Assad sits

at the tip of a great pyramid of power. He is reputed to make

decisions governing the most minute details.57 He oversees all

important appointments; no one achieves high position in Syria

who has not first been vetted by Assad.

In this respect, Syria is a great deal like its sister

Ba'thist republic, Iraq, but whereas Iraq is a highly controlled

society where (until recently, at least) things were efficiently

managed, Syria is inefficiently run, and the reason is

corruption. Syria has the unenviable distinction of having

probably the most corrupt government in the Middle East, as

judged by Middle Easterners. The people of Syria are aware of

this, and reportedly are unhappy with the situation, but

recognize that they are powerless to rectify it.

Corruption is traceable, in part, to the French, who, as

already discussed, held the mandate for Syria after World War I.

They were responsible for developing the country's governing

arrangements. Specifically, they installed an Alawi elite in

power.58 Alawis are an obscure Middle Eastern sect which orthodox

Sunnis regard as heretical. The French made the Alawais the

rulers of Syria, a position they have maintained ever since by

means that are quite ruthless.

This makes for a bad situation. The overwhelming majority of

the country's population, being Sunni, distrusts--and has

contempt for--the country's rulers. To offset this scarcely

repressed hostility, the leadership maintains an extraordinary

solidarity. Assad, of course, is Alawi, as are all of his

division commanders, his chiefs of security, and top air force

officers. By looking out for each other, the sect members have

withstood numerous challenges (but not always effortlessly, as we

shall see below).
27

Corruption has also affected Syria's involvement in Lebanon,

where the Syrians are known to be trafficking in drugs.59 Indeed,

the area where the drugs are grown is under their control, as is

the port from which the drugs are shipped out of the country.

Meanwhile, in all stages of the drugs' movement inside Lebanon,

Syrian commanders take their cut.60 This corruption is so

widespread it has affected the military's performance. The Syrian

army is not well-regarded.61 It is badly disciplined, ill trained,

and not up to the standard of the Israelis. Practically speaking,

the Syrian army's major task is to guard the regime. Of the

several divisions in the army, half are quartered close to the

capital. In the capital, the command is divided, with one top

commander reporting to the army staff, the other directly to

Assad. Until Assad's brother, Rifaat, overstepped himself in

1983, there was even a third layer of protection.62 Rifaat

commanded the so-called Defense Companies, whose only mission was

to protect the president.

Interestingly, Assad seems to stand above and outside of all

this corrupt dealing. The Syrian people appear to tolerate him.

His personal lifestyle is seemingly impeccable. He lives a life

secluded from public view. His wife is modest and self-effacing.

His children are well-behaved and mannerly, in public at least.

The great tragedy of Assad's life was the recent death of

his son, Basil, in a car accident. Assad had been grooming Basil

to succeed him. This had not been an easy task. The average

Syrian was unwilling to see the office of president manipulated

in this way. Syria's military leaders were not much taken with

the idea either. Hence, Assad invested considerable capital in

positioning Basil to inherit the rulership. Principally, he

cultivated the Syrian power elite, promoting individuals who were

disposed toward Basil, and sidelining those who were not.

Until recently it was widely perceived that Assad had

succeeded in his mission. The public appeared ready to accept

Basil. They recognized his good qualities, which, in fact, were

numerous. He had gone through university as an engineer and

gotten his degree. He did well in the army, and had established a

reputation as a reformer.63 None of the corruption that tarnished

other officers rubbed off on him.

And then he died in the car accident, leaving his father
28

bereft.64 Now Assad is attempting to put forward his other son,

Bashir. But Bashir lacks the charisma of Basil. In fact, Bashir

had to be summoned home from London, where he was studying to

become an eye doctor, to begin his leadership training. He came

reluctantly, it was said, and now is not doing well as commander

of a tank unit where Assad has placed him.

The issue of succession is a pressing one as Assad is known

to be in ill health. In 1983, he apparently had a heart attack,

and this led to a crisis of sorts. While the president was

recuperating, the men around Assad fell to fighting among

themselves, and his brother, Rifaat, came close to leading a coup

d'etat.65 Assad, however, recovered in time to calm the unrest,

and ultimately exiled Rifaat to Paris, where he has remained ever

since.

These problems--the difficult succession, the corrupt men

around Assad, the president's ill health--all would appear to

buttress the argument of those who oppose making a deal with the

Syrians. However there are counterarguments, one of which the

author finds compelling--there is no effective opposition in

Syria; Assad does not have to worry about subversive forces

conspiring against him. There was an opposition at one time, but

Assad crushed it, and the manner in which he did is quite

revealing.

Purging the Brotherhood.

Held down by the Alawis for years, Syria's majority Sunni

sect long ago adopted a stance of resignation. They departed from

this, however, in 1982 when elements of the community led a

fierce rebellion against Assad's government.

In 1982, Syria's situation was particularly dismal. Assad

had just allied the country with Iran in the Iran-Iraq war.66 This

alienated the Gulf monarchs, Syria's principal financial backers.

Then he took the country into Lebanon, to oppose the Israeli

invasion. One of these moves, by itself, would have strained

Syrian resources. The two taken together practically broke the

economy.

To be sure, the Sunni rebellion did not develop overnight;

it had been simmering for some time. Since at least the 1970s the
29

Muslim Brotherhood, the most powerful Sunni opposition group in

the Arab world, had been combatting Assad's government through

acts of sabotage.67

In Syria, the bulk of the Brotherhood's membership comprised

middle class elements, as well as less well-off petit bourgeois.

The strongholds of the Brotherhood were located in the north of

Syria, in Hama and Homs. The discontent originated there, and by

1979 it had spread fairly widely. In June of that year an

extraordinary event occurred, the murder, gangland style, of some

69 Alawi officer cadets at the Aleppo military school.68

After that, the dissidence erupted into outright revolt.

Militants associated with the Brotherhood assassinated a number

of Syrian leaders; several Ba'thist headquarters were bombed, and

there were running gun battles between the Brothers and Syrian

security forces in the capital. This, for Assad and the other

regime leaders, was the final straw.

In February 1982, Assad's brother, Rifaat, marched north to

Hama with his Defense Companies and ringed the city, after which

he proceeded to bombard it for 3 weeks. Then the companies moved

into Hama and went house-to-house rooting out resisters.69 The

conservative toll of dead was set at 20,000. The companies

wreaked similar destruction on Homs and Aleppo, which would

appear to indicate the actual toll was higher. After the purge,

the Brotherhood ceased to be active. Periodically, reports are

heard of a Brotherhood revival, but these never seem to develop

into anything; signs of overt dissatisfaction with the regime are

meager. For example, it is claimed that the fundamentalists are

gaining support, and the evidence cited is the increase in Muslim

dress by Syrian women. This is interesting certainly; but, by

itself, it does not appear to be significant.

It seems unlikely that a resurgence of opposition will

develop in Syria, when one looks at the record of recent events.

For example in 1993, the country experienced a disastrous summer

drought, with a virtual shutoff of water to all the major cities.

In the capital, water was out 8 hours a day for weeks. Without

water, restaurants shut down, laundries failed to operate, food

rotted in the stores--there was even a threat of cholera. Israeli

newspapers ridiculed the Syrians editorially, saying it was hard

to take seriously a regime that could not supply water to its
30

capital.70

In the end nothing came of this. In Algeria, a similar

episode (in 1979) produced the revolt of the Islamic Salvation

Front (FIS), which many now fear will topple Algeria's ruling

junta.71 What appears to be working in Assad's favor is the

relative prosperity of the country; the agriculture sector, in

particular, is doing well, and government officials have boasted

that as long as the country can feed itself (with a surplus for

export), they have no fear for the security of Assad's regime.72

Thus, the issue of whether Assad is threatened at home (and

whether, therefore, it is a good idea to negotiate with him) is

undecided; one can argue either way. If one wants to negotiate

with the Syrian president, a case can be made for this; if one

does not, a case likewise can be made.

Taking it all into to account, however, the author favors

making an agreement, mainly because of what is happening in

Lebanon with the Shias.

A Community on the Move.

The Shia community in Lebanon is a dynamic one. It has been

growing and developing politically since at least the 1970s.

Restless and assertive as it is, the community has the potential

to harm not only the interests of Israel but also those of the

United States.

At present Hizbollah is one of the leading forces in the

Shia community; unquestionably it is the dominant party in the

south.73 However, the basis of this dominance seems to be little

understood, in the West at least. The Western media consistently

portray Hizbollah as a lot of fanatics, in the pay of Iran.

Certainly fanaticism is a large part of what Hizbollah is about,

and certainly Iran is financing the party's activities. But the

party's strength does not derive exclusively--or even primarily--

from the ideological commitment of its followers or from their

willingness to take Iranian subventions.

Hizbollah serves the community. It sounds bizarre to state

it this boldly, but this is the essence of the relationship

between it and the mass of Shias. From 1982, when Iran's
31

Revolutionary Guards first arrived in Lebanon, the radicals have

been consolidating their power base by dispensing services the

community needs. Essential services which are unavailable must be

gotten somewhere, if the community is to survive.

Once Israel declared the south a security zone, the area

practically lost contact with Beirut, i.e., the central

government. Hence, the government cannot provide for it. Indeed,

the Lebanese army cannot even operate south of the Litani River.74

This means that the southern Shias are on their own, in an

environment where the SLA and IDF are constantly harassing them.75

The Shias do not receive social services from the Israelis, no

protection, nothing. All this they get from Hizbollah.

In return for serving the community, the party demands

military service from its youth. This is a purely feudal

relationship, no different from that which prevailed in the days

when the warlords were in power.76 It is a way of life that has

characterized Lebanese society for centuries. Moreover, it is an

efficient arrangement, well-understood by the Lebanese. What

makes the party powerful, then, is the patronage it has to

bestow. It would not be nearly so threatening if it depended on

ideology or even on pay-offs from the Iranians.

Further, it seems likely that the party will continue to

grow. Indeed, in recent national elections eight candidates put

forward by Hizbollah took their seats in the Parliament. This

must be taken as an indicator of the party's strength.

The message to the Israelis should be plain--something must

be done to check Hizbollah's power, or else deflect it away from

its present radicalism. It seems to the author that Syria is

offering a way of accomplishing this. Assad apparently is willing

to cut off the guerrillas' supply line through the Beka'a Valley,

in effect shutting down their operations. In return, he wants

Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights. After that, Syria will

pull its troops out of northern Lebanon, if the Israelis abandon

their security zone. This will enable the Lebanese army to take

over the south, at which point, presumably, the Shias will get

back their land and the fighting will cease. The Shias have been

struggling for over a decade to repossess this territory and once

they have it they should have no need to go on fighting.77
32

But opposing this deal are some Israeli politicians (mainly

from Likud) who are saying that Hizbollah is anti-West, and antiIsrael, and that, therefore, there should be no thought of making

a deal with it. This is probably true, but it is largely

irrelevant. The important thing is not that the party be friendly

towards the West, but that it not actively fight against Western

interests.

The Israeli politicians opposed to making peace with Assad

should be challenged to say how they intend to resolve this

difficulty. In this regard it is interesting to reemphasize that

many Israeli hawks are members of the Likud Party. That party's

record in the past has not been reassuring. Likud invaded

Lebanon, twice. Its "solution" to the Palestinian problem was to

drive the Palestinians out of Israel into Jordan, and let King

Hussein take care of them.78 In a word, Likud's answer to most

challenges facing Israel is force.

Force does not come cheaply; using it is a costly

proposition, and Israel is not a wealthy country. It seems

unlikely that Washington will help Israel pacify Lebanon. Indeed,

it would be ironic if the United States, after developing the

Weinberger Doctrine to prevent such involvements, would then

thrust itself back into the very arena where the doctrine was

born.79

Thus, if Likud is thinking of reinvading Lebanon, it might

want to pause and consider. It should examine its perceptions

about the Hizbollahis, particularly from whence they derive their

power. It is incorrect to assume (as many Israelis seem to do)

that the party is the tool of the Syrians--or even of the

Iranians. The party draws strength from the Shia community, which

has been aggressively on the move for years now. Since at least

the 1970s, the Shias have been pushing forward, determined to

make a place from themselves in Lebanese society. To hold back

such a community is no easy task. It certainly cannot be done

without enormous expenditure of resources, which at present are

in extremely short supply.

What Assad Wants.

There are those in Israel (and in the West as well) who

maintain that Assad is the one who is holding up the peace
33

process. The claim is made that Israel will make peace in a

minute, but Assad's demand to have the Golan restored him in a

year is unrealistic.

It is hard not to credit Assad's compunctions. He has no

reason to believe, were he to agree to a staged return, that this

would ever be completed. Likud Party leaders in Israel have said

that they will not be bound by any deal that Rabin enters into

with Assad. Were they to be returned to power (they have said),

they might reject it.80 Under such circumstances, Assad must focus

on achieving concrete gains which cannot subsequently be

overturned. Getting the Golan back, with the chance to repopulate

it, would be a notable achievement, and not something that the

Likud politicians could later on repudiate.

What about Israel's claim that the Heights are strategic,

and that to abandon them would be to expose itself to attack? In

times past the Golan was an ideal observation post; it was also--

for the Syrians--a good staging ground for a surprise attack. But

no one seriously believes that the Syrian army could, by itself,

stage an attack on Israel, not under today's conditions. It would

be suicide, given the discrepancy in the nations' strengths.

Also, Israel has the most sophisticated monitoring equipment

available and does not need the Heights for this any longer. In

effect, then, the claim that the Heights are strategic can no

longer be sustained.81

The Prospect for the Future.

For the Syrians--and indeed for the entire Middle East--

there are signs of a great revival. After the long, draining

experience of war, an opportunity exists for all the area states

to move forward. Syria, in particular, is well placed to advance.

Assad shrewdly threw his support behind the Allied coalition

during the Gulf War.82 This won him the gratitude of the Kuwaitis

and Saudis. Both these immensely rich regimes are willing now to

assist in developing Syria's economy. This is significant, given

the situation discussed above--the animus of the Syrian Sunni

community against Assad. The Muslim Brothers, the major

opposition group in Syria, receives its backing mainly from the

Gulf.83 Were the Saudis to call upon the Brothers to support the

Syrian president--and promise, in return, to finance Syrian

development--it is likely the Brothers would go along. Certainly,
34

the Saudis would strive to gain such backing; it is clear that

they want to see the Arab-Jewish conflict ended. At the same

time, the Saudis are influential in Lebanon, where a similar push

to rebuild is now underway. In Lebanon, the newly-appointed prime

minister, Rafik al Hariri, is heading an ambitious program.84

Hariri is a long-standing friend of the Saudi royal family. He

has won significant pledges of aid from them, which has led to

other pledges of support from Europe and elsewhere. With over $1

billion dollars committed so far, the campaign has already

commenced.

A scheme of such magnitude will produce jobs, many of which

will go to the Shias. With improved career chances will come

hope, and that, more than anything, is what the community needs

right now. The author believes that, were the Shias able to mend

their lives and fortunes, they would not fight with anyone.

Indeed, the recent decision of Hizbollah to field a slate of

candidates in the elections would appear to support this view.

The party (or at least a portion of it) appears to be turning its

back on Iran's crusade against the West, and preparing to assume

a role in Lebanese politics.

This brings us to the last issue we need to consider, the

question of U.S. policy in regard to this problem.

Recommendations.

This question of what stand to take on the issue of

negotiating a peace treaty with Assad is a difficult one.

However, it can be worked out, provided one knows how to approach

the problem. We can best illustrate this by citing the recent

visit to the United States by a delegation of Likud Party

politicians.

The Likud delegation came to lobby the U.S. Congress against

supporting a settlement with Assad.85 Why, the Likud figures

argued, should Israel deal with an Arab head of state whose

regime supports terrorism? It is certainly the case that in the

past Assad was involved with various groups which clearly were

terrorist. The question is, is he so involved today?

The Likud delegation cited Assad's connections with

Hizbollah, which the delegates regard as indisputably a terrorist
35

organization. This is a matter of debate. Hizbollah was terrorist

in the early 1980s when it seized hostages, blew up embassies and

assassinated politicians--all that was the work of men outside

the law, killers, thugs.

What is going on now in southern Lebanon, however, does not

fall into that category.86 The guerrilla war is not terroristic,

in the sense that it targets IDF units and their SLA clients,

and, by and large, avoids involving civilians. This, however, is

beside the point. How to characterize Hizbollah is not important;

rather the focus should be on what the party can do.

The great difference between Hizbollah now and the way it

was in the early 1980s is that now it has the support of the Shia

community. Terrorists can plant bombs and shoot people from

around corners, and the community need never be involved, or even

approve of their actions. However, it is a different matter when

carrying on a guerrilla war; such activity cannot commence, much

less be sustained for any period, without considerable support

from a broad area of the population.87

Earlier we explained that Hizbollah gained support by

providing the Shias with essential services. These services, to

be sure, are quite primitive. The clinics of Hizbollah are mere

store fronts; the schools are conducted in people's homes.

Nonetheless, for the time being this satisfies the community

because it has nothing better. The youths have no jobs, the

families have no security. Indeed, in the case of the Shias

actually living in the security zone, these people do not even

have any internationally recognized status.88

Hence, it should be obvious that what is really involved

here is economics. The problem of Hizbollah, and of Syria's

making peace with Israel, is not about terror (as the Likid

politicians would like U.S. policymakers to believe) but about

economics. How are the peoples of the area, namely the Arabs, to

make any kind of life for themselves under the difficult

conditions that presently prevail?

The youth of the area are not going to remain passive much

longer. Indeed, they are already starting to revolt, and

Hizbollah is positioned to exploit the crisis as it develops. We

mentioned above that the party had fielded candidates for the
36

parliament, and that this should be seen as a move toward

moderation. At the same time, however, another wing of the party

has rejected this approach, and has continued to call for an allout fight against the Zionists. Effectively, it seems, the party

is split into radical and moderate wings.89 Both are well

organized and prepared to act; however, the leadership apparently

is delaying making a decision as to which course it will follow.

In the author's opinion Israel and the Arab governments have,

perhaps, another year to work out the modalities of a peace

settlement, so that they can then move to restoring the area's

economy. If there is no definite sign by the end of 1995 that

things are improving--that is, that there is a credible economic

revival underway--Hizbollah and all of the other radical

religious groups can be expected to react, becoming much more

radical and more violent. Once this occurs it is hopeless to

assume that the region will return to the path of moderation any

time soon.

U.S. policymakers should consider adopting a pragmatic

approach to the problem of peace with Assad, and insist that

Israel and Damascus make peace, as soon as possible. Then the

United States should support the agreement and promote it with

the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and whatever other

international lending bodies can be induced to contribute toward

this effort.

The worst thing U.S. policymakers can do at this juncture is

to assume that Assad is under the gun, that he must give way and

agree to peace on Israel's terms. Assad is not the petitioner

here. If necessary he will change strategies and find ways to

carry on the war--even the possibility of a Baghdad- TehranDamascus axis should not be ruled out.

ENDNOTES

1. See "Rabin Charges Syrians Are Stalling in Talks," The

Washington Post, June 1, 1994; "No Swift Embrace Seen For Syrians

and Israelis," The Washington Post, May 19, 1994; "Israel Seeks

Stepped-Up Syria Talks," The Washington Post, June 22, 1994;

"Israel Stresses Role of U.S. as Mediator," The Financial Times,

May 9, 1994; "U.S. Hints at Better Ties if Syria Signs Peace With

Israel," The New York Times, October 25, 1994; "Israelis Look to

Clinton for Progress With Syria," The New York Times, October 25,
37

1994, and "Christopher's last chance," Middle East International,

July 9, 1994.

2. When the peace talks commenced 4 years ago, Israel

confronted claims by three Arab states and the Palestinians. It

has subsequently concluded a peace treaty with Jordan, and is

negotiating a so-called Declaration of Principles with the

Palestinians which presumably will lead to a peace. The two

remaining claimants are Syria, which wants the Golan Heights

back, and Lebanon, which wants Israel to withdraw the Israeli

Defense Force (IDF) from southern Lebanon.

3. For background on Lebanon's confessional system, see

George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, Ithaca, NY:

Cornell University Press, 1980, p. 360 f.

4. Under prodding by the Saudis, the Lebanese recently

agreed to modify their system of rule, giving more power to the

Muslims. This compromise, known as the Taif Agreement, made the

governing arrangements somewhat more equitable, but there is

still widespread dissatisfaction that the agreement did not go

far enough.

5. The agreement whereby this decision was taken was known

as the National Covenant, and it was concluded primarily between

the dominant Christian community and the then-powerful, but

numerically less significant, Sunni Muslims. See Lenczowski.

6. The Maronites are a Christian sect unique to Lebanon.

They derive their name from their eponymous founder Saint Maron,

a fifth century hermit and saint who originally lived in Syria.

See Jonathan Randall, Going All the Way, New York, NY: Viking

Press, 1983, p. 34.

7. In the 1940s, the Shias probably made up around 38

percent of the population. Today, it is probably closer to 47

percent.

8. For background on this see Lenczowski, p. 470 f.

9. The Lebanese lacked an army for several reasons, the most

important being they didn't want to pay for one. Moreover, what

army they did have was barely cohesive since it was made up of
38

units comprising the various sects, and the loyalty of these was

to their co-religionists not to the central government.

10. For background on this see Augustus Norton, Amal and the

Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, Austin, TX: University

of Texas Press, 1987, p. 64 f. Also Robert Fisk, Pity the Poor

Nation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 74.

11. The Muslim religion is made up of two great branches--

the Sunnis and the Shias. The Sunnis comprise the overwhelming

majority. The Shias are a smaller, much more radical group. They

are primarily based in Iran, with two important colonies--one in

Iraq, one in Lebanon.

12. There is an element of truth in this. Historically,

Lebanon was the home of the Phoenicians, who, being great

traders, spread over the Mediterranean and founded Carthage, the

great enemy of Rome, in what is today Tunisia. Nonetheless, over

the centuries these original Phoenicians intermarried with Arabs,

and the Lebanese of today are, to all intents, Arab.

13. The Druze, while nominally Muslim, are so eccentric in

their beliefs as to be regarded by most Muslims as heretics.

Jumblat was a student of Indian mysticism, and a fierce radical,

of the old-style leftist persuasion.

14. In December 1975, Christian militiamen rounded up some

200 Palestinians in Beirut and massacred them. See Patrick Seale,

Asad (sic), Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988,

pp. 176-177.

15. The founder of the Phalange was Pierre Gemayel, who, in

the 1930s, travelled to Europe and was impressed by the fascist

movements there. Hence, the name Phalange, after the Spanish

fascist organization.

16. See Asad, p. 276 f.

17. Franjiyah's power base was the far north of Lebanon, on

the Syrian border. He traditionally had been an ally of Damascus,

and it is quite likely that his appeal for aid to the Arab League

was prearranged with Assad.
39

18. See Asad, p. 278.

19. The Rejectionist Front has changed names over the years,

and similarly its composition has shifted. However, it has always

comprised Arab states actively fighting Israel. In the late 1970s

it was made up of Syria and Lebanon, Egypt (which was in the

process of opting out of the struggle), Jordan (which was only

nominally involved), Iraq (which was also largely out of it),

Libya and Algeria (both of which provided financial aid but not

much more), and of course the Palestinians.

20. See Fisk, Pity the Poor Nation, p. 85 f.

21. See Asad, p. 278.

22. Asad, p. 288-289.

23. The Likud Party has always been much more aggressive and

expansionist than its rival, the Labor Party. Partly this can be

explained by the nature of its constituency--many supporters of

Likud are devout Jews who wish to see the Biblical prophesies

regarding Israel fulfilled, to the letter; that is, they wish to

see the recreation of so-called eretz Israel, of Biblical days,

which would encompass considerably more territory than Israel

claimed in the mid-1970s.

24. See Going All the Way, p. 208 f.

25. According to Randall, the hand-off to the Christians was

another of Begin's defiant moves against President Carter. On the

last day of Israel's agreed upon stay in Lebanon, Begin made the

announcement that the "security zone" would become the

responsibility of a renegade Christian major from the Lebanese

army, Antoine Lahad. See Going All the Way, p. 210.

26. See Norton, Amal and the Shi'a, p. 111.

27. See Going All the Way, p. 224.

28. Ibid., p. 231.

29. For background on the events leading up to the invasion,

see Pity the Poor Nation, p. 196 f. The perpetrators of the
40

terrorist incident were members of the Abu Nidal organization,

sworn enemies of Arafat's Fatah organization. Arafat condemned

the killing (of an Israeli diplomat in London), and swore this

was a deliberate provocation to provide Israel with the excuse to

invade.

30. For comments by the Israelis on this, see "Palestinians

Arrest 100 Islamic Militants After Bicycle Bombing," The New York

Times, November 13, 1994, in which an Israeli cabinet minister

discusses the impossibility of guarding against such attacks.

31. For background on this see Lenczowski, p. 360 f.

32. For a discussion of the appeal of this ideology to young

Muslims, see Stephen Pelletiere, Hamas and Hizbollah: The Radical

Challenge to Israel in the Occupied Territories, Carlisle

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,

1994.

33. The best reporting on this aspect is by Robert Fisk in

Pity the Poor Nation, p. 460 f.

34. Which is precisely the tactic the Israelis used in their

invasion of Lebanon in 1982. In 1993, in Operation Accountability

(to be discussed below) they attempted to refine this approach.

They relied on air strikes, artillery barrages and tank attacks,

but used very little infantry.

35. See Randall, Going All the Way, p. 283.

36. Assad actually presided over the formation of a renegade

movement within the Palestinian resistance, the so-called Group

of Ten. These were mainly far leftist Palestinian organizations

which rejected any compromise with Israel. The hardliners, by and

large, remained behind in Lebanon and Syria to carry on the fight

against Israel after the PLO left for Tunis.

37. Both sides, Syria and Israel, were able to live with

this arrangement. For Assad, it created a situation which

partially fulfilled his desire to reestablish Greater Syria. For

the Israelis, having a security zone in the south gave them a

buffer against the guerrillas, or so they thought. The loser, of

course, was Lebanon, which ceased to be an autonomous state.
41

38. Itzak Shamir, Likud leader and prime minister of Israel

when the conference call issued from Washington, balked at

attending, and much pressure had to be applied before he would

agree to do so. Shamir argued that Israel could only lose by

going to this conference, since its security was already taken

care of at home.

 39. See "Palestinian Religious Militants: Why Their

Ranks Are Growing," The New York Times, November 8, 1994; also,

"Last tango in the Middle East," The Financial Times, Weekend,

July 30-July 31, 1994.

40. See "Christopher to Pressure Syria To Block Cargo to

Hezbollah," The Washington Post, July 31, 1993.

41. The SLA had been under attack by Hizbollah and several

other guerrilla groups for a number of months prior to the

eruption of the crisis. The IDF had entered the zone in force to

suppress the guerrillas, and during this incursion seven Israeli

soldiers were killed in four separate attacks. Stung by these

losses, the IDF then bombarded Shia villages north of the

security zone, which--inasmuch as they were located inside

Lebanon--ought to have been off limits to reprisals. However,

Rabin claimed the towns were serving as staging areas for the

guerrillas. After this, Hizbollah, in retaliation for Rabin's

retaliation, rocketed Israeli towns in northern Galilee, killing

two Israelis. See "Attacks and Expected Reprisal," Middle East

International, July 23, 1993.

42. This event occurred just after Operation Accountability.

See "SLA Leader Comments on Defections, Peace Process," AFP,

November 29, 1993, FBIS-NES-93-227.

43. See "Israel Bombards Targets in Lebanon," The Washington

Post, July 27, 1993; "Israeli Warplanes Pound Guerrillas," The

Washington Post, July 26, 1993; "A blow for compromise and

conciliation," The Financial Times, July 31, 1993; and "Rabin

faces his greatest challenge," The Financial Times, July 31,

1993.

44. See "The 'peace team' returns empty-handed," Middle East

International, July 23, 1994; "Ninth Round Ends in Middle East
42

Talks," The Washington Post, May 14, 1993; "U.S. Move Fails to

Win Support in Mideast Talks," The New York Times, May 14, 1993,

and "U.S. Expresses Dissatisfaction with Mideast Talks," The New

York Times, June 26, 1993.

45. See "Palestinian Sees Talks Losing Their Luster," The

Washington Post, August 8, 1993.

46. See "Israel Bombards Targets in Lebanon," The Washington

Post, July 27, 1993.

47. See "Killing of 9 Israeli Soliders Sets Off Bitter

Dispute," The New York Times, August 23, 1993; also "Guerrillas

in Lebanon Kill 8 Israeli Soldiers," The Washington Post, August

20, 1993.

48. Rabin brokered a deal with Assad (mediated by Secretary

of State Christopher) in which he claimed that Assad had agreed

to "rein in" the guerrillas. When immediately afterwards nine IDF

soldiers were killed by the Hizbollahis, Rabin was asked to

respond in the Knesset. He said that, whereas the deal with Assad

forbade the guerrillas to rocket Israeli settlements but did

allow them to operate in the security zone, technically there had

been no breach of the agreement (since the killings occurred in

the zone). This set off a firestorm in the Knesset, with Likud

politician Ariel Sharon demanding that Rabin break off the peace

talks and launch a new invasion of Lebanon to "enlarge" the zone.

Rabin weathered this ordeal, but Israel's negotiating position in

the talks was severely damaged. By allowing Assad to continue

talking while the guerrillas kept up their operations, Israel

imposed an unfortunate constraint on itself. The longer the

Hizbollahis are allowed to carry on their war, the more

proficient they are certain to become, and also they gain an

opportunity to destroy the SLA. The SLA militiamen must now ask

themselves what is to happen to us, if Rabin makes a deal with

Assad? They are strongly motivated to make their peace with the

Hizbollahis now rather than later; once the Syria-Israeli deal is

made (assuming it is) it will be too late to switch sides.

Another point that has been raised relates to the morale of the

IDF soldiers. Many Israeli soldiers, it is feared, are unwilling

now to risk their lives in Lebanon, since they believe Tel Aviv

eventually will surrender the area. Recently, the Hizbollahis

overran an IDF post, and took videos of the captured bunkers. The
43

IDF was forced to shell its own position, before it could regain

control. This event is now being investigated in the Knesset. For

earlier Hizbollah activity see "Attacks and Expected Reprisal,"

Middle East International, July 23, 1993. For the more recent

incidents see "Rabin Criticizes Soldiers at Lebanon Post Raided

by Guerrillas," The New York Times, November 2, 1994; "Lebanese

Militants Fire Rockets In Northern Israel," The Washington Post,

October 22, 1994; "Hezbollah (sic) Attack on Israel Post Sparks

Fighting in S. Lebanon," The Washington Post, October 30, 1994;

and, "The erosion of Israel's 'deterrent capacity'," Middle East

International, November 18, 1994.

49. The fact that President Clinton has now had two highly

publicized meetings with Assad (one in Geneva, Switzerland, the

other in Damascus) is a big plus for the Syrian leader, who

afterall is still regarded by the State Department as a supporter

of international terrorism. Indeed, one could say that with these

meetings, Assad has shown the world that he has turned his

previously weak position in the talks into one of strength. See

"Israelis Look to Clinton For Progress With Syria," The New York

Times, October 25, 1994.

50. Israel virtually depends on the United States for its

financial survival. Currently the bulk of foreign aid

appropriated by the U.S. Congress goes to Israel and Egypt (the

aid to Egypt indirectly benefits Israel, since it is an

inducement to the Egyptians not to resume fighting with the

Jewish state). As long as there was a Cold War, Tel Aviv could

justify such treatment on the grounds that it was supporting

Washington in the war against communism. Now that the Soviet

Union is no more, Israel does not have the same strategic

significance for the United States. With opposition to foreign

aid increasing among the American people, the Israelis must be

concerned that this aid will considerably diminish. The idea of a

regional development scheme (a "new Marshal Plan for the Middle

East") seems to be one way of attacking this problem. See

"Mideast Common Market: Desert Mirage?" The Wall Street Journal,

September 30, 1994; "Wary of Expense, Arabs Block Plan For

Mideast Bank," The New York Times, November 2, 1994; and, "U.S.

Says Many Arab Lands Back Aid Bank," The New York Times, November

3, 1994.

51. Before 1973, the Gulf monarchs would never have
44

bankrolled the Israelis, even indirectly. After the Arab oil

embargo, however, they began investing their petro dollars

downstream and now have a material interest in preserving the

health of the world financial system. Thus they are closer to

Israel and the West than they are to many Arab states. The

problem is complicated, however, by the Saudis' special status as

the guardian of the holiest shrines of Islam. The Muslim religion

is explicit in prohibiting usury, or deriving profit from funds

lent out at interest. Hence the Saudis' increasing involvement in

such activities opens them to censure from the masses of the

faithful, who may begin to question the fitness of the House of

Saud to be the protector of the faith.

 52. The monarchs' objections are probably justified.

Afterall, they have seen all this before. Numerous times it has

appeared that one or the other side has prevailed in the war,

only to have the tables turned. The monarchs cannot afford to

take a stand, only to find out later that this was a false dawn

and the war is starting up again.

53. The Hamas revolt is of course tied to the activity of

the Hizbollahis. Both groups bolster each other, although the

Hamas fight seems to be sui generis, in the sense that the

Palestinians are carrying on without any obvious support from

either Iran or Syria. For background on Hamas see Pelletiere,

Hamas and Hizbollah.

54. This assumes that both Syria and Israel pull their

troops out of Lebanon. If either one refuses, the Hizbollahis

will go on fighting that party. We will discuss this below.

55. This information and much of what appears in this

section on Syria's domestic situation was supplied by Western

sources inside the country during a recent visit of the author to

Damascus.

56. To become viable economically Syria will need to

privatize much of its industry. Problems have developed, however,

due to the notorious corruption afflicting the Syrian

bureaucracy. The state officials expect to be bribed by

Westerners wanting to do business in Syria. We will discuss this

problem below.
45

57. It has been pointed out to the author that practically

every Arab government in the Middle East operates this way. This

is true, and it concerns the Israelis, who ask, what will happen

to the peace if Assad dies? It will be some time before his

successor is sufficiently secure in power to carry through

whatever deal Assad has made.

58. Like the Druzes, discussed earlier, the Alawis are

technically Muslim, but their religious practices are so strange

that the mass of Muslims reject them.

59. See Going All the Way, pp. 106 and 136.

60. Lately Assad has been moving to cut down, if not totally

eliminate smuggling. This appears to be a deliberate attempt to

improve his international stature preparatory to making peace

with the Israelis.

61. See Fisk, Pity the Poor Nation, p. 203.

62. Rifaat attempted to seize control of the government in

this year during a bout of illness suffered by his brother. See

below.

63. It was Basil who spearheaded the effort by his father to

crack down on the Syrian army's involvement in drug trafficking.

64. During his visit to Damascus in 1994, the author was

impressed by thousands of posters, displayed seemingly everywhere

in which the visage of the young Basil was depicted. It bordered

on iconography. Interestingly, however, as one got farther from

Damascus the posters disappeared.

65. For details see Asad, p. 419 f.

66. Assad almost certainly did this for geo-political

reasons. He felt that Iraq, by involving itself in this war with

Iran, had abstracted itself from the only real conflict

confronting the Arabs, viz., that with Israel. For further

discussion on this, see Stephen Pelletiere, "Turkey and the

United States in the Middle East: The Kurdish Connection," in

Turkey's Strategic Position at the Crossroads of World Affairs,

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
46

College, 1993. Also, in regard to subventions from the Gulf

states, for years Syria received these regularly as a member of

the so-called Rejectionist Front, the alliance of countries

actively fighting Israel.

67. See Hanna Batatu, "Syria's Muslim Brethren," Merip

Reports, November/December 1982, and Fred Lawson, "The Hama

Revolt," Merip Reports, Ibid.

68. See Ibid., p. 332.

69. See Asad, p. 421 f.

70. When the author was living in Cairo in 1969-70, the

water was shut off for a few hours each day in the extreme heat

of summer. The population put up with it, but this was in the era

of Nasser, when there were no obvious extremes of wealth, and one

could tell oneself that everyone--rich and poor alike--were

suffering in this way.

71. For a discussion of the water riots in Algeria, see

Stephen Pelletiere, Mass Action and Islamic Fundamentalism: The

Revolt of the Brooms, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992.

72. See "The Fertile Crescent Blooms Anew," The New York

Times, November 6, 1994.

73. The other major current among the Shias is the Amal

Party referred to above. We have said little about this. Readers

wishing more information on it should see Hamas and Hizbollah:

The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied Territories.

74. Not only the Israelis prevent the Lebanese army from

repossessing the south; Assad is equally adamant that it stay out

of the area. Assad wants to be able to control Lebanon's vote in

the peace talks. If Beirut could get back southern Lebanon, it is

almost certain it would immediately make peace with Israel,

leaving Assad isolated, and with a much weakened bargaining

position.

75. The best source on the SLA treatment of the Shias is

Pity the Poor Nation.
47

76. The best source on the activity of these warlords is

Randall, Going All the Way.

77. The author assumes there is still time to turn off this

movement by satisfying the community's economic needs. If the

community's hopes are dashed, however, this opportunity may well

be lost.

78. It could be argued that Likud, by its erstwhile policies

towards the Palestinians and Shias, created the very conditions

that it seeks to answer by force. Every time Israel invades one

of its neighbors, it creates more refugees. A proportion of these

dependably will join up with the guerrillas, including Hizbollah.

For a discussion of Likud policies toward the Arabs, see Hamas

and Hizbollah: The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied

Territories.

79. Of course, the essence of the Weinberger Doctrine is

that the United States should not become involved militarily

anywhere in the world without strong support of the American

people. It is doubtful any administration could easily get such

support in the present political environment.

80. See "Likud Leader Puts Accord in Doubt," The New York

Times, January 5, 1993.

<%-3>81. For a discussion of the Heights strategic value to

Israel, see Dore Gold, US Forces on the Golan Heights and

Israeli-Syrian Security Arrangements, Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for

Strategic Studies, August 1944.

<%-3>82. The Syrians, along with the Egyptians, both agreed

to fight alongside the Europeans and the United States against

Iraq, for which both were well-rewarded.

<%-3>83. See Stephen Pelletiere, Shari'a Law, Cult Violence

and System Change in Egypt: The Dilemma Facing President Mubarak,

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College, 1994.

<%-3>84. See "The modern face of an ancient city," The

Financial Times, October 17, 1994.
48

<%-3>85. Rowland and Evans, "Likud's 'Gang of Three'," The

Washington Post, November 17, 1994.

86. There is still the matter of incidents like the blowing

up of the Jewish cultural center in Argentina. That certainly was

the work of Hizbollah, and that was terror. However, the

Hizbollahis claim the attack was provoked by the Israeli

kidnapping of a Hizbollah leader. Similarly, Hamas claimed, when

it blew up the bus station in Tel Aviv recently, that this was in

retaliation for the massacre by a right wing Jewish extremist of

upwards of 29 Muslims during a religious service in Hebron. In

effect, the guerrillas are claiming to retaliate in kind--terror

for terror.

87. This should be obvious. In the case of southern Lebanon,

the guerrillas operate in territory over which the IDF has

control. The Israelis have the will to coerce the community into

telling them who are the guerrillas in their midst, and yet the

resistance goes on. This can mean only one of two things--either

the guerrillas have so terrorized the people they dare not talk,

or else they support the guerrillas. Either way the movement is

successful, inasmuch as it has gained the ability to operate

among the people, which is the test of any such movement.

88. Guilain Denoeux in Urban Unrest in the Middle East: A

Comparative Study of Informal Networks in Egypt, Iran, and

Lebanon, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993,

says (p. 116) that ". . . the clientelist system in Beirut proved

incapable of assimilating the constant flow of Shia rural

migrants, largely as a result of a key provision in the electoral

law, according to which one votes not where one lives, but in the

constituency of one's birthplace . . . under such circumstances,

no Beirut za'im (ward boss, ed.) would perform for a constituency

that was in no position to reciprocate through its vote."

89. For background on the split, see Kenneth Katzman,

Hizbollah: A Radical Militia in Lebanon, Washington, DC: CRS

Report for Congress, October 7, 1993.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Acting Director

Colonel William W. Allen

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Mrs. Kay L. Williams

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler