Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A01-1606-CR-1289 | March 23, 2017 Page 1 of 4

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Scott Knierim

Danville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Bradly Paul Canter,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

March 23, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

32A01-1606-CR-1289

Appeal from the Hendricks 

Superior Court

The Honorable Stephenie LeMayLuken, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

32D05-1411-F3-10

May, Judge.

[1] Bradley Paul Canter appeals the trial court’s imposition, for his probation 

violations, of the 730 days remaining on his suspended sentence. Because the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A01-1606-CR-1289 | March 23, 2017 Page 2 of 4

type of review Canter requests is not available to challenge the sanction 

imposed following probation violation, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 14, 2015, Canter pled guilty to Level 5 felony robbery.1 He was 

sentenced to four-years imprisonment, with three years suspended to probation. 

On February 9, 2016, the State filed a notice of probation violation, alleging he 

had committed new criminal offenses, had used marijuana, and had “failed to 

complete substance abuse counseling as recommended by [his] Probation 

Officer.” (App. Vol. 2 at 13.) On March 8, 2016, the State filed a subsequent 

notice of probation violation alleging Canter had failed to provide contact 

information to his Probation Officer. 

[3] At the evidentiary hearing on May 18, 2016, Hendricks County Probation 

Department Officer Megan Caruso testified Canter had not provided her with a 

valid address or a working phone number, he had not made the appointments 

required to qualify for Work Release or Home Detention, he failed a urinalysis

due to marijuana use, and he failed to complete the substance abuse counseling. 

Canter testified he had smoked marijuana “approximately three (3) times.” (Tr. 

at 22.) 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (2014).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A01-1606-CR-1289 | March 23, 2017 Page 3 of 4

[4] Based on the evidence presented, the trial court found the State had proven all 

the allegations except the new criminal offense, as that matter had not gone to 

trial at the time of the hearing. The trial court then terminated Canter’s 

probation and ordered him to serve the remaining 730 days of his sentence at 

the Indiana Department of Correction. 

Discussion and Decision

[5] Canter’s sole argument on appeal is that “the sentence of 730 days to the 

Indiana Department of Corrections [sic] was inappropriate under Indiana 

Appellate Rule 7(B).” (Appellant’s Br. at 7.) 

Rule 7(B) authorizes appellate review and revision of “a sentence 

authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s 

decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in 

light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.” The Rule permits an appellate determination of the 

appropriateness of a criminal sentence and implements the 

permissive jurisdiction granted in Article 7, Section 4 of the 

Indiana Constitution: “The Supreme Court shall have, in all 

appeals of criminal cases, the power . . . to review and revise the 

sentence imposed.”

As this Court has recently held, the appellate evaluation of 

whether a trial court’s sanctions are “inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and the character of the offender” is not the

correct standard to apply when reviewing a trial court’s actions in 

a post-sentence probation violation proceeding. Prewitt v. State, 

878 N.E.2d 184, 187-88 (Ind. 2007). A trial court’s actions in a 

post-sentence probation violation proceeding is not a criminal 

sentence as contemplated by the rule. The review and revise 

remedy of App. R. 7(B) is not available.
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Jones v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1286, 1289-90 (Ind. 2008). Because Canter’s only 

argument on appeal is unavailable,2 we affirm the trial court’s imposition of the 

730 days remaining on Canter’s sentence.

[6] Affirmed. 

Najam, J., and Bailey, J., concur. 

 

2

Sanctions for probation violations “are subject to appellate review for abuse of discretion.” Jones, 885 

N.E.2d at 1290. Canter has not argued the trial court abused its discretion and, thus, any such argument is 

waived for appeal. Waiver notwithstanding, we would not find an abuse of discretion in the imposition of 

730 days, as the State provided sufficient evidence Canter violated his probation. See, e.g., Crump v. State, 740 

N.E.2d 564, 573 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (court did not abuse discretion in ordering Crump to serve eight years 

that had been suspended because court had properly found his violation and revoked probation), trans. denied; 

see also Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3 (permitting court to “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was 

suspended at the time of initial sentencing” when revoking probation).