U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Wanton Violence at

Columbine High School

Littleton, Colorado

USFA-TR-128/April 1999

Homeland

Security

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough 

to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

International Association of Fire Chiefs assists USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the 

fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from USFA; announcements 

of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that USFA’s assistance and presence would be supportive and would in no way interfere 

with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive during 

the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and objective 

review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review USFA’s 

report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities should they 

wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

This report and its recommendations were developed by USFA staff and by TriData Corporation, 

Arlington, Virginia, its staff and consultants, who are under contract to assist the Fire Administration 

in carrying out the Fire Reports Program.

The U.S. Fire Administration greatly appreciates the cooperation received from the City of Bessemer 

Fire and Rescue Service. Particular thanks go to Bessemer Fire Marshal Bill Avery and also Alabama 

State Fire Marshal John S. Robinson.

For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, National Fire Data Center, 

16825 South Seton Avenue, Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727.

Special Report: 

Wanton Violence at

Columbine High School

This is Report 128 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted 

by Varley-Campbell and Associates, Inc./TriData Corporation under 

contract EME-97-CO-0506 to the United States Fire Administration, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, and is available from the 

USFA Web site at www.usfa.dhs.gov

Homeland

Security

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

Homeland

Security

Acknowledgements

In an effort to share with others the lessons learned from his department’s experience at the Columbine 

High School tragedy, Chief William Pessemier of the Littleton, Colorado Fire Department requested 

that the United States Fire Administration (USFA) assist the department in conducting a post-incident analysis of the event and in documenting the fire and emergency medical services response.

The U.S. Fire Administration wishes to thank the Littleton Fire Department for their exceptional 

cooperation in the development and review of this report. Special thanks also are extended to the 

Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, Jefferson County Schools, and the Journal of Emergency Medical Services. In 

particular, the following individuals were especially helpful to USFA’s research team:

William Pessemier Chief, Littleton Fire Department

Chuck Burdick Operations Division Chief, Littleton Fire Department

Jay Ruoff Training Division Chief, Littleton Fire Department

Doug Ireland Support Services Division Chief, Littleton Fire Department

Wayne Zygowicz EMS Division Chief, Littleton Fire Department

Jim Hofstra Fire Marshal, Littleton Fire Department

Rick Young Deputy Fire Marshal, Explosives Technician, Littleton Fire Department

Ray Rahne Battalion Chief, Littleton Fire Department

Gene Nagle Captain Paramedic, Littleton Fire Department

Susan Brigthmeyer Paramedic Lieutenant, Action PIO, Littleton Fire Department

Doug Terry Communications Supervisor, Littleton Fire Department

John Dunaway Undersheriff, Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office

Dave Walcher Captain, Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office

Karen Duffala Director, Safety and Security, Jefferson County Public Schools

A.J. Heightman Editor, Journal of Emergency Medical Services

Figures

1. Littleton Fire Department Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2. Location of Diversionary Device in Relationship to Station 13 and Columbine 

High School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

3. Columbine High School Facing Ground-Level Cafeteria, Point of Entry, and 

Second-Level Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

4. Cafeteria of Columbine High School after April 20th . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

5. Initial Command Structure (About 1135 hours) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

6. Ambulance Staging at Columbine High School During Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

7. Position of Littleton Engine 11 During SWAT and Rescue Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

8. Second Command Structure Evolution (Established between 1142 and 

1210 hours) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

9. Aerial View Showing Locations of Pertinent Sites and Areas During the

Columbine Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

10. Third Command Structure Evolution (Established between 1200 and 

1238 hours) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

11. Medics Transporting an Injured Student from Columbine High School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

12. Yukon and Caley Triage Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

13. Organization of Investigations Branch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

14. Organization of Law Enforcement Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

15. SWAT Personnel Operating Behind the Cover of a Littleton Rescue Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

16. Type and Variety of Devices Recovered at Incident Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

17. Location of Destination Hospitals Relative to Columbine High School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

18. Mourning the Loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Tables

1. Littleton Fire Department Staffing Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2. Agencies that Provided Bomb Technicians and Apprentices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

3. Fire, Rescue, and EMS Agencies that Responded to Columbine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

4. Destination Hospitals and Patients Received . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

5. Patient Disposition Upon Arrival at Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Table of Contents

Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

DESCRIPTION OF COMMUNITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Littleton Fire District –Service Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Littleton Fire Department – Service Profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Emergency Medical Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Littleton Police Department. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Littleton Fire and Police Communications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Jefferson County Sheriff's Office. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Jefferson County School District. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Columbine High School. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

THE DIVERSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

THE ATTACK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

THE RESPONSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Law Enforcement/SWAT/EOD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

EOD Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Mutual-Aid Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Hospital Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Joint Forces: Unified Command for Major Incidents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Fire Service Operations in a Dynamic, Violent Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Communications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Emergency Medical Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Additional Lessons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Technologies that Enhance Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Surveillance and Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Command, Control and Communications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Detection, Disablement, and Containment of Explosive Devices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Intelligence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

continued on next page
AFTERMATH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Post-Incident Events. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

List of Appendices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Appendix A: Littleton Fire Department Area Response Map. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Appendix B: Unified Incident Command Chart. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Appendix C: Columbine High School Incident Timeline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Appendix D: Abbreviations and Acronyms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

TABLE OF CONTENTS continued
1

Wanton Violence at 

Columbine High School

Littleton, Colorado

Background

This report is an analysis of the fire service and emergency medical service (EMS) operations and the 

overall response to the assault on Columbine High School at Littleton, Colorado, on April 20, 1999. 

Incident command, special operations, and mass casualty emergency medical services are featured.

In any major incident, the efforts of all public safety personnel are inexorably linked. However, this 

report does not address the overall law enforcement operations, or the concurrent operations of 

various police commands, the special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams, or the explosive ordnance 

disposal (EOD) units. The Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office issued a formal report and has released 

surveillance video and radio transmissions that provide additional information on law enforcement’s 

efforts during this incident.

For this report, USFA conducted a comprehensive review of internal documentation and interviewed 

many of the key public safety personnel. Media reports and journal articles also provided insight. 

Information was gleaned from the timelines of the three dispatch centers: Littleton Police, Littleton 

Fire/EMS, and Jefferson County Sheriff. These, in turn, were compared and reviewed against the collection of eyewitness accounts and first-responder interviews to capture a reasonable picture of the 

violent rampage and its impact. Understandably, there are some inconsistencies among the sources 

of information as to the chronology of events. For this report, the events were reconstructed based 

on documentation from the primary response agencies.

Near midday on Tuesday, April 20, 1999, the staff and students of Columbine High School in Littleton, 

Colorado, became targets of yet another U.S. episode of wanton violence. The events of that day 

shocked the nation as two juvenile offenders carried out a premeditated assault and victimized occupants of the school. Thirteen defenseless individuals were slain, and over 160 students and faculty 

were triaged – 24 with serious injuries. The two offenders, both Columbine High School students, 

maniacally unleashed an unprecedented terrorist-style assault using numerous semiautomatic weapons and nearly 100 improvised incendiary and explosive devices. The latter were designed as antipersonnel devices intended to inflict casualties, including harm to responding emergency personnel.

Entering the school building that morning after killing two classmates on the sidewalk, the two 

students fired their weapons into high-occupancy areas and killed some victims at close range, firing 

at will, regardless of the victims’ cooperation, the ensuing level of police response, or the risk to 

themselves. During the assault, the two assailants successfully detonated over 30 improvised incendiary and explosive devices, designed to cause numerous casualties. The incendiary devices included 

glass containers containing homemade “napalm” and various types and sizes of containers holding 

flammable liquids (gasoline, kerosene, and white gas). The juvenile offenders also deployed variously sized pressurized, flammable gas (propane) cylinders. The explosive devices consisted of pipe 

bombs of different sizes that were augmented with nails or pellets, or both, duct-taped to the outside 
2

so as to increase the shrapnel yield and the number of casualties. Investigators later located over 60 

additional undetonated devices in and around the school.

The offenders also outfitted their own vehicles with incendiary and explosive materials that were 

deployed as car bombs. These vehicles were discovered in the parking lots adjacent to the school, and 

were intended as secondary devices to harm people fleeing from the building or to compromise first 

responders. The perpetrators concluded their rampage by committing suicide.

The Nation has suffered other acts of wanton violence, including previous school shootings. However, 

this incident was notable because the perpetrators intended the attack to be an act of terror that 

would devastate their school and the community, thereby earning them personal infamy. 

The assault at Columbine High School placed enormous demands on fire, EMS, and law enforcement 

personnel and placed many of them at mortal risk. Within a short period of time, the incident drew 

a major response from many agencies to an event that, although relatively short-lived, was extremely 

complex. The potential for collateral injury or death to emergency responders during the incident 

was substantial.

The nature of the incident and the resulting response again highlighted the challenges associated 

with complex, violent incidents and joint command operations. Terrorist-style emergencies place 

unique demands on public safety providers and demand nontraditional responses and tactics, especially in the 

presence of multiple casualties. The lesson is becoming clear: Public safety managers need to reassess 

current response strategies in light of emergencies that, with increasing frequency, include wanton 

violence and demand a coordinated and joint public safety response.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY

This report addresses issues primarily related to the fire service response to this mass casualty incident, including joint command, special operations, and emergency medical services. The key lessons 

learned from this incident are summarized below. A significantly more comprehensive discussion of 

these lessons and others is presented in Observations and Lessons Learned, page 32.

• 

• 

• 

• 

Hostile, multi-hazard situations – including acts of wanton violence – challenge the fire/EMS 

service to respond with nontraditional tactics and to operate under a unified incident command structure with law enforcement.

Major incidents draw a substantial number of people and assets to the scene, complicating 

and compromising access/egress, site safety and security, and mission activities. Anticipating 

and successfully managing that influx is essential to maintaining command and control of 

the operational environment. Responding units should be staged outside the incident perimeter and deployed only when specifically "mission assigned". Maintaining unit integrity and 

individual discipline reduces "freelancing" and promotes personnel and unit accessibility 

and accountability.

Terrorist-style assaults compound the unusual risks associated with a major incident. Gunfire, 

incendiaries, explosives, and secondary devices magnify the risks to responders. There is a 

great likelihood of mass casualties and of hostage taking, both of which compound tactical 

response and operations.

To adequately prepare for complex incidents involving multiple casualties and multiple hazards, public safety organizations should plan their incident command operations within the 

context of a Regional, emergency management framework.
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 3

• 

• 

• 

Large-scale mutual-aid operations are critically affected by the sophistication and type of 

communications and information transfer capabilities available to the incident commander 

and to responding units. Interoperability of equipment and frequencies is essential.

The wanton violence associated with terrorist-style assaults is intended to inflict both physical 

and psychological injury, often indiscriminately. During terrorist-style assaults, emergency 

responders are likely targets, and thus should practice and use exposure and risk reduction 

strategies as they carry out their emergency assignments.

High-occupancy public assembly areas are especially vulnerable targets for terrorist-style 

assaults. Incident preplans for each type of occupancy should be developed or amended to 

address the potential impact of a terrorist-style assault. Preplans should anticipate the likely 

response requirements and should be based on joint (fire/EMS/law enforcement) command 

and operations structures.

DESCRIPTION OF COMMUNITY

Littleton Fire District –Service Area

The Littleton Fire District covers approximately 80 square miles, an area that serves a population of 

approximately 230,000 residents. The City of Littleton is a suburban community located approximately 10 miles south of Denver in Arapahoe County, Colorado. The Littleton Fire Department's 

coverage area includes the city proper, with a population of nearly 44,000 covering approximately 

11.5 square miles; and an additional 11.75 square miles in Arapahoe County, 44.5 square miles in 

Douglas County, and 12.25 square miles in Jefferson County. The incident at Columbine High School 

took place in an area of Jefferson County known as Columbine, which takes its name from the indigenous blue and white State flower. (See Area Response Map, Appendix A).

Littleton Fire Department – Service Profile

The Littleton Volunteer Fire Department (LFD) was established in 1890 and protected the community until 1960, when a full-time, career department was formed. The mission of LFD is to provide 

emergency response services and life safety education programs that minimize the loss of life and 

property from fires, medical emergencies, and hazardous conditions. The department provides fullservice response and has specialized resources that respond to hazardous materials incident, wildland 

fires, dive team operations, swift water and ice rescues, and high-angle technical rope rescues. LFD 

also provides the community with a medical bicycle team and a public fire education team. In 1999, 

the department responded to 10,280 incidents, 20 percent of which were fire-related emergencies 

and about 50 percent of which were EMS-related incidents. LFD is experiencing about a 10 percent 

annual rise in response volume.

The department currently maintains a staff of 143 personnel operating from its headquarters and 

eight fire stations within its fire district. The eight fire stations compose one battalion, capable of 

deploying six engine companies, two telesquirt companies, four rescue ambulances, and a hazardous 

materials company. All units can provide advanced life support services. The on-shift battalion chief 

supervises the overall operations of the eight fire stations. They are three rotating platoons (A, B, and 

C), each working 24-hour shifts. Three personnel are assigned to each engine and telesquirt, with a 

captain supervising each company. The rescue ambulances are each staffed by a firefighter/EMT and 

a firefighter/paramedic.
4

The department is organized into five divisions: Emergency Operations, Prevention/Education, 

Training, Emergency Medical Services, and Support Services, as detailed in Figure 1. The department 

is staffed according to the profile in Table 1.

Figure 1. Littleton Fire Department Organization
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 5

Table 1. Littleton Fire Department Staffing Profile

Rank Staffing

  Chief     1

  Division Chiefs     4

  Fire Marshal     1

  Deputy Fire Marshal     1

  Battalion Chiefs     3

  Captains 24

  Lieutenants 12

  Engineers 24

  Inspectors     2

  Firefighters 54

  Administrative Coordinators     2

  Public Information Officer     1

  Communications Supervisor     1

  Cadet     1

  Dispatchers     8

  Part-Time Dispatchers     5

Total 144

Emergency Medical Services

In 1974, LFD became the first department in Colorado to deploy fire department-based paramedics. 

All fire department operations personnel have been certified as at least emergency medical technicians (EMT). In February of 1999, the department made two major changes in their EMS system:

• All units, rescue and fire, are fully equipped with advanced life support (ALS) equipment and 

staffed by at least one paramedic.

• Critical and urgent-care patients are transported directly to area hospitals by LFD rescue 

ambulances.

LFD provides emergency "pre-hospital" medical services to the community and its mutual-aid partners. It has recently adopted a "One Plus One" response configuration on all apparatus. One Plus One 

is deploying one paramedic and at least one EMT on every apparatus, thus expanding EMS coverage 

to the entire community serviced, at the same time reducing response times of ALS to the scene. 

One Plus One has proved to be a cost-effective, responsible method of EMS service delivery in the 

pre-hospital setting. The community also benefits from third-service, private providers who are used 

primarily for routine and non-emergency patient transfers. Many of these commercial EMS providers assisted directly with site triage and patient transport during the Columbine incident; others 

provided area coverage to support the mutual-aid units that were drawn to the scene.
6

Littleton Police Department

The Littleton Police Department (LPD) serves and protects the 11.5 square miles in the City of 

Littleton by providing patrol, investigations, and support services. LPS has a specialized weapons and 

tactics team (SWAT). Columbine High school is not typically covered by the Littleton Police, but 

rather, by the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office.

Littleton Fire and Police Communications

The LFD Dispatch Center is collocated with the LPD Dispatch Center. At the time of the incident, 

dispatch was on VHF; currently, LFD is on an 800-MHz trunked Regional system. The centers dispatch calls received directly and relayed from the area's respective county sheriff's 9-1-1 dispatch 

center. LFD communications on one dispatch channel (154.340 MHz); four tactical channels; one 

Statewide Fire/EMS mutual aid channel, known as the Fire Emergency Radio Network (FERN); and 

one Statewide dedicated hazardous materials incident channel. Law enforcement agencies within 

the area each have their own independent radio frequencies. However, there is one Statewide law 

enforcement mutual-aid channel, the Colorado Law Enforcement Emergency Radio (CLEER).

One dispatch supervisor, 10 dispatchers, and 5 part-time personnel work 8-hour shifts. There are 

three shifts per day. Two or more dispatch consoles are staffed around the clock. During weekdays 

there is an overlap position to provide rotation or staff a third console. The dispatchers use a computer-aided dispatch system as well as a medical priority dispatch system (MPDS), which places 

medical call loads into one of four categories: Levels A and B (for basic life support) and levels C and 

D (for advanced life support). In 1999, the dispatch center handled approximately 22,000 fire and 

EMS calls for seven different departments.

During the incident at Columbine High School, most 9-1-1 calls came to the Jefferson County 

Sheriff's Office Dispatch Center. Both the LFD and the LPD Dispatch Centers handled incoming calls 

as well. In addition, LFD dispatch handled 47 unrelated fire service and medical incidents during the 

incident at the high school. From dispatch records, a timeline has been restructured, summarizing 

the incident events (see Appendix C).

Jefferson County Sheriff's Office

The Jefferson County Sheriff's Office covers an area of approximately 780 square miles and provides 

primary law enforcement services to a population of approximately 190,000 (out of 500,000 total 

population in the county), with a staff of 320 sworn officers. The department's headquarters is 

located in Golden, and its service area is divided into three precincts; northern, southern, and mountain (western). Columbine High School is located in the southern precinct's area of responsibility. A 

Sheriff's Department resource officer is assigned to each of the high schools in the unincorporated 

areas of Jefferson County, including Columbine High School.

Jefferson County School District

The Jefferson County School District maintains a contractual ratio of 42 teachers per 1,000 students, 

which equates to an average classroom size of about 25 students. There are approximately 89,000 

students and 5,200 teachers in the school district.

The district has a dress code policy, a drug-free school program, and procedures for locker searches 

when necessary. Each school has a lock box for emergency response units when the school is closed. 

Schools are protected by a variety of automatic fire protection and security systems.
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 7

Before the incident at Columbine occurred, the school district had begun to work on changing their 

emergency plan. After considerable effort, a new plan was adopted in the fall of 1999. The plan identifies a wide variety of emergency incidents and describes what faculty and other staff should do in 

response to each situation. The plan lists who is in charge, whom to contact, what to do, and where 

to go in the event of various emergencies. Following is a partial list of the situations covered:

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Fire

Hazardous materials spills/releases

Student-staff illness, injury, or death

Blizzard/snow conditions

Building explosion

School violence

Suicide threat

Bob threat

Bus accident

Kidnapping-missing person

Tornado

Of particular note is the fact that the plan is based on the Incident Command System. In crisis situations, teachers are expected to use their best judgment and common sense. They are familiar with 

multiple exit points, what to do in a lockdown situation, and where to go depending on the type of 

incident. They are instructed to follow the procedures taught to them in the emergency management 

plan.

At the time of the incident, fire emergency dills were the only type of drill commonly practiced. 

In the elementary schools, the drills occurred once a month (except December). In the middle 

schools, fire drills were conducted quarterly while the high schools conducted drills semiannually. 

Administrators and teachers had not had much exposure to other types of crisis training.

Columbine High School

Columbine High School is one of the Jefferson High School District's facilities that is located within 

the LFD's fire district. At the time of this incident, 1,945 students were registered in the four-grade 

(9-12), open-campus style high school. Approximately 120 teachers and 20 administrative and support personnel worked at the school.

The majority of the school is a one-story building of masonry construction. However, the facility 

underwent a substantial expansion several years ago, with a two-story addition that included a cafeteria, library, auditorium, and classrooms.

The area immediately surrounding the school includes several athletic fields, recreational park areas 

to the north and west, and three parking lots-one each to the northeast, east, and south of the building. A major north/south thoroughfare (South Pierce Street) borders the east side of the school 

grounds and provides the only street access to the school. Beyond the large parking lot to the south is 
8

an extended privacy fence separating the school grounds from a residential area consisting primarily 

of one- and two- story single-family homes.

At the time of the incident, the school had a public address system in the administration office with 

speakers in the hallways, auditorium, gymnasium, classrooms, commons area, and cafeteria. There 

were security cameras in the administration area and the cafeteria. Each of the 75 classrooms had 

televisions, computers, lockable doors, and a telephone. The telephone system provided 20 outside 

lines.

The building's installed fire protection system included an AC/DC power supply battery backup 

alarm system, fire alarm annunciator panel, sprinkler zone control panel, manual pull stations, water 

gong sprinkler flow alarm, and fire department supply inlet connections for the sprinkler system. 

The sprinkler heads throughout the majority of the school are rated to activate at either 135 degrees 

Fahrenheit or 165 degrees Fahrenheit. The capacity of the system was originally designed to accommodate the simultaneous activation of eight heads before the fire department needed to supplement 

the sprinkler system water supply. However, when the addition was constructed, the capacity was 

reduced to six activated heads.
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 9

THE DIVERSION

On April 20, 1999, at approximately 1122 hours, the Littleton Fire Department, West Metro Fire 

Department, and Jefferson County Sheriff's Office patrol deputy were dispatched to a reported explosion and grass fire at the intersection of Chatfield and Wadsworth, approximately 3 miles southwest 

of Columbine High School. A road crew working along the road's shoulder noticed two bags and 

tossed them aside. One bag exploded, resulting in a small brush fire. A crew member called the 9-

1-1 operator, who dispatched the Littleton Fire Department. Engine 13, normally the unit closest to 

Columbine High, was sent to investigate the explosion and to extinguish the resulting brush fire. The 

person reporting the incident stated:

I don't know if it was a car or what it was, but they're on Wadsworth North Boulevard between 

Chatfield and Ken Caryl. There was an explosion in the backyard. I don't know if it was a car or 

a propane tank, a big ball of fire, now there is smoke. There are several people pulled off to the 

side of the road.

Upon arriving at the scene, they found a small grass fire and an explosive device that had detonated. 

The deployment of Engine 13 on this call placed them about three times farther away from the high 

school than would have been the case if they had been in station. Figure 2 shows the locations of 

Columbine High School, Fire Station 13, and the diversionary device.

Figure 2. Location of Diversionary Device in Relationship to Station 13 

and Columbine High School.
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

THE ATTACK

The assault on Columbine High School began when two male students, ages 16 and 17, arrived at 

the school, parked their cars, and carried two duffle bags into the cafeteria. They returned to their 

cars, put on their trench coats, and gathered their weapons. They open fired at students sitting by the 

fence and outside the cafeteria on the grass by the west entry doors, killing two and injuring five. 

Shortly before 1200 hours, the perpetrators lofted at least one explosive device onto the roof. They 

then went to the northwest doors of the west corridor entrances outside the library (see Figure 3). Courtesy of U.S. Fire Administration

Figure 3. Columbine High School Facing Ground-Level Cafeteria, Point of Entry, 

and Second-Level Library

As the attack began, some students thought it might be something related to Senior Prank Day 

involving firecrackers. A major segment of the students and faculty were completely unaware of the 

events that were unfolding. However, it quickly became apparent that a violent incident was occurring. Teachers who could not get their students out of the building locked down their classrooms 

and barricaded the doors in an effort to keep the students safe. Other students were ushered out of 

the building to safety by the faculty and by fellow students. The administrators were able to relocate 

to safe refuge areas and began efforts to track the locations of students and faculty. The principal and 

a representative from the school district coordinated efforts to provide parents and the community 

with information as it became available.

The attackers threw pipe bombs, fired inside the school doors, and then entered through the west 

entry doors. Shots were fired down the hallway at fleeing students. The two heavily armed students 
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 11

exchanged gunfire with the school resource officer and continued throughout the school, shooting 

and throwing bombs. The assailants entered the library and walked through the area for approximately 10 minutes, encountering students who were hiding under the tables. Ten students were 

fatally shot, 11 were injured, and other escaped unharmed. The assailants then proceeded downstairs 

to the cafeteria, shown in Figure 4, and partially detonated one of the initially deployed duffle-bag 

bombs. From there they proceeded into the science area, shooting through doorway glass panels, 

deploying additional pipe bombs, and starting a fire. They then returned to the library and opened 

fire to the outside, shooting at paramedics who were attempting to rescue the victims lying outside 

the cafeteria.

Figure 4. Cafeteria of Columbine High School after April 20th. Arrows indicate 

the melted plastic chairs and lighting cover over the area of incipient fire.

Because of the haphazard path that was taken by the attackers, there were numerous 9-1-1 calls from 

different locations inside the school, further adding to the confusion as to the location and number 

of perpetrators. At one point, law enforcement personnel were under the impression that as many as 

eight individuals may have taken over the school.

Post-incident reconstruction suggests that the two perpetrators committed suicide in the library 

shortly after firing at the paramedics at about 1205 hours. This fact, however, was not known to first 

responders at the time. As a result, law enforcement and fire/EMS resources continued to arrive at the 

scene and to operate on the premise that violent perpetrators still posed a danger to students, faculty, 

and public safety personnel.

Courtesy of Littleton Fire Department
12 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

THE RESPONSE

The Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office 9-1-1 operators began receiving a flood of phone calls from 

panicked students and faculty. The activated fire alarm at the school also alerted the operators to a 

situation at the school. A teacher called 9-1-1 from the library to report that the teenage assailants 

were approaching and that she was desperately trying to keep the students under the tables. The 

9-1-1 tape reveals her beseeching the children to find cover and stay down.

Littleton Engine 11, Rescues 11 and 13, and Battalion Chief 1 were dispatched for a report of shots 

fired and an explosion on the initial response to the school at 1129 hours. It is estimated that gunfire 

was exchanged between the assailants and the school resource officer at the same time.

At 1133 hours, while enroute to the school, Rescue 13 requested that two ambulances be added to 

the assignment while Engine 11 requested that a MedEvac helicopter be placed on standby. By 1137 

hours, Rescue 13 had arrived and staged at Weaver and Pierce Streets.

Littleton’s Battalion Chief 1 arrived on the scene at 1138 hours and assumed fire command at Pierce 

and Fair Streets (see Figure 5). He immediately gave a size up of the situation and designated a staging area for Rescue 13 at Pierce and Weaver. He then requested that a law enforcement representative 

respond to the command post as a massive law enforcement response was developing. Engine and 

Rescue 11 were directed to stage at Pierce and Leawood.

Figure 5. Initial Command Structure (about 1135 hours)

It is difficult to imagine the scene that first responders encountered shortly after arrival that morning. 

What they were confronted with was confusion, carnage, and chaos – the result of indiscriminate, 

wanton violence. The scene included the following.

• 

• 

• 

Dead and injured students and faculty who had been shot with a variety of semiautomatic 

and conventional weapons

An active, hostile environment

Antipersonnel-style, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in various locations of the twostory portion of the south end of the school, and extending into the adjacent lawns and sidewalks, which suggested additional risks, such as booby traps, tripwires, and motion-sensitive 

detonators
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 13

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Incendiary devices fueled by flammable liquids and gases in various types and sizes of 

containers

An unknown number, status, and circumstance of school occupants hiding inside the structure in many locations, such as above drop ceilings, in closets, and in classrooms

Confirmed casualties needing medical assistance both inside and outside the school

Violent perpetrators whose numbers, identity, location, and status were unknown

Terror-stricken occupants running from building and hiding behind vehicles and barriers

An activated sprinkler system

An activated fire alarm

Reports of an odor of natural gas

The interior environment compromised by smoke, haze, noise, and flashing strobes from the 

fire alarm system.

Battalion 1 was receiving information from students, teachers, and law enforcement personnel 

already on the scene. The Jefferson County Sheriff's Office reported to the LFD dispatch center that 

students were congregating at several locations. Due to the large number of students and teachers 

fleeing the scene in various directions, multiple triage and treatment areas would be established. The 

initial triage/treatment area was organized in Clement Park, just north of the school grounds.

At 1141 hours, the Engine 11 captain worked with students to control the crowd and to identify 

which students had seen the offenders and might be able to provide information. He directed all 

Littleton Fire Department personnel to remove their blue uniform shirt and badge, reverting to the 

standard issue gray fire department T-shirts to enable on-scene personnel and panicked students to 

more easily differentiate between the police and fire and EMS personnel.

The fire department dispatch center had broadcast warnings that he suspects might be wearing long, 

black trench coats. The center also had received reports of victims with head, face, and spinal injuries, 

at various locations in and around the building.

At 1144 hours, after recognizing the impending complexity of the incident, Battalion Chief 1 

requested assistance from the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office to set up a unified command post. 

Simultaneously, Rescue 11 was deployed to Fair and Pierce Streets for a victim with a gun-shot 

wound to the leg. Rescue 11 transported this patient to Jay and Bowles Streets, where the patient was 

transferred to Columbine Ambulance 5 and transported to Littleton Hospital.

At 1145 hours, there was a report of at least one assailant located in the cafeteria.

At 1146 hours, the command post was relocated to Leawood and Pierce near the Sheriff's command post by Chief 10, the designated operations chief. He also initiated a callout of senior fire 

officials. The Littleton Fire Chief, Chief 1, was placed on the call at 1150 hours and responded from 

headquarters.

In the school cafeteria, the assailants were trying to activate homemade explosive devices that had 

not detonated by shooting at them. Their actions were captures by surveillance camera tapes that 

show the two teenagers entering the cafeteria, throwing devices, and shooting at one of the predeployed 
14 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

devise until it ignited and activated the school’s sprinkler system at 1152 hours. That device consisted 

of a 20-pound propane cylinder, a 1-gallon metal can of flammable liquid, and a 1-gallon container 

holding flammable liquid. The detonator was made of a pipe bomb with a combined mechanical 

and electrical activator. The propane cylinder was not breached and the container did not vent in the 

ensuring incipient fire. Only the flammable liquid in the 1-gallon metal can ignited.

Chief 1, along with the deputy fire marshal and a paramedic captain, arrived on the scene at about 

1159 hours, assumed command of the fire and EMS operations, and established unified command 

with the Jefferson County Sheriff’s lieutenant in charge. The arriving command officers obtained 

information on the situation and resource status, incident objectives, and operational tactics. Battalion 

1, now the designated operations sector chief, divided staging into fire and EMS. The north staging 

area included mostly law enforcement and EMS, while fire and EMS units staged to the south (Figure 

6). A liaison officer was established due to the numerous resources and agencies responding to 

the scene. The Fire Department’s Public Information Officer (PIO) assisted the Sheriff’s Department 

(PIO).

Figure 6. Ambulance Staging at Columbine High School During Incident

As the incident progressed, two paramedic units moved in to rescue students who were just outside 

the building. Two minutes later, at 1158 hours, Rescues 11 and 13 reported that they were “taking 

gunfire” as assailants shot at the EMS and law enforcement personnel. Despite facing lethal gunfire, 

the unarmed paramedics made repeated attempts to rescue the wounded and take them to safety. 

Disregarding their own safety, drivers of the rescue units positioned the vehicles to protect the 

patient loading area from the line of fire. They successfully rescued three critically injured students, 

and confirmed that a fourth student was dead.

Courtesy of Corbis Sygma
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 15

At 1202 hours, while Rescues 11 and 13 had recovered three victims and were withdrawing under 

fire from the southwest parking lot, fire command authorized the police to use Engine 11 as a 

vehicle shield for the SWAT officers positioned to approach and enter the school. The windows of 

the engine were covered with body armor, a SWAT officer received an impromptu course in driving 

the fire apparatus from Engine 11’s driver, and all the medical equipment was pulled off the engine 

for use elsewhere on the scene. Onboard breathing apparatus were left on the engine. Those assets 

should have been removed in order to secure them and to reduce projectile-induced explosion 

risks to personnel and equipment. Engine 11 crew members were subsequently assigned to assist 

Rescue 11, Rescue 13, and the medical sector. Figure 7 shows the position of Engine 11 during these 

operations.

Figure 7. Position of Littleton Engine 11 During SWAT and Rescue Operations

Over the following 35 to 40 minutes, command designated a medical group with a communications 

officer and a transportation officer (Figure 8). Although a precise time was not available, Jefferson 

County activated an EOC in their county building in Golden while also establishing an information 

and media center at the Columbine Public Library, which was also used as a meeting location for 

students and parents, as was Leawood Elementary. Student names were faxed back and forth between 

the library and the elementary school as information was updated. Mutual-aid companies began 

backfilling the Littleton fire stations.

Courtesy of Corbis Sygma
16 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Figure 8. Second Command Structure Evolution 

(Established between 1142 and 1210 hours)

Rescue 13 transferred one of its two patients to a waiting Denver Health Ambulance, which subsequently transported the patient to Denver General Hospital. Rescues 11 and 13 each transported their 

patients to the Swedish Medical Center. Students – some wounded – were being escorted from the 

school and away from the area by law enforcement personnel.

A landing zone was established for medical helicopters on the soccer field of nearby Clement Park 

(Figure 9). The area was chosen because it was out of the line of sight from the building and could 

accommodate two helicopters at a time. The area was easy to secure, had good access to the street, 

and provided adequate space to stage and prepare a potentially large number of patients for MedEvac 

transport.

At 1210 hours, the lieutenant from Rescue 18 established the Yukon/Caley Triage Division, a cul-desac in the residential area south of the school where students, some of whom were injured, began 

congregating. Communications at the site were limited as the area was essentially a “dead zone.” The 

communication problems experienced at Yukon and Caley prevented the lieutenant from contacting 

the triage sector for hospital assignments via the trauma-net hospital radio link.

Law enforcement officers began transporting some of the injured students in their police cruisers from a refuge area on the northwest corner of the school to the cul-de-sac at the intersection 

of Yukon and Caley. Rescue 18 responded first to the new triage area with five personnel. Rescue 

18 had been transporting the crew from another unit that was placed out of service for mechanical reasons. Included on Rescue 18’s crew were two paramedics, two EMTs and a new dispatcher 

assigned to ride in the ambulance to observe field operations. An ambulance and engine company 
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 17

from the West Metro Fire Department also responded to Yukon and Caley from a staging location at 

the Littleton/West Metro fire district border. (Figure 10). Staffing was further augmented when an 

off-duty LFD paramedic captain, who was on his way to the school to locate his daughter, arrived 

and began assisting with patient care. Many of the law enforcement and fire department personnel 

at the scene had children or knew other teens that attended Columbine High School, which added 

significantly to responder stress levels.

Figure 9. Aerial View Showing Locations of Pertinent Sites and Areas 

During the Columbine Disaster

Littleton’s Training Chief, Training 10, was in charge of coordinating the landing zone for the MedEvac 

helicopter east of Clement Park. Training 10 had been involved with live burn training evolutions 

prior to responding to the emergency at Columbine; he was still wearing his soot-covered turnout 

gear. At 1212 hours a police sniper deployed about a quarter mile away observed Training 10 and 

considered him a suspicious person because he appeared to be wearing a black trench coat. The chief 

was not wearing a helmet or an incident command vest, which would have more readily conveyed 

his operational role. Command vests were not used because the battalion chief’s vehicle was out of 

service briefly for an oil change. All the normally available incident command equipment was left in 

the vehicle, and the reserve vehicle was not comparably equipped. Officers attempting to secure the 

area approached Training 10 with their weapons drawn and took him to the ground before realizing 

who he was. 

Courtesy of Littleton Fire Department
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Figure 10. Third Command Structure Evolution 

(Established between 1200 and 1238 hours)

At 1218 hours Yukon and Caley Command (R-18) requested 10 ambulances to assist with 11 patients 

– 4 critical, 4 serious and 3 stable – all of whom were students. One of the patients, a young male 

with a gunshot wound to the head, began to experience seizures just prior to transport; paramedics 

rushed to airlift this patient to the hospital (Figure 11). Other units that assisted at the Yukon and 

Caley Triage Sector (Figure 12) included Engine 13; West Metro Ambulances 10,12, and 13; Pride 

Mark Ambulance 106; and Rescue 101. At 1224 hours Regional hospitals set up a trauma network 

and conducted an available bed count of their respective facilities.

Situation report from SWAT members inside the school indicated that fire suppression resources 

might be needed. Reports indicated that there was a fire in the cafeteria and activated sprinkles. In 

addition, the odor of what was thought to be natural gas was present in the school, creating concern over the potential for explosion and fire. Later, it was determined that the smell was in fact the 

residual odor of the combustible liquids ignited from the propane bombs in the cafeteria. A fire task 

force was established at 1242 hours and staged at Pierce and Coal Mine Streets. The task force was 

made up of apparatus and personnel from the Littleton, Denver and West Metro Fire Departments. It 

was determined that the best access to the building would be through the main entrance. The task 

force began formulating plans to combat a fire-related emergency, working closely with law enforcement personnel.
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 19

Figure 11. Medics Transporting an Injured Student from Columbine High SchoolCourtesy of Corbis Sygma Courtesy of Corbis Sygma

Figure 12. Yukon and Caley Triage Sector. Eleven injured students were treated 

and transported in less than 1 hour. 
20 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

With communication between fire and rescue personnel increasingly hampered due to the sheer 

volume of radio traffic, the fire department incident commander, Chief 1, requested a second fire 

ground channel, a dispatcher from the emergency communication center, and the expedient deployment of the department’s new 800-MHz radios, which had not yet been placed in service. The radios 

arrived and were selectively deployed to link the different sectors of the ICS, while the use of VHF 

radios continued for the fire task force and staging operations. Concurrently, all EMS units with access 

to the Fire Emergency Response Network (FERN) were switched over to that channel. The channel 

allowed most, but not all, mutual-aid companies and the Littleton Fire Department EMS units to 

operate on the same frequency. Also, all ambulances transporting patients were required to notify 

the facility to which they were responding on the Hospital Emergency Administrative Radio (HEAR) 

network, which links all the area hospitals. 

Shortly before 1300 hours, parents were advised that uninjured students could be met and released 

at Leawood Elementary School. Frantic parents descended upon the school in anticipation of meeting up with their children. At 1354 hours, LFD’s Rescue 18 and Engine 17 were called to Leawood 

Elementary for a reported heart attack.

At 1305 hours, just 90 minutes into the incident and only 1 hour after it had been established, the 

Yukon and Caley Triage Sector reported to command that all 11 of their serious patients had been 

transported to local hospitals. Police officers accompanied each patient to the hospital to provide 

protection, to collect additional intelligence and evidence, and to be available to record dying declarations if necessary. One ambulance called dispatch while transporting victims to the hospital and 

indicated that they were possibly being followed by one of the assailants. Returning ambulances 

restocked their medical supplies at Station 13 and awaited further mission assignments.

Rescue 13 was ordered to locate at the east doors of the school at the request of SWAT officers, who 

told them to wait there while they attempted to reach a critical patient inside the building. The plan 

was to have the SWAT team bring the patient out to the rescue, since it was unsafe for the paramedics 

to enter the building. At 1325 hours, Rescue 13 established the East Triage Sector at the east entrance 

of the school. The purpose of this sector was to triage and treat faculty and students as the SWAT 

team removed them from the building, or as they escaped on their own. Members of Rescue 13 also 

found a suspicious backpack in their path in the east entrance; by this time they had been warned 

about the possibility of motion-sensitive detonators. There were reports that the gunmen may have 

changed clothes and were attempting to escape with the other students. Thus, as students evacuated 

the building, Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department personnel ordered that they all be treated as 

suspects until cleared. Throughout the incident, numerous students and faculty were evacuated from 

various locations inside the school.

Littleton fire officials, Engine 17, Rescue 18, and the bomb squad were dispatched at 1429 hours 

to one of the suspect’s home for a report of a natural gas leak. Upon arrival and investigation, the 

crews found a variety of apparently live explosive devices. The engine company established a water 

supply, and all radio transmission on the scene were suspended. Upon arrival of an LFD captain at 

1525 hours, the surrounding homes were evacuated, and the bob technicians proceeded to render 

the devices safe without incident.
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 21

At the school, units were still operating with extreme caution. They were unsure of the suspects’ 

locations or conditions and were concerned about the obvious presence of explosive and incendiary 

devices. With students still in the building and no information about the status of most of them, the 

West Triage Sector was established at 1457 hours. An LFD captain assumed command of the sector 

and used the mutual-aid crews and equipment from Denver Health, West Metro, South Metro Rescue, 

and other ambulance companies. The primary mission of this sector was to support SWAT operations 

and to triage and treat victims who might exit the west side of the building. 

By 1534 hours, there were reports of more than 20 people injured in the school. Additional reports 

indicated that there were three officers and two suspects down within the school. Although the 

“officer down” reports proved to be unfounded, they added substantially to the tension at the scene. 

Also at this time, area emergency service personnel began responding. A local news crew had aired 

an unauthorized and unneeded request that all available EMS personnel in the vicinity of Littleton 

should go to Columbine High School to assist with the mass casualty incident. The responsiveness of 

these personnel, some of who drove as long as 2 hours to reach the scene, is commendable, but the 

influx of unnecessary providers only added to the onsite challenges. 

By approximately 1537 hours the last surviving student from the library was transported with multiple gunshot wounds. Moments later, at 1540 hours, a teacher with a gunshot wound to the shoulder 

was transported. These actions essentially drew the assault-related EMS operations to a close. 

Due to the duration of the incident, a logistics sector officer was established. The American Red 

Cross and the Salvation Army supplied food for the emergency workers at the scene. Sanitation needs 

were addressed, and potable water was provided. Local merchants helped with food and beverages. 

Emergency cellular telephone communications were enhanced at the incident site by deploying portable towers to improve service. Lighting units were requested to support nighttime operations. Fuel 

tenders were provided to refuel equipment. The Littleton Fire Department also provided a mobile 

mechanic and tow service for a mutual-aid that had broken down. 

Although a formal planning sector was not established at this incident, the resources that were 

requested were tracked. Patient tracking was conducted between the treatment control officers, staging, and the transportation control officer. (See Appendix B for the Unified Incident Command 

Chart).

At 1543 hours the incident command post received a report of a possible gas leak in the ceramics 

room of the school. Not long after, the SWAT officers reported that there were no more survivors in 

the school. The Fire Task Force was then asked to assist the EOD teams who were conducting rendersafe operations. The task force’s assignment was to provide medical assistance and fire suppression 

if a device activated. Every member assigned to the Fire Task Force operations volunteered for this 

hazardous assignment.

The Fire Task Force was also requested to shut down the sprinkler system, deactivate the fire alarm 

system, and shut off the natural gas supply to the school. Gas company personnel assisted in these 

operations. As the fire department personnel and the utility workers approached the rear of the building to shut off the gas supply, they received reports of shots fired in the gymnasium. Actually, one of 

the explosive devices had detonated spontaneously, but there was no fire and no one was injured.
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

By 1600 hours fire/EMS operations had undergone transition to a standby status in support of 

ongoing EOD and law enforcement activities. At 1604 hours SWAT officers cleared fire department 

personnel to enter the building and shut off the school’s fire alarm and main sprinkler system. As the 

incident began to wind down for the responding firefighters and paramedics, the Littleton Fire Chief 

ordered that all B-shift personnel be brought in to relieve the A-shift personnel for the remainder of 

their shift, thus allowing the A-shift personnel to stand down.

Despite the de-escalation, danger still existed within the school. Many explosive and incendiary 

devices remained in place, and hundreds of backpacks that had to be checked for explosives were still 

inside the building. Explosive experts and SWAT officers were particularly concerned about the possibility that the assailants had placed motion-sensitive detonators on devices throughout the school, 

or hidden devices in concealed locations.

A physician from Denver Health was on the scene as a medical control officer to coordinate transportation of the victims to area hospitals. The command staff was in the process of establishing a team 

of firefighters/paramedics to go into the building to verify the fatalities. Volunteers were requested, 

and protective equipment, such as helmets and ballistic vests, were being gathered. AT 1645 hours, 

the physician entered the school – against orders from the law and fire commands – to pronounce 

the dead. The physician, on his own initiative, assembled a team of on-scene paramedics to search 

the school with him. Their personal safety, as well as that of all emergency responders who were still 

on the scene, was jeopardized by these actions. One of the medics whom the physician directed to 

assist him went on short-term disability leave after the incident due to post-traumatic stress.

Most of the LFD personnel returned to their stations by approximately 1700 hours Critical incident 

stress debriefings took place that evening at the fire stations, and continued incrementally for months. 

Most A-shift personnel were relieved by 2000 hours. Meanwhile, bomb technicians from different agencies worked into the evening at the school, performing render-safe procedures on various 

devices that were being removed. At 2230 hours one technician accidentally detonated a device while 

loading it into a disposal unit and had to be evaluated for injuries. That event effectively suspended 

operations for the day. The bodies of the deceased were removed the following afternoon, which 

concluded the direct fire and EMS support. Investigators processed the crime scene and maintained 

custody of the school until it was returned to the school district on June 1, nearly 6 weeks after the 

incident. The response sequence is outlined in its entirety in Appendix C, Incident Time Line.

Law Enforcement/SWAT/EOD

The first law enforcement actions were rendered by the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office community 

resource officer who was assigned to the high school. He was able to identify the initial location of 

the suspects and to communicate their actions to incoming personnel.

Upon arrival, the incident commander representing the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office recognized 

the need to collocate command posts and to unify the command structure with the fire department. 

It was especially helpful to place both command posts together because inter-agency communications were challenging, even under “normal” circumstances.
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 23

Law enforcement was able to establish a Tactical Operation Branch to coordinate the interior SWAT 

operations as well as the tactical snipers who were deployed around the perimeter. An Evacuation 

Branch was established to control the triage/treatment areas, conduct interviews with students and 

teachers who had information pertaining to the incident, and transport the non injured students 

to safe refuge area. The Evacuation Branch also assisted the parents at the Leawood Elementary 

School until they were reunited with their children. The Scene Control Branch established inner and 

outer perimeters, monitored staging areas, and provided victim assistance and parental control. The 

Investigations Branch (Figure 13) conducted the crime scene investigation, including explosives and 

munitions; gathered information and intelligence; worded with the coroners office and conducted 

vehicle, scene, and residential searches and seizures, shows how the law enforcement response was 

organized. Figure 14 shows how the law enforcement response was organized.

The SWAT teams at first were assembled by assigning SWAT personnel regardless of what agency they 

represented. A total of four primary SWAT teams were deployed (Figure 15). Five secondary teams 

were organized to perform secondary searches. When the teams’ officers entered the building, they 

discovered detonated and unexploded devices, an activated sprinkler system, and activated smoke 

and fire alarms. The SWAT personnel began a search of the 75 classrooms, restrooms, closets, utility 

rooms, and connected areas. They found students who were hiding in concealed spaces throughout 

the building. The officers searched each room, cleared it, marked their findings on the door, and then 

communicated the information to the Tactical Operations Branch director.

Figure 13. Organization of Investigations Branch
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Figure 14. Organization of Law Enforcement Response

Courtesy of Corbis Sygma

Figure 15. SWAT Personnel Operating Behind the Cover 

of a Littleton Rescue Unit
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 25

Law enforcement personnel maintained inner and outer perimeter control of the entire area surrounding the school. They also had to restrict parental access to the school while they assisted fleeing 

students. Other officers were assigned to manage law enforcement staging areas or to interview and 

gather intelligence from students and teachers who had information vital to the incident.

At approximately 1135 hours the Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office issued a group page for members 

of the Arapahoe Sheriff’s Office Bomb Squad to respond to Columbine High School. LFD’s Deputy 

Fire Marshal responded and functioned as a bomb disposal technician under the command and 

control of the Arapahoe sheriff in accordance with preauthorized procedures. After reporting to the 

command post, he proceeded to Pierce and Bowles Streets and established the EOD staging area (near 

the Fire Department Command).

EOD Operations

The law enforcement personnel assigned to the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit included 

certified bomb technicians and bomb technician apprentices from four agencies, listed in Table 2.

Table 2. Agencies that Provided Bomb Technicians and Apprentices

Department Bomb Technicians Apprentices

Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office 2 3

Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office *7* 4

Denver Police Department 4 0

FBI Denver Field Office 1 0

*LFD Deputy Fire Marshal is included in this number.

All bomb squads have at least two bomb disposal suits, x-ray equipment, two disrupters, and counter-explosive charge materials. The EOD personnel brought the following resources and FBI-certified 

tools and equipment to the scene:

• Jefferson County Sheriff's Office: one bomb disposal vehicle (open containment vessel) on a 

trailer.

• Arapahoe Sheriff's Office: one bomb disposal vehicle (open containment vessel) on a trailer 

and transport truck and robot.

• Denver Police Department: one bomb disposal vehicle (open containment vessel) on a 

trailer.

• On Scene: three bomb robots of different sizes.

The arriving EOD units began to conduct render-safe procedures of the numerous devices in the 

building and surrounding areas. Render-safe procedures inside the school included a systematic 

search for explosive/incendiary devices. More than 60 devices were rendered safe for transport to 

a remote disposal area. Over 30 devices had either fully or partially functioned when the suspects 

initiated them.
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

At 1429 hours an EOD team responded to the residence of one of the suspects and conducted a 

consent search. They recovered pyrotechnic materials. Later, at approximately 1600 hours, two EOD 

teams entered the high school under SWAT cover to look for timed devices and to conduct rendersafe procedures on exigent devices. One technician wore a full bomb disposal suit. A “fragmentation 

bag” was also available. The team observed various incendiary/explosive devices – some expended, 

others live.

Concurrently, at approximately 1600 hours, the EOD technicians initiated an automobile search 

and discovered two automobiles, each containing various explosive/incendiary devices. The two 

cars were parked in different lots at the east and south ends of the school. The EOD team identified 

exigent circumstances (timer-initiated devices) and initiated render-safe procedures. All EOD teams 

were diverted from inside the school to conduct render-safe operations on the devices in the two 

automobiles. Nationally recognized and accepted bomb render-safe and disposal procedures were 

employed to mitigate the life-safety hazard of the various explosive and incendiary devices and 

materials.

The crime scene investigation concluded that the assailants fired several hundred rounds of ammunition and used more than 90 incendiary/explosive devices, which were recovered in the investigation. Figure 16, developed by the U.S. Fire Administration, presents the type and variety of devices 

recovered at the site of the incident.

Mutual-Aid Response

Littleton Fire Department participates in automatic mutual aid with neighboring jurisdictions, including the West Metro, South Metro, Englewood, Sheridan, and Denver Fire Departments. They also 

enjoy good working relationships with several private ambulance companies, including Columbine 

Ambulance Company, American Medical Response (AMR), Pride Mark Ambulance Company, Rural 

Metro Ambulance Service , and Denver Health.

The fire, rescue, and EMS resources committed to this incident came from nearly 50 agencies representing local, State and Federal authorities. During this incident, a total of 172 command, fire, and 

medical personnel were used. They responded with 10 fire companies and 48 ambulances. One fire 

department chaplain also responded. Table 3 lists the personnel and equipment from each of these 

responding agencies.

During the incident, a mutual aid chief officer was assigned to the communications center for 

the purpose of coordinating mutual-aid responses, ensuring coverage in neighboring jurisdictions, providing moveups to various fire stations as needed, and initiating the recall of Littleton Fire 

Department personnel The availability of a chief officer at the communications center also provided 

a decision making person to facilitate and approve requests for resources, equipment, services, and 

expenditures.
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 27 Courtesy of U.S. Fire Administration

Figure 16. Type and Variety of Devices Recovered at Incident Site

Table 3. Fire, Rescue, and EMS Agencies that Responded to Columbine

Agency Personnel Units Responding

Littleton Fire Department 36 8 units, 8 command staff, 3 communications personnel and 5 off-duty personnel

West Metro Fire Department 28 7 units and 9 command staff

South Metro Fire Department 12 6 units

Englewood Fire Department 3 1 unit and 1 SWAT medic

Sheridan Fire Department 2 1 unit

Denver Fire Department 11 3 units

Columbine Ambulance Company 10 5 units

American Medical Response 30 14 units and 2 command staff

Rural Metro 6 3 units

Pride Mark 10 5 units

Fight for Life 3 1 helicopter

Airlife 3 1 helicopter

Denver Health 18 6 units, 5 command staff, and 1 doctor

Total 172
28 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Hospital Services

Within the immediate area of Littleton, LFD routinely used six hospitals for patient care (Figure 

17). During the incident, the hospital identified in Table 4 received patients from Columbine High 

School. Table 4 also shows the level of trauma care the hospitals were capable of providing and their 

proximity to Columbine High School.

Courtesy of U.S. Fire Administration

Figure 17. Location of Destination Hospitals Relative to Columbine High School

Table 4. Destination Hospitals and Patients Received

Hospital Trauma 

Care

Distance to School 

(Air Miles)

Number of 

Patients

Denver Health 1 10 5

St. Anthony’s 1 10 4

Swedish 2 7 7

University 2 11 1

Littleton 3 6 6

Lutheran 3 12 2
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 29

As rescue ambulances transporting victims arrived at local hospitals, they were met by trauma teams 

ready to provide the needed definitive care. Table 5 shows the disposition of patients upon arrival at 

the hospital. All the victims who were treated at Columbine and transported by EMS units (and other 

means) from the scene to area hospitals survived their injuries.

Table 5. Patient Disposition Upon Arrival at Hospital

Patient 

Disposition

Number of 

Patients

Critical 4

Serious 6

Fair 3

Good 2

Treat/Release 9

Total 24
30 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Most jurisdictions will never encounter a situation like the one that the Littleton area responders confronted at Columbine High School. However, every community faces the possibility that an 

incident involving wanton violence, mass casualties, or incendiary and explosive devices may occur. 

Rioters, long gunmen, members of political and special interest extremist groups, and sociopathic 

individuals bent on revenge and domestic violence are becoming part of the modern American 

landscape. Indiscriminate acts of wanton violence and terrorism are occurring more frequently. As 

the list of such tragedies grows, so does the evidence that fire and EMS agencies need to plan nontraditional strategies and tactics, and to operate under a unified command structure when faced with 

such hostile incidents.

This section notes some of the more important issues associated with the emergency response at 

Columbine and discusses the major lessons learned from the experience. Among the many conclusions that can be drawn from this incident, the need to develop and apply exposure reduction methods beyond traditional tactics is a major finding. These preventative measures would likely include:

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Fire service/EMS use of protective antiballistic garments

Law enforcement escorts during hostile, interior operations

Assets dedicated to identify and to render safe potential secondary devices

Rapid rescue and medical intervention for tactical teams

Enhanced common interoperable communications

Pragmatic, unified command procedures for all responding agencies.

Such measures should be considered for incorporation into multi-agency, all-risk operations plans. 

As a prelude to amending these plans, police, fire and EMS personnel should jointly assess the risks 

from more "routine" incidents, and from that experience, develop incident command systems for 

more complex incidents, such as the one at Columbine High School.

Joint Forces: Unified Command for Major Incidents

Protecting the public’s safety is a primary mission for both the fire/EMS services and law enforcement. Historically, the line between the two has been relatively distinct: the fire service prevented 

and extinguished fires, and police agencies prevented crime and arrested offenders. As has occurred 

in law enforcement, the fire service’s mission has expanded significantly over the last 25 years. Many 

of today’s departments mitigate hazardous materials incidents, provide EMS and transport, conduct criminal investigations of incendiary fires, and manage EOD units. More recently, departments 

have had to begin preparing for the possibility of attacks involving weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD).

Joint operations and unified command between law enforcement and fire/EMS are critical to successfully manage response to incidents ranging from natural disasters to acts of terror. Some examples of 

such joint operations include the response to civil disturbances in St. Petersburg, Florida and the City 

of Los Angeles; the World Trade Center bombing; the bombing at the Murrah Building in Oklahoma 

City; and a series of recent, indiscriminate shootings at schools, day care centers, churches, and in 

other public assemblies.
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 31

The fire service has a long history of coordinating response to large-scale incidents. The incident 

command system (ICS) is used extensively by fire service personnel to manage major incidents by 

assigning special sectors to handle key response components. The five primary ICS sectors are: command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance. Local emergency management offices coordinate 

natural disasters through a similar system of designated branches that handle communications, requisitions and finance, planning, public information, and so forth.

At the scene of violent, multi-hazard incidents, the fire and emergency medical services usually function in a support role to law enforcement. Fire/EMS command officers need to work in conjunction 

with the law enforcement commander and function under one unified command. The command 

post should be relatively isolated and secure. Operations flow more smoothly if the jurisdictions 

involved have established a means for joint operations and have practiced applying the procedures. 

Whether that system is called unified command, joint command, or incident/standardized management probably matters less than does the fact that all public safety responders become familiar with 

special operational procedures during major events for which nontraditional response strategies and 

tactics are required. Fire and law enforcement commanders can begin planning for a joint command 

system based on ICS by reviewing the requirements of violent, multi hazard incidents.

In some cases, an incident may be so large and have such a broad or unexpected impact (as in 

bombings and riots) that incident commanders should request support form the local Emergency 

Operations Center. Tapping into the emergency management network facilitates the acquisition of a 

broad range of assets that might be needed during a protracted and complex incident. Local emergency management resources may be augmented by State and Federal resources, as well as by the 

private sector.

When the impact of an event meets the criteria for Federal assistance, the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, at the request of State emergency management organizations, can provide 

a wide array of support services. Specialized assets include medical response teams (coordinated 

through the Department of Health and Human Services); and disaster assistance management teams 

that can supply communications, operations, transportation, mass care, urban search and rescue, 

infrastructure support, and temporary housing. Incidents where there are many fatalities may warrant the deployment of special adjunct mortuary teams. National Guard and Reserve components 

also can provide disaster assistance to local governments, and currently are helping to train first 

responders in responding to WMD events.

It would have been of great benefit if the SWAT teams, EOD technicians, and fire/EMS personnel at 

Columbine had been able to train in joint operations. Where joint training is especially critical is 

in the interface of the law enforcement teams and the EMS units. Emergency medical personnel are 

responsible for treating any EOD, SWAT team, or other law enforcement casualties. Generally, EMS 

personnel are not armed or trained in size up of a criminal scene. EMS providers also need to have 

rapid and safe access to civilian victims who require medical attention. 

Fire Service Operations in a Dynamic, Violent Environment

Fire and EMS personnel are beginning to face dangerous multi hazard environments where wanton 

violence, mass casualties, and explosive devices or other hazards are present. Because these types 

of incidents can happen anywhere and at any time, fire service managers should plan solutions to 

address these emerging risks. Issues to consider may include:
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

•	

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Training specialized fire department personnel (such as Hazmat technicians, paramedics, 

EOD personnel, or drivers) to know how the mission and tactics of special law enforcement 

units (such as SWAT teams or riot police) impact special fire/EMS operations. This is best 

accomplished through joint planning and training between law enforcement and fire and 

EMS services. Operational procedures should be documented and distributed to all involved 

personnel.

Determining what ballistics protection the fire/EMS personnel need, given their likely assignments, and securing this equipment in sufficient quantity to ensure that all personnel who 

will be in harm's way have appropriate protective equipment.

Deciding what means will be used to identify fire and EMS responders.

Promoting policies, practices, and protocols that foster use of a common jargon by fire service and law enforcement personnel with regard to the transmission of essential messages so 

that miscommunications are minimized.

Establishing a policy on whether and how to assign personnel with family members who are 

directly involved in the incident.

Determining what role or authority the incident commander should grant to experts (physicians, building engineers, etc.) who are called to the scene to assist, establishing a policy for 

handling outside experts who exceed their authority, and ensuring that they are cognizant of 

the ICS structure and operations.

In situations involving terrorist-style attacks, there is a possibility that the perpetrator(s) may set 

booby traps. Such exigencies present a dilemma for first responders in terms of treating the wounded 

prior to EOD personnel giving the "all clear". This threat raises the issue of whether and how long 

to wait for EOD personnel to confirm that wounded civilians or perpetrators are clear of secondary devices. At Columbine, several undetonated and partially detonated devices were strewn in and 

around the building. Public safety officials should consider such explosion risks when they develop 

response plans for casualty recovery in hostile environments.

Some fire departments manage the EOD unit. If the unit employs canines, it must be remembered 

that they cannot work effectively in atmosphere contaminated with a myriad of explosives, gunpowder, flammable liquids, and flammable gas vapors. Moreover, K-9's do not work a scene without 

their handlers, and in an ongoing violent situation they cannot be used until the area is clear. Since 

intelligence on the presence and type(s) of explosives and incendiaries may be needed before the 

"all clear" can be made, robotics may be a reasonable alternative, though even these devices may be 

impractical if the area of surveillance is "littered" with backpacks and other belongings.

At Columbine there was a serious situation with regard to mistaken identity. A fire department 

officer wearing a soot-covered turnout coat was in the process of setting up a helicopter-landing 

zone, when a law enforcement sniper was on the lookout for a suspect with a black trench coat, and 

identified the officer at long range as a potential suspect. The fire officer was ordered to the ground at 

gunpoint before he could explain who he was. A lesson that can be taken from this episode is the ICS 

command vests should be available and worn by all fire and EMS commanders so that their positions 

are readily identifiable at the emergency incident. Moreover, fire and medical personnel may need 

to remove dark shirts with badges and dark turnout clothing, and wear a fire department helmet to 

distinguish themselves from law enforcement personnel and identify themselves to citizens.
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 33

Communications

Effective communications are one of the most important parts of any emergency response. They 

are absolutely critical in large-scale incidents that draw resources from a large number of agencies. However, maintaining effective communications is especially challenging during such events. 

Columbine was no exception to this rule.

This incident provided several examples of effective communications:

• 

• 

• 

There was good communication between transporting EMS units and the receiving hospitals. All of the patients were transported to appropriate facilities without overwhelming any 

individual hospital, due in part to the use of an on-scene medical control physician and a 

dedicated hospital coordination radio frequency.

Dispatchers on the scene were able to assist in efforts to set up viable communications networks between sectors using a new 800 MHz radio system that was expediently placed into 

service at the scene.

The 800 –MHz radios, once put into service, provided much needed communications 

capabilities and flexibility for this incident. These systems offer one of the best solutions to 

interoperability challenges.

There were also problems:

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

The triage area at Yukon and Caley Streets was located in a virtual "dead zone", an area with 

very poor radio reception.

The dispatch center was besieged with cellular telephone calls related to the incident.

Responders did not receive routine updates on operations.

There was little capability for direct police-to-fire radio communication, which became more 

complicated as additional units from other jurisdictions arrived on the scene.

Not all the EMS units operating on the scene were able to use a common incident frequency 

since some units did not have access to FERN.

With a few exceptions, fire EMS, and law enforcement units had only limited ability to communicate with each other during the incident. Incompatible radio frequencies and a rapid 

buildup of cell phone usage overwhelmed both the nearest tower and the dispatch center, 

thus hampering operations. Emergency service providers were frustrated by the communications challenges, the apparent lack of reliable intelligence, and infrequent operations 

updates.

The National Institute of Justice conducted a study to determine the technology requirements of 

law enforcement to handle terrorist incidents.1 Interoperable communications technologies ranked 

high, and these apply to fire and EMS activities as well. Fire service units should have the ability to 

communicate with incoming fire units, EMS units (including aircraft), and law enforcement. EMS 

personnel should be able to contact medical control facilities, as well as other EMS units, fire units, 

and law enforcement. Encryption capabilities with handheld radios can enable secure communications of sensitive command decisions.

1

 Inventory of State and Local Law Enforcement Technology Needs to Combat Terrorism, “incident Command and Control 

Communications,” National Institute of Justice, January 1998.
34 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Several suggestions regarding communications can be derived from the experience at Columbine 

and should be considered in planning for future incidents.

• 

• 

• 

• 

The initial on-scene SWAT commander indicated that he high levels of noise from news 

helicopter hampered the ability to communicate. Flyover by unauthorized aircraft can compromise security and operations. Incident command should be aware that they can establish 

and enforce airspace restrictions through the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) per CFR, 

Title 14-Aeronautics and Space Chapter I-Part 91, Section 91.137.

Assigning dedicated radio channels to all special-function divisions-such as EMS, EOD, SWAT, 

rescue, and air operations – can enhance on-scene communications.

One of the best solutions to communication problems is to establish multiple statewide 

mutual-aid channels and to equip public safety responders with compatible radios. AS incidents require a Regional level response, the public safety agencies can more effectively communicate with each other. This interagency communication was done at Columbine through 

the CLEERS network operated by law enforcement. Another option is to operate through an 

800-MHz system.

Even at its best, communications during complex, multi-casualty incidents are likely to suffer 

instances of conflicting and unclear information. Also, telephone and cellular phone systems 

can be extremely taxed. Greater decision-making authority may need to be assigned to field 

crews, as was done at Columbine.

Emergency Medical Services

Littleton Fire Department EMS personnel rescued severely injured students while coming under 

fire from the perpetrators. Other EMS personnel triaged, treated, and transported many casualties, 

including over two dozen seriously injured individuals, all of whom survived. Following are some 

observations concerning EMS for future reference:

• 

• 

Emergency response agencies should develop multi hazard (e.g., armed perpetrators and 

explosive devices), multiple casualty incident (MCI) plans. Such plans should designate 

the roles and responsibilities of assigned positions and delineate casualty collection points 

(CCP's) so that victims from multiple venues can be systematically collected, treated, and 

transported. MCI plans also should stress the importance of using incident command vests 

and triage tags. Joint command and interoperable communication systems are two other 

essential components of multi hazard, multiple-casualty planning.

Develop an EMS supply cache system for both advanced life support (ALS) and basic life 

support (BLS) supplies at a local and Regional level, so that supplies can be rapidly acquired 

during a disaster. Supplies should be functionally grouped quantities and ready for field 

deployment. Many jurisdictions around the country have dedicated a trailer or vehicle strictly 

for mass casualty incidents. These specialty pieces often contain immobilization and bandaging supplies to treat 100 or more patients. To address emerging risks, these caches should 

be expanded to include the treatment of respiratory emergencies, possibly resulting from 

biological or chemical weapons; trauma resulting from weapons of mass destruction; and 

burns resulting from the detonation of explosive and incendiary devices.
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 35

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Had more explosive and incendiary devices activated, the incident could have substantially 

escalated and demanded significant burn care assets. If not already in place, States should 

work with their localities and the hospital community to establish protocols for triaging, 

treating, and transporting a large number of victims with burns, respiratory compromise, or 

exposure to hazardous materials.

Departments should consider developing standard policy guidelines for non-departmental 

personnel provided access to the scene. The guidelines should cover the extent and limitations of the assignee's jurisdiction, as well as reporting protocols, responsibilities, and mission limitations, consistent with operating under a joint incident command structure.

During a major incident, authorities should assign a medical air sector commander early in 

the incident to ensure that air ambulances can be requested quickly and staged at the scene 

(if possible), ready to conduct air evacuation of patients. Airspace restrictions should be 

applied if necessary.

When Regional hospital are linked with each other and with dispatch centers, as was the case 

at Columbine, EMS command can remained informed of what types of patients and how 

many each hospital can receive, to ensure appropriate transport assignments.

Fire and police chiefs should work together to familiarize their fire, EMS, police, and SWAT 

personnel with each other's operations. Operational readiness can be strengthened through 

joint training, coordinated procedures, and compatible equipment. Of particular importance 

is that fire, EMS and law enforcement personnel communicate using clear terminology that 

is commonly understood.

Operations

Several tactical interventions are suggested by the challenges presented at Columbine:

• 

• 

• 

• 

Forcible entry operations, such as the use of breaching and breaking tools, may be appropriate to provide access through walls, floors, roofs, and ceilings, when typical access points are 

compromised by booby traps or fields of hostile gunfire.

Commercial armored vehicles may be used to provide cover, help deploy personnel, or 

retrieve victims, while reducing the exposure of emergency service providers.

Technical rescue search teams and equipment (e.g., search cams, acoustic/seismic devices) 

might assist personnel when they are attempting to identify or locate victims or perpetrators 

– especially in confined spaces and structural voids.

Collapse rescue teams, rapid intervention teams, firefighter assist and research teams (FAST's), 

and backup teams may be needed in multiple casualty situations.

Additional Lessons

Several additional lessons were learned from Columbine:

• All commercial and public safety occupancies, including schools, should have a pre-fire/EMS 

plan, which should include a map of the exterior premises; a detailed map or schematic of 

the floor plan with room numbers and functions; contact numbers; fire protection system 

connections; locations of hazards, utility shutoffs, and alarm controls; and instructure communications systems/capabilities.
36 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

It is important to use situation and resource tracking sheets and to communicate vital information about the situation status and the arrival of expected resources down the chain of 

command.

Press areas staffed by public information officers should be established in locations that are 

remote from the incident command post and the operational and staging areas to avoid 

compromising security.

Site control and perimeter security should be among the very first actions taken, not only to 

keep sightseers out, but to control and coordinate incoming units and self-dispatched volunteers. After initial first-due assignment, a staging base should be established to help ensure that 

the rapid influx of resources does not block either access or egress of emergency apparatus. 

This can be accomplished by appointing a staging officer to work with law enforcement personnel in site control. Access and egress routes, as well as staging sites, should be designated 

for each type of resource requested (e.g., ambulances, command officer vehicles, armored 

vehicles, heavy equipment). Assigned routes and staging areas should be communicated to 

incoming resources in advance of their arrival, if possible. A plan should be developed and 

implemented for removing vehicles that obstruct access, and resources should be dedicated 

to carry out the plan, including staging area security.

Building inventory information (access, utility services, fire alarm, burglar alarm, etc.) should 

be made available on the exterior of the building (in a locked cabinet), or be provided in 

advance to the authorities having jurisdiction. Many fire departments use lock box building 

security systems to ensure access to the building and such information. For large buildings, 

it is a good idea to have lock boxes at each entrance.

When planning response to large-scale incidents, the authorities should determine what 

procedures should be followed to deal with individuals who exceed their authority. While 

their intent may be good, individuals who "freelance" at emergency scenes may aggravate 

the risks to themselves and to others by initiating actions that could conflict with incident 

command decisions. During this incident, the on-scene medical director entered the school 

to pronounce the dead against the orders of both the law enforcement and fire commands 

before the scene could be secured. Furthermore, he took three LFD paramedics into the 

school to assist him, thus endangering their lives as well.

Recalling personnel is expedited when command staff recall procedures are in place, which 

proved to be vital in getting a unified command system established at Columbine High 

School. Some methods that have proven effective for other fire departments include phone 

trees and calling lists, alphanumeric pagers, frequency-activated voice pagers, cellular telephones, and direct-connect, two-way radio feature phones.

As a part of preplanning for major incidents, fire departments should consider developing 

memorandums of understanding (MOU's) with public transportation resources (buses) to 

initiate diversion of these assets to the scene of an emergency. It is important that the MOU's 

establish priority of assignment so that other jurisdictions are not keying on the same public 

transit vehicles.

In escalating emergency incidents, a planning sector officer should be assigned. The role 

may differ among jurisdictions but should include documenting the situation and tracking 

resources, conducting planning meetings, providing incident maps, and developing a demobilization plan.
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 37

Technologies that Enhance Response

The lessons from Columbine cover a multitude of important issues for the fire service leaders to 

consider as they preplan joint command structures for potential criminal incidents with mass casualties. Some of the solutions relate to technology and how technological tools might have helped to 

mitigate the impact of and the problems associated with the massacre. Four technology areas deserve 

to be discussed:

• 

• 

• 

• 

Surveillance and security

Command, control, and communications (C3)

Detecting, disabling, and containing explosive devices

Intelligence

Surveillance and Security

Surveillance technology is an important tool for law enforcement, EOD personnel, and fire/rescue 

units. In the Columbine assault, many of the law enforcement and SWAT members who had to 

gain access to the inside of the school had only handwritten maps on which to rely as they negotiated their way into the hostile environment. Technology that literally allows officers to see through 

interior and exterior walls would have been invaluable in locating the assailants and the victims. 

The capability to see through walls remotely (at least 100 feet away) allows operations personnel to 

remain at a relatively safe distance from the violence. This technology allows one person to perform 

the surveillance and simultaneously transmit real-time images to the command post.

Other technology that applies to Columbine is the capability to identify explosive and incendiary 

devices. Not only did authorities have a hard time locating and tracking the suspects inside the 

building, but they also were challenged to locate the dozens of explosive and incendiary devices 

throughout the school.

Audio surveillance equipment, which allows officers to listen to conversations and activities within 

targeted areas from the safety of a secure area, would have aided in tracking the assailants. With audio 

surveillance capabilities, authorities may have been able to listen to the suspects' conversations or to 

secure intelligence from others inside the building. They would have had a means for hearing the 

cries of wounded students and for locating their positions inside the school. Digital photography 

was used at Columbine to brief investigative teams about the complexity and severity of the scene 

and to show incident command staff actual pictures of devices that the EOD team was having to 

render safe before other activities could take place. Some of the digital images were obtained through 

the use of an EOD robot.

The National Institute of Justice published a research report on security technologies for schools.2 

The Bureau of Justice Assistance, in collaboration with the International Association of Chiefs of 

Police, produced a valuable guide on school violence.3

2

The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in U.S. Schools, National Institute of Justice, September 1999 

(NCJ-178265).

3

Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence, Bureau of Justice Assistance and the Security Research Center of the 

Department of Defense, International Association of Chiefs of Police, November, 1999.
38 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Command, Control and Communications

Interagency communications are essential in any incident involving multiple agencies. The 

Columbine incident drew roughly 170 fire and EMS, and nearly 1,000 law enforcement personnel. 

Communications in such situations can easily become compromised and are, by nature, complex. It 

is essential that the incident commander have the ability to simultaneously broadcast to all participating agencies. In addition, the incident commander should have a management information system 

that can provide real-time data to track units and resources. An integrated mapping capability with 

the ability to superimpose unit locations is especially useful in incidents where many agencies are 

involved. A sophisticated management information system that allows the incident commander to 

track resources makes it easier to monitor ongoing operations and to discern what contingency 

resources are needed.

During an event of this magnitude, the incident command post needs sophisticated communications capabilities, including long-range digital radios (with encryption capability if necessary), 

secure faxes, photo faxes, and PC incident software. Such C3 technologies, when employed, facilitate 

interoperability among various agencies and allow the incident commander to control the scene in 

a more coordinated and efficient manner.

As valuable as the emerging C3 technologies are, most jurisdictions currently consider such equipment to be unaffordable. However, the Naval Research Laboratory has supported the development of 

crisis communications technology in a light tactical operations center called the joint combat information terminal (JCIT). Significant design emphasis has been placed on ensuring its ability to support 

horizontal technology insertion. The advanced digital and RF technology provides unprecedented 

connectivity and tactical information processing in a compact, modular, reconfigurable, open system 

architecture. Currently the New York City Emergency Preparedness Office, the Alexandria, Virginia 

Police Department, and the Chicago Fire Department are testing applications for civilian use.

Detection, Disablement, and Containment of Explosive Devices

The scene inside Columbine High was extremely hazardous to responding emergency personnel. 

Not only did the suspects have an array of weapons, including semiautomatic rifles, hand guns, and 

shotguns, but they also dispersed improvised incendiary and explosives devices that were imperfect, 

and therefore very unpredictable. 

The technology currently exists to employ robots with explosive ordnance disablement (EOD) capability. They can climb stairs and, in some cases, manipulate packages weighing up to 100 pounds. 

They have a remote viewing capability and can transmit real-time video to a command post. This 

technology was available at Columbine and proved to be extremely useful given the number of 

explosive devices. A robot with an EOD capability was used for render-safe operations on the two 

cars.
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 39

Intelligence

Intelligence provides the incident commander and first responders with pertinent data about an 

incident and assists them in making informed decisions. When responding units first arrived on the 

scene at the Columbine assault, they had little definitive intelligence upon which to rely. They did 

receive reports of possible multiple gunmen inside the building. Unfortunately, they had no way 

of knowing exactly how many perpetrators were involved, nor what type of arsenal they possessed. 

First responders had only basic information on the layout of the school and conflicting information 

on the suspects themselves. The prefire plans that some fire units did have were out of date. Had the 

aforementioned surveillance and detection technologies been available, intelligence from inside the 

building could have been gathered. The lack of intelligence data was exacerbated by the length of 

time it took to disseminate incoming information to personnel in the field. Maintaining an effective 

method to communicate intelligence data (location of suspects, background data on the suspects, 

number of suspects, appearance, etc.) to operations personnel is essential during chaotic and intense 

situations such as the Columbine incident.
40 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

AFTERMATH

Littleton, the surrounding jurisdictions, and the entire nation grieved after the tragic assault at 

Columbine High School. Soon after the incident, a makeshift shrine consisting of flowers, pictures, 

letters, and stuffed animals began at the school grounds and eventually extended to the adjoining 

public park, serving as a constant reminder of the tragedy for the citizens of the area and the Nation 

(Figure 18). Members of the fire and emergency service community were especially affected, both 

by the trauma of the immediate loss and the realization of the implications for the future.

Figure 18. Mourning the Loss
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 41

Following any major fire/rescue (and law enforcement) incident, there is an immediate need for 

affected personnel to have an outlet for understanding and processing their reactions to the event. 

Critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) is an important undertaking for the health and welfare 

of involved personnel. CISD not only gives the agency leadership the opportunity to discuss the 

operational aspects of the response but, more importantly, provides a forum where the department 

members can express their concerns and feelings about the incident and address their pain.

Terrorist-type incidents such as the one at Columbine by design tax the physical and emotional resources 

of even the most experienced and tenured rescuers. The Littleton Fire Department pursued numerous 

avenues designed to help the department as a whole and its members individually to heal from this 

tragedy.

This report focuses on the recovery activities of the Littleton Fire Department. Many other firefighters, paramedics, and law enforcement personnel from the Denver region responded on the call 

or filled in as mutual-aid companies. The post-incident recovery of these other personnel was not 

within the scope of this report.

The officers of the Littleton Fire Department deemed it their first priority “to attend to our own” and 

considered it appropriate and prudent that each department independently address the needs of its 

own personnel, rather than conduct large-scale, multi-organizational debriefings. In an attempt to 

make the debriefing sessions as beneficial as possible, the Littleton Chiefs thought that each department responding to Columbine should arrange and conduct its own (relatively smaller group) critical incident stress debriefing sessions.

During the incident, on-scene CISD was made available. Around 1700 hours, A-shift personnel began 

to be relieved of duty. Some of the firefighters initially resisted being sent home, wanting instead to 

see the shift through to its conclusion. However, it was later generally acknowledged that “standing 

down” was the right command decision for a number of reasons. Many personnel were physically 

and emotionally exhausted, and their families and friends needed reassurance about the welfare of 

A-shift personnel.

The Littleton Fire Chief, in retrospect, reported that before personnel are released from duty after a 

major incident, the department should make sure that the individuals will not be alone. Some personnel may wish to stay at the station and seek support in group activities; others may not have the 

friends or relatives who are immediately available to offer support. These personnel may prefer to 

stay at the station where they can find others to talk to and help them “decompress”. Such challenges 

should be expected, and the command cadre should maximize opportunities to address such needs 

through innovative peer support and counseling services, as appropriate.

Department personnel should also be alert to members “distancing themselves” from the group. 

Individuals who seem unusually quiet or withdrawn may be experiencing difficulty addressing and 

resolving their emotional reactions to the stress and trauma of the incident.

Such individuals may require special support. The challenges associated with the department’s operational and emotional recovery may place unprecedented demands on the command staff of the 

department as well.

A return to standard operational readiness will likely be achieved in short order, but the organization’s 

psychological recovery (return to normalcy) may be a protracted and complex process, drawing 

heavily on the strength and skills of the command staff. These personnel, in turn, may require train-
42 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

ing in grief counseling techniques and special leadership-focused stress debriefings and support.

The day after the tragedy, Wednesday, April 21, the department conducted an initial debriefing for 

personnel who responded to the incident. However, the counselor conducting the debriefing was 

too inexperienced to address the complexities of such a large-scale terrorist-type event and the 

attendant emotional trauma. These first formal counseling sessions did not go well, and many of the 

firefighters needed extra encouragement from senior officers to attend the debriefing sessions that 

followed.

One-on-one CISD support began five days after the initial group sessions. Following standard guidance on how to handle debriefings, the department worked with the staff in separate groups. For 

example, A-shift personnel were split into those who were directly involved and those who were not 

directly involved. B-shift, C-shift, and spouses formed three other groups. Except for the spouses, 

each group was scheduled for a debriefing with the chiefs and counselors and a walkthrough of the 

high school. Each group conducted critiques as well. While there is value in approaching the task in 

this manner, the Littleton Fire Department encountered a few problems.

The main disadvantage to creating these discrete groups was that, for the personnel who had not 

been on duty that day, or who had worked the incident from a remote location, the separate CISD 

sessions underscored the difference between those who were actively part of the emergency and 

those who were not. This sensitivity was later addressed by ensuring that all shifts had an opportunity to walk through the high school and participate in a general meeting with the chief officers of 

the department.

It also is important to gauge the effectiveness of the CISD sessions. This incident happened on A-shift, 

so those personnel needed immediate attention to address their emotional concerns. However, it is 

important to determine how the others shifts could be involved in post-incident stress interventions. 

B-shift relieved their A-shift colleagues and undoubtedly were affected by their outward stress and 

grieving. A balance should be sought in determining when to conduct and who to include in the 

debriefing sessions.

A 24-hour fire department shift schedule usually creates close interdepartmental relationships. Shift 

colleagues are the ones with whom personnel are likely to be most comfortable in expressing their 

emotions about the incident. Chief officers should recognize this dynamic and be attentive to maintaining the most suitable atmosphere for personnel to resolve their feelings. However, as Littleton 

leadership discovered, it is important not to create separatism among the staff. Senior fire officers 

should consider the respective benefits of mandatory debriefing sessions versus voluntary sessions 

in order to provide the most possible assistance for personnel. Every incident and the subsequent 

impact on personnel is different and uniquely complex. Direct communication with personnel will 

help to guide the chiefs as they pursue the best program.

The CISD process for the Littleton Fire Department encompassed days for some personnel while 

weeks and months were needed for others. Their experience shows that each person’s needs may be 

different. As a direct result of this incident, for example, one staff member needed time away from 

the job. The department accommodated the staff member’s needs, and the individual later returned 

to work. The fire department demonstrated its commitment to staff well being through supportive 

policies and programs for all its personnel as they sought to manage the stress resulting from the 

incident and the return to normal routines.
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 43

Post-Incident Events

On Sunday, April 25, 1999, 5 days after the massacre at Columbine High School, a memorial service 

was held to honor the deceased as well as the injured. While still dealing with the emotions from 

the incident, the Littleton Fire Department had secured coverage for the memorial service and for 

maintaining coverage in their response area. Eighteen teams of two medics each were deployed on 

bikes throughout the grounds of the memorial service. A number of golf carts were also used. Two 

tents and a fixed facility were equipped and staffed for medical emergencies. Three ambulances were 

available on the grounds for immediate transport, six more were in staging, and a helicopter was on 

standby. The South Metro Fire Department backfilled the Littleton Fire Station to ensure that fire protection remained intact for the citizens of Littleton. Approximately 35 paramedics from neighboring 

departments helped to provide medical coverage for the service. By day’s end, there had been only a 

few calls for assistance. Over 70,000 people, including the Vice President, attended the service.

The community memorial service provided not only an environment in which family and friends 

could grieve, but also an opportunity for the Littleton firefighters and paramedics to acknowledge 

their emotions. Twenty-two member of Littleton’s A-shift who responded to Columbine were seated 

together at the service and were recognized by speakers during the program. The outpouring of 

gratitude and compliments to all the public safety personnel who were involved helped ease their 

pain. However emotional trauma from an incident as significant as Columbine can not be erased by 

any single memorial service, counseling session, or critique. Responders must confront the issue not 

only as a team but also individually.

Two of the medics who transported a patient with gunshot wounds continued to visit her in the 

hospital until her release. Since some of the victims were paralyzed from the shootings, major lifestyle changes and renovations to their homes were necessary to facilitate a degree of independence. 

Littleton firefighters volunteered their time and effort to help with such renovations. Becoming 

actively involved in the victims’ recovery helped the firefighters with their own. The need to do 

something positive in response to tragedy contributes to the recovery process. Most people perform 

individual acts of kindness, or contribute in ways that generally go unnoticed. However, in the 

aftermath of this incident, one such effort was a group initiative that literally touched thousands. A 

number of Littleton firefighters collected the flowers that had been left at the impromptu memorial 

site near the high school. They dried the flowers in a hose drier at the station, packaged them as 

potpourri with ribbons in Columbine’s blue and white colors, and distributed the unique remembrances throughout the community.

Equally important as the formal CISD program in helping the responders cope with the aftermath 

of the incident was the peer support (such as that noted above) that was provided. The department 

held an internal awards ceremony where medals of valor, medals of distinction, and other recognition were awarded. Some of the department personnel have also been recognized at both the State 

and National level.

Overall, the department undertook a variety of means to assist personnel in their recovery from the 

shock and aftermath of Columbine. Time off was authorized as needed. The community’s support 

was acknowledged and made available. If it is indeed possible to bring closure to such a horrific 

incident, the memorial service, the counseling, and the awards ceremony helped the Littleton Fire 

Department and the community begin the process of healing.
44 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Conclusion

The wanton violence inflicted on the students and staff of Columbine High School, their families, 

the citizenry at large, and the members of the emergency services community who responded to the 

incident was a tragedy that no one could foresee. The senseless pain and loss visited upon all who 

were affected did not end with the close of the incident, the care provided the injured, the funerals for the victims, the poignant memorials, or the reopening of the school the following year. The 

impact of Columbine will be felt for a very long time.

Unfortunately, such violent incidents perpetrated against young, innocent victims have become all 

too frequent. “It can’t happen here” is happening here, and the emergency service providers who 

may next be called must be prepared for that possibility.

The Columbine incident, and similar acts of wanton violence, create a new dimension for emergency 

service provider roles and functions. Such events challenge the conventional strategies and tactics 

of fire and rescue agencies that normally operate with relative independence. Beyond the normal 

hazards experienced at fire/EMS incidents, large-scale, violent incidents present additional and unfamiliar risks to first responders. Generally, most fire/EMS agencies defer their direct involvement 

in hostile incident operations until law enforcement personnel can “secure” the area. In this incident, fire service and EMS providers were subjected to hostile and gunfire while retrieving seriously 

injured victims. In addition, undetonated incendiary and explosive devices were not discovered until 

personnel had been exposed to substantial risk. Such are the realities of the expanding operational 

environment of emergency service providers to terrorist-type emergencies.

Concurrent police, fire and EMS tactical operations necessitate joint incident command structures, 

robust interoperable communications capabilities, standardized operational practices, and multiagency exercises to promote and achieve an effective response. These lessons were not first learned at 

Columbine; they were, however, dramatically reinforced.
45

Appendices

A. Littleton Fire Department Area Response Map

B. Unified Incident Command Chart

C. Columbine High School Incident Timeline

D. Abbreviations an Acronyms

47

Appendix A

Littleton Fire Department 

Area Response Map

49

Appendix B

Unified Incident Command Chart

Unified Incident Command Chart

51

Appendix C

Columbine High School

Incident Timeline
52 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Columbine High School, Littleton, Colorado 

EMS Timeline

April 20, 1999

1115 Littleton Engine 13 is dispatched for explosion/brush fire at Chatfield and Wadsworth Streets. Device was diversionary explosive previously planted by suspects.

1119 Shootings and explosions begin at Columbine High. School’s fire alarm is sounding.

1130 Littleton Engine 11, Rescues 11 and 13, and Battalion Chief 1 are dispatched to Columbine High.

1133 R13 requests two more ambulances to staging; E11 requests that medical helicopter be placed on standby.

1137 R13 arrives at staging area (Weaver and Pierce Streets); Jefferson County Police enter south parking lot.

1138 BC1 arrives on scene and assumes command at Pierce and Fair Streets. Alternative fire ground channel

requested and Pierce Street ordered closed. One victim is down outside. E11’s officer detains athletes to assist in

containing students and separating students from possible shooters and injured and uninjured.

1140 Comm Center broadcasts warnings that suspects may be wearing long, black trench coats. There are reports of

victims with head, face and spinal injuries. E11’s officer orders LFD personnel to remove dark blue uniform shirt

and badge, reverting to their standard-issue gray T-shirts to differentiate themselves from police.

1140 West Metro Fire Department is on the air, moving into proximity of Littleton Fire District in anticipation of Littleton

calling for mutual aid.

1143 Units advised that there were explosives in cafeteria, in addition to more than one suspect.

1145 BC1 requests assistance from Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office in setting up unified command post. R11 sent to

Fair and Pierce Streets for a victim with gunshot wound to leg. R11 transports patient to Jay and Bowles Streets

where patient is transferred to Columbine Ambulance 5.

1146 Command staff call out.

1146 Chief 11 arrives on scene. Command post is set up at Pierce and Leawood Streets.

1152 Sprinkler system is activated in cafeteria. Off-duty battalion chief is called in to recall off-duty personnel.

1155 First patient is transported to Littleton Hospital by Columbine Ambulance 5.

1157 R11 and R13 are requested by SWAT officers to response to southwest parking lot for report of multiple victims

down. R11 and R13 are advised that scene is secure to proceed; SWAT team is “covering” the paramedics with

their guns aimed on the second floor of the library.

1158 C1 establishes unified command with law enforcement.

1159 Chief 1 (Littleton Fire Chief) is responding with assistant fire marshal and paramedic captain.

1202 Command authorizes E11 to be transferred to law enforcement to be used for cover as they approach school.

Windows of engine are covered with body armor, a SWAT team member is given a crash course on the operation

of the vehicle, and all medical equipment is removed from engine by LFD members.

1202 to

1205

R11 and R13 report they are “taking gunfire.” The police provide cover for them. Three patients are rescued from

area; a fourth victim is obviously dead.

1203 Jefferson County Sheriffs are transporting students from school to south end of Clement Park. Several ambulances are requested by Jefferson County Sheriffs; West Metro Fire Department engine and ambulance respond

to call from their staged location.

1204 Command requests that as many ambulances as possible stage at intersection of Pierce and Leawood.

1206 R13 stops at command post and transfers one critical patient to Denver Health ambulance, which transports

victim to Denver General Hospital. R13 and R11 transport other patients to Swedish Medical Center.

1208 Littleton Fire Stations are backfilled by mutual-aid companies.

1210 Yukon/Caley Triage Division/Sector is established. R18 establishes command of sector. Communication via radio

is limited. R18 is unable to contact Triage Sector for hospital assignment via the trauma-net hospital radio link.
USFA-TR-128/April 1999 53

Columbine High School, Littleton, Colorado 

EMS Timeline

April 20, 1999

1211 Shots are still being fired in and around school area.

1212 Littleton Training Chief 10 coordinates landing of medical helicopter east of Clement Park. Police sniper mistakes

Chief 10 for the gunmen and receives authorization by law command to shoot. Police approach C10 with weapons drawn, take him to the ground, and then realize his identity.

1213 Denver Truck 10 requests ambulance to middle of park; there is one patient on golf cart with gunshot wound.

American Medical Response handles request.

1218 Yukon/Caley Division requests 10 ambulances to assist with 11 patients – four critical, four serious, and three

stable patients – all students. One patient from Yukon/Caley is airlifted with gunshot wound to the head. Many

wounded students are transported to Yukon/Caley in police cruisers.

1219 E13 is dispatched to assist at Yukon/Caley and arrives at 1222.

1219 Medical supplies are being shuttled from Station 13 to Yukon/Caley by off-duty LFD captain.

1219 to

1223

Additional units arrive: West Metro Ambulances 10,12 and 13; Pride Mark Ambulance 106; and Rescue 101.

Secondary staging established at Bowles and Pierce.

1225 R18 transports student from Yukon/Caley with open chest wound to University Hospital.

1227 West Metro Ambulance 12 transports one patient to St. Anthony’s.

1228 Columbine Ambulance 7 transports one patient to Denver General Hospital.

1228 South Metro Chief arrives at Littleton Communication Center to direct operations for resource deployment.

1232 Off-duty Littleton firefighters/paramedics are called in to assist with station coverage.

1240 West Metro Ambulance 13 transports one patient to Littleton Hospital.

1241 IC requests second fire ground channel and a dispatcher from Littleton Communication Center. New 800-MHz

portables are placed in-service to link command sectors.

1242 Fire Task Force is established to provide fire suppression/ventilation in the event of a fire developing (Littleton and

West Metro Fire Departments). E16’s officer is in command of task force. Task force stages at Pierce and Coal

Mine; access to school would be through the main entrance.

1244 EMS units switched to Fire Emergency Response Network. Switching to this channel allowed mutual-aid companies and Littleton companies to all operate on the same frequency. Even still, not all mutual-aid companies had

access to FERN.

1246 All ambulances currently not in staging are instructed by command to stand by at Bowles and Wadsworth.

1252 Parents are advised that uninjured students could be met and released at Leawood Elementary School.

1256 Command requests FAA to clear airspace above school and Clement Park of news helicopters.

1258 Command requests spare radio batteries for on-scene portables and an update on the hospitals.

1311 Yukon/Caley sector reports that all patients have been transported.

1314 Red Cross representatives are en route to scene. LFD acquires bottled water from local stores to hydrate onscene personnel.

1321 Yukon/Caley sector requests additional supplies in anticipation of more patients.

1329 Jefferson County communication Center reports eight students and a teacher are injured inside the school.

1334 East Triage Division is established by R13 to treat victims as they are removed from the structure. A suspicious

backpack is found in their path, inside the east entrance. R13 is warned of the possibility of encountering motionsensitive detonators.

1342 Jefferson County Communication Center reports that all students must be treated as suspects as the shooters

may have changed clothes and could be trying to leave with the other students.
54 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Columbine High School, Littleton, Colorado 

EMS Timeline

April 20, 1999

1356 Command requests refueling services be dispatched to the scene.

1358 EMS units are dispatched to Leawood Elementary for a report of a heart attack.

1428 There are reports of multiple patients inside the school.

1429 E17, R18, and bomb squad are dispatched to one suspect’s home for a reported natural gas leak.

1440 R18 reports live explosives found at suspect’s home. Water supply is established, and radio use is suspended

on-scene until area is secured by bomb technicians.

1455 South Metro R37 arrives with replacement batteries for portables.

1457 West Triage Division is established with LFD captain assuming command of sector. Denver Health A12, West

Metro A15, and South Metro R35 are used to support SWAT operations and triage/treat victims in and around

school library.

1525 LFD captain on the scene at suspect’s home orders evacuation of surrounding homes.

1534 There are reports of more than 20 people injured in school. Other reports were also received indicating three

officers and two suspects down in school. Officer-down reports proved unfounded.

1537 EMS personnel from throughout Colorado call communication centers and begin arriving on-scene to assist after

hearing broadcasts of “all come” on radio and TV.

1541 Wounded teacher is found in library.

1543 There is a report of a possible gas leak in school ceramics room.

1544 There is a report of no other survivors.

1604 LFD personnel are cleared by law enforcement/SWAT teams to enter building and shut off school’s fire alarm and

main sprinkler valve.

1612 Command orders that off-duty battalion chief and B-shift personnel be brought into relieve A-shift personnel to

enable them to return to their families.

1635 Reports of shots fired in gymnasium force command officials to restrict utility companies from accessing rear of

structure to shut gas off to building.

1645 Denver Health physician and paramedics enter school to pronounce the dead.

1647 Yukon/Caley Division is dissolved.

1653 Mutual-aid ambulances are placed in-service by command.

1711 CISM team is requested for defusing/debriefing scheduled for 1830.

1716 B-shift personnel are called in to staff units. Training chief, E11 and R11 are deployed to northwest section of

school to detonate bombs found in and around the school.

1801 Member of SWAT team is transported to hospital for dehydration.

1836 Denver International Airport light trucks are called by Denver police to assist on the scene at Columbine.

1913 LFD Heavy Rescue 14 is repositioned on west side of school for lighting.

1934 C1 arrives at Denver Health for press conference.

2004 A-shift personnel are relieved from duty by B-shift personnel.

2123 All mutual- aid units are released to return to their districts.

2131 All crew changes are completed.

2240 Bomb detonates while being transferred to bomb disposal unit; one technician needs to be assessed for injuries.

2242 Southwest parking lot is declared an unsecured area; all fire/EMS personnel are advised to remain clear of area.

2353 All operations are turned over to LFD Training Chief 10 for bomb disposal.
55

Appendix D

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ALS advanced life support

AMR American Medical Response

BLS basic life support

C3 command, control and communications

CCP casualty collection point

CFR Code of Federal Regulation

CHS Columbine High School

CISD critical incident stress debriefing

CISM critical incident stress management

CLEER(S) Colorado Law Enforcement Radio (System)

EMS emergency medical services

EMT emergency medical technician

EOC emergency operations center

EOD explosive ordinance disposal, explosive ordnance disablement

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FAST firefighter assist and search team

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FERN Fire Emergency Radio Network (State of Colorado)

FM fire marshal

Hazmat hazardous materials

HEAR Hospital Emergency Administrative Radio (State of Colorado)

IC incident commander

ICS incident command system

IED improvised explosive device

JCIT joint combat information terminal
56 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

JCSD Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department

LFD Littleton Fire Department

LPD Littleton Police Department

MCI mass casualty incident

MHz megahertz

MOU memorandum of understanding

MPDS Medical Priority Dispatch System

PD police department

PIO public information officer

RSP render-safe procedures

SWAT specialized weapons and tactics

VHF very high frequency

WMD weapons of mass destruction