### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs D ec em be r 7, 200 4
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. CA RL McIN TOSH

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Madison Cou nty

No. 02-290 Donald H. Allen, Ju dge

No. W2003-02359-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled March 30, 2005

T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J., c on c ur ri ng in p art

a nddis se nti ng in p art

. I concur in a ll pa

rts of the majority

opinion ex cept to that portion which holds that the f elony s e n te n c e imp o s e din v io lati o n of B l a ke l y v. W ashington , 5 42 U. S. _

__ , 1 24 S. Ct . 2 53 1 ( 20 04 ) i s ha rm le ss e rr or

be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t. The majority

relies upon the de cision of a pa nel of this Court in State v. Chester W ayne W alt e rs , No. M2003-03019-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2726034 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 30, 2004), perm. to appeal de nied (T e nn . M ar. 21 , 2 00 5) , f or the c on c lus ion that Bl ake ly violations in Tennesse e’s se ntencing scheme are subject to constitutional harmless err or analy sis. I n W alt e rs , a pane l of this Court relied upon two opinions of the Unit ed S tates S upreme Court in holding that Bl ake ly iss ue s a

re su bje c t to c on sti tut ion a l ha rm le ss e rr or

a na ly sis :
We next consider whether harmless e rror

applies to constitutional violations under Bl ake ly . Reg arding constit u t i o n al harmless error analy sis, the Supreme Court has stated that a tria l court’s findings of f acts ne cessa

ry to increa se a de fenda nt’s sentenc e are essentially elements of a gre ater offe nse. [ Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584, 609, 122 S. Ct . 2428, 2443 (2002)]. I t ha s also held that a jury ’s fa ilure to find an e lement of an off ense is subjec t to harmless err or re view. Neder v. U nited States , 527 U.S. 1, 8-14, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1833-36, 144 L

. Ed. 2d 35 (1999). We ther efor e hold that any issues raised on a

ppeal a rising out of Bl ake ly are su bje c t to c on sti tut ion a l ha rm le ss e rr or a na ly sis

. Walter, 2004 WL

2726034, at *62. Ring and Neder clea

rly state what is refle cted in the W alt e rs opinion. Howeve r, what is not addre ssed by

the Court in W

alt e rs , and the majority opinion in th e c ase sub judice , is the fac t that in Neder a jury was e mpowere d and available to find the “omitted” e lement of the of fense for whic h the def endant wa s on trial, but the trial court e rrone ously took that issue away

from the jury

. I n other words, ther e wa s the o p t i o n , if the ca se wa s reve rsed a nd rema nded for a new trial, that the jury-2-

would be allowe d to make a f actua l finding of

the initially“omitted” ele ment of t he offense. I t was with this backdrop that the United States Supreme Court found that the e rror was ha rmless bey ond a re a so na ble do ub t.
I n Neder , “materiality ” wa s the eleme nt of t he fraud cases for which the de fenda nt was tried, and which the trial court e rrone ously did not allow the jury to make a fac tual finding of its exi stence

. The Court in Neder

noted, [D e f e n d a n t] u n d e rr e p o r te d $ 5 mi ll io n o n h is ta x r e tu r n s , a n d d idn o t c o n te s t the element of

materia lityat trial. [Defenda nt] does not sug g est that he would introduce any evidenc e bea

ring upon the issue of materiality if so allowed. Reve rsal without any consideration of the eff

ect of the error upon the verdict would send the c ase ba ck fo r retrial–a re trial not focuse d at all on the issue of materiality , but on contested issues on which the jury

was prope rly

instructed.
Neder , 527 U.S. at 15, 119 S. Ct . at 1836-37.
At the t ime of Defenda nt’s trial in the ca se sub judice , there was no statutory provision for t h e j u ry t o make the fac tual determination of the applicability of enhanc ement fac tors bey ond a re aso nab le do ub t. O nly

the tr ia l c ou rt

c ou ld m ake the se fa c tua l de te rm inatio ns , a ndwa s o nly require d to f

ind the m by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. This pr ocedur e is in violation of Bl ake ly as to all the s tatutory enhanc ement factors ex cept prior convictions of a defe ndant (found be y ond a rea sonable doubt by

the trial court).
Constit utional ha

rmless err or analy sis may well apply to violations of Bl ake ly in Tennesse e’s sentenc ing sc heme, but I re s p ectfullysubmit, onl y in the following manner : if the trial court’s enhanc ement of a

defe ndant’s sente nce can be justified alone by (a) the prior convictions and/or (b) any enhanc ement factor “admitted by ” the de fenda nt (whate ver that terminology encompa sses), then app lic a tio n o f o the r e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s not found by

a jury would be harmless error bey ond a re a so na ble do ub t. This is analog ous to the situation where the re is er ror in t h e application of ag g ravating circ umstances in a capital case
. Se e Col e ma n v . S tat e , 3 S.W .3d 19, 22 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)

. I n this sit uation, “[a] capital sentenc ing jury ’s consider ation of an inva lid ag g ravating c ircumstance may be considere d harmless only if the appe llate court concludes, be y ond a re asonable doubt, ‘that the se nte nc e wo uld ha ve be e n the sa me ha d th e se nte nc ing a uth ority g ive n n o w e ig ht t o th e inv a lid ag g ravating f

actor .’” Id. (c i t i n g Sta te v . H owe ll , 8 68 S.W. 2d[238 , 2 60 (T e nn . 1 99 3) ]. I n ma kin g thi s de te rm inatio n, the app e llate c ou rt “ sh ou ld c on sid e r ‘ the nu mbe r andstr e ng th o f r e ma ini ng va lid a g g ra va tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s, the pr os e c uto r’ s a rg ume nt at se nte nc ing , th e e viden c e a dmi tte d to establish the invalid ag g ravator, and the n ature, quality and streng th of mitigating evidenc e.’” Coleman , 3 S

. W

. 3 d at 2 2 (c i t i n g [ Ho we ll , 868 S.W .2d] at 261).-3-

Apply ing the harmless err or analy sis in the manner done so by the court in W

alt e rs , and by the majority

in the case s u b ju d ice , s i m p l y perpe tuates the Bl ake ly violation in Defenda nt’s sentenc ing. N o jury

at the time of De fenda nt’ s t ri al , or at the time of the filing of this Court’s opinion in his case , would have the s t at u t ory power to determine se ntencing enhanc ement fa ctors in co m p liance w ith Bl ake ly . Def endant, a nd all those in a similar position, have a c onstitut ional Six th Amendment rig ht for a juryto determine the exis tence of all of Te nnessee ’s enha nceme nt fa cto rs f or fe lon ie s, e xce pt p ri or

c on vic tio ns . H ow e ve r, un de r the ma jority ’s de c isi on , th e re is i n eff ect no reme dy for when t his rig ht has been denied. The c rux of the decision in Bl ake ly wa s not the str e ng th of th e evid e nc e re g ard ing a se nte nc ing e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor – it wa s th e Sixth Amendment rig ht of the def endant in a c riminal case to have a jury determine the exist ence of the enhanc ement fa ctor be y ond a re as onable doubt rather than by a pre pondera nce of

the evidenc e by the trial court. To apply harmless error analy sis such that an appe llate court holds that a hypothetical and non-e x istent jury would obviously apply an enhance ment fac tor based upon the streng th of the pr oo f r e nd e rs Bl ake ly me a nin g le ss. To me, a Bl ake ly or other simil ar constitutional e rror is ha rmless bey ond a re asonable doubt wh e n th e app e llate c ou rt

c on c lud e s th a t if

the c a se is r e mand e d f

or a ne w h e ari ng , th e re su lt w ou ld b e s am e b ey o n d a r ea s o n ab l e d o u b t

. T h i s , o f c o u r s e , i s d ep en d en t u p o n t h e n ew h ea ri n g be ing in compliance wi th the c on sti tut ion a l r ul e pr e vio us ly vio la te d. Th us , w he re a jury ba se s a pe na lty verdic t of dea th upon finding multiple “a g g ravating c ircumstance s,” and one ag g ravating circ u m s t an ce i s found to be in violation of a c onstitut ional rig ht, there is harmless error if the appellate court concludes bey ond a re asonable doubt that the result would be the same afte r a ne w s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g without the constitutionallyinfirm ag g ravating circ umstance being found by the jury

. See Colem an , 3 S.W .3d at 22. As long as Tenne ssee’ s sentencing scheme has pre sumptive se n te n c e s f o r fe lonies, which ca n be incr ease d only

by a trial c ourt finding by a preponderance of the evidence the a pplicability

of one or mor e of

the statut ory

e nh a nc ing fa c tor s, a ny

e nh a nc ing fa c tor , w hic h is not a prior c onviction or a fa ctor “ admitted to” by

a def endant, u s ed t o i n cre ase a felony sentenc e bey ond the pre sumptive se nte nc e vio la te s Bl ake ly . Until there is a c hang e in the sente n ci n g s ch em e, no new hearing a fter rema nd can c omply

with Bl ake ly in such si tuations. I f a jury is not statutoril y

permitted to determine the ex istence of an enhancing fac tor, how can we a s appellate judge s logic ally conclude that a jury which c ou ld not

find an e nhancing fac tor would ha ve do ne so be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t?
I n the ca se sub judice , the t rial court imposed the maxi mum sentence of twelve y ear s based upon the exist ence of three enhanc ement fa ctors, two of which w ere found in violation of Bl ake ly

. As noted in the majority

opinion, the trial court plac ed “g reat we ight” on one of the enhanc ement fa c tor s w hic h v iol a te s Bl ake ly , that Def endant was on parole at the time of the of fense

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 14)(B ). Erroneous application of two enhanc ement fa ctors in this case doe s no t c on sti tut e ha

rm le ss e rr or

be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t as to the se nte nc e imp os e d. I wo uld the re fo re mod if

y the fe lon y

se nte nc e fr om t we lve to t e n y e ars
.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL

L , J UDGE